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**'NO TRUTH, NO APOCALYPSE':
DISMANTLING THE CULTURAL DYNAMICS OF NUCLEARISM
IN OFFICIAL AND NEWS DISCOURSE**

by

Stuart R. Allan, B.A.A., M.A.

**A dissertation submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

**Department of Sociology and Anthropology
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario**

30 September 1991

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in partial fulfilment of the requirements
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation aims to assist with the task of first identifying and then elaborating upon an emergent topic of inquiry for a critical media sociology informed by cultural studies research on language and ideology: namely, the cultural dynamics of nuclearism. Constitutive of the primary focus of this project are the very discursive configurations mobilized by institutional voices to mark or define the boundaries of the *changing, complex realities of Canada's national security in the nuclear age*. At stake, then, is the need to problematize for sustained analytical investigation the precise ideological effectivity of nuclearism. Specifically, the degree to which its materiality is contingent upon the evocation of appeals to *common sense* to displace or rule-out potential threats to the normative vocabulary it engenders to speak the 'strategic environment'. The dissertation proceeds to introduce an agenda for dismantling the preferred logics of nuclearism by seeking to explicate the prevailing relations of *naturalization* inscribed within Canadian defence policy documents (the 1971 and 1987 White Papers on National Defence, and the 1988-89 Defence Update) and how these relations are subsequently inflected and then re-articulated across the field of the Canadian daily press (the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star* from 1 January 1987 to 31 December 1989).

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This dissertation is dedicated to Cynthia Carter, with love.

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CHAPTER ONE:

MAPPING THE LINES OF INQUIRY

Introduction to Chapter One

The principal aim of this dissertation is to assist with the task of first identifying and then elaborating upon an emergent topic of inquiry for a critical media sociology informed by cultural studies research on language and ideology: namely, the cultural dynamics of nuclearism. Constitutive of the primary focus of this project are the very discursive configurations mobilized by institutional voices to mark or define the boundaries of the *changing, complex realities of Canada's national security in the nuclear age*. At stake, then, is the need to problematize for sustained analytical investigation the ideological effectivity of nuclearism. Specifically, the degree to which its materiality is contingent upon the evocation of appeals to *common sense* to displace or rule-out potential threats to the normative vocabulary it engenders to speak the 'strategic environment'. This dissertation will, in turn, proceed to introduce an agenda for dismantling the preferred logics of nuclearism by seeking to explicate the prevailing relations of *naturalization* inscribed within Canadian defence policy documents and how these relations are subsequently inflected and then re-articulated across the field of the daily press.

This study, in endeavouring to elaborate through concrete application a view to the ideological effectivity of nuclearism, will necessarily extend the initial conceptual formulation of this phenomenon outlined in the work of Lifton and Falk (1982). Their deployment of the term 'nuclearism' is intended to provide a name for what they consider to be the deformation of cultural beliefs and attitudes manifest in the current (globalized) psychological, political and military dependence on nuclear weapons. More precisely, for Lifton and Falk nuclearism is made to represent "the embrace of the weapon as a solution to a wide variety of human dilemmas, most ironically that of 'security'" (1982: IX). At the centre of nuclearism as an 'illusory structure', then, is a struggle for a sense of power over death. In this way, they contend, nuclear weapons have become a source of 'vitality' or 'salvation', even of 'symbolic immortality' (1982: 87, 95).

This dissertation undertakes a complementary effort by electing to prioritize for exploration the discursive terrain of nuclearism vis a vis a different set of heuristic strategies. Here it will be argued that by examining the authoritative procedures and mechanisms through which official and news discourse engender certain preferred ways to know the dictates of nuclearism, efforts to centre for purposes of critique the various mythic forms of depoliticized speech implicated in popular frames of intelligibility will be enhanced. To demonstrate how nuclearism can be

effectively theorized as a contradictory product of socially located meaning formations, or discourses, this dissertation commences with the task of tracing the re-articulation of official definitions of 'nuclear deterrence' as a legitimate means to counter the 'impending Soviet threat' to Canadian sovereignty and security into the popularized inflections of media common sense. It will be shown that it is across this field that configurations of difference, at once historical and material, translate into the mythic language of the reigning strategic rationale: *peace through strength, deterrence functions only if it is credible, and nuclear weapons have kept the peace.*

The conceptual approach advanced here thus may be situated vis a vis its attendant methodological framework, one that is informed by a set of analytical strategies first drawn and then subsequently refined from critical media sociology and cultural studies. Moreover, it borrows from linguistics, semiotics and discourse analysis to fashion a collection of tools to perform the work of explicating the fluid dynamics of nuclearism as it is embedded in systems of knowing actualized in official discourse and then routinely processed in news discourse. At issue is the need to push beyond earlier notions of a dominant ideology encapsulated within the narrow confines of a text, whether an official policy document or a news account, so as to directly confront the methodological dilemma of how to account for discursive closure around preferred ways to know the world.

In place of a zero-sum formulation of official censorship, propaganda or disinformation, then, this dissertation seeks to further a critical understanding of the shifting mechanisms working to hierarchicalize contending levels of meaning in official and news discourse. Accordingly, this project marks its point of departure with the question: how to account for the operation of rules of exclusion or prohibition (Foucault, 1972, 1971) as they ex-nominate (Barthes, 1973) or seemingly 'place beyond discourse' certain prevailing inflections of nuclearism so as to construct an appearance of incontestability and finality to the pertinent authoritative statements?

Made apparent will be the cultural dynamics of this struggle for power over the appropriation of meaning, in particular the appeals to rationality, reason, and morality mobilized by Canadian state officials to rationalize the competing logics of a national defence policy that relies on the threat of nuclear aggression to achieve its principal aim, that of 'global stability'. Component factors of this definitional conflict waged across the field of the daily press include efforts on the part of state officials to: first, invoke discursive strategies of affirmation for certain preferred semantic structures of *sovereignty* and *security* emergent from the national defence issue-field and, second, to reinforce the more subtle reifications of preferred ways of speaking a strategic rationale for new military capabilities within a Cold War binarism such that a

privileged appropriation of 'nuclear deterrence' as an operative construct may be achieved. It will be shown that the very unevenness, incongruity and disunity of the interpretive frameworks underpinning these official definitions can be highlighted once the language of news accounts is centred for critical analysis.

There is at present a growing literature on the nuclearization of language, *nukespeak* or nuclear discourse, much of which is located in the domain of linguistics. Underpinning much of this research is the contention that as a system of ideological configurations, discourses of nuclearism work to anchor preferred ways of speaking 'nuclear reality' upon the contested terrain of public discourse. That is, the official deployment of *nukespeak* represents a conscious attempt on the part of the state to legitimize the continued production and 'deployment' of nuclear weapons: it thereby constitutes a controlled response directed at potential threats to official rule. Often the primary focal point for this types of analysis is the terminology and grammatical constructions attributed to 'primary definers' (Hall et al, 1978) or 'authorized knowers' (Fishman, 1980) who are, in turn, likely to be positioned so as to facilitate the public dispersion of nuclear discourse. Generally, most formulations appear to revolve around a number of common linguistic elements or themes, the most prominent of which include the use of euphemism, jargon, modality, negativity, the non-realization

of agency, syntax and vocabulary to construct and reinforce a *neutralizing* language which serves to lend legitimacy to certain nuclearization processes. However, if efforts to provide an analytically precise definition of nukespeak and its effectivity are significant in number, they have consistently proven that the notion is an elusive one. [1]

This dissertation seeks to intervene into current conceptual debates surrounding 'nuclear discourse' or 'nukespeak' (Allan, 1989; Aubrey, 1982; Beedham, 1983; Boyer, 1985; Chilton, 1988, 1985a, 1985b, 1983, 1982; Cohn, 1987; Derrida, 1984; Hilgartner, Bell and O'Conner, 1982; Hook, 1985, 1984a, 1985b; Kauffman, 1989; Lapp, 1956; Lifton and Falk, 1982; Manoff, 1988; Merton, 1969; Montgomery, 1986a; Nash, 1980; Norris and Whitehouse, 1988; Schiappa, 1989; Thompson, 1980; Thornborrow, 1988; Van Belle and Claes, 1985; Williams, 1988); and its re-articulation in and through news media treatments of the related issue-fields (CCCS, 1982; Fowler and Marshall, 1985; GUMG, 1985; Hackett, forthcoming; Hodge, 1985; Knight, 1988; Kress, 1985a;

1 One of the earliest attempts to define the term *nukespeak* is found in the work of Hilgartner, Bell and O'Conner (1982). According to their formulation, *nukespeak* is "the language of the nuclear mindset - the world view, or system of beliefs - of nuclear developers. The word *mindset* means what it implies, a mind that is already set. A mindset acts like a filter, sorting information and perceptions, allowing some to be processed and some to be ignored, consciously or unconsciously. *Nukespeak* encodes the beliefs and assumptions of the nuclear mindset; the language and the mindset continuously reinforce each other" (Hilgartner, Bell and O'Conner, 1982: xiii).

McNair, 1988; O'Toole, 1985; Richardson, 1985; Rubin and Cummings, 1989); as well as its popular dispersal via other cultural forms (Angus and Cook, 1987; Bowd-Bowman, 1984; Brummett, 1989; Chernus, 1986; Deleuze and Guttari, 1986; de Kerckhove, 1984; Easlea, 1983; Foss and Littlejohn, 1986; Keen, 1986; Linenthal, 1990; Luckham, 1984; Moss, 1985b; Nelson, 1987; Pasquinelli, 1985; Ross, 1989; Smith, 1989; Weart, 1985).

A secondary task assigned to this dissertation is to contribute to the substantive refinement of the tools of discourse analysis for critical research in media sociology and cultural studies, a rapidly expanding area of interest within the respective domains (see, for example, Allor, 1987; Becker, 1984; Britton, 1988; Budd and Entman, 1990; Carey, 1985; Charland, 1990; Chevalier, 1990; Connell and Miles, 1985; Cross, 1988; Eagleton, 1991; Fairclough, 1989; Fowler, 1985; Fowler, Hodge, Kress, and Trew, 1979; Frow, 1986; Grossberg, 1986, 1984; Hall, 1988, 1985, 1982; Hardt, 1986; Harp, 1991; Harris, 1988; Hartley and Montgomery, 1985; Hodge and Kress, 1988, 1979; Hopper and Drummond, 1988; Jalbert, 1983; Knight, 1982; Kosir, 1988; Kress, 1986; Long, 1989; McKerrow, 1989; Murdock, 1989; Nelson and Grossberg, 1988; O'Conner, 1989; Palmer, 1990; Probyn, 1990; Richardson, 1987; Robinson and Straw, 1984; Said, 1983; Schudson, 1982; Schwichtenberg, 1989; Simpson, 1988; Sparks, 1977; Spivak, 1987; Stam, 1989; van Dijk, 1988, 1985; Weedon, Tolson and Mort, 1980; Willis and Corrigan, 1983).

Situating an Agenda

Cultural studies, having surfaced as a radical practice situated at an interdisciplinary site, may currently be identified as constituting a growing presence within the institutionalized discourses of critical media sociology. Given that the very desirability of demarcating an overall project for a media sociology informed by cultural studies is very much open to question on both epistemological and political grounds, for our purposes here perhaps it will suffice to claim that it is the latter perspective's interest in the way social divisions and hierarchies are rendered meaningful that best signifies the underlying basis upon which objects of analysis have often been located. More specifically, cultural studies theorists have concerned themselves with the precise means by which social forces, such as class, gender and race, are systematically naturalized and then inflected in mass cultural forms which ex-nominate those correlative inequalities ascribed to the determinate logics of capital reproduction and accumulation.

[2]

2 Sufficient care needs to be taken when using this notion of 'naturalization' so as to avoid *naturalizing* the actual conceptual term itself. That is, there is arguably nothing natural about this process of *naturalization*. Rather, given that certain aspects of the social world are routinely presented as existing in accordance with natural laws or logics (that is, their historical contingency is, often for strategic reasons, left unspoken), a critical discourse analysis may proceed with the task of explicating how this ideologi-

Characteristic of much of the work accomplished under the general rubric of cultural studies is an (often implicit) understanding that the term culture designates that terrain where the relations between levels or instances of the social formation (Althusser, 1962) and the relations between the (non-essential) human subject and the social imaginary (Lacan, 1977) are imbricated in the 'play of language'. Furthermore, this terrain is recognized as the primary site where hegemonic elements (Gramsci, 1971) are contested and reconfirmed through the consensual arrangement of an imaginary coherence on the social as a totality (the base/superstructure relation). The very social relations of domination are thereby translated into a language that ostensibly whispers 'but that's the way things are', 'our's is the best of all possible systems', or 'you simply can't change human nature'.

This dissertation may therefore be situated, in part, along a line of investigation initially sketched out by Louis Althusser to elucidate the very obviousness that language 'transparently' makes a word 'name a thing' or 'have a meaning'. At this point in time, it should be noted, both the post-Althusserians and their critics appear

cal effectivity is accomplished such that it appears to be a matter of 'common sense'. However, this work must acknowledge from the outset, first, that processes of *naturalization* are always compromised to varying degrees (at times through ironic self-awareness), and second, that the deconstructive project is itself conditioned by social determinants! (see Chevalier, 1990; Eagleton, 1991; Sloterdijk, 1987).

to be in general agreement that this 'ideological effect' needs to be examined in a manner which avoids positing the meaning of a word as existing 'in itself' for the human subject to then 'decode' or, equally inappropriate, holding that the word can somehow be analyzed prior to the variable (secondary) non-discursive determinations shaping its 'essential properties'. It is precisely at this juncture that several of the most serious difficulties with this approach have arisen. For while Althusser himself appeared to be posing the right questions, the provisional nature of his answers is such that they have eluded rigorous application.

Indeed, the current recasting of Althusserian precepts in much cultural studies research is largely organized around a declared strategy to secure in these formulations not a practicable definition of operative conceptual categories, but rather a methodological guideline. For the issues pertinent to this dissertation, a key problem concerns the need to establish an epistemological basis for a critical discourse analysis of nuclearism without sacrificing this crucial emphasis on the role of ideology in the constitution of the individual's *lived experience* under hegemonic social relations and, moreover, its re-articulation *vis a vis* sites of hegemonic struggle (of which the media are one) dispersed across the social. This mode of inquiry, in recognizing nuclearism as a terrain of discursive contestation, and not simply the product of

fixed, class-ascribed ideologies, thus follows Althusser's break from earlier notions of 'true' or 'false' consciousness. [3]

As many commentators have pointed out, one of the most perplexing aspects of this type of work is the absence of an elaborated stance regarding the possibilities for the realization of a resistant or counter-hegemonic politic at the level of the text-subject encounter. That is, how to succeed in making common sense uncommon? More often than not, I would argue, Althusserian categories are being deployed within cultural studies in such a way as to render indistinct the imbrication of language with the conditions (institutional sites) of its use, thereby making it much more difficult to theorize the production of a particular range of (tendential) subject positions in relation to the movement of discursive formations. Alarminglly, the resultant claims are frequently made to rest on vague references to the manipulative practices of Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs), while for others 'misrecognition' comes to stand in for the terrain formerly marked off as, once again, 'false consciousness'.

3 Very briefly, critical discourse analysis differs from 'discourse analysis proper' primarily due to its affirmation of the postulate that language is an integral part of the social process (thus the 'language' and 'society' dichotomy indicative of certain forms of sociolinguistics collapses) and, as such, is implicated in the prevailing relations of power and resistance traversing the cultural field (see Allor, 1990; Charland, 1990; Fairclough, 1989; Frow, 1986; Hodge and Kress, 1988; McKerrow, 1989; Montgomery, 1986; Thompson, 1986).

This when Althusser was at considerable pains to show how it is that this ideological misrecognition is unavoidable: there is no 'true' consciousness floating about in limbo. Much recent research has elected to offer a general appeal to 'internalization' as a notion to fill in the conceptual gap, rather than beginning with the ISA-interpellation dynamic and thus the problem of how to account for the procedures through which the 'dominant' or 'preferred' terms and definitions of 'ruling' ideologies are ultimately translated as natural or inevitable. A key dimension sacrificed in this shift is the ability to trace the concrete trajectory of the sign's multi-accentuality (Bakhtin/Volosinov, 1973) for the explicit purpose of identifying both possible and actual points of discontinuity and rupture across the field of hegemonic articulations.

Accordingly, the assertion that 'ruling ideas' are dominant simply by virtue of their correlation to the economic structure alone will be dismissed as conceptually inadequate. Rather, in endeavoring to scrutinize the sign's capacity to signify more than one meaning (depending on the circumstance of its use), greater attention needs to be focused on this notion of 'internalization'. Notably absent from Althusser's formulation of the ISA-interpellation link is a strategic understanding of the linguistic mechanisms working to produce terms of address for the subject as it negotiates possible identifications with a reality 'out there'. That said, however, Althusser is at least pinpoint-

ing the need to account for the mechanisms of identification at play in the text, a dilemma which other theorists have often chosen to sidestep.

Hence this dissertation's attempt to address the very site where 'the politics of the signifier' (Lacan, 1977) configure to regulate the conditions of existence and possibility of textual meaning. In methodological terms, then, this project recognizes the historical embeddedness of the news media's symbolic power as they categorize 'official realities' in and through a wider range of possible antagonisms than could ever be resolved through the mechanisms of economic determinism alone. Consequently, it will affirm a view to hegemonic relations where the meaning of signifiers such as 'security', 'deterrence', 'democracy', 'freedom' or 'peace' may ultimately be re-articulated in a different way due to a lack of fixity (a theme taken-up in Chapter Four's discussion). The argument will be made that once an ontological primacy for the implication of class interests in media power as the origin of the articulation of subjectivity has been displaced, other disparate forms of ideological relations traversing the field of the daily press may subsequently be theorized as they seek to inscribe the reader in a plurality of (contradictory) discursive positions.

Hence the attempt here to supplement earlier critical approaches mobilized to address the cultural dynamics of nuclearism, particularly those which were strictly limited to interrogating the prevailing modes of 'dominant ideology'

reproducing the economic structure ('the real foundation'). This new project, in seeking to prioritize for investigation the very cultural meanings of the power relations in which nuclearism is embedded, hereby elects to initiate a turn to evaluate and refine through application the 'tools' on offer via the respective domains of linguistics, semiotics and discourse analysis.

The Play of Language

In his exploratory article "What is Cultural Studies Anyway?," Johnson (1987) likens linguistics to a 'positive treasure-chest for cultural analysis', one just now beginning to emerge from its burial in the grounds of a 'heightened technical mystique and academic professionalism' (1987: 59). It is perhaps not surprising that practitioners of cultural studies have been wary of linguistics given, firstly, its claims to an explanatory autonomy or scientificity, and secondly, its tendencies to an ahistorical formalism. Reservations as serious as these ones, after all, contributed to cultural studies adopting from the outset a Saussurean variant of semiotics when grappling with the materiality of the linguistic component of cultural phenomena.

Semiotics, unlike much of the linguistic theory in circulation at that time in Britain and North America, could offer a refined analytical vocabulary for speaking precisely

about the effectivity of language use. Indeed, by its very conceptual project, semiotics cracked open the foundations of approaches which reduced language to a 'neutral' instrument through which 'reality' is expressed. In foregrounding the arbitrary nature of the signifying fields in everyday life, it invited fascinating new ways to think through the Williamsian maxim that what was at stake for cultural theory was the investigation of the complex of patterned relationships between elements of culture as *a whole way of life* (Williams, 1961: 63). Moreover, semiotics allowed for the opening up of what had become a rather empty postulate, namely that culture is inherently meaningful, so as to unpack the transparency or naturalness of real meanings rooted in practical social experience.

As has been well documented, however, ensuing attempts over the past two decades to re-centre the domain of cultural studies so as to make better use of this reflexive set of methodologies have culminated today in an acute crisis: how to define the limits of language? Is there a world outside of the text? Where does non-discursive reality end and language begin? Clearly, in some hands, the tools of semiotics have been wielded in such a way as to reify a view of language process antithetical to a critical understanding of the linguistic object. This is particularly so where language has become divorced from its materiality (often re-defined, after Foucault, as the rules regarding the possibilities of use/re-use), thereby effacing

from the purview of study the very historical conditions of its existence.

In some cases, this impasse has stemmed from a reluctance to re-work certain idealist presuppositions underpinning Saussure's own formulations, the resulting theoretical commitments usually engendering a reductive division between 'form' and 'content'. That said, even those theorists who have endeavored to secure a symptomatic reading of Saussure's work frequently fall victim to the economistic trap of asserting that the declared limits of language are strictly determined vis a vis the prefigured needs of a society organized to reproduce a specific arrangement of power relations. Semiotics is then held to blame for ostensibly allowing a rigidly functionalist view to the power dynamic to creep into the resulting conceptual frames. Hence one possible explanation for the increasing number of researchers currently shifting their attention away from semiotics in favour of linguistic frameworks in general, and those of discourse analysis in particular, is directly tied to this problem of accounting for contradiction, and thus struggle, in the 'enfolding and unfolding of the sign' (Chevalier, 1990).

Other possible explanations for this enhancement of interest in the concepts and categories of discourse analysis, in addition to the aforementioned difficulties associated with rendering Althusserian notions of ideology into operative concepts (Althusser 1971; 1969), range from, on

the one hand, the loss of linguistic specificity in the alternative categories borrowed from Foucault's work on the enunciative function of statements (Foucault, 1972, 1971; see Chapter Four's evaluation) to, on the other hand, the growing prevalence of postmodernist arguments that the term 'discourse' be purposefully stretched so as to encompass processes formerly identified as falling under the regions of representation, ideology and signification respectively. For cultural studies practitioners unwilling to allow the term's sharp edge to be blunted, yet forced to concede that no suitable alternative avenue is immediately available, a provisional step is often advocated: namely, that the social factors that determine the meaning of any given utterance simply be recognized as *dialectical*.

This maneuver is, of course, far from satisfactory, but will a turn to discourse analysis eventually reward cultural studies with the requisite means to explicate the materiality of discursive processes? The answer is certainly open to question, particularly given that a number of serious difficulties associated with the 'borrowing' of concepts will first have to be surmounted. Still, it will be shown that a critical discourse analysis holds significant promise as a means to reconstruct the problem of the consensual nature of meaning anew and in a much more elaborate fashion.

The next, concluding section of this introductory chapter, will briefly overview the dissertation's case study

(Chapters Five and Six) by commenting on its structure and key constituent elements.

The Cultural Dynamics of Nuclearism

A world poised on the brink of a nuclear exchange is officially declared to be both necessary and desirable if global stability is to be maintained. Here the declaration of a winnable or limited conflict is euphemized as pushing the button, pulling the nuclear trigger or making the ultimate decision. After thinking the unthinkable, a flexible response may then be set into motion (where the three Rs of winning are reload, re-constitution and refire) with the effect that their soft targets may be removed with clean, surgical strikes. Precisely what yield the nuclear footprint will have when a target of opportunity is neutralized, however, depends upon the success radius of the collateral damage. Consequently, the superpowers, while expressly denying their intention to sustain the arms build up, must continue to demonstrate their need to uphold the ability to wage war through the constant modernization of their forces. The strategic umbrella, after all, has protected the benign pre-SIOP environment ever since the threat of their first-strike capability for the survivability of our delivery systems became official. [4]

4 At this point in time, only the governments of five countries will officially acknowledge ownership of nuclear weapons: the Soviet Union, the United States, France,

Chapter Five, the first part of the dissertation's case study, explores the cultural dynamics of nuclearism inscribed within official discourse. Three texts produced by the Department of National Defence: specifically, the 1971 White Paper, *Defence in the 70s*, the 1987 White Paper, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*, and the 1988-89 *Defence Update*, will undergo a critical discourse analysis. The conceptual framework mobilized here, having been formally introduced over the course of the previous chapter's discussion, is partly based on the precept that as official texts, these documents are constitutive of determinate relations of state power. However, the line of inquiry to be opened up here will look to problematize the assertion, often advanced in work of this nature, that state documents such as these ones be read as simple manifestations of the class interests of elite power groupings seeking to facilitate the smooth reproduction of Cold War ideology.

Similarly, this chapter advances the postulate that to acknowledge the concrete situation of an official document

Britain and China. National governments which, according to published expert opinion, are regarded as being in possession of 'nuclear devices' are: Israel, India, Pakistan and South Africa. At least six countries are widely perceived to be in the process of developing nuclear weapons: Iran, Iraq, Algeria, Libya, Taiwan and, most recently, North Korea. Both Argentina and Brazil have initiated nuclear weapons projects, but recently agreed to halt (at least temporarily) further development of the related technologies (see Langille, 1990; Malcolmson, 1990; Semler, Benjamin and Gross, 1987; Stephenson and Weal, 1985).

such as a white paper as a text produced vis a vis the materialized practices characteristic of the institutional sites making up the Department of National Defence is, at the same time, to affirm that the effectivity of these practices for the finished product can not be determined in advance. That is, analysis must foreground the precise means by which these practices are articulated in a particular instance, and not simply declare that, given the location of this institutional dynamic within the state, the text's mode of signification is prefigured. At the same time, analysis can not rest on the assertion that a genuine plurality of discursive outcomes are possible at any given moment. Rather, by grappling with the question of state power, the contours of the contradictory, uneven articulation of the text's institutional conditions of production with its conditions of existence can be disclosed for critique.

The 1987 White Paper on National Defence commands the largest share of this investigation, since - despite the official concession that the Cold War is now over - government ministers continue to insist that this document be recognized as the 'blueprint' for an indigenous policy. Critics are quick to point out, however, that in the wake of several severe spending cuts, commencing with the April 1989 federal budget which dismissed several of the key elements of the 'modernization' plan in light of the 'new fiscal reality', Canadian defence policy is in disarray. Rumours nevertheless persist that a (non-nuclear powered) 'submarine

option' continues to be regarded as viable, even in the face of the severe 'scaling-down' of financial resources available for the Canadian Forces. Moreover, there is little evidence that the recent spending cuts have in any way problematized the state's commitment to a doctrine of 'nuclear deterrence'. Rather, the central organizing imperatives of nuclearism continue to underpin the official formulation of Canadian sovereignty and security in the 'post-Cold War era'.

This chapter's analysis, in attempting to specify the very conditions of existence and possibility of the official texts, that is, their embeddedness in common sensical explanations of, for example, the realities of 'security in the nuclear age', will explicate several of the key discursive strategies rehearsed on their pages. An emphasis is thus placed on those structuring devices utilized to achieve ascendancy for the official definition of 'the Soviet threat' to 'our way of life' precisely as its historical contingency is ex-nominated or seemingly placed 'outside of discourse' as 'too obvious to be spoken'. In this way, the imperatives of the text, its specific features or patterns of regularity, may be theorized as operating within a certain arrangement of rules or limits. If it is beyond the scope of this analysis to ascertain exactly how the materiality of state practices conditions the internal form of the text's signification, we can nevertheless seek to identify the traces of this struggle as they mark the text's surface.

Chapter Six, the second portion of the case study, is organized to examine the daily press treatment of the 1987 Defence White Paper's denouement: specifically, from the initial 'news leaks' regarding its possible component elements, to its formal release in the House of Commons on 5 June 1987, and up to and beyond the April 1989 federal budget when, as noted, under the rubric of 'deficit trimming' most of the spending commitments implied in the document were cast aside. The 'debate' manufactured by the daily press over a policy calling for the imposition of drastic measures to increase the size and 'readiness' of Canada's military forces, including the acquisition of a fleet of nuclear-powered 'hunter-killer' submarines for the Canadian Navy to counter 'the Soviet threat' to 'our sovereignty and security', provides a fascinating opportunity to investigate one instance of the popular dispersal of nuclearism.

This chapter looks to develop and extend the previous one's interrogation of nuclearism and its embeddedness in the very taken-for-grantedness of the White Paper's mode of argument by attempting, in part, to elucidate the extent to which official control over topic parameters is successfully actualized within news and editorial accounts published by the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star* from 1 January 1987 to 31 December 1989. As will be argued, when examining news accounts published in the daily press it is important to emphasize from the outset that each item constitutes one

part of a larger commodity manufactured by an organization whose declared aim is to make a financial profit while, at the same time, being 'responsible with the truth'.

In thinking of news as discourse, then, this section of the case study challenges certain key assumptions usually associated with conventional research on the social reproduction of news. In this way, it marks a point of departure from those studies which continue to revolve around a notion of partisan bias, thereby implying that the political or ideological role of the news media can be reduced to formal questions of balance, impartiality, or objectivity. By prioritizing for critique the materiality of news discourse, analysis may effectively address the common sense of nuclearism as it is (provisionally) inscribed across the field of voices organized to 'speak the facts'. The case study will therefore further refine the project, to be initiated in Chapter Two, to map out the contours of a practicable approach to theorizing the complex dynamics of media power, one which seeks to recast the postulate that ruling class ideologies are realized epiphenomenally within textual forms.

Accordingly, in recognizing that the patterns of bureaucratic logics manifest in news production will vary from news organization to news organization, a critical discourse analysis may commence by prioritizing the individual inflections of the array of institutional definitions known as news values (see Fishman, 1980; Galtung and Ruge,

1981; Gans, 1979; Hall et al, 1978; Hartley, 1982; Herman and Chomsky, 1980; Roshco, 1975; Schlesinger, 1990; Tuchman, 1978; van Dijk, 1988). As will be shown, the ongoing determination of precisely which of the myriad of occurrences concerning the White Paper will be constructed as a 'news event', and how its newsworthiness will be textually negotiated, is directly linked to a judgment of value: what Hall (1981) calls the 'unstated and unstatable criteria of the significant' (1981: 148). This routine assignment of news salience depends, in turn, on an extensive range of evaluative assumptions about what will be of general interest to the news audience. As described in the next chapter, a news outlet's staff members are guided by a series of professional ideologies which, in turn, structure key bureaucratic formulations about what is and what is not important to know: these regimes become a 'surrogate for the unreachable public' (Rock, 1981; Chibnall, 1977; Ericson, Baranek, and Chan, 1987; Fejes, 1984; Jensen, 1986; Kress, 1986; Moores, 1990; Morley, 1980; Steiner, 1988). This notion of 'surrogacy' underlines what newswriters will often describe as a 'sense' of what constitutes 'proper news', a professional 'instinct' or 'gut feeling' (the product, in part, of both occupational training and the 'news philosophy' of their news organization) which helps to orient or 'cue in' him or her to those occurrences potentially renderable into 'factual', 'impartial' news accounts.

Commencing with the next chapter's discussion of the dynamics of media power, then, this project begins the task of outlining the rudimentary elements of what will later be synthesized in Chapters Three and Four as the framework for critical discourse analysis to be employed in the dissertation's case study.

CHAPTER TWO: INFLECTING FACTICITY: THE LIMITS OF NEWSWORTHINESS

Introduction to Chapter Two

Members of the Canadian public frequently speak out about the quality of the individual news media products on offer to them, and as televised forums, radio talk-shows and the 'letters to the editor' found in the daily and weekly press consistently indicate, opinions vary dramatically regarding the extent to which journalists function as detached, impartial and objective recorders of the world around us. Still, there is nevertheless considerable evidence that these institutions are generally regarded as performing in an adequate fashion the crucial work of contributing to the 'system of checks and balances' popularly held to be representative of democratic structures and processes. Indeed, there appears to be a widespread consensus that the news media, as 'arenas of arbitration', allow for clashes over decision-making to be expressed, adjudicated and ultimately reconciled in such a way as to ensure that neither cumulative nor continuous influence is accorded to a single set of interests. These custodians of conscience, as the clarion voices of the otherwise silent majority, are formally charged with the responsibility of

lending comfort to the afflicted while, at the same time, afflicting those who are most comfortable. [1]

An organizing assumption underpinning much of the research on the popular dispersal of nuclearism, however, is that to the extent that ordinary citizens participate in the cultural reproduction of its logics, they do so in a passive, vicarious manner. The very legitimacy of the structures and processes of the nuclear state is often viewed, in this research, as being contingent upon a depoliticized or politically inert public willing to provide its tacit ideological consent. If, then, as Malcolmson (1985) argues, the language of nuclear politics is 'warped'; that is, it is "consciously reworked and reshaped by powerful interests to discourage awkward questions and to help put people's minds at ease" (1985: 108), the question of how

1 Most Canadians hold reporters and news organizations in high regard, according to the results of the most recent Maclean's/Decima opinion poll, based on 1,500 interviews conducted with a representative national sample of Canadian residents 18 years or older in all 10 provinces. Approximately two-thirds of the respondents said that, in their view, journalists do their work accurately (11 percent said 'very accurate'; 56 percent said 'somewhat accurate'; 24 percent said 'not very accurate'; 7 percent said 'not accurate at all'; 2 percent did not respond). Interestingly, 53 percent of respondents stated that members of the media report on events from an 'objective viewpoint', while the rest were split evenly between those who detected a 'left-wing bias' and those who perceived a 'right-wing bias' (both registered at 19 percent). Finally, 72 percent of respondents declared that the media reports help them to understand 'events', while 27 percent said that reports confuse them. These results, having been rounded off to the nearest whole number, are defined as being accurate within a range of 2.6 percentage points, above or below the figures given, 19 times out of 20 (see Maclean's, 7 January 1991, Vol. 104, No. 1, pp.10-43).

the news media are implicated in this warping process is of central importance. Accordingly, sustained efforts have been undertaken to dismantle the deceptive facade of a democratic media system so as to establish, in turn, the basis for a rigorous accounting of the mechanisms in and through which this quiescent public is routinely reproduced by the news media in the name of 'national defence'.

The aim of this chapter is to centre for discussion attempts to rethink the means by which these ruling inflections of consensus, order and regimentation are embedded within the routinized practices of producing news texts as commodities to be sold in the ideological marketplace. What follows is an evaluative assessment of the relative merits of competing critical media research strategies, one that is organized to assist the process of defining the principal contours of the approach to news media power to be advanced in the dissertation's case study (Chapters Five and Six). Thus, in seeking to secure a new line of critique, this chapter looks to problematize the very conditions upon which the key debates over the dynamics of news media power have come to be situated at this point in time.

Most certainly, many of the questions considered characteristic of a radical political economy directed to the elucidation of competing notions of effectivity, such as: how to demarcate the exercise of news media power 'empirically'?; how is this power, and the heterogeneous material interests implicated within it, linked to news

media ownership structures?; to what extent are news media autonomous from the state?; or, lastly, how to quantify the news media's specificity within civil society?, can assume fascinating new dimensions once certain limitations indicative of the classical formulations are challenged. Here it will be argued that the very concept of news media power needs to be reconfigured. At stake is the necessity of fully accentuating the symbolic capacity of the news media as a centralized source of the prescriptive codes or rules organizing the promulgation and regulation of the very common sense of nuclearism within a 'web of facticity'.

Before assessing several of the more pronounced implications of this methodological shift for the dissertation's object of inquiry, however, it is imperative that the conceptual lineage of the pertinent analytical frameworks be privileged for discussion so as to position the research agenda. To this end, the primary elements of the Marxist exposition on the pluralist stance will be briefly reviewed and critiqued, and then followed by an examination of the instrumentalist branch of political economy (see, for example, Clement, 1977, 1975; Droge, 1983; Garnham, 1979; Golding and Murdock, 1979; Herman and Chomsky, 1986; Hund, 1983; Hund and Kirchhoff-Hund, 1983; Kreimeier, 1983; Lebowitz, 1986; Mattelart, 1978; Miliband, 1977, 1976; Mosco, 1989; Mosco and Herman, 1980; Murdock and Golding, 1977; Negt and Kluge, 1983; Prokop, 1983; Schiller, 1986, 1973; Smythe, 1981, 1977; Westergaard, 1977). Next, the

focus expands to consider the main components of the structuralist branch: specifically, structural Marxism and its approach to media institutions as ideological state apparatuses (or ISAs). The apposite writings of Althusser (1990, 1979, 1976, 1971), Pecheux (1982), and Poulantzas (1978, 1975, 1974, 1973) shall be used as exemplars of this research.

This chapter then proceeds to consider a series of investigations into how news as a determinant form of discourse is enmeshed in the social organization of newswork. For the purposes of the case study, it is necessary at this point to elucidate how news discourse may be set in relation to the mechanisms characteristic of the formal conventions of newswork as a set of institutionalized discursive practices. Thus by confirming, in general, how routinized assumptions about newsworthiness are operationalized into natural or obvious constructions of 'official reality', often at the expense of alternative articulations, it will be possible in the course of the case study to document a concrete instance of the textual features of these processes as they lend shape to the cultural dynamics of nuclearism.

Problems of Control and Allocation

The principal tenets of the liberal-pluralist approach to media sociology, still the major strand of the related

research in Canada, are well known, and hardly require prolonged discussion here. In looking to illuminate the distinctive characteristics of a radical political economy, however, a brief overview of the means by which this particular formation has been interrogated is in order. Beginning with the basic precepts of the pluralist model, it is evident that at its most general level the question of 'nuclear politics' would be framed in relation to problems of allocation (power is diffused and situational). Given that the political realm is said to possess its own internal laws, rules and pressures, it is regarded as standing autonomous from, yet responsive to, the economic domain. Following this conception of economic power as being 'slack' and fragmented is a concomitant view of civil society as the social sphere where various groups of individuals, each with competing agendas and objectives, engage in a harmonious struggle (resources are inclusively distributed) to realize respective interests, largely through coalition building.

Much of the Marxist criticism of the pluralist model has organized itself around two interrelated dynamics: first, the functionality the pluralists ascribe to news media processes and practices, and second, their application of an empiricist view to power relations. In terms of the initial point, the maintenance and reinforcement of a social consensus is considered by pluralists to be a crucial element, one directly attributive to the news media's capacity to sustain (in most instances) a core value system. If

the consensual foundation of civil society remains a complex, structured process of social legitimation, one difficult to distinguish analytically, most advocates still insist that democratic forms of government are generally well served by the 'plurality of viewpoints' articulated by the news media.

Moreover, the claim is often advanced that the news media, beyond providing reasonably balanced information and diversity of interpretation about public affairs, also function to preserve established authority relations, reduce social tension, assist in the formation of publics, integrate and socialize people into an evolving society, promote normative behavior patterns, and help to mobilize support for societal objectives in the national interest, especially during times of crisis (see Gitlin, 1978; Hardt, 1986; Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1948; McQuail, 1983). Significantly, then, as Hall (1982) contends, the news media are regarded as being expressive of an achieved consensus, and "since the consensus [is] a 'good thing', those reinforcing effects of the media [are] given a benign and positive reading" (1982: 61).

The question then arises, with respect to this last point, as to how to concretize the pluralist model's conception of media power relations. Often in citing the government as the primary source of external constraints on the media, pluralists are suggesting that the media/state relation be regarded as a symbiotic one. Much is made of the

apparent mutual dependency: the media rely upon the government for news material (the 'hard facts', access to public figures, expert opinion), while the government, in turn, requires the media to deploy the official definition concerning issues and decisions salient to it for public support. Pluralists insist, as Curran, Gurevitch, and Woollacott (1982) point out, that this capacity to 'deliver' large audiences provides media organizations with an important degree of autonomy: "the implication is not that an equality of power [is obtained] between the media and other powerful organizations, but rather that some measure of independent power enters into the dealings of the media with these institutions" (1982: 21). If willing to concede that political resources are unequally distributed, or that certain social divisions do persist, pluralists remain reluctant to acknowledge that economic control over the media is implicated in the very constitution of political power itself.

Critical theorists, in their assessment of the pluralist model, have sought to demonstrate that the emergent 'consensus of the people' is organized in direct accordance with the dictates of economic power. Presuppositions regarding the professionalization of decision making (often tied to corporatist management frameworks), aggregate interest group demands, and the continuing fragmentation and decentralization of organizational processes in state agency growth, are here countered with a view to the state appara-

tus as functioning to ameliorate substantive class inequalities only under threat of social upheaval. Consequently, critical political economy has sought to speak to pluralism's conceptual dissolution of fundamental linkages between the respective cultural and economic realms where the state functions as a 'power-broker' separated from society, its failure to acknowledge that state policy-making gives structural priority to those interests relevant to capital accumulation (here the very parameters of legitimate debate are centred), and the over-stressing of the role of alternative and countervailing sources of power to keep in check (through the 'indirect mechanisms of democracy') the basic incompatibility of demands and interests (Bennett, 1982; Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott, 1982; Dreier, 1982; Golding and Murdock, 1979; Hall, 1982, 1977; Miege, 1987; Smith, 1978).

An adequate understanding of power, it follows, must move beyond a pluralist definition demarcated by those activities which can be systematically observed so as to encompass a politics of legitimation. Precisely how is it that the inegalitarian structures of Canadian liberal democracy, including its massive commitment of resources to military facilities, have come to be represented as the inevitable result of politics in the nuclear age? In looking for answers, it is clear that Marxist researchers have convincingly demonstrated that pluralists pose an entirely inadequate accounting of the news media's specificity vis a

vis the different forms of constitutive social relations inflected by class, patriarchal and racial formations (amongst others), particularly as they undercut formal political equality. The very existence of a multiplicity of social divisions which traverse these lines is effectively blurred, and the processes of accountability confounded, as the systemic features of capitalism are reinscribed as democratic in the last instance ('the best of all possible systems'). The pluralist emphasis on process as an end in itself finally culminates in a normative posture where persistent configurations of domination and exploitation are rendered virtually invisible for analysis. One could go much further, pointing to its narrow vision of democratization, where strategies of reform are restricted to parliamentary and electoral politics.

This chapter's attempt to highlight the grounds for the conceptual formulation of news media power to be adopted in the case study will presently proceed to consider the problem of ascertaining for analysis, first, the location of the news media vis a vis the capitalist economy, state, and civil society, and second, the precise mechanisms in and through which economic, political and ideological determinants are reproduced such that the asymmetrical social divisions and hierarchies upon which nuclearism is dependent may be naturalized.

Class Power, Media Power

Marx and Engels's famous statement that "the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas" (1970: 64) has sparked much of the contemporary debate over the problem of news media ideology and its class-specificity, a relation mediated by practice within a social totality where those ideas that express the dominant material relationship are reproduced. The thesis, as outlined in the polemical form of *The German Ideology* (1845), is deceptively straightforward: "The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it" (1970: 64). Ruling ideas become the ideal expression of dominant material relationships, thus individual members of the ruling class, to the degree that they rule as a class, will then determine (produce, regulate and distribute) the ideas of their age: "their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch" (1970: 64-65). By accentuating the conditions of production and the producers of ruling or dominant ideas, Marx and Engels intended to dissolve any (idealist) dichotomy between the autonomous, independent ideas of the ruling class and the ruling class itself (1970: 65).

How, then, to characterize the effectivity of ruling ideas? In the classical Marxist formulation, the representations of dominant ideology are not forced on the exploited

class, nor are they to be reduced (conspiratorially) to 'useful fictions'. Rather, the ruling class must work to advance its particular interests by depicting its ideas within the terms of universality. Ruling interests, like the symbolic processes through which they are spoken, are represented as the common interests of subordinate classes: the only correct, rational ones available (1970: 65-66). In this way, ideological ideas or symbols conceal their dependence on social structures, as well as their relation to determinate forms of politics (as defined by class interests; see also Abercrombie and Turner, 1983; Larrain, 1983, 1979; Seliger, 1977; Sumner, 1979). [2]

2 If for Marx and Engels (1970) the very existence of counter-hegemonic ideas presupposes the existence of a revolutionary class, the question may then be posed as to whether they adequately allow for the existence of ideological relations which express the interests of dominated classes. The answer they provide is ambiguous at best, as while all classes can generate ideology, ideology can serve only the interests of the dominant class; that is, dominated classes may articulate revolutionary ideas, but no allowance is made for a revolutionary ideology to serve their interests. How, then, to disrupt the eternal reproduction of the capitalist mode of production? What Marx and Engels do permit is the precept that any class making a revolution will appear as being representative of the whole mass of society and not as a class itself. This is achievable, in part, because its particular interests will not be developed to the point that the general or common interests of other non-ruling classes would be precluded: despite the fact that class consciousness and class position do not necessarily coincide, there will have to exist at least some degree of overlap. Should the revolutionary class then succeed in displacing the ruling class (whose ideology is at last recognized as a system of representations motivated by class interest), its victory would, in turn, also benefit "many individuals of the other classes which are not winning a dominant position, but only insofar as it now puts these individuals in a position to raise themselves into the ruling class" (1970: 66). Here is where the question of ideological struggle (the domination of one ideological

Today, instrumentalist researchers continue to expend considerable effort attempting to demonstrate precisely how it is that the production and distribution of 'ruling ideas' (the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships) is guaranteed by a capitalist mass media system functioning as a means of mental production. Certainly one of the most celebrated attempts to extend and refine this line of inquiry so as to explicate the dynamics of mass media processes is that authored by Miliband (1977, 1969). Freedom of expression, he argues, is not meaningless in capitalist society: it must be set, however, "in the real economic and political context of these societies; and in that context the free expression of ideas and opinions mainly means the free expression of ideas and opinions which are helpful to the prevailing system of power and privilege" (1969: 197). Miliband, like several of the other theorists writing in the instrumentalist tradition, is hardly content to selectively appropriate various aspects of the classical framework and demand that they be reinstalled in their entirety so as to explain away once and for all the durability of contemporary class arrangements. Rather, as those

consciousness over another) is reconfigured into a general concept of hegemony, as Marx and Engels maintain that every new class achieves its hegemony on a basis broader than that of the class it superseded (yet fail to specify how this relation is accomplished). This process of succession, however, is never curtailed once and for all, as "the opposition of the non-ruling class against the new ruling class later develops all the more sharply and profoundly" (1970: 66).

efforts organized to render a 'real' or 'true' Marxism safe from modification or 'bourgeois distortions' are being consigned one by one to the dustbin of history, instrumentalists have sought to step outside the borders of an economistic politic.

This recent shift throws into sharp relief those formulations which enjoyed wide acceptance within the approach well into the last decade. The media, characterized as agencies for the systematic dissemination of those ideas and values which reproduce existing patterns of power and privilege, are said to function, to use Miliband's phrase, as 'weapons in the arsenal of class domination'. The theme of media manipulation is one of the most pronounced, aptly summed up by Enzensberger (1970) who writes: "There is no such thing as unmanipulated writing, filming, or broadcasting. The question is therefore not whether the media are manipulated, but who manipulates them" (1970: 104). If the answer is neatly contained within the question, specifying how the 'machinery of contemporary capitalist mind management' (Schiller, 1973) works often involves a view to a ruling media elite acting as puppeteers, carefully pulling the strings of public opinion.

The ultimate objective of mind management? In a word, passivity. The content (myths) and form (means of transmission) of capitalist media systems are here described as being devoted entirely to manipulation. The disguised aim of which, it is argued, is to spread passivity through

intentionally devitalized programming and physically inactivating communications technology so as to create 'a state of inertia' (Lazarsfeld and Merton's narcotizing dysfunction with a critical twist). Specifically, one that will prevent, or at least contain, any organized response emerging to disrupt relations of exploitation (Schiller, 1973; see also Droge, 1983; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Hund, 1983; Mattelart, 1978; Negt and Kluge, 1983; Smythe, 1981, 1977).

Interestingly, while studies on media manipulation undertaken within an explicit 'propaganda' framework have declined in prominence since the 1950s, they have not disappeared altogether. Herman and Chomsky (1988), for example, argue that there exists within the United States commercial news media an institutional bias which guarantees the mobilization of certain 'propaganda campaigns' on behalf of an elite consensus (propaganda signifies little more than dominant ideology in this analysis). The economic power of owners of capital over the media does not culminate in the creation of a political vacuum: rather, the news media "permit - indeed, encourage - spirited debate, criticism, and dissent, as long as these remain faithfully within the system of presuppositions and principles that constitute an elite consensus" (1988: 302). Pluralist notions of autonomous news media are thereby to be countered by examining the systematic subordination of the media vis a vis the functional requirements of dominant classes. To the degree that the powerful are able to coordinate the fluctuating

boundaries of public opinion through the exercise of control over what will be found in media content, class privilege will be successfully reproduced.

Similarly, in linking the media to the manipulative function of mediating normative knowledge (that knowledge considered correct, to be endorsed through action), Droge (1983) underscores their capacity to reify that knowledge as *hegemonic generality* (1983: 55). That is, the media system dominates through processes of manipulation "insofar as it standardizes and naturalizes a certain section of 'value knowledge' (or personal experience) in order to be able to discriminate against and brand as illegitimate that 'remaining' knowledge of value knowledge that continues to develop, linked to the evolution of the productive forces [and] determined by the society as a whole" (1983: 54). It is the rupture of this intended link between knowledge and action in the sphere of reproduction which is to be made the practical objective of critical research (1983: 60-61).

Negt and Kluge (1983) choose to expand on this theme by arguing that media conglomerates are systematically and intentionally concealing the social effects of their products, lest private ownership of the media be called into question by members of the public (1983: 69-70).

Sympathetic to this type of analysis is Hund (1983), who insists that radical theorizing must continue to accentuate the dialectic of base and superstructure (as well as the attendant modes and levels of consciousness) so as to, in

turn, allow for the consideration of the potential social effects of the media in terms of the 'societal psychology' of the recipients (1983: 76-77, 80). The manipulation of audiences, then, is to be framed with respect to its determination by, first, the existence of certain material societal relationships and, second, by ideological indoctrination itself. That said, however, how to concretize the claim that the knowledge-action relation is grounded in the media's class based conditionality?

Arguably the most frequent response to this dilemma is to undertake an analysis of the ideological predominance of the ruling class through a rigorous accounting of the degree of overlap between the major corporate owners or elites and the media elite (namely the executives and directors of private media complexes). Clement's (1977, 1975) research, for example, indicates that in Canada an extensive linkage may indeed be documented. His findings suggest that one half of the members of the private media elite (the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and other public outlets are not included in the study) are simultaneously located within the divisional borders of the economic elite as a strata, while many of those who do not overlap nevertheless have close corporate ties (1975: 325). Largely drawn from the capitalist class, both elite groups share similar class origins, cultural backgrounds, and, perhaps most importantly here, ideological orientations: both are described as being conservative or pro-business in their views. Consequently,

Clement suggests that they will seek to mask or obscure the forms of class struggle endemic to capitalism by any means available (moreover, it is assumed that such ideological affinities will also be shared with senior state officials). The Canadian commercial media, as class institutions, thus perform the necessary ideological work; they are instruments 'run by, for and in the interest of' the corporate elite (1975: 341; see also Baldwin, 1977; Dreier, 1982).

Implicit within such a view are three key assumptions, each of which needs to be discussed prior to this investigation of nuclearism and the daily press. The first precept holds that there exists a ruling class consensus, and that it is the inevitable outcome of any internal dispute over the general (long-term) interests of the class at any given historical conjuncture; second, that control (intentional and direct) over media ownership translates, by definition, into direct control over media production (and hence media content); and third, that consumers of media texts will 'decode' them in such a way as to ensure that, in the last instance, capitalist social relations will be reproduced. In most cases, the media elite are not to be regarded as responsible for the generation of particular capitalist ideologies (a position advocated by conspiracy theorists), but rather as accountable for directing their management so as to ensure that those inflections conducive to the maintenance of a false consciousness amongst the subaltern classes are reinforced.

Accordingly, it follows that the finished media product is to be framed for analysis strictly in terms of its larger ideological function and not as an entity in itself (its meaning is imposed unilaterally upon the audience). The appropriation of the media text and the interests it embodies will, in turn, determine the deployment of terms within which the audience can respond. That is, the media set down and then regulate the limits of what is legitimate debate over, or tolerable dissent to, existing inequalities. In this way, the media serve as 'gatekeepers' for the ruling class, acting as they do to "hem in the forces capable of opposing or of exposing the deception of the ruling class and its system" (Mattelart, 1978: 8).

One of the most provocative attempts to elaborate this question of the 'setting of limits' to reinforce the subordination of media audiences is advanced by Smythe (1981, 1977). His intervention to secure a firmer basis for generating insights into the production of what he calls 'audience power', and its sale to advertisers as a commodity form, privileges the question of how the media system (as one component of the Consciousness Industry) is implicated in capital's task of maintaining hierarchical social divisions. Very briefly, his thesis holds that at the most general level of effectivity, media in the core area (Canada and the United States) function to guide the capitalist system, a process achieved in part by *screening* in the social values conducive to its maintenance and screening out

disruptive values (1981: 16). For Smythe, control over the means of informing people is the basis of political power, thus he criticizes orthodox Marxist research for what he terms a continuing fixation with theories of consciousness which rely on a variant of the base-superstructure paradigm.

What escapes the attention of such practitioners, Smythe charges, is both "the fact of uneven development of capital in the realm of culture and consciousness [and the certitude that in] the North American core area the distinction between base and superstructure has disappeared" (1981: 272-273). Monopoly capitalism has succeeded in dissolving the once clear dichotomy between base and superstructure (as well as the media's position as a system in the latter), as the principal point of contradiction constitutive of the capitalist/worker relation has become intensified through generalization. Consequently, the media occupy a space simultaneously in the superstructure while also being "engaged indispensably in the last stage of infrastructural production where audiences are produced and consumed in the production of demand and its satisfaction by purchases of consumer goods" (1981: 274).

To clarify, Smythe is not content to simply assert, as more traditional instrumentalist analyses have often tended to do, that all commodities are to be treated as being, by definition, carriers of capitalist ideology. Instead, he attempts to demonstrate how and why this process is brought about by focusing on a commodity new to monopoly capitalism:

the audience. The 'illusion' that advertising supports or makes possible the news, information or entertainment programming on media outlets is cultivated by the capitalist system for a singular purpose: to conceal the fact that such content exists strictly to whet the appetite of the consumer (1981: 8; see also Dunn, 1986). For Smythe, the commercial media are advertising in their entirety, as program material is produced so as to organize the production of an audience commodity. The audience thus defines the media; it functions as the necessary means to the (self-)marketing of the consumer goods and services it beckons into existence (1981: 236). Readers, listeners, and viewers are a commodity par excellence sold to advertisers.

More specifically, their labour power is structured into three distinct, valuable services: that is, in addition to marketing products to themselves, "they learn to vote for one candidate (or issue) or another in the political arena [and, lastly,] they learn and reaffirm belief of their politic-economic system" (1981: 8-9). This process requires that a certain mood or tone for the 'free lunch' be established and maintained throughout, one which will ensure a proper ideological response (based in possessive individualism) to the messages advanced by advertisers (1981: 38). In Smythe's view, "the prime item on the agenda of Consciousness Industry is producing people motivated to buy the 'new models' of consumer goods and services and motivated to pay the taxes which support the swelling budgets

for the Military Sales effort" (1981: 13). Regrettably, he offers little understanding of how it is that this type of audience labour is accomplished. Thus in repositioning the media system problematic back into the realm of the economic (and thereby reversing a perceived ideologist influence from competing approaches), Smythe appears to be pushing the proposed model beyond its limits.

Still, this line of inquiry pinpoints the problem of theorizing the effectivity of media processes vis a vis class power by underscoring the limitations indicative of views which hold that the media be regarded as the simple instruments of ruling class domination. Most certainly, it has proven difficult to distinguish analytically, first, the media's economic function from their political and ideological functions and, second, the means by which media content accomplishes its effects from those conditions which ostensibly guarantee the commodification of audiences.

It may now be argued that in attempting to situate the media power dynamic within the limits of an ownership/control relation, the implied relationship between media products and their determination (by the media's institutional location within the infrastructure) results in a form of closure around a view to effectivity directly correspondent to the material dictates of class forces. Presumably to prioritize for investigation the various ideological elements at work would be to threaten the basic precept that ultimate determination rests solely in the

economic domain. Hence the apparent risk of reducing the news media to either monolithic apparatuses or, even worse, to tired ideological machines confined to performing endlessly and unfailingly the ultimate function of system maintenance. Whether fulfilling the *functional requirements of the capitalist system* or reproducing the logic and fundamental laws of generalized commodity production, the end result remains the same: media power is, in all too many instances, conflated with class power.

State Power, Media Power

The emergence of structural Marxism in Western Europe in the 1960s, with its attendant stress on the structural constraints to which the state is subject under capitalist social relations, marked an efficacious challenge to Marxist orthodoxy. Anderson (1983) argues that, in general, this moment of structuralism is best situated within a larger attempt to resolve an enigma haunting much of social theory (and historical materialism in particular): namely, the problem of the respective status and position of both structure (for Marx, latent disintegration) and the individual turned subject (social integration) within larger social relations (1983: 33-34). Others argue that it is in seeking a reconciliation between contending types of causality, often formulated in Marxist debate as economism and voluntarism, that structuralist theory (here represented by the

diverse theoretical work of Althusser, Pêcheux, and Poulantzas) signals most effectively a shift from earlier approaches to the study of the state/class power problematic.

Today, structural Marxism, in its attempt to recast classical positions, seeks to privilege for investigation the capitalist state's constitutive role in the creation of the necessary conditions for a hierarchical unity between the social formation's three determinant instances (the economic, political and ideological: each has its own specificity and effectivity). Production remains as the determinant factor in the last instance, while a relation of relative autonomy is said to characterize a superstructure where ideology, like the state, is defined as an active agent operating within the (decentred) social totality (itself structured in dominance). Moreover, having banished any notion of a pure or simple contradiction (a mere expression or reflection of the economy) around which all other levels of the social formation will mechanistically collapse, the multiplicity of struggles traversing different institutional sites, including the news media, may then be brought to the fore.

For Louis Althusser (1990, 1976, 1971), the state in contemporary capitalist countries 'has no meaning except as a function of state power', by which he is suggesting it be understood as a force of repressive execution and intervention in the interests of the ruling classes (1971: 137-140).

In acknowledging that the Marxist theory of the state has remained somewhat troublesome with respect to defining its precise institutional form, however, he makes a crucial addition by extending the field of the state complex so as to include the institutionalization of ideology. Looking beyond the organizations of physical force centralized within the state itself: specifically, the Repressive State Apparatuses (the armed forces, police, courts and prisons, and so forth) which function through the use, real or implied, of violence, Althusser identifies, after Gramsci before him, the Ideological State Apparatuses, or ISAs, which function primarily by ideology (1971: 145).

Here the mass media system, like the educational, familial, religious, trade union, legal and political systems, acts *massively and predominantly* by ideology. Still, Althusser cautions, as a state apparatus, each works secondarily by repression, even if ultimately this process is 'very attenuated and concealed, even symbolic' (1971: 145). The mass media as a purely ideological apparatuses could not exist, for while some outlets may be designated as 'public' and others 'private', all are unified in their function to secure the ideological dominance of the ruling class despite its diversity and contradictions (1971: 143-144). The political conditions for the action of the ISAs are realized and maintained behind a *shield* provided by the RSAs, thus it is the intermediation of ruling ideology that

invokes what may be at times a 'teeth-gritting harmony' between the different institutions (1971: 150).

Due to the capacity of the ISAs to ensure that individuals living under capitalist social relations will act in accordance with what the underlying structure requires of them (achieved through interpellative strategies), the state is placed at the centre of the social formation and the continued reproduction of hegemonic forms of common sense. In contending that "no class can hold state power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the [ISAs]" (1971: 146), Althusser is advancing the thesis that the ISAs are both the stake of the larger class struggle (as exercised in ideological forms) as well as the site of where the class or class alliance in power encounters the expressed resistance of the exploited or subaltern classes (1971: 147). Here he is allowing for a degree of autonomy for the media from the ruling class which some instrumentalists would be unwilling to endorse. The media cease to be simple, pliant weapons of capitalist manipulation, and instead are posited within the blurred boundaries of a state/civil society realm where contradictory class forces are ultimately 'fought out'.

The actions or experience of the individual consumer of any given media product, far from arising from personally chosen beliefs, are instead determined by the range of possible ideological (subject) positions made available by the media ISA (but not exclusively, given that the other

ISAs also make positions available from which the media text may be 'read'). His or her (largely passive) acceptance of an assigned identity is itself the result of a material force governed by the apparatus, one achieved in and through the practical rituals where the very 'common sense' of hegemony is inscribed. In other words, the human subject's relation to the (necessarily distorted) image of the real conditions of existence produced via the practices of media representation will function to 'fix' him or her so as to reproduce existing relations of power in ideas.

Althusser takes care to point out that "ideologies are not 'born' in the ISAs but from the social classes at grips in the class struggle: from their conditions of existence, their practices, their experience of the struggle, etc." (1971: 185-186). Both ruling and ruled ideologies are concretized in relation to each other across the shifting field of the media, their determinants reinforced by a class struggle rooted not in ideology, but far beyond the ISAs in the relations of production. Should the media and other ISAs fail to successfully articulate relations of subjugation, the RSAs as an 'organized whole' will ensure the reproduction of the base for class relations through force. This last point allows Althusser to escape the charge of a highly functionalist reading of ideological forms, yet hardly represents an adequate account of resistance to subjugation.

A more diffused conception of the class struggle, one which permits a greater degree of contradiction at the reproductive level of the social formation, contained in the 1976 'Note on the ISAs'. There Althusser (1976) addresses his critics' twin charges of economism and functionalism by contending that the ruling class has to reproduce its material, political and ideological conditions of existence '*as to exist means to reproduce*' (1976: 455). To clarify, ruling ideology, positioned as it is within the complex system of ISAs, is never a *fait accompli* of the class struggle; it is not *immune* to the influence of the class struggle itself (1976: 455). Moreover, the reproduction of the ruling ideology is not a repetitive, automatic or mechanical reproduction of institutions to be defined strictly by their function, but rather "it is the struggle for the unification and renewal of earlier, disparate and contradictory ideological elements within a unity which is achieved in and through the class struggle against the previous forms and the new tendencies" (1976: 455-456).

Given that this ruling ideology's contradictions are subject to a (reimposed) struggle which never ceases to traverse the state apparatuses, the contest for its unification is *always incomplete* and *always has to be resumed* (1976: 456). Althusser's stance, then, rests on the notion that resistance is necessary for ISAs to function, and that "if there is resistance, it is because there is struggle and this struggle is in the last analysis the direct or

indirect, the close or (more frequently) the distant echo of the class struggle" (1976: 456).

'Winning Out' Consent

Michel Pecheux (1982) offers an intriguing elaboration of this last thesis by highlighting the very power/resistance dynamic itself: specifically, as it 'passes through' the field of the Ideological State Apparatuses or ISAs. Briefly, Pecheux elects to adopt a revised framework for conceptualizing the ritualized means of ideological domination in the ISAs such as the mass media (along with the school, the family, the courts, the church and so forth), first by pointing out each respective ISA is deployed hierarchically into ideological formations depending on its regional properties. That is, the individual ISA's 'specialization' in knowledge, politics, religion and so on. Following Althusser, the terrain across which ideology operates is determined by the class struggle in the last instance, its overall function being delimited to reproducing those correlative inequalities ascribed to the determinate logics of capital accumulation.

Thus in place of analyses which attribute to each class its own respective ideology, one which then encounters its opposite in an ISA, for Pecheux the ISAs are made to constitute more than the expression of the ideology of the hegemonic faction or group. Rather, the ISAs may be

regarded as representing "simultaneously and contradictorily the site and the ideological conditions of the transformation of the relations of production" (1982: 99). These ideological conditions are shaped or conditioned, in turn, by the complex set of ISAs: that is, all of the ISAs do not contribute equally to reproduction-transformation processes. Instead, due to their regional and class properties, there exist relations of contradiction-unevenness-subordination between the elements of this complex set of ISAs.

Pechoux makes a crucial contribution to this discussion, then, by pushing the Althusserian notion of class struggle in ideological forms so as to better account for the imposition inside this complex set of ISAs of new relationships of contradiction-unevenness-subordination. If it is accepted that these relations are the stake in the ideological class struggle (given the struggle to impose inside the complex set new relationships of unevenness-subordination), for Pechoux the effectivity of hegemonic ideology is to be characterized as the 'winning out' of the reproduction of capitalist social relations over their transformation, as achieved largely through obstruction or suppression (1982: 100). Ideological struggle between two antagonistic classes is, once again, not symmetrical. Neither seeks 'the same thing' as the other, thus the reproduction-transformation relation is characterized by movement and not an objective form of inertia (1982: 101).

To begin the task of resolving the principal difficulty at issue here, namely the question of how to secure for analysis the ideological conditions of the reproduction-transformation of capitalist social relations in ideas, attention turns to the pertinent research of Nicos Poulantzas. As will be shown, Poulantzas's attempt to pin-down a practicable approach to state power, one which will in turn allow for the theorization of how the individual's subjectivity is a priori caught-up in the discursive activities of ISAs such as the mass media, highlights a number of themes of consequence for efforts designed to discern the antagonistic relations embedded in the popular dispersion of nuclearism.

The Politicization of Media Space

If Poulantzas (1978, 1975, 1974), like Althusser and Pecheux before him, does not offer 'a theory of the media' (nor, one may presume, would he have encouraged such an endeavour), a number of insightful comments are scattered throughout his writings regarding 'normal' state forms. To begin, it is clear from the outset that the proposed distinction between RSAs and ISAs is much more complex than Althusser was willing to concede. For Poulantzas, though, the categories are still useful for descriptive purposes. He acknowledges the merit of the initial formulation for recognizing both the politicization of all social relations,

and the extension of the space of the state to encompass both ideological institutions and, in a restricted manner, relations of production (1978: 30-34). However, he then proceeds to argue that the role of the state is no longer to be reduced to a repression-ideology couplet (1978: 30).

Poulantzas, unlike Althusser before him, is not willing to reaffirm a view to the state's efficacy as being comprised of a dual modality: "what it forbids, rules out, and prevents; or in its capacity to deceive, lie, obscure, hide, and lead people to believe what is false" (1978: 30). Similarly, he points to the attendant danger of narrowing the state's role to that of laying down the negative rules of the economic 'game' (1978: 30). Such a conception would, in his view, ultimately preclude a proper appraisal of the state's position vis a vis the larger, unstable equilibrium of material compromises between classes: specifically, the adoption (through the imposition of concessions) of positive measures for subordinate classes (1978: 31).

Accordingly, then, Althusser's placement of the media as cultural or communications ISAs is also rendered problematic. That is, efforts undertaken by Poulantzas to enhance the amalgamation of the various apparatuses which, formerly, were stretched along a continuum with those functions of (physical) coercion, terror and repression at one end, and those of deception, trickery and illusion at the other, would appear to underscore the need for a reconsideration of the media in terms of their (positive) role in "creating,

transforming and making reality" (1978: 30). As noted, the media as ISAs are not critiqued in a detailed fashion: instead, Poulantzas's work on state power may be read to find indications of how he may have theorized their effectivity had he endeavored to do so. Before addressing the media problematic, however, some preliminary observations regarding the accompanying notion of ideology should be outlined.

Poulantzas (1975) takes care to point out that the ISAs "do not create class divisions, but they contribute to them and so contribute also to their extended reproduction" (1975: 28). Thus any formulation which holds that state apparatuses determine capitalist social relations is here inverted, as it is the class struggle (at each level of the social totality) which is said to govern the apparatuses (1975: 28). It then follows that the ISAs do not create ideology, nor do they represent the primary factor in reproducing relations of ideological domination and subordination: rather, for Poulantzas, they "only serve to fashion and inculcate (materialize) the dominant ideology" (1975: 31). An essential power of the ruling class, ruling ideology embraces "the customs and life-style of the agents and [sets] like cement in the totality of social (including political and economic) practices" (1978: 28). To the extent that the dominant ideology is embodied in the state apparatuses, ideological practice itself then becomes class specific. Ideological elements, then, have determinate

class connotations, a position stretched to encompass a view to the media as an apparatus where ideological relations are elaborated, inculcated and reproduced. State and private media (and their respective organizational logics) are, once again, defined by their capacity to reproduce, in the last instance, their imaginary coherences.

Also consistent with Althusser and Pecheux is the willingness to afford to the media a relative autonomy from specific fractions of capital, one marked by their ability to engineer the consent of subordinate groups so long as it does not impinge on the hegemonic fraction's (long-term) interests being mediated through the state (hence the contrast with his discussion of the media under exceptional conditions). Also critical to the issues at hand is his attempt to extend the limits of other forms of structural Marxist research by assigning greater significance to the means by which the (relatively autonomous) state is implicated in media processes without, at the same time, failing to recognize the full importance of economic power. In other words, in seeking to confront directly the problem how to accentuate the specificity of media power *vis a vis* state power, the very presupposition that the class struggle governs the media is opened-up for inspection.

In place of an approach to the media as an entity which is somehow endowed with an *intrinsic instrumental essence* and a *measurable power-quantum*, a Poulantzian approach would commence with the assertion that as part of the material

framework of the state, the media system may be apprehended, in contrast, as one of several power centres where the relationship of the dominant class to the dominated classes is organized (1978: 147-148). For Poulantzas, economic processes must also, by definition, implicate the class struggle: power is reducible, but only to those objective positions characterized by the division of labour so as to, in turn, designate "the capacity of each class to realize its specific interests in a relation of opposition to that capacity in other classes" (1978: 36). Furthermore, beyond their basis in both the production of surplus-value and in their relation to the politico-ideological powers, power relations are concretized in specific institutions or apparatuses which then play a role in their constitution (1978: 36, 44).

Power relations, then, can neither stand outside of economic relations, nor be contained within them: "they are complex and dislocated relations, determined in the last instance by the economic" (1973: 113). This is not to suggest that power relations represent a simple expressive totality, as neither political nor ideological power is the direct expression of that economic power (1973: 113). By grounding the material foundations of power in the economy (set in terms of the institutional materiality of the state), Poulantzas effectively identifies for power relations a hierarchical basis. It then follows that the media system, as a site positioned at a centre of the exercise of

power, does not possess an exclusive power of its own: rather, political struggles which involve the media, and therefore bear upon them, are inscribed in their structural practices (1978: 148, 1973: 116).

With this new conception of power as a series of relations which may be situated on either side of the terrain of the state, struggles do not assume a position completely external to power: rather, they 'make their own mark' on the state due to its complex articulation with the totality of power mechanisms (1978: 151). In confirming class struggle to be the basis of resistance, Poulantzas neatly steps around the very trap which seizes those who reduce the state to a mere power instrument of the ruling class, as the dynamics of the political level (as manifested in the internal divisions and contradictions within political power) are central to his research. Pluralists, on the other hand, could not escape without first conceding that power and its various mechanisms possess internal limitations intrinsic to their own organization (1978: 151). In terms of the state (also correct for outside mechanisms of class power), such limits are defined and materially grounded by the reproduction of class places and positions within the state (1978: 151).

Thus in defining the state as the condensation of a relationship of forces defined precisely by struggle, Poulantzas is suggesting that struggles are themselves inscribed in the strategic field of the mechanisms and appa-

ratures of power: that is, they may bear upon the state without necessarily being 'integrated' into the power of the dominant classes (1978: 151). While, in his view, power has as its constitutive field an unequal relation of relationships of force, its materiality is still not restricted to the modalities of the exercise of power. Rather, for Poulantzas, as has been shown, power has a precise basis in the form of relations of exploitation, the different classes in the various power apparatuses and mechanisms (essential in the organization of the extra state apparatuses) and, of course, the state apparatus itself (1978: 148).

By assigning the struggles within which power relations are encountered and resisted a specificity denied them in much instrumentalist work, a Poulantzian framework is of considerable value for a study of nuclearism. That said, however, how would such a view correlate with the classical Marxist postulate that the state intervenes so as to assign to all relations of power a class pertinency? If the media as an ISA possess no power of their own (in the narrow sense), how is a politics of legitimation to avoid being ultimately conflated with the (causal) determination of the economic structure within the 'unity of the totality'? Similarly, if class domination is engraved upon their framework, why then do the media not reflect, mirror-like, a specific class (fraction) interest? Is the related assertion that resistance is intrinsic to the particular condensation of these (class) contradictions little more

than gestural? Where, precisely, is the primary organizational nexus of this dominating-dominated relation to be located vis a vis media processes? As an apparatus which acts principally through ideology, the media's material practices are evidently a central component in state attempts to reaffirm (and lend a degree of coherence or unity to) the hegemony of the various fractions of capital. And yet, precisely how this process is accomplished remains to be explored.

The Materiality of Text Production

As we have seen, in ascribing to the 'media elite' a unity it is usually quite reluctant to grant the ruling class as a whole, radical political economy (whether instrumentalist or structuralist) often allows a basic presupposition that media owners have a shared interest in precluding the emergence of an oppositional politic to stand as adequate proof that the media are working to ensure the realization of their class objectives. Explorations into why or by what means this definitional labour is accomplished are frequently tightly framed so as to prioritize ownership structures and ruling interests, thereby foreclosing in advance the possibility of radical forces resistant to the ubiquitous effects of the media surfacing to wage ideological battle on the very terrain of media processes.

The Poulantzian attempt to move beyond the limits of this treatment of the economic determinants of the media, in part by accentuating their position as a strategic field of intersecting power networks, may thus be fruitfully extended by centring an emergent conceptual gap between a cultural product, on the one hand, and its role in the realization of intended ideological interests on the other hand.

Interestingly, an increasing number of critical researchers looking to pose anew the question of how it is that news text, for example, becomes the manifest expression of the larger system of domination, are willing to make the concession that economics are not the singular determinant of news media practice.

This is not to suggest that economic power is inconsequential. Rather, often a strictly qualified view of the effectivity of these relations of power is being deployed so as to describe how they act to set the 'outer limits' of news coverage. The primary point from which these approaches depart from the theses outlined above concerns the general acknowledgment that if economic power is ultimately the most powerful 'levers' operating in news production, this control is not always exercised directly, nor does the news media outlet's economic infrastructure always have an immediate impact on its output (Murdock and Golding, 1977: 20; see also Boyd-Barrrett, 1970; Clark, 1987; Elliott, 1977; Epstein, 1973; Ericson, Baranek, and Chan, 1987; Gallagher, 1982; Hirsch, 1977; Matejko, 1970; Miede,

1987; Schudson, 1989; Tiffen, 1989). Once formulated in this way, however, the pivotal question of how to specify the notion of economic determination in use so as to confirm the importance of the relative autonomy of news production is not easily answered, not without recourse to a market mechanism.

That is, in assigning 'the market' a central role as the determining context for production, a set of institutional logics are made to appear for consideration. Given that the news media, whether 'public' or 'private', are compelled at all times to maximize their audience (and hence their market), production must, in turn, strive to minimize any potential risk of having the news content challenge widely legitimated norms and values (Becker, 1984; Herman, 1986; Hund, 1983; Hund and Kirchhoff-Hund, 1983; Murdock and Golding, 1979; Prokop, 1983). The effectivity of this imperative for news production is discernible when news accounts of a fragmented world-out-there (where dissent and opposition appear as ephemeral, peripheral or irrational) are, in Murdock and Golding's (1977) words, consistently "palliative and comforting, intentionally undisturbing and un-threatening, focusing on institutions of consensus maintenance and the handling of social order" (1977: 40). Critical researchers, having first sought to problematize class power (investigating how these determinants work in practice), will be better able to step around the conceptual

pitfalls which frequently befall those who would regard it as some kind of 'ritual incantation'.

Studies following the path pioneered by work of this nature would seem to hold considerable potential for the further explication of the institutional constraints imposed by the market on the day to day activities of newswriters. Pluralist researchers, after all, may concede that media ownership has been oligopolized, yet continue to insist that the capacity for a particular news organization to present the necessary 'plurality of viewpoints' is nonetheless preserved "by virtue of the clash and discordancy of interests which exist between owners, managers, editors and journalists" (Bennett, 1982: 41). The complex heterogeneity of news production processes has thus been brought to the fore of analysis. For example, Hund and Kirchhoff-Hund (1983) argue that the social relationship of those producing news as a cultural product be examined strictly as a relationship between wage-labour and capital. News is then regarded as possessing both a use-value and an exchange value, "as in terms of its form, it represents a flow of exploited capital in commodity form that must subsequently be realized through sales" (1983: 84). In contrast, Prokop (1983) highlights the importance of examining a cultural institution's internal bureaucracy: specifically, the hierarchical structure of command and its built-in, personalized gratifications for those workers who are dependent upon the 'system of rewards' for personal subsistence.

Prokop concludes that "there are no ruling elites here exercising direct constraints, for their interests are transmitted 'without constraint' (zwanglos) by the system and the exchange abstraction present in the institutions" (1983: 109).

Here it is argued that in electing to address the question of how ruling inflections of consensus, order and regimentation are embedded within the news as a cultural commodity, critical analysis may be most effectively situated at the point of greatest tension between the instrumentalist-structuralist polarity. Specifically, by prioritizing for discussion the production of news as a determinant form of discourse, appreciable insights may be garnered into how reductionist forms of critique may be avoided. As noted, far too often the production-consumption relation is made to represent little more than an arrangement whereby *media effects* are, first, always imposed upon audiences from above, and second, are to be equivocated, in the last instance, with the functional needs of capital.

The next section thus commences with this question of how to account for the unspoken parameters of journalistic activities and prerogatives in relation to the incessant institutional pressures indicative of most news organizations. A variety of different research strategies, some of which are informed by ethnomethodology, are drawn upon to prepare a basis for investigating how the 'raw material' of the social world is processed by news organizations. To

theorize how this strategic arrangement of institutional imperatives is, in turn, routinized into the preferred terms of news values and frames, analysis must grapple with the very skills, methods and tactics of the newsworker as he or she goes about the daily tasks of news event detection, selection and presentation. As Gans (1980) writes, "we do not get the news we deserve because we, the audience, are not directly involved in choosing it" (1980: 80).

Defining the Newsworthy

As has been shown, a political economy of newswork continues, in most instances, to revolve around a notion of partisan 'bias' or 'slanting', thereby suggesting that the politics of news production be largely reduced to questions of 'distortion' or 'manipulation'. Here attention shifts to consider the strategies invoked to make the social world 'describable' in the first place. To theorize how news is enmeshed in the social organization of newswork, and thus how ideological assumptions about newsworthiness (the preferred news values) are operationalized into common sense constructions of reality, we need to examine news as a determinant form of discourse. Accordingly, it is imperative that the mechanisms by which the formal conventions of news discourse maintain and reinforce organizational and professional needs to control work be accentuated for critical discussion. As Rock (1981) notes, "the business of

any bureaucracy is the routine production of sequences of activity that are anticipated and guided by formal rules. Those rules can never be exhaustive. They explicitly and implicitly define the limits of variation in the material that can be processed by the bureaucracy" (1981: 64; see also Hodge, 1979; Jalbert, 1983; Knight, 1982; Trew, 1979a; van Dijk, 1988, 83). Clearly, this transformation of news as knowledge into a work material, in particular one that can be practically managed by a complex organization, has acutely significant implications for the type of narratives that are told, and the type of voices permitted access to speak them. [3]

From the outset, sufficient care must be taken to avoid implying that newswriters are simply performing the task of selecting from a finite collection of things that 'really happened out there'. For as Molotch and Lester (1975, 1974) point out, "what is 'really happening' is identical with what people attend to" (1974: 102). That is, of the infinite number of 'happenings' taking place in the social world, only a very small number will actually be defined as being important enough to register as an 'occurrence', let alone as a 'full-blown news event'. To help sketch out a

3 Portions of this chapter concerned with various research studies of news production have previously appeared as part of my contribution to a chapter in a research report prepared by Eileen Saunders for a Royal Commission study: Saunders, Eileen, (1991). "Mass Media and the Reproduction of Marginalization," *A Report to the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing*, Ottawa, pp.6-12.

preliminary point of departure for investigating what is clearly a hierarchical dynamic, Molotch and Lester specify a typology of public events organized around the assumption that there exist certain substantive differences in the ways in which occurrences are promoted to the status of public events. At stake is the perceived need to problematize the actual combination of circumstances manifest in the promotion work involved in rendering particular types of events available to public attention. Molotch and Lester thus formulate two questions to illustrate the general contours of this dynamic: "First: did the underlying happening come into being through intentional or unintentional human activity? And second: Does the party promoting the occurrence into an event appear to be the same as the party who initially accomplished the happening upon which the event is based?" (1974: 106).

To begin the work of specifying how an occurrence becomes an 'event' in the eyes of the newsworker, Molotch and Lester stress that if all occurrences have, in principle, the potential to be transformed into an event, the discernment of one occurrence over another will be directly linked to its "usefulness to an individual who is attempting on a particular occasion to order her or his experience" (1974: 102). This transition from happening to occurrence is tied to an implicit notion of use value: a happening is thus rendered into an occurrence only after it has been recognized as being especially useful in demarcating time

(Molotch and Lester, 1975, 1974; see also Fishman, 1980; Rock, 1981; Schutz, 1967; Tuchman, 1978). Consequently, this notion of ordering time is key, as an event's temporal points of reference, far from being static or fixed, are in a constant state of transition. Newswriters, therefore, need to bring to the task of event detection a series of framing procedures capable of imposing order and coherence on the social world. To ascertain how this process is achieved, researchers have attempted to explicate the means by which certain news values consonant with the dictates of the news bureaucracy are embedded in the very procedures used by reporters to 'recognize' an occurrence as a potential news event in the first place.

It is important to note that the framing procedures in play are, as Gitlin (1980) suggests, "negotiated among sources, editors and reporters; how they will emerge in practice is not preordained" (1980: 274; see also Bell, 1984). Here Gitlin is not implying that frames are set free to shift arbitrarily: rather, what is ruled in as news, and what is ruled out, is conditioned by conventionalized definitions of what counts as a newsworthy event. Fishman's (1981, 1980) ethnographic research offers a critical insight into the presuppositions underpinning event detection, five of which he states as general principles (1980: 30-32). First, newswriters assume that events are self-evident (events will 'jump out' from mere occurrences), Second, events stand independently from their knower (an undetected

event can still exist). Third, any methods used to detect an event are unlikely to alter or affect the event being so discovered. Four, events follow a certain logic and temporality as they occur prior to their formal detection (newsworkers do not construct events). And, fifth, what Fishman calls the 'master assumption': "the newsworker or an informant is not venal, corrupt, biased, or otherwise a defective observer" (1980: 31). This last principle, Fishman argues, ostensibly confirms the basis upon which the other four presuppositions rest. It works as a trap to ensnare any attempt to criticize journalistic practice in terms of the initial four premises, principally by reducing debate to the issue of 'manipulation' or 'bias': "Is objectivity possible? Should fairness be the journalistic standard instead of objectivity? Are journalists doing the best job possible under the circumstances?" and so forth (1980: 32; see also Anderson and Sharrock, 1979).

Moving quickly to acknowledge that this is a controversy 'which has no end', Fishman assumes a different tack by pointing to the ideological dimension of this set of principles. Here he invokes the notion of ideology, after Dorothy Smith's formulation, as a "scheme for interpreting a factual domain which contains procedures for not knowing certain things" (1980: 32; see Smith, 1987). That is, if no event is 'naturally' newsworthy in and by itself, news outlets are by their organization and staffing predirected to certain types of topics (Brunt, 1990; Curran, 1990;

Elliott, 1977; Epstein, 1973; Gallagher, 1982; Gans, 1980; GUMG, 1982; Hirsch, 1977; Holtz and Wright, 1979; Matejko, 1970; Molotch and Lester, 1975, 1974; Robinson, 1978; Schudson, 1989; Sigal, 1978; Sigelman, 1973; Tiffen, 1989; White, 1950). A crucial question is thus brought to the fore of this discussion: through what mechanisms do professional ideologies of newswork effect control over the construction of certain types of events from occurrences at the expense of alternative ones? After all, any close examination of a 'news blanket' or 'news mirror' will reveal a series of holes or blindspots through which certain types of events are rendered virtually invisible. Indeed, if these 'holes' or 'blindspots' are often rationalized in accordance with professional notions of what counts as news, they nevertheless make both the 'news blanket' or 'news mirror' metaphors increasingly difficult to sustain. In their place, the concept of a 'news net' would appear to be much more suitable.

Casting the News Net

The net metaphor, as Tuchman (1978, 1977, 1972) deploys it, is indeed a useful way to conceptualize this imposition of order on the social world. News, in her analysis, is a social resource which, through its very construction, implies a series of particular constraints or limits on the forms of knowledge which can be generated and, in turn,

called 'reality'. She thus sets out to document how each and every news organization disperses a news net that intertwines time and space in such a way as to allow for the concrete identification of 'newsworthy' events. At stake is the task of unraveling the bureaucratic threads of the news net precisely as they are knitted together so as to frame certain preferred types of occurrences as events while, concurrently, ensuring that others slip through unremarked. A news net stretched to encompass certain centralized institutional sites, ones where news is 'likely to be made today', will in turn reinforce a myriad of normative assumptions about what should constitute a given society's political, economic or ideological agenda. If Tuchman's (1978) claim that today's news net "is intended for big fish" (1978: 21) is correct, then clearly analysis must prioritize for examination precisely whose information is being identified as news (see also Davis and Walton, 1983; Ghadessy, 1988; Harris, 1986, 1983; Hartley and Montgomery, 1985; Hodge, 1979; Trew, 1979b; van Dijk, 1985).

Confronted with the complex bureaucratic arrangements associated with a hierarchical dispersion of information gatherers and processors, Tuchman elects to draw upon a conceptual framework derived, in part, from ethnomethodology (see Garfinkel, 1967; Leiter, 1980). In looking to explicate the various formal mechanisms and procedures underpinning the newsworker's social construction of reality, the very notion of what constitutes an 'appropriate' news story

is first tied to institutional assumptions about what the news audience is interested in knowing. In the case of press reports, Tuchman's research detected three general premises incorporated into the news net: first, readers are interested in occurrences at certain localities and not others; second, readers are concerned with the activities of only specific organizations; and, third, readers find only particular topics to be worthy of attention (1978: 25). In light of this set of working assumptions, then, three inter-related methods of dispersing reporters can be described using the following criteria introduced by Tuchman: geographic territoriality, organizational specialization, and topical specialization.

Geographic territoriality is, for Tuchman, the most important of the three component methods basic to the news net. Each respective news organization, she argues, divides the social world into distinct areas of territorial responsibility in such a way as to replicate its particular 'news mission' (1978: 25). Assessments can then be made as to where news is most likely to happen (in effect, a self-fulfilling tendency as McQuail (1987) notes), so as to allow for a considerable degree of pre-planning. The news mission is a double-sided dynamic: on the one hand, it conforms to certain presumptions regarding what the audience 'wants to know' while, on the other hand, it sets these presumptions against pre-given financial and technological constraints. This dynamic is then handled in different ways according to

how a news site is coded: the contours of the news net will be made to conform to the dispersal of power in certain regions (here the capitals of the so-called 'industrialized world' are deemed to be central). A vast range of bureaucratic procedures follow this imposition of territoriality, such as where to establish news beats and bureaus, so as to maximize the chance of 'catching' events in the patterned selection procedures of the news net.

This method of dispersing reporters is therefore contingent on a second method once the specific region has been determined (for example, Washington, Geneva or Moscow for news of 'arms control negotiations'): beats and bureaus need to be set up in connection with the numerous organizations (both public and private) that are regularly 'making news' in that specific territory. Due to their formal status as sources of centralized information, these institutional sites are legitimated as the preferred places for newswriters to collect the 'facts' they will require to prepare their news account. This is not to imply, however, that the coding of a given news item as 'belonging' to, first, a particular geographic delineation or, second, a particular beat or bureau, is always a straightforward decision.

Rather, as Tuchman contends, "the ways in which conflicts are resolved indicate both the priority of territoriality over organizational specialization and how decisions about the delegation of responsibility are

embedded in bureaucratic distinctions" (1978: 27). These two factors are, in turn, manifest in the third method Tuchman describes, topical specialization. This last method of dispersing reporters addresses how topical specialties (may include, for example, finance, education, environment, or military affairs pages) bypass the territorial desks. Usually each of these departments will have its own budget, to be spent on the preparation of material. A decision on the quantity of material can only be made after the territorial editors announce how much space has been left over for each of them. Evidently, shifting in and across the three methods involves considerable negotiation, and thus flexibility, as each pulls the news net in different directions.

The Rhythm of the News Beat

Returning to the relation of the news net to beat reporting, it is crucial to note that the latter is a distinctive system for covering news. As Tuchman's research demonstrates, a news net is 'anchored' through an overlapping of responsibilities within a complex bureaucratic hierarchy. Still, further analysis is required to elucidate precisely how the exclusion of some occurrences from consideration by the news net is tied to this pattern of centralization of information sources she has documented. As Fishman (1980) points out, reporters working on a beat, unlike their counterparts on general assignment, are rarely

assigned stories to write. Rather, as they are expected to generate news from their specific beat, they work with a much greater degree of day-to-day autonomy from the newsroom and its control over decisions regarding which stories are newsworthy and which ones are not.

This relative autonomy, however, is contingent upon the newsworker's dependence on news sources capable of assisting him or her in negotiating the internal pressures associated with the task of constructing factual accounts. News promoters anxious to have their voice articulated across the field of the news media are often only too willing to openly cater to the practical needs of newswork. As Ericson, Baranek and Chan (1987) write, "journalists face the bounds of powerful sources who mobilize strategically to variously avoid and make news. While the news media institution is effectively closed to most citizens, [...] a limited range of sources can pry it open and sometimes harness its power to advantage" (1987: 364).

In attempting to inquire into the question of the precise extent to which this source action conforms to an *instrumental-utilitarian-calculus*, Schlesinger (1990) poses an ideal type of source as a yard-stick of sorts. He maintains that such an ideal type would have basic to it the following four conditions: first, the source would have a well-defined message to communicate, one purposely framed in such a way as to facilitate the articulation of 'satisfying' news values; second, the optimal locations for placing this

message would have received prior consideration, as well as the audiences to be delivered by particular media outlets; third, the preconditions for a successful articulation have been laid down by utilizing tactics such as securing a sympathetic contact or 'fine-tuning' the timing of news leak; and, fourth, ensuring that the 'opposition' has been 'neutralized', presumably through discreditation, or at least anticipated so that appropriate responses have been developed (1990: 79-80).

Similar types of research provide related examples of some of the preferred tactics employed by news sources or event promoters, including: handing out to newswriters advance copies of talks or speeches; the scheduling of press conferences at convenient hours (safely before deadlines); news releases in inverted pyramid style format; ready access to bureaucratic personnel with useful information; the opportunity to attend 'off-the-record' briefings, and so forth. To illustrate this systemization of sources, and their structured relationship to the ideological 'rules' constraining journalistic news frames, it is thus necessary to outline the key aspects of the beat system of sourcing as perceived 'from the other side': that is, from the position of the newswriter (see Bybee, 1990; Clayman, 1990; Ericson, Baranek and Chan, 1989; Roshco, 1975; Schlesinger, 1990, 1978; Schudson, 1989; Van Poecke, 1988).

A critical analysis of newswriting needs to recognize that beats are defined by, first, the routine affirmation that

the connected activities which 'arise again and again' ultimately form a common set of news topics and, second, the shared territoriality of these activities is stable:

"reporters see sequences of activities as related because they occur in the same physical locations, they are enacted by the same people, and they are subject to the same standard operating procedures" (1980: 29). This duality underlying the newsworker's concept of the beat (in terms of topicality and territoriality) informs the fourth, and final point Fishman outlines: the beat is a social setting complete with a network of social relations within which the reporter is situated. Newsworkers and their beats are thus reflexively related: while a reporter inquires into the beat as an object, this very act of inquiry is itself part of what constitutes the daily activities of the beat and its officials. [4]

Routinizing the Unexpected

4 Fishman (1980) underlines four consequential factors implicated in the beat system. First, individual newsworkers usually arrive at a pre-established beat, and as an organizational structure it will most likely 'out live' their personal participation in the news institution. Second, a newsworker is assigned to 'cover' a beat at the discretion of his or her superior (a status which can be altered at any time). Third, the beat is a complex object of reporting or coverage that consists of a relatively coherent domain of activities (as opposed to a random assortment of same) taking place outside of the newsroom. Accordingly, "the people who produce the activities occurring within a beat territory, and the reporter who covers them, see these actions as sensibly connected in specific ways" (1980: 28).

Before the implications of this form of reflexivity for newsmaking practices can be addressed, it is essential that the types of material constraints under which the reporter labours be briefly characterized. Here the pressures indigenous to the particular news organization with which the newsworker is employed need to be set in relation to those constraints which are indicative of the 'newsworld' (Fishman 1980) toward which his or her reporting is formally directed. Regarding the initial set of factors, attention shifts to consider, amongst other concerns, the economic pressures to maintain a cost-efficient, and thus profitable, news enterprise, in part by avoiding expenses which may not result in a final news story (investigative reporting is often disallowed on these terms); the need to conform to the news organization's daily production schedule; the newsworker's obligation to produce news copy to fill the news space every day ('story quotas' must be met), the pressure to observe deadlines (this when they seldom correspond to the temporal dictates of beat activities); the implementation of new technologies (each have their own varying 'time rhythms') to enhance speed, flexibility and, thereby, professionalism.

The material constraints indicative of the newsworld are not as clearly pronounced as those described above. Analysis must carefully distinguish amongst the multiplicity of organized spheres of activities manifest in the beat

system. Not only is it the case that different work logics are in play from beat to beat, but even within the same beat a myriad of operational strategies are in conflict (Chibnall, 1977; Eliasoph, 1988; Ettema, 1987; Smith, 1978; Soloski, 1989). As Fishman (1980) writes, "it is a fundamental fact of beat work that the reporter must deal with a plurality of worlds of information (news sources in the broadest sense). Such sources differ as to where they are located; at what times they are available; by what means they may be tapped (by telephone, through personal inspection, by appointment with a spokes(person), or through a clandestine informant); and whether the information sources can be expected to be cooperative or recalcitrant to the reporter's inquiry" (1980: 36).

Here the issue of access comes to the fore, as work routines must be adapted to meet these types of opportunities as they are presented. The pace or rhythm of newswork is in this way controlled to a significant extent by the routines of the beat and its internal activities, yet this is not to suggest that there exists a uni-directionality of definitional flow. Rather, to the extent that these routines define what is caught in the news net, they set the boundaries within which newsworthiness will be negotiated.

If, as indeed is the case, the news net produces a far greater number of news stories than can be processed, how then do news personnel anticipate the claims of potential occurrences upon their material resources? Tuchman (1978)

points out that a news outlet (like any other complex organization) can not process idiosyncratic phenomena: rather, to control its work it must reduce all phenomena to known classifications (1978: 45-46). Tuchman shows how, with this aim in mind, newswriters have developed typifications, or classifications arising from practical purposive action, of occurrences as potential news stories. Here it is the newswriter's routine use of time that is of primary importance, as the way typifications are embedded in time directly corresponds to how the news net characterizes newsworthiness by being anchored in space (1978: 46; see also Eliasoph, 1988; Janowitz, 1977; Phillips, 1977; Westerstahl, 1983).

Just as the news net can function to designate newsworthiness without necessarily evaluating the 'content' of events, typifications are also relatively content free: typifications of kinds of news draw primarily upon the way occurrences happen, and to a much lesser degree on precisely what is happening (1978: 46). Five routinized classifications of events-as-news are identified by Tuchman, namely 'hard news', 'soft news', 'spot news', 'developing news', and 'continuing news'. Each typification will presently be described and, at the same time, its implications for governing the flow of newswork briefly assessed (see also Van Poecke, 1988).

Of the range of (over-lapping) distinctions newswriters will often discern between disparate types of news stories,

the most fundamental is between hard and soft news. Hard news stories are characterized as concerning factual presentations of occurrences, and thus are always in danger of becoming obsolete. As an unscheduled or unforeseen event-as-news needs to be processed quickly and efficiently, news outlets will often establish a stable social arrangement designed to anticipate 'emergent situations'. In the case of a major newspaper, for example, the newsroom is unlikely ever to be empty of reporters: a news event may 'break' at any moment. Similarly, as Tuchman suggests, a nation's president or prime minister is covered twenty-four hours a day in case something should happen to him or her (1978: 53). Consequently, in contrast with soft news or 'human interest' stories which are usually less dependent on notions of 'timeliness', this question of being able to routinize the uncertainty of future happenings is considered to be of critical importance. This practical need to anticipate or pre-plan news-as-events leads, in turn, to the further subclassification of hard news into spot, developing and continuing news.

The testing of a 'cruise missile', for example, may be classified as a news event that will become a spot or developing news story: the final decision is largely made on the basis of the amount of information available to the news-worker as he or she prepares the news account. An unexpected event retains the status of spot news if all of the pertinent 'facts' are gathered at the outset. Should a

prolonged effort be required, perhaps to collect other details or background information, then the story is typified as a developing one until this labour process is completed. Spot and developing news will thus each require different allocations of material resources across time, the most obvious of which concerns the type of news gathering technologies utilized to process and disseminate the final account.

Continuing news, on the other hand, is defined as a series of news stories written about events sharing a common subject as they occur over a period of time. As will be shown in the case study, the example of proposals for a defence policy slowly being passed through various parliamentary committees is appropriate here (Tuchman offers the example of a legal statute). While news of these documents' passage varies from day to day, each account is likely to contain a description of the new policy's provisions, views on whether it will be enacted and, if so, its possible effects, and so forth. The likely course or trajectory of the event is easily predictable, and thus work can be routinized, and thereby controlled, accordingly. This capacity to preschedule newswork (as well as the allocation of material resources), according to Tuchman, explains why continuing stories are highly sought after by reporters and editors alike.

Each of these respective typifications, then, is grounded in what she calls 'the rhythm of time use': each

reduces the variability of the 'raw material' of news by instructing the newsworker how to proceed with the practical task of routinizing the unexpected (1978: 39-63). News typifications, she maintains, have become part of the reporter's 'professional stock of knowledge-at-hand': that is, "being a professional reporter capable of coping with idiosyncratic occurrences means being able to use typifications to invoke appropriate reportorial techniques" (1978: 58; see also Boyd-Barrett, 1970; Soloski, 1989; Tuchman, 1972; Westerstahl, 1983). To examine some of the more pronounced ramifications of 'appropriate journalistic techniques' for the type of the news produced, attention will presently turn to the means by which beat agencies provide the resources for these strategies of routinization.

A Common Sense of Bureaucracies

The very basis upon which the journalist is able to detect events, according to Fishman (1980), rests on a common sensical understanding that society is bureaucratically structured (1980: 51). It is this perspective which provides specific procedures for locating knowledge of occurrences: specifically, it furnishes the reporter with a 'map of relevant knowers' for newsworthy topics. Upon hearing of a 'break through' in 'arms control talks', the newsworker may turn to state officials for details. Similarly, in the event of an 'accident' at a nuclear power plant (an

'abnormal evolution'; see Hilgartner, Bell and O'Conner, 1982), local police, fire-fighters and rescue teams will likely be positioned to offer crucial information.

"Whatever the happening," writes Fishman, "there are officials and authorities in a structural position to know" (1980: 51). This 'bureaucratic consciousness', to employ his phrase, indicates to newswriters precisely where they will have to position themselves to be able to follow the time-line or 'career path' of events as they pass through a series of interwoven, yet discernible phases. A 'military affairs' reporter, for example, may see 'national security' news as being organized, in large part, around 'superpower summits', each one of which travels through a fixed sequence of phases: first the announcement of the meeting, then the private talks between the leaders, then a dinner with their spouses, then the joint-press conference, and so on until the date of the next summit is agreed upon. Each phase structure, as Fishman notes, defines a possible news event.

[5]

5 Briefly, Fishman (1980) qualifies his notion of 'phase structures' by identifying five constituent elements: first, the specific phases delimiting the structure are not absolute, but nor are they completely arbitrary. The structure can be modified, either by adding in or leaving out phases from the initial arrangement. Second, each phase in the structure designates one event from a multitude of other events (the question of selection here has professional, and thus ideological implications: a point to be returned to below). Third, phases occur in a sequential order (violation of this ordering threatens the logics underpinning the basic structure), and fourth, phases have typical durations in time: an inappropriate phase duration can call into dispute the construction of the event and/or its initial framing. Finally, there exists a certain presumed

If all journalists employ common sense phase structures, Fishman argues that beat reporters are especially reliant on a special set of ones. He uses the phrase 'bureaucratic phase structures' in order to accentuate how these particular structures find their initial definition in the specific agencies on the reporter's rounds, and also how they come to be shared by the reporter as his or her basic knowledge of beat activities. News phase structures are usually condensed versions of bureaucratic phase structures: certain details are glossed over, while the specific phases the beat agency personnel provide (and enforce) are as a general rule respected. In documenting the grounds to sustain his assertion that beat reporters consistently refuse to expose themselves to unofficial interpretive schemes, Fishman asks the obvious questions: "Why do newswriters so readily adopt a bureaucratic definition of events? Why are news phase structures patterned after bureaucratic phase structures?" (1980: 62).

In looking for answers, Fishman points to the ways in which beat reporters, through their rounds, are able to take advantage of formally organized settings which, in turn, present them with neatly packaged activities to report. He

continuity between phases as their linkage requires that they 'belong' to the same continuum or trajectory. Significantly, this last feature "invites users of the scheme to fill in the likely or typical events which connect two separate phases in the structure" (1980: 58). Here common sensical postulates about how 'society works', as called up by journalists in light of their working assumptions about their news audience, are made palpable.

then shows how phase structures can infuse beat reporters with the sense that 'something new is happening': this 'timeliness' may resolve, at least in part, the reporter's practical problem of constructing newsworthiness. Moreover, journalists on the look-out for a straightforward news 'peg' or 'hook' can usually make one at the moment of transition between bureaucratically defined phase structures. Accordingly, the news events generated by these moments of transition can be planned, often well in advance.

In those cases when a journalist is working under deadline pressure and does not have sufficient time to check 'facts', bureaucratic accounts that are readily accessible are unlikely to be ignored. To the extent that he or she elects to adopt the schemes of interpretation on offer by a beat agency (on the basic unspoken precept that bureaucracies function properly) he or she will be rewarded with an account full of 'credible' voices. This ties into the working assumption, shared by most editors and journalists alike, that the general criterion of facticity is easier to manage when source material has been bureaucratically organized. The final accounts are thought to possess 'harder', more factual data than non-bureaucratically inferred information. To unpack this dynamic, then, the articulation of facticity with credibility needs to be further problematized.

A Hierarchy of Credibility

The maxim of 'news fact' which dictates that "something is so because somebody says it" (Fishman, 1980: 92), also demands that no 'fact' can be presented within a news story unless it is linked to a competent source. Consequently, the issue of competence is of critical concern for the journalist: exactly who qualifies as a satisfactory knower or observer? He or she need look no further, of course, than the agency officials and bureaucrats. As Fishman argues, the latter "are seen as competent knowers by virtue of their social structural position, [that is], their official assignment over a jurisdiction. Thus, they have a social warrant, they are entitled or authorized, to know certain things" (1980: 93). Moreover, as Tuchman (1978) notes, "the higher the status of sources and the greater the scope of their position, the higher the status of the reporters" (1978: 69). An institutional and professional hierarchy of reporters thus finds an interesting parallel with bureaucratic hierarchies, the end result being that a 'hierarchy of credibility' (Becker, 1967) amongst potential sources is achieved.

To clarify, Becker (1967) employs the notion of a hierarchy of credibility to specify how, in a system of ranked groups, participants will take it as given that the members of the highest group are best placed to define 'the way things really are' due to their 'knowledge of truth'. Implicit in this assumption is the view that 'those at the

top' will have access to a more complete picture of the bureaucratic organization's workings than members of lower groups whose definition of reality, because of this subordinate status, can only be partial and distorted. As Becker writes, "any tale told by those at the top intrinsically deserves to be regarded as the most credible account obtainable [...] Thus, credibility and the right to be heard are differentially distributed through the ranks of the system" (1967: 241). By this rationale, then, the higher up in this hierarchy the news source is situated, the more authoritative his or her words will be for the newsworker processing the bureaucratic account.

Newsworkers are thus predisposed to treat these accounts as factual, according to Fishman (1980), "because journalists participate in upholding a normative order of authorized knowers in society [and] it is also a position of convenience" (1980: 96). After all, the competence of the source should, by this logic, translate into a credible news story. Hall et al's (1978) research attempts to document how notions like competence and credibility can, in turn, give rise to a series of discursive practices which together help to ensure that news statements are, wherever possible, grounded in objective and authoritative statements from accredited institutional sources. For newsworkers, they write, "this means constantly turning to accredited representatives of major social institutions: M.P.s for political topics, employers and trade-union leaders for industrial

matters, and so on. Such institutional representatives are 'accredited' because of their institutional power and position, but also because of the 'representative' status: either they represent 'the people' (M.P.s, Ministers, etc.) or organized interest groups" (1978: 58). Here Hall et al proceed to note the irony that "the very rules which aim to preserve the impartiality of the media, and which grew out of desires for greater professional neutrality, also serve powerfully to orientate the media in the 'definitions of social reality' which their 'accredited sources'- the institutional spokes[persons] - provide" (1978: 58).

This practical conflation of intense time and space pressures, together with the professional demands of balance and objectivity, produces in Hall et al's view "a systematically structured over-accessing to the media of those in powerful and privileged institutional positions. The media thus tend, faithfully and impartially, to reproduce symbolically the existing order of power in society's institutional order" (1978: 58). Their research thus concludes that "the result of this structured preference given in the media to the opinions of the powerful is that these 'spokes[persons] become what we will call the *primary definers of topics*" (1978: 58).

It needs to be emphasized, however, that source credibility does not, by itself, ensure facticity: the employment of credible accounts in the manufacture of factual news accounts hinges, as Fishman (1980) notes, on the question of

doubt (1980: 101). Reporters, it follows, will handle the data provided by sources in ways which correspond to their confidence in the truth-value of the given statements. The verification of facts, notes Tuchman (1978), is as much a political accomplishment as it is a professional one (1978: 83). Consequently, if bureaucratic accounts can, on occasion, contain errors, mistakes or oversights, newswriters are also quite aware that most individuals, as news sources, may have 'an axe to grind' (Fishman, 1980: 107; Tuchman, 1978: 93) or, in any case, are in competition with other sources (Bybee, 1990; Clayman, 1990; Ericson, Baranek, and Chan, 1989; Schlesinger, 1990).

A newsworker's decision to ultimately accept the veracity of a source's account or, alternatively, attempt to verify it through independent means, is linked to 'gut instincts' about credibility. If an array of competent accounts, each based on a singular perspective or viewpoint, happen to be in conflict with one another, then the way out of this difficulty for the journalist is to construct what Tuchman (1978) calls 'a web of facticity' and Fishman (1980) 'fact-by-triangulation'.

Here a collection of supposed facts is weaved together to as to form an intricate web or triangle of facts such that, taken either individually or collectively, they become mutually self-validating. According to Tuchman, "together they constitute a web of facticity by establishing themselves as cross-referents to one another: A fact justifies

the whole (this story is factual), and the whole (all the facts) validates this fact (this particular referent)" (1978: 86). As has been described above, journalists take their facts from accounts produced by others: they depend on competent knowers in order to perform their work. As Fishman (1980) suggests, "when someone who ought to know the facts also claims to know the facts, then journalists treat that person's claim as more than just a claim" (1980: 95-96). If newswriters are generally predisposed to accept bureaucratic accounts as factual, then it follows that accounts which differ from one another can do so only in certain prescribed ways. Newswriters anxious to avoid potential criticism for anchoring their account on biased sources must take care to frame any conflict outside of the realm of competence by foregrounding the interested perspectives of the sources.

"Precisely by conceiving of interested perspectives in social structural terms," Fishman (1980) writes, "the reporter is able both to identify a set of competent and relevant interests and to trust that their differing accounts reveal differing factual aspects of the event" (1980: 124). Supplementary evidence is thus mobilized in the form of conflicting truth-claims. Despite the appearance of a plurality of differing viewpoints, these structurally induced interests volunteering interpretations of a common event are contained within very strict limits. To be a part of the constellation of interests the newswriter

constructs around an event, bureaucratic accounts must implicitly reaffirm the terms employed by the newsworker in the initial framing of the event itself. To speak 'off topic', or to stray from the perceived area of competence (and thus be demonstrating 'personal bias') is to be rendered irrelevant to the news frame.

Reporters, therefore, must know what questions to ask the source in order to get at the right 'facts'. Here the news frame comes back into play, for as Tuchman (1978) contends, "knowing what to ask influences whom one asks: The choice of sources and the search for 'facts' mutually determine each other" (1978: 81). Accordingly, a strategy journalists will often adopt to facilitate the comparability of differing accounts include taking care, when first setting up interviews with a source, to inform him or her what they are to talk about (1980: 131). As Fishman writes: "Journalist orient their sources toward a certain way of looking at an event: as a legal-bureaucratic entity, as a moral issue, as a part of a historical trend, and so forth. Thus, they define for their sources the terms of an acceptable account, the terms in which all the various accounts will be framed, and the terms in which the event eventually will be described in the news story" (1980: 131). During the actual interview, then, this shared narrative framework becomes, in effect, an organizing principle of inclusion: the newsworker sets down the rules which must be obeyed if facticity and newsworthiness are going to intermesh (see

also Bird and Dardenne, 1988; Carter, 1988; Darnton, 1975; Kosir, 1988; Schudson, 1989; Young, 1988).

Speaking by the Rules

The notion of media power, it was suggested at the outset of this chapter, needs to be reconfigured so as to fully accentuate the news media's capacity as a centralized source of the prescriptive rules organizing the promulgation and regulation of nuclearism. This chapter has endeavoured to prepare the basis for the necessary heuristic groundwork for such a conceptual shift, principally by challenging assertions that power is a singular object, a quantifiable substance concentrated entirely in the hands of a ruling class fraction or, alternatively, held solely in the grip of a state system (or other variations of a zero-sum theme). It has been argued that once the institutionalization of power is, after Poulantzas (1978), viewed relationally, any view of the ruling class or the state as unitary actors (without internal fractioning and mutually contradictory interests) may subsequently be dismissed. Surfacing as a crucial point of inquiry, then, is the role of the news media in the (constant) renewal of the consent of the subaltern classes to the preferred logics of nuclearism.

Consequently, this chapter has problematized the related precepts that there exists a ruling class consensus (especially where it is held to be the inevitable outcome of

any internal dispute over long-term interests) and that control (intentional and direct) over news media ownership translates necessarily into direct control over news production (and hence news content). This chapter's contention that the routine practices of newsgathering and presentation operate in semi-autonomous fashion, such that ruling interests (whether of media managers or state officials) are sometimes served, and sometimes not, allows for a new emphasis to be placed on the practical constraints conditioning the re-articulation of 'voices in the news'.

Chapter Three's evaluation of contending approaches to the cultural dynamics of nuclearism will seek to highlight further how these insights into the production of news as a determinate form of discourse will inform the case study's exploration of the daily press as a field upon which struggles over ideas or, in this instance, the reality of Canadian security in the nuclear age, traverse. It is this view of the news text as a practical organizational accomplishment implicated in intersecting networks of power and resistance which is key when examining the multiplicity of authoritative voices that, having been caught-up within a 'web of facticity', engage in the work of naturalizing certain preferred ideological inflections.

The question of media effectivity, it will be shown, needs to be set in relation to the popular dispersal of nuclearism such that the cultural dynamics of the latter may be theorized as a hierarchical articulation of material

relations linked, in a non-reductionist way, to the conditions of existence and possibility of strategic discourses. Clearly, to avoid reducing nukespeak or nuclear discourse to simply one component element of 'dominant ideology', the consolidation and dissemination of which is dependent upon the complicity of the news media, a new line of inquiry must be sketched out which is informed by this chapter's explication of the economistic underpinnings of several alternative formulations of media power. Specifically, a critical analysis will need to accentuate how the news media routinely re-articulates various discursive elements constitutive of an ideological consensus, yet one at all times compromised by discursive struggle within a 'web of facticity'. [6]

6 Here the materiality of specific audience responses to news accounts is crucial. As has been argued, in much of the critical political economy work a particular structural unity is presupposed which clearly must be reconsidered so as to avoid foreclosing, in advance, the potential for a tactical codification of the very mechanisms of audience resistance. That is, in conceptualizing the news media as strategic fields upon which struggles over hegemony transpire, it has been shown that news discourse may be distinguished analytically from the constraints and definitions which constitute the media organization itself. Accordingly, the means by which news texts accomplish certain ideological effects may then be set in relation to an active audience (and not one composed only of passive dupes). Thus having identified for analysis the historical specificity of news text's formal inflection as an objective record of the world out there, the very multiplicity of the discourses at work (as well as the conditions of their existence) may then be rigorously interrogated. After all, to assume that this process is arigid and fixed one is to deny a basis for an oppositional reading which could, in turn, accentuate the attendant contradictions, gaps and silences of the text. News accounts do appear open to any number of readings, thus this type of research strategy may begin to demonstrate (and not simply assert) how divergent

Thus the organizing imperative of Chapter Three is to examine various efforts to theorize how official or authorized voices, especially those likely to be woven into the news net, speak the 'nuclear reality' in such a way as to infuse a preferred strategic rationale with a sense of normalcy or familiarity. The next chapter thus aims to extend this discussion of the materiality of this articulation of institutional voices by addressing the domestication or 'taming' in language of the omnipresent threat of nuclear annihilation. In the words of one journalist, writing almost three decades ago, "familiarity takes the sting out of practically anything, even Armageddon" (cited in Boyer, 1985: 357).

interpretations are partially delimited by various rules of exclusion operating both in and through newswork practice. Thus in place of an emphasis on the conscious manipulation of those voices which contradict the perceived interests of a (unified) ruling class, this approach could proceed to theorize news text in terms of the hegemonic arrangement of social knowledges (see Allor, 1990, 1988; Becker, 1984; Brunt, 1990; Jensen, 1986; Moores, 1990; Morley, 1980).

CHAPTER THREE: NUCLEARISM AS A TERRAIN OF STRUGGLE

Introduction to Chapter Three

Critical research on nuclear weapon systems usually takes as its principal point of focus the relevant economic or political relationships which underpin the development, production, acquisition, deployment and control of this technology. Much of the work evaluated in the course of this chapter's discussion, far from attempting to stand in place of such forms of analysis, undertakes to investigate precisely how the logics of these relationships are legitimized, and contested, in and through cultural processes.

To clarify, I want to suggest that to succeed in centring as an object of critical inquiry the very embeddedness of nuclearism in official and news discourse it is necessary to engage in the work of accentuating the effectivity of language use. That is, the conceptual trajectory to be elaborated here for the purpose of the case study is organized around the precept that the actualization of nuclearism in textual form is inextricably linked to the naturalization or ex-nomination of the various social values underpinning, for example, the deadly rationale manifest in 'nuclear deterrence' as a strategy of 'Canadian national security' designed to prevent a 'nuclear war'. Indeed, even the phrase 'nuclear war' is value-laden, as Barash and

Lipton (1982) suggest, for it implies some continuity with earlier wars. "Perhaps our thinking would be clarified," they write, "if we stopped talking about a nuclear war and substituted the nuclear war. Or better yet, maybe we should call it what it really would be, namely the end" (1982: 229).

A central thesis advanced in the previous chapter held that the question of how to substantiate the claim that the production and reception of meanings is conditioned by the dispersion of power across the social field is best approached through explicating the relationship between different texts in conjunction with the historical circumstances of their articulation. Two key questions then emerge: Is it possible to discern for purposes of critique the existence of certain systematic regularities in the plurality of voices pronouncing judgment on the real issues surrounding nuclear weapons? Further, if particular regularities can be distinguished, can they be shown to be delimiting the range of possible meanings traversing the field of a text? It would appear that the most appropriate first step in the search for a practicable response to the attendant conceptual dilemmas would be to outline the terrain upon which approaches to the problem of nuclearism have come to be situated.

In asking how it is that the very existence of nuclear weapons, and the subsequent threat of their use, has today become familiarized to the extent that they have ostensibly

become the preferred means to ensure the 'security' of 'the West', a series of key interventions centre around the problem of 'nukespeak'. Intended in most usages as a substantive refinement on the Orwellian notion of 'Newspeak', the term 'nukespeak' highlights the productive mechanisms by which 'the bounds of possible thought' about nuclear issues are regulated by the language used to speak them. Accordingly, to trace this conceptual shift and its import for an examination of nuclearism, this chapter will commence with a brief consideration of several of the most pertinent themes emergent in the writings of George Orwell (1957, 1954).

While a number of the social issues of which Orwell wrote so eloquently provide an intriguing framework for the study of modern social formations, it is his startling portrait of the various discursive practices through which a fictitious state is able to reproduce ascendant power relations that is deserving of particular attention here. Specifically, the linguistic program of 'Newspeak' he outlines effectively underscores the need to address the language-reality relation implied in popular notions of nukespeak, a compelling point of departure for critical analyses of the contradictions and indeterminacies of the very common sense of nuclearism as it is inscribed in official and news discourse.

Before turning to Orwell's intriguing formulation of linguistic control effected through linguistic mechanisms,

it is advantageous to briefly outline what is at stake in the term 'nukespeak'. For Chilton (1988, 1985, 1982), reportedly the author of the category itself (see Beedham, 1983; Fawcett, 1985; cf. Hilgartner et al, 1982), to employ it is essentially to make three interdependent claims. First, that there is currently in use a specialized vocabulary for speaking about nuclear issues which relies largely on recurrent metaphors and preferred grammatical constructions; second, that this variety of English is 'ideologically loaded' so as to lend justification to the dictates of 'nuclear culture'; and, lastly, that this is of critical importance to the extent that language affects how people think and subsequently act on related issues (1982: 95; 1988: 44). In this way, nukespeak is identified as being more than a formal 'mass response to a crisis of comprehension', or a 'symptom of nuclear culture', but rather as a controlled response directed by the state and other interested actors to constrain or place limits on the popular exchange of ideas about nuclear politics.

A question arises almost at once as to whether or not nukespeak may then be properly characterized as an 'intentional' strategy of popular 'indoctrination'. Similarly, it needs to be asked: through what mechanisms does nukespeak naturalize or, after Beedham (1983), "hide the terrifying reality of nuclear weapons [so as to] ensure that the government's policy on defence is seen as the only sensible one [?]" (1983: 15; emphasis added). Should it

prove possible to discern the preferred logics of nukespeak and the extent to which they are, in a given instance, being ex-nominated, can a critical analysis assume that they are in turn being accepted by most members of the public in an uncritical fashion? As Manoff (1988b) observes, "the nuclear era, usually seen as defined and bounded by the genus of weapons from which it gets its name, is in reality a semantic field. The deployments that come first are not those of warheads, but of meanings" (1988b: 44). Hence the value of the next section's consideration of Orwell's theses regarding the implication of linguistic devices in the reproduction of social control.

From Newspeak to Nukespeak

Much has been written about Orwell's sagacity as his portrayal of 1984 society has proven to be increasingly evocative in the decades following the novel's publication; even today the work is considered to be a remarkably catalytic one for research on language and ideology in general (see Chilton, 1984; Hodge and Fowler, 1979; Miller, 1988; Slater, 1975), and for research on nukespeak or nuclear discourse in particular (Beedham, 1983; Chilton, 1988; Fowler and Marshall, 1985; Hilgartner, Bell and O'Connor, 1982; Hodge, 1985; Hook, 1984a; Knelman, 1985; Lewis and Moss, 1984; O'Toole, 1985). In this novel, Orwell pinpoints a linkage between linguistic processes and the

larger patterns of the distribution of symbolic power within a class society. Described with considerable care are the strategies and techniques exploited by Oceania's ruling class to delimit the bounds of possible thought of its citizenry, a process achieved primarily through the inflection of state discourses on public knowledge such that the historical contingency of the latter is denied.

Newspeak, and the closed or restricted semantic system it embodies (a language of domination distinct from 'Oldspeak'), constitutes the underpinning element upon which the rigidly enforced asymmetry of Oceania's social divisions and hierarchies are configured. As envisioned in 1984, a discursive practice sanctioned by the state is an explicit form of repression, hence the formulation of Newspeak as a mechanism of social control serving to define an official reality where 'War is Peace', 'Freedom is Slavery', and 'Ignorance is Strength'. It is the Oceanic state's insidious plan to narrow the range of possible thought (on the part of its population) through the imposition of the Newspeak program, the consequences of which are carefully interwoven throughout the novel.

As the 'ultimate political language', Newspeak functions as a static, restricted code designed to reinforce and legitimize Oceania's power structure and its national ideology. Practitioners of Newspeak accomplish this work in a number of ways, such as through the falsification or censorship of those records on which world history is based

so that they correspond to the ruling Party's current views. Following the popular Oceanic slogan which dictates that 'Who controls the present controls the past', state officials continuously manipulate this 'factual data', thereby producing the effect of 'stopping' history. To the extent that the 'popular memory' relies on such documentation, the notion of a common past or heritage ceases to exist. In its place is a kind of continuous present in which the Party always acts correctly: "Day by day and almost minute by minute, the past was brought up to date [...] All history was a palimpsest, scraped clean and re-inscribed exactly as often as was necessary" (1954: 39).

The replacement of Oldspeak (terms or expressions considered undesirable because they possess orthodox or secondary connotations) with Newspeak is also critical, as to the extent that oppositional views are dependent on terms such as these ones, thinking is 'made safe' for Oceania's ruling class. Furthermore, this literal destruction of a counter-vocabulary is complemented by the extensive use of euphemisms in 'official' discourse. Overt examples include the names given to various state apparatuses: the 'Ministry of Truth' is responsible for falsehoods, the 'Ministry of Plenty' for managing scarcity, the 'Ministry of Peace' for conducting war, the 'Ministry of Love' for torture and terror, and the 'Ministry of Minitrue' for propaganda. In establishing Newspeak as the sole medium of expression for the world view and 'mental habits' proper to the citizenry,

the state succeeds in exercising a form of thought control which makes speech as nearly as possible independent of consciousness. Future citizens, fully conversant in Newspeak, will be virtually incapable of committing most 'thought crimes' ('Big Brother is ungood'; 'All mans are equal') due to an inability to imagine them in the first place.

The strategic benefits of beginning this chapter's discussion of the play of power and ideology in discourse with Orwell's notion of Newspeak are further enhanced by the clarity with which he address a key underlying issue: does language determine thought? By the logics of the Newspeak program, the answer is straightforward: "a Party member called upon to make a political or ethical judgment should be able to spray forth the correct opinions as automatically as a machine gun spraying forth bullets [...] the language gave him [or her] an almost foolproof instrument" (1954: 265). Orwell repeatedly points out that it is due to the state's capacity to control a subject's mind through the structure of language that it is subsequently able to control the behavior of its citizenry.

Still, even if 'reality is inside the skull', the imposition of certain linguistic devices, in and by itself, ultimately proves inadequate as the sole means of reinforcing state power. Coercive state apparatuses are required to enforce Oceania's reified conceptions of reality: official practices of censorship, 'disinformation', and 'language

reform' are made as chillingly effective as they are only through the implicit threat of further coercive measures by the 'Ministry of Love' and the 'Thought Police'. This latter point, if not acknowledged explicitly by Orwell, does allow him to escape the charge of propagating an extreme Whorfian view of language.

Evidently, this brief assessment of Orwell's linguistic program of Newspeak raises a considerable number of strategic difficulties germane to this dissertation's exploration of nuclearism, arguably the most important of which concerns the absence of an elaborated description of the dynamics of determination. Here it will be argued that in order to avoid the range of problems endemic to the rigid, linear logics of Newspeak as described in 1984, a new consideration of the complex play of social forces constitutive of linguistic control will have to be extended. That is, a critical approach to nukespeak must look beyond a zero-sum formulation of authoritarian forms and representations being directly imposed 'from above' so as to address the question of rule through consent.

Thus the most pressing of the tasks at hand is the need to develop and refine the analytical tools, including a particular arrangement of concepts and categories, to problematize the materiality of the mechanisms of regulation implied in the popular renderings of the nukespeak schema. In this way, the line of inquiry sketched out in the previous chapter to facilitate a sustained examination of the

hierarchical processing of contending definitions of 'nuclear reality' across the field of the news media may also be clarified.

Executing Discourse

It should be noted at this early point that the respective studies of nuclearism, nuclear discourse and nukespeak have been categorized into different sections for purposes of a provisionally thematic, and not necessarily methodological, coherence. However, given that a secondary purpose of this critique is to outline the basis for the dissertation's proposed mode of inquiry for the case study, a parallel theme interwoven throughout this evaluation will address the need to identify the relative advantages and difficulties in appropriating for media sociology and cultural studies the tools of critical linguistics, semiotics and discourse analysis to assist with the dismantling of the cultural dynamics of nuclearism.

The principal imperatives of this chapter's mode of critique are here posed as a series of questions to be taken up in the following discussion: How to recast the Orwellian notion of a totally determinate language so as to allow for a far more nuanced understanding of the indeterminacies of language without, at the same time, abandoning a view to their implication in relations of power? To what extent are discourses used or worked to form the sites of the determin-

ing social relations of nuclearism? Does nukespeak express dominant interests, structure the form of their experience, or name and define the social relationships constituted between individuals or groups located across the national defence issue-field? And finally, if discourses are structured in dominance, how is it possible to identify a productive basis for the re-articulation of those forms (and the knowledges they generate) without absorption back into the ruling inflections of hegemonic discourse?

Clearly, prior to launching a detailed interrogation of nuclearism as being constitutive, in part, of an interested manipulation of everyday language into nukespeak or nuclear discourse, the shifting modalities of this naturalization process need to be carefully unraveled. After all, following Aronson (1983), given that it is impossible to escape the 'brutal fact' that we live at the *brink* of nuclear war, efforts organized to resist a nuclear war before it occurs are forced to confront the ostensibly solid or stable sense of normality characteristic of current popular perceptions of the danger. It is this normality which, in general terms, defines such actions as being disruptive and hysterical (1983: 257). Indeed, Aronson suggests that "beyond such ontological equivocation, built into being-on-the-brink, we find it literally impossible to conceive of the nothingness that might follow an all-out nuclear war" (1983: 257), a

problem of comprehension that is routinely exploited by state officials. [1]

This official or strategic denial of the existence of an imminent nuclear threat is largely accomplished, according to Aronson (1983), through linguistic amelioration such that the subversive force of 'normal human feeling' is banished from political discussion. A key dynamic which emerges at the outset concerns the problem of perspective: specifically, as Hook (1985) points out, the choice of perspective on offer to the public through cultural texts is between a view of nuclear reality from the 'top down' (that of the 'executioners', such as state officials, nuclear strategists, weapons technicians and so forth) or from the 'bottom up' (that of the victims, real or potential). In theorizing the hegemonic function of nuclear discourse, Hook argues that the latter perspective has been consistently excluded: "this is not to suggest the victims themselves have no place in the discourse; for, to some extent, the death of civilians has always been problematic. [Rather, we need to] highlight how the boundaries of the discourse have been set from the perspective of the users of nuclear weapons" (1985: 67). This division of perspectives, then, provides officials and experts with a sense of 'distance' or

1 Interesting research has been undertaken on the 1983 ABC (U.S.) network television fictional program 'The Day After', one attempt to represent 'the nothingness that might follow an all-out nuclear war' (see Boyd-Bowman, 1984; Foss and Littlejohn, 1986; Jeffery and O'Toole, 1985; O'Toole, 1985).

a 'feeling of control' that the language of the victims would otherwise deny. [2]

Cohn (1987) makes the additional point that this expert or 'technostrategic' language provides officials with a means to escape from thinking of themselves as a potential victim of nuclear war. That is, in structural terms, this language positions such speakers as planners, users, and actors. "From that position," she writes, "there is neither need nor way to see oneself as a victim; no matter what one deeply knows or believes about the likelihood of nuclear war, and no matter what sort of terror or despair the knowledge of nuclear war's reality might inspire, the speakers of technostrategic language are positionally allowed, even forced, to escape that awareness, to escape viewing nuclear war from the position of the victim, by virtue of their linguistic stance as users, rather than victims, of nuclear weaponry" (1987: 706). Technological strategy, then, according to Merton (1969) is virtually an end in itself, one that "leads the fascinated players into a maze where finally the very purpose strategy was supposed to serve is itself destroyed. The ambiguity of official war talk has

2 As Malcolmson (1985) notes, "the world of these nuclear experts and professional strategists is alarmingly simplistic and lacking in nuance. They are intolerant of ambiguity" (1985: 109). Moreover, he points out, "for them 'enemies' and 'aggressors' are easy to identify and 'threats' are conceived almost exclusively in military terms; and their notion of 'security' is so remarkably constricted that they exclude from consideration most of what human security actually means and has meant in most civilizations" (1985: 109).

one purpose above all: to mask this ultimate unreason and permit the game to go on" (1969: 109).

For a critical analysis, the question of perspective thus becomes a key feature implicit to the social organization or framing of the predominant ways of speaking nuclear issues and, as such, an explicit manifestation of particular relations of power and resistance in the communication setting. After perspective, a second fundamental choice, one which is clarified by the first one, is the choice of vocabulary and syntax. Putting to one side syntactic choice, Hook (1985) draws attention to vocabulary as "the prime medium to communicate those aspects of nuclear reality not directly accessible to experience" (1985: 67). Metaphors are particularly crucial in this regard, he suggests, because "they are not mere rhetorical embellishments, to be stripped away in order to reveal an objective reality hidden beneath, but means to highlight, shade and obfuscate reality in certain ways" (1985: 67). Examples of the power of metaphor provided by Hook (1984a) include 'the Iron Curtain', the splitting of supporters and opponents of a given policy as 'hawks' or 'doves', or the metaphor of 'falling dominoes' to describe the 'communist threat' (1984a: 260). Metaphors, according to Cohn (1987), perform the work of minimization: "they are a way to make phenomena that are beyond what the mind can encompass smaller and safer, and thus they are a way of gaining mastery over the unmasterable" (1987: 698).

Similarly, Hook (1985) shows how 'strategic' terminology draws on metaphors (together with attendant euphemisms) such that nuclear war becomes a 'trade' to be "conducted rationally based on cost-benefit analysis. A balance sheet of nuclear war is drawn up, where each side has 'defense assets', with weapons of different 'payloads', to be 'delivered' in a nuclear 'exchange', some against 'countervalue' targets of 'remunerative' or 'unremunerative value', others against counterforce targets involving 'collateral damage'" (1985: 72). Drawing on game and sport metaphors, the risk factor is accentuated: "a game of 'chicken' suggests the risk of neither superpower backing down. 'Nuclear poker' is played with cities as 'chips' and 'high stakes'" (1985: 72; see also Malcolmson, 1985; Prins, 1983; Smith, 1989; Talbott, 1984). [3]

As noted, euphemisms, similarly located at the 'core' of nuclear discourse, also play an interrelated role in structuring nuclear reality. Here Hook (1985) offers as an example a brief comparison of the expressions 'collateral damage' and 'massacre'. Either term, he suggests, can be drawn upon to describe what is the same reality: dead civil-

3 Knelman (1987) notes that the notion of *fighting* and *winning* a nuclear war (the 'win syndrome') has been professed in a range of policies: "(a) winning a 'limited' nuclear war or limiting a nuclear war once it has begun; (b) winning a 'protracted' nuclear war by limiting damage, i.e., by suffering less damage than the other side; (c) attaining meaningful 'superiority', or what [former U.S. President] Reagan has termed the 'margin of safety', in order to deter the Soviets" (1987: 162).

ians in the aftermath of a nuclear war. Writes Hook: "the verbal reality created by these two expressions evokes quite different associations, however: the former, associations of unintended damage in the pursuit of planned objectives; the latter, associations of willful murder on a mass scale. The euphemism 'collateral damage' rather than 'massacre' is the expression used in the nuclear discourse. For those involved in planning nuclear war, 'massacre' is not in fact a practical, though it may be a potential, choice of expression. For critics, however, 'massacre' is a practical as well as a potential choice" (1985: 67). The purpose of nukespeak euphemisms, according to Barash and Lipton (1982), "is to cause us to think about something without really thinking about it - or rather, without feeling it. 'Translational velocity' is a problem in physics, not crushed lungs or fractured skulls" (1982: 829).

Significantly, then, the choice of expression will likely prompt different expectations on the part of the listener, as there is an implicit assumption that the respective items possess what Hook (1985) terms 'a different referent point in reality'. That is, in extending the thesis that the sender exercises considerable control over the receiver as a consequence of the choice of perspective and of vocabulary, Hook stresses the need to recognize that "language is a form of power both as a product and as an expression of the distribution of power in society. It is a product of power in being produced by those in powerful

positions in politics, the bureaucracy, the military-industrial-complex; it is an expression of power precisely because this language is the one communicated in conflict of interest situations" (1985: 68). Attention presently turns to examine correlative attempts to demonstrate how the language of nuclear discourse can be analyzed so as to disclose what is an unequal dispersion of power to communicate by focusing, in turn, on how nukespeak functions ideologically as a strategy.

Rhetorics of Domesticity and Bureaucracy

A helpful qualification to the notion of 'intentionality' implicit to Hook's formulation is advanced by Schiappa (1989), whose research advances the postulate that "those having considerable influence over the choice of symbols used to define 'reality' have significant power to control not only what is understood as 'real' to much of the polity, but also what attitudes and actions towards different aspects of 'reality' are appropriate" (1989: 254). In order to clarify what is at stake in this shift of emphasis for the question of intentionality, Schiappa identifies two inter-related rhetorical strategies of nukespeak, namely those of 'domestication' and 'bureaucratization'.

Turning first to domestication, Schiappa contends that as a rhetorical strategy it works to introduce 'nuclear concepts' into public discourse in a non-threatening manner,

such that nuclear weapons and the threat of their use is trivialized or placed in a 'positive light'. By employing the notion of domestication, Schiappa is referring to the use of everyday language to describe the extraordinary in what would otherwise be regarded as quite ordinary terms: "domestication is the use of 'friendly' metaphors drawn from ordinary language to name otherwise objectionable nuclear weapons, strategy, and war" (1989: 255). 'Friendly' metaphors, he suggests, are the most persuasive ones, as ordinary language "embodies the common sense of a community of language-users, which includes the judgments, attitudes and feelings associated with certain words. Metaphors drawn from ordinary language help shape the 'meaning' of a newly named phenomenon by eliciting relatively entrenched attitudes and feelings" (1989: 255).

Schiappa argues that domestication began when the atomic bombs dropped by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were named 'Little Boy' and 'Fat Man' (see also Chilton, 1982; Hook, 1985; Easlea, 1983). More recent examples of the metaphorical extension of ordinary language, he suggests, include "calling the vast accumulation of nuclear weapons part of an 'arms race' [as this] implies that we are involved in a contest which can be won if we are determined to be strong and fast enough" (1989: 256). Similarly, describing the 'MX ICBM missile' ('Missile Experimental') as 'The Peacemaker'; using terms like 'super', 'clean' or 'smart' to identify nuclear weapons; or

referring to the threat of a 'nuclear exchange' due to a 'missile gap' or a 'window of vulnerability', all demonstrate the logics of domestication (1989: 256; see also Chernus, 1986).

The term bureaucratization is introduced, in turn, to specify how nuclear concepts are 'sanitized' or 'technologized'. An alternative to strategies of domestication, the principal rhetorical aim of bureaucratization is mystification, a process largely achieved through the use of jargon or acronyms such that nuclear concepts are 'insulated' from public inspection or deliberation. That is, by formulating such concepts in the language of 'experts' or 'insiders', Schiappa (1989) maintains, their interested or offensive dimension is partially concealed. The bureaucratized version of 'neutron bomb' turns it into a 'radiation enhancement weapon', while a 'Titan 2 ICBM' ('intercontinental ballistic missile') can be described by a United States Air Force officer as a 'very large, potentially disruptive re-entry system'. 'Nuclear warheads' are made synonymous with 'multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles' or 'MIRVs'; should they make a 'footprint' (the explosion pattern of the warheads) on a 'soft' or 'countervalue' 'target' (cities, ports, and so forth) then, once again, 'collateral damage' will be the result. Any men, women and children not incinerated in the 'protracted period' will then be 'operating' in a 'post-attack environ-

ment' (1989: 257; see also Brummett, 1989; Kovel, 1983; Lapp, 1956; Nash, 1980).

As Montgomery (1986a) contends, the technical or specialized status of these terms, ostensibly devised with the purpose of facilitating lucid analysis, calculation and debate, prove instead to be obscurantist: any sense of precision is illusory (1986: 179). To the extent that nuclear policy issues are rendered less accessible to the general public through bureaucratization strategies, then, severe constraints are placed on the type of dialogue which can then develop. "Once the nukespeaker turns technician," Schiappa (1989) argues, "the issue is no longer whether or not an action should be taken, but simply a question of logistics. The use of [this form of] nukespeak cognitively separates competing 'technical' and 'social' knowledge claims and renders the attendant moral concerns obsolete" (1989: 260). Consequently, writes Keen (1986), "when the warrior makes only technical decisions with no reference to moral considerations, the enemy is reduced to a cipher, a statistical unit. Both the warrior and the enemy have disappeared. No living, feeling, agonizing, tragic, cruel, compassionate, courageous, fearful, anxious person is left on the battlefield, which has now become the entire world" (1986: 87).

This re-articulation of technical and social knowledge claims, as highlighted by this line of inquiry, is reinforced through a variety of discursive strategies. As

Chilton (1982) observes, "once you begin to look closely at nuclear language, you get the strong impression that in spite of the scientific background, in spite of the technical theorizing, most talk about nuclear war and weapons reflects irrational, not to say, superstitious, processes of thought" (1982: 96). Presumably, Chilton would agree that those forms of expression which may, at first sight, appear to be 'irrational' or 'superstitious' can be shown, upon even closer inspection, to possess certain patterns of regularity in their articulation. Indeed, by considering a number of the more pronounced features of this talk about nuclear weapons, Kauffman (1989) makes an apt observation when he states that "in the modern era, when nuclear weapons threaten the destruction of humanity itself, namegivers must discover symbols that can both ameliorate guilt and preserve conditions in which nuclear weapons can be built and used" (1989: 273).

Interestingly, several researchers have extended this thesis by examining how names for nuclear weapon systems function symbolically to structure situations involving violence and death in such a way as to, in turn, shape public conceptions of the weaponry. Rites of naming are simultaneously rites of incorporation into social life: "the officially unnamed in many cultures," writes Chilton (1982), "are in a state of nature (as opposed to society) and sin; they are perceived as dangerous" (1982: 103). To elucidate how this process of naming facilitates the construction of

bureaucratic, political and popular support for the continued development and deployment of nuclear weapon systems, it is crucial to account for how the particular names given these weapons are made to address a variety of interested positions.

For example, the recurrent use of human metaphors to 'make familiar' nuclear weapons arguably began with 'the birth of the atomic bomb', a device which had a 'father' (Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, 'father of the A-Bomb'), but not a 'mother'. Easlea (1983) documents how Los Alamos scientists chose to define the problem of how to bring subcritical masses of either uranium-235 or plutonium into contact quickly enough as an attempt to 'give birth to a boy' (a violent explosion), and 'not to a girl', that is, a relatively harmless radioactive fizzle (1983: 94-95). The results of the 'Trinity' test, the last one before the production of 'Little Boy' and 'Fat Man', were reportedly telegraphed to United States President Truman's Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, as: "Doctor has just returned most enthusiastic and confident that the little boy is as husky as his big brother. The light in his eyes discernible from here to Highhold and I could have heard his screams from here to my farm" (Easlea, 1983: 96). Even before the first atomic weapon had been officially named, it had been humanized (see also: Chilton, 1982; Easlea, 1983; Hook, 1985).

In seeking to research the sanitized abstractions of 'nuclear strategy', Cohn's (1987) research documents the

sexual and patriarchal imagery characteristic of what she terms 'the masculinist world of nuclear war planning'. As the examples noted above would indicate, the history of the 'bomb project' is, as Cohn contends, "permeated with imagery that confounds man's overwhelming technological power to destroy nature with the power to create: imagery that inverts men's destruction and asserts in its place the power to create new life and a new world. It converts men's destruction into their rebirth" (1987: 701). Similarly, Luckham (1984) argues that nuclear weapons have become fetishes (in both the Freudian and Marxist sense) to the extent that their names *normalize or sanctify* "the alliance between the aggressive masculinity of warfare and the compulsive masculinity of Big Science: the drive to control mother nature. In this way they belong within the dominant social discourse of a patriarchal and stratified society" (1984: 11-12; see also Carter, 1988; Deleuze and Guattari, 1986; Dornan, 1989; Easlea, 1983; Elshtain, 1985; Jeffords, 1989; McCormack, 1989; Reardon, 1985; Tyler, 1989).

Further evidence to sustain this line of inquiry may be found by problematizing the assumptions underpinning formulations which hold that the 'birth of the atomic era' marked the entry of 'atomic weapons' into a 'family', and thus a 'life cycle'. Several decades later, as Hook (1985) notes, nuclear weapons continue to have a 'useful' life: "they 'enter service', are kept in 'active service' for a number of years, then 'retired' so as to give way to a new

'generation' of weapons, produced after a technological 'gestation' period, to replace 'ageing' weapons" (1985: 70). To use such metaphors, argues Hook, is to see the mechanical as the biological, a discursive shift which can be used politically to legitimize the development of new weapons. The issue of whether or not 'ageing' or 'old' nuclear weapons can still achieve their 'designated military objectives', or should be replaced by a new 'generation', is made that much more difficult to pose. In Hook's words, "by the weapon 'life cycle' metaphors implying nuclear weapons suffer the same fate as human beings as they age - a deterioration in capability to perform their 'jobs' - this essential question is obscured, and the arms race continues unabated" (1985: 70; Chilton, 1982: 103; see also Boyer, 1985, 1984; Weart, 1988). [4]

The 'modernization' of nuclear weapon systems, it follows, is to be understood as a proper, even desirable aim of 'defence' policy. In the bureaucratic arena, where advocates of a particular system have to argue its relative merits in light of, amongst other factors, existing limits on military budgets, competition for funds from other programs, and research and development costs, the selection of a name which will accentuate an implicit argument for modernization is advantageous (see Chernus, 1986; Kauffman,

4 Regarding the 'life cycle' of nuclear reactors (amongst other related aspects), see Corner, Richardson and Fenton, 1990; Farrell and Goodnight, 1981; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Hilgartner, Bell and O'Conner, 1982; Nichols, 1987.

1989; Nash, 1980). Talbott (1984) offers the example of how the development by the United States of the Pershing II nuclear missile (billed as the ultimate 'theatre' weapon due, in part, to its 'survivability') benefitted from "the cosmetic advantage of being distinguished in designation from the Pershing I only by a Roman numeral" (1984: 35). This naming strategy, he argues, allowed a vastly different nuclear weapon system to be advertised as simply an 'upgrading' of an existing system. Finally, then, as Cohn (1987) argues, "there simply is no way to talk about human death or human societies when you are using a language designed to talk about weapons. Human death simply is 'collateral damage' - collateral to the real subject, which is the weapons themselves" (1987: 711).

Life Over Death

To further examine how the various names called forward to organize and classify nuclear weapons help to normalize or naturalize the need for their production, special attention must be given to the mythological qualities of the terms deployed. At stake is the need to construct a popular consensus around these weapons as safe, practical instruments of 'national security': accordingly, for the chosen name to strike the appropriate resonance, it must 'fit' easily into existing normative frameworks. Not surprisingly, then, the names selected to describe 'our' nuclear

weapons will be quite distinct from the ones preferred for the enemy's equivalent weapons. 'Our' nuclear weapons, along with the 'conventional' ones, have names drawn from, amongst other areas, national folklore, Greco-Roman and Scandinavian mythology, science fiction, and popular culture: with few exceptions, all are designed to lend structure to particular ideological positions through the implicit articulation of positive or comforting associations. As Montgomery (1986a) comments, the process of naming does not have to be a matter of conscious contrivance for it to have grave consequences: "There is, presumably, a human finger on the button. One cannot help but sense, therefore, some crucial abdication of human responsibility and control in this naming process, which reinterprets modern nuclear weapons in terms of heroic supernatural struggles as played out by the gods of the myths of antiquity" (1986: 183; see also Boyer, 1984; Chernus, 1986; Chilton, 1982; Moss, 1985a).

Examples of how both nuclear weapons and 'weapons of mass destruction' become repositories of mythological qualities are here classified into five different categories, as follows: first, classical Greek and Roman Gods, each suggestive of supernatural power and control: 'Titan'; 'Poseidon'; 'Vulcan'; 'Nike-Zeus'; 'Hercules'; 'Jupiter'; 'Thor'; 'Polaris'; 'Atlas' and the (non-God) 'Phoenix'. Each (male) God is thus linked, to varying degrees, by the declared function of the weapon bearing its name. As Moss

(1985a) points out, positive strength is thereby prioritized over negative destruction (interestingly, as he notes, the French government prefers gods of the underworld for their weapons, such as 'Pluto' and 'Hades') (1985a: 55). Second, fierce animals, birds and reptiles, most of which are either venomous or usually regarded as hunters: 'Jaguar'; 'Tomcat'; 'Bushmaster'; 'Cobra'; 'Sidewinder'; 'Copperhead'; 'Hornet'; 'Eagle'; and 'Blackhawk'.

The third category, folk or historical heroes, marks the shift from classical mythology to more recent historical myths: those of the pioneering past of the United States are particularly pronounced: 'Minuteman'; 'Pershing'; 'Honest John'; 'Roland'; 'Davy Crockett'; and 'Hawkeye'. Each name invoking Western folklore helps to preserve the illusion that nuclear weapons constitute merely a technological extension of past weaponry from an earlier, simpler time: specifically, one where lone strength and skill were regarded to be crucial attributes (Kauffman, 1989: 278; Moss, 1985a: 55). The traditional weapon names, making up the fourth category, connote the skill of the user, usually a god or hero: 'Trident'; 'Tomahawk'; 'Lance'; 'Rapier'; 'Mace'; 'Harpoon'; and 'Thunderbolt'. Finally, the fifth category consists of descriptive names, most of which find their echo in popular culture as well as in the above categories: 'Hellfire'; 'Patriot'; 'Quickstrike'; 'Seafire'; 'Prowler'; 'Intruder'; 'Captor'; 'Stinger'; 'Thunderbolt'; 'Redeye'; and 'Peacekeeper'.

The use of abbreviations and acronyms to stand in for the names of nuclear weapons (and the related policies) is another strategy often used by military officials. As a process, it allows for a given expression to be further 'insulated' or 'distanced' from the very reality it was ostensibly introduced to represent, thereby normalizing or rendering ordinary the extraordinary. Individuals who do not know precisely what a pertinent acronym denotes, such as: ALPS, BAMBI, MIRV, MARV, ASW, ICBM, SLBM, MX, GLCM, SLCM, LOW, ASAT, LUA, ELF, EMP, ERW, PAL, MAD, SDI, SBKKV, BMD, SALT or START, risk the charge that they are uninformed or non-experts. Schiappa (1989) even suggests that "many people assume an ability to state what the acronym stands for is the equivalent of understanding the concept or strategy" (1989: 257). Echoing this point is Cohn (1987), who suggests that acronyms, as a form of abstraction, "restrict communication to the initiated, leaving all others both uncomprehending and voiceless in the debate" (1987: 703).

Interesting insights into the types of struggles that can take place over assigning names can be acquired by examining the controversy surrounding former United States President Ronald Reagan's attempt to rename the Air Force's 'MX Missile', derived from Missile Experimental Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, the 'Peacemaker'. Intended as the replacement of the 'ageing' 'Minuteman' and 'Titan' 'ICBM systems', the 'MX-ICBM' was designed to have 'Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle capac-

ity' so as to 'deliver' ten '300-kiloton warheads' to 'strike' various 'hard' ('structurally reinforced') 'targets' at a range of up to 13,000 kilometers (Semler, Benjamin and Gross, 1987; Stephenson and Weal, 1985). In his description of the naming conflict, Kauffman (1989) writes that "days after President Reagan rechristened the MX-ICBM 'Peacekeeper,' the Department of the Air Force issued a memorandum announcing that 'effective immediately, the name 'Peacekeeper' will be used exclusively in place of M-X' [...] The order covered all 'conversations and correspondence'; transgressors would find offending documents returned for 'reaccomplishment' (1989: 273).

As Kauffman notes, 'Peacekeeper', like the 'Minuteman' it was to replace, finds a resonance in national mythology: specifically, the hand gun associated with the confrontation between good and evil on the frontier of the American West. Not surprisingly, critics of the program insisted on retaining the initial name, arguing that far from being a 'defensive' weapon 'to keep the peace', its introduction would actually be 'de-stabilizing' due to its 'first-strike capability' against the Soviet Union. Thus in the ensuing debate over the continued 'security' of the United States, the choice of name for this weapon system clearly situated the user in relation to an interpretation of the 'international situation' and the appropriate 'policy response' (1989: 281; see McNair, 1988; Shenfield, 1987).

The names imposed on 'their' weapon systems are equally important. Chilton (1982), in noting how the 'American Eagle' is contrasted with the 'Soviet Bear': that is, where the former "soars to the skies, is wise, and all-seeing, the other is heavy, clumsy, stupid and half-blind" (1982: 102), suggests that weapon names are the 'mythological insignia of the two tribes'. If 'we' can find a degree of reassurance in the names given to 'our' weapons, essentially that they exist for 'our' protection, the threat of 'their' weapons is often encapsulated in the names attributed to them. Thus if the nomenclature of the 'nuclear forces' of 'the West' forms a meaningful pattern, he argues, the code names imposed on Soviet weapon systems are purposefully designed to either to disparage or to be meaningless. Associated with names like 'Scarp', 'Savage', 'Blinder' or 'Scud', all examples of re-designated Soviet weapons, are fluid, common sensical assumptions about, first, the nature of the 'Soviet threat' and the motives which underlie it, and second, the virtue of 'our' 'defensive' stance. Soviet military officials reportedly refer to their 'SS-20 intermediate range missile' as the 'Pioneer', while the United States military designation for it is 'Satan'. In either case, Luckham (1984) suggests, "the names given them exemplify contrasting styles of allegory, all [...] tending to normalize or bring under control the powerful emotions they evoke" (1984: 11).

If analysis assumes the vantage point of the people who are prepared to use nuclear weapons, according to Kauffman

(1989), the names of these weapons (including acronyms) are necessarily indicative of the immediacy of violence and death. That is, the specific names must lend to this immediacy perspective and meaning: "most basically, names justify murder for [people] conditioned by civil law to respect human life" (1989: 274). Consequently, names become 'titles for situations' which then define the conditions under which the weapon in question can be used. As justificatory motives are necessary if any moral or ethical uneasiness associated with violence is to be resolved, Kauffman contends that names have to provide a 'socially acceptable' rationale for killing. At stake for the name is the need to 'distance' the weapon, and in this way the person using it, from culpability for the actual deadly act. Kauffman suggests that "when weapons are named, they are symbolically transformed from agency to agent; their users from agent to agency. Names mediate the act of killing; the focus of responsibility is on the weapon rather than its bearer" (1989: 274). A symbolic transfer of blame is achieved to the extent that the weapon is made to represent the agent of death, the possessor of power over life and death, while the human actor is reduced to the status of innocent (passive) observer.

Un-Naming the Bomb

Since 1945, Kauffman (1989) maintains, this symbolic transfer has caused "both the political right and left [in the United States] to emphasize weapons technology as the route to security (peace through strength) or as the route back to innocence (via arms control)" (1989: 275). It is important to emphasize, however, that the successful articulation of this 'symbolic transfer' through the process of naming is, at the same time, also accomplished through a process of un-naming. For example, conspicuously absent from recent discourses about nuclear weaponry, as Montgomery (1986a) points out, is the term 'bomb': "There are many ways of referring to the devices which engender such explosions. They may be referred to as the nuclear arsenal; or as nuclear devices, warheads, missiles, weapons, weaponry or armaments; but they are rarely, if ever, referred to as 'bombs'" (1986: 180). Beedham (1983) outlines a series of alternative ideonyms for 'bomb', which includes 'ability' ('we' need to 'to maintain our ability to wage war'), 'capacity' ('our retaliatory capacity'), 'potential' ('NATO's war potential'), and, lastly, the most frequently used one, 'weapon', a 'device' which is never dropped, but rather 'delivered' (1983: 24). Furthermore, he argues, 'they' talk "about war without ever saying war, and about rearmament without saying rearmament. [...] Instead a variety of abstract nouns are used which serve to distance both speaker and listener from the horrifying and extremely concrete reality of atomic bombs" (1983: 23).

The resilient qualities of these 'distancing' or 'desensitizing' abstractions can be further demonstrated if analysis asks why the term 'atomic' has become antiquated or, as Montgomery (1986a) suggests, even melodramatic. Hook (1985) contends that the displacement of 'atomic' is itself symptomatic of the acculturation of nuclear weapons from the 'top down' perspective of the user: while at one time it functioned metaphorically to transfer the association 'power' ('atomic cocktail', 'atomic kiss' or 'Atomic Skis'), increased public awareness of the enormous devastation caused by the 'atomic bombing' of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the ostensibly growing danger of a nuclear war, helped to render it archaic or obsolete (1985: 68-69). Does 'atomic bomb' connote certain deleterious properties to a greater extent than 'nuclear weapon'? Beedham (1983) argues that more important than the technical differences (namely, a fission explosion versus a fission or fission-fusion explosion; see Stephenson and Weal, 1985), the former term has the horrific associations of the 'atomic bombing' of the Japanese cities by the United States, while the latter term has largely escaped such a pejorative association. "It would have been a perfectly natural linguistic process," writes Beedham, "for atomic to extend its reference in everyday speech in keeping with technical innovations, without the necessity of introducing the new word, nuclear. But nuclear has conveniently won the day" (1983: 25; see

also Angus and Cook, 1987; Brummett, 1989; Boyer, 1985; de Kerckhove, 1984; Washburn, 1990; Weart, 1985).

A crucial, yet subtle feature of this 'natural linguistic process' is described by Montgomery (1986a), who observes how the word 'bomb' can be used for both the action as verb ('the Allies bombed Hiroshima') and the entity as noun ('the Hiroshima bomb') and, additionally, how it provides the stem for various cognate forms, such as 'bombers' and 'bombing'. In contrast with 'atomic bomb', which clearly implies the action and someone to perform it, Montgomery notes how the items selected as appropriate for 'nuclear' usually "turn out to be either non-specific, general terms such as 'weaponry', 'armaments', 'arsenal', or terms that emphasize technological sophistication ('device') or method of delivery ('missile', 'vehicle'), rather than destructive power" (1986: 180-181). Absent from any of these instances is any suggestion of either action or agency. As several commentators have pointed out, 'we' do not have bombs, rather 'we' have capabilities and weapons. The 'deterrents' which 'we' do 'possess' have been 'procured' (as part of a 'procurement program') or 'acquired'. In the event of a 'nuclear exchange', our 'hardware' will not be 'fired', but instead 'released' or 'dispatched' in accordance with the dictates of 'nuclear war-fighting strategy'.

Finally, with respect to the arcane vocabulary of 'nuclear strategy', weapons are sub-divided into three

categories: 'strategic' weapons are the inter-continental missiles, 'launched' from submarines or from 'silos'; 'theatre' weapons (long, middle or short-range) may be either bombs or missiles, and are 'based' on aircraft, ships, 'mobile launch platforms' or are 'permanently sited'; and, lastly, 'tactical' weapons, which can be 'land-mines, artillery shells, and so forth (Semler, Benjamin, and Gross, 1987; Thompson, 1980; Stephenson and Weal, 1985). The resultant 'war-fighting strategies' envisage a war 'confined' to the Europe as a 'theatre' or 'limited' one; each class of weapon marks a 'threshold', the successive crossing of which culminates in a 'nuclear exchange'. However, due to 'controlled escalation', the 'cornerstone' of the doctrine of 'limited nuclear war' (official United States policy since 1974), the use of nuclear weapons is safely contained to each class of weapon (and its designated target). The risk of 'all-out nuclear war' is thus prevented. For Chilton (1988), this threefold classification is merely a 'verbal con-trick'. Noting that there are no clear-cut dividing lines between these categories, he argues that this schema is designed to "insinuate into our minds the notion that there are different kinds of nuclear war-fighting, and that allegedly 'limited' nuclear war is possible because it is sayable" (1988: 81). This when the term 'limited' itself is, in his words, "one of the most dangerous devices in the Nukespeak arsenal" (1988: 81). [5]

5 "The language of escalation is the language of naked

Fighting Words

In returning, temporarily, to the social formation envisioned by Orwell his novel 1984, certain similarities between the imaginary world of Oceania, where 'war is peace', and the present 'superpower dynamic', arguably still caught in a type of 'peace through strength' logic, are immediately discernible. For example, over the course of 1984, Orwell describes Oceania as being in a state of 'permanent war' against either Eastasia or Eurasia. Through the character Emanuel Goldstein, author of the banned book *The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism*, Orwell (1954) gives voice to the argument that war "helps to preserve the typical mental atmosphere that a hierarchical society needs [...] the object of war is not to make or prevent conquests of territory, but to keep the structure of society intact" (1954: 173). The official reaction of the ruling elite of Oceania, of course, is to make Goldstein an 'Enemy of the People', and then proceed to construct a popular consensus (based on fear) in opposition to his

power," writes Merton (1969), "a language that is all the more persuasive because it is proud of being ethically illiterate and because it accepts, as realistic, the basic irrationality of its own tactics. The language of escalation, in its superb mixture of banality and apocalypse, science and unreason, is the expression of a massive death wish" (1969: 109). This language, he argues, once granted universal currency by the mass media, can quickly contaminate the thinking of everybody (1969: 110).

views. Ironically, as the target of the 'Two Minute Hate', Goldstein as villain becomes within the official discourse a symbol of the 'common will' to resist social change.

Moving from the fictitious 1984 to consider the events of the last decade, an intriguing range of observations can be made in light of the rhetorical stances assumed by official discourse in 'the West'. The 'dehumanization' of the enemy is, according to Keen (1986), intrinsic to the euphemistic language of nuclear warfare: "Our weapons have become so indiscriminate and omnicidal that we dare not look specifically at the enemy on whom they will fall [...] So long as we want to kill from a distance with clean hands, we must refrain from imagining the consequences of our weapons, and must completely eliminate any awareness of the enemy as human" (1986: 86-87). A series of startling examples to demonstrate this logic are found in the rhetoric of Reagan administration officials (1980-1988), for whom the Soviet Union is the target; it is an 'evil empire' and 'the focus of evil in the modern world'; its people are 'monsters', 'squalid criminals' and 'enemies of the human race'. Then President Reagan, speaking at his first news conference after his 1980 election victory, is reported to have stated: "I wouldn't trust the Russians around the block. They must be laughing at us because we continue to think of them as people" (Reagan cited in Knelman, 1985: 30). [6]

6 Interesting examinations of former U.S. President Reagan's 'Cold War rhetoric' include research on the topics of: 'national security' (see Lewis, 1987; Luostarinen, 1986;

Official pronouncements about 'the Soviet threat', according to Malcolmson (1985), serve "not to explain the world, but rather to deflect our attention from a much more fundamental and common threat: the massive presence in the world of nuclear weaponry and the extent to which this weaponry has become deeply embedded in our system of international relations" (1985: 108). The exigent nature of this peril, he contends, is obscured by the 'Cold War language' being spoken from both sides of the 'great-power divide'. Consequently, the 'East-West confrontation' is presented by state officials, primarily through the news media, as the 'central drama of the modern world', with the result that "one's own side's nuclear arsenal is made to appear, by a kind of linguistic sleight of hand, as benign as possible: the other side is said to 'threaten' and is at all times a 'potential aggressor'; we, it is said, merely 'deter' and prepare to act in self-defence" (1985: 108). Consequently, in 'the West', 'new' developments in 'strategic doctrine' are recurrently premised upon references to an impending 'Soviet threat' or to the risk of 'Soviet expansionism'. 'They' are the aggressor poised to attack 'us' at the first sign of 'weakness' in 'our' resolve; 'we' can maintain 'stability' by preparing a 'flexible response' sufficiently

Moss, 1985; Rushing, 1986a; Sigelman, 1990); the KAL 007 disaster (see Corcoran, 1986; Young and Launer, 1988); and, the 'Strategic Defence Initiative' or 'Star Wars' (see Goodnight, 1986; Linenthal, 1990; Manoff, 1988a; Rushing, 1986b; Smith, 1989).

'strong' to 'deter' 'them' from initiating a 'first strike'; 'our' 'nuclear forces' are therefore 'working' to 'keep the peace'. The language of the war-maker, contends Merton (1969), is self-enclosed in finality: "It does not invite reasonable dialogue, it uses language to silence dialogue, to block communication, so that instead of words the two sides may trade divisions, positions, villages, air bases, cities - and of course the lives of the people in them. The daily toll of the killed (or the 'kill ratio') is perfunctorily scrutinized and decoded. And the totals are expertly managed by 'ministers of truth' so that the newspaper reader may get the right message" (1969: 113-114).

Significantly, a number of studies have shown that commencing in 1949, the year the Soviet Union successfully carried out scientific tests of an atomic warhead, a series of fictitious 'gaps' have often been exploited by United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization officials for the purpose of legitimizing demands for increased budgetary allocations for the 'modernization' of weapon systems. A list of the alleged 'gaps' which have been invoked as proof of 'Allied nuclear inferiority', a phenomenon often described as either 'gaposis' (World Military and Social Expenditures, 1987-88) or as 'gapology' (Knelman, 1987), includes the following: 'the Thermonuclear Gap' (1949-1951); 'the Bomber Gap' (1953-1957); 'the Missile Gap' (1959-1962); 'the ABM Gap' (1963-1968); 'the Civil Defense Gap'; 'the ICBM Gap'; 'the Missile Gap'; 'the Hard-Target Kill Gap';

'the Expenditures Gap'; 'the Deterrence Gap'; 'the Warwinning Doctrine Gap'; 'the Counterforce Gap'; 'the Throw-weight Gap'; 'the NATO Conventional Forces Gap'; 'the 'Crisis Relocation' Gap'; 'the Spending Gap'; 'the Anti-Satellite Weapon Gap' (ASAT); 'the Cruise Missile Gap'; 'the Laser Gap'; 'the Tank-Armor Gap'; 'the Space-Based Defenses Gap'; and, 'the Chemical-Warfare Gap' (Knelman, 1987; Malcolmson, 1990; Semler, Benjamin and Gross, 1987; Stephenson and Weal, 1985; World Military and Social Expenditures, 1987-88). These declared deficiencies in the 'nuclear arsenal', often inflected as part of a larger rationale to justify new resources to counter the Soviet threat (advanced in connection with constructs such as the 'window of vulnerability' or various 'linkage' and 'domino' theories), have become key mythological elements of the 'modernization' rationale.

Formulations such as these ones clearly indicate that a central logic of the 'nuclear security rationale' is a view of 'deterrence' as the 'cornerstone' of a sound 'defence' policy. Indeed, much of the current research on the political inflections of nuclear discourse confirms that 'deterrence', as a 'strategic concept', occupies the key terrain of pro-nuclear arguments. Here attention turns to consider a range of conceptual approaches as they have been employed to elucidate the intricacies of the discursive forms and practices exploited in official pronouncements regarding 'nuclear deterrence'.

A review of English language dictionaries suggests that, with subtle variations, the word 'deter' is commonly deployed to mean 'to discourage from acting', or 'to prevent from occurring', by 'instilling fear, doubt or anxiety'. Interestingly, if several commentators point out that 'deter' lacks a direct linguistic equivalent in the Russian language, few regard this as a significant issue of concern. One exception is Vigor (1975), who proceeds to argue that this inability to express in Russian the notion of 'to deter' dictates that "the Russian mind is particularly ill-equipped to apprehend the notion of 'the act of deterrence' and not much better to apprehend that of 'the thing that deters'" (1975: 476). Vigor claims that the Russians have consequently been 'forced' to 'concoct' for their own use certain 'clumsy' phrases in order to explain 'deter', 'deterrent' and 'deterrence'. This when "one cannot think clearly with tangled knots of verbiage: and ordinary human usage is that, whenever a concept has to be seriously debated, the language has to be simplified to allow the debate to continue" (1975: 477). If, as Vigor contends, there can be little 'meaningful' debate without such simplification, then it may be safely concluded that these awkward paraphrases "must inevitably have hindered the evolution in the Soviet Union of a proper discussion, and hence of a proper understanding, of the concept of deterrence" (1975: 477). Implicitly, Vigor would appear to be asking whether

or not a 'Russian mind', unable to comprehend 'deterrence', can be 'deterred'.

In sharp contrast to the stance assumed by Vigor is the position advocated by Chilton (1988, 1985b, 1982). This assertion that the 'Russian mind' can not think 'deterrence' because it can not say 'deterrence' constitutes, in his opinion, an untenable re-working of the extreme Whorfian hypothesis that language determines the limits of possible thought. Chilton declares that this type of linguistic reasoning is both absurd and dangerous, arguing that it rests on two fundamental misconceptions: first, the postulate that the absence of a lexical item in a language implies, by definition, an inability to comprehend the corresponding concept; and second, the postulate that the concept of deterrence is an objectively given category to be independently named in several languages (1985b: 104).

Moreover, for Vigor's extrapolation to be accepted as stated, it requires the assumption that 'deterrence' is an 'essential' concept, one which the Russians ('clumsy', unable to 'think clearly') must debate in a 'meaningful' (by criteria established by 'us') debate. Chilton also notes the culturally-specific nature of the semantics of the English 'deter', showing how it overlaps with the Russian 'otpugivat' ('to frighten off'), the German 'abschrecken' ('frighten off') and the French 'dissuader' ('dissuade'), amongst others variations (1985b: 104). From this vantage point, it is indeed inappropriate of Vigor to automatically

infer conceptual limitation or closure. Chilton thus levels the charge that Vigor's essay, "far from furthering understanding of the Soviet outlook through an analysis of their language, merely records a rigid refusal to entertain any system of values other than those embodied in English, or, more specifically, in that variety of English we are calling Nukespeak" (1988: 47).

A Detering Logic

"Thinking of our own potential annihilation is possible," according to Aronson (1983), "only by leaving behind our normal human concerns and losing ourselves in the ultimate neutral 'objectivity'" (1983: 258). Spoken in the language of official rationality, the nuclear threat becomes a remote abstraction divorced from history: "It is a deformed objectivity, one so total, that we - fearing, feeling, caring - cease to stand behind or shape it" (1983: 258). It is this 'objectivity', therefore, which underpins the 'logic of deterrence' as it dictates that the 'security' of 'the West' is ultimately dependent upon holding 'the East' in a state of 'fear'. This articulation, in turn, reinforces the strategic claim that 'our' quest for 'nuclear superiority' has 'worked' for over forty years to 'deter' 'them' from doing what 'they' would have otherwise done. The term 'deterrent' can, in this way, be utilized in a way that may prove difficult for alternatives, such as

'rearmament': as Beedham (1983) observes, "calls for disarmament are met with calls not for re-armament but for 'deterrence'" (1983: 22). Moreover, according to Shaw (1988), "the defensive quality of nuclear weapons is widely held to lie in their deterrent value, not in their physical use which many agree would be self-defeating. [However,] the central contradiction of 'deterrence' is that it is only viable if use is conceivable" (1988: 127).

In examining official 'NATO defence policy', Van Belle and Claes (1985) suggest that it is evident that words are as crucial as 'arms': "While the arms race continues, the leaders repeat magical formulas toward off evil spirits" (1985: 91). Recognizing 'deterrence' as the key term in this 'exorcism', they suggest that the 'strange logic' of its 'successful' use in 'defence strategy' is tied to a formal symmetry, or mirror relationship, between the 'superpowers'. That is, if in 'the discourse of NATO spokes[persons]', 'the Alliance' is to be regarded as purely defensive while, conversely, the 'Warsaw Pact' is fundamentally aggressive, within Soviet doctrine the mirror image of this position will be projected. Both 'sides' will share the same perception of each other: "we arm because they do so; we will attack (defend ourselves offensively) if they attack us; we will stop armament if they disarm first, etc." (1985: 101). Moreover, Van Belle and Claes insist, "the other party is not seen as a real 'other' (somebody who is different), but is always compared with an 'ideal image' of

the self: 'democracy', 'freedom', etc. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that the mere existence of the other is seen as a threat" (1985: 101).

A further dimension of this logic within which the United States and the Soviet Union are ostensibly 'locked' concerns the inflection in their respective discourses of the interrelated notions of 'capability' and 'intention': specifically, in terms of the 'credibility' of their 'nuclear forces' as 'deterrents'. Here Van Belle and Claes outline how this 'credibility' is interpreted in two contradictory ways: "On the one hand, it is defined as a kind of make-believe: your adversary must believe something you do not really believe yourself, namely, that you will use nuclear weapons at any price (even your own existence). So the threatening becomes a show: 'an appearing'. On the other hand, credibility means that you increase the objective probability of the use of nuclear weapons in order to be as convincing as possible. So the threatening becomes real: 'a being'. The contradiction between appearing and being, between subjective likelihood and objective probability is unsolvable and undermines the whole logic" (1985: 99).

The paradoxical dynamics of this 'illogical logic' are thus neatly encapsulated in the precept that 'security is enhanced by enhancing insecurity'. Accordingly, it follows that: first, because 'deterrence functions only when it is credible', new, more deadly nuclear weapons must be

developed; second, as 'credibility is a matter of probability', 'deterrence' must be 'enhanced' by increasing the probability of their 'use', such as in a 'limited' 'nuclear war'; and, third, given that 'credibility is greater if restraints are fewer', 'deterrence' increases when the 'use' of nuclear weapons is subjected to fewer restrictions; hence 'we', unlike the Soviets, 'do not promise not to use nuclear arms first' (1985: 99).

This schematized rationale for 'nuclear deterrence' in the name of 'credibility' is indeed 'logical' to the extent that it is embedded in relations of *common sense*. In making the 'ideology of deterrence' his primary focus, Chilton (1985b) looks to explicate the causative element in the semantics of 'deter', 'deterrent' and 'deterrence'; this element is considered crucial "since it may be mistaken for, and represented as, rational scientific explanation, the causality it postulates being supposedly inherent in political reality" (1985b: 106). To try and get at this problem of causation, a range of sentences are collected which, when taken together Chilton argues, are representative of the current prevailing usage of 'deter'. In extending his analysis to assess the entailments of such sentences (that is, their 'logical' or 'truthful' consequences; see Wales, 1989), he assumes that "there are degrees of firmness in entailments and that they depend on, and are interconnected with, present predominant belief systems" (1985b: 106).

The necessary causal entailments of 'deter' are such that, first, it is not deemed redundant to declare 'deterrence has deterred' and, second, it is still possible to say 'the (nuclear) deterrent deters the Soviets' and, at the same time, 'the (nuclear) deterrent does not deter the Soviets'; the latter statement being required for continued weapon production (1985: 127). This ambiguity then allows the official claim that being 'strong' (in possession of a 'nuclear deterrent') is not in itself an action, but rather a state, to appear obvious: 'deter' permits such things to pass unsaid as it requires that attention remain on the caused event. Writes Chilton: "In 'NATO deters Russia' and 'nuclear arms deter Russia' a caused event is asserted, namely, that Russia does not do some unspecified actions; the causing event is left equally unspecified" (1985b: 107).

Here Chilton elaborates upon a point made by Van Belle and Claes (1985) above, namely that the issue of whether or not 'detering' is perceived to be 'working' in 'superpower' relations is directly tied to beliefs about 'intent' and 'capability'. To highlight this relation, Chilton questions why the (English) strategic discourse has selected 'deter' from a range of possible alternatives, such as 'dissuade' or 'prevent'. He suggests that the choice of 'deter' was made because it facilitates the articulation of disparaging inferences in a way that most alternatives do not. That is, this choice makes possible, or results from, certain beliefs about the 'irrationality' of the 'Soviet

enemy': namely, "if someone cannot be dissuaded, then they may be deterred; if so then they may not be rational; if they are not rational, they may not be human; and so on" (1985b: 110).

Similarly, the causal interpretation of 'deter' restricts potential associations with counterfactual sentences to certain limits. Chilton suggests that there are two possible counterfactual sentences associated with (1) below, both of which are dependent on an assumed or obvious schema:

- (1) America's deploying nuclear weapons deterred
 Russia from invading Europe.
- (2) a If America had not deployed nuclear weapons,
 Russia might have invaded Europe.
- b If America had not deployed nuclear weapons,
 Russia would have invaded Europe.

Pro-nuclear discourse, according to Chilton, almost always inflects the causal sense of 'deter' in (2)b and not (2)a, as the modal *might* in (2)a: "does not capture the possibility that the event expressed in the antecedent clause could be causally unrelated" (1985: 111). This is, in turn, one way in which nuclear discourse "enables the inference to be drawn that the relationship between nuclear weapons deployment and absence of war in Europe is a necessary and sufficient causal one" (1985b: 111-112). From there it is a short step to argue that 'nuclear weapons have kept the peace for over forty years'.

Chilton is now prepared to further refine this approach to the obviousness of 'deterrence' ideology. Having first briefly traced the transfer since 1945 of 'deter', 'deterrent' and 'deterrence' from the domestic (especially juridical) sphere to the increasingly specialized discourses of international relations or the Cold War ('atomic bombs deter communist aggression'), he proposes that 'deterrent' obfuscates the role of human agency in a different way than the other two terms. Specifically, he argues, "when the semantic make-up of the participants in a sentence involving deterrent is not specified (left out or left ambiguous) in discourse, then a discourse processor will supply default interpretations deriving from the [...] nuclear and Cold War frame of beliefs" (1985L: 113-114). This notion of a 'frame of beliefs', to be 'triggered' by certain terms and not alternative ones, stands in as a form of analytical shorthand to describe the means by which a range of factors (lexical, grammatical, situational and so forth) manifest in a type of conceptual logic.

Chilton provides the following example of discourse incoherences to illustrate how specific beliefs are present in a frame:

- (3) a The bomb is a deterrent. Thus Russians do not attack Europe.
- b ?The bomb is a deterrent. The Americans do not attack Russia.

Evidently, (3)b is a deviation of sorts from 'the normal', an anomaly not to be theorized in terms of ostensibly inherent semantic properties of 'deterrent', but rather, Chilton contends, "in terms of a preference order of frames: ideological frames at a historical moment" (1985b: 116). In this way, it becomes noticeably awkward to speak of the 'Soviet deterrent', just as it is to speak of the 'American threat', because the opposite is 'true'.

Framing Deterrence

Thornborrow (1988) extends this analysis by attempting to situate the 'ideological load' carried by 'deter', 'deterrent' and 'deterrence' in relation to certain related semantic factors. 'Deter', she argues, is 'ideologically useful' precisely because it is recognized as being 'semantically apt for the job' (1988: 38). That is, this term 'fits' into 'strategic' discourse due to two further characteristics of its usage: first, it facilitates the concealment or obscuration of the role of human agency in the 'deployment' of a 'nuclear deterrent'. By way of historical parallel, she writes: "Hadrian's wall deterred the Picts from invading England in the same kind of way, not just because it was an obstacle in itself, but because there were constantly Roman soldiers parading up and down it!" (1988: 46). Second, 'deter' connotes a sense of *appropriateness* that its rival, *unsuitable* terms do not, even if they are

syntactically possible. Implied in this notion of appropriateness is the precept that a user of 'deter' in a statement can purposefully leave unspecified certain semantic details on the assumption that the listener will be able to ascertain what is missing in light of pre-existing (shared) 'Cold War belief frames'.

Where 'deter' differs from 'dissuade' or 'prevent', then, is in terms of the distinct ideological advantages for the speaker in being able to leave certain undesirable or negative elements unsaid: that is, elements that the alternative terms would still permit to be 'ruled in'. Furthermore, this feature is directly linked to the relative ease with which these empty spaces or gaps can be filled in by the listener who recognizes the highly specific context implied by the selection of 'deter' over the others.

A fascinating illustration of a number of the implications of this 'filling in' process vis a vis the complex mobilization of 'deterrence' ideology in British defence debate is carried out by Montgomery, Tolson and Garton (1989). Here analysis first centres on remarks made by Neil Kinnock, leader of the opposition Labour Party, in a television interview with David Frost during the 1987 General Election campaign. Asked by Frost to speculate as to what he, if elected Prime Minister, would do should a 'non-nuclear' Britain be threatened by an aggressor who possessed nuclear weapons, Kinnock replied:

(A) "In those circumstances, the choice is again posed - and this is the classical choice - of either exterminating everything that you stand for and, I'll use the phrase 'the flower of your youth', or using resources that you've got to make any occupation totally untenable, untenable.'

(B) "And of course, any effort to occupy Western Europe, or certainly to occupy the United Kingdom, would be utterly untenable and any potential force knows that very well and are not going to be ready to engage in attempting to dominate conditions that they couldn't dominate."

As Montgomery, Tolson and Garton proceed to document, diverse glossings of Kinnock's statement, such as the *Daily Telegraph's* 'Guerilla war a deterrent says Kinnock', made the front pages of every newspaper, and received extensive coverage in subsequent television news bulletins.

The campaign issue of an adequate defence policy for Britain very quickly underwent a radical reformulation as 'Kinnock's gaffe' was used by commentators as a basis to project various hypotheses and scenarios regarding, first, a foreign occupation of a 'non-nuclear' Britain, and second, the impact of the remarks on the election chances of the Labour Party. The precise content of the original statement was only rarely quoted in media accounts, and thus was soon displaced. Superseding it were a range of glossings which assumed discursive prominence to the detriment of the preferred definitions formally advanced by the Labour Party. Consequently, Montgomery, Tolson and Garton ask, what are

the formal or consistent characteristics of these glossings articulated in defence talk? To address the effectivity of the successful glossings in relation to their inflection in popular cultural vocabularies, the apparent 'logics' of interpretation and presupposition at work had to be problematized.

Four component elements of this articulation process are identified in this research as follows: first, the original utterance is not quoted, thus disclaimers become a routine feature of the glossed explanations ('This appears to me to be...'); second, in attempting to fix or delimit the range of possible interpretations, the glossing activity endeavours to regulate potential ambiguities such that they reflect badly on Kinnock; third, far from being automatic, the patterns of inference in this activity are both elaborative and evaluative; and, fourth: this inferencing activity is dependent upon implicit (ideological) normative assumptions, the general patterning of which can be explicated (1989: 182-184).

To account for the hegemonic construction whereby 'using all the resources you've got to make any occupation totally untenable' is made the equivalent to 'a policy of surrender' or 'an invitation to attack', Montgomery, Tolson and Garton begin by outlining a general series of core bridging assumptions:

1. A nation has enemies.
2. Enemies are potential aggressors.

3. Potential aggressors are prepared to attack.

4. Some weapons deter a potential aggressor.

Accordingly, from (4) can be derived:

5. Some weapons do not deter a potential aggressor.

To the extent that these core assumptions are embedded within the naturalized logics of official common sense reasoning, (4) implies that the weapons which deter are nuclear, whereas (5) 'conventional' weapons do not.

Similarly, once the phrase 'a nation' is filled with the proper noun 'Britain' and 'a potential aggressor' by 'the Soviet Union', the rudimentary contours of what Montgomery, Tolson and Garton call the 'Nuclear Blackmail Script' are accentuated. That is, in noting that inferential processes (1) to (5) are (ideo)logical in character, such that the implicit reasoning takes the form of an argument, they suggest that "it seems that a further set of speculative inferences can be made, which are not so much a series of propositions, as possible narrative scenarios" (1989: 185).

The subsequent inflection of this common sense reasoning through narrative scripts results, in this specific instance, as follows:

6.1 Britain relinquishes nuclear weapons.

6.2 (By doing so) Britain loses its deterrent.

6.3 (Thus) Britain cannot deter the Soviet Union (see 4 and 5).

6.4 The Soviet Union threatens nuclear strikes against Britain.

6.5 Britain surrenders to threat.

6.6 The Soviet Union occupies Britain.

The key point to be recognized about these assumptions, Montgomery, Tolson and Garton maintain, is that "they interlock as a chain of actions and consequences, in which hypothetical consequences are derived from possible actions in a speculative narrative of cause and effect" (1989: 185-186). Moreover, embedded within this chain of 'stereotypical event sequences' are certain anthropomorphic precepts which position the 'personality' of Britain-as-actor in opposition to the traits attributed to the Soviet Union as 'potential aggressor'; features which the investigation of 'scripts' brings, even if only partially, to the fore for analysis.

In describing this script as a sedimented form of common sense, this study highlights the fluidity of its arrangement, including how it is made to merge and overlap with various components of other scripts to achieve the most favourable narrative outcome. For example, 'The Bully Script':

7.1 If you have the strength to stand up to a bully he leaves you alone.

7.2 But if you are too weak to stand up to a bully he persecutes you.

Or, alternatively, 'The Occupation Script':

8.1. The government of the weaker nation surrenders.

8.2. But the population engages in heroic if piecemeal resistance.

Thus returning to Kinnock's original utterance, Montgomery, Tolson and Garton contend that the glosses initially invoked individual scripts in a partial or elliptical fashion, yet as they developed a greater degree of each script became explicit. As the scripts outlined above would indicate, there are points where they are interrelate or interwoven: at this moment of overlap, the scripts reinforce each other and, moreover, the crucial (unspoken) taken-for-grantedness upon which they rest. The ensuing news discourses, in this instance, were systematically framed in ways which followed the path marked out by the presuppositions of these established scripts. That is, the convergence of various 'deterrence' scripts across the terrain of 'defence debate' provided for the news media narrative scenarios that, being very difficult to challenge, could then be naturalized as common sense.

Rescripting Myths of Deterrence

Former President Ronald Reagan's 23 March 1983 'Star Wars Speech' marked an unexpected call for the 'end of nuclear deterrence'. Under the rubric of the 'Strategic Defence Initiative', or simply 'SDI', a massive effort would be launched to develop new forms of experimental laser and particle-beam technologies, the expressed purpose of which would be to intercept and destroy Soviet 'strategic ballistic missiles' immediately following their 'release' to

'disarm' the United States and its allies. In retrospect, the 'Star Wars Speech' clearly constituted a decisive shift in United States 'arms race policy'. First, in calling on the 'scientific community' "who gave us nuclear weapons [...] to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete," President Reagan was signalling a realignment of nuclear armament policy beyond the concept of 'deterrence' based on the doctrine of 'Mutual Assured Destruction' (or 'MAD'). Second, the implementation of 'SDI' would be in direct violation of the 'Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty' of 1972 with its ban on weapons in space, as well as the United Nations Treaty on the 'Peaceful Uses of Outer Space' signed in 1967 by the two 'superpowers'. Accordingly, the 'Star Wars Speech' was the initial step undertaken by the Reagan administration in a lengthy campaign to placate public fears that the real purpose of 'SDI' lay in its capacity as a 'preemptive offensive strike weapon'. Widespread skepticism from critics of the plan was anticipated: beginning with the dramatic unveiling of the prudent 'Peace Shield' strategy before the television audience, the aim was to define the military system as one motivated by purely defensive, even peaceful, intentions.

To address the 'rhetorical impact of Star Wars', Rushing (1986a) suggests, the 'Star Wars' speech is best viewed as an interdependent part of a 'culturally evolving mythic whole'. She argues that Reagan is attempting to

'rescript' history by drawing on the power of a New Frontier (space) myth, one which has evolved from that of the Old West, with the explicit aim of encapsulating "technical reasoning within a myth which creates the illusion of both preserving science and transcending its transgressions" (1986a: 416). The technological 'race' of the two 'superpowers' for 'nuclear balance' has culminated in a reliance on, in the President's words, "the specter of retaliation, on mutual threat. And that's a sad commentary on the human condition" (Reagan cited in Rushing, 1986a: 419; see also Manoff, 1988a).

How, then, to restrain technoscience-as-agency, given that it is 'a little too smart for our own good'? That is, if scientific knowledge can not be 'unlearned', and if science can not be trusted to 'take apart its own gadgets' (there would still be the risk that each would later be reassembled), then a third option must be discovered. Rushing describes the logic implicit in the Reagan alternative this way: "why not simply expand the scene in which science works to encompass its boundless genius rather than to restrict it - that is, why not redefine scene to serve purpose? That way, this still - worshipped deity can create new, improved agencies with a mission to fight it out with those past, unfortunate agencies-turned-devils. Thus, our acts will now be directed towards the renewed ultimate purpose in which paradise lost will be regained and the fallen angel (science) may re-ascend" (1986a: 419-420; see

also Angus and Cook, 1987; Dornan, 1989). 'SDI' is therefore to be defined in transcendent terms: if 'nuclear deterrence' is two enemies (good nation versus 'Evil Empire') pointing six-guns at one another, then new technology should be found to 'save lives' rather than to simply 'avenge them'. 'Missile defence' is a battle against weapons, Reagan insists, not people.

In seeking to frame 'SDI' as a new mode of 'defence' against the threat posed by Soviet nuclear weapons, a precept as illusory as it is rhetorically effective, President Reagan had to revise or re-script the prevailing assumptions about the contradictions underpinning 'nuclear deterrence' as a strategic concept. As Goodnight (1986) writes: "By contrasting faith in American achievement and technological ability with traditional suspicions of foreign powers and diplomacy, by questioning the profoundly immoral and unpragmatic act of revenge necessary to make deterrence credible, and by identifying a concrete means to actualize the possibility of defence, Reagan tapped into a reservoir of public support that enabled him to put the nuclear weapons buildup into a favourable perspective" (1986: 407). An answer to the nuclear dilemma, then, 'SDI' is advanced as a coherent 'vision of the future which offers hope': or was it? Reagan, in defining the central purpose of this new policy for 'truly lasting stability', does allow for a crucial contradiction to emerge in the final portion of the

speech; one which, as Schiappa (1989) notes, would become increasingly pronounced soon after its broadcast.

Briefly, the difficulty revolves around whether or not the programmatic goal of 'SDI' is to 'protect' the civilian population or, alternatively, 'our nuclear forces'. These two visions of 'SDI' are, as Schiappa contends, dramatically different: "population defense was billed by Reagan as a way to eliminate the doctrine of 'mutually assured destruction' (or 'MAD') while missile defense is seen as augmenting 'MAD'" (1989: 266). This inconsistency is ostensibly left unresolved so as to ensure the continued production of ever-more nuclear weapons in the name of 'deterrence' while, at the same time, preparing the basis for the projection of a future without them. Much of the opposition to the program has failed to highlight this emergent contradiction, focusing instead on the 'feasibility' of 'SDI' as a perfect 'defence' system. The operative question is: how will it work? This when, as Linenthal (1989) stresses, "there is no 'it'; there is only the 'I' in SDI, an appealing vision of a world made secure through missile defense or an appalling vision of a world nearer nuclear catastrophe because of missile defense" (1989: xiii).

The ensuing debate over the appropriate, truthful interpretation of this 'vision' has thus quickly translated into a fierce struggle over the effective use of persuasive images and symbols. 'Image achievements' for supporters of 'SDI' largely resulted from the use of symbols of conquest

(space is the 'final frontier'), of fear (an 'SDI gap' is opening up between 'us' and 'them'), of 'self-reliance' ('Isn't it time to put our survival back under our own control?', Reagan asks), and of purity and transformation ('SDI' is a benevolent, morally superior entity, one designed to usher in a new, post-nuclear age) (1989: 42-70). If 'deterrence' has clearly 'worked' since 1945, despite the Soviet 'quest for nuclear superiority' and the criticism of domestic 'subversives', it is nonetheless a 'necessary evil' to be replaced by the 'moral alternative' of 'SDI'. It follows, by this logic, that the abolition of nuclear weapons, the 'hopeful future' envisioned by anti-nuclear activists', becomes little more than utopian in contrast with the sound practicalities of 'missile defence'. Confronted with this dynamic, opponents of 'SDI' drew upon those symbols which accentuated the perilous implications of the 'Grand Vision'.

Critics of the 'SDI' program would often take as a key point of contention the 'blind faith in technological progress' perceived to be underpinning the arguments of its supporters. Here the explosion of the space-shuttle Challenger, and the later 'melt-down' of the nuclear reactor at Chernobyl, were frequently cited by opponents "to remind the public how dangerous it was to place ultimate confidence in any complex technological system" (1989: 78). Concomitant charges were levelled that 'SDI' would upset the delicate 'nuclear balance' and 'arms control interests',

that is was an extraordinarily inefficient use of limited financial resources, and that it constituted an immoral response to the pressing risks of the 'nuclear age'. According to Linenthal, "all of their objections stemmed from the uncomfortable truth that nuclear vulnerability was as much a part of reality as the air people breathed" (1989: 112). Today, the definitions of 'SDI' supporters are increasingly 'commanding the field' ostensibly due, in part, to this public language of innovation, progress and salvation. Opponents of 'SDI' must not lose the conflict over persuasive symbols in the larger struggle to articulate this 'nuclear vulnerability'.

Nuclearism as a Terrain of Struggle

Much of the research on nuclear discourse or nukespeak examined to this point in the discussion clearly signals a significant break from earlier efforts to theorize textual effectivity. As has been shown, if to isolate a single element of nukespeak and attribute to it the capacity to arbitrarily define the 'nuclear reality' is somewhat fanciful, so too is a view of social meaning as the stable, invariant product of a discursive process. As I have sought to demonstrate *vis a vis* the conceptual trajectory marked out both in this chapter and the previous one, the fundamental presupposition that dominant or ruling ideologies are realized epiphenomenally within texts must be carefully

reconsidered. The various conceptual interventions evaluated here have thus been read in accordance with a very selective strategy which should now be apparent; namely, one designed to avoid reducing 'common sense' to a synonym for 'dominant ideology', primarily by bringing to the fore the importance of accounting for the indeterminacies and contradictions of the relations of signification across which the preferred logics of nuclearism are inscribed.

This chapter, in grappling with a series of problems engendered by rigid, monolithic formulations of linguistic determination (as if discourse was exempt from contradiction) has, at the same time, sought to extend and develop a number of issues raised in Chapter Two. There a key argument was advanced that one of the most fundamental organizing elements integrated within the social relations of news production is an unequal distribution of power to communicate. Indeed, this assessment of current research on media power detailed a range of the most pronounced mechanisms implicated in the routines of news production as they work to entangle notions of *newsworthiness* in webs of facticity. Studies were drawn upon to show that in order to achieve the recognized 'credibility' required to be a 'legitimate' or 'trustworthy' candidate for the purpose of appropriation within the news net, individuals or groups attempting to mobilize alternative definitions of the situation are often forced to accommodate or adapt to the narrow confines of legitimated topic parameters.

Moreover, several of these studies attempted to document how, in terms of access to the news frame, the individual news outlets constitute sites of discursive conflict between different institutional voices seeking to articulate 'what really happened' in accordance with their respective assessment of the 'facts at hand'. An effort was made to describe how the imperatives of this struggle are processed by newswriters in terms of certain normative assumptions regarding what properly constitutes an *objective* or *balanced* news account, a complex dynamic with serious implications for the very construction of the thematics around which public debate is focused.

Attention has also been directed to how the tempo or rhythm of newswriting works to prioritize an emphasis on events, not issues. Where the former have a 'beginning', a 'middle' and an 'end', and are therefore easily processed as derivative of the *factual*, the latter implies that the line of demarcation separating the realm of 'facts' from the realm of 'interpretation' and 'explanation' has been crossed. This when 'objective' reporting dictates that this line always be respected. Hence the structural dependence on reliable institutional sources who produce 'consequential events'. These sources, as has been shown, allow for certainty to be built into the reporting process, principally through the imposition of predictability (even a certain 'rationality') vis a vis the confusion of the social world (see Bybee, 1990; Clayman, 1990; Ericson, Baranek, and

Chan, 1989; Fishman, 1980; Rock, 1981, Schlesinger, 1990; Tuchman, 1978, 1972).

Arguably the most important point about this relationship between the news media and this hierarchy of institutional definers is that it permits the most powerful institutional voices to set down the initial definition or primary interpretation of the news topic to be processed. In most instances, according to the research of Hall et al (1978), this interpretation will then be mobilized to 'command the field' with the likely result that it will, in turn, establish the terms of reference within which all further coverage (as well as any subsequent 'debate') takes place. "Arguments against a primary interpretation," Hall et al stress, "are forced to insert themselves into its definition of 'what is at issue': they must begin from this framework of interpretation as their starting-point. This initial interpretive framework [...] is extremely difficult to alter fundamentally, once established" (1978: 58-59). The limits of topicality, once set down, may be transgressed only by those voices willing to respect the rules of newsworthiness.

Thus to highlight the substantive conceptual advantages to be secured for an exploration of the cultural dynamics of nuclearism via this view to the news media as fields across which discursive struggles transpire over newsworthiness, it is necessary to advance a reconsideration of the problem of public acquiescence to official definitions of nuclear

reality. Here it is argued that this particular aim may be most effectively achieved by prioritizing for investigation the materiality of language and ideology in the fluid construction of *common sense*.

At stake, then, is the need to close the conceptual gap between Chapter Two's approach to media power and the insights generated from current research on nuclear discourse or nukespeak. Consequently, the most productive elements of the various conceptual strategies organized to address the implication of state power in the linguistic mechanisms of nuclearism described above must be set in relation to a more rigorous theoretical accounting of the re-articulation by the news media of authoritative facts to speak the defence issue field.

The Fluidity of Common Sense

An exploration of how the preferred logics of nuclearism, together with their gaps, fissures and silences, are mobilized in terms of common sensical frameworks is contingent, in turn, upon an understanding of what Marx describes as the 'solidity of popular beliefs'. That is, to reaffirm the epistemological value of the Marxian proposition that consciousness of structural conflicts is acquired and ultimately 'fought out' on the level of ideologies, this project will seek to extend the research agenda mapped thus far by adopting a revised Gramscian approach to

'intellectual or moral leadership' or hegemony.

Specifically, in looking to centre the problem of hegemony so as to proffer a range of insights into the inscription of these logics in common sense, the precise effectivity of nuclearism in terms of its role as an agent of unification binding together a bloc of diverse social forces is key. The question will thus be posed as to the extent to which nuclearism regulates the ideological terrain upon which these discursive struggles are situated across the field of the daily press.

A critical analysis concomitant with a Gramscian dismissal of any view to ideology which elides the historical specificity of its material force in and through ideas will thus refine certain crucial aspects of the research on nuclear discourse or nukespeak examined above. Such an approach would proceed to look beyond the validity of the content of ideas or popular beliefs so as to consider the operative social forces behind them. A much broader category than ideology, 'common sense' in its Gramscian formulation signifies this uncritical and largely unconscious way of perceiving and understanding the world as it organizes habitual daily experience. Far from being a strictly arbitrary (or 'unorganic') individual elaboration of systematically coherent concepts about the world, common sense is to be identified as "a cultural battle to transform the popular 'mentality' and to diffuse the philosophical innovations which will demonstrate themselves to be

'historically true' to the extent that they become concretely - i.e. historically and socially - universal" (Gramsci, 1971: 348).

Here the conceptual framework to be advanced in the case study's investigation of nuclearism needs to be further qualified through a consideration of how popular conceptions of the 'nuclear reality' help to produce norms of conduct. To take advantage of the Gramscian view of language as both a 'living thing' and a 'museum of fossils of life and civilizations' so as to elucidate the discursive effectivity of common sense, it is precisely this question of how words 'absorb' and 'carry with them' meaning or ideological content that is crucial. If, after Gramsci, "the fact of 'language' is in reality a multiplicity of facts more or less organically coherent and coordinated" (1971: 349; emphasis added), it follows that no new historical situation will completely transform language in its 'external formal aspect', but only with respect to its content (presumably the change is so subtle as to pass unnoticed).

This shift away from previous conceptions of ideology as a 'system of ideas' so as to secure a new emphasis on the complex matrix of power struggles played out at the level of meaning is crucial for our purposes here. This recognition that there are embedded within language contradictory conceptions of the world (distinct responses to problems 'posed by reality') underscores the very fluidity of the common sense of nuclearism. Common sense, as the site upon

which 'dominant ideology' is constructed, is, at the same time, the site of resistance to its efficacy. Neither rigid nor immobile, then, the common sense of nuclearism is constantly renewing itself as new ideas enter daily life and encounter the sedimentation left behind by this 'contradictory, ambiguous, chaotic aggregate of disparate conceptions' (1971: 422-423). Social praxis, necessary for ideology as social or organic 'cement' to solidify, necessarily marks the seams along which it may ultimately be cracked and broken.

Evidently, the Gramscian notion of hegemony, with the attendant emphasis on the contradictory, common sensical internalization by subaltern groups of dominant or 'official' values and definitions, offers an important advance beyond the conceptual limitations of certain Orwellian precepts concerned with linguistic aspects of social control. For a study of nuclearism, the problem of hegemony is central, particularly to the degree that it, as a strategic concept, can be operationalized to speak to how 'voluntary' public compliance with the preferred logics of nuclearism will vary in intensity vis a vis social praxis and, moreover, how it is that different types of commitment are actively negotiated through struggle on the terrain of the very legitimacy of 'ruling ideas', that of signification.

Still, to develop a view of nuclear discourse or nuke-speak as a nexus of interpretive claims, several conceptual

dichotomies underpinning this schematization of language as an instrument of ruling class hegemony (such as hegemonic/subaltern, organic/unorganic, active/passive or unitary/fragmentary) clearly need to be further refined. Similarly, the implications of the Gramscian emphasis on common sense as a complex and disjointed 'infinity of traces' anchored to the interests of the ruling class (yet never simply identical with its ideology) will have to be assessed vis a vis the 'truthful content' of nukespeak as a discursive form. If, after Gramsci, it is impossible to find confirmation of 'truth' by referring to common sense alone, a critical discourse analysis must extend his claim that there exists within common sense various conceptions of the world from which the individual may choose by seeking to explore the (unrecognized) coercive constraints delimiting the range of these choices.

As these points would indicate, a formal retention of the view of 'dominant ideology' as an amalgam of ideologies coincidental with the interests of a ruling class is itself highly restrictive. All too often, conceptions of 'dominant ideology', even those which ascribe to it a heterogeneous nature, consistently reaffirm the assertion that it necessarily functions to preserve through mystification the unity of conflicting power relations such that the 'ideology of the masses' is, by fiat, narrowed to the point where it may be defined as 'untruthful'. The fluidity of common sense (which, as noted above, does possess 'true' elements),

ultimately becomes fixed, even if only in the last instance, via the dynamics of the 'dominant ideology' to which it is subordinate. It is precisely this question of the 'fixity' of 'truth' that must be distinguished for a critical exploration of the common sense of nuclearism beyond its formulation as 'dominant ideology'.

Chapter Four, by electing to prioritize the need to further develop a materialist approach to explicate the (hierarchical) naturalization of this ideological effectivity, prepares the ground for the dissertation's attempt to offer a concrete investigation of its inscription in the language of official and news texts. Thus, by the conclusion of the next chapter, a formal statement of the analytical imperatives to be adopted in the course of the dissertation's case study will have been secured.

CHAPTER FOUR

WHEN WORDS FAIL: A POLITICS OF TRUTH

Introduction to Chapter Four

Is the reality of nuclear war a reality contained within language? To answer in the affirmative would spark considerable consternation on the part of those researchers posited within a traditional Durkheimian, positivistic approach to social reality, one where that reality is assumed to be an empirical fact external to the (essential) individual. Certainly in light of Chapter Three's investigation of various approaches to theorizing nuclear discourse or nukespeak, however, it would be imprudent to dismiss the question so easily. To briefly highlight the conceptual basis for this chapter's elaboration of an alternative, yet complementary approach to dismantling the cultural dynamics of nuclearism, a radical thesis advanced by Jacques Derrida (1984) serves as a fascinating point of departure.

Derrida, in his essay "No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives)," offers the proposition that "nuclear weaponry depends, more than any weaponry in the past, it seems, upon structures of information and communication, structures of language, including non-vocalizable language, structures of codes and graphic

decoding. But the phenomenon is fabulously textual also to the extent that, for the moment, a nuclear war has not taken place: one can only talk and write about it" (1984: 23). It is Derrida's contention that the hypothesis (or 'fantasy' or 'phantasm') of a 'total nuclear war' conditions every discourse and all related strategies in this the 'nuclear age', as a nuclear war has no precedent: "it is a non-event" (1984: 23). Consequently, a non-localizable nuclear war exists only through what is said of it (and where this speaking takes place); it is a fable or fiction, even a speculation or fabulous specularization. "The terrifying reality of the nuclear conflict," he suggests, "can only be the signified referent never the real referent (present or past) of a discourse or a text. At least today apparently" (1984: 23). To retain the metaphor of specularization, then, the 'breaking of the mirror' would signal, through an act of language, the very occurrence of nuclear war: "Who can swear that our unconscious is not expecting this? dreaming of it, desiring it?" (1984: 23).

At first glance, it may appear that Derrida is electing to reduce 'the nuclear issue' to a simple 'fable'. This is a view which he moves quickly to dispel by pointing out that it is not his intention to deny the "massive 'reality' of nuclear weaponry and of the terrifying forces of destruction that are being stockpiled and capitalized everywhere, that are coming to constitute the very movement of capitalization. One has to distinguish between this 'reality' of the

nuclear age and the fiction of war" (1984: 23). Here it should be noted that the point of demarcation between this 'reality' and the 'fiction of war' is itself problematic, as for Derrida, the two are actually one and the same. As he writes, in his own inimitable style, "it is the war (in other words the fable) that triggers this fabulous war effort, this senseless capitalization of sophisticated weaponry, this speed race in search of speed, this crazy precipitation which, through techno-science, through all the techno-scientific inventiveness that it motivates, structures not only the army, diplomacy, politics, but the whole of the human *scholē, paideia*" (1984: 23). 'Reality', in this equation, is itself constructed by the fable on the basis of a non-event, an invention yet to take place. Such a dissolution of the science/belief (or *epistēmē/doxa*) dichotomy thus anticipates the question: is all that is left opinion?

This chapter, having prioritized the Derridian claim that 'the worldwide organization of the human *socius* today hangs by the thread of nuclear rhetoric', marks its commitment to exploring various attempts to theorize the mechanisms in and through which socially located meaning systems delimit the range of potential meanings about the nuclear threat to certain preferred, common sensical ones. As such, it is organized to continue with the work of formulating a conceptual framework for a critical discourse analysis of the embeddedness of this 'nuclear reality' in official and

news discourse. This framework will build upon the insights proffered in the course of Chapter Two's elucidation of the media power problematic as well as Chapter Three's assessment of the advances made in researching nuclear discourse or nukespeak.

Evidently, to develop the tools to investigate the ideological effectivity of various discourses working to naturalize the regulatory logics of nuclearism, a conceptual space must be established for the examination of its hegemonic or preferred representations. In other words, this chapter turns our attention to the need to develop the analytical means to discern to what extent and by what means the social relations of speaking the 'nuclear reality' are structured in dominance.

Confronted with the problem of disentangling the naturalization of the cultural dynamics of nuclearism, this dissertation is compelled to grapple with the highly complex forms of referentiality inflected in the very obviousness of factual accounts of the social world. Accordingly, in electing to confirm, after Gramsci, that the hegemonic integration of official definitions with popularized conceptions of what is 'historically true' is never accomplished once and for all (or, after Derrida, that the appearance of 'truth' will coincide with the apocalypse), this project will seek to trace the faultlines of common sense as it is continually renewed through struggle. That is, to examine the mobilization of official regimes of truth constitutive

of nuclearism in news discourse is, at the same time, to identify the minute tears or rupture points which compromise its efficacy.

As will be shown, marring official claims of universal validity (and the complementary interpretive frameworks demarcating a preferred orthodoxy) is the friction of heterodoxy. A central task of the form of critical discourse analysis to be mobilized in the case study is the evocation of the dis-junctures, fissures, and gaps in the construction and popular dispersal of these claims and definitions as 'truthful'. Consequently, attention presently turns to the apposite writings of Mikhail Bakhtin, Michel Foucault and Michel Pecheux for the purpose of constructing a conceptual strategy capable of assisting with the discernment of the dialogic nature of authoritative truth about 'Canadian security in the nuclear age'.

Dialogicizing Nuclear Ideology

The first point of import in Bakhtin's (1981a, 1981b, 1981c, 1981d, Bakhtin/Volosinov, 1973) work pertinent to this investigation of nuclearism concerns the previous chapter's stated commitment to further accentuate the question of social conflict embodied in discourse beyond the Gramscian formulation. Bakhtin/Volosinov's research contributes to this task of clarification by stressing that an ideological product is "not only itself a part of a real-

ity (natural or social), just as is any physical body, any instrument of production, or any product of consumption, it also, in contradistinction to these other phenomena, reflects and refracts another reality outside itself" (1973: 9). The key point to be underscored here is that any object or phenomenon may be regarded as ideological once it is made to shadow or represent another reality or meaning beyond its given particularity in socio-economic relations. Still a part of material reality (embodied in, for example, sound, physical mass, colour, or body gestures), it is now to be theorized as an 'objective sign' for everything ideological possesses semiotic value (subject to normative evaluation).

This conceptual articulation of the domain of ideology with the world of signs allows Bakhtin/Volosinov to argue that if the sign and the effects it produces occur in outer experience, then it is through treating the ideological as the medium of communication that the individual consciousness may be posited as a social-ideological fact (1973: 12). Nurtured on signs, this 'fact' takes its material shape in accordance with the logic and laws of a social group's semiotic interaction; it "can harbour only in the image, the word, the meaningful gesture, and so forth. Outside such material, there remains the sheer physiological act unilluminated by consciousness, i.e., without having light shed on it, without having meaning given to it, by signs" (1973: 13).

Bakhtin/Volosinov is clearly setting up for a discussion of nuclearism a critical set of questions via this assertion that the reality of ideological phenomena is the reality of social signs. How to demonstrate, for example, that the preferred logics of common sense discourses about the 'nuclear reality' are themselves directly regulated by the total aggregate of social and economic laws without, at the same time, falling victim to the dangers of economism in the resultant form of analysis? The extent to which Bakhtin/Volosinov's formulations allow us to escape this and related difficulties will be elaborated upon shortly; here it may be noted that the main force of the problem is cautiously side-stepped by likening individual consciousness not to an architect of ideological superstructures, but rather to a tenant lodging in the social edifice of ideological signs (1973: 13). It follows that to investigate the conditions and forms of social communication and its materialization in signs, the language of nuclearism will have to be centred for analysis. For nowhere else but in language, or in this instance nuclear discourse or nukespeak, is this semiotic quality and the role of social communication as 'conditioning factor' appear so definitively expressed: "*the word is the ideological phenomenon par excellence*" (1973: 13).

A word, as the 'purest and most sensitive medium of social intercourse', has its entire reality 'wholly absorbed' in its function of being a (neutral) sign residing

between individuals. Before exploring the implications of this shift, Bakhtin/Volosinov first proceeds to explicate a secondary constitutive property, namely the role of the word as the semiotic material of inner life (consciousness) or 'innerspeech'. That is, in recasting the obscured intricacies of individual consciousness as inner speech (words can function as signs without being outwardly expressed), Bakhtin/Volosinov is free to address the unconscious as a level of effectivity. Once it is accepted that a word 'accompanies and comments on' each ideological act, the dependency on inner speech of all processes of understanding is then confirmed: "all manifestations of ideological creativity - all other nonverbal signs - are bathed by, suspended in, and cannot be entirely segregated or divorced from the element of speech" (1973: 15).

This is not to suggest, however, that a specific ideological sign is wholly replaceable by words (words, he points out, ultimately cannot adequately convey a musical composition or pictorial image). Rather, once a sign has been assigned meaning, it becomes by definition part of the *unity of the constituted consciousness*. In the place of orthodox views to mechanical causality, particularly one where the dictates of an economic base or infrastructure are regarded as being determinative of the form and 'content' of nuclearist ideologies, Bakhtin/Volosinov is attempting to shed new light on this conceptual dilemma by theorizing "how actual existence (the basis) determines sign and how sign

reflects and refracts existence in its process of generation" (1973: 19). It is the very properties of the word as an ideological sign which render it the most appropriate point of departure.

The Vitality of Multi-accentuality

From the vantage point of a Bakhtinian analysis, the importance of 'the word' for a study of nuclearism concerns its social ubiquity: that is, the word as sign "is implicated in literally each and every act or contact between people [...] Countless ideological threads running through all areas of social intercourse register effect in the word. It stands to reason, then, that the word is the most sensitive index of social changes, and what is more, of changes still in the process of growth, still without definitive shape and not as yet accommodated into already regularized and fully defined ideological systems" (1973: 19).

A principal task of the study of nuclearism, following this conception of the word working as barometer (registering the shifting, transitory phases of ideological creativity, however provisional), would be to trace this 'social life of the sign'. Moreover, in assuming that the extended range of conditions, forms and types of communication between people (as well as the themes of speech performances) are, in turn, shaped by production relations and the sociopolitical order, then the problem of this relationship

of determination between the sign and existence comes to the fore. How is it that alterations in the hierarchical organization of the participants and the immediate conditions of their interaction combine to change the forms of signs and therefore, ultimately, the projection of the sign itself?

After all, to state that social communication (concrete forms and thematic content) is shaped or conditioned by the material basis still leaves unexplored the precise nature of the hierarchical interplay of social factors in and through signs (both inner and outer). To contend that sign communities are decisively ordered by economic factors is to simultaneously ask how the refraction of existence in the ideological sign is determined as *natural* (or even, in cynical terms, as *inevitable*: see Sloterdijk, 1987). Here Bakhtin/Volosinov makes a vital contribution to the issues at hand with his notion of the *multi-accentuality* of a sign's social value. A sign maintains its 'vitality' or directional force in relation to "an intersecting of differently oriented social interests within one and the same sign community, i.e., *by the class struggle*" (1973: 23). The multi-accentuality of the sign, then, is confirmed by the intersecting of accents.

Nuclearism thus becomes a dynamic arena for the clash of power in words as ruling voices struggle to "impart a supraclass, eternal character to the ideological sign, to extinguish or drive inward the struggle between social value judgments which occurs in it, to make the sign uniaccental"

(1973: 23). This when, according to Bakhtin/Volosinov, each sign has, after Janus, two faces: each has embedded within it a contradiction or *inner dialectic quality* which 'comes out fully in the open' during a period of crisis. During an ordinary period, however, a contradiction underpinning a sign established within 'dominant ideology' can not disclose completely its features because it is "always somewhat reactionary and tries, as it were, to stabilize the preceding factor in the dialectical flux of the social generative process, so accentuating yesterday's truth as to make it appear today's" (1973: 24).

This 'eternal character' of the hegemonic signs of nuclear discourse is not to be viewed as a re-statement of the Orwellian thesis where the ruling dictates or the state are necessarily absorbed by subaltern classes through language. After all, as Bakhtin/Volosinov notes, 'any current truth must inevitably sound to many other people as the greatest lie', by which he implies that the ostensibly arbitrary nature of sign communities is much more complex than it appears to be at first glance. If indeed the meaning of a word is determined entirely by its context (the product of the living interaction of social forces), then a word will have as many meanings as there are contexts for its deployment: or will it?

For nuclearism to exist as a phenomenon to be described, there must be some form of unity beyond the word's phonetic composition, one which links the various

meanings to the word as a discernible entity 'belonging' to nuclear discourse. Bakhtin/Volosinov initiates a key maneuver here by insisting that while a word's evaluative accent changes in different contexts, it is equally important to recognize that at the same time "contexts do not stand side by side in a row, as if unaware of one another, but are in a state of constant tension, or incessant interaction and conflict" (1973: 80). By associating the problem of multi-accentuality with the problem of multiplicity of meanings, then, the issue of a unifying centre may in turn be addressed by explicating the conventions of the expression-experience dynamic. That is, to explore how expression organizes experience (it gives experience its form and specificity of direction) requires that the precise means by which the structure of an utterance is itself implicated in the immediate social situation be identified.

To approach the question of a unifying relation for an examination of nuclearism in official and news discourse, it is useful to recall that for Bakhtin/Volosinov an utterance is constructed between two socially organized persons (for our purposes, institutional voices). Research questions may thus be formulated to inquire into what happens to an utterance in the absence of a real addressee or, similarly, how it is that ideological creativity is oriented toward a stabilized social purview (see Chapter Two's discussion of inferentiality in newswork). Consequently, it is in his

elaboration of the means by which an addressee is presupposed by the speaker or writer that Bakhtin/Volosinov distinguishes a potential resolution to the problem of unity. The critical element is contained in the assertion that far from being neutral, each word is continuously oriented toward an addressee (each person's inner world and thought has its fixed social audience).

Each word of an official or news text, it follows, is 'a two-sided act'. That is, it is determined equally by whose word it is and for whom it is meant. As word, it is precisely the product of the reciprocal relationship between speaker and listener, addresser and addressee. Each and every word expresses the 'one' in relation to the 'other'." (1973: 86). To explicate the materiality of nuclearism in the texts under examination, then, analysis needs to consider the social relations which condition how the word drawn from the social stock of available signs is used or manipulated as a concrete utterance. Once each word as sign is recognized as 'common territory' shared by both addresser and addressee (each is shaped by the other's point of view), then the deployment of markers of address within the official or news text to encourage one reading over another come to the fore.

The Realities of Heteroglossia

The conceptual advantages to be gained by accounting for this question of dialogue are clear, especially when it is noted that earlier notions of nukespeak as a unitary form of language simply 'given' or 'reflected' by social conditions, or the prefigured dictates of dominant ideology, may at last be dismissed. A Bakhtinian analysis will instead begin with the precept that any posited system of linguistic norms such as nukespeak is, by definition, organized in constant opposition to the *realities of heteroglossia*.

Nuclearism, as a provisional system, may be viewed as waging a conflict to overcome the 'many-voicedness' of language: namely, the base condition governing the complex stratification of language into, amongst other interanimated elements, genre, register and inter-textuality (see also Kristeva, 1984). This discursive struggle to impose specific limits or pressures so as to unite and centralize 'verbal-ideological thought' is a never-ending contest to arrange or order heteroglossia into a 'correct' or 'practical' language (not under any condition accomplished completely). The firm, relatively stable linguistic nucleus underpinning nuclearism is thus conceived of as ideologically saturated; the resultant language of nukespeak will thus give expression to, after Bakhtin (1981d), "forces working toward concrete verbal and ideological unification and centralization, which develop in vital connection with the process of sociopolitical and cultural centralization" (1981d: 271).

It follows that embodied in nukespeak as a unitary language are what Bakhtin calls the *centripetal* (homogenizing, hierarchicizing) forces of the life of language; forces which, when drawn out, serve to shatter the illusion of that very unity. A Bakhtinian approach to nuclearism would therefore underscore its stratification into languages that are socio-ideological: for example, languages of state officials, strategic analysts, arms control experts, nuclear weapon technicians or even peace activists. The continuous processes of stratification and heteroglossia ensure for nukespeak a productive dynamic, for in addition to these centripetal forces there are always centrifugal (dispersing) forces operating to subvert fixed definitions. As Bakhtin notes, "alongside verbal-ideological centralization and unification, the uninterrupted processes of decentralization and disunification go forward" (1981d: 272). In due course, a critical discourse analysis can detail the productive quality of these impulses, as opposed to simply attributing to them a negative or negating function.

Bakhtin, in declaring that every concrete discourse (utterance) represents a point where both centripetal (monologic) and centrifugal (dialogic) forces are brought to bear, is confronted with the dilemma of identifying how it is that these processes of centralization and decentralization (or of unification and disunification) are made to intersect or 'collide' in language. Hence the care taken to

highlight the necessary dialogic character of the utterance in lived social time, as the resolution Bakhtin proposes rests on the recognition that every such utterance "not only answers the requirements of its own language as an individualized embodiment of a speech act, but it answers the requirements of heteroglossia as well; it is in fact an active participant in such speech diversity [...] Every utterance participates in the 'unitary language' (in its centripetal forces and tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and historical heteroglossia (the centrifugal, stratifying forces)" (1981d: 272).

To undertake a Bakhtinian analysis of nuclearism, the investigator needs to expose a given utterance as a *contradiction-ridden, tension-filled unity of two embattled tendencies in the life of language*. Each utterance is positioned, after all, within an authentic environment of dialogized heteroglossia as "anonymous and social as language, but simultaneously concrete, filled with specific content and accented as an individual utterance" (1981d: 272). For Bakhtin, the word is 'born' in dialogue. A critical discourse analysis may thus close the door firmly behind any view which continues to adhere to the precept that a word relates to its object in a singular way. Thus in assembling the analytical tools to deal with the 'life and behavior' of nuclearism in a contradictory and multi-languaged world, a critical discourse analysis needs to foreground for investigation the word's *living interaction*

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with an elastic environment of other, alien words about the same object or theme.

A Bakhtinian approach to Canadian defence policy, having elected to draw upon certain authorized signs such as 'peace', 'freedom' or 'democracy', would then question how each sign is directed toward its object. It is in this process of living interaction, whether on the pages of an official policy document or a daily newspaper, that the word is individualized and given 'stylistic shape'. That is, for Bakhtin, a concrete discourse or utterance "finds the object at which it was directed already as it were overlain with qualifications, open to dispute, charged with value, already enveloped in an obscuring mist - or, on the contrary, by the 'light' of alien words that have already been spoken about it. It is entangled, shot through with shared thoughts, points of view, alien value judgments and accents" (1981d: 276).

Accordingly, related discursive constructs, such as 'national security', 'nuclear deterrence', 'flexible response' or even 'the Soviet threat', will also assume their meaning and shape in a complex intersection of time (a particular historical moment) and space (a socially specific environment). [1] As the living condition of nukespeak as

1 Each word as sign, Bakhtin (1981d) writes, "cannot fail to brush up against thousands of living dialogic threads, woven by socio-ideological consciousness around the given object of an utterance; it cannot fail to become an active participant in social dialogue. After all, the utterance arises out of this dialogue as a continuation of it and as a

a discernible language, heterogeneity thus allows for the ceaseless struggle over both the formation of the text as well as its articulation, thereby allowing for the mediation of texts in a way denied by those conceptions still advocating a view to transcendental structures where *nukespeak* constitutes a singular, completely unified instrument (reminiscent of Orwell's *Newspeak*).

In looking to further specify the nature of the word as sign's directionality towards the object (theme) and the addressee, Bakhtin pushes further his notion concerning its saturation in this complex play of light and shadow. This play is defined by the extent to which the object is open to dispute (all are overlain with qualifications) by an alien word about it, one which has arisen from heteroglot social opinion. The boundaries of the word's own semantic and stylistic figuration are, in turn, delimited by this play: a process complicated by the dialogic interaction within the object between various aspects of its *socio-verbal intelligibility* (1981d: 277). The word, over the course of its encounters across an environment full of alien words and evaluating accents, will thus harmonize with some while striking a dissonance with others. In each case, it can not escape a confrontation in this tension-filled interaction with the 'already uttered', the 'already known', the 'common opinion' and so forth (1981d: 277, 279).

rejoinder to it - it does not approach the object from the sidelines" (1981d: 276-277).

Bakhtin states axiomatically that the dialogic orientation of discourse is a natural property of each and every discourse; this world of objects and meanings is therefore highly relativized, as discourse can deviate from such inter-orientation 'only on a conditional basis and only to a certain degree'. It follows that the internal dialogics of the word is not exhausted by its encounter with an alien word in the object itself, as every word is also directed "toward an answer and cannot escape the profound influence of the answering word that it anticipates" (1981d: 280). Interestingly, Bakhtin suggests that not only does the word in dialogue provoke an answer, and in anticipating one proceed to structure itself accordingly in an atmosphere of the already spoken, it simultaneously forms itself in relation to that which has been left unsaid but which will be needed to advance the dialogue.

This subtle and nuanced conception of common sense as constitutive of the conditions of existence and possibility for a discourse is a considerable advance from the dominant ideology thesis, particularly given this new emphasis on responsive understanding as an active force. If the linguistic significance of a given utterance is framed in relation to the background of language (where an utterance's *neutral signification* is key), its actual meaning must be framed in relation to the backdrop of other concrete utterances on the same theme (contradictory opinions, points of view and value judgments) present not in the object, but in

the consciousness of the listener (1981d: 281). Bakhtin thus claims that every utterance is oriented toward this apperceptive background of understanding composed of contradictory objects, emotional expressions, responses and objections. Every concrete act of understanding is thus an active one: "discourse lives, as it were, on the boundary between its own context and another, alien, context" (1981d: 284).

Consequently, these stratifying forces guarantee that contextual overtones are inevitable for each and every word: Bakhtin confirms that 'neutral' words and forms (that belong to 'no one') simply do not exist as language is 'shot through with intentions and accents'. "For any individual consciousness living in it," he maintains, "language is not an abstract system of normative forms but rather a concrete heteroglot conception of the world. All words have the 'taste' of a profession, a genre, a tendency, a party, a particular work, a particular person, a generation, an age group, the day and hour. Each word 'tastes' of the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life; all words and forms are populated by intentions" (1981d: 293). Just as the word is 'a two-sided act' (Bakhtin/Volosinov, 1973: 86), each and every one is half someone else's: it lies on 'the borderline between oneself and the other'.

A speaker or writer seeking to make a word his or her 'own' must appropriate it from other people's contexts

(where it serves their intentions) and then, in turn, populate it with his or her own intention or accent so as to adapt it to a personal semantic and expressive intention that will command the field. Bakhtin cautions, however, that "not all words for just anyone submit equally easily to this appropriation, to this seizure and transformation into private property: many words stubbornly resist, others remain alien, sound foreign in the mouth of the one who appropriated them and who now speaks them; they cannot be assimilated into his [sic] context and fall out of it; it is as if they put themselves in quotation marks against the will of the speaker" (1981d: 294; 1981b: 77). Were language a neutral medium, and therefore not over-populated with other people's intentions, this process of expropriation would be much less complex than it is.

Of Authority and Persuasiveness

A consideration of the relation of nukespeak to common sensical assumptions about 'nuclear reality' embedded in everyday discourse is clearly facilitated by Bakhtin's approach to the 'seeds of heteroglossia' embedded in the word. Particularly relevant is the emphasis on the enormous weight, in psychological terms, of 'it is said' in public opinion. Every ordinary conversation, Bakhtin points out, is resonant with the transmissions, interpretations and evaluations of other people's words. "At every step," he

writes, "one meets a 'quotation' or a 'reference' to something that a particular person said, a reference to 'people say' or 'everyone says', to the words of the person one is talking with, or to one's own previous words, to a newspaper, an official decree, a document, a book and so forth. The majority of our information and opinions is usually not communicated in direct form as our own, but with reference to some indefinite and general source: 'I heard', 'It's generally held that...', 'It is thought that...' and so forth" (1981d: 338). The discourse of another is in this way transformed into a topic in the engaged transmission of practical information.

Of import for an exploration of the inscription of official voices in news texts, then, are the precise means of this transmission and the resultant alterations in meaning and accent. That is, it may be shown that the journalist's highly varied means (ranging from direct quotation to slanderous distortion of another's words) formulate both verbally and stylistically the words of 'authorized knowers' (Fishman, 1980) while, at the same time, providing an interpretive frame (itself a device for re-conceptualization and re-accenting: see Chapter Two's discussion). The speech of an institutional voice, no matter how accurately transmitted by the newsworker via the final account, will always be subject to certain semantic changes once it is enclosed in a context. Hence Bakhtin stresses the need to examine the forms by which another's speech is transmitted

in relation to the specific means of its contextualized (dialogizing) framing, for even words recognized as common sense have 'conditions attached to them'.

Basic to any assessment of the 'real meaning' of the words spoken by various institutional voices quoted or paraphrased in a news item are two factors: who precisely is speaking, and under what concrete circumstances? Just as it is not feasible to separate discourse from the personality speaking it, speech can hardly be isolated from the constraints and conditions of the speaking situation (who is present, expressions used, shades of intonation, and so forth). Bakhtin writes: "when we speak to understand a word, what matters is not the direct meaning the word gives to objects and emotions - this is the false front of the word; what matters is rather the actual and always self-interested use to which this meaning is put and the way it is expressed by the speaker, a use determined by the speaker's position (profession, social class, etc.) and by the concrete situation" (1981d: 401).

To clarify the intricate nature of this dynamic, and in this way further refine the insights of earlier analyses of 'primary definers' (Hall et al, 1978) and 'authorized knowers' (Fishman, 1980) discussed in Chapter Two, attention turns to the distinction Bakhtin draws between *authoritative discourse* and *internally persuasive discourse*.

It is Bakhtin's contention that what determines a word's particular demarcation and individuation in discourse is the

precise degree to which it may be conjoined with authority (acknowledged or not, this authority sets up a distance between discourses). An authoritative or monoglossic discourse (political, scientific, moral, religious; the word of the Defence Minister or of the strategic expert, and so forth), may organize around itself other types of discourse (to interpret, praise, or apply it), but remains distinct from them: "it demands, so to speak, not only quotation marks but a demarcation even more magisterial, a special script, for instance. It is considerably more difficult to incorporate semantic changes into such a discourse, even with the help of a framing context: its semantic structure is static and dead, for it is fully complete, it has but a single meaning, the letter is fully sufficient to the sense and calcifies it" (1981d: 343).

Following Bakhtin, the authoritative discourse of a white paper on national defence, as a text which seeks to restrict the dialogical production of meaning, demands 'our unconditional allegiance'. That is, official (monoglossic) discourse curtails and constrains alterations to its framing context. Rather, it is either endorsed or rejected in its entirety (as is the authority of the institution, the Department of National Defence, or person, the Defence Minister, behind it).

Internally persuasive discourse, on the other hand, is affirmed through assimilation, such as through our own retelling of 'what the white paper really means' in our 'own

words'. While the authority of discourse and its internal persuasiveness may be united in a single word, Bakhtin argues that such a conflation is rare. In most instances, a sharp division is evident between the authoritative word and that which is internally persuasive. To clarify, where the authoritative word possesses a hierarchicalized power fused to it, one which has its basis in the past (it is a prior discourse), the language of internally persuasive discourse can be 'taken in vain' (1981d: 342). Its words sound in spheres of familiar contact, and are chosen amongst other possible discourses that are its equal strictly in relation to their persuasive potential. A principal difference from authoritative discourse, then, is its marked capacity to awaken new and independent words. Far from remaining in an isolated and static (finite) condition, the semantic structure of internally persuasive discourse is in a constant state of struggle, and thus far more open-ended. Bakhtin states that "in each of the new contexts that dialogize it, this discourse is able to reveal ever newer ways to mean" (1981d: 346).

For our purposes, it is important to note that the boundary between an authoritative and internally persuasive discourse is difficult to discern, travelled as it is by this dialogic struggle for hegemony amongst various available ideological points of view, directions or values. The problem of distance, so clearly demarcated by authoritative discourse, is also allowed to remain fluid with respect to

both its transmission and its methods for framing contexts. Each discourse presupposes a specific distance for the listener or reader (relying, in turn, on a conception of his or her level of responsiveness). Maximum interaction between another's word and its context is thus allowed for as they "serve to govern the play of boundaries, the distance between that point where the context begins to prepare for the introduction of another's word and the point where the word is actually introduced (its 'theme' may sound in the text long before the appearance of the actual word)" (1981d: 346). Thus it is the very semantic openness of the internally persuasive word, its unfinishedness and inexhaustibility, that signals its potential for further dialogic interaction.

Evidently, in light of the fluid alignment of its logics in either one of these two types of discourse, nuke-speak can not be theorized outside the chaos of competing voices (some of which speak louder than the others). The dialogic nature of the struggles described above underscores the severe limitations of alternative views, often only slightly modified renderings of Newspeak, which elided social context, often reducing dialogue to relativistic play. As Bakhtin writes, "when discourse is torn from reality, it is fatal for the word itself as well: words grow sickly, lose semantic depth and flexibility, the capacity to expand and renew their meanings in new living contexts - they essentially die as discourse, for the signifying word

lives beyond itself, that is. it lives by means of directing its purposiveness outward" (1981d: 353-354).

In endeavouring to speak in opposition to nuclearism, then, this project can not avoid reaffirming, to varying degrees, portions of the 'nuclear reality' it seeks to deconstruct. Having recognized this dilemma, neatly encapsulated by Bakhtin in the claim that 'every discourse has its own selfish and biased proprietor', we need to open up for investigation the very relations of intentionality underpinning nuclear discourse as it *manages* reality while, at the same time, allowing for its heteroglot quality.

The Discursive Formation of Nuclearism

Bakhtin's attempt to link a notion of intersubjectivity to the affective features of texts (the mechanisms by which they foster or encourage certain interpretive strategies), such that the tensions of its ontological assumptions are partially disclosed for critique, is a crucial conceptual advance. As has been shown, a Bakhtinian analysis organized to examine the formation of a specific signifying system, such as an official policy document or news item, recognizes from the outset that a text is itself the result of a 'redistribution' of several different sign systems. The polysemic official or news text, riddled with the play of centripetal and centrifugal forces, may then be analyzed in such a way as to make it indicate the 'rules' governing the

inscription of the cultural dynamics of nuclearism in discursive relations. This problematic, central to the approach to media power advanced in Chapter Two, is substantively refined in the research of Michel Foucault (1980, 1977, 1972, 1971).

Discourse, according to Foucault in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (originally published in French as *L'Archeologie du Savoir* in 1969), is not to be confused with a consciousness embodied in the 'external form of language' (*langage*), nor is it to be reduced to a language (*langue*) complete with a human subject to speak it. Rather, to show why discourse needs to be theorized as a practice with its own forms of sequence and succession, Foucault (1972) introduces the notion of a field of discursive 'events'. Accordingly, where nuclear discourse or nukespeak is often regarded as a finite body of rules authorizing an infinite number of performances, nuclearism, as a field of discursive events, would constitute "a grouping that is always finite and limited at any moment to the linguistic sequences that have been formulated; they may be innumerable, they may, in sheer size, exceed the capacities of recording, memory, or reading: nevertheless they form a finite grouping" (1972: 27).

Perhaps it is not surprising then that questions considered characteristic of language analysis such as: 'according to what rules has a particular statement been made, and consequently according to what rules could other similar statements be made?' can, in turn, be displaced by

inquiring 'how is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another?' (1972: 27). Once again, Foucault is not interested in distinguishing certain (totalized) discursive statements for the ultimate purpose of extracting the hidden 'intentions' of the speaking subject or the 'real meaning' of what was actually said. Instead, to execute a description of the discursive field of nuclearism, a Foucauldian analysis would seek to "grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations with other statements that may be connected with it, and show what other forms of statement it excludes" (1972: 28). Why could this statement not be other than it was? How has it come to occupy this space and not another? What is its relation to other statements?

If, as Foucault contends, a statement is not to be regarded as an event that can ever be entirely exhausted by language or meaning, just as it is not reducible to either sentences or propositions, there still remains the difficulty of demarcating its constitution. In positive terms, then, a statement is a 'strange event' by virtue of: first, its linkage to 'the gesture of writing or to the articulation of speech' while concurrently opening up to itself 'a residual existence in the field of a memory, or in the materiality of manuscripts, books, or any other form of recording'; second, despite its uniqueness as an event it continues to be subject to repetition, transformation and

reactivation; and third, "because it is linked not only to the situations that provoke it, and to the consequences that it gives rise to, but at the same time, and in accordance with a quite different modality, to the statements that precede and follow it" (1972: 28).

Nuclearism may thus be analyzed, following Foucault, in terms of the interplay of relations both within and outside the statement. This approach necessarily entails the disruption of the concrete presence of nuclearism: that is, the *natural, immediate and universal* unities ostensibly underpinning its conditions of existence and possibility. Still to be resolved, however, is the problem of how to account for these conditions of existence and possibility so as to highlight the rules governing its appearance without recourse to a terminology caught up in idealist or economistic assumptions. It is to achieve this end that Foucault introduces the conceptual categories of 'discursive formation' and 'rules of formation', as in doing so he is seeking to particularize a series of processes that have proven rather difficult to tack down thus far in his project.

At its most general level, a discursive formation is defined as a dispersion of statements. It is identifiable as a provisional unity precisely to the extent that the conditions and rules governing this dispersion are recognizable (this being a theoretical decision). Foucault notes the conceptual inadequacy of any set of hypotheses which

asserts that a discursive formation exists if: first, the statements in it refer to one and the same object; second, there is a regular style to the existence or employment of statements; third, there is a constancy of concepts used in the statements; or, lastly, the statements are found to support a common theme or pattern (1972: 31-36). He then makes a crucial observation: if it can be satisfactorily shown that statements are not unified around a principle of identity, it can nevertheless be demonstrated that the dispersion of statements is far from chaotic.

How, then, to discern a regularity to this dispersion? A discursive formation is present, according to Foucault, only if and when "one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations)" (1972: 38). Furthermore, "the conditions to which the elements of this division (objects, mode of statement, concepts, thematic choices) are subjected we shall call the *rules of formation*. The rules of formation are conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, modification, and disappearance) in a given discursive formation" (1972: 38). To elaborate further on the potential implications of this conceptual shift for a study of nuclearism, attention turns to the need to secure a firmer understanding of discursive practices themselves.

Foucault, having first cast aside alternative efforts to secure the unity of a discourse in the objects 'given' to the speaking subject, proceeds to specify the complexity of discourse by examining the group of rules immanent in the discursive practice itself. It follows that to 'depresentify' what otherwise would likely have been written off as 'things anterior to discourse', Foucault has to initiate a key move to prioritize for analysis the regular formation of these objects as they emerge within discourse. In this way the definition of these objects can then proceed "without reference to the ground, the foundation of things, but by relating them to the body of rules that enable them to form as objects of a discourse and thus constitute the conditions of their historical appearance" (1972: 48). To grapple with discursive practices, then, is to locate the nexus of regularities that govern their dispersion.

It is at this point that the project Foucault advocates diverges most sharply from the linguistic analysis of nuclear discourse or nukespeak. While conceding that studies of, for example, lexical organization or semantics have an important role to play for other types of critique, Foucault deems them to be irrelevant to his agenda. As he suggests, "the analysis of lexical contents defines either the elements of meaning at the disposal of speaking subjects in a given period, or the semantic structures that appears on the surface of a discourse that has already been spoken; it does not concern discursive practice as a place in which

a tangled plurality - at once superposed and incomplete - of objects is formed and deformed, appears and disappears" (1972: 48). As a result, then, words or vocabulary (like 'things') are hereby considered unworthy of sustained attention: as Foucault can not envision returning to a time prior to discourse, nor living beyond the demise of discourse so as to rediscover the forms left behind, he insists that his investigations will remain 'at the level of discourse itself'.

Consequently, Foucault writes, "I would like to show that 'discourses', in the form in which they can be heard or read, are not, as one might expect, a mere intersection of things and words; an obscure web of things, and a manifest, visible, coloured chain of words; I would like to show that discourse is not a slender surface of contact, or confrontation, between a reality and a language (*langue*), the intrication of a lexicon and an experience; I would like to show with precise examples that in analyzing discourses themselves, one sees the loosening of the embrace, apparently so tight, of words and things, and the emergence of a group of rules proper to discursive practices. These rules define not the dumb existence of a reality, nor the canonical use of a vocabulary, but the ordering of objects" (1972: 48-49). Discourses thus cease to be singularly regarded by Foucault as groups of signs (elements referring to representations) but rather designate groups of signs organized as

practices systematically forming the very objects of which they speak.

Here it is necessary to note that Foucault, in abandoning a view of discourse as a phenomenon of expression and replacing it with an approach which privileges fields of regularity (always incomplete, fragmented), is not suggesting that a discursive formation 'arrests time' once and for all in a text or series of words. Rather, a discursive formation determines a regularity proper to temporal processes: "it presents the principle of articulation between a series of discursive events and other series of events, transformations, mutations, and processes. It is not an atemporal form, but a schema of correspondence between several temporal series" (1972: 74). Thus analysis does not concern itself with this manifest level of texts as completed constructions but remains anterior to it. Declares Foucault: "In defining the principle of distributing objects in a discourse, [analysis] does not take into account all their connections, their delicate structure, or their internal sub-divisions; in seeking the law of the dispersion of concepts, it does not take into account all the processes of elaboration, or all the deductive series in which they may figure; if analysis studies the modalities of enunciation, it questions neither the style nor the succession of the sentences; in short, it leaves the final placing of the text in dotted outline" (1972: 75).

It is becoming increasingly clear what this type of analysis rules out for a study of nuclearism vis a vis the research examined in Chapter Three, yet it is still less than certain what it will elect to rule in. The notion of discourse has been stretched to a very considerable degree, such that the problem of the statement, so pertinent to our discussion here, has for the moment been neglected. If, as Foucault maintains, the statement is the elementary unit of discourse, it still remains unclear precisely what statements consist of, or, moreover, how their conditions of existence correspond to the establishment of unity and regularity. As will be shown, however, this slight detour was necessary, for it is in comparing and contrasting the region of the statement with that of the discursive formation that the sharp edge of Foucault's approach is refined.

Rarity and the Dispersion of Statements

The statement, as noted above, can not be equivocated with a unit of linguistic type, such as the sentence, a random collection of words or numbers, or simply a text. Rather, 'the threshold of the statement (l'enonce) is the threshold of the existence of signs', it is 'neither visible nor hidden'. As the sign's 'modality of existence', then, the statement is in turn defined by the enunciative function it provides. This function is not to give 'meaning' to units (such as sentences, propositions, or a series of

signs), but to relate them to a field of objects. Furthermore, "instead of providing them with a subject, it opens up for them a number of possible subjective positions; instead of fixing their limits, it places them in a domain of coordination and coexistence; instead of determining their identity, it places them in a space in which they are used and repeated" (1972: 106). This maneuver allows Foucault to at last demarcate the missing element of his notion of discourse, as the assertion that discourse is constituted by a group of sequences of signs is here clarified with the stipulation that the term 'sequences of signs' be replaced by 'statements'.

Given that the law of this sequencing has been called a discursive formation, then a discourse may be defined as a group of statements deemed to belong to a single system of formation. Existing outside of concrete structures (logical, grammatical or otherwise), the statement "is not haunted by the secret presence of the unsaid, of hidden meanings, of suppressions; on the contrary, the way in which these hidden elements function, and in which they can be restored, depends on the enunciative modality itself" (1972: 110). As Foucault adds, "we know that the 'unsaid', the 'suppressed', is not the same - either in its structure or in its effect - in the case of a mathematical statement, a statement in economics, an autobiography, or the account of a dream" (1972: 110). The analysis of statements, unlike

the analysis of language with its assembly of words and texts, is the investigation of the very limits of language.

Having marked out the region of the statement/enunciative level in this way, Foucault sets out to further qualify its precise articulation with discursive formations. The criteria he has established regarding what a statement requires in order for it to operate, specifically: a referential (a principle of differentiation); a subject (a position that may be filled by an individual under certain conditions); an associated field (a domain of coexistence with other statements); and a materiality (rules regarding the possibilities of use/re-use), are now to be linked with the element of rarity as described above (1972: 88-101, 115). It is not sufficient to characterize a discursive formation as a group of statements without, at the same time, accentuating its role as the general enunciative system defining the very regularity of statements. Each discourse, it would appear, is both 'plenitude and endless wealth' as each "contains the power to say something other than what it actually says, and thus to embrace a plurality of meanings: a plethora of the 'signified' in relation to a single 'signifier'" (1972: 118). Hence the need to question why it is that one statement in particular is enunciated, or allowed to appear, to the exclusion of alternative statements. Is it possible to ascertain the boundary which divides a statement from what is not said? Or, to adopt Foucault's idiom: what is this 'law of rarity'?

The law of rarity rests on the principle that "everything is never said; in relation to what might have been stated in a natural language (*langue*), in relation to the unlimited combination of linguistic elements, statements (however numerous they may be) are always in deficit; on the basis of the grammar and the wealth of vocabulary available at a given period, there are, in total, relatively few things that are said" (1972: 118-119). This 'non-filling of the field of possible formulations' is linked to discursive formations in that the latter appears "both as a principle of division in the entangled mass of discourses and as a principle of vacuity in the field of language (*langage*)" (1972: 119). Here Foucault breaks most firmly with those descriptions of the dispersion of statements which continue to cling to notions of intentionality, rationality or teleology by declaring that the existence of one statement does not signify the complete silencing of another statement claiming that place. [2] Each statement occupies a place unique to it, thus only those analyses organized to map its

2 Unlike the air we breath, Foucault (1972) contends, statements are not an 'infinite transparency', but "things that are transmitted and preserved, that have value, and which one tries to appropriate; that are repeated, reproduced, and transformed; to which pre-established networks are adapted, and to which a status is given in the institution; things that are duplicated not only by copy or translation, but by exegesis, commentary, and the internal proliferation of meaning. Because statements are rare, they are collected in unifying totalities, and the meanings to be found in them are multiplied" (1972: 120).

localization within a 'unifying totality' will succeed in weighing its respective 'value'.

This maneuver thus marks a crucial conceptual transition on to the plane of nuclearism, as here Foucault is acknowledging that the very existence of discourse poses the question of power: discourse, he writes, is "an asset that is, by nature, the object of a struggle, a political struggle" (1972: 120). That is, this 'value' is in turn not to be conflated with, nor defined by, the relative 'truth' of a statement (no attempt is undertaken to look for the 'presence of a secret content'). Alternatively, the value of statements is that which "characterizes their place, their capacity for circulation and exchange, their possibility of transformation, not only in the economy of discourse, but, more generally, in the administration of scarce resources" (1972: 120).

A discursive formation is to be recognized, then, as a space of 'multiple dissensions': neither a continuous text operating beneath the play of contradictions, nor a surface upon which contradictions are ultimately reflected, it is an arrangement of different oppositions. A discursive formation can be made to show all of its many irregularities vis a vis other discursive formations as well as non-discursive practices (such as institutions, political events, economic practices and processes) that 'surround them and serve as a general element for them'. Analysis will find its object (the domain of existence and function-

ing of a discourse) by seeking to link the rules of formation for a discursive formation to non-discursive systems. However, precisely how to elaborate on the precise means by which a discursive formation is articulated or linked on to these social relations, Foucault refuses to say. In search of an answer to this dilemma, our attention turns to the partial solution he proffers in his inaugural lecture to the *College de France*, entitled 'The Discourse on Language' (the original French title is 'L'ordre du discours').

A Prohibitive Truth

Foucault (1971) hypothesizes that within every society the production of discourse "is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality" (1971: 216). He argues that we, as individuals, are all familiar with these procedures at work such that the very *naturalness* or *obviousness* of the functions of exclusion frequently pass unnoticed. As he writes, "we know perfectly well that we are not free to say just anything, that we cannot simply speak of anything, when we like or where we like; nor just anyone, finally, may speak of just anything" (1971: 216). How to connect, then, this sense of what the individual 'knows perfectly well' can or can not be said with the production of discourse at a

concrete institutional level? What are the mechanisms which control, select, organize and redistribute their respective discourses and how is it that their formation is then 'recognizable' as a factual 'representation' of the real?

The line of inquiry Foucault seeks to extend complements a Bakhtinian approach to the dialogic nature of nuclearism by centring the rules constitutive of the politics of truth: that is, the rules which dictate what can and can not be said about, for our purposes, 'the reality of Canadian security in the nuclear age'. Foucault assists this work by identifying three distinct systems of procedures governing the production of discourse, the first of which is made up of 'rules of exclusion' (active on the 'exterior' of discourse). This set of rules subdivides, in turn, into three component principles: first, the exclusion/prohibition of words; second, the binary division between reason and madness; and, finally, the 'will to truth'.

Very briefly, in employing the notion of prohibition, Foucault is looking beyond the 'content' of speech and on to the restrictions which surround it. For it is here that speech is linked with desire (for an infinitely open discourse) and power (existing institutional constraints and control) in a fluid, complex web of the external rules in and through which it is identified as 'correct' or 'appropriate'. Who, Foucault asks, is permitted to speak? What may be said? When and where may speech take place?

From which institutional site(s) does this discourse derive its objects?; What positions can the subject occupy in relation to this group of objects?; and so forth. Similarly, the next sub-principle of exclusion, the opposition reason and folly (or common and abnormal speech), highlights the rejection of the 'other' as socially inferior or threatening. Hence the significance of the third sub-principle he names, the opposition between truth and error. If the initial two sub-principles described above are becoming increasingly 'fragile' or tentative, Foucault insists that the will to truth "daily grows in strength, in depth and implacability" (1971: 219).

The scope of critique for an investigation of nuclearism thus needs to expand beyond the correspondence of the 'will to truth' to its institutional support so as to encompass, in turn, the deployment of knowledge in society: that is, the very ways in which it is put into actual use (exploited, divided, attributed). As Foucault writes, "true discourse, liberated by the nature of its form from desire and power, is incapable of recognizing the will to truth which pervades it; and the will to truth, having imposed itself upon us for so long, is such that the truth it seeks to reveal cannot fail to mask it" (1971: 219). Thus the historically contingent nature of truth, often overlooked in other research approaches seeking to posit nuclearism within a normative framework, is here given pride of place.

To what extent and by what means, then, does this will to truth exercise a power of constraint upon other forms of discourse? Before this problem can be legitimately addressed, Foucault cautions, it is first necessary to acknowledge the need to push beyond the above three (exterior) systems of exclusion so as to grapple directly with the concomitant systems for the control and delimitation of discourse. With this aim in mind, he further refines his project by isolating a second group of rules: namely, those internal rules concerned with the principles of classification, ordering and distribution. A discourse exercises its own control through procedures of 'rarefaction': that is, analyses of forms of discourse can reveal the scarcity of meaning, the actual limits of speech as they are aligned vis a vis certain control principles. Three such principles directed to the 'mastery of the powers contained within discourse' are detailed here: the 'author', the 'commentary' and the 'discipline'.

Very briefly, regarding the first of the respective principles, it is evident that Foucault is not intending to signify with the phrase 'the author' an individual speaker or writer of texts. Rather, what is at issue here is "the unifying principle in a particular group of writings or statements, lying at the origins of their significance, as the seat of their coherence" (1971: 221). This view of the means by which truth can be marked off through the action of an identity whose form is that of individuality (and the

'I') is, in turn, contrasted with the ways in which commentary limits 'the hazards of discourse' through an identity taking the form of repetition and sameness (1971: 221-222). Commentary on texts functions, according to Foucault, "to say *finally*, what has silently been articulated deep down. It must - and the paradox is ever-changing yet inescapable - say, for the first time, what has already been said, and repeat tirelessly what was, nevertheless, never said" (1971: 221).

Where both of these two forms differ from the third and final principle of rarefaction, that of the discipline, is in the capacity of the latter to fix the limits of the production of discourse through the action of an identity taking the form of a 'permanent reactivation' of the rules. It follows that disciplines are then defined by "groups of objects, methods, their corpus of propositions considered to be true, the interplay of rules and definitions, of techniques and tools: all these constitute a sort of anonymous system, freely available to whoever wishes, or whoever is able to make use of them, without there being any question of their meaning or their validity being derived from whoever happened to invent them" (1971: 222). The discipline's adaptability for constructing new statements or propositions (as opposed to reiterating some identity or rediscovering some meaning) is what marks the limits of its positive/restrictive and multiplicative/constraining role.

The third group of rules serving to control discourse, neither exterior nor interior to the discourse itself, concern the conditions under which it may be employed or appropriated. Where access to a given discourse may appear to be ensured, an examination of its distribution (the rules of permission and prevention deployed) may show that it is a site of social conflict. Questions then arise as to whom is permitted access to this discourse, and what rules will subsequently be imposed upon the qualified individuals seeking to utilize it? As Foucault suggests, "this amounts to a rarefaction among speaking subjects: none may enter into discourse on a specific subject unless he [or she] has satisfied certain conditions or if he [or she] is not, from the outset, qualified to do so. More exactly, not all areas of discourse are equally open and penetrable; some are forbidden territory (differentiated and differentiating) while others are virtually open to the winds and stand, without any prior restrictions, open to all" (1971: 224-225).

For our purposes, then, the index of the truthfulness of a news account or a policy document is not defined exclusively by its respective 'author', but rather whether its corpus of propositions may be considered to be true due to their 'fit' into a given conceptual field. Following Foucault, it may be argued that the news media system be recognized as a political means of regulating the public's appropriation of various social discourses. Here analysis

would turn to the 'ritualization of the word' so as to highlight how certain types of roles for speakers are fixed (provisionally) by the dictates of discursive practices themselves. Questions then arise as to how news discourse determines the selection and distribution of one speaker or institutional voice over another as a producer of truthful or valid speech in relation to these constraints (a problematic to be taken up in the case study).

Foucault, having sketched out the general contours of the three systems of procedures governing the production of discourse, shifts his focus to consider the methodological demands they imply. Four inter-related principles are outlined; taken together they are suggestive of the overall direction a Foucauldian discourse analysis would follow. Briefly, the first principle he details is that of reversal, the careful subversion of the seemingly positive (the author discipline, the will to truth) to locate in its place "the negative activity of the cutting-out and rarefaction of discourse" (1971: 229). Next is the principle of discontinuity which signals the end of those forms of analysis which 'imagine some unsaid thing, or an unthought, floating about the world, interlacing with all its forms and events', which must then be restored to speech (1971: 229). Rather, discourse is a discontinuous activity, its "different manifestations sometimes coming together, but just as easily unaware of, or excluding each other" (1971: 229).

Similarly, the third principle, *specificity*, brings to a halt any view to a 'pre-discursive fate disposing the word in our favour': that is, a discourse under investigation can not be lifted out from its position within a prior system of significations. Discourse, Foucault argues, is "a violence that we do to things, or, at all events, as a practice we impose upon them; it is in this practice that the events of discourse find the principle of their regularity" (1971: 229). The fourth principle, *exteriority*, is organized to dismiss the notion of a 'hidden core of discourse' where meaning resides. Instead, analyses should address the discourse itself in terms of its appearance and its regularity, and in this way highlight "its external conditions of existence, for that which gives rise to the chance series of these events and fixes its limits" (1971: 229). These four principles, then, provide a rudimentary grounding for, first, a genealogical description concerning the effective formation of discourse (at once scattered, discontinuous, and regular) *vis a vis* the limits of play in various instances of discursive control, and second, a critical study of processes of rarefaction, consolidation and unification in discourse.

Foucault, in acknowledging that these two enterprises will, at times, prove to be less than complementary, defines their difference not in relation to their object or field, but in terms of 'attack, perspective and delimitation'. "We do not find," he writes, "on the one hand, forms of

rejection, exclusion, consolidation or attribution, and, on a more profound level, the spontaneous pouring forth of discourse, which immediately before or after its manifestation, finds itself submitted to a selection and control. The regular formation of discourse may, in certain conditions and up to a certain point, integrate control procedures [...] Conversely, modes of control may take on life within a discursive formation" (1971: 233). Accordingly, attempts to reveal the universality of a meaning can not succeed: instead, for Foucault, the analysis of discourse must "bring to light the action of imposed rarity, with a fundamental power of affirmation" (1971: 234). Hence the need to initiate a subtle shift in emphasis on to the problem of discursive practices proper, as it will be shown that in doing so, this deconstructive project may better account for these 'modes of control' and their links to relations of power and resistance.

What Can and Should be Said

This chapter, having now taken up key aspects of Bakhtin's and Foucault's examination of discursivity so as to further refine a framework for an investigation of nuclearism, presently turns to examine Michel Pecheux's (1988, 1983a, 1983b, 1982) contribution to this agenda. [3]

3 Portions of this section on the work of Pecheux have been drawn from my contribution to a more detailed critique, co-authored with Dr. Martin Montgomery, which will appear else-

Pecheux (1982), having first acknowledged that *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is a book of 'extraordinary interest for the theory of discourse', proceeds to level the charge that Foucault 'retreats' from the positive implications of the theses this volume contains. This is so, according to Pecheux, because Foucault "fails to recognize the existence of the (ideological) class struggle" (1982: 181).

If, for Foucault, the notion of ideology may be dismissed as conceptually unhelpful, for Pecheux it must be retrieved if critical analysis is to 'make explicit' the uneven and contradictory complex set of discursive formations in play at a particular historical conjuncture. In this way, it follows, a Foucauldian vocabulary needs to be recast so as to prioritize the crucial question of how it is that discursive practices 'take their shape'. That is, an analysis of nuclearism needs to explore how these practices are inscribed (at times antagonistically) via the preferred definitions of ruling ideology so as to naturalize the politics of meaning production.

Pecheux commences with this line of argument by declaring that he finds the (Althusserian) argument that

where. I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Montgomery for sharing with me his insights regarding the potential applicability of Pecheux's research for a critical discourse analysis. Our project has received the considerable benefit of the comments and criticisms of Jacques Chevalier, Line Grenier and William Straw, to whom we are happily indebted.

ideology supplies the evidentness that makes a word or an utterance 'mean what it says' to be convincing. Ideology, he contends, 'takes up the slack'; it designates what 'everyone knows' through 'habit' and 'usage' and, in normative terms, what ought to be (after Althusser (1971), 'ideology interpellates individuals as subjects'). Consequently, in seeking to better understand how it is that ideology accomplishes this work, Pecheux highlights for investigation the mechanisms by which the material character of the meaning of words is 'masked' in the 'transparency of language'. This 'masking' process is theorized as being the outcome of the articulation of representational practices across the field of ideological state apparatuses or ISAs (once again, after Althusser and Gramsci, the range of practices identified as belonging to, amongst others, the cultural, communication, family, educational, and religious apparatuses). An uneven, contradictory relationship of correspondence is in this way constructed, the precise nature of which Pecheux proceeds to specify via two radical theses.

The first thesis holds that *"words, expressions, propositions, etc., change their meaning according to the [ideological] positions held by those who use them"* (1982: 111). The semiotic polyvalence of which Bakhtin writes is here recognized as being constrained or conditioned by a hierarchical set of rules tied to the class struggle; that is, a particular word 'finds its meaning' by reference to

its inscription within one or more positions located across a concrete institutional configuration. This set of rules, to be theorized as constitutive of a discursive formation, marks the limits of 'what can and should be said' in a historical conjuncture. A given word, far from having a meaning 'of its own' perpetually attached to it, is caught up in a multiplicity of normative struggles over appropriateness. Pecheux is thus suggesting that words, like expressions or propositions, obtain their meaning from the determinate discursive formation in which they are produced (the linguistic elements selected, how they are combined) such that meaning becomes an effect upon an active subject, and not a stable or fixed linguistic property.

To clarify how a discursive formation accomplishes certain 'meaning effects' for the individual interpellated as subject while, simultaneously, concealing the contradictory character of the subject's own discourse to itself, Pecheux stresses the attendant point that each discursive formation is itself a 'matrix of meaning'. It follows that individuals are interpellated "as speaking subjects (as subjects of their discourse) by the discursive formations which represent 'in language' the ideological formations [the configuration of ISAs] that correspond to them" (1982: 111-112). This conception leads Pecheux to declare that the human subject is 'forgetful': he or she misrecognizes or occludes the 'cause' or determination of his or her discourse, thinking instead that he or she is its author 'in

reality'. By highlighting how the naturalness or obviousness of words or expressions will, in turn, 'change their meaning' as they 'slide' or 'slip' from one determinate discursive formation to another, Pecheux thus refines the notion of intertextuality (the passage from one sign system to another) posited by Bakhtin. Here, the interweaving of elements from one text to the next is to be specified as the outcome, possibly in the last instance, of the dictates of hegemonic struggles traversing the social field.

The second thesis Pecheux advances postulates that "every discursive formation, by the transparency of the meaning constituted in it, conceals its dependence on the 'complex whole in dominance' of discursive formations, itself imbricated with the complex of ideological formations" (1982: 113). If Pecheux refuses to elaborate upon the precise characteristics of this correspondence beyond the notion of an imbrication, he does offer an advantageous insight when he notes how any instance of enunciated discourse has its intelligibility ensured, at least in part, by the operation of rules of inclusion and exclusion or 'interdiscourse'. That is, the means by which a hierarchy of discursive formations, itself the localized expression or product of ideological hegemony, is mediated with a text is via these rules. The declared 'meaning' of a particular text is in this way removed from the author as speaking subject (usually aligned with a view to his or her intentionality) and is instead confirmed as the effect of

relationships of language use within and between this 'complex whole of discursive formations'.

To push forward from this contention that the human subject's misrecognition of autonomy and centredness (the illusion of self-identity) is anchored within the play of his or her own discourse, and thus those of the dominating discursive formations dispersed unevenly across the social field, Pecheux looks to further unravel the 'thread of the discourse of the subject'. Two types of elements of this interdiscourse are outlined as follows: the *preconstructed* corresponds to the 'always-already there' of the ideological interpellation as it supplies/imposes already available positions, the 'raw material' of 'reality' and its 'meaning' in the form of universality (the 'world of things', the 'evident facts' or 'what everyone knows to be real') or obviousness (1982: 115, 121). The element of articulation (support effect) sustains the subject in relation to that meaning ('as I have said' as if it were something exclusively internal to the subject.

Interdiscourse, in this way, brings about the domination of the subject form to the extent that it makes him or her take up positions as a speaking subject in order to experience a sense of unity that would be otherwise denied. This formulation allows Pecheux to leave open the possibility of a subject 'turning against' preferred identifications, either by engaging in a struggle against ideological evidentness on the terrain of that evidentness (counter-

identification) or by taking up an altogether antagonistic or non-subjective position (disidentification). Regarding the latter modality, the subject working to transform or displace the dominant practices of ideological subjection can never escape them entirely, yet by making ideology operate in 'reverse' or 'on and against itself', the complex of ideological formations and overlapping discursive formations may ultimately be 'overthrown'.

How, then, to continue with this work of theorizing the reactive, contradictory or antagonistic nature of nuclearism as distinct from 'dominant ideology'? If, as the Althusserians would suggest, to consider the question of ideology from the standpoint of reproduction also implies, by definition, considering ideology from the standpoint of resistance to reproduction, then for Pecheux (1983a) analysis must be re-situated so as to better account for "the multitude of heterogeneous resistances and revolts which smoulder beneath dominant ideology, threatening it constantly" (1983a: 26).

A critical discourse analysis of nuclearism, it follows, needs to prioritize these 'dominated ideologies' by treating them, after Pecheux, as a series of ideological effects to be identified as they emerge from domination and work in opposition to it through its inherent gaps and failures. "It is becoming increasingly obvious," Pecheux writes, "that we must learn to listen to this often silent speech enclosed within the urgency of survival. [...] We

must hear the articulations embedded in the 'ordinary way' of meaning" (1988: 645).

Clearly, an attempt to dismantle the cultural dynamics of nuclearism at work in official and news discourse will benefit from Pecheux's insights into how a contradictory series of relatively disparate discursive elements (interdiscourse) can be organized in accordance with the constitutive patterns of ruling interests, should sufficient allowance be made for what Bakhtin identifies as a (stratified) social 'polyphony'. Pecheux's work also underscores a means to avoid the risk, arguably attendant to a Foucauldian analysis, of making the resistance points and bases of counter-hegemonic revolt 'ungraspable' (1982: 219; see also Poulantzas, 1978; Habermas, 1987). Still, Pecheux himself offers only a very tentative approach to rethinking this problematic in light of the strategic importance of accounting for what he aptly calls the 'ordinary way' of meaning. Evidently, the relation of various discourses in play (and the mechanisms of subjection) working to affirm the ideological limits of nuclearism must be specified through concrete analysis.

The Conditions of Nuclearism

This dissertation, in endeavouring to advance a radical theoretical accounting of the mechanisms by which the preferred logics of nuclearism are inscribed in 'webs of

facticity', as spun either by official and news discourse, has seized the conceptual chain of the dominant ideology thesis implied in much of the research on nuclearism at its weakest link. Specifically, as argued in Chapter Three, it is the issue of how to account for social antagonisms in discourse that constitutes one of the most troublesome aspects current work on nuclear discourse or nukespeak. Accordingly, attention presently turns to the task of extending the possibilities of the general conceptual trajectory marked out through this reading of the apposite writings of Bakhtin, Foucault and Pecheux in light of this dilemma.

It is now apparent that any attempt to reconcile the respective insights of these theorists regarding the materiality of ideology into a fixed methodological framework to be called 'critical discourse analysis' would meet with little success. No such attempt shall be undertaken here: rather, the term 'critical discourse analysis' will be used to specify a particular approach to the problem of nuclearism, one which seeks to make explicit the contours of both the conditions of existence and the conditions of possibility underpinning the regulation of its discursive elements. In place of an effort designed to re-state the intricate nature of the concepts and categories outlined above, then, the remaining sections of this chapter will proceed with the further development through positive critique of the component elements of this framework.

Details concerning the precise inflection of this framework vis a vis both official and news discourse will be addressed at the appropriate moment in Chapters Five and Six, respectively.

This chapter has advanced the argument that the phenomenon of nuclear discourse or nukespeak as an object of investigation can not be viewed as a homogeneous entity. That is, it can not be theorized as a closed grammatical system somehow positioned outside of the contending forces of social antagonisms. Instead nukespeak is stratified and heteroglot (Bakhtin) in the forms that carry its meanings according to social activity or praxis (Gramsci). A critical discourse analysis must therefore look beyond the question of a vocabulary of nuclearism to the rules of what can and should be said (Pêcheux) as they are mobilized to mark off a distinctive social space and range of practices as being constitutive of 'the truth' (Foucault).

Brought to the fore of our investigation is the very situation in which the intentional possibilities of language are expropriated: "these possibilities," as Bakhtin (1981d) writes, "are realized in specific directions, filled with specific content, they are made concrete, particular, and are permeated with concrete value judgments; they knit together with specific objects and with the belief systems of certain genres of expression and points of view peculiar to particular professions [or institutional voices]" (1981d: 289). To prioritize the statements of institutional voices

recognized by newswriters as being conversant in the preferred ways to speak the 'nuclear reality' is thus, at the same time, to centre the ways in which their (implicit) claims to authority work to exclude other voices as existing outside the realm of the factual.

This elucidation of what Pecheux (1982) terms (after Lacan) as 'the politics of the signifier', can be credited with opening up to the study of nuclearism a radical method to investigate the *naturalization* of discursive practices (always a matter of degree). It follows that objects and events 'out there' in the 'real world' neither contain nor possess intrinsically a singular meaning which, in turn, determines the ordering of linguistic units as required to speak that reality. Rather, it has been demonstrated that by proposing that a separation be acknowledged between the principal means of expression (or, more precisely, the relationship of a discourse to its referential reality), the ostensibly arbitrary character of the linguistic sign is linked to the play of social struggle. Discourse is therefore to be treated as a fluid, inchoate system formed of linguistic signs, one which conditions the hierarchical 'ordering of reality' through the diachronic arrangement of differences among signifiers.

That is, knowledge of any one discursive element is conditional upon (partial) knowledge of its position along the signifying chain, as meaning is produced only through

reference to other meaning. [4] Through a consideration of phenomena as the concrete manifestations of invisible, inner structures (present only in terms of the utterances they will enable), their constituent elements and the rules or conventions which formulate their nexus may be made a focal point of analysis. Given that the systems, relations and forms that render the practice of meaning production possible are ubiquitous, critical discourse analysis is limited to seeking a reconstitution of the rules governing that production across the text's mode of functioning itself (as opposed to posing that meaning exists as an entity residing within a text patiently awaiting discovery). At its most general level, then, nuclearism comes to stand in for the complex unity of practices working to produce, circulate and regulate the boundaries of common sensical representations of nuclear reality.

The centrality of 'representation' as an analytical concept has proven to be paradoxical, however, as the three theorists positioned along this chapter's trajectory each point out a number of ways in which it blurs the very issue it purports to elucidate: namely, the nature of the relation between that which is represented with that which is produced by the representation. Consequently, the notion of 'articulation' Pecheux introduces via his reading of

4 Moreover, as Chevalier (1990) writes, "in the end encoded chains of signification are not entirely flexible; in reality, the production of meaning is always chained to a particular place in history - to the weighty fetters and the cultural bondage of *la parole*" (1990: 73).

Althusser can be made to serve as a corrective measure capable of re-centring this dynamic around the very social relations of signification. In other words, the question of how to place the text within the social process is reframed in such a way as to problematize the experienced unity of the text by highlighting the *naturalized* articulation (contradictory interplay) of its voices. Reality in this schema becomes a set of discourses in dispute, an arrangement of socially located meaning systems governed by shared rules made intelligible to the human subject in and through active practice. If it is accepted that the 'world out there' can not be isolated from the practices of meaning production, then it follows that the articulation of the real must always be theorized in conjunctural (historical) terms.

Nevertheless, as was noted earlier, should the social relations of meaning production be defined within strict, linear terms, such that a notion of 'dominant ideology' comes to stand in for the mechanisms by which ruling or preferred meanings are dispersed across the social field from above, then the contradictory nature of their actualization via human subject formation is foreclosed in advance. Individuality is subsequently reduced to the subject's inscription in the heterogeneous relations in which it was produced; this maneuver reaffirms Marx's view that human subjects make their history under conditions not of their own choosing, yet sheds little light on how this

level of effectivity is accomplished. Similarly, it was argued that the notion of contradiction is all too frequently elided in the name of hegemony, as commonly deployed. A uni-dimensional, zero-sum approach to hegemony can not adequately account for the conditional positioning of the subject to naturalized or ex-nominated inflections of difference.

Given that, as Orwell (1954) suggests, "it is only by reconciling contradictions that power can be retained indefinitely" (1954: 185), the case study must pose the question: how does official discourse on the 'nuclear reality' seek to overcome legitimation crisis tendencies (real or potential) engendered by public fears about nuclear conflagration? As has been argued, it is conceptually inadequate to simply assert that hegemonic discourses guarantee the naturalization of ruling interests, whether in the first or last instance, as the interests of subaltern classes. Even to maintain that particular configurations of social meaning traverse subject positions is to leave unexplored their articulation beyond the sharp limits of the dominant/subordinate/radical triadism. Hence the need for research to help anchor the precepts of discourse analysis through a rigorous accounting of the fluid, sliding range of possible ideological positions available for negotiation in a given textual moment. Insights are needed into how social identities are provisionally fixed in discourse across the play of ideology and power, particularly as they are

conditioned by social rules or, after Foucault, exclusionary processes.

Herein lies an acute dilemma around which a critical discourse analysis may be organized to intervene in a complementary fashion: how to conceptualize the setting of ideological limits, the operation of rules of exclusion to privilege one meaning over the next? After all, in reconsidering the subject as the active producer of meaning, and not simply the passive receiver of a dominant ideology encapsulated within the (totalized) confines of the text, a critical discourse analysis may be mobilized to help confront the problem of accounting for the politics of discursive closure. Once again, the claim that the social relations of signification are riddled in contradictions is a necessary first step, as in this way the deterministic trap that dominant ideology is necessarily manifest in signification systems may be avoided, yet here it is argued that researchers need to enlarge the scope of their inquiry so as to encompass a more nuanced understanding of this conditioning process.

Dismantling Discourse

Much of the discussion to this point, both in this chapter and in the previous one, has been organized so as to illustrate 'what to look for' when examining the cultural dynamics of nuclearism as they are inscribed in various

texts. The remaining portion of this chapter is devoted to formally specifying the imperatives of the framework for the critical discourse analysis to be undertaken in the case study that follows in the next two chapters. In assuming as its point of contrast all rigid, mechanical approaches to the play of language in and across social forces, this framework will seek to discern, through a fresh emphasis on contestation, the contours of various struggles transpiring over the exclusionary mechanisms of official and news discourse. To demonstrate the heuristic advantages to be acquired in rethinking language as a field of possibilities, attention turns first to the need to account for the component elements present in discourse precisely as they are shaped by its dialogic orientation.

Following the trajectory mapped out above, it may be argued that regardless of whether the object of inquiry is an official document, such as a white paper on national defence, or a news account of its tabling in the House of Commons, the language of the text is more than a simple 'reflection' of the determinate social conditions of its production. Rather, to use the pertinent Bakhtinian notions, the 'many voicedness' of language is, by definition, organized in opposition to the concrete 'realities of heteroglossia'. Consequently, the provisional unity of these texts is under constant threat of collapse; the particular utterances they hold in tension are riddled with the contradictions of dialogue. Thus in order to assemble

the analytical tools to deal with the fluidity of official and news discourse, we need to recognize from the outset the word's living interaction with a shifting environment of other, alternative words about the same object or theme.

As noted, it is in this process of living interaction that the word as sign may be individualized: that is, as Bakhtin (1981d) notes, a concrete discourse "finds the object at which it was directed already as it were overlain with qualifications, open to dispute, charged with value, already enveloped in an obscuring mist: or, on the contrary, by the 'light' of alien words that have already been spoken about it. It is entangled, shot through with shared thoughts, points of view, alien value judgments and accents" (1981d: 276). Heterogeneity, as the living condition of language, allows for the ceaseless struggle over both the formation of the text as well as its articulation, thereby allowing for the mediation of texts in a way all but denied by those conceptions still advocating a view to non-historical structures where language is a singular, completely unified instrument.

To address the 'play' of words in official and news discourse, and in this way elucidate the nature of their directionality towards both the object (theme) and the addressee, it is crucial to underscore the semantic boundaries or limits of these words as signs. As Bakhtin has argued, the word as sign, over the course of its encounters across environments full of alternative words and

evaluating accents, will harmonize with some while striking a dissonance with others. In each case, it can not escape a confrontation in this tension-filled interaction with the 'already uttered', the 'already known', the 'common opinion' and so forth (Bakhtin, 1981; Foucault, 1972; Gramsci, 1971). Every word in an official document or news account is directed toward an answer, an anticipation of how it will be responded to in turn. Research must therefore prioritize not only *how* statements are articulated over others, but also *that which has been left unsaid*, the silences of the dialogue.

Still, how to get at the 'naturalized meaning' of a statement, in analytical terms, if it must be framed in relation to the backdrop of other concrete utterances on the same theme (contradictory opinions, points of view and value judgments) present not only in the object, but in the consciousness of the listener? That is, how do we proceed to explicate the official or news text's common sense. its conditions of existence and possibility?

If indeed the word is a 'two-sided act' (Bakhtin/Volosinov, 1973), then a critical discourse analysis needs to account for the play between the internal logics underpinning the form of a statement and the specific means of its contextualized, or dialogizing framing, to highlight the conditions or 'strings' attached to it. As Pecheux (1982) observes, to speak of the constitutive dependence of the concrete character of meaning on the

complex set of material representations implicated in key ideological formations is to, in turn, confirm that "words change their meaning according to the ideological positions held by those who use them" (1982: 111). Foucault's (1972, 1971) correlative attempt to follow up on the social logics of 'what can and should be said' employed the notion of prohibition to look beyond the 'content' of speech and on to the restrictions which surround it. For it is here, he argues, that speech is linked with desire (for an infinitely open discourse) and power (existing institutional constraints and control) in a fluid, complex web of the external rules in and through which it is identified as 'correct' or 'appropriate'.

Who is permitted to speak and what may be said? When and where may speech take place? From which institutional site(s) does this discourse derive its objects? What positions are ruled in (or ruled out?) for the subject to occupy in relation to the shifting dictates of topicality? To ask such questions, then, is to begin the task of problematizing the relations of authority constraining and conditioning the speaking situation. As will be shown, the conjoining of certain words with authority (as well as author-ity), always at the expense of others, must be dismantled to lay bare the mechanisms by which exclusionary rules of discursive closure are invoked. By re-opening for inspection the articulation of knowledge and power across the pages of the text, then, critical discourse analysis

must deny once and for all the obviousness of the official claim that: only this shall be known as true!

To centre for investigation the apparent 'gap' between 'reality' as it is re-articulated across the text, and the particular forms of language employed to perform this inferential work, critical discourse analysis needs to specify an implicit dichotomy between the modes of recognition within the discourses in play and, secondly, the modes of subjectivity made available via their actualization in textual form. This latter distinction finds its definition in relation to the preconditions underpinning the text and its 'voices'. That is, the question may then be posed: is the knowledge or lived experience 'spoken' by a given voice recognized by the text as conforming to its rules of legitimacy? Following this chapter's trajectory, it may be argued that texts anticipate being read both within an authorized or preferred range of reading positions and a non-authorized range of positions. This fluid equation must be suspended analytically so as to map how a legitimated (official or 'real') image of the text is in turn conditioned not simply by the repression, but also by the projection of its opposite (constitutive of the discursive Other) in accordance with the dictates of the truthful.

The winning of the reader's acceptance of the text's claims as appropriate, such that no alternative claim seems conceivable, is thus tied to the successful articulation of the conditionality of the text itself (as a totality) as

being unified and coherent. If these discursive claims are at their most rigid where the risk of contradiction is most profound, the very obviousness of the common sense at stake becomes the guarantor of the discursive project's validity. However, once analysis elects to seize upon the effectivity of the text's claims by prioritizing for critique precisely that which is dismissed as too obvious to be said, the extensible limits of its speech begin to appear. Why does this truth-claim take this particular form? Why was this truth-claim made in light of these alternative (silent) claims? By what sequential logic is this truth-claim made before this one, and after that one, and always at the expense of this one? To grapple with the text, then, critical discourse analysis takes as its point of departure the conditions of existence upon which the 'truthful meaning of the text' is made to rest (its situation within 'what everyone knows'), and then proceeds to elucidate the regulatory effects these discursive relations imply for the internal form of its signification (the complex array of truth-claims within the rules of a statement). The question of what factors condition the emergence of a truth-claim thus takes the place of the question, characteristic of earlier forms of critical analysis, of what factors determine its role in the 'reproduction of dominant ideology'.

A Question of Imperatives

The above discussion has provided a schematic overview of the principal contours of the conceptual foundations to be extended in the subsequent investigations of the effectiveness of official and news discourse. In this, the final section of this chapter, attention turns to the need to specify the implements of the analytical 'tool-kit' upon which the case study will draw. Any attempt to define an even more rigorous terminology would be provisional at best, however, given that tools are always modified in the course of their use. Thus rather than re-casting the trajectory mapped out thus far or, alternatively, offering a final summing up of the relative merits of the diverse concepts advanced by the different theorists and researchers, this section will affirm in positive terms the principal direction to be taken in the case study by outlining a series of practical imperatives.

Each of these conceptual imperatives is suggestive of the crucial theoretical insights mobilized by the discussion thus far, yet, at the same time, each is (implicitly) framed in relation to the pressing need to state the precise nature of the applicable mode of inquiry for the case study. As noted, each of the three respective theorists whose work has been described above has been made to speak to a set of concrete issues pertinent to the problem of nuclearism, the complexity of which has become increasingly more pronounced over the course of the discussion. The construction of this trajectory, and the selection of operative tools to be

derived from it, should not to be regarded as being somehow representative of a unified or coherent system or methodology. Rather, it is necessary to acknowledge that all of these concepts and categories are being held in tension, for it is only at this point in the dissertation that the logics of the mode of inquiry to be called critical discourse analysis are disclosing their contours. The general methodological agenda, then, may perhaps be best expressed here in the form of four (interrelated) sets of key questions, the precise inflection of which vis a vis official and news discourse will be specified in the respective portion of the case study.

First, this critical discourse analysis, as formulated here to address the cultural dynamics of nuclearism, asks: who is the 'author' of the text? (that is, after Foucault (1971), what is "the unifying principle in a particular group of writings or statements, lying at the origins of their significance, as the seat of their coherence[?]" ; 1971: 221). How is the authorial voice of the text constructed, its identity secured? How are the preferred readings of the text authorized? How does the text mobilize its common sense protocols, the natural logics of its reasoning? What are the normative principles or consensual values at stake in the authorial image of rationality? Is there a systemization or regularity to its modes of argument?

Second, the problem of to whom the text is addressed is centred for investigation: who is the authorized reader implied in its public idiom? What are the desired positions of its intelligibility (or the modes of its subjectivity) and how are they manifest in textual cues for the reader? What are the directives or logics to be followed for an appropriate or correct reading to be accomplished? Who is the un-authorized reader? Who is the denied, unspoken Other (absent signifier) of the text, the existence/non-existence of whom threatens the text's preferred alignment of common sense discourses? How are the limits of interpretation marked, the legitimacy of its rules policed?

Third, this critical discourse analysis grapples with the means by which the text speaks its 'reality' by seeking to explore the text's desire to orchestrate the credibility of its meaning. Wherein lie the convictions of its truth? Does one truth-claim come to command the field above other possible claims, and if so, how is discursive closure (a process which, as will be shown, is never complete) accomplished? What are the mechanisms underpinning the hegemonic status of its classification schemes? How are disparate discursive knowledges brought together, and their competing logics of articulation reappropriated or realigned, to sustain the 'facts at hand'?

Finally, in looking at the discourses in play across the terrain of the text, this critical discourse analysis inquires: what are the 'raw materials' of their textualized

explanations? Is there a regularity to the dispersion of statements or ways of knowing that is discernible for analysis? Is there a pattern to the text's inscription of knowledges in modalities of power, to the hierarchical arrangement of truth-claims? From where do these claims take their discursive legitimation? And, lastly, from where do they fear strategic resistance?

The imperatives of the conceptual framework outlined in this way, we may now proceed to investigate in Chapter Five the cultural dynamics of nuclearism as they are inscribed across various fields of official discourse, namely the 1971 *White Paper Defence in the 70s*, the 1987 *White Paper Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*, as well as the *Defence Update 1988-89*. Attention will then turn, in Chapter Six, to operationalize the claim that the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star*, as ideological formations, are sites of discursive conflict where institutional voices (of which the 1987 White Paper is one) engage in a struggle over the naturalization of the contending logics of nuclearism.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE DEPLOYMENT OF A STRATEGIC RATIONALE

Introduction to Part One of the Case Study

At the close of a 'highly productive' round of talks with United States government officials in 1987, then Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze reportedly startled a Washington press conference by remarking: "We have done a terrible thing to you. We have deprived you of an enemy." Later that same year, the Canadian government released a White Paper on National Defence, entitled *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*, which many news media commentators had anticipated would speak to the dramatic easing of 'East-West' tensions across the globe. Instead, *Challenge and Commitment* declared that the new defence policy agenda would have as its principal point of reference the 'ominous threat' posed by the Soviet Union to 'our way of life'. The bold invitation Soviet state officials had forwarded to 'the West' for fresh political thinking had been carefully rebuffed by the authors of the new strategic rationale.

Canadian state officials have long recognized the necessity of achieving a degree of control over language and

its politicization. The proper meanings of words like security, sovereignty, defence, deterrence, peace and stability are each the object of an ongoing contest for legitimacy. This chapter will thus endeavour to explicate the authoritative procedures and mechanisms through which certain defence policy documents articulate preferred ways to speak the realities of 'Canadian security in the nuclear age'. Of primary concern is the need to explore the materiality of official texts precisely as they evoke and construct their interests via appeals to a common sense of nuclearism. Specifically, analysis will prioritize the ideological struggles waged in and over the terrain of official documents to mark the discursive limits of 'the Soviet threat' and how it is to be countered by the 'modernization' of Canada's military forces (including a fleet of nuclear-powered 'hunter-killer' submarines) which are reliant, in the last instance, on a strategy of 'nuclear deterrence'.

Here it will be shown that the modes of argument invoked by documents such as *Challenge and Commitment* can be read, in part, as a re-articulation of the state's declared right to define the most suitable course for defence policy to adopt. This white paper, in order to ensure that its justificatory arguments would be recognized as a sound, rational development of previously held official positions, marked its conceptual space in light of earlier documents. Clearly, this needed to be accomplished in such a way as to make apparent or obvious precisely why a new policy state-

ment was required without, at the same time, calling into question certain normative ('empty of history') presuppositions about the larger purpose of state action in this particular sphere.

Challenge and Commitment, it follows, had to be made to 'fit' along an ideological continuum of defence documents constitutive of a 'distinctly Canadian' voice appropriate to such matters, one constrained by received notions of the state-defence dynamic. Consequently, in addition to the 1987 Defence White Paper, this chapter also will contain a brief exploration of its 1971 antecedent, *Defence in the 70s*, as well as the 1988-89 *Defence Update*. For our purposes, these three official texts will be viewed as constitutive of a strategic rationality that is itself specifiable as a matrix of interpellative strategies held in tension by an official discourse organized to reconstruct anew its hegemonic formation.

Re-constructing Consensus

A white paper, as an official document sponsored by the Crown, is released before Parliament after discussion and approval by Cabinet. The primary purpose of a white paper, in general, is to set out the government's overall assessment and intentions in a particular policy area, often including possible legislation; a Green Paper, in contrast, is simply employed to raise an issue for public discussion

and debate (Franks, 1988). [1] Accordingly, should analysis seek to address fully the articulation of official discourses across the field of state institutions, it is crucial to recognize that neither the Canadian government nor its Department of National Defence is a monolithic actor following a prefigured or fixed agenda. Rather, it is necessary to consider the bureaucratization of the policy process precisely as it pertains to the typification and categorization of problems as objects for strategic formulation, as well as the interplay of proposals designed to speak to them or, indeed, to remain silent (a decision not to take action is itself a policy outcome).

Prior to proceeding with this analysis, then, it should be noted that an investigative approach complementary to this one might take up the problem of researching the production of policy statements within the Department of National Defence. Such an approach could potentially provide appreciable insights into how the social relations of textual production shape or condition the official voice by prioritizing the dynamics of its internal dialogue with other, disparate institutional voices. Research could problematize, for example, the extent to which a Defence White Paper is designed to articulate a degree of ideological cohesiveness amongst different institutional voices within

1 For a thorough discussion of the evolving nature of 'coloured papers' and their use, see Doerr, 1982, 1971.

the larger state power bloc, specifically those of the political executive, the legislature and the civil service.

For our purposes here, however, it is sufficient to note, first, that while the Governor General is the titular head of the Canadian Forces, it is the cabinet which is the preeminent constellation of actors. Key sources of cabinet influence on defence policy, beyond the prime minister and minister of national defence (the most important cabinet executive official for defence policy), may include: the ministers of other portfolios (especially the Department of External Affairs); various cabinet committees such as the Priorities and Planning Committee, the Committee on Foreign and Defence Policy, and the Treasury Board, as well as others organized to address issues further compartmentalized due to concerns over secrecy; various parliamentary secretaries and assistants privy to the issues; and the bureaucracies of the Privy Council Office and the Prime Minister's Office (see Middlemiss and Sokolsky, 1989; Bland, 1988, 1987).

Second, in contrast with other departments, the Department of National Defence possesses a military bureaucratic hierarchy (here the significant actors include the chief, vice-chief and deputy chief of the defence staff, and the assistant deputy minister, personnel) in addition to its civilian one (actors include the deputy minister and his or her assistant deputy ministers for policy, materiel, and finance). Analysis could compare their respective organiza-

tional ethos vis a vis policy direction, often characterized as a type of tug-of-war between 'operational needs' versus 'program affordability'. Third, attempts to explicate the 'chain of command' could scrutinize the four main committees dealing with defence policy, namely: the Defence Council, the Defence Management Committee, the Program Control Board and the Program Control Board Subcommittee. Finally, this line of inquiry could subsequently be extended to consider now international relations, particularly amongst members of the 'NATO alliance', inform the ongoing definition of the consensual (hegemonic) unity within which official policy claims are to be posited.

It also should be acknowledged at the outset of this chapter that no sustained attempt will be undertaken to examine or evaluate the full range of implications of the relative strategic, legislative or administrative merits and deficiencies of these particular official documents. This is not to suggest, of course, that the related analytical approaches are not being deployed with considerable effect; important research is consistently being advanced by individuals working in the domains of, for example, international affairs or strategic studies. These approaches, largely prescriptive in their examination of 'preferred policy outcomes', often marshal the facts and technical details processed in the 'decision-making environment' for an evaluative, and usually polemical, treatment. There defence policy is generally regarded as being representa-

tional of certain interests or motivations and mis-representational of certain others (the actual relations of power are mystified), such that the veracity of official discourse is then to be quantified in relation to the accuracy of its reflection of the real world.

Here I would argue that this reliance on some form or other of a *neutral* or *objective* true-false measuring stick to assess the correctness of official statements places severe constraints on the type of research questions that can be posed, in most instances delimiting them to those which share the operative assumptions in play (such as 'nuclear deterrence works'). Perhaps not surprisingly, then, these critiques often only elect to delve into subtle nuances of policy detail or potentially troublesome aspects of implementation when outlining an alternative stance. As a result, the rewards to be gained for critical research directed to the disruption of nuclearism are minimal. Still, a careful reading of the pertinent research does facilitate the formal identification of various points of tension in the official discourse, especially those instances where a preferred construction of facts is in dispute or where, due to the degree of secrecy associated with defence policy decision-making, the 'relevant facts' can 'only now be revealed'.

Inscriptions of Authority

Here it is important to emphasize that traces of a dialogue between diverse policy actors mark the surface of a white paper as a textual instance of official discourse; a dialogue that is shaped by, first, the location of these actors or voices within the official network of information-exchange (ranging from those voices outlined above to parliamentarians, interest groups, and to private citizens) and, moreover, by their respective interest in the consultations over the policy position to be adopted. By examining a white paper as the final product of this institutional dialogue, then, certain insights into the means by which the contest over policy priorities is achieved within official frameworks for long-range planning and review can be gained. Here it is argued that embedded within this genre of official discourse is a recognition of the need for the state to do much more than speak to 'public opinion', but rather to actively use this process to facilitate the construction of a popular discourse that will ultimately reaffirm the rationales underpinning official accounts of 'reality' as having been derived from 'the will of the people'.

An organizing precept of this official rationale is that state policy is at all times the embodiment of public consensus. By its very status as a government document, a white paper claims to be the end result of a rigorous set of institutionalized procedures ostensibly designed to encourage the expression of differing public opinions within

appropriate limits. Fundamental to its mode of address is the implicit assertion that it is a policy document representative of Canadian society as a totality. It follows that the ongoing maintenance of the temporal and spatial ordering of policy making processes dictates that official attention be restricted, when possible, to those voices willing to work within 'common beliefs' about the true nature of the problems to be resolved.

This notion of 'common beliefs' or 'public consensus' is what rules some knowledges in, and what rules other knowledges out, in such a way as to ensure for the white paper the means to sustain its status as the official reconciliation of contrary interpretations of the 'facts at hand'. To be seen as the product of dialogue, a white paper cannot deny the existence of voices which challenge or oppose the general framework of agreement it advocates. Rather, as will be shown, it initiates a series of discursive strategies to problematize, and then undermine, alternative interpretive positions as being outside of the realm of popular norms and values.

To grapple with the question of how the competing constituent elements of this process are realized (contradictorily) in official documents, this investigation will look to explore the interpellative inscription of authorized knowledges across their pages. By choosing this particular point of departure, this chapter centres for analysis the specific means by which official inflections of

nuclear reality are structured by established frames of reference or interpretive frameworks constitutive of a strategic rationale. Implicated within an official document's public idiom, it will be shown, are certain processes of identification and contextualization operating to present a perplexing world of occurrences taking place in the 'strategic environment' as functioning in accordance with a preferred set of logics.

Enhancing Stability

The task set for a white paper, as the voice of the government, is to render this complex world comprehensible, primarily through the assignment of a sequential logic to what is ostensibly a haphazard or arbitrary array of 'international developments'. Once mobilized, this strategic logic works to project heterogeneous occurrences as objects or events, the features of which can then be discerned in relation to the shadows they are made to cast on the backdrop of preferred cultural identifications (indicative of the official regime of reading). Each occurrence as object, having been posited in this way, can be mapped or explained/evaluated in relation to the evidential truth-claims it is made to disclose for official appraisal.

As policy documents, the 1971 and 1987 Defence White Papers, along with the 1988-89 *Defence Update*, are the concrete products of a different set of institutional sites

traversed by state power. The most overt characteristic that each document has in common, however, is an implicit affirmation that it constitutes an official response to the shifting realities of national defence. Each can therefore be read, at one level, as an instance of an official will to power via discursive definition. The effectivity of state control is therefore predicated, in part, on the *naturalness* of the preferred descriptions of the social world that underpin strategic claims.

Beginning with the 1971 Defence White Paper, *Defence in the 70s*, it is apparent that this document is organized to formulate a general response to various pressing international developments, a series of which are defined as having culminated in an enhanced degree of 'stability'. [2] *Defence in the 70s* elects to construct three component factors as crucial: first, it declares the emergence of "an increased willingness to attempt to resolve East-West issues by negotiation, although it is still too early to judge the prospects for success" (DND, 1971: 4-5). [3] Second, it contends that the 'total freedom from conflict' Western Europe has 'enjoyed' for twenty-five years "bears witness to the success of NATO, as does the fact that deliberate attack on Western Europe appears improbable today" (DND, 1971: 33).

2 Liberal M.P. Donald Macdonald was the Minister of National Defence from 1970 until 1972.

3 Please note that the emphasis added here (printed in italics), and in all other citations from official documents, is that of this author.

'Collective security', it follows, has worked to keep the 'peace'. Thirdly, this official voice insists that largely as the result of occurrences in Europe and Asia (especially vis a vis China and Japan), "there has been a return to a form of multi-polarity in the international system. Although the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. continue to have overwhelming military power, and in particular nuclear power, the relative ability of these two countries to influence events in the rest of the world has declined in recent years" (DND, 1971: 5).

A 'stable' world thus engenders a particular type of policy response, the details of which, such as a major real reduction in defence spending, can now be outlined as the logical outcome of this assessment of the real. Indeed, "the first concern of defence policy," according to *Defence in the 70s*, "is the national aim of ensuring that Canada should continue [to be] secure as an independent political entity" (DND, 1971: 3). Despite the new 'stability' emergent from these factors, the White Paper warns, this very independence is under threat of attack. Potentially hostile forces are located, in the first instance, inside the country's borders: namely, in the form of those who would "resort to disruption, intimidation and violence as weapons of political action" (DND, 1971: 11). [4] In the

4 Here three recent challenges to government 'surveillance and control' are cited: the Montreal police strike, the 'political kidnapping crisis of last October', and the Kingston Penitentiary riots, each of which necessitated the

second instance, it is claimed that national sovereignty, if to a lesser degree than before, is still under threat in the form of a 'catastrophic war between the superpowers'.

For Defence in the 70s, the most significant changes taking place on the 'international scene' can now be reduced to those movements in 'East-West' political relations pertinent to the 'strategic nuclear balance'. Two aspects of this 'strategic nuclear balance' are identified as important developments: first, an increase in 'stability in nuclear deterrence', and second, the emergence of 'nuclear parity' between the two 'super-powers'. According to the White Paper, "each side now has sufficient nuclear strength to assure devastating retaliation in the event of a surprise attack by the other, and thus neither could rationally consider launching a deliberate attack" (DND, 1971: 4). A series of claims are mobilized to refine this statement, generally advanced in the strategic language of a 'stable mutual deterrence' (distinctions are made between a 'first strike', 'second strike', and 'pre-emptive strike'). Significantly, these claims, while prioritizing the necessity of 'nuclear deterrence' for Canadian security, nevertheless allow or rule in the (unspoken) possibility that Soviet nuclear weapons are simultaneously functioning to 'deter' the United States from launching a nuclear attack.

'timely assistance' of the Canadian Forces to 'come to the aid of civil power'.

That is, this official document, in the course of explaining the intricacies of 'nuclear deterrence', recurrently ascribes agency to 'the attacker' or 'the aggressor' who may be 'either side'. This discursive strategy, while not diminishing the status of a Soviet 'nuclear attack' on North America as the principal threat confronting Canada's 'national security', nevertheless works to problematize the operative assumption that the 'nuclear forces of the West' are for purely defensive purposes. Moreover, the White Paper concedes that the logic of 'mutual deterrence' as a 'system of security', briefly defined as "discouraging attack by demonstrating such a capability to retaliate - even after absorbing a massive surprise attack - that the possible gains of aggression would be outweighed by the losses the aggressor would sustain" (DND, 1971: 6), is to be viewed as 'fearsome' and 'far from being the theoretically ideal means of maintaining peace'.

Despite the reassurance that "the deliberate initiation of nuclear war between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. is highly improbable" (DND, 1971: 25), this document permits the concession that 'mutual deterrence' is "not a satisfactory long-term solution to the problem of preventing world conflict" (DND, 1971: 6). For the 'short-term', however, it remains 'the dominant factor in world politics', hence the rules of possibility (Foucault) are tightly drawn around the declared need for 'Canada to contribute to peace' by ensuring the 'continued effectiveness of the deterrent

system'. The four key dimensions of this contribution to the 'peace' identified are as follows: assisting the efforts of the United States to maintain the 'stability of deterrence' through the operation of a comprehensive system of attack warning; providing 'active defence against bombers and maritime forces'; maintaining membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which, as a 'collective security arrangement', has as its primary purpose 'the prevention or containment of conflict'; and, finally, participating in forthcoming arms control deliberations.

Defence in the 70s, by inflecting 'a contribution to peace' in this way, is attempting to obfuscate Canadian government complicity in legitimizing nuclear war fighting strategies. Still, notwithstanding the categorical declaration that Canada would not be 'singled out' for nuclear attack, an 'unfortunate consequence of geography' is openly acknowledged: namely, 'our involvement' in the aftermath of a 'strategic nuclear strike' against the United States. "Even if no warheads actually landed on Canada in the event of nuclear war, a strategic attack on the U.S., which could leave over 100 million dead, would have cataclysmic consequences for this country" (DND, 1971: 25). It is to be noted, with regret, that there is "not much Canada herself can do by way of effective direct defence that is of relevance against massive nuclear attack, given the present state of weapons technology, and the economic restraints on a middle power such as Canada" (DND, 1971: 6).

Accordingly, this White Paper moves to reaffirm as practicable a 'security system' based on 'stable mutual deterrence' as the most justifiable, but less than ideal, means available to achieve a desired end: the protection of Canada from a threat that can only be 'deterred' through the maintenance of an equal 'retaliatory threat'. To advocate a policy that would disturb this 'strategic balance' would be to misrepresent 'reality', as such a shift would be contrary to the interests of 'stability'. In this equation, nuclear weapons become a symbol of official power and resolve: that is, a proclamation of Canadian commitment to 'freedom' and 'democracy'. For Canada to be recognized by its allies as standing resolutely in the face of the Soviet threat, and thereby being a credible partner, this affirmation of 'nuclear deterrence' as a strategy of 'national security' is clearly a priority for anchoring the normative logics of nuclearism.

To sustain the very obviousness of this re-articulation, however, the signifier 'defence' in play must be further authorized. This is accomplished, in part, by stressing that "a constant criterion for evaluating all aspects of policy is the determination to avoid any suggestion of the offensive use of Canadian Forces to commit aggression, or to contribute to such action by another state" (DND, 1971: 7). To the extent that this possibility is, as the White Paper declares, both 'unthinkable and unacceptable', the 'reality' of the 'strategic situation' is

made to be the bearer of agency. This ascription facilitates the concomitant re-articulation of an official disavowal of any responsibility for projecting the pernicious logics of 'mutual deterrence' as a defensive posture.

Efforts seeking to render apparent the silences of the official definition by contesting the implied justness or authority of its rationale that 'nuclear deterrence' is not a doctrine of aggression will have to disentangle the means by which state power weaves together disparate ideological practices to construct itself as representative of a peaceful, defensive commitment to maintaining the stability of 'nuclear deterrence'. Potential challenges to this set of inferences will have to demonstrate, therefore, the arbitrariness of this ostensibly natural correspondence.

Of Challenge and Commitment

The Progressive Conservative Party, having promised over the course of its successful 1984 election campaign to restore national pride, prepare to chart a new direction in defence policy immediately upon taking office in September of that year. Pointing to the recent 'failure' of former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's 'peace initiative' to bring about tangible results, the Tories move quickly to declare their resolve to 'enhance' Canada's role in international affairs through a massive re-equipping of the country's

'long suffering' Armed Forces. Work begins almost at once to draft policy recommendations for the 'reinvigoration' of the military, principally through the means of a defence review and a foreign policy review (the latter would not lead to a white paper, but does produce a Green Paper the following Spring, to be followed by a Special Joint Committee report in June 1986).

In the meantime, the new Government reaffirms a Canadian commitment to both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the North American Aerospace Defence Command (negotiations with the United States to 'modernize' NORAD are concluded in March 1985), and pushes forward the re-equipment programs initiated by their Liberal predecessors. A decision to reassign the traditional colours to the uniforms of personnel in the three services proves to be popular, but the Mulroney government claims that due to a large federal deficit, the defence budget cannot be increased to the level pledged in the election campaign. Moreover, one by one the pertinent issues to be dealt with are quietly put aside as the realization of the government's legislative agenda is severely impeded by various scandals revolving around ministerial ethics.

One year prior to the release of the new defence policy statement, a formal request from the Reagan administration to enter into the *Strategic Defence Initiative* or 'Star Wars' program on a government-to-government basis is officially refused by the Mulroney government. However, the

participation of private Canadian firms and university researchers in securing related contracts is not ruled out. In June of 1986, the responsibility for ascertaining the current and projected state of the country's security and sovereignty needs falls to Perrin Beatty, the third defence minister in as many years (having succeeded Robert Coates and Erik Nielson in the portfolio). Officials in the defence bureaucracy, along with their counterparts in the Canadian Forces, are immediately called upon to help develop a 'more independent military posture' and within six months the White Paper's primary elements have taken shape. Following promptly after the Department of External Affairs officials' declaration of support for the key foreign policy recommendations of the Special Joint Committee on security matters, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada* surfaces in time to announce that the status quo is no longer tenable.

Challenge and Commitment, as a normal reply to the request for co-operation Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had advanced, is promptly applauded in some circles, particularly those of the military and business. Much is made of its steadfast reaffirmation of previous 'security' postulates, such as 'the Soviet threat', and its resolute rejection of the 'impractical' and 'idealistic' 1971 White Paper (particularly the latter document's emphasis on 'negotiation'). For other commentators, however, the extensive use of 'Cold War rhetoric' to explain many of the

document's policy positions appears to be astonishingly outmoded, lending some to charge that the new White Paper's authors are 'playing politics' with national security issues. [5]

Challenge and Commitment's policy initiatives, by way of an overview, include an increase in defence spending by at least two percent a year over fifteen years (this is 'on top' of 'inflation adjustments'; note that the 1987 budget is \$10.3 billion); an increase in the country's reserve forces to 90,000 troops; and, a realignment of Canada's commitments to NATO in Western Europe (troops would be moved from Norway to West Germany, where 7,000 troops are already stationed); the establishment of a northern training centre at Nanisivik in the high Arctic for troops (as well as

5 Free-lance journalist and military historian Gwynne Dyer, in his feature article entitled "Operation Au Revoir" (TS, 22 April 1988: A7), reports that a secret bid to withdraw Canadian troops from Europe in 1985 was launched by DND officials (with Erik Nielsen as minister). Both the Canadian Air Group and the Mechanized Brigade Group would be removed from West Germany, as would all the other troops "whose principal purpose is to be killed in any war there, thus guaranteeing that Canada is automatically committed regardless of how the war begins, or what Ottawa's wishes are at the time." If then U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger endorsed (at least at first) the concept, the British and West German defence ministers were reportedly furious. Canada's departure, it was claimed, would encourage the U.S. government to follow, thereby compromising the latter country's commitment to 'fight a nuclear war'. Accordingly, Dyer suggests that the proposals in the White Paper and the Cold War rhetoric in which they are couched signify that "a much-chastened Government clearly is trying to restore European goodwill after the secret uproar of 1985."

upgraded arctic airfields); and a new (\$1.6 billion) North Warning Radar System.

The recommended military 'hardware' expenditures, quickly dubbed by several daily press newswriters as a 'shopping list', include: a fleet of 10 to 12 nuclear-powered 'hunter-killer' submarines to maintain a 'Canadian presence' in three oceans, including the Arctic where they are capable of navigation under the ice (at a cost of \$8 billion over the next 27 years); a surveillance space satellite; 250 new main battle tanks (to replace the aging West German manufactured Leopard I tanks); 12 frigates, \$1.3 billion to refurbish 4 Tribal class destroyers; up to 30 minesweepers; 28 anti-submarine helicopters at \$2.8 billion (to replace the Sea Kings); 138 CF-18 Hornet fighter-interceptors; 6 maritime long-range Auroas patrol aircraft; new underwater listening devices; a northern-terrain vehicle fleet (\$420 million over 10 years); and, finally, a Polar 8 icebreaker: all at a projected cost of \$183 billion (in 1987 dollars) over the next 15 years (some estimates would later place the total at three times this figure). [6]

6 According to Bland (1988), approximately twenty drafts of the White Paper had to be prepared before an acceptable version was achieved. He writes: "There were discussions, some very strongly contested, in which the central themes and methods for the defence of Canada were worked out. It was not a case of the military producing a 'wish list' for the Minister's signature but in some cases it was the Minister who challenged the conservative inclinations of the officials" (1988: 23-24).

Mapping the Realities of the Present

This critical exploration of *Challenge and Commitment's* primary discursive elements begins by noting that the government's concern with displacing old realities with new ones is evident from the front cover of the document itself. The illustration presented on the cover consists of a brightly coloured representation of a globe centred by the Arctic Circle. Canada is the only country whose borders are rendered distinct as, unlike all of the other countries which are cast in a bright shade of green, it alone is drawn in white. Projecting out from this map of Canada is a further outline of its Northern boundary in crisp, clear lines.

This image confirms from the outset the general contours of the 'world view' of the new defence policy. That is, this image speaks to the status of Canada's claim to sovereignty in the contested territory of the Arctic by linking it visually with the rest of Canada. The sharp contrast created by the use of colour works to mark out a national frontier in the North, one ostensibly beyond dispute. Similarly, this image aims to delineate a clear boundary with the United States at a time when much public criticism is focusing on the real and potential dangers of 'Americanization' for Canadian society vis a vis the Free Trade Agreement (officially ratified after the 1988 federal election). Finally, the linkage between Canada's

from outside 'the West', namely by the Soviet Union. Together the constituent elements of this new realism illuminate the basic conditions of possibility not only for what peace and security have come to signify in 1987, but much more importantly, what the White Paper can reasonably be envisaged for tomorrow.

These elements, as intertwined as they are interdependent, are hierarchicalized in relation to their conformity with the mode of argument at stake in this document. References to the 'Soviet threat' or 'Soviet expansionism', the gravity of which are sharply accented, are contained within a totalized definition of the Soviet Union as ominous Other: "It is a fact, not a matter of interpretation, that the West is faced with an ideological, political and economic adversary whose explicit long-term aim is to mould the world in its own image. That adversary has at its disposal massive military forces and a proven willingness to use force, both at home and abroad, to achieve political objectives [...] This does not mean that war with the Soviet Union is inevitable or that mutually beneficial arrangements should not be pursued. It does mean that unless and until there is concrete progress, the West has no choice but to rely for its security on the maintenance of a rough balance of forces, backed up by nuclear deterrence" (DND, 1987: 5).

The dynamics of nuclearism embedded in this fluid configuration cannot permit the continued problematization of its 'supraclass eternal character' (Bakhtin/Volosinov,

'what we do at home', are directly tied to the 'well-being and security of the West as a whole'; and, finally, to 'safeguard its sovereignty', Canada must 'look to itself' and 'pursue its own interests'. Here, then, the Prime Minister is attempting to secure for the White Paper a coherent and unified conceptual basis for a complex articulation of thematically disparate, even contradictory, discursive elements.

Considerable ideological labour will be expended across the pages of the White Paper to authorize the complex assemblage of these elements such that the 'common impulse' of 'the Alliance' (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) is in turn made synonymous with the 'protection and furtherance of Canada's sovereignty as a nation'. The claim initiated by Mulroney in this preface that "only we as a nation should decide what must be done to protect our shores, our waters and our airspace" (1987: II) will be held in discursive alignment with the 'sober recognition' of the 'reality' that the country's very survival is conditional on the continued membership of its government in the NATO alliance. To the extent that 'our' security interests are made to conflate with those of this organization, insists the Prime Minister, "Canadians will be able to hold their heads high in the knowledge that we are meeting our responsibilities to ourselves and to our children" (1987: II). The White Paper thus begins the work of 'upgrading and consolidating our efforts' in order to "restore to the

Canadian Forces a sense of direction and a pride born of noble purpose" (1987: II).

Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty's preface to the White Paper also seeks to underscore the implicit morality claims of official definitions of what constitutes a 'modern and realistic mandate' for the Canadian Forces. Beatty contends that the priorities established by the federal government 'for much of the 1960s and 1970s' were improper, as 'our defence relationship with the other democracies' was subject to neglect. The defence policies of these earlier (Liberal Party) governments culminated in cuts to the size of the Canadian Forces, as well as a willingness to allow equipment to become obsolete. Two of the most acute ramifications of this dilapidation, according to Beatty, are that Canada's security and sovereignty have been 'seriously weakened' and that 'both our allies and potential opponents' have received 'mixed signals about our reliability as a NATO partner'. In marking a new point of departure, then, this White Paper will acknowledge that "the challenges Canadians must face between now and the next century go to the survival of humanity itself and to whether Canada will continue as a free and independent country" (1987: III). Accordingly, the new defence policy "commits the Government to giving the Forces the tools to do the job" (1987: III), a 'job' that is characterized as helping to "ensure for our children a sovereign and free Canada in a more peaceful world" (1987: III).

This chapter, in attempting to describe the means by which alternative interpretive positions are encouraged to conform to the dictates of this projection, particularly so as to reaffirm what is a fluid arrangement of bi-polar dichotomies (such as self/other, us/them, home/foreign or ally/enemy), will proceed to explicate the inferential structure of official modes of argument. For the White Paper to succeed in naturalizing the normative logics of nuclearism, it must call forward a regimen of criteria by which alternative knowledges are to be assessed for topical relevancy. These criteria will, in turn, demarcate the rules to be respected: that is, they constitute the shifting parameters (always provisional) within which the play of author-ized knowledges can be safely permitted. To the extent that the naturalness of this set of rules is too obvious to be spoken (or that no clear alternative exists), official definitions of the situation are better able to secure a basis to resist the potential insertion of un-author-ized knowledges threatening to compromise its ideological effectivity.

The Play of Ideology and Power

Following Gramsci's (1971) insight that "every relationship of 'hegemony' is necessarily an educational relationship" (1971: 350), it may presently be shown how the White Paper prioritizes its pedagogic role vis a vis its

mode of address. Implicit within this logic is the view that public acceptance of any new policy will be contingent upon the persuasiveness of official strategies of justification. To render problematic the internal discursive regularities of the document, its embeddedness within common sense needs to be disclosed: that is, analysis must seek to open up for examination the White Paper's conditions of existence and possibility (Foucault) precisely as it is inserted within the play of ideology and power.

Turning now to the main text of *Challenge and Commitment*, it is evident that its initial agenda is to dismiss several of the organizing precepts underlying the department's 1971 antecedent, *Defence in the 70s*. From the vantage point of the mid-1980s, the official voice intones, this latter policy statement may be regarded as unduly optimistic, as a "rather benign view of the world, characteristic of a period in which detente was the watchword" (DND, 1987: 1). *Defence in the 70s* erroneously "took comfort in the increasing stability of mutual deterrence between the superpowers based on an approximate parity in nuclear weapons. It saw in arms control great promise for the reduction of arms at both the nuclear and conventional levels. [...] [I]t anticipated a multipolar world in which power would be more diffuse and the superpowers would play less significant roles. It looked with great optimism to a future in which negotiation would resolve problems in East-West relations" (DND, 1987: 1). This assessment, indicative

of certain intellectual constructs defined elsewhere as belonging to a Pearsonian liberal-internationalist tradition, is now to be regarded as being in need of a substantive re-evaluation.

Indeed, for the new White Paper, it is presently clear that "the great hopes of the early 1970s have not been realized" (DND, 1987: 1). The 'great hopes' of Defence in the 70s can now be discarded in light of the following developments. First, if 'stable mutual deterrence between the superpowers' has 'endured', it has done so only through the use of 'much higher levels of forces'. This is ostensibly due, at least in part, to a second development: the claim that the 'promise of arms control', notwithstanding some early success, "has so far proven to be much more difficult to achieve than many had anticipated" (DND, 1987: 1). [7] Thirdly, while conceding that the greater diffusion

7 A historical continuum is quickly sketched by *Challenge and Commitment*, one that begins with a success: the 1972 signing of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty or SALT I (the Anti-Ballistic Missile or ABM Treaty was a part of this agreement), and ends with failure: the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions or MBFR talks, conducted in Vienna since 1973. Significantly, no mention is made here of a series of important agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union undertaken since that time, including amongst other examples: the signing of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 3 July 1974; the 28 May 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) accord; the 30 July 1985 announcement by the Soviet Union of a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing (which lasted for 19 months); the June 1979 signing of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), an agreement that, although never ratified by the U.S. Congress, had some impact on 'arms limitation'; nor even the October 1986 Reykjavik summit which launched an agreement to eliminate an entire 'class' of nuclear weapon (the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force [INF] Treaty is officially signed in Washington in December of 1987; see

of power anticipated by the 1971 White Paper has transpired, the new document insists that these changes have yet to "alter perceptibly the central fact of confrontation in East-West relations [...] [T]he early promise of detente was exaggerated. Events have not justified the optimism of the early 1970s that problems of East-West relations would be resolved by negotiation" (DND, 1987: 1-2).

It is this 'central fact of confrontation' that must be naturalized if the assertion that 'the West' cannot centre its approach to problem resolution on negotiations with 'the East' is to be sustained. This latter claim is crucial to the larger discursive trajectory of *Challenge and Commitment*, as it is assigned to reinforce the basis to first pose and then answer the question: if the Soviet threat cannot be negotiated away, what is the *honest, modern and realistic* alternative? It is thus with the declaration that 'the realities of the present' currently demand "a more *sober* approach to international relations and the needs of security policy" (DND, 1987: 2) that the White Paper commences with the work of laying down the rudimentary foundations of what will eventually culminate in a new discursive position, namely 'Canada first-ism' as an approach to 'security policy'.

Challenge and Commitment, in setting out the 'immutable' elements of 'our geostrategic situation', grants Bunn, 1991; Semler, Benjamin, and Gross, 1987; Stephenson and Weal, 1985).

priority to the configuration of exigent 'threats' to the Canadian 'way of life'. A pivotal equation is introduced which holds that if there is no external threat unique to Canada, and there is not according to this configuration, then it follows by strategic logic that this country cannot assure its own security independently. Accordingly, Canada's security (along with its 'prosperity') requires the maintenance of a 'peaceful international order'. [8] For the official voice, a 'stronger and more stable environment', one in which 'our' values and interests 'can flourish', is to be made consonant with a 'national interest' ultimately reliant on nuclear weapons to 'keep the peace'.

The White Paper, in part to sustain an implicit claim that its rationale is representative of the will of the public, invokes a series of strategies to situate the implied addressee in certain desired positions discursively mapped as 'our values'. To succeed in the complex definitional work of orienting the addressee to the preferred modes of subjectivity (never fixed once and for all), the text re-inscribes popular conceptions of 'democracy', 'freedom' and 'stability' within the strict limits of authorized consensual values. The state, in its authorial voice, claims to be the rational, normative embodiment of these

8 Note that this postulate ex-nominates the vast range of wars being fought around the globe. Indeed, more wars were reportedly occurring in 1987 than in any previous year (see World Military and Social Expenditures, 1987-88: 5).

values, and thus assigns to itself the task of giving formal expression to that which would otherwise pass unspoken by 'the people'.

At the same time, lines of demarcation must be operationalized to rule out or displace various alternative readings as being emergent from somewhere outside of the popular consensus, particularly those which would seek to re-articulate the official legitimation of the 'our'/Other value dichotomy in motion across the discursive field. The concept of a 'framework of collective security' is, in this way, employed decisively to render both concrete and coherent a distinctly moralized objective. *Challenge and Commitment*, as the 'sober' voice of 'this Government', proclaims "wholeheartedly that there is no acceptable alternative [to this particular framework] and rejects as naive or self-serving the arguments of those who promote neutrality or unilateral disarmament" (DND, 1987: 3).

Interposed as a component factor of collective security, by implication, is an implicit affirmation of the 'deterrent value' of the nuclear weapon systems of 'our allies'. However, this reliance on what will later be labeled as 'strategic nuclear forces' is, for the moment, left unspoken. As a discursive element, then, 'collective security' is allowed to remain relatively indeterminate: consequently, as a (totalizing) construct for the articulation of certain normative truth-claims, it facilitates the discursive construction of an official interest position

within distinct rules of exclusion or prohibition (Foucault).

That is, in the name of 'collective security', *Canadian values and traditions* are ruled in as the desired standards by which the conduct of nations is to be measured. As a part of official common sense, 'Canadian values and traditions' need not be explicated in detail. Rather, its discursive alignment can be underlined vis a vis an implied opposition to what it is not ('the arguments of those who promote neutrality or unilateral disarmament', for example). Thus to advocate 'collective security' is to profess little more than a recognition of common sense. Upon confirming that the obviousness of this configuration is not shared by all, the White Paper highlights the attendant risks should its rationality be put at risk: "We could turn our backs on the obligation to work for a stable world order; technology and geography would not, however, allow us to escape the consequences should that order collapse" (DND, 1987: 3).

Imag(in)ing the Enemy

Challenge and Commitment, in seeking to justify as axiomatic the postulate that the 'international environment' is 'dominated by the rivalry between East and West', elects to frame the proposed 'Canadian security policy' vis a vis the claim that 'neutrality would be hypocrisy'. The 'conflict of ideas and values' between 'the East' and 'the

West' becomes a vehement contest over how 'politics should be conducted, society ordered and economies structured', as well as over the 'value of personal freedom', the importance of the rule of law, and the 'proper relationship between the individual and society'.

Canada, the White Paper contends, stands firmly on one side of the divide: "Our values and our determination to defend freedom and democracy align us in the most fundamental way with other Western nations" (DND, 1987: 5). The severity of this antagonism may not be readily apparent to many Canadians, the official voice intones, as generally they "tend to approach international relations optimistically, assuming the best of others" (DND, 1987: 89). If few Canadians feel 'militarily threatened', even have difficulty 'imagining anyone as an enemy', then it is necessary that this policy statement serve to remind them "that the world is not always as benign or predictable as we would wish, that the spectre, if not the reality, of violence is ever-present and that those who do not look to their own military forces can become the victims of the forces of others" (DND, 1987: 89).

Here the White Paper is acknowledging, at least in part, the traces of the Other, non-author-ized definitions it is seeking to re-appropriate. Thus, in pointing out that a 'clash of arms' is one possible outcome of this conflict, care is taken to emphasize that "for its part, the West would resort to armed force only in its own defence" (DND,

1987: 5). A 'defence effort' is thus a prerequisite of responsible government, even if "we do not expect to have to resort to force of arms to resolve our problems" (DND, 1987: 89). The test of adequacy for 'security policy' is indeed whether or not it recognizes the imminent danger of attack or invasion of 'the West' by 'the East'. Moreover, the allegedly immutable nature of this threat dictates that it cannot be made the subject of negotiation, nor can it be reduced or further qualified through official pronouncements by state leaders on either side of the 'East-West' divide. As the White Paper queries: "can Western governments responsibly base the well-being and future of their own future people on expressions of goodwill and on the most optimistic interpretation of the intentions of others?" (DND, 1987: 5).

The question advanced is clearly a rhetorical one, as the rules of prohibition immanent to its logic delimit the range of possible responses available across the range of subject positions constitutive of a pragmatic realism (as opposed to an inappropriate, naive optimism). This re-articulation of a (realist) common sense ('what can and should be said') is mobilized to counter: first, the legacy of well intentioned but misguided (less than 'sober') earlier governments; second, the criticisms of an allied force that finds Canada's commitment to mutual security lacking; third, internal threats to security and order potentially sparked by 'those who do not look to their own military forces'; and, lastly, the external threat posed

from outside 'the West', namely by the Soviet Union. Together the constituent elements of this new realism illuminate the basic conditions of possibility not only for what peace and security have come to signify in 1987, but much more importantly, what the White Paper can reasonably be envisaged for tomorrow.

These elements, as intertwined as they are interdependent, are hierarchicalized in relation to their conformity with the mode of argument at stake in this document. References to the 'Soviet threat' or 'Soviet expansionism', the gravity of which are sharply accented, are contained within a totalized definition of the Soviet Union as ominous Other: "It is a fact, not a matter of interpretation, that the West is faced with an ideological, political and economic adversary whose explicit long-term aim is to mould the world in its own image. That adversary has at its disposal massive military forces and a proven willingness to use force, both at home and abroad, to achieve political objectives [...] This does not mean that war with the Soviet Union is inevitable or that mutually beneficial arrangements should not be pursued. It does mean that unless and until there is concrete progress, the West has no choice but to rely for its security on the maintenance of a rough balance of forces, backed up by nuclear deterrence" (DND, 1987: 5).

The dynamics of nuclearism embedded in this fluid configuration cannot permit the continued problematization of its 'supraclass eternal character' (Bakhtin/Volosinov,

1973: 23). In order to situate official rationalizations of the Soviet threat above 'interpretation' (by nature optimistic) into the realm of the factual (pragmatic realism), discursive appeals to common sense assumptions about this adversary must be mobilized such that the 'choices' before 'the West' as to how to respond to this threat ultimately culminate in only one real choice being available: 'nuclear deterrence'.

For this characterization of the Soviet Union's 'explicit long-term aim' to be sustained as natural, reference must be made to its distinguishing (timeless) features. A Soviet interest in 'mould[ing] the world in its own image' is thus posited in opposition to Canadian efforts to project upon an international order 'our values and traditions'. Consequently, while the Canadian government is cognizant of the profound division between East and West, 'the new Soviet leadership' is to be condemned because it "continues to view the world as divided into two antagonistic camps" (DND, 1987: 15). The evocation of images of a trustworthy and ethical self is anchored, in part, through its apposition with the sanctioned categorization of the Soviet Union as suspicious and hostile Other.

For the White Paper's mode of argument to succeed in first extending and then reinforcing a polarity between a (virtuous) self and an (evil) Other, the 'fixing' of official truth-claims regarding 'the dangers of aggression against NATO' has to be re-inscribed through a series of

interpellative appeals. The assertion that "there is every reason to believe that [the Soviet Union's] long-term aims continue to include the dissolution of NATO, the neutralization of non-communist Europe and the weakening of the West as a whole" (DND, 1987: 15) ceases to be an article of faith to be affirmed through emotional convictions. [9]

Similarly, the claim that the Soviet Union and its 'Warsaw Pact allies' (contrast with North Atlantic Treaty Organization) are to be denounced for leaving 'the West' with no choice but to rely on 'nuclear deterrence' for its 'security', 'fixes' (provisionally) the official commitment, first, to a 'nuclear war-fighting strategy' and, second, to the pursuit of nuclear superiority. [10] Thus 'our participation in NATO', and bilaterally with the United States, is working to 'enhance' 'nuclear deterrence' as it contributes to "the survivability of United States strategic nuclear

9 Rather, for the official voice, it is an actuality the certitude of which can be quantified through observation: "The Soviet Union has further increased its military potential through its sponsorship and dominance of the Warsaw Pact" (DND, 1987: 9). At the same time, however, this mode of argument rules out, presumably as extraneous or irrelevant, numerous instances where 'Alliance members' have sought to 'translate military power into political gains'.

10 The Warsaw Treaty Organization (as opposed to 'Warsaw Pact') was formed as a military alliance in May 1955 with the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, six years after the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in April 1949. The signatories of the Warsaw Treaty included the U.S.S.R., Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania.

forces, the keystone of NATO's assured retaliatory capability" (DND, 1987: 17).

This strategic reaffirmation of the doctrine of 'mutually assured destruction' or 'MAD' is articulated at the level of the obvious, of what everyone knows to be true. Sufficient care is taken to avoid direct comment on how it is that 'NATO's nuclear forces' actually 'deter' while, simultaneously, Soviet 'nuclear forces' 'threaten'. Rather, the White Paper's statement on 'nuclear deterrence' follows the dictates of a familiar script, neatly encapsulated in its claim: "deterrence is not divisible. If it fails in Europe, it fails everywhere" (DND, 1987: 21).

Also consistent throughout the White Paper is the strategic rationale's ex-nomination of counter-claims that its preferred inflection of 'nuclear deterrence' is itself dangerously compromised. Despite its insistence that the 'present balance of strategic nuclear forces' constitutes the primary factor protecting 'the West' from 'Soviet attack', the official voice is forced to acknowledge the potentially 'catastrophic' implications of such a policy. Still, it declares, "the only effective counter to such a threat is a strategy of deterrence based on the maintenance of diversified nuclear forces. Such forces must be capable of surviving an attack and retaliating in a manner so devastating as to convince any potential aggressor that the penalty he risks incurring far outweighs any gain he might hope to achieve. Each superpower now has the capacity to

obliterate the other, even after having absorbed a nuclear strike. For that reason, the structure of mutual deterrence today is effective and stable. The Government believes that it must remain so" (DND, 1987: 17). As the 'NATO strategy of flexible response' dictates that Canada will be obliterated should 'deterrence fail' the official voice must ensure the ex-nomination of the counter-claim that it may not continue to 'work' in the future.

This discursive alignment of 'Canadian security' with the 'potentially apocalyptic consequences of a nuclear exchange' is, in turn, inflected by the White Paper as being logically consistent with the dictates of *national defence in the nuclear era*. The rules of exclusion and possibility indicative of the security rationale, having found their initial definition vis a vis the declared possibility of an 'enemy strike', re-inscribe the implicit claim that these weapons are actually 'working' to 'deter' the Soviet Union from such a course of action. Nothing short of an actual Soviet invasion of an 'Alliance ally' could succeed in repudiating the presuppositions underpinning this thesis. Until such an event takes place, Canada's 'contribution to deterrence' is made to stand as an *honest, modern and realistic* statement of 'our' commitment to the 'common effort'.

A Nuclear Status Quo

The White Paper's conditions of existence and possibility (its embeddedness within relations of common sense, including those of nuclearism) are clearly shaped by a multiplicity of Others, both spoken and ex-nominated, to whom it is addressed. This configuration of Others 'fixes', however tenuously, an image of the reader or addressee, thereby partially disclosing the regimen of rules to be followed in order to construct an *appropriate* interpretation of its statements.

That is, the White Paper encourages certain preferred readings primarily by making alternative ones difficult to sustain over the duration of the textual moment. Still, to validate or authorize official assumptions about 'nuclear deterrence' as a necessary component of a responsible 'security' policy, the official voice must nevertheless acknowledge the existence of these alternative or non-author-ized positions. As has been argued in the course of Chapter Four's discussion, this dialogic process is most effectively theorized not as an instance of formal repression or censorship, but rather by examining the very *obviousness* of the rules or protocols of the text on which *correct* or *appropriate* readings are contingent. More specifically, a critical discourse analysis seeks to discern this point where, after Bakhtin, both centripetal (monologic) and centrifugal (dialogic) forces are brought to bear.

To clarify, by assigning to defence policy the role of 'enhancing deterrence', the White Paper secures the basis to re-articulate the claim that the Canadian state is doing its part as a 'responsible ally' to ensure that the 'nuclear forces' of NATO preserve 'the peace'. Even given a change in circumstances where the state would be compelled to end this commitment to participate within 'the Alliance', "our security would continue to depend on the deterrence provided by our former allies, but we would have opted out of any contribution to an: equally significantly, any say in the management of that deterrent" (DND, 1987: 3). Here, then, is a key component of the strategic rationale: this 'say in the management of the deterrent' locates the truth-claim that 'a Canadian voice in NATO' is prohibiting certain events or actions from taking place when otherwise such could be the case. The nature of these possible events or actions is left unspecified, yet one preferred implication is clear: without Canadian participation, 'the West' would be substantively weakened in light of the subsequent impact on a 'strategy of deterrence' demarcated within the inflexible discursive limits of a 'Soviet intent' versus 'Soviet capability' polarity.

Attention is then drawn to the next component element of this emergent script: Soviet efforts to reach "rough parity with the United States in strategic weapons while maintaining numerical superiority over Allied conventional forces in Europe" (DND, 1987: 9). The current 'balance of

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forces' is now to be authorized as precarious: 'our' 'stabilizing' 'nuclear forces' are at risk to a Soviet 'pre-emptive first strike'. Having previously anchored 'stability' via the re-articulated signifier 'superiority', whether 'nuclear' or 'conventional' in its definition, the official voice must presently re-trace the hierarchical limits of the *already known* so as to re-assert its rationale that 'our stability' is contingent upon the maintenance of Soviet insecurity. To displace or rule out the basis for a conceptual crisis being engendered by the necessary concession that the two 'superpowers' both recognize that a 'nuclear exchange' between them would have 'catastrophic' consequences, the official voice initiates a shift to prioritize the inflection of the Soviet threat vis a vis its 'conventional' manifestation. Hostilities, it is argued, would be "more likely to begin at the conventional level, where the Soviet Union has its greatest advantage" (DND, 1987: 19).

Once again, the logics of 'deterrence' are rehearsed, in this instance with the principal aim of ex-nominating beyond contention the constituent elements of 'our deterrent' via the signifier 'stability':

"The most effective counter to the conventional threat is to convince any potential aggressor that the chances of an attack quickly achieving its objectives are slight and that, if he were to persist in his aggression, he would run the risk of a nuclear response. This strategy requires adequate

and sustainable conventional forces trained, equipped and positioned according to the threat. It may not be necessary to match the other side weapon for weapon, but the more effective the conventional forces, the less is the reliance which has to be placed on nuclear weapons. If early resort to these weapons is to be avoided, the conventional forces in place must be able to fight over an extended period" (DND, 1987: 20). Thus the official voice, despite its assertion that a 'conventional conflict' would 'put less at risk than would a nuclear war', is forced to acknowledge the limits of the signifier 'stability' in play: that is, by conceding that there exists a 'risk' that hostilities could 'escalate to include nuclear weapons', the strategic rationale is made to disclose the tensions which compromise its nuclear-conventional dichotomy.

Interestingly, the 'European theatre' in this configuration becomes 'the centre of gravity in the balance of power', and as such could quickly be 'the decisive battlefield' at both 'nuclear and conventional' levels (DND, 1987: 5). This notion of a 'balance of power' anchors a rigid polarity between the 'Warsaw Pact', for which military power is concatenated with 'political gain', and the NATO, cast in the role of defender. This re-articulation is mobilized to explain why the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies maintain in Central Europe "massive armed forces well in excess of what is reasonable for defence alone" (DND, 1987: 5). The 'Western response' (primary agency is, once again,

ascribed to the Soviet threat) is one of restraint, namely being limited to the deployment of "forces sufficient at least to deny the Soviet Union the prospect of an easy victory" (DND, 1987: 5). The resultant 'balance' is thus in actuality an imbalance as the enemy possesses: first, a 'decided edge' (a 'three-to-one advantage') in the number of 'theatre nuclear ballistic missiles' it possesses; second, numerically superior 'conventional' forces, particularly with respect to artillery, armed helicopters, battle tanks and tactical aircraft; and third, a large stockpile of chemical weapons (and 'a well-developed military capability to operate in a toxic environment').

'Confronting' Western Europe, the official voice contends, are approximately ninety Warsaw Pact divisions: "more than 2.5 million men [sic] and about 47,000 tanks stand ready for employment with minimal mobilization" (DND, 1987: 12). It follows that "the Warsaw Pact could be expected to use its superior numbers to overwhelm NATO defences" (DND, 1987: 14), particularly given that "the Warsaw Pact would be able to select the time and place of attack and concentrate its forces accordingly, [while] NATO, as the defender, would be obliged to thin out its divisions across the entire front. Under these circumstances, NATO maintains forces barely sufficient to cover the ground" (DND, 1987: 12). Moreover, "the Warsaw Pact has a geographic advantage, as NATO suffers from a lack of strategic depth, and from the need for resupply and rein-

forcement from across the Atlantic" (DND, 1987: 12). Finally, due to the Soviet Union's continued 'modernization' of its military forces, "NATO's margin of qualitative superiority is being eroded" (DND, 1987: 14). Thus while, in the past, "NATO has been able to rely on its qualitative lead in weapons technology to compensate somewhat for the greater number of Warsaw Pact troops and equipment" (DND, 1987: 14), this is no longer the case. [11]

'Soviet superiority', in this its authorized formulation, facilitates the discursive reification of the U.S.S.R. government, first, as being of an untrustworthy or duplici-

11 Robinson (1987) is one commentator amongst several who takes exception to these figures. Citing alternative statistics provided by the United States Pentagon (the reliability of which is similarly open to question), Robinson identifies a persistent pattern of exaggeration of the 'Soviet threat' in the White Paper. Very briefly, Robinson contends that the policy document excludes 52 troop divisions in its calculation of the 'NATO balance' (it fails to include troop divisions from France and Spain), adding up to over 550,000 'allied troops' not being counted. Moreover, Robinson's use of Pentagon statistics shows that the White Paper distorts the number of 'main battle tanks', 'artillery', 'armed helicopters', 'principal surface combatants' (large naval vessels), 'attack submarines' and 'land combat aircraft', in most instances purposefully concealing 'NATO superiority' in its 'armed forces'. This overstatement of the 'Warsaw Pact's advantage', he argues, is constructed through a series of strategies (in addition to the aforementioned exclusion of French and Spanish forces), including: the counting of only those 'NATO forces' located in Europe, and not the enormous number of reinforcements in the United States; the addition of 'hardware' such as 'light frigates' in the 'Warsaw Pact total' exclusively; and, the failure to factor into its calculations the 'vastly superior' nature of 'NATO's anti-submarine capabilities' (sensor systems, aircraft, surface vessels and submarines) and 'NATO's qualitative advantage' in aircraft (technical capabilities and pilot training), amongst other factors (see Robinson, 1987; Keating and Pratt, 1988; World Military and Social Expenditures, 1987-88).

tous nature, and additionally, as having hostile intentions. This maneuver stabilizes or 'fixes' the articulation of a 'deterrent value' as being consonant with the preferred signifier of 'defence' in play, as by this rationale any negotiation of treaties with an insidious opponent cannot produce 'security', only 'fear' or 'intimidation'. The primary features of a (provisional) 'deterrence' script are thus discernible as follows: 'deterrence is not divisible'; should 'deterrence' be allowed to 'fail' in Europe it will automatically 'fail' everywhere; the Soviet Union and its 'Warsaw Pact allies' have concentrated 'nuclear and conventionally armed forces' in the 'European theatre' that are 'larger than defence alone requires'; 'a free and secure Europe' is 'critical to Canada's future'; the Canadian Armed Forces, by 'contributing to deterrence in Europe', are serving Canada's 'security' needs. A key (unspoken) structuring device of this script rules out as irresponsible an isolationist stance, particularly one that could culminate in the withdrawal of a 'Canadian presence' from Europe, while simultaneously conflating the specificity of the 'European democracies' with 'Canadian interests': "Were Western Europe to be subverted, overrun or destroyed, what remained of the West would face a bleak future. It is difficult to imagine what place Canada would have in such a world. [...] Canada's security in the broader sense is inseparable from that of Europe. There is nothing new in this reality" (DND, 1987: 6).

The re-inscription of this reality, in turn, similarly works to reinforce the authority of an ancillary script: for 'conventional forces' to 'deter', they must be able to 'defend'; 'if they are to defend, they must be able to fight'; 'conventional defence must be strengthened in order to improve deterrence'; a commitment to defence 'readiness' and 'combat effectiveness' reduces the likelihood of war; an 'enhanced deterrent' raises 'the nuclear threshold'. The official voice, in seeking to construct a basis for the projection of a particular configuration of *national credibility*, is undertaking to naturalize the need for 'nuclear deterrence' as the most 'efficient' means to 'deter' the 'Soviet threat' (in contrast with that which may be accomplished singularly through 'conventional forces'). Once mobilized, this set of logics constitutive of the 'will of our allies' renders obvious this preferred re-articulation of 'our strategic interests' with 'strategic stability' in Europe.

'Efficiency', as a signifier, is then further implicated in the strategic rationale as it inflects the proposed decision to shift the 'Canadian presence' from Norway to West Germany in the language of sound 'cost' management. The 'great cost' involved in maximizing the value of 'combat resources' previously committed to 'defending' northern Norway is now to be re-articulated via a shift in priorities *vis a vis* logistics, as opposed to those of economics. Failure to take the measures necessary to rectify these

logistical deficiencies could only serve to weaken the 'common defence' of 'the Alliance', for this inadequacy would be 'as obvious to our opponents as it is to us'. Thus the White Paper advocates the 'streamlining of combat forces' so as to enhance the effectiveness of 'supply and sustainment arrangements' (DND, 1987: 60-65), for in doing so it will enhance the level of effectiveness of the Canadian role in upholding a 'credible deterrent'.

Standing on Guard

This Canadian commitment to raising 'the nuclear threshold', when set in relation to the reiterated truth-claim that 'Canada has no aggressive intentions toward any country', highlights a critical point of disjuncture in the strategic rationale's will to naturalization. An elaboration of its mode of signification is thus in order to 'ward off' or delimit the criteria of inclusion such that the anticipation of a Soviet assault on Canada (at sea, land, or 'in the air over the approaches to North America') may be mobilized as a justificatory mechanism. "The principal direct threat to Canada," the official voice declares, "continues to be a nuclear attack on North America by the Soviet Union" (DND, 1987: 10). The accuracy and range of Soviet land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are here called up and, in turn, made to accentuate the

additional claim that they "enable the Soviet Union to inflict enormous damage on any target, anywhere in the world" (DND, 1987: 10). If, 'given the present balance of strategic nuclear forces', such an attack on Canada is unlikely, it nevertheless satisfies the conditions of possibility set down by the criteria of inclusion. The reaffirmation that the Canadian government has 'no intention' of acquiring nuclear weapons recuperates the potentially compromised morality of a strategy of continued reliance on the 'nuclear forces of our allies' to 'deter' a nuclear attack on Canada. "For that reason," *Challenge and Commitment* proclaims, "we support the maintenance of such survivable nuclear forces as are necessary for stable and effective deterrence" (DND, 1987: 17).

Significantly, then, this document departs from the position adopted by the 1971 Defence White Paper vis a vis the mechanisms by which a strategy of 'mutual deterrence' is to be inflected. For the earlier document, as noted, the 'deterrent system' is "far from being the theoretically ideal means of maintaining peace" (DND, 1971: 25), and, moreover, possesses a 'fearsome logic' that is "clearly not a satisfactory long-term solution to the problem of preventing world conflict" (DND, 1971: 6). Thus where *Defence in the 70s* prioritizes in dialogic fashion the tensions indicative of a moral-realist dichotomy, one ultimately resolved through a reluctant endorsement of 'mutual deterrence', it expands the limits of this ideological terrain by

initiating a demand for a much less dangerous alternative system of security. In sharp contrast, *Challenge and Commitment* reaffirms the preferred logics of nuclearism via the interpellative strategy of justifying 'NATO's nuclear strategy' as a policy to be upheld in the name of 'keeping the peace'. Counter-arguments organized to disrupt this inflection of 'peace' are thus held to be transgressive of 'stability', the espoused aim of the preferred claims of moral leadership (Gramsci) in play.

If it is clear that 'defence' against a 'nuclear exchange' is no more feasible in 1987 than it was 16 years earlier, this point is systematically ex-nominated by an official morality defined by a logic where the 'maintenance of survivable nuclear forces' is to be preserved due to considerations of 'efficiency' and 'stability'. Common sense discourses mobilized via *Defence in the 70s* encourage or rule in vivid images of the potential implications of such a rationale: 'during a nuclear onslaught on North America', whether 'ballistic missiles' were 'intercepted' over Canadian territory or that of the United States would "make relatively little difference to the Canadian public with respect to fallout or other effects" (DND, 1971: 26). The only concession authorized by *Challenge and Commitment*, in contrast, is that "the effect on Canada would be devastating" (DND, 1987: 10). The 'Canadian public' (set in relation to 'fallout or other effects'), once reinscribed as simply 'Canada', anchors the projection of the need to

maintain this nuclear status quo (by ensuring that all forms of 'deterrence' remain 'credible') as an abstraction, the potential effectivity of which is inflected as being outside of the daily lives of its potential victims.

Accordingly, for *Challenge and Commitment*, 'we' can be said to be performing the task of 'enhancing deterrence' to "the extent that we are able to deny any political aggressor the use of Canadian airspace, territory or territorial waters for an attack on NATO's strategic nuclear forces" (DND, 1987: 17). 'Our acceptance' of the 'protection' offered by 'collective defence' is thus contingent upon the affirmation of specific 'responsibilities' to be assumed. That is, to advance the aims of 'deterrence' at the 'strategic level', a language of 'obligations' is formulated to contain within the limits of legitimacy 'our': continued membership in 'the NATO alliance' (thereby bolstering its 'assured retaliatory capability') and its 'common funded programs'; participation in 'surveillance, warning and attack assessment' through North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD); engagement in bilateral 'defence' commitments with the United States, particularly with regard to the surveillance of 'Soviet submarine forces'; willingness to allow 'our allies' the use of Canadian airspace, military ranges and training areas to test and evaluate the performance of their weapons, including ('nuclear capable') air-launched cruise missile; involvement in allied naval exercises, as well as the use of 'our' ports by allied warships.

This hegemonizing re-articulation of 'the Soviet threat' to Canadian 'security' and 'sovereignty' takes on a new sense of immediacy via the inscription of an additional danger, previously disclaimed by its 1971 antecedent, directly within the realm of the possible: "Although Canada is unlikely to be invaded in a conflict, limited incursions, principally to neutralize installations, or for diversionary purposes, are conceivable" (DND, 1987: 11). This configuration of Soviet intentionality works to stabilize or 'fix' (tendentially) a relation of equivalence between what is a conceivable threat and what is a threat that must be deterred through a greater expenditure on military forces. The discursive appeal by the White Paper is unequivocal: "We must also have appropriate land forces to demonstrate presence, authority and effective defence within Canada in peacetime and to defend against incursions and sabotage in war" (DND, 1987: 60). Thus in rendering the charge that the 'Soviet conventional threat' to Canada is too often overlooked 'in the face of the nuclear menace', *Challenge and Commitment* moves to sustain further this projection of enmity, in part, by formulating it as being existent wherever 'Canadian interests' and 'Soviet capabilities' can be defined as overlapping. [12]

12 In the 'strategic' terms set down by *Challenge and Commitment*, the sea is 'neutral' to the extent that sufficient naval forces ('properly deployed') are able to 'keep an opponent at arm's length'. In order to contribute to the 'collective maritime strength of the Alliance', it is necessary to deny the use of 'our own waters' to an enemy. According to the White Paper, "Canada's ports and internal

"After the defence of the country itself," in the words of the White Paper, "there is no issue more important to any nation than the protection of its sovereignty. The ability to exercise effective national sovereignty is the very essence of nationhood. [...] The protection and control of our territory are fundamental manifestations of sovereignty" (DND, 1987: 23). Here the official voice endeavours to re-articulate a formalized linkage between, first, national claims to official jurisdiction over a territorial area and, second, an unequivocal capability to maintain in that area a national 'presence' as a 'deterrent' to 'potential violators'. In addition to being able to 'monitor' Canadian territory, the new policy holds that Canadian Forces must therefore possess the means to 'respond with force against incursions'. Nowhere are the implications for this policy initiative more pronounced than in the case of the Arctic Region.

Interestingly, this discursive re-alignment concedes (implicitly) that the complex mechanisms by which the official appropriation of certain non-author-ized definitions has been realized are momentarily at risk. That is, with the acknowledgment that "Canada is not universally

waters are vulnerable to closure or disruption in war by mines laid by enemy ships, submarines or aircraft. Because Canada has no effective means of clearing mines, even a small number could close a port or waterway. Modern mines could be easily and surreptitiously laid just prior to hostilities, and activated when needed. Our current inability to meet this threat must be rectified" (DND, 1987: 51).

recognized as being sovereign in all of the areas that we claim" (DND, 1987: 23), the White Paper is marking its formal entry into the ongoing dispute between the Canadian and United States governments over whether or not the Northwest Passage is, as the former contends, 'internal waters' or, as the latter argues, an 'international straight'. This contest over definitions at the level of sovereignty claims is quickly put to one side, however, as *Challenge and Commitment* seeks to exploit the rhetorical advantage of prioritizing the 'security' dimension for exposition.

The Arctic Ocean has now assumed a 'strategic importance' due to its location 'between the two superpowers': "In the past it served as a *buffer* between the Soviet Union and North America. Technology, however, is making the Arctic more accessible. *Canadians cannot ignore that what was once a buffer could become a battleground*" (DND, 1987: 6). This transformation of the Arctic Region from 'buffer' to 'battleground' is accomplished through the projection, once again, of the Soviet threat: where the United States is cast in the role of a 'challenger' to sovereignty claims (bound by the codes of morality), the Soviet Union is posited in the role of an enemy with capabilities, and thus, by fiat, *bellicose intentions* (transgressive of the codes of morality). The official voice thus repeatedly points to the imminent risk to Canada of the 'growing reach of the Soviet Navy', in particular the

increasing frequency of 'Soviet submarine operations' in 'waters' now to be recognized as 'strategically significant'.

The mode of the present-factual, having established through assertion the propinquity of this danger (no attempt is made to corroborate the obviousness of its existence), is now to be recast within the realm of the future-probable: "In a period of tension or war, Soviet submarines could seek to operate off the deep channels of the Canadian Archipelago to intercept Allied submarine entering the Arctic. Moreover, the Soviets might use these channels in war to reach patrol areas in the North Atlantic, including the Labrador Sea. In light of these circumstances, the Canadian navy must be able to determine what is happening under the ice in the Canadian Arctic, and to deter hostile or potentially hostile intrusions" (DND, 1987: 50). Similarly, "Canadian Arctic waters could well provide an alternate route for Soviet submarines to move from the Arctic Ocean to the Atlantic to reach cruise missile firing positions further south or to operate in more traditional roles against vital Allied shipping" (DND, 1987: 11).

For underwater surveillance of 'the activities of potentially hostile submarines' as they operate in the three oceans contiguous with the Canadian shoreline to be effective, 'imaginative use' will have to be made of new technology. Consequently, for the White Paper, these 'control requirements' dictate that nuclear-powered

submarines (SSNs) are the 'uniquely capable anti-submarine platforms' urgently required if the Canadian Navy is to fulfil its responsibilities. In contrast with diesel-powered submarines (three of which the Canadian navy currently 'commands'), a fleet of ten to twelve nuclear powered submarines will have the following 'strategic advantages': each possesses 'unlimited endurance and flexibility'; each is a 'vehicle of manoeuvre', as opposed to one 'of position', given that during an 'operational patrol' it can maintain a higher speed for a longer period (especially in ice-covered waters); and, finally, 'through their mere presence' an 'opponent' is denied the use of 'sea areas'. These 'SSNs' will, in turn, "complement aircraft, destroyers and frigates in a vivid demonstration of Canadian determination to meet challenges in all three oceans. Such a highly capable, significant and versatile forces will help to restore the effectiveness of the Canadian navy and prepare it to meet Canada's naval requirements well into the next century" (DND, 1987: 52-54). [13]

13 This decision to provide the Canadian navy with nuclear-powered submarines over a period from 1996 to 2010 constitutes one of the most significant military policy measures advanced by a Canadian government since the close of the Second World War. As several researchers have documented, over the years Canada has become increasingly implicated in the nuclear 'arms race', primarily through NORAD; its joint defence production with the U.S.; cruise missile testing; and by corporate and scientific involvement in the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) or 'Star Wars' (and related projects). An overview of the larger context within which the Canadian Submarine Acquisition Program is situated would place considerable emphasis on the risk of Canada being drawn into the dangerous and provocative maritime strategy of the U.S. In contrast with claims that

Challenge and Commitment, in proclaiming that the acquisition of a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines is the most suitable means available to achieve the desired 'operational capabilities', ostensibly anticipates its discursive Other raising at least three possible points of contention: the financial cost of the program; the potential safety-hazards associated with operating nuclear-powered submarines; and, although it is not stated explicitly, the fear that this program may potentially disturb what has been defined elsewhere in its pages as the 'strategic balance'. Having set the rules to be respected by legitimate dissent to its truth-claims, the official voice proceeds to effect the displacement of counter-arguments in accordance with the logics of nuclearism. Regarding financial cost, 'careful study' finds that a nuclear-powered submarine is comparable in cost to an 'air defence frigate', but more expensive than

nuclear-powered submarines would allow the Canadian state to adopt a more independent military posture, a far more likely result would have it inexorably caught up in the 'forward defence strategy' of the U.S. navy.

Very briefly, the world's oceans have been divided up by the U.S. military and its allies in a process called 'water management', the purpose being that allied warships and 'attack' submarines may be positioned close enough to Soviet naval ports that at the outbreak of war they can, in turn, destroy 'enemy' ballistic missile-firing submarines before possible 'escape' into open sea. The further destabilizing effect of this strategy for East-West relations is apparent, yet officially denied. Similarly, the issue of precisely what chain of actions a Canadian nuclear-powered submarine would follow should a Soviet submarine ever be discovered in the Canadian Arctic (together with the possibility of an escalation of tension as a result), was not a subject defence officials were willing to discuss, despite consistent questions raised by critics.

its diesel alternative. In calculating the cost of, first, replacing the current diesel submarines and, second, purchasing another 'batch of air defence frigates', the expenditure would be 'roughly equal' to that required for a nuclear-powered submarine program. When 'capabilities' are factored into the strategic equation, the 'nuclear option' becomes 'the best investment for the navy'.

A particular inflection of 'safety' is authorized here, the intensity of which is reinforced via the assurance that "nuclear propulsion for submarine is technologically mature and extremely safe" (DND, 1987: 54). The official voice, having first pointed out that approximately one half of both 'NATO's attack submarines' and those of the Soviet Union are nuclear-powered, initiates the truth-claim that "after 34 years and more than 3,000 reactor-years of operating experience, the United States Navy has had no nuclear accidents. Similarly, there have been no known safety hazards associated with the design and operation of British and French nuclear submarines" (DND, 1987: 54). [14] This is directly attributable, by extension, to the 'exacting standards' of the submarine designs, as well as the 'highly trained crews using rigorously applied procedures'. The Canadian nuclear-powered submarine program will apply "similar control

14 The phrase 'nuclear accidents' is key, as 'non-nuclear' accidents involving nuclear powered submarines have plagued the navies of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (see Chapter Six's discussion).

processes and standards, including stringent national acceptance and operating criteria" (DND, 1987: 54). Here the 'proven competence, expertise and enviable safety record' of the Canadian nuclear industry is called forward to anchor this assertion of fact, a disingenuous line of argument at best. Bound up with a (mythic) national identity of 'Canada as a non-nuclear power' ("our nuclear-powered submarines will not be nuclear-armed"; DND, 1987: 55), then, is the naturalization of a bi-polar scheme of values (nuclear armed/nuclear powered; hostile intentions/legitimate self-defence, and so forth), while the motives which sustain it are authorized, in turn, by the morality of 'our values'.

The Threat From Above

The truth-effects of the textualization of the 'Soviet air threat' to Canada are similarly projected along distinct lines of closure: first, Canadian airspace "would almost certainly be used by manned bombers armed with cruise missiles" (DND, 1987: 11), and, second, "of course, space above Canada could be traversed by ballistic missiles" (DND, 1987: 11). 'Protection' from this obvious ('of course') 'air threat' lies not only in the 'nuclear forces of the Alliance', but simultaneously in the official recognition of the 'logic of a continental defence partnership'. The necessary surveillance, warning and 'attack assessment' of

this 'air threat' to the North American continent as a 'single strategic entity' is thus to be undertaken by the U.S. and Canadian governments through the North American Air Defence Modernization Program, in addition to the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD).

Challenge and Commitment, in announcing the government's intention to participate in 'air defence' research in conjunction with the United States Air Force's Air Defence Initiative (or ADI), prepares the basis for a discursive appropriation of the 'Strategic Defence Initiative' (SDI) or 'Star Wars' research program as a legitimate response to the Soviet threat. Here a reverse logic is in play: first, the notion of an adequate 'air defence' against Soviet bombers was all but discarded by Canadian officials during the mid-1960s due to Soviet 'deployment' of 'intercontinental ballistic missiles' (a strategy designed to counter the former appeared futile in light of the threat posed by the latter). Suddenly, however, with the emergence of the 'SDI', the 'ADI' becomes crucial to its survivability. Moreover, the White Paper ex-nominates the pertinence of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in this context and then elects to address 'our' traditional 'capability' vis a vis 'surveillance' and 'early-warning' ("to detect, track and identify potentially threatening surface activity"; DND, 1987: 57-58), in accordance with the 'logic of a continental defence partnership'. This strategy can, in turn, be

regarded as an implied commitment to the 'SDI' program (see Robinson, 1987; Malcolmson, 1990; Mosco, 1991).

The official voice thus undertakes to speak the 'SDI' program in such a way that a number of its most controversial elements are ostensibly posited outside of discourse as incontestable *vis a vis* the sovereignty-security dynamic. The potential use of space-based systems for Canada's 'surveillance requirements' is inflected as merely one of several priorities which 'flow naturally from our geography'. The decision to investigate new methods to utilize space is, in turn, re-articulated as being supportive of 'national defence aims': "Failure to meet this challenge," the policy document warns, "could mean forfeiting the responsibility for surveillance of Canadian airspace to the United States" (DND, 1987: 59). Significantly, here the mode of argument once again shifts quickly to contextualize this threat to Canadian sovereignty within the broader formulation of a 'Soviet threat' to Canadian 'security' such that the logics of deterrence are re-asserted as desirable in light of the (unspoken) alternatives, including the further erosion of national identity before the American Other.

In looking to authorize a further point of justification *vis a vis* this affirmation of Canadian sovereignty and security through 'military space activity', the White Paper proceeds to anchor the 'defensive' rationale of the 'SDI' program by inflecting it in relation to its (alleged)

equivalent in the Soviet Union. The possibility of the United States government eventually deploying 'ballistic missile defences', dependent as it is 'on a number of 'technical, financial and political factors', is here correlated with a declaration that "the Soviet Union could expand those already in place" (DND, 1987: 19).

Consequently, the attempt by the U.S military to establish strategic defences against the release of ballistic missiles is thus formulated as a reaction to the existence of a Soviet version of 'SDI', details of which "cannot now be precisely determined" (DND, 1987: 19). This truth-claim, the vagueness of which makes it difficult to disrupt, reaffirms the implicit contention that 'our' peaceful initiatives are being rewarded by greater Soviet efforts designed to exploit the weaknesses of 'our' honest, modern and realistic stance.

To facilitate the 'fixing' of this re-articulation, the White Paper avoids references to the radical peace initiatives or arms control proposals advanced by Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, in the two years previous to its release. *Challenge and Commitment* does acknowledge, however, that arms control is an essential component of 'the search for a more peaceful and secure world', one that "offers the prospect of reducing threats, constraining the competition for military advantage, increasing stability and providing a predictable international environment" (DND, 1987: 7). Moreover, reductions in nuclear weapons,

'conventional' forces, and chemical weapons, amongst other measures, contribute to the building of international 'confidence' and the subsequent reduction of 'tension'. Nevertheless, the official voice cautions, as 'important, desirable and worthy of energetic pursuit' these developments are, progress "is slow and unpredictable, and there is no reason to believe that in the near future it will obviate the need for significant military forces or for deterrence based ultimately on nuclear weapons" (DND, 1987: 7). The notion of an 'unarmed world' is thus ex-nominated as 'utopian': reality dictates that "arms control will never be a substitute for adequate defence" (DND, 1987: 26).

Closing the (Meaning) Gap

An organizing imperative projected throughout *Challenge and Commitment*, one constructed in such a way as to secure the assent of its audience (the success of which, vis a vis news discourse, will be examined in Chapter Six), holds that "after decades of neglect, there is indeed a significant 'commitment-capability gap'. Even if the Canadian Forces were fully manned and had modern, state-of-the-art equipment, to fulfil existing defence commitments would be a daunting challenge" (DND, 1987: 43). The 'truth' of the matter, at present, is that there are 'too few combat-ready soldiers', and the Militia "is too small, ill-equipped and insufficiently trained to make up the difference" (DND,

1987: 43). Moreover, 'modernization programs have not kept pace with obsolescence': that is, much of the military equipment and weapon systems in the various branches is either already obsolete, or in an 'advanced state of obsolescence'. Despite recent expenditures (purchases include new frigates, 'low-level air defence batteries', and other 'essential improvements'), the 'bow wave' of 'deferred equipment acquisition', 'built up since the 1960s', has yet to be overcome. Should 'this condition' be "allowed to continue unaltered, it would soon lead to 'rust-out', the unplanned and pervasive deterioration in the military capabilities of the Canadian Forces" (DND, 1987: 45).

The contending logics of modernization (see Chapter Three's discussion) encourage a hierarchical arrangement of these declared deficiencies be properly inflected as part of the larger strategic rationale to justify new resources to counter the Soviet threat. "If 'rust-out' were permitted to occur, either by intent or neglect," the official voice intones, "the loss of equipment in the 1990s would by itself dictate a new, greatly diminished, defence role" (DND, 1987: 47). Accordingly, the 'process of obsolescence' is so strong that it will eventually begin to determine both the direction and content of defence policy if state officials do not respond with an adequate counter-strategy. In the realist assessment, three approaches to avoiding this dilemma are available: first, "increase significantly the resources devoted to defence so that, over a period of 10 to

15 years, the Canadian Forces would become capable of meeting current commitments" (DND, 1987: 47); second, "reduce commitments to the point where those remaining could be carried out by existing forces, within existing resources" (DND, 1987: 47); or, third, "seek some combination of these two alternatives" (DND, 1987: 47). Only the first of these 'difficult choices' escapes the movement towards closure invoked after the adjudication of the official voice: that is, it alone allows for 'Canada's present commitments' to be achieved in a credible fashion.

The second option, that of reducing commitments to the point where they could be undertaken within existing resources, is inflected outside the realm of common sense appeals. The consequences of electing to undertake the 'massive cuts in our military commitments' that would be required to realize 'a reduction sufficient to eliminate the gap' are defined as devastating: there would be "major repercussions in our relations with the United States and our Western European allies. It would represent a retreat from our undertakings within NATO, would be read by our allies as *shirking our common defence responsibilities* and would *threaten the cohesion of the Alliance*" (DND, 1987: 47). By the same criteria of credibility, the third option is similarly inflected as a false one. "Changes in commitments," the White Paper maintains, "are more easily negotiated when they are part of a *strong and growing defence performance*" (DND, 1987: 47).

The modalities invoked to reconstitute Canadian obligations are thus organized to centre the truth-claim that "defence requires an ability to meet force with force" (DND, 1987: 60). Canada, as a credible and responsible partner can not have its obligations delimited to the detection and evaluation of 'threatening or hostile activity' when 'stability' is best achieved through 'deterring' the Soviet threat. The unpleasant, yet unavoidable, realities of international security in the nuclear age dictate that the Canadian 'way of life' is contingent upon the further expansion of the indigenous military infrastructure. Regardless of the general public's present 'concern about, or even distaste for' some of these new realities, once they become 'widely and well understood', the "Forces [will] enjoy the support they require" (DND, 1987: 81). Until then, 'decades of neglect must be overcome' through "coherent and consistent leadership and by a steady, predictable and honest funding program" (DND, 1987: 89. An 'honest funding problem' will, in turn, ensure that "we will be more honest with our allies, with our citizens, and with the men and women of the Canadian Forces who risk their lives in our defence" (DND, 1987: 49).

The White Paper's re-inscription of a higher morality (the product of a 'proud military history') demarcates, in part, the terrain upon which the discursive logics in play around 'national sovereignty' and 'national security' traverse. That is, by prioritizing its interpellative

function of setting down the rules by which the morality realized through 'our common past' is to be spoken, the official voice declares how alternative inflections are to hierarchically displaced. How is the 'Canadian way of life' possible if sufficient resources are not mobilized so as to ensure the production of strategically coherent and militarily sound initiatives?

The implementation of these initiatives, the official voice concedes, will be achieved only with difficulty: "It has never been easy for democratic governments to find, in peacetime, the resources necessary for defence. It is certainly not easy now" (DND, 1987: 67). Thus it is a necessarily decisive appeal to common sense which, once mobilized, will move to eliminate the basis for a 'social program spending' versus 'defence spending' dichotomy by naturalizing the truth-claim that the former is dependent on the latter. "Social benefits," by this logic, "are the fruits of a secure and free society. This Government accepts the preservation of such a society as its fundamental responsibility and will, therefore, provide the resources necessary to make the Canadian Forces operationally effective and responsive to the challenges of the 1990s and beyond" (DND, 1987: 67).

In order to absorb for purposes of re-articulation potential threats to this normative vocabulary, the authorized truth-claims in play (each an implicit demand for the allegiance of loyal subjects) must constantly be

repaired and renewed vis a vis what is a fluid arrangement of interpellative strategies. Thus it is in order to assert 'the higher morality' of its statements that *Challenge and Commitment* is unequivocal in its demand to possess the status of the voice of 'the people', and thus the consensus: only it will decide which points of resistance to its prioritization of 'an adequate defence posture' over 'social benefits' will be acknowledged as worthy of a response, and then within which terms of reference. This re-appropriation of the moral terrain of 'Canada as responsible ally' rests on the capacity of this voice to re-order the logics underpinning the rules of prohibition in motion so as to contain and restrict the basis for its exclusion as being opposed to the expressed will of the people (the latter being embodied by the state) who want "a firmer basis from which to contribute to peace and freedom" (DND, 1987: 89).

These contending discursive logics of shifting subject-positions hold in tension the relationship of equivalence posited between 'an adequate defence posture' and 'social benefits' such that the criteria by which alternative inflections may be displaced come to the fore. To the extent that a regularity in dispersion in the re-ordered statements is now discernible, analysis may turn to the task of elucidating how, in the *Defence Update* 1988-89, the official mode of argument is re-aligned in light of the dramatic reconfiguration of the Soviet Other as external 'threat'.

Recasting Reality

Minister of National Defence Perrin Beatty (1988) begins his preface to *Defence Update* 1988-89 with the claim that the 5 June 1987 release of the White Paper represented a 'turning point for Canadian defence policy'. The introduction of the White Paper marked the formal end, in his view, of sixteen years "without a clear statement of how we see ourselves in the world and of what should be done to protect our security and sovereignty" (1988: 1). Here *Challenge and Commitment* is formally credited with outlining, first, a 'meaningful and realistic mandate' for state policy, and second, the 'tools necessary to do the job'. Moreover, as an official pronouncement, it 'rededicates Canada to working closely with the other democracies'. This *Defence Update*, then, is the first of what will become a series of periodic reviews of how the federal government is implementing the new defence policy, as well as of how both national and international events 'have affected our plans'.

A series of strategies are utilized to instruct the reader on how to make sense of the perplexities of these recent developments in ways which effect minor legitimization repairs vis a vis the most publicly contested elements of the White Paper (a full analysis of this discursive conflict is provided in the next section of the case study, Chapter

Six). Here, on the pages of the *Defence Update*, the task of re-constructing anew one of the central binary relations of difference underpinning previous defence policy postulates is clearly a formidable one. How to mark off the plurality of antagonisms so as to anchor the preferred inflections of a White Paper that appears to be being rapidly overtaken by events?

Defence Minister Beatty, in calling forward a central thematic of the White Paper, namely that Canada is not a 'neutral nation', proceeds to highlight the rudimentary contours of the new stance to be adopted. He writes: "It would be a denial both of the vital interests we share with our allies and of our responsibility to promote peace with freedom if we were to accept the call by some to simply sit on the sidelines" (1988: 1). Central to this mode of argument is the interpellative strategy of re-unifying 'NATO' with 'democracy' such that 'nuclear deterrence' may be recognizable as being consistent with a larger claim to morality, namely that of 'peace with freedom'. In this way, Canadian membership in the NATO is, once again, correlated with an indigenous defence posture. In Beatty's words, "to be a truly independent nation, we must shoulder the responsibilities that come with independence by contributing more fully to our own defence. If we are able to be truly sovereign, we cannot 'contract out' the defence of Canada to someone else; the cost to our independence would simply be too high" (1988: 1). The successful accomplishment of this

re-articulation rests on the degree to which the contending logics of the integrated mechanisms of control are safely posited within the realm of the obvious.

By way of this preface, then, Beatty advances the contention that the national and international events which have occurred since the tabling of the White Paper demonstrate "that the principles on which [the NATO] is founded remain sound" (1988: 2). This *Defence Update* is designed to illustrate that the official postulates of the White Paper, far from being in a state of disarray, are at one with the Other which makes their projection possible: subtle details may indeed have changed, but due to the fact that the current nature of the 'Soviet threat' remains an ominous one for 'the West', the continuity of earlier claims is discursively preserved, even reinforced.

To clarify by way of example, only one 'event' is made mention of here: the 8 December 1987 signing at the Washington Summit of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement to abolish 'intermediate range' nuclear weapons. This treaty is cited by Beatty as proof that "NATO's two-track policy of *being prepared to defend ourselves while continuing to work for balanced and stabilizing arms control agreements was the correct way to proceed*. The whole world should welcome the INF agreement and we should recognize that *continued solidarity among the Western democracies will be essential as we seek new agreements on conventional forces and on strategic nuclear*

weapons" (1988: 2). Thus, of the various explanatory frameworks on offer, this text selects this one to anchor its preferred mode of argument: the normative pre-givens of its voice are hereby re-evaluated and shown to constitute a full and proper absolution of threats to official definitions.

The main text of the *Defence Update* introduces the official voice which proceeds to characterize the recent changes to the 'strategic context', making brief mention of the 'volatility of the Middle East' (the Iran-Iraq war and rising tension between Palestinians and Israelis in the occupied territories are made to represent the pertinent examples), the 'persistent and pervasive violence in Central America' (this despite the peace plan promoted by President Arias of Costa Rica, it is noted here), and the 'turmoil' in Southern Africa, Chad, Lebanon, Kampuchea, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan (in this order). Particular attention is drawn to the 'internal politics' of Haiti and the Philippines, as recent events there "give rise to concern for the future of democracy as well as for their potential effect on regional stability" (DND, 1988: 4).

Significantly, what has 'captured the attention of observers', and thus of the *Defence Update* (by definition), are the developments in the Soviet Union. Changes taking place over the past twelve months in the name of *perestroika* and *glasnost* "have confirmed that major and dramatic shifts in domestic policy and in the conduct of foreign relations are occurring. [...] For his part, Mr. Gorbachev has placed

less emphasis on the alleged implacable hostility of the Western democracies. Instead, he has stressed the common interests of East and West in *enhancing global stability*" (DND, 1988: 4). Given that such a view to the Soviet threat threatens to transgress the limits of its possible characterization as inscribed on the pages of the White Paper, the *Defence Update* is confronted with the need to fix this legitimating device through its re-appropriation.

Aware that the conditions of existence underpinning the former projection of the 'Soviet threat' have been problematized, at least in part, the *Defence Update* moves quickly to reify the 'real intentions' of the 'enemy' as ahistorical. Thus effectively counter-posed to the declared 'warming trend in East-West relations' and the attendant hope for improvement in the 'strategic environment', is the assertion that "the Soviets remain convinced of the *intrinsic superiority of their own system*" (DND, 1988: 5). This formulation of a 'Soviet threat' as the product of their unwillingness to recognize the obvious truth that 'the West' enjoys 'intrinsic superiority', substantively reduces the risk that the discursive Other so rigidly fixed by the White Paper will become completely unraveled.

Similarly, the claim that: "*We will remain alert [...]* to the difference between rhetoric and substance. We cannot ignore the fact that the Soviet Union still possesses military power far in excess of that needed for self-defence" (DND, 1988: 5), further highlights the familiar

features of the dominant discursive formulation. For this assemblage of subject positions to be sustained, however, this text must be seen to be responsive to the 'new reality'. The basis for an authoritative re-articulation of a new public consensus around official statements needs to be secured, one that allows for alterations to be made in previous definitions of 'international realities', yet rules out or prohibits the construction of a formal challenge to the consistency or coherence of the dominant rationale and its appeal to popular common sense as the basis for its justification.

To dispel or ward off the dangers un-author-ized knowledges are increasingly posing for the very integrity of official claims, the *Defence Update* elects to re-establish for its audience the soundness of official principles (as cited by Beatty in the preface) in the language of the 'intrinsic superiority' of 'our' morality. It follows that if it is to be conceded that the Soviet Union has demonstrated an "unprecedented interest and flexibility in improving East-West relations" (DND, 1988: 5), credit must nevertheless be discursively re-appropriated for 'the West': specifically, for proffering arms control proposals while simultaneously ensuring that 'Allied cohesion and political courage' not be allowed to waver. It is this resolve which brought about the 'historic achievement' of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement, for "had NATO not decided, in December 1979, to deploy ballistic and

cruise missiles in Europe to counter the massive deployment of Soviet SS-20s, it would not have been possible to agree in 1987 to eliminate all land-based, intermediate-range missiles in the superpowers' arsenals" (DND, 1988: 5).

Nuclearism, as the primary articulatory principle underpinning this claim, facilitates the inflection of certain preferred interpretations regarding the changes to the 'strategic reality' in such a way as to delimit the arbitrariness of its truth.

Potentially the most serious of all of the discursive fissures in need of repair by the *Defence Update* is the possible charge, advanced by extension, that the 'strategic doctrine' of 'nuclear deterrence' is thereby in danger of becoming obsolete. Care is thus taken by the official voice to erase the emergent cracks in the preferred mode of argument before they mar further the normative surface of the strategic rationale. Accordingly, the *Defence Update* elects to define as the first of two noteworthy aspects of this treaty its provision for 'asymmetric reductions'. The Soviet Union, it is explained here, has more than twice as many missiles in the affected categories as does the United States ('our' 'nuclear forces' are necessary to counter 'their' nuclear superiority). Second, this treaty establishes 'a new and rigorous verification regime involving on-site inspection' ('we' cannot trust 'them' to be honest). By inflecting the component elements of the treaty in accordance with the material common sense of nuclearism, the

Defence Update can proceed to initiate the truth-claim that the Soviet Union is corroborating the postulate that "far from being incompatible, force modernization and arms control initiatives can be complementary elements in NATO's effort to ensure security and stability at the lowest level of forces" (DND, 1988: 5). Should the range of possible interpretations of the 'strategic nuclear arms cuts' pass unregulated, the basis of the (contradictory) articulation of the official truth could have been seriously compromised: arms control "can only go so far in resolving differences. No amount of arms control can obviate the need for resolution of underlying political issues" (DND, 1988: 6).

In the concluding section of the *Defence Update*, the authors of *Challenge and Commitment* are commended for establishing a policy 'blueprint', one that sets a new direction for a 'modern and effective defence posture' 'into the next century'. While the implementation of the new programs has only just begun, 'significant progress' has already been made. At stake for the *Defence Update* was the necessity of demonstrating that a conceptual basis has been secured for dealing effectively with future alterations to the 'strategic environment'. Far from creating gaps or lacunae in the official mode of argument, new developments will actually re-affirm the implicit logic of the preferred narrative framework, even if the facts change over time. That is, the official discourse provides the means to appropriate these facts within the parameters of existing

common sensical explanations such that their apparent arbitrariness is recognized for what it is: an exception to the rules of normalcy (and their apposite history) set down by the official voice.

As will be documented over the course of Chapter Six, the next portion of the case study, the actualization of official discourse within the dictates of news discourse belies the contradictions inherent in the projected normalcy of the former. Consequently, it will be shown that by examining the dynamics of this fluid re-articulation, the inscription of official discourse within specific modalities of media power can be brought to the fore.

CHAPTER SIX: RE-ARTICULATING REALITY, DETECTING DIFFERENCE

Introduction to Part Two of the Case Study

As the shifting winds of glasnost and perestroika continue to dramatically reshape newspaper headlines, the 1987 White Paper on National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*, can be interpreted as one of the Cold War's final convulsions before its core antagonisms began an astonishingly rapid process of transfiguration. Still, at present, Canadian state officials continue to advocate a 'national security policy' based, in the last instance, on nuclear forces being targeted at thousands of cities, and thus millions of people, in the Soviet Union and neighbouring countries. This deadly paradox brings to the fore a series of complex issues for the second part of the case study. At stake here is the need to investigate the daily press's appropriation and re-articulation of certain inflections of nuclearism precisely as they are implicated in the speech of various 'authorized knowers' who, having been caught in the 'news net', engage in the ideological conflict over defining the White Paper as a news story.

This chapter's examination of the routinized processing of the White Paper and its denouement as a newsworthy topic takes as its point of departure the news and editorial

coverage published by the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star*: specifically, from the initial 'news leaks' regarding the possible component elements of this official text, to its formal release in the House of Commons on 5 June 1987, and up to and beyond the April 1989 federal budget when, under the rubric of 'deficit trimming', most of the spending commitments it proposed were cast aside one by one. Consequently, this second section of the case study will look to build upon Chapter Five's interrogation of nuclearism and its embeddedness in the very common sense of the White Paper's interpellative strategies. Of central concern is the need to elucidate the extent to which official control over topic parameters is successfully achieved within news and editorial accounts published by the two dailies from 1 January 1987 to 31 December 1989. This chapter thus aims to accentuate for purposes of critique the daily press's capacity as a centralized source of the prescriptive rules that organize the promulgation and regulation of discourses as spoken by contending institutional voices.

Chapter Three's assessment of research on nuclear discourse and nukespeak demonstrated that the material inflection of nuclearism has largely been left relatively under-theorized, often simply asserted within a text-context dynamic. The conceptual agenda for a critical discourse analysis of nuclearism outlined in the chapter, and more concretely in Chapter Four, addressed the need to better account for the mechanisms in and through which the condi-

tions of existence and possibility of nuclearism are shaped (dialogically) by the attendant rules of formation and prohibition immanent at the level of the text's interpellative logics. These insights, in turn, generate the basis for a sustained inquiry to be carried out in the first part of this case study. Specifically, Chapter Five sought to dismantle the cultural dynamics of nuclearism inscribed in official texts in order to distinguish how fragments of contradictory, even antagonistic discourses are re-articulated so as to achieve a provisionally coherent domain of significations constitutive of the strategic rationale.

Presently, I will undertake to investigate the extent to which this strategic rationale is actualized in the pertinent daily press coverage. Given that the circulation of the actual White Paper was severely limited, news media definitions represented *Challenge and Commitment* for the vast majority of Canadians. It should be noted from the outset, therefore, that this chapter's exploration of the amplification of nuclearism in the daily press coverage is not based exclusively on analytical findings derived from a detailed textual analysis. Rather, in seeking to complement the approach to critical discourse analysis brought to bear in the first part of this case study, this chapter's line of critique elects to draw upon a series of conceptual methods better suited to the interrogation of the interplay of

common sensical discourses across a vast number of texts dispersed over a prolonged time span. [1]

Certain productive tensions arise when these two levels of analysis are conjoined as they will be here, particularly given their common point of opposition: namely, all rigid, mechanical approaches to the dynamics of news language. That is, in advancing the thesis that news discourse is most effectively theorized as a field of possibilities, this chapter dismisses certain prevalent notions of news language as being 'given' or 'reflected' by various social or institutional conditions in a determined fashion. As noted in the course of Chapter Five's discussion, however, this is not to deny that there is a discernible range of linguistic norms which may be viewed as being characteristic of the broad features of particular types of text. Rather, following the trajectory mapped out in Chapters Three and Four, it may be argued that any posited system of linguistic norms is organized in constant opposition to what Bakhtin calls the 'realities of heteroglossia'.

The crucial set of conceptual issues for this second portion of the case study is therefore centred by questions concerning how news reporters construct formal, 'factual'

1 This chapter's incorporation of certain quantitative research tools to supplement the mode of inquiry parallels recent developments in contending approaches to discourse analysis, perhaps most notably the work of Teun van Dijk (1989, 1988, 1985, 1983). Moreover, the new academic journal, *Discourse and Society*, is organized to encourage research of this type.

accounts of the nuclear reality within this discursive conflict. Specifically, this conflict to overcome the 'many-voicedness' of language must be problematized so as to show how, through the discursive practices of objective reporting, certain kinds of voices come to command the field of truth to the detriment of others. Thus, in contrast with analyses mobilized to reveal 'hidden' or underlying (totalized) relations of causality, functionality or impact, here the attempt is made to discern how this ideological plurality is marked-off or regulated in certain determinate ways.

Signifying Significance

Before proceeding with this next level of the case study, the specificity of news as a discernible genre of discourse first needs to be taken into consideration. A news text is recognizable as such in part because it follows certain prescribed forms of narrative logic: that is, it speaks the world in a particular way. For a factual account to be immediately distinguishable from a fictional one, its implicit truth-claims must be prioritized such that the intended audience will, in turn, know to adapt from the outset a certain set of reading positions. Presumably, when most readers are confronted with a daily press account, they expect a formalized translation of the social world. Formalized in the sense that the who, what, where, when, why

and how of the 'news event' will likely be in the lead or first paragraph. Similarly, this account should tell him or her what newsworthy occurrences have taken place, what the key issues are and how they are impacting on society. Thus there is the implicit assumption that news should make the everyday world comprehensible, that it should take the shifting turmoil of seemingly haphazard and chaotic events and knit them into a coherent news story complete with a discrete beginning, middle and end. The jagged edges of the social world's raw material should be aligned and stitched together with care, while any stray threads of 'ideology' should be quickly snipped off.

In order to address the question of how best to render analytically visible the very invisibility of these common sense negotiations, this chapter draws on Chapter Two's reconsideration of previous understandings of news media power. There the thesis was advanced that a greater emphasis needs to be placed on the productive dimension of discourse, the integration of news text with the social context of this movement to contest, revise and reformulate existing meanings. In this way, it was argued, the means by which the subsequent legitimating/devalourizing of knowledge is anchored in a specific modality of power and resistance may be confirmed for analysis. This maneuver will similarly help to generate a richer understanding of how the occupational strategies, professional ideologies, and typification schemes employed by newswriters during the selection,

construction and presentation of news events are caught-up in an underlying will to facticity.

Researchers, while first noting the fluidity of the news values or judgments implicated in the routinized discursive practices of newswork, can nevertheless point to a rudimentary set of relatively consistent criteria informing this construction of the factual. Drawing from an extensive literature (see, for example, Ericson, Baranek and Chan, 1987; Epstein, 1974; Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Gans, 1979; Hall et al, 1978; Hartley, 1982; Roshco, 1975; Tuchman, 1978; van Dijk, 1988) the following factors may be regarded as being characteristic of the general criteria in play: *conflict* ('balanced' journalism dictates that each story has two sides: when these 'sides' are in dispute, a sense of immediacy is likely to result at the same time that interest is enhanced through dramatization); *relevance* (events should be seen to impinge, however indirectly, on the news audience's daily activities); *timeliness* (the time-span taken by the event should be easily handled in light of institutional constraints and pressures); *simplification* (events are preferably unambiguous: the diversity of potential interpretations of its significance should be kept to a minimum); and, *personalization* (an emphasis on human actors is preferred to sustained descriptions of 'faceless' structures, forces or institutions).

Further factors described in the pertinent research include: *consonance* (the predictability of an event lends it

to the routinized dictates of newsgathering); *unexpectedness* (an event that is 'out of the ordinary' is likely to be 'novel' or 'new', and thus enhances its chances of being caught in the news net); *continuity* (events should allow for the projection of a sense of where they 'fit in': also, continuous events allow for pre-scheduling, a significant consideration for a news organization allocating its resources); *composition* (a mixture of different types of events must be processed on any given day, thus events are chosen in relation to fluctuations in the 'news hole' to be filled); *reference to elites* (a hierarchy is often discernible here, whether in terms of nations or persons, which prioritizes those actors which are seen to 'affect the readers' lives' at the expense of others who, in turn, are relegated to infrequent newsworthy status); *cultural specificity* (if all events are culturally specific, those which conform to the 'maps of meaning' shared by newsworker and news audience have a greater likelihood of being selected: a form of ethnocentrism); and, finally, *negativity* (bad news is favoured over good news, namely because the former usually conforms to a higher number of the above factors).

News accounts, then, may be 'deconstructed' so as to explicate how news values, as mechanisms of ideological work, are systematically implicated in the articulation of facticity, balance and objectivity constitutive of the news frame. Recognizing from the outset the unequal distribution

of power in institutionalized communication settings, attention turns to the need to apprehend the analytical means to discover to what degree the social relations of speaking the common sense of 'Canadian security in the nuclear age' are structured in dominance. Consequently, a series of questions will be raised here regarding the precise extent to which official discourses were mobilized, challenged and compromised within the daily press coverage.

This project commences in the next section with a brief description of certain key institutional characteristics of the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star*. This discussion is followed, in turn, by an effort to identify through the application of basic quantitative strategies the most pronounced contextual features of the news and editorial coverage (where the latter includes editorials, opinion columns, feature articles, and 'letters to the editor'). [2]

Custodians of Conscience

2 This chapter maintains as its principal point of focus the cultural dynamics of nuclearism by prioritizing for inquiry this question of the inscription of the strategic rationale in published news accounts. Here it needs to be stressed that this analysis of the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star* is a comparative one only to the extent that it illustrates certain similarities and differences in the ways the newswriters from the two dailies negotiated the pertinent complexities in their coverage. As such, it does not offer a comprehensive ranking of the relative merits and deficiencies of the resultant coverage in a comparative sense.

One of the most significant factors leading to the decision to delimit this investigation of the daily press coverage of *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada* and its denouement to that provided by the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star* concerns the national status accorded to these two institutions as 'agenda setters' for the state, other news organizations, and the leading wire services (such as Canadian Press). Moreover, these two dailies share other features which contribute to their suitability for a correlative analysis, such as their competitive alignment, together with the *Toronto Sun*, vis a vis a common market (what the 1981 Royal Commission on Newspapers termed a 'coexistence model'), their distinct ownership/audience characteristics and, finally, their individual positioning along both a political continuum ('conservative, business oriented' to 'liberal' or 'populist'), as well as a stylistic one ('quality', 'high-brow' to 'popular', 'middle-brow'). Given that various assessments of both news organizations are readily available elsewhere, this section's overview will remain a brief one (see, for example, Audley, 1983; Clement, 1975; Desbarats, 1990; Ericson, Baranek, and Chan, 1987; Royal Commission on Newspapers Report, 1981; Rutherford, 1978; Stewart, 1980; Taras, 1990; Wanniski, 1990).

The *Globe and Mail*, Canada's only professed 'national' newspaper, is generally recognized as 'the newspaper of record'. Westell (1980) is amongst several commentators

when he writes that this claim rests primarily on "the fact that it often writes the agenda for Parliament and for other papers which report on Parliament" (1980: 27). The Royal Commission on Newspapers (1981) found that the *Globe and Mail* "is read by almost three-quarters of the country's most important decision makers in all parts of Canada and at all levels of government" (1981: 138). As Don Newman, at present a CBC television journalist but formerly with the *Globe and Mail*, recalls: "When you were writing your story you knew that you were writing Question Period the next day" (Newman cited in Taras, 1990: 88). Ranked second after the *Toronto Star* in aggregate average weekly circulation, the *Globe and Mail*'s influence at the national level is also attributable, according to the Commission study, to the finding that "more than 90 percent of media executives read it regularly and it tends to set the pace for other news organizations" (RCN, 1981: 138; *Le Devoir* and *La Presse* are often credited with playing a similar role for French-language news media). Further evidence to support its claim to be the 'newspaper of record' is its status as the source most commonly included in state clipping services.

The *Globe and Mail* is owned and operated as part of Thomson Newspapers Incorporated, a subsidiary of Thomson Corporation which, in turn, is a transnational mixed conglomerate with controlling interests in several spheres (including other media companies, wholesaling and retailing, real estate, insurance, oil and gas, trucking, financial

services, travel, and tourism). Consistently ranked in the upper echelons of the most profitable corporations listed on Canadian stock exchanges, Thomson Corp., with its 44,800 employees, registered a 1990 profit of \$420 million based on revenues of \$5.5 billion (G&M, ROBM, July 1991: 58-59). Thomson Newspapers, with 14,200 employees (just over 1,000 of whom work for the *Globe and Mail*), recorded a 1988 profit of approximately \$255 million (Desbarats, 1990: 58).

As the 'flagship' member of a larger chain of 52 daily and weekly newspapers (likened by the Royal Commission to 'a lacklustre aggregation of cash-boxes'), the *Globe and Mail* is run independently to a large degree, publishing separate local and national editions (the latter is printed at a number of locations across Canada via a satellite system) for each of the major cities. Interestingly, it possesses a much larger 'news hole' or proportion of news or editorial content to advertisement space at 45 percent than the *Toronto Star* does at 30 percent (Audley, 1983: 36-41; Royal Commission, 1981). The two dailies are the only two Canadian outlets to maintain an extensive range of international bureaus (that said, the *Globe and Mail* has recently announced the closing of bureaus in China, Central America and Africa), yet both rely to a considerable extent on wire-services for foreign news.

If the *Globe and Mail* caters to a specialized audience of elite 'decision makers', composed largely of state officials, business executives, and professionals, the

Toronto Star is more 'traditional' or 'general' in its readership. The Royal Commission Report found that the daily's audience was composed of a 'broad cross-section of society', one which still allows it to maintain the highest circulation figures of any newspaper in the country. A

'metropolitan' daily, the Toronto Star has also achieved its status as a 'first order' newspaper through the extensive syndication of its public affairs analysis and opinion columns. As one of the three Toronto newspapers operating within the aforementioned 'co-existence model', it claims to offer readers a distinct choice from the 'business oriented' Globe and Mail (for which it is the key reference point) and the tabloid-styled Toronto Sun (a controlling interest in which is owned by Maclean Hunter Limited).

For example, whereas the Globe and Mail is widely considered to have 'led the fight' for the Free Trade Agreement in the 1988 federal election, the Toronto Star was singled out for criticism by Simon Reisman, the Canadian chief negotiator, for its antagonistic stance. [3] Beland Honderich, until recently the chairperson of Torstar, has been quoted as stating that the newspaper has always been published on a single principle, that of "looking after the interests of the common people. The slant is unshakable" (Honderich cited in Fetherling, 1983: 52). In contrast,

3 However, the Toronto Star reportedly still earned approximately \$550,000 in advertising revenue from groups supporting the trade agreement: see Frizzell and Westell, 1990: 88.

Wanniski (1990) declares that "this paper, which bills itself as a tribune of the people, has a long history of touting urban redevelopment projects on page one that would raise land values in areas where, coincidentally, the paper has extensive real estate holdings" (1990: 50).

If the *Toronto Star's* reputation as a member of the 'left-liberal constellation' (along with CBC public affairs and Maclean's magazine: see Taras, 1990: 55) is open to question, its status as the press with the largest daily circulation figures in the country is not. The daily, employing approximately 2,300 individuals, almost twice as many as the *Globe and Mail*, publishes about 787,888 copies weekdays, and about 515,227 on Sunday (the *Globe and Mail*, on the other hand, records about 326,200 weekdays, and does not publish a Sunday edition). The Torstar Corporation's ownership of the *Toronto Star*, its 'key asset', was complicated by a 1985 'share swap' with Southam Incorporated which, in turn, controls Canada's largest chain of daily newspapers (currently numbering fifteen: together they account for approximately 38 percent of the total national daily circulation).

It was reported at that time that Southam feared it was about to be taken over by a hostile bidder (never publicly named), and had thus sought to protect itself through an arrangement which left Torstar with a 22.4 percent voting stake in Southam, and Southam with 30.0 percent of Torstar's non-voting shares. If not a publishing 'empire' like the

Thomson or Southam groups, Torstar nevertheless has substantial interests in other media, principally community newspapers (many produced for suburban Toronto) as well as book publishing (its subsidiary, Harlequin Enterprises, is the world's largest publisher of romantic fiction, and currently the 'best performing' division). Torstar, with its 5,300 employees, registered \$938.8 million in revenues and \$42.2 million in profits for 1990, down from \$95.2 million in profits for the previous year (G&M, 22 February 1991: B1; G&M, ROBM, July 1991: 60-61). Their formal ties now suspended, rumours continue to circulate that Torstar intends to take over Southam Inc. at some point, the latter corporation having recently adopted a set of measures (described as a 'poison pill') designed to ward off such a maneuver. {4}

To close this section, an assertion advanced by *Globe and Mail* publisher A. Roy Megarry almost one decade ago is apposite: "By 1990, publishers of mass circulation daily newspapers will finally stop kidding themselves that they

4 This chapter's discussion of the *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Star* coverage would be advantageously extended through a consideration not only of the texts produced by other daily newspapers, but also by a comparative investigation with the news accounts prepared by the electronic media. For research studies concerned with radio and/or television treatments of 'war and peace' issues, see, for example, Aubrey, 1982; Boyer, 1985; Chilton, 1985; Glasgow University Media Group, 1985; Hackett, forthcoming; Keen, 1988; McNair, 1988; Moss, 1985b; Nelson, 1987; Rubin and Cummings, 1989; Shapley, 1982; Weart, 1988. Concrete ideas for further work to 'speak to the silences' of this dissertation will be raised in the concluding chapter.

are in the newspaper business and admit that they are primarily in the business of carrying advertising messages" (Megarry cited in Bagdikian, 1983: 197). Today, as the keen rivalry between the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star* in the economic, and ideological, marketplace continues to expand, it is unlikely that the publisher of either daily would be willing to attest to the validity of this startling prophecy. Considerable evidence to sustain it, however, is easily found on the pages of their respective commodities.

Formulating Parameters

Before proceeding to this chapter's illustration of the common sensical inscription of nuclearism in the *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Star*'s respective coverage of *Challenge and Commitment* and its denouement, it is necessary to address the strategies utilized to construct the collection of news texts under investigation. Four distinct methods were employed, the first of which consisted of an electronic archival scan of the two dailies using on-line databank services: namely, InfoGlobe for the *Globe and Mail*, and Infomart for the *Toronto Star*. The data access codes 'defence' and 'white paper' were combined to generate a collection of items, each of which was then read for potential relevance (relevancy is here defined as existing where a minimum of one-third of the item's total word count concerns the topic at hand). Second, the Canadian News

Index was examined for the entire three year monitoring period. A number of items which eluded the computer search were located under a variety of subject headings in this way.

The third strategy to be employed here consisted of reading copies of both newspapers on micro-film. This approach was limited to inspecting each issue published by both dailies for one week before the 5 June 1987 release of the White Paper, and for the following five weeks (up to the 13 of July). As shown below, this six week period constituted the peak of news interest over the three years monitored. Finally, in the course of reading the actual items identified over this time frame, various references to further items were discovered within the texts themselves. This was especially the case with respect to letters to the editor, a genre of item that is particularly difficult to pinpoint, and, to a lesser extent, certain feature articles where the White Paper was a secondary news topic. These four strategies were thus drawn upon with the aim of producing a sample of news items (in light of these constraints, no claim to comprehensiveness can be made) representative of the general features of the larger totality of news coverage from which it had been selected.

Here it would be appropriate to briefly highlight the general features or patterns of the coverage over the sample period of 1 January 1987 to 31 December 1989 (the implications of which for the primary concerns at hand will be

explored in later sections). The *Globe and Mail* published 128 pertinent items over the study period: specifically, 69 news reports, 7 editorials, 2 opinion columns, 27 feature articles, and 23 'Letters to the Editor' (76,347 words total). The *Toronto Star*, in contrast, published 110 items on its pages: 68 news reports, 8 editorials, 4 opinion columns, 8 feature columns, and 22 letters (62,161 words total). To compare the coverage strictly in terms of a total word count per item genre, it is apparent at once that news reports constitute the largest component element of the coverage for both institutions: 54.2 percent and 71.1 percent respectively. The average length of a *Globe and Mail* news report stands at approximately 600 words, while one for the *Toronto Star* measures approximately 650 words.

Feature articles represent the second largest share for both dailies, making up almost one third of the *Globe and Mail's* coverage (32.1 percent), and 12.2 percent of the *Toronto Star's* total (average length in both cases is approximately 925 words). Both of the two dailies provided letters with the third largest share of the coverage total: that is, 6.8 percent for the *Globe and Mail* (225 words average length), and 7.5 percent (212 word avg.) for its counterpart. Editorials are next in sequence for the *Globe and Mail* at 5.0 percent (550 word avg.), to be followed lastly by opinion columns at 1.8 percent (695 word avg.). In contrast, for the *Toronto Star*, the fourth largest share is accorded to opinion columns at 4.9 percent (756 word

avg.), with the final share of 4.4 percent (340 word avg.) devoted to editorials.

This 'total picture' of the press coverage can be brought further into focus by tracing the fluctuations of these genre shares over the three year period. Turning first to the *Globe and Mail*, the percentage share of the total coverage for news reports stays fairly constant over the three year (1987, 1988, 1989) period: 52.6, 55.9, and 56.8 percent of total words respectively. Similarly, the share allotted to feature articles does not experience much variation from year to year either: 31.3, 32.9, and 33.8 percent. Pertinent editorials, however, appear only in 1987 (6.6 percent) and 1989 (8.4 percent), while opinion columns, given marginal play in 1987 (1.8 percent) and 1988 (2.9 percent) have disappeared by 1989. Letters appear in all three years, constituting 7.7 percent in 1987 and 8.4 percent in 1988, yet a mere 1.0 percent by the final year.

A different pattern for the total word count by genre emerges when the *Toronto Star* coverage is examined. News reports are granted a relatively stable share over 1987 (73.6 percent) and 1988 (75.7 percent), but then drop to 54.4 percent in 1989. The reverse is the case for feature articles, which by 1989 account for 41.4 percent of the coverage total: this from 6.8 in 1987, and 7.5 in 1988. Opinion columns appear only in 1987 (7.3 percent), and letters in 1987 (8.0 percent) and 1988 (12.1 percent). Finally, with respect to editorials, the share is generally

consistent: 4.3 percent in 1987, 4.7 percent in 1988, and 4.2 percent in 1989.

An overview of the news report coverage shows that press attention peaked in June 1987, the fifth day of which saw the White Paper tabled in the House of Commons. Pertinent news reports appear as early as January of that year for the *Globe and Mail*, and February for the *Toronto Star*, yet do not gain prominence until June. A word count of news reports for that month demonstrates that the *Globe and Mail* peaked at 13,163 words, and the *Toronto Star* at 17,845 words published. By proceeding to calculate the total word count of news reports on a month to month basis, it can be shown that for the remaining portion of the study period the figures generally hover around the 1,000 word mark per month. Both dailies exceed this level several times over the course of the three years, largely due to factors that will be discussed below. Here it can be noted that the release of the Federal Budget in the Spring of 1989 sparked the second highest quantitative coverage peak shared by both dailies. That is, both the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star* recorded individual peaks greater than this level, but not at the same time concerning the same event. No *Globe and Mail* news reports were identified after September 1989, while *Toronto Star* reports continue to appear until December of that year.

Returning briefly to the items published over the peak period of 1 June to 12 July 1987 ('peak' is quantified in

terms of the sheer number of individual items and their word length), pertinent insights may be gained. For example, it may be shown that hard news reports constitute just over half of the total number of news and editorial items for this six-week period for both the *Globe and Mail* (52.4 percent) and the *Toronto Star* (56.0 percent). More specifically, the week during which the White Paper is released, 1-7 June, recorded the highest level of news report attention at 6,924 total words for the *Globe and Mail*, and 8,428 words for the *Toronto Star*. The next week witnesses a drop to 3,036 words and 5,473 words respectively, to be followed by a mutual downward shift such that by the end of this six week period news report coverage has reached a more typical level (*vis a vis* the coverage as a totality) of about 1,000 words published.

Over the course of this six week peak coverage period, 21 hard news accounts concerning the proposals initiated via *Challenge and Commitment* appear in the *Globe and Mail*, 13 of which are published during the first two weeks of peak coverage (7 of which are, in turn, accorded front-page treatment). Interestingly, by the 22 of June, a general transition away from hard news accounts to editorial coverage is clearly underway, one which will continue for the rest of the three year monitoring period. Here it may be noted that over this peak six week span, the White Paper is formulated as the topic of 3 editorials and 1 opinion

column, the subject of 3 feature articles, and cited as the issue at stake in 10 letters to the editor.

Toronto Star coverage over this peak period (unlike the *Globe and Mail* it publishes a Sunday edition) produced 28 hard news accounts. Three-quarters or 21 of these accounts are contained within the first two weeks of June, only 2 of which are deemed to be page one material. The remaining hard news accounts are played fairly evenly over the subsequent four weeks, although a similar shift away from hard news accounts is discernible by the third week. Looking at the component elements of the editorial coverage over this six week period, 2 editorials, 3 opinion columns, 2 feature articles and 15 letters to the editor may be identified as pertinent. Finally, then, with respect to the total word count of editorial coverage for both dailies (the one exception being *Globe and Mail* feature articles), each of the respective item genres has dropped below the 500 word mark by the close of the last week of this peak period.

Viewing the coverage as a totality (over the three years monitored), the question of news report prominence may be further quantified by considering, first, the total word length of each report; second, the width of its accompanying headline; and third, its placement within the 'news hole'. As observed above, the typical length of a *Globe and Mail* news report found in this sample is about 600 words, while the *Toronto Star* report is approximately 50 words longer on average. To document the relative length of different news

reports over the sample period, each report was placed into one of seven different total word length categories and then calculated as a percentage of the aggregate news report coverage for each of the two dailies. These figures suggest that 39.1 percent of *Globe and Mail* news reports, and 47.8 percent of *Toronto Star* reports, are at least 601 words long, and can thus be regarded as prominent by this criterion.

This result can, in turn, be set in relation to headline width, here defined in terms of columns. In the case of both of these newspapers, a headline measuring three columns or wider will virtually always cross at least one half of the given page. By this criterion, then, 57.9 percent of the *Globe and Mail* news reports, and 65.7 percent of *Toronto Star* news reports, can be regarded as prominent. Finally, with respect to placement in the larger news hole, for the *Globe and Mail* 37.8 percent of the pertinent news reports constituted front page news in 1987, 23.5 percent in 1988, and 6.7 percent in 1989. This contrasts sharply with the *Toronto Star*, where only 13.6 percent of these news reports made page one in 1987, none in 1988, and approximately 10.0 percent in 1989. [5]

5 Other factors facilitating news prominence, some of which will be discussed below, include the size and boldness of type characters used, the placement of the item above or below the fold of the newspaper, the deployment of photographs, charts or diagrams to accompany the news report, the use of colour ink, distinctive border trim, and so forth. Regarding placement of the item in the news hole, for the purposes of this study each news report was identified as falling into one of the following four

Shifting now to consider the production sources of the news reports, it is clear that for both of the dailies the majority of these items were written by staff reporters: for the *Globe and Mail* the total is 85.5 percent, while 56.8 is the figure for the *Toronto Star*. Unlike its counterpart, the *Toronto Star* often specifies on its pages the location of the journalist within a designated beat system (see Chapter Two's discussion). That is, slightly less than one third of these items list, usually above the reporter's name, a topical frame: by far the most common of which for this sample was 'Military Affairs'. Reliance on news agencies to generate news reports, the most important of which for both institutions was Canadian Press (or CP), was 8.7 percent and 12.2 percent respectively. Finally, the *Globe and Mail* listed 5.8 percent of the pertinent reports as being 'Special to the *Globe and Mail*', a practice not emulated by the *Toronto Star* over the course of this study.

Turning briefly to the subject of staff reporters, this investigation finds that over the three years monitored the

categories: 1) front page, first section; 2) inner page, first section; 3) front page, inner section; 4) inter page, inner section. For 1987, the results for the *Globe and Mail* were: 1) 37.8 percent; 2) 59.5 percent; 3) 0 percent; 4) 2.7 percent; and for the *Toronto Star*: 1) 13.6 percent; 2) 59.1 percent; 3) 4.5 percent; 4) 22.7 percent. For 1988, the results for the *Globe and Mail* were: 1) 23.5 percent; 2) 41.2 percent; 3) 5.9 percent; 4) 29.4 percent; and for the *Toronto Star*: 1) 0.0 percent; 2) 61.5 percent; 3) 7.7 percent; 4) 30.8 percent. Lastly, for 1989, the results for the *Globe and Mail* were: 1) 6.7 percent; 2) 86.7 percent; 3) 0 percent; 4) 6.8 percent; and for the *Toronto Star*: 1) 9.8 percent; 2) 80 percent; 3) 0 percent; and 4) 10.2 percent.

byline of 18 different *Globe and Mail* reporters appears on news items, while 17 different ones are listed by the *Toronto Star*. In the case of the former institution, no single staff reporter prepared more than 16.7 percent of the total news reports. However, according to these findings, Ron Lowman of the *Toronto Star* wrote 40.3 percent of that daily's pertinent news reports, a development with important implications, as will be shown below.

In examining the datelines of the news reports: that is, the declared geographical point where the actual account was produced, the contours of the news map (as described in Chapter Two) may be illustrated. In the reports of both dailies, the city of Ottawa was by far the most frequently listed news site: it is identified in 54.4 percent and 48.6 percent of the accounts respectively. For the *Globe and Mail*, a Halifax dateline is cited for 2.9 percent of its reports, while cities or towns in Quebec, Manitoba, Alberta, B.C., and the Northwest Territories each appear as a dateline for less than 2 percent of the news report total. Datelines were also filed from foreign cities: specifically, London, and Cherbourg, France, to make up 5.9 percent of the coverage. No dateline was specified for 29.4 percent of *Globe and Mail* news reports. *Toronto Star* datelines, after Ottawa, encompass other cities in Ontario (1.4 percent), Quebec (4.3 percent), and the Northwest Territories (1.3 percent). Foreign cities cited as datelines, namely Washington D.C., London, Brussels, Oslo and Moscow, account

for approximately 10.0 percent of all news reports. About one-third (34.3 percent) of *Toronto Star* news reports do not possess a dateline.

An overview of the news reporter-news source relation will bring this section to a close. Briefly, an inquiry was made into the formal textual specification of the principal point of contact between the journalist, on the one hand, and the primary news source (as framed in the news report lead), on the other hand. Slightly more than three-quarters (76 percent) of the *Globe and Mail* news reports, and about two-thirds (67.2 percent) of those published *Toronto Star*, cite the key contact in question. For the *Globe and Mail*, private interviews, at 35.8 percent, constitute the most frequently declared point of journalist-source contact, followed by official public statements (20.8 percent), the release of a formal document (18.9 percent), a news conference (9.4 percent), the debate in the House of Commons (5.8 percent), the release of public or private opinion poll data (5.7 percent), and, finally, public or news media interviews and press releases (both at 1.9 percent). Regarding the *Toronto Star* coverage, official public statements at 26.7 percent constitute the most significant point of journalist-source contact, followed in turn by private interviews (24.4 percent), the release of a formal document (17.8 percent), a news conference (13.3 percent), House of Commons debate (13.2 percent), the release of public or private opinion poll data (2.2 percent) and, finally, public or news media

interviews (2.1 percent). These data most certainly throw Chapter Two's discussion of the routinization of newswork into sharp relief (a development to be examined in the next section).

This overview of the quantitative features of the *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Star* coverage serves as an important contextual backdrop, one which will, in turn, help to anchor the general lines of critique to be presently pursued in this case study's exploration of the popular dispersal of nuclearism. Commencing with the next section, analysis turns to discern the textual traces of various discursive strategies of news media management across the pages of the two dailies: namely, the techniques mobilized by government and defence officials aiming to set down the rules of topical formation to be respected by reporter and reader alike.

Terms of Approbation

Defence Minister Perrin Beatty and his 'long-awaited white paper', complete with its 'ambitious shopping list', are front-page news for both the *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Star* editions of 6 June 1987, the day following the formal tabling of the official document before Parliament. News-workers for both dailies stressed in their respective accounts that the 'much-heralded' *Challenge and Commitment* failed to contain any real 'surprises', pointing out that

this was due to a variety of factors, the most notable of which was that the 'big-ticket items' on the 'Minister's wish list' had by now been 'hinted at' or 'frequently leaked'.

Government and defence officials, aware of the potentially controversial nature of several of the White Paper's policy proposals, had worked in earnest during the months preceding its 'unveiling' to prepare for the requisite 'selling-job'. [6] At stake was the need to convince the members of a 'deficit-conscious' federal cabinet and Treasury Board, a number of whom were reportedly aghast at the price tag of the plan, as well as a skeptical news media, that massive expenditures on 'defence' were to be granted fiscal priority. State officials thus had before them the increasingly difficult task of constructing an effective mode of argument to establish the basis for a re-articulation of the national interest. Specifically, a new set of interpellative strategies would have to be fashioned if an extensive procurement of 'military hardware', including nuclear powered submarines, was to be naturalized as a necessary response to a new, disturbing exigency.

6 Also at stake is the need to 'sell' the new Defence Minister. Here it may be argued that the daily press's constant use of descriptive terms such as 'Boy Scout' or 'Boy Wonder' to characterize the personality and motivations of the '37 year old' Defence Minister helped to construct associations of rationality and moral integrity for the unspoken premises underlying his claims.

Consequently, considerable pressure is brought to bear to mobilize through a range of discursive techniques the principal strategic rationale invoked by the White Paper. To begin, a series of official interventions are organized to exploit the newswriters' practical need to anticipate or pre-plan news-as-events. Here the import of the apparent typification of the 'White Paper story' as continuing news (Tuchman, 1978) for the flow of newswork practice comes to the fore, as it allows for officials to become 'sources', and thereby link through a shared thematic a series of otherwise disparate 'news events'. That is, *Challenge and Commitment's* progression through a series of bureaucratic phase structures (Fishman, 1980) served to mark appropriate points for officials to pronounce judgment on matters pertinent to their agenda. Examples discerned from the news accounts include: the formal deliberation over the White Paper's contents before various Cabinet committees, its introduction to and ultimate approval by the full Cabinet, an extensive range of official 'leaks' and 'off the record' statements regarding its most likely contents, official announcements concerning delays for its final release date, and, finally, speculation regarding its imminent release after translation and printing.

Common features found in the resultant news accounts about the forthcoming policy document as it moves through these bureaucratic phase structures include the official rationale for why a new policy is needed at this time, the

probable elements it will contain, the most likely points of controversy, and its potential impact on the 'international strategic environment', in general, and the Canadian economy in particular. Thus the White Paper, once successfully typified as continuing news, ensures for the respective news organizations that the trajectory of the related events is easily predictable, thereby permitting newswork to be routinized through pre-scheduling, the allocation of resources to be controlled, and the 'map of relevant knowers' to be secured, with a minimal amount of effort and expense.

Moreover, there is sufficient textual evidence to indicate that the carefully orchestrated campaign of 'off the record' announcements and 'news leaks' launched by officials had the primary effect of keeping the daily press newswriters squarely in the game of keeping aloft various 'trial balloons'. 'News events' covered by the *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Star* in the days leading up to the release of the White Paper include: speeches made by Prime Minister Mulroney in the House of Commons, as well as at a NATO conference in Quebec City; speeches made by Defence Minister Beatty to the Conference of Defence Association, to senior officers at the Canadian Forces' Northern Region Headquarters at Yellowknife, and at an Ottawa news conference with U.S. General Bernard Rogers, the 'Supreme Commander of NATO'; speeches made by the Minister for External Affairs, Joe Clark, to groups such as the Vancouver Board of Trade

and the House of Commons Defence Committee; and, finally, a variety of speeches and private interviews made by other government ministers and defence officials.

Here it is significant to note that a recurring feature of the resultant news accounts is that the official pronouncement (rooted in the facts) is only rarely challenged vis a vis the news processing of alternative, non-official voices. This highly structured form of access thus allowed officials a certain degree of control over the 'managing' of the news media, as the timing and content of these announcements could be determined in advance to achieve considerable advantage. Specifically, the timing factor could be easily exploited to ensure maximum 'visibility' and to place severe constraints on the ability of newswriters to 'double-check' official 'facts' or even to locate contending voices in the first place. If the *Globe and Mail* or *Toronto Star* newswriters were themselves aware of these strategies of 'news management', ostensibly designed to encourage a smooth, straightforward translation of the 'official message' into 'good copy', no evidence was found to suggest that it was ever formulated as a topic of concern on the pages of either daily's newspaper.

Questions thus emerge as to the extent to which Defence Minister Beatty's campaign of news leaks (and his subsequent 'media tour') served to collapse the basis of public debate over the new doctrine around the official stance. That is, by systematically undermining the 'novelty' or

'extraordinariness' of the White Paper through this specific form of news management (for several newswriters it was a 'thoroughly predictable document'), both government and defence officials could conceivably anticipate a corresponding decline in news interest. Such a decline in attention would presumably be all the better for state officials as they proceed with the implementation of the new policy.

This largely uncritical reiteration of 'what the Minister said' also works to set down several of the primary terms of reference for truthful definitions of the problems to be addressed by the White Paper, thereby facilitating the construction of the official agenda of issues as the one most relevant to the *national interest*. Should a sustained public debate ensue, officials would at least have the advantage of having contributed to the setting down of the initial terms of topicality. Counter-official discourse would then ultimately be made to 'fit', at least to some extent, within the normative frameworks previously inflected as consonant with the prevailing news values. As will be shown, however, the prospect of a Canadian fleet of nuclear-powered 'hunter-killer' submarines elicited a public response far too decisive for the strategic rationale to absorb or deflect entirely: or did it?

The next section undertakes to begin the work of tracing the dispersal of these news values as they inform the preferred framing devices implicated, in turn, in the narratives of the 'White Paper as news story'. Of primary

importance is the need to address the (contradictory) conditions of existence and possibility across which meanings are set in temporary alignment to form a naturalized correspondence with what is known to be appropriate or true about *Canadian security in the nuclear age*. Attention thus focuses on the ideological convergence or re-alignment taking place across the complex matrix of normative inflections such that, first, a distinct issue-field of 'national defence' is discernible, and second, the primary sites of discursive contestation around 'nuclear deterrence' are made to disclose their contours.

Purchasing Power

By the Spring of 1987, it is becoming increasingly clear that major expenditures are being planned for the Canadian Forces. A key policy promise made by Conservative Party strategists in the course of the 1984 election campaign had taken the form of a proposal to raise state spending on national defence by 6 percent. Consequently, defence officials reportedly reacted with delight at the news of the defeat of the Liberal government at the polls, confident that 'a new day had dawned' for their Department. In the early years of the Mulroney government, however, defence spending increases were fixed at a 'modest' level of 2 percent above inflation. When Finance Minister Michael Wilson, in his February 1986 budget statement, announced a

deferment of \$200 million from the Department's resources, it was apparent that even this level of commitment would not be maintained. The spending cuts were rationalized in terms of a declared need to keep the federal deficit below \$30 billion in the forthcoming fiscal year. Still, the Department's budget reached a 'record level' of \$10.3 billion in 1987, 25 percent of which being spent on equipment purchases. The results of public opinion polls published in the daily press over this time period consistently suggest that a majority of Canadians are satisfied with the new level of spending and want it to be either maintained or increased.

Beginning to emerge at this early point in the daily press coverage are the articulatory elements of what will eventually be configured as a crisis, one resolvable only through massive increases in defence expenditures. Government and defence officials are exploiting numerous opportunities to place on the public agenda the truth-claim that Canada's status as a 'responsible ally' is at risk due to a 'commitment-capability gap'. To close this emergent gap, according to the strategic rationale in play, spending on national defence will have to continue to rise at a dramatic rate. The implication that this figure is indicative of an exigency for national security and sovereignty, the preferred reading espoused by defence and government officials, is in the vast majority of instances allowed to be processed

with little or no detailed comment in the pertinent *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Star* coverage.

A central presupposition anchoring this discursive strategy holds that the Canadian government spends less on defence as a percentage of national output (usually stated as 2.2 percent) than any other 'NATO member', except for 'tiny' Luxembourg. This truth-claim is repeatedly reproduced in these news accounts as a fact ostensibly above dispute. [7] Accordingly, the basis for the later articulation of the configuration 'we are not pulling our weight within the NATO alliance' is in this way cultivated in advance of the White Paper's release. Vague references to forthcoming policy proposals are 'leaked' or 'hinted at' by officials, including plans to: beef-up' the primary reserve forces from 24,000 to about 50,000 members in order to satisfy the 'operational needs' of the Canadian Forces; to increase the size of the regular forces to roughly 86,000 personnel; and to continue to 'bolster NATO forces' (1,200 more men and women had been added since the Tories assumed office in 1984).

Regarding this last policy position, a comment by Prime Minister Mulroney is widely reported: "we hope to do more, because this is not a neutral country. This country under

7 This selective use of statistics may be countered by undertaking a comparison of the total Canadian military expenditures with those of the other 'NATO members'. The Canadian 'contribution to NATO for 1987' then stands in sixth place, after the U.S., France, Britain, (then West) Germany and Italy, respectively (see Langille, 1990).

this government stands clearly on the side of the allies and freedom, and the white paper will reflect precisely that" (TS, 18 March 1987: A3). [8] In this way, much of the preliminary terrain upon which the preferred mode of argument will later be restrictively situated vis a vis *Challenge and Commitment* is briefly highlighted. The complex set of interpellative strategies organized to naturalize massive expenditures on 'defence' finds in this statement a key component of its initial definition, namely a configuration of national identity as being contingent on the re-articulation of the signifier 'the allies', together with that of 'freedom', in opposition to 'neutrality'. Indeed, over the course of the pre-release coverage, government and defence officials work to inflect certain difficulties associated with formulating a defence policy consonant with a distinct national identity as being resolvable only through participation in those international alliances which further 'our security and sovereignty interests'.

This official construction of a particular order of discourse whereby a defence policy which advocates Canadian membership in, amongst other arrangements, the 'NATO alliance' or the NORAD may be affirmed in the language of national identity facilitates, in turn, the delimitation of the interpellative appeals of counter-arguments. The

8 The emphasis added in this quotation (in italics) is that of this author. This will be the case in all such quotations from daily press accounts, unless otherwise noted.

constraining power of the authorized voice, through the imposition of its preferred logics, rules out potential accusations that, first, a 'Canadian voice' is not being heard on the 'international scene' and, second, that Canadian defence policy is being 'dictated by Washington'. Thus state officials, in anticipation of efforts being launched to dismantle the obviousness of this re-articulation, may proceed to specify via the White Paper a regimen of criteria to 'fix' this ruling inflection of military preparedness as being derivative of, and consistent with, a distinct formulation of national identity.

The tensions which traverse across this particular movement of ideological convergence are underscored when, in late April, it is 'leaked' to the news media that state officials are seriously considering using the White Paper as a means to substantively alter Canada's 'NATO commitments' vis a vis the country of Norway. Speaking at a public forum, John Oostrom, a member of the Progressive Conservative Caucus Committee on Defence, calls for the government to withdraw Canada from its formal obligation to move a combat brigade to Norway 'in times of crisis'. Rumours that this statement, indicative of 'new government thinking', would be formally advanced in the new policy statement received wide coverage. Vague details of 'Canada's likely pullout plan' (as it quickly became known) were in this way publicly circulated in a manner which did not necessitate

official confirmation that they would eventually become authorized postulates.

The effectiveness of this discursive strategy to distance government and defence officials from direct attribution was shown when, at a North Atlantic Treaty Organization conference in Quebec City the following month, several Norwegian politicians severely criticized the (still not officially endorsed) plan. Charges were leveled by them that 'Canada's plan to bow out of its defence commitments' would 'weaken the Western alliance' and 'send the wrong signal to the Kremlin' (TS, 24 May 1987: A7). None of the resultant accounts located in the *Globe and Mail* or *Toronto Star* contextualized this intervention, with the mutual exception of including the truth-claim that 'major Soviet military facilities' are located close to the Norwegian border. Indeed, the constant reiteration of this point, presumably to anchor the unspoken implication that proximity be equivocated with imperilment (a key thematic of the White Paper), is in and by itself insufficient to warrant greater press comment until, less than one week later, the Defence Minister holds an 'impromptu' Ottawa press conference with U.S. General Bernard Rogers, the 'NATO Supreme Commander'.

"Don't be 'suckered' by sly Soviet Leader NATO Chief warns" (TS, 31 May, 1987: A4), the headline of the resultant *Toronto Star* hard news account, gives extensive play to a series of Rogers's opinions which rehearse various elements of the articulatory principles mobilized by the Norwegian

officials. Rogers's 'warnings' are based on a distinct configuration of crisis where: the 'Western allies' will be 'suckered' into believing that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev 'has their interests at heart'; that people will forget that Gorbachev is "Russian, Communist, charismatic and clever" and is out to "de-nuclearize Western Europe and make it safe for conventional war" (and thus "we must not assist him in this"); and finally, that because too many 'alliance members' have 'failed to educate their people about the threat they face to their freedom', "We'll find ourselves dancing to the tune of a Soviet piper without [Gorbachev] having to fire a shot." Narrative closure is achieved, over the course of this account, with the final attribution to Rogers of the claim that, having been consulted on the forthcoming White Paper, he is "favourably disposed towards its contents."

Once again, it appears to be the case that the strategy of an impromptu press conference has worked to inhibit the emergence of alternative voices, as Rogers's is the singular source of statements cited (the content of Beatty's introduction of the General is not reported). More importantly, however, the timing of this announcement facilitates the official re-articulation of the Soviet threat just at the moment that its underpinning elements increasingly risk being called into question by the transferral of Canadian troops from Norway. The 'symbolism' of 'abandoning' Norway is, in this way, displaced by the prioritization of

'tactical requirements' over this particular 'defence commitment'. Both the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star*, seemingly satisfied with the official reaffirmation that Canadian 'land and air forces' would still be maintained at two bases in southern West Germany, turn their attention elsewhere: namely, the emergent formulation of a new Soviet threat to Canada from the Arctic.

Closing an 'Open Window'

The *Globe and Mail's* 23 April 1987 news report headline 'Canada must defend Arctic to retain claim, Clark warns' effectively underscores a central organizing imperative of the remaining pre-release news coverage. The question of sovereignty over the arctic islands and waterways had surfaced as a serious point of contention between the Canadian and United States governments less than one year earlier. The latter government, in its refusal to recognize the Canadian sovereignty claim vis a vis the Western archipelago, had focused public attention by openly directing vessels through disputed waters, particularly the Northwest Passage, without formal permission from the Canadian government. Both the Manhattan and Polar Sea ice-breaker 'incursions' garnered significant news coverage, as well as editorials calling for a resolution of the matter.

By May of 1987, references are increasingly being made in news accounts regarding 'official speculation' that U.S.

nuclear-powered submarines are secretly being sent into Arctic waters either via the Bering Straits, a route between Greenland and Norway, or through a passage between Iceland and Baffin Island in the eastern Canadian Arctic (and subsequently into the archipelago along Lancaster Sound). Claims that "Soviet attack submarines are increasing their Arctic patrols" (10 May 1987: B1), or, similarly, "have been reported in the northern tip of Davis Strait" (TS, 23 May 1987: B5) are recurrently introduced throughout the coverage, yet almost always without formal attribution.

A corollary of this progression is the affirmation of a growing Soviet 'attack submarine threat' in the Arctic, an official precept accepted and reproduced throughout the pre-release coverage, as both the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star* proceed to report in detail the newly acquired 'strategic significance' of the polar-region. The 'escalating military competition in the Arctic' between the 'superpowers' is posited in terms of a 'natural' development brought on by the emergence of the Arctic as an 'open window' into North America, and not the 'buffer zone' it has been in the past. Official claims that the Canadian public be made aware of 'the new reality' that a clear boundary between sovereignty and security is now 'untenable', another key presupposition of the White Paper, are not problematized in the resultant hard news coverage. Similarly, the strategic rationale that requires 'effective surveillance

and control if it is to be maintained' is ostensibly too obvious to require evaluation.

The implication of state power in this inflection of the 'increasing strategic importance' is made particularly evident when, during a two-day visit to Yellowknife in March, Defence Minister Beatty announced to an audience composed largely of Inuit, Dene, Metis peoples that five airfields or 'FOLs' ('forward operating locations') are to be 'upgraded' at Yellowknife, Inuvik, Rankin Inlet, Iqaluit (Frobisher Bay) and Kuujjuag (Fort Chimo), Quebec. Beatty is forced to acknowledge 'local criticism' to the plan, including the Northwest Territories' legislative council's unanimous vote against the testing of United States 'cruise missiles' in the northwest, and its opposition to low-level navigation by B-52 bombers (often used for 'practice interceptions' by Canadian Hornet fighters as if they were 'Soviet intruders'). Nevertheless, the Defence Minister proceeds to argue that while he, personally, understands and respects local views, "the federal government is responsible for the defence of Canada" (TS, 18 March 1987: A16).

This analysis of the pre-release hard news coverage discerns little evidence to indicate that a serious effort is being expended by either daily's newswriters to find voices willing to challenge the precepts underpinning this projection of a 'Soviet threat' in the Arctic. Repeatedly it is the case that the news accounts frequently contain passages that constitute little more than a re-wording of

the official 'facts' to be located in the forthcoming policy document itself. For example, where the White Paper will later frame an impending 'Arctic threat' with the declaration that: "Although Canada is unlikely to be invaded in a conflict, limited incursions, principally to neutralize installations, or for diversionary purposes, are conceivable" (DND, 1987: 11), here a *Toronto Star* reporter writes: "Although the Soviet Union is unlikely to launch a large-scale land attack against North America across the Arctic, it could land small commando units by air or submarines in remote northern areas to destroy or disable strategically important military installations [...]" (TS, 18 March 1987: A16).

Moreover, several scenarios are mapped out an officially authorized array of institutional voices, most of which rest on strategic projections of what 'the Soviets might do with their 'attack ballistic missile submarines' (the nuclear armaments located on board their 'allied' counterparts are not mentioned in this way) in the event that 'hostilities break out'. "The ability of Soviet ballistic missile subs to fire their SS-N-20 missiles directly into the heartland of America or Europe from bastions within the Soviet Union," intones a *Toronto Star* news account, "has turned previous Western anti-submarine strategy on its head" (TS, 23 May, 1987: B5). The truth-claim is hereby initiated that the 'modernization' of the 'missile ranges' of Soviet nuclear-powered submarines

currently means that they no longer need to pass through a number of 'chokepoints', specifically the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom channels (the 'GIUK Gap'), to reach their 'launch positions'. While these 'gaps' have been 'heavily patrolled' by 'allied ships', and 'dotted with undersea sensors': "Now it is the American subs which must move through arctic chokepoints - the Northwest Passage and the Kane Basin at the northern tip of Davis Strait - to reach the Soviet subs in their undersea hideouts" (TS, 23 May, 1987: B5). Once again, the 'allies' are forced to respond to the threat, real or potential, posed by the Soviet Union, to which hostile agency is consistently ascribed.

In general, there is sufficient documentation to suggest that the arcane complexities of the defence issue-field are making the newswriters' search for a suitable framework to explain its features for their readership difficult. This dynamic may, in turn, partially explain why *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Star* newswriters recurrently elect to call forth into their respective accounts typical or popular representations of what the 'Soviet threat' signifies. In the case of the *Toronto Star*, its 'Military Affairs' journalist, Ron Lowman (as noted above, he is responsible for 40.3 percent of that daily's hard news reports), is particularly inclined to process the strategic formulation of the Soviet threat as a crisis to be resolved in accordance with the preferred dictates of the strategic rationale. In one account, Lowman cites Brigadier-General

John Hayter's argument that to 'protect' NATO's conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear forces' the 'allies' must have 'eyes and ears' in the Arctic, for "if a person can beat your head in, he's a threat, no matter what his intentions are" (TS, 18 March 1987: 11). Lowman, while relying on a third-person narrative voice, repeatedly signals to his reader his affirmation of this quoted official's 'bafflement' that anyone would oppose 'defence efforts' to 'counter' this 'new threat'.

Indeed, the majority of the total number of accounts under scrutiny for this period would indicate that prefigured associations of a calculating, yet irrational and extreme enemy, are being repeatedly mobilized such that the historical contingency of the official inflection are first reified and then displaced as transcendent truth. Having established as factual 'expert' assertions (most of which are processed without attribution) that the Soviet northern fleet 'may have as many as ninety nuclear powered submarines equipped with cruise missiles', or that 'Soviet nuclear attack submarines' are an 'ever-improving force' and 'vastly outnumber NATO's fleet', it is a short advance to re-articulate the need for a Canadian fleet of nuclear-powered submarines to 'counter' this 'growing danger'.

Over the course of the pre-release phase of the monitoring period, External Affairs Minister Clark also makes a series of announcements which receive prominent treatment in both of the dailies. It is his contention that

"the Arctic has a very special place in the Canadian sense of nationhood, [thus] any threats against our sovereign control of that region of our country justifiably provoke the most intense concern'" (TS, 23 May, 1987: B5). Much is made in the early press coverage of his repeated declaration that 'sovereignty claims you can't defend gradually disappear', a position reaffirmative of the truth-claim that 'Canada must be prepared to defend the Arctic if it hopes to assert its national sovereignty in the North' (G&M, 23 April 1987: A1). By this strategic mode of logic, to sustain 'our claim of effective control over archipelago waters', 'we' must possess 'the means to assert it'. Hence the official commitment to expand a 'military presence' throughout the North (for example, by increasing military surveillance flights), and to construct an infrastructure for future development (including the aforementioned 'upgrading' CF-18 of 'interceptor' aircraft bases).

A crucial dynamic of this strategic rationale manifests itself, in part, vis a vis the imposition of a provisional disjuncture between the signifiers 'sovereignty', 'autonomy' and 'security'. Clark argues that "Canadians should not confuse the real sovereignty concerns in the Arctic with the anxiety some people feel about the free-trade negotiations with the United States [...] Those who cannot accept current international realities are not really defending sovereignty, although they be fixated on that word. They are instead pursuing a fantasy of total national autonomy,

something which is now impossible even for the superpowers" (G&M, 23 April 1987: A1-A2). It follows, then, that the most pressing threat to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic is posed not by the enemy, the Soviet Union, but by an ally, the United States. Clark, in his appearance before the national defence committee of the House of Commons in late April, distinguishes between existing threats to security and threats to sovereignty, insisting in turn that through the acquisition of a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, the Canadian navy would then be capable of countering both types of threats.

Clark's statements over this period constitute the first official acknowledgment that the purchase of nuclear-powered submarines, the subject of much rumour and speculation to date, will be spoken to in the White Paper. Consequently, the discursive strategies by which officials are seeking to enact the preferred normative framework for naturalizing as common sense the imperatives of this proposal are becoming increasingly pronounced. Much care is taken to anchor the assertion that only nuclear-powered submarines could provide a Canadian 'presence' at the 'Arctic front' ('where it is needed most') with, at the same time, permitting the linkage of this capability with the possibility that Canada's 'closest ally' would ever have its right of way blocked. Clark becomes one of several officials who insist that such challenges to Canadian

sovereignty are to be handled by collecting evidence for a legal action before the World Court.

In contrast, the security discourse finds its definition *vis a vis* the declared 'Soviet threat'. Here the very inability of officials such as Clark to produce concrete evidence of Soviet 'submarine traffic' in the Arctic is to be accepted as proof of the need for nuclear-powered submarines: how else to collect such evidence? Moreover, when statements such as: "The Soviet Union is building new submarines capable of Arctic operations at a fast pace, Western military analysts say" (G&M, 29 April 1987: A2) are allowed to pass unqualified, Soviet military capability is then, once again, successfully conflated with hostile intentions. Thus, where 'disagreements' with the U.S. government (*respectful of the rule of law*) may be taken before the World Court, 'infringements' by the Soviet Union (*outside of the law*) must be countered with 'coercive force'.

When it is reported on 2 May 1987 that the Cabinet has agreed, in principle, to approve the forthcoming White Paper proposal to 'acquire' a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, it is the expressed need to counter this emergent crisis which constitutes the pivotal structuring element of the strategic rationale. Once again, a series of expert voices are accessed to support the official position that the Arctic needs to be patrolled in order to 'reinforce' national claims to the disputed waters. Comments made by

Brigadier General Terry Liston, director-general of information for the Department of National Defence, are given wide circulation on the pages of both dailies, particularly his remark that: "If you cannot deal with intruders in your waters, then you cannot assert your sovereignty" (G&M, 2 May 1987: A8). Formal attribution continues to be infrequent, however, with statements such as: "Most military strategists say a minimum of three submarines would be needed to detect intruders under the ice in any serious operation" (G&M, 2 May 1987: A1) being far more typical.

The virtual absence of voices critical of the official stance in the pre-release coverage helps to ensure that by the time *Challenge and Commitment* is released in June, the primary threads constitutive of a 'web of facticity' have, to a considerable degree, already been interwoven into place around the authorized signifiers.

Rearming Canada

The *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Star* coverage of the White Paper crystallized on the 6 of June, the day following Defence Minister Beatty's formal tabling of the document in the House of Commons. This section addresses the lead articles and editorials published on this particular day, suggesting that they can be read as (partial) accomplishments of specific discursive tasks, including: the situation of a new reality to be re-appropriated; the inscription of a

hierarchical arrangement of authoritative institutional voices able to discern the facts at hand in accordance with a preferred narrative history (that of the pre-release coverage); and, finally, the setting of rules of appropriateness and plausibility by which differing interpretations are to be affirmed or ruled out (as constitutive of an Other to be either re-articulated or denied) in relation to the present configuration of news frames and values. [9]

The *Globe and Mail's* front page of 6 June 1987 headlines the lead hard news account with "Subs viewed as 'ultimate force'" (subtitled: "Needed For Arctic, defence paper says"). The factual status of this report is anchored at the outset by prioritizing the strategic rationale in the first paragraph: "The Canadian navy should buy nuclear submarines that would be able to use 'ultimate coercive force' in the Arctic if Canadian sovereignty is challenged, the federal Government said yesterday in its Defence White Paper." This assertion is immediately followed by a (paraphrased) cautionary remark from the Defence Minister that 'Canada would never torpedo an intruding ship from a friendly country, such as the United States'. Although it points to 'the tough language in [the] policy paper', this account unfolds in such a way as to displace the possibility of an 'intruding ship' from an un-friendly country being

9 Once again, it needs to be stressed that because the public circulation of the White Paper document itself is negligible, news media definitions will generally constitute *Challenge and Commitment* for the Canadian citizenry.

'torpedoed'; no direct nomination of a hostile Other is made. Rather, the question of the financial costs of the White Paper proposals in general is made the next point of topical focus ('unofficial calculations' are cited which indicate that the 'final costs might be more than \$200 billion), followed by a second movement to cite the proposed increase in the number of Canadian troops permanently stationed in Europe.

The ideological features of the Soviet threat, having been deployed as the primary organizing Other of the strategic rationale, are not disclosed until the last portion (and on page A2) of the article: "The white paper says Canada is unlikely to be invaded, but the major military threat of Soviet nuclear attack still remains." This articulatory principle, while not elaborated upon in a direct manner here, underpins a shift in topical parameters to address, first, the decision to 'drop Canada's commitment to send an army brigade and two fighter aircraft squadrons to Norway in times of crisis' and second, the observation that the White Paper does not rule out the possibility that 'Canada might become involved in the controversial U.S. Star Wars program of ballistic missile defences'. This inflection of the 'major military threat of Soviet nuclear attack' allows for the re-articulation of this topical shift to appear affirmative of a narrative logic, if both the 'commitment to Norway' and the 'Star Wars program' are located as manifestations of an official response to this

same menace. By a parallel logic, the term 'nuclear' is ruled in as a discursive element of the preferred configuration of the threat of attack to Canada, yet ex-nominated ('ballistic missile defences') so as to permit our response to be formulated as being constitutive of a defensive stance.

Next, contending narrative logics of newsworthiness are re-asserted by returning to the 'the most controversial part of the white paper', namely the proposed nuclear powered submarine program. The achievement of 'balance' is brought about in the final section of the account through the alignment of specific criteria of inclusion as defined via the emergence of the institutional voices of the 'defence critics' of the two Opposition Parties, and, in the final paragraph, that of the director of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament. Two trajectories of critique are opened here, both of which are preconditioned by the news frame specified in the lead. The first speaks to the cost of nuclear powered submarines, arguing that it is 'excessive' given that this is 'money that should be spent on other defence modernization programs instead', and that there are 'more effective ways of protecting sovereignty in the North'. The second trajectory questions the potential involvement of the nuclear powered submarines in the 'emerging strategy' of the United States designed to keep 'attacking Soviet submarines in their northern home ports'. Formulated in this way, the U.S. 'strategy' is, once again,

defensive, and thus implicitly appropriate, in light of 'attacking Soviet submarines'.

Turning now to the *Toronto Star*, the headline across the lead hard news account on page one of the 6 June 1987 edition reads: "New defence plan to cost well over \$183 billion." Positioned beside a chart listing the Canadian Armed Forces's 1987, Planned and (projected) 2002 'military hardware' (a backdrop of graphic images of the various items frames the chart), the account commences by stating: "The government plans to spend well over \$183 billion in the next 15 years on defence: including the purchase of 10 to 12 nuclear powered submarines to firmly establish a Canadian presence in three oceans. The submarines for the Atlantic and Pacific, as well as under-the-ice operating in the Arctic, will halt the 'rusting out' of the Canadian forces, Defence Minister Perrin Beatty said in the House of Commons yesterday." This account, having re-appropriated Beatty's assertion that because a state of crisis exists, a 'major rebuilding of our navy' is now required, proceeds to intone that: "In addition to the subs, the [white] paper, a policy document, calls for six more patrol frigates to go with six already being built: a move that will hoist Canada into the world naval big league."

A complex network of causes and relationships thus established, the remaining portion of this account enumerates the main policy points of the White Paper as framed in the daily's pre-release coverage, pausing to note that: "The

long-heralded white paper proved to be a thoroughly predictable document. Most of the big-ticket items had been revealed by The Star over the last few months." Three institutional voices are accessed to assist with the unfolding of the narrative logic to be privileged: the Defence Minister, his 'coherent, made-in-Canada' White Paper, and an 'informed source' (the latter providing technical specifications). Two configurations of the threat against which Canada must be protected are inscribed via statements attributed to Beatty: first, "Somebody's navy will be in our North, whether it's Soviet, American or Canadian. I want to make sure it's Canadian" and second, in explaining why the 1971 Defence White Paper is 'no longer applicable', this voice is paraphrased as citing "the growing strategic importance of the Arctic and the danger from Soviet air-launched and submarine-launched cruise missiles." This officially sanctioned categorization of an impending threat is deemed sufficiently elaborated to be processed without further comment.

Adjacent to this hard news account is a related one, headlined: "Military to stake Arctic claim," which works to regulate discursively any potential ambiguities associated with its counterpart's inflection of the 'growing strategic importance of the Arctic'. This process takes the form of centring the proposal to purchase a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines to patrol the Arctic as the most crucial, and thus intrinsically newsworthy, aspect of Challenge and

Commitment. It begins: "Canada must beef up its military presence in the Arctic or risk compromising its sovereignty, the government's new defence blueprint says. Assertion of Arctic sovereignty is a major theme of the white paper, a policy document on defence which proposes deploying an array of military equipment and troops in the far North." This re-articulation of sovereignty with military expenditures is further reinforced via a list of the 'new northern policies unveiled yesterday' (quotations are attributed to the Defence Minister), and then by the citation of statements from the White Paper justifying the inscription of 'the Arctic as buffer zone' as 'Arctic as [potential] major theatre of war'.

The configuration of crisis is processed through a variety of devices in this account, as indicated by the following statement: "Currently, Canada's Arctic surveillance capability consists solely of three-day air patrols once every three weeks. Beatty's paper proposes the purchase of additional aircraft to remedy the situation. But sovereignty requires more than just improved monitoring, according to Beatty. Canada, he said, must also be able to respond to hostile intrusions so that potential violators will be deterred." The narrative voice continues with the declaration that: "Mining of Arctic waters alone is not seen as a feasible deterrent [...] For that reason, nuclear-powered submarines with great maneuverability get the government's nod as the best means of patrolling under ice

for hostile submarines, in combination with fixed sonar systems." *Feasibility* so defined, allows for sovereignty to be situated amongst a fluid cluster of (possible) subject positions consistent with the emphases and omissions of a news frame embedded in a common sense of nuclearism.

Given that two institutional voices cited in this account are the Defence Minister and the new policy document, and that the reporter processes only the facts without 'editorializing', the strategic rationale is allowed to command the discursive field with very little difficulty. The effectivity of the strategic rationale in aligning the topical parameters of 'what can and should be said' is, in this way, made to disclose its imperatives: that is, this re-articulation of legitimate comment respects the rules of appropriateness by implicitly accepting the reality to be appropriated in the first place, and by then containing itself within the sway of plausible interpretations by these same official criteria. Before proceeding to examine the editorials published this same day, it is important to note that this *Toronto Star* account closes with a brief reference to *Challenge and Commitment's* proposal to "explore the possibility of space-based surveillance which alone 'has the potential for complete coverage of Canadian territory and adjoining air and sea space'." These 'high-tech surveillance systems', according to the narrative voice, will eventually replace the 'chain of ground-based radar stations in the existing North Warning System'. Interestingly, this

truth-claim is qualified with the appeal that these systems "should not be confused with the controversial U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative, popularly known as Star Wars. The proposed U.S. system would use satellite weapons to develop a defensive shield to protect against nuclear attack. Ottawa's plan calls for surveillance only, but would require 'significant resources'." The (implied) reader, once positioned and then commanded to follow specific regimen of combination and inference so as to avoid confusion, is discouraged, first, from linking 'space-based surveillance' with the 'Strategic Defence Initiative' when the two systems are interdependent (see Chapter Five's discussion), and second, from asking who will be protected against nuclear attack by this defensive shield.

The *Globe and Mail's* lead editorial, "Rearming Canada," of the same day begins: "Simply for running his White Paper up the flagpole, Defence Minister Perrin Beatty deserves a salute." [10] Making no pretense of impartiality, the editorial voice elicits approval for this 'statement of [Ottawa's] military mindset', exhorting the reader to recognize that the White Paper "boldly addressees the need for investment in new hardware if Canadian armed forces are to avoid 'rustout'- the obsolescence of their equipment and

10 This discussion of the editorial voice recalls an observation made by Even (1980), who writes: "In life there is chaos, in authority, and on the editorial pages, there is order. [...] A relation of power is reaffirmed in the structuring of information: co-ordination of those in power, fragmentation for the rest of us" (1980: 81).

the roles they perform." A brief appraisal of how 'worn out' present equipment is, particularly naval warships, aircraft and tanks, is in turn formulated so as to reaffirm, once again, a sense of impending crisis: "Unless Canada is to drop some of its current defence roles in the Western alliance, it will have to spend the bucks to acquire more bang." Here Beatty is to be given 'credit', the editorial voice suggests, for having 'won' Cabinet approval for expenditures of \$180 billion (this official estimate figure has been challenged in the lead hard news account). Pointing out that "Mr. Beatty sees the 2 percent as a minimum, and aims for \$55 billion for equipment over the next 15 years," the editorial voice declares that this commitment "should silence the Pentagonians who berate Canada as a 'defence freeloader'."

How to 'spend the bucks to acquire more bang' is where the interpellative strategies of *appropriateness* are mobilized to regulate the ideological terrain of the strategic rationale: "If Ottawa's resolve to modernize the armed forces is laudable, however, the specific munitions and missions envisioned in the White Paper invite some skepticism." Two inter-related points of contention are raised: first, the question of how 'prudent' Beatty is being in 'opting' for nuclear-propelled submarines is authorized within a normative framework of 'fiscal responsibility'. That is, the cost estimates are here considered suspect, as is their capacity in light of how "air-launched Exocet

missiles shattered ships off the Falklands [or Islas Malvinas] and in the Persian Gulf," and, moreover, the emphasis on their 'Arctic utility'. Here the *Globe and Mail* editorial voice, without transgressing the rules of prohibition implicated in the strategic rationale's configuration of an *impending crisis*, advocates the purchase of diesel-powered submarines (this would 'free up funds for a more balanced navy'), as well as the re-alignment of the signifier 'effectiveness' as being delimited to the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts.

The second point of contention raised by the editorial voice, one also contained within the parameters of *informed comment*, concerns a Canadian role in the NATO. Moving from the presupposition that "few will oppose the White Paper's intent to rationalize Canada's troop commitments to Europe," the editorial voice queries the 'logistical capacity' implied by the proposal to " earmark CAST [the 'Canadian Air-Sea Transportable' Brigade] for reinforcement of the infantry brigade group in West Germany." Pausing to note that this proposal "improves matters only marginally," the editorial voice quickly invokes narrative closure by listing several of the main items on 'Mr. Beatty's shopping list' with the normative appeal that they "should command public approval." A preferred arrangement of discursive elements so established discourages the possible re-articulation of 'public [dis]approval' on any level other than those specified by the editorial voice. Thus the normative boundaries

of legitimate debate or fair comment are re-inscribed to demarcate a moral agenda above mere technicalities: "On the principle, if not necessarily all the details, of Canadian rearmament, the White Paper has scored a solid hit."

Turning to the lead of the *Toronto Star* editorial for 6 June, "A Policy Tune-up for Our Military," it commences by stating: "It took three defence ministers and nearly three years in power, but the Progressive Conservative government delivered a policy blueprint yesterday that's designed to guide our military thinking until 2002" (TS, 6 June 1987: B2). Beatty, with his 'thoughtful but cautious document', is to be given 'full credit' for "beginning a vigorous debate on Canada's role as a non-nuclear country in the nuclear age." Here the *Toronto Star's* editorial voice authorizes as 'reasonable' four principal 'defence roles' initially configured on the pages of the White Paper: "protection of our sovereignty by territorial surveillance; the defence of North America in co-operation with the United States; fulfillment of our NATO commitments; and peacekeeping duties."

Editorial comment regarding the White Paper's configuration of these 'defence roles', having first located them as 'sensible' (the state 'is right not to change them in any radical way'), privileges 'one major policy shift' as worthy of a response: namely, the decision to "drop Canada's NATO commitment to send 5,000 soldiers and two squadrons of fighter jets to Norway in a military crisis." The plan to

'beef up our military presence in West Germany' is, in turn, rationalized as necessary due to the need to 'minimize bruised feelings among Canada's NATO allies'. Endorsement for this re-articulation is further set in a relation of equivalence via the truth-claim: "At a time when the U.S. and the Soviet Union are negotiating an end to nuclear weapons in the *European theatre*, a *Canadian pullout* would only increase Europeans' fears about 'decoupling' North America from their continent." The strategic rationale's conflation of 'Canadian interests' with 'the *European theatre*' is thus reaffirmed in the implicit presupposition that any change to the *nuclear status quo* is destabilizing due to the *Soviet threat*.

The *Toronto Star's* editorial voice, while commending the Defence Minister for the White Paper's 'thoroughness in listing the personnel and equipment needs of our over-extended forces', prioritizes as its primary point of contention the truth-claim that: "Beatty doesn't answer the big question: How much will the government spend on defence?" The policy document's proposal to 'deploy' ten or twelve nuclear-powered submarines is identified as its 'most controversial thrust', yet the evaluative limits of possibility regarding potential controversy are strictly demarcated *vis a vis* the financial expenditures implied in the plan. Noting that "Beatty has a tough task ahead selling Canadians on this dubious, \$5 billion-plus hardware commitment," this editorial voice, like that of the *Globe and*

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Mail, actively seeks to displace other possible reading positions by speaking in favour of diesel-powered submarines as a 'cheaper' option. Following the same mode of argument as its counterpart, this editorial insists that this more cost-effective non-nuclear alternative would make the Department of National Defence's "\$55 billion 'wish list' of military hardware more credible." Moreover, the editorial voice surmises, the Defence Minister would then be better placed to achieve "his main goal: To eliminate the yawning gap between Canada's defence commitments and our ability to fulfil them," a principal organizing imperative of the strategic rationale.

The declared advisability of purchasing a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines is, in this way, authorized as a sensible response to the 'Soviet presence in our waters' (a truth-claim ostensibly accomplished by fiat). The acquisition plan thus becomes the product of a 'thoughtful but cautious document' the coherency of which is to be recognized through its projection of a Soviet Other to be spoken in accordance with a preferred set of normative logics. The editorial voice, by re-inscribing as essentially just the realist vocabulary appropriated by the White Paper, is acting to naturalize the re-articulation of, first, the dictates of fiscal realities with those of national security, and second, the acquisition of military hardware as the preferred response to this Soviet threat. This cost-capacity dynamic marks a (provisional) basis for the anchor-

age of a fluid set of topical parameters around a particular inflection of *modernization*. Potential criticism of the plan to 'modernize' the Canadian Forces will thus be made to insert itself upon the ideological terrain delimited by 'Canadian defence commitments' and the survivability of the 'nuclear deterrent' in the name of *stability*. Such counter-arguments, forced to be wary of being defined as originating outside of this inscription of the consensus, start at an acute disadvantage.

A Loyal Opposition

Government and defence officials, in attempting to secure for the strategic rationale a legitimacy derivative of the 'national interest', seek to effect through a series of discursive practices an image of the state as the natural embodiment of the 'public will'. Thus, to the extent that officials are reliant on the news media to contribute to the validation of this inflection by opening up the new policy's central tenets for 'public discussion' and 'debate' (the state must be seen to be 'listening' and 'responding' to public concerns), efforts are taken to ensure that the resultant lines of critique are managed effectively.

Key Cabinet Ministers, presumably in accordance with this agenda, avoided the House of Commons in the days immediately following the White Paper's release in the first week of June 1987. Defence Minister Beatty and Associate

Defence Minister Paul Dick immediately embarked on a two week 'cross-country tour', consisting primarily of speaking engagements and 'media events', to promote the new policy. Both the Prime Minister and External Affairs Minister Joe Clark were away at the Venice economic summit for the duration of the first week. Consequently, the opposition parties, presented with their first opportunity to ask formal questions about the proposals introduced by the document, are reduced to challenging Consumer and Corporate Affairs Minister Harvie Andre to respond to their criticism. Daily press coverage of the House of Commons debate in the two dailies is minimal, improving only with the eventual return of the Defence Minister. In the meantime, Beatty's comments receive sustained attention as he travels from city to city, almost always speaking in a forum where opposition party voices are denied equivalent access. [11]

Moreover, several defence officials proceed to 'break with Canadian military tradition' by 'speaking out' on behalf of the government's new policy during this period. Defining this discursive activity as 'appropriate' and 'part of democracy', General Terry Liston, head of public relations for the defence department, confirms that senior

11 The White Paper as news story, from the point of view of institutional authority, is a problem to be resolved through intervention in the sphere of topicality. Given that virtually every statement made by the Defence Minister will constitute news, the discursive struggle over the proper context within which 'the facts at hand' should be read as, in effect, largely over the routinized definitions of newsworthiness in play.

military personnel have, since the release of the White Paper, been speaking in churches, schools and service clubs. Liston is quoted as stating: "There's always a gray line. [...] If it was proposals that had not yet been accepted by the government and tabled in Parliament, I'd say it was completely inappropriate. But once it becomes policy, it becomes the duty of the bureaucracy and the military to explain to the Canadian people what it is" (TS, 21 June, 1987: A10).

Members of the opposition parties are quick to express dismay that these types of promotional tactics are being used, and argue that this development raises serious questions about the relationship between the military and the government. For Liberal Member of Parliament Len Hopkins, the 'real question' is: "Is the government extending the long arm of its various departments in order to sell their political products?" Liberal M.P. Lloyd Axworthy speaks of the fear that this 'co-operation' could in turn lead to the politicization of the armed forces. Liston, in response to the related queries put to him by newswriters, would only reiterate his assertion that defence officials, while supportive of the policy (including the plan to acquire a fleet of nuclear powered submarines), are not promoting the document itself, but providing 'factual, explanatory information'.

This 'factual, explanatory information', as re-appropriated (in most instances without attribution) in

Globe and Mail and *Toronto Star* news accounts, is increasingly projecting in the language of crisis the need to commit close to \$200 billion to defence spending. The 'downward spiral' or 'drift' of 'our military capability' (largely due to 'rust-out'), should it not be reversed, will translate necessarily into an incapacity to 'give Canada a fighting chance' to 'protect our borders', particularly in the North. To stabilize the preferred definitions of 'crisis' in play, Beatty and his officials undertake to mobilize a complex series of interpellative appeals in the language of, after Gramsci, 'moral leadership': "Some people would suggest that we contract out the defence of Canada's waters to others. We will not allow Canada's sovereignty to be compromised. We will be a better partner with our allies - and not a dependent" (TS, 6 June 1987: A1); "We could contract out the defence of Canada to other people; it would be cheaper. But the price we would pay would be in our nationhood, in our very sovereignty. I want Canada to be a good partner, but I don't want us to become a protectorate" (TS, 10 June, 1987: A3); or, finally, in formulating the decision to increase Canada's military presence in the North is 'irreversible', Beatty contends that: "The issue is whether there will be a Canadian presence there. If we don't have this capability, it's very disturbing. If you provide the territory and another country provides the goods, you become a protectorate" (G&M, 20 July, 1987: A8).

Much of the hard news coverage published over the early post-release period, due to the hierarchicalization of official voices (see below), follows this narrowing of 'what is at issue' to a fluid set of (moral) polarities: *us/some people; better partner/a dependent; pay the price of sovereignty/contract out our defence; Canadian presence/presence of Other; have capability/be a protectorate*, and so forth. A provisional coherency is slowly being configured for this 'news story' vis a vis the formal juxtaposition of cost versus capacity as a narrative dichotomy across which the play of moralized signifiers traverse. The declared financial expenditures dictated by the strategic rationale are, in this way, made to fall into discursive alignment with the declared capacity of the new 'tools' to 'do the job'. The news frame thus constricts definitions of newsworthiness to the 'price-tag' attached to 'the flurry of big-ticket equipment announcements' as the privileged object of 'controversy'. Headlines appearing in the *Globe and Mail* include: "Bill could be \$200 billion over 15 years," "\$7 billion far too low for submarine fleet, British experts say," and "A-sub costs likely to top \$8 billion, study says," while parallel examples for the *Toronto Star* include: "Nuclear subs: \$10 billion bid for sovereignty," "New defence plan to cost well over \$183 billion," "Canadian shipyards begin big battle over warship contracts worth billions," and "Tough tanks sought to fill \$2 billion bill."

Significantly, the reported response of the opposition parties to the policy initiatives introduced in the White Paper, to this point frustrated by the absence of Beatty, Clark, and Mulroney from the House of Commons Question Period, is processed so as to conform to the dictates of the cost-capacity dynamic. In the language of 'fiscal responsibility', the opposition members criticize as insufficient the massive commitment of resources implied by the new policy, 'officially estimated' at \$183 billion (in 1987 dollars) to be spent through an annual 2 percent increase. Liberal defence critic Douglas Frith leads the attack on the Government for failing to honour its election pledge to raise defence spending by 6 percent. New Democratic Party defence critic Derek Blackburn, following the example of his Liberal counterpart (and, arguably, the public opinion polls), stated that his party would be prepared to increase the defence budget to a level higher than that called for by the White Paper. [12] Opposition party criticism, as reported in the two dailies, focuses almost exclusively on official claims regarding increases in the defence budget, and therefore the most 'cost-effective' way to, in the words of the *Globe and Mail's* editorial voice, 'spend the bucks to acquire more bang'.

12 For a quantitative analysis of how the New Democratic Party's defence policy (especially as it concerns the NATO) is treated by the daily press during this period, see Bayer, 1991.

The officially sanctioned inflection of 'having to pay the price' for 'Canada first-ism in defence', the most appropriate response to the impending 'threats' to 'our way of life', is also working to anchor the strategic rationale for state intervention in the indigenous defence industry. The 'vote-getting' potential of the White Paper is at its most refined here, as the electoral dividends to be reaped by the government should 'defence priorities' come to signify an effective regional development strategy (that is, one to be accomplished through military investment) promised to prove substantial. The organizing elements of regional development as a means of 'promoting' (its binary opposite being 'subsidizing') private economic interests are generally diffused, seldom receive sustained attention. Much of the pertinent coverage is located on the respective daily's 'business' pages, yet the sheer size of the financial figures involved ensured that the occasional item received prominent placement. Justification for this rapid expansion of the 'defence' share of national expenditures takes the form of a range of validity claims, yet the attendant logics are often invoked in the languages of 'security' and 'sovereignty' with the effect of depoliticizing the propriety of the state intervening in this sphere.

To proceed with the tracing of this trajectory marked by the signifier 'security', it is necessary to discern how its unity (always incomplete) is contingent upon its re-articulation with 'sovereignty' such that opposition party

voices are regulated effectively. That is, despite the extensive coverage elsewhere in the same news sections with the forthcoming Canada-United States 'Free Trade Agreement' (FTA), the opposition party voices within Parliament do not, according to the resultant coverage, speak to the connections between this agreement and the militarization of the Canadian economy through such investment mechanisms.

[13] Granted, even by the close of 1989 the issue of 'permissible subsidies' has yet to be fully resolved, remaining as it does on the agenda for further negotiations, yet there is sufficient evidence to suggest that in the future Canada's regional development (in addition to its research and development) will become increasingly dependent on military spending to realize its proclaimed goals.

13 Significantly, a formal linkage between 'defence procurement' and 'industrial development' was affirmed with the March 1987 announcement by government officials that the forthcoming 'Free Trade Agreement', once established, would be combined with an increased emphasis on a 'North American defence-industrial base'. This new arrangement was rationalized by officials, in part, as a means to 'encourage sustained investment interest' in Canada, especially by foreign weapons manufacturers. The 'free trade deal', it was argued, would provide the related corporations with access to the 'American market' via this country. As the White Paper is reaching the final stages of its preparation, a Defence Industrial Preparedness Advisory Committee is introduced and given the mandate to implement this policy. Its co-chairs, the minister of national defence and a member of the Business Council on National Issues (an organization representing 150 of the largest North American corporations, and a strong advocate of the FTA; see Nelson, 1991), immediately declare that a stronger North American Industrial Base be established. Under the terms of this trade agreement, any government subsidy 'sensitive to the defence of the country' is deemed a permissible strategy for regional development, a development which will be returned to in the discussion below.

To clarify, under the terms of the 'Free Trade Agreement', the question of Canada's commitment to supply a proportion of its natural energy resources in perpetuity to the United States is unclear. As noted in an earlier section above, with respect to subsidy negotiations, the framing of the issue of exemptions *vis a vis* regional development is also ill defined: to what extent will the Canadian state be reliant on military spending as a 'legitimate' means to further these aims? Thus Canada's participation in the 'common defence industrial base agreement', coupled with a declared commitment to a base rate of annual real growth in the defence budget of two percent per year after inflation (DND, 1987: 18, 20, 67), raises the real possibility that over the White Paper's fifteen-year planning framework defence subsidies will emerge as the principal ('legal' in FTA terms) means of sustaining such forms of development. Thus to the extent that opposition party voices confirm the authorized signifier of 'sovereignty' in play (a question of a 'Canadian [territorial] presence' to be safeguarded through 'military hardware'), the Soviet threat is made to stand as the only explicit justificatory mechanism for what could eventually culminate into an indigenous military-industrial complex.

Just as Canadian economic sovereignty, as a complex assemblage of signifiers, is virtually ex-nominated, the opposition party critics' response to the White Paper's re-orientation of foreign policy to more clearly endorse the

doctrines of 'NATO and its partners' (including 'flexible response' as the preferred configuration of 'nuclear deterrence') may be characterized as muted at best. The inflection of 'sovereignty' vis a vis Canada's 'military share of the NATO burden' is consistently validated by official voices as a problematic to be addressed, not only through 'military efficiency or affordability', but also through selecting the 'most appropriate military posture'. The authorized projection of 'our national purpose', the unity of which is to be defined in relation to 'our commitment to the West', thus encourages the formulation of a linkage between *military preparedness* and 'our obligations to do our share for freedom'. The play of 'security' and 'sovereignty' is also markedly hierarchical in that the latter is closely situated with a territorial significance (a Canadian presence), while 'security' is usually privileged when 'our obligation' to Others (the NATO, the West, the allies) is to be foregrounded.

The primary criteria of this 'obligation' to be 'honoured' concern, first, *visibility*, as Canada 'must be seen to be contributing', and second, *credibility*, as 'our commitment must be meaningful'. While noting differences of emphasis and elaboration, there is little evidence in the resultant *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Star* hard news coverage to suggest that the opposition voices raised in Parliament are being heard beyond the limits of this preferred re-articulation to any serious degree. The individual elements

of the official mode of argument singled out as contentious by the opposition party critics are recurrently posited within a normative framework previously appropriated by state officials. The lines of public consensus about 'national security', having been sharply drawn by the strategic rationale, demarcate, at least for the moment, the terrain of 'loyal opposition'.

Thus to the extent that the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star* delimit the casting of their respective news nets to parliamentary voices for 'the other side of the story', thereby making the House of Commons the most important institutional site of discursive conflict, the 'politics' of the White Paper will be inflected largely in strictly partisan terms. This alignment of official networks of imagery in relation to the Soviet threat, until disrupted, is likely to successfully inhibit the re-articulation of alternative 'security' or 'sovereignty' formulations as visible and credible due to the very constraints of these normative frameworks.

Effecting Efficiency

In the weeks immediately following the release of *Challenge and Commitment*, as its 'news value' begins to diminish, the news net is being cast sufficiently wide to ensnare a range of institutional voices willing to 'take issue' with, to varying degrees, the strategic rationale

embedded throughout this text. As noted in Chapter Two, however, the organizational dictates of routinized newswork usually place severe constraints on the types of narratives that can be told. This examination of the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star* coverage indicates that the mapping of institutional voices outside of parliamentary exchange capable of advancing a critical or counter-hegemonic line of inquiry is indeed tightly regulated. Contending ways of speaking the common sense invoked by the new policy are, in most instances, strictly delimited to those topics deemed pertinent to the fluid dictates of topicality (ostensibly justified in terms of 'news interest').

During this period, both the *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Star* re-centre the 'nuclear submarine controversy' as the singular topical formation capable of first reinforcing and then extending the limits of newsworthiness. Here estimates of the potential costs associated with the planned acquisition of a fleet of nuclear powered submarines becomes the primary site of contending signifiers. This occurs when the White Paper's advocacy of an even more expensive proposal, namely that 'equipment' and 'manpower' be prepared for a 'full-sized mechanized armoured division' (as a key component of 'our new NATO contingent'), is displaced from the field of comment. The costs associated with the nuclear powered submarine plan are 'controversial' in a way that an 'enhanced commitment' to the NATO is not: the former is a departure from 'our traditional roles', while the latter is

processed as originating from within, and constitutive of, an established *popular consensus* about 'Canada's commitment to the NATO Alliance' (one that the NDP prior to the 1988 election is increasingly attempting to convince voters that it shares).

Beatty and his officials, as institutional voices routinely enmeshed in the news text, consistently assume the voice of a unified 'we' of public opinion when pronouncing judgment. Their facts and explanations, frequently spoken in an idiom of public reasoning, implicitly claim to exemplify the full range of consensual values to be defined as common sense or, as they might choose to express it, 'the constraints of the domestic environment'. During this period, however, it is becoming increasingly clear, in light of the 'changing climate' of 'superpower relations', that the preferred configuration of a perilous Soviet presence constitutive of an impending threat to 'our way of life' is in need of discursive renewal. That is, to *naturalize* the demand for new and exceptional financial expenditures on 'equipment' to 'do the job of protecting us', these official voices will need to reinforce the logics of *popular consensus* such that this new, exceptional threat to the 'territorial integrity of the Canadian Arctic' has its status of *obvious fact* preserved. Beatty, together with his official counterparts, are cognizant of the need to eradicate the basis for a potential legitimation deficit, and thus will continue to exert whatever influence they can

over the terms upon which 'defence issues' are to be 'debated'.

Newsworkers for the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star*, on the other hand, are aware of the need to prepare 'balanced' news accounts. It is presumably with this professional aim in mind that they are routinely calling forward the voices of numerous experts, such as 'defence analysts', 'academic authorities', 'anti-submarine warfare experts', 'Pentagon spokes[persons]', retired military officials, and so forth, to contest the principal themes of the White Paper and the current official re-casting of the 'strategic environment'. This examination of the conditions of existence and possibility implicated in this 'debate' suggests, however, that the vast majority of the institutional voices being accessed are accepting as axiomatic the nature of the respective threats in question, only differing on how best to respond to them. 'Debate' thus focuses on whether a fleet of nuclear powered 'hunter-killer' submarines would possess the necessary 'capacity' to 'counter the Soviets' efficiently, while the efficiency of 'nuclear deterrence' is ex-nominated as incontestable. [14]

14 Knight (1988) contends that experts, due to their capacity to provide a semblance of impartial knowledge, are made to occupy 'the middle ground of neutrality and objectivity' between official sources engaged in discursive conflict. The expert provides the newsworker with a 'problem-solving perspective' which facilitates the construction of a technical definition of the pertinent events or issues. According to Knight, "this technical discourse acts as a vehicle of consensus by which experts mediate between conflicting political sources. Technical discourse sets the boundaries and vocabulary of debate, and the criteria for

The formation of the ideological nexus which unifies the inflection of *efficiency* as a signifier across the locus of the resultant news accounts may be read as conditioned by a complex assemblage of rules, a number of which are implicated in the following discursive parameters: the plan is an *inefficient* attempt to satisfy 'Ottawa's sensitivity about American deployments'; the technology is not an *efficient* means to 'show the flag', and is thus little more than 'political posturing'; the plan is not a cost-efficient option when cheaper alternatives are considered (as a pre-release *Globe and Mail* editorial asks: "if a *residual kill capability* is all that Ottawa needs for *deterrence*, why could it not base patrol aircraft in the Arctic and equip them with sonar buoys[?]; G&M, 1 June 1987: A6); the plan is not the most *efficient* approach to 'carrying out' Canada's 'traditional NATO assignment of surface protection of wartime sea links with Europe'; and, finally, the plan is not the most *efficient* way to detect the presence of Soviet submarine 'traffic' in the Arctic region, given that new, more technologically *efficient* devices are being developed.

judging conflicting political [statements of fact]" (1988: 19). It follows that the definitional power of the expert as primary definer will be directly linked to his or her ability to separate the 'political' from the 'technical'. This when, as Knight stresses, the two are actually intertwined: "To deny the differential and political character of representation is itself a political act *inasmuch as it universalizes the particular and naturalizes the social*" (1988: 20; *emphasis added*).

Further instances of the authorization of efficiency include the 17 June 1987 column of *Globe and Mail* opinion columnist Jeffrey Simpson (widely regarded as one of the country's most influential political commentators). Having first pointed out that the White Paper 'contains plenty of common sense', Simpson reaffirms for his audience that "Canada has a yawning and embarrassing credibility gap in defence - just ask our allies - and the white paper sensibly addresses that gap." However, if Simpson remains unconvinced that the governments 'figures are right', he nevertheless reintroduces a key framing device inflected throughout much of that daily's hard news coverage: the principal constraint under which state officials must act is the potential cost to taxpayers. Thus the proposed plan to purchase the submarines is a legitimate one ("The Soviets might operate under the Arctic to break into the North Atlantic in times of hostilities"), but irresponsible given its position vis a vis the cost-capacity polarity. For this columnist, Canadian common sense dictates that the military reality is currently subordinate to the economic reality. Closure may thus be invoked with: "In the best of all worlds, yes, maybe nuclear submarines could marry military needs to economic reality" (G&M, 17 June 1987: A6).

The signifier *efficiency*, balanced precariously between 'military reality' and 'economic reality', represents the point of greatest tension in the strategic rationale. A massive financial expenditure on 'military equipment' is

obviously the most efficient response to the Soviet threat (our obligation to Canada's allies), yet the government must demonstrate 'fiscal responsibility' (our obligation to the taxpayer). By emphatically translating the capacity of Soviet armaments, particularly that country's fleet of nuclear powered submarines, as in and by itself being indicative of a hostile intentionality, the official voice elaborates a discursive basis for the hierarchicalization of this reality over the 'economic reality'. This movement is not contingent upon the outright exclusion of contending knowledges from 'debate', only their displacement vis a vis the moral confines of the 'public interest' as appropriated by the strategic rationale.

The logics of 'debate' unfolding on the news and editorial pages of the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star* are becoming increasingly pronounced: the cost-capacity dynamic, centred by contending signifiers of efficiency, demarcates the ideological limits of available ways of conceptualizing the proper trajectory for the new defence policy. The two dailies, by regulating the field of contestation vis a vis the Defence Minister's response to the Soviet threat, allow the conditions underpinning the re-articulation of this threat to be reproduced as fact, its very history ostensibly made to evaporate. The Soviet threat is real, the need for nuclear submarines is debatable in terms of efficiency (the military reality/economic reality dichotomy): by delimiting the basis for statements

indicative of a counter-logic to this latter dimension, the dailies encourage the former to pass into the public idiom. Left unspoken is the charge that vast financial expenditures on 'military hardware', like those spent in the name of 'nuclear deterrence', constitute a cause, and not the cure, of 'instability'.

The ideological effectivity of this definitional process is quite startling. The strategic rationale, by authorizing this inflection of the nuclear-powered submarine acquisition as a means to further Canadian sovereignty and security interests efficiently, renders counter-attempts to re-articulate the plan to other 'security developments', perhaps most ominously the 'forward defence strategy' of the United States (as noted in Chapter Five), much more difficult to sustain. The Defence Minister's consistent refusal to state in clear terms the intended role for the nuclear-powered submarines, other than to 'firmly establish a Canadian presence' in three oceans with a particular emphasis in the Arctic, and to halt the 'rusting out' of the navy, exploits this ambiguity. On each reported occasion that he is asked to clarify the real or proper purpose of the plan, he instead relies on abstract signifiers such as *efficiency*, presumably so as to allow members of a heterogeneous audience to identify with what they themselves take to be his intended meaning.

Pronouncing Judgment

Critical insights into the invocation of topical constraints via the prevailing news frames and values in play may be achieved through a contextual overview of the topical focus of the pertinent news report leads. [15] Over the course of 1987, *Challenge and Commitment's* proposal to acquire nuclear powered submarines easily constitutes the principal news topic. For the *Globe and Mail*, 40.5 percent of the news leads prioritized the submarines in terms of topical formation, while 31.8 percent is the comparative figure for the *Toronto Star*. A shift in the news values for the respective dailies is discernible, however, if the second largest quantitative share of hard news account leads by topical focus is examined. Accounts formulating as their lead statements regarding Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic region constitute, at 10.8 percent, the next largest share for the *Globe and Mail*, while for its counterpart, Canada's 'NATO commitment' makes up a 15.9 percent share. Looking at the 1987 coverage as a totality, then, it may be argued that

15 For our purposes here, a news lead is defined as the first 25 percent or one-quarter of a news item in terms of its total length in words. An institutional voice statement is deemed to be any discernible statement (here defined after Foucault as being a performance larger than the sentences used in its formulation; see Chapter Four's discussion) linked to a material site or 'news source': specifically, one which is quoted or paraphrased by the newsworker processing the actual news account. All institutional voice statements (IVSs) were first identified and then counted per news lead. Each was then calculated as a percentage of that particular daily's total count of IV statements for news leads in the time period so as to facilitate a comparative analysis.

both dailies condensed the central thematics of the strategic rationale into a preferred topical alignment indicative of differing conceptions of 'news interest'. [16]

Evidence that the institutional and professional logics of routinized newswork govern how and where the 'news net' is cast is provided by an overview of which institutional voices or authorized knowers are permitted space to pronounce judgment on 'the issues at hand' on the pages of the two dailies. Indeed, by tracing the emergence of statements attributed to institutional voices (IVs) in news leads for the pertinent news reports published in 1987, a series of important observations may be made to further substantiate the claim that the over-accessing of primary definers profoundly shapes the type of narratives newswriters construct as authoritative.

Significantly, for both the *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Star* news leads, Conservative Members of Parliament represent the largest share of all institutional voice statements processed at 38.5 percent and 31.6 percent respectively.

16 Following the hard news account leads concerned with the proposal to purchase a fleet of nuclear powered submarines, the other news lead topic shares for the first year of the monitoring period can be quantified as the White Paper and: Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic (10.8 / 11.4 percent); defence industry contracts (10.8 / 9.1 percent); the Department of National Defence budget (8.1 / 6.8 percent); Beatty's competence as Defence Minister (8.1 / 9.1 percent); the 'Soviet threat' to Canada (5.4 / 6.8 percent), Canada's 'NATO commitment' (5.4 / 15.9 percent), changes to the military reserves (5.4 / 2.3 percent), changes to research and development spending (2.7 / 0.0 percent), changes to Canada-United States defence links (2.7 / 4.5 percent), and, finally, a new War Measures Act (0.0 / 2.3 percent).

Moreover, once the White Paper itself is demarcated as a distinct IV, an additional 5.5 percent and 14.7 percent, respectively, may in turn be added to the total of government statements. Similarly, Department of National Defence officials articulate 13.8 percent of the IV statements quoted or paraphrased in *Globe and Mail* news leads, far greater than the 5.3 percent figure for the *Toronto Star*. Canadian Forces personnel are provided with a mere 1.8 percent share for the *Globe and Mail*, while granted a slightly more enhanced status at 4.2 percent of statements for the *Toronto Star*. For the latter daily, foreign (outside of Canada) state officials and/or 'military analysts' make up 16.8 percent of all IVs cited, compared with 8.3 percent for the *Globe and Mail*. Academic and/or scientific IVs, generally called forth to speak on the technical 'feasibility' of the White Paper proposals, stand at a 8.3 percent share for *Globe and Mail* news leads, yet mark only 2.1 percent for the *Toronto Star*. Independent defence analysts (located outside of the state proper) represent a 7.3 percent share for the former daily, and a 4.2 percent share of statements for the latter one.

It is striking to note that neither opposition party MPs nor social action groups are able to claim greater than one percent of the total of institutional voice statements for the *Globe and Mail's* news leads, yet are permitted to have a 7.4 percent and 5.3 percent share, respectively, for the *Toronto Star*. The *Globe and Mail*, in turn, departs from

the *Toronto Star* by prioritizing the IV statements of defence contractors (corporate voices engaged, in most instances, in the bidding process for the contracts named by the White Paper) to a 5.5 percent share for its news leads, while this IV fails to register significantly in the latter daily's leads. The 'voice of the Canadian people' emerges, if only to a minimal extent, in the news leads for this period, almost exclusively in the form of public opinion results (findings released by the state, or prepared for one of the dailies). Statements attributed to this IV occupy a 2.8 percent share for the *Globe and Mail*, and a 2.1 percent share for the *Toronto Star*.

Entering into 1988, the second year of the monitoring period, it is apparent that a distinct shift in topical formation is underway: the 'controversy' over the planned acquisition of a fleet of nuclear powered submarines is re-currently being configured as a two-sided conflict over 'who will design and manufacture the fleet'. The broader strategic implications of the new policy, formerly delimited to a preferred thematic, namely that it constitutes a movement away from 'Canada's traditional diplomatic approach to international relations' (an abstraction only rarely elaborated beyond the signifier 'peace-keeping'), have largely been displaced. Primarily, the 'controversy' is organized discursively in terms of, first, the declared concerns of state officials about job creation (the 'foreign designed' submarines will have 65 percent 'Canadian content' and

involve approximately 50,000 person-years of work) and second, the resultant 'horse-race' between potential 'product suppliers' (the British and French consortiums).

It is the projection of this latter thematic that constitutes the new principal structuring mechanism for much of the hard news coverage for 1988 and the first four months of 1989. The pertinent hard news reports, having long receded from the front page, presently realize a distinct shift in topic formation around a newly emergent dichotomy: will the nuclear powered submarines be designed and manufactured by corporations in Britain, or in France? The financial cost of the proposed fleet, once mobilized by state officials in relation to the competing bids of these two contractors, is quickly framed in narrative terms as a 'horse race' between the two 'competing bidders' (both of whom having signed 'memorandums of understanding' with Canadian officials) for the state's contract. Accordingly, the competitive efforts of promotional teams working to highlight the relative technological efficiency of, respectively, the British Trafalger-class and French Rubis/Amethyste models, are consistently covered in terms of which design 'makes more sense economically'. The resultant 'context' is robbed of a larger context: the legitimacy of the state's intervention, despite the tensions marring the surface of official justificatory mechanisms for the 'acquisition', is asserted through the full sway of a mode

of argument re-articulated as 'getting the best deal for Canada'.

Negotiating Expertise

An overview of the next two years of coverage (1988 and 1989), with respect to the topical focus of news report leads, indicates that, for the *Globe and Mail*, the plan to purchase a fleet of 'hunter-killer' nuclear powered submarines still constitutes the principal news topic in motion. Specifically, 41.2 percent of the pertinent news leads addressed this particular topic directly, followed by a 17.6 percent share for leads concerned with the possible direction of defence policy should the Conservative Party not win the federal election (compared with a 7.1 percent share for the *Toronto Star*). In contrast, the two most prominent news lead topics for the *Toronto Star* in 1988, both claiming about 22 percent of the coverage respectively, revolve around potential implications of the White Paper for, first, Canada's 'commitment to the 'NATO alliance', and second, government spending on defence contracts. News leads framed around the nuclear submarine controversy make up only 14.3 percent of the *Toronto Star* total. [17]

17 The remaining shares for the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star* 1988 news report coverage can be identified as referring, respectively, to the White Paper and: Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic (11.8 / 7.1 percent), the Department of National Defence budget (11.8 / 7.1 percent), changes to the military reserves (5.9 / 0.0 percent), Beatty's competence as Defence Minister (0.0 / 7.1 percent),

Interestingly, by the close of 1989, hard news account lead topics for both dailies have narrowed considerably. By far the most prominent of which, at approximately 40.0 percent for the *Globe and Mail* and 30.0 percent for the *Toronto Star*, addresses real and possible ramifications of the spending cuts outlined in the federal budget for the Department of National Defence. The nuclear powered submarine controversy constitutes the second largest share for both dailies at approximately 20.0 percent, with a roughly equal number of news leads concerning the possibility of an alternative non-nuclear submarine program emerging to replace the first one. The remaining news leads follow the same pattern for both dailies, with accounts concerning possible modifications of White Paper proposals in light of a declared need to reduce the federal spending deficit constituting the next largest group, followed by accounts addressing future alterations to Canada's existing 'NATO commitment'.

An investigation of the emergence of statements (quoted or paraphrased; attributed to institutional voices) in news leads published over the last two years of the monitoring period indicates that, once again, Conservative Members of Parliament enjoy the largest share of space made available to speak the issues. Indeed, for the *Globe and Mail*, if the share accorded to Government MPs is added to that granted to and, finally, the changing nature of the Soviet threat to Canada (5.9 /14.3 percent).

the White Paper, a total of 52.9 percent of IV statements (IVSs) is achieved in 1988. The same calculation for *Toronto Star* news leads produces a figure of 30.4 percent, easily the most significant of the IVs in play. Looking at the news leads published over 1989 as a totality, Government MPs retain their privileged status, shifting to roughly one-quarter of statements cited for the *Globe and Mail*, while rising to 47.6 percent for the *Toronto Star*. Members of the opposition parties, virtually invisible in *Globe and Mail* news leads for either year, claim a 13.0 percent share for the *Toronto Star* in 1988, before dropping from its news leads in 1989.

The IVSs attributed to the Department of National Defence, when combined with those of the Canadian Forces, constitute a 20.6 percent share for the *Globe and Mail*'s 1988 leads, expanding to 32.1 percent in the following year. The respective share provided to these IVs by *Toronto Star* news leads is similar, registering at 13.2 percent for 1988, and 33.3 (9.5 percent for the DND IVs, 23.8 for the CF IVs) in 1989. Foreign state officials and/or 'military analysts' make up 20.6 percent of the statements cited in the *Globe and Mail* and 8.7 percent for the *Toronto Star* for 1988, and 3.6 percent and 4.8 percent, respectively, in 1989. Non-state or 'independent' 'defence analysts', are excluded from the *Globe and Mail*'s 1988 leads (recording a 13.0 percent share for the *Toronto Star*), yet re-surface in 1989 for a 14.3 percent share of the statement total for that daily

(this IV drops from the latter daily's news leads for that year).

Social action groups, noticeably absent from the *Globe and Mail's* 1987 news leads, occupy a 5.9 percent share of the institutional voice statements processed in that daily's 1988 news leads, yet are not prioritized in the 1989 leads. In contrast, the *Toronto Star* rules in social action group statements for a 13 percent share in 1988, and a 4.8 percent share for the following year. A further distinguishing feature of the news leads for the final year is the *Globe and Mail's* privileging of 'the voice of Canadians' (in the form of opinion poll results and the occasional interview with private citizens) to a remarkable 17.9 percent of statements cited. Moreover, 'defence contractors' as an identifiable IV recorded a 7.1 percent share of statements for the daily in that year. This is in sharp contrast with the *Toronto Star*, which denied ascendancy to either of these two IVs in its news leads for this time period.

Points of Contention

Nuclear powered submarines, the one component of the White Paper's policy agenda framed by both the *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Star* as 'controversial' enough to warrant prolonged attention on their pages, make for good news copy. A news story centred by conflict, it can be told largely without reference to the annoyingly subtle nuances of

'superpower politics', much of which is difficult to report on a routinized basis due, ostensibly, to a lack of newsworthy 'events' to map. Moreover, the rising discursive conflict over nuclear powered submarines can be easily spoken within the boundaries of ordinary news narrative: namely, every good story has two sides. As the contextual features of the coverage outlined above would suggest, the resultant 'debate' is largely made up of official voices engaged in a contest with various 'expert' voices (the representative status of the latter vis a vis the public interest is key) over the appropriateness of the respective definitions of the situation. Four primary points of contention are emergent across this the terrain of ideological struggles, each of which will be examined here in turn: first, the real cost of the proposal; second, the manufacture of the nuclear fuel to propel the submarines; third, the nuclearization of the Arctic; and forth, Canada's credibility as a member of 'the community of nations'.

The first point of contention, as noted, concerns the REAL, as opposed to 'officially estimated', financial costs implied by the White Paper proposal to purchase a fleet of nuclear powered submarines. 'Expert' second guessing of official 'facts and figures' are a consistent feature of the news coverage, even in the weeks prior to the tabling of the new policy before Parliament. However, in the autumn of 1987, a series of reports appear which prioritize to a new level the official cost estimates as a point of contention.

A growing number of vague or general references (unattributed) appear citing Cabinet disagreements over the 'heavy price' of the plan, thereby sparking speculation that the proposed fleet is 'sailing into some very rough waters'.

Estimates released by Department of National Defence officials in November of 1987 put the capital costs of the ten to twelve nuclear powered submarines at about \$8 billion; this when nine months earlier the same officials 'costed' the project at \$5 billion. Later that same month, Beatty elects to make a public announcement to the effect that the "Government is not getting cold feet about the high costs of this ambitious defence modernization program" (G&M, 19 November, 1987: A12). The Defence Minister also situates, once again, the Soviet threat as the precursor of legitimate state action, arguing that a refusal to support the 'deployment' of nuclear powered submarines would signify an irresponsible failure to fulfil the state's commitments to its allies. Evidently, it follows that an attempt to disrupt this configuration of the state's normative commitments, even by formulating a counter-argument in the language of 'fiscal responsibility', will first have to insert itself within the topical parameters anchored by the Soviet threat.

A second point of contention, also emergent in the early coverage, concerns conflicting statements regarding the need to acquire 'enriched uranium fuel' to 'propel' the proposed fleet of nuclear submarines. The Defence

Minister's refusal to specify 'where the fuel will come from', insisting only that 'several options are available', opens up a trajectory for much expert speculation about what it is that he 'can't say or won't say' about the matter. Beatty's eventual public declaration that the fuel will be sold to 'us' by 'the country winning the design for the submarine contract' is organized to defer further criticism, presumably until government officials can re-assert control over the topical formation (the authority of Beatty's statement is effectively underscored due to his appearance before a House of Commons committee, where he made this announcement, reportedly accompanied by seven generals and admirals, a lieutenant-colonel, a major, a lieutenant-commander, several captains, deputy ministers and other senior bureaucrats).

Significantly, both the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star* provide coverage to the criticism that because the Canadian government has in the past lectured India and Argentina (as 'non-nuclear nations') for considering the purchase of nuclear-powered warships, it is therefore, in this instance, assuming a 'hypocritical stance'. A related line of critique seeks to highlight the 'fuel controversy' via its possible implications for Canadian compliance with the 'Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty', that forbids the purchase of 'enriched uranium' for 'military purposes'. The final line of opposition focuses on the possibility of a nuclear powered submarine, damaged through a mishap,

accidentally releasing radioactive fuel into its immediate environment. This fear, heightened by a growing number of reports concerning the 'loss' of 'allied' and Soviet nuclear powered submarines, is addressed in the 1988-89 *Defence Update* (see Chapter Five's discussion).

A third point of contention, in part an elaboration of the trajectories mapped via the previous one, is centred by a challenge to the White Paper's strategic rationale on the basis of its apparent advocacy of a 'militarized' Arctic region. Beatty's February 1988 announcement that 'to further assert Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic' the Canadian Forces will seek to locate a permanent military base or 'training centre' at Nanisivk near the Northwest Passage is, once again, mobilized in accordance with the terms set down by the 'recognition of the strategic importance of the North' (G&M, 5 February 1988: A1, A2). The rigidity of this re-articulation is demonstrated by the ease with which officials dismiss a formal offer made by Soviet diplomat to Canada Alexei Makarov (first counselor at the embassy in Ottawa) to discuss "almost any aspect of joint Arctic interests with Canada as a way of accelerating talks that could lead to the demilitarization of the Arctic." Speaking outside of the House of Commons, Beatty insists that the state's outright rejection of the possibility of entering into discussions over Soviet demilitarization proposals rests on the official view that such proposals will continue be 'meaningless' until the Kola

Peninsula in the U.S.S.R. ('an area of concentrated military installations') is first 'demilitarized'. This stance, suggested Makarov, "overlooked the possibility of putting a demilitarized Kola Peninsula on an agenda for later action, once Arctic talks are underway" (G&M, 17 February, 1988: A2). [18]

The fourth, and most pronounced point of contention, concerns the definition of Canada's credibility as a nation: like the signifier *sovereignty* before it, a diverse arrangement of struggles play themselves out over this site. In the first instance, charges are levelled that Canada's credibility has been put 'at risk' by government 'dithering' over the decision to proceed with the program to build the nuclear powered submarine fleet, a claim neatly encapsulated in the hard news report headline: "Submarine stalling may torpedo image" (G&M, 22 February 1989: 23). Here Canada's 'maturity as a nation' is defined as being under threat: in particular, diffused projections of national *self-respect*, *integrity*, *honour*, *principle* and *responsibility* are recurrently privileged in the resultant accounts. Canada, in the language of this discursive logic, must 'grow up'.

18 Similarly, even after the spending cuts introduced by the April 1989 budget, William McKnight, then the new defence minister, is still able to use 'the protection of *sovereignty*' as a legitimizing rationale for government plans to: 'increase Arctic surveillance through over-flights', develop a year-round military training facility at Nanisivik in the High Arctic, and order the production of twelve coastal patrol vessels, six frigates and fifty new helicopters.

'take responsibility for itself', 'show some self-respect as an independent member of the family of nations' and 'cease to think of itself as a dependent colony'. The apparent indecision of state officials as to the future of the plan is condemned for ostensibly prioritizing financial (economic reality), as opposed to 'strategic' (military reality), considerations. Proponents of this stance accorded space in hard news accounts are frequently either aligned with the political Right of the Conservative party, associated with conservative 'think-tanks', or connected with one of the consortiums bidding for defence contracts.

In sharp contrast, credibility is also inflected as a decisive metaphorical construct by the counter-hegemonic or oppositional groups organized to articulate dissent with the preferred definitions of Canadian defence policy. Should state officials implement fully the measures of the White Paper, several of these institutional voices contend, Canada will risk becoming an object of international derision. Here the struggle to justify a rapid expansion of weaponry, particularly the fleet of nuclear powered submarines, is re-inflected as severely compromising the country's 'traditional' credibility vis a vis diplomacy in the area of 'arms control interests', its role in monitoring 'Third World nuclear development' for energy purposes, and its past commitment to the idea of 'peace through collective security' authored by United Nations policy.

Moreover, counter-arguments proceed to mobilize a radicalized logic whereby the proposal is reconfigured as a symbol of a dramatic departure for Canadian policy and practice as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The acquisition of nuclear submarines would violate the spirit, if not the word, of a treaty designed to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. The Canadian state, as an adjunct to U.S. policy, would be drawn along the dangerous path of promoting the 'modernization of nuclear forces' precisely at a time when a 'Soviet threat' is proving increasingly slippery for those trying to pin it down. Credibility, once repositioned in this fashion, underscores the degree to which silences are implicated in the truth-claims of the strategic rationale.

Inflecting Privilege

This section of the case study is organized to provide an overview of the hierarchical dispersal of institutional voices across the discursive terrain (contending institutional voices are ordered in such a way as to propel the narrative forward), as described above, and to document (in general terms) their normative inflection. [19]

19 To clarify, the total word count of each individual news report has been divided by four so as to facilitate the division of each account into quarters. Analysis then proceeds to trace the textual emergence of statements attributed to the various institutional voices (IVs) for each quarter of each respective account for the entire three year monitoring period (this is carried out for both the Globe

Viewing the individual inflections of these IVSSs as a totality over the three year monitoring period, it may be pointed out that the 'positive' share constitutes 54.1 percent of the *Globe and Mail* total, and 60.1 percent of that registered by the *Toronto Star*. IVSSs graded as 'neutral' make up a 31.7 percent and 20.1 percent share, respectively. Finally, the smallest share of the IVSSs in play is composed of those IVSSs identified as 'negative' in their inflection,

and *Mail* and the *Toronto Star* separately so as to allow for a comparative analysis of the IVSSs). Once again, an institutional voice statement (IVS) is deemed to be any discernible statement (often larger than a sentence) linked to a material site or 'news source' that has been, in turn, quoted or paraphrased by the newsworker processing the actual news account.

A series of calculations may be undertaken at this point to ascertain, first, the total number of institutional voice statements (IVSSs) per news account quarter and, second, the precise share of the discursive terrain accorded to each of the IVSs identified as 'helping to tell the story' or propel the news narrative.

Next, this assessment is followed by a consideration of the normative inflection of these institutional voice statements: that is, each IVS is identified as being 'positive', 'neutral' or 'negative' vis a vis the agenda mapped out by the White Paper. An IVS which affirms the strategic rationale as articulated on the pages of this document (allowing for minor modification as the official stance subtly shifts over time) is graded as 'positive'. Those IVS which provide data ostensibly for the purposes of facilitating the newsworker's elucidation of 'the fact at hand', yet which avoid assuming a formal position vis a vis the strategic rationale, are graded as 'neutral'. Finally, the IVSSs which substantively contradict or challenge official reality, whether in terms of a dispute over 'the facts' or their proper interpretation, are graded as 'negative'.

Hence the import for this analysis of Chapter Five's explication of the strategic rationale, as it provides a common basis for judging individual normative inflections as they are actualized in news discourse. The value of this approach to the inflection of IVS in the individual news reports is clearly limited, however, by its capacity to provide only a synchronic 'snapshot' of the news report coverage as a totality.

at 14.2 percent and 19.8 percent. Accordingly, this section's discussion will presently focus on the most pronounced features of the hard news report coverage as disclosed for comparative critique vis a vis each distinct IV and the inflection of its statements.

In addition to the factors outlined above, the remarkable degree of uniformity in the respective coverage of the two dailies may also be read, in part, as the result of a continuing competition between the respective news organizations to 'cover all of the important angles'. Specifically, as described in Chapter Two, there exists an institutional interest amongst news organizations to monitor how 'the competition' is 'telling the story' so as to, in turn, avoid crucial gaps or silences in its own coverage (see Ericson, Baranek, and Chan, 1987; Fishman, 1980; Gans, 1980; Roshco, 1975; and Tuchman, 1978). A second partial explanation for this achievement of similarity may be directly traced to the *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Star*'s shared tendency to 'over access' a highly restricted set of institutional voices as news sources. As described earlier, this 'law of bureaucratic affinity' (Herman, 1989) encourages the mapping of certain types of sources as relevant or credible at the expense of others, the implications of which have been shown to be amenable to concrete investigation.

Therefore, of considerable import for the larger questions posed by this case study is the observation that those IVSS attributed to Conservative Members of Parliament,

when combined with quotations or paraphrased statements from the White Paper itself, easily form the most significant share of the IVSs in play for each quarter in the case of both the *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Star* coverage. As the previous discussion of IVSs in the news leads of the two daily's would indicate, Government MPs recurrently constitute the primary definers or authorize knowers of the 'pertinent facts'. Looking at the news reports as a totality, it is apparent that the discursive priority accorded this IV is particularly visible at the level of the news lead. This prominence is diminished slightly throughout the subsequent quarters of the accounts in terms of its relative share yet, with the one exception of the *Toronto Star*'s fourth quarter, retains its status as the most frequently cited IV.

There is a high degree of correlation between the two daily's normative inflection of the statements made by the Government MPs, with their respective news reports registering a positive inflection at close to a 40 percent share. Significantly, both dailies also record this IV as a source of negative statements, at 11.1 percent share for the *Globe and Mail* and 6.3 percent for the *Toronto Star*. Regarding the White Paper itself, it may be noted that the *Toronto Star* makes much greater use of the text as an IV (it makes up a 11.5 percent share of the first quarter IVSs cited, for example) than does its counterpart (at 4.1 percent for the first quarter). The White Paper IVSs could, by definition,

only be graded as 'positive'; the figure for the *Globe and Mail* is 11.4 percent, and 15.2 percent for the *Toronto Star*.

The IVSs attributed to Department of National Defence officials, on the one hand, and those articulated by Canadian Forces personnel on the other, may here be conflated with little loss of specificity. As noted at an earlier stage of this discussion, these two IVs are self-defined as 'officially neutral' vis a vis government policy, claiming only to be competent to provide 'factual, explanatory information' associated with the various proposals and their implementation. Here it is observed that taken together their IVSs constitute a 19.3 percent share of the discursive terrain delimited by the *Globe and Mail*'s news leads, and a 13.7 percent share of the *Toronto Star*'s. This relative share is maintained with only minor variation throughout the remaining quarters. Perhaps not surprisingly, a premium share of either daily's 'neutral' IVSs are connected with these two IVs: a 31.4 percent share for the former daily and a 25.2 percent share for the latter. However, while less than two percent of the 'negative' inflections in play can be attributed to either IV, both dailies respectively register a combined IVSs share of 'positive' inflections at approximately 20 percent.

The discourses of the 'independent defence analysts' as a discernible IV conform to the criteria of inclusion on a consistent basis by both dailies, registering an approximate share of slightly less than 10.0 percent throughout the four

quarters. The inflection of IVSs attributed to this IV cluster most prominently around the 'negative' end of the normative continuum, registering a 15.7 percent share for the *Globe and Mail*, and a 19.7 percent share for the *Toronto Star*. Foreign officials and military analysts called forth to pronounce judgment on the White Paper and its proposals enjoy a degree of access to the discursive terrain comparable to that provided their Canadian counterparts. In terms of the inflection of the pertinent IVSs, it may be shown that their distribution across the three normative gradings are fairly even, with the exception of the *Globe and Mail*'s 'negative' inflection registering a combined share of 21.3 percent. Returning to indigenous IVs, academic and scientific-technical 'experts' constitute IVs which receive minimal space to articulate their definitions of the situation. Generally claiming less than 5.0 percent of the IVSs in play for any given quarter in either daily, the normative inflection of these respective statements are identified as constituting a 'neutral' configuration.

Turning to the Members of Parliament for the Liberals and New Democrats (the two opposition parties constitute a single IV), it is striking to note that their inflections are denied ascendancy in the first quarter of *Globe and Mail* news reports (registering at less than a 1.0 share). In contrast, the *Toronto Star* provided for those statements attributed to the opposition parties a 7.2 percent share of its news leads. For the *Globe and Mail*, IVSs attributed to

this IV claim their largest share of the discursive terrain in the third quarter at 9.8 percent, in contrast with a 8.5 percent share peak in the fourth quarter for the *Toronto Star*. Less than one percent of the total opposition party IVSSs are identified as constituting a positive inflection for either daily. Indeed, about one quarter of the total IVSSs graded as 'negative' for both dailies over the three year period is attributed to this one IV.

The most consistent trajectory of critique mobilized against the strategic finds its basis in a range of social action and religious groups. Neither the *Globe and Mail* nor the *Toronto Star* privileged in its news reports the IVSSs pertinent to the various social action groups, electing instead to relegate their definitions of the situation to the margins of visibility. In relative terms, the *Toronto Star* accounts provided a higher degree of access, allowing these IVSSs to occupy a 6.5 percent share of the first quarter IVSSs in play (the comparable figure for the *Globe and Mail* is 1.2 percent). All of the IVSSs identified on the pages of the *Globe and Mail* were graded as 'negative' in their inflection (constituting a 10.2 percent share of the total 'negative' inflections for that daily), as were the majority, with only minor exceptions, of those introduced by the *Toronto Star* (15.5 percent of its total share).

Interestingly, the *Toronto Star* made available a portion of its terrain for religious leaders as a distinct IV, although at no time greater than a 1.7 percent share, while the *Globe*

and Mail delimited access to this IV to less than 1.0 percent for any given quarter. For the former daily, this IV projected 6.3 percent share of the total 'negative' normative inflections identified in its news reports.

Of Fact and Opinion

This section turns to prioritize for purposes of critique the most prominent networks of explanation mobilized via two distinct genre of news item over the three year monitoring period: feature articles and 'letters to the editor'. Feature articles are here recognized as a form of account which is discursively organized to offer to the (implied) reader the 'underlying causes' or 'deeper explanations' which the practical constraints of newswork would, in most instances, otherwise deny hard news reports. Moreover, the ideological field appears wider, less structured by the formal (routinized) strategies of facticity brought to bear elsewhere in the newspaper. All too often 'letters to the editor' are passed over in analyses of press coverage, even though a careful examination of them can inform a more critical understanding of a given newspaper's editorial voice and public idiom. Here an attempt will be made to trace the echoes of the larger 'debate' over 'the facts at hand' across the terrain of these pages reserved for 'opinion'.

Beginning with the 34 feature articles published over the monitoring period, 26 of which appeared in the *Globe and Mail* and 8 in the *Toronto Star*, it may be shown by grading their normative inflection that an attempt to achieve 'balance' has been undertaken. In the case of the *Globe and Mail*, feature articles written to underscore the legitimacy claims of the news policy proposals are authored by a variety of 'experts'. [20] The privileged status of these writers, in large part due to their implied expertise and/or proximity to key 'decision makers' equipped with the 'proper facts of the situation', affords them the means to articu-

20 In addition to the Defence Minister himself, contributions graded as 'positive' in their normative inflection vis a vis *Challenge and Commitment* are made by: an editor of *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, a secretary-treasurer of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, a visiting professor of military and strategic studies at Acadia University, a nuclear scientist with the Department of Defence, a political science professor at the University of Toronto, a Florida Democrat Congressman (and chair of the Seapower Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee), a professor of political studies at Queen's University, a retired Vice-Admiral (former vice chief of the defence staff), a Canadian Armed Forces Commander, a chief of submarine acquisition for the Canadian Armed Forces, a history professor and assistant at Wilfred Laurier University, and, finally, a director of a strategic studies program at the University of Calgary. Two feature articles are published by the *Globe and Mail* that may be graded as 'neutral' in their normative inflection, both authored by free-lance journalists, one specializing in international affairs, the other in defence technology.

Turning to the *Toronto Star* feature articles, only one item, authored by a historian at the University of Toronto, may be graded as possessing a 'positive' normative inflection vis a vis the White Paper. 'Neutral' articles were prepared for the *Toronto Star* by an executive director and research assistant at the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, an executive director of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, and a free-lance features correspondent.

late a formal attempt to deny ascendancy to alternative normative explanations.

This examination would suggest that these officials likely recognize that a precondition for the news frame, with its hierarchical dispersal of institutional voices, is the formal inflection of 'the real facts' to be appropriated in the first place. The importance of mobilizing the definitions authorized by the White Paper thus becomes paramount, as in this way these experts are able to mark-out the 'larger picture' within which specific proposals are to be contextualized. The impossibility of discursive closure ever being achieved 'once and for all' dictates that for the official recasting of reality to be sustained, it needs to be regarded as consonant with the dominant signifiers in play.

If, by definition, all aspects of the social world are amenable to processing by the news frame, these experts have before them the task of setting limits on the dynamics of 'what can be said and by whom'. Consequently, to influence the means by which newswriters process conflicting accounts of the truthfulness of the state's preferred claims, these feature articles work to establish a set of rules by which these differing accounts are to be read. Presumably, then, it is at least in part with this specific aim in mind that these individuals look to enter directly into the terrain of debate by preparing such texts (as well as letters to the editor). Thus as opposed to suppressing the logics of

certain voices, these experts as arbiters re-write contending claims, re-inserting or re-aligning them with the dictates of the sanctioned (yet unspoken) Other of official discourse.

Both the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star* published a wide range of feature articles which advanced counter-arguments that, in turn, sought in varying degrees to redefine the ideological terrain across which the state re-articulates its strategic rationale. Often these articles challenged the strategic rationale's re-articulation of 'national security' as achievable through the acquisition of 'military hardware', criticized the notion that the state can afford nuclear powered submarines when social programs are encountering severe budget restraints, or pointed to the risk these submarines would pose for the Arctic's fragile ecological system. [21] Only a minor portion of these

21 *Globe and Mail* feature articles graded as 'negative' in their normative inflection vis a vis the strategic rationale are authored by a research associate and assistant at the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, a former (Liberal Party) Minister of National Defence, a news editor at the Centre for Investigative Reporting in San Francisco, a director of the National Security Program at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington together with a disarmament co-ordinator for Greenpeace Canada, a retired major-general of the National Defence College at Kingston, a chairperson of the Canadian Pugwash Group, an executive director, together with a senior research associate, for the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, a disarmament co-ordinator for Greenpeace, a Toronto writer with a special interest in military and technological affairs, a professor of political science at York University, and, a president of Operation Dismantle together with a researcher with the Foundation for Global Peace. For the *Toronto Star*, feature articles graded as indicative of a 'negative' normative inflection were attributed to a retired major-general and former commandant of the National Defence College at Kingston

'negative' feature articles point to the news values enmeshed in the 'debate's' initial production and subsequent processing in the daily press, and in those instances where such a critique is made, it is with reference to blaming the medium for a 'lack of public debate'. Interestingly, if these 'negative' feature articles typify the two dailies' willingness to allow for some forms of institutionalized dissent to be heard on their pages, the mere presence of these articles also contributes to the naturalization of the prevailing hierarchies of knowledge found in the hard news coverage. That is, the formalized transition from objectified facts (above dispute) to personal opinion (an individual's subjective interpretation of these hard facts) is reified here in terms of a genre distinction.

The strategies of facticity immanent at the level of the hard news accounts echo throughout the feature articles, primarily with the effect of setting the parameters within which dissenting views may be legitimately marginalized by virtue of their defiance of the larger claims to authority constitutive of what is known to be true. Thus through the very inclusion of feature articles, whether 'positive', 'neutra' or 'negative', the projection of the respective newspaper as a fair and balanced totality is itself

(also cited above for the *Globe and Mail*), a chairperson of the Council of Canadians, a research co-ordinator for Project Ploughshares, and a professor of political science at York University (also cited by the *Globe and Mail*).

reinforced, while the preferred news framing and evaluative devices escape sustained critique.

While a more detailed study of the letter to the editor columns in the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star* would be required to specify precisely the inflection of either newspaper's editorial voice on the content of these pages, a brief review of those letters directed to one or more aspects of the White Paper as they appeared in the two dailies offers some important, if still tentative, insights into the problem of definitional labour. The criteria by which the selection process determines which letters will be published (for both newspapers the number would constitute a mere fraction of those letters received) is, of course, not stated explicitly.

Nevertheless, for any such entry into the public arena to be accepted as legitimate or fair comment, it will need to fulfil certain formal requirements (such as style, length, or mode of address) while, in most cases, positioning itself vis a vis a particular reference to an account or editorial published previously. In this way a tightly structured process of inclusion is invoked which generally ensures (there are exceptions) that the resulting dialogue is likely to take place on those terms established by the respective daily's predominant news frame.

Over the three year monitoring period, 45 pertinent letters to the editor were identified, 23 of which appeared in the *Globe and Mail*, and 22 in the *Toronto Star* (the

similarity of these figures is itself surprising).

Regarding topical focus, the majority of these letters either spoke directly to the appropriateness of the White Paper as a policy statement vis a vis some variant of the cost dynamic (12 and 7 respectively), or to the state's proposed acquisition of a fleet of nuclear powered submarines in terms of their situation vis a vis the cost-capacity dynamic (10 and 12 respectively). This convergence between what the newswriters defined as being 'at issue' with what most letters are formulated in response to is striking; it suggests a high degree of success has been achieved by both newspapers in translating 'the world out there' into a preferred hierarchy of ways to know which, in turn, partially reproduced a popular agenda of 'what matters most'. This process is accentuated further by publishing letters from ordinary readers (names listed without an institutional affiliation) beside those of the experts. [22]

22 Specifically, *Globe and Mail* letters graded as 'positive' with respect to their normative inflection are attributed to: two private citizens, as well as an Executive Director of the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, a former (retired) Commander of Maritime Command, a (retired) Major-General, a Government MP and Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, a Government MP and Chairperson of the Standing Committee on National Defence, and a President of the Canadian Maritime Industries Association. Two 'Neutral' letters were written, one by a private citizen, the other by a Chairperson of the Nova Scotia Defence Association.

This clearly disproportionate number of 'positive' and 'neutral' letters being written by individuals with an institutional affiliation is here reversed in the case of 'negative' letters, nine of which were written by private citizens, and the remaining ones by: a Co-ordinator of the Toronto Disarmament Network, a member of Project Ploughshares, a (Retired) Major of the British Army and mem-

Clearly there are sufficient grounds to suggest that this expert-ordinary citizen forum is hierarchically structured in favour of primary definers, particularly those whose discourse will reaffirm the prevailing features of the hard news frame as appropriate. Moreover, it may be argued that the appropriation of ordinary voices allows for the 'fixing' of the implicit notion that the pages of the two dailies are 'open' to anyone willing to participate in pluralistic debate. The definitional labour of the *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Star* thus appears to have come full circle, as the articulation of what is 'at issue' in the White Paper has been processed reciprocally within the terms of a discursive framework effectively secured within the 'larger consensus out there'.

Words at War

ber of Veterans Against Nuclear Arms, and an Executive Member of the Winnipeg Co-ordinating Committee for Disarmament.

A similar pattern emerges vis a vis the *Toronto Star's* published letters to the editor. Of the six letters inflected as 'positive', three are written by private citizens, two by the Minister of Defence, and one by a Government MP and Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence. Three letters are graded as 'neutral', one authored by a private citizen, and the other two by, first, a General and Chief of the Defence Staff at National Defence Headquarters, and second, a Brigadier-General and Director-General of Information for National Defence. Finally, of the thirteen letters with a 'negative' inflection, twelve of them were submitted by private citizens, the other one by an associate of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament.

"The parameters of the White Paper are nevertheless maintained", insists the new Minister of Defence, William McKnight, after cabinet colleague Michael Wilson's April 1989 federal budget cuts clearly 'to the heart' of Department of National Defence's policy agenda. The Conservative party, having won a second mandate on the strength of their perceived economic competence in light of the 'Free Trade' negotiations, vehemently denies that the policy document has been abandoned by the government. Some journalists, having previously conjectured that the removal of Beatty from the defence portfolio in January 1989 was a signal of change underway, appear to have been proven correct. The continual delays in the government's announcement of the contract to build the nuclear powered submarines had raised similar speculations. In any case, a flurry of last minute cost-cutting ends with: the postponement of the nuclear submarine program for at least fifteen years (raising the possibility that 'conventional' ones were still 'viable'); defence spending cuts to total \$2.74 billion over the next five years; the elimination of 3,200 uniformed and civilian personnel positions, the closing or reduction of fourteen Canadian Air Force bases; the cancellation of plans for new CF-18 Hornet Fighter-Intercept aircraft; and a temporary hold on the \$2 billion project to acquire new armoured tanks, amongst other items.

Regarding the defence of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic 'under the ice', it is announced that this 'task'

will temporarily be left to the nuclear powered submarines of the United States and British navies respectively. Despite the drastic expenditure cuts, however, an outline of estimated defence spending tabled earlier that month by the Government had insisted that the White Paper "remains an accurate statement of Canadian defence policy and the objective which the government intends to pursue" (TS, 30 April 1989: A1). Hence much public debate centres on whether or not the government's retreat from the substantive elements of the White Paper demarcates a definitive end to Canada's participation in the Cold War.

If details of the precise decision making process in this instance continue to be elusive, it is clear that proponents of the White Paper program within the government had found themselves defending massive expenditures when, at the same time, procedures were underway to convince the general public that large cuts in unemployment insurance, day care and other social programs were in the national interest. As budget day neared, the plan risked becoming an awkward symbol of spending priorities gone seriously awry and, as such, was finally recognized as a political liability which threatened to unravel completely the already rapidly fraying threads of official denunciatory rhetoric. Interestingly, credit for successfully re-directing popular definitions of Canada's security needs was quickly claimed by all sides concerned. In the discourses of the political Right, a prevailing thematic was mobilized around the claim: 'If the

Cold War is over, it's because we have won it'. No apologies were to be offered for the harsh anti-Soviet stance advocated by the White Paper: rather, it was to be credited with accelerating the Soviet Union's disavowal of 'adventurist' politics by signalling that Canada was prepared to undertake a massive re-equipping of its armed forces.

Alternatively, a view forwarded by peace activists, and one in turn echoed by some military commanders, held that the broad coalition of peace groups had won 'the battle for the hearts and minds of Canadians'. The very limited extent to which the peace movement's agenda was realized through the daily press has been described here, yet in the aftermath of the federal budget, it was the role of favourable television coverage that was commonly cited as the key factor in getting the anti-nuclearist message across to the public (an assertion which indicates that a comparative study with this one would most certainly be worthwhile).

A full summation of the case study, in conceptual terms, will be provided in the next chapter. Here it may be stated that this portion of the investigation attempted to document how, over a three year monitoring period, the official definition of the situation was prioritized and, in most instances, allowed to command the discursive field in the news and editorial coverage. The respective 'debates' manufactured by the *Globe and Mail* and the *Toronto Star* were largely respectful of the constraints of appropriateness

constitutive of the legitimate agenda. The configuration of a 'commitment-capability gap' as an exigency requiring immediate action was ostensibly placed above debate. Officials enjoyed considerable success in winning consent across this field of contestation for their preferred definitions, premises and terms of reference, primarily because both the *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Star* news and editorial accounts consistently spoke the issue-field in the language of power. That is, while the news and editorial narratives implicitly claimed to offer the (implied) reader a contest of interpretations, their coherence and plausibility was largely contingent upon the reader answering the interpellative appeals of the strategic rationale in the affirmative.

Openings for institutional voices calling for modifications of the government agenda were at best limited, but did appear with greater frequency as the theme of 'fiscal responsibility' gained prominence as an articulatory principle of the news frame. In contrast, voices organized to re-articulate an oppositional stance to the basic tenets of the strategic rationale, and in this way mobilize public opinion towards a fundamental reassessment of the direction of Canadian defence policy in general, were consistently delimited to the last quarter of hard news accounts or, more likely, the occasional feature article or letter to the editor. Almost entirely absent from the 'debate' constructed in the daily press coverage were voices capable of

providing a principled critique of a national defence policy that ultimately relies on the pernicious logics of 'nuclear deterrence' to achieve its 'goals'. In the rare instance that such voices were accessed, they were systematically forced to speak safely within the parameters defined, in large part, by the words of state officials.

This section of the case study has thus sought to offer some insight into the means by which counter-hegemonic knowledges are denied ascendancy into 'official' knowledge. In attempting to identify as a site of struggle the presuppositions too obvious to be spoken upon which authoritative discourses have come to depend, the very multiplicity of the discourses at play in news text (as well as the conditions of their hierarchical will to 'newsworthiness') was problematized in terms of the *naturalness* of their alignment with the real or factual. Furthermore, the textual indicators of the operational rules and codes of newsgathering as routinized work were examined, including the attendant reliance on the 'official sources' and 'expert opinions' situated within bureaucratic support systems, in relation to a preferred set of discursive practices organized to produce *balanced, professional* accounts.

To close, then, Canadian state officials, confronted by the 'fiscal reality of a country burdened by a massive deficit', shelved the spending priorities advocated by *Challenge and Commitment*. Still, in January of 1990, the federal Cabinet is still adamant that, even if a 'post-Cold

War era' has begun, *Challenge and Commitment* remains the official 'blue-print' for future government policy. The ideological effectivity of the strategic rationale, while partially compromised 'by recent events in the Soviet Union', is able to retain its primary articulatory principles intact.

CHAPTER SEVEN: PROHIBITING CLOSURE

Introduction to Chapter Seven

Despite the thawing of the pernicious binarisms of the Cold War, thousands of nuclear weapons around the globe remain poised, on a 'high state of alert', to be 'delivered' at any moment. Today, there is remarkably little evidence that Canadian officials, despite the recent series of announcements detailing spending reductions for the Canadian Forces, are actively engaged in the work of re-thinking the state's formal reliance on the entangled logics of nuclearism in the name of 'national security'. Rather, it would appear to be the case that many of these officials are content to grapple with the contradictory task of reassuring the governments of the Soviet Union that a nuclear NATO poses no military threat to them while, at the same time, insisting that the Canadian public understand that maintaining alliance forces has never been more vital to the security of the West. Government ministers, together with defence officials, have ostensibly watched from the sidelines of 'NATO talks' as the strategic modernization of nuclear weapon systems continues virtually unabated, at least 'in the short term'. This when a growing number of 'arms experts', pointing to the reduced probability of a deliberate nuclear exchange, are now focusing their

attention on the enhanced possibility of 'accidents' (or 'points of escalation') that could lead to inadvertent war. [1]

The precarious nature of the nuclear states' control over their 'nuclear arsenal' was underscored during the aborted coup d'etat in the Soviet Union in August of this year. For several days it was unclear precisely which individuals in that country possessed the 'keys' (the codes and communications equipment) designed to 'launch' the U.S.S.R.'s 'nuclear forces'. Much was made in the daily press of the revelation that Defence Minister Dimitry Yazov was one of the plotters and that Mikhail Gorbachev's 'key' had reportedly been seized at the time of his incarceration in the Crimean. Moreover, in the course of the days immediately following the August events, as the Soviet Union's dissolution into a confederation of semi-independent states triggered a new series of imperative issues, questions immediately arose concerning the intercontinental ballistic missiles reportedly located inside the borders of Russia, the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan. News commentators

1 Moreover, an increasing number of news reports are appearing which indicate 'official concern' over the serious threat to public health posed by the deterioration of nuclear weapon producing facilities, particularly in the United States. There a considerable number of 'safety scandals' have now come to light as several of the related production plants are being shut down. Officials are thus repeatedly being forced to confront difficult questions regarding the nuclear weapons complex's legacy of environmental devastation and the costs (some estimates calculate a figure greater than \$100 billion) likely to be involved in the 'clean up' strategies.

continue to speculate as to the specific whereabouts of the mobile, short-range nuclear and non-nuclear weapons (so-called 'battlefield weapons') recently withdrawn from Eastern Europe, pointing to a wide number of possible sites throughout several republics.

The collapse of the 'Warsaw Pact' has served to problematize arguments for maintaining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in its current form, if at all. United States government officials have publicly stressed the import, from their point of view, of retaining a strong 'European pillar' in the organization while, at the same time, proceeding with a further reduction of that country's contingent of 305,000 troops in Europe. There would appear to be an emergent consensus amongst the representatives of the member countries of the European Economic Community currently engaged in the ongoing debate about defence that the policies of the NATO better reflect the dramatic decline in 'East-West tensions'. Plans are being formalized in order to propose that the nature of the alliance be recast so as to shift its reliance away from present arrangements and on to smaller, more mobile, multinational forces. The creation of a 'rapid reaction corps', as it has been described by state officials, is an initiative which is contingent, in part, upon the successful naturalization of a discursive re-articulation whereby the signifier 'instability' takes the place of 'the Soviet threat'.

This type of development would be, as one commentator writes, 'music to Canadian military ears' (G&M, 15 August 1991: A5). It is significant that, despite this profound implosion of the 'Warsaw Pact's' status as a military alliance, Canadian state officials have not joined their European counterparts' demands for a re-evaluation of 'the U.S. role in Europe'. Presumably, the absence of a 'target' will dictate that the 'NATO alliance' itself be modified accordingly, thereby prompting the question of whether these countries will, in turn, insist that the NATO cease to be kept under U.S. control. President George Bush's proposal to simply amend NATO's strategic doctrine of 'flexible response' such that nuclear weapons would be considered 'arms of last resort' (and thereby preserve NATO's 'first strike capability') is cold comfort for those leaders looking to send a genuine signal to Soviet leaders that the NATO's 'strategic thinking' is developing along more progressive lines.

An important symbol of change in 'East-West relations' is the recent signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (or 'START') agreement by government leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union. The principal achievement of this treaty, long delayed due to, amongst other factors, U.S. insistence that the 'Strategic Defence Initiative' remain 'off the table', is that approximately 7,000 nuclear warheads will be destroyed. Specifically, under the treaty's provisions (the subject of over nine years of

negotiation beginning in Geneva in 1982), the 'nuclear stockpile' of the U.S. will be reduced to 9,000 nuclear warheads from about 12,000, while that of the Soviet Union will drop to 7,000 warheads from an estimated 11,000. While a complex series of technical issues remain to be resolved, including procedures to limit new weapon development and the use of counting rules (critics charge that the real number of weapons to be retired is being concealed), significant progress would appear to have been made regarding the framework this treaty provides for verifying compliance. Reportedly, this includes placing 'satellite-readable tags' on 'mobile nuclear and non-nuclear missiles', an increase in the number of 'on-site visits', and an agreement not to encode the radio signals between nuclear missiles and ground controllers (G&M, 18 July, 1991: A7; 31 July 1991: A7; 31 July 1991: A7).

President Gorbachev and his senior military leaders have made it clear to observers that the Soviet commitment to the 'Strategic Arms Reduction Talks' treaty is, in principle, conditional on the continued application of the Anti-Ballistic Missile ('ABM') treaty. However, the Bush administration, in direct violation of the spirit of this latter treaty, has recently announced its decision to put forward a new early deployment plan, called *Global Protection Against Limited Strikes* ('GPALS'), with its \$5.2 billion 1992 Strategic Defence Initiative budget request. The proposed plan calls for the production of approximately

1,000 space-based 'brilliant pebble' interceptors, in addition to 750 land-based interceptors, as the cornerstone of a 'viable space defence'. A House-Senate conference committee is currently debating the component elements of this proposal, while President Bush has threatened to employ his power of veto if he is dissatisfied with the eventual outcome.

Of further concern is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, a multilateral treaty signed by over 140 national governments which aims to control the spread of nuclear weapons, which is set to expire in 1995. As talks continue regarding its renewal, the French government has recently announced that it will now sign the treaty, thereby leaving China to stand as the only major nuclear state that has yet to agree to the terms this treaty specifies. The government of South Africa, a country which like Israel, India, and Pakistan is widely believed to possess the means to assemble nuclear weapons, has been accepted as its newest signatory. Under the terms of the treaty, a country's 'nuclear sites' are open for inspection by independent observers, thereby making it much more difficult for weapon development (and its 'transfer' to 'non-nuclear weapons states') to be kept secret. Recent news reports hold that the North Korean government has now acquired the material and technology to produce a small 'nuclear device', yet has so far rebuffed efforts made by the International Atomic Energy Agency to investigate its nuclear facilities (this

despite signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985). North Korean government officials claim that inspections at nuclear facilities will not be permitted so long as that country continues to face a threat from U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea. North Korea has thus recently joined a group of countries, namely India, Pakistan, Israel, Argentina, and Brazil, which refuse to fully accede to the terms of the accord.

It is becoming increasingly apparent that the 'end of the Cold War' has yet to yield the 'peace dividend' many news commentators have been expecting. Public opinion polls conducted across Canada continue to show popular support for cuts in defence spending, and that the appeal of a potential 'peace dividend' is widespread. Canadian government officials, like those of most other 'developed' nations, are in the process of implementing substantive reductions to the resources allocated to the defence budget. Still, until they are willing to concede that the logics underpinning their construction of 'nuclear deterrence' as a strategy of 'national security' have been compromised, it would appear to be unlikely that fundamental changes to the military infrastructure will be undertaken in the near future. Instead, state officials are routinely being quoted in news accounts on the subject of 'pulling back' from international commitments and, at a more abstract level, of the need to close domestic bases.

More specifically, Defence Minister Marcel Masse, acknowledging the 'easing of Cold War tensions', announced on 17 May 1991 that his department would be, first, cancelling almost \$900 million in military acquisitions and, second, eliminating nearly 1,000 jobs at defence headquarters in Ottawa (approximately 12 percent of the 8,300 civilian and military jobs located at that office). As the largest 'landlord' in Canada, the Department of National Defence reportedly owns more than 33,000 buildings (containing a total of approximately 11.5 million square metres of space), many of which are in need of substantive repairs (G&M, 20 July 1991: A4; Newman, 1991: 46). Masse, having only been appointed to the portfolio in the previous month, declared that this decision had been made in accordance with both the changing realities of global political reforms as well as the need to undertake federal government spending cuts. [2]

Regarding the maintenance of Canadian troops in Europe, several commentators in the daily press cite persistent rumours of a division between Department of National Defence

2 Indeed, shortly after Masse had assumed office and prior to this announcement, Vice-Admiral Charles Thomas, deputy commander of the Canadian Forces, had resigned in protest of government plans to reduce spending without, in his view, any reference to military priorities or any overall strategy. A number of daily press reports at that time made reference to impending cuts designed to decrease the size of the Canadian Forces from 87,000 people to 70,000. Base closings, first announced in the 1989 federal budget, had been scheduled to take place in London, Portage La Prairie and Summerside by the close of 1992.

officials, who would eliminate this commitment in favour of spending the then available resources on modernizing equipment, and officials from the Department of External Affairs, who insist that the troops must be kept in place in order to ensure that there is a Canadian voice in negotiations on disarmament and the military future of that region.

Official estimates quoted in the daily press indicate that the cost to keep 7,051 troops in Europe (a reduction of 1,400 from 1990) will account for \$1.2 billion or 9.3 percent of the 1991-92 defence budget. Approximately 1,400 service personnel are slated to return to Canada from Europe in 1991, and officials have hinted that a further cut, roughly equal to 20 percent, will occur next year.

Also in May 1991, Masse, in his first visit to Canadian Forces bases in Larh and Baden, Germany, stated that he is confident that Canada's 'NATO partners' will approve of a partial or total closing of these two military bases, should the government undertake such an action. In his words; "We don't have to get permission from anybody. It's not done in isolation, but at the end of the process as it's a decision of the Canadian cabinet" (Masse cited in G&M, 31 May 1991: A10). The following month, Prime Minister Mulroney also elected to speak to this issue while visiting Germany, declaring that: "Canadian forces will remain as long as there is a residual threat to European and Canadian security here, and as long as Canadian are needed and welcome" (Mulroney cited in G&M, 17 June 1991: A18). Perhaps more

telling are the words of Colonel Luc Bujold, chief of staff of Canadian Forces Europe: "The other side has self-destructed with a bang. We don't have a Warsaw Pact any more. [Still, there is] no doubt in my mind that we can devise a role, [although] it will probably not entail holding ground and probably not require a mechanized brigade" (Bujold cited in G&M, 15 August 1991: A1).

Prime Minister Mulroney has recently stated that a new defence policy can be expected by the end of September 1991. Mulroney, along with various defence and government officials, has suggested that the new plan will speak to 'the diminished Soviet threat' in the 'post-Cold War era'. The new policy, which received final approval from the inner cabinet on 12 September, reportedly will not signal dramatic changes for the Canadian Forces. Rather, it has been described as containing relatively modest adjustments to personnel and capital programs, including the creation of an independent task force to study the question of how best to proceed with the closing of a number of domestic bases (and thereby allow the government to postpone making potentially controversial decisions about which bases are 'surplus' prior to the next federal election). There is no reason to suggest that, with the advent of the 'end of the Cold War', government officials have ceased 'playing politics' with national defence.

Nuclearism, the Strategic Rationale, and the Daily Press

Chapter Five, the first part of the case study, sought to problematize for inquiry the rich, if inchoate ideological relations across which the strategic rationale re-articulates common sense discourses of nuclearism. This work was undertaken, in part, by discerning a certain regularity in the dispersion of mechanisms through which official modes of knowing struggle to construct 'the government' as a singular voice that speaks of, for, and to 'the people' when intervening in the defence issue-field. It was shown that at stake is the constant renewal of the authority of the official voice as functioning within the consensus, the product of a complex set of interpellative strategies mobilized to avert or hold off real and potential 'legitimation deficits' (Habermas, 1973).

This first portion of the case study thus sought to suggest through example that three official texts, namely *Defence in the 70s, Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada*, and the 1988-89 *Defence Update*, can be read as individual attempts to elaborate a normative vocabulary to speak the 'strategic environment'. Each document was shown to be organized so as to repair the various emergent cracks and fissures compromising previously deployed official definitions. Crucial to this complex process, it was argued, is the act of explaining the precise nature of the (transitory) crises engendered by these exigencies. Official discourses on 'defence' were found to be con-

strained by a fluid arrangement of logics which dictate that only those problems which can be described in the language of policy reform can be safely acknowledged. To succeed in this discursive task, then, state power has to be constantly brought to bear so as to project a proper (realist) network of assumptions for the Canadian public.

Moreover, it was shown that official discourse, when making its most direct appeals to popular common sense, frequently elects to configure its preferred definitions in a variant of everyday language. It systematically seizes hold of the very ordinariness of public discourse and re-articulates it in relation to the authorized projection of a sequential logic immanent at the level of the strategic rationale. Nevertheless, to enhance the probability that this re-articulation is achieved (once again, marked by ongoing resolution and resistance), it is crucial that the intended audience find in official discourse a reaffirmation of the 'popular consensus'. Thus the criteria of inclusion/exclusion were shown to be held in ideological suspension between, first, the dictates of authorized knowledge and modes of argument, and second, the normative constraints of existing public conceptions as embedded within language use. To succeed in bringing about a re-alignment of the latter so as to allow for the purposeful advancement of the former, it was argued, state power must naturalize the arbitrariness of its common sense.

Chapter Six, the second part of the case study, sought to address concretely (and not simply assert) how it is that the limits of nuclearism are first demarcated and then reinforced by a network of various codes or prohibitive rules operating in contradictory alignment. Accordingly, a strong emphasis was placed on the functionality of the daily press as an ideological formation (Pêcheux, 1982), and thus a site of struggle and contestation. Here the conflict over naming, classifying and defining was regarded as being inextricably linked to the dehistoricization of social divisions and hierarchies. The very multiplicity of institutional voices and how they are interwoven into factual explanations of the imperatives of Canadian defence policy were researched so as to allow for the rules of 'what can and should be said' (Pêcheux, 1982) to come to the fore.

Thus in endeavouring to centre for analysis the conditions of existence and possibility of institutional voices as they traverse the field of the daily press, attention turned to the openings, gaps, and closures emergent within news discourse and their re-structuration vis à vis the unauthorized Others which compromise its efficacy. It was shown that news, when theorized as discourse, facilitates a consideration of the arrangement of these prohibitions as they are implicated in official speech without, at the same time, denying ideological slippage: that is, this approach provides for the discernment of cracks in the otherwise opaque truth-claims of official pronouncements.

Consequently, to distinguish the conventionalized logics of news discourse as it speaks the reality of *Canadian security in the nuclear age*, the shifting limits demarcating the plurality of determinate meanings in play across the field of the daily press had to be highlighted. Here it was argued that it is within this re-articulation of social knowledges that constructions of various discursive Others are inscribed as a contradictory accomplishment. Thus the inscription of the Soviet threat in a 'web of facticity' could be identified in relation to the mechanisms by which that projected positionality (this is how the threat is to be appropriated; this is how the threat is to be resisted) is re-constituted as a negotiational effect of the actual news account itself. That is, while an attempt was made to illustrate how newswriters inflected statements made by institutional voices in a hierarchical fashion, at no time was it suggested that only a single 'reading' of the resultant account would be possible. Rather, the intent was to accentuate the basis for the inter-textuality of interpellative outcomes such that certain features of the preferred limits within which proper sense can be made of the Soviet threat are disclosed.

A politics of truth was clearly emergent in the types of routine, professional judgments being made by *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Star* newswriters engaged in the work of reporting on the White Paper as a news story. This investigation has demonstrated that the ideological effectivity of

nuclear discourse facilitated the newsworker's task of sorting through a myriad of possible institutional voices in a variety of ways, particularly to the extent that nuclearism contributes to the naturalization of specific (unspoken) criteria of authoritativeness or credibility. As has been shown, embedded in the news frames under discussion here are a range of assumptions regarding topicality which lend themselves to the construction of a certain narrative linearity. For a speaker to 'fit' within these discursive constraints, he or she needs to address the proper subjects using an appropriate conceptual vocabulary and mode of argument.

Indeed, it was in accordance with this aim that a further effort was made to show how the processes in and through which news discourse incorporates certain types of truth-claims and excludes others as illegitimate or irrelevant are conditioned not only by a dispersal of authorized knowers (those in command of the facts) but also, in perhaps a more subtle way, by the active need to counter the implicit threat that the real facts are not knowable. That is, in constructing the preferred logics of plausibility for the finished item, *Globe and Mail* and *Toronto Star* newsworkers consistently over-ruled the imputation that this arrangement of facts is not arbitrary, not the natural outcome of (neutral) accounting procedures. The ideal knowing subject for news discourse, as implicitly configured in the public idiom of the respective dailies, accepts this authorization of reality as a correct, or at least plausible

one. Still, the text itself must also be organized to confront the accusation that its meaning is not obvious to all. This attempt to identify the very procedures through which textual openings and closures were re-articulated through news texts thus provided useful insights into the degree to which the preferred inflections of various institutional voices were subjected to modification in the perpetual struggle to organize a public consensus around 'the new strategic reality'.

Similarly, it was argued that the ostensibly seamless weaving together of fragmented definitions into a news narrative necessarily had to deny the restrictions such a narrative poses for fragments that do not 'fit', those that do not meet the criteria of inclusion in the news frame because their words contradict the pre-givens or the taken-for-grantedness of 'the story'. Discursive conflict, a principle component of routine notions of 'news values', did not ensure that equal prominence was given to the 'other side of the White Paper story'. Rather, the systematic over-accessing of official institutional voices as primary definers or authorized knowers, as documented in the case study, illustrates how the defence issue-field was successfully depoliticized to a considerable extent. It was shown that the official formulation of a 'commitment-capability gap', as configured on the pages of *Challenge and Commitment* as a normative framework consonant with the strategic

rationale, proved capable of ex-nominating a range of potential points of antagonism.

Moreover, this over-accessing of official voices positioned within the hegemonic limits of authority, when compounded by a definition of politics whereby M.P.s from the other political parties form 'the opposition' or 'the other side to the story', led to a severe curtailment of alternative voices. Liberal and New Democratic Party voices, while critical of the state's policy intervention, largely limited their respective counter-arguments to matters of how best to reduce the 'commitment-capability gap'. The defence critics for the two parties, ostensibly working on the assumption that taking a counter-position on 'Canada's participation in NATO', or 'nuclear deterrence', would not lead to a partisan advantage vis a vis the opinion polls, instead struggled to sound more 'fiscally responsible' than the other. Regarding the effectivity of other institutional voices seeking to articulate dissent, such as various 'independent defence analysts', social action groups, and religious leaders, it was shown that their definitions were systematically marginalized. It was recurrently the case that when they did find space on the pages of the dailies, their speech was strictly demarcated within the ideological limits of the strategic rationale. Thus while the rules of exclusion or prohibition constitutive of a common sense of nuclearism have not been anchored once and for all, this inquiry into the multiplicity of

disjunctions indicative of news discourse illustrates how severely this terrain is regulated by official regimes of truth.

Re-writing Cold War Certainties

As 'strategic experts' commence with the search for a new 'security paradigm' for 'the post-Cold War era', one through which 'foreign policy objectives' can be 'filtered', now is the moment counter-hegemonic voices must seize to demand a fundamental rethinking of a 'national security strategy' which relies, in the last instance, on 'nuclear deterrence'. As old Cold War certainties are being re-written with astonishing speed, informed public discussion must be sustained across the field of the news media in such a way as to foster a dialogue where, in the past, there have too often been only official soliloquies. Newswriters, presented with this ongoing contest over interpretive frameworks, need to act to ensure that genuine debate over the future directions of foreign policy is re-articulated.

This case study has sought to provide a range of insights into how the newsworthiness of the 'nuclear threat' is negotiated in highly complex ways. The release of *Challenge and Commitment* provided newswriters with an abundance of 'news pegs' which could potentially have been elaborated in such a way as to 'make real' the changing nature of this menace. And yet they chose not to pursue

this line of investigation. As Rubin and Cummings (1989) contend, given that the threat of nuclear war serves as 'a *cantus firmus* to modern life', an argument could be made that the news media should carry reports about it on a daily basis. However, they maintain that due to 'the event-pegged nature' of modern reporting strategies, "it is unreasonable, and experientially futile, to expect such constant attention when, in journalistic terms, nothing new is 'happening'" (1989: 40). That is, in light of the professional 'taboo' against reporting 'repetitive news stories', "the constant iteration of the horror of nuclear war and the production of nuclear weapons is not likely to interest or mobilize the public in the absence of clear, practical, uncomplicated actions that could be pursued to reduce the threat" (1989: 40-41). A number of hypotheses are advanced by Rubin and Cummings as possible explanations of precisely why this appears to be the case (their emphasis is on television network journalism), four of which are particularly relevant here.

First, Rubin and Cummings suggest, "journalists seem to have wholly accepted the view that life will not survive a nuclear exchange: therefore, additional evidence of that fact is [...] largely ignored" (1989: 47). Second, journalists, "operating as stand-ins for their audience, seem to believe that viewers cannot endure more debates about the bomb" (1989: 49). A third hypothesis holds that, given the seemingly immutable presence of nuclear weapons, newswriters

"have no desire to politicize their existence or encourage inquiry into how they might actually be used in war-fighting. The underlying premise of much [...] reporting is that there is only one logical way to manage the nuclear arsenal and the permanent threat it imposes on society, and that way lies along whatever course the administration in power is pursuing" (1989: 51). Finally, Rubin and Cummings suggest that the news media lack an extensive "inventory of metonymical images for communicating the horror of nuclear war [thus] they fail utterly to transmit the significance of the 'event'" (1989: 53). [3]

Accordingly, those individuals or groups who lack 'habitual access' to the news frame because they are situated such that their definitions rarely get entangled in the news net, or who find that the criteria of inclusion set down by the primary definition of relevance precludes meaningful participation in subsequent debate, often must resort to seeking 'disruptive access' (CCCS, 1982; Fowler and Marshall, 1985; Gitlin, 1980; GUMG, 1985; Hackett, forthcoming; Hodge, 1985; Molotch and Lester, 1974; Nichols,

3 Rubin and Cummings (1989) proceed to identify four primary types of images routinely employed by television network journalists to convey 'the reality of nuclear war': "computer graphics and winter landscapes to suggest the bleakness of nuclear winter; historical footage of the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which serves to mirror reality; Department of Defense footage of test explosions, missile launchings, silo rehearsals, and related activities; and scenes of everyday American life, set against a chilling voice over to ironic effect" (1989: 53-54). In their view, only this last type of image has 'the power to move an audience'.

1987; Richardson, 1985; Slough, 1988; Walker, 1984). At stake is the need to force the temporary suspension of the routinized access enjoyed by others so as create opportunities for their event to be made into news. As Molotch and Lester (1974) write, these voices "must 'make news' by somehow crashing through the ongoing arrangements of newsmaking, generating surprise, shock, or some more violent form of 'trouble.' [...] In extreme cases, multitudes are assembled in an inappropriate place to intervene in the daily schedule of occurrences and events. Such activities constitute, in a sense, 'anti-routine' events. This 'obvious' disruption of normal functioning and its challenge to the received social world prompts the coverage of the mass media" (1974: 108).

News interest is certainly not an end in itself, however, as the type of coverage which results is often the antithesis of that which had been initially desired by those individuals or groups struggling to articulate a counter-hegemonic interpretation of the situation. All too frequently efforts to dislodge primary definitions are ignored, dismissed as soft news novelties, or trivialized in other ways. Indeed, often it is the case that the news frame is organized around the question of how quickly order can be restored to the social world, thereby ensuring that little, if any, attention is directed to the very issues raised through disruptive access (see Gitlin, 1980; Molotch and Lester, 1974; Tuchman, 1978). Hence the need for a

greater understanding of the respective tensions to be negotiated vis a vis 'routine' versus 'disruptive' access.

Possible points of inquiry may include the following: To what extent does this constant threat of marginalization, of being found guilty of 'bias' or 'emotionalism' (and thus potentially regarded as subversive vis a vis the consensus), force counter-hegemonic speakers to establish their stance in such a way that the professional imperatives of newswork will, in turn, ascribe to it authoritative, newsworthy status? How have the various discourses of subaltern groups been made to cater to the dictates of news discourse? What are the prerequisites to be met before a voice 'deserves' inclusion in media debate? In what ways do these institutionalized inflections of respectability and prestige mark the limits of 'acceptable' dissent with the truth-claims of primary definers? And, finally, how to successfully challenge a bureaucratic phase structure agency's re-appropriations of what 'nuclear reality' is, and the strategic rationale which underpin them, when it is their 'hard data' that propels the routinized logics of news reporting?

Media(tions) of Power

In my view, the project to make space across the field of the news media for progressive, counter-hegemonic activist groups remains contingent upon the disruption of the naturalized processes through which nuclearism is

integrated, primarily, into institutional relations of power, but also those of resistance as well. Research efforts need to continue to enhance the peace movement's capacity to interpret and act against the complex patterns of dominance and dependence in which the Canadian government is enmeshed, and thereby problematize the very possibility of acquiescence to the perilous antagonisms of 'national security in the nuclear age'. Anti-nuclearist voices (together with, at a more general level, anti-militarist discourses) must continue to transgress the codified boundaries of official discourse with an aim of re-articulating new emancipatory positions both within and against prevailing news media inflections of obvious, common-sensical truth-claims about 'the security environment in the 'post-Cold War era'.

Practitioners of media sociology and cultural studies are well placed to elaborate upon present theoretical efforts to counteract the Canadian state's official discourse by opening it up to broader forms of critique and contestation through the re-definition of its primary articulatory elements. This practice of criticism may even, in turn, be correlated with socio-political involvement as institutions currently posited within counter-hegemonic discourses (not necessarily limited to groups involved with the advancement of specific peace and disarmament causes) hold vast potential for assistance in the realization of this critical agenda. Such an approach could severely limit

the ease with which state officials could re-articulate, for example, the signifier 'instability' (discursively anchored by 'The New World Order') to replace the preferred narrative scripts of the Cold War binarism. Thus efforts to facilitate the counter-hegemonic re-articulation of alternative knowledges pose, in turn, a direct threat to the naturalization of the regulatory mechanisms underpinning the official deployment of interpellative strategies designed to 'set limits' on appropriate debate about national defence.

Future research may also be advantageously directed to the further exploration of how the cultural hegemony of the attendant exclusivist structures may best be challenged through a politics of empowerment addressed to news media effectivity. I have endeavoured, through this dissertation, to make a contribution to the ongoing work of illustrating how the conceptual tools of a critical discourse analysis may be refined with the aim of disrupting the very strategies in and through which the invocation of ideological effectivity is mobilized. It has been argued through the example of the case study that to deny the institutional will to power its appropriation of 'public consent' is to, in turn, initiate a new politics of disjuncture between its preferred voice and the facts it speaks. To the extent that an interventionist criticism can proceed to hold in tension these authorized and non-authorized inflections of the real, it can address the modes of subjectivity in play across the terrain of the text precisely as they appeal to the reader

to confirm the obviousness of its truth. These modes of recognition, once identified as such, will cease to operate in the same way again; a development with certain substantive effects for the popular dispersal of nuclearism.

This dissertation may therefore be read as my attempt to affirm the value of Gramsci's insight that it is by 'making critical' existing cultural relations precisely as they traverse the social field that the struggle for linguistic hegemony is most effectively fought.

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