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**NON-GOVERNMENTAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS
AND THE STATE, 1968 - 1993**

by

PATRICK GIBSON, B.A., M.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

July 17, 2000

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Patrick Gibson, B.A. Hons., M.A.

in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Thesis Supervisor

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September 20, 2000

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this dissertation is to sensitize Political Science and Public Administration theory to the importance of administrative infrastructure -- formal and informal rules, regulations, values and instruments -- that shape relationships between the state and civil society. It is argued that Political Science and Public Administration has not paid sufficient attention to the influence of values, rules, instruments that organize these relationships. The most popular liberal Canadian Political Science and Public Administration approaches explain relations between the state and civil society in terms of the ability of civil society organizations to influence policy-making processes and institutions through elite accommodation, interest group bargaining, policy communities and networks and consultative mechanisms. Left approaches tend to focus on structural relationships between the state and capital. I contend that within these approaches, the power of institutional values and organizational instruments to establish and maintain the relationship is not adequately addressed.

The dissertation illustrates the importance of administrative infrastructure in organizing and managing relationships between the state and civil society by examining the organizational dynamics of the relationship between the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) division of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Canadian Non-Governmental Development Organizations (NGDOs), and NGDOs in the English-speaking Caribbean, who are their partners. I contend that between 1968 and 1993, administrative infrastructure was a fundamental factor that influenced the establishment, development and maintenance of the relationship between the NGO division of CIDA and Canadian NGDOs involved in development work in the English-Speaking Caribbean. Furthermore, I argue that the influence of administrative infrastructure was so strong that it shaped the nature of the third party relationships Canadian NGDOs developed with NGDOs in the region. Evidence is presented to show how changes to the administrative infrastructure changed these relationships in the areas of decision-making authority, NGDO autonomy and project administration.

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Without the co-operation of a large number of individuals, this study would not have been possible. Over the years of research and writing, I received tremendous support from family, friends, employers and professors. Although, one person 'holds the pen', it takes a community of interested and supportive individuals and institutions to produce a PhD thesis.

I am indebted to the Department of Political Science for providing an academic environment that could accept an interdisciplinary study that straddled the boundaries of several distinct fields. I am especially grateful to my supervisor Michael Dolan, and advisors Laura MacDonald and Michael Whittington who questioned my assumptions throughout the research and writing process. A department administrator, Valerie Pereboom, deserves a very special thanks for her encouragement, advice and guidance.

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CHAPTER I

NON-GOVERNMENTAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND THE STATE, 1968-1993

I. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Interest in Voluntary Organizations

In both developed and developing countries innumerable nonprofit voluntary organizations draw together states and civil societies. Estimates of the size of this sector in Canada range from 175,000 organizations to more than 200,000.¹ Many of these organizations are known for providing spiritual, health or social services to individuals and communities, as well as mobilizing the public, participating in public policy debates and representing the interests of individuals and communities to governments. Voluntary organizations with charitable status numbered about 70,000¹ in 1993. An estimated \$86 billion passed through these organizations in that year, accounting for almost 13 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product, employing 9 per cent of the labour force and providing more jobs than the Canadian construction industry.²

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¹ Statistics Canada does not capture this data in their industrial sector or employment surveys, and Revenue Canada only captures data on organizations that are registered charities. In 1992 Jack Quarter's research estimated 175,000 incorporated nonprofit organizations. However, Kathleen Day and Rose Anne Devlin have suggested that unincorporated associations increase this number another twenty-five per cent to more than 200,000 organizations. See: Jack Quarter, Canada's Social Economy (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 1992); Kathleen Day and Rose Anne Devlin, "Measuring the Nonprofit Sector" in The Emerging Sector: In Search of a Framework, ed. Ronald Hirschorn, (Ottawa: Canadian Policy Research Networks, 1997), 62.

Voluntary organizations are not new phenomena; they have played an important role throughout Canadian history. In the 1600s, in the British North American colonies, they provided aid to the poor and orphans and lobbied for hospital construction. In the late 1800s, as part of urban reform and social gospel movements, they fought for better working conditions, child welfare, public parks, temperance and moral governance.³ Since the 1960s, tens of thousands of voluntary organizations have been established to provide services to and represent the rights of women, racial and linguistic minorities, gays and lesbians, the poor and disabled, as well as to air public concerns about education, health care and the environment. They have changed the relationship between citizens and governments. To a greater degree than their predecessors, these modern-day organizations have advocated the democratization of society through citizen participation in state decision-making. Many have become integrated into social, economic or other public policy domains, mobilizing the public, participating in public policy decision-making and administering government programs.⁴

In recent years, nonprofit voluntary organizations have received unprecedented attention. Politicians and independent analysts have praised their achievements and potential. In Canada, the Liberal Party applauded their economic and social contributions to society in its 1997 election manifesto and subsequently in the Liberal government's Speech from the

Throne. Earlier in the 1990s, prominent writers, such as Peter Drucker, Jeremy Rifkin, and Robert Putman commended the skills and abilities of voluntary organizations and forecasted a critical role for them in building a sense of community, to satisfy social needs, absorb displaced workers, promote citizenship and strengthen civil society.⁵ However, the praise by politicians and analysts is rather ironic because throughout the 1990s, most nonprofit voluntary organizations have been under severe stress, struggling with challenges posed by municipal, provincial, state and federal budget cuts and rising public demand for their services.

Although the rationale for such praise is not entirely clear, it appears that in Canada there are three significant forces at work. Ignorance about the current health of the nonprofit sector and a resultant overestimation of its desire and capacity to deliver services once provided by the state is the first. A second force is the idea that state power should be dramatically decentralized and that requisite authority and financial resources should be transferred to the voluntary sector for the delivery of services once delivered by the state. Neo-liberal ideology, which for more than a decade has advocated a reduction in the size of the state and its delivery of services, is the third. From the neo-liberal perspective, the market is the most efficient and legitimate delivery vehicle for services. The voluntary sector serves as an alternative service delivery vehicle to serve those

individuals who cannot be served by the market. To what degree these three forces have contributed to the interest in the voluntary sector and its social and economic capacities one can only speculate, because there is no comprehensive body of empirical research or theory on the nature of voluntary organizations, their societal functions or interactions with states.¹

1.2 The Subject

This dissertation is about institutional values and instruments that shape inter-organizational relationships between three actors: the Canadian state, Canadian voluntary organizations involved in international aid, and the voluntary organizations of the South that are their partners. Throughout the dissertation such voluntary organizations are referred to as non-government development organizations (NGDOs); later in this chapter an operational definition is established. The subject of the dissertation represents a gap in political science and international development literature, which has tended to focus on the impact of broad social, economic and

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¹In Canada, this research has started. See: Voluntary Sector Roundtable Panel on Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary Sector, "Building on Strength :Improving Governance and Accountability in Canada's Voluntary Sector" (Ottawa: Voluntary Sector Roundtable, 1999); Michael Hall, Tamara Knighton, Paul Reed, et. al, Caring Canadians, Involved Canadians: Highlights from the National Survey of Giving, Volunteering and Participating (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1998).

political variables on NGDO and state behaviour. Institutional values and instruments have been given very little attention.

In Canada the state's relationship with NGDOs has a long history, but it has only been since the 1960s that there has been institutionalized state support for Canadian NGDOs to establish relationships with NGDOs and other organizations in the South. As part of an ongoing dialogue to build better North-South linkages and partnerships, NGDOs and institutions in Canada and elsewhere have analyzed the dynamics of North-South relationships.⁶ This literature identifies several influential variables, including international⁷ and domestic political and economic forces,⁸ the role and authority of elites at state and community levels,⁹ and the role of women in development planning and project implementation.¹⁰ Indeed, much has been written about the impact of Southern political regimes on Southern NGDOs, the influence of elites on rural development and the importance of gender in international development. However, there has been virtually no serious consideration of the influence of the Northern donor state on the relationship between Northern and Southern NGDOs, particularly, the influence of the state in organizing the relationship between Northern and Southern NGDOs. This dissertation focuses on this gap in the literature, concerning itself with how interactions between the Canadian state and Canadian NGDOs shape relationships Canadian NGDOs develop with

their partners in the South.

II. RESEARCH DESIGN

2.1 The Research Problem

Canadian social scientists have had little interest in the relationships of non-government development organizations, particularly, those established with donor states. Political scientists writing about state - society relations, international development or voluntary organizations have typically focused on several macro theoretical approaches and economic, social and political variables to explain state and NGDO behaviour. As discussed in the next chapter, these approaches consider societal groups and voluntary organizations almost exclusively in the context of their ability to influence policy-making processes and political institutions.¹ These approaches explain relationships between state and voluntary sector organizations almost entirely as a direct or indirect product of policy-making processes. The power of institutional values and organizational instruments to establish and maintain the relationship -- what I call the 'administrative

---

¹A content analysis of the Canadian Journal of Political Science, Canadian Public Administration and Canadian Public Policy conducted by the author, revealed that twenty-eight case studies on voluntary or interest group - state interactions were published between 1980 and 1992. Eighteen case studies focused on groups representing business or capital interests, six on nonprofit organizations, and four on labour organizations or professional associations.

infrastructure' of the relationship -- are not addressed. The popularity of macro policy processes in existing literature presents a very skewed image of state - voluntary organization relations. Only ten to twenty per cent of voluntary sector activity is devoted to policy dialogue, yet the prevailing popularity of policy studies gives the impression that policy dialogue dominates voluntary sector activities. The rich myriad of interaction between the state and the voluntary sector that reflects the voluntary sector's role in the design, administration and evaluation of state programs and the administrative infrastructure that provides the 'terms of reference' for these interactions is left unexplored.

2.2 Practical Importance

Administrative infrastructure exists throughout the state. It links the political executive to central agencies and departments, departments to programs, and programs to thousands of organizations in civil society which in turn serve constituencies in Canada and abroad. Recognition and understanding of the role of administration infrastructure in managing relationships between the state and civil society do not just serve academic purposes. administrative infrastructure can improve the effectiveness of state - NGDO relationships. Indeed, a clear understanding of the dynamics and influence of administrative infrastructure would provide state and NGDO actors with a powerful analytical tool with

which to assess development challenges and opportunities. In practical terms, a greater appreciation of the influence of administrative infrastructure, would mean that political, social and economic variables would be interpreted within the context of the operational values, rules and regulations of state programs. These circumstances would reduce the tendency to overstate the expectations of state - NGDO relationships and initiatives. Additionally, improving the knowledge within Southern NGDO communities of the role of administrative infrastructure in overseas development aid would increase their ability to interpret and validate project and program options presented by Northern NGDOs. Thus, adding administrative infrastructure to the mix of factors that govern relationships between Northern and Southern NGDOs and between NGDOs and the Canadian state would improve decision-making at all critical points along the aid chain.

2.3 Research Questions

Do formal rules, regulations, norms and values organize and manage relationships between the state and societal groups? Does the consideration of such "administrative infrastructure" fill gaps in knowledge or enhance one's understanding of how relationships between the state and societal groups are established and maintained? These are the general research questions of the dissertation. To answer these questions, I investigate the dynamics of administrative infrastructure

within a specific historical time-frame and social and political context. I examine the organizational factors which established, developed and maintained the relationship between the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) division of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and Canadian NGDOs and their West Indian partners. The study covers the period from the time of the establishment of the Division and its early development in the late 1960s and early 1970s, to its rationalization and contraction in the early 1990s. International development non-government organizations were chosen for this study because there is more data available on state - NGDO relationships than on other state - voluntary sector relationships. The third party relationship between Canadian and West Indian NGDOs was included in the study because it adds a dimension of complexity which lends greater legitimacy to hypothesis testing. I reasoned that the strength of the administrative infrastructure concept would be evident if it could be shown to influence both state - Canadian NGDO relationships and relationships between Canadian NGDOs and their West Indian partners.

Forthcoming chapters show how the administrative infrastructure has influenced relations between the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Division and Canadian NGDOs and how this influenced relations between Canadian NGDOs and their partners in the West Indies. The West Indies was one

of the first penetrated by Canadian NGOs established in the 1960s and 1970s, and it was one of the first regions for these NGOs to leave when programs were rationalized in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. Currently, very few Canadian NGOs have major projects or programs in the Caribbean region. As far as Canadian NGOs are concerned, the region has completed a development assistance 'life-cycle'.

Administrative infrastructure exists at every level of the state system. NGO division officers and managers are governed by administrative infrastructure that links CIDA to the broader management framework of the state, by legal regulations and instruments that link the activities of their operational unit to the departmental management framework, and by values, principles, and norms, which manage and sustain day-to-day NGO-State relations. How these elements of administrative infrastructure -- originating within the NGO division, elsewhere in CIDA, and in central agencies -- influenced the NGO division's relationship with non-government development organizations in Canada and the West Indies, is the focus of the dissertation.

2.4 Hypothesis and Variables

The research hypothesis guiding this dissertation is that between 1968 and 1993, administrative infrastructure was a fundamental factor that influenced the establishment, development and maintenance of the relationship between the

Non-Governmental Organizations division of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and Canadian NGOs involved in development in the West Indies. Furthermore, the influence of administrative infrastructure was so strong that it changed the content and form of third party relationships Canadian NGOs developed with West Indian NGOs.

The dependent variable in this study is the relationship between Canadian NGOs and the state. The primary independent variable is administrative infrastructure: the set of formal and rules, regulations, and practices, and informal norms and values that operationalize state programs. Administrative infrastructure may be shaped by tangible policy and program instruments that are widely applied, such as guidelines and regulations found in the Financial Administration Act and other statutes, or less tangible concepts and values such as equity, participation, and representation. The administrative infrastructure is therefore an amalgam of both tangible and intangible instruments and concepts, providing state managers and officers with the frameworks and tools to undertake tasks.

Administrative infrastructure is not static. It varies depending on program and policy objectives, the values, training and aspirations of key actors, and social, political and economic factors shaping the environment in which it must operate. The dissertation identifies several social, economic and political independent variables that influenced the relationship between Canadian NGOs and the state, including

the demands of NGDO constituencies in Canada and the West Indies, Canadian economic, humanitarian and political interests, as well as the forces of structural adjustment and neo-liberalism. The dissertation will show that there is not a predetermined relationship between administrative infrastructure and political, economic and social variables. Administrative infrastructure shapes and is shaped by these variables depending on circumstances.

2.5 Argument

Three arguments elaborate the dissertation's hypothesis. First, an interdependent relationship between the Canadian state and nonprofit voluntary organizations was established by the state to secure public support for an expansion of Canadian international activities. An enduring relationship with NGDOs was seen as the way to involve the Canadian public in Canada's international development effort and thereby bolster public support for Official Development Assistance expenditures and Canadian foreign policy. Second, the administrative infrastructure of CIDA's NGO division played a major role in structuring relations between the state and Canadian NGDOS. Formal rules, procedures and practices and informal organizational values and conventions, developed either by the NGO division, CIDA or the central agencies of the state, played an essential role in the establishment and maintenance and direction of the relationship between CIDA and

Canadian NGDOs.

At the outset the values and knowledge of Canadian NGDOs influenced the direction of the Division and relationship between the sector and state. Due to the fact that most Division employees were recruited from the NGO sector, there was virtually a seamless web of communication between the sector and Division. However in the 1980s, pressures on the Division to align itself more closely with CIDA's corporate agenda -- which included structural adjustment and program management reforms -- eroded the relationship, and as a consequence NGDOs found themselves with almost no influence over the direction of the Division and its administrative infrastructure. Furthermore, I contend that three key characteristics shaped the administrative infrastructure of the relationship: the diffusion of power within the unit's operational environment, the use of values and knowledge to establish and maintain autonomy, and the operational orientation toward project administration. The third argument to elaborate the hypothesis is that the power of the administrative infrastructure influenced the form and content of third-party relationships between Canadian and West Indian NGDOs. The examination of this third-party relationship is included in the dissertation to provide empirical evidence that the administrative infrastructure has far-reaching influence.

A chief proponent of the theoretical approach I have

adopted is James Q. Wilson. He has observed that the effectiveness of a bureaucracy has more to do with its organizational systems than with its finances, client populations, or legal arrangements. Wilson's approach has inspired the development of the administrative infrastructure concept. Organizational systems and administrative infrastructure are similar concepts. As they both focus on the explanatory power of the internal life of organizations, they may be considered neo-institutional concepts. The definition of neo-institutionalism is still evolving, but most researchers agree that such research contends the organization of political life makes a difference.¹¹ For James March and Johan Olsen, institutions are formal rules and practices.¹² Neo-institutional analysis explains public policy as more than the sum of countervailing pressure from civil society groups or accommodative relationships between civil society and state elites. It illustrates the fact that the organization of political life matters. While not denying the importance of both the social context of politics and the motives of individual actors it insists on a more autonomous role for political institutions than is found in contemporary social science literature.¹³ The administrative infrastructure approach is discussed in detail in the next chapter.

2.6 Methodology and Data

The West Indies was one of the first areas of operation for

Canadian NGDOs; between 1968 and 1993 there were countless interactions between Canadian and West Indian NGDOs and the Canadian state. I have implemented a nonprobability sampling technique to reduce the volume of interactions to a manageable number while respecting the objectives of the study. My general strategy has been to identify important sources of variation in the population and then to select a sample that reflects this variation. Purposive sampling has been employed to select a sample from three potential categories: state organizations responsible for international development, Canadian NGDOs and West Indian NGDOs.¹⁴ The Non-Governmental Organizations division of CIDA has been selected because it has the longest existing mandate to serve NGDOs and has been the most frequent point of contact within the state for Canadian NGDOs.

The sampling criteria have the specific objective of creating a pool of Canadian and West Indian organizations that have established relationships between Canadian and West Indian organizations so as to develop and administer projects in the West Indies. Both Canadian and West Indian NGDOs have had to show evidence of at least a three-year relationship to qualify for inclusion. Although the level of commitment to these relationships varied, all the organizations in the sample were required to demonstrate a commitment to share decisions, resources and ideas. Due to the long history of Canadian involvement in the region, a large number of

educational, religious and social service organizations met the relationship criteria. These were excluded from the sample.

The sample has aimed to capture the diversity of relationships established between West Indian and Canadian NGOs. These relationships have included simple information sharing, grassroots community development, technical training using Canadian volunteers, and the development of West Indian NGO policy-oriented networks. The projects and programs of the eight Canadian NGOs selected are highly representative of the secular Canadian NGOs operating in the West Indies between 1968-1993. Approximately half of the secular Canadian NGOs operating in the region during this period have been included in the sample. However, due to the diversity of West Indian NGOs, the sample of twenty-one West Indian NGOs does not capture the complete range of regional, national and local projects and programs that occurred in this time period. As this dissertation is primarily concerned with forces that have shaped NGO relationships, this is not considered a major weakness. The investigator bias that is often associated with nonprobability sampling has been minimized by using project data and NGO executive interviews to validate the sample.

2.6.1 Data Collection

Data was collected through personal interviews with former and current NGO division and NGO executive and officers in Canada

and the West Indies in 1993, 1995, 1998 and 1999. Federal government phone books and CIDA inquiries produced a list of fifty former and current NGO division managers, including all of the NGO division officers responsible for the Caribbean region. Most of the former managers and officers could not be located; a few did not wish to be interviewed. Of fifty potential interviewees, thirteen individuals were selected for one-to-two hour interviews.¹ Similarly, a pool of potential Canadian and West Indian NGDO executive and officer interviewees was selected from NGDO documents dating back to 1968 and from telephone inquiries. Staff turnover in the Canadian NGDO sector is quite high and corporate memory quite poor. As a result, several former executives and officers could not be located. In addition, a few declined to be interviewed and three were deceased. Twenty-six executives and officers were interviewed. Seven of these interviews were with executives and officers who worked for NGDOs that were not included in the sample, but were able to offer insightful comments on other aspects of the state - NGDO relations. In the West Indies, most of the key NGDO officers and executives identified in seven territories were located and interviewed. Twenty-five in - person and telephone interviews were conducted with officers of regional, national and local organizations. NGO division and Canadian and West Indian NGDO executives and officers were asked a battery of questions

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¹The list of interviewees can be found in Appendix I.

based on common themes: organizational history, administrative structures, values, rules and regulations and inter-organizational relationships.¹ Pilot-testing revealed the need to add questions to each group of interviewees. Initially the NGO division instrument highlighted questions concerning the organization of the state - NGDO relationship; however, questions were added on NGO division relations within CIDA and with the central agencies. Canadian NGDOs were asked about the organization of their relations with the state and West Indian NGDOs, but pilot-testing revealed the need to add questions on relations between Canadian NGDOs working in the wider Caribbean. Similarly, West Indian NGDOs were asked about the organization of their relations with Canadian NGDOs, but additional questions were needed on relations between West Indian NGDOs. The additional data generated by additional questions assisted greatly in the testing and validation of arguments. It was from interviews and secondary data that the diffusion of decision-making, autonomy and program administration traits of administrative infrastructure emerged and were developed.

In addition to interview data, a large number of unpublished documents produced by Canadian and West Indian NGDOs and newspaper articles provided electronically by the Inter Press Service were invaluable. They provided critical

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¹The interview question guides can be found in Appendix II.

facts and figures and contributed greatly to the historical record. Secondary sources in the form of books and essays by several researchers, including Peggy Antrobus, Tim Brodhead, Colin Leys, David Morrison, Cranford Pratt, Lester Salamon, Ian Smillie and James Q. Wilson were extremely insightful.

2.7 The Sample of Canadian and West Indian NGOs

I assert that administrative infrastructure not only influenced State - NGO relations, but relations between Canadian and West Indian NGOs as well. To illustrate, I investigate relationships between Canadian and West Indian NGOs. The Canadian NGOs included are the Save the Children Canada, CUSO (formerly Canadian University Service Overseas), the Canadian Organization for Development through Education (CODE), OXFAM-CANADA, INTER-PARES, Match International, Jamaica Self-Help Organization and Plenty Canada. Due to the poor state of NGO archives and rapid turnover of NGO staff, the data available to assess relationships varied significantly. These organizations differ significantly in terms of their histories, mandates, budgets and ideologies. Save the Children-Canada and OXFAM-CANADA began as committees of British organizations; the other NGOs have Canadian roots. Since its establishment in Canada in 1946, Save the Children-Canada's mandate has been focused on child welfare. In the 1960s it inherited its West Indian programs from its British parent. OXFAM-CANADA, upon becoming independent of its

British parent in 1963, established social justice objectives, and began programming in the West Indies in the early 1970s. CUSO began sending Canadian volunteers to work in health and education in the West Indies in the mid-1960s. By the end of the decade hundreds of volunteers had completed the Caribbean program. CODE, which has been in the West Indies since the mid-1970s, has focused on literacy and educational materials. Meanwhile, Match International, established in 1975, has been dedicated to the condition of women, and has supported the development of Caribbean feminist NGOs. INTER-PARES began building relationships with West Indian NGOs to facilitate community development soon after it was founded in 1975. Established in 1978, Jamaica Self-Help has worked in specific Jamaican communities facilitating small scale self-help projects, and has a strong community-based development education program in Canada. Plenty Canada, established in 1976, launched agricultural micro-enterprises in Dominica in the early 1980s. The West Indian NGOs included in the case study are introduced in the following section grouped according to their primary activities.

2.7.1 Agriculture Production and Community Development

As many of the Caribbean islands have economies based on agricultural production and a vast majority of marginalized people are the rural poor, many NGOs have been involved in peasant agriculture development strategies. Land reform has

been a critical political, social and economic issue in the West Indies. Many West Indian NGOs view it as a key factor in obtaining and maintaining social and economic justice for poor West Indians. The Social Action Centre (SAC), which has Jesuit roots dating back to the 1940s in Jamaica, has assisted in the development of housing, credit and agricultural cooperatives. Many other NGOs have supported agricultural communities and cooperatives with development education, project design and management. Of these, the sample includes the Small Projects Assistance Team (SPAT) in Dominica, Projects Promotion (PP) in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Projects for People (PFP) in Jamaica, the Women and Development Unit (WAND) of the Extra Mural Department of the University of the West Indies,¹⁵ as well as the Grenadian organizations, the Agency for Rural Transformation (ART) and the Grenada Community Development Agency (GRENCODA).

2.7.2 Caribbean Feminism

Since the late 1970s, NGOs such as the Women and Development Unit (WAND) and the Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action (CAFRA) have integrated gender and class analysis while linking research with policy recommendations, popular education, and action.¹ In the late 1970s, WAND began

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¹This analysis incorporates a class analysis with that of gender roles mediated by class, race, ethnicity and nationality. Its adoption by feminist-oriented NGOs has put them at the forefront of linking macro-economic analysis to experiences at the micro level of the poorest household.

pioneering work in the area of feminist community analysis, which focused on the integration of women into the development process. WAND's work was the first in the region to emphasize that as part of the development process a greater focus was needed on the social indicators and factors which affect the quality of life for women and their families. Founded in 1987, Jamaica's Women's Media Watch aims to raise the level of media literacy from a gendered perspective. It provides media awareness workshops for community organizations and institutions.

2.7.3 Language, Culture and Identity

Although all West Indian NGOs consider language, culture and identity key ingredients in the equation of national and regional development, some organizations emphasize these factors. Three organizations which fall into this category have been included in the study sample. In St. Vincent and the Grenadines, twenty-one grassroots adult literacy organizations were established between 1975 and 1985, and to coordinate their efforts, the National Association for Mass Education (NAME) was established. NAME and its member groups

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David E. Lewis, "Non-Governmental Organizations and Alternative Strategies: Bridging the Development Gap Between Central America and the Caribbean" in Integration and Participatory Development, ed. Judith Wedderburn, (Kingston, Jamaica: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1990), 157-158. Also see, Patricia Mohammed and Cathy Shepherd, eds. Gender in Caribbean Development, (Mona, Jamaica, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago, Cave Hill, Barbados: Women and Development Project, University of the West Indies, 1988.

offered a community-centred integrated programme of learning activities linked to improving literacy and understanding the relationships between literacy, class and political participation.¹⁶

The Folk Research Centre (FRC) in St. Lucia, which was begun in the early 1970s by secondary students encouraged by the Black Power movement, has focused on the role of culture in the development process.¹⁷ The Sistren Theatre Collective, formed in Jamaica in 1977, has been one of the most celebrated NGDOS in the West Indies for its use and promotion of the language, culture and identity of marginalized Black women. Through popular theatre, Sistren has sensitized and mobilized individuals and communities on issues of gender, identity, class, race and economy.

2.7.4 National and Regional Networks

The coordination of NGDO activities, strategic planning and advocacy have been facilitated by the development of networks at the national and regional levels. The West Indian sample includes four of these national organizations, the Association of Development Agencies (ADA), brings together eighteen Jamaican and international NGDOs and Churches for "collective analysis, discussion, planning, advocacy and collaboration ... ." On a regional level, the Caribbean People's Development Agency (CARIPEDA) was established in 1986 to promote a regional perspective in development planning by

providing a forum for critical thinking and facilitating the exchange of information among member NGOs located in Belize, Jamaica, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada.¹⁸ Also included is the Caribbean Network for Integrated Rural Development (CNIRD). It was established in 1988 to highlight the importance of rural areas and the participation of rural people in the planning and implementation of development initiatives.¹⁹ In 1990, with leadership of the Caribbean Conference of Churches, nineteen Caribbean NGOs came together to establish the Caribbean Policy Unit, (soon after renamed Caribbean Policy Development Centre).²⁰ The establishment of the CPDC reflected the maturation of regional NGOs and their agendas. It blends the results of grassroots community-based NGO work with strategic and research initiatives carried out by more system-oriented NGOs to help NGOs in the region build their capacity for policy analysis and develop skills and strategies for influencing regional and national policy.²¹ This important policy-oriented NGO is also included in the sample.

2.8 Limitations of the Research

The sample of Canadian NGOs selected for the case study and their activities and relationships with the state are highly representative of the entire population of Canadian NGOs that worked in the West Indies between 1968 and 1993. However, generalizing attributes of this relationship to other

relationships CIDA divisions developed with Canadian NGOs working in the region must be done with caution. Some divisions interacting with NGOs share the same history and administrative infrastructure, particularly those in the Partnership Branch, but divisions in other CIDA Branches have developed a different administrative infrastructure which, I believe, would produce different state - NGO relationships. Similarly, one must exercise caution when generalizing the influence of administrative infrastructure to territories that have endured long periods of political, economic or social instability. The conclusions of this study are most accurately applied to relatively stable developing countries where NGO relationships with Canadian organizations have become institutionalized.

My position is that the way program level interactions with the state are organized is very important to understanding the development and evolution of relations between the state and voluntary organizations. However the objective of the dissertation is not to present the dynamics of administrative infrastructure as a "general theory" explaining state - society relations. It is to point out that organizational aspects of the state have an impact on the behaviour of state - civil society relationships. Without dismissing the influence of economic, political and social variables, the study has been designed to identify the role of administrative infrastructure in state - NGO relationships.

The research design is non-experimental and therefore does not provide testable inferences about administrative infrastructure and its influence. The study clearly identifies the various ways in which administrative infrastructure interacts with economic, social and political variables. However, it does not attempt to make precise inferences about the relationship between administrative infrastructure and the form or content of state - NGDO relationships. The next section of the chapter introduces the historical context and basic concepts of the dissertation.

III. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

3.1 The West Indies

The English-speaking Caribbean consists of seventeen territories in the Caribbean basin which are or have been under British rule. Also called the "West Indies", these territories include Guyana on the northeast coast mainland of South America, Belize, on the east coast mainland of Central America, and the following fifteen island territories located in the Caribbean Sea: Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, Barbados, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Kitts and Nevis, Montserrat, Anguilla, Turks and Caicos Islands, Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, Jamaica and the Cayman Islands. Canada has had a long history of commodity trade and merchant banking with this region, which positioned it to become an early recipient of Canadian

development aid. For readers who may not be aware of the depth and breadth of the links between Canada and West Indies, the historical economic and political links between two regions are described.

3.2 Canada - West Indies Economic Relations: Staples Trade, Financial Services, Manufacturing, Mining and Tourism

Many of the West Indies territories were "discovered" on the voyages of Columbus in the late 1400s and claimed for Spain. The speed of colonization, however, was largely dependent on the degree of conflict required to incorporate the islands into the British Empire. About one third of the territories were colonized by the British quickly and permanently in the 1600s with virtually no resistance from Spain, France or Carib and Arawak Amerindians. By contrast, control of the remaining territories was hotly contested by European powers. In addition, Amerindians defended their settlements on several islands successfully for many years.

The ethnic composition of the West Indies is diverse. This is due to the pattern of acquisition of territories, the demand and supply of labour during the first stages of colonization, which required tens of thousands of European settlers, political prisoners, and indentured servants from England, Scotland, and Ireland, and later, the importation of at least 1.6 million enslaved West Africans²². In addition, after the emancipation in 1838 of slaves, tens of thousands of indentured servants, primarily from South Asia but also from

China and Portugal, were brought to the region.

Unlike the mainland British colonies, West Indian territories had to import most of their food. In the earliest days of slavery the New England colonies were the major suppliers²³. Enterprising merchants on the British North American colonies also gained a share of this foodstuffs market as early as the mid-1700s, and trade in staples, salt fish, foodstuffs, sugar, and rum fuelled Canada-West Indies relations from the mid-1800s to the mid-1900s. By the mid-1860s, the West Indies was one of Nova Scotia's most important export markets, ahead of the United States and Britain.²⁴

The Anglo-American reciprocity agreement of 1858 was largely responsible for Nova Scotia's fortunes. Rumour of its non-renewal among the British North American colonies intensified the Canadian Confederation debate, and, after 1867, continuing rumours promoted deliberations about the acquisition of a greater share of the Caribbean market, potentially by economic or political union. In the late 1870s, John Galt advised the prime minister to seek a trade agreement with the wider Caribbean not only for "the mercantile value of the connection", but also as a hedge against the "commercial ascendancy" of the United States in the region which he believed would "seriously endanger the political systems of the British and Spanish possessions."²⁵ Free trade policies, which ended British tariff protection, and subsequent losses in British and North American sugar markets, had West Indian

planters thinking about union as well, believing that it was their best hope for economic stability.²⁶ Notwithstanding the fact that the notion of political union was pursued by influential economic and political Canadian and West Indian elites, it was never widely accepted in Canada or Britain.

The government of Mackenzie King attempted to build on the trade agreements of previous governments by providing for a subsidized steamship service in a 1925 trade agreement. However, economic analyses at the time suggested that the volume of business that could be done with the West Indies had reached its upper limit. The newly-elected government of R.B. Bennett, upon reviewing the declining trade with the West Indies, gave notice in 1938 to terminate the agreement, but the Second World War made the renegotiation of the 1925 trade agreement impossible.²⁷ By the time it was reexamined in 1966, the 1925 trade agreement lacked relevance. In the early 1960s, Canadian exporters had only 7 per cent of the West Indies market, down from a high point of 19 per cent in 1928. The loss of the Canadian export trade was attributed to the success of import substitution in manufactured goods and the inability of the Canadian economy to improve its supply position in such commodities relative to the United States, the United Kingdom, and other nations in Europe and East Asia.²⁸ West Indian exports to Canada of sugar and other commodities from the West Indies also had declined.

By the end of the Second World War, Canada and the West

Indies ceased trying to enhance their trading relationship. The major link between Canada and the West Indies after the Second World War consisted of Canadian investment in financial institutions, mining, tourism, and light manufacturing. Kari Levitt and Alister McIntyre revealed that by the mid-1960s, Canadian investors had more capital at stake in the West Indies than in any other developing region in the world.²⁹ Of the estimated \$550 million invested in the West Indies, approximately \$310 million was invested in bauxite-alumina production, an estimated \$100 million in mortgages and financial securities held by banking and insurance sectors, approximately \$20 million in utilities, \$10 million in sugar and citrus production, between \$5 million and \$10 million in light manufacturing and the remainder, approximately \$100 million, in hotels and other enterprises.³⁰

Canada participated significantly in the economic diversification of the West Indies. However, it was a process which at each new phase failed to provide substantial economic and social benefits to the majority of the population. After 1838, with the transition from plantation slavery to 'free' labour forecasted, massive economic and social change was predicted, but this was thwarted by several British initiatives: regulations disfavoured peasant farming, the importation of indentured labour from South Asia, technological improvements in sugar cultivation and production, and tariff preferences.³¹ The plantation economy

persisted because of these supports but also because it had little competition.

Turn-of-the-century Canadian investors in financial services had no desire to challenge either the ideological or operational principals of the plantation economy. They viewed the region as the sugar planters and adventurers did centuries before them: as a hinterland ripe for economic exploitation. Canadian-owned West Indies insurance and banking operations, although small compared to those in Canada, developed business strategies which ensured that they had regular surpluses to ship home.³²

Mineral staples development in Guyana and Jamaica also failed to reconfigure the economy. High unemployment persisted, social benefits were not widely distributed, and the vast majority of the profits from bauxite mining and manufacturing were exported. West Indian economists revealed that for every dollar of bauxite mined in the West Indies, the mineral-producing country retained nine cents³³. Similarly, although tourism was not highly developed in the mid-1960s, because of foreign ownership and the high input required, it quickly developed a reputation of having a marginal record in terms of financial benefits. Local capital developed on the margins of the economy and was usually concentrated in the hands of less than a dozen families. State enterprise became the only counter-balancing force to the whims of foreign capital markets and corporations. While such enterprises

became a source of pride, they often failed to live up to expectations, and were easily marginalized in the region by the wealthier and more powerful multinational corporations. As discussed in Chapter III, Canadian bilateral aid played an important role in the process. Rather than strengthening the indigenous capital base within West Indian territories, Canadian aid, which focused on infrastructure building served to make the region more attractive and easier to penetrate by foreign capital entrepreneurs. The Canadian bilateral assistance budget for the West Indies was increased to \$9 million annually in 1964-65 and by 1963, the Caribbean program had disbursed approximately \$48 million to the region.

Even though Canadian bilateral aid represented only a small percentage of their needs¹, West Indian territories welcomed Canadian bilateral aid. They encouraged Canada to expand its program and make it more effective. However, bilateral aid was not the only strategy pursued by West Indian leaders. The overpopulation of many of the territories prompted them to argue for liberal immigration policies which would allow West Indians to move to Canada. Canada resisted these requests for many decades. Even in the years that directly followed the 1962 elimination of racial criteria that favoured Europeans, Canada admitted only a few thousand West

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¹It was only seven percent of the total social and economic development budget drawn up by West Indian governments in the mid-1960s. Testimony by Armstrong and Plank, Senate (1969) op. cit., 107.

Indians annually.³⁴ Nonetheless, as the numbers of West Indian immigrants grew in Canada so did the significance of immigration in Canada's bilateral relationship with the region.

Another major consequence of the bilateral program was the growth of existing relationships between Canadian and West Indian church-based organizations and the development of new relationships between emerging secular organizations in the two regions. Canadian volunteer organizations were invited by West Indians or encouraged by the colonial administration to set up programs in the region. Some organizations assumed programs begun by British parent organizations. Canadian church-based and secular organizations, especially those involved in training, saw their activities as adding value to the Canadian infrastructure program. Meanwhile, organizations working at the community level saw their activities as filling gaps in the region's bilateral development program. In the early 1960s, the West Indies was deemed the 'natural' choice for CUSO to launch its volunteer sending program. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s many other secular NGOs followed CUSO's lead.

IV. CANADIAN NON-GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS

4.1 Concept

In Canada, voluntary organizations involved in international development are commonly called 'NGOs' (non-government

organizations). The term was coined by the United Nations and is the most common descriptor of a diverse collection of organizations involved in international development assistance. Despite its popularity, the term is quite meaningless, describing what the organizations are not, rather than what they are; thus, it has limited utility as a research concept. Other popular terms, such as voluntary, nonprofit, third sector or charitable organization, similarly lack conceptual precision. These terms alone do not give any indication of the mandate of these organizations. To be more specific, I use the term non-government development organization (NGDO) throughout the dissertation. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the lead state institution in the administration of international assistance, defines an NGO as a voluntary organization with a voluntary structure¹ and an independent board of directors which devote a substantial proportion of its resources to international development, either overseas or in Canada and is substantially independent of other organizations.³⁵

I have adopted this definition, but not without recognizing that its weakness lies in its avoidance of the social and political values which motivate many of these

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¹In this context, the term "voluntary" means not only that people volunteer their time to run organizations. It also means there is no legislation requiring or preventing these organizations from being formed. As well, it means that while employees are often paid, the Board of Management is not paid and any profits made are not distributed to shareholders or members, but reinvested in the organization's activities.

organizations. Such values are evident in how these organizations interpret the meaning of development. For NGOs, the term refers to the "full realization of human potential, not simply expressed in higher living standards but also in forms of cultural expression, in the development of spiritual values and in people's ability to participate in determining their future."³⁶ Ian Smillie writes that NGO approaches and activities have shifted over the years, but

... there remains an essential self-defining core to which all development NGOs aspire: altruistic in motivation, independent in status, participatory in structure and methodology, respectful of the rights and dignity of individuals and collectivities, and capable of mobilizing resources effectively.³⁷

Essentially, within these organizations there is a profound belief that civil society has the resources and skills to resolve social and economic problems facing individuals and communities.

4.2 Establishment, Growth and Classification of NGOs

Some Canadian NGOs have organizational roots that can be traced back to the early missions of Christian churches. One of the oldest overseas assistance organizations, Les Soeurs de la Congrégation de Nôtre Dame, was founded in 1653 in the colony of New France and is still active in Latin America.³⁸ Other NGOs began as organizational responses to international conflicts. In 1919, Save the Children was founded in Britain by Eglantyne Jebb; its purpose was to help young victims of World War One.³⁹ Foster Parents Plan (now Plan International)

was founded in 1937 by two Englishmen to assist child victims of the Spanish Civil War.⁴⁰ Organizations promoting cross-cultural understanding, such as World University Service and international work camps, were started in Europe in the 1920s.⁴¹ OXFAM-CANADA was begun in Oxford, England, in 1942 to provide relief to famine victims of the Greek civil war and CARE was begun in the United States in 1946 to send food packages to Europe.⁴²

Initially, international NGOs such as OXFAM-CANADA and CARE established fund raising committees in Canada to support head offices in Europe and the USA. Since the 1960s, however, the link to foreign control as well as religious institutions has declined. In the mid-1980s approximately three - quarters of Canadian NGOs considered their organizations secular and accountable solely to Canadians.⁴³ Growing from just 25 in 1960,⁴⁴ the current population of NGOs is estimated to be between 200 and 220. That is quite a sizeable number on a per capita basis, 4.4 times the number in Britain.⁴⁵ Most NGOs are small: only a few have more than a dozen full-time staff and maintain field offices in developing countries. Volunteers do most of the work of NGOs. Brodhead and Herbert-Copley estimated in the late 1980s that 30,000 individuals were 'employed' by NGOs as either paid staff or volunteers on either a full or part-time basis.⁴⁶ In 1994, the North-South Institute estimated that NGOs employed 4,550 staff members and had 72,100 volunteers in Canada with perhaps

another 11,000 overseas.⁴⁷

The expenditure budgets of NGOs vary dramatically but are considerably higher on average than the nonprofit voluntary sector as a whole. Data from 1984 indicated that 36 percent of the agencies had budgets of less than 250,000 dollars, 24 percent, budgets between 250,000 and one million dollars, 24 percent, between one million dollars and five million dollars, and 16 percent had budgets of more than five million dollars.⁴⁸

4.3 Classification

In 1995, Cranford Pratt and Tim Brodhead classified NGOs according to their 'mode of operation'⁴⁹ which is identified by three elements: degree of control by Canadians, source of revenue and development functions. The first type of organization they discuss concentrates its energy on fund raising from the Canadian public. The mandate of these organizations is narrow and their autonomy limited as they report to an international agency headquartered elsewhere. These organizations tend to support welfare and emergency relief programs aimed at individuals and communities through dramatic mass media appeals. They tend to be more effective

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⁴⁷ Even in 1993, almost half of all charities in Canada reported revenues of less than \$50,000. An additional third reported revenues of \$50, 000 to \$250, 000. Only 19 per cent had revenues of \$250, 000 or more and only 2 per cent had revenues of \$5 million or more. Sharpe, op. cit., 16.

in raising money than NGDOs having a more complex message, confirming the popular view that people give money to people, not to concepts.⁵⁰ Organizations such as World Vision Canada, CARE Canada and Foster Parents Plan fall into this category. In contrast to the first, the second type of development organization is established and maintained by Canadians. Many have no institutional links to international or larger domestic organizations. Some of these organizations are part of larger Canadian organizations having activities far wider than development work, such as the development units of churches, unions, the YMCA/YWCA and professional organizations. This group of organizations performs a wide variety of welfare, relief, community development, social justice and advocacy functions in developing countries. The third category of organizations, called 'public service contractors', includes organizations that raise very little money from the Canadian public, relying primarily on CIDA to fund their programs. Volunteer sending organizations such as CUSO (formerly Canadian University Service Overseas) and World University Service of Canada (WUSC) fall into this category. The fourth category of NGDOs has concentrated on development education in Canada. 'Learner Centres' were established in the 1970s by the NGDO sector to teach Canadians about international development, increase public support for Canada's aid program⁵¹ and, to a lesser extent, respond to demands by the growing ranks of Canadian development workers

to sensitize Canadians to international issues. In the 1990s, CIDA withdrew funding for development education organizations, dramatically reducing their numbers.

While this classification describes very important traits of the NGDO community, it is static and implies a causal relationship between organizational functions and funding sources that in reality is not very strong. The degree of Canadian control and the source of funding do not necessarily result in dramatically different organizational functions. While it is true that relief organizations focus on emergency operations associated with strife and famine, after these crises, they often administer community development projects as part of the reconstruction phase. Experience with large scale emergency projects tends to equip NGDOs with the skills and administrative infrastructure needed for other large scale non-emergency projects.¹ Differing funding sources do not point to a complete separation of functions between development oriented organizations and public service contractors. CUSO, a major public service contractor, is very well known, but has raised very little of its revenue from the Canadian public. For three decades, it has functioned as a major volunteer sending agency but it also has become known in

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¹One of Canada's largest aid projects is managed by the emergency relief organization, CARE Canada. The 27 million dollar program involves hiring 60, 000 poor women to maintain 100,000 kilometres of rural dirt roads in Bangladesh. Sean Lowrie, CARE Project Officer, interview with author, April 14, 1997.

the West Indies and elsewhere for its projects. In addition, development-oriented organizations and public service contractors have initiated development education campaigns that have had more scope and impact than Learner Centres.

The 1995 'mode of operation' classification system devised by Pratt and Brodhead is not an improvement over an earlier matrix-based classification system developed by Brodhead in the mid-1980s. Heavily influenced by management theorist David Korten,¹ Brodhead grouped Canadian NGOs into three functional categories: service delivery, education and public policy.⁵² He examined these functions in light of Korten's three generations of development assistance: first generation NGOs are involved with relief and welfare; the second broker self-help community projects; and the third collaborate with local actors to effect changes in public and private institutions. In Korten's model, NGOs evolve from one level to the next, but Brodhead has suggested that most Canadian NGOs are involved in second phase activities, and in some organizations all three stages coexist. In 1990, Korten added the growth of social movements⁵³ as a necessary fourth

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¹David Korten used a social learning framework to divide international NGO activity into three generations: relief and welfare, small scale self-reliant local development, and sustainable systems development. See, David C. Korten, "Third Generation Strategies: A Key to People-Centred Development," World Development, (Supplement: Development Alternatives: The Challenge for the NGOs, 15 Autumn 1987): 145-159.

⁵³Social movements are driven by ideas rather than structures or budgets. Shared visions mobilize independent action by countless individuals and organizations across

phase to achieve global people-centred development.

The Korten model has been thoroughly criticized for its evolutionary concept that organizations move from one 'generation' to another. This developmental model explains the histories of some organizations quite well, but for many others it misrepresents their essential features. Both classification systems are helpful in organizing the diversity of the NGDO sector. I find the Brodhead-Korten model more useful, but, like the Pratt-Brodhead model, it implies more about the causation of organizational functions than empirical evidence provides. It is clear that some organizations are born into first, second and third generations and stay there throughout their organizational lives. Others move from one generation to another and back again. However, the majority of NGDOs blur boundaries, performing functions of two or more generations simultaneously. For instance, in any particular region of the Caribbean the leading NGDOs would be involved in natural disaster relief, small scale community development projects, and the development of strategic plans with regional partners to connect project level operations with broader political, social, economic and environmental issues. Chapter V makes the point that changes to the administrative infrastructure

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national boundaries. These participants collaborate in continuously shifting networks and coalitions. David Korten, Getting to the 21st Century (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1990), 124.

of NGDO - state relationships encouraged the blurring of such boundaries.

V. PREVIEW

The dissertation consists of three sections. The first section consists of this introduction and the second chapter which presents key theoretical approaches which have influenced the study. It explores the various strands of research that intersect the organization approach that has been adopted. The second section consists of chapters three and four. The third chapter provides an overview of the nature of Canadian Official Development Assistance (ODA). The institutionalization of the relationship between the state and NGDOs and the rise of administrative infrastructure is introduced in this chapter. The rise of West Indian civil society and role of Canadian NGDOs in its development is the subject of chapter four. Essentially, the chapter explores the North - South NGDO relationship in an historical context, which draws a link between the behaviour of NGDOs (in the North and South) and state administrative infrastructure. The third section of the dissertation analyzes the relationships described in earlier chapters. Chapter five evaluates the concept of administrative infrastructure and its ability to explain relations between the state in light of points raised in earlier chapters. The dissertation concludes with an evaluation of the foregoing analysis and the generalizability

of its conclusions. Of particular interest is the utility of the administrative infrastructure concept in contemporary political science, public administration, and development studies. The next chapter discusses the common theoretical approaches to the subject and locates the organizational approach within this literature.

1. The total number of nonprofit organizations is estimated at 165,000. Of the registered charities, forty-five percent are run by religious organizations; social welfare and education sector organizations represent thirty percent of the total. David Sharpe, A Portrait of Canada's Charities (Toronto: Canadian Centre for Philanthropy, 1995), 1 and 5.

2. Ibid., ix.

3. Dennis Guest, The Emergence of Social Security in Canada, 2nd. ed., (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1985), 30-31.

4. The diversity of roles is noted by several researchers. See, for example Susan Berger, ed., Organizing Interests in Western Europe. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Jeffery M. Berry, The Interest Group Society, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984); Roxana Ng, Gillian Walker and Jacob Muller eds. Community Organization and the Canadian State. Toronto: Garamond Press, 1990; Steven Rathgeb Smith and Michael Lipsky, Nonprofits for Hire: The Welfare State in the Age of Contracting, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press), 1993; Josephine Rekart, The Transformation of the Voluntary Sector: From the Grassroots to Shadow State, (Vancouver: The Social Planning and Research of British Columbia (SPARC)), 1997.

5. Peter F. Drucker, Post-Capitalist Society (New York: Harper Business, 1993), Chapter 9; Jeremy Rifkin, The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era, (New York: G. P Putnam and Sons, 1995), chapters 17 and 18; Robert Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital" Journal of Democracy 6 no.1 (January 1995), 65-7.

6. International examples of the dialogue include the following: Ian Smillie, "At Sea in a Sieve? Trends and Issues in the Relationship Between Northern NGOs and Northern Governments," in Stakeholders: Government-NGO Partnerships for International Development, Ian Smillie and Henny Helmich, ed, (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 1999); David Hulme and Michael Edwards, NGOs, State and Donors: Too Close for Comfort? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); Colin Ball and Leith Dunn, Non-Governmental Organisations: Guidelines for Good Policy and Practice, (London: The Commonwealth Foundation, 1995), chapter 8 and part II; Ian Smillie, The Alms Bazaar, (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre), 1995; Yash Tandon, "Foreign NGOs Uses and Abuses: An

African Perspective," Associations Transnationales, 3(1991): 141-145; J.M. Theunis, Non-Governmental Development Organizations of Developing Countries and the South Smiles, (Boston: Dordrecht Kluwer Academic), 1991; Joan French, "Moving From the Missionary Positions: NGOs, Partnership and Policy," keynote address to the Annual General Meeting of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, (Ottawa, May 30 - June 2, 1991); Kathy McAfee, Storm Signals-Structural Adjustment and Development Alternatives in the Caribbean, (Boston, Mass.: South End Press, Institute for Social and Cultural Change, 1991), chapter 16; Yash Tandon, "Foreign NGOs: Uses and Abuses: An African Perspective" Associations Transnationales 3(1991): 141-145; Ian Poulton and Michael Harris, Putting People First: Voluntary Organizations and Third World Development, (London: MacMillan, 1988); Charles Elliott, "Some Aspects of Relations Between the North and South in the NGO Sector" World Development 15, no. 13 supplement (Autumn 1987), 57-67; Brian H. Smith, "An Agenda of Future Tasks for International and Indigenous NGOs: Views From the North," World Development 15, no. 13 supplement (Autumn 1987): 87-93; Peggy Antrobus, "Funding for NGOs: Issues and Options" World Development 15, no. 13 supplement (Autumn 1987): 95-102; Nigel Twose, "European NGOs: Growth or Partnership?" World Development 15, no. 13 supplement (Autumn 1987): 7-10; Eric Williams, Some Thoughts on Economic Aid to Developing Countries, Address to the Economics Society of the University of the West Indies, Jamaica, 19 February, 1963, (Trinidad and Tobago: Government Printing Office, Trinidad and Tobago, 1963). Canadian examples of the dialogue include the following: Alison Van Rooy, ed., Civil Society and Global Change, (Ottawa: North South Institute, 1999); Laura Macdonald, "Unequal Partnership: The Politics of Canada's Relations with the Third World," Studies in Political Economy 47, (Summer 1995), 124-136; Cranford Pratt, Canadian International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994); Jamie Swift and Brian Tomlinson, eds, Conflicts of Interest: Canada and the Third World, (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1991); Robert Carty and Virginia Smith, Perpetuating Poverty: The Political Economy of Canadian Foreign Aid, (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1981); North South Institute, In the Canadian Interest: Third World Development in the 1980's, (Ottawa: North South Institute, 1980); North South Institute, North South Encounter: The Third World and Canadian Performance, (Ottawa: North South Institute, 1977); Robin Clyde Sanger, Half A Loaf: Canada's Semi-Role Among Developing Countries, (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1969).

7. David Hulme and Michael Edwards, NGOs, State and Donors: Too Close for Comfort? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); Kathy McAfee, Storm Signals-Structural Adjustment and Development Alternatives In the Caribbean, (Boston, Mass.:

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CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

I. INTRODUCTION

In general, nonprofit voluntary organizations have not drawn much scholarly attention. However, in recent decades their successes in the field of international development have earned these organizations considerable praise. Since 1970, NGDOs have expanded in number, size, and capacity in both Northern and Southern hemispheres and have enjoyed the support of governments, multilateral institutions, developmentalists and the general public. This dissertation focuses on the organization of relationships between NGDOs in the North and the South. To study this phenomenon, I examine the administrative infrastructure that established, developed and maintained the relationship between Non-governmental Development Organizations in Canada and the West Indies between 1968 and 1993. By administrative infrastructure I mean formal and informal rules, regulations accountability frameworks and organizational values. I contend that this "administrative infrastructure", which by and large originated in the Canadian state, formed the terms of reference for the design, establishment and maintenance of relationships between Canadian and West Indian NGDOs. The dissertation, therefore, requires a theoretical framework that can analyze both the dimensions of organizational relations between the Canadian state and Canadian NGDOs on one hand, and between Canadian

NGDOs and their counterparts in the West Indies, on the other. The chapter develops such a framework. However, no single discipline offers a comprehensive framework to guide the work of this dissertation. This chapter begins by introducing key concepts and presenting relevant elements of the state-society debate before considering the major themes in development studies and political science literature. In section II, the major themes in political science that are used to discuss relationships between the state and civil society are identified. These include a wide parameter of representation: elite and pluralistic forms of interest group politics, and Social Movements. There is also a brief discussion about the perspectives of Canadian sociology and social work literature on administrative infrastructure. In section III, a key theme in development studies, North - South NGDO partnerships, is discussed with specific reference to the impact on partnerships of international and domestic politics, local elites, and gender. Section IV introduces the organizational approach in both theoretical and operational terms. Preceding these sections is the following introduction of key concepts.

II. KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

Contemporary social scientists attempting to understand relationships between organizations in civil society and the state draw heavily on the nineteenth century ideas of Hegel,

Marx, Weber, Durkheim and de Tocqueville, which conceived of the state and civil society "as partly interdependent and partly autonomous spheres of action."¹ In fact, Hegel's conception of civil society and the state as the essential dual components of political order is the starting point for many contemporary discussions. For Hegel, civil society "was constituted of the complex interactions of individuals and groups for whom the pursuit of selfishness reigned supreme."² The state was understood "as the one organization predestined to identify the public good and private interests and to mediate between them."³ Two of his ideas, in particular, have held the attention of public policy researchers: the dualism of political order and the concordance between what is defined as the public good and the actions of the state.

Few political scientists accept, however, Hegel's notion that civil societies and states are separate entities. On the contrary, Alan Cairns has described Canada's federal policy process as a seamless web of interaction between state and civil society⁴, but would agree with Peter Katzenstein that the way in which state and society are linked is conditioned by history.⁵ In an essay written for the Royal Commission on Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, Alan Cairns argued that the politicization and fragmentation of society and constraints imposed on the state by its own administrative history created a web of interdependence between these politicized societies and the

state. He wrote:

the contemporary state manoeuvres in an ever more extensive policy thicket of its own creation, . . . new governments inherit massive program commitments put in place by their predecessors. These programs are enmeshed in bureaucracies; they are supported by clientele expectations; they are protected by the incremental processes of policy making and budget decisions; their sanctity is preserved by their number and the crowded agenda of cabinets and legislatures . . . ; except in revolutionary times, their existence is usually equivalent to their survival.⁶

Past state decisions provide a lens for future decisions and often limit the choices available. This provides a fairly stable decision-making framework, but in a fast changing political, social and economic environment, it almost ensures that on key issues, there will be a disjuncture between the public good and state interests. Nevertheless, discussions about the work of NGOs often overlooks this linkage entirely or discusses public good and NGOs as autonomous entities.

2.1 Civil Society

The term "civil society" refers to a social phenomenon; it is a public space in which groups act collectively (for reasons that range from narrow self-interest to philanthropy) so as to change the social, cultural, economic or political circumstances of themselves or others. It is:

an aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged in a complex of non-state activities - economic and cultural production, household life and voluntary associations - and who in this way preserve and transform their identity by exercising all sorts of pressures or controls upon state institutions.⁷

Alison Van Rooy, concludes that the term is often "shorthand for the population of organizations trying to change some aspect of society, including government policy, cultural values, corporate practices and the activities of intergovernmental organizations."⁸ In her view, civil society is both an arena in society where people organize and a political project. It is more than a synonym for a grouping of organizations: it is the cultural space they inhabit.⁹ Additionally, civil society is a political project in which people struggle for the right to organize, assert themselves and have their voices heard.¹⁰

I avoid ideological meanings of civil society including the use of the term as a slogan of different movements, parties or individual thinkers who use it to criticize government policies, or who propose it as a vision of a normative social order.¹¹ This dissertation focuses on voluntary organizations in Canada and the West Indies and therefore on civil society in these two regions.

2.2 The State

The state is a product of historical necessity. Michael Mann has contended that enforceable rules have always been needed to bind together strangers or semi-strangers, and that in most societies some rules, particularly those relevant to the protection of life and property, tend to be set monopolistically as the province of the state.¹² The state is

a system of order exercising power over individuals and organizations through national and sub-national governments and an extensive system of administrative and juridical institutions. Skocpol describes the state as a "macro-structure" of "administrative, policing, and military organizations" more or less coordinated by an executive authority.¹³ In her view, the state "extracts resources from society and deploys these resources to create and maintain coercive and administrative organizations" which must operate "within the context of class-divided socioeconomic relations," as well as "within the context of national and international dynamics."¹⁴ The political system, of which the state is an essential component, "may also contain institutions that facilitate the representation of social interests."¹⁵ It may also contain institutions that mobilize civil society to participate in policy and program implementation, yet Skocpol emphasizes that "the administrative and the coercive organizations are the basis of state power."¹⁶ This is the definition of the state used in the dissertation. It highlights the power of the administrative infrastructure of the state within a social, political and economic context, and illustrates a theme developed later in the dissertation that the state and civil society are deeply embedded in each other's spheres of activity, yet both continually demonstrate

the capacity to act autonomously.¹ In the next section, the most popular state-centred and society-centred frameworks through which relationships between the state and civil society are analysed are reviewed.

2.3 State - Civil Society Relations

Non-government development organizations (NGDOs) are part of the vast collectivity of voluntary organizations that populate civil society. As mentioned in Chapter I, some were formed to pursue humanitarian causes, others were established to pursue social, political and economic issues, and others organize individuals around a common idea. NGDOs, like most voluntary organizations in civil society, maintain a multi-dimensional relationship with the modern state. NGDOs deliver services of interest to, and sometimes on behalf of the state, mobilize support for state policies, undertake research that is of interest to the state, and advocate particular viewpoints to state managers and the general public. The delivery of services or programming dominates the daily activities of most NGDOs. I contend that the administrative infrastructure that governs their relationship with the state shapes their behaviour along with social, political and economic factors. However, very few researchers have taken this approach to

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¹Autonomy is defined as the ability of each entity to structure or manage interest group representation, to pursue its agenda with little or no input from organized interests, or even to pursue its agenda against the will of organized interests.

examining relationships between NGOs (or voluntary organizations for that matter) and the state. This section of the chapter explores key contemporary approaches to state - civil society relations.

Liberal and neo-marxist scholars agree on the symbiotic nature of the relationship between state and civil society, but disagree on the distribution of power in the relationship and on its normative consequences. It is not surprising, therefore, that their perceptions of relations between the state and civil society differ markedly. In explaining the formulation and implementation of political behaviour, liberal "society-centred" interpretations, on the one hand, point to the influence of culturally-based public preferences articulated by political parties at election time or continuously through interest group elites or sectoral networks of organizations. Such interpretations have dominated liberal Anglo-American political science scholarship for several decades. They are analyzed later in the chapter. The state has also been a focal point of neo-marxist study. This work is not taken up in this dissertation. However, its contribution is important to note, as it set the stage for several new perspectives on state - society relations. Neo-marxist scholars emphasize that the state is not just an administrative apparatus responsive to class dynamics, it is, in fact, central to the organization of class relations through its mediation and intervention in the economy through

various economic and social policies, programs and regulatory instruments, which are essential for the accumulation of capital. In the early 1970s, partially in response to liberal analyses, Ralph Miliband constructed a framework to illustrate the instrumental role of capitalist class.¹⁷ He argued that the common social and economic characteristics of elites unify the capitalist class and that these networks manipulate the state according to their interests. In contrast to this society-centred perspective, Nicos Poulantzas advanced an approach that emphasized the internal divisions within the capitalist class and the state, which gives the state a degree of "relative autonomy" from the capitalist classes.¹⁸ This independence allows the state to focus on the long term interests of capital, which requires, at times, initiating policies and programs that run counter to the immediate interests of capital sectors. In the 1980s, Claus Offe offered a third approach to understanding the role of the welfare state. He contended that the state is internally divided by the fact it must provide a broad range of services with taxes derived from private capital accumulation. The welfare state is committed to a certain level of services and it must manage national economic affairs to ensure a steady stream of adequate taxation to support these services. However, capital works relentlessly to reduce its tax burden, primarily by arguing for the reduction and privatization of these services.¹⁹ According to Offe, there is a constant tension

between the "commodification" and "decommodification" of state activities which the welfare state must manage to ensure its own survival. Similarly, James O'Connor wrote that the state is responsible for both legitimation and accumulation functions and that these have a tendency to come into conflict with the reduction in fiscal resources.²⁰

A major contribution of neo-marxist scholarship has been to force liberal scholars to explore "state-centred" frameworks that emphasized the fact that the state is an actor in its own right. Since the late 1970s, many liberal state-centred perspectives have focused on the personal interests of state managers and their perceptions of the national interest. A few other perspectives, however, have focused on organizational culture, values and the nature of administrative instruments. Practically speaking, this means that the operational units within state departments exercise their authority by using policy and program instruments to interpret and operationalize the national political agenda. Both perspectives fall under the rubric of neo-institutionalism. However, it is the latter approach that that forms the basis of the theoretical framework for the dissertation. It has been chosen because for a study of the relationship between the Canadian state, Canadian NGDOs and their NGDO partners in the West Indies, the neo-institutional lense focuses on the myriad of micro level interactions that occur between states and NGDOs, and their partners. Other

theoretical perspectives do not do this. Therefore, the numerous liberal society-centered texts focusing on policy making processes and the power dynamics of interest groups tend to overlook evidence pointing to the independent power of the state. More importantly, however, their focus on interest group representational politics usually means that they miss the essence of state - NGDO relations: operational program dynamics. Canadian NGDOs interact with the state primarily as clients of programs and to a much lesser degree as interest groups. For the majority of Canadian NGDOs, political advocacy is not a key feature of their mandate. Meanwhile, neo-marxist approaches tend to be too macro-scopic to address operational program dynamics. These are subsumed under broader state structures inextricably intertwined with class relations which leaves little room for a discussion of state decisions and actions that may stem from other conditions. It appears that while neo-marxist perspectives provide powerful concepts for debates about the distribution of power in society, they are rather ill-suited for micro level analyses of inter-organizational relations.

The neo-institutional framework presented in the dissertation is not intended to challenge macro theories. Nor is it intended to ignore the importance of other state and societal forces in explaining state - NGDO relationships. International and domestic social and economic dimensions of the relationship are included in the discussion. The

relationship between the Canadian state, Canadian NGOs and their partners in the West Indies is developed in the context of a shared colonial history involving economic trade. For instance, one of the key economic and social factors developed in the dissertation is the rise in Canada and the West Indies of neo-liberal economic thinking. Indeed, the relationship between NGOs and the West Indies has been influenced by the ascendancy of neo-liberal economics. In Canada, neo-liberal policies have reduced and rationalized hundreds of state initiatives, including those that engage NGOs. In the West Indies, debt reduction, structural adjustment programs, export-oriented trade policies and other neo-liberal initiatives have had major social and economic effects. These have become focal points for the activities of some West Indian NGOs and their relations with Canadian NGO partners. The neo-institutional approach presented in the dissertation does not deny the existence of macro social and economic influences. It offers a micro organizational framework that when used with other perspectives leads to a more complete understanding of state - NGO relations.

Researchers from the fields of international development studies, political science and sociology have contributed to the literature on relationships between the state and NGOs and between NGOs in the North and South. However, theoretical frameworks, approaches and instruments geared to program level operations are not easily found. International development

studies offer several perspectives on North - South NGO partnerships. Political science and sociology offer an array of frameworks including those that focus on interest groups, policy analysis, the organization of institutions, and social movements. The next section of the chapter focuses on Canadian political science research in detail. It reveals that such research is heavily skewed toward explaining how interest groups representing the profit sector influence public policy and political institutions. As mentioned earlier, few studies in Canada focus on operational program dynamics; virtually none focus on NGOs. This longstanding focus on representation has encouraged students of politics to believe that interest groups' primary motivation in their interaction with the state is to achieve participation in policy development. This is not the case. Most profit and nonprofit sector groups provide service to their members or constituents and are not actively involved in policy development; most of their interactions with the state take place in relation to program design and administration.

III. STATE - CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONS: DOMINANT THEMES IN CANADIAN POLITICAL SCIENCE LITERATURE

For many decades, Canadian political scientists have conceptualized questions about state - society relations in terms of elite accommodation and other more pluralistic forms of representation. Since the early 1980s, however, several

researchers have broadened the range of perspectives by focusing on other forms of political representation, in particular, new social movements. Both perspectives are discussed in the following section.

3.1 Interest Group Representation

Interest groups are described as organizations which exist to provide internal services to their members and to interpret their will or that of the general public to key decision makers. Within political systems they are said to perform two main functions: communications and legitimation.

The communications function includes everything from furnishing technical data to the communication of the intensity of the views of its members which may range from apathy . . . to anger. Groups also communicate the concerns of policy makers and officials to members. The legitimation function relates to the role interest groups play in broadening the base of information and the number of people involved in discussing policy problems.²¹

Interest groups are often used as 'sounding boards' to test policy ideas. As part of this process, they are also frequently encouraged to organize support or to neutralize opposition to state initiatives.²² Furthermore, interest groups play a major role as regulatory and administrative agents of the state. Many organizations regulate the activities of a professional membership or provide services to individuals and communities on behalf of the state.²³

Most observers of Canadian political institutions consider interest groups an essential component of the

political system. For Paul Pross, an 'organic' relationship exists between the two entities. He has written:

As each unit develops to meet its [administrative] responsibilities, it also tends to divide up its work and create a more elaborate organizational structure. These tendencies are mirrored in the pressure group world, since each separate government agency strikes up a liaison with the parts of the public it serves. From the relationship, the government agency gets information, administrative assistance, and support in its dealings with other parts of the bureaucracy - and ultimately with the political environment.²⁴

There is widespread agreement among public policy researchers that the organizational capacity of interest groups is an important factor in determining their credibility and effectiveness. To be effective in the policy process, interest groups must possess a rationally organized structure, permanent staff possessing technical expertise and political skills, as well as tangible benefits to sustain the membership.²⁵

Pross's 1975 statement on this subject has been modified little by successive researchers:

Effective interaction with the Canadian policy system . . . has favoured the development of institutional groups, groups that possess organizational continuity and cohesion, commensurate human and financial resources, extensive knowledge of those sectors of government that affect them and their clients, a stable membership, concrete and immediate operational objectives associated with general philosophies that are broad enough to permit each group to bargain with government over the application of specific legislation or the achievement of particular concessions, and a willingness to put organizational imperatives ahead of any particular policy concerns.²⁶

Beyond researchers' agreement on the necessity of organization, their opinions diverge on the nature of interest group representation within the policy making process. Two broad interpretations may be distinguished. The first describes the policy process as closed because only a select number of groups actually have the opportunity to influence decision-makers. It explains the inequality of group access in terms of how political culture sets standards of legitimacy and shapes political institutions, or how the capitalist political economy structures the policy process. The second category describes the policy process as open. This perspective is based on the proliferation of interest groups in recent decades and the functional interdependency between many of them and state agencies. William Coleman and Grace Skogstad attempt a synthesis of these two viewpoints, suggesting that interest group - state relations are unfixed and depend on the policy sector, the issue and participants. Each of these perspectives is examined in further detail below.

3.2 Elitism

In the 1970s, Robert Presthus described the Canadian policy process as one in which legislators and top-level bureaucrats dominated the decision-making process. Leaders of interest groups assumed a critical role in the process by formulating and presenting claims to political elites and by participating

in a plethora of joint government-industry committees, administrative boards, and ad hoc advisory roles.²⁷ The model he developed stressed the accommodative role of the state and societal elites as a "structural requisite" in maintaining a "rough equilibrium among the contending group interests." The model minimized the role of citizens so as to provide state and civil society elites greater freedom in working out compromises.²⁸

Presthus explained the elitism of Canadian political institutions in terms of political culture. For him, an "essentially anti-egalitarian and bureaucratic heritage" fashioned a "quasi-participative" political structure.²⁹ Moreover, "subtle socialization processes" within North American society differentiated interest groups in terms of social prestige and importance, and so determined their legitimacy and behaviour.³⁰ In contemporary North America, Presthus wrote:

it seems that the doctrine of natural rights has been transmuted into property rights, with the result that a large measure of legitimacy is attached to institutions that preserve and enhance this value . . . . As a result and with many exceptions, business-industrial norms and institutions and interest groups that symbolize them tend to receive generous shares of legitimation from articulate sectors of society. The legitimacy of groups who challenge these norms may suffer accordingly.³¹

Bruce Doern and Richard Phidd agree with Presthus that Canada's political policy process is closed. They explain the inequality of access which exists among Canadian groups in

socio-cultural and institutional terms. They suggest that profit-sector interest groups or "producer groups" and political institutions are "centres of [political] legitimacy" in Canada.³² According to Doern and Phidd, nonprofit groups are suspicious of these producer groups and institutions, and that tends to undermine their public credibility and exclude them from the decision-making circle. They also contend that Canadian political institutions themselves limit the participants in any policy process. They conclude that there has never been the extent of countervailing power among interest groups that is alleged to exist in the United States; the "institutional realities" of Canadian federalism and the cabinet - parliamentary government provide for fewer points of influence and power than the "separation of powers" system in the United States.³³

3.3 The Influence of Capital Accumulation

Liberal and neo-Marxist political economists largely reject the influence of political culture on individuals and political institutions, and they explain the nature of the policy process in terms of the logic of accumulation in capitalist economies that ties the state agenda to capital interests. For them, the structural relationship between the economy, civil society and the state explains why interest groups representing the profit sector have more influence in policy processes than interest groups representing the

nonprofit sector. Charles Lindblom has concluded that business associations have a privileged status in the policy process because major decisions in a market system that affect the economy at large are taken by capitalists. They take on "public functions" which affect jobs, prices, the standard of living and economic security of everyone, and the political security of the government.³⁴ Consequently, governments must offer inducements to capitalists to take the financial risks necessary for accumulation.³⁵ James O'Connor has also stressed the inability of the state to avoid the necessity of accumulation. He has argued that "a state that ignores the necessity of assisting the process of capital accumulation risks drying up the source of its own power."³⁶ Similarly, Claus Offe has contended that "[p]olitical power depends indirectly - through the mechanisms of the taxation system - on the volume of private accumulation. Those who occupy positions of power are in fact powerless unless the volume of the accumulation process allows them to derive (through taxation) the material resources necessary to promote any political ends."³⁷ Thus, these three theorists conclude that a capitalist political economy structures inequality of access to policy and decision-making processes.³⁸

3.4 Bureaucratic Politics

Many of the basic tenets of the closed policy making model can be found in the "bureaucratic politics" model which was

developed by Graham T. Allison in the late 1960s and first applied to Canadian political institutions by Kim Richard Nossal in the late 1970s.³⁹ The model was developed to refute the Weberian notion that governments are unitary entities that make decisions through rational processes. According to Allison and Nossal, sets of participants within any policy process have diverse interests they wish to have pursued and translated into policy, and so have different, and often divergent, policy preferences on the same issue. These authors have concluded that policy initiatives arise from individuals (bureaucrats and politicians), not governments; thus, these initiatives will be shaped by the individuals' own conceptions of the public good or the national interest, by their organizational affiliation, and by their career ambitions. Public policy outcomes are determined through the coercion, conflict, bargaining, compromise, persuasion, acquiescence and agreement of individuals.⁴⁰ In the bureaucratic politics model, "foreign policy outcomes have generally been the reflection and expression of the state's own interests, defined by state officials as the 'national interest' rather than the reflection of the interests of any one group or class in society."⁴¹

In Nossal's account, civil society interests possess limited influence on the development and implementation of foreign policy, but are able to place issues on the public agenda and to help define the parameters of possible policy or

program responses.⁴² From this viewpoint, the state is quite autonomous, much more so than Presthus' elite accommodation model suggests, and more capable of organizing its disparate resources to achieve its agenda than Allison's bureaucratic politics model suggests is possible in the United States. This model is not only a closed one. It also illustrates the potential power of the state in structuring formal and informal relationships with civil society groups. The state is powerful because it can use its collective expertise, legal authority, and fiscal capacity to structure relations between civil society groups and the political authority in ways that suit its agenda.

The foregoing section illustrates the diversity of Canadian political science approaches to state - civil society relations. To summarize, there is a strong focus on the influence of capitalism and the behaviour of interest groups and state elites. In the following section, additional themes are identified that stress more pluralistic and less structured forms of representation.

3.5 The Open and Pluralistic Policy Process

Pross, Coleman and Skogstad reject the notion that state - interest group relations have been fixed by the effect of political culture on individuals and political institutions or by the capitalist political economy. In fact, Pross argues that relations between the state and pressure groups have

evolved as political institutions have adapted to changes in the economy.⁴³ According to him, pre-Confederation commercial elites responded to the vagaries of the colonial economy by sending skilful trade delegations to England.⁴⁴ After Confederation, as new political constituencies meshed neatly with the local, community-based economy, Parliament and the emerging party system became the target of their lobbying efforts.⁴⁵ Then, in response to the centralization and bureaucratization of the state that began after World War One, pressure groups strengthened their organizational networks and shifted their attention from the executive and parliament to officials in the state bureaucracy.⁴⁶ This phase of relations was transformed in the late 1960s and early 1970s by state responses to the faltering economy and the fear that public management was 'out of control'. An executive decision to authorize central agencies to coordinate the policies of line departments fragmented the policy making power structure, making it difficult for interest groups and state agencies to identify the locus of decision-making power. To protect their own authority, line agency managers sought strategic partnerships with interest groups. In Pross's words, interest groups that were "initially valued for their capacity to communicate technical information, became important allies of line agencies in their struggles with central agencies and hostile political elites."⁴⁷ Pross concludes that the key element in these new relations was the requirement that state

agencies surrender their dominant position in the policy process.

Pross contends that since the 1970s, elite accommodation has been displaced by the growth of policy communities. He describes policy communities as interdependent, institutionalized relationships between state agencies and interest groups, where information, technical expertise, policy influence, money, and political support are exchanged for mutual benefit.⁴⁸ Pross views them as plural, democratizing forces. This perspective is based on his belief that in their quest to cultivate allies in civil society, state agencies fostered the dramatic increase in the number of interest groups.

Whereas Pross's argument is consistent with research on interest groups by conservative American scholars, many Canadian researchers tend to explain the proliferation of interest groups differently. Coleman has contended that interest groups were often formed in Canada in opposition to each other's positions over economic and class issues, and not in response to innovations in state organization. He refers to works by S. D. Clark, Paul Craven, and Michael Bliss who have illustrated that industrial and commercial competition within the industrial sector encouraged, since the turn of the century, the growth of groups.⁴⁹

Within the nonprofit volunteer sector, ideological, ethnic, or linguistic cleavages within civil society have been

known to encourage the proliferation of groups. Les Pal has attributed the emergence of the Federation des francophones hors Quebec, the umbrella group for provincial official language minority associations, to the federal funding it has received to improve consultative structures between them and the Secretary of State.⁵⁰ Indeed, Susan Phillips has contended that "government departments shape the opportunities for certain groups - and not others - to participate in the policy-making process by creating mechanisms for public consultation."⁵¹ Additionally, the federal government has a longstanding practice of providing federal funding to public interest groups so that they may represent themselves in consultative processes.⁵² Meanwhile, Roxana Ng has concluded the state's proactive role in establishing and maintaining community groups has been an inexpensive alternative to a more coercive approach and a way of defusing criticisms directed at the welfare state while meeting the growing demand for social programs.⁵³ Still others argue that many groups are established not so much by state agencies for their support, but rather at the behest of politicians seeking ideological support⁵⁴ or for reasons of patronage, or to 'politically manage' or coopt a particular group of society.⁵⁵

In the last two decades, there has been a proliferation of interest groups as well as a tremendous diffusion of power within the state. How these two events are related appears to be more complex and varied than Pross suggests. Many interest

groups in the profit and nonprofit sectors have not been willing allies of agencies involved in intrastate battles. In addition, many state agencies have found that interacting with so many groups severely taxes their administrative and political energies. The point to be stressed here is that interest group pluralism on one hand, and the desire of the state to build alliances with interest groups, on the other, do not naturally lead to successful alliances.

Coleman and Skogstad have interpreted parts of Pross's work to develop a typology of Canadian interest group - state relations within a policy community framework. Their research supports the arguments of liberal and left political economists that the policy process for interest groups from the profit sector is quite different from those from the nonprofit sector. From the perspective of autonomy, Coleman and Skogstad report that those 'policy networks' "where societal interests have the greatest influence over policy outcomes, virtually always include business as the societal partner."⁵⁶

The typology developed by Coleman and Skogstad tends to describe relations between the state and profit sector interest groups in terms similar to Presthus' elite accommodation model. Relations between nonprofit sector groups and the state tend to be described in the typology as "pluralistic" because of the disorganized, competitive pattern of relations which exists, but this classification lacks

merit. Uncoordinated, ad hoc, and often antagonistic relations between interest groups and state agencies do not constitute a policy community in any meaningful sense. Moreover, from a macro perspective, the policy community concept grossly undervalues the importance of struggles by participants in the policy process to develop and maintain power. Civil society and state elites relinquish power reluctantly and typically aim to construct policy processes where they are in a position of strength.

3.6 Social Movements: A New Form Of Representation

In recent years, the influence of open and closed models of state - society relations have been challenged by the emergence of social movement frameworks which reject many of the premises of traditional interest group models. These new frameworks suggest that the failure of the state to live up to its promises of the late 1960s for greater openness and citizen participation in state decision making, is partly responsible for a 'new' form of interest representation. Susan Phillips has described the study of social movements as "a patient with multiple personalities".⁵⁷ In the United States, resource mobilization researchers have focused on social movement organizations and the mobilization of individuals and communities. In Europe, researchers have largely ignored organizations, focussing their attention on the political and social implications of new social movements. European

perspectives have been influential in Canada. Many Canadian writers have embraced the proposition that new social movements are "new ways of being, thinking, and acting, and social movement organizations are reifications of these ways."⁵⁸ The term "social movement" has been used to describe diverse social and political phenomena: revolutions, religious sects, political organizations, and single issue campaigns. Yet researchers have argued that the values of new social movements exert a democratizing force on societies because high profile movements such as feminism and environmentalism have dramatically expanded the definition of 'the political' and retooled policy making and administrative processes. The boundaries of the state and its ability to define and resolve problems are challenged by social movements that reject predefined political roles such as worker, consumer, client of public services, and citizen and constitute new identities based on gender, age, locality, ethnicity, and sexual orientation.⁵⁹ Civil society has the potential to be empowered as the redefinition of political space generates "politics that spill over into the media and onto the streets, into homes and workplaces . . . "⁶⁰. However, to be effective social movements must increase their autonomy by unfixing societal conceptions of legitimate politics and political possibilities, and define new sites and modes of action, rethinking histories and geographies, and relocating individuals in time and space.⁶¹

The emergence of New Social Movement concepts have fueled several debates. Some researchers have attempted a synthesis of American and European perspectives, suggesting that social movements represent political and social ideas through differentiated but interconnected networks of organizations that act on the state as well as civil society. Others, however, have rejected the premise that new social movements are new, contending that such movements are rooted in earlier agrarian, labour and civil rights movements, and that their contemporary promoters have "forgotten" their history.⁶² Nonetheless, the political project of social movements is to open political processes by radically transforming the definition of 'the political' and rules of political discourse. Some of the normative constructs associated with this project, particularly those which suggest civil society can be empowered and autonomous, are insightful, but the analytical approach used in the dissertation draws largely on other constructs because, based on the above perspectives, very few Canadian NGDOs exhibit new social movement characteristics. For instance, while NGDOs are drawn together by some broad values, these values tend to focus on the mission of NGDOs and other operational questions. Research by Tim Brodhead and Brian Murphy suggests that rather than forging a new political identity and redefining political subjects and policy making processes, the majority of Canadian NGDOs accept the prevailing pattern of state-society relations

and the existing shape of the international system.⁶³ The overwhelming majority of these organizations are not attempting to redefine what is political nor are they attempting to radically redefine their discourse with the state.

An earlier section of the chapter focused on dominant perspectives that focused on the influence of the logic of capitalism and interest group and state elites on macro level policy-making. In the section above interpretations of state - civil society relations that focused on pluralism and less structured forms of representation were presented. Together these perspectives represent the most common theoretical tools available to researchers. However, the foregoing literature review illustrates the inadequate manner in which political scientists have treated relationships between the state and voluntary organizations. Basically there are two issues. The literature focuses almost exclusively on policy making processes, and the political behaviour of profit sector interest groups. Despite their different roles in the economy and society, nonprofit groups have been examined with the same state-centred and society-centred frameworks developed for profit sector groups. It is, therefore, unsurprising that state-centred analyses interpret nonprofit voluntary organizations as agents of the state, receiving funding and direction to carry out the state agenda, while society-centred analyses view these organizations as independent and

politically powerful special interest groups, potentially able to undermine state power.

3.7 Assessment of Prevailing Approaches in Political Science

The state-centred, society-centred dichotomy leaves little or no room for the main objective of this dissertation: the conceptualization of an interdependent relationship between the state and voluntary groups shifting over time, responding to internal and external pressures and exhibiting both dependence and autonomy. Prevailing theoretical approaches focus attention on the independence of nonprofit voluntary organizations, their bargaining skills, and political resources. These approaches are based on the assumption that tension between the state and the nonprofit voluntary sector is natural. Lester Salamon has named this phenomenon the "paradigm of conflict." In the United States, the paradigm has been used to argue that volunteerism has been corrupted by the expansion of state bureaucracies since the New Deal and that the provision of funds and imposition of state values have displaced nonprofit community-based organizations.⁶⁴ Even though Salamon has shown the paradigm of conflict does not correspond with the history of relations between the state and the voluntary sector in the United States, the paradigm has had considerable influence there.⁶⁵ The paradigm of conflict is also present in Canada. On the one hand, politicians and state managers argue that nonprofit voluntary organizations

disdain the state, so should not be supported.⁶⁶ On the other, many individuals and voluntary organizations and communities feel that the autonomy and values of nonprofit voluntary organizations and their accountability to individuals and communities are threatened by the national and regional agendas of bureaucratic and political institutions, and warn organizations to keep their distance from them.

In Canada's international development sector, the conflict paradigm is expressed as competition between NGOs, CIDA and the Department for Foreign Affairs and International Trade. There is a belief in the permanent contest of wills between the state and NGOs over how Canada can best contribute to international development. Rhetoric has pitted "democratic, people-centred, development" promoted by NGOs against "bureaucratic, bilateral projects" authorized and managed by states and international organizations.⁶⁷ In the most extreme version of the paradigm, NGOs view their efforts as empowering people and fostering social justice and democratic development. The state and its policies are viewed as barriers to their success. Conversely, state managers consider their efforts an outgrowth of various domestic and international interests, but see NGOs as politically unsophisticated and poorly managed 'operations' that promote special interests and 'run' on rhetoric and government handouts. The conflict paradigm is prevalent, yet it inaccurately portrays the relations between the state and

NGDOs. It is popular because of the pervasiveness of the interest group approach to understanding such relations, and because isolated clashes between the state and NGDOs attract media attention, giving the paradigm of conflict far more exposure than day-to-day relations state - NGDO relations.

Several scholars have challenged the popularity of the interest group, policy community and the paradigm of conflict models. In the early 1980s, Susan Berger argued that interest groups do more than aggregate, articulate, and transmit demands. Her research illustrated that since the mid-1970s, interest groups have taken on roles which previously belonged to the party system or to government, such as socializing citizens, organizing consensus, making policy, and implementing law.⁶⁸

3.8 The Importance of Operations

Drawing inspiration from Berger, I argue that the nature of NGDO - state relations is not to be found in interest group or policy community models or by accepting the conflict paradigm. These models assign too much rationality to state behaviour and, in so doing, suggest that interest group bargaining for the development and implementation of policies is the primary reason civil society and the state interact.⁶⁹ In fact, it is more common for organizations and individuals to interact with the state as clients of programs and participants of consultative processes than to be involved in policy

development processes. Most organizations are service-oriented and therefore focus on relations that further this aspect of their mandate. Policy advocacy is not absent, but is seen as an adjunct to their project development and management, public education and fund-raising activities. The state has attempted to limit the amount political advocacy of registered charities. Under the Income Tax Act, no organization whose primary purpose is to bring about changes in law or policy, or to persuade the public to adopt a particular view, can qualify for charitable status.⁷⁰ However, the regulation is not strictly enforced, and there have been few penalties issued.¹

Frequent interaction between state managers and civil society has ensured that individuals and groups have a much better understanding of state programs than of the vague policies and complicated statutes which authorize them. Programs play a much more important role linking state and society together than indicated in interest group or policy community literature. Yet the relationship between state policy-making and the dynamics of programming is largely uncharted. Even in policy instrument and implementation studies it is not developed in any significant manner.

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¹The Income Tax Act, paragraph 149(1), also prohibits the transfer of charitable funds to third parties over whom the charity has no control. It would appear the Revenue Canada has recognized that this is a fundamental practice in North - South NGO relations, and chosen not to pursue any Canadian NGOs contravening the law.

Policy instruments are considered mechanisms to achieve policy goals. Among the most popular are exhortation, spending, taxation, and regulation, but G. Bruce Doern and Richard Phidd developed a finer typology in the early 1990s that listed twenty-six.⁷¹ Much of the discussion about policy instruments has been focused on the political or technical rationale that causes one instrument to be chosen over another or the relationship between instruments and outcomes.⁷² The fact that policy instruments gain their force through programs has not generated much theoretical interest. The nature of programming has been left to implementation studies. These focus on the attributes of program design and management; however, implementation studies have not generated much interest in Canada. In the United States, where there is a significant literature, the aim is rather pragmatic. Such studies have been concerned with assessing policy or program effectiveness and prescribing solutions.⁷³ In general, implementation literature has not presented state programming in a positive light. In the 1990s, in both Canada and the United States, it has been home to discussions on the private sector delivery of state programs.⁷⁴

In traditional political science scholarship, programs are understood as products of policy-making processes. However, the fact is, programs have several important effects on the development of policy. First, individuals and groups that become well versed in the functioning of programs are

called upon for policy advice. Second, local programs are often expanded to regional or national levels becoming major components of new or preexisting policies. Finally, when a policy has not been articulated, existing programs, taken together, often serve as its substitute. The importance of focussing on programs is illustrated by the contemporary history of Canadian Official Development Aid (ODA). Major ODA policy statements were elaborated in 1975 and 1987. The latter statement officially sanctioned the use of partnerships with NGOs, educational institutions, and private sector organizations. It also highlighted the role of women, democratic practices, and human rights as agents of development. All of these issues were unofficial elements of NGO Division programs long before the policy statement was issued. In most cases, they were discovered in the course of ongoing project relationships with Canadian NGOs and their partners in the South.

I have asserted that despite the focus of Canadian political scientists on interest group bargaining, conflict and policy making, the organization, development, and administration of programs provide the key to understanding how NGO - state relationships are established and maintained. This approach does not deny the importance of both the social, political and economic forces which have had a bearing on the relationship. It highlights the explanatory power of programs and their administrative norms and

structures in state relations with voluntary organizations.

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, no single discipline was expected to offer a comprehensive theoretical framework for the dissertation. It was expected that Canadian Sociology and Social Work literature would provide assistance in the development of the framework. Canadian sociologists have produced descriptive essays and research monographs that consider the responses of domestic organizations to either federal, provincial or municipal policy or programs. Several of the essays in Roxana Ng, Gillian Walker and Jacob Muller's Community Organization and the Canadian State (1990) identify administrative infrastructure as a factor in shaping program outcomes. However, in these essays, administrative infrastructure is viewed as a undifferentiated set of instruments for the control and regulation of behaviour. There is no discussion about the difference between one set of program instruments and another. There is no sense that the choice of instruments is a powerful factor itself. In addition, the analyses tend to focus on the impact of particular programs on individuals and communities. Relations between the state and volunteer organizations are not theorized in any depth. For the construction of the theoretical framework of relations between the federal state and NGDOS, these studies are of limited value. In the next section, Development Studies literature and its "partnership" approach, which has been so popular in the last decade is

examined.

IV. DEVELOPMENT STUDIES: NORTH-SOUTH PARTNERSHIPS

It might be expected that Development Studies would have begun theorizing about administrative infrastructure as part of its exploration of north - south bilateral and NGDO partnerships. Much has been written about the rhetoric and reality of these partnerships. Unfortunately, except for the odd mention here and there in overview texts and monographs, administrative infrastructure has not been discussed within this context.

4.1 Between Rhetoric and Reality

Since the early 1980s, the establishment of "partnerships" has been a major objective of NGDO practitioners and scholars alike. Partnerships were designed to replace the inequitable relationships established in the 1960s and 1970s that were dominated by the values and objectives of Northern NGDOs.⁷⁵ As part of this effort, numerous studies on the form, content and potential of North - South NGDO partnerships have been conducted. They tend to emphasize mutual trust, respect and equality as well as a degree of reciprocity in decision-making, evaluation and accountability.⁷⁶ Moreover, they embrace development as a process that lies not so much in the delivery of outside inputs as in the uncovering and strengthening of the local capabilities of people and institutions.⁷⁷

Since the late 1980s, there has been a concerted effort

on the part of Northern and the Southern organizations to operationalize the core values of partnerships and embed them in day-to-day practices.¹ Under ideal conditions, partnerships build trust, produce decision making frameworks that share power and resources equitably and facilitate processes that build solidarity for the struggle for political and social justice. However, there is plenty of evidence that most partnerships do not come close to this ideal. In fact, numerous researchers in the North and South have indicated that there is a large gap between the rhetoric and reality of partnerships. In his book, Alms Bazaar: Altruism Under Fire - Non-Profit Organizations and International Development, Ian Smillie contends "every Southern [NGDO] has a donor-related horror story to tell."⁷⁸

Failed partnerships involving Canadian NGDOs have been chronicled by several authors. Clyde Sanger's Half a Loaf, Ian Smillie's The Land of Lost Content and Robert Carty and Virginia Smith's Perpetuating Poverty describe some of the bilateral and NGDO failures of the 1960s and 1970s. In the

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¹For instance, in the Caribbean, the application of these values brought members of the Caribbean regional NGDO coalition, CARIPEDA, to participate in planning the Caribbean programs of the Canadian Interagency Working Group on the Caribbean, a coalition that included OXFAM-CANADA, CUSO and INTER-PARES. In part, these values motivated CUSO to develop a program to hire Caribbean nationals working under the guidance of Caribbean NGDOs. In addition, partnership values motivated several Northern NGDOs to join with Caribbean NGDOs to support the creation of the Caribbean Policy Development Centre, to participate in regional Caribbean policy making processes. Bob Thomson, interview with author, November 24, 1994; Ian Smillie, interview with author, December, 4 1994.

late 1980s, Brodhead and Herbert-Copley's review of fifty-one NGDO projects revealed that the success of NGDOs in building meaningful partnerships was "at best, uneven".⁷⁹ Almost a decade later, Lynn Hatelly concluded that the majority of Canadian NGDOs that describe their relationships as partnerships "are not resolving the contradictions and injustices characterizing past aid relationships."⁸⁰ Moreover, Hatelly contends that many NGDOs "are glossing over the inequities that exist between the North and South and between groups of people that differ in terms of gender, race, class, and ethnicity"⁸¹ and still others have difficulty addressing "the asymmetry of power underlying a North/South partnership . . . which is reinforced by the funding base of Northern NGOs."⁸²

4.2 Explaining Successes and Failures

The barriers to the development of successful partnerships have been a popular topic since the mid-1980s. Some research aims to show what success looks like, other research has detailed the many failures. In these studies several theoretical frameworks are used. Some researchers attribute

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⁷⁹In a sample of 51 overseas projects, researchers estimated of the degree of local participation, with the following results: in 22 percent of cases there was essentially no participation of beneficiaries; in 24 percent a low level of participation; in 36 percent a moderate level; and in only 18 percent a high level of participation. Brodhead and Herbert-Copley, op. cit., 120.

the failure of NGDO relationships to a variety of variables including, a lack of trust, differing ideologies, the power of elites, the inflexibility of rules, and several local, regional and international economic, social and political factors. Other researchers focus on just one or two variables. Of these, the most popular have been domestic and international politics, interventions by state and community elites, and gender. Each of these variables is discussed briefly in the following sections.

4.3 Domestic Politics

All NGDOs, whether they are local or foreign, operate within the boundaries of a nation-state and at the pleasure of a sovereign government. Typically, they are confronted with governments that resist any reduction in its leadership role in development.⁹³ In authoritarian regimes where NGDOs tend to oppose the state there is usually a major effort by the state to regulate partnerships between the NGDOs and their Northern partners. Even in liberal democracies, such authoritarian tendencies exist. It is not surprising, therefore, that Southern NGDOs commonly cite national political institutions and the agenda of the governing party as potentially disruptive factors in their relationships with foreign NGDOs. Northern and Southern NGDOs attempt to insulate their relationships from domestic politics by "playing by the rules", which means not engaging directly in

electoral politics, following local state protocols and keeping the state informed of project activities.

In the West Indies there are hundreds of NGDOs, most of which do not involve themselves in political debates. However, a small but significant number of NGDOs were formed to identify the root causes of social and economic crises and facilitate social change. They too attempt to play by the rules, but at times their probing investigations and public organizing bring them into conflict with the state. The projects these NGDOs have undertaken often have the twin goals of contributing materially to households and communities and training individuals and communities to develop a framework for analysis of their social and economic conditions. Given the colonial history of the region and the contemporary state of dependent capitalism, such a framework necessarily requires the consideration of their conditions within the broader regional and international social and economic sphere.

4.4 International Politics

The skill of employing local, regional and international analytical frameworks to explain domestic conditions is highly developed among leading West Indian NGDOs. Since the early 1980s, the Social Action Centre (SAC), the Women and Development Unit based at the University of the West Indies (WAND), the Association of Agencies (ADA) and the Caribbean Policy Development Centre (CPDC) linked levels of analysis to

address the crushing effects of the debt crisis, IMF Structural Adjustment Programs, gender inequality and poverty.

The practice of linking local conditions to regional and international social and economic forces has led to a critical assessment of the North-South NGDO relationships by leading West Indian NGDOs. Northern models of development based on industrialization, tourism or niche-market exports have been squarely challenged by alternative models that focus on small scale economic development based on local and regional needs. Within this context, North-South NGDO relationships have been scrutinized. Some analysts have argued that the transfer of funds to the West Indies via NGDO relationships without a strategic vision undermines social change efforts.⁸⁴ David Lewis and Xabier Gorostiaga charge that such relationships just "patch up" the social and economic crisis and help to maintain the status quo between rich and poor nations.⁸⁵ For the majority of writers, however, barriers to economic and social development exist at least as much at the micro level of project management and community organization as at the macro level of international political economy.

4.5 The Power of Elites

The power of local civil servants or local community and regional elites, and their ability to use NGDO relationships to their own ends has been a very common explanation for the failure of both bilateral and NGDO partnerships. This is

particularly the case in rural development. Ramesh Kumar Singh of the British NGDO ActionAid argues that the civil servant assigned to the project is often completely out of touch with the needs of rural people. He writes:

The civil servant has often not travelled to the area in which the project will take place: or if he has, then he probably stayed at the government rest house in the regional capital, and talked to other members of the centralised elite with ideas like his own.⁸⁶

When the civil servant intervenes in the relationship between the local NGDO and the Northern NGDO, it is usually to bring outcomes in line with the civil servant's or the government's views. Even if the state takes no interest in the project, village elites are likely to attempt to use the relationship for personal gain. Judith Tendler has argued:

Because communities are often portrayed . . . as internally harmonious and without potential for class conflict, this may have made it easier to assume that decision-making by village elites was the same as, and had the same distributional results as, participation.⁸⁷

The desire by elites to maintain power structures at the local level may have a significant impact on local and North - South NGDO relations. The role of women in the economies and societies of developing countries cannot be overestimated and since the 1970s, a feminist critique has also been influential in explaining the failure of North - South NDGO relationships.

4.6 Gender

Lynne Hately has summarized arguments by Southern and Northern

researchers which contend that partnerships have been based on ethnocentric and androcentric concepts, classifications and values of Northern development activists and practitioners. Northern male biases limit the capacity of Northern NGOs to incorporate gender into their work.⁸⁸ In most cases, these organizations fail to acknowledge the differential needs, experiences, and concerns that exist between women and men.⁸⁹ This gender blind approach is reflected in the relationships these NGOs establish with Southern NGOs, and as a result these relationships fail to create initiatives that address the needs of women, who are often the poorest and the most marginalized in Southern countries. In the West Indies, in the late 1970s, the Rose Hall agricultural community development project undertaken by the Women and Development Unit of the University of West Indies, confirmed their hypotheses that "development which is meaningful to poor women requires approaches which challenge - and change - existing power relationships between men and women, as well as between the community and the state."⁹⁰ The popular and readily available technical assistance was not enough, much greater support was needed for development of initiatives and strategies that increase the capacity of women to cope with social, economic and political issues.

4.7 Assessment of Development Studies Approaches

Explaining NGO partnerships using variables such as domestic

politics, the role of elites or the lack of gender analysis usually do not tell the whole story. Missing in such explanations is a probing discussion of how the organization of the relationship affects the behaviour of these actors. Occasionally, organizational variables are included in the description of these relationships; however, researchers usually give them the short shrift. I contend, to fully understand NGO relationships one must investigate the administrative infrastructure binding the state, and NGOs together. As mentioned earlier, the pattern of interaction between the state and NGOs calls for the use of analytical frameworks that focus on program level operations, rather than representational politics which tends to be focused on higher level analysis.

V. THE ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH

This section discusses the theoretical framework of the dissertation in detail. It discusses the key traits of the organizational approach and establishes its location within the neo-institutional school of political science. The utility of the organizational approach is illustrated with general and CIDA-specific examples. James Q. Wilson is the chief proponent of the "organizational approach". He rejects models of state behaviour-based solely on empirical techniques of policy analysis, interest group pluralism, or legal-constitutional concepts, contending that the effectiveness of

the state has more to do with how its apparatus is designed than its finances, client populations, or legal arrangements. As this approach illustrates the fact that the organization of political life matters, I consider it part of the neo-institutional family of research. Neo-institutionalism focuses on the power of organized and established procedures administered by the state.⁹¹ It explains state behaviour as more than the sum of countervailing pressure from civil society groups or accommodative relationships between civil society and state elites. While not denying the importance of social forces in politics nor the motives of individual actors, it argues for a more autonomous and central role for the state than is usually presented in the literature.⁹²

There is a very wide range of research, organizational concepts and relationships subsumed under neo-institutionalism. Some researchers such as myself feel it is important to focus on basic questions that strengthen the concept's definition and acceptance. However, most North American researchers in Political Science, Management Studies, Sociology, Economics and Organizational Studies have been eager to "put neo-institutionalism to work". A very popular practice has been to investigate the procedural differences between private and public sector organizations using a rather crude bipolar model. On the one hand, private sector organizations have been presented as entities that must meet technical or competitive challenges, while on the other public

sector organizations have been described as entities that must meet institutional demands.⁹³ According to these authors, organizations facing technical challenges are evaluated primarily by their outputs while organizations facing institutional demands are judged more by the appropriateness of the nature of their processes.⁹⁴ Within this framework, an array of specific questions has focused on increasing the competitive challenges of public organizations and/or reducing their institutional demands. There are implications for both intra-state and civil society relationships. Researchers argue that by using these relationships strategically, state processes can be streamlined, expenditures reduced and service to the public improved. I think that much of this research is premature. Not enough is known about organizational procedures and their influence on outputs to engage in applied comparative research. Accordingly, this dissertation does not adopt this popular research framework. Researchers with less ambitious objectives focus on the power of organizational attributes and individual staff skills.

Francis Rourke has concluded that expertise, rooted in the skills of staff and enhanced by the operational characteristics of public bureaucracies, is the state's fundamental source of power.⁹⁵ For him, the highly trained professionals who populate state agencies exercise a significant amount of discretionary power and concentrate on specific problems over a long period of time. They develop a

superior, if not, monopolistic command of the 'facts', which are projected out into civil society and institutionalized within the state (through corporate systems and staff indoctrination). Furthermore, by strengthening skills and knowledge through complex labour-dividing structures, the state agency itself functions as a mechanism for enhancing human competence.⁹⁶ Baker has concluded that power accrues to state elites because of the critical roles they play at the conceptual, design, and implementation phases of policy processes. All major initiatives are scrutinized by them, all major legislation is interpreted by them, and they are in control of the implementation of policies and programs. Moreover, to the extent that power is diffused, discretion is increased and their power enhanced.⁹⁷ This dissertation acknowledges the synergies created by organizational and human attributes, but maintains its core focus on how the power of organized, established state procedures and values influence state - society relationships.

The core concept of the theoretical framework is "administrative infrastructure". This concept has been inspired by James Q. Wilson's concept "organizational systems". His concept has nothing to do with organizational charts and lines of authority illustrated therein. Similar to the administrative infrastructure concept developed in the dissertation, organizational systems are "consciously coordinated activities or forces of two or more persons"⁹⁸ that

are governed by the formal rules and practices of institutions. Organizational systems have three essential functions. They provide individuals with the direction, authority and resources to make decisions and undertake tasks. In doing so they liberate ideas, activate individuals, set goals and objectives, provide direction and evaluate results. Of these attributes, Herbert Simon argued that the provision of authority is the most important. His 1957 statement on this matter still challenges researchers who tend to dismiss its importance:

... [I]f organization is inessential, if all we need is the man, why do we insist on creating a position for the man? Why not let each create his own position, appropriate to his personal abilities and qualities? Why does he have to be called boss before his creative energies can be amplified by the organization? And finally, if we have to give a man some measure of authority before his personal qualities can be transformed into effective influence, in what ways may his effectiveness depend on the manner in which others are organized around him?⁹⁹

Despite Simon's influence in the field of organization theory and public administration, it is common for contemporary studies of the state to focus on the qualities of individuals. Organization and public management theorists tend to divide their attention between issues of leadership, personnel management and organizational design, while public choice theorists explicitly study the utility-maximizing behaviour of state managers and officers. Wilson rejects the notion that the qualities and motivations of people are strong determinants of the qualities of organizations because

individuals do not exist unaffected by organizations. In fact, Wilson has charged that when the internal life of organizations is investigated, researchers wrongly focus on the individuals in the organization, overstating their impact.¹⁰⁰ He recalls the classic work, Administrative Behaviour in which Herbert Simon argued that the biological traits that individuals bring an organization, provide popular, yet poor explanations of that organization's success or failure. According to Simon, people are products of not only their biology, family, and schooling, but of their organizational position or role.¹⁰¹ Living months or years in a particular position in an organization exposes people to some streams of information and shields them from others.¹⁰² This cannot occur "without the most profound effects upon what [that person] knows, believes, attends to, hopes, wishes, emphasizes, fears and proposes."¹⁰³

Wilson contends that the organizational roles managers and officers must undertake force them to consider events in the context of the organization's mission, objectives, and administrative instruments designed to aid internal communication, align goals and objectives and ensure that appropriate controls and reporting mechanisms are in place. I believe that an officer's or manager's organizational role is shaped more by administrative controls, reporting mechanisms and performance indicators than by the broad goals and objectives of the organization. This is so because adherence

to the administrative procedures is easy to evaluate and therefore tends to receive consistent attention by central agencies and executives, while the implementation of goals and objectives allow state managers a wide degree of discretion, and progress toward vague goals is difficult to measure. In addition, control mechanisms are numerous, existant at every level of the state's administrative infrastructure. Officers and managers cannot escape them by chance. They link a department or agency to the broader management framework of the state, they link the activities of the operational unit to the departmental management framework, and they govern the specific practices of a specific program, which is the focal point of the dissertation.

"Contextual goals" also influence programs and organizational roles. These program goals or objectives are "desired states of affairs other than the one the agency was [established] to create."¹⁰⁴ According to Wilson, contextual goals tend to take two forms: procedural and preferential. In recent decades, in an effort to strengthen democracy, liberal democratic institutions have been required to pursue goals of procedural fairness by, for instance, ensuring public information is made widely available, ensuring opportunities to participate in programs are extensively advertised and barriers to participation are reduced, if not eliminated. Contextual goals also seek to favour certain interests over others. Managers may be required to favour certain economic

activities, regions, linguistic or ethnic groups while pursuing goals. In Canada, many of these goals focus on providing federal visibility, and reflecting the regional and linguistic diversity of Canada. The achievement of contextual goals are often political or administrative priorities, and thus shape the roles and decisions of officers and managers and the nature of programs.

At every level of the state system, administrative infrastructure shapes the organizational roles of officers and managers. At the macro level, which links a department to the broader management framework of the state, coordination and control mechanisms of central agencies govern departmental expenditure and management, and human resources. Departmental expenditure, changes to ongoing programs, and the actions of state managers are governed by standardized rules and regulations set out by the Financial Administration Act (FAA), which is administered by the Treasury Board. Ongoing strategic directives developed by the Department of Finance, the Privy Council Office (PCO) and the organization's department also continue to shape programming. The operational roles of officers and managers are shaped by the statutes and conventions that govern the work of these agencies. For instance, new programs are mapped to the ongoing spending authorities of the department. A department that wishes to establish a new direction by the establishment of new programs, may find its progress restrained by its established

spending authorities. It may not be able to offer new goods or services or current goods or services to a new client group, because existing spending authorities, which are supposed to reflect the department's current mandate, do not allow for such expenditure. Innovation is rarely not supported based on its own merit. It must fit existing frameworks established by the state. In this context, the roles of officers and managers designing new programs or enhancing current ones, become less focused on the details of the innovation and more on "packaging" new or on going programs to pass the scrutiny of Treasury Board or Cabinet Committee reviewers. In the process, the program itself is often reshaped.

Communication between departments and central agencies is conducted through formal submissions, which "make the case" for expenditures. In addition to identifying the spending authority, typically departments are required to present program goals and outputs as well as human and financial resource requirements. Cabinet committee and Treasury Board analysts tend to review such submissions against a list of questions focused on what the new program is expected to achieve, how it fits with the major policy directions of government, how it relates to the work of other departments, how the delivery mechanism obtains the best possible value from public resources, and how program activities will be measured and reported.

The need to meet or exceed the expectations of cabinet committee or Treasury Board reviewers exerts considerable pressure on the design of programs. Careful consideration is taken to ensure that each element of the submission is elaborated. For this reason, documents are drafted numerous times and are circulated to check content, but also to build support among state managers. The form and content of the new program or initiative is massaged and massaged again to withstand the scrutiny of Cabinet Committee or the Treasury Board reviewers, but also to meet the demands of state managers, who may wish to coordinate the program with another, share human or financial resources, or include or exclude certain activities. The process at arriving at program outcomes is as important as the outcomes themselves.

Middle level administrative infrastructure links program level activities to broader planning and reporting frameworks of the department. This level of the administrative infrastructure shapes the operational role of officers and managers in two ways. Officers and managers need to prepare for key decision-making milestones in departmental planning and budgeting cycles and respond to the "paper burden" these instruments create. Keeping things going, constantly generating and moving paper to respond to questions and to facilitate decisions is the role demanded of officers and managers. Instruments at this level are often informed by Treasury Board directives, guidelines or expectations, but

also reflect departmental priorities and conventions. These instruments, which include briefing notes, memos, background papers, budget and financial planning and evaluation documents are usually less rigid and codified than documents submitted to the Treasury Board for the approval of new programs or spending.

Closely linked to the middle level of state administrative infrastructure is the micro or program level. Often the same individuals must perform roles to fulfill the demands of both levels. However, at the micro level, the operational roles of officers and managers are strongly influenced by the administrative infrastructure built to operate specific programs and interact with clients. Program design has a great deal of influence on the organizational roles performed at this level. As there is no one way to establish a program, numerous factors can influence organization roles. The degree to which management decisions are centralized, the extent to which public consultation is required, the decision-making autonomy of front line officers and managers, the type contract used for the disbursement of funds, the rigour of reporting and evaluation mechanisms all affect the organizational roles of individuals.¹⁰⁵ The skills required by officers and managers to successfully establish and maintain such programs are developed over time as the direct result of their involvement with administrative infrastructure at various levels. Drawing on the work of

Herbert Simon, Wilson's view is that organizational systems socialize individuals and develop their skills to maximize their contribution to the organization. The impact of the organization on the individual is profound. This is evident in the identification of the organization's critical tasks.

5.1 Critical Tasks

Wilson argues that the effectiveness of organizational systems is dependent on the identification and execution of "critical tasks". These are tasks the organization must perform successfully to meet challenges presented by the organization's operational environment. Naturally, staff must have the requisite skills and motivation to perform these tasks well. In the context of state-society relations, critical tasks assist in the simultaneous management of three sets of relationships: relationships within the state, within civil society, and between the state and civil society. Intra-state critical tasks usually require responding to the demands of political executives, which may include providing basic program information, analysing proposals, preparing policy and program options, providing policy and program advice and negotiating complex multi-stakeholder contracts. It might also require adhering to a process governed by another unit within the state. For instance, in Canada it is a critical task to ensure that state units perform their activities within the parameters of a zero-based budgeting

system. This requires managers to accurately estimate their budgetary requirement well in advance of the start of the fiscal year and spend their budget accordingly. Budgetary surpluses or shortfalls are considered the result of poor planning and management. Cautious managers who limit program spending throughout the year are not rewarded for their thrift. A budget surplus is returned to the treasury and often the unit's budget for the subsequent year is reduced. These consequences compel managers to give away their surplus to other units or to spend it on projects that they may have rejected earlier that year. The year end spending phenomenon has led to a host of administrative problems, but its most negative effect has been to reduce the confidence of the public in public management.¹⁰⁶ In addition to critical tasks governed by intra-state demands and processes, units that provide services to civil society, directly or through partnerships, must focus on developing and managing delivery mechanisms and networks. This is a labour intensive exercise requiring a high degree of coordination with other units within the state. Its importance has increased in recent years because declining budgets and shared jurisdictional authority has increased the number and importance of these partnerships.

In practice, it is not uncommon for two or more critical tasks to be in conflict. Many units of the modern welfare state define their clientele in terms of the political executive and civil society. Thus, lines of accountability run

to the Minister's office through the chain of command and to civil society through a host of programs. The management of these relationships is often frustrated by the differing agendas of politicians, state managers and executives of civil society organizations. In many program areas, including international development, elite accommodation processes and public consultations produce objectives and assist in establishing programs that ministers and state executives partially or completely ignore.

In addition to the pressures caused by competing lines of accountability, the work of state units is shaped by other constraints and contextual goals. Wilson argues that state organizations are constrained in the identification and execution of their tasks by the fact that they must respond to the demands of political institutions and other administrative agencies while having little opportunity to influence their decisions, and they must motivate their staff with few incentives at their disposal. State organizations must also pursue goals that are not essential to their mandate. They are responsible for the implementation of a wide range of contextual goals. In the field of international aid, the most common contextual goals concern tying domestic economic objectives to international development projects.

Unfortunately, when state units are burdened with both constraints and contextual goals, the primary goal of the unit is often lost. Critical tasks do not get the attention they

deserve and are executed poorly. Moreover, the inevitable consequence of such a crowded agenda is that managers worry more about constraints and contextual goals than critical tasks. That is to say, they worry more about processes than outcomes.¹⁰⁷ This occurs because it is difficult to measure progress toward abstract goals and objectives, but rather easy to evaluate a unit's adherence to processes.

Many organizational systems have fallen victim to the inertia of poorly defined goals and objectives and other internal and external constraints. Unfortunately, contextual goals attempting to "deepen democracy" can rarely re-energize these organizational systems. A consultation process lacking content is rarely improved by appropriate representation based on the regional and linguistic characteristics of participants. Thus far, the traits of organizational systems have been illustrated mostly with generic examples. In the next section they are considered in the context of the Canadian International Development Agency and its relationship with non-governmental development organizations.

5.2 Organizational Systems and CIDA's NGO Division

In 1968 when CIDA's NGO Division was established it had to establish organizational systems that would enable the organization to effectively manage its environment. This meant identifying and executing several critical tasks, including establishing the legitimacy of the organization with

other state units and agencies, Canadian and foreign NGOs and the public; gaining enough autonomy to design and execute plans, and obtaining sufficient fiscal and human resources. Of these tasks, the most important was to establish, develop and manage relationships with the Canadian NGO sector, their partners and constituencies.

Due to Canada's longstanding economic and political relationship with the territories of the English-speaking Caribbean, NGOs with operations in this region were among the first to be engaged by CIDA's NGO Division. In the early years, common values and development objectives established a relatively harmonious relationship between the state and Canadian NGOs. Values and development objectives were operationalized through grant and contribution programs, as well as international education programs designed by state managers in consultation with Canadian NGOs.

For more than a decade, the program was highly responsive to the needs of the NGO sector and their partners in the South. However, program expectations grew and government became more complex, program constraints and contextual goals increased. In short, critical tasks became more and more difficult to complete. By the mid to late 1980s, constraints and contextual goals dominated the relationship between the state and NGOs. The organizational systems that supported it focused on processes rather than outcomes. The effect on the relationship was great, making its mark not only on relations

between the state and Canadian NGOs, but also on the relations between Canadian NGOs and their partners in the South.

The dissertation's investigation into North - South NGO relations reveals that by the mid-1980s, the relationship between Canadian and West Indian NGOs was increasingly burdened by state processes that narrowed the list of projects that could be funded, tightened accountability frameworks and increased procedural and preferential contextual goals. These constraints and contextual goals did little to assist West Indian NGOs coping with political and economic crises caused the debt crisis and subsequent neo-liberal economic frameworks. As a result, the organizational systems that supported the relationship between both West Indian and Canadian NGOs, and the state and Canadian NGOs, came under attack from the organizations it was meant to serve. With the decline in legitimacy of the organizational systems that supported and shaped their relationship for so many years, the relationship between Canadian NGOs and their partners in the West Indies also eroded. The health of the relationship was dependent on the health of the organizational systems created and maintained by the state.

VI. CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion on organizational systems helps to explicate the theoretical framework of the dissertation. Administrative infrastructure draws on several elements of the organizational systems concept. In particular the notion that organizational systems are established and maintained by the identification and execution of critical tasks. In the dissertation this notion is applied to relationships between NGO Division and NGDO actors. In this context, the identification and execution of critical tasks is difficult because they often conflict, and are frustrated by organizational constraints and contextual goals. Furthermore, to the extent that critical tasks are burdened by conflicts, constraints and contextual goals, the effectiveness of organizational systems is reduced and state managers and officers shift from focusing on goals to processes.

Both Wilson's organizational systems concept and administrative infrastructure focus on the explanatory power of the internal life of organizations. As such they may be considered neo-institutional research. Basically, neo-institutionalism contends that the organization of political life makes a difference.¹⁰⁸ As I have argued in this chapter, the state is more than an arena for contending social forces; it is an entity embedded with standard operating procedures and structures that define and defend interests.¹⁰⁹

Administrative infrastructure focuses attention on the importance of state programs in building and maintaining state - society relationships. It does not deny the importance of domestic and international social and political forces in propelling and constraining state action. It simply attempts to shed light on an important set of variables that has been relegated to the shadows of state - society analysis for too long. The next chapter provides an overview of the Canadian Overseas Development Assistance system, and locates the state - NGDO relationship within it.

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CHAPTER III

CANADIAN OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: MOTIVATION, MECHANISMS AND CONTEXT

Investigations of Canadian Official Development Assistance (ODA) usually begin with the presentation of the "mixed motives" framework which rationalizes Canadian ODA. To the extent that it exists, the mixed motives framework is a cornerstone of Canadian international development theory. However, I contend that motives alone do not explain much about the form or content ODA. A discussion of the administrative infrastructure that supports and shapes distribution 'channels' is required to operationalize the mixed motives framework, and give it analytical power. This chapter provides an overview of ODA motives and aid delivery channels. The NGDO delivery channel and its administrative infrastructure receive special attention. In each section, examples from Canada - West Indies relations are provided.

I. RATIONALE

1.1 Mixed Motives

Humanitarian, political and economic motives have provided the rationale for a myriad of Official Development Assistance (ODA) programs that have been developed and delivered either by the Canadian state, international organizations or non-government development organizations. As figure 1 shows, the growth of these programs has been steady, until recent years.

Figure 1

Figures include all financial sources of Canadian ODA.
Sources: CIDA Annual Reports, 1976-77 to 1996-97.

The lack of economic development in poor countries has been explained by a variety of political, social and economic factors. Canadian explanations have often referred to the lack of capital investment, skills and technology, and in some cases, unfavourable climatic or geographic conditions. In the mid-1980s, the Canadian International Development Agency summarized the problem of development in the Commonwealth Caribbean in the following manner:

[The region consists] of micro states whose economies suffer from a number of structural constraints common to small islands. For example, there are limited natural resources and land for agricultural development, the small size of domestic markets makes industrialization more difficult, and the costs of infrastructure, especially relating to transport and communications, are very high in proportion to the small populations. Mainly because of their small size and narrow resource base, Caribbean economies are extremely vulnerable and dependent on external factors.¹

Assessments such as this appear to explain why technical assistance in agriculture, construction engineering, communications and management have been the mainstay of Canadian Official Development Assistance (ODA).

However, many researchers, state managers and politicians have argued that ODA policy and programs have not been developed on the basis of needs assessments alone. They argue an influential mix of other motives influence such decisions. These are a desire to: express the humanitarianism of Canadians; achieve political objectives in particular countries, regions and within international institutions; and

increase domestic economic and international trade revenues.² This mix of motives is central to the history of Canadian foreign aid. As early as 1957, the United Nations was informed that Canada's aid program was motivated by "responsibility" to the "less fortunate," "the safeguarding of peace," and "world prosperity," including Canada's.³ The next section reviews each of these motives.

1.2 Humanitarianism

Canadians and the Canadian state have justified ODA spending in the name of humanitarianism. Compassion for the less fortunate has motivated thousands of Canadians to support non-government development organizations and demand that government respond to international emergencies. Politicians and the Canadian International Development Agency have also promoted these values, and used them to justify programs. In 1969, CIDA's Information Division justified the Commonwealth Caribbean Assistance program on the basis of humanitarianism and social justice. Citing the "great contrast between where the tourist stays and where the majority of islanders live" it claimed that "it's mainly because of [the] gap between the 'haves' and 'have nots' that Canada has given grants and loans totalling more than \$81 million to the Caribbean in the 11 years since 1958."⁴

However, it is not clear how humanitarian values have been a major influence in the development of international aid

policy. The idea that they directly motivate decision makers has been seriously challenged. Keith Spicer, in his influential history of the first ten years of Canadian external aid, boldly argued that whereas the humanitarian justification of external aid had attained the status of a 'sacred cow', it had no influence on Canadian aid policy at all.⁵ Governments, he argued, acted purely in the self-interest of the states they served, and the rhetoric of humanitarianism was simply a 'smokescreen' for policy conceived in more rational terms.⁶ Similarly, I have found that humanitarianism has had little impact on the trade and investment focus of Canada - West Indies relations.

In the development literature, the importance of humanitarianism is not found as a motive to explain foreign aid decisions, but rather as a tool to mobilize domestic support for the foreign aid program as a whole. Its use in this manner has been assisted by modern communication technology, which has in increasingly prompt and dramatic ways, informed Canadians about a steady stream of human tragedies. The compassion triggered in Canadians by the media has manifested itself in demands for Canadian emergency assistance. Such assistance, CIDA has learned, is more important to Canadians than long-term development aid programs.⁷ The power of humanitarianism, therefore, has been primarily symbolic. It has encouraged Canadians to support bilateral, multilateral and NGDO aid projects and programs

that have little to do with humanitarianism.

1.3 Political Stability

More influential than humanitarian motives are political arguments that suggest development assistance contributes to world peace and stability. In the 1950s, Canada embarked on bilateral aid programming as a partner in the British designed Colombo Plan devised for Southeast Asia. When announcing Canada's support for these nations, Lester B. Pearson made it clear that Canada's contribution to the multi-year aid strategy was aimed at obtaining political objectives. He warned: "If Southeast and South Asia are not to be conquered by communism, the free democratic world must demonstrate that it is we and not the Russians who stand for national liberation and economic progress."⁸ As discussed in the next section, Canada's political objectives also guided its actions in the West Indies.

1.4 Aid and Political Stability in the Caribbean

Canada's decision in 1958 to initiate a development assistance program for the West Indies, and the content of the program itself, reflected Canada's concern for stability in the region. In the post-war period, Canada regarded itself as an emerging middle power, holding a privileged position within a hierarchically-structured empire⁹ with increasing political responsibilities for the region. Thus, Canada pledged

bilateral aid to the West Indies Federation, an institution conceived by Britain to assume its administrative responsibilities. Prime Minister Diefenbaker, like the British, wanted a West Indian institution that would be economically and politically self-sustaining, yet maintain 'historic' economic and political relations with Britain and Canada.¹⁰ Additionally, Diefenbaker praised the Federation plan because it strengthened a political project of his own, the creation of a commonwealth of countries that could serve as a counterweight to the influence of the United States in Canada and abroad. When the Federation of the West Indies was formed in 1958, the Canadian Government was ready with a five-year, \$10 million economic and technical aid package for the new territory. However, the metropolitan vision of West Indian federalism lacked legitimacy among West Indians. The Federation dissolved in 1962.

The period following the Federation's demise was replete with demands by socialist, nationalist and black power movements for fundamental political, social, and economic change. The activism was clear evidence to Canada, Britain and the United States that their desire for orderly capitalist development in West Indies would require a greater commitment of political and financial resources than was anticipated under the Federation plan.

Canada was the only country that showed any interest in making a financial investment to achieve stability in the

region. With little experience in the area and, as Keith Spicer has recounted, a rather ad hoc dysfunctional bureaucratic apparatus,¹¹ the Canadian bilateral assistance budget for the West Indies was increased to \$9 million annually in 1964-65; by 1968, the Caribbean program had disbursed approximately \$48 million to the region.¹²

Lester B. Pearson agreed with the views of the first generation of the development assistance "theorists"¹² that economic aid could remove or reduce world tension caused by economic disparities and ethnic or religious divisions. It had the potential to obviate expensive military expenditures by Western nations when conflict erupted and threatened Western interests.¹³ Whereas many contemporary analysts doubt this view, in the 1950s and 1960s, it was widely believed that foreign aid was a great pacifier able to quell the 'revolution of rising expectations' found in newly independent nations.

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¹¹In the 1950s, aid decisions were made on an ad hoc basis. The Cabinet had no long-term view of aid. The "want of cabinet vision" resulted in an agency that lacked policy capacity, and had difficulty recruiting talent. Additionally, day-to-day operations were complicated by the fact that the agency was accountable to three departments, Finance, External Affairs and Industry Trade and Commerce. Keith Spicer, A Samaritan State? External Aid in Canada's Foreign Policy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966, chapter 4.

¹²Even though Canadian bilateral aid represented only seven percent of the total social and economic development budget drawn up by West Indian governments, it was welcomed. However, Canada was encouraged by West Indians to expand the program and make it more effective. See: Kari Levitt and Alistair McIntyre, Canada West Indies Economic Relations (Montreal: Centre for Developing-Area Studies, McGill University, 1967), 115.

The belief that foreign aid could help institute a program of social and economic benefits under liberal democratic capitalism was certainly embraced by West Indian and Canadian researchers and politicians.¹⁴ In 1963, Eric Williams, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago resolved:

If we in the underdeveloped parts of the world could get for any period of time any assurance of economic aid on the scale that economic aid was made available to Europe after the war, then a lot of problems that plague us in Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, British Guiana and elsewhere would be solved.¹⁵

The link between aid and stability in the Caribbean region was also made by the Canadian government in the House of Commons¹⁶ and Cabinet. In the early 1970s, an internal Cabinet document reinforced the link between aid and stability in the region.

The [Caribbean] region is a highly volatile one, beset with racial tensions, high unemployment, greater underemployment, and immense income distribution inequities. To the extent that the Canadian bilateral development assistance [program], in cooperation with the governments concerned, is directed toward the solution of these problems, then our aid [program] may be seen as a useful support for peace and stability within the region and hence as effective support for all Canadian interests.¹⁷

The ascendancy of social democratic and socialist governments following political conflicts in Guyana, Jamaica and Grenada, further justified the Canadian assistance program on the grounds of political stability.¹⁸

Since the mid-1980s, the argument that aid maintains political stability has not lost ground with many West Indian politicians. The latter have continued to argue that the

amount of aid received or debt relief provided has been insufficient or inappropriate to achieve a sustainable level of political stability, especially in light of structural adjustment measures requiring their governments to repay debt, devalue currency, reduce and privatize state services, and liberalize trade. In 1994, Cheddi Jagan, the Prime Minister of Guyana, succinctly underscored the link between economic aid and political stability stating, "[t]he major threat to national security and democracy in the Americas is poverty, hunger and unemployment, and solving all these needs money."¹⁹

West Indian history has provided inconclusive evidence about the relationship between foreign aid and political stability. In the 1950s, British and Canadian aid did not reduce the centrifugal forces that led to the dissolution of the West Indies Federation. In the 1960s, aid did not have any effect on reducing the fury of "Black Power" protests in the West Indies,²⁰ nor did it appear to be a factor in averting or retarding the Grenadian coup of 1979. In addition, it is doubtful that it has been influential in reducing politically motivated gang violence in Jamaica, which has been uncontrollable since the early 1980s.²¹ Put simply, the colonial legacy as well as post-independence economic planning failures and corruption produced systemic political, social

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¹ In 1992 there was a total of 629 murders in Jamaica; in 1993 there were 679, and in 1994, the figure stood at 690. Corinne Barnes, "Three Years of Polishing Barely Cleans Up Police Force" (Rome): Interpress Service 26, January, 1996.

and economic problems. These factors created structurally dependent economies unable to produce economic security for the majority of citizens, rigid political institutions with preferences for authoritarian rule²² and societies deeply divided along social class and ethnic lines. Clearly, aid can help, but it cannot singlehandedly resolve all of these problems, especially if it is motivated by the economic interests of the donor, as the next section suggests.

1.5 Economic Benefits to Canada

Whereas in the 1950s and early 1960s, a political motivation for development assistance was common, since the 1960s, it has become more common for Northern nations to praise aid's domestic economic benefits: aid has opened doors to trade in foreign countries that would otherwise have remained closed. Aid money, particularly in bilateral channels, has been used as a device to get into markets.²³ "Trade follows aid,"²⁴ said a senior Canadian trade official while giving evidence at 1969 Senate hearings investigating Canada's relationship with the Caribbean region.

State enthusiasm for the domestic economic benefits of aid has always been strong, despite considerable criticism of the policy.²⁵ Maurice Strong, the first president of CIDA, defended the domestic economic benefits of aid, and Michael

Dupuy, Strong's successor, promoted them unabashedly.²⁶ Since the late 1970s, the importance of the economic benefits of aid has become the mantra of politicians and senior government officials responsible for Canadian foreign policy. This has occurred despite public inquiries, the most notable being William Winegard's 1987 parliamentary committee reports, For Whose Benefit, which have argued that domestic economic benefits are best derived through other economic instruments and that Canada's aid should be motivated by humanitarian considerations. Despite this report, since 1987, the commercialization of aid has become a dominant trait of CIDA's operations. This fact has not been overlooked by the Auditor General for Canada nor the NGDO sector. The Auditor General's 1993 report concluded that economic and political objectives had diverted CIDA from the goal stated in its ODA charter: helping the poorest of the poor,²⁷ and since the late 1980s, Canadian NGDOs have lobbied successive governments to implement recommendations of the Winegard report in order to close the gap between rich and poor, transform global economic structures, support environmentally sustainable development, provide security for individuals and communities and develop democratic institutions.²⁸

In 1977, in an address to the Toronto business community, Dupuy informed his audience that fully 60 per cent of CIDA's dollar budget would be spent in Canada for goods and services for developing countries, and that loans and lines of credit to developing countries required that goods and services be purchased in Canada, giving Canadian suppliers a competitive edge by laying the groundwork for repeat business.

Domestic economic benefits rest largely on the longstanding practice of "tying" Canadian aid to the purchase of Canadian goods and services and the common use of development aid to promote Canadian goods and services. Since the 1960s, in the West Indies, politicians and analysts have argued that this practice has distorted planning objectives, discouraged the use of local expertise, encouraged the use of inappropriate materials, and encouraged an appetite for imported goods, resulting in increased foreign exchange costs.¹²⁹ Programming flexibility which has reduced tied aid to between 50 and 65 per cent has not reduced criticism. Canadian NGDOs have long been of the view that moving away from tied aid is an absolute necessity, and in recent years, their position has been strengthened by studies by the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which have highlighted the anti-developmental effects of tied aid.³⁰ Principally, tied aid is not the most effective manner in which to meet the basic needs of the poorest of the poor. Many poor countries do not have the capacity to use goods and services tied to Northern

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¹Peter Wyse, who surveyed the growth of bilateral spending in the 1970s, concluded that it has been an inefficient policy instrument for the stimulation of the Canadian economy and that of the recipient country. He argued: it increased the cost of goods and services by about 20 per cent over the world price; distorted recipient government spending programs; channelled aid toward lower-priority projects; directed aid away from the most needed and most capable recipient countries; weakened aid administration; and encouraged allocations to bilateral aid away from multilateral aid. Peter Wyse, op. cit., 11.

suppliers.³¹ Additionally, the opportunity cost of tied aid, which is cost of not being able to choose the cheapest suitable supplier, adds approximately a 15 per cent tax on every tied aid dollar.³²

Nevertheless, neo-liberal ideas that promote a 'minimal state' and nagging doubts about the effectiveness of Canadian aid have encouraged Canadian policy makers to be unabashed about their interest in protecting Canadian markets and producing economic benefits at home. In 1987, CIDA's Sharing Our Future stated:

Tied aid reflects the legitimate concern of Canadians that their tax dollars should not end up subsidizing competitors in other industrialized countries. Canadians want to help developing countries, but they do not want to see Canadian assistance going to buy the products of wealthy countries that are Canada's rivals for overseas markets.³³

The humanitarian, political and economic factors that justify Canada's aid program shape and are shaped by the channels that deliver Canadian aid to developing countries. The relationship between these factors and a particular delivery channel are discussed in the following section.

II. DELIVERY CHANNELS OF CANADIAN AID

2.1 Size and Rank

Canadian ODA is provided to poor countries through bilateral, multilateral, food aid and voluntary sector delivery "channels". The remainder of the chapter reviews these delivery channels, beginning with the voluntary sector. The

following table and its chart indicate the relative weight of each delivery channel in selected years. It indicates that in comparative terms, the voluntary sector receives the smallest portion of the ODA budget. However, the rank of the sector is not reflective of its importance to the state and public as a delivery vehicle. The voluntary channel is valued because it is the only one that requires the full engagement of civil society. In contrast to the other channels that often accomplish their goals through dialogue between national and international institutions, the voluntary sector requires dialogue between small organizations, communities and individuals to achieve its goals. It is the human face of Canada's international aid effort. As this sector is a focal point of this dissertation, its relationship with the state dominates the next section of the chapter. Later in the chapter, to round out the discussion on aid delivery, food aid, multilateral and bilateral channels are discussed.

Distribution of ODA by Delivery Channel (\$million) Selected years				
	1975-76	1985-86	1990-91	1994-95
BILATERAL	404.66	665.35	925.00	888.40
MULTILATERAL	213.87	711.84	792.50	1089.36
VOLUNTARY	30.40	155.40	251.34	240.58
FOOD AID	222.54	347.81	382.28	317.85
OTHER	32.04	206.64	665.29	297.64
TOTAL	903.51	2,174.01	3,021.42	2,833.83

Table 1

Sources: Data calculated by Pratt from CIDA annual reports. See, Cranford Pratt, Canadian International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), 6. The 'other' category includes the following items: humanitarian assistance delivered through multilateral and bilateral channels, excluding food aid; business cooperation assistance to Canadian companies; grants to public corporations such as the International Development Research Centre (IDRC); foreign student scholarships, loans to the Export Development Corporation, and administrative costs.

Figure 2.
Sources: See Table 1.

2.2 Establishment and Growth of the Voluntary Sector Delivery Channel

Voluntary organizations predate Canadian Confederation and are innumerable, but non-government development organizations represent a small portion of the voluntary sector, currently numbering just more than two hundred. Until the creation of CIDA in 1968, the External Aid Office (EAO) was responsible for ODA, which included the promotion of a "working relationship between the Office and the numerous Canadian voluntary organizations involved in a variety of overseas activities."³⁴ As Spicer chronicled, there was little evidence that the EAO was able to harness the productive capacities Max Weber assigned to bureaucratic organizations. At the EAO, policy and decision-making authority was split between three departments: External Affairs, whose officers often dismissed development assistance programming as "kitchen stuff";³⁵ Industry, Trade and Commerce, whose officers were solely focused on ensuring trade followed aid; and Finance, whose officers wanted to minimize spending. These traits and the operational culture of the administrative infrastructure produced inertia, inefficiencies and poor program decisions.³⁶

The fledgling NGDO sector would have been completely disregarded amidst the confusion, ignorance, indifference, and administrative changes at the EAO in its first fifteen years, if two of its characteristics had not held the attention of bureaucrats and politicians. First, the field work of the

NGDO sector had provided it with considerable intelligence on aspects of development denied EAO officers and managers based in Ottawa. In fact, within the EAO, only the few officers with military service had experience in developing countries. Officers without overseas experience envied those with it, some even envied Canadian volunteers being placed overseas by NGOs.³⁷

Second, in addition to acknowledging the expertise that could be gained from the NGDO sector, a few EAO managers and politicians recognized the potential for other foreign policy benefits. According to Bill McWhinney, Canadian University Services Overseas (CUSO) received financial support largely because the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Prime Minister believed its volunteer sending program would enhance Canada's image abroad.³⁸ Moreover, throughout the 1960s, Lester B. Pearson and other internationalists were gravely concerned about the slackening of the aid effort by industrialized nations.³⁹ External Affairs Minister Paul Martin believed that the lack of commitment stemmed from the fact that the public was not convinced of the importance of foreign aid.⁴⁰ By the mid-1960s, the view of the informal network of government and non-government development aid experts was that the burgeoning NGDO sector should play a major role in increasing public support for Canada's external aid programs. This view was presented at an international development conference convened in 1965 by the Overseas

Institute of Canada, which was the leading development 'think tank' of the time. After reviewing Canada's development aid efforts, government and non-government delegates resolved that the NGDO sector should play a major role in the "massive effort to rally latent public interest and secure the measure of public interest needed"⁴¹ to allow aid to grow as they felt it should.

In the early 1960s, Canadian voluntary organizations involved in international development were largely branches of religious or refugee and relief organizations. In many cases they were simply the fundraising arms of British or American organizations. Such was the case with CARE, OXFAM-CANADA and the Canadian Save the Children Fund. Although the humanitarianism and the grassroots development knowledge of these organizations were of some value to the state, these attributes alone did not lead to a policy role for the NGDOs. I contend that it was contextual goals: the need to build and maintain a domestic constituency for foreign policy as a whole and the desire to boost Canada's image abroad that brought NGDOs into policy processes that ultimately secured state support for them.⁴²

In the 1960s and 1970s, many of the Canadian voluntary organizations involved in international development became secular and independent. These attributes accelerated the intertwining of the relationship between NGDOs and the state. Dialogue with and financial support for civil society

organizations was in vogue in the early years of the Trudeau administration. It was part of a new governance model called "participatory democracy" in which citizens together with their elected representatives, through dialogue and debate, would arrive at a broad consensus on policy issues. By the end of the 1970s, the model was out of fashion, but it left a legacy that included an array of programs with consultative mechanisms, and public expectation that government would become more open and responsive.

The establishment of CIDA in 1968 ended the ad hoc relationship that had existed between the External Affairs Office and NGOs. The first president of CIDA, Maurice Strong, assumed his post with the desire to build a strong relationship between the state and NGOs. Through the creation of the "Voluntary Organizations" division, renamed in 1970 the "Non-government Organizations" division, the state - NGO relationship was institutionalized. Lewis Perinbam, the Division's first director, believed that this relationship should be organized around the values and aspirations of NGOs.⁴³ Perinbam was an internationalist well known to voluntary organizations. He believed that the state - NGO relationship could contribute greatly to Canada's international development effort if it could be freed from the inertia caused by bureaucratic red tape. Blind adherence to rules and regulations over efficiency and dispatch was a federal management trait noted in the Report on Government

Organization in 1962;¹ little had changed by the early 1970s. Perinbam's anti-bureaucratic attitude and management style received little or no support from other senior managers of CIDA. Despite the view held by many development analysts, politicians and general public that NGOs were more efficient and effective than government bureaucracies, Perinbam consistently encountered cynicism from other managers about the effectiveness of voluntary organizations and warnings about their lack of accountability.¹¹

The criticism reflected a clash of development paradigms. The prevailing paradigm promoted by the Bilateral Branch focused on industrialization to increase economic output. This paradigm rationalized Canadian investment in numerous infrastructure projects in the transportation, tourism and agriculture sectors in the West Indies. By contrast, the

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¹The Report noted that "the government's financial controls and accounting systems are cumbersome, with a multiplicity of checks, counter-checks, and duplication. . . ." "This ponderous system, virtually unchanged in the past thirty years, is regarded by many as the price that must be paid under democracy in order to hold public servants properly accountable. The fact is that the present system, with all its excessive elaboration, fails even in that aim." Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962), 94.

¹¹Some members of CIDA's Bilateral Branch were particularly vitriolic. Former NGO division managers vividly recalled the widely held attitude that the Bilateral Branch was where 'real' development planning took place, and that the NGO division was a "charitable fund" run by "a bunch of do-gooders." John McRae, interview with author, November 24, 1994; John Martin, interview with author, November 23, 1994; Romeo Maione, interview with author, October 21, 1994; Bill McWhinney, interview with author, December 2, 1994.

paradigm promoted by NGOs focused on social justice and the sustainability of communities, individuals and their environments. Typically, these projects were small and community based. The idea of creating a program that as its primary purpose was responsive to the needs of civil society, instead of the state, or political executive, was radical. It clashed with the prevailing 'corporate' values and the views of many state managers that over the years had been socialized by it.

2.3 Administrative Infrastructure and the Construction of the NGO division

Administrative infrastructure is the glue that holds the state together. In the last chapter the diffusion of decision-making power, the autonomy of organizational units and the emphasis on program administration were singled out as important traits of administrative infrastructure. These traits shape the decision-making environment of state units, providing managers and officers with parameters for decision-making behaviour. In the following section, the influences of the three traits are examined in the context of the early design and development of the NGO division, and its relations with NGOs. Additionally, the discussion highlights the interplay between the values held by key individuals and civil society and how they can become embedded in the administrative infrastructure of the state.

In the late 1960s, when Lewis Perinbam was recruited to

design, develop and direct the NGO division, he brought to the state a NGDO-based development paradigm that focused on grassroots development initiatives.¹ Perinbam believed the Division's primary task was to respond to these initiatives by supporting the Canadian NGDOs that supported them; he was cool to corporate and political priorities established by politicians that detracted from this task. For him, the NGO division's mission was to build relationships with NGDOs to facilitate NGDO project development and implementation. Perinbam's challenge was to stay true to the grassroots vision of development, which in practical terms meant shaping the administrative infrastructure over which he had control to support his values and development expertise and those of the NGDO community. The diffused decision-making environment and the autonomy of the unit within CIDA provided him with the independence to develop program level infrastructure to serve these ideals. It also helped him to avoid the inertia often associated with the contextual goals that the program was required to pursue. The design of CIDA, and the NGO division in particular, was strongly influenced by contextual goals to:

- strengthen public support for increased foreign aid expenditures;
- reflect the regional diversity of Canada;

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¹Grassroots development occurs through the leadership of Southern NGDOs whose members are poor and oppressed themselves, and which attempt to shape a popular development process. John Clark, Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1991), 35.

- draw the state and civil society closer together and increase the participation of citizens in the operation of government, and
- bilingualize the services and working environment of the state.⁴⁴

Former OXFAM-CANADA and Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC)⁴⁵ executive Lawrence Cumming recalls that from the beginning of the NGO program, NGDOs were informed that "there was a need for the program to have a federal and linguistic dimension".⁴⁶ Indeed, the NGO division program began with a great fanfare, despite its very small size relative to other CIDA Branches, and within ten years CIDA as a whole was leading the effort to bilingualize the state.

New programs are usually designed within the state, with designers drawing on civil society and other external expertise as required. Essentially, designers must align the objectives and activities of new programs with departmental policy and other government priorities, using prevailing administrative and financial instruments. These instruments, which often have a legal basis, are defined and maintained by the Treasury Board. The Board also scrutinizes proposals for new programs. Those which are not up to the Board's design standard in terms of the program's linkage to the government's agenda, specificity of objectives and outcomes, provisions for evaluation, and financial management are not recommended to the cabinet for approval. Thus, the influence of the Treasury Board in shaping administrative infrastructure begins early in the design stages of a program.

Once a program is established, subsequent expenditure increases and operational changes continue to be governed by administrative statutes and regulations administered by the Treasury Board. The terms and conditions of projects are negotiated within the boundaries of contribution agreements. These are legally binding contracts used throughout the state that designate the financial and legal responsibilities of the funder and recipient. Each agreement specifies the expected outcomes, delivery time-frames, financial and narrative reporting requirements, and terms of expenditure. Grants are also contracts, but they have been used less frequently by the NGO division to fund NGDOs, because they have been deemed by the Treasury Board to lack adequate measures of accountability. Grants do not require detailed financial or narrative reporting and thus are employed when an 'arms length' relationship is desired between the state and an NGDO. Against the pressures exerted by state managers and constraints of administrative processes and contextual goals, state managers struggle to establish programs that serve their clientele. Perinbam was able to do so by establishing administrative architecture at the program level that served civil society along side that which served the state.

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¹For example, the North-South Institute, which has been often critical of CIDA, has for many years received an annual grant from CIDA to assist with its operations. In fiscal years 1995 and 1996 its grant was \$1,000,000. The North-South Institute, Annual Report, (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1996).

Flexible decision rules, "responsiveness" and "matched funding" were prominent traits that were developed to expand the NGDO sector's activities without compromising their independence, relationships with development partners in the South, or their links to local Canadian communities. The NGO division established organizational and project eligibility criteria that allowed officers the flexibility to take risks and approve unconventional or politically sensitive projects. Such flexibility acknowledged the numerous cultural, social, political and economic challenges in "doing development" and the difficulty in administering development projects according to Northern values and processes. NGO division managers exercised discretion in negotiations with NGDOs. While respecting the principle of responsiveness, they sought to ensure that the project's methodology was sound, and factors contributing to the success of the project were maximized.

Perinbam also developed a mechanism that matched funds raised by NGDOs from private sources with government funds. Perinbam believed that such a mechanism ensured the applicant NGDO was supported by the Canadian public. Since the mid-1970s, successful project proposals have had their budgets determined by a matched funding formula of between 1:1 and 3:1.⁴⁷ At times, however, the ratio has been raised to attract the attention of NGDOs. Essentially, CIDA has used the cost sharing funding formula to encourage NGDOs to work in regions

or on issues that they may otherwise avoided.¹ NGO division and NGDO managers agreed that the matched funding formula, which ranged from 1:1 to 3:1, significantly fuelled the expansion of the NGDO sector. Former NGO division director, Romeo Maione recalls that at first, several NGDOs restricted their state funding to ten to 15 per cent of their total budget, but as their relationship with the NGO division deepened, and trust increased, NGDOs "jumped on the gravy train."⁴⁸ Lawrence Cumming remembers that the continuous expansion of the sector created some anxiety and some disdain in the sector, "but there was no effort to control it, just rumbling and grumbling in the corridors".⁴⁹ Individual executive directors raised the issue on the quiet, but the Canadian Council for International Cooperation never suggested that the size of the sector should be limited.⁵⁰

In its effort to serve the NGDO sector, the NGO division took many risks. The diffused decision-making environment and the autonomy afforded the unit by the organizational culture of the department cloaked activities that were in contrast with the general direction of the state. For instance, in the

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¹For certain purposes, the ratio has been raised as high as 9:1. Brodhead and Pratt have commented that such a ratio "turned on its head the traditional rationale for CIDA's support to Canadian [NGDOs]. The Canadian [NGDOs] were not providing local knowledge and grass-roots contacts that CIDA lacked but, rather, CIDA had identified the "need," which had a significant diplomatic and political purpose, and then induced Canadian [NGDOs] which often had little knowledge of the country, to become involved." Brodhead and Pratt, in Pratt (1994) op. cit., 101.

1970s, discretion, responsiveness and matched-funding were conceptual orientations that conflicted with conventional thinking on the role of the state and its interaction with societal groups. Throughout the seventies, despite the popularity of participatory concepts, there was little belief that civil society was a tremendous source of untapped expertise. Empiricism was growing in popularity within the state. "Judgement" was replaced by scientific methods which augmented the legal authority of the state to plan, program, and regulate the affairs of individuals, communities, and organizations with confidence and speed.⁵¹ The administrative infrastructure of the state reflected the change, adding an array of empirical planning and evaluation tools to its legal authority under the Financial Administration Act. In short it became less flexible.

Perinbam's ability 'to work the system', and the political benefits of involving Canadians in development projects abroad protected the NGO division from intense scrutiny in its early years, and spurred its growth. In its first year, the NGO division disbursed \$5 million to 20 NGOs in support of 50 projects. By the mid-1980s, it had a staff of thirty, administered a budget of approximately \$60 million and funded almost 200 agencies involved in 2,400 projects.⁵² In 1992-93, the Division provided more than \$158 million to NGOs.⁵³ The rapid growth of the sector had several key implications for the state - NGO relationship. Within the

state, the growth in the number of NGDOs increased the amount of work of the NGO division. By the late 1970s, there were thousands of single-year projects, each receiving less than \$100,000 in funding. The "person, per dollar ratio" of disbursements was very high.⁵⁴ This required the Division to continuously devise new ways to cope with NGDO demand and disburse funds within prescribed time-frames.

The effect of the responsive funding formula was dramatic in the NGDO sector. Initially, project funding provided Canada's NGDOs with a degree of financial stability, but by the 1980s, some were financially dependent on the state, receiving half their annual budgets from the NGO division. CUSO, which received its funding based on the number of volunteers it placed in developing countries each year, received 80 per cent its funding from CIDA. Funding became an essential issue for the NDGO sector. According to Lawrence Cumming, lobbying for improved conditions to project funding became one of the few issues Canadian Council for International Cooperation member organizations could easily agree on.⁵⁵ Higher disbursements required a greater degree of organizational adaptation to CIDA's reporting cycles and this resulted in the bureaucratization of organizations.⁵⁶ Additionally, the expanding budgets meant that NGDOs shifted their attention away from complicated, labour intensive fund raising campaigns that engaged the Canadian public on a personal level. Cumming recalls that in the 1970s there was a

desire to develop an international development movement rooted in local communities. However, with the expansion of CIDA funding, most NGOs stopped developing their constituencies. By the early 1980s, most NGOs dealt with Canadians at arms length; those who once were members had become donors.⁵⁷

In addition to NGO division responsive funding, other lucrative CIDA funding sources were made available to NGOs. More than \$150 million was disbursed to NGOs by other funding sources such as the 'country focus' program administered by the Bilateral Branch and NGO funds for administering food aid and humanitarian assistance.⁵⁸ These funding sources exacerbated the growing trend of NGO financial dependence on the state. However, the organizational culture and administrative infrastructure governing these funding 'windows' was different from the responsive program maintained by the NGO division. Officially, NGOs were offered "fee for service" contracts which provided them with another source of revenue; NGOs acted as agents for projects developed within CIDA. However, in several cases these funding windows funded projects proposed by NGOs.⁵⁹ The administrative infrastructure required NGOs to assume the role of contractor or consultant serving their client, the state. As discussed later in the dissertation, this development had serious implications for North - South NGO relations. In some countries Canadian NGOs performed dual roles. They were 'partners in development' collaborating with

local NGDOs in one initiative, and agents of the Canadian state in another.

2.4 Program Growth

The political success of the NGO program fostered new relationships between CIDA and societal organizations. A broader interpretation of the term 'voluntary sector,' adopted by CIDA in the late 1970s, expanded existing CIDA funding to numerous colleges and universities and legitimized new funds for unions, cooperatives, and professional associations. These organizations were viewed as additional non-governmental vehicles for the delivery of aid. Since the late 1970s, these organizations have gained a very significant share of non-governmental development assistance funds. As Figure 3 indicates, in 1981, as a per cent of overseas Development Assistance, these organizations received only half the amount of funds received by NGDOs. However, by the late 1980s, their share had reached NGDO funding levels, which ranged between 5 and 6 per cent of ODA.⁶⁰ NGDOs have lost financial ground to colleges and universities and other institutions because since the late 1980s these institutions have been quick to promote themselves as professional executing agencies with the capacity and desire to undertake a wide range of CIDA projects. In short, the funding environment changed very dramatically for NGDOs in the 1980s.

Voluntary Organization / NGDO Funding

Figure 3

Source: CIDA Annual Reports, various years. Disaggregated data unavailable before 1981.

Since then, the most important source of funding, the responsive program administered by the NGDO Division, has been marginalized by other sources of funding and successive budget cuts, which took effect after 1989. Between 1988 and 1996 an estimated four billion was cut from the ODA budget.⁶¹ Appendix III illustrates the decline in CIDA disbursements to selected Canadian NGDOs. The seeds of change, however, were sown in the 1970s and early 1980s, when the flagging domestic economy prompted evaluations of program spending and the role of government in the economy, and the international community began re-thinking development models.

Program rationalization and more sharply focused spending was promoted by central agencies and economic think tanks while CIDA was still maturing as an organization. In 1978, a major study by the Economic Council of Canada, which included twenty background papers, recommended that Canada's ODA target be lowered from 0.7 per cent of GNP to 0.5 per cent, that a ceiling be placed on multilateral aid flows and the number of recipient countries be reduced.⁶² In 1979, the Export Promotion Review Committee of Industry, Trade and Commerce, "urged that CIDA attach a far higher priority to ensuring that its programs brought economic benefits to Canada."⁶³ There was a heightened focus on program spending and management. In 1979, the Auditor General mounted a stinging attack on CIDA, demanding better financial controls, and program management. The mixed motives of the ODA program, combined with rapid

growth caused serious management problems at CIDA. The criticism it faced was more than a call "to get its house in order"; the assumptions underpinning the whole program were questioned.

The Auditor General's demands and 'neo-liberal' ideas changed CIDA and the framework for state - NGDO relations. In the field of public management, there began a general desire to shrink the size and influence of the state, and to focus on expenditure management, program effectiveness and administrative accountability. In the mid-1980s the newly elected Conservative government called it a policy of "simplification and deregulation".⁶⁴ To address Official Development Assistance, the Government commissioned a task force to study the policy and organization of ODA that produced a set of reforms "intended, inter alia, to achieve a greater measure of integrated planning within CIDA and secure for Canada greater leverage on the national policies of the main countries receiving assistance."⁶⁵ However, before the inquiry reported, the Conservative Government set about fundamentally restructuring the policies and operations within CIDA, which entailed a process of renegotiating the relationship between CIDA and NGDOs.⁶⁶ On one hand, this resulted in a decline in influence of the responsiveness principle, matched funding, discretion and other elements of administrative infrastructure that supported the development paradigm of NGDOs, and on the other hand, in the rise of

program rationalization, reduction, and empirical evaluation management techniques. In short, a neo-liberal public management agenda was introduced. These pressures changed the relationship between Canadian NGOs and the state from a dialogue between partners in development to a negotiation between agents and brokers of project management expertise and information. The consequence for relations between Canadian and West Indian NGOs was a narrowing of project opportunities, a greater emphasis on accountability frameworks and reporting, and pressure to show quick positive results.

Thus far, this chapter has introduced the role of organizational systems on relations between the state and NGOs. It is developed further in subsequent chapters, especially Chapter IV. In the following sections, the food, multilateral and bilateral aid delivery channels are briefly introduced.

III. OTHER DELIVERY CHANNELS

3.1 Food Aid

For decades, Canada has provided food commodities to nations unable to grow or purchase enough food or experiencing a disruption in agricultural production due to war or natural disasters. Food aid has been delivered primarily through bilateral and multilateral channels, but, as mentioned, voluntary organizations have also played an increasing role. Despite CIDA's claim that Canada is a major food aid donor,

its budget has fluctuated greatly over the years, ranging between 12.3 and 29.8 per cent of the Canadian Official Development Assistance budget between 1970 and 1991.⁶⁷

Canadian food aid has been rationalized with humanitarian, political and commercial arguments. Prior to 1978, the commercial and political benefits of food aid were maximized.⁶⁸ Food aid was used to dispose Canadian agricultural surpluses, reward nations, and enhance Canada's influence within international institutions. Occasionally it was withheld to punish nations.⁶⁹ Then, for a brief period in the late 1970s, the political and commercial rationale for aid was displaced by humanitarianism.⁷⁰ However, by 1984 this framework had been replaced by one which established Canadian food aid as an instrument to encourage and assist in neo-liberal economic policy changes in poor countries.⁷¹ Mark Charlton writes, the objectives of the food aid program became "increasing the quantities of food aid available in food deficit countries and accelerating the pace of development by freeing foreign exchange and generating domestic resources for investment."⁷¹ CIDA's strategy paper Sharing Our Future stated "future allocations will be used especially to help the recipient country reform its agricultural policy and/or carry out structural adjustments."⁷² Food aid had become an

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⁷¹ Neo-liberal ideology advocated a reduction in the size of the state and its delivery of services, and for market forces to assume control of the distribution of goods and services.

instrument of neo-liberalism. Paradoxically, it has been viewed by the majority of Canadians as a great humanitarian gesture.

3.2 Multilateral Aid

The multilateral aid channel was developed after World War Two when international effort was concentrated on the reconstruction of war-torn nations. Currently, thirty-five major multilateral agencies, such as the United Nations Development Program provide technical assistance or relief. In addition, agencies such as the World Health Organization, the International Labour Organization and multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank, provide a variety of loans.⁷³ NGOs have often been involved in design and implementation of programs sponsored by multilateral agencies.

Canada has provided these agencies with a much greater proportion of its ODA budget than many other wealthy nations.⁷⁴ Table 1, on page 136, indicates that in fiscal year 1994-1995, more than one billion dollars was disbursed to multilateral organizations. Although multilateralism suggests a collective approach in which the money, expertise, and decision-making power of several countries is pooled, so that no benefits accrue to a particular donor country, it is not devoid of domestic benefits for Canada. Indeed, multilateral aid has remained at about 30 per cent of ODA from 1973 to 1993⁷⁵

because international emergencies provide extremely valuable domestic and international political capital for politicians. Canada's participation in the emergency programs of multilateral agencies has also appealed to the humanitarian values of Canadians. Its contribution to these programs has helped meet the conceptual goal to build a domestic constituency for Canadian foreign aid. Furthermore, through participation in these multilateral institutions, Canada has received its greatest exposure as an international actor, resulting in increased prominence in international organizations dominated by the superpowers.⁷⁶

Multilateral aid expenditures have the potential to enhance Canada's image at home and abroad and increase its influence in some international organizations. However, they lack many of the economic benefits of bilateral aid, including Canadian non-commodity procurement returns, control over projects, and the ability to target countries of political and commercial importance. These "tangible" benefits also appeal to state managers as they allow them to justify their budgets in both financial and political terms.⁷⁷

3.3 Bilateral Aid

Since the mid-1970s, bilateral aid, the primary avenue of aid delivery, has constituted at least 30 per cent of Canada's development assistance budget. It has long been justified on humanitarian, political and commercial grounds. Bilateral aid

was used most aggressively in the 1950s and 1960s, during the Cold War, when the United States and other Western nations used food and economic aid as political instruments to contain communism. Large infrastructure projects, food and military aid were provided to countries on the perimeter of the Soviet Union and China. Currently, bilateral aid objectives are typically met through four instruments: aid for specific projects, Canadian commodities, lines of credit or the provision of technical assistance.

As mentioned earlier, the Canadian program of bilateral assistance for the West Indies was started in 1958. It is the author's view that this program was started primarily to meet political obligations to Britain. As a junior partner in the Empire, Canada was encouraged, if not expected, to assist Britain in the decolonization of the West Indian territories. Although both the Columbo and Caribbean assistance programs were shaped by Canada's political relationship with Britain, they also provided commercial domestic benefits. Until the late 1980s, it was common for 80 per cent of the aid given to foreign countries to be tied to the purchase of Canadian goods and services.⁷⁸ Not surprisingly, "tied aid" has been the source of considerable acrimony. Yet, in recent years, several funding mechanisms have drawn larger NGOs and Bilateral Branch planners together, and, as a consequence, they have influenced each other's thinking.

IV. CONCLUSION

Humanitarian, political and domestic economic motives have rationalized Canadian Official Development Assistance program and can be found as salient features of NGDO, food, multilateral and bilateral aid delivery channels. Initially, state relations with NGDOs were fueled by humanitarian and political contextual goals. NGDO sector and NGO division founders viewed the establishment of their relationship as a way to dramatically expand Canadian development and humanitarian work abroad, and to a certain extent the sector and division partnership achieved their goal. However, since its establishment, the state - NGDO relationship has been used to do much more than humanitarian work. It has been used to bolster support for the tax revenue needed to maintain Canada's entire foreign assistance program and to foster public support for projects that exist primarily for political or commercial reasons. In the words of former NGO division executive, Romeo Maione, the NGO division was "a godsend" for CIDA; it provided very good publicity at a very low cost.⁷⁹

I contend that the focus on the motives for development aid is not enough. Motives alone do not explain outcomes. Consideration of administrative infrastructure is essential as it is the 'connecting tissue' that links political motives with outcomes, and in doing so shapes outcomes. In the early years of the Division, responsiveness, matched funding and the autonomy to negotiate flexible contribution agreements,

facilitated the alignment of operations of the Division with development values of the NGDO sector. However, since the late 1970s, internal and external pressures have challenged the underlying assumptions of responsiveness, matched funding and flexibility and have made it more difficult for the NGDO Division to support NGDOs and their vision of development.

After the mid-1980s, the Division's administrative infrastructure was transformed by the demands of senior CIDA management and central agencies to accommodate comprehensive program rationalization and control functions. As part of this process, the relationship was further weakened by the growth of new sources of funding for NGDOs, and, in the late 1980s, by program cuts which reduced the size and budget of the NGO division. Ironically, at the beginning of the 1990s, NGDOs had more points of contact with which to do business, but a weaker relationship with the state as a whole because of the marginalization of the NGO division. In 1988, in her summary of the state of relations between CIDA and NGDOs, CIDA president, Margaret Catley-Carlson said: "I'm not so sure whether you're pulling us anymore, or whether we're pushing you."⁸⁰

This chapter has introduced key administrative infrastructure traits and instruments and the historical context of the Canadian state - NGDO relationship. It has argued that humanitarian motives alone cannot adequately explain the development of state NGDO relations and the

delivery of aid through NGOs to the South. The precise nature of the state - NGO relationship and project or program outcomes is influenced by the prevailing administrative infrastructure. Chapter IV turns the attention to the South examining the development of civil society in the West Indies and evolution of relationships between Canadian and West Indian NGOs and their contemporary challenges. Chapter V analyzes the role of administrative infrastructure in the management of these relationships and challenges.

1. Canadian International Development Agency, Annual Report 1984-1985 (Ottawa: CIDA), 24.
2. The mix of motives has long been the subject of praise and criticism. For examples see: Cranford Pratt, "Human Internationalism and Canadian Development Assistance Policies" in Canadian International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal, ed. Cranford Pratt, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), Chapter 13; David Gillies, "Export Promotion and Canadian Development Assistance" in Pratt, op. cit., Chapter 7; "Catley-Carlson: Canada's aid humanitarian as well as in its own interest," Ottawa Citizen, 7 February 1984, 9; "Foreign aid program more help at home than abroad," Ottawa Citizen, 5 May 1980, 9; "Strong links to private sector important says CIDA," Ottawa Citizen, March 25, 1978, 65; CIDA now gives taxpayer more bang for its buck: Dupuy," Ottawa Citizen, 12 May 1978, 9; Roderick Oram, "Foreign aid benefits claimed many-sided," The Globe and Mail, 4 November 1977, B1; "CIDA defends aid as a beneficiary to Canadian Economy," Globe and Mail, 13 December 1977, 10; Keith Spicer, A Samaritan State? External Aid in Canada's Foreign Policy (University of Toronto Press, 1966), 252-253;
3. Keith Spicer, op. cit., 4.
4. Canadian International Development Agency, Commonwealth Caribbean Assistance Program (Ottawa: Information Division, CIDA, 1969), 1.
5. Keith Spicer, op. cit., 10.
6. Ibid., 12.
7. Ian Smillie, The Alms Bazaar: Altruism Under Fire - Non-profit Organizations and International Development (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1995), 124.
8. Cited in Spicer, op. cit., 13.
9. For a discussion of Canada's position within the Empire, see Laura Macdonald, "Unequal Partnerships: The Politics of Canada's Relations with the Third World," Studies in Political Economy 47 (Summer 1995).
10. According to Selwyn Ryan, there was also an expressed concern for the interests of minorities. Selwyn Ryan, "Dr. Eric Williams, the People's National Movement and the Independence Experience: A Retrospective," in The Independence Experience 1962-1987, ed. Selwyn Ryan (St. Augustine:

University of the West Indies, Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1988), 143.

11. Keith Spicer, op. cit., 105-106.

12. Quoted in Spicer, op. cit., 15. See, for instance, M. F. Millikan and W. W. Rostow, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy (New York, 1957), 21; and Barbara Ward, The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations (Toronto, 1961), 20 and 92.

13. Spicer op. cit., 15.

14. Ibid.

15. Eric Williams, Some thoughts on Economic Aid to Developing Countries, address to the Economics Society of the University of the West Indies, Jamaica, 19 February 1963, (Trinidad and Tobago, Government Printing Office, Trinidad and Tobago, 1963), 3 and 6.

16. House of Commons, Debates, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer), 28 November 1963, 5199.

17. Quoted in Robert Carty and Virginia Smith, Perpetuating Poverty: The Political Economy of Canadian Foreign Aid (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1981) 51.

18. Ibid., 55.

19. In 1994, the 13 nation Caribbean Community (Caricom) had a combined foreign debt of 10 billion dollars and a debt service ratio of 30 per cent. "Region Seeks 'Refined' Agenda for Americas Summit" (Rome): Interpress Service 01 December 1994; See also, "Britain offers more relief," (Rome): Interpress Service 21 February 1994.

20. The unrest and conflict of the late 1960s and early 1970s is captured in Selwyn Ryan and Taimoon Stewart eds., The Black Power Revolution: 1970 (St. Augustine, Trinidad: ISER, University of the West Indies, 1995).

21. Crime is also a serious political issue in other islands. Trinidad has seen a dramatic increase; in 1994 it recorded 79 murders between January and June compared to 31 for the same period in 1993. George John and Corinne Barnes, "IMF anniversary passes with ne'er a whisper," (Rome): Interpress Service 29 July 1994. In Barbados criminal activity has also increased. According to police statistics, 4,752 crimes were reported in 1991, 6,020 in 1992 and 6,531 from January to June 1993. Moreover, within the last three years two policemen have been killed in the line of duty -- the first and second in the

100-year history of the police service. "Increasing unemployment bad news for sluggish economy," (Rome): Interpress Service 08 January 1994. In Guyana, the large number of individuals being deported back to Guyana have been blamed for the increase in criminal activity. Bert Wilkinson, "Gun-Toting Deportees Blamed for 'State of Siege'," (Rome): Interpress Service 20 August, 1996.

22. Attempts by politicians or government officials to curtail press freedom are the most common expressions of this tendency. In recent years, media workers in Antigua Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago have been harassed by their governments. For recent examples, see, Patrick Smikle, "The Gospel According to the Government" (Rome): Interpress Service 30 November 95; Patrick Smile "Journalists to Tackle Governments on Press Freedom" (Rome): Interpress Service 11 December 1995; George John, "'Begone!' Prime Minister Tells Journalist" (Rome): Interpress Service February 2, 1996; Wesley Gibbings, "Former PM Cautions Government on Press Freedom," (Rome): Interpress Service 29 August 1996.

23. James Whiteside, addressing Toronto businessmen in 1973, quoted in Carty, op. cit., 169.

24. Director, Office of Trade Relations, Department of Trade and Commerce, witness before Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Canada, The Senate of Canada, Proceedings on the Standing Committee on External Relations, (Ottawa, 1967), 49.

25. See, Peter Wyse, Canadian Foreign Aid in the 1970s: an organizational audit, Occasional Monograph Series No. 16 (Montreal: Centre for Developing-Area Studies, McGill University, 1983), 1-15; "Feeding world's hungry a worthy objective for foreign aid," Toronto Star, 26 July 1977, B4; "Caribbean churchman criticizes Canada's aid," Globe and Mail, 26 August 1977, 8; "CIDA programs only marginally relevant to 3rd World - McGill Report," Globe and Mail, 26 October 1978, 11; "Foreign Aid eluding the poor," Globe and Mail, 15 September 1980, 7; "Commercialization of CIDA," Ottawa Citizen, 3 February 1986, A11; 4 February 1986, E1, E3; 5 February 1986, C7, C12; "Aid Agency not always on target," Ottawa Citizen, 1 February 1986, A1, B1 and B14.

26. Roderick Oram, "Foreign aid benefits claimed many-sided," The Globe and Mail, 4 November 1977, B1. See also, "CIDA defends aid as a beneficiary to Canadian Economy," Globe and Mail, 13 December 1977, 10; "Strong links to private sector important says CIDA," Ottawa Citizen, March 25, 1978, 65; CIDA now gives taxpayer more bang for its buck: Dupuy," Ottawa Citizen, 12 May 1978, 9; "Foreign aid program more help at home than abroad," Ottawa

Citizen, 5 May 1980, 9; "Catley-Carlson: Canada's aid humanitarian as well as in its own interest," Ottawa Citizen, 7 February 1984, 9.

27. Office of Auditor General, Report, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1993), 311.

28. See: Canadian Council for International Cooperation, Putting People First: Towards a Canadian Foreign Policy for the 21st Century (Ottawa: Canadian Council for International Cooperation, 1993); Canadian Council for International Cooperation, Building and Sustaining Global Justice: Towards a New Canadian Foreign Policy Brief to the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canada's Foreign Policy and Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy, (Ottawa: Canadian Council for International Cooperation, May 1994).

29. Kari Levitt and Alister McIntyre, Canada West Indies Economic Relations (Montreal: Centre for Developing-Area Studies, McGill University, 1967), 116-117; Eric Williams "Economic Aid" in Forge from the Love of Liberty (Port of Spain: Longman Caribbean, 1989), 333-334. See also, evidence given by Maurice Strong. Senate of Canada, The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs (Ottawa, Queen's Printer) Tuesday, November 4, 1969, 1:7-1:27.

30. North South Institute, Key Issues for Canada's Foreign Policy (Ottawa: North South Institute, 1995), 15 and 21. Also see: OECD, DAC, 1992 Report, (Paris: OECD), 42.

31. Ibid., 21.

32. Ibid.

33. Canadian International Development Agency, Sharing our Future, op. cit., 51.

34. Overseas Institute of Canada, "Canada's Participation in International Development", a report based in the second national workshop on Canada's participation in international development, Esterel, P.Q. November 18-21, 1965, (Ottawa: Overseas Institute of Canada), 82-84.

35. Hilda Bateman, former EAO officer, interview with author, December 2, 1994.

36. Ibid.

37. Lawrence Cumming, former executive director, Canadian Council of International Cooperation and OXFAM-CANADA, interview with author, December 2, 1994.

38. Bill McWhinney, former executive director, CUSO and Senior Vice President, Canadian International Development Agency, interview with author, December 2, 1994.
39. Lester B. Pearson addresses this subject squarely in The Crisis of Development (New York: Praeger Publishers), 1969.
40. Overseas Institute of Canada, op. cit., 91.
41. Ibid., 92.
42. Bill McWhinney, interview with author, December 2, 1994. See also, Brodhead and Herbert-Copley, op. cit., 3, 29-30; Canadian International Development Agency, "Cost-Sharing Policy Framework," Paper prepared by Canadian Partnership Branch, (Ottawa: October, 1994), 3.
43. John McRae, former CIDA Manager, interview with author, November 24, 1994.
44. Lawrence Cumming, former executive director, Canadian Council of International Cooperation and OXFAM-CANADA, interview with author, December 2, 1994.
45. For discussion of role, see: Tim Brodhead and Cranford Pratt, "Paying the Piper: CIDA and Canadian NGOs," in Canadian International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal, ed. Cranford Pratt, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), 93-6.
46. Lawrence Cumming, former executive director, Canadian Council of International Cooperation and OXFAM-CANADA, interview with author, December 2, 1994.
47. See, Ian Smillie, A Time to Build Up, New Forms of Cooperation Between NGOs and CIDA (Ottawa: The Canadian Council for International Co-operation, December, 1991), 40; Tim Brodhead, and Brent Herbert-Copley, Bridges of Hope? Canadian Voluntary Agencies and the Third World (Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1988), 4.
48. Romeo Maione, interview with author, October 21, 1994; Hilda Bateman, former EAO officer, interview with author, December 2, 1994.
49. Lawrence Cumming, former executive director, Canadian Council of International Cooperation and OXFAM-CANADA, interview with author, December 2, 1994.
50. Lawrence Cumming, former executive director, Canadian Council of International Cooperation and OXFAM-CANADA, interview with author, December 2, 1994.

51. For a discussion of federal macro planning units, see: Michael J. Prince and John A. Chenier, "The Rise and Fall of Policy Planning and Research Units: An Organizational Perspective" Canadian Public Administration 23, no.4 (Fall 1980):519.
52. This figure includes privately raised funds and matching grants. Ibid., 24.
53. CIDA, "The Role of the Voluntary Sector in Official Development Assistance," an issues paper for discussion at the 1994 CIDA/NGO Consultation, September 29, 1994, 5.
54. Tony Enns, CIDA Director, interview with author, October 20, 1994.
55. Lawrence Cumming, former executive director, Canadian Council of International Cooperation and OXFAM-CANADA, interview with author, December 2, 1994.
56. Hilda Bateman, former EAO officer, interview with author, December 2, 1994.
57. Lawrence Cumming, former executive director, Canadian Council of International Cooperation and OXFAM-CANADA, interview with author, December 2, 1994.
58. For a discussion of contracting, see; Ian Smillie, "Wintertime for Country Focus: Contracts, NGOs and CIDA" unpublished paper prepared for Canadian Council for International Co-operation, 1994.
59. Ibid.
60. See, Canadian Council for International Co-operation, Mind if I Cut In? The Report of the CCIC Task Force on CIDA-NGO Relations (Ottawa: Canadian Council for International Co-operation, 1988).
61. North-South Institute, North-South News, No. 13, Spring, 1991.
62. Economic Council of Canada, For a Common Future: A Study of Canada's Relations with Developing Countries, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1978). Cited in Cranford Pratt, "Towards a neo-conservative transformation of Canadian international development assistance: the secor Report on CIDA," International Journal XLVII (summer 1992), 596.
63. Export Promotion Review Committee, Strengthening Canada Abroad, (Ottawa: Department of Industry Trade and Commerce). Cited in Pratt, (1992) op. cit., 596.

64. The impact on accountability is discussed in: Sharon Sutherland, "The Al-Mashat affair: administrative accountability in parliamentary institutions" Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 34, 4 (Winter, 1992), 583-584.
65. Cranford Pratt, (1992) op. cit., 597.
66. Brian K. Murphy, "Canadian NGOs and the Politics of Participation" in Conflicts of Interest: Canada and the Third World, eds., Jamie Swift and Brian Tomlinson, (Toronto: Between the Lines), 182.
67. Canadian International Development Agency, Sharing Our Future, (Ottawa: CIDA, 1987), 55; See also, Table 1., Mark W. Charlton, "Continuity and Change in Canadian Food Aid" in Canadian International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal, ed. Cranford Pratt, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), 61.
68. Charlton, op. cit., 58.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid., 59.
72. Ibid., 60.
73. David R. Protheroe, "Canada's Multilateral Aid and Diplomacy," in Canadian International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal, op. cit., 25-26.
74. Ibid., 25. Canada has been the fourth or fifth largest multilateral donor for several years. This is due in part, however, to the declining support of the United States and other nations. For a compendium of multilateral data, see: The North-South Institute, Canadian Development Report 1999: Civil Society and Global Change, (Ottawa: The North South Institute/L'Institut Nord-Sud, 1999), Statistical Annex.
75. Ibid., 50, 52.
76. Ibid., 45-52.
77. Ibid., 27.
78. Canadian International Development Agency, Sharing the Future, op. cit., 51.
79. Romeo Maione, interview with author, October 21, 1994.

80. Canadian International Development Agency, "Making Choices: the Future roles of NGOs," notes for remarks by Margaret Catley-Carlson, President, CIDA to NGO/Special Programs Branch Consultation, Ottawa, February 15, 1988.

CHAPTER IV

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF WEST INDIAN CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE EMERGENCE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CANADIAN AND WEST INDIAN NGDOS

The last chapter examined the motives behind the Canadian aid program and the channels that deliver aid to developing countries. This chapter focuses on the voluntary sector delivery channel. It examines the development of relations between Canadian and West Indian NGDOs. In the first section, the social, economic and political forces that led to the emergence of West Indian civil society are discussed. The second section continues this discussion by focussing on the contemporary activities of West Indian and Canadian church-based organizations and NGDOs. The third section examines the establishment of Canadian NGDO programming in the West Indies. It specifically focuses on the activities of the Canadian NGDOs introduced in Chapter I and the social, political and economic forces that shaped their relationships with West Indian NGDOs. The fourth section deepens this discussion by examining Canadian and West Indian NGDO responses to the region's debt crisis, structural adjustment programs, and neo-liberal economic planning.

The chapter illustrates the evolving social and political character of the West Indies and how it influenced relations between Canadian and West Indian NGDOs. It is not meant to be an exhaustive study of NGDO activities or the social and economic crisis; its purpose is to provide a clear picture of

the evolving environment in which NGOs operated, and the key issues which confronted NGO relationships between 1968 and 1993. The discussion provides the context for the final chapter which addresses the extent to which administrative infrastructure interacted with the evolving social and political character of the West Indies to shape relationships between Canadian and West Indian NGOs.

I. THE EMERGENCE OF WEST INDIAN CIVIL SOCIETY

By empowering and organizing citizens to advocate for their political, economic, social and cultural rights, and providing leadership on public issues, West Indian NGOs have brokered and facilitated the democratization of the state and civil society. The emergence of West Indian NGOs, in the early 1970s, was inspired by the orientation of West Indian society toward collective self reliance, which stemmed from African traditions; the failure of postwar economic development planning; and the subsequent rise of socialist, nationalist and Black Power consciousness among citizens, who in turn demanded the democratization of economic, social and political institutions. Like feudalism in Europe, questions of birth, family, property, occupation, and community organization were all governed by the overarching plantation system. West Indian society and the institutions of the plantation economy offered slaves little social welfare. Mostly, they were left to provide for themselves and did so through collective food

production, child rearing, health care, and trading.¹

1.1 Missions

Church Missions established by nonconformist evangelical missionaries from England, Scotland, the United States and Canada were the first institutions to offer slaves support.² Throughout the early and mid 1800s, outraged by the failure of the established churches to provide Christian education to slaves, a steady stream of Moravian, Baptist and Methodist evangelical missionaries arrived in the West Indies.³ Missions established themselves to Christianize Africans. Although the avowed purpose of the missionaries was to 'save souls for Christ', some assisted the poor to establish 'mutual aid societies' providing food, clothing and insurance for health and funerals and promoting thrift. These organizations,

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¹ Canadian missionaries did not arrive until after slavery had been abolished. Early Canadian Catholic missions were started in the 1860s, first in Haiti, then in Jamaica, St. Lucia, Grenada, Trinidad and Dominica. In 1868, Canadian Presbyterian missionaries arrived in Trinidad and Guyana to Christianize Hindu East Indian indentured servants. They also established smaller missions in St. Lucia and Grenada. Both the Catholic and Presbyterian missionaries ran major operations. Thirteen years after arriving in Trinidad, Presbyterian missions served every part of the island, and by 1914, they ran sixty-six day schools and two theological colleges. The Catholic missions were even more active. In the mid-1960s, when most missions were under local control, there were still more than two hundred Catholic foreign missionaries in the region. The United Church of Canada and the Anglican Church of Canada, in contrast, had very limited missionary activity in the West Indies. See: Sarah E. Morton, John Morton of Trinidad (Toronto: Westminster Company, 1916), 149; Canada, The Senate of Canada, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 10 February 1970, Ibid., 5:14, 5:24 and Appendix E.

formed by and working for poor people, were their only representative institutions for more than a century. Mutual aid societies have been identified as the forerunners of West Indian NGDOs³ because they sought collective solutions to social and economic problems that, historically, had been the responsibility of individuals and families. Their impact in the region was profound because their demonstration of collective action inspired agricultural and credit cooperative movements and prepared poor people to support trade unionization.⁴

Nonconformist evangelical missionaries who were abolitionists raised the temperature of the slavery debate in the territories and their overt desire to save souls constantly challenged the status of slaves and indentured servants in West Indian society. Their zealotry disrupted the norms of the plantation economy. Sugar planters fought back; missionaries were harassed, jailed and exiled for advocating religious education for slaves, especially Methodist education, which promoted equality.⁵ Nonconformist, evangelical missionaries left a mixed legacy in the West Indies. Their collective actions often increased the cultural oppression of African slaves and Hindu indentured servants, however, their condemnation of the status quo also contributed to the unraveling of plantation slavery. By the late 1920s, the mutual aid societies that were either started or supported by missionaries had been joined by middle class

service clubs such as the Red Cross, Jaycees, Rotary and Lions clubs. Together, these organizations attempted to address social welfare needs, but they could do little for the majority of the population. Franklin Knight and Thomas Simey suggested that political aspirations and elitism reduced the effectiveness of middle class service organizations,¹ but clearly the major reason social welfare goals were unmet was the lack of economic security that came with land ownership and voting rights.

The importance of land ownership was recognized by British Royal Commissions in 1897 and 1929. The former Commission reported that the distribution of land for peasant agriculture was "the best prospect of establishing a stable prosperous economy in the West Indian Colonies."⁶ These recommendations, however, were ignored by Britain so that by the start of the 1930s, almost one hundred years after emancipation, West Indians were still living in grinding poverty. The Great Depression made their lives absolutely unbearable. The result was spontaneous riots, strikes and

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¹Franklin Knight observed that some service organizations "had overtly middle class political aspirations: a widening of the political franchise to allow more of their members access to political office." Thomas S. Simey, a consultant, reported that when organizations provided services to the poor it was done in a paternalistic manner. In his view, damage to the social fabric of society was being done by "persons and agencies ... steeped in the tradition of Lady Bountiful ... searching out the Grateful Poor." See: Franklin Knight, The Caribbean: The Genesis of a Fragmented Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 298; T. Simey, Welfare and Planning in the West Indies, (London 1946), 200.

disturbances beginning in St. Kitts in 1935, and affecting Trinidad, Barbados, St. Lucia, Antigua, Jamaica and British Guiana before ending in 1938. With the exception of slave revolts, these events were unparalleled in the history of the West Indies.⁷ The West India Royal Commission, chaired by Lord Moyne, and charged with the investigation of these events, reported on the deplorable health¹ and social conditions of West Indians,¹¹ their inadequate wages¹¹ and lack of civil and labour rights.

Described as a "savage indictment of post-emancipation economy, polity, and society"⁸ by Eric Williams, the Moyne Report was the gravestone marker for British colonial policy

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¹Investigations found the average labourer possessing a poor physique, a very high incidence of dental caries, pellagra, tuberculosis, and a general low-resistance to infectious disease. Simey, op. cit., 12. Bryan, op. cit., 10-11.

¹¹In Trinidad, one of the wealthier islands, the workers' barracks of the sugar estates were found to be "in a state of extreme dilapidation, lacking even elementary sanitary provisions." As odious were the barracks of the oil workers. They were described as "an entangled conglomeration of unsightly ruinous huts and privy cesspits placed helter-skelter on a sloping, steep and slippery hillside - a danger to health, life and limb for the local residents and a menace to the normal surrounding city population." Brereton, op. cit., 177-178. Quoted in Patrick Bryan, Philanthropy and Social Welfare in Jamaica (Mona, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1990), 10.

¹¹¹ The weekly labourer's pay was insufficient to feed the whole family for a week, and many children had no regular meals after Wednesday. In Barbados, the 20 to 25 pounds sterling earned per annum by male labourers was found to be completely insufficient. Households were only viable when women and children obtained employment. Simey, op. cit., 12. Bryan, op. cit., 10-11.

and administration in the West Indies and many of the political and social conventions of the plantation economy. Metropolitan control of production, consumption, and the money supply continued, but the economic status quo was challenged by the granting of certain democratic, labour and social rights.¹ The existence of political sovereignty, without economic sovereignty, created a condition that would later cause much tension in the West Indies.

Recognizing that the British Government lacked expertise in the delivery of social services to West Indians, and was unprepared to invest heavily in a state-run welfare system, the Moyne Commission recommended that the churches, mutual aid societies, cooperatives and charities be employed to organize and expand social welfare services in the West Indies.¹¹ This

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¹The franchise was extended to all adults over the age of twenty-one, a limited form of self-government was implemented, social welfare policy was developed and funds were made available for social programs. Franklin Knight, The Caribbean: The Genesis of a Fragmented Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 300.

¹¹The Commission was undoubtedly influenced by what it observed in Jamaica, where the self-help strategy and civil society had been developed further than any other West Indian society. Between 1937 and 1949, each Jamaican village established an average of six organizations, and at the national level, 57 Community Councils had been established to co-ordinate the activities of 464 groups. These developments were due in large part to the financial help of Jamaica Welfare Ltd., an agency established and funded by the Jamaica Banana Producers Association and the US-based United and Standard Fruit Companies. See: Patrick Bryan, Philanthropy and Social Welfare in Jamaica (Mona, Jamaica: Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER), University of West Indies, 1990), Chapter 5.

approach spurred the expansion of civil society organizations throughout the West Indies. It reinforced collective actions and in some territories institutionalized state - society relations in the social welfare field, but the self-help approach was obviously limited in spite of these developments. Only so much could be done by churches, mutual aid societies and community organizations for individuals and communities that generated little or no income. In many territories the self - help approach meant that marginalized communities were left disorganized and dependent on the charity of service organizations. Before 1940, state support for social welfare was minimal and sporadic. Many intellectuals and activists considered raising the standard of living, primarily by increasing wages and employment opportunities through industrialization. As revealed in the next section, the failure of this strategy was a critical factor in building new social formations within civil society.

1.2 Civil Society's Response to the Failure of Industrialization

The development of early West Indian civil society was shaped by the social, political and economic forces of the plantation system, mercantilism and colonialism, and the institutions that opposed these systems. In contemporary West Indian civil society, the influence of social, political and economic factors has remained strong. Economic planning was particularly influential in mobilizing civil society. From

the early 1950s to the early 1970s, West Indian leaders developed industrial policies intended to provide much needed employment and a higher standard of living for West Indians. The intellectual leadership for these policies was provided by the economist, Arthur Lewis, who was influenced by the industrialization of Puerto Rico. In his view, an industrial policy that focused on the manufacture of goods for export was the most efficient means of removing labour from the small agricultural land base: agriculture could be mechanized, labour productivity increased and incomes raised.⁹ As the West Indian territories lacked the capital to industrialize, such investment had to be 'invited' from the industrialized world by providing entrepreneurs with infrastructure, tax holidays, and subsidies, and even by the state initiating enterprises then turning them over to the private sector.¹⁰

Industrialization strategies based on Lewis' prescriptions, or modifications thereof, fell far short of expectations.¹ Neither the quantity nor the quality of

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¹There were several major weaknesses of industrialization strategies. The establishment of monopolies and oligopolies in capital-intensive industries overshadowed the establishment of labour intensive competitive industries. Import substitution was pursued instead of export development. Established industries were underutilized. Economic links on a national or regional basis were weakly developed. In addition, industrialization placed strains on infrastructure, and encouraged rural depopulation, thereby widening the gap between countries and social groups within countries. Clive Thomas, The Poor and the Powerless: Economic Policy and Change in the Caribbean (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988), 90-101.

investment that was needed to alleviate unemployment and provide an internal dynamic to local economies ever materialized. This was due in part to opposition to the strategy by both Britain and the United States. According to Michael Howard, industrialization deviated dramatically from the official colonial development plan which focused on agriculture and social development, and posed a potential threat to the manufacturing industry in Britain.¹¹ Canada started giving bilateral aid to the West Indies in the late 1950s, but as chapter four revealed, this was done to assist Britain in its decolonization of the region, not to industrialize West Indian micro-states.

By the late 1960s, many West Indians had concluded that a combination of industrialization by invitation and welfare services could not substantially improve the quality of life for the workers in the region. Left-wing economists charged that industrialization strategies not only failed to provide for the general uplift of West Indian societies, but in many ways reinforced colonial economic structures. Some macro-economic indicators suggested that the economic health of the region was improving,¹ but, according to Clive Thomas, the

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¹Helen McBain has argued that in the 1950s and 1960s, most Caribbean economies experienced real growth (over 5%) based on trade in raw materials and financial inflows of overseas development assistance. Helen McBain, "Foreign Capital Flows and Caribbean Economic Development" in Caribbean Economic Development: The First Generation ed, Stanley Lalta and Marie Freckleton, (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 1993), 132.

dependence of the new industrial sectors on:

foreign technology, finance, enterprise, raw materials and components, and the consequent drain of surpluses in the form of profits, royalties, dividends, interest, licensing fees, sales charges and management fees, bound the region more and more firmly into the very metropolitan sources of domination it was ostensibly trying to get rid of in its pursuit of independence.¹²

The inability of governments, mutual aid societies, churches, service organizations and industrialization strategies to provide answers to the many problems of employment, social welfare, and the empowerment of citizens, created the political space for radical West Indian intellectuals, students and activists to promote social democratic and socialist options. These options combined quite readily with nationalist sentiment, which at that time was expressed in an anti-colonial consciousness, a growing appreciation of indigenous culture, and a preoccupation with issues of justice and human rights.¹³

Intellectuals, radicalized church and trade union leaders and ordinary citizens began to demand democratic government, social justice and citizen participation in issues of national development, but governments of the day would have nothing of this. The following report on protest in Jamaica in 1968 illustrates the distance between the demands of protesters and the government in that country:

The Government, it seems, had certain specific political objectives clearly defined to itself. Perhaps the principal aim was the destruction and intimidation of a new consciousness emerging

amongst the population in Kingston and some rural parishes. The consciousness is based on a recognition that the bulk of the Jamaican population - small farmers, underemployed, unemployed and self-employed workers, have no real economic or social or cultural stake in the country. An inherent racist situation exists in that the mass of the population is black, while the real control is exercised by metropolitan business, which is white, and the brown people and racial minorities have so far picked up most of the crumbs left behind by the "white power." The "black power" movement is a natural and legitimate reaction to this.¹⁴

The entire power structure, domestic and foreign politicians, business, and state elites were implicated by the protesters. Dependency theory was used liberally by West Indian academics and activists¹⁵ to explain West Indian conditions. The discourse fueled wide-ranging charges of racism and neocolonialism, aimed at Canadian and other foreign investments in banking, insurance and bauxite mining. Canadian educational institutions and NGOs were also targeted.¹ The explosive political environment of the late 1960s and early 1970s reflected the frustration caused by persistent poverty, powerlessness and the enduring presence of colonial structures and attitudes in all spheres of social, political and economic

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¹The Canadian government's immigration laws had long been a target for West Indian politicians, and Canada's universities came under severe criticism after charges of racism at Sir George Williams University, in 1968, led to the occupation of the computer centre, and a violent confrontation between police and mostly West Indian students. On matters of immigration see: The Right Hon. Eric Williams, "The Developing Nation in the Modern World" Encaenia Address, The University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, N.B., (May 20, 1965); Errol Barrow, "A Role for Canada in the West Indies" International Journal vol. XIX, no. 2 (Spring 1964), 184.

life. It created tremendous demand for the mobilization of civil society.

II. THE CONTEMPORARY ROLE OF WEST INDIAN AND CANADIAN CHURCHES IN WEST INDIAN CIVIL SOCIETY

2.1 West Indian Churches

West Indian churches, especially those that had a long history in poor peoples struggles, were "conspicuous" in forging new initiatives for the development of Caribbean societies.¹⁶ In 1973, the Caribbean Conference of Churches (CCC) was established and given the mandate to focus progressive ideas and strategies of Caribbean churches on the social, economic, political as well as religious aspects of development.¹⁷ Through the incorporation of a preexisting organization, Christian Action for Development in the Caribbean (CADET), the CCC administered a wide variety of projects that reflected the twin goals of increasing economic security amongst the poor as well as providing citizens with analysis and encouragement so that they could participate meaningfully in state decision-making processes. CADEC administered a small-scale farming program which, utilizing church lands, encouraged the development of appropriate technology for the Caribbean region, provided print and electronic media training, published development education literature including a newspaper, Caribbean Contact, funded projects suggested by

church committees and held conscientization workshops.¹⁸ Many of the activities of CADEC targeted peasant farmers, petty traders and households existing at a subsistence level, and since the days of slavery, women have been at the centre of these activities.¹⁹

The Caribbean Council of Churches often found itself embroiled in controversy. Its projects challenged the status quo, and as a result, it often felt the hostility of governments and economic elites.²⁰ For example, in 1972, in Dominica, it supported farmers of the village of Castle Bruce in their bid to buy a foreign-owned estate and operate it collectively. The government of Dominica, backed by large estate owners, viewed collective ownership as a socialist instrument and opposed it.²¹ Prime Minister Eugenia Charles criticized the CCC and most foreign NGOs such as CUSO and INTER PARES as partisan bodies "aiding left-wing groups and supporting leftist ideology in Dominica and the region."²² Nevertheless, two years of lobbying by farmers and their supporters led to the sale of the land to farmers and the establishment of the Castle Bruce Farmers' Cooperative.²³

The challenge undertaken by the CCC to develop a Caribbean community attuned to social justice issues attracted

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¹Inspired by the writings of Paulo Freire, conscientization sessions were held with marginalized individuals and communities to validate their lived social, economic and political experiences, deepen their understanding about the root causes of their conditions, and develop strategies for change. See: Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Harmondsworth, United Kingdom: Penguin, 1972).

many university-educated activists. Under the leadership of Revs. Kneehall and Kirton,²⁴ the CCC trained a generation of West Indian NGDO leaders and provided seed funding for several NGDOs. The Pope Paul Ecumenical Centre in Grenada and the Jesuit mission in Jamaica performed similar training and organizational development functions.¹ Although the Caribbean Council of Churches received funding from Canadian organizations, its activities were much more diverse and politically charged than those of Canadian church-based and secular NGDOs that had been providing relief, educational and health services in the region since the early 1960s.

2.2 Canadian Churches

By the early 1970s, there were only a few hundred Canadian missionaries in the Caribbean region, two-thirds of whom belonged to Catholic Orders. However, Canadian church organizations were major players in the political and social life of the Caribbean. Forty-two per cent of the non-government 'development' funds spent in the region by Canadian organizations was spent by churches.²⁵ Although the majority of the money went to fund religious activities and schools,¹¹

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¹Many of the NGDO Executive Directors interviewed for this study started their careers with either the Caribbean Council of Churches or the Pope Paul Ecumenical Centre.

¹¹Schools were operated by the Anglican, United and Presbyterian Churches, the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace (CCODP) and the Congregation of Christian Brothers.

community development projects were also funded. Several Canadian churches supported the Caribbean Conference of Churches and other local church-based organizations that, in addition to community development, were demanding social change and mobilizing the citizenry.

III. CANADIAN NGDOS IN THE WEST INDIES

By the time the NGO division of CIDA was established in the early 1970s, Canadian church-based organizations and secular NGDOs were well established in the West Indies. Table II lists the activities and budgets of Canadian organizations working in the West Indies in 1971. The majority of the organizations in Table II had established links with the region independent of any official state development assistance policy. The nature of their work in the region was humanitarian and educational, largely defined by their organizational agendas, the desires of their host countries, and the communities in which they worked. However, all too often West Indian communities were minor players in planning and implementation of these projects. Despite some effort to include local participation in project design and management, the administration of many of these projects differed little from the bilateral projects discussed in Chapter III.

Table II
Project Activities of Canadian Organizations in 1971

Country	Organization	Project Area	Amount	Country Total
Antigua	Anglican Church	Co-op Dev.	8,000	
	MCA	Community Dev	15,000	
	Chr. Bros	Education	5,000	
	CUSO	Education	5,520	33,520
Bahamas	CTF	Education	2,640	
	CUSO	Agriculture	690	3,330
Barbados	CUSO	Community Dev	8,970	
	YMCA	Community Dev	15,000	
	CUSO	Education, Health & other	2,001	
	CCODP	Relief	1,500	27,488
Dominica	Save the Children-Canada	Community Dev & Health	16,800	
	Christian Brothers	Community Dev & Education	97,000	113,800
Grenada	CTF	Education	2,409	
	CUSO	Education	4,800	
	OXFAM-CANADA	Health	1,200	8,409
Jamaica	Save the Children-Canada	Community Dev & Education	55,600	
	CUSO	Community Dev & Education	42,130	
	Red Cross	Community Dev & Health	7,800	
	Anglican Church	Education	11,000	
	MCC	Education	1,440	
	OTF	Education	600	
	CSC	Other	1,000	
	United Church	Other	45,879	165,449
Montserrat	CUSO	Education	1,380	1,380

St. Lucia	CUSO	Education & Health	10,350	
	OXFAM-CANADA	Health	3,988	10,738
St. Vincent	SFM	Community Dev	12,333	
	CUSO	Education & Health	3,450	
	FCSO	Education	80,000	95,783
Trinidad and Tobago	CUSO	Community Dev and Education	8,280	
	Presbyterian Church	Community Dev	140	
	YMCA	Community Dev	30,000	
	CMHA	Health	150	
	Red Cross	Health	400	
	OXFAM-CANADA	Health	2,980	
	United Church	Unspecified Projects	143,626	185,576
Caribbean Region	Operation Beaver	Community Development	3,583	
	Save the Children-Canada	Community Dev in E. Caribbean	149,900	
	CCODP	Community Dev	22,117	
	CTF	Education	2,301	
	OTF	Education	1,200	
	Presbyterian	Other	23,626	
	Salvation Army	Other	7,000	209,727'

Key: Save the Children-Canada: Canada Save the Children's Fund, CUSO: Canadian University Services Overseas, YMCA: Young Men's Christian Association, CCODP: Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, Chr. Bros.: Christian Brothers, CMHA: Canadian Mental Health Association, CSC: Les Freres de Sainte-Croix, CTF: Canadian Teachers Federation, FCSO: Friends of Christian Schools of Ontario, MCA: Mysterious Canadian Agency, OTF: Ontario Teachers Federation. SFM: Scarbough Foreign Mission Society.

Source: Canadian Council for International Co-operation,

Like elsewhere in the world, in the West Indies, in the early 1970s, "development was something conceived, managed and paid for by outsiders."²⁶ Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, West Indian activists pressured Canadian NGDOs to open up their decision-making and project management processes.²⁷

In the following section, the evolution of Canadian and West Indian NGDO relations are discussed with specific reference to the experiences of eight Canadian NGDOs operating in the West Indies between 1968 and 1993. Each organization had to operate in the evolving social, political and economic environment described earlier in this Chapter and Chapter III. Despite the differing modes of operation (service, community development and social justice), by the end of the period, none of the organizations had a strong program in the region. The next section discusses NGDOs, and the evolving social, political and economic environment in which they operated. The section sets the stage for the final chapter, and main argument of the thesis, which is that within the context of the evolving environment, administrative infrastructure has played a significant role in shaping NGDO relations.

The following Canadian NGDOs were selected to illustrate the wide range of projects on which Canadian and West Indian partnered. The projects are highly representative of the

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Listing of International Development Projects and Activities Supported by Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations (Ottawa: CCIC, 1972).

secular Canadian NGOs operating in the West Indies in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Approximately half of the secular NGOs operating in the region during this period are described below. Some organizations, such as Save the Children-Canada and CUSO have a history of service provision programs aimed at individuals and communities. Other NGOs such as CODE, Plenty and Jamaica Self-Help have administered social or economic community development programs that promote self-reliance. Still others, such as OXFAM-CANADA, INTER PARES and Match International have focused on supporting local NGOs and projects that improve political, social and economic rights.

Save the Children-Canada

Save the Children-Canada, which was established in 1946, inherited its West Indian responsibilities from its British parent in the early 1960s. Canada's historical relationship with Britain and the West Indies encouraged the British office to transfer responsibility for its early education, child welfare and child sponsorship programs in the West Indies to Save the Children-Canada. In 1967, Save the Children-Canada added similar programs in Jamaica, making the West Indies its largest region of operation. By 1971, it was a major player in the West Indies. Its programs accounted for fully 26 per cent of all the funds spent in the West Indies by Canadian organizations. By 1975, it had established programs in seven territories and administered a budget for the region of more

than three hundred thousand dollars.²⁸ The operations of Save the Children-Canada focused on welfare services and, to a great extent, the operations were externally planned and implemented. Regional offices in the West Indies were dependent on the Canadian head office for funding and direction. The social and economic conditions that caused child poverty in the West Indies were less of a concern than the delivery of services to needy children and families.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, in the West Indies and elsewhere in the developing world, child sponsorship became the target of severe criticism. West Indian activists argued that it reflected neo-colonial attitudes. Their disdain for the program, and criticism of it worldwide,²⁹ forced Save the Children-Canada to shift its approach to "community sponsorship". Since the late-1980s, this form of community development has supported projects such as agricultural co-ops and micro enterprises for women, child welfare training centres, clinics and day care centres. The move to community sponsorship was conducted with some reluctance. Child sponsorship was an effective fund-raising vehicle, and Save the Children-Canada found itself with reduced revenues in the years that followed its decision to phaseout child sponsorship.³⁰ Although the mission of the organization is based on the protecting the rights of children, its programming has focused on service provision, not activism. As part of a rationalization of its operations, motivated in

part by falling revenues, in the late 1980s, Save the Children-Canada began withdrawing support from programs established in the Eastern Caribbean and consolidating its operations at its regional office in Jamaica.

CUSO

In 1961 CUSO (then Canadian University Services Overseas) was born. With the absorption of its competitors: Canadian Overseas Volunteers in 1963, and Canadian Voluntary Commonwealth Service in 1964 -- which was the first organization to send volunteers to the West Indies -- CUSO quickly became the largest Canadian organization sending university graduates overseas.³¹ By the end of the decade, CUSO had filled requests from Caribbean governments for more than three hundred teachers, health specialists and technicians.³² Canadian politicians were impressed by the praise that resulted from CUSO's activities in the Caribbean and the growing popularity of CUSO within Canada.

In the 1960s, West Indian governments generally praised the work of CUSO, Save the Children-Canada, OXFAM-CANADA and Canadian Churches. However, by the 1970s, criticism was heard from the burgeoning West Indian NGDO community and activists. They argued that the welfare and community development work of Canadian NGDOs was so closely aligned with policy objectives set by West Indian governments that it could not contribute to fundamental political, social and economic

change in the region.³³

Additionally, the value of CUSO volunteers was questioned by West Indian activists. Were they not just education and technical service workers who, often in a paternalistic fashion, imparted their Northern middle-class values on poor, marginalized West Indians? CUSO bore the brunt of this criticism even though it was aimed at all foreign organizations that served the social development agendas of conservative local governments. The criticism of West Indian activists was part of a popular critique of neo-colonial attitudes, institutions and social structures within the region, which combined with racial tension between West Indians and CUSO volunteers to severely weaken CUSO's program. According to former Executive Director, Ian Smillie, by the late 1960s, the sheen was wearing off the Caribbean's image as a desirable posting for volunteers. By 1969, the early termination rate had reached almost 25%, more than triple the rate in any other region.³⁴

To reverse the trend, CUSO began selecting volunteers more carefully and reducing their numbers, but this had little effect. In 1971, in Jamaica, where the racial tension between locals and volunteers was most overt, the numbers were halved from thirty to fifteen, and still eight volunteers left the program early.³⁵ CUSO's Caribbean program was in crisis. Smillie wrote, "declining requests, continuing West Indian resentment of Canadians, and a critical lack of direction at

the top led to a rapid deterioration of what had once been CUSO's most promising program."³⁶ Fewer and fewer programs were initiated in the region, its share of CUSO's budget shrank, and in 1979, CUSO decided to close the Barbados office. In its place a temporary project officer was hired for the Eastern Caribbean based in Grenada.³⁷

The winding down of the volunteer program was a victory, according to West Indian activists. Speaking of the change in CUSO's direction, the Jamaican Field Staff Officer said, "A maturing process has taken place. We have completed our work in the form of placing volunteers."³⁸ Horace Levy, Executive Director of the Social Action Centre in Jamaica, Arthur Campbell, Executive Director of the Agency for Rural Transformation in Grenada and Jeff James, the Jamaican Regional Field Officer for Save the Children-Canada agreed with this change. They suggested that the pressure exerted by West Indian organizations and activists was the primary reason for a reduction in CUSO volunteers.³⁹ Indeed, the pressure of leading activists, the racial tension experienced in several islands, left CUSO with few options. Its operations, largely defined by its relationship with CIDA, was to send volunteers

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¹CUSO's programs in Africa and other regions also received criticism. By the early 1980s, many developing countries struggling to find jobs for their own graduates, had little need for eager young Canadians with little actual work or international experience. To increase the relevancy of its programming CUSO began to recruit individuals with specialized skills and talents, and began to support local development projects.

overseas. Ironically, natural disasters in the Eastern Caribbean and political upheaval in Grenada provided CUSO with the opportunity in the 1980s to define an important new role in the Caribbean. While not completely abandoning its volunteer sending program, CUSO launched a campaign to build the capacity of local organizations, and facilitate the development of national and regional NGDO networks.

Canadian Organization for Development through Education (CODE)

CODE has been involved in literacy and education in the West Indies since the mid-1970s. From its roots as a service organization that gathered and shipped donations of books to developing countries, CODE expanded the scope of its programs to become a major supplier of paper and other educational materials to schools, and facilitator of micro-enterprise in the publishing sector. CODE has assisted departments of education, schools and NGDOs such as the National Association for Mass Education (NAME) in St. Vincent and the Grenadines working on literacy issues, and book publishers in Guyana and Belize. After more than a decade of social welfare programming throughout the West Indies, in the late 1980s, due to financial pressures, CODE rationalized its programs, reducing its activities in the West Indies to Guyana and Belize where it assists publishers to supply local educational materials to school children. Although CODE supported some popular education initiatives in the West Indies, it maintained a largely apolitical program in the territories.

Plenty Canada

Plenty Canada gained a reputation in the West Indies for technical skill in micro-economic enterprise. Founded in 1976, Plenty Canada brought its expertise in small scale soybean production to Dominica and St. Lucia in the early 1980s. The Dominica Integrated Community project provided agricultural research and extension services, soy food processing centres for training and production, public demonstrations and public education to farmers and consumers alike. The goal of the project was to create sustainable local production and a market for high quality protein foods using soy beans.⁴⁰ By the late 1980s, more than two dozen farmers were producing four tons of soya beans annually, all of which had a guaranteed local market. The health and economic objectives of this project were never part of a broader strategy to transform political or economic institutions. According to one investigator, the project enjoyed the support of the Dominican government, which was very suspicious of NGOs at the time, because it was apolitical and distributed economic benefits to various classes.⁴¹ This project and similar soya bean and product initiatives in Jamaica and St. Lucia consumed twenty four per cent of Plenty Canada's program budget in the late 1980s.⁴²

Jamaica Self-Help Organization

Founded in 1978, Jamaica Self-Help (JSH) is a small

community-based NGDO run almost entirely by volunteers. It began as a fundraising organization for Jamaica's poor, but by the mid-1980s, this function was augmented by the development of small-scale community development projects in poor areas, and twinned with development education in Peterborough, Ontario, where JSH is based. Through its partner organization in Jamaica, JSH has supported education and training for both children and adults, the development of housing co-ops, agricultural production, health and nutrition training and micro-enterprise.⁴³ In 1991 the JSH budget was approximately four hundred thousand dollars. As its name suggests, its focus has been on establishing a viable, community-based self-help NGDO with offices in Jamaica and Canada. Due to its extremely low overhead of seven per cent of total revenues, it has been able to put a much higher proportion of its budget toward its programs than most other NGDOs.

OXFAM-CANADA

OXFAM-CANADA was also active in the West Indies in the early 1970s, albeit on a much smaller scale than Save the Children-Canada or CUSO. In 1963, OXFAM-CANADA ended its role as a fund raising office of OXFAM-UK and established its own objectives aimed at combatting "hunger, poverty, disease, injustice and inequality".⁴⁴ Its mission in the Caribbean region differed markedly from other Canadian organizations which focused on relief and welfare services. OXFAM-CANADA

overtly brought a social justice perspective to its work in the Caribbean. However, apparently as a result of the presence of OXFAM-UK in the West Indies, OXFAM-CANADA never considered it a major area of operation. In 1971-1972, OXFAM-CANADA spent less than four thousand dollars in the West Indies; one percent of its total budget.⁴⁵ From the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, the establishment of West Indian NGOs was a catalyst for new OXFAM-CANADA programming in the region.⁴⁶ However, throughout the 1980s, the Caribbean program budget was often less than two hundred thousand dollars when the budget for all programs was five million or more. Since the early 1980s, OXFAM-CANADA has focused on building the organizational capacity of community and labour organizations, local NGOs and NGO networks. OXFAM-CANADA provided small grants to West Indian NGOs such as the Social Action Centre in Jamaica and the Small Project Assistance Team in Dominica for micro enterprise training and management. It supported Jamaica's Sistren Theatre Collective for popular education, the St. Vincent Union of Teachers to promote basic literacy skills within a social awareness framework, a multi-island agricultural products marketing project run by farmers' unions in Dominica, and training schools and agricultural co-ops in Grenada. OXFAM-CANADA has also participated in the institutional strengthening of national NGOs such as the Association of Development Agencies in Jamaica, and regional NGOs such as the Caribbean Peoples' Development Agency based

in St. Vincent, and the Caribbean Policy Development Centre based in Barbados. These national and regional organizations have viewed themselves as strategic organizations in search of macro level policy solutions.

INTER PARES

When INTER PARES (between equals) was founded in 1975, its philosophy was to build relationships with existing NGDOs in developing countries. Instead of creating overseas offices and running their own programs, INTER PARES has entered into partnerships to support Southern self-help community-based programs.⁴⁷ The following describes the range of activities funded by INTER PARES in the Caribbean in the 1980s and 1990s:

INTER PARES has supported numerous Caribbean organizations in their effort to develop an alternative vision of progress which emphasizes development and community empowerment. In Jamaica, Guyana and the Eastern Caribbean islands we assist women, farmers, literacy organizations and community development groups. We also lend support to Caribbean-wide organizations. For instance:

- The Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action, which conducts action-research and training programs, and promotes activities to ensure the full participation of women in development initiatives.

- The Caribbean Network for Integrated Rural Development, which supports farm organizations, especially at a time when their rural way of life is threatened by global economic changes.

- The Caribbean People's Development Agency, which works to develop cooperative efforts among NGO's and popular organizations from seven countries.⁴⁸

Despite the fact that INTER PARES had relatively small

programs in the West Indies, it was adept at developing partnerships and was able to support a wide range of activities in the region, including national and regional policy networks.

Match International

Established in 1975, after the first United Nations World Conference on Women, Match International was created to forge a direct link for action between Third World women and Canadians. It matches resources and needs, by sharing the experience and knowledge of women internationally, and provides funding, goods or services for international programs and projects designed by women.⁴⁹ Since its inception, Match International has provided small grants to local NGOs with mandates or projects aimed at increasing the respect, skills and independence of women. Rather than spending its small budget on social welfare projects, it has focused on supporting West Indian organizations and projects that empower women and promote their equality. Match International has supported Jamaica's Sistren Theatre Collective, Grenada's Agency for Rural Transformation, as well as the Women's Resource and Research Centre, and the Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action, both located in Trinidad and Tobago.

Despite the fact that virtually all the Canadian NGOs described above have been involved in community development

work, their operational modes can be divided into some broad categories. Since the late 1970s, by supporting projects that analyze social, economic and political conditions, and advocate for change, CUSO, OXFAM-CANADA, Match-International, and INTER PARES, have attempted to address the social, economic and political root causes of "maldevelopment" in the West Indies. The programming of Save the Children-Canada, CODE and Jamaica Self-Help has supported social development. However, in the 1990s, CODE focused on technical services and support to publishers. Plenty Canada has focused on the provision of agricultural technical assistance.

Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s these NGDOs were challenged to adapt to the class, race and cultural tensions that enveloped West Indian territories. As was mentioned earlier, many Canadian-sponsored community development projects were criticized by West Indian activists who charged that too many projects were skewed toward social welfare and often implemented without regard for the realities of class, race and cultural politics. The executives of some Canadian NGDOs rebuffed this criticism, but their Field Service Officers on the front-lines largely agreed with the criticism.⁵⁰ Former CUSO Field Service Officer Bob Thomson went to Barbados in the early 1970s. At that time the cooperant program "was almost entirely teachers, and it was felt by many in the Caribbean and in Canada that Canadian teachers were not needed".⁵¹ Indeed, the majority of Canadian

NGDO projects did have an orientation toward social welfare¹, not the empowerment of people or political change.⁵² For several years in the 1970s and 1980s, encouraged by West Indian activists, Field Service Officers of Canadian NGDOs pressured their organizations to embrace the political nature of development work in the West Indies.⁵³ Selena Tapper, Head of CUSO's Caribbean Regional Office from 1984 to 1993, was "amazed at the complacency of the organization's leaders".⁵⁴ It was her view that "[CUSO was] not very political and did not see the use in developing a strong social base, nor political alliances."⁵⁵

In the early 1980s, Canadian NGDOs were still destabilized by the criticism they received in the 1970s, and were searching for direction. They had achieved mixed results when social and economic relations throughout the West Indies began to be defined by debt crises, neo-liberal economic thinking and structural adjustment programs, and for this, they were totally unprepared. None were ready for the demands of this new regime and the consequences for their relationships with West Indian organizations. The effects of neo-liberalism and structural adjustment are described in the next section, followed by a discussion of the West Indian and Canadian NGDO responses.

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¹In the 1970s and 1980s, bilateral projects supported by the Canadian government tended to support infrastructure development and projects that strengthened educational institutions.

IV. NEO-LIBERALISM AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT: IMPACT AND RESPONSES

Since the early 1980s, "neo-liberals" have argued that development has been blocked by inflated public sectors, economic regulations, and an over emphasis on capital formation. Governments have been identified as part of the problem, not part of the solution. They have been viewed as inefficient, and often corrupt, and hence parasitic, not stimulators of growth. The solution, neo-liberals have argued, is to privatize the public sector, reduce the scale and scope of government spending, and give up all economic policies, such as formal exchange rate controls, subsidies, and redistributive taxation. These policies alter prices that would otherwise be set by the impersonal forces of the market.⁵⁶

The development of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) to transform the indebted economies of Jamaica, Dominica, Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana,¹ are products of neo-liberal thinking. SAPs have had a tremendous impact in these territories. However, Barbados, Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and St. Lucia, were not spared. In these

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¹The debt crisis has been acute in Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad, but other territories with small populations also face major economic challenges. In 1990, the per capita debt of Jamaica was US\$1,839; in Guyana it was \$US 2,244; in Barbados it was US\$2,945, and in Antigua it was US\$3,000. Source: Social Action Centre, Hooked on Debt (Kingston, Jamaica: Social Action Centre, 1990), 10.

territories, austerity programs were designed by national governments to avoid more onerous structural adjustment programs designed by the IMF. Throughout the region, SAPS have required trade liberalization, currency devaluation to improve competitiveness of commodity exports, import tariff devaluation to improve the competitiveness of manufactured exports, incentives to increase foreign investment, promotion of tourism, industrial policies designed to increase productivity, and a reduction in social spending.

4.1 Effects

Jamaica has had a relationship with the IMF since 1977. Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana and Dominica were forced to accept IMF conditions in the mid-1980s. Jamaica's adjustment programs have not revived the economy. In fact, except for repayment of debt to private and public foreign institutions, the programs have basically been a failure.⁵⁷ Marie Freckleton wrote that between 1980-88, devaluation and promotion more than doubled tourist expenditures and increased non-traditional exports, but the trade deficit widened, primarily because of depressed prices for commodity exports and a heavy dependence on imports of the tourism and manufacturing sectors. The widened trade deficit increased the need for external borrowing to finance current account deficits. Jamaica's debt increased from US\$1.7 billion at the end of 1980 to US\$4 billion at the end of 1988.⁵⁸ Despite the claim

by the IMF that stabilization programs would have 'a human face',⁵⁹ declining purchasing power due to devaluation and unemployment and the rapid erosion of state services has plunged many individuals and communities into misery. Under adjustment programs, incomes fell to precariously low levels. In Jamaica, real incomes fell by 15% between 1983-85, and between 7.5 and 8.4 per cent between 1989-90. In Trinidad and Tobago, the country's per capita income dropped by 50 per cent between 1983 and 1988. In Jamaica, in 1991, the minimum weekly wage only covered 22 per cent of the cost of feeding a family of five.⁶⁰ This was the trend on a regional basis; real per capita income was lower in 1988 than in 1980.

Unemployment

The imposition of austerity programs has meant unemployment. More than 20,000 Jamaican public sector workers lost their jobs in the 1980s.⁶¹ In Trinidad and Tobago, 7,000 public servants have lost their jobs since 1988.⁶² The Oilfields Workers Trade Union in that country has lost 22,000 members since 1980. In Barbados, austerity measures in the early 1990s resulted in at least 3,000 public servants losing their jobs.⁶³

Women have been especially hard hit by adjustment programs. In Jamaica, in 1994, the unemployment rate for women more than 25 years of age was 60.4 per cent; for men, the rate was 24.7 per cent.⁶⁴ In St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Grenada

and Trinidad and Tobago the unemployment rate for females was slightly lower, but still 20 to 30 per cent higher than for males.⁶⁵ Throughout the West Indies, almost half the households are headed by women;⁶⁶ high unemployment among women has meant disaster for child welfare.

State Services

Added to increasing prices and declining employment opportunities has been the wasting away of state services. In Jamaica, the public budget for health, education, and social security fell 44 per cent between 1981 and 1986. During the same period, government expenditure on infrastructure fell 57 per cent.⁶⁷ In Jamaica and Guyana, only a few institutions in health, education and social services have been able to offer services to meet public demand. The gap between public demand and institutional capacity has widened in Trinidad and Tobago, as well as in the smaller islands in the Eastern Caribbean.

Macro-economic statistics, however, fail to capture the socio-political and psychological impact of adjustment policies. For many individuals, families and communities, the abysmal conditions of the 1930s have reappeared, and like the 1930s, conditions have caused social unrest commonly called "IMF riots". The attempted coup in Trinidad in 1990 has been largely accepted there as an ill-conceived attempt to stop the downward spiral in social and economic conditions. Horror stories about ineffectual institutions impoverishing or

endangering the lives of the public are recounted regularly.⁶⁸ Even more common have been articles on the rising crime rate, drug trade and illegal migration.⁶⁹ It is difficult not to conclude that adjustment programs have created far more problems than they have solved. Many analysts echo the conclusion drawn by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in 1991:

Widespread malnutrition, illiteracy, deficient educational and training opportunities, poor health conditions, and inadequate housing threaten to erode the foundations of the region's fragile democratic institutions and limit prospects for economic growth over the long term.⁷⁰

4.2 The West Indian and Canadian NGDO Responses

Throughout the 1980s, the desire to develop better relations and projects led Canadian and West Indian NGDOs to experiment with new patterns of inter-organizational relations. Canadian NGDOs hired West Indian consultants and field officers to provide advice, and administer regional officers. West Indian NGDO officers were also elected or appointed to the boards of directors of Canadian NGDOs. Canadian and West Indian NGDOs collaborated on the research, publication and dissemination of information, and jointly designed and implemented development education projects for audiences in the North and South. In addition, Canadian NGDOs funded workshops, conferences and study tours for West Indian NGDOs.

There was also a concerted effort to strengthen the capacity of West Indian organizations, as well as national and

regional NGDO networks to share information, coordinate policies and plan strategy. CUSO, OXFAM-CANADA and INTER PARES were leaders in supporting this initiative. Some of the key national and regional organizations which developed in the 1980s were the Jamaican Association of Development Agencies (ADA), the Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action, (CAFRA), the Women and Development Unit (WAND), the Caribbean People's Development Agency (CARIPEDA), the Caribbean Network for Integrated Rural Development (CNIRD), Caribbean Policy Development Centre (CPDC).

Many networks focused their efforts on the debt crisis and the impact of austerity measures. By the late 1980s, they were articulating an 'alternative development' approach to counter SAPs and other neo-liberal economic measures that have dominated the region since the late 1970s. Like alternative development approaches promoted elsewhere in the South and in marginalized communities in the North, the central goal has been to make development policies responsive to the social, economic and political needs of ordinary people. Horace Levy of the Jamaican NGDO Social Action Centre has offered six principles that have served as a framework for the alternative development approach promoted in the West Indies:

- self determination: shaping Caribbean strategies inside rather than outside the region;
- participation: involving all Caribbean people in the definition and implementation of strategies;
- self-reliance: building local structures and capacities;

- regionalism: fostering cooperation and strengthening regional organizations;
- equity: equitably distributing assets and resources and benefits of development;
- sustainability: grounding alternative strategies in a secure environment and in local human capacity.⁷¹

Within this framework, several themes have been stressed: the role of the cultural and physical heritage of the region as the prime source of collective identity, inspiration, and human-scale economic production; the importance of community-based economic activity that integrates social and political needs with economic ones;⁷² and the critical role of women and gender in the development process. Feminist analyses of neo-liberal macro economic and social policy have drawn heavily on action research and made insightful links between macro economic policy and household micro level economics.⁷³ The Social Action Centre (SAC) and Sistren in Jamaica, and the Women's Development Unit located in Barbados at the University of the West Indies (WAND) have made major contributions in linking macro level events with the micro level experiences of individuals and communities. This type of research, which emphasizes self-reliance, cultural production and participatory community development has struck a chord with segments of the public and some welfare service organizations and has broadened support for the alternative development approach and the NGDOs which promote it.

The alternative development approach has changed the way

many NGOs do business. Their goal of a macro-economic policy framework supporting initiatives by NGOs and communities has required NGOs to shift organizational resources away from the management of local projects to programs aimed at influencing national governments and regional decision-making bodies. Efforts have also been made to present the Caribbean NGO perspective at international fora addressing social, trade and environmental issues. Such communication has been facilitated by the development of national and regional NGO networks that share information, coordinate policies and plan strategy.¹ These networks have altered the traditional relationship between civil society and national and regional state institutions. The political space once filled by the traditional pillars of West Indian polity, the unions and political parties, has been appropriated by NGO networks. David Lewis observes that the inability of political organizations, such as parties and unions, to present viable development strategies has led to the failure of these organizations to meet the aspirations and needs of broad majorities of the region's marginalized and politically dispossessed populations.⁷⁴ As a result, gaps between the rich

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¹The most influential networks have been: the Jamaican Association of Development Agencies (ADA), the Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action, (CAFRA), the Women and Development Unit (WAND), the Caribbean People's Development Agency (CARIPEDA), the Caribbean Network for Integrated Rural Development (CNIRD), Caribbean Policy Development Centre (CPDC) and the Caribbean Conference of Churches (CCC).

and poor have widened and there has been a widespread rejection of the development message presented by the state, local economic elites and international organizations.

As regional articulators of a non-traditional, non-modernization approach to development, NGDOS have been able to position themselves as intermediaries between civil society and the state and address macro-policy issues that are obstacles to a pan-Caribbean, popularly-supported and sustainable development strategy. Their legitimacy is based on their support for regionally based development strategies focusing on the community, workplace and the household; the social environs of marginalized populations. By the early 1990s, NGDO networks were emerging as agents of regional public policy. Although access to decision makers was still ad hoc, they have been participants in several regional economic and social policy conferences which in the 1970s and 1980s would have excluded them. Such conferences include CARICOM Regional Economic Conferences, and other subregional meetings of Caribbean governments.

Some West Indian governments and international agencies have voiced their interest in the alternative development approach, and the NGDOs that promote it. Unfortunately, they have not been interested in the political and economic analyses conducted by these NGDOs, rather in their potential to organize and provide social welfare in the region. David E. Lewis and Xabier Gorostiaga and others have cautioned that

accepting the role of agents of structural adjustment and debt repayment programs would commit the alternative development approach to simply reforming the nature of the socioeconomic system and "patch up the crisis."⁷⁵ Yet, some NGOs committed to the alternative approach have been willing to accommodate the interests of governments and international financial institutions (IFIs), mixing welfare service projects with their own political initiatives. Other voluntary organizations providing services accept the prevailing political environment and thus indirectly act as agents of IFIs.

The social, economic and political crisis in the West Indies caused by structural adjustment and debt repayment programs pressured Canadian - West Indian NGO relationships to a far greater degree than earlier criticism in the 1960s and 1970s about welfare service programming. It became a key issue in the evolution of the relationship, because, despite the fact that Canadian NGOs have a long presence in the region, and they had made significant effort to improve relations with West Indian NGOs, most were not strong supporters of the alternative development approach. I could find little evidence that Canadian NGOs considered making a long-term commitment to this approach, which called for an overt politicization of relationships between NGOs, states and international political and financial agencies. Small short term efforts were made by OXFAM-CANADA, INTER PARES,

CUSO and Match International. None was prepared to take a long-term leadership role, as was requested by many West Indian NGOs. From other Canadian NGOs, the development alternative received only lip service.

In the face of the mounting crisis caused by the imposition of structural adjustment programs, the inter-organizational innovations of the 1980s, which were supported by a few Canadian NGOs, constituted only a modest contribution to growth of NGO capacity in the region. West Indian NGOs needed much more than organizational development. West Indian NGOs needed their Canadian partners to participate in a broad based campaign against the social, political and economic doctrine descending on the region. However, Canadian NGOs were not up to the task. They were weak, disorganized and ill prepared for such a complex and arduous political battle. To a significant degree, their weakness was organizational, tied to their relationship with the state, which had changed dramatically. Since the early 1980s, the Canadian state, from which many Canadian NGOs received more than half their revenue, had been rationalizing and harmonizing its programming. The project management flexibility that existed in the early 1970s was waning in the 1980s, making it more difficult for Canadian NGOs and their West Indian counterparts to do business.

Inter-organizational innovation strengthened the capacities of West Indian NGOs and the Canadian NGO programs

in the region, but it couldn't balance the inherently unequal relationship between Canadian and West Indian NGOs. Such a relationship existed not only because Canadian organizations held the purse strings: field research revealed that the administrative infrastructure -- organization and management of projects -- were often reminders of how power was divided between the so called 'partners'. According to Chris Ferguson, Area Secretary, Caribbean and Latin America for the United Church of Canada: "The conflict that [NGDOs] have with the Canadian state is reflected in the conflict they have with their [NGDO] partners; the contradictions carry through".⁷⁶ The contradictions caused by changes in the organization of relationships between the state and Canadian NGOs and their partners in the West Indies are examined in the next chapter.

V. CONCLUSION

The establishment of West Indian civil society occurred in opposition to the social, political and economic structures rooted in the plantation economy and British colonialism. Demands for social change first came from mutual aid societies created by West Indians and nonconformist evangelical missionaries. These missionaries played a role in destabilizing the plantation society by insisting on the Christianization of slaves, and, in some cases, calling for the abolition of slavery. Since the 1960s, many contemporary West Indian churches and NGOs have drawn inspiration from

these early efforts to mobilize civil society. In response to social, economic and political conditions, they have fought for social change and articulated an alternative development vision rooted in West Indian geography, culture and values.

Canadian missions and NGOs working in the West Indies have challenged prevailing social, political and economic conditions to a far lesser extent than their West Indian counterparts. The first Canadian missions arrived in the late 1800s, decades after the abolition of slavery to Christianize Hindu indentured servants. Their work, no doubt, added to the cultural oppression of Hindus, and challenged the colonial status quo only indirectly, by providing educational opportunities. From the early 1960s to the early 1990s, the majority of Canadian NGOs in the region were involved in community development projects which provided services, trained individuals and strengthened health and educational services. These were typical responses to the social, political and economic consequences of the failure of industrialization, the Black Power movement, and later, the debt crisis and the neo-liberal economic regime. Despite the centrality of these major issues, only a few organizations: CUSO, OXFAM-CANADA, INTER PARES, and Match International, and to a lesser extent Save the Children-Canada focused their efforts on macro level initiatives to build indigenous NGO capacity to change social and economic structures. Their initial support was laudable, but many subsequent

opportunities to reinforce the capacities of West Indian NGOs, which would have assisted West Indian NGOs with their alternative development campaign, were not forthcoming. Undoubtedly, the pressurized West Indian environment made it difficult for NGOs to meet the demands of their partners. However, within this context, other factors were at play. I contend that the administrative infrastructure that organized program level relationships between Canadian and West Indian NGOs was shaping NGO relations. As discussed in earlier chapters, the question of the extent to which administrative infrastructure shapes day-to-day relations, limits choices and constrains the actions of actors engaged in development assistance is rarely addressed in the Political Science or Development Studies literature. It is analyzed in the next chapter.

1. Part of the legacy of the "Sunday Markets" held by slaves, was the post-emancipation development of the informal wholesale and retail agricultural economy based on "higgling." See, Michael Witter, editor, Higgling/Sidewalk Vending/ Informal Commercial Trading in the Jamaican Economy (Mona, Jamaica: University of West Indies, June 1989), 13.
2. See, Robert W. M. Cuthbert, Ecumenism and Development, A Socio-Historical Analysis of the Caribbean Conference of Churches (Bridgetown, Barbados: Caribbean Conference of Churches, 1986).
3. Didacus Jules, "The Challenge of Development: A Perspective From St. Lucia" unpublished paper prepared for the CIDA/CHC-Caripeda Round Table on NGO involvement in National Development (Barbados 1988), 1-2.
4. Franklin Knight, The Caribbean: The Genesis of a Fragmented Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 297.
5. Patricia T. Rooke, The Christianisation of Slaves and Education of Apprentices in the British West Indies PH.D. Thesis, (Department of Educational Foundations, University of Alberta, 1977), 123.
6. Eric Williams, Britain and the West Indies Noel Buxton Lecture 20 March 1969, (London and Harrow: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd: 1969), 16.
7. The issues and tensions during this period are captured in several West Indian novels. See for instance: George Lamming In the Castle of my Skin (London: Longman Group) 1953; Ralph DeBoissiere, Crown Jewel (London: Pan Books) 1952.
8. Williams, (1969) op. cit., 18.
9. Eric St. Cyr, "The Theory of the Caribbean-Type Economy," in Caribbean Economic Development: The First Generation ed. Stanley Lalta and Marie Frecklton (Kingston, Jamaica: Ian Randle Publishers, 1993), 9.
10. For a critical overview see, Clive Thomas, The Poor and the Powerless: Economic Policy and Change in the Caribbean (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988), 81-90.
11. Michael Howard, Dependence and Development in Barbados: 1945 - 1985 (Bridgetown, Barbados: Carib Research & Publications Inc., 1989), 31.
12. Thomas, op. cit., 100.

13. Cecil Ryan, "The Relationship Between Government and NGOs: The Case of St. Vincent and the Grenadines" a paper presented to the NGO Consultation in New Delhi, India. (March 20 to March 23 n.d.), 4; Joan French, "Moving From the Missionary Position: NGOs, Partnership and Policy" keynote address to the Annual General Meeting of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, (May 30 - June 2, 1991), 1.

14. Norman Girvan, "After Rodney - The Politics of Student Protest in Jamaica", New World Quarterly (IV, no. 3, 1968), 59. The political turmoil and social tension of this period is captured by V. S. Naipaul in his novel, Guerrillas (London: Andre Deutsch, 1975) and his short story, "Michael X and the Black Power Killings in Trinidad", in The Return of Eva Perón (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), 1-97.

15. See: Kari Levitt and Lloyd Best, "Character of the Caribbean Economy," in Character of the Caribbean Economy, ed. Lloyd Best (Mona, Jamaica: Institute for Social and Economic Research, 1975), 38-41; George Beckford, Persistent Poverty (Morant Bay: Maroon Publishing, 1983; Magnus Blomstrom and Bjorn Hettne, Development Theory in Transition, (London: Zed Books, 1984), Chapter 5; Clive Thomas, op. cit., 40-41.

16. Cuthbert, op. cit., 1.

17. Ibid., 9-10.

18. Between March 1973 and December 1980, CADEC disbursed \$6.5 million (US) throughout the region to fund projects in the areas of agriculture, fishing, education, vocational training, and community development. Project proposals were assessed on their support for social and economic justice, community action and cooperation, indigenous culture and values, local participation, employment generation, economic viability and self-dependence, benefit to local churches and regional and national integration. See: Randy Cato, "CADEC's efforts to meet needs of Caribbean Poor," Caribbean Contact, (Bridgetown, Barbados), June 1981, 8; Robert Cuthbert op. cit., 83, 105.

19. For discussions on the important role of women in Caribbean development see: See, Michael Witter, op. cit.; Hillary Beckles, and Verene Shepherd, Verene eds. Caribbean Slave Society and Economy (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers; London, James Curry Publishers, 1991); Barbara Bush, Slave Women in Caribbean Society 1650-1838 Kingston: Heinemann Publishers (Caribbean), (London: James Curry Ltd, 1990); Carmen Deere, Peggy Antrobus, Lynn Bolles et. al., In the Shadows of the Sun: Caribbean Development Alternatives and U.S. Policy Boulder, Co., Westview Press, 1990); Judith Wedderburn, ed., A Caribbean Reader on Development, (Kingston,

Jamaica: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1987); Lynn Bolles, "Surviving Manley and Seaga: Case Studies of Women's Responses to Structural Adjustment Policies" Review of Radical Political Economics 23: 3&4, 1991; Sidney W. Mintz, "From Plantations to Peasentries in the Caribbean," in Caribbean Contours, ed. Sidney W. Mintz and Sally Price (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); Patricia Mohammed and Cathy Shepherd, eds., Gender in Caribbean Development. Mona, Jamaica, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago, Cave Hill, Barbados,: Women and Development Project, University of the West Indies, 1988.

20. C. M. Hope, Caribbean Council of Churches, interview with author, December 17, 1993.

21. Aaron L. Schneider, "Grass Roots Development in the Eastern Caribbean," in Canadian-Caribbean Relations: Aspects of a Relationship, ed. Brian Douglas Tennyson, (Sydney, Nova Scotia: Centre for International Studies, University College of Cape Breton, 1990), 196-197.

22. Ibid., 194.

23. Ibid., 196-197.

24. For perspectives on foreign aid development, see Darryl Bean, "Caribbean Churchman Criticizes Canada's Aid," Globe and Mail, (August 26, 1977), 8.

25. Calculated from Appendix IV; Canadian Council for International Co-operation, Listing of International Development Projects and Activities Supported by Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations (Ottawa: CCIC, 1972) 132-146.

26. Ian Smillie, The Alms Bazaar, (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1995), 181.

27. Jeff James, Jamaica Field Service Officer, Save the Children-Canada, interview with author, November 24, 1994; Selena Tapper, CUSO Caribbean Field Service Officer, interview with author, March 5, 1993; See also Joan French, "Moving From the Missionary Position: NGOs, Partnership and Policy" Keynote address to the Annual General Meeting of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation, Ottawa, May 30 - June 2, 1991.

28. Save the Children-Canada, Annual Report (1976), 3

29. See, New Internationalist, No. 111 (May 1982), 7-28.

30. Adrienne Clemens, Program Director, Save the Children Canada, interview with author, October 18, 1994.

31. The Canadian Voluntary Commonwealth Service had been sending students to the West Indies since 1961, promoting cultural interchange, practical experience, and skills transfer. Ian Smillie, The Land of Lost Content, A History of CUSO (Toronto: Deneau Publishers, 1985) op. cit. 29. See also, Chapter 2 and 3.
32. Senate of Canada, The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Ottawa, Wednesday, February 25, 1970 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970), Appendix II.
33. Jeff James, Jamaica Field Service Officer, Save the Children-Canada, interview with author, March 11, 1993. Lennox Campbell, Executive Director, Agency for Rural Transformation, interview with author, January 28, 1993; Horace Levy, Executive Director, Social Action Centre, interview with author, March 10, 1993.
34. Ian Smillie, op. cit., 34.
35. Ibid., 41-42.
36. Ibid., 43.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Jeff James, interview with author, March 11, 1993. Lennox Campbell, Agency for Rural Transformation, interview with author, January 28, 1993; Horace Levy, interview with author, March 10, 1993.
40. Schneider, op. cit., 189.
41. Ibid.
42. Plenty Canada, News (Winter 1986-87), 7-8; Plenty Canada Update, (Summer 1989), 1-4; Plenty Report (Winter 1983), 2-4.
43. Jamaica Self-Help Organization, "Finding a Niche," (Peterborough, Ontario: n.d., n.p.); Jamaica Self-Help Organization for the Relief of Poverty, Annual Report 1991-1992, n.d., n.p.
44. OXFAM-CANADA, Inside OXFAM, (July 1974), 4.
45. OXFAM-CANADA, Inside OXFAM No. 31 (October 1973), 3
46. OXFAM-CANADA, Inside OXFAM No. 32 (February, 1974), 4.
47. INTER PARES, Annual Report, (1993), 12

48. INTER PARES, Annual Report, (1991),3.
49. Match International, Match Newsletter 1, no. 2 (August 1977), 2.
50. Jeff James, interview with author, March 11, 1994; Bob Thomson, former CUSO Eastern Caribbean Field Service Officer, interview with author, November 24, 1994.
51. Bob Thomson, interview with author, November 24, 1994.
52. Jeff James, interview with author, March 11, 1994; Bob Thomson, interview with author, November 24, 1994.
53. Bob Thomson, interview with author, November 24, 1994; Ian Smillie, former CUSO Executive Director, interview with author December, 4 1994; Jeff James, interview with author, March 11, 1994. The radicalization of CUSO staff was also raised as an issue at Senate hearings, and according to Ian Smillie, the desire to be a radical organization greatly contributed to the secession of the Quebec branch of CUSO and formation of a separate organization. See, Senate of Canada, The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 25 February 1970, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada),7:11; Ian Smillie, op. cit., (1995) Chapter 23.
54. Selena Tapper, CUSO Caribbean Field Service Officer, interview with author, March 5, 1993.
55. Ibid.
56. Colin Leys, The Rise and Fall of Development Theory (London: James Curry Ltd., 1996),18.
57. See: Janine Iqbal, "Adjustment Policies in Practice: Case Study of Jamaica, 1977-91," in Lalta, and Freckleton, op. cit., 57-62. For the structure of Caribbean Debt, see: Norman Girvan, "The Debt Problem of the Caribbean and Central America: An Overview," in Lalta and Freckleton op. cit., 105-113.
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59. Kathy McAfee, Storm Signals, Structural Adjustment and Development Alternatives in the Caribbean (Boston: South End Press, 1991),23.
60. Iqbal, op. cit., 56.
61. Ibid.

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63. Bernard Babb, "NGOs to wave the anti-SAPs flag," (Rome): Inter Press Service, 24 June 1994.
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70. McAfee, op cit., 23.
71. Horace Levy, "Towards a Caribbean Alternative: A Working Paper", Mimeo, (September 1992), 2; See also, Brian Tomlinson, "Alternative Development Strategies: Reflection on Conceptual Issues" Unpublished Paper, (May 1993).
72. Kari Polanyi Levitt, "Toward A Self-Reliant Style of Caribbean Development for the 1990s," Address to the Caribbean NGO Policy Development Centre (CPDC), Barbados, (May 20, 1992).

73. Feminist researchers have been linking macro-economic policy with experiences at the micro level of the poorest households. See: Peggy Antrobus, "Gender Implications of the Development Crisis," in Development in Suspense selected Papers and Proceedings of the First Conference of Caribbean Economists, ed. George Beckford and Norman Girvan (Kingston, Jamaica: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1989), 145-161; "Gender Issues in Caribbean Development" in Stanley Lalta and Marie Freckleton op. cit., 68-77; Caribbean Policy Development Centre, Challenges in Caribbean Development (Barbados: Caribbean Policy Development Centre, 1990), Chapter 1.

74. David E. Lewis, "Nongovernmental Organizations and Caribbean Development," The Annals of the American Academy 533 (May 1994), 126-127.

75. David E. Lewis and Xabier Gorostiaga, "The Contemporary Caribbean: Economic Crisis, Social Movements, and Alternative Development Strategies," (Managua, Nicaragua: Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Economicas y Sociales, July 1988), 34.

76. Chris Ferguson, United Church of Canada Latin American Co-ordinator, interview with author, October 11, 1992.

CHAPTER V

THE ROLE OF ADMINISTRATIVE INFRASTRUCTURE IN STATE-NGDO RELATIONS

Chapter IV examined the rise of civil society in the West Indies, the establishment of Canadian NGDO operations, and the growth of relations between West Indian and Canadian NGDOs. In this chapter, the role of administrative infrastructure in influencing and shaping these relations is analyzed.

Administrative infrastructure exists throughout the state. It links the political executive to central agencies, central agencies to departments, and departments, through their programs, to civil society. It is composed of values, instruments, processes, and regulations that are configured by function and environmental circumstances. The author's research revealed three predominant characteristics of the administrative infrastructure that influenced the relationship between the state, Canadian NGDOs and their West Indian partners: the diffusion of power within the state, the use of values and knowledge to establish and maintain autonomy, and an operational focus on project administration. The diffusion of decision-making power and autonomy are characteristics that have broad influence on many departments and agencies of the state. The operational focus on project administration, however, is unique to units that administer projects through grant and contribution agreements.

This chapter examines the three components of administration infrastructure and their impact on the state - NGDO relationship. It is divided into four major sections. The first examines the diffusion of decision-making power within CIDA and the NGO division, the second, the effect of organizational autonomy on the Division and the third, the central role of program administration. The fourth section considers the effect of these elements of administrative infrastructure on Canadian NGDOs and their partners in the West Indies. The characteristics of administrative infrastructure are discussed in two time-frames, 1968 - 1980 and 1981-1993. During the years 1968 to 1980, the NGO division unit was established and underwent rapid growth and developed a relatively harmonious relationship with the voluntary sector. Between 1981 and 1993, the Division underwent further budgetary growth, but also rationalized programs, deployed new management instruments and had their operations closely scrutinized by central agencies.

I. DIFFUSION OF DECISION-MAKING POWER

The diffusion of decision-making power refers to the multiplication of sources of decision-making authority within the state. The post-war expansion of the welfare state has required it. A proliferation of state bureaux to coordinate and support policies and programs and administer networks of service delivery has required that decision-making power be

assigned to middle managers and senior officers. In the 1970s, the diffusion of decision-making power was accelerated by the desire of the Trudeau administration to develop multiple sources of policy and program expertise within the state,¹ and by the adoption of management standards and techniques that emphasized middle management accountability.²

The diffusion of decision-making power is considered an innovative instrument in public administration that can produce effective, timely decisions. However, it also has some negative attributes. When vague policy and program goals and objectives exist, state managers and officers interpret goals and objectives according to their own perceptions and abilities. The result is often an array of uncoordinated, sometimes conflicting initiatives that are difficult to reconcile. For the diffusion of decision-making authority to be effective, there must be a collective identity or sense of mission that embraces the entire organization. According to James Q. Wilson, managers and officers alike must widely share and warmly endorse a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of an organization as well as the human relationships within it.³ They all must have the same orientation so that they will 'row in the same direction'. As presented in the upcoming section, the divergent agendas of ODA stakeholders produced vague policy and program statements.

1.1 CIDA: A Diffused Decision-making Environment

Due to the fact that there have always been numerous participants in the setting of ODA targets and foreign policy, CIDA has "grown up" in a diffused decision-making environment. Until 1960, CIDA's predecessor, the External Affairs Office, operated under a system of shared decision-making authority involving External Affairs, Finance, and Industry, Trade and Commerce departments. Even after EAO direction was assigned to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and its mandate sharpened, decision-making authority for Canada's aid effort was still diffused among politicians, an External Aid Board¹, and Canadian diplomats and advisors abroad who served as front-line project managers, usually with infrequent communication with the EAO.⁴

The creation of CIDA as a separate agency with a president reporting to the Minister of External Affairs clarified senior lines of authority but, as David Morrison's history of CIDA has revealed, its legal status could not have been vaguer.⁵ The cabinet memorandum setting up the agency mentioned the deficiencies of the EAO and the need to broaden Canada's mandate, but the specific functions or responsibilities of the agency were never described: "nothing was spelled out".⁶ Since the late 1960s, decision-making processes have continued to involve numerous managers and staff from CIDA and the departments of External Affairs,

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¹ The Board was comprised of senior managers from the departments of Finance, Trade and Commerce, and the Canadian Executive Director of the World Bank.

Industry, Finance, Agriculture and the Treasury Board. Lacking the concentration of authority to set and manage development policies and programs, CIDA has been in the unenviable position of receiving direction through inter-departmental bargaining processes, with members who regard CIDA as a "parking lot for [their] aims and ambitions"⁷. CIDA has always been a major player in these processes, however, the compromises required to meet conflicting agendas often produced bland texts with vague goals and objectives. In the early 1970's, the Liberal government's White paper on International Development "fell far short of the exciting, forward looking document that [Maurice] Strong had wanted, or even a less ambitious codification of policy to provide guidance for delivering the aid program."⁸ The end product was "a slight pamphlet" that argued the case for aid and presented policy intentions "often expressed in vague terms."⁹ The lengthy intra and interdepartmental processes that produced CIDA's Strategy for International Development Cooperation 1975-1980 also fell short of their mark. Morrison confirmed Glyn Berry's conclusion that "the document was not a strategic action plan, but rather a collection of existing positions and principles with little operational meaning."¹⁰ By the mid-1970s, it was clear that CIDA was not destined to dominate multi-stakeholder negotiations. More powerful departments, especially the central agencies, would exercise enduring influence over key aspects of the agency's policies

and programs.¹ Peter Wyse contended consensus decision-making within interdepartmental committees "was at the heart" of CIDA's problems.¹¹ Senior executives were compelled to present aid programs that appealed to the interests of other departments in return for budgetary support.¹² Phillip Rawkins restated this point in the mid 1990s and agreed with Rodger Young that in the context of domestic priorities the "development criterion ... is often the least influential and the easiest to sacrifice."¹³

Between 1968 and 1993 there were numerous attempts to sharpen CIDA's goals and objectives and bring coherence to decision-making and programming within CIDA. However, the divergent agendas of ODA stakeholders produced vague policies and program guidelines. Virtually all of the six CIDA presidents that presided during this time period undertook the exercise to focus and unify CIDA's goals and objectives. However, CIDA was influenced by so many intra and inter departmental stakeholders that it was never able to take firm control and develop a cohesive agenda.¹⁴ It was turned in so many directions by its own executives, politicians, civil society organizations and media critics that a fog of organizational confusion often cloaked the agency.¹⁵

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¹Industry, Trade and Commerce took the view that Canada's commercial interests should be paramount. External Affairs weighed political considerations. The Treasury Board and the Auditor General lobbied for financial management controls. See Morrison, op. cit., 70, 128.

1.2 The Adroit Use of Diffused Decision-making Power

The vague outputs of inter-departmental bargaining did not mean that CIDA has always been without direction. In fact, CIDA executives and managers, especially in the early years, were able to use their vague mandate and the diffused power structure to their advantage to define their own strategies. For instance, Maurice Strong, the first president of CIDA, who was new to government management, was able to recruit talent from federal and provincial departments and the private sector. He was able to negotiate with External Affairs a larger role for field staff. In addition, Strong encouraged the private sector to raise its contribution to international development, and he created the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) to fund researchers in developing countries. Strong also saw the need to embrace and support the actions of the voluntary sector and earn the support of Canadians in general. He saw NGDO and other nonprofits as well as business and industry complementing and supplementing CIDA's initiatives.¹⁶ Strong's agenda was met with resistance from other department executives, but he was able to build sufficient support to have many of his ideas adopted. The engagement of civil society and the provision of funds to civil society organizations and other non-governmental institutions was a particular issue with the Department of Finance and the Treasury Board. However, the diffusion of power and CIDA'S vague legal status provided him with

leverage. Recalling his early days at CIDA, he said: "Although it's true that we couldn't state absolutely that our mandate gave us the right to do x or y, nor could anyone else say that our mandate did not give us that right."¹⁷

Successive CIDA presidents and managers followed Strong's lead, using CIDA's vague mandate and overlapping jurisdiction to take the agency in new directions. In the 1970s, Paul Gérin-Lajoie used his presidency to represent Canada abroad and to establish links with Francophone Africa and Latin America.¹⁸ In the 1980s, Marcel Masse undertook to dramatically increase the policy-making authority of the agency and Maggie Catley-Carlson attempted to make CIDA a world leader in the field of 'Women and Development'.¹⁹ These initiatives and others were launched and pursued with vigor, even after 1980, when they faced heightened scrutiny by other departments, central agencies, the media, the public, and eventually in the late 1980s, declining budgets, all of which reduced CIDA's room to manoeuvre.

The first NGO division director, Lewis Perinbam, used the diffused decision-making environment to establish programs that reflected his knowledge, values and extensive overseas experience.¹ In the 1970s, he, like other decision makers charged with defining and implementing programs, was free of much of the inertia of the decision-making processes of senior

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¹He was a founder and first Executive Secretary of CUSO and was the Secretary General of the Canadian Commission for UNESCO.

management.²⁰ The NGO division was an unorthodox administrative unit, one which was almost entirely oriented to Canadian organizations and their work in the South with other organizations and communities. The Treasury Board was concerned about funding to civil society organizations, but did not block the initiative. The Division emphasized the importance of NGDOs, grassroots development and the maintenance of a framework for relationships with NGDOs that was highly responsive to their programming needs. Indeed, there was very little separating NGDO and NGO division goals in the early 1970s. Tim Brodhead and Cranford Pratt recall that "the alliance of CIDA and NGDOs seemed secure, rooted in shared objectives and common interests."²¹ Many of the officers were recruited from the NGDO sector and were encouraged to draw on their experience and networks to shape projects. There were disputes and constraints, but there was a sense that the state and the NGDO community were in the 'development game' together.²² Former NGO division manager John McRae recalls that officers did not view themselves as bureaucrats, hired to enhance a ministerial agenda. They were facilitators hired because of their expertise, judgement and commitment to advancing international development.²³ The diffused decision-making environment liberated them. Like other CIDA officers, they were isolated from senior management discussions.²⁴ However, throughout the 1970s, few ODA stakeholders took serious interest in the NGO division and its growing

relationship with civil society. Nonetheless, there was tangible evidence that CIDA, through the Division's project and development education programs, had taken initial steps to share with civil society organizations its power to shape Canada's international development effort.¹

After 1980, the diffusion of decision-making power took on a new role. CIDA's growing budget and external scrutiny required new instruments that could disburse funds at a higher rate, while tightening financial and management systems.²⁵ To meet these challenges, CIDA embarked on a 'hands off' management strategy that devolved financial and project management responsibilities to competent NGOs and other 'executing agencies'. Within the NGO division, the diffusion of decision-making power was transformed from an ambient environmental influence to a strategic management tool that shifted decision-making power from the Division to NGOs and other executing agencies. Instead of liberating officers and managers to take creative initiatives, the diffusion of decision-making power challenged the Division to increase productivity, accountability and eventually 'to do more with less'.

The diffusion of decision-making authority also meant the

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¹The Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC) was established in the late 1960s with CIDA funding to create a national civil society organization to represent the views of NGOs and provide input into state decisions. CCIC's establishment also had the practical result of helping to manage CIDA's burgeoning relationship with NGOs.

proliferation of new units with programming authority that affected NGDOs. Starting in the late 1970s, and continuing in the 1980s, specialized units were established to serve NGDOs and other voluntary organizations. Each had specific functional relationships with either large or small Canadian NGDOs, International NGDOs¹ or Non-governmental Institutions. Additionally, units were focused on specific geographic regions such as Africa or on development themes such as humanitarian relief or food aid. The proliferation of functionally specific units eventually overshadowed the NGO division's responsive program, which until then had meant that CIDA responded to project proposals by NGDOs, giving them the lead in determining the design and implementation of projects. After 1980, a greater and greater proportion of NGDO budgets came from funding windows, which tended to generate projects that treated NGDOs as implementation agents. As discussed in the next section, these organizational changes had a serious impact on the degree of organizational autonomy exercised by the NGO division, the second key characteristic of administrative infrastructure.

II. ORGANIZATIONAL AUTONOMY

This characteristic of administrative infrastructure follows

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¹These organizations, which are located in Canada and abroad serve a network of the affiliates in developed and developing countries, and focus on primarily regional and international initiatives.

naturally in an environment where there is a diffusion of decision-making authority. Vague mandates and few clear rules specifying how tasks should be performed leave managers and officers to rely on their own predispositions, prior experiences, professional training, and political views about how tasks should be carried out.²⁶ Allowing an organizational unit to shape its own future is autonomy enhancing. It establishes an organizational sub-culture disconnected from the core goals and objectives of the organization. This occurred with many of the units within CIDA²⁷ including the NGO division. Since the early 1980s, the Auditor General has complained about the lack of coordination, information-sharing and cross-fertilization within the agency, and attempts since to rationalize CIDA functions and to make them more cohesive have met with mixed results. Most CIDA watchers agree that organizational 'silos' erected in the late 1960s and early 1970s, may have been weakened by reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, but are still standing.²⁸ In fact in the early 1990s, Phillip Rawkins concluded that CIDA was one of the most decentralized agencies in the federal state, operating as "... a loose collection of series of task-oriented units, with a large measure of autonomy in decision making at the operating level."²⁹ The early history of the Non-Governmental Organizations division confirmed this description. It was established with minimal consultation or integration with the activities of other units outside of its

Branch. It enjoyed its isolation; one former CIDA executive recalled that for the first ten to fifteen years, "because 'the spotlight' was always on CIDA's Bilateral Branch; the NGO division could, by and large, do what it wanted."³⁰ In the following sub-sections the values, knowledge, professional affiliations and career ambitions of NGO division officers and managers are examined as sources of organizational autonomy.

2.1 Values and Ideas

James Q. Wilson contends that the design of new organizations is highly susceptible to the ideas and personalities of its early managers and officers.³¹ CIDA's organizational culture has been built on a commitment to development, the management of heavy workloads and delegated authority, a high tolerance for vague guidelines and the insensitivities of central agencies.³² The organization was formed in the early 1970s by managers and staff when there were few rules, regulations, training or recruitment protocols.

In the NGO division, autonomy granted by the diffused decision-making environment gave Lewis Perinbam, its first director, the opportunity to select and institutionalize values, interests and aspirations he shared with NGDOs. Key elements of NGO division programing were established during the first years of the program. The principle of "responsiveness" - in which a critical task of the Division was to respond to the efforts of the NGDO sector to design and

implement development projects overseas and development education in Canada - was established in this early period. This concept was not new. It was used by the External Aid Office in the disbursement of bilateral aid. However, to accord voluntary organizations involved in international aid the same decision-making power as foreign governments in the selection of projects and management was quite radical. It made Treasury Board officials nervous; it clouded lines of control and accountability at a time when the state was quite paternalistic.¹ In addition to responsiveness, Perinbam conceived and implemented an innovative funding mechanism that matched funds raised by NGDOs from the general public and private sources with government funds. The idea of leveraging funds raised by NGDOs was novel at the time. It was meant to be a hedge against NGDOs becoming financially dependent on the Division and ensured NGDOs had a certain degree of public support. Matched funding has underscored the notion that the state and NGDOs were in a partnership specifically designed to achieve certain goals and objectives. The effectiveness of responsiveness and matched or cost-shared funding has been

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¹In spite of the Trudeau administration's promotion of "participatory democracy", responsiveness was still an unconventional way to think about the role of the state and its interaction with civil society. At that time, access to decision-makers and information was highly regulated, and in the areas of social and economic policy, the state was interventionist. It conceived and administered "mega-projects" in resource and industrial sectors. It shaped consumer, health and environmental protection policies and vigorously regulated resource revenues and international trade.

questioned, however. The mechanism has been used by CIDA to encourage NGDO activity in regions or fields that are of interest to the state. According to Tim Brodhead and Cranford Pratt, the ratio has been raised as high as 9:1 to entice NGDOs to undertake projects on the state's behalf. Clearly, this distorts the responsive relationship between the state and NGDOs. Yet, despite the challenges it has faced, matched funding has not been displaced as a fundamental characteristic of the NGO division responsive program.

2.2 Knowledge, Training and Career Aspirations

Specialized training, codes of ethics, professional practices and legal liability instill in individuals confidence in specific procedures, methodologies and practices. These tend to become established benchmarks within the administrative infrastructure of units. In the early years of CIDA, the norms associated with professional training and the career aspirations of managers had a strong influence on administrative infrastructure. In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, the NGO division did not recruit individuals from established professional occupational groups. Instead, the Division required that new recruits have both overseas and voluntary sector experience. This requirement encouraged the movement of staff between NGDOs and the NGO Division,³³ providing the unit with more knowledge on grassroots development than any other Division in CIDA. The

organizational culture of the Division was shaped by the elaboration of values and knowledge that emphasized the importance of field experience and operations. Until the early 1980s, the front line focus was maintained by hiring practices. It brought the perspective of a development field officer into the state, which strengthened the Division's relationship with the NGDO sector and enhanced its autonomy within CIDA.

Unfortunately, the decision to adopt a 'hands off' management strategy required officers and managers to focus on contract management processes, while many analytical tasks were contracted to consultants and executing agencies. Throughout CIDA, the use of consultants became commonplace'; they became an 'invisible arm' of the state. The work of consultants devalued and displaced the expertise held by Division staff. This reduced the Division's organizational autonomy. Additionally, for individuals who were attracted to CIDA because they sought analytical development work, the 'dumbing down' of their tasks had a very negative effect on their morale.³⁴

Within the organizational environment established by the diffusion of decision-making authority and organizational autonomy, a regime of program administration was established by the NGO division. This third component of the NGO

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³⁴Between 1983-84 and 1988-89 CIDA's staff grew by 6% to 1,146, while the number of consultants registered with the agency grew from 2,500 to 5,500. Morrison, op. cit., 250.

division's administrative infrastructure is discussed in the following section.

III. PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION

This section of the chapter is divided into two parts. The first examines the operational instruments of the Division such as selection criteria, terms and conditions of contracts and contextual goals. The second considers the importance of the fiscal environment, including budgets and financial management.

3.1 Selection Criteria

Determining which projects and programs get funded and the terms and conditions of funding has been a major task under the Division's responsive program. Project funding refers to the disbursement of funds for a specific set of project objectives. Program funding provides an NGDO a sum of money for several projects with a common objective or theme.³⁵

Since the early 1970s, NGDO proposals for projects and programs have been assessed by country, organizational and project eligibility criteria. As described in the following section, these conditions shape the relationship between NGDOs and the state by limiting the scope of activities NGDOs can undertake alone or with partners in the south.

3.2 Country Eligibility

Projects and programs funded by CIDA have been assessed against the social, and economic criteria of the host country, and Canadian political and economic interests. As discussed in earlier chapters, the West Indies have been of political and economic interest to Canada for decades, receiving Canadian aid since the late fifties. Jamaica and Guyana and most of the small islands of Eastern Caribbean have been "core" countries for decades. Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Belize, as well as regional Caribbean institutions, and some territories under British control are considered non-core countries, where a strategic Canadian presence may be maintained and initiatives developed on an ad hoc basis. There is also a category of non-eligible countries, referring to countries excluded from aid and a category for those countries not receiving development aid because they lack full independence.³⁶

Few West Indian initiatives considered by Canadian NGDOs have been restricted by country eligibility criteria. Most of their projects and programs have been designed for core countries in the region, such as the small islands of the Eastern Caribbean¹. Responsive NGDO initiatives have also been favoured when CIDA has opted to provide a minor contribution to non-core countries. However, the favourable status of West Indian countries has not been exempt from

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¹Grenada, St. Vincent and Grenadines, St. Lucia, and Dominica.

scrutiny. Jamaica's status as a core country has been threatened in several reviews.³⁷ The classification of West Indies countries as "middle income" by CIDA and other donor agencies has implied that the major developmental challenges have been accomplished, or that they can be achieved simply through higher levels of commercial trade. However, activists in Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados have complained that middle income status gives a false impression of social and economic circumstances. On one hand, the state faces high expectations from its domestic and the international community, and on the other it has to deal with the reality of 'arrested development', without the necessary resources to get their economies moving again.³⁸

3.3 Organizational Eligibility

Organizational eligibility is another basic criterion of the NGO program. Generally, project and program applicants must be incorporated, non-profit, organizations that have experience in international development and fund raising capacity. Requirements have varied, however, in the 1980s, NGDOs seeking project funding required two years of international development experience and at least \$25,000 in cash raised over a period of two years from Canadian sources.³⁹ Since the 1990s, NGDOs have been required to provide detailed information on the applicant's history, financial capabilities, senior personnel and southern partners. NGDOs

that are deemed to lack the capacity to undertake projects either have their applications rejected outright or are encouraged to work in partnership with other NGOs that have the necessary capacity.

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the matching or cost sharing formula is a fundamental trait of the NGO division's administrative infrastructure. It has varied over the years, however, normally the Division has provided no more than two-thirds of the total Canadian cost of a project. This may include some funds for public education and administration in Canada. Very small NGOs may include in-kind contributions to meet a portion of their share of project costs. As a check against dependency, the amount provided by the Division cannot exceed 50 percent of the total amount of cash raised by the NGO in the previous fiscal year.⁴⁰ Minimum and maximum project budgets and time-frames have also shaped proposals. In the 1980s, the minimum total contribution by the Division was \$25,000, the maximum in one fiscal year was \$350,000 and projects were limited to a maximum of three years.

3.4 Project Eligibility

In the early years of the NGO program, officers and managers used their judgement and exercised discretion in determining a project's eligibility. There was little recourse to written rules and regulations. By the 1980s, however, there was a codified list of ineligible project activities, including:

- capital purchases
- child sponsorship
- humanitarian assistance and emergency relief
- fund raising and other activities that focus on promotion of the NGDO
- conferences and visitors that are not an integral part of the project
- visits to Canada of resource people who are not from eligible countries
- youth projects for academic credit
- work camps
- political advocacy in Canada or abroad and the promotion of religious beliefs.⁴¹

In addition to the eligibility criteria mentioned above, after 1980, applicants increasingly had to describe how their projects intended to meet contextual goals. These are desired project outcomes other than those the Division was established to pursue.⁴² NGDO proposals have been required to consider a wide range of political, social or geographic contextual goals such as fostering democratic participation, empowering women or ethnic groups, protecting the environment and providing cultural and educational experiences and employment for Canadians.⁴³ NGDOs may have had to explain how they can ensure that women are not only beneficiaries of development and development education but are also included as equals in decision-making in every aspect of the program. They may be required to screen their initiatives for environmental impacts and design ways of mitigating any potential threats to the

environment.

The selection of projects against a growing list of country, organizational and project criteria, as well as contextual goals, increasingly limited the scope of activities CIDA was willing to support, and slowed the selection process down. Savvy NGOs adopted tactics to keep their proposals moving. Project elements that might not be well received were deleted, or disguised, and the presentation of acceptable project objectives and the pursuit of contextual goals were highlighted.

In an attempt to manage the burgeoning number of new NGO applicants, while improving administration and accountability, the NGO division tightened eligibility criteria. By the mid 1980s, organizational eligibility criteria began to favour older, more bureaucratized NGOs with an established track record. Since then, new NGOs seeking seed funding or existing on a shoestring budget with few or no permanent staff and few partners in the south have tended to be filtered out at the early stages of the selection process. Given the proliferation of small NGOs this screening process may ensure that only those organizations with the demonstrated capacity to deliver results are awarded projects. However, the tighter criteria may also create an 'inner circle' of most favoured NGOs, which would draw criticism, and limit the state's access to the innovation found among small NGOs.

3.5 Legal Contracts

A major influence on program administration is exerted by the nature of the grant or contribution agreement. These are contracts governed by principles set out in the Financial Administration Act used throughout the Canadian state to designate the financial and legal responsibilities of state agencies and recipients of state funds. The Financial Administration Act empowers the Treasury Board to authorize the terms of contracts entered into by all departments. The FAA (and other relevant Acts) are 'operationalized' and elaborated by the Treasury Board through guidelines and directives, which departments and agencies must follow.

A contribution agreement specifies the expected outcomes, delivery time-frames, financial and narrative reporting requirements, and terms of expenditure. A grant does not require specific outcomes or detailed financial or narrative reporting. These definitions, which interpret the FAA, are provided to departments by the Treasury Board. Contribution agreements determine the form and content of narrative and fiscal reporting required by NGDOs and their partners. In the early years, simple financial statements and summary reports returned annually sufficed for most projects. However in later years, quarterly reports accompanied by detailed narratives, and followed by annual independent audits, reports and evaluations became common, greatly increasing the paper burden on NGDOs. For the first ten years

of NGO Division programming these simple instruments evolved slowly, meeting new circumstances and requirements relatively well. However, as discussed in the following section, by the end of the 1970s, senior executive expectations of NGOs and the NGO division were increasing steadily.

3.6 The Budgetary Cycle and Program Rationalization

In the early 1960s, EAO Director General, Herb Moran, received authorization from the Cabinet to carry over funds appropriated from one fiscal year to the next, and to engage in multi-year project and financial planning. This innovation recognized that Canadian budgeting and expenditure cycles are difficult, if not impossible to reconcile with the 'real world' of international development. Unfortunately, such reasoning came to an abrupt end in 1977 when the Treasury Board, alarmed over the growing amount of unspent funds and poor financial management, revoked CIDA's right to carry over unspent funds from one fiscal year to another. Since then, CIDA managers have faced the rather contradictory task of conducting long-term development planning based on annually lapsing, often variable, funds.

Despite having a relatively small slice of the ODA budget to disburse, the NGO Division was greatly challenged by the budgetary cycle. Throughout the late 1970s and into the 1980s, the Division's budget grew fast to meet rising ODA targets. Between the fiscal years 1980-81 and 1983-84, ODA

funds channeled through voluntary organizations increased 119 per cent⁴⁴. By the end of the period each officer was administering approximately \$2.7 million worth of projects and programs.⁴⁵ CIDA executives expected that the Division and its NGDO partners would meet its annual disbursement targets, with the appropriate reporting and monitoring, by administering contribution agreements for larger and more comprehensive projects and programs, and by developing new management systems. However, there was a chronic problem with capacity at the NGO Division, which was analyzed by the Auditor General. The 1979 Report by the Auditor General severely criticized CIDA for poor fiscal control, programming and management practices. While the Report recognized that the responsiveness of NGO Division programs required non-interference in the operations of NGDOs, it nonetheless focused on the need for improvements in fiscal and administrative control.⁴⁶ The Report noted that internal procedures for selection and approval of NGDOs and projects and the terms and conditions of agreements were not formally documented. It also found the potential for the duplication of projects and double funding was not being adequately checked by the sharing of information between the Division and other units in CIDA and Canadian diplomatic posts.⁴⁷ Moreover, the Division had not determined the information it required for financial monitoring reports or established procedures to ensure that they were received on time. Audited financial

statements were received by NGDOs, but they were overviews; they did not contain any information on individual projects funded by the Division.⁴⁸

By the early 1980s, the NGO Division's workload was rising to administer the disbursements of the responsive program, assist with the burgeoning country focus program and respond to the concerns of the Auditor General. Due to these pressures, officers complained that too much of their time was dominated by selection and contract management processes; little was left for monitoring and evaluation, let alone innovative thinking about development issues, or the state - NGDO relationship. Tension grew, morale diminished and cracks emerged in the relationship between the Division and NGDOs.⁴⁹ The responsive 'people-centred' programming values held in high esteem by the NGO Division staff and their NGDO partners collided with the logic of the budgetary cycle and program rationalization. However, more challenging years were yet to come.

The election of the Progressive Conservative government in 1984 intensified the central agency focus on CIDA's project administration and financial management. It also fused pre-existing conservative political goals of shrinking the size and influence of the state in society and economy, and the public management goal of improving program administration through computer technology and data analysis. This process of "simplification and deregulation"⁵⁰ was intended to rationalize

the operations of the state. In the years that followed, the Auditor General, Department of Finance and the Treasury Board campaigned relentlessly on expenditure management, program effectiveness, "value for money" and administrative accountability issues. Within CIDA, Branches and Divisions were constantly reminded that their activities were being watched. Probing audits in 1984, 1988 and 1993 kept the heat on. In the 1988 review of twenty-one projects with NGOs and non-governmental institutions the Auditor General could find only one that "was not performing in accordance to the detailed project descriptions contained in CIDA's files".⁵¹ To most observers it was clear evidence that program administration had improved since the 1979 audit, yet the Auditor General still issued a long list of deficiencies.⁵² The Report requested additional measures to account for expenditures and more focused monitoring and control procedures. CIDA agreed to improve its collection of information for evaluative purposes and to increase the influence of audit and evaluation plans in the organization, and, as if sensing a grave penalty for non-compliance, stated that it "takes special note of the observations on current funding trends and its accountability implications."⁵³

3.7 New Program and Project Instruments

Up until the late 1970s, a harmonious relationship based on shared values and short, cost-shared projects wedded the

interests of the NGO Division to Canadian NGOs. By the early 1980s, however, the increasing workload and scrutiny by central agencies had begun to radically change program administration in the NGO Division. Brodhead and Pratt observed that:

By the mid-1980s, the NGO division at any given time was involved with some 150 [NGOs] and was contributing to several thousand projects. It became apparent that the division could not provide effective service to nor sustain an informed overview of so many NGOs and projects.⁵⁴

New mechanisms to rationalize operations and increase 'productivity' were established in the late 1970s, when new units with functional specializations were created. The Institutional Cooperation and Development Services Division (ICDS) was established to fund programs for volunteer sending organizations and educational institutions. Large volunteer sending organizations such as CUSO and Canada World Youth were placed in the same category as colleges and universities, ostensibly to develop links between professional and educational institutions in Canada and developing countries, even though many of these organizations were drifting away from their college and university roots at the time.' Since

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It is true that many of these organizations send volunteers to instruct at educational institutions, but a large number of volunteers do community development work. In the fiscal year 1985-86, 60% of the 247 volunteers in the Caribbean region were involved in education projects and 26% in community development. Francine Trempe, E.G. Thiessen, and Louise Pesant, A Study on Volunteer-Sending Activities by Canadian NGOs/NGOs. Final Report for SECOR INC, June 1987, Table 2.13.

the late 1970s, they have been viewed as state contractors, delivering volunteers to the South, rather than independent NGOs pursuing grassroots development with their partners in the South.¹

Within the NGO Division there were important organizational changes aimed at reducing CIDA's project administration costs. In the early 1980s, to reduce the paper burden and provide NGOs with longer term funding, the most effective and efficient NGOs 'graduated' from one year project funding agreements to longer term program funding agreements. Under this approach, an NGO submitted a proposal outlining the general direction of its programming, including areas of regional and sectoral concentration, and its NGO partners in the South.⁵⁵ If the applicant passed evaluations of its management systems, financial viability and accountability mechanisms, it was usually awarded three-year renewable agreements. In 1989, twenty-two NGOs were supported; by 1993, fifty NGOs received program support.⁵⁶

Program funding should have been celebrated as a progressive, autonomy enhancing instrument, which gave NGOs the programming flexibility they needed, but it was not. Within CIDA it was promoted as an effective instrument to reduce the paper burden caused by administering thousands of projects.⁵⁷ In addition to this instrument, between 1989 and 1992, to

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¹From 1981-81 to 1985-86, CUSO funding rose from \$13 million to 23 million with no less than 70% of their budget coming from ICDS, and no less than 81% coming from CIDA.

further "ease the [NGO] Division's workload,"⁵⁸ four regional funds were established to serve NGOs seeking project funds of less than \$250,000. Each fund was administered by a non-government institution, consulting firm, or provincial NGO council. In 1993, through a peer review process, these decentralized funds provided monies to 117 organizations.⁵⁹ In that year, the NGO Division provided project funds to an additional 43 NGOs.⁶⁰ To increase disbursement flows even further, non-accountable grants were awarded to selected NGOs. Since 1989, some of the most competent NGOs have undergone extensive institutional evaluations by independent consultants - focusing on management systems, finance and administration - to be eligible for three- year grants, which NGOs can use for projects, programs or core administration. In 1993, twenty-eight NGOs were funded under this instrument.⁶¹

The program rationalization 'movement' eventually culminated with a discussion within CIDA and with NGOs on the potential for widespread direct funding of Southern NGOs, including some in the West Indies.⁶² The practice had been tested by CIDA, and for decades a small "mission administered" fund had been disbursed by Canadian diplomats to Southern NGOs and community groups. Direct funding had strong support at the executive level, but as a policy proposal it was met with stiff resistance from Canadian and Southern NGOs who feared the loss of their inter-organizational relationships. West Indian NGOs felt that their relationships with OXFAM-

CANADA, Match International, CUSO and INTER-PARES had more substance than the transfer of funds. It facilitated a North-South dialogue that might not exist under a direct funding.

In addition to mechanisms that devolved responsibility to individual NGOs, CIDA also encouraged the creation of coalitions of NGOs to administer funds in geographic or thematic areas. Some of these funds, such as Partnership Africa Canada and the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Fund, disbursed tens of millions annually. Between the early 1980s and mid-1990s, units within CIDA established more than a dozen of these funds. However, none was developed for the Caribbean region.

In addition to these initiatives, the country focus program was established to concentrate CIDA's resources on regions or sectors. This program was considered a major innovation because it attempted to transform CIDA's thinking about how it should muster its resources to delivery aid. Rather than simply initiating a contracting competition between private sector firms, officers in the Bilateral branch were encouraged to think about using NGOs, universities and professional institutions as executing agencies for projects where such organizations had more relevant experience.⁶³ In many cases the Bilateral branch was presented with projects from NGOs. Within this operational context, the NGO Division and Bilateral programs were forced to work together, blurring responsive and proactive aid delivery approaches. Part of the

reason for the Bilateral Branch's interest in the country focus program was that it could quickly disburse funds. The sole-source contracts given to NGOs eliminated lengthy contractor and consultant selection procedures.⁶⁴ The popularity of the mechanism peaked in 1990-91, when it disbursed \$307 million.⁶⁵

Eligibility criteria, the terms and conditions of contribution agreements and the budgetary cycle evolved throughout the 1970s to meet increasing client and corporate demands. However, by the time the decade came to a close, it was obvious to the NGO Division that facilitating the process of grassroots international development was more complex than sharing the vision of NGOs, fostering good working relationships, and sharing the emotional highs and lows of their programs and projects. Central agencies and senior executives at CIDA demanded a greater emphasis on public management throughout the agency. For the NGO Division this meant that it had to establish processes to evaluate its programs, report results, improve accountability frameworks, and contribute to both the integration and rationalization of CIDA programs. Thus far the chapter has examined the three central traits of administrative infrastructure: the diffusion of decision-making power, organizational autonomy and the focus on program administration. In the fourth section of the chapter the influence of administrative infrastructure on the relationship between the NGO Division, Canadian NGOs and NGO

partners in the West Indies is analysed.

IV. THE EFFECTS OF DIFFUSION, AUTONOMY AND THE FOCUS ON PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION ON RELATIONS WITH NGDOS

In this section I argue that the administrative infrastructure was so influential that it was imprinted on the relationships Canadian NGDOs established with their West Indian partners. Interviews with key NGDO officers and executives in Canada and the West Indies revealed that the diffused decision-making environment, autonomy and program administration had serious consequences for West Indian NGDO program planning, funding, reporting, human resources and accountability. Indeed, the very health of relations between the state and Canadian NGDOs and their partners in the West Indies was in part determined by the administrative infrastructure that sustained it. The power of the administrative infrastructure is recognized by 'insiders'. Former Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC) executive director, Tim Brodhead, views institutional structures as the essential building blocks of the relationship between CIDA and NGDOs. "Budgeting, spending, auditing, and accounting is what keep these places going."⁶⁶ John Saxby, who has held program management positions at CUSO and OXFAM-CANADA, agrees, asserting that "the essence of the system is the operation of the 'aid chain' that transfers resources from CIDA to Canadian NGDOs, and from there to Southern NGDOs."⁶⁷ Lawrence Cumming, who held executive

positions at OXFAM-CANADA and CCIC is in agreement with Saxby, and adds that "the contradictions of the aid chain carry through to the front lines of projects in the South."⁶⁸ Indeed, Phillip Rawkins has observed that the behaviour of Canadian NGDO coalitions working in the South are highly influenced by the structures within CIDA that sustain them.⁶⁹

The effect of administrative infrastructure on NGDO relations can be illustrated in the late 1960s and 1970s when there was a minimum of bureaucracy and there were few NGDO relationships, and later, in the 1980s, when, in the words of former NGO division manager John Martin, "changes at CIDA effectively changed the direction of these [NGDOs]."⁷⁰ The effect of the diffused decision-making environment and the autonomy that it fostered is discussed in the next section.

4.1 Diffused Decision-making Environment and Autonomy

The diffused decision-making environment and the autonomy that flowed from it is an enduring feature of the administrative infrastructure that linked the state to Canadian and West Indian NGDOs. In the late 1960s and 1970s, the diffused decision-making environment together with the ethos of project flexibility gave West Indian and Canadian officers in the field the autonomy to make project decisions without extensive consultation with other stakeholders. Such freedom, which was aimed at demonstrating trust and giving project managers the authority they needed to make decisions quickly to keep a

project moving, was demanded by NGOs. Rodger Wilson, an NGO division manager from 1975 to 1982, recalls that there were many discussions in the 1970s about the autonomy of NGOs. The Division wished to cultivate a partnership based on shared values and development practice that would have a minimum of bureaucratic rules. The minimization of rules was a high priority. According to Wilson, "there was a feeling among some Canadian NGOs that they just should be given the money, that CIDA should not set too many conditions or ask too many questions. . . . there was a lack of appreciation for accountability."⁷¹

The diffused decision-making environment shaped the pattern of NGO relations. Interviews with Canadian and West Indian NGO officers and executives and NGO Division officials revealed that too often project and program decisions, taken within a spirit of trust and flexibility, lacked clear agreement among stakeholders on goals and objectives. This decision-making environment led to many inefficiencies, errors and misunderstandings between West Indian and Canadian NGOs. On a practical level, it increased the number and scale of common project problems such as gaining the trust in the host community, hiring appropriate personnel, securing appropriate materials, and coordinating their activities with other NGOs and institutions. More importantly, however, it left Northern donors and West Indian NGOs with different interpretations of what the project was about and how success should be measured.

According to Clem Ballah, co-ordinator of the Caribbean Peoples Development Agency (CARIPEDA) based in St. Vincent, despite years of working with Northern donors, lack of agreement on the objectives of projects and programs remains a serious problem that has cost West Indian NGOs dearly. In the late 1980s, when Canadian and other NGOs started leaving the region, they expressed disappointment with project outcomes as part of the reason for their withdrawal. CARIPEDA and the Small Projects Assistance Team (SPAT) in Dominica lost long-term funding because donors, which included Canadian NGOs, were disappointed with their performance. Yet, CARIPEDA and SPAT believe that their goals and objectives were met. When asked about the concern by Canadian donors about NGO outcomes in Jamaica, Horace Levy, long time co-ordinator of Jamaica's Social Action Centre (SAC) argued that "results might not always be as expected, but according to our standards we achieved our goals."⁷² Jeff James, former Save the Children - Canada regional officer based in Jamaica, explained that there "was always a degree of tension created between the goals and objectives of headquarters and that of the front line operations in Jamaica and the Eastern Caribbean that was never resolved."⁷³ According to Adrienne Clemens, a Save the Children - Canada program manager, "many good things were happening in the Eastern Caribbean, including the spearheading of advocacy for children, but generally, the Eastern Caribbean offices did not meet the operational

requirements of the organization and thus were given their independence."⁷⁴ Similarly, former OXFAM-CANADA coordinator for the Caribbean region, Catherine Hyett, said that despite OXFAM-CANADA's work in the region for more than 20 years, the goals and objectives of partnerships with Caribbean NGOs remain unresolved. "It's hard to establish our agenda, [and without it] we end up being a funding bureaucracy."⁷⁵

The diffused decision-making environment allowed West Indian and Canadian NGO officers to confuse project objectives with domestic party politics.⁷⁶ In Dominica, Belize, Barbados, Grenada and Jamaica, NGO projects supported by Canadian NGOs were slowed or stopped by their governments because they implicated themselves in local electoral politics. The Hurricane Allan Farm Rehabilitation project in St. Vincent, Dominica's Castle Bruce Co-operative and Farm to Market Program, and the GrenFruit Co-operative in Grenada -- all which received support from CUSO, OXFAM-CANADA and INTER PARES -- were embroiled in political battles because the local NGOs were either critical of their national government or employed well known critics of the government.

Similarly, in St. Vincent, victims of Hurricane Allen found out that their proposal to OXFAM-CANADA would not receive matching funds from CIDA because the project was led by an individual who was a bitter rival of the government. In

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⁷⁴In several islands West Indian NGOs have been used as springboards to political office.

Grenada, in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of the island, many of projects of the Agency for Rural Transformation (ART) and GRENCODA were ruined. They were viewed with suspicion by the American-backed government because they had been endorsed by the revolutionary government of Maurice Bishop.

In the West Indies, the political elites often have strong links to social, economic and cultural institutions and organizations. Thus, the potential for these organizations to be drawn into party politics or perceived to be partisan has been always high. According to Jean Christie, former co-ordinator of INTER PARES, "anyone who has been around the Caribbean for any length of time knows this."⁷⁷ Canadian and West Indian officers knew that non-partisanship was essential to the success of their work. The frequency with which projects and party politics became entwined in the 1970s, suggests that Canadian NGDO officers were either 'captured' by local political events,⁷⁸ or more likely, unskilled at navigating around politically sensitive issues with host governments.⁷⁹ Decision-making autonomy was cultivated at the front lines by NGDOs before they had gained the requisite development knowledge and experience. Put simply, the diffused decision-making environment provided the autonomy for poor decisions to be taken that endangered these projects. Canadian officers and executives, removed from daily project management activities, usually found out a project was in deep political trouble after the fact. Former CUSO Executive Director Ian

Smillie has concluded that these errors in judgement and decision-making occurred in the Caribbean region and elsewhere, especially in the early days, because most Canadian NGOs grew from fund raising arms of other organizations to funding southern NGOs without an extensive period of program management in developing countries.⁸⁰ He states, "They graduated from kindergarten to high school without attending junior high school".⁸¹ This condition, coupled with decentralized NGO management, meant that an executive director did not know what was going on in the field until he or she got a call from a high ranking government official asking for an explanation for the conduct of officers in far off lands, and "for organizations without field offices -- which are the majority in Canada -- it is impossible to know what is going on a day-to-day basis."⁸² Jean Christie acknowledged the ease with which Canadian NGOs lost touch with front line operations. Each year in the 1980s, in an effort to ensure that INTER PARES stayed abreast of the issues in the West Indies, she spent three weeks reviewing projects and engaging partners. "This was much more attention than other Northern NGOs gave the region", she states.⁸³ The diffused decision-making environment encouraged front line decision-making and autonomy. However, without a unifying mission or agreement on goals and objectives, many of the Canadian and some West Indian decision-makers on the front lines were ill-prepared for the operational and political

challenges of the work.

4.2 Program Administration

Key instruments of program administration further shaped the behaviour of West Indian NGOs and their relations with Canadian NGOs. These are discussed in the following section.

4.2.1 Funding

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, CUSO and Save the Children - Canada were the only Canadian NGOs that had major programs in the West Indies. Both organizations had difficulties due to a lack of experience and sensitivity to local social, economic and cultural politics. CUSO was criticized for poor management and was embroiled in conflicts with host governments and local communities over the purpose of their program and the political activities of some of their members, and Save the Children - Canada's flagship child welfare and sponsorship program had little support on the ground. In fact, Save the Children - Canada was criticized and lobbied in the late 1970s by West Indian activists to end its flagship child sponsorship program because it smacked of colonialism.⁸⁴ For both organizations, how they got their funding from CIDA was a decisive factor in shaping outcomes. Of CUSO operations in the late 1960s Clyde Sanger wrote:

Mainly because of the contract with CIDA specifying an exact number of [CUSO] placements . . . more than a few [Canadians] are now sent abroad who should never have gone. This pattern has been

clearest in Jamaica whose government has been casual in its way of accepting virtually anyone offered to it. This sloppiness, both by a host government in not checking that there was a proper job to do and by CUSO at several levels in not filtering applicants more carefully, had an inevitable result in 1968-69 when nearly half the volunteers sent to Jamaica returned before their first year was over.⁸⁵

For Sanger, the driving force behind CUSO's poor programming was the system that determined CUSO's budget: the head count. Former CUSO Executive Director, Ian Smillie confirmed its importance. In his recollection: "CUSO was always trying to get away from funding based on the head count and almost destroyed itself trying to do so."⁸⁶ In the case of Save the Children - Canada's child sponsorship program, the West Indian region was one of the first in which it faced opposition. By the late 1970s pressure for change was increasing in other regions of the world. In the same period, CIDA was beginning to move to make an administrative change that would make child sponsorship an ineligible activity for responsive funding. In the early 1980s, as a result of the pressure from those opposed to the practice and CIDA's waning support, Save the Children - Canada replaced the program with one it called 'community sponsorship', which funded community development.⁸⁷ The moral argument coupled with the impending reduction in CIDA support ended the program.

In 1980, CIDA managers rolled out its 'hands off' management strategy, which gave rise to a dramatic increase in the number of funding instruments, consultants and executing

agencies. These organizational changes were reflected in the NGO division and other NGO funding "windows" carried through to Canadian NGDO projects in the South. As the effectiveness and management of foreign assistance became a recurrent issue in Canada throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s,⁸⁸ the NGDO reporting system became increasingly rigid, restricting the expenditure of money to certain items, requiring frequent reports and, in some cases, independent audits. Former NGO division managers Bill McWhinney, Rodger Wilson, John McRae, and officers Paul Denis and Robert Langlois recall the transformation. "Initially the NGO division had minimal reporting requirements"⁸⁹ and "simple procedures were used,"⁹⁰ however, "since the 1980s, the whole agency took its clues from the Treasury Board,"⁹¹ and then, "CIDA had as its primary concern, determining whether the money was spent in the way [NGDOs] said it would be spent."⁹² As a result, another former CIDA manager recollects, "the auditing of NGDO projects increased dramatically".⁹³ The demands of Treasury Board carried through to front line NGDO operations in the South. Indeed, in the 1980s and 1990s, paper burden and accountability mechanisms were among the strongest concerns voiced by West Indian NGDO executives. These issues are discussed in the following section.

4.2.2 Paper Burden and Reporting

Restrictions on funding are rooted in the contribution

agreement and project funding criteria in force at a given time. While elements of the criteria have been subject to change over the years, such criteria has consistently excluded the purchase of capital goods, such as building and equipment, and costs for the general administration of offices, including salaries. Generally, only costs linked to specific projects or programs are included. The rationale for this practice has been to discourage the growth of a dependent funding relationship and to reduce the possibility of double funding, whereby an NGDO is able to recover the full cost of an expenditure item from more than one donor.⁹⁴ It has also served the practical aim of stretching funding dollars.

In Ring Ding in a Tight Corner: A Case Study of Funding and Organizational Democracy in Sistren 1977-1988, one of few books that documents the power of administrative infrastructure in the context of international development project aid, Honor Ford-Smith stated that most donors refused to fund administrative project costs such as salaries, rental cost or equipment.⁹⁵ These restrictions have been a persistent problem that threaten the viability of West Indian NGDOs. Due to the fact that development work is labour intensive and that the costs of communication, printing and computer technology in developing countries are much higher than in Canada or the United States,¹ salaries and administrative costs are a major

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¹ According to Hilary Nicholson in the Caribbean region these administration costs are at least twice as much as in Canada or the United States.

proportion of an NGDO's budget. Yet, West Indian NGDO co-ordinators Lloyd Wright, Hilary Nicholson, Asha Kambon, and Tyrone Buckmire contend, donor responses to the deficiencies of the funding framework have not changed over the years.⁹⁶

There is an expectation on behalf of the donor community that West Indian NGDOs can raise funds from national governments, the public, or sell their services to cover the costs of salaries and general administration, but according to Tyrone Buckmire, Simeon Robinson and Asha Kambon this is not possible. National governments are cash strapped and resist siphoning funds to NGDOs, and charitable giving cannot generate the sums needed to support the NGDO sector, partly because there is not a culture of private sector giving like there is in the United States or Canada. Additionally, most West Indian NGDOs are not in business to sell services to their constituents, who are usually the poor and marginalized.⁹⁷

Restrictions on funding have several serious consequences for West Indian NGDOs. First, most projects are launched on a precarious financial footing and generally lack the resources to fulfill their objectives. Jamaican NGDO co-

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⁹⁶ Lloyd Wright is co-ordinator of Projects for People (Jamaica), Hilary Nicholson is a program director at Women's Media Watch (Jamaica), Asha Kambon is the co-ordinator of the Trinidad and Tobago Network for the Advancement of Women (Trinidad and Tobago) and Tyrone Buckmire is the co-ordinator of the Inter Agency Group of Development Organizations (Grenada).

ordinator, Lloyd Wright explains the dilemma:

If you present a project which costs \$150,000 US dollars to a funding agency, they run for cover. It's too dear, so you start to whittle down the project to meet the resource constraints of your funders. Then, when you start getting the funds your project is perpetually having problems. You are short of working capital, you can't hire people, ... and you have no marketing except by word-of-mouth, so you really don't get the project off to a good start.⁹⁸

Small projects also suffered from under-funding. Agency for Rural Transformation (ART) co-ordinator Sandra Ferguson recalled that:

OXFAM-CANADA gave us funding for a gender workshop to cover the costs of the resource persons or consultants we may need, but they were not willing to pay salaries for the officer on the ground who is mobilizing the community, organizing and doing 'follow-up' work. If we were not able to fill the gap, the project would not happen as we would like and not have the impact we would like.⁹⁹

A second consequence of restricted funding is that, in the words of Lloyd Wright, "it breeds dishonesty".¹⁰⁰ Hilary Nicholson, program director of Women's Media Watch and former Sistren officer, agrees and laments that "one has to learn how to hide salaries, administration and other costs under other project expenditures, just for the organization to survive".¹⁰¹ In the case of Sistren, Ford-Smith writes, business as usual meant that "money to pay [the] rent ... had to be squeezed from other areas."¹⁰² During times of desperation, Sistren had to find ways to fund their search for funding.¹⁰³ Ford-Smith recalls that:

... we had no money to xerox the endless pages of proposals. In desperation one day, we went to a

large hotel, watched until the xerox room was empty, raced in, xeroxed frantically while somebody kept watch and then raced out again.¹⁰⁴

Northern donors generally take a dim view of this behaviour, even though they may have helped to create the conditions for its occurrence, and eventually shun organizations that must 'cook the books' to survive.

The third consequence of the funding framework and priority shifting, the subject on the next section, is the problem of finding and keeping staff. The lack of salary and administration funding has meant that it has been difficult to attract people to the NGDO sector. Sandra Ferguson contends that in Grenada NGDO work has become a profession and is therefore attracting the attention of people who expect to be paid adequately, and who quickly go elsewhere when financial difficulties arise.¹⁰⁵ Similarly, Lloyd Wright contends that in Jamaica "we are no longer dealing with a generation of professionals that are interested in volunteering their talents for a cause, or for the betterment of the country. They want to be paid a decent salary."¹⁰⁶ In Trinidad and Tobago, Asha Kambon has observed that:

despite the country's size, you don't have a large pool of human resources. People with good social mobilization and communication skills are not easy to find and keep. The NGDO sector is a training ground for international organizations, and we are continuously losing good people to them.¹⁰⁷

Simeon Robinson of the Association of Development Agencies is amazed that, "Northern NGDOs will fund local consultants at high salary costs instead of using the funds to keep

professionals on board with NGDOs over a longer term, which is a better way to build internal capacity in the region."¹⁰⁸

A fourth consequence of the funding framework results from the fact that under-funding requires West Indian NGDOs to secure several sources of funding to support their projects. In twenty years of NGDO work in Jamaica, Hilary Nicholson cannot remember one project that did not need multiple funders,¹⁰⁹ and based on Lennox Campbell's experience, several funders "each with their own administrative requirements, time lines, accounting methods and restrictions, place a heavy burden on a project."¹¹⁰ Asha Kambon has found that:

the paper burden can definitely become a nightmare, when you find yourself with a \$5,000 dollar grant from one [NGDO], and another \$10,000 dollar grant from another, and other small sums, perhaps in other currencies, and you have to show how they have contributed to the completion of one task, using differing forms, accounting procedures, and reporting at differing times.¹¹¹

Honor Ford-Smith wrote that the number of funding applications and appointments with funders multiplied, and with this, accounting and administrative tasks soared.¹¹² Sistren had "to concentrate its time and energies on servicing the accounting reporting processes of international aid agencies and [had] little time left to develop the productive resources of the collective."¹¹³ Ford-Smith writes:

Three agencies required us to produce receipts for every penny we had spent "in order to give a good example to our donors and to cover for other organizations who are unable to present such a good record." For a small organization with already overburdened staff and no xerox machine, this was a

deeply infuriating task.¹¹⁴

Canadian NGDOs tried to mitigate the funding problem by developing multi-objective programs that included funds for administrative support and coordination. However, such programs were more difficult to create and took a lot longer to get funded than targeted projects. As well, in the Caribbean context, they tended to serve regional NGDO Networks in the Caribbean such as CARIPEDA, at the expense of project support for small grassroots organizations. Jean Christie recalls that the movement to program funding accelerated the debate about the right mix of funding between regional organizations and networks involved in macro-level policy discussions with national governments, and small organizations that focused on grassroots projects.¹¹⁵

Some Canadian NGDOs were flexible in terms of project reporting requirements. OXFAM-CANADA and Match International minimized the length and depth of the reports it required, and in one case INTER PARES arranged for Canadian NGDOs joint funding a project to share one report. This was initiated by Jean Christie, who was responsible for the Caribbean program at INTER PARES and who "sympathized with those [West Indian NGDOs] that just wanted to get on with the work, yet were constantly required to jump through hoops like performing bears."¹¹⁶ She acknowledged, however, that there was competition between NGDOs for attention and public funds and that they needed to 'put their stamp' on projects, so

collective efforts were not as easy to manage or as helpful as they could have been.¹¹⁷ Hilary Nicholson and Lloyd Wright praised these efforts but noted that Canadian NGOs were often minor donors and usually did not work together to simplify reporting requirements, and thus made only an incremental, ad hoc difference to the paper burden problem.

Francisco Esprit, co-ordinator of the Small Project Assistance Team, contends that despite efforts by NGO donors, generally, reporting has become more complex.

We use to prepare a 6 month report that in the past would satisfy all our funders. But that has changed. Now everybody says we need something different, so we have to tailor our reports according to the demands of the funders; some clearly tell you that they are not interested in reading about anything they are not funding.¹¹⁸

In Tyrone Buckmire's estimation, since the 1980s, the paper trail for NGOs has tripled. From his perspective, "something is very wrong when NGOs have had to hire accountants to keep on top of the paper, even though their budgets have been declining, and auditors are hired at \$600.00 dollars a day to see how \$3000.00 dollars was spent."¹¹⁹ In the last decade, Asha Kambon who has also been frustrated by the negative consequences of the funding framework, the fact that the viability of the NGO community has been threatened, and the lack of interest by the Northern NGO community to assist in finding solutions. "Canadian NGOs know that administrative costs are needed, they know what these costs are, so how is the job to be done?¹²⁰... By us wiggling our noses?"¹²¹ Former

OXFAM-CANADA Caribbean Regional Officer Claudette Legault agrees with Asha Kambon, contending that:

We should not expect West Indian NGOs to assume total responsibility for [administrative] costs because if you look at any Northern [NGDO] and the percentage of budgets that is going to maintain that structure, it is not fair to expect NGOs in the South to maintain themselves without support.¹²²

Most importantly, she believes that supporting NGDO staffing costs is a good investment "that strengthens internal capacity and might have as much impact in the long-term, as funding the planting of five acres of seeds."¹²³ However, Legault is doubtful about the possibilities for change because, in her words, "the [NGDO] funding structure is dictated by who and how we get our funds".¹²⁴ She states that:

OXFAM-Canada's behaviour was heavily influenced by its dependency on annual fund raising campaigns¹ and restrained by a fiscal year budgetary cycle, and CIDA, which didn't allow you to carry forward monies that you have not committed in that fiscal year. In practice, it means that agricultural projects get funded according to the budgetary and project funding cycles of CIDA, and with no correlation to the planting season in the South.¹²⁵

Under these conditions, "you would be hard-pressed to find an [Canadian NGDO] that really starts its planning with the needs of partners in the South."¹²⁶ The effect of the funding

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¹Due to the lack of an obvious political crisis, like South Africa or Latin America in the 1980s, the Caribbean region was not a popular region upon which to base fund raising campaigns. OXFAM-CANADA fund raisers always cautioned against it for fear that the campaign would reap lackluster returns, which in turn would restrict OXFAM-CANADA access to matched funding by the NGO Division's responsive programs' matched funding. Claudette Legault, interview with author December 1, 1999.

framework on West Indian NGDOS has been aggravated by the regular shifts in priorities by NGDO donors.

4.2.3 Priority Shifting

Whether West Indian NGDOS received project or program funding, they were negatively affected by the frequent shifts in priorities and contextual goals set by funders. West Indian NGDO officers and executives observed that in the 1980s the terms and conditions of NGDO activities in the region were often established and adjusted to suit Canadian priorities. In some cases these priorities reflected the agenda of a particular NGDO, in other cases that of the Canadian government or, occasionally, influence from Canadian pressure groups. Peggy Antrobus, the director of WAND, has written that the priorities of donor NGDOS have tended:

to shift in a somewhat arbitrary manner, unrelated to the needs and priorities of southern countries or organizations. This has led to an unenviable situation: long-term planning strategies have been very difficult to undertake while the ensuing short-term, often ad hoc approach to programming and planning has discouraged effective work and efficient management practices.¹²⁷

Tyrone Buckmire, co-ordinator of the Inter Agency Group of Development Organizations in Grenada, complained that in the last decade Grenadian NGDOS have seen several priorities of donor NGOs come and go: teenage pregnancy, HIV-Aids, Environment, Sustainability; and the current theme of civil society:

The practical consequence of frequently shifting

priorities is that a Grenadian skills training project for low income youth that was resourced for sewing, crafts and carpentry, was told after two years to change to computers, which would have required new investments, staff training and administration. Just when a project to meet the training needs of low income youth is seeing its first results, it is dropped. It is no longer an "in" project.¹²⁸

Sistren, which received financial support from several Canadian NGOs including OXFAM-CANADA, INTER-PARES and Match International, experienced the shift in donor interest as well. Sistren's interest in cultural development and women's empowerment was in contrast to the rising interest of donors in micro-enterprise and sustainability. According to Honor Ford-Smith, international donor agencies made it clear "that the problem with [Sistren's] work was that it was not income-generating."¹²⁹ Despite her argument that there was a need to educate women about their position and rights in society, and that confidence-building was essential to redress the huge problem of cultural alienation, international agencies argued that "development means getting your production going, not spending what you don't have. . . ."¹³⁰ Pressure from donor agencies gave birth to a screen-printing textile project that turned out to be unprofitable and a burden to the organization. Sistren, however, was in no position to argue with international funding agencies; in Ford-Smith's words, "they had the handle and we had the blade."¹³¹

New priorities are often funded with new funds. In the 1980s and early 1990s, CIDA's objective to increase

disbursements by creating more avenues of funding and using NGOs as executing agencies created an artificial demand for projects, to which West Indian NGOs felt obliged to respond. West Indian NGOs were encouraged to consider projects that they did not have the mandate -- nor at times the ability -- to undertake. Sister Doreen Francis, executive director of Dominica Save the Children (DOMSAVE)¹, observed that some Canadian NGOs were disappointed when their West Indian counterparts and the communities would not commit the time, money and human resources needed to respond to project opportunities made possible by a shift in Northern priorities.¹³²

Frustration with the changing priorities led Lloyd Wright of Projects for People in Jamaica to chide Canadian funders: "All the problems of women are all solved, all the problems of children are all solved, we just need to solve the problems of the environment."¹³³ He concluded: "Now, if you don't put the phrase 'sustainable development' in your proposal, you wouldn't get funding."¹³⁴ Francisco Esprit, co-ordinator of the Small Project Assistance Team, (SPAT), has seen his organization shaped by the funding interests of Canadian NGO funders. When SPAT was formed in 1981, it was focused on co-operative and income-generating projects funded by CUSO and OXFAM-CANADA:

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¹ Dominica Save the Children's Fund (Domsave) was funded by Save the Children-Canada until the early 1990s.

We were asked to focus on women's discrimination and later the environment. In both cases these objectives were not successfully integrated into projects. On one hand, the women in their local project did not see gender discrimination as a major barrier to their success, and on the other, environmental protection was already a deeply rooted cultural value in Dominica so that very little 'education' was needed. It appears that northern funders just take an international problem and assumed that it is a problem every where in the third world.¹³⁵

Asha Kambon recalls the shift in donor priorities away from popular education to micro-enterprise and from social mobilization to service delivery. She asks: "If that is not the type of work you were doing, how do you shift?:"¹³⁶

Many [NGDOs] felt it was not their business to provide services, for instance, to care for the elderly. It was their business to mobilize people to access the services in their environment or to interface with those people who are supposed to provide services,... it was rights based, rather than service based .... Life becomes very difficult for an [NGDO] when a donor says it is shifting its interest despite what you are doing on the ground, because then you have to scramble to build new relationships with new donors, and this takes time. You have to develop a relationship; they have to see your track record."¹³⁷

Hilary Nicholson contends that many NGDOs suffer from a lack of requisite skills, yet Northern NDGOs do not seem to acknowledge this persistent problem. She notes, "At Sistren and elsewhere, I have worked with tremendously talented community workers who don't have the skills to write reports and project proposals."¹³⁸ Priority shifts often require new skills such as proposal writing skills, or mediation skills are needed because interfacing with new donors and new

processes are required. Additional technical and scientific knowledge also may be required. Women's Media Watch was asked to move into HIV/AIDS education after completing a database project on women and media.¹³⁹

Weary of the trend of NGOs "to follow the money" several West Indian NGOs have stuck to their own priorities, resisting the temptation to fulfill the priorities of Canadian NGOs. Lennox Campbell and Sandra Ferguson, the former and current co-ordinators of the Agency for Rural Transformation, contend that they have not allowed themselves to be governed by 'donor led' funding. Hilary Nicholson confirmed that "changing priorities was definitely a problem with Sistren" but Women's Media Watch has resisted inducements to change focus: "We haven't shifted, but it means that we have lost funding. We have to shop around and find NGO donors that are interested in the work we want to do."¹⁴⁰ Simeon Robinson of the Association of Development Agencies (ADA) also has refused to be led by donors, and in some cases has been able to have funding agencies change their priorities to accommodate ADA's goals and objectives. However, it is more often the case that if a project or program funding relationship cannot be developed around new priorities, the relationship between the West Indian NGO and the funder dwindles.

The diminuation of relationships under these circumstances illustrates the extent to which Canadian and West Indian NGO relationships have been configured by

project or program funding. Yet, in the early 1990s, both West Indian and Canadian NGDO leaders suggested that relationships could be based on the exchange of goods and services. Lennox Campbell and Peta Ann Baker indicated the need for information, networking and support. As Lennox Campbell put it: "Canadian and other Northern NGDOs have easier access to data, information and statistics about the Caribbean region than do most Caribbean NGDOs, and in this regard, there still an important role for them to play."¹⁴¹ Similarly, former OXFAM-CANADA Caribbean program manager Catherine Hyett identified unexplored opportunities for Canadian and West Indian NGDOs, such as tapping the resources of the Caribbean diaspora in Canada. However, very little has come of these ideas.

4.2.4 Time frames

Despite the fact that some Canadian NGDOs endorsed the notion of development as a lengthy, holistic process, the life-cycles of NGDO projects are often too short to provide significant opportunities for organizational learning through experimentation or training, and to ensure that the project would be self-sustaining after funding ceased. According to the program guidelines, projects could be no longer than three years and programs no longer than five, which was often too short to sort out the complex social, economic and political issues associated with cooperative development, let alone see

a significant return on a farmer's investment. According to former CIDA manager, Hilda Bateman, "time frames were always a problem."¹⁴² "No project could be longer than five years, even though conventional wisdom said that 20 or 30 years was needed .... There were high expectations."¹⁴³ The logic of the short time frame was to reduce the likelihood that the project would grow dependent on project or program funding. John McRae, a former CIDA executive, expressed his frustration with this condition by recalling that in his experience it took a decade or more to see real change in rural agriculture: "Three years was much too short a time frame for the majority of rural projects [CIDA] funded, and many local agencies had difficulty fitting into the time lines and constraints of CIDA's guidelines."¹⁴⁴ From what he observed and from what evaluations told him, the first two years of a rural project were needed for passive animation -- putting one's feet up and talking with the locals -- it would take until the third, fourth, and fifth year until one could say many projects were up and running.¹⁴⁵ Consequently, many projects were closed down before they really started.¹⁴⁶ The effects of administrative infrastructure discussed in this section and in earlier sections all had implications for the structure of accountability.

4.2.5 Accountability

Since the early 1980s, West Indian NGDO executives have been

struggling to keep their organizations focused on the needs of their constituents, who are typically poor and marginalized. The administrative infrastructure that sets the terms of reference for the relationship between Canadian NGDOs and the Canadian state, has hindered this process. West Indian executives¹⁴⁷ have voiced their concerns about a funding framework that usually provides small, short-term contributions on the one hand, and heavy administrative demands on the other. In Lennox Campbell's words: "You lose credibility with local communities when you spend all of your time writing funding proposals, negotiating new projects, and reporting to funders."¹⁴⁸ Tyrone Buckmire has observed that some local communities in Grenada feel like pawns in the development game. They have become cynical about the whole development approach designed by NGDOs because of the sudden starts, abrupt stops, and attention to the bureaucratic process rather than local outcomes. "They have lost credibility with their own constituencies."¹⁴⁹ While West Indian NGDOs attempted to increase their accountability to the communities in which they worked, too often their time and energy was being diverted by more demanding lines of accountability running northward to Canadian NGDOs and from them to the Canadian state. Former executive director of INTER PARES Jean Christie has concluded that the many funding and administrative deficiencies of the state - NGDO aid chain call into question its legitimacy as a development model.¹⁵⁰ Former

OXFAM-CANADA Caribbean Program Officer, Claudette Legault agrees, concluding that the system evolved from one which was struggling to be responsive to one which is donor led. In Tim Brodhead's view:

The most insidious consequence of the [state -NGDO] relationship was that it turned organizations, which formed because people were committed to try to do something about poverty, into mini aid agencies. [NGDOs] have been technocratized. They move money, like CIDA, they operate in lockstep in a technocratic fashion.¹⁵¹

V. CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown how administrative infrastructure shaped relationships between the NGO division, Canadian NGDOs and their West Indian partners. Three characteristics of the administrative infrastructure were highly influential: the diffused decision-making environment, autonomy, and a focus on the operational instruments of project administration. Together these values and instruments provided the terms of reference for the relationship between state and NGDOs. The diffused decision-making environment and autonomy had a broad influence on the organization of the NGO division and its relations with NGDOs. From the late 1960s to the mid 1980s, grassroots development intelligence and front line decision-making was emphasized. During this time period, the NGO division cemented an alliance with NGDOs that was rooted in shared objectives and common interests. The alliance made the Division a wellspring of expertise and innovation and created an NGDO industry. A more obvious impact on these

relations, however, was made by project and program funding criteria, frameworks, and other operational instruments. Before the 1980s, these instruments were few in number and applied in a flexible manner. Between 1981 and 1993, the Division was forced to rationalize programs to meet goals and objectives set by senior management and central agencies. In this time period, Bill McWhinney recalls that "so many new administrative initiatives were launched in the 1980s that the Division felt like a 'guinea pig'."¹⁵² Some of the initiatives drew on the diffused decision making environment to devolve management responsibility and fiscal accountability to NGDOs and institutions. Other initiatives encouraged the multiplication and diversification of NGDO relationships with CIDA. While these meant new opportunities for NGDOs, they struck a blow to the NGO division's autonomy. No longer could it claim to be CIDA's 'clearinghouse' for grassroots NGDO development expertise. Additionally, the 'hands off' management strategy increased the Division's workload and its use of contractors, which had the cumulative effect of lowering staff morale. The most pervasive effect of the strategy, however, was the bureaucratization of operations and day-to-day relations with NGDOs. Relations between NGDOs and CIDA increasingly focused on the requirements of management processes, rather than on new ways to meet stark development challenges created by debt and structural adjustment programs. Former manager Nigel Martin recalled the transition with the

NGO division lyrically:

Someone made a mistake, some program went wrong, someone lied. The government saw a loophole and closed it. All [NGDOs,] and the culture of the Division was affected. The one page report became three . . . . Year after year the specifications of the program became tighter and tighter, then the tail was wagging the dog.¹⁵³

Changes to the administrative infrastructure within the NGO division shaped relations the Division had with Canadian NGDOs and, in turn, influenced the relations Canadian NGDOs had with West Indian NGDOs. Principally, the responsive, flexible programming that was developed between the founders of the NGO division and Canadian NGDOs in the late 1960s and early 1970s, turned rigid and bureaucratic in the 1980s and early 1990s. Some Canadian NGDOs attempted to mitigate the deficiencies of the tighter administrative infrastructure, but their efforts could not 'turn back the clock' to the time when the administrative infrastructure supported the belief that the NGO division, Canadian NGDOs and their Southern partners were in the development game together.

1. The primary purpose of several sources of advice was to challenge the influence of departmental mandarins. Richard J. Van Loon and Michael S. Whittington, The Canadian Political System: Environment, Structure Process (McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd.), 487-488.
2. This flowed from the recommendations of the Glassco Commission and its famous admonition: "let the managers manage". Ibid., 568;
3. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 95.
4. David R. Morrison, Aid and Ebb Tide: A History of CIDA and Canadian Development Assistance, (Waterloo, Ontario, Wilfrid Laurier University Press in association with the North-South Institute / L'Institut Nord-Sud, 1998), 42.
5. Ibid., 63.
6. Ibid.
7. Alison Van Rooy, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, July 26, 1994, session 48, 10; Quoted in Morrison, op. cit., 445.
8. Morrison, op. cit., 95.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 119.
11. Peter Wyse, Canadian Foreign Aid in the 1970s: An Organizational Audit (Montreal: Centre for Developing Area Studies, McGill University, 1983), 27.
12. Ibid.
13. Roger Young, "Canadian Foreign Aid Policies: Objectives, Influences and Consequences," Working Paper No. A.10, Development Studies Program, University of Toronto, February 1984, 32-33, Quoted in Morrison, op. cit., 444.
14. For examples and reactions to the vague outcomes from multi-stakeholder processes, see David Morrison, op. cit., 95, 119, 133, 368, 387, 400; Phillip Rawkins, "An Institutional Analysis of CIDA," in Canadian International

Development Assistance, ed. Cranford Pratt, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994); 173.

15. Ibid., 86-87, 98, 100; Hilda Bateman, former External Aid Office officer, interview with author, 2 December, 1994.
16. Ibid., 68.
17. Ibid., 63, and 61.
18. Ibid., 99-100.
19. Ibid., 238.
20. Rawkins, op. cit., 159.
21. Brodhead and Pratt, op. cit., 96.
22. Brodhead and Pratt, op. cit., 96; Romeo Miaone, Tony Enns, Tom Schatzy, Lawrence Cumming, interviews with author, October 21, 1994, October 20, 1994, November 22, 1994, and December, 1994, respectively.
23. John McRae, former CIDA Manager, interview with author, 24 November 24, 1994.
24. Rawkins, op. cit., 159.
25. Ibid., 144.
26. Ibid., 55.
27. Ibid., 163 - 165.
28. Ibid., 171, 177-178.
29. Phillip Rawkins, op. cit., 156. Also see 163-4.
30. John McRae, interview with author, 24 November 24, 1994.
31. Wilson op. cit., 55.
32. Rawkins, op. cit., 161.
33. Brodhead and Pratt op. cit., 96.
34. Morrison, op. cit., 250.
35. Lucie M. Bohac, "The Institutional Cooperation and Development Services Division Project Selection Process," unpublished paper (April, 1987), 10.

36. Ibid., 6-7.

37. David R. Morrison, "The Choice of Bilateral Recipients" in Canadian International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal, ed. Cranford Pratt, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), 123-155.

38. Lloyd Wright, and Horace Levy, interviews with author, March 10, 1993, and March 11, 1993, respectively.

39. Canadian International Development Agency, NGO Division, "Introducing ...The NGO Project Facility" (Ottawa: CIDA, n.d.).

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Wilson, op. cit., 129.

43. Bohac, op. cit., 9.

44. Morrison, op., cit., 209.

45. A Review of the Organization and Program Delivery Mechanisms of the Special Programs Branch, A Report by The Coopers & Lybrand Consulting Group, February 11, 1986, iv.

46. Office of Auditor General of Canada, Report, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1979), 279.

47. Ibid. The lack of coordination between aid donors and NGOs in the Caribbean was noted by CUSO executives in the 1970. See, Senate of Canada, The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Ottawa, Wednesday, February 25, 1970 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1970), 7:27.

48. Ibid, 280.

49. Within CIDA and among NGOs there was a sense that the responsive relationship of the 1970s had diminished, and a far more complicated relationship had emerged. Tim Brodhead and Cranford Pratt, op. cit., 96-110.

50. The impact on accountability is discussed in: Sharon Sutherland, "The Al-Mashat affair: administrative accountability in parliamentary institutions" Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 34, 4 (Winter, 1992), 583-584.

51. Office of Auditor General, Report, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1988), 9.67.

52. Ibid., 9.79.
53. Ibid.
54. Tim Brodhead and Cranford Pratt, "Paying the Piper: CIDA and Canadian NGOs" in Canadian International Development Assistance Policies: An Appraisal, ed. Cranford Pratt, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), 97.
55. Ibid.
56. Morrison, op. cit., 360.
57. Coopers & Lybran Consulting Group, "A Review of the Organization and Program Delivery Mechanisms of the Special Programs Branch", (February 11, 1986), ii.
58. Morrison, op. cit., 361.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Brodhead and Pratt, op., cit., 98.
62. Hon. Don Mills, "The Concept of Direct Funding and implications for Caribbean Non-Governmental Organizations," Unpublished report prepared for CUSO a Canadian Development Agency working in the Caribbean, (June 1988)
63. Ian Smillie, "Wintertime for Country Focus: Contracts, NGOs and CIDA," unpublished paper, (December, 1993), 3-4.
64. Coopers & Lybran Consulting Group, "A Review of the Organization and Program Delivery Mechanisms of the Special Programs Branch", (February 11, 1986), ii.
65. Ibid.
66. Tim Brodhead, interview with author, December 2, 1994.
67. John Saxby, interview with author, November 20, 1999.
68. Lawrence Cumming, interview with author, December 3, 1994.
69. Phillip Rawkins, interview with author, December 10, 1999.
70. John Martin, interview with author, November 23, 1994.

71. Rodger Wilson, interview with author, October 17, 1994.
72. Horace Levy, interview with author, March 11, 1994; According to NGO division officer Robert Langlois, serious concerns about NGDO outcomes were first raised within the division in the early 1980s. Robert Langlois, interview with author, October 21, 1994.
73. Jeff James, interview with author, March 11, 1993.
74. Adrianne Clemens, interview with author, October 18, 1994.
75. Catherine Hyett, interview with author, November 3, 1992.
76. Bob Thomson, and Ian Smillie, interviews with author, November 24, 1994 and December 3, 1994, respectively.
77. Jean Christie, interview with author, December 6, 1999.
78. Bob Thomson, and Ian Smillie confirmed that Field Service Officers sometimes used poor judgement, or got carried away with the politics. Interviews with author, November 24, 1994 and December 3, 1994, respectively.
79. Ian Smillie, interview with author, December 3, 1994.
80. Ian Smillie, interview with author December 3, 1994.
81. Ian Smillie, interview with author December 3, 1994.
82. Ian Smillie, interview with author, December 3, 1994.
83. Jean Christie, interview with author, December 6, 1999.
84. Jeff James, interview with author, March 11, 1993.
85. Clyde Sanger, Half A Loaf: Canada's Semi-Role Among Developing Countries, (Toronto: The Ryerson Press. 1969), 234.
86. Ian Smillie, interview with author, December 4, 1994.
87. Addrianne Clemens, and Jeff James, interviews with author, October 18, 1994 and March 11, 1993 respectively.
88. See, David Humphreys, "CIDA lifts financial ban on CUSO after management moves accepted," Globe and Mail, (8 June 1979), 9; Auditor General of Canada, Annual Report 1988 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1988).

89. Bill McWhinney, interview with author, December 2, 1994.
90. Robert Langlois, Paul Denis, interviews with author, October 21, 1994, November 22, 1994 and respectively.
91. Bill McWhinney, interview with author, December 2, 1994.
92. John McRae, interview with author, November 24, 1994
93. John Martin, interview with author, November 23, 1994.
94. Jean Christie, Claudette Legault, Simeon Robinson and Hilary Nicholson, interviews with author, December 6, 1999, December 1, 1999, December 3, 1999, and December 16, 1999, respectively.
95. Honor Ford-Smith, Ring Ding in a Tight Corner: A Case Study of Funding and Organizational Democracy in Sistren, 1977-1988, (Toronto: Women's Program, International Council for Adult Education, 1989), 64.
96. Lloyd Wright, Hilary Nicholson, Asha Kambon and Tyrone Buckmire, interviews with author, December 4, 1999, December 16, 1999, December 1, 1999 and November 15, 1999, respectively.
97. Tyrone Buckmire, interview with author, November 25, 1999.
98. Lloyd Wright, interview with author, March 10, 1993.
99. Sandra Ferguson, interview with author, December 30, 1999.
100. Lloyd Wright, interview with author, December 4, 1999.
101. Hilary Nicholson, interview with author, December 16, 1999.
102. Ford-Smith, op. cit., 64.
103. Ford-Smith, op. cit., 63.
104. Ibid.
105. Sandra Ferguson, interview with author, November 30, 1999.
106. Lloyd Wright, interview with author, December 4, 1999.
107. Asha Kambon, interview with author, December 1, 1999.

108. Simeon Robinson, interview with author, December 3, 1999.
109. Hilary Nicholson, interview with author, December 16, 1999.
110. Lennox Campbell, interview with author, January 28, 1993.
111. Asha Kambon, interview with author, December 1, 1999.
112. Ford-Smith op. cit., 64. The cost of administration was a key point in several interviews with NGDO executives. Lennox Campbell of the Agency for Rural Transformation, St. Georges's Grenada, interview with author, 28 January 1993; Lloyd Wright of Project for People, Kingston, Jamaica, 10 March 1993; Peta Anne Baker, Association of Development Agencies, Kingston, Jamaica, 10 March 1993; Sister DOMSAVE, Roseau Dominica, 5 January 1993; Small Projects Assistance Team, Roseau, Dominica, 6 January 1993. For an international overview of accountability and management issues, see, Ian Smillie, The Alms Bazaar, Altruism Under Fire - Non-profit Organizations and International Development (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1995), Chapter 8.
113. Ford-Smith, op. cit., 36.
114. Ford-Smith op. cit., 64.
115. Jean Christie, interview with author, December 6, 1999.
116. Jean Christie, interview with author, December 6, 1999.
117. Jean Christie, interview with author, December 6, 1999. Based on his experience with NGDO coalitions involved in South Africa, Jim Mackinnon, program manager with OXFAM-CANADA agrees that there is an underlying competition between Canadian NGDOs working jointly. Interview with author, November 21, 1994.
118. Francisco Esprit, interview with author, December 2, 1999.
119. Tyrone Buckmire, interview with author, November 25, 1999.
120. Asha Kambon, interview with author, December 1, 1999.
121. Asha Kambon, interview with author, December 1, 1999.
122. Claudette Legault, interview with author December 1, 1999.

123. Claudette Legault, interview with author December 1, 1999.
124. Claudette Legault, interview with author December 1, 1999.
125. Claudette Legault, interview with author December 1, 1999.
126. Claudette Legault, interview with author December 1, 1999.
127. Peggy Antrobus, "Funding for NGOs: Issues and Options" World Development 15, (Supplement, 1987), 98-99.
128. Tyrone Buckmire, interview with author, November 25, 1999.
129. Honor Ford-Smith, op. cit., 59-60.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid., 63.
132. Sister Doreen Francis, interview with author, Roseau, Dominica, January 5, 1994.
133. Lloyd Wright, interview with author, December, 4, 1999.
134. Lloyd Wright, interview with author, December, 4, 1999.
135. Fransico Esprit, interview with author, December 2, 1999.
136. Asha Kambon, interview with author, December 1, 1999.
137. Asha Kambon, interview with author, December 1, 1999.
138. Hilary Nicholson, interview with author, December 16, 1999.
139. Hilary Nicholson, interview with author, December 16, 1999.
140. Hilary Nicholson, interview with author, December 16, 1999.
141. Lennox Campbell, interview with author, January 28, 1993.
142. Hilda Bateman, interview with author, December 2, 1994.
143. Hilda Bateman, interview with author, December 2, 1994.

144. John McRae, interview with author, November 24, 1994.
145. John McRae, interview with author, November 24, 1994.
146. John McRae, interview with author, November 24, 1994.
147. Lennox Campbell of the Agency for Rural Transformation, (Grenada); Lloyd Wright of Projects for People, (Jamaica); Peta Anne Baker, Association of Development Agencies, (Jamaica); and Ron Green, Small Projects Assistance Team, (Dominica). Lloyd Wright, Projects for People, Kingston, Jamaica, interview with author, 10 March 1993; Lennox Campbell, Agency for Rural Transformation, interview with author, St. Georges, Grenada, 28 January 1993.
148. Lennox Campbell, interview with author, January 28, 1993.
149. Tyrone Buckmire, interview with author, November 25, 1999.
150. Jean Christie, interview with author, December, 6, 1999.
151. Tim Brodhead, interview with author, December 2, 1994.
152. Bill McWhinney, former executive director, CUSO and Senior Vice President, Canadian International Development Agency, interview with author, December 2, 1994.
153. Nigel Martin, interview with author, November 11, 1994.

CONCLUSION
ADMINISTRATIVE INFRASTRUCTURE:
A NEW TOOL FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS

I. ADMINISTRATIVE INFRASTRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIPS

Does state administrative infrastructure influence relationships between the state and societal groups? This dissertation has examined this question by investigating the impact of values, rules and accountability frameworks on the relationship between the Canadian State, Canadian NGOs and their partner NGOs in the West Indies between 1968 and 1993. In this chapter the dissertation concludes with a review of the conceptual 'road map' of administrative infrastructure and a consideration of its implications for contemporary political science, and for development theory and practice in the Caribbean region.

1.1 Conceptual Road Map

Administrative infrastructure is a mixture of tangible and intangible state characteristics. Examples of tangible characteristics include the rules and regulations governed by the Financial Administration Act, whereas less tangible characteristics are values like responsiveness and equity. The influence of a particular characteristic is dependent on the goals and objectives of the state and the challenges, opportunities, and constraints presented by social and economic circumstances.

Three major characteristics shaped the relationship

between the Canadian State, Canadian NGOs and their partner NGOs in the West Indies: diffusion of decision-making power, autonomy and project administration. Diffusion and autonomy are traits of administrative infrastructure that informed the decision-making environment of the state and NGOs. Program administration is a trait that shaped the operations of projects and programs directly.

The diffusion of decision-making power meant that the relationship between the state and NGOs was influenced by a wide variety of state and NGO managers and officers. At the outset, just the NGO division and other CIDA executives and officers had the opportunity to influence the direction of projects. However, steady growth of the NGO division and its activities resulted in the growth of project stakeholders. From the mid-1970s onwards, in addition to CIDA staff, other departments or agencies who could claim to have a stake in a project or region often exerted influence. Additionally, consultants, by virtue of their contracted analytical and evaluation tasks often had the capacity to shape the direction of many NGO projects and programs. Within civil society, NGO and other stakeholders grew as well. A wider range of NGOs and non-government institutions such as colleges, universities, and professional associations were brought into the decision-making circle. In the South, the process was replicated. Section IV of Chapter 5 illustrated how the rise of NGO consortia, jointly funded projects by Canadian NGOs,

and regional and multi-stakeholder projects in the West Indies added to the number of decision-makers shaping the direction of projects and programs.

Like diffusion, autonomy also shapes the decision-making environment. A commitment to responsive grassroots development rationalized the autonomous behaviour of the NGO division within CIDA. This drew the Division closer to NGDOs, but also isolated it from the main thrust of CIDA programming and policy processes. In short, the rise of the Division's expertise in grassroots development programming provided it with an exclusive zone of operation, but also earned it the scorn of other Branches within CIDA.

The grassroots values and expertise that rationalized the autonomy of the NGO Division in the late 1960s and 1970s shaped the behaviour of Canadian and West Indian NGDOs. These traits empowered Canadian NGDO officers posted to the West Indies and local West Indian NGDO executives to take the lead in project decision-making. Reporting and accountability structures were flexible. Unfortunately, under the ethos of diffusion and autonomy, many West Indian NGDOs operated in isolation. The connection between the activities of NGDO 'partners' in Canada and West Indians was often too loose. The lack of communication, and in some cases, oversight meant that many difficult project management challenges were not overcome and sometimes these challenges spiraled into crises.

After the mid-1980s, the decentralization of

administration and the rise of new sources of CIDA funding promised to increase the autonomy of organizations in Canada and the West Indies further. However, this promise went unfulfilled. Project management "horror stories," revealed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, earned CIDA the scrutiny of the Auditor General and the Treasury Board, and in subsequent investigations of CIDA's management practices, the Auditor General demanded tighter financial controls, reporting and evaluation measures.¹ As a result of the intense pressure generated by central agencies and CIDA executives -- who were well aware that CIDA had to show 'value for money' to protect its budget from 'deficit-cutting' politicians -- CIDA became a laboratory for management control systems. The focus on management practices culminated in 1996 with the announcement that Results-Based Management (RBM) would become integral to CIDA's management philosophy and practice.¹

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¹Also called performance contracting, results-based management (RBM) is a systematic method of project design and management that places an emphasis on what projects will actually achieve in the short, medium and long term. In the NGDO context, it requires organizations to identify the short, medium and long-term results and their indicators, which must be monitored. RBM has the potential to focus the attention of project stakeholders on the clarifying goals, objectives and instruments to achieve desired outcomes. However, to a greater degree than other management techniques, RBM has the potential concentrate scarce NGDO energies on project monitoring, empirical data collection, evaluation and reporting. For discussion, see: Peter Morgan and Ann Qualman, "Institutional and Capacity Development, Result-Based Management and Organizational Performance," a paper prepared for the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) Policy Branch, February 1996.

Since in the 1980s, CIDA has attempted to move ahead on several fronts of international development programming, but with the reins of management and accountability tightly drawn. The focus on mechanisms of accountability and measurement has created contradictions that have carried through to CIDA's relationships with Canadian NGOs and their partners in the South. For the West Indian NGOs discussed in the dissertation, the growth in their autonomy has been frustrated since the 1980s by unrealistic financial and narrative reporting frameworks. The inability to resolve the contradictions created by CIDA's desire to increase the use of NGOs while tightening reporting and controls, contributed to the erosion of relations between Canadian and West Indian NGOs.

By the late-1980s the commitment by Canadian NGOs to the Caribbean region had waned. CUSO had found that its volunteers were not particularly welcome. Save the Children - Canada had decided that it could no longer support the Eastern Caribbean programs it had inherited from Britain, and despite the efforts of a few key individuals, support could not be mustered within OXFAM-CANADA and INTER-PARES, for the development of a comprehensive program for the region.

Difficult programming experiences in the region, together with calls from CIDA to plan strategically and rumours of impending cuts to ODA, contributed to the erosion of relations between Canadian and West Indian NGOs. These factors clearly

offer some insight into NGDO behaviour. However, on their own they do not explain why few Canadian NGDOs are in the region today. As noted in Chapter V, administrative infrastructure imposed a litany of constraints on NGDO relationships. Project administration restricted funding to only a portion of total project costs. It was common for Canadian and other Northern NGDO funders not to cover the administrative and salary costs of West Indian NGDO projects. This had the effect of reducing the financial stability of the West Indian NGDO, which in turn made it difficult for it to attract or keep highly trained staff. The weakness of the organization also reduced its legitimacy and encouraged the misappropriate use of donor funds, and desperate, even illegal acts. Attempts by NGDOs to secure funding from several funders did not solve these problems. Multiple funders exacted their own costs in terms of paper burden and reporting. West Indian projects suffered because NGDO executives and officers were too busy attending to the demands of the numerous reporting frameworks of funders. Additionally, projects and programs suffered from short project time lines and frequently changing funding priorities. Changes to the framework of program administration terminated projects before their time and encouraged NGDOs to take on tasks for which they were ill suited.

Restrictive funding, shifting priorities and short time lines required many West Indian NGDOs to focus their energies

on serving the needs of funders. In short, accountability to their communities was overshadowed by the demands of Canadian NGDO funders, who were ultimately accountable to CIDA and private funders. The state - NGDO relationship that began in the 1960s with a fanfare, had changed dramatically by the early 1990s. The shared vision of the early years that focused on responsive grassroots development eroded under a torrent of institutional change. By the early 1990s, the administrative infrastructure had become far more complex, rigid and constraint driven. Budget cuts, which began in the late 1980s, concentrated further attention on the management of the project cycle and related accountability processes. The result was that the focus on state processes dwarfed efforts to improve grassroots development programming.

II. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE

Administrative infrastructure as described in the dissertation, is not described in any depth in Canadian political science or public administration literature. The theoretical framework on which the dissertation is built draws on elements of organization theory presented by James Q. Wilson.² He is one of the few theorists of contemporary bureaucracy who contends that one should look to the design and operation of the state itself for answers to questions about the nature of state behaviour. The tension between political and administrative institutions, the authority of

executive power, the dynamics of interest groups and policy communities cannot adequately explain outcomes, Wilson contends. Even neo-institutionalists, who focus on the political life of the state, tend to avoid detailed micro level examinations of state organization. They prefer to concentrate their attention on macro-level questions, such as legal - institutional differences between private and public organizations, and search for an internal logic that determines state interests.

Within Canadian Political Science and Public Administration, one can find only glimpses of the administrative infrastructure concept. For example, both fields discuss policy instruments, which are mechanisms to achieve policy goals. Among the most popular are exhortation, spending, taxation, and regulation. Generally, each policy instrument produces a different policy outcome. This expectation is similar to the central argument of the dissertation that the nature of administrative infrastructure influences outcomes. However, a consideration of administrative infrastructure would suggest that each policy instrument can produce several outcomes. Although spending has been the principal policy instrument used by the NGO division to achieve development goals, it can take several forms. It has been the specific terms and conditions of NGO division grant and contribution agreements that has influenced the behaviour of NGDOs. Thus, the way in which a particular

instrument is operationalized is as important as the choice of instrument itself.

Implementation is a subject of academic study in its own right, however, it has been virtually ignored in Canada, and in the United States it concerns itself mainly with assessing policy or program effectiveness. Although implementation studies might appear to be the ideal home for the administrative infrastructure concept, in the United States the idea of state power as conceptualized in this dissertation as a relational concept linking state and society is not very popular. When one speaks of internally generated state power, American political scientists tend to point to the self-interested behaviour of state managers; not the power embedded in the values and operating norms of organizational units of the state.

In Canadian Political Science and Public Administration policy community models are popular. They focus on interaction between political and administrative institutions, and the roles of state managers and key non-state actors in the pursuit of power in a particular policy area. The relational aspect of the model suggests that the administrative infrastructure concept should be represented in the literature. Policy community models represent both the open and closed concepts of government discussed in Chapter II. One policy community might reflect pluralistic pressure group activity, and another elite accommodation lobbying.

Policy community models tend to identify the state as just one actor among many in the policy sector. Unfortunately, they down play, if not avoid discussing the state's organizing and shaping role. Ironically, policy community literature dwells on the organizational aspects of policy communities, while avoiding discussion of the state's influence in shaping relationships. If policy community researchers integrated the administrative infrastructure concept into their analyses, the interaction between the state and civil society around programs would inform their policy formulation research. A practical outcome might be the frequent identification of a lack of 'connecting tissue' between macro policy formulation processes that are said to give the programs strategic direction and day-to-day program management. The approach may even lead to the discovery that contemporary policies are more often a collection of semi-autonomous operational programs linked only by subject matter, rather than a strategic, purposeful framework for action.

Contemporary social movement researchers also avoid investigating how micro-level interactions between the state and civil society organizations and the general public influence such movements. Whether a social movement is considered the mobilization of an idea or people, an investigation into the interplay with state programs would be valuable. In a speech to NGOs former CIDA President Maggie Catley-Carlson concluded: "I'm not so sure whether you're

pulling us anymore, or whether we're pushing you."³ Her statement vividly illustrates the relational nature of state interaction with civil society organizations. The CIDA president's statement could have been attributed to a speech to environmentalists by the Federal Minister of the Environment in the early 1980s when that department launched a massive education campaign and led the fight against Acid Rain to mobilize environmentalists and Canadians around the issue. Similarly, it is conceivable that on the eve of the proclamation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms the Minister of Justice could have made similar remarks to rights-seeking groups. Social movements affect state programs and state programs influence the social movements; however, the idea that state values, structures and programs shaped the behaviour of social movements has been left largely undeveloped in the Canadian literature.

Neo-Marxist analyses of state behaviour also might benefit from an investigation of administrative infrastructure. It might shed light on the murky relationship between capital and the state. Whether a researcher is investigating capitalist class hegemony, the state's role in maintaining capitalist ideology, the organization of capitalist classes or mediation of class struggles in civil society, it is difficult to see how such studies would not benefit from an investigation of administrative infrastructure. Does not the 'ideological apparatus' of the

state engage civil society through the expression of values and symbols imbedded in state services and programs? Is not the organization of competing capitalist classes managed by a myriad of measures and programs that operationalize spending, taxation and regulatory policy instruments?

As stated in Chapter II, the overarching weakness in Canadian political science and public administration is the frequency of macro level investigations of political institutions and policy-making processes and the lack of corresponding research into micro-level state programming as if there is no important connection between the two levels. Yet, it is at the micro level where civil society and the general public most frequently engage the state. It is where state relationships with economic and social sectors of a society are established and maintained.

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND PRACTICE

The Caribbean region has experienced several development models. Arthur Lewis called for the reduction of the regional population through immigration and industrialization in the 1950s. In the 1970s, Kari-Levitt and George Best argued that the legacy of a plantation economy characterized as having bias toward raw materials production, external control over the direction of trade, a monetary system backed by foreign exchange and allegiance to established trade blocs was responsible for a structural incapacity of Caribbean countries

to transform their economies.⁴ Also in the 1970s, Clive Thomas argued that the inherent tendency of capitalism to generate development at the centre and underdevelopment at the periphery meant that only an alternative path that stressed small-scale economic development based on national social and cultural objectives could lead to national development.⁵ Arguments first presented by Levitt, Best and Thomas are still in use. As discussed in Chapter 4, an alternative development model has been of great interest to West Indian NGOs. Many have developed and promoted it to counter neo-liberal ideas that contend the massive role of the state in Caribbean economy and inefficient export sectors are the primary barrier to development.

NGOs have been incorporated into both neo-liberal and alternative development models. In the latter, NGOs play a role in the mobilization of people and resources, and in the articulation of demands from the marginalized and disenfranchised. In the former they are viewed as part of the private sector whose main purpose is to provide services that the rationalized state can no longer provide. Indeed, Hilary Nicholson, Asha Kambon and Tyrone Buckmire, NGO executives in Jamaica, Trinidad and Grenada, respectively, noted the tension between the two models. They have sensed that the neo-liberal model has influenced their funders. In their view, since the mid-1980s, there has been a declining interest by many Northern funders in alternative development activities, such

as the mobilization and empowerment of people to demand their democratic rights. Instead, funders have tended to be interested in projects that deliver social services to the poor and marginalized, or deliver labour market training to certain segments of a population.⁶

The administrative infrastructure concept can contribute to development theory, however, the concept also has important implications for local development practices. The dissertation has shown that in addition to local, political, social and cultural conditions, relationships with Northern NGOs and their funders shape NGO behaviour and project outcomes. As has been discussed, the health and sustainability of civil society organizations in the South, which too often are dependent on links to Northern funders, are an essential part of the project aid equation. It is not enough, therefore, for researchers to use popular variables such as the quality of local governance, the role of local and state elites, or the position of women to analyze or predict the success or failure of development projects. A significant part of the equation is the relationship that NGOs have with Northern NGOs, who are in turn heavily influenced by their funders.

This dissertation has shown that in the case of NGO administered projects, local or national social and economic variables alone do not hold the key to a project's success. Equally and sometimes more important is the nature of the administrative infrastructure that set the terms of reference

for funding and project management and interpreted local social and economic variables in a way that allowed the state to support North - South NGDO collaboration.

Whether one is interested in NGDOs and contemporary development theory or technical aspects of NGDO project management, clearly, administrative infrastructure has a role to play in contemporary discussions on development theory and practice. I contend that administrative infrastructure is a powerful concept. It links the various policy-making, coordinating and operational components of the state with civil society and identifies key elements in the design and implementation of programs. Together with social and economic domestic and international factors, the concept of administrative infrastructure helps disentangle and explain relationships between the Canadian state and civil society organizations. It locates 'the devil' in the details.

1. See: Office of Auditor General, Report, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1988), Chapter 9; Office of Auditor General, Report, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1993), Chapter 12.
2. James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, (New York: Basic Books, 1989), parts I-III.
3. Canadian International Development Agency, "Making Choices: the Future roles of NGOs," notes for remarks by Margaret Catley-Carlson, President, CIDA to NGO/Special Programs Branch Consultation, Ottawa, February 15, 1988.
4. Kari Levitt and Lloyd Best, "Character of Caribbean," in Caribbean Economy: Dependence and Backwardness ed. George L. Beckford, (Kingston, Jamaica: Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of West Indies, 1984), 34-61.
5. Clive Y. Thomas, The Poor and Powerless: Economic Policy and Change in the Caribbean (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988), Chapter 15. West Indian NGOs have also contributed to this approach. See, Horace Levy, "Towards a Caribbean Alternative: A Working Paper", Mimeo, (September 1992), 2; Feminist researchers have been linking macro-economic policy with experiences at the micro level of the poorest households. See: Peggy Antrobus, "Gender Implications of the Development Crisis," in Development in Suspense selected Papers and Proceedings of the First Conference of Caribbean Economists, ed. George Beckford and Norman Girvan (Kingston, Jamaica: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1989), 145-161; "Gender Issues in Caribbean Development" in Stanley Lalta and Marie Freckleton op. cit., 68-77; Caribbean Policy Development Centre, Challenges in Caribbean Development (Barbados: Caribbean Policy Development Centre, 1990), Chapter 1.
6. Hilary Nicholson, Asha Kambon and Tyrone Buckmire, interviews with author, December 16, 1999, December 1, 1999 and November 15, 1999, respectively.

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APPENDIX I**INTERVIEWS****CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY**

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Judith Wedderburn
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APPENDIX II

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Themes and Sample Questions for Canadian NGDOs

History

- How did your organization get started?
- How is your organization structured?
- How is your organization funded?
- Why did your group decide to work in the English-speaking Caribbean?
- How long has your group worked there?
- Over the years, has your focus or approach to development changed?
- What influenced these changes?

Partnerships

- To what degree do you work with Caribbean NGDOs to carry out your programs?
- Who initiated these partnerships?
- How do partnerships affect project decision-making?
- In practical terms, how is project related work such as fund-raising, planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation shared with your partners?
- What are the most common problems in your partnerships?
- How are problems overcome?
- Do you think partnerships will be as popular in 5 to 10 years as they are currently or have been in the past?

Federal Government Relations

- Why do you think the Canadian Government funds NGDOs?
- How would you characterize your relationship with CIDA?
- Has this relationship changed over time?
- Have policy or program changes at CIDA affected your

operations?

Identity

- Do NGDOs differ from other social groups such as women's groups or environment groups? How?
- Do you consider political advocacy an important role for your organization?
- What are typical examples of your advocacy work?

Canadian NGDO Sector Dynamics

- Do you have relationships with other Canadian NGDOs?
- How would you characterize these relationships?
- Are you a member of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation?
- Of the services they provide, which are the most important for your organization?

Themes and Sample Questions for Caribbean NGDOs

History

- How did your organization get started?
- How is your organization structured?
- How is your organization funded?
- What is the type of development work that you do?
- Has your work changed over time?
- What factors led to these changes?

Partnerships with Northern NGDOs

- Do you have development partners in Canada or other industrialized countries?
- How do your partnerships affect your organization?
- What is the most important aspect of the relationship between Canadian and Caribbean NGDOs?
- What are the most common problems in your partnerships with Canadian NGDOs (or other Northern NGDOs?)
- How are problems overcome?
- What is the most effective way for Canadian NGDOs to participate in social change in the Caribbean?
- In general, how would you like to see the relationship between Northern and Southern partners develop in the future?

Partnerships with local Caribbean NGDOs

- Do you have partnerships with other Caribbean NGDOs?
- What is the nature of these partnerships?
- What are the most common problems in your partnerships with Caribbean NGDOs?
- How are these problems overcome?

Political Developments

- What are the major political issues in this country?
- What impact do these issues have on your projects?
- How would you characterize your relations with the government?

- Do you consider political advocacy an important role for your organization?
- What are some of typical examples of your advocacy work?

Themes and Sample Questions for CIDA Officers and Managers**Organizational History**

- When you started at CIDA, what was its vision?
- When you started at CIDA how was it structured?
- When you started with the NGO division what was its vision?
- How was the NGO division structured?
- How did the structure of the NGO division change overtime?
- How would you characterize relations between the NGO division and other Branches within CIDA?
- What were your key organizational challenges while you were at the NGO division?
- What were your key financial challenges while you were at the NGO division?

Partnerships

- How did the relationship with the voluntary sector begin?
- The NGO division has a "responsive program." What does that mean?
- What were your key organizational challenges in developing relationships with NGDOs?
- How were these challenges overcome?
- How do you account for the health of the NGDO sector?
- To what extent do you think CIDA and the NGO division influences the activities of NGDO Sector?
- In your experience, what are key factors that shape the relationship CIDA has with NGOs?
- Do you consider the NGDOs interest groups?

Project Management

- Could you walk me through the project cycle?
- What are the common problems encountered at each stage of the project cycle?
- How are budgets negotiated?

- How is the work of NGOs evaluated?
- How is knowledge gained from projects disseminated within CIDA?
- How has the project management system changed since you started with CIDA?
- Do you see any drawbacks in these changes?
- Have these changes influenced the NGO division's relationship with NGOs?

Caribbean NGOs

- Is the Caribbean region a priority for NGO-supported programming?
- Have you had any experience with Caribbean NGOs?
- What is your assessment of their strengths and weaknesses?
- What is your perception of their relations with Canadian NGOs?

APPENDIX III

CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY FUNDING
SELECTED NON-GOVERNMENTAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS

CIDA Funding 1981-1993