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THE EMERGENCE AND TRANSFORMATION OF BASQUE NATIONALISM:

1875-1975

© Daniel Light

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Master of Arts of International Affairs

Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

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ISBN 0-315-40664-X

The undersigned hereby recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research acceptance of this thesis, submitted by Daniel Light, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the conjuncture of material and ideological structures that influenced the development of Basque nationalism in an attempt to account for the development of a conservative nationalist party (the Partido Nacionalista Vasco) and a radical nationalist party (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna) at different moments during the past century of Basque nationalism. Although covering the years from 1875 to 1975, the thesis focuses on the formative years of each organization -- 1875 to 1917 for the PNV and 1939 to 1975 for ETA.

A Gramscian conceptual framework work was selected for the analysis of the Basque case since his framework allowed for an interpretation of Basque nationalism that neither ignored the specific political economy nor placed the burden of explanation on specifically cultural factors.

This thesis concludes that the divergent nationalist ideologies of the PNV and ETA resulted from the unique political economy within which each movement developed in conjunction with the ideological structures already existent within Basque civil society during the years in question.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

In Grade 10 I promised Lee Ann Maust that I would dedicate my first book to her, however I am sure she does not remember me and I only vaguely remember her. Therefore, I will dispense with that aged vow with this fleeting acknowledgement here and move on to more influential people. I would first like to thank my supervisor, Daiva Stasiulis, and advisor, Michael Dolan, who have read this thesis almost as many times as I have. Without their guidance I would never have finished (or perhaps I would have finished sooner, but with a less respectable work).

For technical support above and beyond the levels of normal friendships I need to mention Judi and Ravi who let me use their computer until 4:00 in the morning.

But most of all, I want to show my appreciation to my extended Canadian, American and Spanish families -- Christie, Colleen, Ricarda, Nusret, Judi, Ravi, Antoine, Cathy, Scott, Helena, Ernie, Roger, Ted, Taka, Grant, Cathy, Ron, Paula, Joe, Akhil, Kim, Lucy, Marja, Carleton, Martin, Heather, Sean, Sue; Mom, Dad, Pat, Chris, Kathy, Sarah, David, Tim, Russ, Barbara, Mary, Doug, Barbara; Juan (that fun loving Basque) and his mother, Pilar, Amalia, Vilma, Waldo, Mariana, José Manuel, Mariano, Lola, Blanca and June whose love and support kept me from going to Florida.

Quedáis siempre en mis recuerdos,
Hasta siempre,
Daniel

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MAP OF EUZKADI

CHAPTER ONE

I. INTRODUCTION

The central problem of this thesis is to provide an analysis of the conjuncture of social, political and economic forces underlying the emergence of Basque nationalism that will account for the development of a conservative (right wing) nationalist movement as well as a radical (left wing) nationalist movement. The concept of nationalism tends to be problematic since it is used to refer to movements expressing political ideologies that span the ideological spectrum from conservative to radical with an ethnic, cultural or "national" core as a common denominator. Nationalism is the desire to establish and/or maintain some type of self-government (ranging from autonomy to independence) on behalf of a group, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual, or potential 'nation'. A nationalist movement is a political party or organization which espouses an ideology that is based on nationalism. The nationalist problematic, then, is to understand why an "ethnic" movement develops in conjunction with a particular political ideology.

Many of the more traditional approaches to the study of nationalism conceptually isolate nationalism from the political economy of the region in question. This neglects the specific political and economic factors involved in the rise of nationalism to focus solely on its ethnic nature. The resulting studies tend to ignore the importance of the political and economic objectives of a nationalist movement in favour of exaggerating the cultural elements and, thus, fail to explain why a nationalist movement has a specific political ideology. Other theories, however, deny the importance of cultural factors to focus on the political and economic reasons leading to the development of a nationalist party. The primary emphasis is on the political ideology and the ethnic concerns are deemed unimportant. By not addressing the ethnic or cultural component of nationalism, approaches of this type fail to adequately explain why nationalism developed but merely

explain the political content of a political party.

The Gramscian approach was selected for this study specifically because it attempts to meld together an understanding of social and cultural elements and economic and political elements. As a Marxist, Gramsci bases his analysis on an understanding of class and the relations of production, yet he incorporates non-economic factors into his analysis through his conceptualization of the political party as representative of the interests of distinct classes. While Gramsci's work was not originally intended for a study of nationalism, his particular attention to ideological as well as material elements allows for an effective adaptation of his work to the study of nationalism.

Euzkadi, as the Basque country is referred to in Euskera, the Basque language, is a region situated along the Bay of Biscay and up into the Pyrenees that divide France and Spain. Euzkadi consists of three provinces on the French side of the border; Labourd, Basse Navarre and Soule, as well as four provinces in Spain: Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, Alava and Navarra. Since Basque nationalism has historically not been an important political force in France, this thesis will be confined to a discussion of the development of Basque nationalism within the Spanish State. Therefore, the Spanish Basque region will be described in further detail and the term Euzkadi is used here only in reference to the Basque region within the Spanish State.

The population of Euzkadi in early the 1970's was nearly 2.5 million, with over a million inhabitants in the province of Vizcaya alone. The four principal cities of South Euzkadi (the Spanish Basque region) are the four provincial capitals: Bilbao (Vizcaya); San Sebastián (Guipuzcoa); Vitoria (Alava); and Pamplona (Navarra). Bilbao is the industrial capital of Euzkadi and one of the largest urban areas in Spain. The remainder of the Basque industrial complex is spread throughout the smaller towns of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa. The provinces of Alava and Navarra are more agricultural with a small industrial base around Pamplona. The division between the industrial provinces and the

two agricultural provinces corresponds to the Cantabrian mountain range that runs along the southern border of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa cutting off Alava and Navarra to the South. The position of the Cantabrian mountains has also meant that Alava and Navarra are more accessible to the Castilian plains and thus to Spanish influence, while, Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa are separated from the Spanish heartland. On the other hand, Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa had easier access to the sea and to foreign states, especially England (see map 1).

The position of the Basque language, Euskera, vis-a-vis Spanish is hard to establish due to a lack of dependable statistics. Relative to the other languages in Spain (Galego, Catalan, Mallorquin, Valenciano) Euskera has lost much ground. Euzkadi has experienced a process of castilianization (the imposition of the Spanish language) from the early 1800's. The spread of Spanish was also aided by the geography of Euzkadi since Alava borders on the Castilian plains and Navarra has historically been part Basque and part Castilian. However, current (1986) estimates of the Euskeraphone population of Euzkadi range from 20% to 35%.¹ Estimates of speakers of Galego, Catalan and Mallorquin, in contrast, are all over 80%. The use of Euskera is increasing as more schools begin to use Euskera as the medium of education - projected figures for the near future are that 40% of the Basque population will speak Euskera and a further 30% will be able to understand Euskera.²

Over the last century Euzkadi has supported various nationalist movements, but the two most important organizations are the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party: PNV) founded in 1895, and Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (Euzkadi and Freedom: ETA) which was founded in 1959. Basque nationalism provides an interesting case study since the two movements are ideologically very different. The older organization, the PNV, is a

¹. Bidegain 1986: pp. 13-14; Waid 1986: p. 13; Siguan 1986: p. 89.

². Siguan 1986: pp. 89-95.

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conservative political party, while the newer one, ETA, is a revolutionary freedom fighter/terrorist organization. Here, then, is the core to the problem of understanding nationalism by reference to an actual example. The same region has produced two radically different political movements that both express nationalist ideology. Why did these two nationalist movements each develop with its own particular formulation of political and ethnic ideological elements? To clarify the following analysis the term "nationalism" will refer to the nationalist phenomenon as a whole, thus grouping all the nationalist organizations together. "Nationalist movement" and "nationalist party", however, will refer to an individual organization.

A careful analysis of Euzkadi, its history and development, and the origins and growth of each nationalist movement should provide some understanding to the formation of each party. A detailed study of the political economy of Euzkadi and Spain during the formative years of each organization, combined with a break down of each party's ideology into its constituent elements can illuminate how different forces combined to produce two such distinct organizations that are both tied to the phenomenon of Basque nationalism.

The time frame relevant to this study of Basque nationalism is approximately from 1875 to 1975 with a more specific interest in the years covering the initial development and formation of each party. Thus, within the general time frame particular attention is given to the years between 1875-1917 and 1939-1975. The year 1975 was chosen as the cut off date for this study since that year marks the end of the Franco regime and a radical transformation of the Spanish State.

This study is organized into four chapters and a conclusion. Chapter One addresses the problem of a theoretical framework to guide the analysis. This chapter includes a review of several prominent approaches to nationalism and the reasons they were not considered suitable for the Basque case. The second half of Chapter One analyzes the

merits of the Gramscian approach for the current analysis.

Chapter Two moves on to discuss the political economy of Euzkadi and Spain between 1875 and 1975, giving particular attention to the periods when the PNV and ETA developed. For the PNV, the time frame is from 1875 to 1917: the years of the Restoration Monarchy in Spain. ETA developed during the Franco regime, 1939-1975, the period covered in the latter half of Chapter Two.

A detailed study of the PNV comes in Chapter Three. This chapter focuses on the ideology of the PNV and the transition that occurred among the party's membership before the turn of the century. The first half of Chapter Four is an analysis of ETA that is very similar to the discussion of the PNV. The second half of Chapter Four is a comparative analysis of both organizations exploring the interrelationship between economic and political structures with the ideology of Basque nationalism. The concluding chapter returns to the theoretical discussion of Chapter One to review the choice of an analytical approach. The conclusion appraises the effectiveness of the Gramscian approach both at the theoretical level and at the level of the Basque case study, and goes on to suggest areas for further investigation.

CHAPTER TWO

II. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO NATIONALISM

The purpose of this chapter is to set forth a theoretical framework from which to analyze the phenomenon of Basque nationalism and the unique combination of forces that guided the development of the two Basque nationalist organizations that are the subjects of this study. The difficulties of selecting an adequate approach to nationalism are reflected in the organization of this chapter. The first section of the chapter is a critique of conventional approaches to nationalism that have been classified under three broad headings according to the ascribed root cause of nationalism: integration; dependency; and economic class analysis. Each critique is based on a brief summary of one or two representative authors. The list of theories reviewed here is not meant to be exhaustive; the objective here is to provide a critical appraisal showing the shortcomings of various approaches both in respect to the case of Euzkadi and in general.

The second section of this chapter is a presentation of the alternative approach to nationalism used in this thesis. It is an analytical framework which draws from the work of Antonio Gramsci. The discussion of the Gramscian approach is divided into two parts. The first part discusses the strengths of Gramsci's work in general. The second part is an examination of specific Gramscian concepts that are particularly suited to nationalism.

A. THEORIES

1. Integration Theories

Integration theories view nationalism in terms of the homogenization and Westernization of the world. The primary focus of these studies is on cultural factors of social

change and increased communication rather than on economic factors.

The seminal integration theory is Deutsch's communications theory (Deutsch 1966). As the world progresses along the path to modernity, the level of communication and interaction among peoples and societies increases leading to assimilation and the formation of states, or nations as Deutsch calls them. Nationalism is equated with nation-building. Separatist movements, then, are dysfunctional to the process of nation-building. In fact, Deutsch views nationalism as a psychosis linked to the process of modernization.

Nationalism and national development were found to involve processes of social learning and control which are particularly subject to risks of pathological developments and trends to self-destruction.³

Modernization for Deutsch is "the course of economic development as countries are becoming somewhat less like Ethiopia and somewhat more like the United States".⁴ Hence, the theory is linear and deterministic, assuming the end stage will be countries resembling the United States. Deutsch, like many other theorists of nationalism, has reified the concept of modernization in a rigid mechanical manner⁵ and specific features of the actual situation are ignored. Thus, modernization rather than the specific process of Spanish (British, Nigerian, Indian...) modernization causes nationalism. Deutsch's theory also reifies the concept of ethnicity. The belief that "ethnicity causes nationalism" ignores the fact that some ethnic groups peacefully share a state with other groups. Ethnicity is not, therefore, a sufficient root cause of nationalism. Many valid factors are overlooked because of the use of such reified terms.

There is also the possibility that Deutsch's model is constructed on a false perception of the development of the United States. Deutsch's definition of nationality states that "nationality is an implied claim to privilege. It promises to eliminate or lessen

³. Deutsch 1966: p. 189.

⁴. Deutsch 1961: p. 495.

⁵. Sathyamurthy 1983: p. 14.

linguistic, racial, class or caste barriers to the social rise of individuals within it."⁶ If the United States is an example of the final product of development thus conferring nationality, one wonders about the elimination of racial barriers, especially in 1966 when Deutsch published his book. Many approaches to nationalism, besides Deutsch's, are based on improper analogizing or misinformation.⁷ Because so many approaches use European and U.S. history as the basis for an analysis of nationalism in general, an accurate understanding of Europe and the United States is essential. Otherwise the approach is skewed and inapplicable to non-Western situations and to some Western cases.

By ignoring the unique political and economic situation of each state, Deutsch has no conceptualization of imperialism. Deutsch states "a further side effect of social mobilization and economic development might possibly be first a substantial expansion...of the share of international trade sector in the national economy".⁸ From this point of view a state's increased ties to the global economy are the result of internal changes (improvements according to Deutsch) rather than the result of the expansion and interference of outside states into the domestic economy. Nationalism, therefore, could not be a reaction against imperialism.

Anthony Smith has a different understanding of the rise of nationalism (Smith 1979; 1982). Smith sees changes in government and education as the prime causes of nationalism. Nationalism, says Smith, is an outgrowth of the ethnic revival which is itself a result of the new historicist movement. Historicism, an intellectual movement of the past two centuries, increases ethnic self-consciousness which prepares the way for nationalism.

Historicism is not to be equated with a species of disinterested historical

⁶. Deutsch 1966: p. 102.

⁷. Connor 1972: pp. 344-345; Sathyamurthy 1983: p. 3.

⁸. Deutsch 1961: p. 501.

enquiry. On the contrary it aims to establish through detailed research the origins and laws of growth of a particular entity...Everywhere we find political nationalism preceded by, and indebted to, the growth of an historicist's vision.⁹

Coinciding with the new historicism is a pattern of bureaucratization that leads towards nationalism. First comes the introduction of modern centralized bureaucratic and educational systems from the core into the region. This undermines traditional customs and institutions and threatens the old order of the local elites. In the second stage, the local elites begin to use ethnic self-awareness to formulate political claims against the government. In the third stage the separatist movement emerges and takes shape as determined by the local situation and the government's policies.¹⁰ It is this intrusion of an alien culture that prompts members of local ethnic groups to begin a search for identity, or nationalism.

Nationalism is a vision of the future which restores to man his 'essence', his basic pattern of living and being, which was once his undisputed birthright. It is an attack on tradition and modernity alike, insofar as they obscure and distort the genuine relationship of man with nature and his fellow man.¹¹

The intellectuals/bureaucrats will play the pivotal role of organizing the movement. They are also the reason that a sense of cultural alienation takes on a political form; as bureaucrats they are habituated to seeking political solutions.¹²

Smith's theory of bureaucratic nationalism suffers from several problems. First, Smith's approach is Eurocentric since he perceives the influx of European organizational techniques as the cause of nationalism. Furthermore, Smith makes a series of broad assumptions about the timing and development of intellectual movements (historicism), changes in government and nationalism. But most importantly, there is no perception of

⁹. Smith 1979: p. 26.

¹⁰. Smith 1979: p. 34-35.

¹¹. Smith 1971: p. 22.

¹². Smith 1982: p. 28.

the role of economic factors. To follow Smith's views is to put forward that the colonies revolted against the metropole for purely cultural reasons, rather than because of political or economic domination.

As representatives of the integrationist view, both Deutsch and Smith place overwhelming emphasis on cultural factors to the exclusion of economic factors. Obviously culture is closely tied to any nationalist movement since it is usually linked to justifying the movement's demands and forms some part of the group's goals. However, giving causality to culture or ethno-psychological factors ~~alone~~ leads to the belief that all ethnic groups will try to establish a political entity, a nation-state, of their own.¹³ Thus, the mere existence of an ethnic group will create a nationalist movement.

Smith's conceptualization, in particular, gives ethnicity chronological primacy as the first stage of a developing nationalist movement which is ethnic revival. This approach sees the creation of ethnic consciousness as fundamental to the later emergence of a political movement. Ethnic revival is cultural rebirth and celebration of a distinct language, history, customs, etc. One problem with Smith's formulation is that it fails to address why ethnic revival occurs. To affirm that ethnicity causes nationalism oversimplifies a complex phenomenon.¹⁴ Ethnicity is definitely involved but cannot be seen as a causal factor since there are many ethnic groups that are not politicized along ethnic lines. It is important not to obscure the question of why a group becomes politicized.

A final common feature of integration approaches is the importance of intellectuals to nationalism. Intellectuals are seen as the organizing, motivating elements of nationalism. Since all organizations have leaders, and all mass movements need spokespersons, intellectuals gain importance. However, none of the approaches provide a definition of intellectuals or their function and the relationship of intellectuals to nationalism.

¹³. Smith 1981: p. 47.

¹⁴. Sathyamurthy 1983: p. 231.

Although recognizing the importance of intellectuals, these theories do not effectively incorporate intellectuals into the analysis.

2. Dependency Theories

The approaches reviewed under this heading share a common perception of capitalist expansion as the root of nationalism. They are inspired by the work of Gunder Frank, Dos Santos and the dependency theorists in development studies. The analysis of the dependency theorists is focused on external class relations between states rather than on internal class relations. When dependency theory was adapted to sub-state nationalism, the basis for analysis then became the external relations between ethnic groups. Thus, the dependency approach to nationalism obfuscated the importance of class relations within a single ethnic group. The works selected here (Hechter; Nairn) were chosen because they adapt this approach to nationalism in the West and would therefore have greater relevance to Basque nationalism than similar works that analyze nationalism in the non-Western world.

The theory of internal colonialism (Hechter 1975) adapted dependency to the West by viewing the nationalist regions as internal colonies of the State. Hechter's major study focused on the nationalism of Britain's Celtic periphery: Wales, Ireland and Scotland. As the development of the United Kingdom progressed, the peripheral Celtic regions were tied economically, politically and judicially to the English core. The relationship, however, was one of dependence and a cultural division of labour resulted in the low status (i.e. proletarian) jobs being filled by members of the peripheral ethnic group whereas high status (i.e. bourgeois) positions were reserved for members of the core ethnic group. Ensuing from this stratification was the ethnic identity among the peripheral ethnic group that later crystallized into a nationalist movement.¹⁵

There are a number of problems with internal colonialism, both in general and as a

¹⁵. Hechter 1971: p. 42; Hechter 1975: p. 40.

viable approach to understanding Basque nationalism. The first problem is definitional.

Hechter defines national development as:

those processes by which a state characterized by sectional, or otherwise competing economies, politics and cultures, within a given territory, is transformed into a society composed of a single, all pervasive, and in this sense "national" economy, polity and culture.¹⁶

By defining the erosion and destruction of ethnic, cultural and economic differences as national (and beneficial) development Hechter is biased in favour of the existing European States. Under this definition, for example, the French attempt to absorb Algeria into the French State was not imperialism but national development. In a study of nationalism the theoretical distinctions between nations (ethnic nations) must be maintained whether the nations are on different continents or on the same island.

Another definitional problem common to many students of nationalism including Hechter is a slippage between "nation" and "state". The terms "nation" and "state" are confused in common speech, but in a study of nationalism it is important to maintain the distinction between a social entity and a political entity. Unfortunately, such a distinction is not always clear.¹⁷ For example, nationalism is often confused with colonial liberation and nation-building. Such slippage of terminology results in definitions that are not universally applicable.

The focal point of Hechter's study, the cultural division of labour, is a grand oversimplification. It is difficult to show that all members of an ethnic group will pertain to one class only, while other classes are of different ethnic groups. Exploitation does not follow strict ethnic lines.¹⁸ Such a belief not only obscures the complex class make-up of a nation, but obliterates the complexities of the social and economic divisions

¹⁶. Hecht 1975: p. 17.

¹⁷. Connor 1972: p. 322.

¹⁸. Smith 1982: p. 20.

within any ethnic group. Many nations, among them the Basque nation, have both capitalist and Marxist nationalist organizations. Yet Hechter's theory does not consider such diverse class bases of nationalism.

In relation to Spain and Euzkadi, internal colonialism falls short on other accounts. First, Hechter's theory is based on an exaggerated belief in the impact of material well being.¹⁹ Ethnic groups that are well off will not form a nationalist movement, while underprivileged groups will become nationalist. But, Euzkadi is one of the few industrial regions in Spain. Furthermore, Euzkadi's development was not dependent on the Spanish core. Second, there is no cultural division of labour. The industries are owned and staffed by Basques, and Basques are represented in all the professions in Euzkadi (see Tables 1.1, 1.2). This is reflected in the panorama of nationalist organizations operative in Euzkadi.

Nairn's theory of uneven development (Nairn 1977) is similar to Hechter's since nationalism is rooted in the global spread of capitalism. In brief, capitalism spreads about the globe creating rich and poor areas and when this occurs along ethnic lines, nationalism will result. Nationalism, is in fact a historical necessity of capitalist development, either as peripheral nationalism (Basques) or as core nationalism (English, Spanish, German...) since nationalism is the force associated with molding a traditional society into a modern society.

Welsh nationalism has nothing to do with Wales. It is not a Welsh fact, but a fact of general developmental history...²⁰

Nairn refers to nationalism as the cultural form of industrialization. It stands at the doorway to the modern era. For Nairn, nationalism is the "dominant contradiction of

¹⁹ Connor 1972: p. 342.

²⁰ Nairn 1977: p. 335.

capitalism's growth during so much of this century" ²¹ overriding the class struggle. This is quite a large step for Nairn who as a Marxist is attempting to correct Marxism's great failure to analyze nationalism.

Naturally, Marxist thinkers have launched quite a vociferous attack against the theory of uneven development, and especially the last point. However, since the objective here is to discuss the relevance of Nairn's approach to nationalism this study will not focus on the debate surrounding Nairn's position on class struggle, ²² but will instead review other points.

One problem with Nairn is his tendency to ignore or underrate specificities of the local situation in favour of global processes. While defending Celtic nationalism against the larger British State, Nairn cautions that not all nationalist movements are acceptable. Nairn supports the thesis that a larger (multi-ethnic) state is better than several small mono-ethnic states if the larger state is progressive (i.e. moving to a stage of advanced capitalism or socialism) and, if this is the case, a peripheral nationalist movement would then be regressive.

Viable larger units of social organization ought to be defended against "narrow nationalism" or an ethnic parochialism indulged in for its own sake. But defence is only possible when they are actually viable. ²³

This line of reasoning shifts the focus of nationalism away from the ethnic group in question and places it on the State against which the nationalist movement is directed. Celtic nationalism, as in Nairn's example, is acceptable (i.e. not "ethnic parochialism") because the United Kingdom is, in Nairn's view, a decaying, archaic social organization. ²⁴ Only if Great Britain is anachronistic, is Celtic nationalism then acceptable. Such

²¹ Nairn 1977: p. 353.

²² For critiques on Nairn's position see Blaut 1980, 1982; Munck 1986: pp. 145-147.

²³ Nairn 1977: p. 77.

²⁴ Blaut 1980: p. 2.

reasoning places the focus of analysis on the central state rather than on the inter-relation between state and ethnic group.

There is also a contradiction in Nairn's thought. The main tenet of uneven development is that nationalism is a necessary condition for modernization. Yet when focusing his attention on advanced regions such as Scotland, Euzkadi or Catalunya, Nairn states that "such advanced societies have become modernized without the benefit of nationalism."²⁵ The same incongruency is expressed in the idea that capitalist growth (uneven development) creates nationalism and that capitalist decline (i.e. the anachronism of the United Kingdom) creates nationalism. If nationalism does occur in relation to such distinct processes, it needs to be related to the conjuncture of specific factors that may occur during capitalist growth or decline, but not to the processes in and of themselves.

Eurocentrism is another problem inherent in both Nairn's and Hechter's theories as well as some of the other approaches reviewed. More than just using a European case study, these theorists have incorporated a number of broad assumptions related to European history and development which are not applicable to non-European areas nor even to all European areas. In this view, nationalism is a reaction to a global European centred process.²⁶ From its home in Europe, nationalism spreads across the globe in the colonial education systems or modernization, it is part of the package of "Civilization" that comes from Europe.²⁷ In addition to adopting a patronizing view towards the non-Western world, Eurocentrism perceives nationalism only as a reaction to external, global stimuli such as colonialism or Westernization, and fails to properly study the historical specificities of the region or State.²⁸

²⁵ Nairn 1977: p. 177.

²⁶ Blaut 1982: p. 133; Smith 1982: p. 22.

²⁷ Blaut 1986: p. 5.

²⁸ Munck 1986: pp. 145-146.

3. Economic Class Analysis

Studies on nationalism that adopt a Marxist perspective tend to reduce nationalism to class struggle and the economic base. As represented by Blaut (Blaut 1982; 1986), they differ from the Marxist dependency approach (Nairn) in that nationalism is not linked specifically to capitalism. According to Blaut, all societies (past and present) are divided into two with a dominant class exploiting a producing class. In all systems there are two sets of class relations, an internal set between two classes of one society and an external set between classes of different societies. Once internal class relations reach the limit of exploitation beyond which revolution will occur, the dominant class will go out and find an external producing class to exploit. Under the conditions of external exploitation:

the class struggle assumes certain appropriate forms. It tends to be more nakedly political ...Nationalism, therefore, is the form of the struggle for state power which accompanies efforts to impose, and to resist external domination.²⁹

Nationalism for Blaut is a political process and one which, "functions as a neutral tool or implement"³⁰ which may be used by any class and within any ideological framework.

There are several difficulties inherent in this perspective. The notion of the nation has disappeared. Nation/foreigner has become internal/external but no criteria are supplied to explain when the exploitative relationship is internal and when it is external. Is the Basque case external because the Spanish and Basques are different cultures or internal because Basques of the dominant class exploit Basques of the producing class? This indistinction leads Blaut to conclude that "national struggle can exist without nations. It is a struggle over the state..." and that "national struggle is class struggle..."³¹ By this point, nationalist struggle is so broadly defined as to become meaning-

²⁹. Blaut 1986: p. 8.

³⁰. Blaut 1986: p. 7.

³¹. Blaut 1986; p. 9; 1982: p. 22.

less.

Parallel to the above shortcoming, Blaut's internal/external division ignores class differences within the nation thereby excluding two aspects of nationalism. Firstly, some members of the exploited nation must benefit from the relations with the outside power. Their function in a nationalist struggle is not incorporated into the framework of internal/external. Secondly, the base assumption that nationalism is directed against external exploitation or imperialism precludes the possibility that nationalism could be linked to internal exploitation either as an ideology that maintains exploitative relations of production or as an ideology opposed to such exploitation.

Despite their differences, the above three perspectives (integration, dependency, economic class analysis) all share one analytical failure; nationalism is often conceived of and studied without considering either the political economy of the region from which the movement emerged or the specific goals pursued.³² Nationalism is part of a process and although it is possible to theoretically isolate nationalism for the purpose of analysis, there must be some method to conceptualize the conjuncture of political economic factors underlying nationalism. Approaches to nationalism also ignore the fact that nationalist movements aspire to the development of some type of state. It is therefore necessary to incorporate the conceptualization of the state which a particular movement aspires to establish into the analysis of nationalism since such a conceptualization reflects the interests of the class fractions represented by nationalism and is essential to the amount of support a movement receives or does not receive. The dissociation of nationalism from its historical context leads to a skewed perception of the phenomenon.

B. GRAMSCIAN APPROACH

³². Sathyamurthy 1983: p. 2; Munck 1986: p. 145.

Although Gramsci never addressed himself to nationalism, many of the concepts he developed in his studies of the French and Italian bourgeois revolutions and the rise of fascism are applicable to the study of nationalist conflict. The suitability of the Gramscian approach to the study of nationalism stems not from any similitude among Italian fascism, the French Revolution and nationalism, but from the flexibility of the approach itself. Many of the other theories on nationalism, as detailed in the first part of this chapter, tend toward extreme economism or idealism. In contrast, Gramsci was able to meld analysis of material and ideal structures into a valid method for understanding conflict. A phenomenon such as nationalism, which is clearly rooted in the material level as well as the ideological level, would require a perspective capable of effectively integrating such varied elements. In this respect the approach outlined by Gramsci provides a beneficial method of analysis.

There are five fundamental attributes of Gramsci's work which recommend its use for the topic at hand. First, Gramsci provides a non-economistic, non-reductionist method of using Marxist tools of analysis. Second, the approach is specifically designed for the study of politics, for the dynamic inter-relation of social groups and political entities. Third, Gramsci pays particular attention to the links and inter-play between ideal and material structures. Fourth, intellectuals are a central aspect of Gramsci's analytical framework. And, finally, Gramsci analyzes the difficult process of creating a political party with effective public support.

The traditional economistic approach to ideology is distinguished by two features. First, ideology is dispensed with as an epiphenomenon, with no continuous function in history. Furthermore, neglecting any independent role of the ideal, economism examines the nature of ideology as a reflection of the relations of production and the subject's position within.³³ In this manner, economic relations become the sole determining factor

³³ Mouffe 1979: p. 169.

and ideology is subordinated to economic forces. Stemming from the above perception are three basic assumptions of the reductionist problematic:³⁴

- 1) all subjects are class subjects,
- 2) social classes have their own paradigmatic ideologies,
- 3) all ideological elements have a necessary class belonging.³⁵

In order for ideology to play a role in history and to be a dynamic part of any analytical framework, the above principles have to be refuted. In response to the first assumption, Gramsci postulates that political subjects are not equivalent to social classes which are economic subjects.³⁶

Politics becomes permanent action and gives birth to permanent organizations precisely in so far as it identifies itself with economics. But it is also distinct from it, which is why one may speak separately of economics and politics, and speak of 'political passion' as of an impulse to action which is born on the permanent and organic terrain of economic life but which transcends it, bringing into play emotions and aspirations in whose incandescent atmosphere even calculations involving the individual human life itself obey different laws from those of individual profit, etc.³⁷

The 'permanent organizations' are the political parties, which act on the political level. The party is the directive and organizing agent of the collective will, the term Gramsci uses for the political subject.³⁸ The term "collective will" is defined in detail below along with the other conceptual definitions. Let it suffice for now that the collective will is a coalition of classes united for political action.

However, it should be noticed that while the political subject is not reduced to class, it is overdetermined by the economic in the last instance in that political parties gain permanency through their identification with the economic and that the parties act on

³⁴ Reductionism reduces all contradictions to the class contradiction. Therefore, all political elements, all ideological elements have a class character.

³⁵ Mouffe 1979: p. 189.

³⁶ Mouffe 1979: p. 189.

³⁷ Gramsci 1971: p. 139-140.

³⁸ Gramsci 1971: p. 133.

the "terrain of economic life". The political subject, the collective will, may be composed of various classes when analyzed on an economic level.

The second assumption, that each social class has its own ideology, is negated by the concept of collective will. For the collective will to form there must be some ideological consensus among the participating classes. The assumption of a necessary class belonging of ideological elements is well refuted by Ernesto Laclau, a student of Gramsci.³⁹ Laclau sees the pronouncement of class belonging as arbitrary. Ideological elements alone have no class connection until they are articulated to a particular political subject. In fact, some ideological elements may pertain to one class in one country, but belong to an opposing class in another country and time.⁴⁰ Such an interpretation as Laclau's is useful to understanding Gramsci's relevance to the analysis of nationalism.

For Gramsci, ideological struggle (the creation of collective will) is a dynamic of disarticulation/rearticulation of various ideological elements from the old into the new collective will.⁴¹

What was previously secondary and subordinate, or even incidental, is now taken to be primary-- becomes the nucleus of a new ideological and theoretical complex. The old collective will dissolves into its contradictory elements.⁴²

The process of disarticulation/rearticulation would only be possible if the ideological elements were not bound to a specific class. Otherwise it would be impossible for a particular ideological component to disarticulate itself from one class and be rearticulated into the ideology of a different class. The ability to theoretically construct an inter-class alliance while at the same time maintaining the importance of the economic is quite

³⁹. Laclau 1979: pp. 97-99.

⁴⁰. One of the examples given by Laclau is liberalism's bourgeois connection in 18th Century Europe and its link to feudal landowners in Latin America. Laclau 1979: p. 97.

⁴¹. Mouffe 1979: p. 193.

⁴². Gramsci 1971: p. 195.

relevant to nationalism. As was pointed out in the review of the major approaches to nationalism, many other approaches are unable to conceptualize the alliance of classes prevalent in a nationalist movement. Likewise, other studies ignore the economic factor to focus on the 'national' character of the movement. In contrast, Gramsci's ideas are able to capture the contradiction of a force like nationalism which unites members of various classes, yet basically redresses the economic interests of only one class.

A second attribute of Gramsci's work, and one which constitutes his major contribution to Marxist theory, is its specific attention to politics.⁴³

If political science means science of the state, and the state is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules, then it is obvious that all the essential questions of sociology are nothing other than the questions of political science.⁴⁴

These essential questions are the ones to which Gramsci addresses himself. Gramsci wants to understand how to affect change in society, so this is not a stagnant view of politics. In the "Modern Prince", Gramsci, like Machiavelli centuries ago, advises the prince (the Party) on how to transform the State, how to "win the active consent of those over whom it rules."

Nationalism is an attempt to transform the state. It is important to remember that the goal of a nationalist movement will necessarily be the creation of a state different from the present state.⁴⁵ Furthermore, the agent by which this transformation is attempted is a nationalist party.

The above two features are closely associated to a third quality of Gramsci's thought, namely the "complex articulation of social formation"⁴⁶ of the link between

⁴³. See Hobsbawm 1982.

⁴⁴. Gramsci; p. 244.

⁴⁵. Sathyamurthy 1983: p. 2.

⁴⁶. Hall et al, 1977: p. 47.

material and ideal structures. Gramsci's non-reductionism theoretically raises ideology beyond a mere epiphenomenon to where ideology can actually play an autonomous role, while maintaining the importance of the economic. The political focus of Gramsci's thought comes from Gramsci's conceptualization of politics as the manifestation of the articulation of the material and ideal structures.⁴⁷ In effect, Gramsci delineates the two spheres and then develops the tools to link them back together. Concepts such as civil society, hegemony and historic bloc overlap into both regions and represent their articulation. The analysis of nationalism as an inter-class movement hinges upon an understanding of the complex articulation of the material and ideal structures since nationalist ideology unites economic classes with differing interests into a single political movement.

A further attribute of Gramsci's thought is his understanding of the intellectuals' function in politics. Many students of nationalism have discussed the importance of intellectuals in organizing, propagating and directing nationalist movements. Few, however, provide a definition and an analytical perspective on the vital role of the intellectual. Gramsci, on the other hand, not only saw the importance of the intellectual to politics, he also developed a method to incorporate the intellectuals into an analysis of politics by focusing on the role intellectuals play in organizing and structuring social and economic relations.

A final strength of Gramsci's work in its application to the study of nationalism, is the attention given to the creation of hegemony (an inter-class alliance). Not only can the study of hegemony help understand the strength of a nationalist movement by highlighting the difficulty and fragility of class alliances, it can also provide insight into why some movements settle for less than their stated goals (i.e. autonomy versus independence). The inter-class alliance might dissolve if the attainment of a lesser goal

⁴⁷. Hall et al, 1977: p. 47.

sufficiently fulfills the interests of an allied class such that the class withdraws from the alliance. The difficulty in attaining hegemony is further able to aid in an analysis of nationalism that failed to emerge despite the right conditions of economy or ethnicity.

The following section discusses those Gramscian concepts which are particularly relevant to the study of nationalism. Each term accompanied by a discussion first of Gramsci's use and definition of the particular concept and then of its relevance to the study of nationalist movements.

1. State and Civil Society

Basic to Gramsci's work are the concepts of civil society and State. Unfortunately, those two concepts are very controversial due to their various uses in the Prison Notebooks. Gramsci at first defines them quite clearly:

What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural 'levels': the one that can be called 'civil society', that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private', and that of political society or 'the State'.⁴⁸

But later on Gramsci uses the terms in contradictory ways; "civil society-- which is 'State' too, indeed the State itself"⁴⁹ In total there seem to be three definitions of the relationship between those two superstructural planes. The first sets State and civil society in a balanced relationship. The second views the State as the outer defense of civil society. Finally, the third conception identifies State with civil society.⁵⁰ Obviously a thorough definition of State and civil society is impossible; however working definitions for the needs of this thesis are necessary.

The Gramscian concept of State embodies four fundamental themes: the State as an instrument of class; the State as representative of a particular inter-class alliance; the

⁴⁸. Gramsci 1971: p. 12.

⁴⁹. Gramsci 1971; p. 261.

⁵⁰. Anderson 1977: p. 12; Gramsci 1971 editors note; pp. 207-208.

subordination of the State to society and the transitory nature of the State.⁵¹ The State is instrumental to the ruling classes to maintain their dominance and, by doing so, to aid in their own economic expansion. The relationship of instrumentality cannot be applied mechanically; it is not reductionist.⁵² The State is comprised of a dominant class and subaltern social groups and such a unity is achieved only when the dominant class moves beyond its own narrow economic interests to include aspects of the subaltern classes' interests. Thus the State, as the instrument of a coalition of classes, will serve the interests of the various classes to some extent.

The particularity of the State is due to the composition of the unity of classes (the power bloc) which is realized in the State. The State in a specific country will vary from that of other countries in large part because of the different class alliances. To comprehend the State it is necessary to understand the class unity in the State.⁵³

The subordination of the State to social and economic dynamics is a delicate theme to handle in Gramsci. Subordination is so easily simplified into a reductionist conception.⁵⁴ The State is conditioned by, and subordinated to the underlying society.⁵⁵ The State is subordinated to the economy in a complex connection through the class alliance realized in the State. The State, as an institution subordinated to society, is not only charged with winning the consent of those governed, it also adapts society to improve production.⁵⁶ Gramsci's essay "Americanism and Fordism" is an in depth study of the economic rationalization of society as carried out through the State's power. As the class

⁵¹. Bobbio 1969: p. 78.

⁵². Gramsci 1971: p. 116.

⁵³. Gramsci 1971: pp. 52-53.

⁵⁴. See the debate between Bobbio and Texier in Rossi 1969.

⁵⁵. Bobbio 1969: p. 78.

⁵⁶. Gramsci 1971: p. 242.

unity behind the State changes and evolves, the State will necessarily change; the State is not a permanent configuration.⁵⁷

The four themes of the Gramscian concept of State each offer a particular advantage to the study of nationalism. In the Gramscian approach, the State is no longer a monolithic entity and in the case of nationalism, the interests and links the State has in the nationalist region can be clearly identified and incorporated into the analysis of nationalism. The instrumental and subordinate nature of the State allows the conceptualization of the State's resistance to a nationalist movement as the reaction of the ruling classes or class fractions to a threat to their economic and political interests. The particularity of the State permits the analysis of intra-ethnic class differences and their role in nationalism by identifying which classes of the nationalist ethnic group are or are not part of the power bloc.

Finally, the transitory character of the State conceptualizes the potential for the State to adapt to nationalist demands. If a nationalist movement were able to transform the State (and the power bloc) to such an extent so as to satisfy a sufficient number of the interests of all or some of the ethnic classes or class fractions that are united in the nationalist party, the State could break the nationalist alliance. Such a transformation might usually (but not always) take the form of autonomy. Conversely, if the transformation is impossible, nationalism will either result in the destruction of the old State or the violent destruction of the nationalist movement.

Civil society is the other plane set forth by Gramsci. Civil society is not just ideological but extends across both the material and ideal structures, including social institutions, private associations, the press and the family. Civil society is the intermediary between the economy and the State.⁵⁸ However, one must avoid a rigid defini-

⁵⁷. Bobbio 1969: p. 78.

⁵⁸. Hall et al. 1979: p. 47.

tion of civil society or the elements ascribed to it. In the case of nationalism, civil society represents the sphere from which a nationalist party will emerge in opposition to the State.

By examining a few sections of the Prison Notebooks it may be possible to glean a more precise comprehension of the demarcation between civil society and the State and, furthermore, one that is suitable to this thesis. In discussing the origins of the bourgeois States that arose after the French Revolution, Gramsci states that "in this form of regime... hegemony over its historical development belongs to private forces, to civil society - which is 'State' too, indeed is the State itself."⁵⁹ Before the bourgeois State could emerge, the preparation of the conditions of success, the coalition of forces, etc., all took place within civil society. Then, when the moment was right, through revolution or reformation, these elements became the State (in both the narrow sense of government and in the broader sense). In the above quote Gramsci appears to be identifying civil society and State by continuity of process through time.

In Gramsci's "Notes on Italian History" there are a series of quotes along a similar vein:

The historical unity of the ruling classes is realized in the State... the fundamental historical unity, concretely, results from the organic relations between State or political society and 'civil society'.⁶⁰

The subaltern classes,⁶¹ by definition are not unified and cannot unite until they are able to become a 'State': their history, therefore, is intertwined with that of civil society, and thereby with the history of States...⁶²

A study of how these innovatory forces developed from subaltern groups to

⁵⁹ Gramsci 1971: p. 261.

⁶⁰ Gramsci 1971: p. 52.

⁶¹ "This does not just mean oppressed, although that may be the case, but lacking autonomy, subjected to the influence or hegemony of another social group, not possessing one's own hegemonic position." Showstack Sassoon 1982: p. 16.

⁶² Gramsci 1971; p. 52.

hegemonic and dominant groups, must therefore seek out and identify the phases through which they acquired: 1. autonomy vis-a-vis [the State]; and 2. support from the groups which actively or passively assisted them.⁶³

All the above citations refer to the creation of the Italian State, and imply that the historic origins of the State lie in civil society. The concepts of State and civil society are linked through time. Once elements of civil society are realized in a new State, the new State then uses its coercive power to control (civilize) civil society. But, in effect the new State is still closely linked to civil society. This link, however, is not permanent since the first phase towards creation of a new State is the autonomy of the subaltern classes (i.e. civil society) from the dominant classes in the old State.

This conception of the processual link between civil society and State is particularly relevant to nationalism considering that the nationalists' goal is to create a new State, and they are obviously not part of the current State but only of civil society. Furthermore, since the current State must once have had, and still has to some extent, hegemonic links to civil society in the nationalist region certain class fractions within the nationalist region will support the State against the nationalist movement. This explains the intra-ethnic and inter-class struggle that often accompanies nationalism.

⁶³. Gramsci 1971: p. 53.

2. Intellectuals

The intellectual is a key category in Gramsci's work. In fact, Gramsci is one of the major writers in understanding the role of intellectuals. Gramsci places the criterion for differentiating intellectuals from other groups in the function played by intellectuals.

The most widespread error seems to me that of having looked for this criterion of distinction in the intrinsic nature of intellectual activities, rather than in the ensemble of the system of relations in which these activities (and therefore the intellectual group who personify them) have their place within the complex of social relations.⁶⁴

Given that their function is precisely "to sustain a conception of the world or to modify it", the intellectual must be a "constructor, organizer 'permanent persuader'".⁶⁵

Once the categorization of intellectual activity by social function has been established, the intellectuals themselves can be organized into levels. "At the highest level would be the creators of the various sciences, philosophy, art, etc., at the lowest the most humble 'administrators' and divulgators of pre-existing, traditional, accumulated wealth."⁶⁶ Philosophers, artists, politicians as well as civil servants, are all considered intellectuals according to Gramsci.

A fundamental aspect of Gramsci's theory of intellectuals is that they are not an independent class. To the contrary, every class creates a stratum of intellectuals. The specific activity of the intellectuals is to "give [the class] homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields."⁶⁷ Based on the relation between class and intellectuals, Gramsci creates two types of intellectuals: organic and traditional. These types are overdetermined by the economic

⁶⁴. Gramsci 1971: p. 8.

⁶⁵. Gramsci 1971: p. 10.

⁶⁶. Gramsci 1971: p. 13.

⁶⁷. Gramsci 1971: p. 5.

since the typology depends on the position in the relations of production of the class to which the intellectuals are attached.

Organic intellectuals form the most important category, they are those intellectuals that are tied to a fundamental class. The fundamental classes are basically two: the directive class in power of the State, and the directive class among the subaltern classes opposing the State.

Traditional intellectuals are extensions of older classes; classes that were fundamental in the preceding economic structure. Priests are an example of traditional intellectuals because they were attached to the landed aristocracy in pre-industrial Europe.⁶⁸ After the disappearance of the previous fundamental class, those allied intellectuals who have survived as intellectuals will progress in one of two ways: they will either crystalize and view themselves as an independent class or they will align themselves with another class. This last possibility is important for the fundamental classes.

One of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing towards dominance is its struggle to assimilate and conquer 'ideologically' the traditional intellectuals.⁶⁹

In the case of nationalism it falls upon the intellectuals to slowly create popular support. This can be done via an ethnic revival which creates an ethnic self-awareness. Authors, linguists, historians... are all intellectuals. It will also be through intellectuals that ethnic awareness solidifies into a political movement with direction and aspirations. Due to the intellectuals connection to specific classes, there will be definite economic interests shaped into nationalism.

3. Party

In Gramsci the party is an essential element in understanding the dynamics of conflict in that the party is an organizer.

⁶⁸ Gramsci 1971: p. 67.

⁶⁹ Gramsci 1971: p. 10.

In the political party the elements of a social group get beyond that moment of their historical development and become agents of more general activities of a national character.⁷⁰

Through the vehicle of the party, intellectuals will react back on the class to which they are bound "in order to develop, solidify and universalize them."⁷¹ But, the party also has another ability which is the ability to weld other classes and social groups (through their intellectuals) into a coalition with the party. Despite the alignment of other classes the party will predominantly represent the interests of the directive class. The directive class is that class within the alliance which exercises leadership of the others. Potentially the coalition will disintegrate if the interests of the various groups diverge too much. A nationalist party then is the instrument by which intellectuals and class articulate other sectors of the population into a nationalist collective will.

4. Collective Will

The collective will, then, for Gramsci is the subject of political activity. "A definition must be given of collective will in general, in the modern sense: will as operative awareness of historical necessity, as protagonist of a real and effective historical drama."⁷² The collective will is the coalition of classes that forms around a directive party. "A national popular collective will of which the modern prince [party] is at one and the same time the organizer and the active, operative expression."⁷³

A careful distinction must be maintained among intellectuals, party and collective will. The collective will is the political subject, a coalition of different classes aligned around the organizing, directive element of a party. The party is the primary expression of only one class (the economic subject), although it is directive over many classes

⁷⁰. Gramsci 1971: p. 16.

⁷¹. Gramsci 1971: p. 227.

⁷². Gramsci 1971: p. 130.

⁷³. Gramsci 1971: p. 133

through the collective will. Intellectuals are linked to a specific class. Some of these intellectuals will react back upon the class on a political level by joining a party. Organic intellectuals will also affect other classes by assimilating traditional intellectuals, who are linked to other classes. A nationalist collective will would consist of all individuals of a particular ethnic group who support the nationalist movement. They would not necessarily be members of a nationalist party, but would include the people who vote nationalist, participate in general strikes or engage in passive resistance or other political activities in support of nationalist goals. In Francoist Spain, for example, merely speaking Euskera was a nationalist act.

5. Ideology

[Ideologies] 'organize' human masses, create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc...⁷⁴

Ideology in Gramsci has shifted from a negative formulation of deceit to a positive meaning as shown above. Ideology is a practice producing subjects.⁷⁵ The subject produced is the collective will. Ideology interpellates⁷⁶ individuals, gives them an identity, and creates the collective will. This interpellation (identity) will form the nucleus of the collective will, the directive force of the political subject.⁷⁷ In the case of nationalist movements, ethnicity is the interpellative core or central identifying trait.

Gramsci cautions against a potential confusion over the term ideology. The term is used to refer to the necessary superstructure for every structure; but not to refer to a particular persons own 'theory' (i.e. Hitler, Mussolini).

One must therefore distinguish between historically organic ideologies, those,

⁷⁴. Gramsci 1971: p. 377.

⁷⁵. Mouffe 1979: p. 187.

⁷⁶. "Interpellation is the mechanism by which individuals, who are simply bearers of structures are transformed by ideology into subjects." Blight 1984: p. 45.

⁷⁷. Laclau 1979: p. 101.

that is, which are necessary to a given structure, and ideologies that are arbitrary, rationalistic or 'willed'.⁷⁸

Organicity is judged by an ideology's ability to create a collective will, its efficiency.

Although ideology is an abstract element, it does have a material manifestation: a world view.⁷⁹ Religion, so often used by Gramsci, is the material existence of an ideology. One's world view forms the rational basis of action, therefore ideology is a causal factor. Thus, for a nationalist collective will (political force) to form and take action ideology must first create an awareness of political, economic and cultural oppression along ethnic lines and second, develop a plan of action to redress those "ethnic" grievances. Nationalist ideology will direct the transformation of society to reflect this ideology. (See also "Historic Bloc").

Under the discussion of ideology it should also be mentioned that in the case of nationalism there will be at least two competing nationalist ideological elements within the State and civil society. These are the nationalist component of the State's ideology (a core nationalism) and the nationalist ideology of the nationalist party within civil society (a peripheral nationalism). There may of course be several core or peripheral nationalist movements with differing "nationalist" ideologies.

6. Hegemony and Domination

A social group dominates antagonistic groups; it leads kindred and allied groups.⁸⁰

The concepts of hegemony and dominance are essential to Gramsci's thinking. The conception of hegemony in particular is an example of Gramsci's brilliance and innovation. Hegemony is the process and the construct in which various classes or class factions are welded into a collective will under the direction of a party (i.e. of an

⁷⁸. Gramsci 1971: p. 376-377.

⁷⁹. Mouffe 1979: p. 186.

⁸⁰. Gramsci 1971: p. 57.

essential class). Ideology is a fundamental aspect of hegemony, but hegemony cannot be reduced to ideology alone.⁸¹ Hegemony is a dialectical relationship among the distinct groups forming the hegemonic structure, it is an articulation of ideological elements and economic interests of all the allied classes. However, the ideology and economic interests of the directive class form the core. The alliance that forms around the hegemonic class is termed the power bloc. Nationalist hegemony would be a structure of various classes' economic interests and elements of their ideologies held together around a nationalist interpellative core. A nationalist hegemony may disintegrate if one or more of the allied classes no longer perceive the nationalist party to respond to their needs or if their needs are met by the State (thus they would be rearticulated back into the State).

Domination is the other pillar of the State. The hegemonic class unity which is realized in the State will support the State freely. Antagonistic sectors are coerced into acquiescence. Thus the ruling class is both directive and dominant. A crisis of the State emerges when the hegemonic structure cracks. If the allied classes withdraw their consent, the ruling class is no longer directive but only dominant. One would expect that in the case of nationalism, the State must rely mostly on dominance in the nationalist region. If the State were to still maintain hegemony, the success of the nationalist movement would be minimal.

7. Historic Bloc

The Gramscian concept of historic bloc cuts right across the division between material and ideal structures. Historic bloc refers to the very unity, the coordination of the material and the ideal. Historic bloc is a unity "in which precisely material forces are the force and ideologies are the form."⁸² An historic bloc is created when there are no contradictions between ideology and the relations of production. It is achieved by people

⁸¹. Hall et al 1977: p. 48.

⁸². Gramsci: p. 377.

and through people in that individuals both rearticulate ideology to conform to the material and act to change the economic structures to reflect ideology. Both spheres need to be transformed and brought into concordance.

Man is to be conceived as an historical bloc of purely individual and subjective elements and of mass and objective or material elements with which the individual is in an active relationship.⁸³

In Gramsci's view, humanity forms the very link, the connection between the material elements and the subjective elements. Since the collective will is the political subject of humanity, it is the collective will (guided by the party) that strives to consolidate the historical bloc. In the case of nationalism, it is the nationalist movement which attempts to change the material world to reflect nationalist ideology on both ethnic issues and economic issues. A nationalist historic bloc would be formed when the material world, including economic factors as well as political factors such as independence or autonomy, finally reflects nationalist ideology.

8. Consent

The State in Gramsci can no longer be reduced to a simple tool of economic domination. Since pure violence is not a possible explanation for the State's continued existence, the notion of consent rises in importance. Consent is the basis of hegemony, and therefore, a necessary condition for the State.

The State is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class...manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules.⁸⁴

Gramsci divides consent into two categories, either passive and indirect or active and direct. The type of consent is important because certain States can only exist with a specific type of support.⁸⁵ The Church, for example, requires passive consent - active

⁸³ Gramsci 1971: p. 360.

⁸⁴ Gramsci 1971: p. 244.

⁸⁵ Buci-Gluckmann 1982: p. 118.

participation from below would shatter the structure. Parties that are not yet States need the active consent of the collective will. Thus, for nationalist parties which advocate either a major transformation (ethnic autonomy) or the destruction of the old State and the creation of a new State (independence), active participation is fundamental.

9. Passive Revolution or Revolution/Restoration

Passive revolution is a process of change Gramsci counterposes to (active) revolution. Revolution is a sweeping, dramatic change where old structures are physically destroyed. For Gramsci this is embodied in the French Revolution when most vestiges of the old feudal classes were killed. In France, revolution brought the change from Ancien Regime to capitalism, but this was not the case in other European States.⁸⁶ Change came about in other States through passive revolution or revolution/ restoration.

Social struggles find sufficiently elastic frameworks to allow the bourgeoisie to gain power without the French machinery of terror. The old feudal classes are demoted from their dominant position to a 'governing' one; but are not eliminated.⁸⁷

Passive revolution is a dialectical process posing a new collective will against the old State and a new State emerges as a resolution of the struggle. In revolution/ restoration there is "necessity for each member of a dialectical opposition to seek to be itself totally, and to throw into the struggle all the political and 'moral resources' it possesses."⁸⁸ Although passive, it is not a non-violent process, there may be sporadic acts of violence, attempts at rebellion etc. Nationalism can take either route, passive revolution or active revolution.

C. CONCLUSION

⁸⁶. Gramsci 1971: pp. 114-115.

⁸⁷. Gramsci 1971: p. 115.

⁸⁸. Gramsci 1971: p. 109.

When returning to the problematic of this thesis, which is to analyze the conjuncture of social, political and economic forces involved in the emergence of Basque nationalism, the basic underlying advantage of Gramsci's work, compared with the conventional theories of nationalism, is that Gramsci eschewed monocausal theory predicting particular forms of social change. Instead, he outlined and defined a series of concepts to analyze the relations of power existent within any society. Thus, he avoids the false generalizations and misanalogization of Eurocentrism, for example, because he does not predict that the phenomenon of the French Revolution or Italian fascism will be repeated. History is not used like a crystal ball to predict the future but to conceptualize the dynamic relationship between elements of society by studying how different sectors formed, acted, interacted and disappeared in the past.

The emphasis Gramsci places on the specific and unique characteristics of every situation also require very precise definition of all terms of reference. In particular, the terms "State" and "civil society" minimize the possibility of confusing the terms State and nation. State carries the political connotation, and nation could only be used to refer to sectors of civil society and, most logically, sectors defined along ethnic characteristics.

Among Marxist theorists of nationalism, Gramsci avoids the common error of equating national struggle with class struggle by conceptualizing the collective will. The collective will is the political subject of nationalist struggles since a nationalist conflict is a political struggle. Classes are represented in the collective will, and, therefore, are in struggle. But, the conflict is not necessarily drawn along the lines of the fundamental classes (i.e. of the class struggle). Again, the specific coalition of classes within the

collective will, as within the State, is essential to a Gramscian study.

To analyze Basque nationalism from a Gramscian perspective, a competent understanding of Euskeran political economy is necessary. Chapter Two examines the history of Euzkadi and Spain between 1875 and 1975.

CHAPTER THREE

III. A CHAPTER IN EUSKERAN HISTORY

This chapter will outline the developments within Spain and Euzkadi that eventually led to the emergence of Basque nationalism and the development of two distinct nationalist organizations. Without a political economic understanding of the situation analysis of the Basque nationalist struggle tends to ignore the context of Euzkadi's relation with Spain. Many of the developments that occurred within the social, political and economic structures of Euzkadi are unique to that region. But, there are also a number of Spanish state-wide phenomena that have had tremendous impact on Euzkadi. It is the complex interrelation of internal structures, as well as the reaction to external events that form the basis of Basque nationalism.

The time frame relevant to Basque nationalism stretches from about 1875 to the present. This thesis, however, is concerned with the origin of the first movement, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (the Basque Nationalist Party: the PNV) and the fundamental shift that occurred later on when the Marxist Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (Euzkadi and Freedom: ETA) emerged. Therefore the historical study will concentrate on the formative periods of these movements, roughly from 1893 to 1906 for the PNV and 1959 to 1973 for ETA. Unfortunately some important events in Spanish and Euskeran history fall outside these time spans, for example the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), and will therefore be considered only in relation to their relevance to the movements for Basque nationalism.

This historical review will begin with a brief summary of conditions in Euzkadi before 1875, the era that marks the end of the bourgeois revolution in Spain. Then the discussion will move on to the effects of the bourgeois transformation and industrializa-

tion in Euzkadi. Only the briefest of surveys will be provided for the time (1917-1939) between the emergence of the PNV and ETA. When discussing Franco, the study takes on a more national Spanish focus due to the very centralized character of the regime. The Franco era is divided into four sub-periods reflecting economic policies and power configurations.

A. CONDITIONS OF EUZKADI - pre 1875

Under the Absolutist Regime, Euzkadi and most of the other regions in Spain had maintained considerable autonomy through the process of building the Spanish State.⁸⁹ Euzkadi's position and relation to Spain were set out in the Fueros, a body of laws covering the obligations and privileges of both entities. Under the Fueros Euzkadi had control over internal political organization, tax system and legal system. This allowed the Basque hegemonic bloc tremendous leeway to protect their interests.⁹⁰ In place of the Spanish tax system, for example, Euzkadi paid a yearly sum to the Madrid government, however the monies were raised according to the wishes of the Basque government.

Another important feature of the Fueros was that the Spanish customs houses were placed inland at the border between Euzkadi and Castile, not along the Basque coast. This meant that although imported goods entered Euzkadi duty free, goods produced in Euzkadi were taxed upon entering Spain. On the one hand, Basque consumers had access to quality goods at low prices; thus, the Basques, nobles and peasants alike, had a higher standard of living than the rest of Spain.⁹¹ But on the other hand Basque industry had

⁸⁹. Aguayo 1978: p. 315.

⁹⁰. Greenwood 1985: p. 209.

⁹¹. Gonzalez Portillo 1977; p. 124.

only a small domestic market and was taxed on entering the Spanish market, which severely hampered industrial expansion. The Fueros also placed restrictions on Euzkadi's economic relations with foreign states. Euzkadi's small iron industry was restricted from entering the European market by a prohibition on ore exports. Foreign investment in Euzkadi was the other major restricted activity. Taking into account these aspects of the Fueros it is evident that they constituted a major block to the industrialization and the transformation of production relations in Euzkadi.

The political system under the Fueros was a coalition of the industrial and merchant bourgeoisie in the cities and the rural nobility.⁹² Through the Fueros this bloc had been able to structure the economy to their own benefit for a long time. This was particularly true of the nobility. Due to peculiarities of Iberian history there were few feudal landowners in Euzkadi with extensive landholdings. For the most part peasants either owned their own land or used land held communally, thus the nobility's wealth was not based on agricultural rents.

The causes of this unique land holding pattern of Euzkadi go back to the time of the Reconquest of the Iberian peninsula. The Muslim invasion of Iberia never reached the Basque provinces in the North of the peninsula leaving Euzkadi unaffected by the Arab influences. After the Reconquest in 1492 the Spanish State developed the concept of Pureza de Sangre (Cleanliness of Blood) as a necessary quality for aristocratic privileges. Cleanliness of Blood referred to the absence of Jewish or Arab ancestry. The Basques were granted hidalguía colectiva (collective nobility) since Euzkadi had never fallen under Arab domination. Hidalguía was a low rank of nobility but it granted a number of privileges that freed the bearer from many feudal obligations. All Basques were thus granted freedom from serfdom and from taxes, they were allowed to own land and to receive court patronage etc. By 1875 Basque collective nobility was translated into a

⁹². Corcuera 1978: p. 112.

Basque peasantry that owned the land and even bore titles.

Due to the wider distribution of land, the wealth of the Euskeran nobles (not the hidalguia) did not come from vast agricultural holdings. Instead the economic power of the nobility came from trade (both maritime and terrestrial) and small scale mining and iron production. The rural nobility used their political power to monopolize these activities. This was the source of a major contradiction in the Fueros system. The political position of the hegemonic fraction, the nobility, did not come from their economic power but emanated from their titles. With time the Euskeran nobility's economic power eroded away from under their political domination.

The change in the economic structure of Euzkadi was the result of the central government's attempts to transform the relations of production and create private property. The disentanglement of communal lands, decreed in 1856, affected Euzkadi as much as the rest of Spain.⁹³ Much of the Basque nobility involved in mining and iron lost their industries because they had been leasing communal lands from communities that they politically controlled. Except for a few nobles, the only sectors with enough capital to purchase this land were the industrial and financial bourgeoisie from the cities. The rural nobility saw a drastic decline in their economic position, yet remained in a politically dominant position.⁹⁴

The noble/bourgeoisie power bloc in Euzkadi began to fracture as their economic interests began to diverge as the bourgeoisie no longer needed economic concessions from the nobility. The emerging bourgeoisie saw the Fueros as a hindrance to their own economic growth and a curtailment of their political power. The Euskeran nobility, on the other hand, could maintain its dominant position in the State only by keeping the

⁹³. Tuñón de Lara 1977: p. 12.

⁹⁴. Corcuera 1978: pp. 112-113; López Adán 1977: p. 4.

Fueros. This contradiction was resolved in favour of the bourgeoisie in 1875 when the Spanish State abolished the Fueros.⁹⁵

B. THE BOURGEOIS REVOLUTION IN SPAIN

The most salient feature of the bourgeois revolution in Spain and Euzkadi was its failure to radically transform the country.⁹⁶ In Gramscian terminology, it is incorrect to speak of a bourgeois revolution in the case of Spain. There was no dramatic eradication of the feudal relations of production as in the case of France. Rather Spain passed through a process of revolution/restoration from which a power bloc dominated by the traditional sectors emerged.

The year 1875 marked the consolidation of the new power bloc in Spain with the Restoration Monarchy, a constitutional Monarchy with an elected Parliament that lasted until 1923.⁹⁷ However the electoral system was continually manipulated by the cariques, political bosses, especially in the rural ridings. The Constitution of 1876 created a political structure around a coalition of the aristocracy/latifundistas and sectors of the upper bourgeoisie (resource and financial capital). The directive ideology within this bloc remained that of the aristocracy, and it remained so until 1939.

It could be argued with some validity that the bourgeois transformation of Spain had the inverse effect on Euzkadi than it had on the whole of Spain. In Spain, the aristocracy was able to use its power as latifundistas to articulate the resource and financial capitalist class fractions into a bloc to the exclusion of the other bourgeois

⁹⁵. Gonzalez Portillo 1977: pp. 172-173.

⁹⁶. For a more detailed account, see the excellent works by Tuñón de Lara 1971; 1977.

⁹⁷. Tuñón de Lara 1971: p. 155.

sectors.⁹⁸ The end result was the continued directive force of traditional ideology, and the disarticulation of resource and financial capital from industrial capital and the "other bourgeoisie". Spanish historian, Tuñón de Lara uses the term "otra burguesia" to refer to the bourgeois sectors that were not part of the power bloc which were the agro-industrial bourgeoisie (wines, food oils, preserves), small (family) industry (textiles, leather, shoes), and merchants.⁹⁹ The hegemony of the latifundistas within the power bloc slowed down the bourgeois revolution, such that the "other bourgeoisie" remained weak and the working classes were slow to develop.

CHART 1

The Spanish Power Bloc and Subaltern Classes, 1875-1917.

<u>power bloc</u>	<u>subaltern classes</u>
latifundistas/aristocracy	industrial capital
resource capital	"other bourgeoisie"
financial capital	petty bourgeoisie
	agricultural labourers
	proletariat

The Euskeran Power Bloc and Subaltern Classes, 1875-1917.

<u>power bloc</u>	<u>subaltern classes</u>
resource capital	industrial capital
financial capital	"other bourgeoisie"
	petty nobility
	proletariat
	peasants

Almost the inverse can be seen to occur in Euzkadi where the bourgeois transformation was successful. Euskeran society paralleled other bourgeois societies of the late 1800's in that there were bourgeois, petty bourgeois and proletarian classes which were establishing themselves and, contrary to Spain as a whole, the nobility was marginalized from power. Because of the reduced agricultural holdings of the Basque

⁹⁸ Tuñón de Lara 1971: p. 181.

⁹⁹ Tuñón de Lara 1971: pp. 172-173.

nobility, they were not articulated into the new Spanish power bloc like the aristocracy in the rest of Spain. Their last hope of dominance disappeared in 1875 with the Fueros. Whereas the Spanish nobility maintained its position within the new State, the Euskeran nobility was relegated to a subaltern class.

Although the "other bourgeoisie" in Spain was fairly weak, their geographic concentration made them a potential force within Euzkadi. The region was also home to a good portion of Spain's industrial, resource and financial capital.¹⁰⁰ The presence of resource and financial capital, which were part of the power bloc, as well as a substantial part of industrial capital and other fractions excluded from the power bloc was a source of great tension in the region since both groups fought over the same voting population in their attempts to influence the Spanish State.

The Spanish working class did not constitute a major force before about 1920. The Spanish economy remained agricultural until well into the 20th Century (see FIGURE 1). In 1900, 66% of the work force was employed in agriculture.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, the percentage of the male work force in primary sectors remained above 50% until 1950. Euzkadi, due to its geographic concentration of Spanish industry, entered the 20th Century as an industrial region.¹⁰² Yet, the Basque labour movement was not particularly strong. From 1890 to 1903 in all industries except mining there were only 32 strikes (about 2.5 per year) in Vizcaya province, the Basque industrial core.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰. Harrison 1978: p. 74.

¹⁰¹. Harrison 1978: p. 69.

¹⁰². Mendiguren 1978: p. 149.

¹⁰³. Marvaud 1910: p. 96.

FIGURE 1
Evolution of the male working population in Spain by sectors as a
percentage of total population, 1900-1960

YEARS	SECTORS			TOTAL ACTIVE POPULATION
	primary	secondary	tertiary	
1900	69.17	13.73	17.10	100
1910	66.23	14.51	19.46	100
1920	63.89	15.99	20.12	100
1930	56.17	18.72	25.11	100
1940	56.55	17.77	25.68	100
1950	48.83	25.09	25.06	100
1960	41.29	31.39	27.32	100

SOURCE: Rull Sabater 1983: p. 361.

Two reasons may account for the low level of organized labour. First, the general lack of labour organization within Spain prior to 1910 uniquely affected Euzkadi. What little organization that existed, was directed primarily at Spanish agricultural workers. The emphasis on agricultural workers neglected the problems of Euzkadi's industrial workers. Nor did labour organizers gain a foothold in rural Euzkadi since most of the Euskeran peasants were not day labourers but owned their own land, either communally or individually. Thus they did not suffer the same problems as the Spanish peasants.

The second factor contributing to the weakness of the Basque workers' movement was the fractious nature of the Euskeran workers' associations. In the period before 1910 there were 143 associations with 16,714 members in Euzkadi. Madrid at the same time had 146 associations with 62,482 members.¹⁰⁴ In percentages, Euzkadi accounted for 7% of workers organizations in Spain but only 4% of members. The Basque average of 117 members per organization is well below the national average of 428 members per group. On the whole the working class in Euzkadi, as in Spain, had yet to reach class

¹⁰⁴. Marvaud 1910: p. 454.

consciousness and assume a directive role among the subaltern classes.

The weakness of the labour movement in Euzkadi was further complicated by ethnic issues. The ranks of the workers were swelling with the influx of Spanish immigrants to such an extent that by 1900 nearly 60% of unskilled workers (category 7) were Spanish born (See TABLES 1.1; 1.2). The Spanish immigrants were concentrated in three categories - unskilled workers, servants (doormen, waiters, coachmen...), and bureaucrats. When the figures are broken down by geographic origin it is revealed that approximately 52% of the Spanish immigrants worked in unskilled labour. These statistics show that the Spanish presence in Euzkadi was concentrated in the proletariat.

The ethnic divisions within the Basque proletariat created a dualism within the labour movement in Euzkadi once worker organization began to grow in strength. By the end of the first decade of the 20th Century, the socialists emerged as the principal force within the labour movement in Euzkadi. However, the next strongest organized movement was the nationalist Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos (Solidarity of Basque Workers: STV).¹⁰⁵ The growth of the STV is covered in greater depth in Chapter Four during the discussion of the PNV since both organizations were very closely connected. The dualism that was created between the socialists and the nationalists was paralleled by a difference in political ideology of the two unions. The STV was a Catholic union with a very cautious legalistic approach to labour disputes, compared to the socialist's more radical and activist pursuit of the interests of the proletariat.

After the transition of the Spanish State from feudalism to capitalism, Euzkadi was left in a unique predicament. The new Basque society that emerged at the end of the 19th Century, was constructed on top of a Spanish society which failed to achieve an

¹⁰⁵ Fusi 1984: p. 47.

TABLE 1.1
Bilbao, 1890-1900. Distribution of the male working
population by professional category and geographic origin.

Professional categories used in TABLES 1.1 and 1.2:

- Group 1: Landowner, financier, industrialist.
- Group 2: Advanced degrees (technical, university), stockbroker.
- Group 3: Lesser degrees (teacher).
- Group 4: Merchants, small industry.
- Group 5: a) Assistants, office clerks;
b) shopclerks, salespeople.
- Group 6: Artisans (cobblers, carpenters...).
- Group 7: Journeymen, factory workers, miners.
- Group 8: Farm labourers.
- Group 9: Sailors.
- Group 10: Bureaucrats.
- Group 11: Skilled labour (blacksmiths, telegraphists, electricians...).
- Group 12: Servants, porters, cooks, waiters...

Profes- sional category	1890 Census		1900 Census	
	Geographic Origin			
	Euzkadi : % of each category	Spain : % of each category	Euzkadi : % of each category	Spain : % of each category
1	83.33	16.66	77.65	22.34
2	76.81	18.18	70.93	29.05
3	65.38	34.61	65.21	34.78
4	72.72	27.27	57.26	42.72
5a	56.86	43.13	54.84	45.14
5b	73.97	26.01	55.13	44.86
6	65.26	34.72	55.77	44.21
7	47.39	52.60	41.95	58.03
8	98.67	1.31	93.21	6.77
9	95.82	4.16	85.93	14.06
10	29.16	70.83	30.36	69.62
11	71.42	28.57	62.74	37.25
12	60.46	39.53	47.61	52.38
sample	1,571	1,053	2,014	1,920
%	59.86	40.12	51.19	48.80

TABLE 1.2
Professional distribution within each geographic group
for Bilbao (percentage).

Profes- sional category	1890 Census		1900 Census	
	Euzkadi :	Spain :	Euzkadi :	Spain :
1	2.04	0.75	4.98	1.09
2	2.56	0.94	3.65	1.77
3	2.20	1.70	2.51	1.77
4	7.47	5.41	8.74	7.43
5a	5.25	6.26	6.57	6.57
5b	5.07	3.03	4.55	4.32
6	26.71	20.51	17.92	14.53
7	35.91	51.85	38.89	51.71
8	3.50	0.09	2.70	0.20
9	2.16	0.18	2.70	0.46
10	1.56	4.84	2.31	4.89
11	1.89	1.13	4.59	2.96
12	3.64	3.22	3.13	3.43
sample	1,571	1,053	2,014	1,920
%	100	100	100	100

SOURCE: Based on Corcuera 1979: pp. 76-79.

historic bloc.¹⁰⁶ A series of contradictions existed, therefore, within Euzkadi and between that region and Spain.

First, The Euskeran nobility was marginalized from power but its power was not broken. They were trapped in the contradiction of being outside the power bloc while elements of their ideology (the traditional ideology of the Spanish nobility) was still directive within the State. Second, the historic opposing class to the nobility, the bourgeoisie, was divided and certain bourgeois fractions (the "other bourgeoisie" and industrial capital) were marginalized from power while other fractions were represented in the power bloc. Not only were the "other bourgeoisie" and industrial capital unable to expand economically, the State was in the hands off resource capital whose monopolistic

¹⁰⁶ Recalde 1977: p. 47.

tendencies were threatening industrial capital.¹⁰⁷ And third, the other historic class, the proletariat, was too weak within Spain to push forward its demands. In a sense, the Euskeran proletariat was isolated in the region. The next section will examine the development of these classes in the context of Euzkadi's economic development.

C. INDUSTRIALIZATION IN EUZKADI

Based on the strength of Basque iron mining and metallurgy, industrialization took off at a rapid pace after the end of the Fueros in 1875. Foreign investment flowed into Euzkadi to help increase ore production. This foreign link is reflected in the fact that from 1876-1901, 90% of the ore mined was exported, three-fifths of that going to Britain alone.¹⁰⁸ The foreign market was much more important to Euzkadi than the domestic one. However, the Spanish State was dependent on Euzkadi's virtual monopsony as its iron supplier.¹⁰⁹ The owners of the mining industries constituted the dominant fraction of the capitalist class within Euzkadi and formed part of the Spanish power bloc.

The plentiful source of iron and the need for shipping to maintain Euzkadi's foreign markets stimulated the creation of a strong Basque shipbuilding industry. Shipbuilding constituted the other major sector of the Basque industrial complex. But, this sector of industrial capital was excluded from the Spanish power bloc. Unlike the iron interests, this sector was not articulated to the State. The comparative weakness of industrial capital was perhaps due to the sector's late establishment and that the core industry, shipbuilding, was dependent on resource capital for iron and steel. There was also

¹⁰⁷ Corcuera 1978: p. 112.

¹⁰⁸ Harrison 1978: p. 73.

¹⁰⁹ Harrison 1977: p. 373.

another fundamental difference between industrial capital and other sectors of the Spanish capitalist class. Industrial capital was an indigenous class independent of foreign capital,¹¹⁰ and presented strong opposition to State policies favouring foreign interests in the Spanish economy. Resource capital's monopoly of political power and the ship industry's lack of power led to a sharp conflict between these two sectors.¹¹¹

The enormous profits of these two sectors, metallurgy in particular, had two effects within Euzkadi. First, Euzkadi was transformed into the major industrial complex in Spain. By the end of World War I Euzkadi's industrial strength far surpassed that of Catalunya.¹¹² The second effect was to create one of the strongest financial classes in Spain. The Bank of Bilbao, founded with Basque capital¹¹³, quadrupled its capital from 1876-1900, and in the same time span the Bank also tripled profits and increased by eight-fold its holdings.¹¹⁴ In all, the Basque banking sector was fundamental in mobilizing capital.¹¹⁵ The banks were essential not only to Basque industrial expansion, but in channeling capital to the rest of Spain. Thus, Basque financial capital was able to incorporate into the power bloc with the aristocracy/latifundistas and resource capital.

The strength of resource and financial capital combined with Basque anger at the loss of the Fueros enabled Basque resource and financial capital to negotiate the

¹¹⁰. Lieberman 1982: p. 132.

¹¹¹. Corcuera 1978: p. 111.

¹¹². Harrison 1978: pp. 73,95.

¹¹³. López Adán 1977: p. 5.

¹¹⁴. Tuñón de Lara 1971: p. 166.

¹¹⁵. Harrison 1978: p. 73.

Concierto Económico (Economic Accords) of 1877 with Madrid. The Concierto granted the Basque region extensive fiscal autonomy by replacing the Spanish tax system with a prearranged sum of money which was raised according to the desires of the Basque political authorities (i.e. resource and financial capital). Under the Concierto there were no direct taxes such as property or income taxes in Euzkadi.¹¹⁶ Not only did the Concierto favour certain sectors of Euskeran society over other sectors, but the Concierto also favoured Euzkadi over other regions in Spain by fixing the yearly Basque contribution at an amount proportionately below what other provinces paid. For example the 1913 Spanish national budget listed the contribution paid by the four Basque provinces at 8,988,068 pesetas. But when examining the total contributions, both direct and indirect, paid by the other provinces, the four Basque provinces combined would have ranked eighth overall yet Euzkadi was one of the most industrialized regions in Spain.¹¹⁷

At this point in Spain, the upper capitalist class can be divided into three fractions: monopolistic resource capital (in extractive sectors); financial capital; and industrial capital (secondary sectors). All three sectors were present in Euzkadi. The first two fractions were aligned with the latifundistas in the South to create the Spanish State. These three groups in the power bloc were linked to foreign capital. Both the agricultural and mining sectors were dependent on export: mining especially since little steel or iron was consumed domestically. Financial capital also benefitted from assisting foreign interests to enter Spain.¹¹⁸ The third faction, although rapidly getting rich, did not form part of the State, a fact that was reflected in protectionist policy. In 1896, the

¹¹⁶ Corcuera 1978: p. 114.

¹¹⁷ Enciclopedia Ilustrada Segui, vol.VII. (1907-), Barcelona: Centro Editorial Miguel Segui: pp. 504-505.

¹¹⁸ Lieberman 1982: pp. 120; 126-127.

State imposed import duties on iron manufactures at the urging of the iron industry. The resulting jump in iron prices hurt the shipyards and the consumer goods industries. But, there were almost no protective measures for the shipbuilders.¹¹⁹ Thus, the third fraction (industrial capital) had a decided interest in changing the class alliance realized in the State.

The opportunity to enact such a change came when Spain lost the last vestiges of the old empire in 1898 in the Spanish-American War. The crisis that followed the war weakened the power bloc which would have facilitated the admittance of industrial capital and the bourgeoisie into the power bloc. However, the war crisis also affected the economic power of industrial capital in Spain, but not in Euzkadi. The loss of the Cuban and Philippine markets, the huge expense of the war and the loss of Spain's position in the world were devastating to most of Spain. The consumer and textile industries of Catalunya, for example, were very hard hit: cotton supplies were cut off, colonial markets disappeared and the domestic market shrank as unemployment grew.

Euzkadi, on the other hand, benefitted greatly from the crisis of 1898.¹²⁰ The war only increased Spain's consumption of iron and ships. And now with the destruction of the Spanish navy, new ship orders had to be placed with the Basque industries. Also, Euzkadi was never dependent on domestic and colonial markets and the war had little effect on Euzkadi's European market.

The most dramatic, and perhaps least expected effect was a huge influx of capital. As the colonials returned to the metropole, their savings poured into the Basque banks. This was due to two factors: 1) many of the returnees were Basque and they went to their home region; and 2) the other regions for investment (i.e. Catalunya) were

¹¹⁹ Harrison 1977: p. 373; Corcuera 1978: p. 111.

¹²⁰ Harrison 1978: pp. 76-80.

trembling under the crisis, making Euzkadi the only profitable area for investment. Between 1900 and 1901, 254 new companies were established in Bilbao.¹²¹

The result, therefore, of the Spanish-American War was a great diversification of the Euskeran industrial base (paper, chemicals, hydro-electricity) and the expansion of industrial capital, the "other bourgeoisie" (agro-industrial, small industry and merchant) and the working class. Thus, at the prime moment for industrial capital to articulate itself into the State, only Euskeran industrial capital was in a position to do so. But, without the support of allies outside of Euzkadi, Euskeran industrial capital was unable to transform the power bloc, which remained in control until 1917 when it finally articulated to the power bloc.

D. 1917 TO 1939

The time span, 1917-1939, actually covers three segments of Spanish history: the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930); the Second Republic (1930-1936); and the Civil War (1936-1939). However, the focus of this study is on the moments before and after this time period. Therefore, a detailed review of these years cannot be included here. Only two aspects of that period will be touched on. The first will be the transformations that occurred within the power bloc of the Spanish State which set the stage for the particular State that emerged under the Franco Regime. The second aspect is the role Euzkadi played during the Civil War which has some bearing on the position of Euzkadi under Franco.

¹²¹. Harrison 1978: p. 80.

CHART 2
Spanish Power Bloc and Subaltern Classes, 1917-1930

<u>power bloc</u>	<u>subaltern classes</u>
latifundistas/aristocracy	"Other bourgeoisie"
resource capital	agricultural workers
financial capital	proletariat
industrial capital	petty bourgeoisie

Euskeran Power Bloc and the Subaltern Classes, 1917-1930

<u>power bloc</u>	<u>subaltern classes</u>
resource capital	"other bourgeoisie"
financial capital	proletariat
industrial capital	peasants
	petty bourgeoisie

The power bloc that emerged in Spain after the bourgeois transformation remained dominant until 1939.¹²² This was not, however, a perfect alliance of class interests and a series of contradictions affected the unity of the power bloc. The main contradiction was between the latifundistas, the hegemonic fraction, and resource capital. The economic power of the latter increased continually as a result of industrialization and modernization, while the agricultural sector slowly declined. Within the Spanish State the contradiction between the power bloc and the subaltern classes (the "other bourgeoisie" and the workers) reached a point of crisis in 1918-1920.¹²³ It was during the labour unrest of this "Bolshevik Triennium" that threatened to topple the State when industrial capital articulated into the power bloc. The resulting dictatorship of Primo de Rivera repressed the conflict until 1930.

From 1930/31 to 1939, the State became the territory of the conflict between the

¹²² . Tuñón de Lara 1977a: p. 17.

¹²³ . Tuñón de Lara 1977b: p. 90; Lieberman 1982: pp. 139-140.

subaltern classes and the power bloc.¹²⁴ This conflict started in the political arena but eventually turned into the Civil War. Violence was the route chosen by the traditional power bloc to regain their position. In this case the opposing forces were dominated by the working classes under the Popular Front government of the Second Republic, and not around the bourgeoisie as during the failed bourgeois revolution. Thus, Spanish fascism, which was aimed at destroying the power of the ascending working class did not have the mass base of its German and Italian counterparts.¹²⁵ The Franco regime which emerged was very much poised against the working class interests.

CHART 3 The Second Republic and the Civil War

<u>Class alliance</u> <u>Republican Spain</u> proletariat petty bourgeoisie agricultural workers	<u>Class alliance</u> <u>Nationalist Spain</u> financial capital industrial capital latifundistas small/medium industrial bourgeoisie - <u>Falange</u>
<u>Republican class</u> <u>alliance in Euzkadi</u> Basque small/medium industrial bourgeoisie petty bourgeoisie proletariat	<u>Nationalist class</u> <u>alliance in Euzkadi</u> financial capital industrial capital

The time period of the Second Republic and the Civil War also witnessed the new strength of the petty bourgeoisie in Spain. As Spain's economy slowly shifted from an agrarian to an industrial base the numbers of the petty bourgeoisie expanded. By 1930 the service sector accounted for 25% of the work force (see FIGURE 1). The democratic experiment of the Second Republic allowed the petty bourgeoisie organic expression through political parties for the first time since political organizations had been banned

¹²⁴. Tuñón de Lara 1977b: p. 90.

¹²⁵. Tuñón de Lara 1977b: p. 98.

under the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. The petty bourgeoisie began to play an increased role in Spanish history.

Euzkadi's role in the Civil War was interesting for two reasons. First, Euzkadi's activities during the War highlighted the odd contradiction between the Basque nationalist parties and the central government. The Partido Nacionalista Vasco (the Basque Nationalist Party: PNV), a very conservative party representing business interests, aligned itself with the Popular Front against the Fascist rebels because the fascists were ideologically opposed to the nationalist parties in Euzkadi, Catalunya and Galicia. Yet, Popular Front social and economic policies were very distinct from the PNV's platform, which was more similar to Franco's economic policy. It had often been the case that the Madrid political organizations most sympathetic to the Basque cause were also the ones with the most distinct interests from the PNV.

A related point pertains to Franco's reaction to Basque support for the Republic. At the start of the war, Franco controlled only the agricultural regions of Spain. Military necessity obliged an early attack on Euzkadi which, with its large industrial complex, could produce needed arms and ammunition. The campaign against Euzkadi was fierce, and immediately upon conquest the region was brutally pacified to begin producing war materiel for Franco's army. The occupation and treatment of Euzkadi led to the belief that Euzkadi was more severely punished by Franco than other regions for its support of the Republic. It is hard to clarify whether Franco's repression of Euzkadi was based on vengeance or the need for Euzkadi's industries and Franco's anti-proletarian sympathies.

In 1939 Franco's forces finally won the Civil War. Spain and Euzkadi entered another era of their histories just as Europe was about to break into war. It was under the Franco regime that a major transformation occurred within Basque nationalism.

E. THE FRANCO YEARS

The Franco regime was a highly centralized corporatist State with an appointed legislature representing different sectors of Spanish society. Final control rested with General Franco until his death in 1975. It was not, however, an immobile permanent configuration. The power bloc on which the State was built went through a series of transformations such that the class alliance that had dominated Spain since the mid 1800's finally fractured. The 35 year period can be divided into four roughly delineated sub-periods that follow the internal transformations of the State. Because of the rigidity and secretiveness of the regime, there are few sharp exact dividing lines between the sub-periods. Through these transitions the State's final position was one of foreign dependency. Among the dominant and subaltern classes there finally appeared a tactical convergence of interests in favour of democracy.¹²⁶

CHART 4
Spanish Power Bloc and Subaltern Classes, 1939-1975

<u>power bloc</u>	<u>subaltern classes</u>
financial capital	proletariat
foreign capital	petty bourgeoisie
latifundistas (1939-58)	agricultural labourers
industrial capital	domestic bourgeoisie
(subsumed by	(1970-75)
financial capital)	
domestic bourgeoisie (1958-70)	

Euskeran Power Bloc and Subaltern Classes, 1939-1975

<u>power bloc</u>	<u>subaltern classes</u>
financial capital	proletariat
industrial capital	petty bourgeoisie
domestic bourgeoisie	domestic bourgeoisie
(1958-1970)	(1970-1975)

The first sub-period of Franco's rule ran from 1939 to about 1950. Economic autarky was the central trait of this period in Spain's history. Autarky was, in part, imposed on Spain by the outside world. As a fascist regime, Spain was excluded from world trade

¹²⁶ Poulantzas 1976: p. 41.

during the 1940's.¹²⁷ But, there was also a conscious effort on the part of the Spanish State to become self-sufficient since the regime was distrustful of the foreign governments which had destroyed the German and Italian fascist States.

The power bloc that emerged after the Civil War was the traditional alliance of latifundistas, financial, resource and industrial capital, plus the Falange (the fascist Movement). The Falange had been founded by José Primo de Rivera, son of the late dictator, as an ultra-nationalist party opposed to "the Left, the Centre and the Right".¹²⁸ The Falange represented the interests of medium industrial and merchant capital whose growth had been hampered by Spain's restrictive economic conditions. The majority of Falange members were students who, for the most part, came from bourgeois backgrounds (60-70% of the falangistas were under 21 years of age). Within the new power bloc, elements of the old power bloc attempting to return to a pre-Second Republic State were opposed by the modernizing impetus of the Falange which rejected the antiquated economic structures of the old State.¹²⁹ The Falange had been necessary to win the Civil War and they had been able to maintain their position after victory. The Falange was the driving force behind autarky in an attempt to regain Spain's dominance in the world. The power of the Falange ended, however, with the economic crisis brought on by autarky.

The other three class fractions of the power bloc had not survived the war unscathed. Their power and positions vis-a-vis the other fractions had all shifted. The most fundamental transformation was the replacement of agrarian capital (latifundistas)

¹²⁷ . Harrison 1978: p. 153.

¹²⁸ . Payne 1961: p. 82.

¹²⁹ . Bernecker 1984: p. 382.

by financial capital as the hegemonic fraction.¹³⁰ The industrial and financial sectors had been more vital to the Civil War effort and were able to strengthen their positions against the latifundistas. But, autarky dealt a final blow to agrarian capital. To become self-sufficient Spain had to develop its own industry. Thus the ideology of the regime shifted in favour of industry.

As the influence of the latifundistas waned, it was not industrial capital that became the hegemonic fraction. Despite the importance of industrialization within the regime's ideology, big industrial capital actually saw its position weaken for distinct reasons. But first it should be remembered that the industrialists were largely based in Euzkadi. The Euskeran industrial complex had been severely damaged during the war and was in dire need of modernizing, but due to the lack of foreign exchange under autarky, Spanish industries had to do without the needed new equipment and technologies from abroad.¹³¹ The chronic shortages of inputs created by the currency restrictions made Spanish production slow and inefficient.¹³² A final blow to industrial capital's position came with the mushrooming of small firms under the import substitution policies of the State. To be self-sufficient, Spain needed thousands of small and medium sized firms to manufacture a huge array of goods that could no longer be imported. This strengthened the ranks of the "other bourgeoisie"¹³³ in respect to industrial capital. Although small firms were established all over Spain, Euzkadi's strong industrial complex meant that many new firms

¹³⁰ . Tuñón de Lara 1977b: p. 91.

¹³¹ . Bernecker 1984: p. 385.

¹³² . Harrison 1975: p. 153.

¹³³ . The "other bourgeoisie" is applied to the Spanish case to group together agro-industrial; small/medium industrial and merchant bourgeoisie during the period prior to 1939. see note 99 above.

were able to develop within the region, thus enlarging the ranks of Euzkadi's small bourgeoisie. In the end autarky was not beneficial to the industrial fraction of the power bloc.

The industrial class might have been able to weather autarky better than it did if it had not been for another factor -- the consolidation of financial capital. Soon after the start of the Civil War, the financial fraction had reached an agreement with Franco's forces that eventually lead to its hegemony. In exchange for monetary support, which Franco badly needed, Franco decreed a Bank Status Quo by which no new financial institutions could be established.¹³⁴ The five largest banks were given a virtual monopoly on capital. Among the big five were two Basque institutions: the Bank of Bilbao and the Bank of Vizcaya. Through their monopoly, financial capital was able to subsume industrial capital by the end of the second phase.¹³⁵

Autarky had been a drastic failure and by the 1950's Spain was in economic crisis: industrial productivity was low, agricultural production was dropping, imports were scarce and food was rationed. The situation was so critical that only foreign aid could pull Spain out of its decline and maintain the Franco regime.¹³⁶ Fortunately for Franco the mood of the United States was much different in 1950 than in 1945; anti-fascism had been replaced by the Cold War and no State was more anti-communist than Franco's Spain. The United States soon began to send Spain massive amounts of aid.

The second period of Franco's regime began in the early 1950's and lasted until 1958. The fundamental event of this period is the 1953 U.S.- Spain Bases Agreement establishing U.S. air and naval bases in Spain. In exchange for the bases, Spain was

¹³⁴ Harrison 1978: p. 164.

¹³⁵ Bernecker 1984: p. 384.

¹³⁶ Bernecker 1984: p. 387.

reaccepted into the Western community under U.S. sponsorship and began receiving U.S. economic and military aid.

The foreign capital that began flowing into Spain had major effects on both its economic and political structures. First, the latifundistas were no longer an influential sector within the State. The attempts to industrialize under autarky had eclipsed the importance of agricultural capital.

The indigenous industrial class fraction was now caught between domestic financial capital and foreign industrial capital. Domestic industrial capital was being subsumed by financial and at the same time foreign capital moved in to Spain.¹³⁷ Two fractions of the Spanish power bloc merged into financial-industrial capital, if not solely into financial capital.

The rapid changes that were taking place created a new fraction of the bourgeoisie within Spain and within Euzkadi - the domestic bourgeoisie (the term Poulantzas uses).¹³⁸ Emerging from the bourgeois class fractions termed the "other bourgeoisie" that had previously been subaltern classes, the domestic bourgeoisie, representing smaller industrial enterprises, was distinguished by a complex articulation to international capital. The domestic bourgeoisie was only able to articulate itself to the power bloc via international capital. The domestic bourgeoisie was allied to international capital through licensing agreements for patents and trademarks, distribution agreements, capital goods imports and the like. The Franco regime needed the active consent of international capital since it was dependent on large capital imports. International capital in turn needed the domestic bourgeoisie to mediate with the proletariat and to channel surplus labour value back into international capital. While forming a link in the

¹³⁷ Poulantzas 1976: p. 166; Harrison 1978: p. 166.

¹³⁸ Poulantzas 1976: p. 41.

internationalization of production, the domestic bourgeoisie also attempted to improve its own position by protecting the domestic market and increasing internal consumption.¹³⁹

Foreign capital now formed a fundamental support for the Franco regime since its help was the only way the regime could avoid economic ruin. Spanish financial capital provided the necessary link between foreign interests and the regime. By this time, Spanish financial capital constituted a comprador bourgeoisie since they worked for foreign capital.¹⁴⁰ Many members of the financial class fraction held positions on the boards of directors of transnational companies in Spain. They directly represented the interests of foreign capital.

During this period (1950-1958) the masses suffered a drop in living standards,¹⁴¹ despite U.S. aid and the rise in productivity. The working classes were still unorganized since independent unions were made illegal. Furthermore, as a subaltern class, the workers were unable to press their demands on the State. Although financial and foreign capital were only concerned with maintaining a cheap labour supply, the domestic bourgeois fraction shared common interests with the proletariat in the desire to increase internal consumption and expand domestic markets. This led to a major contradiction within the power bloc between the domestic bourgeoisie's conciliatory stance and the hostile position of the rest of the bloc towards the working class.¹⁴²

One trend affecting Euzkadi in the 1950's was the increased foreign presence in industries that had once been Basque dominated. Iron, steel production and chemicals

¹³⁹. Poulantzas 1976: pp. 42-43.

¹⁴⁰. Poulantzas 1976: p. 43.

¹⁴¹. Bernecker 1984: p. 385.

¹⁴². Poulantzas 1976: p. 43.

were principal Basque industries that now switched to foreign control. The increase of foreign control of Basque industries was facilitated by the difficulties in obtaining sufficient capital loans from domestic banks. When faced with a crisis situation many companies had to go directly to foreign banks since their needs far outstripped the resources of domestic banks.¹⁴³

This second period of Franco's regime came to an end in 1958 with Spain teetering on the verge of bankruptcy. The great influx of aid created balance of payments and inflationary crises.¹⁴⁴ The crisis was only averted by further shifts in the power bloc which began the third phase of the regime.

The new phase of the Franco government (1959-1970) was ushered in by the Stabilization Plan of 1959. Three developments emerged in relation to the Plan of 1959: 1) direct State intervention through the National Institute of Industrialization (INI); 2) Spain opened up more towards foreign investment; 3) the regime attempted to incorporate the domestic bourgeoisie into the State.

The INI, established to help create new industries, was also involved in older sectors, especially industries in the Basque region. The INI eventually held 90% of all shipbuilding, 45% of steel production as well as major holdings in chemicals.¹⁴⁵ The interests of foreign capital and the financial and industrial capitalist class fractions of the power bloc (and the State) began to converge and consolidate. It is interesting to note that shipbuilding was tied in here since in the 19th Century it had been controlled by industrial capital opposed to the power bloc.

In conjunction with the 1959 Plan, Spain institutionalized the links to the

¹⁴³. López Muñoz 1970: p. 72; Harrison 1978: p. 166.

¹⁴⁴. Harrison 1978: p. 154; Bernecker 1984: p. 388.

¹⁴⁵. Harrison 1978: p. 162.

international economy by joining the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank.¹⁴⁶ After 1959 foreign investment turned Spain into one of the fastest growing economies in the OECD. Although U.S. capital was still dominant, British and French capital also became involved in Spain.

The last development during this period (1959-1970), was the attempted articulation of the domestic bourgeoisie into the power bloc. The Plan of 1959 symbolized the success of the domestic bourgeoisie in breaking the agrarian/financial capital alliance within the power bloc by replacing the agrarian fraction with the domestic bourgeoisie. However the class alliance was unable to successfully incorporate the domestic bourgeoisie. Since the State was dominated by financial and foreign capital, the domestic bourgeoisie could only effectively negotiate with the allied financial/foreign fractions from an independent position (i.e. from within civil society). But, because political parties were illegal, the domestic bourgeoisie was denied organic expression.¹⁴⁷ It was the inability of the regime to resolve internal conflicts that eventually brought in the final phase.

The fourth and final period of the Franco regime (1970-1975) was the decomposition and fracturing of the power bloc.¹⁴⁸ The inability of the regime to negotiate the resolution of the intra-bloc conflict between the domestic bourgeoisie and financial/foreign capital vis-a-vis the ascending working class proved to be a critical failure. Industrialization created a surge in the numbers of the proletariat, and their position as a subaltern class unable to express its demands in a legal or open fashion through unions or political parties prompted the emergence of radical clandestine

¹⁴⁶ Bernecker 1984: p. 394; Harrison 1978: p. 155.

¹⁴⁷ Poulantzas 1976: pp. 48-51.

¹⁴⁸ Tuñón de Lara 1977b: p. 93.

organizations.¹⁴⁹ The regime's response (the policy favoured by financial and foreign capital) to worker discontent was repression. The domestic bourgeoisie, however, was caught in the contradiction of its own partial harmony of interests with the working class and its dependency on foreign capital. The spiralling conflict of the State's repression forced the bourgeoisie to slowly withdraw consent from both the State's policies and the State itself.¹⁵⁰

The Spanish economy also began to show the internal contradictions. International factors brought out major imbalances in the domestic economy. The most dramatic shock was the shift in the balance of payments and the inflation caused by the jump in oil prices after 1973.¹⁵¹

The combination of the economic crisis, the disaffection of the domestic bourgeoisie and the ossification of the regime led to the dissolution of the Franco State and the peaceful transition to a new State after Franco's death in 1975.

A final comment about the situation of the Spanish Catholic Church and its support for the Franco regime would illuminate certain facets of the analysis of Basque nationalism. The upper hierarchy of the Catholic Church in Spain was closely aligned with the power bloc under Franco and thus official Church dogma represented the interests of financial and industrial capital.¹⁵² As a "constructor, organizer, 'permanent persuader'",¹⁵³ the Spanish Church was crucial to the Spanish State during and after the

¹⁴⁹ Bernecker 1984: p. 399.

¹⁵⁰ Poulantzas 1976: p. 55.

¹⁵¹ Harrison 1978: p. 157.

¹⁵² Hermet 1980: p. 342.

¹⁵³ See Chapter Two above for a discussion of the intellectual in Gramsci.

Civil War. State propaganda consistently referred to the war as the Cruzada (Crusade) in which the enemies of God and Church were vanquished by Generalísimo Franco, Defender of the Faith. After the "Crusade", the State forcibly imposed Catholic unity and uniformity in Spain, to the relief of most of the Spanish hierarchy.¹⁵⁴ The Church was now restored to a privileged and powerful position within Spain, for the Spanish people, despite the long presence of the Catholic Church, were not necessarily willingly Catholic. During the Civil War, for example, nearly 7,000 clergy and religious had been massacred in Republican held areas.¹⁵⁵ The Church, under Franco, received protection, power and money, since the State directly funded the Church by paying clerical salaries from the Public Treasury and indirectly through State support for religious educational systems.

In return for State support and protection, the Spanish Church helped maintain the hegemony of the Franco regime through two very effective connections to Spanish society. The primary power of the Church at the time lay in its control over the Spanish education system where the vast majority of the students were enrolled in Catholic schools.¹⁵⁶ The second ideological arm of the Church was the organization, Catholic Action (the YMCA/YWCA affiliate in Spain) which set out to establish a Catholic presence in every facet of Spanish society. Catholic Action promoted the State ideology of "national-Catholicism" which was based on the equation of Spanish identity with Catholicism under the conceptualization of Spain's "inner reality" (La España Eterna - Eternal Spain) as Catholic, nationalist, centralist, anti-liberal and anti-socialist.¹⁵⁷ Thus,

¹⁵⁴. Lannon 1987: p. 45.

¹⁵⁵. Lannon 1987: p. 201.

¹⁵⁶. Hermet 1980: p. 41.

¹⁵⁷. Lannon 1987: p. 219-220.

the Franco regime monopolized the Catholic Church within its own ideology and so strongly linked Catholicism and Spanishness that it became increasingly difficult, within the Spanish context, to ideologically link Catholicism to any force opposing the State.¹⁵⁸

The theological autarky of the Spanish Church did not continue throughout the duration of the Franco regime. Internal and external factors conspired to fracture the imposed uniformity by the end of the 1960's. First, as the Spanish economy entered the crisis of 1958, the contradictions between the reality of Spanish life and the Church's rhetoric became increasingly obvious - Spain was not recovering its past glory, the economy under Franco was worsening, the poor were still poor, etc. The Catholic youth, women's and labour organizations became more vocal in their demands against the State as certain sectors of the Church began to break from the power bloc and ally themselves with the subaltern classes.¹⁵⁹

The final blow to the strict control of the Church ideology and activity, however, came from outside of Spain. In 1965 the Second Vatican Council produced a series of major changes in the Catholic Church regarding official stance towards dissenting opinions both inside the Church and from the other Christian denominations. The new openness of the Vatican forced the Spanish Church to open up to outside influences and the Church began to address issues of tolerance, human rights, social justice, democracy, etc. The changes in Church ideology began slowly among the parish priests and lower clergy and did not reach the upper levels of the hierarchy until the 1970's and the end of the Franco regime.¹⁶⁰ Consistent with the pervasive influence of the Church within Spain, the Basque nationalist response to the Catholic Church was a fundamental aspect

¹⁵⁸ Payne 1984: pp. 179-183.

¹⁵⁹ Hermet 1980: pp. 341-342.

¹⁶⁰ Lannon 1987: p. 47.

of nationalist ideology. Among all the regions in the Spanish State, Euzkadi had the highest levels of popular support for the Church (as measured by Mass attendance).¹⁶¹ The contradiction between the high level of Basque popular support for the Church and the Church's alignment with the State, especially in the time of Franco, forced the nationalist organizations to develop very complicated ideological positions between rejecting and accepting the Church.

F. CONCLUSION

In comparing these two time spans, 1875-1917 and 1939-1975, three general differences stand out with relation to the emergence of Basque nationalism. The first difference was in the number of power centres involved. During the emergence of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco the State was less centralized so there was a three way relationship. On the one side there was the relationship within the power bloc between latifundistas and the Basque resource and financial capital. Then there was an antagonism among the Euskeran subaltern classes (industrial capital, the nobility, the "other bourgeoisie", the peasants and the working class) towards Euskeran resource and financial capital. And, finally, there was the relation between the Basque subaltern classes and the power bloc in Madrid. Under Franco, however, intense centralization had removed the local Euskeran power focus by drawing Basque financial/industrial capital closer into the regime, nor was the nobility a fundamental class. In contrast the working class, which had been weak in 1900, had achieved direction and purpose by the 1930's. Also, a sector of the domestic bourgeoisie had entered the power bloc.

Another important difference was the comparative strength of the fundamental classes. During the failed bourgeois revolution, the bourgeoisie had been too weak to

¹⁶¹ Lannon 1987: p. 10.

obtain hegemony within the power bloc and take over the State. But by the time of the Franco regime, the proletariat had proved its strength in the Second Republic and the Civil War. Under Franco, working class numerical and organizational strength increased.

Finally, a third difference was the increased foreign links of the Franco regime. At the turn of the century, foreign influence in Spain had been much less overbearing. But by the 1960's, Spain was firmly locked within the capitalist system under U.S. influence.

The historical development of Euzkadi discussed in this chapter provides the landscape within which the various nationalist political organizations emerged. Chapters Three and Four will examine the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party) and Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (Euzkadi and Freedom) within a Gramscian framework.

CHAPTER FOUR

IV. A PARTY FOR THE BASQUES: THE FIRST NATIONALIST ORGANIZATION

The party, according to Gramsci, is the organizing element of any conflict since the intellectuals direct and shape their own class, as well as create a collective will, through the party. The party functions as a platform from which to build a political subject. This chapter, then, will discuss the history of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (the Basque Nationalist Party: PNV) from 1893-1906 and analyze its attempts to construct a nationalist political force. The social composition of the PNV at its inception will be examined first. Then there will be a discussion of the PNV's original ideology and its transformation when, around 1898, the PNV went through a transition and its social composition changed, as did its ideology. This chapter will also cover the PNV's political activities and successes or failures.

A. The Early Partido Nacionalista Vasco

The original structure of the PNV in the early 1890's was due to the impetus of Sabino Arana y Goiri, the founder and leading intellectual of the party.¹⁶² Arana himself was typical of his supporters. They were, to a great extent, descendants of the Euskeran nobility who had lost dominance during the process leading up to the end of the Fueros. These early members of the PNV were not connected to the bourgeoisie; instead they were engaged in minor activities that had carried over from the previous relations of production. Some, like Arana, lived on the rents from the family estate, others were

¹⁶² . Mendiguren 1978: p. 152.

engaged in small scale trade or worked in Bilbao offices.¹⁶³ The two other sectors which supported the PNV were the peasants and the lower clergy, who were intellectuals allied to the petty nobility.¹⁶⁴ The support of the lower clergy was a marked difference from the stance of the Church hierarchy which was closely aligned to the power bloc.¹⁶⁵ Taking into account the changing relations of production in Euzkadi and the effects of the bourgeois revolution in Spain, the three classes and intellectuals articulated together in the PNV did not represent the emerging relations of production¹⁶⁶ but rather the previous economic structure. The Euskeran nobility, in particular, was in a frustrating position since the nobility outside of Euzkadi was the directive class within Spain which meant that much of the "noble" ideology was directive in the State. But, the conditions of the Euskeran nobles had left them marginalized from actual power.

In 1894 the Euzkaldun Batzokija was founded by Arana and a group of supporters as a social and recreational society, but in actuality the Batzokija was to form the ideological nucleus of the PNV, founded in 1895.

The core of Basque nationalist identity at this time was race. Although language and history were fundamental traits of a nation, the primary determinant was race.

...The elements or characteristics of nationality are five, here they are: 1. race; 2. language; 3. government and laws; 4. character and customs; 5. juridic personality.¹⁶⁷

For Arana, race was a quality that was carried in the bloodlines, that was passed from

¹⁶³. Corcuera 1979: pp. 418-419.

¹⁶⁴. Corcuera 1979: p. 276.

¹⁶⁵. Agirrebalzategui 1978: pp. 198-199.

¹⁶⁶. Corcuera 1979: p. 419.

¹⁶⁷. Arana Goiri 1978: p. 52. Author's translation.

parent to child. Arana's conception of race bore striking similarities to the Spanish feudal concept of Pureza de Sangre (Cleanliness of Blood) which was used to determine nobility in Spain, except that Christian purity was replaced with Basque purity. The Basque "race" could therefore be diluted by intermarriage with non-Basques. PNV doctrine under Arana made it a point to establish the belief in the pureness of the Euskeran people in that they never mixed with the various invading "races" of the Iberian peninsula.

[The Basque race] is not Celtic, nor Phoenician, nor Greek, nor Latin, nor German, nor Arabian, nor is it similar in anything but in its humanity to any of the races that inhabit the European, African, Asian and American continents or the islands of Oceania. It is isolated in the Universe...¹⁶⁸

The membership restrictions of the Batzokija reflect the centrality of "race" in Arana's thinking: to be an original member (voice and vote), all four grandparents had to have had Basque last names; to be a full member (just voice) all four grandparents had to have been born in Euzkadi; to be just a member (no voice and no vote) both grandfathers, at least, had to have had Basque last names.¹⁶⁹ These restrictions applied not only to the prospective member, who was male, but also to his wife, and the rank was set according to the lowest level of qualifications held between the member and his wife.

There were principally three effects of using race as the determining factor of ethnicity over other possibilities (i.e. language, self-identification, history...). First, emphasizing race enabled PNV ideology to include the Basque urban middle classes who did not speak Euskera. Since the early 1800's many Euskeran families had not allowed their children to speak what was considered to be a peasant language. Arana himself only

¹⁶⁸ Arana Goiri 1978: p. 52 Author's translation.

¹⁶⁹ Corcuera 1979: p. 224.

began to learn Euskera when he was in his twenties.¹⁷⁰

The second result of basing the entire ideological structure on race was the exclusion of the majority of the working class who were Castilian immigrants. The proletariat could conceivably learn Euskera or adopt Basque customs but they could never change their "race". Thus, they were excluded ad infinitum.

The third effect, and one the PNV probably did not expect, was to limit the extent of support that the PNV received. The limited appeal of the PNV in the early years cannot be attributed to only the racial element of the PNV's doctrine, but it must have contributed in part. Since only the purest of Euskeran couples could be original members there was little room for people who had a Spanish last name somewhere in their recent forebears, or who might have married someone of impure ancestry. Racial purity was an impossibility especially in the urban areas that had begun a process of Castilianization in the early 1800's.¹⁷¹

From the motto Jaungoikua eta Lagizarra (God and Ancient Law) the PNV developed a very extensive ideology that was traditional, clerical, anti-liberal, anti-industrial and anti-Spanish. It is important to closely examine how these distinct ideological elements were articulated together and to understand how this ideological configuration affected the shape of Basque nationalism of both the present PNV and in the future.

One of the fundamental pillars of the proposed Euskeran State was Jaungoikua, or God.

Art. 3. Jaungoikua (God)- Vizcaya will be apostolic Roman Catholic in all manifestations of its internal life and in its relations with other peoples.¹⁷²

¹⁷⁰. Corcuera 1979: p. 191.

¹⁷¹. Corcuera 1979: p. 391.

¹⁷². Reglamento of "Euskaldun Batzokija May 24, 1894". Published in Artola 1975: p. 238. Author's translation.

To the early nationalists, the Basques were Catholic by nature.¹⁷³ This was evident in the popular mythology that the Basques were the chosen people and the Euskera was the language spoken in Paradise.¹⁷⁴ The PNV linked race and religion in their perception of both the Basques and the Spanish. The liberal Spanish State's anti-clericalism¹⁷⁵ was proof of the immorality of the Spanish "race", the race that was invading Euzkadi and threatening its moral fibre.¹⁷⁶ For Arana, it was imperative that Euzkadi gain its independence to better serve God.

...Here in Vizcaya in order to love God it is necessary to be a patriot, and in order to be a patriot it is necessary to love God...¹⁷⁷

The PNV rearticulated the ideology of divine ordination (a major ideological element of the Feudal system) to justify the independence of Euzkadi as a nation-state.

Arana y Goiri further complicated the religious guiding principle of the PNV by calling for the division of Church and State in the new Euzkadi. However, despite legal separation there would still exist a harmony between the two structures.

Art. 5 ETA (and)- Vizcaya will be established on a perfect harmony and conformity between religious and political order, between the Divine and the Human.

Art. 6 Distinction between Jaungoikua (God) and Lagizarra (Ancient Law)- Vizcaya will be established on a clear and marked distinction between religious and political order, between the ecclesiastical and the civilian.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷³. Arana Goiri 1978: p. 72.

¹⁷⁴. Corcuera 1979: p. 317.

¹⁷⁵. Connelly Ullman 1983: pp. 155-160.

¹⁷⁶. Arana Goiri 1978: pp. 69-80.

¹⁷⁷. Arana Goiri 1978: p. 161. Author's translation.

¹⁷⁸. Regulations of "Euskaldun Batzokija". Artola 1975: p. 238. Author's translation.

Thus, the distinction between Church and State in the PNV ideology was merely theoretical. The reason for making the distinction in Art. 6 lay in the particular Spanish State that the PNV was opposing. First, although the lower clergy was sympathetic to Arana, the Church hierarchy was aligned with the State. The separation of Church and State would exclude members of the Church hierarchy from interfering in politics. The "harmony" between Church and State would insure the maintenance of the feudal social and economic structures, which were perceived as divinely inspired. The second reason was even closer to home, the local political bosses (caciques) used the Church and its influence over the people, with the support of the hierarchy, to fix elections.¹⁷⁹

Obvious contradictions in the PNV attempts to incorporate a religious content emerged between the feudal perception of religion as the organizer of all life and the Church as it was in the 1900's after the bourgeois revolution had marginalized the Church's position. The idyllic view of rural Euzkadi the PNV wished to reestablish had been based on the religious world-view of feudalism, thus the reason for the "harmony and conformity between the religious and political order." Yet the Church of 1890, as exemplified by the upper hierarchy, was already under the hegemony of the bourgeois State,¹⁸⁰ and thus opposed the nationalist goals to transform the State.

The specific articulation of religion into early PNV ideology had three results. First, the independence of Euzkadi was not justifiable by the right of self-determination but only as the means to the goal of being faithful to God. "Vizcaya dependent on Spain, cannot direct itself to God, it cannot be Catholic in practice."¹⁸¹ There was an

¹⁷⁹ Corcuera 1979: p. 402.

¹⁸⁰ See Connelly Ullman (1983) and Garcia de Cortázar (1978) for a discussion of the Church in Spain.

¹⁸¹ Arana Goiri 1978: p. 75.

important implication here since independence was no longer the final goal, religious salvation was. This was the beginning of a process that slowly pushed separatism from the foreground of PNV ideology as the party slowly developed a regionalist position. It must be remembered, however, that Arana himself believed that the eradication of the immoral Spanish presence was a necessary condition for Basque salvation.

The identification of the only true Basque as Catholic had the second effect of allowing the nationalists to integrate other Catholic traditionalist movements that were not nationalist into their party.¹⁸² The adherents of these movements could be comforted by the strong faith of the PNV and the fact that the PNV was only separatist for very devout and religious reasons (to avoid the immorality of the Spanish State and the salvation of Euzkadi). With the passage of time, the smaller traditional movements that had emerged to oppose the bourgeois transformation entered crises and many adherents passed into the PNV.

Finally, the third result was to cut off the option of a non-confessional nationalist movement.¹⁸³ If the only true Basque was a Catholic, then a non-Catholic Basque becomes a traitor, an anti-Basque.¹⁸⁴ This development had interesting implications for any future participation of the bourgeoisie in the nationalist movement. The "other bourgeoisie" in Euzkadi was outside the Spanish power bloc and needed a party from which to press its demands upon the State. But, since the "other bourgeoisie" was also anti-clerical it could not adopt nationalism until resolving the contradiction between bourgeois anti-clericalism and the feudal clericalism of the early PNV.

¹⁸². Corcuera 1979: p. 278.

¹⁸³. Corcuera 1979: p. 275.

¹⁸⁴. Heiberg 1980: p. 54. Heiberg uses the term anti-Basque to refer to a Basque who deviates from the strict social and political ideology of being Basque and is therefore in opposition to the Basques. This is different than non-Basque.

Nostalgia for the traditional, rural Euzkadi was inherent in the other half of the PNV's slogan Lagizarra (Ancient Law). The nationalists portrayed pre-industrial Euzkadi as a just and prosperous time, they blamed the industrialists indirectly for destroying and degenerating Euzkadi since it was industrialization which brought the flood of Spanish immigrants to contaminate Euzkadi.¹⁸⁵ In nationalist rhetoric, Euzkadi's traditional ways were based on equality and democracy; all Basques were equal and there had been no class distinctions.¹⁸⁶ Hidalguia kolektiva (collective nobility) had made all Basques equal before the law as nobles. In its condemnation of industrialization, the PNV was using rhetoric very similar to the socialist conception of a classless society.

The effects of the nationalist rural arcadia were twofold. On the one side, it articulated a concern for social problems into nationalism in that it at least conceptualized the issue of oppression (the PNV social conscience was not, however, socialist - the proposed solution to capitalist abuses was the removal of the proletariat because they were Spanish). Indeed, many PNV nationalists, especially in the youth wing, passed into the Socialist party after becoming both sensitized to the worker's problems in the PNV and frustrated with the PNV's lack of response.¹⁸⁷ Eventually ETA would emerge from within the PNV in the same manner. The other result of a rural perspective was to discourage the small and medium industrial bourgeoisie from joining the nationalist movement unless there were a change in the anti-industrial sentiment of the party.

During the first few years of its existence, the PNV emerged as the primary voice of traditional interests, but had very little popular support among other sectors of Euskeran

¹⁸⁵. Arana Goiri 1978: pp. 105-169; 175-178.

¹⁸⁶. Corcuera 1979: p. 358.

¹⁸⁷. Corcuera 1979: p. 259.

society. At this stage the PNV was the expression of a class that was quickly fading away under the new capitalist system. As a class there was little the petty nobility could offer classes forming within the capitalist production relations. Ideologically, the doctrine of racial purity and the anti-industrial stance limited the movement's appeal to the urban sectors of Euzkadi. It was not until a transformation took place within the PNV that the movement would gain greater support. The irony of events was that this transformation of Basque nationalism occurred in 1898, almost as a result of the great wave of Spanish nationalism that swept Spain during the Spanish-American War,¹⁸⁸ and that the transformation was engineered by Ramon de la Sota, a man Arana had publicly called a Basque capitalist traitor.¹⁸⁹

B. Transformation of the PNV

To understand what happened to the PNV it is necessary to first discuss the Sociedad Euzkalerria (Society of Euzkadi). The Euzkalerria had been created after the loss of the Fueros in 1876 by the "other bourgeoisie" and industrial capital which had slipped into subaltern positions within the Spanish State.¹⁹⁰ These two sectors, although strong within Euzkadi, were relatively weak within the context of Spain. They opposed a power bloc which included resource and financial capital which were of equal strength to industrial capital within the geographic extension of Euzkadi but much stronger within

¹⁸⁸ Spain itself, though, went through a period of intense self-criticism following its defeat in the war. This sentiment is embodied in the literary and philosophical works of the "Generation of '98".

¹⁸⁹ Arana attacked de la Sota in the article "El Caciquismo", Arana Goiri 1978: p. 175-178.

¹⁹⁰ Corcuera 1978: p. 119.

Spain.

The attempts of the Euskalerria to improve their position vis-a-vis the State failed, and the Euskalerria, divided into three factions, two of which were important: the hispanophiles and the nationalists. The third faction, the fueristas were a traditionalist sector of little political consequence. The hispanophiles supported Spain in the War since their interests were increasingly being subsumed by the power bloc which led to their eventual integration into the bloc during the crisis year of 1898. The other faction, the nationalists, represented industrial capital opposed to the power bloc. Under the shipping magnate Ramon de la Sota, they were against Spain in the War and moved closer to the PNV position. With the internal fracturing of the Euskalerria, this "nationalist" sector joined the PNV in its search for a political party through which to formulate its demands.

The various bourgeois class fractions grouped together as the "other bourgeoisie" (small, medium industrialists, merchants, agro-industrial) were coming under increasing pressure from the monopolistic tendencies of resource capital. Just two years before in 1896 the Vizcayan League of Steel Producers had been formed to represent the interests of monopolistic resource capital. The immediate results of the cartel were new laws forbidding the importation of iron manufactures and an increase in steel prices. Thus surplus value accumulated by smaller industries that consumed iron or steel was transferred back to resource capital.¹⁹¹

After the disappearance of the Euskalerria, Euskeran industrial capital was in need of a distinct and autonomous political ideology to resist the pressure resource capital exerted through the State.¹⁹² Despite the various drawbacks of PNV nationalist ideology,

¹⁹¹. Harrison 1977: p. 373.

¹⁹². Corcuera 1979: p. 208.

by 1898 the PNV began to appear as the best possible choice as a vehicle for the opponents of resource/financial capital. The union of the Euskalerria and the Partido Nacionalista Vasco was cemented with the creation of the Centro Vasco in 1899.¹⁹³

Nationalist ideology went through a drastic reformulation when the ex-Euskalerrians entered the PNV. Arana and his early followers had been attempting to return to relations of production that had been upheld by the ideological structure of feudal religious doctrine. The PNV under Arana was going through a process of "crystallization", as discussed in Gramsci, whereby traditional intellectuals displaced by the disappearance of the previous feudal relations of production perceive themselves as autonomous classes. Since crystallized intellectuals represent no productive forces, they are an anachronism. The capitalist class fraction represented by de la Sota, the leader of the ex-Euskalerrians was motivated by very immediate needs linked to the current relations of production and to a very different ideological conception: the need to create a mass based party with an autonomous ideology through which they hoped to negotiate with the State. They sought to create this party by transforming the PNV into an organic expression of the "other bourgeoisie"/ industrial capital. The transition from traditional to organic is evidenced in the new ideology that began to emerge after 1898 and its reflection of the current production relations.

The first change was a dilution of the Catholic rhetoric.¹⁹⁴ The party still maintained its connections to the Catholic Church and Euzkadi was still Catholic, but the feudalistic conception of perfect harmony and conformity between religion and politics disappeared. The "Manifesto of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco" of 1906 only mentioned the Church twice; once to say that Euzkadi would be Catholic; and once to say that the

¹⁹³ Corcuera 1979: p. 453.

¹⁹⁴ Corcuera 1979: p. 465.

party would follow a Catholic code of morality.¹⁹⁵

The new PNV still faced the dilemma of defining a common base for Basque ethnicity since the premise of racial purity of earlier nationalist ideology was impossible to maintain with a mass based party. De la Sota himself was probably at least half Spanish since his last name was de la Sota y Llano, which denotes that his grandfathers both had Spanish last names. Since language would exclude much of the urban industrial and merchant bourgeoisie but would include mostly rural agro-industrial bourgeoisie and peasants, language was not a viable option. The ascending "other bourgeoisie" within the PNV chose to reformulate ethnicity as a historical construct based on a shared past, traditions and customs.¹⁹⁶ In 1900 this was very effective at opening the party to hispanophone Basques and Basques of mixed blood but excluding the recent Spanish immigrants who could not identify with a common Basque past.

In accordance with the influx of industrial capital and the "other bourgeoisie" into the PNV, the nationalist position on industrialization was transformed. Although the concept of rural arcadia was kept for rhetorical purposes, the PNV accepted that industry would be the base of Euzkadi's future.¹⁹⁷ The industrial strength of Euzkadi even became a symbol of national superiority. It is quite revealing to note that as the PNV aligned itself with industrial capital, Arana began to invest in the stock market and other activities with de la Sota.

Another ideological rearticulation due to the integration of bourgeois sectors was the PNV glorification of Euzkadi's egalitarian past. In order to give a response to the proletarian question that was more consistent with bourgeois interests, the myth of an

¹⁹⁵. Artola 1975: pp. 239-240.

¹⁹⁶. Corcuera 1979: p. 391.

¹⁹⁷. Corcuera 1979: p. 367.

egalitarian society was transformed to that of an interclass balance wherein the directive class protected and sheltered the weaker classes.¹⁹⁸ The bourgeois sectors of the PNV hoped to obtain the consent of the working classes with the promise of a paternalistic state that would lessen the abuses of capitalism.

It was within nationalist policy that the real enemy of the PNV was perceived. The party platform for the 1903 parliamentary elections exhibited several policies hostile towards Basque resource capital. First was a rather vague promise to make laws restricting the abuses of the capitalist system. The lack of details as to which abuses or what laws belied this as a campaign promise to attract the workers' votes, but it did indicate the sectors towards which the PNV was opposed.

A second plank was much more specific: The PNV sought to replace the Concierto Económico with yearly payments to be negotiated at intervals of under 25 years.¹⁹⁹ The Concierto Económico of 1877 (See Chapter Two: p. 52) had given Euzkadi fiscal autonomy and the right to structure its own tax system. Resource capital's participation in the State, however, allowed this fraction to portion most of the tax burden on to other sectors of Basque society.²⁰⁰ Because the Concierto aided Basque resource and financial capital at the expense of the "other bourgeoisie" and industrial capital, the PNV found itself in the difficult position of criticizing an agreement that was actually a step towards Basque autonomy.

The most fundamental transition of the nationalist movement, however, was the shift from separatism to autonomism. The adoption of a regionalist policy was never stated clearly, but can be deduced from certain ideological omissions and activities of the PNV.

¹⁹⁸ Corcuera 1979: pp. 374-378.

¹⁹⁹ Corcuera 1979: p. 501.

²⁰⁰ Harrison 1977: p. 371.

The earlier rhetoric of a "Free Euzkadi" was replaced with vague phrases such as "... so that the political, economic, juridic, etc. institutions, characteristics of the Basque People, shall return to be valid and in force, molded, as far as necessary, to the reality of the present times..."²⁰¹ The characteristic Basque institutions as well as the "reality of present times" were such vague meaningless terms. The 1906 Manifiesto made no mention of the relations between Spain and Euzkadi except to call for the derogation of the law which abolished the Fueros.²⁰² As a separatist movement, the PNV should not have been interested in changing the laws of the Spanish State but in completely breaking away from Spain. Therefore, the PNV's actions after 1898 clearly showed an interest in participating in the Spanish system and a shift towards a regionalist position.²⁰³

The electoral activity of the PNV definitely increased about the time the ex-Euskalerrians entered the party. Starting with the 1899 municipal elections in Euzkadi, the PNV began presenting candidates with a considerable degree of success. In 1899, five of eight PNV candidates won in Bilbao.²⁰⁴ This change in tactic had two causes. First, there was now the will to get involved in the political system since industrial capital and "other bourgeoisie" were attempting to fight against resource/financial capital's monopoly of power from within the system. Second, with the coffers of the PNV filled with the ex-Euskalerrians money, the means to finance a political campaign now

²⁰¹. "Manifiesto of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco", 1906, reprinted in Artola, 1975: p. 239. Author's translation.

²⁰². Artola 1974: p. 452.

²⁰³. Fusi 1984: p. 34.

²⁰⁴. Corcuera 1979: p. 460.

existed.²⁰⁵

In the 1903 Parliamentary elections, the PNV emerged as the principal option in Euzkadi to the political parties of resource/financial capital. The PNV had been able to forge a collective will composed of the conservative Catholic elements and the liberal anti-cacique sectors, but it was evident that the directive class fraction within the collective will was the industrial bourgeoisie and not the earlier traditionalist supporters of Arana. For example, all three PNV candidates were new party members from the bourgeoisie.²⁰⁶

Sabino Arana y Goiri's death in 1903 opened the way for industrial capital and "other bourgeoisie" to consolidate their control of the party, a fact that was accomplished by 1906. The year 1906 also coincides with a second growth spurt of the PNV as it opened new offices all over Euzkadi.²⁰⁷

As the PNV grew to represent the "other bourgeoisie", it had to develop a response to the situation of the workers. Part of the PNV's view on the class struggle was evidenced in the party's reaction to the four major strikes in 1899, 1906, 1910 and 1911. The reaction was almost invariably the same. The party would always recognize that excesses of the capitalist system might result in the exploitation of workers, but on analysis of the specific strike in question, the strike would be declared unjustified. The strike was usually, then, blamed on deceitful maneuvering of the Spanish socialist party.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁵, Corcuera 1979: p. 457

²⁰⁶, Corcuera 1979: pp. 496-498.

²⁰⁷, Artola 1974: pp. 449-450.

²⁰⁸, Corcuera 1979: pp. 379-383.

The intensity of the general strike of 1911 pointed out the need for the PNV to develop a better link to the proletariat. The PNV finally created a Basque trade union, the Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos (Solidarity of Basque Workers: STV).²⁰⁹ The STV grew slowly during the early years but by the beginning of the Second Republic it constituted the second strongest sector of the Basque labour movement. As a Catholic workers' organization, the STV advocated a paternalistic view of labour relations and seldom took part in organized protests and strikes. Also, the STV was closely linked to the PNV which provided the union with various types of support. STV leaders often appeared on the lists of PNV candidates, thus demonstrating the common identity of both organizations. The new union developed as a vehicle for the bourgeoisie of the PNV to direct the ethnic Basque proletariat.

C. CONCLUSION

From its inception in 1894 to its consolidation in 1906, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco experienced a radical transition, not unlike the bourgeois transformation of the State in that the result was an alliance between classes which were tied to different relations of production. The original party was very much a crystallization of intellectuals allied to classes linked to the previous relations of production. The anachronistic character of the early PNV would explain the failure to create a large following among the classes behind the new capitalist relations of production. In 1898 the situation changed when the war crisis threw the rest of Spain into disarray, but strengthened Euzkadi's position. The crisis in the State divided the Sociedad Euzkalerria by allowing the hispanophile sector to integrate into the State. The failure of the Euzkalerria left the "other bourgeoisie" and industrial capital isolated. The solution of

²⁰⁹ Artola 1974: p. 450; Corcuera 1979: p. 381.

this predicament was for these two class fractions (other bourgeoisie and industrial capital) to integrate into the PNV. Just as in the transformation of the Spanish State, the Euskeran "other bourgeoisie" and industrial capital had to ally itself with the feudal nobility. But in contrast to the aristocratic/latifundista alliance with the capitalist class fractions in the Spanish power bloc (which was based on the aristocrats' economic power as landholders), the strength of the Euskeran nobility lay in its dominance of ideological elements of ethnicity and nationalism.

The difficult relation between the original PNV, with its feudal character, and the capitalist society of Euzkadi in the 1900's was evidenced by the lack of popular response to the early PNV. Clearly the intellectuals of the petty nobility no longer had a strong enough position in the current relations of production to be able to offer any incentives for other social sectors to ally themselves with the Euskeran nobility. Furthermore, the PNV's early hostile attitude towards the proletariat and the industrial bourgeoisie demonstrated the early PNV's unwillingness to encourage an alliance with the bourgeoisie and especially not an alliance under the direction of the bourgeoisie.

However, the early PNV's abstraction from the reality of contemporary Euzkadi under the direction of the intellectuals of the Euskeran nobility was what finally created the conditions that allowed the "other bourgeoisie" and industrial capital to reshape the PNV under their direction. As the economic position of the nobility weakened, they were not able to remain independent from the forces of the capitalist relations of production and the noble class needed to articulate itself into the capitalist system. The only attraction of the Euskeran noble class was its dominance of nationalism as a political force free from influence of the Spanish power bloc. It was the situation created by the Euskeran nobility's comparative "ideological strength" and the economic strength of the "other bourgeoisie"/industrial capital that transformed the PNV into a complex juxtaposition of varied ideological elements of the feudal and capitalist system.

The electoral strength of the PNV continued to increase after 1906 until it peaked in 1918. In 1917 the PNV won control of the Vizcayan provincial legislature. This provincial victory was followed in 1918 by a national victory when the PNV managed to place seven candidates in the Spanish Parliament.²¹⁰ However, after 1919 PNV power in electoral politics was greatly diminished when the PNV lost control of the provincial legislature and, in parliamentary elections that year only three PNV candidates were returned to Madrid. In 1920, the number of nationalist deputies dwindled to one. The collapse of the PNV electoral strength coincided with the "Bolshevik Triennium" (1918-1920) (see Chapter One) and the articulation of industrial capital into the power bloc.

After 1918, the PNV was virtually eliminated as an electoral force although it remained the preeminent Basque nationalist organization. With the banning of political parties in 1923 under Primo de Rivera, the PNV transformed itself into a primarily cultural association only to reemerge as a political party in 1931 when fifteen Basque nationalists went to the constitutional convention. During the Second Republic (1933-1936) the nationalists continued to have representation in parliament (twelve deputies in 1933 and ten deputies in 1936).²¹¹ Finally, the Autonomous Basque Government that controlled Euzkadi during the Civil War was a coalition between the PNV and the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE). This government passed into exile in Paris for forty years under control of the PNV. The PNV remained the main force of Basque nationalism until the emergence of ETA in the 1960's presented a challenge to the PNV's hegemony of Basque nationalism.

The early years of the PNV and its consolidation in 1906 set the frame within which Basque nationalist ideology remained fixed until the crisis of the state during the Franco

²¹⁰ Harrison 1977: p. 371.

²¹¹ Varela 1978: pp. 69, 72, 74.

years. The PNV legacy was a conservative, Catholic movement that focused on electoral and parliamentary activity rather than violent actions. Basque nationalism was left with a very xenophobic tone regarding the Spanish immigrants in Euzkadi and yet, with a regionalist position vis-a-vis the Spanish State. When ETA emerged nearly fifty years later and began to rearticulate the ideological components of Basque nationalism, it had to reformulate the components of Catholicism, non-violent electoral activity, xenophobia and regionalism in order to create a radical separatist movement with a distinct working class perspective. Thus, the structure of ETA is, in part, due to ETA's need to respond to specific elements of Basque nationalism that were formed by the PNV in the early 1900's.

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central driving force that shaped ETA's development through a series of internal disputes during the period in question (1959-1975). During its early history, ETA's membership could be divided into three groups corresponding to two different elements of the emerging ideology: ethnicity and tactics.²¹² The more important of the two components was the continuing debate over ethnicity versus class as the core of ETA ideology. The second divisive issue was the tactical question of the choice between direct action (violence) or mass political action (non-violent activities, demonstrations, strikes). Linked to these two debates were a whole series of subsidiary issues - autonomy or independence; cooperation with other Basque parties; cooperation with Spanish parties; and the position of non-Basque immigrants in Euzkadi.

The first faction, the ethno-linguists or culturalists, defined ethnicity and language as the core of the movement. To protect Basque culture, the culturalists favoured non-violent activities to achieve legal protection and to promote the use of Euskera within Euzkadi. In keeping with the primary importance of Euskera language and ethnicity, the culturalists rejected any alliance with Spanish organizations, although they accepted non-Basque immigrants willing to learn Euskera.

Españolistas, or hispanophiles, formed the second faction within ETA. In the choice between class or ethnicity, the españolistas adopted Marxism, and saw class exploitation as the fundamental problem in Euzkadi. In the struggle to liberate the working class, the españolistas rejected alliance with PNV, which they saw as bourgeois, in favour of alliance with Spanish working class organizations. The advocacy of ties to Spanish parties won this faction the name, and insult, of españolistas. Violence was accepted by the españolistas as one tool of revolution among many possible tools.

The third faction developed the most radical solution to the contradiction between class and ethnicity by considering ETA to be both a Basque liberation movement and a

²¹². Clark 1984b: pp. 32-34; Medhurst 1982: p. 247.

~~class movement.~~ This faction opposed all non-Basques, be they proletarian or bourgeois, as well as the Basque capitalist classes. This faction used the name tercermundista, Third Worldist, since they considered Euzkadi to be a colony, like Algérie or Indochina. The Third Worldists advocated the use of violence in a war of national liberation. Consistent with their radical position, the Third Worldists opposed alliances with any Spanish political group or any group that represented Basque capitalists.

From the very beginning ETA contained representatives of each viewpoint and the struggle among them often forced the losing faction to split off from ETA. The development of ETA will be covered in detail below, but before going on it is necessary to mention that although a certain faction would leave ETA, this did not insure that the ideological perspective would not reappear among incoming members. This occurred quite frequently with the españolistas and the Third Worldists so that ETA was never free of the debate between class and ethnicity.

The composition of ETA's membership remained fairly constant between 1959 and 1973, despite its ideological progression towards Marxism. ETA had been founded by disaffected members of the PNV representing the petty bourgeoisie who now sought their own independent ideology. Throughout its development, however, ETA was unable to acquire a substantial proletariat membership.²¹³ Except for a small base among euskeraphone workers, ETA remained connected to the petty bourgeoisie.²¹⁴ This petty bourgeois element was often criticized as being too bourgeois by the españolistas and was a prime factor in their eventual abandonment of ETA. The Marxist ideology of ETA's later years, in addition to its strongly petty bourgeois membership, makes this organization difficult to comprehend.

²¹³ "L'ETA" in Halimi 1971: p. 149; Medhurst 1982: p. 251.

²¹⁴ López Adán 1977: p. 13; Clark 1984b: p. 60.

A. EGIN 1952-1959

The roots of ETA go back to 1952 and the PNV. With the fall of Euzkadi during the Civil War, the PNV Basque government went into exile for the next forty years. During the Franco regime, the Spanish economy and society experienced a number of major changes such as the liberalization of the economy and the influx of foreign investment. These changes had a noticeable impact on Spanish and Euskeran society. At the same time, though, the rigidity of the Franco regime did not easily permit civil society to transform itself in accordance with changing social and political structures. The illegality of political parties, free unions and any but the most innocuous organizations did not allow newly forming sectors of society (for example the growing ranks of the proletariat and the expanding petty bourgeoisie) any expression of their demands and interests. The PNV Government-in-exile in Paris was cut off from these new developments in Basque society, and over time the gap between Basque reality and the ideology of the PNV Government-in-exile became too large for the PNV to effectively reflect modern Euskeran society.²¹⁵ Out of a sense of frustration with the PNV, Ekin (to do), the forerunner of ETA emerged.

Ekin began in 1952 as a political discussion group founded by young PNV adherents at Deusto University in Bilbao. At this time Ekin's ideology was still very traditional, based on Arana y Goiri. However, Ekin differed with the PNV on three points. First, Ekin was very adamant that Euskera become the sole official language of Euzkadi whereas the PNV considered this idealistic given the extent to which Euskera had already

²¹⁵ Medhurst 1982: p. 245; Ortzi 1975: pp. 295-296.

died out.²¹⁶ Second, Ekin was not sympathetic to the Catholic Church²¹⁷ and defined itself as non-confessional. As discussed in Chapter Two, the Spanish Church had become a major structure of the State's influence in civil society. Consistent with the ideology of "national-Catholicism", the Church actively promoted a sense of Spanish nationalism and, thus, official doctrine attempted to eradicate Basque culture and nationalist sentiment from the Euskeran Church. In fact, in the Post Civil War era, the Church and State worked together to keep Basques out of the Church hierarchy in Euzkadi.²¹⁸

Finally, Ekin was unwilling to link Basque independence with the restoration of the Second Republic in Spain. Ekin argued that the Basques had never received help from the Spanish and that Euzkadi should pursue its own independence regardless of the Spanish.²¹⁹ In essence Ekin was refusing to participate in the Spanish State and civil society.

In a short aside here it is necessary to establish that ETA (Ekin) and the PNV differed in their conceptualization of Spain, especially regarding the Franco regime. While the PNV was willing to separate Spain and the Spain of Franco, ETA failed to distinguish between the Spanish State under Franco and the Spanish State before and after Franco. Therefore, according to ETA the Spanish State would never change and would always be the oppressor.

²¹⁶. Medhurst 1982: p. 25.

²¹⁷. Ortiz 1975: p. 279.

²¹⁸. Medhurst 1982: p. 244.

²¹⁹. Medhurst 1982: p. 26.

FIGURE 2

Historical Development of ETA, 1952-1973.

MCR = Movimiento Comunista Español (Spanish Communist Movement)

SAIOK = Celulas Rojas (Red Cells)

PCE = Partido Comunista Español (Spanish Communist Party)

LCR = Liga Comunista Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Communist League)

Under pressure from the PNV, Ekin fused with the more activist youth wing of the PNV, Euzko Gastea (Basque Youth: EGI) in 1956 despite their differences listed above. The union between Ekin and the PNV was tense due mostly to the PNV's refusal to respond to the demands of the newly radicalized EGI. Finally, amid charges of lethargy and ineffectiveness, the ex-Ekin members split off from EGI and founded ETA in 1959 (see FIGURE 2).

B. PRE-FIRST ASSEMBLY 1959-1962

The initial group in 1959 was small, unorganized and ideologically ill-defined until ETA held its First Assembly in 1962. Between 1959 and 1962, which corresponds to the second phase of the Franco regime, there were changes in the State's economic policy affecting Euzkadi. After the near bankruptcy of 1958, the Stabilization Plan of 1959 liberalized the economy and brought increased competition for Euskeran industry through the influx of foreign capital and direct State competition from the National Institute of Industrialization (INI). The vast array of small industries that had been fostered under import substitution policies now entered a period of crisis during which many of them disappeared.²²⁰ The marginal industries that survived the crisis were those involved in heavily monopolized sectors - like steel and metallurgy - because these smaller firms were useful to monopolistic capital. The unprofitability of these firms created a negative pull on salaries, while their high production costs pushed prices up.²²¹ These changes in the economy began to radicalize both the Euskeran bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie

²²⁰ . Ortiz 1975: p. 285.

²²¹ . López Muñoz 1970: pp. 62-63.

since both sectors were pressured by the advance of foreign and State capital. It was during these years that ETA developed.

In the early days ETA was already beginning to differ from the PNV. The first statement of purpose, which did not appear until right before the 1962 Assembly, described ETA as a patriotic, democratic and non-confessional organization seeking Euzkadi's independence as rapidly as possible using all means available, including violence.²²² The two points of difference between ETA and the PNV were the former's non-confessional stance and the acceptance of violence. These early changes of ETA nationalist ideology were due to the influences of three successful nationalist movements in the Third World: the 1959 victory of Castro in Cuba; and the 1962 successes of the FLN in Algeria and the communists in Vietnam.²²³ The works of Che Guevarra and Frantz Fanon were used by ETA intellectuals to organize a similar independence struggle in Euzkadi.

Despite the rhetoric, however, ETA's activities during this time were relatively meek, being limited to painting "Gora Euzkadi" (Long Live Euzkadi) on the walls and displaying the ikurriña (the Basque flag). Then, in July 1961 ETA carried out its first act of violence by trying to derail a train carrying Civil War veterans to a celebration of the 25th anniversary of the War. Although the bomb never exploded, the police repression that followed decimated ETA. An estimated 100 persons were arrested and another 100 went into exile, leaving another 100 activists in Euzkadi.²²⁴ This was the first of many mass arrests and expulsions to affect ETA during its history. ETA's current leaders passed into France where they began to improve the organizational structure of ETA. On

²²² . Ortzi 1975: p. 298; Clark 1984b: p. 37.

²²³ . Ortzi 1975: pp. 299-301.

²²⁴ . Halimi 1971: p. 152.

the Spanish side, direct control of ETA passed into the hands of a whole new generation of younger less experienced leaders.²²⁵

The repression of ETA continually forced its leaders to pass into exile in France. The continual shifting of leadership had two effects. First, there was never a stable leadership, nor did ETA leaders have the benefit of long years of experience. Second, as one faction gained control there was no guarantee that another faction would not take power once the current leaders passed into exile.

C. THE FIRST THREE ASSEMBLIES

The next phase of ETA was covered by the first three Assemblies. The Assemblies were periodical meetings called to debate or reformulate ETA's ideology and structure. Sometimes, if the Assembly produced a radical change in ideology, the number of the Assembly was tacked on to the end of "ETA" to designate the ideological stance, for example ETA-V and ETA-VI.

The First Assembly, in May of 1962, produced the statement of principles that guided ETA through the early years. ETA declared itself a Basque Revolutionary Movement for National Liberation in the First Assembly, thereby distancing ETA from the PNV position.²²⁶ Most notable among the guidelines for the proposed Euskeran State contained in the 1962 document were: freedom of religion; freedom to unionize; and the end of economic liberalism.

Freedom of religion was a break from the Catholicism of traditional Basque nationalism and in keeping with ETA's view of the Church as an agent of the Spanish

²²⁵ Clark 1984b: pp. 35-37.

²²⁶ Reprint of "Euzkadi ta Askatasuna, May 1962" in Sarrailh de Ihartza 1979: pp. 607-608.

State and an enemy of the Basque people. The disarticulation of Catholicism from Basque nationalism was a fundamental step in the development of ETA's nationalism. First, by ideologically separating Church and Basque nationalism ETA was further distancing itself from the PNV. ETA was now revolutionary in pursuit of its nationalist goals and, as a non-confessional party, that goal would be fundamentally different from the PNV's conceptualization of the Euskeran state. Parallel to the newly established ideological distance between ETA and PNV, the disappearance of Catholicism allowed ETA to incorporate class issues into its ideology. In accordance with a Christian democratic view of society, the PNV and STV (Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos) did not perceive the problems of the workers in terms of class analysis. Rather, these two organizations saw the solution to the workers problems in the establishment of a Basque Christian social system since exploitation was incompatible with Christian values. But, by removing the Catholicism on which the PNV's social policy was based, ETA was able to incorporate a new interpretation of society based on class analysis into nationalist ideology. Finally, the Spanish State's use of the Church both as an agent of control and as an ideological support, made the Church incompatible with a revolutionary ideology within the context of Spain and Euzkadi. This situation arose despite the fact that many of the Basque lower clergy displayed pro-nationalist sympathies and that Euzkadi had the highest percentage of practicing Catholics of any region in Spain (well over 75% for the region and up to 90% in some parishes).²²⁷

The inclusion of the right to unionize was evidence of the articulation of a class analysis into ETA's nationalism that began with the rejection of Catholicism as a fundamental part of nationalist ideology. The inclusion of the right to unionize was only the beginning; the effects of a class analysis became more pronounced as ETA developed.

²²⁷ Lannon 1987: p. 10.

Most interesting of all the ETA pronouncements was the call for the end of economic liberalism especially since no economic system was proposed to replace liberalism. Although ideologically pro-labour, in 1962 ETA, influenced by the current wave of anti-Stalin sentiment, was not at all sympathetic to communism. At this time ETA identified both communism and fascism as dictatorial regimes.²²⁸ Thus, while rejecting the current economic structure and beginning to support the proletariat, ETA was not yet able to disarticulate the bourgeois interests in capitalist relations of production that was inherent in PNV Basque nationalism. Since the adoption of Marxist ideology could not yet explain ETA's rejection of liberalism, what might best explain the attack on liberalism was the crisis of small and medium Basque industry that resulted from the State's liberalization Plan of 1959.

Soon after the end of the First Assembly, the book Vasconia by Federico Krutwig was published.²²⁹ This work had a major impact during the early days of ETA and provided an in depth look at ETA ideology.²³⁰ Vasconia contained an attack on the PNV and on the PNV interpretation of Arana y Goiri. Referring to the "dark night" of nationalism, Krutwig focused on three points:

The Basque case has suffered monstrous errors. First, they [the PNV] continued presenting a national problem as merely a question of state. Second, they had subordinated the Basque case to religion to such an extent that it drained the Basque Nation of its life blood. Third, the Basque nationalist case was reduced to regionalism...²³¹

²²⁸. Ortiz 1975: p. 300.

²²⁹. Vasconia was published under the pseudonym Fernando Sarrailh de Ihartza. The edition cited in this work is a reprint under a different title: Sarrailh de Ihartza. (1979) La Nueva Vasconia.

²³⁰. Ortiz 1975: p. 301; Clark 1984b: p. 38.

²³¹. Sarrailh de Ihartza 1979: p. 11. Author's translation.

These criticisms opened up ground for ETA to begin restructuring nationalist ideology. The first criticism was a debate that existed between the PNV and ETA in the days of Ekin. Since ETA identified national liberation with social liberation,²³² Krutwig attacked the PNV on its failure to conceptualize class issues as tied into the national question. The PNV, as the organic expression of bourgeois sectors, was in agreement with the overall structure of society and economy in Spain and merely sought to participate in the State. The PNV was therefore willing to work within the Spanish State system. ETA, however, tied national oppression to social oppression and both were the result of Spanish State action.

Krutwig's second criticism was an attempt to disarticulate the PNV's Catholicism. ETA viewed the Church as an agent of the State.

There is no doubt that the Church of Rome has been the weapon employed to enslave the Basque spirit, the tool of the most hideous oppression.²³³

The Church was guilty of colonizing and oppressing the Basque people through its control of the education system which destroyed the Basque mentality and language by replacing it with Spanish. This cultural oppression led to economic exploitation since before the hispanifying influence of the Church, Euzkadi was a classless society based on communal property.²³⁴ It was the class based world-view of the Spanish that the Church propagated which brought in the exploitative relations of production. The new nationalist ideology of ETA replaced the Catholic morality of the PNV with "Basque" socialism as the proposed social structure of the Euskeran State.²³⁵

²³² . Ortiz 1975: p. 306.

²³³ . Sarrailh de Ihartza 1979: p. 67. Author's translation?

²³⁴ . Sarrailh de Ihartza 1979: pp. 63-66.

²³⁵ . Heiberg 1980: p. 58.

The final point made by Krutwig criticized the PNV's concept of the relationship between Spain and Euzkadi. Although the PNV never publicly adopted a regionalist position, this was clearly demonstrated by its actions. To ETA, Euzkadi was not a region of Spain but an independent country that had been colonized by Spain.²³⁶ Spain, the Church and the hispanophile Basque capitalists were the cause of Euzkadi's demise.

With the introduction of a colonial perspective into Basque nationalism the Basque struggle was cast as a war of liberation and violence became a necessity. With the acceptance of violence, ETA had gone farther than the PNV in the analysis of the cause of Basque nationalism. ETA's willingness to use violence was perhaps due to the belief that the creation of ETA's Euzkadi would entail a fundamental restructuring of relations between different sectors of Basque society. The desire to restructure Basque civil society also accounted for the fact that ETA supported the use of violence against the traitors -- Basque industrial and financial capital. ETA was calling for a revolution against Spain and especially against fascist Spain and its Basque supporters. In contrast, the PNV's goal was a passive revolution in order to include the Basque bourgeoisie within the pre-existing power bloc.

On the questions of language and non-Basque immigrants Krutwig offered a solution that was both anti-Spanish and yet accepting of the immigrant workers. In Nueva Vasconia language was defined as the basis of ethnicity.²³⁷ Since the Euskera language embodied, represented and passed on the Basque culture and mentality from generation to generation, the primary emphasis on language forms the key element in the rearticulation of nationalist ideology under ETA auspices as well as the basis for an attack on the PNV. The Church's use of Spanish combined with its monopoly on education and the

²³⁶. Sarrailh de Ihartza 1979: p. 177.

²³⁷. Sarrailh de Ihartza 1979: pp. 10, 21.

PNV's endorsement of the Church make these two institutions guilty of destroying Basque culture by not promoting the Basque language. Ideologically, ETA transformed the Church and the PNV from the essence of Basqueness to being anti-Basque.

Once the importance of Euskera and the complete rejection of Spanish was established, Krutwig focused on the immigrant question. There were two elements of ETA ideology that relate to immigrant workers. First, quite simply, was that immigrants could learn Euskera.²³⁸ If language was the basis of ethnicity, then learning the language was also accepting Euskeran nationality. This element allowed the Spanish immigrants to become "Basque".

The second ideological component related to immigrants displayed the strength of ETA's desire to attract the latter and, by extension, the working class, since the proletariat in Euzkadi were mostly immigrants:

... in case of mass immigration, you find a type of "telluric assimilation", in which the land seems to appropriate, in turn, the new arrivals. Therefore, you find that a mixture of two racial factors usually gives birth to a more potent national spirit than that which is derived from just one race.²³⁹

Not only were the Spanish immigrants able to become Basque, they were equal partners in the creation of a new stronger Euzkadi. Euzkadi was better because of the immigrants - on the necessary condition they learn Euskera since the Euskeran language (mentality and culture) was the basis of a classless society.

The major ideological contradiction was brought to the fore in Nueva Vasconia and it was the Third Worldist interpretation, as represented by Krutwig, that predominated over the españolistas. Inherent in ETA ideology were the concepts of national liberation and social liberation, but it was the link between the two liberation struggles that divided ETA.

²³⁸ . Sarrailh de Ihartza 1979: p. 21.

²³⁹ . Sarrailh de Ihartza 1979: p. 56. Author's translation.

Under the Third Worldist view, social oppression resulted from national oppression. The history of Euzkadi was that of a classless society before the arrival of the Spanish. Basque language (and therefore Basque mentality and culture) reflected a language (mentality and culture) of communal harmony. Spanish, on the other hand, was a language and culture of class struggle and exploitation.²⁴⁰ Therefore, the colonization and hispanification of Euzkadi brought with it the culture and mentality of oppression; or class conflict between bourgeoisie and proletariat.

The españolistas, however, inverted the relation between national and social liberation. National oppression resulted from the inequality of people inherent in classes and the capitalist system. The elimination of class structure must therefore come before national liberation.²⁴¹ The españolistas necessarily favoured alliances with the Spanish leftist parties rather than the bourgeois Basque parties as the best way to achieve social liberation.

The ideological struggle between the Third Worldists and the españolistas reflected the class alliances each fraction was attempting to make. Since ETA was the expression of the petty bourgeoisie, it could have allied with either the proletariat or the bourgeoisie in Euzkadi. The Third Worldists, by stressing cultural issues over class issues were attempting to articulate the Euskeran bourgeoisie into revolutionary nationalism. After all, the Third Worldist conception of the idyllic traditional Euskeran society did bear a strong similarity to the PNV rhetoric of the traditional Basque arcadia. The españolistas represented the fraction of the Euskeran petty bourgeoisie who saw a greater harmony of interests with the proletariat. The large Spanish presence among the workers in Euzkadi required that the españolistas stress class as the basis of ETA, since

²⁴⁰ Sarrailh de Ihartza 1979: pp. 40-41.

²⁴¹ Isabi 1971: pp. 93-95.

the Spanish proletariat was not able to identify with Basque "ethnicity".

The Third Worldists dominated the Second and Third Assemblies each time; thus ETA ideology became increasingly radical up through the Third Assembly, yet still maintained a heavy emphasis on Basqueness. The Second Assembly, held in March 1963, officially accepted Krutwig's revolutionary tactics which led to an increase in ETA's terrorist activities.²⁴²

The increased stringency of ETA's position was connected to the adoption of Frantz Fanon's Les Damnés de la Terre as part of ETA ideology at the Third Assembly, May/April 1964.²⁴³ Fanon's work was a discussion of Algeria's war of liberation. According to Fanon, a colonial struggle will always be violent.

Car si les derniers [the colonized people] doivent être les premiers, ça ne peut être qu'à la suite d'un affrontement décisif et meurtrier des deux protagonistes.²⁴⁴

ETA, then, not only perceived Euzkadi to be a colony of Spain, but also held that a violent struggle was the only means of liberation. The Third Assembly, under Third Worldist direction, broke off relations with the PNV which was considered hispanophile.²⁴⁵ Political parties, like the PNV, which advocated working within the system were regarded as colonialist and therefore not working towards real liberation.²⁴⁶

²⁴². Ortiz 1975: p. 306.

²⁴³. Ortiz 1975: p. 308.

²⁴⁴. Fanon 1968: p. 6.

²⁴⁵. Clark 1984b: p. 39.

²⁴⁶. Fanon 1968: p. 24.

D. ESPAÑOLISTAS IN POWER: 1964-1970

The españolistas rise to power late in 1964 was not due to internal manoeuvrings but to the actions of the Spanish and French States. Spanish police pressure broke up the Spanish-based leadership at the same time that the French State expelled four exiles active in ETA leadership to Belgium.²⁴⁷ With the Third Worldists removed from power, the españolistas were left in control of ETA. The españolistas, however, were unable to maintain control for as long as the Third Worldists had, and the inter-factional struggle became very prominent during the next ten years.

The Fourth Assembly, held in the summer of 1965 under the direction of the españolistas, abandoned the colonial framework for a socialist perspective. ETA publications under the Fourth Assembly (ETA-IV) began criticizing the "racist" tendencies in ETA of representing bourgeois nationalism and of ignoring the central problem of social and economic oppression. The españolistas envisioned ETA as the vanguard of the proletariat with a mission to create the conditions of revolution.²⁴⁸

ses theorie [of ETA-IV]: la lutte de libération basque est un frein pour la libération sociale, il est nécessaire de subordonner la lutte que se déroule en Euzkadi à celle de la classe ouvrière de l'Etat espagnol.²⁴⁹

It was also at the time of the Fourth Assembly that ETA commandos were established to rob banks, factories, army depots... for money and supplies. Since ethnicity was not a factor, the targets were both Basque and Spanish.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁷. Clark 1984b: p. 40.

²⁴⁸. Ortiz 1975: pp. 312-313; Clark 1984b: pp. 40-42.

²⁴⁹. From "L'ETA" an analysis by an anonymous ETA activist reprinted in French in Halimi 1971: p. 154.

²⁵⁰. Ortiz 1975: p. 312.

By 1966 the españolistas were already facing stiff opposition from the other two factions. The military branch of ETA broke away in 1966 to form Grupo Autónomo de ETA (ETA Autonomous Group) under Third Worldist leadership. The culturalists also began criticizing the españolistas through Branka, ETA's cultural magazine.²⁵¹

The crisis caused by internal feuding came to a head in the Fifth Assembly, held at two separate times - December 1966 and March 1967 (see FIGURE 2). The first part of the Fifth Assembly expelled the españolista leaders who then created ETA-berri (New ETA). The removal of the españolistas left the Third Worldists and the culturalists struggling for control of ETA. The second half of the Fifth Assembly gave victory to the Third Worldists who were in the majority and out-voted the culturalists on every issue.²⁵² Soon after the Fifth Assembly the culturalists left ETA to form BRANKA, a non-Marxist, non-violent nationalist organization.

ETA ideology after the Fifth Assembly maintained the Marxist perspective of the Fourth Assembly but returned to stress the importance of ethnicity. The Fifth Assembly (ETA-V) was at pains to incorporate the Spanish immigrant workers as well as the Basque bourgeoisie. ETA-V returned to the argument that by culturally integrating themselves with the Basques, the immigrants would not be oppressing the Basque nation but would be contributing to the reformation (desalienación) of the Basque People. According to ETA-V ideology, the Basque bourgeoisie, for its part, was in solidarity with the people and, in practice, revolutionary in so far as it was struggling to end the national oppression of Euzkadi.²⁵³

The ideological struggle between national liberation and social liberation became

²⁵¹. Clark 1984b: p. 42.

²⁵². Clark 1984b: p. 45.

²⁵³. Reprint of Fifth Assembly statement in Ortzi 1975: pp. 321-322.

defused after the Fifth Assembly but the event that unleashed the final conflict, the event that would give ETA the structure it had at the end of the Franco regime, was still to come. In June of 1968, Txabi Etxebarrieta, the president of ETA, was killed while trying to run a police road block.²⁵⁴ The death sparked three reactions. First, Euzkadi was swept by popular demonstrations in support of ETA and priests all over Euzkadi held mass for Etxebarrieta. Second, ETA responded with its first assassination. Police commissioner, and ethnic Basque, Meliton Manzananas was killed in August, 1968.²⁵⁵ Third, ETA unity shattered over the question of how to proceed after the death of Etxebarrieta.

One group of ETA militants, under the name Celulas Rojas (Red Cells), believed that ETA's function had ended and the movement must now convert itself into a Basque communist party. Another group took the contrary position that ETA's role was just beginning and ETA should take the leadership of the Basque struggle with the creation of a united Nationalist Front including all Basque parties.²⁵⁶

E. THE SIXTH ASSEMBLY AND BEYOND

The Sixth Assembly, August 1970, that had been called to settle the internal confrontations ended with the creation of three organizations (see FIGURE 2): Celulas Rojas which abandoned the nationalist struggle for the class struggle; and two different ETA's - ETA V, under control of the executive elected at the Fifth Assembly, and ETA VI, under control of an executive that was elected at the Sixth Assembly with the support of Celulas Rojas. ETA VI emerged as a revolutionary socialist organization with a

²⁵⁴ Clark 1984b: p. 48.

²⁵⁵ Ortiz 1975: pp. 340-341; Clark 1984b: pp. 48-51.

²⁵⁶ "L'ETA" reprinted in Halimi 1971: p. 156; Ortiz 1975: p. 356.

secondary interest in Basque ethnicity in the vein of ETA IV ideology as represented from the Fourth Assembly. ~~ETA VI~~ advocated a five point program: 1. violent destruction of the State; 2. right to Basque independence under a Basque People's Democracy; 3. socialization of the goods of the oligarchy, of the imperialists and of the counter-revolutionaries; 4. equality of Basque and Spanish languages; 5. freedom of organization.²⁵⁷

In opposition to ~~ETA VI~~, the executive committee of the Fifth Assembly voided the decisions of ~~ETA VI~~ and created ~~ETA V~~. ~~ETA V~~ maintained the ideology of the Fifth Assembly in advocating its own five point plan: 1. unification of French and Spanish Euzkadi; 2. sovereign independence; 3. restoration of Basque as the only official language; 4. democratization of basic industries; 5. nationalization of basic industries.²⁵⁸

~~ETA V~~ ideology was definitely more nationalistic than that of ~~ETA VI~~ and less threatening to the bourgeoisie. ~~ETA VI~~ advocated the socialization of the goods of the counter-revolutionaries, which was a catch all phrase with possible application to many sectors of Euskeran society. For example, under the influence of Fanon on ETA ideology, the PNV was already considered counter-revolutionary. In contrast, ~~ETA V~~ called for the nationalization of basic industries, which were already either in the hands of financial and foreign capital or controlled by the INI (Instituto Nacional de Industrialización, National Institute of Industrialization). ~~ETA V~~ thus, posed no threat to the Euskeran bourgeoisie.

During the latter half of 1970, ~~ETA VI~~ was the stronger of the two ETAs. It was in December of 1970 that the landmark "Trial of Burgos" took place, which brought the Basque struggle to national and international attention. Sixteen ETA militants, including

²⁵⁷. Clark 1984b: p. 59.

²⁵⁸. Clark 1984b: p. 59.

two priests, were accused of the 1968 Manzananas assassination. The proceedings brought the pseudo-justice of the fascist regime and Basque oppression to international attention. The popular demonstrations in support of the "Burgos 16" all favoured ETA VI's emphasis on the class struggle.²⁵⁹ Incidentally, popular demonstrations in support of the "Burgos 16" took place all over Spain, not just in Euzkadi. But, as ETA VI began drifting towards revolutionary class struggle to the exclusion of the Basque cause, it began losing supporters. By 1972, ETA VI was involved in internal squabbles and by 1973 it merged with Liga Comunista Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Communist League) (See FIGURE 2).

ETA V's position steadily strengthened as ETA VI became more and more distracted from the Basque cause. Whereas ETA VI's public profile waned, ETA V was increasingly active and it was this activism that made ETA V the sole representative of ETA by 1973. ETA V kept up the bank robberies that had started years earlier, but it also began a new type of activism which proved immensely successful. Early in 1972 ETA became involved in a labour dispute at the company Eibar y Ermua. In late 1971 the company had fired its entire staff for going out on strike. To support the strikers, ETA V kidnapped the company president, L. Zabala, an ethnic Basque, in January of 1972. The ransom was the return of the fired workers and a wage increase. The membership of ETA V swelled after the Zabala kidnapping. It was also at this time that EGI (Euzko Gastedi), the old PNV youth wing, joined ETA V.²⁶⁰

Although it would be incorrect to state that ETA lacked internal struggles between 1973 and 1975, the debates that did arise tended to be over tactics rather than ideology. Thus, ETA ideology remained unchanged until 1975 and even for a few years beyond. The Spanish State, however, changed drastically after Franco's death in 1975, which,

²⁵⁹. Ortiz 1975: p. 379; Clark 1984b: pp. 58-59.

²⁶⁰. Ortiz 1975: pp. 384-386.

therefore caused radical changes in Euzkadi and the relations between the different institutions and organizations. ETA continues to exist as a violent clandestine organization within Basque nationalism although the overall shape of nationalism has changed from the days of Franco since there are now a number of leftist nationalist political parties allied to ETA which compete with the PNV in the electoral arena. The post-1975 Spanish State, however, falls outside the scope of this paper.

F. CONCLUSION TO THE DISCUSSION OF ETA

Throughout the ideological struggles between 1959 and 1973, there was a consistent pattern for ETA to favour ethnicity as the interpellative core or central identifying trait of the movement. The support for an ethnic base to ETA was demonstrated by the fact that the Third Worldists controlled ETA for the First, Second, Third and Fifth Assemblies whereas the españolistas (who favoured a class base) were only able to achieve dominance in the Fourth and Sixth Assemblies, both of which were short lived. The final tone of ETA, as based on ETA V's five-point program, placed a decided emphasis on Basque ethnic concerns.

The failure of ETA to adopt a Marxist perspective was not due to the unresponsiveness of the population of the Basque region to support a Marxist party. The españolista factions that split off from ETA eventually joined different Marxist parties in the region. ETA's inability to develop a class basis revealed that ETA was not the expression of the proletariat. ETA had been formed in 1959 by students of the petty bourgeoisie and the organization remained the expression of petty bourgeois interests. Furthermore, the presence of the two different tendencies - nationalist vs. Marxist - within ETA did not reflect different class bases for each tendency. Rather, the struggle between an ethnic base or a class base arose from the situation of the Euskeran petty

bourgeoisie which was attracted at times to the bourgeoisie and at other times to the proletariat in its attempt to secure its position during the developing crisis of the Spanish State from 1958 onward.

The ossification of the State under Franco, and the economic pressures felt by the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat both forced the petty bourgeoisie to look outside the State and to view the proletariat as a possible new ally. Although the petty bourgeoisie had enough interests in common with the other two classes mentioned above to create an alliance with either one, it was not able to function as a link between the proletariat in Euzkadi and the Euskeran Bourgeoisie. Since the proletariat in Euzkadi was comprised of large sectors of Spanish immigrants, the working class was unable to respond to the ethnic identity of ETA. Alternatively, whenever ETA emphasized the class basis, the organization exhibited a definite Spanish presence which went against the ethnic ideology held by the Euskeran bourgeois sectors.

The radicalization of ETA that began under the Third Assembly, May 1963, just before the españolistas came to power, fell within the third phase of the Franco regime (1959-1970). The activities of the State at this time may partially account for the growing strength of ETA's Marxist tendency, even among the Third Worldists who endorsed Fanon's work in 1964. During the third phase, the Spanish power bloc attempted to articulate the domestic bourgeoisie into the regime. The State's attempt to create hegemony over the domestic bourgeoisie would have counteracted ETA's attempt to articulate the Euskeran bourgeoisie. Furthermore, the economic strength of the State, compared to that of the Euskeran petty bourgeoisie, meant that the State was able to offer more to the bourgeoisie (Euskeran and Spanish) than could ETA. Similarly, the collapse of españolista power within ETA coincided with the beginning of the fourth sub-period of the Franco regime (1970-1975) which was characterized by the failure of the power bloc to articulate the domestic bourgeoisie. The domestic bourgeoisie was again

forced to seek non-State solutions. For the Euskeran bourgeoisie this meant a return to ETA's radical nationalism; and for ETA this meant a retreat from the more revolutionary, Marxist tenets of the españolistas.

Consistent with the clandestine nature of ETA, it is difficult to get a clear picture of the membership of ETA and, therefore, difficult to measure the support ETA received from the Euskeran bourgeoisie. The numerical estimates of ETA membership depict a relatively small core of actual members(See Table Two), however, popular support was more widespread. It is certain that ETA received monetary support from the bourgeoisie through a revolutionary tax that was collected from industry in the Basque region. The tax was not necessarily voluntary since violence was a constant threat to force compliance. Perhaps the best indication of bourgeois support for ETA was the position of the Catholic lower clergy. By the end of the 1960's, the Catholic clergy had begun to support ETA by

TABLE 2
Estimated Size of ETA, 1952-1973

<u>Year</u>	<u>Membership</u>
1952	6
1953	18-20
1954-56	50
1959	50-70
1960	300
1961	200-250
1963	250-300
1966	300-450
1968-69	600
1970	100-200
1973	100-200

SOURCE: Clark 1984: pp. 220-221.

sheltering members from the police and by using weekly Mass to promote ETA's cause. In 1968 the clergy openly supported the nationalist cause by holding Mass all over Euzkadi

for the slain hero, Etxebarrieta, and, in 1970, two priests were among the accused at the Trial of Burgos.

One of the more confusing incidents in ETA's development with respect to the struggle between proletarian and bourgeois sympathies was certainly the Zabala kidnapping which was carried out by the pro-bourgeois ETA-V. The kidnapping of a member of the Basque bourgeoisie would, at first glance, appear to be more consistent with a Marxist view. However, when examining the incident from within the context of Spanish political economy a different interpretation emerges. The Zabala kidnapping played a double role in the petty bourgeoisie's attempt to develop an effective alliance against the State. Regarding ETA's relations with the Euskeran bourgeoisie, the Zabala incident was an attempt to coerce the bourgeoisie into agreement with ETA's position, and force the bourgeoisie to shift away from the regime. Furthermore, as the domestic bourgeoisie shifted into opposition towards the State, those members of the bourgeoisie who still supported the State became class traitors and needed to be brought back into line. The second function of the Zabala kidnapping was an attempt to show the proletariat that ETA also considered the interests of the proletariat and would support fair labour practices.

ETA's final consolidation as an ethnic rather than class based organization was not the result of the weakness of proletariat sympathies among the ethnic Basque petty bourgeoisie. Instead, it was due to the emergence of new Leftist movements that occurred during the fourth phase of the Franco regime (1970-1975)²⁶¹ which began to siphon off ETA members with Marxist sympathies. The organizational chart for ETA (See FIGURE 2) shows the exodus of ETA factions into Basque and Spanish worker's parties.

G. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: PNV AND ETA

²⁶¹. See Chapter Three pp. 65-66.

The purpose of this section is to provide a comparative analysis of the two political organizations within Basque nationalism. The problem here is to understand how both political parties functioned as a connection between material and ideal structures, and how this function may account for the particular ideology of each movement.

The Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party) developed into the expression of Euskeran industrial capital and the "other bourgeoisie" in the late 1800's.²⁶² Industrial capital and the "other bourgeoisie" were able to transform a party created by a traditional intellectual, Arana y Goiri, that originally responded to the interests of the feudal class to which he was tied. During the transition of the class alliance supporting the PNV, there was a parallel transformation in PNV ideology. The resulting ideology retained certain traditional elements (religious, rural overtones) but also acquired other elements that reflected the interests and world-view of the bourgeoisie. The influence of the "other bourgeoisie" and industrial capital was responsible for the PNV's support for liberal capitalism and industrialization.

The collective will, the political subject, aligned around the PNV reflected the particular configuration of PNV ideology. The PNV received support from the lesser nobility, the clergy, as allied intellectuals, and the peasantry who were attracted by the Catholic and rural elements which they perceived to protect their interests. Ethnic Basque workers also supported the PNV through Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos (Solidarity of Basque Workers). The PNV's vision of capitalism tempered by Christian charity and paternalism offered to alleviate the worst excesses suffered by the Basque proletariat. But the mainstay of PNV support was the "other bourgeoisie" and industrial capitalists who hoped to use the party to enter the power bloc controlling the Spanish

²⁶². "other bourgeoisie" refers to the class fractions that were excluded from the power bloc: small and medium industry, merchants. Tuñón de Lara 1971: pp. 172-173.

State.

Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (Euzkadi and Freedom) was, in contrast, the expression of the petty bourgeoisie. ETA, too, was the result of the transformation of the ideology of another party -- in this case the PNV. But instead of transforming the entire PNV, ETA split off to create a new party with its own distinct ideology. ETA disarticulated the Catholic, ruralistic elements which were so strongly associated with the PNV, replacing it with "Basque" socialism based on Euzkadi's past. The paternalistic approach to labour was also dropped by ETA. In response to the structure of Franco's State and the paternalistic State unions, ETA advocated a much more active pursuit of workers' rights. The collective will that supported ETA at various times in its early development was comprised of proletariat, bourgeois and petty bourgeois sectors whose interests were blocked by the State and therefore favoured a radical change.

Both ETA and PNV emerged in response to crises in the State, although the crises were drastically different. The PNV arose in response to the crisis that was resolved by the failed bourgeois revolution and the Restoration Monarchy in 1876. The PNV was the expression of class fractions that had been excluded from the new State. The separation of financial and resource capital from the other capitalist class fractions forestalled the hope of another bourgeois revolution within Spain. However, a nationalist movement provided the possibility for the Euskeran "other bourgeoisie" and industrial capital to participate in the State and protect their interests from the monopolistic tendencies of resource and financial capital.

The social forces represented by the State during the 1950's and 1960's when ETA emerged were different than those represented during the 1890's. Participation in the State was not a strong possibility for the Euskeran proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie, although there was an unsuccessful attempt by the State to articulate the domestic bourgeois class fraction (See Chapter Three for a discussion of domestic

bourgeoisie) into the State during the declining years of the regime. The Euskeran bourgeoisie was pressured by industrial interests dominated by foreign capital, the same foreign capital upon which the State was dependent. The economic crisis also affected the petty bourgeoisie who were entirely dependent on the shrinking domestic market and did not have the connection to international capital of the domestic bourgeoisie. The proletariat was in a particularly difficult situation since foreign capital's primary interest was to keep salaries as low as possible.

During the 1960's, however, the Spanish State would not have been able to act against foreign capital. Thus, all three sectors of Euskeran society were forced to look outside the State for the representation of their interests. ETA originally emerged from the petty bourgeoisie in an attempt to create an alliance among these three classes and class fractions.

The differences in the State also explained the different approaches to revolution and passive revolution of the PNV and ETA. The creed of non-violence of the PNV was directly related to its desire to participate in the State. The PNV supported the general capitalist structure and world-view of civil society around the turn of the century. Thus, the PNV had no reason to push for revolutionary changes of the system which would also have affected civil society.

In contrast, ETA did not want to participate in the Spanish State nor did it agree with the structure of civil society. ETA advocated a war of liberation to create a Basque State completely independent from the Spanish State. Not only would this revolution have created a new State, it would also have established a new Basque civil society.

Although both parties were expressions of Basque nationalism, they had quite dissimilar nationalist ideologies. The original PNV definition of Basque was based on race, which was also considered to be a scientifically-based criterion for differentiation. Either individuals were Basque or they were not. The definition of Basque was later based on

ethnicity in terms of a shared history, customs and traditions. Ethnicity was more open than race had been, but the PNV still maintained a restrictive definition of Basqueness since ethnicity required a person's family to have lived at least a generation in Euzkadi.

The ideological basis of ETA ideology was slightly more accessible. ETA defined Basqueness on the basis of language. To speak Basque was to be Basque. It was unimportant to ETA whether a person was from an euskerophone family or learned Euskera independently. ETA ideology was, therefore, accessible to the Spanish immigrants, whereas they were excluded from the PNV. Although it must be remembered that ETA's conceptualization required a strong desire to join on the part of the individual members since it often required one to learn a new and difficult language.

The differences in the definition of Basqueness were related to the different class alliances formed by the two parties. The PNV in 1900 sought to create a political subject, a collective will, of the Euskeran bourgeoisie who might not have spoken Basque, nor have been of pure Euskeran blood but who had always lived in Euzkadi. The PNV did not want to incorporate the Spanish immigrant workers, but to exclude them; to define them as non-Basque. ETA, however, was attempting to create a revolutionary subject out of the frustrations of the petty bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Since the proletariat was comprised of many Spanish immigrants and their descendants the definition of Basque had to incorporate these individuals.

It is interesting to note that while the españolistas were dominant in ETA, the identifying trait was not language but residence in Euzkadi and class background. This was evidence of the españolistas' emphasis on social liberation, while the other factions of ETA put primary importance on ethnicity.

The prospective States of each organization, as identified in their ideological statements on society and the economy also differed greatly between the PNV and ETA. The Euskeran civil society envisioned by the PNV at the turn of the century was based

on a conservative Catholic morality. The superior classes would protect the weaker classes from suffering the abuses of capitalism with a paternalistic structure of labour relations. Euzkadi would be preserved for Basques, giving Basques preference for jobs and removing foreign interests from the economy, thus protecting the interests of the Basque "other bourgeoisie". The regionalism of the PNV was consistent with its conception of civil society in that regionalism implied agreement on the part of the PNV with Spanish civil society. It would not have been possible for the PNV to radically change the social relations of Euzkadi and still remain within the Spanish State. The PNV also agreed to keeping Euzkadi linked to the Spanish economy. After all, the "other bourgeoisie" wanted to increase its internal market.

In contrast to the PNV, ETA proposed a radical change in civil society. ETA offered the creation of a socialist society. It was not a Marxist society but a type of "Basque" socialism based on the historical harmonious, classless society of Euzkadi before the Spanish. The economy would be radically restructured, democratized and nationalized. ETA's desire for a radical change was reflected in its separatist spirit. ETA wanted to separate from Spain and from the domination of financial and foreign capital centred in Madrid.

The emergence of the PNV and ETA as nationalist movements as opposed to another type of political movement stemmed from the unique conjuncture of material and ideological factors. In the case of the PNV the structural factors were the Spanish industrialization process and the bourgeois revolution. After the bourgeois revolution in Spain, various sectors of the bourgeoisie were excluded from the power bloc, leaving them in a weak position vis-a-vis opposing interests (i.e. resource and financial capital). The bourgeoisie was not evenly distributed throughout Spain but concentrated in three regions, one of which was Euzkadi. The crisis of the War of 1898 presented the optimum moment for the "other bourgeoisie" and industrial capital within Spain to enter the power

bloc, except that the bourgeoisie in the other regions were suffering from the economic crisis of the War. Only the Euskeran industrial capital and the "other bourgeoisie" were in a strong enough position to confront the Spanish power bloc. Thus, the Euskeran "other bourgeoisie" and industrial capital were without allies in the rest of Spain and their best solution was a regional organization.

Within Euzkadi, ideological factors came to bear on the final emergence of the PNV. The intellectuals of Euskeran industrial capital (i.e. de la Sota) needed to find an autonomous political ideology through which to create a party. The attempted Sociedad Euzkalerria of the 1890's failed due to its inability to create hegemony. At the same time, the PNV was emerging as the focus of the remaining feudal classes opposed to the State (the nobility and the peasants). When the situation presented itself in 1898, industrial capital successfully transformed the PNV since nationalism was the most effective ideology for industrial capital's needs. It was autonomous from the power bloc and provided a core of an ideological structure that would be very effective in Euzkadi.

The situation surrounding the initial development of ETA was distinguished from the case of the PNV in that ETA developed as a party which rejected the existing State. ETA emerged from the same sectors that supported the PNV firmly believing that the PNV was incapable of responding to the situation. The rigidity of the State explained ETA's rejection of PNV passivity in favour of radical activism. However it was not sufficient to explain the nationalist core to ETA ideology.

The nationalism of ETA resulted from other factors. The sectors of the petty bourgeoisie within ETA that were in search of a radical ideology often came close to adopting Marxism. Indeed, ETA twice accepted Marxist philosophy almost to the exclusion of nationalism (ETA IV and ETA VI). But both times the Marxist leaders were forced out of ETA. First, Marxism, as the organic expression of the proletariat, was still unacceptable to those petty bourgeoisie elements in ETA which saw their common

interests lying with the bourgeoisie. Second, the particular articulation of class over ethnicity did not respond to the cultural interests of the petty bourgeoisie.

Marxism attracted the proletariat as a class on the basis of their economic interests. The Euskeran petty bourgeoisie, however, chose to use Basque cultural interests as their base. The oppression of the Basque culture was something most ethnic Basque would have experienced under the Franco regime. The petty bourgeoisie hoped, therefore, to attract both Basque bourgeoisie and the proletariat (be they ethnic Basque or not).

In the case of ETA, therefore, the nationalist ideological content was due to a combination of the rejection of the State and the PNV's passive tactics which led to a radicalization of segments of the Euskeran petty bourgeoisie. The inability of this radicalized petty bourgeoisie to abandon the Euskeran bourgeoisie and to adopt Marxism and its consciousness of ethnic oppression resulted in the development of ETA with an autonomous ideology that was independent of both Marxist organizations and of the PNV and yet revolutionary. ETA, then, fulfilled the needs of the Euskeran petty bourgeoisie for an autonomous radical political expression that responded to cultural and economic oppression.

Both ETA and the PNV were nationalist parties attempting to attract similar sectors of Euskeran society, the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat, yet there the similarities ended. The PNV was a conservative party of the bourgeoisie committed to the electoral system, whereas ETA, a radical party reflecting the petty bourgeoisie, was committed to armed struggle. Both parties had different ideologies of the state. They even had different definitions of nationalism and of Basque ethnicity. The differences in ideology originated in the drastically different political economic situations within Euzkadi and within Spain that promoted each class to take action and that guided the development of each organization and its attempt to create hegemony within Basque civil society.

The emergence of ETA caused a fundamental change in the direction Basque nationalism had taken since the development of the PNV in the early 1900's. The radicalization of Basque nationalism that began with ETA has continued with the emergence of leftist Basque political parties, Euskadiko Ezkera (Basque Left, EE) and Herri Batasuna (People United, HB) and the increasing strength these parties show at the polls. The radicalization of Basque nationalism has paralleled a similar shift among the non-nationalist sectors of Euzkadi with the electoral strength of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE). In the 1986 general elections the PNV won six seats, the Basque left (EE and HB) sent seven deputies to Madrid and PSOE took nine seats for Euzkadi.²⁶³ The Parties of the Spanish right and centre only won four seats. The 1986 elections were the culmination of a process of radicalization within Basque nationalism that began with the emergence of ETA in 1959.

The radicalization of Basque nationalism was just part of the legacy of ETA's early years. Another component of Basque nationalism that developed with ETA is the continuing legacy of violence within Euzkadi, Spain and, now, France. The ideological construction of Basque nationalism as a war of liberation introduced violence into ETA's activities. Even though ETA no longer promotes the "war of liberation" perspective, violence has become part of the Basque nationalist phenomenon. In recent years an anti-ETA terrorist organization has emerged which targets suspected ETA members for assassination.

²⁶³. Anuario Estadístico de España. (1986). Madrid: Instituto de Estadística Nacional.

CHAPTER SIX

VI. CONCLUSION

The first chapter of this thesis examined a few possible analytical approaches to nationalism outlining why they were not suitable for this study and then, as an alternative, presented the Gramscian approach emphasizing both ideal and material forces. This concluding chapter will return to the theoretical considerations of selecting an analytical framework for the study of nationalism in order to evaluate the results of having applied a Gramscian framework in the Basque case, as well as the validity of not having used the other theories (Deutsch, Smith, Hechter, Nairn, Blaut) that were critiqued at the beginning of this study. The other approaches that were critiqued were grouped onto three categories: integration (Deutsch, Hechter); dependency (Hechter, Nairn); and economic class analysis (Blaut).

The integration theories viewed Westernization and modernization as the root causes of nationalism. Deutsch linked nationalism to the increasing level of communication between peoples that was part of the process of modernization. For Deutsch, nationalism was a cultural phenomenon. In the case of Euzkadi, while it is evident that culture played a role in the emergence of nationalism there were also important economic and political factors that shaped the development of the PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco) and ETA (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna). Deutsch's approach is unable to incorporate these very important factors.

In relation to the emphasis on modernization, the Basque example brought out a few interesting points. First, Spain was beginning to industrialize during the formative years of the PNV. It was the process of Spanish industrialization, in part, that resulted in the exclusion of the "other bourgeoisie" and industrial capital from the power bloc. However, the original PNV under Arana in 1895 was anti-industrial and yet by 1898 the PNV was transformed into a pro-industrial ideology. Modernization per se could not have prompted

the emergence of two such contradictory ideological elements. Such developments within the PNV were the result of the interaction of various social sectors such as the Euskeran nobility and the "other bourgeoisie" who were linked to two economic systems that came into conflict during the Spanish modernization process. Yet these two classes did not oppose each other, rather they created an alliance to support mutual interests vis-a-vis the much stronger classes represented in the State (which itself was an alliance of both feudal and capitalist classes). The conjuncture of such diverse elements would receive inadequate treatment by Deutsch's approach.

Another element of Deutsch's theory is that nationalism involves a struggle to eliminate barriers to social mobility. The Basque were not responding to a lack of social mobility. Early statistics, as discussed in Chapter Three (see TABLES 1.1, 1.2), implied that Basques were distributed throughout all occupations and classes, but that the Spanish in Euzkadi were concentrated in the proletariat. Basque nationalism was not a struggle to remove barriers to social mobility. The cultural claims of the Basques were to revitalize their culture -- to go back to using a language which many of them had forgotten, to maintain a pattern of life that had existed in the region for centuries.

Smith, the other integration theorist considered here, saw the emergence of state educational systems and bureaucracies as fundamental to the emergence of nationalism. The development of these two state apparatuses threatened local cultures and sparked a nationalist response among the previous ethnic elites. In the example of the PNV, there were indeed changes in the government that affected the Basque elites. However, these changes were not bureaucratic changes but rather involved the exclusion of Euskeran feudal classes and sectors of the bourgeoisie from the power bloc of the Spanish State.

The entrance of state education into Euzkadi did increase the use of Spanish over Euskera. The loss of Euskera would have been felt by the peasants and euskeraphone workers. The elites, however, were already hispanophone and many did not even know

Euskera. Therefore it was not the elites who were most threatened by the loss of Euskera, yet they were involved in the emergence of the PNV. The bourgeoisie was more threatened by political and economic changes.

Hechter's theory of internal colonialism was the first dependency approach discussed. The key focus of Hechter's theory was the cultural division of labour and, as such, was inappropriate for the Basque case. As was revealed in the analysis of Euzkadi, the PNV represented the Basque bourgeoisie and industrial capital that opposed Basque resource and financial capital. The proletariat in Euzkadi had a very large Spanish component, but it was not nationalist. Thus, in the Basque example the evidence would suggest a cultural division of labour with the creation of a Spanish proletariat and a Basque bourgeoisie, which is the reverse of what Hechter's theory predicts. Similarly, ETA later encountered difficulties in developing a coherent ideological link between Basque and "working class" because this did not reflect the cultural division of labour in Euzkadi.

The theory of uneven development presented by Nairn did not rely on the cultural division of labour but rather focused on ethnic divisions into rich and poor regions caused by capitalism. The first difficulty that arose in respect to Euzkadi was that this region was one of the richest in Spain. Thus, it was impossible to cast Euzkadi as a poor exploited region.

To invert the rich/poor relationship and view Euzkadi as a rich region which wanted to leave behind poor Spain was also in contradiction with the situation. Basque resource and financial capital were part of the Spanish power bloc, therefore they benefitted from the connections to Spain. The PNV represented industrial and bourgeois fractions that would also have benefitted from links to Spain's market. Indeed, this was the interest represented by the PNV's regionalism. The PNV wished only to strengthen the Euskeran "other bourgeoisie's" power within Spain and not create a separate State.

The final theoretical approach, economic class analysis, was represented by Blaut.

Blaut reduced nationalism to the class struggle arguing that when the dominant class of a particular society exploited another society then nationalism would result. Nationalism was the struggle against external exploitation. The PNV, being the expression of the bourgeoisie and industrial capital, was linked to the dominant classes of Blaut's model and not to the producing class (Blaut's term for the exploited class in his model). Furthermore, the PNV was in opposition to a combination of Basque and Spanish classes and not solely Spanish financial and resource capital. Although ETA had stronger support among the proletariat than the PNV, ETA was also allied to the bourgeoisie. ETA was the expression of the petty bourgeoisie which, economically pressured by a power bloc of financial, resource and foreign capital based in Euzkadi, Spain and abroad, attempted to create an alliance with the Euskeran bourgeoisie and the largely Spanish proletariat resident in Euzkadi. This then presented a very complicated set of class relations which did not fit the mere internal/external distinction of Blaut.

A Gramscian approach offered various advantages for the study of nationalism even though Gramsci's original work was not directly related to nationalism. Five attributes of a Gramscian approach were particularly relevant to nationalism. They were: 1) a non-economistic, non-reductionist use of Marxist tools of analysis; 2) specific attention to politics; 3) link between ideal and material structures; 4) the role of the intellectual; and 5) the study of the creation of a political party. The following section will discuss these particular points in respect to the analysis of Euzkadi.

The non-economistic element of Gramsci's work was able to conceptualize the class alliances that were represented by both the PNV and ETA in such a way as to understand the complex make-up of ideological structures that resulted from each alliance. If the approach had not been able to recognize the alliance between the Euskeran nobility and industrial capital, as was the case of the PNV, it would not have been able to explain the articulation of feudal and capitalist elements within PNV

ideology. In fact it was the articulation of these distinct elements which led to the success of the PNV. The only route to autonomous political expression open to the "other bourgeoisie" and industrial capital was that of joining the party set up by the feudal nobility.

A Gramscian understanding of political activity pinpointed the political struggle within the Spanish State and the role it played in Euzkadi. Questions of State came to bear on the emergence of both nationalist parties. The "other bourgeoisie" and industrial capital's need to transform the PNV arose out of their relationship with the Spanish power bloc. The case of ETA was particularly interesting since it was in response to the structure of the State that an alliance under the direction of the petty bourgeoisie was attempted between fractions of two fundamental classes (the bourgeoisie and the proletariat).

The particular alliance represented by ETA, mentioned above, illustrates the third attribute of Gramscian analysis, namely the conceptualization of the link between material and ideal structures. In the case of ETA, politics, as the manifestation of this link, was the creation of a collective will comprised of three classes with competing economic interests. The alliance was based on ETA's position favouring the nationalization of the economic interests of the oligarchy (the power bloc), which would have benefitted the working classes, and on ETA's position falling short of the nationalization of all wealth and the abolition of private capital, which would have been to the detriment of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. Thus ETA's ideology was fundamental to maintaining the alliance.

The intellectuals, the fourth attribute of Gramsci's analytical framework, were the constructors and organizers of the nationalist movement. Focusing on the role played by Arana y Goiri, de la Sota, Krutwig and others, two aspects of Basque nationalism were revealed. First, by analyzing their published works, it was possible to develop an

interpretation of PNV and ETA ideology that was based on more than just the activities of each organization. The ideological tracts of the intellectuals outlined the party's conception of the state and civil society as they would be if the party were to gain dominance. This was an essential ideal element in understanding the creation of the collective will on the material level.

The second aspect of the intellectuals was their class connection which revealed the directive class within the collective will. The analysis of an intellectual's work, and the class link, as well as the response that a particular intellectual received from the party itself gave an indication of the class expression of the party.

The Gramscian concept of ideology enters into the analysis of intellectuals in the conceptualization of the internal struggles of each party. The factious history of ETA revealed ideology as a dialectical process. Within ETA, factions of the petty-bourgeoisie each strove to incorporate bourgeois or proletarian ideals (and economic interests) as the dominant influence. This struggle was manifested on the ideological level in the debates over class or ethnicity as the interpellative core. This debate was carried out through petty bourgeois intellectuals as they attempted to create hegemony over either the bourgeoisie or the Proletariat.

The fifth and final attribute of the Gramscian approach was the study of the creation of a political movement. The difficulty of creating hegemony explained the internal transformations of both parties in question. The transformation of the PNV in 1898 was the result of the failure of the "other bourgeoisie" and industrial capital to create an efficient political party out of the Sociedad Euzkalerria. ETA emerged from the inability of the PNV to maintain hegemony. As the situation of the petty bourgeoisie came under increasing pressure from the State due to the effect of foreign interests on the domestic market, the PNV was unable to respond to their interests. The radicalized sectors, therefore, split off from the PNV to create an autonomous organization. The

same difficulty in creating hegemony was also related to the continual struggles and divisions within ETA.

As an approach to the study of nationalism, the Gramscian analytical framework has proved successful. The analytical concepts used were able to conceptualize the essential elements involved in the emergence of nationalism and the development of a nationalist movement on an ideal level as well as on the level of material structures. Such a conceptualization allowed for an interpretation of Basque nationalism that neither ignored the specific political economy nor placed the burden of explanation on the political, economic or cultural factors involved. The Gramscian approach adequately explored the unique conjuncture of elements that led to the emergence of nationalism in Euzkadi.

The insights into Euskeran nationalism provided by the Gramscian approach have raised a series of intriguing issues for future research that would provide a deeper understanding of Spain and Euzkadi as well as further examine the relationship between nationalism and society. To begin with, the original basis for a comparative study of the origins of the PNV and ETA was based on the assumption that there was some commonality between two nationalist parties representing the same ethnic group. Consistent with a Gramscian perspective emphasizing the political content of nationalism, there should also be some commonality between nationalist and non-nationalist parties that represent similar political ideologies. The relations between ETA and the Spanish leftist parties operating in Euzkadi would provide a very fertile case study for such research.

Another avenue for further work is a Gramscian analysis of Spanish nationalism. If Gramsci's work provides a valid framework for the analysis of periphery nationalism it will also be applicable to core nationalism or state nationalism. In Spanish history there are two moments that are deserving of study and would provide excellent material for the study of core nationalism. The first moment is at the end of the 19th century when

Spain's position in the world was in decline and there was a very acute awareness of Spain's situation among Spanish intellectuals. The second moment is during the Franco regime when nationalism became a fundamental link in State ideology.

Finally, the necessary historical limits of this study have left the topic of ETA's adaptation to post-Franco Spain open for further research. The integral role within ETA ideology that was fulfilled by the oppressive nature of the regime left a major gap in ETA ideology once the regime disappeared in 1975. The democratization of the Spanish State and the survival of ETA poses the question of how ETA has survived as a radical organization poised against the Spanish State when the State has experienced such fundamental changes.

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