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**LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ
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NIETZSCHE
AND
THE GRAND POLITICS OF AUTHORITY

by

ALEX McINTYRE

A thesis
presented to Carleton University
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Political Science

Ottawa, Canada

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THESIS ABSTRACT

The thesis which this dissertation attempts to demonstrate is that Nietzsche's philosophy is fundamentally a political theory of authority: i.e., a grand politics of authority. This basic argument is advanced through the three following points. First, every being presupposes a sense of eternity or an "unhistorical" horizon in order to be happy and healthy. However, with memory and the concomitant sense of history, man alone has no eternal horizons. The dilemma of the human condition is that man comes into being through history and yet he must transcend history in order to be happy. It is my contention that, for Nietzsche, authority fulfills this fundamental need for the illusion of eternity. Thus authority represents the Apollonian power of drawing unhistorical boundaries around man's experience.

This would seem to imply that authority is exclusively Apollonian. However, I shall argue that Nietzsche aspires to an affirmative concept of authority through the wedding of Apollo and Dionysus or being and becoming. Hence, the second point: while the Apollonian illusion of being is essential to the existence of a perspective, this illusion is affirmative and healthy only through the Dionysian will to power or becoming. Therefore, authority is truly affirmative to the extent that it is the self-mastery of the will to power. This affirmative concept of authority is a dynamic one which is realized through the self-overcoming of history that Nietzsche symbolizes in the three metamorphoses of the spirit: the camel, the lion and the child.

The third point in this argument is that, through the realization of the child-spirit, man not only transcends history; he also overcomes humanity in the Overman. Authority is affirmative in and through the Overman's transcendence of the historical and the human world.

One of the fundamental paradoxes of Nietzsche's thought derives from his attempt to reconcile his philosophy of pure becoming with his anti-historicism. I argue that Nietzsche's grand politics of authority resolves this dilemma through the reconciliation of being and becoming in the concept of authority.

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I wish to express my deep gratitude to Professor Tom Darby for introducing me to the political philosophy of Nietzsche and his constant encouragement for this project. As my supervisor, he has also been an ardent and relentless critic who has immeasurably improved the clarity of the arguments developed in the thesis. I also wish to thank Professor Peter Emberley for his guidance and careful criticism throughout the preparation of this dissertation. I am especially indebted to Professor Jacques Chevalier for his exuberant imagination and incisive commentary on the emerging manuscript.

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INTRODUCTION

Given Nietzsche's reputation as a solitary and Dionysian immoralist full of contempt for politics, an analysis of his conception of authority might seem an odd choice for a dissertation. However, it is my contention that Nietzsche's philosophy is a grand politics aimed at the conception of a polity governed by master-morality. More than this, I shall argue that the concept of authority plays an absolutely central role in his grand politics.

Two questions must be addressed before I can turn to a brief delineation of my thesis concerning Nietzsche's grand politics of authority. First, why concentrate on the concept of authority?; and, second, why should I examine this concept through the philosophy of Nietzsche?

With regard to the first point, interest in the role of pre-reflective thought and thus tradition and authority in human activity has been renewed through the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. In particular, the concept of the "life-world" has focused attention upon man's pre-conscious worldliness and in a way that is not merely intellectual but sensual and perceptual. The significance of the concept of the "life-world" is that, as Gadamer argues, it highlights the importance of tradition, authority and prejudice in human existence: "That is why the prejudices of the individual, far more than his [conscious] judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being."¹ Long before one

begins to reflect self-consciously on oneself, one understands oneself and the world in a self-evident way ~~through~~ the authority of prejudices and traditions. Before the world is bifurcated into hardened categories of "subjectivity" and "objectivity," one lives and participates intuitively in the world through a sensuous and perceptual worldliness.

In a very real sense, contemporary phenomenology has elaborated and advanced Burke's appreciation of the pre-reflective life of authority which he identifies through the concepts of "prescription" and "the coat of prejudice." He is one of the first to philosophically address the notions of tradition and authority as essential to political life. Burke begins the theoretical investigation of "exteriority," as I shall call it following Plessner and Zijderveld², and its role in authority: i.e., man is not an abstract and self-conscious subjectivity but rather exists outside of himself in and through a pre-predicative "objective spirit"; and hence the exteriority of the coat of prejudice is intrinsic to his being.

Aside from these theoretical advances, authority and its historic decline have received increasing recognition as fundamental parts of the emergence of the modern state. Through the work of Robert Nisbet, Hannah Arendt and John Schaar³, we have been made aware of the intimate relationship between the disintegration of religion and traditional authority and the development of the mass, bureaucratic state. Indeed, the decay of authority involves a paradoxical liberation of the individual from the constraints of tradition which

is, at the same time, the liberation of the state from the limitations of authority: hence, the loss of authority leads to the atomization of the individual and the expansion and centralization of power in the hands of the state.

The radical fragmentation of social life along with the centralization of state power has cultivated an historicist conception of authority as "ideology," "propaganda" and "legitimation." This is especially true of Marxist political theory which reduces authority to a utilitarian function of social power. Authority is merely the ideological mystification that legitimizes the power of a ruling class or strata, notwithstanding the "relative autonomy" that is occasionally conceded to the "superstructures." The reduction of authority to an epiphenomenon of power through the theory of legitimation betrays not merely a fundamental inversion of their true status but the death of authority itself.

It is not surprising that this theoretical and historical recognition of authority have occurred together because it is only when authority is in decline, when it is under attack, that it can be truly addressed philosophically. Hence, Plato founded philosophy in and through the persistent questioning of the authoritative convictions and customs of the city. The love of wisdom entails an attack on exteriority or the authoritative prejudices in order to ascend to the naked truth. Authority and philosophy have traditionally been enemies and it is only through contemporary phenomenology and the historic decline of authority that philosophy has begun to approach authority.

in a less antagonistic fashion. And this happened not out of nostalgia but out of the real political and philosophical nihilism that accompanies the loss of authority. Nihilism is the consequence of the void of authority because with the collapse of the pre-reflective horizon that authority ensures, philosophy itself is thrown into crisis. Reason and reflection lose their roots in objective spirit and withdraw into the solipsism of pure subjectivity. The paradox arises that authority can only become the subject of political philosophy when philosophical thought itself is sagging under the weight of nihilism. Authority is thus no longer a lived reality and yet only in this void does it become a philosophical question of the first order for political thought.

The second question is why I have chosen Nietzsche as the subject for an examination of the concept of authority. My contention is that Nietzsche is of decisive importance for political philosophy because (a) he departs fundamentally from both classical and modern metaphysics and (b) he is primarily concerned with the relationship between time, affirmation and order: i.e., with the nature of being. First, Nietzsche confronts philosophy with a radically immanent conception of becoming which precludes any notion of being. Yet at the same time, Nietzsche combines the philosophy of pure becoming with a strident anti-historicism.⁴ Hence, he shares the metaphysical assumptions of neither classical nor modern philosophy. However, Nietzsche's anti-historicism compels him to develop a notion of being that is immanent to pure becoming, and from this concern with time and

order, Nietzsche formulates his most basic argument: in order to be happy, affirmative and healthy, man must impose the illusion of being upon the reality of becoming--an eternal Apollonian world of order must be created out of the terror and chaos of Dionysian disorder.

Notwithstanding his essentially Dionysian philosophy of pure becoming, Nietzsche argues that being and Apollonian order arise of necessity from becoming. This Apollonian dynamic leads Nietzsche to formulate a political philosophy of being, order and authority. Hence, Nietzsche's grand politics of authority is constructed around a fundamental paradox: the Apollonian illusion of being is created from the Dionysian reality of becoming and thus the former must overcome and, at the same time, affirm the latter. Grand politics forms a world of being out of becoming through illusion and the constraints of perspective. Form is introduced into chaos through the more or less fixed horizons of one's perspective; boundaries circumscribe man's world and authority is the historical practice by which man protects the illusory character of this order.

By arguing an anti-historicist philosophy of becoming, Nietzsche is thereby compelled to elaborate a concept of being as pure illusion and, at the same time, he must demonstrate that the illusion of eternal order is accepted not as illusion but truth! This is to say that Nietzsche is compelled to develop a political philosophy and a theory of authority. It is central to his argument that Apollonian boundaries be drawn around experience and, further, that these barriers become laws; indeed, it is significant that the Greek word

for law (Nomos) retains the root meaning of boundary or limit.⁵

Nietzsche's political philosophy blends the Apollonian sanctification of boundaries with the Dionysian violation of old limits and creation of new ones. Thus, Nietzsche's anti-historicism culminates in a political theory of order, law and authority.

In this thesis, therefore, I shall argue that, in spite of his reputed Dionysianism, Nietzsche seeks an Apollonian mastery of the power of Dionysus; or, more precisely put, an Apollonian order emerges from the self-mastery of the Dionysian. The realization of this project entails the elaboration of a political philosophy of order and authority. The thesis that I wish to argue and demonstrate concerning Nietzsche's grand politics of authority may be summarized in the following three points.

First, man alone among the animals has no eternal horizons (FW/GS 143) and yet his happiness and strength are contingent upon his belief that law and truth are eternal. While the animal lives unhistorically in pure becoming through forgetfulness, man remembers a portion of his experience and thus lives, to a certain extent, historically. The boundaries of the animal's life are narrow and fixed but horizons of man's perspective are much broader and intrinsically unsettled. Man only becomes a man through remembrance and history but he requires the stable boundaries of forgetfulness and the unhistorical if he is to be happy.

Nietzsche portrays the dilemma of the human condition clearly in this balance of history and the unhistorical. On the one hand, it is

a universal law that a living being can only be strong, creative and happy within a secure, unhistorical horizon (UII/UAH, I); on the other hand, man's memory renders the boundaries of his perspective forever insecure. The primary role of forgetfulness is partially compromised by human remembrance and, with it, the preconditions for strength and creativity.

The natural primacy of the unhistorical must be protected from the debilitating encroachment of history and, Nietzsche argues, this is the crucial function of authority. A human perspective may be granted the pre-human sense of eternal horizons through the trans-historical walls that authority builds around man's life-world. In particular, revelation and tradition are the two modes by which authority sanctifies and protects the unhistorical from disintegrative effects of historical questioning (A/AC 57). Authority acts not so much to create the unhistorical horizons of a life-world as to render the illusion of order as unquestionable as a pious illusion or a holy lie.

Man, the only animal without eternal horizons, must live in and through the illusion of absolute boundaries and hence authority is the essential precondition of human health and creativity. Apollo is the god who defines and simplifies the world "by drawing boundary lines" (GT/BT IX) and it would seem to follow that authority, as the sanctification of the limits, is fundamentally Apollonian. However, I will argue that Nietzsche aspires to an affirmative concept of authority and this implies the wedding of Apollo and Dionysus, spirit and body or being and the creative eros of the will to power.

Hence, the second argument that I shall stress in elaborating Nietzsche's grand politics of authority is the following: while the constraints of Apollo are essential to the health of a perspective, Dionysus is the affirmative force of the will to power. In contradistinction to the serene world of being, the will to power is the overflowing creativity of becoming and is conceived, by Nietzsche, as an instinctive force of the body. Indeed, the body is the locus for man's true self because the creative and affirmative eros of the will to power resides in the body rather than the spirit. The grand politics of authority aspires, therefore, not simply to the imposition of being upon becoming but to the spiritualization of the Dionysian will to power; the Apollonian world should not suppress and oppose the power of the Dionysian but preserve its affirmative strength while sublimating it. Authority is truly affirmative to the extent that it is the self-mastery of the will to power in which being and becoming or spirit and body are harmonized.

The corollary of this point is that the spiritualization of the will to power is a protracted pedagogy of the spirit that aspires to a self-mastery which affirms life. Moreover, Nietzsche uses the term, "morality," in its best sense (as "master-morality") to refer to this cultivation of the self-mastery of the will to power. Morality constitutes the sublimation of the body through Apollonian spirit to a higher form of life. The importance of morality as the sublimation and spiritualization of Dionysian power is generally recognized and appreciated in the secondary literature on Nietzsche.⁶ However, it is

less commonly recognized that the very dynamic of history and remembrance, which undermines the unhistorical horizons of animal life and initiates spirit, also makes it possible, through the self-overcoming of history, to ascend from the unhistorical to the super-historical life. This constitutes the fundamental thesis of this dissertation: Nietzsche does not propose a static concept of authority through the simple assertion of the necessity of an Apollonian world of being; rather, he argues that, precisely through his power of remembrance, man can elevate authority from the unhistorical to the super-historical, through the self-overcoming of history!

In short, Nietzsche's anti-historicist argument for Apollonian horizons to man's sense of history does not lead him to a static concept of authority. On the contrary, since the Dionysian will to power is the force of affirmation, it follows that an affirmative notion of authority must descend into pure becoming through an excess of history in order to discover the necessity of illusion and limited horizons. My contention is, therefore, that Nietzsche formulates a three-fold pedagogy of the spirit culminating in an affirmative concept of authority! Since I am arguing that this pedagogy of the spirit constitutes the basic structure of Nietzsche's philosophy, I have divided the thesis into three sections to demonstrate that the grand politics of authority corresponds to these metamorphoses of the spirit which are symbolized, by Nietzsche, as the camel, the lion and the child (Z; I. 1). This tripartite structure may be summarized in

the following way.

First, Nietzsche establishes the concept of perspective as a balance of history and the unhistorical in which authority narrows a people's perspective (J/BGE 188) through a protracted obedience to the imperatives of custom and tradition. The camel symbolizes a reverence and awe for what Nietzsche calls the "Thou shalt" of the pious illusion. I have called this "the pedagogy of constraint" because, for the camel-spirit, the boundaries of thought and action are narrowed and infused with an imperious sanctity that precludes individual action. At the same time, spirit cultivates a will to truth and knowledge through its protracted obedience to the imperative values of its culture. However, truthfulness remains subordinate here to the piety and conventions of the polis. Through this protracted unfreedom of the spirit (J/BGE 188), the will to power gradually begins to acquire an instinctive self-mastery and spiritualization (A/AC 57).

In the second stage of the spirit, however, the pursuit of the truth drives the spirit beyond the conventions of the city. The very devotion and reverence of the camel to the moral imperatives of the "Thou shalt" compel it to struggle for freedom from the authority of the unhistorical. Authority functioned to narrow the perimeters of thought and action for the camel-spirit and hence it becomes an obstacle for the freedom of the lion. An excess of history leads the spirit to dissolve the veil of the unhistorical and to descend into becoming. With the demystification of the Apollonian world of being,

the lion discovers illusion and caprice in the most holy and authoritative values (Z, I, 1).

I contend, however, that, far from ending in the complete destruction of authority, Nietzsche views this descent into becoming as the self-overcoming of history and the beginning of the cultivation of an affirmative, super-historical authority. By removing the veil of authority, the accidental and illusory nature of the imperative values is revealed to the spirit. Moreover, the necessity of the unhistorical and the whole apparatus of exteriority (i.e., Burke's "coat of prejudice") is equally disclosed to man. Having discovered illusion and forgetfulness as the fundamental condition of every action, an excess of history cures man of taking history too seriously (UW/UAH, I). The lion-spirit learns that accident and illusion belong to the perfection and innocence of becoming; further, in amor fati he learns to love this fate because therein the world stands complete and fulfills itself in every moment (Loc. Cit.).

Like Plato, Nietzsche portrays knowledge as a force that takes man outside the city to the true nature of things. Moreover, both philosophers discover a trans-historical plenitude through overcoming of the authority of the polis; for Plato, this wholeness resides in pure being whereas for Nietzsche, it manifests itself in pure becoming. In both cases, authority poses an obstacle to the realization of the super-historical life, although Nietzsche ultimately returns to a higher form of authority.

The child symbolizes the reconciliation of the world of being with

the reality of becoming and thus signifies the unity of authority and affirmation. The descent of the lion-spirit has shown that forgetfulness and the illusion of being are intrinsic to becoming itself. If the highest will to power is the imposition of being upon becoming (WM/ WP 617), then the child-spirit represents the self-imposition of being by becoming (the will to power). In summary, Nietzsche has argued that man requires the illusion of being or eternity in order to be healthy and authority secures the unhistorical boundaries from the encroachment of history; however, through history itself, the power that undermined pure forgetfulness, Nietzsche discovers a pedagogy of the spirit beyond history to an affirmative and super-historical form of authority.

The third hypothesis that this thesis will attempt to demonstrate is the following: man is the animal that surrenders the security of eternal horizons with the power of remembrance and thus, in overcoming history, man overcomes himself in the Overman. Nietzsche argues that man is a bridge from animal to Overman (Z, Prologue, 4) and the pedagogy of the spirit from the camel to the child culminates in a supra-human form of life. The grand politics of authority is inseparable from Overman because (a) the illusion of eternal horizons that authority creates is essential for true life; and (b) only by overcoming man and history can authority become truly affirmative. Nietzsche insists that true polity rests on the authority of the Overman in whom the world stand complete and eternal.

The three propositions that structure my thesis may be summarized

in this way: (1) man needs the illusion of being and eternity which authority creates; (2) however, since becoming is the source of affirmation, man must reconcile being and becoming (Apollo and Dionysus), through a pedagogy of the spirit leading to an affirmative, super-historical authority; and (3) the highest authority is realized in the Overman. ⁶

The method that I have used to investigate this topic has been dictated, to a large extent, by the subject itself. Of necessity, I have concentrated on primary sources because the number of critical examinations devoted to Nietzsche as a political theorist still remains surprisingly small. Even more constraining is the fact that there are no works that deal specifically with the question of authority in Nietzsche's political philosophy.

It seems to me that the recent reinterpretations of Nietzsche by French authors, demonstrating his contributions to ontology and semiotics, have been of immense benefit to philosophy as a whole. With the notable exceptions of Farbe, Deleuze and Granier, the implications of this research for ethics and political philosophy have yet to be explicated to any extent. Moreover, where Nietzsche is recognized as a political thinker, he is often represented in a purely critical or negative sense. Arendt, in particular, sees Nietzsche as one of the closing chapters of modernity and its collapse into privacy. There is therefore a decided reluctance on her part to accept Nietzsche as political philosopher who adds positively to the tradition.⁷ While Nietzsche does fulfill the negative role that

Arendt ascribes to him, I shall attempt to demonstrate that he goes much farther and tries to prepare a new concept of authority.

Particularly illuminating for my investigation of Nietzsche's theory of authority has been the work of Granier, Farbe and Strong. Jean Granier's explication of the relationship between history, politics and power in Nietzsche's thought is exceptionally insightful in clarifying the anti-historicist character of his philosophy.

Unfortunately, Granier deals with Nietzsche's political thought as a secondary and derivative dimension of his work and thus many seminal ideas are undeveloped. Farbe, on the other hand, devotes one of her books on Nietzsche exclusively to his political contributions.⁸ She is especially sensitive to the interrelated roles of affirmation, tragedy and the Dionysian in the remedy for nihilism. Moreover, she clarifies the centrality of grand politics for Nietzsche's revaluation of the highest values. However, she does not explicitly relate his ideas to traditional political concepts like authority or power. As a result, Farbe's review of Nietzsche's political concepts tends to remain a static contrast of nihilistic versus affirmative politics.

Although he was not concerned specifically with the concept of authority, Tracy Strong has contributed the most thorough and sophisticated study of Nietzsche's political philosophy. In particular, he argues that Nietzsche is essentially a political thinker who conceives of grand politics as the creation of a "life-form." Of singular importance is the attention Strong devotes to the understanding of Nietzsche's perspectivism through the notions of the

unquestioned and the unquestionable. The use of Wittgenstein's concept of "the life-form" is extremely illuminating with regard to Nietzsche's perspectivism and the role of authority in sanctifying the unhistorical horizons. However, the relationship between history and the unhistorical is interpreted in largely static terms which do not easily account for the pedagogy of the spirit in Nietzsche's grand politics. My contention is that authority is cultivated through the camel, lion and child by the self-overcoming of history. Hence, authority as the unhistorical is fundamentally different from the super-historical, affirmative form. Tracy Strong's research into Nietzsche's conception of a new and affirmative form of life remains the most independent and insightful examination of Nietzsche as a political philosopher.

To conclude, the central difficulty in the interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy involves the problem of reconciling his metaphysics of pure becoming with his anti-historicism. My thesis attempts to demonstrate that the grand politics of authority resolves this dilemma by showing how Nietzsche himself reconciles being and becoming in the concept of authority.

ENDNOTES:

1. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Sheed & Ward Ltd. (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), p.245.
2. Anton C. Zijderveld, The Abstract Society, A Cultural Analysis of our Time (New York: Doubleday/Anchor Books, 1971), pp.24ff. & pp.33ff.
3. My argument relies heavily on these authors and the following works: Robert Nisbet, Power and Community (New York: A Galaxy Book, 1962); Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future, Eight Exercises in Political Thought (London: Penguin Books, 1977); John H. Schaar, "Legitimacy in the Modern State," in Power and Community, P. Green & S. Levinson, editors (New York: Pantheon, 1970). Also of great importance in this regard is the work of Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (New York: W.W. Morton, 1957) and Bertrand de Jouvenel, On Power, trans. J.F. Huntington (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).
4. Cf. Jean Granier, Le Problème de la vérité dans La philosophie de Nietzsche (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966), p.403.
5. See F.M. Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy, A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957), especially chapter one; "Destiny and Law".
6. This is particularly true of Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 4th Edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), especially chapters 7 and 8; and Jean Granier, Le Problème de la vérité dans la philosophie de Nietzsche (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966), Book 2, chapter 2, part 2, pp.411-461.

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7. Cf. "Tradition and the Modern Age," in Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future, Eight Exercises in Political Thought (London: Penguin Books, 1977).

8. Cf. Simone Goyard Farbe, Nietzsche et la question politique (Paris: Editions Sirey, 1977).

Section One: THE CAMEL.

Chapter One

THE WALLS OF AUTHORITY.

It has proven impossible to build a culture upon knowledge.
Friedrich Nietzsche

For man alone, so we have been taught for some centuries now, is the source of all demand, command, and call with which he finds himself addressed, and their imputation to a nature barren of mind is no more than an anthropomorphic liberty.

At any rate, the contention...that something like an "ought" can issue only from man and is alien to everything outside him, is more than a descriptive statement: it is part of a metaphysical position, which has never given full account of itself. To ask for such account is to reopen the ontological question of human within total existence. Ontology may yet relocate the foundation of "ought" from the ego of man, to which it has been relegated, to the nature of being in general.

Hans Jonas

The contemporary situation in which "the ego of man" and especially his knowledge have become the foundation of value is characterized by the incommensurability of man and nature. The ethical and political realms have witnessed a corresponding dichotomy between an abstract and worldless freedom and a coercive and external image of authority. The subjectivism of the modern era derives historically from the radical duality of a purely extramundane and spiritual soul for whom nature, the body and polity are the mundane tombs of the soul. This revolutionary disintegration of humanity and nature eventually culminates in the Cartesian opposition of the worldless res cogitans, the locus of freedom and reality, and the

inanimate and mechanistic res extensa, or the body and the material world.

With the reduction of nature to the inert and mechanistic categories of extension, knowledge too becomes increasingly synonymous with objectification, measurement and calculation. "This means that the lifeless has become the knowable par excellence and is for that reason also considered the true and only foundation for reality."¹

The significance of this disruption of man and nature is not only the subjectification of man but also the conquest of ethical and political thought by the categories of extension and science. With this, there is an attempt made to establish lifeless knowledge as the foundation of culture and, with the lifelessness of knowledge the unity of man and nature as well as freedom and authority is eroded.

Nietzsche insists that nature and humanity need not exist in a relationship which negates life and power. Indeed, for the nobility of the tragic world of Greece, there was no ethical realm of manifest law and freedom which was not, at the same time, embodied within nature and character (ethos). Hegel recognizes, in the tragic Sittlichkeit or "ethical life," an immediacy which resists the explicit knowledge of self-consciousness. Moreover, divine law enshrined in the family, presided over human law and the ethical action of free subjectivity.² In a similar way, the pre-Socratic culture of the Greeks subordinates the manifest law of the polis to the unwritten law of religion, tradition and poetry.

The spirit which is manifest to the light of day has the roots of its power in the lower world: the certainty felt by a nation, a certainty which is sure of itself and which makes itself assured, finds the truth of its oath binding all its members into one, solely in the mute unconscious substance of all, in the waters of forgetfulness.³

The immediate unity of spirit and nature, the conscious and the unconscious, concedes to a people a distinct character, ethos, and natural custom. It is, however, the authority of forgetfulness which makes law natural, binding and certain. Authority rests upon that which is never "manifest to the light of day".⁴ Hence, justice presupposes an authority which is mute and, like nature, never fully unveils itself.⁵

In attempting his own genealogy of morality, Nietzsche returns to the tragic conception of authority in the ethico-political realm as an authority based in nature, custom (ethos), and character(ethos). Underlying Nietzsche's lifelong concern for culture is the conviction that every people requires a fundamental imperative "in accordance with which the people is to live--that is, can live . . ." (A/AC 57; Nietzsche's Emphasis). At the foundation of every living culture is an imperative "truth," an existential morality, which breathes life into a people. This is, in short, Nietzsche's attempt to "relocate the foundation of "ought" from the ego of man...to the nature of being in general".⁶

The manner in which Nietzsche accomplishes this mission may best be explicated by means of the following division of the argument:

A/ Perspectivism, Remembrance and Forgetfulness;

B/ Instinct and Daimon;

C/ Authority, Tradition and Revelation.

A/ PERSPECTIVISM, REMEMBRANCE and FORGETFULNESS.

Perspectivism forms the basis of Nietzsche's endeavour to embed consciousness in the existential realities of nature, the body and action. Nietzsche's critique of consciousness and free will entails not only the attempt to place boundaries around reason but more fundamentally involves a redefinition of reason itself. Reason is no longer self-grounding and transparent for it presupposes the pre-reflective and unconscious creation of limitations and therefore form. Consciousness necessarily implies a finite perspective and, furthermore, a perspective defined by a limited remembrance of an historical past; it implies a memory bounded by partial forgetfulness.

Nietzsche contrasts animality and humanity, a distinction which traverses human existence itself, with reference to these two powers of forgetfulness and remembrance:

Consider the herds that are feeding yonder: they know not the meaning of yesterday or today; He [i.e. man] wonders also about himself--that he cannot learn to forget, but hangs on the past: however far or fast he runs, that chain runs with him. It is matter for wonder: the moment that is here and gone, that was nothing before and nothing after, returns like a specter to trouble the quiet

of a later moment. . . . Then he says, "I remember. . .," and envies the beast that forgets at once and sees every moment really die, sink into night and mist, extinguished forever. The beast lives unhistorically; for it "goes into" the present, like a number, without leaving any curious remainder. It cannot dissimulate, it conceals nothing; at every moment it seems what it actually is, and thus can be nothing that is not honest. (Ull/UAH, I; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

Here Nietzsche defines the distinct mode of being-human as the animal which has partially overcome its animality by remembering certain things and thereby acquiring a past, at the expense, however, of the present, the eternal present of animality. Moreover, being-human coincides with historical existence inasmuch as consciousness and remembrance are intrinsic to one another.

However, Nietzsche insists that memory is also a sickness and "a dark invisible burden" (Loc. Cit.) while forgetfulness represents not only animality but life, health and nature. Man is, in short, a divided soul (cf. GM, II, 16) and a field of combat within which natural forgetfulness opposes artificial memory.

Now this naturally forgetful animal, for whom oblivion represents a power, a form of strong health, has created for itself an opposite power, that of remembering, by whose aid, in certain cases, oblivion may be suspended. . . . (Ibid., II, 1; Emphasis Added)

Nietzsche's thesis is that the life of any living thing can only be preserved and enhanced when enclosed within a perspective or

horizon. Happiness, health and creativity depend upon the subordination of remembrance (and therefore of consciousness, free will and history) to the natural power of forgetfulness and the unhistorical. The "night and mist" (UW/UAH, I) of unconsciousness concede man access to the happiness of the unhistorical present.

But in the smallest and greatest happiness there is always one thing that makes it happiness: the power of forgetting, or...capacity of feeling "unhistorically" throughout its duration. One who cannot leave himself behind on the threshold of the moment and forget the past, who cannot stand on a single point, like a goddess of victory, without fear or giddiness, will never know what happiness is; . . . but life in any true sense is absolutely impossible without forgetfulness. . . . This is a universal law: a living thing can only be healthy, strong, and productive within a certain horizon; if it is incapable of drawing one round itself, or too selfish to lose its own view in another's, it will come to an untimely end. (Ibid., I; Emphasis Added)

The greatness of both an individual and a culture presupposes "the veil of the unhistorical" (Loc. Cit.), the power to let the reins drop and become "enveloped in the dust-cloud of the unhistorical" (Loc. Cit.).

Four basic points may be identified in Nietzsche's concept of perspectivity as a balance of remembrance and forgetfulness. First, there are two basic drives in being-human: forgetfulness and remembrance or the aesthetic and epistemic drives. The former, the "faculty of oblivion" (GM, II, 1), is the active veiling, screening and withholding from consciousness in order to create and maintain the

boundaries of a perspective. Blindness, the active not seeing of many things, is an essential part of self-preservation, a maintenance of "order and etiquette in the household of the psyche" (Loc. Cit.). This active forgetfulness is also a part of what Nietzsche calls good taste and the instinct for self-preservation (cf. EH, II, 8).

The second drive is that of remembrance or the epistemic. Similarly, remembrance is not a passive but an active continuation of a past action: "an active not wishing to be done with it, a continuing to will what has once been willed, a veritable 'memory of the will'" (GM, II, 1). It is important to note that the adjective, "active," does not mean "conscious" or "freely willed," as will become clearer as Nietzsche's thought is explicated. The most important implication of active remembrance is that this drive involves the capacity for causal thought. Indeed, it presupposes the distinction between the necessary and the contingent, cause and effect, and thus the calculation of future possibilities (cf. Loc. Cit.). Temporality is implied in causal thought because the identification of cause and effect entails the reference of certain events to previous situations in the past. While the aesthetic orientation of forgetfulness concentrates on the immediate, "the perspective of the foreground" (WM/WP 804), the epistemic force of remembrance calculates the more remote consequences based on causal links between past and future. The latter cultivates a perspective of the background (cf. Loc. Cit.; GM, II, 1; J/BGE 229).

The second point in Nietzsche's theory of the perspective is that

the two must be united, albeit under the guiding force of forgetfulness, in order to preserve and enhance a perspective. The point of Nietzsche's critique of consciousness is not to abolish reason and remembrance but to circumscribe their roles and capabilities. The existence of a form or perspective necessarily entails both the distinction and the unity of remembrance and forgetfulness.

Cheerfulness, a good conscience, and belief in the future presuppose horizons limited by the pre-reflective obscurity of the unhistorical. "This is the point the reader is asked to consider: that the unhistorical and the historical are equally necessary to the health of an individual, a community, and a system of culture."

(UII/UAH, I; Emphasis Added)

The third point to which Nietzsche devotes particular attention is that concerning the natural priority of the instinct of forgetfulness over remembrance. Nietzsche is fundamentally hostile to the usual priority assigned to consciousness and the epistemological subject in general. The essential preconditions of any perspective and, therefore, of consciousness itself are the establishment and maintenance of the boundaries of visibility. By implication, this means that a degree of invisibility and blindness must be secured, for without the unhistorical we would be "condemned to see 'becoming' everywhere" (Loc. Cit.). The conclusion that Nietzsche reaches on the relation or hierarchy of forgetfulness and remembrance is unambiguous:

...and so we may hold the capacity of feeling...unhistorically to be the more important and elemental, as providing the foundation of every sound and real growth, everything that is truly great and human. (Loc. Cit.; Emphasis Added)

The discipline of knowledge is a subordinate and profoundly negative act inasmuch as it is "essentially a brake upon immediate reactions on the basis of instinctive judgments" (WM/WP 804; Emphasis Added). The will to knowledge is secondary to the will to forget simply because 'man is a "naturally forgetful animal" (GM, II, 1) whose fundamental will is the will to the superficial, the veil and the aesthetic (cf. J/BGE 229 & 230). The successful attempt to overcome ignorance and illusion would undermine the very conditions of existence of a perspective as such and therefore of life "in any true sense" (UII/UAH, I). The inferiority of consciousness to forgetfulness does not however imply that the will to knowledge is irreconcilably antithetical to the aesthetic drive of nature.

O sancta simplicitas! What strange simplification and falsification mankind lives in! . . . how we have from the very beginning understood how to retain our ignorance so as to enjoy an almost inconceivable freedom, frivolity, impetuosity, bravery, cheerfulness of life, so as to enjoy life! And only now on this now firm and granite basis of ignorance has knowledge hitherto been able to rise up, the will to knowledge on the basis of a far more powerful will, the will to non-knowledge, to the uncertain, to the untrue. Not as its antithesis but--as its refinement! (J/BGE 24; Emphasis Added)

Nietzsche's critique of consciousness is therefore not simply a rejection of remembrance and knowledge but constitutes the affirmation of nature and the body: indeed the very bodiliness of consciousness. With Nietzsche, there is no antithesis of ideality and materiality or of soul and body. In fact, "'being conscious' is in no decisive sense the opposite of the instinctive" (J/BGE 3; Nietzsche's Emphasis). The conscious ego, the "little intelligence" (Z, I, 4; cf. WM/WP 676), is only a tool and an instrument of the body, the "great intelligence" (Loc. Cit.). Higher than the free will, consciousness or the ego is the body, which Nietzsche calls the Self. "Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, stands a mighty commander, an unknown sage--he is called Self. He lives in your body, he is your body." (Loc. Cit.) Clearly this Body/Self cannot be placed over against the ego as pure materiality in opposition to pure intelligibility, for this Body is itself "a higher, comprehensive intellect" (WM/WP 676).

On the one hand, Nietzsche recalls consciousness to its subordinate position as a lesser intelligence relative to the Self. On the other hand, he emphasizes the creative and active character of the natural, pre-reflective Self as opposed to the negative or "braking" function of the ego. It is on the basis of this more comprehensive intelligence which precedes any divorce between ideality and materiality (and certainly not out of any irrationalism) that Nietzsche exclaims: "We are in the phase of the modesty of consciousness." (Loc. Cit.) For the conscious ego is only a "little instrument and toy of your great intelligence" (Z, I, 4), the Self/Body.

Moreover, the modesty of consciousness is illustrated in the fact that it "is a surface" (EH, II, 9; Nietzsche's Emphasis). It is the Body, in all its unconscious forgetfulness that is the source of creation and action while the ego is essentially critical and reactive. It is only the perversion of Socrates, Plato and Christianity, Nietzsche argues, which inverts this natural hierarchy.

Whereas in all truly productive men, instinct is the strong, affirmative force and reason (Bewusstsein) the dissuader and critic, in the case of Socrates the roles are reversed: instinct is the critic, consciousness (Bewusstsein) the creator. Truly a monstrosity! (GT/BT XIII)

The relocation of the "ought" from the ego of man to the animal dimension of forgetfulness is expressed not only in Nietzsche's critique of consciousness but in the priority which Nietzsche assigns to the unconscious or, better, pre-reflective wisdom of the Body/Self. Consciousness can and should be only a means and a tool of "a powerful life-giving influence...if it is guided and dominated by a higher force...serves an unhistorical power" (UW/UAH, I).

The final and, from Nietzsche's point of view, the most important aspect of perspectivism is the argument that forgetfulness and the unhistorical are the preconditions for mastery, creation and growth: i.e., the feeling of growth and power. "Forgetfulness is a property of all action" (Loc. Cit.) and is thereby the foundation of any perspective and, ultimately, a culture. However, the horizon is not only a metaphysical and cultural form but also the form of the Self.

And the oppositon of the historical and the unhistorical is fundamentally that of the feeling of these two forces. It is the capacity to feel unhistorically that Nietzsche identifies as the power to create: i.e., as the will to power. "The unhistorical is like the surrounding atmosphere that can alone create life and in whose annihilation, life itself disappears." (Loc. Cit.; Emphasis Added)

The capacity of feeling unhistorically and of leaving oneself behind on the threshold of the present moment is, for Nietzsche, the feeling of power and growth; it is the will to power which alone constitutes and creates real life and happiness. By the term, "will to power," he seems to understand both the power to enclose and confine the will itself within specific limits as well as the power to overcome these horizons through growth or the assimilation of the new to the old. The will to power is not simply the desire to preserve oneself (the will to life) but, more than this, it is the will for growth, expansion or an endlessly self-transcending eros. Nietzsche's formulation of this eros-force in both his early and late works is remarkably similar: "I mean the power of specifically growing out of one's self, of making the past and the strange one body with the near, and the present, of healing wounds, replacing what is lost, repairing broken molds." (Loc. Cit.) Twelve years later, in 1886, when the concept of the will to power had achieved its mature expression, he articulates this idea in the following way:

That commanding something which the people calls
"spirit" wants to be master within itself and around

itself and to feel itself master Its intention in all this is the incorporation of new "experiences," the arrangement of new things within old divisions--growth, that is to say; more precisely, the feeling of growth, the feeling of increased power. (J/BGE 230; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

The will to power, the desire to grow out of one's self, has nothing in common with the will to life or the desire for self-preservation. The corollary of this conception of the will to power is that pleasure is not the end or purpose of the will. Hence, Hobbes' theory of life as motion and man as the seeker of ever greater power superficially resembles Nietzsche's will to power that neither seeks pleasure nor avoids pain. They both seem to argue that any given power seeks to become more powerful and, in this pursuit, tries to overcome and command other powers; pleasure is simply the feeling of increased power and displeasure is the experience of a resistance to one's will to power.⁷

However, the apparent coincidence of these two thinkers on this conception of the will to power falls down on a number of points. First, Hobbes' desire of power for more power is a second-order phenomenon which arises out of a transformation of a first-order desire for satisfaction (will to life). Only through prudence, concern for the future, does desire become the will to secure and dominate other means of acquiring more power: this involves the transformation of one's present powers into instruments for the acquisition of future power.⁸ For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the

will to power far from being the prudent metamorphosis of the will to life is itself the primordial and eternal character of the will.

Second, it follows from Nietzsche's rejection of the will to life that he does not perceive the will to power as a desire to secure or preserve life (indeed, this characterizes only slave-morality) but as the pure desire for self-transcendence (i.e., to make life as insecure as possible). Third, whereas Hobbes' conception of motion and desire is mechanical, Nietzsche categorically repudiates all causal and mechanical theories of the will (cf. J/BGE 19; & G/TI, VI, 3ff.). Fourth, while Hobbes sees pleasure as the accompaniment of increased power (or vital motion) and pain as occurring when something hinders vital motion and causes a movement away (aversion), Nietzsche resists any such separation of pleasure and pain. Indeed, pain is the necessary precondition for overcoming and hence pleasure. "It is not the satisfaction of the will that causes pleasure The feeling of pleasure lies precisely in the dissatisfaction of the will, in the fact that the will is never satisfied unless it has opponents and resistance." (WM/WP 696; cf. Ibid. 702) Pain may be distinct from pleasure but it is assuredly not its opposite since the former is the presupposition of the latter (cf. Ibid. 699).

A final characteristic and one that epitomizes his revolutionary ontology distinguishes Nietzsche's will to power from all other conceptions of the will. The will to power is not only a pre-reflective phenomenon derived from Nietzsche's critique of the epistemological subject (the "I think") and the moral subject (the "I

will"); it is pre-predicative or non-objective will that precedes all subject-object distinctions: the will to power is the radical repudiation of the very concept of the subject.

It follows from Nietzsche's critique of consciousness that he completely rejects the notion of a subject of the will, separated from the act of willing itself. There is no subject or intention which can stand outside of the will to power and use the latter as an instrument of its self-realization. Having no being in-itself, the will to power is a pure becoming without beginning or end: it is not something that has become or come into being. And hence as Deleuze writes: "Now, not being something that has become, it is no more the becoming of something."⁹

It follows from this pre-predicative notion of the will to power as pure self-transcending eros that it cannot be the instrument of an epistemological or a moral subject. The will to power exceeds or rather precedes consciousness and free will precisely because it is non-objectifiable: it is not a thing but a pathos.

If we eliminate these additions, no things remain but only dynamic quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta: their essence lies in their relation to all other quanta; in their "effect" upon the same. The will to power [is] not a being, not a becoming, but a pathos--the most elemental fact from which a becoming and effecting first emerge-- (WM/WP 635; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

To conclude this section, I have attempted to demonstrate that Nietzsche's concept of perspectivity rests upon four fundamental

theses: (1) the distinction between remembrance and forgetfulness; (2) the necessary unity of the two for any culture or polity; (3) the priority of forgetfulness over remembrance; and (4) the implication of the will to power in forgetfulness and the Self/Body: the self-transcending eros.

B/ INSTINCT and the DAIMON:

The transition from the concept of "perspective" to the notion of "instinct" would appear to take us from the realm of culture to that of psychology. However, the distinction, for Nietzsche, is a question of perspective itself. Indeed, he argues that the very existence of a perspective is predicated on the establishment of strong and healthy instincts.

I shall proceed by elaborating (1) Nietzsche's view of the Self as Body and instinct, (2) his understanding of instinct as the ground of perspective, and (3) how instinct is the condition of perfection, the Good in the masterly sense.

Nietzsche situates his revaluation of the objectified view of the body and instinct within the critique of consciousness which he saw as a growing movement in the late nineteenth century. "We are in the phase of modesty of consciousness." (Ibid. 676) However, in light of what does Nietzsche conduct this revaluation of consciousness? And is he simply transferring the traditional metaphysical attributes of "substance," "subjectivity" and "being-in-itself" to the concept of

"instinct"?

The starting point for this revaluation, Nietzsche argues, must be the Body (as the pre-objective eros) as opposed to the prevailing conception of the body (which I will distinguish from the Body by leaving it uncapitalized) as res extensa. The Body is the most suitable point of departure because it provides a concrete way of grasping "the nature of our subject-unity" (Loc. Cit.), that is, of our subjectivity as a unity of multiplicities. Indeed, the subjectivity of man is reinterpreted, by Nietzsche, in a manner that is in contrast to the Platonic and Cartesian opposition between ideality and materiality; unlike the latter, Nietzsche views the subject as identical with the Body. As a result, the ego is no longer placed over against the image of the body as objectified extension. The ego is now the "surface" (EH, II, 9) of the Body/Self, reinterpreted as subjectivity.

The body is a great intelligence, a multiplicity with one sense, a war and a peace, a herd and a herdsman.

Your little intelligence, my brother, which you call "spirit", is also an instrument of your body, a little instrument and toy of your great intelligence.

You say "I" and you are proud of this word. But greater than this... is your body and its great intelligence, which does not say "I" but performs "I". (Z, I, 4)

Nietzsche then goes on to distinguish "sense," "spirit" and "Self" and to outline the elements of a theory of transcendental subjectivity

beyond the mind-body dichotomy.

What the sense feels, what the spirit perceives, is never an end in itself. But sense and spirit would like to persuade you that they are the end of all things: they are as vain as that.

Sense and spirit are instruments and toys: behind them still lies the Self. The Self seeks with the eyes of the sense, it listens too with the ears of the spirit. (Loc. Cit.)

The multiplicities of the senses and the spirit are appropriated and organized by the Self. The former are thus instruments of the latter. In this way, the Self/Body is an active and thinking subjectivity which Nietzsche contrasts with the conscious ego. "The Self is always listening and seeking: it compares, subdues, conquers, destroys. It rules and is also the Ego's ruler." (Loc. Cit.)

However, the culmination of ~~this~~ conception of human subjectivity is the identification of the Body and the Self: "Behind your thoughts and feelings...stands a mighty commander, an unknown sage--he is called Self. He lives in your body, he is your body." (Loc. Cit.)

Nietzsche's radical reformulation of subjectivity advances the argument that the Self resides, not in the disembodied world of the conscious ego (res cogitans), but in the pre-conscious Body. Yet this corporal Self is not unthinking materiality opposed to abstract intelligibility. For Nietzsche, thought is not necessarily conscious and reflexive (cf. FW/GS 354). It is, in fact, predominantly unconscious and pre-reflexive. The Body is thus a "great intelligence" and contains "more reason" than the ego's "best wisdom"

(Z, I, 4).

The very distinction between organic and inorganic is no longer appropriate (cf. WM/WP 676), inasmuch as consciousness is a surface expression of aspects of the Body and instinctive actions (cf. J/BGE 3). Indeed, consciousness is merely the "becoming-conscious" of certain instincts and relations of instincts (dynamic quanta of power), according to Nietzsche. The rejection of the notions of "substance" and "subject" (cf. G/TI, VI, 3 & WM/WP 481ff.) gives rise to the conception of consciousness as a becoming-conscious, not of the Body as "subject," but of relations of power within the Body.

The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought and our consciousness in general? A kind of aristocracy of "cells" in which dominion resides? (WM/WP 490)

The modesty of consciousness is precisely its role as symptom or image of the political hierarchy within the Body. For the Body is a "political structure" (Ibid. 660) or, in spatial terms, "a stellar system" (Ibid. 676) in which "by far the greater number of motions have nothing whatever to do with consciousness" (Loc. Cit.).

The object of Nietzsche's attack, along with his critique of consciousness, is the very notion of causality. And in its place, he puts the will to power and the contest or struggle of a plurality of powers which eventually resolves itself into an hierarchy of command and obedience. The ego, therefore, is not an "effect" of the Body.

viewed as the "cause," for with the collapse of consciousness as subject "in itself" there has also fallen the notion of cause "in itself". Becoming-conscious is a coming-to-consciousness of a relation of command and obedience which is the political structure of the Body. The modesty of consciousness is illustrated by the fact that active powers, within the Body, are unconscious while reactive ones alone become conscious.

What is consciousness? Like Freud, Nietzsche thinks that consciousness is the region of the ego affected by the external world. Nevertheless, consciousness is defined less in relation to exteriority, in terms of the real, than in relation to superiority, in terms of values. . . . In Nietzsche, consciousness is always the consciousness of an inferior in relation to the superior to which it is subordinated or "incorporated." Consciousness is never self-consciousness, but the consciousness of an ego in relation to the self that is not conscious. It is not the master's consciousness, but the slave's consciousness in relation to a master, who does not have to be conscious of himself. "Consciousness ordinarily only appears when a whole wishes to subordinate itself to a superior whole. . . . Consciousness is born in relation to a being of which we could be the function." Such is the servility of consciousness.¹⁰ (Deleuze's Emphasis)

It is significant that the "servility of consciousness" is defined not in terms of a causal relationship with the "real," but in terms of an hierarchical relationship of value and will to power in which the inferior is subordinate to the superior. The ego exists within the subject-object duality through the representation of the world as determinate objectivity over against determinate subjectivity.

Moreover, relationships are not intrinsic to this duality but external, fortuitous and causal. The representational nature of the ego's thinking manifests itself in its causal conception of relationship.

The Self/Body, however, is the pre-reflective mind which knows nothing of the ego's representational abstractions. Since the Self pervades the Body, it can have no determinate or abstract identity. The unconscious, pre-reflective Self of the Body is precisely "the primary subjectivity ".¹¹

The corporal Self pre-exists, therefore, the abstract surreality of the ego's reflexivity, representations and causal mode of thought. In contrast to the ego's causalism, the Body is composed of relations of mastery and subservience between multiple forces or instincts. The Body is therefore a natural hierarchy of mastering or active and servile or reactive powers--that is, "a kind of aristocracy of "cells" in which dominion resides" (WM/WP 490). Moreover, this natural aristocracy is by no means static. In the hierarchy of forces which constitutes the Body/Self, struggle is the primary characteristic, for in mastery there is the tacit admission that the subordinate powers have not surrendered. Hence "'obedience' and 'commanding' are forms of struggle" (Ibid. 642).

The active powers, instincts, are these primary subjectivities in their dominant aspect, as natural wills to power. The Self is thus grounded in action, instinct and the unconscious (the pre-reflective) whereas the ego is reaction, the de-instinctualized and the conscious.

The superior and active forces of instinct are by their nature immune to consciousness and free will and so, therefore, is the Self. The conclusion, which Nietzsche does not hesitate to reach, follows inevitably: "The best that one is, one does not know--one cannot know." (J/BGE 249) Action, creation and the will to power, although they are of the essence of life, must remain unknowable, for the knowable does not belong to power or the Self--the "unknown sage" (Z, I, 4).

No doubt it is more difficult to characterize these active forces, for by nature they escape consciousness: "The great principal activity is unconscious." Consciousness merely expresses the relation of certain reactive forces to the active forces that dominate them. Consciousness is essentially reactive¹²

The most that can be inferred, concerning the Self, is that, like the will to power, it is "a pathos", a will to command, grow and be active; it is the natural will "to create beyond itself" (Z, I, 4) which lies at the heart of the Body. "Excentricity"¹³, the pathos of the will to power to grow beyond itself, is the defining feature of Nietzsche's concept of the Self as Body and instinct. It is also the imperative of life itself.

Let us return to the notion of perspective and see how Nietzsche's theory of the bodiliness of the Self illuminates this concept. As I noted earlier, a perspective is not the creation of a subject because the latter exists only within the context of the former. Indeed, the

ego is not creation at all, according to Nietzsche, but is rather the reactive dimension of the creative and unconscious Self. How then does the Self relate to the phenomenon of perspectivity?

Emerson anticipates not only Nietzsche's perspectivism but also his sense of corporeal excentricity in the Body's will to power in his metaphor of "the circle" overcoming itself.

The eye is the first circle; the horizon which it forms is the second; . . . The life of man is a self-evolving circle, which, from a ring imperceptibly small, rushes on all sides outwards to new and larger circles, and that without end.¹⁴

Similarly, Nietzsche describes the intrinsically aesthetic drive of the senses to focus, select and distinguish fore- and back-grounds. The Body instinctively organizes and circumscribes the world into a "space" and an horizon. This is Nietzsche's perspective and also Emerson's circle; the substance of the latter is not a revision of res extensa but a realm of intersubjectivity encircling each individual within what I shall call "an horizon of exteriority".

The Self, for Nietzsche, is the Body growing out beyond itself through its instinctive excentricity as, for example, the senses actively perceive certain things and not others. The Self is this excentricity of the carnal will to power, building itself outwards into a perspective, an horizon of political exteriority. Worldliness or exteriority is not foreign or fortuitous to the Self because intersubjectivity is intrinsic to the Body as self-overcoming and the

will to power. As the pathos of self-transcendence and as "dynamic quanta" whose essence is not an in-itself but the relation with other wills to power, the Self is neither an interiority nor an exteriority but the rushing outwards of power in its excentricity. To say that the Self is perspectival is to say that the Self is always intersubjective and forever non-objectifiable. Nietzsche echoes and refines thereby Emerson's "self-evolving circle".

My eye, whether it be keen or weak, can only see a certain distance, and it is within this space that I can live and move: this horizon is my immediate fate, greater or lesser, from which I cannot escape. Thus, a concentric circle is drawn round every being, which has a centre and is peculiar to himself. . . . We measure the world by these horizons within which our senses confine each of us within prison walls. . . . We are like spiders in our own webs, and whatever we may catch in them, it will only be something that our web is capable of catching. (M/D 117; Emphasis Added. Cf. WM/ WP 602)

Life is possible only "within this space," the concentric circle of the horizon of exteriority. Nietzsche here restates his earlier thesis that every living being requires "a happy blindness" (Ull/UAH, I) as a precondition of sight inasmuch as visibility stands within an horizon delimited by invisibility. "This perspective world, this world for the eye, tongue, and ear, is very false . . . " (WM/ WP 602); yet it is this very falsity, blindness and tragic obscurity that makes life possible at all. Perspectivity is "obtuseness of vision" (Loc. Cit.) and it is intrinsic to the nature of the Self/Body: indeed, the Body is, as obtuseness and forgetfulness, is essentially tragic. And

as such, the Body is forever resistant to those optimistic projects of exposure and illumination, like Socrates' (cf. The Republic, Book 5, 452b): i.e., the attempt to suppress the tragic character of the body by politicizing it, making it public--men and women will "clothe themselves in virtue instead of robes" (Ibid. 457a). The Body, as Nietzsche views it, is intrinsically self-concealing, forever clothed in forgetfulness and thus eternally pre-objective. Moreover, the ego, far from constituting the subject of a perspective, only gradually emerges from the Body's molding of subordinate experiences around a prevailing perspective. The ego slowly emerges from the protracted sovereignty of a certain instinct and its perspective over the Body. The habitual restriction of view which this instinct imposes upon the Self constitutes a pedagogy of constraint. This constraint is the physiology of the Self and the ego.

The restriction of views, which habit has made instinct, leads to what is called strength of character. When any one acts from few but always from the same motives, his actions acquire great energy. (MA/H, I, 228)

"Strenth of character" rests on the protracted narrowing of one's perspective, a "grandiose stupidity" (J/BGE 188), in order to solidify the "sovereign instincts" (WM/WP 377) and their hegemony over the Self. A character, an ethos, for an individual or a polity, is the culmination of this "fettering" (MA/H, I, 228) of the spirit to a few, common--"recurring" (J/BGE 268)--instincts and commanding experiences.

Character, perspective and custom are, in this way, intimately related.

In every soul...an equivalent number of frequently recurring experiences has gained the upper hand over those which come more rarely . . . Exactly which groups of sensations are awakened, begin to speak, issue commands most quickly within a soul, is decisive for the whole order of rank of its values and ultimately determines its table of desiderata. (Loc. Cit.; Emphasis Added)

The Self is a natural hierarchy in which certain instincts command over others and thereby determine the ego's "table of desiderata". That which is sovereign, therefore, in man's subjectivity and determines his perspective is beyond the scrutiny of consciousness or free will because the Self, through this pedagogy of constraint, becomes a settled character, instinctive and pre-reflective: a rule by unconsciousness which Nietzsche often calls "fate".

But at the bottom of us, "right down deep," there is, to be sure, something unteachable, a granite stratum of spiritual fate, of predetermined decision and answer to predetermined selected questions. In the case of every cardinal problem, there speaks an unchangeable "this is I." (Ibid. 231; Emphasis Added)

In summary, Nietzsche wishes to argue that perspective is intrinsic to human bodiliness and selfhood; that perspective is the Body and in particular the active instincts, going beyond themselves like Emerson's self-evolving circles. The instinctiveness of the will

to power establishes the physiology of self-overcoming via perspective.

The most political consequence of Nietzsche's theory of selfhood is the following: that the good is the unconscious, the natural and the instinctive. This follows from the two previous points: (a) the Body is the site of selfhood and (b) that perspective is rooted in the bodiliness of the Self. Just as the vitality and dynamism of the horizon resides in the dark and invisible region of the unhistorical, so the spirit's life-force is grounded in the "granite stratum" of the unconscious and the unknowable. The active and creative power of the instincts is the true pathos of affirmation and overcoming, while consciousness is merely critical and derivative.

Nietzsche sees instinct, nobility and polity as a fundamental trinity; and all three imply the grand politics of authority. He begins with the premise that there can be no perfection, no noble good, without instinct.

The great rationality of all education in morality has always been that one tried to attain to the certainty of an instinct: so that neither good intentions nor good means had to enter consciousness as such. . . . In fact, this unconsciousness belongs to any kind of perfection. (WM/WP 430; cf. Ibid. 434)

Mastery resides in instinct or pre-reflective spontaneity which flows from the pedagogy of constraint. Only within the narrowed perspective of forgetfulness (the unhistorical) which a polity imposes

(through customs and habits) does there emerge a "strength of character", an instinctive certainty; habit (ethos) generates character (ethos) through polity and thus provides the conditions for nobility. "One acts perfectly only when one acts instinctively." (Ibid. 440)

It follows that the good is not only pre-conscious but also necessary, effortless and spontaneous: a fate (cf. G/TI, VI, 2; also Ibid. IX, 47). The noble exhibits mastery not because he has knowledge, good ideas or a moral will but because his virtue is his physiology: "he transports the order of which he is the physiological representative into his relations with other human beings and with things" (Loc. Cit.). The good is founded in the certainty of an instinct which is also a fate, a daimon. Nietzsche identifies the good with the Body and the sovereign instinct which forms the Body constitutes thereby a physis. "Le corps est nature, au sens grec du mot "physis" et c'est seulement par référence à cette "physis" que la philosophie peut être caractérisée par Nietzsche comme "physiologie".¹⁵ Nietzsche attempts to identify the good with nature insofar as the latter is interpreted as Body, instinct (pre-reflective spontaneity) and fate:

For one must not mistake the method involved here: a mere disciplining of thoughts and feelings is virtually nothing...: one first has to convince the body. The strict maintenance of a significant and select demeanour, an obligation to live only among men who do not "let themselves go", completely suffices for becoming significant and select: in two or three generations everything is already

internalized. It is decisive for the fortune of nations and of mankind that one should inaugurate culture in the right place--not in the "soul"...: the right place is the body, demeanour, diet, physiology: the rest follows. (G/TI, IX, 47; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

In terms of the structure of a political perspective, instinct is the darkened perimeter of the unhistorical which encircles the illuminated interior of consciousness and history. It is physis, therefore, which comprises the unhistorical foundation of a cultural horizon and it is the Self, the daimon, within the good man which constitutes his goodness. Moreover, Nietzsche insists that it is the degeneration of instinct which underlies the ascension of consciousness to the role of creator and law-giver. It is this physiological decadence which defines the phenomenon of Socrates.

We are offered a key to the mind of Socrates in that remarkable phenomenon known as his daimōnion. In certain critical situations, when even his massive intellect faltered, he was able to regain his balance through the agency of a divine voice, which he heard only at such moments. The voice always spoke to dissuade. The instinctual wisdom of this anomalous character manifests itself from time to time as a purely inhibitory agent, ready to defy his rational judgment. Whereas in all truly productive men, instinct is the strong, affirmative force and reason (Bewusstsein) the dissuader and critic, in the case of Socrates, the roles are reversed: instinct is the critic, consciousness (Bewusstsein) the creator. Truly a monstrosity! (GT/ET, XIII; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

The birth of rationlistic optimism is possible only on the ashes

of the physis, with the disintegration of one's sovereign instincts and thus on what Nietzsche has defined as "bad." Socratic optimism is, for Nietzsche, not an action with consciousness as its source.

The philosopher is merely a symptom of a decay of instinct and his optimism is only "the reaction: he desires the old virtue" (WM/WP 427; Nietzsche's Emphasis). While the good presupposes instinct and nature as its foundation, the bad is precisely the de-naturalization of morality and the abstraction of consciousness from the "soil" of "regulating instincts" (Ibid. 430): "the flight from the tragic essence of the Body/Self."

What is significant for political theory is that Nietzsche's concepts of the perspective and the Body imply an identity of the good with the natural and the unconscious. The will to power, therefore, of an individual or a political horizon depends on the strength of the Body and its instincts as the physis of that perspective. "We must in fact seek perfect life where it has become least conscious . . . " (Ibid. 439; cf. FW/GS 354).

C/ AUTHORITY, TRADITION and REVELATION.

From the foregoing discussion, a number of concepts and arguments which are fundamental to Nietzsche's philosophy have emerged.

Moreover, the import of this discussion is clear and addresses a drastic challenge to the political status of the contemplative life of philosophy. The political import is one which Nietzsche does not

hesitate to express, even in his earliest writings: "It has proven impossible to build a culture upon knowledge." (PT 73)

Even more explicitly, Nietzsche himself tells us that his revalued notion of "good" and "bad" are the essential ingredients for a new consideration of polity. This ethical revaluation is the project of "grand politics": the foundation of a new authority for polity. And this is the case simply because the bad can never provide the foundation for community; only the good can fulfill this task. The good alone have the will to power to create beyond themselves and establish a realm of justice and law.

As a good man, one is reckoned among the "good," a community which has common feelings. . . . As a bad man, one belongs to the "bad," to a party of subordinate, powerless people who have no common feeling. The good are a caste, the bad are a mass like dust. (MA/H, I, 45)

The good possess a sense of community because they alone participate in the experience of goodness, that is, of action and the creation of values. The worldliness of a perspective in which many can participate as within a realm of justice is the product of the active and powerful men.

Against Dühring's specific proposition that the native soil of justice is in the reactive emotions, it must be urged that the exact opposite is the case: the soil of the reactive emotions is the very last to be conquered by the spirit of justice. . . . Historically speaking, all law... is a battle waged against the reactive emotions by the active and aggressive . . . (GM, II, 11)

It is a fundamental thesis of grand politics that community, i.e., polity, presupposes and is centred on the good and the creative. Indeed, perspectivity on a political scale rests on these active forces: "The world revolves about the inventor of new values." (Z, I, 12)

However, even while Nietzsche rejects the contemplative ideal of the good and instead makes polity a consequence of action, one must still ask: what is the good, according to Nietzsche? For Nietzsche's perspectivism would appear to preclude any notion of a good transcending the individual's subjectivity which could provide the basis for community. We have already seen that nature, instinct and the unhistorical--what Nietzsche calls the Body/Self--are the essential features of the good. However, the essence of the Self, its happiness and goodness, is not simply the will to life and self-preservation but the will "to create beyond itself" (Ibid., I, 4). The essence of the Self is this impulse to growth and enhancement of power. "Grand politics" is the destiny intrinsic to the very nature of the Self. A second proposition follows the first and likewise constitutes a fundamental pillar of Nietzsche's grand politics: the good is overcoming, the enhancement and expansion of the will to power! The bad is the impoverishment of the power of transcendence and action (cf. A/AC 2).

Indeed, good is fundamentally the self-ascription by the will to power of value to itself. It is the self-consciousness of power that

is growing. The valuation, "good," is an epiphenomenon of nobility and the pathos of distinction and distance (cf. GM, I, 2ff.). Grand politics grounds itself on the trans-moral experience of nature, becoming and overcoming.

However much utility and vanity...may play a part in grand politics: the strongest tide which carries them forward is the need for the feeling of power. . . . When man possesses the feeling of power he feels and calls himself good. (M/D 189; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

That polity is bound up with the good, which, in turn, is symptomatic of a strong will to power, all this is an elaboration of the natural morality which Nietzsche opposes to the denaturalized morality based on consciousness and free will (cf. GT/BT XIII & WM/WP 423, 428 & 430). A strong horizon of justice, a true polity, can only stand upon a physis, an unhistorical foundation built on the authority of forgetfulness and instinct: Nietzsche's affirmation of ontological immanence is combined with a strong repudiation of historicism.¹⁶ His attack upon consciousness and free will is also an assault upon historicism. And the significance of forgetfulness and the unhistorical is that natural morality maintains therein a foundation in nature and eternity.

How, then, does authority provide and protect this foundation? As we have already seen, the will to power is the struggle of the active instincts for mastery over the reactive ones. What distinguishes the will to power from "'desiring,' striving, demanding"

(WM/WP 668) is the feeling of command, the overcoming of one will by a stronger one, which reduces the former to obedience (cf. Loc. Cit.; & J/BGE 19 & 230). The pathos which characterizes the will to power is that of distance and distinction (cf. M/D 113; GM, I, 2; G/TI, IX, 37). This hierarchy of the active over the reactive or the commanding over the obedient wills is precisely the natural political structure of all living beings. Nietzsche argues, thereby, that overcoming is the pathos of life itself (J/BGE 259).

This central dynamic of the will to power as a struggle of commanding and subordinate wills implies a further condition, equally fundamental to Nietzsche's vision of grand politics. This is the idea that that which commands is unconscious, non-objectifiable and instinctive. It follows from the latter that command never "gives reasons" for its existence: its irrefutability lies in its unhistoricity and its pre-reflectiveness. For Nietzsche, the will to power realizes itself in command over other wills and thereby command is essentially authority! Moreover, the essence of the will to power necessarily coincides with authority.

Authority, command and the good itself are necessarily incompatible with the contemplative equation of virtue with reason, advocated by Socrates. In fact, Socrates represents intellectual as opposed to moral virtue, philosophy rather than poetry: rationalistic optimism versus tragedy! And Nietzsche places authority at the foundation of the classical taste.

With Socrates Greek taste undergoes a change in favour of dialectics: what is really happening when that happens? It is above all the defeat of a nobler taste; with dialectics the rabble gets on top. Before Socrates, the dialectical manner was repudiated in good society: it was regarded as a form of bad manners, one was compromised by it. And all such presentation of one's reasons was regarded with mistrust. Honest things, like honest men, do not carry their reasons exposed in this fashion. It is indecent to display all one's goods. What has first to have itself proved is of little value. Wherever authority is still part of accepted usage and one does not "give reasons" but commands, the dialectician is a kind of buffoon: he is laughed at, he is not taken seriously. (G/TI, II, 5; Nietzsche's Emphasis. Cf. WM/WP 431)

What is significant here is not only the identification of authority with command but also the affiliation of the latter with nobility and hence Nietzsche's concept of the good. That which is of great value does not prove or "display itself"--it simply commands. And in order to command, it must remain fully dressed in all its disguises, concealments and illusions: its power lies in its clothing (exteriority), not its nakedness (cf. M/D 507, 535; J/BGE 1, 2, 24). It is more than merely bad-taste, however, to wish to undress authority and see its naked truth: it is dangerous, for without the veils of exteriority there can be no truth or authority! "We no longer believe that truth remains truth when the veils are withdrawn; . . . Today we consider it a matter of decency not to wish to see everything naked...or to understand and "know" everything." (Preface, FW/GS)

A command, therefore, is by its very nature partially concealed.

since it cannot fully display itself without forfeiting its authority. This veiling of much of what constitutes value corresponds to the unhistorical and the forgetfulness which define an horizon of exteriority. The good requires this veil if it is to become a command and an authority. It is basic to Nietzsche's perspectivism that the will to power, i.e., the power to command, conceals and veils a great deal in order to act as authority.

Nietzsche notes two modes by which authority may veil the roots of the good: tradition and revelation. It would, in fact, be more correct to say that since concealment pertains to the will to power itself, the good does not first exist and is afterwards enshrouded in a veil: the good is an appearance and a veil. This follows from the position that every value is a perspective created by remembrance and forgetfulness. Through tradition, the historical conditions of the origin and development of a value or law are concealed, conveying the illusion of permanence. The questionability¹⁷ of the law is reduced and its command is correspondingly enhanced to the extent that it is perceived as trans-historical and thereby absolute, uncreated, eternal and necessary. Morality (Sittlichkeit) derives from custom (Sitte), according to Nietzsche (cf. M/D 9, 19 & 27), and "customs (Sitten), however, are the traditional way of behaving and evaluating" (Ibid. 9; Nietzsche's Emphasis).

But what is tradition? Nietzsche's response demonstrates the centrality of command to authority: "A higher authority, which is obeyed, not because it commands what is useful to us, but merely

because it commands." (Loc. Cit.) Tradition is not based on utility or rationality but simply on the power of command. However, this is common to authority as such and does not distinguish tradition from revelation or fear. Is there something specific about the awe of command in tradition which separates it as a specific dimension of authority? "It is the fear of a higher intelligence which commands, the fear of an incomprehensible power, of something that is more than personal" (Loc. Cit.)

The ancestral ways and customs impart a reverential awe to the laws through their mystique of the extra-personal, a sense of a higher, more incomprehensible intelligence. It is therefore not simply long established customs which constitute tradition but the awe and reverence of practices whose origins appear to derive from a higher intelligence. Tradition without this awe and sense of power exercises no authority and no command. Nietzsche summarizes and defines tradition in the following way: "Then tradition...[is] the assertion that the law has already existed from time immemorial, that it is impious, a crime against the ancestors, to call it in question."

(A/AC 57; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

The "instinct of reverence" (I/BGE 263; Nietzsche's Emphasis), the sense of awe and "deep reverence for age and the traditional" (Ibid. 260), is one of the foundations of authority's power to command: "the awe of authority" (Ibid. 263). Custom by itself is not yet a moral law since it does not cultivate "the feeling of custom"

(M/D 19) which imbues the individual with the fear or awe of "a higher

intelligence", which inclines men to obedience.

Custom represents the experiences of men of earlier times in regard to what they considered as useful and harmful; but the feeling of custom (morality) does not relate to these experiences as such, but to the age, the sanctity, and the unquestioned authority of the custom. (Loc. Cit.; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

Custom (Sitte) rises to morality (Sittlichkeit) only through the feeling of reverence and obedience which tradition imbues in the individual.

The second aspect of authority that Nietzsche identifies is revelation. This other veil "which gives existence an eternal and stable character" (Ull/UAH, X) removes justice from the realm of the all-too-human by attributing to it a divine origin beyond human history. Justice becomes thereby eternal, suprahistorical and perfect. Revelation is, therefore, the assertion of the sacred as the foundation of authority: the transcendence of history.

[R]evelation...is the assertion that the reason for these laws is not of human origin, was not sought and found slowly and with many blunders, but, being of divine origin, is whole, perfect, without history, a gift, a miracle, merely communicated. (AC 57; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

Nietzsche's thesis is that the "two-fold wall" (Loc. Cit.) of authority, i.e., tradition and revelation, endows the values of custom with "the imperative tone, the 'thou shalt'" (Loc. Cit.) which makes

justice and polity possible. This table of values, the "holy lie" (Ibid. 55ff.), is the commanding will to power which creates a perspective, an "objective spirit," on the basis of authority.

Authority holds the status of "grand politics," for Nietzsche, because it establishes the order of rank and the imperative commands upon which the political horizon of justice can be erected. Authority exists to "plant a way of life, a new instinct, a second nature...to gain a past a posteriori . . . " (Ull/UAH, III). Tradition and revelation create the illusion of a physis, for a second nature becomes a first when custom matures to become a natural morality, a natural law. It is only on the precondition of a deeply rooted authority, a law that commands not just externally and ideally but existentially and thus instinctively, that man can augment and cultivate the will to power and thereby life itself. What is at stake in the existence of authority, therefore, is not only the possibility of justice and community but the very existence of man himself.

The authority of the law is established by the thesis: God gave it, the ancestors lived it.--The higher rationale of such a procedure lies in the intention of gradually making the way of life...unconscious: so that a complete automatism of instinct is achieved--the precondition for any kind of mastery, any kind of perfection in the art of living. To set up a lawbook...means to concede to a people the right henceforth to become masterly, to become perfect--to be ambitious for the highest art of living. To that end the law must be made unconscious: this is the purpose of every holy lie. (A/AC 57; Nietzsche's Emphasis).

The higher rationale of authority is to institutionalize perspectivity and forgetfulness and, through natural justice (i.e., law made unconscious), give a people "the right henceforth to become masterly" (Loc. Cit.). Authority "exerts a retroactive force" (FW/GS 34) and gives man an instinct, character and a second nature a posteriori. Tradition and revelation constitutes this retroactive power of authority through which an horizon of justice and polity is secured.

In this conception of authority as the two-fold wall of tradition and revelation, Nietzsche simply restates his theory of the perspective as a balance of remembrance and forgetfulness, and of history and the unhistorical. Without the Apollonian power to tranquilize "the individual by drawing boundary lines" (GT/BT, IX), "without any power to forget" (UW/UAH, I), man "no longer believes in himself or his own existence...and loses himself in the stream of becoming" (Loc. Cit.). The walls of authority, thrown up against becoming by tradition and revelation, lay the foundations of forgetfulness and thereby the possibility of higher existence.. Nietzsche insists that natural morality and virtue cannot command as authorities without the concealment of becoming offered by tradition and revelation: "A virtue is refuted with a 'for'." (WM/WP 423; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

The issue at stake in the question of authority is man's existence as such, for the will to power and indeed life "in any true sense" are predicated on command and obedience. The will to power is the will to

command other wills to power and command requires the forgetfulness and concealment of authority. Human polity stands or falls on its power to command and thus its authority.

Who can command, who can obey--that is experimented here! Alas, with what protracted searching and succeeding, and failing and learning and experimenting anew!

Human society: that is an experiment, so I teach--a long search: it seeks, however, the commander! (Z, III, 12-#25; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

Authority lies at the heart of the will to power because it is the exercise of command through forgetfulness and concealment, the Apollonian walls of authority. As the essence of the will to power, the "higher rationale" of authority is the enhancement of life and, for Nietzsche, this entails the pedagogy of the spirit. Authority is not a finality but the will to power cultivating itself for higher forms of power; it is "the precondition for any kind of mastery . . . " (Loc. Cit.). It establishes the medium of natural virtue within which the will to power may be cultivated and educated. Nietzsche wishes to cultivate the power of command by first subordinating the will to power to the imperative of the "thou shalt" (A/AC 57; Z, I, 1), to a protracted obedience. This first phase of the spirit, which Zarathustra calls "the camel" (Z, I, 1), lays the foundations of mastery, perfection and command, realized in the metamorphoses of the will to power from the "camel," to the "lion" and finally the "child" (Loc. Cit.).

Nietzsche's grand politics consists of the essential proposition that the world revolves around the creator and the commander of new values (cf. Z, I, 12; Ibid., II, 18 & 22; Ibid., III, 12-#25).

Authority is the embodiment of command in the Self/Body, instinct and natural morality. Without the command of authority, the will to power and thus life, in Nietzsche's sense, cannot possibly prosper: i.e., become masterly and noble.

ENDNOTES:

1. Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: toward a philosophical biology (New York: Dell Publishing, 1968, c.1966), p.10.
2. Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J.B. Baillie (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), Chapter VI, Part A, for the contradiction within objective spirit between the ethical world and ethical action.
3. Ibid., p.495.
4. Loc. Cit.
5. Cf. C.H. Kahn, editor, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), Fragment #10; This aphorism particularly relates to a theme so fundamental to Nietzsche's ontology: "Nature loves to hide."
6. Hans Jonas, Op. Cit., p.283.
7. Cf. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. and introduced by C.B. Macpherson (London: Penguin Books, 1974) for the Hobbesian conception of life as motion, desire and power culminating in the proposition: Mankind is "a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death". Leviathan, chapter 11, p.161.
8. Cf. Thomas Hobbes, Op. Cit., chapter 10; see also M.M. Goldsmith, Hobbes's Science of Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp.85ff.
9. Gilles Deleuze, "Active and Reactive," in The New Nietzsche, Contemporary Styles of Interpretation, David B. Allison (ed.), (New York: Dell Publishing, 1977), p. 85. Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p.47.

10. Ibid., p.80. Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Op. Cit. (1983), p.39.

11. Jean Granier, Le Problème de la Vérité dans la Philosophie de Nietzsche (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966), p.344.
 La subjectivité primaire est non-réflexive, non-représentative (elle est indépendante du cadre sujet-objet), elle n'est pas, liée à un pôle fixe, le moi, elle désigne une multiplicité de centres d'interprétation: "Il y a...dans l'homme autant de "consciences" qu'il y a d'êtres...qui constituent son corps."

12. Gilles Deleuze, Op. Cit., p.82. Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Op. Cit. (1983), p.41.

13. Anton C. Zijderveld, The Abstract Society: a cultural analysis of our time, (New York: Doubleday/Anchor Books, 1971), p.33.
 Zijderveld borrows the term, "excentricity," from Helmuth Plessner to highlight man's social/political being-outside himself: his fundamental worldliness. I use the term here in its dynamic, existential sense of going-outside as pure self-transcending eros. I shall reserve the term, "exteriority," to refer to the political dimension of excentricity: man's true Self lies not within himself ("underneath" his social roles and traditions) but "outside", in the worldliness of his sociality or polity; what is now often referred to as "intersubjectivity".

14. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Circles," in Selections from Ralph Waldo Emerson, Stephen E. Whicher (editor), (Boston: The Riverside Press, 1960), pp.168-169.

15. Jean Granier, Op. Cit., p.343.

16. of. Ibid., p.403:
 "Toute la difficulté d'une interprétation de la philosophie de Nietzsche réside ainsi dans l'obligation qu'elle nous fixe de penser l'immanence de l'Etre en dehors de tout historisme."
 (Granier's Emphasis)

17. Cf. Tracy Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp.24ff. Strong makes a useful distinction between the "unquestioned" (what is beyond question) and the "unquestionable" (what is relatively

unquestioned). The former refers to what I here interpret as authority, although both aspects may belong to concrete authority.

Chapter Two

THE PEDAGOGY of CONSTRAINT

Henceforth man was to figure among the most unexpected and breathtaking throws in the game of dice played by Heracleitus' great "child," be he called Zeus or Chance. Man now aroused an interest, a suspense, a hope, almost a conviction--as though in him something were heralded, as though he were not a goal but a way, an intelude, a bridge, a great promise...

F. Nietzsche

With the concept of perspective, Nietzsche elaborates a critique of consciousness and demonstrates its modesty in relation to the Body/Self. In this chapter, I shall extend the discussion of perspective into the realm of morality itself where the political implications of the notion of horizon become explicit. While Nietzsche understands morality very broadly (and in a variety of senses), I shall argue here that morality is a perspective under constraint: it is "the narrowing of perspective" (J/BGE 188; Nietzsche's Emphasis) as "the indispensable means...for spiritual discipline (Zucht) and breeding (Züchtung)" (Loc. Cit.). Morality, in its most fundamental and natural form, is both educational and constraining: the former because it is a pedagogy, a breeding and a promise; the latter because it is a fettering, narrowing and repression of life.

A basic paradox pervades the Apollonian world of morality, according to Nietzsche: while authority assures the primacy of life over the spirit, spirit nevertheless remains a constraint upon life (the will to power): indeed, "spirit is the life that itself strikes

into life". (Z, II, 8) Morality or spirit is life in self-contradiction because morality is "a piece of tyranny against 'nature'" (J/BGE 188) and yet morality is itself a part of nature. Hence, the spirit of morality is characterized by the basic fact that it is "nature against something that is also nature" (WM/WP 228).

However, in this chapter, morality will be examined as a concept of Nietzsche's grand politics with two principal dimensions: first, it is a pedagogy of the spirit, a promise and a breeding of higher forms of life. Morality is a discipline which cultivates mastery and perfection in the art of living (cf. A/AC 57). "A people is a detour of nature to get to six or seven great men.--Yes: and then to get round them." (J/BGE 126)

Second, it is no exaggeration to say that morality is the means by which man comes into being and not the reverse. Man is his political/moral existence as established through authority. This implies that man is characterized by heteronomy or rule by the Other (law/morality): man becomes human only within the law and thus to the extent that he himself is made lawful. The existence of law, therefore, implies not merely obedience but, before and underlying this, the creation of a being capable of making promises, obligations and practicing truthfulness. And the capacity for truthfulness is cultivated by rendering the individual visible and intelligible to others and himself, through the common roles and institutions of morality; in short, through morality man becomes regular, uniform, equal and, above all, calculable (cf. GM, II, 1ff.).

Morality is a common/political pedagogy of constraint which through the law and its educational institutions establishes a moral horizon as a "life-form" (Lebensform)¹ or "life-world" made instinctive through authority. This moral life-world is symbolized in the figure of "the camel", in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, through which Nietzsche expresses the educational grand politics of authority. In order to facilitate the explication of Nietzsche's examination of law, morality and authority this chapter will be subdivided into the following sections:

A/ Law, Truthfulness and Morality,

B/ A Protracted Obedience: The Camel.

A/ LAW, TRUTHFULNESS and MORALITY.

In the first chapter, it was argued that authority is intrinsic to command and as such lies at the heart of Nietzsche's grand politics precisely because command is that which defines the will to power. It would, however, be truer to the concept of the will to power to say that it is command and obedience together which are of primary concern to Nietzsche because obedience is the realization of the power which commands. The will to power, which exercises command, always commands another will which obeys. Ortega y Gasset, in a passage which could have been written by Nietzsche, shows that it is obedience which distinguishes command from violence.

Command is not exercised in the void. It implies a pressure exercised on others. But it does not imply this alone. If it were only this, it would be mere violence. We must not forget that command has a double effect--someone is commanded, and he is commanded to do something. And in the long run what he is ordered to do is to take his share in an enterprise, in a historic destiny.²

It is from the weakening or even the complete collapse of the unity of command and obedience, in short, authority, that raw violence springs. Similarly obedience has nothing in common with either action motivated by the threat of violence or indifferent and lifeless compliance; it is the will to obey which defines obedience under authority. Hence, Ortega adds:

By obedience, I do not mean mere submission--this is degradation--but on the contrary, respect for the ruler and acceptance of his leadership, solidarity with him, an enthusiastic enrolment under his banner.³

Nietzsche's interpretation of the will to power as a hierarchy of command over obedience follows the same logic. Out of a multitude of wills to power, a Body is formed through an hierarchy of "under-wills" (J/BGE 19) crystallizing around a sovereign will to power. Whether this Body be individual or political, it is "a social structure composed of many 'souls'" (Loc. Cit.). The commands of the higher will to power gradually become codified as the "Truth" and "Law" through and within which a people can live (cf. A/AC 57). Through authority, and in particular through its "walls" of tradition and

revelation, "the holy lie" (Ibid. 55ff.) is made into a Law which itself becomes synonymous with a perspective and a polity.

That law and authority are both preconditions of command and that polity stands or falls on the strength of command, these were arguments aired in the first chapter. Here, the realization of command through obedience is at issue. This realization of command is crucial because the latter is only as strong as obedience. And without obedience, command degenerates into mere violence. The existence of command in the law presupposes not only obedience but, underlying this, the creation of an animal capable of obedience. This means an animal able to promise and obligate itself to present and future solidarity with the sovereign will to power. And this, Nietzsche argues, is the problem of man as such.

To breed an animal with the right to make promises-- is not this the paradoxical problem nature has set itself with regard to man? and is it not man's true problem? (GM, II, 1)

This may be man's true problem but the problem is first initiated by nature and it involves, furthermore, a paradox. The implication seems to be that what is promised goes beyond man and merely employs him as a means or a preparatory stage. The locus lies in nature, not man--a startling reversal of the modern position.

What is paradoxical about breeding a promising animal? This is a question which is beyond the argument at this stage. Thus far the recognition of the need to create a being with the capacity to promise

obedience and obligation has only just come into view.

Nietzsche draws our attention to the fact that to live within the law, one must be able to make and fulfill promises. One must become, therefore, a moral animal! The life of the law rests on the life of a moral being. More than this, Nietzsche insists that at the very heart of the moral event of promising lies the capacity to relate cause and effect. For a being to even be capable of promising something in the future, and thereby enter the domain of morality, he must view the world as lawful. To order events in a causal fashion, spirit must already be able to distinguish what is lawful and necessary from what is chance and accident.

But how much all this presupposes! A man who wishes to dispose of his future in this manner must first have learned to separate necessary from accidental acts; to think causally; to see distant things as though they were near at hand; to distinguish means from ends. (Loc. Cit.)

The domain of law and humanity implies a sense of the calculability of both nature and man. One can anticipate and therefore promise certain events and actions because one can relate causally specific occurrences to determinate effects; one can assign responsibility to identifiable things and persons as causes of visible effects.

However, man alone is now apprehended as able to dispose of the future and therefore promise--i.e., view himself as responsible. It is therefore not only the world which must be seen as lawful and calculable for morality to exist but, more importantly, man himself must be

interpreted as calculable and predictable. The power to reason and calculate which underlies law and morality renders the promising animal itself rational, uniform and calculable.

In short, he must have become not only calculating but himself calculable, regular even to his own perception, if he is to stand pledge for his own future as a guarantor does. . . . The task of breeding an animal entitled to make promises involves...the preparatory task of rendering man up to a certain point regular, uniform, equal among equals, calculable. (Ibid., II, 1 & 2)

The task of breeding a moral animal which is able to live within the law and promise obedience presupposes the transparent rationality of men to one another but especially of each to himself. Nietzsche emphasizes that man must become stable and calculable "even to his own perception". One is to become a "herd animal," a social being, since one must become like the others in order to be regular and uniform. Conformity, therefore, is intrinsic to morality and obedience.

The moral sphere is not only predictable but fundamentally historical.. In the first chapter, we saw that man is plunged into time through his power of remembrance. Moreover, remembrance was shown to be related to the epistemic drive. Nietzsche further cements the relationship of remembrance, reason and promising in The Genealogy of Morals.

Now this naturally forgetful animal, for whom oblivion represents a power, a form of strong health, has created for itself an opposite power, that of remembering, by whose aid, in certain cases,

oblivion may be suspended--specifically in cases where it is a question of promises. (Ibid., II, 1)

The power to promise and thereby to obey the law is predicated on remembrance. The moral animal is intrinsically historical to the extent that promising presupposes causal and rational thought since reason implies the capacity to remember. It is only through memory that form becomes possible and reason is merely recollection of established forms. One can anticipate and promise an event only to the extent that one can remember the structure of past events.

Remembrance is, therefore, the active continuation of past forms into the present and future, "a continuing to will what has once been willed, a veritable 'memory of the will'" (Loc. Cit.). Thus, to promise is to remember and continue actively to will past forms into the future.

Lawful existence represents therefore moral, rational and historical modes of life synthesized into a polity. I shall adopt Nietzsche's abbreviation and use the term "morality" to represent the promising animal, "man," in all his historicity. Moreover, Nietzsche perceives the essence of morality to lie in obedience to the "Truth" as the Law. The entire project of breeding an animal with the right to make promises culminates in the creation of a truthful animal, a moral being imbued with the will to truth.

The paradox of the task of morality begins to become more apparent now that truthfulness is revealed as its essence. The young

Nietzsche, embarking upon the investigation of morality, therefore asks: "How is it that there is any pathos of truth in this world of lies?" (PT, Appendix, 5) The problem which nature sets itself with respect to man is paradoxical because Nietzsche has already informed us that the natural order is intrinsically mendacious and self-concealing. It is in no fashion a violation of nature to deceptively raise the "holy lie" as the Truth, because the will to deception is internal to nature itself. What is unnatural in the highest degree is the moral cultivation of a will to truth as the dominant will to power over the natural will to deception. How does morality emerge as a will to power within an amoral nature? In other words: " 'How could something originate in its antithesis? Truth in error, for example? Or will to truth in will to deception?' "(J/BGE 2; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

The task of morality, to breed the truthful animal, is to establish not merely a truth as The Truth but a will to truth and therewith a belief in the truthfulness of others and oneself. Nietzsche insists that truth and truthfulness do not coincide and his genealogy of the two demonstrates both the intimate affinity and the enormous qualitative gap which separates them.

Nietzsche looks for the source of truthfulness, the pathos of truth, in the emergence of political life itself. An animal appears which no longer lives in the bouyant element that lightens its weight but on the contrary drops all of its weight on itself alone.

Just as happened in the case of those sea creatures who were forced to become land animals in order to survive, these semi-animals, happily adapted to the wilderness, to war, free roaming, and adventure, were forced to change their nature. Of a sudden they found all their instincts devalued, unhinged. They must walk on legs and carry themselves, where before the water had carried them: a terrible heaviness weighed upon them. . . . for in this new, unknown world they could no longer count on the guidance of their unconscious drives. (GM, II, 16; Emphasis Added)

The "terrible heaviness" and "leaden discomfort" (Loc. Cit.) which characterize man's reduction⁴ to his weakest organ, consciousness, is the result of a pathological departure from the natural dependence of the ego on the Self. Man reduces himself to the conscious ego which tries to bear itself along "unhinged" from the guidance of the unconscious Self.

Nietzsche finds this "monstrosity" (GT/BT, XIII) both terrifying and humorous. The intellect developed within the weakest, most unfortunate animal merely as an aid, "to hold them for a minute in existence" (OTL/Kaufmann ⁵). The conscious ego is initially an ancillary tool of survival whose primary function is deception (cf. Loc. Cit.). Reason is so deeply enmeshed in illusion and surfaces which mask reality that "almost nothing is more incomprehensible than how an honest and pure urge for truth could make its appearance among men" (Loc. Cit.). At this embryonic stage of the ego's development, it does not direct itself but is rather carried by instinct--it is still able to ride on the back of "the 'divine animal' and let the

reins hang loose." (Ull/UAH, V; cf. J/BGE 224).

However, if this contingency of reason's "little intelligence" (Z, I, 4) on the Body is the natural hierarchy then from where does the will to truth arise? The origin lies in the need to leave this "state of nature" and establish a formal social structure. At this early stage of his genealogy of polity, Nietzsche does not expand at any length on the nature of this need, except to say that it is "need and boredom" (OTL/Kaufmann, p.44) which prompts the transformation. The meaning of "need" is no doubt related to the biological vulnerability which Nietzsche attaches to the pre-moral proto-man (Loc. Cit.).

However, Nietzsche is somewhat more candid in his exegesis of the emergence of Greek law where he unveils this vulnerability as fear and terror of the incalculable, of Chance (Moirai).

But what lies behind the Homeric world, as the womb of everything Hellenic? . . . Only night and terror . . . A life ruled only by the children of Night: strife, lust, deceit, old age, and death. . . . Further, it was in truth from murder and the expiation of murder that the concept of Greek law developed. (HC/Kaufmann, pp.33-34; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

The origin of the polis lies in the need for refuge from the terror of violent passions which means fundamentally flight from the fear of the other's otherness, his unpredictability. Fear turns to knowledge to reduce and control otherness by making it disarm itself by becoming knowable. "Fear has promoted knowledge of men more than love has, for fear wants to divine who the other is, what he can do,

what he wants." (M/D 309; cf. I/BGE 201) Fear underlies culture from the moment it exiles otherness as evil and institutes measures to control and forestall evil in advance. What is terrifying in this evil "night" is precisely its incalculability and suddenness. Fear of this "night" is the ground of law and morality.

In the inner psychic economy of the primitive man, fear of evil predominates. What is evil? Three things: chance, the uncertain, the sudden. How does the primitive man fight against evil?-- He conceives it as reason, as power, even as a person. In this way he establishes the possibility of entering into a kind of treaty with it and in general to exercise influence over it in advance--to forestall it. . . . Now the whole history of culture represents a diminution of this fear of chance, the uncertain, the sudden. For culture means learning to calculate, to think causally, to forestall, to believe in necessity. (WM/WP 1019; cf. M/D 9; I/BGE 201)

When Nietzsche speaks of the task of breeding an animal with the right to make promises and thus the capacity for causal thought, he always places this moral transformation against the backdrop of fear of the extra-moral. Hence we may now say that the need to live politically arises out of a fear of chance and uncertainty. This is another way of saying that man begins to fear himself, to become terrified at the "divine animal," the merciless "tiger" of nature upon whose back he eternally rides (cf. OTL/Kaufmann, p. 44).

Fear drives this proto-man to disarm not only others but also himself through knowledge of not only others but especially himself. He enters into a peace pact with others in order to secure himself

against the predatory, albeit divine, animal. This peace pact is the first step towards the political life of truthfulness.

Insofar as the individual wants to preserve himself against other individuals, in a natural state of affairs he employs the intellect mostly for simulation alone. But because man, out of need and boredom, wants to exist socially, herd-fashion, he requires a peace pact and he endeavours to banish at least the very crudest *bellum omnium contra omnes* from his world. This peace pact brings with it something that looks like the first step toward the attainment of this enigmatic urge for truth. For now that is fixed which henceforth shall be "truth"; that is, a regularly valid and obligatory designation of things is invented, and this linguistic legislation also furnishes the first laws of truth: for it is here that the contrast between truth and lie first originates. (Loc. Cit.; Emphasis Added)

A rudimentary disarmament inducts "man" into incipient forms of communication and hence language. One begins to develop and adopt "a regularly valid and obligatory designation of things" as the Truth. Communication of the conventional symbols constitutes the form and substance of political life and this conventional truth is the precondition of polity. The establishment of this "linguistic legislation", an emerging nomos, comprizes in no way a pathos of truth at this point. For what is still feared by all is not deception as such but merely the effects of being deceived. Truthfulness has not yet come into being even though truth has; but it is a truth allied with deception because it is a "holy lie".

Thereby men do not flee from being deceived as much as from being damaged by deception . . . In a

similarly limited way man wants the truth: --he desires the agreeable life-preserving consequences of truth, but he is indifferent to pure knowledge, which has no consequences; he is even hostile to possibly damaging and destructive truths.
(Ibid./Kaufmann, p.45)

Thus begins the task of breeding an animal with the right to make promises. The thesis fundamental to Nietzsche's conception of morality views polity as an artificial convenience for communication, born of fear. Out of the need for communication, language and consciousness were developed in order to express and codify the ruling designations of things and relationships. Polity, language, truth and consciousness (language and consciousness being synonymous for Nietzsche), all emerge from the distress and fear of "evil." Indeed, the modesty of consciousness derives from its function as "a net of communication".

[C]onsciousness has developed only under the pressure of the need for communication; that from the start it was needed and useful only between human beings (particularly between those who commanded and those who obeyed); and that it also developed only in proportion to the degree of this utility. Consciousness is really only a net of communication between human beings; it is only as such that it has to develop; . . . (FW/GS 354; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

The evolution of truth develops, therefore, from the fear of evil to the need for sociability and communication, culminating in a growing consciousness, speech and historicity. While thought is for

the most part unconscious, the small portion which becomes conscious is restricted to language, which, to Nietzsche, means that part of thought which is under the dominion of the common signs of communications. "[T]he thinking that rises to consciousness is only the smallest part of all this--the most superficial and worst part--for only this conscious thinking takes the form of words, which is to say signs of communication, and this fact uncovers the origin of consciousness." (Loc. Cit.; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

The corollary of Nietzsche's conception of consciousness as the fruit of politico-moral and historical existence implies that truth and reason belong to man's general, common and non-individual life.

"My idea is...that consciousness does not really belong to man's individual existence but rather to his social or herd nature." (Loc. Cit.) Consciousness is an instrument of communication and a means of organizing man's life in common. By this, Nietzsche means that morality and consciousness are ways in which "the most endangered animal" (Loc. Cit.) made his need and distress known to others: and thereby made others known to him.

It is therefore with some astonishment that one reads Kaufmann's thesis that "reason is the "highest" manifestation of the will to power"⁶, and that Nietzsche views reason as "man's highest faculty"⁷. While Kaufmann is no doubt correct in arguing that the role of "sublimation"⁸ and reason in Nietzsche's thought has been underplayed, it is clearly bending the stick too far to the other extreme to interpret Nietzsche as a Socratic rationalist. The role of

consciousness ("not of reason but merely of the way reason enters consciousness" (FW/GS 354; Nietzsche's Emphasis)), truth and morality are indeed indispensable and important, but they remain, for Nietzsche, means and instruments (cf. Z, I, 4; WM/WP 676).

The limited and restricting quality of consciousness is particularly evident in its principal, herd-like aspect: its function of equalization. The social nature of communication is first and foremost a disarming of the other and then a sharing of experience, a bringing into the common realm what is intrinsically uncommon; therefore, after disarmament, communication demands the equalization of the unequal and the homogenization of the unique. To use Nietzsche's early example, just as each leaf is distinct from all others, so it is that the idea, "leaf," is an abstraction which omits all these individualities and achieves the common and universal attributes (cf. OTL/ Kaufmann, p. 46)

"The disregarding of the individual and real furnishes us with the idea, as it likewise also gives us the form." (OTL/Levy, II, p. 180)⁹

The emergence of the idea/form lays the foundation for "a regularly valid and obligatory designation of things" and thus the concept of truth. The illusion of pure form and permanent being gradually solidifies into a fixed and binding truth. Nietzsche defines truth as this illusion of universality about which one has forgotten that it is an illusion (cf. OTL/Kaufmann, p. 47).

Politico-moral truths require both forgetfulness (unconsciousness) as well as remembrance (consciousness). On the one hand, one must

forget that truth is in reality an illusion, a holy lie, constructed by man through the equalization of the unequal. On the other hand, truth is an idea/form which must be remembered as the archetype through which the manifold contents of experience may become comprehensible. The synthetic nature of thought means that in understanding an individual event, we do not encounter it immediately and directly. It is rather through indirect action and the mediation of traditional forms (prejudices, as Burke calls them), which we remember and thus continue to will what has once been willed, that this individual experience becomes intelligible, albeit no longer individual. All knowing is a recognition, a referring back to memory and form. And as such remembrance is a reflection of the past into the present (tradition) and its anticipation in the future. The temporality of indirect action¹⁰ and mediation of characterizes in this way the nature of all moral truth.

Moreover, since man is a "naturally forgetful animal" (GM, II, 1), "mnemotechnics" (Ibid., II, 3), the means of disciplining the memory and thereby truthfulness, must be correspondingly harsh. Indeed, the pre-history of truthfulness must surely have been brutal. The "unhinging" of proto-man from his instincts and the slow repression of those ancient guides required a violent discipline.

It is the past--the longest, deepest, hardest of pasts--that seems to surge up whenever we turn serious. Whenever man has thought it necessary to create a memory for himself, his effort has been attended with torture, blood, sacrifice. The ghastliest sacrifices and pledges...all these have

their origin in that instinct which divined pain to be the strongest aid to mnemonics. (Loc. Cit.)

Asceticism and cruelty or, more precisely, the spiritualization of cruelty (J/BGE 229) through asceticism belongs intrinsically to the discipline of truthfulness and its overcoming of the natural forgetfulness of man. Morality requires and fabricates an unnatural and profound suffering which, when codified, becomes "bad conscience" (GM, II, 16-25). Truth imposes a regime of suffering and sublimation of cruelty because all remembrance and knowledge run "counter to the inclination of his spirit...which ceaselessly strives for appearance and the superficial--in all desire to know there is already a drop of cruelty" (J/BGE 229; Nietzsche's Emphasis). Knowledge presupposes memory and remembrance suppresses man's forgetful nature through bad conscience. The socialization of man means that the instincts are "devalued, unhinged" (GM, II, 16) and, prohibited entry into the social world of morality, they "turn inward" (Loc. Cit.). This "interiorization (Verinnerlichung)" (Loc. Cit.) of man constitutes the origins of what we call the "soul" through the discipline of remembrance (Erinnerung). Polity depends on bad conscience becoming attached to the natural exteriorization of the instincts as the necessary precondition of community. The disarmament of the other, in this otherness (the essence of truthfulness), implies a re-armament of each against himself--i.e., his own otherness; the social peace rests on a psychological war. Hence, a new, more elusive war replaces the

old one.

Lacking external enemies and resistances, and confined within an oppressive narrowness and regularity, man began rending, persecuting, terrifying himself, like a wild beast hurling itself against the bars of its cage. . . . Let me hasten to add that the phenomenon of an animal soul turning in upon itself, taking arms against itself, was so novel, profound, mysterious, contradictory, and pregnant with possibility, that the whole complexion of the universe was changed thereby. (Loc. Cit.)

It is through this "ineluctable disaster" (Ibid., II, 17) that man becomes not only a "soul divided" (Ibid., II, 18) but, through bad conscience, ascends to morality, truthfulness and political life:

"Such was the beginning of the human polity; I take it we have got over that sentimentalism that would have it begin with a contract."

(Ibid., II, 17) Moreover, through remembrance, man renders himself visible, equal and similar to the others (cleansed of their otherness), and in this way brings himself under the strict and harsh regimen of the Truth. Bad conscience constitutes the rite of passage from the pre-moral state to the internal war of the ego against the Body/Self.

However, I have still not uncovered the roots of the pathos of truth, of truthfulness, for I have only shown how the demand for obedience imposes the political regimen of remembrance, repression and truth in the origins of history and communication.

Still we do not yet know whence the impulse to truth comes, for up to now we have heard only about the

obligation which society imposes in order to exist: to be truthful, that is to use the usual metaphors, therefore expressed morally: we have heard only about the obligation to lie according to a fixed convention, to lie gregariously in a style binding for all. (OTL/ Levy, pp.180-81; Emphasis Added)

The moral value of truthfulness to the polity only truly takes hold when man himself is pervaded by the obligation to be truthful; when his very instincts are dominated by the will to no longer deceive others or himself. The unnatural is thus made natural. The moral sense of truthfulness gradually awakens and solidifies the moral will within man only on the basis of the unconsciousness of this internalized obligation to lie according to a given convention. The moral spirit, being the life that itself strikes into life, tries to make its unnatural imperatives natural through forgetfulness!

Now man of course forgets that matters are going thus with him; he therefore lies...unconsciously and according to habits of centuries' standing--and by this very unconsciousness, by this very forgetting, he arrives at a sense for truth. Through this feeling of being obligated to designate one thing as "red," another as "cold,"...awakes a moral emotion relating to truth. (Loc. Cit.; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

Morality comes into being, for Nietzsche, only with the awakening of this physiological certainty, "a complete automatism of instinct" (A/AC 57), whereby a custom (Sitte) becomes, through age, sanctity and authority, transformed into morality (Sittlichkeit) (cf. M/D 19). In this way, the obligation to practice truthfulness becomes "this

feeling of being obligated" to truthfulness: "a moral emotion relating to truth"!

This moral will to truthfulness constitutes the true inception of political life. Only with this moral pathos does communication arise in the political sense that the individual is now obligated to express himself to others in a regular, uniform and thus knowable form. This political demand by the Truth/ Law (the Other) that one promise truthfulness belongs to the heart of obedience whose discipline organizes morality. However, it is important to emphasize the distinction Nietzsche makes between truth and the moral will to truth. For it is the transition from the former to the latter that heralds the birth of morality and therewith the species, "man."

What does the truth matter to man? The highest and purest life is possible with the belief that one possesses truth. Man requires belief in truth. The necessity for truthfulness begins with society. Otherwise man dwells within eternal concealments. The establishment of states promotes truthfulness.

The drive toward knowledge has a moral origin. (PT 91; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

Nietzsche's contention that the will to truth is intrinsically a moral will amounts to the argument that the desire for knowledge is really based on a completely different desire which has nothing to do with knowledge or morality. The natural form of the will to power is the will to deception and appearance, and it is only on this will that morality and its will to truth can stand. As a result, there is a

self-contradiction within the will the truth itself. On the one hand, science accepts beliefs and convictions on the condition that they are reduced to hypotheses. This means that a conviction no longer remains a conviction within the context of the method of science (FW/GS 344).

On the other hand, the will to truth presupposes "belief in truth" (PT 91; Nietzsche's Emphasis). Indeed, for science to even begin its discipline there must be some pre-scientific and even a pre-reflective conviction (prejudice) that truth exists and that it is of the highest value.

To make it possible for this discipline to begin,-- must there not be some prior conviction--even one that is so commanding and unconditional that it sacrifices all other convictions to itself? We see that science also rests on a faith; there simply is no science "without presuppositions." (FW/GS 344; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

Nietzsche goes a step further and not only affirms that there must be a pre-scientific a priori underlying science but this will to truth is in itself harmful to the fundamental will to appearance. For when he inquires into the nature of the will to truth, Nietzsche discovers that at bottom it is the will not to deceive, not even oneself, "and with that we stand on moral ground" (Loc. Cit.; Nietzsche's Emphasis). However, when life itself is rooted in dissimulation, deception and self-deception, then the will to truth is not simply "a quixotism" (Loc. Cit.), it can become "a principle that is hostile to life and destructive. . . . a concealed will to death" (Loc. Cit.).

Hence, the violent and cruel means of unhinging man from his animal forgetfulness and developing his faculty for remembrance. However, truth also requires this very forgetfulness and unconsciousness (i.e., belief and the pre-reflective) in order to preserve itself from its own self-destructive tendency: the inclination to make of the spirit not merely the life that strikes into life but a will to death. This means that truth is able to maintain itself only on a strongly laid foundation of deception and untruth. The moral/truthful will must be enveloped within an horizon of amoral values.

Apollo is "a moral deity" (GT/BT, IV) and teaches self-control and self-knowledge. As long as knowledge and truthfulness, i.e., morality, are limited, then the abyss of "night and horror" remains veiled by the veneer of law. However, the unlimited will to truth, derived from but constituting the principal threat to morality, is also the vehicle of descent beneath the surface of law into the abyss and the barbaric: the void of authority! The Apollonian urge for self-knowledge, when unhinged, leads down into the dionysian underworld. "In knowledge, mankind possesses a beautiful means of decline." (PT 125; cf. Ibid. 124)

Nietzsche's concept of law and obedience has led to the morality of truthfulness: to morality as truthfulness. Morality comprises the means of breeding an animal with the right to make promises. To transform the forgetful animal into a man, a painful and ascetic discipline of remembrance has to be imposed. With a rudimentary memory, man develops linguistic conventions for communication, from

which truth and consciousness gradually emerge. The obligation to lie according to a fixed convention becomes, through a new forgetfulness, a moral pathos for truth. It is only here, with the subtle transition from truth to the moral will to truth, that the animal, "man," becomes recognizable. Everything which distinguishes man from nature depends on his mediation through memory and the traditions of form. It is this indirect action (heteronomy) and this action at a distance which defines man as a moral, lawful and truthful institution. The animal which fled the pre-Apollonian abyss of night and terror to become human through the cruelty of morality, gains civilization and the moral spirit living in a dissonant harmony with his "divine animal," the Body/Self.

B/ A PROTRACTED OBEDIENCE: THE CAMEL.

When proto-man, from fear and terror, turns heavy and serious-- i.e., becomes moral--, he also becomes heroic and pregnant with a promise that goes far beyond his moral existence. Through morality, humanity becomes serious because it establishes a Law " 'at which it is absolutely forbidden henceforth to laugh' " (FW/GS 1). Man is heroic because he attempts to pit his absolute truthfulness against nature's deceptiveness; and this moral hero is tragic (cf. Loc. Cit.) because nature ultimately must prevail over truth and morality.

Man's longing to be completely truthful in the midst of a mendacious natural order is something noble and heroic. But this is possible only in a very relative sense. That is tragic. (PT 73; Nietzsche's

Emphasis)

The epoch of man and morality is a tragic period, because man is both separated from and ultimately bound to nature and its amorality. Through the belief in the meaningfulness and purpose of existence, man comes to need one additional reason for life: "man has to believe, to know, from time to time why he exists; his race (Gattung) cannot flourish without a periodic trust (Zutrauen) in life--without faith (Glauben) in reason in life" (FW/GS 1; Nietzsche's Emphasis). Morality gives man a second existence, separate from that of nature, whose purpose, heroism and faith in this "unhinged" existence are beyond derision. In order to teach man the capacity to promise, purpose and seriousness must be instilled in the forgetful animal.

[A]nd to this end he invents a second, different existence. . . . Indeed, he wants to make sure that we do not laugh at existence, or at ourselves--or at him: for him, one [the individual] is always one. . . . His inventions and valuations may be utterly foolish and overenthusiastic; . . . and yet, whenever "the [moral] hero" appeared on the stage, something new was attained: the gruesome counterpart of laughter, that profound emotional shock felt by many individuals at the thought: "Yes, I am worthy of living!" Life and I and you and all of us become interesting to ourselves once again for a little while. (Loc. Cit.; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

This "gruesome counterpart of laughter" is the belief and unconditional conviction (Überzeugung) that life and especially man's life is purposeful. More specifically, belief in the purpose of human

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existence means adherence, reverence and participation in the institutions and rituals (myths) of truthfulness, through which the law becomes the embodied medium of ethico-political life. The law amounts to nothing as the discipline of obedience if it remains a mere ideal. These beliefs must become unconscious patterns of conduct, living media or institutions so that the law/morality can become character (ethos). Indeed, the law is authoritative only insofar as it becomes a concrete idea/form whose schema is continually willed again and again, a paradigm of remembrance and tradition. A law which serves as a paradigm for ethical behavior, a divine law which is a gift of revelation and lived by the ancestors (cf. A/AC 57), realizes itself as an institution. These paradigms of remembrance make possible communication, social relationships and the entire order of polity.

For within the range of those schemata a something becomes possible that never could succeed under the first perceptual impressions: to build up a pyramidal order with castes and grades, to create a new world of laws, privileges, sub-orders, delimitations, which... assumes the appearance of being the more fixed, general, known, human of the two and therefore the regulating and imperative one.
(OTL/Levy, p.181)

Through the mediation of remembrance and memory's paradigms, man is able to raise up a "pyramidal order" of laws and institutions. The entire heroic enterprise is premised on the strength of these traditional paradigms, convictions and beliefs; however, the strength of schemas depends on how imperative and instinctive they become.

Wherever the power to bear responsibility through generations, to promise and obey across millennia is absent, the will to authority and its institutions is also stillborn.

Ortega writes that the etymology of command carries the meaning of "putting a load into someone's hand"¹¹, to impose responsibility and purpose within "a historic destiny"¹². Modernity represents the decay of the institution as such, according to Nietzsche, because the will to tradition and authority has weakened to the point where the power to promise is threatened.

Our institutions are no longer fit for anything: everyone is unanimous about that. But the fault lies not in them but in us. Having lost all the instincts out of which institutions grow, we are losing the institutions themselves, because we are no longer fit for them. — For institutions to exist, there must exist the kind of will, instinct, imperative which is anti-liberal to the point of malice: the will to tradition, to authority, to centuries-long responsibility, to solidarity between succeeding generations backwards and forwards in infinitum. (G/TI, IX, 39; Nietzsche's Emphasis. Cf. WM/ WP 65ff.)

In The Use and Abuse of History, Nietzsche notes that the most remarkable feature of modernity is that it is not a living, real culture but only "a kind of knowledge about culture" (UHI/UAH, IV). What distinguishes the modern spirit is the extreme opposition between the inner and the outer in which a cult of inwardness seeks to withdraw the individual into his private knowledge. And from this citadel of "substance," one eschews all "form" as dead externality,

"disguise or hypocrisy" (Loc. Cit.). The modern spirit adopts a solipsistic hermeticism¹³ and, radically, "enclosed within itself, incapable of submitting to anything or anybody"¹⁴, each follows "his own sweet will" (Loc. Cit.). From this void of will, the beautiful soul concocts his private world of freedom, rejecting the constricting "artificiality" and exteriority of authority.

One lives for today, one lives very fast--one lives very irresponsibly: it is precisely this which one calls "freedom". That which makes institutions institutions is despised, hated, rejected: whenever the word "authority" is so much as heard one believes oneself in danger of a new slavery. (G/TI, IX, 39; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

What then does Nietzsche understand as the character of form and institution? Through the rigours of truthfulness, morality seeks to render man knowable, intelligible and thereby recognizable. Truthfulness reflects the requirements of society for the permanent and the common: hence, Nietzsche argues, the individual is the first victim to be sacrificed to morality.

The origin of morality may be traced to two ideas: "The community is of more value than the individual," and "The permanent interest is to be preferred to the temporary." The conclusion drawn is that the permanent interest of the community is unconditionally to be set above the temporary interest of the individual, especially his momentary well-being, but also his permanent interest and even the prolongation of his existence. . . . Hence it constantly happens that the individual makes himself into a majority by means of his morality. (MA/H, II, 89; cf. FW/GS 116)

Proto-man is not naturally inclined to the ascetic rigours of remembrance which are entailed in the cultivation of the permanent interest of the community and thus he does not walk placidly to his sacrifice. The counterpart to laughter is in fact "gruesome" and the means employed are cruel. The object of this asceticism is to brand the incipient memory with a sense of the immutable, "to make a few ideas omnipresent, unforgettable, 'fixed,' to the end of hypnotizing the entire nervous and intellectual system" (GM, II, 3) with the paradigms of remembrance. To manufacture a sense of the permanent, a belief in the illusion of the universal and trans-individual being must exist before institutions can develop. And with the belief in permanence and eternal being, man himself becomes more regular and unchanging: more truthfull

The institution of marriage furnishes Nietzsche with an example of how morality demands and makes of the individual a noble sacrifice through "a noble belief" (M/D 27): here morality coincides with the goal of the highest will to power "to impose upon becoming the character of being" (WM/WP 617). Marriage is the archetype of all institutions because it eternalizes a passion, love, through the belief that this passion can endure a lifetime.

Through tenaciously adhering to a noble belief...marriage has bestowed upon love a higher nobility. All institutions which accord to a passion belief in its endurance and responsibility for its endurance, contrary to the nature of passion, have raised it to a new rank. (M/D 27;

Nietzsche's Emphasis)

The analysis of the essence of institutionality conducted here will take us back to the discussion of truthfulness. For what is invoked in the morality of truthfulness is nothing but the belief in the permanence of one's emotions and thoughts as well as the responsibility for their endurance. One must believe oneself to be regular, uniform and calculable in order to believe in truthfulness. "In order for a world of the true, of being, to be invented, the truthful man would first have to be created (including the fact that such a man believes himself "truthful")." (WM/WP 543; Emphasis Added)

The establishment of institutions coincides with the establishment of man himself as an institution, as a sacrifice of the unique and the temporary to the common and the enduring. The noble belief in the duration and similarity of the passions allows the possibility of communication and truthfulness. In short, moral/political institutions require "the truthful man" (Loc. Cit.) and the latter "presupposes the knowability and stability of the person" (Ibid. 277). The political or promising animal must communicate himself and not only to others. First and foremost, he must believe himself to be communicable and therefore he must communicate himself to himself as non-individual, common, unchanging and knowable.

Truthfulness and institutions reveal the essence of morality as the transformation of becoming into being, art into nature (FW/GS 356), role into character (Loc. Cit.) or custom (Sitte) into morality

(Sittlichkeit); through the veils of authority (i.e., tradition, sanctity and unquestionability), man is elevated above the all-too-human into the supra-human and the supra-historical. "Think of institutions and customs which have created out of the fiery abandonment of the moment perpetual (ewige) fidelity . . . out of a single and unpremeditated word perpetual obligation. This transformation...has introduced a new suprahuman (übermenschlicher) concept which elevates mankind." (M/D 27; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

With this fundamental transformation in mind, Nietzsche's concept of morality may be summarized in the following way. The essence of morality: (1) represents the conditions of life under which a species flourishes, grows and achieves mastery in the art of living; (2) emerges as spirit or "the life that itself strikes into life" (Z, II, 8), nature against something that is also nature (cf. WM/WP 228); (3) strikes into life by attempting to eternalize it--imposing upon becoming the character of being (Ibid. 617) through the illusion of permanence and commonness; (4) seeks to balance remembrance/history and forgetfulness/the unhistorical; and (5) raises man to the supra-human by typifying the individual in the image of the Law/Truth or the Other: in obeying the "Thou shalt", morality transforms the role into character (ethos) and thereby makes the law instinctive and unconscious.

Nietzsche symbolizes this vision of morality in the figure of the camel-spirit (cf. Z, I, 1). It is important to note that in the symbol of the camel, Nietzsche expresses his positive evaluation of

morality as a pedagogy of the spirit; indeed, the grand politics of natural morality is the realization of the highest will to power which wants to eternalize becoming. Hence: "The great rationality of all education in morality has always been that one tried to attain to the certainty of an instinct" (WM/WP 430).

The spirit of the camel embodies the essential role of morality as the pedagogy of constraint leading to a masterly certainty. The camel is "the strong, weight-bearing spirit in which dwell respect and awe: its strength longs for the heavy, for the heaviest" (Z, I, 1). The camel is, thus, "the beast of burden" (Loc. Cit.) which longs to take upon itself all of the solemn and most revered values "of a thousand years" (Loc. Cit.): it wishes to continue to will that which have already been willed by the ancestors and given by God. The camel-spirit affirms and worships the imperative of the "Thou shalt" which decrees: " 'All values have already been created and all created values--are in me. Truly, there shall be no more "I will"! ' " (Loc. Cit.).

The "Thou shalt" is the truth embodied in divine law of tradition and revelation--i.e., in traditional piety (poetry or the pre-philosophical ethical life). The awe and reverence of the camel for this imperative law lies in its belief that "God gave it, [and] the ancestors lived it" (A/AC 57; Nietzsche's Emphasis). The rationale for the camel's morality is that it is a protracted education of the spirit through constraint, obedience and reverence.

Every morality is, as opposed to laissez aller, a piece of tyranny as "nature", likewise against "reason". . . . The essential and invaluable element in every morality is that it is a protracted constraint The essential thing... seems... to be a protracted obedience in one direction: from out of that there always emerges... something for the sake of which it is worthwhile to live on earth Regard any morality from this point of view: it is "nature" in it which teaches hatred of laissez aller, of too great freedom, and which implants the need for limited horizons and immediate tasks--which teaches the narrowing of perspective, and thus in a certain sense stupidity, as a condition of life and growth. "Thou shalt obey someone and for a long time: otherwise thou shalt perish and lose all respect for thyself"--this seems to me to be nature's imperative (J/BGE 188; Nietzsche's Emphasis).

The higher rationale of the camel-spirit's protracted obedience to the "Thou shalt" is that this discipline cultivates a limited horizon and the narrowing of perspective: i.e., precisely what Nietzsche, in his early work, calls "the veil of the unhistorical" (UHI/UAH, I) without which life in any true sense is impossible. The camel learns to restrict its perspective by first acquiring the ability not to will but re-will the imperatives of traditional piety: " 'Truly, there shall be no more 'I will'!' " (Z, I, 1). This spirit renounces and is reverent" (Loc. Cit.) because it must overcome and spiritualize its passions in order to approximate itself to the law. Like the institutions which impose upon becoming the character of being, the spirit of the camel learns to concede to a passion "belief in its endurance and [takes] responsibility for its endurance". (M/D 27; Nietzsche's Emphasis). In short, the camel is that transformation which Nietzsche

calls the " 'spiritualization of passion' ('Vergeistigung der Passion')" (G/TI, V, 1; Nietzsche's Emphasis).

The camel must, therefore, narrow its horizons by imposing a sense of duration on certain passions through their spiritualization. The heart of this transformation is that one no longer reacts immediately to every impulse but learns to put a brake on the will: one cultivates the power to not will!

This is the first preliminary schooling in spirituality: not to react immediately to a stimulus, but to have the restraining, stock-taking instincts in one's control. . . . the essence of it is precisely not to 'will', the ability to defer decision. All unspirituality, all vulgarity, is due to the incapacity to resist a stimulus--one has to react, one obeys every impulse. (G/TI, VIII, 6; Nietzsche's Emphasis).

The spirit of the camel is to make this ascetic spiritualization instinctive, necessary and easy. However, this implies a protracted "unfreedom of spirit" (J/BGE 188) in which the will is "fettered" (MA/H, I, 228) and constrained. The pedagogy of constraint instills a limited horizon, through habit (ethos), and renders the spiritualized and thus institutionalized passions instinctive--the heart of character (ethos) (cf. Loc. Cit.). Indeed, this strength of character constitutes the essence of morality and the camel-spirit. "The man of strong character lacks a knowledge of the many possibilities and directions of action; his intellect is fettered and restricted, because...it shows him perhaps only two possibilities" (Loc. Cit.).

His constrained perspective offers him two instead of fifty alternatives and he chooses "of necessity...in accordance with his whole nature" (Loc. Cit.). The spiritualization of passion into character means that the camel has internalized the morality of his polity: his experience has been typified and socialized. "If one has character one also has one's typical experience which recurs again and again." (J/BGE 70) The spiritualization of passion not only accords the latter the belief in its endurance, it also renders man intelligible to his peers because to the extent that he has character, he also has his experience in common. This is the political dimension of the camel which is fundamental to morality as such.

To understand one another it is not sufficient to employ the same words; we have also to employ the same words to designate the same species of inner experiences, we must ultimately have our experience in common. . . . In every soul in this... [people] an equivalent number of frequently recurring experiences has gained the upper hand over those which come more rarely: it is on the basis of these that people understand one another, quickly and ever more quickly--the history of language is the history of a process of abbreviation--; it is on the basis of this quick understanding that they unite together, closely and ever more closely. (J/BGE 268; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

Through the camel's spiritualization of the will to power, morality elevates man to the supra-human realm of enduring emotions, traditions and perpetual obligation. This is to say that morality breeds man as a political animal living in a common world--in a horizon of exteriority. The spirit of tradition, piety and authority

which the camel represents makes of morality a political "life-world", a common, ethical horizon shared by a whole people. "In a child, the familiar manifestation of restriction is called a good character; in placing itself on the side of the fettered spirits the child first discloses its awakening common feeling; with this foundation of common sentiment, he will eventually become useful to his State or rank." (MA/H, I, 228)¹⁵

It is important to note, however, that Nietzsche always distinguishes the people from the State (cf. Z, I, 11) and consistently repudiates the notion of "the 'cultural state'" (G/TI, VIII, 4).

Hence, when Nietzsche talks about "grand politics," he seems to be referring to what he calls "the grand architecture" (A/AC 58; cf. FW/GS 356) of common life or the "grand organization of society" (Ibid.). This distinction between grand politics and empirical politics seems to correspond to the French differentiation between le politique (polity) and la politique (politics). Through the concept of the grand politics, Nietzsche explores natural morality as the pre-objective worldliness that constitutes an "objective spirit" or "life-form"¹⁶.

The purpose of this grand architecture is to build a polis with a "classical effect" (G/TI, X, 2) and, for Nietzsche, this means to build in the Roman rather than the Greek tradition (cf. Loc. Cit.). The grand politics of authority, which begins with the camel-spirit, wishes to demonstrate that natural morality institutes a way of life sub specie aeterni, so that it "could make itself heard against the

accidents of feeling, passion and the moment" (Ibid., IX, 39; Nietzsche's Emphasis). The imperative of "the holy lie", the "Thou shalt," seeks "to 'eternalize' a grand organization of society, the supreme condition for the prosperity of life" (A/AC 58; Nietzsche's Emphasis).

The Imperium Romanum...this most admirable of all works of art in the grand style, was a beginning, its structure was calculated to prove itself by millennia--to this day there has never been such building, to build in such a manner sub specie aeterni has never been so much as dreamed of!--This organization was firm enough to endure bad emperors: the accident of persons must have no effect on such things--first principle of all grand architecture. (Loc. Cit.; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

The essence of the pedagogy of constraint, symbolized in the spirit of the camel, may be summarized in following points. Morality (1) represents the conditions of life under which a species of life flourishes, grows and achieves mastery in the art of living; (2) is spirit or "the life that itself strikes into life" (Z, II, 8); (3) opposes life or becoming by imposing the character of being on it through the illusion of permanence and commonness with the veils of authority; (4) balances remembrance/history and forgetfulness/the unhistorical; and (5) institutionalizes man through his typification in the image of the Holy Lie (the "Thou shalt," the Law, or the Other) which becomes character (ethos), instinct and pre-reflective.

The significance of the spirit of the camel for Nietzsche's conception of morality is fundamental. For his critique of subjective

spirit, "the cult of 'inwardness'" (UII/UAH, IV), attempts to rethink objective spirit as the pre-predicative horizon of exteriority: i.e., as authority. And as such, the significance of the camel-spirit lies as well in its rejection of the autonomy of philosophy in relation to poetry or authority. The primacy of the grand politics of authority testifies to the fact that knowledge can never provide the foundation of culture (cf. PT 73). The first stage of the spirit, the camel, exemplifies that world of poetry, traditional piety and pre-reflective belief that Plato/Socrates relentlessly criticized: thus, "a thing can live only through a pious illusion" (UII/UAH, VII). Moral virtue is objective spirit (the holy lie/Thou shalt) and it begins with habit and custom becoming established as morality through authority (tradition and sanctity): i.e., when becoming is transfigured into being through a pious illusion, which itself becomes unconscious instinct.

ENDNOTES:

1. Cf. Tracy Strong, Op. Cit., pp. 79-86.
2. José Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses, trans. anonymous (New York: W.W. Norton, 1957), 142.
3. Ibid., pp.144-145.

4. Cf. GM, II, 16:
 "They were forced to think, deduce, calculate, weigh cause and effect--unhappy people, reduced to their weakest, most fallible organ, their consciousness!"

In The Will to Power, Nietzsche repeatedly characterizes consciousness as a "reduction" and "simplification". Here however the point is augmented with the insertion that man himself is reduced to a part, a fragment. Hence, this reduction is an unhinging of the ego from its natural subordination to the instincts and therefore the Self.

5. Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense," in The Portable Nietzsche, Walter Kaufmann, editor and translator (New York: Viking Press/Penguin Books, 1977), p.43.

6. Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 4th ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p.230.

7. Lpc. Cit.

8. Ibid., Chapter 8, especially Part II, pp.235-246.

9. Friedrich Nietzsche, OTL, in The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, Oscar Levy (ed.) (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964), Volume II, p.180.

10. For the notion of "indirect action" , see Ortega's The Revolt of the Masses, especially chapters 8 & 10.

Indirect action or heteronomy define the essence of common life (polity) as action mediated by the Other, i.e., the Law/Truth or "holy lie." To act within a culture is to continue to will what has already been willed--by the Other; action as remembrance, repetition or ritual: history within the limits of the unhistorical.

The rejection of indirect action (of submission to the traditional Other) epitomizes the revolt of the masses ("slave-morality") and the resulting "hermeticism of the soul" leads to statism and the decline of authority. Nietzsche and Ortega here reiterate much of the analysis of de Tocqueville in Democracy in America, as we will see later.

11. José Ortega y Gasset, Op. Cit., pp.135-36,

12. Ibid., p.142.

13. Cf. José Ortega y Gasset, Op. Cit., pp.66-68, 74-77, 115-124. This hermetic rejection of exteriority and therefore of authority will constitute the content of the next chapter on slave-morality.

14. Ibid., p.66.

15. Indeed, this is the basic function of the State or polity, according to Nietzsche: to promote character (ethos) and duration-- i.e., truthfulness! "With regard to the State, Machiavelli says that, 'the form of Government is of very small importance. . . . The great aim of State-craft should be duration . . .'" (MA/H, I, 224)

16. Cf. Tracy Strong, Op. Cit., pp.79-86. Cf. also Jean Granier, Op. Cit., pp.156ff. & p.474.

Chapter Three

SLAVE MORALITY
and
the DECLINE of AUTHORITY.

The modern theory, which has swept away every authority except that of the State...condemns as a State within a State every inner group and community...administering its own affairs; and, by proclaiming the abolition of privileges, it emancipates the subjects of every such authority in order to transfer them exclusively to its own It recognizes liberty only in the individual, because it is only in the individual that liberty can be separated from authority .

Lord Acton

A curious paradox emerges from Nietzsche's conception of natural morality as a horizon of law circumscribed by authority because, being a "holy lie," morality is always subordinate to the tragic: morality is only as strong as its horizon of extra-morality (illusion, the unhistorical, etc.). Apollo is tragically dependent on Dionysos, truth on untruth, and reason on the pre-reflective world of tradition, poetry and the veils of authority. Nietzsche has formulated this tragic paradox, which stands at the centre of this thought, this way: "to make morality one must have the unconditional will to the contrary." (G/TI, VII, 5; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

The very fact that morality is the life that 'itself strikes into life' (Z, II, 8) means morality exists in a perpetual state of tension with its conditions of existence. Indeed, authority not only veils becoming but also its own veiling so that morality appears autonomous, absolute and eternal--i.e., beyond tragedy. There is therefore an

ever present danger that morality may turn against its own conditions of existence, the veils of authority.'

In periods of crisis, when morality begins to disintegrate, a reaction against natural morality arises which seeks to establish a new foundation for morality beyond tragedy. This involves a rejection of authority and its foundation in the extra-moral (forgetfulness, exteriority). There arises the search for a truth without veils, a being beyond becoming or an absolute free of finitude, negativity and exteriority. This repudiation of authority entails a critique of "objective spirit," of the pre-reflective world of poetry and traditional piety: philosophy emerges from this doubting of authority (poetry) and this doubt justifies itself on the basis of a new distinction between nature (physis) and convention (nomos)¹.

The repudiation of authority constitutes a subversion of the very conditions of humanity itself, according to Nietzsche. For with the attack on forgetfulness, perspectivity itself is brought into question and therewith the whole grand architecture of political life: without the horizon of exteriority and its tragic paradox, there can be no polity.

To say it briefly (for a long time people will still keep silent about it): What will not be built any more henceforth, and cannot be built any more, is--a society in the old sense of that word; to build that, everything is lacking, above all the material. All of us are no longer material for a society; this is a truth for which the time has come. (FW/GS 356; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

As early as Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche distinguishes the good (die Guten) and the bad (die Schlechten) by their capacity for solidarity with a communal destiny: "The good are a caste, the bad are a mass like dust." (MA/H, I, 45) In a "society" organized by the latter, a mass society, "a community could hardly exist, or at most it could exist only in its crudest form" (Loc. Cit.).

This rise to dominance of the mass has come to pass in modernity and comprises what Nietzsche calls "slave-morality." Although Nietzsche often refers to slaves and slavery throughout his work, the concept of slave-morality can only be understood in sharp distinction from the former notions, as well as from the "bad." While slavery (i.e., the protracted unfreedom of the spirit, the camel) is intrinsic to morality (cf. J/BGE 188) and community, even for the master, slave-morality only occurs with "the slave revolt in morals" (GM, I, 10; Emphasis Added), when "ressentiment turn[s] creative and giv[es] birth to values" (Loc. Cit.).

The argument of this chapter is an attempt to demonstrate that Nietzsche's concept of slave-morality contains two fundamental aspects: (1) Ressentiment: Slave-morality is not synonymous with the bad as such but refers to the revolt of the bad, born of ressentiment, against the master-morality of good/bad (Gut/ Schlecht). Ressentiment then gives birth to a reactive and vengeful morality of good versus evil (Gut/Böse); (2) The Will to Freedom: Since the bad are the subordinate, the oppressed and the powerless, the will to freedom represents the desire for liberation from the relations and

institutions of personal inequality through new relations of impersonal equality. This means that slave-morality not only rejects authority in the name of the independent individual (bourgeois) but identifies personal freedom with popular sovereignty: freedom from traditional society, ordered by authority, becomes absolute subservience to the state, now seen as the embodiment of popular sovereignty.

With this examination of slave-morality, I shall attempt to show that at the heart of ressentiment and the will to freedom stands the rejection of authority. The revaluation of freedom by slave-morality removes liberty from the polis to the pure subjectivity of the private bourgeois: the repudiation of exteriority and objective spirit as inimical to freedom is absolutely fundamental for the reason Lord Acton enunciates: " . . . it is only in the individual that liberty can be separated from authority"². Hence, the problem of understanding Nietzsche's concept of slave-morality means that this devaluation of authority by ressentiment and the will to freedom must first be grasped in order to then comprehend the positive revaluation of freedom and the State.

A/ RESSENTIMENT:

Slave-morality is consistently characterized by Nietzsche as a revolt (der Sklavenaufstand) against master-morality and as such it is therefore derivative. It is a response to an already existing

morality. Hence, "all its action is reaction" (GM, I, 10). That which precedes this revolt and upholds a primordial status is master-morality. The relationship of slave- to master-morality is a ressentiment which becomes creative and, in opposition to the latter, formulates its own values. I shall leave the full elaboration of master-morality to a later chapter. However, a brief characterization of this natural and primordial morality is required to preface the analysis of slave-morality.

Nietzsche argues that moral valuations invariably arise from the form of life first of the ruling class and later of the ruled, the slaves. The morality of the noble gives rise to the distinction between the good and the bad (Guten/Schlechten). The rulers ascribe the value "good" to themselves and not to their actions for "it is the exalted, proud states of soul which are considered distinguishing and determine the order of rank" (J/BGE 260). With the notion of "healthy selfishness" (Z, I, 22), Nietzsche refers not to mere self-conceit because it is spontaneous and pre-reflective; it refers rather to a quality of certainty and instinct which presides over any self-conscious pride. While master-morality is "self-glorification" (J/BGE 260), it is a self-affirmation which arises from neither actions nor works, but from a reverence and faith in oneself.

It is not the works, it is the faith which is decisive here, which determines the order of rank here, to employ an old religious formula in a new and deeper sense: some fundamental certainty which a noble soul possesses in regard to itself, something which may not be sought or found and perhaps may

not be lost either.--The noble soul has reverence
for itself. (J/BGE 287; Nietzsche's Emphasis)³

This "masterly certainty" (J/BGE 188) is therefore not a certainty of belief or dogma (cf. A/AC 39; G/TI; IX, 47) but a "certainty of an instinct" (WM/WP 430). Furthermore, on the basis of this reverence for himself, the ruler (who is "the most spiritual human being" (A/AC 57), the megalopsychia⁴) "feels himself to be the determiner of values...he knows himself to be that which in general first accords honour to things, he creates values" (J/BGE 260; Nietzsche's Emphasis). Thus, reverence and affirmation of self provide the foundation for "the bestowing virtue" (Z, I, 22) which distinguishes the noble soul.

Moreover, the self-affirmation does not imply a narrow concern for self-preservation. On the contrary, the noble soul is inclined to be inexpedient and constantly placing himself at risk to the point of self-sacrifice in order to increase his will to power. The master is the play-thing of great love, magnanimous feelings and is therefore "more stupid" (FW/GS 3) and "more unreasonable" (Loc. Cit.; Nietzsche's Emphasis). On the other hand, the bad "never loses sight of its advantage" (Loc. Cit.). Hence, "slave-morality is essentially the morality of utility" (J/BGE 260), of self-preservation and the will to survival at all costs.

Nietzsche adds one further characteristic to flesh out his portrayal of the noble soul: he is powerful. One is powerful, he

tells us, because whoever "really practices requital, and who is, therefore, grateful and revengeful, is called good; whoever is powerless, and unable to requite, is reckoned as bad" (MA/H, I, 45; cf. Ibid., I, 44). The power to bestow and benefit as well as harm comprises the dual nature of the will to power; and the powerful man is able to practice requittal: "the capacity for and duty of protracted gratitude and protracted revenge... among one's equals" (J/BGE 260). The bestowing virtue is given primacy by Nietzsche because the alternative practice of inflicting violence upon others "is a sign that we are still lacking power, or it shows a sense of frustration in the face of this poverty" (M/D 112)⁵. It is however the power of requittal which here distinguishes the good from the bad; the powerless are bad because they are unable to requite.

How, then, does ressentiment develop in opposition to master-morality? "Suppose the abused, oppressed, suffering, unfree, those uncertain of themselves and weary should moralize: what would their moral evaluations have in common?" (J/BGE 260; Emphasis Added) Nietzsche's response takes us to the heart of slave-morality and its revolt: the repudiation of "the other," the non-self as evil (cf. MA/H, I, 45; GM, I, 10); moreover, in this rejection of otherness, there speaks a vengeful ressentiment. This reaction to the other, to what is not the same, is the distinguishing characteristic of slave-morality. Fundamentally, it is "this reversal of direction of the evaluating look, this invariable looking outward (for blame, evil, uncertainty) instead of inward" (GM, I, 10). This reversal of the

evaluating look from inward to outward bespeaks the attitude of the "bad," i.e., "those uncertain of themselves" (J/BGE 260). Ressentiment, the slavish morality of good and evil, and revenge are symptoms of a profound lack of self-certainty, fear and impotence.

The term "ressentiment" and the precise concept of slave-morality emerge in Nietzsche's work in the mid-1880's. However, his attack on the reactive "look" goes back to the very beginning of his work and his early repudiation of the ethics of pity.

That book [Human, All Too Human]...was likewise an attack. The point at issue was the value of the non-egotistical instincts, the instincts of compassion (Mitleid), self-denial, and self-sacrifice ... (GM, Preface, 5)

The later conception of slave-morality is logically grounded in the earlier problem of "the value of pity and the morality of pity" (Ibid., Preface, 6; Nietzsche's Emphasis). Nietzsche's contention is that the supposed altruism of the morality of pity is based on the repudiation of the other as evil; a repudiation, moreover, nurtured by a "sick selfishness" (Z, I, 22): "Your love of your neighbour is your bad love of yourselves." (Ibid., I, 16) Hence, pity, far from being a manifestation of unselfishness, is in reality the symptom of a selfishness weakened and poisoned by impotence and uncertainty.⁶ As Kaufmann notes, "[p]ity is not unselfish; all our conduct is selfish, and we cannot help that. Pity, however, is our bad love of ourselves,

while the Eros for the friend and toward our own self-perfection is a superior love"⁷.

The distinction fundamental to any morality, according to Nietzsche, is not whether it is selfish or not but whether it represents a selfishness which is "healthy (heil) and holy (heilig)" (Z, I, 22) or one which is "hungry" and "sick" (Loc. Cit.): i.e., a reverence or a hatred for the Self. The confrontation with a morality stimulates one overriding question for Nietzsche: "I ask in every instance, 'Is it hunger or superabundance that has here become creative?' "(FW/GS 370) What becomes creative in the morality of pity is the reactive look, the "hungry selfishness," which is born of powerlessness, uncertainty, unhappiness and ressentiment.

However, if the morality of pity is turned outward, toward the other, it does not originate in an immersion in the other. On the contrary, pity (Mitleid) arises from the desire to share suffering (Leid) and thereby cause pain to others. For it is this power to inflict suffering on others that constitutes the only power of the impotent (cf. MA/H, I, 50). At the heart of pity, therefore, lies the will to give pain--particularly to the powerful and the strong. The suffering (Leidenden) make a virtue of pity (Mitleid) because through it they acquire the power to cause suffering (Leiden) by making others suffer with them. The apparent altruism of the morality of pity is a form of revenge upon others by the weak/suffering in order to (1) flee from their own suffering through (2) the power to inflicting pain on others. "Pity (Mitleiden), insofar as it really causes suffering

(Leiden)--and this is here our only point of view--is a weakness, like every losing of oneself through a harmful affect." (M/D 134; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

In criticizing pity, Nietzsche is not, of course, arguing the case for indifference to the suffering of others; indeed, pity, as the generalization of suffering, is the greater offender in this regard. Nietzsche's only point of view is that pity is a loss of oneself through a harmful emotion: harmful because it causes shame and suffering (cf. Z, II, 3); and it is a loss of self because its apparent altruism is really "bad love of [oneself]." (Z, I, 16) and the desire to escape from oneself through the other.

You flee to your neighbour away from yourselves and would like to make a virtue of it: but I see through 'selflessness'.

You cannot endure to be alone with yourselves and do not love yourselves enough: now you want to mislead your neighbour into love and gild yourselves with his mistake. (Loc. Cit.)

The poverty of selfishness, of self-love, which pity exhibits, drives it to the other whereas Nietzsche argues that only self-affirmation can authentically address the other: "And if we learn better to enjoy ourselves, we best unlearn how to do harm to others and to contrive harm." (Ibid., II, 3; cf. Ibid., III, 11-#2; FW/GS 338)

However, if revenge is at the heart of pity, then revenge must be clearly distinguished from the power of requittal. To make this

distinction, we must recall Nietzsche's notion of "bad conscience."

It will be remembered that "bad conscience" is the interiorization (Verinnerlichung) of instincts no longer allowed free expression.

Certain instincts are repressed by attaching a bad conscience to their realization. Through this repression, certain instincts which formerly were spontaneous and active become conscious and reactive.

Ressentiment is distinguished, by Nietzsche, from instinctive reprisal and self-defense by its temporary suppression of the impulse to requite the injury or insult suffered precisely because the victim is aware of his powerlessness to respond without suffering further defeat and humiliation. Hence, the defensive counter-blow, struck almost unconsciously, does not constitute ressentiment because "we do not think of the doer of the injury but only of ourselves. We act without any idea of doing injury in return, only with a view to getting away safe and sound". (S/WS 33; Emphasis Added)

The two essential factors that comprise ressentiment are weakness and the consciousness of this weakness which blocks real action, thereby displacing requital into the realm of thought, imagination and reactive emotions. Nietzsche demonstrates that protracted hate and revenge will not arise where the feeling of power and strength sustain the active nature of one's emotions. For example, if the victim feels nothing but contempt for the perpetrator, then his honour cannot be wounded. Thus, "he will not think of revenge if he despises the offender and the spectator; because as objects of his contempt they cannot give him honour, and accordingly cannot rob him of honour".

(Loc. Cit.). The reactive character of hatred pertains to weakness and therefore one will not hate that which one despises: "One does not hate so long as one continues to rate low, but only when one has come to rate equal or higher." (J/BGE 173)

Similarly, the active nature of love precludes ressentiment because its only object is the preservation of its beloved (cf. S/WS 33). In this case, one may suffer a loss of honour in the other's eyes and thereby become despicable but this reciprocity of honour and love is readily sacrificed by the lover whose only concern his object of love.

Reßsentiment flourishes only where the conditions for hate are ripe: powerlessness and the consciousness of one's impotence. Max Scheler's brilliant elucidation of Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment emphasizes the role of repression, consciousness and reaction.

Thirst for revenge is the most important source of ressentiment. . . . the very term "ressentiment" indicates that we have to do with reactions which presuppose the previous apprehension of another person's state of mind. The desire for revenge... is also such a reactive impulse. . . . Revenge is distinguished by two essential characteristics. First of all, the immediate reactive impulse, with the accompanying emotions of anger and rage, is temporarily... checked and restrained, and the response is consequently postponed This blockage is caused by the reflection that an immediate reaction would lead to defeat, and by a concomitant pronounced feeling of "inability" and "impotence." . . . Furthermore, it is of the essence of revenge that it always contains the consciousness of "tit for tat," so that it is never a mere emotional reaction.⁸

As Scheler admirably shows, ressentiment is not simply the desire to requite injury for injury but presupposes the consciousness of impotence on the part of one who cannot act but merely react in imagination, at least initially. Hence the excessively cerebral nature of protracted hate and the secondary role of emotion. While the impulsive counter-blow is delivered without any thought of the other or of returning injury (for the victim thinks "only of [himself]"), protracted revenge requires time and thought to deflect one's attention from oneself to the offender. "It needs time to pass in thought from oneself to one's adversary and ask oneself at what point he is most vulnerable. This is done in...[ressentiment] the preliminary idea of which is to consider the vulnerability...of the other." (S/WS 33)

The most harmful and insidious aspect of ressentiment is its tendency to institutionalize reactive behavior by displacing the feeling of revenge into a protracted mental attitude: thus, whereas the camel-spirit elevates active passions into enduring institutions, ressentiment destroys the active emotions and eternalizes reactive ones. "Ressentiment is a self-poisoning of the mind It is a lasting mental attitude"9 "Slave-morality is the perversion of the natural, active morality of the camel-spirit and represents the revolt of the bad against the good (cf. GM, I, 10).

However, Nietzsche's argument goes beyond the critique of ressentiment as the revolt of the bad against master-morality. The protracted hatred and revenge of the bad transforms its revolt into a new

morality by institutionalizing the reactive spirit. Slave-morality occurs only where the bad become creative and ressentiment gives birth to its own values. To begin with, bad conscience is attached to spontaneous action and especially requittal to the point where the interiorization of these instincts acquires a good conscience. Reaction, consciousness and impotence replace the active and spontaneous values of master-morality. The slave's consciousness of his own powerlessness to act and requite ends with the desire for revenge creating a morality in which this very reactive impotence is made into an absolute virtue. Indeed, bad conscience is now assigned to action itself and the will to power. Uncertainty of self conceals itself behind altruism. Thus, " 'impotence, inability to retaliate, is to become "goodness"; timorous lowliness becomes "humility"; submission to whom one hates is "obedience".' " (GM, I, 14)

What constitutes the specific creativity of slave-morality? The morality of ressentiment is unique in the following points: (1) Slave-morality replaces the primordial distinction between good and bad with that of good and evil; (2) whereas the masterly good is active and spontaneous self-affirmation and the bad is a "late, pallid counterpart" (Ibid., I, 10) of the positive good, the slavish good is the reactive "late, pallid counterpart" of evil (i.e., the good of master-morality); (3) slave-morality embodies a sick selfishness or a bad love of self; moreover, it is a profound mistrust and hatred of Self, action and affirmation which are, Nietzsche argues, the virtues of the Body: hence, the mistrust of the Self/Body is a repudiation of

worldliness, exteriority and the tragic character of life; (4) this rejection of exteriority manifests itself in a radical subjectification of the concept of being-human: world and Body are now evil, dead matter over against the living soul (mind, intelligibility); (5) since the specific nature of man is thought, rationality and calculation are the means of realizing man's humanity and optimism triumphs over tragedy by subordinating life to reason.

In short, slave-morality institutionalizes a bad love of Self/Body which poisons and undermines the necessary exteriority (worldliness and authority) of life: protracted hatred shrinks the horizon of authority and the camel-spirit's self-love.

And a thing can live only through a pious illusion.
 For man is creative [active] only through love and
 in the shadows of love's illusions, only through the
 unconditional belief in perfection and righteousness.
 Everything that forces a man to be no longer
unconditioned in his love cuts at the root of his
 strength; he must wither and be dishonoured.
 (Ull/UAH, VII; Emphasis Added)

Man's worldliness resides in the fullness of his spontaneous and innocent self-love; and slave-morality abstracts man from the very conditions of his life when it criticizes the masterly good of self-affirmation. In this way, ressentiment heralds an insidious subjectification in its institutionalization of the reactive emotions. The uncertainty of Self/Body which characterizes slave-morality withdraws from the other with fear and mistrust "as hostile, inconsiderate, rapacious, cruel, cunning, be he noble or base; evil is the

distinguishing word for man, even for every conceivable living creature, e.g. for a god; human, divine, is the same thing as devilish, evil" (MA/H, I, 45) Ressentiment culminates in a morality which condemns man and his tragic worldliness as intrinsically evil. When Nietzsche asks: "Suppose the abused...those uncertain of themselves... should moralize: what would their moral evaluations have in common?" (J/BGE 260) He responds, with Christianity in mind, that mistrust and denial are the creative forces here: "Probably a pessimistic mistrust of the entire situation of man will find expression, perhaps a condemnation of man together with his situation." (Loc. Cit.)

Since authority alone provides man with the sense of certainty, the uncertainty of Self which defines slave-morality implies a loss of authority. And with this disintegration of authority, natural morality's principal creation, a people, also collapses. Man now exists as subjectivity, subjective spirit abstracted from objective spirit, and riddled with uncertainty: i.e., this subjectivity is "unhappy consciousness". Stripped of his former worldliness and certainty, man must construct a new communal artifice around new values.

What is most interesting in slave-morality, from Nietzsche's point of view, is how the values of equality, pity and freedom combine to create this new community. Nietzsche turns to the history of Judeo-Christian morality in order to examine this form of community.

The sense of uncertainty and concomitant withdrawal from the world (dead nature) is called, in the Judeo-Christian terms, sin.

Nietzsche's distinction between master- and slave-morality corresponds to Ruth Benedict's typology of "shame-culture" and "guilt-culture"¹⁰; the former lives its moral life around public esteem, honour and self-respect while the latter subordinates public respect to conscience and personal guilt. This distinction clarifies Nietzsche's interpretation of Christianity as the subjectification of being-human whereby man loses his necessary worldliness.

Sin, as it is now experienced wherever Christianity holds sway or has held sway, is a Jewish feeling and a Jewish invention. . . . Greek antiquity--a world without feelings of sin--still seems so very strange to our sensibility. . . . The Christian presupposes a powerful, overpowering being [God] who enjoys revenge. . . . Sin is an offense against him, not against humanity. . . . God and humanity are separated so completely that a sin against humanity is really unthinkable . . . (FW/GS 135; Emphasis Added)

The unbridgeable chasm between God and humanity which sin represents recalls Hegel's analysis of Abraham as the embodiment of "unhappy consciousness." Hegel interprets the essence of Abraham as "the spirit of self-maintenance in strict opposition to otherness"¹¹. The absolute otherness of man and nature is overlaid with the antithesis of God and world. Nature and society are pure negations of the divine and must be categorically rejected. Therefore, Abraham "was a stranger on earth, a stranger to the soil and to men alike. Among men he always was a foreigner"¹².

The God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob is conceived in his sublimity to be beyond all given, finite reality. But for the same reason all of given reality is reduced to its finitude and becomes incapable of representing the infinite. . . . Consciousness of the infinite is joined then by consciousness of finitude, and all existence is reduced to a finite Dasein: there is no longer a living bond between the finite and the infinite. 13

Consciousness of infinitude (God) and finitude (man and his intrinsic sinfulness) culminates in unhappy consciousness, i.e., self-consciousness. However, unhappy consciousness (uncertainty) is the very condition of subjectivity, which is itself the profound discovery of Judaism, for self-consciousness grows out of the knowledge of the otherness of God and therefore out of sin (GM, I, 6 & 7). This consciousness of the otherness of God is also the awareness of the nothingness of man. It is this conception of God and sin which prompts Nietzsche's observation: "The concept 'God' has hitherto been the greatest objection to existence." (G/TI, VI, 8; Nietzsche's Emphasis) For that which transcends the whole as judge and condemns our being (as sinful) thereby condemns the whole.

Unhappy consciousness corresponds to ressentiment, for it expresses the uprootedness of man from nature and natural morality (polity), and his interiorization into an innerworldly subjectivity placed over against the world, polity and God. The "living bond" of the infinite and the finite is broken and God is denaturalized through his absolute transcendence of man. For Nietzsche the history of Israel illustrates this dissolution of the people through the radical polarization of

subjectivity and the world of man and God.

The history of Israel is invaluable as a typical history of the denaturalizing of natural values. . . . Originally, above all in the period of the Kingdom, Israel too stood in a correct . . . natural relationship to all things. Their Yaweh was the expression of their consciousness of power, of their delight in themselves, their hopes of themselves. . . . Yaweh is the God of Israel and consequently the God of justice: the logic of every nation that is in power and has a good conscience about it. . . . But every hope remained unfulfilled. The old God could no longer do what he formerly could. One should have let him go. What happened? One altered the conception of him: at this price one retained him. Yaweh, the God of "justice"--no longer at one with Israel . . . (A/AC 25; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

The denaturalization of morality derives from the abstraction of God from his people, the negation of the living bond. The abstraction of God arises from the denaturalization of culture. By this Nietzsche means that aristocracy has been replaced in Israel, as a result of foreign domination by a priestly caste. Slave-morality is spawned within a culture decapitated or "castrated" (WM/WP 184), in a culture without an aristocracy and exiled from God. The conditions underlying this denaturalization of morality may be summarized as: (1) the depoliticization of a culture: the loss of its indigenous nobility; (2) the hegemony of the priest caste; and (3) the subjection of a culture in which the people and the priests become closely identified.

The Jews tried to prevail after they had lost two of their castes, that of the warrior and that of the peasant; in this sense they are the "castrated": they have the priests--and then immediately the

chandala--(Loc. Cit.)

This denaturalization of culture, the loss of nobility, is a kind of socio-cultural nihilism which then becomes moral nihilism: the denaturalization of morality. And what follows from the new Yaweh "no longer at one with Israel" (A/AC 25; Nietzsche's Emphasis)?

A God who demands--in place of a God who helps, who devises means, who is fundamentally a word for every happy inspiration of courage and self-reliance.

Morality no longer the expression of the conditions under which a nation lives and grows, no longer a nation's deepest instinct of life, but become abstract, become the antithesis of life-- (Loc. Cit.; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

Through a curious dialectic, Nietzsche argues that the dissolution of the people, through slave-morality's attack on the polis, leads to a new sense of community centred in the family and its ethic of love. This transformation manifests itself in the evolution of Christianity and its withdrawal from polis. The denaturalization of morality in ancient Israel had been precipitated by the loss of both the aristocracy and the peasantry, leaving the priests ruling over the "chandala". Christianity originates with the slave revolt of the masses against the priest--the self-redemption of the masses. Christianity is the disintegration of the priest-alliance of Judaism.

As is only fair, a break develops among them, a revolt of the chandala: the origin of Christianity. . . . The Christian is the chandala who repudiates the priest--the chandala who redeems himself--

(WM/WP 184)

With this revolt of the masses there is inaugurated the most radical refusal of the world, exteriority and objective spirit. With this revolt begins the complete atomization of the individual, his abstraction from the polis and from his people (which Judaism, on the other hand, preserved). On the one hand, there is God and, on the other, there is individual man, abstracted from his status, language and people. Indeed, man no longer dwells in a people, a city or a status group; the world is the only abode of this abstract, bourgeois man. As Nietzsche points out, this could only occur within a people already uprooted and depoliticized, without a city of its own.

This was also the case with the earliest Christian community (also Jewish community), whose presupposition is the absolutely unpolitical Jewish society. Christianity could grow only in the soil of Judaism, i.e., amidst a people that had already renounced politics and lived a kind of parasitic existence within the Roman order of things. Christianity is a step further on: one is even more free to "emasculate" oneself--circumstances permit it. (Ibid. 204; Emphasis Added)

Moreover, this unpolitical ethos becomes anti-political, through the Pauline interpretation of the death of Jesus: it harbours a ressentiment against the Roman nobility and ruling Judaism and the Pharisees. Christianity thereby became a permanent revolution against the very principle of society as such, hierarchy--despite the fact that its egalitarianism cultivates a private form of community in the

Church and family.

The fate of the Evangel was determined by the death--it hung on the Cross. . . . a disciple's love knows nothing of chance. Only now did the chasm open up: "Who killed him? who was his natural enemy?"--this question came like a flash of lightning. Answer: ruling Judaism, its upper class. From this moment one felt oneself in mutiny against the social order, one subsequently understood Jesus as having been in mutiny against the social order. . . . Precisely in the most unevangelic of feelings, revengefulness, again came uppermost. (A/AC 40; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

This unevangelic ressentiment places Christianity in revolt not merely against corrupt rule but against any rule, and thus against polity as such. The temporal mastery of the nobility is prescribed, however, only with reference to an eternal Mastery and Law. The guilt culture of slave-morality demands that one live in but never become of the world as was the case with master-morality. For Nietzsche, one is Christian to the extent that one views oneself as equal to the ruling class and thereby refuses its institutions.

The gospel: the news that a gateway to happiness stands open for the poor and lowly--that all one has to do is free oneself from the institutions, traditions, guardianship of the upper classes: to this extent the rise of Christianity is nothing more than the typical socialist doctrine. (WM/WP 209; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

In this respect, Nietzsche reaffirms Hegel's analysis of the bourgeois character of the Christian-slave revolt. Here Christianity

represents a rebellion on the part of the private world of particularity and subjectivity against the public, masterly spirit of universality and recognition (honour). The former world of slave existence was that of the family, work and simple being, as opposed to action. And what is repudiated in this revolt is the very essence of human mastery but not mastery or slavery as such. It is the profound irony of Christianity, as well as its secular parodies, that the revolt against mastery only institutes a more absolute and oppressive mastery and a more crushing slavery. The equality of the slave with the master rests on the acceptance of the divine and absolute Mastery of God, before whom all are equal: the overcoming of the human master only presupposes that humanity itself is perceived as pure slavery to the divine Master¹⁴.

This radical egalitarianism thus in no way constitutes a fundamental departure from the pagan master-slave relations except to absolutize the dichotomy, and to found this new mastery upon ressentiment. Christianity, for Hegel and Nietzsche, represents an absolute slavery.

However, this very "hermeticism of the soul"¹⁵ which underlies Christianity's a-political character leads it to form alternate communities in the private sphere. Indeed, the private world of the family constitutes the paradigm for all relations within the Christian world: "The reality upon which Christianity could be raised was the little Jewish family of the Diaspora, with its warmth and affection, with its readiness to help and sustain one another--"(WM/WP 175). Moreover, within the family, one's worth resides in the mere fact that

one is, not in what one does. It is for this reason that the essence of the family is love (cf. Loc. Cit.), the love of a person regardless of his actions. And this is the case because love is the buttress of the apolitical realm of the family. Indeed, what is distinctive in the Judeo-Christian morality, according to Nietzsche, is that out of ressentiment, it developed a new concept of love and assigned it a new value: it created "a new love, the deepest and sublimest of loves" (GM, I, VIII). This is the significance of Jesus and his greatest gift to humanity, in Nietzsche's eyes: "True life, eternal life is found--it is not promised, it is here, it is within you: as life lived in love, in love without deduction or exclusion, without distance." (A/AC 29; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

However, familial love institutes relationships which necessarily involve a certain hermeticism, a death to the world and hence an apolitical attitude. Indeed, in loving someone for what he is, rather than what he does, one considers him as if he were dead. For this reason, Hegel criticizes the ethical spirit of the family for its concern with the dead rather than the living.

The [ethical] act, then, which embraces the entire existence of the blood relation does not concern the citizen, for he does not belong to the family . . . : it has as its object and content this specific individual belonging to the family, takes him as a universal being, divested of his sensuous, or particular reality. The act no longer concerns the living but the dead 16

While Nietzsche shares Hegel's critique of Christianity as a

slave-morality which withdraws man from the public life of the polis. Nietzsche takes this conception of love and being and makes it the core of the child-spirit. Against Hegel's historicism, he argues that love is the transfiguring and eternalizing power by which the character of being is imposed upon becoming: it is therefore the eros (will to power) through which the "holy lie" (the "pious illusion") of authority, certainty and polity is founded and sustained (cf. UW/UAH, VII; Z, I, 14, 16, 17, 20, & 22). I shall pursue Nietzsche's conception of great love, amor fati, and friendship as the heart of self-affirmation in the discussion of the child-spirit (Section III).

The elevation of the slave's private world of the family initiates the Christian devaluation of exteriority and the polis. Hence Nietzsche's critique of Pauline Christianity as a mutiny against the social (political) order as such: "Primitive Christianity is [the] abolition of the state. . . . Christianity is also [the] abolition of society." (WM/WP 207). The reason for this accusation is simply Christianity's generalization of the a-political and its paradoxical socialization of privacy. This is the beginning of the bourgeois world of apolitical sociality. "Christianity is possible as the most private form of existence; it presupposes a narrow, remote, completely unpolitical society--it belongs in the conventicle." (Ibid. 211; Nietzsche's Emphasis) In the end, then, the subjectification of being-human which occurs with Christianity's uncertainty of self and world cultivates a repudiation of society as such and the political character of humanity: i.e., his excentricity and intrinsic exterior-

ity in objective spirit (the life-world). The exteriority of institutions, the unhistorical and therefore of authority is what is ultimately attacked in slave-morality's values of pity, equality and private freedom, according to Nietzsche. Moreover, the slave revolt of ressentiment against the ethics of mastery do not free the slaves but simply universalize slavery and destroy the necessary conditions of true freedom: self-mastery or self-affirmation!

B/ THE WILL TO FREEDOM:

The desire for freedom, and especially egalitarian freedom, is the second aspect of slave-morality and the one which Nietzsche finds unique to the modern political culture and philosophy via the thought of Rousseau. The revolt against master-morality leads to the subjectification and denaturalization of morality. The result of slave-morality is the replacement of the people with the mass which organizes itself through the centralized nation-state. The will to freedom and equality destroys authority and strengthens the power of the state: and the modern state rises from the ashes of natural morality and the death of peoples.

2 There are still peoples and herds somewhere, but not with us, my brothers: here there are states.

The state? What is that? Well then! Now open your ears, for now I shall speak to you of the death of peoples.

The state is the coldest of all cold monsters. Coldly it lies, too; and this lie creeps from its mouth: 'I, the state, am the people.' (Z, I, 11;

Emphasis Added)

Modernity likes to view itself as the "liberation" of the individual from the "tyranny" of authority and tradition: hence equality is the condition of freedom. However, Nietzsche follows Burke and de Tocqueville in arguing that the "liberation" of the naked individual from authority is also, and more importantly, the liberation of the state power from the limitations of authority. With the death of peoples and the emergence of the mass, liberty is recognized only in the individual "because it is only in the individual that liberty can be separated from authority"¹⁷; and it is the mass-state (the state which says 'I am the people') which emerges from the separation of authority and freedom, and it is this state which recognizes and institutionalizes this separation.

The modern manifestation of slave-morality is the will to equality and freedom which "liberates" the individual and the mass-state. The antinomy of freedom and authority is an essential part of slave-morality's withdrawal from exteriority. When Paul rises up in mutiny against "ruling Judaism" (A/AC 40; Nietzsche's Emphasis), it is against the mastery and exteriority of Mosaic law that he rebels. In a remarkable passage, Nietzsche argues that the will to exist outside the law is, ultimately, the will to exist beyond the flesh; a will fueled by ressentiment against the excentricity of the law.

The law was the cross to which he felt himself nailed: how he hated it! . . . how he sought for a means of destroying it--and no longer to fulfil it!

And at last the liberating idea came to him
 For from now on he is the teacher of the destruction
of the law! To die to evil--that means also to die
 to the law; to exist in the flesh--that means also
 to exist in the law! (M/D 68; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

The saga of Christian "liberation" from sin thereby leads to the denaturalization of law and thus concretely to "the abolition of society" (WM/WP 207). The body of the law is no longer seen as a necessary or an intrinsic exteriority.

The will to freedom derives its anti-political impetus from its desire to overcome the bodiliness of the polis: to be free of the body of the law and the tragedy of exteriority, illusion and authority. Man must now be seen as "free will," autonomous subjectivity and morality as the consensus of wills free of authority. Nietzsche sees slave-morality as "the teaching of unconditioned morality" (MA/H, II, 33) and master-morality as "the teaching of unconditioned non-freedom" (Loc. Cit.): i.e., free-will versus natural morality.¹⁸

This "dream of freedom" (Loc. Cit.), the idea that man can somehow escape the contingency of his perspective into complete autonomy, is the illusion of optimism which always seeks to free morality from tragedy. The will to freedom is an open door behind which one discovers "once more the gleaming brass wall of fate" (Loc. Cit.). This radical subjectification of being-human constitutes a negation of the tragic view of the world because it detaches humanity from nature, will to power or fate. Slave-morality thereby makes of the will not a free voluntas but a "noluntas"¹⁹, a turning away from our inevitable

non-freedom, our fate.

The will to freedom means that, through the separation of freedom and authority, man no longer lives but merely plays his social roles: he becomes an actor! His exteriority is no longer a part of his being but is rather a thing with which he experiments or under which he feels himself oppressed. In durability and the will to tradition, there is established the "grand architecture" through which man becomes "a stone in a great edifice...a 'stone'--and above all not an actor!" (FW/GS 356; Nietzsche's Emphasis) To become a "stone," the roles and mediations of society must become nature and above all not art. It is only within the grand architecture of a second nature, physis, that morality can cultivate or breed a higher form of life: a life sub specie aeterni (cf. A/AC 58).

The Christian/bourgeois morality constitutes a withdrawal into the privacy of a radically subjective freedom, such that appearance (through the mediation of the role, exteriority, mask) in the "outside" world becomes fortuitous and contingent.

And so the whole of modern culture is essentially internal. . . . The opposition of inner and outer makes the outer side still more barbarous The sense of form is ironically disclaimed by the people--for they have the "sense of substance"; they are famous for their cult of "inwardness."

But there is also a famous danger in their "inwardness": the internal substance cannot be seen from the outside (UW/UAH, IV; Nietzsche's Emphasis)²⁰

The danger of the actor's hermeticism lies in his fundamental

invisibility; he can no longer "be seen from the outside". Nietzsche concludes from this that, with the advent of slave-morality, society as an artifice of "grand architecture" can no longer be built. Modern man, the actor, is a descendant of Christianity inasmuch as "Christianity is also [the] abolition of society" (WM/WP 207). The revolt against the roles, forms and institutions of master-morality, a rebellion initiated by Christianity, culminates in the modern demand for equal "direct action": the Rousseauian rebellion against society.

Nietzsche notes three basic facets of the modern, bourgeois morality: (1) the fundamental identity of mass morality with its Christian antecedents: "One may assert an absolute equivalence between Christian and anarchist: their purpose, their instinct is set only on destruction." (A/AC 58; Nietzsche's Emphasis. Cf. G/TI, IX, 34) And even more explicitly: "The French Revolution...[is] the continuation of Christianity." (WM/WP 94) (2) Polity and its grand architecture of forms and roles are increasingly vilified as "evil," the fundamental source of the corruption of man's natural goodness and freedom. (3) Hence the abolition of society (i.e., traditional polity) is the condition of true morality; however, this "liberation" need not await the Second Coming because it can be realized in the state as the people: i.e., the identity of the state and the masses which heralds the despotic threat that Nietzsche detects in Rousseau. The revolt of slave-morality begun by Christianity culminates not only in the mutiny against the social order (polis) but the absolutization of the state through its liberation from authority.

The danger posed by the apparently idyllic ideals of freedom, equality and fraternity is that they conceal a less pastoral reality: through the destruction of the horizon of exteriority, direct action (outside of the indirect means of authority) liberates the raw violence and power of the total state.²¹ The quest to create an absolute, inalienable and indivisible sovereign power requires the condemnation of particular, traditional authorities (masters), so that only the naked individual confronts the state; or, better, the unmediated individual is the state (the general will). The naked, unmediated person is, however, derived from an even more fundamental act: the separation of freedom and authority! The absolute sovereignty of the state/people "recognizes liberty only in the individual, because it is only in the individual that liberty can be separated from authority, and the right of conditional obedience deprived of the security of limited command"²² (Emphasis Added).

This means that the emergence of free subjectivity is also and more fundamentally the liberation of the state from authority; the modern spectacle of the individual and the nation-state presupposes the disintegration of freedom and authority. The individual "liberated" from authority, the bourgeois, is the condition for the liberation of the state from authority, i.e., master-morality. This destruction of authority through its separation from freedom is, Nietzsche argues, the necessary outcome of slave-morality's rebellion against master-morality.

The responsibility for much of this disruption of the intrinsic

unity of authority and freedom Nietzsche assigns to Rousseau. What is so striking about Rousseau (and what constitutes for Nietzsche the greatest objection to him) is the fact that he embodies the paradox of modern morality: its romantic eulogy of the belle âme, the hermeticism of the free soul, on the one hand, and the smothering egalitarianism of the nation-state, on the other. Thus, liberty, shorn of authority, is identified with servitude, unencumbered by constraint or tradition. This freedom is an absolute independence from authority through an equally absolute dependence upon the state (or the general will of the people). Hence, Rousseau writes:

[E]ach citizen shall be at the same time perfectly independent of all his fellow citizens and excessively dependent on the republic...it is the power of the state alone which makes the freedom of its members.²³

For Nietzsche, it is precisely this hermetic romanticism combined with a servile glorification of the state (qua general will) as the emancipator par excellence, which binds the bourgeois with his Christian predecessors. It is important to show how Nietzsche views the relationship of Rousseau and Christianity and, secondly, how their ressentiment compels a romantic withdrawal from the world into an abstract subjectivity. On the first point, Nietzsche harbours no doubt that the revolutionary romanticism of the French Revolution and its socialist/anarchist offspring derive from the slave-morality of Christianity.

The Christian is the chandala who repudiates the priest--the chandala who redeems himself--That is why the French Revolution is the daughter and continuation of Christianity--its instincts are against caste, against the noble, against the last privileges--(WM/WP 184)

However, between the French Revolution and Christianity stands Rousseau as the secular romanticization of Christianity's "mutiny against the social order" (A/AC 40; Nietzsche's Emphasis): "The French Revolution as the continuation of Christianity. Rousseau is the seducer." (WM/WP 94)

The relationship of Rousseau to Christianity lies in their common posture of ressentiment toward social and spiritual nobility and the concomitant desire to elevate the values of pity, equality and subjective freedom. This transformation of Christianity is effected by changing the object of revenge from "the world" to "society" or the masters; however, the instinct of ressentiment remains the same.

The Christian and the anarchist--both are decadents.--And when the Christian condemns, calumniates and befoils the 'world', he does so from the same instinct from which the Socialist worker condemns, calumniates and befoils society: even the "Last Judgement" is still the sweet consolation of revenge--the revolution, such as the Socialist worker too anticipates, only conceived of as somewhat more distant. (G/TI, IX, 34; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

Indeed, Nietzsche argues that there is already in Pauline Christianity, with its "destruction of the law" (M/D 68; Nietzsche's Emphasis) and its exhortation to freedom from noble institutions, "the

typical socialist doctrine" (WM/WP 209; Nietzsche's Emphasis). Thus, Rousseau lay incipient within Paul, the anarchism of the latter presaged the bourgeois morality of the former.

Moreover, it comes as no surprise, to Nietzsche at least, that Rousseau placed himself within the spiritual heritage of Plato. The uncertainty and precariousness of exteriority haunted both and they reacted against exteriority itself in order to found a new moral certainty in interiority. "The 'philosopher,' is the reaction: he desires the old virtue" (Ibid. 427; Nietzsche's Emphasis)--but on new grounds. And Rousseau is eminently Platonic in his ressentiment against law and society.

Like Plato, Rousseau was obsessed by intimations of corruption, disorganization, even of breakdown in the society around him in France. And, also like Plato, Rousseau saw the political community, absolute, indivisible, and omnipotent, as the only possible haven from the ills and torments of society.²⁴

What is most fearsome in the moralist's reaction to decadence is his absolute rejection of exteriority in favour of an absolute morality of the belle âme, arbitrated by the absolute sovereignty of the state: the expedient chosen to remedy decadence, Nietzsche argues, is merely another form of that decadence itself (cf. G/TI, II, 11). As a result, Nietzsche responds to Rousseau's moralism not as an alternative to nihilism but as precisely its cause and exacerbation.

If one views modernity as nihilistic, one also has the option of concluding, with Rousseau, "that 'this pitiable civilization is to

blame for our bad morality' " (M/D 163; Nietzsche's Emphasis); or, against Rousseau, "that 'our good morality is to blame for this pitiableness of our civilization' " (Loc. Cit.; Nietzsche's Emphasis). However, the irony of the expedient of the former reaction to the decay of authority is that it attacks authority itself (as Plato attacks tragic poetry) and demands complete "liberation" from the veils of tradition and law. Thereby an equation is posited between the freedom of the individual and his undressed condition of liberation from the cumbersome clothing of authority; for the naked bourgeois, direct action is the true condition of freedom.

And what precise form does this immodesty assume? In Book two, chapter seven of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche represents the "will to equality" as a "tarantula". And three years later, in his 1886 preface to Daybreak, he refers to "the moral tarantula Rousseau". On this basis, one may venture to argue that Nietzsche finds the will to equality at the heart of Rousseau and slave-morality's will to freedom.

Indeed, there is a profound complicity between the slave's will to freedom and the will to equality because the latter is the form that the frustrated will to freedom takes. For "one desires freedom so long as one does not possess power" (WM/WP 784; Nietzsche's Emphasis) and hence the will to equality is symptomatic of a will to power which remains unsuccessful in its will to freedom (cf. Ibid. 776). Like its Christian predecessor, Rousseau's civil religion of freedom and equality contains a vigorous ressentiment against power and nobility

(cf. Z, II, 7).

Ressentiment may manifest itself in its most vindictive form in the will to equality but the oppressive and stultifying consequences it wrecks on the cultivation of real freedom are made most apparent in the political community of the romantic: the absolute state. The disruption of liberty from its intrinsic affinity with authority creates not only the naked, bourgeois individual who defines himself as pure freedom. This fatal dichotomy undermines authority only by assuring the absolute sovereignty of the centralized state. And sovereignty is itself assured by identifying itself with the masses: the sovereignty of the state is the rule of the masses. In this way, the will to equality creates an absolute servitude. The death of peoples (cf. Z, I, 11) which the mass state heralds derives from Christianity's "abolition of society".

The argument which Nietzsche makes with regard to the opposition of the modern state to master-morality may be summarized in the following way: (1) ressentiment and the will to freedom/equality express a protracted hatred of the valuations of master-morality; (2) slave-morality creates its own values through the separation of freedom from authority and thereby undermines natural morality and traditional polity; (3) the apparent liberation of the individual from authority is fundamentally the liberation of the state and thus raw force from the constraints of exteriority (objective spirit); (4) slave-morality signifies the death of peoples and the advent of the mass, bureaucratic state which stands upon the divorce of freedom and

authority: i.e., the naked, bourgeois individual.

Nietzsche's concern with the importance of exteriority, illusion and form is an unwitting echo of a tradition articulated by Burke and de Tocqueville. I shall highlight these two particular authors because they both express a specific concern with: (1) this elemental worldliness which I am calling "exteriority," and which underlies authority; and (2) the threat to freedom which the loss of authority implies in and through the aggrandisement of the modern state, albeit a state based on the sovereignty of the people. This focus on Burke and de Tocqueville in no way implies that Nietzsche shares a fundamental metaphysical vision with them.

Burke is one of the earliest critics of abstract virtue, be it rationalist or romantic, and its liberal corollaries of natural rights, natural freedom and the pre-political character of man. At the core of Burke's crucial theory of prescription stands the contingency of naked reason upon illusion, "drapery," and the "coat of prejudice." The obscurity of forgetfulness and the unhistorical clothes reason with a stable horizon. The danger of an excessive reliance on individual rationality is the indecent exposure of reason's contingency and the corresponding loss of authority which inevitably accompanies this demystification. Although the terminology is deceptively Nietzschean, the following is Burke's concise articulation of the phenomenology of exteriority and the effects of its unveiling: "All the pleasing illusions which made power gentle and obedience liberal... are to be dissolved by this new conquering

empire of light and reason. All the decent drapery of life is to be rudely torn off."²⁵

The ode to the necessary excentricity of subjectivity, i.e., its intrinsic political contingency on the false, is elaborated in the more famous passage wherein Burke insists on the shrouding of reason within a trans-rational "prejudice".

We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason; because we suspect that the stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages. Many of our men of speculation, instead of exploding general prejudices, employ their sagacity to discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them. If they find what they seek (and they seldom fail), they think it more wise to continue the prejudice, with the reason involved, than to cast away the coat of prejudice, and to leave nothing but the naked reason.²⁶

Burke develops a line of thought dear to Nietzsche's heart when he argues here that consciousness presupposes a latent, pre-reflective wisdom, an unconscious horizon of prejudice: i.e., a pre-judgment which is passive yet constitutive of worldliness; a prejudice corresponds to what Nietzsche calls "instinct," because it prescribes virtue as one's character (daimon). It thereby makes of virtue "not a series of unconnected acts" but "a part of his nature".²⁷

Virtue and reason do not fall back on their own self-sufficiency but move out along prescribed paths, opened and maintained by the general stock (the "grand architecture") of reason. This latent reason is both paradigmatic and passive in the sense of an assimila-

ted, pre-objective structure rather than "ideas" that are objects of thought. In this way, reason and subjectivity in general are not beings in themselves, entities, but are embedded in the grand architecture of custom, habit and prejudice--or Bodiliness!

Reason is, in this way, embodied in the coat of the unhistorical. The temporality of consciousness is similarly dependent. It is not an abstract present, willing freely its own thoughts: the temporality of the present is not independent of a past, "dead and buried." It is rather tradition itself unhistorically presenting and representing the past as present, forming a chain of duration. Every historical moment is at the same time unhistorical. As Nietzsche often reiterates, the first principle of all grand architecture is that it builds sub specie aeterni. An unhistoric temporality is intrinsic to all grand architecture (grand politics) of prejudice and prescription. Polity always presupposes an horizon which unites the historical and the unhistorical or the living and the dead.²⁸ This sense of being in becoming, the unhistoric in the historic, is tradition. As I have argued, this unhistorical temporality (the supra-historical) of tradition is fundamental to Nietzsche's conception of authority (cf. A/AC 57 & 58).

Alexis de Tocqueville further examines the excentricity of time in his analysis of the egalitarian culture of the nineteenth century United States in Democracy in America. The most insistent theme of the investigation is the disintegrating political effect of the principle of equality. Tocqueville elucidates this phenomenon with

reference to two aspects: (1) the condemnation of "form" by the culture of equality; and (2) the concomitant glorification of the interiority and worldlessness of the individual as the reality of the "true" and "free" self.

There exists in every age and culture, Tocqueville argues, some "peculiar and preponderant fact"²⁹, "some ruling passion"³⁰ which orders all others. The distinguishing feature of democratic cultures is not, as is often thought, freedom because "it is not confined to democracies"³¹. It is "the equality of condition"³² or the will to equality rather than equality itself (cf. FW/GS 18) which is important here. Democratic culture may or may not have an intellectual inclination and taste for freedom but "for equality, their passion is ardent, insatiable, incessant, invincible; they call for equality in freedom; and if they cannot obtain that, they still call for equality in slavery".³³ This sentimental priority of the will to equality over that of freedom is precisely the nihilistic dimension that Nietzsche recognizes in his analysis of slave-morality.

This principle of the equality of condition entails the two theses adumbrated above: i.e., the contempt for forms and the hermeticism of the radically individualist spirit. The first point concerning form immediately recalls Burke's critique of liberalism's ressentiment toward "the coat of prejudice". Egalitarianism instills a passionate antagonism for exteriority as a restriction and limitation of personal freedom. "Men living in democratic ages do not readily comprehend the utility of forms: they feel an instinctive contempt for them."³⁴

Tocqueville correlates form with hierarchy and status while equality corresponds with social stratification based on wealth.

Nothing seems at first sight less important than the outward form of human actions, yet there is nothing upon which men set more store; they grow used to everything except to living in a society which has not their own manners. . . . In democratic countries, manners are generally devoid of dignity because private life is there extremely petty. . . . True dignity in manners consists in always taking one's proper station 35

Form implies "taking one's proper station" in the hierarchy and therefore form is intrinsically inimical to equality and vice versa. And directly opposed to hierarchy stands the concept of stratification.³⁶ The latter assumes a natural equality which is only corrupted by the fortuitous and artificial inequalities of forms, roles and manners. The premise underlying the theory of stratification is that equality is a natural given and inequality is therefore a false and perverse form extrinsic to the real content of selfhood.

The second aspect of equality to which Tocqueville draws our attention is the hermeticism of the bourgeois individual, "throw[n] back forever upon himself alone"³⁷. The condemnation of forms uproots man, who, thus abandoned, withdraws into himself. Henceforth, the bourgeois views the institutions and roles of political existence as mere means to be utilized and dominated rather than lived. He thus becomes an actor. The individual is thrown back upon himself alone by separating him from authority and, according to Tocqueville, by dissolving the temporality of tradition. The bourgeois is alone with

himself whereas the aristocrat lives contemporaneously with his ancestors, "always acting as if in the presence of canonized forefathers"³⁸, as Burke puts it. The past lives in the present and gives life to the present and the future. Time maintains an un-historical dimension in and through tradition. And this excentricity of the unhistorical draws man out of himself and invites him to take up residence in the grand architecture of the body politique. Through hierarchy and patronage in aristocratic cultures, men are "closely attached to something out of their own sphere, and they are often disposed to forget themselves".³⁹ Under egalitarian conditions, duty is depersonalized and hence more extended and yet at the same time more relaxed: "In democratic times...when the duties of each individual to the race are much more clear, devoted service to any one man becomes more rare; the bond of human affection is extended, but it is relaxed."⁴⁰

For the contemporaneous integration of past, present and future, which allows men to go beyond themselves and realize their excentricity, modern man substitutes a disconnected past, present and future within an egalitarian, bureaucratic machine; a completely abstract "exteriority" from which one then flees into an hermetic subjectivity. The fleeting present becomes at once more ill-defined and at the same time more important than the past. "[T]he woof of time is every instant broken and the track of generations effaced. . . . Aristocracy had made a chain of all the members of the community . . . ; democracy breaks that chain and severs every link of it."⁴¹

For Tocqueville as for Nietzsche, the bourgeois conception of freedom as a levelling egalitarianism is "peculiarly favourable"⁴² to the concentration of all power in the hands of the state. For the latter becomes the sole arbiter and agent of rights for the liberated individuals: "The sovereign, being necessarily and incontestably above all the citizens, does not excite their envy, and each of them thinks that he strips his equals of the prerogative that he concedes to the crown."⁴³

The will to equality (i.e., the general will) fosters those conditions under which despotism flourishes. For, in the void of authority opened up by the absence of a stable horizon of exteriority, there now stands only an atomized mass and, above it, the sovereign state. Where the aristocratic age naturally expected to place secondary powers between the sovereign and his subjects, the democratic culture conceives "the notion of a single and central power which governs the whole community by its direct influence".⁴⁴ Where the polis once provided a foundation for action and individuality, the state now sustains the inertia of the crowd. Moreover, the emasculation is all the more insidious because the state itself does not act but merely stupifies with its omnipresent regulations.

The disintegration of authority extends not only the apparent scope of freedom but also the actual power of the state, while at the same time softening its power through the development of its bureaucratic apparatus. Most importantly, the emasculation of authority has an equally disastrous effect on man himself because authority

is the condition of health. On the basis of this scenario, Tocqueville warns of a new despotism inherent in the mass, democratic state which, to use his striking phrase, does not "destroy but it prevents existence"⁴⁵ and this is precisely the danger that Nietzsche foresees in slave-morality.

The will of man is not shattered, but softened, bent, and guided; men are seldom forced by it to act, but they are constantly restrained from acting. Such a power does not destroy, but it prevents existence; it does not tyrannize, but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupifies a people, till each nation is reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd.⁴⁶

The modern, mass state "prevents existence" because it precludes authority and destroys peoples, reducing them to "a flock of timid and industrious animals". As the predominant force of enervation and stupification, the bureaucratic state is the institution of nihilism par excellence, and constitutes this nihilism through its destruction of authority and its will to equality.

Tocqueville's analysis of the mass, bureaucratic state as an enervating force of nihilism recalls Nietzsche's argument that the disintegration of forgetfulness prevents "life in any true sense" (UW/UAH, I). Life (the will to power) is "the power of specifically growing out of one's self" (Loc. Cit.). In this sense, the very existence of man "in any true sense" presupposes this power of excentricity and the objective spirit of exteriority; the horizon within which man can grow out and overcome himself. Without the

mediation of authority which constructs this grand architecture of exteriority, existence in its truest and fullest sense is not available to man or to a people. The state stands in a void of authority not only in an institutional sense but, more importantly, in an existential sense. Both Burke and Tocqueville show that the divorce of freedom from authority destroys the necessary exteriority of prejudice and form which lets man appear and exist in the political world. The attempt of slave-morality to "abolish society" by identifying excentricity with alienation leads not to liberation but to a new despotism over which the state alone presides. The revolt against authority (and master-morality) culminates not in freedom but in nihilism.⁴⁷

Authority, Nietzsche tells us, "declares the experience in accordance with which the people is to live--that is, can live--to be fixed and settled" (A/AC. 57; Nietzsche's Emphasis). This means that morality becomes natural and supra-historical so that life can be lived sub specie aeterni. Moreover, it is only within this eternalized existence that the protracted obedience and spiritualization of the camel-spirit can take place. Thus, one fundamental precondition of grand politics is that the state must always remain subordinate to authority; power must be circumscribed by the pleasing illusions of prejudice, tradition and sanctity.

When ressentiment becomes creative and gives birth to slave-morality, authority and freedom are separated into antitheses and the conditions for grand politics collapse. The loss of certainty that

underlies this subjectification of man begins in the unpolitical conditions of Judaism and flourishes in the anti-political life of Christianity. However, it is only with modern, bourgeois society that ressentiment fully evolves into the political will to equality whereby the liberation of the individual from authority culminates in the liberation of state power from authority, tradition and sanctity.

With the preconditions of authority undermined, the presuppositions of man's life in any healthy, affirmative and true sense also disappear. The mass, bureaucratic state is the death of peoples, natural morality and authority. In opposing and destroying authority, man finds himself thrown back upon himself alone in slave-morality and "softened, bent and guided" by a more benevolent but omnipresent state.

The denaturalization of morality which Nietzsche identifies as the essence of slave-morality culminates in a passive nihilism. However, the camel-spirit pursues truthfulness to the point where it also begins to oppose life, unveil the unhistorical and attack authority. And with this contradictory metamorphosis, the camel becomes the lion and the spirit begins to practice an active (as opposed to a passive) nihilism which both destroys and rejuvenates authority!

ENDNOTES:

1. Cf. Leo Strauss, Op. Cit., pp. 81ff. See also Jean Granier Op. Cit., pp. 160ff. Here Granier theorizes Nietzsche's distinction between natural morality and metaphysical/rational morality. He identifies the latter with slave-morality (good/evil) whereas master-morality (good/bad) is the spiritualization of natural morality.

2. Lord Acton, quoted by Robert A. Nisbet, Power and Community (New York: A Galaxy Book, 1962), p. 112.

3. Nietzsche clearly identifies self-love as the highest and most affirmative state of spirit; and at the same time he views this state as anything but narcissistic: it is the very essence of the "bestowing virtue" (Z, I, 22). Ultimately, self-love and love of fate (amor fati) are inseparable and constitute the highest form of worldliness and grand politics.

"I wish men would begin by respecting themselves: everything else follows from that." (WM/WP 919; Nietzsche's Emphasis) An "innocent selfishness" (FW/GS 99), one free of self-consciousness, is, for Nietzsche, perfection in the art of living:

"But he who wants to become light and a bird must love himself--thus do I teach. Not the love of the sick and diseased, to be sure: for with them even self-love stinks! One must learn to love oneself with a sound and healthy love, so that one may endure it with oneself and not go roaming about--thus do I teach." (Z, III, 11)

4. Megalopsychia or "greatness of soul" is a common phrase in Nietzsche's work and coincides with the later notion of the Übermensch, or the child-spirit.

5. The powerful are not the vindictive or violent type because it is the awareness of impotence that cultivates the protracted desire for revenge: power thus overcomes violence!

"Truly, I did this and that for the afflicted; but it always seemed to me I did better things when I learned to enjoy myself better.

As long as men have existed, man has enjoyed himself too little; that alone, my brothers, is our original sin!

And if we learn better to enjoy ourselves, we best unlearn how to do harm to others and to contrive harm." (Z, II, 3)

6. It is extremely significant that Nietzsche invariably associates impotence with a weakness in self-constraint: i.e., with an inability to overcome reactive emotions. The strong (who are also the most spiritual) "enjoy their finest gaiety in such constraint and perfection under a law of their own" (FW/GS 290); "[T]heir joy lies in self-constraint: with them asceticism becomes nature, need, instinct." (A/AC 57)

The weak, on the other hand, are not only unable to restrain their emotions but reject the asceticism and spirituality of constraint: "Conversely, it is the weak characters without power over themselves that hate the constraint of style. They feel that if this bitter and evil constraint were imposed upon them they would be demeaned; they become slaves as soon as they serve; they hate to serve." (FW/GS 290; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

The unconstrained freedom of "laissez aller" is, for Nietzsche, the very opposite of the masterly freedom of the higher spirit (cf. J/BGE 188; G/TI, IX, 38, 39 & 47; WM/WP 45ff. & 122). This is also why the protracted unfreedom of the camel-spirit is so significant in the cultivation of self-mastery: "This is the first preliminary schooling in spirituality: not to react immediately to a stimulus . . . All unspirituality, all vulgarity, is due to the incapacity to resist a stimulus--one has to react, one obeys every impulse." (G/TI, VIII, 6; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

7. Walter Kaufmann, Op. Cit. (1974), pp.368-369; Kaufmann's Emphasis.

8. Max Scheler, Ressentiment, translated by William Holdheim (New York: The Free Press, 1961), p.46; Scheler's Emphasis.

9. Ibid., p.45.

10. Cf. Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946), p.222. See also E.R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), pp.17-18 & pp.28-50.

11. G.W.F. Hegel, Early Theological Writings, trans. T.M. Knox (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p. 186.

12. G.W.F. Hegel, quoted in Jean Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by S. Cherniak and J. Heckman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), p.191.

13. Ibid., p.192.

14. Cf. Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, trans. by James H. Nichols, Jr. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), p.56.

15. José Ortega y Gasset, Op. Cit., p.74. Cf. pp.66-67.

16. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. by J.B. Baillie (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1967), p.470. Cf. Alexandre Kojève, Op. Cit., p.61.

17. Lord Acton, quoted by Robert A. Nisbet in Power and Community, Op. Cit., p.112.

18. Cf. Jean Granier, Op. Cit., pp.160ff., for his discussion of "metaphysical morality" (slave-morality) as opposed to natural morality (the pre-reflective life-world of a perspective).

19. José Ortega y Gasset, Op. Cit., p.103.

20. It is interesting to note the similarities between Nietzsche's concern for exteriority and authority and Hannah Arendt's interest in "the space of appearance". Moreover, both thinkers attribute to Christianity and modernity a intrinsic aversion to worldliness. For Nietzsche, however, worldliness is grounded in bodiliness (nature and the will to power), whereas Arendt strictly opposes the two concepts. Cf. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959).

21. José Ortega y Gasset argues that there is a coincidence of mass society, violence and statism through the direct identity of state with people: "Statism is the higher form taken by violence and direct action when these are set up as standards. Through and by means of the State, the anonymous machine, the masses act for themselves." Cf. José Ortega y Gasset, Op. Cit., p.123.

22. Lord Acton, quoted in Robert A. Nisbet, Op. Cit., p.112.
23. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. by Maurice Cranston (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1972), Book II, Chapter 12.
24. Robert Nisbet, The Social Philosophers, Community and Conflict in Western Thought (New York: Washington Square Press, 1983), p.37.
25. Edmund Burke, "Reflections on the Revolution in France," in Edmund Burke on Government, Politics and Society, ed. by B.W. Hill (Glasgow: Fontana/The Harvester Press, 1975), pp.343-344.
26. Ibid., p.354.
27. Ibid., p.355.
28. Hannah Arendt devotes special attention to the problem of tradition and authority in Between Past and Future, Eight Exercises in Political Thought (London: Penguin Books, 1977), especially in the Preface and chapters 1 & 3. She also makes the crucial point that "tradition and past are not the same" (p.94) because tradition is the transmission of the past unhistorically into the present and future, giving the latter a sense of permanence essential for a "groundwork of the world" (p.95). Authority is dependent upon this continuity and unhistorical quality of time, themes which are fundamental to both Nietzsche and Arendt.
29. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. by Phillips Bradley (New York: Vintage Books, 1945), Volume 2, p.100.
30. Loc. Cit.
31. Loc. Cit.
32. Loc. Cit.

33. Ibid., p.102.
34. Ibid., p.344.
35. Ibid., p.228.
36. Cf. Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus, trans. by Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd. (London: Paladin, 1972), pp.104ff., pp.287ff.
37. Alexis de Tocqueville, Op. Cit., p.106.
38. Edmund Burke, Op. Cit., p.299.
39. Alexis de Tocqueville, Op. Cit., p.105.
40. Loc. Cit.
41. Loc. Cit.
42. Ibid., p.312.
43. Loc. Cit.
44. Ibid., p.306.
45. Ibid., p.337.
46. Loc. Cit. Cf. M/D 179, 184; FW/GS 377; Z, I, 11.
47. Cf. Bertrand de Jouvenel, On Power, trans. by J.F. Huntington (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969); especially Book IV: "The State as Permanent Revolution," where he argues that state power in its mass form is the revolt of masses against authority and the aristocracy, a process which both atomizes society and strengthens state power.
 "Where will it end? In the destruction of all other command

for the benefit of one alone--that of the state. In each man's absolute freedom from every family and social authority, a freedom the price of which is complete submission to the state. In the complete equality...of all citizens, paid for by their equal abasement before the power of their absolute master--the state. In the disappearance of every constraint which does not emanate from the state In a word, it ends in the atomization of society, and in the rupture of every private tie linking man and man, whose only bond is now their common bondage to the state. The extremes of individualism and socialism meet: that was their predestined course." (p.172)

SECTION II: CHAPTER 4

The Lion-Spirit

Hence the free spirit hates all rules and customs, all that is permanent and definitive, hence he painfully tears asunder again and again the net around him, though...he will suffer from numerous wounds, slight and severe; for he must break off every thread from himself, from his body and soul. He must learn to love where he has hitherto hated, and vice versa.
Friedrich Nietzsche

Genuine--that is what I call him who goes into god-forsaken deserts and has broken his venerating heart. . . .
Hungered, violent, solitary, godless: that is how the lion-will wants to be.

Friedrich Nietzsche

In the three chapters of section I, I examined the spirit of constraint and discipline that Nietzsche calls "the camel." The life of the spirit was shown to depend on the eternalization of a perspective through its unhistorical horizon. Authority assures a moral perspective by surrounding it with "a pious illusion" (U II/UAH, VII) which makes the "Thou shalt" unconditional. In this way, authority raises a perspective above history by imposing "upon becoming the character of being" (WM/WP 617). Hence, Nietzsche's concept of authority manifests itself in the camel's pious respect, awe and unconditional love of the values of the polis's tradition and sanctity.

However, the thesis argued in this dissertation is not simply that Nietzsche elaborates a theory of authority through this concept of natural morality. Rather I emphasize that Nietzsche's theory of authority is built upon an explicit paradox. And this is unavoidable

since Nietzsche defines the spirit as the life that strikes into life itself (Z, II, 8). Life needs the pious illusion (the "holy lie") of authority in order to impose permanence (being) on the flux of becoming. Hence spirit strikes into life by creating this artifice of morality.

The paradox of this "holy lie" lies in the fact that in order to make morality, one must, as Nietzsche puts it, "have the unconditional will to the contrary" (G/TI, VII, 5). This means that truth is inextricably contingent upon untruth, order on illusion and morality on the holy lie of authority. The Apollonian veil of authority "gives existence an eternal and stable character" (UII/UAH, X) and morality is thereby imbued with an unhistorical sense through an unconditional will to untruth and illusion.

While this paradox lies at the centre of Nietzsche's thought (just as the holy lie structures his grand politics of authority), Nietzsche constantly stresses that the paradox in no way represents a duality. Apollo and Dionysus, morality and the extra-moral, tragedy and comedy or spirit and life (the will to power) are not two distinct things or worlds. There is only one realm (cf. M/D 130; FW/GS I, WM/WP 272, 328) and it is from the very immanence of being in becoming (morality in life) that morality learns to affirm and love the necessity (fate) and eternity of illusion. Through this affirmation, morality rises to the super-historical viewpoint (cf. UII/UAH, I) wherein the paradox of morality and nature (tragedy and comedy) is recognized in its dissonant harmony as the eternal character of becoming. Indeed, only through the paradox of making morality through the unconditional will

to the contrary is Nietzsche able to both reject historicism and insist upon the absolute immanence of becoming¹: for without the natural power of forgetfulness and the unhistorical, morality could never impose the holy illusion of being upon becoming.

It follows that ~~morality~~ can only become truly natural and life-affirming after it has experienced its extra-moral will to power and through the tension (war) of this paradox realized its super-historical reality: that its holiness is inseparable from its power to lie! Hence, man rises to the super-historical standpoint only through knowledge of the radical immanence of becoming and thus through an awareness of necessity of illusion and forgetfulness. The role of the lion-spirit is to learn to see the Apollonian world of illusion no longer as being but as illusion. Where the camel worships and loves the pious illusion because he has forgotten that it is an illusion, the lion learns to remember this illusion as "illusion and caprice" (Z, I, 1).

This means that the lion-spirit comes to view the unhistorical as mere history and thereby undermines the necessary foundations of authority. The remembrance of (forgotten) illusions institutes a dangerous excess of history, of the historical sensibility, that Nietzsche calls "active nihilism" (cf. WM/ WP 15, 55). This historical remembrance is the only manner in which man may come to the affirmative, super-historical morality of the master: that is, he comes to know the paradoxical harmony of morality and the extra-moral only through another paradox. "History must solve the problem of history, science must turn its sting against itself." (UHH/ UAH, VIII;

cf. FW/GS 337)

The paradoxical spirit of the lion is, in short, the self-overcoming of history (optimism), an active nihilism that is the self-overcoming of nihilism. The lion is that type of history (knowledge) which serves life because it leads man out of history to the super-historical. This rejuvenation of authority through its weakening may be summarized in the following points: (1) the spirit of the lion is, the knowledge (remembrance) of forgetfulness and hence of the illusory foundation of the unhistorical (authority); (2) however, this knowledge reveals the necessity and innocence of the will to untruth (forgetfulness): it unveils the paradoxical identity of morality and the extra-moral (spirit/life, tragedy/comedy); and (3) the self-overcoming of history means that knowledge cultivates a new affirmation or love: amor fati! Where the spirit (as camel) once loved, it now finds only illusion and caprice; at the same time, what it previously hated (i.e. chance, injustice and illusion: the extra-moral), it now not only recognizes but loves as redemptive fate and innocence. Through amor fati, the lion-spirit embodies a transfiguration of the spirit's will to power (eros/love); the lion is the rejection of the camel's pious love of the "Thou shalt," but, through this, the spirit engenders an unconditional will (love) to the contrary: an unconditional love of the innocence of the pious illusion (the holy lie/authority). Indeed, the lion-spirit is ultimately affirmative (amor fati) because it ends not with knowledge but with the definitive eros of the extra-moral: affirmative love of the innocence of becoming. While the camel symbolizes a certain love

of the good, the lion is the enhancement and transfiguration of love because it is also the enhancement of illusion--and the two are inseparable! "For man is creative only through love and in the shadow of love's illusions, only through the unconditional belief in perfection and righteousness." (Ull/UAH, VII)

The lion-spirit is the rejuvenation of authority because it is the self-overcoming of history and hence a knowledge that strengthens love and illusion through amor fati. This exploration of the lion and its reaffirmation of authority will proceed in the following fashion:

A/ The Lion-Spirit, Knowledge and Suffering;

B/ The Lion and Socrates;

C/ Amor Fati, Justice and the Lion.

A/ THE LION-SPIRIT, KNOWLEDGE and SUFFERING

In the early evolution of his work, Nietzsche consistently articulated the same metamorphoses of the spirit which he eventually characterizes, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, as the camel, the lion and the child. Moreover, the relationship between the first two stages of the spirit, the camel and the lion, is always presented in certain constant oppositions; faith/knowledge, solidity/fluidity, general/particular, peace/war, etc. These invariable dichotomies will be elaborated to trace the development of this metamorphosis of the spirit and its intrinsic unity with his later notion of amor fati.

Nietzsche's mature statement of the lion-spirit is contained in Thus Spoke Zarathustra and therefore I shall begin with it and then

examine his early formulations.

My brothers, why is the lion needed in the spirit? Why does the beast of burden, that renounces and is reverent, not suffice?

To create new values--even the lion is incapable of that: but to create itself freedom for new creation--that the might of the lion can do.

To seize the right to new values--that is the most terrible proceeding for a weight-bearing and reverential spirit. Truly, to this spirit it is a theft and a work for an animal of prey.

Once it loved this "Thou shalt" as its holiest thing: now it has to find illusion and caprice even in the holiest, that it may steal freedom from its love: the lion is needed for this theft. (Z, I, 1)

Nietzsche begins by asking why the lion is required for the spirit and Zarathustra responds that, for the freedom to create new values, the lion is necessary. This, it becomes clear, means that the camel must find "illusion and caprice" in that which it once loved as "its holiest thing" (Loc. Cit.), the "Thou shalt": or authority.

This is, however, "the most terrible proceeding for a weight-bearing and reverential spirit" (Loc. Cit.). The terror of this experience arises from the critical, destructive knowledge that opposes and undermines the camel's love, peace and beauty. In this sense, the spirit of the lion declares war on the camel's love and its holiest thing and, thereby, introduces suffering and solitude into its existence. The camel drives itself, heavily laden with the "values of a thousand years" (Loc. Cit.), into the solitude of the desert ("the loneliest desert") where the spirit becomes a lion; and the lion emerges from the war waged against the spirit's former love of the "Thou shalt" (authority). The pious illusion of authority and the

camel's reverential love were the necessary conditions for the genesis of spirit. However, if the spirit is the life that itself strikes into life (Z, I, 1), then war and the spiritualization of war is intrinsic to the enhancement of the spirit. And the war from which the lion emerges is one that is constituted by knowledge, suffering and solitude.

From his earliest writings, Nietzsche explicitly identifies Dionysus with a destructive, unnatural knowledge, a knowledge that dissolves the life-force of illusion. It is this warning and danger to life that he discovers in Sophocles's Oedipus.

It is as though the myth whispered to us that wisdom, and especially Dionysiac wisdom, is an unnatural crime, and that whoever, in pride of knowledge, hurls nature into the abyss of destruction, must himself experience nature's disintegration. "The edge of wisdom is turned against the wise man; wisdom is a crime committed on nature": such are the terrible words addressed to us by myth. (GT/BT, IX)

From his notes of 1872, one finds many references to this descent of knowledge into the abyss: "In knowledge mankind possesses a beautiful means of decline." (PT 125) Wisdom is inherently tragic and destructive within the natural order of illusion. Thus wisdom undermines itself and nature by exposing its contingency and falsity but, at the same time, returns man to his natural condition--after the descent to the depths of dissimulation. Knowledge, pushed to its outermost circumference (the unhistorical horizon of its life-world), undermines itself and reveals its own perspectivity. What is noteworthy, for our purposes, is the role of knowledge as a force of

descent and destruction of authority.

The demystificatory effect of knowing is given striking representation in The Use and Abuse of History. Here Nietzsche first articulates the roles of forgetfulness and remembrance whereby knowledge is contained within the strong and healthy horizon of the unhistorical. Life in a true sense depends on forgetfulness, illusion and narrow boundaries around historical knowledge. However, the higher perspective of the super-historical is preceded by the annihilation of the unhistorical.

Should anyone be able to dissolve the unhistorical atmosphere in which every great event happens, and breathe afterwards, he might be capable of rising to the "super-historical" standpoint of consciousness that Niebuhr has described as the possible result of historical research. "History...is useful for one purpose...: that man may know...the accidental nature of the forms in which they see and insist on others seeing," as one who took it could feel no impulse from history to any further life or work, for he would have recognized the blindness and injustice...as a condition of every deed. (UII/UAH, I)

The historical sensibility reduces time to history² and events to knowledge and, as mere objects of thought, destroys their power by removing their unhistorical veils. As Niebuhr remarks, the historical sense unearths "the accidental nature of the forms in which they see" and thereby reduces the "Thou shalt" to an arbitrary fiction; "for he has found out its madness, its injustice, its blind passion, and especially the earthly and darkened horizon that was the source of its power for history." (Loc. Cit.)

The destruction of old truths and pieties is precisely the

function of "critical history" (Ibid., III) which, Nietzsche insists, "also serves life and the will to power. "Man must have the strength to break up the past The same life that needs forgetfulness sometimes needs its destruction." (Loc. Cit.) By bringing to light the madness and injustice of humanity and nature, knowledge takes man down into the depths of history and, at the same time, frees him from past "truths" so that he may will new ones. Without this critical history, man "cannot shake himself free from the delicate network of his truth and righteousness for a downright act of will or desire" (Ibid., I). The descent of wisdom, especially that Dionysian wisdom which "is an unnatural crime" (GT/BT, IX), frees as it violates and destroys the narrow horizons of the unhistorical authority.

Nietzsche expresses this metamorphosis from the camel's truthfulness to the lion's freedom as a suffering liberation that knowledge inflicts on faith. Moreover, it is, paradoxically, weakness and even corruption that makes possible an eventual strengthening of the spirit. Nietzsche represents this "paradoxical passage"³ through a contradiction: this transformation of the spirit is an "ennoblement through degeneration (Veredelung durch Entartung)" (MA/H, I, 224). Hence, through a descent into history, the spirit may ultimately ascend to the super-historical: the self-overcoming of history.

Nietzsche emphasizes that strength of spirit is dependent on custom, common faith and the subjection of the individual to authority (Loc. Cit.; cf. Ibid. 228). At the same time, this stability and commonality breeds "stupidity" (Loc. Cit.; cf. J/BGE 188) and inertia. Initially, the individual is molded in the image of the common faith

of morality, i.e., "the permanent interest of the community" (Ibid., II, 89): this corresponds to the strong, weight-bearing spirit of the camel.

However, the growth and enhancement of the spirit depends upon the weaker, more evil spirit who opens a wound on the body of the grand architecture of society: "The strongest natures retain the type, the weaker ones help it to develop." (Ibid., I, 224; Nietzsche's Emphasis) It is the morally weak who bring the strange and terrifying sides of existence into the open as necessary and hence good. In short, the camel maintains and fortifies the type but the lion helps to develop spirit.

Everything to which we are accustomed draws an ever-tightening cobweb-net around us; . . . Hence the free spirit hates all rules and customs, and all that is permanent and definitive, hence he painfully tears asunder again and again the net around him, though in consequence thereof he will suffer from numerous wounds, slight and severe; for he must break off every thread from himself, from his body and soul. He must learn to love where he has hitherto hated, and vice versa. (Ibid., I, 427; Nietzsche's Emphasis. Cf. FW/GS 76)

This cultivation of a new, super-historical love through the self-overcoming of morality anticipates Nietzsche's later concept of amor fati. For what is asked of the free spirit of the lion is that it love that which it formerly saw as "evil" because it now knows that madness, falsity and injustice are the necessary conditions of all life.

Knowledge tears the womb of morality and, through this wounding, shatters the chrysalis, giving birth to a freer spirit (cf. Ibid., I,

107). However, knowledge, as the means of descent, does not escape the effects of this descent. Knowledge tears through the veils of the unhistorical only to find itself torn and dissolved into non-knowledge (illusion). Wisdom involves a reference back (through tradition and authority) to the known, the established and the accustomed. However, it is precisely what is established and customary that is torn and left behind as the spirit shatters the limits of its horizon. And what it discovers it does not know for it is the new, the unlimited and the undefined. As impious wisdom "hurls nature into the abyss of destruction [it] must [itself] experience nature's disintegration" (GT/BT, IX).

The lion is, then, this tearing and shattering of authority through knowledge of the illusion and caprice that underlies the "Thou shalt". In this way, the spirit steals freedom from its love by breaking "off every thread from himself" (MA/H, I, 427; Nietzsche's Emphasis). At the same time, the lion comes to love the necessity of illusion and the unhistorical (authority): the descent of knowledge discloses the necessity and innocence of the extra-moral. "Everything is necessity--so says the new knowledge, and this knowledge itself is necessity. Everything is innocence, and knowledge is the road to insight into this innocence." (Ibid., I, 107; Emphasis Added).

The lion-spirit thus seems to embody three fundamental dimensions: knowledge, suffering and freedom. The three coincide in the perilous dissolution of the unhistorical veils of health and happiness (cf. VII/UAH, I). First, the lion frees itself from all that is customary and permanent (the pious illusion of the "Thou shalt"); second, the

spirit suffers as it tears asunder the horizon of exteriority (authority) because this perspectivity is the precondition of happiness, strength and health; third, knowledge is the road to this suffering freedom through insight into the necessity and innocence of forgetfulness, illusion and hence of the extra-moral.

The self-overcoming of history (morality and authority) occurs within the context of the paradox which defines Nietzsche's grand politics: i.e., to make morality one must have the unconditional will to the contrary (G/TI, VIII, 5)! The free spirit of the lion is this discovery, through the impious descent of Dionysian wisdom, of the unconditional will to the extra-moral. Through the dissolution of the veils of authority, knowledge comes to know "the accidental nature of the forms in which [we] see and insist on others seeing" (UII/UAH, I); and thereby spirit recognizes the madness, injustice and blindness in every actor "as a condition of every deed" (Loc. Cit.). The lion is the self-overcoming of history insofar as it embodies the dissonant harmony of this paradox: the excess of history which critical wisdom brings to bear on "the holy lie" culminates in a rejuvenation of the unhistorical and hence of authority. If man lives "hanging in dreams on the back of a tiger" (UWL/OTL) then knowledge (and history) can serve life if it reaffirms and continues the dream of authority.

[T]he knower is a means for prolonging the earthly dance and thus belongs to the masters of ceremony of existence; and...the sublime consistency and interrelatedness of all knowledge perhaps is and will be the highest means to preserve the universality of dreaming and the mutual comprehension of all dreamers and thus also the continuation of the dream. (FW/GS 54; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

If the lion-spirit is the road to understanding of the necessity and innocence of the dream (authority), it is important to emphasize that this road is one of solitude, suffering and danger. The freedom of spirit that the lion symbolizes may be summarized in the following way.

First, the camel lives in a state of unconditional trust in and love for the "Thou shalt": he has absolute confidence in the solidity and permanence of being. Here the veils of authority are unquestioned and beyond history. The lion, on the other hand, in freeing itself from the darkened horizon of authority, lives in a "terrible sobering brightness" (M/D 114) which strips things of their "lying charms" (Loc. Cit.): hence, the lion's eye does not stop at the surface but sees "through things" (Loc. Cit.) to their accidental nature! The camel's reverence and awe of authority is stripped away to reveal illusion and accident.

He who suffers intensely looks out at things with a terrible coldness: all those little lying charms with which things are usually surrounded when the eye of the healthy regards them do not exist for him; indeed, he himself lies there before himself stripped of all colour and plumage. If until then he has been living in some perilous world of fantasy, this supreme sobering-up through pain is the means of extricating him from it: and perhaps the only means. (Loc. Cit.; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

In short, the moral world of the camel is characterized by reverence, trust, awe and loving worship while the lion-will has "broken his venerated heart" (Z, II, 8) and lives "hungered, violent,

solitary, [and] godless" (Loc. Cit.).

Second, the lion, as a result of his freedom of spirit, lives far from the market, the city and the moral world of the polis. The excess of history that destroys authority places the spirit outside the stability and permanence of the city in a wilderness of fluidity and becoming: "Here is the sea, here we can forget the city." (M/D 423)

But why must the lion forget the city and its "charms of health" (Ibid. 114)? Authority is necessary for strong and healthy life because it imposes the character of being upon becoming (WM/WP 617). However, "lest the Apollonian tendency [authority] freeze all form into Egyptian rigidity" (GT/BT IX), life needs the critical knowledge of the lion in which "all the 'pieties' [of authority] are grimly trodden under foot" (Ull/UAH, III). Hence, while the Apollonian, weight-bearing spirit of the camel is necessary for natural morality, the weight of "too many foreign heavy words and values" (Z, III, 11-2; Nietzsche's Emphasis) can make "life seem to him a desert" (Loc. Cit.). Paradoxically, the very strength of authority initiates its disintegration because its pious illusions have lost their life and vitality.

However, by driving the spirit outside the city, authority makes the transformation of the camel possible. For only in overcoming the city and its rigidity can the spirit free itself for a higher morality and a higher love. The free spirit thereby incurs the wrath of the city for his impiety: indeed, he "is hated by the people as a wolf is by the dogs" (Ibid., II, 8). The lion is thus a threat to the camel

as the wolf is to the "noble dog" (cf. Plato, The Republic, Book II, 375e). While the camel like the noble dog is tamed by the pious illusions of the city and is ruled by a profound love of its laws, the lion is the philosophic spirit of "the inquirer, the seeker, the overcomer" (Z, II, 8). His antagonism towards authority and the city's traditional "Thou shalt" lends the lion a certain Socratic quality, which I shall explore later in this chapter. At this point, it is sufficient to note the equation, in the lion-spirit, of knowledge, the critique of authority and a life beyond the city: this coincide is, for Nietzsche, the philosophic life! "Philosophy... is a voluntary living in ice and high mountains--a seeking after everything strange and questionable in existence, all that has hitherto been excommunicated by morality. . . . a wandering in the forbidden . . . " (EH, Foreword, 3; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

Third, the lion's overcoming of authority's piety leads to the "death of God": i.e., the immanence of being in becoming. The self-overcoming of history (which reveals the illusory and immanent character of being) institutes "'a higher history than all history hitherto'" (FW/GS 125) because therewith man recognizes the necessity and innocence of the unconditional will to the extra-moral: i.e., forgetfulness and the unhistorical.

For the camel, the authority of the "Thou shalt" was God and resided outside of nature and becoming. The lion, on the other hand, sees through the "Thou shalt" to "the great dragon which the spirit no longer wants to call lord and God" (Z, I, 1). The free spirit is thus the godless lord of the desert who understands the universality of

dreaming (cf. FW/GS 54) and the unity of the moral and the extra-moral. The immanence of being in becoming (Apollo/Dionysus, tragedy/comedy, purpose/chance) ends not in historicism but in the ascent to the super-historical (cf. UII/UAH, I). The self-overcoming of history therefore implies the absolute immanence of becoming (through the death of God) and the recognition of the innocence of becoming in its extra-morality (cf. G/TI, VI, 8).

Where formerly the lion stripped the "lying charms" M/D 114) of authority away, he now "hear[s] behind every word the laughter of error, of imagination, of the spirit of delusion" (Ibid. 423); where once the lion saw things in a "terrible sobering brightness" (Ibid. 114), he now realizes that all sobriety conceals an "inextinguishable drunkenness" (FW/GS 57). And this spirit of delusion and intoxication is, Nietzsche argues, love (cf. UII/UAH, VII; A/AC 23): a primeval love (FW/GS 57)! The ascent to the super-historical manifests itself therefore in a new, affirmative love: amor fati. The self-overcoming of history is not merely the recognition of the necessity of "the laughter of error" (for it is not a theoretical exercise) but the love of the fatefulness of illusion.

The lion-spirit symbolizes a rejuvenation of authority through the rediscovery of the necessity and desirability of the illusion-creating force. Unlike the camel, however, the lion recognizes the immanence of this power and thereby is able to ground authority more securely in the super-historical nature of forgetfulness. Through amor fati, the horizon of exteriority acquires a foundation that is both immanent and trans-historical in the unconditional will to the unhistorical!

B/ THE LION and SOCRATES:

The spirit of the lion summons up "the courage for an attack on one's conviction".⁴ The life of philosophy begins with the rebellion against authority in which spirit comes face to face with his own ignorance, injustice and blindness. If this wandering in the forbidden (the extra-moral) constitutes Nietzsche's conception of philosophy, then he would seem to have his predecessor in Socrates. The liberation of man from the cave of illusion and belief through knowledge seems to be the archetype for Zarathustra's lion-spirit.

Yet Nietzsche is well known for his denunciations of Socrates as "a monstrosity" (GT/BT, XIII), a "buffoon" (G/TI, II, 5) and a "decadent" (Ibid., II, 1-12). Given the variety of emotions and assessments, one is free to portray Nietzsche's relationship to Socrates, and Plato, in almost any light one chooses. Indeed, the literature on this point amply demonstrates this freedom as it ranges from the standard view of Nietzsche as uncompromisingly anti-Socratic to Kaufmann's extraordinary argument that Dionysus is, for Nietzsche, Socrates-himself⁵--albeit a "music-practicing Socrates" (GT/BT, XVII).

There is no doubt that Nietzsche's assessment of Socrates is extremely ambivalent and even contradictory. Yet it is my contention that this relationship is inseparable from the ambivalent and contradictory relationship between life and truth: the will to power and the will to truth. Throughout Nietzsche's thought, there prevails this fundamental assumption: "There is no pre-established harmony

between the promotion of truth and the welfare of mankind." (MA/H, I, 517; Emphasis Added) The word "pre-established" is absolutely critical to Nietzsche's view of the tension between truth and life. Whether it is a question of balancing forgetfulness and remembrance or the unhistorical and the historical, the prime concern of Nietzsche is to build a culture that establishes a harmony between these two dissonances. For without this dissonant harmony, full of tension and contradiction, there is neither spirit nor humanity.

However, it must not be forgotten that Goethe's epigram on the needed harmony of theory and practice ("I hate everything that merely instructs me without increasing or directly quickening my activity" (cf. UII/UAH, Preface)) moulded Nietzsche's view of philosophy as "an art of living" (WM/WP 449; Nietzsche's Emphasis). That is to say, philosophy is not concerned with "the art of discovering truth" (Loc. Cit.) as its primary aim but the great and rare art of "giv[ing] style' to one's character" (FW/GS 290); i.e., achieving mastery and perfection in the highest art of living (A/AC 57). And the will to truth possesses no pre-established harmony with the art of living but, within the larger economy of justice, life and forgetfulness, it can serve this art.

The search for truth is often thoughtlessly praised;
but it has something great in it only if the seeker
has the sincere unconditional will for justice.
(UII/UAH, VI)

Nietzsche's relationship to the Socratic taste is extraordinarily complex but may be simplified in the following way. (1) Socrates

provides the proto-type of the lion-spirit with his merciless questioning of the wisdom of convention (nomos or ethos): from the point of view natural morality (and authority), therefore, Socrates is an "immoralist" (cf. M/D 9, 496, & 544); (2) at the same time, this attack on customary convictions stands upon an ethic which presents itself as a meta-ethical knowledge of the Absolute. This lion is, in reality, only another, higher camel that seeks to free reason from practice in order to ground practice in theory: i.e., ground the pre-reflective ethical life in the contemplative certainty of the meta-ethical.

The attempt to make lived morality into a dialectical exercise is, in Nietzsche's view, to react to decadence with an even more decadent alternative. However, Nietzsche seems to distinguish between the personality of Socrates and rationalist Socratism as a system of thought, as Kaufmann following Hildebrandt argues.⁶ I would like both to advance and amend this distinction in the following way. Nietzsche finds both the power and the weakness of knowledge in Socrates. More than this, Nietzsche detects a subtle masking on the part of the first and more profound Socrates through the second, more systematic persona. The truer and therefore more concealed and elusive face I shall, following Nietzsche, call the existential/pessimistic Socrates while the more established face will be called the optimist/rationalist Socrates. The relationship between the two faces is almost that of Dionysus and Apollo and just as mysterious.

As already indicated, the value of the will to truth for the art of living refers to the worth of knowledge (intellectual virtue) for

action (moral virtue). We who are imprisoned within the customary illusion of authority believe that we know with certainty what action is and how it comes about. Indeed, this is an essential condition of morality. However, sounding very much like Socrates, Nietzsche questions our belief and certainty regarding action.

That which...men have found so hard to understand is their ignorance of themselves! The primeval delusion still lives on that one knows . . . how human action is brought about. (M/D 116; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

Morality insists upon (and instills) this "primeval delusion" because it is a necessary part of truthfulness. The transparency and knowability of action is secured through the fiction of freedom and responsibility (cf. WM/WP 277, 278, 543; GM, II, 1 & 2).

With regard to this fiction, Nietzsche counts Plato and (Plato's) Socrates⁷ as "great doubters and admirable innovators" (M/D 116). Indeed, through his interpretation of Socrates, Nietzsche is really addressing the labyrinthine problem of the relationship of intellectual and moral virtue, philosophy and authority, or the lion and the camel. For the question is not whether Nietzsche values philosophy but its role in relation to morality. Moreover, it would in no way be unfair to Nietzsche to presume that his characterization of the lion-spirit, in the following passage, draws heavily on the Socratic taste.

But the ability to contradict, the attainment of a good conscience when one feels hostile to what is accustomed, traditional, and hallowed [i.e., authority]...constitutes...the step of steps of the

liberated spirit. (FW/GS 297)

Cultivating "the intellectual conscience" (Ibid. 2) is the distinction of the highest spirits and both Plato and Socrates are explicitly distinguished as free spirits, in Nietzsche's eyes (cf. M/D 9, 116, 496, 544).

Moreover, Socrates embodied his intellectual conscience, his new taste, in a new practice: dialectics. By appealing to a standard of evaluation which lies outside of authority, Socrates tried to make reason the new authority and taste (cf. M/D 544; G/TI, II, 5).

It is clear, therefore, that Nietzsche portrays the existential Socrates as a free spirit. However, it is important also to note that he understands "Socratism" ("rational thinking" or intellectual virtue) as intrinsic to the free spirit. Kaufmann is quite right to suggest that a distinction between Socrates and Socratism is required but, at the same time, the easy solution that Nietzsche somehow loves the former while despising the latter is both facile and untenable.⁸

The passion for knowledge is "the road to insight into...innocence" (MA/H, I, 107) and the preeminent path by which the spirit is liberated: and it is this passion that Nietzsche shares with Socrates. Indeed, knowledge is "a beautiful means of decline" (PT 125). As a result, the romantic notion of a categorical and exclusive opposition between life and knowledge is entirely foreign to Nietzsche. Therefore, Nietzsche's critique of Socrates must be sought elsewhere.

Nietzsche's thought revolves around the recognition of the paradox

that morality presupposes the unconditional will to the extra-moral (exteriority/illusion or love): hence, knowledge is founded on non-knowledge and truth on untruth (cf. J/BGE 1, 2, 24, 229). The reflective life of intellectual virtue always stands upon the foundation of the pre-reflective life of authority, prejudice or forgetfulness. Hence, knowledge ("critical history") serves life and is valuable to the extent that it affirms exteriority by "prolonging the earthly dance...the universality of dreaming" (FW/GS 54). Intellectual virtue can never ground itself and is thus important only as a means of ascension to the super-historical.

However, intellectual virtue, while not replacing moral virtue for the spirited and appetitive souls, maintains a much higher and autonomous status for the rational and philosophic soul, in Socrates's eyes. Exteriority, far from being affirmed by knowledge, is the essence of non-being which must be overcome before the good life can be won. Nietzsche, on the other hand, emphasizing the paradoxical identity of being and illusion, views this optimistic rationalism as the "profoundest of errors" (M/D 116)!

Socrates and Plato, in this regard [i.e., with respect to the authority of custom] great doubters and admirable innovators, were nonetheless innocently credulous in regard to that most fateful of prejudices, that profoundest of errors, that "right knowledge must be followed by right action"--in this principle they were still the heirs of the universal madness and presumption that there exists knowledge as to the essential nature of an action. (Loc. Cit.; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

The "madness and presumption" resides in the belief that knowledge

and the philosophic knower can stand upon themselves alone, bereft of the unhistorical, outside of perspective, and determine practice.

This belief rests on the ontological assumption of a mind-substance (the epistemological subject) that is a neutral instrument, distinct from its contents, which determines behavior.⁹ It follows from this assumption that the rationality of action precedes action itself.

Hence, to act according to the instinct of custom, tradition or authority is to act, not necessarily wrongly but certainly blindly and irrationally: in a state half-way between wisdom and ignorance, one has "true convictions without being able to give reasons for them"

(The Symposium, 202a). The moral virtue of authority gives one true convictions, at best, while the intellectual virtue of philosophy gives one true knowledge of just action.

The essential presupposition of Socratic meta-ethics is the autonomous world of the mind; what Nietzsche calls "the unknown world of the 'subject'" (M/D 116). However, Nietzsche rejects the conception of the mind as a "container" that is independent of its contents: the idea that first reason exists as a faculty which afterwards, through experience, acquires ideas as its contents.¹⁰

The mind, understood as a neutral instrument, implies that custom prejudices or obscures rational thought and conduct. The mind freed of the illusions and convictions of the cave is the most rational and therefore the most virtuous. Intellectual virtue, in its Socratic form, attacks authority because it seeks to overcome exteriority (prejudice) whereas, for Nietzsche, the free spirit must attack the true convictions of authority (moral virtue) in order to love

exteriority, the pre-reflective truth of prejudice. Indeed, Nietzsche insists that there can be no presuppositionless knowledge (no "naked" reason without its "coat of prejudice") because reason is never purely instrumental, autonomous or transparent: it can never be wholly self-conscious.

To make it possible for this discipline to begin,
must there not be some prior conviction--even one
that is so commanding and unconditional that it
sacrifices all other convictions to itself? We see
that science also rests upon a faith; there simply
is no science "without presuppositions." (FW/GS 344;
Nietzsche's Emphasis)

If reason is always contingent on authority and prejudice, then action is intrinsically opaque and unknowable. Far from preceding and determining action, rationality is always embedded in practice.

Therefore Nietzsche concludes that "no amount of knowledge about an act ever suffices to ensure its performance, that the space between knowledge and action has never yet been bridged . . . Actions are never what they appear to us to be! . . . all actions are essentially unknown" (M/D 116; Nietzsche's Emphasis). Action is then intrinsically unknown and unknowable because reason is not something independent of its actions and contents.

Nietzsche argues, therefore, that when reason practices the Socratic dialectic, it does not thereby transcend the finitude of perspective (with all its untruth) but only moves from one particular horizon to another (cf. Ibid. 474). Moreover, while dialectic takes one out into the desert and brings one into the realm of the lion-spirit, it cannot take us behind the veil of appearance to truth and

pure reason. The destruction of one illusion only leads to another and hence deeper into the desert (cf. WM/ WP 603).

However, dialectic is not only wrong but, most importantly, it is bad; it is symptomatic of a servile ressentiment toward life, the pre-rational and exteriority (Bodiliness). From the perspective of the art of living, Nietzsche condemns Socratic philosophy as the "profoundest of errors" (M/D 116) because (1) it reduces intellectual virtue to conscious reason (self-consciousness) as the cause of just action and thereby identifies morality with free will: an identification fundamental to ressentiment; (2) it makes virtue essentially utilitarian; and (3) by hypostatizing reason it exacerbates the opposition of thought and action.

Like Nietzsche, Socrates confronts an age when the ruling convictions, embodied in poetry, are no longer rooted in the authority of a politically binding ethos: i.e., morality is uprooted from the ethical spirit of lived justice, in the age of sophism.¹¹ Confronted with the life of true convictions lived half-way between wisdom and ignorance and the sterile poetry whose morality has no foundation in justice, "Socrates is looking for another way to make men love justice".¹² The attempt to refound justice beyond moral virtue leads away from authority towards intellectual virtue and self-conscious reason.

Nietzsche contends that this turn away from authority toward self-sufficient reason is not only a delusion (because knowledge is always contingent upon its horizon of exteriority and therefore authority) but it is itself a symptom of weakened morality: a ressentiment

against the Body/Self born of a degeneration of instincts and therefore a loss of "masterly certainty" (J/BGE 188). The equation that defines this "forgetfulness of the demands of the body"¹³ (and assumes "the irrelevance of the body to the question of what justice in a man is"¹⁴) is "reason=virtue=happiness" (G/TI, II, 4 & 10). The eros of philosophy here leads from the darkness of materiality to the sobering brilliance of intelligibility. Through the forgetfulness of the Body, eros ascends "from physical beauty to moral beauty, and from moral beauty to the beauty of knowledge, until from the knowledge of various kinds one arrives at the supreme knowledge whose sole object is that absolute beauty, and knows... what absolute beauty is" (The Symposium, 211c; cf. The Republic, 507d-509a). -

What Socrates understood so well, according to Nietzsche, is precisely that which he himself embodied: the fact that "the old Athens was coming to an end" (G/TI, II, 9). Socrates was able to pose an alternative to authority only because he lived that decay of authority. That the true antecedents of virtue were found in self-conscious reason, that the emphasis was urgently placed on "becoming-conscious" (WM/WP 423), all this was symptomatic of an actual decline of natural morality. One has to make a counter-tyrant of reason only because, in the absence of authority, the chaotic passions threatened to become tyrants.

If one needs to make a tyrant of reason, as Socrates did, then there must exist no little danger of something else playing the tyrant. Rationality was at that time divined as a savior; neither Socrates nor his "invalids" were free to be rational or not, as they wished--it was de rigueur, it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of

Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish or --be absurdly rational.... The moralism of the Greek philosophers from Plato downwards is pathologically conditioned: likewise their estimation of dialectics. Reason=virtue=happiness means merely: one must imitate Socrates and counter the dark desires by producing a permanent daylight--the daylight of reason. One must be prudent, clear, bright at any cost: every yielding to the instincts, to the unconscious, leads downwards... (G/TI, II, 10; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

The absence of authority, i.e., of a politically binding ethos by which morality can be rooted, generates a ressentiment against authority itself: in particular, against the exteriority and bodiliness of natural morality. Here intellectual virtue turns against the materiality of moral virtue, the instinctuality of natural morality, as the seeds of injustice. To strip reason naked by tearing off the coat of prejudice and to attempt to make consciousness self-sufficient is, Nietzsche argues, to try to defeat decadence with even more decadent means. The need to repudiate bodiliness and make virtue self-conscious is "no more than a form of sickness, another form of sickness--and by no means a way back to "virtue", to "health", to happiness... To have to combat one's instincts--that is the formula for decadence: as long life is ascending, happiness and instinct are gone." (Ibid., II, 11; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

Two points need to be clarified here. First, Nietzsche is aware of the fact that intellectual virtue does not necessarily condemn moral virtue as wrong but merely blind and irrational in its "true convictions." Even when attacking the exteriority and bodiliness of

authority, Socrates still recognizes its necessity for the spirited and appetitive souls. Nietzsche is rather taking issue with both the possibility of disengaging consciousness from prejudice (exteriority) even for the "rational" soul and the desire (i.e., the ressentiment) to even attempt it. "Becoming-conscious is a sign that real morality, i.e., instinctive certainty in actions, is going to the devil" (WM/WP 423).

Second, it is, at the same time, evident that Nietzsche is also condemning the social and political appropriation of this Socratic enterprise: i.e., the interpretation which would generalize this rationality beyond intellectual virtue and make it the foundation of moral virtue for non-philosophic as well as philosophic souls. Nietzsche no doubt perceives a fundamental de-naturalization of values born of ressentiment against the bodiliness of natural morality (and authority) in Plato and his Socrates (cf. WM/WP 427ff.). However, if Socrates and Plato did not represent a type, an historical phenomenon, then Nietzsche would have paid them scant attention. That is to say, his distrust of Plato derives from the fact that Nietzsche finds in him "an antecedent Christian" (G/TI, X, 2): the struggle against Plato is "to express it more plainly...the struggle against the Christian-ecclesiastical pressure of millennia--for Christianity is Platonism for 'the people'" (J/BGE, Preface).

In the great fatality of Christianity, Plato is that ambiguity and fascination called the "ideal" which made it possible for the nobler natures of antiquity to misunderstand themselves and to step on to the bridge which led to the "Cross"... And how much there still is of Plato in the concept "Church", in the structure, system, practice of the Church!

3

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
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(G/TI, X, 2; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

Socrates and Plato are significant for Nietzsche's genealogy of slave-morality because they are the "bridge" to Christianity and its appropriation of the "ideal." Christianity's mutiny against the social order (its anti-political character) is prepared by the Socratic "counter-movement against the old, the noble taste (--against the agonal instinct, against the polis, against the value of the race, against the authority of tradition)" (*Ibid.*, X, 3). However, it must be emphasized that what Nietzsche repudiates in both Socrates and Christianity is the de-naturalization of morality: the condemnation of exteriority and bodiliness as "evil."

Nietzsche's second objection to Socrates is that reason cannot function as the foundation of virtue without thereby reducing the good to utilitarianism. The Socratic thesis that injustice is involuntary because the bad man harms himself and would not willingly do so identifies goodness not only with knowledge but with happy and useful ends. Ignorance is thus the root of evil and once enlightened only good action can follow. The premise of this equation of reason with virtue is that the bad is condemned only with regard to "its disagreeable consequences" (*J/BGE* 190). Hence, "it is [merely] stupid to act badly'; while it takes 'good'...to be identical with 'useful and pleasant' " (*Loc. Cit.*; Nietzsche's Emphasis).

In arguing that the Socratic good is merely utilitarian Nietzsche is clearly indulging in polemical excess for he is certainly aware that Socrates is trying to teach a new eros or love of justice through

a transfiguration of the soul. He is drawing our attention again to the fact that the political appropriation of this argument which identifies reason and happiness. Moreover, for Nietzsche, self-conscious reason is by its nature concerned with "utility and fitness for a purpose" (Ibid., 191). Consciousness is fundamentally an organ for communication and developed "in proportion to the degree of this utility" (FW/GS 354). Thinking is for the most part unconscious and "the thinking that rises to consciousness is only the smallest part of all this--the most superficial and worst part" (Loc. Cit.; Nietzsche's Emphasis) because it is concerned with social utility and purpose. In this way, becoming-conscious is the opposite of real morality because it is at the same time a becoming common, social and utilitarian.

In brief, the development of language and the development of consciousness (not of reason but merely of the way reason enters consciousness) go hand in hand. . . . It was only as a social animal that man acquired self-consciousness--which he is still in the process of doing, more and more.

My idea is...that consciousness does not really belong to man's individual existence but rather to his social or herd nature; that, as follows from this, it has developed subtlety only insofar as this is required by social or herd utility. (Loc. Cit.; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

In the end, Nietzsche's attack on the utilitarian nature of conscious reason, for which Socrates and Plato are merely symbols, is a critique of the concept of purpose (cf. M/D 130; MA/H, I, 39 & 107; Ibid., II, 33; FW/GS 1; G/TI, VI, 8 and Z, III, 4). What Nietzsche questions here is not that people do act with a purpose in mind on occasion nor that it is indeed necessary to morality; it is rather in

the metaphysical sense that Nietzsche denies purpose and meaning since these are the creations of particular perspectives and not transcendental forms.

Moreover, action is intrinsically unknowable not only because it is always personal but also for the reason that forgetfulness is a part of every deed. The pre-reflective and instinctive aspect of every horizon (its bodiliness and exteriority) precludes any notion of conscious purpose or utility as determining or controlling action. Purpose pertains to conscious life and is therefore non-individual, social and utilitarian. Nietzsche's perspectivism implies "the modesty of consciousness" (WM/ WP 676) and this is what intellectual virtue should reveal: that "we knowers are unknown to ourselves" (GM, Preface, 1; cf. M/D 116)! The essential question concerning action and virtue is what can be willed and what disappears precisely because it is willed.¹⁵ Purpose and utility pertain to consciousness while virtue is that which disappears precisely because it is willed: nobility and masterly certainty cannot be the object of will; one must be capable of them "in innocence and blindness" (MA/H, II, 336). Hence, in opposition to Socrates' identification of the good with reason, Nietzsche finds perfection in the art of living in spontaneity, instinct and the unconscious.

Third, and most important from Nietzsche's point of view, Socrates exacerbates the natural opposition between life and knowledge by reifying reason into a substance. Nietzsche argues that the will to truth grows out of the far more powerful eros: the will to untruth; and that there are no antitheses here, only refinements (I/BGE 24)!

With the optimistic and rationalist metaphysicians, however, the case is very different: "The fundamental faith of the metaphysicians is the faith in antithetical values." (Ibid. 2; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

Hence, Plato identifies "the third thing" (cf. The Republic, 507d) as absolute light and intelligibility, "the idea of the good" (Ibid., 508e; Plato's Emphasis); whereas that which fully is has pure being and light, that which is becoming is mixed with darkness (Ibid., 508d).

This conception of absolute truth and being implies a negation of the horizon of exteriority and thereby the paradoxical unity of truth and untruth, being and illusion: a negation which undermines life itself. "To be sure, to speak of spirit and the good as Plato did meant standing truth on her head and denying perspective itself, the basic condition of all life" (J/BGE, Preface; Nietzsche's Emphasis).

However, a more fundamental criticism underlies Nietzsche's argument that life itself is paralyzed by "standing truth on her head". If illusion is not an absence of being but the fullness of life itself, then eros is also not the overcoming of illusion but its fulfillment and affirmation. Indeed, Nietzsche presents man's basic will to power as a "primeval 'love'" (FW/GS 57) of the world. More than this, love is "the illusion-creating force...at its height" (A/AC 23) and in this sense constitutes the will to power and life in its truest and most affirmative form.

And a thing can live only through a pious illusion.
For man is creative only through love and in the
shadow of love's illusions, only through the
unconditional belief in perfection and
righteousness. Everything that forces a man to be

no longer unconditioned in his love cuts at the root of his strength; he must wither and be dishonored.
(UW/UAH, VII)

The paradox which stands at the centre of Nietzsche's thought is illuminated by his concept of love. He has stated that to make morality one must have the unconditional will to the contrary (G/TI, VII, 5); and my thesis is that this extra-moral will is love. The lion-spirit does not simply know that forgetfulness, illusion and injustice are "a condition of every deed" (UW/UAH, I); he does not merely recognize the paradoxical unity of illusion and being. The spirit of the lion makes possible the ascent to the super-historical (and the child-spirit) because it loves "the laughter of error" (M/D 423) and the play of illusion as the fullness of life: in this extra-moral love, one feels that "the world is complete and fulfills its aim in every single moment" (UW/UAH, I)! This love (amor fati) is the Dionysian affirmation of the innocence of becoming, "the unconditional belief in perfection and righteousness" (Ibid., VII). While Plato defines eros by its poverty and lack of being (cf. The Symposium, 203b) that is thereby the hunger of incompleteness for fulfillment, Nietzsche finds in eros the self-overflowing fullness of being and life.¹⁶ This is the fundamental difference between Nietzsche's lion-spirit and the intellectual virtue of Socrates and Plato: in the former, knowledge leads to the affirmative love of exteriority (bodiliness) as the completeness of life, while in the latter, knowledge is the fulfillment of love through the overcoming of exteriority as the incompleteness of being.

C/ AMOR FATI, JUSTICE and the LION:

The spirit of the lion withdraws from custom, "the charms of health" (M/D 114) and the authority of the "Thou shalt." The camel, on the other hand, reveres the solid, enduring and faithful realm of morality. Its reality is the surreality of the worldliness and objective spirit embodied in the moral/political space.

This space, however, restricts (even while it cultivates and breeds) the will to power (cf. J/BGE 188) through the subordination of the individual to the grand architecture of authority. Indeed, "morality is essentially the means of ensuring the duration of something beyond individuals, or rather through an enslavement of the individual" (WM/WP 730; cf. MA/H, II, 89). The "continuum" (Ibid. 731) or the will to tradition is made solid and enduring through the subordination of the will to power to law.

One sense of justice, in Nietzsche's thought, is this limitation and restriction of the will to power. The pedagogy of constraint circumscribes eros within the veils of tradition and authority: the old is the good and the just. Hence, from the perspective of natural morality, "what is new...is always evil, being that which wants to conquer and overthrow the old boundary markers and the old pieties; and only what is old is good" (FW/GS 4; Nietzsche's Emphasis. Cf. M/D 9; MA/H, I, 224). Here justice seems to reside within custom, tradition and authority: in the camel-spirit's reverence for the "values of a thousand years" (Z, I, 1):

However, the lion-spirit discovers that morality is merely the means and discipline towards something higher and that the absolutization of custom and its justice brings about "a reign of nothingness" (GM, II, 11). In this way, morality can lead to nihilism if it turns against life and exteriority. In its desert wanderings, the lion discovers a higher justice that affirms the will to power's love of the unaccustomed, the new and the extra-moral. The spirit thereby learns that the will to power, amor fati and justice coincide. The descent of the camel through knowledge is the impious exercise of active nihilism that unveils the purposeless becoming of the will to power; at the same time, active nihilism (the self-overcoming of history) realizes the identity of innocence, affirmation and necessity (fate).

My argument is that Nietzsche represents in the lion-spirit the self-overcoming of history through the synthesis of (1) amor fati, (2) the will to power as the innocence and necessity of "injustice" and (3) the highest justice as the will to power affirming itself! If the will to power is to become affirmative, creative and therefore loving, the spirit must achieve "freedom from ressentiment, enlightenment over ressentiment" (EH, I, 6; cf. Z, II, 7). In short, the lion-spirit must not only look directly into the terrible and questionable sides of existence: it must desire them as the truest and most beautiful aspects of life.

Nietzsche was constantly concerned that the descent of the spirit into the madness, injustice and blind passion of the unhistorical would end not with the self-overcoming of history but in the paralysis

of disgust and contempt for man. For the impiety of the lion is not at all impersonal: in the recognition of the falsity and injustice of the past, it does not thereby escape them; it realizes that it is their offspring and that "it is impossible to shake off this chain" (Ull/UAH, III). In order to avoid the paralysis of disgust and ressentiment, the spirit must learn to love where it formerly hated: it must affirm the errors, passions and crimes that make up its fate. This is the task of amor fati.

I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things; then I shall be one of those who make things beautiful. Amor fati: let that be my love henceforth! I do not want to wage war against what is ugly. I do not want to accuse; I do not even want to accuse those who accuse. Looking away shall be my only negation. And all in all and on the whole: some day I wish to be only a Yes-sayer. (FW/GS 276; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

This affirmation of fate (i.e., of "what is necessary in things") does not affirm the ugly as the antithesis of the beautiful. On the contrary, amor fati celebrates the paradoxical unity (dissonant harmony) and homogeneity of opposites: that "pain is also joy, a curse is also a blessing, the night is also a sun" (Z, IV, 19-10). Only the affirmative love of fate can cure the spirit of "taking history too seriously" (Ull/UAH, I) and, having overcome history, rise to the super-historical.

Second, the will to power is the life of becoming that combines these opposites in its process of eternal and simultaneous birth and death. The will to power lives becoming in its coming to be and its passing away. The camel-spirit reveres the old and fears the new but

the will to power unsettles and uproots the past and thus lives to the extent that it overcomes rather than respects boundaries, however sacred and authoritative they may be. The will to power characterizes the most primordial sense of life as nature (physis) which Nietzsche emphasizes as "birth," "becoming" and "growth."

Life--that is: continually shedding something that wants to die. Life--that is: being cruel and inexorable against everything about us that is growing old and weak--and not only about us. Life--that is, then: being without reverence for those who are dying, who are wretched, who are ancient? Constantly being a murderer?--And yet old Moses said: "Thou shalt not kill." (FW/GS 26; Nietzsche's Emphasis)¹⁷

In this way, the lion embodies the will to power by overcoming the camel, shedding its reverence for ~~the~~ old and established truths and thereby rejuvenating the spirit with life. At the same time, this aspect of the will to power as birth reveals a crucial dimension of Nietzsche's conception of overcoming (negation) and one that distinguishes it from ressentiment: healthy overcoming begins with a Yes, an affirmation and a new love that only negates in a secondary way. The camel-spirit is shed simply because something new is being born in and through the lion.

Now something that you formerly loved as a truth or probability strikes you as an error; you shed it and fancy that this represents a victory for your reason. But perhaps this error was as necessary for then...as are all your present "truths," being a skin...that concealed and covered a great deal that you were not yet permitted to see. What killed that opinion for you was your new life and not your reason: you no longer need it, and now it collapses and unreason crawls out of it into the light like a

worm. When we criticize something, this is no arbitrary and impersonal event; it is, at least very often, evidence of vital energies in us that are growing and shedding a skin. We negate and must negate because something in us wants to live and affirm--something that we perhaps do not know or see as yet.--This is said in favour of criticism. (FW/GS 307; Nietzsche's Emphasis. Cf. Ibid. 304; GM, I, 10; M/D 573, 552)

Healthy criticism is not an arbitrary rejection of something that one could just as well have maintained; on the contrary, one truly renounces a past only when one "no longer need[s] it" and something new is being born. To begin with a No is, for Nietzsche, a fatal symptom of ressentiment (cf. GM, I, 10) where it is not affirmation and creative love that underlies criticism but negation and creative hatred.

Hence, the signal importance of amor fati for the free spirit of the lion. For the latter, the pieties and imperative "Thou shalt" have disclosed their roots in error and more than a little "unreason [has] crawl[ed] out...into the light, like a worm". Authority has lost its unhistorical veils and hence its preconditions of life. However, amor fati allows the free spirit to affirm its affiliation with the errors of the past as the fate from which it springs; ressentiment condemns unreason and hopes that it has thereby overcome it, while the lion affirms the necessity of unreason and exteriority as a super-historical part of life.

This negation of tradition because "something in us wants to live and affirm" (FW/GS 307), what may be called "physiological criticism," may be more closely related to amor fati in the following way.

Through the love of fate, the lion-spirit is (1) the celebration of the paradox of the will to power (the unity of the moral and the extra-moral, spirit and life or Apollo and Dionysus); (2) both the knowledge and affirmation of the innocence and necessity of "injustice"; and (3) the embodiment of the spontaneous, active and creative instincts of the spirit so that even its criticism of authority signifies an affirmation: the birth of new life.

In this way, overcoming is fundamental to the will to power but the old must be overcome in an active and affirmative manner. And that which is active, affirmative and innocent is the will to power (i.e., life, nature, fate): the extra-moral. Moreover, the innocence of nature derives from the fact that it is measureless: since no one can stand outside it and award it a value: "the value of life cannot be estimated" (G/TI, II, 2; Nietzsche's Emphasis). In amor fati, innocence is secured through fate, through the identity of man and fate, humanity and nature.

One is necessary, one is a piece of fate, one belongs to the whole, one is in the whole--there exists nothing which could judge, measure, compare, condemn our being, for that would be to judge, measure, compare, condemn the whole.... But nothing exists apart from the whole! --That no one is any longer made accountable...this alone is the great liberation--thus alone is the innocence of becoming restored.... The concept 'God' has hitherto been the greatest objection to existence.... We deny God; in denying God, we deny accountability: only by doing that do we redeem the world. (Ibid., VI, 8; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

Amor fati is the recovery of the unconditional will to the extra-moral through the identity of man and fate.¹⁸ Affirmation, innocence

and fate coincide in the concept of the love of fate; and if justice is grounded in innocence and affirmation then through this identity of man and fate, justice becomes the will to power affirming itself in amor fati. Although value judgements concerning life, positive or negative, can never be true, "they possess value only as symptoms" (Ibid., II, 2). And they are symptomatic of one's degree of life, power or love because it is life itself that evaluates "through us when we establish values" (Ibid., V, 5): values are thus an expression of one's physiology or vitality.

The lion-spirit accentuates the distinction that stands at the heart of Nietzsche's thought: the opposition between an affirmative and a ressentiment will to power. In a sense, amor fati underlines this fundamental distinction because it illustrates Nietzsche's thesis that, even as spirit, man remains a part of nature (for spirit is the life that itself strikes into life). The affirmative life gives rise to value judgements which celebrate the unity of spirit and life (morality and the extra-moral) while the negative life produces judgements that place man in opposition to nature. Hence, the affirmative physiology manifests itself in "the wish to be just" (MA/H, II, 33) while negative appears in "the wish to be a judge" (Loc. Cit.). Justice is the will to power that affirms its identity with nature (life, fate or becoming): with the unconditional will to the extra-moral! The unjust life wishes to de-naturalize man and morality by condemning bodiliness and exteriority as external to spirit.

The whole pose of "man against the world," of man as

a "world-negating" principle, of man as the measure of the value of things, as judge of the world who in the end places existence itself upon his scales and finds it wanting--the monstrous insipidity of this pose has finally come home to us and we are sick of it. We laugh as soon as we encounter the juxtaposition of "man and world," separated by the sublime presumption of the little word "and." (FW/GS 346; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

The free spirit of the lion has considerably illuminated the paradox of making morality through the unconditional will to the contrary. The spirit's descent beneath the surface of morality (the "Thou shalt") has unveiled the necessity and the naturalness of illusion, forgetfulness and exteriority. Through its attack on authority, spirit has discovered the innocence and fatefulness of "the charms of health" (M/D, II, 4). Moreover, the lion may be said to represent a "return to nature," albeit in a sense explicitly opposed to Rousseau: "I do speak of a 'return to nature', although it is not really a going-back but a going-up--up into a high, free, even frightful nature and naturalness, such as plays with great tasks, is permitted to play with them." (G/TI, IX, 48; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

Amor fati constitutes an ascent to nature through the recognition and affirmation of man's bodiliness; and by cultivating "the unconditional will to the contrary" (to the extra-moral), amor fati and the lion-spirit when "the wish to be just" (MA/H, II, 33). In contrast to ressentiment's need to de-naturalize man and morality, amor fati seeks "to naturalize humanity in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature" (FW/GS 109; Nietzsche's Emphasis). Hence, the lion symbolizes the self-overcoming of history through an

unconditional affirmation of nature.

The spirit of the lion is, then, fundamentally affirmative. Amor fati arises out of a critique of authority and the camel's reverence for the "holy lie," but it ultimately affirms the naturalness and innocence of exteriority. The knowledge that illusion and caprice underlie the authority of the "Thou shalt" may dissolve the unhistorical but it soon learns that knowledge itself is "in love with error" (Ibid: 24): that "it is precisely the best knowledge that wants most to hold us in this simplified...falsified world, how it is willy-nilly in love with error because, as a living being, it is--in love with life!" (Loc. Cit.; Nietzsche's Emphasis). The lion does not create new values but, through its physiological critique of authority, it creates the freedom for new creation (cf. Z, I, 1). And it does this precisely through the affirmation of the unconditional will to the extra-moral: i.e., the will to exteriority.

Grand politics entails the paradox that authority can only be established through the lion's critique of authority. Only the lion's ascent to nature, justice and amor fati make it possible to create authority in an affirmative form, free of ressentiment. Authority, like all grand architecture, must build on the foundation of the extra-moral nature: the permanence and stability of the house of authority arise from the waters of forgetfulness and the fluid will to power!

I would not build a house for myself But if I had to, then I should build it as some of the Romans did--right into the sea. (FW/GS 240; Emphasis Added)

ENDNOTES:

1. Cf. Jean Granier, Op. Cit., p.403. Granier correctly points out that since Nietzsche shares with Hegelianism the certitude that (1) there is no suprasensible realm and (2) being is immanent in becoming, the philosophy of Nietzsche is often mistaken for a philosophy of history; i.e., the belief that this immanence necessarily leads to an historicist immersion of values in the flux of time. Indeed, Nietzsche's repudiation of Hegel's identification of reality and value derives from his attack upon historical optimism and, more fundamentally, from his theory of value as based on the unhistorical and the super-historical: the powers of eternalization! Cf. Jean Granier, Ibid., pp.395-404. For the opposing argument which interprets Nietzsche as an historicist, see Stanley Rosen, Nihilism, a philosophical essay (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969).

2. Cf. George Grant, Time as History, Ninth Series of the CBC Massey Lectures (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1969). Despite his interpretation of Nietzsche as an historicist (hence his failure to understand the notions of amor fati and eternal recurrence), Grant does successfully elucidate Nietzsche's misgivings about the reduction of time to history and the implications of radical historicism for the good life.

3. Mircea Eliade, Myths, Rites, Symbols: a Mircea Eliade Reader, Volume 2, Wendell C. Beane and William G. Doty (editors) (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), p.410.

4. Friedrich Nietzsche, quoted in Walter Kaufmann (1974), Op. Cit., p.19. Kaufmann gives the reference for this fragment as Volume 16, #318, Gesammelte Werke, Musarionausgabe, 23 volumes (Munich: Musarion Verlag, 1920-29).

5. Cf. Walter Kaufmann, Op. Cit. (1974), Chapter 13, pp.391ff., especially pp.410-II. On the whole, Kaufmann's assessment of Nietzsche's relationship with Socrates is much subtler and richer than most other, contemporary readings. Gilles Deleuze is the exception here for he also notes Nietzsche's ambivalence and ambiguity (cf. pp.98ff. in David Allison (ed.), The New Nietzsche (New York: Dell Publishing, 1977)).

Werner Dannhauser, Nietzsche's View of Socrates (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974) is very much less sensitive to the contradictions and profound admiration that Nietzsche exhibits towards the lion-like character of Socrates.

The more contemporary interpretations by Sarah Kofman, in David Allison, Op. Cit., Rose Pfeffer, Nietzsche:

Disciple of Dionysus (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1974), and Simone Fabre, Nietzsche et la question politique (Paris: Editions Sirey, 1977) tend to fall into the same Dionysus versus Socrates opposition largely because the category of the lion-spirit is not employed to provide a context within which the tensions and ambiguities can be seen more clearly. The three-fold metamorphoses of the spirit is invaluable and essential as an interpretative device for reading Nietzsche and this is particularly true in regard to the question of Socrates.

6. Cf. Walter Kaufmann, Op. Cit. (1974), pp. 393ff. and 398ff.

7. It is important to note that Nietzsche portrays Plato as Socratic only "in spite of [himself]" (J/BGE 191) and emphasizes Plato's refinement and nobility in sharp contrast to Socrates's plebian character. Hence, Socrates is usually the principal target of Nietzsche's attack and Plato is viewed as interpreting Socrates "only in the manner of a popular tune [picked] from the streets" (Loc. Cit.): in short, Socratism is something "for which he [Plato] was really too noble" (Loc. Cit.).

8. Cf. Walter Kaufmann, Op. Cit. (1974), pp. 393-94.

9. For a fascinating and sophisticated critique of the Socratic ideal of self-sufficient reason, see Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), especially pp. 42ff.; see also Karl Jaspers, Reason and Existenz, Five Lectures, trans. William Earle (New York: The Noonday Press, 1955), especially the first and fourth lectures where omnipresence of the non-objectifiable a-logic: "The rational is not thinkable without its other, the non-rational, and it never appears in reality without it." (p. 19); and, of course, Hegel's devastating critique of the epistemological subject and knowledge as a neutral instrument, in the Introduction to The Phenomenology of Mind.

10. For an excellent critique of this conception of reason and the epistemological subject, see Michael Oakeshott, "Rational Conduct," in Rationalism in Politics (London: Methuen & Co., 1962), pp. 80-110.

11. Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). In his essay, "Plato and the Poets," Gadamer argues that Plato pits philosophy against poetry at a time when the latter no longer functioned as an ethical spirit. Before the era of

sophist education, poetry was guided, in its education of youth, by the fact that the morality it conveyed was a lived justice: an "ethos prevailing in the society which, though concealed, secretly molds human beings" (p.49). Once poetry was severed from its authority, morality lost its imperative tone and, in reaction to this vacuum, philosophy aspired to ground poetry in a new and certain authority: reason. Philosophy must discover the grounds of justice for morality at a time when "no existing ethos in the communal life of young and old [was present] to guide and define the effect of the poetic word" (p.50): "Plato's Socratic insight was that a binding political ethos which would assure the proper application and interpretation of poetry, no longer existed once sophism had come to define the spirit of education." (Loc. Cit.) Cf. WM/WP 427.

12. Allan Bloom, "An Interpretive Essay," in The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p.354.

13. Ibid., p.371.

14. Ibid., p.375.

15. Cf. Karl Jaspers, Op. Cit. (1955), p.122.

16. For an intriguing and insightful discussion of Nietzsche's conception of love and the will to power see Henri Birault, "Beatitude in Nietzsche," in David B. Allison, Op. Cit., pp.219-31. I owe to Birault the insight that Nietzsche's metamorphosis of the spirit is the transfiguration of the will as love: "If Nietzsche's philosophy is not a new philosophy but a new way to philosophize, it is just because of this revolution worked in the very form or essence of desire. While the sophia changes its content, the philein changes its form. It is not a question of desiring other things, or of desiring the same things by other means; it is a question of desiring all things in another way--the material and the spiritual, the good and the bad, for ourselves and for others. . . . Thus desire now has as its father (or rather its mother) wealth, and no longer poverty; action is the child of happiness and no longer of unhappiness; beatitude is initial and no longer terminal." (p.229)

17. For the etymology of physis as "birth," see F.M. Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy, A Study in the Origins of Western Speculation (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), pp.7, 73ff., 150-53, 185ff. It is also interesting to note that Emerson, whom Nietzsche read with great admiration (cf. G/TI, IX, 13), conceived nature as "the

energizing spirit" of transition, becoming or the new in which the past is always swallowed and forgotten (cf. pp.176ff. in Ralph Waldo Emerson, Op. Cit.; cf. also p.367).

18. Cf. Joan Stambaugh, "Amor dei and Amor fati: Spinoza and Nietzsche," in Studies in Nietzsche and the Judeo-Christian Tradition, edited by J.C. O'Flaherty, T.F. Sellner and R.M. Helm (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina, 1985).

SECTION III

THE CHILD-SPIRIT

Chapter 5

The Spirit of the Child and Master-Morality.

Let us think this thought in its most terrible form: existence as it is, without meaning or aim, yet recurring inevitably without any finale of nothingness: "the eternal recurrence." . . . Can we remove the idea of a goal from the process and then affirm the process in spite of this?--This would be the case if something were attained at every moment within this process--and always the same.

Friedrich Nietzsche

The spirit of the lion learns that the grand architecture of master-morality can only be built on the foundation of the unconditional will to the extra-moral. Emerging from this pedagogy, the child symbolizes that spirit which is sovereign, autonomous and thereby far above morality (GM, II, 2). The child is sovereign and extra-moral precisely because it is above the law: its principle of life is unadulterated selfishness and the lust for power. Hence, the grand politics of making morality, that Nietzsche envisions, is explicitly distinguished from that of becoming moral oneself (WM/WP 304)!

Given that the above is true, is Nietzsche not simply embellishing the Machiavellian theory of politics divorced of morality or, perhaps more aptly, is he not merely a modern Thrasymachus advocating "justice" as the interest of the stronger? Is the child, at bottom, any different from the tyrant for whom the greatest good is the

pursuit of his private advantage or pleasure? And is justice not simply a convenient semblance ("false consciousness") by which the interest of the strong is made to appear just? In short, is Nietzsche anything more than a modern sophist arguing (through the will to power) that power is the good that the will necessarily seeks to possess: that the will to power (der Wille zur Macht) is the will to tyranny (der Wille zur Reich)?

This chapter will attempt to argue that Nietzsche does indeed introduce a new virtue based on the will to power but that this master-morality is opposed to any morality based on interest, utility or pleasure: moreover, Nietzsche conceives the will to power as the redefinition of eros away from these instrumentalist criteria. In order to accomplish this, it will be necessary to explicate the new virtue that the child-spirit represents and which Nietzsche calls "the bestowing virtue" (Z, I, 22). As the heart of master-morality, this virtue is none other than the self-overcoming of the superabundant will to power.

While the tyrannical life is based on the desire to have power, the eros of the healthy will to power is power: for the former, having is being while Nietzsche views it as a question of "physiology," of who one is.¹ Hence, the metamorphosis of the camel into the lion is the transformation of the "Thou shalt" into the "I will"; but the transfiguration of the lion into the child symbolizes the achievement of the "I am" (WM/WP 940). The will to power that the child-spirit is is the overflowing eros; and the physiology of the

master is "the exalted body...the dancer" (Z, III, 10)!

This is the reason that Nietzsche repeatedly stresses the point that nobility does not reveal itself in works or actions (J/BGE 287). The good (nobility) pertains to who one is: i.e., to the strength and health of one's will to power. However, as demonstrated in the exploration of the camel-spirit, Nietzsche argues that the strong and healthy eros is a product of authority and the pedagogy of constraint. The mastery of the higher spirit presupposes a long and disciplined spiritualization of the passions. Only the weak and servile feel themselves above the constraint of authority while the strong find their joy in such restriction under the law (cf. FW/GS 290, J/BGE 188, A/AC 57). In short, Nietzsche condemns the libertinage and "laisser aller" of the tyrannical will as weak and impotent: i.e., the very opposite of the will to power (WM/WP 122)!²

While Nietzsche completely rejects the freedom from constraint which characterizes the tyrannical life, he insists that the spirit of the child is just as erotic. The tragic paradox reasserts itself: spirit (the life that itself strikes into life) is only as strong as the Body that constitutes its life; hence, the eros of the tyrant is both the precondition of the child-spirit and its greatest danger! The passion of the highest spirit always lives on the threshold of the chaos of Alcibiades, "five steps from tyranny" (G/TI, IX, 38): it is no exaggeration to use the word "chaos" here because Nietzsche, like Plato, considers tyranny as the anarchy of the spirit or the Body/Self; hence, "laisser aller" is not a doctrine but a

physiological condition, according to Nietzsche. However, master-morality presupposes this terror and abyss as the life of the will to power. " 'Man must grow better and more evil'--thus do I teach. The most evil is necessary for the Superman's best." (Z, IV, 13-5)

This over-abundance of passion and eros is thereby the precondition of the spiritualization of passion and master-morality.³ As a result, the highest spirit must live forever on the edge of anarchy and tyranny while continually overcoming their hostility to constraint, authority and thus exteriority. Indeed, only through the discipline of authority can the eros of tyranny be sublimated in the spirit of the child--i.e., become better and more evil at the same time.

One would have to seek the highest type of free man where the greatest resistance is constantly being overcome: five steps from tyranny, near the threshold of the danger of servitude. This is true psychologically when one understands by "tyrants" pitiless and dreadful instincts, to combat which demands the maximum of authority and discipline towards oneself--finest type Julius Caesar--; . . . First principle: one must need strength, otherwise one will never have it. (G/TI, IX, 38; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

The paradox of Nietzsche's grand politics of authority may thus be further clarified in the following manner. I have attempted to illuminate the paradoxical character of authority through the proposition that to make morality one must have the unconditional will to the contrary (Ibid., VII, 5). However, it is essential to emphasize that this paradox is a war (between authority and eros) and

that the free spirit of the master is that of the conqueror, the overcomer, the spirit of the warrior -(Ibid., IX, 38).

The spirit of anarchy which pervades the life of the tyrant betrays a Body/Self devoid of the constraint and order of exteriority; he is, for Nietzsche, the cynical "actor" for whom all nature ceases and becomes art (FW/GS 356), and roles are merely acted as conscious instruments of private gain: i.e., the "coat of prejudice" is no longer lived in a pre-reflective way as authority and character but cynically acted (cf. UW/UAH, V & IX)!

In this chapter, therefore, I shall explore the nature of "the bestowing virtue" and the overabundant will to power that defines it. At the same time, in order to distinguish this virtue from the tyrant's anarchy of the spirit, I shall attempt to show that the child symbolizes the strength and joy (self-affirmation) of self-constraint (A/AC 57; FW/GS 290; J/BGE 188). Hence, Nietzsche stresses the tremendous tension and effort demanded by authority to overcome the evil and power of the passions: yet this self-mastery in the face of tyranny is fundamental to the noble good that Nietzsche seeks to delineate. "I believe you capable of any evil: therefore I desire of you the good." (Z, II, 13)

In order to fully explicate the complex relationship between the bestowing virtue and the will to power, I shall compare and contrast Nietzsche's will to power (particularly its highest manifestation in love) with Plato's eros. "The fundamental relationship between love and virtue is crucial to both philosophers and yet constitutes the

basic difference between the two. In the first section, therefore, I will examine Plato and Nietzsche with regard to (a) the nature of love, (b) its function, (c) love and virtue and (d) the relationship between the tyrannic spirit and greatness of soul.

In order to cultivate this joy in self-constraint, master-morality requires a means of breeding the strength and courage to affirm the terrible and the illusory as the fullness of life. The affirmation of blindness and injustice as the eternal conditions of every action (UII/UAH, I) is the love of fate (amor fati) transformed into a means of cultivating self-mastery: Nietzsche calls this "the eternal recurrence of the same". In the very absence of purpose and meaning, Nietzsche asks man to find the perfection and innocence of becoming (G/TI, VI, 8); the fullness of the will to power in its self-overcoming, destruction and becoming.

Finally, since Nietzsche's will to power proceeds from affirmation, fullness and happiness, the eros of the master must be distinguished not only from Plato's philosophic eros (which proceeds from poverty), it is also distinct from Hegel's historicist desire. The latter begins with negation, deficiency and unhappiness and evolves through knowledge to the completeness of the Absolute. Moreover, while the command of the Overman is independent of any mediation by the slave and therefore history (and the historicist "idolatry of the actual"), Hegel's lordship depends reactively on the recognition of the slave. Hence, the eros of master-morality is active and creative whereas Hegel's lord finds his truth in the slave

and defines desire in a reactive and historicist fashion.

In order to elaborate this argument, the chapter will be divided into the following sections:

- A/ The Child-Spirit and the New Virtue,
- B/ The Eternal Return of the Same,
- C/ The Master versus the Shepherd.

A/ THE CHILD-SPIRIT and the NEW VIRTUE

Nietzsche's grand politics projects the cultivation of a new, physiological virtue through pedagogies of the camel, the lion and the child. However, master-morality is the birth of a spirit that is extra-moral and yet still, in some sense, moral. The ambivalence is unavoidable because it is inherent in the will to power itself which is both eros and its self-mastery.

However, the question persists: Is the child subject to master-morality or beyond it? Nietzsche indicates that the provocative expression, "beyond good and evil," does not mean "beyond good and bad" (GM, I, 17; cf. J/BGE 260) or beyond master-morality. Since the concepts of "good/ evil" are the foundations of slave-morality, the phrase "beyond good and evil" points not to some realm outside of morality as such but beyond ressentiment to a higher morality. Since Nietzsche often uses the term "morality" to denote natural, slave- and master-morality, it is sometimes difficult to decipher what content he means to give the word. However, there is one generic dimension to

morality, according to Nietzsche: it is the Apollonian will to overcome oneself, to spiritualize the will to power through authority's constraints and narrowed perspectives. This Apollonian desire to impose the character of being upon becoming (WM/WP 617) thus gives rise to order and morality but only through the extra-moral exteriority of illusion and forgetfulness: hence, Apollo/morality is the self-overcoming of Dionysus/will to power!

In this sense, master-morality remains a morality and therefore a life of protracted constraint and authority. What distinguishes the master from both the camel-spirit and the slave is that he is autonomous (master of himself), affirmative (of himself and fate) and, above all, creative (giving and bestowing spontaneously); that is to say, he embodies the most spiritualized and active will to power.

Moreover, Nietzsche makes it clear that only from the point of view of slave-morality does mastery appear to be foreign to morality as such. "Lofty spiritual independence, the will to stand alone, great intelligence even, are felt to be dangerous; everything that raises the individual above the herd and makes his neighbour quail is henceforth called evil." (I/BGE 201; Nietzsche's Emphasis) Natural morality combines eros and authority's constraint through a limited perspective; and although a higher morality may widen and deepen a perspective, thereby representing a danger to traditional authority, it still requires measure and constraint--i.e., exteriority.

Morality is in Europe today herd-animal morality--
that is to say, as we understand the thing, only one

kind of human morality beside which, before which, after which many other, above all higher, moralities are possible or ought to be possible. (Ibid. 202; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

It is on this basis that I interpret the child-spirit as a part of and not a sequel to master-morality. It may be argued that in the three metamorphoses of the spirit that comprise the whole of master-morality, the paradox of morality is experienced, fought out, thought and acceded to. Master-morality as a protracted metamorphosis of the Body/Self from the camel to the child culminates in the active, affirmative and independent spirit. Hence, Nietzsche contends "that a lofty spirituality itself exists only as the final product of moral qualities...[and] is the spiritualization of justice" (Ibid. 219).

The child symbolizes therefore a full, rich and refined will to power in which coincides mastery, affirmation and spontaneous creation. It would be entirely erroneous and grossly unfair to read Nietzsche's master-morality as an expression of ressentiment, libertinage or the lust for tyranny (all of which signify an anarchy of the spirit rather than mastery). For the child is the transformation of the "I will" (the lion) into the "I am" (WM/WP 940): i.e., the child is the spiritualization of justice that both overcomes justice/morality and sublimates it into a spontaneous way of being. Hence, the child is the "self-overcoming of justice (Selbstaufhebung der Gerechtigkeit)" (GM, II, 10), which Nietzsche calls "mercy" (Loc. Cit.; Nietzsche's Emphasis).

However, in order to fully understand this self-overcoming of

justice and morality (and its relationship to authority), it is necessary first to clarify the nature of affirmation in Nietzsche's thought. He constantly reminds us that the noble soul lives and embodies an innocent and spontaneous selfishness; and the essence of this selfishness is reverence for oneself, self-love or self-affirmation. Once again, it must be emphasized that this is not an idea or an attitude towards oneself but a physiological state: a quality of the will to power, the Body/Self, that defines one's being.

At the same time, Nietzsche distinguishes between the selfishness which is healthy and another that is sick and impoverished (Z, I, 22). The foundation of this distinction is that, first and foremost, the selfishness of the noble soul is a self-affirmation that is active and spontaneous; it is a physiological phenomenon which is symptomatic of a certainty concerning oneself, a happiness and exuberance that has become instinct (J/BGE 287; A/AC 57; FW/GS 290). As a result, self-affirmation has nothing to do with conceit or arrogance that is product of ressentiment and therefore betrays a weak and uncertain will to power; hence, sick selfishness is reactive and self-conscious, on the one hand, and an expression of self-indulgence and laissez aller rather than mastery, on the other. The selfishness which seeks its own advantage over against those of others is unhealthy, according to Nietzsche, because its will to tyranny betrays an anarchy of the spirit; a failure of self-mastery.

The second aspect of this distinction between a healthy and a sick selfishness concerns the quality of self-love. Nietzsche links

creativity (procreation) with love because man is creative only through love and its illusions (Ull/UAH, VII); indeed, the strength and power that define greatness of soul for Nietzsche presuppose unconditional love. Hence, one thing, above all else, is needful (FW/GS 290): that one should learn to love oneself in a healthy way (Z, III, 11-2). Nietzsche argues that this is the finest and rarest art which constitutes the heart of master-morality. And as such, healthy self-love is inseparable from the constraint, discipline and mastery of authority. For it is only through authority that the illusions of love can be secured and maintained. In this way, selfishness, self-affirmation and authority are intrinsically related in Nietzsche's argument.

The sick selfishness, on the other hand, which seeks only its own advantage, is the manifestation of a poverty of self-love. At the same time, the shame and unhappiness with regard to themselves that "the bad" experience betrays a lack of self-mastery and authority (FW/GS 290). The "cunning, loveless Ego" (Z, I, 15) becomes a slave of things and persons while hungering for tyranny over both because its eros, devoid of constraint and authority, is impoverished. The epitome of sick selfishness is the slavish pursuit of pleasure or utility which, for Nietzsche, characterizes the life of the tyrant and his anarchy (laissez aller) of the spirit (J/BGE 188); the tyrant's spirit is essentially slavish as are all forms of life that measure the value of things according to pleasure and pain (e.g., hedonism, pessimism, utilitarianism or eudaemonism) (Ibid. 225). The

selfishness that indulges in mere pleasure or self-interest is then not only deficient in mastery but weak in its will to power (which seeks not pleasure but greater power).

The third point that distinguishes the healthy from the sick selfishness is that a self-love which is innocent and spontaneous is the consequence of an overflowing, super-abundant eros. Above all else, the magnanimous will to power defines "the bestowing virtue" (Z, I, 22) of master-morality and the child-spirit.

In order to better understand Nietzsche's conception of the will to power as affirmation and creative love, it may be worthwhile to compare the will to power with Plato's concept of eros. At first sight, it might appear as if the will to power and eros could be counterposed in a very straightforward fashion. After all, Nietzsche himself repeatedly states that the will desires not pleasure but power and that all modes of thought that make pleasure and pain the criteria of value are superficial (J/BGE 225; WM/WP 699). Indeed, so far is pure pleasure and happiness the goal that pain is seen as intrinsic to the will to power's joy in self-overcoming.

On the other hand, Plato argues that the philosophic eros knows the greatest pleasure because it is unmixed with pain (The Republic 586a). The philosopher experiences a pleasure which is sure and pure through the fulfillment of eros in the knowledge of those things which really are: pure Being, free of becoming and pain.

On this basis, one could attempt to argue that Plato's eros seeks pure pleasure while Nietzsche's will to power strives for more power

rather than pleasure. However, the difference between Plato and Nietzsche in this regard is far more nuanced and subtle than this. In order to appreciate the complexity of the difference, I shall examine the two thinkers with regard to (1) the nature of love, (2) the function of love, (3) love and virtue and (4) the uncanny kinship between the tyrannic spirit and greatness of soul.

Let us begin with the last point because it provides a view into a curious and significant similarity between Plato and Nietzsche. For both, there are only two real options for the best life: tyranny or philosophy; all other possibilities being merely compromises that are symptomatic of a weakness of desire. In The Republic, the tyrannical city is the worst regime because, like democracy, eros is less controlled than is the case under timocracy and oligarchy. Yet the tyrannical soul is closest to the philosophic because in it (e.g., Alcibiades in The Symposium and Glaucon in The Republic) eros is at its greatest intensity. Moreover, because it presupposes unnecessary and unlawful desires, philosophy arouses the greatest hostility from timocracy and oligarchy, which pursue only the necessary desires; and it flourishes under democracy where unnecessary desires are tolerated. The democratic city leaves the individual free to pursue his own private desires and thereby allows the greatest scope to both the philosophic and the tyrannic soul (The Republic 558d-561e).

Even more than the democrat who pursues the unnecessary, the tyrant resembles the philosopher because he seeks pure pleasure unmixed with pain (Ibid. 571b, 572b-573c, 574e, 583a-585a). Both the

tyrant and the philosopher follow love outside the city and beyond law and convention.⁴ The tyrannic spirit is therefore the most dangerous and the most criminal; and yet he is also the most interesting man, from the philosophic point of view. Hence, it is characters like Alcibiades in The Symposium and Glaucon in The Republic to whom Socrates addresses himself most earnestly: i.e., the most dangerous youths. Plato seems to be saying that the unswerving pursuit of the most unnecessary and most pleasant things is the very love, however tyrannically inclined, that philosophy presupposes!

In this, Nietzsche concurs with Plato: viz., that the highest man is the most passionate, the most dangerous and hence the most impious. The truly free spirit lives "five steps from tyranny, near the threshold of the danger of servitude" (G/TI, IX, 38). The subtle kinship between spirit and desire compels Nietzsche to portray the most spiritual man as impious, evil, uncanny, and even criminal (cf. GT/BT IX; FW/GS 4, 76; G/TI, IX, 45; EH, II, 4; WM/WP 120). For this reason, the camel must become a lion and leave the city--not to indulge the anarchy of passions ("laissez aller" as Nietzsche puts it (FW/GS 290; J/BGE 188; G/TI, IX, 47; WM/WP 122)), but to deepen and widen his will to power. In this way, Nietzsche's disturbing exhortation, "'man must grow better and more evil'" (Z, IV, 13-5; cf. J/BGE 295), is not a vindication of Thrasymachus' "might is right" thesis; it is, on the contrary, an attempt to elaborate Plato's insight into the kinship between the tyrannic and the philosophic eros. More than this, the invitation to man to become more erotic is by no means

simply an offer to express those desires as they arise; rather, Nietzsche demands an ascetic joy in self-constraint, sublimation and spiritualization of this tyrannic love: "I believe you capable of any evil: therefore I desire of you the good." (Z, II, 13) An even more explicit warning against the dangers of tyranny is offered, by Nietzsche, to the higher man of great eros: "He who fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does not become a monster." (J/BGE 146)

With this fundamental similarity between Plato and Nietzsche concerning the kinship of the philosophic and the tyrannic spirits in mind, I shall now compare their concepts of the nature of love. Here the contrast between the two could not be more striking. On the one hand, Plato presents eros, in The Symposium, as (a) the son of Poverty and Contrivance, meaning that love is defined by its deficiency, non-being and longing for fulfillment; and (b) this fulfillment is realized in the ascent to philosophic knowledge that, as Socrates says in Book IX in The Republic, is pure pleasure (584b-586e). On the other hand, Nietzsche's healthy will to power (a) proceeds not from poverty and deficiency toward fulfillment but from a superabundance that overflows itself with creative love and happiness; and (b) while pleasure is part of the feeling of increasing power, Nietzsche insists that pain is intrinsic to the self-overcoming of the will to power.

In The Symposium, Plato elaborates his conception of love as the deficient desire for beauty and wisdom when Socrates responds to Agathon's speech. Agathon had described love as a god who is

beautiful and good, an argument that was in direct opposition to Aristophanes' depiction of love as deprivation and incompleteness longing for wholeness. Socrates begins by revealing a lack in Agathon's speech itself: if eros is the desire for something, then it must be incomplete; and since love desires beauty and goodness, it must be lacking in both (The Symposium 199c-202a). Since one desires something because one does not have it, the nature of love is always poor, unhappy and cunning. As Socrates learns from Diotima, love is the child of Contrivance and Poverty (Ibid. 203b). Indeed, love is not a god but a daimon half-way between man and god (Ibid. 202e) and between ignorance and wisdom (204c).

Socrates also learns from Diotima that love is not simply the desire for the possession of the good and the beautiful: more than this, "love is desire for the perpetual possession of the good" (Ibid. 206a). In this sense, love is fundamentally love of immortality as well as of the good (Ibid. 207a). And only that which really is (Being) exists eternally and above becoming. Hence, love is a poverty which desires wholeness and this fullness of Being is pure, self-sufficient Being. As Socrates demonstrates in Book IX of The Republic, the purity of what truly is implies that immortal Being is pure pleasure, completely unadulterated with pain (The Republic 585e-587a). In short, the Platonic eros is the desire for transcendence of love itself, the overcoming of its incompleteness and pain, its mortality and bodiliness. Whether Plato really considers this a possible goal or not, the purity of Being to which love aspires

necessarily implies the extinction of love itself: the possession of wisdom is no longer the love of wisdom (philosophy).

Nietzsche's understanding of the eros of the will to power contrasts sharply with Plato's in two decisive senses: (a) the healthy will proceeds not from poverty but from plenitude and overabundance and (b) the will to power has no terminus beyond itself, least of all in pure pleasure or happiness because pleasure is a mere corollary of the growth of power. The will to power is distinguished not by the fact that it desires or strives for more but that it is growth, becoming and overflowing. Power is self-overcoming and the enhancement of power, or else it is disintegration and the loss of power. Like Plato's eros, the will to power is not defined by Being or the possession of power but (and here Nietzsche differs from Plato) by an over-full becoming, the ever-expanding increase of power; it is not poverty but plenitude that characterizes this becoming. Nietzsche distinguishes two states of the will to power: the healthy will that is constantly overflowing and super-abundant and the sick will to power that is impoverished and hungry (FW/GS 370; cf. Ibid. 349).

The second point follows from the first: since the will to power is growth, it has no terminus or final state of Being toward which it is ascending. However, this perpetual becoming is the manifestation not of deprivation but abundance. Moreover, since power lives and experiences itself as more power, pleasure is not only not its goal but is simply the accompaniment of growth. Suffering is intrinsic to self-overcoming and, for this reason, Nietzsche insists, in opposition

to Plato, that pain is inseparable from both the will to power and pleasure itself (FW/GS 370; J/BGE 225; Z, IV, 19-10; WM/WP 696ff.).

It is worthwhile, as Kaufmann does, to distinguish between "happiness/joy" and "pleasure" in explicating Nietzsche's will to power. Nietzsche often attacks the ideal of that peace of soul which is calm, stillness and rest: i.e., the pleasure that marks the exhaustion of will and life. This pleasure and peace is simply impoverishment (FW/GS 370; G/TI, V, 3). "Joy," on the other hand, is the self-rejoicing of the will to power in its self-overcoming and therefore its pain; this happiness is the affirmation of the inseparability of pleasure and pain and hence this healthy joy occurs in "those who suffer from the over-fullness of life" (FW/GS 370; Nietzsche's Emphasis; cf. J/BGE 225; Z, IV, 19-10). The will to power necessarily entails a tragic rather than a pure joy that affirms the identity of life, plenitude and suffering.

The next point to consider in this comparison of Plato and Nietzsche is their conceptions of the function of love. The nature of love, as Diotima presents it in The Symposium, is desire for the perpetual possession of the good. The function by which eros is realized is procreation, physical and spiritual, of what is beautiful (The Symposium 206b & c). Hence, the real object of love is not beauty but the procreation and birth of beauty (Ibid. 207a) because procreation is "the nearest thing to perpetuity and immortality that a mortal being can attain" (Loc. Cit.). In short, the spiritual love of philosophy desires the birth within the soul of what is eternally true

and beautiful: the good that constitutes that which really is. And this procreation and birth occurs through the love of wisdom that ascends from physical beauty through morality and science to wisdom whose sole object is absolute beauty (Ibid. 211c).

Nietzsche's conception of the function of the will to power is remarkably similar in many respects. The entire pedagogy of the spirit from the camel and the lion is directed toward the birth of the child-spirit. Indeed, man is portrayed as a bridge (Z, Preface, 4) between animal and Übermensch, a protracted pregnancy during which he learns to create beyond himself (Ibid., I, 4 & 20) and give birth to a higher being. This protracted spiritualization of the will to power through the constraints and authority of morality is the procreative art of selfishness. Morality, the conscious ego and the whole realm of the spirit are the means by which the Body/Self cultivates a higher Body and thereby overcomes man (WM/WP 676). This is what Nietzsche calls "ideal selfishness (die idealische Selbstsucht)" (M/D 552).

Is there a more holy condition than that of pregnancy? To do all we do in the unspoken belief that it has somehow to benefit that which is coming to be within us! --has to enhance its mysterious worth, the thought of which fills us with delight! . . . our child shall grow out of all that is gentlest and best. . . . At the same time, a pure and purifying feeling of profound irresponsibility reigns in us...it is growing, it is coming to light It is in this state of consecration that one should live! It is a state one can live in! And if what is expected is an idea, a deed--towards every bringing forth we have essentially no other relationship than that of pregnancy and ought to blow to the winds all presumptuous talk of 'willing' and 'creating'. This is ideal selfishness:

continually to watch over and care for and to keep our soul still, so that our fruitfulness shall come to a happy fulfilment! (Loc. Cit.; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

Nietzsche's conception of procreation differs from Plato's because the will to power does not give birth to something absolute and hence outside of love. The child-spirit that the will to power creates is a higher Body/Self which learns to affirm its immanence within becoming. Moreover, one becomes what one is precisely by not knowing what one is (EH, II, 8) and one only gives birth through "a pure and purifying feeling of profound irresponsibility" (M/D 552). One knows nothing of what is happening just as the "little intelligence" (Z, I, 4) of the conscious ego is only a means of the "great intelligence" (Loc. Cit.) of the Body/Self. This pregnancy and selfishness is spontaneous, instinctive and pre-conscious.

The last and most significant point concerns the relationship between virtue and love, according to Plato and Nietzsche. Plato, through Diotima, has already defined the nature of eros as the desire for the perpetual possession of the good. Wisdom, pure happiness and virtue are the ends of love: the final state of Being that lies at the end and beyond love! This follows from that fact that eros stands half-way between ignorance and wisdom and, driven by poverty, seeks wholeness. The very unhappiness and poverty of love is what compels it toward fulfillment in truth and virtue. Pure beauty, happiness and wisdom form an identity with virtue but they postdate love which embodies unhappiness and ignorance. In this way, love leads man

toward virtue but it does not participate in it because eros is riddled with deficiency and unhappiness. Virtue, on the other hand, belongs only to the purity of complete Being--that which really is--as does pure pleasure, happiness and beauty.

Nietzsche presents an entirely different relationship between love and virtue. The nature of the will to power is overflowing love and joy that forms the source of not only creativity but masterly virtue. In short, while, for Plato, virtue and happiness crown and complete love, Nietzsche sees love as completion and abundance itself from whose joy and creativity virtue spontaneously follows. Love is the full, healthy and "exalted body" (Z, III, 10); hence, joy and perfection pertain to the will to power that is love and the Body/Self. Therefore virtue is not the completion of love, according to Nietzsche, but rather follows from the completeness of love.⁵

[F]irst example of my "revaluation of all values": a well-constituted human being, a "happy one", must perform certain actions and instinctively shrinks from other actions, he transports the order of which he is the physiological representative into his relations with other human beings and with things. In a formula: his virtue is the consequence of his happiness. (G/TI, VI, 2; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

Natural morality is, in this way, the protracted pregnancy which cultivates the healthy selfishness (Selbstsucht) of the child-spirit; the higher will to power. And the innocent and joyful selfishness of the higher Body/Self is the manifestation of self-love: reverence for oneself is the "bestowing virtue" of the noble soul (J/BGE 287). For

Nietzsche, one thing, above all else, is needful (FW/GS 290) and constitutes the finest and greatest art (Z, III, 11) for man: that he should learn to love himself with a sound and healthy love (Loc. Cit.). Moreover, since the Self is the Body and thus a part of nature, self-love must also be the love of fate (amor fati) (cf. S/WS 61). Hence, the bestowing virtue is "a bestowing love" (Z, I, 22).

Master-morality, the morality of good and bad, emerges from the cultivated and spiritualized will to power and hence stands beyond the slave-morality of good and evil. It follows then that actions done out of bestowing love always take place beyond good and evil (J/BGE 153). From his earliest work, Nietzsche identifies love as creativity and affirmation of the innocence and beauty of the whole; indeed, love is the will to power that epitomizes strength and virtue.

For a man is creative only through love and in the shadow of love's illusions, only through the unconditional belief in perfection and righteousness. Everything that forces a man to be no longer unconditioned in his love cuts at the root of his strength; he must wither and be dishonoured.
(UW/UAH, VII)

Virtue flows from this physiological state of joy, power and creative love: this physiological Body/Self that spontaneously bestows the benefactions of its creativity. The love that amor fati manifests is one that beautifies and enhances life; it bestows because it enriches (cf. FW/GS 276; G/TI, IX, 8 & 9). The bestowing extravagance of this healthy will to power is symbolized in what Nietzsche calls "the pure, purifying eye" (M/D 497; Nietzsche's

Emphasis; cf. Z, I, 8). The strong will to power purifies, bestows and enriches the world; and the strength of the bestowing virtue is can be seen in the fact that its only negation is looking away (FW/GS 276)! "Where one can no longer love, one should--pass by!" (Z, III, 7; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

In conclusion, Nietzsche conceives virtue as the consequence of the healthy and overrich will to power and is in no sense independent or beyond the bestowing love as Plato's virtue is in relation to eros. Moreover, knowledge and spirit revolve around this loving power and its "exalted body" (Ibid., III, 10-2). Creative love is innocent power and joy and is symbolized, by Nietzsche in a parody of Plato, by the sun around which all life revolves and finds its source--including the serpent's wisdom.

It is power, this new [bestowing] virtue; a ruling idea, and around it a subtle soul: a golden sun, and around it the serpent of knowledge. (Ibid., I, 22)

It is noteworthy that the Socratic formula, as Nietzsche interprets it ("reason=virtue=happiness", (G/TI, II, 4 & 10)), is reversed and its ontology of Being and identity overcome. Platonic love is a daimon that lives between ignorance and wisdom while the good is absolute Being. Eros is thus a becoming which is overcome in the pure Being of Wisdom, Beauty and the Good. On the other hand, Nietzsche too conceives the will to power as a becoming but it is defined by its plenitude rather than by poverty. Moreover, this

fullness is not an identity (presence) but a continuous overflowing and leaving oneself behind. Virtue is not therefore knowledge of Being from which pure happiness will follow; on the contrary, the joy of the will to power's self-overcoming bestows virtue out of its wealth of love and creativity. Just as virtue is the consequence rather than the source of joy, so knowledge revolves around the loving will to power as does the serpent around the sun. As we have already seen, Nietzsche insists that it is impossible to found a culture upon knowledge (PT 73; UW/UAH passim). Now it is clear that not only knowledge but culture is also dependent on the child-spirit of affirmation, creation and bestowing love.

B/ THE ETERNAL RETURN of the SAME:

Nietzsche's understanding of the bestowing virtue and its transfiguration of the will to power no doubt provokes an instinctive skepticism because he asks us to identify greatness of soul with becoming in all its ateleology and meaninglessness. Moreover, the will to power's nature as endless becoming is supposed to constitute the self-overcoming of history and the ascent to the superhistorical. However, this would seem to imply that becoming has being and identity and thus always remains the same. The problem of morality had been to impose upon becoming the illusory character of being (WM/WP 617). Through the notion of the eternal recurrence of the same, Nietzsche hopes to offer a new form of self-overcoming that will also be "the

closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being" (Loc. Cit.); but now being will be discovered in the most terrible form: the eternal return of life as it is, without meaning or aim (Ibid. 55).

Nietzsche has already made it clear that the highest will to power is affirmation and love. Furthermore, the healthy will must be an unconditional belief in the perfection of the whole (UII/UAH, VII). It follows that the quality of being is inseparable from the love and joy of the creative will to power: the problem of imposing the character of being on becoming (the essence of grand politics) is fundamentally the problem of learning to love and acquiring the strength of will to spontaneously affirm fate. Hence, the tragic nature of the creative and bestowing will: it must love the whole as perfect and yet find this superhistorical perfection in the necessity of the most terrible; i.e., life as it is, without meaning or aim. In short, the love of fate (amor fati) must become the love of active nihilism.

Nietzsche conceives of the eternal return of the same as a cultivation of the most spiritual will to power (cf. WM/WP 1053ff.). This most terrible idea (FW/GS 341) is a breeding (Zucht) and a discipline (Züchtung) of "the pure, purifying eye" (M/D 497) around which grand politics will revolve; the discipline of the eternal recurrence will teach man to love fate and to thereby make necessity, perfection and joy the basis of natural morality and grand politics. The bestowing virtue must therefore be the self-overcoming of nihilism

through its affirmation.

The problem of master-morality and grand politics (i.e., the imposition on becoming of the character of being or the superhistorical) becomes that of breeding the power for the highest affirmation and love. I will argue that, in order to be fully appreciated, Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal return of the same should be placed within the context of amor fati. The eternal return of the same has often been misinterpreted and distorted. However, if the ideas of the will to power, becoming and amor fati are considered closely, then eternal return will be seen as an intrinsic and necessary sequel.⁶ Indeed, it is because of the ateleological and anti-subjective character of Nietzsche's conception of the will to power that the eternal return of the same makes any sense. This I shall demonstrate by the following points: (1) becoming is without beginning or end and is therefore eternal; (2) becoming is forgetfulness and knows only the eternal present; (3) the character is measureless and thus beyond valuation; and (4) man in his historical existence can approximate the innocence of becoming only through knowledge and affirmation.

First, Nietzsche posits that all beings are characterized by the will to power and self-overcoming. In this sense, life is becoming. Moreover, the will to power is a becoming without a subject or a purpose; it is pure becoming. Without a beginning or an end, the will to power is not the becoming of some thing or subject and thus becoming does not become: it always remains the same. Hence, every

coming to be is also a return of the same to its eternal character.

The ateleology of the will to power implies an absence of being and substance. The will to power is always the same because it is a pure becoming which overcomes itself only through and toward itself.

Nietzsche calls the will to power a ring "(WM/WP 1066-67) and it is a circle without a subject because it has no beginning or end.

Second, becoming implies forgetfulness because if one cannot leave oneself behind and pass into the new moment, then becoming is thwarted. The temporality of becoming is fundamental to Nietzsche: life must ~~forget~~ the past in order to become and pass into the present.

However, forgetfulness implies even more than this. It means that the essence of becoming is passing and, therefore, that the present moment, understood as an atom of time, does not exist. The present is a passing moment, a becoming that is never purely present but is also past and future: this is the essence of time's becoming--its passingness. Furthermore, this is Nietzsche's forgetfulness (as pure passing and becoming).

While nature lives unhistorically and goes into the present "without leaving any curious remainder" (UW/UAH, I), man preserves the past and re-members time historically. In history, forgetfulness is suspended and one actively re-wills that which was willed in the past (cf. GM, II, 2). By actively bringing back the past or, more precisely, bringing the present back to the past, man no longer lives in the present as does the animal. Through forgetfulness, becoming

knows only the passing moment and "an everlasting Now reigns in Nature"⁷, in which each moment is also the fulfillment of becoming. In the forgetfulness of pure becoming, there is thus no past and each moment is both passing and eternal.

Third, the will to power is measureless because it has no being and thus no standard by which it could be judged. And since pure becoming cannot be measured, it is necessarily without value. The innocence of becoming is a fundamental tenet of Nietzsche's philosophy and it rests on the principle that nothing can stand outside becoming and evaluate it (G/TI, II, 2; Ibid., VI, 8): the innocence of becoming is inseparable from its valuelessness and lack of meaning. Moreover, since no one exists outside of it, the will to power is, in its character ~~as~~ a whole, the same value all the time. It remains eternally the same in its innocence and hence its perfection; the will to power is fully itself eternally and fulfills itself at every moment (UW/UAH, I; WM/WP 55, 293, 708). The character of the will to power as eternally innocent and perfect clearly underlies both amor fati and the eternal return of the same (cf. WM/WP 1066-67). Since the will to power is the eternal coming to be of the same innocence and perfection, value judgments about life, pro or con, are in themselves never true (and hence eternal return is not simply a judgment). "One must reach out and try to grasp this astonishing finesse, that the value of life cannot be estimated." (G/TI, II, 2; Nietzsche's Emphasis) The will to power's character as pure becoming thus provides the conditions of perfection and eternity but conceals them.

behind the terror of the meaningless and the measureless.

The fourth and last point is that man is an historical being who does not completely forget but always carries the past with him. He never goes fully into the eternal Now of the present as nature does and therefore never lives in a state of pure becoming. Through remembrance, he retains the past and, as it grows, it becomes a painful burden that he longs to renounce and deny (cf. Z, II, 20; UII/UAH, I). Indeed, the feeling of impotence in the face of the implacability of the past may cultivate a profound resentment and desire for revenge. The will's powerlessness to will backwards (Loc. Cit.) and break the past engenders a ressentiment against time itself.

However, the lion's descent reveals that this antithesis is, at the same time, a harmony because the historical rests on the unhistorical just as remembrance presupposes forgetfulness. The madness, errors and injustices of the past are indeed a chain from which one can never escape. However, the condemnation of these errors is the condemnation of oneself; and the denunciation of the past does not change the fact that one springs from these injustices (cf. UII/UAH, III). Hence, the lion recognizes the necessity of the all-too-human and that man arises from error and always will. In this recognition, the spirit comes to the affirmation of the innocence and fatefulness of falsity (i.e., exteriority) as that which eternally remains the same. Through the lion's ascent to amor fati in the self-overcoming of history, man, in his historical existence, attains a sense of the super-historical: in error and exteriority, man

discovers his own fatefulness and the eternal return of the same. When the will to power thereby learns to love fate, it begins to cultivate the power to create and thus will its being in becoming. "All 'It was' is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful chance--until the creative will say to it: 'But I willed it thus!'" (Z, II, 20).

- With these four points I have attempted to show that the eternal return of the same is directly descended from both the will to power and amor fati. That the eternal return is the intrinsic nature of the will to power, this represents what may be called the metaphysical aspect of eternal recurrence; the idea is also an ethical one which tests, cultivates and strengthens one's power of affirmation and love.⁸ Nietzsche demands through the discipline of the eternal return that the love of fate be practiced within the historical existence of man. Within history, one must affirm the unhistorical, the necessary and thereby the eternal sameness of becoming; only in this way can the historical be redeemed through the superhistorical.

The eternal return is test of strength to reveal those who are able to affirm the terrible and the measureless as the innocence and perfection of the will to power (cf. WM/WP 15, 22, 23, 55). Active nihilism represents a divine way of thinking (Ibid. 15) because through this crucible, one recognizes the absolute immanence of becoming and thus its perfection in its meaninglessness. In its ethical aspect, the "ecstatic nihilism" (Ibid. 1055) of eternal return functions as "a selective principle" (Ibid. 1058) to distinguish the affirmative from the resentful spirits.

The selective and cultivating sides of this confrontation with fate constitute a concrete practice of overcoming history within history. Nietzsche had offered a similar test in The Use and Abuse of History when he suggested that one should ask one's friends whether they would live the last ten or twenty years over again (UW/UAH, I). For this would reveal who was "born for the 'super-historical standpoint'" (Loc. Cit.). All would in fact answer in the same fashion, "no." The historical men are optimists whose historicist view of time drives them toward the future because they view happiness as the end and the culmination of historical "development" and "progress." The optimistic historicist does not acknowledge the unhistorical character of his own thoughts and actions (cf. Loc. Cit.) and therefore he sees no redemption or happiness in reliving the past.

Curiously, and in contrast to his later position, Nietzsche, at this time, feels that the super-historical men will also answer negatively, albeit for different reasons. Having descended into the depths of the unhistorical and recognized its necessity, this man finds no redemption in history or its repetition. The spirit now realizes that it belongs to fate and becoming and that the plenitude of life is manifested in the terrible, the sudden and the uncertain (WM/WP 1019) as the true character of life that remains eternally the same. For the superhistorical spirit, "the world is complete and fulfills its aim in every single moment" (UW/UAH, I). The objective, of being thus tested with this demonic question, that of the eternal recurrence of the same, is to cure the spirit of taking history too

seriously and to thereby overcome ressentiment. Only through this superhistorical affirmation of perfection in the meaninglessness of absolute becoming does one ascend to the master-morality of the child: "how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?" (FW/GS 341; Nietzsche's Emphasis).

The doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same should be seen as the existential practice of amor fati. As such, it is a way of breeding the child-spirit and the bestowing virtue which presupposes the superhistorical standpoint. If man is creative only through love and the unconditional belief in perfection (UII/UAH, VII), and if the character of the will to power is the terrible measurelessness of becoming, then man has to learn to love the most questionable and terrible sides of existence. By this, Nietzsche means that the immanence of becoming is not merely tolerated as an unavoidable abomination but affirmed as the manifestation of fullness and innocence of life. To learn to love with such strength implies that one sees as beautiful what is necessary (FW/GS 276). The eternal return, as an ethical practice, breeds "the pure, purifying eye" (M/D 497; Nietzsche's Emphasis), "a Goethean eye full of love and good will" (WM/WP 1031) that says "Yes" to life as the will to power. In this sense, the eternal return of the same is a breeding and discipline of unconditional love because "everything that forces a man to be no longer unconditioned in his love cuts at the root of his strength; he must wither and be dishonoured" (UII/UAH, VII)!

In order to clarify this presentation of the eternal recurrence of the same, I shall present three distinct types of interpretation which have played a significant role in illuminating or obscuring, as the case may be, Nietzsche's philosophy. I have chosen the cosmological, the existential and the metaphysical/ethical versions because the first has exercised an unfortunate influence until recently, while the last two are currently entertained at the forefront of Nietzsche scholarship.

My stand has been to emphasize, first, the ateleological character of eternal return as a necessary effect of its identity with the will to power; and next, as a corollary of this, the will to power is a critique of substance. The critique makes the eternal return not the return of some thing but a becoming that is always the same in returning to itself through self-overcoming. In this way, the eternal return and the will to power are intrinsically related at the metaphysical level of Nietzsche's thought.

The cosmological interpretation of eternal return diverges fundamentally from the above thesis and maintains, I would argue, a superficial rendering of Nietzsche's thought. Although this view has suffered recently from the surge of Heideggerian and post-structuralist commentaries, it holds an historical prominence and credibility that require that it be addressed.

This reading of eternal return is unabashedly objective and hence argues that it is actual, historical events that recur eternally. For this school, Nietzsche construes the world as a cosmos governed by a

cyclical temporality in which "all events are repeated endlessly".⁹

It follows that eternal recurrence is the objective form of time as a cycle and "the same" is the content that is recycled within this form.

The problem with this exegesis of eternal recurrence is that it tells us nothing about the innocence of becoming or the fullness of the will to power that manifests itself in every single moment. And since it is so uninformative with regard to the very foundations of Nietzsche's metaphysics, its mechanical rendition of the theory fails to illuminate the significance of the superhistorical and its basis in becoming. Given that the latter were the reasons for the prominence and importance that Nietzsche assigned to it, this failure is decisive and fatal for the cosmological interpretation.

In explicit opposition to the cosmological view, there has arisen an existential interpretation, heavily influenced by Heidegger but considerably more subjective. This argument sees eternal return as a belief whose truth-value is beside the point precisely because it is a means of transforming experience and, at the same time, a test of affirmation. It is central to this commentary that eternal return is understood less as a theoretical doctrine than a transfiguration of one's existential experience of the world and time. "Return" should therefore be seen not as a propositional truth but as a kind of myth.¹⁰ "The doctrine of eternal recurrence gives us a problem not in Platonic cosmology but in Socratic self-interest. The question is, 'Do you want this once more, and also for endless time?'"¹¹

This existential, "transfigurational" reading strongly colours

Tracy Strong's interpretation of the eternal return.¹² The fundamental category that structures Strong's entire reading of Nietzsche is Wittgenstein's concept of "the form of life."

Furthermore, Strong dissociates the eternal return from the will to power and thereby divorces the practice of affirmation from the nature of becoming as a whole. This reintroduces a break between man and nature that Nietzsche strives to overcome (cf. FW/GS 109, 346); it subjectifies the Yes of eternal recurrence whereas, when the bond of the will to power and eternal return is acknowledged, it follows that "in itself, everything that is says Yes" (WM/WP 293).

The unique contribution of Strong is to have drawn our attention to the political essence of eternal recurrence as a means of breeding not only the child-spirit but also the revaluation of values that will reinstitute the grand politics of master-morality.¹³ Employing the concept of "the form of life," Strong unfolds the theory of eternal return as a means of cultivating the existential life-form of the child-spirit. By presenting the "idea" as a life-form rather than a conscious doctrine, Strong is able to avoid the temptation to turn eternal return into a Kantian imperative by emphasizing the practice rather than the moral-theoretical dimensions.¹⁴ This innovative approach is no small advance since eternal return has never been appreciated as an essentially political experience. However, in divorcing the eternal recurrence of the same from the will to power and thereby treating it as a way of life independent of becoming, Strong, along with others of this persuasion, has "culturalized" and

limited the full import of this concept.

However, there has arisen a more satisfactory interpretation, again influenced by Heidegger, that explicitly bases the eternal return on the will to power.¹⁵ Deleuze presents this thesis in its most convincing form by emphasizing its derivation from the ateleological nature of the will to power. That is to say, eternal return rests on a conception of pure becoming that has no beginning, end or state of equilibrium.¹⁶ Becoming can never be arrested in being and can never cease becoming because if it had a final state, it would already have realized it. "But the present moment, as the passing moment, proves that it is not attained and therefore that an equilibrium of forces is not possible."¹⁷

Why would the end of becoming, if it were possible, have to have been already attained? The will to power is not something that has come into being nor will it pass out of being (WM/WP 1066). Possessing no beginning or end, becoming is eternal and is characterized by "the infinity of past time".¹⁸ The infinity of past time means that, being infinite, becoming cannot have started. Moreover, as an infinite becoming, it is not the coming to be of something. And since the will to power would have to have attained a state of being in order to stop becoming (a state which implies that something has indeed come to be), clearly becoming and the will to power can have no terminus.

Deleuze draws our attention to the crucial nature of temporality that illuminates the relationship between becoming and returning. Far

from being an atom or "a moment of being"¹⁹, the present is a passing moment which itself has neither beginning nor end. The implications of this conception of the instant as pure becoming are radical. For if the nature of the present is to pass of its own accord, then it must already be past and at the same time future. If it did not pass on its own and had to wait for another present in order to become past, the past could not be established as a part of time and the present would not pass. Hence, the moment is simultaneously past, present and future, a contemporaneity that corresponds to the moment's nature as passing.²⁰

In this way, Nietzsche affirms the passing moment as eternity. Becoming is not fulfilled by being or eternity as the end of becoming; on the contrary, becoming is always the same and fulfills itself at each moment. Similarly, power is always the same and its will to more power is a return to itself through self-overcoming. Power remains the same in its becoming-more and this self-expansion is a return to itself: the same exists as return. "Nietzsche thinks increase and power as a kind of giving back, an act of return."²¹

The will to power is then a plenitude or a sameness that exists and becomes by returning eternally to itself. "The same" in the eternal return of the same does not refer to some particular thing or event which is endlessly repeated. Power itself in becoming, expanding and transcending itself is the same eternally returning to itself. "Eternity is eternal return of the Same. The Same is not a thing or a person recurring in endless cycles of absolute time. The

Same is return. Return can "occur" only in the moment."²²

This then is the metaphysical character of the eternal recurrence of the same in its identity with the will to power. It is power, through its plenitude, love and joy, returning to itself in self-overcoming. Joy is the manifestation of the self-rejoicing will to power and eternity is the nature of this will as it circles back to itself.

Joy...does not want heirs or children, joy wants itself, wants eternity, wants recurrence, wants everything eternally the same. (Z, IV, 19-9)

The metaphysical characterization of eternal return reveals the absolute immanence of the will to power which implies that self-overcoming is necessarily a return to itself. The very nature of the will to power entails the implication that one belongs to the whole, that one is a piece of fate (G/TI, VI, 8). It also shows that the will to power is intrinsically a joyful and unconditional love. "Did you ever say Yes to one joy? O my friends, then you said Yes to all woe as well. All things are chained and entwined together, all things are in love" (Z, IV, 19-10; Nietzsche's Emphasis). The thesis of the eternal recurrence of the same draws one back to the point that the healthy (natural) will to power is unconditional love; and a surprising corollary follows from this: love as pure becoming is the highest approximation to a life of pure being, i.e., the perfection and eternity of eternal return. "That everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being:"

high point of the meditation." (WM/WP 617; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

This metaphysical aspect of eternal return is what I, following others²³, have distinguished from a second and equally integral dimension: the ethical and selective role. This refers to what Nietzsche calls "the test" of the superhistorical power of the spirit (cf. UW/UAH, I). This practice offers one the possibility of overcoming purpose and history through the affirmation of the immanence of becoming as that which always remains the same. However, one affirms becoming not as something other than oneself but as the fundamental nature of oneself. Indeed, strictly speaking, it is always the will to power that evaluates life through us when we affirm or deny (G/TI, V, 5). The ethical discipline of amor fati and eternal recurrence is one of strengthening the spirit by enhancing its power to love; however, in order to affirm, the spirit must, first, come to recognize the necessity of the immanence and meaninglessness of becoming and, second, learn to love this whole as it is without wanting to change anything.

This ethical practice of affirmation refers only to the metaphysical character of the will to power; Nietzsche is by no means asking us to bless or even tolerate behavior which proceeds from weakness, hatred and ressentiment (cf. Z, III, 7, & IV, 17-2; G/TI, X, 49). For the essential rationale of the ethical dimension of eternal return is to select those who can affirm and cultivate this power. Deleuze emphasizes the transfiguring power of this affirmation as "the becoming-active"²⁴ of reactive and ressentiment spirits. One cannot

overcome nihilism by opposing as Socrates tried to do; only active nihilism activates the will to power by cultivating the strength to say Yes to the whole as the essence of one's nature. And through the terrible practice of the active nihilism of eternal return, the Body/Self is raised to the superhistorical spirit of the child and the Übermensch. Amor fati identifies Self and fate²⁵ and eternal recurrence supplies the cultivating test of affirmation and love of Self through the love of fate. In this fashion, eternal return breeds the practice of master-morality and thus prepares the grand politics of a new form of life in nourishing the bestowing virtue. Hence, it opens:

the possibility of a joyous affirmation of the 'Same' in that world. This 'Same,' the sameness of power and bliss in the total character of life, is Nietzsche's experience of the Self. It is the meeting of 'my own return' with 'the ring of rings.'²⁶

In conclusion, the eternal return's coincidence with the will to power and amor fati is best appreciated by this third approach which unites the metaphysical and the ethical considerations of the idea. Moreover, in attending to the unity of Nietzsche's philosophy, it illuminates the identity of metaphysics and grand politics or affirmative love and master-morality--the two uniting in the bestowing virtue.

C/ THE MASTER VERSUS THE SHEPHERD:

One thing, above all, reveals the greatness of soul of the master: he has love and reverence for himself (J/BGE 287). Moreover, the unconditional and super-historical quality of his love sharply distinguishes Nietzsche's master from the historicist and, especially, the Hegelian concept of the master. For one thing fundamentally reveals the spirit of the optimistic historicist, in Nietzsche's eyes: he lives an ironical and even cynical self-consciousness that infects those who are "indifferent and careless of their own and others' existence" (Ull/UAH, VII).

While exaggerating the importance of Hegel for Nietzsche's philosophic development, the following assertion tells us a great deal if one substitutes "anti-historicism" for "anti-Hegelianism": "Anti-Hegelianism runs through Nietzsche's work as its cutting edge."²⁷ I have already indicated that an excess of history and self-consciousness is corrosive of the unhistorical foundations of authority and life. However, the most fatal effect of unbridled historicism is its "idolatry of the actual" (Ull/UAH, VIII), an idolatry which is also self-consciously ironic: for the actual is but a short moment in the historical unfolding of Absolute Spirit. Thus historicism invariably breeds irony about oneself and thereby undermines the unconditional love that defines Nietzsche's conception of the master.

I shall concentrate on three points in this section: (a) Nietzsche's will to power proceeds from superhistorical plenitude

whereas Hegel's dialectic begins with negation and unhappiness; (b) the command of the master is independent of any mediation through the slave or labour while Hegel's lordship exists reactively through the recognition of the slave; and (c) master-morality is active and creative as love while Hegel's lord finds his truth in the slave and reaction.

First, Nietzsche celebrates the power of the will as luxury, overflowing and squandering. The good of master-morality embodies the spontaneous and active life of the will to power while the bad is a negation which follows after the self-affirmation of the good; negation is secondary and derivative in relation to action.²⁸ Only slave-morality begins with negation and refusal, a reversal of the natural spontaneity of the will to power; hence, slave-morality requires an external given before it can act, making all its action fundamentally reaction (GM, I, X).

For my purposes at this stage of the argument, Nietzsche's will to power may be counterposed in the following manner to Hegel's dialectic in fairly general terms. The will to power undoubtedly connotes differentiation through its "pathos of distance" (J/BGE 257; GM, I, 2), but this difference is the manifestation of plenitude and a superhistorical identification with the eternity of becoming. Indeed, differentiation is intrinsic to the very nature of the will to power as pure becoming.²⁹ For Hegel, on the other hand, difference is always the result of negation and therefore history. Nature is pure immediacy or being-in-itself which implies that it is also devoid of

spirit, knowledge and meaning. Man is the self-negation of nature and hence the initiation of history, mediation and work: all three being synonymous for Hegel. Man in his consciousness and historical spirit is the negating action of freedom and transcendence. History is only complete with man's absolute knowledge of the unfolding of the Idea through history; i.e., only when nature and history are reconciled in absolute spirit. In short, Hegel's dialectic moves itself through a negation of given being, thereby initiating history which ultimately, after recognizing its mediation through the negated other, identifies itself with that which it negated. While Nietzsche's will to power differentiates itself through affirmation, the Hegelian dialectic overcomes itself through negation.

Second, it follows from the above that the command of the Overman, unlike Hegel's master, is not mediated through the slave and hence through the historical struggle for recognition. The differentiation of power that characterizes the life of the will to power Nietzsche calls "command." Only a will to power that is strong enough to affirm itself in its difference is able to command itself and others because affirmation is the source of power and command (WM/WP 668). Furthermore, the mastery that defines the commanding will to power implies solitude and its concomitant incomprehensibility. The difference between master and slave is fundamentally that of the standard or rather the physiology of valuation. The Overman is solitary "not because he wishes to be alone but because he is something that finds no equals" (Ibid. 985; Nietzsche's Emphasis).

Greatness of spirit isolates and command therefore connotes not recognition but misunderstanding (J/BGE 271, 278, 284, 289, 290).

Nietzsche opposes the master to the shepherd (WM/WP 902) through the distinction between sovereign solitude and recognition.

Underlying this dichotomy, however, stands that of super-historical self-love and the historicist "tyranny of the actual" (UII/UAH, VIII).

Hegel does not conceive power as a force of difference or command that precludes recognition. On the contrary, power is the negation which mediates master and slave; i.e., a dialectic which is motivated by the desire of the other's desire, recognition. As Hegel says: "Self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness."³⁰

This desire to be desired is the epitome of servility, according to Nietzsche. "For in this desire is expressed the will to be equal and hence to be recognized and judged by the common, existing standard of evaluation. For this reason, Nietzsche views the desire for recognition as (a) the symptom of a weak will to power and (b) the historicist submission to the mere fact of existing political power.

Recognition betrays a weak and hungry will because it expresses an abdication of sovereignty and self-affirmation. Moreover, the desire for current honour and adulation reveals a slavish subject to one's time and its concept of power.³¹ The shepherd does not transcend the herd as the master does and this is dramatized by the former's desire to have his power seen and acknowledged. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the true master is an untimely solitary who lives "beyond the

rulers, freed from all bonds" (WM/WP 998).

The crucial objection which Nietzsche addresses to the desire for recognition is that its historicism necessitates "an idolatry of the actual" (UW/UAH, VIII); and, as a corollary of this, it is capable only of a conditional self-affirmation and thereby undermines the possibility of a true, superhistorical spirit. As a result of an excessively historical self-consciousness, spirit loses and indeed attacks any unhistorical authority as a limitation of its freedom. Far from being the fulfillment of the world, each moment or period of history is merely the progressive unfoldment of the "world-spirit" that will finally reveal itself at the end of history. Hence, each moment is both necessary and historically finite; and Nietzsche argues that this historicist comportment contains two insidious effects: (a) an uncritical worship of success, existing power and current opinions; and (b) a self-irony and even cynicism that destroys the possibility of true (i.e., super-historical) self-love.

The Hegelian dialectic entails an historical identity of the "ought" and the "is," or the Sollen and the Wirklichkeit³², as a consequence of its concept of the revelation of the Idea through the necessary stages of history. Since the Absolute Idea must transcend its immediacy in order to become spirit, it must gradually unfold itself through the historical mediation of work, discourse and knowledge. Hence, each historical manifestation of the Absolute Idea is both finite (and therefore temporary) and necessary (and therefore a positive advance of progress); and thus the fullness of time, the

fulfillment of history, is always to come (unless one occupies the summit of finality) and yet the actual can be the only standard to evaluation (again, unless one stands at the end).

As Nietzsche observes, this involves a submissive affirmation of every current success, each established power and contemporary opinion. One must accept everything objectively, be angry at nothing, love nothing and understand everything (Ull/UAH, VIII)! Notwithstanding the fact that each era produces its own internal contradictions and thereby becomes its own critic, the problem persists: there is no standard but the historically given; i.e., that which succeeds.

And it [Hegelianism] has put history in the place of the other spiritual powers, art and religion, as the one sovereign . . . and thus he has implanted in a generation...the worship of the "power of history" that turns practically every moment into a sheer gaping at success, into an idolatry of the actual . . . But the man who has once learned to crook the knee and bow the head before the power of history nods "yes" at last, like a Chinese doll, to every power, whether it be a government or a public opinion or a numerical majority; and his limbs move correctly as the power pulls the string. (Loc. Cit.)

The poverty of the historicist desire for recognition and success means that instead of representing the will to power, it merely signifies the servile desire to participate in the glow of existing power: historicism cultivates a will to have power (der Wille zum Reich) rather than the will to power!³³ The will to power always resists the blind power of the present, overcoming the given through

the power of the superhistorical. Hence, "the virtuous man will always rise against the blind force of facts, the tyranny of the actual He ever swims against the waves of history" (Loc. Cit.).

The second facet of Nietzsche's repudiation of historicism attacks the corrosion of self-certainty that corresponds to the dissolution of the unhistorical: man entertains an ironic and even cynical self-consciousness that precludes the possibility of unconditional self-affirmation. The optimism and pride of historical consciousness, at being more advanced than all previous ages, is haunted by the persistent knowledge that it is finite and contains an intrinsic obsolescence. Its idolatry of the actual is always marred by the awareness of its transience.

Under these circumstances, "all nature ceases and becomes art" (FW/GS 356). Everyone is conscious of the historical contingency of political institutions, traditions and roles, and, as a result, man becomes an actor, self-conscious of his alienation from exteriority. With the disintegration of the authority of the unhistorical, the individual loses the sense of unconditional reverence which trans-historical exteriority sustained. Furthermore, the really dangerous quality of the actor, according to Nietzsche, is his complete absence of trust and certainty concerning himself: historical self-consciousness leaves him only an ironical attitude toward himself.

And in this way my thesis is to be understood and considered: "Only strong personalities can endure

history; the weak are extinguished by it." History unsettles the feelings when they are not powerful enough to measure the past by themselves. The man who no longer dares trust himself, but asks history against his will for advice "how he ought to feel now," is insensibly turned by his timidity into a play-actor, and plays a part or, generally, many parts--very badly, therefore, and superficially. Gradually all [lived] connection ceases between the man and his historical subjects. (Ull/UAH, V; cf. FW/GS 356)

The actor is a servile type of man who is not to be confused with the camel, lion or child because he has neither the unhistorical nor the superhistorical foundations for a strong will to power. The camel, for example, is enclosed within the restricted parameters of the unhistorical; the lion uses history to open a way beyond it through amor fati; and the child symbolizes the ascent of the spirit to the superhistorical standpoint. The actor embodies slave-morality because he is devoid of the mastery and self-affirmation which pertain to the superhistorical life. Nietzsche conceives mastery as the unconditional reverence for oneself achieved through the self-overcoming of history; and whatever undermines unconditional self-love thereby destroys one's strength and mastery (Ibid., VII).

For this reason, historicism creates the conditions for slave-morality in its most intense form of ironic self-consciousness: man is transformed into an actor. The coincidence of the two features of historicism, its idolatry of the actual and self-irony, in the most extreme case would lead to cynicism (Ibid., IX). The sort of man Nietzsche delineates in this analysis of historicism corresponds to

Plato's tyrannic soul in at least one respect: for despite his conformity to current opinion and his aspiration to objectivity, he "adore[s] the mere fact of power" (*Ibid.*, VIII) and his cynicism renders his desire for conformity increasingly marginal.³⁴ And given the actor's cynicism toward roles and institutions (coupled with the dissolution of self-esteem through irony), his passionless objectivity could easily become transformed into the opposite. In short, Hegel's master is, according to Nietzsche, merely a servile shepherd who is crippled by his worship of the present and withered by his ironic view of himself.

Nietzsche's third rebuttal to Hegel is one that I have already discussed thoroughly in the context of the preceding point: the will to power is superabundant and overflowing love while the desire for recognition betrays a poverty of self-affirmation. Through the argument of this chapter, I have attempted to show that Nietzsche's central concepts (mastery, selfishness and the will to power) may all be resolved to that of great love (cf. *FW/GS* 276, 334, 345; *Z*, III, 11-2). This is explicitly affirmed in Thus Spoke Zarathustra where the bestowing virtue, which characterizes master-morality, is revealed as "bestowing love" (*Z*, I, 22).

Moreover, Nietzsche views great love as the creative force of the superhistorical life, the pre-eminent power of the self-overcoming of history. Self-affirmation is intrinsic to the strong and healthy will to power because it is the very life of power to return eternally to itself. Hence, in contradistinction to Hegel's concept of desire, the

will to power or great love does not desire to be loved or recognized. The will to power wants to become more, it wants itself, and it wants eternity. Man only becomes creative through great and unconditional love that affirms the completeness and perfection of the world in each moment (Ull/UAH, VII). The will to recognition, the desire for another's desire, is symptomatic of a hungry and unhappy will to power: it is not strong enough to desire itself and thereby desire more.

And he himself did not love sufficiently: otherwise he would not have been so angry that he was not loved. Great love does not desire love--it desires more. (Z, IV, 13-16; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

In conclusion, the master-morality of the child is the spirit of unconditional self-affirmation realized in amor fati and the eternal recurrence of the same. The character of the healthy will to power manifests itself as great love (the bestowing virtue). Nietzsche's concept of love is distinguished from Plato's eros by its plenitude and its status as the source of virtue. The bestowing virtue also separates Nietzsche's master from Hegel's through its anti-historicism and its impetus in difference as opposed to negation.

ENDNOTES:

1. Jean Granier, Op. Cit., has elaborated this distinction between "having" and "being" as essential to an understanding of Nietzsche's will to power. Granier insists that the interpretation of the will to power as the desire to have power over others (as "Wille zum Reich") mistakenly attributes to Nietzsche an ontology of having: hence, power is a thing which a given subject attempts to possess and to prevent others from similar possession. Cf. Jean Granier, Op. Cit., pp.389-98.

2. Cf. Ibid., pp.419-421, where Granier counterposes Nietzsche to the sophist Callicles. Granier correctly argues that the once common comparison of Nietzsche's philosophy with the libertinage of sophists such as Callicles is superficial.

La vérité, c'est que ces deux doctrines sont aux antipodes l'une de l'autre. Pour Calliclès, en effet, la puissance consiste dans le déchaînement des appétits sensuels... [cf. Plato, Gorgias, 492c]. Pour Nietzsche, la puissance est exactement l'antithèse de la définition de Calliclès: c'est l'étendue de la maîtrise qu'un homme parvient à gagner sur ses passions, c'est la mesure de son aptitude à se transcender lui-même. (Jean Granier, Op. Cit., pp.419-20)

For a similar exposition of Nietzsche's opposition to freedom as simply doing as one pleases, "laissez aller," see Walter Kaufmann, Op. Cit. (1974), chapter 9: "Power versus Pleasure".

3. Cf. Ibid., pp.421ff. where Granier demonstrates that the will to power is self-overcoming in the sense of the "sublimation" and "spiritualization" of the will to power's passions. In this depiction of Nietzsche's philosophy, the will to power is not only the unbridled, Dionysian desire for more power; it is even more fundamentally the will to self-mastery! And in this sense, the intrinsic longing for self-overcoming means that the will to power is itself naturally inclined to master-morality!

See also Walter Kaufmann, Op. Cit. (1974), on the importance of "sublimation" in Nietzsche's thought: especially chapters 7 and 8.

4. For an excellent discussion of the kinship between the tyrannic and the philosophic souls, see Allan Bloom's Interpretive Essay, appended to his translation of The Republic, pp.422-26.

5. Cf. Henri Birault, "Beatitude in Nietzsche," in David B. Allison, Op. Cit., pp.219-31. Birault provides an extremely insightful discussion of Nietzsche's conception of the highest and most creative will to power as great love. In particular, he clarifies the transformation of love as a deficient becoming into an overflowing becoming whose plenitude and joy constitutes the source of virtue. See especially pp.228-30.

6. The argument presented here that the eternal return of the same is intrinsic to the will to power is the thesis advanced by Heidegger and those influenced by him, e.g. Henri Birault, Op. Cit., p.220. Another interpretation which maintains that the eternal return is a teaching and an experience independent of or a special instance of the will to power is advanced by Tracy Strong, Op. Cit., pp.275ff.

7. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Op. Cit., p.157.

8. For this distinction, see Rose Pfeffer, Nietzsche, Disciple of Dionysus (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1972), Part II, chapters 6 and 7.

9. Walter Kaufmann, Op. Cit. (1974), p.327; cf. Arthur Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher (New York: MacMillan, 1965), pp.203ff.

10. For this perspective, see especially Harold Alderman, Nietzsche's Gift (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1977), pp.84-99; see also Bernd Magnus, Nietzsche's Existential Imperative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), pp. xiiiff. and chapters 5 and 6.

11. Harold Alderman, Ibid., p.84.

12. Cf. Tracy Strong, Op. Cit., pp.265ff.

13. Ibid., pp.270ff.
14. Ibid., pp.270ff and pp.284ff.
15. The principal adherents of this approach being Rose Pfeffer, Op. Cit.; Joan Stambaugh, Nietzsche's Thought of the Eternal Return (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1972); and Gilles Deleuze, Op. Cit.
16. Gilles Deleuze, Op. Cit., p.47.
17. Loc. Cit.; Emphasis Added.
18. Loc. Cit.
19. Ibid., p.48.
20. Loc. Cit.; Cf. Joan Stambaugh, Op. Cit., p.117.
21. Joan Stambaugh, Op. Cit., p.15.
22. Ibid., p.107; Stambaugh's Emphasis.
23. Principally, Rose Pfeffer, Op. Cit., especially chapters 6 and 7, and Gilles Deleuze, Op. Cit., pp. 47ff. & 68ff.

24. Gilles Deleuze, Op. Cit., p.68.

25. Cf. Joan Stambaugh, "Amor dei and Amor fati: Spinoza and Nietzsche," in Studies in Nietzsche and the Judeo-Christian Tradition, edited by J.C. O'Flaherty, T.F. Sellner, and R.M. Helm (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985).

26. Joan Stambaugh, Op. Cit. (1972), p.102; Stambaugh's Emphasis. Cf. Z, IV, 10: "!--when, well of eternity! serene and terrible noontide abyss! when will you drink my soul back into yourself?" This unity of Self and will to power/fate pervades all of Nietzsche's thought during every period of his work: "Thus live waves--thus live we who will . . . You and I--are we not of one kind?--You and I--do we not have one secret?" (FW/GS 310; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

27. Gilles Deleuze, Op. Cit., p.8.

28. Deleuze, Op. Cit., emphasizes the positive and spontaneously affirmative nature of Nietzsche's will to power versus Hegel's negative dialectics which closely mirrors the character of slave-morality:

"In Nietzsche, the essential relation of one force to another is never conceived of as a negative element in the essence. In its relation with the other the force which makes itself obeyed does not deny the other or that which it is not, it affirms its own difference and enjoys this difference. The negative is not present in the essence as that from which force draws its activity: on the contrary it is a result of activity, of the existence of an active force and the affirmation of its difference." (Gilles Deleuze, Op. Cit., pp.8-9.)

29. Cf. Alphonso Lingis, "The Will to Power," in David B. Allison (ed.), Op. Cit., pp.39ff. Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Op. Cit., pp.8-9.

30. G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, Op. Cit., p.226; for the discussion of recognition, see Part IV.

31. Cf. Gilles Deleuze, Op. Cit., p.10.

32. For an excellent discussion of Nietzsche's critique of historicism and its conflation of the good and the actual, see Jean Granier, Op. Cit., "Puissance, histoire et politique," pp.395-404.

33. Cf. Jean Granier, Ibid., on the conflation of "having" and "being" in certain interpretations of the will to power, pp.389-91; and also on how the historicist desire for recognition leads to the transformation of the will to power into a desire to dominate (der Wille zum Reich), pp.395-96ff.

34. George Grant's review and commentary in his essay, "Tyranny and Wisdom," in Technology and Empire (Toronto: House of Anansi, 1969), on the Strauss/Kojeve debate on the relationship between tyranny and philosophy, concisely elaborates the classical argument that historicism culminates in tyranny. Just as Nietzsche, from a modern perspective, equates slavery and historicism, so Grant and Strauss see the triumph of universal recognition in the universal and homogeneous state as the most appalling form of tyranny.

Chapter 6

FRIENDSHIP and AUTHORITY

I teach you the friend in whom the world stands complete, a vessel of the good--the creative friend, who always has a complete world to bestow.

Friedrich Nietzsche

In Chapter Five, I have shown that (a) master-morality is the offspring of the highest will to power, "the bestowing virtue; (b) the eternal recurrence of the same is the metaphysical essence of the will to power and the ethical practice by which amor fati is realized; and (c) Nietzsche's master is fundamentally different from Hegel's lord in that the former is the physiological expression of the plenitude, sovereignty and trans-historical nature of the highest will to power.

The self-mastery of the child-spirit manifests itself in an unmediated sovereignty and autonomy (GM, II, 2)--i.e., in a freedom that comes into existence far beyond the limits of authority and the morality of the city (or the camel-spirit). Indeed, Nietzsche constantly stresses the solitary nature of the higher spirits (i.e., the lion and the child) and their aversion to community (cf. J/BGE 262, 268, 271, & 284). Hence, when we are first introduced to Zarathustra (FW/GS 342; Z, Prologue, 1), he has left his home and been living alone in the mountains for ten years.

However, the discourses of Zarathustra begin at the conclusion of his solitude because of the intrinsic compulsion of his will to power

to create, share and give itself away. The story of Zarathustra commences then with the struggle of the philosopher, who comes into being through the rejection of his city and friends, to live with man again as a man; Zarathustra decides to descend to man and live within and re-form his community. Hence, Thus Spoke Zarathustra immediately confronts the necessity of the philosopher to search for and cultivate friendship! Having been rebuffed by the crowd in the market square, Zarathustra realizes his need for companions beyond the people (Z, Prologue, 9): i.e., within the polity but above the multitude; Nietzsche recognizes that, within the city, there is a relationship that preserves and even cultivates the highest spirit and it is called friendship. In Chapter Five, the nature of the most elevated will to power was seen to be the bestowing virtue and great love. However, it was still unclear how this virtue would fulfill itself within a community; it is precisely this theme that I shall address in this chapter. For it is only through friendship that the bestowing virtue interacts successfully with man and thereby realizes the grand politics of authority: thus, the bestowing virtue and eternal recurrence, if they are to be practiced and lived as the foundations of a new authority, presuppose friendship as the basis of grand politics.

In the first section of this chapter, therefore, I shall elaborate Nietzsche's conception of friendship through a comparison with Plato's and Aristotle's. In many respects, Nietzsche's understanding of friendship concurs with the classical view: e.g., (a) that this love

is confined to the mature, (b) that it entails a certain madness and intoxication, (c) that it is active and bestowing, (d) that it is higher than sexual/romantic love and pity (neighbour love) because only the good can practice it, and (é) that it engenders a true community (polity) and equality of spirit.

However, two essential points separate Nietzsche's from the classical conception of friendship: (a) Nietzsche's view is premised on active nihilism and the pure immanence of the will to power; and (b) the great love of the friend is founded not on knowledge of the absolutely real but on the transfiguration and beautification of what is. It is precisely this latter point that I shall address in the second section, "The Holy Lie of Great Love". With this discussion of the transforming and creative power of love, a theme dealt with in an earlier chapter is reintroduced: the role of illusion and exteriority in perspective. Great love, particularly in its political capacity as friendship, is the highest will to power and therefore conceals and lies as it creates. It forms an affirmative perspective through an unhistorical horizon and thus revives authority through the holy lie of great love.

Friendship is the summit of grand politics because, first, it forms the fundamental community of the good and, second, it recreates authority. In partnership with eternal recurrence, friendship separates the higher spirits from the lower: i.e., it establishes an order of rank--an hierarchy. Like Plato, Nietzsche differentiates three types of men and three political orders: the most spiritual and

affirmative men, the guardians (kings and warriors) and, lastly, the people. At the same time, Nietzsche constructs this trinity as a conscious parallel with the Hindu hierarchy of the Brahmans, kings and labourers and as a parody of Plato's ideal order of philosophers, guardians and people. Friendship thereby creates the basic order of the grand politics because it alone is the realization of the good' (Z, I, 16) and only the good (the affirmative) can create a true community (MA/H, I, 45) and thus found a polity. In the third section, therefore, I will explore this congruence of authority, friendship and hierarchy in the grand politics.

This final chapter on authority and friendship illuminates and develops the central themes of the previous chapter: namely, that unconditional love is the most active and affirmative will to power, and thus constitutes that state of being in which man experiences the innocence, perfection and superhistorical happiness of becoming. More than this, the discussion of friendship and authority illuminates the grand politics of authority as a whole. For in Nietzsche's conception of friendship, master-morality is revealed to be more than individual self-mastery; true mastery builds beyond itself and creates a new perspective or life-world. The highest will to power imposes the character of being on becoming through a belief in perfection and trans-historical completeness; and authority is the means by which man overcomes history and creates the illusion of being. Now Nietzsche tells us that, in his self-mastery and unconditional love, the friend realizes the highest task of authority: in him, the world stands

complete and, from his overflowing happiness, he always has a complete world to bestow (Z, I, 16). Mastery fully manifests a new life-world in grand politics, therefore, only through the concurrence of friendship and authority.

The coincidence of friendship and authority in Nietzsche's grand politics will be elaborated in this final chapter through the following division of the discussion:

- A/ Friendship and the New Virtue,
- B/ The Holy Lie of Great Love,
- C/ Authority, the Child and Hierarchy.

A/ FRIENDSHIP and the NEW VIRTUE:

Once it has completed its ascent to enlightenment, the philosophic soul is overcome by a strange combination of injustice and comedy. Moreover, Nietzsche and Plato share similar characterizations of this critical denouement of the cultivation of the philosophy.

In Plato's allegory of the cave, the enlightened soul that has transcended the cave of the city is finally faced with the most odious and difficult dilemma: beyond the illusions of the city, he has found true being, beauty and happiness; he has nothing but contempt for the city and its shadowy honours. But his very disinterest in the city makes him the most suitable candidate for the leadership of the city because he cannot be corrupted by the illusions and attachments of the cave since he now belongs to the higher world of the Good.

Since the philosopher no longer belongs nor even wants to belong to the lower world, the city must compel him to return and go down to the cave again (cf. The Republic 516d, 519d-521b). This is the ultimate comedy of the philosopher and the city: once the soul is enlightened by the Good and has thus acquired the attributes of rulership, it has thereby become disinterested in the city and disinclined to rule.¹ By using coercion to force the philosopher to return, injustice underlies the kingship of the enlightened spirit.

Nietzsche delineates a similar comedy of descent except that, in his case, the higher soul is compelled not by the city but by his own instincts. On the one hand, the most refined spirit instinctively wants to free himself of the commonness of herd-life and nourish himself in solitude (J/BGE 26). Indeed, I have argued that the significance of the lion-spirit lies in this attack on the common life of authority and the "Thou shalt." However, on the other hand, Nietzsche insists that the highest spirit will be compelled "by an even stronger instinct" (Loc. Cit.) to return and go down to man. It is for this reason that Zarathustra's first act is to announce his desire to descend to the city and offer his bestowing virtue to the people (cf. Z, Prologue, 1).

Unlike Plato, Nietzsche presents this descent not as something imposed externally on the life of the good but as the intrinsic dynamic of the strongest will to power. The nature of the most powerful life is to overflow, give itself away and transcend itself (FW/GS 370; M/D 449). In contrast to the Platonic philosopher, the

plenitude of the active and creative spirit finds its happiness in going down to man: the good is a bestowing virtue that is compelled by its nature to return to the city.

The drama of Zarathustra begins with this descent and it represents the summit of grand politics when pride and solitude are overcome by a stronger instinct: the desire of wisdom to give itself away. Indeed, joyful wisdom is driven, by its nature, to elevate this solitary pride to friendship. Zarathustra's eagle, the proudest animal (Z, Prologue, 10), seeks the solitary heights and only overcomes this tendency by flying with the earth-bound serpent, the wisest animal (Loc. Cit.), coiled around its neck. Nietzsche hopes to transcend pride's solitude by subordinating it to wisdom and its compulsion to return to the necessary (fate) and to share its joy and knowledge: wisdom thus propels the spirit to friendship.

However, Zarathustra quickly discovers that the people are not capable of friendship. After his speeches on the Overman and the Last Man (Z, Prologue, 3-5), Zarathustra is greeted with "shouting and mirth" (Ibid., Prologue, 5). And having buried his first friend, the tight-rope walker who is fatally injured in the square where Zarathustra confronts the people, he realizes that friendship occurs only outside the market; and thus friends are possible only with those who are able to live beyond the multitude.

A light has dawned for me: I need companions,
living ones, not dead companions and corpses which I
carry with me wherever I wish.
But I need living companions who follow me because

they want to follow themselves--and who want to go where I want to go.

A light has dawned for me: Zarathustra shall not speak to the people but to companions! Zarathustra shall not be herdsman and dog to the herd!

To lure many away from the herd--that is why I have come. The people and the herd shall be angry with me: the herdsmen shall call Zarathustra a robber. (Z, Prologue, 9)

Zarathustra specifies the nature of these friends who will accompany him as "fellow-creators (Mitschaffende), fellow-harvesters (Miterntende), and fellow-rejoicers (Mitfeiernde)" (Loc. Cit.). The vision that Nietzsche presents here of mastery is a far cry from the quietism and solitude that are sometimes invoked in his work.

Through the opposition of pride and friendship, Nietzsche reiterates an ancient objection to philosophy: i.e., that the philosophic life is inclined toward self-sufficiency and proud independence. Indeed, antiquity throws up to philosophy the criticism that it makes one useless to one's friends (cf. M/D 503; FW/GS 61) and thereby undermines public life. Yet Nietzsche ultimately defends philosophy and argues that friendship is the summit of philosophic life as he understands it. For within this relationship alone the noble soul may consider himself a member of a community and an equal among equals. This form of polity is uniquely suited to overcome philosophic pride and build self-mastery into a real community.

What, then, is friendship, in Nietzsche's terms? I shall argue that he isolates the following characteristics in order to define its nature: (a) friendship is confined to the mature (approximately forty

years and older); (b) this love is suffused with intoxication and hence stands above justice; (c) it is active and bestowing; (d) friendship is distinguished from romantic love and pity because only the good can be friends; and (e) this entails an equality of spirit. These five points bear a certain resemblance to the classical conception of friendship held by Plato and especially Aristotle.

However, Nietzsche's understanding of love and friendship departs from the classical conception when his metaphysical position is brought more clearly to bear on the discussion. Two points will be emphasized in this regard: (a) Nietzsche's notion of friendship is premised on active nihilism and the pure immanence of the will to power; and (b) the great love of friendship is the power of beautification and transfiguration--it is "the pure, purifying eye" (M/D 497; Nietzsche's Emphasis).

Like the ancients, Nietzsche reserves friendship for those who have practiced a protracted self-mastery and who are likely, therefore, to be more mature. For Nietzsche, this means approximately forty years and older (cf. S/WS 269) since, even at the age of thirty, "one is, as regards high culture, a beginner, a child" (G/TI, VIII, 5). The importance of these age differentials is symbolized in the fact that Zarathustra leaves his home at thirty and descends to man in search of friendship at forty (Z, Prologue, 1). Moreover, Nietzsche has Zarathustra expressly identify the mature man as the most child-like and therefore more capable of love.

The youth loves immaturity and immaturity too he hates man and the earth. His heart and the wings of his spirit are still bound and heavy.

But there is more child in the man than in the youth, and less melancholy: he has a better understanding of life and death. (*Ibid.*, I, 21)

In this identification of maturity and friendship, Nietzsche follows the classical view that before one can share one's spirit one must have cultivated a spirit of one's own. Hence, Plato's dialogue on friendship, *Lysis*, begins with Socrates asking two youths, who consider themselves friends, which of them is the older.² Through his questioning, Socrates makes them aware that they do not yet know, constrained as they are by their youth, what true friendship is and concludes by leaving to find older interlocutors. Similarly, Aristotle views the young as less prepared for lasting friendship because their relationships are grounded in the inconsistencies of pleasure (cf. *The Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VIII, Section 3). Perfect friendship is possible only among those who are good, beneficent and loving; and these qualities are cultivated with age (*Ibid.*, VIII, 3, 5, & 8).

Second, Nietzsche conceives of love as the spiritualization of passion and sensuality (*G/TI*, V, 1 & 3); and he explicitly identifies this love as friendship (*FW/GS* 14). The first point that Nietzsche highlights in this regard is that love, being a passion, is a type of intoxication that transfigures and perfects the world (*WM/WP* 805ff.). Hence, love is the most powerful illusion-creating force and "the

state in which man sees things most of all as they are not" (A/AC 23; Nietzsche's Emphasis)! Through love alone man participates in and affirms the whole by imposing the illusion of being (perfection) on becoming as envisioned in amor fati.

The wholeness that characterizes love/friendship imbues man with an independence and creativity that elevates him above justice. For Nietzsche, the love that defines friendship is the unconditional will to the contrary (the extra-moral); and as such it exists beyond justice and is its self-transcendence and spiritualization (GM, II, 10). As I have already argued, this extra-moral love is not a tyrannical laissez aller but the bestowing virtue which demands the greatest self-discipline. The morality of mastery is a love which transcends justice and the law, because it is mercy (Gnade) (Loc. Cit.): in this sense, the love that is the spiritualization of passion is also the spiritualization and transcendence of justice.

The classical conception of friendship, articulated by Plato and Aristotle, also portrays this form of love as a kind of intoxication or madness that elevates man above the conventional justice of the city. With respect to the former point, Plato in particular argues that love is a type of divine madness (cf. Phaedrus, 244ff.) which, in its philosophic form (i.e. the love of wisdom), is able to ascend to knowledge or recollection of the truth (Ibid. 249; cf. The Symposium 210ff.). Both Nietzsche and Plato understand love as a transcendence of the reality of the city through intoxication; however, Nietzsche ascends to a being that is also illusion whereas one transcends

illusion toward Being, according to Plato.

Aristotle emphasizes the fact that friendship is higher than justice to the point where "between friends there is no need for justice" (The Nicomachean Ethics, VIII, 1). Nietzsche's portrayal of friendship as the spiritualization and transcendence of justice reiterates much of Aristotle's thesis. For the latter argues that friends have no need of justice because friendship presupposes good men for whom the good of the other is identical to one's own good (Ibid., VIII, 3 & 5). Although Aristotle is less inclined to conceive of friendship as intoxication or madness than is Nietzsche, it is clear that for both it represents a love that rests on a goodness which is independent of the city.

The next three aspects of Nietzsche's theory of friendship are so interrelated that I will deal with them together: the third point is that friendship is active and bestowing; the fourth is that friendship is higher than romantic love and pity because only the good are capable of it; and the fifth aspect argues that friendship involves community and thus an equality of spirit. The third point reiterates the argument I presented in the previous chapter that Nietzsche's will to power (and thereby great love) is intrinsically active and creative. This follows from the nature of becoming as a self-overflowing plenitude. Therefore, the great love that characterizes friendship is the bestowing of love's transfiguring illusions on others: and what it bestows, according to Nietzsche, is the completeness and eternity of the superhistorical life. The bestowing

virtue is realized in grand politics through the great love of friendship: "I teach you the friend in whom the world stands complete, a vessel of the good--the creative friend, who always has a complete world to bestow." (Z, I, 16)

The world stands complete in the friend because in great love (e.g., amor fati) the world becomes perfect (cf. UH/UAH, VII; WM/WP 805); and this friend is at the same time creative and thus descends to man and bestows completeness on others. Hence, through friendship, great love establishes the foundations of grand politics and authority in affirmation and plenitude.

The classical idea of friendship, and Aristotle is especially relevant here, also highlights its active and bestowing nature. It is of the utmost significance that Aristotle designates loving as an active experience and being loved as a passive one (The Nicomachean Ethics, IX, 7). Moreover, friendship is epitomized by loving rather than being loved (Ibid., VIII, 8) for "loving is the distinctive virtue of friends" (Loc. Cit.). However, whereas Nietzsche understands love to be naive, spontaneous and pre-conscious, the classical ideal grounds the highest friendship in the contemplative life of reason: love must come to know its nature and its object.³

The forth aspect follows from above because only friendship, as opposed to romantic love and pity, is based on the good. For Nietzsche, the good, in the masterly sense, are those who spontaneously love themselves and the world (amor fati) and friendship is impossible without self-love. An innocent and healthy selfishness

is the essential quality of the good and therefore of friendship.

"Only the most complete persons can love; . . . one must be firmly rooted in oneself." (WM/WP 296) For this reason, Nietzsche stresses that self-love is the foundation of mastery and nobility (FW/GS 290; Z, III, 11; J/BGE 287).

Friendship presupposes self-affirmation and is thereby the ultimate counter-principle to ressentiment, pity and its bad love of self (Z, I, 16). Moreover, healthy and sick selfishness are best understood through this dichotomy between friendship and resentful pity. In one of his most revealing statements in this regard, Nietzsche explicitly defines friendship as the active and spontaneous sharing of joy (Mitfreude) while pity (Mitleiden) is the sharing of suffering: "Fellowship in joy, not sympathy in sorrow, makes people friends. (Mitfreude, nicht Mitleiden, macht den Freund)." (MA/H, I, 499) Hence, friendship requires a healthy selfishness and self-affirmation because friends are "fellow-rejoicers (Mitfeiernde)" (Z, Prologue, 9)!

Pity or "neighbour-love" is infected with ressentiment and its bad love of self. This sick selfishness compels the spirit, out of self-hate, to turn away from oneself and toward one's neighbour. In this sense, pity (Mitleiden) is the community or fellowship formed around the suffering of those who do not love themselves enough. Indeed, a fundamental self-irony and cynicism is the ultimate danger that pity poses to true life: for sick selfishness culminates in sick life.

"Your love of your neighbour is your bad love of yourselves. . . . You

cannot endure to be alone with yourselves and do not love yourselves enough." (Ibid., I, 16) Great love is superior to pity (Ibid., II, 3) because it shares joy and fullness rather than suffering.⁴

Apart from pity, friendship must be distinguished from romantic or sexual love. Nietzsche does not entirely dissociate sexuality and friendship, since he conceives love as the spiritualization of desire (G/TI, V, 1 & 3). However he does view healthy love as both the sublimation and transformation of sexual desire (FW/GS 14). Nietzsche seems to construe sexual love in a Hegelian fashion as the desire for the desire of the other: i.e., the longing not only to be loved but the lust to possess the other unconditionally. And in this way, romantic love is neither a bestowal of completeness, as friendship is, nor is it a public relationship; for in romance, one wishes to exclude the world and tyrannize the other.

Sexual love betrays itself most clearly as a lust for possession: the lover desires unconditional and sole possession of the person for whom he longs; he desires equally unconditional power over the soul and over the body of the beloved; he alone wants to be loved and desires to live and rule in the other soul as supreme and supremely desirable. If one considers that this means nothing less than excluding the whole world from a precious good, from happiness and enjoyment . . . then one comes to feel genuine amazement that this wild avarice and injustice of sexual love has been glorified and deified in all ages (Loc. Cit.; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

• The lust for possession that defines romantic love is symptomatic of the same poverty of spirit and lack of self-love which .

characterizes pity. A sick selfishness undermines both varieties of love in contradistinction to the healthy and innocent selfishness of friendship. At the same time, Nietzsche occasionally concedes that friendship maintains a remote affiliation with sexual love; but it is always accompanied with the provision that friendship sublimates and transforms sexuality into a new desire that proceeds from joy and plenitude (cf. Loc. Cit. & M/D 503)..

Here again, Nietzsche's argument reiterates that of Aristotle. For the latter, friendship is possible only between the good (Op. Cit., VIII, 3 & 5) and those stronger enough to be active and loving (Ibid., VIII, 8). More than this, Aristotle argues that the good man is not a better friend because he is more selfless than the bad because friendliness toward others reflects a man's feeling toward himself (Ibid., IX, 8). The good man is able to be a friend because he first loves himself (Loc. Cit.). Indeed, since it is difficult to distinguish the self and the other in a true friendship, one could say that "a friend is another self" (Ibid., IX, 4) and love for the other is self-love. In arguing that a healthy selfishness is essential to friendship, Nietzsche confirms Aristotle's insight that self-love underlies and distinguishes friendship from other associations.

Finally, Nietzsche concurs with the classical view that friendship implies community and an equality of spirit. I have argued that one may distinguish master- and slave-morality through the distinction between healthy and sick selfishness. However, given Nietzsche's antipathy toward the notion of equality, one might assume that a

healthy selfishness precludes any company of equals. The truth is quite different: "all company is bad company except the company of one's equals" (J/BGE 26). The social equation of one will or spirit with another in friendship is permissible if they already share a strength of will to power and similar value standards (Ibid. 259). Moreover, not only can the good establish an equality of spirit but the most profound community, friendship, is accessible to those alone who can affirm themselves. There is only one real principle of community, according to Nietzsche, and that is affirmation, unconditional love and the sharing of joy (Mitfreude). The bad can never create a friendship because sick selfishness, be it slavish or tyrannical, is able to affirm neither the self nor the other: "Are you a slave? If so, you cannot be a friend. Are you a tyrant? If so, you cannot have friends." (Z, I, 14; cf. MA/H, I, 45) For this reason, Nietzsche sees friendship as peculiar to master-morality and thus above the people in general.

Aristotle specifies that perfect friendship occurs only between the good and those similar in their goodness (Op. Cit., VIII, 3). In this sense, friendship is equality (Ibid., VIII, 5) although it is restricted to the good. However, beyond this perfect form, there is another type of friendship that entails superiority (Ibid., VIII, 7).

Hence, between the old and the young or rulers and subjects it is also possible to cultivate a close affinity. Through this category of unequal friendships, Aristotle is able to evaluate the relative possibilities for justice within different constitutions (i.e.,

monarchy, aristocracy and timocracy): the greater the friendship within a constitution the greater its justice. Monarchy, therefore, offers the most just constitution because there is an outstanding beneficence of the king for his subjects while in timocracy, the worst of the regular governments, the equality of the subjects makes friendship possible between good men (*Ibid.*, VIII, 11). The perversions of these constitutions (tyranny, oligarchy and democracy) make both friendship and justice unlikely. In tyranny, friendship is precluded by the absence of common ground between ruler and subject but, in democracy, where people are still equal and have much in common, there survives a certain capacity for friendship.

On the question of equality, Nietzsche resembles Aristotle's portrayal of perfect friendship where friends must be good and similar in their goodness. However, it is safe to say that Aristotle's category of "unequal friendship" would have appeared to Nietzsche as a contradiction in terms. Friendship is above the people because it is active, spontaneous and unconditional love which presupposes a strength and self-mastery that is inaccessible to all but a few.

As I noted above, Nietzsche's theory of friendship departs radically from the classical one when his metaphysical position is taken into account. Friendship is related to Nietzsche's metaphysics in the following way: (a) friendship is premised on active nihilism and the absolute immanence of the will to power; and (b) the great love that characterizes friendship is the power of beautification and transfiguration. Nietzsche defines the friend as one in whom the

world stands complete (Z, I, 16); yet this wholeness resides in the pure immanence of becoming and thus its measurelessness (cf. G/TI, VI, 8). The unconditional love of the whole (amor fati) that distinguishes the friend thereby implies active nihilism: i.e., the insistence on the immanence of becoming and the corollary that life cannot be measured or judged. Nietzsche separates himself from the classical tradition through his conception of great love or friendship as the affirmation of the innocence (or unaccountability) of the whole.

The second point returns us to the relationship between friendship and intoxication. The world stands complete in the friend because the healthy will to power imposes being upon becoming as it beautifies and transfigures: unconditional love/friendship is "the pure, purifying eye" (M/D 497) that believes in the perfection and wholeness of the world in every moment. In the highest will to power and thus in great love, affirmation is inseparable from illusion because love is the intoxicating and transfiguring power (A/AC 23; Ull/UAH, VII). Hence, Nietzsche departs from the classical tradition in his conception of love as an illusion-creating force through which the world is affirmed as perfect and whole--as Being. I shall address this critical dimension of Nietzsche's theory of friendship in the following section.

B/ THE HOLY LIE of GREAT LOVE:

In this chapter and the previous one, I have argued that the most affirmative will to power is, for Nietzsche, friendship or great love. At this stage of cultivation, the will becomes creative, bestowing and active; and, it is important to note, it possesses these attributes in a pre-conscious, spontaneous or innocent fashion. Furthermore, love affirms the world as complete, perfect and thus super-historical at each moment only through active nihilism: affirmation is inseparable from pure immanence and thus amor fati is realized in the eternal recurrence of the same. I have also tried to show that friendship is not only the realization of the complete world in the individual but that the creative friend (cf. Z, I, 16) is one who always has a complete world to bestow. Friendship is thereby the manifestation of grand politics because it makes affirmation the foundation of a new life-world.

I shall now look more closely at what I have called the intoxicating and transfiguring nature of love. First, I will examine how love creates a complete world and transforms things by imposing the illusion of being on becoming: in this way, love realizes a new holy lie. Second, great love thereby transforms man by making him whole and thus more than a man: love is the precondition of the Overman. Third, through this coincidence of transhistorical wholeness and creativity ("lying"), I shall return to the concept of authority; for great love founds a new standard of value (self-affirmation), a new type of community (friendship) and thereby a new form of authority. True life is possible, according to Nietzsche, only when

an illusion of being is imposed upon becoming through a perspective or "holy lie." The unhistorical authority of the camel is transformed into the superhistorical authority of the child through great love and friendship.

With respect to the first point, Nietzsche identifies love as the creative, illusion-making force of the will to power (cf. UW/UAH, VII; A/AC 23). In this way, the illumination of the nature of friendship necessarily brings us back to exteriority and authority. Nietzsche argues consistently that man requires a holy lie and therefore an authority in order to live happily; this is the essence of his perspectivism. At the same time, he characterizes love as the highest expression of creativity or "lying." It follows that great love or friendship is able to bestow a complete world only through a holy lie and thus a higher form of authority.

Friendship and its unconditional love are so important to Nietzsche and his grand politics because therein coincide plenitude and illusion: in friendship, the world stands complete because the illusion of being is thrown over becoming. Amor fati embodies this affirmation of the world as beautiful or, more accurately, the love of fate is a way of seeing the world as beautiful (FW/GS 276). It cultivates the pure, purifying eye. It is not the world, therefore, that is beautiful; in fact, it is terrifying and ugly. Hence, amor fati is a love that makes things beautiful by seeing them as such.

Clearly, the nature of love is to be bestowing, enriching and thus creative, according to Nietzsche. For man to be creative (active and

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affirmative), he must see and experience the world through unconditional love and its illusions (cf. UII/UAH, VII). Nietzsche consistently characterizes love as an enriching power of illusion and thus a holy lie. "Love is ~~the~~ state in which man sees things most of all as they are not. The illusion-creating force is there at its height, likewise the sweetening and transforming force." (A/AC 23; Nietzsche's Emphasis. Cf. WM/WP 805ff.)

As I have already argued, illusion is singularly important and valuable because it is the condition of health and happiness. Indeed, it is possible to distinguish, in Nietzsche's work, two types of vision that correspond to a healthy and sick life: first, the purifying and beautifying eye that enhances illusion and, second, the suffering and diminishing eye that destroys it! The principal condition of a perspective stipulates that an unhistorical horizon surround it and that "a happy blindness" (UII/UAH, I) limit its vision. This healthy view is intrinsically dependent upon illusion and blindness in order to preserve its self-certainty.

On the other hand, there is a penetrating vision that seeks to remove the concealing veils of illusion and know what the truth of this surface really is. The sober eye of science looks through the charm and beauty of things whereas the intoxicated eye rests at the surface; the sober eye suffers while the healthy eye enjoys the play of illusion. "He who suffers intensely looks out at things with a terrible coldness: all those little lying charms with which things are usually surrounded when the eye of the healthy regards them do not

exist for him." (M/D 114; Nietzsche's Emphasis) What distinguishes the vision of the healthy is that they look at things "with a more desiring eye" (Loc. Cit.) that creates as it loves. That is to say, the eye of the healthy is not a passive vision that merely enjoys illusion; rather, it is a bestowing, procreative eye that transfigures as it sees.

The significance of great love and friendship, for Nietzsche's grand politics, can be seen most clearly in his concept of the love of fate. Amor fati is the divine power of seeing as beautiful that which is necessary; and this affirmative seeing makes things beautiful through its lying charms. The love of fate engenders a bestowing vision of the world because to make beautiful is to lie and create: "To experience a thing as beautiful means: to experience it necessarily wrongly" (WM/WP 804). Great love glorifies exteriority by creating and affirming the surface and face of the world. Its "inextinguishable drunkenness" (FW/GS 57) conjures up the solidity and durability of human worldliness precisely by granting man a "freedom above things" (Ibid. 107; Nietzsche's Emphasis). By creating a freedom and a surface above things, love becomes the essential precondition for an healthy perspective and polity.

The second point concerning the procreative vision of love is crucial for the understanding of friendship and the Overman. Nietzsche insists that the seer as well as the seen is transformed by the pure, purifying eye because one is no longer the same being when one loves greatly. There is not a given subject who then practices

love and remains unchanged. By its very nature, great love is a profound discontinuity, a transfiguration, "une métamorphose physiologique"⁵. Moreover, in this state, "man cease[s] to be man" (M/D 423), he is raised above himself and is transformed into an Overman.

As a result, it is insufficient to say that love is the state in which one experiences things wrongly. The significance of this experience is not that one merely seems to oneself transformed, richer and more perfect; on the contrary, through the abundance of power that characterizes great love "one is more perfect" (WM/WP 808; Nietzsche's Emphasis)! Love provokes a physiological transformation that elevates man above himself.

But we should do wrong if we stopped with its [i.e., love's] power to lie: it does more than merely imagine; it even transposes values. And it is not only that it transposes the feeling of values: the lover is more valuable, is stronger. . . . His whole economy is richer than before, more powerful, more complete than in those who do not love. The lover becomes a squanderer: he is rich enough for it. (Loc. Cit.; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

In light of this transfiguration of man through affirmation, it is now clearer why Nietzsche characterizes the friend as one in whom the world stands complete and who always has a complete world to bestow (Z, I, 16). The friend is able to bestow a complete world because through his creative affirmation of life, the world becomes complete. The friend is more valuable and complete because, within himself, the world fulfills itself every moment. Amor fati is intended then to

raise man above himself and become the creative friend who embodies the innocence and perfection of becoming.

Third, with this coincidence of transhistorical wholeness and creativity, authority re-emerges as the centre of Nietzsche's grand politics. One of the great difficulties of interpreting Nietzsche's philosophy derives from the fact that it is anti-historicist and yet affirms the immanence of becoming. This means that the illusion of being or wholeness (Apollo) must be maintained in and through pure becoming (Dionysus): the paradox thus arises that becoming affirm itself as being. Yet unconditional love, friendship and authority coincide in this paradox.

Nietzsche begins with the premise that becoming, not being, is the fundamental ontological reality. At the same time, happiness and health presuppose the illusion of permanence or being. This would seem to pose an impossible dilemma for Nietzsche. However, becoming is not unity or a subject but a plurality of wills to power. For this reason, each will finds itself limited to its own perspective and horizon. Moreover, forgetfulness and the unhistorical nature of pure becoming compel the particular wills to power to see themselves as enduring beings. In this way, the illusion of being is intrinsic to the life of pure becoming because experience is perspectival.

While forgetfulness is the natural condition of life, man is distinguished by his power of remembrance. His naturally unhistorical inclination is compromised by his sense of history and hence man alone has no eternal perspectives (cf. FW/GS 143). Without a stable

unhistorical horizon, however, man cannot be happy and healthy because his self-certainty is always threatened by history and knowledge.

Authority is the stabilization of the "walls of the world"⁶ whereby the unhistorical horizon of a polity is rendered unquestionable and instinctive. Despite the fact that man can never have an eternal perspective in the way the pre-human world can, a sense of eternity is preserved through the stabilization of the unhistorical. Authority provides a people (a polity) with the essential condition for an healthy life: the sense of trans-historical permanence or completeness and thereby the unconditional affirmation and reverence for oneself.

In this sense, by strengthening the power of the unhistorical horizon, authority is the fundamental precondition of a community's health and self-esteem. However, Nietzsche argues that the most affirmative men are able to realize an even higher form of the trans-historical: they may ascend to the superhistorical life. The highest approximation of becoming to a world of being demands that man learn to affirm that which is necessary in becoming. This demand culminates in amor fati and the eternal recurrence of the same. With these two ideas, Nietzsche argues that man can impose on becoming (from within becoming) the illusion of being only through unconditional love.

The superhistorical life coincides in friendship/great love and authority. Nietzsche conceives of love as the creative force that makes beautiful and thereby gives the world a surface that conceals its truth. Hence, love is the only state in which man blends the

creative, illusion-making power (the Dionysian) with the stability and permanence of the surface (the Apollonian). Becoming and being, creativity and completeness are reconciled and harmonized in affirmation. Friendship and authority together fulfill the essential condition of Nietzsche's grand politics: i.e., that being and becoming (spirit and life or Apollo and Dionysus) attain a harmony in which the world stands complete; and through the creative friend, a complete world is bestowed upon man.⁷

Nietzsche contends that the highest will to power imposes being upon becoming; and given the immanence of becoming, this amounts to the self-imposition of being by becoming. In great love or friendship, being and becoming are no longer counterposed and Apollo is not seen as an imposition on Dionysus: friendship bestows a complete, Apollonian world through the self-overcoming of Dionysus. Authority is no longer a wall built to freeze becoming forever because, through friendship, being and becoming are now an harmony in tension: completeness (being) and becoming are no longer opposites. Hence, friendship is the manifestation of this higher authority because the friend is the creative affirmation in which the world fulfills itself at every moment.

C/ AUTHORITY, THE CHILD and HIERARCHY:

Nietzsche's metaphysics is intrinsically political and hence his philosophy is always elaborated as the grand politics. Thus, on the

one hand, the world revolves about the creator of new values (Z, I, 12; & Ibid., II, 18) and healthy politics rests upon the superhistorical authority of the love of fate. On the other hand, however, master-morality is, for the great majority of people, "untimely," incomprehensible and even imperceptible (Loc. Cit.). Indeed, Zarathustra concludes the Prologue with the decision that he will speak henceforth to companions, not to the people (Ibid., Prologue, 9)! Friendship is an exclusive polity which maintains itself above the multitude; and this means that Nietzsche's ultimate vision of authority is strictly hierarchical: the world revolves around the child-spirit but this authority is imperceptible! " 'It is the stillest words which bring the storm. Thoughts that come on doves' feet guide the world.' " (Ibid., II, 22)

The question arises, then, as to how these untimely philosophers will exercise their imperceptible authority? How are they related to those who perceptibly rule and occupy power? With Plato, Nietzsche shares a steely hostility to the city and his grand politics asserts a natural, tripartite hierarchy that resembles Plato's vision in The Republic; and yet Nietzsche rejects the idea that philosophers must be kings and thereby he maintains an even more remote role in politics for the Overman.

In this section, I will clarify the political status and role of the masterly spirits; i.e., how they live beyond the rulers and yet determine the values of the polity. This will emerge as a corollary of an examination of the political hierarchy that Nietzsche specifies

as natural and essential to healthy political life.

Since the child's will to power is accessible to only the few, Nietzsche ~~sees~~ the affirmative spirit of master-morality as intrinsically hierarchical. Nietzsche explicitly elaborates the grand politics of authority as an order of rank under the influence of Hindu thought as well as classical political thought. In order to demonstrate this affinity, I will briefly compare Nietzsche's hierarchy with the Hindu caste system, to which he makes explicit reference (cf. G/TI, VII, 3; A/AC 56 & 57); and Plato's tripartite political order.

When Nietzsche codifies his vision of master-morality as a concrete political constitution, he begins with a natural hierarchy of three types of men to which corresponds a political order of three castes. Moreover, he stresses that this political constitution is an "order of castes" (A/AC 57; Nietzsche's Emphasis) that is merely "the sanctioning of a natural order, a natural law" (Loc. Cit.; Nietzsche's Emphasis). To begin with the natural hierarchy, three physiological (in Nietzsche's vocabulary, this refers to the Body/Self) types are distinguished: the predominantly spiritual, the predominantly muscular and temperamental, and a residual category that is gifted in neither direction (Loc. Cit.).

Following this natural typology of men, Nietzsche delineates a political order of rank: the highest caste, simply called "the very few" or "the perfect caste" (Loc. Cit.; Nietzsche's Emphasis), is evidently a purely spiritual status beyond the state itself (cf. I/BGE

258); the second caste is composed of the guardians and executives of the law: a category that includes the king (or the political ruler in the generic sense) as well as the military; and finally, what Nietzsche blithely dismisses as "the mediocre" (Loc. Cit.) to which he consigns all economic and professional activities.

It is important to note that, apart from the deliberately polemical tone of his argument, Nietzsche describes this natural/political order, first, as a spiritual one and, second, as based on physiology. By the term "spiritual," Nietzsche means the power to master and sublimate one's will to power in the direction of unconditional affirmation. The most spiritual type refers to the child-spirit that affirms the world as perfect and thereby represents the friend in whom life stands complete. Second, by physiology, Nietzsche indicates that it is the nature of one's being that determines how and what one does. Therefore, the spiritual rights and responsibilities of each order are the consequence not of class or education but of who one, spiritually and physiologically, is. This explains Nietzsche's assertion that the most spiritual men rule not because they want to but because they are: "they are not free to be second in rank" (A/AC 57)!

The authority of the highest caste manifests itself in a political status and role that sheds some light on the imperceptible character of their rule. The highest type of man is incomprehensible to all but his equals because he embodies the strongest and most affirmative will to power. At the same time, he is the most creative spirit and,

through his revaluation of values, he transforms and strengthens his peers. While he may belong to the lowest class of his society (due to his untimeliness), he nevertheless transcends the rulers by virtue of who he is; moreover, even in the most spiritual and natural order, the creative man does not rule politically: "The highest men live beyond the rulers, freed from all bonds; and in the rulers they have their instruments." (WM/WP 998)

The world revolves imperceptibly around the creators of values because, through friendship, their authority determines the order of valuations and, by cultivating others, directs the will of millennia (Ibid. 999). The grand politics of friendship transcends the state and its time but creates "a voice that speaks across millennia" (EH, Foreword, 4). At most, the philosopher rules indirectly, through the guardians, by formulating the superhistorical life that will become the authority and the standard by which law and practices are measured. The masterly rule as Zarathustra does: by luring the best away from the herd, revaluing the established virtues and founding a new polity in friendship. The authority of Zarathustra's grand politics is therefore purely spiritual and physiological: i.e., the authority of one who "first creates truth, [who is] a world-ruling spirit [and] a destiny" (Ibid., IX, 6; Nietzsche's Emphasis); the authority of one who creates the superhistorical perspective within which a community lives and values.

In his elaboration of this hierarchical order, Nietzsche consciously adapts the traditional Hindu order of statuses known as

Brahmans, the spiritual caste, Kshatriyas, the warriors, and the Vaishyas and the Shudras, merchants and servants respectively.⁸

Nietzsche cites the Hindu "Law of Manu" as an example of a master-morality that cultivates distinct types of spirit (G/TI, VII, 3).

However, there are two points worth noting in his attempt to adapt and develop this historical instance of hierarchy: (a) it demonstrates the possibility of a masterly (non-Christian) polity wherein a spiritual/philosophic order maintains the highest status while standing apart from the political rulers; and (b) this form of grand politics signifies an important distinction between status and authority, on the one hand, and power, on the other.

These two points are, of course, intimately related because the separation of status from power makes it possible to establish a religious leadership (the Brahmans, for example) that exercises neither political nor economic power and yet maintains the highest status in the polity. This distinction between status and power (hierarchy and class stratification) gives rise to the pure concept of authority as an ethical order of rank which is not reducible to the determinations of class or political power: indeed, a polity based on pure authority and hierarchy separates and subordinates power to status consistently throughout society.⁹

My argument in this regard is that Nietzsche is exclusively concerned with a physiological and spiritual order of rank determined by one's power to overcome oneself: "What determines your rank is the quantum of power [that] you are" (WM/WP 858)! The authority of the

highest type of man derives from his being and character (ethos) rather than from his control over the state; indeed, Nietzsche insists that every true aristocracy must exist beyond the state for which the latter is merely the "scaffolding" (J/BGE 258) for its higher architecture. This is the lesson that Nietzsche wishes to draw from the Hindu hierarchy: that authority is distinct from power and, within the grand politics of authority, the highest status can "rule" without political power. Authority rules imperceptibly through this conception of a hierarchy that subordinates power to status.

The second political hierarchy to which Nietzsche alludes is the famous order introduced by Plato in The Republic. A comparison of the two forms of political hierarchy is natural because, despite the fundamental differences in philosophy, there are many similarities which cannot be ignored. I shall concentrate on the following points: (a) for different reasons, they both concede the highest status to the philosophers and second rank to the warrior/guardians; (b) the philosophers, in both orders, are the spiritualization of the best guardians; and (c) after an ascent outside the city to the supra-human realm, the philosophers return to the city to rule, albeit in distinct ways.

Just as there is a hierarchy of reason, spiritedness and desire within the soul, Plato maintains that there is a corresponding order within the city: the philosopher/king (The Republic 473c-487a), the guardians (Ibid. 372e-376d & 412b-417b) and the people. Nietzsche's hierarchy clearly resembles Plato's in that the philosopher also

presides, followed by the guardians and the people. Moreover, just as Plato argues that every citizen must devote himself to a single art according to the nature of his soul (Ibid. 423d), so Nietzsche distinguishes the work and mastery peculiar to each type of man (A/AC 57). However, whereas Nietzsche's philosophers are not directly political rulers, Plato's philosophers are themselves kings and thus political power and philosophy coincide (Ibid. 473d).

In the second place, both Plato and Nietzsche conceive of the philosopher as the spiritualization of the warrior. Unlike those ruled by desire, the guardians control their desires and their spiritedness through the moderating effect of education whereby they acquire a love for the beautiful (Ibid. 375ff.). Being the defender of the city, the warrior is also a formidable opponent of philosophy and its transcendence of the conventional; yet, through his education in the arts, his spiritedness (especially his anger) is tamed and he even practices philosophy to the extent that it is capable with the city (Ibid. 376a). It is for this reason that those disposed to philosophy by their rational nature are drawn from the ranks of the best and most refined of the guardians. While the guardians are by nature governed by the spirited part of the soul, it is this class of nobility and their love of the beautiful that is most likely to produce future philosophers.

Similarly, Nietzsche groups the warriors and the philosophers together as "the nobles" (A/AC 56; Nietzsche's Emphasis) and tends to see the most spiritual type as the refinement of the

governing class (WM/WP 978). Despite the fact that the guardians belong to a different physiological type, they are the closest to the philosophers in nature and make up "their following, their right hand, [and are] their best pupils" (A/AC 57). Moreover, through the continual practice of self-overcoming, the philosopher is the spiritualization of war: albeit a war against convention and himself. Hence, Nietzsche defines the most spiritual life as a kind of war: "One has renounced grand life when one renounces war" (G/TI, V, 3). The philosopher is the spiritualization of the best and therefore most spiritual of the guardians--i.e., those guardians who do not belong to the predominantly muscular and temperamental type.

Third, for both Plato and Nietzsche, the most spiritual man is he who transcends the city and its pious illusions, and thereby goes beyond the realm of man by participating in a supra-human reality. Even the guardians maintain an ambiguous relationship with the city. Plato regards them as defenders of the city but ones who also practice a limited philosophy and who thereby are able to moderate their devotion to convention. In Nietzsche's hierarchy, the warriors are principally those camel-spirits who are able to exercise a formidable self-mastery but, unlike the lion, do not venture very far from the illusions of the "Thou shalt." However, their status in this regard is ambiguous because, while they are certainly natives of the city, they are also, like the best camels, driven beyond the confines of the polis by their self-mastery (cf. Z, I, 1 & 10).

Only the philosophers have truly transcended the conventions and

pieties of the polity. Plato contends that philosophy takes one up beyond the cave of illusions to the divine truth which gives being to what is. The mortal philosopher is enlightened by this revelation of the absolute truth and, when compelled by the city, returns to subordinate the city to wisdom and justice. Through the lion-spirit, Nietzsche conceives the philosopher as one who overcomes the "Thou shalt" and ascends, as the child-spirit, to the supra-human life of the Overman. As I have argued earlier, human life comes into being only with morality, remembrance and history. Hence, man is a phenomenon peculiar to the moral life of the polis; and at the same time, polity is a bridge between animal and Overman (Z, Prologue, 4): i.e., man is a protracted pregnancy that gives birth to something beyond himself. In transcending the city, the philosopher overcomes his own humanity and, transfigured in the super-historical and the supra-human, becomes the Overman. Being one in whom the world stands complete, the philosopher is supra-human; but, being the friend who bestows a complete world, he is also one who wants to become human again and go down to man (Ibid., Prologue, 1)!

Despite several similarities, Nietzsche's hierarchy differs from Plato's in important respects. As I have already noted, in contrast to Plato's philosopher/kings, the most spiritual men rule imperceptibly by revaluating the dominant values and redirecting the highest natures (WM/WP 999). Like the Brahmins, the Overmen occupy a status and authority that is superior to political power and this authority distinguishes grand politics from statesmanship which is

entrusted to the guardians.

Second, whereas Plato maintains that reason alone can liberate man from the illusions of the cave and lead him to the good life, Nietzsche defines the Overman as innocence and forgetfulness (Z, I, 1). Life in any true sense requires the opaque horizon of the unhistorical or the superhistorical and knowledge is always subject to the pre-reflective life of illusion. While both Plato and Nietzsche posit being as the foundation of the true and just polity, being is conceived as truth by the former and Apollonian illusion by the latter. Hence, the noble lie is confined to the guardians in The Republic (414b-415b), while Nietzsche insists that perspectivism and the pious illusion are intrinsic to the Apollonian world of being as such. Nietzsche's philosophers do not overcome the Apollonian dream through knowledge; rather the best knowledge continues the universality of dreaming (cf. FW/GS 54; J/BGE 24).

Finally, while both Plato and Nietzsche assert that the philosopher must transcend the city and its conventions, Nietzsche adds that the most spiritual type, the Overman, is supra-human. The child-spirit of the Overman is raised above man because he is Self and fate, spirit and life or Apollo and Dionysus in harmony: he is the friend in whom the world stands complete. If man is "the animal with red cheeks" (Z, II, 3), the animal that is ashamed of itself, then the self-love of the Overman represents an innocence and plenitude that is supra-human. In this sense, the Overman is both more remote and closer to the city than the philosopher/king; more remote because the

Overman is separated physiologically from human world of the city and yet closer than the philosopher/king because he is instinctively drawn back down to man. Friendship embodies both the perfection of the world that elevates man above himself and the desire of perfection to go down to man and bestow itself.

In the first chapter, I discussed and elaborated Nietzsche's concept of authority through the related physiological notions of instinct and the daimon. I think that it is appropriate, therefore, to conclude my analysis of Nietzsche's theory of authority by returning to these ideas. For in this way, the coincidence of friendship, hierarchy and authority may be further explicated. Moreover, the full significance of Nietzsche's critique of Socrates in The Birth of Tragedy will also become clearer.

In his early critique of historicism (cf. The Use and Abuse of History), Nietzsche asserts the necessary hierarchy of forgetfulness over remembrance. His mature formulation of this thesis, especially in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, portrays the spirit as a lesser intelligence employed by the Body/Self that is designated as the great intelligence (Z, I, 4). It is evident from Nietzsche's characterization of the Body as an intelligence and an unknown sage that he does not conceive of the Body as inanimate nature; on the contrary, it is the Self.

However, having traversed the three metamorphoses of the spirit and examined the supra-human nature of the child/Overman, I would like to return to Nietzsche's commentary on the Socratic daimon in The

Birth of Tragedy. I think that this will illuminate why Nietzsche views the Body/Self as supra-human and thus the physiological ground of authority. For in this early work, Nietzsche suggests that the daimon offers a key to the mind of Socrates. Socrates' daimon is the divine voice which always spoke to him in a dissuading or restraining capacity (e.g., cf. Phaedrus 242c). Now Nietzsche describes the daimon, in more physiological terms, as an "instinctual wisdom" (GT/BT XIII) that is present in all creative men. However, in the latter, this wisdom is always the affirmative and creative force while reason is the restraining and critical power. Thus what distinguishes Socrates is the inversion of this natural order: i.e., consciousness is the creative power while the daimon is merely critical (Loc. Cit.).

This clarifies Nietzsche's critique of the Socratic hierarchy of reason over instinct within the soul and also explains the significance of the Body/Self. For it is evident that, in Nietzsche's eyes, the Self is the affirmative daimon and it follows that it is also an extra-human power. Within his moral psychology, the Body/daimon is the "divine animal" (Ull/UAH, V), the supra-human power of spontaneous affirmation and creativity. As a result, authority within a healthy perspective and polity must be founded on the instinctive daimon.

Just as consciousness should be subject to instinct, so spirit should be an instrument of life. Indeed, Nietzsche argues that spirit is a form of life--the life that itself strikes into life (Z, II, 7).

Spirit is the self-overcoming of life. Man comes into being with the emergence of consciousness and spirit, and coincides therefore with polity and morality. However, to be happy, creative and healthy, man and polity must maintain the natural hierarchy of life over spirit or the Body/Self over consciousness. Therefore spirit needs to be subject to the affirmative power of authority which limits the role of remembrance and spirit. Moreover, the human spirit requires authority in order to engage in the metamorphoses of the spirit.

However, if this daimon is already a divine animal, then why must man undergo a protracted pedagogy at all? The reason which Nietzsche emphasizes throughout his work is that the dionysian daimon is not a tame animal that man can easily subdue; on the contrary, it is a numinous power that is terrifying, uncanny and monstrous. Nietzsche's early image of the human condition remains the most vivid in this respect: man lives hanging in dreams on the back of a tiger. The vital and creative force, the will to power, is thus also the most dangerous and terrifying.

Nietzsche views the human condition in the following terms: a healthy life requires the Apollonian illusions of perfection and eternity achieved through the imposition of being on becoming; at the same time, a healthy life is sustained only through the affirmative force of the Dionysian will to power. In short, the good life entails the paradoxical unity of spirit and life or Apollo and Dionysus; Nietzsche formulates this paradox in the proposition that in order to make morality, one must have the unconditional will to the contrary

(G/TI, VII, 5).

The discipline of a pedagogy of self-mastery is necessary because grand politics involves not simply an Apollonian world of order but an affirmative world of order; and therefore one rooted in the authority of the Dionysian will to power! The symbol of the child represents the highest harmony of the spirit and the daimon, or the self-mastery of the Dionysian will to power. For this reason, Nietzsche portrays the child-spirit as the fulfillment of man's crossing from animal to Overman: i.e., through man and his moral/political life, the "divine animal" (the Body/Self or the daimon) is raised to a supra-human self-mastery! For Nietzsche, the Overman represents a divine or semi-divine existence because he embodies a complete world in his Body/Self: "Now I am nimble, now I fly, now I see myself under myself, now a god dances within me." (Z, I, 7)¹⁰

The contention of this thesis is that Nietzsche's Dionysian philosophy is overwhelmingly Apollonian in the sense that the noble life presupposes the illusion of a world of being and eternity. Hence, the necessity of authority and grand politics as means of institutions of forgetfulness and the unhistorical. However, if this were the only condition of the noble life, then it would be impossible to explain the purpose of amor fati, eternal recurrence and the whole pedagogy of the spirit; indeed, it would also be impossible to conduct the critique of slave-morality that Nietzsche launches. Thus, the additional and fundamental condition of the noble life: the Apollonian world of eternity must also be affirmative and creative in

order to be truly healthy! The corollary of this proposition is that authority must similarly reconcile spirit and life or being and becoming.

With this necessity for Dionysian affirmation within the Apollonian, Nietzsche argues that morality should be (a) based on the strongest will to power which, I have shown, is great love or friendship; and (b) the self-mastery of the will to power. Only the child-spirit/Overman can combine spirit and life in the manner that master-morality requires. Moreover, the interpretation of Nietzsche as a Dionysian anarchist who professes no interest in politics falters precisely with regard to this point. The animal form of the daimon is insufficient to realize the noble life because it is the spiritualization of the will to power or the self-mastery of the Dionysian that defines nobility. It is true that the highest spiritualization of the Body/Self elevates man above the human/political world but, at this point, the spirit becomes creative and bestows a complete world. Every perspective constitutes a holy lie; but only the masterly perspective is affirmative and thus the ground and authority of grand politics.

I shall conclude with a brief synopsis of the relationship between perspectivism, affirmation and authority. The essential thesis of Nietzsche's grand politics of authority may be summarized in the following points. First, every healthy life presupposes a limited perspective enclosed within an unhistorical horizon of authority; this is the Apollonian element of Nietzsche's thought that eulogizes the

illusion of being, perfection and eternity. Second, a noble life requires more than simply a secure perspective: spirit should affirm life while overcoming it, otherwise it will not be creative and vital. The Apollonian world must retain the vitality of the Dionysian will to power and, at the same time, it must master and spiritualize the latter; thus authority should become affirmative and masterly through the pedagogy of the spirit in the camel, the lion and finally the child/Overman. The necessity of the reconciliation spirit and life which will harmonize Apollo and Dionysus provokes this pedagogy because this self-mastery of the Dionysian daimon is achieved only through a protracted spiritualization of the will to power. Third, Nietzsche consistently argues that there can be no real community except through the affirmative spirit of master-morality. Hence the harmony of spirit and life is not an individual event but the grand politics of an affirmative authority. Master-morality is intrinsically political because the highest (i.e., most spiritualized) will to power constitutes the bestowing virtue. Community and affirmation coincide, according to Nietzsche, in friendship: the affirmative authority is realized in the identity of spirit and life that creates a complete world; and, being affirmative and creative, this identity overflows itself in friendship and thus bestows its plenitude on man. With the realization of the child/Overman, the spirit and authority become affirmative and go down to man out of friendship. In these three points, the pure and purifying eye of the affirmative spirit becomes the sun around which the world revolves in

Nietzsche's grand politics of authority.

ENDNOTES:

1. For a discussion of Plato's conception of the philosopher as the best ruler because of his disinterestedness and hence the need to compel him to return to the city, see Allan Bloom, "Interpretive Essay," Op. Cit., pp.407ff.; and Eric Voegelin, Plato (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), pp.114ff..

2. I rely on Gadamer's discussion of this dialogue for my interpretation of Plato's conception of friendship and age. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Logos and Ergon in Plato's Lysis," in Dialogue and Dialectic, Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, Op. Cit., pp.1-20.

3. Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Op. Cit., pp.10ff. Gadamer argues that the Socratic ideal of knowledge is most appropriate to the problem of friendship. Since knowledge is necessary to moral life, according to Socrates/Plato, and friendship is the sharing of the good, then wisdom is intrinsic to friendship. For Nietzsche, however, this would preclude the active and spontaneous nature of love since knowledge is inherently reactive and historical.

4. It should be noted that Walter Kaufmann is the only Nietzsche commentator who draws attention to the importance of friendship in his philosophy. Moreover, he provides an excellent discussion of the distinction between friendship, pity and romantic love in Nietzsche's thought. Cf. Kaufmann, Op. Cit., pp.363ff.

5. Simone Goyard-Farbe, Nietzsche et la question politique (Paris: Editions Sirey, 1977), p.129.

6. Leo Strauss, Op. Cit., pp.112ff.

7. It is important to recall that Nietzsche does not see these two fundamental principles as opposites. After all, spirit is the life that itself strikes into life (Z, II, 8) and therefore it would be a

mistake to understand being as something over against becoming or Apollo as independent of Dionysus. The stable, eternalized world of Apollo is the self-limiting or self-overcoming of Dionysus just as spirit is life overcoming itself. This follows from Nietzsche's ontological principle of the pure immanence of becoming. Spirit must always exist in tension with life and yet a certain harmony between the two is essential to the superhistorical spirit: otherwise spirit cannot be fully affirmative of life.

8. For an excellent, anthropological analysis of the Hindu caste system, see Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus, The Caste System and its Implications, trans. by Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd. (London: Paladin/Granada Publishing, 1972), pp.106ff.. Dumont points out that originally there were only three castes (Brahmans, Kshatriyas, and Vaishyas) because the Shudras were a later addition along with the Chandalas, to which Nietzsche often makes reference as "the non-bred human being" (G/TI, VII, 3). It is this original three-fold hierarchy which Nietzsche adapts to his own order of rank; of course, it was also Plato's tripartite typology which also influenced Nietzsche and probably even more so than the Hindu system.

9. Cf. Ibid., pp.111ff. and pp.300ff. for an elaboration of this important argument. Dumont does argue that this pure separation of hierarchy and class is largely unknown in the West since the conflation of church and state in Medieval Europe and the egalitarianism of modernity. The thesis which he advances and which, I think, underlies Nietzsche's order of rank, is that any polity is naturally and universally inclined to hierarchy: "To adopt a value is to introduce hierarchy, and a certain consensus of values, a certain hierarchy of ideas, things and people, is indispensable to social life." (Ibid., p.54)

10. That Nietzsche conceives the child-spirit as divine is also strongly suggested in a fragment of The Will to Power (#940). In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche characterizes the camel as the spirit of the "Thou shalt," while the lion represents the "I will." In this fragment from The Will to Power, the "I am" is presented as the divine culmination of the pedagogy of the spirit from the "Thou shalt" and the "I will" the summit of this ascent thus being a spirit like "the gods of the Greeks" (#940).

Apart from this passage, Nietzsche often characterizes mastery as divine or godlike: cf. G/TI, VI, 2; M/D 423; FW/GS 125; Z, I, 7, 17; Ibid., III, 2; I/BGE 150.

Again it is instructive to compare Nietzsche's Overman with Aristotle's philosopher with regard to the element of the divine in this form of life: "But such a life will be too high for human attainment; for any who lives it will do so not as a human being but virtue of something divine within him" (The Ethics, X, vii).

CONCLUSION

AUTHORITY: The Invisible Coat of Prejudice.

[T]he prejudices of the individual, far more than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being. . . . Thus the essence of authority belongs in the context of a theory of prejudices free from the extremism of the enlightenment. . . . That which has been sanctioned by tradition and custom has an authority that is nameless, and our finite historical being is marked by the fact that always the authority of what has been...has power over our attitudes and behavior.

Hans-Georg Gadamer

Authority poses a dilemma for political philosophy because it stands in the ambiguous zone between nature and custom, and thus between philosophy and poetry. Authority is the elusive and ever-undefined boundary between spirit and body, Apollo and Dionysus, and history and the unhistorical. Constantly and inevitably, Nietzsche's thought draws our attention back to this necessary and fragile boundary.

One of the most salient characteristics of the modern age has been the increasingly radical critique of authority. Fuelled by an ardent will to freedom and equality, modernity views itself as the emancipation of the individual from the "arbitrary" and "irrational" subservience to authority. However, this "liberation" of the

individual is also, and more importantly, the individualization of freedom. Modernity's individualism is, therefore, really the abstraction of freedom from authority and its subjectification within the worldless individual. Marx puts it very aptly when he writes: "It is a question of the liberty of man regarded as an isolated monad, withdrawn into himself."¹

The differentiation and increasing antagonism of authority and freedom manifests itself in a wide variety of phenomena, however the political essence of these transformations is the subjectification of "objective spirit" through the opposition of freedom and authority. Although the critique of this abstraction of the subjective from the objective spirit was initiated by Burke and Hegel, Nietzsche "was the great, fateful figure who fundamentally altered the task of the critique of subjective spirit for our century"². Thus, the rehabilitation of authority, that Nietzsche begins, confronts not only the subjectification of freedom but also a history of struggle between nature and custom. As Leo Strauss compellingly shows, philosophy originates with the uprooting of customary authority (poetry) and the attempt to establish nature (philosophic reason) as the only true standard of the good life.³ In this way, freedom and authority come into conflict only after nature and tradition have been separated by philosophy; only after philosophy attempts to overcome the body through the self-grounding Reason.

Of particular importance for the historical context of Nietzsche's rehabilitation of authority is the emergence of a conservative politi-

cal philosophy which reestablished the integrity and primacy of the non-rational, through an attack on the Enlightenment's rationalist critique of authority. More precisely, a principal theme of conservative thought has been the primacy of a pre-reflective reason, embodied in tradition and authority. Beneath the self-conscious cogito, they argued, there lies an unconscious, latent wisdom that is incarnated in the body and the institutions of the polity--a prescriptive authority. Burke is the first modern to give this pre-reflective reason its full due by reviving Aristotle's conception of ethos through his categories of prescription, latent wisdom and prejudice (pre-judgment). Through the latter, Burke identified a form of rationality which is pre-predicative, supra-individual and, at the same time, is the presupposition of all self-conscious reason ("naked reason"). This immediacy, givenness and habit constitutes a lived ethical world (ethos), an instinctive exteriority, embodied in authority. Hegel takes perhaps the most radical step in the overcoming of the epistemological dilemma of subjectivism. His critique of the abstract character of the Understanding (Verstand) shows that the knowing subject is immediately and existentially outside himself, immersed in the world of experience. In a word, the subject is always already substance because the former always finds himself already bound up with the immediately given--with exteriority. In political terms, the individual, long before he understands himself through self-reflection, understands himself in a self-evident way through objective spirit, the spontaneous, pre-reflective ethos (Sittlichkeit)

constituted by authority. The hegelian subject lives his prejudices, as does Burke's, long before he reflects upon them.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the critique of subjective spirit was elaborated through Tocqueville's analysis of form and manners, Durkheim's examination of mechanical and organic solidarity, and, by the turn of the century, Husserl's phenomenology of the "life-world." Husserl's concept of intentionality continues Hegel's attempt to show the subject as living in the world, even though Husserl initially tried to contain intentionality in a purely epistemological function. Through his critique of Kant's purely formalistic notion of the transcendental subject, Husserl was increasingly compelled to recognize the contingency of conscious (predicative) intentions upon "hidden" or prepredicative co-intentions. This led Husserl to the theory of the life-world, the originary, pre-reflective field of pure experience. The life-world represents man's lived exteriority; his immediate and intuitive worldliness embodied in tradition, habit (ethos) and authority. The life-world, like Hegel's objective spirit, is an unconscious and inter-subjective habitus: "By habit, I would say, I inhabit my world."⁴ From Burke's concept of prejudice to Husserl's life-world, there has gradually emerged an increasing recognition of the integrity and primacy of this prereflective horizon of exteriority that defines authority as the primordial worldliness of political life.

Nietzsche is pivotal in this phenomenological transcendence of the war between philosophy and poetry and he accomplishes this precisely

through the rehabilitation of authority. In what way does Nietzsche reopen the question of the nature of "objective spirit," authority and philosophy, through his critique of subjectivity? I have argued, in this dissertation, that Nietzsche is a political philosopher and, furthermore, that at the heart of his grand politics stands the problem of the cultivation of authority. My contention is, therefore, that his grand politics of authority is exemplified in the fundamental character of Nietzsche's thought as ethical-political reflection on man's primordial worldliness: basically Nietzsche is a political thinker who explores the genealogy of objective spirit, called "morality."

It is all too common to view Nietzsche as an "immoralist," the prototype of existentialist individualism, who is not only indifferent to politics but passionately anti-political. After all, is it not Nietzsche who announces the death of God; denounces all morality as herd-life, and equates social life with the suppression of nobility? According to this view, Nietzsche is the quintessential counter-cultural hero who transmits something that refuses to be codified, as Deleuze puts it: hence, the Übermensch represents an unbridled dionysianism. At the very least, Nietzsche is pictured as an uncompromising critic of tradition and authority and even as a Socratic advocate of philosophy over against custom (nomos).

However, at best, this is a fundamental confusion and, at worst, a complete misunderstanding of the essential paradox that defines Nietzsche's political thought: the paradox which, I have argued,

pervades Nietzsche's reconstruction of authority and morality. At the core of his philosophy stands this contradiction: to make morality, one must have the unconditional will to the contrary (G/TI, VII, 5). In contrast to the view of Nietzsche as an anti-political immoralist, my thesis argues that he envisions a conception of authority that unites nature (life, will to power) and culture (morality) or Dionysos and Apollo: what Nietzsche often calls comedy and tragedy. Nietzsche's central proposition, that to make morality one must have the extra-moral will to power, illustrates not only this unity as a paradox but also his fundamental commitment to morality.

Thus, while Nietzsche is better known perhaps for passages which appear to praise nature (the extra-moral), Dionysos and laughter at the expense of morality, his argument, when examined closely, never strays very far from the paradoxical relationship between nature and morality or laughter and tragedy. The following passages illustrate this clearly.

...whenever "the [moral] hero," appeared on the stage, something new was attained: the gruesome counterpart of laughter. . . . There is no denying that in the long run every one of these great teachers of a purpose was vanquished by laughter, reason, and nature: the short tragedy always gave way again and returned into the eternal comedy of existence. (FW/GS 1; Nietzsche's Emphasis)

Nietzsche's "dionysianism" seems to place him far beyond the constraints of morality, Apollonian seriousness and tragedy: "He who climbs upon the highest mountains laughs at all tragedies . . . " (Z,

I, 7).

Far from being paradoxical, it seems, from these passages, that Nietzsche is only too happy to submerge morality in laughter and the unconditional will to power. However, Nietzsche concludes this analysis of morality with his characteristic affirmation of the necessary unity of comedy and tragedy, and thus nature and morality. " 'Not only laughter and gay wisdom but the tragic, too, with all its sublime unreason, belongs among the means and necessities of the preservation of the species.'" (FW/GS 1) Through this paradoxical formulation, Nietzsche expresses his basic ethical and political proposition: morality is a part of and a means for advancing nature even while it contradicts and negates life. Nietzsche affirms the necessity and inseparability of both laughter and the gruesome counterpart of laughter: nature and morality. Moreover, he does not place these terms over against one another. Indeed, Nietzsche rejects "the whole pose of 'man against the world'" (Ibid. 346; Nietzsche's Emphasis) and insists upon the inherence of culture (morality) within nature (cf. Ibid. 109).

Hence, morality, the tragic counterpart of laughter, is a part of laughter itself and this paradox is best expressed in the following passage from Thus Spoke Zarathustra: "Spirit is the life that itself strikes into life." (Z, II, 8) Clearly, Nietzsche sees Apollo and Dionysos or morality and nature not as two distinct entities but the former as the self-limitation of the latter. This accounts for the obscure and contradictory pronouncements on morality within

Nietzsche's work. On the one hand, morality is "a piece of tyranny" (J/BGE 188) against nature, reason and laughter; and, on the other hand, this anti-naturalism is itself nature (cf. Loc. Cit.) and serves as a condition of life (FW/GS 1). In short, "it is nature against something that is also nature" (WM/WP 228).

Nietzsche is the great "immoralist" only in the following sense: that he proclaims the absoluteness of nature (the will to power, life, comedy, etc.). At the same time, it is all too often forgotten that he places morality within nature as its self-limitation--its self-overcoming! Nietzsche is so far from being an immoralist that his highest ideal, the mastery of the Übermensch, consists of the most severe self-limitation; but this mastery is a self-mastery of and by nature.

The implications of this conception of morality are radical. For it follows from this paradox that man does not pre-exist morality and then create it as his instrument of self-preservation. Man only comes into being through morality, which, in turn, is "created" by nature (the will to power). Morality is not the predicate of man or nature, for there is no subject or object in this paradigm of self-overcoming. The problem of morality is therefore the problem of man himself and, more than this, it is also the problem of nature itself. "To breed an animal with the right to make promises--is not this the paradoxical problem nature has set itself with regard to man?" (GM,II, 1) Thus when Nietzsche states that spirit is the life that itself strikes into life, he clearly intends to refer to man as the locus of this paradox

and contradiction. Man is a moral being because he is the self-mastery of the will to power.

Secondly, this paradoxical conception of nature and morality constitutes Nietzsche's essentially ethical/political mode of thought. His fundamental interest is to make morality through the self-mastery of the will to power. Furthermore, morality is the political phenomenon, for Nietzsche, because it is the originary constitution of man and social life together. Morality is therefore the primary social horizon, the very worldliness (exteriority) that constitutes man. As such a social/political horizon, morality addresses itself not to the individual but to the supra-individual: to peoples, races, classes, etc. (cf. J/BGE 188). "A people is a detour of nature to get to six or seven great men." (Ibid. 126) And this "detour of nature" which constitutes a people is morality itself. Spirit is then, as Nietzsche portrays it, the worldliness of morality/man, and as such is always objective spirit (ethos, exteriority).

Morality, at this most fundamental level, is a political phenomenon because it constitutes the life-world (the life-form as Strong calls it) of a people. And it is in this sense that morality and authority are bound together as objective spirit, as symbolized by "the camel." Jean Granier argues that three distinct levels can be identified in Nietzsche's use of the concept of "morality": vital morality (ethos), metaphysical Morality and master-morality.⁵

The first sense of morality is the most important for understanding Nietzsche's conception of authority. Vital or natural

morality is the originary worldliness, the life-world that is formed when an unhistorical horizon is drawn around man by forgetfulness: that is to say, by authority. Natural morality and authority are indistinguishable because it is authority that constitutes the unhistorical boundaries of tradition and religion (cf. A/AC 57) which delineate the horizon of morality. Tradition, myth and custom--i.e., the entire pre-philosophic world of poetry (nómos)--comprize the elements of the prepredicative horizon of the world.⁶

As early as The Use and Abuse of History, Nietzsche emphasizes the importance of the unhistorical (authority) to the preservation of man's life-world: morality. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, he symbolized this moral horizon, with its awe and reverence for tradition, as the camel-spirit. This pre-reflective ethical world, undisturbed by the questions of philosophy, is precisely the originary order (constitution/politeia) of myth and poetry that Socrates and Plato so ardently attacked. Like Aristotle, Nietzsche insists that morality is, first, the traditional way of acting (cf. M/D 9) and that authority (pre-conscious worldliness) is the necessary infrastructure not only for reason but also for human life as such. In this sense, Strong is entirely correct to employ Wittgenstein's concept of the "life-form" to illuminate Nietzsche's theory of morality. For only such terms as these can express the pre-reflective worldliness of Nietzsche's morality/authority that exceeds (or precedes) all distinctions between subject and object.

The camel-spirit represents "the awe of authority" (I/BGE 263)

that issues instinctively from traditional morality. The camel thus also symbolizes the pre-philosophic world of poetry, tradition and intuitive life: i.e., Aristotle's ethos, Burke's prejudice, and Hegel's objective spirit. At the same time, the spirit of the camel illustrates Nietzsche's rejection of the epistemological subject: i.e., the primacy and necessity of the unhistorical, an active forgetfulness or the pre-reflective thought. The modesty of consciousness lies in its contingency on pre-conscious functions of prejudice, illusion and the whole apparatus of authority. "And only on this now firm and granite basis of ignorance has knowledge hitherto been able to rise up, the will to knowledge on the basis of a far more powerful will, the will to non-knowledge, to the uncertain, to the untrue!" (Ibid. 24)

The very fact that Nietzsche places philosophy in a position of dependency on poetry and natural morality is a fundamentally political act in itself. For this primacy of the pre-reflective spirit leads to the following conclusion: "It has proven to be impossible to build a culture upon knowledge." (PT 73) From this fundamental imperative to build polity on the foundation of the authority of vital morality, Nietzsche presents the camel-spirit as the essential precondition of self-mastery and "perfection in the art of living" (cf. A/AC 57).

It is absolutely crucial to remember that, along with his rejection of rationalism and free will, Nietzsche is not calling for a conscious construction of authority--which would be a contradiction in terms. Authority "creates nothing new" (Loc. Cit.), it merely

summarizes, codifies and endows experience with power. Indeed, authority is the way of making a way of life unconscious and instinctual. "For one must not mistake the method involved here: a mere disciplining of thoughts and feelings is virtually nothing...: one, first has to convince the body." (G/TI, IX, 47) The spirit of the camel not merely advocates the primacy of the pre-reflective but embodies poetry and authority. As Plato recognized, albeit in a critical fashion, to base polity on the poetic nomos is to found spirit and polity on the authority of the Body: on the unity of nature and morality or Body and spirit.

Underlying Nietzsche's political thought is the assumption that the Body/Self (cf. Z, I, 4) is itself always a natural worldliness, and not an objective thing--the Body and its poetic eros is itself the will to mastery and self-overcoming. However, the paradox of Nietzsche's ethical/political thought manifests itself in an even higher and more intense contradiction. If Nietzsche places himself unconditionally on the side of poetry and against philosophy, then why does he advocate, through the lion-spirit, a critical, philosophic questioning of the unquestionable? If authority is essential to mastery and perfection in the art of living, then why is the overcoming of traditional morality made the precondition of master-morality? Most importantly, if knowledge can never provide the foundation of a culture, why then does Nietzsche give it so prominent a position in the development of the spirit?

The uprooting of authority by philosophy, its irreverence for the

traditional ways, and the dissolution of the unhistorical atmosphere that surrounds the moral horizon are necessary for one basic reason: the same life that needs the poetry of authority and forgetfulness also needs its destruction. While consciousness and knowledge cannot constitute the foundation of life, it must be recalled that spirit is the life that strikes into itself. Therefore, while life may enclose itself within the boundaries of authority, its vivacity constantly compels it to go beyond itself through self-overcoming, self-destruction and the disintegration of morality. Life in any true sense is impossible without authority and yet, at the same time, death, the wounding of life by itself (war), is equally necessary through the overcoming of authority.

The paradox that defines Nietzsche's political thought emphasizes not only the harmony of nature and morality but also their fundamental dissonance; indeed, life is this war (spirit) that rages in an harmonious dissonance between poetry (authority) and philosophy (critical reflection)! The lion-spirit represents not only the philosophic life but this war itself. The will to knowledge presupposes the pre-predicative world of the will to non-knowledge but, according to Nietzsche, the former serves life when it is not the antithesis but the refinement of the latter (J/BGE 24).

This refinement of the primordial will to appearance (non-knowledge) constitutes the essence of philosophy: philosophy is the mastery of the will to knowledge in order that it may serve life in building a grand culture. Philosophy in this context becomes not the

antithesis of poetry and authority but, through the lion-spirit, it becomes the enhancement of this primary, pre-philosophic world. The lion-spirit accomplishes this task by dissolving the unhistorical atmosphere of authority, not in order to absolutize knowledge and history, but to make possible the ascension to the "super-historical" viewpoint: i.e., master-morality! The will to knowledge thereby illuminates its own contingency by unveiling the presence of illusion and caprice in the most traditional and authoritative beliefs. It grasps both the illusory nature of authority and at the same time the necessity for both illusion and authority.

The significance of the lion-spirit, when viewed not as the antithesis but the refinement of authority, comes down to this: the best knowledge, la gaya scienza, does not oppose but continues and preserves the superficiality and exteriority of the life-world (vital morality)! The joyful wisdom of the lion is in love with error and the laughter of error (cf. J/BGE 24 & M/D 423) and wants to preserve the Apollonian dream and its earthly dance (cf. FW/GS 54) because it is in love with life (J/BGE 24).

In dissolving authority's unhistorical atmosphere, knowledge (1) advances the dialectic of spirit and life (morality and nature) by (2) undermining the conditions of true life through its attack on authority (i.e., its revelation of ignorance as the basis of knowledge and illusion as the ground of authority) and (3) thereby discloses the worldliness of the spirit (morality and man). The best knowledge (philosophy) unveils the poetic basis of life in authority: in this

descent of knowledge, the lion shatters the stability of the unhistorical in order to show the universality of forgetfulness--the super-historical nature of illusion, poetry and authority. Philosophy masters knowledge by coming to know its poetic foundation, its pre-reflective worldliness and its unity with the laughter of error (M/D 423).

The lion makes possible this ascent to the super-historical, by teaching knowledge to love ignorance, truth error and philosophy poetry (authority). The gay wisdom of the Übermensch (the child) recognizes blindness, injustice and untruth as a necessary condition of every deed (cf. U II/UAH, I)--as universal or super-historical. The child-spirit is therefore the reconciliation of philosophy with poetry (authority) and at the same time the renewal of morality through master-morality or polity through amor fati and the eternal return of the same.

Nietzsche tells us that the super-historical man is cured of taking history, the optimism of rationalism, too seriously and, more than this, he learns the answer to the question of how and why life should be lived (Loc. Cit.). The spirit of the child represents the coincidence of knowledge and affirmation: a knowledge that is at the same time an affirmation of life. Knowledge can affirm life only by ascending to the super-historical standpoint: i.e., by not only recognizing but also loving the necessity (the fatefulness) of what Burke calls "the coat of prejudice."

The lion recognizes the universality of the horizon of the

unhistorical (exteriority) but the child is cured of historical optimism by loving this fate. The child loves fate (amor fati) because, in the laughter of error, the world manifests its innocence and completeness in every single moment (U II/UAH, I). The highest knowledge implies affirmation because this enlightenment is fundamentally a physiological metamorphosis, the transfiguration of the will (eros) that defines mastery. The grand love that affirmation and the super-historical teach man is therefore amor fati, the love of fate, the Body/Self and the eternity of prejudice (the unhistorical). The child is the rebirth of the innocence of poetry, exteriority and authority through the rejuvenation of the Body (the pre-reflective worldliness). For amor fati is essentially the love of the laughter of error--of natural poetry. At the very conclusion of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche writes:

Now, sure of victory together, we celebrate the feast of feasts: friend Zarathustra has come, the guest of guests! Now the world is laughing, the dread curtain is rent, the wedding day has come for light and darkness... (I/BGE, "From High Mountains: Epode")

The child symbolizes the affirmative power of joyful wisdom because in amor fati, the Übermensch celebrates the perfection, innocence and completeness of life in its "negativity": prejudice, error, injustice, suffering, etc. In short, the affirmation celebrates "the wedding day" of opposites (light and darkness) not by abstract identification but the unity in contradiction: the

perfection and harmony of the eternal war of life striking into itself.

Authority resides in this wedding of nature and custom or life and spirit: Dionysos and Apollo! Just as the primacy of poetry is affirmed through philosophy, so authority is reborn through the lion in the child. In the super-historical perspective of authority, the spirit learns to affirm the eternal recurrence of suffering (negativity) as the manifestation of the perfection of life. Hence, Nietzsche calls Zarathustra the advocate of a new trinity: life, suffering, and the circle (cf. Z, III, 13). The threefold metamorphosis of the spirit (Body/Self) from the camel, to the lion and finally into the child represents Nietzsche's attempt to solve the problem of history through history itself (cf. U II/UAH, VIII). The necessity of the unhistorical, poetry or authority is grasped only through the mediation of philosophy's descent into the groundlessness of the life-world.

In the end, Nietzsche provides a phenomenology of natural morality (the life-world) as established through forgetfulness of authority (the unhistorical). Lived morality is preserved in the unhistorical but affirmed (master) morality is reborn through the philosophical ascension to the super-historical. The child gives birth to a unity of poetry and philosophy, tragedy and comedy, or custom and nature. Mastery is the culmination of the three stages of the spirit from the camel to the lion and finally into the child.

However, Nietzsche's conception of mastery has nothing to do with

the immoral and even anarchistic exercise of free will; on the contrary, it is bound together with fate (necessity) and self-affirmation. In fact, the three stages of the spirit correspond to the "Thou shalt" (camel), the "I will" (lion), and the "I am" of the child (cf. WM/WP 940). Nietzsche's physiology of virtue clearly comes into view in his identity of self-affirmation with fate: masterly certainty arises from the spontaneous, instinctive life of the Body/Self, the "I am."

With the ascension to the super-historical, man not only overcomes the optimism of history but he also sees the necessity of the extra-moral (negativity). Thus through amor fati, and especially the eternal recurrence of the same, the Übermensch recognizes completeness and innocence of the world in every moment: every moment is equal to another for it always remains the same (complete). Masterly certainty, affirmation and fate coincide in eternal recurrence and amor fati.

The evolution of the "Thou shalt" of the camel to the "I am" of the child is Nietzsche's reponse to Pindar's "how one becomes what one is." For Nietzsche, as always, there is the added paradox that to become what one is "presupposes that one does not have the remotest idea what one is" (EH, II, 9). The birth of the child is the becoming of oneself that eludes consciousness and free will. Hence, "towards every bringing forth we have essentially no other relationship than that of pregnancy and ought to blow to the winds all presumptuous talk of 'willing' and 'creating'" (M/D 552).

The grand politics of authority constitutes a radical physiology of morality in which Nietzsche formulates his alternative to the ethics of free-will. Authority appears as both the lived morality of the unhistorical and the master-morality of the super-historical. Masterly certainty can only be grounded above history and free will in the necessity and eternity of the "I am." What distinguishes nobility is not its actions, works or talents but its fundamental faith in itself; and this certainty is inseparable from necessity and hence from eternity (the super-historical). Through the spirit of the camel, authority creates a pre-reflective character (ethos), an instinct, which becomes a destiny (daimon) in the ascent to the love of fate. Authority binds mastery, fate and affirmation together in eternal return of the same: the fulfillment of the world in every moment. This affirmation of life as perfection and necessity in and through authority makes the "I am," the Body/Self, the physiological basis of virtue. The higher rationale of all morality is certainty of instinct and hence only the unconscious (ethos) is good.. The innocence and perfection of life is affirmed only in the masterly authority of amor fati and the eternal return of the same.

Hans Jonas has often reminded us that the opposition of nature and ethics is a modern distinction. And the questioning of this opposition reopens the ontological question of the place of human existence within nature. My contention is that Nietzsche's basic task is the attempt to remove ethics from the conscious ego and relocate it within the totality of nature (i.e., becoming/the will to power). And

in order to overcome the opposition between nature and ethics, he has to confront the separation of the "subjective" and the "objective." Nietzsche's adoption of Pindar's imperative, "become what you are", is realized through the rejection of both the epistemological subject (the "I think") and the moral subject (the "I will"). However, the "I am" is not merely the manifestation of a resort to a new subject, albeit an ontological one; the Body/Self is a rejection of the primacy of not only consciousness and teleology but especially of the predicative duality of subject and object. The primary "subjectivity" of the Body is prepredicative and is thus always immersed in the pure participation in the world.

Nietzsche's physiology of virtue should not be seen, therefore, in objectifying terms. The radical ontology of the will to power is founded in a pre-reflective and non-objectifiable realm. Hence, his constant repudiation of the opposition of self and fate (cf. S/WS 61; G/TI, VI, 8) or man and nature (cf. FW/GS 109, 346). Natural morality constitutes the pre-condition of mastery because only then does man act out of necessity, fate or the super-historical! And amor fati and the eternal recurrence of the same represent Nietzsche's attempt to relocate ethics within the totality of nature. For only in nature do innocence, fate and eternity (the super-historical) coincide in the fulfillment of the world in every moment.

Whereas for Plato, the ascent to the nature of things (the Idea) entails the forgetfulness of the body, Nietzsche identifies nature and the Body/Self as forgetfulness, and the latter as the precondition of

master-morality. The grand politics of authority is the realization of Nietzsche's attempt to overcome the divorce of nature and ethics through a natural morality embodied in the childspirit/Übermensch.

ENDNOTES

1. Karl Marx, Karl Marx, Early Writings, translated and edited by T.B. Bottomore (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p.24.
2. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, translated and edited by David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p.116.
3. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp.81ff.
4. Paul Ricoeur, Husserl, An Analysis of his Phenomenology, translated by Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), p.107.
5. Cf. Jean Granier, Op. Cit., pp.156-163.
6. Ibid., p.474.

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and Key to Abbreviations:

1. NIETZSCHE'S CITED WORKS WITH A KEY TO THE ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE DISSERTATION:

<u>Philosophy and Truth, Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the early 1870's</u>	PT
<u>Die Geburt der Tragödie/The Birth of Tragedy</u>	GT/BT
<u>Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen/Untimely Meditations (4 Volumes)</u>	U
<u>Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben/The Use and Abuse of History for Life</u>	UII/UAH
<u>Menschliches, Allzumenschliches/Human, All Too Human (2 Volumes)</u>	MA/H I
<u>Vermischte Meinungen und Sprüche/Mixed Opinions and Maxims</u>	MA/H II
<u>Der Wanderer und sein Schatten/The Wander and his Shadow</u>	S/WS
<u>Die Morgenröte/The Dawn</u>	M/D
<u>Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft/The Gay Science</u>	FW/GS
<u>Also Sprach Zarathustra/Thus Spoke Zarathustra</u>	Z
<u>Jenseits von Gut und Böse/Beyond Good and Evil</u>	J/BGE
<u>Zur Genealogie der Moral/The Genealogy of Morals</u>	GM
<u>Die Götzen-Dämmerung/The Twilight of the Idols</u>	G/TI
<u>Der Antichrist/The Antichrist</u>	A/AC
<u>Ecce Homo</u>	EH
<u>Der Wille zur Macht/The Will to Power</u>	WM/WP
<u>Homer's Contest</u>	HC
<u>On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense</u>	OTL

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