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The Dia-eclectics of European Security:
A Critical Evaluation of European Union Security Policy

by

Rodney D. Loeppky

A thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Political Science

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

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**THE DIA-ECLECTICS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY:
A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY POLICY**

submitted by

Rodney D. Loeppky, B.A. Hons.

in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts

Chair, Department of Political Science

Thesis Supervisor

Carleton University
May 16, 1995

ABSTRACT

The end of the Cold War has occasioned a critical rethinking of the concept of security. Security, conventionally preoccupied with military matters between states, is now being rethought in the context of a wider array of important issues. More than just an academic exercise, this rethinking has found its way into policymaking circles. Among these, the European Union (EU) has stated its intention to approach security with a broadened perspective -- one which addresses conventional, economic, and environmental concerns. However, this is no simple task. The 'Dia-eclectics of European Security' implies not only how new security issues emerge from prior contradictions within security policy, but also how they cannot be treated in a linear fashion. Environmental, economic and conventional security problems are dependent on a multitude of different factors and are interrelated in complex and difficult ways. Not surprisingly, with respect to the East Central European region, the EU's aim has been only partially realized. The EU's recent engagement of a conventionally-oriented Common Foreign and Security Policy, with its commitment to a narrow articulation of European identity, influences the way in which the Union approaches other security concerns. As a result, the Union's attachment to a 'neo-traditional' approach constricts its consideration of economic security to status-quo terms, while a consideration of environmental security remains non-existent.

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INTRODUCTION

Since the demise of 'superpower' politics, the topic of 'European security' has become a hotly contested issue. European Cold War security institutions have been subject to rearrangement while questions concerning the reasons for their existence have also been raised. Beyond this, the concept of security itself is also being reexamined. Traditional conceptions of security have tended to emphasize the importance of protection from territorial threats. In the case of the East-West European divide, the representation of 'threats' to European states was confined largely to the military realm because this was assumed to pose the greatest danger to the territorial integrity of these states.¹ Consequently, in order to ensure security in Europe, it was considered crucial to engage means that bolstered first the military, but also political, social and economic, strength of the state (or group of states), as a means to preserve territorial integrity.

The resulting policy is familiar to those who have considered the European security question in the past. Particularly in the case of the states that composed the European Community, security was conventionally interpreted primarily in terms of military strength, as a means to

¹. This issue of sovereignty is of course open to differing interpretations. Both in the case of Western and Eastern Europe, sovereignty was considered to be both maintained and intruded upon by the imposition of collective alliances.

bolster these states' capacity to remain independent of outside rule. This was reflected in EC states' determined commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as their acceptance of American military hegemony on the Western side of the continent. Only secondarily was security considered to include other elements such as inter-state cooperation, internal social cohesion, and economic well-being. Moreover, the relevance of these secondary elements was largely dependent on their capacity to strengthen EC states' capacity to 'resist' an 'imminent' Soviet threat.

Since the breakdown of bipolar politics, an important challenge posed to this conception of security has been the questioning of the *raison d'être* of Western security arrangements. In a relatively short time period, Western institutions have rushed to redefine, rearrange, and rejustify their existence with regard to European security. High profile organizations, including NATO, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the West European Union (WEU) and the European Union (EU), have been involved in this process.

This work focuses on the EU's involvement in the present controversies surrounding European security, particularly in the context of its relation with East

Central Europe (ECE).² The EU has considered the possibility of expanding the agenda of security. It has, to varying degrees, represented its own policy as espousing a 'new', broadened conception of security. Ostensibly, this approach embraces new issues such as human rights, economics, and environmental concerns. Especially within the context of its relations with the ECE region, the EU has recurrently mentioned the importance of such a broadened understanding.³

However, as a recent stream of security literature makes clear, a broader interpretation of security is not without problems. Security in the context of issues such as economics and the environment are less than easy to incorporate within security thinking.⁴ Nonetheless, such discussions also point to the potential usefulness of rethinking security. Particularly within the recently emerging stream of critical security analysis, security has been rendered meaningful in a variety of previously unimagined ways. This is attested to by security's new-

² . For the purposes of this work, East Central Europe includes the countries of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania.

³ . See, for example, "EP Resolution on developments in East-West relations in Europe and their impact on European security," (A3-0108/93), *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No C 176/185, 28 May 1993.

⁴ . See for instance Patricia M. Mische, "Ecological Security and the Need to Reconceptualize Sovereignty," *Alternatives* 14 (1989): 389-427; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs* 68, No.2 (1989): 162-177; Daniel Deudney, "Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 47, No.3 (1991): 22-28.

found association with issues such as human rights, gender, and the environment. Exemplifying such an approach, Simon Dalby states that

[the] social contexts of security discourse have changed in the aftermath of the cold war. The dilemmas of reformulating security suggests that it is time to seriously reconsider the whole concept, its rise to political prominence with the origin of the cold war, and the possibility of thinking about global politics in ways that are not reduced to the ethnocentrically limited discourses of (national) security. The possibilities for such a post-security security discourse may not be very bright as yet, but the effort to rethink this important theme in contemporary politics... is surely worth the effort.

In the case of the environment, a topic addressed within this work, persistent damage to ecosystems, resulting public health effects, and potentially disastrous economic consequences have reinforced the importance of reconceptualizing security. If security is understood to have as a goal the alleviation of risks to society's health or general well-being, then issues such as environmental degradation and climatic change are extremely important. With respect to Eastern Europe, extensive environmental dilemmas make the need for environmental security in the region particularly acute. Similarly, in terms of economic problems in ECE, the "adoption of monetarist policies or blind faith in the market" have also led to considerable

¹. Simon Dalby, "Security Dilemmas in the New World Disorder," Paper for the York University Centre for International and Strategic Studies Conference, January 1994, p.10

². *Ibid.*, p.82.

problems, including unemployment, increasing poverty, rising alcoholism, and decreasing social morale.

There is little doubt that critical approaches to security thinking have come far in questioning the grounds upon which security rests. However, along with this 'success', one finds an insufficient number of cases in which critical thinking is used to directly question security policy. There is a need for more critical security analysis which investigates and problematizes particular cases of security policy on an in-depth basis. Thus, by emphasizing the EU's security approach to the ECE region as a case study, this work fulfills a dual purpose. First, it supplements the rather 'lean' collection of applied work within critical security analysis. Second, and related to this, it shows that the reconsideration of 'security' is much more than just an academic exercise. It shows that in the case of the EU, a redefinition of security is actually taking place. Indeed, among international organizations, the EU demonstrates well that the theoretical rethinking of security has profound policy implications.

⁷. Examples of such works include David Campbell, *Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and Narratives of the Gulf War* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993); David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992); Bradley Klein, "How the West Was One: Representational Politics of NATO," *International Studies Quarterly* 34 (1990): 311-325; Simon Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics* (London: Pinter, 1990); Simon Dalby, "The 'Kiwi Disease': Geopolitical Discourse in Aotearoa/New Zealand and the South Pacific," *Political Geography* 12, No.5 (1993):437-456.

The central focus of this thesis is to problematize the EU's post-Cold War attempts to 'broaden' its security policy in the context of relations with the ECE region.⁶ Specifically, by examining the Union's engagement of conventional, economic, and environmental security, the paper presents a two-fold argument. On one level, it attempts to 'position' the EU's policy towards ECE with regard to its reconsideration of security. As such, the paper gauges the extent to which the Union's security policy reflects its own references to broadened security. By organizing the work into sections dealing with the Union's consideration of conventional, economic and environmental security, the EU is identified as having fully engaged the first, semi-engaged the second, and only nominally engaged the third. Thus, while the EU makes references to the importance of each of these issue-areas, the further one moves towards the latter category, the weaker the Union's policy tends to reflect these references.

On another level, the paper asserts that the EU's approach to conventional security issues is steeped in a politics of identity,⁷ characterized by specific

⁶. It is important to note, however, that the work is not intended as a meticulous historical account of EU-ECE relations through this time period. Rather, it is an attempt to ascertain what has been emphasized and what has been silenced in EU security policy vis-à-vis the ECE region. It should not be considered a chronological account of EU-ECE relations.

⁷. On this issue, see also David Long, "The Security Discourses Of The European Union: A Functional Critique," Paper presented at the Workshop on 'Functionalism and Conflict Management', Ottawa, March 1995.

representations of an East/West division, the relationship between individual and state, and the eternal and 'natural' character of a liberal/capitalist economic order. From this, it argues that the Union's shifting focus from conventional towards economic and, eventually, environmental issues, is progressively hindered by the influence of this particular articulation of EU identity. Consequently, as the EU seeks a broadened notion of its ECE security policy, the reproduction of conventional identity assumptions hampers its capacity to either fully engage economic security or take environmental security seriously at all.

Importantly, it is this progression from conventional, through economic and environmental security that motivates the title of this thesis: "The Dia-eclectics of Security." On one hand, it could be characterized as a 'dialectical' process, wherein each 'new' issue emerges from the problematic aspects of the issue considered before it. However, while this 'dialectic' serves to heighten awareness of contradictions between different perspectives, it fails to capture their multifaceted, interconnected character. Economic and environmental issues of security are part of a more complex problematique in the EU's approach to the ECE region. For instance, as problems of the environment make evident, multiple factors -- such as ecology, poverty, and

unemployment -- have an impact on each other in complicated and difficult ways.

The structure of this work's argument is divided into three chapters discussing the EU's consideration of conventional, economic and environmental security. The first chapter, centred on the EU's approach to conventional security in the ECE context, begins by reframing the conventional Cold War security debate. Here, it is suggested that within conventional conceptions of security, the maintenance of a threat-perception has played a crucial role. Moreover, such conceptions are based largely on assumptions concerning West European identity. These identities are expressed, on a political level, through the East/West division, the role of the state, and the Western 'way of life'.

In the post-Cold War period, EU security policy has endeavoured towards a new engagement of indigenous conventional security measures as a means to cope with the rapidly changing security needs of the ECE region. Thus, the chapter argues that despite the EU's consideration of security in terms of "ecological, social, democratic and economic spheres,"¹ its emphasis on a conventional approach serves to undermine its capacity to usefully consider such

¹ . EP Resolution on the outlook for a European Security policy: the significance of a European security policy and its institutional implications for the European Political Union," (A#-0107/91), *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No C 183/18, 15 July 1991.

issues. To demonstrate this, it turns to a discussion of the Union's newly evolving instrument of conventional security, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). By pointing out the CFSP's discursive and institutional dependence on 'traditional' security thinking, it is highlighted as a security arrangement that oversimplifies and limits the possibilities for addressing European security questions, and, consequently, has negative implications for notions of European identity.

While conventional issues of security are fully addressed through EU policy, the second chapter argues that an economic security approach to ECE has also been initiated. However, such an approach has been neither fully engaged nor adequately implemented. It asserts that the EU's consideration of economic security with respect to ECE extends only insofar as the economic status-quo will allow. Here, the EU's references to broadened security and its policy discourse (including practice) begin to diverge. While the Union has made some earnest attempts to consider economic questions as integral to its ECE approach, it has done so only on terms which intertwine with its politics of identity. The chapter begins by elaborating on the connections which the EU makes between its ECE security approach and economic issues. It then discusses the instruments chosen by the Union to address such questions,

including the PHARE assistance programme¹¹ and the 'Europe (Association) Agreements'. The chapter concludes that, in keeping with threat-based identity politics, both of these programmes emphasize ECE 'instability' and the need for 'efficiency', at the expense of other important economic questions, including poverty, the uneven impacts of rapid social change, and, leading into the third chapter, the structural effects of 'development'. Ultimately, EU policy exhibits a narrow conception of economic security, which largely excludes from discussion the disadvantageous effects of 'free market' development.

The third chapter discusses the EU's consideration of environmental issues in the ECE security context. It points out that any connection between environmental security and the EU's approach to ECE environmental problems is extremely weak or non-existent. It demonstrates how the possibilities for an environmental security approach are mired by the EU's emphasis on identity politics, particularly in the economic sphere. For this reason, the chapter differs from the first two in that it contains a descriptive section on the environmental problems in the ECE region. This description highlights the distance between the EU's approach to ECE environmental problems and the needs of the ECE region. As well, it underscores the gravity of problems which are faced

¹¹ . PHARE stands for Poland/Hungary Aid for Restructuring Economies.

within the ECE region, a difficulty not frequently alluded to in discussions about European security. Finally, the chapter offers a critique of the EU's approach, highlighting the problematic because of its reliance on market values in addressing environmental problems. As a result, the EU's approach does more to undermine, rather than contribute to, the idea of environmental security.

The work concludes with critical afterthoughts on how to 'position' the EU's security approach within the ECE context, as well as an evaluation of this approach. To accomplish the former, it relates the EU's consideration of conventional, economic, and environmental issues to more general categories in security thinking, including 'traditional', 'neo-traditional', and 'non-traditional' perspectives. Using these categories to 'position' the EU's approach as neo-traditional, the paper then turns to an evaluation of that approach. It argues that the EU's embrace of the neo-traditional perspective stems from a problematic commitment to a narrow articulation of its own identity. This, in turn, ensures that the Union's consideration of economic issues is only 'half-hearted', and that environmental issues are of only nominal importance.

An important epistemological note concerns the appearance of theoretical tensions throughout this work. It should be quite obvious that the work depends greatly on

some of the critical techniques found within the diverse approaches grouped together under so-called 'postmodernism'. It shares similarities with critical trends within postmodernism such as a distrust of 'modernity', an emphasis on 'text' as a part, or an indicator, of 'reality'; and an emphasis on uncovering silent power relations.¹² However, the work's reconceptualization of security also suggests that new categories, modes of thinking, and even realities will be accorded some privilege.¹³ Thus, this work also recognizes the importance of further subjecting these to critical analysis. Otherwise, its reconceptualization of European security runs the danger of creating fixed assumptions presumed to be immune to criticism. Accordingly, the work's problematization of 'security'

¹² . On these issues, see Pauline Marie Rosenau, *Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, and Intrusions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

¹³ . This tension between the critical tendencies of postmodernism and the requirements for political action is well captured by Linda Hutcheon. She rightly points out that any discussion concerned with political action must "...go beyond making ideology explicit and deconstructing it to argue a need to change that ideology... Postmodernism has not theorized agency; it has no strategies of resistance... it disperses but does not (re)construct the structures of subjectivity." See Linda Hutcheon, *The Politics of Postmodernism* (New York: Routledge, 1989) p.3.

intentionally engages this critical/constructive tension in order to emphasize security as a 'process' which leads neither to an 'end' nor a 'stable' conceptual framework.

CHAPTER 1

The EU and Conventional Security: finding problems for solutions

The community needs to be more aware than it is today of the problems of peace and security in a turbulent world.... The common foreign and security policy in itself will change nothing but it will provide a political framework in which we can define our common interests and defend them together. ...
... The strategic environment requires a new approach to security issues. ...
... In this new strategic environment the European Community has a special role to play... as an anchor of stability for the entire continent.¹

Throughout the Cold War, the EU was considered a crucial aspect of the European security 'framework'. As an important complement to NATO's strategy of 'containment', the EU encouraged increased economic cohesion between West European states in the face of a perceived 'Soviet threat'. However, since the demise of this bipolar order, the EU has initiated a process of rethinking both its role in, as well as its perception of, a changing European security context. Particularly in the case of its relations with East Central European (ECE) countries, the EU has expressed an interest in a broadened conception of security. Strangely, a major way in which these security considerations have been expressed is through the Union's stress on a 'common' approach, reflected in the adoption and development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP has

1 . Jacques Delors, "Questions Concerning European Security," Speech to IISS Conference, Brussels, September 1993.

been implemented as a way to reduce the "risks and uncertainties which could impair the territorial integrity and political independence of the Union and of its Member States, their democratic nature, their economic stability and the stability of the neighbouring regions."

This chapter highlights the accelerated adoption and development of the CFSP as an avenue through which the EU has embraced its own conventional security policy in its post-Cold War relations with the ECE region.² Moreover, by relating this approach to Cold War security conceptions, it points to some of the troubling effects of the CFSP, particularly its tendency to conceptualize EU security policy through narrow conceptions of European identity. Finally, the chapter asserts that the CFSP, and particularly the security mechanisms that have emerged from it, are not only largely irrelevant to the security needs of the ECE region, but that they also serve to undermine the EU's own advocacy of a broadened security conception.

As an important step not only for this chapter, but also the argument presented throughout this work, the first section examines the EU's advocacy of a broadened conception

2 . Commission of the European Communities, *XXVIIth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities 1993* (Brussels: European Commission, 1994) 328.

3 . This is not to assert that the CFSP is used strictly for questions concerning the ECE region. It is rather to say that in the EU's approach to ECE, the CFSP has been considered a major vehicle for considering security problems.

of security in the ECE regional context. Next, following a general discussion of Cold War security conceptions in the West European context, it argues that the CFSP rehearses much of the traditional thinking on security with respect to ECE. Related to this, it further argues that the CFSP's representation of security -- which places a discursive emphasis on threat-perceptions -- oversimplifies and limits the possibilities for addressing European security questions, and, consequently, has negative implications for notions of identity within the EU. Finally, the chapter goes on to explore the problematic security mechanisms that have emerged from the EU's conventional approach, pointing to their inability to address either the EU's own broadened security agenda or the complex security problems experienced by the ECE region.

The EU: Broadening Security

The EU has been a major part of the debates concerning European security since the upheavals of 1989. Much of this activity has centred around discussions of how the future European security 'architecture' will unfold.⁴ Beyond this debate, however, the Union has begun a process in which the understanding of security itself is being rethought. Indeed, there have been ample references within the EU to a

4 . See for instance, László Valki, "A Future Security Architecture for Europe?" *European Security* 2, No.4 (1993): 502-544.

conception of security that stretches beyond the military realm. Concerning questions of security in the ECE region, EU institutions have emphasized a wider variety of issues than in the Cold War. For instance, in 1991, the European Parliament (EP), stressed that it was

[c]onvinced that the military strategies and structures currently in force must be completely reformulated in the light of the collapse of the East-West divide and the new threats stemming from serious imbalances and injustices in the ecological, social, democratic and economic spheres...⁵

In 1993, the EP spelled out these 'threats' even more explicitly by stating that it

[c]onsiders the increasing tendency of armed forces and weapons systems to be beyond political control, the breaking up of nations, border conflicts and the ethnic or national tensions and conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe, the social and economic disparity between East and West, impending environmental disasters or those which have already occurred, in particular those caused by past malpractice, for example in the field of nuclear safety, and the continuing effects of the dissolution of the former area of Soviet influence to be the most serious threats to security in East-West relations in Europe.⁶

This new sense of what security entails, however, is not held exclusively by the parliament. Jacques Delors, former President of the EU Commission, has also elucidated on a contemporary perspective on security.

Although the threat of a massive military attack for the [E]ast has disappeared, new risks and uncertainties have emerged. Specialists in geopolitics are agreed that anything could happen in the present situation for the best or the worst. Actual and potential instability in

5 . "EP Resolution on the outlook for a European security policy: the significance of a European security policy and its institutional implications for the European Political Union" (A3-0107/91), *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No C 183/18, 15 July, 1991.

6 . "EP Resolution on developments in East-West relations in Europe and their impact on European security" (A3-0108/93), *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No C 176/185, 28 May, 1993.

Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union [and] in Central and Eastern Europe... is one cause for concern. Similarly, the dangers presented by the spread of weapons of mass destruction, extreme nationalism, religious fundamentalism and terrorism must be taken into account. Massive, uncontrolled migration, transnational environmental issues and the risks of economic destabilization could also threaten security.⁷

Whether all of these (often undefined) issues constitute an actual 'threat' is certainly debatable. Nonetheless, it is crucial to recognise the consistent emphasis on a wider array of issues, portending a much broader conception of EU security policy.⁸

This rethinking of security has also found resonance within ECE states. Considering the vast array of challenges faced by this region, it is hardly surprising that ECE states advocate notions of security that are more fitting to their own contemporary situation. For example, in April of 1991, the Czechoslovakian government issued a 'Memorandum on European Security'. This memorandum asserts security in

7 . Delors, *op.cit.*, note 1.

8 . The fact that these considerations are documented more closely by institutions that carry less 'weight' in EU decisions, is not a good indicator of how well they reflect much of the general thinking on 'security'. More typically, especially on matters related to foreign policy, both the EP and the Commission attempt to make their views seem as amenable to Member State positions as possible. This is one way in which these institutions promote themselves as 'non-threatening' and 'worthy' of increased powers. Moreover, there is effective consultation between these institutions concerning matters of security policy. Neill Nugent makes the point that in EU cooperation on matters of foreign policy, "Ministers from the Presidency usually attend the EP committees that deal with their spheres of responsibility at least twice during their country's Presidency... Ministers from the Presidency also regularly attend EP plenary sessions and participate in important debates. And the EP can, through the Presidency, ask questions of the Council and the Council of Foreign Ministers..." See Neil Nugent, *The Government And Politics Of The European Community*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan Press, 1991) 141.

Europe to be "indivisible" and that the greatest risks with respect to security "stem especially from the different levels of social and economic development of European countries and also from revealed nationalistic problems." Moreover, while stating that a risk to the young democracies are a 'threat' to the whole of Europe, the document also contends that the critical European security problems of the future are those "of migrations, national minorities, ecology, energy, and others."⁹ Most East European states have, since 1989, sought to ensure that their security is understood in terms that emphasize a broadened agenda.

From a critical viewpoint, there seems little doubt that for security to mean anything in the context of the ECE region, it should transcend conventional thinking. If security is to stress the importance of the individual, as one recent European security forum has clearly suggested,¹¹ then the necessity of reexamining the problems with conventional security thinking becomes clear. As Dalby points out emphatically, Ken Booth's understanding of security as 'emancipation' has only been partially achieved

9 . "Text of Memorandum on European Security," (Prague CTK in English), *FBIS-EEU-91-069*, 10 April 1991, pp.8-9.

10 . *Ibid.*

11 . "Paris Forum on European Security Reported," (Moscow KRASNAYA SVEZDA in Russian) *FBIS-SOV-91-074*, 17 April 1991, pp.2-3. This conference, attended by over 2000 security 'experts' as well as numerous influential policymakers, stated clearly that security needs to address numerous issues including "economic, cultural, diplomatic, scientific research, and other elements..."

in the context of ECE.¹² While these populations may have gained political liberty, "[to] be able to enjoy the benefits... one also needs the economic wherewithal to make the liberty meaningful."¹³ Moreover, "there remains the necessity of reorganizing society to ease the burden of human activities on the natural environment."¹⁴ The continuing existence of these problems points to an insecurity across the European continent, which is particularly acute within the ECE region.

Additionally, attempts to address European security also inevitably point to the importance of successfully engendering 'democracy' in Eastern Europe. Whatever 'democracy' may ultimately amount to, it undoubtedly is dependent on the ways in which the various crucial problems mentioned above are approached.

In so far as these societies succeed with policies to alleviate environmental degradation, maintain nonprovocative military force postures, deal with ethnic tension and migration issues and seek political rather than military solutions to disputes, they will point to the possibilities of a less violence-prone, more 'secure' future for all of humanity.¹⁵

Thus, the EU has recognized (although not necessarily in policy terms) that its security approach to ECE cannot and should not be separated from a wider consideration of the

12 . Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation," *Review of International Studies* 17 (1991): 313-326.

13 . Simon Dalby, "Post-Cold War security in the new Europe," in John O'Loughlin and Herman van der Wusten (eds.), *The New Political Geography Of Eastern Europe* (London: Belhaven, 1993) 71-88.

14 . *Ibid.*

15 . *Ibid.*

region's political, social, economic, and environmental challenges. Such a separation would only serve an artificial image of security, exacerbating more problems that it solves.

The CFSP and Cold War Security

Of course, the EU's consideration of broadened security does not, in itself, amount to a security policy. Instead, the Union has engaged, in varying degrees, different policy commitments for different security issues. A major way in which ECE security questions have been approached is through the CFSP. While this policy was initiated well before the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe, its adoption has been markedly accelerated as a means through which security questions in ECE are to be addressed. Importantly, the conventional character of this policy is considered as a major 'broadening' of the EU's security outlook -- a prospect with meaningful ramifications for how European security is perceived in relation to the ECE region.

There is little doubt that much of the discussion surrounding the EU's involvement in the European security debate centres on its capacity to make a unique and useful contribution to Europe's security. Particularly in the case of Eastern Europe, it is regularly stressed that "the political developments in Central and Eastern Europe have further confirmed the need for the Community to devise and

implement a common foreign and security policy."¹⁶

Consequently, it is useful to compare the security conception reflected in the CFSP to those found within the Cold War context. Such a comparison is helpful in ascertaining how much EU thinking on 'security' has changed through the inception of the CFSP.

Security and the Cold War Context

In the aftermath of the Cold War, there has been an increasing willingness among writers to state that the success of post-WWII West European institutions was aided, in large part, by the stability of the bipolar order. However, while making such admissions, such arguments also assert that

[t]hroughout the Cold War years, the European Community paid almost no attention to its eastern neighbours... The Soviet bloc was primarily viewed as a military problem, and was thus a NATO rather than an EC matter. EC policy was developed without any reference to [E]astern Europe and the USSR.¹⁷

Analysis of this type turns a blind eye to the more extensive relationship between the EC and NATO following WWII. Indeed, a more convincing argument asserts that it was only under the threat perception from the East that West European states were sufficiently motivated to combine their

16 . "EP Resolution on the intergovernmental conference on a common foreign and security policy" (B-3-1703/91), *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No C 305/98, 25 November 1991.

17 . Giles Merrit, "The European Community in the 21st Century: Why an EC Security Policy is the Surest Route to European Union," eds. Roger Morgan et.al., *New Diplomacy In The Post-Cold War World: Essays for Susan Strange* (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc, 1993) 282-289.

interests within these institutions in the first place. In this sense, organizations such as NATO, the WEU, and the EC required the prospect of an external aggressor to bolster their internal coherence, relative effectiveness, and public support.

The emergence of the Cold War and a strong external threat constituted an essential impetus to the creation of new cooperative international structures in the West. Formerly hostile nations were compelled to mend their fences and to cooperate in the creation of a stable international order.¹⁸

The very idea of 'containment', as conceived by George Kennan, was based on this notion. Containment, with its intention of creating 'natural forces of resistance' to the perceived Soviet threat, regarded both socio-economic and psychological factors as crucial to its own success.¹⁹ As such, Kennan advocated political, military, and especially economic cohesion among West European states, because "together the states of that region could better withstand Soviet pressure than if they acted separately..."

Thus, although the EC's immediate tasks involved economic security, they could only be conceived within a reciprocal relationship with military security. The fact that European cohesion was considered crucial for security but was also dependent on the expression of a threat,

18 . Joachim Krause and Peter Schmidt, "The Evolving New European Architecture--Concepts, Problems, and Pitfalls, *The Washington Quarterly* 13, No.3 (1990): 82.

19 . John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1982) 37.

20 . *Ibid.*, p.38.

implies that EC's approach to security during the Cold War period cannot be disassociated from that taken by NATO. NATO became the dominant organization through which threat perceptions of Soviet military capacities were expressed. To be sure, some uniquely 'European' approaches to security did emerge during the Cold War, the most prominent of which included West Germany's policy of *Ostpolitik* and France's separation from NATO's integrated military command structure. However, the acceptance of these policies resulted largely from their relatively compatible coexistence with NATO security perspectives.

According to Bradley Klein, NATO's successful dominance of security interpretations for Europe during this period is less a result of its actual military posturing towards the Soviet Union than of its capacity to bind diverse Member-states together under a common cause.²¹ He identifies two ways in which this bond was created between Member-states.

First, NATO presented an exaggerated picture of the Soviet 'threat', whereby "strategic analysis recurrently privileged claims about intentions over actual operational

21 . It should be noted that, at times, even the Soviet 'threat' did not ensure Alliance cohesion. See, for instance, the controversies surrounding the placement of nuclear missiles on European soil: Bernard Rogers, "The Atlantic Alliance: Prescriptions for a Difficult Decade," *Foreign Affairs* 60, N.5 (1982): 1145-1156; Steven Canby and Ingemar Dörfer, "More Troops, Fewer Missiles," *Foreign Policy* 53 (1982): 3-17; McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, Gerard Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs* 60, N.4 (1982): 753-768; Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes, Franz-Josef Schulze, "Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace," *Foreign Affairs* 60, N.5 (1982): 1157-1170.

capabilities... [through]... discursively constructed claims about the nature of the Soviet totalitarian state and about its implacable global purposes."²² Here, the prospect of threat became the means through which unity among Member-states was garnered.

[I]nvocations of "the bomber gap," "the missile gap," "the INF-gap," and "the window of vulnerability" derived their value as significations of imminent danger only by drawing upon salient claims, sometimes explicated but, often allowed to reside in a tacit subtext about the alien-ness and "other-ness" of Soviet political culture. ...Even if the imputation was within the realm of possibility, let alone the question of plausibility, the mere reference to the question of "what would happen if...?" granted credibility to invocation of a threat.²³

NATO's credibility was, however, in no way guaranteed through the simple invocation of a Soviet 'threat'. Such invocations could not, in themselves, justify the logic of deterrence -- particularly the insecurity element inherent in its 'rational-technical' consideration of mutual annihilation. As a way to ensure its own credibility then, Klein maintains that NATO,

[by] effectively wedding itself to the defense of a distinctly modern, Western, Atlantico-centric cultural project, ...deflected criticism of the Alliance's otherwise obvious contradictions.²⁴

In this sense, NATO was not so much appreciated for its military role (indeed, this often aroused great controversy), but rather for the political ends to which that role was tied. The Alliance was not only represented

22 . Bradley Klein, "How the West Was One: Representational Politics of NATO," *International Studies Quarterly* 34, No.3 (1990): 313.

23 . *Ibid.*

24 . *Ibid.*

as securing its members against a Soviet threat, but also as having something to secure, namely "that precarious historical construct called the Western way of life."²⁵

Consequently, the 'cohesion' fostered between West European states through the EC must be considered to be an integral part of this threat-oriented security approach. Throughout the Cold War period, the political, social and economic ties developed by the European Community provided the Alliance with a major part of the modern Western project referred to by Klein. In turn, the representational practices of the Atlantic Alliance supplied the EC with the political goals necessary to bolster the process of integration. Security, as conceived through this threat-discourse, was integral to the internal cohesion of the EC and its members. This cohesion was reflected in the unprecedented cooperation between European states in events such as the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952, the signing of the Treaties of Rome in 1957, EC expansion in 1973 and 1986, the establishment of Common policies on Agriculture and Fisheries, the setting up of a European Monetary System (EMS), and the creation of the Single European Act (SEA) in

25 . *Ibid.*

1987 which sought to remove all internal trade barriers by 1992.²⁶

As testimony to NATO's successful linkage to the EC's economic goals, the French supported 'Pleven Plan' offers a useful contrast in that it failed to represent itself as a protector of a West European 'way of life'. The plan's suggestion to create a European Defence Community (EDC), from which the idea of a European Political Community (EPC) was conceived, failed miserably with a negative vote in the French National Assembly in 1954. In contrast to the image of NATO, the proposal for the EDC (upon which EPC's success was deemed crucial) was seen more as a way to assuage French concerns over a recidivist German military.²⁷ Unable to evoke the same sense of immediate concern among West European countries with respect to a Soviet threat, the proposal was evaluated for its reflection of inter-European disagreement, rather than its capacity to increase security among West Europeans.

The connection drawn here between NATO, the EC and West European security conceptions is not intended to suggest that Soviet political and military activities were fabricated. Rather, it suggests that 'security' conceptions during Cold War era involved particular representational

26 . For historical surveys of the EC's evolution, see Neil Nugent, *op.cit.*, note 8; Derek Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A History of European Integration Since 1945* (London: Longman, 1991).

27 . Urwin, *op.cit.*, note 26, pp.60-68.

practices that were more than simple references to external challenges. Instead, these practices asserted the need for a concerted defence against aggressive, external 'others', ensuring the continuation of an internal identity -- an identity bolstered by cooperative and integrative organizations like the EC.

In this sense, the EC's conception of security in the Cold War context can be read as a strategy of identity-creation and reification. EC security was largely understood in negative terms -- that is, as a kind of protection from an externally originating 'threat'. This conception carried with it an inherent understanding of self that is based on dichotomies of inside/outside, 'us'/'them', and, ultimately, identity/difference.²⁸

This understanding of how and why threats are constituted is examined by David Campbell, who suggests that states, in pursuing security, are doing no less than pursuing the conditions necessary for their own existence. Following Campbell's argument, states have no *a priori* sense of identity -- commonly attributed to the 'nation' -- before the establishment of the state.²⁹ Thus, states are

28 . William Connolly, *Identity/Difference: democratic negotiations of political paradox* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992).

29 . To this, he cites the recent sociological literature of Benedict Anderson and Charles Tilly concerning the construction of the concept of 'nation' within nation-states. See Campbell, *op.cit.*, note 28, p.11; see also Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the*

constantly engaged in a reproduction of national identity because they "have no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality..." Security becomes a principle mechanism through which this reproduction takes place, reflected in the articulation of a 'danger discourse'.³¹ Klein's argument concerning NATO during the Cold War fits well as a reproduction of Campbell's topic writ large. Similarly, ensuring EC 'security' meant drawing stark differentiations between West and East European societies. The security goals of EC states converged with those of NATO to ensure the 'survival' of the West European lifestyle from imminent danger in the East.

In addition to these 'horizontal differentiations', Campbell sheds further light on Klein's argument by pointing to 'vertical' moral distinctions.³² These distinctions inscribe identity not only through spatial separations, but also through value judgments upon the spatial 'other'.

Origin and Spread of Nationalism, revised edition (New York: Verso, 1991); Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organised Crime," eds. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, *Bringing The State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 169-191.

30 . Campbell, *op.cit.*, note 28., p.11.

31 . Connolly, *op.cit.*, note 28., p.206; Campbell clearly draws on the thinking of Connolly in his conception of how foreign policy creates the conditions for national identity. Connolly's own argument is additionally interesting in that it asserts that the territorial state, with a decreasing ability to effect any change globally, intensifies its search to single out and punish internal others (who are supposedly responsible for its downfall) in order to further justify its own existence.

32 . Campbell, *op.cit.*, note 28, ch.4.

These judgments are then deployed in oppositions such as superior/inferior, good/bad, civilized/barbarian, in which each differentiation is accorded a certain moral weight and affects our identity through negation of the 'other'.

For Campbell, the Cold War produced identity differentiations that were powerful in their appropriation of moral superiority. Along with Klein, he sees the use of the 'body trope' as a potent employment of these differentiations. Drawing again on George Kennan, discourse concerning European 'security' isolates an 'ill' by first describing the healthy model of the West:

This is the significance of the [European Recovery Program], the idea of European Union, and cultivation of a closer association with the U.K. and Canada. For a truly stable world order can proceed, within our lifetime, only from the older, mellowed and more advanced nations of the world--nations for which the concept of order, as opposed to power, has value and meaning.³³

Given this depiction of Western states, the danger is then spelled out in medical terms:

Much depends on health and vigor of our own societ[ies]. World communism is like a malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue.³⁴

Such connections between medical and strategic discourse represents danger through divisions between health/disease, normal/pathological, and other divisions highlighting the

33 . Klein, *op.cit.*, note 22, pp.314-315; the quotation is taken from George Kennan, "PPS--Review of Current Trends: US Foreign Policy, February 24," eds. T.H. Etzold and J.L.Gaddis, *Containment* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978).

34 . *Ibid.*, p.315; taken from Kennan, "Moscow Embassy Telegram #511: 'The Long Telegram', February 22," in Etzold and Gaddis, *op.cit.*, note 11, p.315.

illness metaphor. In this way, the EC's role in security was represented as a kind of stalwart against the 'unhealthy' and 'malignant' tendencies of Eastern aggressors. In this sense, the approach to security within the EC/NATO relationship could be likened to an "'ethical power of segregation', whereby moral distinctions can be made through spatial and temporal delineations, such that a 'geography of evil' is constituted, so that dangers can be calculated as originating from distinct and distant places."

CFSP: A New Conception?

The stability of this identity-based conception of security within Western Europe was put in question as Cold War regimes in Eastern Europe began to unravel. The discursive strategy of presenting the East as a threat suddenly appeared increasingly untenable. Moreover, as a parallel interrogation of NATO's *raison d'être* came about, serious challenges were posed to the political face of Western Europe."

The most obvious of these challenges has been the emerging questions concerning West European identity. With the East-West lines of 'us'/'them' ostensibly lifted, "[i]t is no longer clear who is to be legitimately incorporated

35 . *Ibid.*, p.99.

36 . This is not to assert that NATO's demise is necessarily imminent, but that its main purpose--that of 'security' against the Soviet Union--became inadequate as a basis for West European self-identification.

within the space of modern Western culture."³⁷ Accordingly, in terms of both its 'security' and the concomitant reproduction of its West European political identity, the EU's connection to the Atlantic Alliance has, arguably, decreased. The EU has also found itself in an unfamiliar situation, wherein the basis for delineating its own post-Cold War identity is still largely unexplored.

This 'identity crisis' has been crucial in motivating the EU to accelerate its long-delayed project of political union. Incorporated within the 'Maastricht Treaty', the project conceives of a 'European Union', made up of three 'pillars': provisions amending the EEC (including Economic and Monetary Union, citizenship, and institutions), provisions on cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs, and provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Additionally, a Social Charter has been established among the Member States (with the exception of the United Kingdom).³⁸ While space limitations within this work only allow for a discussion of the CFSP, it is crucial to recognize the EU's inclusion of the CFSP as an important

37 . Klein, *op.cit.*, note 22, p.321.

38 . Finn Laursen, *From the Single European Act (SEA) to the Maastricht Treaty: Explaining Recent Developments in European Integration* (Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration, 1992).

aspect of its overall project to redefine a European political identity.³⁹

The CFSP was conceived solely for the purpose of addressing post-Cold War security questions. Indeed, some analysts make the claim that "[t]he doctrine that the [EC] is a purely economic organisation has for the past decade been no more than a vertige left from the Community's early years."⁴⁰ The Single European Act had already initiated the CFSP in 1987 by stating that

[t]he High Contracting Parties consider that closer cooperation on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external matters.⁴¹

This amounted to a recodification of European Political Cooperation (EPC), an intergovernmental consultation and cooperation structure first codified at the Copenhagen Summit of 1973. The difference after 1990, however, is the sense of urgency with which the EU began to seek out a defined security approach by rapidly accelerating the development of the CFSP -- a policy which involves primarily the EU's military and political thinking in a post-Cold War context.

39 . Simon Lunn, "A reassessment of European security," eds. Manfred Wörner, et.al., *What is European Security after the Cold War?* (London: The Philip Morris Institute, 1993) 64.

40 . Merrit, *op.cit.*, note 17, p.285.

41 . Bulletin of the European Communities, *Single European Act*, Supplement 2/86 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1986), Title III, Art.30, 6(a).

The development of the CFSP received its first strong support at the Dublin European Council meeting in 1990, where it was decided that an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on Political Union would be held parallel to that for Economic and Monetary Union. The political value of the CFSP's inclusion within the movement for Union then became clear in the Franco-German Initiative of October 1991. It stated that

...it is important that the Europeans should clearly show, by practical decisions and institutional measures, that they want to take a greater responsibility in the security and defence spheres.⁴²

Consequently, the 'Maastricht Treaty', signed in December 1991, reflected the first serious attempt to 'write' a CFSP. From the outset, the treaty connects aspects of EU identity to the augmentation of the CFSP. The document's text indicates that with a view to "safeguard[ing] the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union," the members agree to a

...common foreign and security policy [that] shall include all questions related to the security of the European Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.⁴³

Thus, the new emphasis on an EU identity has been an integral part of, and reason for, the CFSP's rapid development. In this sense, the EU has adopted the CFSP as

42 . "Test of Franco-German European Security Proposals" (Paris LE MONDE in French), FBIS-NEU-91-202, 18 October, 1991, p.21.

43 . European Council., 'Treaty on European Union', Maastricht, December 1991, Title V, Article J1(2), Article J4 (1).

a means to protect and reproduce West European identity in a manner which is similar to that during the Cold War. This similarity becomes even more striking when one considers the threat-discourse around which the policy is grounded.

The representation of threats has been an important aspect of entrenching a new political identity within the EU. The Union has been actively reassessing what it constitutes as a security threat, a process visible in debate surrounding its contemporary approach to Central and Eastern Europe.

[The] new security situation in Europe resulting from the moves toward democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, the end of the division of Europe into two opposed military alliances and significant steps taken toward arms control and disarmament calls for a revision for [sic] traditional pattern of threat assessment."

Not surprisingly, the expression of this reconsidered threat-discourse is especially frequent in relation to the CFSP. When asked whether Europe is a secure area, Willem van Eekelen, Secretary General of the WEU (an important actor in the shaping of the CFSP), replies negatively.

It is true that the threat posed by the Soviet Union is no longer very likely. In that respect, we are more secure than we were; but, on the other hand, the danger of war is much greater now in Central and Eastern Europe."

Here, the conception of a general threat of war is evoked in the East as a means to ensure that the act of 'securing' is

44 . "EP Resolution on the creation of an Institute of European Security" (A3-0239/91), *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No C 305/95, 24 October, 1991.

45 . "Secretary General views Future of WEU," (Madrid ABC in Spanish), *FBIS-WEU-91-246*, 23 December, 1991, p.3.

still absolutely necessary. This position reflects the dominant perception within the discourse surrounding the framework of the CFSP. It highlights especially the widespread practice of associating threats to European security through the spectre of 'instability'.

In this way, the fear of instability becomes a key part of the EU's threat discourse with respect to East Central Europe, a process achieved through stark contrasts between the condition of Eastern and West European societies. While the latter is viewed as a centripetal force of stability and cohesion, the former is recurrently differentiated as a region that "will remain [in] a crisis... for the next twenty years."⁴⁶ Addressing the question of Eastern Europe, Jacques Delors gives dire warning in 1991 that

[a]ll around us, naked ambition, lust for power, national uprisings and underdevelopment are combining to create potentially dangerous situations, containing the seeds of destabilization and conflict... .⁴⁷

Through this threat perception, security is depicted both spatially and negatively -- i.e. as process of resistance to events stemming from dangerous external factors.

Importantly, Campbell's notion of a body trope is alive and well in Delors' text. Dangers to the EU are considered in a sexual manner, described in terms of 'nakedness', 'lust',

46 . "Defense Minister Fasslabend on European Security" (Vienna Kurier in German), Interview by Hans Rauscher, *FBIS-WEU-93-001*, 4 January, 1993, p.1.

47 . Jacques Delors, "European Integration and Security," Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture given to IISS (London: 7 March, 1991).

and the contaminating 'seeds' of the East. Through an implicit contrast, this external threat from the East is tied integrally to the EU's Western identity. By positing this threat as clearly antithetical to its interests, the EU reestablishes itself as an example of stability and cohesion *vis-à-vis* the East.⁴⁸

Considering the 'new approach' to security issues outlined by Delors at the outset of this chapter, it is difficult to discern a fundamental shift within the CFSP away from the conventional security assumptions of the Cold War. Security issues may be broadened to include new topics, but the way in which they are represented remains remarkably similar to Cold War threat-discourse. Indeed, the analyses of Klein and Campbell on security discourse seems to have increased relevance in a present-day context. The struggle of the EU to create a political identity, a goal it links explicitly to CFSP, highlights the connection between defining security and defining the self. Along the way, however, it remains to be seen how, or whether, such a conception of security in the EU enhances security for either the EU or ECE region in any meaningful way.

48 . It is important to note here that in the case of the Višegrad countries, a strange tension is exhibited in how this threat perception is represented. On the one hand, instability is most obviously played up within the mechanisms of the CFSP as a crucial aspect of its security mandate. On the other hand, these states are also hailed as the first most likely to be prepared to join the EU. In other words, there is a push and pull element as to where these states fit into the identity aspects of EU security policy.

EU Security and Identity

The reproduction of conventional security assumptions within the CFSP has particular effects on the EU's conception of security and on notions of identity within its borders. First, the invocation of a threat-discourse has a tendency to reduce ECE's complex and varied difficulties to a simplified terminology. Addressing this linguistic problem, Heinrich Vogel has suggested with respect to Eastern Europe that "language matters."⁴⁹ Terms such as 'instability' or 'chaos' serve as

...a category for some of the worst cases in the decay of post-Soviet states, as a spectre of calamities. As an argument in current politics, it helps to raise levels of adrenaline by conjuring up the fear of something that will be happening... The proposed remedies are help from outside (the Western view) or a new regime of law and order... .⁵⁰

By using these general terms with respect to the ECE region, the CFSP's security analysis is reduced to the prospect of 'combating' simplified, yet 'serious' problems. Texts associated to CFSP regularly explicate ECE security issues through a reductive reference to 'instability'. For example, statements made by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, prior to the opening conference on the "Pact for Security and Stability in Europe" (the first policy initiative of the CFSP), express the view that the end of the Cold War did not bring the "hoped for stability in the

49 . Heinrich Vogel, "Transformation in the East: the gurus and the mantras," *The World Today* 49, No.4 (1993): 73-76.

50 . *Ibid.*, p.74.

states of Central and Eastern Europe... but rather new problems."⁵¹ On the same occasion, French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur claimed that Eastern Europe is witness to "a range of complexities," that are presently manageable. He then posits the question as to "what will happen tomorrow if this situation is threatened by an economic or social crisis?"⁵² This is a powerful textual tool. Such allusions to the general dilemma of instability are used to justify the existence of a CFSP, but have little informative value; instead they serve to conjure up anxiety concerning the 'situation in the East'.

As a result, the CFSP's treatment of security questions in the ECE region is generalized in such a way that their contextualization is of secondary importance. For example, CFSP discourse consistently makes references to 'new' problems, such as those connected with minorities, borders, the environment, and socio-economic 'transition', with little explication as to what these concepts really mean when they are associated to security.⁵³ These

51 . "Eklärung von Bundesaußenminister Klaus Kinkel anlässlich der Eröffnungskonferenz zum 'Pact für Sicherheit and Stabilität in Europa, am 26. Mai 1994 in Paris," *Europa Archiv* 49, N.13-14 (1994): D402-D403. All quotations taken from texts in German have been translated by the author.

52 . "Rede des französischen Premierministers, Edouard Balladur, anlässlich der Eröffnungskonferenz zum "Pact für Sicherheit and Stabilität in Europa, am 26. Mai 1994 in Paris," *Europa Archiv* 49, N.13-14 (1994): D398-D402.

53 . Additionally, 'democratization', 'free-marketization', and 'stabilization' have also become goals closely associated to the creation and maintenance of the CFSP.

generalizations allow for policy that focuses on the widest schemes possible for dealing with these 'threats' of 'instability', and makes the uniform deployment of these schemes across the entire ECE region more likely.

The implications of such thinking are two-fold. First, the CFSP's narrow discourse serves to skew the EU's conception of security *vis-à-vis* the ECE region. The Union's consideration of ways to promote European security through the CFSP amounts to universalized approaches that say little about many of the challenges facing the ECE region. More often than not, these universalizations involve spatial understandings of how to ensure security for the peoples of the region. This is highlighted by Delors, who states that in the East,

...the biggest problem is that of security. These countries have the feeling of living in a lack of security because the problems of minorities arise, border questions have apparently not always been solved, and then there is the contamination of the Bosnian affair...⁵⁴

Security for ECE is reduced here to the inviolability of borders and the problems that ill-planned borders create. The overwhelming concern is the territorial spread of instability. Delors' reference to the 'contamination' of the ECE (as well as the West) by the Bosnian affair evokes an understanding of the region as 'diseased' with

54 . "EC's Delors Interviewed On Current Issues," (Paris TF-1 Television Network in French), *FBIS-WEU-94-108*, 6 June, 1994, p.3.

nationalism."⁵⁵ Again, this medical/strategic intersect suggests that regional difficulties need to be 'isolated' and 'remedied' through instruments such as the CFSP. The ECE region's present challenges are profoundly simplified through such references, particularly when they are considered within the context of the many economic problems which exist in the region.

This is not to say that the EU has no interest in some of the socio-economic questions that underpin the above mentioned problems. Indeed, the EU has traditionally found much of its international influence through economic media. The notion of the EU as a 'Civilian Power' has come about largely through the Union's capacity for cooperation in economic sectors. According to Christopher Hill,

...precisely the kinds of attributes possessed by the European community -- the intellectual impact of a new model of interstate relations, the disposition of considerable economic influence over the management of the international economy, the possession of a vast network of contacts and agreements with every region of the international system -- are those most capable of influencing the very environment which determines whether or not military strength will need to be used."⁵⁶

Additionally, with respect to the ECE economic situation, it has been suggested that the EU "[is] helping them as well as [it] can."⁵⁷

55 . Valki, *op.cit.*, note 4, p.529.

56 . Christopher Hill, "European Foreign Policy: Power Bloc, Civilian Model - or Flop?" ed. R. Rummel, *The Evolution of an International Actor* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990) 31-55.

57 . *Ibid.*

However, as far as the CFSP and 'security' goes, economic questions become a separate category in a way which is traditionally unfamiliar to the EU. Problems such as poverty, unemployment, and increasing social tension based on hardship are discussed separately from the 'harder' questions of security, including borders and nationalism. The best example of this can again be found in the convening of the Stability Pact Conference. The agenda for this conference was overwhelmingly placed on "territorial integrity and respect of existing borders, as well as the protection of national minorities."⁵⁸ This example will be discussed in depth below. The important point is that generalizations concerning ECE security concerns tend to foster an artificial division between security and economy in CFSP discourse. Yet, in many cases, it is complex questions of socio-economic tension that are inextricably linked to the symptoms of territorial- and minority-related problems. Here, a dialectical element arises from the CFSP. While the policy intends to create security by addressing instability, its failure to address integral socio-economic questions exposes contradictions inherent in such a conventional approach.

58 . "Abschlußdokument der Eröffnungskonferenz zum 'Pakt für Sicherheit und Stabilität in Europa' vom 27. May 1994 in Paris," *Europa Archiv* 49, No.13-14 (1994): D403-D407.

The case of Slovakia following the breakup of Czechoslovakia provides another example of this policy thinking. Following separation, the EU reacted with considerable concern over whether Slovakia would maintain a path of 'Westernization' comparable to its Višegrad counterparts. As the process of separation unfolded, concerns were suddenly voiced over the problems of the Slovakia's slow economic 'transformation', Hungarian minority rights within Slovakia, and its feud with Hungary over the Gabčíkovo-Nagymoros Dam Project. These 'security' concerns were raised in a simplified manner, whereby rather crude indicators of slower economic 'progress' (such as inflation and currency value), perceived populist overtones among some Slovakian politicians, and the trading of rhetoric between Slovak and Hungarian officials were all translated under the rubric of 'instability'. Through this translation, the relevance of Slovakia's more difficult structural economic problems vis-à-vis its Višegrad neighbours has been largely downplayed. The local socio-economic perspective of Slovakia has been subordinated to its exterior political and economic image relative to the other Višegrad countries.

59 . See for instance, "Slovakia: Back Up," *Economist*, 13 August, 1994, p.47.

60 . Rodney Loeppky, "The Czech Republic and Slovakia: Divergent Paths?" unpublished paper, Carleton University, March 1994; Richard Frensch, *Wirtschaftliche Folgen der Teilung der Tschechoslowakei* (München: Osteuropa-Institute working paper No.162, 1993).

The second implication of this narrow threat-discourse concerns notions of identity within the EU. The EU's foray into a CFSP tends to reinforce the differences between EU and non-EU societies. Consistent dichotomizations between stability and instability, cohesion and chaos, as well as order and disorder reproduce a sense of identity closely associated to an East/West divide. In turn, this identity perception provides an outlet through which the CFSP's spatial/territorial security conception can be reinforced.

For instance, the ECE region is persistently characterized as a 'security vacuum'.⁶¹ The perceived task of the CFSP (and Western Europe in general) is to fill this 'vacuum' with a uniquely West European provision of security. Consider, for instance, the following statement on the importance of an enhanced CFSP:

The 12, and soon even 15 or 16 partner states, do not have a choice. They must make an effort... through a common foreign and security policy. ... At home everyone must ensure economic and political stability. If, however, the 12 were to succeed in exporting political stability and security to their neighbour countries, above all in the east, through unanimity and the common decisionmaking ability, the citizens and voters could perhaps be won over for European integration in the course of time.⁶²

Parallel to the rather obvious connection between external security and a stronger European identity among EU citizens,

61 . As mentioned above, this is all too often an image that is also propagated actors within the region. See also: Alexander Moens, "The European Security and Defence Identity and the Non-Concert of Europe," *European Security* 2, No.4 (1993): 569.

62 . "Editorial View EU Foreign, Security Policy," [Editorial by Winfried Münster, Brussels: 'Europe on New Tracks'] (Munich *Süddeutsche Zeitung* in German), *FBIS-WEU-93-222*, 19 November, 1993, p.28.

this passage territorializes the EU's security approach to ECE. European security, equated here with the Union's brand of 'stability', is a matter for EU 'export'. Of further concern is the text's exclusion of alternative approaches, presumably for fear of either chaotic societal collapse or of other actors (read Russia) supplying this stability more quickly.

The association between divisive notions of East/West identity and spatial solutions to ECE difficulties exposes a rather geopolitical character within the CFSP approach. This character is exemplified by common positions taken by EU member-states vis-à-vis ECE countries. For instance, in their 'strategic vision for Europe', Germany and Britain take the position that "[s]ecurity and stability must be carried over from our [EU] part of Europe to other European states in the East."⁶³ They go on to state that

There will be no security for us if insecurity and fear reign over our immediate neighbours in Central Europe. Stability in Central Europe strengthens our security.⁶⁴

In the context of future EU membership, German and French officials strengthen the territorially-based differences perceived between East and West.

Germany and France support the wish of Poland and other Central European states to be drawn closer into European and transatlantic security structures. We view this as a natural fulfillment of the increasingly closer

63 . "Gemeinsamer Presseartikel des deutschen und des britischen Außenministers, Klaus Kinkel und Douglas Hurd, über eine strategische Vision für Europa, veröffentlicht am 26. April 1994," *Europa Archiv* 49, No.15 (1994): D435-D437.

64 . *Ibid.*.

cooperation of these states with the EU in the context of future membership."⁶⁵

Whatever the ultimate intent of this common approach, the immediate effect is to reinforce the perception of 'two Europes'. Although common foreign and security positions among EU members consistently allude to the potential of a cooperative and unified Europe, such a possibility usually carries with it the condition of removing difference -- i.e. that the ECE region adapts itself in ways that make it politically, economically and socially similar to the EU."⁶⁶

This geopolitical element leads to further questions pertaining to European security and the individual/state relationship. Geopolitical conceptions of security evoke images of random events, external and uncontrollable to EU policymakers. Such an interpretation of 'threats' relies heavily on an "understanding of knowledge and social reality in dichotomized, ontological terms," in particular in its separation of subject from object."⁶⁷ With the division between the policymaker's practice and the 'external' environment which s/he addresses, the 'writing' of security

65 . "Gemeinsame Erklärung der Außenminister Deutschlands, Frankreichs und Polens, abgegeben am 12. November 1994 in Warschau," *Europa Archiv* 49, No.15 (1994): D432-D434.

66 . "Gemeinsamer Presseartikel des deutschen und des britischen Außenministers, Klaus Kinkel und Douglas Hurd, über eine strategische Vision für Europa, veröffentlicht am 26. April 1994," *op.cit.*, note 63, p.D436.

67 . For an interesting discussion of how 'realist' thought consistently frames its conception of social reality in dichotomies between 'subject' and 'reality', see: Jim George, "Of Incarceration and Closure: Neo-Realism and the New/Old World Order," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 22, No.2 (1993): 197-234.

in the CFSP is considered a description of, and reaction to, the world 'out there'. Consequently, those making policy -- states -- are represented as 'realistic' in their attempt to cope with the 'actual' problems unfolding in front of them.

This understanding of security questions with respect to the ECE region is problematic in that

...different threats are presented to different audiences, depending on the circumstances. One day the audience is confronted with a vision of domestic anarchy and foreign aggression. Another day the same politicians describe their country as exceptionally stable and surrounded by peaceful neighbours. In East-West encounters the latter vision is usually presented to Western bankers and investors; the former to security experts.⁶⁸

This is not to say that the ECE region somehow fabricates its problems, but rather that these problems are open to a variety of interpretations. Unfortunately, according to Delors' text (p.17), consideration of these problems is a matter only for security 'experts' -- i.e. states. Indeed, the notion of security implied within this discourse emphasizes the importance of 'specialists' (of geopolitics), and demands that 'non-specialists' (everyone else) accept the possibility that 'anything' can occur. Thus, not surprisingly, the CFSP continues a 'traditional' definition of security in state-centred terms. This not only narrows the EU's security approach to ECE, it precludes most people from genuinely participating in its conceptualization. ECE

68 . Valki, *op.cit.*, note 4, p.529. The reference is to Jan Zielonka, "Security in Central Europe," *Adelphi Paper* 272, (London: Brassey's for IISS, 1992) 33-34.

security concerns remain what states say they are, in keeping with their 'objective' and 'expert' view of the region.

To summarize these criticisms, the problems of using a threat-discourse to elaborate aims of CFSP are closely related to the way in which it encourages a narrow understanding of 'security'. The approach skews EU security conceptions by basing itself on the generalization of 'threats' within the ECE region. Instead of considering the underlying causes of some of these problems, CFSP tends to address their spatialized symptoms -- particularly problems dealing with borders and 'nationalism'. Moreover, the notion of identity which arises from such policy emphasizes and reifies the division between East and West. This, in turn, bolsters a geopolitical, spatial consideration of security for the ECE region. Finally, the CFSP approach constrains EU security conceptions to a state-centred discussion surrounding Eastern Europe.

The conception of security elicited within the CFSP suggests solutions that defer questions concerning the 'inside' of societies. Are there aspects of West European societies that need to be fundamentally reevaluated in order to ensure a peaceful Europe, including values, priorities and lifestyles? How well suited are CFSP approaches to the inner makeup of East European societies? Do the methods

used by Western security 'experts' really reflect ECE societies' conception of what makes them insecure? These questions are not only left unanswered within a CFSP, they are largely left unasked. Thus, it is not surprising to see that mechanisms emerging from such a policy display an equal lack of relevance to problems in the ECE region.

CFSP Mechanisms

The CFSP's embrace of conventional notions of security discourse is well reflected in the policy mechanisms to which it is associated. In fact, by relating their necessity to the discursive expression of threats, the existence of these mechanisms is questioned only insofar as their possible overlap with similar European security institutions. The discussion, as Edward Mortimer points out, "tends to start from solutions and then look for problems to which to apply them." As such, the actual existence of threats is never seriously problematized. Instead, the debate centres around which security organization will be first to effectively address these assumed threats. The CFSP, for its part, has envisioned two major mechanisms with which to address these 'threats': the establishment of the WEU as the 'security' arm of the EU and the attempt to create a European 'Stability Pact'.

69 . Edward Mortimer, "European Security after the Cold War," *Adelphi Paper* 271, (London: Brassey's for IISS, 1993) 61.

West European Union

As an integral part of accelerating the development of the CFSP, the WEU has been 'reawakened' as a security institution for the European Union.⁷⁰ The close affinity that the EU envisions between the WEU's 'security' role and CFSP is outlined by the EP.

...[T]he provisions of the Treaty on European Union entrust a large part of the common foreign and security policy to a separate agency, the WEU, rather than including it fully among the policies of the European Union...

Title V of the Maastricht Treaty identifies the WEU as "an integral part of the development of the European Union," which has been requested "to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications." Although the treaty refers mostly to the organization's 'defence' role, it has been continuously represented, albeit controversially, as the potential 'security' arm of the European Union.

For its part, the WEU has attempted to fulfill the role assigned to it within Maastricht. This was particularly evident in the organization's 'Petersberg Declaration', which stated that the "WEU, together with the European Union was ready to play a full part in building up Europe's

70 . See "Waking the sleeping beauty," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 4 January, 1992, pp.19-22; "Seeking a stronger identity," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 27 July, 1991, p.159.

71 . Ibid.

72 . European Council., "Treaty on European Union," Maastricht, December 1991, Title V, Article J4 (2).

security architecture." The tasks which it outlined for itself fall closely in line with the 'traditional' security perspective espoused within the CFSP.

- Member states are willing to make military units available from a spectrum of conventional forces for command under the WEU.
- The WEU will adhere to Article V of the Brussels treaty for common defence.
- The WEU could deploy military units for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.
- Member states intend to develop and exercise the appropriate capabilities to enable deployment of WEU military units by land, sea or air to accomplish these tasks.
- Establishment of a planning cell... in Brussels, responsible for: preparing contingency plans for the employment of forces, preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrangement, and keeping an updated list of units for WEU operations.

This declaration's focus on military matters is not surprising, given that the WEU has always been a military-centred organization. More peculiar, however, is its selection by the EU as the organization's security 'arm', especially in the context of the Union's various references to a broadened security conception.

The EU's background as an actor in international politics emerged before the recent collapse of the bipolar order. In the context of Eastern Europe, the EC was able to have substantial policy effects due to its economic leverage. The use of export credits, industrial cooperation ventures, and the reliance on loans from EC members states

73 . "Petersberg Declaration Released," (Paris AFP in English), FBIS-WEU-92-120, 22 June, 1992, p.6.

74 . *Ibid.*, p.6.

made for considerable influence through multiple bilateral and multilateral channels. For instance, it has been suggested that during the Polish crisis of the early 1980's, these avenues of influence "led to some of the worst excesses of repression being avoided, and maintenance of open ties with the West."⁷⁵

Consequently, the EU's current initiative to shift questions of security to a reawakened WEU is certainly open to criticism, particularly concerning the institution's suitability for dealing with the challenges of contemporary Europe. Along with the EU's allusion to broadened security, it is reasonable to anticipate that its institutional choice for a security 'arm' would increase its capacity to address the non-military issues highlighted above. With respect to European security issues, the EP, as well as the EU Commission, state

...that the changed geopolitical situation in Europe requires a thoroughly redefined security concept, which must include both new instruments and new objectives in the military and non-military spheres (such as economic relations and measures, environmental protection, financial aid, diplomatic initiatives, support for the respect of human rights).⁷⁶

However, the EU's shift to conventional security endeavours represents a regressive step in approaching these security challenges. As David Long points out, "the [CFSP] relies on

75 . Hill, *op.cit.*, note 56, p.37.

76 . "EP Resolution on future relations between the EU, the WEU and the North Atlantic Alliance" (A3-0041/94), *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No C77/17, 24 February, 1994.

a narrow meaning of security as preventive diplomacy and military means of defence that is ill-suited to the region of greatest security concern to EU relations, Central and Eastern Europe."⁷⁷

As far as the ECE region goes, the WEU has set up a 'Consultation Forum' with 9 East European countries, including all ECE countries. The forum ensured that the

...development of relations between the WEU and its consultation partners, in the future, would reflect the ever closer relationship between the countries of Central Europe and the European Union. As well, it pursues the goal of expanding the zone of stability and security in Europe."⁷⁸

Here the conception the EU and WEU as centres of stability reinforces the perception of East/West difference referred to above. Perhaps to the organization's credit, this process has already begun with the granting of associate status to ECE countries. The WEU Council has gone so far as to refer to security guarantees (although these are likely somewhat questionable).⁷⁹ However, it is also clear that improved status within the organization -- i.e. full membership -- will work in conjunction with membership in the EU. Until the EU finds sufficient 'stability' and

77 . David Long, "The Security Discourses Of The European Union: A Functional Critique," Paper presented at the Workshop on 'Functionalism and Conflict Management', Ottawa, March 1995, p.21.

78 . "Kommuniqué der Tagung des Konsultationsforums der Westeuropäischen Union am 20. Mai 1993 in Rom," *Europa Archiv* 48, No.15 (1993): D289-D291.

79 . For references to associate status and security guarantees, see "Kirchberg-Erklärung der Westeuropäischen Union (WEU) vom 9.Mai 1994," *Europa Archiv* 49, No.17 (1994): D489-D495.

'security' in the ECE region, the WEU will continue to define itself through difference with ECE countries.

The correlation between an expanded security agenda vis-à-vis ECE and the EU's new interest in the conventional security capabilities of the WEU is not clear. The latest initiatives by this organization include the attempt to fulfill the necessary troop contingents for the tasks outlined in the Petersberg Declaration, the creation of a marines unit, the consideration of an Italian proposal to develop land fighting capabilities, and the ongoing work on an independent European satellite capability.⁸⁰ At best, the 'evolution' of security to encompass such initiatives is a questionable way to address problems of the environment, or the social and economic problems that can lead to migration or unrest among national minorities. At worst, as one could claim about the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia, such initiatives can, arguably, do far more harm than good. Indeed, the conflict within that region has made even the possibility of a 'divisible' peace somewhat laughable.⁸¹ Ultimately, the WEU's approach relies on the continuing perception of an external 'threat' -- an approach that does little to address the complex mixture of social, political,

80 . *Ibid.*, D491.

81 . Richard Ullman. *Securing Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991) 28.

economic, and environmental problems confronting the ECE region.

In order to understand the WEU's predominant position within the EU's broadened security approach, it should be contextualized within the EU's debate concerning the future development of the Union. The sharing of sovereignty on military issues is perceived as a crucial symbolic element in the credibility of a political union among Member-states. Because "control over defence and security policy may be the last expression of state sovereignty,"⁸² the WEU is consistently represented as a lynchpin for European identity. The Maastricht Treaty states outright that the EU's move towards a common security policy is intended as a means "to assert its identity on the international scene..."⁸³ Moreover, the role of identity politics is exhibited quite clearly in the institutional ambiguity between the WEU and NATO and their future roles in the European security framework.⁸⁴ Thus, the WEU's importance

82 . Terry Terriff, "The European Community and The Future European Security Architecture," unpublished paper, University of Calgary, May 1992, p.20.

83 . European Council., "Treaty on European Union," Maastricht, December 1991, Title V, Article J1(2), Article B, paragraph 2.

84 . There is not space in this work to consider the debate concerning the WEU and NATO. NATO has been somewhat more active than the WEU in terms of a rearticulation of its goals. It has taken steps that include the 1990 London Declaration which contained a non-aggression pledge to Warsaw Pact members; the 1991 Rome Summit which declared a 'New Strategic Concept' for the organisation; the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), a largely consultative ministerial organisation that brought together NATO, Central European states, and the Soviet Union; and the inauguration of 'Partnership-for-Peace' at the January 1994 North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels, calling for cooperation between NATO and Eastern signatories on training and joint

within CFSP and EU security policy cannot be disassociated from the present struggle over identity within the EU itself.

Regardless of the future outcome between the 'Europeanist' and 'Atlanticist' debate, the preceding questions regarding the WEU are equally germane to NATO. It is unclear how the rearticulation of either organization will address an expanded conception of security. This is not to suggest that the military dimension of security -- and the institutions that support it -- should be immediately dismantled. Such an act would in no way guarantee a more progressive 'security' environment in Europe. There seems little doubt that, at least for the time being, problems will arise in the European context which require some military capacity.⁸⁵ However, it is crucial to question the degree to which such institutions should dominate the process of creating a new security agenda. In

military exercises. Although the EU, the WEU and NATO have attempted in writing to clarify the roles of each institution, the formation of such initiatives as the Eurocorps, as well as the painstakingly ambiguous characterization of 'separable but not separate' forces, makes clear that this issue is not closed. See: Lunn, *op.cit.*, note 38, p.65; Alexander Moens, "The European Security and Defence Identity and the Non-Concert of Europe," *European Security* 2, No.4 (1993): 570; Mortimer, *op.cit.*, note 59; Stephen Cimbala, "Security in Europe After the Cold War: Part I," *European Security* 2, No.2 (1993): 173-179; Rosser Baldwin, Jr., "Addressing the Security Concerns of Central Europe Through NATO," *European Security* 2, No.4 (1993): 552-554; Stefan Fröhlich, "Needed: A Framework For European Security," *SAIS Review: A Journal of International Affairs* 14, No.1 (1994): 38-39.

85 . Admittedly, one argument may be that if such regional organizations are of any use, it is to keep West European countries in good standing with one another through the reciprocal presence of foreign troops. However, whether such measures are necessary in the contemporary context of European integration is surely debatable.

the case of the WEU as an instrument of the CFSP, its dominant emphasis on military-centred security leaves a large portion of the EU's 'broadening' of security concerns ill-suited to East European concerns. To a large extent, the WEU will have few tangible -- let alone positive -- effects on a complex situation of insecurity in the ECE region.

Stability Pact

The other major mechanism engaged by the CFSP has been the creation of a European 'Stability Pact'. The pact, proposed to the EU by French Prime Minister Balladur in June 1993, calls on Europe to "draw the lessons from the painful experience of the Yugoslav conflict and to initiate active research into greater stability and security on the continent."⁸⁶ The outline for the pact, adopted by the European Council in December of 1993,⁸⁷ includes the objective of 'stability' which "will be achieved through the promotion of good neighbourly relations, including questions related to frontiers and minorities, as well as regional co-operation arrangements..."⁸⁸ To this end, the conference set

86 . "(EU) European Security: According To The Balladur Plan Community Membership Should Only Be Contemplated For Countries Which First Resolve Problems That Might Threaten European Stability," *Agence Europe* (Luxembourg-Brussels), 22 June 1993, pp.7-8.

87 . "Council Decision concerning the joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the inaugural conference of the stability pact," (93/728/CFSP), *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No L 339/1, 31 December, 1993.

88 . European Union, *Draft Document For The Inaugural Conference For A Pact On Stability In Europe.*, Paris, 27 May, 1994, sec 1.6.

up 'round tables' to "include the [already] existing good neighbourly relations agreements in the Pact, if the parties agree, or in the absence of such agreements, to intensify or launch negotiations."⁸⁹ The result of this process has been the signing in March 1995 of a 'Pact on Stability in Europe', during the French Presidency of the EU.⁹⁰

The Balladur proposal approaches security in a way that accounts for more than just external threats. At a minimum, it contains a 'positive'⁹¹ rather than military understanding of the concept. Relative to much of what has passed for a common 'security' conception in the CFSP, this must be seen as mild improvement. However, while assessing the pact's effect is difficult given its still inchoate form, it is nonetheless subject to criticism based on its stated goals, as well as its proposed methods.

Most importantly, the Stability Pact carries a reversed notion of how to address insecurities: start with the symptoms and hope to eventually affect underlying causes. Balladur and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl spell this out in common by stating that

This initiative rightly underlines the point that political stability is an indispensable condition for economic and social progress and the securing of peace and freedom. What value would the Europe Agreements have for Central and East and South East European states -- or their future entrance into the European Union for that

89 . *Ibid.*, sec 2.9.

90 . "Moscow condemns NATO expansion: Spectre of new East-West row raised," *Globe and Mail*, 21 March 1995, A2.

91 . This term is taken from Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* 6 (1969): 167-191.

matter -- if political crisis -- created especially through border or minority problems -- puts these accomplishments in question.⁹²

The Pact's notion of ensuring 'stability' -- and with it 'security' -- through the legal means of border recognition and friendly inter-state relations, once again, overlooks fundamental questions of security in the ECE region.

Implicit within this inter-state approach is an understanding of security that defers the question of insecurity to the realm of 'anarchy' outside of the state's borders. It reifies an image of the state as the necessary reference point of security, representing it as a universalized, unproblematic sphere.⁹³ Here, the discourse of CFSP centres security on states as 'experts'. Through this perspective, security is an issue to be dealt with only in the realm of inter-state relations, largely ignoring any understanding of 'structural insecurity' -- that is, those forms of insecurity that may result from the system of organization set up to ensure security (e.g. the structure of states).⁹⁴

92 . "Gemeinsamer Presseartikel von Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl und Premierminister Edouard Balladur anlässlich der Eröffnungskonferenz zum 'Pakt für Sicherheit und Stabilität in Europa' veröffentlicht am 27. Mai 1994," *Europa Archiv* 49, No13-14 (1994): D407-D409.

93 . A related discussion has been suggested within what Richard Ashley terms the 'double move of realism'. Ashley maintains that, within the realist paradigm that states embrace, insecurity is intentionally perpetuated external to the state (or at least security is not fully realized), in order to defer the question of insecurity within the universalized, unproblematized boundaries of the state. See: Richard Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics," *Alternatives* 12 (1987): 429.

94 . The concept of 'structural' violence is borrowed from Galtung, *op.cit.*, note 91.

Conceiving of inter-state agreements as the necessary path to 'security' for the ECE region tends to exclude more pressing questions of socio-economic, environmental, and personal insecurities that can lead to inter-state problems in the first place. It could be argued, however, that parallel to the EU's Europe Agreements with the ECE, the pact is part of a larger EU strategy for the region. However, this seems unlikely in that these economic arrangements are oriented towards the long-term and, as the next chapter points out, are questionable in their intent to bolster ECE security. In contrast, the Stability Pact states quite clearly the intent to "reach a conclusion as fast as possible."⁹⁵ Documents concerning the pact make no mention of the agreements in relation to the pact. Instead, the pact has been presented as a diplomatic achievement that stands apart from the EU's economic measures aimed at the ECE region."

Related to this, the Pact's intention to offer both political and economic incentives as a 'carrot' with which to ensure success is a questionable exercise. The EU's aim is to "'eventually' contemplate further accessions by Central and East European countries on the express condition

95 . "Abschlußdokument der Eröffnungskonferenz zum 'Pakt für Sicherheit und Stabilität in Europa' vom 27. May 1994 in Paris," *op.cit.*, note 58, p.D406.

96 . Indeed, the pact has been viewed as a product of both France's wish to have a 'successful' Presidency of the EU and Edouard Balladur's personal political ambitions concerning the recent French elections.

that they first resolve the problems that may threaten European stability."⁹⁷ It further states its intention to see that "the EC could provide specific aid to countries which take particular care to solve their minority, immigration or refugee problems and cut off all cooperation with the countries violating minority rights or challenging existing frontiers."⁹⁸

There are two problems with this kind of incentive-oriented approach. The first has already been mentioned, that the EU's goal of 'stability' -- related here to the resolution of border tension -- should not necessarily be equated with 'security' or the resolution of structural insecurity. EU member states claim a justification for such an approach to be the proven success of German-French cooperation.

This tendency [towards good border relations] was a key to the reconciliation and success of the integration in Western Europe following the last war. The contemporary relationship between Germany and France, considered to be long time foes, is most impressive evidence for this.

While there is little doubt that French-German cooperation has witnessed considerable success over the years, its comparison to the Stability Pact is very questionable. Not

97 . "(EU) European Security: According To The Balladur Plan Community Membership Should Only Be Contemplated For Countries Which First Resolve Problems That Might Threaten European Stability," *Agence Europe*, (Luxembourg-Brussels), 22 June 1993, pp.7-8.

98 . *Ibid.*

99 . "Gemeinsamer Presseartikel von Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl und Premierminister Edouard Balladur anlässlich der Eröffnungskonferenz zum 'Pakt für Sicherheit und Stabilität in Europa' veröffentlicht am 27. Mai 1994," *op.cit.*, note 91, p.D408.

only was the signing of border arrangements between these countries done in the context of American 'supervision', but the cooperation which they undertook following this had more to do with French fears than with 'good neighbourly relations'. The creation of the ECSC -- the inspiration for European integration -- came about as a 'functional' way to prevent German re-armament in the future and involved far more than interstate relations. If anything, the German-French relationship demonstrates ways in which a functional alternative to security thinking may transcend territorially-conceived initiatives such as the Stability Pact.¹⁰⁰

The second problem is the underlying 'developmental' perspective entrenched within this approach. ECE states are only considered worthy of assistance in the case that they fulfill certain political conditions that coincide with how the EU conceives of stability. If these stipulations are not met, ECE countries will be denied the very assistance and cooperation needed to enhance the security of their societies.¹⁰¹ The EU's use of assistance as a carrot in order ensure a particular notion of stability -- as achieved

100 . On the possibility of a functional alternative in EU security policy, see Long, *op.cit.*, note 77.

101 . This is not to suggest, as later chapters will make evident, that these countries necessarily must follow a Western model of development. Rather, it suggests only that effort on the part of both the West and the East will be necessary to address the many social, economic, political, and environmental problems existing in the East.

through resolution of territorial agreements -- further ignores many of the underlying reasons for instability.¹⁰² It holds Eastern societies hostage to a narrow conception of security and stability, and forces them to maintain it, for fear that they should lose their perceived 'lifeline' to the West. Not only does the pact's roundtable approach impose Western conceptions of stability on Eastern states, it also completely fails to take into account conceptions of security among sub-state actors. The pact's bilateral negotiations have not allowed for the input of various sub-state actors from the ECE region. This approach excludes or marginalizes alternative conceptions of how security may be brought about, reducing stability to the signing of international treaties.¹⁰³

Since "the nonmilitary sides of security policy have become more important, ...the [EU's] economic and political role is constantly growing in security policy importance."¹⁰⁴ Yet, considering the necessity of the

102 . Additionally, many of the countries participating were 'irritated' by the insistence that they should partake in the stability pact when they had largely already dealt with these problems through separate bilateral arrangements. See: "EU/Stability Pact: Some Difficulties Remain Before The Launching Conference," *Agence Europe* (Luxembourg-Brussels), 18 May, 1994, p.3; "Foray into foreign policy hesitant," *The Globe and Mail*, 7 June 1994, p.6.

103 . While it is not within the scope of this work to carefully consider the politics between EU members on various issues, it should be noted that the proposal for the pact bears a strong resemblance to the French position on the question of 'deepening vs. widening'. On questions of the EU's approach to the East European countries, France has shown considerable reticence in extending 'premature' help to the region.

104 . Gro Harlem Brundtland, "The Security Picture," (Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norweigen), FBIS-WEU-94-001, 3 January 1994, pp.27-29.

broadened perception of security suggested above, both the WEU and the Stability Pact are problematic in their conception of an EU security policy. They are unable to move beyond the militaristic, state-centred, and divisive nature of Cold-War thinking on security. If security is to be inclusive of the interests of both EU and ECE citizens, then these CFSP mechanisms fall far short of addressing the challenges ahead.

The CFSP and Security

The EU's conventional approach to what it has described as a changed security environment in Europe leaves much to be desired. The increasing criticism of military-centred security does not fit well with the promotion of the CFSP as the main avenue of EU security policy. This chapter has pointed out the CFSP's close relation to Cold War thinking on security, as well as the resulting detrimental effects. Not only does CFSP skew security conceptions within the EU, but it also reinforces perceptions of European identity which are based on an East-West divide, specific state-citizen relationships, and the privileging of a Western lifestyle which is embodied in the liberal market economy.

Ultimately, the institutions that emerge from this thinking suffer from the same constraints. The incapacity of these mechanisms to consider security beyond the questions of Eastern 'instability' and the praise of

'neighbourly relations' effectively excludes non-military issues from their agenda. This is not to assert that CFSP-type institutions have no place in European security policy; indeed, at times such institutions are necessary. However, in order to address more complex ECE problems, it is crucial to problematize the CFSP and its predominance within EU security policy.

The necessity of this criticism is particularly evident when ECE structural economic problems are considered. By focusing purely on issues such as border-management, the CFSP has not been able to adequately focus on ECE socio-economic difficulties. Pointing to such problems exposes the CFSP's axiomatic divide between economic and military challenges. Political resources concentrated on the ill-defined and rather simplistic notion of Eastern 'instability' conceal the need to address more pressing economic and social dilemmas within the region.

Consequently, the next chapter of this work discusses the ways in which the EU has engaged economic security issues within ECE. This expansion of the EU's security agenda, while perhaps well-intentioned, adopts many of the same assumptions of the CFSP. The EU's rather simple insistence on 'structural' economic change is rooted more in its fear of 'instability' than in its concern for the security of peoples in ECE. Consequently, the import of

conventional security assumptions proves to be problematic in its pursuit of narrow EU interests. And eventually, as the third chapter points out, these same assumptions make policy considerations of environmental security virtually impossible.

CHAPTER 2

The EU and Economic Security: the importance of identity and markets

The Central Europeans rest their case for [EU] membership on its value to them -- and on simple justice... [M]embership is basic to modernisation. It symbolises it. It is an essential part of it because the EC's free-trade pact integrates its members into the world economy. And it guarantees it because the EC sets down codes of conduct which, if obeyed, would solve the region's deep-seated security problems and keep lunatics from coming to power.¹

We have all been left to choose what we need, and we have pushed the search for private meaning to the limits of what a public language can contain if it is to continue to be a means of communication... Instead of being astonished at the spiritual emptiness of the times we should be amazed that individuals manage, in both the silence and the babble, to find sufficient meaning and purpose.²

The problematic nature of the EU's conventional security approach towards ECE demonstrates the need for the Union's reconceptualization of security. The conventional emphasis on identity-based exigencies such as 'stability' and 'cohesion' present a superficial treatment of ECE concerns and make the prospects for the EU's expanded security agenda tenuous. Importantly, for both the EU and ECE, economic security also plays a part in such an expanded agenda. Economic issues tend to make up the majority of EU-ECE relations, and thus it is not surprising that they should be included in the security debate. Moreover, the

1. "2001 is too late," *The Economist*, 13 March 1993, p.20 (Survey Eastern Europe).

2. Michael Ignatieff, *The Needs of Strangers: An essay on privacy, solidarity and the politics of being human* (New York: Penguin Books, 1984) 62, 78-79.

immense undertaking of economic 'transition' has made both the EU and ECE more aware of the economic effects on regional 'stability' and security.

Thus, in keeping with the overall two-fold task of this work -- both to 'locate' the EU's security approach to ECE and to critically assess this approach -- this chapter examines the Union's consideration of economic security within the ECE context. It asserts that the EU's location within an economic security approach to ECE is of dual character. On the one hand, the extension of security thinking to economic issues is an earnest attempt to 'secure' Eastern Europe on terms that transcend simple military strategy. On the other hand, however, the EU's policy is mired by the 'import' of conventional security assumptions which leads to a 'half-hearted', narrow approach to economic security.

To this end, the chapter begins by examining the references made by the EU which implicate its security approach to the economic problems of the ECE region. Following this, it outlines and criticizes the EU's economic security approach in the ECE context, particularly as prescribed in the PHARE programme and the 'Association Agreements' with ECE countries. Finally, it critically explains these policies as fitting within a dualized

approach which expands the EU's security agenda but also restrains it within the economic status-quo.

The EU: Envisioning 'Economic Security'

The EU has increasingly characterized the ECE region as 'unstable'. Much of this characterization is grounded in particular perceptions of ECE's economic problems, which are viewed as "formidable [even] under the best of circumstances."³ Economic issues have held such prominence because of an EU perception that ECE social and political 'stability' depends largely on the region's economic vagaries. Thus, by considering economic problems, the EU attempts to address the more general question of ECE 'instability', incorporating problems of political organization, democracy, social well-being, and regional 'stability'.

In doing so, the EU has drawn a connection between the concepts of security and economics. This connection expands security to involve issues that are beyond its conventional preoccupation with military issues. Such a practice is not particularly new for EU member states. European Political Cooperation routinely used economic instruments as a means to gain political leverage in the East.⁴ The aim of these

3 . Mark Kramer, "Eastern Europe Goes To Market," *Foreign Policy* No.86 (1992): 134.

4 . Christopher Hill, *European Foreign Policy - Power Bloc, Civilian Model - or flop?* ed. R. Rummel, *The Evolution of an International Actor* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990).

practices was to draw Eastern 'bloc' countries away from Soviet influence, thereby advancing EU security interests. However, in the present context, economic measures are considered more than ever to be an integral part of the security approach. Indeed, at times, this linkage is asserted so emphatically as to make military matters appear as a secondary concern. This perspective is underlined by statements such as those made by former German President Richard von Weizsäcker, who claims that Europe's dangers are found not so much in "military power or the pressure of those governing, but the disappointment of citizens and societies concerning withheld basic rights, economic injustice, and social insecurity."⁵

Reinforcing this assertion of economic problems as 'danger', former German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher suggests that a major 'threat' stems from the inequality between East and West, and the consequences that this portends. He claims that the West

...must not permit a new division of Europe into poor and rich, because this would mean a strain on political and economic stability, such as we cannot imagine today. We must take care that the inhabitants of Eastern Europe and the USSR stay home and thousands of them do not seek prosperity in the West.⁶

Here, the possibility of mass migration is posited as a major reason to address economic problems. Such assertions,

5 . "President Hosts Ministers" (Hamburg DPA in German), *FBIS-WEU-91-119*, 20 June 1991, p.9.

6 . "Genscher Warns Against New Divisions In Europe" (Vienna DIE PRESSE in german) *FBIS-WEU-91-186*, 25 September 1991, pp.6-7.

which once again evoke the 'what if...?' question described by Klein, position the economic difficulties in the East as a probable threat. Although the usefulness of branding such problems as threats is certainly open to question, it is nonetheless crucial to recognise the conceptual linkage being drawn between economic instability and 'threat'. It is this association which enables the EU to tack 'security' onto economic questions concerning the ECE region.

As such, EU security discourse reflects the perspective that unless economic issues are addressed within ECE, they threaten the security of West European countries. Consider the EP debate concerning the effects of East-West relations on European security. The EP claims that

...in view of the far-reaching changes which have occurred in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989, there is now a new basis for European security policy... [E]conomic regeneration in Central and Eastern Europe is a fundamental prerequisite for maintaining peace and stability in Europe as a whole and [the EU] supports, first and foremost, efforts towards the promotion of economic development in the region.⁷

7 . Interestingly, such assertions generally disregard compelling studies that downplay the probability of such events. As Laszlo Valki and Laszlo Csaba point out, within the United States, a region with little linguistic, legislative, or territorial barriers, sizable migration never develops until an income difference of 1:3 is discernible. Given that sizeable barriers exist in Europe in all of these categories, and that differences in standard of living (measured by purchasing power parity) show an average difference of 1:2.5 or 1:3 between ECE and Western Europe, it is difficult to "support the apocalyptic visions of Central Europeans flooding over to the other half of Europe." See: Laszlo Valki and Laszlo Csaba, "Economic and Social Stability in Central and South-Eastern Europe: Preconditions for Security," in "European Security After The Cold War Part I," *Adelphi Paper 284* (London: Brassey's for IISS, 1994) 57.

8 . "EP Resolution on developments in East-West relations in Europe and their impact on European security," (A3--0108/93), *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No C 176/185, 27 May 1993, emphasis added.

The rather obvious linkage here between security and economics lends a sense of urgency to fostering, 'first and foremost,' the economic well-being of the ECE region. Such explicit connections have also been drawn by Delors, who claims that

...[t]he European Community is the foremost proponent of 'soft security'... [and has] welcomed the prospect of future membership and agreed to a number of measures to improve market access. ...
In other words, when Europeans come to identify their vital interests, they will be forced to recognize that economics and security are two sides of the same coin.⁹

Again, Delors' connection is intended to provoke a sense of urgency by appealing to what he suggests is 'foremost' on the EU's agenda, economic security, and identifying it with Europe's 'vital' interests. In this way, the economic dimension of European security is not only a matter of ECE 'instability', but also the speed at which 'stability' is to be created in the region.

Thus, the representation of ECE economic problems as imminent danger connects EU discourse to economics in such a way as to make 'stabilization' the most important security end. As Delors' statement suggests, stabilization is equated with the establishment and maintenance of an efficient free market economy. Consequently, the EU's approach could be characterized as narrow in its conception,

9 . Jacques Delors, "Questions Concerning European Security," Speech to IISS Conference, Brussels, 10 September 1993, emphasis added.

assuming the free market to be the ultimate end towards which economic security in ECE must be aimed.

EU Policy and Economic Security

In terms of policy, two major routes have been taken by the EU in order to address security in ECE from an economic perspective. These include the implementation of programmes of aid and assistance and the creation of the so-called 'Europe (Association) Agreements'. The following sections outline these policy approaches, emphasizing security elements which are closely related to the objective of contributing to, and maintaining, 'stability' in the ECE region. Each demonstrates a tendency towards self-definition through an emphasis on existing ECE 'instability'. Thus, similar to the conventional CFSP security perspective, both the aid programme and the association agreements are policy that is inextricably linked to the reproduction of a West European identity.

Assistance Programmes:

Economic aid has been a major element in the EU's security approach to ECE. The Union's main conduit has been through the 'Poland-Hungary Aid for Restructuring Economies' (PHARE). Responding to a pre-existing consensus among G-24 states to administer aid to ECE, PHARE was devised by the EU Commission in order to coordinate financial assistance to these countries. The programme, initially funded with ECU

500 million, consisted of working groups dealing with emergency food aid and projects to increase productivity in the agricultural sector.¹⁰ However, as food supply problems in the region dissipated, "the promotion of the industrial sector, especially [small and medium-sized enterprises], vocational training, energy, transport, telecommunications, environmental protection and the development of an efficient banking sector steadily gained in importance."¹¹

PHARE was extended in July 1990 to Bulgaria, the former Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia (where it would later be withdrawn) and the German Democratic Republic. By 1993, it had been extended to include all countries of Central and Eastern Europe, with the continuing exception of the former Yugoslavia. Information dealing with the administration of the programme is rather limited, which has led to some criticism of the Commission. For instance, the publication of general reports on the programme only a year and half after the studied administrative period has tended support this criticism.

From such reports, one can easily discern the main objective of PHARE "which is to support the process of

10 . PHARE funding now exceeds well over ECU 1Billion, see "EC Aid To The East: Good Intentions, Poor Performance," *Economist*, 10 April 1993, pp.21-23.

11 . "EP Report of the Committee on Regional Policy, Regional Planning and Relations with Regional and Local Authorities on the regional implications of Community assistance to Central and Eastern Europe," (A3-0032/94), PE 206.624/fin., 27 January 1994, p.11.

transformation from a centralised command economy to one based on market forces."¹²

Hence the emphasis on 'core' aspects of the reform process, notably the restructuring and privatisation of public enterprise, the modernisation of financial services, the promotion of the private sector and the development of labour market mechanisms.¹³

Beyond these aims, the programme also imposes political and economic conditions on the disbursement of aid. Prior to being eligible, governments must demonstrate a firm commitment to the rule of law, respect for human rights, the holding of free and fair elections, the introduction and maintenance of a multiparty systems, and the development of market economies.¹⁴

Assessing this approach to economic security in critical terms reveals its rather mixed character. From one perspective, the PHARE programme seems to clearly transcend a more conventional conception of security. This can be said for two reasons. First, the programme reflects the need to ensure 'stability' through non-military measures. This in itself offers the possibility of transcending simpler conventional notions of 'instability' in ECE. It is

12 . "Second Annual Report From The Commission To The Council And The European Parliament On the Implementation Of Community Assistance To The Countries Of East And Central Europe (PHARE) In 1991," COM(93)172, Brussels, 10 May 1993, p.5.

13 . *Ibid.*

14 . Stephan Haggard and Andrew Moravcsik, "The Political Economy of Financial Assistance to Eastern Europe, 1989-1991," eds. Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye and Stanley Hoffmann, *After the Cold War: International Institutional and State Strategies In Europe, 1989-1991* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993) 260.

thus not surprising that Delors, in addressing issues of European security, emphasizes that the PHARE programme is "the largest ever developed in the area of technical assistance. ...[and that the] Community has supplied 70% of this type of assistance to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe."¹⁵ The implication is that through the disbursement of financial assistance, the EU is working to ensure a kind of (economic) security that cannot be achieved by military means.

Second, PHARE's emphasis on development of civil society offers the opportunity to create stability through work at a local level. This local approach, generally overlooked within conventional security perspectives, conceivably opens policy to more than just state-'experts'. Ostensibly, the programme is intended to work in a decentralized manner, with its 'indicative programmes' organized in such a way as to account for the local perspective of different ECE regions. In this sense,

...the national authorities and the Commission agreed specifically on the importance of promoting, in the context of aid programmes, the development of civil society through the involvement of intermediate non-state bodies, associations and organisations with a view to assisting in the overall process of economic and political reform.¹⁶

Consequently, "[d]irect support to NGOs to act as instruments of policy implementation figures particularly in

15 . Delors, *op.cit.*, note 9.

16 . "Second Annual Report From The...," *op.cit.*, note 12, p.19.

PHARE sector programmes concerning SMEs, environment, social and employment policy."¹⁷ Such an approach offers the opportunity to locate 'security' at an intersect with public policy,¹⁸ addressing a wider variety of areas, and conceivably diversifies the field of participants within the security process. In this way, what counts as security does not need to be frozen at one level of societal organization (e.g. the state), but can be continuously reconceived at the most appropriate locality possible.

However, beyond these attempts to transcend a conventional security approach, a more critical reading of PHARE reveals the programme's tendency to adopt many conventional assumptions. In this sense, PHARE exhibits all aspects of the identity-based threat discourse mentioned in the previous chapter. First, the programme vigorously emphasizes difference along an East-West divide. This is well reflected in regular references to "European stability [being] dependent to a large extent on the success of the economic and political restructuring taking place in most of the countries concerned."¹⁹ The EU is seen as having vital interests in confronting Eastern 'instability' because it sees itself as the centre of cohesion and stability in

17 . *Ibid.*

18 . On this issue, see Simon Dalby, "Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse," *Alternatives* 17 (1992): 116.

19 . "EP Report of the Committee on Regional Policy....," *op.cit.*, note 11, p.15.

Europe. Economic difficulties in the ECE region are represented as anathema to which the EU contrasts itself. Indeed, as Jean Laux points out, "[t]he fundamental insecurity for Western donors, particularly in Europe, turns around the fear that failure of the economic and political transition in eastern Europe could spill over and jeopardize Western prosperity and stability."²⁰ In presenting the Eastern challenge in such a way, the EU's policy reproduces an identity which differentiates between the destabilizing East and the cohesive, 'free market'-oriented West.

This leads to the second way in which PHARE adopts traditional assumptions -- in its wholehearted engagement and enforcement of a liberal economic order. There is, of course, little doubt that the ECE region, in facing its serious economic challenges, has wilfully affirmed the need for the 'free market'. But this affirmation has certainly been subject to different qualifications in all ECE states. The negative impacts of rapid transition has been undeniable in these societies, reflected by problems such as widespread unemployment, drastic increases in poverty, and the rapid deterioration of social programmes.²¹

20 . Jean Laux, "Reform, Reintegration And Regional Security: The Role of Western Assistance in Overcoming Insecurity in Central and Eastern Europe," Working Paper #37, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, October 1991, p.4.

21 . By 1993, Romania led in terms of unemployment with 22 per cent, followed by Poland and Bulgaria with 14 per cent, Hungary with 13 per cent, Slovakia with 12 per cent, and the Czech Republic with 3 percent. 'Transition' has also had devastating effects on the standard of living. Valki and Csaba state that "[a]ccording to recent sociological research,

Nonetheless, the EU's assistance policy has relentlessly insisted on a reproduction of West European market values. Ingeborg Tömmel, in assessing PHARE, has noted that its policy

...is strictly bound to the basic goal of creating and reinforcing market mechanisms. This together leads to the strong bias of the Phare policy-concept towards market-led development and policy-making. The proposals of the recipient states are only integrated into this basic approach insofar as they fit -- or can be made to fit -- into it.²²

PHARE's overwhelming emphasis on the bolstering of small and medium-sized enterprises is "oriented towards creating... modern-type market economies based on a model of flexible specialisation."²³ The transfer of such a system tends to promote rapid decline of large state-owned industries, without compensatory economic activity. This is, of course, not merely the result of PHARE policy. Nonetheless, "because of the extremely market-led policy strategy of the [EU], these processes are more accelerated than counteracted."²⁴ Thus, the market-style model being promoted by EU policy is not necessarily conducive to ECE countries

roughly 40% of people live below subsistence level in Poland, while in Hungary it is about 20%. This figure will also soon be high in Slovakia. the authors of this paper are not aware of such research in Romania and Bulgaria, but the extremely high inflation rates in the two countries -- not mirrored by a similar increase in earnings -- points towards similar conclusions." See Valki and Csaba, *op.cit.*, note 7, pp.45-48.

22 . Ingeborg Tömmel, "The European Community's strategy for a system-transformation in Eastern Europe," Paper presented at European Consortium for Political Research: Joint Sessions of Workshops, Leyden University, April 1993, pp.9-10.

23 . *Ibid*; See also Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, *The Second Industrial Divide* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

24 . Tömmel, *op.cit.*, note 22, p.15.

in that it accelerates their exposure to the harsh and indifferent effects of free competition without offering either 'shelter' or means for a more gradual approach.

The strict market emphasis of PHARE is further highlighted by the EU's conditions for the distribution of financial assistance. It is generally accepted that potential recipients must first satisfy the conditions of, or at least show substantial progress towards, successful macroeconomic stabilization, economic restructuring and privatization, and political reforms. In this sense, consideration for PHARE funding possesses a strangely circular element, in that the conditions listed above are the same goals to which the programme is ostensibly aimed.²⁵ Thus, to some degree, the programme validates its own success by simply waiting for it. In effect, such an approach (which is obviously not limited to PHARE) also encourages ECE countries to hastily introduce structural adjustment which can have severe effects on the population. In this sense, PHARE privileges the economic efficiency of market-reform over any other aspect of 'reform' in ECE. Despite the difficult impacts mentioned above, alternative courses that slow the reform process substantially, such as those chosen in Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, are discouraged. This is not to say that EU policy necessarily

25 . See for instance Bull. EC-9-1992, point 1.3.4.

prevents ECE states from taking different 'transition' courses, "but, if they do they cannot count on any support from the EC."²⁶

With PHARE's emphasis on East-West difference and 'free-market' principles, it is no surprise to see that the objectives of assistance are not necessarily centred on Eastern peoples' security. Rather, they remind EU citizens

...that a failure of economic development in the CEECs would increase the risk of their dumping goods on the world market to the detriment of Community producers in general and to less highly capitalized producers in the less-prosperous regions in particular...²⁷

EU assistance to the ECE region is consistently represented primarily not as a means through which the security of ECE can be fostered, but as way in which to secure a particular Western 'way of life' which has become inextricable with 'stability' and 'prosperity'. While most seem to pay lip-service to the idea that transition is not merely a matter of letting the 'market' take over, "no efforts have been made to develop more specific strategies for system-transformation [involving] gradual steps of systemic change... [or] 'mixed' or 'third way' strategies combining the market-initiative with public ownership and planning."²⁸ EU assistance is presented with an underlying agenda which

26 . Tömmel, *op.cit.*, note 22, p.9-10.

27 . "EP Report of the Committee on Regional Policy...", *op. cit.*, note 11, p.5.

28 . Tömmel, *op.cit.*, note 22, p.14; see also Ben Slay, "Rapid versus Gradual Economic Transition," *RFE/RL Research Report* 3, No.31 (1994): 31-42.

is never questioned -- the aim is to reward those agents who have successively established the path to a free market transition.

Such an approach has also meant that PHARE's potential to challenge another emphasis of conventional security, state-centrism, is mostly undermined. When the revolutions within East Central Europe unfolded, it was generally recognized that the deep-rooted presence of civil-society in these regions acted as one of the main instigators of change.²⁹ While the presence of these actors may not conform to the EU's conception civil-society, one cannot make the assertion that Eastern countries are without local 'expertise' on a variety of different issues. Despite this, PHARE has been largely subject to control by Western 'experts'. More specifically, while the programme's operations are officially decentralized, they are informally dominated by the EU Commission.

The Commission's control of PHARE operations has come about in a number of ways. First, in terms of PHARE programme research, the agenda is set by the Commission as to which areas will be considered for study. These research areas overwhelmingly focus on ways to promote rapid economic transition to a market-based system -- taking for granted

29 . Andrew Nagorski, "The Intellectual Roots Of Eastern Europe's Upheavals," *SAIS Review: A Journal of International Affairs* 10, No.2 (1990): 89-102.

the need to conduct this transition as quickly as possible. The results are eventually discussed at East-West conferences structured to "convince the delegates of the recipient countries that there is a clear path to reform."³⁰ Second, the Commission negotiates with the recipient country to establish its needs, and then chooses those that best fit EU policy structures. Third, especially in the policy-implementation stage (but also research and decisionmaking stages), the use of private consultants give the Commission an extensive informal means of control over PHARE projects. While consultants are ostensibly supposed to lead to a more 'neutral' use of PHARE funds, the tenders put out for their hiring are almost completely dominated by the Commission. Thus, particularly at the implementation stage, PHARE is controlled by the Commission through, as one EU Commissioner recently stated, "a giant system of outdoor relief for Western consultants."³¹

As result, PHARE's much celebrated local focus has amounted to the engagement of NGOs that 'fit' the EU's narrow policy emphasis on the business sphere. This includes groups such as the Hungarian Foundation for Enterprise Promotion and the Polish Telephone Foundation.

30 . Tömmel, *op.cit.*, note 22, p.9.

31 . The commissioner is quoted but not identified in D.J. Blackman, "Relations Between the European Parliament and The Countries of Central and Eastern Europe," Directorate General for Research--Division for Central and Eastern Europe, Brussels, 24 March 1993, p.9.

The rare social issues addressed by PHARE are represented in such a way as to secure the continuance of rapid economic 'reform'. An example of this is PHARE's attempt to strengthen NGOs in Hungary to ensure that its social welfare program emphasizes "decentralisation and promoting self help."³² The language chosen in such programmes is crucial, in that it privileges the efficiency of economic reform over its social ramifications. Indeed, notwithstanding the TEMPUS programme for educational aid and the very limited 'democracy programme'³³, EU assistance has effectively written out issues that fall outside of the rubric of efficient economic 'reform'.

Thus, security, as viewed through the medium of EU economic assistance to ECE countries, has involved particular representations of the presence of 'instability' on the borders of the EU. Against this, the EU's identity as 'cohesive' and 'stable' can be secured. The *telos* of economic security in the ECE region is simplified to a project of macroeconomic stabilization, as well as the rapid implementation of capitalist-style economic structures.

32 . "Second Annual Report from the...", *op.cit.*, note 12, p.19.

33 . The 'democracy' programme earmarks ECU 5 million for "provide financial aid through the Community budget on a non-party basis, principally through parliamentary insitutions and to non-governmental organizations and non-profit groups, for general civic education and stabilize and reinforce democratic principles in non-EC countries; ...[and] to developm the concept of civil society in countries where human rights, multi-party systems, the rule of law, and economic freedom have been lacking." See: Blackman, *op.cit.*, note 31, pp.6-11.

While the social and political factors are not completely ignored within this approach, they are largely subsumed under the project of economic 'efficiency'.

Notably, issues such as the environment, which transcend social intervention/market freedom debates, are even more severely excluded from EU assistance discussions. As the next chapter makes clear, the PHARE programme weighs heavily here in that it is the EU's main avenue for addressing such environmental concerns. Environmental issues are a topic of PHARE discussions only insofar as they conform to its basis of identity-oriented politics. Unfortunately, the application of identity politics to these problems underscores the contradictions inherent between status-quo politics and a genuine concern for environmental security.

EU-ECE Economic Relations:

The economic relations between the EU and ECE have been perceived by many to be an integral part of ECE's security. Historically, these relations have been used as a mechanism of leverage, particularly the use of quantitative restrictions (QRs) and anti-dumping duties, bilateral and multilateral trading agreements and export credits.³⁴ In the post-Cold War context, an important objective has been to

34 . Leah Haus, "The East European countries and GATT: the role of realism, mercantilism, and regime theory in explaining East-West trade negotiations," *International Organization* 45, No.2 (1991): 163-182; Hill, *op.cit.*, note 4, pp.36-39.

establish security in the region through its gradual integration into the EU. Delors proposed

...to draw up a precise plan of action and procedures for stabilizing the situation in Central and Eastern Europe, responding to their security needs and linking them stage by stage to the Community beginning with association, then accession to the European Economic Area, and finally Community membership, the ultimate goal.³⁵

Here, security is held out as an 'endpoint' which is to be achieved through the gradual assimilation of the ECE region into the structures of the EU.³⁶ Each stage is represented as an 'increase' in the security of this region.

The most visible promotion of this security approach is in the signing of the EU's association agreements -- or Europe Agreements -- with Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. Since their initial conception, the agreements have been represented as a means through which the EU can satisfy "the wish of those countries...to forge closer and lasting links with the Community through a form of association designed to support their reforms."³⁷

The agreements' content is summarized by Gerd Langguth in five points.

1. A permanent political dialogue is planned, to be conducted in mutual interests in the Association Council

35 . Delors, *op.cit.*, note 9.

36 . See Gabriella Izik Hedri, "Die EG und die Staaten des 'Visegráder Dreiecks': Zu den Assoziierungsabkommen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft mit Polen, der Tschechoslowakei und insbesondere Ungarn," *Osteuropa* 43, No.2, (1993): 155-166; Peter M.Schmidhuber, "Die Europäische Gemeinschaft und die Veränderungen in Osteuropa," *Osteuropa* 42, No.3 (1992): 265-270.

37 . Bull. EC 11-1990, point 1.4.1.

at ministerial level on all questions of a bilateral and multilateral nature.

2. A further key element is the establishment of a free trade area for industrial products during a transitional period lasting ten years. An asymmetric granting of free market access is to be one of the contributions by the EC to the economic development of the partner countries. Due to the difficult economic state of these countries the EC must open up its market much faster than its partners.

3. Economic cooperation is the third main element, for example, when restructuring industrial branches, setting up small and medium-sized production enterprises, and introducing norms and standards.

4. Financial cooperation is also planned on a many-year basis.

5. Furthermore, cultural cooperation is to be promoted to enable people in the previous EC-Europe and in Central and Eastern Europe to become fully aware of their common European identity.³⁸

These objectives intend to "foster transformation in [ECE] and to promote [their] integration...into the western-style international economic and political system." Opening up markets to ECE countries is suggested to be the greatest guarantor of security. And indeed, these countries themselves have vociferously pursued such arrangements."

However, as in the case of financial assistance, this notion of ensuring security rests on the assumption of the EU as an 'anchor' of stability which should be emulated by the rest of Europe. The agreements are perceived to have

...considerable political importance because they [symbolise] the new-found unity of Europe and [show] that the European Community [is] the central factor behind the reorganization of Europe...³⁹

38 . Gerd Langguth, "The Single European Market-Also An Opportunity for Eastern Europe?" *Aussenpolitik* 43, No.2 (1992): 112.

39 . Heinz Kramer, "The EC and the Stabilisation of Eastern Europe," *Aussenpolitik* 43, No.1 (1992): p.14.

40 . Witness Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus' public assertion that the Czech Republic intends to accede to the Union before its Višegrad counterparts.

41 . "Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security on the conclusion of the Europe Agreement between the European Communities and

This assumption is certainly problematic in terms of how security of the ECE region is approached. It implies that ECE security will be best served by the grafting of EU economic models and trade relations onto economies in the region. As in the case of economic assistance, this implies the pervasive accommodation of the marketplace. On the one hand, it would be difficult to make the assertion that ECE could meet its economic challenges without some kind of integration and cooperation into regional economic structures. Alternatively, however, the approach used in the agreements assumes ECE societies' capacities to withstand the harsh aspects of such integration if only certain structural steps are taken -- a tenuous assertion at best.

For example, even if one accepts the Europe Agreements' method of market integration as a viable route to ECE security, there is still the major difficulty of the EU's *de facto* asymmetrical trade advantages. Considering the relative differences between the market power of Eastern and Western countries, ECE countries are in an obviously vulnerable position. The agreements' attempt to compensate for this is quite limited and, in many cases, can even be

read as intentionally damaging to the limited ECE opportunities that do exist for trade.

This argument is not to suggest that liberal trading arrangements should necessarily be maximized as a viable road to security of ECE countries. Rather it suggests that the EU attempts to cloak such agreements in terms that, at first glance, may seem economically very attractive to the ECE region. Upon further investigation, however, their text reveals little intention to ensure the 'security' of this region, but rather to ensure the creation and maintenance of a regional liberal trading order. For example, free trade for industrial goods is subject to the possibility of restrictive EU anti-dumping and escape clauses. Moreover, the EU has demonstrated its willingness to impose restrictions on the 'sensitive' areas of agriculture, steel, and textiles (where ECE countries clearly have the best capacity to be competitive). This, despite studies showing that the so-called 'sensitive' areas are not particularly sensitive at all. Thus, even in keeping with the perspective that free trade in the region is a road to security, the EU clearly sees many of its own perceived interests to be of greater importance.⁴²

42 . See Sándor Richter, "East-West Trade Under Growing Western Protectionism," *Forschungsbericht* No.198, Wiener Institut Für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, June 1993; Jim Pollo and Alasdair Smith, "The political economy of East European trade with the European Community: why so sensitive?" *Economic Policy* 16 (April 1993): 140-181.

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PRECISIONSM RESOLUTION TARGETS

A related point, and one which is more germane to this study, is that the agreements reinforce a perception that a maximization of 'free trade' is necessarily beneficial to the ECE region's security. The discourse which emerges from this maintains the necessity of 'efficiency' throughout ECE economies, in order to ensure their ultimate integration into the Western regional system. In doing so, the ECE region's likely 'success' within a free trade arrangement will involve specific sectoral areas such as agriculture, textiles, and steel products. As Tömmel points out,

Assistance policies together with association agreements will mainly induce and reinforce sectoral specialisations between East and West European countries... [leading] to a marked international division of labour. East European countries can only successfully compete...in the field of labour-intensive traditional sectors and mass production.

The agreements' approach is tightly wound up in an identity-based understanding of the EU's role in Europe, which may prove to be not only stagnating, but also damaging, to the security of ECE.

Tömmel further raises the rather provocative, but not unlikely, possibility that

West European countries will find new opportunities for expanding especially in high-tech sectors or in those branches producing highly diversified consumption goods...
In the long run, the economic development strategy of the EC for Eastern Europe will accelerate economic restructuring and modernisation in Western Europe and strengthen its competitive position in world markets.

43 . Tömmel, *op.cit.*, note 22, pp.17-18.

Under the approach suggested here, the EU would clearly perceive itself as a post-industrial region, while ECE countries provide both a market for high-tech products and services and a 'backyard' for the region's less glamorous industrial needs. Such a trend could only emerge parallel to a conception of West European identity, which positions the West in distinction to the 'rest', due to its 'advanced' embrace of market-based principles. Along the way, this sectoral dependence on EU economic interests in no way guarantees ECE regional economic security.

Additionally, if economic security is to be produced from such a system, it is important to question who is being secured. If the ongoing process of market reform is any indicator, it is not the majority of ECE citizens who benefit on the whole. There has been a clear advantage in economic benefits accrued by those who are directly involved in market reform. Valki and Csaba clearly point to the "...growing disparity in the standard of living and consumption among various strata of the population, especially the growing gap between the rising income of new entrepreneurs and the eroding income of employees."⁴⁴

Finally, it is important to note that the prospect of efficient transitions translates into harsh macro- and microeconomic policies being demanded of the ECE region. By

44 . Valki and Csaba, *op.cit.*, note 7, p.48.

shaping the agreements in a particular way, the EU's approach effectively excludes other aspects of economic security. This delegates the social dimensions of security in ECE-EU relations to a second order importance. For instance, there are restrictions placed on low-priced goods originating from the ECE. These restrictions result from an EU perception of an ECE 'comparative advantage' in producing exports.⁴⁵ However, when this 'advantage' is assessed relative to Western 'efficiency', the advantage is indeed quite small and has extremely negligible effects on the EU. Despite this, the Europe Agreements aim to open up even these markets, signaling an inevitably large rise in unemployment in the East, as firms tighten up quickly for the marketplace. This rapid dismantling of 'inefficient' industries, also discussed above with respect to PHARE, has already led to increasing unemployment in Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, and is imminent in the Czech Republic. If the EU's approach to economic security is to include issues such as the freedom from the fear of poverty (and the Union's own references to economic 'injustice' in the context of ECE security suggests that it does⁴⁶), then the Europe

45 . Volkhart Vincentz, "Die Integration Osteuropas In Die Europäische Wirtschaft: Bedingungen und Konsequenzen Unterschiedlicher Entwicklungsstrategien," Working Paper No.155, Osteuropa-Institut München, November 1992.

46 . Reinforcing this point is the EU members' engagement of the Social Charter, as well as its recommendation that ECE countries become signatories of the Social Charter of the Council of Europe. "Opinion of the Committee on Social Affairs, Employment and the Working Environment on the conclusion of an association agreement between the European

Agreements seem to delay such prospects until an alternative employment base (within the competitive market) is fostered in ECE. This is, at best, a very long-term prospect.

Another important example of how social questions are put aside is exemplified by the issues of women and economic security within the ECE region. The difficult 'double burden' of women in communist systems has been well documented, but little has been explored in terms of women's plight in the post-communist societies. According to Sarah Ashwin, despite the move to 'transform' ECE societies,

...[the] well-known catalogue of women's woes is merely being replaced by a new set of problems, fast becoming equally familiar. Women are the first to be sacked by enterprises keen to cut costs (they are seen as more expensive to employ and less reliable); governments generally respond to this by extolling the virtues of a female return to the home... [W]omen have [also] virtually been squeezed out of politics... '[F]reedom' has merely allowed deep-rooted prejudices to rise to the surface, since lip service need no longer be paid to the idea of sexual equality.'

The EU agreements' effective nullification of the social content of economic security makes it extraordinarily difficult to address such social problems. If the agreements are to act as an avenue for association between the EU and ECE, their 'silence' on the structural effects of

Community and the Republic of Poland" (A3-0258/92/Annex), PE 200.339/fin./Ann., 30 November 1992, p.17.

47 . Sarah Ashwin, "Women and the Transition from Communism: Between a Rock and a Hard Place," *Slavonic and East European Review* 71, No.4 (1993): 712-716; Maria Ciechocinska, "Gender Aspects of Dismantling the Command Economy in Eastern Europe: the Polish Case," *Geoforum* 24, No.1 (1993): 31-44; A recent example of this dilemma is found in Geoffrey York, "Russian women battered on all sides," *Globe and Mail*, 9 March 1995, p. A1, A6.

economic reform leaves particularly little room for considering women. This structural concern is not inherent only in the ECE,⁴⁸ but the rapid impact of structural reform in the region has magnified the inequalities built into the engagement of a liberal economic framework.

In both of these examples, the social consequences of the EU's emphasis on market efficiency, are treated as epiphenomenal. The second example raises the possibility that market reform itself carries certain structural deficiencies which, in fact, lead to insecurity. Here, the ontological privileging of market economics as 'natural' must be questioned. This issue resurfaces in the next chapter, where the attempt to take environmental issues seriously also leads to this kind of fundamental questioning.

Not surprisingly, the predominance of free market principles within the agreements have come under criticism within the committees assigned to study them. For instance, the EP Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy asserts that the agreements need to decrease their emphasis on the imposition of a 'market

48 . On the issue of structural inequalities for women within the EU, see Jacqueline True, "National Selves and Feminine Others," *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 17, No.2 (1993): 75-89.

economy', suggesting this term to be "a little simplistic."⁴⁹ Instead, the committee claims that

...[i]nside the Community, there is a growing acceptance of the fact that neither a simple market economy nor a centrally-planned economy can guarantee the welfare of the population at large... [and that] the term 'social market economy' should be used throughout the final agreement in order to make the association agreement more acceptable.

The Committee on Social Affairs, Employment and the Working Environment goes even further in stating its

...objection at the fact that these agreements lack a social dimension and overlook fundamental questions such as social protection, vocational training, the role of the social partners, living and working conditions, the situation of women and young people in society and in the labour market and the social consequences of the parallel economy.⁵⁰

These criticisms indicate some of the crucial areas that have been written out of these agreements. If an expanded sense of security is to be understood as including the consideration of ways in which society's health or general well-being is put in peril, then many of these concerns must be recognized as important.⁵¹

49 . "Opinion of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy for the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security on the conclusion of an association agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Poland," (A3-0258/92Annex), PE 200.339/fin./Ann., 30 November 1992, p.4.

50 . *Ibid.*, p.5.

51 . "Opinion of the Committee on Social Affairs, Employment and the Working Environment on the conclusion of an association agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Poland," *op.cit.*, note 46, p.17.

52 . One could make the argument that such measures would ultimately deny ECE economies the capacity to be competitive. However, from a West European perspective, this seems a spurious argument. The strength of these West European economies was clearly constructed in the post-WWII context with considerable attention paid to the social dimension of recovery. Indeed, the EU's heavy emphasis on structural reform and market enhancement advocates recovery in the East which it would never expect of its own member states.

To review, the assumption that economic security for the ECE region is realized through the Europe Agreements is highly problematic. Even if one accepts the discourse that emphasizes liberal trade as an instrument to build ECE stability (and thus security), the terms within the agreement are not particularly favourable to the region's capacity to participate in such a system. But beyond this, the agreements' overriding emphasis on the benefits of free-trade and 'efficiency' not only ignores the possibility of regional insecurity (based on sectoral dependency), but also leads to the neglect of other important aspects of economic security.

The EU's 'Dual Approach'

The EU's policy as related to economic security in ECE suggests the existence of a dual approach, displaying both an engagement of and aversion to the consideration of economics and security. On the one hand, the EU's regard of economic issues as integral to ECE security suggests an endorsement of an expanded notion of security. Simultaneously however, this expansion of the agenda has carried with it much of the constraining discourse of conventional security, leading to a narrow conception of economic security which heavily favours the 'free market' as its 'natural' aim.

To understand the reasons for the latter aspect of this approach, it is helpful to discuss the way in which 'traditonal' security conceptions are able to pervade an expanded approach. As indicated above, the EU's representation of how security is linked to economics is closely associated to a traditional threat-discourse. The discourse takes its main referent point to be the juxtaposition of ECE economic 'instability' to the West European 'stability'. Consequently, 'instability' is closely related to the inchoate character of nascent ECE market economies.

This conception of economic threat is underlined by an understanding of economic security which is comparable to 'soft-neorealism'.⁵³ Soft-neorealists, exemplified by writers such as Barry Buzan, explain the 'reality' of economic security as "a slippery relativity combined with a peculiarly intense nexus of contradictions and trade-offs." Elaborating on this 'nexus', Buzan states that

[t]he elusive quality of economic security becomes apparent immediately [when] one tries to apply the idea to the dominant mode of economic organization in the system: capitalism... [which is] by definition a competitive system, the whole dynamic of which depends on the interplay of threats, vulnerabilities and opportunities within the market. How can any units within such an environment ever be meaningfully secure when competition implies an ever-present danger of becoming a loser?...

53 . Whether the term originated with him or not, I owe its use to conversations with Simon Dalby concerning Barry Buzan's work on European security.

54 . Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda For International Security Studies In The Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991) 235.

Competitive capitalism is thus founded on a considerable degree of permanent insecurity for all the units within it (individuals, firms, states), making the idea of economic security within capitalism seem a contradiction in terms...

The tension between vulnerability and efficiency occurs again and again at almost all the levels of economic security from the individual, through firm, class and state to the system as a whole.

This understanding of economic security allows for the division of 'threats' and 'non-threats', embodied respectively in capitalist and non-capitalist societies. Here, the 'real' instability and threats, closely associated to societies unable to establish an 'efficient' capitalist system, are not to be confused with those that occur 'naturally' within a 'healthy' capitalist system. In other words, economic insecurity is justified within established market economies as a natural element of those systems, but becomes a reason to denounce non-market systems that contain any element of insecurity.

The soft-neorealist perspective bears strong resemblance to the EU's discourse vis-à-vis ECE, in its insistence on "the implementation of the reform programme... to help the [ECE] face up to the economic consequences of the structural adjustment measures." Here

55 . *Ibid.*, pp.236-237.

56 . Making this point clear, Buzan states that countries which attempt to reduce their vulnerability, by not participating in the international trading order, do so only by 'threatening the division of labour and economies of scale that make production efficient.' See Buzan, *op.cit.*, note 54, p.236.

57 . "Opinion of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy for the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security on the conclusion of an association agreement between the European Community and the Republic of Poland," *op.cit.*, note 49.

the difficulties of economic transition are represented as 'normal' and, by inference, those not following this path are somehow not facing the 'truth' about economic security. As such, this discourse propagates a narrow understanding economic security. Polarizations of 'stability' and 'instability' lead to the implication that efficiently operating market systems are the only economic avenue for security. Thus, capitalist principles are a preconceived conclusion in any search for economic security, and the structural insecurity that accompanies them are wholly justified.

This narrow understanding of economic security is displayed within the EU's policy. Through its conditions on aid, as well as the whole structure of the Europe Agreements, the EU considers market principles as the 'natural' conclusion of economic security in ECE. In the same way as the perspective described above, the relative insecurity that is experienced along the way is explained as a justified function of the EU's ultimate telos for the region's 'stability' and 'security'. Such a representation of economic security ensures that the more detrimental effects of EU policy never fundamentally undermine the policy itself. The high levels of unemployment experienced in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania; rapidly deteriorating social protection; the difficult situation of

women; and all other difficulties involved in the 'transition' are represented as problems which will be overcome by improvements to the market system. Rarely, if ever, is the imposition of market principles questioned as possibly deleterious to the needs of ECE societies.

Instead, the degree of economic security that the region has is gauged by crude economic indicators. For instance, although Poland's economy 'grew' modestly in 1993, according to such indicators as industrial production and gross national product, the many social problems including unemployment, ill-health, and crime call into question the 'health' of this society. Indeed, Poland's 'democracy' has been one of the most unstable in the ECE region since its emergence as the leader in capitalist reform. These and other problems are seen, however, as part of a larger, 'natural' process whereby the increasing embrace of market principles signify the attainment of economic security.

Evaluating the EU on Economic Security

The EU has engaged the concept of economic security in that the agenda for ECE is represented as having expanded to include non-military issues such as economics. However, as the policies dealing with EU assistance and EU-ECE economic relations make evident, this expanded security agenda is

58 . See, for instance, "Survey Eastern Europe: The old world's new world," *Economist*, 13 March 1993.

accompanied by an identity-based threat-discourse. This discourse privileges an East-West divide, state-centrism and the universal embrace of market principles as ways of fending off economic 'instability'. As such, while the EU has engaged economic security, it has done so in a limited manner. The critical perspective taken here shows that effects of EU policy on the 'security' of the ECE region is by no means always positive. Instead, the narrow, market-oriented focus keeps the Union from fully -- and successfully -- engaging the concept.

The ramifications of the EU's approach are severe when social questions are considered. However, as alluded to in the analysis of PHARE, the effects seem particularly difficult when marginalised issues, such as the environment, are considered. Such issues do not come under serious review because structural effects which stem from the nature of the system itself are effectively silenced. Thus, while the linkage of status-quo economics to security is possible to some degree, such a linkage with environmental issues produces damning contradictions. For instance, if security translates into Tömmel's division of the European land-mass into industrial and post-industrial societies, what will this say about future ecological sustainability? What is the relationship between such market-driven economic

development and environmental security, in Eastern or Western Europe?

CHAPTER 3

The EU and Environmental Security: subtle silences and overt contradictions

The first person who, having enclosed a plot of land, took it into his head to say *this is mine* and found people simple enough to believe him was the true founder of civil society. What crimes, wars, murders, what miseries and horrors would the human race have been spared, had someone pulled up the stakes or filled in the ditch and cried out to his fellow men: "Do not listen to this impostor. You are lost if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong to all and the earth to no one!"¹

There has clearly been an intrusion of conventional identity politics into the EU's consideration of economic security. In approaching the ECE region, the EU has engaged economic security only insofar as status-quo perceptions of 'stability' are maintained and reproduced. While such an approach portends an expanded security conception, a more extensive broadening of the EU's security's agenda has been indefinitely deferred. In issue-areas where structural insecurity figures prominently, such as those involving environmental concerns, the EU's reliance on identity politics silences questions regarding possible systemic effects on security in either ECE or the EU.

By examining the EU's approach to environmental problems in the ECE region, this chapter highlights the EU's incapacity to seriously engage an environmental security

1 . Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Discourse On The Origin Of Inequality Among Men," in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Basic Political Writings*, Trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1987) 60.

approach. It suggests that while the EU has loosely alluded to the environment in the security context, its preoccupation with identity politics has effectively meant that such ecological considerations remain in the form of broad, unexplained references. While the PHARE and the 'Europe Agreements' are regularly referred to as an instrument of the EU's economic security approach, the Union can make no equivalent claim with respect to environmental security. It considers environmental problems only insofar as they bear upon the accepted approach to ECE economic questions, effectively excluding serious consideration of environmental problems in the ECE region. Thus, the EU's susceptibility to conventional identity politics makes the advent of an EU approach to environmental security virtually impossible and, if anything, actually increases environmental insecurity in the ECE region.

To argue this, the chapter is divided into four sections. Similar to the last chapter, the first section briefly highlights the EU's references to the environment in the ECE security context. It shows that the EU, in fact, makes only obscure connections between environment and security, with no indication as to how such reflection might be reflected in security policy. Diverging from the format to the previous two chapters, there is then a discussion of environmental concerns that have come to light in the ECE

region since the revolutions of 1989-90. This environmental 'review' is necessary for a number of reasons. First, because the EU does not advocate an ECE environmental security approach per se, it is necessary to highlight the gravity of ECE problems which make their connection with security important. Second, the elaboration of these problems make their serious disconnect with EU environmental policy more obvious. Third, while both economic and military concerns get considerable attention in literature dealing with European security, environmental issues receive, at best, passing mention. Thus, the section familiarizes the reader on a topic of interest to European security that has otherwise been left largely unexplored. The next section outlines the EU's policy for addressing ECE environmental problems, pointing to some its more obvious drawbacks. Finally, after having discussed the EU's approach to these problems, the chapter then critically evaluates that approach in the security context.

EU Security: the environment 'included'

The expanding conception of EU security, already examined in terms of economic security, has touched upon ECE environmental issues. The EP has referred to the environment as one of the EU's security issues by stating that "Community security policy must incorporate the economic, ecological, demographic, technological and other

aspects on which social and international interaction is based."² Moreover, in calling for this expanded agenda, the EP has suggested specific institutional measures "which must include both new instruments and new objectives in military and non-military spheres (such as economic relations and measures, environmental protection, financial aid, diplomatic initiatives, support for the respect of human rights)."³ Finally, in relation to East-West relations and the environment, the EP views "...impending environmental disasters or those which have already occurred, in particular those caused by past malpractice...[as] the most serious threats to security in East-West relations in Europe."⁴ Thus, the environment has been linked to the issue of East European security, but only as one among a number of new issues which ostensibly require the EU's attention.

The EP's interest in linking non-military issues, such as the environment, to security has been echoed by Delors. In referring to the problem of security, he claims that

2 . "EP Resolution on the outlook for a European security policy: the significance of a European security policy and its institutional implications for European Political Union," (A-30107/91), *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No C 183/18, 15 July 1991.

3 . "EP Resolution on future relations between the European Union, the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance," (A3-0041/94), *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No C 77/17, 24 February 1994.

4 . "EP Resolution on developments in East-West relations in Europe and their impact on European Security," (A3-0108/93), *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No C 176/185, 28 May, 1993; see also "Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security on shaping the European Community's common foreign policy (Rapporteur: Mr. Josep Verde I Aldea)," (A3-0322/92), PE 201.471/fin, 23 October 1992, p.5.

...we have to incorporate new dimensions such as the protection of the environment or, at a deeper level, the relationship between man and nature. Public opinion has sensed the major importance of this issue but has not yet grasped all the implications of a long-term policy to conserve the natural world and to hand down intact to future generations precious resources.⁵

Two years later, considering the same topic, Delors states more explicitly that there must be "a broader approach to security, embracing political, economic, ecological, and other factors."⁶ Once again, in relation to the ECE region, Delors makes clear that among other issues to be taken into account, "transnational environmental issues...could also threaten security."⁷ Here the implication of whose security is being threatened is not precise, offering no reasons for why security and the environment should be linked nor any appropriate policy avenues to follow. Subsequently, it is reasonable to state that the Union's approach to ECE environmental problems exhibits little more than vague references to the connection between the environment and security.

Such vagueness is not surprising because the consideration of the environment in the context of security leads to difficult sociological/philosophical questions. In his quintessentially modern questioning of the relationship between "man and nature," Delors connects security to the

5 . Jacques Delors, "European Integration and Security," Speech to IISS Conference, London, 7 March 1991.

6 . Jacques Delors, "Questions Concerning European Security," Speech to IISS Conference, Brussels, 10 September 1993.

7 . *Ibid.*

problem of how individuals and humanity imagine themselves within their environment. His conclusion is mixed, suggesting a certain reverence for the 'natural' world but also evoking images of ownership. Europeans are encouraged to view the environment as a 'precious resource' that they must 'hand down' to their future generations, as if it were a family business.⁸

Moreover, Delors' suggests the important place of politics in creating perceptions of the environment. On the one hand, this approach asks the reader to accept the significance of public opinion in addressing environmental issues. On the other hand, the public, which Delors' does not seem to view as possessing sufficient cathetic capacities, needs to be shown why the environment should be important. The implication is, of course, that the responsibility for expressing environmental concerns falls mainly with those responsible for policy. Policymakers, in this sense, expand their 'expertise', defining how Europeans should consider the environment.

Such a perspective is a good reflection of how the EU's approach to ECE environmental problems takes shape, largely

8 . On the issue of ownership and the environment, see Jeremy Rifkin's section on the 'enclosure movement' in *Biosphere Politics* (New York: Harper Collins, 1992) 11-94.

9 . On the question of cathetic capacities, see James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: a Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990) 334. On this issue related to the environment, see: Cindy Termorshuizen, "Power, Knowledge and the Environment in International Relations Theory," Master's Thesis (Carleton University, Ottawa, 1994) 98.

on a modern, scientific, 'environment-as-resource' basis. The vague, open-ended nature of linking security to the environment has, in effect, meant that no serious connection has been drawn between the two at all. Instead, the EU has been content to maintain a perspective synonymous with Delors' rather than seriously questioning what is required to engage environmental issues.

Eastern Europe: an environmental dilemma

Before proceeding to discuss the EU's perspective, this section explains some of the main environmental dilemmas of the ECE region. Not intended as an authoritative description,¹⁰ it discusses the contemporary environmental situation in the ECE region and the many environmental problems which have come to light since the 1989 political upheavals. While many of these problems find their roots in the central planning legacy of the past,¹¹ there are also a

10 . There is little doubt that other arguments concerning the evaluation of security policy could offer counter-descriptions that reflect different theoretical biases. One such approach is the so-called 'no-regret' approach. In it, absolute 'scientific legitimacy' is privileged as a necessary precursor to action in the environmental sphere. According to this approach, since there is little conclusive evidence concerning the future impact of present environmental concerns, these issues are seen as only one of many endangering humanity. See C. Boyden and David B Rivkin, Jr., "A 'No Regrets' Environmental Policy," *Foreign Policy* 83 (1991): 47-65.

11 . Clearly the legacy of centrally planned economies has much to do with the ECE region's present environmental problems. Among the most damaging elements was a failure to enforce environmental regulations, an emphasis on quantity of products, and a tendency towards widespread wastage (at least in the public realm). See Roger Manser, *The Squandered Dividend: The free market and the environment in Eastern Europe* (London: Earthscan, 1993); Leslie Dienes "Environmental Disruption in Eastern Europe," in Ivan Volgyes (ed.) *Environmental Deterioration in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974) 141-158; Helmut Schreiber, "The Threat from

variety of 'new' problems on the scene. Whatever the origins of the ECE environmental situation, one thing is certain: since the political changes of 1989/90, its gravity has become increasingly evident. The damage to the environment in the region has been, and continues to be, extensive.

There are numerous 'hot spots' throughout ECE which portend severe environmental and human health catastrophes. One of Eastern Europe's worst environmental dilemmas is that of air pollution. Within the region, particularly in the former East Germany, the Czech Republic, and Poland, (regularly referred to as the 'Black Triangle') air emissions of sulphur dioxide (SO₂) and nitrogen oxide (NO_x) account for 30 and 20 per cent of the European totals respectively. The source of much of these emissions is the use of low quality coal (lignite) with a high sulphur content for the production of energy. In the face of increasing Russian oil prices, economic needs and the dynamics of transition has made the use of cheaper (and relatively abundant) lignite a necessity. As a result, the air quality in numerous ECE urban and industrial areas is

Environmental Destruction in Eastern Europe," *Journal of International Affairs* 44, No.2 (1991): 368.

12 . Schreiber, *op.cit.*, note 11, p.365.

13 . Gordon Hughes, "Clean Air But No Jobs? Environmental priorities and policies during the transition in Central and Eastern Europe," *Proceedings from Conference on Energy and Environment In European Economies In Transition: Priorities and Opportunities For Co-operation and Integration*, Prague, 17-19th June 1992, p.62.

deplorable. Some of the more 'noteworthy' areas include Kraków, Teplice, Most, Ostrava, Katowice, Copsa Mica, Prague, Budapest, Halle, and Leipzig, to name only a few. Within most of these areas dust emissions are also extremely high and are believed to cause even more health problems than SO₂. Some of the more deleterious health effects in these regions include a shortened average lifespan, neurological damage, birth defects, and acute and chronic respiratory diseases (asthma, emphysema, bronchitis, and tuberculosis).¹⁴

Water problems are also very informative in ascertaining the extent of environmental damage in the ECE area. Much of the region's population lacks appropriate sewage and water-treatment facilities, leading to considerable deterioration ground water over the years. Additionally, industrial use of water has tended to proceed without the use of waste-water treatment systems. Consequently, the water quality within the region is less than ideal. In Poland, 95 per cent of the surface water is classified as unfit for human consumption,¹⁵ and much of it is even unfit for industrial use. Similar figures exist for most other countries in the region.¹⁶ The Vistula river,

14 . *Ibid.*

15 . Manser, *op.cit.*, note 11. p.21.

16 . *Ibid.* According to Manser, "[in] former East Germany, some 20 percent of waters could be drunk only after being treated... [while] an estimated four-fifths of Romania's rivers were unable to supply drinking water. In the Czech Republic, class I [drinkable] water represented 17

Poland's main waterway, is now estimated to be saltier than the Baltic Sea into which it empties because of the flushing of coal mines. Other main rivers such as the Elbe, Oder, Neisse and Danube are also highly polluted. The latter's journey through Europe paints a particularly grim picture of the problems of industrial and sewage waste throughout the region. The river is the dumping ground for industrial waste from countless factories, as well as 'new' toxins from the consumer market, including phosphate-laden detergents. A major problem is in the inability of cities and towns to expand sewage treatment systems. Budapest alone dumps raw wastes from two million people into the river, only 25 per cent of which is treated.¹⁷ Finally, according to Helmut Schreiber, "[the] problem of the purity of underground water is similar. In rural areas, the proportion of water fit for human consumption has decreased due to problems associated with unsatisfactory sanitation conditions and the growing use of pesticides and fertilizers."¹⁸

Soil pollution is another major problem in the ECE region. The acidification of soils, the burying of toxic industrial and agricultural wastes (particularly heavy metals and chemicals), and the extensive overuse of

per cent of water flow length, and the poorest quality 22 per cent, while in Slovakia, about half the water flows were class IV [biologically dead]."

17 . Marlise Simons, "East Europe Sniffs Freedom's Air, and Gasps," *New York Times*, 3 November 1994, pp.A1, A14.

18 . Schreiber, *op.cit.*, note 11, p.366.

fertilizers have led to widespread problems in soil management. In the 1960s and 1970s alone, Poland buried a minimum of 40 000 tonnes of toxic agricultural wastes, including pesticides (DDT), organochlorides, and pesticide containers. Officials in that country now suspect that the containers in which they were placed are leaking extensively.¹⁹ In multiple production sites, chemicals such as mercury, phenols, hydrocarbons, and carbon disulphide have been either intentionally dumped or have leaked out of the production process. While acid rain has virtually destroyed hundreds of thousands of square kilometres of forest in Poland, the former East Germany, and the Czech Republic, attempts to replant these areas may be fruitless because of the acidification of the soil. The soil has lost much of its ability to recycle nitrogen properly, and the loss of buffering agents such as calcium and magnesium have caused the release of toxic aluminum.²⁰

In terms of sources of environmental degradation, the first major one in the region is the energy industry. East European governments have tended to stick to domestic sources of energy rather than becoming dependent on a variety of external sources, such as oil or natural gas. As mentioned above, this has resulted in the widespread burning

19 . Manser, *op.cit.*, note 11, p.22.

20 . Craig ZumBrunnen, "The Environmental Challenges in Eastern Europe," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 19, No.3 (1990): 395.

of indigenous lignite coal for energy production, the heating of industrial open hearth furnaces, and the heating of private homes.²¹ This is exacerbated by the problem cross-border pollution which brings much of West European states', particularly Germany's, pollution into the ECE region. In areas where pollution is most extensive, such as Northern Bohemia in the Czech Republic where emissions reach up to 117.6 tons/km², life expectancy is almost a full ten years lower than in Western Europe.²²

Other contributors to the region's environmental dilemmas include poor waste management, agricultural practices, and an increasing imitation of Western consumption patterns. Waste management involves the disposal of waste from industrial and personal sources. Untreated sewage in water is a central problem in all of the countries concerned, in that garbage and personal waste processing is done inadequately or not done at all.²³ Alternatively, waste is left in heaps that

...exert a very harmful effect on their environment. They may cause deformation in the ground and their chaotic distribution impedes natural runoff. Their soluble particles are washed out by rain and carried into the soil and the ground-water supply, changing the latter's chemical composition. When on fire, waste dumps pollute the air, and through water and the atmosphere act toxically on the vegetation.²⁴

21 . Hughes, *op.cit.*, note 13, pp.63-67.

22 . Jaroslav Maroušek, "Energy and Environment: The Path Of Coexistence For The CSFR," in *Proceedings of Conference on Energy and Environment In European Economies In Transition: Priorities and Opportunities For Co-operation and Integration*, note 13, pp.99-101.

23 . Simons, *op.cit.*, note 17.

24 . Dienes, *op.cit.*, note 11, p.147.

Agricultural practices throughout the region are "in many ways as destructive as industry in the towns."²⁵ As mentioned above, the overuse of agricultural fertilizers in the region ties in closely with problems of waste management and soil degradation. Beyond this, however, the continuing expansion to marginal lands and the practice of monocropping has also led to soil erosion and the reduction of soil fertility. Additionally, the irrigation practices in the region have tended to create falling water tables and saline soils.²⁶ The example of Hungary, a major agricultural exporter, is particularly salient. Over two-thirds of Hungary's arable land is cultivated leading to some serious problems. According to Sandor Kerekes and Miklos Bulla,

Water erosion has damaged about 2.3 million hectares of mountainous and hilly terrain. In addition, 1.4 million hectares are endangered by wind erosion. According to estimates, degraded soil amounts to about 80-100 million m² on these areas. That means about 1.5 million tons of organic matter are destroyed on a yearly average. In the plains, a 10- or 20-year flood may inundate 130,000 hectares of land. This may increase to one million hectares in extreme cases. Soil acidification increased greatly in the last 1.5-2 decades and became one of the most damaging processes.

Finally, a more recent problem in the region has been the increase in personal consumption rates. While the decline of communist political regimes brought with it certain rights of political expression for peoples, the

25 . Manser, *op.cit.*, note 11, p.23.

26 . *Ibid.*

27 . Sandor Kerekes and Miklos Bulla, "Environmental Management In Hungary," *Environmental Impact Assessment Review* 14, No.2/3 (1994): 95-101.

close link between this political change and a market 'transition' has also meant a wider availability of consumer goods. This has helped lead to the arrival of the 'car culture of the West.'²⁸ The already extraordinary rise in consumer goods, accompanied by Western-style packaging, the decline of the former regimes' recycling system, and a surge in consumer durables such as washing machines and automobiles have imposed a stress on the environment that is somewhat unfamiliar in this region. For instance, the rising number of washing machines being purchased has far outstripped the installation of waste water treatment capacity. This has led to a large increase in untreated phosphate-detergents in the sewage.

This latter example makes especially evident the contradictory element at work when economic and environmental security are considered in the same light. In many ways, East Europeans' conception of economic security has come to mirror that espoused within the West. Individual security is reflected in the rise in personal income and the purchasing power of individuals within a demand-driven economy. While this tendency towards an consumption-oriented economy may provide a sense of psychological security among individuals, its effects are antithetical to any genuine understanding of protecting the

28 . Simons, *op.cit.*, note 17.

29 . Manser, *op.cit.*, note 11, p.96.

environment. The litany of problems discussed above suggest serious obstacles to the well-being of ECE societies. As Dalby notes, if security "is understood in its broad sense to encompass substantial human-generated threats then clearly the legacy of the industrialization patterns of Eastern Europe continues to render large numbers of people insecure."³⁰ Indeed, the gravity of these problems suggests that environmental challenges should be of first-order importance when the security of Europeans is considered.

Such a task is by no means easy. It is made more difficult by the realization that "[t]he challenge is to simultaneously demilitarize, provide jobs and clean up the environment, hence reducing the inducements to large-scale destabilizing migration and potential transboundary disputes."³¹ Certainly the 'dia-eclectic' element of this work suggests the importance of creating economic sustainability while attempting to encourage ecological sensitivity. It is, however, important to not that an ill-conceived overemphasis on the environment could easily lead to difficult economic problems within the ECE region. Unfortunately, as the next section makes clear, the EU's approach has fallen far short of such a holistic consideration of environmental challenges. Instead, its

30 . Simon Dalby, "Post-Cold War security in the new Europe," in John O'Loughlin and Herman van der Wusten (eds.), *The New Political Geography Of Eastern Europe* (London: Belhaven, 1993) 79.

31 . *Ibid.* , p.82.

approach is an appendage of, and aims to complement, its push for rapid economic restructuring in the region, marginalizing ECE environmental problems from the security context.

EU Policy: maintaining the 'sustainable'

EU policy intended to address ECE's environmental dilemmas can be divided into two kinds, direct and indirect. The main mechanism for direct policy is found within the PHARE programme.³² The programme possesses an environmental component through which the Union advances aid for the purposes of alleviating environmental problems. Indirectly, the Union addresses environmental problems through other mechanisms such as the Europe Agreements, international arrangements and the 'Environment for Europe' conferences. The following section discusses the environmental facet of the PHARE programme and briefly elaborates on the indirect programmes mentioned.

PHARE and the Environment:

While PHARE has already been described to some degree in the second chapter, this section addresses more specifically how the programme has an impact on the environmental problems of the ECE region. When PHARE was established in 1989, the intention was to earmark a total of

32 . See, for instance: *Towards Sustainability: A European Community programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1993) 132.

25 per cent of the aid to environmental expenditure.³³

Although this amount ostensibly underpins an EU response to ECE environmental problems, it is important to note that the PHARE programme's funds are to

...be used primarily to support the process of reform in [Central and Eastern Europe], in particular by financing or participating in the financing of projects aimed at economic restructuring. Such projects or cooperation measures should be undertaken in particular in the areas of agriculture, industry, investment, energy, training, environmental protection, trade and services; they should be aimed in particular at the private sector in [Central and Eastern Europe].³⁴

Not surprisingly, descriptions of the PHARE programme continuously make clear that whatever the programme achieves, it is done with the ultimate aim of successfully 'restructuring' ECE economies into market-based systems.³⁵ Thus, while the EU makes reference within its writings to a "moral obligation...in helping the new governments to protect and preserve their environment and the quality of life for future generations,"³⁶ the intention for PHARE is to

33 . "EP Resolution on the environmental aspects of the Phare programme in the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary)." (A3-0361/93), *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No C 44/41, 14 February 1994.

34 . "Council Regulation (EEC) No.3906/89 of 18 December 1989 on economic aid to the Republic of Hungary and the Polish People's Republic," *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No L 375, 23 December 1989. The addition of 'Central and Eastern Europe' reflects the following update to this document: "Council Regulation (EEC) No 2698/90 of 17 September 1990 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3906/89 in order to extend economic aid to other countries of Central and Eastern Europe," *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No L 257, 21 September 1990.

35 . See, for instance: *Phare: Assistance for economic restructuring in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe--An operational guide* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 1991) 5.

36 . *Report of the Commission of the European Communities to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development* (Luxembourg: Office

harness market structures in such a way as to find 'effective' solutions to environmental problems. One member of the European Court of Auditors claims in relation to the PHARE programme that the ECE region has "no need to seek to provide competitive advantages at the cost of the environment."³⁷ Indeed, the PHARE 'Operational Guide' goes so far as to say that the programme supports actions in sectors that are "essential for balanced economic development and sustainable economic growth," among them energy and the environment."

On this subject, PHARE has established a link with the concept of 'sustainable development', or in this case, 'sustainable restructuring'.³⁸ This has been made clear in a Council of Ministers 'opinion', emphasizing that all "measures receiving support from Community Funds should be analysed in terms of their compatibility with the goal of sustainable and environmentally-friendly development."³⁹

for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992) 108. This section of the report deals with the PHARE programme and EU activities in Central and Eastern Europe.

37 . B. Friedmann, "Assessment of the Various parts of the PHARE programme and the other forms of financial assistance," *Cooperation With The Countries Of Central and Eastern Europe: Assessment of Financial Aid*, Seminar of the European Court of Auditors, Berlin, 18-19 November 1993, p.49.

38 . *Phare: Assistance for economic restructuring in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe--An operational guide*, note 35, p.8.

39 . Manser makes use of this term in describing the economic and environmental objectives of Central and Eastern Europe. See Manser, *op.cit.*, note 11, pp.149-163.

40 . "Opinion on the proposal for a resolution of the council of the European Communities on a Community programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development," in *Towards Sustainability*, note 32, p.152.

Additionally, in adopting the "Fifth Action Programme on the Environment", the Council ultimately resolved to "play a positive role in the formulation of programmes of sustainable development including in... the countries of Central and Eastern Europe within the framework of the Community's cooperation and association agreements."⁴¹ As is often the case with the term 'sustainable development', its meaning is left largely unexplained. According to the EP, PHARE has the "aim of reducing the most serious sources of environmental pollution in the near future and in the longer term, aiming to secure sustainable economic development and prevent pollution."⁴² Thus, under sustainability the Union appears to emphasize economic growth first, particularly growth that minimizes or eliminates its impact on the natural environment.

Beyond these PHARE objectives, the programme's administration illustrates how the EU is responding to ECE environmental problems. PHARE is ostensibly intended as a 'demand-driven' programme,⁴³ in that funds are allotted with

41 . "Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the council of 1 February 1993 on a Community programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development," in *Towards Sustainability*, note 32, p.27.

42 . "EP Resolution on the environmental aspects of the Phare programme in the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary)," *op.cit.*, note 33.

43 . A.Mayhew (Director of the Directorate General for External Relations of the EC Commission),, "Assessment of the PHARE programme from the Commission's point of view," *Cooperation With The Countries Of Central and Eastern Europe: Assessment of Financial Aid*, Seminar of the European Court of Auditors, Berlin, 18-19 November 1993, p.142.

the intention of supporting regionally-conceived environmental needs. Initially, the EU Commission and ECE governments meet at a political and administrative level to work out 'indicative programmes', which set out the priorities of each recipient country for the year based on their needs. As I.Hagelmayer, President of the Hungarian National Audit Office, makes clear with respect to Hungary,

...aid that is granted on the basis of the framework agreement between the European Community and the Hungarian government cannot be considered to be a private-sector revenue, that the use of it increases national (in many cases, government) wealth and that responsibility for the use of it rests with the Hungarian Government."

Thus, it is notable that the programme's direction at the planning stage is determined completely by state governments. The EU's claim to decentralization at this stage is reflected only insofar that governmental actors other than the EU Commission are involved in the process.

At the 'implementation level', PHARE's attempt to create Programme Implementation Units (PIUs) has resulted in some decentralization. Once a project's feasibility and appraisal are completed and approved by the Commission's PHARE Operational Service (PHOS), a PIU is established in each 'programme sector' for the overall implementation of

44 . I. Hagelmayer, "Experience gained from the cooperation between the Hungarian national audit office and the Court of Auditors of the EC in connection with environmental measures," *Cooperation With The Countries Of Central and Eastern Europe: Assessment of Financial Aid*, Seminar of the European Court of Auditors, Berlin, 18-19 November 1993, p.55.

45 . The four sectors of PHARE include: 1) transport, agriculture, the environment and food aid, 2) development of the private sector, small

PHARE aid in each country. These units consist of consultants from the EU, the EU delegation within the affected country, and national officials working in an integrated way with appropriate ministries of ECE governments. However, while this implementation process should allow for the possibility to include non-governmental access and influence, the last chapter made clear that the Commission's informal use of Western 'consultants' tends to dominate and control the utilization of aid.

There have been numerous criticisms of PHARE's attempts to address environmental problems. The first has been the disconnection between intended funding and funds actually spent. As mentioned above, 25 per cent of PHARE funds were to be devoted to environmental expenditures. The programme has yet to accomplish this; indeed, it has fallen far short, allotting only 21 per cent in 1990, 11 percent in 1991, and 6 per cent in 1992. Moreover, these figures represent only funds committed, not funds spent. There was "an extremely low rate of implementation," in that by the end of the 1992 budget figures, "less than 21% allocated to the environment had been spent..."⁴⁶ Other problems have included the

and medium-sized enterprises, the development of banking, management training etc., 3) social security, labour market, the reform of the public sector and democratization, and 4) financial affairs and control. See "Report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection on the environmental aspects of the Phare programme in the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary)," (A3-0361/93) PE 204.624/fin, 3 September 1993 p.9.
46 . Ibid., p.11.

emphasis placed on Western rather than local 'expertise', the non-accessibility to information about programmes, and the inability to work with local officials and structures.⁴⁷ These problems will be discussed below as part of the chapter's critical evaluation.

Other Programmes:

While PHARE is the main instrument of EU environmental policy vis-à-vis the ECE region, the programme is viewed as being complemented by a range of other instruments, which indirectly affect ECE environmental challenges. One such instrument is the Europe Agreements, which are represented as useful to the environment in two ways. First, they are intended as a way to accelerate the 'reform' process by opening Eastern economies to Western competition. This, in turn, is viewed as a way to decrease negative impacts on the environment, as ECE countries gain the wealth and 'know-how' required to utilize their resources more efficiently. The argument for 'temporarily' emphasizing economic growth above environmental factors has been to

...provide these countries with new mechanisms and technologies for resolving old environmental problems. The adjustment of prices for energy and natural resources will provide incentives to replace the obsolete structure of production and lead to new investment in less polluting technologies, thereby reducing the rate of pollution per unit of output.... increas[ing] their

47 . Ibid; see also *Energy in Europe: Community Assistance in the Energy Sector To The Countries Of Central And Eastern Europe And The Former Soviet Union*, Report by the Services of the Commission (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1993).

energy and material efficiency and reduce the share of heavily polluting industries.⁴⁸

The second important aspect of these agreements is the 'normalization' of relations between the EU and the ECE region. The agreements are intended to "provide the long-term framework within which relations between the Community and these countries will develop, including environmental cooperation."⁴⁹ Following the ultimate goals of the agreements, it is hoped that ECE countries will eventually 'parallel' their environmental regulations with the EU's as they approach their goal of acceding to the Union. One official characterized the process as quite simple, stating that

...many Western companies that now want to invest in [ECE] countries have already been used to complying with environmental regulations in their own countries. All that [these countries] need do is to require them to apply the same standards in [their] countries. It costs [them] absolutely nothing. The technology has been available for a long time. And [they] will have made some contribution to environmental policy.⁵⁰

Thus, the aim of the Europe Agreements is to expose ECE industry to market factors while encouraging ECE governments to assimilate their environmental legislation to that of the EU. In this way it is hoped that energy and resource

48 . Marina Alberti (European Environmental Agency Task Force), "Regional Integration And Environmental Policy In Europe: The Need For A Pan-European Approach," *Environmental Impact Assessment Review* 14, No.2/3 (1994): 140.

49 . *Towards Sustainability*, note 32, p.132.

50 . Friedman, *op.cit.*, note 37, p.49.

efficiency will become paramount, substantially alleviating environmental problems in the region.⁵¹

Further indirect EU environmental policy comes about through other international institutions. The EU's programmes are supposed to be coordinated with various lending institutions, including the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development.⁵² The EIB incorporates, in addition to rigid financial conditions, an environmental component within its project and lending assessments. This applies particularly to the energy sector where the bank is especially active.⁵³ The EBRD, for its part, has become involved in some environmentally-oriented programmes, such as the Danube River Basin Environmental Programme, a district heating programme in five Polish cities, and the installation of flue-gas desulphurisation (FGD) technology in Bulgaria. The EBRD lending procedures are said to "integrate environmental concerns into all parts of the project preparation and approval process." Moreover, potential projects "can be rejected when there are major environmental problems or when

51 . Hughes, *op.cit.*, note 13, p.147.

52 . *Report of the Commission of the European Communities to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development*, note 36, p.108.

53 . Christopher Knowles, "The European Investment Bank," Prague, 17-19th June 1992, pp.209-212. Knowles comes from the 'Unit for Operations in Eastern and Central Europe', European Investment Bank.

a project sponsor fails to handle environmental issues in a satisfactory manner."⁵⁴

Finally, the EU has also been involved in both 'Environment for Europe' conferences in 1991 (Dobris, Czech Republic) and 1993 (Lucerne, Switzerland). From this latter conference has come the Environmental Action Plan for Central and Eastern Europe (EAP). This enormous document stresses the importance of "setting priorities, policy reforms, institutional prerequisites, expenditure priorities, and transboundary concerns."⁵⁵ The project is subject to many criticisms, including its superficial, and often conditional, approach to environmental problems, its tendency only to look seriously at environmental solutions as long-term prospects (leaving much of the present and future environmental impact of 'transition' intact), its avoidance of specific programmes, its silence on indigenous knowledge and non-governmental organizations, a lack of committed funds, and its paternal Western approach.⁵⁶

54 . Erich Unterwurzacher, "EBRD's Approach to Energy and Environmental Funding," *Conference on Energy and Environment In European Economies In Transition: Priorities and Opportunities For Co-operation and Integration*, note 13, pp.213-217.

55 . Bernd Baumgartl, "'Only' a Guideline: The Environmental Action Program For Central and Eastern Europe," *Environmental Impact Assessment Review* 14, No.2/3 (1994): 149.

56 . *Ibid.*, pp.151-155. On this last point, Baumgartl points out quite rightly that "[most] of the chapters of the EAP, in fact, could well serve as a policy guideline for western environmental policy, too. Eastern experts could easily write an Environmental Action Program for Western Europe and North America in answer to those who blame current Central and East European countries of specific negligence."

Critically Evaluating EU Policy

Following the ECE political upheavals, environmental groups played an important role early on in the setting of objectives for reform. Towards the end of the 1980s, groups such as the Danube Circle in Hungary, Ekoglasnost in Bulgaria, and PKE in Poland had been considerably successful in raising awareness of ecological issues and were one of the main catalysts for encouraging peoples to protest against dominant political regimes.⁵⁷ This translated into influence to push issues such as global warming and resource depletion onto the reform agenda. Indeed, most political programmes could not afford to pass up on opportunities to address the region's environmental degradation.⁵⁸

As a result of this influence, environmental activists -- especially those taking part within new governments -- encouraged an optimistic outlook on the opportunities of economic restructuring. They envisioned, with the help of foreign investment, the import of environmentally-friendly technology, to ensure that restructuring would proceed in an innovative manner. Moreover, they saw their capacity to have a great impact on the environmental situation through the advocacy of increased energy and resource efficiency, a factor largely missing in the old centrally-planned

57 . Manser, *op.cit.*, note 11, p.26.

58 . Duncan Fischer, *Paradise Deferred: Environmental Policymaking in Central and Eastern Europe* (London: RIIA, 1992) 8.

economies. As such, these activists "sought to *leapfrog* the environmental delinquency of the West by integrating their countries' programmes for economic development and environmental recovery at both national and local levels."⁵⁹ This would certainly constitute a considerable accomplishment--the reconciliation of the market and the environment in such a way as to ensure ecological well-being.

The prospects for such a 'leapfrog', however, have been substantially diminished within ECE economic reform. Environmental issues have been put far down on ECE regimes' list of priorities. The EU policy approach towards both economic security and the environment in the region can be considered one of the important factors contributing to this situation. The above discussion of EU policy points to a rather serious disconnection between the Union's approach to ECE environmental problems and an environmental security approach. The EU goes no further than the casual mention of the environment within the framework of conventional security. This tendency results from the Union's inability to move away from identity-based notions of what constitutes security -- an inability reflected in its overwhelming emphasis on market principles and Western 'expertise'. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to critically

59 . Manser, *op.cit.*, note 11, p.13, emphasis added.

evaluating how such notions permeate the EU's approach to ECE environmental problems, and make an environmental security approach on the part of the Union impossible. Its evaluation centres largely on PHARE and the Europe Agreements, since these are the two mechanisms through which the Union most directly affects ECE events.

To understand the problems with the EU's approach, it is helpful to examine recent theoretical work on environmental security which has put the ontological dominance of the 'market' into serious question. Simon Dalby asserts that there are very problematic contradictions between prevailing conceptions of economic security and environmental security.⁶⁰ In critiquing various approaches to an expanded security agenda, he points out that extending non-military regimes, such as the EU, to other regions as a way of engendering security raises serious difficulties.

The suggestion that such arrangements be extended to other regions... contains the implication that the resource-intensive industrial model of 'development' brings with it security. But it is precisely the further expansion of unreconstructed industrialism that is fueling the greenhouse, toxic waste, deforestation, acid rain, and other large-scale environmental threats that some are suggesting should be considered in terms of security. Insofar as security is premised on maintaining the status quo, it runs counter to the changes needed to alleviate many environmental and economic problems because it is precisely the status quo that has produced the problems.⁶¹

60 . Simon Dalby, "Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse," *Alternatives* 17 (1992): 95-134.

61 . Dalby, *op.cit.*, note 60, pp.111-112.

Here, Dalby is referring to the emergence of what he terms a different kind of 'security dilemma'. Unlike the traditional definition of the term,⁶² he refers to a situation in which attempts to create security in one area leads to the imposition of insecurity in other areas. In the case of economic and environmental security, "[i]ndustrial activity, agricultural monocultures, and rampant individual consumption of 'disposable' items... produce other forms of insecurity, which undermine the security provision that is the ostensible reason for many of these activities in the first place."⁶³

Dalby's 'security dilemma' is helpful in understanding a number of ways in which the EU's status-quo approach to ECE economic security sits in contradiction to prospects for environmental security. As seen above, the PHARE programme overwhelmingly stresses economic restructuring as its objective in ECE countries. The dwindling environmental budget allotments certainly indicate a fleeting interest in ecological sustainability. More importantly, however, they are dwarfed by the remaining 89 per cent of the budget which, ultimately, has a much greater impact on the environment. An example of this contradiction is the

62 . On the original conception of a 'security dilemma', see John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism And The Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2, No.2 (1950): 157-180; Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under The Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, No.2 (1978): 167-214.

63 . *Ibid.*, p.113.

funding to Polish agriculture in 1990. In that year, ECU 22 million was the overall allocation for the purpose environmental protection. In the same year, ECU 50 million was used on supplying Polish farmers with 'unspecified' pesticides. Obviously, the sheer quantities of toxic pesticides will far outstrip the benefits of environmental aid given.⁶⁴ Such counter-productive measures highlight the manner in which continuing efforts to ensure economic security come at the expense of ECE ecological sustainability.

This collision between economic and environmental security is further evident in PHARE's overwhelming emphasis on industrial growth in the ECE region. The majority of PHARE investment has gone into the areas of privatization and industrial restructuring, a policy direction that often counteracts attempts to alleviate environmental stress. An example is the programme's support of plans to rapidly privatize East European economies. The goal of these plans is the "efficient sale of state property, quick transfer to private owners, and the creation of competitive markets."⁶⁵ At the same time, however, a mentality has arisen in which

64 . "Report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection on the environmental aspects of the Phare programme in the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary)," *op.cit.*, note 45, p.13.

65 . Theodore Panayotou, Randall A. Bluffstone and Vladislav Balaban, "Lemons and Liabilities: Privatization, Foreign Investment, and Environmental Liability In Central And Eastern Europe," *Environmental Impact Assessment Review* 14, No.2/3 (1994): 158.

privatisation is seen to be "hindered by unresolved issues of environmental liability that create conditions of uncertainty in the privatization and foreign investment market."⁶⁶ The invocation here of the term 'liability' reduces environmental problems from an issue of ecological impact, social justice and 'sustainability' to one of economic profitability. Indeed, the fear of environmental 'liability' detracting potential investors has been so great that much of the legislation for Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) has not been included as part of the privatization process.⁶⁷ In the case of Poland, where EIAs are carried out only at the request of the investor (on a confidential basis), "the Privatization Ministry appeared surprised when environmental issues were raised by prospective investors."⁶⁸ While it is certainly not the responsibility of the EU to dictate how privatization should proceed, the administration of PHARE's support programmes, such as privatization, proceed without any capacity for environmental assessment. Indeed, "PHOS has yet to undertake an environmental impact assessment of any PHARE funded project, let alone programmes or policies."⁶⁹ Thus,

66 . *Ibid.*, p.159, emphasis added.

67 . Jerzy Jendroska and Jerzy Sommer, "Environmental Impact Assessment In Polish Law: The Concept, Development, and Perspectives," *Environmental Impact Assessment Report Review* 14, No.2/3 (1994): 169-194.

68 . *Ibid.*, p.189.

69 . "Report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection on the environmental aspects of the Phare programme

PHARE's overwhelming interest in bolstering 'privatization' can be read as very problematic in terms of ecological concern.

In the case of the Europe Agreements, the contention that they will make ECE economies more efficient -- and thus more environmentally friendly -- is a dubious proposition. There is little doubt that economic development within post-WWII communist societies was long "skewed towards squandering nature."⁷⁰ However, in terms of the benefits of 'efficient' economic transitions, Wolfgang Sachs points out that

...the past course of economic history--in the East, West, and South--though with considerable variations--suggests that there is little room for efficiency strategies in earlier phases of growth--and are affordable--when applied after a certain level of growth has been attained.

Here, Sachs is referring to economic growth that occurs on a relatively slow, long-term basis. Considering the rapidity with which ECE countries have been encouraged through the Europe Agreements to engage economic 'transition', the ultimate environmental 'spoils' of efficiency are highly questionable. While there were some reductions in overall

in the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary)," *op.cit.*, note 45, p.14. The report goes on to say that "Indeed, there appears to be no mechanisms to achieve this within PHOS. This is inconsistent with the move in Western Europe towards the greater integration of environmental considerations into all levels and areas of policy."

70 . Wolfgang Sachs, "Global Ecology and the Shadow of Development," in Wolfgang Sachs (ed.), *Global Ecology: A New Arena of Political Conflict* (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1993) 15.

71 . *Ibid.*

sources of pollution in the ECE region following the political changes of 1989/90, most of this was attributable to a slowdown in the economy and industrial closures. Fundamental changes to production processes or the economic system in general did not occur, essentially because rapid transition meant that "the environment lay well down on the list of both public and private priorities."⁷² Thus, by sacrificing environmental considerations for the 'benefits' of reform, the EU is silent on the deleterious environmental effects of a lengthy market 'transition'.

The deleterious character of the EU's overemphasis on the market is made more concrete by considering two problematic aspects of its ECE policy: the encouragement of increased consumption and the use of 'end of pipe' environmental technology. In terms of the former, PHARE has stressed the importance of increased industrial efficiency as a major way in which environmental degradation could be minimized. As indicated in the argument above, however, the term 'efficiency' runs into difficulties when its implications are unraveled. For instance, continuing with Sachs' argument concerning the 'pay off' of efficiency, he states that

...the magic words 'resource efficiency' have a shady side... they obscure the fact that ecological reform must walk on two legs: scrutinizing means as well as moderating goals. ...An increase in resource efficiency alone leads to nothing, unless it goes hand-in-hand with

72 . Manser, *op.cit.*, note 11, pp.77-83.

an intelligent restraint of growth. ...If, however, the dynamics of growth are not slowed down, the achievements of rationalization will soon be eaten up by the next round of growth.⁷³

Putting 'curbs' on the supply-side environmental impacts of production, through the imposition of more efficient means, will not be adequate to address a more pressing problem: demand. In the type of market economies encouraged by the EU, the upward spiral of demand for goods and resources is an extraordinary motivator of environmental degradation. Advocates of market 'efficiency' are usually silent on this issue when discussing the interplay between the market and the environment.

PHARE's involvement in the ECE energy sector offers a good example of such 'silences'. In the early 1990s, energy consumption in the ECE region went down considerably due to the recession and rising prices. According to Manser, this "present[ed] governments with a breathing space during which they could have introduced a range of innovative measures both to improve the efficiency with which energy was used and to develop new, less conventional sources."⁷⁴ Thus, not surprisingly, PHARE set for itself the objective to look at problems involving the restructuring of the solid fuels sector and integration of the region's largest energy

73 . Sachs, *op.cit.*, note 70, p.16.

74 . Manser, *op.cit.*, note 11, p126.

networks, in particular the gas and electricity grids.⁷⁵

However, PHARE has chosen, along with ECE governments, to bolster the supply-side aspect of the industry.

'Efficiency' here means production efficiency and the generation of more power.⁷⁶ Such goals fly in the face of environmental considerations, emphasizing efficiency over the consumption/conservation problem. While efficiency can have a positive effect on the environment, it is the overall impact of energy consumption that matters to the environment, not the per unit price of 'resources'. As ECE economies grow along the lines that EU policy intends, the benefits of efficiency will be outweighed by the detrimental effects of consumption, because a conservation mentality has not become widespread.⁷⁷

Another problematic aspect of EU policy is the use of 'end of pipe' technology. Of the environmental areas addressed by the EU, most have been oriented towards the use of such technology, including pollution monitoring, waste water treatment, hazardous waste disposal, and air pollution

75 . *Energy in Europe: Community Assistance in the Energy Sector To The Countries Of Central And Eastern Europe And The Former Soviet Union*, note 47, p.10.

76 . Maroušek, *op.cit.*, note 22, p.108.

77 . In most ECE countries, a difficult problem within public attitude is that most people associate conservation with poverty. See *Ibid*; Ian Brown, "Prospects for Energy and Environment Policy Integration in Hungary," and Slawomir Pasierb, "A Review of Energy and Environmental Policies in Poland," in *Conference on Energy and Environment In European Economies In Transition: Priorities and Opportunities For Co-operation and Integration*, note 13.

abatement.⁷⁶ The message within such projects is to continue industrial output as usual, only attempting to reduce its environmental impact at the end of the production process. Given the likely rise in production that is suggested above, this approach encourages environmental degradation to increase. While PHARE proceeds with the export of technology, intended towards "the creation of pilot projects with important multiplier and demonstration effects,"⁷⁷ it remains silent on the effects that such technology will not have on production processes. It will not, for instance, compel producers to integrate environmental effects as an important factor in the way their products are made -- an instrumental aspect of any reconciliation between economic and environmental sustainability.

Moreover, the introduction of such technologies are often inappropriate for ECE economies. An excellent example of this is the promotion of flue-gas desulphurisation (FGD) technology by the PHARE programme. This programme has involved the transfer of FGD technology to some of the worst polluted regions of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. While these projects are intended as 'demonstrators', they are carried out with little interest for the costs involved

78 . "Report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection on the environmental aspects of the Phare programme in the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary)," *op.cit.*, note 45, p.10.

79 . *Report of the Commission of the European Communities to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development*, note 36, p.108.

and the capacity of other enterprises to use it.⁸⁰ FGD technology is 12 to 18 times more expensive than coal cleaning/enrichment. For it to have any substantial effect, it must be adopted on widespread basis, an unlikely possibility given the costs.⁸¹

This ill-fit between local needs and suggested 'solutions' also highlights the EU's reliance on Western 'expertise' as a means to address ECE environmental problems. PHARE programmes, in particular, have been criticized for their tendency to fall into this routine. In a report critical of the environmental impacts of PHARE, it has been suggested that the "end product of many PHARE-funded projects was studies or 'master plans' rather than action."⁸² This is not to say that studies are of no importance in addressing ECE environmental concerns. Rather, the difficulty lies with "the use of numerous

80 . "Report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection on the environmental aspects of the Phare programme in the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary)," *op.cit.*, note 45, p.12.

81 . Manser, *op.cit.*, note 11, pp.134-35. Manser, in fact, asserts that it is very "tempting to say that FGD was proposed because Western companies were the most likely beneficiaries. The Dutch Electricity Board put in Hoogovens units at Belchatow in central Poland, while at Opole to the west, where the \$230 million revamp programme was German funded, the contract went to Klöckner and Lurgi, two German companies." He makes a similar suggestion concerning the refitting of East European nuclear power stations. While the nuclear industry has become largely unpopular in Western countries, companies such as Westinghouse and Siemens have been encouraged to provide services for the many problematic reactors in the ECE region.

82 . "Report of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection on the environmental aspects of the Phare programme in the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary)," *op.cit.*, note 45, p.11.

consultants from Community countries, who are often ignorant of situations and customs in the recipient countries."⁸³ Here, the use of experts reinforces the suggestions of Tömmel in that they have become an instrument through which the EU Commission 'guides' reform along lines of Western-style economic aspirations. Not surprisingly, such expertise forms around the assumption that unrestrained economic growth is the first priority.

Thus, in terms of security, the EU's emphasis on the 'positive' impacts of market economics has the effect of reinforcing ecological insecurity for the ECE region. Nonetheless, a style of linear thought has been employed by both the EU and ECE governments concerning the environmental 'benefits' of economic restructuring.⁸⁴ ECE countries have

83 . "EP Resolution on the environmental aspects of the Phare programme in the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary).", *op.cit.*, note 33. An important contribution to environmental security literature has been made in this regard by feminists. Feminists have asserted, quite convincingly, that the 'masculine' control and domination of nature overlaps considerably with a control and domination of the 'feminine'. This domination is closely implicated with the rise of science, technology, 'expertise', and the liberal-market state. In the same way that the 'feminine' is subordinated within the private side of the public/private split, the environment is subordinated to the 'expert' capabilities unleashed by the power of science, the market, and the nation-state. Along the way, there is a rampant disregard of local (non-global, non-'expert') perspectives, particularly those associated with the 'feminine'. Such insights offer the opportunity to reconsider the way in which environmentalism is viewed, insisting on a reappraisal of social relationships before any genuine consideration of the environment can take place. See Joni Seager, "Feminism & the Environment: What's the Problem Here?" Paper presented to the Social Sciences Federation of Canada Conference, Ottawa, February 1994, p.7; J. Anne Tickner, "States and Markets: An Ecofeminist Perspective on International Political Economy," *International Political Science Review* 14, No.1 (1993):59-69.

84 . On the issue of linear and circular thought, see Gwyn Prins, "Politics and the Environment," in Gwyn Prins, *Threats Without Enemies: Facing Environmental Insecurity* (London: Earthscan, 1993) 171-191.

been encouraged to follow a market-oriented development trajectory, in order to 'catch up' to the EU as quickly as possible. Along the way, however, numerous factors are either left out or excluded from the discussion, such as the dangers of overconsumption and an after-the-fact approach to environmental pollution and degradation. Moreover, the EU's approach dislocates environmental problems from social relations and posits them mainly as a 'technical' problem to be solved through the consignment of Western 'expertise'. As long as EU policy represents Western-style economic progress as the most important means to achieving ecological sustainability, prospects for seriously addressing environmental security will be inevitably diminished.

Environment and Security: Placing the EU

Expanding security into issues of the environment implies serious challenges for the EU. The highly visible character of ECE environmental problems has reinforced the difficulty in addressing these challenges. This chapter has shown that while the Union has loosely referred to the importance of such issues in the context of its ECE security policy, it has, in fact, no approach to environmental security. The EU's approach to ECE environmental problems, as evident in PHARE and the Europe Agreements, demonstrates the particularly close connection between its more explicit approach to economic security and that to the environment.

As such, the EU overwhelmingly emphasizes the importance of restructuring economic interests in ECE along Western lines -- a prospect inimical to ecological well-being in the region.

In the face of severe environmental difficulties in the East, it has become abundantly clear that security is not a matter which adheres to the political divisions of Eastern and Western Europe. The problems experienced in ECE are as much of a pressing challenge to the EU as they are to those in the ECE region. The EU's putative commitment to creating a 'secure Europe', its pronounced 'responsibility' to the peoples of the Eastern Europe, and its self-perception as an organization devoted to environmental sustainability (as outlined, for instance, in the Fifth Environmental Action Plan) all suggest what should be the EU's deep concern for environmental problems in ECE, broader Europe, as well as globally. Moreover, the severity of ECE problems indicate the necessity to think in terms of a common European fate, as the effects of continuing environmental depletion will be felt across the European continent. When considered in these terms, EU security quickly must be understood only in the context of wider European security.

Unfortunately, the EU's security approach has become caught up in a constrained notion of its own identity, adhering to a strict faith in the benefits of the

marketplace. This adherence precludes the possibility of the EU's engagement of environmental security. In order to take environmental problems seriously, the EU would need to reexamine fundamental aspects of how market values relate to its identity, and how both of these relate to security. Doing so, however, "challenges the most basic political values of contemporary Western capitalism: the assumptions of resources in nature available for exploitation, ever-enlarging consumption,...as well as faith in 'the market'..."⁸⁵ In this sense, examining security in the ECE context requires, first and foremost, a reexamination of what it means for citizens within the EU to be secure.

None of this is to simplistically denounce market principles as a means to ensuring either economic or environmental security in the ECE context. Indeed, there are many positive aspects to free-market principles, and many of them are crucial to the transition process in ECE societies. A naive reversal of values that deifies the environment as the only important factor in policy would, in its own way, lead to widespread insecurity. However, an important point is that the EU's policies, like those of other international organizations, bring pressure to bear on the ECE region which practically ensures its inability to

85 . Dalby, *op.cit.*, note 60, p.114.

conceive of reform programmes that seriously address environmental issues.

Similarly, the intention here is not to pave the way for paternalistic EU policies which would (rather hypocritically) dictate environmental terms to the East. Rather, it should be stressed that the EU's overwhelming reliance on economic efficiency to achieve wide-ranging goals also ensures environmental insecurity. As a result, the need arises for alternative approaches that allow the ECE region more possibilities for dealing with environmental problems, while considering the economic needs of their populations. This is, of course, no simple task; nonetheless, some avenues for action do present themselves. The importance of opening the Union's economic assistance programmes to more actors, particularly NGOs, is a crucial beginning. Giving these groups a voice in how, for instance, PHARE's indicative programmes are shaped could have an indelible impact on how economic reform is considered.

Another obvious avenue is to devote far more attention, both within the EU and the ECE region, on increasing awareness of the benefits of recycling and energy conservation. Without a concomitant change in societal opinions concerning consumption, attempts to change the impact of market economies on the environment will be of

little use. These are not policies that inhibit ECE societies from their right to seek economic security. Instead, they empower them with the capacity to merely ask how this security is to be achieved. A failure to consider such steps -- resulting in the full extension of the EU's model of industrial development eastward as a means to ensuring security -- will guarantee that the EU's approach never contains anything more than passing references to environmental security.

CONCLUSION

The ECE context brings to light the ways in which security can be problematized to question the conventional privilege accorded to military issues. The complex 'transition' process highlights the gravity with which other issues, such as economic stress or rapid environmental degradation, can come to bear on peoples' insecurity. Since the conventional conception of security is closely implicated with the ways in which these problems have emerged, this conception clearly requires careful rethinking. If such a rethinking is ultimately to be concerned with the protection of peoples' well-being (as this paper has maintained from the outset), then security must incorporate both economics and the environment as important issues to be addressed.

The EU's attempts to consider such a broadened security approach to ECE have been somewhat problematic. In order to draw some insights into why this may be, it is important, initially, to respond to the first task set out in this work: to 'place' the EU's approach to security. That is, how far has EU policy gone in terms of reconsidering security in the ECE context? To answer this question, it is useful to adopt three categories which generalize different streams of security thinking. They are: traditional, neo-traditional, and non-traditional security.

The first considers security in its conventional terms as exclusive to the arena of territorial politics. It is primarily concerned with military matters and the maintenance and protection of national interests within an international framework riddled by the 'security dilemma'.¹ The second attempts to simply expand security's agenda, in order to address pressing issues that might lead to conflict or 'threaten' national, regional or 'global', interests.² However, this security approach, while taking on a variety of different issues, retains the assumptions of security in its traditional form -- state-centred protection from threats. Finally, following the directions of a critical group of theorists within international relations,³ 'non-traditional' approaches have emerged which problematize and

1 . Examples of this security thinking include, of course, Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesely, 1979); John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism And The Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2, No.2 (1950): 157-180; and Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under The Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, No.2 (1978): 167-214.

2 . The most influential of this emerging literature tends to emphasize the importance of national security. See, for instance, Theodore C. Sørensen, "Rethinking National Security," *Foreign Affairs* 69, No.3 (1990): 1-18; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs* 68, No.2 (1989): 162-177; Norman Meyers, "Environment and Security," *Foreign Policy* 74 (1989): 23-41; Peter Gleick, "Environment and Security: The Clear Connection," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 47, No.3 (1991): 16-21; Thomas Homer-Dixon, "On The Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," *International Security* 16, No.2 (1991): 76-116.

3 . Examples of this include James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds.), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan Canada, 1989); Richard K. Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics," *Alternatives* 12 (1987): 403-434; R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/outside: international relations as political theory* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Jim George, "Of Incarceration and Closure: Neo-Realism and the New/Old World Order," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 22, No.2 (1993): 197-234.

subvert the ontological categories assumed within the concept of security.⁴ As each of these perspectives is considered in turn, the term 'security', as well as the meaning of expanding security's agenda, becomes increasingly complex.⁵

These general approaches are useful in that they assist in our understanding of how the EU considers security. In a sentence, the EU can be said to have fully engaged a traditional approach, largely embraced a neo-traditional approach, but mostly ignored the possibility for non-traditional approaches. This characterization shows quite clearly how the EU has imagined its approach within each of the specific categories of security. The Common Foreign and Security Policy demonstrates quite aptly the Union's continued embrace of traditional security. With respect to economic security, the EU has considered economic matters to

4 . Some examples of this literature include Simon Dalby, "Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse," *Alternatives* 17 (1992): 95-134; V.Spike Peterson, "Security and Sovereign States: What Is at Stake in Taking Feminism Seriously?" in V.Spike Peterson (ed.), *Gendered States: Feminist (re)Visions of International Relations Theory* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 31-64; Bradley Klein, "After Strategy: The Search for a Post-Modern Politics of Peace," *Alternatives* 13 (1988): 293-318; Carol Cohn, "Wars, Wimps, and Women: Talking Gender and Thinking War," in Miriam Cooke and Angela Woollacott (eds.), *Gendering War Talk* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993); David Campbell, *Writing Security: University foreign policy and the politics of identity* (Manchester University Press, 1992).

5 . In addition, it should be noted that not all security theorists fall conveniently into these categories. Some examples include Gwyn Prins, "Politics and the environment," *International Affairs* 66, No.4 (1990): 711-730; Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation," *Review of International Studies* 17 (1991): 313-326; Patricia M. Mische, "Ecological Security and the Need to Reconceptualize Sovereignty," *Alternatives* 14 (1989): 389-427.

be an important aspect of its security policy towards the ECE region. However, this policy considers economics only insofar as ECE is encouraged to reproduce the political and economic systems found within Western Europe. Thus, new issues are engaged by EU policy as long as they do not seriously question the present West European framework for political, social and economic organization. The engagement of a neo-traditional approach is further emphasized by the EU's consideration of environmental security. The EU's approach to ECE environmental problems never surpasses a neo-traditional approach -- demonstrated by its overwhelming emphasis on the 'market' over the environment. Further, since such an approach addresses little in terms of the difficult structural questions pertaining to ecological sustainability, it is clear that the EU simply fails to consider the possibility of a non-traditional security approach.

Viewing the EU's consideration of specific security issues through these more general approaches quite clearly 'places' the EU as neo-traditional in its outlook towards the ECE region. Having said this, it is necessary to ask why the EU has referred to the importance of (more typically) non-traditional security issues but continues to maintain a neo-traditional security outlook. Why has the EU considered both economic and environmental issues within the

security debate, when its interest in engaging the former comprehensively, or the latter at all, is sadly lacking?

Much of the reason for the Union's inability to surpass a neo-traditional approach lies in its particular notion of a West European identity, which finds its roots in, and serves to reinforce, its continuing engagement of traditional security conceptions. This identity is expressed within perceptions of an East-West division, a specific state/citizen relationship, and the praise of liberal-market values. As the EU progresses from conventional through economic and ultimately environmental security issues, it needs to adapt to the increasingly complex approaches to security referred to above. Crucially, however, as these security approaches become more complex, the EU's perception of itself as an 'anchor' of stability becomes increasingly obstructive. As a result, the EU's neo-traditional approach carries with it identity notions that constrict the way it views economic security and prohibit it from seriously considering environmental security.⁶

6 . One could make the argument that the neo-traditional approach is inevitable in all EU policy given that it 1) envisions itself as an successful source of political and economic cohesion in Europe and 2) that attempts to change such an approach will be discounted due to the power of certain entrenched political, economic, and cultural values within the EU. Such an argument merits attention in that its understanding of political change is not perceived as resulting merely from top-down decision-making models. However, an underlying assumption within is that these values are, at least to some degree, both universal and highly resistant to change. In terms of security considerations vis-à-vis the East, this is not necessarily the case. The recent

In the context of East Central Europe, the restraining effects of identity on the EU's security approach can be unpackaged by positing the question of 'whose security'?' This seemingly simple question presents us with the complex challenge of unraveling the referent points around which the EU's approach to security is constructed. This thesis points out that the referent points of the EU's approach correlate to its conceptions of identity. In this sense, the question 'whose security?' leads us to reiterate Campbell's argument in that what is being secured within the EU's approach is EU identity itself. Consequently, understanding the EU's neo-traditional perspective on security requires that its notion of identity be unpacked in order to reveal its effects on the Union's approach to ECE.

example of German reunification demonstrates how a variety of public values can be manipulated, universalized, and used to bolster a political agenda. The litany of doubts about both viability and wisdom of rapid reunification -- a process that was represented as unstoppable due to the general desire of the German population -- highlights how the concerns of an entire portion of the population can be marginalized by certain political agendas. In this case, doubts raised long before and after the initiation of the reunification process (largely by left-leaning parties such as the Social Democratic Party and the Greens, very large portions of the student population, as well as a variety of East German parties, including the Christian Democrats) highlight the seriousness with which the issues of West-East issues can be considered among European populations. See Luc Rosenzweig, "What Germany's other half thinks," *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 21 February 1993, p.23; Michael Kreile, "The Political Economy of the new Germany," Ed. Paul B. Stares, *The New Germany and the New Europe* (Washington: Brookings, 1992) 11-54.

7 . Simon Dalby, *op.cit.*, note 4, p.103. Dalby credits this question to R.B.J. Walker in "The Concept of Security and International Relations Theory," University of California, San Diego, Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation, Working Paper No.3, 1988.

The first element of EU identity that impinges on the security debate is the perception of an East/West divide. Although the end of the Cold War ostensibly removed such a divide, the EU's approach to military, economic, and environmental issues in the ECE region demonstrates its longevity. The ECE, having not partaken in post-WWII integration initiatives, is recurrently depicted as an 'other' which threatens the established notions of self within Western Europe. In the explicit discourse of the CFSP, this plays itself out in repeated warnings about the 'threat' of potential conflict, unrest or instability from the East. These warnings, either implicitly or explicitly, differentiate politically 'mature' societies of EU member states with ECE populations which are depicted as being inherently susceptible to political instability.

From an economic perspective, the EU takes a somewhat 'softer' approach, in that ECE economies are encouraged to 'catch up' to the West as quickly as possible. At first, this appears to be an obvious case of the EU redefining its identity to ultimately include the Eastern parts of Europe. However, the approach contained within PHARE, as well as that outlined within the Europe Agreements, make clear that this engagement is part of how the EU primarily defines its own economic identity. Not only is the EU positioned as the centre of 'cohesion' and 'stability', but its economic

identity for the future is also ensured. Along current patterns of economic 'development' in ECE, the East/West divide will be strengthened as the East serves as the industrial 'yard' for technologically sophisticated, service-oriented EU economies.

The EU's approach to ECE environmental problems is not associated to security, because such a security perspective requires that artificial political lines are transcended. Since ECE environmental problems are treated as 'external' to EU borders, the possibility for understanding them in anything other than a neo-traditional context becomes extremely difficult. In this sense, East/West identity notions exclude or downplay an important aspect of environmental security -- the recognition that, at least to some degree, security of the one has connections to the security of the whole.

Another element of EU identity is in the relationship between the individual and the state. While the EU makes much of the notion of 'subsidiarity' and the decentralization of power, its security approach suggests the importance of political efficacy for the state or state-like structures. Again, this political identity is most evident in the Union's traditional security approach. The very idea of a CFSP takes as its first principle the importance of states in delineating what security is. The

state-dominated mechanisms of the CFSP define who or what is threatening in the ECE context, and then proceed to define themselves as the main guarantors against these threats.

This aspect of identity finds its way into the EU's approach to economic security by way of 'expertise'. As the execution of the PHARE programme makes clear, expertise is manipulated by the Commission in such a way as to ensure that reform proceeds in certain directions. Largely excluding the possibilities of a 'third way', the EU example helps set, and consistently reproduces, the attitudes of other international financial institutions towards 'reform'. As such, counter-possibilities for alternative development are discouraged by state actors, both Western and Eastern. Eastern governments' aspirations to receive aid become intertwined with their capacity to surge ahead with structural economic reform, regardless of the many negative consequences.

The same manipulation of policy through 'expertise' takes place in the environmental realm. This occurs through the imposition of Western 'solutions' on local ECE environmental problems. These 'solutions', which are often grand in conception but small in funding, are usually illfit, and serve more the neo-traditional security approach of the EU in the region. The 'top-down' policies made possible through the use of 'expertise' tend to marginalize

the possibilities for local solutions to ECE environmental dilemmas, and make the prospects for ecological sustainability largely untenable.

Finally, an element of identity which indelibly finds its way into the EU's security approach is the acclamation of liberal economic values. The EU's identification with the 'success' of market-economics ensures, and is bolstered by, specific approaches to security in the ECE context. The relationship between the EU's current traditional approach and the Cold War approach has shown how the preservation of West European liberal-democracies is written into the reasoning for the existence of a CFSP. Reciprocally, the CFSP's threat-orientation against Eastern 'instability' helps foster a recognition of the EU as an anchor of 'stability', putatively made visible by the 'efficient' working of its liberal-market economies.

The PHARE programme and the Europe Agreements make it overwhelmingly clear how this perception is reproduced with respect to economic security. The EU's conception of this security is embodied in the smooth functioning of a liberal-market economy. While EU countries possess considerable social 'nets', the EU's approach to ECE sets a 'telos' which has as its ends successful structural adjustment, 'efficient' privatization and industrial restructuring, and eventual export-led growth. This reproduction of values,

crucial for liberal (re)industrialization, finds its roots in the EU's vision for its own service-oriented economic identity of the future. If Tömmel's suggestions are accurate, it may be the case that the EU is presently ensuring the export of an identity to the ECE region which, in the future, will ensure a new 'intra-liberal', East-West divide between highly technological and liberally industrialized societies.

Not surprisingly, this element of EU identity flies directly in the face of any genuine EU approach to ECE environmental problems. The EU's neo-traditional fixation with rapid 'development' is inimical to the ecological well-being of the ECE region in that it reinforces the faulty perception that the environment can be 'sustained' infinitely, regardless of current economic practices. PHARE and the Europe Agreements make it abundantly clear that ECE environmental problems are viewed as a mere subset of the EU's economic approach to the region. This places a priority on efficiency' and profit over the environment, and makes the Union's vague references to environmental security at best laughable.

None of this is to suggest that it is identity itself which is the problem here. Indeed, the notion of identity is inescapable. All politics of the self, group, nation, state, institution, or even region necessarily employ some

assumption of identity for self-definition. Whichever way one conceives of the EU's future role, as an emergent power bloc, civilian power, or passive institution,⁸ identity will continue to play a crucial part. However, the assertion here is that the EU has rigidly, and detrimentally, articulated a narrow elaboration of identity which is closely associated to its security approach. If, in the ECE context, the EU genuinely intends to consider security in a broader sense (as it has indicated), it will need to undertake a critical questioning of the conventional identity notions which constrain it to a neo-traditional policy approach.⁹

Any such inquiry into the EU's security approach towards the ECE region must be an inquiry into the EU itself. As a beginning, the EU needs to rethink the elaboration of itself as representing the 'heart' of Europe. Within such a conception, one finds the consistent depiction of the "historical duty and the common goal of the [EU] to

8 . This is taken directly from Christopher Hill, "European Foreign Policy: Power Bloc, Civilian Model - or Flop?" Ed. R. Rummel, *The Evolution of an International Actor* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990) 31-55.

9 . Admittedly, the EU's difficulties may also point to a problem in using security as an intellectual or political tool to overcome complex problems such as those involving the environment. It is possible that the concept security inevitably 'imports' notions of identity and understanding tend towards simplified solutions for complex problems. As Dalby warns, "the question then is whether, in the process of extending the ambit of threats requiring a military response, one isn't militarizing society rather than dealing with social difficulties." See Simon Dalby, "Contesting an Essential Concept," Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Occasional Paper No.6 (1994), p.4.

support the reforming states of Central and Eastern Europe on their way back into Europe..."¹⁰ The constant reminder, well intentioned or not, that ECE societies are not yet part of 'Europe' exacerbates an image of these societies as second class. This clears the way for a parochial approach on the part of the EU which insists on a particular path toward political and economic reform. Critically rethinking such an approach will mean a reconsideration of what it is to be 'European' and how such a conception is reflected in EU policy. At its worst, such a rethinking will entail little more than 'window dressing' on an agenda of member states' and EU interests. The continued equation of EU interests with European interests leaves vast numbers of Europeans, particularly those in the East, with little voice in their future. At its best, however, this rethinking offers the opportunity for the EU to approach the ECE on more equal and constructive terms that promote a greater sense of common security.

Related to this, a critical perspective also suggests that the EU requires an approach which considers more than just 'national interests'. Embracing economic and environmental security will require the participation of actors who are more critical of the actions of government,

10 . "Gemeinsamer Presseartikel von Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl und Premierminister Edouard Balladur anlässlich der Eröffnungskonferenz zum 'Pakt für Stabilität in Europa', veröffentlicht am 27. Mai 1994," *Europa Archiv* 49, No.13-14 (1994): D407.

financial institutions and major corporations. Thus, the emphasis within PHARE on encouraging the growth of 'civil society' must not be limited to organizations that bolster the efficient workings of the market economy. Such criticism is already finding its way into the EP, reflected in its call for "the services of local consultants to be enlisted wherever possible, as they can, at a fraction of the cost of Western consultants, produce results better tailored to local conditions."¹¹ Getting to such a point requires that the direction of 'transition' is determined through a consultation process which involves more than just the Commission, member states, and ECE governments. As Dalby points out, "the creative energy for reformulating security comes from outside the entrenched bureaucratic structures of states with their primary objective of self-preservation."¹² The participation of a variety of non-governmental actors (NGOs, social movements) are necessary as means to ensuring that a more diversified range of issues are considered in the security debate, and that they are considered in a way that addresses both common European aspirations and often ignored local contexts.

11 . "EP Resolution on the environmental aspects of the Phare programme in the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary)." (A3-0361/93), *Official Journal of the European Communities*, No C 44/41, 14 February 1994.

12 . Dalby, *op.cit.*, note 4, p.115.

Finally, the EU needs to reconsider its elaboration of the value of Western style prosperity. Particularly when environmental security is considered, the priority given to unrestrained economic growth and an increasingly comfortable lifestyle must be questioned. Here, a critical perspective of the EU's approach is faced with its most complex challenges. For the EU to approach ECE environmental problems seriously, it would first need to substantially reorient its approach to economic growth and ecology within the Union. Even if this were to occur, it is questionable whether ECE societies would feel obliged to undertake any concomitant rethinking. As a result, a reconceived EU approach to ECE security should aim at opening the possibilities for change, rather than dictating its terms. The EU's neo-traditional approach towards ECE societies is certainly problematic in that it tends to dominate, or even control, the agenda of 'transition'. However, equally problematic would be a new EU approach that imposes the terms of security, such that the possibilities for economic restructuring are largely sacrificed. The EU's challenge is to approach ECE on terms that recognize the exigencies of economic change in the East, while attempting to avoid having its policy push ECE societies headlong into severe structural adjustment -- a prospect which may prove

economically and environmentally detrimental in the long term.

Accomplishing such an identity/policy shift does not, by any means, portend the possibility for the easy resolution of European security problems. Indeed, it means that answering questions like 'whose security?' becomes substantially more complicated. Moreover, such a shift puts in question the notion that security can be understood as an end, reached conclusively through the establishment of specific institutions. Instead, it becomes more useful to consider security as a process -- a concept that is effectively open to contestation. As is clear with respect to the concept of environmental security, this contestation brings with it inevitable tensions between seemingly incompatible interests. In the ECE context, such an approach offers, at the very least, the possibility to open up political 'spaces' for what is presently being precluded from EU policy: the serious engagement of security on a broader range of issues for a wider number of people.

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