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STATE-BUILDING FROM BELOW:
A CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA
by
SEAN JORGENSEN

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Political Science

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

4 July 1994

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coercive force to centralize power and authority - were not borne out by the UNTAC experience. Rather, the international community attempted to institute a form of popular sovereignty in Cambodia - a 'bottom-up' experiment in state-building. By giving high priority to increasing participation and the recognition of human rights, and improving the behavior of the Cambodian state, the UN sought to change the nature of the state from being a problem of security to being its source. Given the current state of global politics, this strategy is more realistic and normatively superior to those espoused by Buzan and Ayoob. The experience of the UNTAC mission provides an alternative 'model' to the top-down, and violent, models of state-building culled from European history. If the prescriptions of Third World security theorists are to have any practical utility, then they should not cause more insecurity than they relieve. This thesis suggests that incorporating the UNTAC experience into their models would be an important step in this direction.

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**STATE BUILDING FROM BELOW:
A CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA**

submitted by

Sean Jorgensen, B.A. (Hons.)

in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts

Chair, Department of Political Science

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**Carleton University
June 29, 1994**

ABSTRACT

Theorists of Third World security point to the unfinished process of state and nation building in the Third World as a major cause of domestic and international conflict. They suggest that reducing this problem requires strengthening Third World states as forms of political organization. Yet, the state-building model relied on by these theorists is based on a top-down view of sovereignty that has proven to be extremely violent and is therefore problematic as a prescription for improving international peace and security.

This thesis argues that an alternative model may be gleaned from the United Nations intervention in Cambodia. Over the course of its 18 month intervention, the UN tried to end the war in Cambodia by first reducing external penetration in the state and then laying the foundations for a new polity. Considerable attention and resources were directed toward strengthening Cambodian civil society, increasing recognition and respect for basic human rights and freedoms, and improving the functional ability of the state. These efforts address crucial problems of Cambodian security and hold the potential for changing the nature of the state from being a problem of security to being its source.

This thesis also argues that, on a wider level, the UN intervention in Cambodia is an example of a new strategy for improving international peace and security - state-building from below. Unlike models used by Third World security theorists, this 'model' holds the promise of improving the cohesion and functional ability of states without resorting to violent means. It is therefore a superior method of addressing important problems of Third World security and should be used as the basis of intervention in future UN operations.

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INTRODUCTION

'How can the international community intervene to relieve the insecurity of Third World states?' Addressing this question has become increasingly important with the end of the Cold War and the advent of "failed states," a term coined by two authors to describe the condition of some states, located mostly in the Third World, that have, by most indicators, failed as forms of social organization.¹ They exist merely as lines on maps and suffer from a number of problems, including the lack of coherent government, limited or ill-functioning state machinery, limited internal legitimacy, disputed sovereignty, and divisive, often ruthless, internal conflict.

States that have been noted to fall into this category include Lebanon, Mozambique, El Salvador, Angola, Namibia, Somalia, and Cambodia. States that may be on the precipice of collapse are even more numerous, including some from Asia (Afghanistan, Burma, the former republics of the Soviet Union), Africa (Liberia, Rwanda), the Middle East (Iraq), and Latin America (Haiti, Nicaragua). The conditions evident in these states contribute little to the security of

¹ Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," *Foreign Policy*, no. 89 (1992/93): 3-20

their inhabitants and, through warfare, the movement of refugees, and the aggravation of regional tensions, create security problems for neighbouring states and the international community. Whether there is a common source to these problems is open to dispute, that they are a problem of international security is not.

The seeds of an answer to the above question may be culled from the experience of the United Nations (UN) in one of these states - Cambodia. Beginning in November 1991 and lasting until October 1993 (and beyond), the international community undertook a massive effort to end the Cambodian civil war and relieve the historic insecurity of the state. Using the UN as its intervening agency, the international community designed and implemented the most comprehensive program ever devised to end an intrastate war. This program attempted to address a huge array of issues, including - crucially - the formation of a government through national elections that would be considered legitimate domestically and internationally. Its practical implementation was carried out by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), a mission unprecedented in complexity, cost and design. If the answer to how the international community may intervene to relieve the insecurity of Third World states is to be found, the UNTAC mission probably holds important insights.

This thesis will proceed as follows. The first chapter summarizes what a number of authors describe as the problems of Third World security and goes on to discuss the analysis and prescriptions of two authors, Barry Buzan and Mohammed Ayooob. Based on the experience of early European state-makers, these authors make the clearest case for a strategy of 'state-building' to relieve the insecurity of Third World states and the international community more generally. A general critique of their prescriptions will be given at the end of the chapter.

The second chapter uses the theoretical categories outlined in chapter one to discuss Cambodian security. It seeks to locate the domestic and international sources of conflict in Cambodia, particularly since the Second World War. Following the insights of country-specialists, it argues that a number of domestic factors - including a lack of political institutionalization, limited legitimacy for leaders and state apparatus, and consistently poor economic conditions - have had serious implications for Cambodian security. These have interacted with external threats and interference to create an environment within Cambodia of extreme insecurity. This situation continued until the late 1980s when changing regional and international conditions created an opportunity for the world community, acting through the UN, to end the conflict in Cambodia and lay the foundations for a more lasting peace.

Chapters three and four discuss the efforts of the international community in ending the war in Cambodia, culminating in the UNTAC mission. Chapter three begins with an overview of the negotiating process and the UN's efforts at implementing the resulting agreements (the Paris Agreements, signed in October 1991). The key to these agreements was the organization and running of nation-wide elections by the UN. These elections not only served as a useful mechanism of conflict resolution, but have the potential of reconciling the domestic parties to the conflict. Another important aspect of the negotiations was the agreement of signatory states to recognize Cambodia's 'perpetual neutrality' and cease intervening in its internal affairs. This agreement, coupled with the practical efforts of UN personnel during the UNTAC mission, address an important problem of Cambodian security, one shared by many Third World states, external penetration.

Chapter four describes the efforts of the international community to address the domestic sources of Cambodian insecurity. The agreements signed in Paris in October 1991 commit Cambodia to a form of liberal-democracy. The UNTAC mission tried to make this commitment a practical reality by familiarizing the populace with liberal-democratic norms, undertaking efforts to increase the strength of Cambodian civil society, and securing basic human rights and freedoms. In an effort to link popular mobilization and political

outcomes, substantial attention was paid to changing the behavior and increasing the functional ability of the state through training and technical assistance. Lastly, the international community created a number of mechanisms that seek to monitor the future behavior of the Cambodian state and provide funds and assistance for its development. Chapter four concludes with a discussion of what potential these efforts hold for improving Cambodian security.

The final chapter discusses the theoretical significance of Cambodia and the UNTAC mission for broader understandings of Third World security. On a practical level, it argues that the UNTAC mission is one example of a wider UN strategy of improving international security through the strengthening of the system's constituent units, states. Mission of this kind are an important vehicle to address security problems in Third World states wracked by internal conflict and, despite their high cost and lengthy commitment, are necessary (though not sufficient) means to end insecurity. On a wider level, it also notes that, although the UNTAC mission addressed many of the problems pointed to by security theorists such as Buzan and Ayoob, it did so in ways that depart markedly from their assumptions and prescriptions. Their view of the methods necessary to increase domestic legitimacy, cohesion and stability - premised on a 'top-down' theory of state-building which entails, according to their models, the widespread use of

coercive force to centralize power and authority - were not borne out by the UNTAC experience. Rather, the international community attempted to institute a form of popular sovereignty in Cambodia - a 'bottom-up' experiment in state-building. By giving high priority to increasing participation and the recognition of human rights, and improving the behavior of the Cambodian state, the UN sought to change the nature of the state from being a problem of security to being its source. Given the current state of global politics, this strategy is more realistic and normatively superior to those espoused by Buzan and Ayoob. The experience of the UNTAC mission provides an alternative 'model' to the top-down, and violent, models of state-building culled from European history. If the prescriptions of Third World security theorists are to have any practical utility, then they should not cause more insecurity than they relieve. This thesis suggests that incorporating the UNTAC experience into their models would be an important step in this direction.

CHAPTER ONE

THIRD WORLD SECURITY: PROBLEMS AND PRESCRIPTIONS

Since the early 1980s, the literature dealing with problems of security in less developed countries has grown as authors from a variety of perspectives began examining the specific sources of conflict in the Third World.¹ Many argue that for a majority of Third World states, security is a function of both internal and external factors. Many of these factors are rooted in their historical legacy - one of communal division, poorly developed political infrastructure, decentralized authority, and state

¹See for instance Abdul-Monem M. Al-Mashat, *National Security in the Third World* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985); Bahgat Korany, "Strategic Studies and the Third World: a critical evaluation," *International Social Science Journal* 110 (1986): 547-562; Mohammed Ayoob, ed., *Regional Security in the Third World: Case Studies from Southeast Asia and the Middle East* (London: Croom Helm, 1986); Caroline Thomas, *In Search of Security: the Third World in International Relations* (Boulder: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987); Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, eds., *National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats* (Maryland: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 1988); Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge University Press, 1990); Yezid Sayigh, *Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries* Adelphi Paper 251, Summer 1990; Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World," *World Politics* 43, no. 2 (1991): 257-283; Barry Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-Cold War Era*, 2nd. ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Caroline Thomas, "New directions in thinking about security in the Third World," in Ken Booth, ed., *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security* (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991); Abbas Maleki, "A Southern Perspective on Kolodziej," *Arms Control* 13, no. 3 (1992): 499-504; Ravinder Pal Singh, "Security Studies in the Post Cold War," *Arms Control* 13, no. 3 (1992): 505-512; Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, "Critical Commentary on Kolodziej's Analysis," *Arms Control* 13, no. 3 (1992): 513-517; and Brian Job, ed., *The Insecurity Dilemma* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992)

boundaries that envelope a number of often competing identity groups. Most states lack a common sense of identity or a degree of social and political consensus that allows long-term planning to occur. Nor have legitimate systems of rule or mechanisms of political succession developed in most areas. Competing ideas of how to run the state and economy, whether based on formal ideologies such as Marxism or Liberalism or on looser conceptions based on group identity or a single leader, flourish and cause substantial disagreement and conflict. Since traditional methods of organization and political rule have either been undermined by the colonial experience or fallen out of use, there exists few means to ameliorate these divisions.

In these circumstances, the state loses - or more accurately, never gains - the social welfare and security functions that are traditionally attributed to it. With consensus lacking on basic organizing principles of the state and the direction that policy should take, and deep social cleavage existing within society, the state becomes a means to accumulate wealth and provide security for whatever faction that can seize and control it. The short time that groups have had to consolidate power and authority, coupled with the high levels of financial and military aid available to opponents of regimes during the Cold War, has made it extremely difficult for states to establish themselves as legitimate and able players on the global stage.

Owing to their internal weakness, conflict and external intervention have become endemic characteristics of many states. Domestic divisions have not only weakened states as political entities, but have provided a conduit for external intervention by powers that are often more cohesive, and more economically and politically powerful, than themselves. Such intervention was particularly pronounced during the highly charged atmosphere of the Cold War, where the United States and the Soviet Union competed for influence in areas that were of little strategic value and that required the expenditure of comparatively few resources to make a significant local impact.

As a result, groups within states enjoyed greater amounts of power and resources than they would have in the absence of outside support. Thus, many conflicts were prolonged unnaturally or fought with unusual intensity, with the effect that significant damage was done to political and economic infrastructure. Furthermore, many conflicts that would have ceased on their own accord were kept alive through the provision of external resources. Regardless of whether external intervention resulted from the superpowers promoting conflict or from groups within states seeking external assistance, it can be said to have perpetuated both conflict and state weakness within the Third World.

Thus, as discussed by a growing body of literature, problems of Third World security must be understood in terms

of factors such as domestic legitimacy, internal cohesion, underdevelopment, and the rigidity of political institutions. It must also be understood in terms of the links between external actors and internal division, as well as through the effect that external conditions, such as the international economy and norms of international society, have on these states.

As with most security literature, authors dealing with issues of Third World security do not shy away from prescription. Although authors dealing with new understandings of Third World security each place different emphasis on the factors mentioned above, there is a remarkable degree of consensus on what steps may be taken to reduce the insecurity of many Third World states. Essentially, many authors argue that the unfinished process of state and nation-building in much of the Third World is responsible for the majority of violence and external penetration experienced there. Since the majority of these authors still work within the Realist paradigm, their answer to this problem is not directed toward building new forms of political organization such as world government (the traditional area of prescriptive analysis) or to new forms of international society (often based on new social movements),² but rests on strengthening the state.

²See for instance the complementary articles of Martin Shaw, "Global Society and Global Responsibility: The Theoretical, Historical and Political Limits of 'International Society,'" *Millennium* 21, no. 3 (1992):

Unfortunately, few authors elaborate on this prescription by detailing which parts of the state are in need of strengthening, or how this rebuilding can occur when it has failed so markedly in the past.

The following chapter will provide the theoretical framework for the proceeding thesis by summarizing and contrasting the position of two authors that have made significant contributions to theories of Third World security, and that have made clear cases for strengthening states as a means of improving security within the Third World and the international community in general.

The first is Barry Buzan, an author whose ideas have sparked a renewed interest in the theoretical study of security analysis and issues, and to whom a substantial intellectual debt is owed by the many authors that build upon his analysis.³ The second is Mohammed Ayoob, an author that has published extensively on Third World security and is cited frequently as an authority on the topic. Ayoob's analysis overlaps and expands Buzan's work, tracing the interaction between domestic politics and

421-434 and "There is no such thing as society: beyond individualism and statism in international security studies," *Review of International Studies* 19 (1993): 159-175

³Authors that openly acknowledge their debt to Buzan or use his ideas include Alexander Johnston, "Weak states and national security: the case of South Africa in the era of total strategy," *Review of International Studies* 17 (1991): 149-166; and Job, *The Insecurity Dilemma*. He is otherwise well-cited in security literature after 1983. Critical commentary on Buzan's work is given in Steve Smith, "Mature Anarchy, Strong States and Security," *Arms Control* 12, no. 2 (1991): 325-339; Ken Booth, "Security and emancipation," *Review of International Studies* 17 (1991): 313-346; Shaw, "There is no such thing as society," 159-175.

international penetration and the effect that this interaction has on the security of Third World states. Together, they are arguably the most influential authors of Third World security currently writing. This chapter will conclude with a critical discussion of these authors' theories and prescriptions.

STATE-BUILDING AND THIRD WORLD SECURITY

The work of Barry Buzan is strongly conditioned by the author's neo-realist assumptions. He believes that states play a vital role in security relations, because they mediate between conditions at a domestic and international level. They are therefore essential to his analysis. The problem for Buzan is that there exists within the international system a number (even a majority) of states that cannot fulfill the essential functions of statehood - internal order and external defence. These states are the sources of system-wide insecurity because their internal weaknesses tends to spill into the international arena, creating the potential for conflict. Intrastate weakness is therefore a security concern for both the inhabitants and the ruling regime of the state, as well as the wider community of states. As Buzan puts it, "The international anarchy is a decentralized system of order, and therefore depends for its stability on the robustness of its component

units. Weak states are like holes in the fabric of international order."⁴

Buzan's analysis leads him logically to his answer. Since states play such vital roles in global politics, and since the evolution toward higher forms of political organization seems a remote possibility, then the answer to problems of state, regional and international security posed by the existence of weak states is to build stronger states:

...the creation of stronger states is a necessary condition for both individual and national security. The existence of stronger states will not by itself guarantee security, but their continued absence will certainly sustain insecurity. Both national security and international security for the system as a whole, will remain problematic so long as the structure of anarchy is flawed by the presence of many weak states.⁵

Although Buzan realizes that such a task is extremely complicated and that the process may have negative effects for "the security of many individuals and groups" within the state, he maintains that "without strong states, there will be no security, national or otherwise."⁶

How does Buzan envisage this process occurring? On the one hand, Buzan sees important trends in the international system that are simply a function of the passage of time. For instance, the passage of time has allowed some states to legitimate themselves domestically, build viable governing

⁴Barry Buzan, "Is international security possible?" in Booth, *New Thinking About Strategy and International Security*, 45-46

⁵Buzan, *People, States & Fear*, 106

⁶Ibid.

institutions and establish internationally recognized borders; the legitimacy of the state as a form of political organization has improved gradually, as evidenced by the disappearance of multinational empires; and international institutions have evolved in an attempt to ameliorate the worst characteristics of an environment marked by the absence of over-arching authority. Buzan believes that this evolution should lead to a more 'mature anarchy' - an international environment marked by strong states, a reluctance to use force, viable international organizations, and mutual respect.⁷

On the other hand, Buzan is careful to guard against the charge of determinism by noting that "The idea of a temporal imperative behind an evolution towards maturity has considerable appeal, and does not exclude trying to force the pace by more directed measures."⁸ Thus, Buzan allows for a degree of agency in his theory of international security. In a discussion of how his ideas are relevant to policymakers, he argues that his idea of state-building "has the massive advantage of focusing attention on the structures that actually exist."⁹ In terms of how the international community can aid in this process, Buzan posits that "It is not impossible to imagine that in some

⁷Ibid., 174-181

⁸Ibid., 178

⁹Ibid., 381

parts of the [Third World], notably those where both imported state structures and economic development have failed totally, there may evolve a kind of de facto institutional recolonization..." Buzan cites the proposals for international intervention in Cambodia and the "influence of IMF and World Bank 'advisers' in many places" as evidence of this progression.¹⁰ Thus, both the passage of time and the action of states and international organizations may aid in relieving the insecurity of some Third World states.

How various actors can go about strengthening states is not the focus of Buzan's analysis, but his discussion of the constitution of states provides some guidance. Although he is an avowed neo-realist, Buzan's understanding of the internal structure of states is quite subtle, resting on the interconnection between three components; the 'idea' of the state, its institutional expression, and physical base. The glue that binds these components together is sovereignty.

Buzan argues that the first component, the 'idea' of the state, is the most crucial of the three and has two potential sources. The first is the nation, defined as "a large group of people sharing the same culture, and possibly the same ethnic or racial heritage."¹¹ This is the ideal

¹⁰Barry Buzan, "New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century," *International Affairs* 67, no. 3 (1991): 447

¹¹Buzan, *People, States & Fear*, 70

foundation for a strong state, having the positive attributes of cohesion and a shared sense of purpose. Buzan recognizes, however, that few states in the international system resemble the ideal of the nation-state. To achieve this condition, governments may develop policies and practices that attempt to inculcate in society a shared sense of identity. They must also accumulate "central state power" if they are to be viable actors in the international community.¹²

The second idea of the state is its 'organizing ideology,' articulating the form that political rule takes between rulers and subjects. In the absence of a strongly developed sense of nation, ideologies may be used to create allegiance to a state by identifying it with principles that transcend immediate concerns. According to Buzan, the degree that a state's population accepts these ideologies is crucial for its security:

Since these ideologies address the bases of relations between government and society they define the conditions for both harmony and conflict in domestic politics. If the ideas themselves are weak; or if they are weakly held within society; or if strongly held, but opposed, ideas compete within society: then the state stands on fragile political foundations.¹³

Regardless of how the idea of the state comes about, therefore, it is only powerful to the extent that it is widely accepted. As Buzan notes, "Unless the idea of the

¹²Ibid., 99

¹³Ibid., 79

state is firmly planted in the minds of the population, the state as a whole has no foundation. Equally, unless the idea of the state is firmly planted in the 'minds' of other states, the state has no secure environment."¹⁴

The idea of the state is closely tied to Buzan's next component; the institutional expression, consisting of a state's governing bodies, bureaucracy and laws. Many forms of institutions may rule over a state's population, attempting to extract resources and maintain internal order. Their success and stability are dependent on how legitimate they are in the minds of the populations they effect. If the idea of the state closely matches its institutional expression, the state rules with the acquiescence of the population. If it does not, then the state's apparatus may have to be extremely large, attempting to control a reluctant or even hostile population. The degree of legitimacy a state enjoys is therefore a security concern, because in its absence, challenges to state authority will be widespread.

The physical base of a state, coupled with its degree of exercisable sovereignty, are the last of Buzan's components. The physical base consists of a state's territory, wealth and population. Given that it is the most concrete of Buzan's components, threats to it are easily understood and encompassed by traditional concepts of security. As Buzan

¹⁴Ibid., 78

points out, however, the physical base of a state may suffer from some ambiguities, particularly in the Third World where borders are often disputed and populations migrate often and mingle freely. A state's sovereignty, the 'glue' that Buzan suggests binds these components together, rests on its claim to be the highest authority over a given territory and population. To be valid, sovereignty must be exercised. If it is not, a state is little more than an extension of another political entity, under its control and authority.

Using these components as a basis of comparison, Buzan develops a typology of state strength, strength defined as the degree of socio-political cohesion existing within a state (as opposed to power, which measures the military capability of a state or its relative economic wealth). States can then be placed on a continuum, with 'weak states' on one end and 'strong states' at the other. According to Buzan, the latter states enjoy a clearly defined and widely held idea of the state, high legitimacy and an enduring institutional express, a long and common history where the state consolidated and matured, settled borders and exercisable sovereignty. Under these circumstances, he submits, national security deals primarily with external threats to the components of the state.¹⁵

¹⁵Ibid., 96-107. See also Barry Buzan, "People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World," in Azar and Moon, *National Security in the Third World*, 14-43

This is not the case for weak states which exhibit few, if any, of the above traits. They are instead characterized by some or all of the following conditions: high levels of political violence, an active and intrusive internal security force, serious disputes over society's organizing ideology, an incoherent or contested national identity, an unclear hierarchy of political authority, and little or no independent media.¹⁶ These conditions make for a far more varied and complex environment in which to pursue security. They will be perpetuated, Buzan's analysis suggests, until measures are taken to strengthen the state along each of its three components.

Mohammed Ayoob builds a similar case as Buzan and arrives at similar conclusions. He argues that most Third World states suffer from violence due to the incomplete process of nation and state-building. Aside from inheriting poorly developed or inappropriate state apparatus upon decolonization, ruling regimes have not had the time since to achieve internal cohesion, "societal penetration and the achievement of political legitimacy both for state institutions and for ruling elites."¹⁷ For Ayoob, the experience of European state-builders is instructive. As he notes,

¹⁶Buzan, *People, States & Fear*, 100

¹⁷Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World," 268

As the European experience has demonstrated, three areas - taxation (extraction of resources under the protection of coercive state agencies), policing (maintaining domestic order where it has already been imposed), and warfare aimed at the primitive accumulation of state power (extending and consolidating a particular political order by the use of force against potential as well as dissident subjects and fending off rival claimants to the same territorial and demographic space) - comprise the bulk of the activities undertaken by early state makers.¹⁸

These processes are by nature violent, explaining why the Third World has been the sight of so much conflict.

This violence has been fueled by the action of global actors. In this context, Ayoob agrees with Buzan's idea of the 'weak state,' arguing that it is this weakness that allows for and promotes external penetration which, in turn, serves to perpetuate the weakness of the state. For instance, in a discussion of regional security, Ayoob argues that "one cannot realistically begin to talk of genuine regional security until the 'security' of Third World states in general...becomes far less fragile than it is today. This is related to the legitimation of state structures and regimes in the Third World on the one hand, and the nature of linkages with systemic security on the other."¹⁹ He adds that external penetration by major powers must "diminish drastically" if such a process is to be viable.²⁰

¹⁸Ibid. 279. In support of his argument, Ayoob cites, among others, the essays in Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975)

¹⁹Ayoob, "Regional Security and the Third World," 20

²⁰Ibid.

How does Ayooob envisage this process occurring? Ayooob's analysis places significant emphasis on "the role of the coercive apparatuses of state" in legitimizing the regime through the process of accumulating "central state power," as well as the earlier mentioned roles of taxation and policing.²¹ However, unlike Buzan, who allows for a degree of positive international intervention in this process, Ayooob sees the key variable as being the passage of time, while giving secondary significance to the action of state leaders:

As it stands, the existing parameters of the security problematic of the Third World can be altered only if Third World states have adequate time to complete the twin tasks of the [sic] state making and nation building, plus enough political sagacity on their leaderships' part to attempt to accomplish these tasks in as humane a manner as possible.²²

Thus, according to Ayooob's analysis, strengthening of states is primarily a domestic matter, relying on the coercive apparatus of the state to establish the conditions where, through time, the regime and state gain legitimacy and the foundations of a nation-state are laid. That this process occur is a necessary requirement for Ayooob if security is to carry meaning within and between states of the Third World.

In summary, both Buzan and Ayooob point to the weakness of Third World states as a primary cause of insecurity - both on a domestic and international level. Bolstering the

²¹Ayooob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World," 280

²²Ibid. 283

strength of Third World states is posited as a potential remedy. Both authors believe that this can only be achieved in a 'top-down' fashion; that is, ruling regimes acting to accumulate centralized control through the application of various policies, particularly coercive force. The evidence they marshal for this assertion relies on the experience of the European states from the 16th century forward. Each believes that the passage of time is essential to this process, but they differ as to how much positive influence can be brought to bear by the international community. Ayooob mentions only the withdrawal of foreign intervention as being helpful to the state-building process. He argues that the most demanding role is played by domestic actors within the states themselves. Buzan on the other hand allows for a more active role for international agencies, going so far as to suggest a form of international 'recolonization.' Aside from this minor difference, however, their analyses are remarkably similar.

CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS

Will building stronger states improve the security of the Third World and the international community? Is such a project viable in the twentieth century? What role, if any, will international actors play? Although these questions have no hard answers, there are a few issues that should be considered when attempting an answer. Perhaps the most

important argument for utilizing the state as a foundation for building international security is that it uses, as Buzan notes, structures that already exist. State-building prescriptions do not envisage new forms of international rule, nor seek to undermine existing ones. Rather, they seek to bolster the strength of the system's constituent units, states. These projects have built-in appeal for states and the forums through which they collectively act, international organizations, because they reinforce the centrality of the state in international relations.

While the latter argument relates to the subjective appeal of a state-building enterprise to the sensibilities of diplomats and international bureaucrats alike, there are other merits in these designs. For one, they emphasize that the state remains an important actor on the world stage and within domestic life. While this argument must be tempered in our era of 'cascading interdependence' and 'eroding sovereignty,' it remains the case that the state has not 'withered away' and is unlikely to do so until replaced by alternate forms of authority, most still in their infancy. If there exist many states that cannot meet the roles attributed to them, and instead spill conflict into the international system, then they may indeed be 'holes in the fabric of international order.' This is not to say, however, that the state is the only actor, or even the most important, in effecting the security situation of Third

World populations. International organizations, such as the IMF and World Bank, affect the well-being of Third World populations every day, as do indigenous and non-governmental organizations. However, it is almost always the state which poses a military threat to its citizens. Therefore, efforts to improve Third World security must be directed at some point to effecting the behavior and function of states.

Lastly, if lack of governance is a serious problem of Third World security, as these and other authors suggest, then efforts to improve the functional abilities of the state seem necessary to ameliorate the causes of conflict. Governments that can impose order on a potentially hostile domestic environment, that can extract and allocate resources in a directed fashion, and that attempt to build internal legitimacy will inevitably be valued over those that cannot end domestic chaos, are unable to promulgate and implement policies, or that blatantly rule for a select few. These are the most important merits of a theory of state-building for security and will be discussed in more detail in later chapters.

What are the problems associated with pursuing a project of state-building as suggested by Buzan and Ayooob? There are a number. The first, pointed out by Brian Job, is that the idea that the Third World can repeat the state-building process of the European states may be misplaced. European states emerged in relative isolation, unaffected by trends

and events facing the Third World today - lingering effects of colonization, the penetration of an often volatile global economy, the "freezing of territorial boundaries" associated with the evolution of norms of international society, and the influence and penetration of the global media.²³ These factors may make it impossible to build the strong nation-state deemed necessary for improving both domestic and international security by Buzan and Ayoob.

Job's assertions regarding the impact of colonization and the role of the global economy are particularly important. In terms of the former issue, the work of Joel S. Migdal points to the long-lasting and pervasive effects of the European colonization. Migdal argues that the weakness of most Third World states today is a function of the strength of their societies which, in turn, is a result of their colonial experience. Previous to foreign contact, many Third World societies relied on long-established and stable strategies of survival. Colonization destroyed these strategies by opening these societies to international economic penetration. In addition, colonial powers imposed or created new forms of political organization at the same time as individuals and groups were searching for new means to ensure their survival. The structures created, usually based on the devolution of power, gained allegiance and

²³Brian L. Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World," in Job, *The Insecurity Dilemma*, 26

strength, providing that they could meet the survival needs of these individuals and groups.

With the end of colonization, social control within states of the Third World lay not at the level of the state, but lower down, in the groups able to provide material benefit, security and governance to the population. This locus of control has posed enormous problems to regimes attempting to consolidate the power and authority of the state after decolonization, and has been the cause of substantial amounts of violence as regimes attempt to usurp power from below. As Migdal puts it;

In short...our preliminary answer to why some Third World states have been at such pains to increase capabilities is that colonial rule helped induce a fragmentation of social control, an environment of conflict, during that historical window of opportunity when the population sought new strategies of survival.²⁴

This fragmentation of social control continues to be a cause of much conflict within states of the Third World.

Although his analysis supports those of Buzan and Ayoob, Migdal rejects the notion that it should lend itself to prescriptive designs, arguing that;

For vulnerable individuals, [the] struggle for control of their lives has frequently been little more than a conflict between the evils of exploitative local powers and the "justice" of an aggrandizing state intent on transforming them and ridding them of some of their most cherished values.²⁵

²⁴Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 141

²⁵Ibid., xx-xxi

This normative position is bolstered by Migdal's argument that even the passage of time cannot relieve the weakness of states, arguing that the structural conditions underpinning this weakness is likely to perpetuate decentralized forms of social control.²⁶ Thus, although Migdal's analysis points to the sources of state weakness in the Third World as a cause of insecurity, he rejects the idea of shoring up the strength of states on both normative and analytic grounds.

The role of the international economy in undermining the stability of Third World states is another important factor to consider when judging the merit of state-building proposals. Third World states find themselves in a historically unique epoch in terms of state-building. Third World states must survive in a global economy marked by the presence of competitive producers, highly mobile capital, and declining terms of trade.²⁷ They are also burdened with high debt loads that drain away needed capital and must comply with the 'liberal' dictates of international financial organizations, a practice that substantially reduces their control over domestic policy.²⁸ All these factors reduce the amount of resources available to pursue

²⁶Ibid., 265

²⁷See John Ravenhill, "The North-South balance of power," *International Affairs* 66, no. 4 (1990): 731-748

²⁸See for instance G. K. Helleiner, "Structural Adjustment and Long-term Development in SubSaharan Africa," in Frances Stewart, Sanjaya Lall, and Samuel Wangwe, eds., *Alternative Development Strategies in SubSaharan Africa* (London: MacMillan Press, 1992); John Loxley, *Debt and Disorder* (London: Westview Press, 1990)

strategies of nation and state-building called for by Buzan and Ayooob. Although Buzan notes the gravity of these problems, it is difficult to see how he can then sustain his prescriptive conclusions, given the pervasiveness of these conditions in states of the Third World.

The third problem with the state-building prescriptions of Buzan and Ayooob is that, if they are carried out, they may actually exacerbate rather than improve international security. Both Buzan and Ayooob cite sources that suggest that the European state and nation making experience was a violent process, involving pitched battles between state centralizers and those that resisted them. Further, both expect that this situation will continue. As Buzan argues, "Because they are still in the early stages of the attempt to consolidate themselves as state-nations, domestic violence is endemic in such states. Under these circumstances, violence is as likely to be a sign of the accumulation of central state power as it is to be a symptom of political decay."²⁹ This argument closely follows that of Ayooob.

The problem with accepting this situation is that it entails accepting a great deal of inter-state tension, arising from wars that spill over borders, refugees fleeing

²⁹Buzan, *People, States & Fear*, 99. In support of his argument, Buzan quotes Y. Cohen, B. R. Brown and A. F. K. Organski, "The paradoxical nature of state making: the violent creation of order," *American Political Science Review* 75, no. 4 (1981): 901-910

conflict and repression, and the potential for ethnic conflict arising from the existence of transnational identity groups. The easy availability of weapons and assistance only exacerbates this violence and increases the potential for it to spill into other states. It is difficult to understand, therefore, how promoting a state-building project in the Third World can improve international security, particularly in the short to medium term.

Fourth, and more importantly, if building strong states causes insecurity at an international level, it is even more the case at a domestic level. Both authors believe that centralizing state power is an essential prerequisite for improving the strength of states. Each acknowledges that activities that promote this goal are violent: suppressing contending identity groups, jailing or killing opponents of the regime in power, up-rooting and replacing traditional forms of rule. Each even makes sympathetic noises toward those groups and individuals that will suffer at the hands of would-be state-builders.³⁰ Yet neither believes that the security of groups or individuals within the state should take precedence over the state itself. It is only

³⁰In this context, Buzan notes that, "Building strong states...may have negative consequences for the security of many individuals and groups caught up in the process." Buzan, *People, States & Fear*, 106. Similarly, Ayooob hopes that in the process of state-building, state leaders have "enough political sagacity" to carry out their policies "in as humane a manner as possible." Ayooob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World," 283

over the long term - after domestic opposition has been crushed and society and polity function in tandem - that the security of groups and individuals becomes synonymous with the state.

Under their designs, the question of whether the short-term interests of individuals within the state should take precedence over the long-term interests of state and international security is decided in favour of the latter. Does this justify the time honoured and currently popular practices of forced migration ('ethnic cleansing') as in the Balkans? or the genocide practiced by Iraq against the Kurds? or the suppression of domestic opponents in any number of states? Their moral hand-wringing aside, each author is at least partially culpable of lending credibility to these practices, each of which may be justified in terms of improving the strength of the state by laying the foundation of 'the nation.' Thus, in their call for strengthening states to improve international security, these authors go beyond explaining much of the violence that accompanies life in the Third World, to justifying it.

Related to this point is a normative one. States exist for reasons other than providing means through which elites may increase their wealth or maintain power. This is in accordance with the work of liberal theorists of the state such as John Locke, who argues that people create states to provide them with safe environments to pursue social and

economic activities while offering them protection from externally generated threats.³¹ In this formulation, the state is a means to an end. Seemingly, neither Buzan nor Ayoob would disagree with such an assertion. Yet, their proposals, and their willing acceptance of the violence that they entail, tend to lose track of what the state exists to do - provide internal order and external protection. Policies that support activities that purposely decrease the security of state inhabitants - such as Ayoob's "primitive accumulation of central state power" - fall into this category but make little sense, because they privilege the security of the means over that of the ends.³²

If states do in fact exist for the well-being of their inhabitants (or if that *should* be the case, as a generous interpretation of both Buzan and Ayoob may suggest), then it makes little sense to privilege the security of the state to the detriment (even short term) of its inhabitants. Doing so relies on the morally specious argument that the short-term suffering of a state's population will be balanced by the long-term gain in security for succeeding generations and for the international community. If the end sought is the security of the state's inhabitants and the

³¹As John Locke puts it, "The great and chief end...of men's uniting into commonwealths and putting themselves under government is the preservation of their property," which he defines as "their lives, liberty and estates." John Locke, *The Second Treatise of Government* ed. Thomas P. Peardon (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1952), 71

³²Ken Booth, "Security and emancipation," *Review of International Studies* 17 (1991): 320

means is the state, then it makes little sense to support policies that have at their core the destruction of individuals and groups within the state. To paraphrase Ken Booth's rhetorical question, 'There is obviously a relationship between the well-being of the sheltered and the shelter of the state, but can there be any question as to whose security is primary?'³³ Buzan and Ayooob's privileging of the shelter to the detriment of the sheltered seems logically misplaced.

The final problem with the prescriptions of Buzan and Ayooob may be seen as a summation of the points made thus far. Leaving aside for a moment the argument that state-building in the current epoch may be impossible due to a number of factors (mentioned earlier), one can question whether the form of sovereignty supported by both authors through the beginning and middle phases of the state-building enterprise may not be a major cause, and not the solution, to problems of Third World security. As was noted earlier, both authors take a 'top-down' view of state-building; that is, with state leaders using the apparatus of government to eliminate opponents, gradually impose their rule, build a sense of nation, and extend political participation.³⁴ It could be argued, following

³³Ibid.

³⁴This case is made most explicitly by Ayooob, based on the European experience. See Mohammed Ayooob, "The Security Predicament of the Third World State: Reflections on State Making in a Comparative Perspective," in Job, *The Insecurity Dilemma*, 69

much of what has been presented before, that this form of sovereignty - dependent on one person or one party rule, at least initially - has *been* the source of insecurity in Third World states and has not led to consolidated rule but, rather, increased violence.

Furthermore, the centralizing rule posited as necessary by both authors seems out of sync with trends in the world community - trends that promote democracy, human rights and participation. This raises the question as to why the authors are so wedded to their top-down view of legitimation and centralization; that is, state-building. Little consideration is given in their writing to building states on the opposite premise - based on popular sovereignty and the rule of the people. In fact, both authors consider the call for participation in Third World states as a problem to be overcome, not as a possibility to be explored. It may be said, therefore, that their attachment to the European state-building experience as a model for their prescriptions is neither original nor realistic, given the trends at work in the international system today.

As will be argued in chapter five, the experience of the United Nations in Cambodia suggests that the world community is attempting to increase the strength of Third World states, but by promoting the exact opposite form of sovereignty to that outlined by Buzan and Ayoob. This experience points to a simple but overlooked point: it is

not just that Third World states need to be more functionally competent ('stronger'); rather, attention needs to be paid to the particular type of state so-strengthened. The type imposed upon the leaders and people of Cambodia is one that holds the potential of improving domestic and international security in both the short and long-term. It is only on this basis, I argue, that a state-building enterprise can be justified as a means of improving Third World and international security.

CHAPTER TWO

THE CAMBODIAN STATE AND SECURITY

The history of Cambodia is marked by upheaval and warfare. Over time, almost every conceivable type of conflict has been visited upon the Khmer people; war, invasion, insurrection, revolution, genocide. Using the concepts outlined in the previous chapter, this chapter seeks to locate the sources of this insecurity. It supports many of the insights of Third World security theorists, arguing that Cambodia's security problems are largely a function of its weakness as a state. This is particularly true of its internal politics. Marked by divisiveness and contested legitimacy, domestic politics in Cambodia have created internal strife and frequent opportunities for regional and global powers to intervene in the pursuit of their own goals. Foreign intervention serves to perpetuate the worst characteristics of Cambodian political life, reinforcing the insecurity of the Khmer state and people.

This chapter will proceed as follows. First, it will briefly outline Cambodia's pre-modern history in order to highlight certain trends and events that have had a major impact on the modern Cambodian state. Second, it will

provide a more detailed discussion of Cambodian history since the Second World War. This section will discuss four periods: the reign of Sihanouk between 1941 and 1970; the rule of the Khmer Republic between 1970 and 1975; the rule of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) or Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1978; and the rule of the Vietnamese supported People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) from 1979 to 1990. As will become clear in the course of this chapter, each of these sections describe distinct periods in Cambodian history, the implications of which reverberate to this day. After reviewing Cambodian history since the Second World War, this chapter goes on to discuss the problems of Cambodian security. It concludes that the primary causes of Cambodian insecurity are the lack of political institutionalization, minimal legitimacy, and continuing foreign penetration. It suggests, therefore, that Cambodian security will not be improved until each of these issues are addressed.

'PRE-MODERN' CAMBODIA

The modern state of Cambodia traces its lineage back to what the Chinese at the time dubbed the Kingdom of 'Funan,' established in the early part of the Christian era in the lower Mekong valley.¹ Probably no more than a collection

¹G. Coedes, *The Making of South East Asia* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), 57

of chiefdoms that collectively paid tribute to the Chinese Kingdom (and then only intermittently), Funan was peopled by the Mon-Khmer tribes. These groups, and the forms of social organization they created, were influenced heavily by Indian culture. This culture affected Khmer language and writing style; forms of social hierarchy; introduced their dominant religion, Buddhism, and the Brahmanic concept of *devaraja*, or God-King; and, as David P. Chandler summarizes, "new ways of looking at politics, sociology, architecture, iconography, astronomy, and aesthetics."² Echoes of each of these influences can be heard throughout the history of Cambodia, to the present day.³

In the sixth century A.D., Funan gave way to the Kingdom of 'Chenla,' the centre of which was located further inland and encompassed territory as far as the Malay peninsula and throughout the Mekong Delta. More of a collection of "little realms and princedoms" that occasionally collaborated in war and commerce than a coherent polity, Chenla nevertheless expanded its territory throughout the following centuries, laying the basis for the rise of the Kingdom of Angkor in the ninth century. The period of Angkor, dating from 802 to 1431, witnessed the peak of Cambodia's power. A series of kings ruled more or less

²David P. Chandler, *A History of Cambodia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 12

³Abdulgaifar Peang-Meth, "Understanding the Khmer: Sociological-Cultural Observations," *Asian Survey* 31, no. 5 (1991): 442-455

successively through this time, expanding their territory further into the Malay peninsula and encompassing much of what is present day Thailand, Vietnam and Laos. Under their reign, the Khmer built elaborate temples (such as Angkor Wat and Angkor Thom), and became known for their fighting prowess, agricultural ability, art, and architecture. Most important was their construction of sophisticated irrigation works that allowed more than one rice harvest per year, allowing for the concentration of large populations and the accumulation of sufficient rice for waging military campaigns.⁴ Until the middle of the thirteenth century, these were sufficient to maintain the power of Angkor.

Beginning in the thirteenth century, the Kingdom of Angkor experienced a gradual loss of power and prestige. The slow failing of the irrigation works, the rapid conversion of the peasantry from Mahayana to Theravada Buddhism (the latter preaches personal salvation through individual deeds and is believed to appeal to the 'common people,' probably undermining traditional social relations),⁵ and the loss of control over its northern territory reduced the power of the Khmer Kingdom to resist the growing strength of nearby kingdoms, particularly the Siamese (Thai) Kingdom of Ayuddha. The Khmer's shift from a

⁴Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, 51

⁵David Joel Steinberg, ed., *In Search of Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 39-42

preoccupation with war to trade is indicated by the abandonment of the capital of Angkor in favour of an area where the Mekong and Tonle Sap join - present day Phnom Penh.

Although this shift made the Khmer Kingdom well-situated to control the area's increasing trade with China, Angkor could no longer compete with neighbouring Kingdoms, and lost increasing amounts of territory to Siam. As a result, the period from the 15th to 17th century was marked by the increasing Thai dominance of Cambodian affairs. Beginning in the 17th century, Vietnam competed with the Thais for control of Cambodia, as Vietnamese migration slowly displaced the Khmer in the Mekong Delta.⁶

Cut off from river-borne commerce and losing territory to its expanding neighbours, the Khmer were forced to recognize the suzerainty of Siam and the power of Vietnam.⁷ This pattern continued into the eighteenth century as the Khmer royal family, described by Chandler as "perennially riven by factionalism," split along "pro-Thai and pro-Vietnamese lines," making each dynastic succession subject to the approval of either or both foreign powers.⁸

⁶These migrations are of particular relevance to Southeast Asia since, as Jerry M. Silvermann argues, lasting change in political structure and authority in the area is best understood in terms of mass migrations and not to the outcome of any particular conflict. Jerry M. Silvermann, "Historic National Rivalries and Interstate Conflict in Mainland Southeast Asia," 54 and 59

⁷Coedes, *The Making of South East Asia*, 209

⁸Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, 94-97

The situation within Cambodia worsened with time.⁹ In a competition for power, Siam and Vietnam refused to recognize the other's position and competed in Cambodia for supremacy. Control of the Khmer capital fluctuated between the two Kingdoms as each repeatedly invaded Cambodia in the 18th and 19th centuries. Following a particularly successful Thai military campaign in 1834, the Vietnamese sought to increase their power in Cambodia, improving its utility as a buffer-zone. From 1834 to 1840, Vietnamese officials consolidated their administrative control of Cambodia and extended their military presence. At the same time, Thai military forces settled in the Northwest region of the Khmer Kingdom, increasing their control of the provinces of Siem Reap and Battambang. In 1840, anti-Vietnamese uprisings broke out in much of Southern Cambodia, sparking Thai intervention and widespread conflict. The subsequent conflict went poorly for Vietnam and its forces withdrew in 1848, leaving the field open for a resurgence of Thai influence. Subsequent Khmer Kings were crowned by Thai officials, signifying their practical dependence on the Siamese court.

By the middle of the 19th century, the presence of French colonial officials began to make an important impact on the politics of Southeast Asia. In 1863, Cambodian King Udong,

⁹The following summary is taken from Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, chs. 6 and 7

attempting to reduce Thai control over his Kingdom, accepted France's offer of protection in exchange for "timber concessions and mineral exploration rights."¹⁰ Instead of improving the situation, however, this move merely traded one master for another. In the following decades, France consolidated its power in Cambodia through a number of treaties, increased military and administrative presence, and by playing off opposing sides of the Khmer royal family. A full colony by 1884, Cambodia became an important source of revenue for France as French colonizers planted and exported rubber crops and tapped the rice-growing potential of the Khmer for export. Roads and railways were built to facilitate the increased trade so that, as Chandler notes, "After 1904, with some exceptions, Cambodia became a relatively efficient revenue-producing machine."¹¹ For France, this propitious situation was to last for the next four decades.

Japan's invasion and occupation of Indochina during the Second World War not only interrupted this arrangement, but sparked a process of violent resistance that vented its full fury on the returning French forces, leading to the collapse of France's Asian empire. Japan's initial policy in Indochina was to govern through the existing French administration, allowing French officials some leeway in

¹⁰Ibid., 140

¹¹Ibid., 148

their colonial rule. Their continued influence is evident in the period following the 1941 death of Cambodian King Monivong, an opportunity that French officials seized to install nineteen year old Prince Norodom Sihanouk on the throne, instead of Monivong's son and designated successor, Prince Monireth.

As Japanese fortunes declined in battle, their policies toward French administration shifted. On 9 March 1945, Japanese forces disarmed French troops and replaced their administrative officials. As in the other French colonial possessions, Japan encouraged Cambodian officials to declare independence (which Sihanouk did on 13 March 1945) and armed anti-French forces prior to their departure. With the defeat of Japanese forces in 1945 and the return of the French the following year, Cambodian independence was revoked and important figures in the short-lived movement were arrested (this included ardent nationalist and then prime minister Son Ngoc Thanh), many of whom went on to become leaders in the anti-French forces supported by the Thai (the Khmer Issarak and, later, the Khmer Serei, or Free Khmer) and the Vietnamese (the Communist Party of Kampuchea or CPK).¹² The restoration of Cambodian independence would wait eight more years.

¹²Ibid., 172

THE REIGN OF SIHANOUK, 1941-1970

For almost three decades, Norodom Sihanouk presided over Cambodian politics. His rule has been variously described as mercurial, contradictory and adroit, but few dispute that his impact on Cambodian security was substantial. His rule began in 1941 when French governor-general Jean Decoux chose Sihanouk as Cambodia's new King in the belief that he would be easily manipulable. These predictions would eventually prove false, but in the first years of his rule Sihanouk proved quite pliable to French influence. The formulation of a new constitution under the auspices of a joint French-Cambodian commission was perhaps the first time that Sihanouk exercised substantial influence over politics in his Kingdom, proposing two amendments to the paternalistic document; one guaranteeing universal male suffrage, the other outlining a number of rights and freedoms.¹³ This apparent support for norms of liberal-democracy notwithstanding, Sihanouk used France's presence to strengthen his power and undermine political rivals. In the country's first elections, held in 1947, the newly formed Democratic Party - running on a pro-independence and anti-monarchic platform - took 73 per cent of the vote. This suited neither the interests of Sihanouk nor the French. In September 1949, with the blessing (and military support) of

¹³David P. Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 29

France, Sihanouk dissolved the Democrat- controlled national assembly and appointed a new, pro-Sihanouk (and therefore pro-French) government.

The popular Democratic Party was further weakened in January 1950 with the assassination of its leader, Ieu Koeuss, under circumstances that strongly suggest French complicity.¹⁴ This party, whose active supporters included Saloth Sar (Pol Pot) and Ieng Sary, was constantly harassed by Cambodian and French officials, causing many members to flee Phnom Penh and join forces with those opposed to continued French rule. Nonetheless, when given the opportunity to run for office again in 1951, the Democratic Party repeated their 1947 victory and formed a new government.

Not all Cambodians were content to play politics by the rules set by the French and Sihanouk. By 1951, two groups that chose to resist French colonization controlled over 1/6 of Cambodian territory. The first was the Khmer Issarak, supported by Thailand and led by pro-democratic and anti-French (though not anti-Sihanouk) leaders. The second was the Khmer Peoples' Revolutionary Party (KPRP), formed in 1951 out of the Indochina Communist Party. This group, influenced heavily by the Viet Minh, fought on anti-French and anti-monarchic grounds, but enjoyed little popular support owing to the conservatism of the peasantry. These

¹⁴Ibid., 45

two forces, often acting in unison, put increasing pressure on the French, tying down valuable forces that could have been used in the war against the Viet Minh. Their strength caused Sihanouk to reconsider his cooperation with the French.

His change of policy began after the 1951 elections returned the Democratic Party to the national assembly. Their attempt to exercise real power caused Sihanouk concern, as did their pro-independence stance for the French. Hoping to split their strength, Sihanouk requested that Son Ngoc Thanh, a popular nationalist detained in France for his role in the 1945 independence movement, be returned to Cambodia under his auspices. Much to Sihanouk's dismay, Thanh arrived to a hero's welcome and proceeded to defect to the Khmer Issarak in March 1952. The King blamed the Democrats for this 'treason' and dismissed the government in June 1952 and the entire assembly in January 1953. Sihanouk then took up the Democrat's cause, crusading for independence from the French.

Recognizing that the war in Indochina was going poorly at this point, France preferred to transfer power to leaders of its choosing. It granted Cambodia independence on 9 November 1953. This nullified the support of the Khmer Issarak whose forces ended their resistance and rejoined Khmer society. The other leading armed opposition force, the Cambodian Communists, were abandoned by the Viet Minh at

the 1954 Geneva talks, their personnel forced to carry on their struggle in the open or to train in North Vietnam in anticipation of future conflict. For the time being, Sihanouk had managed to defeat the armed opponents of his rule.

That done, his attention shifted to defeating those forces that peacefully opposed him. In order for the Khmer people to 'judge' his independence crusade, Sihanouk organized a national referendum in 1955. Sihanouk rigged the election so that he won by a massive majority (925,667 in favour, 1,834 against). He then used the result to justify the arrest of editors of even mildly critical newspapers, as well as to rewrite the constitution to, among other things, increase the executive power of the King.¹⁵ However, these initiatives did not enjoy much popular support and, after this became clear to him, Sihanouk abdicated the throne to form his own political party, the *Sangkum Reastr Niyum* (People's Socialist Community), in order to run against the existing three parties - the liberal Democratic Party, the Liberal Party (actually conservative supporters of Sihanouk), and the leftist *Pracheachon* - in the frequently postponed elections called for under the Geneva agreements.

Through the manipulation of electoral results and the intimidation, assassination and imprisonment of his

¹⁵Ibid., 77

opponents, Sihanouk easily won the elections. Over the next year, physical intimidation by government personnel forced the remaining Democrats to dissolve their party and join the Sangkum. This move had important consequences. As Chandler comments,

It was a sad demise for an organization founded with such high hopes, such a large following, and so many talented leaders. Political opposition to Sihanouk among Cambodia's elite went underground, emerging ten years later with more intensity from radicals and conservatives alike. The Khmer Republic and the [Communist Party of Kampuchea] were in a sense both children of the Democratic party and products of this repression.¹⁶

After the dissolution of the Democratic Party, the only group willing to remain in the political arena was the leftist *Pracheachon*. In the 1958 elections, this party faced repression similar to what the Democrats did in 1955. Nonetheless, some members, such as Khieu Samphan (a leftist that would later emerge as a key figure in the Khmer Rouge) retained their seats and attempted to influence Sihanouk's policies through legitimate channels. Many of their policies were quite influential, as Sihanouk co-opted their 'socialist' stance for his own purposes.

This is most evident in Sihanouk's foreign policy. Despite the fact that his army was being supplied by the United States (a situation that lasted from 1955 to 1963), Sihanouk played up his anti-American rhetoric at international conferences, particularly within the

¹⁶Ibid., 94

Non-Aligned Movement. He also declared himself and his Kingdom 'socialist,' believing this to be fashionable behaviour for Third World governments. His position earned him the favour of many regional states, particularly China and North Vietnam, as well as stole the thunder from his sole remaining domestic opponent, the *Pracheachon*. It did not endear him to the Americans, however, who began to search for alternatives to Sihanouk. At least three plots to kill or overthrow Sihanouk were uncovered in 1958, most with the backing of the American supported Diem government in South Vietnam. The United States also supported the Khmer Serei guerrillas on the Thai border and trained anti-Sihanouk Khmer Krom in Vietnam.¹⁷ These policies convinced Sihanouk that the Americans were against his rule and could not be trusted. They had an important influence on his 1963 decision to suspend American aid to the Cambodian government.

The decade of the 1960s was marked by the further consolidation of Sihanouk's formal rule but a gradual loss of substantive power. Prior to the 1962 national election, Sihanouk mounted a campaign of harassment and intimidation against the only remaining independent political party, the *Pracheachon*, so that by 1962, none of its members offered themselves as independent candidates. Those leftists that

¹⁷Khmer Krom are ethnic Khmer living in the Mekong Delta region of Vietnam, remnants of Cambodia's former empire.

could remain in the open, such as Khieu Samphan, did so by joining Sihanouk's Sangkum, while many others fled to the countryside, joining the CPK in their nascent attempt to build popular support. With the left effectively co-opted or 'safely' hidden away in the jungle, Sihanouk was in a seemingly powerful position.

This power was illusory, however, owing to the interaction of internal and external events. This was particularly true after 1963. This year witnessed the beginning of Sihanouk's increasing persecution of the Cambodian left, causing the remaining socialists to flee for good (these included Pol Pot, Ieng Sary and, in 1967, Khieu Samphan). Sihanouk also broke relations with the United States in November 1963, following the assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and the capture of American backed Khmer Serei rebels - events that undermined Sihanouk's faith in the United States as an ally.¹⁸ The break in relations was also intended to meet two goals: diminish the power of Cambodia's economic elite, which had prospered from the infusion of American funds since 1960, and make Cambodia a more attractive destination for communist aid, particularly from China. It did have many of these effects, but at great cost: the Cambodian elite became increasingly disenchanted with their prince; the national budget, previously dependent on American money, became

¹⁸Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 130

seriously unbalanced; and the Khmer armed forces, never very powerful, declined further, owing to the loss of American arms shipments.

The increasingly hot war in neighbouring Vietnam added to Sihanouk's problems. The US invasion of Vietnam in 1965 prompted Sihanouk to seek allies that would guarantee Cambodia's independence. Having already cut ties with the US, Sihanouk turned to the Vietnamese communists. In 1964, he concluded an agreement with North Vietnam to allow the passage of materiel through the port of Sihanoukville to NVA forces controlling most of Eastern Cambodia. In return, North Vietnam recognized and promised to respect the existing Cambodian border.¹⁹ In Sihanouk's mind, this agreement shored up pro-Sihanouk sentiment among the North Vietnamese (as will be discussed below, this was largely the case as the North Vietnamese consistently counselled their Cambodian allies not to engage Sihanouk's government in armed struggle) and reduced the incentive for these forces to remain on Cambodian soil after the war. (The supposedly anti-communist officer corp of the Cambodian armed forces, including its highest ranking general, Lon Nol, were not adverse to using this arrangement to strengthen their positions, skimming off up to one-third of all supplies.)²⁰

¹⁹Gareth Porter, "Vietnamese Communist Policy Toward Kampuchea, 1930-1970," in David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan, eds., *Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays* (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1983), 78

²⁰William Shawcross, *Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction*

Sihanouk also turned to the Chinese for assistance and, by the end of 1964, had received promises of unconditional aid from China. Another promise that Sihanouk consistently sought, and was unable to attain, was an international guarantee of Cambodia's neutrality - even China would not make this promise.

The national elections of 1966, the last for nearly three decades, were, like the previous ones, corrupt and run without opposition. However, unlike the previous four elections, Sihanouk did not choose the Sangkum slate, allowing candidates to run on the basis of financial power or, less frequently, merit. The resulting assembly owed Sihanouk nothing and was composed mostly of the right wing of the Cambodian political spectrum. Concerned that this assembly, and the Prime Minister they elected, Lon Nol, may usurp his authority, Sihanouk created a 'countergovernment' (composed mostly of Sihanouk allies) to check its power. This precaution taken, it was still in Sihanouk's (perceived) interest to allow the assembly to operate, as doing so gave Cambodia's pro-Western elite the illusion of power without the substance of real control.

Unfortunately for Sihanouk, the Cambodian elite wanted a real say in running the affairs of state. In 1967, while Sihanouk was in France, the military instituted a new policy to decrease the amount of rice being sold to Vietnamese

forces on the Eastern border, thus allowing for increased export-tax revenue.²¹ Implementation of the policy was brutal, and often took the form of an anti-communist persecution, further alienating the Cambodian peasantry and driving less conservative citizens into the arms of the resistance.²² It sparked a popular uprising in Northwest Cambodia in March 1967 that quickly spread to many parts of the country. Although the uprising involved violence in some areas, it was often marked by peaceful demonstrations organized by disgruntled peasant leaders. However, government forces ignored these distinctions and subjected all opposition to brutal suppression.²³ By May 1967, they had crushed the rebellion.

This revolt, and the 1968 decision by the CPK to begin armed struggle, pushed Sihanouk back to the right. Believing that the Cambodian Communists were acting with the support of the North Vietnamese, he began to reverse his anti-American policy in 1968, receiving American diplomats and seeking a renewal in aid. This move, he hoped, would give him new leverage with the North Vietnamese and convince

²¹By this time, over 40 per cent of Cambodian rice normally meant for export was being sold, at higher than market prices, to NVA forces in Eastern Cambodia. Unable to tax the profits and losing a crucial source of foreign currency earnings, the central government experienced a serious loss of revenue, further destabilizing the national budget.

²²An important example is Hun Sen, a monk in Phnom Penh who joined the Khmer Rouge in 1967 and who would go on to lead the Vietnamese-backed government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

²³Sihanouk commented in 1972 that, as a result of this suppression, "...10,000 died." Quoted in Craig Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1964), 71

them to rein in their Cambodian allies. The apparently erratic nature of these policy shifts were an important factor in Sihanouk's demise as they convinced the Cambodian elite of the correctness of their pro-American stance all along, further encouraging them to actively seek power.

Equally important, however, were external events. Under American President Johnson, US military policy toward Cambodia was one of non-aggression.²⁴ The Vietnamese Tet offensive in February 1968 ruined Johnson's presidency by giving lie to the administration's reports of American military success in Vietnam, thus causing an erosion in American support for the war. As a result, Johnson, who had been plagued throughout his term by the trials of the war, announced that he would not run in the 1968 presidential elections, paving the way for the election of Richard Nixon, an ardent conservative who promised to "end the war and win the peace."²⁵

Despite his peace rhetoric, Nixon began to expand the Vietnam war. On 18 March 1969, he broke Johnson's precedent of non-aggression in Cambodia and ordered secret bombing

²⁴By this I mean only that no American military forces mounted any major operations in Cambodia or against the North Vietnamese forces located there. It is not meant to deny that the United States supported anti-Sihanoukist rebels, such as the Khmer Serei, payed off members of Cambodia's military (including Lon Nol), or conducted minor military operations, especially surveillance, within Cambodia. For a discussion of these issues see Shawcross, *Sideshow*, 63-66 and Seymour Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House* (New York: Summit Books, 1983)

²⁵Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), 627

campaigns against NVA sanctuaries. This bombing, initially limited to Cambodia's Eastern border, increased in intensity and geographic scope in the following months and over the next three years. By the end of 1973, the US had dropped three times the amount of bombs on Cambodia than it did on Japan during the entire course of World War Two. As one author comments, "This is equivalent to some 15,400 pounds of explosives for every square mile of Cambodian territory."²⁶ The long-term implications of this bombing are noted by David Chandler; "The bombing destroyed a good deal of the fabric of pre-war Cambodian society and provided the CPK with the psychological ingredients of a violent, vengeful and unrelenting social revolution."²⁷ Sihanouk concurs; "With his bombs [President Nixon] performed the miracle of turning our people into revolutionaries within weeks."²⁸

Aside from the bombing, Nixon's administration increased its aid to the Cambodian right. Thus encouraged, leaders of right-wing factions began plotting against Sihanouk, whose rule was under increasing strain economically due to increasing landlessness, a reduction in the size of peasant landholdings, increasing peasant debt, and a growing

²⁶Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 99

²⁷Quoted in Noam Chomsky, *The Chomsky Reader* ed. James Peck (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), 290

²⁸Quoted in Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 119

disparity between rich and poor.²⁹ His recent overtures to the United States had not yet produced major infusions of aid, yet the war against the CPK and the loss of tax-revenue continued to drain the national treasury. Sihanouk's power had eroded and over the course of 1969, he became increasingly withdrawn from Cambodian politics. The Cambodian right, under the leadership of Lon Nol and others, asserted their rule, passing a series of laws that reversed most of Sihanouk's 'socialist' policies and were intended to signal to the United States that Cambodia had returned to the American fold. The most important of these policies were to begin military attacks on NVA forces in Eastern Cambodia, as well as to stage riots outside the diplomatic missions of North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front (NLF, the South Vietnamese insurgent army). The attempts by the Cambodian right to attain power culminated on 18 March 1970 when the Cambodian national assembly withdrew its confidence in Sihanouk as head of state. Sihanouk would not return to power for 23 years.

THE RULE OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC, 1970-1975

The March coup forever changed the face of Cambodian politics. For the new government, events quickly got out of control. Two days prior to the coup, Lon Nol demanded that all Vietnamese communist forces immediately leave Cambodia.

²⁹Ibid., 16

After coming to power, he ordered his army to increase their attacks on Communist sanctuaries, attacks which heretofore had been isolated to artillery bombardment. To carry out their orders, Cambodian government forces moved closer to the Eastern border, posing a substantial threat to Communist supply lines. At the same time, units of the South Vietnamese army (ARVN) prepared to raid Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia. Anticipating these attacks, the NVA moved their headquarters and main units further into Cambodia, both to escape ARVN strikes (which began on 20 March in conjunction with increased American air attacks) and to secure their lines of supply, now threatened by the newly belligerent Lon Nol. Cambodian army units, in the words of one author, "reeled back under the hammer blows of the battle-hardened North Vietnamese regulars,"³⁰ leaving large tracts of territory open to Communist occupation.

These events convinced American President Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to take further action in Cambodia. Their first decision was to increase American aid to the Lon Nol government.³¹ Military equipment was flown into the capital, as were units of the Khmer Serei and anti-Sihanouk Khmer Krom, to shore up the

³⁰Ibid., 106

³¹Between 1970 and 1975, the United States supplied Cambodia with \$1.18 billion in military materiel and \$503 million in other assistance. Timothy Carney, "The Unexpected Victory," in Karl D. Jackson *Cambodia 1975-1978* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 31

military strength of the new regime.³² However, merely supplying the Lon Nol government lacked the drama needed to pursue wider American policy goals, one of which was to convey a message of strength to Communist countries, particularly the Soviet Union.³³ Nixon and Kissinger were also convinced that allowing Lon Nol to fall would jeopardize Nixon's newly developed policy of Vietnamization, leaving Vietnam's Eastern flank exposed and providing a safe haven for NVA forces.³⁴ Lastly, Nixon wanted to support the Lon Nol government because, as he put it, "...[the communists] are romping in there, and the only government in Cambodia in the last twenty-five years that had the guts to take a pro-Western and pro-American stand is ready to fall..."³⁵ For these three reasons, Nixon and Kissinger believed that direct military action was needed.

As a result, and for reasons only remotely related to the Cambodian situation, American and South Vietnamese forces

³²Shawcross, *Sideshow*, 131

³³According to Seymour Hersh, in April 1970, Nixon had Kissinger secretly approach Soviet officials to explore the possibility of a summit meeting. The Soviets snubbed this request, according to White House sources, by increasing their troop level in Egypt and by allowing Soviet pilots to fly air patrol missions in Egypt. See Hersh, *The Price of Power*, 185. This assertion is given credibility by the comments Kissinger made to White House staff in a briefing prior to Nixon's speech announcing the pending invasion: "We're trying to shock the Soviets into calling a conference, and we can't promote this by appearing to be weak. We're not pleading for a thing - this is a very tough speech." William Safire, *Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1975), 186

³⁴Vietnamization was a program aimed at improving the ability of the ARVN to wage war in South Vietnam, thus allowing Nixon to withdraw American troops 'with honour.' See Karnow, *Vietnam*, ch. 15

³⁵Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 449

invaded Cambodia in April-May 1970. The effect of the invasion for Cambodia was to drive NVA units deeper into Cambodia, exacerbating the already poor condition of the Cambodian armed forces. These events, taking place over the course of a few weeks, struck a serious blow to the strength of the Cambodian government.

Equally serious was the change in fortunes of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK or Khmer Rouge) following the March 1970 coup. Initially formed under the name 'Khmer Peoples' Revolutionary Party' (KPRP) in 1951 as an offshoot of the Vietnamese dominated Indochina Communist Party, the CPK had trouble gaining recruits or fomenting revolution in a society dominated by peasant conservatism and the near universal ownership of private property.³⁶ Many communist leaders, such as Saloth Sar and Khieu Samphan, used the period between the late 1950s and the early 1960s to attract adherents through teaching in public and private schools. Advised not to engage in open conflict by their Vietnamese allies but under increasing oppression from the Sihanouk government, the CPK split between the Maoist faction of Pol Pot, who advocated struggle independent of the Vietnamese, and those cadre who supported, and were in turn supported by, the North Vietnamese.

³⁶The history of the CPK is detailed in Serge Thion, "Chronology of Khmer Communism, 1940-1982," in Chandler and Kiernan, *Revolution and Its Aftermath*, 291-319; Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, esp. ch. 7; and David P. Chandler, *Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).

In 1968 when the CPK finally embarked on an armed struggle against government forces, it was done with only limited assistance from its erstwhile Vietnamese allies and a small domestic base of support. Local support for their cause grew over time, however, as a result of the government's increasing corruption and inability to provide protection from internally or externally generated threats. The massive social dislocation caused by American bombing also contributed greatly to their increased power. Yet the Khmer Rouge was still in no position to overthrow the central government.

This situation changed dramatically in March 1970 for two reasons. First, with the formation of an anti-communist government in Phnom Penh, the North Vietnamese had no reason to continue their support of the Cambodian government and began aiding the CPK unconditionally. In addition to direct combat support in some battles, particularly in April-May 1970 and October 1971, this aid included war material, training and financial assistance. Second, instead of slipping quietly into obscurity, Sihanouk travelled to China, received assurances of support, and announced his alliance with the Cambodian communists in opposition to the new government. He called on the Cambodian peasantry, the one constituency that still revered him, to resist the new 'Republic' and to fight the American invasion. As Chandler notes, as thousands of students were heeding Lon Nol's call

to join the national army and rid Cambodia of the Vietnamese, "thousands of other people were lining up in the countryside in response to the call from Prince Papa to drive out the Americans."³⁷ As a result, the Khmer Rouge gained increasing numbers of new adherents and, through Vietnamese and Chinese support, the weapons to arm them.

The following five years witnessed the slow destruction of the Republican government and the traumatization of the Khmer people. Increasing amounts of territory fell out of the hands of the central government and into the administrative control of the North Vietnamese and CPK. The state apparatus that remained in the control of the Lon Nol government, mostly in the major cities, was soon overwhelmed by the influx of refugees fleeing the war and American bombing. Nonetheless, for a time it appeared that the central government could rally its defenses and regain control of at least some parts of the country. In October 1971, Lon Nol launched what was to be the government's last major offensive, an attempt to link Phnom Penh with Kompong Thom, a city in central Cambodia. Although it initially met little resistance, the campaign turned into a rout as NVA and CPK units systematically divided, then crushed, Cambodian government forces. Government units retreated in disarray. By May of 1972, the central government controlled

³⁷Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 201

less than one quarter of the countryside and CPK units were encircling the capital.

The government's survival now became totally dependent on American supply and military support. However, the infusion of American funds, which by 1974 accounted for 95% of the government budget, although meant to bolster the strength of the Lon Nol government, instead spawned widespread corruption. Phantom military units were created and the size of existing ones exaggerated to take advantage of America's financing of military salaries. Government officials sold their services and American military and food aid, often to Communist agents, at inflated prices.

While these practices padded the bankrolls of the Cambodian elite, they did nothing to secure the protection of the state or population, many of whom had abandoned the countryside for the (temporary) safety of the cities (by 1974, two million refugees had fled to Phnom Penh and 250,000 others into the second largest city, Battambang, exacerbating those cities' already poor economic and social infrastructures).³⁸ The effect was devastating. As one author comments,

Corruption was not a casual thing in the Khmer Republic. It was the central occupation of the highest officials of the government. Profiteering is seen in almost all wars. In the Khmer Republic, this type of corruption reached deep into the state apparatus, and severely imperiled what slim hope the regime had for survival. The widespread corruption and simple

³⁸Ibid., 230

incompetence of many of the people Lon Nol entrusted with positions of responsibility in the Khmer Republic must be cited as a principal cause of its defeat. With such leadership, the Khmer Republic needed no enemies to achieve collapse.³⁹

Although the latter sentence may exaggerate the effect that corruption had on the survival of the Khmer Republic, the passage does reflect the opinion of most country specialists.

The final collapse of the Khmer Republic was staved off by massive American intervention, particularly in 1973. In that year, the CPK surrounded and prepared to assault Phnom Penh without the direct assistance of the NVA. However, a cease-fire between the United States and North Vietnam freed up American bomber and, over the course of five months, the United States dropped more than 1/4 million tons of bombs on CPK military units. As with earlier American bombing campaigns, the short term result was to impede the progress of the insurgent forces, this time breaking their siege of the capital by inflicting heavy casualties. The long-term effects were equally consistent: the Khmer peasantry turned increasingly to the insurgents and thousands more refugees streamed into the cities.⁴⁰ The following year was marked by see-saw battles over the remaining cities under government control. In the countryside, the CPK consolidated its power and extended its rule, eventually

³⁹Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 95

⁴⁰Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 101

cutting off all land and river supply routes, forcing the United States to fly in all further aid to the central government.

The end of the Khmer Republic came in April 1975. By this time, American military and financial aid, slowly decreasing due to Congressional pressure, could no longer prevent the collapse of the corrupt government of Lon Nol. Beginning in January, the CPK launched its final offensive and, over the course of the following four months, destroyed most of the government's remaining forces. On 17 April, units of the CPK entered Phnom Penh as the upper echelon of the Khmer Republic's army conceded defeat. Having succeeded in battle, the revolutionary forces now faced the equally challenging task of ruling a country devastated by war.

THE RULE OF THE KHMER ROUGE, 1975-1978

Upon attaining power, the CPK (or, as it popularly became known, the Khmer Rouge) embarked on a number of policies that were unprecedented in Cambodian history. All were intended to fulfill the long-term goal of "leveling" Cambodia's prerevolutionary society and building a new, socialist one in its place.⁴¹ That many of these policies also served the short-term goal of securing the new regime's

⁴¹Marlowe Hood and David A. Ablin, "The Path to Cambodia's Present," in David A. Ablin and Marlowe Hood, eds., *The Cambodian Agony* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1990), xxxvi

survival was probably intended. The fact that over time these policies served only this purpose was probably not.

The most immediate policy of the CPK was to force the inhabitants of all major cities and towns into the countryside. Thus, millions of people, many of whom had never lived outside the city, were evacuated in the course of a few days and sent to grow rice in the fields of Cambodia. A number of quite plausible reasons were given for this policy, including the fear of American air attacks; the potential for the traditional elite to reassert its dominance over Cambodian politics; the difficulty of administering the swollen populations of the cities and towns; the inability of the new regime to feed these people from existing, and mostly depleted, food supplies; the consequent need to tend fields left fallow for much of the war; and the potential for renewed resistance in the burrows of the larger cities, particularly Phnom Penh.

But there was also a strong ideological element to this policy of forced evacuation. It was the first step in the regime's plan to overturn centuries of class dominance - to start fresh in building society on egalitarian grounds. Emptying the cities reduced everyone almost instantly to the level of peasant. The fact that these evacuations caused tens of thousands of deaths mattered little to the upper echelons of the CPK, who held distinctly anti-urban

attitudes in any case. In one fell swoop, class distinctions were seemingly erased.

Other policies enacted over the next year (and beyond) contributed to this change. In the economic realm, these included the abolishment of the market, private property, and money. All Cambodians were made to work in existing rice fields, or in the construction of irrigation works and new fields. Much of this work was extremely difficult and tens of thousands of Cambodians died of overwork, malnutrition, illness and execution. Social relations were also drastically altered. People were forbidden to engage in 'unauthorized' social activities, made to eat in large groups (often cited as the most hated of all CPK policies), and deprived of medical attention and supplies. Religion was forbidden in this mostly Buddhist country and all levels of schooling ended, as did most cultural activities, such as peasant festivals. These policies were implemented almost immediately upon the CPK victory and were enforced, with varying degrees of uniformity, throughout Cambodia.⁴²

The creation of other policies began in 1976, the preceding year spent attempting to revive Cambodia's agricultural sector. In March, elections were supposedly

⁴²Regional variations in the enforcement practices of the CPK are outlined in Michael Vickery, "Democratic Kampuchea: Themes and Variations," in Chandler and Kiernan, *Revolution and Its Aftermath*, 99-135. These variations made important differences to the lives of average Khmer, because cadre in different zones carried out their orders with varying degrees of kindness or hostility. These variations were also the primary cause of the massive purges carried out by Pol Pot beginning in 1977.

held to form a People's Representative Assembly, which comprised 250 members representing peasants, workers and the army. It sat for three days in order to create a new government, consisting of the same group of individuals at the highest echelon of the CPK - Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Son Sen, Khieu Samphan, Vorn Vet and Nuon Chea.

This group devoted the next several months to the creation of a four year plan intended to build state socialism. Outlined on 21 August 1971 by Pol Pot, its central tenets were based on the increase of agricultural production, particularly rice, to levels never before attained in Cambodia (pre-war production of rice averaged less than one tonne per acre of land, even in the most fertile areas of the country, whereas the four year plan called for a three tonne yield per acre without the input of any additional material - such as fertilizer - except revolutionary zeal).⁴³

The expected surpluses were to be exported to finance the purchase of agricultural tools and inputs and the creation of light industry. Production quotas for items such as irrigation pumps were also given, despite the fact that Cambodia had no factories that built these items, and those that could have been damaged or destroyed during the war or had their skilled personnel removed during the CPK's evacuation of the cities. The goal of this plan was

⁴³The following is drawn from Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 120-128

economic independence, but as noted above, the means to attain it seemed detached from reality. Although certain aspects of the plan were carried out or attempted, such as the development of light industry (ironically with the aid of foreign states, mostly China and India) and forcing the peasantry to grow the called for yield of rice, the majority were not. Nor was the plan officially promulgated. Instead, the leaders of the CPK turned their attention to more pressing matters, particularly regime survival.

The first of their concerns regarded Vietnam. Since 1973, the CPK had been openly hostile to Vietnamese influence, even attacking some of its units during combined operations. This hostility did not fade with the end of the war, as suggested by occasional border clashes, such as the CPK's invasion of Vietnamese islands in 1975 and their 1976 attack into the Mekong Delta area of Vietnam (Cochinchina). Emboldened with Chinese military aid, the CPK continued these attacks through 1977, increasing their intensity and brutality. The Vietnamese retaliated on a number of occasions, most forcefully in December 1977. This situation would only get worse with the passage of time.

The second concern was enemies within the party. Purges conducted during the war of CPK cadre trained in North Vietnam accelerated after 1975. By 1977, the purges extended to personnel that had been loyal to Pol Pot for years, reaching into the highest levels of the party

(examples include Vorn Vet, deputy Prime Minister, and Chou Chet and Muol Sambath, secretaries of the Western and Northwestern zones, respectively).⁴⁴ After the Vietnamese invasion of December 1977, Pol Pot turned on the cadre of the Eastern zone, ostensibly for not adequately resisting the attack, but as likely for allowing the population under their control some degree of leniency in meeting party demands and to consolidate centralized control.⁴⁵ As Chandler recounts, from May to October 1978, "the military infrastructure of the eastern zone was torn apart...Perhaps as many as 100,000 people - a large proportion of them cadre, soldiers, and their families - were gathered up and put to death."⁴⁶ CPK cadre in the eastern zone fought the forces brought in to destroy them (mostly from the Southwest, under the command of Ta Mok) but were ultimately defeated, some fleeing to Vietnam to set up a government in exile. The purges were put to an end only by Vietnam's invasion of 25 December 1978 - an invasion that quickly overwhelmed CPK forces and that was popularly greeted by the Khmer people. Following its unexpectedly quick victory, the Vietnamese installed a new government in Phnom Penh made up of the cadre who had fled Pol Pot's purges. Unlike the previous two regimes, this government would not fall in

⁴⁴Ibid., 156

⁴⁵Serge Thion, "The Pattern of Cambodian Politics," *International Journal of Politics* 16, no. 3 (1986): 126

⁴⁶Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 156

battle but would be replaced by elections organized fourteen years after its inception.

THE RULE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

The government installed in Phnom Penh in January 1979 had to recreate a state apparatus that had been largely destroyed in the Second Indochina war and that had since been neglected or further dismantled by the Pol Pot regime. The tasks that it faced were enormous. State agencies either did not exist or were dormant - there was no national bank or currency, the education system had ceased functioning, medical care, where it existed at all, was very primitive, taxes had not been collected for more than nine years, there was no judicial system or police force, nor were there any laws governing social relations or state behavior. Furthermore, the personnel required to staff state apparatus were in short supply: Pol Pot's regime had killed many of Cambodia's educated people and those that survived his regime were still in the countryside or fleeing to the Thai border.⁴⁷ The economic conditions within the state were also very poor, no market functioned and people

⁴⁷For instance, in his detailed study of the PRK, Michael Vickery reported that in 1979 there were only 50-60 doctors left in Cambodia. Michael Vickery, *Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society* (London: Frances Pinter, 1986), 43. Similarly, a UN report noted in 1993 that "The judicial structure collapsed completely in 1975...in 1979 there were only 10 law graduates (including five judges) left in the country, and respect for the rule of law had disappeared altogether." Report of the Secretary-General, "Situation in Cambodia," Commission on Human Rights, 14 January 1993 (E/CN.4/1993/19), p. 8

were generally undernourished. Within weeks of the invasion, the agricultural situation deteriorated sharply as millions of Khmer left the fields they were tending to return to their original residences or to search for family lost years before. Creating the conditions essential for the normal functioning of state and society would prove to be an onerous task.

With few resources at its disposal, the new regime approached problems pragmatically. Its initial efforts were devoted to the essential area of agriculture. Following a policy of total laissez-faire, the government allowed people to grow, eat and sell whatever food they wished, placed no taxes on agricultural produce (this situation would last until 1983), no requirements on peasants to sell food to the state, and gave no substantial aid to producers (due to the state's lack of resources). It then relied on food aid from the Soviet bloc and, later, western states to feed returning urban populations and state employees. These policies helped revive the country's agricultural sector and stave off widespread starvation. They also helped revive a market economy, which emerged quickly under PRK rule. The government aided this process by creating a national bank and reintroducing the country's currency, the riel, in 1980.⁴⁸ The riel quickly replaced foreign currencies in

⁴⁸Vickery, *Kampuchea*, 129

local transactions, although its strength was limited by the state's lack of economic resources.⁴⁹

The government also made serious efforts to rebuild state social services. Emphasis was placed on reviving the educational and medical sectors. Although this process was hindered by the lack of qualified personnel, substantial assistance was made available from Vietnam and the Soviet bloc, particularly in the provision of trained teachers and material assistance. Efforts were also directed toward promulgating national laws and establishing a judicial system. Probably more than any other area, however, these efforts were stymied by the lack of qualified personnel and, for the majority of the regime's existence, the rule of law remained a dead letter. Nonetheless, one foreign observer noted in 1985 that even in the absence of a functioning legal system, there was no fear of arbitrary arrest or detention.⁵⁰

⁴⁹Early, first-hand impressions of PRK efforts to revive Cambodian life are given in Ben Kiernan, "Kampuchea Stumbles to Its Feet," in Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua, eds., *Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981* (London: Zed Press, 1982) and Chanthou Boua, "Observations of the Heng Samrin Government, 1980-1982," in Chandler and Kiernan, *Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea*, 259-290

⁵⁰Opinions on this topic vary. In 1985, based on extensive research in Cambodia, Vickery argued that, "There can be no doubt that the PRK intends to operate under a rule of law, probably difficult to re-establish after five years of war-time anarchy (1970-1975), four more years without any legal system or even pretense of legality (1975-9), and faced with near total loss of documents, dispersal of qualified personnel [sic], and decay of institutions, in a poverty-stricken country on which war continues to be waged." Vickery, *Kampuchea*, 120. However, information gathered in interviews with UN personnel involved with Cambodia's legal system during the UNTAC mandate indicates that, regardless of the state's intentions, the legal system was generally weak in Cambodia in 1991. In some places, it was described as a legal 'vacuum' as state personnel usurped legal power.

Within two years of taking control, the new regime built the foundations of a political apparatus. On 1 May 1981, national elections (based on lists drawn up by the party) were held to create a 117 member National Assembly. The Assembly passed a new constitution and then became the organ of government for the next decade. However, real power lay in the upper echelon of the party apparatus, itself divided among contending factions. At the provincial level, government structures were built but suffered from slow recruitment rates, again due to lack of trained personnel and the fact that many qualified individuals could make more money by selling their services on the open market. Despite the problems encountered, both the national and provincial levels of government attempted to penetrate society, seeking to provide necessary functions while tapping the resources of the population.

However, the serious internal problems faced by the government in establishing their rule were exacerbated by the ongoing war with opponents of the regime. The principal concern was the Khmer Rouge. After having suffered a serious defeat at the hands of Vietnamese forces in 1978-79, the Khmer Rouge regrouped on the Thai border and began to resist the Cambodian government. They were joined by two groups; Son Sann's Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and forces loyal to Sihanouk (*Armée Nationale Sihanouk* or ANS).

The Khmer Rouge was undoubtedly the strongest military player, and its forces gradually became respected in certain areas of Cambodia for their incorruptibility and discipline, particularly when compared to the other two groups.⁵¹ Nonetheless, the Khmer Rouge lacked the international respectability and broad-based domestic appeal of the other groups, particularly Sihanouk's ANS. As a result, it succumbed to pressure from the states of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China, and formed an alliance of convenience with the other groups in 1982, called the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). Its military strength bolstered by ASEAN, China and the United States, and diplomatic legitimacy maintained by continued UN recognition (the only government in exile to receive such status), the CGDK waged a war that it probably could not have in the absence of international backing.

The war in Cambodia reached a stalemate through the 1980s as foreign states - most notably China, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Thailand - intervened to support the factions amenable to their interests.⁵² The conflict thus became known as a "stable war," because its perpetuation

⁵¹Nate Thayer, "Cambodia: Misperceptions and Peace," *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1991: 179-191

⁵²The Soviet Union supported Vietnam and the PRK throughout most of the war. The three resistance factions were initially supported by China and Thailand (which acted as the conduit for all assistance), although later in the war the states of ASEAN and the United States primarily supported the non-communist resistance groups, while China primarily supported the Khmer Rouge.

served regional and international interests."³³ The Vietnamese invasion prompted the states of ASEAN to enact policies aimed at pressuring Vietnam to withdraw, fearing that its invasion was more in pursuit of regional hegemony than for reasons of national security (ie. defending against Khmer Rouge incursions).³⁴ They were joined in opposition by China, which sought to bleed Vietnam's strength in a protracted conflict in Cambodia, punishing it for defying China's own regional aspirations. Because Vietnam was supported in its fight by the Soviet Union, the United States added its political weight to the resistance coalition, lending diplomatic support and material aid.

Wishing to decrease the economic strain of its occupation and improve its foreign relations as it pursued policies of economic reform, Vietnam began withdrawing its units from Cambodia in 1985. China maintained its diplomatic pressure in the following years, making improved relations with both the Soviet Union and Vietnam contingent on the former's reduction of forces in Indochina and the latter's total withdrawal from Cambodia. By the late 1980s, China achieved what it wanted as the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from

³³William S. Turley, "The Khmer war: Cambodia after Paris," *Survival* 32, no. 5 (1990): 437-435

³⁴Summaries of the international politics surrounding the war in Cambodia are given in Robert S. Ross, "China and the Cambodian Peace Process: The Value of Coercive Diplomacy," *Asian Survey* 31, no. 12 (1991): 1170-1185; Charles McGregor, "China, Vietnam, and the Cambodian Conflict: Beijing's End Game Strategy," *Asian Survey* 31, no. 3 (1990): 266-283; and Turley, "The Khmer war," 437-453

Cam Rhan Bay, decreased its military and economic assistance to the Vietnamese and Cambodian governments, and pressured Vietnam to complete its withdrawal. China was now more amenable to finding a solution to the Cambodian war, although it still maintained that it had to be based on removing the Vietnamese installed PRK. It therefore continued its support for the Khmer Rouge and other factions into early 1991, when changing conditions allowed it to achieve its foreign policy goals peacefully.

The changing external environment forced the PRK to increase its military strength and political appeal. On the military side, the slow withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and the continued international support for the CGDK made the PRK shoulder an increasing share of the war effort. The government armed and trained some 200,000 militia and its units began operating with increasing independence. These changes were matched by similar efforts on the economic and political fronts. Due to decreasing levels of Soviet-bloc aid, the continued economic isolation imposed by ASEAN and the US, the need to build popular support, and in an attempt to entice Sihanouk into forming a coalition government, the PRK began liberalizing its economic policies through the mid-1980s.⁵⁵ These changes included encouraging private economic activities, promoting privatization in

⁵⁵Khatharya Um, "Cambodia in 1989: Still Talking but No Settlement," *Asian Survey* 30, no. 1 (1990): 102-104

government-owned industries, passing laws that ensured the right of inheritance and ownership of property, and attempting to increase foreign investment.⁵⁶ These reforms had immediate effects on the Cambodian economy, as economic activity quickly increased. However, the state benefitted little from the growing economy as it lacked the administrative capacity to manage the economy or tax the resulting growth.⁵⁷

The PRK also made a number of political reforms. In 1989, the PRK changed the name of the country to 'State of Cambodia' (SOC), declared the national religion to be Buddhism, and introduced a number of legal reforms, such as abolishing the death penalty and guaranteeing the right to legal defence.⁵⁸ These various reforms were enacted to enhance the legitimacy of the ruling regime -- an important consideration since by October 1989, Vietnamese forces finished their withdrawal (with the exception of some military advisors), leaving SOC fully responsible for conducting the war against the CGDK.

Although the war initially went poorly for the SOC, by 1990 the military situation had stabilized. However, changes on the global scene began to have important effects

⁵⁶Mya Than, "Rehabilitation and Economic Reconstruction in Cambodia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 14, no. 3 (1991): 271

⁵⁷Frank Frost, "The Cambodia Conflict: The Path Towards Peace," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 13, no. 2 (1991): 125

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, 122

on Cambodian politics. With the end of communism in East Europe and the slow disintegration of the Soviet Union, foreign aid to the SOC dried up. The USSR decreased its aid by 60 per cent and states of East Europe ended their funding altogether.⁵⁹ Given that as much as 80 per cent of the state budget was subsidized by the former Soviet bloc, these changes had a major impact on the stability of the regime.⁶⁰ Inflation increased substantially and corruption flourished, fueled further by the state's inability to tax the economy. As a result, domestic struggles for power intensified, split between hard-line conservative supporters of Chea Sim and economic reformer Hun Sen. The reform faction emerged as the most powerful, yet the government was unwilling to allow change to go beyond economic issues. Beginning in May and continuing throughout the year, over forty government officials, professors, journalists, and political dissidents were arrested for trying to start a new political party.⁶¹ The ruling party would not face real domestic political opposition until 1992, with the arrival of the UN mission in Cambodia.

⁵⁹This funding ended altogether in 1991. Frederick Z. Brown, "Cambodia in 1991: An Uncertain Peace," *Asian Survey* 32, no. 1 (1992): 88-96

⁶⁰Justus M. van der Kroef, "Cambodia in 1990: The Elusive Peace," *Asian Survey* 31, no. 1 (1991): 94-102

⁶¹*Ibid.*, 95

SECURITY AND THE CAMBODIAN STATE

Third World security literature points to the nature of the state as a determining factor in its security relations. What type of state is Cambodia? What are its characteristics and what effect have these had on Cambodian security? The following section will address these questions, using four analytic categories - Colonial Legacy, Impact of Global Politics, Political Weakness, Economic Factors.

The Colonial Legacy

What are the enduring effects of French colonization on the security of the Khmer state? First, it is possible that the French intervention in 1863 saved the Khmer Kingdom from being extinguished altogether. As the pre-modern history of Cambodia shows, the Kingdom was experiencing a slow decline, its neighbours seizing territory on its periphery and exerting increasing control over its internal politics. By the mid-1800s, Cambodia had lost effective control over territory in the lower Mekong delta to Vietnamese migration and was faced with the potential loss of its Northwestern provinces to the Thai. France prevented the further loss of territory to the Thai (after the Second World War, France forced Thailand to return the provinces it had annexed), but bowed to the demographic reality of the lower Mekong Delta area, placing the territory under the control of its

colonial administration in Vietnam. France also ended the historic interference of the Thai and Vietnamese by imposing its own authority over Cambodia.

The borders drawn by the French in Indochina, the first of their kind, generally reflected the ethnic and cultural make up of Cambodia. In this sense, they have not acted to divide the Khmer nation or create the conditions for rise of separatist feelings. However, they have been an occasional source of dispute between Cambodia and its neighbours, first with the Khmer Rouge's 1975 invasion of a number of Vietnamese controlled Islands on the justification that they were legitimately Khmer territory, and again in the 1977-78 raids into Cochinchina, motivated in part by feelings of irredentism.⁶² As it stands today, "The basic legal fact is that Cambodia has no border freely agreed upon with its neighbors."⁶³ This is in part a result of France's imposing territorial limits on the political entities of Indochina, a practice that, as shown above, has had both positive and negative effects on Cambodian security.

French colonization also had the effect of increasing Cambodia's dependence on the international economy. The planting and export of rubber and increased production of rice, coupled with the laying of rail lines and construction of roads, enriched French economic interests and redirected

⁶²Thion, "The Pattern of Cambodian Politics," 120-121

⁶³Ibid., 120

some of Cambodia's agricultural production toward the international market. However, the penetration of the international economy brought about by the French did not result in the "socially explosive change" predicted by some theorists.⁶⁴ Rather, it introduced a new form of production that gradually displaced traditional forms, the effects of which were not felt until the mid to late 1960s.⁶⁵ For the time being, the bulk of the peasantry continued living as they had for generations, farming their ancestral fields and inhabiting the same villages. The conservative existence of the Khmer peasantry was not altered much by its contact with the French.

The French impact on Cambodian politics was more pronounced. In order to consolidate their rule, French administrators chose among competing lines of royalty according to what best suited their objectives. These decisions repeated the pattern established over the previous several decades of foreign states choosing between potential sovereigns in their own interest, contributing to what Thion calls "The gradual loss of substance suffered by Khmer kingship..."⁶⁶ However, unlike in previous periods, this 'loss of substance' was more pronounced because the French

⁶⁴For instance, Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988)

⁶⁵Serge Thion, "The Cambodian Idea of Revolution," in Chandler and Kiernan, *Revolution and Its Aftermath*, 12-13

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 10

ruled through the King without giving him any substance of power. This reduced the legitimacy of the King among his followers.

At the same time that they undermined this traditional form of rule, the French made few efforts to build new forms of government within Cambodia. The national assembly created after World War Two was often dismissed by the French and their resident patron, Sihanouk. Furthermore, the French may have undermined the strength of the populist and pro-nationalist Democratic party through direct attacks and harassment, as with the 1950 assassination of party leader Ieu Koeuss. Thus, in the attempt to perpetuate their rule, French administrators not only reduced the importance of Cambodia's historic means of governance, kingship, but helped undermine the development of new institutions and parties, perhaps more able to govern in the modern era.

The Impact of Global Politics

The influence of global politics on Cambodian security has been substantial over the years. This was particularly true after the early 1960s when the war in Vietnam threatened to draw Cambodia into conflict. In the course of the war, various external parties supported factions within the government as well as anti-government forces in order to pursue interests only tangentially related to Cambodia. Examples include the American backed Khmer Serei, American

influence over Khmer domestic elites, and the Chinese and Vietnamese backed CPK. This interference had a number of important effects. One was to sustain conflicts within the state. The Khmer Serei and probably the CPK in its early stages could not have survived without external support. Such aid allowed them to continue attacks against government forces, despite limited (in the case of the CPK, initial) domestic support. Another was to complicate domestic politics. Prior to his overthrow in March 1970, Sihanouk had to contend with a highly charged external security environment. Not only did the main protagonists (North and South Vietnam, the United States) represent an immediate threat to his country, but each supported domestic opponents to his rule. Trying to find a balance between these competing threats greatly complicated his domestic and external policies, causing him to fluctuate between poles of alliance. These fluctuations ended with the overthrow of Sihanouk on 18 March 1970 (a coup supported by the United States).

Aside from external support of domestic parties, external penetration often took a more direct form. For most of the Vietnam war, NVA forces used Cambodia's eastern border as sanctuary, undermining the state's administrative control of the area and sovereignty. It also attracted American air bombardment and land invasion. The former had a catastrophic effect on Cambodian society, creating thousands

of refugees and increasing the pool of potential communist support. By forcing NVA units deeper into Cambodian territory, the latter led to the destruction of most of Cambodia's army. As well, by this time the Vietnamese communists were no longer adverse to aiding the cause of their Cambodian allies, and in addition to substantially increasing their material aid to the rebels, the NVA often joined them in mauling government forces.

With the Khmer Rouge victory in April 1975, foreign interference decreased significantly. The United States, chastened by its loss, retreated from the area and ceased its attempt to support or oppose Cambodian domestic factions. China and Vietnam, on the other hand, had no reason to undermine what had been a wartime ally and, initially, both supported the new regime. This situation changed with time. Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorated after the war, as did relations between Cambodia and Vietnam. China now used its support of Cambodia as a means to offset the power of Vietnam, increasingly allied with China's enemy, the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that China encouraged Democratic Kampuchea to attack Vietnam through the mid to late 1970s for precisely the reason that doing so may encourage a Vietnamese invasion, thereby justifying what China saw as Vietnam's quest for regional hegemony.

Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978 provided a new forum for external intervention in Cambodian affairs. In return for its use of Vietnamese naval bases, the Soviet Union provided Vietnam with substantial assistance, allowing it to wage war against the Khmer Rouge. China saw this as evidence that the Soviet Union was using Vietnam to surround it, as well as proof that Vietnam was pursuing regional ambitions. The states of ASEAN agreed with China's second interpretation and the two supported the three rebel factions that emerged after the invasion. The conflict took on global dimensions with the entry of the United States into the competition, its agenda shaped by its opposition to the Soviet Union. Its major impact on Cambodia was to isolate the country economically and politically, diminishing the PRK's ability to rebuild the country after the war and the devastating rule of the Khmer Rouge. External penetration would continue to have detrimental effects on Cambodian security until the early 1990s.

Political Weakness

The political weakness of the Cambodian state, it is argued here, has been the most significant cause of Cambodian insecurity. This weakness manifests itself on two levels - limited legitimacy and the lack of political institutionalization. As theorists of Third World security point out, the first of these, legitimacy, is a crucial

ingredient for state stability and security. It relates to, as Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon define it, "whether citizens are loyal and willingly support state policies - whether they accept the authority of the state and believe existing institutions are functionally competent, legally right, and morally proper."⁶⁷ In Cambodia, legitimacy was traditionally tied to the concept of kingship. As one author notes, "The monarchy has been the social thread that has entwined the Khmer throughout history."⁶⁸ Sihanouk, as the latest claimant to the throne, possessed the support of the Khmer peasantry, who revered him as a *devaraja* (God-King). Yet, his legitimacy with Cambodia's educated and economic elites was limited. They believed that the monarchy was an outdated concept and wanted a share of ruling-power. Despite his popularity among the peasantry, Sihanouk could not garner support at the highest levels of the Cambodian elite, and this contributed to his downfall.

Establishing legitimacy proved to be a difficult task for all subsequent regimes. The government of Lon Nol enjoyed little legitimacy, marked as it was by massive corruption and the absolute inability to control or protect the population or territory of Cambodia. At no time did Lon Nol

⁶⁷Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, "The 'Software' Side of Third World National Security," in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, eds., *National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats* (Maryland: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 1988), 81

⁶⁸Peang-Meth, "Understanding the Khmer," 448

gain the support of more than a few fragments of Cambodian society, particularly the military and upper class, and even here it was due less to loyalty than greed."⁹ The Khmer Rouge, although initially considered legitimate in some areas of Cambodia due to its discipline and fair treatment of peasants under its control, squandered its political capital by instituting a radical program of reconstructing Khmer society. This program overturned social and economic practices that had developed over generations, and resulted in widespread and arbitrary executions and the brutal treatment of the Khmer population. The quick defeat of the Khmer Rouge by Vietnamese forces and the fact that, in many places, Khmer peasants spontaneously rose up and slaughtered Khmer Rouge cadre, attest to the limited legitimacy of the CPK among the Cambodian people.

Unlike the previous two regimes, the PRK consciously attempted to build legitimacy among the Khmer people. It reinstituted essential state functions such as the provision of currency and legal practices and provided basic social services such as health and education. To increase security, it armed over 200,000 militia, a policy that, as Brian Job notes, is infrequently followed by illegitimate regimes for fear of overthrow.¹⁰ It also pursued policies that relaxed

⁹"As one military official told David Chandler, many backed Lon Nol in the hopes that "a 'faucet of dollars' would be permanently turned on." Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 205

¹⁰Brian Job, "The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third World," in Brian Job, ed., *The Insecurity Dilemma*

state control over economic activity and promoted agricultural recovery, as well as improved personal freedoms.¹¹ Its efforts were stymied, however, by its continuing dependence on Vietnam for survival and the limited resources available for recovery, a result largely of its international opposition.

Why have succeeding Cambodian regimes been unable to establish political legitimacy? One of the most important reasons is that there has never developed within the state a form of political institutionalization, what Azar and Moon describe as a "structural source of legitimacy."¹² Instead, Cambodia has been ruled by a series of one-man or one-party regimes that made the maintenance of power their *raison d'être*. Institutions that could have acted to extend political participation and build a means to peacefully transfer power were undermined first by the French and later by Sihanouk. Even the elections conducted under Sihanouk's rule were not used to build a base of 'institutional legitimacy,' but were instead used as a vehicle to undermine his political opposition. Individuals and parties willing

(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 30

¹¹These practices prompted one author to note in 1990 that "The foreign policy of the PRK, like that of its predecessor regimes, is aimed at regime survival but has implicitly subordinated the aim of independence to the aim of building a state structure that can once more succeed in imposing peace and order on the country in the aftermath of the Pol Pot debacle." Gareth Porter, "Cambodia's Foreign Policy," in David Wurfel and Bruce Burton, eds., *The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia* (London: Macmillan, 1990), 248

¹²Azar and Moon, "The 'Software' Side of Third World National Security," 82

to contribute to Cambodian public life were squeezed out of the polity, often through violence and repression. The result was to push dissidents of all stripes into armed opposition, as with the Khmer Serei, the CPK, and the elite surrounding Lon Nol. The clash of ideas was therefore carried out on the battlefield and not through ballots, creating the internal divisions that made the state so vulnerable to external penetration."

Political institutionalization made no more headway under the Lon Nol regime than in the one it replaced. Although it was supposedly a 'republic,' no elections took place and those that governed did so for their own benefit. The rule of the Khmer Rouge only exacerbated this condition. No attempt was made to extend the ruling class beyond a few select individuals surrounding Pol Pot. Due to a mixture of paranoia and the legacy of living as a guerilla organization, Pol Pot's regime ruled secretly - it did not make its existence known until two years after coming to power - and enforced its orders through coercive force and the control of food. Participation was non-existent and dissent punishable by death.

The twelve year rule of the PRK did little to alleviate the problem of political institutionalization. The ruling party, the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (later

⁷³See also Michael Leifer, "The Failure of Political Institutionalization in Cambodia," *Modern Asian Studies* 2, no. 2 (1968): 125-140

the Cambodian People's Party or CPP), governed through a centralized apparatus. Party membership was limited and recruitment selective. Although the 'squabbling of petty leaders' that is ostensibly an enduring characteristic of Cambodian political life went on within the party apparatus,⁷⁴ little dissent outside of this realm was allowed. Individuals and groups that challenged the rule of the party were arrested or otherwise suppressed. As with previous regimes, the government's real opposition was located on the border, armed by foreign powers and scheming its overthrow.

These conditions led Douglas Pike to comment in 1989 that; "The central factor in the Cambodian peace process always has been governance, the institutionalization of political power...The opposite of war in Cambodia is not peace; it is government. To reverse this, if there is government there can be peace; without government continued warfare is inevitable."⁷⁵ As Pike's comments point out, the continuing absence of governing structures in Cambodia has been a major cause of insecurity for the Cambodian people.

⁷⁴Thion, "The Pattern of Cambodian Politics," 117

⁷⁵Douglas Pike, "The Cambodian Peace Process: Summer of 1989," *Asian Survey* 29, no. 9 (1989): 847

Economic Factors

What implications do economic factors have for Cambodian security? Even if we leave aside the 'structural violence' of factors such as poverty identified by Johan Galtung and accept a more limited definition of security offered by Mohammed Ayooob - "in relation to vulnerabilities that threaten, or have the potential, to bring down or significantly weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, as well as the regimes that preside over these structures and profess to represent them internationally" - a case can be built that economic factors played an important role in the insecurity of the Cambodian state.⁷⁶

As described by Etcheson, capitalist methods of production introduced by the French combined with high rates of population growth in the early 1960s to create a rural environment marked by increasing landlessness, smaller plot sizes, higher peasant debt levels and "a growing cleavage between rich and poor peasants."⁷⁷ Etcheson suggests that these factors played a major role in founding the ensuing

⁷⁶Mohammed Ayooob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World," *World Politics* 43, no. 2 (1991): 259. Ayooob clarifies this definition by adding; "Different types of vulnerability, including those of the economic and ecological varieties, become integral components of this definition of security only if and when they become acute enough to take on overtly political dimensions and threaten state boundaries, state institutions, or regime survival." Ibid.

⁷⁷Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 16. This appraisal is drawn from Ben Kiernan, "Introduction," and Hu Nim, "Land Tenure and Social Structure in Kampuchea," in Kiernan and Boua, *Peasant and Politics in Kampuchea*, 1-28, 69-86

2

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revolution.⁷⁸ Such assessments must be tempered, however, by the fact that the majority of Cambodian peasants still owned their own land, and that high concentrations of land ownership did not appear. Perhaps the most that can be said about the problems outlined here is that they may have affected Cambodian security in three ways: by contributing to the later radicalism of the peasantry; laying the basis for the support of the Khmer Rouge; and as an important factor turning the Cambodian right against Sihanouk, thus contributing to his demise in 1970.⁷⁹

The inability of Cambodian regimes to either feed the Khmer people or generate sufficient wealth to sustain state functions had an important effect on Cambodian security over the years. The first factor - the inability of the state to provide sufficient food to the people - primarily affected the rule of Democratic Kampuchea.⁸⁰ Despite its

⁷⁸"...by this time [1964] the tensions within Cambodian society brought on by ubiquitous economic hardship were beginning to translate into political conflict. The accumulating frustrations would drive that conflict into an escalating spiral of cleavage and violence, culminating in peasant rebellion in 1966 and 1967, insurgency in 1968 and 1969, and, finally, wide-open civil war after 1970." Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea*, 22

⁷⁹Regarding this last possibility, Chandler suggests that, on balance, problems of landlessness and peasant debt contributed to Cambodia's economic problems acutely enough to cause Sihanouk to 'lose his grip' on power, replaced by capitalist minded individuals who believed that they could salvage the economy through laissez-faire practices. Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 178-191

⁸⁰Malnutrition and starvation were also present during the rule of Lon Nol, but given the gravity of other issues, they probably played a limited role in the demise of the regime. The PRK also experienced problems feeding its population, but these were eased substantially by its laissez-faire agricultural policies and pleas to the international community for humanitarian assistance, and never posed a threat to the stability of the regime.

pretensions to triple the output of rice, Democratic Kampuchea experienced declining agricultural yields, causing malnutrition in most areas and starvation in many (particularly the Northwest region).⁸¹ Support for the regime diminished accordingly.⁸²

The second factor - the inability of Cambodian governments to generate sufficient funds to sustain state functions - had important security implications for the Sihanouk, Lon Nol, and the PRK regimes. Many of these were due to the regimes' heavy dependence on foreign aid. For Sihanouk, the loss of export revenue due to rice sales to the NVA and his decision to end American aid to his government severally unbalanced the national budget, weakened the armed forces, and turned domestic elites against his rule. These are all reasons cited for his overthrow. The situation deteriorated under the Lon Nol regime, which, by the end of 1974, was almost completely dependent on American aid for survival. However, despite arguments made at the time that the cut off of American aid doomed the Lon Nol government, it is more likely that no

⁸¹Chandler, *Brother Number One*, 124

⁸²As Chandler recounts, "Many new people [former city residents or refugees] saw the point of working to feed themselves and increase agricultural production. This willingness faded after the 1975 crop was harvested and villagers saw most of it hauled away in government trucks to undisclosed destinations. In fact, in a contorted stab at self-reliance, the regime exported several thousand tons to China to pay for Chinese aid. The rice harvest of 1976 was exported also, but by then government demands on the population were even greater, and starvation occurred on a national scale." Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, 260. As one refugee said of the Khmer Rouge experiment, "If we'd been given enough to eat, the revolution would have succeeded." Ibid., 259

amount of aid could have saved this regime and American largesse probably only prolonged its demise by a few years.

The PRK was also unable to sustain itself without substantial financial assistance from allies. Although the Cambodian economy recovered substantially under its rule, particularly after the enactment of liberal policies in the late 1980s, the PRK was unable to benefit from the resulting growth due to poorly developed government infrastructure.⁸³ As a result, it depended on foreign aid for up to 80 per cent of its national budget. This inability to extract resources from the population and dependence on foreign states for substantial amounts of financial assistance severely reduced the CPK's ability to defend itself when Vietnam began to withdraw its troops and the Soviet bloc ended its aid. It was unable to sustain the military forces necessary to prevent the resistance from taking control of more territory or operating with greater impunity.⁸⁴ These conditions limited the options of the CPK to continuing the fight against its opponents alone or to agree to the terms of a UN sponsored peace plan. Either way, the survival of the regime was at stake.

⁸³As Frost notes, "a major problem for the government has been that it pursued economic liberalization without having the administrative capacity to manage the resulting private growth of wealth, or to be able to gain much financial benefit from this through taxation." Frost, "The Cambodian Conflict," 125

⁸⁴Thayer, "Cambodia: Misperceptions and Peace," 179-181

CONCLUSION: CAMBODIAN SECURITY

In a theoretical discussion of security, Barry Buzan argues that "The concept of security can be mapped in a general sense, but it can only be given specific substance in relation to concrete cases."⁸⁵ The case of Cambodia suggests that Cambodian security must be understood in relation to factors that are both internal and external to the state. The lack of uncontested legitimacy for government and state in Cambodia, poorly developed political institutions and, to a lesser extent, domestic economic problems, have created cleavages within Cambodian society and reduced the ability of the state to provide protection from internally or externally generated threats. In fact, Cambodia's modern history shows that the state was more often a tool of the elite to maintain power than a means to protect or provide for the population.

Furthermore, the cleavages of the Cambodian state and society were often exploited by external powers pursuing their own interests. This intervention reinforced the insecurity of the Khmer people and state by either intensifying domestic conflict or draining government resources. In the eyes of many foreign states, Cambodia was a pawn on a global chess board. Little if any attention was paid to improving the security or domestic political and

⁸⁵Barry Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd. ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 97

economic situation in the state, and often policies that acted to the contrary were pursued. Conflict was perpetuated.

Relieving this conflict therefore requires action on a number of different levels. The United Nations mission in Cambodia, based on agreements negotiated over several years, was an attempt by the world community to do just that: act on a number of different levels to improve security within the Cambodian state and the surrounding region. Its efforts can be broken down into two areas. The first was an attempt to end one of Cambodia's most important sources of continuing insecurity - foreign penetration. The second included efforts to increase the strength of the Cambodian state by improving its domestic legitimacy and functional capacity. How the international community went about these tasks is the subject of the following two chapters.

CHAPTER THREE

INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA:

ENDING THE WAR

How can the international community act to resolve the problems of Third World security? The case of Cambodia offers an unprecedented example of an international intervention specifically designed to end an internal conflict and lay the foundations for a lasting peace. The following two chapters discuss the efforts of the international community, culminating in the United Nations (UN) mission in Cambodia, in two parts. The first part, the topic of this chapter, relates to the diplomatic efforts to reach agreement among the parties to the dispute and the measures enacted to carry these agreements through. I shall label them simply 'Ending the War.' Ending the war required finding a mechanism that would reconcile the various domestic parties to the dispute and allow their international backers to withdraw from the conflict. In theoretical terms, such an effort would relieve one source of weakness in the Cambodian state - external penetration. It alone would be an insufficient measure to end the insecurity of the Cambodian state.

The second area where the attention of the international community was directed will be the topic of the next chapter, labelled 'Securing the State.' Actions taken in this area were directed at strengthening the state of Cambodia as a political and economic entity. As outlined in chapter two, the state of Cambodia has been unable to fulfill even the most basic of state functions - creating a domestic environment relatively free from the threat of violence and securing that environment from external attack. The state's role as guarantor of security was minimal, at best. International efforts to secure the state were directed, therefore, at strengthening it politically and economically in order that it may begin to meet the needs of its population.

Politically, these efforts included enhancing the capability and representativeness of the state and increasing the political acumen of individuals and groups within society. Economically, attention was paid to the transportation and economic infrastructure of the state, financial and monetary stability, and long-term development needs. In theoretical terms, these are the efforts necessary to relieve the domestic sources of Cambodian insecurity. Together with the efforts of the international community to end external penetration in Cambodia, they improve Cambodia's chances of surviving as a political entity in the years to come and increase the state's ability

to act as a guarantor of its population's security rather than a benefactor for its ruling elite.

This chapter will proceed as follows. First, it will outline the diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the war, culminating in the October 1991 Paris Peace Agreements. It will then briefly review these accords before giving a more detailed overview of the UN's attempt to implement them. This overview, based on UN documents, media sources, and interviews conducted in Ottawa and at the UN in New York,¹ provides the necessary background for the following chapter and forms the basis of discussion for the final section of this chapter. This section will discuss the role that elections played in ending Cambodia's civil war and the effects that the Paris Agreements had on relieving a consistent source of Cambodian insecurity, external penetration.

REACHING AGREEMENT

As discussed in the previous chapter, the civil conflict in Cambodia became known as a 'stable war,' because its continuation served the interests of major international players, particular China. However, the rise of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union led to major changes internationally and

¹With one exception, there are no published chronologies of the UN mission in Cambodia. The exception is Ramses Amer, "The United Nations' Peacekeeping Operation in Cambodia: Overview and Assessment," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 15, no. 2 (1993): 211-231

regionally. In an attempt to improve relations with China, the Soviet Union pressured Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia and reduced its aid to Cambodia. With Vietnam's withdrawal in 1989, China achieved its regional goals and became amenable to a negotiated solution to the Cambodian war. As they were fewer regional barriers to an agreement, the intransigence of the Cambodian parties - displayed in deadlocked negotiations throughout the 1980s - had to be overcome.²

Negotiations shifted to an international forum. In January 1990, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (Perm 5) met in Paris to seek consensus on how to end the Cambodian conflict. They agreed that a comprehensive solution, including a substantial role for the UN, would be necessary. Based on a proposal by Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, the plan included the verified withdrawal of foreign forces, the end of foreign assistance to the conflicting parties, and the creation of a new government through elections organized and conducted directly by the UN.³ Crucially, the Perm 5 agreed to respect the results of the election.⁴

²A detailed discussion of changing international conditions and negotiations is given in Frank Frost, "The Cambodia Conflict: The Path Towards Peace," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 13, no. 2 (1991): 119-163

³As described by Evans, this proposal was intended to "sidestep the power-sharing issue which had bedevilled the Paris Conference, and to constrain the role of the Khmer Rouge in the transitional arrangements..." quoted in Frost, "The Cambodia Conflict," 141

⁴Letter dated 16 January 1990 from the representatives of China, France, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of

This agreement served as a basis for further discussion in New York on 11-12 February and in Paris on 12-13 March 1990. In these meetings, the Perm 5 discussed issues surrounding the peace-keeping and administrative sides of the potential operation. They also called for the creation of a "Supreme National Council" (SNC) that would "enshrine" Cambodia's "national sovereignty and unity" but that would delegate "all necessary powers to a United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)..."⁵ The SNC was the legal fiction that would allow the UN to escape the provisions of its Charter, stating that the UN cannot intervene in the domestic affairs of its member states.⁶

The Perm 5 confirmed and elaborated these principles on 26 May 1990 in a "summary of conclusions,"⁷ which formed the basis for discussion in July and agreement in August for

Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America addressed to the Secretary-General, 18 January 1990 (S/21087), Annex, pp. 2-3. A discussion of Evan's proposal is given in Stephen J. Solarz, "Cambodia and the International Community," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1990: 99-115

⁵Letter dated 13 February 1990 from the representatives of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 15 February 1990 (S/21149), Annex, p. 4

⁶For instance, Article 2(7) of the Charter states: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."

⁷Letter dated 29 May 1990 from the representatives of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 29 May 1990 (S/21318), Annex

a "Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict."⁸ This document, which formed the basis of agreement in later conferences, outlines administrative and military arrangements through the transitional period, the means by which an election should be conducted, measures to ensure the protection of human rights, and the basis upon which Cambodia would conduct its future interstate relations ("perpetual neutrality"). This framework was accepted by the Cambodian parties in its entirety at the second Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM II) in September 1990.⁹

Although disagreement over the composition of the SNC continued among the Cambodian parties, the Perm 5 forged ahead, elaborating their framework document into a more detailed draft agreement in December 1990.¹⁰ This document was discussed by the Cambodian factions on 21-23 December 1990 and agreement was obtained on "most of the fundamental points."¹¹ Negotiations continued over the next several

⁸Letter dated 19 July 1990 from the representatives of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 23 July 1990 (S/21404), Annex; Letter dated 30 August 1990 from the Permanent Representatives of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 31 August 1990 (S/21689), Annex

⁹Letter dated 11 September 1990 from the Permanent Representatives of France and Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 17 September 1990 (S/21732)

¹⁰Letter dated 29 November 1990 from the Permanent Representatives of France and Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 6 December 1990 (S/21985)

¹¹Letter dated 8 January 1991 from the Permanent Representatives of France and Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 11 January 1991 (S/22059)

months and included, at various times, the four Cambodian parties, the Perm 5, members of ASEAN and other regional actors (notably Australia and Japan). Following the acceptance of a cease-fire and the deployment of a UN mission that held talks with the Cambodian factions, the SNC met in Jakarta in early June 1991. These discussions faltered, due to disagreements over the status of faction armies during the transitional period, the relationship between the SNC and UNTAC, and Hun Sen's insistence that the Khmer Rouge be held responsible for its historical acts of genocide.¹²

A significant breakthrough in the negotiating process came at the Thai resort of Phattaya on 24 June 1991. With Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot apparently in attendance and strong pressure being exerted by Thailand, China and Vietnam on their respective factions, the SNC agreed to end the conflict, begin an unlimited cease-fire, halt outside military assistance, and establish their headquarters in Phnom Penh.¹³ In a follow up meeting on 16-17 July in

¹²"Khmer Representative Urges Acceptance of UN Plan," Hong Kong, *AFP in English* (2 June 1991) in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service - East Asia* [hereafter FBIS EAS], 3 June 1991, p. 4; Peter Mackler, "Indonesia's Alatas Addresses News Conference," Hong Kong, *AFP in English* (4 June 1991) in FBIS EAS, 5 June 1991, p. 5

¹³Erskine McCullough, "Further on Talks," Hong Kong, *AFP in English* (24 June 1991) in FBIS EAS, 24 June 1991, p. 10; "Sihanouk Gives News Conference 25 Jun," Bangkok, *The Nation in English* (26 June 1991) in FBIS EAS, 26 June 1991, p. 1; Letter dated 26 June 1991 from the Charge d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cambodia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 26 June 1991 (S/22740), Annex "Final communique of the meeting of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia in Pattaya (Thailand)"

Beijing, China, the SNC elected Sihanouk as its president and asked the UN to send a survey mission to Cambodia to ascertain what would be necessary for it to monitor the cease-fire and the end of foreign assistance, a request that UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar carried out.¹⁴

Despite this progress, disagreement among the factions continued. In terms of force reduction, the Khmer Rouge argued for a common level of 6,000 troops per side, while the State of Cambodia (SOC) called for a 40 per cent reduction and the remaining forces cantoned. For its part, the SOC opposed the UN's planned take-over of its administrative apparatus, a fundamental condition for Khmer Rouge participation.¹⁵ Under pressure from its allies, Phnom Penh compromised with the other factions at a SNC meeting in Phattaya, Thailand on 26-29 August 1991. The new understanding foresaw all factions reducing their troop and weapon strength by 70 per cent, with the remaining forces to be cantoned under UN supervision. In addition, the SNC requested that the UN send 200 troops by September to observe the cease-fire and end of foreign military assistance.¹⁶

¹⁴Letter dated 8 August 1991 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 14 August 1991 (S/22945)

¹⁵"SNC Differences Over Demobilization," Bangkok, *Bangkok Post* in English (27 August 1991) in FBIS EAS, 27 August 1991, p. 3

¹⁶Letter dated 23 September 1991 from the President of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia addressed to the Secretary-General, 24 September 1991 (S/23066), Annex

Recognizing that an agreement was imminent, UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar proposed the dispatch of a small contingent of UN troops as an interim measure before UNTAC's arrival. The United Nations Advanced Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) was to act as a liaison between the four Cambodian parties, create and chair a Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG) composed of high level military officials from each of the four factions, and begin mine awareness training for the population at large.¹⁷

After ironing out difficulties concerning UN plans to repatriate refugees, months of diplomacy finally bore fruit on 23 October 1991 at the Paris Conference on Cambodia. The Supreme National Council, representing Cambodia, and eighteen other states adopted four documents:¹⁸ the Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia (hereafter referred to as the 'Final Act'); the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict (hereafter 'Comprehensive Settlement Agreements'); the Agreement concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia ('Guarantees Agreement'); and the Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia

¹⁷Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia, 30 September 1991 (S/23097); approved in S/RES/717, 16 October 1991

¹⁸The following states are signatories of the Paris Agreements: Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia.

('Declaration').¹⁹ Together, these agreements represented a major financial and military commitment by the international community to ending the conflict in Cambodia.

Over the course of eighteen months, the United Nations was to regroup and canton over 200,000 troops from various factions; disarm some 220,000 militia; expand the mine awareness and de-mining programs established by UNAMIC; verify the withdrawal of all foreign forces; seek out and destroy arms caches throughout the country; find, register, and educate an estimated 4.3 million voters; set up and conduct a national election and verify the results; create and implement a human-rights training program for the population and government; repatriate and help resettle 290,000 (later to become 350,000) refugees; take over and manage key ministries of the SOC; and begin the crucial but enormous task of reconstructing Cambodia's shattered economic and transportation infrastructures. These enormous and diverse tasks were to be accomplished by approximately 22,000 personnel in an operational environment that, in Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's words, would "require UNTAC to be almost 100 per cent self-sufficient in

¹⁹See Letter dated 30 October 1991 from the Permanent Representatives of France and Indonesia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 30 October 1991 (S/23177), Annex "Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia." References for this document will be given by Article number. Shortened usage borrowed from Steven R. Ratner, "The Cambodia Settlement Agreements," *The American Journal of International Law* 87, no. 1 (1993): 8

providing its own equipment, goods and services."²⁰ The following section will discuss those aspects of the Paris Agreements related to the conduct of national elections and then provide a chronology of their practical implementation.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND IMPLEMENTATION

The Paris Agreements gave the UN the authority to organize and conduct election in order to form "a new and legitimate Government" in Cambodia.²¹ The scope of this task was enormous: within the period of nine months, UN electoral staff had to find and register nearly four and a half million voters; create and conduct a mass education program to teach the population about liberal-democracy and the actual practice of voting; register political parties; ensure that each party registered had free access to communication mediums; design and implement electoral laws and procedures; abrogate existing laws that did not conform to the new ones; and conduct the polling and counting procedures in such a way as to be considered free and fair by international observers.²² As defined in the Paris Agreements, and elaborated in the Secretary-General's

²⁰Request for inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the forty-sixth session: Financing of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 31 January 1992 (A/46/235/Add.1), "Initial Phase of the Implementation Plan," p. 7

²¹Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Article 4 (S/23177, p. 11)

²²Ibid., Annex 1, Section D, Elections (S/23177, p. 25-26)

implementation plan, UNTAC's electoral component was to play an enormous practical role in ending Cambodia's civil war.

As was recognized early on, regardless of how well the electoral component performed their many tasks, the success of the elections ultimately depended upon the creation of a "neutral political environment." It was recognized that fair elections could not take place in an environment marked by high levels of fear and the ongoing clash of opposing armies. As a result, an important role in creating a peaceful environment in which to conduct elections was given to the UN's military component. As outlined in the Paris Agreements, UN personnel were to supervise the assembly and cantonment of the forces of each of the four factions. Once cantoned, the UN was to then oversee their disarmament and demobilization.²³ These efforts were to meet the component's basic objective which was, according to the UN's implementation plan, "to stabilize the security situation and build confidence among the parties to the conflict."²⁴

Equally important for the creation of a neutral political environment was the role outlined for the UN's civil administration component. In terms of competing in open elections, the ruling party of the SOC, the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), had an immediate and obvious

²³Ibid., Annex 2, Articles III-V (S/23177, p. 31-34)

²⁴Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia, 19 February 1992 (S/23613), p. 12

advantage. It controlled the resources of the state - including the national bank, all mediums of communication, mechanisms of taxation, and ports and airports. Its governance extended outward from the capital, embodied in the twenty-one provincial administrations. It also had a military presence throughout most of the country, "right down to the village level."²⁵ It therefore had an unmatched ability to influence the outcome of national elections.

The task of the international community was to minimize this advantage. The problem was, as the head of UNTAC, Yasushi Akashi, summarized in a classic understatement, the line between the CPP and the SOC was "blurry." In fact, the CPP was the state and, as such, performed important, often vital, functions. The crux of the matter was, then, to decrease the advantage of the CPP while maintaining the essential roles of the state.

The answer to this dilemma was to entrust the UN with the running of essential components of the state. As stated in the Paris Agreements,

In order to ensure a neutral political environment conducive to free and fair general elections, administrative agencies, bodies and offices which could directly influence the outcome of elections will be placed under direct United Nations supervision or control. In that context, special attention will be

²⁵This was a comment made by several officials involved with the UNTAC mission.

given to foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information.²⁶

In addition to these five, the UN was also given discretion to expand its supervision or control to any other component of the state to ensure that they functioned in "strict neutrality."²⁷ As foreseen in the Paris Agreements, the UN had the power to place its personnel in any state agency or office with the right to "unrestricted access to all administrative operations and information," remove any administrative personnel that it wished, and was given powers of investigation and correction.

According to its implementation plan, the UN was to exercise "direct control" over the five key ministries through the deployment of liaison officers in government offices in Phnom Penh and at the provincial level. It was also to promulgate "codes of conduct and guidelines for management" to ensure that the apparatus of the state functioned in a politically neutral fashion. In addition, UNTAC claimed the power to "issue binding directives," oversee the planning of budgets and finances at all levels, review existing laws, and supervise the execution of policy decision, legal processes, and the dissemination of public information.²⁸ For these tasks, the civil administration

²⁶Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, Article 6 (S/23177, pp. 11-12)

²⁷Ibid., Annex 1, Section B, Civil Administration (S/23177, p. 22)

²⁸Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia, 19 February 1992 (S/23613), pp. 24-28

component was allotted 224 "specialists" and 84 "support staff" (these numbers included the human rights component).²⁹

As things turned out, the development of a neutral political environment through the interim phase got off to a slow start. The personnel deployed under the auspices of UNAMIC had neither the mandate nor the numbers to prevent the rise of banditry in Cambodia caused by troops of various factions. Nor could they improve the security situation in Phnom Penh, a fact underlined by the near murder of Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan at the hands of rioters on 27 November 1991.³⁰

The situation deteriorated through December as violent anti-corruption riots shook the ruling regime. Leaders from each of the four factions called for the UN's rapid deployment, joining international diplomats critical of the speed with which the UN deployed its forces.³¹ The cease-fire established after the Phattaya meetings in June

²⁹Ibid., Addendum, 26 February 1992 (S/23613/Add.1), p.2

³⁰Many commentators noted at the time that these riots were probably orchestrated by the SOC, and may have included Vietnamese military advisors. They may also have been an indication of a split in the SOC political hierarchy, since the police that failed to intervene in the riot for over four hours were under the control of Chea Sim, Chairman of the National Assembly and hard-line opponent of Prime Minister Hun Sen, while troops that eventually stopped the attack were regular soldiers, under the more direct control of the Prime Minister. See Jacques Bekaert, "Peace Pact now at Stake," *Bangkok Post* in English (29 November 1991), in FBIS EAS, 2 December 1991, pp. 42-43 and Rodney Tasker and Nate Thayer, "Tactics of silence: Khmer Rouge ignore humiliation to promote peace process," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (hereafter FEER), 12 December 1991, pp. 10-11.

³¹Nate Thayer, "Unsettled land: UN's delayed arrival starts to undermine peace settlement," FEER, 27 February 1992, pp. 22-26

1991 broke down repeatedly in the period prior to UNTAC's deployment, and the Khmer Rouge stopped attending the Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG) set up by UNAMIC's General Loridon to iron out differences among the parties.³²

With the establishment of UNTAC on 15 March 1992, the process envisioned in the Paris Agreements finally got underway. The electoral, human rights, repatriation, and rehabilitation components of the mission either accelerated or began to implement their programs. However, the development of the neutral political environment called for in the Paris Agreements was hindered by the slow rates of deployment of UNTAC's military, police and civil administrative components.³³ Of the envisioned 15,000 troops to be deployed by mid-May, only 4,000 had arrived by the end of April, and only 193 police.³⁴ These numbers increased to over 10,000 by the middle of June, as the cantonment of the four parties forces was to begin.³⁵ However, UNTAC did not achieve full deployment until late September 1992 - months after the first signs appeared that the Paris Agreements were in trouble.³⁶

³²"UN Awaiting Promised Khmer Rouge Deployment," Hong Kong, *AFP* in English (14 February 1992), in FBIS EAS, 14 February 1992, p. 27

³³First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 1 May 1992 (S/23870)

³⁴"Australian, New Zealand Signal Experts Arrive," Phnom Penh, *SPK* in English (13 May 1992), in FBIS EAS, 14 May 1992, p. 21; Interview 2, New York

³⁵Special Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 12 June 1992 (S/24090)

³⁶Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 21

The non-compliance of the four Cambodian parties with the Paris Agreements became obvious by June 1992. The most widely reported incidences were those of the Khmer Rouge. After its leadership was attacked in Phnom Penh in November 1991, the Khmer Rouge became less forthcoming. Their call for quick UN deployment unanswered, the party's leadership believed that its safety would not be assured should it go back to Phnom Penh. It was also critical of UN plans to provide aid to the SOC.³⁷ Since the line between the SOC and CPP was blurry, and since the UN had yet to deploy administrators in the apparatus of the state, these concerns were not without merit.

Despite these problems, the Khmer Rouge permitted the UN access to its zones and reestablished their headquarters in Phnom Penh, allowing the leader of UNTAC's military component, General John Sanderson, to announce the start of phase two of the operation on 21 April 1992.³⁸ Less reported, at least internationally, was the non-compliance of the SOC. Like the Khmer Rouge, it engaged in cease-fire violations. Its forces also threatened UN human rights

September 1992 (S/24578), p. 5

³⁷"Large Amounts of Aid Bypassing SNC criticized," *Clandestine, Voice of the Great National Union Front of Cambodia* in Cambodian (14 February 1992), translated by FBIS EAS, 14 February 1992, p. 27; Nate Thayer, "The war party: Khmer Rouge intransigence threatens peace," *FEER*, 25 June 1992, p. 12

³⁸Sheri Prasso, "Khmer Rouge Invites UN Into Controlled Areas," *Hong Kong, AFP in English* (21 April 1992), in FBIS EAS, 21 April 1992, p. 21

investigators and refused to mark its minefields, as called for by the UN.³⁹

On 1 July 1992, UNTAC announced that its civil administration component had "entered its active phase," opening offices and appointing Directors in twenty provinces. It also announced a number of new areas that would come under its supervision.⁴⁰ The efforts of the UN's military component to canton and demobilize each faction's forces continued through the following weeks as well, although at a much slower rate than planned. The Khmer Rouge refused to enter these cantonments, criticizing the UN for not controlling the five key ministries and for being biased in favour of the SOC, particularly for supporting international loans to the regime.

The following months were marked by various efforts to bring the Khmer Rouge back into the peace process. On the one hand were efforts best described as 'coercive diplomacy.' French commander Loridon, the second ranking officer in UNTAC's military component, apparently proposed that the UN force the Khmer Rouge to comply with the peace process, using military means if necessary (he was replaced as Second in Command in July 1992).⁴¹ Similar calls were

³⁹"UN Peacekeepers Protest Over 'Armed Threat,'" Tokyo KYODO in English (18 April 1992), in FBIS EAS, 20 April 1992, p. 35; "Factions Refuse To Be First to Mark Minefields," Hong Kong, AFP in English (28 April 1992), in FBIS EAS, 28 April 1992, p. 34

⁴⁰UN Daily Highlights, 2 July 1992 (DH/1175), p. 3

⁴¹See excerpts of an interview with General Loridon in Nayan Chanda,

heard from other areas, such as by the chairman of Australia's Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, Senator Chris Schacht.⁴² There were also heated denunciations of the Khmer Rouge made at the June 1992 Tokyo conference by Sihanouk and American and British officials. Other measures were discussed in August 1992, when the UN Security Council considered imposing sanctions on the Khmer Rouge.

On the other hand were the efforts of some states to encourage the Khmer Rouge to cooperate with the United Nations. China apparently held talks with top Khmer Rouge leaders to persuade them to rejoin the peace process.⁴³ Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans also held informal discussions with the Khmer Rouge on 24 June 1992, addressing what he called "legitimate grievances."⁴⁴ These grievances centered around the CPP's continuing hold over state apparatus. The Khmer Rouge was concerned that, without depriving the CPP of their power over the state, fair elections could not be held and, more importantly, that the CPP would gain power in such elections. As a result, the

⁴²UN divisions: Signs of growing Franco-Australian rivalry within peacekeeping force," FEER, 23 July 1992, pp. 8-9

⁴³"UN Urged to Consider Force Against Khmer Rouge," Melbourne Rad Australia in English (27 July 1992), in FBIS EAS, 28 July 1992, p. 58

⁴⁴"PRC Official Allegedly Meets Pol Pot in Bangkok," Hong Kong, AFP in English (5 August 1992), in FBIS EAS, 5 August 1992, pp. 26-27; Nate Thayer, "Fighting Words," FEER, 20 August 1992, pp. 8-9

⁴⁵"Australia's Evans Notes Khmer Rouge 'Grievances,'" Tokyo, KYODO in English (22 June 1992), in FBIS EAS, 23 June 1992, p. 10

Khmer Rouge demanded increased and shared control of the state apparatus as far down as the village level. A number of states and organizations - most particularly Japan, China and ASEAN - considered these demands to be legitimate, and proposed measures to meet their concerns.⁴⁵ (These proposals were eventually rejected.)

Despite these efforts, the peace process looked to be increasingly threatened. The Khmer Rouge returned to the MMWGs, but their attendance was sporadic. They still refused to allow UN forces into their areas and had not begun the process of cantonment. The cooperation of the CPP was also problematic. As UN personnel took up their positions within the state's administrative apparatus, they began to find evidence of widespread political activities carried on by the CPP, particularly within the armed forces.⁴⁶ In addition, the economic situation in the country had begun to deteriorate. According to World Bank economists, inflation would reach 200 per cent by the end of 1992. SOC reacted by printing more money, fueling the inflationary spiral. Corruption within the government became more prevalent as officials sought to bolster their

⁴⁵See the series of Annexes in Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 783 (1992), 15 November 1992 (S/24800), pp. 9-29

⁴⁶Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 21 September 1992 (S/24578), p. 8

threatened salaries through the sale of public properties and services.⁴⁷

The final three months of 1992 saw a progressive worsening of the security situation in Cambodia and a further move away from the plans envisioned in the Paris Agreements. The Khmer Rouge refusal to place their forces into cantonment led Akashi to freeze the disarmament of the other three factions, citing a need to maintain a balance of power within the country.⁴⁸ This process was suspended altogether in November 1992, and UNTAC's military component changed its priorities to providing protection for voter registration, electoral campaigning and the polling process. It also began guarding offices of political parties and increased its patrolling in order to build the neutral political environment deemed essential for the upcoming elections.⁴⁹

The need to take these latter measures were not spurred by Khmer Rouge attacks, however, but by the antics of the CPP. By November 1992, it was becoming clear that forces loyal to the SOC were attacking party personnel of both FUNCINPEC and the political party of the KPNLF, the Buddhist

⁴⁷Nate Thayer and Susumu Awanchara, "Cambodia takes a bath," FEER, 15 October 1992, pp. 56-57

⁴⁸"UN's Akashi Temporarily to 'Freeze' Disarmament," Tokyo, KYODO in English (21 October 1992), in FBIS EAS, 21 October 1992, p. 39

⁴⁹Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 25 January 1993 (S/25124), pp. 9-10, 20-22

Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP).⁵⁰ FUNCINPEC seemed to have been singled out due to their strong electoral campaign, and this party accused SOC of killing or kidnapping many of its workers.

SOC forces also jailed or threatened nascent human rights groups, in one instance sending over 100 troops to destroy a human rights group's office.⁵¹ SOC also became more intransigent toward the UN through this period, hindering the takeover of its administrative apparatus. Although the UN responded to this intransigence by producing new rules to curb the abuse of power by the CPP and receiving assurances from top officials within the party, effective control of SOC's administrative apparatus eluded the UN. This resistance began in October 1992 and, according to the Secretary General's Third Progress report on Cambodia, extended to "nearly all fields."⁵²

Aside from redeploying its troops, the UN took a number of other measures to improve the political climate in Cambodia. The idea of holding a presidential election before or concurrent with the planned Constituent Assembly elections was mooted about for some time, and officially endorsed by Boutros-Ghali on 15 November 1992. The idea

⁵⁰"Phnom Penh Reportedly Blamed KR for Own Attacks," Hong Kong, *AFP* in English (10 November 1992), in FBIS EAS, 10 November 1992, p. 39

⁵¹"Closure of Human Rights Office Reportedly Forced," Hong Kong, *AFP* in English (13 December 1992), in FBIS EAS, 14 December 1992, p. 31

⁵²Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 25 January 1993 (S/25124), p. 13

behind this proposal was to allow Sihanouk to assume the presidency through internationally sponsored elections (thus lending the process an air of legitimacy), thereby stabilizing the political environment and improving the prospects for continuing the peace process. The UN also tried to keep the door open for Khmer Rouge involvement in the process, offering to hold special by-elections in Khmer Rouge zones if the party returned to the fold.

However, as Akashi put it on 10 November 1992, the "carrot" of elections was to be matched by the "stick" of economic sanctions. On 30 November 1992, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for an embargo on the supply of petroleum products to the Khmer Rouge, and threatened to freeze their assets should they fail to cooperate. This resolution also supported an earlier moratorium on the export of logs from Cambodia, and suggested similar measures be applied to the export of minerals and gems. UNTAC forces were to aid in implementing these provisions.⁵³

1993 was marked by the continuing struggle of the Cambodian parties to gain advantage in the political arena on the one hand, and UNTAC's efforts to create a neutral

⁵³S/RES/792. It should be noted that the economic measures passed by the Security Council on 30 November 1992 were not officially 'sanctions,' as defined under Chapter seven of the UN Charter. Therefore, states were not compelled to enforce them. Nonetheless, the compliance of neighbouring states, including Thailand whose military had close economic ties with Khmer Rouge officials, increased with time. Interview 8, New York

political environment, on the other. Khmer Rouge attacks on Vietnamese settlers increased, as did their detention of UN personnel. These practices were in support of the Khmer Rouge strategy of delegitimizing the UN presence by tarring it with a neo-colonialist brush while stoking the racist fears of Cambodians - a xenophobia running far back into Cambodian history.

Beginning in January, the daily count of cease-fire violations increased as Khmer Rouge and SOC forces clashed over disputed territory, particularly in the Western and Northwestern regions of the country.⁵⁴ Attacks on political parties and workers also continued, the "great majority" of which the UN attributed to the SOC.⁵⁵ These attacks included drive-by shootings, abductions and "summary executions." The UN also complained of being targeted in an anti-UNTAC propaganda campaign mounted by the SOC.

The responses of the UN to these events varied. In order to reduce the incidence of violent attacks, UN military units changed their deployment pattern to conform to the borders of the Cambodian provinces.⁵⁶ Increased levels of patrolling and the addition of military personnel to UN

⁵⁴Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 25 January 1993 (S/25124), pp. 8-9

⁵⁵Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 792 (1992), 13 February 1993 (S/25289), p. 3

⁵⁶Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 25 January 1993 (S/25124)

police patro's in eight 'risky' provinces were also begun.⁵⁷ These measures were taken to reduce the response time to requests for assistance and to build confidence among the Cambodian population. In terms of civil administrative reforms, UNTAC announced procedures it would follow to prosecute human rights offences, using the existing administrative and judicial apparatus of the four parties. These procedures gave the UN powers of arrest and imprisonment.⁵⁸

Furthermore, the UN began to recognize that SOC's real power rested not at the national level in Phnom Penh, but in the capital of each of the provinces. This power manifested itself mostly in personal ties, not through the expected links of state and provincial government. In response to this situation, the UN created and deployed mobile "Control Teams" in order to increase their supervision of SOC administrative apparatus in the provinces. Each team was composed of personnel from the military, police, finance, civil administration, and information components of UNTAC and was charged with investigating whether SOC's local administration was acting in a "politically neutral manner during the electoral process."⁵⁹

⁵⁷"UN Force Empowered to Arrest, 'Use Force,'" Hong Kong, AFP in English (7 January 1993), in FBIS EAS, 8 January 1993, pp. 44-45

⁵⁸Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 25 January 1993 (S/25124), p. 10

⁵⁹Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 3 May 1993 (S/25719), p. 14

Through the course of their work, the Control Teams found "widespread and persistent use of the SOC state apparatus to conduct political campaign activities of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) in which state employees - police, armed forces and civil servants - are mobilized for CPP electioneering."⁶⁰ According to several UN personnel involved with these teams, they represented the first real challenge to the CPP's control of state apparatus and provoked a heated, even "desperate," response by the leadership of the SOC.⁶¹

UN efforts to curb the abuse of power by the CPP continued through February. In the beginning of the month, UNTAC set up a complaint process intended to draw the attention of SOC defence officials to cases where army personnel took part in illegal activities, particularly politically motivated acts of violence. This mechanism elicited few responses. Later in the month, UNTAC's civil administration component managed to pass a directive ordering members of the army to stop wearing the insignia of the CPP on state uniforms.⁶² The measures taken by UNTAC's Military and Police components were attributed with

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 14

⁶¹See the 'letter' sent from SOC Prime Minister Hun Sen to Akashi in "Hun Sen Objects to UNTAC Search of Government Office," Phnom Penh, Samleng Pracheachon Kampuchea Radio Network in Cambodian (18 March 1993), translated by FBIS EAS, 19 March 1993, p. 34. The quotation comes from an interview with a UN official involved with UNTAC's Civil Administration component. Interview 2, New York

⁶²Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 3 May 1993 (S/25719), p. 15

decreasing the number of attacks on political offices through February and the first half of March. Although probably effective in decreasing the level of violence in parts of Cambodia, these measures could not stop the harassment of UN personnel by Khmer Rouge and SOC forces, nor the cease-fire violations that continued throughout the month.

As the country approached the time of elections, the security situation in Cambodia deteriorated. The Khmer Rouge staged three attacks on Vietnamese civilians, prompting many to flee to Vietnam. Politically motivated violence and harassment also increased against political parties and voters.⁶³ Forces of the Khmer Rouge and the SOC confiscated UN electoral registration cards in order to prevent peasants from voting in the upcoming elections. The CFP's main political rival, FUNCINPEC, recorded 59 attacks against its workers in April alone, and the UN reported that the Khmer Rouge was responsible for 62 civilian deaths, 137 injuries and 31 abductions in the same month.⁶⁴ UN personnel also came under deliberate attack in this period from forces of both the Khmer Rouge and the SOC.⁶⁵

⁶³Ibid., p. 24

⁶⁴"UNTAC Acts Against Phnom Penh Officials," Hong Kong, *AFP in English* (11 May 1993), in FBIS EAS, 11 May 1993, pp. 35-36

⁶⁵Letter dated 26 April 1993 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 27 April 1993 (S/25669)

In the economic realm, the UN found itself battling a falling currency through March as the value of the Cambodia riel plummeted inextricably. Although UNTAC placed large amounts of rice on the market in order to drive the price of this staple good down, it was reluctant to intervene further fearing that doing so would be construed as favouring the SOC.⁶⁶ The poor economic situation in Cambodia was probably exacerbated, and certainly not improved, by the lack of economic aid - aid that was pledged by the international community at the Tokyo Conference in June 1992.

UNTAC continued its efforts to stabilize the political situation in Cambodia, with mixed success. A World Bank loan of (US) \$66 million favoured by UNTAC officials as a means to stabilize the country's economic situation in the period preceding the election was blocked by FUNCINPEC, claiming that it would unfairly benefit the SOC.⁶⁷ In terms of improving the level of security within Cambodia, UN measures were more successful. At UNTAC's instigation, UN and local police jointly staffed checkpoints in Phnom Penh and confiscated unregistered weapons. This and other measures previously announced probably caused a decrease in

⁶⁶Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 3 May 1993 (S/25719), p. 16

⁶⁷Sheri Prasso, "Sihanouk to Resign as Head of State After Elections," Hong Kong, AFP in English (2 April 1993), in FBIS EAS, 2 April 1993, p. 25; Nate Thayer, "No Riel Currency: Cambodia rocked by financial turbulence," FEER, 8 April 1993, pp. 62-64

the level of reported crimes in the capital.⁶⁸

Furthermore, the UN announced that its forces would be solely responsible for the security of polling stations, and, in an attempt to prevent SOC interference, offered to transport politicians in the final phase of the electoral campaign.⁶⁹ On this basis did Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali open the campaign phase of the election, declaring that for elections to occur, the "basic acceptable conditions existed."⁷⁰

This declaration did not mean, however, that elections would occur in a safe or politically neutral environment. Incidences of banditry increased throughout the country, attributable to soldiers that were paid infrequently. Concerted attacks on UN troops continued, resulting in a number of deaths. Most of these attacks were perpetrated by forces loyal to the Khmer Rouge, but some were also attributable to the forces of the SOC. The number of violent attacks against civilians rose through April and May

⁶⁸According to UN statistics, the number of serious crimes reported in Phnom Penh totalled 66 in January, 82 in February, 65 in March and 35 in April. See Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 3 May 1993 (S/25719), p. 19

⁶⁹Robert Birsel, "UN to Provide Politicians' Transportation During Polls," Hong Kong, AFP in English (29 April 1993), in FBIS EAS, 29 April 1993, pp. 41-42

⁷⁰Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 3 May 1993 (S/25719), p. 3

as well, with 110 killed and 179 injured.⁷¹ The situation had the potential to get much worse.

On 13 April 1993, the Khmer Rouge withdrew their personnel from Phnom Penh, declaring that their safety could no longer be assured. The UN was left with few contacts to the faction, a situation aggravated when UNTAC withdrew its personnel from Khmer Rouge headquarters in Pailin due to ongoing harassment and an inability to resupply. Worse still, nominal Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan pledged to prevent the upcoming elections, predicting more violence in the ensuing weeks.⁷² According to some observers, these were not idle threats. Up to eight weeks before the election, the Khmer Rouge stopped firing its heavy weapons, broke into patrol-sized units, and spread throughout the country. They were in a position to disrupt the elections.⁷³

Activities by other parties also hindered the creation of a neutral political environment. The presence of UNTAC's civil administration personnel in the administrative apparatus of each of the three complying parties was unable to prevent their use in mobilizing political support. Nor could UNTAC prevent the "surveillance" and "harassment"

⁷¹These statistics are to 15 May 1993. See Report of the Secretary-General in Pursuance of Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 810 (1993), 15 May 1993 (S/25784), p. 3

⁷²Nate Thayer, "Bloody Agenda: Khmer Rouge set out to wreck planned elections," FEER, 15 April 1993, p. 20

⁷³Interview 3, Ottawa

perpetrated by each of the parties against the others. Because of its greater resources, the activities of the SOC were of "particular concern to UNTAC."⁷⁴ The nature of these activities, coupled with the ongoing violence throughout the country, prompted UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to note, "the election will clearly not be taking place in an environment as disarmed and politically neutral as was envisaged in the Paris Agreements and in the implementation plan."⁷⁵ In a fit of rueful melancholy, Boutros-Ghali added that "It may well be, in the light of the sobering experience of the last 13 months, that the expectations originally entertained for ensuring that the election is free and fair and for the success of national reconciliation were overly optimistic."⁷⁶

Although this late bout of pessimism was probably warranted given the problems that UNTAC encountered in the run-up to the election, the Cambodian people and parties defied expectations and conducted the polling in a manner that was largely free of violence or intimidation. Despite sporadic attacks by forces of the Khmer Rouge, the UN carried out six days of polling that attracted nearly 90 per cent of registered voters. The results were equally unexpected. Having endured a concerted campaign to ruin its

⁷⁴Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 3 May 1993 (S/25719), p. 23

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 27

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 29

electoral chances - a campaign that included killings, torture, imprisonment, and widespread intimidation - FUNCINPEC emerged victorious, taking 58 seats and 45 per cent of the popular vote to the CPP's 51 seats (38 per cent), the BLDP's 10 seats (4 per cent) and a smaller party's 1 seat (1 per cent).⁷⁷

The UN, determined to see the process through, and in a conscious act of forgetting, declared that "the Cambodian people, by coming forth in their millions in a festive atmosphere of joy and hope for the future, made the election free and fair by their own courage and determination."⁷⁸

Apparently, the criteria announced by Akashi on 21 April 1993 for judging the freeness and fairness of the election -

the extent to which the campaign and voting are marred by violence, intimidation, and harassment; the extent to which SOC, which controls the largest zones and has the most extensive administrative structure, enjoys unfair advantages, whether by using its administrative apparatus for its own political ends or by denying other political parties access to the public media; and the technical conduct of the poll.⁷⁹

- was reduced to a single measure: the secrecy of the ballot.⁸⁰ The holding of elections carried out, the UN declared its mission a success and prepared to withdraw.

⁷⁷Report of the Secretary-General on the Conduct and Results of the Elections in Cambodia, 10 June 1993 (S/25913), p. 3

⁷⁸Ibid., Annex II, p. 8

⁷⁹Report of the Secretary-General in Pursuance of Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 810 (1993), 15 May 1993 (S/25784), p. 2

⁸⁰Interview 9, New York

ELECTING TO END THE WAR

Why was the running of elections considered the crucial part of the Paris Agreements and the UNTAC mission?⁸¹ The answer lies, in part, in the role that elections play in resolving domestic conflicts.⁸² The utility of holding elections to end internal conflicts can be explained in relations to two issues: the effect that they have domestically and the importance they are given internationally.

On the domestic level, elections allow even the most virulent of enemies to reach a compromise by resorting to the 'open market' of democracy. According to Giuseppe DiPalma, a regime crisis, brought on by external factors such as a regional hegemon encouraging a democratic transition or outside powers cutting off crucial aid, or internal factors such as economic decline resulting from mismanagement, corruption, or democratic dissent within the state, pressures government leaders to liberalize in order to continue in power or maintain international legitimacy.⁸³ Seeking to avoid deadlock (the condition which caused or reinforced the regime crisis in the first

⁸¹As Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali states in his implementation plan, "The election is the focal point of the comprehensive settlement." Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia, 19 February 1992 (S/23613), p. 11

⁸²The role of elections in potentially improving the long-term security of Cambodia will be discussed further in chapters four and five.

⁸³Giuseppe DiPalma, *To Craft Democracies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990)

place) or their absolute loss of power, government leaders may compromise on elections. Why? As Thomas M. Franck puts it, "They do so to avoid the alternative - persistent challenge to authority by coups, countercoups, instability and stasis - and to enable themselves to govern with essential societal acquiescence."⁸⁴

DiPalma argues that it is only by submitting themselves to a truly competitive electoral process that political actors can ensure their continued presence in the political system. As a result, all sides compromise on a set of rules, institutions and procedures that create a competitive process and regulate a fair balance of winning and losing. By agreeing to a degree of calculated uncertainty, all actors are in affect agreeing to accept the loss of political power so that they may attain it again."⁸⁵ While we may acknowledge that the agreement to coexist and accept a degree of uncertainty may not appeal to all actors, it is important to remember, as Franck points out, that the alternatives, particularly continued warfare, are often worse. In any case, DiPalma argues that actors do not compromise on a fixed outcome (as would be the case in a power-sharing agreement) but, rather, on a "competitive political market giving contestants fairly equal chances to

⁸⁴Thomas M. Franck, "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance," *The American Journal of International Law* 86, no.4 (1992): 51

⁸⁵This argument is based on John Rawl's dictum that "in a democracy consenting to lose is a condition for winning." DiPalma, *To Craft Democracies*, 55

effect and share in outcomes."⁸⁶ Thus, the very uncertainty of the electoral process proves to be its most enduring strength.

The resolution of internal conflicts through democratic elections also enjoys widespread international support, particularly within international organizations. As the United Nations Secretary-General argues, over the last decade, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, elections have come to be recognized by the international community as "a potentially useful conflict resolution mechanism" for either averting or ending intrastate wars.⁸⁷ The role of international organizations, particularly the UN, in monitoring increasing numbers of elections throughout the world is evidence of this conviction.

Furthermore, through their practices and normative support of the principle of democratic elections, international organizations have helped to raise the legal status of the norm of democratic governance in international law. As Franck puts it,

Increasingly, governments recognize that their legitimacy depends on meeting a normative expectation of the community of states. This recognition has led to the emergence of a community expectation: that those who seek the validation of their empowerment patently govern with the consent of the governed. Democracy, thus, is on the way to becoming a global entitlement,

⁸⁶Ibid., 41

⁸⁷Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections: Report of the Secretary-General, 18 November 1992 (A/47/668), p. 16

one that increasingly will be promoted and protected by collective international processes.⁸⁸

Importantly, the promotion of democratic transitions is not isolated to the speech halls of international organizations or the rhetoric of their press releases. Rather, it is becoming the case that aid and financial assistance, whether it be from individual states or international financial organizations such as the IMF or World Bank, is increasingly contingent on a regime's willingness to hold elections and submit itself to popular will.⁸⁹ This type of external pressure is an important factor when a regime is forced to consider the costs and benefits of submitting itself to the electoral process.

For the domestic parties to the Cambodian conflict, these considerations became increasingly important in the late 1980s and 1990. Although none of the four parties had been decisively defeated on the battlefield (international support had assured them of that), each was being pressured by foreign states to arrive at a compromise. However, compromise did not come easily. The Phnom Penh regime refused to accept the four party power sharing plans offered by the other factions. The regime's ability to control approximately 95 per cent of the country's population and 85 per cent of its territory, even after the withdrawal of the

⁸⁸Franck, "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance," 46

⁸⁹Interview 4, Ottawa

Vietnamese armed forces, hardened its opposition to these proposals. Further, most of SOC's leadership were former Khmer Rouge insurgents who had either fled Pol Pot's purges or turned against the increasingly violent policies of his regime. Their hatred of the Khmer Rouge stemmed from their familiarity with its practices: the idea that the two parties could share power was anathema. This was equally true for the Khmer Rouge: the Phnom Penh regime was not only a puppet of a historic enemy, Vietnam, but was composed of traitors to the party and country.

Nonetheless, the Phnom Penh regime recognized that international support for its position was dwindling. Without the assistance supplied by the Soviet Union and Vietnam, and facing continued international isolation, the regime's long term prospects looked bleak. Its reformist faction, led by the pragmatic Hun Sen, introduced a number of liberalization policies in the late 1980s in order to increase its legitimacy and to entice Sihanouk into accepting a coalition government. Although these policies improved the Cambodian economy, the state benefited little from the economic revival and the regime's overtures to Sihanouk were blocked by his Chinese backers. These conditions altered Phnom Penh's calculus of survival. By 1991, the SOC determined that holding elections was a compromise it could accept, particularly since it already enjoyed the advantage of controlling most of the state's

population, territory, and administrative and security apparatus. Expecting to win in UN sponsored elections, the SOC seized the opportunity to end the war and gain international legitimacy.

The Khmer Rouge was also put in a position where it was forced to compromise. Although its military power was the strongest of the three resistance factions, it was unable to make significant inroads in its war against the Phnom Penh regime. Nor did its fighting prowess translate into major diplomatic clout, owing mostly to its international reputation as a genocidal party. The withdrawal of American support for the Khmer Rouge's seat at the UN in July 1990 further increased its isolation while lending more legitimacy to the Phnom Penh regime.⁹⁰ Increasingly warm relations between China and Vietnam, and China and the Soviet Union, meant that China depended less on the Khmer Rouge as a tool for obtaining its interests. This situation was reflected in the increasing pressure China placed on its ally to compromise. It also became painfully apparent when China stopped supplying the faction with arms after signing the Paris Agreements in October 1991.⁹¹

Nate Thayer, a long time analyst of the Khmer Rouge with access to its highest leadership, reported in March 1991

⁹⁰Nayan Chanda, "For reasons of state," FEER, 2 August 1990, p. 10

⁹¹Nate Thayer, "The war party: Khmer Rouge intransigence threatens peace," FEER, 25 June 1992, p. 12; "PRC Official Allegedly Meets Pol Pot in Bangkok," Hong Kong, AFP in English (5 August 1992), in FBIS EAS, 5 August 1992, p. 26

that Pol Pot was ready to accept participation in internationally supervised elections as part of a long term strategy to win support.⁹² It is possible that the disposition of the Khmer Rouge toward joining an agreement increased greatly in June 1991 when Hun Sen and Sihanouk appeared ready to form a coalition government that excluded the Khmer Rouge.⁹³

Regardless of its immediate motivation, the Khmer Rouge joined the peace process and agreed to elections, subject to conditions spelled out in the Paris Agreements, for three reasons: in order to gain a degree of domestic and international legitimacy, in the recognition that a power sharing agreement was unlikely, and that failing to do so would result in its complete isolation.⁹⁴

Son Sann, head of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), and Norodom Sihanouk, leader of the *Front uni national pour un cambodge indépendant, neutre, pacifique et coopératif* (FUNCINPEC) were also subject to international pressure. Neither faction had performed well militarily, and their only strength came at the diplomatic table where they led a coalition government that included the Khmer

⁹²Nate Thayer, "A Khmer ruse," FEER, 7 March 1991, p. 25

⁹³Peter Mackler, "Indonesia's Alatas Addresses News Conference," Hong Kong, AFP in English (4 June 1991), in FBIS EAS, 5 June 1991, p. 5; Suphaphon Kanwerayothin, "Khmer Rouge Demands Conference by 1 Jul," Bangkok, Bangkok Post in English (5 June 1991), in FBIS EAS, 5 June 1991, p. 6; Interview 3, Ottawa

⁹⁴Nate Thayer, "Out With the Old: Two Khmer Rouge stalwarts fade from view," FEER, 10 February 1994, p. 26

Rouge. Son Sann, the only leader to consistently espouse liberal-democratic principles, was easily reconciled to the idea of democratic elections, recognizing also that his group would not survive without international backing. Sihanouk, on the other hand, was more likely to support a power sharing plan with the Phnom Penh regime, and attempted several times to carry this out, only to be reined in by his Chinese backers. Compromising on elections was not difficult, however, since Sihanouk was still a popular figure among the general population, despite his long absence from power. His party was at least assured a significant role in a future Cambodian government.

What was the role of the international community in this process? For one, it pressured the four Cambodian factions to accept a *democratic* resolution to their conflict. This is least surprising for the Western states most involved in the negotiations. Australia, the originator of the UN plan, France and the United States are all liberal democracies on the record as supporting the global evolution of democratic norms. Perhaps more unusual was the consistent support of China for national elections. It is, after all, an authoritarian state that had crushed democratic dissent within its own borders.

Yet, as a result of the Tianeman square incident in 1989, China was under increasing pressure to improve its international image. Since most of its goals in Southeast

Asia were already met by 1990 with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the region and Vietnam's exit from Cambodia, China could gain political mileage by pressuring the Khmer Rouge into agreement. Elections seemed a natural choice. Phnom Penh rejected the idea of power sharing with the Khmer Rouge, yet China understood that without the inclusion of this faction, continued conflict was inevitable. Elections would give the Khmer Rouge a place in the government, thus ending Cambodia's civil war and achieving China's final goal of an independent, "balkanized" Indochina.⁹

Despite encountering major obstacles in implementing its plan, the intervention of the international community proved to be crucial in the actual election process. While it is true that each of the four factions compromised on the electoral process, all did so under duress. Two of the factions - the Khmer Rouge and the SOC - had the military (and, in the latter case, administrative) power to ruin the election. As envisioned in the Paris Agreements and the UNTAC implementation plan, the UN's role was to minimize this power, creating an environment where free and fair elections could take place. As discussed in the summary of the UNTAC mission, events did not go according to plan. The two most powerful Cambodian parties - the Khmer Rouge and

⁹Steven J. Hood, "Beijing's Cambodian Gamble and the Prospects for Peace in Indochina," *Asian Survey* 30, no. 10 (1990): 977-991

the SOC - did not canton their forces as called for in the Paris Agreements, continued fighting in many areas of the country, and conducted harassment campaigns against voters and UN personnel alike. These activities exacerbated the security situation in the country, causing the UN to substantially alter its deployment plans and prolong the stay of its military units. The decreasing cooperation of the Cambodian parties in the military realm then placed more importance on the work of UNTAC's Civil Administration component. However, the neutral political environment that it sought to create was never realized, owing to the intransigence of all Cambodian parties, particularly the CPP.

Furthermore, the most important component of the UNTAC mission, the electoral campaign, was marred by politically motivated murders, the clash of armed forces, incidences of racially related massacres, and an environment of fear and intimidation. As well, each party used its governing apparatus to influence the outcome of the election, a particularly relevant fact for the performance of the CPP. This party was scarcely separable from the SOC, meaning that it enjoyed all the trappings of power associated with the state. It was only the actual process of voting that was carried out in a mostly peaceful environment. Thus, come election day, the only realistic claim that UNTAC could make was that it had conducted the polling in an atmosphere

generally free of threats or coercion. On a practical level - that is, in achieving the goals set out for it in the Paris Agreements and the Secretary-General's implementation plan - the UN's mission in Cambodia was only partially successful.

Nonetheless, the see-saw battle waged by the UN to conduct the elections gave the Khmer people their first real opportunity to influence the formation of their government. The 120 person constituent assembly that resulted from this election was the first freely elected body since 1947. In the months following the election, it formed an interim government, promulgated and enacted a new constitution, and transformed itself into the new government of Cambodia. Without the presence of UN personnel during the interim phase, this result probably would have never occurred. If the goal of the Paris Agreements and the UNTAC process was to end the Cambodian war through the election of a legitimate government, then the means necessary to achieve it, no matter how messy, were justified.

ENDING EXTERNAL INTERVENTION

No matter how effective the efforts of the international community were in reconciling the Cambodian factions in the short-term, the true effect of elections on Cambodian security can only be judged by the long-term behavior of the Cambodian state. This issue will be addressed further in

chapter four. This section discusses the potential effect that certain provisions of the Paris Agreements have for improving the long-term security of Cambodia.

The second agreement signed at the Paris Conference on Cambodia - the Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia (the Guarantees Agreement) - is a crucial mechanism for ending what has historically been a significant cause of Cambodian insecurity, external penetration. It committed the yet-to-be-elected Cambodian government to a policy of "perpetual neutrality," a policy that was to be written into the future Cambodian constitution.⁶

Furthermore, Cambodia was to terminate all treaties and agreements that were incompatible with this position, and refrain from entering into any similar agreements in the future. In return, all signatory states vowed to respect Cambodia's neutrality, cease interfering in Cambodia's internal affairs, prevent the use of their territory for such purposes, and to end the positioning of forces on Cambodia soil. As well, in the recognition that human rights abuses had caused substantial interstate tension and

⁶Guarantees Agreement, Article 1 (S/23177, p. 49). This provision was adopted in Chapter 1, Article 1 of the new Cambodian constitution, which reads: "Cambodia is a kingdom in which the king abides by the Constitution and multiparty liberal democracy. The Kingdom of Cambodia is an independent, sovereign, peaceful, permanently neutral, and non-aligned state." 'Text' of Cambodian National Constitution. Translated by FBIS EAS, 18 October 1993, p. 52

conflict in the past (for example, the mass exodus of refugees sparked by the brutal rule of the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979 or the racially motivated genocide perpetrated under the Lon Nol and Pol Pot governments), the Guarantees Agreement reiterated the commitment Cambodia made in the Comprehensive Settlement Agreements to respecting the human rights of its population. Parties to the Guarantees Agreement promised to encourage respect for this commitment, and means were established to act should it be violated.

Compliance to the Guarantees Agreement has been high among the signatory states, with one exception. The major international players, the Soviet Union and the United States, had both desired to end their involvement in the conflict and, during the course of negotiations or following the agreement in October 1991, ceased supplying the Cambodian factions, largely for domestic political reasons. The Soviet Union had begun decreasing its involvement in 1986 and had stopped almost all of its aid by 1990 due to its collapsing economic position and increasingly volatile domestic situation. The administration in the United States had also reduced its level of aid, owing to Congressional pressure regarding the supply of the Khmer Rouge. The Paris Agreements allowed both superpowers to wash their hands of the ordeal.

The same was true for two important regional actors, Vietnam and China. Vietnam's ten year occupation of

Cambodia had cost it over 220,000 casualties and substantial amounts of economic resources.⁹ Decreasing support from the Soviet Union, a desire to bolster the efficacy of its economic reforms, and the potential for improved relations with China encouraged Vietnam's leadership, particularly its reformist factions, to seek an end to the country's involvement. Having withdrawn most of its units from Cambodia by 1989, Vietnam used the International Guarantees Agreement to demonstrate to the world, and particularly to the Western industrial powers, the extent to which its policies had changed, both domestically and internationally.

In part, China was motivated by similar conditions. It too used the Paris Agreements as a means of enhancing its international reputation as a peacemaker (especially important after its diplomatic isolation following Tianenmen square), improving its image for Western states and investors. More importantly, the Paris Agreements were a satisfactory means to attain China's long term interests in Southeast Asia. With the Soviet Union withdrawing from the region, and its alleged client state - Vietnam - doing the same in Cambodia, China could drop its "two track policy" of supporting the Khmer Rouge and pressuring the Vietnamese to withdraw. Regardless of the outcome of the election, the

⁹In 1990, the official toll of Vietnamese casualties in Cambodia was given by Major-General Nguyen Van Thai as 55,300 dead and 166,000 wounded. Cited in William S. Turley, "The Khmer war: Cambodia after Paris," *Survival* 32, no. 5 (1990): 438

result would be a Cambodia far less tied to its Vietnamese neighbour. As a result, China stopped supplying military aid to the Khmer Rouge after October 1991. It also actively committed itself to the peace process by deploying military engineers to help in reconstruction tasks. A stable Cambodian state was now in China's interest: the Paris Agreements were a mechanism to ensure this stability.

This single exception is Thailand. Over the course of Cambodia's twelve year civil war, Thai companies and military officials established close relations with the Khmer Rouge. Thai gem-mining and forestry companies were allowed to operate in areas controlled by the Khmer Rouge in return for a cut of the profits. The same was true for Thai military officials, who both allowed for and protected the transit of these goods. Nonetheless, when UN sanctions were imposed on the Khmer Rouge in November 1992, the Thai civilian government apparently made serious efforts to comply.⁹⁸ After Thailand was accused of evacuating Khmer Rouge soldiers under pressure from Cambodian government forces in August 1993, Thai army commander General Wimol Wongwanich reassigned military officers with vested interests in the area, thus reducing the level of Thai interference in Cambodian affairs.⁹⁹ This interference has

⁹⁸Rodney Tasker, "Dangerous Neighbours: Recent Cambodian fighting tests Thai nerves," FEER, 18 February 1993, p. 18; Rodney Tasker, "Hitting a Nerve: US-Thai links strained over Khmer Rouge," FEER, 1 July 1993, p. 21

⁹⁹Rodney Tasker, "Comrades Adrift: Army moves to cut links with Khmer

not stopped, however, and is a cause of continuing tension between the Thai and Cambodian governments.¹⁰⁰

Given that many of the states previously involved in Cambodia's civil war withdrew due to often unique domestic or international factors, what is to prevent a resurgence of foreign intervention in Cambodian affairs? A hard realist answer to this question would be 'nothing.' States will intervene in the affairs of others if it serves their interests to do so. Yet, the Guarantees Agreement serves many interests of the signatory states. This is particularly true of China and Vietnam. Both of these states have incentives to respect the treaty, because not doing so may induce the other state to undertake reciprocal action - an incidence that both seek to avoid. For Thailand, its continued interference in Cambodian affairs has become a source of international criticism, straining its relations with important trading partners.¹⁰¹ As well, the Guarantees Agreement enjoys treaty status under international law. Future interventions by states party to the treaty would be subject to international condemnation. Although this will not prevent intervention, it may act as a deterrent. While this is not a perfect solution to the

Rouge," FEER, 14 October 1993, p. 20

¹⁰⁰Nate Thayer, "Land Reclamation: Phnom Penh government wants lost land returned," FEER, 28 October 1993, p. 32

¹⁰¹Rodney Tasker, "Hitting a Nerve: US-Thai links strained over Khmer Rouge," FEER, 1 July 1993, p. 21

problems of Cambodian security caused by external intervention, it does hold promise for improving them.

Although proof of the treaty's long-term strength will have to await the passage of time, initial indications suggest that its provisions are being respected and that its purpose is being achieved. Following the June 1993 election, the Cambodian state received military aid from foreign governments and its personnel were paid by the UN. This allowed it to launch major attacks against the Khmer Rouge. These attacks deprived the Khmer Rouge of many of its major strongholds in the country, including the lucrative gem mining town of Pailin.¹⁰²

Unlike in the past, however, these activities attracted little international attention or concern. No state began resupplying the insurgents or condemned the Cambodian state for their actions. The holding of internationally organized and conducted elections had produced a government that the international community would recognize as legitimate. And, as a government recognized as such both internationally and domestically, it was fully within its sovereign right to attack a group of armed insurgents devoted to the state's

¹⁰²"Government Fights to Hold Pailin Base," *China News* (Taipei), 21 March 1994. The other two areas considered important to Khmer Rouge operations and captured by government forces are Phum Chat and Anlong Veng. Sheila McNulty, "Aid called best weapon," *China Post* (Taipei), 14 March 1994. Although the government managed to hold the smaller bases that it captured in the country's Northwest, the key bases of Anlong Veng and Pailin were soon recaptured by the Khmer Rouge. Nate Thayer, "Untactical Retreat: Government limps back to the negotiating table," *FEER*, 5 May 1994, p. 15

overthrow. The prospects for the Khmer Rouge to return to power now appear remote, having lost its major international backers (China and, increasingly, Thailand) and suffering from continual defections of its troops. With the government unified and the link between internal conflict and foreign assistance broken, one source of state insecurity is gone.

CONCLUSION

The efforts of the international community in the late 1980s and early 1990s to end the civil war in Cambodia offers an unprecedented example of how the world may act to resolve the problems of Third World security. Its diplomatic intervention insured that the solution be based on principles of liberal democracy - a means of conflict resolution that is quickly becoming the norm. This diplomacy was backed up by the deployment of over 22,000 personnel under the auspices of UNTAC. Described by William Shawcross as "an invasion with benign intent," the UNTAC mission played a crucial role in resolving the civil war by organizing and conducting national elections to create a government that could be recognized as legitimate domestically and internationally.¹⁰³ Its battle to improve the Cambodian political environment often proved violent

¹⁰³William Shawcross, *Fear and Hope in Cambodia* (New York: United Nations, 1993), videocassette

and, at times, futile, its efforts thwarted by two of the domestic factions. Yet, UNTAC managed to carry out what was always envisioned as the cornerstone of the peace agreements, national elections. A new, legitimate government formed and the international causes of the country's civil war were relieved.

In addition to reconciling three of the domestic parties to the conflict, thereby improving the security of the Cambodian people, the Cambodian peace process also holds the potential for reducing a historic cause of insecurity - external penetration. The agreements signed in Paris in October 1991 commit all signatory states, including those that have been long involved in Cambodian affairs, to respect Cambodia's neutrality and end their interference in its domestic affairs. While no treaty can prevent a determined actor from carrying out its intentions, the Paris Agreements offer some hope that the international community will respect its treaty obligations in the future. If this proves to be the case, then one part of Cambodia's 'insecurity dilemma' has been resolved.

CHAPTER FOUR

INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA:

SECURING THE STATE

External penetration has always been regarded as a major element of Cambodian insecurity. The centuries-old interference by its neighbours, Vietnam and Thailand, was augmented in the modern period by the more powerful, and destructive, activities of the great powers. French colonization, the invasion of Japan, and France's efforts to maintain its empire had a significant impact on the political history of Cambodia. The period following Cambodian independence had an equally important, but far more destructive, impact as the American invasion of Vietnam engulfed much of the Indochina peninsula in conflict.

In the years following the withdrawal of the United States and the victory of the Khmer Rouge, Cambodia was again overcome by external penetration, this time by its historical enemy, Vietnam. The ensuing struggle became internationalized as the divisions in the Cambodian state were manipulated by foreign powers and local states for their own ends. The most recent international intervention, that carried out under the auspices of the United Nations,

is the first example of an intervention meant to improve the long-term security of the Cambodian state. As discussed in the previous chapter, a significant goal of this intervention was to end what has long been recognized as a major cause of Cambodian insecurity - external penetration.

But the insecurity of the Cambodian state has traditionally manifested itself at another level, within the state itself. As a modern political entity, Cambodia has rarely fulfilled its citizens' security needs either through the provision of internal order or the protection against external threat. In fact, the Cambodian state has often proven to be the largest threat to its inhabitants through drastic policies of rule or by provoking external conflict. There are a number of reasons for this poor situation. One is that mechanisms for peacefully transferring political power were never developed in the country before or after independence. The absence of such mechanisms made it exceedingly difficult for successive governments to build or sustain their legitimacy, contributing to the unsettled and often volatile character of Cambodian domestic politics. Cambodia's modern history of coups and revolution attests to this character.

Another cause of Cambodia's historical insecurity is the consistently limited administrative capacity of the state. Its inability to mobilize, extract or redistribute resources from or to its population has limited its ability to act as

the guarantor of its inhabitants' security. This situation was compounded over time by the state's relentless spiral into conflict. Years of insurgency coupled with short but devastating foreign incursions caused massive movements of refugees and a serious decline in economic productivity, such as with the production of the staple good, rice. Cambodia's economic and political infrastructure crumbled as a result of this migration and the debilitating effects of its internationalized civil war.

The revolution inflicted by Democratic Kampuchea after 1975 greatly exacerbated this condition through, among other things, the eschewal of any institutionalized form of governance in favour of a closed, highly secretive form of rule, the killing or brutal treatment of the Khmer population, the death or flight of most of its educated citizens, the elimination of currency, and the collectivization of agriculture. Some semblance of normalcy returned to the country after Vietnam's December 1978 invasion of Cambodia overthrew the regime of Democratic Kampuchea. However, the efforts of the new regime to build an administrative capacity or provide services to its population were limited by the international support given to its opposition, support that enabled groups that may have otherwise collapsed to continue their struggle against the regime in power. This support wasted valuable resources and countless lives.

These attributes and the clear link between domestic instability and external penetration mark Cambodia as a prototype 'weak state.' The actions taken by the international community to relieve Cambodian insecurity, as outlined in the previous chapter, may help to reduce the weakness of the Cambodian state by removing one of its causes - external penetration. It is the purpose of this chapter to show that it is also possible that the United Nations intervention may serve to alleviate the weakness of the Cambodian state itself by initiating a process that may 'recreate' the Cambodian state.

This chapter argues that the many diverse and complex activities undertaken by UNTAC may be best understood as a state-building enterprise. This chapter groups these activities into three areas. The first involves the role of the United Nations in strengthening Cambodian civil society. In this context, the constitutional principles embodied in the Paris Agreements and their importance for relieving some of Cambodia's worst, and long-standing, problems of security will be reviewed. Also included in this section is a discussion of the practical importance of the work of UNTAC's human rights component and the electoral process. The second section addresses the efforts of the international community to reform Cambodia's state apparatus - what Boutros Boutros-Ghali has called "post-conflict

peace-building."¹ The final section discusses the UN's attempt to establish international mechanisms to both monitor and rebuild the future Cambodian state. In essence, it has attempted to build links between Cambodian society and global actors in order to prevent the state's relapse into conflict as well as enhance its long-term stability. It is these efforts that hold the most promise for alleviating the second cause of Cambodian insecurity - the weakness of the state - and as such will be referred to collectively as 'Securing the State.'

STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY

Perhaps the most important long-term impact of the international intervention in Cambodia was to create the constitutional and practical conditions for the formation of a new polity. This effort was two-fold: first, the Paris Agreements committed the Cambodian state to a form of liberal democracy that was to be strongly supportive of human rights and freedoms; second, the UN took elaborate measures to make these ideals a practical reality through its efforts to educate and mobilize the citizens of Cambodia.

The Paris Agreements signed in October 1991 committed the future Cambodian state to a specific form of governance -

¹Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations, 1992), paragraphs 55-59

"liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism." The constitution was to enshrine this system by providing for "periodic and genuine elections," based on "universal and equal suffrage," secret ballot, and the right to "organize and participate in the electoral process."² In addition, because the Comprehensive Settlement Agreement has treaty status under international law, all signatory states have an international obligation to observe and respect the principles of liberal democratic governance within Cambodia.³

The Paris Agreements also committed the four Cambodian parties to a specific type of constitution. The most important provisions of the future constitution relates to the protection of basic human rights. According to the Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, the new constitution would be "the supreme law of the land," and would contain;

a declaration of fundamental rights, including the rights to life, personal liberty, security, freedom of movement, freedom of religion, assembly and association including political parties and trade unions, due process and equality before the law, protection from arbitrary deprivation of property or deprivation of private property without just compensation, and freedom from racial, ethnic, religious or sexual discrimination.⁴

²Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, Annex 5, Principles for a new constitution for Cambodia (S/23177, p. 46)

³Steven R. Ratner, "The Cambodia Settlement Agreements," *The American Journal of International Law* 87, no. 1 (1993): 28

⁴Comprehensive Settlement Agreement, Annex 5, Principles for a new constitution for Cambodia (S/23177, p. 46)

This declaration was to be consistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "and other relevant international instruments."⁵ In order to guarantee these rights, the new constitution provided for the establishment of an independent judiciary. Due to Cambodia's long history of human rights abuses, the enunciation of these principles and the establishment of organs to protect them were deemed essential for the protection of the state's population. According to one international legal analyst, the strong human rights provisions contained in the new constitution and the institution of a liberal-democratic polity "transcend existing international human rights instruments" by establishing "the political foundation of a government able to protect human freedoms."

It should also be noted in this regard that the human rights guarantees provided under the Comprehensive Settlement Agreement are repeated in the Guarantees Agreement, which reiterates Cambodia's pledge to respect basic human rights and freedoms. The Guarantees Agreement commits signatory states "to promote and encourage respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cambodia as embodied in the relevant international instruments in order, in particular, to prevent the

⁵Ibid. As will be discussed below, over the course of the UNTAC mandate, the UN's human rights component submitted to the SNC seven international human rights instruments, all of which it acceded to.

⁶Ratner, "The Cambodia Settlement Agreements," 27

recurrence of human rights abuses."⁷ Clearly, the link between human rights abuses and domestic and regional insecurity was recognized by actors in the international community and meant to be addressed in the agreements ending the Cambodian conflict.

Most important for the development of human rights in Cambodia is that the international recognition of the importance of human rights issues for the future of Cambodian security was matched by an intensive and practical effort to secure these rights on the ground. From its inception, UNTAC gave high priority to two areas: developing and implementing a wide range of programs designed to increase popular and official awareness of human rights issues; and the more immediate effort of creating an environment in which human rights were respected during the transitional phase. Lest these activities be construed as the sole purview of one of UNTAC's components, the Secretary-General's implementation plan held that all UN personnel would be responsible for carrying out human rights activities "as an integral part of their primary duties."⁸ As a result, the size of the human rights component itself was relatively small (31 people), its duties borne by all UN personnel.

⁷Guarantees Agreement, Article 3

⁸Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia, 19 February 1992 (S/23613), p. 5

The efforts of UNTAC in the field of human rights were twofold. One, to be dealt with in the following section, involved introducing the concept of human rights to personnel in the state apparatus and training them to recognize and respect these rights. The area to which UNTAC devoted considerable attention was the creation and dissemination of a mass education program designed to increase the popular awareness and understanding of issues such as basic human rights and freedoms. Although the content of these programs touched on numerous subjects, themes relating to the exercise of rights in an election, the importance of the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the ability to seek legal protection or compensation during UNTAC's mandate were given particular attention.⁹

Creative means were used to impart these messages to a largely illiterate population.¹⁰ Cambodian actors were hired to perform radio and television skits, traditional Cambodian artists and singers held performances in mediums such as theatre and song, television 'mini-dramas' and news programmes were developed, radio interviews and 'spot' messages were released regularly, video tapes were prepared for the country's widely attended video parlours, and

⁹Ibid., pp. 3-4

¹⁰A comprehensive discussion of the work of UNTAC's human rights component is given in the Commission on Human Rights, "Report of the Secretary-General: Situation in Cambodia," 14 January 1993 (E/CN.4/1993/19), pp. 1-18

hundreds of thousands of cartoons, leaflets and posters were printed and distributed. A Khmer translation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was also widely distributed, as were each of the other major international human rights instruments (although the latter were printed in lesser quantities - approximately 10,000 - and more specifically targeted to schools, universities, organizations and professional groups).

These activities helped raise popular awareness of human rights issues and mobilize large portions of the population into the political arena. One indication of how mobilized Cambodian society has become is the existence of indigenous non-governmental human rights groups. Prior to UNTAC's arrival, no human rights groups existed in Cambodia. During UNTAC's mandate, four human rights NGOs formed with a combined membership of approximately 50,000. UNTAC encouraged these groups by providing administrative grants, funding for publications, access to human rights materials, the provision of facilities and the opening of a human rights resource centre. (It should also be noted that UNTAC provided physical protection for these groups as well, often guarding their offices or freeing their members from jail.) The number of Cambodian human rights NGOs now stands at 26 with a total membership of approximately 200,000.¹¹ As a result of UNTAC's crucial intervention and the continued

¹¹Interview 9, New York

work of these NGOs, Cambodian society has been, and continues to be, widely exposed to the philosophy of human rights.

The mobilization of the population can also be measured in the revival of an independent media. Prior to the UN intervention, some forms of dissent were permitted, particularly in the Communist party's newspaper, the *Pracheachun*. However, critics of the regime walked a dangerous and unpredictable line in their criticisms.¹² Over the course of the UNTAC mission, the newspaper lost its state funding and sole claim to readership as numerous indigenous papers began printing without censorship, including two english language papers.¹³ UNTAC supported this revival by releasing liberal media guidelines in October 1992 and encouraging the establishment of the Cambodian Media Association. During UNTAC's intervention, Cambodian journalists became increasingly critical in their reporting and now openly criticize the new government.

The fact that UNTAC's civic education programme was conducted in conjunction, and often in close association, with its electoral education campaign may have had an important effect on how Cambodians view political

¹²One example of the dangerous line that dissidents tread was the jailing of over three dozen academics and journalists in June 1990 for their criticisms of the regime and pro-democracy activities. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Cambodia in 1990: The Elusive Peace," *Asian Survey* 31, no. 1 (1991): 95

¹³"Long out of print," FEER, 16 April 1992, pp. 38-39; Michael Vatikiotis, "Cambodia's new war of words," FEER, 23 July 1992, pp. 8-9

participation and political rights. Because in their civil education programmes one of UNTAC's consistent themes was the existence of rights in an election, the popular perception in Cambodia may be that human rights and the holding of elections are synonymous. Certainly, elements of this belief were embodied in the Paris Agreements.¹⁴ It would not be unusual, therefore, to expect that UNTAC's human rights and electoral components imparted this message through their work, particularly since many human rights professionals - whether those working under the direct auspices of UNTAC or in close association, as were some human rights INGOs - personally subscribe to this belief.¹⁵ If this is the case, then the popular perception of elections may not be solely as a means to transfer power, but also as a means to secure basic human rights. The idea is that the ability to choose one's destiny, to control one's life, is embodied in the symbolic act of voting.¹⁶ Therefore, the deprivation of this right would be as serious a human rights violation as impinging those outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Such a philosophy

¹⁴See Ratner's comments, fn. 6

¹⁵Interview 4, Ottawa

¹⁶A number of human rights groups also believe that election monitoring and NGO involvement in the electoral process empowers communities and augments NGO training in human rights areas. See the discussion in Commission on Human Rights, "Report of the International Symposium on Human Rights in Cambodia," 14 January 1993 (E/CN.4/1993/19/Add.1), esp. p. 11. More generally see Gerald J. Schmitz and David Gillies, *The challenge of democratic development: sustaining democratization in developing societies* (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1992)

puts strong pressure on governments to hold elections in order to secure their legitimacy.¹⁷

Regardless of whether this proves to be true, UNTAC's electoral campaign did have the effect of mobilizing the majority of Cambodia's adult population into the political process. This effort was in accord with UNTAC's implementation plan, the objective of which was "to facilitate the broadest possible participation of Cambodians in the election of their representatives."¹⁸ Between October 1992 and January 1993, UNTAC's electoral workers registered approximately 4.7 million voters throughout Cambodia. In the process, and in efforts continuing up until the election itself, these voters were exposed to an elaborate civic education programme that emphasized not only the technical aspects of electoral participation, but the merits of democratic elections in forming a new government and the importance of the process to ending the war within the state.¹⁹

Significant emphasis was placed in these programmes on electoral procedures, from initial registration, through the campaign phase, to the final act of polling. As well, UNTAC consistently stressed the secrecy of the ballot in the

¹⁷See also Thomas M. Franck, "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance," *The American Journal of International Law* 86, no. 4 (1992): 46-91

¹⁸Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia, 19 February 1992 (S/23613), p. 6

¹⁹Interview 5, New York

elections, an assurance that had to be repeated throughout the campaign due to several parties' harassing voters (particularly the Khmer Rouge and the SOC). These measures paid off handsomely as Cambodians participated in hundreds of peaceful political rallies during the campaign phase of the election and, contrary to most expectations, defied the attempts of the SOC and the Khmer Rouge to undermine the election by coming out in large numbers to vote (of the over 4.7 million voters registered for the election, more than 4.2 million voted, raising the participation rate to nearly 90 per cent).²⁰

The legacy of the UNTAC mission goes beyond the important work done in exposing Cambodia's population to norms of liberal democracy and mobilizing it into the political process. The UN election was organized and conducted in a technically scrupulous manner, and the laws and regulations imposed by UNTAC to govern the electoral process were equivalent to those of any established liberal democracy (these laws were retained by the new Cambodian government). This was the first time in Cambodian history that elections were held in such a manner and sets a high standard by which future elections may be judged.

Furthermore, UNTAC consciously attempted to establish the administrative and technical groundwork for the repetition

²⁰See Report of the Secretary-General on the Conduct and Results of the Elections in Cambodia, 10 June 1993 (S/25913), p. 2

of such elections.²¹ Beginning with its Advanced Electoral Planning Unit, the UN conducted significant research on Cambodia's demographic and social situation, producing a voluminous document that details the characteristics of even very small villages and communes. In a country where there is a severe lack of technically qualified people to conduct these tasks, these efforts should not be under-emphasized: the state now has access to a source of reputable data which it could not have otherwise collected.

In terms of developing the qualified human resources necessary to conduct a democratic election, the UN's intervention may also prove crucial. Through the course of its work, UNTAC's electoral component made a deliberate effort to include as many Cambodians as possible, eventually employing and training over 56,000 Cambodians in electoral procedures - from the rudimentary tasks of clerical work to the more elaborate duties of "election management."'' It also held a variety of well-attended seminars for representatives from each of the twenty registered political parties, providing them with information on the organization and conduct of electoral campaigns in a democratic

²¹As Ron Gould, Canadian electoral expert and leader of the UN's Advanced Electoral Unit, said in a media interview in 1991, "We want to create an election system where Cambodians can pick it up and use it rather than create a vacuum when we pull out." Sheri Prasso, "UN Experts' Preparations for Elections Reported," Hong Kong in English, AFP (29 October 1991), in FBIS EAS, 29 October 1991, p. 38

²²Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia, 19 February 1992 (S/23613), p. 7

environment.²³ As a result of UNTAC's intervention, significant numbers of Cambodians have obtained the training and knowledge necessary to organize and conduct legitimate nation-wide elections.

REFORMING STATE APPARATUS

Aside from its efforts to strengthen Cambodian civil society, much of UNTAC's considerable resources were devoted to the oversight and training of the apparatus of the Cambodian state. As outlined in chapter three, the administrative oversight carried on by UNTAC's civil administration and police components was related mostly to the creation of a neutral political environment as called for by the Paris Agreements. In practice, these efforts amounted to partially successful attempts to prevent the CPP from using its control of state resources and institutions to gain political advantage.

However, another important aspect of administrative oversight was to ensure that state officials abided by human rights norms in their dealings with the Cambodian population. Codes of conduct were drawn up and distributed to relevant state institutions and UN personnel encouraged and cajoled their Cambodian counterparts to observe them.

²³One of these proved unexpectedly popular, drawing over 800 participants - a response rate dubbed "overwhelming" by UN electoral workers. See *Free Choice: Electoral Component Newsletter*, Issue 5 (9 October 1992)

These efforts were particularly important for the UN's civilian police component, which was to supervise the conduct of the SOC's 47,000 strong police force. As in most states, the nation's police force has the day-to-day responsibility of maintaining order in the country's populated areas. Such a position carries with it high potential for abuse, since the police have 'legitimate' powers of arrest and detention.

This situation was particularly onerous in Cambodia, where the judiciary was very weak and the recognition of defenders' rights non-existent. In order to reduce the potential for abuse, the UN provided for the close oversight and supervision of SOC police forces. UNTAC's civil police component was charged with making Cambodian police forces familiar with the "concept of human rights and fundamental freedoms" through, among other things, the creation of administrative provisions and the implementation of specific codes of conduct.²⁴ (Other measures taken by the UN in the realm of public security will be elaborated below.) As it turned out, intentions were not met by reality and UNTAC's penetration of the SOC's police apparatus was the weakest of all areas.²⁵ Nonetheless, some progress was made in

²⁴Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia, 19 February 1992 (S/23613), pp. 28-32

²⁵Interview 8, New York

altering the behavior of the state's police forces and official human rights abuses were curtailed.

A more successful example of UN efforts to increase official recognition of and respect for international norms of human rights relates to UNTAC's review and reform of Cambodia's prison system. Beginning in June 1992, UN human rights officers began visiting prisons throughout the territory controlled by SOC. The generally poor conditions witnessed in these institutions prompted the UN to initiate reforms. At UNTAC's insistence, the SOC took specific measures to improve prison conditions. SOC also established a Prison Control Commission to address UN concerns. In addition, the UN secured the release of hundreds of prisoners detained without cause (many of whom were political prisoners), and encouraged SOC to charge and try those held for reasons of public safety.⁶ The importance of these reforms lay in the fact that they were directed at strengthening the state's recognition of human rights norms, thereby increasing the state's value as a guarantor of its citizens' security, rather than its chief antagonist.

However, the value that these actions may have over the long-term is questionable. While UN personnel were in Cambodia, the three parties abiding by the Paris Agreements

⁶See Commission on Human Rights, "Situation in Cambodia," 14 January 1993 (E/CN.4/1993/19), pp. 5-6. One example was a programme initiated by UNTAC in the latter half of its mandate to bring uncharged prisoners before SOC courts. See Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 3 May 1993 (S/25719), p. 15

were constrained in their official behavior by the actions and presence of the various UN components. UN personnel did not (and probably could not) prevent the various parties from using violence or the power flowing from their control of their administrative apparatuses, but they mitigated it. If the codes of conduct and administrative provisions implemented by the UN during their presence does cause a lasting change in the behavior of state officials or sparks a process of incremental reform, then this is a beneficial development for the state of Cambodia for it will increase the security of its citizens. But there is no guarantee of it - state officials may be just as likely to return to their former ways. On the other hand, it is probably unfair to expect more than transient effects from these efforts, since they represented, in the first instance, practical measures to improve Cambodia's political environment through the transitional phase.

Holding more potential for the long-term strengthening of the Cambodian state are the UN's efforts to rehabilitate the state's legal and judicial system. As outlined in chapter two, respect and provision for due legal process was never strong in Cambodia, collapsed altogether under the rule of the Khmer Rouge, and was only partially resuscitated thereafter. As the UN's Commission on Human Rights noted in their report on Cambodia, as late as 1990, there were many areas of Cambodia that constituted a legal 'vacuum,' a

situation that led to the state's usurping of power.²⁷

Thus, UN efforts in this area were of particular value.

One of the most important efforts to reform Cambodia's legal and judicial system was the UN's review of Cambodian law. Undertaken by UNTAC's Civil Administration and Human Rights components to ensure that Cambodian law was consistent with the objectives and purposes of the Paris Agreements and to the two human rights instruments acceded to by the SNC, this program led to the development of an elaborate 'interim' penal code.²⁸ In addition to defining a number of crimes and misdemeanours, and their related punishments, these transitional provisions deal with a wide range of issues, such as the rule of law, official abuse of power, and the rights of defendants. They also provide for the creation of an independent judiciary under UNTAC supervision and outline "procedures for arrest and detention."²⁹ Upon acceptance by the SNC on 10 September 1992, these provisions nullified existing Cambodian laws.

²⁷Commission on Human Rights, "Situation in Cambodia," 14 January 1993 (E/CN.4/1993/19), p. 8

²⁸The fact that these provisions, referred officially to as 'Provisions relating to the Judiciary and Criminal Law and Procedure Applicable in Cambodia during the Transitional Period,' were so elaborate proved to be a point of contention within UNTAC. The Human Rights component criticized the Civil Administration component, responsible for drawing up the code, that too much time was spent on drawing up legal instruments that could neither be enforced nor understood. The former favoured simpler, more quickly implemented provisions so that UNTAC could turn its attention to the task of actually improving the security condition in Cambodia. However, the latter persevered with their work and the resulting code is today part of Cambodia's legal system.

²⁹Commission on Human Rights, "Situation in Cambodia," 14 January 1993 (E/CN.4/1993/19), p. 9

creating a single consistent legal code within the state.³⁰ Most importantly, these provisions were retained when the new Cambodian government took power in September 1993.

In order to increase the implementation of these codes, UNTAC initiated extensive training programmes aimed at police, judges, prosecutors and defenders. Emphasis was placed in these courses on the importance of due process, recognizing the rights of the accused and establishing procedures to ensure the neutral conduct of state officials. In general, these programs were intended to lay the groundwork for the development of an independent judiciary, an effort deemed essential by the United Nations Human Rights Commission to ensure the protection of the Cambodian population.³¹ Begun in late 1992, these courses continued until the end of UNTAC's mandate and were given high priority in the run-up to the election and the post-electoral phase. By the end of 1992, over 60 defenders and approximately 200 magistrates and police had been trained in the new codes,³² and hundreds more were trained in the new year.³³

³⁰Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 783 (1992), 15 November 1992 (S/24800), p. 3

³¹Commission on Human Rights, "Situation in Cambodia," 14 January 1993 (E/CN.4/1993/19), p. 2

³²Ibid., p. 9

³³Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 3 May 1993 (S/25719), p. 15

This specifically targeted training augmented UNTAC's already widespread efforts in other areas. In the area of human rights, UNTAC devised a number of educational instruments and conducted "hundreds" of seminars for state personnel, particularly for justice officials and the police.³⁴ Human rights materials were also introduced into the curriculum of primary and secondary schools, and UNTAC personnel trained teachers in their use and presentation. This was also the case for Cambodia's university, where weekly courses were created in the faculties of law and medicine. Lecture series on human rights issues were held in other faculties and institutes of higher learning, and human rights materials were introduced more formally into the curriculum of "specialized courses," such as journalism.³⁵

As the election grew near, UNTAC accelerated these training efforts. In the period from February to May 1993, the UN's human rights component concentrated its efforts on training teachers, health care professionals, state officials and indigenous human rights groups.³⁶ Week long courses were held in twelve provinces and were attended by

³⁴By 10 January 1993, 6100 state officials and related professionals (such as lawyers and doctors) had attended UNTAC sponsored training programmes. See Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 25 January 1993 (S/25124)

³⁵Commission on Human Rights, "Situation in Cambodia," 14 January 1993 (E/CN.4/1993/19), p. 7

³⁶Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 3 May 1993 (S/25719)

justice officials, teacher trainees, political party officials and indigenous NGOs. Cambodian teacher training colleges in two cities were also targeted by UNTAC for courses on human rights. At the provincial level, human rights officers conducted courses "addressed to commune leaders, district electoral supervisors, teachers, women's associations, monks, soldiers, police, political parties and human rights associations."³⁷ These course were said to have reached "thousands" of individuals. UNTAC continued its efforts following the election and the creation of an interim Cambodia government, conducting "(e)xtensive training for the police and the judiciary..."³⁸ As will be shown in the following section, these initiatives did not end entirely with UNTAC's withdrawal.

After describing the above initiatives, it should be emphasized that human rights was not the sole emphasis of UNTAC's training efforts. Considerable effort was also devoted to training Cambodian officials in the conduct of normal state activities. As described in UNTAC's implementation plan, one of three areas deemed essential for UN attention was the "Essential restoration, maintenance and support of basic infrastructure, institutions, utilities and other essential services...as well as training related to

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Resolution 840 (1993), 16 July 1993 (S/26090), p. 4

the efficient operation of the various sectors."³⁹ Thus, as part of their regular duties, UNTAC personnel were included in plans to improve the functional capacity of the Cambodian state.

Improving the state's capacity in various realms was accomplished in part by the creation and dissemination of new codes of conduct. Although these were also created to establish UN control over the parties' administrative apparatuses, they served the dual function of outlining and elaborating procedures for running state services. More intensive training efforts were made in the fields of justice (in addition to human rights related training), finance, economic management and customs.⁴⁰ In the latter three areas, efforts were directed by UNTAC's rehabilitation and finance components through the holding of "seminars and training programmes in priority areas of public sector management and civil service reform, investment planning and natural resource development."⁴¹

Considerable effort was also devoted to the creation of a professional Cambodian police force. Over the course of its mandate, UNTAC's civilian police component "conducted courses in basic training, operational training, traffic

³⁹Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia, 19 February 1992 (S/23613), p. 37

⁴⁰Interview 2, New York

⁴¹Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 3 May 1993 (S/25719), p. 21

control, human rights, criminal law, criminal investigation, the roles of UNTAC and the Civilian Police Component, crime prevention, demonstration and riot control and the code of conduct." Over 2,000 officers from SOC and more than 450 from the other three factions (including 28 from the Khmer Rouge) graduated from these programs.⁴⁷

These activities, referred to by UNTAC as "institutional capacity-building," correspond with activities carried on by the UN's specialized agencies, particularly in the development sector. Both the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNICEF seized the opportunity offered by UNTAC's presence to greatly increase their activities in Cambodia. For its part, the UNDP directed its attention in the transitional period to two areas closely related to increasing the functional capacity of the state. These were, first, the provision of "technical cooperation for national capacity-building in the delivery of essential public services inherent to any administration" and, second, "to help establish and enhance internal capacity to coordinate, absorb and effectively use the considerable amount of external assistance expected to flow from multiple channels, multilateral as well as bilateral." Recognizing that Cambodia had never recovered from the loss of most of its educated and trained people under the rule of the Khmer Rouge, the UNDP used these strategies to develop the state's

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 19

human resources through "in-country training courses as well as on-the-job training."⁴³ UNICEF used its funds to establish community development projects, local cooperatives and small-scale production. Part of this work involves "social mobilization and advocacy" - efforts to "emphasize more popular involvement, participation and responsibility" in the development process.⁴⁴

Other activities, directed more toward improving the country's physical infrastructure (such as the provision of safe drinking water, health care, agricultural equipment), were conducted under the auspices of these agencies and were designed to address immediate needs. They complimented the development tasks of UNTAC's rehabilitation and reconstruction component and the work carried on by the UN's military engineers. Roads were built or repaved, ports and airports were repaired, bridges were built or reconstructed, wells dug, water purification facilities designed and constructed, communications facilities upgraded, and numerous tasks undertaken to (re)establish the normal functioning of state utilities.

As well, UNTAC's military component cleared large areas of the Cambodian countryside of mines and expanded the mine awareness and disposal programs initiated by UNAMIC. The UN

⁴³Country and intercountry programmes and projects: Assistance to Cambodia: Note by the Administrator, 24 March 1992 (DP/1992/56), p. 2, 4

⁴⁴UNICEF, Country Programme Recommendation: Cambodia, 13 April 1992 (E/ICEF/1992/P/L.19), p. 8

also established ties to NGOs working in the area of mine-clearance, created the Cambodian Mine Action Centre for training, and provided specialized funds to support work in this area.⁴⁵ For a state so dependent on agriculture (approximately 80 percent of the population works in the agricultural sector), these efforts are essential for securing the long-term economic viability of the country.

Carrying on this work to rebuild the Cambodian state is a costly proposition. In the Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia contained in the Paris Agreements, the importance of first rehabilitating crucial sectors of the Cambodian state (singled out are "food security, health, housing, training, education, the transport network and the restoration of Cambodia's existing basic infrastructure and public utilities") and then providing long-term development assistance is recognized.⁴⁶ The UN estimated that US \$600 million would be necessary for rehabilitation and reconstruction tasks over the years 1992-1994 and an appeal was made for this amount by the UN Secretary-General in April 1992.⁴⁷

Within several months, the international community, led by Japan, responded, pledging US \$880 million at the

⁴⁵Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 25 January 1993 (S/25124), p. 16

⁴⁶Declaration (S/23177, p. 56)

⁴⁷Mya Than, "Rehabilitation and Economic Reconstruction in Cambodia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 14, no. 3 (1992): 274

Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia held in Tokyo on 20 and 22 June 1992. In the declaration issued at the end of the conference, the participating parties stated that,

We recognize that Cambodia suffers from the devastation of a 20-year-long war, which resulted in the destruction of its basic infrastructure, deterioration of living standards, lack of human resources and a serious fiscal deficit. In order to undertake full-scale rehabilitation and reconstruction which would bring about economic and social stability in Cambodia, external assistance, both technical and financial, is indispensable.⁴⁸

Despite the fact that many contributing states were extremely hesitant to deliver the promised aid, these pledges do represent a strong commitment by the international community to the long-term stability of the Cambodian state.⁴⁹

FUTURE INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

Importantly, the commitments made at the Tokyo Conference, and the many international peace conferences

⁴⁸Letter dated 24 June 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 25 June 1992 (S/24183), Annex II, Tokyo Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia.

⁴⁹It should be noted, however, that when questioned about the commitment of the international community to the Cambodian peace process, some UN observers cited the slow dispersal of pledged aid as a potential indication of declining international interest in the UNTAC mission. This suggestion has some basis in fact, since by mid-August 1993 - nearly 14 months after the Tokyo conference - only US \$200 million of pledged aid had been disbursed, despite the fact that nearly all of the \$880 million had been approved by the SNC for various projects. However, this situation is probably accounted for by the unsure outcome of the mission itself. Once contributing states were assured of the stability of the new Cambodian government, they were less reluctant to provide their pledged funds.

dealing with Cambodia, to fostering the development and security of the Cambodian state do not cease with the end of the UNTAC mandate or after the initial two year development period emphasized by UN agencies. On the contrary, a number of measures were taken and mechanisms established over the course of the UNTAC mission that seek to prevent Cambodia's slide back into conflict. Collectively, these measures represent a form of global intervention designed to foster the strength of the Cambodian state while checking its potentially abusive power.

One of the most important mechanisms to maintain international interest in the future of Cambodia's economic development is the International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC), created at the Tokyo Conference in June 1992. According to its mandate, ICORC is a "long-term consultative body" that is to help coordinate international aid designed to promote "the reconstruction of Cambodia."⁵⁰ Chaired by Japan and convened at least once a year in either Paris or Tokyo, ICORC provides a forum for the Cambodian government to interact with international donors in order to plan its future development requirements. Like the efforts of the UN specialized agencies to develop Cambodia's human resources, ICORC's mandate seeks to develop within Cambodia "an institutional economic and social

⁵⁰Tokyo Declaration on the Reconstruction of Cambodia, Appendix, Framework of the International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (S/24183, p. 7)

planning and aid-management capacity necessary for the successful implementation of the reconstruction programme."

After its establishment in June 1992, preparations for its first meeting were begun in February 1993 at an aid-donor conference held in Phnom Penh. (This meeting was held to promote the disbursement of funds pledged at the previous year's Tokyo conference, reminded donors of their commitments and led to a declaration reconfirming those commitments.)⁵¹ These arrangements allowed ICORC to hold its first meeting on 8-9 September 1993 in Paris to discuss a number of matters, including "budgetary support, public administration reform, mine clearance, resettlement and reintegration of displaced persons, agriculture, social services including health care and education, maintenance of public utilities and repair of the transportation system and infrastructure."⁵² These discussions were followed by ICORC's second major conference in Tokyo in March of 1994. There, international aid donors pledged US \$773 million to the coalition government of Hun Sen and Norodom Ranariddh for the years 1994 - 1995.⁵³ Such continued interest in

⁵¹Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council 792 (1992), 13 February 1993 (S/25289), p.8

⁵²Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Resolution 840 (1993), 26 August 1993 (S/26360)

⁵³"Aid meeting pledges US \$ 773 million," *China Post* (Taipei), 12 March 1992, p. 14; Sheila McNulty, "Aid called best weapon," *China Post* (Taipei), 14 March 1994, p. 14

Cambodia's long-term economic development bodes well for its future stability.

In addition to securing international interest in Cambodian economic development, the UN took a number of measures to check the power of the Cambodian state. Most of these are aimed at preventing the recurrence of human rights abuses and were carried out during the UNTAC mission by the human rights component. At the start of its mission, the UN recognized that the laws currently existing in Cambodia were an inadequate basis upon which to promote human rights. Rather than attempt to improve upon these rights, UNTAC decided to start anew.⁵⁴

The first step in this process was presenting the SNC with the various international human rights instruments so that it may accede to them. Doing so provided UNTAC with a basis upon which to formulate the interim penal code, as well as more generally promote human rights within the state. On 20 April 1992, the SNC was presented with and acceded to the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. On 10 September 1992, it acceded to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention and Protocol

⁵⁴Interview 9, New York

relating to the Status of Refugees.⁵⁵ These instruments thus served as a basis for Cambodian domestic law and gave the international community a means to judge the future conduct of the Cambodian state.

The latter efforts will be aided by a number of permanent missions established in Cambodia to help monitor the state's recognition of human rights principles. The first of these was the appointment of a Special Representative, appointed by the UN Human Rights commission in its February 1993 session after strong lobbying efforts by the UNTAC human rights component. The mandate of the Representative is to "maintain contact with the Government and people of Cambodia; Guide and coordinate the United Nations human rights presence in Cambodia; [and] Assist the Government in the promotion and protection of human rights."⁵⁶ The Representative will annually report his/her finding to the UN Commission on Human Rights and the UN General Assembly.

In the same vein, the UN Commission on Human Rights agreed to establish a permanent Centre for Human Rights in Cambodia. The Centre for Human Rights was charged with the following activities;

Manage the implementation of educational and technical assistance and advisory services programmes and to ensure their continuation; Assist the government of

⁵⁵Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNTAC, 21 September 1992 (S/24578), p. 3

⁵⁶This mandate is given in the draft resolution of the Commission on Human Rights, "1993/...Situation of human rights in Cambodia," 17 February 1993 (E/CN.4/1993/L.15), p. 3, which was subsequently adopted.

Cambodia established after the election, at its request, in meeting its obligations under the human rights instruments recently acceded to, including the preparation of reports to the relevant monitoring committees; Provide support to bona fide human rights groups in Cambodia; Contribute to the creation and/or strengthening of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights; Continue to assist with the drafting and implementation of legislation to promote and protect human rights; Continue to assist with the training of persons responsible for the administration of justice."

After extensive preparations by UNTAC's human rights component, the Centre became operational on 1 September 1993 and will be expanding its size in 1994.

Two short to medium-term mechanisms established by the UN complement the longer-term focus of ICORC, the Special Rapporteur and the Centre for Human Rights in Cambodia. The first of these is the establishment of a military liaison office in Phnom Penh "for a single period of six months" - from 1 November 1993 to 31 April 1994."⁸ This team is to confer with the new government of Cambodia on matters of security of the state, as well as assist it "in dealing with residual military matters related to the Paris Agreements." The rationale behind this team is to build confidence throughout the state, provide the Secretary-General with

⁸Ibid.

⁹Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Resolution 840 (1993), 27 October 1993 (S/26649). Regarding the team's limited deployment, officials interviewed in the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations in New York noted that the length of the deployment would probably be extended.

first-hand information on events in Cambodia, and to act as a "token" UN presence in the state.⁵⁹

The second mechanism is the UN interim office in Cambodia. Expanding on an idea first implemented in the states of the former USSR, the interim office was created by the Secretary-General to coordinate the various aid and development projects undertaken by the UN and its specialized agencies. One was established in Cambodia as "an instrument of post-conflict peace-building," its activities covering areas other than development, including those that "foster respect for human rights in Cambodia."⁶⁰ The interim office will also act as a "channel of communication" between the government of Cambodia and the UN Secretary-General and provide information for the compilation of UN reports.⁶¹ The UN military liaison team and the interim office represent the practical side of UN monitoring and assistance operations in Cambodia.

⁵⁹The former two are the official reasons behind the team's deployment, the latter was suggested to the author by a UN official working in the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations. Interview 7, New York

⁶⁰Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Resolution 840 (1993), 16 July 1993 (S/26090), p. 8; Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Resolution 840 (1993), 26 August 1993 (S/26360), p. 7

⁶¹The reasoning behind UN interim offices and their suggested functions are outlined in Report of the Secretary-General: United Nations Interim Offices, 20 July 1993 (A/48/146/Add.1). It should be noted that the label 'interim' does not suggest transience, but is a reflection of the idea's "experimental nature" and the lack of funds in existing UN budgets. Should the idea prove successful, the offices will likely be renamed "United Nations integrated offices." Ibid., p. 3, 8

The commitments of the UN to monitor the Cambodian state supplement the efforts of other global actors. Of particular importance are international human rights NGOs. During the UNTAC mandate, a number of human rights INGOs established links with Cambodian human rights groups in order to build ties of solidarity and protection. These working relationships act as a conduit for moral, technical and financial support. They also allow Cambodian NCOs access to the media connections of the INGOs. The international publicity that INGOs can muster on behalf of Cambodian organizations could prove to be an essential form of protection. Abuses by the Cambodian government in general, or those directed specifically at these groups, would be reported globally. More importantly, INGOs have had good success in the past mobilizing opposition to regimes that perpetrate human rights abuses. For the state of Cambodia, known popularly for its history of 'the killing fields' and already monitored by a number of specialized UN bodies, this pressure could prove difficult to resist.

Although the links between human rights groups that act globally and those that act within Cambodia may have formed anyway, UNTAC can take credit for initiating early and widespread contacts amongst them. The mission's human rights component organized a human rights symposium in Phnom Penh on 30 November to 2 December 1992. Its goal was "to bring together national, regional and international human

rights bodies to build a foundation for the protection and promotion of human rights, particularly following elections and UNTAC's withdrawal from Cambodia."⁶² It succeeded in establishing ties of solidarity and assistance among national and international human rights NGOs. It also led to offers of assistance from international NGOs for aid in the areas of monitoring and training, with particular reference to Cambodia's judicial system. Another symposium was held in July 1993 to build and maintain these ties and offers of assistance, particularly among regional human rights NGOs. In this fashion, the UN recognized the importance and influence of global, non-governmental actors, and incorporated them into its efforts to rebuild Cambodian civil society. The ties established at these symposiums act as a further check on the abusive potential of the state of Cambodia.

These efforts at monitoring the Cambodian state will be important in the future. Given that Cambodia depends so heavily on external assistance for its development, the existence of these instruments gives the international community strong leverage to make Cambodia comply with its international commitments, embodied repeatedly in the various Paris Agreements and in the acceded to human rights instruments. This leverage provides at least some assurance

⁶²Report of the International Symposium on Human Rights in Cambodia, 14 January 1993 (E/CN.4/1993/Add.1), p. 1

that the Cambodian state will not return to the practices of its past and may continue its evolution toward a liberal-democratic polity. This may be the best hope for the state to begin acting as the guarantor of its peoples' security and not its chief antagonist.

RECREATING THE CAMBODIAN STATE?

Does the UNTAC mission represent a case of 'State-building?' The purpose of this chapter is to argue that this is indeed the case. The intentions of the world community went beyond ending an internationalized civil war through the establishment of a new government. Rather, it sought to change the nature of Cambodia's polity, to form a new state based on popular sovereignty. The agreements upon which UNTAC was based called for the founding of a specific form of government, liberal democracy. Under this form, the popular will of the Khmer people takes priority in the formation of future governments. UNTAC took elaborate, practical measures to ensure that the population understood their role in this process and could act accordingly. UN civic education programmes emphasized both the technical aspects of elections and their value as a means of expressing popular will. These efforts mobilized the population into the political arena and fostered the expectation and technical ability for the future conduct of elections.

This popular view of sovereignty is also indicated by the fact that the future Cambodian state was to be based upon the recognition of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. UNTAC took substantial practical efforts to raise awareness of these issues among the Khmer population and encouraged the growth of institutions within society that could act to guard these rights, such as indigenous human rights NGOs and an independent media. These efforts were intended to lay the popular basis of democracy within Cambodia.

However, the building of democratic institutions cannot be isolated to institutions of civil society. Rather, the establishment of a democracy requires a particular type of state, one where participation is fundamental to its existence. As a consequence, the state as a whole must respect basic human rights and freedoms, and parts of the state, particularly the judiciary and police, must actively promote and protect those rights and freedoms. This is where the UN's efforts in training state personnel and reforming state apparatus come to the fore. Over the course of its stay, UNTAC attempted to lay the foundations of a democratic state constitutionally and practically by, for instance, pressuring Cambodia to accede to seven international human rights instruments, creating a new legal code based on these instruments, and by fostering an independent judiciary and a professional police force.

Thus, not only did the UN help create and strengthen a civil society that could check the centralizing power of the state, but it also attempted to establish within the state respect for the role of civil society by encouraging respect for human rights and freedoms. These efforts seek to link the mobilization occurring in the population to outcomes in the state: to make the idea of popular sovereignty a reality.

It should be recognized, however, that the sovereignty resulting from the UN's intervention was tempered in the first instance by the planned penetration of a number of global actors. The first indication of this penetration is the monitoring function given to the states party to the Paris Agreements. As part of the Guarantees Agreement, Cambodia pledged to respect a number of human rights and, in turn, signatory states pledged to "promote and encourage" these rights in order to "prevent the recurrence of human rights abuses."⁶³

⁶³The full text of Article 3 of the Guarantees Agreement reads as follows: 1. All persons in Cambodia shall enjoy the rights and freedoms embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international human rights instruments. 2. To this end, (a) Cambodia undertakes: to ensure respect for and observance of human rights and freedoms in Cambodia; to support the right of all Cambodian citizens to undertake activities that would promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms; to take effective measures to ensure that the policies and practices of the past shall never be allowed to return; to adhere to relevant international human rights instruments; (b) The other parties to this Agreement undertake to promote and encourage respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cambodia as embodied in the relevant international instruments in order, in particular, to prevent the recurrence of human rights abuses.

Should Cambodia renege on their promises, the Guarantees Agreement contains a number of general provisions that states could take to ensure respect for the treaty. It also contains a specific provision in the case of "serious violations of human rights in Cambodia" where signatory states "will call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such other steps as are appropriate for the prevention and suppression of such violations in accordance with the relevant international instruments."⁶⁴ As Steven Ratner, Attorney-Advisor to the American Department of State and participant in the Paris negotiations, notes, this separate provision "was included to underscore the international community's continued anxiety about human rights in Cambodia and its resolve (or at least hope) to react forcefully in case of renewed atrocities by the Khmer Rouge (or others)." Although the provision does not require that signatory states do more than bring the matter to the attention of the UN, Ratner argues that "it does compel them to take *some* action..."⁶⁵

Other 'penetrations' that act as a check on the abusive power of the Cambodian state include the appointment of the Special Representative, the establishment of the Centre for Human Rights in Cambodia, and the links forged among indigenous NGOs and those operating on a regional and global

⁶⁴Guarantees Agreement, Article 5

⁶⁵Ratner, "The Cambodia Settlement Agreements," 37. Original italics.

scale. Each of these 'penetrations' forge supportive links between organizations in Cambodian society and external actors and, through the provision of this support, nurture democracy from below. They also represent the practical efforts of the global community to monitor the behavior of the Cambodian state. In this sense, they represent an external check on the internal power of the Cambodia state, a check that helps to secure the growth of popular sovereignty.

Those are the efforts undertaken by the global community, mostly in the political realm, to recreating the Cambodian state. Also of importance are the many efforts to rebuild the physical foundations of the Cambodian state. On a practical level, these efforts were initiated by the many development NGOs and a select few UN specialized agencies over the course of the 1980s. With the formation of UNTAC, these efforts accelerated greatly. The mission's various components, particularly the military and rehabilitation components, conducted work in a variety of areas, re-establishing necessary utilities and improving the state's infrastructure. In addition, international organizations and international donors committed substantial sums to Cambodia's economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. The global commitment to Cambodia's economic development has a high probability of being sustained with the creation and operation of ICORC, a body

amount of aid could have saved this regime and American largesse probably only prolonged its demise by a few years.

The PRK was also unable to sustain itself without substantial financial assistance from allies. Although the Cambodian economy recovered substantially under its rule, particularly after the enactment of liberal policies in the late 1980s, the PRK was unable to benefit from the resulting growth due to poorly developed government infrastructure.⁸³ As a result, it depended on foreign aid for up to 80 per cent of its national budget. This inability to extract resources from the population and dependence on foreign states for substantial amounts of financial assistance severely reduced the CPK's ability to defend itself when Vietnam began to withdraw its troops and the Soviet bloc ended its aid. It was unable to sustain the military forces necessary to prevent the resistance from taking control of more territory or operating with greater impunity.⁸⁴ These conditions limited the options of the CPK to continuing the fight against its opponents alone or to agree to the terms of a UN sponsored peace plan. Either way, the survival of the regime was at stake.

⁸³As Frost notes, "a major problem for the government has been that it pursued economic liberalization without having the administrative capacity to manage the resulting private growth of wealth, or to be able to gain much financial benefit from this through taxation." Frost, "The Cambodian Conflict," 125

⁸⁴Thayer, "Cambodia: Misperceptions and Peace," 179-181

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NBS 1010a ANSI/ISO #2 EQUIVALENT

that attempts to serve two functions: attracting aid for the state of Cambodia and providing technical assistance to the state to improve its functional capacity. In essence, ICORC represents the commitment of the international community to rebuild Cambodia's economic, political and social foundations.

CONCLUSION: SECURING THE STATE?

Will the UN's intervention, one result of which may be, as I have argued, the formation of a 'new' type of state, increase the security of Cambodia in the long-term? The previous chapter suggested that the efforts of the international community to reconcile the domestic parties to the conflict and end external penetration make important contributions towards this goal. Those efforts address important parts of Cambodia's security problematic. The measures taken by global actors discussed in this chapter also seek to address core problems of Cambodian security: political institutionalization, legitimacy, and economic development. What potential benefits do these efforts hold for improving Cambodian security?

The first issue deals with governance. While few would argue that the three-party reconciliation brought on by the peace process decreases Cambodia's security, some do suggest that the imposition of elections is inappropriate within the Cambodian context. One of these is Serge Thion. Thion, a

long-time country specialist, argues in a 1986 article that Cambodian politics are marked by a number of enduring characteristics. These include nepotism, corruption and, most importantly, factionalism. In noting this, Thion says he passes no judgement; "This political pattern obviously caters to social needs."⁶⁶ Rather, Thion seeks to point out Cambodia's political "continuities" that, in his opinion, "should be the basis of any projection of a political future for the country." These continuities create boundaries beyond which change is unlikely. As a result, "Any proposal going beyond these bounds, calling for some kind of modern representative system, had better be forgotten as unrealistic and probably dangerous."⁶⁷ The Khmer's ideal alternative, according to Thion, would be the rule of a King. Unfortunately, this type of "dream" is usually ignored by "The decisionmakers in our world," but, Thion asks rhetorically, "who cares for the dreams of the Khmer?"⁶⁸

Other observers, while more open to the possibility of democratic transformation, share Thion's skepticism. Pierre Lizée and Surpong Peou are two. In a study of the Cambodian peace process and regional security, Lizée and Peou argue that the electoral process failed. One reason for this

⁶⁶Serge Thion, "The Pattern of Cambodian Politics," *International Journal of Politics* 16, no. 3 (1986). 129

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Ibid.

failure was that "UNTAC tried to institutionalize and democratize political conflict in a society where such concepts have little resonance."⁶⁹ Such a transformation was bound to meet resistance, they argue, and therefore "The result was predictable."⁷⁰ Yet, while each of these authors may be correct to note the obstacles to a democratic evolution, their arguments suffer from two problems.

The first is that they essentially argue for and support the status quo. This is especially true for Thion, whose understanding of Cambodian society and the potential for political evolution is based on the seemingly unchanging nature of Cambodian society. For him, political processes and social expectations of the past will continue in the present and into the future. These views are mostly shared by the other authors, who place much stock in the immutability of Cambodian society brought on by its religion and "socio-cultural heritage."⁷¹

However, as I have argued in this chapter, the UNTAC intervention sparked a number of important changes in Cambodia, particularly by providing a 'window of opportunity' for the strengthening of Cambodian civil

⁶⁹Pierre Lizée and Sorpong Peou, "Cooperative Security and the Emerging Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: The Challenges and Opportunities of Peace in Cambodia," York University (Toronto), Centre for International and Strategic Studies Occasional Paper Number 21, 1993, p. 18

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Pierre Lizée, "The Challenge of Conflict Resolution in Cambodia," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (1993): 38

society, and changing the apparatus of the Cambodian state. In addition, little room is allowed in these interpretations for other sources of change, such as those sparked by increasingly dense political and economic interdependence among peoples and states of the world through, for instance, the growth of communication, travel, education, and foreign investment.⁷² Furthermore, these views tend to measure the success of any new form of governance in the extreme short term. This is perhaps best summarized by Lizée who says of the UNTAC mission; "To put it simply, the UN hoped to impose a liberal democratic political process in a society where this concept remains unclear. The reality of the situation is that it couldn't work." He goes on to add that the international intervention "never achieved the deep social transformations on which the whole logic of the peace plan was based."⁷³ However, given that the intervention lasted only 18 months, I would suggest that it is premature to declare it a failure.

This static view of Cambodian politics and society relates to my second criticism of these authors' arguments - that they ignore the deep-seated sources of Cambodian insecurity. Two of relevance here, discussed in more detail in chapter two, are the lack of political

⁷²An excellent discussion of these issues and their implications for governments of the world is given in James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990)

⁷³Lizée, "The Challenge of Conflict Resolution in Cambodia," 38

institutionalization and low level of legitimacy. The first of these, limited political institutionalization, has proven to be an enduring problem in Cambodian politics. Between 1941 and 1970, it was Sihanouk's reluctance to share power and his opposition to the development of modern political institutions that forced his opponents to resort to violent measures. The situation deteriorated under the rule of the following three regimes, as each chose highly secretive forms of rule. It is difficult to see, therefore, how Thion's "dream" of reinstituting the Kingship could realistically improve the security of Cambodia, since it was precisely the one-man rule of Sihanouk and his successors that caused Cambodia's internal conflict.

The attempt by the international community to impose a new form of governance, one based on popular participation, holds more promise. Unlike one-person or one-party rule, which requires no political institutionalization save for the existence of adequate coercive forces to maintain power and enough administrative capacity to make the regime's rule profitable, a bottom-up form of sovereignty requires institutionalization, because it has no other means of expression. Through elected representatives and the functioning of the electoral process, popular sovereignty gives the Khmer a say in their governance and forms the basis of political institutionalization. Furthermore, this form of governance does not rely solely on one or even

several elections, but depends on the evolution of civil society (which acts as a check on state power) and the existence of a state willing to permit and protect citizens' rights. If this form of state takes hold and endures, it is reasonable to expect that Cambodia's long-term security will improve, as political conflict moves from the battlefield to the political arena, and the state acts more on behalf of its population than its elite.

Furthermore, by initiating this change, actors within the world community hoped to improve the legitimacy of future Cambodian governments (low levels of legitimacy being another important source of Cambodian insecurity).⁷⁴ The idea is that the establishment of internal legitimacy is an evolutionary process. Elections promotes tangible interactions with the idea of democracy through rallies, political parties and voting. As people grow accustomed to the idea that their actions cause political change, "once they get the taste of political power," they may develop an affinity for democratic mechanisms. If the Khmer approve of elections as a mechanism to transfer power and change governments, then the process itself is legitimated. This in turn places pressure on the political elite to gain approval through democratic means. Although the benefits of this process will not accrue to the Khmer automatically, it

⁷⁴This paragraph is based on an interview with an individual that was involved with organizing the elections in Cambodia. Interview 4, Ottawa

is believed that building internal legitimacy starts with the first elected government. If this proves to be the case, then Cambodian security may improve in tandem with the evolution of the new political process.

The last issue to be dealt with in terms of improving Cambodia's security is the measures taken by the world community to improve the economic prospects of the state. As argued in chapter two, economic problems have had serious security implications at several points in Cambodian history. These include the destabilizing effects that increasing landlessness, smaller plot sizes, higher peasant debt levels and the increasing disparity in wealth between classes had on Sihanouk's rule; the loss of support experienced by the Khmer Rouge due to its inability to feed the population; and the dependence on foreign aid for survival felt by all post-war regimes. These problems, perhaps particular to Cambodia, are compounded by structural problems in the world economy. Cambodia faces many of the problems common to Third World states attempting to develop in the current world economy; declining terms of trade, high debt levels, a dependence on a few exports, and trade practices that often restrict Third World exports. If these problems cannot be overcome, economic factors may again play a detrimental role in Cambodia's security.

However, there is reason for optimism. During the UNTAC mission, a host of programs were initiated to address the

essential needs of the Cambodian population and lay the foundations for the state's economic development. Much of this effort was concentrated on improving Cambodia's economic infrastructure. International and non-governmental organizations used the opportunity afforded by the peace process to expand their efforts considerably. Substantial amounts of economic aid and assistance were made available during the mission and an international body (ICORC) was established to address the state's long-term economic needs. The facts that Cambodia is located in one of the world's most economically dynamic regions and that Japan, the region's most powerful economy, has taken a direct interest in Cambodia's development, bode well for Cambodia's future prosperity. If Cambodia's economy cannot prosper under these conditions, it is not for lack of trying.

In the end, what can be said about Cambodian security after the international intervention? In the short-term, a number of security problems persist. The most important of these is that the civil war continues. As recently as May 1994, Cambodian government forces and Khmer Rouge insurgents were involved in heavy fighting in the country's Northwest. According to initial reports, this fighting went poorly for government forces owing to their lack of pay and poor leadership. Negotiations to end this fighting have stalled, leaving the possibility of further fighting open.⁷⁵

⁷⁵Nate Thayer and Nayan Chanda, "Cambodia: Things Fall Apart..." FEER,

However, few analysts believe that the Khmer Rouge is strong enough to seize power. Following the elections, thousands of its soldiers defected to the government and its top leadership apparently split over disagreements stemming from the UN intervention.⁷⁶ Further, the Khmer Rouge has lost its international backers. Thus, for the short-term, it appears that the Cambodian civil war will continue as neither side has the ability to defeat the other. However, the long-term prospects favour the government of Cambodia. Only it enjoys international legitimacy and access to international loans, aid and military assistance. Therefore, the military side of Cambodia's security problem will likely fade with time.

Furthermore, events in the political realm offer hope for guarded optimism about the future of political reforms begun during the international intervention. After the adoption of a new constitution in October 1993, the government began working on legislation for the new state. Currently, procedural disputes within Cambodia's parliament have tied up this legislation, reducing the government's ability to act on important domestic and international issues. However, these disputes can be taken as an indication of the successful operation of the political system rather than a

19 May 1994, pp. 16-18; Jonathan Manthorpe, "Cambodia: Spectre of renewed civil war hangs heavy," *Ottawa Citizen*, 1 June 1994, p. 14

⁷⁶Nate Thayer, "Out With the Old: Two Khmer Rouge stalwarts fade from view," *FEER* 10 February 1994, p. 26

failure. Political conflict is taking place within the imperfect but peaceful confines of the political system and not through the force of arms.

Another indication that the government is committed to the evolution of the new political system is the position that it has taken in negotiations with the Khmer Rouge. Since overtures were first made to it following the elections in May 1993, the government has consistently rejected the idea of power-sharing and insisted that the Khmer Rouge comply with the Paris Agreements if it is to join the political process. As discussed earlier, core aspects of these agreements deal with the recognition of norms of liberal-democracy and human rights and freedoms. If this commitment to the Paris Agreements can be sustained, then the security benefits flowing from the adoption of popular sovereignty - particularly in terms of political institutionalization and legitimacy - will be realized and Cambodia's security will gradually improve.

CHAPTER FIVE

UN OPERATIONS AND THEORIES OF THIRD WORLD SECURITY

The problems of Third world security are complex and difficult to resolve. In Cambodia, problems of legitimacy, political institutionalization, and development interacted with external threats and interference to create an environment marked by high levels of insecurity. Internal and external threats merged as other states manipulated Cambodia's divisions in pursuit of their own policies. External penetration exacerbated domestic divisions, making problems of Cambodian security particularly intractable. Efforts to address these problems would prove futile until domestic or external conditions changed.

Such an opportunity arose in the later 1980s. Changing political conditions regionally and internationally gave impetus to plans of ending the war in Cambodia. Negotiations were often lengthy and strained, but resulted in a comprehensive plan to end the war and lay the foundations of a lasting peace. A fundamental aspect of the plan was the holding of national elections to create a government considered legitimate domestically and

internationally. The world community would play a key role in the implementation of the plan by organizing elections and creating a domestic environment where all parties could participate, if not enjoy equal advantage. Its longer-term contribution lay in the areas of economic development and assistance, crucial aspects of improving the security of the Cambodian state.

The UNTAC intervention offers one example of how the global community may act to resolve problems of Third World security. Does it have wider practical or theoretical implications? This chapter explores this question. On a practical level, it argues that the principles and assumptions underlying the UNTAC mission appear to be similar, if not identical, to those enunciated in UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* and to those animating other UN missions in states of the Third World. Together, they represent the outlines of a new strategy of pursuing international peace and security - one that is necessary to address problems of Third World security.

On a theoretical level, this chapter goes on to argue that the means taken by the international community to address problems of Cambodian security depart markedly from the theoretical prescriptions of Buzan and Ayoob. These differences are outlined in an effort to show how the 'UN model' of 'state-building' offers a superior alternative to

those used by these authors. This chapter concludes that it is only on the basis of such a model that a theory of state-building can be justified in our present era.

BUILDING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY: A NEW STRATEGY?

The Paris Agreements and the mandate of the UNTAC mission were based on a number of principles. These included the use of elections to help end an internal war and establish the basis of a legitimate government; new roles for the UN, such as civil administration and the organization of national elections; pledges of financial assistance aimed at improving the functional capacity and economic viability of the state; and practical efforts to improve state apparatus and strengthen civil society. These principles are not unique to the UNTAC mission. Rather, it appears that the UN intervention in Cambodia contains the seeds of a wider strategy of achieving international peace and security. That is, the UNTAC mission is one example, the most elaborate so far, of a new type of UN operation marked by an attempt to blend the development and security sides of the organization's mandate into one goal: strengthening states to achieve international peace and security.¹

This strategy is new to the UN and is evident in two, interrelated ways. The first is the recent report of

¹The following seven paragraphs closely follow the argument made in Sean Jorgensen, "UN Operations and Third World Security: Expanding the Agenda," *Contemporary Security Policy* 15, no. 1 (1994): 7-9

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, entitled *An Agenda for Peace*. Second, it is evident in other recent UN missions in states such as Namibia, El Salvador and Somalia. It is argued here that the assumptions underlying the UNTAC mission are the same as in *An Agenda for Peace* and as those animating new UN missions in the 'failed states' of the Third World.

The first indication of the UN's new strategy is Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*. As Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros-Ghali was asked by the Security Council to recommend ways of improving the UN's ability to conduct preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. This call for reform stems from the conviction, as Boutros-Ghali notes, "that an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter - a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, 'social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom'"² His reply contains far reaching proposals and an ambitious program aimed at enhancing international security. The goals of his plan are summarized early in the first chapter:

Our aims must be: To seek to identify at the earliest possible state situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of

²Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations, 1992), paragraph 3

danger before violence results; Where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues that have led to conflict; Through peace-keeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peace-makers; To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts, rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife, and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war; And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict - economic despair, social injustice and political oppression...³

The first several proposals go well beyond traditional notions of peacekeeping, but are still consistent with the UN's traditional focus on the 'hard' problems of security, such as interstate war.

What has changed is the new emphasis on 'peace-building.' Boutros-Ghali outlines a wide-ranging program aimed at strengthening individual states by building state infrastructure, improving economic and social development, expanding food and water resources, enhancing human rights and promoting political participation.⁴ The link between domestic and international peace seems clear. According to Boutros-Ghali, "Peace at home and the urgency of rebuilding and strengthening our individual societies necessitates peace abroad and cooperation among nations."⁵

It is equally clear that this process will take place within the current state system. Throughout the Agenda,

³Ibid., paragraph 15

⁴See Ibid., Chapter IV, "Post-conflict peace-building," paragraphs 55-59

⁵Ibid., paragraph 79

Boutros-Ghali emphasizes the continuing relevance of the state as a form of political organization. He comments early in his report that the recognition of new states by the UN "reconfirms the importance and indispensability of the sovereign State as the fundamental entity of the international community." He reinforces this point several pages later, noting that "The foundation-stone of this work is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress."⁶ In essence, Boutros-Ghali argues that insecurity in the international system is rooted in factors below the level of state intercourse. His proposals try to address these causes, but within the parameters of the existing state system. Thus, efforts at improving international security will not be directed at the structure of the system (anarchy), but to its constituent elements (states).

The second indication of the UN's new strategy of strengthening states as a means of attaining international peace and security is found in a number of UN operations undertaken since 1987, particularly in Third World states marked by internal conflict. These missions are taking place in what two authors describe as "failed states."⁷

⁶Ibid., paragraphs 10, 17

⁷Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, "Saving Failed States," *Foreign Policy*, no. 89 (1992/93): 3-20

One example that closely matches the UN intervention in Cambodia is the international effort to bring peace and independence to Namibia. Beginning in March 1989 and lasting until April 1990, the UN deployed the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. Its military component was mandated to monitor the end of hostilities between the warring parties, supervise their demobilization or withdrawal, and ensure the non-return of foreign forces. The civilian side of the mission was charged with monitoring the conduct of the national police, repatriating and resettling refugees that had fled the conflict, and monitoring electoral registration and the conduct of the elections.

Despite encountering a number of obstacles, the mission enjoyed a high degree of success as elections were carried out (with a participation rate of over 97 per cent), a new government formed, and independence was achieved.⁸ The domestic parties to the dispute now appear to be conducting their conflict within the confines of the new national assembly, improving the possibility that democratic values can be sustained within the state and peace take hold.

Another intervention that shares the assumptions of the UNTAC mission, although not all the details surrounding its implementation, was the international effort to end the war

⁸M. K. Jeffery, "The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) Namibia," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, June 1991: 7-11

in El Salvador. Beginning in December 1989, UN mediator Alvaro de Soto and Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar played crucial roles in ending the civil war in El Salvador by helping to negotiate a wide ranging agreement based on national elections, adherence to human rights, and substantial pledges of financial assistance to rebuild a state wracked by a decade of conflict.⁹

The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) played a key role in the implementation of these accords by monitoring human rights in the state and helping to strengthen "domestic structures that will prevent the recurrence of conflict."¹⁰ The UN also monitored national elections in March 1994. Although many problems still persist, particularly in reforming the judiciary and military, internal conflict has ended and for the first time ever all parts of the Salvadoran political spectrum are represented in the political arena.

The ongoing mission in Somalia shares many of the state-building goals of Cambodia, Namibia and El Salvador. These include efforts at rebuilding economic and social infrastructure, such as water, sanitation and food supply, establishing administrative control over the population, and

⁹A brief overview of the negotiating process is given in Terry Lynn Karl, "El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 2 (1992): 147-164. See also Linda Robinson, "The end of El Salvador's war," *Survival* 33, no. 5 (1991): 387-400

¹⁰David Holiday and William Stanley, "Building the Peace: Preliminary Lessons from El Salvador," *Journal of International Affairs* 46, no. 2 (1993): 416

building a national police force.¹¹ As the Secretary-General summarizes in his report to the Security Council, the Somalia mandate empowers the UN to "provide assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their shattered economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's institutional structure, achieving national political reconciliation, recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country's economy and infrastructure."¹² However, unlike the other missions (which appear to have been at least partially successful in improving the security of the state involved), the success of this project is far from certain and only the passage of time will reveal whether the UN's presence contributed positively to Somalia's security.

What is clear from a review of these missions, however, is that a state-building strategy appears evident in each. As with the international intervention in Cambodia, these missions are based on principles consistent with those outlined in *An Agenda for Peace*. The first is that they use UN personnel in a variety of new roles (in Somalia, this included the use of armed force against a domestic party to the war, a move akin to the 'peace enforcement units'

¹¹See Report of the Secretary-General: The Situation in Somalia, 26 January 1993 (S/25168)

¹²Further Report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1992), 3 March 1993 (S/25354)

suggested by Boutros-Ghali in the Agenda).¹³ The second is that they rely on elections to end internal war and help establish a legitimate government as the basis of national reconciliation. According to Boutros-Ghali, the assumption behind this principle is that, "The social stability needed for productive growth is nurtured by conditions in which people can readily express their will. For this, strong domestic institutions of participation are essential."¹⁴

Third, the pledges of economic assistance made in each of these examples are consistent with the process of 'post-conflict peace-building' - efforts directed toward "rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war..."¹⁵ Such assistance is provided in the recognition that political efforts to achieve security will probably be undermined if economic conditions do not improve in the state in question. Thus it appears that in the period following the Cold War, the world community, acting through the UN, is pursuing a strategy of 'state-building' to improve domestic and international security. Does such a strategy address the problems of Third World security?

Answering this question requires a careful examination of the particular security conditions in each state. As

¹³Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, paragraph 44. See also Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 5 (1992): 93-94

¹⁴Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, paragraph 15

¹⁵*Ibid.*, paragraph 15

discussed above, the cases of Namibia and El Salvador suggest that such a strategy may indeed be contributing positively to security in those states. This study suggests that the efforts of the international community hold considerable promise for improving Cambodian security. As discussed in chapters three and four, the attempt to end intervention in Cambodian affairs, codified in an international treaty, seeks to relieve one source of insecurity. Instituting a popular form of sovereignty through the development of a liberal-democratic political system holds the potential of relieving others, such as the lack of legitimacy for government and state structures and limited political institutionalization. Similarly, the efforts of the international community in the realm of development aid and assistance may act to reduce the importance of economic issues to the security of the state. These efforts represent a comprehensive response by the international community to the complex problems of security within the Cambodian state.

However, the problems associated with the UNTAC mission were substantial and may make similar operations unpopular with decision-makers or the publics of contributing member states. For one, the UNTAC mission was very expensive. Not including the substantial amounts needed for economic development, the mission itself cost US \$2.1 billion, with a further US \$ 600 million necessary to repatriate the 350,000

refugees on the Thai border. For another, UN personnel serving with the mission came "under deliberate attack and...suffered large number of casualties."¹⁶ Member states feel uneasy about such developments, particularly when casualties include civilian personnel and volunteers. Another problem was that the accords themselves appeared not to be implemented. The cooperation of two of the Cambodian parties (the CPP and the Khmer Rouge) was less than forthcoming and, as a result, key aspects of the agreements (such as the cantonment of faction armies, UN 'control' over state apparatus, or the creation of a neutral political environment) were not carried out.

Although these problems are substantial, many are not irresolvable. The latter problems could be addressed by better planning and organization,¹⁷ faster deployment,¹⁸ and the more forceful implementation of existing mandates.¹⁹ Security problems could be addressed by the

¹⁶Mats R. Berdal, *Whither UN Peacekeeping?* Adelphi Paper 281 (1993): 29

¹⁷As with any mission, problems of coordination, logistics, and command and control, among others, inhibited the success of UN operations. Suggestions for reform in these areas are found in Berdal, *Whither UN Peacekeeping?*, 51-72; Thomas G. Weiss, "New Challenges for UN Military Operations: Implementing an Agenda for Peace," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1993: 51-66; and the special peacekeeping issue of *Survival* 32, no. 3 (1990)

¹⁸Many external observers and UN personnel agreed that the slow deployment of UN personnel, particularly in the military and civil administration components, reduced the cooperation of the factions and may have been the deciding factor in the Khmer Rouge's decision to opt out of the accords.

¹⁹Suggestions made in the final report of the UN civil administration component include importing a practicable judicial system from abroad to counter problems of lawlessness and rights abuse, more direct presence and control of ministries and officials, increased efforts to coordinate UN

deployment of more UN troops, particularly in states wracked by civil war where faction armies suffer from poor communication and ill-discipline. Nonetheless, there is no getting away from the fact that missions based on the UNTAC experience will be expensive and have the effect of putting UN personnel in dangerous situations. Should this prevent the deployment of UNTAC-style missions in the future?

The answer must be no. Problems of Third World security are linked to a very high degree and include issues of development, political capacity, and legitimacy. Efforts to address these issues must therefore be comprehensive, directed not only to ending external intervention (a factor that may become less relevant in the geopolitical environment at the end of the Cold War), but improving the political and economic strength of states. Fundamental to the latter initiatives is the deployment of substantial numbers of UN personnel in support of wide-ranging agreements signed by parties within the state. In political terms, their deployment creates a 'window of opportunity' for the establishment or consolidation of civil society, an environment where the free expression of the population leads to the creation of a new government, and the

civilian and military components, and more personnel in key areas such as foreign affairs and defence. Other suggestions include making relations between UN and state personnel clearer, emphasizing the former's control over the latter, and more bold initiatives like removing top personnel, a power granted the UN in its mission statement. These suggestions are taken from UN documents in the author's possession.

opportunity for UN agencies and other global actors to expand their developmental work. If, as argued in this thesis, the enactment of a form of popular sovereignty holds important potential for improving the internal strength of states, thereby contributing to a more secure domestic and international environment, then international intervention is essential to create an environment where democratic foundations are laid and the above processes allowed to occur. In sum, where states have collapsed to the point that conflict spills freely into the international system, their existence is not so much a 'hole in the fabric of international order' as it is a sore on the body of the global polity. If the health of the body is to improve, international intervention must go beyond patching the sore, to treating it.²⁰

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS: COMPETING MODELS OF STATE-BUILDING

Having argued that the international intervention in Cambodia is indicative of a wider strategy of strengthening states to improve international security, and that

²⁰However, it should be noted that it is an open question whether the 'disease' can be isolated to parts of the 'body' or whether its causes lie at a deeper level. In a recent article, I argued that UN "C-style operations may turn out to be "palliatives for patients suffering from a chronic disease" if they ignore the wider issues of security and development, affected by trends in the international economy. Action at this level, treating 'the underlying disease,' may be the most crucial determinant of the success of state-building in the Third World and should be addressed in tandem with international efforts to improve the domestic strength of states. Jorgensen, "UN Operations and Third World Security," 21-30

UNTAC-style operations may be essential if such a strategy is to relieve the domestic and international security problems arising from 'failed states,' an important question to consider is 'Does the case of the UN intervention in Cambodia carry any theoretical implications?' As with any case study, there is the possibility that it may not. This situation is captured by the frequently asked question, "How can you generalize from a single case?"²¹ One answer is summarized by Robert K. Yin;

The short answer is that case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. In this sense, the case study, like the experiment, does not represent a "sample," and the investigator's goal is to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization).²²

As argued in previous chapters, the UN intervention in Cambodia represents an attempt to strengthen the state as a means of improving domestic and international security. Such an effort appears to resemble the theoretical propositions advanced by both Buzan and Ayoob. There is therefore reason to believe that the international intervention in Cambodia may hold important implications for theories of Third World security. The following section addresses this issue.

²¹Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (London: SAGE publications, 1984), 21

²²Ibid.

On a general level, the assumptions underlying the UNTAC mission and the prescriptive elements of Buzan and Ayoob's work share one important element: they emphasize the importance of dealing with domestic issues of governance, legitimacy, and development. Intrastate wars are by their nature centered on the questions of 'who governs, how?' Without the widespread acceptance of a means of governance, instability within the state is perpetuated. This instability, as theorists of Third World security suggest and the case of Cambodia shows, creates divisions within the state that allows for or attracts external intervention, reinforcing the insecurity of the state. Breaking this cycle therefore requires not only the end of external penetration (as Ayoob suggests),²³ but increasing the legitimacy and political and economic capacity of the state itself (as both authors suggest).²⁴ In general terms, this is the agenda followed by the UN in its attempt to end Cambodia's civil war and establish the basis for a more enduring peace.

Yet, beyond these general similarities, the practical efforts of the UN differ quite markedly from those suggested by both Buzan and Ayoob. In order to draw out these differences, I will first summarize the prescriptions of the

²³Mohammed Ayoob, "Regional Security and the Third World," in Mohammed Ayoob, ed., *Regional Security in the Third World: Case Studies from Southeast Asia and the Middle East* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 20

²⁴See chapter one

authors in question, then compare them to the efforts taken by the world community during the UNTAC mission.

The analyses of both authors suggest that state-building must occur from the top-down. Crucial to this effort, and particularly pronounced in the work of Ayoob, is the "primitive accumulation of state power." Internal divisions must be alleviated and opponents to centralized rule dealt with in order that state-building may occur. Doing so relies heavily on the coercive apparatus of the state to, among other things, extend and consolidate "a particular political order by the use of force against *potential as well as dissident subjects* and [fend] off rival claimants to the same territorial and demographic space."²⁵ It is only after this order has been established will legitimacy accrue to the state and its governing elite. That is, by first extending their rule and administration, and then extending economic and, later, political benefits (such as participation), government and state become legitimate in the eyes of the population they purport to represent internationally.

This view of state-building comes as a result of the models used by both authors. As was noted in chapter one, their prescriptions rely on the experience of 16th century European state-builders. Each believes that this experience

²⁵Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World," *World Politics* 43, no. 2 (1991): 268. My emphasis.

will likely be repeated in the new states of the Third World in the process of becoming the viable entities of their European relatives. For instance, in support of his argument, Buzan cites, among others, a number of authors who hold that violence in states of the Third World is evidence of the same centralizing process undertaken by European state-makers centuries before.²⁶ As he summarizes, "Because they are still in the early stages of the attempt to consolidate themselves as state-nations, domestic violence is endemic in such [Third World] states. Under these circumstances, violence is as likely to be a sign of the accumulation of central state power as it is to be a symptom of political decay."²⁷ Buzan adds that, "If they are correct, then the process of state-building necessarily involves a phase of internal conflict during which contradictions between individual and national security will be extreme."²⁸

That the state-making process of the Europeans will be repeated in the Third World is accepted even more readily by Ayooob:

Since state making is a process that can be compared over time and space and its main elements that are of

²⁶Youssef Cohen, Brian R. Brown and A.F.K. Organski, "The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order," *American Political Science Review* 75, no. 4 (1981): 901-910, cited in Barry Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd. ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 110, fn. 34

²⁷Ibid., 99

²⁸Ibid., 111, fn 36

universal significance can be isolated for analytical purposes, a comparison of the early crucial stages of this venture in Europe...and the current attempts at state making in the Third World are feasible, in fact necessary, despite the differences in time and place.²⁹

For both authors, therefore, it is through the time-honoured policies of state-building from above that Third World states will develop into sturdy units of political organization.

As pointed out in chapter one, using this model suffers from a number of problems. One of particular relevance is that doing so entails accepting the violence associated with the state-building process. Both authors recognize that the process tends to generate significant internal conflict. Since a substantial part of each authors' work argues that it is the state-building process itself that generates violence, and that this violence tends to spill into the international arena, each author also apparently recognizes that such a process generates significant international security problems. Sympathetic noises are heard from Buzan and Ayoob about these issues, but the impression left from their work is that the long-term benefits accruing from increased domestic and international security outweigh the short-term violence expected from the means taken to achieve them. It is the case, as Buzan puts it, that "without

²⁹Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Predicament of the Third World State: Reflections on State Making in a Comparative Perspective," in Brian L. Job, ed., *The Insecurity Dilemma* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 67. My emphasis.

strong states, there will be no security, national or otherwise."³⁰

Although it may indeed be the case that strengthening states improves domestic and international security, the 'top-down' argument can only be sustained in the long-term. The terms 'centralizing power' and 'strengthening states' tend to gloss over the fact that the means necessary to do so, according to the authors' models, entail making enemies of individuals and groups within the state. Their destruction or, at a minimum, submission is necessary for the state-centralizer to be successful. It is only when power and authority rest in one place can the state be considered cohesive. Legitimacy will then accrue to the government and state as their ability to 'penetrate' and 'mobilize' society rises and, through their policies, the 'nation' is forged. As the 'idea' of the state embeds itself in the minds of the population and the state develops economically, so too does it politically. Over time, the state is to slowly extend benefits to the masses, including participation and wealth, thus further enhancing its strength. It will then be in a position to provide security to its citizens both from within and without. On the international side, there will be no internal divisions or conflict to affect neighbouring states or be used by other

³⁰Buzan, *People, States & Fear*, 106

powers for their own ends. Security will be more of a reality domestically and internationally.

As pointed out in the first chapter, the difficulty with this view of state-building is that, in the short to medium term, it increases insecurity both domestically and internationally. On both levels, this is a difficult argument to accept. Considering the international level first, the violence accompanying efforts to 'accumulate central state power' seems likely to spill into the international arena. As in the past, this violence may serve to destabilize surrounding states, cause refugee movements, or spark regional tensions. The point here is not to deny that the authors do not recognize these problems or that they do not consider them a pernicious part of the state-building process. Rather, it is to assert that their reliance on these models leaves no alternative to the above problems - state building is a messy process, and the mess is likely to spread.

Even if the authors can claim that their prescriptions do not condone violence, it is difficult to argue, based on the historical experience they themselves cite, that a top-down model of state-building does not naturally gravitate in that direction. However, in an era where terribly destructive weapons are readily available and international events are becoming ever-more linked, it is inane to rely on models for *prescription* that have traditionally caused substantial

international conflict and suffering. At any rate, no international intervention would be based on an attempt to increase the power of the state if doing so is to the detriment of the state's population.

On a domestic level, this model of state-building is equally problematic. It is difficult to see why the security of the present generation (and how many other generations it takes to complete the state-building process) should be sacrificed for the well-being of future generations. To accept this position entails forgetting the purported reason for living in states altogether. As Ken Booth argues, states were ostensibly created as a means of achieving an end; the security of people living within their boundaries.³¹ This is not to say that strong, viable states may not be vital to securing this 'end.' But if the process of improving their strength acts to the detriment of their inhabitants, then the state is no longer a means to an end, but an end itself. This is illogical in the extreme. As Booth asks rhetorically, "There is obviously a relationship between the well-being of the sheltered and the state of the shelter, but can there be any question as to whose security is primary?"³² Thus, if the state is to be a provider of security to its citizens and not their primary

³¹Ken Booth, "Security and emancipation," *Review of International Studies* 17 (1991): 319

³²*Ibid.*, 320

antagonist, their well-being must be a priority in both the short and long term. A model that offers this possibility while improving the legitimacy and functional capacity of the state is offered by the UN intervention in Cambodia.

What are the most important characteristics of this 'model'? The first is that it is based on democratic norms. This is important for international and domestic reasons. As shown in chapter three, the resort to elections has become a favoured means of conflict resolution. Elections provide a means to by-pass often intractable power-sharing negotiations by submitting all parties to the competition of an electoral process. This may make reaching agreement easier since it does not commit parties in advance to a certain position or status within the state. In addition, in the absence of a better means to establish the legitimacy of domestic groups, elections are a useful device for the international community to ascertain who is considered legitimate within the state. It is becoming increasingly the case that only on this basis will donors of economic aid and assistance commit funds to the state. In other words, it is becoming a norm of international society that governments rule with the consent of the governed. Because elections are one of the few means to determine consent, strong international rewards and punishments are associated with their conduct. There are therefore strong incentives for state leaders to carry them out.

Aside from their utility as a mechanism of conflict resolution and as a means to gain international legitimacy, elections may serve other security needs. As suggested in the case of Cambodia, the electoral process may reconcile opposing parties by institutionalizing political competition, thus providing a vehicle for peaceful expression and dissent. By extending participation beyond the level of the elite, this measure may reduce the incidence of violence associated with regime change by providing alternate means of attaining and transferring power. Furthermore, institutionalizing political expression and competition through elections has the effect of placing government legitimacy on wider grounds than economic and political elites. Political power becomes at least partially dependent on the will of the people. As people participate in the election process and find that their actions provoke change, the system gains legitimacy. Like the institutionalization of political power, this change may alleviate one source of domestic insecurity - limited government and state legitimacy.

Another important characteristic of the 'UN state-building model,' related to the use of elections, is the attempt to strengthen civil society. The Paris Agreements called for the founding of a liberal-democracy in Cambodia. This was supposedly achieved with the adoption of a new constitution in September 1993. Yet, liberal-

democracy is not solely a function of the conduct of elections or the clauses of constitutions. Participation must be an accepted and real part of the political order, as must respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The UN took substantial steps to make these ideas a reality by mobilizing the Cambodian population into the political arena: in the short-term by encouraging participation in the election; in the long-term by supporting the establishment of institutions of civil society, such as human rights groups and an independent media.

These measures were matched by the UN's attempt to reform the apparatus of the state - to increase official recognition of human rights and freedoms in general, and provide for their protection in specific areas, such as the judiciary and police. In total, these policies and actions - whether by ensuring the adoption of a liberal-democratic constitution recognizing human rights and freedoms, mobilizing the population, creating institutions of civil society, or reforming state apparatus - were intended to check the power of the state. That these efforts stand in sharp contrast to what Buzan and Ayooob assert as necessary to begin the process of state-building, best summarized by Ayooob's "primitive accumulation of state power," is obvious. Yet, they represent legitimate alternatives to the top-down view of state-building offered by these authors, while pursuing the same ends - such as increased domestic

legitimacy and political institutionalization. Better still, they enjoy the advantages of being less violent, less likely to sacrifice the security of the present generation, or cause international conflict.

Checking the power of the Cambodian state is also an important aspect of the third characteristic of the 'UN state-building model' - the 'planned penetration' of the international community in the period following its intervention. The global community has established within Cambodia a number of bodies mandated to monitor the future behavior of the Cambodian state. This includes the Special Representative, the Centre for Human Rights in Cambodia, the military liaison office, and the UN interim office. Also of importance are the links forged between international and indigenous human rights NGOs. These bodies will carry on a surveillance of the domestic activities of the Cambodian state. This 'watchdog' function is particularly important following the accession of the Cambodian state to seven human rights instruments during the UNTAC mission, and its agreement, in an international treaty, to respect human rights and freedoms and sustain a liberal-democratic polity. It allows the monitoring of the state according to common norms of international society. There is thus a common standard of behavior, agreed upon by both the Cambodian state and the international community, by which the future activities of Cambodian leaders will be judged. All of

these efforts focus on securing the inhabitants of the state against the state itself. On a very practical level, they get to the core of what states are expected to do: provide security to their inhabitants, including in the short-term. Again, this stands in sharp contrast to the European state-building model used by Buzan and Ayoob.

The last characteristic of this 'model' is the importance given to economic development and reform. Here again, the state itself was made the subject of reform, as the UN and other global actors attempted to raise the functional ability of the state in areas such as finance, customs, the public sector, natural resource development, and utilities. These efforts were complemented at the community level through the work of UN specialized agencies and international non-governmental actors. Physical infrastructure was also built, rebuilt or repaired and substantial funds committed to the future development of the state's economy. As with the attempt to increase the state's legitimacy or institutionalize its politics, these efforts do not necessarily differ from the prescriptive intention of the theorists in question. Both Buzan and Ayoob recognize the crucial role that economic development plays in improving state security and therefore strength. What it serves to highlight, however, is the importance given to the state as a provider of security and material benefit to its population. These efforts seek to change the

state from an apparatus to accumulate wealth for a would-be state-centralizer to a vehicle of popular service. In this design, the economic development of the state is viewed as a 'means' of improving the well-being of the population and not as an 'end' in itself. As with the 'planned penetration' of the international community following the UNTAC mission, it is the importance given to the immediate benefit of the population that distinguishes this model from the authors.'

CONCLUSION

The international community appears to have embarked on a strategy of improving international security through the rebuilding of its weakest members, located mostly in the Third World. The UN intervention in Cambodia offers the most elaborate example of this strategy so far - a strategy that is similar in intent but not means to some theories of Third World security. If in the future the prescriptions of security theorists are to have practical utility, then they must not cause more insecurity than they relieve. The acceptance by two prominent theorists, Barry Buzan and Mohammed Ayoob, of a top-down model of state-building can therefore be criticized as containing the potential and, at worst, justification, for increasing domestic and international insecurity.

The state-building model gleaned from the UN intervention in Cambodia offers an alternative to their prescriptions by introducing a new form of state, one that is based on popular sovereignty and human rights. The goals sought by each model are the same; increasing the legitimacy, cohesion and functional capacity of the state. Yet the methods forwarded for doing so differ substantially. The 'UN model' seeks to increase the security of the state's population in the interim phase of the state-building process, not by trading their security for that of future generations. In doing so, it points to a matter often overlooked by theorists of Third World security: it is not just that Third World states need to be more functionally competent ('stronger'); rather, more attention needs to be paid to the particular type of state strengthened. The questions that need to be asked include 'what form of governance increases domestic security?' and 'how can it be achieved?' The model offered by the UN intervention suggests that the international community supports a form of popular sovereignty. Achieving it entails action at a number of levels, but importantly, the short-term security of the population is not sacrificed and is, in fact, made a priority in the efforts to strengthen the state. This approach is more in tune with current developments in the international system than the ones offered by security theorists. It is only on the basis of a popular or

'bottom-up' view of sovereignty can a state-building project be justified in the current era.

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Appendix 1 The Components of the UNTAC Mission.

The components of the UNTAC mission and their duties are described in detail in The Report of the Secretary-General on Cambodia, 19 February 1992 (UN Document S/23613), pp. 3-41. The components are (as listed in the above report):

- Human rights component
- Electoral component
- Military component
- Civil administration component
- Police component
- Repatriation component
- Rehabilitation component

Appendix 2: List of Cited Confidential Interviews

Interview 2: Individual deployed with UNTAC's civil administration component. Interviewed 1 March 1994, UN Headquarters, New York.

Interview 3: Individual deployed with UNTAC's military component. Interviewed 11 February 1994, Ottawa.

Interview 4: Individual associated with UN efforts to organize and monitor elections in member states, including Cambodia. Interviewed 29 March 1994, Ottawa.

Interview 5: Individual deployed with UNTAC's electoral component. Interviewed 1 March 1994, UN Headquarters, New York.

Interview 7: Individual working in the UN's Department of Peace-Keeping Operations. Interview 25 February 1994, UN Headquarters, New York.

Interview 9: Individual deployed with UNTAC's human rights component. Interview 25 February 1994, UN Headquarters, New York.

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