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**RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN SUDAN:
THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS**

by

Denis D. Leclaire

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in International Affairs

The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

Canada

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The undersigned recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies acceptance of the thesis "Rural Development in Southern Sudan: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations" submitted by Denis D. Leclaire, B.A. Hons., in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science.

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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to discuss and analyze the role of non-governmental organizations in rural development in Southern Sudan. The major hypothesis is that within the existing NGO system in the region, Southern Sudanese are not given adequate opportunity to be involved in their own development process. The supporting sub-problems relate to the reasons for the region's acute underdevelopment and to the many varied and often incongruent developmental strategies taken by the numerous aid agencies working in Southern Sudan. As well, these sub-hypotheses refer to the lack of cooperation between NGOs, to the misuse of available resources by many of these groups, and to the self-serving objectives of these agencies which often take precedence over meeting goals relevant to the needs of the Southern Sudanese.

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THE SUDAN

200 mls

- Sudan borders
- Southern provinces
- Towns

- Capital
- ~ Rivers
- +++ Railways

Glossary of Abbreviations

ACROSS	- Africa Committee for the Rehabilitation of Southern Sudan
ADC	- Agricultural Development Center
AIM	- Africa Inland Mission
AMREF	- African Medical and Research Foundation
CAFOD	- Catholic Fund for Overseas Development
CHW	- Community Health Worker
CIDA	- Canadian International Development Agency
CODEL	- Co-operation in Development
CRS	- Catholic Relief Service
CUSO	- Canadian University Service Overseas
ECIP	- Expanded Childhood Immunization Programme
GVS	- German Volunteer Service
ILO	- International Labor Organization
IMREF	- International Medical and Research Foundation
IVS	- International Voluntary Service
LWF	- Lutheran World Federation
MSR	- Micro-Social-Realization

NCA	- Norwegian Church Aid
NGO	- Non-Governmental Organization
PHCP	- Primary Health Care Programme
PHCU	- Primary Health Care Unit
RMOC & RD	- Regional Ministry of Co-operative and Rural Development
RMOH	- Regional Ministry of Health
SCF	- Save the Children Fund
SCOVA	- Sudanese Council of Voluntary Agencies
SIL	- Summer Institute of Linguistics
SIM	- Sudan Interior Mission
SRG	- Southern Regional Government
TAICH	- Technical Assistance Information Clearing House
UNDP	- United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	- United Nations High Commission for Refugees
USAID	- United States Agency for International Development
VSO	- Voluntary Service Overseas

Basic Facts on Sudan and Southern Sudan

Area of Sudan : 2,505,805 sq. kms /967,500 sq. miles

Area of Southern Sudan : 648,051 sq. kms /250,000 sq. miles

Population of Sudan : 18.5 million (estimate)

Population of Southern Sudan : 3 million (estimate)

Capital of Sudan : Khartoum

Capital of Southern Region : Juba

Head of State and Government : General Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiry, since May 25, 1969.

President of Southern Regional Government : Abel Alier

Currency : Sudanese Pound (LS) - 1 = (US) \$2.00 (approx.)

Official Language : Arabic

Other Major Language : English

Please note: Some maps will show Southern Sudan divided into six provinces. These divisions are no longer valid, as the region has returned to a three-province system: Bahr el Ghazal and El Buheyrat are Bahr el Ghazal, Western and Eastern Equatoria are Equatoria, and Jonglei and Upper Nile are Upper Nile.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The Dilemma of Development

Change strategies now in vogue rarely consider the cultural trauma they cause, since culture is another realm in which underdevelopment is experienced by its subjects as vulnerability.

Denis Goulet (1)

Looking at many of the all-embracing, large-scale development projects which have been imposed in Third World countries, one can ask: What moral license do outsiders have, with all their masses of technology and modern ideas, to irreversibly alter people's lives in so fundamental a fashion. What evidence do we have that our concept of development is an absolute good, or even an improvement over the present condition of those who are being "developed"?

Critics of large-scale schemes are accused of wanting to preserve exotic human zoos rather than actually promoting a better life for the people involved. Those who would impose development feel that the quantitative aspects stressed in large-scale development strategies (income, productivity, output, literacy rates, occupational structures) will in turn be translated into a qualitatively better standard of life.

The transfer is not, unfortunately, made quite so readily. Planners and policymakers frequently take the qualitative goals for granted, and such

uncritical acceptance breeds confusion. There may be considerable merit, after all, in asking whether higher living standards, self-sustained economic growth and modern institutions are good in themselves, or necessarily constitute the highest priorities.⁽²⁾ The problem is not that technology is a villain or that certain facets of modernization are intrinsically bad. Instead it is that the purveyors of the newly imposed systems may not have been sufficiently critical of the impact that new values, ideas and norms would have on certain environments. In many instances, these new value and normative systems have been introduced irresponsibly, under the false assumption that some type of greatly needed progress was being disseminated.

A more critical look should be taken at the norms and values underlying these innovations and at the merit of imposing different value systems in the Lesser Developed Countries. Economic improvement or social modernization should not be viewed as ends in themselves, but merely as instruments in achieving the human goals of the so-called target community.

Taking certain liberties with Maslow's scale of human needs, one could say that meeting the range of human needs beyond the basics is a different kind of growth and development question. The "first floor" minimal needs of food, water, housing, and employment tend to be somewhat standard regardless of social and cultural needs. But "second floor" and subsequent needs tend to be more individually, socially, and culturally diverse.⁽³⁾ They are less materially defined and more qualitatively sensed.

The acceleration of economic development is both commendable and desirable because it shortens the time of suffering from ignorance, poverty, and disease. Nevertheless, the physical difficulties will simply be replaced by less

concrete, but just as real emotional and cultural problems if economic engineering is not complemented by specific social engineering.

What is needed then is not grand schemes created and imposed by people who in reality have only their own interests in mind and who have no genuine feeling or concern for the recipient society. Instead, development should focus directly on the basic needs of the people on a manageable scale. The minimum requirements for personal survival - the "first floor" needs of adequate nutrition, housing and clothing - should be priorities, along with the provision of essential community services such as clean water, sanitation, basic education, and health facilities. Also important is the opportunity to be productively occupied, both for income and for self-esteem - being part of and contributing to society. Finally, there should be political development, at least at the local level, to allow all people the chance to be involved with and to participate in the decisions which are going to affect their community.⁽⁴⁾ The basic needs of the individual and of the community should be the reason for all political and economic strategy.

These basic requirements indicate that the real strength of a nation does not depend on the importation of ethnocentric, external, usually Western industrial and technical systems which normally demand such advanced expertise and such refined materials that local labor and even at times local materials are passed over in favour of skilled workers and goods from Western Europe and North America.⁽⁵⁾ Instead, these basic requirements point to strong local organizations to provide realistic goals and credible leadership that will use the existing natural resources and economic strengths to help the people to develop within the context of their own society. These organizations (and their

"consultants") have to define development to fit the particular underlying values of their own society, so that their goals may be attained through self-directed and self-generated means. To do so "...social systems must respect natural limits to growth and optimize their quality of life within these limits in their own way." ⁽⁶⁾ The key to long-term survival and overall growth is to have a sound social organization that commits itself to pursuing the goals of human dignity and social equality ⁽⁷⁾ within its own traditional framework, and which rejects economic and ideological policy which does not have these ideals.

The "transformation" approach to development attempts to establish new forms of agriculture and social organizations, usually breaking with existing traditional systems on questions of scale of operation, production techniques and socio-legal structure. The "improvement" approach, for its part, aims at encouraging agriculture within existing production systems and at strengthening the existing social system. In this latter approach, development, with all its ethical and moral connotations, is seen as a two-tier phenomenon which should have parallel objectives. On one level, the government or agency that is encouraging a certain development program must be morally responsible for and, as well, sensitive to the way of life of the traditional society. On the other level the people of the recipient, and hence of the participatory, society must support and have faith in the strength of their own traditional norm and value structures so that they will be able to evolve positively to meet the demands of development and modernization within a framework where they feel comfortable. Therefore, instead of attempting to modernize through the irreversible redirection or destruction of the traditional system, the attitude taken illustrates that "...the gradual integration of patterns congruent with modern life

comes less through rejection of tradition than through its accommodated qualification and syncretic blending of (imposed, existing and traditional) structural concepts and ideology." (8) Development occurs through the process of creative evolution and a historical dialectic, rather than as a "win-lose" design between competing ideological and cultural systems.

A Basic Assumption : The Perceived Role of Non-Governmental Organizations

With the reigning development philosophy throughout the Third World shifting more and more towards a rural development approach, it has become apparent that while government and multilateral aid agencies are indeed focusing on the rural regions, they are still implementing large-scale industrial, agricultural or infrastructural projects. These schemes, which in many instances are capital intensive, require advanced technology and a trained labor force, and do not normally have any immediate positive effect on the lives of the majority of the rural poor. While there may be some long-range advantage for the rural regions as a whole, there is no provision made in most large-scale projects for basic human needs programming, nor is there any concern shown over issues of equity for the rural masses. Given this "...lethargy or inability of government agencies to reach the poorest segments of society, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are sometimes seen as a third force between government and industry in the development of a country." (9)

NGOs are generally more people oriented than profit or product oriented. Their criteria for success are based on satisfying the basic needs of the poor and

on helping to bring about self-reliance (see Table 1:1). To reach these ends NGOs generally focus on the rural areas and tend to work at the local level through small-scale projects. In this way a basis for development can gradually be laid, with people from all spheres of the target society having the opportunity to get involved in their own development process.

In legal terms and to qualify for tax exemption status in their countries of origin, NGOs, which are for the most part Western based,⁽¹⁰⁾ are considered to be non-profit agencies or societies⁽¹¹⁾ established for the purpose of carrying out projects and programs of international development and/or international emergency relief.⁽¹²⁾ Specifically, NGO programs and projects deal with such things as development education in the developed world, and agricultural, technical, medical, and educational schemes in Third World countries.

Some of these "private and voluntary agencies" as they are sometimes called, have "volunteers" or "cooperants" working in the lesser-developed countries. Others will simply be clearing houses for development education material. Some NGOs promote First World public awareness of international development issues and of Third World cultures through discussions at schools and with community organizations. Other groups are involved in raising money either to support local agencies involved in development, or to be sent to Third World countries to finance particular programs. Some organizations, such as Help the Aged and The Foundation for International Training, are formed for the purpose of working in a particular sector of international development. Other groups are more catholic in their programing and may be involved in a great variety of development activities.

Some agencies have a purely secular basis and have been established for humanitarian reasons. Other NGOs, such as the Sudan Interior Mission and

Catholic Relief Services, are religious or quasi-religious groups who view international development both as an extension of their Christian duty and as a possible platform for proselytizing. Finally, while an NGO's budget may in part at least be made up through fund raising, private donations or special projects, 30% to 80% of most agency monies comes through direct "Western" government grants. (13)

Purpose and Scope of the Study

Statement of the Problem:

Non-governmental organizations, unlike government departments, and bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, are reputed to have flexible organizational frameworks that encourage local participation in the decision-making and implementation processes of development programming. Thus, affected communities have an active voice in shaping their own destinies.

The purpose of this study is to show that most NGO activity in Southern Sudan, while being generally different in type from government efforts, and bilateral and multilateral activities, is not radically different in approach from the more official and larger development agencies. While most NGOs working in Southern Sudan do follow true to form in project selection, they do not reflect the usual NGO characteristics in method of implementation, since most NGO projects in the Southern Region are planned and carried out without local participation. Therefore, even within the existing NGO system in the region, Southern Sudanese are not given adequate opportunity to be involved in their own development process.

Secondary Objectives:

For the purpose of illustrating and analyzing the above hypothesis, the following sub-problems were also formulated:

1. The extreme underdevelopment that exists in Southern Sudan can be attributed to more than just geographical isolation, its frequent natural disasters, and its ethnic heterogeneousness. Colonial and post-colonial governments have constantly ignored the Southern Region, exiling it to the periphery of Sudanese economic and political life.
2. There are a great many "aid" organizations who are planning and implementing development programs in Southern Sudan. To date, no coherent development strategy in the region has emerged, nor has any major effort been made to integrate the existing socio-political and cultural structures into the complex development process.
3. There is very little cooperation or dialogue between the NGOs working in Southern Sudan. Instead, unnecessary mistakes are made repeatedly, valuable expertise is not shared, and there is unhealthy competition for programs.
4. For NGOs in Southern Sudan, the acute problems of transport and communication, scarcity of trained personnel, the dearth of relevant information, and the misuse of available resources often result in poor planning and "second-best" projects.
5. Some NGOs working in Southern Sudan have commitment lapses at both the field and organizational level. Self-serving reasons and motivations for being in the region take precedence over meeting goals relevant to the needs of the Southern Sudanese, often resulting in "showcase" development.

Methodology and Scope of the Study:

The general focus of this study was first formulated in July 1979. This fairly long lead time has allowed the use of several methods, both in Canada and in Sudan, to collect data relevant to the topic of: Rural Development in Southern Sudan : The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations.

In Canada I initiated contact through correspondence, or where possible through personal visits and interviews, with approximately 200 individuals or organizations involved with or having knowledge of development issues in Southern Sudan. This communication has been with non-governmental organizations and bilateral and multi-lateral agencies as well as with academics, Sudanese government officials, Canadian government personnel, and other experts on the Sudanese situation. Parallel sources were any available books, documentary studies, and administrative reports dealing with Southern Sudan.

In Sudan, the bulk of my time was spent in or around the Khartoum area, as transport difficulties made it impossible for me to travel to Southern Sudan. At the University of Khartoum I was given access to what is called The Sudan Library, which consists of the great majority of materials (books, unpublished theses, magazines, journals, reports, etc.) written on Sudan or by Sudanese authors. In addition, The Sudan Records Office, or National Archives, was able to provide invaluable primary background material. The documents that I found most useful here were letters and reports written by colonial administrators during colonial times.

In Khartoum I also conducted over 50 interviews. These informal sessions with Sudanese academics, government officials, official aid personnel, and non-governmental agency workers gave me a good picture of the state of rural development in Southern Sudan.

It is a fact that no research study of value has been conducted in the particular area of rural development in Southern Sudan and certainly nowhere is there any mention of the role of NGOs in this process. Therefore, this study could be regarded as an exploratory "survey" type of work which, in the process of testing the stated hypothesis, also provides basic information and descriptive analysis. To the extent possible, this study is undertaken for applied purposes, and it is limited to actual field experiences in the problem of rural development in Southern Sudan. Hence, particular attention is paid to the empirical side of the study rather than to the theoretical.

I have chosen to look at the problem of NGOs and their work in Southern Sudan as it exists, taking what could be labeled a liberal, holistic approach. It seems that if a more radical framework to this paper had been considered, the pursuit of a total restructuring of the present economic and political systems in Southern Sudan would have negated the need for NGOs in the region. Since I believe that NGOs do have a role to play in the rural development process in Southern Sudan, this approach was unacceptable.

Organization of the Study:

In order to meet the purpose of this study, the remainder of this work will discuss and analyze the role of non-governmental organizations in the rural development process in Southern Sudan.

The last section of this chapter will put this study into its geographical, economic and social context by first briefly discussing Sudan as a whole and then by giving detailed, factual information on Southern Sudan.

Chapter Two will trace the relationship between the Southern periphery and the Northern core region in Sudan, to explain some of the reasons for the

marked difference in development between these two areas, to examine the results of the disparities and to emphasize that the social and political factors in development planning, particularly in the early stages of nation building, are of extreme importance. To do this, the basic, if not inherent national integration issues which have contributed to the disparities that do exist - communication, ethnicity and religion - will be discussed. From a historical perspective, there will be an examination of the relationship between the Northern core and the Southern Region in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial times, as well as an account of the relief and reconstruction efforts in Southern Sudan in the early 1970s. In the final section of this chapter, the present dualism that exists in the Sudanese society and economy will be inspected.

Chapter Three has a twofold purpose : First, it will illustrate the impact on Southern Sudanese society of rural development activities stemming from bilateral and multilateral aid programs. Second, it will contrast these more official efforts with the usual approach taken by NGOs. In order to do this, rural development will initially be defined in general terms and then, more specifically, the rural development strategies of the government and of the bilateral and multilateral aid organizations working in the Southern Region will be looked at. From here, a survey of the program activities in Southern Sudan of these three rural development purveyors, in the context of transport and communication, agriculture and agro-industries, health, and education will be given. Next, the social impact of these rural development activities will be discussed, and finally an alternate approach, that usually taken by NGOs, will be submitted.

Chapters Four and Five, besides giving a detailed account of the work of the many NGOs in Southern Sudan, will show that most NGO projects in the

Southern Region are designed and implemented without adequate local involvement. Chapter Four will be concerned with the "umbrella" or "consortium" NGOs which organize and coordinate development efforts in Southern Sudan on behalf of various funding organizations. Chapter Five will deal with unaffiliated NGOs who work in the Southern Region. In this latter grouping, the NGOs work alone, funding and controlling their respective development programs.

The final chapter, Chapter Six, will bring together and reiterate the salient findings of this work, linking these findings with the central and supporting hypotheses of the study. As well, this chapter will make recommendations for improving NGO programming in Southern Sudan.

Background of the Study

The Country:

Sudan is the largest country in Africa. This immense land of close to one million square miles contains a relatively small population of approximately 17 million inhabitants. It has three distinct regions with varying topographic features and climatic conditions. Most of the northern third of the country is a vast desert. The Southern Region is a land of flood plains, swamps, and tropical woodland and forests. Large clay plains occupy the middle of the country where the two extremes meet, giving rise to a region of high agricultural potential and great possibilities for economic development. Through the entire length of the country runs the Nile River, along which large towns and villages have grown as a result of the transport and irrigation advantages of the waterway.

In describing Northern Sudan, Gaitskell writes:

Northern Sudan ...(is) the country of the nomad Arab following the rains with his flocks, and of his semi-nomad neighbour who grows his precarious subsistence crops. Through the length of this vast land of open horizons and great untracked distances, flow the two branches of the Nile, the sluggish White Nile from the great lakes in Uganda, and the Blue Nile, the flood-giver, from the mountains in Ethiopia. When the rains fade as the rivers flow north, the Nile adds another way of human life to the overall nomadic picture. In narrow strips along its banks, water wheels irrigate crops independent of the rains and so give life to settled villages dotted at intervals along the river course right down to Egypt. Where the rains increase far to the south, huge stretches of swamps demarcate the southern Sudan, where the Middle East ends and Africa begins. (14)

In Northern and Central Sudan, the people are to a large extent homogeneous in culture and tradition, despite the wide variation of their ethnological origins. These inhabitants are predominately Muslim and have in common the Arab culture and tradition. Nomadism across the desert plains and sedentary life along the Nile are the two main characteristics of the northern and central Sudanese, with the main vocations of the people being agriculture, animal husbandry and trade.

The Northern and Central Sudan are described here because of their distinct differences from the way of life and environment of Southern Sudan. The problems of rural development of Northern and Central Sudan are beyond the scope of this study, and the above and any subsequent references to these areas are made only to provide a clear background to conditions in Southern Sudan. This study is therefore concerned only with that part of Sudan where "...the Middle East ends and Africa begins."

Southern Sudan:

Slightly less than one quarter of both the Sudanese population and area is accounted for by what is generally referred to as "the South". The indigenous

peoples of the region are exclusively negroid, and have less in common with each other than have the Muslim groups of the North. The South, which consists of the three provinces of Upper Nile, Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria, lies south of the tenth parallel and extends to the north of Lake Mobutu in Uganda. The boundaries of the Southern Region were not drawn on any ethnic basis, but, as is common in Africa, are in fact lines drawn by the former colonial powers for the political and administrative convenience of the time.

Climatically, the South is distinct from the northern regions, as it has higher rainfall, longer rainy seasons, and more moderate temperatures. Geographically, the flood plain and the Equatorial region are the two major divisions in Southern Sudan. Along the White Nile and its tributaries, and at the southern end of the central clay plains, excess water has created extensive swamps with dense grass vegetation. ⁽¹⁵⁾ The inhabitants of the area are Nilotic tribes, who are nomadic and semi-nomadic cattle-owning people. The swampy land, or "sudd", is mostly unsuitable for agriculture, but in the dry season it offers these Nilotic people vast stretches of grazing land for their cattle.

The Equatorial region consists of two important areas, the Ironstone area and the Greenbelt. ⁽¹⁶⁾ The Ironstone area has generally poor ironstone soils, but has an adequate rainfall. This area is covered by broad-leaved grass woodland vegetation, harbouring the tse-tse fly, which endangers the life of cattle and other domesticated animals. The inhabitants of this region are also Nilotic but are non-cattle-owning. The Greenbelt, which occupies the southwest corner of the country, is an ever-green area with enough rainfall almost throughout the year. It has a moist and cool climate which favours the growth of perennial crops, and, due to the shortness of the dry season, little irrigation is needed. ⁽¹⁷⁾

The Sudanic and Nilo-Hamitic tribal groups that inhabit this area are cultivators and have almost no cattle.

If the future development of Southern Sudan were to be solely determined by the quantity and quality of resources that lie within the total region, then Southern Sudan, as a British economic survey team reported in 1952 could, "given the money, the technical know-how and the experts, ...easily become one of the richest countries in Africa."⁽¹⁸⁾ Indeed, the region has tremendous potential. Much of its area of 647,500 square kilometres is readily available and suitable for the cultivation of traditional foodstuffs such as sorghum, and cash crops such as coffee, sugar, rice, pineapples, and tea.⁽¹⁹⁾ (See Map 1:1.) The most recent census indicates that the South has about 5.5 million cattle, 3 million sheep and 2 million goats.⁽²⁰⁾ The region also contains more than half the country's fisheries, which are estimated to cover close to 2 million hectares.⁽²¹⁾ Much of the South is covered with thick tropical forests which are quite rich sources of firewood and timber. Southern forests also contain large numbers of wild animals, some of which, like the white rhinoceros, are quite rare, and could attract a large tourist market.

In spite of all this potential, however, a combination of factors has, to date, essentially cancelled out many, if not most, of these natural advantages and has hindered any sustained economic development in the Southern Region. Droughts, floods, pests, and diseases render much arable land unusable during certain periods of the year. As a result, only .4 or .8 million hectares are thought to be currently under cultivation. Also, crop yields are low, reflecting a lack of both modern technology and the market incentive needed. Shifting cultivation is widespread and soil preparation is by handtools, which are

themselves in short supply. Little or no use is made of pesticides, and improved seed, mainly for corn, groundnuts and sorghum, is just becoming available. ⁽²²⁾ In terms of livestock, diseases such as rinderpest, trypanosomiasis, anthrax, and foot and mouth disease cause serious losses. Certain beliefs and social values among the Southern peoples hinder the utilization of the region's vast animal wealth, as cattle are traditionally seen as a measure of prestige and wealth rather than as a marketable commodity. Hence, offtake rates are low. As well, lack of adequate infrastructure, financing and incentive have held fishing levels and timber extraction to a mere fraction of their potential harvests and have made a tourist industry, even at the most modest level, an unrealistic expectation.

The exploitation of these natural resources, and the reliability and efficiency of government services in the Southern Region also depend on a major improvement in the transport and communications systems in the area.* At present, access and transportation is limited to only a small portion of the Southern population; most areas of the region are inaccessible (see Map 1:2). Communications within the South and between it and the outside are very poor. The few roads that have been built become unusable in the rainy season and after floods, especially in the clay plains. ⁽²³⁾ Secondary and feeder routes seldom take the form of more than trails or footpaths, or are non-existent. Public transportation is characterized by irregularity and unreliability, and has a high accident rate. The only railway line in the South connects Wau with Babanousa and is essentially of no importance to the region as a whole, due to its uncertain service, lack of rolling stock, and an inefficient feeder network. There is a steamer service on the White Nile between Kosti and Juba through Malakal but

much of the fleet used is very old, and the upstream journey, almost 1300 kilometers, now takes between 21 and 35 days. Air service between Khartoum and the airfields in Wau, Malakal and Juba is expensive, and frequent shortages of aviation fuel, maintenance difficulties and scheduling problems⁽²⁴⁾ make the service unreliable at the best of times.⁽²⁵⁾

Southern Sudan's requirements in the field of medical and educational services are acute. Infectious and parasitic diseases (see Table 1:2) are prevalent. This high rate of disease can be attributed to difficult geographical and climatic conditions, diets low in nutritional value, poor sanitation, contaminated water supplies, insufficient medical care, and the continuous mobility of nomadic and semi-nomadic peoples. Life expectancy in the region is short, infant and maternal mortality rates are among the world's highest, (see Table 1:3), and most of the few modern medical facilities are confined to Northern Sudan, especially Khartoum (see Table 1:4). Many, if not most, of the inhabitants of Southern Sudan continue to rely on traditional diagnosis and treatment in times of illness.

The isolation of many of the villages in the region makes it difficult for the government to supply trained personnel in both the health and education fields. Present illiteracy rates are very high and the linguistic diversity of the area (not to mention the struggle between English and Arabic for official status in the South) poses basic education difficulties⁽²⁶⁾ which are not easily overcome.

On the whole then, Southern Sudan is currently one of the most under-developed and isolated regions of the world. If the poorest of Third World countries to which Sudan as a whole belongs is designated a "fourth world", then Southern Sudan belongs to a "fifth world", which is almost completely off the

scale of wealth as measured by per capita GNP. (27) The small farmers, pastoralists and fishermen of the region who make up over 90% of Southern Sudan's population (see Table 1:5) have, in the past, been excluded from any type of development or growth process, whether as recipients of goods and services, producers for the economy at large, or as partners in collective decision making. The result is a crippling sense of insecurity and poverty compounded by malnutrition, ill-health and illiteracy.

SUDAN
MAIN
TRANSPORTATION
NETWORK

Map 1:2

Source: World Bank, Sudan: Southern Region Agriculture
Project: Staff Appraisal Report, Washington
D.C., Report no. 2356a, April 26, 1979 p.28

Table 1:1

Types of Projects and Programs Favoured By NGOs

Those which:

- a) contribute significantly to development;
 - b) foster self-reliance;
 - c) are compatible with the priorities and needs of the population of the recipient country;
 - d) promote the economic and social progress of the least developed sections of the population; in this context particular attention will be given to rural educational, health and social projects and to projects which can be repeated in other regions;
 - e) develop local initiative and innovation and make the maximum use of local human and material resources;
 - f) help narrow the gap between the rich and the poor in LDCs.
-

Source: CIDA, Guide for Project Submission, NGO Division, Ottawa

and

Commission of the European Communities, Introduction to, and the General Conditions of, the scheme for the Cofinancing of micro-projects by the CED with European NGOs in the Developing Countries, Doc. VIII/620/75/Rev. 3, Brussels, July 1979. p. 1.

Table 1:2

Prevalent Diseases in Southern Sudan

Schistosomiasis
Cholera
Diphtheria
Dysentery
Filariasis
Hookworm
Kala azar
Leprosy
Malaria
Meningitis
Oriental Sore
Pneumonia
Sandfly Fever
Sleeping Sickness (trypanosomiasis)
Tuberculosis
Venereal Disease
Yaws
Yellow Fever

Source: Harold D. Nelson et al - Area Handbook for the Republic of Sudan, 1973. p.p. 134 - 135

NB. Latest medical reports also indicate that incidents of 'Green Monkey Disease' and a form of plague, both painful and fatal diseases, have recently occurred in Southern Sudan.

Table 1:3

Infant Mortality Rate in Sudan

(Last available figures 1956)

PROVINCE	PER 1000
KHARTOUM	71.4
NORTHERN	66.7
RED SEA	87.0
KASSALA	87.0
BLUE NILE	72.2
KORDOFAN	76.0
DARFUR	75.0
UPPER NILE	143.9
BAHR EL GHAZAL	111.0
EQUATORIA	132.9
SUDAN	93.6

Source: Sudan Facts and Figures, Ministry of
Culture and Information, Nov. 1974.
p. 13.

Table 1:4

Health Services in Sudan

ESTABLISHMENT	NORTH	SOUTH	ALL OF SUDAN
Hospital	114	25	139
Number of Beds	13,301	2,869	16,170
Health Centers	189	12	201
Dispensaries	682	116	744
Dressing Stations	1,627	260	1,887
Doctors	1,740	58	1,798
Dentists	137	4	141
Pharmacists (1)	67	0	67
Medical Assistants	1,158	78	1,236
Senior Nurses	265	5	270
Junior Nurses	11,465	1,496	12,961
Midwives	Breakdown not available		4,500
Health Visitors	357	3	360
(1) Private pharmacies	215	11	226

Source: Sudanaid, Yesterday and Today, printed by St. Joseph's Technical School, Khartoum, Sudan, 1978. p.p. 17 - 18.

Table 1:5

Rural and Urban Distribution of Population By Province in 1973
Southern Region Sudan

Province	Rural		Urban	
	No.	%	No.	%
Bahr el Ghazel	1,290,572	92.4	106,341	7.6
Equatoria	607,119	80.3	148,631	19.7
Upper Nile	761,104	95.3	37,147	4.7
TOTAL	2,658,795	90.1	292,119	9.9

Source: Department of Statistics. Estimates based on preliminary 1973 Census results.

Footnotes

- 1 - D. Goulet, The Cruel Choice, New York, 1971. p. 50.
- 2 - Ibid, p. 85.
- 3 - J. McHale and M.C. McHale, "Basic Human Needs and Sustainable Growth" in The Futurist, vol. XIII, no. 1, 1979. p. 19.
- 4 - J.J. Nassen, Surveys for Development, Amsterdam, 1977. p.p. 22-23.
- 5 - E.F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful : A Study of Economics as if People Mattered, London, 1974. p. 7.
- 6 - P. Arnopoulos, "New International Order May Not be Mainly Economic" in International Perspectives, September/October, 1977. p. 14.
- 7 - C. Elliot, The Development Debate, London, 1971. p. 64.
- 8 - C.C. Zimmerman and R.E. DuWors, Sociology of Underdevelopment, Montreal, 1970. p. 44.
- 9 - Alan B. Amey, "The Role of Canadian NGOs in World Food Supply, 1968-1977" in From the Bottom-Up: Involvement of Canadian NGOs in Food and Rural Development in the Third World, Ottawa, June 1979. p. 26.
- 10 - Most NGOs working in the Third World originate in North America and Western Europe.
- 11 - J.G. Sommer, Beyond Charity : U.S. Voluntary Aid for a Changing Third World, Washington, D.C., 1977. p. 8.
- 12 - Commission of the European Communities, Introduction to, and the General Conditions of the Scheme for the Cofinancing of Micro-Projects by the Commission of the European Communities with European NGOs in the Developing Countries, Brussels, Document VIII/620/75/Rev. 3, July 1979. p. 1.
- 13 - J.G. Sommer, Beyond Charity, p. 94.
- 14 - A. Gaitskell, The Gezira : A Story of Development in the Sudan, London, 1959. p.p. 25-26.
- 15 - H.D. Nelson et al, Area Handbook for the Democratic Republic of Sudan, Washington, D.C., 1973. p. 52.
- 16 - Ibid, p.p. 54-55.
- 17 - S. Bessis, "L'Agriculture au Soudan" in Afrique Agriculture, no. 33, mai 1978. p.p. 52-53.
- 18 - H.M. Awad, "The Southern Sudan : Planning for National Integration" in Sudan Notes and Records, vol. LV, 1974. p. 90.
- 19 - N. Kasfir, "Still Keeping the Peace" in Fieldstaff Reports: Northeast Africa Series, vol XXI, no. 10, August 1976. p. 11.
- 20 - The World Bank, Sudan: Southern Region Agriculture Project: Staff Appraisal Report, Washington, D.C., Report no. 2356a - SU, April 26, 1979, p. 3.
- 21 - B.M. Said, The Sudan: Crossroads of Africa, London, 1965. p.p. 136-137.
- 22 - The World Bank, Southern Region Agriculture Project, p. 2.
- 23 - M.H. Awad, "The Southern Sudan", p. 91.
- 24 - The Sudan Airways fleet of airplanes consists of two Boeing 737s, two Boeing 707s and five Fokkers, and is expected to provide both domestic and international service. With the total number of weekly Sudan Airways flights scheduled to leave Khartoum alone totaling approximately 75, these airplanes are taxed to the maximum, and flights are often very late or cancelled altogether.
- 25 - At the worst of times the service from Khartoum to the Southern Region, especially to Juba, is cancelled for weeks or months at a time. Explana-

tions for this range from lack of fuel, to airport maintenance, to political problems, to cholera epidemics.

- 26 - ILO/UNDP, Growth Employment and Equity : A Comprehensive Strategy for the Sudan, Geneva, 1976. p. 209.
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Chapter 2

A Background to Development in Southern Sudan

Introduction

Geography is a major factor giving initial direction to the development process. Due to the spatial distribution of natural advantages and disadvantages, development in the past has tended to be localized or focused in a favoured area, with the distribution of available investment, income, and other capital resources repeatedly converging in this area.

This tendency, of course, has been the key to the "growth-pole" model for economic development, the implementation of which has been the foundation for many national planning strategies both in the "developed" and "underdeveloped" worlds. "Growth-pole" models are based on the belief that concentration of investment in a favoured area will create a center of growth, to which labor, raw materials and foodstuffs are drawn and from which capital, technology and skills are diffused to an ever-widening area.

There is also the danger, however, that sustained and unregulated expansion in one core area will adversely affect other regions. Once a certain area has been able, through some advantage, to move ahead of other regions, the "backwash" effect or "polarization" effect that arises could greatly restrict opportunities for development in the rest of the country, as productive resources

like labor, capital and commodities are drawn into the growth area. Counter-vailing "spread" effects or "trickling down" effects from the favoured area are usually too weak in the poor countries to correct the balance; consequently the normal tendency is for an increase in inequalities between the core region or regions and the rest of the country. (1)

Sudan is a perfect example of the failure of the "growth-pole" approach. In this case the country is dominated economically and politically by the northeast riverine (see Map 2:1) area in general and the Khartoum conurbation, a region that embraces a circular land area with a radius of approximately 160 kilometres from Khartoum, in particular. This region is the only truly economically developed area of Sudan, as its advantageous geographical location around the confluence of the White and Blue Niles, its good soil, and close proximity to a port have formed an attractive base, drawing to it the majority of government services, and public and private investment in Sudan. Today the conurbation is by far the most important administrative, educational, medical, commercial and industrial center in Sudan. The west, parts of the east, and especially the Southern Region of the country, have continued to be social and economic backwaters, remaining in a quasi-colonial relationship with the northeast riverine area, supplying it with cheap produce and labor.

It can be argued, in theory at least, that the drastic imbalance that exists in Sudan today is part of a natural, logical, evolutionary process needed to bring about long-term and far-reaching development in the country as a whole. This hope, however, is of little relevance to the majority of the "peripheral" population who, as one Southern Sudanese leader suggested, are asked to accept their poverty, underdevelopment and backwardness "...and remain as a sort of

human zoo for anthropologists, tourists, environmentalists and adventurers from Europe to study us, our origin, our plights, the sizes of our skulls and the shape and length of our customary scars." (2) For them, the imbalance that exists within the country is totally unjust, exploitive and humiliating.

The feeling of exploitation and alienation is widespread in the Southern Region of Sudan. For many Southerners, the lack of "spread" effect from the "growth pole" to their area reflects not simply the failure of the development strategy. Rather, this failure is seen as being a part of a grand design perpetuated by the Khartoum establishment to continue to subjugate the South to a role of servitude and derision. The major constraints to development in this case are therefore due not only to physical or geographical factors, but, if the above argument is valid, lingering social and political considerations and conflicts have also played a major role in the slow development of the South and, conversely, in the accelerated development of the Northern "growth pole".

The Inherent Problems of Regional Inequality and National Integration in Sudan

Introduction:

Sudan is faced with problems which stem from its striking geographical, ethnic and religious divisions. The country is a mixture of numerous tribal and linguistic groups. Those from the northern section of the country are dominant in terms of population, and also, as we have seen, in the political and economic sectors. These divisive characteristics, which are the causes and, in certain instances, the effects of the problems of national integration, are also greatly

responsible for the existing internal economic and social inequalities that exist in Sudan. The problems of national integration and acute Southern underdevelopment are therefore closely linked.

To examine this linkage, three major factors which influence the national integration/regional inequality issue will be discussed: communication, ethnicity and religion.

Communication:

The word "communication" encompasses such ideas as geography, transportation and language. Communication is therefore a critical factor which can either promote or destroy national unity, and hence aid or discourage uniform development. If a national language is spoken by all inhabitants of a country, and if no geographical barriers are present to hinder the interchange of ideas and goods, then national integration is facilitated. If, however, a nation has more than one dominant language, and has some type of geographical feature discouraging overland transport, uniform economic and social growth is made more difficult because of the poor potential for communication.

The lack of communication (in every sense of the word) is a great deterrent to the development of Sudan as a whole and of the South in particular. The country is vast. Its topography and climate vary greatly. The only natural link within Sudan is the Nile River, which has in the past been clogged by the great "sudd" or swamp, hindering traffic between the economically progressive core region and the stagnant South. While efforts today are being made to construct roads and railroads, to unclog the Nile by means of a canal, and to connect the different regions of the country by air, the size and character of the geography are formidable obstacles to uniform economic and social development.

Compounding the problem of physical features is the language issue. In the Khartoum conurbation, the area from which the major Sudanese decisions are made, Arabic is spoken by all. In the South, where the principal language is legally English, there is no real common mode of expression, as the various ethnic groups (see Map 2:2) speak their own indigenous tongues. With more than three-quarters of the total population speaking Arabic, and with the major political, economic and educational sectors of the country dominated by the Arabic language, there is no question that friction, prejudice and imbalance occur.

Ethnicity:

Ethnicity, as defined for the purpose of this study, is used to describe people who make up a group and share common traits and customs which are distinct from surrounding communities or regions. When an area, district or nation is comprised of two or more of these cultural elements, a plural society (or tribalism or communalism or regionalism or sectionalism) may be the result. Therefore, ethnicity can be used to exploit differences in a country to further the class, political or economic privilege of specific groups. The resulting strains on development are imposed not only by the strength of ethnic loyalties, but also by the competition that arises among ethnic groups as they modernize and struggle for a share of the meagre resources of a new country.

In Sudan, the ethnic problems of the nation are further complicated by the distinctive racial compositions of the North and the South. Generally, the populace of Northern Sudan is, as has been mentioned, part of the "light-brown" Arab culture. The inhabitants of the southern third of the country are mostly

Negroid Africans and are part of the black African culture. These obvious racial differences found in Sudanese society tend to accentuate the ethnic and cultural differences.

Many Northerners, especially those living in the core riverine area, have long behaved in a quite superior fashion toward the Southerners. They have consciously used the ethnic and racial differences as justification for monopolizing power, stressing that the Southerners are in no way fit to hold any positions of real authority, nor are they competent to make any important decisions. Many Southerners interpret this attitude as a rejection both of them and of their African identity. They see Northern domination as an attempt to assimilate the South and its way of life into a totally Arab nationalist state, and to downgrade the region's people to a "second-class" race.

In both cases, it should be stressed, ethnicity is being used to further economic and political ends. Some Northerners do not want to share the reins of power or the economic advantages they have accumulated; some Southerners would prefer to have total decision-making powers in their own area and to keep for themselves whatever economic gains the region has stimulated.

Religion:

Religion can also influence political and economic integration. While it can be argued that religion is not directly related to the problems of uniform national development, it is, however, an important factor because of all the emotional and traditional feelings attached to it. If a country's different ethnic groups share the same religion, this common identity serves to reduce tensions and to increase trust. If, however, a plural society is further divided along religious lines, cleavages within the nation are reinforced.

The Sudanese situation is such that the Arab North, and hence the economic and political leadership, is primarily Muslim, while the South has a combination of Christian and animist religions (see Table 2:1). During the colonial period, Christian missionaries, in their desire to promulgate their faith, did all they could to combat Islam in the South and to label Northerners as slave traders. (3) When independence arrived, Southerners regarded the expulsion of Christian missionaries, the introduction of Arabic, and the standardization of the weekly holiday to Friday as attempts not only to turn them towards the Arab world, but also to complete the Northern "grand design" of a pan-Islamic culture.

An Historical Perspective

Introduction:

Common values may, under certain conditions, be the underlying bridge to national equality and harmony. One way that these shared values may be generated is by the transmission to the present of a joint history. This common past creates a mutual relationship or web, binding the people of a nation through their past experiences.

History can also, of course, be a divisive element. This is especially true where problems of national unity occur; history illustrates that the various groups which form a nation state may actually share few cultural, social or political traditions. When these groups are thrown together to form a single country, the ensuing mixed marriage could be plagued with problems of distrust, detachment, misunderstanding, petty jealousies, and regional inequalities.

The history of Sudan in its pre-colonial, colonial, post-colonial, and reconstruction eras shows the generations of internal conflict which are at least partially responsible for the existence today of division and disparity within the nation, and therefore for the acute underdevelopment of the Southern Region as well.

Pre-Colonial Era:

The history of Sudan shows that the problems of national development which are present today have roots firmly embedded in the country's past. The North has for several thousand years been in regular contact with the peoples of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Most of the Southern Sudanese were totally ignorant of the outside world until almost the middle of the nineteenth century.

From that time until 1898, the Northern Sudanese, first under the Turco-Egyptian regime (1821 - 1884) and later under Mahdist rule (1884 - 1898), attempted to dominate the whole country, using the South as a source of ivory and slaves. This exploitation, accomplished with the help of foreigners, was carried out at the expense of the Southern people.

The commercial invasion set the stage for significant trends which were to continue well after the Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist rules had terminated. On the one hand, the attitude of the Northerners toward the South has been maintained to the present time. The Northerners from the beginning "...shared a common contempt for the Southerner as an inferior being, coupled with complete indifference to his religious ideas, ethics, and standards of behaviour, his social and tribal pattern."⁽⁴⁾ On the other hand, the slave raiding, the plundering of

property, the constant commercial manipulation and the arrogance of the Northerners towards their Southern countrymen has created unremitting resistance on the part of the Southern people. This has developed through the decades into an almost excessive fear and suspicion of Northern domination and exploitation.

Colonial Era:

Between 1898 and 1956 Sudan was ruled by what was known as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. The title was, of course, merely a formality because the British were the de facto rulers. The primary reason behind British interest in the country as a whole was control of the Nile and its tributaries, as Britain was concerned with preventing any other colonial power from threatening her position in Egypt. ⁽⁵⁾ The South, while initially viewed as a useless territory "which would be difficult and costly to administer properly," ⁽⁶⁾ assumed some measure of importance mainly because through it flows the White Nile.

Though this narrow concern for the Nile did not warrant any real interest in the welfare and development of the Southern people, it did mean that some type of rule would have to be imposed in the area. While the pacification and occupation of the Southern Region began in late 1900,

...only gradually did British officers and administrators turn African resistance into collaboration and win a measure of confidence among the African peoples in the Southern Sudan, sometimes by cajolery, gifts and peaceful displays of power; sometimes by offers of protection or treats, and even by playing on the traditional enmities of the tribes. ⁽⁷⁾

This gradual process of "Pax Britannia" took close to thirty years to firmly take hold, but in the end it did establish the authority of the colonialist Sudan government.

Almost from the beginning of their rule, though the North and the South were formally federated into one nation, the British decided to treat the South separately from the North and to consider them as two entities in different stages of development and progress. The South was divided into three administrative units: Fashoda (Upper Nile), Mongalla (Equatoria) and Bahr el Ghazel. At the head of each province was a British governor. These provinces were subsequently divided into districts with British inspectors as district commissioners assisted by lower level personnel of Egyptian (later of Northern Sudanese) origin. The day-to-day problems of the various areas were left to a tightly controlled form of indirect rule. This process was imposed as the most "practical, conservative and inexpensive" ⁽⁸⁾ means of administration, and as early as 1911 the official government policy was to rule the South "...through the media of tribal chiefs and Sultans." ⁽⁹⁾

Again due to the lack of funds available to the Southern regions, from the outset permission was reluctantly given to Christian missionaries to set up churches and schools in the three Southern provinces; conversely, in the North Christian proselytizing was officially forbidden. The South was parcelled out to various religious orders and denominations, who were expected to train the personnel to eventually form the region's bureaucracy. The official view of the Governor General in Sudan was that the missionaries were to educate first and proselytize second, while the missionaries wanted converts first and educated converts second. ⁽¹⁰⁾ What occurred was that the pupil had to accept Christianity before he could be educated, which, while not satisfactory for the Muslims and animists in the area, was a compromise that the government had to accept for economic reasons.

The development of English as the official language in the South also occurred in these early years, as the missionaries shunned Arabic and taught mostly in English. Therefore the idea of adopting English was quietly implemented in much of the South until it became official policy in 1918. (11) (Another interesting influence brought by the Christian missionaries was that Sunday replaced the Muslim Friday as the weekly day of rest.)

The segregation of the North and the South even permeated the armed forces of Sudan. During the first years of occupation in the South the soldiers employed were Northern Sudanese, but in 1911 the training began of a local "Equatoria Corps", whose soldiers would be Christian, with the commands given in English. These Southern troops were regarded by the British as a valuable counterweight to the Arab influences in Sudan. The Equatoria Corps with its contingent of exclusively Southern soldiers, continued to be the sole military force in the South until it was replaced by Northern units following the 1955 mutiny. (12)

Economic development for the South was not even considered in the first decades of condominium rule. What resources were available to Sudan were invested in creating a basic infrastructure, mainly for the Khartoum conurbation and for other parts of the Northern riverine area, which in 1913 became the proposed location of the massive agricultural (mainly cotton) Gezira scheme. Heavy investment in Khartoum area projects and in the Gezira scheme diverted capital resources from other parts of the country. Though it was hoped, even at this early stage, that these projects would generate income to be used for development schemes elsewhere, (13) the "trickle-down" effect never materialized. These core projects, while providing jobs for the relatively few

Southerners who were willing to migrate north, proved to be the first highly visible examples of regional disparity between the Northern core region and the South.

With the rise of both Sudanese and Egyptian nationalism after World War I, the British-controlled condominium intensified its attempts to separate the North and the South. While certain policies were imposed, ostensibly to protect the Southerners against Northern domination, British administrators redefined their Southern goals because they in fact were alarmed that anti-British feelings in the North, encouraged by similar Egyptian sentiment, might spread to the South and even into British East Africa. ⁽¹⁴⁾ Therefore, the Southern Policy was implemented with the thought of using Southern Sudan as a buffer zone.

In 1922 the South was legally declared a "closed district", and Northern traders were greatly discouraged from entering the area, while the Permits to Trade Order of 1925 further controlled entry into and trading in the South. ⁽¹⁵⁾ Moreover, while it was never fixed policy, the British contemplated annexing the South to one of their East African territories. Economic planning was carried out in the East African context and Southern governors met with their East African counterparts rather than with their Northern ones. Southern students were even encouraged to go to Makerere College in Uganda for higher education instead of attending Gordon College in Khartoum.

On January 25, 1930, an official decree written by the Governor General of Sudan to the governors of the three Southern provinces left no doubt as to the object of the Southern Policy:

The Policy of the Government in the Southern Sudan is to build up a series of self-contained racial or tribal units with structure and organization based, to whatever extent the requirement of equity and good government permit, upon the indigenous customs, traditional

usage and beliefs...It is the aim of the Government to encourage, as far as possible, Greek and Syrian traders rather than the Gellaba (Northern) type. Permits to the latter should be decreased unobtrusively but progressively, and only the best type of Gellaba whose interests are purely commercial and pursued in a legitimate manner should be admitted...Every effort should be made to make English the means of communication among the men themselves to the complete exclusion of Arabic. (16)

The feeling that the South should "build up a series of self-contained racial or tribal units" signalled the creation of even further barriers to North-South unity and respect. All Muslim colonies were removed from the South, the licenses of Northern traders in the South were not renewed after 1930, and a pass system was introduced to control movement between the two Sudans. (17)

Most Northern officials who were working in the South were transferred to the North. The more devout Muslims among the Southern police were dismissed, Arabic names among Southern people were no longer officially recognized, and Northern dress among Southerners was prohibited. (18) By 1940, the Southern Policy had achieved its major aim. Arab and Muslim influence was almost eliminated, as the three Southern provinces were for the most part closed to the Northern Sudanese.

By the end of World War II, British administration in the South was coming under extreme criticism. It was realized that their policies resulted in the South being left further and further behind the North. In 1946 the Southern Policy was suddenly reversed. The British, realizing that they would be withdrawing from Sudan far more rapidly than they had initially planned, decided that the future of the South was bound up with that of the North:

The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the Southern Sudan is to act upon the facts that the peoples of the Southern Sudan are distinctively African and Negroid, but that geography and economics combine to render them inextricably bound for future development to middle-eastern and arabicized Northern Sudan: and therefore that

they shall, by educational and economic development be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future as socially and economically equals of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future. (19)

In 1947 the Juba Conference was held to inform the South of this radical change in policy. While the formal object of the Conference was to measure the views of the Southerners concerning policy changes, the Northern insistence on unity, backed by the British, meant that the real function of the Conference was to prepare the Sudanese for self-government and to persuade the Southerners to participate in the proposed Legislative Assembly. (20)

In 1948 the establishment of the Legislative Assembly for the whole of Sudan, with 13 Southern members, marked the beginning of the formal political unity between the North and the South. Certain measures were implemented in the hope of promoting a common outlook and a common feeling of citizenship. Total freedom of movement was allowed throughout Sudan. Northerners in senior government positions were sent into the Southern Region, ostensibly to speed up development in that region. Arab traders were allowed to set up businesses in the South and Southerners were permitted, if not encouraged, to work in the North. (21) Freedom of religion was reestablished and the weekly holiday was standardized to Friday. Arabic became the official language of the nation.

With the introduction of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1953 which ended the Condominium and introduced self-rule, and with the gradual withdrawal of British officials as full independence approached, nervousness stemming from the South's vulnerability increased. The failure to consult the Southern Sudanese or give them any sense of identity or expression in a unified Sudan, the fear of Northern domination, and above all the obvious lack of

development in the South compared with that of the North, had led to increasing resentment and acute concern for the future as Sudan moved inexorably towards independence. (22) As the Sudanization of the administration took place in preparation for independence in 1956, it became apparent that the North was not prepared to concede any measure of power or position to the South. When the Sudanization of 800 posts previously held by the colonial government was announced, Southerners found that they had been appointed to only four minor positions. (23) This proof of inequality was the final exasperation. On August 18, 1955, Southern troops revolted against their Northern officers, many of them fleeing into the bush to form the nucleus of the Southern secessionist movement.

The official reasons behind the British creation of a separate Southern policy are rather vague. This manner of administering the South was to be officially seen as a response to the physical isolation of the region and to reflect the genuine desire of the British to protect a primitive people from exploitation and domination - though in reality it seems to have been nothing more than a policy of convenience. (24) It was also felt that this policy was a natural extension of indirect rule, and that the continued Africanization of the South, which therefore meant anti-Arabization, was necessary for the implementation of indirect rule. (25)

There were, however, some other underlying reasons for actively pursuing the division of Sudan which were not always given as the official government explanation. One of these was the indecisiveness with which the British regarded the South's future. As was previously mentioned, the British could not decide whether the South should be part of Sudan or annexed to their East African territories. Another major unarticulated factor was the Christian phobia about

Islam. The Christian missionaries and some British administrators felt that by totally eradicating all Muslim influence in the South, they would stop the spread of Islam into Central Africa, preserving these areas as possible Christian sanctuaries. This served a dual purpose, also stopping the movement of Arab nationalism with its ideas of independence from creeping down into the East African territories. In the end, it is ironic that what materialized was exactly what the policies were designed to prevent: the domination of the South by the North.

By the time independence was approaching, the North was clearly dominant in every sphere of Sudanese society. Economically, the major manufacturing and agricultural developments are in the northeast riverine area. While some efforts were made to bridge the gap (e.g. the Zande Resettlement Project), wartime industry in the Khartoum conurbation further strengthened the axis of economic power in this core region. In terms of education, the English policies of the Southern schools clearly put most Southerners at a disadvantage when the time came for them to compete with Northerners for government positions which required the use of Arabic. In addition, it seems that the education system in the South left many Southerners ill-prepared for the Sudanese job market; an unhappy District Commissioner wrote, towards the end of Condominium rule "...perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the Southern Policy is the failure to produce in 10 years any Southern staff trained for executive work." (26)

The economic weakness and the apparent educational inferiority of the South in Northern terms resulted in the political and social balance of Sudan being tilted heavily towards the Northern core region. At the time of independence it appeared to many Southerners that the Northern power struc-

ture, centered in the Khartoum conurbation, was going to take advantage of the imbalance. The Southerners, in their quest to break out of their perceived role of servitude and therefore to overcome their political helplessness and economic stagnation, felt that since they were dealing from a position of weakness, they were left with little choice but to attempt to secede.

Post-Colonial Era 1956 - 1972:

The situation in Sudan between 1956 and 1972, the first decade and a half of independence, is well illustrated by the 1961/62 - 1970/71 Ten Year Plan of Economic and Social Development. Under the plan, major government investment was concentrated in three irrigation projects in the northeast riverine area. Together these projects absorbed 75 percent of all official expenditures on agriculture.⁽²⁷⁾ Industrial development, growing at an annual rate of 15 percent, was largely confined to the Khartoum conurbation.⁽²⁸⁾ The Ten Year Plan was prepared with advice from a World Bank mission and from a special United Nations advisor. Its content and structure reflected a conscious effort to continue the growth-pole strategy that had evolved during the colonial period, in the hope "...that in general more advanced growth in one region will spill over into other regions and that the former will partly supply the resources - without arresting its own growth - to develop the latter."⁽²⁹⁾ It seems that neither the failure of this approach in the past nor its political implications were in any way considered when these plans were drawn up.

The result was increasingly violent Southern discontent, articulated in a guerrilla type of civil war and a correspondingly acute reaction by the central government to repress this dissidence. Hence, while (US) \$35 million was

budgeted for a special five-year Southern development program begun in 1970, more than (US) \$30 million was spent annually on security in the South to put down an uprising which was at least partially a product of regional inequalities. This expenditure on security depleted foreign-exchange reserves and encouraged the continued concentration of investment in the more advanced Northern core district, where returns on capital are relatively rapid and assured. ⁽³⁰⁾

The rebellion in the Southern Region began with the Equatoria Corps revolt in 1955. Although this insurrection was suppressed and conditions in the area remained relatively stable for a number of years, some of the mutinous soldiers fled into the bush to form the nucleus of the Southern guerrilla forces. In September 1963 a revitalized campaign began with attacks by Southern dissidents on central government offices and installations. After the overthrow of General Abboud's military regime in 1964, in part brought about by the failure of the Sudanese army's repressive Southern policy, there was a short period of political, rather than military, maneuvering over the Southern conflict. In March 1965, the interim government led by Sir al Khalim al Khalifa convened the Khartoum Round Table Conference, attended by leading Northern and Southern politicians. Even though no agreements were made, it is doubtful whether any would have translated into tangible results, as the massacres of civilians in Juba and Wau by Northern soldiers in July 1965 ⁽³¹⁾ destroyed any chance for an immediate peaceful solution. The subsequent governments of Ahmed Mahgoub (1965 - 1966), Sadik el Mahdi (1966 - 1968) and Ismail el Azhari (1968 - 1969) were preoccupied with simple survival and were never able to properly deal with issues confronting them.

In May 1969, a military coup in Khartoum brought to power a left-wing military government led by General Nimeiry. Only two weeks after taking

power, the new President issued what is known as his June Declaration, in which he committed his government to the resolution of the North-South conflict as a top priority. Perhaps the most important element of Nimeiry's approach lay in the acceptance of a new and different premise for analyzing and eventually resolving the problem:

...The revolutionary Government is confident and competent enough to face existing realities. It recognizes the historical and cultural differences between the North and the South and firmly believes that the unity of our country must be built upon these objective realities. The Southern people have the right to develop their respective cultures and traditions within a united Socialist Sudan... (32)

Little actual progress towards a negotiated settlement was made for two more years. From the beginning of the civil conflict until this time thousands of Southerners had fled to surrounding countries⁽³³⁾ or were hiding in the Southern forests. It was also estimated that attacks by government troops, forced movement out of home areas, disease, and malnutrition had killed about 500,000 Southerners.⁽³⁴⁾

Having claimed since 1969 to be in favour of granting partial autonomy to the South and granting amnesty to members of the Southern Anya Nya,⁽³⁵⁾ Nimeiry moved from preliminary arrangements into advanced negotiations in late 1971. On March 27, 1972, Southern Sudanese leaders ratified the Addis Ababa Agreement, bringing about the negotiated end to civil war in Sudan. This accord provided the "Regional Self-Government Act" for the Southern Sudan (within a united Sudan), which allowed for the creation of a single, self-governing region out of the three Southern provinces, to be administered from Juba by a High Executive Council of 12 members.⁽³⁶⁾ The agreement also granted English the status of "principal" language in the South. In legislative matters the central government in Khartoum retained control over defense, foreign affairs and

customs, plus overall economic and educational planning. All other areas were under the jurisdiction of the Southerners. Other key articles in the Addis Ababa Agreement provided for the absorption into various government services of former Anya Nya soldiers and the reintegration of the estimated 200,000 refugees from abroad. ⁽³⁷⁾ Finally, it is worth noting that the overriding principle of the accord is acceptance by both sides of the unity and indivisibility of Sudan as a federal state. ⁽³⁸⁾

Relief, Reconstruction and Resettlement:

While the Addis Ababa Agreement may have fired the imagination of the Southern people, the realities of the situation at the end of the war meant that in the long run both the body and the spirit of the accord would be difficult to implement. First, the residue of 150 years of distrust, discrimination and hard feelings between the North and the South were not going to disappear overnight. In addition, what little economic development the South had achieved had been virtually demolished during the war. The transportation, health and educational infrastructure that had existed had either been destroyed or made inoperative due to military attacks. Complicating these problems was the utter lack of qualified administrative and extension personnel, as an entire generation of civil servants and educated personnel were missing for never having gone to school.

The Southern Regional Government (SRG) was therefore in the unenviable position of having neither the physical resources nor the administrative capacity to cope with the pressing relief and rehabilitation needs of Southern Sudan. Both the SRG and the central government, recognizing their limitations and the need for quick and practical solutions, requested outside help. The international

community responded as if a natural disaster had struck the region. A comprehensive emergency disaster relief operation under the auspices of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) was the major instrument.⁽³⁹⁾ The main supporters were voluntary organizations, especially church groups like Caritas, Church World Service and Lutheran World Relief. There was also substantial emergency aid from Britain, the United States and the Scandinavian countries.

The relief and settlement operation was officially terminated at the end of 1974,⁽⁴⁰⁾ by which time the vast number of refugees who had fled to the bush had returned to their homesteads, and approximately 170,000 displaced persons had returned from abroad.⁽⁴¹⁾ Reception stations for those returning from outside Sudan were set up on the borders with the host countries; similar stations were established in the larger villages to accommodate those returning from the bush. At the reception centers the former refugees were given clothing, blankets, and food. Then, those who came from rural areas were given agricultural equipment and sent to their homes. Those who stayed in the towns were given two months' rations and referred to the local employment offices.⁽⁴²⁾

The UNHCR Relief Programme in Southern Sudan spent almost (US) \$20 million between July 1972 and October 1973 (see Table 2:2). Although more than half of the budget was for repatriation costs, food, supplies of medicine, and shipment costs for urgently needed basic necessities, a large part was also used for important reconstruction and development activities such as the repair and rebuilding of roads and bridges, dispensaries, clinics and hospitals, and primary and secondary schools. The success of this immense task of resettling more than one million people in little more than a year and the impact on the economy of

this operation is probably best illustrated by the fact that for nearly all foodcrops, the area under cultivation was estimated to have been higher in the 1973/74 season than before the start of the hostilities.⁽⁴³⁾

It is not to be concluded however, that the relief operations all went smoothly and according to plan; the resettlement and reconstruction programs were also subject to a number of very real difficulties. These included poor rainfall which restricted the potential of the extended cultivation area. There were instances of lack of cooperation between Northerners and Southerners, and reports of deliberate obstruction by some Khartoum officials who opposed Nimeiry's generous policy towards the South.⁽⁴⁴⁾ There were snags in ferrying relief supplies into the South through Uganda due to poor security conditions in that country.⁽⁴⁵⁾ The onslaught of international inflation hit the emergency operations in Southern Sudan particularly hard, and the (LS)50 million which had been expected from donor agencies and contributing nations actually turned out to be less than 20% of that total, although considerably more in services and supplies was eventually contributed.⁽⁴⁶⁾

Another obstacle came from the high expectations of many of the refugees who returned to Southern Sudan. The refugees repatriated from the settlements of Uganda, Zaire, the Central African Republic, and Ethiopia had learned ways of life and acquired attitudes which were bound to create new demands as they returned to their home areas. As a UNDP senior consultant said at the time:

This has been a civil war, without victors or vanquished. From the political point of view, the unity of the country has been saved, but resulting in tremendous change in mental outlook, inter-tribal relationships and economic expectations for all groups in the Southern Region. Paradoxically, while the flimsy structures of modernization in the Southern Provinces have been shattered, the attitude of all the people in all walks of life has changed beyond all recognition.⁽⁴⁷⁾

These people who returned to their homes expected to be provided with a "welfare state", particularly in regard to health and education. Some of these refugees had been used to an urban life abroad. They refused to return to farmwork. Instead, they drifted into towns in a futile search for employment (see Table 2:3). By the end of 1974, the region had at least 35% more people to accommodate than it had at the end of the war, with a large portion of this influx bloating the already overextended towns.

The absorption into government positions of the former Anya Nya units also involved inflated numbers. While many of these men were integrated into the army, the police or prison service, some were taken into the civil service as administrators even though they had few skills or little education. The balance were originally hired for one year as agricultural and forestry assistants, road laborers and for other unskilled positions. This was meant to be an aid in helping these former soldiers in their transition into civilian life, but it proved politically impossible to release them from their jobs a year later, ⁽⁴⁸⁾ putting an even greater long-term strain on the government's acute shortage of funds.

Despite the many problems and shortcomings which plagued Southern Sudan during the reconstruction and resettlement period, at least a start had been made and a basis for development laid. This, combined with the establishment of a regional government with the trappings of local autonomy, created for the first time since 1955 the possibility of stable and orderly development in the region.

The Present Economic Dualism

Today, eight years after the end of the internal war, the delicate peace in Sudan is still holding, and the gains that are being made in the South are

themselves significant. Roads and bridges have been rebuilt. Telephones and telegraphs have been restored to their pre-war numbers. Locally grown crops have tripled in production since 1972.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Cultivation of cash crops and the raising of cattle for profit are increasing. Southern sawmills have been rehabilitated, scattered small-scale cottage industries have sprung up, and a university has been founded in Juba. On the political and administrative levels the Regional Government and its bureaucracy are functioning.

In a relative sense, however, the South has lost ground to the Northern core region. The structural dualism in the Sudanese economy caused by (or in some cases causing) technological, financial and social dualism, suggests that any interaction or influence from the modern economy in the Northern core region, while creating the possibility for some type of "spread" effect, is usually too weak to strengthen the traditional economy of the South.⁽⁵⁰⁾ Instead, the modern sector, centered in the Khartoum conurbation, is expanding rapidly on its traditional axis only, continuing to draw needed resources for this expansion from outside areas such as the Southern Region. Hence, despite the fact that the Khartoum area is poorly provided with basic industrial materials, over 73% (see Table 2:4) of Sudan's manufacturing industries, together with about 75% of the labor force employed in manufacturing, are concentrated in the Khartoum region.⁽⁵¹⁾ The per capita consumption of electricity, the availability of piped water, the number of schools (see Table 2:5) and hospitals, the transportation system and many other statistical indicators (see Tables 2:6 and 2:7) reveal that the people in the national capital area have an ever-increasing economic and social advantage compared to the rest of the country in general and to the Southern Region in particular.

The programs and projects implemented in the Southern Region since the end of the civil war have in reality barely affected the socio-economic difficulties encountered daily by the majority of Southern Sudanese; in some respects the situation may be even worse today than in March 1972. Not only is there a continuing scarcity of such basic commodities as flour, sugar, salt, and fuel oils, but, due to the rapid increase in population, the normal food staples of the area are not being produced in sufficient quantity. Inflation is rampant, unemployment in the towns is high, a "cumbersome" and "confused" bureaucracy has been installed, there is evidence of corruption at high levels, and the government is not a truly representative body. (52)

The high development expectations of 1972 have simply not materialized, as the majority of ideas have not advanced past the planning stage. For many entrepreneurs and government departments, a shortage of funds, power, and skilled management has meant continually postponing production starts. (53) Educational shortages are still serious, with only a small minority of children entering primary school and even fewer having the opportunity to go on to secondary school. (54) Health care is inadequate, as most rural dispensaries are inoperative due to a shortage of drugs, equipment, (55) and trained staff. It is proving most difficult to break this self-perpetuating pattern of low finances and unskilled personnel.

The frustrations of unemployment^e in the swollen towns, the soaring inflation and the unrealized expectations have led to discontent, making the regional administration increasingly unpopular. This dissatisfaction has led to the almost yearly change of regional government in recent years. At the same time there is far-reaching suspicion about the underlying concept of regional

autonomy. The suspicion is that the autonomy possessed on paper "... is in reality very small because of the region's dependence on the North for money and supplies." (56) This dependence brings us back full circle to the fear of Northern domination that was originally responsible for the economic imbalance and conflict. Development funds and personnel from the North are viewed as a means of spreading Arab and Islamic influence.

The South then is clearly in a dilemma, in that its people want to assert their limited autonomy, but their prostrate economy forces them to rely on the previously unreliable North. Any lack of Northern interest is seen as an attempt to sabotage Southern progress, but at the same time Southerners resent the quasi-colonial relationship which these centrally allocated funds represent.

THE NORTHEAST

GROWTH AREA

Map 2:1

Source: El-Sayed El-Bushra
"The Development of
Industry in Greater
Khartoum, Sudan" in
The East African Geograph-
ical Review, no.10,
April 1972, p.28

Map 2:2

Source: Godfrey Morrisson, *The Southern Sudan and Eritrea: Aspects of Wider African Problems*, London: Minority Rights Group, Report No.5. p.4

Table 2:1

Religions of Sudan

	NORTH	SOUTH	TOTAL
Moslems	12,780,000 (90%)	380,000 (10%)	13,160,000 (73.11%)
Traditional Religions	1,278,000 (9%)	2,660,000 (70%)	3,938,000 (21.88%)
Catholics	71,000 (.5%)	270,000 (15%)	641,000 (3.56%)
Other Christian Religions	71,000 (.5%)	190,000 (5%)	261,000 (1.45%)
	14,200,000	3,800,000	18,000,000

Source: Sudanaid, Yesterday and Today, printed by St. Joseph's Technical School, Khartoum, Sudan, October 1978. p. 13.

Table 2:2

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, South Sudan Relief Operation
Summary of Southern Sudan Utilization of Funds as of 28 September 1973

Main Items of Budget	Budget Allocation in U.S. \$	Cash in US \$	Commitments Kind in US \$	Total in US \$
1 - Repatriation	1,419,534	1,419,534	-	1,419,534
2 - Food	7,830,000	-	7,830,000	7,830,000
3 - Shipment of Goods	2,547,139	1,282,173	736,933	2,019,106
4 - Transport & Communication	3,654,682	3,520,379	134,303	3,654,682
5 - Shelter	349,749	333,613	16,136	349,749
6 - Agriculture	174,455	174,455	-	174,455 ^e
7 - Health	3,125,000	3,011,165	6,378	3,017,543
8 - Education	1,000,000	630,059	-	630,059
9 - Administration	710,625	557,625	-	557,625
10 - Reserve	34,499	-	-	-
TOTAL	20,845,686	10,929,005	8,723,750	19,652,756

Source: T. Betts - The Southern Sudan: Ceasefire and After, London: The Africa Publications Trust, 1974.
P. Appendix B.

Table 2:3

Resident Population in Urban Centers*: 1955 to 1973

Provinces and their Urban Centers	Resident Population (thousand)			Percentages of Total Population of Provinces		
	1955/56	1964/65	1973/74	1955/56	1964/65	1973/74
EQUATORIA	10.7	19.8	56.7	1.2	1.7	7.9
Juba	10.7	19.8	56.7	1.2	1.7	7.9
BAHR el GHAZAL	8.0	14.8	53.4	0.8	1.2	4.0
Wau	8.0	14.8	53.4	0.8	1.2	4.0
UPPER NILE	9.7	17.9	37.1	1.1	1.6	4.9
Malakal	9.7	17.9	37.1	1.1	1.6	4.9

* Including only centers which in 1973 had more than 20,000 inhabitants.

Source: ILO/UNDP - Growth, Employment and Equity: A Comprehensive Strategy for the Sudan, Geneva, 1976. P. 364.

Table 2:4

Industry in Greater Khartoum

Type of Manufacturing	Number of Industries		
	Khartoum Area	Rest of Sudan	Total
Textile	20	1	21
Plastic	3	-	3
Matches	1	-	1
Glue	1	-	1
Paint and Polish	3	-	3
Paper, Printing, Packing and Stationery	27	6	33
Perfume, Pharmaceutical	11	2	13
Oil and soap	18	11	29
Leather and Plastic shoes	13	-	13
Decortication plants	-	2	2
Mirrors and glass works	1	-	1
Buttons	-	1	1
Acetylene and Oxygen	2	-	2
Flour Mills	1	3	4
Maccaronia, Vermicelli	17	13	30
Cigarettes and Tobacco	1	1	2
Beer and Alcohols	3	-	3
Sugar	-	2	2
Vegetable and Fruit Canning	-	5	5
Tanneries	1	-	1
Cardboard	-	1	1
Ice and Mineral Water	8	4	12
Confectionaries and Biscuits	9	-	9
Workshops and Ironworks	25	9	34
Cork	1	-	1
Utensils (House)	5	1	6
Refrigerators and Coolers	2	-	2
Nails	1	1	2
Vehicle Assembly	1	1	2
Electric Equipment	2	-	2
Batteries	3	-	3
Building Materials	20	1	21
Mining	-	6	6
	200 (73.8%)	71 (26.6%)	271 (100%)

Source: El-Sayid El-Bushira "The Development of Industry in Greater Khartoum, Sudan" in The East African Geographical Review, No. 10, Apr. 1972. p. 31.

Table 2:5

**Distribution of Students in General Education
By Province, Level and Type of Education, 1973/74**

PROVINCE	PRIMARY	GENERAL SECONDARY	ACADEMIC UPPER SECONDARY	TECHNICAL UPPER SECONDARY	PRIMARY TEACHER TRAINING	TOTAL
Northern	95,672	20,058	2,722	248	188	118,888
Nile	79,739	15,481	3,652	246	841	99,959
Red Sea	39,346	5,173	2,385	351	139	47,394
Kassala	81,051	10,443	2,630	1,030	346	95,500
Blue Nile	78,860	11,007	2,523	-	-	92,290
White Nile	100,699	14,754	2,480	401	399	118,733
Gezira	217,978	36,535	7,987	1,175	884	264,559
Khartoum	192,982	33,354	13,899	2,006	433	242,674
North Kordofan	80,133	11,765	2,532	275	365	95,070
South Kordofan	70,206	6,557	795	-	475	78,033
North Darfur	53,644	6,558	1,607	-	246	62,055
South Darfur	38,421	4,480	530	261	234	43,926
<u>Southern Region</u>						
Bahr el Ghazal	41,168	2,150	706	-	-	44,024
Upper Nile	26,059	2,650	428	-	264	29,401
Equatoria	53,363	5,200	271	-	-	58,834
TOTAL	1,249,321	186,165	45,147	5,993	4,814	1,491,340

Source: ILO/UNDP, Growth, Employment and Equity: A Comprehensive Strategy for the Sudan, Geneva, 1976, p. 128.

Table 2:6

Geographical Spread of Bank Offices, 1973

PROVINCE	BANK OF SUDAN	OTHER GOV'T BANKS	COMMERCIAL BANKS	TOTAL
Khartoum	1	4	27	32
Kassala	1	3	6	10
Red Sea	1	1	8	10
Blue Nile	2	6	13	21
Northern	1	4	5	10
Kordofan	1	1	7	9
Durfur	1	1	4	6
<u>Southern Region</u>				
Upper Nile	-	1	1	2
Equatoria	1	-	1	2
Bahr el Ghazal	-	-	1	1
TOTAL	9	21	73	103

Source: ILO/UNDP, Growth, Employment and Equity: A Comprehensive Strategy for the Sudan, Geneva, 1976. p. 514.

Table 2:7

Distribution of Post and Telegraph Offices, 1973/74

PROVINCE	NUMBER OF OFFICES
Khartoum	26
Blue Nile	41
Northern	55
Kassala	12
Red Sea	10
Kordofan	24
Darfur	10
<u>Southern Region</u>	
Equatoria	9
Upper Nile	10
Bahr el-Ghazal	7
TOTAL	204

Source: Sudan Facts and Figures, Ministry of Culture and Information, Khartoum, Nov. 1974. p. 27.

Footnotes

- 1 - W.B. Stohr and D.R.F. Taylor, "Development from Above or Below? Some Conclusions" in Development from Above or Below, eds. W.B. Stohr and D.R.F. Taylor, London, 1981. p. 460.
- 2 - J. Waterbury, "The Sudan in Quest of a Surplus" in Fieldstaff Reports: Northeast Africa Series, vol. XXI, no. 10, 1976. p. 26.
- 3 - Beshir Mohammed Said, The Sudan: Crossroads of Africa, London, 1965. p. 90.
- 4 - J. Oduho and W. Deng, The Problem of Southern Sudan, London, 1963. p. 13.
- 5 - R. Gray, "The Southern Sudan" in The Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 6, no. 1, 1971. p. 113.
- 6 - Mohammed Omer Beshir, The Southern Sudan : Background to Conflict, London, 1968. p. 18.
- 7 - R.O. Collins, Land Beyond the Rivers, New Haven, 1971, p.p. 162-163.
- 8 - E. O'Ballance, The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955 - 1972, London, 1977. p. 28.
- 9 - R.O. Collins, Land Beyond the Rivers, p. 165.
- 10 - Ibid, p. 291.
- 11 - Mohammed Omer Beshir, Background to Conflict, p. 39.
- 12 - E.O'Ballance, The Secret War, p. 39.
- 13 - D. Roden, "Regional Inequality and Rebellion in the Sudan" in The Geographical Review, vol. LXIV, 1974. p.p. 504-506.
- 14 - E. O'Ballance, The Secret War, p. 30.
- 15 - Mohammed Omer Beshir, p.p. 41-42.
- 16 - "1930 Memorandum on Southern Policy" quoted in The Southern Sudan and the Problem of National Integration, ed., D.M. Wai, London, 1973. p.p. 175-179.
- 17 - D. Roden, "Regional Inequality and Rebellion in the Sudan", p. 507.
- 18 - Beshir Mohammed Said, Crossroads of Africa, p.p. 34-35.
- 19 - "1946 Memorandum on Southern Policy" quoted in Mohammed Omer Beshir's, The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict, London, 1968, p. 18.
- 20 - R. Gray, "The Southern Sudan", p. 115.
- 21 - Beshir Mohammed Said, Crossroads of Africa, p. 36.
- 22 - Sudan Ministry of Culture and Information, The Pride of May: Self-Government in Southern Sudan, Khartoum, 1977. p. II.
- 23 - O. Albino, The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint, London, 1970. p. 38.
- 24 - It is interesting to note that no such special arrangement was worked out to protect backward Muslim areas further north.
- 25 - O. Albino, A Southern Viewpoint, p.p. 19-20.
- 26 - Ibid, p. 21.
- 27 - Sudan Economic Planning Secretariat, The Ten Year Plan of Economic and Social Development, 1961/62 - 1970/71, Khartoum, 1962. p. 46.
- 28 - El-Sayed El-Bushera, "The Development of Industry in Greater Khartoum, Sudan", in The East African Geographical Review, no. 10, April 1972. p. 37.
- 29 - Sudan Economic Planning Secretariat, 1962, p.p. 46-47
- 30 - D. Roden, "Regional Inequality and Rebellion in the Sudan" p.p. 514-515.

- 31 - On July 9, 1965 an argument in Juba between a Northern soldier and a Southern soldier led to a night of killings and burnings by army personnel, during which anywhere between 1,000 and 3,000 people were killed. Much of the African quarter of the town was burned. Three days later in Wau, 76 people at a wedding reception were gunned down by Northern soldiers.
- 32 - Democratic Republic of Sudan, Ministry of National Guidance, Cultural Section, Policy Statement on the Southern Question, Khartoum: June 6, 1969. p. 2.
- 33 - Mainly to Ethiopia, Uganda, Zaire, and Central African Republic.
- 34 - H.D. Nelson et al, Area Handbook for the Democratic Republic of Sudan, Washington, D.C., 1973. p. 315.
- 35 - Anya Nya was the name taken by the Southern guerrilla army, derived from the Dinka word for snake venom.
- 36 - D. Roden, "After Three Years: The Present State of the Southern Sudan" in Frontier, Autumn 1975, vol. 8, no. 3, p. 15.
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- 38 - D. Roden, "After Three Years: The Present State of the Southern Sudan", p. 14.
- 39 - R.E. Gribbin, "Two Relief Cases: Biafra and Sudan" in Africa Today, vol. 20, no. 3, Summer 1973. p.p. 55-56.
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Chapter 3

Rural Development in Southern Sudan

Introduction

It has become apparent to many Third World governments, and to aid and development agencies, that the focus on industry and urban centered development has not helped to ameliorate the daily lives of the people in the Third World. They now recognize that if people in the developing countries are ever to take an active role in shaping their own destinies and if there is to be any type of sustained economic and social improvement in their countries, then a balanced rural development strategy is essential.

Rural development can be defined as being an "integrated trans-sectoral process" ⁽¹⁾ based on activities designed to promote "...the improvement of the productive capacity and standard of life in its broadest sense, of those in developing societies who live outside the urban areas, and particularly of those people who depend directly or indirectly on the exploitation of the soil." ⁽²⁾ This "improvement" may be expressed through the development of stronger institutions and the availability of more stable employment and income, as well as the advancement and upgrading of health, nutrition and education in the rural area.

Rural development, however, is not a straightforward, simple answer to the problems of the world's poor. There are many hidden complexities and problems

that go along with this approach. A strategy which so closely affects such basic human concerns as land, food and social organization requires a high degree of acceptance and involvement by those affected as well as a deep degree of understanding of the human values and institutions which are being adjusted or transformed. It follows that rural development schemes are unlikely to succeed unless they are wholeheartedly adopted and supported by the governments concerned, have the active backing and understanding of those affected by the program and unless effective administrative arrangements by local people can be assured. ⁽³⁾ A rural development project will be most effective therefore, when it responds to local demands, reinforces local effort, and builds on local tradition.

This chapter looks at rural development as it is today in Southern Sudan, from strategies to specific projects. As well, the social impact of rural development on Southern Sudan will be examined, followed by discussion of a possible alternate approach.

Rural Development in Southern Sudan: Obstacles and Opportunities

In 1977, Sudan's Ministry of National Planning published the country's prospective long-term economic and social development plan (1977/78 - 1994/95). This development effort:

...aims at progressive improvement of the quality of life and the general welfare and standard of living of its citizens and seeks the fullest realization of his potential. Dignity and self-respect of the Sudanese individual in the framework of social equity, full, self-rewarding and productive employment and adequate availability of basic human needs and essential goods and services constitute the

essence of the broad long-term objectives of the 18 year perspective Plan. To lift the economy from the preconditions of the take-off to the stage of self-sustained growth and to achieve a regionally balanced, self-reliant and accelerated economic development that would about triple real per capita income by 1995 and ensure its equitable distribution are the main objectives of the perspective Plan. (4)

Clearly, keeping in mind the great problems and discrepancies that exist in Sudan in general and in the Southern Region especially, these objectives are formidable tasks that involve markedly significant and drastic changes not only in the economy, but in the political and social attitudes of the Sudanese people as well.

To bring about these changes, Sudan's most recent development plans officially set out to discourage large-scale schemes and to encourage the traditional sector to take part in all aspects of the economy. In reality this design has not been followed and, though there are sporadic efforts being made to stimulate the traditional sector, much of the activity to date has involved large-scale, highly visible projects. Since Sudan does not have the adequate financial resources to invest in all sectors of its economy, it is trying to attract foreign money, especially from the oil-rich Arab nations. Of course, these outside financiers invest in Sudan in order to make profits, for political reasons, and, in the case of the Arab investors, in the hope of developing a "breadbasket" for the Middle East and a secure food supply. Consequently, development capital will be drawn either to a region where natural resources, transportation links, and government services combine, or to projects large enough and profitable enough to warrant sizable expenditures. The central government, in its quest to attract foreign investment, is certainly in no position either to dictate the foreign investment patterns or to financially support the development of the necessary infrastructure in the less favoured regions. Therefore, in order to

provide some semblance of development activity in the more remote areas of the nation, the central government has had no choice but to go against its own dictates and allow, if not encourage, large, growth-oriented projects.

After the termination of the UN relief operation, the prime responsibility of actual development planning, plan implementation and provision of public services in Southern Sudan rested with the Southern Regional Government. However, because the resources of the South - both in finance and in skilled manpower (see Table 3:1) - were very limited, it was painfully evident from the outset that infusions of capital and trained personnel from the Northern region and from external sources would be necessary to ensure that effective, comprehensive development be established. Hence, while the autonomy of Southern decision making was in a real sense reduced, the outside "knowhow" and financial resources that were and are being pumped into the region were seen as necessary preconditions to the social and economic development and growth of Southern Sudan.

The Southern Region is dependent on the North for most of its goods and fuel and for meeting many of its food and financial needs. For example, in 1975/76 the Southern Ministry of Finance prepared a recurrent budget of (LS)20 million (see Table 3:2) and a development budget of (LS)7 million (see Table 3:3). Of these (LS)27 million, (LS)5 million at the very most was expected to come from local revenues, with the central government being counted on to supply the rest. ⁽⁵⁾ Unfortunately, the Khartoum government is not always able to live up to its financial obligations. ⁽⁶⁾ While Southerners may suspect this lack of central support as being an attempt by the North to sabotage Southern development, the primary reason stems, as has been mentioned, from the sheer inability of the

national government to supply sufficient money, due to its own problems of liquidity.

To further complicate matters, several natural disasters have, since 1972, taken the focus away from development planning and implementation in Southern Sudan, with scarce funds and manpower used for the more immediately pressing problems. Severe flooding in 1974 and 1975 in Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile Provinces created even greater food shortages than normal. Outbreaks of cholera, Green Monkey (Marburg) and other highly infectious diseases necessitated the establishment of quarantine zones and have brought about restrictions on travel several times in the last 8 years. Drought, which seems always present somewhere in the South, has been particularly calamitous in the southeast corner of the region in the last two years (see Map 3:1).

In addition to these "Acts of God", the presence of large numbers of Zairian, Ethiopian and, most recently, Ugandan refugees⁽⁷⁾ in Southern Sudan has also put supplementary and essentially unproductive demands on the region. The SRG has made extra expenditures on special security forces and has created new bureaucracies to police, register and generally organize the refugee communities. Moreover, existing health and education services, which are not even adequate for the indigenous population, are being further strained by the presence of the refugees.

The international "development" or "aid" community (see Table 3:4) responded to Southern Sudan's plight and to the inability of Sudan as a whole to cope with the South's problems, by rendering its support through the planning and implementation of various development programs in the rural areas. Therefore,

along with government departments and private investment there are now multilateral, bilateral, and non-governmental groups involved in a multitude of projects in the Southern Region, bringing with them every and any type of development bias. In a region where the development focus was to stress the traditional sector, circumstances have dictated that a more comprehensive, almost "catch all" strategy is the norm.

A Survey of Rural Development in Southern Sudan

Introduction:

The process of rural development in Southern Sudan is a complex and slow moving one. It is very difficult to formulate realistic development plans, with the scarcity of vital statistics for economic and social planning on human and animal populations, rate of population growth, Gross Regional Product and per capita income. In addition, the money and manpower shortages, the extra human effort and the additional expenditures brought about by the many natural (and at times, less natural) misfortunes, and, of course, the existing infrastructural, economic and social realities in Southern Sudan have contributed to the near paralysis of the SRG in carrying out any type of cohesive development policy. Furthermore, the various levels of government involved and the external aid agencies working in the region bring with them their own philosophies, bureaucracies and prejudices. This mélange of approaches results in the planning and implementation of diverse programs and projects (see Table 3.5).

This section of the chapter will examine the salient features of the various governmental, bilateral and multilateral development programs under the

following subheadings: Transport and Communication, Agriculture and Agro-Industries, Health, and Education.

Transport and Communication:

The reliability and efficiency of government services, solving the very difficult supply situation, the development of agriculture and other economic activities, and quite possibly the very success of the Addis Ababa Agreement, all depend on a major improvement in transport and communication in the South. At present, the situation in these sectors is deplorable.

Major infrastructural investments must be urgently undertaken in the transport and communications sector. The Regional Ministry of Communications, Roads and Transports, while recognizing the pressing needs, suffers from the lack of trained staff, equipment, vehicles, fuel, materials and, above all, foreign currency, and is therefore not in a position to implement all the communication programs that are needed. Nevertheless, the Southern Sudan does have four strategic "termini" which connect it with the Northern Region as well as with the outside world: the Juba-Malakal-Kosti track and Nile transportation; the Wau-Kosti track and rail transportation; the Juba-Yambio-Zaire track; and the Juba-Uganda track.⁽⁸⁾ It is these traditional routes that are the foci of transportation development in Southern Sudan.

Through both Sudanese and foreign initiative, some 3,660 kilometres of road is being constructed or improved to "Engineered Gravel Standard".⁽⁹⁾ CIDA is financing the Juba to Torit section.⁽¹⁰⁾ The Dutch are assisting in the improvement of 200 kilometers of road between Juba and Nimule (on the Ugandan border), as well as helping to construct six bridges on that road,

including the Juba-Nile Bridge.⁽¹¹⁾ The longest part of the road-improvement program, the 960 kilometer Juba-Yambio-Tabura-Wau road, is being built with West German aid and under the control of consulting engineers from a Dusseldorf firm.⁽¹²⁾ This Juba-Wau Road, when completed, will link the river terminal at Juba to the rail head at Wau. It will connect the fruit and coffee-growing region of the western part of the Southern Region with the cattle and rice-growing areas of the central areas. It will also increase the mobility of the populations of the Southern Region.

It should be noted however, that the development of a network of road systems in the Southern Region is progressing very slowly, owing to the limited efficiency of existing vehicles, the limited supply and high cost of vehicles, spare parts and fuel, plus the distance of the region from the seaports of Port Sudan and Mombasa in Kenya. The quickest way to improve transport conditions with other parts of Sudan is, as has been recognized, by improvements in river transport. Twelve new steamers and barges have been purchased to reinforce the obsolete fleet.⁽¹³⁾ The 354 kilometre-long Jonglei Canal (see Map 3:2), which will be discussed in fuller detail later, will be a new lifeline linking North and South Sudan, cutting the travel time between the two regions substantially. The road built alongside the canal will be the first all-weather overland link across the central Sudanese plain, which is at present cut off completely from the outside world during the rainy season.⁽¹⁴⁾ Opportunities to reach markets through these better and quicker transport arrangements, as well as the knowledge that much needed supplies will arrive, could help transform economic prospects for Southern Sudan.

Other efforts towards improving the South's transport and communication system have been made. Juba airport is being expanded, Malakal's airport is being modernized and a large air terminal center is being built at Wau. Total investment in these three airport projects amounts to (LS)18 million.⁽¹⁵⁾ The Southern Region's communications with the rest of Sudan have been vastly improved with the recent opening of an earth satellite station with telephone and telex services to Khartoum - an important link in an information chain that will bring regional radio and television as well as a long-distance telephone service to the Sudan.⁽¹⁶⁾ In addition, a complete AM radio broadcast service is to be installed in Jubā.

Agriculture and Agro-Industries:

Present thinking on how agriculture in Southern Sudan should be developed is divided between, and in some cases is, a mixture of two ideas: mechanized rainfed schemes and large capital intensive projects such as irrigated sugar, kenaf, and rice plantations on the one hand, and on the other the selective development of traditional agriculture. It is interesting to note that the Southern Sudan Ministry of Agriculture and involved international agencies do not see these two as being totally incompatible!

The above stated "mixture" is best exemplified by the World Bank sponsored Southern Region Agricultural Project. In 1974 the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank's affiliate for concessionary lending, lent the SRG (US) \$12.6 million to finance this project.⁽¹⁷⁾ The aim of this project was to increase smallholder production of foodstuffs, primarily sorghum, maize and ground-nuts, as well as to reduce dependence on food

imports and to increase nutrition. Cash incomes were to be increased through the development of cotton and coffee as cash crops, and through the sale of surplus food crops. ⁽¹⁸⁾ In 1979 the IDA approved another (US) \$15 million credit to the SRG to help complete the institutional framework begun in 1974. ⁽¹⁹⁾

Separate from the IDA financed project is the large Pengko Scheme. This project, which involves 607,000 hectares of floodplain to the east of Bor on the White Nile, is a Dutch aid scheme. It is planned that with proper drainage, flood control and irrigation, year-round agriculture will be possible, involving wet season rice, sorghum and oil seed in the period May/October, and cotton, sugarcane, dry season rice and corn during the period November/April. ⁽²⁰⁾ Dutch consultants working in developing an applied research station as part of the project have stated that the soils of the Pengko Plains are "...probably the most productive of the Southern Region." ⁽²¹⁾

Some other donor projects involved in the agriculture sector include a UNDP/FAO crop and soil investigation program which has provided a base of applied research, agro-economic survey, and pilot extension for the western part of the region. ⁽²²⁾ A 40,500 hectare project for growing sugarcane along the banks of the Yei River involves smallholder farmers already living along the river. The agricultural part of the Jonglei Canal project is supposed to eventually bring 1.5 million hectares of land under cultivation through the utilization of heavy machinery. Coffee plantations totalling 57,000 hectares are being financed by the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development. ⁽²³⁾ Further recent project proposals are geared to solving problems of local storage, income, and nutrition, with much effort also being put into developing crops with high export value or those which can rapidly assist in satisfying urban food needs.

Aside from crop production, the livestock industry will provide the basis for economic development of the Southern Region, as about 90% of the inhabitants are considered to be pastoralists, combining animal husbandry with subsistence agriculture. Of these, an estimated two-thirds are nomadic livestock rearers. (Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Awak, and Toposa people ⁽²⁴⁾) The IDA financed Southern Region Agricultural Project is involved in building on this high degree of animal husbandry and is therefore involved in developing the livestock industry. The Project is operating the Livestock Production Centre at Marial Bai, just north of Wau (see Map 3:3). The work there consists of studies on the performance potential of local cattle, sheep and goats for meat production, and a pilot dairy ranching scheme for the envisaged smallholder dairy units to supply low-cost milk and milk products to urban areas. The centre will also compare local cattle and sheep under field and station conditions and engage in feeding local cattle in final fattening feedlots. ⁽²⁵⁾

Other projects include a livestock disease control program which is being financed by West Germany. Disease control survey units work with vaccination teams to determine the prevalence and the extent of livestock diseases; well over one million head of cattle have been vaccinated against rinderpest and pluro-pneumonia. ⁽²⁶⁾ The drug trypanosomadil is being slowly introduced in an attempt to control trypanosomiasis and thereby extend the possible grazing land. ⁽²⁷⁾ Demonstration projects have been implemented in the Juba area showing that the careful crossing of exotic European breeds with tropic hardy traditional ones can greatly improve yields of milk and meat while retaining native disease resistance. ⁽²⁸⁾ Also, some Americans from Texas have set up a demonstration cattle ranching operation. ⁽²⁹⁾

In the fishing, forestry and tourism sectors slow progress is being made. The reorganization of the SRG Fisheries Department, together with the establishment of a Fisheries Extension Service, has had a direct influence on the fish landings. Fishing schemes on the Nile, developed with the help of UNDP and Danish government aid, ⁽³⁰⁾ have offered good opportunities of employment and are a source of protein for the population. In the forestry sector the only mature plantation, 400 hectares of pine in the Imatong mountains, is now ready for harvesting. ⁽³¹⁾ An agreement has been signed with the British government to manage the cutting, sawing and transportation to the Nile at Juba, where the timber is shipped north in barges which previously made this trip empty. The West Germans have begun another forestry development program involving inventories and survey for further cropping and planting of both hardwoods and softwoods. ⁽³²⁾ The untapped promise of tourism is being looked at in a larger perspective than its present form of "big-game" hunting. (LS)10 million is to be invested in the industry and in protecting the region's abundant wildlife. ⁽³³⁾

New secondary projects are also growing on the back of the agricultural development, livestock, fishing, forest, and tourism industries. Industrial development, with its natural base in agro-industries and building material industries, has created considerable employment both directly and indirectly. A textile industry, albeit on a very small scale, has been developed in five Southern cities. ⁽³⁴⁾ Sawmills have begun to take advantage of the South's large timber reserves, and CIDA is involved in a small-scale portable sawmill scheme in the region. ⁽³⁵⁾ The town of Mongalla, with the help of Danish money, has a meat processing factory ⁽³⁶⁾ and poultry and fishery plants. ⁽³⁷⁾ Finally, the contribution of the all important brewery (at Wau) is of course the most notable proof of at least the rudiments of industrial development!

Health:

In order to combat diseases associated with poor environmental conditions, and because of the ever present financial and logistical problems, the emphasis of the Southern Ministry of Health has been on developing a widespread basic health service structure. The aim of the Primary Health Care Programme is health care for the "optimum population coverage in rural areas."⁽³⁸⁾ To achieve this a network of Public Health Community Units (PHCU) is being set up. Each PHCU will serve a population of 4,000 within a radius of 16 kms. For 5 PHCUs, a dispensary will be provided for the purposes of referral, supervision, and supply of drugs, forming Primary Health Care Complexes.⁽³⁹⁾ (See Table 3:6.) The basic approach that the PHCUs are taking towards the provision of health services in the South has brought about the creation of an entirely new category of personnel called the Community Health Worker (CHW), who is to be involved in both promotive and health care activities.⁽⁴⁰⁾ The CHW should ideally be a member of the community where he or she will serve, and whose training will be essentially one of community health (see Table 3:7). The CHW will be supervised technically by a Medical Assistant and administratively by the community through the Village Development Committee.

In other more traditional sectors of health care, progress has been steady if not spectacular. There are now over 30 major health centers and hospitals in the Southern Region, and the number of available beds has risen to 3,000.⁽⁴¹⁾ Also, the World Health Organization is assisting the Regional Ministry of Health in a major vaccination program against a number of endemic diseases.

Programs and projects are also being implemented which should help to alleviate some of the causes of disease. With progress in the agricultural sector,

nutritional standards will rise and the people will be more resistant to infections and disease. Small-scale community development projects, which in fact make up the bulk of programs run by a number of volunteer organizations, are teaching sanitation and water management. The World Health Organization and UNICEF are co-operating on a Domestic Water Supply Programme in the hard rock areas of the Southern Region, recognizing that the provision of a clean and adequate water supply is a prime requisite for improvements in community health standards.

Education:

There is no doubt that education is an important part of the development of a rural area. However, the questions of how much education and what type of education are subject to debate. Clearly, literacy facilitates the dissemination of ideas concerning agriculture and health, and normally raises the standard of life of a region. This type of education can, however, also generate levels of aspiration which simply cannot be met in the rural milieu, causing dissatisfaction and frustration and usually leading to migration to the urban areas. On the other hand, education which is based solely on the pragmatic day-to-day needs of the rural populace limits their flexibility and choice.

In Southern Sudan, the Ministry of Education has had the dubious advantage of being able to direct the thrust of education in the region without conflicting with existing structures. This is because the remnants of the educational system set up by the British and the missionaries in the first half of this century were seriously disrupted by the civil war. By the mid-sixties, education came to a virtual halt, as soldiers took over schools for barracks and entire villages fled

into the bush. The only base left was the small village school, whose flexible curriculum usually consisted of a combination of basic literacy, agriculture, and survival skills.

As far as primary schooling is concerned, it is these "bush" schools which form the backbone of the present educational system in the Southern Region. Today there are just over 100,000 students enrolled in primary school - or about 20% to 25% of the primary school-aged population. There are 12,000 pupils in junior secondary schools and 3,000 in higher secondary schools. Thus, for every 40 pupils at the primary level there are four in junior secondary and one in senior secondary school. Attrition is due not to dropping out but to a lack of facilities; even the schools that do exist may lack equipment, furniture, or even classrooms. They are almost universally understaffed and half the teachers are not formally qualified.⁽⁴²⁾ Although the formal stream of education in the South has a distinctly academic bent, it is also making an effort to effect a process relevant to the rural surroundings of the pupils (see Table 3:8).

In terms of higher education, there are now three teacher training institutes supporting and upgrading the lower levels of the SRG's educational program.⁽⁴³⁾ There are two technical training centers, one at Wau and the other at Juba. A new university has also been established in Juba. This institution is geared towards meeting the region's desperate shortage of administrative manpower. Although students will graduate with degrees in specialized subjects, the university hopes that these graduates will be "...well rounded 'social engineers' who can apply their skills creatively."⁽⁴⁴⁾

A less traditional approach to education is also being proposed by the Southern Ministry of Education with the help of the World Bank. A plan to

construct thirty Integrated Rural Education Centers (IRECs) has been drawn up. These IRECs would become focal points for development of village life, as primary schools for children and centers of adult education and training in areas where fewest educational opportunities are available. Each IREC would have facilities to support courses in agriculture, farmer cooperatives, domestic science, health, and village crafts as well as for children's basic education. The primary school program would be taught within the context of the village environment, and courses for adults would focus on skill development. Each IREC would have a health clinic to provide preventive care in the community. A store would distribute seed, particularly to those who participate in farmer training courses, to enable them to practice more effectively what they have learned.⁽⁴⁵⁾ In this way the earning potential of the farmers in the community would be directly improved. It is distressing to note, however, that while the IRECs were proposed and given support over five years ago, to date not one is in full operation.⁽⁴⁶⁾

Apart from the IRECs, there have been other and more successful efforts made in adult education. The latest development plan has set the goal of a 45% reduction in adult illiteracy by 1983. The SRG has launched a far-reaching wide-based functional literacy program which aims at the improvement of skills and attitudes, and the positive involvement of the individual in his society. This program, which involves people in the agricultural and service sectors (i.e. women), helps equip the target groups with basic reading and writing skills to the standard of fourth year in primary school and teaches the individuals in each sector the rudimentary technical knowledge related to their respective work situations.⁽⁴⁷⁾

The Social Impact of Rural Development in Southern Sudan

When one sees a man who has walked 700 miles with heavy loads on his head to earn 25 piastres, or a woman discharged from hospital cured of anemia, who will infallibly contract it again in the near future from diet deficiency and the towering effect of endemic disease, can one be sure that the moral obligations towards them can be discharged by encouraging them to produce commodities for sale abroad which nobody wants?

It is obviously much more difficult to plan the economic development of a country than to let it drift. But since the mandate of the administration is to fit the African for a place in the modern world, and it has not quailed before the task of checking the decay of his social system, it should not be afraid to give him an economic system suited to his needs and desires.

Comment on Economic Policy in Southern Sudan by P.J. Sanidson, Juba, 1939.

The problem of development, its scale, its focus, and its possible effects on the social systems of Southern Sudan are not, as the above statement illustrates, new concerns. Going through documents and correspondence from the colonial era, one realizes that the administrators and missionaries - the development personnel of that time - were well aware of the possible difficulties that their rule, presence, and example could bring about in the indigenous social institutions. They aimed, (or so they said) "... not to divorce the African from his natural background, but at teaching him to adapt himself to changing ideas and conditions." (48)

Their concern was, and still is, a legitimate one. Whether development is planned or not, or whether a project achieves its stated intention or not, culture, values, and ideas are going to change because it is impossible, and actually not desirable, to keep the Southern Region in isolation. Social institutions, either in traditional or modern societies, have to adjust to change, and, it is hoped, to evolve into something better.

The foreign aid agencies - bilateral or multilateral - which are involved in development in the Southern Region, do so of course with the approval of the SRG. For these agencies the question of development vis-à-vis the traditional culture and value systems of the society is basically a non-question. They are no doubt concerned about the widespread implications of their work, but it is felt that what they are doing is essentially right, and that the positive results outweigh the negative ones. Pragmatically, this means that if the aid agency personnel can help a child to live, or if they can bring clean water right to the village instead of having it carried for two kilometres they will do so with little thought for the social disturbance that may be caused. The widespread feeling is that the people will readily accept these improvements and will not be overly concerned that the introduction of these materially progressive programs will interfere with or change their value and cultural structures.

The SRG, the administrative body now responsible for development in Southern Sudan, is concerned with the possible effects of development on the region's social structures. But to the government, with its strategy designed to achieve rapid economic and social progress, the stated objective of development is the improvement of the living conditions of every member of society, and not necessarily the maintenance of the existing socio-political and cultural structures. In fact, many bureaucrats feel that these traditional structures hold back progress and modernization. Hence, the Southern Government's philosophy was well summed up by SRG President Abel Alier's statement that "...if we have to drive our people to paradise with sticks we will do so, for their good and for the good of those who come after us." (49) This is not to say that no thought or effort has been made to guard the traditional social systems of the area. In fact,

it seems that the "development" people in the government prefer to work through and to strengthen any existing structures. However, if these structures are not compatible with the aims of the government, or if they hinder the implementation of a program, then the government feels it has the right to impose its will "for the good of the people."

The most pronounced example of this imposition of development is the controversial Jonglei Canal Scheme. This scheme is one of the biggest engineering projects in Africa's history. The canal, which was started in 1978 and is scheduled to be finished in 1983, will be 354 kilometres long, 4 metres deep and 50-100 metres wide.⁽⁵⁰⁾ The purpose of the main canal will be to take about 20 million cubic meters of water a day from the "sudd" or large swamp through which it will pass, while another smaller canal, running parallel to the main waterway, is supposed to siphon off a further 5 million cubic meters for the irrigation of newly reclaimed desert and swampland.⁽⁵¹⁾ According to supporters of this joint Egypto-Sudanese venture, the Jonglei canal will not only provide the two sponsoring countries with additional water for the Nile valley, but for the hundreds of thousands of Southern Nilotic people, the scheme is supposed to bring new livelihood and a rise in living standards by creating vast quantities of arable land in the immediate canal area and by giving the impetus to "dozens of new industries."⁽⁵²⁾ The entire Southern region, it is also said, will greatly benefit from the improved river travel on the White Nile made possible by the canal.

There are, however, certain fears expressed concerning the Jonglei Canal Project. Environmentalists are worried that major drainage of the sudd could affect the temperature and humidity inside the area, destroying the region's

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fragile ecosystem and possibly create a new desert in the South. Rainfall in Ethiopia and in the Lake Chad district could also be affected. The wildlife and vegetation in the area could vanish once the drainage process begins. Politically, the project is not popular with all Southerners; some see it as a further proof of Northern domination. Furthermore, there can be no question that the completion of this huge project will change the social and cultural structure and patterns of life for a large portion of the population living in the sudd area. Many of the Nilotic peoples, especially members of the Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk tribes, are nomads who drive their herds of livestock across the sudd plain in search of seasonal water holes and grazing lands (see Table 3:9). Even though the government has responded to criticisms from conservationists, anthropologists and tribal leaders by twice changing the southern route of the canal, at least some of the lush riverine 'toiches' or pasture land, which now exist in the dry season when the floods recede, will certainly dry up and be lost. The canal itself and the associated agricultural schemes will create barriers in the seasonal migration routes, greatly changing the migratory patterns and hence the lives of the people. The introduction of a money economy, the demonstration of technology, the many new government rules and regulations, and the example of the many expatriates and Northerners in the area will undoubtedly cause social transformation.

Change in Southern Sudan: An Alternate Approach?

As was suggested earlier, the people of the Southern Region still follow, to a great degree, their traditional ways of life, and to date their social structures

have remained quite strong. The vigorous resistance to change and the cultural ethnocentricity of the Southerners have helped to perpetuate the notion that Southern Sudan is the last refuge on earth for Rousseau's "noble savage".

Yet Southern Sudan is actually, like other cultures, in a constant state of change. It obviously takes more than mere novelty to persuade anyone satisfied with his system of values to freely abandon them. Benefits must be apparent in the proposed change to warrant its acceptance. Southern Sudanese, while being conservative, have also shown over the years that they are not adverse to improving their lives by gradually and selectively adopting, adapting and integrating elements of foreign cultures into their own indigenous cultures. In pre-colonial times people in the South, just as everywhere else in Africa, organized their communities according to a framework imposed on them by natural environment, traditional socio-economic systems, accumulated experience, and rudimentary techniques of production. This long period was one of constant innovation, adaption and evolution, with the Southern Sudanese themselves able to make the decisions which affected their everyday lives.

Since the early 1900s, however, changes within the culture and value systems of Southern Sudan have not always been voluntary or even in harmony with these systems. First, the colonial authorities imposed new systems of administration, economy, production, and transportation that drastically altered the spatial structure of Southern Sudanese society and its economy. More recently, since the end of the civil war in 1972, the appearance in the area of a multitude of development agencies of every description, the discovery of oil and other valuable natural resources in the region, and the strong pressure exerted by the central and regional governments for transformation, growth and develop-

ment have caused strains and have accelerated change within the structure of Southern Sudanese society.

In general terms, the spread of services and infrastructure and their imposition on Southern Sudanese society have helped to link the rural economy with the national economy - in many instances effectively destroying village self-sufficiency and exposing it to more outside influences. With these external influences, new values and aspirations have emerged, manifesting themselves in new systems of agriculture, in new methods of husbandry, in different settlement patterns, and in the loosening of traditional links, as the new ways of life and behaviour invaded the countryside.

Specifically this means that even the smallest project is altering the social system of the region. For example, many settlements have in the past been distributed along streams and rivers. New water sources such as shallow wells and recently drilled boreholes have opened up new areas for settlement, especially along the roads where infrastructural services such as schools, health-centers, and transport facilities are more easily provided. (53) Similarly, new roads open to trucks and cars have boosted market centers along them, attracted more settlements, and/or caused the decline of certain previously important markets. Since rural communities reflect their cultural diffusions and attributes, the change of lifestyle brought about by a change of environment is also demonstrated in the cultural and social spheres.

Transport facilities, relatively easier movement (bicycles instead of walking), and the introduction of mass media have exposed much of the rural populace of Southern Sudan to urban institutions and have helped shape their values and attitudes. These communication and transport systems provide

channels for the flow of people and beliefs as well as for commodities. Village structures are altered as returning migrants or increasingly sophisticated villagers become involved in village affairs through new village organizations which ignore the traditional village leaders. Exposure to different ways of life, usually Western, is exhibited in clothing styles and in high brideswealth payments which are now demanded in money instead of in cows or spears.⁽⁵⁴⁾ As well, having grown accustomed to relying on market goods, much of the Southern population has at least short-term dependence on such goods as sugar, salt, edible oils, clothing, and soap, all of which continue to be purchased from outside rather than being locally manufactured or bartered.⁽⁵⁵⁾

Most education and literacy programs being implemented in Southern Sudan are concerned with educating the children of the rural population, most of whom are involved in farming. However, children are actually being prepared to leave farming for non-farm occupations.⁽⁵⁶⁾ The more education, the greater the mobility, and most Southerners who have attained even minimum education levels are attracted by what they perceive as greater opportunity and remuneration in the towns and more developed areas. Educational systems in Southern Sudan have altered traditional aspirations, with the broadening of consciousness and new motivations created through contacts with this modernizing institution.

With the possible exception of the Jonglei Scheme, in most of the rural development projects reviewed in the "Survey" section of this chapter, planning and decision-making are done at the regional level with the stated objective of satisfying regional and subregional requirements. While the potential for community involvement in the development process does exist in this system, the

step has not been taken from the SRG and from the many aid offices in Juba to the rural areas for community consultation and participation.

In theory, at least, there is an alternative to this approach, as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are generally reputed to plan subregional development activities at the community level and with community participation: The general impression of NGOs is that they "...exhibit high levels of dedication, honesty, flexibility, promptness of action, willingness to go into remote and needy areas, and have the ability to experiment and coordinate with other related efforts." (57)

Accordingly, NGOs, while realizing that change in traditional societies is inevitable, attempt to soften the negative impact it will have. They apparently feel that it is important to "educate" the "recipient" group about a proposed development program and to help the people who will be affected by a particular project to realize its advantages and disadvantages, as well as the possible alternatives. It is felt that the best way to ensure this local decision making and involvement is to make use of existing local skills and organizational capacities, and to attempt to design program inputs to best mobilize these local resources - be it for increased production in agriculture, for a building project, or whatever. Even if widespread involvement is not possible, the fact that a neighbour or a relative is allied to a particular activity facilitates its acceptance and provides a degree of dignity, where direct project implementation might only serve to humiliate the "target" community. In other words, the physical and intellectual participation of the local population is a most vital aspect. The program must therefore be flexible enough to adapt to local initiatives and to channel those initiatives in directions consistent with the overall development goals.

Accelerated social change in Southern Sudan is occurring through a combination of the imposed development strategies with the existing indigenous social systems. The final form and focus of those systems is therefore mainly brought about by the reaction of local inhabitants and the modification of their traditional institutions in accommodating these external pressures. According to the rhetoric of the NGOs, they are able to prepare the local people to better understand, accept, or even challenge the external pressures by making the people part of the development process. Chapters Four and Five of this study, while looking at the overall role that NGOs play in the development process, will, more importantly, examine the extent to which actual community involvement is taking place in NGO programing in Southern Sudan. (Note that these two chapters have been arbitrarily divided simply for reasons of symmetry and that both are of equal importance for the testing of the central hypothesis of this study.)

Drought Region in Southeastern Sudan

Source: "Scourge of Hunger" in Africa, No.108, August 1980. p.13

Map 3:2 - The original route for the Jonglei Canal ran from the Sobat River near Malakal to Jonglei, a village on the River Atem. The revised route joins the main line of the White Nile at Bor. A third route, now almost certain to be chosen, runs even further to the east, and will no longer cut through Dinka grazing lands.

Source: Earthscan, *The Jonglei Canal*, London: Earthscan Press Briefing Document No. 8, April 1978. p.9

Table 3:1

**Estimates of 1975/76 Manpower Requirements in the
Public Sector in Southern Sudan**

Category of Employment	Total Posts	Filled Posts
1 - Professional, technical and related workers	12,746	8,188
2 - Administrative and managerial workers	214	88
3 - Clerical and related workers	7,016	5,256
4 - Sales Workers	35	27
5 - Service Workers	15,741	14,300
6 - Agricultural, livestock, forestry, fishery	1,885	1,397
7 - Production and related workers, transport equipment operators, laborers	<u>19,022</u>	<u>15,953</u>
	56,659	45,209

Source: UNDP, Multi-Service Training Center, Juba (Phase II), Project Document, No. SUD/78/014., No. 2, 1978. p. 3.

Table 3:2

Approved Ordinary Budget for 1973/74, 1974/75 and 1975/76
By Ministry for the Southern Region of Sudan

No.	Ministry/Department	1973/74 LS	1974/75 LS	1975/76 LS
1 -	Regional Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, Animal Production and Forestry	361,807	555,825	734,182
2 -	Regional Ministry of Communications, Transport and Roads	99,460	158,685	947,222
3 -	Regional Ministry of Cooperative and Rural Development	150,410	188,055	371,564
4 -	Regional Ministry of Education	780,566	780,566	1,003,233
5 -	Regional Ministry of Information, Culture, Youth, and Sports	571,705	324,385	401,945
6 -	Regional Department of Conservation and Tourism	53,400	226,590	343,670
7 -	Regional Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities	423,720	569,255	620,847
8 -	Regional Ministry of Health and Social Welfare	1,652,255	2,102,851	2,754,659
9 -	Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning	617,629	272,628	288,404
10 -	Regional Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Supply	-	101,690	110,873
11 -	Regional Ministry of Administration, Police and Prisons	3,855,295	3,892,631	4,426,346
12 -	People's Regional Assembly	36,670	239,550	256,754
13 -	Central Regional Services	-	578,828	760,701
14 -	Regional Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform	452,295	302,900	395,622
15 -	Grant-in-aid to People's Local Government	-	5,200,000	7,217,460
TOTAL		9,055,272	15,494,439	20,633,482

Source: Regional Budget 1974/75 for the Southern Region of Sudan, Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Juba, November, 1975.

Table 3:3

**Special Development Budget for 1974/75,
By Ministry for the Southern Region of Sudan**

No.	Ministry/Department	Fiscal Year 1973/74		Fiscal Year 1974/75	
		Amount LS	As a % of Total Approved	Amount Approved LS	As a % of Total Approved
1	Agriculture, Irrigation, Animal Production, and Forestry	1,200,000	16.4	1,086,687	15.3
2	Communications, Transport & Roads	400,000	5.5	376,656	5.3
3	Cooperatives and Rural Development	400,000	5.5	525,000	7.4
4	Education	934,000	12.7	480,694	6.8
5	Finance and Economic Planning	1,000,000	13.6	900,000	12.6
6	Housing and Public Utilities	2,400,000	32.7	2,074,100	29.1
7	Health and Social Welfare	150,000	2.0	400,064	5.6
8	Information, Culture, Youth, & Sports	447,410	6.1	324,275	4.6
9	Information, Industry and Supply (The Ministry was not set up as a separate entity but was joined with the Ministry of Finance.)	-	-	361,429	5.1
10	Public Service and Administrative Reform	25,500	0.3	81,380	1.1
11	Regional Administration, Police, Prisons, and Legal Affairs	70,000	1.0	104,625	1.5
12	Department of Wildlife & Tourism	302,590	4.1	284,600	4.0
13	Grant-in-aid to Provincial Admini- stration	-	-	117,000	1.6

Source: Approved Special Development Budget for the Southern Region, Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Juba, November, 1975.

Table 3r4

**Major Bilateral and Multilateral Development Donors
Presently Working in Southern Sudan**

UN System:	UNDP FAO UNOTC WHO UNHCR	ILO IMF UNESCO UNICEF	UNIDO UNCTAD IBRD ECA
Other Multilateral Organizations:	African Development Bank Arab Fund Arab Organization for Agricultural Development		
Bilateral:	Abu Dhabi Fund Austria Australia Belgium Bulgaria Canada China CIDA Czechoslovakia Denmark EDF Egypt GDR FRG Finland Ford Foundation France IDA	Hungary India Iraq Ireland Italy Japan Kuwait Netherlands Norway Poland SIDA Sweden Switzerland Turkey UK USA USSR Yugoslavia	

Source: UNDP, Development Assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Sudan for the Period 1 January 1977 to 31 December 1977, Report of the Resident Representative, Khartoum, 1978. p.p. ii-iv.

Table 3:5

**Sectors of Rural Development Activity
in Southern Sudan**

Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
Culture, and Social and Human Science
Education
General Economic and Social Policy Planning
Health
Human Rights
Industry
Labor Management and Employment
Natural Resources
Relief Activities
Science Technology
Social Security and Other Social Services
Transport and Communication

Source: UNDP, Development Assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Sudan for the Period 1 January 1977 to 31 December 1977, Report of the Resident Representative, Khartoum, 1978. p. i.

Table 3:6

PHCU - Primary Health Unit

— - Normal Referral

----- - Emergency Referral

Source: Department of Health, Primary Health Care Programme, Southern Region Sudan, 1977/78 - 1983/84, Khartoum, 1976. p. 55.

Table 3:7

Health Care Activities of a Community Health WorkerList 1: Diseases to be treated in the Public Health Community Unit

1. malaria
2. gastro-enteritis, dysenteries and diarrhoea
3. respiratory diseases, upper and lower, including asthma and diphtheria
4. measles
5. wounds, including minor burns
6. abscesses
7. skin diseases, including scabies and yaws
8. malnutrition and anaemia
9. eye infections
10. venereal diseases
11. bites and stings: snake, scorpion and dog
12. guinea worms

List 2: Diseases to be referred to the district dispensary

1. leprosy
2. tuberculosis
3. suspected worm infections
4. bilharzia
5. ear diseases
6. kala-azar
7. cerebro-spinal meningitis
8. sleeping sickness
9. any other condition

Source: Ministry of Health - Manual for the Community Health Worker, Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1976. p.p. 3-4.

Table 3:8

Basic Subjects Taught at Each Level of School

Religious Studies
Arabic and English Languages
Mathematics
Science and Hygiene
Social Studies
Art and Hand Work
Physical Education
Rural Education and Industrial Arts (boys only)
Home Economics (girls only)

Source: Sudan Ministry of Education and Guidance, Development of Education 1976-78, National Report presented to the 37th Session of the International Conference of Education, Geneva, July 1979. p. 8.

Table 3:9

The Dinka Migratory Cycle in the Kongor Area, Sudan

Source: Earthscan, The Jonglei Canal Project, London, Briefing Document no. 8, April 1978. p. 13.

Footnotes

- 1 - CIDA, Rural Development and Renewable Resources, Ottawa, April 1976. p. A.2.
- 2 - "Rural Development: Report of a Working Group" in Journal of Administration Overseas, vol. IX, no. 1, January 1970. p. 13.
- 3 - This point was developed most effectively by Dr. Milton Esman, the Director of the International Studies Center at Cornell University in his lecture "Public Administration, Local Organization and Rural Development". This lecture was given at the University of Ottawa on October 15, 1980.
- 4 - Sudan Ministry of National Planning, The Six Year Plan of Economic and Social Development 1977/78 - 1982/83, Khartoum, vol. I, 1977. p. 23.
- 5 - J. Waterbury, "The Sudan in Quest of a Surplus" in Fieldstaff Reports: Northeast Africa Series, vol. XXI, no. 40, 1976. p. 22.
- 6 - For instance, out of the special development budget for 1973-74 of (US) \$20.4 million (for which the central government was responsible according to the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement) only (US) \$1.1 million, or 5% was received by the Southern Regional Government.
- 7 - Figures on the number of refugees presently in Southern Sudan range from 40,000 to 75,000. It seems that at one time in early 1979 there may have been as many as 150,000 refugees in the Southern Region.
- 8 - B.A. Buttig, "Better Communications in the South" in New African Development, no. 1, vol. 11, Jan. 1977. p. 57.
- 9 - H.M. Awad, "The Southern Sudan: Planning for National Integration" in Sudan Notes and Records, vol. LV, 1974. p. 89.
- 10 - Information received from CIDA's Sudan Project Officer, 1980.
- 11 - Sudan Ministry of Culture and Information, The Pride of May: Self-Government in Southern Sudan, Khartoum, 1977. p. 21.
- 12 - B.A. Buttig, "Better Communications in the South", p. 57.
- 13 - H.M. Awad, "Planning for National Integration", p. 90.
- 14 - J.O. Fadaka, "The Jonglei" in African Business, Nov., 1978. p. 16.
- 15 - Sudan Ministry of Culture and Information, The Pride of May, p. 22.
- 16 - Ibid, p. 22.
- 17 - B.A. Buttig, "World Bank Assists Southern Region" in Southern Sudan, no. 5, April/May 1979. p. 27.
- 18 - The World Bank, Sudan: Southern Region Agriculture Projects: Staff Appraisal Report, Washington, D.C., Report no. 2356a - SU, April 26, 1979. p. 3.
- 19 - The World Bank, IDA Provides \$15 Million to Sudan for Agriculture Project in Southern Region, IDA News Release no. 79/70, May 10, 1979. p. 1.
- 20 - The World Bank, Southern Region Agriculture Project, p. 6.
- 21 - UNDP - Development Assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Sudan for the Period 1 January 1977 to 31 December 1977, report of the representative, Khartoum, October 1980. p. 22.
- 22 - The World Bank, Southern Region Agriculture Project, p. 6.
- 23 - UNDP - Development Assistance - January to December 1977, p. 2.
- 24 - H.D. Nelson et al, Area Handbook for the Democratic Republic of Sudan, Washington, D.C., 1973. p.p. 84-87.

- 25 - The World Bank, IDA Provides \$15 Million, p.p. 1-2.
- 26 - A. Lycett, "Slow Development in the South - but No Desire to Break Union" in New African Development, no. 125, January 1975. p. 72.
- 27 - P. Hendry, "Choosing Among Awkward Options: Land Based Settlement in the Sudan" in Ceres, vol. 11, no. 4, July/August, 1978. p. 21.
- 28 - Ibid, p. 21.
- 29 - S. Bessis, "L'Agriculture Au Soudan" in Afrique Agriculture, no. 33, mai 1978. p. 53.
- 30 - A. Lycett, "Slow Development", p. 72.
- 31 - Ibid, p. 72.
- 32 - UNDP, Development Assistance - January to December 1977, p. 17.
- 33 - Sudan Ministry of Culture and Information, The Pride of May, p.p. 27-28.
- 34 - N. Kasfir, "Still Keeping the Peace", in Fieldstaff Reports: Northeast Africa Series, vol. XXI, no. 10, August 1976. p. 11.
- 35 - Information received from CIDA's Sudan Project Officer, 1980.
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- 37 - Sudan Ministry of Culture and Information, The Pride of May, p. 29.
- 38 - Sudan Ministry of Health, Primary Health Care Programme, Southern Sudan, 1977/78 - 1983/84, Khartoum, February 1976. p. 50.
- 39 - Ibid, p. 53-54.
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- 41 - Sudan Ministry of Culture and Information, The Pride of May, p. 22.
- 42 - Inter-University Council for Higher Education Overseas, University of Juba, Sudan, Background Information, (mimeographed), 1977. p. 1.
- 43 - Sudan Ministry of Culture and Information, The Pride of May, p.p. 23-24.
- 44 - Inter-University Council for Higher Education Overseas, University of Juba: General Information and Conditions of Service Leaflet: Addendum (mimeographed) London, 1979. p. 2.
- 45 - IBRD, Appraisal of a Second Education Project in the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Washington, D.C., Report no. 484a - SU., March 25, 1975. p.p. 8-9.
- 46 - Information received from the World Bank's Project Officer for Sudan, 1980.
- 47 - Sudan Ministry of Education and Guidance, Development of Education, 1976-1978, National Report to the 37th Session of the International Conference on Education, Geneva, July 1979. p.p. 19-20.
- 48 - Advisory Council of Education in Southern Sudan. Extract from the minutes of 6th Educational Conference of Mongalla Province held at Juba on 16th April, 1972.
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- 50 - Earthscan, The Jonglei Canal Project, London, Briefing Document no. 8, April 1978. p.p. 5-10.
- 51 - Sudan Ministry of Culture and Information, The Pride of May, p. 30.
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- 53 - C.D. Masueto, Some Aspects of Agricultural Change in a Rural Community: The Case of Yambio Area, Western Equatoria Province, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Khartoum, 1979. p. 160.
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- 55 - Ibid, p. 225 and p. 253.

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Chapter 4

"Umbrella" NGOs in Southern Sudan

Introduction

People who work in the development field with NGOs and with other types of aid agencies feel that if anything positive is to be accomplished in most Third World countries, then more than just good will and hard work is necessary. While these two factors are certainly essential, all efforts will be wasted unless there is an organization or structure to provide realistic direction and, just as importantly, material support to the development aim.

The Sudanese central government, recognizing these needs, approved the creation of a domestic agency which, ostensibly at least, is to help organize the volunteer sector in Sudan. This "umbrella" organization, called the Sudanese Council of Voluntary Agencies (SCOVA), was founded only in March 1980 and operates under the direction of the Sudanese Red Crescent Society. It is supposed to have representation from all voluntary agencies working in Sudan. SCOVA's purpose is to coordinate the activities of these organizations to make collective use of the available resources and to prevent duplication. ⁽¹⁾

This objective has met with some success in Northern Sudan, as a number of voluntary organizations working in the North have joined with the coordinating body. To date, however, very few agencies or societies working in

the South have registered with SCOVA. Reasons for this stem from SCOVA's recent beginning and from the communication problems between the South and Khartoum where SCOVA is based. Also, while many of the agencies functioning in the North originate in Sudan and are government sponsored, those in the Southern Region tend to be externally rooted and to draw their funds from outside sources. These latter organizations, though recognizing the need for a role for the Southern Regional Government in initiating any projects, feel that SCOVA will limit their autonomy and could adversely affect their programs.

Some NGOs in Southern Sudan have, however, already banded together to form three large consortium agencies which organize, coordinate and generally oversee their development efforts in the region. These cooperative groups are all church-based with membership depending on the religious orientation of the various Christian agencies involved. In this way the member NGOs retain control over the programs initiated, have a strengthened organizational capacity, and are comforted by the knowledge that their partner members share the same ideological foundation in religious as well as in developmental terms.

The three "umbrella" agencies - The Africa Committee for the Rehabilitation of Southern Sudan, Sudanaid and Sudan Council of Churches - will be discussed in the following sections.

The Africa Committee for the Rehabilitation of Southern Sudan (ACROSS)

Introduction:

Soon after the Addis Ababa Accord in 1972, a committee of several evangelical missionary societies came together to determine the most effective

means of assisting the people of Southern Sudan now that the civil conflict which had so adversely affected the area was over. Joining together as the Africa Committee for the Rehabilitation of Southern Sudan, they began a cooperative program of relief and rehabilitation assistance.

The initial ACROSS program was largely an emergency humanitarian effort. It was designed and implemented quickly, aimed specifically at bringing relief aid to the thousands of refugees who were returning from neighbouring countries. A major emphasis of those activities was on the provision of medical services, and on renovation or construction of hospital and clinic buildings. Other activities included training programs in tailoring and blacksmithing in Juba and in Wau, and secondment of interim expatriate staff for a variety of Regional Government positions.

Since 1977, ACROSS's reconstruction phase in Southern Sudan has given way to a focus on development. "Not wishing to perpetuate the one-sided, benefactor-to-recipient relationships characteristic of the ACROSS relief/rehabilitation programme, ACROSS is endeavouring to participate in the formation of two-sided relationships more characteristic of true partnership in human development."⁽²⁾ Responding to requests and directives from the Southern Regional Government and appeals from some Southern communities, ACROSS is today mostly involved in small-scale development schemes in some of the most isolated areas of the region. (See Map 4:1.)

ACROSS's membership, while greatly expanded, is still an association made up of evangelical Christian agencies or development arms of linked mission societies (see Table 4:1). Because of this organizational structure there is no general fund for ACROSS development projects. Each request for assistance

from ACROSS must be passed on for consideration to the member organizations. The ACROSS director communicates with one or more member organizations who are most able to provide the particular type of help needed. Any funds received from a member agency are designated to be used by one, or part of one, particular project. In several instances larger-scale projects have been made possible through co-financing arrangements between ACROSS contributing partners and their respective government foreign aid programs.

Besides channelling the necessary funding to its various programs, ACROSS is able to offer Southern Sudan personnel with technical and professional skills. All ACROSS expatriate staff are volunteers who go to Sudan for two or three-year periods. Occasionally volunteers extend their contracts for second and third terms. While usually working on ACROSS projects, some of the agency's personnel do at times also participate in programs partially or entirely funded by the Sudanese government.

Ultimate responsibility for the volunteers, policies and programs of ACROSS rests with the umbrella agency's Board of Directors, which is made up of fourteen representatives, each associated with one of the participating organizations. ⁽³⁾ The Executive Director and the Field Director (based in Juba) are responsible for implementing decisions taken by their Board of Directors and are authorized to represent ACROSS in discussions with the Regional and Central Governments. In the Southern capital the regional office maintains whatever stocks of supplies it can, especially vehicle parts, pharmaceuticals, building materials and fuel. ⁽⁴⁾ The organization also maintains a garage there in order to repair and service ACROSS vehicles and equipment. The International Office, located in Nairobi, channels communications to and from the associated

agencies in their various countries, as well as coordinating the purchasing and shipping of supplies not available in Southern Sudan.⁽⁵⁾ The needed items are either forwarded by truck from Nairobi to Juba or are transported by ACROSS's own aircraft which makes the journey into Sudan at least once each week.

The ACROSS projects now being implemented in Southern Sudan are based on what the ACROSS directors have identified as the five major areas of need in any given community in the Southern Region: water, health, education, rural community development, and small-scale construction.

Water Resources Development:

In water resources development ACROSS is assisting in the provision of new sources of water for people of Southern Sudan and is involved in helping communities benefit more fully from the water resources at their disposal. In 1978 ACROSS was asked by the Regional Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural Development (RMOC & RD) to drill 100 borehole wells in rural areas of central Equatoria. Unfortunately, attempts to hand-dig wells in this particular sector have always been hindered by the peculiar geology of the area. According to ACROSS the only feasible way of ensuring a reliable supply of water in the villages of that region has been to bring in a highly-trained crew and heavy equipment to drill very expensive, deep borehole wells.⁽⁶⁾ The ACROSS drilling team, made up of five Sudanese trainees and two expatriate engineers/supervisors, was forced to import a custom-engineered rotary/percussion hammer drilling rig particularly suited for drilling through the heavy granite sub-strata of central Equatoria (see Table 4:2). The initial cost of this rig and its support equipment totalled over LS 100,000.⁽⁷⁾

The ACROSS drilling team has, by default, assumed responsibility for well maintenance for the duration of the drilling program. The drilling and maintenance equipment travels extensively over crude rural roads and then must drill deep into solid rock. Consequently, the drilling operations are slow and costly. It takes an average of 10 days to drill one well, ⁽⁸⁾ and in 1978 each of the 85 boreholes drilled (of these 20% were dry) cost approximately (LS) 2,529. ⁽⁹⁾ Normal mechanical maintenance of the drilling equipment, difficulties in obtaining spare or replacement parts for the sophisticated rig and its support equipment, and fuel problems are also significant factors in the high unit cost of ACROSS wells.

The high cost and complex technology of the ACROSS rural water project has obviously provided few opportunities for significant community participation. The main locally initiated activity is the clearing of the drilling site. In addition ACROSS has not been able to work throughout its assigned area. ⁽¹⁰⁾ Most drillings have occurred at villages on the main roads, as the unwieldy equipment is difficult to transport on some of the smaller tracks.

In the water management program the ACROSS well drillers, rural community development staff, and health personnel all help communities to use their water effectively. The people in the villages are taught to collect and store their water in a hygienic manner and to avoid contaminating their water source. In addition, efficient water use in agriculture is stressed. Mulching crops to retain moisture, correct timing of weeding and planting, dry season irrigation in appropriate regions, and simple, inexpensive windpumps have been demonstrated. ⁽¹¹⁾

Rural Health Projects:

Improved health of the Southern Sudanese is the goal of a large portion of ACROSS activities. Many of the existing health programs are extensions of the reconstruction endeavors started by the organization in 1972. ACROSS is still involved in providing interim health-care staff until trained Sudanese nationals become available in large enough numbers. Five doctors and 50 nurses recruited from abroad by ACROSS are today based in 16 locations across the region. Under the direction of the Regional Ministry of Health (RMOH), ACROSS doctors undertake responsibility for medical and surgical services and/or the training and supervision of Sudanese health personnel. These doctors support and participate in the implementation of the Primary Health Care Programme (PHCP), Expanded Childhood Immunization Programme (ECIP), and other special RMOH schemes designed for control of endemic and epidemic diseases.⁽¹²⁾ The ACROSS nurses are involved in the day-to-day operations of a number of clinics in Southern Sudan. The medical program of these clinics includes general diagnostic, curative and referral services, antenatal care, and training of Sudanese personnel.⁽¹³⁾

Working within the RMOH's highly ambitious PHCP for Southern Sudan (which was described in Chapter 3), ACROSS is committed to offering appropriate forms of assistance with PHCP implementation in the Mundri District of Equatoria. ACROSS nurses, based at six locations in this district, conduct mobile general clinics and mobile mother-and-child clinics. The organization's policy is to conduct these clinics only at proposed primary health care unit and dispensary sites⁽¹⁴⁾ in order to later facilitate a smooth transition to the PHCP. Community health education - health promotion - is also an important focus of

the agency's health activities in the district: Where in the past much of the effort was directed toward curative medicine, new strategies are now being designed by ACROSS to introduce preventive services. Other ACROSS health activities in the Mundri District include PHCP promotion and training for Community Health Workers and village midwives.

Finally, ACROSS is involved in PHCP implementation among the semi-nomadic populations of Tonj District and Pibor District of Southern Sudan. The health workers in these two areas must contend with the seasonal migrations of large segments of the populations and with vast barriers of mud, swamp and water. The nomadic lifestyles of the people and the harsh environmental conditions of the Tonj and Pibor Districts have meant that regular ACROSS mobile outreach activities like those in Mundri District are impossible. Consequently, women carry children great distances to seek help. Most of the diseases treated are related to malnutrition and poor hygiene, with the result that promotion of adequate nutrition and cleanliness are prominent project features.⁽¹⁵⁾ Pregnant women are immunized with tetanus toxoid and are introduced to more hygienic childbirth practices.

Assistance to Formal Education:

Providing assistance to the Southern Sudanese school system through the recruitment of teachers has been the primary ACROSS contribution to education in the Southern Region. Twenty-three of the agency's teachers are teaching in primary and secondary schools in Rumbek, Loka, Mundri, and Juba.⁽¹⁶⁾ At the Maridi Teacher Training Institute, where the medium of instruction was changed from English to Arabic in 1978, the number of ACROSS lecturers has decreased

from 5 to 1. (17) These ACROSS education personnel, besides their teaching duties, may also assist with curriculum development, administrative work, and supervision of extra-curricular activities.

Rural Community Development:

ACROSS is committed to working with rural communities in order to help strengthen community organization and to help mobilize local resources to meet local needs. ACROSS community activities to date have been centered in Mundri District. A network of 20 part-time village development officers extends throughout this region. (18) Chosen by his community (the village workers have invariably been male) and trained by ACROSS, each agent provides a link between his community of subsistence farmers and the four expatriate and four Sudanese ACROSS village development experts based in the two larger towns of the region. This staff, which is qualified in agriculture and in civil engineering, is able to furnish assistance aimed at overcoming the locally identified problems. ACROSS, however, supplies only the minimum of material resources when helping with local difficulties, preferring instead that local products be utilized.

In response to perceived community needs, present development goals in the Mundri District include the improvement of feeder roads and bridges in the district. Tools, materials, and supervision are contributed by ACROSS when a community decides to undertake such a project. Another objective is to increase food crop production and to replace fruit trees lost during the civil war. The village worker introduces his community to new ideas and sells seeds or locally grown seedlings and other supplies at reasonable prices. Many agricultural implements designed by agriculturalists but made by village blacksmiths have

also been distributed. A third community development objective is the advancement of poultry stocks through better poultry management and the introduction of hybrid eggs. Development of animal traction (animal drawn carts) and simple village mechanization have been identified as needs, and are therefore ACROSS priorities in the Mundri District. Finally, an effort is being made to strengthen the cash crop potential of the area. ACROSS is helping Mundri District communities improve production and marketing of several small-scale cash crops including honey, beeswax and papain. (19)

Construction Work:

Until 1977 ACROSS construction work had been limited to the erection or renovation of housing, stores, clinics, and workshops which were mainly designed to serve the needs of ACROSS volunteers. In the past three years however, ACROSS has been able to participate in several construction projects more closely related to the needs of Southern Sudanese communities and institutions. (see Table 4:3). ACROSS has recently taken part in several small road and bridge schemes to help improve communication. A classroom block and a dormitory were constructed in Pibor and in 1978/79, ACROSS helped to complete construction of six PHC units and one PHCP dispensary in Mundri District.

Conclusion:

Although it is too early to determine the success rate of ACROSS programs, it can be said that the organization is trying to meet the needs and demands of both the people they are working with and the Southern Regional

Government; while the water-drilling project has proven to be unavoidably expensive and technically sophisticated most of the other programs are being dealt with in a simple and straightforward manner. The end result is that the development strategy employed has, for the most part, been aimed at stimulating and encouraging local initiative.

These five project areas do, then, at least partially fulfill one ACROSS goal; to help the people of Southern Sudan in the development of their region. However, due to the religious nature of the organization and that of its member agencies, ACROSS also has as its objective the strengthening of the Christian Church in Southern Sudan. In addition to the major programs demonstrating "...the concern of Christians for both the spiritual and physical well-being of - (Southern Sudanese)," ⁽²⁰⁾ ACROSS is involved more directly in church-related activities. It has seconded personnel to teach in theological colleges. The agency's construction team has built or renovated churches or homes of church personnel. Hymn books, Bibles and other types of religious literature have been donated by ACROSS. Finally, the organization has rendered continued assistance to member churches including vehicle maintenance, provision of fuel and materials, and transportation of goods and materials by road and by air. ⁽²¹⁾ Hence, while more overt proselytizing is forbidden by the national government, the success of the projects, the growing number of churches, and the high profile of the affiliated personnel will, according to ACROSS, serve as a subtle reminder of the presence and dynamism of the Christian Church in Southern Sudan.

Sudanaid

Introduction:

Catholic missionary work in Southern Sudan, once concerned primarily with spiritual guidance and education, now has an entirely new image as a contributor to social and economic development in the region. The Catholic Church arrived at this changed role through a fairly lengthy process. During the 55 years of colonial rule it worked hard at the traditional missionary activities of spreading the Gospel and converting the Southern Region's indigenous peoples to Catholicism. In 1957 their schools, then the main venue for missionary activities, were nationalized. This was followed in 1964 by the expulsion of expatriate missionaries from the Southern Region. In all about 272 priests and nuns were expelled, leaving less than 70 Sudanese priests, brothers and sisters. ⁽²²⁾ This, along with the problems caused by the civil war, meant that most existing Catholic Mission centers were neglected and that any coherent, progressive church-related activities and programs were almost non-existent. Then in 1972 came the Addis Ababa Agreement and the establishment of full diplomatic relations between Sudan and the Vatican. ⁽²³⁾ To coincide with this the Sudanese national government proclaimed a more liberal policy, allowing for free religious activities in the country as long as no active proselytizing took place. In addition, the Khartoum administration encouraged the churches to participate in the rehabilitation and resettlement of Southern refugees, and in the general development of the South.

In response, teams of Catholic expatriate missionaries moved back into Southern Sudan to rebuild their neglected parishes and to help in the develop-

ment of the region (see Table 4:4). At the same time many Catholic organizations and churches around the world offered their help in the Southern relief efforts. In September 1972 the Sudan Catholic Bishops' Conference in Juba founded Sudanaid to coordinate assistance from the large number of contributing Catholic agencies and individual parishes. At the end of the relief phase in 1977, the organization became the executive secretariat of the Episcopal Commission for Aid and Development, in charge of all the development and aid projects of the Catholic Church in Sudan.

As the official development arm of the Catholic Church in Sudan, Sudanaid has the credibility and backing it needs to meet at least some of its wide-ranging objectives. The organization's aims are:

...to organize, start, direct, support and coordinate the local communities for the benefit of the needy, irrespective of race, colour or religion. And to give expression of authentic witness of human brotherhood at the local level. To study and execute projects for relief, social and economic development. And to represent the local associations in their relations with civil authorities, and other official institutions both national and international. (24)

Sudanaid is at the service of the whole Catholic Church in Sudan, but is of special importance to the Southern Region. Due to the dominance of Islam in the North and the historical presence of the Catholic Church in the South, five of the seven Sudanese Catholic dioceses are located in the South.⁽²⁵⁾ In each of these dioceses a committee made up of local people identifies the development needs of their own communities and, within certain guidelines,⁽²⁶⁾ draws up relevant project proposals. The proposals are then sent to the Sudanaid office in Khartoum for review. Here the Sudanaid officials, after inspecting the various proposals received, send them abroad, matching the planned schemes with the potential funding organizations⁽²⁷⁾ (see Table 4:5). Sudanaid has no special

funds and all the project proposals it receives are sent on an individual basis to either Western Europe or North America for financing. In 1978 nearly (LS)1 million was channeled through Sudanaid back to the diocesan associations and their projects. ⁽²⁸⁾ In the first nine months of 1979 (LS)930,000 was spent in a similar manner (see Table 4:6).

Sudanaid, at present, is involved in approximately 800 projects in Sudan as a whole, with 75 percent of these located in the Southern Region. The majority of these projects are focused in four program areas: Education, Health, Micro-Social-Realization and Emergency Assistance.

The Education Program:

In many ways Sudanaid's role in the educational system of Southern Sudan is just a continuation of the Catholic Church's activities in the region before the nationalization of schools in 1957. The major difference today is that Sudanaid is now an outside agency trying to assist the controlling organ, in this case the Southern Regional Government, to implement its education policy. Sudanaid is helping the SRG in the construction of new schools, and in the extension and maintenance of existing ones. It is also trying to aid in meeting the day-to-day expenses of now self-supporting schools and in financing scholarships for students from the Southern Region who migrate to the large Northern centers to pursue their education.

Recently, due to a shift in national government policy, some Christian organizations have been allowed to reestablish their own schools on a limited basis. The Catholic Church through Sudanaid, has opened a few small schools in the Southern Region (see Table 4:7). These schools have only kindergarten and

the primary grades, and are staffed mainly by priests and nuns. Because of less government involvement in adult education, Sudanaid is also making great efforts in this area, especially in literacy. A Sudanaid program is now in operation in 12 Adult Education Centers in Southern Sudan. (29)

Health Program:

Sudanaid is participating in the development of a comprehensive health program in Southern Sudan. To this end the organization is involved in the government-administered PHCP as well as in some independently administered health projects. Sudanaid, through the direct funding of Caritas Germany, built 5 health centers and 21 dispensaries for the Regional Government in the Southern Region. (30) The organization has helped to staff these rural health units and the government hospitals in Juba, Malakal and Wau by providing nursing sisters and brothers. In addition, Sudanaid has built homes for their personnel and for other expatriate staff. Finally, various Catholic aid agencies have, through Sudanaid, supplied medicines (31) and equipment (32) to dispensaries and hospitals in Southern Sudan. These are donated free of charge to the Regional Ministry of Health except for the cost of transport within the country.

Independent of the government health network, Sudanaid is involved in two major health programs in Southern Sudan. The first, the biggest single Sudanaid project, is the (LS)1.35 million Health Training Institute in Wau which is being financed over a four-year period by Misericordia, the West German Bishops' Association. The purpose of this center is to train all the medical assistants, nurses and midwives for the Southern Region. When the school is finished (scheduled for late 1981), it will have a capacity of 160 students per year. At its completion

the Health Training Institute will be given to the Regional Government in Juba as a gift from the Catholic Church in Sudan. The administration of the Institute will then be taken over by the Regional Ministry of Health. The staffing for the first few years of the center's operation will be provided by the World Health Organization and the Catholic Church through Sudanaid. Both organizations have pledged to supply teaching doctors and nurses and other health instructors for the Institute.

The second major health program is the leprosy-control activities of two "teams" covering the Rumbek, Tonj and Yirol districts and Tombura-Ezo district. Sudanaid provides housing, medical supplies, transport, and construction of new dispensaries for these two teams, which are composed of 7 Comboni sisters and several Sudanese assistants. ⁽³³⁾ The activities of these control teams include continuous medical care of the lepers in each district, ⁽³⁴⁾ medical treatment of other needy patients, ⁽³⁵⁾ and re-integration programs for the lepers. In the more accessible centers of the districts, treatment is given on a weekly basis. In the more isolated areas, the long distances, heavy rains, lack of fuel and bad roads mean that at best only monthly visits are possible.

Micro-Social Realization (M.S.R.):

M.S.R. projects are the most "grass-roots" oriented of all Sudanaid's projects. Working through each diocesan coordinator and their respective local committees, M.S.R. was designed to be a direct response to the needs of the communities. The plan is for Sudanaid to advance small-scale loans in cash or in kind to groups whose requests have been accepted. In the 5 years that the M.S.R. program has been in existence, Sudanaid has financed 57 small-scale schemes for over (LS)26,000. ⁽³⁶⁾

According to Sudanaid however, the M.S.R. program has not been a great success. Many of the projects have tended to help individuals rather than communities. Where communities were to be the recipients, too much of the planning and execution was carried out by the diocesan committee and not enough participation came from outside that group. This apparent failure of the M.S.R. program stems from a number of reasons. Sudanaid, for its part did not clearly indicate the M.S.R. guidelines and regulations. In direct relation to this, it is not surprising that the people both in the diocesan committees and at the "grass-roots" had only a vague idea of their responsibilities vis-à-vis the M.S.R. projects. Most projects were accepted as mere grants and not as the loans that they were, so that many project holders and executors were not really convinced of their debt to Sudanaid. (Only (LS)1,200 has been refunded!) Projects were implemented in a hurry, and were not well planned or evaluated. Again, transport difficulties were a problem as bad roads and long distances meant that little administrative help or even encouragement could be given.

Sudanaid was on the verge of cancelling the whole M.S.R. program in 1979. However, requests from diocesan committees who now better understand the M.S.R. process, and who have said they will rectify past failures have given the scheme new life. Stricter guidelines stressing the need for participation from all the members of a community both in the planning and implementation stages of a project have been imposed by Sudanaid. Even more concretely, Sudanaid has pointed out that cooperative schemes ⁽³⁷⁾ will be viewed more favourably than less group-oriented ones. While it is too early to judge the success of the new M.S.R. initiatives, donor organizations such as Miseror and CAFOD are again ready to finance M.S.R. projects, with the stipulation that the revised guidelines be adhered to.

Emergency Assistance:

Sudanaid's Emergency Assistance program deals both with aid to foreign refugees residing in the country and with natural disaster relief. In the Southern Region refugee help has ranged from counselling services to the erection of zinc sheet shelters (see Table 4:8). The organization's relief contribution in times of floods, droughts or famine in the South has been mainly in the provision of what food or medical supplies it could quickly transport to the remote areas where these calamities took place.⁴ Aside from their obvious humanitarian benefit, Sudanaid is also hoping that their emergency assistance efforts will bring the recipient groups to a level where economic and social development can once again take place.

Conclusion:

The stated aim of Sudanaid is to respond to the needs of the people of Southern Sudan, and (like ACROSS) Sudanaid perceives one of these needs to be Christianity. The Catholic organization, with the full support of its donor agencies, is therefore involved not only in extending the social and development activities of the Catholic Church throughout the region, but also in the expansion of its pastoral responsibilities. Sudanaid financed the reconstruction of 11 churches, and priests' and nuns' residences in 1978.⁽³⁸⁾ Means of transport and vehicle maintenance were provided for a number of clerics to allow them to carry out their pastoral and social obligations.⁽³⁹⁾ Hymn books and catechisms have been published in some of the dioceses with the help of Sudanaid.

Sudanaid's support of the Catholic Church's pastoral duties has generally been straightforward and successful. Similarly, those schemes which were

designed to meet immediate requirements through emergency assistance or food distribution and medical care have also been fairly effective. Even large, longer-term health and education projects usually fulfill much of their intended purpose. These types of projects are mainly capital intensive endeavors, with key professional and administrative duties filled by well-trained expatriates.

The small-scale development projects have, however, been less than successful. Sudanaid's donor agencies, who initially were willing to answer most requests, now have slowed their financial help. It has been realized that while the local committees in rural Southern Sudan may have the best of intentions, their ability to absorb overseas aid is limited. A good illustration of this is a construction project that was recently planned for the Malakal Diocese. From the project proposal it seemed that the building plan and schedule had been well thought out; but when the money was forwarded, the project planners still found that they had no definite building site, nor had they as yet located workers or ordered bricks and cement which would have to come from Khartoum.⁽⁴⁰⁾ This project, characterized, like most other small-scale Sudanaid development projects, by its meagre financial base and by its lack of experienced management personnel, was hindered by serious planning and administrative problems. Combined with the ever-present transportation difficulties of the region, this brought about long delays, which will more than double the cost of the project before its completion.

While the donor groups realize that it is next to impossible to carry out any project according to schedule in Southern Sudan,⁽⁴¹⁾ they also feel that the local committees need to be given more help and be better prepared to meet the demands of actually implementing a project. Programs could, due to escalating

costs, be delayed or completely cancelled, and local enthusiasm and support to help in the development process could be quickly eroded.

Sudan Council of Churches (SCC)

Introduction:

Like ACROSS and Sudanaid, the Sudan Council of Churches came into being shortly after the end of the civil war in 1972. Then known as the Sudan Christian Council the organization was initially composed of representatives from Catholic, Episcopalian (Anglican) and Presbyterian churches. In the early years of its existence, from 1972 to 1975, SCC was almost an extension of the Sudanese government: most of its activities during that period were geared towards facilitating and strengthening the government's Relief, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation program, and helping the national administration to rebuild schools, dispensaries, health centers, and community buildings in Southern Sudan.

In 1975 there was a change in SCC's organizational structure. All of the executive and decision-making posts within the agency were taken over by Sudanese clergy and laity. Expatriates, who were originally in some of the more important positions, were now hired solely as consultants, with many training Sudanese counterparts to take over their responsibilities. Finally, the main area that was to be served by SCC, the Southern Sudan, received stronger representation in this new administration.

SCC's managerial transformation, along with the lessening of the need for relief help in the Southern Region, in turn led to a shift in policy and in

programing. While retaining a good relationship with the government, SCC quietly ignored its policy dictates and decided to move towards more development types of activities. The organization felt that building infrastructure was not the complete answer to the needs of the people of Southern Sudan and that this type of development did not truly represent all that the region needed. Also, while SCC was previously involved in the construction of schools and clinics, these efforts were often wasted due to the lack of trained personnel who could make use of these buildings. SCC's new development program was designed to emphasize health and agricultural projects which would work through local community structures, use existing facilities and build on local skills. These projects were to be oriented towards a basic-needs approach and to be kept on a very small scale.

Recently SCC has started to develop its own identity and now sees itself as a more church-oriented group, representing especially the traditional Protestant denominations. In its relationship with the Sudanese government, SCC works to assist the national administration without being a part of it. The organization involves government personnel in its operations, as especially in Southern Sudan it is difficult to sustain activities unless there is government support. SCC tries, however, to rely more on district governments than on provincial, regional or national systems, hoping in this way to keep the projects in the hands of the local communities.

SCC is funded by churches and aid organizations from North America, Western Europe and one church in Kenya (see Table 4:9). Although a part of the financial aid is destined for specific projects, most of the support is in the form of non-specified donations and is used with the discretion of the SCC administra-

tion. The agency's central office in Khartoum is responsible for general programing and administration. Here funds are received from overseas and are then distributed to finance projects that SCC personnel have identified after consultation with community groups. SCC has a small network of employees throughout the Southern Region, and it is through this local representation, along with more input from community members, that the individual schemes are administered. The organization uses this method of small-scale in-area management because of travel problems and communication limitations, and, most importantly, to keep all aspects of the project in the full view and control of the local people.

SCC is now associated with 32 projects in Sudan (see table 4:10), with all but three having at least some significance for the Southern Region. These projects tend to emphasize the following: agriculture and food production, health and water projects, and community development.

Agriculture and Food Production:

In order to help Southern Sudanese communities grow more and better food for their own use and for market, the main facet of SCC's agricultural program is to aid in the development of small farming and garden schemes. To do this, the organization is providing, where possible, the inputs needed to make agriculture viable and productive. SCC's rural development personnel are playing a general advisory role with project formulation for church and community groups. Through these groups SCC is distributing, at nominal cost, hand tools as well as vegetable seeds and plant shoots. Encouraging results have so far been obtained with some varieties of garden and vegetable seeds

apportioned to the rural farming communities during the 1979 planting season. ⁽⁴²⁾ Those varieties that have performed well and are popular with the people will be continued in the future. Hybrid varieties were not encouraged and the farmers were urged to continue making their own seed selection so as to avoid depending on resources which they may not always be able to acquire.

Some Protestant churches in the Southern Region are, with financial aid and guidance from SCC, cultivating a portion of their own land to serve both as model farms and as means of supplying extra food for their communities. For example, the Maridi Archdeaconry in Eastern Yambio has developed what they call a "Practising Farm". The church set aside ten fedans of their own land for this activity. Under the supervision of the pastor, some lay people and members from women groups, both common varieties and demonstration crops have been grown. ⁽⁴³⁾ An integral part of the project is the dissemination of information concerning plant types and cultivation practices. It is hoped that as the farm develops it will provide added income for the church (see table 4:11) and be a source of food for the community.

6 SCC has implemented an Ox-Plough Training Program at a center in Rumbek and at a satellite center at Panliet near Gogrial. The intent of these schemes is to show local farmers in the South the value of using oxen to pull ploughs for cultivation. Local farmers can take their own oxen for training and purchase ploughs at a token sum at the centers. Since the initiation of ox-cultivation in the Rumbek area in 1975, more than 15 farmers have adopted the innovation. ⁽⁴⁴⁾ Some of the farmers are still rather reluctant to put their own oxen to the plough, but have taken a great liking to ox-ploughing when the oxen of others is used. As a result, the demand for contract ploughing has increased dramatically with many local entrepreneurs emerging to provide this service.

In December 1979 the Rumbek center was turned over to the Regional Ministry of Agriculture, but extension services in the area are still being provided by SCC through four smaller affiliated demonstration centers. Field staff there are also collecting data on the effect of continued ploughing on the soils, yield comparisons between ox-ploughed and hand tilled fields, and the suitability of new crop varieties and types of plough.

Other SCC-sponsored agricultural projects in Southern Sudan include a small livestock extension and community outreach program in Raga. Here an American expert and a Sudanese counterpart trainee are instructing interested members of the community in proper poultry management. As well, in the town of Naisir in Upper Nile Province, SCC is building a grain store to make it possible to buy large quantities of dura during the dry season and store it for sale during the rainy season before the new crops are harvested. The food situation in this remote area is normally very poor and storage facilities are required to ensure essential food supplies during the rains when transport to the area is often impossible.

Health and Water Program:

SCC is just really beginning to get involved in a health and water program in Southern Sudan. In 1978, the Regional Ministry of Health requested that the organization help out with their PHCP in the Bentiu District of Upper Nile Province. So far, two medical survey teams have made feasibility studies in the area and half of the total estimated budget requirement for the program has been raised.

In 1979, SCC organized a pilot scheme to establish a drug store in Naisir. Permission was obtained from the Ministry of Health to sell medicines not

available through the government hospital.⁽⁴⁵⁾ The pharmacy, which sells its medicines at cost plus (i.e. transport handling charges and salary of druggist), is administered by a board headed by a local Anglican pastor. If this project proves successful and self-sustaining in the long term, then SCC plans to establish similar drug-distribution centers in other priority areas.

In water development, SCC is having some difficulty carrying out its two-phase plan which calls first for the completion of 40 shallow wells in the Rumbek region and then for a continual program on a large and more economical scale.⁽⁴⁶⁾ Actual field work on either part has yet to begin due to personnel and technical problems. Only recently has a qualified driller been hired, and a technical consultant is being shared with another organization, but other key field supervisory positions have yet to be filled. SCC feels that it is not technically possible for them to manage this project alone and is trying to develop a relationship of cooperation and/or partnership with another agency to facilitate this task. No such relationship has as yet materialized.

Community Development:

Existing SCC activities in community development in Southern Sudan are its building projects and training programs. In the former, the organization has recently financed the construction of a women's center at Rumbek, a girls' school in Dolieb, a very expensive hospital in an isolated area in the Jonglei region and a community center in a town called Bum. Its training program tends to be directed towards women. Seminars for women's groups dealing with rural development and with simple financial administration have been held by the agency. One woman, who was sent to a dress-making course in Khartoum by

SCC, is now teaching the craft to people in the Southern Region. A girl's vocational institute, funded by SCC, was opened in Rumbek in 1979 to teach primary school leavers practical skills. This institute will be run by SCC for a five-year period. After this, a local board which will have been connected with the school since its inception will assume responsibility.

A future SCC community-development scheme, an Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP), is now in its preliminary planning stage. This IRDP is the largest and most ambitious of SCC projects and has a four-year budget of (LS)1.13 million. It is to be located in Yirol, which is about 110 kms. east of Rumbek. This isolated region, which regional government officials strongly recommended for this comprehensive program, has over 20,000 inhabitants and often suffers from water and food shortages. The IRDP is designed "...to focus on this one district and systematically respond to felt community needs." (47)

A project planner seconded from Church World Service and a Sudanese counterpart have conducted a one-year feasibility study in the target region. Their initial conclusions led them to recommend water development as the scheme's number one priority, seeing this facet of the IRDP as a prerequisite for development in other areas. In this vital component of the IRDP, water management is to be made part of a hand-dug well program. A model farm has been planned to demonstrate efficient methods of cultivating traditional crops and to serve as an extension base. A small-scale agricultural research station is to focus on the farming needs of the immediate district and to provide both seeds and modified technology to Yirol and its surroundings. A veterinary extension system has been proposed which will train local secondary school

graduates in the basics of animal husbandry. SCC is hoping to strengthen the existing PHCP in the area by transporting equipment, drugs and personnel, as well as by training local health workers.⁽⁴⁸⁾ Another intention is to facilitate the acquisition of school books and equipment, and to assist the community in building schools.⁽⁴⁹⁾ A literacy program, scheduled to begin only in the fourth year of the IRDP, is to be taught in Dinka (the predominant local language) and will be aimed primarily towards adults. If there are still funds available, road reconstruction in the area is also part of the comprehensive scheme. Finally, a local administrative system is to be devised to look after financial flows, logistical problems, evaluations, and progress reports.

Conclusion:

SCC sees itself as the representative for various Protestant churches in the rural development process in Southern Sudan. The organization describes the entry of Christian Churches in the realm of rural development as "...a positive response to the material needs and spiritual needs of man, underlining all through the well being of the whole person."⁽⁵⁰⁾ While SCC itself does no direct pastoral work, it does support those who are involved in this activity. A department of Evangelism and Christian Education has been created within the agency, and it is about to pursue a project called Theological Education by Extension. In conjunction with this, a communication center with a cassette-tape ministry, an audio-visual section and a radio production unit is to be completed in 1982. Also, SCC has a Church reconstruction program which is very active due to the high priority placed on it. The agency feels that church buildings have "tremendous emotional and spiritual" importance for the churches in Southern Sudan and that

the credibility of SCC rests on its ability to fulfill its commitment to the reconstruction program. (51) In 1978-1979 alone, SCC has participated in the reconstruction of 10 churches and a number of houses for parish pastors.

Most of the less church-oriented SCC activities have either only recently begun or are still in the planning stage. In the short term however, those that have taken form seem to be fulfilling their intended purposes and are generally being accepted as useful by the people affected by these schemes. A major factor behind this apparent success is SCC's realization that the type of project proposed, the way it is presented, and even the character of SCC officers in the field all play a crucial part in determining acceptance by the rural people. SCC therefore tries to lay a solid base for its projects: A detailed feasibility study involving extensive community participation is normally sought. Field personnel who can command the trust of the people, yet be flexible enough to change their ideas when necessary are also greatly valued.

SCC is also concerned about the effect of change on traditional societies. The agency understands that the acceptance of a new method of doing things entails leaving the security of familiar ways and risking failure and possible greater hardships. While not negating the problems that change may bring, SCC's field personnel meet with community groups to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a particular project. In this way it is hoped that the affected people will be better prepared to cope with their altered lifestyles.

A Comparison of the "Umbrella" Agencies

ACROSS, Sudanaid and SCC are, as was mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, all church-based organizations, which reflect in general terms the religious and development orientations of their member groups. Each was formed soon after the end of the civil war to assist primarily in the relief and reconstruction of Southern Sudan. In 1975/1976 when the need for extensive emergency help had diminished, the three "umbrella" organizations altered their focus from "relief" to "development". In conjunction with this new emphasis, the three agencies are all also directly or indirectly involved in pastoral endeavors, seeing this spiritual work as a major part of their ongoing responsibility to Southern Sudan.

Beyond these similarities, ACROSS, Sudanaid and SCC have a number of intrinsic differences which affect their respective programs and which consequently help determine the role each organization plays in the rural development process in the Southern Region. The first of these differences is the variation in project-funding procedure. At ACROSS and Sudanaid each project is financed by a particular member group; there is no common fund. Conversely, most of SCC's incoming grants are non-specified, with the result that the organization supports its various activities through a common resource pool. This in effect indicates that while all three organizations rely on outside donations to support their programs, the first two agencies seem to be more constrained than SCC in their activities.

Another dissimilarity is in the human makeup of their management structures. At ACROSS, the hierarchy consists of only non-Sudanese members.

The administration at Sudanaid, for its part has quickly and quietly shifted from total expatriate control to today's mostly indigenous executive. At SCC, the decision makers are all Sudanese nationals.

A slightly different situation exists at the project sites themselves. Here the ACROSS field workers again tend to be mostly European or North American, with indigenous involvement limited mainly to non-supervisory tasks. There are, however, recent indications at ACROSS that more Sudanese technicians and professionals are being hired by the agency to work at the project level. At Sudanaid, while there is still a small number of expatriate clergy on local committees or helping with program implementation, the majority of the local staff is Sudanese. At SCC all field personnel, except for a modest contingent of consultants and some Eritrean and Ugandan social workers, are Sudanese citizens.

The degree of indigenous involvement in the three agencies is partially reflected by some discrepancies in project planning and administrative approaches. In planning, ACROSS workers identify projects in a number of ways: Firstly, they plan schemes which they themselves perceive as meeting local needs. Secondly, ACROSS, while not always agreeing with Regional Government directives, attempts to respond positively to most government requests. Finally, in some instances, the agency solicits local participation in the planning phase of a program. At Sudanaid, programs are carried out either at the invitation of the Southern Regional Government or, more commonly, after a local diocesan committee has made a specific request for assistance. At SCC trained Sudanese staff, who are ideally from the region they are working in, develop project proposals after extensive consultation with local groups and interested individuals.

In administration, the location of actual program management varies. In the ACROSS case, the major decisions are made outside of Sudan in Nairobi, and it is from here that all projects are administered. At Sudanaid, management responsibility rests with its central office in Khartoum. At SCC, each project is administered by a field worker with the help of local community members. SCC's central office in Khartoum serves in a liaison and general administrative capacity only.

These funding, staffing, and organizational differences do not as such, however, translate into vastly contrasting programs and projects. The three inter-mission organizations all stress health, education, agriculture, clean water, and community development in their programming in Southern Sudan. All projects they support are small-scale endeavors, except possibly for ACROSS's water development program and Sudanaid's Health Training Institute. In addition, all three agencies have taken a "basic needs" approach in their attempts to bring about a better quality of life for the rural Southern Sudanese.

The area of prime concern, however, in this comparison is whether the three Christian agencies are actually helping to improve the lives of those in the Southern Region. In relation to less tangible concepts such as human dignity and learning, the method used in carrying out a rural development scheme is of paramount importance. It is recognized that when people think and work for themselves it instills a sense of pride and accomplishment, provides valuable experience,⁽⁵²⁾ and may also result in the more widespread acceptance of a project. The three agencies have, as has already been indicated, varying degrees of local involvement in their development programs. For ACROSS, indigenous participation is not present in all aspects of the development process, whereas at

SCC and Sudanaid there is local involvement in every phase of their operations.

It follows then that communities which are part of SCC and Sudanaid-sponsored activities will be better psychologically and have a better understanding of development than those in the ACROSS "target" areas.

Concerning the more discernible matters of actual project completion and accomplishment it is rather difficult to make a comprehensive evaluation. This is due to the relative infancy of most programs and to an information void. Because of internal communication, travel, and bureaucratic constraints, all projects supported by ACROSS, Sudanaid and SCC are 18 to 30 months behind schedule. It also seems that in the short-term at least Sudanaid and SCC are having difficulties starting some of their schemes due to their stress on the use of indigenous personnel. Since experienced local staff are difficult to find or must be painstakingly trained on the job, the result is often long delays and floundering projects.

Certain choices or trade-offs between immediate gains and ongoing advantages have been dictated by circumstances within Southern Sudan. ACROSS has decided to opt for a strategy that assures relatively quick and efficient project implementation, thereby providing much-needed service, and in some cases, small-scale infrastructure. Sudanaid and especially SCC have selected to sacrifice some efficacy to stress the development of local human systems.

**Christian Missions and Agencies Which Comprise
The Africa Committee for the Rehabilitation of Southern Sudan (ACROSS)**

- Africa Inland Mission
- Christoffel Blindenmission
- Deutsch Missionsgemeinschaft
- Medical Assistance Programs (MAP International)
- Missionary Aviation Fellowship (U.K.)
- Sudan United Mission (Australia)
- Swedish Free Mission
- TEAR Fund
- World Vision International
- Africa Evangelical Fellowship
- Algemeen Diakonaal Bureau
- Bible Churchmen's Missionary Society
- Church Missionary Society
- Mennonite Central Committee
- Missionary Aviation Fellowship (USA)
- Scripture Union
- Sudan Interior Mission
- Swiss Evangelical Nile Mission
- Church of Christ in Nigeria

ACROSS - Drilling Rig Specifications

Atlas Copco screw compressor, PR425 DdA powered by V-8 Deutz diesel engine F8L413

Atlas Copco down-the-hole hammer, drill COP4

Mobile B50 diamond drill rotary rig with 9.5 metre tower with 4 metre slide

Custom-installation on 4 1/2 ton Bedford 4 x 4 6-cylinder petrol lorry with modified chassis and suspension to 9 tons

Scania LBT 110S-69 6-cylinder diesel supply truck with 3 1/2 ton hydraulic lift crane

Rig capacity: 103 metres depth; 105 mm diameter hole

Source: ACROSS, What is ACROSS?, (mimeographed) Nairobi, p. 11.

Table 4:3

General Principles for ACROSS Construction Projects

-
- 1 - Each project should be consistent with the policies, plans and priorities of the Regional Government.
 - 2 - Each project should represent an optimally effective use of available material and manpower resources.
 - 3 - Architectural design, building materials, and construction processes should be compatible with the intended functions of a new building.
 - 4 - Construction of a community building should endeavour to mobilize meaningful community self-help inputs to the construction process.
 - 5 - At a minimum, ACROSS construction activities should not detract from other community-oriented development activities.
 - 6 - In general, ACROSS contributing agencies prefer to assist small-scale rural construction activities.
 - 7 - In general, ACROSS contributing agencies prefer to assist construction activities which are one component of a more comprehensive project offering other opportunities for assistance by ACROSS volunteer staff.
-

Source: ACROSS What is ACROSS?, Nairobi, p. 29.

Table 4:4

The Number of Priests, Brothers and Sisters in Sudan
(Sudanese and Expatriate)

	Population	Priests		Brothers		Sisters	
		Sud.	Exp.	Sud.	Exp.	Sud.	Exp.
<u>Northern Region</u>							
National		2	5	-	-	-	3
Ad. Khartoum	8,957,500	-	42	-	8	2	109
D. El Obeid	5,242,500	1	15	-	3	-	21
<u>Southern Region</u>							
Ad. Juba	578,960	25	3	5	3	11	2
D. Malakal	1,053,740	3	5	-	3	2	4
D. Rumbek	817,740	9	-	-	-	-	3
D. Tombura	306,800	11	3	-	2	10	3
D. Wau	1,042,760	16	7	7	2	6	3
TOTAL	18,000,000	66	80	12	12	29	148
TOTAL		146		24		177	

Source: Sudanaid, Yesterday and Today, printed by St. Joseph's Technical School, Khartoum, Sudan, October 1978. p. 32.

Table 4:5

Sudanaid Funding Agencies

-
- Caritas Internationales
 - Individual Parishes
 - Catholic Medical Mission Board (USA)
 - Missio - Munchen
 - Secours Catholique Français
 - MIVA (Austria)
 - Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace
 - Coordination in Development (USA)
 - German Leprosy Relief Operation
 - Damian Foundation (Belgium)
 - Mediciens sans Frontiers
 - La Nastra Famiglia
 - Secours Catholique (France)
 - Catholic Fund for Overseas Development (U.K.)
 - Catholic Relief Services (USA)
 - Miseror (West Germany)
 - CEBEMO (Netherlands)
 - Amici Dei Lebbrasi
 - Fame Pereo
 - Roskole Foundation
 - Rance Foundation
 - UNESCO
 - OXFAM
 - Memisa (Holland)
 - Christolffel (West Germany)
 - US AID

Table 4:6

Sudanaid Program Expenditures for 1/01/79 to 30/09/79
(In Sudanese LS)

	1/01/79 CREDIT	1/01/79 EXPENDITURES	30/09/79 INCOMES	1/10/79 CREDIT
Emergency Assistance	8,141	136,574	136,689	7,756
Rebuilding Programs	5,326	23,162	22,150	4,314
Micro-Social- Realizations	1,533	-	-	1,533
Means of Transport	46,751	66,700	30,011	10,063
Development Projects	175,765	317,417	237,793	96,141
Wau Training Institute	-	360,000	360,000	-
TOTAL	250,085	931,208	813,344	132,221

Source: Sudanaid, Report of the Annual Meeting 1979 of Sudanaid, copy of the minutes of Sudanaid annual meeting held in Juba February 18 - 23, 1980. p. 3 - Financial Report of the Executive Secretariat.

Table 4:7

Students in Catholic Schools in Southern Region

	Kindergarten Boys/Girls	Primary Boys	Girls	Adult Ed Students	Total Students
ARCH. DIO JUBA	27	699	319	450	1,495
Dio. Malakal	50	127	21	61	259
Dio. Rumbek	-	1,675	959	207	2,841
Dio. Tombura	25	150	25	230	430
Dio. Wau	-	-	-	124	124
TOTAL	102	2,651	1,324	1,072	5,149
TOTAL	102	3,975		1,072	5,149

Source: Sudanaid, Annual Report, 1978, Khartoum, Sudan, 1979. p. 12.

Table 4:8

Sudanaid Contributions to Refugees in Southern Sudan

Organization	Program	Amount (LS)
Australian Catholic Relief	Relief Society Tigrai	2,740
Australian Catholic Relief	Sheets for Shelters	2,767
Caritas Austria	Uganda Refugees	1,000
France Caritas (S.O.S.)	Uganda Refugees	3,360
Caritas Neerlandica	Ugandan Refugees - Medicines	2,500
Caritas Neerlandica	Sheets for Shelters	5,000
Caritas Neerlandica	Emergency Assistance	10,000
Caritas Neerlandica	School for Refugee Children	5,200
Caritas Switzerland	Sheets for Shelters	5,000
Caritas Germany	Chad Refugees	25,000

Source: Sudanaid, Contribution of the Sudan Catholic Bishops' Conference to the Programme of Refugees in the Sudan, Khartoum, June 1980. p.p. Appendix 2-5.

Table 4:9

**Organizations and Agencies Who Fund the Sudan
Council of Churches**

German Central Agency - (EZE)
 Norwegian Church Aid
 Church World Service
 Lutheran World Relief
 Christian Aid
 World Outreach
 Eastern Mennonite Board
 Swedish Church Relief
 Danschurch Aid
 Lutheran World Federation (Sweden)
 Canadian Council of Churches
 Strichting - Netherlands
 Swedish International Development Agency
 Basil Mission
 National Christian Churches of Kenya
 Canadian International Development Agency
 Oxfam
 Help the Aged
 Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)
 Church of Sweden Mission
 Africa Inland Church
 Episiopal Church
 Bread for the World
 Swedish Medical Foundation
 Mennonite Central Committee
 United Methodist Board
 Swedish Evangelical Mission
 World Association of Christians Communication
 Doc Diokonische Wick (W. German)
 Swedish Free Mission
 World Council of Churches
 NCKK (Islamic Organization)
 World Association of Christian Churches
 ICCO

Table 4:10

Sudan Council of Churches - Budget 1979-1980 (LS)

PROJECT	1979	1980
Administration	141,500	175,000
Workshops	30,000	40,000
Transport coop.	-	35,000
Building Project	14,000	15,000
Akobo Hospital	45,000	72,000
LWF/SIDA Building	100,000	75,000
Office Building	-	15,000
Church Reconstruction	150,000	175,000
Agricultural Projects	5,000	15,000
Agricultural Handtools	10,000	10,000
AIC Agricultural Project	10,000	10,000
Small Project for Churches	14,000	20,000
Integrated Rural Development	30,000	200,000
Food Storage (Nasir)	-	30,000
Oxplough Training Center	20,000	-
Oxplough Satellites	25,000	27,500
Horticulture	40,000	55,000
Livestock (Raga)	64,000	37,500
Water Development (I-II)	100,000	30,000
Afforestation	101,000	118,000
Refugees and Emergencies	137,500	150,000
Refugees Eastern Sudan	200,000	230,000
Oxfam	15,000	17,500
Ugandan Refugees	20,500	25,000
Refugee Counselling	60,000	60,000
Women's Work	22,000	25,000
Medical Kits	20,000	22,500
Primary Health - E. Sudan	-	25,000
Primary Health - Bentiu Dis.	-	50,000
Bum Community Centre	20,000	-
Radio Studio	42,500	132,000
Leadership Training	10,000	15,000
Girls Vocational Training	-	75,000
TOTAL	1,447,000	1,957,000

Source: SCC, Programme Plan for 5 Year Period, 1979-1983

Table 4:11

Maridi Archdeaconry Practising Farm, Eastern Yambio Diocese

A. - TOTAL COST (LS)

	<u>1st Year</u>	<u>2nd Year</u>
Manager (LS 41/mo.)	492	492
Assistant Manager (LS 25/mo.)	300	300
10 Labourers (LS 9/mo.)	1,080	1,080
Training	200	200
Tools	100	100
Seeds	150	150
Chaffer	100	100
Bicycle	150	150
Storehouse, Office	200	600
TOTAL	2,772	3,072

B. - PROJECTED INCOME (LS)

	<u>1st Year</u>	<u>2nd Year</u>
<u>Sales of Products</u>		
Groundnuts	25	360
Maize	15	180
Dura	50	480
Sweet Potatoes	4	12
Tomatoes	7	15
Beans	15	60
Rice	20	200
Simsim	-	7
Pineapples, bananas	-	100
Nursery	-	100
Sugar cane	-	100
Sundry Crops	-	100
TOTAL	136	1,174

Source: SCC, Progress Report, December 1979, Khartoûm, 1979. p. annex 2.

Footnotes

- 1 - Interview with Mohamed El Mahali Musa, Secretary General of Sudanese Red Crescent and of the Sudan Council of Voluntary Agencies, Khartoum, May 31, 1980.
- 2 - ACROSS, What is ACROSS?, (mimeographed) Nairobi, p. 5.
- 3 - Ibid, p. 8.
- 4 - Ibid, p.p. 7-8.
- 5 - Ibid, p.p. 7-8.
- 6 - ACROSS, 1978 Annual Report, Nairobi, 1979. p. 3.
- 7 - Ibid, p. 5.
- 8 - ACROSS, What is ACROSS?, p.p. 9-10.
- 9 - Ibid, p. 9.
- 10 - ACROSS, 1978 Annual Report, p. 5.
- 11 - ACROSS, What is ACROSS?, p. 11.
- 12 - ACROSS, 1978 Annual Report, p.p. 9-23.
- 13 - Ibid, p.p. 9-23.
- 14 - ACROSS, What is ACROSS?, p. 19.
- 15 - Ibid, p. 21.
- 16 - Ibid, p.p. 24-25.
- 17 - ACROSS, 1978 Annual Report, p.p. 21-22.
- 18 - ACROSS, Project Proposals for the Mundri Area Rural Development Project, (mimeographed), 1979. p. 1.
- 19 - Ibid, p.p. 2-4.
- 20 - ACROSS, Let Us Introduce Ourselves, Nairobi, 1976. p. 1.
- 21 - Ibid, p. 3.
- 22 - Sudanaid, Yesterday and Today, Khartoum, St. Joseph's Technical School, October 1978. p. 31.
- 23 - Ibid, p. 33.
- 24 - Sudanaid, Report of the Annual Meeting 1979 of Sudanaid, copy of the minutes of Sudanaid's annual meeting held in Juba from February 18-23, 1980. p. 61.
- 25 - The 5 Southern Dioceses are: the Archdiocese of Juba and the Dioceses of Wau, Tombura, Malakal and Rumbek. The two Northern Dioceses are: the Archdiocese of Khartoum and the Diocese of El Obeid.
- 26 - The Sudan Catholic Bishops Council in 1979 drew up a list of social conditions and project criteria "which should be of the greatest concern to the diocesan associations."
 The Social conditions were:
 - (1) Unemployment
 - (2) The flow of young people from the rural area to the towns with the accompanying spiritual, moral and social consequences.
 - (3) Students living away from parental influence and lacking moral and human guidance.
 - (4) Low income on which families and individuals live and which exposes them to exploitation by the rich.
 - (5) Lack of training capabilities for craftsmen and others.

The criteria for social projects are:

- (1) The project should respond to the immediate needs of the people, without of course losing sight of their long-range needs.
 - (2) The project should bring help directly to the people.
 - (3) The project should be feasible, simple and manageable, i.e. can be handled by the local people, and in the long run is supported locally.
 - (4) The project should fall in line with government priorities where these exist, and should not duplicate the same kind of project in the same area for the same people.
- 27 - Since Sudanaid is the 94th member of the powerful Caritas Internationales, most of the aid extended to Sudanaid's health and educational services as well as to a variety of development projects has come from Caritas members around the world.
 - 28 - J.J. Akol, "Sudanaid: Reaching Broader Horizons" in Sudanow, September, 1979. p. 33.
 - 29 - Sudanaid, Annual Report, 1978, Khartoum, 1979. p. 12.
 - 30 - Sudanaid, Contribution of the Cathloic Church in the Medical Field in Sudan from 1973 to October 1979, Khartoum, 1979. p.p. 17-19.
 - 31 - Sudanaid, Annual Report, 1978, p. 13. In 1978 the Dutch organization MEMISA sent 796 kilos of medicine and the American Catholic Medical Mission Board sent 22,000 kilos of medicine to dispensaries and hospitals in Southern Sudan.
 - 32 - Ibid, p. 13. Caritas Denmark, with help from the St. Lazare Order and the Danish Government sent \$350,000 (US) of hospital equipment to Southern Sudan.
 - 33 - Sudanaid, Report on Annual Meeting, 1979, p.p. 12-13.
 - 34 - Sudanaid, Contribution of the Catholic Church in the Medical Field, 1973-1979, p.p. 3-4. The Leprosy Control Team of Rumbeck has 929 patients under treatment. The Leprosy Control Team at Tombura is looking after 1,966 lepers. 75% of the patients are seen on a regular basis.
 - 35 - Ibid, p.p. 3-4. The Rumbeck team treated more than 15,000 "other" patients in 1978. The Tombura team saw approximately the same number of these "other" patients.
 - 36 - Typical of the past M.S.R. projects are: Sewing machines given to individuals, tools for a carpentry workshop, electric grinding mills for "social and pastoral" activities and helping set up a grocery.
 - 37 - Sudanaid has even made it quite clear what type of small-scale co-operatives would be most acceptable: farm co-operatives, mill co-operatives, grocery co-operatives, welding co-operatives and tailor co-operatives.
 - 38 - Sudanaid, Annual Report, 1978, p. 15. Cost of this building was about LS 23,000.
 - 39 - Sudanaid, Report of Annual Meeting, 1979, p. annex 2. In 1979, 40 requests for Means of Transport were received by Sudanaid from the parishes. 31 of these were sponsored at the cost of LS 66,700. Included in this are cars, a bus, a lorry, motorcycles, bicycles, and spare parts.

- 40 - J.J. Akol, p. 34.
- 41 - I was told by Sudanaid's Executive Secretary that completion of a project up to two years behind schedule would be regarded as an achievement by the donor agencies.
- 42 - Sudan Council of Churches, Progress Report, December 1979, Khartoum. p. 14.
- 43 - Ibid, p. annex 1.
- 44 - Ibid, p.p. 5-6.
- 45 - SCC, Programme Plan for 5 Year Period 1979-1983, Khartoum, 1979. p. 8. When I asked why this project wasn't run through the government hospital, the only answer I received was that this wasn't possible. In 1979 the Nasir hospital failed to get its supplies from Khartoum, and the SCC pharmacy was left to supply drugs to the area by itself.
- 46 - Ibid, p. 6.
- 47 - Ibid, p. 5.
- 48 - One group of health-care workers to be trained will be the Village Health Workers who will be involved mostly in the preventive side of health care. The people who make up this group of health workers usually have quite low levels of education. SCC proposes to teach them their duties through traditional methods of instruction such as songs, stories and demonstration.
- 49 - It is strongly stressed that foreign teachers not be brought in to these schools.
- 50 - K. Manibe, "Forum on Rural Development" in Southern Sudan Magazine, vol. 2, no. 2, June/July 1978. p. 6.
- 51 - SCC, Program Plan for Five Year Period, 1979-1983, p. 4.
- 52 - This point is well illustrated by Sudanaid's MSR program. In this case, while a number of small-scale schemes have not been successful per se, the experience gained by many of the diocesan committee members is invaluable for the ongoing development of the Southern Region.

Chapter 5

Unaffiliated NGOs in Southern Sudan

Introduction:

NGO involvement in Southern Sudan is not restricted to the "umbrella" agencies. In addition to these three, there is an array of unaffiliated NGOs in the region maintaining their own development programs. These unattached organizations plan their own projects, singlehandedly finance these schemes from their own sources, and control their respective programs under independent administrations.

Though the unallied NGOs are similar in makeup and structure, they are taking part in varying types of development activities. Several are involved in only one aspect of the development process. Other groups implement more comprehensive development programs. A few of the organizations are responsible strictly for the recruitment of trained volunteer workers.

It is according to this division of development activities that the various unaffiliated NGOs will be examined.

Unaffiliated NGOs : Single Programs

Introduction:

NGOs that are involved in only one phase of the development process in Southern Sudan fall into two separate categories. They are either specialist agencies which, by their own definition, are limited to working in one particular field, or they are "generic" groups which normally cover a broad spectrum of activities but which, due to the exceptional difficulties encountered in the South, have chosen, for the present at least, to consolidate their efforts and restrict their activities to a single program area. The "specialist" and "generic" NGOs that do support single programs do not necessarily simply implement single projects, as a number of the singular focused programs have been transformed into a network of related schemes.

Specialist NGOs:

There are three specialist agencies which are involved exclusively in the provision of medical services in Southern Sudan. The first, Catholic Medical Mission Board Inc., furnishes medical goods to medical facilities throughout the region. ⁽¹⁾ The second, Mission Aviation Fellowship, transports medicine, health equipment ~~and needed~~ health personnel to all areas of the South. ⁽²⁾ The third, The International Medical and Research Foundation/The African Medical and Research Foundation (IMREF/AMREF), is providing support costs and backup services for two Southern PHCPs as well as being involved in a medical training program east of Juba. ⁽³⁾

The first two programs give essential logistic support to a number of health projects in the Southern Region, whereas the IMREF/AMREF design establishes the framework for the direct dissemination of health services. Through a grant from USAID, ⁽⁴⁾ IMREF/AMREF assists the Southern Regional Government with its PHCP by providing technical staff and corresponding support funds. The agency is helping to train Community Health Workers and other staff working with the CHWs in the rural area. It is actively promoting the construction of low cost Primary Health Care Units and staff housing. Also, IMREF/AMREF is designing and implementing an information system to be used in the PHCPs and in the planning, execution, analysis, and presentation of evaluation studies. ⁽⁵⁾ While there is a fairly large expatriate staff on site overseeing the programming, ⁽⁶⁾ the project team itself is backed up technically and administratively by AMREF headquarters in Nairobi.

Two more specialist NGOs, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Sudanese Red Crescent Society have combined their efforts in Southern Sudan and are devoting their energies to emergency aid. Since 1972 these organizations have contributed to the relief programs of the region by tending to some of the essential material needs of the area's population. This assistance, usually in the form of food, clothing and shelter (see Table 5:1), has come in the wake not only of the civil war, but also of natural disasters such as floods and droughts.

In 1978, the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL), a Christian evangelical group which specializes in literacy work, began operating in Southern Sudan. Their project, The Literacy Training Operation Program, is aimed at instructing personnel of the Southern Regional Ministry of Education to carry out linguistic

analyses of local languages and to prepare literacy materials for children and adults. To do this, SIL has established a department of local languages at the British Overseas Development Ministry - sponsored Curriculum Development Center at Maridi. Through this new bureau, the Christian agency is training 48 Ministry of Education personnel in the preparation of vernacular language texts to be used as the medium of instruction in the first four years of primary education for rural students. The organization itself is in the process of preparing pre-primers, primers and post-primers in 16 local languages and already these materials are being used in teaching almost 35,000 students to read and write in their mother tongues.⁽⁷⁾ In addition to their value as literacy tools, these textbooks follow an "integrated" design as they also teach health, sanitation, nutrition, family planning, and basic education.⁽⁸⁾ Finally, SIL is compiling vocabulary lists for 16 languages and is carrying out general analyses on the grammars of 11 languages.

The project, which is scheduled to be completed in 1982, is being carried out jointly by the Ministry of Education of the Southern Region and SIL. This scheme, estimated in 1978 to cost (US) \$1.4 million, is being financed completely by USAID.⁽⁹⁾ Thirty literacy and linguistic staff of SIL plus 10 support staff are involved in the program.

Part of SIL's program also deals with the translation of the Bible into a number of the vernacular languages. The evangelical organization does, then, have its own particular reason and incentive for producing relevant texts, training local staff and teaching literacy on a broad base. Nevertheless, SIL's literacy work has been, from its inception, one of the most successful NGO schemes in the Southern Region.⁽¹⁰⁾ The most direct beneficiaries to date are

the students who are currently using the pre-primers, primers and post-primers produced by SIL. By 1985, it is estimated that the number of young students using the materials will be 150,000 and that the number of adults achieving functional literacy will be at least 15,000. (11)

Finally, the Telecommunications Research Group of Simon Fraser University, with funding from CIDA's NGO division, is working with the University of Juba on a new and apparently innovative education program. This scheme, still in its preliminary planning stages, calls for the development of a Distance Education System for the Southern Sudan. Using radio, information archives and local intelligentsia, the project is designed to create an information network that will assist the rural people of the South: "The aim of the project is to help change the material basis of their lives without destroying the sense of worth and cultural identity that the traditional life gives." (12)

Specifically, two-way radio will be used to link the isolated areas in the region. This two-way link will be established between the University of Juba and 12 main development areas in the Southern Region. These dozen centers will in turn be connected not only with each other, but each of these will also be joined by less powerful two-way radio sets to five to eight surrounding villages. In this way, farmers and villagers will be able to ask for the information they need, exchange progress reports on rural projects, keep the university in contact with its staff, students and rural campuses as they develop, and keep in touch with the isolated field personnel working with the ministries. It is hoped that this two-way link will help with practical research, field-work and the development of procedures that fit the needs of the particular area. (13)

There has already been some criticism concerning this program. While the concept of "distance education" is generally seen as a viable extension and pedagogical expedient for Southern Sudan, it is the proposed "system" or method of implementation that is being questioned. Under its present format, the Distance Education System is closely identified with the University of Juba. Some people fear that this educational institution will dominate the project and will turn the scheme into yet another "typical academic, do-nothing program" ⁽¹⁴⁾ that in reality will serve only the interests of intellectuals and researchers, and that will have no far-reaching practical significance. In order to circumvent this possibility, it has been suggested that instead of running an independent system emanating from the university, either the widespread mission communications network already in existence in the region or the struggling government service could be improved and modified to handle the project.

Generic NGOs:

Of the few generic NGOs which are involved in only one phase of the development process in Southern Sudan, most have only recently started their independent operations in the region. The Catholic Fund for Overseas Development and the YWCA have begun by getting involved in a rural development training institute. The ICUW and Den Afrkanske Laegefond, a Danish agency, have both initiated medical activities to supplement and support the Southern Regional Government's PHCP. The Seventh Day Adventist World Service arrived in the South in mid-1980 and is working on improving small-scale vegetable production.

One "generic" organization has, however, been in the Southern Sudan for a number of years. Save the Children Fund (SCF), an agency which has experience in most facets of rural development work, has been involved in medical pursuits in the South since just after the end of the civil war. The SCF program is based 160 kilometres east of Juba at Torit and attempts to cater to the health needs of that town and its surrounding district.

The major part of their medical program is the running of a health clinic where the SCF team usually attends to 20 to 30 patients each day. There is a daily curative clinic and a twice-weekly ante-natal clinic. ⁽¹⁵⁾ SCF provides all medical equipment and supplies, and sells soap at subsidized prices. Expatriate involvement in the clinic is kept to a minimum, as local staff can manage most simple diagnosis and treatment. One expatriate nurse works full time and is particularly involved in the malnutrition and ante-natal clinics. The SCF doctor provides consultant services for the most severely ill and for difficult diagnoses, and gives regular training courses for staff. The doctor also assists the pediatric ward in the town hospital 3 or 4 times weekly on an advisory basis, examining and reviewing the treatment of in-patients. ⁽¹⁶⁾

In the past, part of the SCF medical team regularly went on "curative safaris" to outlying villages. These have now been discontinued since they provided an extremely poor service. Under normal conditions little acute sickness was seen and most of the patients were suffering from minor illnesses (i.e. skin disease) which could not be easily helped by single occasional consultations. Further, the cost in terms of strain on staff and on vehicles was found to be excessive. In the period February 1978 to September 1978, the then full program of 28 villages each month was completed on only four

occasions.⁽¹⁷⁾ Four primary health care workers are now posted within the district, and the "safari" program has been reduced to visiting and supervision of these and four medical assistants in the SCF area.

Conclusion:

The NGOs which focus on single development areas are, either by accident or design, working on fairly straightforward projects which emphasize health, emergency aid or education. None are involved in less concrete programs which demand more than just material inputs. Also, these organizations, most possessing a secure financial base, seem to be able to function within their budgetary constraints and have attempted only manageable designs.

By working towards readily measurable and relatively modest goals, and by keeping within certain self-imposed limitations, these single program agencies are generally fulfilling their stated purposes. Those groups which are supposed to transport and/or supply medical goods and emergency aid are doing so. The NGOs involved in the region's PHCP have the financial backing needed to make some impact on the program. Those organizations involved in education have the necessary expertise and resources to realize their plans.

There is, however, one major criticism which can be made of the one-program NGOs. In their attempts to quickly strengthen and cement their respective programs, little indigenous participation is solicited either in the preparatory stages or in the actual implementation phase. While it can be argued that due to the nature of the schemes only trained people can cope with their many demands, this does not answer why more counterparts are not trained or why Sudanese consultants are not used to greater advantage. It is obvious, for example, that a trained pilot is necessary for Mission Aviation Fellowship's

medical transport program, but this does not excuse the lack of local participation in planning and in general administration; though organizations such as SIL and SCF are making efforts to train Sudanese staff in the relevant vocational skills, the dearth of indigenous personnel involved in the management apparatus of all single-program NGOs seems to be counterproductive in overall developmental terms.

Unaffiliated NGOs: Comprehensive Programs

Introduction:

NGOs that implement independent comprehensive development programs in Southern Sudan have generally been working in the region for a number of years. In fact all, in one way or another, took part in the relief and reconstruction efforts immediately after the civil war in 1972. Since then of course, these labors have grown into more development focused activities. Most of the NGOs implementing comprehensive programs have only gradually expanded into the various rural development spheres. In some instances however, the modification of relief work to development programming has taken place at a greatly accelerated rate, with large amounts of money and resources used to fuel some rather ambitious schemes.

The Deliberate NGOs:

Of the NGOs that take a more cautious approach in relation to their development activities in Southern Sudan, many have correspondingly modest projects in the field. For its part, Christian Aid has two building schemes, is co-

sponsoring a vocational training center, and is giving assistance to refugees. All of this is being accomplished on a budget of less than (US) \$500,000. The organization Coordination in Development is funding three vocational schools and a water project, and is helping out in the Southern Regional Government's PHCP. The financing for these totals (US) \$106,000. OXFAM, a major international NGO, is spending (US) \$48,000 in the region through its co-sponsoring of a rural development institute, a medical center and a sheep ranch.

Another agency which today is operating on a small scale in the Southern Region is Catholic Relief Service (CRS). What is different about this organization is that it did at one time have more grandiose plans for its programming in the South. CRS is the official overseas aid and development agency of the United States Catholic Conference, the national coordinating body of the American Catholic Church. It is also the largest American non-governmental agency involved in foreign aid programs, and during 1978 provided assistance valued at over (US) \$225 million to developing countries around the world.⁽¹⁸⁾ The organization opened its Sudan program in 1972, working out of its new headquarters in Juba. As its relief activities started to taper off, CRS immediately began to map out its development strategy. In Torit, they implemented a rural sanitation scheme. In Juba and the surrounding area, CRS started a major water development project, organized and equipped a women's domestic science center and purchased grinding mills for grinding cooperatives. At the same time, the organization also provided for school gardening projects at 100 primary schools in the Yei area, supported the management of a leprosy rehabilitation clinic and purchased tools, equipment and materials for a self-help carpentry workshop in Loa.⁽¹⁹⁾

Today, five of these seven activities have proven to be failures; only the rural sanitation project and the women's center have come anywhere near meeting their goals. The school gardening scheme and the leprosy clinics have been abandoned, and the carpentry workshop is barely functioning.

The grinding cooperative is on the brink of collapse, having floundered from its inception: The mills are powered by diesel engines and are much too big for the work they are required to do. There are no spare parts, and even if some could be found, there is no qualified mechanic available to make use of them. As well, fuel is expensive and difficult to obtain.

The water development project is also at a virtual standstill and it too has been a costly disappointment from the beginning: Due to internal politics the initial site, which had been chosen because of favourable land conditions, had to be changed. Unfortunately the new location was not suitable for open wells or hand dug wells. Furthermore, the people of the area did not want open wells because they had recently been shown by another agency that the water from this type of reservoir would soon become infested with parasites.⁽²⁰⁾ The communities are therefore not very enthusiastic about aiding in well construction.

In addition to (and in many ways as a result of) all the program difficulties, CRS moved its Sudan office to Khartoum and closed its Juba location in 1976. At this time the CRS country director was expelled from Sudan by the government.⁽²¹⁾ The new staff taking over, recognizing the inherent difficulties of working in the South, decided to focus their efforts mainly in the northern part of the country.⁽²²⁾ While no final decision has been reached on the fate of CRS's Southern schemes, it seems that the program there will either be slowly

phased out, or just maintained at its present level. The organization feels that unless it is willing and able to funnel in large amounts of resources, provide adequate back-up for its personnel, and have access to a reliable transportation and communication system, their efforts in Southern Sudan will be mainly wasted.

A few of the more conservative NGOs have succeeded in establishing some fairly extensive programs by implementing a *mélange* of projects. Africa Inland Mission (AIM) has as its main scheme the Logotok Health Project in Equatoria province. The objective here is to build a base for rural medical outreach by constructing one dispensary in Logotok and eight healthcare units in the surrounding area. Aside from this, AIM is also involved in an agricultural extension program and provides transportation and technical support as well as food and basic equipment for several Southern districts.

Sudan Interior Mission (SIM), which began its ministry in Southern Sudan in 1937, also has a medical program as its core activity. SIM operates PHCPs in three locations in Upper Nile Province, providing both curative and preventative services at existing dispensaries, a vaccination campaign, mother-child health classes, and special village-level disease control and health education programs.⁽²³⁾ Besides this (US) \$3 million effort, SIM has organized an adult literacy scheme which includes the printing and distribution of primers in Mabaan and Dinka, and the periodic presentation of literacy workshops.⁽²⁴⁾ The agency is presently looking into the possibility of expanding its program in Upper Nile Province to include other facets of the rural development process in an integrated strategy that will better meet the many needs of the area.⁽²⁵⁾

Finally, the joint Euro Action Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development/Canadian University Service Overseas (EA-ACORD/CUSO) program is, as well, part of this more prudent NGO category. This alliance is involved in a PHCP, actively encourages a brick-making cooperative, and supports a hand-dug well project. It has also recruited volunteers to help in government administration, to act as financial advisors and to work in health and agricultural extension programs.

EA-ACORD/CUSO's main scheme is the Amadi Rural Development Institute, a training center for Community Development Officers. At present the institute is being managed and largely financed by EA-ACORD/CUSO, but the Sudanese government is sharing increasingly in the cost and plan to take over in 1982, the seventh year of operation. The students at the institute are trained in organizational and management skills relevant to the rural situation. Their education vis à vis specific crafts, trades or professions is, however, superficial at best.

Criticism has been levelled at the Rural Development Institute. There is a feeling that it may be overbuilt, underutilized and expatriate oriented. Things such as "European" food, gas stoves, petrol and diesel fuel are regularly trucked in from Nairobi and are used by expatriate and local staff alike. (26) Not only is this incongruous with the self-reliance that a community development officer should be practicing, but it is doubtful that the government will be able or willing to provide its workers with these imported items. Along with this, once the students do start working in the community, many have serious conflicts with the specialists they are supposed to be consulting. Some of the community development officers, whose role is to dabble in the different development fields

but still work through the experts, have somehow felt that their training entitles them to make the final decision in all matters. ⁽²⁷⁾ Obviously this incompatibility is not in the best interests of the rural communities.

The Expansive NGOs:

Two independent NGOs, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and Lutheran World Federation (LWF) have, since the phasing out of the relief operations in Southern Sudan, quickly expanded their development programs to a point where both are today involved in a multitude of rural development schemes.

In 1979 NCA signed a new four year agreement with the SRG and is carrying on with its development activities that began in 1975. This most recent phase of the NCA program has a (US) \$25 million budget. The Norwegian organization is accountable for 85% of this amount with the Sudanese government being responsible for the balance. ⁽²⁸⁾ Of the sum that NCA itself is to provide, 85% will be derived directly from the Norwegian government. ⁽²⁹⁾ The remainder of the money is to be obtained through contributions from the various Norwegian churches that make up NCA. ⁽³⁰⁾

The NCA program in Southern Sudan is centered in the town of Torit in the eastern part of Equatoria province, and is designed to improve the economic and social conditions of this town and seven adjoining districts. Believing that a major pre-condition for the realization of this goal is the establishment of major infrastructure in the area, NCA has made construction of buildings and roads its number one priority. In the buildings section, an effort has been made to provide schools, health centers and residential accommodation. The roads project, for its part, was set up primarily to improve feeder roads in the Torit region. Emphasis

has been put on building roads to a minimum single lane, able to sustain heavy rains with a modicum of maintenance. ⁽³¹⁾

Even though conventional road building equipment (see Table 5:2) and civil engineers were brought in to work on this scheme, the roads section has not been able to meet its original objectives. Between 1975 and 1978, the first four-year period of NCA's development program, only 168 kilometres of road were constructed. ⁽³²⁾ The main reason for this is that NCA's aims were too ambitious relative to the available machinery, personnel and working conditions. Work was suspended for about one year because of delivery delays for equipment. The existing roads were of such a standard that reconstruction rather than maintenance had to be carried out. Unskilled drivers and machine operators resulted in low utilization of machinery and progress was often completely stopped. Finally, road and weather conditions made work impossible during parts of the year.

Another NCA priority for the Torit region is in water development. In the review period 1975 to 1978, 180 wells were dug (see Table 5:3). Of these only 46 were dry. ⁽³³⁾ Generally, the productive boreholes are installed with simple hand pumps and are capable of serving 500-600 people with potable water. The water project team, besides maintaining their own wells, also cleans and repairs other existing boreholes and reservoirs in their district.

NCA's agricultural project revolves around the establishment of six Agricultural Development Centers (ADC) in their program region. The basic objective of these centers is to promote agricultural production in each of the six areas in order to obtain self-sufficiency in their staple crops, an adequate supply of vegetables, fruits and legumes and, eventually, a surplus of produce to

be sold on the regional, national or international markets. ⁽³⁴⁾ The scheme as a whole has had a sluggish start. Lack of data and documentation, and a scarcity of qualified technical people, especially at the more isolated ADCs, has made it difficult to meet specific goals in all centers. Nevertheless, a start has been made. Suitable land has been acquired for all centers and most now have at least skeleton technical staff. Unfortunately, few in-service training courses have yet been held and such schemes as crop trials, seed production, ox-cultivation and extension courses are still in the planning stages.

In education, NCA is committed to reprinting certain texts in several of the vernacular languages for the Regional Ministry of Education. The organization is also providing basic furniture and school supplies for 9 schools which the agency itself built. ⁽³⁵⁾

NCA's health program has focused on curative medicine through its involvement in some local PHCUs. An NCA mobile health unit regularly visits different dispensaries and dressing stations, and, on these safaris, is also able to supervise and support the local health personnel in their work. Preventive medicine and health promotion, especially in the remote areas, have been difficult to sustain due to the lack of constant follow-up. Therefore only limited sanitation and vaccination campaigns have so far been possible. Between 1975 and 1978 NCA also built four dispensaries and five PHCUs. ⁽³⁶⁾ The equipping of these units was not undertaken until the arrival of sanctioned staff able to take charge of these stations.

Another NCA project is its successful printing press installation in Juba. This offset printing venture publishes regional newspapers and magazines, agency newsletters and reports, and government publications. Along with this, technical

and administrative training has been given, and today most of the plant's positions are locally filled. Known now as the Nile Printing Press, this small publishing business was given to the Regional Ministry of Information and Culture in 1977 and has since functioned as part of and under the administration of this ministry.⁽³⁷⁾ NGA remains involved through its donation of equipment and its provision of consultant services.

The final part of NCA's rural development program is its cooperative project. The intention here is to stimulate initiative in the local population and give assistance to enterprises which will promote production and activity in the area. The plans for the project call for support to local groups in the marketing of produce, equipment and seeds, and in extension services, production of building materials, carpentry, tailoring, blacksmithing, and shops.⁽³⁸⁾

Even though by early 1978 this cooperative scheme had organized more than 40 groups in four widely separated areas and among four different tribal groups,⁽³⁹⁾ qualitatively it cannot be deemed a success. Invariably it was the NCA advisors who devised a particular project and, after this, encouraged the formation of a group to undertake the now de facto cooperative venture.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Not only is this imposition contrary to the spirit of cooperative movements, but, NCA's lack of base-line information and socio-economic data meant that decisions were made based on assumptions rather than facts. The result, in effect, was often the encouragement of totally inappropriate projects. Furthermore, it is doubtful if the people always grasped the rationale behind the formation of their organizations. It could be suggested in fact that their enthusiasm was aroused more out of the prospect of getting things free of charge than by a genuine desire to solve common problems.

To plan, build and manage all of these projects, NCA has established some backup structures to facilitate their task in Southern Sudan. Directly supporting the various schemes, the agency has recently formed a research team whose role is to survey relevant information for planning and implementation of development activities. A Cessna 404 and a two-way radio system provide dependable supply lines and communication links. To support the personnel themselves, NCA has set up a Norway in microcosm in Hiliu,⁽⁴¹⁾ a small village just outside of Torit, where over 110 Norwegians are posted. A private school has been organized to ensure that the 25 or so expatriate children there will follow a Norwegian curriculum. As well, there are of course electric generators, water filtration units, shops, and a hospital for the exclusive use of the Norwegian community. The NCA plane regularly flies between Juba and Nairobi⁽⁴²⁾, and, besides its project duties, fetches European food and other personal items for NCA expatriate staff.⁽⁴³⁾ The organization also has liaison offices in Juba, Khartoum and Nairobi to handle bureaucratic problems concerning equipment and personnel.

The details of implementing each of the many projects have been worked out with the respective Regional Ministries in Juba and approved by the Planning Commission in Khartoum. In addition to these more official consultations, NCA's stated aim has also been to encourage grass-roots participation in their activities:

The programme's chief intention has been to take existing local skills and organizational capacities and attempt to design programme inputs to mobilise local human resources for increased production. In other words, the participation of the local population is a most vital aspect for the outcome of the programme. This implies that the programme must be flexible enough to adapt itself to local initiatives and to channel them in directions constant with overall development goals. The programme activities should be closely related to the

district and rural council administrations where the projects are to be implemented. (44)

By the very nature of the NCA schemes and their manner of implementation, it is obvious that this resolve has been all but ignored. As it is, NCA is simply importing and imposing foreign goods and designs in order to solve problems which the organization itself has identified. Relatively very little on-site training goes on, nor are any Sudanese nationals part of NCA's decision-making structure. It is a good thing that NCA sees its involvement in Southern Sudan as long term, (45) because if its projects are to be successful within their present framework, the Norwegians are going to have to keep sending in resources and trained personnel for a long time to come.

Compared to NCA's work, the activities of the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) in Southern Sudan are basically similar in content and manner of implementation. They are, however, different in scope. First their budgets are drastically different. (Compare NCA's annual (US) \$6.25 million with LWF's (US) \$1.1 million in 1978 - see Table 5:4.) Second, NCA tends to focus its efforts on a relatively small area, whereas LWF projects are spread over hundreds of kilometers in Upper Nile Province (see Map 5:1). This large LWF work district is also a most difficult and hazardous region. During the dry season the area's soil is as hard as concrete, making farming next to impossible but overland transport feasible. Conversely, during the rains, which fall for more than half the year, the ground is excessively swampy, rendering possible only limited types of agriculture and making the swollen rivers and streams the only avenues of mobility.

LWF's base in Malakal is the heart of their program. Not only does LWF manage its operations from this provincial capital, but a carpentry and

mechanical workshop have already been ~~started there~~. A sub-base has recently been opened in Nasir in the eastern sector of the province, cutting travel time for staff and giving them an opportunity to be in more frequent contact with projects. The organization also has logistic and liaison offices in Juba and Nairobi. Twice-monthly charter flights are made with aircraft hired from NCA to bring in supplies from Nairobi and to facilitate movement of staff.

LWF's major project is its agricultural scheme, which is actually made up of a number of related activities: drugs and medicine are being supplied to different veterinary hospitals and dispensaries in order to help improve local livestock quality, agricultural production cooperatives have evolved through LWF's support; demonstration plots have been established for planting-date trials; ⁽⁴⁶⁾ different selections of maize and vegetables along with high yielding types of sorghum are being distributed to schools and farmers; insecticides and spraying equipment are made available for crops susceptible to attack by pests; several windmills have been erected for use in small irrigation projects; finally, a tree-planting scheme was started in Malakal.

Another notable LWF activity is its building program. The agency has constructed or encouraged the erection, through self-help schemes, of many essential buildings in Upper Nile Province. This has included several PHCUs, a large health center, a few veterinary dispensaries and numerous primary and secondary schools. Along with these buildings, LWF's carpentry workshop has been able to provide most of these establishments with basic furnishings (see Table 5:5). Road and bridge maintenance and the construction of ditches and a causeway have also been carried out. Finally, as soon as heavy lifting equipment arrives, LWF will expand its operations to construct voluminous tanks to ensure safe water supplies for schools and hospitals.

The last noteworthy LWF project is its health scheme. A portion of the agency's effort in this development area is connected with the local PHCP, as LWF sends staff and donates equipment and medicine to the province's hospitals and clinics. The organization also runs a CHW training course and has just recently launched a "hospital-boat" which facilitates movement during the rainy season. In terms of preventive health, LWF, as has been mentioned, will furnish sealed water tanks to educational and health institutions.

Conclusion:

This group of comprehensive NGOs covers a wide spectrum of development activities and operations. Their programs range from a handful of almost insignificant projects to a large number of imposing schemes. Some of these agencies tend to restrict their activities to a limited geographical area, whereas others work throughout the Southern Region. Whatever the case, however, all the organizations in this category are, at best, getting only mixed results for their efforts.

Those agencies with small-scale operations in the region are experiencing direct project failures because of their lack of backup services, and of access to reliable transportation and communication systems. Moreover, these NGOs tend to try to do too much with the few resources they have to offer, and instead of solidifying one or two schemes, thinly spread their meagre supplies and over-worked staff over a multitude of projects. Not only does this cause immediate problems, but in the longer term, an originally fragile program may have additional difficulties because of its inability to build durable indigenous support to provide continuity and follow-up. Without the assurance of this long-lasting

local involvement and ensuing progression, there will be little to show for an agency's efforts after it has left the district.

Some of the more prominent international NGOs are, due to the above reasons, notable by their absence in Southern Sudan. Agencies such as Foster Parent's Plan,⁽⁴⁷⁾ which is active in Northern Sudan, and CARE⁽⁴⁸⁾ have indicated that at present they are not ready to initiate any projects in the South. These organizations feel that unless at least the minimum infrastructural utilities are in place, their efforts would be mostly wasted in the Southern Region.

Those NGOs which have medium to large-scaled operations may have successful projects per se, but in general their programs do not always serve the best interests of the local people. Excesses in overhead and style, paternalistic attitudes, lack of professionalism and a certain parochialism emerge when agencies overestimate the significance of their activities and compete over asserting their particular identities, at times ignoring the better interests of the potential recipients. In addition, one of the key problems with these more expansive organizations is that they tend to finance high-priced institutions whose ostentatious image, not to mention maintenance costs, may conflict directly with the values that are being encouraged.

Finally, all the comprehensive NGOs do have one general characteristic which may, in part, be the cause of their collective inefficacy. These agencies are top-heavy with foreign experts and are therefore wanting in indigenous participation. It seems that if continuity and relevant programming are to be achieved, then genuine empathy on the part of these multi-project organizations can be reflected only through their efforts to involve Sudanese nationals in all aspects of their work.

Unaffiliated NGOs : Volunteer Programs

Introduction:

There are four NGOs involved strictly with recruitment of trained volunteers for placement in Southern Sudan. Of these only one minor group, Swedish Church Mission, which has three volunteers in a school, has a religious orientation. The other three are secular based.

The secular voluntary agencies receive the major part of their funding through their respective governments' bilateral aid programs - at the same time maintaining their non-governmental status. However, in spite of the official support, the voluntary organizations do not have large programs, nor do they have sophisticated backup structures to bolster the spirits and meet the needs of the volunteers in the field.

The Secular Missionaries:

Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO), a British agency, has been in Sudan since the early 1950's, but first sent volunteers to the Southern Region only in 1973. At one time there were over 60 VSO workers throughout the country but at present there are less than 20. The reason for this rather scanty representation is that VSO, which once recruited heavily for secondary school teachers, is now shying away from any involvement in academic education. This is especially true in Southern Sudan where many volunteers working in rural schools terminated early because of frustration, sickness, loneliness, and overall poor working conditions. (49)

VSO cooperants are now working in fairly structured situations where they not only receive suitable professional direction, but where more familiar material comforts are provided. Several of the British volunteers have been seconded to a (US) \$53 million World Bank agricultural project near Wau: One is an agriculturalist, three are mechanics and two more have taken on administrative posts. Three forestry engineers under VSO's jurisdiction are part of a forestry scheme financed by Britain's Official Development Assistance program. This agency also has three specialists acting as advisors in a tea plantation and has sent a mechanical engineer to help build "ferra/cement" boats in Juba.

An American group, International Voluntary Service (IVS) has been in Southern Sudan only since 1977. Previously, it was providing post-secondary teachers for Northern institutions ⁽⁵⁰⁾, but IVS has geared its small Southern volunteer program towards community-development activities.

An IVS water engineer is implementing a self-help open-well project to encourage and mobilize villages to tap underground sources of clean drinking water. This includes training government personnel to supervise and manage all aspects of the program and organizing local villagers to maintain the existing water supplies while developing new ones. In Juba a leathercrafts specialist recruited by the American agency is director of a ten-person leatherworks cooperative. Working with the Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural Development, an IVS cooperant is assisting in the provision of grinding mills for a few villages. This project is designed to provide a source of income and of high quality flour for the communities as well as training for co-op members and ministry staff. In another project, an IVS sheep rancher is managing a pilot scheme developed by

the Regional Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Forests. Working with local tribesmen, the volunteer is helping to upgrade their pastures and herds of sheep. As well, the organization will soon send some of its volunteer personnel to Terakeka to serve in a community development project there. Finally, IVS would like to be involved in the rehabilitation of an agricultural research station in Yambio, but due to early terminations and subsequent recruitment problems has had difficulties in finding suitable people.

The last of the three secular voluntary agencies to start working in Southern Sudan is German Volunteer Service (GVS). Negotiations between GVS and the Government of Sudan went on for several years before an agreement was finally signed in 1978. Due to bureaucratic mishaps and procrastination, the ratification procedure was finalized only in late 1979. Of the four initial programs that GVS volunteers are or will be involved within Sudan, three are located only in the South, while the last is nationwide.

At present five GVS cooperants are working at the May Vocational Training Institute in Wau in the fields of metal work, car mechanics, carpentry, and electricity. Later in 1981, the West German agency will send 20 science and technical teachers to secondary schools in the Southern Region. These teachers will be appointed to only 7 or 8 centers in the area to ensure that there are 2 or 3 GVS teachers per school, thereby providing instant security for the often young volunteers. Also, later this year, the organization will get involved in the South's PHCP by assigning 11 to 15 health professionals to the region. Of these, half are to be doctors, while the remainder will be nurses and paramedical personnel.⁽⁵¹⁾ Again, GVS wants to ensure that none of its health people will be without German companionship so it is insisting that all assignments be on a team basis.

GVS's involvement in the nationwide program is a joint effort with Sudan's Supreme Council of Youth and Welfare, the UNDP and the ILO. In this program, volunteer staff are engaged as instructors in metalwork, carpentry, electricity, car mechanics, handicrafts, needlework and home economics, building techniques, and plumbing. This vocational project is a mobile scheme designed to go to all areas of the country to help those with a basic education and no marketable skill. The GVS agents will travel to the various regions, set up 6 to 9 month workshops and, working with Sudanese counterparts who will eventually become instructors themselves, teach the required trades and crafts.⁽⁵²⁾ The UNDP's involvement is strictly financial, whereas ILO experts do an initial analysis on who needs help and on what skills need to be taught.

All GVS volunteers in Sudan get the same allowance and benefits regardless of what they do. Besides free medical care and life insurance, paid transportation to and from Sudan, totally subsidized housing, and substantial "settling-in" and "resettlement" compensation, the basic monthly volunteer's salary is 950 German Marks - equivalent to approximately (LS)380.⁽⁵³⁾ Most of the German cooperants working in Southern Sudan are in their mid-twenties, many doing their stint with GVS in order to be exempted from military service in West Germany. The majority of the volunteers are well trained but generally have little job experience. Hoping that this shortcoming will be offset by the natural enthusiasm of youth and the excitement of a different culture, GVS does little more than provide its field workers with in-country orientation and some language training.

Conclusion:

Volunteers recruited by the three secular NGOs are required to work and serve in a variety of employment situations in Southern Sudan. Volunteers are attracted to these positions for a number of reasons. For some it is the lure of the exotic and adventure. In other instances it is an altruistic desire to help less fortunate human beings. More and more it is because jobs cannot be found at home and, in fact, the so-called volunteers do end up being well remunerated, considering all the benefits. Or, as is the case with some GVS cooperants, being a volunteer in Southern Sudan is the more palatable of two dismal choices.

Though there are different reasons for going to Southern Sudan in the first place, the actual performance and attitude of volunteers in the region falls under three fairly predictable categories. Some seem to be effective in their posts and even extend their standard two-year contract for a third or fourth year. Others, more through pride and tenacity than anything else, fulfill their obligations the best way they can, at the same time despising their jobs and where they are living. Finally, a large enough proportion of volunteers are so displeased and depressed about their living and working conditions that they return home just weeks or months after their arrival in the South.

The failures and frustrations encountered by the volunteers of the last two types are lamentable on the personal level because these people have wasted their time and left with a negative feeling about Southern Sudan and its populace. More importantly, however, the recruitment of volunteers, ill-suited on a professional or personal basis, has ruined, delayed or cancelled needed projects. In addition, the lack of expertise and/or commitment, and the numerous premature departures not only disappoint and disillusion affected

Southerners, but may be taken as affronts to the culture and lifestyle of the region. (54)

The fault for the many problems met by volunteers in Southern Sudan does not lie with the cooperants themselves. Most who have experienced difficulties were either ill-informed or misled. Furthermore, stories concerning the personal trials experienced by other North Americans or Western Europeans who have lived and worked in Southern Sudan are not always fully believed or felt to be applicable when one is filled with a sense of adventure or mission. Obviously then it is the recruiting agencies, the NGOs themselves, which have not done their jobs properly.

One difficulty lies in the recruitment process. Often, insensitive and/or poorly trained individuals are selected. On the other hand a person may be highly trained and have experience in a particular area, but may not have the relevant background for the job assigned. Job descriptions for Southern Sudan are rather difficult to write because they can never convey the complete picture not only of what the position entails, but also of living conditions, interaction with the local people and the social and cultural intricacies of the societies. Recruitment in North America or Europe is most unsatisfactory because the employees in the home office do not really have a good sense of the type of person that is needed in a particular situation. In any event, certain measures can be taken in the home country to exclude most of those who would not be effective in Southern Sudan: Detailed dossiers could be sent to the front-line field staff officers for examination and consent. As well, orientation sessions should be more comprehensive and demanding.

The second and more controllable part of the problem lies in the services that the in-country offices provide for their volunteers. As has been stressed

several times previously, Southern Sudan has little in the way of luxuries to offer Western visitors. Unless certain goods and comforts deemed basic necessities by North American or European standards are accessible, a typical volunteer will have difficulties just physically adapting to the new situation. In conjunction with this, help in alleviating the inevitable "culture shock" is also needed to facilitate emotional adjustment.

The three agencies have sometimes been lax in the preparatory and the follow-up phases of their responsibilities.⁽⁵⁵⁾ Sites where volunteers will be working should be visited by field staff before the cooperants arrive to ensure that a suitable residence is available and that the position to be filled does exist. In addition, articles such as medical kits and food supplies should be furnished, as these basic amenities can seldom be obtained in Southern Sudan. Finally, follow-up in the form of regular contact and visits by field staff, especially in the first months, would provide assurance for the often confused new recruits.

A Comparison of the Unaffiliated Agencies

The independent NGOs which operate development or volunteer programs in Southern Sudan have varied characteristics. They have, for instance, a diverse history of involvement in the area. Many of the NGOs have been working in the South since 1972 and their present development activities are merely extensions of their original relief and rehabilitation work. Several of the agencies have only recently begun independent programing, at the same time sustaining their long-standing memberships in one or more of the inter-missionary associations. Only

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a few of the groups which have started programs in the last two or three years have had no previous connection with the region.

It would seem to logically follow that those NGOs with long years of experience in Southern Sudan would, because of accumulated expertise and the strengthening of programs, have stable, successful projects. Yet agencies such as CRS and VSO, whose presence in the South dates back to 1972 and 1973 respectively, have not been able to fully establish themselves or their programs in the area. On the other hand, several groups such as SIL and GVS, both of which started their programs only in 1978, are meeting with relative success. It is fair to say then that longevity of involvement in Southern Sudan bears little relation to how an NGO fares in the region.

Besides length of service, however, other individual factors which make up an NGO's character do influence the role that each organization plays in the rural development process in the Southern Region. One of these factors is that the unattached groups stem from two distinct backgrounds. Most of these NGOs are mission societies or originate from a religious foundation, with only a few having a secular base.

On the individual level, staff working for religious and secular organizations have different incentives for wanting to serve in Southern Sudan. Personnel employed by religious agencies are, for their part, united in their intense commitment to serve God. Conversely, employees of secular groups do not usually have either a common motive or a deeply ingrained reason behind their inclination to work in the South. There are only a few secular NGOs in Southern Sudan; consequently little empirical data is available to show if these motivation differences affect the quality of programming or the performance of

an NGO. All that can really be extrapolated is that the lack of on-going commitment to a certain ideal affects the continuity of programs: Where religious missionaries may be in Southern Sudan from the inception to the conclusion of a project, their secular counterparts normally stay only two or three years, leaving not when the scheme is complete, but when their contract has expired.

In addition to problems of motivation on an individual basis, most secular and religious groups working in Southern Sudan have, to varying degrees, commitment lapses at the organization level. It seems that at times some agencies become bogged down in bureaucratic procedure, becoming interested primarily in justifying and extending their own existence. Even though the religious agencies are able to appeal to their spiritually captive donors, they, like the secular NGOs, raise the bulk of their funds from government or other public sources. In their attempts to get more for themselves and their programs, administrators often lose sight of what they are supposed to be doing, operating more like businesses than non-profit international development organizations. It also seems that NGOs like NCA, LWF, and the three secular volunteer agencies are quite content to use and be used by existing political and power structures, furthering ends which are not always concomitant with the needs and requests of community groups.

Similarly, there is very little cooperation and next to no project coordination between the NGOs working in Southern Sudan. Expertise, personnel and even resources that could be shared between the agencies are usually jealously guarded. ⁽⁵⁶⁾ Overly competitive agencies who view their work in the Southern Region as a contest with other organizations, ineffective government coordina-

tion, human oversight, and an unreliable communication network frequently result in a duplication of projects and in the squandering of valuable resources, time and expertise. Where a joint effort for the common goal of helping the Southern Sudanese should be the norm, it is instead the exception.

Another determining factor of NGO performance in Southern Sudan is that some of the unaffiliated agencies enjoy extensive financial support, while others, due to the limited resources made available for their Southern Regional programs, can barely carry out the most modest projects. Throughout this chapter it has been stressed that those groups with the proper backup facilities have been able, to some extent at least, to attain their objectives by bringing in materials and personnel to impose their own brand of development. Those agencies with only limited budgets have been far slower in achieving their aims.

Closely related to the question of resources is that of program size. Even some of the larger organizations have chosen to work in only one or two sectors to ensure that they are not taking on more than is reasonable given their resources and the difficult conditions in Southern Sudan. Other groups, however, try to do too many things at one time with the result that none of the schemes get the attention they need. Project results for those organizations that tend to overuse and strain their resources are only marginally successful, if at all.

The problem here though is not always one of finances or resources. At times there is actually too much money chasing too few opportunities for wise expenditure. Instead of selecting demonstration projects, making sure these function properly and then expanding gradually when more experience has been gained and preparation has been made, some groups, especially the comprehensive agencies, expand to humanly unmanageable and ineffective perimeters.

So far the factors listed which help determine NGO effectiveness in the field have covered only the outside or visible portion of programs. Yet the success or failure of a rural development project is not always apparent. Though a particular scheme may outwardly be complete and meet specifications, on the less visible level this same scheme may be interfering with community life and may actually be having a negative impact on the region. Conversely, a program which on first sight seems to be a shambles may in reality be a dynamic force involving large segments of the community and building the foundation for long-lasting, relevant development. While the above two examples are rather extreme and are certainly not representative of all the possible combinations of program impact, it is important to illustrate that it is this "unseen" result which in the long term greatly determines the effectiveness of a project.

The factors which help determine the success or failure of the more visible part of a scheme are also pertinent when looked at in relation to the less apparent portion of program effectiveness. A change or loss of commitment, especially when an organization becomes overly preoccupied with itself as an agency or has to bend certain principles in order to secure funding, often results in "showcase" development.

Similarly, while a minimum of financial support is obviously necessary, there are dangers that some schemes administered by unaffiliated NGOs have grown into ostentatious shells. Besides the fact that field workers have difficulty relating to the people they are sent to serve, agency program administrators, it seems, tend to lose their energy and imagination in proportion to the growth of their budgets. Hence, construction of physical infrastructure or the importation of all needed materials are popular because the end product is

highly visible and relatively easy to accomplish. Programs involving extensive local participation on the other hand, need more preparation and are not always conspicuous successes.

In addition, it is often simply assumed that there is a need for certain facilities or products. In reality though, the presence of a particular building or the availability of foreign goods may be counter productive to more favourable development goals. Often the short-term solutions tend to be pallatives rather than contributors to real change.

There is one additional factor affecting the discernible portion of program results that is especially relevant for the less apparent portion; unfortunately this characteristic is common to all unaffiliated NGOs: All are administered by expatriates, with Sudanese participation limited to the fringe of the management hierarchy. None of the groups, though a number pay lip service to such notions as self-reliance and indigenous involvement, are ready or able to alter their rooted paternalism. It is, they say, too soon for the Southern Sudanese people themselves to take on all decision-making responsibilities, and it is more expedient to impose various projects than to wait for a consensus among community groups.

In the same way that ACROSS decided to opt for more short-term development goals, and SCC and Sudanaid chose the slower yet longer-lasting avenue of human development, the unaffiliated NGOs have also had to make a choice. In many instances this decision is made for them as funding guidelines or other outside pressures may insist on quick and recognizable results in return for continued support. In any case, while many try to maintain some balance, all of the independent groups have elected to work more towards the immediate, highly

visible ends (which may in fact help alleviate immediate human suffering) than to struggle to build longer-lasting, more durable human systems.

This choice of strategy does not necessarily indicate that the independent agencies are not interested in "institution building" in Southern Sudan. Rather, their development preference may, in conjunction with the external factors that have been discussed, be seen as the only way of accomplishing anything in the Southern Region. Due to the large area and the great difficulties encountered when working in the region, many agencies feel that immediate and widespread indigenous participation is a luxury the South cannot afford. After essential agricultural, health, education, transport, and communication structures are in place, they say, there will be ample time to fully involve the Southern Sudanese in the development process. The major criticism of this attitude is that the Southern people are not given sufficient voice in their own collective destiny. In addition to being able to eat more and be sick less, the Southern Sudanese should be able to partake in all decisions affecting their lives. In this way dignity, decency and self-respect as well as an eventual better standard of living will be ensured.

Map 5:1

Lutheran World Federation
Program Area

Source: Lutheran World Service,
Sudan Annual Report, 1978,
Nile Printing Press, Juba,
1979. p.1

Table 5:1

**Distributions Made By the Sudanese Red Crescent
In A Joint Relief Operation With the International Committee of the Red Cross
August 9 to November 21, 1978**

PROVINCE	NUMBER OF ARTICLES	TYPE
Equatoria	41 Boxes	Assorted Medicaments
	20 Cartons	Baby Milk
	14 Bags	Milk/Protein Mixture
	4 Sacks	Milk Powder
	50 Cartons	Tinned Milk
Upper Nile	92 Boxes	Assorted Medicaments
	24 Sacks	Milk Powder
	39 Cartons	Baby Milk
	95 Bags	Milk/Protein Mixture
	124 Cartons	Sugar
	66 Cartons	Tinned Meat
	10 Cartons	Tea
	2 Boxes	Jam
	63 Cartons	Biscuits
	35 Cartons	Beans in Tomato Sauce
	1,000 Pieces	Blankets
	236 Pieces	Tents
Bar el Ghazal	3 Bales	Cotton Bleached Cloth
	144 Boxes	Assorted Medicaments
	2,540 Pieces	Blankets
	22 Bales	Cotton Bleached Cloth
	600 Pieces	Tents
	10 Bales	Clothing
	20 Cartons	Biscuits
	40 Cartons	Tea
	37 Sacks	Milk Powder
	3 Boxes	Baby Milk
	4 Cartons	Jam
	190 Packs	Rice
	12 Bags	Milk/Protein Mixture
	60 Boxes	Mackerel
	35 Cartons	Beans in Tomato Sauce
	60 Cartons	Tinned Meat

Source: International Committee for the Red Cross, Sudan: Floods, Relief Bureau, circular No. 714. ROP-7809a, Geneva, 3rd August 1978. p. annex 1-3-4.

Table 5:2

Norwegian Church Aid's Road Building Equipment

Type	Make	No.
Car	Landrover	3
Tipper	Mercedes 1313	6
Grader	Champion-D-600	1
Excavator	Broyt X-20	1
Bulldozer	Caterpillar-D-4	1
Tractor	Massey Ferguson	5
Tow Grader	Champion	1
Tipper	Nissan	2
Roller		1
Concrete		3

Source: NCA - Sudan Programme - 1st January to 30th June 1978,
Program Report No. 8, Torit, 1978. p. 30.

Table 5:3

**Boreholes Drilled by NCA in Relation to the Targets
for the 1975 - 1978 period**

	Planned Boreholes	Actual Boreholes Drilled	% of Total Boreholes Drilled
1975/76	50	40	22.2%
1977	75	59	32.8%
1978	75	81	45.0%
TOTAL	200	180	100.0%

Source: NCA - Sudan Programs, 1st January to 31st December 1978,
Progress Report No. 9, Torit, April 6, 1979. p. 28.

Table 5:4

Lutheran World Federation - Sudan Program - Expenditure 1978

Project	US Dollars
Administration	117,000
Stores and Central Supplies (Juba and Nairobi Offices)	97,000
Project Engineers	56,000
Transportation and Equipment	284,000
Village Water Supplies	5,000
Agriculture Extension	160,000
Road and Bridges	27,000
Reconstruction, Labour and Transport	182,000
Self-help Schools and Dispensaries	18,000
Supplementary Medical Assistance	17,000
Health Extension Services	69,000
New Emergencies	2,000
Carried forward from 1977	75,000
TOTAL	1,109,000

Source: Lutheran World Service - Sudan Annual Report 1978, Nile Printing Press
Juba, 1979. p. 19.

Table 5:5

**Furniture Made Available by Lutheran World Federation to
Different Projects in Southern Sudan in 1978**

Items	PHCUs	Veterinary Dispensaries	Primary Schools	Secondary Schools	Ready but not Distributed	Total
Desks	-	-	62	46	59	169
Chairs	15	24	2	2	7	50
Tables	6	12	2	2	10	32
Boxes	-	4	-	-	2	6
Cupboards	3	4	2	2	4	15
Benches	3	-	-	-	1	4

Source: Lutheran World Service - Sudan Annual Report 1978, Nile Printing Press, Juba, 1979 p. 13.

Footnotes

- 1 - Technical Assistance Information Clearing House (TAICH), Country Report: Development Assistance Programs of U.S. Non-Profit Organizations, Sudan, October 1979. p. 9.
- 2 - Information received from interview with Roger Wilson, CIDA, NGO Division, December 12, 1980.
- 3 - TAICH, 1979. p. 9. and USAID, Survey Report for Democratic Republic of Sudan, May 1979. p.p. attachment A-16-17.
- 4 - While USAID is providing the grant covering the cost of the project, CUSO, CODEL, Maryknoll Fathers and UNICEF are cooperating with IMREF/AMREF on the PHCPs.
- 5 - USAID, Survey Report for Sudan, p. attachment A. 17.
- 6 - Training Project Team: Medical Officer, Public Health Nurse and Sanitary Overseer; Building Program: Self-Help Building Supervisor and Assistant Self-Help Building Supervisor (Counterpart); Information System: Medical Records Technician, Survey and Evaluation Officer and Medical Secretary; Supply System: Senior Supplies Officer.
- 7 - USAID, Survey Report for Sudan, p. attachment A-11.
- 8 - Information received from the USAID Project Officer in Khartoum, July 14, 1980.
- 9 - USAID, Survey Report for Sudan, p. attachment A-11.
- 10 - The IVS director and the USAID Project Officer both said that SIL's project is one of the few in Southern Sudan which is actually achieving what it set out to do.
- 11 - USAID, Survey Report for Sudan, p. attachment A-12.
- 12 - Larry and Vivian Soule, "Educational Change: A New Network to Learning" in Sudanow, May 1980. p. 27.
- 13 - Ibid, p.p. 27-28.
- 14 - This is the way one member of CIDA's NGO Division expressed his feelings for the "Distance Education System" in its present format.
- 15 - Dr. J. Seaman, Report on Visit to the Save the Children Fund Medical Project, Torit, Southern Sudan - 19th April to 6th May, 1979, p. 3.
- 16 - Ibid, p. 3.
- 17 - Ibid, p. 4.
- 18 - CRS, Sudan program: Annual Summary of Activities, July 1, 1977 - June 30, 1978, Khartoum, 1978. p. 3.
- 19 - Ibid, p.p. 5-6; TAICH, Country Report Development Assistance Programs of U.S. Non-Profit Organizations in Sudan, November 1975. p. 7.; interview with Charles Allen, CRS Sudan Program Director, Khartoum 26/6/80.
- 20 - Taken from interview with Charles Allen, CRS Sudan Program Director, Khartoum 26/6/80.
- 21 - According to Mr. Allen, the director was expelled because "...the man was very straight and couldn't abide by the corruption and bribes that are normal parts of the system in the Southern Region."
- 22 - CRS's programing in the North is quickly expanding. The backbone of its present activities is its health and nutrition program for pre-school children. This program currently serves 30,000 children in Khartoum and Kassala Provinces. CRS is also involved in water, food, literacy, sanitation, and vocational programs in the Northern Region.

- 23 - TAICH, Sudan Country Report, 1979. p. 20.
- 24 - Ibid, p. 19.
- 25 - SIM, Integrated Community Development Project - PHCP Section - Three Year Plan, Second Phase (mimeographed). p. 1.
- 26 - Information received from Roger Wilson, CIDA, NGO-Division, who visited the project in October 1980.
- 27 - Information received from David Chell, EA-ACORD/CUSO Director in Juba.
- 28 - Information received from Sigurd Fossland, NCA Resident Representative in Khartoum 31/8/80.
- 29 - According to some sources NCA's activities in Southern Sudan take over 50% of the Norwegian government's NGO budget. I have not been able to confirm this.
- 30 - These are mostly Protestant Churches, but there are some Catholic groups which put together funds for specific projects. Since 76% of all Norwegians belong to the Lutheran Church, the official state religion, it is not surprising that a large percentage of non-government NCA funds are derived from this source.
- 31 - NCA, Sudan Programme, 1st January to 30th June 1978, Progress Report No. 8, 1978. p. 13.
- 32 - NCA, Sudan Programme, 1st January to 31st December, Progress Report No. 9, Torit, April 6, 1979. p. 28.
- 33 - Ibid, p. 33.
- 34 - NCA, Report No. 8, p. 47.
- 35 - Ibid, p. 67.
- 36 - NCA, Report No. 9, p.p. 99-100.
- 37 - NCA, Report No. 8, p. 81.
- 38 - Ibid, p.p. 89-93.
- 39 - NCA, Report No. 9, p. 127.
- 40 - Interview with Sigurd Fossland, 31/8/80.
- 41 - In fact Hiliu is often referred to as "little Oslo".
- 42 - The three main functions of the air service are:
 - 1 To adequately support people so that they can live and work in an atmosphere of security and efficiency while isolated from the necessities and conveniences to which they are accustomed.
 - 2 To provide the administration of the program with a tool for the purpose of communications and project control.
 - 3 To provide all the projects and personnel with the opportunity to transport high priority cargo items in a safe and efficient manner.
- NCA, Report No. 9, p. 145.
- 43 - Roses for wives' birthdays and fresh Norwegian cod are some of the less critical items which are often flown in.
- 44 - NCA, Report No. 8, p. 5.
- 45 - "The conclusion is that most of the activities started by NCA will need continued administration and support by qualified staff and financial resources for a long period to come." - NCA, Report No. 8, p. 6.
- 46 - Due to food shortages in the region, this food also directly benefited the local population, as much of it was 'gathered' secretly before all required data had been compiled.

- 47 - Bruce Kennedy, the director of Foster Parent's Plan in Wad Medani in the North of Sudan, said that his organization wouldn't be able to do their job properly in the South. As it is, PLAN is expanding to Port Sudan, Khartoum and possibly to Kassala.
- 48 - In 1979/80, CARE studied the feasibility of opening up a program in Southern Sudan. They finally decided against it.
- 49 - Interview with Dick Poole, VSO Director in Khartoum. He said that VSO could not provide the needed backup services to run a widespread voluntary program, June 25, 1980.
- 50 - TAICH, Sudan Country Report, 1975, p. 10.
- 51 - Bodo Walter, GVS Director, Khartoum, Interview 15/6/80.
- 52 - Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, Co-operation Between the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the Federal Republic of Germany, Khartoum; (mimeographed), EZ. 440. 09, July 1980. p. 19.
- 53 - Bodo Walter, GVS Director, Khartoum.
- 54 - Don Paul, Former IVS Director, Khartoum.
- 55 - This is especially true for VSO. In the early days of VSO's programing in Southern Sudan, several VSO volunteers arrived at their job sites, usually schools, to discover that they were living in school dormitories with 100 students. Others arrived to find that their jobs were non-existent.
- 56 - A good example of these organizational jealousies is that of a church-based NGO in Southern Sudan which has its own airplane. This agency refuses to give passage to personnel associated with any Catholic organization. The reason given for this action is that Catholic missionaries infringed on the agency's government-alloted sector by actively encouraging community development programs in this district.

Chapter 6

The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in Southern Sudan: Some Conclusions <

In the introductory section of this study a hypothesis and five supporting sub-hypotheses were set down. The remainder of the work tested the empirical validity of these claims. The problems have now been explored, analyzed and illustrated. As well, in discussing these points a background to the acute underdevelopment in the Southern Region was presented, with an overview of development activities in the region, and a detailed account of the role of NGOs in the rural development process in Southern Sudan.

The first section of this final chapter will bring together and reiterate the salient findings of this study, linking these findings with the central and supporting hypotheses of the work. The second part of this chapter will suggest how the development process in Southern Sudan can be accelerated and improved.

Conclusions

NGOs are normally perceived as taking a holistic view to development, being concerned not only with material success, but also placing equal if not greater emphasis on the emotional, psychological and social conditions of man. Accordingly, while it is realized that some change in traditional societies is both desirable and inevitable, NGOs are seen as flexible developmental vehicles which are able to consult and include communities in their own development process. The central hypothesis of this study is that within the existing NGO system in Southern Sudan, the indigenous people are not given adequate opportunity to participate in their own development process.

The supporting sub-hypotheses relate to the reasons for the severe underdevelopment in Southern Sudan and to the different and often conflicting development approaches taken by the aid agencies working in the region. Dealing more specifically with NGOs and their role in the Southern Region, other supporting sub-problems refer to the inadequate cooperation and coordination between these agencies, to the waste of available resources by these groups, and to the self-serving objectives of these NGOs and their personnel, objectives which often take precedence over goals relevant to the needs of the region.

Much of the empirical data examined does support the claim that NGOs in Southern Sudan have very little local participation in the planning or implementation phases of their programs and projects. The majority of these NGOs tend to be administered by expatriates and to use mainly non-Sudanese as field personnel. For many of the agencies, the major decisions regarding programming in the South are made outside the region, if not outside the country. As well, many

tend to import and impose foreign goods and designs in order to meet needs which the organizations themselves have identified or which are responses to government requests.

There are, however, two exceptions which do not support the central hypothesis. As was shown in Chapter Four, SCC and Sudanaid are NGOs working in Southern Sudan which do have indigenous involvement in every sphere of their operations. Both of these agencies solicit local participation in the planning phase of a program, and most of their administrators and field staff are Sudanese. Furthermore, while Sudanaid manages its Southern program from Khartoum and through parish committees, SCC field workers directly administer each project with the help of the local community.

To reiterate, the bulk of evidence in Chapters Four and Five does illustrate and support the central hypothesis of this study: Most NGOs working in Southern Sudan do not reflect the usual NGO characteristics, as most NGO projects in the South are identified, planned and implemented without local participation. In most instances, therefore, the people of the region are not given adequate opportunity to be involved in their own development process.

In addition, this study has shown that social and political factors have greatly contributed to the development pattern in Sudan, and therefore have played a major part in bringing about the economic inequalities that exist in the country today.

The main result of the Anglo-Egyptian rule before 1946 was further division along traditional lines between the North and the South. The natural tensions which existed between the two groups, the ethnic, cultural, religious, ideological, and even geographical differences were manipulated by the Condom-

inimum administration to polarize the country into two distinct Arab and African spheres. Economically, the British all but ignored the South, valuing the region mainly for political considerations. Administratively, the colonial government vacillated between making Southern Sudan part of Sudan or part of its East African territories. When the British finally and arbitrarily solidified their Southern Policy, deciding after all to join the South (administratively, economically and politically) with the rest of Sudan, the Southerners were left completely unprepared and unprotected from Northern domination, due to their lack of political and economic infrastructure.

After independence, the continuation of the growth-pole strategy failed to achieve the desired spread of capital and skills from the advanced region to the less favoured areas. Localization of investment again tended to reinforce traditional divisions. The heaviest burden of underdevelopment again fell on the non-Arab minority which was never adequately represented in national affairs, and which eventually sought an alternate means to share in the wealth, power and prestige of the politically dominant Northern majority. Heavy expenditure to suppress the subsequent internal conflict simply widened the existing disparities by further concentrating fresh investment in the already favoured northern riverine district. Though the official end of the conflict has brought about some progress in the Southern Region, it still remains one of the poorest and least developed areas in the world.

Today, Southern Sudan is characterized by two closely related features. First, it is an economically poor and socially isolated region. The agrarian system in the Southern Region, with its traditional methods of cultivation and grazing, yields low production per man and low productivity per acre. The area

suffers from high rates of illiteracy; high incidence of disease, especially infant and child mortality; low levels of school attendance; poor housing and sanitation; and inadequate or even seriously deficient diets. The second and concomitant feature is that there is a large number of projects and programs, sponsored by the Central and Regional governments, and international and national development organizations, which are being proposed, planned and implemented in an attempt to alleviate the difficult situation. All those involved in the development process of the Region, while recognizing that agriculture should be the principal avenue used to develop this rural area, also agree that the upgrading of rural infrastructure, especially improvements in accessibility to education and to medical facilities, are necessary for comprehensive economic and social development.

What is not agreed upon, however, is the method or approach that the development process should take. In fact, the governments and aid agencies involved have taken a somewhat eclectic, if not directionless, approach since no coherent, integrated development strategy has yet been planned or carried out. Hence, while large-scale projects are officially discouraged, the government of Sudan is simply not in a secure enough position financially or politically to dictate the type or the scope of foreign programs in the South. The result in many instances has been large schemes which, at best, have done little to help the majority of Southern Sudanese, and, at worst, have unilaterally and inexorably altered the culture and social systems of Southern communities.

Although the more than 30 NGOs working in Southern Sudan all generally focus on health, education, agriculture, water, and community development, they vary in size and scope of programming. Some groups have immense budgets which

not only allow them to plan large schemes, but also provide these agencies with the luxury of furnishing essential, and at times excessive, backup services to support their personnel and their projects. Other NGOs working in the South have comparatively meagre financial support, and modest programing. While some agencies attempt to stay within reasonable organizational and financial constraints, other NGOs overextend themselves - getting involved in more schemes than they are able to adequately maintain.

A more general characteristic of NGOs in Southern Sudan is that these agencies have little communication with each other. Consultation or union at the program level is rare. Excessive competition and longstanding rivalries between agencies, the inadequacy of the regional government's policy and direction, simple thoughtlessness, and the lack of a reliable communication service often result in duplication of effort and in a needless waste of time and resources. In addition, readily available, trained and experienced personnel are often not fully utilized. This is due both to ignorance and, more seriously, to the refusal on the part of the agencies to share. It is sadly ironic then that while the majority of NGOs in Southern Sudan are Christian groups preaching the virtues of cooperation and community, in actual practice these same agencies cannot work together for the long-term advantage of the people of the Southern Region.

This lack of cooperation at the agency and program levels compounds the great problems brought about by the almost non-existent transport network, the shortage of relevant expertise, and the inadequate statistical and information systems. Poor planning, long delays and structurally weak programs are more the norm than the exception in NGO programing in Southern Sudan.

As was mentioned at the beginning of this section, administratively and organizationally, all of the NGOs in the Southern Region, with the exception of Sudanaid and Sudan Council of Churches, have little if any indigenous representation in their bureaucracies and very little consequential local involvement in the planning and implementation phases of their programs. Along with, and possibly because of this scarcity of local input and involvement, and again due to the resultant cultural gaps and, often, off-site decisions that are made, some administrators and even project staff, at times, tend to confuse their more humanitarian objectives in Southern Sudan with artificially manufactured, internal demands placed on them by their-respective organizations. John Sommer, in his book on American private-voluntary organizations, could have been describing most NGOs in Southern Sudan when he wrote: "Aid, no matter how much one possesses purely humanitarian motives, is also culture-bound - thus political - and carries its own values, self-rationalizations and impetus for self-perpetuation that can too easily, unless one is careful, corrupt both recipients and donors." (1)

An even more important consequence of the overwhelming foreign control of most phases of NGO programing in Southern Sudan is the dearth of indigenous qualified and trained personnel. Again, except in the Sudanaid and SCC programs, the Southern Sudanese are not given the opportunity to plan, administer or implement projects for fear of mistakes and wasted time. (This argument is highly questionable, since even under present conditions most NGO projects face long delays and are not terribly efficient.)

The cost of ignoring the Southerners is high. Not only does the scarcity of Southern Sudanese expertise mean that foreign involvement in the Southern

Region will have to be extended for an indefinite period, but, as well, the cultural and social structures of the area will be altered and molded without local guidance. Development should be a process of self-directed change which observes social structures and patterns, and which brings about a change from a less desirable to a more desirable situation. However, because of the dearth of Southern Sudanese participation in most aspects of NGO programing in Southern Sudan, the often inappropriate goals and the unilaterally imposed development which result do not serve the best interests of the Southern Sudanese people.

Recommendations

The final section of this study will begin with some comments relating to general strategy and attitude adjustments within Sudan which, in the author's opinion, are necessary pre-conditions to development in Southern Sudan. With the framework thus provided, the second part of this section will look at the central topic of this study, dealing specifically with NGOs, and will suggest ways to make their work more relevant to the needs of the Southern Sudanese.

A Framework for Change in Southern Sudan:

To lead its economy Sudan today relies on its core area and on its cotton growing sector in the northeast riverine district. Yet to date, this sector has not been strong enough to pull the greater part of the country out of its stagnant, if not declining, state. Hence, if heavy investment in the Khartoum conurbation and in cotton has not in the past been the proper vehicle to spread development

throughout Sudan, then, clearly, alternate strategies should at least be tried if the proposed development aims of "regionally-balanced" ⁽²⁾ growth and equity are to have a chance of fulfillment.

The Southern Region, if exploited in a positive sense, has the potential to complement the present economy and therefore to help Sudan as a whole achieve its development goals. The development of rural Southern Sudan should focus on those strengths and comparative advantage opportunities that best suit the whole of Sudan. The South, if properly developed, could provide the proper mix of core and dispersionist development planning without changing the basic focus of the country's economy. Even if the central government wants to retain its outward-looking, export-oriented economic stance, the South's economic promise can be used to complement the more modern Northern economic structure, diversifying and strengthening the Sudanese economy as a whole.

The implication here is not that the South should simply continue to be a reservoir for Northern advancement, but rather that both areas cooperate to exploit the strengths of the country for the good of all. In the end, Southern rural development would take place. Jobs and resources which are now going north would stay in the Southern Region, involving its people in agriculture or in small-scale agro-industries, and creating all the additional economic linkages. The shift from a centralist model to a more dispersionist rural model would actually go a long way towards bringing about the stated goal of "regionally-balanced" growth and equity.

There are undoubtedly some major problems in the development of the Southern Region. The imbalance between the region's vast natural resources and its inadequate human and physical capital are most significant. Drastic

improvement in transport and communication is requisite for growth in the area. These problems in themselves are not, however, insurmountable. Already Southern students are being trained. Finances could be diverted from the more established central district. More boats could be built, more roads could be constructed and better communication lines could be established.

Two important but less tangible changes will have to be made to bring about the social and political milieu necessary to create a diverse yet complementary economic base. There must be a genuine desire by the Northern establishment to change the growth-pole strategy. Probably the most realistic way to bring about this change is to convince the Northerners that their prejudices about the South and its people not only have no basis, but, more importantly, that their obstinacy and discrimination are destroying their country and making them poorer.

The basis for the second change is the social engineering that will have to be initiated before considerable progress in the South can be made. Transformation of this highly traditional agricultural and pastoral sector into one which is designed to meet its great potential will bring about fundamental social, economic and cultural change for the Southern people. This change will affect local land tenure systems and ingrained agricultural methods. The view of some people that their nomadic existence and their livestock are cultural necessities will have implications for credit, for marketing, for transport, and for all the infrastructure involved not only in agricultural or livestock development, but also in the development of all aspects of rural life in Southern Sudan.

Traditional farming methods and traditional crops have, to date, provided the necessities of life for the Southern Sudanese. Any attempts by the

government or by aid agencies to introduce innovations may signal danger to many subsistence farmers, threatening the equilibrium that has existed over the centuries, and worsening their economic situation. Thus the introduction of a marketable crop will only have a lasting improvement on the farmer's economic situation if he is also shown means of production to increase his yields and if financing and marketing facilities are ensured.⁽³⁾

The large numbers of Southern nomads with their millions of head of livestock represent an important potential for the Southern economy as well as for the Sudanese economy. For the nomad, however, the quality and market value of his animals is not the primary concern. The crucial factor is the number of animals a man or family may have, to further social prestige and to provide a certain safeguard against losses in periods of drought.⁽⁴⁾ Attempts either to settle the nomads and/or to cull their herds to ensure better quality will have to be preceded by a campaign to convince these pastoralists that they will be better off in a more stable lifestyle. The advantages of settled living (education, health services, etc.) must be made real, and will have to be presented without destroying the nomads' dignity, culture, and tradition.

In a country the size of Sudan, with its strong regional and ethnic identities, a poorly planned social transformation and lack of political will could have very serious ramifications like those which occurred at the time of independence with the outbreak of the civil war, when the central government imposed regulations concerning the internal policies of the country without consulting the people affected. If this same lack of "savoir faire" is again demonstrated in the government's dealings with the Southern Region, political and social troubles could result.

In the end, if Sudan is going to take advantage of its large area, its rich land and water resources, its livestock and generally favourable climate, the economy must be based on a fuller use of these natural resources and on diversification through a progressive yet moderate modernization of methods of industrial and agricultural production. In this way the improvement in the standard of living of regions such as the Southern Sudan will signal the improvement in the quality of life for all Sudanese.

New NGO Strategy in Southern Sudan?:

In recommending where NGO activity in Southern Sudan should be focused and how this work should be implemented, it is obvious that the antitheses of the many criticisms will predominate. In citing lack of cooperation between agencies, misuse of available resources, and self-serving objectives as major drawbacks to present NGO programming in Southern Sudan, evident counsel would be for the organizations to work in conjunction, to use available resources efficiently and effectively, and to follow through on the goal of helping to alleviate the poverty and the suffering of the Southern Sudanese.

These recommendations are simple only insofar as they are obvious. Pragmatically though, NGO cooperation and coordination is severely limited by the many organizational and administrative differences that exist, not to mention the competitiveness and jealousies. Similarly, with the great transport, administrative and personnel difficulties present in Southern Sudan, is it realistic to expect better use of resources at this time in the region's development? Also, can total commitment, either on the personal or organizational level, be in any way legislated or guaranteed?

Real solutions to these problems do exist. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the Sudan Council of Voluntary Agencies (SCOVA) is supposed to consist of all voluntary agencies registered and organized in Sudan, for the purpose of coordinating their activities. However, the only NGOs with activities in the Southern Region who are also part of SCOVA are Sudanaid and SCC. All other groups discussed in this study have stayed outside the SCOVA grouping.

If SCOVA, or a similar organization strictly for Southern Sudan could induce all active NGOs in the region to participate in a national or regional umbrella agency, much overlapping of programs, repetition of mistakes and wastage of resources could be avoided. While a strong coordinating body would not be a panacea for all the problems, it could, if nothing else, provide a forum for an exchange of ideas to bring about some understanding between the NGOs in the region. A participatory, democratic structure, such as that proposed with SCOVA, could, in contrast to a strict, governmental, regulatory department, provide a flexible, general design which would give the involved agencies a sense of independent programming while maintaining some degree of developmental focus and efficiency in the NGO schemes in Southern Sudan.

A more collective effort on the part of all NGOs would help reduce the squandering of materials and of human energy. Added to this, demonstration or model projects would concentrate resources and expertise on specific schemes. These consolidated programs would have a greater chance of success and, hence, of establishing a basis for further development.

A few selected schemes, successfully operating, contribute more to social and economic growth and development, and to the morale of involved individuals (both NGO personnel and "recipients") than do a large number of floundering and

perpetually incomplete projects. The psychological boost of achievement, if not of completion, could be augmented by thorough screening and orientation of individuals who are to work in the Southern Region, and by adequate material and emotional support from the sponsoring organizations.

The common theme of these recommendations is that the NGOs at the organizational level must have the will to do what is best for the Southern Sudanese people. Without this nothing positive can happen. Southern Sudan is rich in people, but, for the most part, in people whose skills are not fully developed, who lack organization and whose poor health and living conditions severely limit their productivity. The need therefore in Southern Sudan is for training of, and confidence in, the region's greatest resource, its people.

Rural development is an operational process in which the local communities become activated to work for their own welfare. The NGOs should help the community to identify its own problems and needs, to search for ways of meeting them, take stock of resources at its disposal, make decisions and share responsibilities, and to act effectively to reach higher levels of satisfaction by overcoming problems and adapting to change. The community in turn should be able to enlist, combine and coordinate available external assistance in the appropriate degree and manner.

All of this suggests an intensification of self-help activities and the use of the local community.⁽⁵⁾ Local people must be involved in actual program planning and implementation. NGOs must understand the Southern Sudanese concept of resources, risks and rationality, and must emphasize the attitudes, aspirations, perceptions, and priorities of the people. By being loyal to this rural development process, the NGOs will become catalysts for change rather than instigators.

The size and scope of most projects will be at a relatively modest level, so that local people can readily identify with a certain scheme rather than be overwhelmed by it. This is not to say, however, that no large-scale projects are necessary; the infrastructural pre-conditions are certainly needed in Southern Sudan. ⁽⁶⁾ However, if the basic goal of development is the maximum standard of life within the framework of Southern Sudanese society, then infrastructural and economic developments are only vehicles for the general good; they are not ends in themselves. In the final analysis then, the real issue has little to do with how much large-scale or economic growth can be achieved in the South. Rather it is how the area's natural resources can be used to benefit all of its people in providing a setting where the general population can acquire a better quality of life through their own labor, decisions and experiences. This favourable setting is more probable when the development of a community evolves from within its own people and structures.

Footnotes

- 1 - J.G. Sommer, U.S. Voluntary Aid in a Changing Third World, Washington, D.C., 1977. p. 26.
- 2 - In 1977, Sudan's Ministry of National Planning published the country's long-term economic and social development plan (1977/78 - 1984/95). A major objective of this plan is: "To lift the economy from the preconditions of take-off to the stage of self-sustained growth and to achieve a regionally-balanced, self-reliant and accelerated economic development..." Sudan Ministry of National Planning, The Six Year Plan of Economic and Social Development, 1977/78 - 1982/83, Khartoum, vol. 1, 1977, p. 23.
- 3 - M. Bardeleben, The Cooperative System in the Sudan, Munchen, 1973. p. 96.
- 4 - Ibid, p.p. 98-99.
- 5 - The self-help, community approach is no certain remedy for the problems facing Southern Sudan, since this strategy may, in some instances, actually strengthen existing political or economic structures which are not in the best interest of the people. Yet since these structures, if they do exist in the region, are probably relatively new, a minimum of government action to resolve any conflicts is all that may be needed. For further discussion see: W.B. Stohr and D.R.F. Taylor "Development From Above or Below? Some Conclusions" in Development From Above or Below?, eds. W.B. Stohr and D.R.F. Taylor, London, 1981. p. 459.
- 6 - In fact it is argued by some that what Southern Sudan really needs is the 1960's concept of development, with huge infrastructural programs and various types of physical structures. Because of the civil war in the area during the 1960s, the Southern Region missed this phase, which took place in most other LDCs. Even though many of the huge projects carried out during that era were not great successes, they did provide some basis for further development.

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