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The Soviet Union and Unstable
Deterrence: The Ideological and
Structural Basis of Soviet
Third World and military Policy

University — Université

Carleton University

Degree for which thesis was presented — Grade pour lequel cette thèse fut présentée

M.A.

Year this degree conferred — Année d'obtention de ce grade

1984

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THE SOVIET UNION AND UNSTABLE DETERRENCE:

THE IDEOLOGICAL AND STRUCTURAL BASIS OF
SOVIET THIRD WORLD AND MILITARY POLICY

EDWARD KARAM

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THE SOVIET UNION AND UNSTABLE DETERRANCE:
THE IDEOLOGICAL AND STRUCTURAL BASIS OF
SOVIET THIRD WORLD AND MILITARY POLICY

submitted by Edward Karam, B.A.
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

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THESIS ABSTRACT

The°Soviet Union and Unstable Deterrence:

The Ideological and Structural Basis of
Soviet Third World and Military Policy

The purpose of the thesis is the illustration of the destabilizing impact of Soviet policy upon the nuclear balance of power. It is composed of six chapters. It proceeds with a discussion of the nuclear balance of power, its framework, dynamics and structural characteristics. Secondly, the thesis will examine the basis of Soviet policy. It will discuss Soviet ideology and the structure of the political system with particular emphasis upon the role of the Soviet military as derived from the system. Finally the thesis will discuss two fundamental and interdependent areas of Soviet policy; its Third World and military policies as they affect the stability of deterrence. In essence, the thesis discusses Soviet military and imperial expansion based upon inherent ideological and military institutional factors and their adverse effects upon the stability of the nuclear balance of power.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION:

THE STRUCTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

INTRODUCTION

The adversarial nature of the superpower relationship represents an important "contemporary" development with respect to the international system. A relationship that fluctuates in degree of tension, cooperation and conflict while characterized by continual competition. The superpower relationship however, assumes its particular quality in light of the development and stockpiling of vast nuclear arsenals by each. The qualitative and quantitative leap in the destructive capabilities associated with nuclear weapons place not only the superpowers in positions of vulnerability but also threaten the entire world environment. The potential for extinguishing life on an exhaustive scale is the critical element in this relationship, compelling each of the superpowers to seek the appropriate means for continued national survival while ensuring national security interests. Assuming survival and victory in the conventional military sense are not possible in the event of a nuclear war, the existence of associated weaponry serves no traditional military purpose. In this context, the utility of maintaining large nuclear arsenals lies in their role of preventing a nuclear attack by the adversary through the threat of retaliation. Such is the basis of nuclear deterrence. In this respect, the Soviet Union and the United States are able to balance issues of security and national survival through the maintenance of weapon systems that could never possibly be used towards the same end. Deterrence in this sense is mutual and based on the potential for mutual destruction.

Therefore, nuclear deterrence can be distinguished from previous conceptions of deterrence or balance of power considerations prior to the introduction of nuclear weaponry.

First, the destructive capability of nuclear weapons, often precludes their utility as an effective instrument of war. If that deterrence is based on the threat of using nuclear forces, the credibility of that threat is suspect outside of the immediate superpower relationship. As exemplified in the war in Vietnam, the nuclear option is an inappropriate response for a "lesser" provocation or situation of limited interest. However, it is beyond the scope of the thesis to discuss the varying applications of deterrence outside of the superpower relationship and therefore the discussion will be restricted to the Soviet-American "deterrent structure".

Second, the destructive power, high speed and accuracy of nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems, limit the possibilities of defense against nuclear attack. Nuclear weapons are offensive in nature and design such that securing immunity from attack requires its prevention through the deterrence of the adversary.

Deterrence includes two different, although not totally unrelated concepts. First of all, deterrence can be maintained through the conveyance to the potential aggressor, the guarantee of retaliation if attack is initiated. Deterrence in this context is not directly related to defense. Secondly, deterrence may be secured through the maintenance of a "war-fighting" capability. This includes offensive and "defensive" capability and is designed to convey to the potential aggressor that nothing is to be gained through the initiation of attack. As will be discussed below, each require substantially different force levels and imply different degrees of stability with respect to the structure.

This paper therefore, will focus upon the destabilizing qualities of the nuclear balance. More specifically, the Soviet contributions to an unstable structure of deterrence.

However, before discussing the Soviet role in the deterrent structure, the paper will introduce the topic with an analysis of the deterrent structure in abstract terms. The structure of deterrence assumes new and unique qualities, due to the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons.

These particular qualities serve in many instances to de-stabilize the structure. Therefore, the analysis of the deterrent relationship will consider the various elements contributing to the stability/instability of the structure. Included are the various offensive and defensive strategies associated with nuclear weapons. Also included are the elements involved that are beyond the immediate scrutiny of the decision makers such as the momentum of technological development. Finally, the analysis will consider the grey or peripheral areas not directly related to the nuclear balance, which nonetheless, exert their influence upon the structure itself. In essence the strategic nuclear balance or deterrent structure will be discussed in terms of its inherent instability.

Within this context, it will be possible to discuss the role of the Soviet Union in the superpower relationship and therefore illustrate its contributions to the instability of the balance. More specifically, the discussion will centre upon the Soviet nuclear military doctrine and its Third World policy within the context of this balance.

The era of détente has witnessed a continual arms buildup, both nuclear and conventional, as well as a more forceful policy in the Third World with respect to the Soviet Union. Contrary to expectations, détente did not serve to inhibit the Soviet Union in either case nor did it serve as an indication of Soviet acceptance of Western concepts of

stability with respect to the arms race and the international system in general.

The Soviet Union, in pursuit of its security objectives, has contributed decisively to the instability of the strategic nuclear balance. Soviet nuclear military doctrine, contrary to Western military theory, continues to regard nuclear war as one like any other in the sense that the objective is to win. The view that victory is possible, necessitates corresponding force outlays and results in the accompanying strategic instability.

Moreover, the Soviet Union has extended and continues to expand its influence in the Third World. It has applied a more militant and decisive approach in achieving its objectives. While much of the Soviet activity in the Third World has been directed towards areas peripheral to the core security interests of the superpowers, there remain certain regions of importance where their interests intersect. In this instance, competition in the Third World may affect deterrence directly, undermining its stability.

The Soviet Union continues unabated in each objective, despite détente and despite having achieved the security of the Soviet Union proper.

However, such policy is a function of a number of variables, both internal and external to the Soviet Union, which interact and are interdependent.

The continual pursuit of security that has characterized the history of the Soviet state indicates a continued sense of insecurity as perceived by the Soviet leaders with respect to the international system, especially the non-communist world. A history of foreign invasion

and intervention has helped to condition such attitudes. However, the continued perceptions of distrust and hostility are also a function of a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the international system.

Second, the Soviet Union is an ideological political system. Foreign policy is defined within a broad outline based on long term future projections and objectives. In this context, the Soviet Union assumes its self-proclaimed role as guarantor of world revolutionary movement and therefore, its ideologically defined objectives assume an "offensive" character.

Third, the political system and the monopoly of political power by the Communist Party is justified ideologically.

Finally, without conventional means of power maintenance and succession, the various institutional interests and relationships in the Soviet political system assume importance. Of particular relevance to the thesis is the role of the military in the Soviet system.

In sum, the ideological and structural elements of the political system affect the Soviet decisional and policy processes. The interaction of these elements, the thesis will argue, has profound implications and influence with respect to Soviet military and foreign policy.

Therefore, the purpose of the following chapter is to provide a framework within which Soviet military and Third World policies can be analysed. Although a number of factors will be discussed with respect to the stability of the nuclear balance of power, the remainder of the thesis will concentrate essentially on the aspects of the discussion concerned with the strategy of damage limitation and superpower competition in the Third World as they affect deterrence.

Within this framework, it will be argued that the Soviet Union has followed a strategic nuclear policy based on damage limitation and has sought ambitious Third World objectives which undermine the stability of the deterrent relationship.

However, prior to this discussion, chapters two and three will examine the role of ideology and the military in Soviet foreign and military policy and thus pinpoint some of the motive forces behind such policy.

THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE

The strategic nuclear balance of the two superpowers, to a large extent dominates either directly or indirectly, most contemporary military affairs. With their respective nuclear arsenals, the United States and the Soviet Union possess the capability for the virtual destruction of one another as modern industrial societies as well as threatening the entire world environment. Within this context exists what is commonly referred to as the "balance of terror". A balance of terror exists according to E.M. Bottome,

... when two nations can annihilate each other no matter which side attacks first. In this sense, in the thermonuclear age, power has become absolute in that mutual destruction is assured in the event of war between the superpowers. With over 50,000 megatons stored and deliverable by diverse means, there is no way that either the United States or the Soviet Union can guarantee the security of the citizens of their countries. The simple fact of the balance of terror is that the modern nation-state is obsolete as guarantor of the security of its people.

In effect the proliferation and continual expansion of their respective nuclear arsenals have in fact, decreased the security of the United

States and the Soviet Union. As such, the security of each country rests upon the vulnerability of the adversary in that neither could initiate nuclear war without suffering incalculable damage. Such is the basis of nuclear deterrence.

Deterrence in this respect appears simple and essentially stable. However, in reality the nuclear balance is neither so simple, nor is it inherently stable. It is a function of a number of interdependent elements and variables whose interaction render the structure inherently unstable and which distinguish it from previous deterrent and balance of power relationships prior to the introduction of nuclear weaponry.

While deterrence has long served as an instrument of diplomacy and foreign policy, it necessarily involves only the negative in that it is an attempt to influence behaviour by inhibiting or preventing certain action(s) of the adversary. It includes a number of possible sanctions ranging from the economic to the threat of war. However, for the purpose of this discussion, deterrence will include only the elements of military policy. Therefore, deterrence as defined by J. David Singer is,

... a particular form of influencing by discouragement; it is a strategy of threatened punishment or threatened denial and proceeds from the premise that the anticipated but conditional destruction or denial of a player's values will discourage certain forms of behaviour.

Included in and complementary to deterrence, although not necessarily essential, is defense, "entailing the physical blunting of the enemy attack and minimizing its effect on oneself."³ Deterrence threatens punishment and defense deters through the conveyance to the aggressor the futility of the potential attack.

While deterrence and defense have been commonly conceptualized as one and the same, the emergence of nuclear weapons, including nuclear explosives, associated delivery systems and supporting infrastructure, has had a tremendous impact on the nature of armed conflict, military security and on the function of the military factor as an input into foreign policy and as such has distinguished and concepts of deterrence and defense.

Klaus Knorr identifies four characteristics distinguishing the present from the pre-nuclear past.

The first involves the enormous increase in the destructive potential of nuclear weapons. "The destructive capacity of nuclear weaponry represents a revolutionary progression; it involves a quantum jump of stupendous and awesome proportions. The two nuclear superpowers possess the means to snuff out human life on a gigantic if not exhaustive scale."⁴

The second is the military advantage and enormous technological superiority of the offensive as opposed to defensive strategy and forces. This development and the great destructive power of nuclear weapons create a situation "against which, so far at least, there is no effective defense affording protection to territories and populations."⁵ The quantitative and qualitative developments in military technology leading to the more "recent" "trend towards total war, in which civilians have come to be regarded as legitimate targets of warfare, represents an ominous consideration in light of nuclear weapons and delivery systems."⁶

Third is the range and accuracy, assuming global proportions and ability, of nuclear weaponry. Whereas previously, the cost effective-

ness of military power was inevitably less as a nation moved away from its home base, "the cost of long range nuclear weapons has fallen dramatically. In this respect also, the world has 'shrunk'. Against a nuclear superpower, there is no safety anywhere."⁷

Finally, there is the tremendous speed with which nuclear weapons can reach their targets and the potential decisiveness of a surprise attack. "Although the phenomenon of the 'Blitzkrieg' has been observable through the ages, armies and navies were cumbersome and slow; belligerents relied on the mobilization of additional military forces while hostilities were in progress; and war was therefore ordinarily slow in gaining momentum. This gave governments relatively more time to consider and reconsider and enabled them to negotiate its end before destruction could reach too large a scale."⁸

In sum, nuclear weaponry represents an enormous qualitative development in the nature of military science with the potential repercussions extending to various elements of military and foreign policy. Within this context, the nature of deterrence and defense have been altered and represent important considerations for the superpowers when developing strategic and national security policies.

The United States and the Soviet Union have continually attempted to manage and adapt their respective national security policies in relation to the changing circumstances and developments brought about by the proliferation and technical progress of nuclear weapons. Yet, neither of the superpowers has been able to decrease substantially, its vulnerability with respect to the nuclear capabilities of the other. Within this context -- the context of mutual vulnerability and balance of terror -- it appears inconceivable that the initiation of nuclear war as a

policy objective would be rational. With the enormous destructive capabilities possessed by the superpowers, each must expect to suffer incalculable damage in the event of nuclear war, outweighing any conceivable gains.

However, the balance of terror is not a static relationship, but rather one that is dependent upon a number of variables affecting the relative capabilities of the superpowers and therefore resulting in persistent uncertainty as perceived by the United States and the Soviet Union with respect to the capabilities and intentions of the other. As a result, the United States and the Soviet Union must continue the quantitative and qualitative arms race.

The United States and the Soviet Union maintain vast nuclear arsenals in a constant state of readiness, possessing what appears to be a redundant or overkill capacity. The sheer number of nuclear weapons and the variety of delivery systems contribute to both stability and instability depending upon the various strategies relied upon and upon the manner that their existence is perceived.

The destructive capacity of nuclear weapons makes it imperative for the superpowers to work towards securing immunity from nuclear attack beyond relying upon the good will of the opponent or the possibility of appeasing his demands. This requires the capacity to defend oneself against attack or the ability to deter the opponent from attacking.

For a deterrent policy to be effective it must not only threaten more destruction than the enemy cares to incur but also to do so with credibility. Credibility involves both intention and capacity.¹⁹ The intention to execute the threat depends largely upon the subjective

perceptions of the leaders with respect to the costs and utilities involved in carrying out the threat and for the purposes of this section will be largely ignored. The capacity to execute the threat "depends upon the ability of the forces to survive any attacks and to penetrate the enemy's defenses."¹⁰

If a deterrent involves the threat of retaliation, the incentive to do so may be credible but retaliation will have to be carried out with forces that have survived a first strike. That is, secure "second strike" forces, involving survivability and the capacity to penetrate the opponents' defenses. The capacity to deliver unacceptable damage with such a surviving force is known as "assured destruction".

Deterrence itself can entail two possible security positions depending upon the foreign policy objectives of the deterrer. There is a basic deterrence as mentioned above and a broader or extended deterrent policy implying distinct strategic doctrines and capabilities.

If all that is required is to deter an all-out nuclear attack on one's own cities, then a capacity to retaliate against enemy cities in a "countervalue" attack may be adequate. A nation that wants to use its nuclear forces not merely to deter all-out attacks on itself but also to deter other forms of aggression, such as conventional attacks and nuclear attacks on allies, must then threaten to initiate strategic nuclear strikes. To do this credibly implies a capability to prevent the enemy from succeeding in his own retaliatory strike. The capacity to do this is known as "damage limitation", the reciprocal concept to assured destruction.

- In the age of deterrence and the mutual balance of terror, damage limitation can be regarded as the remaining element of defense. Defence itself in this narrow sense can be divided into two forms, active and passive. "Passive defenses may involve measures to protect population centres through civil defense shelters, evacuation, duplication of essential facilities and provision for post-attack recovery and or measures to protect retaliatory forces through sheltering or hardening of

missile silos, concealment, dispersal and mobility."¹² Active defenses may include anti-aircraft artillery, missiles and interceptors, anti-missile and anti-submarine forces.

Also included, although difficult to distinguish from offensive capability, is the possibility of destroying the opponent's retaliatory forces before they can be launched. This would involve "counterforce" as opposed to countervalue strikes.

If a state had a high capacity to destroy enemy retaliatory forces, it might enjoy the ability to launch a first strike with impunity. In other words, its damage limitation would negate its opponents second strike. In that case there might indeed be no need for a first strike to hit enemy cities at all; instead the enemy's retaliatory force could be eliminated and the enemy cities as hostage to a residual offensive force retained for bargaining purposes.

This illustrates the fine line between preemptive and therefore defensive capability and surprise attack and offensive capability. It is highly improbable presently that one or the other nuclear superpower could be completely disarmed in a first strike. Yet the possibility of counterforce exchanges in which cities were spared and residual forces retained for purposes of bargaining remains.

This is the concept of controlled response and intrawar deterrence. Such restraint may be impossible in practice, given the emotions and degree of chaos implied by a state of nuclear war, but in theory at least it is not enough to think only of precipitate all-out mutual countervalue strikes in a "spasm" war. If deterrence were to fail, the anxiety to postpone catastrophe might spur national leaders to attempt a controlled response.

The concept of controlled response complicates the design of adequate deterrent forces. On one hand, a minimum deterrent force level, designed for an all-out one-shot countervalue response to a first strike of the opponent. Or a more flexible, strategic force design, tapered towards a more uncertain outcome than the assumed assured destruction, with contingencies for perhaps a variety of scenarios

including the idea of a protracted nuclear war. The concepts of assured destruction and controlled response necessarily imply different levels of force requirements and stability with respect to the strategic balance. It is the latter which is most de-stabilizing, requiring and generating higher force levels and greater uncertainty.

For questions of deterrence, it is not so important to discuss the development and adequacy of superpower stocks of nuclear explosive to do unacceptable damage, for it was never in doubt. What is important is the provision for and design of systems with survivability and retaliatory capability. That is, maintenance of an invulnerable retaliatory or second strike force. This is the basis of a stable deterrent structure. However, it is not so easily achieved in that the number of variants involved running counter to stability are many.

INSTABILITIES IN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

Before discussing the different force levels and strategies which contribute to strategic stability or instability, the concept of stability will be defined.

Strategic stability for the purpose of this paper, will reflect the views held by a number of experts on the subject. As defined by Bernard Brodie:

The situation is symmetrical but not stable when either side, by striking first, can destroy the other's power to strike back; the situation is stable when neither side can destroy the other whether it strikes first or second -- that is when neither in striking first can destroy the other's ability to strike back.

"The latter situation removes the advantage and incentive to striking first and the need to react quickly to what might prove to be a false alarm."¹⁶

Similarly by J. David Singer:

Very simply, the proposition is that if a major power takes appropriate measures to protect its retaliatory forces, there will be less disutility to the victim of a surprise attack and there will be less utility to the attacker. Such invulnerability produces two consequences. One is that a would-be attacker is less likely to carry out an opening strike because he cannot accomplish his overall destructive goals and therefore must anticipate receiving a fairly destructive blow in return. The second consequence is that the potential victim need no longer maintain a fast draw, hair trigger response system.... Invulnerability is seen, therefore, as a highly stabilizing measure.¹⁷

Finally, as defined by Albert Wohlstetter, stability of the balance of terror and deterrence are synonymous. That is, deterrence is stability. As follows,

The problem (of enhancing deterrence) has been conceived as more or better bombers or missiles. This has meant confusing deterrence with matching or exceeding the enemy's ability to strike first. Matching weapons, however, misconstrues the nature of the technological race. Not, as is frequently said, because only a few bombs owned by the defender can make aggression fruitless, but because even many might not.... To deter an attack means being able to strike back in spite of it. It means, in other words, a capability to strike second.¹⁸

Common to all of the above quotations is the necessity for the maintenance of invulnerable retaliatory or punitive forces. That is, second strike capability as the negation of first strike incentive. Within this context of a mutual balance of terror, ideas of defense and military victory are ignored and assumed slim or infeasible at best.

J. David Singer discusses the deterrent structure in terms of two dimensions:

In the simpler analyses of military strategy ... the would be attacker compares utility's (damage he can do to the victim) with the disutilities (damage the victim can do to him).... The utility-disutility is one of two dimensions which will affect the choice

between attacking and not attacking. The other is subjective probability: in a sense, the odds which the decision maker would give in betting the outcome.... A successful attack would be one in which "most" of the victim's strike back forces were destroyed before they were ever launched; and an unsuccessful attack would be one in which only a "small" portion were so destroyed and the attacker thus received a highly destructive retaliatory blow.

Within this context, stability or the degree of stability in general can be discussed or placed within a continuum ranging from a "no-war" condition at one end with probability of zero to a "war" condition at the other end with a probability of one. The probabilities would represent the likelihood of either side launching a surprise attack and are a function of the relative capabilities (subjective variables aside) of the opponents. For example, if both sides possessed invulnerable retaliatory forces, the possibility of launching a successful first strike would be nil. Assuming rationality of the decision makers and assuming retaliation as automatic, neither side would be in a position to successfully strike first and therefore the situation or balance is one of stability. On the other hand, if both sides possessed highly vulnerable strategic forces, advantage necessarily accrues to the aggressor since a first strike could effectively neutralize any retaliatory force. Under this condition, although it does not necessarily mean war will occur, the balance is unstable. As such, the degree of stability in the strategic balance can be said to be a function of the degree of vulnerability associated with the respective strategic forces.

In essence, deterrence suggests stability. That is, the maintenance of invulnerable retaliatory force capability eliminates the incentive for the adversary to initiate nuclear war. However deterrence in this context is based purely on retaliatory capability. To go beyond simple deterrence as with a "warfighting" or damage limitation strategy is to

cross the threshold distinguishing deterrence and provocation. As will be discussed below, each of the various aspects of the strategies to be outlined, contribute to the stability/instability of the nuclear balance and therefore effectively enhance or undermine deterrence. Each facet of nuclear force strategy will therefore be discussed relative to its "deterrent value", individually and in conjunction with the other aspects of strategy.

Having left subjective variables aside, we can discuss them briefly as follows. Perceptions of the international situation, of relative capabilities and expected outcomes associated with nuclear weapons and warfare will vary to an extent with the decision makers. For the purpose of this chapter of the thesis, they will be largely ignored, since the discussion to this point has and will continue to examine the strategic balance in objective terms. The subjective elements will be included once we reach the sections dealing with the respective military doctrines of the superpowers. For the balance of this chapter, we will discuss the stability of the nuclear balance on the basis of objective criteria only.

FORCE STRATEGIES AND UNSTABLE DETERRENCE

There are only two strategies involving nuclear weapons and delivery systems which decision makers can employ to facilitate national security objectives; "assured destruction" and "damage limitation". Although central to both strategies is the concept of deterrence, each affect the stability of the nuclear balance differently and diverge sharply with respect to objectives and required capabilities.

Assured Destruction vs. Damage Limitation

The strategy of assured destruction is relatively simple as opposed to the strategy of damage limitation. It is based solely on the punitive or retaliatory aspects of deterrence in that it is designed to inhibit or prevent a first strike nuclear attack by threatening to deliver unacceptable damage to the opponent. For a successful and effective deterrent policy, it must threaten more destruction than the aggressor is willing to incur and to do so with credibility, requiring in itself intention and capacity. The capacity to do so depends upon the ability of the forces to survive any attacks and to penetrate the enemies' defenses.

Assured destruction relies upon a countervalue (non-military) targetting strategy and is based upon the assumption that the potential loss of a great proportion of a country's population and economic centres and of its citizenry represents a sufficient deterrent and an intolerable level of destruction for the aggressor.

In essence, the strategy of assured destruction is based simply on the punitive aspects of deterrence. It is not a first strike strategy nor does it involve measures to defend directly, a nuclear attack. Its primary objective is war avoidance as opposed to achieving military victory and therefore does not involve civil defense measures. In essence, its overriding assumption is the futility of nuclear war and therefore its avoidance through the threat of retaliation to the aggressor. In that it requires only secure second strike nuclear forces, assured destruction is a highly stabilizing "defense" posture with respect to the structure of deterrence.

The strategy of damage limitation on the other hand, is highly de-stabilizing. It is based on the premise that military victory in

nuclear war is possible and includes a counterforce targetting strategy as well as active and passive defense postures. As will be illustrated below, every facet of a damage limitation strategy, is effective only in a first strike.

Targetting Strategy; Counterforce vs. Countervalue

In general, there are two targetting strategies with respect to nuclear forces; counterforce or military targets and countervalue or non-military targets such as population and economic centres.

If stable deterrence has to do with minimizing the incentive to strike first and securing invulnerable retaliatory nuclear forces, the deterrent value of a counterforce targetting strategy is questionable in that it may be more provocative.

The counterforce argument at first glance may appear very similar to the countervalue argument in that its essence is in its deterrent value. The argument runs as follows: For a credible deterrent, one must convey to the opponent that his ability to wage war, more specifically nuclear war, will be eliminated. However, a counterforce doctrine extends beyond mere deterrence, for its requirements necessitate much larger force levels and broader objectives: (a) the destruction of deterree's strategic striking force; and (b) ultimate military victory.²⁰ The prevailing view among advocates of counterforce targetting, is one that stresses the inadequacies of a countervalue doctrine for deterrence and nothing less than a threatened neutralization of the opponent's striking force will deter aggression.

The arguments in favour of a countervalue targetting strategy, are based on the assumption that the potential loss of a great proportion of

a country's population and economic centres and of its citizenry represents a sufficient deterrent and an intolerable level of destruction.

The opposing views not only represent a difference in calculation of what constitutes an intolerable threshold of destruction for the opponent, they also require very different force levels and capabilities.

The countervalue school argues that a given megaton field, launched from invulnerable sites will pose an adequate retaliatory threat. From this contention they point out that a finite number of warheads, delivered by a finite number of delivery systems, from a finite number of launch sites, is all that is required. To go beyond that is to acquire an overkill capacity whose costs would be unlimited. The pursuit of counterforce capability is not only astronomically expensive but it cannot succeed in that the opponent merely has to add to his own number of missiles to counter.²¹

A counterforce doctrine can be seen as de-stabilizing in that it feeds the arms race, (as will be discussed below). A counterforce doctrine, it can be argued, represents an exercise in futility as a retaliatory measure. Not only for reasons mentioned above, but in the fact that forces designed for retaliation would be targetted towards largely vacant launch sites. Although a second strike counterforce capability can be discussed in terms of belying the possibility of post-attack blackmail, a counterforce doctrine is essentially a first strike strategy, (especially with the development of Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVS)) by the fact its effectiveness is much more certain. A counterforce doctrine suggests first strike rather than a retaliatory posture; otherwise, it is essentially useless.

Timing: Retaliation vs Preemption

In discussing deterrence through retaliation, of particular significance is distinguishing between retaliation in the pure sense and preemption. Although both imply not initiating the attack, each suggest different effects with respect to strategic stability.

A purely retaliatory deterrent force is highly stabilizing as mentioned, requiring invulnerable retaliatory capability and thus affording the victim the ability to absorb a first strike before launching.

However, the problem is not so simple. As mentioned, the overwhelming advantage of nuclear weaponry is with the offensive as opposed to the defense.

As the discussions of delivery and payload capabilities and the problems of interception and vulnerability indicate, contemporary technology offers a prominent advantage to the offense as against the defense. In other words, despite all efforts to make one's strike-back capability as invulnerable as possible, it is quite likely that a carefully executed surprise attack could destroy substantially our retaliatory forces.

Preemption thus offers a solution to problems of force vulnerability: launch them before they are destroyed.

However, a preemptive strategy is highly de-stabilizing. If attack is imminent it means deterrence has failed. A countervalue strike as such represents a redundant element, in that it does not prevent such an attack. Preemption requires a counterforce capability, otherwise it serves no useful purpose.

Another problem in a preemptive strategy is the limited time factor. The great speed with which nuclear weapons can be delivered, narrows the decisional latitude of the national leaders. A preemptive stance reduces the time factor even more. A purely retaliatory and invulnerable force structure is able to withstand the attack before it is

utilized. Whereas a preemptive doctrine requires a launch-on-warning readiness, or whatever criteria are used, to signal imminent attack. Each of the strategies imply different levels of certainty. With a retaliatory force structure, the certainty of attack is established before retaliation. Preemption affords no such certainty given even the most modern detection and early-warning capabilities, (technological error is possible) assuming the enemy is preparing to strike. The enemy may not be preparing a strike, but a political crisis for example, may generate tension and misperception of the opponent leading to escalation. In any event, preemption is difficult to distinguish from surprise attack in that both assume similar force requirements and are highly destabilizing.

All this suggests is that the difference between a preventive and a preemptive strike is rather indistinct. A preventive strike is launched on the grounds that one expects the other side to do sometime in the future. A preemptive strike is launched only when the other has begun such an attack. The problem is obvious: How and when does one know that the other has begun to launch a first strike? The answer is equally obvious: One does not; therefore, a doctrine of preemption makes it quite likely that what began as a purely retaliatory doctrine may well end up with a preventive strike or at best a preemptive strike that is not, in fact, preemptive at all.

DEFENSE STRATEGIES: ACTIVE AND PASSIVE DEFENSES

Civil Defense

The first area to be discussed concerns the evacuation or protection of civilian populations, relocation or duplication of essential facilities and provision for post-attack recovery. All of the above measures can be included in civil defense in that they are not linked directly to

military capabilities. The latter two measures involve long term planning and commitment regardless whether the nation is attacked or is attacking and therefore with respect to the immediate stability of the balance, represent more or less, neutral factors. The evacuation or protection of civilian populations, on the other hand, is linked to and derives its effectiveness relative to the particular force strategy employed. That is, more effective when combined with a first strike.

Nuclear warheads, very destructive and deliverable within minutes of launch, impose certain limits with respect to the efficacy of civil defense measures as a means of minimizing civilian casualties. Assuming blast and fallout shelters were designed such that they were able to withstand the blast and fallout of direct or indirect detonation and that the population could be supported "underground" for however long was required, the problem remains in receiving adequate warning time. It is quite conceivable, that with maximum warning time, civilian casualties can be reduced considerably. However, such is not the luxury of a country relying on a purely retaliatory doctrine. Assuming a warning period of between fifteen and thirty minutes depending upon what force is used to initiate the attack, (ICBM or SLBM), the victim's civilian population would be afforded little time for evacuation, and depending upon the development of active defense forces, would bear the full brunt of a first strike. The degree of devastation inflicted upon civilian centres, would of course, depend upon the nature of the aggressor's attack, whether counterforce or directly upon the cities. However, the cities of a victim of a surprise attack would receive "in addition to heavy doses of delayed fallout, immediate direct hits or near misses with their attendant radioactivity. Thus, even if cities are not

prime first-strike targets, fall-out shelters are unlikely to be particularly effective in reducing casualties."²⁴

Fall-out shelters and contingencies for the evacuation of population centres, might however, be effective for a nation "which had warning times perhaps twice as long and whose damage would come only from a crippled and disorganized retaliatory force."²⁵

Whether civil-defense enhances deterrence is debatable. It is argued that if you demonstrate to the aggressor your ability to withstand a direct assault and recover quickly, he is less likely to strike. However, this sort of deterrence does not constitute much of a threat, rendering its deterrent value rather insignificant. In any event its de-stabilizing contribution nullifies and exceeds its deterrent value.

If civil defense is of extremely low value to the victim and of reasonably high value to the attacker, he who initiates it may well appear reluctant to accept the former role. To a fearful and suspicious adversary, a strong civil-defense program must suggest a commitment to the preventive or preemptive strategy.²⁶

Other forms of passive defense available to the superpowers, in contrast to civil defense measures, serve to stabilize the strategic balance. Their stabilizing influence originates from their purpose: the protection of retaliatory forces. Missile silo hardening, dispersal and mobility serve to stabilize in this capacity. The logic is straightforward: to decrease the vulnerability on one's retaliatory force. The efficacy of such measures, however, is uncertain, especially if the adversary is willing to counter such force design with an ambitious counterforce strategy, and since technological development has served to increase the gap between offense and defense. (To be discussed below.)

Active Defense

The role of active missile defense is important when discussing the stability of deterrence.

If each of the superpowers possessed impenetrable active defense systems, the balance may be stable. However, to date, the required technology has not been so developed. If it were developed, it does not necessarily presuppose possession by both sides. Within this context of not completely reliable defense systems, the efficacy of such a force design is dependent upon the remaining elements of damage limitation.

Essentially an active defense force as mentioned, is one designed for directly countering or confronting the opponents incoming force. The impact of an incoming nuclear strike may be reduced by "throwing up an umbrella reducing the quality of megatonnage which reaches the defender."²⁷ There are a variety of active defense systems which have been mentioned. Yet the task of constructing a missile defense is a formidable one. The most promising area of research was in developing the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) and more recently emphasis upon satellite and laser technology.

However, the technological difficulties and costs associated with developing an effective ABM force prompted the superpowers to agree to their restriction. The issue of more recent technology remains open. Technological considerations aside, the implications of an adequate ballistic missile defense (BMD) are important with respect to strategic stability.

Current belief in the balance of terror is based on the assumption that each of the superpowers possesses an unquestionable capability to

effectively obliterate the other even if one launches a first strike counterforce attack. Active defenses have not been developed to the extent of decreasing substantially, the decisive superiority of the offense.

The balance would be 'stabilized' if both sides deployed their BMDs only in defense of their retaliatory forces and thus rendering them less vulnerable to a first strike. However, it is unlikely any one of the superpowers would restrict their BMD force to missile sites to the exclusion of their respective civilian population, in the event they are able to develop effective defenses. If such forces were to be deployed on behalf of population centres, new uncertainties would be introduced affecting the stability of the balance, especially if only one side were to develop such capabilities. For it is the population that represents the final "bargaining chip" in the age of nuclear deterrence. The basic requisite for the nation state remains the security of its citizens, yet it is the inability of the superpowers to guarantee it in the event of a nuclear war that precludes the initiation of such an adventure.

Secondly, it is highly unlikely that BMD development would proceed symmetrically, affording one side a temporary although perhaps minimal advantage. These two factors serve to de-stabilize the balance.

In brief, the power with ABM success might be far less deterred than the other from initiating courses of action now considered too risky. By diminishing the opponents confidence in his offensive power, superior defensive capabilities may encourage an aggressive posture.

Third, any active defense force necessarily complements a counterforce doctrine and completes a damage limitation strategy. An active defense system would prove much more effective in countering the strike of a crippled retaliatory force as opposed to a fully intact first strike, in light of the technology available.

In sum, a doctrine of damage limitation represents a highly destabilizing element in the structure of deterrence as opposed to a doctrine based simply on retaliation. However, even such a doctrine may be inadequate in maintaining stability by the fact that there are factors beyond the immediate scrutiny of decision makers that facilitate an unstable environment. These are the subjects of the next section.

TECHNOLOGY AND UNSTABLE DETERRENCE

The deployment of nearly invulnerable strategic forces in the form of submarine launched missiles (SLBM) of the Polaris type and the hardened land based missiles (ICBM), by the late nineteen sixties, it was thought, had reached a plateau and that stability in the arms race would follow. It was assumed that in achieving the invulnerability of an adequate portion of one's missile forces, the rapid pace of military technological development would be arrested, stabilizing not only the arms race but also the strategic nuclear balance.

There being no defense against the missile, an adequate arsenal could be calculated against the static standard of the enemy's society as a target, rather than as in previous technological periods, against the dynamic standard of the enemy's offensive and defensive strength. Moreover as retaliation was inescapable there would be no temptation to attack. Thus strategic stability might be achieved in two senses; first, there would be an end to the arms race both quantitative and qualitative; and second, there would be no strategic nuclear hostilities.

However, the dynamics and uncertainty of technological development as illustrated in most aspects of society, would not be stifled in the area of the military. Two significant developments have proceeded to make the balance more precarious.

The first involves the development of more sophisticated guidance systems and therefore much greater accuracy of the intercontinental missiles. It is the accuracy of a missile which is effective as opposed to merely increasing the blast or yield.

The greater significance of this improvement is that the effectiveness of weapons for destroying a small, well protected target like a missile silo, is much more sensitive to accuracy than to size of the warhead.... Increased accuracy is nearly ten times as effective as increased yield. The implication of greatly increased accuracies is small for large, soft targets like cities, but is very great indeed for hardened targets like missile silos. Increased accuracy is therefore a step towards counterforce capability, and throws into question, the assumption that the hardened Minuteman-type missile is an invulnerable and reliable second strike weapon.³⁰

This trend has been compounded by the development of multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV). In essence, "providing separate warheads with individual guidance so as to engage several widely separated targets or improve the pattern of attack in a single area."³¹ The implications of such a development are serious as advantage continues to accrue in favour of the side which strikes first.

Their counterforce potential depends primarily on accuracy; multiplication is a useful refinement. But multiplication has another disturbing implication for those who fear a counterforce strategy; this is that accurate MIRVs could attack more than one missile site, while a MIRVed missile on the ground still only constitutes a single target. Thus the exchange ratio once again come to favour the side that strikes first.³²

As such, it becomes more difficult to neutralize a counterforce strategy of the opponent by merely adding to one's arsenal. Secondly, a counterforce strategy "restores the familiar military situation in which the adequacy of one power's force must be weighed against the military capability of the possible adversary."³³ In essence, technological advance fuels the arms competition with implications of its own for strategic stability.

Aside from the fact the arms race is de-stabilizing in the sense that it increases the possibility of accidental war due to the increasing number of weapons developed and in stock, competition in arms procurement represents an unstable element in the nuclear balance with potentially more far reaching implications.

However unlikely one side will come through with a technological breakthrough of such qualitative proportions to upset the balance, the uncertainty and unpredictable nature of technological development makes this a possibility. Certainly, technological progress has not proceeded symmetrically and for this reason perpetuates the arms race. The uncertainty involved compels each to "catch up" in areas lagging behind. Each side must fear that it might confer a degree of temporary advantage on the other. The action-reaction processes continue to operate.

The advent of multiple warheads with their potential for ending the supposedly invulnerability of landbased strategic missiles, undermines the assumption that counterforce cannot contribute to damage limitation. Similarly the appearance of potentially practical systems for intercepting offensive missiles in flight has "restored the possibility of an active defense against missiles and therefore undermines the assumption that the only way to security is deterrence based on vulnerability."³⁴ Deterrence as the basis of security requires faith in the rationality of the adversary, while defense if possible, implies self-reliance in ensuring security. The possibility that constructing a BMD system might prove practicable has impelled both superpowers to explore the necessary technology. The danger lies, not so much in the possibility of both developing adequate defenses, but in the asymmetrical and poten-

tially one-sided development of an active defense system. A temporary advantage may encourage aggressive behaviour as a result of lower level conflicts that escalate, allowing the advantages player the luxury of standing firm or extracting concessions in time of crisis or in an effort to halt or inhibit a similar development with respect to the adversary. The uncertainties involved in predicting the future capabilities of the adversary makes the balance that more precarious. Such measures are likely to stimulate anxieties about a first strike in the mind of the opponent.

At present, no BMD system even if used in conjunction with a preliminary counterforce strike to weaken the enemy's offensive power, can purchase a reliable immunity from catastrophic retaliation.... Stability in the sense that a first strike cannot seem a rational act, remains secure for the moment. But this will only continue to be the case if each superpower keeps pace with the quality and quantity of the other's strategic arsenal.... Although these systems cannot purchase immunity to retaliation, and therefore do not make it rational to seek a nuclear war, they make it very advantageous to strike first if a war seems inevitable.

These technological developments have helped to stimulate continual competition in missile procurement, requiring mutual and symmetrical progression for the maintenance of strategic stability. Yet, mutual technological development cannot be assumed to remain, if it had been, symmetrical, bringing into question, the stability of the balance. The overwhelming advantage of offensive as opposed to defensive systems and therefore the advantage of striking first as opposed to striking second, makes technological breakthroughs potentially decisive in an environment of uncertainty.

However, even symmetrical technological development does not assure the stability of the strategic balance. The American-Soviet competition extends beyond the arms race and the balance of terror. These peripheral areas are the subject of the next section.

PERIPHERAL ISSUES AND UNSTABLE DETERRENCE

As mentioned the competition of the superpowers extends beyond merely the balance of terror. Representing conflicting ideological camps and being the two most powerful members of the international system, it is perhaps inevitable that the two appear diametrically opposed on a number of issues. The fact that these issues are peripheral in the sense they are not directly related to the strategic nuclear balance, does not preclude their influence upon the stability of the structure.

Once such area is the nature of weapons development and technology of the non-nuclear type. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have invested considerable research and expense into the development of military technology of the non-nuclear type. Examples include biological, and or chemical weapons and the development of conventional but extremely powerful weapon systems. A most ambiguous example is perhaps the "neutron bomb", a nuclear device with a limited blast effect. The central problem area with respect to these weapons, is in defining their roles within the respective strategies of the superpowers. These weapons can be relied upon in some cases, to produce similar effects as nuclear devices. Where once, conventional and nuclear weapons represented mutually exclusive domains, conventional weapons today have achieved at least, the lower threshold of nuclear power. The strategic value of such weaponry is perhaps minimal. As tactical battlefield devices however, their inclusion in the respective arsenals of the superpowers may be of a decisive nature. This prospect may be the catalyst for escalation since the line between nuclear and non-nuclear weaponry is not so defined as in previous technological

eras. The danger of lower level conflicts or limited wars escalating to the point of a strategic confrontation, is more likely. For example, in the potential use of biological weapons.

Biological weapons could do immense damage in much smaller quantities than chemical weapons. They are however, relatively difficult to disseminate in a controlled manner and slow to act compared to other weapons. This slowness makes them useless for tactical purposes except perhaps for ... incapacitating a command headquarters. If used to a substantial effect against a nuclear power, the consequences would ~~very~~ probably be such as to remove any inhibition the victim felt about nuclear retaliation.³⁶

Their very existence and potential use represent a de-stabilizing element in the strategic balance.

However, more serious implications have arisen with respect to the so-called "tactical" or battlefield nuclear weapons, associated most often with the European theatre where the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces confront one another. It illustrates another scenario of limited war and potential for escalation to the strategic level.

The very distinction of tactical and strategic weapons is in itself highly ambiguous.

As a rough guide we might agree to regard as "strategic" any weapon used to do direct damage to the home base and war making potential of an enemy state. We might regard as "tactical" any weapon used to have a relatively immediate effect on the course of military operations.³⁷

Such a contrast is relatively simple in distinguishing between field artillery and long range bombers, but the "ambiguity is important where nuclear weapons are concerned, because these weapons are so potent in their larger sizes."³⁸

The potential limited use of nuclear weapons raises the spectre of escalation; "the process whereby, intentionally or not, the level of violence rises to what, once nuclear weapons are employed, could be

virtually total devastation. There is therefore a sharp debate as to whether a class of weapon so ominous and unmanageable at the higher end of its spectrum could be used safely and effectively at the lower.³⁹

There is no question however, that both the United States and the Soviet Union have included the use of these weapons in their respective limited strategies. Whether they are able or willing to divorce their "tactical" and "strategic" considerations is open to question. The prospects of escalation necessarily require strategic superiority for an effective tactical doctrine. The potential use of tactical nuclear weapons is therefore de-stabilizing.

THIRD WORLD AND UNSTABLE DETERRENCE

The idea of lower level conflicts escalating to the strategic level and the contrast in general and immediate deterrence requirements must include the Third World. The development of long range nuclear capabilities have not lowered the risks of direct confrontation between the superpowers, but has not abated their competitions in gaining the "hearts and minds" of the rest of the world. It is in this area that the superpowers engage one another in a "low cost, relatively low-risk, highly intensive pattern of classical imperial competition."⁴⁰

A combination of strategic, political, ideological and economic reasons form the basis of this competition. "Whereas, Europe and the Far East have relatively stable political and military formations that coincide with established territorial boundaries and spheres of influence

shielded by security agreements, Southern Asia, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa are characterized by transient alliances and systemic instability and so have attracted superpower attention and rivalry."⁴¹ In the short run, specific gains or setbacks are not likely to alter the overall balance of power, yet the potential long term considerations give purpose to such competition. Also, there are certain areas representing the vital interests of one or both of the superpowers, where the intensity of the competition is above those of other areas. Whether through treaty obligation or informal alliances, the superpowers maintain close military, political and economic relations with a number of "client states" often in conflict among themselves.

These peripheral areas of conflict are often supported, fueled and influenced by the superpowers themselves in pursuit of their respective strategic interests. The nuclear stalemate has encouraged this form of indirect confrontation. In effect, the "higher level" stability of the superpower relationship has contributed to "lower level" instability.

The danger lies in the potential for escalation. The probability of either or both the superpowers being drawn into local conflicts cannot be assumed to be zero. Where the interests involved are assumed to be vital, superpower intervention and direct confrontation leading to escalation cannot be ruled out. One such example is the Middle East. The 1973 Arab-Israeli war was a conflict which almost resulted in superpower intervention. Both put their military forces on alert, "going nearer to the brink of confrontation than ever before. Both sides had sizeable conventional forces deployed in proximity, so that a small incident might easily have triggered a chain reaction."⁴²

Deterrence within this context, extends beyond the immediate issues of the strategic balance. An effective deterrent in this situation requires unlimited force outlays, strategic superiority and the willingness to initiate and escalate hostilities. This doctrine is reminiscent of the previous American doctrines of massive retaliation and flexible response.

The superpowers having assumed essential parity in strategic forces, are not in a position to exploit an extended deterrence doctrine. However, this does not isolate these issues from the strategic debate. In fact they remain very much a part of the debate. Détente and the arms limitation agreements were partially predicated upon the assumptions of achieving stability in the international context, at least from the American perspective. Détente soured eventually largely as a result of superpower competition and conflict in the international arena. In essence, the state of the superpower relationship, either directly or indirectly influenced, will affect the degree of stability in the strategic nuclear balance. Therefore, when discussing the structure of deterrence, we must also consider elements beyond the immediate structure, which although peripheral, exert a degree of influence upon the stability of the strategic relationship.

SUMMARY

Presently neither superpower could hope to initiate nuclear hostilities while remaining immune to retaliation and great destruction. Such an act would be outside the parameters of rationality. Yet the

peculiar nature of nuclear weaponry with its high speed of delivery and the enormous advantage of offensive over defensive forces, help to undermine the stability of the balance of terror. In a structure where the great advantage lies in striking first and the element of surprise may be decisive, rationality may dictate the necessity of striking first in crisis where nuclear war appears inevitable.

The structure of nuclear deterrence, however unstable, does not in itself contain the cause or potential cause of a nuclear war. Aside from the prospects of accidental nuclear detonation, the mere existence of nuclear weapon systems will not be the fundamental reason for a future nuclear holocaust. Nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the superpowers are the manifestation of their competition, not its cause. Therefore, of importance is the adversarial nature of the superpower relationship, with each diametrically opposed on a number of issues and objectives. Herein lies the potential context for future conflict. Only when placed within the context of the Soviet-American relationship do the existence of nuclear weapons become a contributing factor to a potential conflict. The arms race therefore, becomes dangerous when considered relative to the level of tension generated by Soviet-American competition in the international system. Conflicting interests and objectives, when considered vital by each, may inevitably lead to confrontation and potential escalation to a situation of perceived crisis. It is within this situation that the stability of the nuclear balance may contribute to or inhibit crisis resolution and therefore determine whether there is nuclear war or not.

Superpower competition in the Third World, a potential catalyst for conflict and confrontation, is therefore linked closely to nuclear deterrence. It invariably affects the level of tension in the Soviet-American relationship and therefore the stability of the nuclear balance.

Within this context, Soviet military and foreign policy assume importance. Despite the initial SALT agreements and despite détente, the Soviet Union has continued the massive expansion of its strategic nuclear arsenal and increased its military activity in the Third World.

All of this while the United States was restricting its commitments in the Third World and maintaining its strategic forces at a fixed level.

(Although the United States is now expanding and modernizing its strategic nuclear forces in all areas, much of it is in response to the Soviet military buildup i.e. MX missile). The Soviet nuclear buildup

has exceeded the level sufficient to maintain deterrence, yet it has continued to expand. From the Western perspective, Soviet defined

security objectives may appear unnecessary and unreasonable. How-

ever, Soviet perceptions of the international system and the utility of nuclear weapons and warfare diverge sharply from those prevalent in

the West. Marxist-Leninist ideology and the pervasive military influence

in the formulation of strategic doctrine have contributed to these view

such that Soviet security requirements and Third World objectives have

undermined the stability of the strategic balance.

CHAPTER II

IDEOLOGY AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

INTRODUCTION

The following chapter will deal with the role of Soviet ideology in the formation and justification of policy objectives of the USSR. Marxism-Leninism, as the recognized state ideology of the Soviet Union, has endured and appeared rather flexible with respect to changing circumstance and policy objectives of the Soviet state. The extent to which ideology serves as an input and determinant of policy or is utilized merely for the legitimation of Soviet state action and perceived national interests is indeterminable. While it is true that Marxist-Leninist ideology has conditioned Soviet perceptions of the non-communist world, every pronouncement cannot be totally understood at face value, solely for its ideological content. In the Soviet context therefore, ideology on the one hand defines policy objectives and on the other, serves as a means of justification and legitimation of policy. This distinction of ideological roles however, is essentially irrelevant. As will be illustrated, Soviet ideology is utilized essentially as an instrument enhancing the foreign policy objectives of the USSR. Of course this ideological role can be attributed to any state or political system. Its importance however, is derived from the peculiar nature of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Ideology in the Soviet context, provides a more clear understanding of Soviet policy formation and direction with respect to the military and "imperial" policies of the USSR.

THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN THE FORMULATION
OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Ideology influences the foreign and domestic policy of all states. It serves to legitimize the structure of power within a given political system.

However, in the formulation of foreign policy, ideology does not stand in isolation, but rather in conjunction with the perceived national interests of the state. It is this balance or interaction of ideology and the national interest which is important within the Soviet context.

Every régime is rooted in an ideology of some nature. The ideology or "world view" of a particular nation state serves to interpret the social, political and economic environment within the domestic and international contexts. Thus ideology, to a large extent, influences perception of the international system and events, subsequently affecting policy considerations either directly or indirectly.

The input of ideological elements into the formulation of policy, both foreign and domestic, is no less prevalent in the Soviet Union, rather it is more so. The conflict between the original ideological doctrine and the practical needs of the state, is perhaps more acute within the Soviet Union than elsewhere. The dilemma facing many political leaders is whether the preservation of the purity of doctrine is worth risking the potential disintegration of the system founded to articulate that doctrine, or adjusting doctrine to suit the practical needs of the system. The usual solution is to adjust doctrine. When ideological considerations conflict with national interests, ideology must accommodate. This is exemplified in American policy of supporting

often undemocratic and repressive régimes deemed friendly to the United States. As such, the "free world" concept becomes one including all non-communist régimes, regardless of the extent of liberty in a particular country or political system.

The Soviet Union adheres to the same rules of international behaviour. A non-communist or even anti-communist régime following policy friendly to the Soviet Union or in quarrel with the West, is welcomed as an ally in the international competition.

However, a comparison of Soviet and Western doctrinal accommodation is superficial at best and can be reduced to a generality that all nations will subordinate ideological particulars to national concerns. Within the Soviet Union, this paradox presents more of a dilemma than in the Western democracies because of the Marxist-Leninist ideological framework serving as the basis of the Soviet political system.

Marxism-Leninism is an ideology whose legitimacy involves the achievement of certain political, economic and social objectives. In that the Soviet political system was "designed" in accordance with such objectives, the system and the successive elites are committed, at least formally, to the goals outlined in Soviet ideology. However, revolutionary objectives, no matter how desirable, are not always readily achievable in the short term, nor, as is often the case, realistically attainable at all. Thus, for a political system and elite groups whose legitimacy and authority derive from such revolutionary goals, there exists a certain inconsistency between professed objectives and more realistic national interests. In this context, the leadership must always portray itself as acting in accordance with the ideological objectives. There must appear a consistency between the means utilized by the political elite and their professed objectives.

Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet state ideology, interprets the interaction of objective immutable laws as postulated by Marx and subjective elements, which together determine mankind's social evolution towards communism. The processes and end result are inevitable. The subjective input into this process interact with, manipulate and exploit the objective conditions and therefore accelerate mankind's social progression towards the same end. Whether Soviet leaders regard themselves as the subjective elements within this framework is irrelevant. It must appear as such due to the revolutionary nature of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and its principles.

First of all, ideology in general and Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet context, legitimizes the structure of political power. In the Soviet Union, the infallibility of the CPSU as the vanguard of the proletariat serves to legitimize its monopoly of political power. Unconcealed deviation from the basic tenets of Marxist-Leninist doctrine could conceivably erode the basis of political power. Similarly, within the CPSU itself, doctrinal deviation or revisionism represents a potent weapon for the removal of individuals from positions of importance. In so doctrinaire a political system, ideological consistency is a necessary requirement.

Within the world state-system, Marxist-Leninist doctrine provides the internationalist orientation and impetus behind Soviet foreign policy. That is, theoretically it subordinates nationalism to the world revolutionary movement. The Soviet Union portrays itself as the leader and guardian of the world revolutionary movement. On this basis it seeks the loyalty of all governing and non-governing communist parties in the world. Therefore, it must theoretically at least, adhere to its ideo-

logical principles, especially within the context of the Sino-Soviet split and division of the "socialist camp." The internationalist orientation of Marxist-Leninist doctrine does not formally allow for the subordination of the world revolutionary movement to individual state interests. Soviet foreign policy must always be reconciled with respect to the interests of the world revolutionary movement. Yet the Soviet Union has always followed a policy consistent with its own state interests irrespective of the country(s), group(s) and issue(s) involved. Soviet national interests assume priority. Soviet nationalism however, is not from the Soviet perspective, distinct from Marxist-Leninist internationalism. The various elements of ideology and the many features of Soviet nationalism are not considered separate or distinct, but are viewed to be interrelated to the extent that they are one.

The state and security interests of the Soviet Union are interpreted to be the interests of world revolution.

The creation and development of the Soviet Union, have by themselves exerted a powerful transforming influence on the contemporary world and on the whole course of history of our time. The security of the Soviet state amounts in these circumstances to the preservation of the most important factor which accelerates mankind's progression towards socialism.

In effect, the Soviet Union portrays itself as the guarantor of the world communist movement. The CPSU was the first to carry out the socialist revolution and during the more than six decades of its position in power, claims the experience and knowledge required for the construction of a Marxist-Leninist based social system. Its ascendancy to the rank of superpower and its international influence reinforce such claims. In essence, the interests of world revolution are dependent upon the state and security interests of the USSR. In this context, the potential for conflict is abated in that the interests of world revo-

lution yield to those of the Soviet state. Thus, the role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy, is one which serves as an instrument of the Soviet national interest.

In this sense, ideology is used to justify adoptive courses of policy and policy revisions.

However, the ideological role in Soviet foreign policy extends beyond its utilization as an instrument of foreign policy. Marxist-Leninist ideology is used to interpret the dynamics of the international system. It has to a large extent, conditioned the Soviet view of the international system in general and for purposes of this discussion, the non-communist world in particular.

Marxist-Leninist theory attempts to explain the past, present and future course of mankind's social evolution based on subjective elements and immutable objective laws. It presents and justifies theory and practice as an integrated whole. In essence, Marxism-Leninism is used to define and interpret the international environment in which the Soviet Union interacts. In this sense, ideology affects the Soviet perception of the international system and therefore exerts its influence upon the policy process.

In general, Soviet ideology may be regarded as a systematic body of goals, ideas and assumptions shared by the elite affecting their attitudes and behaviour. It helps to shape their mode of response to social, economic and political phenomena and conditions their perceptions of reality.

Although the above statement can be applied to any group of political decision-makers, its relevance stems from the fact that the ideology is Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet Union is a superpower.

The Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the capitalist world has conditioned the Soviet view of it. It purports to explain the inevitable

demise of capitalism and links the probability of war to capitalism. The assumptions held by the Soviet decision-makers, give substance and purpose to international conflict and competition and in this sense, serve to influence and define policy objectives.

In essence, the Soviet Union can be referred to as an ideological as opposed to an instrumental political system. That is, policy is formulated within a theoretical framework based on long term future projections. This is not to suggest that the Soviet leaders are devoid of reactionary pressures, only that such pressures are considered within the broad outline or framework of the present and future environment as defined by the ideological requisites of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

In essence, Marxism-Leninism interprets the capitalist system as hostile. It defines the social and ideological conflict and competition. The Soviets regard the West with deep suspicion, which will direct its energies to the maintenance of the status quo in contradiction to the objective laws of history and as such against the Soviet Union. This helps to explain the continuing policy assumption by the Soviet leaders of hostility between the two systems. The hostility and suspicion remain despite the concepts of peaceful coexistence and détente.

Whether the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States is the manifestation of irreconcilable ideological perspectives or is the result of the confrontation of the two principal players in a highly competitive international system is debatable and essentially irrelevant. Marxist-Leninist doctrine gives substance to the competition and conflict from the Soviet perspective.

Thus, in a sense Marxist-Leninist ideology serves a dual function with respect to Soviet state interests and policy. It is used as an instrument of justification and legitimation of Soviet policy. Moreover, ideology to a large extent defines Soviet interests, especially with respect to long term projections of the future.

Ideology conditions the Soviet view of the non-communist world and its own historical function relative to the international system. In essence, there is a close interaction of Soviet state interests and ideology, necessitating an understanding of the theoretical or doctrinal requisites for the understanding of Soviet interests and policy.

The relationship of nationalism and ideology is important with respect to the legitimacy of the Soviet regime and its foreign policy. The Soviet political system is one based upon and sustained by the projected fulfillment of its "universal mission" on a global scale. The Soviet Union portrays itself as the "historic agent" acting in accordance with the objective laws of "social progression" towards that same end. Therefore it seeks to extend its influence in the international system. An expansionist foreign policy acts as a legitimizing factor for the system. Moreover, beyond the "offensive thrust" of ideology, the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the international system, generating perceptions of hostility and insecurity, similarly justifies Soviet expansionism and defense preparedness in terms of safeguarding the "revolution". In essence ideology defines simultaneously offensive and defensive objectives with respect to Soviet national interests. However, whether Soviet expansionism is merely legitimized ideologically or in fact Marxism-Leninism defines the objectives with respect to Soviet imperial policies, is indeterminable and essentially irrelevant. Ideology is uti-

lized as an instrument of foreign policy and the national interests of the Soviet Union as perceived by its leaders. This chapter will proceed on the assumption that Soviet ideology constitutes a mix of these two functions in its role in the formulation of policy.

In this context, Soviet leaders have continually reiterated their desires for peace and disarmament in relation to their capitalist neighbours, while at the same time, they have persisted in their view that conflict with the West is inevitable and continual. A seeming contradiction in terms and ideas, the Soviet view of the international system links the disparate concepts of peace and military strength such that they are interdependent. Within this context, the continual struggle for strategic advantage helps to define Soviet objectives with respect to its nuclear arms and Third World or national liberation policy.

The "correlation of socialist forces" of which the power of the Soviet Union and the assistance to national liberation movements, are integral components, represent this mix of subjective input in combination with the objective forces.

For example, the Soviet Union, relative to its growing power and influence over the last three and a half decades, can confidently point to the decline in American military and economic influence, the North-South economic contradictions and the growing number of Third World countries willing to consider "deeper" relations with the Soviet Union, as evidence of the shifting balance of power in the international system in favour of the USSR.

The favourable changes in the world situation are first of all due to the impact of the world of socialism, its achievements, its might and its example in international developments ... a result of the effective cooperation between the three major revolutionary forces of our day, namely, the socialist community, the international communist and working class movement, and the national liberation movement.

Ideology contains the clues to understanding the Soviet leadership's perception of the international system in general and the non-communist world in particular.

SOVIET CONCEPTION OF WAR

As in most areas of economic, political and social development, the military role of the Soviet State is defined in terms of ideologically based theoretical principles. The irreconcilable and inevitable clash of the two social systems remained a dominant theme defining the Soviet role in international conflict. The concept of war as defined by Lenin, is discussed in terms of its progressive role in mankind's social evolution. That is, the essence of war, its context and objectives determine its place within Soviet considerations. The concept of war is not considered a neutral, ahistorical event to be discussed objectively with respect to its qualities. Rather, its qualities and role derive substance relative to its historical, social and political context. As Lenin wrote:

When in speaking of the wars ... socialists stressed the legitimacy of defensive wars, they always had these aims in mind, namely revolution against medievalism and serfdom. By a defensive war socialists have always understood a just war in this particular sense. It is only in this sense that socialists have always regarded defensive wars as legitimate, progressive and just.... From liberator of nations which it was in the struggle against feudalism, capitalism in its imperialist stage has turned into the greatest oppressor of all nations. Formerly progressive, capitalism has become reactionary.

Wars are distinguished in terms of being just or unjust. A war is just with respect to its progressive role. Regardless of who initiates the hostilities, all "anti-capitalist" wars are considered just wars.

For example, if tomorrow, Morocco were to declare war on France, or India on Britain ... these would be just and defensive wars, irrespective of who would be the first to attack; any socialist would wish the oppressed, dependent unequal states victory over the oppressor, slaveholding and predatory Great Powers.

Capitalism and capitalist states, having passed their progressive stage, represent forces of reaction and oppression upon reaching their imperialist stage. It is these forces which attempt to inhibit and prevent the momentum of the progressive forces. The competitive nature of the imperialist countries, ending inevitably with war among themselves do not constitute just wars in any sense. Rather, intercapitalist wars are instruments utilized for the preservation and consolidation of the imperialist system.

Imagine a slaveholder who owns a hundred slaves warring against another who owns two hundred slaves, for a more just redistribution of slaves. The use of the term of a defensive war ... would clearly be historically false in such a case and would in practice be sheer deception of the common people.... It is in this way that peoples are being deceived with national ideology ... by the present day imperialist bourgeoisie in the war being waged between slaveholders with the purpose of consolidating slavery.

Therefore, the road to universal peace for mankind, lies in adopting socialism,

... it (capitalism) had developed the forces of production to such a degree that mankind is faced with an alternative of adopting socialism or of experiencing years and even decades of armed struggle between the "Great" Powers for the artificial preservation of capitalism by means of colonies, monopolies' privileges and national oppression of every kind.

In either instance, war is a direct result of imperialism. The Leninist thesis went beyond these aspects and included war upon the Soviet state. The Soviet state as a socialist and therefore progressive force would be a prime target for the "forces of reaction", i.e. the imperialist states. The clash of two social systems was inevitable and their mutual existence incompatible.

We are not living in a state, but a system of states and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with the imperialists for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. Prior to that outcome, a series of horrible clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is unavoidable.

Although Lenin's thesis of the "inevitability of war" has since been revised, the above statement characterizes the Soviet view of international conflict and competition between the two social systems. The inevitability of war was to remain part of Soviet doctrine until 1956. Despite this revision, the categorization of war as just or unjust has continued. In essence, all wars waged by imperialist powers were unjust while just wars were those fought by "progressive forces". This includes those fought by socialist states against imperial states, colonial resistance to oppression by imperialist states, wars of the semi-colonial countries against the imperialist states and civil wars if one party to the conflict was progressive such as an indigenous communist party or anti-imperialist faction.

The inevitability of war within an international system including capitalist states was further articulated by Joseph Stalin. The Soviet government stressed the theory of capitalist encirclement during the interwar period.

Whereas it was possible and necessary to speak of a period of a certain equilibrium and peaceful coexistence between the USSR and the capitalist countries, today we have every ground for asserting the period of peaceful coexistence is receding into the past, giving place to a period of imperialist assaults and preparation for intervention against the USSR.... We must not forget Lenin's statement that as regards our work of construction depends upon whether we succeed in postponing war with the capitalist world, which is inevitable....

Following the Second World War, the emphasis was again upon the intercapitalist wars.

... a movement for the preservation of peace will if it succeeds result in the preventing of a particular war in its temporary

postponement.... But at the same time, it will not be enough to eliminate the inevitability of war between capitalist countries generally. It will not be enough because ... imperialism will remain, continue in force - and consequently the inevitability of war will continue in force. To eliminate the inevitability of war it is necessary to abolish imperialism.

Despite the fact Lenin's thesis on imperialism and war was written many years ago and has been subject to revision since then, the prevailing view of the capitalist world has remained essentially the same; the continued perception of the capitalist world as hostile and inherently aggressive towards the progressive forces in the world, i.e. socialist forces. In either case, intercapitalist wars or a direct assault upon the Soviet Union, war was considered inevitable and a threat to Soviet security. Thus, the Soviets had basically two conceptions of war with emphasis upon the particular one reflecting Soviet national interests for a given period. For example, prior to Second World War, the emphasis was on the doctrine stressing the theme of capitalist encirclement when the Soviet Union was more vulnerable, while following the war, as the Soviet Union aspired to superpower status, the emphasis again shifted to the doctrine of intercapitalist wars.

The classification of war as being just or unjust has remained. A just war was considered a legitimate instrument for the furthering of political or diplomatic objectives with respect to undermining the capitalist system.

This basic theme characterizing Soviet perceptions of the capitalist world would remain despite peaceful coexistence and détente, and have its influence felt upon Soviet foreign and military policy.

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

The inevitability of war between the two social systems remained a part of Soviet doctrine until 1956. It was during this time the Soviet Union was emerging clearly as a superpower with greater confidence in its international affairs and position.

Nikita Khrushchev, at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 outlined what was to be the new foreign policy approach of the Soviet Union. It reflected a more pragmatic if not traditional approach to international relations, with the Soviet Union acting more like a status quo rather than revolutionary power. Dominance over Eastern Europe had been consolidated and the USSR represented a formidable military power with nuclear capabilities to complement already existing conventional strength. The Soviets were seeking to improve their domestic economic situation while internationally they continued to lend their support to indigenous communist movements in the Third World, but were shifting emphasis towards the governments in power. A more pragmatic approach when considering the large and growing number of newly emerging ex-colonial states at the time.

However, to have considered the Soviet Union as an established and therefore satisfied power, would have been incorrect. The Soviets were merely re-defining the instruments of conflict, short of war, not eliminating the competition. The increased military power of the USSR had become an effective deterrent to capitalist aggression.

There is of course a Marxist-Leninist precept that wars are inevitable as long as imperialism exists.... In its period this precept was absolutely correct. At the present time however the situation has changed radically. Now there is a world camp of socialism which has become a mighty force. In this camp the peace forces find not only the moral but material means to prevent aggres-

sion.... War is not fatalistically inevitable. Today there are mighty social and political forces possessing formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war and if they actually try to start it, to give a smashing rebuff to the aggressors....¹¹

What is apparent is the view that the increasing power of the Soviet Union, militarily and economically, has prevented the outbreak of world war. Peace as such, becomes a function of Soviet military strength and therefore war is no longer inevitable as long as the socialist camp is prepared to engage in one.

Secondly, Khrushchev's ideological revision illustrated Soviet recognition of the potential destructive power of nuclear weaponry necessitating a more discriminate approach to war as an instrument of politics. Within this context, the forces of peace as represented by the socialist camp and including the new countries in the international system and elements within the capitalist countries, would inhibit the capitalist propensity to initiate a war and its potentially disastrous consequences.

War was considered something to be avoided if possible. However, war, although no longer considered inevitable, represented a real possibility as long as capitalism existed. The basic suspicion remained.

As long as capitalism survives, reactionary forces representing the interests of monopolies will continue to drive toward military gambles and aggression and may try to unleash war. But war is not fatalistically inevitable.¹²

Thus, peaceful coexistence necessitates the continuation of the struggle against capitalism in the international system and continuation of the ideological struggle, illustrating the synthesis of ideological and strategic security interests in Soviet policy.

The conflict and hostility between the two systems remains, with peaceful coexistence merely a transitory stage in the inevitable evolution towards communism.

Peaceful coexistence is a specific form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism. In peaceful competition with capitalism, the socialist system will win.... There is no contradiction between the Marxist-Leninist formulation concerning the inevitability of the victory of communism in the whole world and the policy of peaceful coexistence.

Peaceful coexistence represents the acceptance of international realities without sacrificing the revolutionary momentum of Marxism-Leninism. It implies tolerance of the present existence of capitalist states. Therefore it impels the Soviet government to cooperate with capitalist governments in certain areas, at least towards the avoidance of war since the security and survival of the Soviet state is the primary objective of foreign policy, for it represents the survival of the revolution. However, the competitive aspect of peaceful coexistence remains. It permits, encourages and supports, especially in the Third World, the seizure of power by non-ruling communist groups and the weakening of Western influence in these areas. Peaceful coexistence does not restrain the ideological conflict, it merely defines how it will be continued. It represents a continuity in policy ends and is designed to facilitate the achievement of Soviet objectives, whether the Soviet leaders truly believe the Marxist-Leninist dogma or not, without the risks of direct confrontation.

In essence, the hostility, suspicion and security requirements of the Soviet state relative to the West remain. In the Soviet view, their own military strength and preparedness were and are the pressure forcing the West to negotiate and coexist.

...mutual agreement depend on how powerful the Soviet Union is on the correlation of forces. The more powerful it is, the more willing the capitalists will be to accept agreements with it and thus the easier it will be to negotiate those agreements. This rule applied to arms control negotiations as well.... All members of the Soviet ruling elite agree that the U.S. and other capitalist countries are inherently aggressive and militaristic and therefore

hostile to arms control but will accept it under pressure. ... Therefore, the power of the Soviet Union, its ability to put pressure on the U.S. is the most important factor making arms control attainable.

The national liberation movement, as a revolutionary force and an element of the Soviet national interest, gains a new importance in the strategic competition. It is sufficient to say at this stage of the paper that wars of national liberation in a sense represent an exception with respect to the Soviet theory and conceptions of war. That is, although the theme of peaceful coexistence represents the peaceful continuation of the global competition, it allows for revolutionary wars or wars of national liberation.

Although Marxist-Leninists uphold the concept of peaceful coexistence between states of different social systems, they have never been pacifists. They determine their attitude to a given war based on that war's character and essence. Wars are just and unjust. Just wars are those such as the peoples uprisings against oppressors, wars of national liberation and other kinds of anti-imperialist struggles. Communists not only support them with all their forces and means, but march in the first ranks of people who wage a war of liberation.

Included in this framework is "limited war". Soviet theory differentiates and categorizes war in terms of its social character and therefore determines the relative contribution by the Soviet Union to that effort. Whereas some wars may be fought for limited political objectives, i.e. Afghanistan or wars of "national liberation", war with the United States would not be limited in that it constitutes a conflict between "opposing social systems". It would inevitably represent the battle for social system supremacy, suggesting from the Soviet perspective, that there can be no limited objectives in a war with the United States. As stated by General S.M. Shtemenko,

It is not impossible that the protagonists of aggression will try at the beginning to unleash in some area a "small", "limited" war. Such wars are fraught with the enormous danger of growing into thermonuclear world war....

According to our doctrine, war is not inevitable. But if it is unleashed by the imperialists, it will be the last war, one in which imperialism will be reduced to ashes. It will be the decisive clash between two different social systems and will become a world war and a coalition war.¹⁶

Therefore, within the framework of peaceful coexistence, nuclear war with the United States, and its catastrophic consequences, is to be avoided because the same objectives can be realized, albeit over a longer period, through peaceful means. Thus, Soviet opposition to war is restricted to those wars which can be termed as major wars in the nuclear age, such as a direct confrontation with the United States.

DETENTE: CONTRASTING VIEWS

Détente as perceived by the East and West are quite different, implying specific and contrasting objectives. In the United States and Western Europe, détente is considered as a means of avoiding nuclear war and leading to what Henry Kissinger terms a "stable structure of peace."¹⁷ For politically and militarily status quo oriented powers like the United States and the countries of Western Europe, détente serves as a means of lowering East-West tension. It implies the removal of the conflict and "ideological struggle" characterizing previous relations with Soviet Union and as such, maintenance of the status quo. Negotiations for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, (CSCE) at Helsinki in 1975, reflected this approach. The United States and Western Europe conceded recognition of the post WWII European territorial boundaries and Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.

However, "to expect that the Soviet Union will agree so to define détente flies in the face of modern Russian history, of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the theory and practice of the Soviet Union in international affairs."¹⁸

Because of the close interaction between the Soviet perception of its national interest and its ideology as mentioned, the relatively static orientation of détente as interpreted by the West is inconsistent with Marxist-Leninist doctrine and as such not applicable to the Soviet context.

Détente and peaceful coexistence have to do with interstate relations.... Détente does not in the slightest abolish, nor can it alter, the laws of class struggle.... We make no secret of the fact that we see détente as the way to create more favourable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist construction.¹⁹

Secondly, détente as perceived by the Soviet Union in no way leads to any fundamental changes in the nature, character and objectives of the capitalist or imperialist states.

Does the gradual assertion of the principles of peaceful coexistence in relations between states mean any change in the aggressive, class nature of imperialism? Of course not. To think so would mean to entertain illusions.... Imperialism still strives on military strength in order to preserve its class position. It goes ahead with the arms race. At the same time, the realistically-minded leaders of capitalist countries are becoming increasingly aware that the alignment of world forces is changing in favour of socialism, and they are trying to adapt themselves to the new circumstances.²⁰

However, détente as the continuation of peaceful coexistence, is designed to avoid direct confrontation and war while facilitating Soviet objectives.

Peaceful coexistence is really a form of class struggle which in no sense eliminates contradictions between the two systems -- socialism and capitalism. However, it does create an opportunity for precluding such a sharpening of these contradictions as would lead to thermonuclear war with its toll of millions of human lives.²¹

Thirdly, détente as perceived by the Soviet Union does not suggest maintaining international stability and preserving the international status quo, especially with respect to the Third World and the national liberation movement. Rather, détente is seen as the environment which greatly facilitates the "progressive forces" which the Soviet Union is willing to assist.

They link the current détente with hopes for the Soviet Union's renunciation of support for the revolutionary movement in the rest of the world or, contrarywise, appeal for not cooperating with the USSR so long as it is giving such support. The slanderous character of such allegations is obvious. In actual fact, international détente is now an important factor in the development of all the streams of the world revolutionary process.²²

More specifically with respect to the national liberation movement, détente is seen as effective in furthering the revolutionary cause.

By linking the relaxation of international tension with the need for disarmament, for reducing military expenditures and increasing economic aid to the developing countries, the socialist community substantially facilitates the cause of the people's national liberation struggle.... Hence the easing of international tensions facilitates the struggle against imperialism and colonialism. ...an indispensable condition for a further offensive against imperialism....²³

Therefore, although both the USSR and the U.S. approached détente with desires of limiting the likelihood of nuclear war, the Soviets view it as a means of enhancing their objectives. Peace as such, becomes a condition favourable to Soviet objectives rather than an end in itself. "Minimally as a relaxation of tension in order to lower the risk of nuclear war and maximally as an instrument to expand its influence."²⁴ Détente in the Soviet view is merely an extension of the concept of peaceful coexistence. The irreconcilable conflict between socialism and capitalism remains in Soviet thinking. The deep suspicion and hostility attributed to Western actions and motivations are not abated and the implications associated with such attitudes are serious

when considering the whole question of arms control and strategic stability between the USSR and the U.S." For the Soviet Union to remain suspicious and hostile towards the West in general, the United States in particular, at a time when the West was recognizing the Soviet Union as "having arrived" so to speak, reflects the constant Soviet perception of the West seeking compromise in the face of Soviet military power.

Soberly evaluating the conditions that exist in the world, above all the growth of the military economic potential of the USSR, the USA has been compelled to conclude with us the aforementioned Treaty and Temporary Agreement (the SALT I agreements)."²⁵

Whether Marxist-Leninist ideology has conditioned Soviet perceptions of capitalist hostility necessitating constant vigilance, or ideology defines foreign policy objectives with respect to the West in general or ideology merely legitimizes militarist and imperial ambitions of the Soviet elite, it represents a critical element or motive force in Soviet policy.

The implications of continued perceptions of mistrust and hostility with respect to Western and more specifically American military and foreign policy objectives, are serious. Peaceful coexistence and détente have not thus far produced any meaningful inhibitions in the Soviet military buildup. Contrary to Western beliefs that the Soviet Union upon achieving strategic nuclear parity with the United States, would ease its military buildup, the Soviet Union has continued its rapid arms production, both conventional and nuclear, despite achieving basic nuclear parity and despite détente and the SALT I agreements. Internationally, with respect to the Third World, the Soviet Union has stepped up its "exporting of revolution" contributing to the instability of the international system.

In essence, the suspicion and insecurity of the Soviet leadership, represents a potential driving force towards the continual expansion of military capabilities. Similarly, Soviet policy in the Third World as a function of not only ideological considerations but of military capabilities and requirements, is potentially de-stabilizing not only with respect to the international system but also relative to the strategic nuclear balance.

Marxism-Leninism to an extent has served to condition such attitudes. Whether it continues to do so means little when considering that a cycle of hostility and distrust once initiated becomes self-perpetuating.

Within this context, the Soviet conceptions of war and peaceful coexistence are manifest in the military doctrine and Third World policy of the USSR, contributing to the strategic instability of the superpower relationship.

CHAPTER III

CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS

INTRODUCTION

The following chapter will focus upon the role of the Soviet military establishment in the formulation of strategic military doctrine.

The discussion will open with a brief overview of the Soviet dependence upon its military for the attainment of foreign policy objectives. The dependence of the Communist Party upon the military assumes importance in light of the structure of the Soviet political system.

The totalitarian nature of the Soviet political system, impels the Communist Party towards achieving complete control over all aspects of the system. Yet the party is dependent upon one of the instruments of its control, the military. The military requires a certain degree of independence for the maintenance of its efficiency. This paradox, as the following chapter will illustrate, affords the military a relatively higher degree of leverage within the Soviet policy process, especially in areas directly related to its sphere of activity:

The discussion will focus upon the role of the military as it evolved out of the strategic debates and Party-military conflicts during the term of Nikita Khrushchev. This is important in light of the repression and control exercised over the military by the Party during the Stalin era.

Within this context, the role of the military in the security management of the Soviet Union can be discussed, illustrating the contribution of the institution to a military doctrine that conflicts with strategic stability.

THE MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

The USSR is a superpower and exhibits a certain willingness to utilize its military status in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. In fact, its ability in achieving certain objectives rests on the military dimension and is consciously recognized as such by the Soviet leaders. The continued Soviet military buildup, aside from basic security requirements of the Soviet state, has reflected a conscious desire on the part of the Soviet leadership in tailoring military policy to political objectives.

The fifties witnessed the emergence of the USSR as a superpower with nuclear capability. The Soviet Union developed an intercontinental capability during this period but lagged far behind the United States. Desires and attempts to achieve strategic nuclear parity with the United States were complicated by the economic problems facing the Soviet Union, requiring added investment in favour of the domestic economy and the necessity of easing the labour shortage.

In 1960, Khrushchev proposed a far reaching reform of the Soviet military establishment which called for the reliance on nuclear rocket capability in deterring any would-be aggressor and a sharp reduction in the manpower and conventional aspects of the Soviet military.

Khrushchev and the military pressed for the rapid acceleration of the strategic nuclear forces in the attempt to achieve at minimum, parity with the United States.

Khrushchev, however, sought an alternative that would ease military spending while satisfying military and security interests of the state and the military. He decided upon placing intermediate range

missiles in Cuba "which in effect would have narrowed in one quick stroke the actual margin of the U.S. advantage in strategic forces for it would have had the effect of transforming readily available missiles of 1,100 to 2,200 mile range into intercontinental missiles."¹

However in the end, Khrushchev and the Soviet Union capitulated in face of the firm resolve of the United States and removed the missiles. The failure in Cuba strengthened his opponents in Moscow and the military and instead of stifling Chinese criticism, it intensified it. Soviet prestige and political leverage vis a vis the United States was severely undermined.

The failure in Cuba exposed not only Soviet strategic inferiority but its inability to carry out conventional military operations beyond its continental environment.

Khrushchev's successors not only continued his plans in developing strategic nuclear forces but also initiated "across the board investment, building up not only nuclear capability but conventional force capability so as to obtain maximum flexibility in foreign policy."²

"By the seventies, this policy was to pay-off when Soviet capability to project military power greatly enhanced its prestige and attractiveness among Third World clients and contributed to the globalization of its rivalry with the United States."³

The Soviet determination to redress its strategic inferiority relative to the United States was successful by the end of the sixties and brought with it impressive results with respect to its political status. The Soviet Union realized several immediate advantages through negotiations for the SALT agreements.

First of all it gained recognition of its status as a full-fledged and equal superpower partner of the United States.

Secondly, the Soviet policy promoting détente was greatly enhanced with the agreements. Not only did the Soviet Union succeed in slowing U.S. defense efforts, it enhanced Soviet diplomacy in Western Europe, culminating in the CSCE at Helsinki in 1975, and gaining recognition from the West of the territorial status quo in Europe and the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, long sought by the USSR. Détente also brought with it extensive economic credits and assistance -- especially in the areas of high technology -- for the Soviet Union.

However, optimism for détente faded quickly in light of the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, competition over Angola in 1975, in the Horn of Africa in 1977-78 and the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The West was relatively powerless in challenging Soviet objectives in the Third World beyond the usual diplomatic protests. A far cry from the Truman Doctrine and the policy of containment, Soviet military power inhibits any direct response or confrontation from the West with respect to peripheral areas of competition such as the Third World.

Within this context, we can discuss the conventional military dimension of Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet Union over the years has continued a steady and substantial buildup of its conventional force levels, with far reaching foreign policy implications.

The Soviet Union has been able to project its conventional force capability beyond the immediate confines of its continental environment, and with it, its range of options and objectives. "Initially designed to deter Western interference in Eastern Europe and to ensure internal

security and stability in the bloc, Soviet conventional forces by the seventies could, if required, assume an offensive role capable of over-running key sectors of NATO."⁴ In light of the nuclear stalemate, the Soviet conventional advantage affords it a certain degree of leverage in its diplomacy in Europe.

Apart from the influence the Soviet conventional forces have on its European diplomacy, its value in its Third World or national liberation policy is immense. "Military power is the arm of Soviet diplomacy that has made the USSR a real rival of the United States in the Third World with exception perhaps in Latin and South America",⁵ and is recognized as such. As Marshal Grechko, then Minister of Defense and Politburo member, stated in 1974,

At the present stage the historical function of the Soviet Armed Forces is not restricted to their function in defending our Motherland and the other socialist countries. In its foreign policy activity the Soviet state purposefully opposes the export of counter-revolution and the policy of oppression, supports the national liberation struggle and resolutely resists imperialists' aggression in whatever distant region of our planet it may appear.⁶

Soviet military power enhances its prestige among the Third World and its capability enables it to assist or intervene directly into the affairs of the Third World countries. "The development of long-range air transport capability, the construction of a blue-water fleet and a large versatile merchant marine and the availability of huge stockpiles of surplus weapons have provided the Kremlin with the military clout it needs for interventions in Africa, the Middle East and Vietnam."⁷

The Soviet military is an indispensable instrument of the Soviet overseas policy, enabling the Soviet Union to compete with and undermine U.S. efforts in the Third World.

THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM

The Soviet political system represents an enigma in contrast to the open, relatively democratic systems of the West in general. In the West, studies concerned with the decision processes, the interaction and influence of different elements and groups, have proliferated and have provided a relatively clear understanding in the workings and mechanisms involved in the functioning of the systems. The pluralist school emphasizes the politicization of special interest groups in Western societies and their impact on the policy process, be they within or outside of the bureaucratic structures and institution.

Within the Soviet Union it is difficult to gauge the impact of the various bureaucratic institutions with respect to their degree of influence on the policy process due to the secretive nature of the Soviet political system. Information originating from within the Soviet Union concerned with its own political system, in general emphasizes and reflects issues of political purpose and legitimization rather than analytical substance. However, the structural characteristics of the Soviet political system to an extent, determine the nature of the interactions of the various groups and institutions such that the analysis of the various power arrangements and subsequent policy direction is possible.

THE SOVIET UNION: TOTALITARIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM.

The Soviet Union represents a totalitarian political system. The structure of political power is legitimized ideologically, based on the fundamental tenets of the Marxist-Leninist theoretical framework. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) as the enlightened vanguard of the proletariat, claims the monopoly of political power based on the Leninist concept of democratic centralism. This is based on Lenin's idea that the proletariat is unable to achieve "class consciousness" and therefore, govern on its own.

Therefore the CPSU claims the right and the duty in guiding the masses in the progression and perfection of socialism. This means necessarily the right to direct all aspects of life of its citizens. Whether legitimate or not, the control and maintenance of power within the Soviet system requires the hegemony over all aspects of that system. The resistance to economic reform despite a declining economic performance, on the part of the CPSU, necessitating a decentralization of control and authority, reflects the reluctance of the political leaders in giving up or sharing power. This however presents a paradox; a certain incompatibility between the sole holder of power in the state and one of the main instruments of that power.

This is essentially the argument put forward by Roman Kolkowicz. He asserts that the tendencies towards autonomy and professionalism inherent in the military in general, conflict with Party objectives towards full integration of the military within the parameters of the totalitarian system and therefore within its control.

The Party's pervasive endeavour to hold on to its monopoly of power is related to its expectation of challenge from organized groups within society. This wariness, moreover, is closely tied to the constant unease that afflicts political authorities in totalitarian states because of the absence of provisions for the orderly transfer of power when changes in leadership become necessary, and the consequent opportunity for rival groups to assert themselves. In this context the military appears to the Party as a potential challenger, who must be controlled and manipulated at all times to prevent any power seeking elements from threatening the Party's monopoly.... In dealing with it, the Party must balance the usefulness of any coercive measures against the possibility of demoralizing and weakening the country's military forces.

In essence, the Party must reconcile its need for an effective military organization, which necessarily implies relatively broad professional autonomy, with the constant concern for the erosion of its position with respect to the military and the rest of society.

The precarious balance characterizing the Party-Military relationship is a relatively unique feature of the Soviet system. The CPSU requires control of the military, yet it remains dependent upon the military in foreign policy.

On the one hand, they pursue an ambitious foreign policy, predicated to a large extent on the continued viability of a powerful military capability, and invest a substantial share of their GNP and large numbers of scarce scientific and technical personnel in the development and maintenance of this military juggernaut.... This establishment is in the anomalous position of being a central factor in the survival of the régime and in its ambitious expansionist policies ... and being (on the other hand), denied not only any role in the political sphere but also the freedom to practice the military profession without political impediments.

This anomaly derives from the absence of regularized procedures for the succession of political power and from the party's insistence on its hegemony, two factors which,

... lead to an unstable equilibrium between the power of the party and that of the major institutions within the state. In such a delicately balanced system of power-relationships, any major challenge to the balancer, the Party, is a threat to the equilibrium, to the status quo. Thus acts by the military representatives, considered of little consequence in Western democracies take on political significance in authoritarian societies because they could ... change that vital internal balance.

Interests and features of the Soviet military achieve their role and position in the balance due to the nature of the Soviet system.

MILITARY INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES

Among the difficulties involved in the analysis of the role of the military in the Soviet Union, is recognizing and defining the military's separate institutional identity: its interests, policies and objectives. "The CPSU denies the military such a distinct identity, constantly reinforcing the image of the military as a fully integrated part of the system."¹¹

However, such a situation appears unlikely assuming the large power base at the disposal of the military. Not to deny the subordination of the military establishment to the Party, but that the military is able to assert a certain influence on policy decisions.

"One can distinguish the military establishment from other institutions in that it possesses vast means of physical power and coercion. Secondly, the military tends to be a closed group and as such breeds elitist values; sharing the experiences and the schooling common to their career, its members are cliqueish with a strong sense of solidarity."¹² Regardless of its social-political environment, the military in general exhibit characteristics of high professionalization and demands for professional autonomy.

These institutional propensities or tendencies of the military clash with the Party's ideal image of an open institution, easy to penetrate

and manipulate, according to Kolkowicz. However, the Party is unable to alter these characteristics without undermining military effectiveness it is so dependent upon.

The Soviet military is accorded certain leverage with respect to its relationship with the Party, especially in light of the growing technological proliferation with respect to the instruments of war, requiring expertise and specialization within the military.

The growing complexity and proliferation of military equipment and weapons, and the greater need for military professionals able to attend them, have set new boundaries to the Party's rule over the military, for they have heightened its dependence on the experts, forcing it to treat them with circumspection.

While this technological dependence can describe the civilian-military relationship in the United States, the checks and balances characteristic of the American political system preclude the potential hegemony of the military in the formulation of policy. Within the context of the Soviet political system, political dependence upon the military extends beyond professional aspects.

The Soviet political system is not designed for political change. Therefore, the stability of the Soviet system is dependent on the military institution to a large extent. Finally, Soviet foreign policy and international prestige are based on its military power. Within this context, the role of the Soviet military is expanded in the system.

The inherent instability of power arrangements in the Soviet state has forced contenders for power to seek alliances with major social groupings (the government bureaucracies, the Party professionals, the military, the terror machine among others) either to protect a monopoly of power or to ensure against the possibility of a show-down in a future crises ... when the Party's hold is weakened -- by interline power struggles, succession crises or external military threats -- the groups that have formerly been kept submissive and politically impotent tend to gain in stature and influence.

The military, being well-integrated with a cohesive structure and powerful weapons and logistic facilities, is in an excellent position

to exploit those elements of division and weakness in the Party and to fill the partial void of authority that they created.

Following the death of Stalin, the military emerged with a greater voice in policy, from which evolved the current Soviet military doctrine and to a large extent defined the current role and relationship of the Soviet military in Soviet politics. The debates concerning the direction of Soviet military doctrine and policy to a large extent, reflected the growing influence of the military during this period as it sought to have its voice heard in the political circles.

MALENKOV AND KHRUSHCHEV

As long as he was alive, Stalin's rule of terror kept the military and other groups in a state of insecurity and political impotence. After his death, the Soviet political system became factionalized as several men with diverse power bases entered into a precarious unstable coalition. Freed from Stalin's terror and with the discrediting of the security apparatus following his death, the military was in a position to assert more decisively its role, as intra-party struggles for power became manifest behind Khrushchev and Malenkov.

The policies and issues which caused conflict between the military and Malenkov and between Malenkov and Khrushchev are central for the understanding of the military's institutional interests and the nature of the recurrent dissensions between civilian political decision makers and the military.

Such conflicts reflect the political dilemma of decision makers who must balance the various institutional interests in such a way that

"internal, external and ideological interests are reconciled",¹⁵ with respect to the allocation of resources and social functions.

In general, the institutional interests and objectives of the Soviet military are determined by its social function. That is, to safeguard the country during times of external aggression. Therefore, during times of war or international tension, the social function of the military rises to prominence in consideration. In consideration of its own immediate institutional needs and requirements, the military must continually impress upon the political decision makers the necessity for the maintenance of a large and efficient military organization; that is, the continual securing of its prominent social role, even to the extent of the subordination of other social and economic objectives.

This essentially characterized the military-Malenkov conflict between 1953 and 1955.

"The years following the death of Stalin, saw a halt in the momentum of Cold-War- and Korean-War-inspired military growth of the Soviet Union."¹⁶

"Troop reductions initiated by the demobilization of 640,000 men in 1955 were foreshadowed by military budget cuts of 2 percent in 1953 and 8.9 percent in 1954."¹⁷

These budget reductions in military allocations were initiated by Malenkov's greater emphasis upon domestic economic issues concerning the Soviet Union. "They were based upon budget re-allocation in favour of consumer goods priority and on his efforts to ease international tensions."¹⁸ Malenkov planned a change in Soviet economic planning and allocation, a change necessitating a shift from heavy to light industry.

...our main task -- ensuring further improvement in the material well-being of the workers, collective farmers ... all the Soviet people.... Today on the progress we have made on the development of heavy industry, we have all of the necessary conditions for bringing about a sharp rise in the production of consumer goods.... The Government and the Central Committee of the Party consider it necessary to increase significantly the investment of resources ... in the direction of a significant increase in the program for the production of consumer goods.

This was based on Malenkov's assessment of the international situation, as one of less tension and therefore permitting the scaling down of military spending in favour of budget re-allocation towards areas of the domestic economy. When introducing this program, Malenkov exhibited a position reflecting a more confident and more secure Soviet Union.

The international situation at present is characterized first and foremost by the great successes achieved by the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China ... in the struggle to ease international tension, strengthen peace and prevent war.²⁰

Malenkov believed that the Soviet Union had achieved a satisfactory level of security and should concentrate on issues of domestic concern. This was also reflected in his conception of the futility of war in the nuclear age in that a thermonuclear war would result in a "new world slaughter and would mean the destruction of world civilization."²¹ "By stressing the deterrent power of nuclear weapons in a world aiming at détente, Malenkov was denying the *raison d'être* of huge conventional arms and the need for large military budgets."²² The statement undermined the views and the interests of the military.

The military retorted, in published articles of its own, on the continued necessity of investment in heavy industry and the view that the nuclear deterrent itself was an insufficient guarantee for the maintenance of peace and Soviet security.

Heavy industry is the foundation of our socialist economy. Without heavy industry it is not possible to ensure the further growth of light industry and the productive forces of agriculture, and the furthering of the defense capabilities of the Soviet State.²³

Dissatisfaction within the Party ranks concerning Malenkov's perspective arose by 1954, with views, led by Khrushchev, echoing the sentiments of the Soviet military. Khrushchev stressed the necessity of heavy industry for both the domestic economy and military requirements.

Only on the further development of heavy industry will we be able to successfully promote all branches of the national economy, raise the well being of the people and ensure the inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet Union....²⁴

Heavy industry however, does not facilitate the development of consumer oriented industry once it has been developed. Thus Khrushchev, in advocating the military position, utilized the military to consolidate his own power base politically.

This was complemented by the view held by the Minister of Defense, rejecting Malenkov's view concerning the reliability of mutual deterrence, when in fact "it is incorrect to assert in as much as both East and West possess hydrogen weapons, the possibility of a thermonuclear war is automatically excluded."²⁵

Thus by 1955, Malenkov's base of support within the Party was eroding as Khrushchev's faction began openly criticizing his views in concert with the military. The military continued to take a hardline and to "advocate a policy less geared to détente". "The fate of Malenkov was thus sealed since his sole remaining source of support was the bureaucracy, against a united opposition representing the Party machinery and the military."²⁶

Malenkov's position asserted the noninevitability of war. It represented a revision of the traditional Soviet view with respect to war with the capitalist states. It provided Khrushchev the opportunity to exploit Malenkov's revisionist argument in so pervasively doctrinaire a political system. In that it also entailed the reduction of allocations to the military, Khrushchev gained a significant bureaucratic ally.

Whether the military-Khrushchev faction represented a conscious united opposition to the elements and issues representing Malenkov, can be debated. What is apparent that "for the first time there emerged what appeared as purely military demands. Articles campaigning for the continued predominance of heavy industry, for continued international vigilance and for greater attention to be paid to military preparedness prerogatives."²⁷ What is important is that the greater confidence exhibited by the military in airing its views was manifest also in evident opposition within the Party, to the Malenkov position. "The more open military opposition to the prevailing line received its main raison d'etre from explicit opposition within the party."²⁸

Thus the ascendancy of Khrushchev in early 1955 represented a victory for the military. Khrushchev, with a strong base of power outside the Party, represented by the military, was able to seize complete power within it. Whether he was able to gain full support within the Party is unclear, presumably in light of the fact that Malenkov commanded a relatively broad base of support in the Party which would not dissipate immediately. In any event, Khrushchev moved quickly to strengthen his position within the Party.

MILITARY INDEPENDENCE

This section will deal briefly with the period when Marshal Zhukov was the Minister of Defense, a time when the military sought and achieved a relative degree of professional autonomy from Party controls. The military pursued efforts to increase the role of the professional in the military in the formulation of strategy and theory. "Military doctrine was previously formulated by Stalin, forcing the military to work within the constraints and parameters of the Stalinist view which was accompanied by the reintroduction of extensive political involvement into the command procedures and duties of the military."²⁹

Of issue was the Stalinist assertion of the predominance of the permanently operating factors involved in modern warfare, in determining the outcome of war. In light of the superiority of socialism as a social system, such transitory factors as surprise attack were therefore relegated marginal importance and not decisive in war. Such a view necessarily constrained practical efforts on the part of the military to defend against surprise attack. Especially in view of the effects of nuclear warfare and the prospects for long range delivery systems making the initial period of a nuclear war a decisive element. Soviet military planners, acquainted with the destructive power of nuclear weaponry obviously found it difficult to reconcile such potential with Stalinist doctrine.

Having allied itself with the victorious Khrushchev group, the military utilized the efforts of Khrushchev towards de-Stalinization, in asserting its demands with respect to its own professional efficiency and autonomy concerning the issues of military theory and doctrine.

The Stalinist military science or doctrine was almost immediately rejected and discredited. The Stalinist doctrine was essentially dogmatic, restricting the formulation of military strategy, reflecting political considerations, and therefore inapplicable to the new generation of weapons and warfare. The Soviet military recognized it as such.

During these years, major changes took place in the organization of the Soviet army and in the weapons and the combat equipment assigned to it.... The development of Soviet military theory during this time was influenced negatively by the cult of personality....³⁰ Historical truth on the war was twisted to Stalin's advantage....

Thus the debate concerning the issue of surprise attack was short and conclusive. The decisiveness of surprise attack in the nuclear age was clearly established. Marshal Rotmistrov concluded that,

...surprise attack in a nuclear war could cause the rapid collapse of a government whose capacity to resist is low as a consequence of radical faults in its social and economic structure ... history has shown that skillful employment of surprise brings true success not only in battles but also in war.³¹

The logical corollary was then to avoid and protect against surprise with a defensive and preemptive posture.

"The issue of surprise attack was clearly resolved. It could decide the outcome of war in the nuclear age. The military were now free to seek 'real' world solutions to the problem."³²

"Having gained in institutional confidence and strength, the military began to address itself to some sensitive problems hoping to reverse the patronizing attitude toward the military characteristic of the Stalin period and to emancipate itself from the confining embrace of the Party."³³ One area concerned the formulation of strategic doctrine. The other concerned the political control system used by the Party to monitor the military. While independence from Party control was never demanded explicitly, subtle intimations in that direction were suggested

in articles demanding the highest possible degree of professional autonomy.

"Under the firm and confident direction of Marshal Zhukov, the military apparatus entered a new era in the Soviet state: old ideological-political shackles were found to be outmoded and abandoned; the traditional deference to the Party gave way to professional pride and greater independence."³⁴

Between 1955 and 1957, the military found itself relatively free of Party domination.

However, one must qualify the growing independence of the military. The Party itself,

was suffering from internal power struggles during this period. The 'traditional persuaders', the security organs, had been reduced in role and authority, (Beria's liquidation) leaving the military as the only massive means of coercion; and the Soviet Union was involved in a deadly political-military game with the West, forcing the Party to deal cautiously with the military, since an open rift could have had a disastrous effect on the Soviet Union's international standing, psychologically bolstering the case of the military.

In 1957, Khrushchev was again challenged for the leadership by Malenkov. Despite Malenkov's reduced power base since he "resigned" the Premiership in 1955, he managed to gather support within the Politburo for the ouster of Khrushchev. Khrushchev was once again compelled to utilize his military support to secure his position. He convened a meeting of the Central Committee and emerged victorious following the vote. However, it was the aid of Zhukov and the use of military aircraft to fly in the members in support of Khrushchev that secured his position.

In October of 1957, Zhukov was removed from his position of Minister of Defense because of his growing power and independence with respect to the control of the military. This development did not

precipitate a revocation of the professional autonomy that had been delegated to the military but rather was a "reassertion of the bounds to the military professional autonomy and it was a reflection on the inadmissability of Zhukov's Napoleonic aura."³⁶

More than that however, it reflected a more confident Nikita Khrushchev having consolidated his position within the Party. By 1956, Khrushchev was initiating a new foreign policy direction, reminiscent of Malenkov's, that ultimately would have its effects upon the military.

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND THE NON-INEVITABILITY OF WAR

In his discussion of foreign policy, Khrushchev introduced several doctrinal shifts affecting the Soviet approach to international affairs. First, while affirming the Leninist contention of the irreconcilability of capitalism and socialism, he stated that war between the two systems is not "fatalistically" inevitable. His view was obviously tempered by the recognition of the destructive potential in the nuclear age, leading him to discuss social system competition in social, economic, and political terms. It also reflected his concern for the domestic economic situation facing the Soviet Union and the need for greater investment into areas of consumer production. Thus the attempts towards the easing of international tension and therefore of military requirements of the Soviet state complemented Khrushchev's view in the need for the budgetary re-allocation from the military towards domestic concerns.

When we say that the socialist system will win in the competition between the two systems -- the capitalist and the socialist -- this by no means signifies that its victory will be achieved through armed interference by the socialist countries.... Our certainty of victory is based on the fact that the socialist mode of production

possesses decisive advantages of the capitalist mode of production.... Building communism in our country, we are resolutely against war.... Indeed there are only two ways; either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history.... War is not fatalistically inevitable. Today there are mighty social and political forces possessing formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war....

The repercussions were not immediate with respect to the military, but the emphasis of Khrushchev's new foreign policy direction was to lay the groundwork for future military-Party conflict.

In outlining the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union in 1960, Khrushchev discussed in more specific terms, his foreign policy approach formulated in 1956. Of importance were those parts of his speech that dealt with the problems of defense as they related to economic policy.

Khrushchev discussed the need to divert resources and investment towards the economic sectors. His ambitious economic plans required a great deal of investment, necessitating re-allocation from other sectors, i.e. defense. Secondly, greater budget allocation to the domestic economy was a method of staving off economic reform of the system, necessarily requiring decentralization and therefore erosion of the Party's power. This was possible and justified by Khrushchev in his contention that large conventional forces were redundant in the maintenance of security and that reduction in these forces would bring about huge savings which could thus be directed towards other sectors of the economy.

Our state has at its disposal powerful rocket equipment. The military air force and navy have lost their previous importance in view of the modern development of military equipment.... The armed forces have been to a considerable extent transferred to rocket and nuclear arms.... In our time the defense potential of the country is determined, not by the number of our soldiers under arms ... but by the total firepower and the means of delivery available ... the reduction of the Soviet armed forces will

save approximately 16 to 17 billion rubles per year.... This is a large additional amount for the fulfilment and overfulfilment of our economic plans.³⁸

Khrushchev's view was reminiscent of the American strategy of massive retaliation, formulated during the fifties and similar to the direction of Malenkov's policy in 1955. The revision in Soviet strategic doctrine oriented towards the deterrent value of nuclear weapons at the expense of a large conventional force, was the substance of the military opposition to the previous policies of Malenkov. It was consistent with Khrushchev's previous contention of the non-inevitability of war and the importance of economic competition and peaceful coexistence with the West since "the trend was towards a reduction of tension in international relations."³⁹

Khrushchev's announcement of the cut in the armed forces, the apparent change in Soviet strategic doctrine, and the reduced role of many of the conventional forces, "had a shocking impact on the military and hastened the deterioration of its relations with the Party leadership."⁴⁰ The Cuban missile crisis only strengthened the hand of the military as it exposed the Soviet weakness in extending its conventional military capability beyond its continental environment.

Khrushchev succeeded in alienating the military in favour of his ambitious economic objectives. By 1964, he had succeeded also in alienating the rest of the Politburo, due to the failure of his economic policies and was subsequently removed by the group led by L. Brezhnev. At this time, confronted with opposition within the Party, Khrushchev was unable to reach outside of the Party for support. In fact, "spreading opposition within the larger military community to the

new policies pursued by Khrushchev accelerated, if it did not actually bring about the latter's ouster in 1964."⁴¹

According to C.G. Jacobsen, "it was Khrushchev's reluctance to define and respect sufficiently a precisely delineated sphere of military professional autonomy which occasioned the obvious difference in Party-Military relations prior to and following his ousting."⁴² As Khrushchev stated,

The Party Program emphasizes that single command is a highly important structural principle of the Soviet Armed Forces.... At the same time we must always remember that Party leadership and a greater role and influence for the Party organizations in large and small units is the basic foundation of our military structure.⁴³

Khrushchev alienated the military, especially following the events in Cuba exposing the weakness in his deterrent stance that prompted the military in shifting its allegiance behind Brezhnev. Again it is impossible to illustrate a conscious alliance between the Brezhnev group and the military. However, Brezhnev appeared as one "more tolerant of a consistent sphere of military professional autonomy,"⁴⁴ and therefore less liable to confuse the respective parameters of military and Party roles. Therefore, although Brezhnev and his accomplices were motivated primarily by the failure of Khrushchev's domestic policies, they appeared quite sensitive to the demands of the military:

...it seems likely that a bargain was struck in 1964 between the military and the Brezhnev faction which has permitted among other things, across the board Soviet military growth ever since. It appears to have established both an unprecedented degree of independence for the military in the management of its own affairs and a significantly more prominent voice in shaping foreign policy.⁴⁵

The Soviet military buildup of the Brezhnev period appears natural and consistent. It allowed the Soviet military the opportunity to formulate "military" solutions to the questions of security in the nuclear age.

Thus Soviet strategic nuclear doctrine was free to develop almost totally from a military perspective, in sharp contrast to American nuclear doctrine. (To be discussed below.)

Following the Khrushchev ouster, the Soviet military immediately reasserted a strategic doctrine emphasizing the possibility of victory in nuclear war and the "warfighting" utility of nuclear weapons. The Soviet strategic nuclear policy, initially advocated by Malenkov and eventually by Khrushchev, stressing deterrence rather than "warfighting" was considered inadequate for the security interests of the USSR. Support within the Soviet military for the Khrushchev view was quickly stifled by the hardliners.

For example, General N. Talensky rejected the prevalent view in the Soviet military that nuclear war could serve as an instrument of politics because it presupposed that nuclear war could be fought and won by the Soviet Union.

In our days, there is no more dangerous illusion than the idea that thermonuclear war can still serve as an instrument of politics, that it is possible to achieve political aims by using nuclear weapons and at the same time survive, that it is possible to find acceptable forms of nuclear war.⁴⁶

In direct reference to the article by Talensky, Colonel Y. Ribkin attacked the views mentioned above. He discussed elements beyond the military-technical aspects of nuclear war, including the social and political superiority of communism as a social-system.

The a priori rejection of the possibility of victory is bad because it leads to moral disarmament, to disbelief in victory, to fatalism and passivity.... The Soviet people are sure of their victory over the forces of reaction. This sureness is based on the real power of our government and of all of the socialist system, with prepossessing economic, moral and military-technical opportunities for the rapid, utter defeat of the aggressors.⁴⁷

Similarly as stated by Colonel I.A. Grudinin,

Such an assertion is not only in error, but it is harmful because it can shake one's assurance of our victory over the aggressor, and the consciousness of the necessity to be ready at any moment for armed struggle with the use of the nuclear rocket weapon.... Without question world nuclear war will lead to great destructive consequences.... However, no matter what the consequences of a given war, this in no way changes the position that war would be a continuation of the policies of the government and the classes taking part in it by forceful means.

Such views reflected the institutional biases of the Soviet military in that they implicitly advocated increased defense investment. In that Ribkin and Grudinin were ranking members of the MPA, they necessarily reflected the views of the civilian leadership.

While it can be argued that such views merely reflect an exercise in propaganda designed to maintain troop morale and legitimize ideological tenets, the subsequent Soviet military buildup and force design in the years following suggest that such objectives extend beyond mere polemics. Soviet military policy over the years has reflected the attempt to achieve capabilities consistent with objectives outlined in their military theory.

The Brezhnev period was characterized by relative political stability, and the development of a rough nuclear parity and conventional superiority with respect to the military capability of the United States. Whether this implies a high degree of deference and acquiescence to Soviet military institutional demands and therefore military support is undeterminable. What is apparent was the relative harmonious nature of the military-Party relationship during the Brezhnev tenure, implying a working relationship between the two institutions, satisfying both.

STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE MILITARY-PARTY RELATIONSHIP

The Party-military decision structure reflects an interdependence, exhibiting a rather high degree of deference on the part of the Party with respect to interests of the military. As mentioned, for the political leadership, the essential consideration has always been the maintenance of political control; for the military, autonomy was required in order to perform its professional duties effectively. "The character of Soviet military policy has always been a function to some extent of this accommodation worked out between the political and military leaderships regarding their respective spheres of authority and competence."⁴⁹

At the top of the decision making organization is the Politburo of the Central Committee, a body of fifteen party leaders who share full formal authority for running the Soviet Union in the name of the Communist Party.⁵⁰ In 1973 Marshal Grechko (then Defense Minister) became a full Politburo member, the first since the ouster of Zhukov in 1957, and his successor Marshal Ustinov is a Politburo member.⁵¹

A subgroup of the Politburo, the Defense Council, determines military policy and commands the armed forces. "It is the highest authority on Soviet military doctrine and its responsibilities include most military policy decisions; such as, the size of the armed forces, the development and deployment of weapon systems, and the determination of the defense budget. Its permanent members, after Andropov's death in 1984, include, Party Secretary C. Chernenko, Prime Minister N.A. Tikhonov, Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov, Chief of the General Staff N.V. Ogarkov and the Chairman of the State Planning Commission N.K.

Baibakov."⁵² However, the operational implementation of military policy is the responsibility of the General Staff. (To be discussed below.)

The military is well represented in the central decision making group of the Soviet Union. The ultimate decision making authority concerning all aspects of Soviet domestic and foreign policy emanates from the Politburo. The membership of a military representative is indicative of the influential role of the military with respect to its own affairs.

Of the nine defense related ministries, the most important and central is the Ministry of Defense, which runs the armed forces. The defense ministry includes the five services of the Soviet forces: "Strategic Rocket Troops, Ground Troops, Troops of National Air Defense Forces, Air Forces and Navy."⁵³

It appears that the Ministry of Defense in terms of organizational structure exhibits a similar pattern of organizational practice, adapted of course to the functions of the military, as other departments in the Soviet Union; hierarchal with power flowing from above.

"At the top level are the minister and his two or three chief deputy ministers, the latter designated on the basis of position not personal merit. Two positions carrying this ex-officio status are the chief of the General Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces. At the next level are the deputy ministers -- the commanders in chief of the main branches of the service branches and the chiefs of the main support branches. Next are the main collateral staffs of the Ministry, such as the General Staff and the Main Political-Administration, (Party control organ). Finally at the bottom level are the operating commands -- the commanding staffs of the military districts of the

country (of which there are fifteen), the air defense districts (two), the fleets (four) and Soviet forces abroad."⁵⁴

From top to bottom, the Defense Ministry is directed and manned by professional military officers. "Although the Soviet Ministry is like its American counterpart, both the steward of the government in military affairs and the representative of the military in the councils of government, it leans more to the latter of these two roles, in part because of the professional habits and institutional interests of those who man it."⁵⁵

In this organizational structure, the important group to be discussed with respect to the military's role in the decision making process is the General Staff. The role of the General Staff is wide in scope and highly centralized. The five Soviet military services are subordinate to the Ministry of Defense through the General Staff. Its functions are as follows,

The General Staff thoroughly analyses and evaluates military-political conditions which are taking shape, determines the trends of development of the means of waging war, the methods of their use, organizes the training of the Armed Forces, and carries out the necessary measures assuring their high degree of combat readiness.... The further development of military theory occupies an important place in the activity of the General Staff. It directs military scientific work, researches actual problems of Soviet Military science, introduces its achievements into the practice of operational and combat training of troops and staff.⁵⁶

What is apparent is the highly centralized role of the General Staff. "In the United States these tasks would encompass the work of the entire Department of Defense in the Pentagon, some of the work of the National Security Council and a number of activities of the departments of the army, navy and air force."⁵⁷

Although formally subordinate to the political decision making groups with respect to defense, the Council of Defense and the Main

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Military Council, its broad scope of activity and its accumulation of knowledge attribute to this organ of the Defense Ministry a high degree of leverage with respect to the policy process.

An example of the influence of the military is suggested by the selection of Marshal Grechko as Minister of Defense in 1967, a position vacated upon the death of Marshal Malinovski. Although the appointment was a natural one in many ways -- Grechko as Commander of the Warsaw Pact forces -- it was apparently made grudgingly by the political leadership under military pressure. The Politburo choice was Marshal Ustinov. What makes this example interesting is the fact that Grechko's selection was not made for two weeks following Malinovski's death, despite the fact it was expected considering his long illness. Before the decision, a full convocation of the entire command was called to meet with the political leadership. "In any event, whatever the nature of the exchanges that took place it was apparent that the leadership considered it expedient to consider the opinion of the military."⁵⁸

PARTY-MILITARY INTEGRATION

At all key levels of the Soviet political system, the Politburo, Central Committee, Party Secretariat and the Council of Ministers, the military is currently represented. However, military representation in the various institutions of state remains limited. Moreover, the military command has never seriously challenged the primary role of the political leadership with respect to the affairs of state. This is not to suggest

that conflicts, both personal and institutional, do not arise, but rather it suggests that whatever the nature of the interactions and competition that occur, they do so within limits established by the Party.

Secondly, within the Soviet political system there is no clear institutional distinction between the Party and the government such that the ministers of the various bureaucratic institutions are often voting members of the Politburo. Therefore, the Politburo exercises directly, control and authority over the government bureaucracies including the military. (The Minister of Defense is currently a voting member in the Politburo.)

In this sense, military influence and independence is limited with respect to the political leadership.

However, within the limits suggested above, the Soviet military has been able to satisfy most of its institutional "requirements" even at the expense of other sectors.

Relative to the other institutions of the Party and bureaucracy, currently represented in the Politburo, the Defense Ministry has at its disposal, a potential power base that is unequaled such that the Soviet leadership must be to an extent, responsive to the institutional interests of the military, especially during periods of succession and political instability.

Secondly, the growing complexity and sophistication of modern weaponry limit the degree of input by the civilian leadership with respect to the "internal affairs" of the military.

Finally, in that Soviet foreign policy is highly dependent upon a viable and efficient military organization, the institutional interests of the military are important factors which the political leadership must take into consideration.

Therefore, in that the Minister of Defense (a military officer) is a member of the political leadership and at the same time, representative of the military in government, the institutional interests of the Soviet military are represented and more directly enhanced within the Politburo itself.

The Soviet military represents a potential challenger to the primacy of the political leadership such that it must exercise effective control of the institution. However, the extent to which the civilian authorities are capable of effecting control is limited for reasons mentioned above. This is not to suggest, however, that civilian-military relations in the USSR are characterized by incessant conflict and competition. Rather, it suggests a relationship manifest through precisely delineated roles within the system such that conflict is managed within its limits. The CPSU maintains its primacy in its capacity to dictate policy on all major issues while permitting a relatively high degree of independence for the military in the management of its own affairs. The control mechanisms utilized by the civilian leadership illustrate this relationship.

The Main Political Administration (MPA) is the political control organ of the CPSU and is utilized to oversee the activities of the military. It is directly accountable to the Central Committee of the CPSU. "Its two major functions are to provide ideological guidance and instruction to the armed forces and to ensure the military's loyalty to the regime."⁵⁹ However, in contrast to the Stalinist period, the contemporary MPA is limited in its authority such that "it is unlikely to interfere directly in military decision making of an operational or expert character".⁶⁰

A second mechanism through which the CPSU exercises control is through military membership in the Communist Party and Komsomol or Young Communist League. An overwhelming majority of officers and enlisted personnel are members of one or both organizations. "The fact that virtually all Soviet officers above the rank of lieutenant are members or candidate members of the CPSU suggests the reality that membership in the CPSU is a requirement for career advancement in the services and an explicit recognition of the party's supremacy."⁶¹

However, beyond maintaining such institutional mechanisms, the civilian leadership realizes the importance of satisfying the material requirements of its armed forces as well as limiting its input into military decision making in areas of operation. "The Politburo's routine allocation of 12 to 14 percent of the country's GNP to defense purposes helps to ensure the political passivity of the armed forces and helps retain its confidence and goodwill."⁶²

SUMMARY

Since the early 1970's, the military has assumed a higher "profile" with respect to the Soviet policy process, beginning with the elevation of Marshal Grechko to the Politburo in 1973 and followed by Marshal Ustinov's membership. More recently it has been the Chief of the General Staff, N.V. Ogarkov who has publicly explained the Soviet position with respect to arms control negotiations and the shooting down of the Korean civilian airliner.

The "military approach" to foreign policy during this period is significant. As will be discussed in the following chapters, direct military intervention into Third World conflicts, the continued nuclear and conventional military buildup and modernization, and more recently, the sanction of the military regime in Poland suggest a greater willingness on the part of the Soviet leadership to apply military solutions to policy issues and objectives.

The relatively independent role of the military in the area of defense doctrine, complements the ideologically defined perceptions of insecurity and suspicion of the civilian leadership with respect to the international system. From the military perspective, the need for constant vigilance against foreign threats, is reinforced and legitimized ideologically.

Ideology and the influence and perspective of the Soviet military converge as important elements or forces which influence foreign policy objectives and alternatives. During periods of high international tension, these forces assume a more prominent role in Soviet policy in the Third World and the military doctrine of the USSR. Military institutional influence and Marxist-Leninist ideology have had a profound effect in defining policy alternatives in these areas. The following chapters will discuss Soviet policy in the Third World and Soviet military doctrine, illustrating their de-stabilizing influence upon the structure of deterrence.

CHAPTER IV

SOVIET POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD

INTRODUCTION

The Third World has long occupied a position within the ideological framework and formulations of the Soviet Union.

The essentials upon which Soviet strategy for the Third World are based, originate from Lenin's theory of imperialism. Lenin's thesis identified imperialism with monopoly capitalism. Capitalist countries impelled by the forces of their economic system and by nature of their political systems, expanded into the undeveloped world in order to offset the crises tendencies inherent in monopoly capitalism.

Lenin linked the struggle of the proletariat in the industrialized nations to the struggle for national self-determination of the oppressed peoples of the colonies. As natural allies, the two would work together toward the defeat of capitalism, the proletariat by weakening the imperialist power in its home territory and the colonial peoples by driving out the European rulers, thereby creating social and economic unrest in their home countries. Lenin established the basis upon which Soviet policy in the Third World could be fully and practically articulated. The potential vulnerability of the West with respect to its economic interests and the potential strategic and political utility of the undeveloped areas with respect to Soviet interests, were identified in Lenin's analysis.

However, the Leninist legacy of utilizing the Third World on behalf of Soviet strategic and security interests, was not fully and practically articulated until Nikita Khrushchev introduced fundamental and profound ideological revisions. From the themes of peaceful coexistence and the non-inevitability of war between capitalism and socialism, the Third

World achieved a prominent position with respect to the advancement of socialism. (To be discussed below.) However, before discussing Khrushchev's ideological revisions and their implications, the discussion will be concerned with the development and basis of Soviet Third World Policy prior to Khrushchev and therefore illustrate the importance and relevance of those revisions with respect to Soviet policy in the Third World.

Under Joseph Stalin, the Third World was recognized, although relatively little effort was extended in utilizing it as a potential environment for the extension of the Communist movement before World War Two. Support for indigenous national movements was offered, but limited to communist elements.

... it is necessary for the proletariat of the dominant nations to support the national liberation of the oppressed and dependent peoples.

This does not mean that the proletariat must support every national movement ... It means support must be given to such national movements that tend to weaken, to overthrow imperialism ... when national movements in certain oppressed countries come into conflict with the development of the proletarian movement ... support is out of the question....

Stalin set the tone for Soviet Third World policy that continued following the war. The emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower and the beginning disintegration of European overseas empires following the war afforded the Soviets the opportunity of using the Third World to enhance its international position. However, the Soviet Union was rather misguided initially in utilizing its opportunities. Although it permitted the indigenous communist parties to ally with national-bourgeois elements and directed them to acquire important positions in the new emerging governments and various local movements in order to

encourage anti-Western sentiment consistent with Moscow's, there was lacking a sound and consistent policy framework on the part of the Soviet Union.

Secondly, Stalin's attention focused firmly on the consolidation of communist power in eastern Europe and the emerging cold-war further inhibited Soviet Third World policy. All non-communist countries were considered hostile as the cold-war was thought of within the context of a global phenomena. Support was given only to communist movements in isolation and antagonism was directed towards indigenous national-bourgeois movements. Soviet underestimation of nationalist sentiment severely impeded and undermined pro-Moscow communist movements as they appeared in conflict to the nationalist movements in general.

However, despite these setbacks in Soviet national liberation policy under Stalin, the linking of the national liberation movement to the world communist movement and to the Soviet international position and interests, was established. The Third World had become ally to the ideological and strategic struggle against the west in Soviet doctrine.

... Marxism-Leninism calls on the oppressed people to struggle for their complete liberation, binding the national liberation movement of the oppressed peoples of the colonies and dependent countries with the revolutionary struggle of the proletariats.

Another ideological consideration of relevance to Soviet Third World Policy concerns the Bolshevik policy on national self-determination. Although it was originally propagated in reference to the Russian context in 1917, it serves as a useful instrument in justifying Soviet support of national liberation movements. Although, national self-determination was valued and was considered a right of all nations within a state, it is of secondary importance to the proletarian movement.

Otherwise, bourgeois elements, exploiting nationalist sentiment, would undermine the proletarian revolution and fragment it.

The question of the right of nations freely to secede must not be confused with question of whether it would be expedient for any given nation to secede at any given moment. The latter question must be settled quite independently by the Party of the proletariat in each particular case.... The Party of the Proletariat rejects what is known as national cultural autonomy ... which artificially divides the workers in one locality and in the same industrial enterprises in accordance with adherence to a particular national culture; in other words it strengthens ties between the workers and the bourgeois culture of individual nations whereas the aim of Social-Democracy is to strengthen the international culture of the proletariat of the world.

Lenin, in 1920, went on to more clearly define the question of national self determination outlined by the Bolshevik statement in 1917. It emerged at the time the Russians, soon after the Bolshevik revolution, were attempting to consolidate their own empire made up of a variety of nationalities. It also represents a clear case of doctrinal accommodation to national interests and the initial recognition of the Third World as a potential ally in the world revolutionary movement. As Lenin wrote,

Victorious socialism must achieve complete democracy and consequently, not only bring about the complete equality of nations, but also give effect to the right of oppressed nations to self-determination, i.e. the right to free political secession. Socialist Parties which fail to prove ... that they will free enslaved nations and establish relations with them on the basis of a free union - and free union is a lying phrase without right to secession - such parties would be committing treachery to socialism.

However, within the Russian context at this time, outright concession to the demands of self-determination would have substantially disintegrated the Russian empire. Lenin continues on to qualify more clearly the right to self-determination.

this demand is by no means identical with demand for secession, for partition, for the formation of small states. It is merely the logical expression of the struggle against national oppression in every form. The more closely the democratic system of state

approximates to complete freedom of secession, the rarer and weaker will the striving for secession be in practice.... Just as mankind can achieve the abolition of classes only by passing through the transition period of the dictatorship of the oppressed class, so mankind can achieve the inevitable merging of nations only by passing through the transition period of complete liberation of all the oppressed nations, i.e. their freedom to secede.

Russia having achieved the socialist pinnacle, the need for secession was no longer applicable. He goes on to say that the unity of the proletarian movements of different nations is essential, be they in oppressed or oppressing nations. Otherwise the bourgeoisie in either will attempt to exploit the concept of national self-determination for the purpose of inhibiting the ~~eventual~~ unity of all nations, occurring after socialist liberation. Similarly secession within a socialist federation like Soviet Russia, is merely the attempt by the bourgeoisie to undermine the proletarian unity, having priority over nationalism, already established.

Without such unity, it will be impossible to maintain an independent proletarian policy and class solidarity with the proletariat in the face of all the treachery and trickery of the bourgeoisie; for the bourgeoisie always convert slogan of national liberation into a means for deceiving the workers.

Essentially, each nation, including the colonial oppressed, has the right to secession under oppression. However, upon the emergence of socialism, oppression is eliminated as is the desire and necessity of secession. With socialism emerges class solidarity, subordinating nationalist sentiments. Secession and calls for national self-determination at this stage become instruments for the deception of the working class by the bourgeoisie in that nation. National self-determination, according to Lenin is only a transitory stage for the eventual unity of mankind.

Leninist doctrine on national self-determination served as the basis of the Brezhnev Doctrine in relation to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and similarly to support the struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism in the Third World. It appears highly flexible and therefore is easily adapted to Soviet national interests in defining each particular situation.

In concluding this section, it has been noted that the weighing of ideological considerations with those of the practical necessities of the state, is of importance within any political régime but are of a more crucial nature within the Soviet context due to the nature of its ideology. Although the first section touched only lightly on the complexity of Soviet ideological considerations concerning foreign policy, it is sufficient when pertaining, eventually during the course of the chapter, to the context of Soviet Third World policy.

NATIONAL LIBERATION POLICY

The newly independent states emerging in the late nineteen-fifties and early sixties provided the Soviet Union with promising opportunities in extending and exerting their influence in the Third World. The colonial experience of the new countries offered explanation for the impoverished existence facing most of the developing countries. Marxism-Leninism offered a new hope for rapid economic and social development in the Soviet example. The emerging nationalism within these countries was influential in propagating anti-colonial sentiment within the states, facilitating the environment for the severing of colonial and

neo-colonial ties. The international status of the Soviet Union was not tainted to the extent that the former European colonial powers and the United States were. There was little exposure to post-war Soviet policy in Eastern Europe for example. The Soviets could enter into the Third World context with a relatively unmarked reputation.

However, colonial ties were not so easily severed following independence. Economic and even administrative dependence upon the European countries was prevalent. The restructuring of the Third World economic system during the colonial period and the subsequent inclusion of the developing countries into the world capitalist system, left these states in many cases, wholly dependent upon their former colonial rulers. To risk economic chaos and upheaval by severing ties and re-structuring the economic system along Marxist-Leninist lines was a risk most were not willing to undertake immediately. Therefore the Stalinist Third World policy of supporting pro-Moscow communist régimes, severely limited prospects for Soviet initiatives in the Third World.

However, the perception of Soviet interests relative to the Third-World would change upon the emergence of Nikita Khrushchev as the leader in the Soviet Union.

A combination of strategic, political and ideological considerations gave impetus to Soviet policy in the Third World. "Ironically it was Washington's deterrent policy during the pre-missile age when U.S. nuclear superiority was paramount that facilitated the USSR's entry into and courtship of Third World countries."⁷ The Soviet leadership perceived the American defense and alliance strategy of ringing the Soviet Union with military and refuelling bases for purposes of enhancing the effectiveness of the Strategic Air Command as threatening its security.

Secondly, the American alliance system and widespread economic influence and exploitation was contrary to the emerging forces of nationalism and non-alignment in the Third World. The Soviet Union recognized the opportunities to utilize the Third World with respect to the indigenous movements seeking to discard the remnants of Western domination and establish an independent course of foreign affairs.

Furthermore, "it was in Soviet interests to eliminate or neutralize the U.S. military presence in the countries lying south of the USSR and to end the intelligence flights over the Soviet heartland."⁸

In the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev outlined what was to become a major shift in Soviet foreign policy as a whole and more specifically, Soviet Third-World policy. While consistent with overall Soviet strategy, Khrushchev's revision reflected an adaptation to changing circumstance of the time in redirecting Soviet policy. By 1956, the Soviet Union had ascended to the status of superpower. The inevitable clash of the socialist and capitalist camps, ending perhaps in the nuclear annihilation of both, was no longer considered feasible and consistent with Soviet interests. The altered balance of world power, makes it possible for the socialist camp, which he called the camp of peace, to extend the hope for peace. The peaceful co-existence of socialist and capitalist states was not only tolerated but encouraged. The socialist revolution could be continued, but through peaceful endeavours. The only inevitability that remained, was the triumph of socialism, but only through the recognition of the newly emerging nations, whether socialist or non-socialist, as included in the "correlation of socialist forces".

The steady strengthening of the forces of socialism, democracy and peace and the forces of national liberation movement, is of decisive

importance.... The forces of peace have been greatly augmented by the emergence of a group of peace loving states which have proclaimed non-participation in blocs as a principle of their foreign policy.... As a result a vast peace zone including both socialist and non-socialist countries has emerged in the world arena.... It is possible that more forms of transition to socialism will appear ... but the forms of socialism vary. It is not true that we regard violence and civil war as the only way to remake society.

In effect, Khrushchev's speech reflects again the linking of Soviet political theory and the practical interests of the state, allowing for doctrinal compromise without upsetting the ideological fundamentals of foreign policy. By identifying peace as an objective and characteristic of world socialism in common with the objectives of the new non-aligned states, all of the newly emerging countries, socialist and non-socialist, are incorporated into the world revolutionary movement (within Soviet interests). In opposition are the imperialistic and capitalist elements in the world representing the source of aggression.

The disintegration of the imperialist colonial system now taking place is a post-war development of history-making significance.... The winning of political freedom of the former colonies and semi-colonies is the first and most important prerequisite of their full independence.... These countries, although they do not belong to the socialist world system can draw on its achievements to build up a national economy. They need not go begging for up-to-date equipment of their former oppressors. They can get it in the socialist countries without assuming any political or military commitments.

In essence, the above represents a shift in Third World policy towards a more pragmatic approach. By establishing themselves within the context of friendly relations with the newly emerging states, the Soviets hoped to undermine the international capitalist system, and establish themselves in areas previously beyond their influence.

What is implicit in Khrushchev's speech was the realization that conditions in the Third World may not be adequate, in all instances, for social and economic development along the lines of the Soviet model. It

was recognized that it was not always in Soviet interests to initiate and encourage social revolution, but rather to pursue a policy in the Third World along the more conventional lines of international relations, but in quest of gaining influence. What was important at that stage and throughout the sixties was that Soviet policy appeared more concerned with establishing good relations initially in hopes of undermining links with the West and prelude a shift in the world power balance.

However, for the policy of national-liberation, Soviet national interests could not alone justify support and aid to the non-socialist and even anti-communist régimes of the new nations, despite the fact they are considered to reflect the interests of the world socialist movement. Ideological considerations again come to dominate policy. Indefinite Soviet support of sometimes anti-communist, capitalist régimes, with little or no prospect of economic and social re-structuring is controversial in itself, facilitating disunity within the world communist ranks as exemplified in the Sino-Soviet rift. Doctrinal accommodation relative to Soviet foreign policy interests was required to provide more ideological consistency to Soviet state interests in the Third World. Otherwise, Soviet Third World initiatives would appear to subordinate the world communist movement to Soviet interests rather than the professed unity and interdependence of the two.

Ideological accommodation to Soviet state interests was articulated within two related conceptual frameworks. First, the idea of non-capitalist development introduced in 1960 as an avenue for the transformation of a country from national liberation to socialism. Secondly, the introduction of a country typology, categorizing the newly independent countries relative to their stage of development and their position vis a vis the socialist and imperialist camp.

Non-capitalist development as a relatively new feature in Soviet doctrinal thought, was a realization of the fact that the conditions of many a new independent nations would not facilitate the immediate introduction of the Soviet-type socialism. It served as a link between national-liberation and socialism beyond the anti-imperial struggle. It provided the means of transition to socialism while avoiding capitalism.

Now that the balance of the world forces has changed in favour of socialism ... these countries have a real opportunity of advancing to socialism while bypassing the capitalist stage....

Non-capitalist development is a gradual revolutionary process of transition in a country from national liberation to socialism, through several intermediate stages. It begins with the general democratic stage which is secured in the struggle by the toiling masses and other democratic forces who have united in a national front. The basis of this front is the alliance of the working class with the peasants. In countries where there is no working class and countries lacking influential Marxist-Leninist parties, the path of non-capitalist development is possible under the leadership of revolutionary democrats. The course of social transformation, growth of the working class and consolidation of its parties create the objective conditions enabling the revolutionary democrats to assimilate scientific socialism.

Non-capitalist economic development, loosely defined to identify nationalization of industry or regulation of foreign investments within the developing country, can be undertaken in states with differing social and political systems, clearly distinct from the Soviet model, be they socialist oriented or not. Non-capitalist development also served, in the sixties, as the indicator of Soviet relations with the developing nations, ranging along a spectrum of friendliness to hostility towards the Soviet Union and its policy initiatives. The countries were typed or categorized.

... we can single out at least three groups of newly independent countries; those which reject capitalist development, proclaim the building of socialism as their goal and carry out profound social transformation of an anti-capitalist nature; those which develop

along capitalist lines and last but not least, the countries which occupy an intermediate position, so to speak.

The difference between these three groups mostly determine the content and range of relations between the USSR and the developing nations. In those countries which have chosen the policy of non-capitalist development ... the revolutionary-democratic governments stand at the helm.... On the international stage they follow the policy of uncommitment which is oriented towards friendship with the socialist countries.... In the countries which try to develop mainly in the capitalist way, power is held by the national bourgeoisie or by the landowners and feudal dynasties close to that bourgeoisie.... However in their domestic policy these states have recourse to methods uncharacteristic of capitalism.... The bourgeoisie displays cautiousness in international politics in its resistance to imperialist aggression and in its support for the liberation struggle ... they follow the peace-loving policy of uncommitment, including cooperation with the socialist states and the liberation movement....

The states of the remaining group are still tied to the imperialist powers.... They are almost completely oriented towards the Western capitalist states in their economic relations ... however experience has convinced the governments of some member-states of these blocs that the exclusive orientation toward the west is an error; they have concluded that one can achieve successes in national development only by widening the relations with the states of the socialist system. In other words the objective laws which determine the cooperation by the USSR with the majority of developing countries are also applicable to those whose ruling circles refrain from this cooperation.

In other words, the degree of Soviet friendliness was a function of the domestic and foreign policies of the underdeveloped countries. The potential for friendly relations are open to all of the nations, regardless of the extent of relations with the Soviet Union at the time. In essence the Soviet Union was following a policy motivated more by balance of power elements than ideological considerations. Objectives more concerned with the undermining of the Western economic and political relations to newly independent nations, and in realization of its own imperial considerations, with the spread of communism as a secondary concern. However, Soviet national interests had to be rationalized

within the context of doctrinal or ideological orthodoxy of scientific socialism or Marxist-Leninist tradition. The utilization of the conceptual adaptation of the Third-World environment to the principles of the Marxism-Leninism reflected the need for doctrinal accommodation to Soviet state interests. Therefore the concept of non-capitalist development as a path towards scientific socialism, and the typology of newly independent countries, all potentially within the parameters of this concept, serve to justify Soviet imperial motives or state interests as being consistent with the world revolutionary movement. Soviet penetration and support of non-socialist regimes, or national front movements dominated by bourgeois elements with little local communist input, was a means of establishing more conventional international relations with the new countries. The Soviets extended offers of economic cooperation between the socialist world and the Third World, including military assistance. The Soviets hoped to undermine Western influence and shift the balance of world power through relations with the new nations. Secondly, it was a method of encouraging the foreign policy of the Third-World countries into adoption of a more pro-Soviet line disguised as the front for peace through non-alignment and the battle against imperialism. This is exemplified by the policy of uncommitment, (nonalignment) preferred by the Soviets for the Third-World.

The independent foreign policy in the developing countries is often called the policy of uncommitment or the neutralist policy. However, neither of these terms discloses the essence of that policy completely. The term neutralism pictures this policy as though it were neutral in the struggle for peace, for the liquidation of colonialism and for national development. It fits the policy of countries which do not take part in war rather than the policy of countries which are consolidating their independence in the struggle of imperialist intrigues.... The term uncommitment is more exact in singling out one of the main features of the foreign policies of developing nations - their non-participation in military blocs and alliances - but it misses the other aspects, particularly

the struggle against colonialism and for independent economic development.... The policy of uncommitment can be defined as a policy directed towards the creation of those international conditions necessary for the strengthening of independence and the national economy.

The Soviets thus maintain that the developing countries should evaluate the international situation in terms of their own national interests, but these interests are best served in conjunction with the common interests of the world revolutionary movement.

It is the unity of action of all anti-imperialist forces that will ensure the ultimate triumph of peace, democracy, national independence.... Experience clearly shows that joint actions by these forces provide the optimum conditions for developing the building of a new society in the socialist countries, for new victories by the national-liberation movement, for strengthening the independence and ensuring social progress of young national states.

This reflected Soviet concern during the sixties, more with the international stance relative to Soviet interests, than with the domestic social and political developments of the new countries. Social and political transformation is of secondary concern, serving to enhance Soviet national interests without undermining the ideological fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism.

The Soviet recognition that even among the countries which had adopted the path of non-capitalist development, there remained lacking many elements required for the establishing of "scientific socialism." Soviet specialists at the time realized that scientific socialism may be impossible for some of the new countries. However, to ignore the opportunity to advance Soviet interests internationally would be ideologically inconsistent in terms of furthering the interests of the world revolutionary movement. Therefore the Soviets bridged ideologically the national liberation movement and scientific socialism through its inclusion in Soviet national interests, and thereby enhancing their position in the

global competition with the West without compromising ideological requisites. A more pragmatic method of enhancing Soviet global interests by courting many of the newly emerging states with different social, economic and political systems with the objective of establishing a presence in the Third World and undermine their links to the West. One such example is illustrated in Soviet-Egyptian relations during the sixties. Nasser went so far as to repress the communist movements within Egypt. However, Soviet support and relations were continued because Nasser maintained an anti-Western, anti-colonial position. Throughout the sixties, Soviet initiatives displayed opportunism in the Leninist tradition, and although they preferred more socialist oriented regimes, the door was closed to none.

Considering the closeness of the positions of the Soviet Union and the developing countries on a number of major international problems, the Soviet Government will maintain close contacts with these countries in the interests of peace and expanding the anti-imperialist front. The Soviet Union is ready to develop friendly relations with all African, Asian and Latin American states. At the same time, we do not conceal that our sympathies are first of all with the peoples who have chosen the path of non-capitalist development.

A further doctrinal recognition was in distinguishing between the stereotype of the conventional conservative, bourgeois dominated military regimes and the progressive military-political establishment in developing countries that could possibly lead towards social transition.

In tropical Africa the intelligensia, the state bureaucracy and the army are the only forces capable of providing the leadership in the vacuum created by the end of colonial rule. This role cannot be played by any social class, because distinct social classes do not exist there. The army takes over after the failure of the bureaucracy to govern the country.

The Soviet recognition of the military as a potentially progressive force in the Third-World, in essence reflected its approach to the entire Third-World. It was the recognition that within the Third-World, social

transformation need not be initiated by a movement representing the working class in the traditional Marxist philosophy due to the fact that in most cases it did not exist. Class distinction and/or Class consciousness had not developed sufficiently. What is important is that scientific socialism was considered within reach by a variety of social forces be they class based or not. The inevitability of communism was never compromised, only the methods and forces involved in its realization.

SOVIET POLICY IN ASIA AND AFRICA

The first Soviet success in Southern Asia was with India in February of 1955. The agreement to finance and construct a million ton steel plant for India meant for the Soviet Union "a link with the region's leading power and non-aligned country and a safeguard against India's membership in any anti-Soviet alliance; it offered a showcase for Soviet assistance; it brought the USSR respectability right at the takeoff of its courtship of African and Asian nations; and it served in sharp contrast to the military-minded Cold War oriented policy of the United States.¹⁸ The Soviet penetration of the zone of peace was off to a good start. Similar agreements with other non-aligned countries were concluded in the years that followed.

Relations between the two countries continued to improve as India, faced with major crises during the nineteen sixties and early seventies, could rely on Soviet support.

Initially under Khrushchev, the USSR sided with India in its dispute with U.S. supported Pakistan. It upheld India's policy of non-alignment and opposition to the American military presence in the area and to Western colonialism in Africa. The Soviet Union remained neutral (with respect to giving military assistance) in the Sino-Indian border dispute even as it erupted into war in October 1962. The Soviet Union in effect, "refused to choose between its communist ally and its extensively cultivated stake in Asia's premiere nonaligned nation."¹⁹

During the undeclared war that erupted between India and Pakistan in September of 1965, the Soviet Union was effective in gaining a cessation of hostilities. This was the first time that the USSR played the role of peacemaker in a Third World conflict. Its aims were to prevent China's involvement in the region and to improve relations with Pakistan as well as with India. "The Soviet Union's longer range goal in drawing closer to Pakistan and encouraging a gradual normalization of relations between India and Pakistan was to realize their dreams of a land route that would link Soviet Central Asia to India via Afghanistan and the Khyber Pass and enormously expand their economic penetration of the subcontinent. A more prominent Soviet role would thwart China and provide greater support for Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea."²⁰

In August of 1971, the Soviet Union and India signed a twenty-year treaty of friendship and cooperation which India wanted as a deterrent to possible Chinese intervention on behalf of Pakistan. Tension was building as Pakistan sought to suppress the separatist movement in East Pakistan and the refugees fled to India. In the ensuing war, the Soviet Union supported India with military supplies

and vetoed all resolutions in the U.N. Security Council calling for an immediate ceasefire, thus enabling India to complete its military campaign in East Pakistan and help create the independent nation of Bangladesh in its wake.

However, continual Soviet efforts to improve relations with India did not generate the degree of influence hoped for by the Soviet Union. Soviet efforts in establishing an alliance of collective security in the region and "desired" naval facilities and privileges at Vishakhapatnam have been met with little reciprocal intent on the part of India.²¹

Similarly, the Soviet Union has sought to establish a foothold in the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia.

In Africa, the Soviet Union initially sought to exploit the surge of anti-Western sentiment in the wave of African de-colonization and the potential Western vulnerability to this. The anticolonialism and radical nationalist outlook of leaders like Nkrumah of Ghana and Touré of Guinea drew the Soviets into Africa. A key objective was the normalization of diplomatic relations, which the Soviet Union eventually established with most countries of black Africa.

These relations were put in effect through economic and more importantly military programs. Arms helped widen and ease Soviet political access to Africa.

Realizing that no African proletariat, no well organized Communist parties, and no decisive class antagonisms existed, and that African states were heavily rural, often rent by tribal and ethnic feuds and as often dissatisfied with colonial territorial divisions, the Soviet Union has been ever ready over the years to exploit local rivalries, successionist impulses and national liberation movements seeking the end of European colonialism, and more latterly, of white supremacist regimes, by assuming a major role as supplier of weapons and advisors.²²

The USSR has usually been attracted toward those elites in Africa "who are particularly receptive to Soviet ideas and who are anti-Western not because of coldwar preferences, but for reasons relating to inter-African rivalries."²³

These efforts to influence the outcome of internal and regional struggles have been characterized by mixed results.

In Nigeria during the civil-war from 1967 to 1970, the Soviet Union improved relations for its support of the central government during the war. However, in 1979, the Nigerian government expelled Soviet military advisors. "Arms supplies have also assisted in establishing closer ties at various times with Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Benin, Upper Volta, Burundi and Uganda."²⁴ However such ties are not guaranteed in an environment of political instability as Soviet initiatives were often set back when friendly governments were overthrown as in Ghana and more recently in Uganda.

In Egypt and Somalia, both partners to Soviet treaties of friendship and cooperation and where the Soviet Union had made considerable progress in establishing a military presence, Soviet fortunes turned rather unexpectedly. Despite the heavy dependence of both countries on the Soviet Union, economic and military, the Soviet military presence was terminated. In Somalia, Soviet naval and air facilities and privileges at Berhera were revoked in light of Soviet support for Ethiopia during the deterioration of Somalian-Ethiopian relations in 1977. In 1976 in Egypt, President Sadat unilaterally abrogated the 1971 treaty of friendship and cancelled the Soviet naval facilities.

In essence, the Soviet courtship of the Third World until more recently has met with mixed and erratic results. Soviet prestige and influence has accumulated in certain areas, but has been characterized

by continual uncertainty. "Prestige is not tantamount to influence; nor can it necessarily be translated into secure military advantage"²⁵ as has been illustrated by some of the above examples.

Two purposes initially underlay the emerging recognition of the Third World for Soviet foreign and security policy: "to undermine the Western system of alliances and international economic order and to establish a political and economic presence in areas previously outside the realm of Soviet capabilities."²⁶ As one Soviet writer commented in 1961,

The imperialists ... are trying in every way to restrict the national sovereignty of the liberated countries, to keep them in economic dependence and to draw them into military pacts. In Pakistan, Thailand, Malaya, and the Philippines, the actual masters are the United States imperialists. In many other countries ... the imperialists have established military bases.... National democracy makes it possible for each country that has attained political independence ... to weaken the influence of and then break away from, the world capitalist economic system.... There is no doubt that the national democratic state provides the possibility, as the objectives and subjective prerequisites mature and depending on the struggles of the peoples of these countries, for a transition to a higher form of social structure. The achievement of a socialist system requires revolutionary change in one form or another.²⁷

This illustrated the sense of insecurity of the Soviet leadership with respect to the American system of alliances in the early nineteen sixties. It also suggests the perceived need to undermine that system through the re-structuring of the international system which at that time was dominated by American economic and military influence.

Khrushchev's effort to devise ideological typologies for categorizing developing countries with respect to their degree of pro-Soviet affinities, was not continued to the same extent by Brezhnev, yet the basic theme continued. The Third World or the national liberation policy of the Soviet Union has continued essentially along the same lines; to undermine military and economic links with the West and establish Soviet

presence in areas previously outside Soviet influence and capabilities. As it was, the theme of peaceful-coexistence launched Khrushchev's Third World policy, so it has continued with détente and despite undermining Soviet relations with the West in general and the United States in particular. It is the theme of peaceful coexistence that characterizes the Soviet perception of détente. The competitive side to peaceful coexistence remains in full force. Therefore it is not surprising that the Soviets have continued to manoeuvre for strategic advantage.

The belief in Lenin's Theory of Imperialism remains the basis for the understanding of the Soviet perceptions of Third World developments. The fundamentals of Leninist assumptions such as the vulnerability of Western capitalist countries from pressure and instability in developing areas, the competitive nature of relations among capitalist countries and universal urge of the national liberation movements for greater economic and political independence, remain, and afford the Soviet leadership the opportunity for the exploitation of these trends. These complement and illustrate the pervasive optimism that says that world trends favour the advance of socialism, as evident in Soviet explanations of Third World alignments, policies and developments.

... it (the Leninist view) may not be the entire truth behind Moscow's way of seeing or responding to reality, but it provides the Soviets with an outlook, a way organizing and weighing the importance of events and useful road map for traversing the changing international system.

It is not surprising that détente has not abated Soviet Third World "enthusiasm". The pervasive Soviet view of the United States as a status quo, reactionary power on the way down as the correlation of forces continue to shift in favour of socialism, encourages Soviet behaviour in this context. The concept of international stability runs

contrary to Leninist doctrine. Thus despite achieving strategic nuclear parity with the United States by the early seventies and achieving the security of the Soviet homeland, the Soviet Union continues vigorously in the international competition.

It is difficult to isolate the motive forces behind Soviet policy, be they ideological, structural or merely the reaction of a highly xenophobic, insecure society. In any case, the Soviets have continued and have broadened their objectives. By the late nineteen-sixties two other broad purposes emerged with respect to Soviet policy in the Third World: "to offset the Chinese challenge for leadership in the Communist world and Third World; (and more importantly) to acquire air and naval bases that would provision the USSR's blue water fleet, keep close tabs on the counteract U.S. forces operating in strategically important areas, protect clients threatened by their pro-Western rivals and enable Moscow to project military power more expeditiously into politically promising situations."²⁹

In essence the expansion of Soviet objectives correlates closely with the expansion of its military capabilities. Capabilities which now extend beyond the Eurasian land base from which the Soviet Union is able to more easily influence political variables in the Third World.

The nineteen seventies witnessed a more militant and confident approach to the Third World by the Soviet Union. The utilization of military power and influence is recognized as indispensable for Soviet objectives.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are cooperating with the national liberation movement in various ways, the major ones being political, economic and financial aid, and, finally military cooperation and support when the Afro-Asian nations need such assistance to achieve political independence or to defend it from imperialist encroachments.... The economic, political and military

might of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries is the principle roadblock in the way of the colonial policy of imperialism; in many instances it has forced the latter to refrain from aggression against the developing countries.³⁰

In essence, what is illustrated is a new theme, that in establishing economic, political and military links to the Third World, the Soviet Union has reached beyond merely undermining the "imperialist" interests to defending its own interests in the Third World. Soviet national liberation policy has assumed a new offensive most evident following détente in the nineteen seventies. As mentioned the Soviets consider the easing of international tensions, more specifically better relations with the United States as conducive to the national liberation movement. What is apparent however is that the Soviet Union appears less averse to direct intervention on behalf of particular indigenous movements and groups in power or seeking power. In regional conflicts where the power balances are fragile and unstable, direct intervention with Soviet forces, as in Afghanistan or by proxy with Cuban forces in Angola and Ethiopia, assume critical importance in determining the outcome. Secondly, the trend appears to be in the direction of assisting the communist Marxist-Leninist groups in achieving power. Not that Soviet support for the indigenous national bourgeois or socialist groups as initiated by Khrushchev is dissipating, but rather the Soviets appear to consider uncertain outcomes of such policy and the peaceful transition to a more pro-Soviet position as less desirable, when possessing the ability to directly influence such developments. American inaction serves to reinforce the attitude of the shift in the balance of world forces in favour of the world revolutionary movement.

Although the events leading to communist victories in the Third World were complex, involving a number of indigenous factors and cannot be attributed solely to Soviet manipulation, Soviet intervention was decisive in many instances.

Since 1975, a number of pro-Soviet communist parties have seized power or territory in Africa and Asia with armed force.

In the spring of 1975, after a North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam, North Vietnam's Communist Party took control of the South and its puppet, Pathet Lao, seized power in Laos. After a short civil war in Angola, Agostinho Neto's Marxist-Leninist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) defeated two other Angolan groups contending for power. In February 1977, in a "red terror" directed against other military leaders who had previously shared power with him after the fall of Haile Selassie in 1974, Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam and his group of communist officers seized power in Ethiopia. In April 1978, Nur Mohammad Taraki's People's Party launched a successful armed coup in Afghanistan against the military government of President Mohammad Daoud. In June 1978, in South Yemen, the communist group in a ruling coalition of leftists carried out a successful armed coup against President Salim Robaye Ali, the leader of the non-communist leftists and his army supporters. Finally in 1979, after a Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Hanoi replaced the pro-Chinese government of Pol Pot with a pro-Soviet régime³¹ and the Soviets intervened directly to install Babrak Karmal in Afghanistan.

Since these pro-Soviet communist parties have come to power, the Soviet Union has served notice it considers them all to be new allies and plans to assist them in consolidating power against internal and external enemies.

In the past few decades the sphere of application of proletarian internationalism, a major principle of Soviet foreign policy, has been vastly extended. This principle has grown into socialist internationalism in the Soviet Union's relations with socialist countries.* At the same time, proletarian internationalism is a cornerstone of the socialist community's policy as regards the newly free countries.³²

The extension of proletarian internationalism to the Third World countries represents a subtle shift in Soviet objectives suggesting a de-facto inclusion of some of these countries into the socialist community. It is proletarian internationalism that masks Soviet imperial policy and was used to justify the invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. It is defined as,

... the international solidarity and fraternal alliance of the working people of all countries.... The extent of proletarian internationalism is revealed by observing the relations between the main revolutionary forces which exist in the era of transition from capitalism to socialism ... the proletarian internationalism of the working people in foreign countries and their love for their own countries are inconceivable if these people do not support and defend the Soviet Union and the whole world system of socialism.³³

In each of the cases mentioned, the pro-Soviet régimes in power have yet to solidify their power base. In each case, the régimes are threatened by internal and/or external forces. Particularly after China's invasion, Vietnam will require continued security ties with the Soviet Union. In Angola, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) continues to receive support from South Africa and threatens the régime's stability. In Ethiopia, threats from Somali led insurgents into the Ogaden and secessionist forces in Eritrea remain despite the heavy influx of Soviet arms and advisors and Cuban troops. In Afghanistan, the deteriorating position of the régime and the armed forces which necessitated the invasion originally has not stabilized and they have yet to consolidate power outside of the main urban centres as an array of guerrilla groups continue to challenge the

legitimacy of the régime. The South Yemeni régime continues to represent a problem in the eyes of its anti-communist neighbours, North Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Oman. Also Libya has helped to de-stabilize the pro-Western régimes of Chad and the Sudan. (Correctly assessing Colonel Kadhafi's particular affinities is difficult at times yet his military dependence upon the Soviet Union for supplies and advisors and his anti-Western position makes it difficult to conceive of Libya as outside of Soviet influence.)

In any event, the implications are serious especially in the long term.

In sum, all of the new communist states will require Soviet and/or Cuban arms and protection against continuing threats to their own security which could last for some time. Over time there is the possibility that these régimes may become increasingly dependent upon the Russians.

"The Soviet Union has signed friendship treaties with Angola (October 1976), Ethiopia (November 1978), Vietnam (November 1978) and Afghanistan (December 1978)."³⁵

Despite the fact that the rapid succession of Third World developments cannot be attributed solely to Soviet manipulation, there is obviously a pattern to these developments.

As mentioned, Khrushchev's policy of supporting and encouraging indigenous communist movements in alliance with "national democrats or bourgeois" groups has proven not entirely successful. In many a situation the Soviets have lost their foothold. In Egypt, President Sadat ousted the Soviet presence as did Sudan's President Nimeiry in the nineteen seventies. Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown by a military coup. In other countries, the nationalist purge of communist groups continued. Even in the non-communist régimes such

as those of India and Iraq, where Soviet influence continued although limited for the most part, influence is not guaranteed. In general, the African and Asian régimes have not proven so weak or dependent as to become reliable surrogates of Soviet foreign policy objectives..

Having realized the often fruitless effort of cooperation with the "nationalist bourgeois" elements, the Soviet Union has apparently initiated a more militant, decisive and reliable strategy for the nineteen seventies and eighties. They continue to support non-communist elements but with the proliferation of more orthodox Marxist-Leninist groups in many parts of Africa and Asia, the new element in Soviet policy is to assist communist parties gain state power. "Then via friendship treaties, arms aid, and Soviet, Cuban or East Europeans advisors, the Soviets will help the local communists hold onto and consolidate power."³⁶

The Soviet Union is giving assistance to the Asian and African countries in consolidation of their independence and sovereignty and in their economic and cultural progress.... When recently independent Peoples Republic of Angola fell victim to imperialist invasion, the Soviet Union and Cuba came out squarely against foreign interference and³⁷ gave the Angolan people assistance in repelling the aggressors.

Implied are Soviet efforts, beyond merely establishing a degree of influence to initiating a new alliance system to complement Soviet objectives. For example,

The line of strengthening peace and international security, of expressing solidarity with the liberation struggles of peoples of all countries ... are inalienable elements of this policy....

Such a conclusion is thoroughly confirmed by the Soviet Union's relations with the Third World, relations which are growing ever deeper and more diversified. An important role played in this is played by the Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation concluded. ... The Soviet initiative aimed at creating a system of collective security in Asia is meeting with ever greater support.³⁸

Within this context the Soviets are determined to gain allies which reliably and faithfully follow the Soviet line in foreign policy where previously, in areas outside of its zone of influence in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union could not expect unconditional support of its foreign policy initiatives. The evidence of some Soviet success in implementing this strategy is illustrated in the events following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. With the exception of Romania and Yugoslavia, the entire socialist community was joined by Ethiopia, South Yemen, Angola, Afghanistan and Laos in extending formal recognition of the Vietnamese installed government. "Thus Moscow's new allies in Asia and Africa joined Moscow's faithful régimes in Eastern Europe, Mongolia and Cuba in a critical test of allegiance to the Soviet Union that most of the Third World and even communist Romania could not pass."³⁹

Another indication of the shift in Soviet Third World objectives concerns the nature and orientation of the political system and structure of the new régimes achieving power. The Soviet Union appears determined that once it gains a new ally and establishes a relationship of asymmetric interdependence, the régime remains in power. To accomplish this the Soviet Union is assisting some of the newer régimes in establishing a political system structured in the image of the Soviet model. That is in the model of "scientific socialism" where political power is monopolized by the communist party and power flows downward in the Leninist tradition. Once established, the régime with the aid of its Soviet designed security system is able to consolidate power as exemplified by the relative stability and continuity of the Soviet installed régimes of Eastern Europe. For example in Angola;

... the people of Angola are building a new life under MPLA leadership, based on socialist transformation. The Prime Minister spoke of the practical tasks facing the country and its leadership in increasing agricultural and industrial production, restructuring the economy of the country on the basis of state and cooperative property ... setting up the organs of people's power, strengthening the country's defense potential and raising the MPLA's role in the guidance of the people.

The Soviet side expressed great satisfaction in connection with the progress which the Angolan people have made toward the implementation of (these) goals....

Similarly in Mozambique where the Soviet Union maintains close relations,

... the revolutionary process in Mozambique in the spirit of people's democracy and on results of the Third FRELIMO Congress, which has decided to set up a vanguard party of the working class and its main ally, the peasantry to be guided by Marxism-Leninism.... the Party program adopted at the Third FRELIMO Congress which sets clear guidelines for the creation of the basis for the building of a socialist society.

(The Soviet Union) highly assessed the results of the Third FRELIMO Congress and stressed its importance both for Africa and internationally.... The two sides welcomed the development and strengthening of links between the CPSU and FRELIMO based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism and the ideals of peace, freedom and socialism.

The trend is evident also in the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDY) and in Ethiopia where the Commission to Organize the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE) is scheduling the establishment of a true Marxist-Leninist vanguard party in 1984.

This trend not only helps to legitimize the Soviet political system at home, it justifies Soviet policy objectives with respect to Asia and Africa and therefore justifies the expansion of this policy.

... the best guarantee of success for the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist struggle of the African front lies in their united action with the socialist countries and other progressive forces in the world. They consider that because they have to counter the united forces of international reaction, the alliance of revolutionary forces - the world system of socialism, the international working class movement and the fighters for national and social liberation - must be further consolidated.

Finally, the success of this policy facilitates its expansion such that,

... new promising prospects have now opened up for the liberation movements on the subcontinent (southern Africa) ... never before have there been such favourable political and material conditions to abolish racism and foreign rule.... In combination with the increasing solidarity of all the progressive forces, the major changes in world politics, the growing might of the socialist community and the successes of the national liberation movement are making it possible to crush the intrigues of international reaction.

Although these newer régimes are not all geographically close to the Soviet Union where the Soviets are able to exact conformism to its policy, the heavy economic and military reliance upon the Soviet Union should exert a degree of influence at least in the short term. In essence the Soviet Union is proceeding in hopes of gaining influence and once accomplished, stabilizing the political and military environment of the new régimes. The Soviet Union has returned to the method of supporting the armed seizure of power within the Third World by potentially more reliable allies and therefore assuring a higher degree of certainty with respect to long term foreign policy objectives.

The newer pro-Soviet régimes in Africa and Asia, imposed by force and supported as they are by Soviet power, pose serious threats to many of the regional powers friendly to the United States. For example, North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Oman are threatened by South Yemen. "The South Yemenis have let it be known that they intend to renew support for the Marxist-Leninist rebel movement of the Dhofar region of Oman. With Iran in the throes of its own internal problems it cannot be expected to maintain regional stability as it did prior to its revolutions."⁴⁴

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan combined with its traditional insecurity with respect to India, heightens the insecurity of the Pakistani régime. It is encircled by India and Afghanistan, both of which

maintain friendship treaties with the Soviet Union. This represents a potentially unstable situation especially within the context of relationship of Pakistan with China and the United States.

In Southeast Asia, the spread of Soviet power and Vietnamese influence has greatly alarmed China and all of the ASEAN powers, especially Thailand.

Similarly in Southern Africa and on the Horn of Africa, Angola and Ethiopia represent potentially destabilizing elements in the respective regions.

In sum, the forcible extension of pro-Soviet communism supported by Soviet power to several new areas of the world poses serious new strategic problems for a variety of régimes, many of which look to the United States for support. The implications are potentially serious.

The danger is not so much that Moscow will achieve hegemony in the Third World (in the short term).... The danger is rather that the spread of communism and Soviet power will upset tenuous regional balances of power, lead to intensified regional instabilities, and make even more difficult the⁴⁵ settlement of a variety of regional clashes that could lead to war.

Consequently, the potential for direct superpower confrontation rises in situations where both the United States and the Soviet Union are involved. The prospect for the escalation of regional conflicts to higher levels is increasingly a possibility and is recognized as such by the Soviet Union.

Any local military conflict might evolve in the contemporary situation into a general thermo-nuclear catastrophe.... Many diplomatic actions of the USSR are caused by the necessity to oppose the aggressors whenever needed and at the same time to avoid succumbing to their provocations and to extinguish the first sparks of military conflicts.⁴⁶

This represents a dilemma in the sense that the Soviet Union is pledged to support wars of national liberation. It represents a contradiction in terms of proletarian internationalism and Soviet security

interests. The dilemma however, is rectified in that proletarian internationalism yields to Soviet national interests.

The concrete, historical approach to wars can never be founded only on the classification of a given war, i.e. whether it is just or unjust war, while at the same time ignoring a new factor introduced into the world situation by new weapons and the present correlation of forces between the two systems.... It is also necessary to discover the scale and nature of the weapons used in the war and with what means, peaceful or military, one can aid the party waging the just war and hinder the party which started an unjust war, while preventing the transformation of that war into a world war.... Local wars waged by imperialists against other nations which are fighting for their freedom and independence are unjust and aggressive. But these local wars might grow into a world thermonuclear war. This situation determines the attitude of the CPSU and the Soviet government toward local wars.

In essence, Soviet strategy for the Third World is one concerned with opportunism, the probability of success and the degree of risk associated with the possibilities of direct confrontation with the other superpower, the United States. Thus the Soviet policy of support for Third World revolutionary movements is defined in terms of maximum flexibility. The more recent forcible seizures of political power in Asia and Africa appear to have been supported and manipulated in the utmost confidence in the particular situations and their repercussions with respect to the United States. The atmosphere of détente, as Soviet writers have continually stressed, has greatly facilitated Soviet initiatives in the Third World and is consistent with the overall Soviet conception of peaceful coexistence.

The strategic impetus behind Soviet policy in the Third World has assumed a more offensive orientation as opposed to the more defensive character of Soviet Third World initiatives in the nineteen-fifties and sixties. It represents a dialectical interaction of objectives and capabilities. Expanded military capabilities have facilitated the attainment of

objectives and the nature of the particular objectives define the necessary military capabilities.

The Soviet Union has been able to support the forcible gaining of power by indigenous communist groups with little or no substantial reaction from the United States and therefore has enhanced its strategic objectives.

Military power is the essential element which has made the USSR a real rival of the United States in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. As Soviet military capabilities expanded so did its Third World objectives.

In the mid-1950's, Moscow could frustrate the Western Powers and their diplomacy by sending arms to anti-Western Third World leaders; in the 1960's it could enable prized clients to engage in overseas adventures (for example Nasser's intervention in Yemen from 1962 to 1967) and avoid lasting defeats (for example, by rearming the Egyptian and Syrian armies after their trouncing by Israel in June 1967.) But in the 1970's it could intervene directly to protect clients from defeat and provide decisive assistance to produce political and military outcomes regarded as congenial to the spread to Soviet influence.⁴⁸

Intervene it did as mentioned in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Afghanistan.

Until the early nineteen seventies, the Soviet Union lacked the military capability to project military power decisively outside of the Eurasian land mass, a shortcoming that hampered the conduct of a foreign policy in the Third World. This has changed.⁴⁹ The availability of huge stockpiles of surplus weaponry and the air and naval capabilities required for transport have provided the Soviet Union the military clout it needed for the above mentioned interventions. "For example, in late 1977 - early 1978, the USSR poured more than two billion dollars in weapons, ammunition and supplies with essential personnel, into Ethiopia, changing the entire complexion of regional affairs in the Horn without in anyway diminishing its military capability in

Europe."⁵⁰ Thus the Soviet military has become an indispensable element of Soviet Third World policy and many features of its most modern force additions imply an intention to play an increasingly active role in the Third World.

In Somalia, which dominates the entrance to the Red Sea and the northwest area of the Indian Ocean, the Soviet expulsion has been compensated through Ethiopian granted naval privileges at the Dahlak Islands on the Red Sea and South Yemeni privileges at the naval port in Aden. "The Soviet interest in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula is an outgrowth of its Middle East policy and ambitious construction of its blue water fleet."⁵¹

This strategic impetus has been evident in Soviet policy throughout the Third World. The Soviet desire for naval privileges in India is apparent in that it would complement its existing facilities at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, at Vladivostok and the controversial islands North of Japan. This not only threatens the Chinese but also the strategic and economic interests of pro-west Japan and the ASEAN countries with the potential for interdicting the sea supply lanes to the east.

The success of the MPLA in Angola suggests similar implications. Air and naval facilities there would position the Soviet Union to "interdict the sea route around the cape of Good Hope and rival the South African base at Simonstown."⁵²

The expansion and potential expansion of the Soviet military privileges provides the impetus for its continued strategy and political competition with the United States. It has been most noticeable during the era of détente with the West where the Soviet Union attempts to maintain East-West stability while simultaneously intensifying the compe-

tition in the peripheral areas outside each side's core security sphere. The Western interpretation of détente combined with the failure of American Third World ventures, has provided the Soviet Union with the confidence that its initiatives in the Third World would go unchallenged.

However the continual Soviet push in the Third World, as in the case of its arms buildup, has precipitated a sharp reaction in the West in general and the United States in particular, against Soviet style détente. The creation of the Rapid Deployment Force in conjunction with the pro-Western countries in areas of vital interest to United States and Western Europe is an example of such a reaction. The implications with respect to the strategic balance between the U.S. and the USSR are serious relative to maintaining the stability of their relationship, especially in the short term. Regional instabilities in the Third World, often exploited and manipulated by the Soviet Union, can only heighten the tension characterizing East-West relationship. The refusal or inability of the Soviet Union to link Third World stability with détente for ideologically and structurally defined strategic and security reasons represent essentially de-stabilizing elements with respect to the strategic nuclear balance. Western insecurity is only heightened by Soviet influenced Third World developments which is manifested in Western perceptions and reactions directly associated with the East-West relations. Soviet initiatives in the Third World appear to be directed towards consolidating its position and therefore, like its military policy, represents the continual perception of the need to enhance its strategic position relative to the United States.

Soviet military and Third World policy are inextricably linked. It is a method of securing advantage without the risks of direct confron-

tation with the United States and completely consistent with the theme of peaceful coexistence.

Nor does the Soviet Union appear deterred or concerned with the growing financial and military costs of involvement in the Third World. "For example, in Ethiopia, the Soviets are unlikely to collect the estimated two billion dollars loaned for arms, in the near future, as Ethiopia's export earnings totalled a mere \$398 million for 1981."⁵³ Yet it is just as unlikely to withdraw support of a loyal and strategically important ally, but rather it will continue to underwrite the cost of this Marxist revolution in the Horn of Africa.

In essence, it has been Soviet military power upon which the Soviet Union has based its foreign policy initiatives in the Third World.

Thus in the short term, Soviet supported and inspired regional instability contributes not only to international instability but also to the strategic instability of the superpower relationship.

In the long term, the Soviet Union appears interested in establishing a network of regional alliances. Perhaps not with the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact, but enough to guarantee its presence in strategically important areas of the world via bilateral treaties. It is therefore, more able to successfully compete with the United States in projecting its military power into politically promising situations abroad. The Soviet Union appears willing, in a more forceful way, to exploit opportunities to enhance its strategic position relative to the United States. While the Soviet Union has yet to establish a network of alliances in the Third World to the extent the United States has, it has successfully expanded its influence in recent years. The combination of opportunity, prospects for success and expanded capabilities encourage the

continuation of this policy, despite the realization by the Soviet leadership that superpower competition in the Third World is a potential catalyst for nuclear confrontation. The more recent Soviet naval acquisitions suggest a willingness to intensify competition in the Third World.

To this point in time, Soviet naval strategy remains more defensive than offensive in character. However, the Soviets are enhancing their limited capabilities for underway replenishment and gaining access to an increasing number of distant ports which will improve their ability to project naval power in the 1980's.

The perceived benefits of establishing alliance subsystems in the Third World appear to outweigh in consideration, the associated risks involved. Soviet policy in the Third World not only facilitates the maintenance and expansion of its influence in important areas, it is designed to enhance the strategic nuclear position of the Soviet Union relative to the United States. The USSR requires the means of supporting its expanding naval capabilities for both, offensive and defensive purposes, one of which being the objective of developing an effective anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. As will be discussed in the chapter on Soviet military doctrine, Soviet policy appears one designed to neutralize the U.S. nuclear retaliatory capability. Achieving a potent ASW capability represents an important objective with respect to Soviet strategic priorities such that the establishment of a network of air and naval bases in and around the Asian and African theatres of operations would be a significant step in that direction.

CHAPTER V

SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE; MILITARY SOLUTIONS TO
THE PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR WAR

INTRODUCTION

An important factor affecting the military capabilities of a state especially in the nuclear age, is quality of resources and ideas utilized with respect to the organization and operationalizing of the state's military forces. The next section will deal with how the Soviet Union has coped with the conceptual problems of modern war. The previous sections were concerned with illustrating the influence of military in the formulation of military policy, its interests and objectives, and the ideologically defined need for maximum security.

From the Soviet perspective, the military and security interests of the state are paramount. Ideologically, the inherent aggressive nature of capitalism necessitates a high level of military preparedness and force deployment. The military power of the Soviet Union therefore, represents the single most important revolutionary force.

From the military point of view, the issues associated with nuclear war and weaponry assume a more traditional position in the realm of military theory. That is, the specific role of nuclear weaponry is determined with respect to its utility in the conduct of war.

After the Khrushchev ouster in 1964, the Brezhnev group permitted greater military autonomy. The sixties witnessed a buildup of the military in the effort to achieve strategic parity with the United States and to extend the range of military options beyond the Soviet continental environment. The seventies witnessed a continuation of this policy by the Soviet Union. Brezhnev appears to have permitted across the board Soviet military growth. There appears to have been established

an unprecedented degree of independence for the military in managing its own affairs and a more prominent voice in the shaping of foreign policy.

It appears natural that the military buildup proceeded and has continued. From the perspective of the military planner, the purpose is to gain the ability to hedge against virtually any uncertainty. In the Soviet Union, such uncertainty is prevalent considering the "hostile" borders to the East and West, requiring substantial military investment.

With respect to nuclear forces, the formulation of strategy and doctrine have been characterized by the biases of the military, as will be illustrated below, and reflects the traditional military approach to war, regardless of weapons development. Soviet military doctrine in contrast to the American doctrine illustrates the considerable military input, relative to the United States, into the management of Soviet defense, reflecting the traditional military concepts which emphasize the war fighting capacity of weaponry and the objectives of warfare.

For institutional and psychological reasons, the military has rejected the American logic of deterrence. First strategic stability through mutual assured destruction as opposed to damage limitation would require less in military expenditures. Secondly, it goes against the traditions of the military to link one's own security to that of the adversary's.

SOVIET AND AMERICAN MILITARY DOCTRINE: CONTRASTING VIEWS

Since the beginning of the cold war the United States has relied upon the deterrent value of its nuclear force. In the late 1940's the United States and Western Europeans firmly believed that the only way to halt and deter Soviet aggression was with the threat of rapid atomic escalation. Such was the basis of massive retaliation, allowing for a plausible and cost efficient deterrent, considering the Western view of difficulty in matching Soviet conventional forces. Massive retaliation stressed deterrence rather than defense.

When the Soviet Union developed its own nuclear capabilities while maintaining the conventional edge over NATO forces, the United States decided to deploy tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons. "These tactical weapons compensated for the U.S. loss of its nuclear monopoly in that they were expected to provide an additional firebreak between conventional provocation and all out nuclear war."¹ Again the emphasis was on deterrence rather than defense, stressing war avoidance rather than conventional capability. The absence of a credible conventional response, it was thought, made the nuclear response all the more credible as a deterrent. This was feasible as long as the U.S. was invulnerable to a Soviet nuclear counter strike and "therefore the United States refrained from extending its range of options."²

However, as the Soviet Union progressed in its nuclear counter-strike capability, the United States was compelled to extend its range of options to avoid being left with the options of either nuclear response or nothing in the event of a conventional provocation on the part of the Soviet Union. The strategy of "flexible response" resulted. It was

designed to expand American strategic and tactical options. Central to this strategy was the concept of "graduated deterrence", emphasizing the option of controlled escalation in light of Soviet aggression. Again the emphasis was upon deterrence rather than defense, providing the U.S. the option of escalation in response to a Soviet conventional attack in Europe. The range proceeded from conventional response to the threat of strategic nuclear attack on the Soviet Union.

By the end of the nineteen sixties, however, "flexible response" was no longer considered a viable defense doctrine, except in Europe. The United States had imposed unilateral limits on the deployment of U.S. strategic forces because it was involved heavily in the Vietnam War. The Soviet Union on the other hand was determined to redress the previous imbalance.

The age of détente emerged as the Soviet Union achieved what was recognized in the United States as essential parity in strategic forces.

The United States was no longer in a position to articulate a doctrine of the broader based deterrence of flexible response. The Nixon administration, partly in response to the unfavourable domestic climate during the Vietnam war and partly in response to the Soviet strategic buildup, stated what was to be a profound change in the U.S. deterrence policy. In what was to be known as the "Nixon Doctrine" pronounced in 1969, the United States was no longer prepared to meet communist aggressions directly in the world outside of its own treaty commitments. The responsibility for the provision of manpower would now rest upon the indigenous forces in whatever area.

The "Nixon Doctrine" reflected the new American strategic doctrine, "Assuming a stable power balance, based on mutual assured destruction, could be maintained by strategic sufficiency in U.S. arms levels."³

Thus, the United States policy of deterrence was to be based purely on its retaliatory function. Gone were the options of controlled escalation of flexible response and the broadly based deterrent posture of massive retaliation, both requiring a substantially superior strategic position. It represented a retrenchment from the open ended commitment of the "Truman Doctrine" in light of the changing realities of the day.

In effect, U.S. security was to be based upon a sufficient deterrent force and the diplomacy of détente, through which the United States and the Soviet Union could avoid nuclear confrontation. It was hoped that the USSR, with respect to this policy stance, would not only agree upon the limitation of strategic arms, but also refrain from further "aggression" in the rest of the world.

What is apparent when discussing the evolution of American strategic doctrine is the continual attempt to adapt it to contemporary circumstances. Atomic and nuclear proliferation rendered, in the American view, traditional military approaches to war obsolete in the sense that war had become something to be avoided, rather than continued emphasis upon "war winning". That is, nuclear weapons had become valued more for their deterrent capability rather than their use. American strategic military doctrine adapted to the changing relative balance of nuclear capability between the United States and the Soviet Union with continued emphasis upon maintaining their deterrent value.

According to Stanley Sienkiewicz, "American strategists concluded that with the destructive power of thermonuclear weapons combined with the great numbers and modern long range delivery systems, produced a variety of attack scenarios possible, against which defense was extremely difficult at best."⁴ The traditional military view of the decisive role of surprise or preemptive attack was changed. "American strategists concentrated on a particular kind of surprise attack, the so called first strike disarming attack in which the victim's retaliatory capability would be rendered impotent."⁵ Therefore the task of American military policy makers was to make surprise attack infeasible. Deterrence of the Soviet Union was to be maintained through large and secure punitive capabilities. It was almost totally unconnected to the problem of defending against nuclear attack. Defense and deterrence had become almost totally distinct concepts in American strategic doctrine. The American approach therefore provides a basis for potential stability in the strategic balance.

If the problem of surprise has to do primarily with a fairly narrow band of capabilities threatening the adversary's second-strike forces, then we have primafacie, a basis for limited superpower cooperation towards enhancing the security of both. They could cooperate ... in managing force postures so as to minimize threats posed to their respective second-strike capabilities.

This has been the American approach. The United States has continually adjusted its forces to prevent the emergence of threats to its punitive capabilities. In essence, the Americans approach has conceded the chance of a military victory in the event of a nuclear exchange. The three principles of American doctrine have been "the maintenance of secure second strike forces; limited war forces to extend and enhance deterrence; the avoidance of threats to Soviet second strike forces."⁷ The American view of nuclear war was one of recogni-

tion of the futility of defense and therefore mutual assured destruction (MAD) if second strike capabilities are secured, requiring little more in the way of military forces.

This relatively recent approach to the state military requirements reflects not only the quantitative and qualitative developments of military capabilities in contemporary history, but also the civilian-military relationship, in the United States. The American nuclear doctrine emphasizing deterrence rather than defense and sufficiency rather than maximization, reflects the considerable civilian input into the formulation of military strategic doctrine. Not to discount the input of the military, the civilian-military relationship in the United States has traditionally subordinated the military.

... to the experience in the United States high powered RAND-type civilians proceeded to educate our military in matters of war and peace in the nuclear age....

In contrast, Soviet military doctrine and policy have been formulated almost entirely from the perspective of the military.

SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

The conclusion of the SALT I accords, especially the ABM agreement, was considered significant in that the Soviet Union had agreed virtually to an ABM ban and was therefore viewed by many in the West as having accepted the logic of the U.S. theory of deterrence and assured destruction. However, the continued buildup of Soviet strategic forces during the 1970's, again illustrated the contrasting nuclear doctrines of the United States and the Soviet Union. Doctrinal recon-

ciliation between the superpowers appears distant. The Soviet doctrine is a function of structural, ideological and traditional elements within the Soviet Union and is therefore not subject to radical change.

The development and deployment of nuclear weapons and long range delivery systems, have radically changed the nature of contemporary military affairs. In the Soviet Union, there is a deep appreciation and understanding of the implications associated with contemporary nuclear weapons and warfare. However, certain aspects related to the Soviet conceptions of war in general have been retained from the pre-nuclear era which may profoundly affect the stability of the strategic nuclear balance.

The distinction of just and unjust wars in Soviet military theory has remained. War between the Soviet Union and a capitalist power would, from the Soviet side, be considered a just war.

So, long as nuclear war, if the imperialists despite the will of the people unleash it, will have the goal, from our side, of the annihilation of the aggressors, and the liquidation of the perpetrators - imperialism -- then from this side, it will bear a just character.

Associated and complementary to the ideas of a just war, and implicitly suggested in the above quotation, is the continual assertion put forward by Soviet military theorists that the initiation of hostilities would not be a Soviet prerogative, but rather, imperialist inspired. The introduction of nuclear weapons and the potential for catastrophic and widespread destruction, have not altered the essence of imperialism. The Soviet perceptions of the inherent aggressive and hostile nature of imperialism have remained.

Thanks to the rise of the socialist system, the sphere of actions of the sources of war now are seriously restricted. The presence of nuclear weapons in the U.S.S.R. serves as an enormous factor deterring the aim of the imperialists to start a world war.... (However), the real possibility of nuclear war, now as before,

fashions itself only out of the economies and politics of imperialism.

In essence, war remains a function of imperialism and the existence of nuclear weapons does not preclude the possibility of an imperialist attack upon the Soviet Union. These basic constants remain a part of Soviet military thought and literature.

However, these traditional Soviet conceptions associated with war, have been integrated with the more contemporary aspects of nuclear warfare. Nuclear weapons, from the Soviet perspective, have radically altered the nature of future warfare in many areas. The enormous destructive potential of nuclear weapons combined with rapid means of delivery, have made the initial period of the war more important. That is, in the event of a nuclear war, the initial periods are decisive with respect to the outcome of the war.

Soviet military doctrine takes into account that the appearance of the nuclear rocket weapon signifies not a conventional change in the technical equipment of the troops but a basic revolution in military affairs....

The power of the nuclear weapon and the possibilities of almost instantaneous delivery of it in massive quantities on the target pre-determines the aim of both sides to carry out strikes of maximum force in the very first minutes of the war. In view of this, the beginning period of the war acquires a qualitatively new significance which can have a decisive effect on its whole course and outcome.

The role of the surprise factor in combat operations will increase sharply.

Striking first in nuclear war is recognized as decisive by Soviet military theorists. Yet, the continual assertions by the Soviets of not assuming the position of the aggressor under such circumstances represents a paradox in Soviet military theory. This paradox is further complicated by the Soviet extension of the Clausewitzian conception of war and its objectives into the nuclear era. As stated by Colonel Ribkin,

... nuclear war, because of its consequences, leaves the framework of previous ideas about the relationships of politics and war. Remaining as the continuation of politics, such a war now, because of the effect of the consequences of the nuclear means of struggle is limited as a weapon of politics. This fact does not negate either the possibility of the unleashing of war by aggressors or the possibility of our victory in it.

In effect, the Soviet military doctrine continues to conceptualize war, nuclear war included, as the extension and legitimate instrument of politics. War as such, depending upon the social and historical conditions and upon who is involved, can serve as a useful instrument of change.

The Marxist-Leninist approach to war is different in principle from pacifism. Pacifism is also against war, but it condemns war in general, irrespective of with whom and for what it is being waged. The pacifist does not connect his negative attitude toward war with the struggle against its main source, the capitalist system.

While considering the defense of peace as the most general democratic task of nations.... Marxist-Leninists themselves go further in solving the problems of war and peace. They connect the struggle for durable peace, universal security and the curbing of aggressors with the struggle for the revolutionary reformation of society, for social progress and for the triumph of socialism and communism on earth. The leading role of the Communist movement is foregrounded by them as the greatest antiwar force of the day.

Military doctrine within the Soviet Union makes no distinction between conventional and nuclear war, at least to the extent of discussing the military objectives in the event of war. This is not to say that the Soviet leaders are insensitive to the destructive power of nuclear as opposed to conventional weapons, rather the traditional conception of war as an extension and instrument of politics has not been substantially altered in light of nuclear capabilities. That is, in the event of war, the objective is to win it, be it nuclear or conventional. Soviet strategists continually assert that the Soviet Union would win a nuclear war if one occurred.

No one has a right to close his eyes to all the serious results of nuclear war. Exactly therefore, the Communist Party, and the Government of the USSR ... propose a maximum effort in order to not permit the unleashing of war and to curb aggressors. However to maintain the victory in nuclear war is in general impossible would not only be untrue theoretically but dangerous from a political point of view.

Also Soviet military theory considers nuclear war with the United States will inevitably be one that is all encompassing with both sides utilizing the full destructive power at their disposal. The presence of nuclear weapons in the respective superpower arsenals necessarily means they will be used.

From the social point of view, this war will be a decisive armed clash of two opposed social systems, capitalism and socialism, in which both sides will pursue the most decisive goals, excluding any sort of compromise. From the military technological point of view, the war inevitably will be thermonuclear, the chief means of destruction will be atomic and hydrogen bombs, and the basic means of delivering them to the targets will be rockets.

From the Soviet perspective, nuclear war is discussed in terms of social-system competition. The Soviet Union considers any war with the United States will inevitably escalate to total nuclear war because it will represent the ultimate battle for social-system supremacy. In that it represents a "just-war" from the Soviet perspective, nuclear war is therefore a "progressive force" in the competition against "imperialism". Emerging victorious or at least in a better condition than the United States is therefore a necessary objective.

However, this does not mean that Soviet leaders are insensitive to the consequences of nuclear war. Rather, it implies a deeper appreciation of the superpower competition beyond the military-technical aspects or its relationship with the United States such that mutual nuclear deterrence through self-denial of first-strike capability is considered inappropriate with respect to the political and military utility of nuclear

weapons. In the Soviet view, the nuclear balance of forces must be considered within the broader framework of peaceful coexistence and the political objectives of the state. Achieving and maintaining a decisive advantage in nuclear forces represents a more certain deterrent such that Soviet policy objectives may be continued with the minimum threat of nuclear attack, while in the event of war, the Soviet Union is able to emerge from it in a more favourable condition than the United States. In either situation, Soviet military power represents the most important "revolutionary" force.

Thus, on the one hand, Soviet military theory recognizes the potential destructive capability and consequences of warfare conducted with nuclear weapons, and considers nuclear war a definite possibility while "imperialist" nations continue to exist in the international system. On the other hand, Soviet military doctrine considers nuclear war a legitimate political instrument, albeit a limited one, and considers the possibility and objective of victory in a nuclear war.

The Soviet Union desires peace yet considers nuclear war within the context of legitimate political instruments. However, peace and military strength are consistent elements with respect to the Soviet perceptions of its relationship with the West in general. It assumes the role of the non-belligerent party in the superpower relationship, but remains prepared for the possibility of being attacked with nuclear weapons by an inherently aggressive adversary. Within this context, secure defense necessarily assumes an offensive orientation. This is apparent when considering the continual Soviet assertion that it will not initiate a nuclear war, while considering the initial period of the war as decisive. To achieve victory means necessarily that one strikes first.

The degree to which damage is limited is a function of the speed with which the Soviet military reacts. For example:

Of course, in this forced, just war from the side of progressive forces, mankind will suffer enormous losses. But it must be kept in mind that the degree of damage which inevitably will be brought to civilization by such a war, in many ways, depends on the speed of the armed struggle. The more decisively and quickly the aggressive acts of imperialism are suppressed by the force of our weapons, the fewer the negative results of war.

In essence, Soviet military doctrine illustrates an integrated deterrent and preemptive strategy. This will become more apparent as the discussion progresses. Suffice to say for the moment, while Soviet doctrine denies the intent to initiate the attack, this does not necessarily preclude striking first.

Whether Soviet strategists truly believe in the possibility of a successful nuclear war, is difficult to determine and is essentially irrelevant. They must proceed within the contexts of this assumption due first of all to their ideological requisites. To accept the American concept of assured destruction is contrary to the Marxist-Leninist view of inevitable socialist victory and capitalist downfall.

Secondly, this particular orientation of nuclear planning reflects the high military input into the policy process in contrast to the large civilian influence in the United States. In this context, the institutional interests of the military are more directly articulated and enhanced.

It is important to understand the implications of this approach because of the current role of the Soviet military in all areas of national security management especially as compared to the United States. Both defense establishments may be seen as organizational pyramids, functionally differentiated and performing all the tasks necessary to the management of the national security apparatus. In the Soviet Union however, all aspects of this activity -- from intelligence and analysis to the production and deployment of weapons systems -- are almost entirely in the hands of the professional military.... What it suggests is that they frame which

military solutions are to be sought. To argue that security in the nuclear age is to be found in agreeing to a posture of mutual vulnerability ... is at radical variance with all of the traditions of the Soviet military establishment.

We can discuss the Soviet approach to nuclear war in consideration of their own security requirements relative to their perception of their adversary, the United States. As mentioned, the Soviet perception of American actions and motivations makes nuclear war a real possibility in the thought and literature of the Soviets. The long held view that "imperialist" nations are inherently aggressive, hostile and even irrational, has continued in the nuclear age. Despite the Soviet growth in nuclear capability and therefore the lessened likelihood of war, it remains a possibility while "imperialism" exists.

One must not fail to take notice of the element of despair and recklessness in the policy of imperialist circles ... from this it still doesn't follow that the possibility of such a war (nuclear) can be considered completely eliminated. While imperialism exists the threat of predatory wars also continues to exist....

If a nuclear war is still possible then the Soviet Union should be prepared to fight and win. This is in sharp contrast to the American view, where the possibility of victory has been conceded and survivability is in reference to its second strike capability as the basis of deterrence. War avoidance is primary.

For the Soviet Union to survive and win a nuclear war, it would need at least, substantive strategic superiority and counterforce capability, a very potent active defense force, a potent anti-submarine capability, a massive civil defense program, a large army and considerable adaptation of the Soviet economy to survive a nuclear war.

One can speculate whether the above is attainable. However, the perception of the necessity for preparedness, drives Soviet policy in the above direction.

Repelling a possible aggression demands not only the deployment of multimillion member Armed Forces but also mobilization of all the economic resources of the country for the achievement of victory.. That involves increased demands on the level of mobilization readiness of the economy, the preparation of the territory of the country, the organization of civil defense and the entire system of defense-mass work.

It follows logically, that with the continual perception of the possibility of nuclear war and the necessity for preparedness and survivability, military strategy will include the requirements for surprise and preemptive attack.

At the present time, the armed forces should be able under any conditions to break up a surprise attack by the aggressor either with atomic or with conventional weapons by means of rapid crushing blows, destroy his basic rocket-nuclear forces and troop formations, securing favourable conditions for the future conduct and victorious conclusion of the war.

Although Soviet strategists would never admit to a military force design tailored for surprise attack, they nevertheless maintain the need and preparation to preempt any possible aggression. This merely represents a manipulation of semantics required for doctrinal reasons. Otherwise, the Soviet Union as the leading socialist and therefore "peace loving" state would appear as the aggressor. Soviet nuclear doctrine, as will be discussed, is one designed extensively for damage limitation. Damage limitation as illustrated, requires a massive first strike for achieving anything that resembles victory. In addition to the necessity for striking first, damage limitation necessarily requires substantive strategic nuclear superiority to give meaning to any first strike. Presently, there exists no decisive strategic edge for either superpower. Yet, to inflict a successful first strike requires it and is recognized as such by the Soviet Union. Thus, to enhance the possibility of victory in nuclear war, it is necessary to achieve and maintain strategic military superiority. According to Colonel V.M. Bondarenko,

Military-technical superiority ... is one of the most important factors in our time for the reliable defense of the country.... In the past, the relationship of strength in military equipment could be changed in the course of the war itself.... Now in connection with the revolution in military affairs, the significance of military-technical superiority in peacetime has increased sharply. Under the influence of the new weapon and other new means of destruction, the importance of the beginning period is enhanced and the possibility of change in the relative forces in the course of the war itself is seriously hampered....

The achievement of military-technical superiority of one side over another is no guarantee of its preservation in the future. The stern dialectics of development are that the struggle for superiority must be waged continually.

What is evident thus far, is the apparent obsession with the consequences of the initial nuclear strikes. The decisive nature of the first strike necessitates the ability to deliver one. The logical corollary is in assuring the invulnerability of one's own security area, requiring the means for active and passive defense systems. (To be discussed below.) Attaining and maintaining strategic superiority establishes a higher degree of certainty in the event of nuclear war. Soviet strategists appear obsessed with achieving the maximum degree of certainty possible. For example, the need for achieving nuclear superiority and maintaining it serves as a hedge against the possibility of technological breakthroughs which may alter the existing strategic balance.

The achievement of quantitative and qualitative superiority over the enemy usually demands long industrial efforts. At the same time, the creation of a weapon that is new in principle and secretly nurtured in scientific research bureaus and constructors collectives can in a short time sharply change the relationship of forces.... Surprise in this area not only demoralizes the enemy, it also for a long time deprives him of the possibility of using effective means of protection from the new weapon.

This appears to be in reference to the United States and its highly capable research and development abilities. In essence it illustrates the insecurity of the Soviet Union with respect to its security requirements and the constant perception for the need of certainty and preparedness. This constant drive towards achieving maximum security is illus-

trated in the Soviet perception of the need for erecting capable defense systems against nuclear attack. If a first strike is considered decisive, then the requirements to defend against such an attack and assure the relative invulnerability of the country and its military forces are necessary. General N.A. Lomov advocates a combined counterforce and defense posture.

Theoretically it is possible to conjecture that the length of nuclear war will be directly proportional to the ability of the country ... to resist the nuclear blows of the enemy. And this ability will depend basically on two conditions: First on how much the nuclear power of the enemy will be strengthened or weakened; and second, on the effectiveness of protecting the country from nuclear blows in the widest sense of the word, that is on active PVO (air defense) and civil defense.²³

Defense including active and passive defense systems to ensure the survivability of the state. Here, civil defense assumes importance for the continued functioning of the state and government. As stated by Marshal V.I. Chirjkev,

The people played a decisive role in the last wars. But in modern conditions this role has grown even more. The outcome of nuclear rocket war will now be decided not only on the battle-field, it will in significant measure be predetermined by strikes on the rear areas and on important political and economic centres. Victory in such a war will depend to a large degree on the ability of the state to survive. Therefore, civil defense, the basic significance of which is to assist the government to survive in war, assumes, in truth, a state and national character.²⁴

Survivability, in sharp contrast to the American conception of the term, includes political continuity. It also includes the possibility of protracted nuclear war and the possibility of conventional hostilities following, in which case, survivability means necessarily the capability to carry on military operations under a post-nuclear war environment. This illustrates the Soviet combined arms approach to war, involving the full utilization of its nuclear and conventional capabilities. It reflects the quest for certainty in Soviet doctrine. Despite the decisive

nature of the initial period of nuclear war, the Soviet military considers it prudent to be prepared for the possibility of having to complete the defeat of the enemy with conventional means in the event the nuclear strike is not decisive enough. Thus despite the priority attached to strategic nuclear weapons, it is necessary to maintain a high level of capability in all spheres of the military.

While stressing the decisive role of the nuclear rocket weapon ... our military doctrine by no means minimizes the significance of conventional weapons. It considers that victory in modern war can be achieved only by the combined forces of all of the services of the Armed Forces.

In the importance of the beginning period of the war and the possibility of its short duration, Soviet military doctrine does not exclude the fact that under certain conditions war might become long and drawn out; consequently the country and the army must be ready for such a variation of armed struggle.

What is evident, is the view that surprise or preemptive attack would be decisive in a nuclear war. However, it cannot be admitted that surprise attack would leave the Soviet Union in defeat contrary to the socialist inevitability. Hence the need for survivability includes both active and civil defense.

It illustrates a sharp contrast in the strategic thinking of the United States and the Soviet Union. They agree on the potential decisiveness of surprise attack in the nuclear age, but for different reasons. The Soviets view it decisive because it could destroy the ability for the functioning of government and the ability for military forces to defend the state. The Americans, as mentioned, view surprise attack as potentially destroying its second strike or punitive capabilities. This illustrates the different conceptions of survivability. For the United States it requires the adjustment of forces to maintain the security of its second strike or punitive capabilities. For the Soviet Union, it requires the adjustment and development of both offensive and defense.

sive capabilities, (although it is argued that they are inseparable), a much more open ended pursuit of security objectives, requiring relatively unrestrained defense spending following the traditional military approach to national defense. "Sufficiency" is therefore insufficient.

This is not to say that Soviet strategic thought is devoid of the logic of deterrence. Rather it is a view that does not rely solely on deterrence relative to punitive capability. Deterrence as such is not considered distinct from defense. The best deterrent is considered to be its war-fighting capability.

... the general Soviet attitude toward successful deterrence is rooted in essentially traditional military maxims which emphasize the war fighting capacity of weaponry. Soviet doctrine and military posture do not distinguish between deterrent and war fighting capability, but appear to view them as fused together....²⁶

Planning is designed to include every conceivable situation. This is illustrated by the preparedness for conventional war following a nuclear exchange and extensive civil defense preparations. It is essentially a "two tiered" strategy of deterrence, including retaliation in the event of a first strike by the United States. As Leonid Brezhnev stated at the 24th Party Congress, "any possible aggressor knows well that should he attempt a missile attack on our country, he will receive an annihilating retaliatory blow."²⁷ What is obvious is that although the Soviets accept the punitive aspects of deterrence, it is not in isolation. In effect, the Soviet approach is to convey to the aggressor that nothing is to be accomplished by attacking the USSR, (requiring a substantial counterforce and damage limitation posture) and secondly, minimizing incentives for attack by guaranteeing retaliation. A mix of primarily preemptive and secondarily retaliatory capabilities as the most reliable deterrent.

Therefore although the ABM agreement suggested the Soviets had accepted the American concept of assured destruction as the basis for deterrence, it has become increasingly apparent in recent years that this is not so. The Soviet Union has never accepted the American premise that stable deterrence is based on having cities held hostage to retaliation. Therefore it is not surprising, even with the assumption the Soviets did restrict their ABM development, it has not halted research into other forms of active defense such as anti-satellite, surface to air, air defense and anti-submarine war systems. The implications of such an approach are obvious in that the USSR, is deliberately attempting to undermine American retaliatory capability. It represents one element of a strategic force design being developed for damage limitation. Soviet strategic policy is designed around the possibilities of achieving victory in a nuclear war and is therefore highly destabilizing with respect to the strategic balance.

SOVIET THIRD WORLD POLICY AND MILITARY-STRATEGIC INTERESTS

As mentioned previously, the ambitious policy of the Soviet Union in the Third World contributes to regional or "lower level" instability. It provides the potential catalyst for superpower confrontation and escalation in the short term. However, as will be discussed below, the long term implications of Soviet policy in the Third World are such that they exert their own degree of influence upon the stability of the nuclear balance. Soviet policy in the Third World is a direct outgrowth and function of its nuclear doctrine. The growing Soviet presence in

the Third World complements its foreign policy approach in general and its nuclear doctrine in particular. The role of the military and its power relative to the main adversary, the United States, is instrumental with respect to foreign policy and is recognized as such by the Soviet Union.

In our time it is necessary to represent beyond all doubt the correlation at any moment of the military-technical equipment of our own army and the army of the probable enemy. Without a sober stocktaking of the military technical possibilities of the opposing sides, it is impossible to carry out not only one's own military organization but also to carry out correctly a foreign policy....²⁸

As mentioned, it was Soviet military power and the willingness to lend assistance that paved the way for the Soviet entry into the competition for the Third World. The growing Soviet presence in the Third World and growing military capabilities have allowed the Soviet Union to more expeditiously project its military power for political objectives. The larger the Soviet presence in the Third World, the easier it is for the Soviet Union to expand its presence and objectives.

However, in discussing the strategic impetus behind Soviet Third World policy, a brief discussion into the fundamentals of Soviet theory in general and its military theory in particular may shed some light on the basis of Soviet military doctrine. Soviet theory is usually discussed within the context of dialectics and may suggest why the Soviet military doctrine is incompatible with Western conceptions of stability.

The problem is not limited to the search for the most effective way of using modern weapons. The appearance of new means of struggle always brings into being corresponding countermeans, which in the end also lead to changes of the methods of military operations. The struggle of tanks and anti-tank means, submarines and anti-submarine means, airplanes and anti-airplane defense, radio means and means of radio jamming, rockets and anti-rockets -- around which evolves the development of military affairs,²⁹ including the development of methods and forms of armed conflict.

The introduction, for example, of increased numbers of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles and the emphasis upon active missile defense reflect their dialectical analysis of strategy. This method of analysis is evident throughout all spheres of Soviet force design. In effect, every new means of conflict inevitably produces countermeans. Although in contradiction, means and countermeans inevitably assume a synthesis or interdependent relationship. For example, in discussing the concepts of attack and defense in nuclear war, Colonel Krupanov suggests:

Since war began to be waged, armies have always had to attack or defend themselves. Attack and defense are two contrasting kinds of military action. But it is the kind of contrast which originally ties and depends on each other and the correct understanding of the development of each of them is possible only by examining attack and defense in close connection with each other.

In present day war with use of the latest means of attack, just as it was before, only attack can lead to the defeat of the enemy and victory over him. But even in such a war, one cannot manage without defense. The nature of both attack and defense has essentially changed and the tendency to rapprochement is observed of these basic aspects of combat. A strategic nuclear rocket strike, for example, combines in itself, simultaneously, the function of attack and defense.³⁰

Thus the nuclear era has necessitated the greater unity of contradictions for maximum effectiveness of force design. The American global network of economic, political and military alliances has necessitated, on the part of the Soviet Union, a reaction in kind. The globalization of the superpower rivalry with respect to the Soviet Union represents their countermeans. It is consistent with the Soviet observation that, in the event of nuclear war, the sphere of action will be global in scope, encompassing much of the world.

Armed struggle in a world nuclear war acquires intercontinental scope and may be waged simultaneously in several land and sea operations. The modern arrangements and relationship of political forces in the international arena and the special characteristics of nuclear weapons permits conjecture that a world nuclear war will be short and swift moving.... However in certain conditions, war might take on a protracted character, the waging of which also will demand corresponding preparation.³¹

Thus, with the international system of defense established by the United States, the Soviet Union must be prepared to counter these measures with its own. This necessarily requires expanded naval and air-transport capabilities and therefore allow for the ability to carry on both conventional and nuclear operations beyond its own continental environment. The United States with its nuclear armed submarines and surface ships, its fleet of aircraft carriers and its long range bomber capability, necessitates the appropriate countermeasures.

Highly significant is the influence of military doctrine on the structure of the Navy and the character of naval operations. The basis of its fighting power now is the missile submarine and naval rocket carrying aviation. This allows it to decide successfully the most complicated problems of fighting with enemy aircraft carriers and rocket carrying fleets, to carry blows to his important objectives located on land, to attack actively the ocean communications of the enemy in remote regions of ocean theatres and to wage, together with other services of the armed forces, landing and counter-landing operations. The connection of naval operations with aviation, especially long range actions, will be more closely connected than in the last war....³²

Traditionally a land-based military power, the Soviet Union has indicated the desire to more expeditiously apply its military power beyond continental Europe and Asia. Beyond expanding Soviet influence abroad, it suggests more specifically, the desire to enhance Soviet nuclear strike and defense capabilities with respect to the American system of alliances and sea-based nuclear forces. Soviet doctrine emphasizes the combined offensive and defensive operations for the effective neutralization of the enemy's ability to wage war, both nuclear and conventional. The interdiction of lines of supply and communication necessarily assumes importance with respect to American treaty commitments in Europe and the Far East. Of priority however, is the effective neutralization of the American sea-based nuclear forces.

The realization of these objectives is necessarily dependent upon the accompanying infrastructure required to support such operations.

Soviet policy in the Third World therefore, gains substance with respect to the strategic nuclear requirements of the USSR in that the lack of "warm-water" outlets necessitates the securing of such facilities.

The expansion and development of Soviet military forces, including air and sea-lift capabilities, naval based aircraft and infantry units and the growth of its surface and submarine fleets, enhances not only the Soviet ability to wage war on a global scale, but facilitates the military support of its allies and client states in the Third World. The seaborne nuclear threat directed against the Soviet Union has necessitated "the extension of Soviet maritime defense zones to cover sea areas whence such nuclear strikes could be launched and to establish an increasingly active naval presence in these areas to contest and perhaps deny the use by the West for the deployment of strategic systems."³³

Of importance in this respect, is Soviet desires in achieving a potent anti-submarine capability (ASW). The Polaris, Poseidon and more recently, Trident submarine strategic systems, represent for the moment, relatively invulnerable nuclear delivery systems. It is therefore consistent with the overall Soviet strategic design and doctrine to develop a reliable anti-submarine warfare capability.

It appears that the Soviet Union has developed a regional or "zone" approach to anti-submarine warfare. For the non-contiguous Mediterranean and Norwegian Seas, which were operational areas for Polaris submarines with A-1 and A-2 guided missiles, the Soviet Navy developed surface warships such as the Kashin guided missile frigates, Kresta-2 and Kara guided missile cruisers, and the Moskva-class helicopter carriers -- vessels with the necessary endurance and anti-air defenses -- as well as longer range maritime reconnaissance/ASW aircraft and possibility of attack submarines and bottom-anchored acoustic detection devices.³⁴

A strategically oriented forward deployment posture, which as a prerequisite of its effectiveness, relies on an external basing structure, "logically presupposes some form of Soviet alliance system of which the

strategic utility is determined by its ability to deal with threats posed to the USSR proper, rather than to its security subsystems."³⁵ The establishment of an alliance system necessarily requires the development of capabilities to support and therefore maintain it. As mentioned, this requires air and sea lift as well as landing and airborne forces capability. More important however, is maintaining these forward based systems politically. Not only must the Soviet Union possess the capability to project its military power abroad, (i.e. provide military assistance to friendly governments), it requires a high degree of political continuity. Hence, the support and often direct military intervention on behalf of indigenous Marxist-Leninist parties or groups, that has characterized Soviet Third World policy in the seventies. Soviet national liberation policy assumes a meaningful direction. It not only serves to enhance Soviet strategic objectives, it facilitates the expansion of Soviet Third World presence and capabilities. Soviet political military objectives and strategic objectives interact and reinforce each other.

The development of an infrastructure abroad has, of course, facilitated the external deployment of Soviet forces and contributed to Soviet strategic goals, as well as enhancing Russia's ability to support the security subsystems militarily.³⁶

Thus, the expansion of Soviet activity in the Third World represents an outgrowth of its strategic nuclear security system. It is designed to counter every conceivable threat, nuclear and conventional, posed not only by the United States and its allies, but also from China.

... they (the Soviet Union) have been actively pursuing two outflanking moves designed to safeguard what is probably defined as the defense perimeter of the USSR. The first is into the Middle East/Mediterranean region, with an immediate military goal -- that is, confronting the US nuclear strike capability deployed on the periphery of the Soviet Union, and a long range political goal -- the end of American influence and presence in this area through denial to Washington of local bases and allies. The other outflanking move, directed at the South Asia - Far East region, has an immediate political aim -- the containment of China and the

end of the American presence in the area; and a long range military aim -- laying the infrastructure for confronting possible American nuclear deployments in the Indian Ocean, combined with the development of Soviet-sponsored second front against China.³⁷

The aim to establish Soviet collective security systems is a perceived requirement designed to deal with a "multi-threat environment through a multi-optional belt of allies, air and naval bases, improved lines of communication and forward force deployments."³⁸

However, the Soviet Union has proceeded in its military buildup to surpass the force deployment levels sufficient for deterring its adversaries, even if they are positioned on two fronts. The Chinese have yet to erect a credible nuclear force to rival that of the Soviet Union and are years behind. The United States is not in a position to successfully initiate a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. The prospects for a Sino-American alliance appear unlikely in the near future. It has been the United States throughout the seventies which has sought the stabilization of the strategic balance, through which it would not only enhance its own security, but that of the Soviet Union. Yet the Soviet Union has continued to develop and expand its strategic capability as well as openly pursuing an ambitious foreign policy in the Third World. It appears difficult in this context, to accurately define the limits of satisfactory security requirements. However, when viewed in light of ideologically defined objectives, hostility and insecurity as well as substantial military input and orientation, Soviet security requirements appear to extend beyond Western conceptions of sufficiency. Soviet force deployments, as will be discussed later, are consistent with the Soviet perceived level of security, which in the nuclear era, requires substantial strategic superiority.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE DESIGN AND UNSTABLE DETERRENCE

INTRODUCTION

In discussing Soviet military doctrine, the concepts and objectives outlined thus far, appear rather abstract. In a political system where pronouncements and all forms of journalism and literature are censored to conform with the interests of the state and its ideological constraints, the validity of all material published is in question. All published material is designed to legitimize policy initiatives and the political system. Deriving Soviet intentions from the military theory and doctrine espoused is difficult at best. Material concerned with military concepts and doctrine is of course integrated with the subterfuge and "doublespeak" associated with the praising of the socialist system and of the Soviet Union. However when discussed with reference to the design and deployment of Soviet strategic systems, prior to and following détente and the SALT negotiations, the abstract concepts of Soviet military theory and doctrine assume form and direction.

While in recent years the Soviet leadership has often stated that victory in nuclear war is impossible, there appears to be a divergence between what is stated publicly and the private view of the political-military establishment. There is no doubt that the scientific community in the USSR has the ear of Soviet decision makers and that they have publicly stated that nuclear war would result in total human extinction, yet their degree of influence relative to that of the military appears slight. With respect to military pronouncements, the view that victory in nuclear war is possible, may reflect merely doctrinal adherence to

the "socialist inevitability" and a method of maintaining morale in the military.

Thus it is difficult to analyse correctly the Soviet perspective on nuclear war. However, two points may shed some light on this question. First, all Soviet military publications, like any other in the USSR, must be cleared initially by the Party. Through clearance, the Party appears to endorse the military perspective on nuclear war. Secondly, recent Soviet nuclear deployments appear to validate military doctrinal statements and publications.

In the following chapter, the discussion will integrate some of the concepts and ideas of Soviet military doctrine with a number of examples of Soviet strategic deployments. Therefore a more accurate assessment of objectives with respect to Soviet military policy is possible. Although the derivation of intent from capabilities is not a certain method of analysis, the combination of Soviet military doctrine and capabilities does provide valuable insight into the objectives and potential of the Soviet military.

SOVIET FORCE DESIGN

In no other major state do military factors assume so prominent a role relative to other elements of statecraft as in the Soviet Union. In nearly every indicator of power except military, the Soviet Union lags substantially behind the United States. It has been the continual utilization of a strategy designed to maximize available capabilities which has contributed decisively to the growth of Soviet global influence since

World War Two. The capacity of the Soviet Union to exercise policy objectives with respect to the West or the Third World, has been and is a function of its military capabilities and is recognized as such by the Soviet leadership.

The Soviet view of military doctrine and capabilities differs substantially from those shared in the United States and Western Europe. In contrast to the prevailing Western view where the political utility of nuclear power is considered limited, the Soviet leadership continues to conceptualize military doctrine and capabilities within the parameters of legitimate political instruments. The development of nuclear military power, while recognized as a fundamental revolution in military affairs, retains its political utility within Soviet conceptions and theory.

The growth of Soviet nuclear and conventional military power as well as its expansion in the Third World represent integrated elements in Soviet foreign policy. Such policy, framed with considerable military input, reflects the military orientation of policy objectives. Therefore, Western conceptions of security through mutual vulnerability with respect to maintaining strategic stability find no place in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy.

The Soviet military doctrine and perceived military requirements differ substantially from those of the West. The Soviet leadership, in entering the SALT negotiations in the late 1960's and early 1970's, concluded that an essentially equal strategic military balance then existed such that they were able to negotiate from a position of equality. Yet the Soviet Union felt it necessary to continue its massive nuclear arms buildup, initiated in the mid 1960's, following the arms limitation agreements. Contrary to expectations, the Soviet Union did

not embrace Western conceptions of strategic stability upon achieving nuclear parity with the United States.

American conceptions of military strategy and stability have often been based on a "quest for technical solutions to problems that, like weapons systems, are considered to be primarily scientific in nature. Therefore the solutions like science itself, supposedly have transnational applicability - to the Soviet Union as well as the United States."¹ However, strategy in the Soviet conception represents a political concept related to the constantly changing reality defined in Marxist-Leninist dialectical terms and based in the political objectives of the state.

Military strategy is inseparably linked with the social and political structure of any government. The political leadership of a country determines the military, political and strategic goals, selects the ways and forms of waging war, ensures conformity of the political aims of the war to the military and economic potential of the country, creates conditions for achieving the established goals, mobilizing for this human and material resources. Military strategy finds and puts into practice the ways of achieving established political goals through armed struggle.

Thus, for the Soviet Union to embrace technical solutions to the problem of strategy and arms and to accept Western conceived ideas concerning stability, would run contrary to the essence of strategy itself.

It is not surprising that Soviet strategists have not been "enlightened" by Western strategic views. Soviet military writers appreciate the significance of the introduction of nuclear weapons and maintain that certain traditional concepts and ideas about the conduct of war have required revision. However, Soviet military writers have also concluded that certain traditional concepts must be retained. Hence the continued adherence to Clausewitzian conceptions of war as the extension of politics and the objectives of victory in the event of war. In

the Soviet view, nuclear weapons are to be used in engagements where vital Soviet national interests are at stake. "Therefore Soviet forces along the border with China and in the Warsaw Pact are equipped and trained to operate on a nuclear battlefield."³ Also, Soviet strategists reject the American notion, that nuclear war will necessarily be the culmination of an escalatory process begun conventionally in the European theatre. Such notions characteristic of the American strategy of flexible response, are rarely discussed in Soviet military publications. The prevailing Soviet view of nuclear war is the all-out "total" war. While the concepts of limited or local war are mentioned, the danger of escalation to war on a large scale necessarily requires preparation for a total war. Rather than await escalation, the Soviet Union will pursue what is inevitable from the outset.

For everyone, including the imperialist theoreticians of local wars, obviously the probability of the development of limited war into world nuclear war, in the event of the involvement in local conflicts of nuclear powers, is always great, and under certain circumstances inevitable.

Taking into account the nature of imperialism ... Soviet military doctrine defines as the main trend of the perfection of the Soviet Armed Forces their ability and readiness to successfully wage armed combat in conformity with the demands of world nuclear war ...

The use of intercontinental means of combat can at once, from the very beginning of the war, achieve results of great strategic meaning. These results are achieved by the immediate use of strategic nuclear weapons, avoiding the methodical successive development of tactical successes into operational and finally strategic and in turn political results.

The Soviet Union therefore must be assured of escalation dominance in the event of a confrontation with the United States. That is, possessing the military capability for maximum political and military leverage in time of crisis or war. This necessarily requires strategic superiority.

Soviet strategic force deployments reflect this continual attempt to achieve strategic nuclear superiority in accordance with objectives outlined in the military doctrine of the USSR.

Therefore, although military power itself, within the Marxist-Leninist framework, is not the driving element in international politics, it nonetheless represents an important instrument in accelerating the inevitable forces of history while simultaneously restricting the forces of "reaction" i.e. the military capabilities of the West, which might otherwise be utilized to resist the unfolding and inevitable course of history and therefore the Soviet Union. It is this integrated mix of offensive and defensive elements - the historical role of the Soviet Union and the hostile perceptions of the noncommunist world - that characterizes Soviet military theory in particular and its foreign policy in general.

"Soviet military strategy and capabilities are designed to underwrite a global political conception in which the noncommunist industrialized states are weakened relative to the Soviet Union by the gradual loss of positions of influence and power, particularly in the Third World."⁵ Hence, Soviet support for wars of national liberation and the "progressive" forces engaged in the "anti-imperialist" struggle. "Again, the Soviet view of military power is related to a view of history - in the case of the Third World, a progression of revolutionary forces working against the West and in Moscow's favour, in which military power can be usefully employed to accelerate change that is considered inevitable."⁶ Ideologically the "correlation of forces" continually shifting in favour of socialism. Strategically, the drive to achieve conventional and nuclear superiority relative to the position of the primary adversary, the United States, without the risks of direct confrontation.

Peaceful coexistence and détente are the means through which the Soviet Union is able to maximize foreign policy gains and improve its strategic position with minimum risk. Avoiding nuclear war while at the same time preparing for such a possibility characterizes a basic theme in Soviet foreign policy and military doctrine. Peace and military strength represent consistent elements within Soviet doctrine. In this respect, deterrence and defense are conceptualized in a manner which diverge sharply from ideas held in the West.

In the Soviet conception, the inevitability of war with the capitalist states is no longer applicable within the context of the contemporary international system, where the growth of Soviet military power has served to deter Western "adventurism". However, this fact, due to the aggressive intent inherent in capitalist states, does not preclude the possibility of the Western states initiating nuclear war. Deterrence has always played a role in Soviet strategic military doctrine. However, the continued perception of the possibility of nuclear war, necessitates the erecting of means to defend against such a situation. Hence, Soviet emphasis upon active air defense and a large scale civil defense program.

Deterrence in the Soviet conception is fundamentally different from views held in the United States. In the United States, deterrence and defense are considered separate elements within the strategic military doctrine. Victory and defense in nuclear war are considered unachievable. War avoidance is primary. What has been deemed adequate for deterrence would not necessarily suffice for defense. Since, however, nuclear war as perceived by the West is to be avoided, then deterrence is considered adequate.

In contrast, Soviet logic holds that the possession of a war-fighting, war-winning capability is the necessary requisite for the deterrence of an adversary. In the Soviet conception, therefore, deterrence and defense are one and the same. The Soviet commitment to defense as an integral element in deterrence, signifies a willingness to consider nuclear war a possibility. "The objective postulated in Soviet military doctrine is not the deterrence of both sides, but the deterrence of the United States and in the event of war, the victory of the Soviet Union."⁷ Security through mutual vulnerability, as in mutual assured destruction, finds no place in Soviet strategic thought. It rejects the idea that cities be held hostage as postulated in mutual assured destruction. For the Soviet Union, deterring an attack on the Soviet homeland assumes priority and the idea of basing one's own security on one's own vulnerability is rejected. Hence the emphasis upon both active and passive defenses, specifically air and civil defense.

Defense, however, is effective in the nuclear era, only if combined with offense. The utility of active air and civil defenses increases considerably if combined with an effective counterforce capability. Soviet theory continually emphasizes the decisiveness of the initial periods of a nuclear war. The role of Soviet forces would be first to destroy the enemy's ability to conduct warfare. Nuclear weapons in Soviet doctrine, provide a decisive means in influencing the outcome of conflict, if utilized efficiently. This necessarily means striking first; either through surprise or preemptive attack. The role of Soviet strategic forces is therefore to destroy as much as is possible of the enemy's strike force through a first strike and minimize the effects of the enemy's retaliation through active and passive defenses. Damage limi-

tation, is the strategic force design of the Soviet Union. It is highly de-stabilizing as defined earlier, and requires continual and almost unlimited force deployments. It requires not only the continual upgrading of Soviet offensive capabilities, but also the continual quest of neutralizing American retaliatory capabilities. This not only requires the development of a Soviet counterforce capability aimed at American fixed land-based missiles, but also the means of destroying and defending against the remaining elements of the U.S. triad; sea and air launched strategic forces.

Moreover, strategic nuclear superiority represents a potential political instrument to be utilized for the enhancement of Soviet foreign policy objectives. Détente and the SALT negotiations represented the means through which the Soviet Union was able to advance its strategic position relative to the United States.

The Soviet Union has not allowed SALT to inhibit its manifest determination to achieve first strike capability to destroy the most accurate and responsive element of the U.S. strategic force posture - the ICBM's, which are at present the main U.S. means of destroying hardened Soviet military targets ... This behaviour is consistent with Soviet military doctrine which assigns top priority to the destruction of the enemy's most effective nuclear weapons. This counterforce capability could be useful to the Soviets in assuring escalation dominance in a U.S.-Soviet confrontation, even if never used operationally.

This objective is illustrated in their respective strategic force configurations and reflects the sharp contrast in their respective doctrines.

The United States has maintained its fixed land-based missile arsenal at the level of 1054 since 1967 in the belief that such a level guaranteed, together with the other elements of the triad, the destruction, in the event of a surprise attack upon the United States, of the Soviet Union and therefore adequate to maintain deterrence. In con-

trast, the Soviet Union has felt it necessary to test and deploy a series of new strategic systems beyond those required for deterrence as postulated in American strategic doctrine. "In 1975, the Soviet Union began deployment of the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19, all of which possess far greater throw weight than the U.S. Minuteman."⁹

Potential Soviet counterforce capability against the U.S. fixed land-based strategic force has arisen with respect to their prospective strategic postures during the 1980's. "With or without a SALT II treaty, the Soviet Union could deploy at least 300 SS-18's and about 500 SS-19's and SS-17's. The SS-18 has a payload of about 16,000 pounds, while the SS-17 and SS-19, respectively have payloads of 7,000 and 8,000 pounds. In contrast, in the U.S. inventory, the Minuteman Three has a payload not exceeding 2,200 pounds and carries three MIRVed warheads."¹⁰

The SS-18 is the largest of the Soviet ICBM force. "It is capable of carrying one 25 megaton warhead or as many as 40 MIRVed warheads, each in the kiloton range, or 10 to 12 warheads each having a yield of 550-800 kilotons."¹¹ Although the 308 SS-18's are permitted, the maximum of 10 warheads per missile under SALT II, the Soviet Union possesses the potential to successfully launch a counterforce strike against the U.S. land-based strategic forces.

A two-one-one attack against the Minuteman force would expend only two-thirds of the warheads permitted on the SS-18 force alone under the terms of the treaty. The remaining one-third re-entry vehicles, each approach one-megaton yield, could strike the B-52 force not airborne, SSBN bases, Washington D.C., the Strategic Air Command, the largest 100 U.S. urban centres and other high value targets including all major military bases in the U.S.¹²

"The SS-17 and SS-19, are permitted four and six MIRVed warheads respectively."¹³

Until the development and deployment of a new generation U.S. missile system, the Soviet Union will possess substantially more warheads in its ICBM force, only part of which would have to be launched against U.S. fixed land-based systems.

The greater throwweight combined with improvements in accuracy gives the Soviet Union a capacity to deploy more or heavier warheads on a single MIRVed missile and therefore the potential counterforce capability against the U.S. land-based force. The United States on the other hand, "will continue during much of the 1980's at least, to have a total deployment of MIRVed ICBM warheads of 1,650 - three times the number of missiles (550) deployed."¹⁴ A change in the situation must await the deployment by the United States of follow-on missiles well after 1985, with the MX and Midgetman missile systems. Therefore by the mid-1980's, "the Soviet Union could have available an aggregate throwweight in its MIRVed ICBM force as great as 13,000,000 pounds, in contrast to about 3,000,000, pounds for the United States. In numbers of ICBM warheads, the Soviet Union could have as many as 9200, while the United States figure will probably not exceed 2150."¹⁵

The asymmetrical emphasis upon land-based strategic forces, illustrates the contrasting strategic doctrines. For the moment at least, only the fixed land-based missiles possess the accuracy required for an effective counterforce doctrine. The Soviet Union, consistent with its doctrinal emphasis upon the Strategic Rocket Forces, has concentrated on building up its land-based strategic force.

However, since the late 1960's the Soviet Union has arisen as a naval power second only to the United States. Sea-based strategic forces have been developed to complement the large Soviet land-based

force. The emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower with global influence coincided with the attainment of substantive naval capabilities. Thus, naval capabilities not only serve to project Soviet influence around the world, its naval forces provide the strategic capabilities to combat an adversary that is traditionally, a naval power.

The Soviet navy is designed for both offensive and defensive operations. The missions given are first strategic nuclear strikes against the United States. "In addition to its formidable landbased MIRVed force, the Soviet Union possesses two MIRV-capable SLBM's. These include the SS-NX-17 and SS-NX-18, the latter of which is being deployed on Delta Three submarines."¹⁶

"The Delta class submarines, the world's largest in service as of 1979, could strike targets in any part of North America, Europe and a large part of China from the Greenland and Norwegian seas. In addition, the Soviet Union has under construction a new generation of submarines called the Typhoon, that will rival in size the U.S. Trident submarine."¹⁷ The development of the Soviet surface fleet has also been apparent. It is designed to confront the large U.S. fleet and naval dependence. In the case of offensive missions, the Soviet Union requires naval forces to interdict sea lines of communication to thwart U.S. resupply efforts to NATO for example. Soviet naval requirements also include sea-lift capabilities for purposes of its own re-supply and arms transfers for instance, with respect to its Third World policy.

In essence, the dependence of the Western industrialized states upon the oceans for economic and security interests makes them highly vulnerable, and in the event of war, represents an important consideration with respect to Soviet naval operations.

The Soviet Navy is expanding with respect to combating American offensive naval capabilities. It represents a vital element in the Soviet damage limitation posture in light of the design of the U.S. retaliatory force which places emphasis upon its own naval power. In essence, the Soviet Union is proceeding in its naval deployment, in developing capabilities required for both conventional and nuclear operations.

It suggests a desire on the part of the Soviet leadership, to develop the capabilities for the efficient projection of military power abroad and for purposes of developing potent anti-ship platforms. Of importance in both respects, is the expansion of Soviet naval aviation.

Since 1975, the Soviet Union has put into preparation, at least two of the Kiev class carriers, equipped with vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft and helicopters. Secondly, the Soviet navy is developing a large carrier, comparable to that of the U.S. navy, "which will provide the Soviets their first sea-based platforms for tactical aircraft on the American model."¹⁸

Included in Soviet naval aircraft are the Backfire B Bomber and the older Tu 16 and Tu 22 aircraft, the majority of which are antiship platforms. Anti-submarine warfare operations include a number of converted bombers and helicopters. However, the efficacy of Soviet naval aviation operations against the U.S. is currently limited, since most if not all of the above mentioned aircraft must operate from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This situation may change if the Soviet Union succeeds in expanding its influence in strategically important areas abroad and "begins to procure large deck aircraft carriers which reduce the dependence of the navy on shore-based aircraft."¹⁹

Moreover, "the Soviet Union maintains more attack submarines (190 to 84) than the United States, of which 54 are nuclear-powered."²⁰ They are deployed to protect ballistic missile submarines from American attack submarines and carrier task forces and to track U.S. ballistic missile submarines. "The Soviet Union has introduced a new class of attack submarine, the Alpha, which is extremely fast and deep diving and has constructed a sizeable force of cruise missile submarines including the Oscar-class, which can fire its 24 long-range antiship cruise missiles while submerged."²¹

The Soviet Union appears determined to erode and eventually neutralize the potential effectiveness of U.S. forces that would survive a Soviet first-strike attack. This necessarily requires defense against U.S. submarine launched strategic forces.

In its strategic defensive programs the Soviet Union attaches priority to the research on anti-submarine warfare. As stated by the Soviet Admiral of the Fleet, Sergei Gorshkov, "the requirement is for an intensive research and development program for anti-submarine warfare capabilities directed against U.S. and NATO sea-based forces."²² Soviet R&D efforts have been oriented towards achieving a breakthrough in submarine detection technologies and "as a result of extensive experimentation with passive and active, magnetic as well as, acoustic and non-acoustic ASW techniques, the Soviet Union may have made substantial advances in deepwater ocean detection."²³

Similarly in the area of air defense, the Soviet Union has invested considerable effort. Soviet efforts in the area of air defense appear directed towards the remaining element of the U.S. triad, the strategic bomber and cruise missile capability. "The appearance of the SA-X-10

on surface ships as well as in test fields in the Soviet Union and more recently a Soviet look-down, shoot-down capability, attest to their efforts to achieve an active defense against this component of the U.S. triad."²⁴ Despite the ABM treaty, which severely restricted the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems, the Soviet Union considers air defense as important. "At least 12,000 surface-to-air missile launchers and nearly 3,000 interceptor aircraft are deployed in the Soviet Union, and considerable emphasis is placed on the modernization of air defenses."²⁵ Active defenses, already existing and those of future technologies, assume importance when considered within the context of defense priorities of the Soviet Union. The role of defense includes survival of the government or state apparatus, requiring a post-attack recovery base, which necessarily includes the maintenance of key economic installations. The efficacy of an active defense system, however, remains a function of the level of technological sophistication of Soviet defensive capabilities. As of the early 1970's, the United States held an impressive lead over the Soviet Union in ABM technologies, and as such, it is believed the Soviets were interested in concluding the ABM agreement in SALT I. The Soviet Union allocates substantial investment into air defense forces, as emphasized in their doctrine. However, the extent to which the Soviet Union has involved itself into this area is open to debate. The level of Soviet research and development efforts and the potential for the rapid deployment of ABM technologies now in existence is open to question, but the possibilities exist. In the ABM treaty, the United States was allowed the protection of one ICMB site while the Soviet Union protected an urban centre. This again illustrates the contrasting doctrines where the United States could protect against a first strike and the Soviet Union against retaliation.

A second area of which the Soviet Union appears to be investing considerable effort, is in the development of directed energy technologies. The feasibility of such systems for the near future is uncertain. Yet Soviet doctrinal emphasis upon the interdiction of the "communication" of the enemy, pushes effort in this direction. The U.S. strategic forces are highly dependent upon the availability of reconnaissance and early warning communication systems. The development of an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability has potentially important military applications with respect to undermining U.S. retaliatory capabilities. Therefore, "while directed energy technologies presently have limited use against ballistic missiles, a laser weapon could potentially blind or damage many key U.S. space-based early warning and communications systems."²⁶ Similarly, the Soviet Union has successfully tested "killer satellites", which when placed in orbit close to American satellites are designed to explode and destroy them. In sum, the current generation of Soviet active nuclear defense capabilities are limited with respect to defending against all elements of an attack by U.S. ballistic missiles and aircraft. However, the Soviet emphasis upon warfighting strategy impels the Soviets towards continuing the research into erecting an adequate active defense system. In contrast, after the ABM treaty the United States dismantled most of its continental air defense system.

Similarly, in the area of civil defense, the Soviet Union attaches a much greater importance. "The Soviet interest in civil defense as a central part of strategy represents an asymmetry of fundamental proportions with respect to the United States and specifically a strategic concept based on mutual assured destruction."²⁷ The importance attached is illustrated by the fact that civil defense contingencies are

under the direct control of the military. In civil defense, the Soviet Union emphasizes the protection of those institutions, industries and individuals considered most important for the survival and post-attack recovery of the Soviet state. "Civil defense has been steadily increasing since the mid-1950's as a component program for war survival. It has gained importance, especially since 1961, when it was placed within the Soviet Ministry of Defense. The civil defense organization, it is estimated, includes tens of millions of people."²⁸

In general, Soviet doctrinal commitment to strategic defense has been "manifest in both passive (civil) defense and active defense, including anti-ballistic missile systems, anti-satellite capabilities, surface-to-air, air-defense systems, and anti-submarine warfare capability."²⁹

The efficacy of defense against nuclear attack with existing technologies is debatable. Whatever the potency of Soviet defense systems, both active and passive, it remains a function of the particular force strategy employed. That is, much more effective if employed in combination with a first-strike counterforce strategy. Defending against a retaliatory strike is much simpler than defense against a first strike. Soviet doctrine emphasizes striking first. Even within the context of Brezhnev's declaration for no-first use of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union retains the first strike prerogative. As stated by Marshal Ustinov, the Soviet Minister of Defense:

The leaders in Washington and other NATO capitals most surely realize that while renouncing first use of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union also denies the right of first strike to all those who harbor plans of a nuclear attack in the hope of winning a nuclear war. The balance of the military and technological capabilities of the two sides are such that the imperialist forces will not be able to achieve military superiority either at the stage of preparation for nuclear war or at the time when they try to start such a war.

Ideas of stability in the nuclear balance through mutual vulnerability find no place in Soviet strategic doctrine. The Soviet Union continues to pursue an efficient damage limitation ability, requiring substantial nuclear superiority. It is a military policy which is destabilizing by Western conceptions and has generated an American reaction which is potentially dangerous.

IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

The American posture on deterrence has the potential for ensuring stability in the strategic balance with the USSR. If ensuring stability is concerned with the security of second strike capabilities of both parties, then there is a basis for limited cooperation between the superpowers toward enhancing the security of both. They could cooperate explicitly or tacitly in managing force postures so as to minimize the threats posed to their respective second strike capabilities. As Paul Nitze stated,

... the basic aim was an underlying condition of what might be called "crisis stability", a situation where neither side could gain by a first strike and of "mutually assured destruction" where each side would have a fully adequate second-strike capability to deter the other. In such a condition it was believed that the result would be much greater stability and higher chances of the peaceful resolution of crises if they did occur.³¹

It is possible to envisage over time, movement towards disarmament. "If both sides were to adopt such a concept it should be possible to move from what might be called a "high deterrent" posture to a "low deterrent" posture with the deterrent remaining essentially equivalent on both sides but at successively lower levels."³²

"Crisis stability" however, does not appear to be a Soviet objective. Strategic and international stability are alien concepts to Soviet policy formulations. Third-World competition is the potential environment for superpower confrontation. In a crisis, an unstable strategic balance may undermine attempts towards crisis resolution. In a context where the overwhelming advantage lies in striking first, "lower level" instability could conceivably escalate to nuclear war if one or both sides perceived it as inevitable.

The Soviet Union however, has continued in both areas. Its nuclear force design is damage limitation. Its Third World policy has continued in the quest of undermining American interests and enhancing Soviet strategic objectives. In fact it is Soviet military doctrinal requirements which form the basis of its "national liberation" policy. In this sense, the Soviet Union does recognize the link between competition in the Third World and the strategic relationship of the superpowers. However, not in the same way as the West.

It is becoming more evident the Soviet Union has not accepted the American logic fundamental to "deterrence". Ideology, undiminished hostility and insecurity with respect to the West, and extensive military, rather than civilian input into the design of strategic policy have all contributed to a strategic military doctrine based on the possibility of victory in nuclear war. Victory requires damage limitation policies including active and civil defense in combination with preemptive or first strike and retaliatory capability. The Soviet strategic philosophy is functionally incompatible with any tangible limits or attaining any sort of equilibrium. A doctrine that seeks substantial survival levels for one's own system and society and assured destruction of the opponent

requires almost unlimited force outlays. Soviet doctrine, when operationalized, is a catalyst for endless competition and escalation in the arms race.

If by the mid 1980's, the Soviet Union is able to achieve a marked superiority in strategic forces and is able to substantially neutralize American land-based retaliatory capabilities, deterrence will become less stable for a number of reasons.

First, although the Soviet Union does not desire nuclear war, being prepared to engage in and survive such a development may compel Soviet leaders to initiate nuclear hostilities in a situation of crisis if it is perceived as the only alternative.

Secondly, vulnerability from the American perspective, may limit the political and military options available to the United States such that the will or to intent to retaliate is doubtful in the event of a crisis situation. In this context, the credibility of the U.S. deterrent is suspect, not only operationally, but psychologically.

Third, U.S. ICBM vulnerability may necessitate a change in American nuclear strategy so as to avoid the destruction of its most effective retaliatory forces. The United States may deem it necessary to adopt a "launch on warning" posture, at least until it is able to secure the invulnerability of its retaliatory forces once again. In this situation, the strategic balance is more unstable, increasing the possibility of accidental war.

Soviet strategic military doctrine is an inherently destabilizing factor in the strategic balance, compelling the United States towards either continual re-adjustment in maintaining its second strike capability. (Deployment of the MX system and the Trident SLBM system are

said to be designed for this purpose.) Or the United States can respond in kind and adopt a similar nuclear strategy as posed by the Soviet Union. (It appears the United States is moving in this direction under the massive military building of the Reagan administration.)

If both were to seek such war-fighting capabilities with nuclear weapons, the strategic balance becomes even more unstable, providing the advantage and therefore incentive to both superpowers to launch preemptive strikes, if war seemed inevitable.

Essentially, Soviet strategic military doctrine complicates ever more an inherently unstable structure of deterrence, which in itself implies perhaps inevitable catastrophe. Although it may be argued that it remains possible to conclude agreements towards arms control despite contrasting doctrine, it does nevertheless limit the scope of arms control. "The Soviet warfighting strategy makes it difficult to accept strategic parity with the United States and makes it difficult for the United States to conclude strategic arms limitation agreements on any other basis."³³

Despite pronouncements in favour of peace and disarmament, Soviet leaders have never regarded such measures as realistic policy ends. "The appeals for disarmament have often been used for political ends. Soviet disarmament policy has been used as a means of compensating for military and technical inferiority or as in the case of European IRBM systems, to induce a rival to offer unilateral concessions and limitations to its own limited programs."³⁴ This was illustrated in the Soviet interest in the ABM agreement of SALT I, from which a considerably superior American development program was halted. Soviet strategists appear to have concluded that defense could be enhanced through a counterforce policy in combination with the halting of the American ABM

program, thus relieving them of the pressure to match U.S. developments in this area.

"During the 1970's, while negotiating SALT and other arms-control related agreements, the Soviet Union is estimated to have spent upwards of \$100 billion more than the United States on strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems alone."³⁵ The Soviet Union appears determined to achieve strategic superiority and to design a conventional force to advance its global and strategic objectives.

Despite claims in favour of arms-limitation, Soviet force deployments imply the contrary. Soviet objectives concerning arms control appear aimed at limiting American strategic forces. For example, the Soviet Union has continually called for agreements to limit the use of outer-space for strategic purposes. The reaction of the Soviet Union following President Reagan's speech concerning the American commitment to develop laser and particle beam defense systems, was swift. The Soviets claimed that the U.S. was undermining the fundamentals of a stable deterrence.

Yet the Soviet Union has also invested heavily in the exploration of outerspace for military purposes. It has been the Soviet Union which first tested "killer satellites". It was the Soviet Union which stated as part of its military program that,

It would be a great mistake not to take into account the possibility that cosmic means of attack might turn out to be in the hands of the imperialists. The interests of the security of our Motherland and other socialist countries demand the detailed study of the whole sum of questions connected with organizing PKO (anti-cosmic defense) and with working out effective methods of battle with the cosmic strategy of the aggressor.³⁶

In effect, the Soviet Union is willing to negotiate on a number of issues concerning arms control and international stability, but only to the extent they do not undermine its own objectives with respect to its

military and foreign policy. This posture is evident in its arms control negotiations. "In the SALT I negotiations, the Soviet Union negotiated for 313 to zero advantage in deployment of heavy missiles."³⁷ "In SALT II, the Soviet Union was permitted to retain a 308 to 0 advantage in heavy silo-based ICBMs (SS-18) - it successfully resisted U.S. pressure to reduce the number of heavy missiles to 150 - in return for agreeing to equal aggregate force levels."³⁸ In effect, while both sides had agreed to equal aggregate force levels, the United States has maintained a much higher proportion of its force deployments in the form SLBM's and heavy bombers, which for the time being, are essentially retaliatory in design and capability.

The Soviet Union also enjoys a lead in "Euro-strategic" weapons, which do not have intercontinental range, but are capable of hitting targets anywhere in Western Europe. However, they can be easily made into an ICBM by adding a third stage to the rocket. The SS-20 represents a potential first-strike weapon against Western Europe and complements the Warsaw Pact's conventional edge over NATO. "If the Soviet Union achieves unquestioned dominance in theatre nuclear forces and it can check the U.S. strategic capability, it will be advantageously situated, in nuclear terms, to play on Western European fears and intra-alliance objectives in Europe."³⁹ That is, it will succeed in de-coupling the American and European nuclear security system.

In essence, the issue of arms control has been approached by the U.S. and USSR, with different objectives in mind. The United States assumed the basic principle involved was maintenance of strategic stability through mutual assured destruction. That has never been the Soviet objective. The concept of strategic stability finds no place in

Soviet military doctrine. Rather, the achievement of a nuclear war-fighting capability has been the objective. "They worry less about the de-stabilizing effects of rendering land-based ICBM forces vulnerable. Particularly when it is only the American ICBM force that faces the danger. Better that their ability to take out the largest part possible of American ICBMs remain unimpaired than that the unsettling efforts of a counterforce race be precluded. Only when the issue becomes the very survival of the Soviet ICBM force are they likely to accept this as a pressing matter in SALT."⁴⁰

Thus Soviet interest in détente, stems from a number of policy objectives, least of which are mutual arms control and international stability. A fundamental objective was the pressing need of foreign importations of superior technology and grain for highly wasteful and inefficient economic and agricultural systems.

A second factor in the Soviet interest in détente concerns the Soviet problem with China. The Sino-Soviet schism, represents a perceived threat to Soviet security, despite their substantial military superiority, and especially within the context of better Sino-American relations. "Unhappy over the need to maintain large conventional forces along the Chinese border and disturbed as much by China's active challenge to Soviet interests and clients in the Far East as by its potential as a superpower, Moscow seeks détente in the West in order to acquire maximum latitude for dealing with China in the East."⁴¹

A third factor for Soviet interest in détente was the desire to obtain formal recognition of the territorial status-quo in Europe. The legitimization of the division of Germany and the Soviet imperial system in Eastern Europe was accomplished at the CSCE in Helsinki in 1975.

In sum, détente had facilitated the attainment of a number of Soviet foreign and domestic policy objectives, was recognized as such by the Soviet leadership and was therefore advantageous in this respect. However, this did not inhibit the continual Soviet quest for military-strategic and political advantage relative to the United States. The Soviet Union sees no contradiction in the cooperative and competitive aspects of peaceful co-existence. In general, peaceful co-existence means the continued competition and ideological struggle in all aspects short of war. It includes the continued effort to weaken the adversary in order to alter the "correlation of world forces" through political, economic and ideological means. Within this context, Soviet ambitions in the Third World assume substance. Despite the adverse effect on Soviet-American relations, the Soviet Union is "riding the crest of an imperial-minded phase of its foreign policy." It seeks influence in major areas of the world, especially in the regions lying south of the USSR; Afghanistan, Iran, Arab states of the gulf and Arabian peninsula and more recently in black-Africa.⁴² In effect, the Soviet Union has continually sought to enhance its strategic-military and political position relative to the United States. Détente has facilitated this objective. Within the context of détente, the Soviet Union has continued its military buildup, both nuclear and conventional, and has expanded its objectives in the Third World in an effort to undermine the West and extend Soviet influence. However, the view that the preponderance of military power relative to one's adversary is necessary, a view which appears dominant in Soviet political and military circles, serves only to increase the insecurity of the adversary, and as such, gives continual momentum to the arms race and international competition.

This has been evident in the recent American military and foreign policy initiatives. The United States has reacted with an unprecedented military buildup, both conventional and nuclear, and has stepped up its objectives and commitments in the Third World. This serves only to heighten tension and helps to destabilize an already precarious strategic nuclear balance.

It has been, as this paper has attempted to illustrate, the function of ideological and structural elements of the Soviet political system which has contributed to Soviet policy; undiminished hostility, far-sighted global objectives and considerable military input into policy.

The military power of the Soviet Union, as the main element of the "correlation of forces", represents the subjective element upon which the objective immutable laws of the inevitable socialist triumph are based. Theoretically, Marxist-Leninist doctrine establishes the necessity for its military arm; for the preservation and security of the Soviet state and therefore, protection for the present socialist gains and of the future socialist progression. The "correlation of forces", also including the national liberation of all of the oppressed peoples, requires the extension of Soviet military capability and assistance to those nations in need. As such, Soviet military policy in general is easily justified theoretically. The strength of the Soviet military in turn, gives substance and legitimation to Soviet ideology and doctrine. For it is Soviet military strength and capabilities which enables the USSR to exert its influence abroad with respect to not only the Western powers and the United States but also with the Third World. The Soviet Union does not possess the economic power of the United States with respect to gaining influence abroad, and therefore must rely more upon its

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cumscribed objectives with respect to military policy and capabilities. Ideology legitimizes an almost limitless necessity for arms procurement. Military policy in turn gives credence to the theoretical constructs of the Soviet system. In essence allowing for the articulation and dissemination of Soviet doctrine. Both contribute to the stability of the Soviet political system through the provision of the rationale behind the system.

For ideological and structural reasons, the Soviet Union in seeking to enhance its security, undermines the stability of the strategic nuclear balance. However, the unparalleled Soviet military growth which began in the mid 1960's and its continued national liberation policy, has generated a sharp reaction from its main adversary, the United States. Which, with its own tremendous military "reaction" has increased the intensity of the arms competition. The Soviet Union, in disturbing the basis of détente and in stimulating a new escalation in the arms race, may have inadvertently, as is the case in the nuclear age, undermined its own security.

This brings into question whether the Soviet Union will ever perceive itself as militarily secure. Traditional insecurity as well as ideologically defined hostility and suspicion and considerable military input in policy formulation breed perceptions of inherently aggressive intent with respect to Western actions and objectives. Even during détente such perceptions were not abated. Consequently, Soviet foreign and military policies have engendered a Western, especially American, reaction which fulfills Soviet expectations and strengthens the role of the military in the USSR. Achieving security through strategic nuclear superiority within the context of the arms race appears unlikely. The continual arms competition both quantitative and qualitative

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precludes such a situation. As such, the Soviet Union may see its security interests better fulfilled in recognizing the security of mutual vulnerability as perhaps a more practicable alternative.

However, such a view runs contrary to the views held by the Soviet military. Secondly, re-orienting preconceived notions and attitudes of the entire political-military establishment appears unlikely. This fact is complicated by the apparent rejection by the Reagan Administration, of the doctrine of deterrence discussed earlier. American strategic nuclear policy appears directed towards regaining nuclear superiority and obtaining a "first strike" capability. Yet such a policy, while highly de-stabilizing may be the only method of inducing the Soviet Union towards any meaningful reduction in strategic weapons. For example, the MX missile system, has 10 nuclear warheads. It is to be based in existing Minuteman silos which are assumed to be vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. It is therefore highly de-stabilizing in that it increases American first strike capability without decreasing ICBM vulnerability. Yet the MX represents the only credible "bargaining chip" with respect to decreasing Soviet heavy silo-based missiles such as the SS-18.

If utilized for this purpose, new American strategic systems may eventually contribute to the stability of the nuclear balance, such that the superpowers will have more "common points" of interest with respect to arms control negotiations. Otherwise, imbalances in the strategic forces of the superpowers make it difficult to conclude meaningful arms limitation and reduction agreements because each attach divergent priorities and objectives with respect to such negotiations. Currently, this is the situation. Whether the Soviet Union will accept the concepts

of stability discussed earlier is debatable, but appears unlikely. The Soviet Union has continued to expand its arsenal irrespective of whether or not the United States was doing likewise, as exemplified during the period of détente. This has generated among American policy makers a level of paranoia matching that of the Soviets, with respect to Soviet intentions, thus limiting the prospects for any meaningful dialogue between the superpowers on nuclear arms control.

In essence, as argued in the thesis, the current state of the superpower relationship to a large extent, originates from recent Soviet military and Third World actions. The Soviet Union, through its continual and massive military buildup, has effectively undermined the stability of deterrence. In some areas, Soviet military capabilities have achieved the level necessary to fulfill objectives outlined in its military theory. Moreover, Soviet policy in the Third World, often manifest in direct military intervention, provides the potential setting and catalyst for superpower confrontation and conflict. In effect, the Soviet Union has undermined the stability of deterrence at the strategic level thus impeding prospects for crisis resolution in the event there emerges serious conflict, while simultaneously providing the impetus for such possibilities through its ambitious objectives in the Third World.

Consequently, the level of tension between the superpowers has risen considerably. Despite the fact that deterrence remains relatively "intact" in that neither superpower is presently in a position to initiate nuclear hostilities without suffering immense destruction, it will remain so only as long as each are able to match the military developments and deployments of the other or are able to conclude an agreement limiting nuclear weapons such that stability and security are reconciled. The

implications of an intense and protracted nuclear arms race are potentially serious, raising the level of tension and affecting the perceptions of each superpower with respect to the objectives and capabilities of the other.. Yet, Soviet policy objectives are functionally incompatible with achieving a level of equilibrium or limitation of strategic nuclear weapons, thus inhibiting prospects for arms control agreements. This will change only when the Soviet Union perceives its best interests served through a stable deterrent relationship with the United States.

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