**Squeegee kids:
A study of successful scapegoating, 1995-2001.**

By
Derek S. Foster, M.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

School of Journalism and Communication
Faculty of Public Affairs and Management

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
© Derek Foster, 2004

Library and
Archives Canada

Bibliothèque et
Archives Canada

Published Heritage
Branch

Direction du
Patrimoine de l'édition

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file Votre référence

ISBN: 0-612-97823-0

Our file Notre référence

ISBN: 0-612-97823-0

NOTICE:

The author has granted a non-exclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distribute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or non-commercial purposes, in microform, paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright ownership and moral rights in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

AVIS:

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou autres formats.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur et des droits moraux qui protègent cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis.

Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privée, quelques formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de cette thèse.

While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis.

Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant.

Canada

ABSTRACT

This is a study of how the social issue of squeegeeing was constructed in the media. It concentrates on media coverage in Toronto and the period ranging from 1995 to 2001 – the time and place of the greatest debate in the Canadian context. The main theoretical tool for this analysis comes from the collected work of Kenneth Burke. Specifically, I apply Burkean dramatism – the idea that all life is a drama and that all dramas involve some means of “guilt-redemption” – in order to understand the social issue of squeegeeing as a drama created by communication. I contend that people symbolically act through language and create dramas when they make claims in the media. These claims about squeegee kids were inherently moralistic. Rhetoric about squeegee kids cast them as a problem in need of reform. I will show how squeegee kids came to represent social dis-ease and how they were identified as scapegoats whose eradication would bring about safer streets and a purified social scene. My goal is to demonstrate that a dramatistic analysis of guilt-redemption and people’s motives is relevant to the study of contemporary social problems. The debate over squeegeeing (understood dramatically) illuminates important aspects of our human rhetorical condition and contributes to our understanding of the political and social value of the scapegoating process.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the course of writing a dissertation, one's attempt to establish "semantic" meaning might preclude one's "poetic" meanings from seeing the light of day. However, I've decided to include a bit of poetic meaning (liberally, and fairly directly informed by the thoughts of Warren Zevon) to sum up the process of writing and to give thanks where they are due:

Not all pieces of writing skip merrily into the world. As with children, there are the melancholy and the morbid ones, prone to spells of worrisome inactivity. This project proved itself to be one such troubled spirit. It got made. Yes. And its conception and birth was, finally, a happy time for me. But in its youth it spent too much time alone, as my happiness (or what I thought happiness was, at that time) precluded time spent with it. Then, to get it done, it stopped visiting with old friends. But it picked up new ones along the way who guided it, like adolescence, through a period of sometimes bumpy development in order that it might emerge to become something greater.

The final shape of this dissertation is quite a bit improved from its earliest incarnation. There was a period of early inactivity during which I taught many courses and investigated many different possible theoretical directions for my writing. I would like to especially thank my supervisor Prof. Paul Attallah. Your guidance of this project – especially in the final stages – was invaluable.

From the project's conception to its birth (and when it began to walk on its own – with the discovery of Burke), many friends and acquaintances made my doctoral studies always happy and productive, both personally and professionally). My fellow Ph.D. students in the department have provided networks of support, kept me intellectually honest and kept me entertained.

Sincere appreciation must also be expressed to the faculty in Carleton's school of Journalism and Communication, other departments, and other schools who have supported this project in one way or another. Some of you have been involved directly in its formative stages or sitting on the defense at its end. Others have been indirectly involved but encouraging me all along. Thank you.

I acknowledge the love and support of my family throughout this project. Even when I couldn't seemingly adequately explain my project, my mother has been an especially strong advocate of my work and has always listened to my arguments (both the good and the bad).

Finally, I would like to acknowledge Constanza Alvarado. You will always be my Neruda – my source of strength and beauty. As this project has come together, so have you and I. As I leave it behind me, I move towards you.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	ii
Acknowledgments	iii
Table of Contents	iv
Introduction	1
Squeegeeing: A dramatic social issue.....	2
Introducing Burke and rhetoric	4
Burke and dramatism	7
The constructionist approach to social problems	8
Why study squeegee kids?	12
Potential contributions of this dissertation	12
Chapter review	17
Chapter 1: Literature Review I – Burke, summarized	20
Overview of Burke’s dramatistic system	20
Dramatism and language	26
The pentad	27
Ratios	29
Substance	31
Identification	35
Hierarchy	38
The negative	39
Guilt and guilt-redemption	41
Victimage	43
Entelechy	45
Tragic and comic perspectives	47
Justifying my use of the term “dramatism”	49
Conclusion	52
Chapter 2: Literature Review II – Burke, contextualized	54
Dramatism and social constructionism	54
Squeegee narrative or squeegee drama?	63
Dramatism versus speech act theory	66
Dramatism versus the moral panic	71
Applying dramatism to social problems discourse	75
Conclusion	82

Chapter 3: Methodology	84
Applicability of method	84
Description of method	86
Methodological choices	87
Components of a dramatistic methodology	96
Structural Analysis I: The Representative Anecdote	96
Structural Analysis II: The Pentad	98
Structural analysis III: guilt-redemption analysis.	100
Cluster analysis	103
Agon analysis	105
Conclusion	106
Chapter 4: Outlining the Representative Anecdote	109
Specifying the anecdote in the squeegee issue	109
A cleansing vocabulary	112
A militaristic vocabulary	115
Chapter 5: Who are the squeegee kids I – Pentad Analysis	121
Squeegee kids' actions	123
Pentad I – act	124
Pentad II – agent	125
Pentad III – part (a): agency of squeegee kids	129
Pentad III – part (b): agency of drivers	132
Pentad IV – part (a): the scene of city streets	134
Pentad IV – part (b): the urban scene of the city	136
Pentad IV – part (c): the scene of youth violence	138
Pentad V – purpose	143
Conclusion	146
Chapter 6: Who are the squeegee kids II – The Scapegoat	149
Introducing Scapegoating	149
Scapegoating as guilt-redemption	152
The randomness of victimage	154
Justifying victimage – they brought it on themselves	155
Victimage as a political tool	156
Deflections of scapegoating	158
Scapegoating and the ossification of attitudes	160
Squeegee kids as enemy	162
The cumulative effect of negative representations	170

Linking the enemy to dirt, death, and disorder	171
Squeegee kids as political enemy	173
The usefulness of political enemies	177
Conclusion	179
Chapter 7: Media Analysis I – 1995-1997	181
1995 – An introduction to the phenomenon	181
1996 – Squeegee kids become a specific target	188
1997 – Rising squeegee kids and mounting frustration	195
Conclusion	203
Chapter 8: Media Analysis II – 1998	204
An escalating problem?	207
The vilification of youth	216
Shifting blame from youngsters to individuals	219
The city takes action	224
Squeegee kids – as abject and fecal	229
Squeegee kids – the imperfect villain	232
Conclusion	238
Chapter 9: Media Analysis III – 1999	240
Inaction and frustration at the city level	240
The provincial government finally steps in	242
Making kids (rhetorically) criminal	245
Specifying kids as a political enemy	248
Squeegee kids as agon	255
The issue of squeegee kids starts to decline	260
Conclusion	267
Chapter 10: Media Analysis IV – 2000 and beyond	268
Implementation of solution – end of debate?	269
Moving on – looking beyond the squeegee problem	275
2001 – contesting ownership	280
What comes after the fight is won?	287
2002 & beyond – rare reminders of an outsider status	292
Conclusion	295

Chapter 11: An Overview of the Squeegee Drama	296
Summation of the squeegee narrative	296
Final comments about guilt and the squeegee drama	298
Final comments on value-conflict and the agon	302
Final comments	307
Conclusion	309
Considering the power of the media	309
Considering the power of the audience	310
Considering my method	312
Considering the power of language	314
Considering the implications of this study	315
Appendix I: Squeegee events timeline	323
Appendix II: Evidence of the representative anecdote	332
Cleansing vocabulary	332
Militaristic vocabulary	335
Appendix III: Graphic evidence of media coverage of squeegee kids	339
Temporal development of squeegee drama (1995-2001)	340
<i>Toronto Star</i> squeegee coverage – coded for bias	341
<i>Toronto Sun</i> squeegee coverage – coded for bias	342
Work Cited I: Bibliography of academic sources	343
Work Cited II: Bibliography of media sources	359

INTRODUCTION

The date is June 20, 1996. Squeegeeing – the idea of washing car windows for cash – began in Toronto the summer before, but only a few intersections in the Queen St. W. and Yonge St. areas became squeegee sites. By the summer of 1996, the practice now attracted suburban teens in addition to street kids. Mike Colle, a Member of Provincial Parliament, was stopped at the intersection of Richmond St. W. and Spadina Ave and had his wiper blades torn off by a squeegee kid. These windshield washers were referred to as “swarms of squeegee mercenaries” in a report of the incident to the *Toronto Star* (Stancu, 1996, p. A2). Colle noted how he was “jumped upon by a squeegee person” and spoke of the phenomenon as “a plague” (ibid.).

Colle’s claim reinforced how this “infestation” was no longer contained in just a few squeegee hotspots. Colle reported widespread “intimidation on our downtown streets.” He even spoke of shopkeepers who feared their businesses would be vandalized (ibid.). The kids are referred to as “nattily dressed” and “punks” and a Metro sergeant referred to the aggressive tactics of squeegee people as “extortion plain and simple” (ibid.). Colle asked Toronto Mayor Barbara Hall to stop this harassment of motorists. He indicated he would contact Metro and provincial officials for their input in “*stamping out the squeegees*” (ibid., emphasis added). The headline of Stancu’s article read, “MPP vows to *wipe out* army of squeegee ‘punks’” (ibid., emphasis added).

This anecdote is representative of language claims that constituted the squeegee drama. The claims-maker exhibited great indignation and squeegee kids were typified as dirty, aggressive and intransigent. Stancu (1996, p. A2) noted, “Police yesterday blitzed

some downtown intersections.” The war-like nature of squeegee kids apparently demanded a like-minded response. However, violence on the part of the State was typified as redemptive. After all, squeegee kids were characterized as a force that threatened not just drivers but everyone in the city. The “fall” of the city seems to be augured by the presence of squeegee kids. In order to redeem the image of “Toronto the Good,” the befouling squeegee kids must be removed. The threat is so great that all levels of government are conscripted to the cause of finding a solution to the squeegee problem.

SQUEEGEEING – A DRAMATIC SOCIAL ISSUE

This dissertation examines the social construction of squeegeeing. Public claimsmakers used very dramatic rhetoric when they told their stories of squeegee encounters and communicated their thoughts and feelings about the issue. I selected the above anecdote in order to reflect the scope of people’s moral rhetoric regarding squeegeeing and to outline the nature of this drama. This anecdote is representative of common understandings of squeegee kids and the vocabulary used to describe them. Colle’s claim, coincidentally, was the first public claim about squeegee kids that featured an explicit call for their reform.

Put prosaically, squeegeeing was the act of cleaning a vehicle’s windshield while the vehicle is stopped at an intersection and asking the driver for change. This act became a significant political and social issue in a number of constituencies in the late 1990s. The people who performed the act of squeegeeing were generally known in Canada as squeegee kids. This study will examine media constructions of squeegee kids in order to analyze how squeegee kids emerged and evolved as a social problem and a significant

political issue. I will use Kenneth Burke's "dramatism" to analyze how this issue was socially constructed as a drama through media representations.

Dramatism is "a technique for analyzing language as a mode of action in which specialized nomenclatures are recognized, each with particular ends and insights" (Burke, 1985, p. 89). The language that typified squeegee kids exhibited a specific, dramatic nomenclature. Claims-makers characteristically referred to these windshield washers as "squeegee brats" (Barnes, 1996, p. 12) and "real terrorists" (Taylor, 2000). I will investigate such language use in order to understand the nature of the human being as symbol-user and to understand how human beings use and are used by symbols (see Chesebro, 1988: 185).

Squeegeeing in the streets was a dramatic spectacle. But it was the public rhetoric of pro-squeegee activists and anti-squeegee advocates that communicated the issue to the public and dramatized it in the public imagination. In order to study squeegeeing as a social issue, I concentrated my analysis on Toronto newspapers. Squeegeeing also occurred in other Canadian locales such as Vancouver, Montreal, Winnipeg, Saskatoon and Edmonton, all of which instituted local bylaws against squeegeeing. However, the debate in Toronto reached another level. As local ordinances were discussed and abandoned, it was widely reported that squeegee kids from other cities (which had instituted crackdowns) migrated to Toronto. As the squeegee population grew, squeegee "diversion" policies were implemented (and widely criticized) and a municipal "solution" to the "problem" of squeegee kids was preempted by a province-wide squeegee-initiative. As Canada's largest city became a battleground over squeegee kids, its media also served as a lightning rod for attention about the issue. In fact, people's rhetoric – their language

claims about squeegee kids in the media – made squeegeeing into an issue. This dissertation will use dramatism to study the rhetoric of these claims in the media in order to chart the evolution of a controversial social issue.

INTRODUCING BURKE AND RHETORIC

My dissertation will examine squeegee claims – and the evolution of squeegee kids as a social issue – by paying attention to rhetoric. Specifically, it will use Kenneth Burke's theories of language use to examine individuals' public claims about squeegeeing. In Burkean¹ terms, "from the vantage point of rhetoric, society is a 'barnyard' in constant turmoil from voices wrangling for adherence to competing orientations" (Heath, 1986, p. 40). This orientation is crucial to understanding the divisive nature of social issue discourse.

"The heart of Burke's argument is simple enough, namely, that symbolic forms affect conduct because of the ways in which they affect communication, and thus all action" (Duncan, 1965, pp. xx-xxi). From this, we can understand that the way in which squeegeeing is symbolized largely determines the kinds of emotions we have about squeegee kids. Burke believes that, as symbol-using animals, people express themselves symbolically primarily through language. People might hate (or love) squeegee kids but they cannot stop them from approaching cars in the street (or change their social status) physically with their own hands. Instead, they try to effect change regarding squeegee kids by engaging in symbolic action. By describing things in language, people act via the words they speak and the documents they write. This symbolic action includes describing a group such as squeegee kids in written form in newspapers. People can try to change

¹ Some authors use the term "Burkean" while others use "Burkeian". I chose the former.

others' attitudes regarding squeegee kids by describing the nature of their acts (or their living conditions).

Thus, my analysis will focus on the language used to describe squeegee kids, the terminologies used by public rhetors (whom I also refer to as claims-makers) in the media that made squeegee kids known to the public. The intent is not to criticize the authors of these claims, nor to critique people whose actions are described. Instead, my goal is to understand how such claims-making activity brought about a reality whereby squeegeeing was typified as an issue of widespread and pressing concern. The issue is not to understand what made an individual act in a particular way or even, for that matter, the circumstances of any one individual situation. Rather, the important thing is to ascertain how "discrete [accounts of squeegee activity] become constructed as part of a generalized social problem" (Jenkins, 1995, p. 123).

I am interested in the process whereby claims excite or irritate audience members or, to put it in Burkean terms, why audiences identify certain social issues as important and how they come to identify with certain solutions. This project is not an attempt to understand what rhetors mean when they write letters to the editor (or editorials, for that matter). Nor does it aim to understand what those written accounts come to mean for audiences who consume them. Instead, it seeks to understand the cumulative rhetorical power of these texts and the process whereby social issues are made meaningful in the public eye – how complex connections are established between the symbolic action of people's language claims and audiences' recognition of and reaction to these claims. My goal is to explain a rhetorical/discursive process, not to make a social judgement or take sides one way or the other.

Consequently, my dissertation deals with statements that are “presented as *an admonishment* about people, rather than as *the* “low down” on them” (Burke, 1941, p. 146). In other words, it examines attitudes about squeegee kids rather than the truth about them. I am interested in the public discourse over squeegee kids (and all its rhetorical admonishments) with an eye towards establishing a poetic ideal rather than semantic transparency. Burke (1941) explains this distinction in the following manner:

The semantic ideal would attempt to *get a description* by the *elimination* of attitude. The poetic ideal would attempt to *attain a full moral act* by attaining a perspective *atop all the conflicts of attitude*. The first would try to cut away ... all emotional factors that complicate the objective clarity of meaning. The second would try to attain its vision from the maximum heaping up of all these emotional factors. (pp. 147-148)

In other words, I am not trying to get at the underlying truth insofar as this entails an objective understanding of what was said. While semantic meaning aspires to neutrality, poetic meaning has (and acknowledges) a moralistic basis. Following Burke, I believe that the critical standard I should apply in evaluating language claims is not whether the statements accurately represent squeegee kids. This is a scientific imitation. Rather, I attempt to obtain a dramatic version of imitation. This type of analysis does not avoid drama but “envision[s] a vocabulary that *goes through* drama” (Burke, 1941, p. 149). Commentators such as Heath (1986) believe that “meaning in a dramatic sense is not representative but participative” (p. 250). This means that statements about squeegee kids should be evaluated as contributions to the substance of “squeegee kids” (or the issue of “squeegeeing” in general), but should not be presented as a necessarily accurate reflection of squeegeeing. They participate in (and help constitute) the social knowledge about squeegeeing.

BURKE AND DRAMATISM

The social issue of squeegeeing can be viewed as a drama. I do not identify squeegee kids as inferior or good (or suggest that the government who sought to do away with them was superior or evil). However, it is possible to read them as tragic villains and tragic hero locked together in combat. But to say that a hero requires a villain does little to describe the quality of this drama. Similarly, the suggestion that we exaggerate villainy in order to increase our own heroic status offers little explication. Thus, my dissertation is not concerned with assessing claims as exaggerations. Instead, it analyzes claims in the media as moral rhetoric.

To say that a rhetoric is moral ... is to say that the rhetors involved base their fundamental rhetorical strategies and major arguments on the moral assumptions and principles usually associated with cultural-religious systems of thought. Such rhetors are concerned with judgments of good and evil, with virtue and vice. (Mechling & Mechling, 1983, p. 22)

This does not mean that there must be explicit references to religious morality in people's claims. Distinctions between God and Satan need not appear, but distinctions between good and evil, appropriate and inappropriate or responsible and irresponsible behavior, and obedience and disobedience to some code or higher law will characterize the discourse. Kenneth Burke is useful here because he believed that "most successful moral advocates in western culture employ some variant of the Judeo-Christian drama of the fall" (ibid.). Using Burke, I will analyze rhetorical acts in the media in order to suggest how the social issue of squeegee kids evolved in this manner. Within this model, stages of pollution (acknowledging a state of sin and a fall from grace) lead to guilt (debating and assigning responsibility for dealing with this pollution). This then leads to a

need for purification (the implementation of action to cleanse this pollution), and finally, redemption (the return to grace).

I use the label “dramatism” to describe the method which allows one to analyze this process of guilt-purification.² As Heath (1986) argues, “dramatism, Burke's critical methodology, is designed to disclose the dialectical interaction among the symbols which comprise the substance of statements, whether by a poet, or in the dialogue of society” (p. 43). I suggest that media claims about squeegee kids can be used to indicate this “dialogue of society.” By analyzing the accumulation of society's statements about squeegee kids in the media, I can investigate the effectivity of these statements and how they made squeegee kids into a “substantial” social problem. It is my belief that an analysis patterned after Burke’s own model of a Christian drama of fall, guilt, suffering, and salvation can offer much to social constructionist theorizing of social issues. Much can be explained about the polarization of antagonists and protagonists and the conflict between claims-makers who argue one side or another through an analysis of moral rhetoric as people assess blame, hurl epithets, attack others or defend their own positions, and offer specific inducements as solutions to problems.

THE CONSTRUCTIONIST APPROACH TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS

I should explain what I mean by the terms ‘social construction,’ ‘social issue,’ and ‘social problem.’ First, Best (2003a) provides a brief outline of how social problems and/or issues are typically understood:

A traditional, objectivist approach to homelessness might focus on measuring the size of the homeless population, learning why some people become homeless, or otherwise exploring homelessness as a social

² Some might suggest that “logology” is a more appropriate label to describe this specific narrative of “the fall.” My decision to use “dramatism” as a catchall that describes all of Burke’s oeuvre is explained in the literature review of Burke.

condition, while a constructionist analysis would ask whose claims brought homelessness to public attention, how these claims typified the homeless, how the public and the policy-makers responded to the claims, and so on. (p. 338)

For the constructionist, “there is no simple ‘event’ here to be understood, apart from the social processes by which such events are produced, perceived, classified, explained and responded to” (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, & Roberts, 1978, p. 18). With this in mind, questions such as “who does this,” “where does it occur,” and “what harm is objectively rendered” are valid but are left for others to pursue – perhaps within sociology, cultural geography, or criminology. The most interesting question from my communication perspective is why squeegee kids became an issue that politicians emphasized and how squeegee kids were defined as troublesome, even criminal. As Loseke (1999) points out, “if we confine ourselves to looking at social problems only as objective characteristics of our social environment we will miss other important issues” (p. 12). I am interested in the objective characteristics that underlie squeegeeing (i.e., the factors that might have led one to undertake such activity) and the objective act of squeegeeing itself only insofar as this information underlies the subjective definitions of squeegeeing as an object of contention. I am primarily interested in this definitional game whereby constellations of symbolic meanings were presented in the media and a public image of squeegee kids took shape. Squeegee kids came to be identified as a problem in need of reform. Best (1999) outlines the traditional distinction between social ‘issue’ and social ‘problem’:

A social issue implies a debate in which there are two or more competing opinions - something unresolved, perhaps unresolvable, about which people may agree to disagree. ... In contrast, the term 'social problem' presents a very different message. Problems have solutions. The label

'social problem' implies that something can be done, that the matter can be solved. (p. 6)

Loseke's (1999) definition builds on this: "A social problem is a condition defined as wrong, widespread, changeable, as something that should be changed" (p. 6). Similarly, Gusfield (1996) observes how subjects that are customarily studied under the rubric of social problem typically "involve an assumed public consensus from which the behavior targeted for change or reform is perceived as outside the norm, as opposed to societally shared values" (p. 23). To speak of a social problem, then, is to imply a sort of evolution from a social issue. It assumes a level of moralizing that identifies a condition as something in need of reform and uses language "to portray its subjects as sick or as troublesome" (Gusfield, 1996, p. 24). This is distinct from the social (or political) issue that merely meets the threshold of some level of social, cultural or political conflict (Gusfield, 1996, p. 26).

In theory, this distinction between social issue and social problem can be maintained. In the real world of political claims-making, however, the distinction tends to be muddled. For example, following the 1999 Ontario provincial election in which the Progressive Conservative Party won a second majority government, Premier Mike Harris followed through on his promise to amend the Highway Traffic Act to deal with squeegee kids. According to the definitions outlined above, the government had already engaged in a protracted campaign in which its rhetoric clearly identified squeegee kids as a social *problem*. When it came to the announcement of anti-squeegee legislation, though, Attorney-General Jim Flaherty "insisted he wasn't playing on the fears of a minority of people. 'I tell you I hear from people all the time about this *issue*'" (Boyle, 1999b,

emphasis added). Flaherty's comments acknowledged the lack of public consensus about squeegeeing.

My analysis will examine language claims from both perspectives – those that sought to first establish squeegee kids as a social issue worthy of attention and those that featured a heavy moral tone and typified squeegee kids as a problem. Sometimes I refer to squeegeeing as a “problematic social issue” when I wish to describe non-consensual and widespread debate regarding what should be done about squeegee kids. As it turned out, the conflict over values in this case was unresolvable, even if there ultimately was a solution that was proffered to deal with the offending condition. So I use both social “issue” and social “problem” to describe squeegeeing, depending upon the frame that was used by the original claims-maker in question.

“The first task in constructionist analysis is to locate examples of the claims being made” (Best, 1989, p. 250). I have already specified that I chose, for the most part, Toronto-based media. This allowed me to trace the shifting level of interest in squeegeeing by assessing the quantity of squeegee-related stories and by analyzing their content. A second focus is claims-makers. “Claims-makers shape our sense of just what the problem is” (Best, 1989, p. xix). I view every reporter, columnist, editorial-writer, and letter-to-the-editor-writer as a claims-maker. Though they all have different interests, all claims-makers have a common goal: They want others to view their claims as legitimate and to act upon them. Descriptions of squeegee kids do more than just draw attention to the issue; they contribute to the audience's understanding of the issue. As Best (1989) puts it, “claims-makers inevitably choose to focus on particular aspects of the condition. They do not merely say that Condition X is a problem; they characterize X as a problem

of a particular sort” (p. xx). Having identified claims and claims-makers, I will then undertake a dramatistic study of the claims-making process.

WHY STUDY SQUEEGEE KIDS?

Some might say that squeegeeing is a trivial social issue. However, instead of debating whether or not the issue was significant, I ask the social constructionist question, “How do people come to view certain problems as important?”. I acknowledge that “no message is inherently worthy of study. Just because a given text fascinates the critic does not mean that study of it will be worthwhile” (Hart cited in Nothstine, Blair, & Copeland, 1994, p. 52). Squeegee kids were not chosen just because their presence in the streets was spectacular and because everyone seemed to have an opinion on them. Apart from public opinion that was starkly divided, the constitution of squeegee kids as a social and political problem is of interest on its own merit. An analysis of this debate – how squeegee kids were symbolized in media language – can contribute new understandings about rhetorical processes and about our society in general. Specifically, I assume that talk about squeegee kids is about much more than the “textuality” of squeegee kids. Debates over foundational social values are displayed in the debate over squeegee kids. Thus, one of the goals of this dissertation is to understand who “we” are – not just how “they” (squeegee kids) were understood – in order to reveal fundamental meanings that often lie beneath the surface communication about a controversial social issue.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS DISSERTATION

My project is a study of how squeegee kids were socially constructed as a problematic issue. It is not a study of interpersonal interaction that comprised the squeegee ritual itself, nor is it a study of a particular variety of political rhetoric. It does,

however, subject people's claims in the media to a rhetorical analysis using Kenneth Burke's dramatism. By analyzing the rhetoric that surrounded squeegee kids, it acknowledges both that the media coverage of them was dramatic and that life itself is a drama. Burke is rarely applied to the construction of social issues. As such, this study also contributes to an understanding of dramatism as a communication theory of ongoing relevance. It is not a study of dramatism per se, but an application of it. Burke urged the members of the newly formed Kenneth Burke Society not to do Burke-ology – he wanted to be used, not studied (Coe, cited in Behr, 1996, p. x). That is what I try to do. Using dramatism, I will show how media coverage of squeegee kids – presented as an unfolding, agonistic drama – captured and sustained audience attention and encouraged certain interpretations, participation, and evaluations. My study of the development of the social issue of squeegee kids should serve as an example of “how [humankind's] special prowess in the use of symbol systems drives towards the search for ideal victims, perfect scapegoats under one form or another” (Burke, 1968, p. 39). This tendency to identify (perfect) villains and enemies is a fundamental aspect of all social exchange.

My dissertation will explain squeegeeing as a social issue by studying how it has been infused with the symbolic action of language that was circulated through the mass media. The point of my dissertation and the knowledge that comes from it is not to appraise the truth or falsity of media accounts but to suggest what their meaning is, what they are evidence of (and the work that this evidence is made to do). Burke (1985) suggested that any systematically analyzed text or discourse, subjected to “modes of analysis we consider informative” (p. 92), could be a contribution to knowledge. With this as inspiration, my dissertation will advance an understanding of who we are and what

we value as a society by its focus on humans' use of symbols. Specifically, an analysis of the symbolic action that both surrounds and constitutes the drama that is the social issue of squeegee kids can offer many things. We can learn something about how social issues emerge, how scapegoats emerge within that process of issue-formation, and how a dramatistic perspective can offer insights into our contemporary culture.

Part of the value of such an inquiry is that it takes up Brummett's (1991) call for the application of rhetorical theory beyond the traditional approach to discrete texts such as speeches or other forms of public address. Rosteck (1999, pp. 16-17) similarly recommended a rhetorical analysis of media culture and an analysis of rhetoric as the product of multiple, competing voices. Instead of choosing one text to be analyzed according to the stages of pollution, guilt, purification and redemption, I analyze the entire media discourse about squeegee kids as a rhetorical drama that moves through these same stages. As a social issue evolves, building public awareness, arriving at the stage of policy determination, and moving to efforts at reform (see Fuller & Myers, 2003b), its ebb and flow of moral debate can be seen as a moral drama, constructed and made real through rhetoric.

Ultimately, this project should contribute to the social constructionist perspective on social problems. Mechling and Mechling (1991) noted a move toward analysis of the general, public, cultural scene of discourse and the attempt to bring together "interactionist, social-constructionist, dramaturgical sociology, on the one hand, and rhetorical criticism on the other in the study of 'the culture of public problems'" (pp. 108, 129). My dissertation is located in this intersection of disciplinary interests. Its focus on rhetoric is meant to re-integrate Burke within the constructionist tradition of studying

social problems. Burke was cited and used by early social constructionists (such as Gusfield, 1981) but has been largely ignored by current theorizing about social issues. I want to re-articulate the value of a dramatic perspective within the social constructionist canon. Both the sociological strains of the social constructionist perspective on social problems and the primarily rhetorical perspective of Kenneth Burke deal with the role of language. But both the social constructionist and the rhetorical perspectives have been “disciplined” – they no longer regularly “talk to one another” even though they have similar vocabularies that might regularly contribute to each other’s range of inquiry. Joel Best (2003b) made this general point about the factionalizing of academic discourse in his presidential address to the journal *Social Problems*. Burkean dramatism may provide one way of bridging these factions.

Moreover, the vocabularies of social constructionism and rhetoric have much to offer studies in mass communication. I do not study drama or rhetoric as the purview of “speech” communication and consider journalism and newspapers as something to be studied by “mass” communication. Instead, I suggest that problems analyzed as “a social process of definition” (Miller & Holstein, 1993, p. 4) are germane to communication studies, broadly understood. The focus is on people’s assertions of grievances and public claims, on the conditions that come to be defined as problems and the people who come to be defined as problematic through the way in which they were typified in the media. Consequently, I also hope to bridge the divide that too often separates speech communication and mass media studies.

“The tendency to say that rhetorical scholars and communication scholars live in separate worlds is the consequence of simply paying too much attention to methodologies

and too little attention to how we are conceptualizing the ultimate stuff being studied” (Carroll Arnold, cited in Nothstine, Blair, & Copeland, 1994, p. 30). There have been substantial inroads in the study of the “apparent rhetorical implications of mass media” since Berg (1972) noted a paucity of such analyses. But Burkean studies still appear rarely in mass communication journals and rarely in social issue commentaries. Though they are more commonly associated with theories of speech or human communication than with mass communication, Burke’s ideas address what both fields have in common. After all, the process whereby social problems emerge and take shape can only be fully grasped if we pay attention to the rhetoric of people’s claims *and* the media through which such problems come to be known.

The study of squeegee kids has practical consequences for future understandings of other issues – the formation of public opinion and of policy responses to issue generation. I do not presume to present some “squeegee solution” that in its explanation of this particular issue development might also be applied to other discourses of marginal groups. However, I will present some arguments about the emergence of scapegoats as I chart the development of squeegeeing as a social issue. My focus on communication concentrates on the symbolic power of claims-making via the mass media. Kenneth Burke’s dramatism (and viewing squeegeeing as a social issue whose progress replicated that of “the fall”) provides a solid foundation for this. Of course, I must acknowledge, just as Burke (1959) did, that “every insight contains its own special kind of blindness” (p. 41). Certain questions are deflected just as others are pursued. Hopefully, my dissertation can contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of social congregation (and tendencies to scapegoat marginal groups in order to maintain this sense of order).

This work is not undertaken with the goal of preventing future instances of scapegoating. Rather, its goal is to contribute to (and modestly reform) the Canadian tradition of communication studies. Rhetoric seems to occupy a marginal position in this tradition. Viewing the mass media through the lens of rhetoric is not novel (see Berg, 1972), but it still occurs quite rarely. My study of squeegee kids in the media can hopefully indicate the value of research in this area. Similarly, viewing social problem rhetoric as dramatic is not novel; but analyzing it via dramatism is.

CHAPTER REVIEW

My approach to the study of squeegee kids (and how they evolved as a social issue) begins with an overview of Burke's dramatistic system in Chapter 1. This is the foundation for the later application of Burkean insights to claims in the media. It reviews Burkean terminologies and concepts as they relate to my case-study of the squeegee "drama." I refer to squeegee kids throughout this chapter but only as an example of how these concepts can be applied; in each case one could substitute any other object of analysis. Chapter 2 contextualizes Burke by demonstrating how dramatism is applied to a social constructionist study of social problems. It explains why dramatism is preferred over a narrative approach, speech act theory, or a moral panic model in order to describe the evolution of controversial and divisive social issues such as squeegeeing. It also offers some initial thoughts on the power of language to effect change in such dramas. Chapter 3 outlines the methodology for this dramatistic analysis. It justifies the selection of method and describes its significant components. Though they can never be entirely sub-divided, the first three elements of this method (outlining a representative anecdote, the pentad, and guilt-redemption analysis) are, in large part, the subjects of the

subsequent three chapters. The next two elements (cluster and agon analysis) are taken up in the media analysis of squeegee-claims.

Chapter 4 marks the beginning of the application of Burkean concepts to the specific issue of squeegeeing. It outlines the case for a representative anecdote that can describe the overall drama. It summarizes the importance of both cleansing and militaristic metaphors and language use as a means of understanding the squeegee drama and suggests an anecdote of “redemptive violence” can sum up much of this drama. This underscores the relevance of victimage to squeegeeing and also provides the foundation for subsequent structural, cluster, and agon analyses. Chapter 5 outlines how Burke’s pentad can describe the significant aspects of the issue that formed the basis of claim-makers’ rhetoric. It also provides an explanation of a number of background issues (such as traditional attitudes about youth and fears of youth violence) that informed squeegee-claims. This chapter suggests how squeegee kids symbolized debates much more significant than whether one wanted one’s windshield cleaned. It sets the stage for the arguments in Chapter 6 about squeegeeing as guilt-redemption. This chapter outlines Burke’s arguments about victimage and scapegoating and demonstrates how they can be seen in people’s claims about squeegee kids.

Chapter 7 is the beginning of my formal analysis of squeegeeing as a social issue. It inaugurates the sequential analysis of the issue by charting its emergence in Toronto over the period between 1995 and 1997. Chapter 8 continues to analyze people’s language claims in the media and examines how the issue took shape in 1998. This is the year in which the number of squeegee-related claims peaked. Divisive and vilifying rhetoric (on both sides of the debate) also reached unprecedented levels. Thus, this

chapter sets the stage for Chapter 9 and its analysis of 1999 and province-wide efforts toward squeegee-guilt-redemption. Chapter 10 marks the end of the evolution of the squeegee issue. It analyzes what the decreasing number of claims meant for squeegeeing as it follows the progress of the issue in its final stages in the years 2000 and beyond. Following this is Chapter 11, a coda of sorts that attempts to sum up the squeegee narrative-drama. This is followed by the conclusion that presents some final thoughts on the value of dramatism as an explanatory regime. It also outlines the implications of my study for other analyses of social issues. Last, but not least, I have organized supplementary material into three appendices. These might assist the reader in understanding the development of the squeegee narrative-drama by providing a quick index of the issue's evolution. Appendix I provides a squeegee events timeline. Appendix II provides sequential evidence of the representative anecdote by citing claims that employ cleansing and militaristic language. Finally, Appendix III consists of graphs that present thumbnail sketches of squeegee kid media coverage.

CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW I – BURKE SUMMARIZED

This chapter will review the theoretical contribution of Kenneth Burke. It will establish Burke's relevance to my investigation of how squeegee kids were constituted (or socially constructed) as a social issue. It will describe Burke's approach to language. It will explain why an analysis grounded in his dramatistic method is my preferred choice for studying the media's use of language to describe squeegee kids. My goal is to understand the development of squeegee kids' status as a controversial and dramatic social issue. To this end, we must exhume the corpus of Kenneth Burke's dramatistic method and examine its core concepts.

Any dramatistic analysis must focus on language and its constitutive role in social relations. Burke views language itself as a performance, one undertaken consciously by "actors" who each play a role in the ongoing human drama. My dramatistic analysis of squeegeeing as a social issue focuses on the language used in media accounts that made squeegee kids "substantial" in the public mind. Media accounts of squeegee kids (and politicians dealing with squeegee kids) are conceptualized as language accounts designed to create and maintain the attention and interest of an audience. As Burke (1976) said, "strictly speaking, dramatism is a theory of terminology" (p. 345), and I will use it to analyze the nomenclature in the media discourse surrounding squeegee kids.

OVERVIEW OF BURKE'S DRAMATISTIC SYSTEM

Dramatism is many things to many people. For Rueckert (1982b), it "is a powerful humanistic vision, centered on the primacy of moral action and ethical purpose, language, creativity, and the paradoxical drive toward perfection, a drive that Burke says

is intrinsic to the very nature of language itself” (p. 21). For Heath (1986), “dramatism is a methodology” (p. 44) while Brock (1985; 1993) sees it primarily as a metaphor. These multiple perspectives were prompted by Burke’s own varied uses of the term throughout his career. Early on, he argued that “the ultimate metaphor for discussing the universe and man’s relations to it must be the poetic or dramatic metaphor” (Burke, 1954, p. 263). According to this view, “the analysis of social life is inadequately served if it is not treated, to begin with, as drama and only then compared to other forms and paradigms” (Perinbanayagam, 1985, p. 59). Political or economic narratives could themselves be subsumed within a dramatic account of people’s actions and their motives behind these actions. Later on, Burke clarified that this notion of a drama was more than a motif to explain people’s actions. For Burke, the world was a stage with a moral order wherein each individual had a part to play. King (2001) argues, “Burke’s doctrine of Dramatism was developed from Walter Pater’s original insight that theatre was the *Mass with secular vestments*” (p. 35). One’s life was not *like* a play; it was not something that was dramatic only because it was described as such. Life itself was a drama (Hindson & Gray, 1988, pp. 8-9). By the end of his career, Burke clarified this position:

If people really do act in particular situations with certain purposes, then dramatism becomes the basic form from which one builds a theory of analysis about what is happening. In this sense, dramatism is not figurative at all. ... I don’t view the theory of dramatism as a metaphor or as a way of saying that “All the world’s a stage.” I use the notion of the stage to highlight that an act is occurring. (Burke, cited in Brock, Burke, Burgess, & Simons, 1985, p. 24)

Burke took the idea that “all the world’s a stage” literally. Because humans are separated from the rest of the animal kingdom by their special aptitude for “symbolic action”, “drama is employed, not as a metaphor but as a fixed form that helps us discover

what the implications of the terms ‘act’ and ‘person’ *really are*” (Burke, 1976, p. 345).

Burke’s understanding of the human drama depends on people’s ability and desire to *perform* symbolic acts. Drama “can refer to staged presentations, as in the theatre. In another sense it includes an element of excitement and heightened experience” (Gusfield, 1981, p. 175). Burke’s dramatism is often conflated with Goffman’s dramaturgical model. However, “Goffman’s emphasis is on performances and performers; Burke’s is on language and interpretation” (Gusfield, 1989b, p. 37).

This distinction is not as clean-cut as it may sound. For Burke, “the forms that organize the behavioral patterns called culture are not *expressed* in language; rather social order is *performed* in language” (Klumpp & Hollihan, 1989, p. 88). Goffman’s social agents can be seen as *actors* who perform. His emphasis is on the staging ritual: “artifacts – more or less tangible objects that can be manipulated and converted into signifying gestures: time, clothes, and moves indicating deference, obedience, supplication, arrogance; signs of stigma, honor, prestige, etc.” (Perinbanayagam, 1985, p. 67). Burke’s focus, however, is not on how agents “perform,” as much as on how their utterances symbolize their motives and thus cause the social order to take shape.³ Burgess emphasized a further difference. He argued that Goffman’s conclusion of *The presentation of self in everyday life* understood the dramaturgical as mere metaphor even

³ Perinbanayagam (1985) demonstrates how closely these models are aligned. He outlines five elements of Goffman’s dramaturgical analysis: a) performances; b) regions; c) performers, skills, speakers, etc.; d) communication, staging, talk, team collusion, realigning actions, etc.; e) dramatic realization, expressive control, definition of self and situation. He then arranges them alongside Burke’s five aspects of the pentad: a) act; b) scene; c) agent; d) agency; e) purpose and notes how the two schemes parallel quite nicely (p. 66). However, Goffman’s tools outline the five key elements of a dramatic situation while Burke’s tools outline the key terms of motivational statements that constitute all human life as drama.

as he implied that he was “‘talking about real life.’ That is what Burke does *not* mean. It is not mere metaphor; Burke means that people do act on the stage of life. So, Goffman is a clear contrast to what Burke means” (cited in Brock, Burke, Burgess, & Simons, 1985, p. 25). For Burke, people act through the use of their language and by the way that they name (or misname) things. They are not “acting” (i.e. playing a part) but they are acting (i.e. speaking and/or behaving) and they therefore undertake a part (and take part) in the wider social drama.

Burke used a complex terminology to describe the nature of this drama. He believed that the dramatistic nature of social relations is revealed in four basic motives arising in human communication. “The motives of Guilt, Redemption, Hierarchy, and Victimage supplement and modify men’s purely natural or biological inclinations. Such social, linguistically grounded motives can be said to “perfect” nature, in a purely *technical* sense” (Burke, 1954, p. 274n). One way to understand his dramatistic system is by tracing its evolution through his books. Rueckert (1982a, pp. 152-157; 1989, pp. 243-253) outlines Burke’s trajectory:

Permanence and Change (1935) provides the foundations for Burke’s social analysis by outlining a critical method that would eventually coalesce into his theory of dramatism. *Attitudes Toward History* (1937) further develops a dramatically inclined terminology. It casts human behavior as a comedy that is always on the edge of turning into a tragedy. This work also emphasizes the importance of the scapegoat when it comes to understanding “life in political communities” and “characteristic responses of people in their forming and reforming of congregations” (Burke, 1959, p. i). *The Philosophy of Literary Form* (1941) was primarily a study of literature as a form of symbolic action.

Burke expanded this focus to language in *A Grammar of Motives* (1945) and its examination of human symbolic action in general. This work focuses upon “substance” and tools of the dramatistic method used to describe it (the pentad, ratios, and the representative anecdote). *A Rhetoric of Motives* (1950) elaborates on “identification” and has a relentless focus on “hierarchy”. It emphasizes the partisan aspects of language when people are at odds with one another and provides the foundation for *The Rhetoric of Religion* (1961). This book moves from dramatism to “logology” – words about words (specifically, religious words). It focuses on the conditions and consequences of symbolic action. It further explains the functioning of the social order via concepts such as “guilt”, “victimage” and the “negative”. It culminates with a contemplation of humankind’s “entelechy” as a symbol-using animal. While Burke wrote much more, the concepts within these books form the central nexus of his dramatistic system and are crucial to understanding my analysis of the squeegee issue.

The whole drama of human relations is premised upon people’s ability to use language and introduce the negative into human experience. “Dramatistic emphasis focuses attention upon the ‘moralistic’ or ‘hortatory’ negative (“Thou shalt not”)” (Burke, 1976, p. 348). By expressing this negative in language, various kinds of hierarchic orders are created. Each of these orders contains the possibility of acceptance and rejection since “order” is a polar term that implies a corresponding idea of disorder (ibid.). When people try and create order, they create institutions (family, church, school, government, etc.) and each of these has its own hierarchy. Dramas occur when people object to the functions and relationships imposed by these hierarchies. Burke felt that objection to and rejection of these hierarchic norms is inevitable because of humans’ language-using

ability. Burke used the terminology of “guilt” to sum up the uneasiness that came from this rejection, this failure, or disobedience. “Guilt is his catch-all term to cover every form of tension, anxiety, embarrassment, shame, disgust, and other noxious feelings that he believed intrinsic to the human condition” (E. Griffin, 2000, p. 288). Burke saw it as analogous to the Christian notion of original sin. It was a condition shared by everyone, brought on by humankind’s inescapable “fall” every time one follows the impulse towards abstraction which reason and language make possible. It is felt every time one conceives of ideals that are incapable of being perfectly realized (Burke, 1941, p. 50).

As Burke hypothesized, every quest to produce order also produced hierarchies. These hierarchies also produced guilt, which also require purging in order to redeem that sense of order. This purging of guilt – or guilt-redemption cycle – is summed up as follows: “Order leads to Guilt (for who can keep commandments!) -- Guilt needs Redemption (for who would not be cleansed!) -- Redemption needs Redeemer (which is to say, a Victim!) -- Order through guilt to victimage” (Burke, 1961, pp. 4-5). There are costs, though, in order to achieve this cathartic redemption and alleviate guilt. Again, people’s symbol-using ability is crucial. Guilt can be expiated by self-blame or “mortification”, personal sacrifice by the guilty. Here, the guilt-ridden individual or group makes a symbolic offering as an attempt to restore social order. Or, guilt can be resolved by blaming others. Burke terms this “victimage” and suggests, “since substitution is a prime resource available to symbol systems, the sacrificial principle comes to ultimate fulfillment in vicarious sacrifice” (Burke, 1976, p. 349). Having provided this broad overview, I will now elaborate on Burke’s central themes as they relate to the study of a social problem such as squeegee kids.

DRAMATISM AND LANGUAGE

“Dramatism is the most direct route to the study of human relations and human motives” (Burke, 1976, p. 341). He intended us to understand “motive, not as a source of behavior but as a concept used by people to make actions understandable to them and to others” (Gusfield, 1989a, p. 11). This is especially useful when analyzing language in the media that describes squeegee kids and represents them to a mass audience. People “act” with intent; they have motivations. Our actions – and the language that we use to describe them – have symbolic meaning. A symbolic transformation occurs when a squeegee kid takes an action *and* when people take actions such as writing a letter to an editor or writing an editorial about them. These latter acts typify the squeegee drama for a broad audience. With dramatism, the goal is not to define the “truth” of someone or something but to understand the power of language as symbolic action – as a “terministic screen” that orients actions. The use of language is a symbolic action. Dramatism acknowledges that the terminologies we use to describe things *reflect* reality just as they *select* and *deflect* reality too (Burke, 1945, 59; 1968, p. 45). Every account is a partial and subjective one, but every account in the media acts to reveal attitudes – in this case – about squeegee kids and what people think about them.

It is also important to note that “dramatism is a methodology, one largely designed to disclose the efficiency and explosive impact of patterns that recur in thought and expression” (Heath, 1986, p. 44). The tools of this method are outlined in *The Grammar of Motives*, the overall purpose of which is to answer the question “what is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it” (Burke, 1945, p. x). To do this, the “grammar focuses on how patterns in discourse index, construct, and

embody motives. ... The key concepts that figure in this analysis are the pentad, ratios, and substance” (Stillar, 1998, p. 63). Burke’s pentad was the entry-point into an analysis of the vocabularies and structures of texts; he believed that a focus on five pivotal grammatical terms in the language of texts could explain the motivation underlying people’s symbolic action.

THE PENTAD

The dramatistic pentad is a tool to analyze how a speaker (or author) tries to get an audience to accept his or her representation of reality. The object of a pentadic analysis is the language of the text itself and how it construes its main elements (E. Griffin, 2000, p. 287; Stillar, 1998, pp. 63-4). To analyze media accounts about squeegee kids involves “definition of structure in terms of dramatic action. There are five elements in the structure of a social act. These are the time and place of the act, the types of characters who perform the act, the kind of act it is, the means by which the act is performed, and its purpose” (Duncan, 1969a, p. 352). Burke refers to these five crucial elements of the human drama as “scene,” “agent,” “act,” “agency,” and “purpose,” respectively. “Scene” is the dramatistic term for the context of the act – the time and place in which the situation occurred. “Agent” is the dramatistic term describing the person or kind of person who performs the act. “Act” is the dramatistic term that explains what was done. “Agency” is the dramatistic term that describes ways of acting. It accounts for how the act took place – what instruments were used to perform it. “Purpose” is the dramatistic term for the stated or implied goal of an act – why the act took place (Burke, 1945, p. x). All five terms are generally present in statements about motives.

Heath (1986) notes how the pentadic elements coincide with the five journalistic Ws (who, what, where, when, why) or the equation: quis, quid, ubi, quibus, auxiliis, cur, quo modo, quando (who, what, where, by what means, why, how, when). The term “agency” merges ‘how’ and ‘by what means’ and the term “scene” merges ‘where’ and ‘when’ (p. 188). A dramatistic analysis must show how the elements of the pentad exist in individuals’ choice of terms (and the ordering of terms) as people describe the drama at hand. For instance, Gusfield (1981) analyzed discourses of drinking and driving and noted how variations in language use changed the moral character of the public drama portrayed. For instance, the slippage of terms describing the agency – from the drinking-driver to the “drunk driver” – changed how the agent was perceived. The label of “drinking driver” still maintains at least the possibility of self or motor control while “drunk driver” entails the loss of such ability. Additionally, he showed how the context of drinking and driving gave way to an emphasis on the agent who was described as a “drunken driver” (p. 82).

Similarly, social motives in the squeegee drama will be revealed when claim-makers highlight certain aspects of the pentad (grounding accounts in descriptions of agents or choosing to emphasize other aspects such as the scene or the act itself). They will also be evident when aspects of the pentad are typified in a particular light (when the act is described as a threat to people’s property or sense of propriety, when agents are characterized as forces of disruption, etc.). The real value of this analysis, however, comes when one links these pentadic elements together in textual accounts because one can then study “the relationships between the terms of a text as the means for giving

reasons, thereby constructing motives” (Stillar, 1998, p. 72). Burke termed the inter-operation of these grammatical resources “ratios.”

RATIOS

By their very existence, texts must describe acts, agents, agency, scenes, and purposes in different arrangements. When written accounts arrange the elements of the pentad in different ways, they encourage different constructions of motives. This is what Burke calls “ratios.” “A ratio is a formula indicating a transition from one term to another” (Burke, 1945, p. 262). The five terms of the pentad allow for ten ratios (scene-act, scene-agent, scene-agency, scene-purpose, act-purpose, act-agent, act-agency, agent-purpose, agent-agency, and agency-purpose) (1945, p. 15).⁴ Ratios are not causal relationships as much as they are principles of “determination” and “selectivity” (1945, pp. 15, 18) that invite interpretation through different lenses. Pairs of pentadic terms form “ratios” of importance where the former aspect acts as the “container” for the second. “Using “scene” in the sense of setting, or background, and “act” in the sense of action, one could say that “the scene contains the act.” And using “agents” in the sense of actors, one could say that “the scene contains the agents” (1945, p. 3). So, the scene contains both act and agent, but in different relationships. We can use ratios to understand how an

⁴ Burke (1945) notes how the relationships of the pentad’s five terms in ten ratios could also be reversed (pp. 9, 262). Just as a certain kind of scene may call for its corresponding kind of agent, a certain agent may call for its corresponding kind of scene. Thus, the list of possible combinations can thereby be expanded to twenty (including purpose-act, purpose-scene, and so on). For Burke, however, it was the ambiguity of these terms that led to their explanatory power, not their necessary ordering. The point was to investigate the potentialities in each relationship to address the motivational complexity in social action. Interestingly, Rueckert (1982a) argues for eleven ratios (p.74). He includes act-act but notes that this is probably the only reflexive ratio. He suggests, “a pure act is one in which the sole purpose is the performance of the act for its own sake” (1982a, p. 79). Just as most commentaries skirt over this ratio, I feel that this ratio can be safely excluded from a discussion of the attribution of motives for squeegeeing.

author's viewpoint is revealed in texts by observing when one element of the pentad is prioritized over the others. I will provide an explication of the various ratios as they appear in texts when I subsequently analyze the media discourse about squeegee kids. For now, though, a brief outline of how these ratios "invite interpretation" should be sufficient:

1. Scene-act – social motives for acts are located in conditions, backgrounds, environments (obverse = act-scene where the act conditions the quality of the scene).
2. Scene-agent – people are portrayed as prisoners of the situation (obverse = agent-scene where people affect the nature of their environment).
3. Scene-agency – customs, traditions, and means condition ends (obverse = agency-scene where the means change the nature of the scene).
4. Scene-purpose – the conditions under which we act provide the rationale for actions (obverse = purpose-scene where the description of the rationale for actions affects the description of the context for those actions).
5. Act-purpose – acts are presented as having a self-evident or inevitable character. Here purpose, or the end of action, and action itself are congruent (This can be represented as purpose-act also).
6. Agent-act – the character of the agent explains action taken (obverse = act-agent where descriptions of an act suggest a certain type of actor).
7. Act-agency – action to be taken determines the means by which it is accomplished (obverse = agency-act where the means for an action condition the action taken).
8. Agent-purpose – a prominent character comes to represent the purpose of the community (obverse = purpose-agent where suggestion of a rationale suggests a certain type of agent).
9. Agent-agency – the instincts, drives, states of mind, character (individual or national) of the actor are said to motivate relationships (obverse = agency-agent where the means condition the type of person conducting the act).
10. Agency-purpose – instruments or techniques become ends (obverse = purpose-agency where one's objectives condition the means by which action is taken). (see Duncan, 1969a, pp. 353-355)

The particular ratio that one foregrounds in a text underscores an authors' motives and constructs a preferred frame for audiences' orientations. When it comes to the construction of social issues, "clusters" of these ratios can represent public attitudes toward an issue. For instance, at one stage of development, public claims may tend towards a particular description of a problem population. Blame might be deflected onto

their social circumstances. This could emphasize a scene-act ratio that constructs the act as appropriate to the scene. When a police inspector suggested, “some are coming from a very tragic set of circumstances” (Munroe, cited in Levy, 2000, p. 17), a scene of relative deprivation and abuse excused the act of squeegeeing. Elsewhere, another account noted, “joblessness among youth is especially tragic. But the politically incorrect truth is that many of the street kids don't want to work” (Barnes, 1996, p. 12). Here, the emphasis shifts from scene to purpose whereby kids conduct the act of squeegeeing in order to gain a quick buck. The scene-act ratio gives way to an agent-act ratio and agent-purpose ratio, ultimately emphasizing reasons for squeegeeing other than the kids’ tragic circumstances and allowing blame to rest on agents. Ratios radiate out from one another to provide textual accounts with a kind of “substance,” something Stillar (1998) refers to as “ostensibly inalienable kinds of ‘being’” (p. 72) – what social constructionists would refer to as an issue’s taken-for-granted status.

SUBSTANCE

Things in discourse are made *substantial* when the elements of the pentad work together to frame actions in discourse. The symbolic action of language produces things in language; people’s claims construct substances. People reading textual accounts are encouraged to adopt a certain type of attitude, to see things in the terms that were constructed by the author. “The very framing action of the ratios and the elements of the pentad presuppose a whole series of substantives – things that are” (Stillar, 1998, p. 66). In discourse, problems such as squeegee kids are made real and descriptions of them are presented as natural and purely descriptive. All of the pentad’s elements are implicated in this process: “Just as an act derives part of its substance from the scene in which it is

enacted and the agent who enacted it [scene-act and agent-act respectively], so it derives part of its substance from the agency used to enact it" (Rueckert, 1982a, pp. 75-6).

Substance sums up the *supposed* quality of something (Burke, 1945, pp. 51-52). Within dramatism, things can be defined according to their "geometric", "familial", or "directional" substance (pp. 29-33). Geometric substance emphasizes the spatial context. One can see this in the expression that someone feels "trapped" or "fenced in" or when one describes a problem by describing its affected area. For instance, after Dunford (1998) asked, "How can no more than 300 tanned kids with hip haircuts bring our city to its knees?," he announced "We are under siege" (p. 6). Familial definitions assign substance in terms of shared ancestry, lineage, and membership. The claim that a group is collectively working toward a common cause suggests this. Classifying members of a group as a subculture similarly assigns familial substance. As an example, one *Toronto Star* reader accused the paper's squeegee coverage of portraying the youths "as drug-addicted, aggressive and violent criminals" (Rahder, 2000). Directional substance brings to mind relations of trajectory and motion. Motive, here, is expressed as movement of some sort. This can be indicated in reports about the "rising crime rate" or statements such as "youth today are a growing force to be reckoned with." For instance, there were seemingly constant reminders of Toronto's "growing squeegee kid problem" (M. Macdonald, 1996, p. 16; Wallace, 1998, p. 4), and the "growing number of street people asking for spare change" ("Several of," 1998). Toronto police chief Fantino warned of "the growing number of young people who are out of control and seem to be accountable to no one" (Wallace, 2000, p. 4) while Gold (1999) spoke of "the good burghers of Ontario, particularly in Toronto, who feel increasingly powerless in the face of growing

poverty and homelessness in their city” (p. A18). Motives that are grounded in dispositions such as habits and inclinations can also be classified as directional. Emotions threaten to become commotions or motions, tendencies or trends.

Of special note is Burke’s (1945) suggestion of a fourth “meta” category: dialectic substance. This “overall category of dramatism ... considers things in terms not of *some* other, but of *the* other. The sharpest instance of this is an *agon* wherein the protagonist is motivated by the nature of the antagonist” (p. 33). Indeed, squeegee kids were cast as offenders against the public order based on qualities that some found offensive. In the *Star*, Marshall (1997) called for politicians to “protect Toronto and allow innocent people to drive the streets safely” after encountering a squeegee kid whose “language was foul and abusive. The individual was filthy and spaced on drugs” (p. A22). Likewise, in the *Sun*, Rickard (1999) entreated Toronto’s mayor to “get rid of the squeegee kids/men/women” after reporting an encounter with a “strange-looking, filthy, smelly creature” (p. 17). The three former categories (geometric, familial, and directional) usefully describe important aspects of social issues. But this last category of dialectic substance describes the very nature of division upon which the whole enterprise of social issue debate is built. Consequently, identifying these types of substance as they appear in discourse contributes to an understanding of how claims-makers typify social issues and the agents therein.

There is an ambiguity in saying that something is “‘substantially such-and-such,’ instead of having to say ‘the state of affairs *is* and/or *is not* such-and-such’” (Burke, 1945, p. 52). This is a handy linguistic resource that is often employed in typifications of social issues. Part of this ambiguity lies in “the ‘paradox of substance.’” For Burke,

describing the substance of something means to “designate what some thing or agent intrinsically *is*” while also conjuring up “a person’s or a thing’s sub-stance ... something that stands beneath or supports the person or thing” (pp. 21-22). Substance designates more than those things “intrinsic to it. The word etymologically refers to something *outside* the thing, *extrinsic* to it. ... The word refers to an attribute of the thing’s *context*” (p. 23). Claims about squeegee kids designated the things within the issue – the people, the places, and the actions involved – while they also served to contextually locate these people, places, and acts within wider arguments about values, interests, and morals. This wider constellation of values represents the sub-stance (or substrate, if you will) that is the foundation for the actual matter (the things said) of social problems discourse.

Interestingly, *The Grammar of Motives* has been labeled, “not a Grammar at all but another bit of philosophy, a substance metaphysics” (Rosenfeld, cited in Chase, 1969, p. 252). Yet later, in his own overview of dramatism, “Burke not only does not discuss “substance” but also replaces its function with “attitude”” (Brock, 1995, p. 24). When people share a common substance, they can be said to have an attitude in common. My deployment of the term “attitude” (and substance) needs to be clarified. To speak of attitudes toward squeegee kids is to say that people assign them a substance – it entails that people “identify” squeegee kids, one way or another. Thus, when I speak of how the issue of squeegee kids was made “substantial,” I am referring to the process of typifying the internal people, places, and actions involved in the drama as well as invoking the wider nexus of cultural concerns.⁵ After all, “a thing’s substance is that whereof it is

⁵ Hall et al. (1978, p. 54) spoke of naming and defining events in order that the audience can assign them to a social context. He refers to this process whereby things are given meanings that are already made familiar as *identification* (or contextualization).

constituted” (Burke, 1945, p. 337) and attitudes about social issues constitute a substantial part of any discourse. The speaker’s orientation or attitude is revealed in the choice of words that not only express an opinion but also claim to capture the reality of a situation.

IDENTIFICATION

Burke (1950, p. 43) suggests the principal function of rhetoric lies in “the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols.” Poetry, like rhetoric, can induce catharsis and can appeal to people but its symbolic use of language is “engaged in for sheer enjoyment” (Heath, 1986, p. 235). Rhetoric, on the other hand, is the symbolic use of language whose primary goal is to induce some effect, to address an audience and exhort it to act one way or another. Rhetoric, for Burke, entailed partisan action and people’s attempts to influence one another. He distinguished between the “old rhetoric” with an emphasis on persuasion and his version of “new rhetoric” whose key term was identification.

As Charland (1994) states, “identifications are rhetorical, for they are discursive effects that induce human cooperation. They are, also, however, logically prior to persuasion” (p. 211). Identification actually forms the basis of persuasive appeals: “You persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, *identifying* your ways with his” (Burke, 1950, p. 55). Identification is the process of becoming consubstantial – the process whereby audiences and communicators come to share the same substance. “A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is *identified* with B. Or he may

identify himself with B" (Burke, 1950, p. 20). Identification occurs when audiences consider a social issue in the same light as communicators (sharing basic ideas and value judgements, agreeing and rejecting typifications of people, acts, and institutions). When an audience identifies with the claim, it becomes consubstantial with the claims-maker.

Consubstantiality is present in any drama where claims-makers (politicians or otherwise) entreat the public to identify with their priorities, their values and their prescriptions for change. Partisanship, as a major mode of identification, is of crucial importance in the squeegee drama. It describes "the ways in which individuals are at odds with one another, or become identified with groups more or less at odds with one another" (Burke, 1950, p. 22). People's appeals to shared substances often advance their partisan interests just as partisan efforts can try to cultivate a wider base of support through consubstantial appeals. Ultimately, the two types of identification broadly understood as "identification-with" and "identification-against" define both sides of the squeegee kid debate.⁶

It is important to note that even though they may not like each other and though they may have radically opposing world-views, pro-squeegee and anti-squeegee rhetors are consubstantial. They shared a common interest insofar as they both sought to raise awareness about squeegeeing and gain media attention and public legitimacy for their particular perspective. Their goals were different and both sides defined different elements of squeegeeing as problematic, but both sides addressed the same fundamental condition. Thus, even wholly antagonistic claims-makers can have "common sensations,

⁶ Burke (1950) also speaks of "autonomous" identification - activities "capable of reduction to intrinsic, autonomous principles" (p. 27). Such specialized activities do exist, but they are rare and, arguably, have little or no presence in the discourse about squeegee kids.

concepts, images and ideas,” “both joined and separate” (Burke, 1950, p. 21) as they act together in the exercise of making squeegee kids into a social issue.

There is no perfect communion between communicators and audiences. Identification is always “in process;” it is never complete. “Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity” (Burke, 1950, p. 22). Because people are naturally divided from one another, identification is necessary to bridge differences. But as we identify with some people, we are divided from others. Burke “knew that every identification was also a division, or (in postmodern parlance) a repression, deflection, or difference” (Farrell, 1995, p. 59). Importantly, one does not identify with a group such as squeegee kids simply because a claim in the media suggests such a course of action. The process of relating to others through language “transcends the text and deals with the relation between text/source and audience” (Brock, 1995, p. 14). Thus, understanding the process of consubstantiation ultimately means identifying cultural attitudes that can underlie textual accounts.

“Identification is necessary in order to decide which of the pentadic terms is highlighted, while the highlighting of a term from the pentad suggests to the critic the type of substance established by the speaker” (Brock, 1969, p. 448). Through journalistic depictions of the street scene, readers can identify with squeegee kids, or with the police, or with those who call for squeegee sanctions. For someone identifies with others, “even when their interests are not joined, if one assumes that they are, or is persuaded to believe so” (Burke, 1950, p. 20). Ultimately, all social issues require identification with or

against someone or something else. “To exist socially is to be rhetorically aligned (enrolled in a larger social action)” (Lentricchia, 1983, 148-9).

HIERARCHY

It is important to note the hierarchical function of Burke’s concept of identification. Kirk (1969, p. 345) considered identification’s ability to elaborate the mysteries of social status more central than its capacity for ‘the joining of interests.’ Social merger and division constitute the foundation of identification just as they constitute the basis of any system in which people cooperate to establish a sense of unity, a common identity or a social order. Burke (1954) explains:

(1) Man’s specific nature as a symbol-using animal transcends his generic nature as sheer animal, thereby giving rise to property, rights, and obligations of purely man-made sorts; (2) the necessary nature of property in a complex social order makes for the “embarrassments” of social mystery in men’s relations to one another, thereby giving rise to attitudes that pervade areas of thought not strictly germane to it; (3) the terms “Bureaucracy,” “Hierarchy,” and “Order” all touch upon this realm of social mystery, because of their relation to Authority, and to canons of Propriety. (p. 283)

This question of order is central to Burke’s project. It is also crucial to any investigation of social issues – not just those dealing with “law and order” problems. Society exists as a hierarchical drama “in which superiors, inferiors, and equals communicate by symbols which they believe will create and sustain social order” (Duncan, 1969a, p. 350). Burke (1954) is careful to note, “order is not just “regularity.” It also involves a distribution of *authority* ... with its uncertain dividing-line between loyalty and servitude [and] roughly a pyramidal or hierarchal form” (p. 276).

Though people are constantly tempted by disorder, they are continually goaded into order. Within “socio-political structures in which people can give or receive orders

... offices are said to pyramid in an orderly arrangement of powers and responsibilities” (Burke, 1961, p. 181). Government edicts maintain a graded, value-charged structure that ranks groups, priorities, actions, etc. “Authorities must bedazzle us with the majesty of their commandments and, at the same time, arouse guilt within us over disobedience of their ‘sacred’ edicts” (Duncan, 1965, p. xxxvi). Wherever there are attempts to construct order, there are also conflicts and rejections of these prescriptions for order – what Burke termed “guilt.” Thus, hierarchies that orchestrate order also create disorder. “The social order is a hierarchy in that it is a ‘good’ that “makes orderly what otherwise might be chaotic. [It also] is a ‘goad’ in so far as division into higher and lower is inevitable wherever there is ordering” (Burke, cited in Rueckert, 1982a, p. 132).

People express their relationship to authority when they use language and develop terminologies with the goal of repressing the tendency to disorder. “Humans, being talkers and writers, can conjure up ‘thou shalts’ and ‘thou shalt nots.’ The acceptance and rejection of morals, of authority, and of division is ever present. We are capable of thinking the negative and are also ‘goaded by the spirit of hierarchy’” (Gusfield, 1989b, p. 47). This emphasis upon the negative – the dark underbelly of positivity that constantly lingers in quests to impose or maintain order – brings us to the next major pillar of dramatism.

THE NEGATIVE

“Despite Kenneth Burke’s absorption in language and literature ... his bent is incurably toward studies in the hazards of trespass and the ... dangers that manifest that “vast system of Nays” that governs our real and imagined worlds” (Wasserstrom, 1982, p. 100). This is because drama presumes conflict, which is impossible without the

negative and its insistence on difference. Indeed, the very idea of a social order implies general principles of right and wrong about which people can differ. This is because order is a term that implies a direct logical opposite. “A word like ‘table’ is ‘positive’ in the sense that it implies no contradictory term such as ‘anti-table’ ... but ‘polar’ terms such as ‘right,’ ‘true,’ ‘order,’ ‘yes’ imply respectively ‘wrong,’ ‘false,’ ‘disorder,’ ‘no’” (Burke, 1961, p. 23).

For Burke, the negative is central to any use of language. It “is not a deformation or distortion, a problem to be resolved” (Farrell, 1995, p. 59). It provides the very basis of the moralistic vocabulary that is at the heart of the dramatistic system. More than just the propositional negative (it is not), the drama of everyday life is fashioned out of the hortatory negative (thou shalt not). As he understood it, all types of social order rest on positives and negatives expressed in “thou shalt” and “thou shalt not.” This use of the linguistic negative is omnipresent. Even when we act as equals under rules of our own making, we are careful to define how the game must be played and establish umpires to punish those who break the rules that we have agreed to respect. Hierarchy alone cannot explain this characteristic of social order (see Duncan, 1965, p. xxxv).

As symbol-using animals, we “abstract and construct hierarchies of values in which certain persons, places, things, acts, states of mind, and ideas are positive (good) and negative (evil)” (Rueckert, 1982a, p. 145). The negative allows the differentiation between “shall” and “shall not” and gives people engaged in social action the power to say “thou shalt not” - the ability to be moral and pronounce legal and moral proscriptions. And, through the hortatory negative we can learn what is right by first learning what is wrong. Burke (1968) cites the case of Helen Keller to demonstrate this (p. 10). The

negation of a negative is central to order. People are free to disobey “thou-shalt-nots” just as authorities can try to deny or punish what they deem to be unwanted actions. Negation, then, can be a positive act. It can be purgative. The negative that is the disobedience or rebellion associated with the social order is itself negated (“No trespassing” or “No squeegeeing”) in order to purify the guilt associated with this disorder and bring about redemption of the social order.

Authorities such as governments outline permissible temptations just as they outlaw others. This “sets the conditions for the imagining of a character who yields to this temptation” (Heath, 1986, p. 236). Thus, legislation can be seen as secular commandments that do not just sustain the social order but constitute it and encourage citizens to identify with it. But just like identification, the social order is never complete. People will always disobey commandments. The guilt associated with this and the need to redeem it through efforts to punish or reign in this disobedience are the next crucial aspects of Burke’s dramatistic system.

GUILT AND GUILT-REDEMPTION

Reason itself ... is the very factor which causes the ‘categorical guilt’ or ‘original sin’ from which all men naturally suffer. Man ‘falls’ every time he follows the impulse towards abstraction which reason and language make possible, and conceives of ideals (‘god terms’) which are incapable of being perfectly realized. Man is naturally of ‘guilt-laden substance’.
(Rueckert, 1982a, pp. 46-7)⁷

⁷ It does seem reasonable to critique Burke for his seemingly universal account of symbol-use based on a particularly Western version of religion. “It may be that the cycle of guilt-victimage-purification-redemption is the single strongest motive in American discourse, but Burke leaves us with insufficient evidence to claim that it is the dominant motive of all cultures” (Condit, 1992, p. 352). However, my case-study of moral rhetoric surrounding squeegee kids is concerned exclusively with Western discourse. Consequently, I see no reason to dismiss or qualify Burke’s notion of guilt-redemption as a leitmotif that underpins people’s motives in this particular drama (or one that, at the very least, is helpful when it comes to describing and understanding this rhetoric).

In addition to the list of analogues already provided (anxiety, embarrassment), other words for guilt can include social tension and unresolved tension (Foss, Foss, & Trapp, 2002, p. 210). Guilt is not only inevitable, it is also uncomfortable which entails that people will necessarily attempt to resolve such tension. To eliminate guilt is to redeem oneself. Through this act, the self can be re-born and this salvation can bring about a better life. The casting out of guilt and expiation of sin occur through a symbolic act of cleansing, the social action of which brings about a symbolic heaven of orderly affairs. As Rueckert (1982a) claims, “things are classified as unclean because of categorical guilt, the hierarchic psychosis, or the violation of any moral negative” (p. 209). And for the “positive” clean to come out of the “negative” unclean, there must be a cleansing, a cleanser, and a cleansed.

This purification – or cleansing – must express and redeem the “fecal motive.” “Fecal is simply another word which Burke uses to indicate the pollution archetype – that which needs to be transcended, expelled, changed, expiated, or solved” (Rueckert, 1982a, p. 101). Fecal images suggest anything that invoke “the ambiguities of the cloacal - urinary, erotic, and excremental products” (Burke, 1945, pp. 301-302). Burke (1968) suggested, “only by excretion can the body remain healthy” (p. 341). Similarly, we can expect social and moralistic imagery to be represented at the bodily level when people report on social pollution and the need to cleanse it. After all, “the idea of purgation readily includes connotations of physical excretion” (Burke, 1968, p. 308).

Naturally “unclean”, fecal images suggest polluted conditions – or even people – in need of purification. To purify people – and by extension, the social order itself – the act of purification (either self-sacrifice or sacrifice of others) must be commensurate with

the amount of guilt aroused by the sins of those who rejected the social order. Crucially, “if those in power make us equate disobedience with sin, and teach us to feel guilt over impulses within us which lead to disobedience, they must also provide us with means for expiation of sin, and yet see to it that expiation is carried out in ways which do not threaten their power” (Duncan, 1969b, p. 414). We come, then, to the next pillar of dramatism: redemption through victimage – the process of designating an external enemy as the source of all our ills.

VICTIMAGE

People can choose two modes of sacrifice to expunge their guilt: They can “express themselves either “suicidally,” as mortification, or “homicidally,” in the slaying of scapegoats” (Burke, 1961, p. 223).⁸ Both modes have in common the identification of a victim. In the first case, this occurs through nomination of oneself as a candidate for punishment and the ritual atonement of sins. In the second case, it occurs through the selection of someone or something else as purificatory victim. Burke clarifies: Mortification implies that “to ‘pay’ for one’s wrongdoing by suffering punishment is to ‘redeem’ oneself” (1961, p. 176). On the other hand, victimage implies “the possibility that one character may be redeemed through the act or agency of another” (1961, p. 176). Mortification – or self-sacrifice – seldom occurs in social dramas. This is primarily

⁸ Brummett (1994, p. 133) outlines another way to deal with guilt – transcendence (also discussed by Burke). Rather than admitting and expunging guilt through some form of disciplinary action, transcendence justifies guilt-inducing actions with the suggestion that they’re required by a different, higher or nobler set of principles. For example, when a government explains unpopular policies by declaring that they’re being taken for the greater ultimate good of all, it is seeking to transcend guilt rather than purify it. It is possible to suggest, however, that this is a universal tactic adopted by political rhetors and, as such, is not as inherently interesting as an analysis of the moral rhetoric underpinning the scapegoating of a particular group. Consequently, my analysis of how squeegee kids were constituted as a social issue will revolve around victimage.

because it is discomfiting. It requires “subjection of the passions and appetites ... a kind of governance, an extreme form of “self-control”, the deliberate, disciplinary “slaying” of any motive that ... one thinks of as unruly” (1961, p. 190).

Though it is a way of making oneself appear virtuous, mortification carries with it too many personal and professional costs for it to be a popular option. Saying “yes” to order by scapegoating others, on the other hand, is a widespread practice. “There’s no end of proof that a connoisseur’s taste in victims drawn from nearly all categories of scapegoat and entrenched both in families and in government, underlies... characteristic American attitudes” (Wasserstrom, 1982, p. 104). Edelman (1988, p. 89) and Rochefort and Cobb (1994, p. 16) make similar arguments. Aside from exceptional cases wherein public figures like Bill Clinton and Jesse Jackson accepted blame for their own mistakes, scapegoating others is preferred to martyrdom or blaming oneself.⁹

“The sacrificial principle of victimage (the ‘scapegoat’) is intrinsic to human congregation” (Burke, 1976, p. 349).¹⁰ Wherever there is action, there is drama, and conflict exists wherever we find drama. Conflictual relations presume acts against

⁹ Interestingly, in a *Globe and Mail* article titled “Who’s sorry now? Just about everybody,” Kamal Al-Solaylee (2004) suggested that public apologies for misbehavior occur much more regularly than in the past. Yet the occasion of three high profile public figures who issued apologies within days of each other was, I believe, more of a coincidence than an indication of increasingly popular acts of mortification. Al-Solaylee’s conclusion that “we live in an age where acting out feelings on prime time may be the only way to save a public figure’s skin” (p. R5) ignores the context of the guilt-producing condition. Not all acts (or actors) can be redeemed with an apology. And some actors refuse to be so mortified.

¹⁰ I have provided only a brief outline of what Burke means when he uses the term “scapegoat” here. Some might suggest that the scapegoat is sufficiently prominent in Burke’s theory to warrant its own section in this literature review. Far from ignoring it or skirting its centrality, I devote a large part of a subsequent chapter to the scapegoat and how its process is manifest in the squeegee kid drama. I allude to the importance of the concept in Burke’s writings here but I specify how it can be recognized and how it functions in the squeegee drama there.

someone – victimage. These acts arise from the need to resolve guilt that comes from confronting disorder (which is the residue of hierarchy and disobeyed commandments). Just as people can accept and obey laws, so too can they reject and disobey them. People are capable of loyalty and love, hence of alienation and victimage, “the perversions of love (forms of ill-will towards one’s neighbor)” (L. Griffin, 1969, p. 459).

So that people can be convinced of new attitudes or new action to be taken against someone or something, “every act of victimage must be preceded by a transfer through identification” (Rueckert, 1982a, p. 151). Projecting guilt onto others so that they might serve as a sacrificial vessel and carry it away is the extreme possibility contained within any partisan identification against some person(s) or some thing. As Heath (1986) notes, “victimage and ‘Thou-shalt-not’ come together as the *persecutional* aspects of Order” (pp. 136-137). When these concepts come to a head in their “perfect” form, we encounter the entelechial principal.

ENTELECHY

By entelechy, Burke (1972) referred to “such use of symbolic resources that potentialities can be said to attain their perfect fulfillment” (p. 39). “Entelechy” or the “entelechial principle” refers to the “logic of perfection” that Burke believed was at the root of all language and social interaction. It can be seen in his dramatistic definition of human beings. To paraphrase slightly, Burke (1968) suggested that people are: (1) symbol-using animals; (2) inventors of the negative; (3) separated from their natural conditions by instruments of their own making (i.e. language and other symbolic instruments such as clothing); (4) goaded by the spirit of hierarchy (which is to say,

moved by a sense of order, and motivated to try and increase the amount of it in the world); and (5) rotten with perfection (p. 16).

To describe something as “rotten with perfection” is to say that it is subject to upward movement towards abstractions and a motive of transcendence, the ultimate end of which would be perfection itself. There is an ironic aspect to this principle insofar as people continually attempt to construct the “perfect villain” or “perfect enemy” even though such quests are destined to be frustrated (see Burke, 1968, p. 18). The entelechial tendency is connected to victimage insofar as “perfected” ideas like the scapegoat “impose simplistic and uniform meanings on the multifaceted, contradictory, and plural character of human acts” (Gusfield, 1989b, p. 35). Thus, entelechy is not just an element of language. Carried into social relations, “men are by nature ambitious, Faustian, rotten with perfection; and ambition is a disease that ends in pride, the desire to excel by the abasement of others” (L. Griffin, 1969, p. 460). The potential for scapegoating, or, “purgation, which is a means of perfection” (Heath, 1986, p. 105) is ever-present in human societies which forever seek to transcend the negative, the undesirable side-effects of human congregation. “It takes very little inducement for us to begin ‘perfecting’ the characters of our opponents by the gratuitous imputation of unseemly motives” (Burke, cited in Blakenship, 1989, p. 133). By positing perfect villains – or pollution archetypes (dangerous people or places) so thoroughly abhorrent that purification is necessary – a perfect society can be promised. It will be a symbolic heaven wherein guilt has been expiated and the social order redeemed.

TRAGIC AND COMIC PERSPECTIVES

Burke believed that “standard, classical genres of literature underlie all texts that one might encounter and that those standard genres provide important but unsuspected ‘equipment for living’ to their audiences” (Brummett, 1994, p. 132). Of the “poetic categories” that Burke (1959, pp. 34-90) outlined, comedy and tragedy are the two that are most widely discussed (and the two that have the most explanatory value for the squeegee drama). Ultimately, the squeegee drama can be understood as tragic. After all, “people do not kill and victimize each other or commit suicide in comedies, as they do in tragedies; people are not punished in comedy but corrected by dialogue and dialectic” (Rueckert, 1994a, p. 118). The tragic character is the “bad guy” whereas the comic character is the clown. But Burke was not interested in tragic or comic types of dramatic productions. Rather than describing dramatic form, he understood comedy and tragedy as points of view. Within a dramatisitic inquiry, tragedy and comedy should be considered, “formulations of modes of thought, attitudes toward the world, ways of coming to terms with the meaning of its triumphs and vicissitudes” (Martin, cited in O’Leary, 1993, p. 392).

Victimage is, by its nature, a tragic phenomenon. Victims and villains do not exist in comedy as they do in tragedy. There is comic punishment and absolution but it is based less on threat and sacrificial punishment than understanding. “Unlike tragic confession, when we appeal to some power beyond the group, we assume in comedy that open and free communication will tell us what our guilt means so that we can expiate it” (Duncan, 1962, p. 397). Yet such efforts are constantly undermined by the temptation of tragic correctives such as victimage rituals. A tragic frame of mind goads people into

conflict and seeks to oversimplify social reality. It tends to be characterized by vehement advocacy of extreme positions.¹¹ “The tragic perspective usually projects ‘evil’ onto a ‘scapegoat,’ lays the blame at its feet, and ‘slays’ it. From this perspective, no social change is possible without some form of violence” (Carlson, 1986, p. 447). Burke suggests that as long as orders (such as “do this” or “do not do that”) are given and proclamations made, people will be tempted by tragedy. Certainly, in the arena of social problem construction, discourses of good-versus-evil and right versus wrong(ed) tend to trump the terminology of the comic frame that “warns against too great a reliance upon the conveniences of moral indignation” (Burke, 1959, p. 174).

The comic perspective, on the other hand, invites complication and a broadening of points of view. It seeks alternatives to conflict. Far from calling for some sacrifice or engaging in “the cult of the kill” in order to alleviate the pain of guilt, comedy need not banish doubt; it can reaffirm difference. “The comic frame should enable people to be observers of themselves, while acting. Its ultimate goal would not be passiveness, but maximum consciousness. One would ‘transcend’ himself by noting his own foibles” (Burke, 1959, p. 171) Ultimately, the difference between a comic perspective and a tragic one is not that the latter perspective is more prone to seeing evil and judging it more seriously. “It is rather in the form of exposure and the principles invoked to resolve incongruities” (Duncan, 1962, p. 403). Unlike the punitive proclivities of tragedy, “comedy conceives of evil not as guilt, but as error; its mechanism of redemption is

¹¹ Burke describes such positions as euphemistic, debunking, and polemical. Euphemistic describes promises of a better life without doing anything to actually bring about this reform. Debunking describes any attitude that is consistently negative and simply attacks things in order to discredit or destroy them. By polemical, Burke means any absolutist frame that allows for only one point of view that is always defended as the only correct or true frame or doctrine. (see Rueckert, 1994, pp. 118-119)

recognition rather than victimage; its plot moves not toward sacrifice but to the exposure of fallibility” (O’Leary, 1993, p. 392).

Ambivalence between the extremes of fanaticism (wherein claims-makers feel there is no choice but to take a specific action) and fatalism (wherein one believes there is really nothing to be done) defines the comic vision of human relations. Burke’s comic frame involves appreciating all points of view without adopting them. It is a charitable stance that “liquidates” rigidity (Knox, 1957, p. 71). This is valuable when it comes to analyzing a social issue such as the rights of squeegee kids. Claims-makers’ rhetoric can be examined for tragic tendencies (characterizations of those who hold other views as irredeemably evil or malicious). More importantly, though, Burke also “recommends that we hold our beliefs tentatively” (Carter, 1996, p. 125) so that we may avoid the dramatic intensity of moral debate while still managing to comment on the drama.

JUSTIFYING MY USE OF THE TERM “DRAMATISM”

Burke’s oeuvre was re-evaluated in a symposium in the early eighties in which Burke participated. The central issue was whether dramatism should be viewed as “(1) an ontological system which offers literal statements regarding the nature of the human being as a symbol-user and the nature of language as an act, or (2) an epistemological system which posits but one way of viewing human beings and human activities such as language-using” (Brock, Burke, Burgess, & Simons, 1985, p. 17). Burke and Burgess maintained that the first stance is the correct one while Brock and Simons argued largely for the second perspective. The most prescient acknowledgement, however, is that “this is an issue which is unlikely to ever be resolved in any permanent fashion” (Brock, Burke, Burgess, & Simons, 1985, p. 18). Debate continues among Burke scholars

whether emphasis should be placed on the epistemological basis of dramatism (wherein drama equals metaphor) or its ontological basis (wherein dramatism equals literal reality).

The distinction between ontology and epistemology is largely analogous to Burke's use of the terms "dramatism" and "logology." Brock (1985) described how, in his later writings, Burke added "the ontology of dramatism to his epistemology, labeling work in his earlier period "dramatism" and the later "logology" (p. 103). Rueckert (1982a) emphasized how both approaches were always present in Burke's thinking and noted, "one can say that before 1961 there was *dramatism* and logology and after 1961 there was dramatism and *logology*" (p. 242). 1961's publishing of *The Rhetoric of Religion* marks this new development in Burke's thinking. But its "first chapter concludes with an outline of dramatism, suggesting that 'dramatism' is still Burke's titular term and that logology is simply another addition to his dramatistic vocabulary" (Wess, 1996, pp. 217-8). Chesebro (1988) finds a different origin but charts a similar development: "In his earlier writings, Burke attributed an epistemic function to rhetoric. However, since 1968, he has posited a decidedly dialectic view in which both epistemic and ontological functions govern rhetoric" (p. 176).

Burke (1985) clarified his use of terms: "Dramatism is treated as a technique for analyzing language as a mode of action in which specialized nomenclatures are recognized, each with particular ends and insights. Logology is cast as the study of the knowledge acquired by the human being's aptitude for learning communication" (p. 89). Dramatism is ontological insofar as it stresses what we are (symbol-using animals). Logology is epistemological insofar as it deals with the vocabulary that humans develop in order to know the natural world (and our actions within it).

These two approaches to understanding people's use of language are obviously related. I suggest that the distinction between them is one of degree rather than one of kind. Chesebro (1988) suggests how Burke's dramatistic concepts of the negative, morality, hierarchy, and perfection contribute to an ontological focus on a general conception of all human beings as symbol-users. Meanwhile, he classifies the Burkean concepts of hierarchy, acceptance and rejection, identification, pentad, substance, and form as logological concepts that focus on "the study of how and why people use certain symbols in particular circumstances to create and to control specific social settings" (p. 181). Similarly, Wess (1996, p. 241) enumerates *Rhetoric of Religion's* concepts of order, guilt, and sacrifice as elements of Burke's logological epistemology. But as the foregoing review of Burkean concepts should have made clear, these concepts are imbricated together with "dramatistic" theorizing that laid the groundwork for logology. I suggest, then, that both dramatism and logology's inter-related modes of analysis are necessary to explain the varieties of human symbol-using that constitute all social dramas. Any study must feature both ontological and epistemic perspectives in order to fully explain symbol-using (and thereby explain what constitutes a drama and what it signifies for the wider culture in which it takes place). As Chesebro (1992) asserted, "only one perspective, dramatism and logology together with their related methods for analysis, is needed to explain all human symbol-using" (p. 357). Designed to be cohesive, they are not the same but they are two parts of an interrelated similar project.

For the sake of consistency, I refer to my study of squeegee kids as a dramatistic analysis. There is a precedent for the use of such a synoptic label. Wess (1996) points out Burke's constant emphasis on humans' special aptitude for symbolic action and classifies

Burke's thought as "consistently dramatistic" (p. 239).¹² The groundwork for such a judgement was laid by Burke himself: "I am trying to present some interrelated principles of method, developed in the 'Dramatistic' step from specific literary analysis to the consideration of human motivation in general. That is, I am not here concerned with steps that I went through and left behind. Rather, I am trying to stress procedures that I still abide by" (Burke, 1972, p. 21).¹³ And, if I sometimes use dramatism to refer to concepts or terms that one might traditionally associate with the "logologic," it is in keeping with Burke's own argument for perspective by incongruity. New meanings might evolve by "extending the use of a term by taking it from the context in which it was habitually used and applying it to another" (Burke, 1954, p. 89).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has explained some key elements of "Burkean" theory in order to set the stage for their application to the public rhetoric of the squeegee kid social problem. It has outlined Burke's notion of drama, a dramatistic approach to language, and pillars of this approach such as the pentad, substance, identification, hierarchy, the negative, victimage and guilt redemption. It ended by clarifying some distinctions and some commonalities between dramatism and logology, and their respective emphases on the ontological and the epistemic. This is a significant point. As Chesebro (1988) argued,

¹² In a similar vein, Conrad and Macom (1995) use the term dramatism/logology to refer to the corpus of Kenneth Burke's work.

¹³ Regarding the "cycle of terms tautologically implicit in the idea of order," Melia (1989, p. 67) noted that the narrative account (the temporalized essence) is unidirectional (if the story is to make sense it must proceed through time from beginning to end) whereas the logological rendition suffers from no such limitation. This is yet another reason why I trumpet a "dramatistic" account, rather than a logological one. I recount a story that *does* proceed from beginning to end (even while acknowledging that, conceptually, the equations in the cycle of terms can in fact be eternally co-present and implicit in each other).

“we live in a media age which has blurred the distinction between what is real and what is understood. ... The most challenging task for the rhetorical critic is to reassert and to employ the distinction between the epistemic and ontological, to specify what is real and what has been constructed through human symbol-using” (pp. 186-187). My dissertation contributes to this project and this chapter is an important first step toward that goal. The review of Burkean theory I provided here will provide the foundation for my analysis of how we came to know and understand squeegee kids through the symbol-using actions of claims-makers in the media.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW II – BURKE, CONTEXTUALIZED

This chapter will justify the use of Burke. It will situate his theory and explain why dramatism is the preferred lens for this inquiry. Rochefort and Cobb (1994) suggest the need to “map out the rhetoric most frequently employed by problem definers, and to analyze the scenarios by which definitions are built or crumble” (p. 4). By using Burke, I attempt a similar project: understanding how squeegee kids were “identified” (by both claims-makers and audiences) as a problematic social issue. Thus, this project is a response to Ivie’s (2001) challenge to confront the “underutilized potential in thinking about social problems as rhetorical problems.” Just as rhetoric can constitute civic identity (Charland, 1994), so too can it constitute a social problem. However, social problems scholars rarely acknowledge Burke explicitly (even though his dramatism is often implicit in social constructionist accounts). This chapter will redress this and clarify Burke’s relevance to such an investigation. It will relate dramatism to social constructionism and specifically, the social constructionist approach to social problems.

DRAMATISM AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM

“The primary interest of social constructionism is to understand how we make sense of the world around us. ... Words and their specific definitions matter” (Loseke, 1999, p. 176). Thus, at an initial and very cursory level, dramatism and its emphasis on the symbolic action of language seems pertinent. Selzer (1999), for one, was quite explicit about this link; he argued that Kenneth Burke outlined the first moments of social constructionism in *Permanence and change* with the observation that people can never get outside the constructions and conventions of discourse (p. 9). Gusfield (1989b)

presented a similar argument: “Because Burke insists on the paramount importance of language and symbolism in framing and defining the experiences of our world, he may be seen as a precursor of the contemporary emphasis in the social sciences on cultural forms in the construction of reality” (p. 30). Others have elaborated upon this intellectual connection. For instance, Loseke (1999) noted, “constructionist perspectives on social problems are located within the general social constructionist perspective on social life” (p. 209). She added that *The Social Construction of Reality* (1966) by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann is an obvious precursor of this perspective. Meanwhile, Brock (1993) suggested that Burke’s dramatism is consistent with this “landmark work” (p. 327). A Burkean analysis has much to offer Berger and Luckmann’s argument that the world in which we live is not just composed of objectively occurring phenomena. For instance, Potter (1996) argues that Berger and Luckmann “focus on the phenomenology of individual’s experience instead of analyzing the processes of construction at work in talk and texts” (p. 13). Contrarily, dramatisitic analysis highlights these processes of construction. It complements Berger and Luckmann whose approach “tends to obscure the interactional and rhetorical nature of fact construction” (ibid.).

Admittedly, Burke was not concerned with the social construction of problems (much less reality). When he labeled his five terms of the pentad as “forms of *talk about* experience,” his “concern [was] primarily with the analysis of *language* rather than with the analysis of “*reality*” (1945, p. 317). But insofar as “we depend on language to talk about – even to think about – social problems” (Best, 1999, p. 185), Burke’s approach to language is useful. Dramatism encourages us to see how discussions of actions (the subjective definitions of objective conditions) are actions of import in and of themselves.

It is only through language that we come to identify some conditions as social problems. This approach is a relativist one. As such, it is compatible with the constructionist perspective that advocates viewing a social problem as the product of subjective claims-making activities (rather than the product of some objective threat).

With *Constructing Social Problems*, Spector and Kitsuse (1977) advanced this quintessential constructionist perspective on social problems. They presented a “vision of social problems as social constructions, that is, as the products of claims-making and constitutive definitional processes” (Miller & Holstein, 1993, p. 3). Stated broadly, their radical subjectivist account argued that “conditions aren’t important; what’s important is what people say and do in order to convince audiences that troublesome conditions exist” (Loseke, 1999, p. 195). My investigation of squeegee kids similarly emphasizes the symbolic action of people’s claims but falls short of Spector and Kitsuse’s manifesto to ignore underlying social conditions.

For Kitsuse and Spector, it was only necessary to speak of “putative” conditions, conditions that were merely alleged to exist. Since social problems are what people think they are, the important thing to consider is not the actual nature of the condition but what people say about it. Burke (1961) is *somewhat* sympathetic to this point of view:

“Logology looks upon “evil” as a species of the negative, and looks upon the negative as a sheerly linguistic invention” (pp. 199-200). When he states, “a given event can be at once good, evil, and neutral, depending upon the frame of reference by which we ‘place’ it” (1954, p. 203), he sounds like a social constructionist outlining the importance of claims-makers’ typifying strategies.

The original Spector and Kitsuse agenda has both advocates and critics within the constructionist community. Loseke (1999, p. 205) suggests that Ibarra and Kitsuse (1993) attempted to defend the idea of social problems claims-making as a “language game” (Best, 1993, p. 123), one in which analysis of social problems can exist independent of talk about their objective referents. Ibarra and Kitsuse even replaced “putative condition” with the label “condition-category” in order to obviate any reference to objective conditions).¹⁴ Their goal was to rebut the criticism of “ontological gerrymandering” (see Woolgar & Pawluch, 1985). This argument accused “strict” constructionists of implicitly assuming an objective condition exists independent of people’s variable interpretations of it when they make “certain phenomena problematic while leaving others unproblematic” (see Loseke, 1999, p. 204).

However, Best (1993) notes that most social constructionists will stray from the strict constructionist’s tight focus on language and link rhetoric to social circumstances – a “weak reading” of constructionism (pp. 120-121). I suggest that this perspective is more consistent with Burke’s point of view. He concluded his essay on Terministic Screens with a section titled, “Our attempt to avoid mere relativism” (Burke 1968, p. 52). Subsequently, by emphasizing that dramatism was literally true, Melia (1989) suggested that Burke avoided the “vertigo of thoroughgoing relativism” (p. 63). King (2001) also

¹⁴ The difficulty of maintaining a strict constructionist attitude is evident in the following fictional account between a cynical editor and newspaper reporter (played by Clint Eastwood in the film *True Crime*): “issues are what we make up to give us an excuse to run good stories. ... A nine-year old shoots his brother with an Uzi, it’s the child violence issue. People want to read about sex organs and blood and we make issues out of them to give them an excuse” (Klavan, 1997, p. 25). The “issues” are “invented” in the media insofar as they are a product of language choices, but the linguistic frame that is chosen is still attached to some event or another. The violent act gave editors an excuse to typify the event as “child” violence and ratchet up that angle.

noted how “Burke liked to point out that it didn’t matter how well you spoke about sanitation if you continued to station your toilets above your well” (p. 36). Thus, Burke always emphasized the link between verbal action and material interests in any context. My dissertation is located in this middle ground between realists and strict relativists. It is a “contextual constructionist” account that focuses on the claims-making process while still acknowledging the underlying reality of objective conditions. Its view of the social construction of social issues assumes a combination of objective conditions and subjective definitions thereof. For instance, to answer why scapegoating was chosen as a rhetorical strategy instead of mortification demands an acknowledgement of the context in which social problems claims arise.

A strict constructionist might note claims-makers’ references to higher crime rates or rising fear of crime. But the strict constructionist would view these statements as claims, without making any effort to assess whether there really were increases in crime or the fear of crime. ... A contextual constructionist might [investigate the relationship] between the claims and other information about social conditions. At a minimum, it seems reasonable to ask what the claims-makers used as the basis for their claims of increasing crime, and an analyst might also ask what else could account for the timing of those claims. (Best, 2003a, p. 345)

So, though my analysis will contain statements that sound like a strict constructionist (“it does not matter whether or not crime was on the rise but that people said it was, and that this became the basis of subsequent claims”), I also take into account the ever-present context of a divisive political climate and political and social benefits to be won through effective claims-making. Ultimately, as Best (2003a) argues, “analysts who hope to understand how and why social problems emerge and evolve must locate claims-making within its context. By default, all constructionist analysis becomes a form of contextual constructionism” (p. 346).

The constructionist approach to social problems is related to the value-conflict perspective (see Rubington & Weinberg, 2003, pp. 282-283). I shall briefly outline this approach to social problems since I refer to some of its principles throughout my analysis. The value-conflict perspective is associated with Richard C. Fuller and Richard R. Myers. They held that social problems arise when groups with incompatible values and/or interests find themselves clashing over social conditions. They argued that all problems follow a standard pattern or “natural history” that progresses through awareness, policy determination, and reform and that at each of these stages, the values and interests of the groups clash. Ultimately, they believed, “the objective condition is necessary but not in itself sufficient to constitute a social problem. ... Social problems are what people think they are” (Fuller & Myers, 2003b, p. 95).

Kitsuse and Spector (2003) had much in common with Fuller and Myers. They both focused on “moral indignation, for some groups attempt to define a condition as a social problem because it offends their sense of values” (p. 290). And they believed in “a theory of natural history, because we conceive social problems not as static conditions or instantaneous events, but rather as a sequence of activities that may move through different stages” (ibid.). However, they parted company with the value-conflict perspective when they suggested that the emergence of social problems could be explained by referencing subjective definitions of problems (independent of objective conditions). Those who trumpet the value-conflict approach to social problems, on the other hand, inevitably find themselves referring to the context that spurred on language claims.

The value conflict perspective is useful for a number of reasons. First, it identifies different types of social problems. An “ameliorative” problem refers to a situation in which people agree that a condition constitutes a problem (but where proposals to reform the condition still prompt conflicts). “Value-judgements not only help to create the condition, but to prevent its solution” (Fuller & Myers, 2003a, p. 92). Homelessness and poverty are examples of such ameliorative problems. Everyone agrees that they should be reformed but there is no agreement on the means to accomplish this. On the other hand, “the moral problem represents a condition on which there is no unanimity of opinion throughout the society that the condition is undesirable” (Fuller & Myers, 2003a, p. 93). Squeegeeing is a moral problem. There was no agreement whether they were homeless and poor or kids out for a lark and thumbing their noses at authority. With this type of problem, there is widespread disagreement over whether anything should even be done about the condition.

The value-conflict perspective is also useful for its belief in a temporal course of problem development. The initial stage of “Awareness” is when “people have not crystallized their definition sufficiently to suggest or debate exact measures for amelioration or eradication of the undesirable condition” (Fuller & Myers, 2003b, p. 97). The catch-phrase that sums up this stage is “*something* ought to be done.” Then, a period of “Policy Determination” follows during which “interest groups are now concerned primarily with “what ought to be done” and people propose that “this and that should be done” (Fuller & Myers, 2003b, p. 99). Finally, a stage of “Reform” arises during which action is taken. “This is the institutionalized phase of the social problem in the sense that

we have established policies carried out by publicly authorized policy-enforcing agencies” (Fuller & Myers, 2003b, p. 100).

One could argue that social constructionists have adopted the value-conflict perspective more thoroughly than they have incorporated rhetoric. While they have used rhetoric, they still tend to use the terminology of the “old rhetoric” associated with persuasion instead of Burke’s “new rhetoric” and its emphasis on identification. For instance, Best (2003a) suggests social constructionist accounts of social problems must ask, “What is the rhetoric of claims-making - how are claims presented so as to persuade their audiences?” (p. 347). While Simons (1990) argued, “part of the job of the rhetorical analyst is to determine how constructions of ‘the real’ are made persuasive” (p. 11), I am interested in the process by which these constructions are made dramatic and how the public came to “identify” squeegee kids as a particular sort of problem. Burke seems invaluable here. A dramatistic analysis of social issue construction must move beyond persuasion and its stress upon deliberate design. “Identification, at its simplest level, may be a deliberate device, or a means. ... But identification can also be an ‘end,’ as ‘when people earnestly yearn to identify themselves with some group or other.’ They are thus not necessarily acted upon by a conscious external agent, but may act upon themselves to this end” (Nichols, 1976, p. 323).

Burkean identification assumes that audiences have a role to play in the discourse of social problems. The idea that social issues are made into issues of concern through the interpretive work of audiences is built upon the separate recognition that audience members’ identities are themselves rhetorical constructs (we identify with and against certain groups and certain concepts). This perspective is indebted to Charland (1994) who

states Burke “does not posit a transcendent subject as audience member, who would exist prior to and apart from the speech to be judged, but considers audience members to participate in the very discourse by which they would be ‘persuaded’” (p. 211).

As Burke (1950) admitted, the treatment of language in terms of identification instead of persuasion “is decidedly not meant as a substitute ... but an accessory to the standard lore” (p. xiv). Or, as he states later, “there is no chance of our keeping apart the meanings of persuasion, identification (‘consubstantiality’) and communication (the nature of rhetoric as ‘addressed’). But, in given instances, one or another of these elements may serve best for extending a line of analysis in some particular direction” (p. 46). Ultimately, I hope that an emphasis upon identification will extend the study of social problem construction and encourage analysts to consider further the power of language claims.

Some theorists of social problems have explored these issues, albeit without invoking Burke. Just as Spector and Kitsuse in 1977 “shifted the attention of sociologists of social problems away from social conditions and onto claims-making, Ibarra and Kitsuse propose another, albeit more subtle shift, away from claims-making activities and onto the language of claims” (Best, 1993, p. 120). Ibarra and Kitsuse seem to channel Burke (a man whose whole project dealt with people as symbol-using beings) when they suggest, “social constructionism studies members’ distinctive ways of perceiving, describing, evaluating, and acting upon *symbolically demarcated social realities*” (p. 29). For them, a social problem is something “situated within a network of signs, i.e., language” (ibid.) and they specifically identify rhetoric and an emphasis on “the constitutive techniques and processes that are entailed in claims-making” (p. 30) as an

area of study that could benefit social constructionism. Ibarra and Kitsuse suggest that “to speak of the rhetoric of social problems discourse is not to limit our domain to techniques of persuasion” (ibid.). Burke, though never mentioned, seems to lurk in the background of their prescription for change in constructionist studies of social problems. My project, on the other hand, makes Burke central to its study of claims-making.

SQUEEGEE NARRATIVE OR SQUEEGEE DRAMA?

Since I will be examining the emergence and evolution of squeegee kids as a social problem, I must also confront the issue of whether a theory based in narrative would better address such issue-development. After all, building on the value-conflict perspective, “scholars in the social constructionist school long ago identified the need to view social problems in terms of a career wherein a problem first emerges, next gains attention and legitimacy, and then receives official programmatic response” (Rochefort & Cobb, 1994, p. 8). The progress of a social issue can be understood as a narrative, but not just because it unfolds over time. “Narrative is a discourse, not a series of events” (Todorov, cited in Leitch, 1986, p. 17).

Admittedly, an analysis of a social problem tells a story. But this is compatible with a dramatistic analysis. Fischer (1999) pointed out how “the narrative perspective does have a critical connection with dramatism” (p. 266), and Duncan (1969b) clarifies that “a drama has a beginning, a middle and an end” (p. 415). Burke (1961) described “Principles of Governance Stated Narratively” and emphasized that narrative terms involve temporal sequence (pp. 201-208). In a sense, a dramatistic analysis of the construction of a social issue addresses a narrative, but through a dramatistic lens. It views an issue’s origin in the activities of claims-makers that raise awareness of some

condition (suggesting or producing feelings of guilt). Often these claims employ terminologies that present terrible examples and frightening statistics meant to move audiences through pity or fear to do something about the problem. As the issue evolves, news media cover these claims and authorities debate what to do about the condition, eventually acting upon some of these claims in an attempt to invoke collective catharsis and the resolution of public tensions. If there is a story to be told, it is one whose meaning is best apprehended through the siren song of the scapegoat. The outcome of the drama (or the end of the story, if you will) is one in which claims about the social order orient themselves toward a promise of ultimate redemption.

This “Burkean”-styled narrative can be seen in Leland Griffin’s (1969) study of social movements and Turner’s (1981) concept of the “social drama.” One could feasibly use either to address the evolution of social issues.¹⁵ I use dramatism because I view social issues just as Burke saw all life as a drama (one whose narrative, so to speak, unfolds in dramatic terms). The drama that was the evolution of the social issue of squeegee kids was understood through language claims made in the media. The “problem” of squeegee kids did not develop through the labor of some narrator. Though dramatic, it was not a narrative in the strict sense that drama and narrative have traditionally been demarcated according to representational modes of mimesis (showing)

¹⁵ Turner sees such “dramas” as evolving through four phases. He labels these breach, crisis, redress, and *either* reintegration *or* recognition of schism. Evolving first from a breach of a norm, a rule of morality, law, custom, or etiquette, conflict forms as sides are taken and factions are formed. Subsequently, adjustive and redressive mechanisms are attempted and attendant effects are registered (Turner, 1981, pp. 145-147). Turner acknowledges Burke while I attempt to apply his theory explicitly. While Burke can be said to lurk in the background of Turner’s theory, Turner’s theory (and its parallels with the value-conflict model) can be said to lurk in the background of my application of Burke.

and diegesis (telling) (see Leitch, 1986, p. 3; E. Black, 1992, p. 147). In dramatic form, there is no narrator intervening between the action and audience. The “story” of squeegee kids lacked a narrator – someone who controls what will be told, someone who structures a point of view in order to encourage public reception and perception of the story. Rather, the issue was an artifact of language formed through the conjunction of public rhetors’ (claims-makers) actions and the organizing of these claims and their endowment of meaning by audiences.

Edwin Black (1992) acknowledges another significant point: “Showing engages the auditor differently from telling. In dramatic form, the auditor observes actions that elicit judgement” (p. 154). This is especially relevant to the squeegee drama wherein the setting, characters, the onset of action, climax in conflict, and resolution all revolve around hortatory expressions. “To say that something is a social problem requires making an evaluation that the condition isn’t good. This is a question about morality” (Loseke, 1999, p. 47). This suggests, I believe, how Burke (and his use of the negative) is central to an understanding of the very foundation of social issue constitution. “Moral action arises as a consequence of the hortatory, judgmental uses of the negative. ... Without the negative implicit in language, moral action based on conceptions of right and wrong behavior (such as law, moral and social rules, and rights) would not exist” (Foss, Foss, & Trapp, 2002, p. 205). The *Safe Streets Act* that banned squeegeeing underscores the importance of the negative to any language-based understanding of the social order.

In the final analysis, “it [is] impossible to define narrative in contradistinction to drama” (Leitch, 1986, p. 40).¹⁶ Having chosen drama as a theme, though, it is useful to understand the squeegee kid issue as a particular type. Burke suggests that “contemporary exasperations make us prefer the tragic (sometimes melodramatic) names of ‘villain’ and ‘hero’ to the comic names of ‘tricked’ and ‘intelligent’” (Burke, 1959, pp. 4-5). Similarly, Best (1999) suggests melodramatic imagery often saturates discussions of crime, reports of journalists and the speeches of politicians (p. xii). With this dramatic nature in mind, it is interesting to observe “some ‘plot lines’ that reoccur in many constructionist studies. One standard plot features plucky claims-makers who draw attention to a neglected social problem. ... A second common constructionist plot line seems more critical of the claims-makers. Here the analyst dissects claims, often calling them into question” (Best, 2003a, 349). A dramatistic perspective does not construct a drama by creating a sympathetic portrait of underdog claims-makers (or challenging and rallying against powerful claims-makers). Instead, its notion of drama comes from ascribing motives to claims-makers and revealing the presence of a purgative ritual whereby guilt is purified and the social order is redeemed.

DRAMATISM VERSUS SPEECH ACT THEORY

Rhetoric not only accomplishes arguments that advance positions on social problems; it also constitutes social problems – it brings them into being. The use of language by claims-makers should be seen as action that has symbolic and material import. Claims-making can bring about new laws and new ways of thinking that a culture

¹⁶ Brummett (1994) also takes this tack. He describes dramatistic/narrative criticism as one of five perspectives that can be used to undertake rhetorical criticism of popular culture.

takes for granted, changing both collective attitudes and individual behavior. This concern with language as performance, a medium of action that is used to do things, is something that is held in common by both speech act theory and dramatism. Dramatism examines “language and thought as basically modes of action rather than as means of conveying information” (Burke, cited in Frank, 1969, p. 9). This is similar to speech act theorists who emphasize that the way language is used is a more important source of meaning than its logical structure or the way words stand for the things they represent. “A speech act always has two dimensions: propositional content, or the basic factual sense or meaning; and illocutionary force, which gives the speech act its performative dimension” (Foss, Foss, & Trapp, 2002, p. 245). Henderson (1988) described this connection when he suggested that *How to do things with words* (the foundational work of John Austin – prominent speech act theorist) “falls under the rubric of dramatism” (p. 108). Still, as Wess (1996) noted, though Burke himself made this observation, the affinities between the two figures have received little attention (pp. 112-113).

Of course, a theorist more sympathetic to Austin than to Burke might suggest that dramatism falls under the rubric of speech act theory. So, what does dramatism have to offer to an analysis of social issue emergence and evolution that speech act theory does not? One major difference lies in the goal of one’s analysis. For instance, Potter (1996) acknowledges an intellectual debt to Austin (and Berger and Luckmann) in his treatment of discourse, rhetoric and social construction. He investigates how descriptions are produced so they will be treated as factual (appearing neutral and independent), yet he is interested in the construction of facts whereas I am interested in the construction of a drama.

And herein lies the main reason why I believe a speech act theory is not the best perspective from which to study social issues. Austin “focuses his theory on serious, authentically meant speech acts while deferring ironies, jokes, actors on stage and so on for later examination (which never arrives)” (Potter, 1996, p. 83). Burke’s notion of symbolic action applies equally to poetry, puns, dramatic acts, and the like. These are equally if not more interesting for Burke and yet Austin classified them as “parasitic” forms of talk. Just as Derrida deconstructed Austin’s arguments about speech acts, Burke’s symbolic action does not make an ethical determination of what is and is not proper language use. Austin’s distinction between “serious” and “non-serious” speech acts means his theory tends to operate surrounded by “the rhetorical security of a factual world untainted by fiction” (Wess, 1996, p. 113). Dramatism, on the other hand, not only uses the tools of fiction to address the concerns of our non-fictional world, it also has inspired analyses of social issues that refuse to cleanly separate fact from fiction.

To place the logic of fact, first, and fiction, second (or for that matter, to have fiction trump fact) is to create an artificial opposition. “The Theatre does not win out over ‘real life.’ The two are seen as indistinguishably and structurally implicated” (Spivak, cited in Wess, 1996, p. 169). By way of illustration, “to write about the drinking-driver materials as dramatic is to treat public events *as if* they are only dramas rather than real events. These emphasize the ‘as if’ or fictional character of this form of public action and its mood of excitement and conflict – its dramatic value” (Gusfield, 1981, pp. 76-77). Such a perspective does not deny that such real events occurred. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate how semantic meanings were represented as facts about an issue that then furthered its conversion into a public problem. Gusfield’s desire is to show how facts are

sometimes convenient fictions used to support one's claims. He refers to this process as "the very fictive facticity" that "enables the drama to be performed. It renders the events closer to the imagined model of villainy, and in this fashion serves to organize attitudes of condemnation" (1981, p. 81). Burke's emphases on the centrality of guilt-redemption and on the process of the "tragic rhythm of action" (Frank, 1969, p. 138) are implicit in Gusfield's view of social problem development. Thus, Burke's use of language can be distinguished from speech act theory, I believe, by its emphasis on the "dramatic." It is not just action, but action that is always potentially tragic.

We can view speech acts as performances meant not to exchange information but arguments that serve to establish or reject problematic validity claims. But for Burke (1941), the speech act can be seen as the symbolic act, or "the dancing of an attitude" (p. 9). This is, I suggest, a perspective that lends itself to the rhetorical idea of reasonability rather than the theoretical concepts of rationality and certainty. "Burke has pointed out that by using our rationality (our symbol-using genius) ... we have arrived at the outer limits of rationality and at an ironic and potentially tragic point where rationality is in conflict with itself" (Rueckert, 1994, p. 131). This is important because speech act theory might reasonably address the construction of social issues whose emergence and evolution depends on logic. However, dramatism may be better suited to explaining those social problems that depend more on emotion. Loseke (2003b) suggests how, "in addition to – or even instead of – appealing to logic, claims-makers can construct claims encouraging audience members to *feel* sympathy for social problem victims and/or *feel* hatred for social problem villains" (p. 27). I believe the issue of squeegee kids was one

such case; very few “experts” were ever consulted and very few “facts” were advanced in support of pro- or anti-squeegee arguments.

Perhaps this is because the debate over squeegee kids typically did not revolve around the objective condition. The facts of the condition – how many squeegee kids there were, how much damage they caused – were minimized next to subjective definitions of whether they constituted a nuisance (or something more). References to the harm caused typically took a back seat to expressions of moral indignation that people felt. Thus, definitions of the condition itself tended to be about definitions of the types of people involved. I argue that instead of audiences evaluating claims as important and/or believable, audiences for media claims about squeegee kids judged them primarily as people worthy of blame and/or punishment. “Constructionists have focused on examining the *logical* appeal of claims; they haven’t done much with what Aristotle called “*pathos*” or emotional argument” (Loseke, 1999, p. 66). My use of dramatism is meant as a step in this direction.

Loseke (2003b) suggests that the claims-making process can be approached using an analytic framework advanced by Stephen Toulmin in *The uses of argument* (p. 71). Here, arguments (of any type) have three components: grounds – which are the basic facts, conclusions – what should be done, and warrants – why something should be done. Interestingly, though, Klumpp (1993) argues, “two of the most vital strains of contemporary rhetorical study – dramatism and argumentation – proceed with energetic progress and with no apparent influence on each other” (p. 148). Loseke (2003b) speaks of claims and claims-makers but suggests “the term rhetoric is a good substitution for the term claim because both have the characteristic that they seek to persuade” (p. 45).

Which is to say, when using argument as one's primary motif, the operative term of the "old rhetoric" – persuasion – is the fundamental issue when it comes to thinking about social problems and audience responses to them. The tradition of using argument as a basis for understanding social issues is a valuable one. I believe, though, that the "motif" of drama also has much to offer. Thus, I propose to "think about social problems, dramatically." Far from an attack, this is a supplement to previous studies.

Dramatism and its view of language as a particular form of phatic communication – not to exchange information as much as to establish a bond of some sort – can be used to analyze any speech act. Gossip, for instance, can be seen as a form of argument with grounds and conclusions all meant as a performance. But when we examine it for a specific dynamic of making friends and enemies, clarifying allies and opponents in a potentially tragic drama – that is when Burke's analysis distinguishes itself. The same approach can be applied to social problems discourse. When acts of communion function to exclude (what Burke referred to as "congregation by segregation"), that is when dramatism is particularly helpful. It does not just show how speech acts (or symbolic action) were formed, but contextualizes them as part of a wider human drama.

DRAMATISM VERSUS THE MORAL PANIC

Admittedly, not too many analyses of social constructions of social problems use dramatism. An article by Boor Tonn, Endress, and Diamond (1993) is a notable exception.¹⁷ Some, though, do use the moral panic model (for a brief sampling, see

¹⁷ I would like to think that this is more an unfortunate byproduct of the increasing specialization of academic disciplines (and the journals dedicated to "spreading the word"), rather than theoretical incompatibility. Best (2003b) offers further thoughts on this in the journal identified most with the sociological analysis of social problems. Boor Tonn, Endress, and Diamond (1993) had their article published in a journal most identified with rhetoric. It is my hope that journals dedicated to media and

Loseke, 2003b, p. 71n). The moral panic model and dramatism are not complete strangers to one another. Stanley Cohen's introduction of the moral panic model expanded on Frank Tannenbaum's idea of dramatizing evil – the public degradation and stigmatizing of offenders. With this notion of victimage in mind, Cohen explained how young people in England were transformed into “folk devils” by a control culture of police, the courts, and informal community action groups (Ellis & Dekeseredy, 1996, pp. 51-2). On the face of it, Cohen's (1973) definition of a moral panic seems to accurately describe what occurred with squeegee kids:

A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates. (p. 9)

If the concept of moral panic was used simply to describe the process of arousing social concern over an issue – then I could see my way to using it. However, the model has certain assumptions built in which make it hard to strictly apply to my case-study. For instance, the hallmark of moral panics is “a unanimous cry of outrage, with virulent calls for tougher action being taken to stop it” (McRobbie, 1994, p. 208). Once certain groups are labeled as deviant (and once these labels “stick”), a context of panic and subsequent moralizing is said to follow in order to deal with this deviancy. “A moral panic occurs when official reaction to a series of events builds a consensus about the presence and seriousness of a perceived threat. Once a public consensus occurs, the result can be the instigation of new control policies” (Davis, 1999, p. 117).

communication might offer further opportunities for the propagation of rhetorical analyses of social problems and their development.

Though squeegeeing comprised a series of events that prompted official reaction (and new control policies), there was no consensus about the seriousness of the threat that squeegee kids posed. Some politicians, editors, and letter-to-the-editor writers invoked the idea that everyone was threatened; but a large number of contravening claims suggested otherwise. Some claims condemned politicians while others supported them. At the same time, political rhetoric vilified kids while interest groups stood up for them and demonized the government. McRobbie (1994) suggests how this proliferation of voices, the diversity of positions from which they speak, and their increased ability to “fight back” demands a reconceptualization of the traditional moral panic model. This lack of consensus is one reason to qualify the moral panic’s applicability to my case study. When it came to squeegee kids there was certainly widespread attention, but the degree of concern over them as a “problem” was continually contested.

McCorkle and Miethe (2002) use the moral panic model to explain the construction of gangs as a social issue. They pay special attention to the disproportionate expression of concern in a moral panic as they ask the following set of questions regarding media treatment and public perception of the issue:

How afraid should the public be of gangs? Do the images and rhetoric surrounding street gangs accurately reflect the nature and extent of the threat? Has the response to gangs been commensurate with the actual threat posed? ... Is it possible that, at least in certain parts of the country, the gang problem has been exaggerated, distorted, and exploited by those seeking to further organizational interests, sell newspapers, attract viewers, and sometimes even advance personal careers? (p. 5)

These are valid questions within the moral panic model. But they are not concerns of dramatism. The moral panic’s emphasis on disproportionality is another reason to avoid this model. It is highly probable that claims-makers engaged in exaggeration and

distortion in order to distinguish their position regarding squeegee kids (and emerge as prominent among competing claims-makers, sell more papers, etc.). However, in addition to the question of how one measures the degree of distortion, I do not feel that the nature of the “panic” is the most interesting object of study. Instead, a dramatistic analysis examines how language use could produce attitudes of concern or fear in order to goad people into cathartic or purificatory solutions. My approach is to “look for a sacrificial principle as a dramatic theme in creating social order. ... The drama consists in seeing some players as victims, others as villains. Order is obtained through sacrifice so that unity is derived” (Gusfield, 1981, p. 81). The point is not just to suggest that there was a drama afoot, performed in speech acts arguing both for and against squeegee kids. While this is true, it should not represent the end of analysis. Rather, viewing statements dramatistically allows us to speak of the rhetorical means by which squeegee kids are identified. The end point of this is not to suggest that people were persuaded to reject squeegee kids (or to critique those who sought to bring this about). Instead, it is to outline the means by which the identification of the squeegee kid occurred.

Both dramatism and the moral panic model have an interest in how a particular group came to be represented as a threat and concerned with how the condition came to be recognized by the public as a social problem. The scapegoat (central figure of a dramatistic analysis) is analogous, in some ways, to the folk devil figure of the moral panic. Ellis and Dekeseredy (1996) sketched a trajectory of moral panic formation: “working class youth groups → threat or problems → moral panic → socialization of public *and* dramatization of conduct → folk devil stereotypes” (p. 54). Even still, as I shall demonstrate, squeegee kids’ public identity fell short of personifying evil, the

description Goode and Ben Yehuda (1994, p. 28) use to summarize folk devils.

Dramatism investigates the representation of threat without moralizing about the nature or degree of it. As such, it may be more accurate to understand the social issue of squeegee kids as “a moral drama – when deviant labels emerge and are applied during the course of interactions involving alleged offenders and accusers” (Ellis & Dekeseredy, 1996, p. 53). To wit, “the moral drama of the drinking-driver” is the term used by Gusfield (1981, p. 80) to describe the language of conflict and combat surrounding public campaigns about the problem of alcohol.

In the end, my project is situated (like McCorkle and Miethe’s) as a constructionist inquiry whereby social problems are viewed as products, derived from the claims and assertions of groups and individuals with respect to some actual or reputed condition. In both the dramatistic and moral panic approach, claims-makers and the language claims they employ are more important than the condition itself in determining its definition as a social problem. McCorkle and Miethe are primarily interested in how claims-makers present their issues in terms of symbolic representations that distort their conditions whereas I am interested in how these representations dramatize the conditions. The distinction is, in part, one of degree rather than kind. Representations that distort obviously dramatize too. I, however, am interested in the nature of the drama that can be analyzed independent of the assumption that distortion is involved.

APPLYING DRAMATISM TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS DISCOURSE

The social issue of squeegee kids boils down to the rhetorical struggle over meaning. It involves the power to name squeegee kids (or squeegee adults) and identify them as some sort of threat, and the power to resist those typifications and present

alternative ones. It involves the power to assert and to challenge the “public image” of squeegee kids. As Rosteck (1999) argued, “the management or negotiation of contradiction, both in texts and by audiences, is an inherently rhetorical process” (p. 19). As contradictory claims regarding squeegee kids accumulated, they provided the raw material out of which a typical consumer of the mass media might form his or her opinion of squeegeeing.

Burke, though not the origin of all contemporary rhetoric, has much to offer this project. For instance, Carey (cited in Denzin, 1992, p. 71) argues that cultural studies, in an American context, is an attempt to reclaim and reconstruct the tradition in which Burke wrote. Meanwhile, McLemee (2001) asked whether Kenneth Burke accidentally created cultural studies. However, I have chosen to forgo debate about whether Burke is best classified as a scholar of rhetoric or a pre-cursor to cultural studies. Instead, I suggest, “what is really at stake is less a question of whether one is being ‘rhetorical’ or ‘cultural’ in approach than it is one of how best to investigate the way stability or change is structured into social discourse” (Rosteck, 1999, p. 7). I chose Burke’s view of change, structured rhetorically through the metaphor of “the fall” to analyze the evolution of the social issue of squeegeeing. Interpreting the squeegee drama as if occurring in stages evident in media discourse is, admittedly, only one kind of reading. However, I feel it has much to offer when it comes to mapping the trajectory of popular opinion and claims-makers’ attempts to mobilize fears and emotions regarding squeegee kids.

Burke’s notion of “identification” – the question of how people are both integrated and divided through discourse – is crucial here. Instead of powerful claims-makers jockeying for position, gaining and losing strength as they clash with others,

language itself contributes to the social order with a power of its own to affect change through a vast array of identifications. Burke is a thinker whose work exhibits a tension between structuralist and post-structuralist tendencies. I suggest that this tension is necessary for a full understanding of the genesis and development of social problems discourse.

Charland (1994, p. 216) says Burke's tradition of critique shares much with structuralism. Carter (1996) notes how "structuralists view words as binary oppositions; Burke views our identities as oppositional word-constructions" (p. 138). And Rueckert (1994, p. 235) suggests that Burke quests after four kinds of structure in verbal works: structures of identifications (what goes with what); structures of opposition (what versus what); structures of progression (what follows what); and structures of transformation (what becomes what). The classification of Burke as a structuralist (or a post-structuralist) depends, in part, on which of Burke's books is the focus. Gusfield (1989b), for instance, suggests much of *A Grammar of Motives* is akin to a "form of structuralism" designed to "rid us of the view of appearances as understandably ordered and to go beyond the disorder of appearances to perceive the forms which are constant" (p. 47). Meanwhile, Williams (1989) suggests Burke's later work is akin to Derrida's "deconstruction" (p. 216). Like anyone who continued to publish over a long period and whose thinking continued to evolve, there are many "Burkes" to be analyzed. Tompkins and Cheney (1993, p. 226) and Coe (in Behr, 1996, p. x) situate Burke as an anticipatory post-modernist. Some suggest that "Burke can be profitably identified as an idiosyncratic American post-structuralist" (Condit, 1999, p. 331; Nelson 1989, p. 171). This latter view

of Burke is due, in part, to his question, “Do we simply use words, or do they not also use us?” (1968, p. 6).

Burke did see the human being as the agent of his/her actions. But even though he suggested that humans use symbols and invented the negative, he considered that “it might be more accurate to say that language and the negative ‘invented’ man” (Burke, 1968, p. 9). Nelson (1989) sums up this tension: “The issue is whether one sees the symbol-using animal in Burke as an independent agent or as a figure occupying the role of agency within a verbal drama that is in a sense already written for us” (p. 157).

Ultimately, Burke was a pragmatist when it came to this issue. He attributed agency both to the active agent using language and to language itself. “The driver drives the car, but the traffic drives the driver. We use words and exercise a certain choice in speaking (thereby driving the car), but we are ourselves driven by our historicized participation in the linguistic situation (the traffic)” (Nelson, 1989, p. 163). The implication of the vast menagerie of language – pursuing its own entelechial end – is that we become language’s servants. Here, “nothing can exist outside the text, where truth is in effect a trope” (Simons, 1989, p. 18). Taken to this extreme, Burke’s ideas about language have definite shades of “strict constructionism.” However, this vision is misleading since Burke does not posit that language is *all* there is.

What Burke suggests instead is, first, that we see always through terministic screens; second, that language is an independent source of human motivation; and third, more deeply, that anything we can see or feel is already *in* language, given to us *by* language, and even produced *as us* by language. Moreover, language produces us as motivated subjects not through some free play of difference but as part of mobile yet always structured and hierarchized differences. Our work, then, is already written for us. In writing it anew, we make it our own but always as agents of a rhetorical situation of no one’s choosing. (Nelson, 1989, p. 169)

Burke's analysis of discourse is semiotic but not confined to it. His analysis of discourse can be compatible with a cultural studies perspective but should not be consigned to it. When one views his whole body of work, Burke's approach "could properly be charged neither with the reductions of structuralism, nor with the vaporization of history in the name of Derrideanism" (Lentricchia, 1982, p. 135). Thus, rather than trying to authoritatively classify Burke, I believe we are best served by the less specific but more useful observation that "Burke serves as an intersection of contemporary critical theories" (Carter, 1996, p. 82). Similarly, Condit (1995) argues that Burke should be seen as "an actor within a philosophical scene, rather than as an actor polarized against other actors" (pp. 255-256).

Blair (1995, p. 153) paints Burke as a skeptical humanist who weighs in on, but draws back from, the controversy of all-pervasive subjectivity and the possibility of an all-encompassing discourse. This perspective is helpful to the analyst of social issue formation. I suggest that we can use Burke to analyze the structured but cacophonous array of voices expressing claims about squeegee kids. This means viewing this array of claims as reflections or representations of their creators. Here, discourse refers to "simply instances of rhetoric, as most rhetoricians would refer to them" (Blair & Michel, 1999, p. 72). However, claims-makers can also be seen as subjects who are formed and dispersed in discursive practice as well. Burke provides a foundation for this. "Most contemporary rhetoricians take discourses to be definitively symbolic ... [but] meanings are treated not only as the by-product of symbols but also as the connective tissue between discourse and audience" (Blair & Michel, 1999, p. 30).

Discourse, then, is not *only* the sum total of statements about a particular object, it is *also* a pattern for the formation of statements, a set of institutions from which statements may be proffered, networks for the circulation of statements, etc. In short, discourse is not only discursive, it is also institutional; it does not merely describe objects, it constitutes them. Discourse is more than just a form of representation; it is a material condition that enables ways of speaking of things. “Burke’s rhetorical perspective extends discourse analysis by introducing different vocabularies to understand how and why symbolic action occurs. Burke’s rhetoric shares an object of analysis with discourse analysis – real instances of text in context” (Stillar, 1998, pp. 58-9). But because it is explicitly aligned with the language of drama a different set of knowledge-claims is typically expressed.

As Rosteck (1999) points out, “both rhetorical studies and cultural studies may well address issues of power and interpretation” (p. 18). They just do it differently. “Rhetorical studies seems comfortable with a more or less adversarial model of the social sphere, where competing ideologies, manifest in texts, strive to overturn others and to establish themselves as common sense” (ibid.). So, rhetorical studies can help trace the struggle over power as it developed in the squeegee debate. Yet, as I have shown, Burke moves us away from an emphasis on persuasion and the limited view of rhetors who are empowered by the force of their argument. By emphasizing identification, Burke prefigures a notion of diffused power among rhetors and receivers. In this view, rhetoric is not a means of individuals exercising power over other human beings. Instead, it provides some tentative first steps towards recognizing multiple nodes of intentional power. Burke believes language use by rhetors has the power to constitute objects, new

domains of knowledge. For him, the point is not to affirm or deny true or false propositions but to construct meanings in order that one can then identify with (or against) some group or some thing. We can use him to understand how meanings (and in turn, social issues) are constructed, not just presented for public consumption. For our purposes, social issues are formed out of the symbolic action of a discourse. The symbolic action of the language in a claim (and the publicizing of the claim) joins with other claims and merges into an active matrix of negotiated interpretation.

In this discourse over squeegeeing (as in all questions of social issue formation), power exists in “the struggle to install meanings within popular common sense, to establish and naturalize certain connotations” (Nelson, 1999, p. 216). It is the power to produce new understandings (such as the idea that squeegee kids are dangerous and that new laws are necessary in order to deal with a tragic condition instead of simply trying to understand squeegee kids and negotiate with them). In the social issue of squeegee kids, in particular, there was very little evidence of “discursive domination” whereby the power and knowledge of politicians or police over civilians and of experts over laymen is reflected in linguistic debate. And, ultimately, we can say that – like other social problems – squeegee kids only became an issue when the power of the public announced it as such. Consequently, my analysis of squeegee discourse also recognizes how discourse is always a product of wider social formations. My project is envisioned not as Burke-ology, per se, but “rhetorical cultural studies” (Rosteck 1999, p.22). Power is not located precisely in the text/utterance itself, nor in the ability of the author to structure claims therein. There is a wider sense of diffused power – the ability to encourage certain readings of texts and certain things to be said and others not to be said. I recognize how

there are multiple meanings circulating here but this project is consistent with the portrayal of rhetorical studies as “a discipline in retreat from the poststructuralist abyss – from an emphasis on the endless play of meaning ... fixing discursive meaning in and through particular contexts” (Rosteck, 1999, pp. 21-22).

In this view, rhetoric entails a process of creating consubstantiation. It acknowledges “that the interdiction, the refusal, the prohibition, far from being essential forms of power, are only its limits: the frustrated or extreme forms of power” (Foucault, 1989, p. 220). Even still, government claims that vilified or prohibited squeegee kids are eminently worthy of examination not as rhetorical products whose force derives from their condemnatory language but as products whose use of the hortatory negative were inspired by and produced other rhetorical claims. This accumulation of claims, this discourse about squeegeeing, produced pleasure and also produced new objects of knowledge. It produced a drama and it constructed squeegee kids as a dramatic social issue.

CONCLUSION

This chapter outlined how Burke’s writings can provide the analyst of social problems with the resources to analyze rhetorical claims as meaning-making resources oriented in discourse. It first described how Burke’s view of rhetoric offers a powerful set of tools to the social constructionist. It argued for the ongoing relevance of Burke to those who call for renewed attention to the power of rhetoric to constitute putative conditions and putative populations as problems. It clarified why such an analysis was better served by a dramatistic analysis than either a narrative-based approach or one whose main pillar was speech act theory or moral panic reasoning. Finally, it made a case for a pragmatic

approach to discourse analysis, one whose dramatistic foundation allows for an examination of text and context, the power of symbolicity and representation, and the dynamic between claims-maker and audience.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes how dramatistic concepts can be employed in an analysis of media texts. Its task is to outline a methodology that will demonstrate how attitudes toward squeegee kids were dramatized and how these attitudes then became knowledge. This will explain how squeegee kids were typified as a public problem and how their image as a public threat was created. To do this, I have chosen to undertake a dramatistic analysis of media coverage of squeegee kids. Here, the intent is not to criticize the authors of articles for their descriptions of squeegeeing or to criticize the squeegeers themselves. Rather, “it [is] the task of the Burkean critic to ... link discourse to the real situations for which it is symbolic equipment. In this way, by examining what people are *saying*, the critic may discover what cultures are celebrating or mourning” (Brummett, 1999, p. 479). My analysis examines how squeegee kids became a prominent object of mourning. Why did this characterization work? What part of truth and fantasy within it clicked? To investigate this I resort to a number of classic “dramatistic” tools. This chapter describes how these tools are employed in my primary analysis of squeegee-based claims.

APPLICABILITY OF METHOD

As a first step towards explaining *how* the dramatistic tool set can be applied to my case study I need to explain *why* Burke’s dramatistic method is applicable. Dramatism is often linked to studies of literature and dramas within literature, rather than to social dramas taking place in the streets or news coverage of social dramas. Even still, Burke (1941) himself contended that the main ideal of criticism is to use *all* that there is

to use (p. 23). Therefore, while “Burke focused more on fiction and poetry than on any other form of discourse, he draws upon a wide variety of discourses in different media, including news reports. ... There is nothing in his theories which disqualify them for application today to all forms of mass media” (Brummett, 1999, p. 480).

Journalists are symbol-using animals. The same can be said for all those who use language to comment upon squeegee kids. Those who publicly air their thoughts and write letters to the editor have a much wider forum for their symbolic meanings when their musings are selected for publication in the news media. An identification of squeegee kids as significant symbol-users is necessary but the media must communicate this condition to a wider audience in order for it to become an issue and hence really transform squeegeeing into a social and political drama beyond an interpersonal drama in the streets.

Certainly the news media often take on a dramatic form that lends itself to dramatistic analysis just as much as any novel. After all, “every news story should, without any sacrifice of probity or responsibility, display the attributes of fiction, of drama” (Frank, cited in Beckett, 2003, p. 332). This is explicit in coverage of a divisive or controversial social issue. As Hall et al. (1978) noted, “the setting up of a topic in terms of a debate within which there are oppositions and conflicts is also one way of *dramatising* an event so as to enhance its newsworthiness” (p. 58). Brummett (1999) notes that audiences expect the world to be mediated to them dramatically and suggests, “it is more real than metaphorical to refer to ‘media dramas’” (p. 483). Media descriptions of human behavior provide an excellent breeding-ground for dramatistic analysis. This is because the goal is not to ascertain the motives that may exist inside

squeegee kids' heads, but to understand how their descriptions allowed others to impute motives to them.

In addition, there is a "novel" appeal to the frisson of squeegee kids. They provide new material for yet another retelling of the classic "us versus them" story. Burke's dramatism, applied as media analysis, reminds us that media content tells a story. It allows us to see how that story unfolds as a narrative as certain pivotal scenes, characters, and themes emerge. It tells the tale of symbolic ills that must be confronted and cures that must be implemented when people confront controversial social issues.

Condit (1990) demonstrates one way of applying elements of Burke's method to media coverage of a social issue. She analyzes media discourse over abortion as rhetoric. She adapts elements of Burke (notably his pentad) and suggests that abortion rhetoric can be read as a narrative of a particular sort. She brings out the "dramatic structure" of abortion rhetoric – "the act, agent, agency, purpose, and scene that constitutes any narrative – discursive depiction of human situations and events" (p. 226). Condit's study of the abortion controversy's development in public discourse does not focus on the people or the events "behind" social change. Rather, it focuses on the discourse itself and the arguments over abortion that shaped its status as a social issue. I will study squeegee kids in a similar fashion. By recourse to dramatism, the shifting meaning of squeegee kids, the associated new constellation of terminologies, practices, and laws (as well as the role of the media as a producer and circulator of those meanings) will be examined.

DESCRIPTION OF METHOD

"The great importance of Kenneth Burke's work is that it is a *methodology*. He does not go on telling us the *what* of communication ... but *how* it affects our social

relationships” (Duncan, 1969b, p. 408). There is no one set of tools in Burke’s canon of writings that is advisable over others. Instead, “if reading Burke prompts any lesson, it is that creative insights are constrained by the systematicity of method” (McKerrow, 1999, p. 452). Still, even though Burke (cited in Lansner, 1969) entreats us to “keep trying anything and everything, improvising, borrowing from others” (pp. 261-262), there is a strategy for analyzing squeegee kids that can be distilled out of the many approaches that he uses. Brock (1990) provides a partial overview of this:

[Burke] advises gathering lists of recurrent terms until the critic begins to sense which are essential – which terms cluster and where. Beginnings and endings, he argues, are particularly likely to reveal key terms. Critics may verify the hypotheses they construct by making a reasoned case for the consistencies of the parts and the whole, that is, for how the terms fit the apparent situation. (p. 187)

Burke (1941) suggests that “we might equate the word *symbolic* with the word *statistical*” in order to understand the rational base of “symbolic action” (p. 18). His goal is to find a pattern in humans’ symbolic use of language that will reveal something of human relations and human motives.¹⁸ To do this, uses of language are grouped into cycles or clusters of terms so that their functions may be revealed. I will use this method to analyze squeegee-based claims in order to demonstrate how the life-cycle of squeegeeing functioned as a symbolic drama.

METHODOLOGICAL CHOICES

To study the squeegee kids discourse as an unfolding drama, a series of choices must be made in order to approach the subject matter effectively. To begin with, the

¹⁸ Knox (1957) suggested, “Burke chose the mechanical term ‘statistical approach’ because he wanted to move in on the empiricist’s territory” (p. 96). Regardless of the choice of terminology, we can apply literary methods (such as dramatism) to social scientific events.

public discourse must be selected. “The dramatistic analysis of motives has its *point of departure* in the subject of verbal action (in thought, speech, and document)” (Burke, 1945, p. 33). I chose mainstream media coverage as the document(s) of verbal action surrounding squeegee kids. “The press and entertainment media have become the principal means of relaying social problems claims to a broad audience, and sociologists tend to assume that claims presented in the media have both reached and gained considerable acceptance in the general population” (Best, 1999, p. 189). Staudenmeier (1989, p. 209), Albert (1989, p. 52), and Johnson (1989, p. 5) make similar arguments. I chose to analyze the complete set of records that comprise the news media coverage of squeegee kids as indexed by Canadian Newsdisc (discontinued and replaced by), Canadian Newsstand, and Lexis Nexis Canada for the period between 1995 and 2003. The media reports are preserved in complete form and they provide a manageable but large quantity of discourse to study.

A few acknowledgements of the limitations of the use of full-text databases are in order. As Best and Furedi (2001) argue, the results one gets from using these new research tools “depend upon the precise search strategy adopted. ... It is not enough to simply count citations; attention must be paid to the location of the publications being cited” (p. 123). “Location” can refer to a geographical place and to placement in different media. Thus, I have produced charts that depict the development of the squeegee issue (by tracing changes over time in the quantity of squeegee-based claims), and charts that acknowledge the location of these claims (in the two major papers covering the issue – *The Toronto Star* and the *Toronto Sun*). These are provided in the third appendix. Also, “the choice of a search term makes a difference” (Best, 1999, pp. 192-193). I performed

two “meta”-searches: first, I searched for every article or program that included the word “squeegee” and promptly found articles about innovations in windshield wiper technology and so forth. So, my second search was for articles that contained the term “squeegee kid”. This narrowed the search parameters substantially. Then I went back to the initial search and browsed the titles of articles for news accounts that dealt with my subject but did not use the typical label “squeegee kid.” I also had recourse to transcripts of CBC and CTV national news broadcasts. While “transcripts let researchers recover media messages that used to be ephemeral” (Best, 1999, p. 195), their limitations also confront the analyst of newspaper content. They “reveal little or nothing about what viewers saw, and they may not always accurately record what listeners heard” (ibid.). Finally, I acknowledge that the use of these databases sometimes limits the full bibliographic citation since not all archived articles feature the original page number of publication. In these instances, I provide all other publication information so that one can find the same article in a database search.

My purpose is not to compare papers’ contrasting coverage of squeegee kids. Rather, my dramatisitic analysis will chart how the issue, as a whole, took shape and how its characterizations shifted over time. It is likely that certain terms will cluster in certain papers at specific times. However, such features of media coverage are more valuable for their contribution to the overall development of the social issue than for the degree to which they distinguish individual differences in reporting style.

Different papers employ different modes of address and therefore can have different implications for the framing of social problems. Consequently, a brief description of the style and content of the *Toronto Star* and the *Toronto Sun* is in order.

These two main Toronto dailies granted the most in-depth coverage to the Toronto squeegee problem and hence provided the majority of the squeegee-based claims for my analysis. Broadly speaking, the more 'liberal' *Star* (a broadsheet style paper) took a more squeegee-friendly stance than the (tabloid-style) *Sun* (a paper also typically more populist in its political stance). Kesterton (1967, p. 87) noted that the *Star* has often supported the Liberal party and expressed concern for the underprivileged and the victims of injustice. Its operating principles (see "Atkinson," n.d.) ensure this is still the case today.

The *Toronto Star* is the only broadsheet with in-depth coverage of the Metro Toronto area. This style of paper has different sections and headlines that tend to be more descriptive and not as bold as tabloids. It can be characterized as trying to achieve what Burke suggested was 'semantic meaning' - being true to the actual facts of a story, neutral, more conscientiously objective. This is the case even though the paper's coverage can be accused of seeming "perpetually indignant" (Kesterton, 1967, p. 88). This insinuation is echoed by its contemporary competition: One *Sun* writer bemoaned the *Star*'s coverage "which frets about the homeless and squeegee kids" (Worthington, 1999, p. p.17). The tabloid-style *Sun*, on the other hand, is one paper, subdivided into different categories with a heavy quotient of sports, cheesecake, larger pictures and font in both text and headlines. Typically using more colloquial expressions and simpler language than the broadsheet, the *Sun* offers less material to read (and is easier to read) than the *Star*. Its tendency to put more of a 'slant' on its coverage (through the use of 'poetic' meaning) was noted by a prominent columnist (and one-time editor for the chain Sun Media Corp). Worthington (2004) argued that the *Sun* covered hard news just as fine as its competition though it "was a different sort of paper, and had better comment and

pizzazz than rivals” (p. 39). Importantly, just as there was no consensus about squeegee kids among the public, there was no uniform position about squeegee kids in individual papers. Editorial stances shifted over time, and letters often opposed the editorial stance.

The second methodological choice is the question of what focus to bring to a study of hundreds of documents. The choice is again theory-driven. I believe that three (broadly stated) units of dramatism are central to explaining the impact of this public discourse. These are what Rueckert termed the first three parts of Burke’s critical method (structural, cluster, and agon analysis) and are tools that “can be used by anyone for any purpose” (1982a, p. 96).¹⁹ These analyses respectively concentrate upon the progressive form of the narrative (what follows what?), the repetitive nature of descriptions (what goes with what?) and the dramatic alignment of protagonists versus antagonists (what goes against what?) in squeegee discourse. The rest of this chapter largely details the precise shape that this investigation’s structural analysis, cluster analysis, and agon analysis will take.

As a result of applying this methodology to squeegee kids I hope to track the “shelf-life” of squeegee kids as a social issue -- to map the narrative and the characters as

¹⁹ Rueckert notes that these are the three main elements of any dramatistic analysis. He also outlines another three elements to Burke’s method. I include two of these (archetypal analysis and the study of progressive, purgative form (sometimes called the dialectic of the Upward Way)) in my version of structural analysis. These latter elements are most often used to analyze poetry as symbolic action (instead of analyzing the symbolic value of social action). However, I suggest they are eminently suited to my analysis since I emphasize the “poetic” meaning of squeegee kids. Consequently, while Rueckert states, “for convenience, they can be split and discussed separately” (1982a, p. 97), I will deal with structural, cluster, and agon analysis as comprehensive strategies that incorporate the elements that Rueckert chose to partition. (Pun analyses (and “joycing”) comprise the last of Rueckert’s six strategies available to the dramatistic critic. Since I do not anticipate using pun analysis to any extent I do not explain it in any detail here. It is not an essential component of my analysis of purgative form in squeegee discourse.

they appeared over time. I hope to identify what new additions were made to the public vocabulary as the social issue took shape. Accordingly, the dramatistic methodology should reveal how new terms and new meanings resulted from the interplay of competing rhetors and the characterizations of the social issue that they offered to the public.

These strategies are not employed to present a critique of a certain type of text or to explain the hidden symbolic meanings in a speaker's text. Instead, this deployment of dramatism is meant to produce an explanation of the development of squeegeeing as a social issue. Squeegee kids and the controversy that sprang up around them provide an excellent case study in the communication and the politics of the drama of human relations. This is meant to take an existing group of theoretical contributions (Burke's overall oeuvre) and develop them in a new direction. The goal is to apply this material in a new fashion or extend it in a direction that is under-examined.

There are a few notable studies of an issue's development over time in which the analyst employed a Burkean perspective to examine a large number of texts. A brief overview of these will help contextualize my own study of squeegee kids. Condit (1990) studied the longitudinal development of a social issue but her application of dramatism was more implicit than explicit. Gusfield (1981), too, is concerned with a series of thematically linked texts. Like Condit he "decenters" the author in his dramatistic examination since he is not examining a discrete speech or a single instance of language use as symbolic action. He also admits a more explicit debt to Burke. He is concerned with Burkean meanings expressed and symbolized in legislation and he describes stock-images in the social issue of drinking and driving that acknowledge differences in the use

of pentadic terms. This can be described as a sophisticated account that combines structural and cluster analyses.

Finally, there are two examples where Burke has been specifically applied to a wide variety of media-based claims. Olson (1995) studied shifting coverage of Ronald Reagan's 1985 visit to the Bitburg war cemetery and Boor Tonn, Endress, and Diamond (1993) cite Burke extensively in their analysis of unfolding media coverage about a tragic hunting death. Both analyses examine one event, but then trace how it was presented in the media and how its meaning changed over time by analyzing claims-makers' appeals. Boor Tonn, Endress, and Diamond's quest to understand how an act and agent were defined in a certain way depended almost exclusively on their use of the pentad. Olson, on the other hand, concentrates almost exclusively on Burkean form – "the creation of an appetite in the mind of an auditor and the satisfaction of that appetite" (Olson, 1995, p. 44). This notion of "what follows what" also accounts for the principle of the agon when Olson acknowledges how conflict or competition among adversaries seems to underlie the general nature of news presentation. She notes how, in newspapers' "conflict coverage, as in fictional narratives, form operates in conjunction with agon" (ibid.). My study can be distinguished from hers insofar as I emphasize agon while she emphasizes form. Both of our accounts demonstrate, however, how media can "cultivate expectations that then are satisfied or frustrated by the developments related in subsequent news accounts" (ibid.).

My account integrates a wide variety of Burkean concepts in its empirical research. Agon analysis is crucial here, as is an archetypal analysis that analyzes the

rhetoric of rebirth and purgation in people's language claims.²⁰ As such, while many others who seek to illuminate the literary or dramatistic element of sociological life principally resort to *The Grammar of Motives* or *The Rhetoric of Motives*, Burke's *Rhetoric of Religion* is just as important to my analysis.²¹ I am most interested in the Burkean emphasis upon division (and how it manifests itself in the purgation ritual that is part of the guilt-redemption cycle).

There are some significant methodological assumptions that come with the belief that victimage and the guilt-redemption cycle pertain to a study of squeegee kids: (a) There is a story to be told about squeegee kids. (b) This story is not due to the prescience of a researcher seeking to grant squeegee kids a character of a particular sort; it is the product of the natural life cycle of a social issue. (c) This evolution of squeegee kids as a social issue can be read as a sort of narrative development, marked by clashes of poetic meanings. (d) The analysis of these poetic meanings reveals something of the drama of "real life." All of this is an endorsement of Burke's belief that a rhetoric of rebirth – something that has the power to purge and redeem – is central to all poetry, and indeed, all symbolic action.

²⁰ This last strategy is one of the secondary components of a dramatistic analysis enumerated by Rueckert – most aptly applied to poetic works. "Archetypal" analysis is integral to my charting of the squeegee narrative over time. It explains how division manifests itself in the guilt-redemption cycle of squeegee kids and thus is central to the overall story being told. The fact that squeegee kids were occasionally explicitly identified as scapegoats is a literal demonstration of this cycle.

²¹ Olson's (1995) analysis is distinct in that it depends on Burke's *Philosophy of literary form*. As she notes, one of the reasons "the function of form in news coverage largely has been ignored by scholars ... [is because] form in the Burkean sense is not easily detectable unless one examines a large body of related reports" (p. 48). My study of the sequential nature of an issue's development over time implies how some claims prepare audiences for future claims (and indeed, future actions) but it does not concentrate on Burkean form, per se, as much as reinforce a Burkean drama of guilt-redemption.

It is not my goal to find out *if* these cathartic properties informed political rhetoric in this controversy, but rather to find out *how* and *when* this sort of catharsis materialized in public discourse. Rueckert describes the analysis of poetry's symbolic action: "The problem is not to determine empirically whether the various archetypes of the rhetoric of rebirth are present – they are always present – but to determine by means of what Burke calls 'free association' in what particular, specific form they appear" (1982a, pp. 98-99). I will search for these archetypes and I will highlight claims in which these appear in order to suggest how catharsis materialized in the overall squeegee kid drama. There are those who might suggest this is too "loose" an application of Burke. To this I say, following Blair (1995), "If we have corrupted Burke by appropriating him, it means only that his work still can and *should* be freshly probed, reread now for the dangers rather than the comforts it sanctions" (p. 154).

Of course, choosing dramatism as a methodology leaves some aspects of squeegeeing (that might be revealed by some other approach) unexamined. Burke's concept of "Terministic Screens" wherein "every way of seeing is also a way of not seeing" (Burke, 1954, p. 49) instructs us that our terminological and methodological choices enable certain things to be seen and done just as they also restrict others. "Even the most inclusive terminologies and methodologies are limiting and determining, if only because they limit you to inclusiveness" (Rueckert, 1982b, p. 10). Having chosen to use Burke, I also acknowledge, "in order to be organized, logical, and coherent I must reduce the Burke of all of his writings to a perfect Burke, an abstract Burke" (Gusfield 1989b, p. 35).

I have selectively chosen elements of Burke and his methodology that convey the dramatistic structure of pollution/guilt/purification/ and redemption within the social issue of squeegeeing. To some extent, my choice of method underscores Burke's belief that human beings are "rotten with perfection" – it takes some aspects of the Burkean terminology and extends them to their terminus. As a result, some simple and uniform meanings are imposed upon the multifaceted and plural character of Burke's writing. Similarly, some notions about motives and their purgative character are imposed upon the multiple, contradictory meanings of the human act known as squeegeeing. This is the price of my selection of dramatism as an explanatory tool. To claim anything else would be to ignore Burke's own methodological warning that any vocabulary seeking to reflect reality must also select reality. In so doing, it will also sometimes deflect reality (1945, p. 59). I only hope that my selection of dramatism reflects the spirit of Burke's writings and accurately reflects at least some of what transpired in the social drama surrounding squeegee kids.

COMPONENTS OF A DRAMATISTIC METHODOLOGY

As I have already stated, the method I am employing can be broadly broken down into three components: a structural, cluster, and agon analysis. To some degree these are, as I shall show, interdependent elements in what will become a seamless, overall analysis. Nonetheless, what I deem to be the most important constituents of a structural analysis first must be outlined:

Structural Analysis I: The Representative Anecdote

Burke insisted that any method should represent rather than reduce its subject matter. To *represent* something is to sum up its essence ... And therefore, one key Burkean method stemming from his dramatistic metaphor is his insight that the content or "terminology" of whole

discourses or groups of discourses will imply, or will seem to be based upon, a *representative anecdote*. (Brummett, 1999, p. 480)

The search for a “representative anecdote” is so central to Burke’s method that he suggests it might be termed “the dramatistic approach to dramatism” (1945, p. 60). This is not something that can be found only in literary texts. “The representative anecdote is a critical tool especially well-suited to analysis of the media ... because of their ‘anecdotal’ nature. Television, newspapers, film, popular magazines, etc., mediate reality to people recasting the chaotic, disjointed world into ‘story exposition forms’” (Brummett, 1999, p. 482). If the anecdote is *representative*, it should be able to sum up the essence of a story, whether one is concerned with representing the essence of an individual text or a wider body of media-based texts that revolve around a particular issue.

Methodologically speaking, the anecdote is meant to provide “a summation of the discourse without being a mere summary” (Madsen, 1993, p. 229). It should be simple enough to immediately indicate the nature of the “story”, while also possessing adequate scope to represent the action in its entirety. “One should seek to select, as representative anecdote, something sufficiently demarcated in character to make analysis possible, yet sufficiently complex in character to prevent the use of too few terms in one’s description” (Burke, 1945. 324). A representative anecdote must have breadth – it must be intricate enough to accurately represent the subject matter. At the same time, it must be simple enough to easily convey the essential nature of the subject at hand. Certain aspects are selected that must reflect and make sense of the wider drama. “In its selectivity, it is a reduction” (Burke, 1945, p. 59), but one that still has to possess the necessary scope.

To identify an anecdote one should ask, “if this discourse were based upon a story, an anecdote, what would the form, outline, or bare bones of that story be?”

(Brummett, 1999, p. 481). Having detected a pattern in the basic “plot-line” of the events under investigation, the critic attempts to represent the content of that discourse as accurately as possible. The dramatistic analysis – starting with a representative anecdote – does not proceed like a content analysis with a need to account for every word or every phrase used. “The critic does not present the whole discourse but rather chooses certain aspects of it that can stand for the whole” (Brummett, 1999, p. 481). With a representative anecdote in hand, different media (for instance, letters to the editor, editorials, and headlines) can all be surveyed for their correspondence to this dramatic form. When all share the same basic vocabulary, all can be seen to fit with the basic story being advanced.

The anecdote should sum up the spirit of claims-makers’ language use but need not be applicable to *every* claim. Rather, it should be something that is *common* in descriptions of squeegeeing. It should be appropriate to the situation and representative of people’s hopes and fears when it came to squeegee kids. For instance, supporters of certain hard-line squeegee policies will use the vocabulary of the anecdote in one way while those who oppose such policies will use it to advance a different perspective on the squeegee kid story. Either way, the anecdote should resonate with what audiences believe are important aspects of the squeegee kid drama. Hence, it should also go some distance to summon the “substantial” characteristics of squeegee kids by representing the discourse surrounding them.

Structural Analysis II: The Pentad

The pentad is a tool for the analysis of people’s descriptions of other people and the world around them. It does not describe the person speaking or the things of the world

themselves. "The object of a pentadic analysis is the language of the text itself. By identifying how a text construes each element, we begin to get a picture of how it constructs a representation of reality" (Stillar, 1998, pp. 63-4). The aspects of the pentad are interdependent. "We have likened the terms to the fingers, which in their extremities are distinct from one another but merge in the palm of the hand" (Burke, 1945, p. xv). People can never discuss squeegee kids' actions without at least some acknowledgement of squeegee kids themselves. Similarly, a description of the agent requires at least a tacit acknowledgment of the agency of the squeegeer. This detailing of agency can also shade into the location (or scene) where the action takes place. Only by acknowledging the structuring power of ratios (i.e., the relationships between pentadic terms) can one fully grasp how motives are constructed in language.

When examining ratios of terms in a text of some sort (whether it is a speech or a letter to the editor) a person's vocabulary can be examined for its ordering of terms. By revealing which terms are featured in an utterance and how emphasis shifts from one term to another, one can illuminate the set of terms that dominates someone's thinking and speaking. How that person imputes motives to others can then be illustrated. "Some people, for example, will ask *what* and then *who*, others *who* and then *what*. These thoughts are then reflected in symbolic relationships. In Burke's language an 'act-agent' ratio properly labels the first sequence of questions, and an 'agent-act' the second" (Brock, 1990, p. 188).

On the other hand, ratio analysis can also be used to show those instances "when two terms from the pentad receive equal stress so that no discernible substance evolves" (Brock, 1990, p. 195). In other words, there are some times when there is no appreciable

emphasis on one pentadic term over another. For example, there might be times when audiences are encouraged to view squeegee kids not as predominantly agents or as primarily victims of the scene. Squeegee kids are not always clearly constituted one way or another when different substances are attributed to them. Importantly, “the pentad itself does not reveal substance so much as it provides a schema for directing the critic’s attention to the points of transformation in the narrative” (Birdsell, 1990, pp. 208-9).

One can see the dramatistic narrative taking shape as pentadic elements cluster at certain points in the issue’s development (and certain ratios seem to appear more than others do). This is, I feel, one of the major contributions of my thesis and the application of this particular method. Not only do I undertake to identify ratios in individual, representative instances of language use, I also seek to ascertain points at which certain ratios take on a “critical mass” in the overall squeegee narrative. This is where the pentad shades into other Burkean elements and becomes not only a tool to identify language use but to identify stages in the guilt-redemption cycle.

Structural analysis III: guilt-redemption analysis.

I do not wish to describe squeegee kids as if they are frozen in time. Nor do I wish to describe the squeegee drama as if it were a series of simple or straightforward movements toward a predetermined end. The most interesting thing for me is how the squeegee story (and squeegee kids’ substance) changed over time. Consequently, I follow Brock’s (1990) advice: “The critic should study stages in the dramatistic process – pollution, guilt, purification, and redemption – and determine how each stage is developed and stressed” (p. 194). Formal dramas have a plot to guide their forward movement. In a similar fashion, the collection of claims regarding squeegee kids in the

media exhibit a progressive form. A brief description of how some others have examined these stages will provide the background for my own analysis of the development of the guilt-redemption cycle and squeegee kids.

Gusfield (1981) charted the appearance of terms such as drinking driver and drunk driver and analyzed how and when various terms were dropped. He explained how decisions were made to officially endorse certain labels over others and to recognize some agents as part of the problem and to discard others as contributing factors. Consequently, he showed how “order is obtained through sacrifice so that unity is derived” (p. 81). Gusfield’s stages progressed from the non-existence of a problem, to the nomination of a problem and the confusion over how best to identify it, to the sifting through of different vocabularies until, at the end of the story, drinking and driving was identified as a public problem. A similar progression will be charted in my own analysis of the squeegee kids issue.

Brock (1969) also recommends a stage-based analysis of guilt-invocation, rejection, and purification in rhetoric. He suggested, “this ‘dramatistic’ cycle [of guilt-redemption] can be used by the critic to explain the stages politicians take their audiences through in order to obtain acceptance or rejection for some policy or action” (pp. 448-9). At first glance, this approach seems particularly applicable to an analysis of political rhetoric such as the law and order platform that the Conservative government of Ontario proposed in 1999 in order to bring about “safer streets.” However, my analysis focuses upon the evolution of the social issue of squeegeeing (and all of the claims that contributed to it, not the evolution of a particular argument as evidenced in particular

claims by the government). As such, I follow the model of Gusfield's analysis of public pronouncements more than Brock's model of argument development.

Leland Griffin (1969) provides a third example of a Burkean analysis of an unfolding narrative. "To study a movement is to study a striving for salvation, a struggle for perfection, a progress toward the 'good.' It is a progress that is grounded in Guilt; but 'Guilt needs Redemption', and Redemption needs Redeemer – which is to say, a Victim, a scapegoat" (pp. 460-1). His study of how social movements develop inspires my investigation of how and when squeegee kids were identified as a source of suffering such that an act (i.e., their proposed outlawing) could be proposed to make things well again. He suggests that social movements "progress from *Inferno* through *Purgatorio* to *Paradiso*: from the hell that is indecision, through the purification that is decision, to the heaven that is "the arrival that follows decision persevered in" (pp. 461-2). These are tools to analyze the overall squeegee drama – one that started with much indecision over what should be done, and which culminated in massive debate over the government's proposed "purification device" and the redemption that was supposed to follow.

Griffin's model begins with the classification of an "inception period of a movement. ... It is a time for the identification of destination and devils, the 'Mecca' of the movement, and the 'evil principles' it opposes" (L. Griffin, 1969, p. 462). My analysis of media coverage of squeegee kids will begin with the search for language claims that typify the agents of squeegee kids and the scene of Toronto in a similar light. Importantly, the rhetoric of a movement's inception period typically causes the development of a counter movement. Thus, the principle of the agon begins to appear when groups seek to (a) infuse members of the public with attitudes of rejection (towards

other groups, against other claims, against rules and laws), and (b) provoke conflict (see L. Griffin, 1969, p. 463). I will search for these two strategies of language use.

We can expect a rhetoric of conversion and catharsis to follow this appearance of a rhetoric of dissent. There are two strategies to look for in this period too: (a) attempts to promote decision, to *convert* the estranged, and (b) to provoke action (L. Griffin, 1969, p. 464). This period should be marked by attempts to “move the converted through pity, fear, and the like emotions and ... move them to the purgative act (*poiema*) that will purify their “faulty living” (ibid.). Following this, the movement of public opinion culminates in “the crisis period [that] is a time of mass decision; of collective catharsis, purgation, the resolution of public tensions” (p. 466). The way that one identifies each one of these periods is by the deployment of cluster analysis, the assessment of periods in a discourse characterized by a noticeable grouping of terms. This brings us to the next main component of my dramatistic analysis.

CLUSTER ANALYSIS

This important element of dramatism is so fundamental to any analysis of discourse that Brock (1969) believes it should be the first task confronting an analyst of political rhetoric. “The critic should ascertain what ideas, people, and institutions the speaker accepts and rejects and then group them into “clusters” which represent the speaker’s strategies for identification. In this way, the critic can discover the speaker’s strategies for acceptance and rejection” (p. 445). The theory behind this strategy is that a speaker’s attitude can be discovered by locating “clusters” of terms he or she uses (since these are the terms with which he or she identifies). Instead of examining how groups of terms cluster together in a single text, I will suggest how certain types of language use

cluster at different stages of the squeegee issue. For instance, claims that identify squeegee kids according to a certain scene-act ratio may appear early in the issue's development while different claims (marked by different ratios) cluster at later stages.

The evolutionary character of the squeegee issue can be charted, in part, by citing the existence of these clusters and acknowledging their role in the changing substance of squeegee kids. "According to Burke, clusters are spontaneously generated and/or deliberately contrived as a result of a process of identification or association which operates under all conditions and in every human activity" (Rueckert, 1982a, p. 178). These clusters are identifiable in discourse as a result of a critical mass of terms shared by a number of rhetors and exist as a natural part of the discourse. Rueckert (1982a) used the term 'archetypal' to describe clusters that are not grouped together in a single utterance:

These clusters are meant as a method of relating all images, terms, and subjects to certain archetypes in the purgative-redemptive quest. The three main archetypal clusters are pollution (hell), purification (purgatory), and redemption (heaven). The movement from the first to the last through purification constitutes the pattern of the rhetoric of rebirth and is the prime function of symbolic action. (p. 104).

I have already discussed my belief that this patterned rhetoric of redemption and rebirth is central to the squeegee drama. I have also explained that the issue of squeegeeing can pass through various stages such as Leland Griffin's *Inferno*, *Purgatorio*, and *Paradiso*. (Archetypal) cluster analysis will be used to chart these progressions. It will do so by relating groupings of terms to archetypes of heaven, hell and purgatory (the squeegee analogues of which are clean and safe streets, dirty and dangerous streets, and a generally disorderly urban scene in which kids are seen as both threatened and threatening, respectively).

AGON ANALYSIS

Agon analysis basically entails an examination of the dramatic alignments that make up a text (or a series of texts). Burke (1941) believed that “a total drama ... is analytically subdivided into competing principles, of protagonist and antagonist” (p.76). He called this alignment the principle of the “agon,” now widely understood as the principle of “what vs. what”. Audiences for rhetoric are often encouraged to consider “things in terms not of *some* other, but of *the* other. The sharpest instance of this is an *agon* wherein the protagonist is motivated by the nature of the antagonist” (Burke, 1945, p. 33). I will search for language claims that exemplify this principle in the public debate over squeegee kids.

Rueckert (1982a, p. 86) distinguished cluster analysis from agon analysis when he suggested that the former is akin to the gathering of evidence while the latter entails the interpretation of it. Since Burke is concerned with life as drama, and drama means conflict, one will always have some principle of the agon to analyze. The ultimate goal of agon analysis is to demonstrate how this dramatic conflict takes shape in each different context. Notably, this “conflict is worked out in images rather than through characters” (Rueckert, 1982a, p. 87). The cluster analysis of any drama is meant to identify the major principles out of which the drama is formed. These clusters will typically orbit around some strongly defined characters. But an agon analysis should not identify these individual characters as antagonists and protagonists. My analysis of the squeegee kids discourse, then, must go beyond identifying characters such as John Clarke of the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP) who vehemently opposed Premier Mike Harris. It must go beyond identifying letters to the editor that were antagonistic towards squeegee

kids (or, contrarily, to the Premier and his government's plan to deal with squeegee kids). It must complete the story of squeegee kids, so to speak, by organizing these opposing voices and personalities into opposing images.

Agon analysis should be the final step in understanding how the squeegee kid drama (and squeegee kids themselves) were constituted through media coverage. Remember, as Birdsell stated earlier, the pentad on its own does not reveal substance. Agon analysis is key to determining the substance of squeegee kids because it reveals the paradox of substance – it shows how definitions of squeegee kids depend upon definitions of what they are not. As Burke (1945) noted, the search for the agon involves “systematic contemplation of the antinomies attendant upon the fact that we necessarily define a thing in terms of something else” (p. 33). Agon analysis counterpoises aspects of a text or a series of texts and provides context by collapsing them into competing clusters. Thus, I will attempt to trace squeegee kids' emergence as a scapegoat by highlighting competing images of dirty, criminal kids and clean others. I will examine debates between pro- and anti-squeegee claims-makers where both parties contest the other's hard-done-by status.

CONCLUSION

Throughout this chapter I have expressed an interest in a number of questions. These include: (a) how division is manifested in the purgation ritual of the guilt-redemption cycle; (b) how squeegee kids become substantial in the working out of this cycle; (c) where blame manifests itself in this cycle. All of these are connected. Investigation into one does not preclude another. These are not discrete projects entailing separate explorations. This is because “the dramatistic screen involves a methodic

tracking down of the implications in the idea of symbolic action” (Burke, 1966, p. 54).

Both identification and division occur when squeegee kids are constituted in discourse. I will be searching for expressions of this division that manifest themselves as blame. This is, as Burke (1968) notes, the “gloomy route” implicit in dramatism: “If *drama*, then *conflict*. And if *conflict*, then *victimage*. Dramatism is always on the edge of this vexing problem, that comes to a culmination in tragedy, the song of the scapegoat” (pp. 54-55).

To carry out a dramatistic investigation of squeegee kids’ constitution as scapegoats, one must conduct a structural, a cluster, and an agon analysis. Rueckert (1982a) notes: “In any discussion of catharsis Burke will logologically ‘radiate out’ and consider the negative, victimage, mortification, hierarchy, redemption, and categorical guilt” (p. 208). Similarly, structural, cluster, and agon analyses radiate out into one another; each is implicated in the other.

The method approaches all works, whether lyric, dramatic, or narrative, in the same way, looking for the same things. Every work is first indexed and then schematized in terms of the opposed principles or image clusters; then the structure is carefully charted and the work is again schematized in terms of the interplay between the opposed principles. ... At this point, an intense agon analysis can begin, for the critic has now prepared the work so that it can be analyzed as a document of and in the drama of human relations. (Rueckert, 1982a, pp. 89-90)

I have slightly modified Rueckert’s model of dramatistic analysis. He separated structural, cluster, and agon analysis from pun analysis, archetypal analysis, and the analysis of the dialectic of the Upward Way. I have incorporated these last two steps into a broader definition of a structural analysis to fully explain the existence and development of a guilt-redemption cycle in the body of squeegee claims. I have also demonstrated how cluster and agon analyses can be incorporated into a structural explanation of squeegee kids. Archetypal clusters deal with repetitive form while the

analysis of structure as symbolic and purgative requires the analysis of progressive form, but both overlap to an extraordinary degree and complement each other (Rueckert, 1982a, pp. 96-97). Only by acknowledging the inter-related nature of them all can one fully address how an archetypal pattern of purgation and rebirth may have taken on a progressive shape in media coverage of squeegee kids. I have identified a number of tools in the dramatistic critic's toolbox. I must now use them to examine the collected body of squeegee-based claims, to index and schematize it, chart its evolution, and reveal its underlying dramatic oppositions.

CHAPTER 4: OUTLINING THE REPRESENTATIVE ANECDOTE

An early step in the analysis of any text/discourse as drama is the selection of a representative anecdote. One chooses an anecdote that can represent the essential nature (or substance) of a text. An anecdote should be an expression of the essential dramatic conflict that underlies squeegee discourse. This short chapter will outline the theoretical foundation for my choice of a representative anecdote. It will also justify the selection of this anecdote by explaining its relevance to the squeegee drama.

If drama is the representative anecdote for Burke's undertaking, then I could suggest the "representative anecdote" of the "fall" as a narrative formula that describes much of what was involved in the emergence, evolution, and resolution of the squeegee kids social issue. But though it possesses scope, this is not precise enough to fully represent the agonistic and antagonistic nature of relationships in this drama. The story of "the fall" might be an accurate description of the overall drama of squeegee kids. But it cannot be seen in typical utterances of claims-makers in the squeegee drama. Since an "anecdotal approach provides a means for evaluating a body of rhetoric that extends across time" (Madsen, 1993, p. 226), I sought a representative anecdote that could invoke crucial characteristics of a social issue and also be immediately recognized throughout the discourse about a social issue.

SPECIFYING THE ANECDOTE IN THE SQUEEGEE ISSUE

The representative anecdote that can best describe the tragic nature of the squeegee kid story is "redemptive violence." Slotkin (1973, 1992) uses this term to describe the myth that has become the structuring metaphor of the American experience.

It entails the notion that fortunes, spirits, and power can be regenerated through violence. Redemption (through the conquest of a place or the subjugation or displacement of some people) is meant to achieve or re-invigorate a sense of collective identity or purpose. This myth believes that violence of some form or other is a necessary and an appropriate response to situations so that order can reign over chaos and the promise of prosperity and progress can be realized. Insofar as the notion of redemptive violence substantially describes things as they are in the squeegee drama, it is a constitutive representative anecdote (see Williams, 1989, pp. 198-199). Through the deployment of this anecdote, the ontological nature of the struggle over squeegee kids can be revealed.²²

We can understand crucial characteristics about the social issue by revealing the presence of this anecdote in people's habitual descriptions of squeegee kids. Redemptive violence, in this case, can be seen as a drama underlying public claims about squeegee kids. This notion of violence that serves good, moral, social ends is expressed in two separate forms when it came to squeegee kids. First, squeegee kids' symbolic elimination from the social scene was expressed in various claims that employed the motif of "cleansing." Second, squeegee kids' symbolic killing was expressed in the metaphor of "war" as crackdowns were initiated and militaristic language was used to describe the nature of the squeegee kid conflict. Vocabularies of cleansing and of warfare were widespread and natural in the media discourse surrounding squeegee kids (see appendix

²² Williams also notes another variety of anecdote – the admonitory. This warns of future conditions and thus provides clues to what is becoming or may become substantial. Burke (1945, p. 330) provides the foundation for this distinction.

II). I suggest that such language use is representative of attitudes toward squeegeeing as a social problem in need of reform.²³

This boils down to a search for “recurrent thematic elements and figures of speech that encapsulate or highlight some aspect of a social problem” (Ibarra & Kitsuse, 1993, p. 43). Thus, my identification of a representative anecdote in the squeegee drama is consistent with Ibarra and Kitsuse’s call for a renewed focus on the rhetorical foundations of claims-makers’ language use. Their focus is on “morally imbued metaphors and phrases [that] can be intelligibly applied in claims-making” (ibid.). I suggest that this is consistent with rhetoric’s emphasis on *argumentation* whereas my goal emphasizes the dramatistic element of *identification*. My search for a representative anecdote (or a comprehensive motif) should identify how morally imbued metaphors and phrases can indicate commonly held ways of viewing the social issue in question. In turn, such an anecdote should help with an understanding of how social problems discourse can function as a symbolic operation in general. For instance, if motifs of cleansing and warfare (and an anecdote of symbolic violence) are representative of the social issue of squeegee kids, then this will further an understanding of the symbolic currency of certain words (like victim and enemy) that claims-makers regularly employ.

I hope to explain the connotative power of these cleansing or militaristic metaphors. Not every such expression will be listed in appendix II – but enough to demonstrate that an anecdote of redemptive violence is representative of the squeegee

²³ Not all uses of cleansing or warfare-oriented language suggested a need to “clean” the streets of squeegee kids or “wipe them out.” Claims-makers who defended squeegee kids also invoked these terminologies in their efforts to advance their own cause. Still, arguments against “social cleansing” or announcements that “it’s time to fight back” reinforced the naturalized power of redemptive violence.

drama. Listing them chronologically will also reveal how certain terms clustered at particular periods of heightened conflict. The goal is to illustrate to the reader, even independent of the context of other content in each article, the extensive use of these vocabularies. To do so should indicate how, even without regularly receiving news about squeegee kids or paying close attention to it, one could get the sense of how people spoke about squeegee kids. This should also demonstrate that such language use is not restricted to particular media outlets but rampant throughout media coverage of squeegee kids. The commonality of terms that invoke cleansing or warfare metaphors underscores the appropriateness of understanding the social issue of squeegee kids as a tragic drama, one in which guilt-redemption and purification were natural (if not inevitable). After all, both vocabularies invoke catharsis, which “involves fundamentally purgation by the imitation of victimage” (Burke, 1968, p. 186). I shall start with the anecdote of cleansing.

A CLEANSING VOCABULARY

It is not an ironic coincidence that squeegee kids – whose objective purpose was to clean car windshields – found themselves the object of “cleansing” rhetoric. Claim-makers of all positions could not resist the potential for expressing themselves via this pun. It is also important to bear in mind the latent image of Toronto-the-good. The civic identity of Toronto capitalized on the sanitary imagery invoked by Peter Ustinov when he exclaimed Toronto looked like New York run by the Swiss (cited in Coyle, 1997, p. A6; Wanagas, 1999, p. B2). Toronto was imagined as a salubrious, efficient, non-offensive space for communion and interaction. *Fodor’s* travel guide described Toronto as “Clean. Safe. Orderly” and *The Rough Guide: Canada* said Toronto “might be too clean and safe for some tastes” (see Coyle, 1997, p. A6). Against this backdrop, squeegee kids emerged

as agents who ostensibly cleaned windshields. Quickly, though, news accounts used the presence of squeegee kids (and panhandlers) to argue that dirty streets had replaced the clean and orderly streets of the past.

With this connection in mind, we can understand how references to physical cleansing can contain seeds of violence. The act of cleansing is inherent to the concept of catharsis, central to Burke's project. "The paradigm of catharsis must contain ideas and images for at least these major elements: unclean, clean, cleansing, cleanser (personal or impersonal), cleansed" (Burke, cited in Heath, 1986, p. 249). Within this drama, squeegee kids became the cleansed as the government and other agents of the state sought to clean the streets of the unclean presence of unruly kids who were deemed more sullyng than cleaning. References to unclean kids were plentiful: The *Toronto Sun* referred to them as "often-dirty and flamboyantly-dressed cleaners" ("Wipeout," 1997, p. 19) while, in the *Star*, Peigi (2001) spoke of them as "dirty, drugged-out idiots" (p. A21).

Early on, the image of cleansing the city of its befouling irritants was advocated as a means of returning a sense of order, civility and social stability to the city. New York City's "broken windows" plan to reduce deviance was a popular referent. Burke's dialectic of the upward way is implicit in this vision of purification whereby eliminating minor offenses (like urinating in public, panhandling and squeegeeing) should naturally bring about reform of the greater ills that affect the whole community. Consequently, we can see how various squeegee "crackdowns" instituted by police (and the Safe Streets Act, instituted by the government and enforced by the courts and the police) functioned as impersonal cleansing agents (and also reinforced the warfare connotations of this clean-up campaign). At some point, in fact, the association of cleansing with social

groups leads to accusations of ethnic cleansing. As shall become evident, this occurred when the vocabulary of cleansing took on attributes of elimination, not just betterment and beautification. This occurred at the mid-point of the squeegee kids drama when conflict between anti- and pro-squeegee forces reached its apex.

Early on, references to squeegee kids described them as agents performing the act of cleaning windows. Quickly, though, references shifted to emphasize the government (and police) as agents (and their crackdown efforts as the agency by which action is taken to deal with the “problem” of squeegee kids). Squeegee kids were not the sole objects of this cleansing. An equally if not more important argument involved the cleansing of the streets and the urban scene in which squeegee kids operated. By the end of this drama, even legal journals did not resist the anecdote of cleansing which, by then, connoted both disorderly streets and dirty individuals befouling them. The June-July 2002 edition of *LawNow* included an article titled “Cleaning up our streets: anti-panhandling and squeegee laws” (McKay-Panos, 2002, pp. 27-28).

Burke explains the concept of downward conversion when he shows how idle curiosity can be transformed into curiosity, and then to interest. And he notes that “we may project fear at a tangent, getting by continuity to such exegetic possibilities as defense, since fear suggests the need of self-protection” (Burke, 1954, p. 145). With this in mind, one can see how this logic means that the cleansing of squeegee kids actually entails their removal from urban intersection. The vocabulary of cleansing condenses many expressions of guilt, resentment and fear. A heavenly state of redemption can be achieved only through the purgatory of purification. Consequently, we can see in the anecdote of cleaning a “watered-down” version of the symbolic kill since “there is a kind

of 'terministic compulsion' to carry out the implications of one's terminology" (Burke, 1968, p. 19).

As Rueckert (1982a) notes, "Burke cites a can of dutch cleanser as a purification image, because it suggests ... the process of cleansing itself, and the act of making the dirty clean" (p. 105). In this sense, crackdowns on squeegee kids (meant to remove squeegee kids from city streets, and, by extension, move the city from polluted to redeemed) can function as a purification image. The ultimate symbolic value of a crackdown is the appeal to law and order and the overarching motive to clean up the streets. Alongside crackdowns, descriptions of squeegee kids as dirty (and admonitory language that beseeched them to "clean up" their act) identified them as deviant others in need of purification. After all, "the name that we give to [a social issue] largely determines how we fight the war against it" (Duncan, 1965, p. xv). Dirty squeegee kids seemed to demand some ritual of purification. Cleansing is, thus, an anecdote that is pertinent not only to an understanding of squeegee kids but also any social issue that involves calls for law and order. Its connotation of redemptive violence is contained in references to "squeegee cleansings" or appeals to "wipe out" squeegee kids.

A MILITARISTIC VOCABULARY

There is, however, a slippage from an anecdote of cleansing to an anecdote of warfare. Rhetoric that repeatedly employs the motif of cleansing might goad audiences into pity for the unclean. However, it also deploys an implicit terminology of victimage that cultivates images of a potentially dangerous enemy. In the case of squeegee kids, dirtiness, aggression, unattractiveness and threat all condensed into a figure against whom others felt they needed to rally in order to prevent further subjugation of innocent

peoples. Of course, not everyone identifies with such rhetoric. In moral debates (such as whether (or how) to clean the streets), claims-makers inevitably feel a need to “defend” their claims. When the object of moralizing does not reform itself, claims-makers often “attack” their opposition. Burke (1954) put it best:

Morals, shaped by the forms and needs of action, become man’s most natural implement when exhorting to action. As implicit in censorial words, they are the linguistic projection of our bodily tools and weapons. Morals are fists. An issue, raised to a plane of moral indignation, is wholly combative in its choice of means. From this point of view, the moral elements in our vocabulary are symbolic warfare. (p. 192)

Militaristic language was frequently deployed in the symbolic warfare over squeegee kids. Whereas I stated that cleansing typified squeegee kids and law and order issues, I suggest warfare is germane to social issue discourse in general. This is evident whenever conflict over an issue causes rhetoric that is more appropriate to combatants than to levelheaded discussion of policy alternatives. Again, Burke (1954) is relevant: “This warlike element is fully as present in the censorial quality of speech as in the patterns of overt combat. A ‘dyslogistic’ adjective is the equivalent of a blow” (p. 250).

Thus, it is now incumbent upon me to chart the use of language that connotes a warfare-orientation in order to identify squeegee kids as combatants. I contend that the gradual building up of such identifications attributed a public identity to squeegee kids as either an enemy against whom others must mobilize or an ally whose cause must be defended. To chart this development, I must first account for a family of militaristic terms that appear throughout squeegee-claims. These terms were used on a regular basis in order to establish a frame of battle. All social issues involve the establishment of battle-lines of some sort or other. The two anecdotes of cleaning the city (of squeegee kids) and going to war (against squeegee kids) work together although they are not identical. There

are instances of claims-making rhetoric, for instance, that employ the terminology of both cleansing and warfare.²⁴ In particular, both seem to cluster around the occasion of the declaration of war against squeegee kids.

As Madsen (1993, p. 225) explains, there is another type of anecdote - an act within a larger body of acts that can sum up the drama as a whole. The language of redemptive violence came to a head when Toronto's Mayor declared war on squeegee kids. As Best (1999) notes, "declaring war is simply one instance of a broader tendency to use militarized language to describe social problems and social policy" (p. 144). Various governments have declared wars on drugs, wars on crime, and wars against terror. It seems almost inevitable, then, that war was declared against the terror of squeegee kids, (who were repeatedly described as both drug-users and criminals). I will chart the issue of squeegeeing through both general instances of militarized rhetoric and at the moment where war was formally declared. Doing so will demonstrate how this warfare-oriented terminology joins together with (and extends) the language of cleansing in order to explain the whole discourse of squeegeeing as a social problem that can be understood through the representative anecdote of redemptive violence.

The declaration of war came at the height of squeegee-based conflict and represented the institutionalization of redemptive violence. It also came to represent the divisiveness of the social issue (for while some rallied to the Mayor's call, others fought back). Not everyone adopted the mentality of warfare. Some called for mediation with squeegee kids and appealed for a comic frame of understanding in the face of

²⁴ Though some claims-makers use both the rhetorical motifs of cleansing and warfare, I've divided the two motifs in my enumeration of them in appendix II. This way, each can be appreciated for its own contribution to the texture of the discourse.

increasingly tragic understandings. Some claims-makers also poked fun at *both* squeegee kids and the government's squeegee-agenda. Thus, even though I suggest the tragic frame was intractable by the time of the declaration of formal hostilities, we can see that the comic and the tragic frames of understanding were not entirely mutually exclusive. Declaring war "is a call for a united, committed campaign against a social problem" (Best, 1999, p. 147), though it is no guarantee of any such commitment. After all, the "enemy" tries to rally support for its cause too, eventually causing a clash of people and competing interests.

This absolutist either/or, "us" versus "them" attitude was implicit in the militaristic rhetoric leading up to the declaration of war against squeegee kids. It was made explicit in the formal announcement of conflict. "Policymakers declare war on social problems precisely because they hope to invoke ... unity against a common enemy" (Best, 1999, p. 148). Interestingly, a shift occurred in the attribution of agency in this battle. Until mid-1997, militaristic rhetoric was used almost exclusively to typify the substance of squeegee kids. But then authorities such as the police begin to be portrayed as aggressors. The *Toronto Sun*'s coverage of the initial onslaught of the 1997 police crackdown demonstrates this through a concatenation of cleansing and warfare metaphors. Headlines for four days in a row announced: "Squeegee Kids Busted", "Squeegee Kids Doused", "Squeezing Squeegees," and "Squeegee Wipeout." By 1998 (and Mayor Lastman's declaration of war), the issue was typified with thoroughly engaged combatants on both sides. By this point, the government consistently seemed embattled. This marked a distinct change from earlier characterizations of squeegee kids as an "army" but one with whom conflict was not actively sought.

Squeegee kids were often portrayed as at war with each other. Conflict was reported regularly among them (as well as with drivers). Then, the *Toronto Sun* suggested the first police crackdown on squeegee kids was “intergenerational warfare” (“Pornographer as victim,” 1997, p. 11). At this point, the metaphor of war did not describe the conflict over the city or divergent views on public order as much as it indicated battle lines along age. Early on, then, squeegee coverage seemed consistent with Giroux’s (1996) assertion that, “headlines proliferate like dispatches from a combat zone, frequently coupling youth and violence” (p. 27). However, youth themselves were not the object of public analysis so much as disorderly behavior (often attributed to youth). Indeed, columns like the *Sun*’s seemed to suggest a debate between adults seeking to exercise control and authority, and disorderly kids exercising their freedom at the expense of those adults. Certainly, some claimed that squeegee kids were, as Giroux (2003) suggested of youth in general, “demonized in the popular media and derided by politicians looking for quick-fix solutions to crime” (p. xvii). But the squeegee conflict was not representative of a generalized war against young people (Grossberg, cited in Giroux, 2003, pp. 107-108) or what Males (1996) calls a “generation war” (p. 44) declared by the old against the young in American society.

Instances where claims-makers spoke in highly alarmist terms of the threat posed to social stability by *young people* were, over time, minimized in squeegee-oriented claims. As the narrative developed, less emphasis was placed on their status as “kids” as more and more claims focused on what to do about them to minimize their status as irritants and their involvement in serious and petty criminal acts. A tragic frame of war became more pervasive than even a tragic view of youth when the issue evolved out of

the “awareness” stage and into debates about “policy determination.” Both the rhetorical move of declaring war and the passing of the law that outlawed them promised reform through redemptive violence – purification through victimage – as squeegee kids were sacrificed for the greater good.

At a very basic level, “declaring war is dramatic” (Best, 1999, p. 146). But, according to dramatism, all of life (much less divisive social issues) is dramatic. With this in mind, it can be argued that the declaration of war against squeegee kids signified a crucial shift in the claims-making that typified this particular drama. By and large, it marked the end of comic laughter. Up until that point, there was at least the possibility of comic resolution of the issue. Acceptance of squeegee kids was certainly not universal but at least there was the possibility of negotiation. Even if this included “savage ridicule, a weapon [that] wounds deeply” (Duncan, 1962, p. 404), there was still a degree of open-mindedness when it came to considering what to do about squeegee kids. Comedy means “a mind-set ... that is always opposed to the closed confrontational mind-set that so often leads to violence, killing, and war” (Rueckert, 1994, p. 118). War and the comic perspective are incompatible insofar as “the obverse of the comic perspective is killing, victimizing, and destroying those you can’t get along with” (Rueckert, 1994, p. 122). In this sense, using even the metaphor of war to describe the nature of conflict with squeegee kids (much less the actual application of force) sanctioned the tragic perspective as the norm. The metaphor was used to “imply a whole narrative story and a prescription for action” (Stone, cited in Best, 1999, p. 145) and violence (albeit of a redemptive variety) was recognized as the means by which a solution to the squeegee kid drama could be reached.

CHAPTER 5: WHO ARE THE SQUEEGEE KIDS I- PENTAD ANALYSIS

This chapter will discuss how squeegee kids represented *themselves* symbolically and how the media symbolically represented *them*. Together these representations led the public to an impression of squeegee kids as an antagonistic other. This chapter attempts to see squeegee kids as *text*, as a relatively coherent set of signifiers that produce a relatively unified meaning. Using a contextual constructionist approach, squeegee kids' presence in the streets – their bodies and their actions – can be read as a series of *claims*, as verbal, visual, and behavioral statements meant to prompt audience attention. Like all texts, their meaning comes not simply or uniquely from the meanings they hope to induce in observers but also from the texts' relationship to other texts, other behaviors, and expectations about texts.

I am not interested in what makes someone adopt squeegeeing. Instead, I am concerned with how the activities of squeegee kids shaped their public identity and influenced the media's subsequent characterizations of them. It is not necessary to determine who squeegee kids are by determining, for example, where they came from if who they are is determined in large part by what they do. This is akin to what Linda Alcoff calls a "politics of positionality wherein group identity is created not through some innate, essential quality shared by the group's members, but through their similar external relations to the dynamic social processes of history, economics, and politics" (Kearney, 1998, p. 169). As shall become clear, the connotations of "abnormality" that attached to squeegee kids were at least partly due to the fact that they were a disruptive presence in city streets, not just because they were labeled as such. Their appearance,

their actions, and their overall behavior incited a variety of public responses and a “public image.” This is “a cluster of impressions, themes and quasi-explanations ... a kind of composite description-*cum*-explanation ... [that] tend[s] to appear *in place of analysis*” (Hall et al., 1978, p. 118). To explain this image, I now address the social issue of squeegeeing by explaining these elements according to Kenneth Burke’s pentad.

I acknowledge that this may “stretch” the applicability of the pentad. For instance, Jodi Cohen (1998) argues that there is a “tendency to apply the pentad to the communication situation instead of to the drama that is created by the communication” (p. 96). Ultimately, the pentad is meant as a device that gets at the grammatical – or internal life – of a discourse. It is not meant as a tool to describe the overall rhetorical situation. However, my entry point for descriptions of the squeegee drama is people’s textual accounts of them. Thus, I describe the drama that occurs within language claims even as I describe the drama of squeegeeing in the street. Burke commented on a similar quandary when he noted the differences between his work and that of his friend, Malcolm Crowley: “You are trying to write an interpretation of certain cultural trends; I am trying to write on the process of interpretation” (cited in Jay, 1988, p. viii). I am trying to interpret the specific cultural phenomenon of squeegeeing, but I am doing so by interpreting people’s interpretations of this phenomenon.

Squeegee kids’ actions cannot be separated from what their actions symbolized. The meanings of squeegee kids’ actions were always already caught up in a series of gazes or pre-existing analytical frameworks which brought with them expectations about how the constellation of signifiers mobilized by squeegee kids should be interpreted.

SQUEEGEE KIDS' ACTIONS

Generally speaking, the pentad (Act, Agent, Scene, Agency, and Purpose) can be used to describe, “what is involved when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it” (Burke, 1945, p. xv). This very first line of *The Grammar of Motives* can be used to describe the general conditions that surrounded squeegee kids and the public debate around them. But Burke is not concerned with motives as “causes of actions” but as labels for completed actions (Golden, Berquist, & Coleman, 1976, p. 318). This endeavor to label behavior after it has been enacted corresponds to a media discourse that presented the drama of squeegee kids to the public.

Burke’s pentad is an instrument to describe a rhetorical event. I argue that squeegee kids are individuals whose “rhetorical bodies” (appearance and behavior) signified a challenge to the established order. But their actions also had material consequences. This chapter, then, is inspired by the argument that rhetoric should be a lens to “study the significations of material things and corporeal entities – objects that signify not through language but through their spatial organization, mobility, mass, orality, and tactility” (Dickson, 1999, p. 297).

Squeegee kids comprise an excellent case study for just such an analysis. For Burke, “a politician was not simply a politician, he was a ‘political actor’, and therefore his function was not to simply ‘make’ or ‘undertake’ political duties, it was to ‘act’ or ‘perform’ them. Political events were invariably described as ‘scenes’ or ‘acts’” (Hindson and Gray, 1988, p. 28). Squeegee kids can be similarly understood and also recognized as ‘political actors’. Just as politicians make declarative statements in order to persuade, so too do squeegee kids’ bodies and actions create a political performance in the streets.

Describing squeegee kids as “political” and not just “actors” suggests that the act of squeegeeing is political even if it is not consciously intended by all involved as a form of protest against the government or against a certain way of life. Squeegee kids are not political because they can be seen as rebelling, but because they act to differentiate themselves at all. Through their actions they may be known and their actions distinguish these kids as separate from the everyday metropolitan routine.

PENTAD I – ACT

Having declared squeegee kids as political actors engaged in a certain type of public performance, let us now interrogate their actions. It seems simple enough to assess the act being performed. Individuals clean the windshields of vehicles stopped at the intersections of city streets. Here, though, is the first indication that things are not entirely as they initially seem. Normally, the biggest demand on one’s attention while stopped at an intersection is waiting for the right of way to proceed. If one wishes to have one’s windshield cleaned, it is usually done at a service station – either by one’s own labor or by a paid attendant who does not expect anything extra for the act. Squeegee kids first and foremost defy convention by their activity of skirting between cars at stoplights and even ignoring traffic signals in order to complete their service or to ask for compensation. As such, accounts of meetings with squeegee kids were often cast as challenges and not polite requests for change.

The point is that squeegee kids’ actions definitely affected people. “Rhetoric acts on the whole person, not just on the ‘hearts and minds’ of its audience” (Blair, 1999, p. 46). Squeegee kids’ bodies and actions made demands on drivers to pay attention. They did not necessarily endanger the occupants of vehicles so much as they made being at the

intersection more dangerous by simply interrupting the flow of traffic. They distracted drivers, did not follow the rules of the road for pedestrians, and they sometimes made it difficult or even dangerous for cars to move.

Admittedly, being “moved” by squeegee kids (or not moving, as may be the case) is very different than being touched by the content of a book or speech. Still, we can see how the very presence of squeegee kids embodied a rhetorical challenge to the moral mainstream that resulted in a wide range of responses ranging from disgust to calls for their defense. The reason for such a variety of responses is straightforward. The acts of squeegee kids, just like the acts of all social actors, usually contain “an intermingling of ‘competitive’ and ‘nest-building’ features (invidiousness and industry). ... [They are the] confluence of a predatory instinct and an instinct of workmanship. The carpenter who builds a house for the goods his wages will bring him, is both a workman and an aggrandizer of the self” (Burke, 1954, p. 200). Commensurately, claims-makers critiqued the act of squeegeeing as predatory just as others lauded it for its constructive value.

PENTAD II – AGENT

Having outlined what squeegee kids did, I must also outline who squeegee kids were (or who they were represented to be). First and foremost, squeegee kids were represented as young people. Even the label “squeegee kids” draws immediate attention to the concept of youth. It quite literally denotes the age of those who squeegee, which became an important factor in how society came to know them. The very label “squeegee kid” calls forth a multitude of cultural references such as developing bodies, dissidence, passionate arguments, and alienated social groups. “The term ‘youth’ is popularly used to refer to people aged 16-25 which bears no correlation with any of the diverse legal

classifications of childhood or adulthood” (Valentine, Skelton, & Chambers, 1995, p. 5).

This flexible understanding of youth corresponds well to the majority of those who squeegee. For instance, one “informal police survey ... found most were male and under the age of 25” (“Call off,” 1998, p. A16).

Still, it is this accommodating definition of “youth” that prompted some of the greatest complaints regarding squeegee kids. As one letter to an editor exclaimed upon five squeegee kids appearing in court (the youngest 18, the oldest 22), “they aren't in juvenile court; these are not young offenders – they are highwaymen - One who practices robbery on the highway. Why not call them for what they really are?” (Cofell, 1998, p. A15). Over time, the claim that those who squeegeed were not youthful was expressed with increasing regularity (and espoused by increasingly prominent claims-makers). Conservative pundit Michael Coren declared, “many of them are 25-years-old, they're not kids” (“Panel discussion,” 1998), and Toronto Mayor Lastman repeated this sentiment: “They're not kids, by the way, they're squeegee troublemakers, they're squeegee pests” (cited in Gollom, 2000, p. A19). Peigi (2001) took umbrage at the *Toronto Star's* “persistence in calling men 25 and 30 years old ‘kids’” (p. A21) while Knight (2001) also objected to the phrase “squeegee kids” and protested, “in the not too distant future, this squeegee ‘kid’ will need a prostate exam” (p. A21).

If squeegee kids are, by and large, young people, then what kind of young people are they? Squeegee kids are, admittedly, atypical looking. The mainstream media typically denoted them via reference to a “uniform” of sorts. Particular attention was paid to grubby faces and hairdos, variously described as spiked, punky, mohawk, and aggressive. These were typically accompanied by commentaries on their choice of

apparel – frequently coded as leather jackets, fatigues, tattered clothes, and often heavy boots of some sort. Finally, most accounts were not complete without some description of body piercings or tattoos. Thompson (1997) writing for the alternative magazine *In These Times*, suggested, “aside from the profusion of tattoos and eyebrow piercings, they don’t look much different from average college students” (p. 40). This, however, was the exception to the rule of most coverage that tended to emphasize the negative or unconventional aspects of squeegee kids’ dress. By example, Peigi (2001) described a confrontation with a “dirty, drugged-out idiot with a ring in his nose” (p. A21). This was, admittedly, a one-sided depiction. So too was the opposite perspective: “Most of the kids, even in Toronto, are insidiously good-natured. Just say no, to coin a phrase, and they raise their arms in cheerful surrender, then dance along” (Warren, 1999, p. A10). This disparity of views is instructive. Squeegee kids were depicted both as villainous and as virtuous agents. While negative depictions were more plentiful, it was not the one-sidedness but the extreme nature of the claims that would have been apparent to any casual reader of media coverage.

One reason for extreme reactions to squeegee kids may have been their widespread appropriation of the punk aesthetic. From the 1970s on, these markers of street-wise sensibility have served as a shortcut to signify youthful rebellion.²⁵ Squeegee kids’ adoption of this fusion of downtrodden-ness and vituperation aligns them with what Leblanc (1999) identifies as “gutter punks,” a 1990s re-invention of punk’s “sartorial terrorism” and attitude among itinerant street youth (pp. 208-209). This playful

²⁵ It is important to note, though, that “punk” is not a closed circuit of meaning. It may help to distinguish some rebellious youth from adults preaching establishmentarianism, but it is no guarantee of an oppositional viewpoint among young people.

performativity and culture of conspicuous display distinguished squeegee kids from mainstream, adult culture. But though the clothes and the behavior may have been different, Rozell (1998) suggested in the *Star* that their symbolism of youth versus adults expressed a “symbolic language as old as the human race” (p. A13).

Rozell also emphasized how squeegee kids were located at the margins of society. This claim was often repeated by squeegee-defenders: “Squeegee workers [are] the most marginalized of the youth population. They tend to be alienated not only from their families but also from the rest of society and the services geared to helping individuals who are homeless” (Tyyska, 2000, p. 81). Squeegee kids’ marginal status was also acknowledged by anti-squeegee claims-makers (although their claims typically used marginality as an argument to crack down on squeegee kids rather than lend them assistance). For instance, *Sun* columnist Blizzard (1999a) recognized “the number of young people who are out there, living marginal lives” (p. 15), but also suggested, “squeegeeing is simply a way some teens act out” (1999b, p. 15). Many accused squeegee kids of voluntarily adopting the veneer of marginality and of hardship. The belief that the majority of these kids came from middle-class, not broken or abusive, homes (and that they could return home when winter came or the thrill wore off) was a popular one (see Coren in “Panel discussion,” 1998; Meyer, 1999; Schulgan, 2000, p. C8; Steward, 1999b, p. 15). Self-appointed hard-core street kids derided these typically suburban kids as “twinkies” – hard on the outside and soft on the inside.

Whether it was because they were described as unemployed and homeless, or simply as strange-looking and rebellious, squeegee kids were typified as marginal. Frequent references to their drug-use and violent nature further reinforced the possibility

that typical newspaper readers would identify them with an outsider-status. All media, even the *Toronto Star* (accused by its competition of being predisposed toward squeegee kids) described kids negatively. One *Star* reader charged that the paper “portrayed squeegee kids as drug-addicted, aggressive and violent criminals. Drug-free or polite kids were shown as the exception” (Rahder, 2000).

Not just unclean (and thereby offensive), squeegee kids came to be recognized as combative agents – a collective force that was on the offensive. Squeegee kids were also termed a “squeegee army” and called urban guerrillas, squeegee commandos, and rude, urban warriors.²⁶ These associations were made easy because those who squeegeed were known as “kids” or “adults,” but not “squeegee children.” As Oswell (cited in Saunders, 2002, p. 137) explained, “Whereas those in danger are constituted as ‘children,’ those deemed dangerous are quite clearly constituted as ‘youth.’” Thus, as agents, squeegee “kids” can be seen as part of a chain of unlimited semiosis – individuals squeegeeing in the streets, connoted as “kid,” linked to other connotations and incidents typified by dirtiness, youthful rebellion, juvenile delinquency, and so forth.

PENTAD III – Part (a): AGENCY OF SQUEEGEE KIDS

As practical action, the agency of squeegee kids involved approaching cars while stopped at intersections. As symbolic action, however, one might say that this act was accomplished (and the issue took form) by squeegee kids calling attention to themselves by being where they should not have been, darting in and out of traffic. By flaunting the convention of staying out of traffic, they introduced an element of disorder and unpredictability into the urban environment. The agency of squeegee kids contested

²⁶ For a full account of these militaristic monikers, see Appendix B.

vehicles' legitimacy as (mobile) private realms.²⁷ The protection a vehicle affords its driver, not to mention the independence from the routines of others, is implied every time one uses a vehicle. Peter Hall suggested as much with his idea that "perhaps the only difference between the Florence of the Medicis and the New York of Ronald Reagan is that now the rich can protect themselves in taxis and cars" (1998, p. 987). But squeegee kids disrupted this complacency to some degree.

However, these statements may exaggerate the power granted to the driver. Mumford, for instance, suggested that the freedom granted drivers was not absolute. "As long as motorcars were few in number, he who had one was a king: he could go where he pleased and halt where he pleased" (1964, p. 245). But this ability to use the car to flee was hampered by high-density areas in the metropolis. Additionally, squeegee kids frustrated the very presumption of this autonomy when they congregated in the areas of highest traffic. By targeting cities' busiest intersections, they aimed for the greatest turnover and potential profits. Furthermore, as Safdie (1998) points out, "the automobile experience, taken as a totality, is full of anxiety" (p. 138). Dealing with interloping squeegee kids adds to the overall tension of traffic jams, gridlock and parking woes. Thus, the actions of squeegee kids clash with those of drivers. The power of city drivers can be seen to shift to squeegee kids:

The most slow-moving, traffic-infested intersections with the longest lights invariably attract the greatest number of squeegee kids. The intersection of Front and Spadina ... is one of the longest lights in town. What's more, during afternoon rush hour, it can take southbound cars [exiting the city onto major thoroughfares] five or ten minutes to clear the intersection (and the squeegee people have wisely chosen to work only the southbound lanes). ("Squeegee kids clean," 1997, A18)

²⁷ Speaking to this, McLuhan (1964) argued that "the car gave to the democratic cavalier his horse and armor and haughty insolence in one package, transmogrifying the knight into a misguided missile" (p. 199).

If “cars have become the real population of our cities” (McLuhan, 1964, p. 194), then squeegee kids’ agency consists of their ability to disrupt the image of smoothly flowing goods, services, and people, not to mention the image of pleasantly jostling bodies in public space. They changed the cultural and spatial politics that occupants of the city, and commuters and tourists alike, constantly have to negotiate. Squeegee kids appropriated city streets – very literally a “non-place” meant only for transition – and made them over as sites for their own expression. That conflicted with the practices of others who sought to use streets for their “typical” use.

Squeegee kids, then, as an atypical presence in city streets, can be seen to frustrate the interests and the welfare of everyone, not just drivers. This is predicated on the belief that “traffic and its routes of circulation are a preliminary condition for the growth of the state, which follows close behind” (Mattelart, 1996, p. 210). Squeegee kids were criticized for impeding the freedom of those who travel the roads and those who keep the economy moving. They were blamed for decreased traffic to certain downtown cores of cities, thereby threatening the success of legitimate, formal businesses.

Before the intervention of police crackdowns on the incivility and nuisance-making of squeegee kids, traffic lights effectively regulated the ebb and flow of intersections. When squeegee kids intervened in this setting, regardless of one’s opinion about the level of respect they showed for other people’s property (and even time), the normal appearance of the street is thrown into disarray. Consequently, when one analyzes what squeegee kids actually do, then they can be understood as much more than merely symbolizing a threat to the established, common-sensical order. They also *are* a threat – not just conjured out of discourse, but embodying difference, visually disrupting the

orderly routines of everyday life. The kids are out of place amongst the cars. As Goffman (1971) suggested,

When an individual finds persons in his presence acting improperly or appearing out of place, he can read this as evidence that although the peculiarity itself may not be a threat to him, still, those who are peculiar in one regard may well be peculiar in other ways, too, some of which may be threatening. For the individual, then, impropriety on the part of others may function as an alarming sign. Thus, the minor civilities of everyday life can function as an early warning system. (p. 241)

This is most applicable to the process whereby squeegee kids came to be known to the public. As an obvious nuisance factor, their initial public image may be merely an atypical presence, but they can be made over into a threat, into the object of criminalizing legislation or even of a moral campaign.

PENTAD III – Part (b): AGENCY OF DRIVERS

So far, I have highlighted squeegee kids as agents. However, for the drama in the streets to unfold, drivers, too, are necessary. “Symbolic transformations of public space occur when the urbanite uses body management and facial expressions to create around himself a shield of privacy. By ... 'disattending' to others in a public setting, the urban dweller communicates to strangers that he or she does not want to interact with them” (Riedel, 1993, pp. 7-8). The car is a classic example of such a shield, protecting the occupant from having to pay too much attention to the things speeding by outside. Of course, this shield is weakened when the car has to come to a stop, which is when further steps must be taken to avoid interaction.

When squeegee kids approached cars and expected acknowledgement, they reinforced the idea that, “to recognize another person is to find oneself already claimed upon by the other person’s potential neediness. The sensual, material proximity of the

other person in his or her bodily need and possibility for suffering makes an unavoidable claim on me, to which I am hostage" (I. Young, 2000, p. 58).²⁸ Yet squeegee kids' potentially intrusive actions were balanced by drivers' attempts at non-acknowledgement. Recognition must come before any acknowledgment that someone may pose a threat. Many drivers attempted to escape being held "hostage" and avoid the expectation of monetary exchange. These drivers only recognized squeegee kids in order to avoid further interaction. Goffman (1963) explains this 'civil inattention':

What seems to be involved is that one gives to another enough visible notice to demonstrate that one appreciates that the other is present (and that one admits openly to having seen him), while at the next moment withdrawing one's attention from him so as to express that he does not constitute a target of special curiosity or design. (p. 84).

When it came to drivers' interactions with squeegee kids, a quick shaking of the head and then aversion of the eyes seemed to acknowledge that the kids existed but also made clear that no service was required of them. This play of gestures can be telling. "Gesture exaggerates the body, extending it into space, breaking through the mute boundaries of the skin to create a deformed image of the self in a social relationship" (Betsky, 1997, p. 22). Not all drivers acted this way and not all the gestures of squeegee kids were meant to be threatening, forcing drivers into a defensive or garrison-like mentality. The tip of the squeegee in the direction of a driver can be seen as a latter-day tip of the hat, a street-culture form of politeness.

Additionally, it must be noted that media accounts regularly depicted squeegee

²⁸ Beyond the typical "youthful look" of squeegee kids, an explicit example of the threatening nature of the sensual, material proximity of other bodies occurred in the summer of 1997. As a result of the recently won right for public toplessness, the Premier expressed his displeasure at the idea of topless female window-cleaners (Blackwell, 1997, p. B1). Thus, squeegee kids represented a larger feeling that norms are waning.

kids – and not drivers – as the ones who were aggressive. The following colorful caricature is illustrative: “Some horrified motorists put their hands in front of their faces, as if the teens were vampires and the looming squeegees crucifixes. Others merely nodded no” (Freeze, 1997, p. D1). When drivers ignored squeegee kids (or when they gave money to squeegee kids to get them to go away), they seemed to reinforce the idea of the city and its interactions as, “a mosaic of little worlds which touch but do not interpenetrate” (Park, 1916, p. 608). The squeegee kid’s touching of one’s car means one is brought into contact with a world that one might otherwise avoid. Civil inattention on the part of the drivers is one mechanism to help avoid the pressing of conflicting bodies, attitudes, and values.

PENTAD IV – Part (a): THE SCENE OF CITY STREETS

The scene, using Burke’s terminology, is the context in which the act occurs. The most immediate context of squeegee activity was the downtown core of city streets. The scene of city streets encouraged the act of squeegeeing even as the act of squeegeeing changed the scene of city streets. We may also say that, as a result of media coverage of squeegee kids in these environs, a light was shone on the city as a wider scene beset by youth unemployment and youth violence. As people argued about these issues and what to do about them, squeegeeing became a social issue whose claims exhibited a “scenic” anti-youth attitude. Some description of these overall scenes has already been implied in my discussions of squeegee acts, agents, and agency. Still, one must pay more attention to the context in which squeegeeing occurs. For one thing, one is likely never to find a squeegee kid in the suburbs. Mumford (1964) provides one reason why squeegee kids flock to the urban scene:

The great function of the city is ... to permit – indeed, to encourage – the greatest possible number of meetings, encounters, challenges, between varied persons and groups, providing as it were a stage upon which the drama of social life may be enacted, with the actors taking their turn, too, as spectators. (p. 240)

Squeegee kids (who only exist amidst this hustle and bustle and who contribute to it) may, at first glance, seem to encourage this function of bringing people together. However, they importantly interrupt the normal flow of city life. Squeegee kids represent an understanding of city life which sees the urban scene as a carnivalesque place of discontinuity, simultaneity and encounter, what Lefebvre (1996) saw as “permanent disequilibrium, seat of the dissolution of normalities and constraints, the moment of play and of the unpredictable” (p. 129). But squeegee kids’ actions bring people together where there is no precedent for these co-minglings. Squeegee kids encounter other people in the intersections of city streets. They create mis-meetings where encounters are indeed challenges, sometimes tolerated, and sometimes rebuked. Many of the physical spaces of the modern city are organized so “meetings which are not actively sought may be avoided” (Bauman, 1993, p. 157). City streets are examples of this. They are designed more as fleeting spaces than meeting places. Or, as one Halifax police constable put it, “the streets are for vehicles; they’re not for people” (cited in Flinn, 1997, p. 3). When individuals are ‘met’ here, there is bound to be some anxiety.

In these mis-meetings, squeegee kids generate a tension and the sense that something is unnatural or wrong.²⁹ This is because the usual scene-act ratio is one of “streets-driving” (for drivers) and “streets-waiting-at-stoplights” (for driving and walking alike). Now a new scene-act ratio radiated out from this last one: “waiting at stoplights-confronting drivers/squeegee kids through the windshield.” Thus, squeegee kids threatened the normal appearance of the city and its principal conduits. One could even suggest that the squeegee ritual reveals Goffman’s (1971) two basic modes of activity for all human or animal life. Those in their vehicles may be typified as “going about their business grazing, gazing ... placidly attending to easily managed matters at hand” while squeegee kids can be seen as “fully mobilized, a fury of intent, alarmed, they get ready to attack or to stalk or to flee” (p. 238). At least, this seemed to be the attitude in many public expressions about squeegee kids.

PENTAD IV – Part (b): THE URBAN SCENE OF THE CITY

The wider scene of the city lies beyond the immediate scene of city intersections where squeegee kids and drivers met. One way to make squeegee-related claims more dramatic was to associate squeegeeing with places suffering from widespread poverty.

²⁹ This should not be taken to mean that anxiety is generated each and every time one encounters a squeegee kid – or that the anxiety is equally felt by all. Nor should it be interpreted as suggesting that it is wrong to squeegee. But the very fact that they are there, where they were not before, indicates that something is amiss with the normal – or traditional – appearance of the city. This has nothing to do with squeegee kids appearing threatening or some presumption of anxiety on the part of drivers unfamiliar with squeegee kids. It has, rather, entirely to do with the unfamiliarity of squeegee kids within the setting of the intersection itself. Those who don’t feel anxious at their presence because they are used to seeing them there may have become acclimated to them in the city but may also believe that this indicates something systemically wrong with the city. Those who think that there’s nothing wrong still have to admit that there is something “unnatural” about anyone (disorganized squeegee kids or organized charities) who interrupts the flow of traffic and the ordinary routines of drivers.

Some claims-makers invoked scene-act ratios that suggested the scene of poverty and unemployment prompted young people to take up squeegeeing. Other accounts depicted an act-scene ratio that suggested squeegeeing was negatively affecting the scene: One Toronto Councillor claimed, "the squeegees start to make Toronto look like a Third World city" (Mennin-Wong, cited in "Do something," 1998, 14). The "tarnish" of poverty is a double-edged sword; both pro and anti-squeegee claims-makers used it to depict the context of the city in a negative light and encourage others to identify with their cause and agenda of reform.

With this negative image of rampant panhandlers and squeegee kids asking for change, some prominent claims-makers portrayed the city as under siege. For instance, Ontario's Solicitor-General, Bob Runciman declared that he was afraid to walk Toronto's streets. This statement was prompted by local squeegee kid activity: "I spent hours and hours walking the streets of New York, even at night, and I never felt uncomfortable. ... I can't say that about some areas of downtown Toronto right now" (cited in Coyle, 1997, p. A6). This image of Toronto was an extreme one. However, its expression indicated the belief (held by at least some) that squeegee kids endangered not just traffic but the very image of "Toronto the good." This sobriquet was already well established over a century ago, serving as the title of a book that declared, "'Toronto the Good' and beautiful - one of the finest cities on the continent in point of beauty, wealth and intelligence" (Clark, 1970/1898, 1-3). Just as at the end of the nineteenth century, this is the image cultivated by city boosters a hundred years later. For some, squeegee kids threatened the widely propagated image of Toronto's scene as a very safe, friendly and clean city.

It is important to keep in mind which way of knowing the city is being advocated and by whom. The claims that constituted the social issue of squeegeeing figured the city through usually contrasting polemical categories. Depending on one's point of view, it was either bad (dangerous, polluted, concrete) and set against good (safe, healthy, green) suburbs, or it was good (diverse, dense, stimulating) and superior to the bad (sprawling, homogeneous, dull) suburbs (see Rybczynski, 1995, p. 176). This demonstrates how convenient binary oppositions are as a means of organizing this discourse. It also demonstrates how the scene was not the "hard city" locatable in maps, statistics and architecture but "the soft city of illusion, myth, aspiration, nightmare" (Raban, 1974, p. 10). Whether or not squeegee kids were to blame, they were always associated with "the filth and danger of downtown streets" (Barnes, 1996, p. 12) of this nightmarish city.

PENTAD IV – Part (c): THE SCENE OF YOUTH VIOLENCE

Alongside contested depictions of squeegee kids as poor and young was the frequent association of squeegeeing with the context of youth violence. "Increasingly, youth is represented as not the victim of suicide but the perpetrator of homicide, not the user but the seller of drugs" (Grossberg, 1992, p. 188). There are those, for instance, who directly accused Toronto's squeegee kids of "tarnishing the image of the city, or more seriously, [being] responsible for elevating levels of violence in the urban core" (O'Grady et al., 1998, p. 315). With such reports, many believe, "things are getting worse, that there are ever more violent incidents, that respectable citizens run greater risks of victimization than in the past" (Best, 1999, p. 9). This describes the scene that was the "soft city" of the imagination into which squeegee kids appeared. Concerns about youth crime and violence were not just claims about crime, violence and law and order.

They also expressed concerns about (and fear of) youth. As I already stated, squeegee kids were (generally speaking) young people. Thompson (1997), for one, suggested, "it's the youthfulness of the squeegeers that unsettles the city's pundits" (p. 40). In Burkean terms, some believed that young people themselves (and not just the disruptive act of squeegeeing) were a significant source of "guilt" that materialized in the moralizing of the squeegee issue. In a widely cited example of this, Ontario's Attorney General connected squeegee kids and aggressive panhandling to a felt crisis in public safety (Brennan, 1999) and pointed out, "violent youth crime has increased 77 per cent nationwide during the past decade" (Boyle, 1999a, p. A8).

This scene of youth violence contained, so to speak, the act of squeegeeing. Similarly, widespread instances of the act of squeegeeing made it possible to say that the city was a scene in which youth violence was on the rise. Unlike the scene of poverty, references to the scene of violence typically portrayed squeegee kids in a uniformly negative light. Incoming Toronto police chief Julian Fantino identified squeegee kids as "violent teens" who needed to be "held accountable for their criminal conduct" when he claimed, "we must be extremely concerned about the growing number of young people who are out of control and seem to be accountable to no one" (Wallace, 2000, p. 4). We can see, then, that pre-existing discourses of problematic, troubling, and violent youth served as a cultural resource that lent context and explanatory power to concerns about squeegeeing. Both Condit (1990, p. 25) and Best (1999, p. 87) argue that effective rhetoric taps into resonant moral vocabularies and easily recognizable themes or cultural preoccupations.

When it came to “setting the stage” for squeegee kids, ongoing anxieties over the undisciplined nature of young people, central to the social order throughout modern times (see Pearson, 1983), played a part. McRobbie (1994) also pointed out the prevalence of moral campaigns focused on youth and order: “The same anxieties appear with startling regularity. These involve the immorality of young people, the absence of parental control, the way in which having too much free time leads to crime, and the threat which deviant behaviour poses” (p. 205). As Burke might say, people are repetitively goaded into thinking about youth as if they were polluting agents that can threaten a scene of social stability. Older, familiar images of disruptive young people combined with newer ideas and images of squeegee kids at intersections in order to make the social issue of squeegeeing meaningful.

Whether one emphasizes “youth” or “violence” when discussing “youth violence,” the controversy over squeegee kids exemplified the belief that young people posed an increasing threat to social stability. Giese (2002) reported the claim, “adults have always been afraid of teenagers, but now there’s even a greater angst and a greater sense of being threatened” (p. K2). Thus, we can also speak of a scene (or context) of alarmist rhetoric that focused on young people and the potential disruption they augured. Some of the squeegee claims certainly seemed to emphasize the idea that, “youth powerfully connotes problem. ... [Whenever] we speak of youth we are always speaking of how youth creates discomfort” (Acland, 1995, p. 28). This is not to say that when squeegeeing first emerged as a problem young people were only viewed as a problem or that all claims-makers deemed squeegeeing problematic. Claims-makers variously typified squeegee kids as young people who were trustworthy and irresponsible, both

victims and criminals. However, the arguments for and against squeegee kids revolved around the notion that “youth is present only when its presence is a problem, or is regarded as a problem” (Hebdige, 1988, p. 17).

At the time of the emergence of squeegee kids as a social issue, there was a widespread understanding of youth as threat. Social commentators as prominent as U.S. President Clinton suggested, “we are raising a generation without a future” (cited in Best & Kellner, 1998, p. 88). The pervasive image of youth that was fed by such accounts was one of rudderless slackers, generation X whose daily existence was permeated by sex, drugs, and violence. Apple went as far as to suggest that, within this contemporary moment, “the very word Columbine has been engraved onto our memories as nearly an archetype of the tragedy of adolescence” (cited in Lasko, 2001, p. xi). Such claims do not appear randomly or without justification. Accounts of misbehavior and episodic violence on the part of young people feed this sense of anxiety. Squeegee kids arose within this scene of heightened fears and anxiety – synonyms for Burkean “guilt” – about the behavior of young people. They also came to symbolize the idea of youth as potentially problematic individuals.

Like young people in general, squeegee kids were not inherently rebellious but they were regularly constructed as such. Much of the rhetoric surrounding squeegee kids painted a picture of an urban scene occupied by violent youth in which “youth becomes the boys, the wild boys ... out for blood and giggles: youth-as-trouble, youth-in-trouble” (Hebdige, 1988, p. 27). Still, even though “‘youth gone wild’ is a popularly recognized and increasingly forceful site of social concern in the United States” (Acland, 1995, p. 10), it is not the only way of speaking of youth. It is, however, a powerful way of

arresting the polysemic slippage of the concept of youth in order to identify young people in general (and squeegee kids, specifically) as a population in need of control and reform. The public drama that was the social issue of squeegeeing depended upon this motif of potentially out of control young people since it drew heavily upon the imagery of bad youth, an association that squeegee kids, by all accounts, consciously cultivated (see Blatchford, 2000, p. B8).

It should be stressed, however, that the scene in which squeegee kids emerged did not consist exclusively of anti-youth attitudes. Within the eighties and nineties – at the same time of heightened fears of youth – claims of “at-risk” youth were also increasingly circulating. To speak of youth as being “at-risk” is to suggest that because of a combination of factors, youth are put at risk for a life of less than full development. This may be because of poor education, exposure to drugs, lack of parental guidance, or any number of other factors. “Phrases such as ‘high risk youth’ were used to describe the excess rates of sexually transmitted diseases, pregnancy, substance use, suicide, and accidental death among the heterogeneous groups between ages 12 and 21” (Hill & Fortenberry, cited in Males, 1999, pp. 237-238). This discourse presents youth increasingly as victims of their environment. However, it also has the effect of turning youth into victimizers. Young people who are “at risk” also present a risk – both to themselves and to others. Concerns *for* young people blend with concerns *about* young people as the circumstances of “at-risk” youth threaten to affect others’ lives as well.

Squeegee kids can be both threatened and threatening, no matter who talks about them, the only difference being the order of the threat. For claims-makers who made arguments against them, it was because they were threatening that they were threatened

(i.e., their high-risk actions put them more at risk – both from physical violence (from drivers, from cars, from other squeegee kids battling for high-yield corners) and from the symbolic violence of crackdowns). Meanwhile, those who argued on their behalf claimed that they were threatening because they were threatened (i.e., they were forced to resort to unusual and discomfiting activity due to their socially marginal location). Both pro- and anti-squeegee rhetors constructed city streets as sites of uncertainty and potential danger and both outlined how bad social conditions result in bad behavior. The difference lay in whether one saw young people as the origins of these bad circumstances (victimizers) or caught up in them (victims).

Moral claims about the need to reform squeegee kids were predicated on the image of the city and its streets as a potentially dangerous, violent place. This image, in turn, was predicated upon a belief in widespread youth violence (or at least the violent propensity of squeegee kids). Ultimately, it does not matter whether one saw squeegee kids as violent (and therefore as victimizers) or saw them as victims of larger social forces. Each of these interdependent scenes – city streets, the overall urban scene, and the cultural theme of youth violence – can be subsumed into an overarching scene of potential victimization. The question is not whether squeegee kids were actual victims (or actual threats). Even when typified as victims, the risky behavior of squeegee kids marked them as threats. Faced with the premise of problematic youth, observers of squeegeeing “came to see themselves as *potential* victims” (Hall et al., 1978, p. 20).

PENTAD V – PURPOSE

An act, such as squeegeeing, “can be called an act in the full sense of the term only if it involves a purpose” (Burke, 1976, p. 341). Purpose refers to the “why”

something was done (Burke, 1945, p. xv). There is some debate, however, whether this refers to the inner logic of the symbolic act itself or the more general rationalization one provides to others (see E. Griffin, 2000, p. 288; Jameson, 1982, pp. 79-80). The reason for this confusion can be seen in Burke's (1961) own pragmatic use of the term: "Purpose will have its origins in bodily desires, most notably the appetites of food and sex. In this respect, it will be grounded in man's animality. But it will attain an immaterial counterpart in the principle of communication. Hence, purpose will have a secondary grounding in man's symbolicity" (p. 305). There were instances where squeegee kids announced their material purposes for squeegeeing in the media. The immediate purpose was to gain money. In many cases squeegee kids were frank about their desire to feed appetites for food, alcohol and drugs.

"We ground social motives ... in purpose when we say that ends or values determine our motives" (Duncan, 1969a, p. 355). The ends seem fairly clear when one claims that one squeegees to feed a drug habit or pay the rent. However, the purpose-act ratio becomes much more complicated when it comes to the 'immaterial' purpose that was attributed to squeegee kids' actions by other claims-makers in the media. "It is a principle of drama that the nature of acts and agents should be consistent with the nature of the scene" (Burke, 1945, p. 3). The same can be said of the relationship between purpose and act. When it comes to the attribution of motives, things have to look like they belong, actions have to be appropriate to the place, and purposes need to fit in with the type of people and places described. Thus, whenever one typifies squeegee kids by describing the act, agent, agency, or scene, one has already sketched the outline of purpose. Burke (1945) admitted, "of the five terms, Purpose has become the one most

susceptible of dissolution” (p. 289). Purpose is implicit in the concepts of act, agent, agency (since certain tools are for a purpose) and even scene. It is therefore important to recognize that the symbolic purposes of squeegee kids’ actions will vary according to what other aspects of the pentad are emphasized. Claims-makers with different visions of the city or different perspectives on squeegeeing will emphasize different reasons for squeegee kids’ actions.

By example, the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP) emphasized a scene-purpose ratio in its claims. It typically argued that poverty prompted squeegee kids’ actions, the purpose of which was earning a living any way (or the only way) available to them, looking as they did and in the circumstances in which they found themselves. On the other hand, columnists like Blizzard (1999a) conjectured that the act-purpose ratio that really defined kids was their goal of ticking off mom and dad. The “why,” for her, meant that most acts of squeegeeing could be explained away as youthful rebellion. Other pundits expanded upon this internal logic and suggested that the purpose of squeegeeing was ultimately to irritate, intimidate, and extort money from unwilling motorists. After all, the purpose of service-provision was belied when squeegee kids instituted the practice of “jumping” cars – washing windshields even when drivers indicated it was not necessary (because they discovered more money could be made this way). The purpose of squeegeeing was obviously not to damage vehicles. However, the media frequently described squeegee kids’ practical actions such as “smear[ing] slush across the windshield” (“Squeegees stayin’,” 1997, 6) and denting and scratching cars (Marshall, 1997, p. A22). When OCAP threatened to organize mass demonstrations of squeegeeing

and shut down the city, this symbolic purpose became practical – a form of political protest against government policies on poverty.

No one purpose can summarize why squeegee kids acted the way they did. It is impossible to say that there was one set of values underlying all squeegee acts. While some accounts described squeegee kids' stated goals in a particular light, others described quite a different purpose. Some admitted to being in it for "blood and giggles" while others suggested they were motivated by sheer survival. In addition, there was no uniform purpose attributed to squeegee kids by claims-makers other than the kids themselves. This lack of consensus, though, is what drives a social constructionist account of how squeegeeing came to be defined as a divisive social issue. It is legitimate to ask questions such as *why* one "became" a squeegee kid in the first place, *why* one performs the act in the way that one does, or even *why* the situation of the street and the city itself might encourage a particular rationale for one's actions. However, instead of trying to establish authoritative answers to these questions, an analysis of the social construction of squeegeeing should examine debates over these questions. What, for instance, does it mean for the status of the social issue for people to be arguing about squeegee kids' purposes and what does it mean when public debate shifts to other foci? A primary goal of this analysis, then, is to examine the "secondary" grounding of purpose in squeegee kids symbolism in order to clarify how they came to be identified as a population in need of reform.

CONCLUSION

Like politicians, squeegee kids served as "symbols to other observers: they stand for ideologies, values, or moral stances and they become role models, benchmarks, or

symbols of threat and evil” (Edelman, 1988, p. 2). By going through Burke’s pentad of act/agent/agency/scene/purpose, we have seen how squeegee kids can function as “Condensation symbols” – items that evoke the emotions associated with the situation (Edelman, 1967, p. 6). Such symbols function in the media to condense emotions such as anxiety and stress into one symbolic figure that everyone can easily recognize. Whether or not one agreed with the characterizations of claims-makers, it seems reasonable to suggest that by the time squeegee-related claims reached their apex, most audiences for these claims could recognize squeegee kids as a harbinger of disorder and a symbol of threat. Squeegee kids were either threatening or threatened, deserving to be persecuted or vociferously defended. Vilifications and defenses of squeegee kids alike served to divide them from the normal person by pointing out how they were different from what was taken for granted as the good citizen.

Since squeegee kids did not fit mainstream sensibilities of public behavior and decorum, they became the ballast for claims that sought to distinguish between those who belonged and those who did not. Following Honig (2001), “either [squeegee kids] are valued for what ‘they’ bring to ‘us’ such as a sense of the new, of diversity, plus a renewed appreciation of our own regime whose virtues are so great that they drew them to us – or they are feared for what they will do to us: consume our welfare benefits, fragment our politics, undermine our democratic and law-abiding culture” (p. 46). As this chapter has demonstrated, this dichotomy in the perception of squeegee kids is due in part to squeegee kids themselves. As with any other social or political actor, one can see how squeegee kids put on a show. Squeegee kids’ public image as deviants was founded first

and foremost on their disruptive (or at the very least, nuisance-based) actions and their appearances that were meant to agitate.

This chapter has clarified (a) who squeegee kids are, and (b) why many felt anxious (i.e. guilty) about squeegee kids. In part, this is because squeegee kids were often seen as young people, a group about whom anxieties are regularly mobilized in public rhetoric. This guilt can be further explained by reference to: (a) acts that young squeegee practitioners have done, (b) a widespread willingness to see young people's agency as disruptive, and (c) a concern for the wider scene of the city, the fate of which is determined at least in part by the behavior of the young people therein and everyone's social relations with them. Also, widespread guilt exists because some claims-makers use anxiety to advance their own interests and they find young people an especially appropriate or useful target. It is to this last possibility that we now turn.

CHAPTER 6: WHO ARE THE SQUEEGEE KIDS II – THE SCAPEGOAT

This chapter goes beyond describing squeegee kids according to the dramatic pentad and refers to Burke's notion of a guilt-redemption cycle in order to fully explain squeegee kids' public image as deviants and outsiders. It will show how squeegee kids became emblematic of something dangerous and deserving of sanction or punishment (regardless of their sociological status as youthful suburbanites or as poor, unemployed street people). It will demonstrate the applicability of Burkean victimage to this drama by referring to a number of media accounts of squeegee kids wherein claims-makers used the rhetoric of victimization. As a result, it will clarify how squeegee kids were identified as enemies of the dominant order via the process of scapegoating.

INTRODUCING SCAPEGOATING

The scapegoat is the figure that, once it is widely associated with wrong-doing and is recognized as no longer constituting a legitimate part of the community, gets expelled from view, and subsequently confirms the goodness of all those who define themselves against it and who remain in the community. While there might not be a fixed deviant out there who grants one certainty by being the reverse of all that is absolutely correct and virtuous, this does not preclude attempts to create one. Douglas (1995) outlines the process whereby such enemies of the social and political order are identified:

Any material object, animal, bird or person on whom the bad luck, diseases, misfortunes and sins of an individual or group are symbolically placed, and which is then turned loose, driven off with stones, cast into a river or the sea, etc., in the belief that it takes away with it all the evils placed upon it. (p. 3)

Ancient scapegoat practitioners believed they could pass tangible evil onto others by magic and ritual. This might “disperse that contamination and reinstate them as clean in their own eyes and, more importantly, in the eyes of their god” (Douglas, 1995, p. 14). In the modern context, public opinion and voter support are new god-substitutes and can be won by publicly targeting someone or something that can already be identified as different. If squeegee kids can be shown to represent the worst aspects of our society, then their elimination might renew a good urban scene, i.e. “Toronto the Good” (or at least renew the political success of those who promise such changes).

One person/thing/group is chosen as a scapegoat largely because it symbolizes fears and anxieties that can be mobilized easier than other targets. Interestingly, Toronto’s police chief questioned whether “in this day and age, we want to call a squeegee kid, a panhandler, a homeless person a criminal” (Boothby, cited in Duncanson, 1998c, p. B3). But he also suggested that squeegee kids contributed to “a general fear in the community that the crime situation is getting worse, even though statistics don't support it” (ibid.). Thus, it appeared that the public was primed to accept squeegee kids as a target for disciplinary measures even though it appeared as if other targets might better address the crime problem. Also, groups who are nominated as scapegoats are typically assumed to possess some sort of fearsome or destabilizing power that could potentially damage the social fabric. Just as witches fell into this category, so too do young people when they are associated with violence and anti-social behavior. Problematic youths who are already understood to pose a risk to others are readily scapegoated.

Both Edelman (1988, p. 89) and Douglas (1995, p. 191) argue that scapegoating is not exceptional but is instead flourishing. Its servicing of a very basic human need is

summed up in the phrase, “If order, then guilt; if guilt, then need for redemption; but any such ‘payment’ is victimage. Or, if action, then drama; if drama, then conflict; if conflict, then victimage” (Burke, 1976, p. 349). According to this cycle of terms, wherever there is order, there will also be disorder. Because wherever there are moral commandments there must be sinners. And with this disorder come attempts to rectify the situation – cleansing efforts that require a redemptive sacrifice. Hence, scapegoats are born. “A dramatic view of human motives culminates in the ironic admonition that perversions of the sacrificial principle (purgation by scapegoat, congregation by segregation) are the constant temptation of human societies” (Burke, 1976, p. 350).

Scapegoating is undertaken when people symbolically offer a ritualistic transference of pollution instead of a form of self-sacrifice in order to deal with guilt – the term that stands in for all forms of social anxiety. “To make others suffer for our own sins is victimage; to make ourselves suffer for our own sins is mortification” (Rueckert, 1982a, p. 147). The crucial mechanism involved in scapegoating is the cathartic blaming of someone or something else for one’s own troubles. Burke addressed this in a number of his writings. For him, the scapegoat is “the representative or vessel of certain unwanted evils” (Burke, 1941, p. 39) that “performs the role of vicarious atonement” (Burke, 1945, p. 406). He argued that all individuals seek to “ritualistically cleanse themselves by loading the burden of their own iniquities” upon a surrogate victim (*ibid.*).

Burke is, of course, not the only one to theorize this nomination and elimination of something evil in the name of something good. René Girard (1977, 1989) is perhaps even better known for his work on scapegoats and mimetic violence. Girard (1978) approvingly cited Burke as “a most remarkable figure” (p. 175) and praised his doctrine

of the scapegoat.³⁰ Carter (1996) suggests that their contributions are mutually reinforcing (pp. 65, 87), noting, “Burke emphasizes such resources of symbolism as antithesis and substitution [whereas] Girard emphasizes repetition” (p. 21). Because of the importance of symbolicity in people’s use of language, the nature of squeegeeing as a social *drama*, and the centrality of rhetoric to the development of squeegeeing as a social issue, I continually refer to Burke rather than Girard.

Since scapegoating pinpoints someone or something as a victim, this frequently leads to descriptions of these targets as unjustly or unfairly blamed for certain events. However, “the ‘innocence’ of those involved in the apparent scapegoating process may be relative rather than absolute” (Douglas, 1995, p. 154). This point is also borne out by previous discussions of squeegee kids’ acts. While squeegee kids may not have been hardened criminals, their behavior lent support to that view since victimization stems from a yearning for perfection, for the casting out of impurities, even those as relatively insignificant as petty crime.

SCAPEGOATING AS GUILT-REDEMPTION

Crime is a major currency of scapegoating campaigns, regardless of the degree of the offense. Burke (1945) pointed out the relativity of this attribution of blame:

“criminals either actual or imaginary may serve as scapegoats in a society that ‘purifies itself’ by ‘moral indignation’ in condemning them” (p. 406). Consequently, it does not

³⁰ I suggest, though, that one can take issue with one of Girard’s few direct citations of Burke’s work. He argues that the principle of victimage is present in Burke’s definition of man only as a “codicil,” (referring to Burke’s explanation of the entelechial principle in his updated definition of man in *Language as symbolic action* (p. 16)) (see R. Girard, 1978, p. 176). The choice of this passage minimizes victimage in Burke’s work. It reinforces Girard’s argument that victimage “be moved out of the marginal and the eccentric and into the center, that it be made the origin of symbolicity” (ibid.) whereas I believe Burke always viewed victimage as central to human symbol use.

matter whether squeegee kids were hardened criminals or mere nuisances but that they became the focus of such a campaign in the first place. Speaking to this tendency, Gold (1999) criticized the Ontario government's proposal of the *Safe Streets Act* and used terminology familiar to Burke: "It purports to address a crime issue that, in reality, is nothing more than a figment of our guilt and discomfort about poverty" (p. A18).

In a statement that describes the importance of scapegoating rhetoric, Solicitor-General David Tsubouchi suggested, "People have the right to not only be safe, but also to feel safe in their communities" (cited in Boyle, 1999a). While scapegoating may not solve crime, generating the impression that a group is a threat and promising to take action against it at least generates the impression of more safety. Squeegee kids' criminality was not as important as their ability to play a symbolic role. Criminals happen to be one particularly common form of scapegoat, nominated as a popular victim in campaigns to bring about public order. But anyone, given the right combination of factors and characterizations, can play the role. This is because life, as an ongoing symbolic drama, requires characters with whom one can identify and against whom we can also define ourselves.

The compensatory forces of identification and division come together in the figure of the scapegoat (Burke, 1950, pp. 34, 46, 140). After all, the victim must be "profoundly consubstantial" with those who designate it as the bearer of their sins in order for its expulsion to be "curative" (Burke, 1945, p. 406). If a sacrificial offering has nothing in common with those wishing to relieve themselves of guilt, then no pollution will be transferred. Yet following this "original state of merger," some "principle of division" must enter into the equation in order that "the elements shared in common are

ritualistically alienated.” Then, another stage of identification can begin anew as people join “in the unification of those whose purified identity is defined in dialectical opposition to the sacrificial offering” (ibid.).

Victimizers, then, do not merely identify against a group such as squeegee kids. They come to identify with each other insofar as the scapegoat represents pollution that they are unwilling to tolerate any further. If they can agree on nothing else, people “can unite on the basis of a foe shared by all” (Burke, 1941, p. 193). This “all” must be qualified, however. Not everyone rallied against squeegee kids and not all felt the same degree (or type) of guilt about their co-presence. Instead, as Burke (1959, pp. 188-190) explained, they can be seen as a “factional” scapegoat wherein evil or misdeeds are not attributed to *all* men, but to *some* (the other faction, against whom action is taken in order to weaken it). The factional scapegoat emerges when society factionalizes and when each camp projects its sadism upon the other camp. Each camp, in other words, attributes atrocities to the enemy alone and not to all mankind.

THE RANDOMNESS OF VICTIMAGE

Anyone can be made into a scapegoat. “The list of candidates is limited only by our imagination” (E. Griffin, 2000, 290). As René Girard (1977) noted, a surrogate victim is “chosen only because it is vulnerable and close at hand” (p. 2). In the case of squeegee kids, social activist Judy Rebick made this same point when she argued, “What the attack on the squeegee kids represents is politicians attacking the most vulnerable visible target they can attack. That's it” (“Panel discussion,” 1998).

Rebick's comments underscore Edelman's (1988, p. 86) belief that there is no manifest connection between people who are identified as enemies and those who do or

threaten harm. Instead, a drive for perfection entails a quest to find a perfect victim chosen merely because of some sort of distinctiveness or weakness. Thus, political leaders often engage in campaigns that do not just argue in favor of something but also urge the adoption of policies that represent what they are against. This is how the sacrificial principle emerges as a dramatic theme in politics. "When an image of social order is conveyed, its opposite – disorder – is also portrayed. The drama consists in seeing some players as victims, others as villains. Order is obtained through sacrifice so that unity is derived" (Gusfield, 1981, p. 81).

JUSTIFYING VICTIMAGE – THEY BROUGHT IT ON THEMSELVES

Squeegee kids were nominated as scapegoats, in part, because of the idea that they "chose voluntaristically their deviance rather than being impelled by any social circumstances. ... They're seen to be the cause of society's problems rather than their problems being caused by society" (J. Young, 1999, p. 113). For instance, often when asked why they squeegeed, squeegee kids offered a mixed response that acknowledged it was a tough life but also fun ("Toronto squeegee," 1999). "I do it for food, for fun, for beers and for survival" (Levy, 1998a, p. 15) said another. Comments such as these fueled the indignation evident in the some claims-makers' arguments. For instance, conservative pundit Michael Coren urged others not to be taken in by squeegee kids' appearances or their supposed hard-luck stories.

How can [squeegee kids] afford Rottweilers that cost between 500 and 1000 dollars? How can they afford tattoos that probably come to 500 bucks a time? How can they afford all the body piercing? ... Compassion is wonderful but for the *right people*. ... These kids tend to be not mentally ill, not from broken homes. ... Don't give your compassion to those who don't deserve it. ("Panel discussion," 1998)

Squeegee kids were delegitimized by Coren as an object of concern because of the idea that they willingly chose this lifestyle and the notion that they did not require any financial assistance. The suggestion that they deliberately appeared as they did also implies that they knew what is “normal” and intentionally chose to oppose it, thus even further justifying any ill treatment they received at the hand of authorities. Coren’s rhetorical appeal divides the world into categories of “them” and “us”: those who have no relationship with the core values and properly functioning structure of society and those who do. It also affirms that squeegee kids’ deviance is a product of their own culture and of their own volition and obviously therefore not a characteristic of “us” or something for which we should be responsible.

Claims that squeegee kids were free riders and deserved to be singled out because of their conduct only serve to underscore how they stand outside of the realm of what is typically considered “normal” behavior. George Kelling (a criminologist whom many credit with providing the blueprint for New York’s crackdown on crime) also counseled Toronto on an appropriate response to its squeegee kids. He argued, “the fact that people are homeless is not an excuse for misbehaving” (cited in Edwards, 1998, p. B2). Those who were inclined to side with squeegee kids would likely argue that this is just another displacement technique, “blaming victims of social misfortune for their own troubles: portraying the poor as dangerous people whose moral inadequacies make them responsible for their own problems” (Edelman, 1988, p. 79).

VICTIMAGE AS A POLITICAL TOOL

Some did argue against the likes of Coren and Kelling and suggested that there were good excuses for squeegee kids’ behavior. These squeegee defenders typically

pointed out how squeegee kids were being scapegoated precisely in order to assuage collective guilt or in order to advance partisan prospects in the upcoming Ontario election. Urquhart (1999) expressed this view in the *Star*:

The Safe Streets Act [has] two political benefits from the government's point of view: It creates the illusion of action, and it puts the opposition parties on the spot. ... In their election post-mortems, both opposition parties lamented that they had been labelled as 'soft on crime,' while the Tories had successfully cultivated an image as crime fighters. (p. A3)

Just as the Premier accused the opposition of being soft on crime, the opposition attacked him for "profiting politically by appealing to the ugly side of human nature." Liberal leader Dalton McGuinty suggested, "He'd stand up here and say, 'you know the problem with Ontario today? It's those people.' And you just pick your favourite scapegoat" (Stevenson, 1999, p. A5). This theme, in turn, was continued in many letters to the editor that protested the Conservative strategy. Mike Pearson (1999) denounced the provincial government and suggested, "The Canadian equivalent of ethnic cleansing is poor-bashing. In this sport of the rich and politically well-connected, the poor are made the scapegoats of all the ills of society" (p. A19).

It can be argued, too, that one's youthful status lends itself to scapegoat status since youth's voices "are simply restricted from speaking in those spheres where public conversation shapes social policy" (Giroux, 1998, p. 24).³¹ As one individual indicated, "any way you look at it, it's a political win for the Conservatives. The squeegee kids themselves have no way of fighting back, and they sure ain't the Tory electorate" (G. White, 1999, p. E4). This targeting of squeegee kids is consistent with the understanding

³¹ This attitude was borne out in the Canadian context in a 1993 Liberal Party report: "Youth exercise little creativity or judgment in their work, have no technical expertise or authority, express themselves awkwardly, especially in public or bureaucratic settings, and do not command respect" (cited in Elton and Brearton, 1997, p. 5).

of scapegoating as something undertaken in order to turn public attention away from one set of problems and instead focus it on something else. Deadman (1999) points this out:

Squeegee kids are a relatively powerless group that are easy targets for the vocal diversion of our interests away from the more serious problems at hand. A scapegoat, if you will. It's easier to get up and promise to crackdown on the scourge of squeegee kids than it is to devise a plan to restore health care while still supplying us with our tax cut and a balanced budget to boot. ... Our reaction to squeegee kids tells us a lot about ourselves. It tells us how we react to people who are different. It tells us how we react to *guilt*. (p. A19, emphasis added)

The preponderance of statements by squeegee defenders in this section demonstrates that scapegoating is a powerful political tool (just as it provides a ready critique of politicians). But it is much more than that. René Girard (1977) insists that “the various scapegoat phenomena are not the reflection of some ill-articulated guilt complex, but rather the very basis of cultural unification” (p. 302). This is consistent with Burke’s idea that guilt, broadly construed, is really the secular equivalent of original sin – something that is inescapable in the human condition and which each individual tries to obviate. Obviously then, attempts to cast blame on others in order to purge one’s own feelings of culpability or anxiety do not *only* occur in election campaigns where politicians seek out specific targets to grant substance to their rhetoric. They are a fundamental part of human nature.

DEFLECTIONS OF SCAPEGOATING

While squeegee kids may have been picked largely at random (compared to other potential targets that also could have engendered indignation), their nomination as a threat stuck because they were seen as obdurate or even dangerous individuals too difficult to accommodate. Jock Young’s (1999, p. 59) description of several responses to different types of people may help to explain this: People who are diverse and *different*

are often celebrated and even recast in commodity form. People who are *difficult* provide a greater challenge but attempts to absorb and assimilate, rehabilitate and reform them still occur. Quite distinct, however, are those who are seen as *dangerous* and against whom defenses are erected. Squeegee kids are interesting because they fall into each of these categories. They were represented in advertisements for cars and featured in popular music videos. But, just as they were included in such scenes to lend a sense of urban verisimilitude, they were also continually accused of making downtown life and travel more problematic. Hence, even though such characterizations were contested, there remained ample reason for seeing squeegee kids as the guilty party. Edelman (1988) explains further:

The targets of displaced resentments or guilt are often “catch-all” enemies: people who become magnets for the suspicions and anger of many different groups and therefore serve to condense and transform a range of discontents. ... The key factor that appears to make people magnet targets is some characteristic that the majority in a community has mutually defined as a symbol of suspect status: i.e. skin color, religious belief, ideology, anything that’s typically viewed as indicative of less than fully developed or evolved. (p. 80)

Of course age is a prime marker of just such an under-developed status. More than squeegee “people” and certainly more than squeegee “workers”, it was the label squeegee “kids” that was popularized in Canada (as opposed to squeegee “men” in the United States). For those who were exposed to stories about them, this use of language performed a symbolic action that automatically identified them as less-than-fully developed or not yet mature. As such, their very naming provided a tacit defense for campaigns that sought to crack down or reform them. Instead of victimization, if squeegee kids were seen as inferior, primitive, childlike, uncivilized, irrational, or simple, it could be suggested that they benefited from measures that were in their best interests.

This is what Stanley Cohen terms “condescension” (see J. Young, 1999, p. 112). It occurs when a group or individual is regarded not so much as evil but as something to be patronized.

SCAPEGOATING AND THE OSSIFICATION OF ATTITUDES

As the displacement of guilt onto the victim occurs, so too are those who are typified as guilty reborn as even larger threats. This is because, quite apart from mortification, redemption achieved through victimage implies that the scapegoat is unable (or unwilling) to adapt to the situation. “For the victims there remains only the possibility of an aggressive response as a means of improving their situation. These aggressive responses ... reinforce the ideal image of negativity and increase the anxiety of the rest of the population” (Yamaguchi, 1985, p. 182).

This response was demonstrated in the media discourse over squeegee kids. Many stories mentioned squeegee violence and intimidation tactics. One relatively innocuous example described a squeegee kid who retaliated against a ticket “by swearing at the officer, then partially cleaning his windshield. ‘I cleaned it up halfway and left it half dirty’ he said” (Edwards, 1998, p. B2). Even a description of this sort of action is enough for some to justify tougher measures against squeegee kids. And when it was made clear that the legislation was coming, many articles cited kids’ ready acknowledgement that they would turn to crime once this source of income was taken away from them. Thus, the scapegoat can go from being nominated as a deviant to being accepted as invariably one. Their strangeness and marginal status become established and provide a rationale for less accommodating attitudes and further measures against them.

Those who condemned squeegee kids and those who defended them both worked from the assumption that squeegee kids were outsiders. This made them a political friend to some, and a political enemy to others. This outsider status is based on accusations of criminality, on body and behavioral norms that seem to violate mainstream doctrines, and on the idea that they are, for the most part, young people constantly threatening to 'cross the line.' Squeegee kids threatened to literally come 'inside' – to breach the boundaries of one's car and personal sense of distance. Touching one's vehicle is, for many, tantamount to touching their bodies. Drivers frequently expressed what might best be described as a sense of dread at this prospect.

The more that this division between the orderly and the disruptive was enunciated (and the more that others defended squeegee kids' right to be conspicuously different), the more justification there was for their identification as scapegoats. In this capacity, once the outsider becomes recognized, and understood as being on the outside, the characteristics that placed him or her there become better known. And once this occurs, the very things that set the outsider apart become the distinguishing features for further stigmatization – a kind of "outsider amplification" so to speak. Subsequently, once society is comfortable with a group as "outside", given the right opportunity, the right combination of circumstances, the stigmatized group can be identified as an enemy of order, not just outside of order.

It is important to note that this process does not necessarily occur all of the time. The circumstances have to be right and political actors have to shape them to their advantage. There are, in fact, occasions where it serves every party's interest to turn outsiders into insiders. "The natural tendency of symbolic enterprise is towards

integration” (Burke 1959, p. 184). Many argue that the natural tendency of groups and people in society is towards integration too. They emphasize the process whereby groups come to identify with each other, how people become substantially the same (having the same interests) and how one can move from being an outsider to an insider (Spoel, 2002). On the other hand, my analysis of the social issue of squeegee kids will show how ‘insiders’ were made into ‘outsiders.’

SQUEEGEE KIDS AS ENEMY

While the selection of one group as a surrogate victim for violence may be random, the justifications for this identification tend to be quite purposeful. I have already explained that part of the reason squeegee kids became a politically expedient bearer of social anxieties was because they were seen as young people. However, youthful status alone cannot account for why squeegeeing was targeted for reform. After all, the style or actions of squeegee kids were no more remarkably threatening than that of any other manifestation of contemporary youth culture that similarly expresses its difference from mainstream culture and that could have been randomly targeted with victimization. Consider, for instance, the parallels between squeegee kids and skateboarders. Both are sources of public annoyance and irritation as they ply their trade or blaze their way through high-density public spaces. Both groups ignore traffic rules and local ordinances and are easy targets for accusations of slacker hedonism.³²

Interestingly, though, of the two similarly disruptive (youth-oriented) practices, it

³² The parallels with the vilification of squeegee kids are easily made. As one skater stated: “We’re considered a threat. It’s the same young person versus older problem. And if you’re a teen with a skateboard, then you’re even worse,” ... “People think you’re a crazy, punk-assed kid” (Foster, 2002, p. D03). One could just as easily substitute “teen with a squeegee” and imagine a similar response.

was squeegeeing (and aggressive panhandling under the rubric of “Safe Streets” legislation) that the Ontario Conservatives listed as one of their top three priorities (along with tax cuts and a balanced budget) after being re-elected in 1999. This followed the significant elevation of the squeegee kid issue as an object of public discourse, a rise in public attention not experienced by other youthful, arguably comparable, sites of public anxiety such as skateboarding, graffiti, rave parties, and so forth. The point is that the mimetic violence against squeegee kids may seem, to some, as irrational. “It has its reasons, however, and can marshal some rather convincing ones when the need arises” (R. Girard, 1977, p. 2). Unlike these other youthful acts, seen by some as transgressions, squeegeeing encouraged widespread claims of victimization by *both* parties involved (squeegee kids and drivers). Aho (1994) suggests one possible end of such claims-making:

I sense that my violation of you is vindicated when I grasp profoundly my own victimization: when I not only see you as my enemy but viscerally feel it. ... My violation of you grows from my yearning to rectify the wrong I sense that you have done me. Violence emerges from my quest for good and my experience of you as the opponent of good. (p. 11)

The general sense of omnipresent victimization in squeegee-related claims is noteworthy. As Loseke (1993, pp. 208-209) suggests, victims and victimizers are labels for *types* of persons. Drivers who complained about squeegee kids frequently characterized their own victim-status as the result of an exploitative encounter wherein they suffered somehow at the hands of the window washers. In the incident that would set the stage for many a report of subsequent squeegee-conflicts, it was not the driver but the vehicle that was the victim: Mike Colle’s “windshield wipers, which were switched on intermittently, had snapped off, victims of the merciless swish of the squeegee”

(Schaffeler, 1996, p. 7). "Victims" here were anything but absolute. Downtown residents expressed their victimization through a fear of depreciated property values and a general angst about increased danger due to the presence of squeegee kids while the harm done to drivers rarely exceeded inconvenience. Still, drivers claimed victim-status. This was especially the case when squeegee kids were portrayed as terrorizing women.

As Rueckert (1982a) explained, "certain kinds of women are universally used as symbols of the redemption archetype. Usually they are naively innocent and often they become sacrificial agents or innocent victims; they are naturally good, have always been and will always remain this way" (p. 107). Rueckert suggested that Shakespeare's Cordelia was one such figure. I propose that women whose cars were their only protection against the mean streets also symbolized this redemption archetype. "When considering such a notion as the 'redemption of guilt,' one might note what Bentham would call the 'archetypal image' here: the satisfying of a debtor by the paying of a ransom" (Burke, 1954, p. 292). Similarly, I suggest that the invocation of the female driver became an archetypal image of victimhood, standing in for all those who felt threatened or vulnerable. As the attorney-general's office spokesperson said, "It's a priority of the government and the ministry to allow Ontarians, particularly women, to feel safe and not to be harassed on city streets" (cited in Boyle, 1998b, p. A4).

Claims-makers frequently suggested that squeegee kids specifically targeted women in vehicles in order to increase their chances of a fear-based donation. Here, a single female occupant of a vehicle represents the "ideal victim - usually a respectable person engaged in some innocent activity - who suffers a sudden, unexpected, unprovoked, violent attack by an assailant" (Best, 1999, p. 7). Meanwhile, the suggestion

that squeegee kids engaged in such consciously predatory behavior typified them as (melodrama's) villains: "not just bad, but threatening" (Best, 1999, p. 89).

There were recurring references by individuals (including Tory MPP Crime Commissioner Jim Brown and Toronto Police Services Board Chair Norm Gardner) who presumably were not intimidated by squeegee kids but who claimed that women (often their wives) were (see Boyle 1998a; "Panel discussion," 1998; Morrell, 1998, p. A15; "Do something," 1998, p. 14). Female drivers came to stand in for all drivers who were fearful. The *Toronto Sun* wrote, "The implicit intimidation is still there. This is particularly true for, say, a woman alone in her car when she is approached by a burly male with a stick in hand, who may or may not accept her refusal politely" ("Squeegee wipeout," 1997, p. 10). It also argued, "motorists, particularly women, feel intimidated by the often-dirty and flamboyantly-dressed cleaners" ("Wipeout," 1997, p. 19). The *Toronto Star* asked readers to imagine being intimidated: "Say you're a woman in a car, and you have someone with 52 nails stuck in their face coming at you waving a stick" (Rankin, 1998, p. A6).

For the most part, readers had to imagine what it would be like for (other) women who felt terrorized by squeegee kids. Apart from a female councillor who said, "I have real difficulty as a woman when these people approach the car and won't take no for an answer" (cited in Honywill, 1998, p. 4), I found only one instance (until late 1999) of a woman who expressed her own fears. Roslyn Avery (1998) was a rarity among the much more frequent male expressions of female fears by proxy: "What has our city become? Do I have to worry every time I stop at an intersection that I am going to be accosted by these people? ... My car is private property and my privacy and peace of mind are being

threatened” (p. F5). Statements such as these suggested a dual threat; not only were female motorists identified as endangered, so too was the entire image of Toronto the clean and Toronto the good. Another city councillor explicitly identified both female motorists and the overall city as potential victims: “This is hurting the image of this city and I don't like women feeling uncomfortable” (cited in Levy, 1998c, p. 16). Women who felt fear (or men who felt anxious about female drivers) recurrently symbolized the guilt that some felt about their encounters with squeegee kids. They also personalized and embodied a wider sentiment of shame, disgust, or embarrassment (all of which Burke included under the rubric of guilt) when it came to squeegee kids. These expressions laid the foundation for the purification of the polluting influence of squeegee kids long before the provincial government formalized the hortatory negative “Thou shalt not squeegee” into law.

When drivers claimed victim-status, the relatively straightforward relationship between victims and their victimizers was made decidedly atypical. Apart from the “David vs. Goliath” picture of kids who are “armed” with a squeegee and an attitude asking for money from people who are relatively secure in their vehicles, one must also consider the claim that “abuse is a two-way street” (Stevenson, 1996b, p. 18) also meted out against squeegee kids by drivers. When it comes to squeegeeing, then, victimization is morally ambiguous and in the eye of the beholder. This is evident in cases where squeegeers were portrayed as victims. They were cast as victims of legislative and/or police crackdowns, “the next victims of the new right” (Sapiano, cited in Moloney, 1997a, p. A1) and “victims of governments slashing the social safety net” (“Crime-busting,” 1998, K2).

The activist organization OCAP argued a similar position when it warned against “blaming the victim” – the idea that the “underclass, too often seen as villains in middle-class eyes, were the products – or victims – of racial and class oppression” (Best, 1999, p. 99). An exchange between journalist Dan Matheson and activist Sue Collis of OCAP (see “Ontario law,” 2001) served as an example of what Holstein and Miller (1990) describe as “victim contests” – both parties in the squeegee drama claimed to be victims at the hand of the other. As drivers presented their package of claims to the media, squeegee kids presented their competing claims. When they spoke for themselves in the media, squeegee kids often claimed that they were victims of abuse and that they had sought out a life on the streets to avoid an even harsher existence at home. Christina Blizzard at the *Toronto Sun* refuted these claims (1998, p. 16; 1999b, p. 15). Similarly, McCallum (1998) wrote to the *Toronto Star* and complained that downtown residents were the ones who deserved public sympathy since they had to put up with squeegee kids’ obscene and lawless behavior (p. A17). The paper printed her letter under the heading “Squeegee kids aren't always the victims.” According to claims-makers such as McCallum, everyone forced to endure the co-presence of squeegee kids – in essence, the entire downtown scene – took on victim status.

Interestingly, government rhetoric reinforced this notion that anyone could be a victim and all squeegee kids could be victimizers. Upon publicly presenting the plan to make squeegeeing and aggressive panhandling illegal, Premier Harris declared, “We're going to call them what they are -- they're crimes. These ordinary people are victims of crime, but there's no statistics to count them” (cited in Artuso, 1999, p. 5). Conservative Party strategists defended this plan against accusations that it would not stand up to a

legal challenge but admitted they did not consult lawyers before including plans to deal with aggressive panhandling and squeegee kids in their *Blueprint* election platform:

"We're listening to people who have been victimized by crime, who are afraid. Frankly, between listening to victims and listening to lawyers, we're listening to victims" (Rhodes, cited in Lindgren, 1999, p. E11). Finally, the Premier defended this course of action when he cited the need for greater public safety in the wake of the "easy-going, forgiving and weak approach" of the Federal Young Offenders Act. He declared, "I stand on the side of victims, not criminals" (cited in D. Girard, 1999, p. A9).³³

Essentially, squeegee kids came to represent civic pollution, disorderly people who revealed the imperfection of social order and the possibility that even if crime is not out of control, anyone can be a victim. They became "putative people" just as the problem of squeegeeing was a "putative condition" (see Loseke 1993, p. 207). They were identified as an enemy – not just of the government whose rhetoric labeled them as villainous squeegee-polluters (so that the government could take on the role of hero-redeemer) – but also of the social order in general. Given this, the vicarious atonement that Burke spoke of is also at work here. By nominating squeegee kids as scapegoats, the guilt that some might have felt regarding their own role in the emergence of the problem (or even guilt about their own lack of any other form of action) was turned outward and focused on the kids instead. As Scott and Smith (1969) asserted, "the blighted self must be killed in striking the enemy" (p. 4). Deadman (1999) addressed this (regarding

³³ When the law banning squeegeeing (and aggressive panhandling) was instituted, not only did poverty activists claim they were being unfairly victimized, so too did charities. In an unanticipated side-effect of the legislation, charities claimed their revenues were being adversely affected because they were unable to solicit from cars and felt their activities shouldn't be constrained because of negative public opinion directed at squeegee kids (see Brennan, 2000a, p. 14).

squeegee kids in particular): “We have elected [the Ontario government] to do the distasteful things that we don't want to own up to personally. ... It acts as our convenient thug, doing the things we want done, and taking the rap for it, while we sit back absolved of our guilt” (p. A19).

Enemies threaten the perfection of an orderly system. They are “identifiable persons or stereotypes of persons to whom evil traits, intentions, or actions can be attributed” (Edelman, 1988, p. 87). Of course, no system is actually perfect, just as no victim is the perfect receptacle for the displacement of collective guilt. Still, squeegee kids became an object of concern for every level of government and many insisted that they constituted a problem that demanded a solution. Gardner (1999) used literary license to characterize this scene:

To the Gulliver observing our media, the fight over the nation's windshields might easily be mistaken for our civilization's last stand against the Nazi hordes. Whole squadrons of newspaper columnists have taken to their keyboards with the passion of Spitfire pilots scrambling to meet the Hun, while Mel Lastman, our very own Churchill with hair plugs, exhorts us not to surrender a loonie to the green-haired enemy. Never in the field of human conflict was so much said by so many about so little. (p. A11)

This account is a caricature of what transpired but like any such comical portrait, its most exaggerated features were based in reality. Squeegee kids aroused passions and inflamed combative tendencies. Yet the demonizing was not absolute even though many were eager to jump on the squeegee-vilification bandwagon. One Toronto City Councillor emphasized this point: “If this is the most serious problem in our society, boy are we lucky” (cited in DeMara, 1998, p. B3).

THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF NEGATIVE REPRESENTATIONS

By the height of squeegee tensions, it seemed as though most claims-makers debated the extent to which squeegee kids were a problem, not whether they were one. Many of the squeegee-characterizations fit into Klapp's (1978) classification of villain-types. He offers up four different groups of villains that can satisfy the scapegoating process.

Klapp's first category of villainy is made up of *order-destroyers*. This is subdivided into outlaw/public enemy, and another type of order-destroyer, the troublemaker – the rowdy, the agitator. "People feel that if he were not around things would be all right" (Klapp, 1978, pp. 92-3). Squeegee kids were certainly cast as this type. They were typified as outlaws by the most vituperative of critics and recognized as troublemakers by others. Another class of villains consists of "*strange outsiders* from beyond the pale whose foreignness ... introduces entropy into things as they should be" (1978, p. 93). This intruder type could easily apply to squeegee kids, since they were frequently accused of being "people who neither know nor care about the social rules" (ibid.).

The last category of Klapp's "rogues' gallery" that can apply to squeegee kids is the *undercover operator*. This included the "sneak attacker" and the "parasite, who saps society ... by claiming something he is not entitled to" (ibid.). The former characterization was explicit in claims of extortion and intimidation against squeegee kids who washed windshields with or without driver approval. The latter characterization was seen in Bowers's (1998) accusation that "they batten on us ... in a totally parasitic and thoughtless fashion" (p. A15). It was also implicit in every claim that squeegee kids were freeloaders and not welcome service-providers. Millman's (1997) letter to the editor

is one such example: "What bothers me most of all is, when I get stopped at a red light on my way to work, I'm asked to give a portion of my hard-earned money to people who are too lazy to get an education or won't attempt to obtain a real job" (p. D5).³⁴

These typifications of villainy meted out in the media took on a cumulative weight that created a public image of squeegee kids as enemies of the social order. Of course, "a large part of the population does not see them as enemies at all. The very fact that their categorization is controversial seems to intensify the fears of those who do perceive them as threats, for their own rationality is at stake" (Edelman, 1977, p. 34). Consequently, it is the possibility of disorder and the dread it induces that constitutes the enemy proper - for both those who vilify squeegee kids and those who defend them. "The enemy is not merely any competitor or just any partner of a conflict in general. He is also not the private adversary whom one hates. An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy" (Schmitt, 1996, p. 28).

LINKING THE ENEMY TO DIRT, DEATH, AND DISORDER

The villainous type of character is marked by motives "discontinuous with normal ones, and hence unpredictable and incomprehensible. He seems to come from nowhere to intrude his dirty work into an otherwise tolerable state of affairs" (Klapp, 1978, p. 92). This description is aligned with many accounts of squeegee kids in the press. It also has a parallel in Burke's rhetoric of rebirth. The cycling through from polluted to purified to

³⁴ Klapp did describe one other category: *oppressors* were described as those who "abuse superior position and power" (Klapp, 1978, p. 93). My citation of a number of squeegee-defenders' claims is evidence that some individuals labeled the Ontario government as oppressors. This category does not apply to squeegee kids. However, insofar as some claimed the government's treatment of squeegee kids was "cruel, unfair, and relentless" (ibid.), this construction of villainy also entered into the talk about squeegeeing.

redeemed requires certain archetypal motives that allow guilt to be transferred from one individual to another. One way that squeegee kids were contaminated so that the others (and by extension, the public order) could be purified was through the application of the “fecal motive” to them. Remember, “analyzed as symbolic action, the fecal or pollution archetype is indicated by all the negatively charged persons, places, things, and ideas ... that the author wishes to reject” (Rueckert 1982a, p. 101).

Squeegee kids’ negatively charged identity was cultivated via references to filth (and surrogates such as sin, guilt, crime, shame). Aho (1998) suggests such identification occurs because, “typically, enemies are visualized and mythologized either as death’s instrument (that is, as a plague or an infection), as inhabiting death’s archetypal residence (dirt, filth, or garbage), as death’s carrier (in the form of vermin, pests, or bacilli), or as all three” (p. 71). Dirt or filth should be seen as an almost automatic association with squeegee kids by now, often used as a marker of their strangeness. Though more rare, there were also those news accounts that associated vermin with squeegee kids. For instance, an early story in *Toronto Life* magazine described the co-existence of rats and squeegee kids in dirty living conditions where the names of the rats and the kids were interchangeable and so too were their existences. “Spot” was “a body rat” that usually lived inside “Acid Boy’s” T-shirt (Smith, 1996, pp. 82-85).

In another case, the *Star* printed Connor’s (1997) claim that this association with death’s carriers was implicit in others’ descriptions of squeegee kids. He reacted against accounts that tended to suggest, “a squeegee kid was not a human youth in an appalling situation, but rather some species of vermin, like a rat or housefly” (p. A23). Of course, this notion of death being connected to unwanted, unclean individuals should not be

understood literally. Instead, the presence of these individuals and the possibility that their lifestyle might spread can augur the death or dismantling of an orderly system. Hence, some advocate the need to purify the system of unpredictable, potentially dangerous, rebellious types who might soil others with their base, dark, smelly, and foul ways.

SQUEEGEE KIDS AS POLITICAL ENEMY

The guilt-purgation cycle is in the background of all political claims that pledge to redeem the public by the hand of a government. Only two conditions need be met: (a) an enemy to the public must first be identified, and (b) measures must be promised and instituted that will expunge that polluting influence. Burke (1976) explains this process:

In the polemics of politics, the use of the scapegoat to establish identification in terms of an enemy shared in common is also said to have the notable rhetorical advantage that the candidate who presents himself as a spokesman for "us" can prod his audience to consider local ills primarily in terms of alien figures viewed as the outstanding causes of those ills. (p. 350)

Widely recognized as deviants, squeegee kids and their supporters were seen as "them" – alien, figures who threatened "us" – and who were responsible for the "ill" of diminished safety (or at least the impression of decreased safety) in "our" city streets. As such, they became an example of a "political enemy." This figure is typified by language and symbolism of the enemy and used to further a particular cause or engender support for a political issue. This is not a different figure from the enemy per se, but a particular variant that becomes evident in polarized and political discourse.

Opponents in politics are not necessarily enemies, for some opponents are respected and accepted as legitimate. ... So long as the focus is on finding and pursuing winning tactics, the opponent is an adversary. ... Where an opponent is an enemy rather than an adversary, it is not the process but the character of the opponent that focuses attention. Enemies are characterized

by an inherent trait or set of traits that marks them as evil, immoral, warped, or pathological and therefore a continued threat regardless of what course of action they pursue. (Edelman, 1988, p. 67)

Thus, the Ontario Liberal Party should be seen as an adversary but not an enemy of the Ontario Progressive Conservative Government. Though often in disagreement, they both employ largely the same tactics. Squeegee kids, on the other hand, took quite a different tack and were condemned for their tactics as well as their character.

Using the terminology of purification, Aho (1998) suggests, "If the enemy is filth, then I am clean" (pp. 73-74). Seen in this light, political enemies such as squeegee kids help constitute the drama of politics. They play an important role as they arouse passions and fears, and not only among people of like-mind. If the enemy ultimately is a figure to be despised, one person's enemy is another's ally. What some vilify, others defend as a victim. So, "[the opposition leader] McGuinty attacked [the provincial premier] Harris for polarizing the province by creating enemies with such groups as teachers and union members" (Stevenson, 1999, p. A5). This was a case of a political competitor pointing out how political enemies were being unfairly targeted as victims of what Burke might call displaced guilt. While enemies are feared for their disruptive power, there can be spin-off benefits when they become a political enemy.

The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business transactions. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible. (Schmitt, 1996, p. 27)

There is one crucial difference between Edelman's and Schmitt's use of the term "political enemy." For the former, it frequently refers to a group of individuals whose already-suspect status makes them a better target than another group "whose actions hurt

others without bringing them an “enemy” label [because they] are likely to be high status, upper class, or relatively powerful” (Edelman, 1988, p. 87). Edelman’s political enemy is not expected to contest its vilification effectively. Contrarily, Schmitt’s political enemy is a group that can fight back and engage in a countervailing campaign. Squeegee kids were more consistent with Edelman’s understanding. They were a disorganized constituency that had no-one to officially represent their cause and some, such as OCAP, who appointed themselves to the job but were castigated as “professional protesters.”

Even still, there was no shortage of voices that defended squeegee kids in the media. This ensured that the government’s rhetoric was not the only representation available to the public. In essence, squeegee kids were able to combat their negative representations vicariously through the numerous public declarations of support raised on their behalf. So, while squeegee kids were not the most obvious political enemy for the Progressive Conservatives in their 1999 election campaigning, they were enlisted nonetheless. Jeffrey (1999) elaborates:

Teachers’ unions were specifically targeted for causing problems with the implementation of the government’s cutbacks. These, in addition to economic worries were added to that other concern of law and order embodied by panhandlers and squeegee kids – folk who were either lazy, shiftless, or undeserving and who were creating an “unfair” burden on others. (p. 278)

This last point is worthy of additional emphasis. While some saw squeegee kids as potentially threatening, it seems likely that most saw them as lazy and undeserving of any special treatment. Squeegee kids were typified as aesthetically ugly, or at least unusual and discomfiting, but never actually identified as morally evil. Though they were stereotyped, it was as punks, not as unambiguously evil figures. I never found any examples of anti-squeegee claims-making in which the kids were typified as evil. I did,

however, find a sprinkling of letters-to-the-editor that defended squeegee kids against such depictions. The *Sun*, for example, printed the letters of Niles (1998) who exclaimed, “Drivers, lighten up; these kids are not evil or the devil incarnate” (p. 15) and Therdink (1999) who also protested that he traveled “the streets of Toronto daily and encountered no evil two-headed monsters looking to damage my car” (p. 14). These letters identify and respond to a *perception* of squeegee kids as a grotesque intrusion into the city, one that could even be responsible for its fall from grace. To wit, the *Toronto Sun* followed Therdink’s letter with an editorial comment of its own: “Toronto was good before squeegee kids, it’ll be good after they’re gone.”

This commentary is important because it reinforces how squeegee kids can be understood as a tragic scapegoat figure even though they were not described as particularly evil. The tragic perspective on human motivation holds that people are vicious or evil, “describable by an enemy as vermin” (Burke, 1961, p. 276). The tragic scapegoat is prepared for sacrifice whereas the comic scapegoat is the victim who is mistaken, not villainous, and whose follies can be laughed at. Part of this has to do with how society adjudges the scapegoat and its actions. Another factor is how the group being scapegoated reacts to its treatment. “The comic transgressor accepts his beating as just punishment and longs to be accepted again by those who punish him” (Duncan, 1962, p. 398). Scapegoats are allowed, even encouraged, to talk back within a comic frame. The tragic villain, on the other hand, fights back even though no such encouragement is granted. In tragedy there is no room for dialogue, only purgation.

For the most part, squeegee kids did not accept demonizing rhetoric directed at them and often fought back with combative claims of their own. I also suggest more

claims-makers typified squeegee kids as troubling or even dangerous instead of foolish and laughable. The comic view of squeegee kids might typify them as “those who oppose our principles of order [and who] may be considered as misguided sinners who have fallen from grace (yet who, in their fall, do not deny our principles of order)” (Duncan, 1969b, p. 412). Some claims-makers certainly described them in this fashion. However, when the Attorney-General insisted legislation was needed to tackle the problem of squeegee kids, he claimed, “People have the right to walk on the sidewalk and drive on the street without being hassled, without being intimidated” (Flaherty, cited in Brennan, 1999). This claim typified squeegee kids in a tragic frame – “as villains who must be overcome by the hero who personifies a principle of social order” (Duncan, 1969b, p. 412). Claims such as Flaherty’s (and editorializing such as the *Toronto Sun*’s, described above) do more than describe squeegee kids as “fallen”; they typify the city as having tragically fallen from grace at the hands of the squeegee kids.

THE USEFULNESS OF POLITICAL ENEMIES

When someone or something does act up and threaten others, it often “helps marshal support for a regime or a cause; in that case those who construct an enemy have every reason to perpetuate and exaggerate the threat he poses” (Edelman, 1988, p. 66). Thus, while enemies are always marked for destruction, political enemies – like scapegoats – are continually reintroduced because of the political benefits they bring with them. “From a functional point of view, they can be negentropic; they do something to earn their keep” (Klapp, 1978, p. 94).

Political enemies indicate the priorities in a given social setting by suggesting who or what is a target for moral vigilance. And, by defeating them, the government can

affirm its role as guardian of the public order. The scapegoat as political enemy underscores this principle of the agon: "By splitting the hierarchic principle into factions, it becomes ritually gratifying; for each faction can then use the other as *katharma*, the unclean vessel upon which can be loaded the dyslogistic burdens of vocabulary" (Burke, 1950, p. 141). Yet public order is not guaranteed by reinforcing squeegee kids' strange, peripheral, or youthful status through scapegoating rituals. Bauman (1999) explains:

Governments cannot honestly promise their citizens a secure existence and a certain future, but they may for the time being upload at least part of the accumulated anxiety (and even profit from it electorally) by demonstrating their energy and determination in the war against... intruders into once clean and quiet, orderly and familiar, native backyards. (pp. 194-195)

Also, political enemies can be easily turned into "wedge issues." Political enemies allow for the easy bifurcation of the political scene into those who agree with one's point of view and those who oppose it. For instance, McCarten (2000b) referred to this enemy status in order to succinctly "set the stage" for readers the day of the *Safe Streets Act's* implementation: "Allies of squeegee kids call them young entrepreneurs. The Ontario Conservative government sees them as a modern terror of urban living" (p. A5). Wedge issues clarify Schmitt's belief in the simple, constant criterion of politics – the distinction between friend and enemy. His description of the political sounded very dramatic: "It does not describe its own *substance*, but only the intensity of an association or dissociation of human beings whose *motives* can ... effect at different times different coalitions and separations" (Schmitt, 1996, p. 38). This central meaning of political life involves a tension between friends and enemies and the recognition that there are those who are with you, and those who are against you and with whom you struggle. Wedge issues, like scapegoats, depend upon this dialectic of union and separation.

It is important to note that scapegoats are not targeted because of some sense and fear of their inherent difference. Rather, it is because of the need for competition (R. Girard, 2001). Both Klapp (1978, p. 94) and Edelman (1988, p. 40) make similar points. Friends and enemies, leaders and things designated as problems to be solved, antagonists and protagonists, villains and heroes alike: each reinforces the role of the other. Each engages the other in a mutually defined performance where the actions of each oppose but complement the other.

Interestingly, there were very few explicit references in the media that identified squeegee kids as enemies, unlike their easy designation as scapegoats or strange outsiders. This seems to reinforce Edelman's (1988) statement that "beliefs in political enemies seem to influence public opinion most powerfully when the enemy is not named explicitly, but evoked through an indirect reference. Perhaps the most common form of subtle evocation is the advocacy of a course of action that implies that a particular group is dangerous" (p. 73). This implicit association of danger, dirt, disorder and incipient threat was certainly levied at squeegee kids but the government never said, "We're going to attack squeegee kids! They're the enemy!" Instead, there was a constant inference of insiders and outsiders. This demonstrates how "the major power of 'identification' derives from situations in which it goes unnoticed" (Burke, 1972, p. 28).

CONCLUSION

This chapter has revealed how, through indirect reference and sometimes not so subtle evocation, the squeegee kid was identified in media discourse as an enemy. While squeegee kids were not expressly labeled as enemies, they were described as disturbers of the peace and thereby branded as outlaws, as outsiders. They were easily identified as

disrupting the orderly, familiar routine of making one's way through the city. Once this small threat was established, they were implicated in larger issues such as the propriety of public conduct. Then, they became a lightning rod used to ground debates over social values. Through the sedimentation of negatively charged associations and an ever-present context of victimization, squeegee kids were identified as scapegoats. Having ascertained that squeegee kids were cast in this manner, we must now turn to an analysis of how this enmity took shape over time and how it was contested in order to show how the overall issue of squeegeeing was dramatically created.

CHAPTER 7: MEDIA ANALYSIS I – 1995-1997

This chapter charts the emergence and early development of the squeegee kid issue over a three-year period between 1995 and 1997. It describes how squeegee kids were initially introduced to the public and how their public identity gradually shifted from curiosity, to benign nuisance, to public threat. I will show how the condition of squeegeeing emerged by analyzing trends in claims-making in the media and also noting the emergence of prominent claims-makers who began to clamor for something to be done about the condition.

1995 – AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHENOMENON

The story of squeegee kids and their emergence as a social issue begins in 1995. By the end of the year, however, the issue would still only be in a ‘cocoon’ stage, yet to blossom fully into the public arena. In 1995, only two articles in the Canadian Newsdisc files explicitly mentioned “squeegee kids.” One was a syndicated story that reported on new slang that reflected social change. It reported, in fact, that “‘squeegee kids,’ those urban urchins of the ‘80s wanting to wash your windshield at intersections, have evolved into ‘squeegee men’ for the ‘90s” (Bacchus, 1995, p. B3). This stands, in retrospect, as a very interesting introduction to squeegeeing in Canada. The story was a report on the scene in New York City from a lexicographer who worked for *The Atlantic*. In New York there was an all-around “hardening” by 1995 – both of the people doing the windshield cleaning and of attitudes toward them. It was widely understood that those who squeegeed were mostly older males and recidivist criminals.³⁵ In Canada, on the other

³⁵ George Kelling (the community policing specialist associated with the “broken windows” theory of deviance) wrote a 1993 report for New York City that found 75 per

hand, squeegeeing was just starting to materialize as a street practice. News coverage of these events in Canada would distinguish “squeegee kids” from American squeegee men.

The second story that made its way to a national audience in 1995 did just that. It was a national CTV news report that reinforced the idea of Canadian street youth. Lloyd Robertson set up the report with the following comment: “Tough economic times have some Canadian young people taking their skills to the streets quite literally. This entrepreneurial spirit can be seen amid the belching car exhausts and constant racket of big city traffic in Vancouver” (“Trying to wipe,” 1995). Reporter Mark Schneider framed the issue of squeegeeing in terms of streets that “are looking more like the third world.” A sense of pathos underscores this report: squeegeeing is described as “in your face” but excused because “that's how they squeeze money out of a cash starved economy.” The kids are the ones getting dirty, working in the streets where the pollution comes from passing cars. Kids are represented in their own words as pursuing an alternative to welfare. They are also depicted as offended against just as much as offending (Schneider notes that they are sometimes “hit in the face for trying to earn a buck”). The article ends by describing the squeegeeing scene, “like a throw back to the '60s. It is a new reality that may not be what most of us think as working but it is in our New Society.”

Initially, descriptions referred to the practice of squeegeeing (and the scene of Toronto street life) in general but did not use the label “squeegee kids.” The earliest reference that sensitized readers to this new phenomenon occurred on July 29, 1995 in the *Toronto Sun*. It began with an image of infestation: “The kids pour off the curb, descending on the stopped car like a plague of locusts” (Barnard, 1995, p. 45), but

cent of the squeegee people there had addresses - and minor criminal histories (Rankin, 1996, p. G10).

contained fewer descriptions of confused and annoyed drivers than reports of the enterprising spirit of street kids. One kid said, "You have to respect the car and watch out for the paint, treat it like it was your own." Barnard's story included no mention of squalid living conditions or drug-induced slumbers on the sidewalk. Instead, the industriousness of kids is highlighted. They are described "like competitors in a squeegee Olympics." Even though the term "squeegee kid" is never used, the practice is identified as "barely a week old, it's *the latest trend among street kids*" and no-one aged more than seventeen is quoted. It is described as "a lucrative new twist on begging."

This first ever Toronto-specific mention occurred in the *Toronto Sun*'s lifestyle section. This presaged future debates between those who argued squeegeeing was an unfortunate life and those who claimed it constituted a lifestyle choice. Six days after this first mention in the *Sun*, another story appeared. It described an initially scary encounter between a woman and a squeegeer: "like being in New York" (N. White, 1995, p. 11). But the squeegeer is described as a "cute young guy with a big smile." Unlike later stories that highlighted female horror and fear, this female driver "was delighted at his enterprise." This article ends on a prescient note: "We're going to be seeing a lot more squeegeeing ... in the months to come" (ibid.). This description of an emerging or growing condition is the first attribution of directional substance to squeegee kids. This "strongly futuristic" way of speaking of squeegee kids whose "slogan might be: Not 'Who are you?' or 'Where are you from?' but 'Where are you going?'" (Burke, 1945, p. 31) would become familiar as the social issue developed.

This early account reinforces another type of substance. By referencing New York, a geometric substance is attributed to squeegee kids. Geometric substance places

an object in its setting as “existing both in itself and as part of its background” (Burke, 1945, p. 29). This emphasis on the spatial context of the American big city-gone-bad is quite common in the early stages of the Canadian issue. Later on, as Canadian squeegee kids could be identified as a problem in their own right, Toronto-specific geometries would materialize.

However, this early account of squeegee kids appears atypical compared to the volume of squeegee stories yet to come because it did not describe the appearance of the kids. Descriptions of squeegee kids’ appearance as members of a punk-based subculture would establish a familial substance for them that immediately distinguished them from the mainstream. Most kids had this aesthetic in common, and insofar as “the concept of family is usually ‘spiritualized’ so that it includes merely social groups” (ibid.), squeegee kids subsequently became identified as part of the ‘punk family.’

Just a day later, another opinion piece in the same paper also alluded to New York. This time, though, there was no contradictory message when it came to the referent; there is no mention of pleasant, smiling service-providers here. The writer notes, “Canadian cities have become much more unsafe than they were only a decade ago” and warns, “the experiences of once-great cities such as New York strongly suggest that a city that tolerates urban disorder is signing its own death warrant” (Frum, 1995a, p. 11). New York’s “squeegee men – derelicts who used to extort money from Manhattan motorists” (ibid.) – were used as a sign that the streets had become dangerous. Finally, Frum notes that “in Toronto, we are starting down the reckless route New York took in the 1970s. Panhandling goes unchecked. Squeegee men can be seen at work on Yonge Street” (ibid.). Frum encouraged readers to see squeegee kids in terms of a directional

trend – the growing threat of disorderly behavior. His perception of an increasing tolerance for disorder led to the assertion, “Canada's public authorities are making the same terrible mistake that American cities made 30 years ago” (Frum 1995b, p. 11).

Frum's writing typified squeegee kids through a directional substance that identified them as a growing threat. This description of the scene of Toronto as a more dangerous place because of squeegeeing will become a recurring pattern in squeegee discourse. The earlier CTV piece described the social issue in terms of a scene-agent ratio where the synecdochic relation is between person and place (Burke, 1945, p. 7) and a scene-act ratio where economic circumstances created this new practice – new types of people and new behavior. Schneider reported, “At the intersection of a tough economy and social alienation a medieval world is re-emerging. These are the modern day equivalent of chimney sweeps - the squeegee kids. ... Government grants are scarce, make work has given way to no work for many young Canadians” (“Trying to wipe,” 1995). Frum, on the other hand, describes an act-scene ratio. This different ratio constructs different motives, different orientations and attitudinal dispositions. Here the new act contains the seeds of the city's downfall. According to Frum (1995b), squeegeeing is at least partly to blame for a city's increase in disorder and crime: “The standards of civility have declined on the city's streets ... You can, if you want, accost motorists on Queen Street, squeegee their windows, and ominously demand money. ... The public, meanwhile, must learn to live with fear” (p. 11).

The only 1995 mention of squeegeeing in the *Toronto Star* similarly emphasized this “new reality” but did not find fault with squeegee kids or with authorities who tolerated them; it criticized politicians for causing the problem in the first place. Ontario

Premier Mike Harris was blamed for making Toronto “a dying city. ... We're beginning to get kids with squeegees looming up at traffic lights, trying to hustle a few cents by washing windows - just like you see in the most devastated inner cities of the United States” (Lewis-Stein, 1995, p. A23). Overall, media in 1995 feature scarce references to squeegee kids. Therefore, though squeegeeing existed, it had not yet captured the public's attention. The picture that existed at this point was of rare squeegee kids, beginning to appear in the big cities but through the lens of a human-interest story rather than through that of a full-fledged social problem. While some of these kids seemed confrontational, they also were portrayed as industrious. Amidst the dirtiness and the disruption of the big city, they were presented as less alienated than drivers, trying to do the best they could with limited resources.

So far, no critical mass of squeegee-prompted commentaries or letters to the editor appeared. With no repetitive form in the discourse so far (or, for that matter, much of a discourse), the substance of squeegee kids was unclear and the status of squeegee kids as a social issue had not yet even reached the inception period. Squeegee kids were identified as quizzical public figures but not as a clearly marked danger. However, dirty and threatening squeegee activity was spotted in New York and readers were warned that this trend was starting to appear in Toronto. Consequently, a number of claims associate the act of squeegeeing with the scene of a troubled city. The city is never portrayed as a healthy, vibrant place in any of these accounts. At this point, though, squeegee kids are not blamed for this condition. In the CTV report, the kids were dirty because they ply their trade in the streets among the danger and the belching exhaust of cars. White's (1995, p. 11) earlier description of a “cute young guy” with a squeegee in the *Sun* used

squeegee kids as an example of a wider condition of suffering and misfortune. The kid, however, is personable instead of subjecting (female) drivers to suffering of their own. Frum does not portray squeegeeing in such a favorable light but he seems to find equal fault with public authorities who seem to say that this behavior is acceptable. There is scant public awareness of squeegee kids at this point. However, these references have one thing in common. All of them refer to a “diseased” city (a city whose inhabitants are in a state of dis-ease). Toronto is variously compared to a third world country, seen as unsafe and uncivil, and called a dying city. While this may be troubling, it is difficult to construct a social issue out of this alone.

Loseke (1999) suggests why this is the case: To say that something is a social problem means: 1. It is something of concern. It indicates that something is wrong. 2. It affects a significant number of people. 3. The condition *can* be changed by humans. 4. It *should* be changed (pp. 5-6). To suggest that the urban scene of Toronto is a disorderly, unsafe environment is to also suggest that it needs betterment. While “cleaning up” Toronto might be a laudable goal, its objective condition (things are bad) also requires a subjective definition (an understanding of who or what is at fault) so that a solution might be agreed upon. At this point in the discourse, squeegee kids were not even identified as the source of disagreement. Loseke (1999) also notes that “social problems are about conditions *and* they are about people in those conditions” (p. 5). To claim that crime or disorder constitutes a social problem in need of a solution also requires the construction of certain types of people. There must be a victim. And for this there must also be a villain. So far, squeegee kids were not made “substantial” as either victims or villains in media accounts of the Canadian context. This would change suddenly in early 1996.

1996 – SQUEEGEE KIDS BECOME A SPECIFIC TARGET

As the year before, 1996 starts out with a dearth of articles featuring squeegee kids. The *Globe and Mail*'s first mention of squeegee kids was a brief one in February. It was a generic comment on the phenomenon popping up in cities such as Vancouver, Toronto and Montreal. In May 1996 there were two articles in the *Toronto Star* that referred to squeegee kids specifically as street kids and associated them with the voluntary homeless and with street youth – a motley label that joined together anarchists, drug-users, and the like. All of a sudden, however, the notion of squeegee kids as a social problem emerged in June of 1996. The first major claims-maker to make this claim is Liberal MPP Mike Colle. The *Toronto Sun* reported an encounter with some squeegee kids during which his car suffered minor damage (Schaffeler, 1996, p. 7). Following this incident, Colle undertook to “wipe out street-corner squeegee squads in Toronto” (ibid). Some reports of this incident never even referred to squeegee “kids.” Instead, they were termed “squeegee mercenaries” and punks (see Stancu, 1996, p. A2).

According to the social constructionist position, social issues cannot exist without agents who make claims. These issues can be both created and promoted by claims-makers. In this case, Colle, as an MPP, was an “accredited representative of a major social institution” (Hall et al., 1978, p. 58). According to the hierarchy of credibility, it made sense for the media to pay attention to his claims and frame squeegee kids as a political issue. This principle states, “those in powerful or high-status positions in society who offer opinions about controversial topics will have their definitions accepted, because such spokesmen are understood to have access to more accurate or more specialized information on particular topics than the majority of the population” (Hall et

al., 1978, p. 58).³⁶ Through his position, Colle, in principle, represented ‘the people’. More important, though, was the fact that he was a victim. The victim who can tell it the way “it really is,” and whose rhetoric often includes references to his or her personal experiences is perhaps the most obvious type of claims-maker. Colle’s claims were dramatic and newsworthy. But it is almost certain that there were other instances of threatening and maybe destructive behavior by squeegee kids that predated Colle’s claims. There was an objective condition of squeegeeing in the streets. Other people certainly felt aggrieved. However, when Colle vented his frustrations and called for change he had the status and the resources to cause others to pay attention.

Colle is espousing a view that will become the Tory government’s view. Hence, it is important to note that he was a *Liberal* because it illustrates the widespread potential of the discourse. Colle’s claims that squeegee kids were dangerous and injurious to the city’s well-being marked the instantiation of the pollution (or hell) archetype from which the city of Toronto would need to be redeemed. While Edelman (1998) argued that “problems come into discourse and therefore into existence as reinforcements of ideologies, not simply because they are important” (p. 12), the provincial government had not yet weighed in on this issue. It was not yet an issue ripe for ideological exploitation since squeegeeing had not materialized as a condition that generated either widespread or sustained debate. The city would generate much of this debate before the province entered the fray.

³⁶ Use of the term can be traced back to Howard Becker (1967, p. 241) who called attention to “hierarchies of credibility” when he argued that news workers accord greater legitimacy to those at the top of status hierarchies. This is similar to Hartley’s notion of “accessed voices ... the [over-represented] views and styles of a privileged body of politicians, civil servants, directors, managers, experts of various kinds” (see Fowler, 1991, p. 22).

Colle's claims marked the first time squeegee kids were specifically vilified. Before this point in the discourse they were of minor note, invoked as a potentially bothersome presence. As a result of Colle's claims-making, battle lines were quickly drawn. The first letter to the editor (in the *Star*) dedicated to the subject of squeegee kids defended them for their entrepreneurial initiative (Munro, 1996, p. A20). An early *Star* commentary quickly followed and painted a different picture:

The 'squeegee kids' who clean windshields of cars stopped at red lights are beggars too. Providing a service that almost no one wants hardly qualifies them as entrepreneurs. The majority it seems play on the fears of captive drivers, using veiled threats and intimidation to extract the charity they demand. Their brand of panhandling borders on extortion. ("Window on the times," 1996, p. A12)³⁷

Toronto City Council took up the issue shortly after Colle's initial claims-making. City Councillor Chris Korwin-Kuczynski called squeegee kids a serious liability for the city (both literally and metaphorically): "These guys are taking their lives in their hands when they run onto the street to do their thing for spare change" (cited in Wanagas, 1996a, p. 24).³⁸ This early account represented the *Toronto Sun*'s characteristic mode of

³⁷ Interestingly, this was the early stance of the *Toronto Star*, a paper that subsequently was identified as overtly sympathetic to squeegee kids. It is notable, also, that the *Globe and Mail*'s first editorial lauded squeegee kids' entrepreneurial initiative but later took issue with them. So, following Hall et al. (1978, p. 60), we can see how each paper has its own 'social personality' formed out its sense of the newsworthy (and a sense of its audience). These personalities have the capacity to change alongside the evolution of a social issue.

³⁸ This kind of rhetoric become typical of early calls for action that expressed a need to protect squeegee kids as they seem to have no regard for their own safety (or for that of drivers). Concern for the city's streets (and its image as a whole) runs parallel with an ostensible concern for the kids plying their trade. As the discourse develops, this latter concern was increasingly relegated to the margins. Korwin-Kuczynski's statement also reveals another important characteristic of squeegee kids: the vast majority of them were male (or at least typified as "guys"). While female squeegee kids would become the subject of some claims (usually in order to emphasize the tragic nature of living on the streets), most claims (and certainly those that cast squeegee kids as aggressors) identified squeegeeing as a male-based activity.

address. Squeegee kids were referred to as “windshield-wiping beggars,” called “a menace,” and told to “get off the road or face the city's wrath” (ibid.). It is also at this point that the unsafe nature of the city was directly linked to the presence of squeegee kids. While Frum’s 1995 warnings suggested trouble would take root if steps were not taken, city councillor Tom Jakobek now declared that the intimidating nature of squeegee kids “makes our streets that much more perceived as being unsafe” (cited in Moloney, 1996, p. A6). Councillors such as Jakobek and Korwin-Kuczynski, also had a privileged position in the ‘hierarchy of credibility.’ Unlike Frum who was paid to comment on the city, they were elected officials charged with the administration of the city.

This process whereby significant claims-makers seek credibility on an issue is known as gaining “ownership” of an issue. To own a social problem is to have “the ability to create and influence the public definition of a problem” (Gusfield, 1981, p. 10). It entails having the power to influence laws, enforcement abilities, and public opinion to the end of resolving a problem. In other words, certain members of Toronto Council sought to “own” the issue by directing public attention to squeegee kids’ capacity for public disorder. There was, at this point, however, too much of a symbolic fog surrounding squeegee kids. The pressing claim of youth unemployment battled with depictions of lawless youth. Claims that squeegee kids threatened law and order managed to sensitize the public to the existence of a “problem” but this position was not validated as the only one. Jenkins (1995) suggested that a specific topic, “like great drama, should evoke an emotional response such as outrage or pity” (pp. 211-212). But squeegee kids generated *both* outrage and pity.

At this point claims-makers generally agreed that a troublesome condition (squeegeeing) existed but they could not agree on the immorality of the condition. Toronto council voted to help out the kids rather than rein them in. It emphasized that youth unemployment was the underlying issue that demanded attention, using a scene-agent ratio to describe squeegee kids as prisoners of their situation. The *Toronto Star* reported how city council “voted 9-8 against asking Metro police to step up enforcement [against squeegee kids] and instead called on federal and provincial governments to ‘reinvest in youth employment programs.’ One councillor said ‘There is not work available for them.’ And suggested the real problem was youth unemployment, not squeegeeing” (“Safe to squeegee, 1996, p. A7). As a result, I suggest that at this point the problem of squeegee kids was framed as a consequence of lack of opportunity rather than a consequence of kids who just wanted to spurn the system and gain money for alcohol or drug habits.

New York City was, at this point, still a common referent. In the wake of city council’s decision to tolerate squeegee kids until further information could be gathered, the *Toronto Sun* quoted New York City police officer Vince Grevelli: “Don’t even think about it.” He described his city’s squeegee problem as an “incessant irritant” for residents and tourists alike. “Get rid of them now or you’ll be saddled with them forever” (Magnish, 1996, p. 29). The repeated references to New York City embody the claims-making strategy of “constructing difference within sameness” (see Loseke, 1999, pp. 81-82). For audiences to be successfully convinced that a problem is troublesome enough to violate morality, it should be novel enough to capture their attention but somehow

familiar enough that it is easy to understand. Hence, readers were told it was a problem elsewhere and encouraged to think of Toronto's situation in these terms.

Rankin's (1996) *Toronto Star* account described both difference and sameness. "Unlike the New York squeegees, Toronto's bunch are younger, white, the majority homeless, and, in typical Canadian fashion, more polite. ... Many come from abusive homes and dream of getting a steady job and off the streets" (p. G10). Yet Toronto squeegee kids were also described as a problem, maybe even worse than that which confronted the Big Apple: "Last summer, there were only a handful of them in Toronto. Now, there are nearly a hundred - more than New York city had at the peak of its squeegee 'problem' in the early 1990s" (ibid.). This account trumpeted the kids' dreams of redemption amidst the drug use, dirt and squalor of the present. Many articles placed squeegee kids (and street kids in general) in the context of abusive pasts that they wish to escape. This article featured the first explicit statement of a kid's own striving for salvation. This was a rarity, though. Elsewhere, a squeegeer said, "I'm at a dead end, I have no future. I want to get out of this one day. That's my only hope" (cited in Peritz, 1996, p. A4). A better future is sought here but no solution is proposed in order to obtain it. Another story portrayed an even more miserable scene in which squeegee kids act. It concluded, "they have no goals, no savings" (Mandel, 1996, p. 40). These early accounts laid the groundwork for the idea that redemption (for squeegee kids and for the city overall) was unlikely to come from the hands of the kids themselves.

As the end of the summer approached, there was a noticeable increase in the number of warnings that the problem of squeegee kids was only going to get worse. This is a noticeable change from previous warnings that the problem was coming. Both

claims, however, attribute a directional substance to squeegee kids. Korwin-Kuczynski spoke to this noticeable trend of increasing squeegee kids (and their increasingly problematic behavior): "Beware - It's going to mushroom and create more problems on the streets of this city" (cited in Wanagas, 1996b, p. 19). Similar cautions came from the police. "With warm weather, the city's downtown core has been taken over by hundreds of beggars and a skyrocketing number of squeegee kids. "By next summer it's going to explode," said Const. Doug Surphlis" (Warmington, 1996, p. 4).

By the end of 1996, squeegee kids are commonplace enough that descriptions of who they are or what they do are no longer necessary.³⁹ Toronto Councillor Mario Silva said, "they really are a sign of the times" (cited in Wanagas 1996b, p. 19). Another account suggested that "squeegeeing is the flavor of the day in many Canadian cities where residents are shocked to see a practice associated with bigger, brasher cities like Bombay and New York City" (Mercer, 1996, p. A7). Nonetheless, a few distinctions appeared in the typology of squeegee kids. Squeegee kids now took pains to divide their population into "ask first" and "demand payment" categories. The latter are identified as "jumpers" – assaulting cars before drivers have a chance to say no (often disregarding drivers' protests). It is frequently claimed that these few "bad apples" destroy it for everyone else. References to squeegee kids also increasingly differentiate between indigent, homeless street youth and suburban youths who try their hand at the downtown "squeegee trade" but go home to a full meal and a roof over their heads when the going gets tough. References to squeegee kids tended, at this point, to cluster around descriptions of inadequate social structures; families, the social welfare system, schools,

³⁹ At the same time, however, nearly every account *does* include a description of what squeegee kids look like (and many accounts describe what they smell like, too).

and the economy are all blamed for letting youth down. Thus, as 1996 ends, the city was “unhealthy” as its citizens suffered from a certain amount of dis-ease but squeegee kids (en masse) were not generally seen as the cause. Problems with squeegee kids were typically ascribed to irresponsible individuals who did not respect drivers. While some moral condemnation was directed at squeegee kids, they were not yet identified as an object that merited scapegoat-status.

1997 – RISING SQUEEGEE KIDS AND MOUNTING FRUSTRATION

Unlike 1995 and 1996, 1997’s squeegee-based claims commenced at the start of the calendar year. Squeegee kids made the news in January as city council voted to dedicate funding to a “youth-at-risk” initiative to find them alternative means of making money. Support for this was not unanimous. Councillor Korwin-Kuczynski said the kids would be better put to work cleaning up litter and eliminating graffiti – *cleaning up the city*. He said “the fund is nothing more than a way for councillors to ease their consciences over high youth unemployment” (cited in Moloney, 1997b, p. A7). Korwin-Kuczynski’s use of language evokes Burke’s concept of categorical guilt. The disparity between councillors with a left-wing attitude to problem-solving and the right-wing attitude of councillors who disagreed is telling; it illustrates how the need to expiate guilt spans the ideological spectrum. In addition, the councillors did not feel ‘guilt’ as a result of their individual transgressions. Instead, Burke’s notion of guilt “by reason of a tribal or dynastic inheritance” (1954, p. 278) is manifest by politicians who at least partly shoulder the responsibility for correcting problems such as youth unemployment. In Burke’s scheme, people suffer a sense of guilt anytime they fall short of being perfect. While the

feeling is inescapable, it is all the more obvious when politicians confront systemic problems like unemployment, homelessness and poverty.

A large number of news stories trumpeted squeegee kids' "lack of co-operation" regarding these efforts on their behalf. The following statement is representative of this attitude: "The thing is, we don't want to have a boss" (McLean, 1997, p. 22). Squeegee kids derided the prospect of minimum wage jobs that did not match up to the freedom and the compensation gained by squeegeeing. Increasingly, the squeegee discourse will be dominated by accounts of problematic youth (expressing agent-scene ratios) rather than descriptions of youth who find themselves in problematic situations (i.e. scene-agent ratios). Even squeegee-defenders find themselves making their arguments on these grounds: "Nineties people don't give money to squeegee kids on principle, that principle being, I think, 'Well, f--- them. Why can't they just get a job?'" (Blatchford, 1997a, p. 5).

Many of the news reports up to this point were characterized by a scene-act ratio where youth unemployment is the "container for the thing contained" – the "thing" being squeegee kids. The obverse of this, however, quickly became the norm: the act of squeegeeing came to contain the threat of a ruined city. Politicians blamed their own inability to deal with the "problem" instead of only blaming squeegee kids. Councillor Tom Jakobek expressed his displeasure with *both* squeegee kids and his fellow politicians when he said, "we're destroying our city" ("Toronto's squeegee kids," 1997). Jakobek was irritated at city council's setting aside of \$50,000 to divert eight youths from the street (by paying them a wage of ten dollars an hour for three months and providing them with job skills training). Every letter to the editor in both the *Sun* and the *Star* opposed

this move; readers mocked the futility of the gesture and were hostile towards politicians who rewarded people who chose to be, at best, a nuisance and, at worse, lawbreakers.

I believe this episode revealed a very important lesson. Public opinion was divided on how (or even whether) punishment should be applied to squeegee kids. On the other hand, public opinion seemed universally opposed to the provision of incentives to divert kids away from the practice if it meant very little would be accomplished or taxpayers would have to shoulder a significant cost. Still, the police proceeded to charge squeegee kids with various crimes. The announcement of the second annual summer crackdown on squeegee kids again underscored kids' directional substance. The *Toronto Sun* quoted Staff-Sergeant David Bowen: "Last year we had squeegee kids. This year it's squeegee kids on top of squeegee kids" (Honywill, 1997a, p. 19). The *Toronto Star* quoted the same officer: "Suddenly they're everywhere this summer" (Funston, 1997, p. A3). The *Globe and Mail* quoted another Toronto police officer who told readers, "This year it's a lot worse than it was last year" (Skelton, 1997, p. A1). All of a sudden it seemed as though metro Toronto residents could not escape squeegee kids – either in the streets or in news coverage. The new crackdown brought with it increased penalties to try and deal with the growing number of kids squeegeeing. While some of the earlier concern for the safety of the kids was still expressed, protection is also increasingly sought for others: Korwin-Kuczynski worried about potential liability claims for the city (cited in Honywill, 1997a, p. 19), and Officer Bowen said, "our concern is for drivers" (Funston, 1997, p. A3).

Increasingly, letters started to appear in papers that described horrors wrought upon them by squeegee kids. For instance, after being accosted by a squeegee kid and

talking with the police, one driver reported, “we learned that damage to vehicles was not unusual. ... Our main thoroughfares have become toll roads where the squeegee kids hold up both the traffic and your property for a loonie” (Marshall, 1997, p. A22). This letter began by emphasizing the appearance and attitude of the destructive kid whom he encountered. It ended by emphasizing the need for authorities to intervene “to protect Toronto and allow innocent people to drive the streets safely” (ibid). This account is typical of the increasing number of media descriptions of squeegee kids that develop an act-scene or agent-scene ratio. (The act of squeegeeing is almost universally associated with some description of the squeegee kids’ bodies or appearance, thus act and agent are almost inseparable.) Scene-act ratios where the motives of squeegee kids were rooted in their backgrounds or condition of living seemed increasingly rare. Similarly, there appeared to be fewer instances of act-purpose or agent-purpose ratios (other than claims that suggested kids squeegeed for drugs) in accounts of squeegeeing. (Stories that suggest kids squeegee primarily out of need are infrequent.) It should be noted that, so far, there were no agent-purpose ratios in the media that accused squeegee kids of purposefully squeegeeing in order to disrupt the city. Nevertheless, squeegee kids were frequently accused of making the city disorderly and unwelcoming.

All media outlets described squeegee kids in conjunction with a deteriorating city, a scene that inspired more fear than hope. While the *Toronto Star* tended, in general, to find less fault with squeegee kids than the *Toronto Sun*, it also spoke of the “numbingly familiar *signs of social decay* in our city: panhandlers on the sidewalks, the squeegee kids on the street corners, the homeless people in the doorways” (“Protecting Metro,” 1997, p. A24). Similarly, an account in the *Financial Post* described rollerblading in Toronto as

going “from pothole to pothole -- that's if you can even make it to the road through the gauntlet of winos, panhandlers and squeegee kids” (Wayne, 1997, p. 55). At the end of the summer of 1997, the *Toronto Sun* strongly suggested that the city had descended into disorder. Toronto's inability to deal with the “urban problem” of squeegee kids was underscored by an unfavorable comparison with New York City. “In Manhattan, at least, the panhandlers are less aggressive than in Toronto, Ottawa or Montreal and there are no squeegee kids to be seen” (Benzie, 1997, p. 12). For some claims-makers, Toronto-the-Good became Toronto-the-sullied. The lawlessness of Toronto was reinforced by a report that a 76-year-old amputee was left stranded at work after three squeegee kids stole his wheelchair (Sands, 1997, p. 4). The debasement of Toronto was suggested yet again when Worthington (1997) questioned Toronto politicians' response to squeegee kids:

We are following the path that New York was on 20-25 years ago that led to chaos. ... Squeegee kids aren't interested in changing lifestyles. They are city nomads, street hustlers. For Toronto politicians to suggest squeegee kids are entrepreneurs and working, is like saying a mugger is practising free enterprise. ... It's not that they are a menace, but that people in positions of power, who pander to them, insist on seeing virtues where few exist. ... By indulging squeegee kids we are exhibiting a symptom that foretells further decline of social values and order. (p. 11)

At the end of September, the *Toronto Star* reported results of a poll it commissioned: Surveyed residents said that, compared with 10 or 20 years ago, they generally were happy about the Greater Toronto Area. However, “if there is one area of mixed review, it is residents' growing concern about their safety and security” (Royson, 1997, p. F1). Only one person is quoted on this topic: “I think Toronto is less safe. I definitely feel more vulnerable than 15 years ago. I notice the increase in street people, the squeegee kids. It seems to be increasing with less control” (ibid.). While this story

might not reinforce an overall vision of a deteriorating city, it does nominate squeegee kids as a source of blame for the amount of ill that Toronto is experiencing.

Unlike the year before, the issue of squeegee kids did not disappear as the summer faded. Instead, as the year continued, discussion of squeegee kids now regularly accompanied accounts of other problematic downtown phenomena. Ibbitson (1997) lumped in squeegee kids with the problem of the homeless and the mentally ill: "The downtown middle class has exhausted its meagre fund of compassion. ... It will want ... vagrancy laws stiffened and enforced, squeegee kids banned from intersections. *Downtown isn't going to feel guilty any more*" (p. C3, emphasis added).⁴⁰ Ibbitson's notion of omnipresent downtown guilt (and its surrogates – anger, resentment, etc.) suggests a potential public appetite for victimage. In the guilt-purification ritual, people shift the stigma of guilt from themselves to others, purging the feeling by blaming their condition on another group. Claims (such as Ibbitson's) underscored how Toronto was a city in need of purification. The hell from which people must be rescued is the dis-ease-ridden downtown. People had taken notice of pollution and Burkean guilt was aroused. However, squeegee kids were not yet explicitly identified as the scapegoat that could carry away this feeling of guilt. They were one factor among many, highlighted by some sporadic accounts but seemingly not yet capable of widespread arousal of public opinion on their own.

⁴⁰ The same incident that prompted Ibbitson's piece caused Blatchford (1997b) to speak of new resentments that "you can feel on the downtown streets. The homeless, the squeegee kids, the beggars, the drunks and addicts, the mentally ill, have so much affluence waved under their noses now, and the sure knowledge they have so little chance of ever attaining any of it, they're increasingly willing to take some of what doesn't belong to them, or at least strike out at those to whom it does belong" (p. 5). Here, squeegee kids are cast as harbingers of potential violence, the nature of which could be far more widespread than damage to one's windshield wipers.

According to law professor Dianne Martin, Toronto's Chief of Police David Boothby took an easy route to resolving guilt. He suggested that police be given more powers to deal with squeegee kids and other beggars. According to Martin (1997), this "simply offered ... instant solutions to poverty and instant proof of the success of current social and economic policies. What you cannot see cannot hurt you or make you feel *guilty* or selfish. Very quickly you can forget there ever were squeegee kids or panhandlers or newspaper sellers" (p. F12, emphasis added). The desire to forget this (or at least absolve oneself of the responsibility for it) is evidenced by a certain amount of collective hand-wringing. For instance, Goldstein (1997) observed, "Apparently in the '90s, you're not supposed to enjoy anything without having a soupcon of guilt over it - not even a night out on the town" (p. 16). This was in response to the Toronto media's reaction to the arrival of the Broadway musical *Rent*. After all, watching it meant one was confronted by "an urban hell's basement of homeless people, squeegee kids, heroin addicts, and starving artists" (Teshner, 1997, p. A7). This image of downtrodden New York was the same one that pundits feared was gaining a toehold in Toronto. Even those sympathetic to squeegee kids suggested things did not seem the same:

In the good old days, in this case, but a couple of years ago, there may have been the odd toll highway around, but now there are toll streets. I often walk to work through downtown, and by the time I've arrived at the office have usually paid out close to \$5 to beggars, moochers et al. Driving the same general route is no cheaper; the squeegee kids see to that. I'm not sure I object to any of this so much, but I believe such streets (Yonge, Spadina, King, University, Queen) should be clearly marked as pay roads, so that the poor visitor is at least given fair warning. (Blatchford, 1997d, p. 5)

1997's Toronto municipal election was the most important factor that kept squeegee kids in the public eye as the year wound down. An election campaign provides a

concrete opportunity for the institutionalization of a social problem as various claim-makers stake out their positions on issues they hope will resonate with the public. In a mayoralty debate, the candidates were asked if squeegee kids were “just a royal pain in the butt” or free-enterprisers. Mel Lastman (mayor of North York and campaigning for the head position of the newly amalgamated mega-city) replied, “They intimidate people, and if someone's intimidating people... (I say) don't give them any more, don't give them anything!” (Blatchford, 1997c, p. 5). He also made it clear that, had he been Mayor, he would not have supported the \$50,000 alternative employment plan for eight street kids. Barbara Hall, the mayor who did support the plan, pointed out double-digit youth unemployment and described the squeegee kids as “damaged” (ibid.).⁴¹

The choices were clear: Lastman was the “law-and-order” candidate who preferred a tougher approach than that implemented by Hall’s administration. Lastman saw Toronto in black-and-white terms while Hall’s vision was a palette of grays. In dramatic terms, Hall pointed out other problems that politicians must attend to and she introduced some element of self-blame or mortification along the route to redemption. Lastman’s response, contrarily, set the stage for future victimage. Lastman’s rhetoric was far more antagonistic. This prompted a *Toronto Star* editorial declaring Hall as “our choice for a new Toronto.” It also highlighted “beggars, panhandlers, vagrants and squeegee kids on our streets” as one of the problems facing Mayoral candidates in Toronto (“Hall is our choice,” 1997, p. A22). Also in the *Star*, Monsebraaten (1997) went

⁴¹ Fringe candidate Stephen Markle showed just how widespread the issue of squeegee kids had become: his platform was based around a promise to spend \$1.2 million to train squeegee kids, give free spray paint to graffiti artists and issue goats to homeowners to clean up garbage (Monsebraaten, 1997, p. F1). Even this “joke” candidate realized he could gain attention by tapping into some widespread social insecurity about squeegee kids and the cleanliness and attractiveness of the city.

so far as to declare this, “the scariest issue facing the new city: What will become of its quality of life? Not just how to find jobs for squeegee kids, but how to create a comprehensive social strategy [to deal with] growing numbers of squeegee kids - and homeless people and welfare families” (p. F1). The direct and immediate appeal of victimage seemed to work in this election campaign. I do not mean to suggest that Lastman was elected Mayor of Toronto because his rhetoric was laden with incipient victimage claims. Still, Lastman was elected Mayor and his rhetorical appeals against squeegee kids would only gain force – both quantitatively and qualitatively – in the years to follow.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has described how the issue of squeegeeing took shape in its first three years on the public radar screen. It described how squeegee kids developed from a non-issue into an object of concern that was prioritized by high-profile public figures. This chapter has demonstrated that, by the end of 1997, squeegee kids could serve as a scapegoat in political campaigns. They became a widely-recognized and easily-understood controversial issue. They were a group with which (and against which) people could identify. However, they were but one of many issues designated as political problems. Essentially, this chapter outlined early efforts by claims-makers that made squeegee kids substantial in the public imagination and laid the groundwork for future acts of victimage.

CHAPTER 8: MEDIA ANALYSIS II – 1998

This chapter describes squeegee-based claims in 1998. This chapter will outline how both the quantity and the quality of reproachful squeegee-related rhetoric also reached heretofore-unprecedented levels. It will chart a shift in public rhetoric whereby contests now occurred over the degree to which squeegee kids are problematic (instead of debating whether or not they are problematic). This chapter also will clarify how squeegee kids were typified as a pollution archetype with claims-makers using squeegee kids' youthful status against them. Overall, this chapter demonstrates how the meanings of "squeegee kid" continued to change and how the struggle over these meanings encouraged public perception of squeegee kids as enemies of public order.

Just as the year before, 1998 squeegee coverage now spans the entire year. There is, of course, a spike in the amount of squeegee stories and letters in the summer season. But there is still a noticeable amount of squeegeeing in the streets in February. Confronting this, Progressive Conservative MPP Jim Brown (1998) of the Ontario Crime Control Commission reported, "State Attorney Harry Shorstein, a Democrat from Florida was completely depressed after a walk along Yonge St., dodging aggressive panhandlers, squeegee people and other types of street disorder. He said, and I quote, 'I haven't seen it this bad, even in New York'" (p. E3). Brown argued that the *Toronto Star* misrepresented former New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton when it reported that he "admired Toronto's safety and said our squeegee kids and panhandlers didn't rate a crackdown" (ibid.). In an article titled "Toronto is very safe," the *Star* reported the following Bratton statements: "I was not uncomfortable walking around. Indeed, the city

seems to be a very comfortable city. Your squeegee pests are nowhere near the level that ours became, because they seem to be actually performing the service that they want money for" (Duncanson, 1998d, p. A7).

Contrarily, in an article titled "T.O. Becoming rotten apple?," the *Sun* reported the following Bratton statement: "My sense is that where you're at is where we were ... in the early 1970s in America" (Artuso, 1998b, p. 7).⁴² In both cases squeegee kids were constituted by reference to their directional substance: the *Star* suggested that the problem was not increasing as it had in other jurisdictions while the *Sun* reported that a rise in crime and disorder had already accompanied the rise in squeegee kids. It did not matter that there was no unanimity about a decline in public safety or whether squeegee kids were to blame for the perceived change. This debate over their directional substance had the effect of framing squeegee kids as a problem that was either (a) not on the rise and did not lead to even greater problems or, (b) was on the rise with very troubling consequences. The only question concerned the severity of the problem that squeegee kids represented and how best to deal with it.

There were a few crucial incidents that underscored just how problematic squeegee kids were (or could still become). One of these took place in February 1998 and involved a squeegee kid who rolled (purposefully) under a truck (in order to get quickly back to the curb once traffic had re-commenced). He sustained extensive injuries when the truck's wheels rolled over him. No longer did traffic or an oncoming vehicle mean "get out of the way;" now it meant potential customers. One defiant squeegee kid announced, "I am going to do it until I get hit by a car and die" (cited in Wanagas &

⁴² The *Edmonton Journal* reported the same comments under the headline, "Canada warned it may face U.S.-style murder, mayhem" ("Canada warned," 1998, p. A7).

Warmington, 1998, p. 5). Therefore, dodging vehicles safely (and obeying traffic signals) meant less opportunity for plying one's trade and hence less money. This is why, in addition to being a threat to themselves, squeegee kids were also threatening to others. When traffic rules (and common sense) were ignored, everyone was put in danger.

At this point, a militaristic metaphor no longer applies solely to the conflict in the streets between squeegee kids and drivers. There was also a burgeoning war between papers (in which editorials would mock the competition for their coverage of the issue). Even more striking was the "war of words" that broke out between authorities that one would expect to be on the same side of law and order. The following account in the *Toronto Star* depicted this:

It's not every day that a police chief takes on the provincial government of the day, especially a Conservative one that's considered pro-police. Yet Toronto police Chief David Boothby is not mincing words in letting Premier Mike Harris know he has no intention of implementing such simplistic crime-busting Tory notions as jailing beggars, the mentally ill, the homeless and the squeegee kids. (Crime-busting," 1998, p. K2)

Boothby's statements in the *Star* countered those of politicians such as Brown and Lastman, Colle, and various Toronto Councillors: "I think we should be tough as hell on hardened criminals. But I'm not sure, in this day and age, we want to call a squeegee kid, a panhandler, a homeless person a criminal. I really don't think so" (cited in Duncanson, 1998b, p. C1). In addition, the *Sun* reported Toronto Police Services Board Chairman Norm Gardner's comments that most are willing to 'tolerate' squeegee kids: "For the most part I find them rather kind and disciplined, not undisciplined or intimidating. I don't see it as a major problem" (cited in Robertson, 1998, p. 10). This position of the police would change before the year was through. But at this point, the war between kids and police was proceeding "quietly." Rankin (1998), in the *Star*, explains:

No one's holding any press conferences to share the fact that a renewed effort is under way. ... Staff Sergeant Ken Kinsmen reports, 'I'm not getting anything from politicians, but my own philosophy is that we get a lot of complaints concerning the in-your-face sort of disorder issues ... and that's a very high priority for us. ... If you talk to people in the community, we're being directed very forcefully to take action against these people.' (p. A6)

The most notable conflict at this point was the war *over* the streets and the question of what to do about them. There was consensus among politicians and police when it came to identifying a destination – the future safety of the city – but not when it involved identifying the devils that had to be expunged in order to reach the paradise of an orderly metropolis. The city was mired in this hellish state of indecision for quite some time. The quagmire-nature of the city politicians' indecision was evidenced by a day-long conference dedicated to finding a solution to the problem of squeegee kids which ended with no resolution whatsoever.

AN ESCALATING PROBLEM?

In the recent past, readers of Toronto newspapers had encountered warnings that the number of squeegee kids was rising. Now, though, these warnings were regularly accompanied by political mudslinging. In March, Police Chief Boothby spoke to the *Star* and expressed annoyance with politicians when they “point fingers at my police officers and say, ‘You should be doing this,’ when they know they have not provided the tools” (cited in Duncanson, 1998a, p. E5). Subsequently, the Mayor predicted the number of squeegee kids soon would triple. His comments in the *Sun* seemed to blame the unhelpful police: “Soon you're going to find more pails on the sidewalks than the sidewalks can take. ... I don't think the chief should be telling us what we can't do. Tell us what we can do. I'm tired of people telling us what we can't do” (Ruryk, 1998, p. 2). In May, Toronto's

community services commissioner predicted that “Toronto will see more squeegee kids and homeless families as a result of the province's decision to slash welfare for people who live with their parents” (Monsebraaten, 1998, p. F5).

Admittedly, there had been isolated instances of politicians blaming other politicians when squeegee kids first emerged as a social issue. But these claims became much more common by 1998. In the early days, discussion about squeegee kids was minimal and could hardly be called a social issue. Consequently, it would have been unreasonable to expect widespread public ire when some politicians were accused of inaction on the subject. However, by 1998, squeegeeing is recognized as a problematic condition. Disagreements are no longer over the existence of the problem, though there is still indecision over the nature of squeegee kids. Now, the problem is taken-for-granted and the debate seems increasingly dominated by questions of squeegee kids' own culpability for their fate. As Councillor Kyle Rae stated, “the police tell us a significant number of people are involved who don't need to be. They live in Oakville, their parents have lots of money, but they want more money for their tattoos, piercings, drugs and alcohol” (cited in Moloney, 1998, p. B2). Rae's allegation is decidedly unforgiving. And though there are countervailing voices, it is this sentiment that appears increasingly to dominate squeegee claims-making.

As the summer of 1998 began, stories featuring squeegee kids appeared with far greater frequency than before. The discourse up to this point had been largely dominated by debates over whether squeegeeing was just a nuisance/eyesore or an actual threat to the reputation and economic vitality of downtown. Now, however, this debate over the severity of the problem, while still present, seemed to recede next to the number of voices

arguing what to do about the problem. In other words, squeegee claims that once seemed to revolve around a discussion of the “ill” afflicting the city (characterizing 1995 and 1996 especially) had moved on to “blame.” Squeegee kids were, by and large, identified as one source of the suffering/misfortune that characterized the urban condition and one that needed to be purified so that the city could be redeemed. The debate, now, centered on the “cure” – the type of action necessary in order to solve the problem.

If the tide had shifted toward acknowledging squeegee kids’ contribution to the hellish condition of the city, there was still no clear determination of what to do about them. Toronto city council tried to put this period of indecision behind it with a new bylaw. It was responding to an increase in complaints such as those of Elyse Allan, president and CEO of the Toronto Board of Trade. She noted in the *Sun* that panhandlers and their irritating ilk “are starting to drive away tourism traffic downtown. It’s not consistent with the image people have of Toronto” (cited in Levy, 1998d, p. 16). City council’s consideration of a legislative crackdown in June seemed to stem, in part, from downtown residents’ sense of increased frustration at the continued presence of squeegee kids. This is evident in the response to an editorial in the *Star* that criticized the bylaw (see “Face of poverty,” 1998, p. A24). The paper suggested that a crackdown on panhandlers and squeegee kids was wrong. Numerous readers countered this with more letters to the editor expressing more indignation than ever before. Many readers seemed ready to blame squeegee kids. “Many of these kids are not the regular pink-haired, pin-in-the-lip variety, but average high school students. It is not poverty, but the lure of easy pickings that has attracted them to such undesirable ends” (Greisman, 1998, p. A21). Another letter to the *Star* expressed a similar opinion. Its title should suffice: “Squeegee

kids aren't always the victims" (McCallum, 1998, p. A17). Even as the traditionally liberal *Star* printed editorial and opinion pieces that favored alternatives to crackdowns (thereby addressing the "underlying disease" rather than the "symptoms"), it also printed an increasing number of letters that seemed increasingly disposed towards a crackdown.⁴³ In the more "hawkish" *Toronto Sun*, vitriol against squeegee kids seemed even more widespread as editorials and letters alike argued more often than not for a hard-line stance against squeegee kids. In one case, the *Sun* noted that "intimidation has become part of the panhandling process" when it responded to a letter-writer who said, "Do not under any circumstances give a beggar anything" (Kennedy, 1998, p. 14).

Of course, no "anti-squeegee consensus" suddenly materialized. Even as the city of Toronto considered a squeegee-control bylaw, the city council's community and neighborhood services committee endorsed a new half-million "squeegee diversion strategy." Councillor Michael Prue said, "that's \$500,000 for 100 kids because the sight of squeegees offends us" (cited in Wanagas, 1998a, p. 7). This phrase reveals how squeegee kids were figured as an object that produced guilt (i.e. anger, disgust, shame) in addition to producing incitements towards victimage. People are of a "guilt-laden substance" (Burke, 1941, p. 50), in part because they conceive of ideals ("god-terms") that are incapable of being realized, ideals brought to life in phrases such as "Toronto the good." When the city does not live up to the symbolic power in these language claims, this guilt needs to be expiated. Only then can an individual – or, in this case, the city itself – be symbolically reborn as redeemed and marching towards a better existence.

⁴³ Though hardly scientific, the *Toronto Star* asked its readers at the end of July whether they were "on the side of the kids in the so-called 'squeegee wars.'" No final tally was revealed but the sample of printed responses favored the 'No' side and the story was reported under the title "Callers say clean squeegee kids out" (Stefaniuk, 1998, p. B2).

The act of squeegeeing was far less likely to be framed as entrepreneurial now. A summer earlier, the *Globe and Mail* had published its first editorial on the subject and lauded squeegee kids as “traffic-dodging impressarios” whose entrepreneurial activity was more educational than troublesome: “They are almost all polite to the point of obsequiousness. Like door-to-door salesmen and telemarketers, squeegee kids are exploiting vulnerabilities. Yes, the squeegees are a nuisance, but a nuisance you can’t help but kind of admire” (“Squeegee kids clean,” 1997, p. A18).⁴⁴ Expressions of admiration seemed even less frequent by mid-1998. In the *Star*, Rankin (1998) reported a Toronto businesswoman who “has no problem with kids making a buck, she just wishes they were polite and looked presentable” (p. A6). By doing so, she underscored the ease with which offensive-appearing kids could be lumped into a “society-negative kind of entrepreneurship” (Kastner, 1997, p. E2; Salutin, 1997, p. C1).

Many claims-makers spoke of how their attitudes towards squeegeeing had changed. One individual noted, “I have never had any problems or complaints about them even as I’ve seen their numbers increase. On the contrary, I found most of them friendly and harmless. ... I have, however, noticed in recent days, a more aggressive, ‘tougher’ and older crowd” (Figueiredo, 1998, p. 15). Actions that were once appreciated as unvarnished moxie or hustle now tended to escalate into confrontations. Letter writers frequently complained of kids’ extortionist tactics.⁴⁵ Squeegeeing was now understood as synonymous with “jumping” cars. Even a sympathetic account in the *Sun* described “a squeegee kid [a]s someone who leaps out at you in big cities and cleans your windshield

⁴⁴ An opinion piece in the *Toronto Star* nearly a year later (Coyle, 1998, p. B1) took the exact same tack but generated far more letters of disagreement.

⁴⁵ A 1998 incident in which five squeegee kids allegedly surrounded and threatened a non-uniformed police officer found the five arrested and charged with extortion.

whether you want him to or not. The quid pro quo is that you can either give him a loonie or not” (Steward, 1998, p. C5).

This shift in temperament also marks the point in the discourse where the development of a counter-movement begins in earnest. At the beginning of June 1998, Royson (1998b) pointed out how “anti-poverty activists have a new in-your-face attitude and campaign aimed at improving the lot of the city's outcasts” (p. B1). The Ontario Coalition Against Poverty (OCAP) became the most vocal of such activist organizations, often mobilizing protests and advocating the cause of squeegee kids in the media. It also provided the basis for the next phase of conflict – the war between OCAP and the provincial government over the fate of squeegee kids. Aprille Rhomer, an OCAP executive, protested the proposed city-wide anti-squeegeeing bylaw by targeting perceived privilege. In front of Toronto council she promised “mass panhandling and mass squeegeeing in front of opera houses, theatres and restaurants. ... We'll shut down every tourist attraction in this city” (cited in Woodcock, 1998, p. 16).

The response to these claims in the *Sun* was straightforward: “Thanks to OCAP, no one need ever feel guilty about ignoring a panhandler again. OCAP is nothing more than a bunch of professional poor people wielding far greater power than they actually have thanks to the guilt we all harbor for the genuinely poverty stricken” (ibid.). Quickly, battle-lines were drawn. On their own, squeegee kids could still generate sympathy. But now they were allied with “professional protesters.” OCAP’s tactics were almost exclusively geared towards the rejection of hierarchy and the provocation of conflict. While squeegee kids could be seen as just a nuisance, OCAP was candid about its goal of increasing disorder. OCAP’s rhetoric heated up as it saw itself facing an increasingly

intransigent city hall. In turn, this prompted increased calls for the sanctioning of squeegee kids.

This burgeoning battle was summed up in the *Sun* by Cumming (1998): “A war of words has erupted between Toronto Mayor Mel Lastman – who backs restrictions on panhandling and squeegee kids – and poverty activists who have threatened to mobilize street people into an army of tourist-terrorists” (p. 33). Physical conflict between police and OCAP was anticipated. The *Sun* described what happened as city politicians deliberated the fate of a bylaw to severely restrict begging: “Six cops wearing bullet-proof vests were on hand. ... To any reasonable observer, the message was clear that councillors and city bureaucrats needed protection from the 60 beggars and their squeegee pals who packed the council chambers, outnumbering the members of Toronto's taxpaying public” (Levy, 1998c, p. 16). An immediate conflict was averted when councillors decided that the bylaw was largely unenforceable and they decided against a crackdown.

City council was in a dilemma: to enforce a bylaw regulating panhandlers and squeegee kids required new laws whose implementation was beyond its jurisdiction. In the meantime, it considered “diversionary” programs: make-work projects to get street-kids off the street. But it expressed fears that there would be little incentive to join such a program without some threat of punitive measures that made it more difficult to beg or squeegee. Lawyers again determined that any such enforcement strategy would be unconstitutional. Consequently, more time passed without any action to tackle the issue of squeegee kids. Still, growing concerns about Toronto's tourist image and the sense of ever increasing numbers of panhandlers (especially their aggressive ranks) and squeegee

kids flocking to Toronto⁴⁶ meant something needed to be done. By now, letters to the editor and opinion pieces frequently linked squeegee kids to panhandlers through their expressions of disgust and dismissals of the service provided. Police Chief David Boothby tried to correct this impression in the *Sun*: “There is no linkage between the condition of being homeless and unruly or predatory behavior [of squeegee kids]” (cited in Elder, 1998, p. 17). Even still, both the typically younger squeegeers and the typically older, more diverse population of panhandlers – some of whom suffered from physical or mental illness and many of whom were homeless – were increasingly typified as being one and the same. The *Sun* reported Mayor Lastman’s declaration that squeegee kids “are nothing but lazy beggars” (cited in Lee-shanok, 1998a, p. 24) and journalist Peter Worthington’s (1998) statement, “Squeegee kids are panhandlers, parasites, bums, irritants, as are their scruffy soulmates with paper cups begging for change” (p. 15). Both politicians and journalists alike argued that both groups could be dealt with by enacting a city bylaw against panhandling. These claims underscore how, “an epithet assigns substance doubly, for in stating the character of the object it at the same time contains an implicit program of action with regard to the object” (Burke, 1945, p. 57).

Less than two weeks after Toronto’s police chief claimed that there was no necessary link between predatory behavior and homelessness, news circulated of a police report prepared by the Community Response Unit and meant for internal use. It placed squeegee kids in three categories: unemployed youth, homeless individuals and criminals (Hanlon, 1998, p. A3). Many claims-makers used the shared condition of poverty to join

⁴⁶ Five squeegeers who were arrested for extortion (and a majority of another 19 kids who were arrested for mischief and causing a disturbance that same week) were French Quebecers. This exodus of kids from other, less tolerant, jurisdictions was used to justify tougher measures in order to protect the overall scene of Toronto.

the two separate issues of homelessness and squeegeeing. Squeegee-defenders, however, argued that the criminalization of squeegee kids would not solve the problems of homelessness, unemployment, or poverty. A letter to the *Sun* demonstrates this attitude:

While I agree that some people have been intimidated by squeegee kids and panhandlers, I suspect that most of us haven't. More likely, we feel uncomfortable at being reminded so often of the homeless situation in Toronto. ... Making it illegal to be a panhandler or a squeegee kid is not going to eliminate the homeless problem of Toronto. (Ritchie, 1998, p. 14)

Ritchie's opinion largely reflected OCAP's position that poverty connected both squeegeeing and homelessness. A letter to the *Star* during the same week made the same point but with a tongue-in-cheek addition: "The squeegee epidemic has been brought about by two endemic factors ... homelessness and bad fashion sense" (Evans, 1998, p. A15). The *Star* printed like-minded comments by Gordon Cressy (a former chair of the old Toronto School Board and a veteran of Yorkville's culture clashes between youth and police in the sixties). He suggested, "The squeegee kid uniform has a lot to do with [the problem]. ... Dress is part of this. Class is part of this. Many of the hippies came from comfortable middle-class homes, and many could return to them. The squeegee kids are not like this" (cited in Hanlon, 1998, p. A3). By the summer of 1998, though, sympathetic voices that argued on behalf of poverty-stricken, homeless squeegee kids seemed to be in the minority. John VanDeursen (president of the Ontario Psychological Association) alluded to both sides of the issue. "Some [squeegee kids] are desperately troubled, from poverty-stricken and abusive homes. Some are weekend warriors from the suburbs looking for the adventure and excitement associated with street life" (ibid.). Michael Coren emphasized the latter perspective but generalized it to all who squeegeed: "These are not needy kids. ... It's a fashion statement" ("Panel discussion," 1998).

THE VILIFICATION OF YOUTH

References to “fashion sense” seem to indicate a choice in one’s apparel, something that is not generally a concern for those truly down-and-out. References to squeegee kids’ appearances nearly always accompanied accounts of squeegee activity. However, now accusations that this appearance was carefully cultivated also became commonplace. Some argued that the punk-look was nothing but a veneer, a façade meant to disguise a lack of desperation or destitute status. Blizzard’s (1998) comment, “I suspect there are a great number of kids who come from loving homes, but who simply want to experience the thrill of living on the wild side for a while” (p. 16) is representative of this increasingly prevalent attitude. Another argument suggested that since these kids put so much effort into appearing different, others shouldn’t put that much effort into assisting them: “In the language of clothing, street kids’ message is clear: fishnet stockings and post-nuclear makeup symbolize rejection of society” (Frum, 1998, p. 15). Squeegee kids’ appearance, then, increasingly became a reason to reject them and their claims. The position that squeegee kids were homeless street youth who had no other choice but to act in this way was contested by a new cluster of claims that indicated less toleration or sympathy for squeegee kids’ youthful condition and their propensity to act up, act differently, and dress differently.

Until 1998, I never documented a single claim that used the youth of squeegee kids explicitly against them. While there were complaints about youthful behavior or appearances, these were not used to justify punitive measures against them. Many times, the youthful condition of squeegee kids was invoked to partially absolve them of responsibility for their actions. Coyle (1998, p. B1) spoke of youth as a scene where “kids

today were the first latchkey kids, survivors of broken families, bombarded with media blandishments, video culture, drugs." He lamented attacks on squeegee kids that reprimanded them "for failing to play by mainstream rules at the same time the struts are kicked out from them when they do" (ibid.). Squeegee diversion programs were proposed because of this recognition that street youth had "complex needs."

But the labeling of squeegee kids as homeless or in need of assistance had to contend with wider fears of youth as troublesome or even dangerous. As Brockville's Police Chief put it, "You won't convince anyone in our community that kids aren't more violent or they're not under less control than they used to be" (King, cited in Blackwell, 1998, p. A16). This attribution of directional substance warned of kids' overall status as an increasing threat and the rise in squeegee kids seemed to reinforce this. Letters to editors increasingly claimed that squeegeeing had little to do with poverty or homelessness as more kids appeared in the streets and took up the practice in more and more neighborhoods. One woman whose daughter ran away from home wondered if the phenomenon was mostly "a case of young people going through a rebellious phase of their lives" (cited in Warmington, 1998a, p. 4). The federal transport minister (and minister responsible for the Greater Toronto Area at the time) also weighed in on the subject: "This is serious. You have got young people running away and getting caught up in this. This is like a cult" (Colonette, cited in Wanagas & Warmington, 1998a, p. 7).

Even the "hardcore" contingent of squeegeers who claimed squeegeeing was the only choice (other than crime) available to them acknowledged that the population of squeegee kids swelled because the "market" was flooded with those who were not homeless street youth. Durant and Neale (1998) spoke to three street youths (one of

whom was “quick to point out that she's not a ‘Twinkie’ - slang for someone who is just into it because mommy and daddy wouldn't buy them a pony when they wanted it. ... They say much of the aggressive behaviour that drivers complain about is the fault of young people from stable, suburban homes who ply squeegees for a thrill” (p. C1).

Bowers' (1998) letter to the *Star* complained about this specific group of young people: “Most [squeegee kids] do not want our idea of a normal life. I am willing to bet most of them have a normal life waiting for them if they chose to accept it, but they have willingly shunned and abandoned it” (p. A15). This attitude was implicit in much of the squeegee discourse at this point. It can also be expressed in terms of Burkean ratios. Squeegee defenders such as OCAP presented a scene-act ratio of “poverty-beg” or “poverty-squeegee.” Upon first glance, a scene-agent ratio of “poverty-youth” would also seem to invoke greater sympathy. Increasingly, though, those who argued against squeegeeing invoked youth as a context of its own that contained acts of rebellion. This scene-act ratio of “youth-rebellion” also contained agent-act ratios such as “rebellious kid-squeegee.” Poverty was understood by all as an undesirable condition. But squeegeeing was increasingly positioned as a youthful indiscretion that was consciously chosen. Williamson (1998) expressed this belief in the *Sun*: “It was clear that the vast majority of squeegee people weren't homeless, or mentally ill, or anything other than young people seeking freedom and a quick buck” (p. 15). Claims-makers, especially those opposed to squeegeeing, increasingly emphasized the agency of individual choice regardless of scenes of youth or poverty.

More than ever before, people expressed the opinion that squeegee kids willingly courted the life they lived and the dangers that came with it. This attitude was crucial in

the constitution of squeegee kids as a significant social *problem* (rather than just some condition that some isolated individuals found problematic). “The way a problem is defined invariably entails some statement about its origins. ... The question of culpability is the most prominent of all aspects of problem definition. One important distinction is whether attribution is made to individual versus impersonal causes” (Rochefort and Cobb, 1994, p. 15). Claims that squeegee kids were just youngsters acting out and thumbing their noses at authority helped identify squeegee kids as voluntary outsiders. Such claims also made it easier to blame the kids themselves for their condition. One *Toronto Sun* reader opined that “most of the kids aren't out there to earn money to pay rent. They just want to buy beer and drugs” (Granatstein, 1998, p. 4). Statements such as this constituted squeegee kids as delinquents and criminals who were responsible for their own actions. The proliferation of claims such as this also suggested that members of the public might accept a solution that targeted the problem at an individual level (such as charging the individual with breaking the law).

SHIFTING BLAME FROM YOUNGSTERS TO INDIVIDUALS

Loseke (2003a) suggested that “American audiences in general are more interested in hearing about individuals than we are in hearing about social causes of conditions” (p. 293). I argue that this was true with the Canadian discussion of squeegee kids, too. If individuals are found to be the root of a problem (rather than finding fault with “the system” and blaming poverty or homelessness), the focus shifts to different understandings and different solutions. Individual problems lend themselves to individual solutions instead of systemic changes. Consequently, when the Ontario government joined forces with the City of Toronto and commenced its “war” against squeegee kids, it

was accused of attacking the poor or attacking the young. By the summer of 1998, however, neither the attribution of poverty or youth seemed sufficient defense against the claim that squeegeeing was a product of individual choice.

In earlier stages of squeegee discourse, appeals to assist squeegee kids based upon their (a) youthful or (b) homeless condition often involved an appeal to communitarian values. For instance, squeegeeing was frequently cited as one way of dealing with an “official youth unemployment rate of 17 per cent,” of which the estimated annual cost to the economy was \$4.5 billion (Elton & Brearton, 1997, p. 4). In June 1996, Prime Minister Jean Chretien declared, “No group faces bleaker economic prospects than Canadians under 25. ... If young people have to wait until the turn of the century to get work...we will have lost a generation of Canadians” (ibid.). For many, squeegee kids were emblematic of this failure. Programs meant to divert squeegee kids into alternate forms of employment were intended to assist “at-risk youth” and, by extension, the community, the economy, and the future. However, each suggestion of funding for squeegee kids was followed by numerous complaints by those who considered such assistance to be special-treatment. As the squeegee discourse evolved, both squeegee detractors and defenders staked out a position based on individual freedom and choice. OCAP argued that the poor had the right to ask for money, just as drivers had the choice to say no. Meanwhile, drivers claimed that they had the right to drive without being hassled for money.

Now, divisions among young people were reported just as widely as divisions between young people and adults. For instance, two separate submissions to the “Young People’s Press” section of the *Toronto Star* – on the same page and the same day – show

both sides of the story. One 18-year old said, “they live on the streets because there is nowhere else for them to be” (Demien, 1998, p. C2). Another 18-year old argued, “There are all kinds of jobs out there, but not everything in life will be handed to you on a silver platter. ...Squeegeeing is not the only solution” (Wales, 1998, p. C2). Therefore, debates about individual choice did not cleanly break down along age lines. While some claims-makers presented all squeegee kids as homeless and having no choice, others expressed their disapproval with individualist moralizing that blamed squeegee kids for being weak-willed or lazy and not trying hard enough to get a “real” job.

Foremost among this latter group of claims-makers was Toronto Mayor Mel Lastman. His rhetoric and his position as a prominent claims-maker contributed significantly to squeegeeing’s evolving status as a public problem independent of youth or poverty. The *Star* reported the following comment of his at the height of squeegee tensions in mid-summer 1998: “These squeegees, they’re not kids, they’re adults. Don’t dare call them kids, because most of them are not kids. ... I don’t believe for one minute that this is entirely a poverty issue. It’s not. Many come from middle-class families. It is definitely not a poverty issue” (cited in DeMara, 1998, p. B3). This statement accompanied the Mayor’s announcement of a program to find jobs for at-risk youth such as high-school drop-outs, street kids, and young welfare recipients. He was adamant that this program was not for those who squeegeed; Lastman increasingly described these individuals as “squeegee men” or “squeegee pests” instead of referring to them as “kids.”

Other evidence seemed to support Lastman’s choice of rhetoric. When the city of Toronto’s child and family task force created a “squeegee diversion strategy for street-involved youth,” it did not use the term “kids.” Rather, it spoke of squeegee

“practitioners” (Levy, 1998b, p. 17). And, even though the *Star* reported “an informal police survey [that] ... found most were male and under the age of 25” (“Call off,” 1998, p. A16), letter writers did not seem convinced that the label of “youth” should be applied so broadly. One *Star* reader protested an article that used the moniker squeegee “kids” but approved of another article that spoke of “squeegee users and squeegee people” (Cofell, 1998, p. A15). Claims about squeegeeing now tended to highlight incidents where *people* acted in a disruptive or rebellious manner rather than explicitly identifying *kids* that chose to do so.

This is not to say that the scene of youth disappeared from the discourse. The *Star* published the commentary of a social anthropologist: “Squeegee kids are new on the face of the earth, but their use of the symbolic language of youth - and our range of reactions - are centuries old” (Rozell, 1998, p. A13). Lawyer Clayton Ruby suggested on CBC television that adults may not appreciate squeegee kids but squeegeeing was consistent with “a level of rebellion and self-awareness which is inherent in growing up” (“Windshield war,” 1998). In the midst of more squeegeeing than ever before, such claims were not likely to generate much sympathy for squeegee kids. Numerous letters to the *Star* castigated Rozell as an apologist for squeegee kids and not one letter of agreement was printed. However, the label squeegee “kid” was not entirely disingenuous, as the following comment in the *Sun* suggests:

Squeegee people fall into two general categories. First, there are the squeegee adults, who really should ... get a real job. ... Secondly, there are the under-age squeegee kids, and these I suspect are the ones [some politicians] want to help through costly programs. But we already have a program for 15-year-olds. The province throws \$9 billion annually at it. It's called education. (Blizzard, 1998, p. 16)

One letter to the *Star* acknowledged, “perhaps it’s the connotation of kids that evokes some sympathy for this segment of society, as though they are some poor pre-adolescent waifs” (Cofell, 1998, p. A15). But for Cofell (as for many others), the allusion to “children” contained in the label “squeegee kids” had no resonance given the number of older squeegeers in the streets. Canadian squeegee “kids” were an interesting variant on New York City’s squeegee “men” (the original referent for Toronto’s squeegee activity) in the early days of the discourse. But those who were irritated by squeegeeing tended now to deny that youth was a factor in the phenomenon. The Community Social Planning Council of Toronto underscored the widespread nature of this belief. It surveyed the city’s street youth and found “two-thirds were under 21 years of age; only 10 per cent were over 25” [yet] “the myth persists that these are mostly squeegee men plying a lucrative trade” (Wirsig & Clutterbuck, 1998, p. A22). With numbers of squeegeers seemingly ever on the rise, and with frustration levels rising commensurately (as indicated by both the quality and quantity of anti-squeegee editorials, opinion-pieces, and letters), there also seemed to be a greater demand for action than ever before.

There were increasing calls for government action because squeegeeing did not offer its own solution – squeegeeing did not seem to lead to better opportunities, only to more squeegeeing. Isolated instances of squeegee redemption were, however, reported in 1998. The “Toronto Shines” program was presented as one such case. This was a private entrepreneurial effort meant to curtail squeegeeing. Kids were issued supplies and licensed as buskers by the city in order to shine shoes instead. There were occasional media accounts of kids trying this out and reporting far more public acceptance of their attempts to make money. In another instance, the *Sun* charted the betterment of one

squeegeer's life over four articles spanning July to December. As Warmington (1998b) reported, "It all started to turn around for him July 29 when the *Sun* wrote a story of the 'kinder, gentler squeegee old man,' who agreed with Mel Lastman's criticism of squeegee kids" (p. 4). These stories reported that, through mortification (or self-sacrifice), the man found redemption in the form of a family-reunion and a stable work and home environment. But most squeegee kids did not engage in such public acts of self-criticism.

THE CITY TAKES ACTION

The mood for victimage seemed strongest in late July 1998, a watershed moment in the public discourse over squeegee kids. Previously, when Toronto City Council debated bylaws and programs to remedy the problem of squeegee kids, Police Chief David Boothby had publicly announced his opposition to a crackdown whose charges would likely not stand up in court. Now, however, Boothby called for new legislation to wipe out squeegee kids. This shift in attitude was based on some high profile incidents involving street kids and violence and a volume of public complaints that was reportedly too large to ignore anymore. At this same time, the Provincial government promised it would bring in new legislation. Here is where the representative anecdote of war becomes more than just anecdotal. Now, war was used as the explicit foundation of rhetorical claims. For instance, the front-page headline of the July 23rd edition of *The Toronto Sun* declared, "Mayor: It's War On Squeegees." The headline of another article announced, "Premier declares war on squeegee kids" (Wallace, 1998a, p. 4). Noting the combined forces of Harris, Lastman, and Boothby, the *Toronto Star* observed, "The squeegee wars have begun" (Gombu, 1998, p. C1).

I have already established that militaristic terminology was commonly used in squeegee claims and that squeegee kids and politicians were frequently cast as warring factions in the media before this point. However, this new onset of hostilities and an official declaration by the highest level of authorities reinforced how the spirit of previous conflict had now escalated into a battle the likes of which had not been seen around squeegee kids before. "Burke observed how politicians coin phrases that lead people to understand and approach problems differently than they actually are. He warned against politicians with their vague terrors" (Heath, 1986, p. 115). In this case, when politicians declared war against squeegee kids, there was nothing vague about the terror that they posed. The declaration of the squeegee-war served "as a dramatic device for inaugurating policies: it highlights the new social policy, makes it a priority, and indicates official commitment to the cause" (Best, 1999, p. 148). In the Mayor's apparent zealotry to remove the squeegee problem, he even proposed charging those motorists who gave squeegee kids money. Squeegee-friendly drivers were, essentially, helping the enemy. The *Toronto Sun* suggested "the war on squeegee kids may have reached its zenith" with this idea ("All it takes," 1998, p. C1).

With the declaration of war and the explosion of squeegee-claims, late summer 1998 marked the apogee of squeegee debate. It was the point at which the Province finally moved toward fulfilling the Mayor of Toronto's longstanding dream of anti-squeegee legislation. Conservative MPP Jim Brown of the Province's Crime Control Commission said, "I think Toronto is becoming the squeegee capital of the world. I think we're squeegee heaven. You are going to see more and more violence and they are certainly getting more and more aggressive" ("Street kids," 1998, p. A28). This notion of

“squeegee heaven” was a “hell” for the provincial government. Brown (and by extension, the government) saw this “heaven” as a perversion of the properly functioning order and as a state of pollution from which the province’s citizens needed to be rescued if they were to be able to use their streets and public places with no fear for their safety. Inherent in the nightmare of squeegee-infested streets is the dream of an orderly society and the potential to rescue that dream back from the reality of social disorder. Action taken against squeegee kids can reasonably be represented as a catharsis for this troubled state of urbanity. In Burkean terms, squeegee kids and the government are both agents of a “moral drama in which the ‘fall’ is inevitable and the driving need purgative-redemptive” (Rueckert, 1982a, pp. 209-210). Squeegee kids augured the fall while the government became redeemer and public savior. By taking on the role of cleanser, the government’s task was to do away with polluted agents and thereby make the taint of their pollution disappear along with them.

This is, admittedly, a poetic reading of the situation. A poetic reading goes beyond the literal meaning of a text or discourse and features the vocabulary of drama with its emotion, naming, and moralizing. It acknowledges that the drama is predicated on tensions and conflict (see Burke, 1941, pp. 149-150). It invokes catharsis and a progression out of guilt through victimage towards redemption. This analysis of public claims about squeegee kids is less concerned with the accuracy of squeegee kids’ descriptions and more concerned with how claims contributed to the discourse’s curative function. As Heath (1986) notes, “the dramatistic process depends upon the particular transformations and interactions needed to become cleansed. Our desire to cleanse ourselves leads to purgation through victimage, which has been, since Aristotle

emphasized the importance of the goat song, one of the primary requirements for poetic impact" (p. 249).

Recourse to this dramatistic terminology is not the sole purview of government critics who are predisposed to see the worst in its actions and to condemn its motives. It is also a political strategy used by governments. In 1995, Progressive Conservative Education minister John Snoblen suggested that the government needed to invent a crisis in the education system (Laird, 1998, p. 72). Upon doing so, it could then institute policies in order to be seen as education's redeemer. In Burkean terms, the "payment" for this redemption is victimage; somebody or something must suffer to realize the promise of the greater good. Victimage requires victims unto whom some harm is done which in turn requires villains. In the case of squeegee kids, the provincial government did not have to invent a crisis. Nor did it have to invent villains. Other politicians and citizens' claims in the media had already constructed a sense of both.

Again, the rhetoric of Toronto's Mayor is instructive. By constructing horrifying consequences, he encouraged the public to see squeegee kids as more than just a mere problem. Amazingly, he warned of imminent catastrophe at the same time he claimed, "Toronto politicians and the media have paid too much attention to squeegee kids this summer and made them a bigger issue than they really are" (cited in Wanagas, 1998b, p. 22). This statement appeared in the *Sun* less than two weeks after the mayor declared war on them. City council had deferred decisions until October on two related issues: a bylaw proposed to regulate the squeegee trade and the city's half-million dollar program that was designed to find alternative employment for the street-kids. But, as his comments in the *Star* demonstrate, the Mayor still chose to typify the problem in most dramatic terms:

“This is a crisis, this is a problem, this is a major problem in the city. This is a menace and there's a disaster waiting to happen on our streets. There's people being hurt, there's people who could be hurt, there's people who could be killed and you don't think that's a disaster?” (cited in DeMara, 1998, p. B3).

“Within the social-constructionist school, crisis has been identified as a prevalent motif of the ‘rhetoric of calamity,’ used by claims-makers to elevate a concern when facing an environment overloaded with competing claims” (Rochefort & Cobb, 1994, pp. 21-22). By using terms such as crisis, menace, and disaster, Mayor Lastman sought to denote squeegeeing as a severe condition, the circumstances of which were dire for its practitioners as well as for the city as a whole. The *Toronto Star* did not agree: “There are 200 squeegee kids in the city; hardly an infestation. They aren't breaking the law or threatening people. They impede the flow of traffic and get on motorists' nerves. Every city should have such crises” (“Squeegee truce,” 1998, p. A22). Following Burke, it is not important to determine whose subjective definition of the situation is more accurate. Nor is it important that Council did not take any action. The *Toronto Star* expressed “relief that the punitive impulses on display at Metro Hall for the past month were not converted into action” (ibid.). But this makes no allowance for the belief that all language use is symbolic action. Like anyone's choice of words, the selection and expression of vituperative rhetoric by municipal politicians who were opposed to squeegee kids was an action with consequences of its own. The dramatic language used by these public claims-makers set the stage for the next act in this curative drama. Only after war had been declared could the villain who was identified as responsible for the crisis be sacrificed. Only then could the sacrificial principle of victimage – the scapegoat – be formalized.

SQUEEGEE KIDS – AS ABJECT AND FECAL

Following the Province's pledge of tough action, Mayor Lastman promised that there would be no more squeegee kids in Toronto and Police Chief Boothby promised that he could eliminate all of them in two weeks if the right laws were instituted (Gombu, 1998, p. C1). A number of images that are implicit in the elimination of squeegee kids cluster together here: war; heaven and hell; cleanliness. These all come together in the idea that redemptive violence (i.e., the purification ritual of the crackdown) can "clean-up" Toronto's tarnished reputation and remove the "stain" of squeegee kids from the city. The symbolic slaughter of squeegee kids could cleanse the city's public places of their polluting presence and could also appease the wider sense of discomfort/displeasure expressed at squeegee kids. After all, pollution is not limited to the physical soiling of the scene by squeegee kids. It also has a metaphysical manifestation as "tensions, irresolutions, psychoses, guilt, discord [that can be] exploited for cathartic purposes" (Rueckert, 1982a, p. 222). While the government might have hoped to expunge some element of collective guilt from the public, the most dramatic impact of its squeegee purification was the rejection of the 'unclean' squeegee kids. Squeegee kids could reasonably be classified as unclean because of (a) their rejection of a moral negative (contained in official exhortations to "not squeegee,") (b) frequent references to their literal dirtiness, and (c) evidence that their fecal motives disrupted the city.

Just as division is the dialectical opposite of identification, impurity (in the form of dirt and the fecal motive) is the obverse condition that is rejected in the move towards purification. Remember, fecal – in the Burke lexicon – refers to any pollution archetype. "Analyzed as symbolic action, the fecal or pollution archetype is indicated by all the

negatively charged persons, places, things, and ideas – by all that the author wishes to reject” (Rueckert, 1982a, p. 101). The fecal motive can be seen in any product of the fecal, sexual, and urinal orifices. “Objects generating abjection – food, feaces, urine, vomit, tears, spit that represent a body in revolt” (Gross, 1990, pp. 88-89) express the fecal motive quite literally. After all, it is “urinating, elimination of feces, and sexual orgasm and everything connected with them that Burke calls the “Demonic Trinity” because from them come most of the sin and guilt which need to be purged” (Rueckert, 1982a, p. 93). By pointing out how squeegee kids were the antithesis of the ‘clean and proper’ body, references to the abject also reinforced how squeegee kids constituted a threat to the smoothly functioning symbolic order. A body that does not respect its own borders introduces disorder to the system within which it operates. First the abject is referenced in squeegee kids’ bodies and then it is connected to the predicament of the wider urban scene. Reports of excretions such as urine and feces from squeegee kids’ bodies only served to reinforce squeegee kids’ negative image. These reports clustered in the media just as war was declared on squeegee kids in late July 1998.

Pile (1996) used Burkean terminology and noted, “the purification of the city becomes an obsession where abjection takes hold” (p. 244). In the past, the abject was used almost exclusively to describe squeegee-agents and their agency. Squeegee kids were described as spitting at motorists (M. Macdonald, 1996, 16), smelling bad with filthy clothes and arms and ankles covered with infected mosquito bites (Rankin, 1996, G10), and it was even reported that they urinated in their pails (“Oath to squeegee by,” 1997, 6; “Squeegees stayin’ alive,” 1997, 6).⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Interestingly, in the very early stages of the squeegee discourse there was a story that framed squeegee kids as determined and downtrodden and reported, “They’ve been spat

Now, however, the abject was used to typify the whole scene. In an immediate sense, the intersection and drivers were affected by the filth and the stench of squeegee kids (see Herrell, 1998, p. A21). In a larger sense, the scene is no longer just urban intersections where only drivers have to deal with this fecal (or unclean) nuisance: “[Our] doorways now have almost an overpowering stench of stale urine. ... The squeegee kids, tolerable when they were contained to small numbers and certain intersections in the downtown core, are menacing as large groups of squeegee men are invading residential neighborhoods” (Bird, 1998, p. C3). Another downtown resident’s letter to the *Sun* said, “In some ways, I envy people in cars, they’re only there for two minutes” (Granatstein, 1998, p. 4). Bird explicitly mentioned that the onetime entrepreneurial luster of the phenomenon wore off since the kids have “moved in” on her doorstep.⁴⁸ Mayor Lastman also suggested that the befouling presence of squeegee kids had spread beyond city streets. He attributed the fecal motive to squeegee kids (and conjoined abjection and aggression) when he accused them of intimidating the public and fouling parks with human waste (see DeMara, 1998, p. B3).⁴⁹

on, sworn at, left with fender bruises from angry motorists” (Mercer, 1996, p. A7). This was, however, the only instance I found where drivers and not street-kids were characterized by an explicit reference to the abject.

⁴⁸ This is further evidence in favor of Joel Best’s “contextual” constructionism – the problem (indicated by an increase in letters taking an oppositional stance to squeegee kids) seemed to escalate in accordance with an increase in the presence of kids downtown. The subjective phenomenon whereby squeegee kids became a “social issue” was directly related to the objective condition in the streets.

⁴⁹ Interestingly, the traditional symbolic value of the squeegee is that of a purifying tool. Without any other associations or connotations, the squeegee is a source of cleanliness. But with squeegee kids, it was often associated with lawlessness (being stolen from service stations), the dirty bodies of the youthful squeegee practitioners, ‘dirty’ water, and foul behavior. Squeegees were even described as dangerous weapons in the hands of these kids (Jones, 1998, p. A9; Wallace, 1998b, p. 7; Wanagas & Warmington, 1998b, p. 5). Consequently, the squeegee – in this context – is less of a purification and more of a pollution or fecal archetype.

Coren said, “The water's dirty. I've seen the guys even relieving themselves in it” (“Panel discussion,” 1998). The *Sun* described squeegee kids who “carried needles, vomited, urinated in public and forced pedestrians onto the road” (Timberlake & Kingston, 1998, p. 4) and cited MPP Jim Brown’s reaction against squeegee kids’ “garbage strewn all over the place and the smell of urine rampant” (in Wanagas & Warmington, 1998a, p. 7). Hueson (1998) wrote to the *Star* about “squeegee kids keeping the neighbours awake all night, and brutally ruining an otherwise tranquil urban retreat by *defecating*, smashing liquor bottles and writing graffiti” (p. A19). A month later Tervit (1998) wrote to the *Sun* about how a downtown daycare playground “has become home to squeegee kids who sleep on the equipment, urinate, defecate and leave their used needles in the sand” (p. 31). Each of these claims was a moral rebuke that underscored squeegee kids’ constitution as a threat to the cleanliness of the entire city, not just as a nuisance to drivers. Reports of squeegee kids’ externalization of the internal identified them as impure and established them as potential objects of externalization from the body politic. As they purged their bodies in public they provided others with motivation to purge them from the streets and, by extension, the social order. Repeated mentions of squeegee kids’ polluting actions contributed to their public identity as human waste that defiled the public order, not just people befouling public parks with human waste.

SQUEEGEE KIDS – THE IMPERFECT VILLAIN

There is evidence, however, that the attitude of politicians such as Lastman was not altogether shared by the wider public. Calls for tougher action certainly found support. But not everyone supported a hard-line response such as legislation that would outlaw squeegeeing. For instance, at the beginning of August, a 1998 Ottawa survey

reported forty-five percent of respondents thought that squeegee kids should definitely not be allowed to continue their practice. Ebner and Spears (1998) reported, "the issue could be a political sleeper [but] it just doesn't get people excited" (p. B1). Admittedly, the sheer number of squeegee kids in Toronto may have inflamed greater passions than in Ottawa. The *Sun* reported the results of a Toronto-specific poll in October 1998. Two-thirds of respondents stated that squeegee kids were a safety hazard and should not be allowed on city streets. Yet it also reported that squeegee kids did not rank as a significant issue (Botchford, 1998b, p. 4). Thus, the construction of squeegee kids as a political enemy was not yet complete.

Furthermore, invective rhetoric was not directed exclusively at squeegee kids. Pundits like Frum warned politicians not to tolerate this burgeoning disorder when squeegee kids were only threatening to appear on the Canadian scene. Now that squeegee kids seemed omnipresent in downtown Toronto, politicians were indeed held to blame. Bob Macdonald (1998) wrote to the *Sun* and asked, "What happened to our safe city?" He ultimately identified "the gutless, destructive and vote-seeking opportunism of our politicians" (p. 36) as a key factor. The *Star*'s criticism tended to censure city council for contemplating a crackdown while the *Sun* typically reproached city council for wasting tax dollars on ineffectual gestures aimed at improving the lot of squeegee kids. For instance, *Star* columnist Coyne (1998) took one councillor to task for "truckling to the advantaged and aiming his trumped-up righteousness at the easiest of targets" (p. B1). As the following letter to the *Star* indicates, disapproval of government did not seem contingent upon sympathy for its targets. "I am not against banning or cracking down on squeegee kids and panhandlers. ... But what infuriates me is, why now? ... It's leaders

and people on top, especially politicians, who are responsible for both this hypocrisy and the ever-present injustices. They are worse than squeegee kids and panhandlers” (Migliarisi, 1998, p. A15). The “gutlessness” of politicians was also cause for comment when Toronto’s municipal government announced it could take no action against squeegee kids because the provincial government had not provided the proper “tools” to do so. A *Toronto Star* editorial declared, “the province’s inaction does not let the city off the hook. Both governments have a responsibility to act” (“Street kids,” 1998, p. A28). When the provincial government ultimately did act, however, it too was accused of vote-seeking opportunism.

Regardless of the political gains to be won, the promise to eliminate squeegee kids from the body politic embodied Burke’s principle of entelechy insofar as it promised to purify, and thus ultimately perfect, the social order. Purgation is a means of perfection. The end of the line of squeegee-problem-solving was a vision of “Toronto the Good” (and by extension, a vision of the good society) without squeegee kids in it. Burke argued that a given terminology contains various implications. “No matter whether the motivation is toward good or evil ends, we strive to achieve the perfection implicit in our perspectives” (Heath, 1986, p. 104). The implications within the government’s rhetoric were clear. Regular vilification of squeegee kids (and the declaration of war against them) identified them as villains. This identity entailed the motivational possibility of a perfect villain. However, it must be noted that even though there may have been an overall sense of acrimony surrounding squeegee kids, many members of the public disapproved of what some termed “draconian” measures to get rid of them. For instance, every letter to the editor that was printed in the *Toronto Sun* on August 1 (15 in total) was

on the subject of squeegee kids. The majority opposed a crackdown on squeegee kids. (8 letters obviously identified with the overall condition of those squeegeeing, 5 identified with efforts to cut back on them, and 2 were “neutral” insofar as they defended kids but also expressed irritation at them.) In other words, squeegee kids were not yet constructed as the “perfect” villain.

Loseke suggests that there are three distinct strategies for constructing villains, a more complex process than constructing victims. I suggest that the claims of squeegee detractors tended to fall within her third category: constructions of a “true villain deserving condemnation.” Many politicians, such as Mayor Lastman, used language that encouraged audiences to imagine nothing good about squeegee kids. Burke used Hitler as an example of total evil. This was, however, a difficult label to make stick to squeegee kids. As Loseke (2003a) states, “in these instances, the strategy is first to construct *unthinkable* harm done to victims. What this extreme construction does is silence competing claims that might deflect blame; it constructs a villain as a dangerous outsider, as not one of us, as somehow less than human” (p. 299). There were instances of dehumanizing rhetoric prior to 1998. These included comments such as, “the squeegee kids blink like lab animals” (“Squeegees stayin’ alive,” 1997, p. 6), and a number of instances where the *Toronto Sun* lamented the city’s “wiper vipers” (“\$50Gs handout, 1997, 3; “Oath to squeegee by,” 1997, 6). This association with snakes invokes the quality of treachery since the snake is symbolically linked to the serpent in the Garden of Eden (see Scheibel, 1995). Thus, to typify kids as “wiper vipers” is to say that they have not resisted the temptation of acting improperly.

References to squeegee kids as “somehow less than human” also tended to cluster around 1998’s declaration of war. In the *Toronto Sun*, Bird (1998) suggested that they constituted “new wildlife in the urban jungle” (p. C3). Meanwhile, Bowers (1998) wrote to the *Star* and similarly described squeegee kids as parasites, milkers of the system, and wolves who must not be tolerated (p. A15). Charron (1998) a squeegee kid, rebutted a previous letter to the *Star*: “I would remind ‘real’ people in this and every other city where we work that we are indeed people too” (p. A17). Contrarily, Conservative MPP Jim Brown reinforced squeegee kids’ status as outsiders: “They look like grubs. I don’t mind the colorful hair, the piercings everywhere, but at least they should bathe, and they don’t” (cited in Shaw, 1998, A17). This indictment is telling: squeegee kids were not classified as urban pariahs because of the threat of systemic violence. Instead, they were shunned because they were discomfiting. If it was not the nonconformist accoutrements of the youthful punk aesthetic, it was their grimy or squalid condition that was to blame. While squeegee kids were the subjects of many angry claims, they were usually reprimanded as an annoyance, not a danger. It was a rare claim that typified squeegee kids as actually dangerous. When they were so described, it was usually as a danger to themselves.

Quite simply, even though many claims-makers expressed considerable displeasure, the nature of squeegee kids’ actions was not so extreme that people claimed unthinkable harm was done to them or their environment. Drivers’ claims of victimization generally occupied one of three categories: the quite rare claim of property damage to one’s car, the more frequent claim that one’s personal space was invaded because of unwanted touching of one’s car, or, most frequently, the complaint that one’s

commute was made more inconvenient. These claims did not silence competing claims from squeegee-friendly claims-makers. However, this side's appeals were also underwhelming. As I have already mentioned, the defense that squeegee kids were poor or youthful seemed to offer up increasingly little protection. When OCAP claimed that the government was responsible for squeegee kids' condition, letter-writers and editorials contrarily suggested that squeegeeing was not a condition but a conscious choice – an action often motivated by an individual's decision to intimidate drivers and gain quick cash to buy drugs. Squeegee defenders also regularly refused to construct squeegee kids as any particular type of person. This sort of claim suggested that anybody could turn to squeegeeing – it could be anyone's child or anyone who fell through the cracks. But this type of claim also asked a lot of its audience; it asked people to consider squeegeeing as a symptom of a more complex constellation of problems. As such, these claims led to no solution at all; they increased the collective guilt instead of purging it.

I suggest that the early stages of the squeegee discourse exhibited a more pronounced dichotomy than that which existed at the end of 1998. Early on, squeegee kids were likely to be cast as one of two different types of problem populations. They were either strange, threatening, and undeserving of sympathy, or they were the most familiar, sympathetic, and deserving characters of all – our children. Anti-drug campaigners confronted this same dichotomy (see Sharp, 1994). However, the media increasingly reported the image of mature squeegeers and constituted them as agents who though not villainous, were annoying. By the end of 1998 they may or may not have been seen as criminals or may or may not have been perceived as needy but they were identified as strange and were constituted as outsiders by most citizens. The Monarchist

League of Canada clarified squeegee kids' status as an object of pity or disgust. An organization spokesperson was cited in the *Sun* asking people to commemorate the one-year anniversary of Princess Diana's death with a random act of kindness: "We want people to do something that she might have wanted. So smile at squeegee kids, who we normally scowl at" (cited in Botchford, 1998a, p. 4).

CONCLUSION

After the height of squeegee tensions in the summer, many expressed a general belief that the onset of colder weather would clear the streets of squeegee kids. With fewer squeegee kids, the number of altercations should decrease, tensions would recede, rhetoric would be tempered, and perhaps the problem would seem to disappear as it had in previous years. Public reproaches of squeegee kids did decrease but the issue stayed in the public eye. In early August, Premier Harris reiterated the government's desire to outlaw squeegee kids. The *Sun* quoted his promise that "Legislation may be drafted quickly" even as the Premier cautioned against overreaction: "There has been a lot of focus on the issue. It's a catchy, newsy issue but it's certainly not dominating anybody's agenda, including city council" (cited in Harder, 1998, p. 26).

This changed in 1999 when squeegee kids became an issue in the Progressive Conservative re-election agenda. In the meantime, though, Queen's Park commenced another session at the end of September 1998 and the provincial government indicated that it would consider an amendment to the Highway Traffic Act to adequately enforce laws against squeegee kids. This followed a summer report from the Crime Control Commission to the premier's office outlining ways to curb squeegee kids. Even though the Provincial government had not yet made squeegee kids a priority, it was aware that

squeegeeing was a dramatic and polarizing topic and it positioned itself as a purifying agent ready to sacrifice squeegee kids to ensure the safety of Ontario.

One did not need to agree with Williamson's (1998) assertion in the *Sun* that squeegee kids were pests to concede her point that "everyone's talking about squeegee people these days. The squeegee trend became a squeegee plague, and then the inevitable squeegee backlash" (p. 15). This chapter has shown how the summer of 1998 represented the pinnacle of this backlash with more anti-squeegee rhetoric than ever before (or ever since). It also outlined how, at the same time, there were fairly frequent expressions of anti-politician sentiment for government treatment of squeegee kids. Consequently, this chapter has demonstrated that even in the midst of great demonizing rhetoric, squeegee kids were not yet completely identified as villains. By the end of 1998 one could not help but acknowledge the widespread arousal of squeegee-related guilt. The purification of this guilt had been promised many times but it had not yet occurred. One final move towards the cleansing of this guilt would occur in 1999.

CHAPTER 9: MEDIA ANALYSIS III – 1999

This chapter will reveal a number of important shifts in the way that people spoke about squeegee kids. It will describe how the provincial government established itself as the primary protagonist-agent in the fight against squeegee kids. Also, it will outline how, once province-wide measures to deal with squeegeeing were introduced, the specific problem of squeegeeing seemed to recede and more general problems such as crime (and concerns about young people) began to supplant specific squeegee-based claims.

INACTION AND FRUSTRATION AT THE CITY LEVEL

As 1999 commenced, the squeegee gauntlet was passed, so to speak, from the municipal government to the provincial government. Amongst many rancorous debates, Toronto's politicians announced there was very little else they could do about the "problem" if there were no measures to discourage squeegee activity. By this point in the discourse, stories about politicians' attempts to deal with squeegee kids occurred just as often as stories about squeegee kids themselves. The objective condition of squeegeeing in the streets still existed and many were unnerved by this disruption, but each attempt to deal with it seemed to amount to little. Frustration with politicians seemed just as prominent as frustration with squeegee kids. Squeegeeing remained the source of some moralizing, but with a little bit of time and perspective, 1998's clamor for action somehow seemed out of proportion to the objective danger posed by squeegeeing. In the spring, after the previous summer's feverish arousal of squeegee tensions, Ontario Crime Commission member Toni Skarica conceded the squeegee problem "dropped off" as an issue in the fall of 1998 (cited in Levy, 1999e, p. 17). For some, there seemed to be

especially little imperative to elevate the issue when it was compared to others. Early on in the year, the *Toronto Sun* ("City that works?," 1999) acknowledged the objective condition but mocked City Hall's subjective definition of squeegeeing as a crisis:

Government is all about setting priorities. Snow removal and garbage collection, delivered at reasonable cost, are real priorities - not grants to squeegee kids et al., which preoccupied so much of this council's time in its maiden year. And after the great snow storm of '99, the last thing we need is yet another snow job from this council. (p. C1)

But snowfall and garbage are not as dramatic as squeegeeing (unless solutions to these problems involve something drastic – such as enlisting the military to help with their removal). And, just like snow and garbage, efforts to eliminate squeegee kids did little to stop them from reappearing anew. Now there seemed to be increasing acknowledgement not just of the cyclical nature of squeegeeing but also of the repeated failed attempts to deal with the problem. For the past four years both pundits and members of the public had either warned of a coming infestation or implored the government to do something about this invasion of squeegee kids. Yet it seemed as though every proposed squeegee solution had done little to slow the growth of the condition (if indeed they had not contributed to the problem, as many argued, because Toronto refused to crack down on squeegeeing as other jurisdictions had). When squeegeeing first appeared in Toronto's streets, it was novel and it won a lot of attention. With many issues, once the novelty wanes, it is natural for the public and the media to become bored or distracted (see Downs, 1972).

But with squeegeeing, the novelty did not subside as time passed. As I have already stated, the dramatic nature of the act kept it in the public eye as long as people continued to squeegee. Squeegeeing also continued to attract a lot of attention since

numerous attempts to deal with it failed to produce a solution that would (a) reduce the incidence of squeegeeing, (b) assist those who engaged in the activity, and (c) be legally defensible. The most newsworthy aspect of squeegeeing, now, was not the interaction ritual between drivers and squeegee kids but the tension among politicians and the lack of issue resolution. The media, depending on their subjective definition of the condition, dramatized assistance to squeegee kids as something proposed by misguided head-in-the-sky politicians or something undermined by mean-spirited politicians. The one constant was the expression of disappointment in appraisals of the city's attempts to deal with the condition. By this point, the debate over squeegeeing increasingly appeared to be about how politicians could position themselves relative to other politicians rather than actually dealing with the condition.

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT FINALLY STEPS IN

Apart from the occasional reference, squeegee kids did not really appear as a major object of concern in 1999 until the Ontario provincial government revealed its *Blueprint* – its pre-election package outlining its future policies. Consequently, this next section is a slight departure from previous sections. Instead of focusing on claims in the media, this next section is dominated by an analysis of government language in its own position document. This is because – unlike previous stages in the issue's development – claims-makers in the media now had a specific focus. Unlike discrete debates in city council or isolated reports of squeegee encounters, the *Blueprint* document and the role of squeegee kids in the provincial government's re-election platform provided an opportunity for sustained attention on a specific series of claims.

As an expression of the government's ideological position, the *Blueprint* document can be seen as the "bureaucratization of the imaginative." This is Burke's (1959) term "designed to name the vexing things that happen when men try to translate some pure aim or vision into terms of its corresponding material embodiment" (p. xiii). This document contained a section titled "A Safer Ontario" which promised to make aggressive panhandling a provincial offense and promised to "give police the power to crack down on squeegee kids." As Walkom (1999) suggested in the *Star*, "In 'Blueprint,' there are enemies everywhere. The world it describes is one of dark fears - of aggressive panhandlers who block city streets and squeegee kids who leap out at intersections to harass middle-class motorists" (p. A2). Nowhere in this call to arms against troublemakers such as squeegee kids is there an affirmation of some agrarian ideal from the past to which we should return. Still, it features the rhetoric of loss, an idiom rooted in the language of social responsibility that "is not concerned with mourning the extinction of something but rather inveighing against its devaluation" (Ibarra and Kitsuse, 1993, pp. 33-34). The government typified itself as the custodian of public order and safety (and encouraged the public to see itself as consubstantial with the government in this quest).

Rather than emphasizing the beauty or purity of the urban scene, *Blueprint* serves as an example of Burke's idea that "man is an inventor of the negative" (quoted in Golden et. al, 1976, p. 335). The government presented the positive idea of freedom, which can be explained fully only by employing the language of the negative (and the negative image of squeegee kids and their association with disorder and deviancy). One can even suggest that *Blueprint* offered an account of social relations that rendered demands for 'purification' intelligible and reasonable. It invoked a sense of widespread

disorder and offered a consubstantiality between the government agenda and those who felt threatened.

Blueprint's story of a citizenry and its need to reform Ontario's dangerous streets implied the existence of a collective subject (the protagonist of the contemporary drama, who experiences, suffers, and acts) and seems similar (in some ways) to Charland's (1994, pp. 218-219) account of the Québécois. The picture of society invoked by the government's *Blueprint* document was just that – an image of a society that was constituted out of words. It was not an objective rendering of society devoid of or separate from human interpretation. As such, *Blueprint* constituted a mythical public just as Charland's (1994) analysis of the Quebec government's White Paper identified a mythical "people." *Blueprint* offered voters a picture of a society on the brink of (further) ruin, a besieged population of lawful citizens confronted by moral degeneracy and threatened by ever-present potential violence. It rhetorically constituted a sense of insecurity and a specific outcry against the threatening image of squeegee kids and aggressive panhandlers.

Certain specific types of disorderly people were constituted as enemies of an order-loving society through the language of the *Blueprint* document. It is possible to see *Blueprint* as a proposal for a tragic purge that is "the sacrifice of victims whose suffering and death serve as a vicarious atonement for our guilt. ... Tragedy begins with a firm statement of belief in some principle and dooms those who threaten it" (Duncan, 1962, p. 395), and the *Blueprint* document can be seen as the expression of one such principle – that of law and order. The tragic villain "is beyond hope, an enemy who must be destroyed, for if he is not he will destroy us" (ibid.). There was no formal rhetoric that

identified squeegee kids and aggressive panhandlers as 'beyond hope.' However, they were identified as frustrated others who did not take kindly to others' commandments. Generally speaking, their vice distinguished others' virtue and they became representative of 'the fall' of the social order.

With the *Blueprint* document, the government reiterated the former Crime Control Commissioner's claim that squeegeeing was a pan-provincial concern. Suddenly, the scene was no longer a troubled city but a province threatened with disorder. Squeegeeing was now positioned as a threat to the entire province and not only major cities in which it seemed to exist. It could be argued that politicians universalized the problem to impress upon the electorate the perceived severity of the threat and the need for tough anti-squeegee and panhandler measures. In order to bring about the paradise of a safer Ontario, the government promised to keep the problem of squeegee kids from spreading. This symbolism is reinforced in Mandel's (1999) description of the government's choice of "scene" for the 1999 election call in "Pleasantville, er, I mean Newmarket, a nice, small town that is Harris country, the quintessential white, middle-class source of his support. ... No squeegee kids live here, no panhandlers, either" (p. 5).

MAKING KIDS (RHETORICALLY) CRIMINAL

With an election looming, authorities no longer merely described squeegee kids as disruptive. Now their criminality also became a major focus of the discourse. While earlier accounts attributed a directional substance to squeegee kids by speaking of their rising numbers, stories now tended to suggest a directional substance by describing their increasing volatility or violence. The *Sun* printed claims by both Artuso (1999, p. 5) and Levy (1999e, p. 17) that suggested squeegee kids were becoming "more aggressive."

Elsewhere, the *National Post* reported that crime ranked third on a list of Ontario voter concerns (Frum & Duffy, 1999, p. A6). Yet this fear was in the face of a downward trend of serious crimes. It seemed that Ontarians were worried by civic disorder: “petty” crimes such as panhandling, squeegeeing, vandalism, and public drunkenness.

The act-agent ratio of “squeegeeing-criminal” is evident in the following claim by a downtown Toronto police officer in the *Star*: “A good 50 per cent of the squeegee kids who have migrated here from Quebec and B.C. have warrants out for them at home” (Taylor, 1999, p. D15). The symbolic action of such claims helped to identify squeegee kids through a new act-agent ratio: “squeegee-criminal” replaced “squeegee-nuisance.” The Premier elevated squeegee kids to the top of the political agenda by making crime an issue and making squeegee kids criminals. He repeatedly claimed Liberal Party leader Dalton McGuinty (his main political opponent) was “soft on crime”⁵⁰ and said that legislation to make squeegeeing and aggressive panhandling provincial offences was “a top priority for us” (cited in Levy, 1999f, p. 17). Responding in turn, commentators regularly pointed out that squeegee kids seemed to be the election’s main issue (Fotheringham, 1999, p. 16).⁵¹

⁵⁰ While the Conservatives made crime a key component of their re-election campaign, the Liberals devoted only one page of their 24-page platform to safe communities (with no clear promises on how to obtain them, unlike their P.C. counterparts). Meanwhile, the New Democrats’ platform did not even mention the word crime and none of its six key election promises involved justice. The *Star* quoted Pollster Frank Graves of Ekos Research who said the Tories “owned” crime with 68 per cent of people polled saying Harris is the leader best suited to deal with it (Mallan, 1999, p. B4).

⁵¹ Ironically, as the province was ratcheting up the attention given to squeegee kids and panhandlers, municipal politicians seemed less troubled by the condition (see Levy, 1999d, p. 17). As one indicator of this, Toronto city councillors’ list of city priorities they felt should be addressed in the provincial campaign included no mention of the need for tougher legislation to combat the problem of squeegee kids (Levy, 1999c, p. 15).

Of course, the 1999 Ontario provincial election was more than a referendum on squeegee kids. It was a referendum on the overall policies and values of the governing Progressive Conservative Party. For the government's purposes, squeegee kids had emerged over the last number of years as an issue that stood in for the larger issue of what was wrong with Ontario. Part of this was because disorderly squeegee kids stood in for the perceived and perennial problem of youth, and discourses about youth regularly serve as a reflection upon (a) how well we have instituted the social relations we wish and, (b) a reflection on the future of the social relations we have instituted. By trumpeting the need for law and order and greater safety in the streets, the government's campaign sought to convince the electorate to identify its beliefs and values with those of the party. Before the election was even called there were hints that law and order would play a key role in the government's bid for re-election and that a focus on youth would accompany this. Premier Harris floated plans to instill more discipline in Ontario's schools in a speech to the Canadian Jewish Congress in early February. The *Star* reported this:

With that speech, Harris kicked off what has become a routine performance of tough talk. That night, the focus was young people, teaching respect and responsibility and the Conservatives' unsuccessful campaign to push Ottawa to revamp the Young Offenders Act and force 16- and 17-year-olds to be tried as adults. (Mallan, 1999, p. B4)

A crackdown on youth figured prominently in the provincial government's pre-election crime platform (released at the end of April 1999). Along with highlighting squeegee kids, it proposed to make parents financially responsible for property damage and other consequences of their law-breaking children. The government committed to petition the federal government to revise the Young Offenders Act so kids under 12 could be prosecuted and people over 15 could be tried and punished as adults. It sought the

right to refuse to pay provincial legal aid when a young person's parents could afford the cost of a lawyer. It also proposed stricter rules for all teens including uniforms in any school where most parents wanted them and 'strict discipline schooling programs' (i.e. boot camps) for youth who were so unruly that they required additional external controls.

As one commentator in the *Star* observed, of all the dangers facing the province, according to the government, "it is the kids who are scariest of all" (Walkom, 1999, p. 2). A *Montreal Gazette* article made a similar point: "Considering that most young people can't even vote, they sure are playing a large role in the Ontario election campaign" ("Election campaign," 1999, p. D8). Squeegee kids were a dramatic reminder of the Premier's position that youth were increasingly undisciplined and disrespectful. The government made crime an issue and they also made child discipline an issue. The proposed criminalization of squeegee kids was a policy action that gave life to the symbolic action of Premier Harris's rhetoric: "[Young people] need to know what the line is - what's acceptable and what isn't, and that there are consequences for going over the line" (ibid.). The government's platform exhibited a tragic frame for understanding squeegee kids. "Tragedy emphasizes crime whereas comedy emphasizes stupidity" (Burke, 1959, p. 41). Unlike the comic attitude that is contemplative and open-minded and whose solutions are speculative and possibly fallible, "tragedy reinforces belief in a social order" (Carlson, 1986, p. 448) and does so in a strident manner.

SPECIFYING KIDS AS A POLITICAL ENEMY

When politicians invoked the figure of the squeegee kid in the summer of 1999 (and elevated squeegeeing from a contentious social issue to a political problem), it was a means to achieve electoral success. Language claims that cast squeegee kids as enemies

of public order encouraged citizens who shared the government's values and attitudes to identify with it, but they also provided the opportunity for the public to unite together with the party and identify against a common foe. Squeegee kids emerged as a scapegoat in this nexus of simultaneous identification-with and division-from. The reasons for this are complex. Guilt naturally occurs when one is confronted by 'pollution' such as the visible failing of the ideal, safe, and civil society in the streets. Thus, while the *Star* argued "the one tremendous advantage of squeegeeing is its visibility"⁵² (Wirsig & Clutterbuck, 1998, p. A22), I suggest that this was also its greatest disadvantage.

Squeegee kids were targeted for elimination partially because their actions were more "in your face" than other more pernicious activities. Squeegee kids were not identified as scapegoats because of the objective nature of the threat they posed or because of what may have been their intentions or motivations. Instead, we came to understand squeegee kids as a scapegoat and as a political enemy because of the way in which representations circulate within society.

Squeegee kids were targeted because the discourse surrounding them clearly identified them as outsiders. Because of all the claims made about them, it was evident that a portion of the population was intimidated by their actions, put-off by their manner of dress, and irritated when their vehicles were touched without permission. Because of their economic status, it was also evident that squeegee kids had little means at their disposal to defend against such victimage. Consequently, squeegee kids at least had *the potential* to become the nigh-perfect scapegoat. Perfect redemption requires a perfect scapegoat but public condemnation of squeegeeing – though extensive – was never

⁵² The idea, here, was that as long as youth were on street corners, the risk of severe health problems or the temptation to turn to illicit activity for survival was lessened.

thoroughgoing. However, it is possible to see squeegee kids as a safe target against which the government could channel discontent since they were typified as poor, young, and hooligans. The moniker of youth seemed to generate the most resentment. For instance, Troster (1999) wrote to the *Star* and said, "I never cease to be amazed at the term 'kids' being applied to them. Doesn't 'kid' imply a certain innocence, or childlike behaviour?" Overall, squeegee kids were rarely typified as children but were frequently typified as adults. They were both youth, and not-youth, depending on what claim one wanted to make at the moment. The *Sun* outlined one point of view:

A study published in the Canadian Journal of Public Health found 48% of the 88 street youth in downtown Toronto who took part in a recent survey reported some hunger and/or absolute food deprivation in the 30 days before they were interviewed. ... Those living on the street or squatting in abandoned buildings and those relying on street-based activities for income such as squeegee kids and panhandlers, were particularly vulnerable. (Lem, 1999, p. 27)

This picture was one of young people who fled abusive situations and survived by panhandling, squeegeeing, prostitution, drug dealing, and welfare. Here, kids were constructed as threatened and endangered. But though they were typified as vulnerable, they were not innocent or uncontaminated. Through their association with irksome activities such as panhandling and squeegeeing, and deviant activities such as prostitution and drug-dealing (all of which were also typified as voluntaristic), these kids did not qualify as unabashed victims. Instead, they were typified as uncontrollable and potentially violent (at worst), and non-conformist and anti-social (at best). Squeegee kids were not necessarily either 'victims' or 'threats'; they could be both, simultaneously. This was demonstrated in a letter that was printed, interestingly enough, in both the *Toronto Star* and the *Toronto Sun* (five days later):

I understand that these kids often come from bad family situations - just as I would understand the same about a kid who mugged me - but that doesn't mean I have to prostrate myself before them and invite them to trample roughshod over my rights. They're not the only ones with problems. ... I would tell these kids' defenders that [they're] ... reinforcing a very real form of hooliganism. ... Anyone who calls me an anal, reactionary, cold-hearted, redneck, kid-hater ought to try driving for a living in this city 12 hours a day for a few weeks. Poor kids? Poor drivers. (E. Fox, 1999, p. 15)

Letters like Fox's were cathartic for, in their rejection of squeegee kids, people released their frustration with the seemingly disorderly reality around them. Also, they defined themselves in contrast to the characteristics of disorder they criticized. Some continued to argue that squeegee kids were not at all "kid-like" (Sonmor, 1999, p. 5; Rickard, 1999, p. 17), but an even more popular claim was that squeegeeing was a youthful lifestyle *choice*. Meyer (1999) argued this when he suggested that the *Star* should stop "treating squeegee kids as downtrodden members of society, because they are not." This perspective was even more common in the *Sun*. Blizzard (1999a) said, "I know also there are many young people who simply view cleaning windshields as a means to an end. And the end is ticking off good ol' mom and dad" (p. 15) and Levy (1999f) suggested, "many squeegee kids view it as a lifestyle – a way to finance a summer vacation or make more money for their Nike sneakers and jackets" (p. 17). These claims contested those of the Shout Clinic's report on homeless youth and employment. It reported that of Toronto's homeless youth and street kids, panhandlers and squeegee kids had the lowest education levels, the worst health and were likely living in squats, parks or under bridges (see Dunphy, 1999). Of the youth population interviewed, only 36 per cent worked at panhandling or squeegeeing.⁵³

⁵³ The other 64% of the population earned money in other ways: 19% - from crimes; 18% - social assistance; 17% - paid employment; 10% - jobs in the sex trade.

Reports such as Blizzard's and Levy's are obviously subjective while the Shout Clinic presented its findings as objective. The continuing debate meant neither set of claims was authoritative. Regardless of whether they were seen as thrill-seeking suburbanites or a part of the homeless population, squeegee kids continued to raise public ire and the government continued to identify them as one of many purification-deserving villains in the provincial election of 1999. As Burke put it, "Ostracism ... attempted to solve the problem of "hubris" by amputating from the body politic whatever member seemed swollen to the point of becoming a threat to the public welfare" (cited in Jennermann, 1982, p. 35). There are many reasons why politicians made squeegee kids into a political target before other guilt-producing groups (such as the homeless population). For one thing, the squeegee kid population seemed to be growing exponentially. Homelessness was a familiar public woe but the frequency and prevalence of downtown squeegeeing demanded more attention, in part because it was more novel and because there was an available solution (in terms of a crackdown and a law outlawing such behavior).

Also, homelessness is a tremendously old problem and associated with deeply ingrained prior thought patterns. Unlike squeegeeing, it has preoccupied religious thought for thousands of years being interpreted as either a punishment from God or a provocation to charity. By 1999, the moral commentary and the pathos that accompanied homelessness did not generally extend to squeegeeing. For instance, in a report for the *Star*, Mascoll (1999) quoted the city of Toronto's budget chief and his desire to resolve what he called the moral issue of homelessness: "What I found was people in a pathetic state." The majority of the people on the street, he concluded, were chronic alcoholics,

drug addicted or mentally ill. He did not include 'cultural' street groups, like "the so-called squeegee kids." Finally, squeegeeing was proximate to downtown residents and suburban commuters alike and visible to both drivers and pedestrians in a way that homelessness typically was not. This meant that squeegeeing could be typified as a threat to public (and private) safety in a way that homelessness was not.

The 1999 Ontario provincial election provided an opportunity to test the public's appetite for the government's framing of squeegee kids as a blame-worthy problem population. Interestingly, squeegeeing and aggressive panhandling did not generate substantial coverage as *featured* issues during the course of the election. But the government continued to raise the issue as something that demanded action and squeegee kids were often mentioned as a symbol of things-gone-wrong. Broadly speaking, for those allied with the government, squeegee kids represented disorder that needed to be corrected. For those opposed to the government, they represented the folly of Conservative policies that similarly needed to be stopped and rectified. On June 3, 1999, the Ontario Progressive Conservative Party was elected to a second term as the province's government. Blizzard (1999b) commented on this in the *Sun*: "The Harris Tories were elected on a platform to clean up squeegee kids and aggressive panhandlers, so let's not whine when they go ahead and do it" (p. 15). It is true that the government's re-election platform - its so-called *Blueprint* - declared squeegee kids to be an object of concern. But it was still a surprise for many when the government announced that a law to rid the streets of squeegee kids was one of the province's three top priorities for the coming legislative session (alongside tax cuts and legislation banning deficits) (see Blackwell, 1999, p. A9). The government called this law the Safe Streets Act. This was

one source of Premier Mike Harris' and the Progressive Conservative Government's success: they actually did what they said they would do. Even still, some questioned whether squeegee kids actually deserved such a prominent position on the legislative agenda. An editorial in the *Toronto Star* ("Skewed priorities," 1999) questioned the government's priorities and asked why Attorney-General Jim Flaherty "brought along a prop for the media - a squeegee he tossed into a garbage can." Perhaps the government believed that the symbolic action of its words was not evocative enough. Rochefort and Cobb (1994) address this belief:

Actions speak louder than words, it is commonly said. However, in the world of politics and policymaking, this is not necessarily so, and in any case the two are inextricable; actions and words influence and even stand for each other as embodiments of the ideas, arguments, convictions, demands, and perceived realities that direct the public enterprise. (p. 27)

Actions such as Flaherty's symbolic toss of a squeegee into the garbage made for dramatic images. This action made the attorney general into a purifying agent by means of disposal. The squeegee (originally a purification symbol that had been sullied by its association with the dirtiness and lawlessness of squeegee kids) became trash and, as such, was solidified as a pollution symbol. By extension, the squeegee kids become human trash (or refuse) as the government announced (and enacted) its refusal to tolerate squeegee kids any longer. "Trash is refuse. To be refuse is to be deemed unacceptable" (Aho, 1998, pp. 73-74). The squeegee, in this instance, stood in for all "those impulses which, if unchecked (unnegated, unmortified) would return man to the jungles from whence he came" (Rueckert, 1982a, p. 149). Thus, the disposal of the squeegee into the trash did not merely symbolize the government's intentions to dispose of the human nuisance/pests. It also dramatized the government's desire to negate all the fecal or

pollution connotations attached to it and to prevent further human regression back to our base ways that was associated with squeegeeing.

The action of squeegeeing itself was certainly dramatic. But it was really the symbolic action of language – the cumulative words used in the media (by journalists, editors, letter-writers, and politicians alike) that made squeegee kids into a substantial subject of concern. Language about squeegee kids typified them as “the presence or threat of an adversary,” and set the stage, so to speak, for “the agonistic or competitive stress” (Burke, 1950, p. 52) that characterized squeegee discourse. This agonistic discourse actually culminated in 1998 as Toronto politicians and other public claim-makers divided the urban realm into a battlefield over squeegee kids. But 1999 saw the provincial government deliver on its promise to provide municipalities with the necessary tools to do away with squeegee kids. The accompanying debate guaranteed that competing visions of Ontario would continue to be defined in terms of the squeegee kid.

SQUEEGEE KIDS AS AGON

Dramatic media accounts of squeegee kids may have contributed to a climate of fear for *some* readers. But they exposed *all* readers to a climate of divisiveness. Burke describes this agonistic emphasis thusly: “Even as Aristotle is teaching one man how most effectively to make people say “yes,” he is teaching an opponent how to make them say just as forceful a “no”” (ibid.). For instance, reports that typified squeegee kids as unkempt and malodorous tended to produce two quite disparate responses. Some letters to the editor agreed with the description while others leapt to the defense of the kids and scorned the account rather than the kids themselves. This agonistic scene was ever apparent; there was never one monolithic vision of squeegee kids presented to the public.

Readers always had the opportunity to respond “yes” or “no” to reports of squeegee activity and – once the issue became thoroughly infused with party politics – “yes” or “no” to parties’ visions of the province and of the future. The words themselves are proxies for visions of social order. By 1999, the principle of the agon had become clear. It was hinted at in debates between contrasting, conflicting colorful characters but it was really evident in terms of dramatic, opposing images of the province as they were expressed in the year’s provincial election campaign.

The following quotation from the *National Post* expresses a sense of the polarization and division that had become the status quo of Ontario Politics: “It’s us against them. The hard-working taxpaying citizens against the welfare bums, the squeegee kids and the union bosses” (Rebick, 1999a, p. B5). This enunciates the dialectical opposition of good versus bad, order versus disorder and lazy versus industrious, but it also demonstrates how both pro-squeegee and anti-squeegee (or anti-government and pro-government) sides saw themselves as forces for good and typified the other side as bad. When Rebick accused others of articulating an “us versus them” vision, she ironically did the same. Thus, good and bad may be more discursively alike than different. There is a kind of morose irony (that Burke uses to describe the ‘unpleasant’ hero) evident in both sides of the squeegee debate wherein each side “laments, rejoices, beseeches, admonishes, aphorizes, and inveighs, to be sure, but always in a repellent manner” (Burke, 1932, pp. xii-xiii).

Squeegee kids represented this sense of polarization. They stood in as a sort of shorthand for cleavages between middle-aged and younger people, between high income and low income, and between suburban and urban residents. They symbolized the debate

between left and right, between those who believed they possessed superior insight into social problems (and were owed the obedience of society) and those who believed that no such superior insight was possessed. The important point here is not that people like Rebick blamed Harris for this discord (or that Harris blamed squeegee kids). Rather, the crux of the matter is that the state of Ontario politics was spoken of in terms of *the* other, not some generalized other. Liberal Leader Dalton McGuinty protested Harris's "politics of division." But division is the "dark side" of identification. By focusing on hot-button issues such as mandatory treatment for addicts on welfare, laws to limit panhandlers and squeegee kids, and mandatory testing of teachers, the Tories may have divided the electorate but they also successfully articulated a future vision for Ontario. A clean, safe and orderly future society was identified, in part, by attributing a criminal substance to squeegee kids and aggressive panhandlers in the present. And, in articulating their vision of society, they defeated the alternative vision because it was articulated, too.

The fundamental point I wish to make here is that squeegee kids really only became substantial as a public problem when the principle of the agon spread beyond the actors in the immediate interaction between squeegee kids and drivers. It took the media's propagation of claims about squeegeeing to transform an objective condition involving private adversaries into a problematic condition whereby squeegee kids had become public foes. Consequently, the conflict over one's windshield became representative of decidedly contrasting views about the fate of the city. This was a battle that became even more evident after 1999's provincial election in which the Progressive Conservatives won a majority government. Up to this point, there was still a debate over the fate of squeegee kids. However, after the election, anti-squeegee legislation was

enacted. I suggest that most of the continuing debate about squeegee kids was now intended as an *expressive orientation* rather than action meant to influence the fate of squeegee kids. Compared to instrumental arguments that set out a deliberate course of action carefully calculated to achieve a desired end, “expressive arguments typically reflect broader and deeper cultural and ideological values and therefore can be potent in assigning negatively viewed target populations to their socially constructed ghettos” (Bosso, 1994, p. 188).

When it came to squeegee kids, I suggest that the expression of one’s cause and the enunciation of one’s issue as an end in itself became more important in the post-election period when it was clear that the government planned to proceed with its squeegee crackdown. Now, when vicarious combatants such as politicians and organizations such as OCAP added their voices to the debate it only reinforced what seemed like intractably opposed visions of the city. On the one side, the Mayor established a Safer City Task Force. This was formed in response to complaints that police were not visible in many neighborhoods and that the use of public spaces was dropping due to criminal activity (see S. Black, 1999, p. B2). The Mayor also instructed the police to go ahead with a community action policing plan. Police were paid overtime to crack down on squeegee kids, prostitution, drug dealing and vagrants sleeping in parks.

The inspector in charge of the city’s community-based policing downplayed interest in increasing arrests while emphasizing the need to eliminate disorderly behavior: “We are talking about harmony here, and what type of social order we want. ... You can dress any way you want. You can look any way you want. What is problematic is when your activity is causing stress within the community” (cited in Steward, 1999a, p. 15).

The implication behind the inspector's comments (in the *Sun*) is that guilt-causing phenomena are legitimate targets for police or government purification campaigns. This vision of the city emphasizes regulatory and "ruly" (or rule-based) behavior in order to expiate this guilt. It encourages one to imagine a space of orderly social relations compared to the unruly lived space encouraged by squeegee kids and their agitating practices. Crackdowns were also a response to the widespread public impression of street-people getting ever more numerous and ever more unruly. Dismissing anti-poverty activists' claims that he was a "thug," The *Sun* quoted Mayor Lastman: "I like a safe city and those who don't like it, it's too damn bad" (cited in Honywill, 1999b, p. 22). Contrarily, OCAP felt that this strategy made the city "unsafe" for the homeless. Consequently, they encouraged the city's homeless to erect a "safe city" in Allen Gardens, a five-hectare downtown park (see Honywill, 1999a, p. 26).

OCAP's "camp-in" did not last long. After being forcibly removed from Allan Gardens, the *Sun* reported how the group demanded "an end to public remarks by the mayor and other public officials that seek to criminalize the homeless, panhandlers and squeegeers." Otherwise, they promised to "directly attack the reputation of this city as a place to visit, invest in or to potentially host the Olympic Games. We guarantee that large numbers of tourists (will) leave Toronto this summer with stark images of the homeless" (Magnish, 1999, p. 4). Instances such as this (when squeegee kids threatened to fight back) underscored their seemingly self-affirmed identity as enemies of the public order. By this point, partisan allegiances had turned the strange squeegee kid into an enemy quite distinct from its earlier incarnation as a partner in a generalized conflict or a "private adversary whom one hates. An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one

fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity" (Schmitt, 1996, p. 28).

Post-election promises of legislative action from the government identified squeegee kids as a top priority and sometime-squeegee-defender OCAP dug in for yet more battle.

THE ISSUE OF SQUEEGEE KIDS STARTS TO DECLINE

The "occupation" of Allen Gardens on August 7 by anti-poverty activists underscored an important shift that occurred in the squeegee discourse after the re-election of the provincial Progressive Conservative Party. With the fate of squeegee kids seemingly decided by mid-1999, squeegee kids began to slowly disappear as the main subject of stories. News accounts featuring squeegeeing were still quite frequent. However, squeegee kids (who had been accorded greater attention than even aggressive panhandlers with whom they were originally linked) now seemed to get lumped in with other causes. It seemed as though many claims-makers considered the election to have been a referendum on squeegee kids. As such, references to squeegee kids increasingly materialized in the course of stories about wider social issues such as homelessness and poverty but did not form the basis of claims of their own. The ordeal in Allen Gardens demonstrated this conflation of issues. Squeegee kids were involved in the protest and the *Star* printed the argument of one of them: "They treat us like garbage because we are homeless" (cited in Harvey, 1999). But the news story about the protest in the park was about homelessness and street people, with squeegee kids materializing as just one subgroup within this larger population.

This conflation of homelessness and squeegee kids did not go unnoticed. Commenting in the *Sun*, Levy (1999a) noted, "OCAP's scope has broadened. It's not just the homeless who now fall under its umbrella but also squeegee kids and panhandlers

who they say have been unfairly 'criminalized'" (p. 15). Homelessness and squeegeeing were separate issues, even if both were ostensibly associated with poverty. However, the government targeted squeegeeing as an item of concern. This meant it needed to be separated somehow from the issue of homelessness in order to transform it into a social problem that was both capable of being addressed and deserving of a crackdown.

One of the ways the government accomplished this was by personalizing the battle. For instance, a press conference to launch the Safe Streets Act was held at the corner of Seaton and Dundas Sts., on the eastern edge of downtown Toronto. This was a corner already well known for its conflicts between residents and advocates for the poor. *Star* columnist Urquhart (1999) suggested the Tories probably welcomed the confrontation that was "entirely predictable ... [when] of course, militant anti-poverty activist John Clarke and several homeless people also showed up to heckle Flaherty. ... If he hadn't wanted a jeering crowd, Flaherty could have held his press conference at the Queen's Park media studio, where security would have kept Clarke et al. at bay" (p. A3).

The jeering crowd guaranteed that the message of dangerous streets would be conveyed to the public. For not only did the announcement of the Act make the news, so too did the disruption that forced Flaherty back into his limousine. Thus, when groups like OCAP chase off politicians, they did not create further antipathy towards the Tories as much as they reinforced the perception that pushy panhandlers and aggressive squeegee pests must be removed from the streets. An unsympathetic face was attached to squeegee kids when OCAP leader Clarke sparked a conflict on their behalf. The heckling and shouting served to reinforce Flaherty's message that "Ontarians have the right to walk

down the street, drive on the roads and enjoy public places without feeling intimidated” (ibid.).⁵⁴

In the *Sun*, Attorney-General Flaherty repeated the claims of people who “feel uncomfortable and intimidated and harassed by people coming at them, yelling at them, perhaps grabbing their arm against their will, attempting to clean their windshield and then expecting to be paid money” (cited in Boyle, 1999b). And the government had data that suggested widespread support for its policies, at least in Toronto – the “frontline” in the squeegee war. The *Globe and Mail* reported poll results that showed fifty-six per cent of the people in Toronto agreed with the government's crackdown on squeegee kids. The poll also indicated that close to 125,000 people considered squeegee people and aggressive panhandling the most important issue facing the province (Mackie, 1999). With statistics such as these, the *Star* reported how provincial opposition parties “were careful not to state their opposition [to the Safe Streets Act] in civil libertarian terms or to express undue sympathy for the squeegee kids and panhandlers” (Urquhart, 1999, p. A3). Instead, they opposed the new law on the principle that it was unenforceable. This is also an example of how identification by antithesis “can serve to deflect criticism, as a politician can call any criticism of his policies “unpatriotic” on the grounds that it reinforces the claims of the nation’s enemies” (Burke, 1972, p. 28).

⁵⁴ I have discussed the “guilt” (i.e. anxiety, anger) that is associated with squeegeeing quite extensively. But, quite apart from feelings that spur on the need for purification and redemption, pleasure can be gained from hearing stories of these bad kids. For instance, accounts about disruptive kids might generate pleasure for those pre-disposed against the government (knowing that their message got out). At the same time, though, they also can generate pleasure on the part of those pre-disposed against squeegee kids and panhandlers (having their perception of kids (as deviants or troublemakers) confirmed). Such feelings can co-exist with feelings of guilt and the impression that the system is imperfect and needs to be reformed.

This change in political rhetoric was different from the early days of squeegee-attention when opposition parties seemed more willing to defend squeegee kids from victimization at the hands of the government, seemingly on the principle that the enemy of your enemy is your friend. Now, though, the “problem” had been “solved” – squeegee kids had passed through what Fuller and Myers (2003b) termed the “natural history” stages of issue awareness, policy determination, and reform. This meant that there were few political gains still to be won by those who continued to fight for the squeegee-cause. Though there would still be debate about the implementation of reform measures, the major disputes over “what should be done” had already occurred. Interestingly, there was a waning of public defenses of squeegee kids at this time, too. By late 1999, many of what could be coded “pro-squeegee kids” letters-to-the-editor are actually more “anti-government” in orientation. Staunch defenses of squeegee kids against negative descriptions used to be a regular feature of such letters. Now these letters tended to be dominated by attacks upon the government in which the condition or treatment of squeegee kids constituted but one reason for the letter-writer’s displeasure.

By this point it was readily apparent that squeegee kids were not an entirely threatening presence in city streets or an entirely sympathetic one. Squeegee kids did not confirm as much as confound the traditional understanding of relationships between victims and their victimizers:

Most claims about victims describe victimization as exploitative encounters between a victimizer who takes advantage and a victim who suffers. Usually, the perpetrator is portrayed as more powerful than the victim, more aware of the exploitative nature of their relationship, and more responsible for the victimization. In this view, victimization is morally unambiguous: The victimizer is exploitative, the victim innocent. (Best, 2003c, p. 307)

However, most claims-makers were hard-pressed to describe the harm done to drivers as suffering and to describe squeegee kids as powerful. It was far more likely that drivers were described as irked or inconvenienced while squeegee kids were lambasted as irritants. Because of the ambivalence about kids as both victims and predators, squeegee kids did not constitute the perfect target for victimization. Even still, squeegee kids were repeatedly described as a threat to public welfare, and were easily ostracized. Squeegee kids' defenders were more disaggregated voices than an effective lobby. Groups such as OCAP that organized on their behalf were forced to defend against claims of disrupting public safety. OCAP's stated goal of creating further urban discontent only damaged its position. Additionally, as Rochefort and Cobb (1994) argue:

Several attitudinal axes structure aggregate impressions. Is the group worthy or unworthy (deserving or undeserving) of assistance? Underlying this question is the recurrent notion of culpability. Are members of the group seen as familiar or strange? Social deviants and other out-group members do not receive equivalent consideration to persons with whom the public readily identifies. Related to these issues is the distinction between sympathetic and threatening populations. (p. 22)

Squeegee kids were seen as a strange and vaguely threatening population, a point even conceded by their sympathizers. When OCAP organized on their behalf, squeegee kids were accused of being in league with "paid protesters." For some, this association constituted yet another reason why squeegee kids were undeserving of further assistance. They were imperfect villains given the lack of consensus about their culpability for their actions. On the other hand, there were frequent attempts to turn squeegee kids into a more perfect villain, namely by creating a perfect victim. Burke (1954) spoke of the "perfection" of a secular enemy and how, "given the vast complexities of the modern world, it would be hard to find a "perfect" material victim for any of our ills" (p. 293).

Even still, people “are eager to tell themselves of victims so thoroughgoing that the sacrifice of such offerings would bring about a correspondingly thoroughgoing cure” (ibid.). This was certainly the case with squeegee kids.

As I already discussed, one of the ways squeegee kids’ “fragmentary” enemy-nature came to take on the attributes of an absolute was by relating it to the archetype of the single woman in a car. 1999 featured more claims that squeegee kids specifically targeted women. Again, both members of the general public (E. Fox, 1999, p. 15) and politicians (see Gollom, 1999, p. B2) expressed this view. Once again, it is notable that there were precious few instances of women expressing fears of squeegee kids compared to frequent claims made on their behalf. Only the second such example of a woman expressing fear in a letter-to-the-editor appeared at the end of September. The *Toronto Star* printed Scanlan’s (1999) claim, “as a woman driving alone in a car in Toronto, I not only feel uncomfortable, intimidated and harassed by squeegee kids, they terrify me.” Interestingly, the *Star* printed a letter from another woman on the same day that takes just the opposite stance. It was titled, “No thanks works well on squeegees” (Fowler, 1999).

Obviously some women found squeegee kids threatening while others did not. This was the same situation with the wider population. There was a lack of consensus regarding the redemption archetype of the victimized, defenseless woman. Whether squeegee kids were a genuine threat was a source of debate that was never resolved – it presented a continual definitional problem. However, this did not stop ongoing references to the vulnerability of women at the hands of squeegee kids. Even though it was contested, the archetype of the perfect female victim was still a popular rhetorical device used to justify a law to protect such individuals. It also recurred in the squeegee discourse

on the eve of the law's implementation. Referring to squeegee kids, a police constable stated in the *Star*, "Some of those guys are real terrorists. You can see the intimidation on a lot of drivers' faces. And these guys know who to target in cars, especially women. This new law's going to mean that cell phone sales to single women will drop" (Taylor, 2000).

At least for this one claims-maker, the issuing of the law also heralded the ushering in of a new era – an era of real change, of safer streets and purified social relations where fear-based cell-phone calls would be a thing of the past. Again, it did not matter whether or not this was the case. What mattered is that the media reported claims such as these. The provincial government had argued earlier that statistics about lower crime rates meant little if people felt a growing sense of insecurity. Taylor argued that the new law would reduce this insecurity. His claim seemed to indicate that some members of the public had accepted the purgative act of the Safe Streets Act as a means of purifying this guilt.

It seems, then, that just as the "crisis" in the streets was socially constructed, the same could be said of its "solution." While the objective condition of squeegeeing would largely disappear with the implementation of the Safe Streets Act, related issues of street life in general, homelessness, poverty, and drug use would still continue. All of these also produced a sense of insecurity (or guilt). With this in mind, it appears that the social issue of squeegee kids (and what to do about them) was never as much about obtaining real purity as about the promise of purity. Once squeegee kids were eliminated, these other issues became objects of partisan appeals that identified the need for salvation. But for all intents and purposes, squeegeeing was solved when the visible source of suffering and

misfortune (the squeegee kids at intersections) was eliminated. The guilt-provoking condition (for some, fear, for others, pity) was removed along with the kids.

CONCLUSION

This chapter explained how 1999's squeegee-based claims revolved around the provincial election and efforts to establish squeegee kids as a province-wide threat. It outlined further instances of OCAP's counter-rhetoric defending squeegee kids, which reinforced the divisiveness of the political climate. This chapter thereby demonstrated Burke's principle of the agon and elaborated how squeegee kids were identified as a political enemy. It showed how this was accomplished, in part, through rhetoric that involved the domain expansion of anxieties about young people. It also outlined how, once the "war" against squeegee kids had been effectively "won," squeegee-related claims widened beyond the specific condition of squeegeeing and increasingly began to prioritize other issues. Squeegeeing would not actually be outlawed until early 2000 but the downward spiral of squeegee-based moralizing already started in 1999. References to squeegee kids around the election and the implementation of the Safe Streets Act are plentiful, but the majority of these are now, in fact, merely asides. The audience for these claims is already familiar with squeegee kids and knowledgeable about the divisive politics of the issue. Consequently, 1999 marked the point at which squeegee kids started to become footnotes to other issues rather than the cause of public claims.

CHAPTER 10: MEDIA ANALYSIS IV – 2000 & BEYOND

This chapter charts the final stages of decline in the social issue of squeegeeing. Instead of focusing on the act of squeegeeing, it highlights the acts of implementing and defending the constitutionality of the Safe Streets Act. As such, the development of this chapter parallels the development of the squeegeeing issue: focus shifts from the drama in the streets to the drama around the legislature and the courtroom. This chapter examines how a solution to the problem of squeegee kids was introduced, contested, and eventually largely taken-for-granted as squeegee kids, for the most part, disappeared. Having already outlined competition among claims-makers over the nature of the squeegee problem and debate over possible solutions to the problem, this chapter outlines competition with other issues for public attention. It explains the rise of other issues (and the fall of interest in squeegeeing) by referencing the ‘limited carrying capacity’ for social problems exhibited by audiences and the public arenas of the mass media, the courts, and the arena of politics alike (see Loseke, 1999, pp. 39-40).

As 2000 began, squeegeeing still made the news. But it was not the interaction ritual between squeegee kids and drivers – the original catalyst for the problem-discourse. Instead, as 2000 began, squeegee kids were labeled as just one sub-set of a motley association of outsiders. Worthington (2000) noted in the *Sun*, “At the lower end of the scale [of social irresponsibility] we have squeegee kids - deadbeats at best, thugs at worst” (p. 17). At this point, the issue was no longer the priority it once was. Both the quantity of stories featuring squeegeeing and the heightened rhetoric that once characterized them decreased substantially as soon as legislation outlawing squeegeeing

was passed. To wit, only a week after it had come into effect, the bill was dismissed by the *Star*: “This past fall's legislative session was highlighted by the ‘squeegee kids’ bill, a showy but insubstantial piece of legislation that is unlikely to make much difference to anybody” (“It looks like,” 2000). Controversy followed the proposal and the debate over the bill, but its passing was never in doubt with a majority government. Public opinion on the issue was divided but it was widely believed that most people were in favor of doing *something* about squeegeeing.⁵⁵ By and large, claims about squeegeeing virtually disappeared from the media with the implementation of the Safe Streets Act. Now, when the *Toronto Star* commented on squeegee kids in the streets, it stated, “No one's looking terribly intimidated by them” (“Voters may,” 2000).

IMPLEMENTATION OF SOLUTION – END OF DEBATE?

The sudden lack of attention to all-things-squeegee is at least somewhat substantiated by the incidence of letters to the editor on the issue. It was a rare letter, now, whose focus was entirely on squeegee kids. Instead of being about the Safe Streets Act or squeegee kids, letters now tended to be about other social issues which the authors wished would receive the attention squeegee kids had obtained. Government criticism, at this point, tended not to focus on its scapegoating of squeegee kids. Instead, authors typically questioned why squeegee kids had received such attention and sought to broaden the public agenda so that their own issue might gain some similar public momentum. This was not an example of other issues attempting to “piggyback” upon the

⁵⁵ For instance, the *Toronto Star* could be accused of being unsympathetic towards the Progressive Conservative agenda. But even it declared, “Much as Harris' left-of-centre critics hate to admit it, he is usually in synch with public opinion, whether bashing squeegee kids, welfare recipients, teachers, school boards, taxes, union bosses or quota laws” (“There are,” 2000).

social issue of squeegeeing as much as it was ironic commentary on the agenda of governing, the prominence of some issues over others, and the advancement of public policy.

After a short period of time, the *Toronto Star* accused the Safe Streets Act of being “all sizzle, no steak” (Urquhart, 2000, p. A33). Additionally, a nationally syndicated story declared that “the Safe Streets Act has had little impact on the squeegee population in Toronto and other big cities” (Blackwell, 2000, p. A4). The objective condition of squeegeeing in Toronto did eventually disappear for the most part. But Toronto police reported the continuing presence of squeegee kids in the immediate aftermath of the legislation. Still, there was incredibly scant brouhaha in the media over squeegeeing. With no more Act to debate, it seemed as though there was little left to argue. Outside of Toronto, the Ottawa police reportedly handed out three tickets. As one officer said, “We never rounded up the troops and did a blitz, because we felt it wasn't warranted. It's not a really significant problem” (ibid.).

I believe this constellation of evidence is quite telling. In Toronto, hundreds of tickets were handed out and a legal challenge of the Act was undertaken quite quickly but progressed slowly – people charged did not find out for more than a year whether the charges would even be upheld. In other parts of Ontario, the reported issuing of but a few tickets reflected the overall trend of devoting very little further attention to the issue (and possibly reinforced how the condition was never really defined as a problem outside of Toronto). On the surface, it appeared as though once the solution was implemented, the problem disappeared. On the other hand, the re-election of the Progressive Conservatives and their subsequent passing of the Safe Streets Act may be an instance where the

solution begat the problem. As some social constructionists argue, “sometimes it is solutions that determine problem definition. ... A problem is linked to a solution; a problem is a problem only if something can be done about it” (Wildavsky, cited in Rochefort & Cobb, 1994, p. 24). Until the proposal of the Safe Street Act, the problem of squeegeeing was never clearly constituted. Various courses of action were proposed but little action was taken as different levels of government argued over jurisdiction and efficacy of squeegee solutions. As the squeegee issue evolved, claims increasingly focused on the solution rather than the problem. The proposed implementation of the solution seemed to be just as big a problem for many as squeegeeing seemed for others. It seems reasonable to declare that politicians’ attempts to do something about squeegee kids became at least as significant an issue as the squeegee kids themselves.

With the passing of the Act, squeegeeing apparently no longer merited space on a crowded public policy agenda. Instead, domain expansion (see Best, 1999) now set in. The narrow problem of squeegeeing expanded as agents that formerly spread the claims of squeegee kids devoted their energies to other issues. As one example, OCAP transferred its attention away from squeegeeing and toward the wider problem of homelessness. Squeegee kids, through their previous association with OCAP, were implicated in the damage when a large protest on June 16, 2000 organized by OCAP to protest treatment of the homeless turned into a riot. In the *Star*, Dimanno, (2000) asked, “Who were these men and women (mostly young males) who wrapped bandanas around their faces and slipped huge chunks of rocks inside their jackets? Were they the squeegee kids for whom a segment of the public has had some degree of sympathy, now squandered?” (p. B01). Another example of this domain expansion (wherein public

attention and calls for action that originated in squeegeeing were cast onto other associated issues) was evident in the call to continue funding for the Squeegee Working Youth Mobilization (SWYM) program, designed to help retrain squeegee youth. The program reported to the community services committee, the chair of which claimed in the *Star*, “I think there is an erroneous view that because there are less squeegees on the street now, the problem is solved. ... This program isn't just to get rid of squeegee kids; it's also to get kids off the street, period” (Duguid, cited in Harding, 2000, p. B03).

The *Star* reported how, by the end of 1999's 10 week \$645,000 squeegee kid training program, only 34 of the 81 participants said they would give up making a living cleaning windshields (Palmer, 2000, p. A7). Mitigated results such as these (combined with Safe Streets legislation and continual pressures to cut back on city spending) meant this squeegee-specific diversion strategy did not continue past its inaugural year. But even in the wake of legislation that banned squeegeeing (and fewer squeegee kids on the streets), funding to assist squeegee kids continued – with the goal of helping *all* street youth. The problem of squeegee kids expanded into other issues such as housing, addiction counselling, job retraining, and so forth. By this point, squeegee kids did not demand attention as a priority public issue. While the problem of squeegeeing had been solved, problems associated with squeegeeing were still widespread. Near the end of the year, the *Toronto Star* reported that “the so-called Safe Streets Act ... has effectively cleared street corners and traffic islands of squeegees. But the street youth are still very much here. More hit the streets every day, replacing those who have moved on. Street youth and youth councillors say the law has driven the kids underground, where they were before the squeegee came along” (Rankin, 2000, p. E01).

For the government, resources had already been expended and a given course of action had been chosen and implemented in order to deal with the squeegee problem. Once the condition had been (for the most part) eliminated, these key claims-makers saw no need to continue making assertions with respect to squeegeeing. To stay alive as an issue, squeegeeing (like any social issue) depended on continued attention from groups or agencies that defined it as problematic and deserving of further action. In this case, OCAP, the major counter-rhetor, moved on to other issues that it found offensive.

In Burkean terms, the entelechial implications of the banning of squeegee kids meant their elimination and hence their symbolic death. "The imagery of slaying is a special case of transformation, and transformation involves the ideas and imagery of identification. That is: the killing of something is the changing of it, and the statement of the thing's nature before and after the change is an identifying of it" (Burke, 1950, p. 20). Throughout the entire discourse, municipal and provincial governments increasingly identified squeegee kids in partisan terms: they were considered as individuals who were at odds with one another or identified as a group whose values and actions more or less conflicted with those of other groups. The "war" against squeegee kids was, as Burke (1950) put it, "a disease of cooperation. ... Not simply strife come to a head, but a perversion of communion" (p. 22).

With the imposition of the Safe Streets Act, however, this war itself came to a head. There was no need for further identification of squeegee kids as standing against the mainstream. Up until this point (and specifically during the government's quest for re-election), there was a constant need to declare how people were apart from one another. Emphasizing division meant there would also be a need to rhetorically proclaim

how these people could be brought back together into a world free of agonistic stress. This would be a world where voters are invited to share in a dream of perfect social organization. Of course, this is the entelechial fulfillment of political rhetoric. It is the representation of a political motive in its ultimate terms. This ideal of perfect communion is forever postponed, though. It is undermined by the rhetoric of “the Scramble, the Wrangle of the Market Place, the flurries and flare-ups of the Human Barnyard, the Give and Take, the wavering line of pressure and counterpressure ... the onus of ownership, the War of Nerves, the War” (Burke, 1950, p. 23).

Still, with the Safe Streets Act the government could legitimately say it fulfilled its promise to act against squeegee kids. The imposition of the Act was, in the end, a final salvo in the war of values: the passing of the law legitimated the values of those opposed to squeegeeing while discrediting those who opposed it. While many journalists noted that it indeed eliminated squeegeeing, the population of street youth remained constant. The Act, then, stands as a social symbol that in fact fosters further value conflict. But skirmishes over these values were destined to involve actors other than squeegee kids.

By the time of the Safe Street Act's passing, there had been years of debate over what assistance should be given to squeegee kids. The group had been firmly identified as strange and as a threat, either to one's property or to one's sense of morality. By the end of 1999, there was redundancy in the grievances (and the defenses). This ultimately decreased the issue's dramatic value. Though a consensus on their culpability had never been reached, squeegee kids were a negatively constructed population. The government had tried to construct squeegee kids as a scapegoat ripe for homicidal victimage. And though squeegee kids never were – in dramatistic terms – an ideal kind of victim, they

were, nonetheless, a polluted group who could be targeted for sacrifice because of their pollution, able to be sacrificed because they were identified as both weak and dangerous.

MOVING ON – LOOKING BEYOND THE SQUEEGEE PROBLEM

From the government's position, it was time to move on to other priorities.

"Consubstantiality is established by common involvement in a killing" (Burke, 1950, p. 265) and as far as the government's purposes were concerned, squeegee kids had been symbolically killed. The public had been given an opportunity to veto this process, so to speak, by not returning the government to power in 1999. Instead, the government's *Blueprint* for change was tacitly endorsed and anti-squeegee legislation was undertaken. The passing of the Safe Streets Act marked the end of the flurry of public debate that swirled around squeegee kids. As a result, editors, politicians, journalists, columnists and protesters alike moved on to other topics. The continued presence of OCAP and the continued conflict over squeegee-diversion projects such as the SWYM maintained the novelty of squeegeeing as moralizing by letter-writers and columnists alike continued apace. But an important shift in the problem discourse occurred here. Another type of problem, distinct from (and arguably more complicated) than squeegee kids, starts to materialize. Fuller and Myers (2003a/1941) – original proponents of the value conflict perspective – posited three kinds of social problems: the physical, the ameliorative, and the moral. Rubington and Weinberg (2003) sum up the differences:

Physical (such as a tornado): people agree that the condition is undesirable and that nothing can be done about the physical cause of the problem.
 Ameliorative: (such as crime or poverty): people agree that the condition is undesirable and that the condition can be corrected, but they disagree about what action should be taken. Moral (such as abortion or gambling): people do not agree that the condition is undesirable or about what action, if any, should be taken. (p. 88)

I suggest that squeegeeing is a moral problem. On the other hand, the root conditions that explain why a lot of people squeegee are ameliorative. Drug use and homelessness (two problems that contribute to the problem of street youth), for instance, are difficult to combat but almost all can agree that they are undesirable and some action should be taken to try to alleviate the problem. Squeegeeing was attacked and solved, (insofar as the visible threat was largely eliminated) but there was never any widespread agreement that this sort of action was required. There were, throughout the life of the issue, claims that called for sympathetic treatment of squeegee kids and letters to the editor that argued against this position. Similarly, press coverage of squeegee kids also contained articles attacking squeegee kids followed by responses that defended them. This cleavage of opinion stood in contrast to typical statements from politicians (i.e. Mayor Lastman and Premier Harris) who positioned their opposition to squeegee kids as if it were the general public will.

As a moral problem, it is reasonable to expect commentary in the media from those who opposed solutions to social problems. But in the case of squeegee kids, commentary quickly turned to subjects broader than squeegeeing. It seems that, in its early stages, discourse about squeegee kids constituted a domain expansion of the generalized "problem of youth." But as the issue advanced into its later stages, the dramatic potential of squeegeeing was no longer sufficient to maintain a sense of urgency about squeegeeing on its own. At this point, squeegee-related claims expanded so that they were married to other claims about youth. The reasons for this are fairly clear: Squeegees were excellent targets. When young people were not visibly squeegeeing, they

were still there but were not as easily identifiable as a problem. The moral ramparts still needed to be guarded even though squeegeeing was eradicated.

After the Conservative government fulfilled its promise to crack down on squeegee kids, it promised to continue prioritizing law and order and targeting youth justice. The problem of squeegee kids had already been identified and solved, so new problems needed to be identified. New divisions needed to be exacerbated so that the game of solving social problems (and thereby new attempts at consubstantiation) could continue. Now, the *Sun* reported that squeegee kids were but one of a bevy of issues that confronted incoming Toronto police chief Julian Fantino. They were grouped together with violent teens, pedophiles, violent video games, and cyber-crime (Wallace, 2000, p. 4). This coincided with “a continuing effort by Premier Mike Harris and his Tory government to portray themselves as a law-and-order administration bent on straightening out wayward youth and buttressing the rights of victims” (McCarten, 2000a, p. 8). This effort included proposals for a Parental Responsibility Act, a province-wide code of conduct for students, the introduction of school uniforms and the law banning squeegee kids from city streets. Taken together, these formed a condensation symbol of “wayward” or disruptive youth. While these youth were not “evil,” they were a banal substitute for the “perfect villain” that served to underscore the rejection of hierarchy and the need for redemption all the same.

Tackling the “problem of youth” meant that the Ontario government could renew its scapegoating strategies and identify other youthful transgressions as needful of reform. This was a huge project. Tackling even the particular problem of street youth entailed dealing with a constellation of issues that included problems such as drug use, poverty,

homelessness, domestic abuse, youth unemployment, and prostitution. Loseke's (1999, p. 81) idea of "difference within sameness" is instructive here. She suggested that successful social issues use frames of reference similar to those that came before (while adding their own unique characteristics). But in this case, there was not enough similarity between the isolated action of squeegeeing and all the other problems of "youth." Too much difference meant all of these somewhat related but distinct problems would carry on without reference to squeegeeing. The social issue of squeegee kids was never constructed in order that other problems could piggyback on it. Squeegeeing appeared to be a discrete object of concern. It was initially carved out of a larger body of anxiety about youth but was transformed over time to satisfy concerns about "squeegee people." As the discourse evolved, the most inflamed rhetoric argued that there was nothing youthful about the squeegee population. Consequently, tackling the problem meant eliminating all variety of squeegee practitioners. Other concerns that were not solved with the elimination of squeegee kids were disparate and distinct enough to occupy attention independent of the squeegee issue. Thus, the squeegee "problem" expanded the domain of "problem youth" but once its own drama was exhausted there was nothing of its own left to expand.

As Downs (1972) argued, problems tend to fade from prominence if they (a) have no intrinsically exciting qualities or (b) if these qualities are de-emphasized or forgotten when nightly news coverage of the problem ceases. I believe that squeegeeing contained a sense of inherent drama. This meant the potential for "a wide variety of incidents [that] can serve as "triggering events" – that is, those occurrences that galvanize attention and provide instant raw material for those who would characterize a topical area as a crisis"

(Sharp, 1994, p. 104). These incidents were plentiful in the early stages of the issue. Following the early exemplar of MPP Mike Colle's reports in which he found himself "victimized" by a new, strange threat in 1996, claims-makers continually brought other accounts of "attacks" to the attention of the media over the subsequent years. This helped constitute squeegeeing as a social issue that at least warranted the printing of many letters to the editor by irritated citizens. In addition, there were a number of high-profile events (the Allan Gardens sit-in, the self-injury of a squeegee kid who rolled under a truck, the assault of squeegee kids by irate people in cars, and so on) that renewed this dramatic profile of squeegeeing and maintained its public profile. By 2000, however, these occurrences had tapered off severely.

The implementation of the Safe Streets Act and the threat of prosecution and increased policing played a large role in bringing about a dramatic decrease in the number of people squeegeeing. With fewer interactions between squeegee kids and drivers, there was less incidence of the very behavior that inaugurated a public backlash. Because of the significantly fewer cases of squeegee kids touching cars, slowing commutes or camping out and taking up residence in neighborhoods, there was also less personal relevance of the topic to many individuals since there was a decrease in perceived intrusions into one's personal space. Now, for squeegee kids to remain a novel social concern, the transformability of the issue was more important than its inherent dramatic value. However, as already mentioned, the underlying problems associated with squeegeeing and street youth (themselves only a portion of the squeegee population) were much more complex and contradictory than that of squeegeeing alone. Squeegeeing's continued newsworthiness depended on its ability to maintain itself on the front pages by

wrapping itself up with other issues of significant social concern. This did not happen. By the end of the year it became clear that the solution to the problem of squeegeeing had created another problem – namely that of decreased funding for charities.⁵⁶ But once again squeegee kids were not the subject of this concern. And this problem paled in comparison to the other problems competing for attention on the public agenda. Even those claims that were related to squeegee kids – identification of youth crime as a significant concern or, contrarily, defenses of young people – mentioned squeegee kids only as an adjunct. Squeegee kids had now become a symptom of a wider problem that deserved its own attention rather than the condition that merited attention itself.

2001 AND BEYOND – CONTESTING OWNERSHIP

By 2001, squeegee kids were, for the most part, relegated to background material that lent context and character to stories about other issues in the media. For example, when Mike Harris announced that he intended to resign as Premier (October 16, 2001), they sprang up in assessments of the legacy of the Harris Years. Squeegee kids were markers of lack of compromise or compassion in Mike Harris's Ontario for some writers. They also materialized when former Attorney-General Jim Flaherty campaigned to replace Harris. Again, they served as a powerful condensation symbol as the squeegee crackdown was trumpeted as a successful part of the government's approach to law and order. However, apart from these indirect references to squeegee kids, there was one ongoing drama that provided the final flurry of squeegee-inspired media attention and

⁵⁶ Brennan (2000a) reported in the *Star*, “the Harris government's squeegee law is having a devastating effect on charities across Ontario that have depended on the kindness of motorists to raise money” (p. 14). The article reported that the Muscular Dystrophy Association of Canada lost \$200,000 in 2000 and expected to lose as much as \$750,000 in 2001.

which brought the social issue, by and large, to a close. This drama involved the legal question of the constitutionality of the Safe Streets Act.

The court challenge to the law banning squeegeeing and aggressive panhandling began in January 2001 by first distinguishing between squeegeeing and aggressive panhandling. 43 people faced 80 charges under the Act but 67 of those charges were withdrawn at the outset of the proceedings. Each of the remaining charges involved squeegeeing (except for one). This was significant. The initial explanation of the Safe Streets Act in the Progressive Conservative *Blueprint* document dedicated far more space to aggressive panhandling than to squeegeeing. However, squeegeeing (maybe because of its dramatic nature), soon took priority and generated far more public attention. Squeegeeing became a social issue in its own right, independent of panhandling. Then, in the first challenge to the legislation banning both, the Crown Attorney legitimated all the attention by dismissing the panhandling charges and asking the court to limit its ruling to the section of the Act covering squeegeeing (see Gombu, 2001, p. F03).

The Ontario Coalition Against Poverty, whose lawyers challenged the Act on the basis that it violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, organized the legal action. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association took the position that squeegeeing is a cry for help from economically disadvantaged people, and the only place they can express it is on a road. In the end, more than a year after the charges were laid, the thirteen individuals who were on trial were found guilty and given suspended sentences. The *Sun* reported the following comments of the judge: "I find that the purpose or effect of the government action has been to restrict expression [but] the infringement of freedom of expression is justified" (cited in Drummie, 2001, p. 7). Judge Babe rejected

the defense's claim that the Safe Streets Act was in effect criminal law (and therefore the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government). "Traditionally the provinces and their municipalities have had wide scope to control the use of public places" (Babe, cited in Perkel, 2001, p. B8). And with that, Babe announced that the law did not discriminate against the poor even as Canadian Civil Liberties lawyer Frank Addario said the judgement confirmed a "hierarchy of citizens" (ibid.). Obviously this judgement did not stop the agonistic struggle between those who battle over individual and communal rights. But it did end the use of squeegee kids as a symbol for that struggle. The Attorney-General suggested that the people of Ontario were not happy with the harassment they were experiencing and noted how the decision, "allows us to carry on with a commitment ... to enhance the safety of the public on streets and sidewalks across this province" (cited in Drummie, 2001, p. 7).

As Gusfield (2003) stated, "A courtroom decision or a legislative act is a gesture which often glorifies the values of one group and demeans those of another" (p. 103). One can say that the passing of the Safe Streets Act glorified (or represented at the very least) the values of those who advocated a clean and orderly urban environment. The upholding of that Act in the courtroom can be seen as a further endorsement of those values. The successful defense of the Safe Streets Act had the effect of establishing squeegee kids as offenders of the law, and not just agents who offended the sensibilities of some people. Insofar as "tragic rituals are institutionalized in our legal trials" (Duncan, 1962, p. 398), squeegee kids were reinforced as the villainous ones whose behavior was confirmed as problematic. This is not to suggest that one moral viewpoint is now ascendant, just because a law was passed. But the affirmation of the constitutionality of

the Safe Streets Act was a “dramatistic event” whose “public designation of morality” was “important in what it symbolizes as well or instead of what it controls. Even if the law was broken, it was clear whose law it was” (Gusfield, 2003, p. 104).⁵⁷

As I suggested regarding the P.C. Party's 1999 election *Blueprint*, this act of legal affirmation also serves as an example of the negative. One could say that the successful legal defense of squeegee-purification measures was the ultimate symbolic action in this drama that served to define squeegee kids in negative, if not oppositional, terms. Whether or not the streets of the province are safer as a result of the legislation is not as significant as the fact that squeegeeing in Ontario was sanctioned once and for all. This judgement was something akin to a metaphorical nail in the coffin of the social issue of squeegee kids. After all, many had, to this point, expressed opinions regarding squeegee kids. But judges, because of their training and their ability to bestow legal authority to their decisions, occupy a privileged position within the hierarchy of credibility. Media outlets paid more attention to the opinions of Judge Babe than those of the average letter-to-the-editor writer. Of course, Babe's decision did not bring an end to the clashing of values and interests that defined the issue. For instance, Julian Roberts, a professor of criminology at the University of Ottawa (and hence, another individual who holds a privileged position within the hierarchy of credibility) argued that a law can be constitutional and still be a bad idea and inappropriate social policy. “The [government's] position is that the bill was a legitimate response to complaints the government received about squeegee kids and panhandlers. But what responsible government legislates on the

⁵⁷ The former opposition Liberal Party is currently the government and protests against the Safe Streets Act by homeless individuals occur regularly. However, there is no indication that the law will be changed or repealed.

basis of public complaints alone? What we need is systematic research on the issue”

(Roberts, 2001, p. A17).

What this appeal fails to mention is that “different public arenas – legislatures, courts, bureaucracies, the media – have different ‘selection principles’ that are satisfied more or less well by different problem definitions” (Rochefort & Cobb, 1994, p. 9). In the eyes of the court, the legislature had come up with a satisfactory solution to a public problem. In the eyes of the media, there was no more problem. Remember Loseke’s four-part definition of a social problem: (1) it is something of concern; (2) it affects a significant number of people; (3) the condition can be changed; (4) it should be changed. Steps had already been taken to change the problematic condition with the imposition of the Safe Streets Act. With the subsequent nigh-disappearance of squeegee kids there was very little reason (and very little evidence) for further claims problematizing the condition. “The social problem emerges out of the volatile mixture of objective condition and subjective definition” (Rubington & Weinberg, 2003, p. 88). The 2001 Ontario Court judgement against squeegee kids was the last substantive excuse for competition over definitions of squeegee kids. Like most clashes of values, there never was agreement whether (or what kind of) action should have been taken against squeegee kids. But with this action, the objective condition withdrew from visibility and claims regarding the troubling (and widespread) nature of the condition could no longer be supported. The problem of squeegeeing was effectively eliminated.

Claims-makers like Roberts sought “concrete” evidence that squeegeeing was a problem, data such as statistics about the size of the population or estimates about the damage they caused. However, Best (2003b) argues in the tradition of Berger and

Luckmann's *Social Construction of Reality* that all claims (and for that matter, all human knowledge) are socially constructed and that there is no reason to assume that descriptions of objective conditions deal with what is true. Any such account is also a product of social interaction, a report from a particular point of view, and hence, a social construction too. In lieu of "objective" proof, the government used language to convert people rhetorically through pity and fear. Instead of facts and figures, the government engaged in "symbolic politics." This refers to the dynamic of first raising public concerns about an issue, then offering an apparently effective policy response that assuages public concerns.

Edelman (1977) explains how this threat-reassurance dynamic works: "People resort to religion and to government to cope with anxieties they cannot otherwise ward off. ... Eagerness to believe that government will ward off evils and threats renders us susceptible to political language that both intensifies and eases anxiety at least as powerfully as the language of religion does" (p. 4). This dynamic requires both the mobilization of public concern about a problem and the subsequent demobilization of concern, as the public is reassured by government action (see Sharp, 1994, p. 109). In the case of squeegee kids, the implementation (and successful defense) of the Safe Streets Act seemed reassurance enough for the majority of the public. In fact, the only letters to the *Star* about the law or Roberts' opinion-piece were all anti-squeegee in orientation.

Ultimately, the Ontario court judgement rhetorically confirmed the constitutionality of the law, even if it did not confirm the government's reasoning that squeegee kids were a threat to public safety in need of reform and deserving of punishment. In so doing, the court's decision functioned as further reinforcement of the

government's "ownership" of the issue. "The course of conflicts may be partially understood by reference to the ability of groups to establish their definition of the situation as the appropriate one" (Alford, cited in Portz, 1994, p. 44). OCAP (the organization that represented squeegee kids and that sought to establish their anti-government as the appropriate one) took a quite different position:

When we're living in these extreme times, when there are so many people who literally bed down on sidewalk heating grates every night, that the slight discomfort or minor malaise someone might feel that having their window tapped in order for someone to solicit change, cannot take priority over people's right and necessity in providing for themselves. (Collis, cited in "Ontario law," 2001)

Unfortunately for OCAP, Judge Babe did not agree. Throughout the years, OCAP had publicly argued for its understanding of squeegeeing as an inoffensive, unproblematic (if admittedly, occasionally unsettling) activity. However, this "minor malaise" was likely a major factor that motivated people to call for squeegee sanctions. Squeegee kids presented boundary problems such as the intrusion of the messy and sometimes dangerous public into private space. This notion of squeegeeing as an unruly and sometimes dangerous nuisance was the public image proffered by the Ontario government. This position was, in part, built upon an image of problematic youth. This association was used by the government to make squeegee kids into a "target population," understood as "stereotypes about particular groups of people that have been created by politics, culture, socialization, history, the media, literature, religion, and the like" (Schneider & Ingram, cited in Bosso, 1994, pp. 183-184). In other words, OCAP was not just doing battle with the government. It was arguing against predispositions to view those individuals who squeegeed as troublesome and problematic, an association underscored by their visible non-conformity and their disruption of traffic. Dan Matheson

of *CanadaAM* expressed this position when he asked Sue Collis of OCAP whether all squeegee kids were also homeless kids. She replied that the vast majority was homeless, but that she did not really think that was the issue or the point. Matheson disagreed:

I actually think it is part of the issue and part of the point because are these people in fact in a hopeless situation where they're doing the last resort to make a few dollars to feed themselves? Or, are they in a position -- and a lot of people suspect this to be the case -- who actually have places to stay and are trying to look for some easy, quick cash to buy cigarettes and maybe some dope? ("Ontario law," 2001)

WHAT COMES AFTER THE FIGHT IS WON?

Of course not everyone felt predisposed against squeegee kids and not everyone questioned their motives. But those who defended squeegee kids had to argue against a social desire for scapegoating. Squeegeeing was the object of dramatic negation as the proposition "No" was transformed into the command "Thou shalt Not squeegee." This hortatory no is related to the figure of the scapegoat when it is used against a "a creature that can be struck down without fear of reprisal since he lacks a champion ... in order to localize and discharge, purge, the will to disorder in society" (Wasserstrom, 1982, p. 103). Squeegee kids are an example of one such group. They are consistent with the wide spectrum of human victims sacrificed by various societies, beings who tend to be on the fringes of society. Squeegee kids were "marginal individuals, incapable of establishing or sharing the social bonds that link the rest of the inhabitants. Their status as foreigners or enemies, the servile condition, or simply their age prevents these future victims from fully integrating themselves into the community" (R. Girard, 1977, p. 12).

Burke (1950) discusses "the use of suasive devices for the transcending of social estrangement" (p. 208) and scapegoating can be one such device. Often used in political campaigns, scapegoating has potential benefits and costs. It can both transcend and

escalate social estrangement. It demonstrates Burke's belief that division is the flip-side of identification. Politicians often target and vilify political enemies in their attempts to convert people to their way of thinking. When the government announced that "thou shalt not squeegee," it was tacitly blaming squeegee kids, at least in part, for the degeneration of public order. While squeegee kids may have been unduly targeted for social disorder, as a symbol they represented "very real (though often hidden) hostilities that all the members of the community feel for one another" (R. Girard, 1977, p. 99). There were obvious tensions that the Safe Streets Act addressed. And, though Burke lamented it, he recognized that victimage was an endemic fact of human society. Guilt-redemption, in one form or another, is necessary. Similarly, Girard (1977) suggests that the various 'scapegoat' phenomena are not the reflection of some ill-articulated guilt-complex, but rather the very basis of cultural unification (p. 302).

As I have already explained, a wide variety of responses to the squeegee condition "afflicting" Toronto were considered in the early stages of the social issue's evolution. None of these was satisfying – to either politicians or to the public (assuming that squeegee-related claims in the media are at least some indication of public opinion, priorities, and tensions). There was quite a different genesis of policy at the Ontario-wide level. No alternatives to the Safe Streets Act were considered when the Province eventually decided to take action on the issue. This almost certainly would have been different had the Progressive Conservatives only secured a minority government in 1999. Even still, when "policy development goes without serious challenge, or when challengers are effectively kept on the sidelines in the decision-making process – these are signs of ownership in public policymaking" (Rochefort & Cobb, 1994, p. 14).

Even a cursory analysis of squeegee claims in the media reveals that not everyone approved of the government's solution and not everyone was comforted by its scapegoating strategy. In the end, then, I suggest that the squeegee "problem" was never *entirely* owned by the government or those who articulated an anti-squeegee position. Ownership should be conceived of as a process, a series of claims to be worked out rather than a thing to be achieved. "The structure of public problems is an arena of conflict in which a set of groups and institutions, often including governmental agencies, compete and struggle over ownership and disownership, the acceptance of causal theories, and the fixation of responsibility" (Gusfield, 1981, p. 15). A wide variety of public rhetors weighed in on the issue of squeegee kids during its life-cycle. These voices ranged from government and anti-poverty activists to corporations, business districts, political officials, religious officials, union representatives, and "everyday" non-affiliated individuals. Yet blame or responsibility for the condition of squeegeeing was never *fully* affixed. This was due, in part, to the plurality of voices and the diversity of (opposed) interests involved in the issue. Nonetheless, blame was affixed enough. Squeegeeing was outlawed and the court challenge of this law was struck down and there were no longer enough opportunities to keep squeegeeing in the public eye as a priority issue.

Nimmo (1975) argued that popular understanding of the political world revolves around "images." In this case, even though the presence of squeegee kids in the streets was radically reduced, the image of the clean, orderly city was not yet secured anew. For instance, Roberts (2001) wrote to the *Star* and pointed out, "CBC national news carried footage of Toronto police officers bundling squeegee kids into a police cruiser. Is this the kind of image that residents of Canada's largest and most prosperous city want to

project?" (p. A17). On the other hand, the image of a government whose legislation had been vindicated by the courts was clear. And the public image of squeegee kids never recovered from this development. With this judgement (and the withdrawal of squeegee kids from the frontlines in city intersections) the problem – though never entirely owned by any one group – was resolved. The social issue of squeegee kids went away (as did most of the squeegee kids themselves). There were still occasional references (paralleling occasional sightings). But in the social issues game there is a season, to which everything must turn. At the end of June, 2001, the *Star* printed the estimate of one squeegeer: "I'd say that there is only five to 10 per cent of the squeegee kids in Toronto that there were a year ago" (Jones, 2001, p. B07). In turn, protagonists and antagonists that once dedicated their time, energy, and resources to squeegee kids now moved on to other fields of battle.

Interestingly, another field of battle seemed to be the issue of panhandling. The Safe Streets Act, which was meant as an instrument to be used against squeegee kids *and* aggressive panhandlers, seemed effective only against the former. A mid-2003 *Globe and Mail* story confirmed squeegee kids' now-insignificant status in the streets. "At the downtown Toronto corner of Queen Street West and Spadina Avenue, there's no trace of the squeegee-kid community that used to converge there every night" (Caldwell, 2003, p. R5). The same could not be said of panhandlers. At the beginning of 2001, a television report declared, "Yes, there are still panhandlers, but for drivers, something is missing, something that used to be everywhere. The so-called squeegee kid is vanishing" ("Test case," 2001). The *Sun* printed comments by Toronto's Mayor at the end of the year that seemed to confirm this. "Lastman contended he 'can't do a darn thing' about the panhandlers who continue to crop up everywhere on downtown streets. ... While the

squeegee people have pretty much been wiped out, panhandlers are flourishing” (Levy, 2001, p. 15). For many, this decrease in squeegee kids confirmed that they were not really that hard off to begin with. Many believed, after all, that if squeegeeing was a last resort, they would be undeterred by a law and still be out on the streets plying their trade. The following letter to the *Sun* is representative of this attitude:

For several years now, I've been sickened every time I heard people referring to panhandlers and squeegee kids in connection with the poor and the homeless. Until the squeegee law came into effect ... my exit from the subway gave me a daily reminder of this falsehood as several squeegee kids, buckets and squeegees in hand, would be entering the subway to commute to their chosen place of work. (Henry-Cotnam, 2001, p. 14)

As the impact of the legislation set in, squeegeeing separated from other social issues such as homelessness (recognized as a wider problem) and panhandling (a related problem whose solution was not enforced as with squeegeeing). And, in the midst of a financial crisis where punishment was relatively inexpensive compared to “squeegee diversion” efforts, support for programs that offered life skills and job training to get squeegee youth off the streets also came into question. Several Councillors protested against continued funding when Toronto’s auditor calculated the cost of the city’s squeegee diversion program at \$11,000 per person. The following claim in the *Star* reinforced how squeegee kids were no longer a social issue of pressing importance: “This is the year that we're looking at cutting libraries, bookmobiles, dental care for poor kids, health programs, you name it. ... We're also looking at cutting jobs and peoples' livelihoods, so community services needs to consider if this is really a priority” (Soknacki, cited in Lakey, 2001, p. B01). With the Safe Streets Act proffered as a solution, such programs now seemed redundant. Consequently, there now seemed to be minimal public debate over such programs. The limited arguments that did take place

seemed reminiscent of the early days of the squeegee issue. By mid-2001, the few reported statements about squeegee kids seemed marked by frustration compared to the heightened and more vitriolic rhetoric of the “squeegee-warfare” era that marked the height of the crisis.

2002 & BEYOND – RARE REMINDERS OF AN OUTSIDER STATUS

2002’s quantity of squeegee-related claims (and the character of their rhetoric) indicated that squeegeeing could no longer be accurately considered a social “problem.” Squeegee kids appeared very infrequently in news reports throughout the year. As the following reports from the *Sun* indicate, when they did materialize they were still “a symbol of a city grown more shabby than shiny” (Downing, 2002, p. C5). Infrequent references to squeegee kids identified them as part of the overall *scene* of Toronto. By way of illustration, Warmington (2002) noted “the sad reality is there is a lot of bad out there today,” and lumped in “the continuing squeegee problem” with “aggressive mental health patients all over the place and loads of criminal types out on the street” (p. 22). Even though a few remaining squeegee kids may have been problematic, they were mentioned as *symptoms* of an unclean, sometimes dangerous, but always unappealing city. They were not specifically targeted as *agents* who were the cause for this downfall. In this capacity, squeegee kids left the “radar screen of public opinion” in exactly the same manner as they were introduced to it.

One news-story that demonstrated how squeegee kids symbolized an urban scene in disrepair came from Burnaby B.C (a jurisdiction with no bylaw against squeegeeing). Here, police posed as squeegee kids in the summer of 2002 in order to catch unsuspecting motorists guilty of minor traffic infractions. CBC-TV, reporting on the phenomenon, said

that police were “going for a more urban look” by masquerading as squeegee kids (“Squeegee cops,” 2002) and did not bother to characterize the look itself. The notion that police could go “undercover” as squeegee kids and affect an “urban look” suggests a scene-agent ratio whereby it was taken for granted that the urban environment of Burnaby contained squeegee kids. Most interesting of all is how this incident underscored the widespread identification of squeegee kids as threatening agents.

These police-cum-kids possessed few of the identifying characteristics of squeegee kids. First, they failed to successfully adopt the squeegee kids’ style. Tanner (2002) indicated this in the *Globe and Mail* when she observed an officer who wore a “floppy sun hat, sports sunglasses and torn orange safety vest [and] looked a little too clean-cut to fit the squeegee image” (p. A2). Together with sandals, bright orange shirt and camouflage shorts, the overall impression was more circus chic than what one might call the grotesque realism of “authentic” squeegee kids. Somehow, they just did not pull off the seemingly inherently dirty, less healthy-looking, confrontational appearance of the more chaotic, unruly and volatile bodies of street youth.⁵⁸

Met with comments like, “Hey buddy, those shoes don’t go with the outfit” (ibid.), the problem was not just one of an inaccurate facsimile of “real” kids’ materiality. Apart from impersonating their physical appearance and their actions, the police could not fully

⁵⁸ The safety vest was, I suggest, the definite giveaway. Much earlier, a letter to the editor of *The Toronto Star* suggested (tongue-in-cheek) that squeegee kids could be put to work and report “red-light runners ... broken headlights, cracked windshields, expired licence stickers and the odd driver too intoxicated to be behind the wheel. ... I bet we could get the auto insurance companies to supply the squeegees and orange vests for the kids” (Schwartz, 1998, p. A19). Strangely enough, in this account (just as in the real-world episode in British Columbia four years later), the “legitimate” squeegee kids – conscripted to the cause of the greater good – are pictured with “orange vests.” “Real” squeegee people, hardcore kids with street-cred instead of their disingenuous imitators, would never put safety first in such a deliberate fashion.

adopt the style of squeegee kids in terms of their attitude. As Tanner noted, “creators of the new traffic program realize that some drivers find squeegee people annoying or vaguely threatening. These officers are professional and polite. They are not there to intimidate and they are not impeding traffic” (ibid.).

Regardless of one’s opinion about the nature of the squeegee kid threat, they can be seen as posing in the dual sense of the term indicated by Hebdige (1988, pp. 17-18). They are “posing a threat” in terms of potential violence, but also “posing” by affecting a certain (oppositional) stance.⁵⁹ Alternatively, the Burnaby police officers were merely posing as squeegee kids. The only thing the police had in common with real squeegee kids was the fact that they both put on a show. A comic, rather than a tragic, attitude accompanied this pretense because people were unused to squeegee kids who were placid or polite. Consequently, this incident demonstrated the widespread acceptance of squeegee kids’ discomfiting substance.

Even when squeegeeing was no longer a social issue, more often than not squeegee kids were portrayed as deviants. Infrequent examples of squeegee kids in the news extended what was, by now, a common association of criminality-depravity and squeegeeing.⁶⁰ But their insignificant status in public discourse no longer warranted their identification as a “target population.” This did not stop people from trying, though.

Toronto Councillor Tom Jakobek, a Mayoralty candidate in 2003, showed how political

⁵⁹ Of course, this “posing” can be seen as resistance. It can also, depending on one’s point of view, be seen as an example of narcissistic, wasted energy. It can be just as empowering as self-defeating.

⁶⁰ Now, the few references to squeegee kids tended to feature claims of cruelty to animals instead of humans. For instance, a Crimestoppers alert on December 23, 2002 asked for the public’s help to capture a “Squeegee holdup man.” In addition to robbing a variety store, he kicked a dog. There were also a number of reports in early 2003 about a former Toronto squeegee kid who was charged with the torture and slaying of a cat.

opportunism and political targets go hand in hand. He presented a plan to encourage people to come to Toronto. Presented in the *Star*, his first priority was to “Clean up the city.” His second priority was to “eliminate panhandling and squeegee kids” (Jakobek, 2003, p. B04). His proposal combined both literal and metaphorical calls to clean up the city. It also demonstrated how squeegee kids, even when largely absent from the streets, continued their existence as objects of exasperation. By now, even rare references to squeegee kids continued the longstanding pattern of questioning of their motives. On the occasion of a wide-scale blackout, squeegee kids took control of the traffic at the Queen St. W. and Spadina Ave. intersection in Toronto. A University of Toronto student questioned this turn of events in the *Star*: “It seems like a pretty important intersection to turn over to street kids” (“Good deeds,” 2003, p. A9). The social issue of squeegee kids may have been gone but the anxieties and the tensions that surrounded them were obviously not forgotten.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has demonstrated how squeegeeing endured in people's imaginations even as other conditions became the focus of more sustained attention. It has outlined how a wider constellation of social problems regarding young people and deviancy supplanted the specific moralizing about squeegee kids. By highlighting conflicts over the implementation and legal defense of the Safe Streets Act, it has also described how the issue progressed from one issue-attention cycle to another. This progress reinforced squeegee kids' collective identity as a scapegoat and political enemy and maintained the dramatic appeal of squeegeeing as a social issue even as the drama in the streets waned.

CHAPTER 11: AN OVERVIEW OF THE SQUEEGEE DRAMA

This chapter provides a summation of the overall squeegee drama. I will encapsulate how the issue of squeegeeing evolved over the years by identifying a sequence of crucial signifying events that made squeegee kids into a specific issue of concern. Following this summation of the squeegee narrative, I will suggest how the overall body of squeegee-related claims functioned dramatically.

SUMMATION OF THE SQUEEGEE NARRATIVE

Like Jenkin's (1995) description of the problem of clergy sex abuse, squeegeeing was "a model example of a social problem that appears to undergo mushroom growth, receiving virtually no attention from media or policymakers before about [1995], yet becoming a major focus of popular concern within a few years" (p. 110). Though some might argue that the issue received attention disproportionate to the threat that squeegee kids posed, the rapid growth of interest in squeegee kids paralleled the rapid growth of squeegeeing in Toronto's streets.

Early on, there were a few scattered claims about the potentially undesirable impact of squeegee kids. Then they were upon us, and people disagreed over what to do about the condition. Squeegeeing did not arise fully formed, into the public eye.

Consciousness of the problem really started to emerge around the prominent claims-making behavior of Mike Colle. This incident demonstrated how social issues only get classified as such when people categorize them as troublesome and in need of repair. Colle's package of claims was similar to that which introduces many other social issues. In this case, drivers claimed terrible experiences in which they were made into victims –

either by being intimidated or inconvenienced and irritated or in extreme cases, assaulted. The media, in turn, covered these claims and squeegeeing became widely recognized as a popular phenomenon that was bothersome to many. It became a social problem not because of actual damage done by squeegee kids but because of the conflict of values that their presence highlighted (see Fuller & Myers 2003a, p. 90).

For a long period, squeegee-debate involved seemingly irresolvable disagreements over whether the condition was even a problem. Even those who agreed that it was a problem in need of reform got mired in debates about how many resources to dedicate to it. Conflict abounded, over the ends (what the goal of reform should be) and the means (how that reform should be accomplished). There were numerous proposals to ameliorate the condition but the administration of reform seemed continually undermined by further conflicts. In the end, people did not come to share the same values and objectives but squeegee kids still ceased being a social problem because people ceased subjectively defining it as such. Other issues began to demand more attention in the crowded public policy arena once the issue ran its course through stages of awareness, policy determination, and reform (see Fuller & Myers, 2003b).

The issue took a crucial turn when the provincial government released its *Blueprint* document and made the claim that squeegeeing presented a threat to Ontario's culture. In it, the idea for what was to become the Safe Streets Act was suggested as a solution for this purported increase in disorderly behavior. By this point, however, the issue of squeegee kids was widely present in the imaginations of many Ontarians. The announcement of formal action on behalf of the province followed intensive coverage of squeegee-related incidents over the immediately preceding years. By the time the

provincial government took action, the Ontario public had been exposed to a barrage of public claims concerning squeegee behavior, many of which typified them as deviant.

The most important factor was perhaps the accumulated effect of a rhetoric of calamity and warfare that sensitized media consumers to the idea of squeegee kids as an opponent or adversary that stood in the way of social order. It was unlikely that one could have read a Toronto paper in the summer of 1997 or 1998 and not form the impression of a city that was at war with squeegee kids. Whether or not people felt that squeegee kids threatened their own values or interests, it was hard to dispute that they inflamed tensions and revealed community divisions. Expressions of dis-ease, dis-comfort, and dis-order condensed within the symbol of squeegee kids because of the vague definition of the problematic condition. Squeegeeing was variously described as a problem due to the act itself, the appearance of the agents, and the overall scene in which these agents lived (one of homelessness, street-life, chronic youth unemployment, youth crime, and drug use). It seemed as though squeegee kids were an “indicator species” (see Mitchell, 1995), standing in for a series of other conflicts and representing how much disorder society can withstand. They became symptomatic of the presumed ill-health of public space.

FINAL COMMENTS ABOUT GUILT AND THE SQUEEGEE DRAMA

Put in dramatic terms, the policy arena was an “inferno” – a hellish period of indecision – for the longest time. Following this, “purgatorio” – or the purification of the problem that came with the decision to finally act – was ultimately brought about by the institution of the Safe Streets Act. Whether or not the consequences of this act result in a heaven-like “paradiso” remain to be seen. No matter what, though, removing squeegee kids from the streets was a practical act with symbolic value. Burke (1941) distinguished

between symbolic and practical action when he noted “a radical difference between building a house and writing a poem about building a house” (pp. 8-9). Dismissing or vilifying squeegee kids in language constituted a symbolic act whereas eliminating them from the streets carried symbolic meaning but was a quintessentially practical act.

Two things happened when a “solution” to the problem of squeegee kids was introduced. Squeegee kids disappeared for the most part from the streets and squeegeeing withdrew from the front pages as a social issue that demanded the public’s attention. That did not mean, however, that the ‘guilt’ associated with them also disappeared. Rather, “the guilt was ‘processed.’ It was not resolved” (Burke, 1961, p. 236). Ultimately, expiation of all guilt would also eliminate the need for catharsis. It would mean the end of tragedy, the end of drama. The curative role of victimage, however, is never complete. Conflict is inherent to the human condition and so will be efforts to assuage it for, “strictly speaking, there can be no perfection but ... in heaven” (Burke, 1961, p. 303). To say that we cannot wholly eliminate guilt or disorder does not preclude that there is something to be learned from the effort. “The cycle of terms implicit in the idea of worldly order continues, forever circling back upon itself, thus forever ‘guilty’, thus forever demanding ‘redemption,’ thus forever inciting anew to the search for a curative victim” (Burke, 1961, p. 223). The goal is to understand how this cycle functions and, in doing so, better understand how social issues evolve through the analysis of the communication of the drama itself.

The legislation of the Safe Streets Act put the words of the *Blueprint* document into action and allowed the guilt redemption cycle of order-pollution-guilt-purification-redemption to come full-cycle. Admittedly, however, the expiation of guilt was partial;

squeegee kids were removed along with the discomfort that some felt when they confronted them. But new sources of guilt will arise with renewed social tensions as other issues demand our attention, demand action, and demand cleansing anew. On the eve of the public announcement of the Safe Streets Act, one article in the *Star* concluded, “time will tell – if, in a year from now, the streets are still cluttered with squeegee kids, then this act will have been more about scapegoating the poor than creating safe streets” (Urquhart, 1999). The removal of squeegee kids from the streets solved the problem of squeegeeing but it did not necessarily make streets safer or eliminate the sense of Burkean guilt that caused squeegeeing to become a problem in the first place.

Typifications of squeegee kids as victimizers created the conditions for victimage (and squeegee kids’ symbolic extermination via the Safe Streets Act). “Scapegoating will continue. ... We cannot eradicate our language structures, but perhaps we can reflect on them well enough to keep them from leading us to do too much harm to ourselves” (Condit, 1995, p. 236). The point is not to decry some of these classifications as unjust and others as fair. What is important, instead, is to recognize the desire to re-order ambiguous statuses, how this causes the attribution of both positive and negative meanings to differently situated social groups, and to ask what society does with these associations. An analysis of this process (and greater public awareness of it) is unlikely to directly affect people’s practical action. It can, however, change the way we view communication and our understandings of symbolic action.

Throughout my study I analyzed claims-makers’ language in which squeegeeing was identified and debated as a social problem. I traced how claims-makers argued that the condition was problematic, widespread, and growing worse. In the beginning,

squeegeeing presented the mass media with a wealth of new and dramatic stories to cover. In turn, the mass media presented the opportunity for publicity for those who wanted to make claims around the issue, activists and politicians alike. Activists, though, did not offer support for politicians as much as they raised dissenting voices. Without anyone “owning” the issue and the way it was framed, a single dominant orientation was never established. Though squeegee kids were nominated as tragic figures who could bring about a redeemed social scene, in the end, redemption was somewhat denied because squeegee kids’ punishment did not provide catharsis. As evidenced by the quantity (and tone) of people’s pro-squeegee kid sentiments, many did not identify with the forces of “good.” Instead, many saw themselves as consubstantial with those who were identified as sources of disorder (and likely envisioned a different vision of the good life). Consequently, condemnation could not be levied against squeegee kids in a guilt-free orgy of aggression since there was no consensus about disorder to forswear. Identification with the government and its anti-squeegee claims was ever partial, always incomplete (as was identification with squeegee kids) as division lurked throughout the drama. Indeed, divisiveness was the defining characteristic of this moral drama. As a moral problem, not everyone agreed on what to do (or even what the problem was).

The symbolic meanings that circulated in the media were not a reflection of the government’s preferred view of squeegee kids. Even so, the prevailing tone of claims about squeegee kids consistently indicated that it was necessary to subject them to varying degrees of care and control. Squeegee kids were discursively identified similar to the way in which, “general lists of negative characteristics were assembled into composites of the ‘typical’ abortionist” (Condit, 1990, p. 33). Negative connotations

added up to suggest an image of squeegee kids as antagonists in the life-drama of an order-seeking society. Protagonists (those fighting for a cleaner society) identified squeegee kids as a group that had to be eliminated in order that the tensions in society (leading to its tragic downfall) could be solved or at least mitigated. They saw the present as intruded upon by lawlessness and irritating nuisances (but envisioned a better future that could be brought about by the elimination of those unruly elements). By nullifying the source of disruption, not only could the public be saved but the kids could be too. As the end of the drama approached, the government did not need to convince people that its vision of a future Ontario was the right one. It merely needed to reinforce OCAP's social vision – an unrestrained future where anything goes – as something potentially injurious to the idea of the province as a desirable and safe place.

FINAL COMMENTS ON VALUE-CONFLICT AND THE AGON

Apart from the ever-repeating cycle of guilt-redemption and purification (the sacrificial principle that Burke believes is intrinsic to the nature of order), a central debate that underpinned the drama of squeegeeing concerned the idea of personal freedom. The question of whether squeegee kids should be free to act as they saw fit, or whether drivers were having their freedoms trampled was paramount. As one constable argued, "We've lost the focus that everyone has equal rights, that the taxpaying citizens of this city should be able to walk around unimpeded. ... It's causing the citizens to be fearful, intimidated" (Ibbitson, 1999, p. A1). This claim underscores how squeegee kids served as a condensation symbol that made it possible for society to debate wider issues about personal freedom, safety, and law and order.

Debates about squeegee kids were concerned with more than just the condition of squeegeeing. If news “reflects, and in return shapes, the prevailing values of a society in a particular historical context” (Fowler, 1991, p. 222), then the social issue of squeegeeing says much about values/morals/interests, and how debates over these are turned into controversies. It says much about politics and the rhetoric (i.e. claims-making process) that is mobilized in order to capture the attention of audiences. It reinforces valuable lessons about effective means of making and establishing claims. Specifically, it highlights the continued importance of the dramatistic lens of guilt-redemption and its relevance to studies of social issue construction. The debate over squeegeeing (understood dramatistically) contributes to our understanding of the political and social value of the scapegoating process. If a scapegoat can be identified and linked to issues that are seen to be in need of reform (and for which public support can be generated), a population can be constructed as threatened and a threat can be constructed (for what harm can be done without a villain).

When squeegee kids acted in public space, they helped to create the conditions for their own exclusion. They demonstrated the *dialectics of exclusion*. This entails a progressive accentuation of marginality whereby a group will “create an identity which is rejecting and exclusive, they exclude others by aggression and dismissal, and they are, in turn, excluded and dismissed by others” (J. Young, 1999, p. 13). My dissertation described how claims-makers responded to (and helped constitute) this public identity of squeegee kids. It also showed how reformist actions (in the form of legislation) can be proposed and instituted under the auspices of purification rituals. And the foregoing analysis of squeegeeing demonstrated that this process does not depend on consensus.

Rather, antagonistic relationships and a divided public can end up further polarized by rhetoric that continually emphasizes the paradox of substance and defines one's values by virtue of not being those of one's opponents.

Claims that squeegeeing was bad (or that it simply was an occasionally forgivable nuisance) were about fundamental political, cultural, and social disagreements. One could even argue that the underlying issue is ultimately more symbolic than real. This is the case even though, in a very real sense, squeegee kids offended some individuals' sense of smell, sense of sight, and sense of personal boundaries. However, in a broader sense, squeegeeing involved conflict over what constituted acceptable public decorum and social norms much more than it was about being delayed or verbally assaulted while stopped at traffic intersections. For those inclined against squeegee kids, the window-washers symbolized a decline in civility and a burgeoning crisis in law and order. They symbolized an unforgivable intrusion on others' individual rights, a disruptive spectacle associated with offensive behavior and language. Similarly, squeegee-sympathizers also felt attacks on squeegee kids symbolized an assault on squeegee kids' individual rights. Interestingly, the "good life" propounded by the government was not as diametrically opposed to the "bad life" of squeegee kids as much as it defended the right of some to freedom and classified another group's claims to such a right as "bad conduct". Different images of public order guided each side's definition of the situation. Pro-squeegee rhetors saw government laws impinging on personal freedoms and viewed intolerant people as the problem. Anti-squeegee rhetors saw squeegee kids' actions as infringements on their personal freedoms and viewed squeegee behavior as the problem.

Following Mitchell (1995), we can see how the squeegee debate represented two

opposed and perhaps irreconcilable visions of the nature and potential use of public space. The first vision (held by squeegee defenders) was one of unconstrained interaction in the city; its advocates suggested that no one should be barred from this space. The second vision was held by claims-makers who were opposed to this first vision and who believed in certain standards for public behavior. This latter perspective envisioned public space as controlled and orderly in which improperly behaved people might experience sanctions. The seeming resolution of the squeegee problem did nothing to quell these incommensurable discourses. As Condit (1990) noted regarding abortion rhetoric, "gradually, the public settled down to live in the limited new vocabulary, even while extremist ideologues ... continued their impassioned arguments" (p. 202).

The squeegee debate exhibited more than just a lack of consensus; it demonstrated the principle of the agon as "news of controversial issues keeps tensions between groups alive or intensifies them or broadens them. ... Every such story buttresses the antagonism between the groups" (Edelman, 1988, p. 94). In this case, the media gave voice to moral judgements on squeegee kids in claims that levied both terms of abuse and terms of endearment. Squeegee kids were typified as objects of both pity and fear. Their emergence as a scapegoat came "by assigning different semantic roles to the members of different groups, thus discriminating among them" (Fowler, 1991, p. 120). Media coverage did not discriminate against them.

To paraphrase Burke (1941, p. 33), the total dramatic agon was broken down into "squeegee" as the symbol of the antagonist and "law" as the symbol of the protagonist with the two symbols competing in an over-all cooperative act, as pro- and anti-squeegee forces competitively worked together to make a game. By "statistically" charting the

course of the plot, squeegee came to equal disorder and individual freedom that translated into disdain of rules. On the other hand, the law (and by inference, the government - its administrator) came to equal order, the protection of permissible individual freedoms, and the promise of social unity and prosperity. Obviously, "squeegee" and "law" did not signify that for each person. But that is how the clusters of language-claims were organized within the conditions of the drama. Squeegee kids were often depicted as predatory, devoid of moral scruples and rebelling against the law and a law-abiding public that was portrayed as a pool of potential victims.

Whether squeegee kids were seen as criminal and dangerous, or just marginal and needy, they remained essentially deviants to most onlookers. Those who were not sympathetic to squeegee kids asked "them" to change their erroneous ways. Even their supporters recognized how they were not part of the mainstream and asked "us" to broaden our idea of what was acceptable. Some editorials lamented the deterioration of law and order in the streets while others lamented the government's treatment of "them." Overall, though, the story of redemptive violence, of purification and war as an extreme form of cleansing, summarized the situation by which we came to know squeegee kids.

Squeegee kids did not personify evil, *per se*, but they did signify an antagonist capable of exposing the tragic flaw of scapegoating and politics. They represented the necessity of eliminating disruption in order to achieve temporary redemption and they provided a tacit reminder of the ultimate futility of such a heroic quest (see Ivie, 1996, pp. 172-173). For someone to play the role of redeemer and bring about a utopia of law and order, "forces for good" need to find evil and fight it. "Perfect community will require the elimination of the agon, but the 'elimination' is horribly ambiguous. Do we

mean the 'reconciliation' of agonistic elements through the healing power of a truly embracing human vision? Or do we mean 'elimination' as exclusion, negation, exile, and murder?" (Lentricchia, 1983, p. 163). The squeegee drama was resolved through the latter course of action when squeegee kids became a "political enemy." This figure "need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly. ... But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and ... in a specifically intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible" (Schmitt, 1996, p. 27).

FINAL COMMENTS

There were occasional appeals to logic in this drama (i.e. downtown business owners who wrote letters complaining that their business was negatively affected). However, most claims surrounding squeegee kids played "the emotion card." Their focus was on the hostility felt by letter-writers (either at the perceived intrusions of squeegee kids or the social treatment of squeegee kids), or alternatively, they sought to cultivate sympathy (either for squeegee kids or for drivers who were similarly set-upon). After a couple of summers of recurring squeegeeing with ever increasing numbers of practitioners, squeegee-naysayers' language was increasingly marked by concern and alarm (if not outright anger) at being inconvenienced, slowed down, and generally imposed upon by these kids. In turn, squeegee-advocates also exhibited a tone of anger in their commentaries as they directed their claims at squeegee-detractors. An emotional vocabulary dominated squeegee discourse and led to antagonistic relations among differing claims-makers.

Themes of redemption and catharsis underscored many of these squeegee-claims. However, I found very few instances of claims that aligned one's partisan appeals

(whether they be the government's or those of groups aligned against it) with the idea that one's own platform comprised a striving for salvation, a way to achieve the 'good.' Instead it seemed as though the principle of a 'pre-emptive' agon was at work – appeals tended to simply identify the other group as 'bad.' Thus, squeegee kids exemplified the paradox of substance: "The more intently any character seeks his own identity or essence, the more he will need to define that identity and essence through dramatic interaction with the opposed or adjacent identities of others" (Fletcher, 1982, p. 161).

The social issue of squeegeeing contained many dramas. There was the drama in the arena of the streets, in the arena of the media, and in the arena of government rhetoric and policy. There were certainly other scapegoats who could have represented problems in the social order. But claims-makers of all stripes enthusiastically used squeegee kids to define themselves and their preferred visions for public life. The conflict-ridden nature of squeegeeing lent itself to debates about how order is established just as dramatism is a fitting device to explain how these claims-makers symbolically enacted such visions. Kenneth Burke's emphasis on tragic drama, the hierarchal, and the power of the negative help to explain why we should care about the social construction of problems such as squeegeeing. My analysis of the social construction of squeegeeing hopefully has underscored the continued relevance of studies that search for the guilt-redemption cycle in rhetoric and which examine life as a drama, one in which we constantly articulate and re-define our values through our responses to social problems.

CONCLUSION

Having concluded my analysis of the social issue of squeegeeing, this chapter concludes the entire study with an evaluation of the appropriateness of my application of dramatism. It will discuss (and justify) the limitations of my study and outline its potential contributions.

CONSIDERING THE POWER OF THE MEDIA

The explicit object of my study has been the evolution of a social issue. But the media are thoroughly implicated in this study for they are the main vehicles for public claims-making. Burke (1954) identified journalists as a particular symbol-using group that “keeps us abreast of the world’s miseries” and that performs the “normal priestly function” of partly upholding and partly transcending the “mysteries” that classes of people become to one another owing to their different modes of living (pp. 276-277). As Hall et al. (1978) suggested, “the media define for the majority of the population *what* significant events are taking place, but, also, they offer powerful interpretations of *how* to understand these events” (p. 57). I have focused on the second part of this equation – how the “public image” of squeegeeing was constructed in the media – but I have dedicated precious little space to a discussion of the power of the media to effect change in people’s attitudes toward squeegee kids. However, it should not be taken for granted that people thought a lot about squeegee kids just because the media featured a lot squeegee claims. Nor should it be assumed that people’s interpretations of squeegeeing were the result of their media consumption.

“The social constructionist who cannot find related data in public texts must conclude that there is no problem under construction. ... Discerning reality by publicity, however, suggests problems are purely rhetorical” (Gubrium, 1993, p. 59). Even though I studied the rhetorical quality of social problem definitions (not the definitional quandary of what constitutes a problem in the first place), it bears emphasizing that the social problem of squeegeeing was not a mere construction of the media. Of course, the public image of squeegeeing was created in the media. But the condition of squeegeeing had to exist first. For my purposes, claims mutually constitute social problems (alongside the conditions that are the object of those claims). I “suspend[ed] the distinction between definitional, interpretive, or representational practices on the one hand and the referent of those practices on the other” (Pollner, 1993, p. 71) in order to pursue an inquiry into the role of the media as organizing context for claims-making activities.

CONSIDERING THE POWER OF THE AUDIENCE

Claims do not have power (to persuade or to identify) simply because they are carried by the media. “The mass media carry a great deal of symbolic freight [but the] news ... is more the pawn of shared presuppositions than the purveyor of self-conscious messages” (Schudson, 1995, p. 15). As Johnson (1989) explained in his account of child abuse constructions, “it would be a mistake to see [squeegeeing] as merely a creation of the media. News organizations played a creative role in the process; some would argue a major role. But just as important, news organizations *responded* to a sense of urgency created by other groups, agencies, and sectors of the public” (p. 16). This point about the institutionalization of a problem also is emphasized by Best (1999, p. xiv; pp. 63-69). One must also pay attention to the matter of the reception of social problems (in addition

to recognizing the multifaceted nature of problem production). Claims only possess power to effect changes in attitudes (much less inspire further practical or symbolic acts) when they coincide with an audience's pre-existing predilections regarding issues, parties, leaders, enemies, and social problems (see Edelman, 1988, p. 32, 100; Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994, p. 26; Jenkins, 1992, p. 21).

Especially when it comes to the study of social problems, "the public is the audience that reads newspapers and news magazines, and listens to the broadcast media. It is a decidedly media public" (Gubrium, 1993, p. 56). Yet as Blair and Michel (1999) argued, "rhetoric typically does not address the material presence or practices of audiences" (p. 68). Admittedly, the criticism that "the audiences ... whom many constructionists study through media analysis, are a socially nebulous lot" (Gubrium, 1993, p. 57) can also apply to my study. But this is also consistent with rhetorical analysis that "proceeds with 'audience' as its ground, ... [but] not the concrete individual human beings who listen to or read and interpret a discourse. Rather, following Aristotle, rhetorical theory considers the audience as a class" (Charland, 1999, p. 466).

There are obvious questions still to be answered about how audiences used, consumed, and redeployed claims regarding squeegeeing. My analysis accounted for those readers who objected to certain claims and then, through their contribution of letters-to-the-editor, acted as claims-makers in their own right. My analysis assumes, therefore, that the claims that appeared in the media are reflective of the issue itself. If a social issue is what people think it is, then it is also what people say it is, documented in the media and spread to others. Of course there is the possibility that the way audiences read squeegee-related claims (or what they read together with them) might be more

important than the claims themselves, but this still requires the consumption and consideration of these claims. Considering that a social problem cannot emerge unless people pay attention to it, I took the material practices of audiences for granted since audience activity was implicated in the public production of the issue as a whole. There is obviously much to be interrogated here, but this must be left for future projects.

My project is an attempt “to ground in a specific material circumstance (historical, economic, political, social) the production of textuality and the kinds of readings that audiences might make” (Rosteck, 1995, p. 399). The point of my analysis is not that people produce texts and other people consume them. Rather, analysis of the dynamic nature of social issues requires that these elements be held in tension, flowing back and forth with text and context as reader and reading combine as inseparable elements in this drama. They should not be collapsed together but read as interwoven together. Society, society’s documents such as the media, and people’s interpretations thereof are all agonistically related. As such, a dramatisitic analysis should help defend against the claim that the constructionist approach to social problems sees “an audience that is mainly just there to receive” (Gubrium, 1993, p. 57). The social issue of squeegeeing reflected conflict over meaning (what do squeegee kids represent, what are we – as a society – willing to tolerate) even as it is also the site of these struggles.

CONSIDERING MY METHOD

For the most part, like Hall et al. (1978: 75-6), I chose to disregard differences between different media outlets and examine how they collectively contributed to a sequence of events in which critical definitional work on the controversial topic of ‘squeegeeing’ was carried out. I also chose to largely disregard style differences between

different formats of papers (tabloid versus broadsheet) and between sections in newspapers. I viewed all media accounts of squeegeeing – letters to the editor, editorials, news stories, opinion columns alike – as “public communications, colored by ‘public motives’ [whose] intention is ... to shape policy, influence opinion, swing the course of events, defend interests, advance causes” (Hall et al., 1978, p. 121). My qualitative analysis of squeegeeing did not differentiate between these accounts in order to concentrate on the issue’s development. My treatment of the overall drama of squeegeeing – and by extension, the drama of life – examined all squeegee-based claims as equal indicators of public concern about the issue. It did not elevate any claims-makers over any others and demonstrated how no one primary definition commanded the field.

Obviously, the method I chose does not have all the answers. But I believe it revealed some very important aspects of social issue construction. “A way of seeing is also a way of not seeing” (Burke, 1954, p. 49). My approach showed how the media serve another function other than just the dissemination of claims-makers’ world-views. They also serve a public information function, creating an overall picture of reality, one that is not necessarily balanced or objective but is also not necessarily partial or beholden to government and its claims. I chose to cobble together different squeegee-related claims to construct panoptic images of squeegee agents and the urban scene. By doing so, we can see how, “the newspaper also reaffirms the reader’s connection to the city he or she lives in or lives near” (Schudson, 1995, p. 41). Viewing the social issue of squeegeeing as the sum of its parts allowed for the possibility that audiences could, over time and through their exposure to any medium, either become consubstantial with squeegee kids or be tempted by symbolic cleansings such as purgation by scapegoat.

CONSIDERING THE POWER OF LANGUAGE

My study was obviously interested in the power of language and its ability to fill people “with fantastic hatreds for alien populations they know about mainly by mere hearsay” (Burke, 1968, p. 5). However, I also underscored how language constructs people even as people attempt to construct powerful language claims. I demonstrated how a particular set of statements and expressions defined the drama of squeegeeing as a specific political problem. As people accepted and deployed this language they adopted certain roles in this drama. “The stylized utterances of public officials, interest group spokespersons, and concerned citizens [mean] ... a person becomes a particular kind of subject: ... a liberal or a conservative, a victim of authority or a supporter of authority, an activist or a spectator” (Edelman, 1988, p. 112). Even still, the power of language is constrained. For instance, “police chiefs are expected to focus on the importance of maintaining law and order rather than on the anarchic virtues of disorder” (ibid.).

People’s positions in the social order bind them together in a system of rights and obligations *and* condition the language that is available for them to use. People’s social positions and backgrounds condition their acceptance of others’ language claims also. I demonstrated that social processes and social relations are mediated through the language we use to describe social issues. This is, however, a partially determining effect; my focus was on the power of language and textual accounts to effect moral judgements but I also acknowledged how other discourses affected the circulation of symbolic meanings of squeegee kids. I outlined how the import of squeegee-based claims in the mass media depended, in part, upon pre-existing understandings of youth unemployment and youth crime. This explained to some extent why moralizing flared up around squeegee kids

instead of just showing how moral rhetoric created the figure of the squeegee kid-cum-scapegoat. Thus, I recognized an important material context that underpinned the textual drama. Again, further examination of this issue is better left to other projects. My focus was on mass media texts and how they communicated a conflict-ridden drama of squeegeeing to the public. It did so, even while acknowledging that the power of these claims to valorize a particular understanding of squeegeeing was not an exclusive property of language and textuality.

Part of my study's contribution lies in its examination of the media and language use therein as a site of power and constant struggle. It began with the assumption, "because language is important, it deserves critical attention. How we think and talk about social problems ... demands to be better understood" (Best, 1999, p. 186). My dissertation offers new insights into problem construction by revitalizing old concerns about language and making them manifest in order to provide answers to contemporary questions. It suggests the value of re-integrating Burke and his theorizing of rhetoric into the social constructionist canon of dealing with media and construction of social issues.

CONSIDERING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STUDY

Regarding Burke's treatment of language, Carter (1996) suggested, "the main recurring pattern Burke finds is ... a surrogate victim. ... When alphabets are tossed into the air, they are likely to land in the pattern of a scapegoat" (p. 109). Feelings of guilt (i.e. discomfort, anxiety, fear) directed at squeegee kids can be seen as the expression of a common, perhaps even predictable communication pattern of scapegoating others. With this in mind, my analysis of squeegee kids provides a case study for future analyses of how other groups may be made into problem populations. Squeegee kids were

dramatized as culpable for much larger problems of urban identity and prosperity. They were cast as undeserving of assistance, and (for some) worthy of punitive measures. The use of dramatism provides a valuable perspective on the manner in which groups of people can be defined collectively as a problem, not just how conditions can be defined as problematic. As such, my study of squeegee kids can be a guide for other studies that also seek to study discourse in ways that focus on the role of rhetoric in shaping the evolution and structure of social problems.

“Our best criticism ought to be both particular and summative. That is, it ought to illuminate particular situations and at the same time suggest hypotheses regarding human rhetorical behavior that, when added to the insights of other critics, provide generalizable understandings of the human rhetorical condition” (Richard Gregg, cited in Nothstine, Blair, & Copeland, 1994, p. 33). I hope my study of squeegeeing can be similarly classified. An analysis of the rhetoric that comprised the squeegee drama can help us understand how problems are constituted and therefore how future problems might take shape. As Duncan (1965) put it, “language is an instrument that causes and solves our problems” (p. xvii). Paying attention to the dramatistic implications of this language (our rhetorical condition) can also sensitize us to important aspects of our social condition. My study of squeegeeing demonstrated how battles over morals take place in conflicts over social issues. It also demonstrated how the language that constructs these conflicts forms the very basis of the dramatic nature of life. It would be imprudent to believe that my study of the squeegee kids controversy is representative of the development of all social issues (much less all dramas). But the study of people’s public claims-making regarding

squeegee kids does suggest interesting elements that can be examined in the study of other public problems.

One element to consider in future analyses is the degree to which one should update or revise Brock's (1969) suggestion that the dramatistic process existed in the background of politicians' rhetoric. I believe the dramatistic idea of guilt-redemption was in the foreground of people's (moral) claims in the squeegee drama. This is not to say that all contemporary political problems feature this explicit rhetoric. However, an interesting avenue for future research might be a consideration of whether this dramatic element in political claims is more pronounced now than in the past. Do politicians see fit to increasingly employ moral rhetoric that incites or encourages victimage and is there an appetite for this kind of socio-political theatre? My analysis of the squeegee drama provides merely the impetus for such speculation but it is an example of a drama in which politicians did not "shun the conflicts that embitter and divide their electorates" (Gusfield, 1996, p. 27).

Another element to consider is the degree to which a dramatistic analysis of guilt-redemption and people's motives is even relevant to contemporary problems. Burke explains how guilt, purification and redemption are manifest in government rhetoric, just as they are in all of human existence. Politicians provide secular equivalents to religious absolution when they present solutions to problems. Dramatism underscores how all humans are imperfect creatures, capable of sin, and inclined to appeal to something outside of themselves for exoneration from their own weaknesses. Victimage and scapegoating depend on the view that evil (and guilt) can be cast outside us but this very

notion references something larger than ourselves which also calls into existence a good that is greater than ourselves.

Yet the argument can be made that in modernity, there is no greater referent than the individual itself. This can be seen in the interplay of squeegee claims. Both pro- and anti-squeegee claims of victimization (the ultimate individual indignity) can be seen as assertions of unbridled self-expression. Both the protestations of squeegee kids and the lamentations of offended drivers exhibited a thoroughgoing self-absorption. These characteristics of rampant narcissism or radical individualism also indicate that society is less explicitly moral than it was when Burke originally fashioned his theory of guilt-redemption. However, scapegoating continues, even in our contemporary society that exhibits less agreement on what is "right" and what constitutes the "good" life. Perhaps, instead of expressing invariant belief structures, constructions of social issues and discourses of scapegoating express anxiety (i.e. Burkean "guilt") about waning norms. The scapegoating process provides easy (and satisfying) answers to social problems and is indifferent to the content that fuels it. As people continue to debate moral problems, it will continue as an attractive vehicle for the sedimentation of different beliefs, attitudes, and discursive positions.

With this in mind, my analysis of squeegee kids can serve as a form of Burkean admonitory, preventative knowledge. Increasing the awareness of rituals of victimage will not make them go away but it might help with the recognition of such rituals. Inspired by Burke, "the challenge ... is to offer a statement of values that can serve as incipient action preparing us for the time when we encounter each problem" (Heath, 1986, p. 246). Carter (1996) believes we "need to choose our surrogates more self-

consciously" (p. 136) but my study was not meant to contribute to such moral advocacy. Instead, it acknowledges the possibility that the dramatistic approach is "more likely to lead to an understanding of the human situation than to an undertaking to change it" (Melia, 1989, p. 70). This is not second-class analysis, though. Like Duncan (1965), my dissertation suggests that we can turn to Burke "for the analysis of what symbols do to us in our relations with each other [so that] we may yet learn to lead a better life" (pp. xlii-xliii). Such a quest stands on its own merit. Thus, I take note of the "running battle between those who believe that analytically controlled rhetorical analysis generates human understanding ... and those who demand that critics must push past the disinterestedness of rational analysis and into the realm of ideological critique and political action" (Gronbeck, cited in Rosteck, 1999, p. 8). My dissertation is located in the former camp.

Contrarily, some critics take up the challenge "to identify the symbolic constructions which mislead, and to isolate the range of life-affirming options which can be employed to enhance the quality of human life" (Chesebro, 1988: 187). Ivie (2001) is one such critic whose mission is to redress the tendency to "think of Burke's theory as a way of accounting for rhetorical practice rather than as a way of addressing social problems and improving human relations." My dissertation has sought to address one particular social problem through Burke's theory but stops short of trying to improve human relations. One of the reasons for this is that it was not meant as an effort to alter some perceived problematic condition or defend some wronged population or some maligned aspect of social life. Instead, it marshaled Burke to the cause of "the theoretical reconstruction of the vernacular features of social problems as moral discourse" (Ibarra &

Kitsuse, 1993, p. 25). My intention was to use dramatism to understand people's language claims as symbolic action worthy of study in their own right. The goal was "not to laugh, not to lament, not to curse, but to understand" (Spinoza, cited in E. Becker, 1973, p. vi) the ways in which claims and counterclaims assess and describe motives and contribute to (and even constitute) the evolution of the social problems language game.

Burke's own words can defend against charges that the moralistic vocabulary of dramatism is best suited to a more explicit critique and greater intervention in political life. His suggestions regarding the analysis of hierarchy pertain to any critique. One should not "vacillate between 'mystification' and 'unmasking,' between the journalistic 'build up' and the compensatory 'character assassination,' but should aim at the kinds of contemplation and sufferance that are best adapted to the recognition and acceptance of a social form inevitable to social order" (Burke, 1954, p. 294). Of course, contemplation and sufferance are not always comfortable bedfellows. "Comedy teaches us that men can endure much if they can endure it in rational discourse with each other. When we cannot communicate in reason we are ready for the tortured image of tragedy" (Duncan, 1962, pp. 403-404). My analysis of squeegeeing showed that some claims-makers laugh in the face of discomfiting guilt. It also showed how, overall, the conflict-ridden drama did not lend itself to rational discourse. Claims-making depended on emotional appeals more than rational ones.

Squeegee claims-makers captured public attention by being melodramatic, tragic, and irrational. Such claims increased the sense of incipient danger and excitement but provided precious few opportunities to present "people not as *vicious*, but as *mistaken*" (Burke, 1959, p. 41). I hesitate to say whether, in the drama of squeegee kids, this comic

circle and the lesson of humility that underlies all tragedy was ever reached. Squeegee kids were portrayed as vicious as was the government that sought to criminalize them. Both sides in the squeegee struggle employed rhetorical vilification in order to elevate their own arguments and debase those of their competition. In this manner, “bad” squeegee kids and “good” agents of the state were more alike than dissimilar. Both sides sought to tragically cast the other as enemy and both contributed to the guilt that ran rampant in the urban scene.

My analysis demonstrated how the social issue of squeegeeing emerged out of a guilt-ridden nexus of cultural concerns such as fear, anxiety, interest, alarm, and curiosity. Hopefully I have contributed to an understanding of how these emotions are implicated in the drama of social issue construction. My goal was to re-integrate Burkean theory into the study of how we communicate and construct social problems. I hope I have managed the creative tensions between different disciplines and integrated rhetoric into mass communication research rather than just borrowing bits of social constructionism and dramatism to advance just another report of findings into some social issue. Part of this contribution is the application of Burke – most often used by rhetoricians and scholars of human communication – to the discipline of mass communication in order to emphasize how language claims in the media help construct our pictures of the world. I took seriously the idea that “we must show how social order is expressed, for all we really can observe about order is how it is communicated” (Duncan, 1962, p. xvii).

Debates about social issues such as squeegee kids contribute to this. They help comprise “the parade of news about political acts reported to us by the mass media and

drunk up by the public as drama” (Edelman, 1967: 8). But there is more to this than the representation of social order in dramatic news content. Burke instructs us that life is dramatic. My analysis of squeegee-claims in the media demonstrated this in a two-fold fashion: It highlighted individual squeegee-claims and showed how they acted as dramatic expressions of people’s identifications with (and against) other claims-makers in their quest to create social order. It also highlighted how the Burkean sense of repetitive and progressive form functioned in squeegee coverage “to encourage certain interpretations and evaluations of the events and ‘characters’ involved over others” (Olson, 1995, p. 44). I have provided further evidence for the re-connection and re-enlivening of the Burkean perspective within studies of social issue construction through this analysis. My use of dramatism and my search for the rhetoric of guilt-redemption in the diffused mosaic of squeegee-claims also took up the challenge of those who suggest the need to examine rhetoric beyond the traditional modes of public address with which it is usually concerned (see Rosteck, 1995, p. 402). While many social constructionists emphasize the need for dramatic claims, my study showed how the entire issue of squeegeeing was constructed dramatically. Ultimately this is a valuable (and under-represented) perspective that can explain what is necessary for the emergence, maintenance, and decline of social issues.

APPENDIX I: SQUEEGEE EVENTS TIMELINE

1995: scattered references to squeegee kids in the media

May 1996: A group of squeegee kids staged a sit-in at Nathan Phillips Square, refusing to move as they protested their eviction from a Carlton St. squat and demanded free shelter without rules.

June 21, 1996: Squeegeeing is thrust into the Toronto spotlight. The media reports Liberal MPP Mike Colle's claims that he was attacked by squeegee kids. In a letter to the city he subsequently suggests "prohibiting these reckless squeegee people who are regularly intimidating motorists. You can imagine the impact this has on Toronto's tourism industry, as visitors meet upon this unwelcome and often frightful harassment." Colle raised the squeegee issue in Queen's Park, suggesting the Highway Traffic Act should be changed because the tickets the Toronto police were handing out were ineffective.

July 15, 1996: The city's legal department drafts a report on squeegee kids: "In terms of policing priorities in the city, this is a relatively low priority." Council recommends against urging Metro police to lay charges. Instead, city council's executive committee concludes that the essential problem is severe youth unemployment and calls on the provincial government to put money into youth employment programs. Mayor Barbara Hall announces she would be uncomfortable about cracking down on the squeegee kids without city youth workers first speaking with them.

July 19, 1996: Squeegee-ers protested briefly in front of Toronto City Hall.

July 20, 1996: Toronto Police Chief David Boothby announces the first police crackdown on squeegee kids. Justification: "Because the kids scare drivers. I've received some complaints from citizens that felt intimidated or threatened, and also from tourists." It is reported that officers have issued about 150 tickets a month for the last few months. Boothby admits that squeegeeing will not be tolerated though squeegee kids "may not top the priority list."

August 12, 1996: Toronto city council voted 9-8 against asking Metro police to step up enforcement of the law when it comes to squeegee kids. And in a unanimous vote, councillors called on federal and provincial governments to "reinvest in youth employment programs."

November 26, 1996: The *Toronto Sun* reported that there were an estimated 200 squeegee kids in the city. Of this number, 160 supposedly signed an agreement to respect "No Thanks" windshield stickers being marketed to drivers who were fed up with unwanted washes. Thus, while these kids can be seen as a growing problem, they can also be seen as somewhat conciliatory and accommodating.

By the end of 1996 squeegee kids have entered Canadian popular culture – they are reported as elements in stand up comedy routines and set the opening scene in a Second City comedy revue titled *Tragically OHIP*. A production of an updated *Godspell* features squeegee kids to reinforce moral messages behind ancient tales.

January 27, 1997: Toronto city council's executive committee proposed a job subsidization job plan for squeegee kids. The city would set aside \$200,000 to pay half the wages of people hired for minimum wage private sector jobs. The plan came under attack from some committee members who charged it was poorly researched and would accomplish little. Jobs proposed include sweeping out storage areas, making deliveries and cleaning out eavestroughs. Council approves the plan on February 3rd.

May 21, 1997: Premier Mike Harris announces the creation of the Ontario Crime Control Commission. Its initial mandate is to examine youth crime, child sex abuse, organized crime and school safety, and its first task is to go to New York City and review its measures that drastically reduced the city's crime rate. The commission includes MPPs Jim Brown, Jim Flaherty and Bob Wood. Brown and Wood are parliamentary assistants to Solicitor-General Bob Runciman and Flaherty is parliamentary assistant to Attorney-General Charles Harnick. Brown declares a special interest in NYC's broken-windows approach to combating squeegee kids. The broken-window theory argues that a strict police crackdown on minor offenders will head off a progressive development to serious criminal activity.

May 22, 1997: Metro Toronto Police Chief David Boothby says "If you get me 1,000 more officers I could saturate the streets and address this broken-window approach immediately."

June 10, 1997: Toronto police issue a press release announcing a summer crackdown on squeegee kids. A new approach is taken; whereas \$105 tickets were issued in the past, police announce a new form of ticket that requires them to go to court rather than simply paying a fine. Now, probationary terms, like ordering them not to squeegee, can be set by the courts. Police say complaints from drivers and business owners, politicians and the community in general prompted the action. Police advise motorists not to encourage the activity by giving the youths money.

June 11, 1997: In the wake of a late 1996 ruling by the Ontario Court of Appeal that toplessness is legal, Attorney General Charles Harnick announces that squeegee kids should not use that ruling as a marketing tool.

June 12, 1997: The *Toronto Star* prints an editorial titled "The squeegee squad": "Premier Mike is suddenly feeling faint about Metro's mini-boom in 'in-your-face' bare breasts. And Police Chief Dave is sweating, well, bullets about the squeegee kids who are sprouting like weird, pierced rhubarb on traffic-clogged street corners. And both are having a meltdown over that ultimate challenge to Toronto the Good: Bare-bosomed squeegee kids!"

June 13, 1997: Councillor Kyle Rae announces, "The squeegee problem is out of control in the downtown area."

June 16, 1997: Amidst questions of what happened to the \$200,000 allocated to find squeegee kids alternative employment, Toronto City Council announces a \$50,000 squeegee rehabilitation plan. Announcing that it could only handle eight applicants, John Gladki, director of the city's programs, policy and research division noted, "It's not a solution to the issue of squeegee kids." Council rejected Korwin-Kuczynski's suggestion that Toronto create "squeegee zones" in out-of-the-way parts of the city, a "red-light-district" of sorts for those who wanted to support the kids.

June 17, 1997: The *Toronto Sun* runs an editorial opposing "blowing a few hundred thousand on squeegee kids" and announces, "we support the ongoing police crackdown."

June 24, 1997: By a vote of 8-5, Toronto council announces that it is proceeding with a \$50,000 summer works program for eight street youths. Because of a public outcry, however, the 'youth-at-risk pilot program' (which was originally intended just for squeegee kids) was extended to other unemployed young people. Councillor Peter Tabuns charged some councillors of making too big of a deal out of squeegeeing: "It's a nuisance ... not a significant problem. The real issue is youth unemployment."

June 25, 1997: Recognizing that the conflict between police and squeegeers is getting worse, a group of squeegee kids tries to implement a squeegee code of conduct: to be polite, to not spit or swear, to say thank-you. It generates further publicity but few results.

July 3, 1997: In what is believed to be one of the first squeegee cases to reach court as a result of the 1997 crackdown, the Crown withdrew the charge. The lawyer for the defense declared "there is a void in the law at this point. There's nothing to charge these kids with."

August 21, 1997: Councillor Kyle Rae, whose downtown ward has seen the highest concentration of squeegeeing and citizen complaints, puts forward a plan to include squeegeeing in the city's street vending restrictions. The move would have allowed police to lay charges of illegal vending of a service on city streets. Council rejected Rae's plan in a 7-5 vote.

November 10, 1997: Mel Lastman wins the mayoralty of the new mega-city of Toronto. Lastman makes it clear that he is less friendly to squeegee kids than the previous administration.

December 9, 1997: Ontario's Crime Control Commission is officially launched. Tory MPP Bob Wood announces an intended zero-tolerance policy for all crimes, no matter how minor the offence - including littering, jaywalking and public urinating. Squeegee kids again are specifically identified as an object of concern.

December 13, 1997: It is reported that Solicitor-General Bob Runciman is afraid to walk Toronto streets and is scared of squeegee kids: "I spent hours and hours walking the streets of New York, even at night, and I never felt uncomfortable. I can't say that about some areas of downtown Toronto right now."

December 31, 1997: Summarizing the year in news, *The Hamilton Spectator* points out that "Youth poverty came to the fore, symbolized by the squeegee kids in major cities."

February 11, 1998: An 18-year old squeegee kid has his lungs crushed when he is run over by a five-ton truck. Reports say he purposefully rolled under the truck to avoid walking around it once the light changed. The incident is used by police and citizens alike to renew calls for some new form of bylaw since kids are irresponsible and pose a danger, both to themselves and others.

February 13, 1998: A conference hosted by the Ontario Crime Control Commission creates another flurry of squeegee-specific commentaries.

Early February, 1998: Toronto police Chief David Boothby meets with the editorial boards of both major Toronto papers and voices his opposition to the crime commission's call for a crackdown on petty criminals such as aggressive beggars and squeegee kids.

April 25, 1998: Squeegee kids say they are in the midst of another crackdown after police started handing out \$45 tickets for walking on the road outside of a crosswalk. Unlike previous years where the police announced such an initiative, Sergeant Marilyn McCann of police headquarters said there is no special effort underway.

May 12, 1998: Toronto's mayor gathered police, politicians, government officials and members of social service agencies and community groups for a day-long brainstorming session dedicated to squeegee kids. The Mayor's office issued a news release stating a desire to find "a new and creative method of helping these people get off the streets." Lastman says, "We're trying to come up with different things we can offer the kids to do. And then if they don't accept them, maybe get them off the street." Lastman also announces that the provincial government may join forces with city hall. Attorney General Charles Harnick declares, "It is something that needs to be controlled." This is the first foray into the issue by a Cabinet Minister.

May 13, 1998: Tory MPP Jim Brown announces the Ontario crime commission's Neighbourhood Protection Act, set to go to cabinet within the month. Its goal is to use civil court to target squeegee kids, street prostitutes, crack houses and aggressive panhandlers.

June 16, 1998: Toronto Councillor Ila Bossons puts forth a motion before the city's emergency and protective services committee calling for a bylaw with tighter enforcement of panhandling. Seeking support, Bossons wrote a memo to fellow councillors saying, "Squeegee kids are no longer cute." In an editorial, the *Toronto Star* calls the proposal "callous, wrong, and probably unconstitutional."

June 18, 1998: Toronto Police Chief David Boothby says the city's proposed bylaw to crack down on panhandlers and squeegee kids is "the wrong move" because it is unworkable.

July 14, 1998: The bylaw designed to restrict begging in Toronto was defeated 6-4 at the emergency and protective services committee. City politicians decided against it after their lawyers said it could not be enforced.

July 14, 1998: A squeegee kid (a 26 year old man) was beaten and threatened with a pistol by an irate car passenger.

July 15, 1998: When trying to clear squeegee kids out of a park, a police constable fears for his safety and shoots a rottweiler. Mayor Mel Lastman said the incident highlights his concerns with squeegee kids: "I'd like to see them out of Toronto. This is turning us into a Third World country."

July 16, 1998: Councillors on Toronto's community and neighbourhood services committee endorsed an initiative to spend \$500,000 to develop new employment and lifestyle opportunities for 100 squeegee kids.

July 21, 1998: The 1998 crackdown commences. At least 30 squeegee kids are arrested for various offences in the absence of legislation directly addressing the problem. Ontario's Premier joins the calls of Toronto's Mayor for such legislation, as does Police Chief Boothby who reversed his earlier position and said if the province outlawed the practice under the Highway Traffic Act he could rid Toronto of every squeegee kid in Toronto within two weeks. Lastman suggests fining drivers who pay the kids in order to cut down on the practice.

July 22, 1998: Ontario's Crime Control Commission sets up a toll-free hotline to register public complaints about squeegee kids. Commission chair Jim Brown reports hundreds of calls the first day.

July 26, 1998: The *Toronto Sun* runs an editorial applauding Mayor Lastman's efforts to end "squeegeeism" but denounces his recent idea to charge motorists who give squeegee kids money.

July 27, 1998: David Collenette, federal transport minister and the minister responsible for federal issues in the Greater Toronto Area, weighs in on squeegee kids: "These particular people constitute a hazard," he said. Collenette suggests talking to Cabinet about making amendments to the Criminal Code "if that's what's required" to eliminate it.

July 29, 1998: After almost three hours of debate, Toronto politicians determined they need more time to come up with measures to ease the squeegee controversy and decide not to adopt a proposed bylaw further restricting squeegee kids and beggars.

August 22, 1998: About 1,000 people from an anarchy conference and members of the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty marched to protest the "horrificing treatment" of street youth in Toronto.

September 28, 1998: The fall session of the Ontario Legislature starts and the *Toronto Sun* prints an editorial praising the Tories' law and order agenda and calls for "effective laws to control squeegee kids."

October 6, 1998: Results of an Angus Reid-CFRB-Toronto Sun poll are released. One-quarter of the respondents said taxes were Toronto's No. 1 issue with homelessness ranking a distant second at 15%. Unemployment and crime (each prioritized by 12% of the population) ranked lower than transportation and education. Squeegee kids did not rank as a significant issue, but two-thirds agreed they were a safety hazard and should not be allowed on city streets.

November 5, 1998: A joint meeting of the emergency and protective services committee and the community and neighbourhood services committee recommended that the city of Toronto postpone spending \$250,000 to subsidize diversionary jobs for squeegee kids until the province passes legislation to more effectively deter squeegeeing.

November 24, 1998: A group of the Toronto's religious leaders representing Christians, Muslims, Jews and Buddhists held a news conference at Metro Hall asking Toronto council to use love and compassion, not force and repression, to deal with squeegee kids. They entreat politicians not to link \$250,000 in funding to the implementation of punitive measures.

November 27, 1998: Toronto council voted to proceed with \$250,000 in "diversion" services for squeegee kids. By doing so, it ignored the recommendations of two of its standing committees to wait for tougher enforcement legislation from the province. Instead, it proposed an overall million-dollar plan requiring 250,000 each from the federal and provincial governments, as well as from the private sector. The mayor says the plan is a waste.

April 29, 1999: Staking out a tough-on-crime stance for the election later on in the year, the Conservative Party released their crime platform in which squeegee kids and aggressive panhandlers were highlighted as issues alongside drug abuse, child molestation and parole violators.

May 19, 1999: Ignoring the city of Toronto's request for more money, Premier Harris instead announced plans to crack down on squeegee kids and aggressive panhandlers by enacting laws that would make such behavior illegal.

May 20, 1999: The federal government announces a contribution of \$395,000 towards Toronto's attempt to help squeegee kids find alternate employment. This augments \$250,000 the city had allocated last year to provide "special job training that recognizes and targets the unique needs of squeegee kids."

July 19, 1999: After the Progressive Conservatives won a second majority government, Toronto Mayor Mel Lastman reports Premier Mike Harris' assurances to him that action will be taken to wipe out Toronto's squeegee nuisance as soon as the Legislature resumes in the fall.

July 19 1999: The annual squeegee crackdown begins anew. This time, though, the police claim the blitz is not a crackdown on squeegee kids, but an attempt to tackle a social problem and protect law-abiding citizens from harassment. To do this, Toronto Police undertake a \$1.9 million community action plan. 175 officers were paid overtime for 11 weeks to patrol at least 40 designated "hot spots" where crime was believed to be high, targeting squeegee kids, panhandlers and street criminals. Groups such as OCAP call this target policing harassment of poor people.

July 26, 1999: In response to Mayor Mel Lastman's renewed hard-line approach to squeegee kids, Toronto councillor Chris Korwin-Kuczynski said the city should look for alternatives. He suggested that the city should provide a "squeegee zone of tolerance" so that people who want to support squeegee kids could have the opportunity to do so while those who view squeegeeing as harassment would not have to go there.

August 7, 1999: OCAP organizes the creation of a "safe park" where squeegee kids and homeless can seek refuge against the city's targeted policing.

September 1, 1999: Attorney-General Jim Flaherty announces that aggressive panhandling legislation is being prepared and that he expects to introduce it in the fall. He says, "We made it clear that aggressive, intrusive behavior toward citizens on the street is not acceptable" and suggests that squeegee kids and aggressive panhandlers could be gone by Christmas.

September 20, 1999: Attorney-General Jim Flaherty announces that a bill "to clean squeegee people off our streets and end aggressive panhandling" is a top priority for the government when the legislature re-opens a month hence. He tosses a squeegee into a garbage can to emphasize his point. The *Toronto Star* mocks the government's positioning of squeegee kids as its top legislative priority.

October 21, 1999: The Progressive Conservative Government delivers its Speech from the Throne, promising what it will undertake in its new legislative session. As one its top priorities, the plan to crack down on squeegee kids and aggressive panhandlers catches the attention of opposition critics and media alike.

November 2, 1999: The Ontario Government introduces the "Safe Streets Act" in the Legislature. Officially, its full title is *An Act To Promote Safety in Ontario by prohibiting aggressive solicitation, solicitation of persons in certain places and disposal of dangerous things in certain places, and to amend the Highway Traffic Act to regulate certain activities on roadway*. Focusing mainly on aggressive panhandling and squeegee kids, the proposed legislation will create new provincial offences. When passed, the law

will make illegal: 1. Approaching a vehicle for the purpose of offering a service. 2. Aggressive panhandling and other types of aggressive soliciting, such as ticket scalping. 3. Panhandling in spots where the right-of-way is impeded, such as bank machines and transit stops. 4. Disposing of used condoms and needles in parks and schoolyards. 5. Soliciting while impaired by drugs or alcohol. Under the proposed legislation, fines will range from a maximum of \$500 for a first offence to \$1,000 and/or six months in jail for a repeat conviction.

December 8, 1999: The "Safe Streets" bill passed third and final reading in the Legislature. 49 Government MPPs supported the bill while 36 opposition MPPs opposed it.

January 31, 2000: Bill 8, the Safe Streets Act, comes into effect. It bans squeegee workers and "aggressive" panhandlers from the streets. The very next day the *Toronto Star* reports that "Toronto was a squeegee ghost town."

February 12, 2000: The *Toronto Star* reports OCAP's plans to defy the province's new law aimed at clearing the streets of squeegee kids and aggressive beggars.

April 8, 2000: In order to prevent municipalities from banning fundraising campaigns that take place near roadways, Ontario's Attorney-General distributes a letter to Ontario charities. In it he clarifies that they will be able to use roadway medians, shoulders and sidewalks during their fundraising campaigns without violating the province's new law.

June 13, 2000: The new "squeegee law" begins its first charter test as about 30 defendants charged under the Safe Streets Act face their first day in court.

July 19, 2000: The office of the Attorney-General releases a statement that the Safe Streets Act is a success. It notes a visible decrease in the number of squeegee kids and a 75 per cent conviction rate under the new law. Liberal MPP and Justice Critic Michael Bryant contrarily suggests that the law has only succeeded in moving squeegee kids further underground and to other parts of the city.

August 1, 2000: Toronto City Council approved another year of funding (\$250,000) to maintain the year-old Squeegee Working Youth Mobilization program. This move was made despite a decision by the city's policy and finance committee not to support the project's renewal.

December 14, 2000: The Muscular Dystrophy Association reports that the agency has lost \$200,000 and expects to lose as much as \$750,000 in 2001 as a result of the Safe Streets Act. Liberal MPP Bruce Crozier attempts to redress this negative impact on charities with a private member's bill calling on the government to amend the act to let recognized charities use the roadway to collect money where they have local approval. While the bill passed second reading today, Attorney-General Jim Flaherty refused to amend the law, re-stating that no-one was allowed to go out and stop traffic in the middle of the traveled portion of the highway.

January 8, 2001: The challenge of the Safe Streets Act gets officially underway in the Ontario Court of Justice. Mr. Justice William Babe granted standing in the case to the Canadian Civil Liberties Association. As part of the proceedings, Erza Hauer (professor emeritus of engineering at the University of Toronto) submitted evidence that squeegee kids pose no more danger to stopped motorists than people handing out political pamphlets. Hauer's affidavit was one of 10 affidavits filed by defense lawyers challenging the constitutionality of the Safe Streets Act. On the other side, the Crown Attorney filed only one affidavit – from Sergeant Theodoor Holzheuser, head of traffic safety programs with the Toronto police. His affidavit stated that pedestrians, such as squeegee kids, who approach stopped vehicles constitute “a distraction” to motorists and could be a danger.

May 18, 2001: A squeegee kid who set a mentally ill man on fire was sentenced to 15 years in jail.

June 27, 2001: The *Toronto Star* quotes a 26-year old and self-admitted “squeegee man’s” estimate that there are only five to ten per cent of the squeegee kids in Toronto that there were a year ago.

August 3, 2001: Ontario Court Judge William Babe concludes the first legal challenge of the Safe Streets Act. He finds all 13 defendants guilty. His judgement upholds the law even though it violates freedom of expression. He finds such infringement reasonable as it is in the service of protecting public safety. The Ontario Coalition Against Poverty promised to appeal the judgement, but never did. In March of 2002, Babe's reasoning was adopted in a British Columbia court ruling in a case of Federated Anti-Poverty Groups of B.C. versus the City of Vancouver.

September 2001: Squeegee kids appear in a commercial for the Honda Accord with Formula One driver Jacques Villeneuve (who does not pay them for their services). This follows another car commercial (where the squeegeers were reimbursed for *not* touching the car).

October 2001: The documentary *S.P.I.T.: Squeegee Punks in Traffic* is released.

November 16, 2001: Inspired by the successful defense of Ontario’s Safe Streets Act, the *Vancouver Province* reports that Vancouver city hall is looking at outlawing squeegee people with a similar program. The discourse begins to take shape as it did in Toronto, evidenced by the article’s headline: “Vancouver declares war on city's squeegee kids.”

APPENDIX II – EVIDENCE OF THE REPRESENTATIVE ANECDOTE

CLEANSING VOCABULARY

August 19, 1996: The *Toronto Sun* calls windshield washers squeegee “brats” but does not typify them as dirty or potentially dangerous strangers. Instead, they are described as “young, healthy people living in the *filth and danger* of downtown streets” (Barnes, 1996, p. 12).

January 11, 1997: In the *Toronto Sun*, Woodcock (1997) calls for a new vagrancy law to get irritating people off the streets and create a kinder, more compassionate city via the reverse logic of a crackdown which should take no prisoners in order to save them. Once upon a time, she argues, such a law “was a contributor to Toronto's *squeaky clean image*” (p. 12).

May 23, 1997: The *Toronto Sun* prints a headline: “*Mop squeegee kids, MPPs told*” (Harder, 1997, p. 2).

June 12, 1997: The *Globe and Mail* (1997) runs a pro-squeegee editorial under the title “Squeegee kids *clean up*” (p. A18).

June 15, 1997: The *Toronto Sun* (1997) runs a story with the headline, “Squeegee Kids Doused” (p. 10). The article reports, “The kids say the cops are *dirtying their public image*.”

June 26, 1997: The *Toronto Star* prints a letter that compared squeegee kids to late nineteenth century “cross-sweepers. Burch (1997) suggests both groups offer an unwanted and unnecessary cleaning service, one that provides an excuse “for soliciting gratuities without being considered in the light of a street beggar” (p. A26).

July 3, 1997: The *Toronto Star* prints a letter from a driver who reported a “*foul and abusive and filthy individual*” dented and scratched the roof of his new car when he refused to pay for the squeegee job (Marshall, 1997, p. A22). Here, the dirtiness of the squeegee kid was associated with aggressiveness, physical damage to a vehicle, and the deteriorating image of the city.

August 10, 1997: The *Toronto Sun* (“Squeegees stayin' alive,” 1997) describes both squeegee kids and their instruments as dirty.

November 6, 1997: In the *Toronto Sun*, Worthington (1997) suggests that both candidates running for Mayor of Toronto read *Fixing Broken Windows* for ideas how to reduce crime, disorder and violence. “Those interested in preserving Toronto as a favored, safe, *clean*, relatively harmonious city should read this book” (p. 11).

May 8, 1998: The *Calgary Herald* prints an article titled "Movement under way to wipe out squeegee kids." In it, Toronto city councilor Kyle Rae refers to public opinion that squeegee kids "*detract from the safety and cleanliness*" of his area. Meanwhile, Larry King, a policy planner with Toronto's urban development committee argues, "*cleaning up the streets by removing the street kids* doesn't magically solve the problem" (Shaw, 1998, p. A17).

May 13, 1998: In the *Toronto Sun*, Levy (1998a) equates cleansing/purification with elimination and asks, "Can we *wipe out* squeegee folk?" (p. 15).

June 14, 1998: In the *Toronto Star*, Councillor Brian Ashton describes [Ira Bossons' proposed anti panhandling and squeegee bylaw] as *a kind of social cleansing*. (cited in Royson, 1998a, p. F5).

July 16, 1998: The *Toronto Sun* (1998) typifies squeegee kids as "the *grungy* young men and women who wash the windows of idling cars for spare change" ("Do something," p. 14).

July 22, 1998: The *Toronto Sun* reports "squeegee kids who had plagued the corners of Spadina Ave. and Queen St. W. disappeared yesterday after police arrests aimed at *cleaning up* the corner" (Timberlake & Kingston, 1998, p. 4).

July 23, 1998: The *Toronto Sun* reports "the government is requesting your help as it tries to *wipe Toronto clean* of squeegees" ("Ticked off?," p. 5).

July 31, 1998: The *Toronto Star* prints a column in which Taube (1998) argues that squeegee kids could help to "*beautify the city*" but because of their vagrancy, others should "use those windshield wipers to *clean the slate of the squeegee phenomenon*" (p. A21)

July 31, 1998: The *Globe and Mail* prints a (humorous) column that argues attacks on squeegee kids contain shades of ethnic cleansing (Salutin, 1998).

August 18, 1998: The *Toronto Star* prints a letter arguing against "Toronto's current crackdown on squeegee kids [and] attempts to *sanitize* the Yonge/Dundas area" (Keith, 1998, p. A15). This reveals that squeegee defenders have now adopted the vocabulary of (social) cleansing.

May 18, 1999: The *Toronto Star* prints a letter defending squeegee kids. It suggests, "the Canadian equivalent of *ethnic cleansing* is poor-bashing" (Pearson, 1999, p. A19).

May 24, 1999: The *Toronto Sun* criticizes government efforts to solve the squeegee problem: "At least they can say to their voters they've done something to *sweep the streets clean* of squeegee kids - however absurd" (Levy, 1999f, p. 17).

July 26, 1999: *The National* on CBC TV reported "a new campaign to *clean up the streets*. ... Police have begun a two million *clean-up* campaign -- confronting the squeegee people" ("Banning squeegee kids," 1999).

July 27, 1999: In the *Toronto Sun*, Steward (1999a) questions whether "most people, as the police and politicians say, support them in their *squeegee cleansing*" (p. 15).

August 4, 1999: The *Toronto Star* prints a letter typifying squeegee kids as lazy and non-industrious. It demands that they "*clean up their act*" by looking for work (Troster, 1999).

August 4, 1999: The *Toronto Star* quotes a community health worker accusing Toronto of "*social cleansing*" with its program of targeted policing of squeegee kids and poor people (Spears, 1999).

August 8, 1999: The *Toronto Sun* reports on a rally of about 500 people who opposed Toronto's \$1.9-million Community Action Policing Plan and described its attempt to clear the poor (including squeegee kids) from the city center as "*social cleansing*" (Lee-shanok, 1999, p. 4).

August 26, 1999: The *Edmonton Journal* reported squeegee kids transmitted scabies to eight Toronto police officers. "A highly communicable skin disease, scabies is spread by parasitic mites living in *unhygienic* conditions" ("Squeegee kids pass fleas," 1999, p.A9).

September 6, 1999: The *Toronto Sun* prints a letter in response to the above incident. Wood (1999) entreats squeegee kids "for the sake of the rest of us who live in this city, *clean up your act!*" (p. 14). (The *Sun* agreed and appended the following comment: "Instead of dirtying our windshields.")

November 3, 1999: The *Toronto Sun* describes the unclean nature of squeegee kids via dehumanizing rhetoric in a column titled "Cleaning up our act": "Hogtown is fast starting to look like a place inhabited by animals of the same species. ... Streets in the downtown core are becoming more and more of a litter bin. Maybe we should change our name from Toronto the Good to *Toronto the Good and Dirty*" (Levy, 1999b, p. 15).

February 26, 2000: The *Toronto Sun* again reinforces the unclean nature of squeegee kids with a headline, "Is there life after squeegees?; street kids come in from the cold to learn life skills, a work ethic - even *proper hygiene*" (Levy, 2000, p. 17).

July 16, 2001: The *Toronto Sun* prints a letter describing squeegees as "*filthy*" and "*dirty*" and contrasting squeegee kids against "*normal people*" (Bagley, 2001, p. 14).

August 10, 2001: The *Toronto Star* prints a letter they titled "Squeegees should clean up." In it, Peigi (2001) argues against "some *dirty*, drugged-out idiot with a ring in his nose [who] invades our space and forces us to look at him. ... Let them *clean up* and find decent jobs" (p. A21).

MILITARISTIC VOCABULARY

June 21, 1996: The *Toronto Sun* reported Mike Colle's statement that a squeegee *commando* accosted him. The headline reads, "Squeegee squad in a wipeout" (Schaffeler, 1996, p. 7).

June 26, 1996: A letter to the *Toronto Star* extends the military metaphor: "Colle and other politicians should be wary of alienating what he himself has labelled the squeegee *army*" (Munro, 1996, p. A20).

July 17, 1996: The *Toronto Sun* headlines a story, "Squeegee teens *fight* city ban" (Stevenson, 1996a, p. 17).

July 27, 1996: The *Toronto Sun* reports on clashing squeegee factions: "Squeegee turf war turns violent" (Timberlake, 1996, p. 2). On the same day, a *Toronto Sun* reporter poses as a squeegee kid and reports that "from the driver's seat, squeegee kids are rude, *urban warriors*." But he also says aggressive and rude drivers coexist with this "aggressive brand of begging" (Stevenson, 1996b, p. 18).

Aug. 8, 1996: The *Toronto Star* reports that squeegee kids comprise "a growing legion of asphalt *warriors*." They are "*in a war with the city, and with themselves. A bloody turf war* has erupted between different squeegee gangs" (Rankin, 1996, p. G10).

November 27, 1996: The *Toronto Sun* suggests, "Toronto has experienced a *brigade* of street youth who earn their living by squeegeeing" (L. Fox, 1996, p. 73).

June 11, 1997: The *Globe and Mail* notes, "police are cracking down on the wiper *brigades*" (Skelton, 1997, p. A1).

June 17, 1997: The *Toronto Sun* suggests that the crack down on squeegee kids is "*intergenerational warfare*" ("Pornographer as 'victim,' 1997, p. 11).

June 15, 1997: The *Toronto Star* reports, "Squeegee people fight back" (Funston, 1997, p. A3).

June 29, 1997: A headline in the *Toronto Sun* announces, "Squeegee kids get in *turf war*" (p. 14).

July 5, 1997: The *Toronto Sun* prints the headline, "Wipeout: the war on squeegee kids," and typifies squeegee kids as "*a small army of youth* in Metro" (Honywill, 1997b, 19).

July 8, 1997: *Toronto Sun* columnist Christie Blatchford (1997e) reports that she is “offended by the war on squeegee kids” (p. 5).

August 10, 1997: The *Toronto Sun* describes squeegee kids as “*urban guerrillas*” (“Squeegees stayin’ alive,” 1997, p. 6).

May 12, 1998: The first line of a *Toronto Sun* story headlined, “Tories May Join Squeegee Fight” is “Attorney General Charles Harnick and Mayor Mel Lastman may *join forces to wipe the streets clean* of squeegee kids” (Harder & Benzie, 1998, p. 18). This is an explicit use of both the warfare and the cleansing metaphors.

May 13, 1998: A *Toronto Sun* headline announces that civil court may be enlisted in the government’s efforts in the “squeegee war” (Artuso, 1998a, p. 8).

June 10, 1998: The *Toronto Star* headline declares, “Time city declared war on rudeness” (Heinrich, 1998, p. A19).

June 28, 1998: With a headline, “Begging for a fight,” the *Toronto Sun* reports, “a *war of words* has erupted between Toronto Mayor Mel Lastman [and] poverty activists who have threatened to *mobilize street people into an army of tourist-terrorists*” (Cumming, 1998, p. 33).

July 12, 1998: The *Toronto Sun* reports, “an *army* of tattooed and pierced squeegee kids hit the streets yesterday to *battle* a proposed bylaw aimed at wiping them out” (Lee-shanok, 1998b, p. 26).

July 23, 1998: The *Toronto Star* leads off a story with the announcement, “the *squeegee wars* have begun” (Gombu, 1998, p. C1). On the same day, the *Toronto Sun* prints a letter noting, “what started out as a few kids scattered throughout the downtown core has grown dramatically into a *small army*” (Niles, 1998, p. 15).

July 24, 1998: The *Toronto Star* quotes a city councilor: “We have to de-escalate this, because mediation is the answer, not a war” (Chow, cited in Ebden & Monsebraaten, 1998, p. B1). On the same day the *Toronto Sun* quoted an anti-poverty activist’s antagonism towards the Mayor: “Are you going to get your *stormtroopers* off the squeegee kids?” (Heroux, cited in Benzie, 1998, p. 7).

July 26, 1998: The *Toronto Star* prints a column protesting the war. Hutchinson (1998) argues, “the *moral armies* are on the march and the *heavy political artillery* is being lined up” (p. F3). On the same day, the *Toronto Sun* uses the war as a source of satire. Dunford (1998) sarcastically comments on a city supposedly “under siege” (p. 6).

July 27, 1998: The *Toronto Sun* outlines The Ontario Coalition Against Poverty’s “squeegee *battle plan*.” John Clarke, leader of OCAP declared, “it is going to start *returning fire* tomorrow in the ‘war’ against squeegee kids.” Clarke also suggests, “the campaign to rid the city of squeegee kids is really part of a larger symbolic politics to

purify the city – to make it more presentable for Toronto's 2008 Olympic bid and for commercial interests in the downtown core (the re-development of Yonge and Dundas)" (cited in Warmington & Lee-shanok 1998, p. 21).

July 28, 1998: The *Toronto Star* prints a letter with the headline, "Crackdown on squeegee kids is war against poor, not poverty" (Gordon, 1998, p. A15). On the same day, the *Toronto Sun* prints the headline "Feds Enter Squeegee War" (Wanagas & Warmington, 1998a, p. 7).

July 29, 1998: The *Toronto Star* prints the headline, "Call off squeegee war" (1998, p. A16).

July 30, 1998: The *Toronto Star* quotes the leader of OCAP and his call for "squeegeers - everywhere in Canada, especially those in Quebec – [to] come to Toronto now. Help us take up this *fight*" (Clarke, cited in DeMara, 1998, p. B3).

October 30, 1998: *The National* on CBC TV reports on "The windshield war."

May 30, 1999: The *Toronto Star* suggests, Premier "Harris' Us vs. Them Ontario increasingly looks like a *war zone*" (Siddiqui, 1999, p. A17).

July 26, 1999: The *Toronto Sun* accuses Toronto Mayor Lastman of "again launching your *verbal grenades* against the squeegees" (Sonmor, 1999, p. 5).

July 26, 1999: *The National* on CBC TV repeats "The windshield war" documentary (originally broadcast October 30, 1998). A new introduction prefaces the report by classifying Toronto as, "the new centre of the universe for the bucket *brigade*. ... It's a *fight* that's been brewing since last year."

August 8, 1999: The *Toronto Sun* reports on "the *ragtag army* of squeegee kids and street people, led by the Ontario Coalition Against Poverty" (Lee-shanok, 1999, p. 4).

August 13, 1999: The *Ottawa Citizen* references both warfare and cleansing with a headline, "Stop this dirty war on the homeless" (Rebick, 1999b, p. A15).

August 21, 1999: The *Toronto Sun* prints a letter supporting Mayor Lastman's hard-line stance against OCAP. It advocates using "every *legal cannon* he can bring to bear" (Sheriff, 1999, p. 14). The *Sun* offered the following editorial rejoinder: "Mel's *heaviest artillery* is his mouth."

November 3, 1999: Urquhart (1999) writes in the *Toronto Star*, "the Tory government denies it has declared *war* on the poor, but its actions suggest otherwise" (p. A3). He identifies the corner of Seaton and Dundas Streets as the *front line* in this conflict. The same day, another article cites anti-poverty activists who called the Safe Streets Act an *attack* on the poor (Brennan, 1999).

January 31, 2000: The *Ottawa Citizen* repeats OCAP's warning that, by the summer, "Toronto's going to be a real *battleground*" (cited in McCarten, 2000b, p. A5).

February 1, 2000: The day after the Safe Streets Act was made into law, the *Toronto Sun* quotes OCAP leader John Clark: "We're declaring a *counter-attack -- this law is war*" (Artuso, 2000, p. 7). The same day, The *Toronto Star* quotes Alan Borovoy, lawyer for the Canadian Civil Liberties Association. Borovoy looked forward to challenging the law and said, "the *battle* against squeegee kids and aggressive panhandlers will be waged on the streets, but the *war* will be won or lost in the courtroom" (cited in Brennan, 2000b).

March 4, 2000: The *Toronto Star* prints a letter accusing Toronto of an "all-out war on squeegee kids and panhandlers" (Gustafson, 2000).

APPENDIX III – GRAPHS OF MEDIA COVERAGE

This appendix provides visual evidence of the rise and fall of the squeegee issue. It also accounts for differences in the content of the two main vehicles for Toronto-based squeegee claims.

All three graphs in this appendix compare the *Toronto Star* and the *Toronto Sun*'s coverage of squeegee kids.

Graph #1 (p. 340) – This graph charts the volume of squeegee claims from the beginning of 1995 to the end of 2001. It breaks down this period into quartiles. It shows how both the *Star*'s and the *Sun*'s coverage of squeegeeing progressed over these years. Both papers followed the relatively same pattern of peaks in the summer months with a sudden elevation of interest in 1998. I have also included a third line on this graph in order to indicate the total volume of squeegee claims (i.e. both papers' coverage, combined) over this period of time.

Graph #2 (p. 341) – This graph depicts the nature of the *Toronto Star*'s coverage of squeegee kids. It again covers the years from 1995 to 2001. This chart, however, devotes a different bar to each year. Each bar is divided into 6 different categories. Essentially, I analyzed each use of the term "squeegee" to determine if it was either the subject of the claim or played a major role in the claim. This graph includes only these significant uses of the term. Having isolated those claims *about* squeegeeing (rather than all the claims that featured references to squeegeeing), I then coded the claims-maker's language use as either sympathetic to squeegee kids, averse to squeegee kids, or, instead of showing an obvious bias, balanced (adhering strictly to facts without obvious editorializing, or portraying both sides of the story). I also divided the paper's coverage into its own depictions of squeegeeing (editorials, columns, and news accounts) and letters-to-the editor. The legend of the graph depicts these categories as "letter-neutral," "letter-anti," "letter-pro," "paper-neutral," "paper-anti," and "paper-pro." Letters-to-the editor comprise the top three categories of each bar, while the paper's own coverage of the issue comprise the bottom three categories. This graph reveals the paper's overall depiction of squeegeeing and allows an easy comparison between readers' reactions to the paper's coverage and the coverage itself. Beyond demonstrating the rise and fall of squeegee-based claims, it also shows the proportion of public feedback about squeegeeing that was featured in the paper.

Graph #3 (p. 342) – This graph reveals the same information as Graph #2, coding the content of the *Toronto Sun*. This also allows a comparison between the two papers. A marked difference between the two is the greater proportion of "neutral" accounts in the *Star* and anti-squeegee accounts in the *Sun*. Also, both graphs reveal somewhat of an inverse relationship between letters to the respective editors and the paper's own treatment of squeegeeing. Admittedly, these readings are based on my own subjective analysis of paper content. These findings cannot account for inter-coder reliability.

Temporal development of squeegee drama

Toronto Star Squeegee Coverage - Coded for Bias

Toronto Sun Squeegee Coverage - Coded for Bias

WORK CITED I: ACADEMIC BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Acland, Charles R. (1995). *Youth, murder, spectacle: the cultural politics of "youth in crisis"*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Aho, James. (1994). *This thing of darkness: a sociology of the enemy*. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.
- (1998). *The Things of the world: A social phenomenology*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Bauman, Zygmunt. (1993). *Postmodern ethics*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- (1999). *In search of politics*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Becker, Ernest. (1973). *The denial of death*. New York: The Free Press.
- Becker, Howard. (1967). Whose side are we on? *Social Problems*, 14, 239-247.
- Beckett, Katherine. (2003). Culture and the case of child sexual abuse. In E. Rubington & M. S. Weinstein (Eds.), *The study of social problems: seven perspectives* (6th ed.) (pp. 317-335). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Behr, Martin. (1996). *Critical moments in the rhetoric of Kenneth Burke: Implications for composition*. Winnipeg, Manitoba: Inkshed Publications.
- Berg, David M. (1972). Rhetoric, reality, and mass media. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 58, 255-263.
- Berger, Peter L., & Luckmann, Thomas. (1966). *The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company.
- Best, Joel (Ed.). (1989). *Images of issues: typifying contemporary social problems*. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter.
- (1993). But seriously folks: the limits of the strict constructionist interpretation of social problems. In G. Miller & J. Holstein (Eds.), *Constructionist controversies* (pp. 109-127). Hawthorne, NY: Aldine De Gruyter.
- (1999). *Random violence: How we talk about new crimes and new victims*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- (2003a). Constructionism in context. In E. Rubington & M. S. Weinberg (Eds.), *The study of social problems: seven perspectives* (6th ed.) (pp. 336-350). New York: Oxford University Press.

- , (2003b). Killing the messenger: The social problems of sociology. *Social Problems*, 50(1), 1-13.
- , (2003c). Victimization and the victim industry. In E. Rubington & M. S. Weinberg (Eds.), *The study of social problems: seven perspectives* (6th ed.) (pp. 304-316). New York: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1997)
- Best, Joel, & Furedi, Frank. (2001). The evolution of road rage in Britain and the United States. In J. Best (Ed.), *How claims spread: Cross-national diffusion of social problems* (pp. 107-124). New York: Aldine De Gruyter.
- Best, Steven, & Kellner, Douglas. (1998). Beavis and Butt-head: no future for postmodern youth. In J. Epstein (Ed.), *Youth culture: Identity in a postmodern world* (pp. 74-99). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Betsky, Aaron. (1997). *Queer space: Architecture and same-sex desire*. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.
- Birdsell, David S. (1990). Ronald Reagan on Lebanon and Grenada: Flexibility and interpretation in the application of Kenneth Burke's pentad. In B. L. Brock, R. L. Scott & J. W. Chesebro (Eds.), *Methods of rhetorical criticism: a twentieth-century perspective* (3rd ed.) (pp. 196-209). Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
- Black, Edwin. (1992). *Rhetorical questions: Studies of public discourse*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Blair, Carole. (1995). Symbolic action and discourse: the convergent/divergent views of Kenneth Burke and Michel Foucault. In B. L. Brock (Ed.), *Kenneth Burke and contemporary European thought* (pp. 119-165). Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press.
- , (1999). Contemporary U.S. memorial sites as exemplars of rhetoric's materiality. In J. Selzer & S. Crowley (Eds.), *Rhetorical bodies* (pp.16-57). Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- Blair, Carole & Michel, Neil. (1999). Commemorating in the theme park zone: Reading the astronauts memorial. In T. Rosteck (Ed.), *At the intersection: Cultural studies and rhetorical studies* (pp. 29-83). New York, NY: The Guilford Press.
- Blakenship, Jane. (1989). Magic and mystery in the works of Kenneth Burke. In H. W. Simons & T. Melia (Eds.), *The legacy of Kenneth Burke* (pp. 128-155). Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- Blueprint: Mike Harris' plan to keep Ontario on the right track*. (1999). Toronto: P.C. Party of Ontario.

- Boor Tonn, Mari, Endress, Valerie A., & Diamond, John N. (1993). Hunting and heritage on trial: A dramatistic debate over tragedy, tradition, and territory. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 79, 165-181.
- Bosso, Christopher J. (1994). The contextual bases of problem definition. In D. A. Rochefort & R. W. Cobb (Eds.), *The politics of problem definition: Shaping the policy agenda* (pp.182-203). Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Brock, Bernard L. (1969). Politically speaking: A Burkean approach. In W. H. Rueckert (Ed.), *Critical responses to Kenneth Burke: 1924-1966* (pp. 444-455). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- (1985). Epistemology and ontology in Kenneth Burke's dramatism. *Communication Quarterly*, 33, 94-104.
- (1990). Rhetorical criticism: A Burkeian approach revisited. In B. L. Brock, R. L. Scott, & J. W. Chesebro (Eds.), *Methods of rhetorical criticism: A twentieth-century perspective* (3rd ed.) (pp. 183-195). Detroit, IL: Wayne State University Press.
- (1993). The evolution of Kenneth Burke's philosophy of rhetoric: Dialectic between epistemology and ontology. In J. Chesebro (Ed.), *Extensions of the Burkeian system* (pp. 309-328). Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press.
- (1995). Evolution of Kenneth Burke's criticism and philosophy of language. In B. L. Brock (Ed.), *Kenneth Burke and contemporary European thought* (pp.1-33). Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press.
- Brock, Bernard L., Burke, Kenneth, Burgess, Parke G., & Simons, Herbert W. (1985). Dramatism as ontology or epistemology: A symposium. *Communication Quarterly*, 33, 17-33.
- Brummett, Barry. (1991). *Rhetorical dimensions of popular culture*. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.
- (1994). *Rhetoric in popular culture*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- (1999). Burke's representative anecdote as a method in media criticism. In J. L. Lucaites, C. M. Condit, & S. Caudill (Eds.), *Contemporary rhetorical theory* (pp. 479-493). New York: The Guilford Press.
- Burke, Kenneth. (1932). *Towards a better life: A series of declamations or epistles*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.
- (1941). *The philosophy of literary form*. USA: Louisiana State University Press.

- (1945). *A grammar of motives*. New York: Prentice-Hall.
- (1950). *A rhetoric of motives*. New York: Prentice-Hall.
- (1954). *Permanence and change* (2nd ed.). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. (Original work published 1935)
- (1959). *Attitudes toward history* (2nd ed.). Los Altos, CA: Hermes Publications. (Original work published 1937)
- (1961). *The rhetoric of religion*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- (1968). *Language as symbolic action: Essays on life, literature, and method*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. (Original work published 1966)
- (1972). *Dramatism and development*. Barre, MA: Clark University Press.
- (1976). Dramatism. In J. Golden, G. F. Berquist, & W. E. Coleman (Eds.), *The rhetoric of western thought* (4th ed.) (pp. 341-351). Dubuque, IO: Kendall/Hunt. (Original work published 1968)
- (1985). Dramatism and logology. *Communication Quarterly*, 33, 89-93.
- Carlson, A. Cheree. (1986). Gandhi and the comic frame: 'ad bellum purificandum'. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 72, 446-455.
- Carter, C. Allen. (1996). *Kenneth Burke and the scapegoat process*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Charland, Maurice. (1994). Constitutive rhetoric: the case of the *Peuple Québécois*. In W. L. Nothstine, C. Blair, & G. A. Copeland (Eds.), *Critical questions: Invention, creativity, and the criticism of discourse and media* (pp. 211-232). New York: St. Martin's Press. (Original work published 1987)
- (1999). Rehabilitating rhetoric: Confronting blindspots in discourse and social theory. In J. L. Lucaites, C. M. Condit, & S. Caudill (Eds.), *Contemporary rhetorical theory* (pp. 464-473). New York: The Guilford Press.
- Chase, Richard. (1969). Rhetoric of rhetoric. In W. H. Rueckert (Ed.), *Critical responses to Kenneth Burke: 1924-1966* (pp. 251-254). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Original work published 1950)
- Chesebro, James W. (1988). Epistemology and ontology as dialectical modes in the writings of Kenneth Burke. *Communication Quarterly*, 36, 175-191.

- , (1992). Extensions of the Burkeian System. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 78(3), 356-368.
- Clark, C.S. (1970). *Of Toronto the good: The queen city of Canada as it is*. Toronto: Coles Facsimile Edition (Original work published 1898)
- Cohen, Jodi R. (1998). *Communication criticism: Developing your critical powers*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Cohen, Stanley. (1973). *Folk devils and moral panics*. St Albans: Paladin.
- Condit, Celeste Michelle. (1990). *Decoding abortion rhetoric*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- , (1992). Post-Burke: Transcending the sub-stance of dramatism. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 78, 349-355.
- , (1995). Kenneth Burke and linguistic relativity: reflections on the scene of philosophy of communication in the twentieth century. In B. L. Brock (Ed.), *Kenneth Burke and contemporary European thought* (pp. 207-261). Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press.
- , (1999). The materiality of coding: rhetoric, genetics, and the matter of life. In J. Selzer & S. Crowley (Eds.), *Rhetorical bodies* (pp. 326-356). Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Conrad, Charles, & Macom, Elizabeth A. (1995). Revisiting Kenneth Burke: Dramatism/logology and the problem of agency. *The Southern Communication Journal*, 61, 11-28.
- Davis, Nanette, J. (1999). *Youth crisis: Growing up in the high-risk society*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Denzin, Norman L. (1992). *Symbolic interactionism and cultural studies*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Dickson, Barbara (1999). Reading maternity materially: the case of Demi Moore. In J. Selzer & S. Crowley (Eds.), *Rhetorical bodies* (pp. 297-313). Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- Douglas, Tom. (1995). *Scapegoats: transferring blame*. London: Routledge.
- Downs, Anthony. (1972). Up and down with ecology – the issue attention cycle. *Public Interest*, 28, 38-50.

- Duncan, Hugh Dalziel. (1962). *Communication and the social order*. New York: The Bedminster Press.
- (1965). Introduction. In K. Burke, *Permanence and change* (pp. xiii-xliv). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- (1969a). A sociological model of social interaction as determined by communication. In W. H. Rueckert (Ed.), *Critical responses to Kenneth Burke: 1924-1966* (pp. 350-357). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- (1969b). Communication in society. In W. H. Rueckert (Ed.), *Critical responses to Kenneth Burke: 1924-1966* (pp. 407-420). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Edelman, Murray. (1967). *The symbolic uses of politics*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- (1977). *Political language: words that succeed and policies that fail*. New York, NY: Academic Press.
- (1988). *Constructing the political spectacle*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ellis, Desmond, & Dekeseredy, Walter. (1996). *The wrong stuff: An introduction to the sociological study of deviance*. Scarborough: ON: Allyn & Bacon Canada.
- Farrell, Thomas B. (1995). Comic history meets tragic memory: Burke and Habermas on the drama of human relations. In B. L. Brock (Ed.), *Kenneth Burke and contemporary European thought* (pp. 34-75). Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press.
- Fischer, Walter. (1999). Narrative as human communication paradigm. In J. L. Lucaites, C. M. Condit, & S. Caudill (Eds.), *Contemporary rhetorical theory* (pp. 265-287). New York: The Guilford Press.
- Fletcher, Angus. (1982). Volume and body in Burke's criticism, or stalled in the right place. In H. White & M. Brose (Eds.), *Representing Kenneth Burke* (pp. 150-175). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Foss, Sonja K., Foss, Karen A., & Trapp, Robert (Eds.). (2002). *Contemporary perspectives on rhetoric*. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.
- Foucault, Michel. (1989). The end of the monarchy of sex. In S. Lotringer (Ed.), *Foucault live* (pp. 214-225). New York, NY: Semiotext(e).
- Fowler, Roger. (1991). *Language in the news: discourse and ideology in the British press*. London: Routledge.

- Frank, Armin Paul. (1969). *Kenneth Burke*. New York: Trayne Publishers Inc.
- Fuller, Richard, C. & Myers, Richard R. (2003a). The conflict of values. In E. Rubington & M. S. Weinberg (Eds.), *The study of social problems: seven perspectives* (6th ed.) (pp. 89-94). New York: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1941)
- (2003b). The stages of a social problem. In E. Rubington & M. S. Weinberg (Eds.), *The study of social problems: seven perspectives* (6th ed.) (pp. 95-102). New York: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1941)
- Girard, René. (1977). *Violence and the sacred* (P. Gregory, Trans.). Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins Press,
- (1978). *"To double business bound": Essays on literature, mimesis, and anthropology*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- (1989). *The scapegoat* (Y. Freccero, Trans.). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- (2001, November 6). What is occurring today is a mimetic rivalry on a planetary scale. *Le Monde*. Retrieved July 12, 2004 from http://theol.uibk.ac.at/cover/girard_le_monde_interview.html
- Giroux, Henry A. (1996). *Fugitive cultures: race, violence, and youth*. New York: Routledge.
- (1998). Teenage Sexuality, body politics, and the pedagogy of display. In J. Epstein (ed), *Youth culture: Identity in a postmodern world* (pp. 24-55). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- (2003). *The abandoned generation: Democracy beyond the culture of fear*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Goffman, Erving. (1963). *Behavior in public places: Microstudies of the social order*. New York: Basic books.
- (1971). *Relations in public: Notes on the social organization of gatherings*. London: The Free Press of Glencoe.
- Golden, James L., Berquist, Goodwin F., & Coleman, William E. (1976). Kenneth Burke's theory of dramatic rhetoric. In J. Golden, G. F. Berquist, & W. E. Coleman (Eds.), *The rhetoric of western thought* (4th ed.) (pp. 318-319). Dubuque, IO: Kendall/Hunt.

- Goode, Erich, & Ben Yehuda, Nachman. (1994). *Moral panics: the social construction of deviance*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Griffin, Emory A. (2000). *A first look at communication theory* (4th ed.). Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.
- Griffin, Leland M. (1969). A dramatistic theory of the rhetoric of movements. In W. H. Rueckert (Ed.), *Critical responses to Kenneth Burke: 1924-1966* (pp. 456-478). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Gross, Elizabeth. (1990). The body of signification. In J. Fletcher & A. Benjamin (Eds.), *Abjection, melancholia, and love* (pp. 80-103). New York: Routledge.
- Grossberg, Lawrence. (1992). *We gotta get out of this place: popular conservatism and postmodern culture*. New York: Routledge.
- Gubrium, Jaber F. (1993). For a cautious naturalism. In G. Miller & J. Holstein (Eds.), *Constructionist controversies* (pp. 55-67). Hawthorne, NY: Aldine De Gruyter.
- Gusfield, Joseph. (1981). *The culture of public problems: drinking-driving and the symbolic order*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- (Ed.) (1989a). *On symbols and society*. University of Chicago Press.
- (1989b). The bridge over separated lands: Kenneth Burke's significance for the study of social action. In H. W. Simons & T. Melia (Eds.), *The legacy of Kenneth Burke* (pp. 28-54). Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- (1996). *Contested meanings: the construction of alcohol problems*. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- (2003). Values, politics, and social problems. In E. Rubington & M. S. Weinberg (Eds.), *The study of social problems: seven perspectives* (6th ed.) (pp. 103-104). New York: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1967)
- Hall, Peter. (1998). *Cities in civilization*. London: Phoenix Giant.
- Hall, Stuart, Critcher, Chas, Jefferson, Tony, Clarke, John, & Roberts, Brian. (1978). *Policing the crisis: Mugging, the state, and law and order*. London: Macmillan Press.
- Heath, Robert L. (1986). *Realism and relativism: A perspective on Kenneth Burke*. Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press.
- Hebdige, Dick. (1988). *Hiding in the light*. London: Routledge.

- Henderson, Greig E. (1988). *Kenneth Burke: Literature and language as symbolic action*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Hindson, Paul, & Gray, Tim. (1988). *Burke's dramatic theory of politics*. Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishing Co.
- Holstein, James A. & Miller, Gale. (1990). Rethinking victimization. *Symbolic Interaction*, 13, 103-22.
- Honig, Bonnie. (2001). *Democracy and the foreigner*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ibarra, Peter R., & Kitsuse, John I. (1993). Vernacular constituents of moral discourse: An interactionist proposal for the study of social problems. In G. Miller & J. Holstein (Eds.), *Constructionist controversies* (pp. 21-54). Hawthorne, NY: Aldine De Gruyter.
- Ivie, Robert L. (1996). Tragic fear and the rhetorical presidency. In M. J. Medhurst (Ed.), *Beyond the rhetorical presidency* (pp. 153-178). College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press.
- (2001). Productive criticism then and now. *American Communication Journal*, 4(3), Retrieved May 1, 2004 from, <http://acjournal.org/holdings/vol4/iss3/special/ivie.htm>
- Jameson, Frederic R. (1982). The symbolic inference; or, Kenneth Burke and ideological analysis. In H. White (Ed.), *Representing Kenneth Burke* (pp. 68-91). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press.
- Jay, Paul (Ed.). (1988). *The selected correspondence of Kenneth Burke and Malcolm Crowley: 1915-1981*. New York: Viking.
- Jeffrey, Brooke (1999) *Hard right turn: The new face of neo-conservatism in Canada*. Toronto: Harper Collins.
- Jenkins, Philip. (1992). *Intimate enemies: Moral panics in contemporary Great Britain*. New York: Aldine De Gruyter.
- (1995). Clergy sexual abuse: the symbolic politics of a social problem. In J. Best (Ed.), *Images of issues: typifying contemporary social problems* (2nd ed.) (pp. 105-125). New York: Aldine De Gruyter.
- Jennermann, Donald L. (1982). Burke's Poetics of Catharsis. In H. White (Ed.), *Representing Kenneth Burke* (pp. 31-51). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press.

- Johnson, John M. (1989). Horror Stories and the construction of child abuse. In J. Best (Ed.), *Images of issues: typifying contemporary social problems* (pp. 5-19). Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Kearney, Mary Celeste. (1998). Don't need you: Rethinking identity politics and separatism from a grrl perspective. In J. Epstein (ed), *Youth culture: Identity in a postmodern world* (pp. 148-188). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Kesterton, W.H. (1967). *A history of journalism in Canada*. Toronto, ON: McClelland and Stewart Ltd.
- King, Andrew. (2001). Burkean theory reborn: How Burkean studies assimilated its postmodern critics. *Rhetoric Review*, 20, 32-36.
- Kirk, John. (1969). Kenneth Burke and identification. In W. H. Rueckert (Ed.), *Critical responses to Kenneth Burke: 1924-1966* (pp. 344-346). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Kitsuse, John I. & Spector, Malcolm. (2003). The definition of social problems. In E. Rubington & M. S. Weinberg (Eds.), *The study of social problems: seven perspectives* (6th ed.) (pp. 285-290). New York: Oxford University Press. (Original work published 1973)
- Klapp, Orrin. (1978). *Opening and closing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Klavan, Andrew. (1997). *True crime*. New York: Dell.
- Klumpp, James F. (1993). A rapprochement between dramatism and argumentation. *Argumentation and Advocacy*, 29, 148-163.
- Klumpp, James F., & Hollihan, Thomas A. (1989). Rhetorical criticism as moral action. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 75, 84-97.
- Knox, George. (1957). *Critical moments: Kenneth Burke's categories and critiques*. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.
- Laird, Gordon. (1998). *Slumming it at the rodeo: the cultural roots of Canada's right-wing revolution*. Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre.
- Lansner, Kermit. (1969). Burke, Burke, the lurk. In W. H. Rueckert (Ed.), *Critical responses to Kenneth Burke: 1924-1966* (pp. 261-270). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Lasko, Nancy. (2001). *Act your age!: A cultural construction of adolescence*. New York: RoutledgeFalmer.

- Leblanc, Lauraine. (1999). Punky in the middle: cultural constructions of the 1996 Montreal summer uprisings (a comedy in four acts). In J. Ferrell & N. Websdale (Eds.), *Making trouble: Cultural constructions of crime, deviance, and control* (pp. 203-230). New York: Aldine De Gruyter.
- Lefebvre, Henri. (1996). *Writings on cities*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Leitch, Thomas M. (1986). *What stories are: narrative theory and interpretation*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Lentricchia, Frank. (1982). Reading history with Kenneth Burke. In H. White (Ed.), *Representing Kenneth Burke* (pp. 119-149). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press.
- , (1983). *Criticism and social change*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Loseke, Donileen R. (1993). Constructing conditions, people, morality, and emotion: expanding the agenda of constructionism. In G. Miller & J. Holstein (Eds.), *Constructionist controversies* (pp. 201-216). Hawthorne, NY: Aldine De Gruyter.
- , (1999). *Thinking about social problems: an introduction to constructionist perspectives*. New York: Aldine De Gruyter.
- , (2003a) How to successfully construct a social problem. In E. Rubington & M. S. Weinstein (Eds.), *The study of social problems: seven perspectives* (6th ed.) (pp. 291-303). New York: Oxford University Press.
- , (2003b). *Thinking about social problems* (2nd ed.). Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter.
- O'Leary, Stephen D. (1993). A dramatistic theory of apocalyptic rhetoric. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 79(4), 385-426.
- Madsen, Arnie. (1993). Burke's representative anecdote as a critical method. In J. W. Chesebro (Ed.), *Extensions of the Burkeian System* (pp. 207-229). Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press.
- Males, Mike A. (1996). *The scapegoat generation: America's war on adolescents*. Monroe, MA: Common Courage Press.
- , (1999). *Framing youth: ten myths about the next generation*. Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press.
- Mattelart, Armand. (1996). *The invention of communication*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

- McCorkle, Richard C., & Miethe, Terance D. (2002). *Panic: the social construction of the street gang problem*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- McKay-Panos, Linda. (2002). Cleaning up our streets: anti-panhandling and squeegee laws. *LawNow*, 26(6), 27-28.
- McKerrow, Raymie E. (1999). Critical rhetoric: Theory and praxis. In J. L. Lucaites, C. M. Condit, & S. Caudill (Eds.), *Contemporary rhetorical Theory* (pp. 441-463). New York: The Guilford Press.
- McLemee, Scott. (2001, April 20). A puzzling figure in literary criticism is suddenly central. *The Chronicle of Higher Education*. Retrieved March 30, 2004 from, <http://chronicle.com/free/v47/i32/32a02601.htm>
- McLuhan, Marshall. (1964). *Understanding media*. New York, NY: Mentor Books.
- McRobbie, Angela. (1994). *Postmodernism and popular culture*. New York: Routledge.
- Mechling, Elizabeth Walker, & Mechling, Jay. (1983). Sweet talk: The moral rhetoric against sugar. *Central States Speech Journal*, 34, 19-32.
- (1991). The campaign for civil defense and the struggle to naturalize the bomb. *Western Journal of Speech Communication*, 55, 105-133.
- Melia, Trevor. (1989). Scientism and dramatism: some quasi-mathematical motifs in the work of Kenneth Burke. In H. W. Simons & T. Melia (Eds.), *The legacy of Kenneth Burke* (pp. 55-73). Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- Miller, Gale, & Holstein, James A. (1993). Constructing social problems: context and legacy. In G. Miller & J. Holstein (Eds.), *Constructionist controversies* (pp. 3-18). Hawthorne, NY: Aldine De Gruyter.
- Mitchell, Don. (1995). The end of public space?: People's park, definitions of the public and democracy. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 85(1), 108-133.
- Mumford, Lewis. (1964). *The highway and the city*. Toronto: Mentor. (Original work published 1953)
- Nelson, Cary. (1989). Writing as the accomplice of language: Kenneth Burke and Poststructuralism. In H. W. Simons & T. Melia (Eds.), *The legacy of Kenneth Burke* (pp. 156-173). Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- (1999). The linguisticity of cultural studies: Rhetoric, close reading, and contextualization. In T. Rosteck (Ed.), *At the intersection: Cultural studies and rhetorical studies* (pp. 211-225). New York, NY: The Guilford Press.

- Nichols, Marie Hochmuth. (1976). Kenneth Burke and the "new rhetoric." In J. Golden, G. F. Berquist, & W. E. Coleman (Eds.), *The rhetoric of western thought* (4th ed.) (pp. 319-332). Dubuque, IO: Kendall/Hunt. (Original work published 1952)
- Nimmo, Dan. 1975. *Popular images of politics*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
- Nothstine, William L, Blair, Carole, & Copeland, Gary A. (1994). Professionalization and the eclipse of critical invention. In W. L. Nothstine, C. Blair, & G. A. Copeland (Eds.), *Critical questions: Invention, creativity, and the criticism of discourse and media* (pp. 15-70). New York: St. Martin's Press.
- O'Grady, B., Bright, R., & Cohen, E. (1998). Sub-employment and street youths: an analysis of the impact of squeegee cleaning on homeless youths. *Security journal*, 11, 315-323.
- Olson, Kathryn M. (1995). The function of form in newspapers' political conflict coverage: The *New York Times*' shaping of expectations in the Bitburg controversy. *Political Communication*, 12, 43-64.
- Park, Rupert Everett. (1916). The city: suggestions for the investigation of human behavior in an urban environment. *American Journal of Sociology*, 20, 608-620.
- Pearson, Geoff. (1983). *Hooligan: A history of respectable fears*. London: Macmillan.
- Perinbanayagam, R.S. (1985). *Signifying acts: Structure and meaning in everyday life*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Pile, Steve. (1996). *The body and the city: psychoanalysis, space, and subjectivity*. London: Routledge.
- Pollner, Melvin. (1993). The reflexivity of constructionism and the construction of reflexivity. In G. Miller & J. Holstein (Eds.), *Constructionist controversies* (pp. 69-82). Hawthorne, NY: Aldine De Gruyter.
- Portz, John. (1994). Plant closings, community definitions, and the local response. In D. A. Rochefort & R. W. Cobb (Eds.), *The politics of problem definition: Shaping the policy agenda* (pp. 32-49). Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Potter, Jonathan. (1996). *Representing reality: Discourse, rhetoric and social construction*. London: Sage.
- Raban, Jonathan. (1974). *The soft city*. London: Fontana.
- Riedel, Marc. (1993). *Stranger Violence: A theoretical inquiry*. New York: Garland Publishing.

- Rocheftort, David A, & Cobb, Roger W. (1994). Problem definition: An emerging perspective. In D. A. Rocheftort & R. W. Cobb (Eds.), *The politics of problem definition: Shaping the policy agenda* (pp. 1-31). Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Rosteck, Thomas. (1995). Cultural studies and rhetorical studies. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 81, 386-403.
- (1999). Approaching the intersection: Issues of identity, politics, and critical practice. In T. Rosteck (Ed.), *At the intersection: Cultural studies and rhetorical studies* (pp. 1-24). New York, NY: The Guilford Press.
- Rubington, Earl, & Weinberg, Martin S. (Eds.). (2003). *The study of social problems: seven perspectives* (6th ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rueckert, William H. (1982a). *Kenneth Burke and the drama of human relations*. Berkeley: University of California Press. (Original work published 1963)
- (1982b). Some of the many Kenneth Burkes. In H. White & M. Brose (Eds.), *Representing Kenneth Burke* (pp. 1-30). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- (1989). Rereading Kenneth Burke: Doctrine without dogma, action with passion. In H. W. Simons & T. Melia (Eds.), *The legacy of Kenneth Burke* (pp. 239-262). Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- (1994). *Encounters with Kenneth Burke*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Rybczynski, Walter. (1995). *City Life*. Toronto: Harper Collins.
- Safdie, Moshe. (1998). *The city after the automobile*. Toronto: Stoddart.
- Saunders, Eileen. (2002). Good kids/bad kids: What's a culture to do? In P. Attallah & L. R. Shade (Eds.), *Mediascapes: New patterns in Canadian communication* (pp. 136-157). Scarborough, ON: Nelson.
- Scheibel, Dean. (1995). "Making waves" with Burke: Surf nazi culture and the rhetoric of localism. *Western Journal of Communication*, 59, 253-269.
- Schmitt, Carl. (1996). *The concept of the political*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Schudson, Michael. (1995). *The power of news*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- Scott, Robert L., & Smith, Donald K. (1969). The rhetoric of confrontation. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 55, 1-8.
- Selzer, Jack. (1999). Habeas corpus: An introduction. In J. Selzer & S. Crowley (Eds.), *Rhetorical bodies* (pp. 3-15). Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Sharp, Elaine, B. (1994). Paradoxes of national antidrug policymaking. In D. A. Rochefort & R. W. Cobb (Eds.), *The politics of problem definition: Shaping the policy agenda* (pp. 98-116). Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Simons, Herbert W. (1989). Introduction: Kenneth Burke and the rhetoric of the human sciences. In H. W. Simons & T. Melia (Eds.), *The legacy of Kenneth Burke* (pp. 3-27). Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- (1990). Introduction: the rhetoric of inquiry as an intellectual movement. In H. W. Simons (Ed.), *The rhetorical turn: Invention and persuasion in the conduct of Inquiry* (pp. 1-31). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Slotkin, Richard. (1973). *Regeneration through violence*. Middletown, CN: Wesleyan University Press.
- (1992). *Gunfighter nation*. New York: Atheneum.
- Spector, Malcolm, & Kitsuse, John I. (1977). *Constructing social problems*. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine De Gruyter.
- Spoel, Philippa. (2002). *From outsider to insider: Arguments concerning the regulation of midwifery in Ontario*. Paper presented to the Canadian Society for the Study of Rhetoric, Toronto.
- Stillar, Glenn F. (1998). *Analyzing everyday texts: discourse, rhetoric, and social perspectives*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Tompkins, Phillip K., & Cheney, George. (1993). On the limits and sub-stance of Kenneth Burke and his critics. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 79(2), 225-231.
- Turner, Victor. (1981). Social dramas and stories about them. In W. J. T. Mitchell (Ed.), *On narrative* (pp. 137-164). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Tyyska, Vappu. (2001). *Long and Winding Road: Adolescents and Youth in Canada Today*. Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press.
- Valentine, Gill, Skelton, Tracey, & Chambers, Deborah (1995). Cool places: an introduction to youth and youth cultures. In T. Skelton & G. Valentine (Eds.), *Cool Places: Geographies of youth cultures* (pp. 1-32). London: Routledge.

- Wasserstrom, William. (1982). Kenneth Burke, logology, and the tribal no. In H. White & M. Brose (Eds.), *Representing Kenneth Burke* (pp. 92-118). Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Wess, Robert. (1996). *Kenneth Burke: rhetoric, subjectivity, postmodernism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Williams, David Cratis. (1989). Under the sign of (an)ihilation: Burke in the age of nuclear destruction and critical deconstruction. In H. W. Simons & T. Melia (Eds.), *The legacy of Kenneth Burke* (pp. 196-223). Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- Woolgar, Steven, & Pawluch, Dorothy. (1985). Ontological gerrymandering: the anatomy of social problems explanations. *Social Problems*, 32, 214-227.
- Yamaguchi, Masao. (1985). Towards a poetics of the scapegoat. In P. Dumouchel (Ed.), *Violence and truth* (pp. 179-191). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Yarbrough, Stephen R. (1999). *After rhetoric*. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.
- Young, Iris Marion (2000). *Inclusion and Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Young, Jock. (1999). *The exclusive society*. London: Sage.

WORK CITED II: MEDIA BIBLIOGRAPHY

- All it takes is an act of political will. (1998, July 26). *Toronto Sun*, p. C1.
- Al-Solaylee, Kamal. (2004, March 20). Who's sorry now? Just about everybody. *Globe and Mail*, p. R5.
- Artuso, Antonella. (1998a, May 13). Crime czars eye shift in tactics. *Toronto Sun*, p. 8.
- (1998b, February 14). T.O. Becoming rotten apple?; Ex-N.Y. Cop boss sees roots of crime wave. *Toronto Sun*, p. 7.
- (1999, May 20). Squeegee squeeze; election '99: Tories tough on street crime. *Toronto Sun*, p. 5.
- (2000, February 1). Squeegees vow to fight law. *Toronto Sun*, p. 7.
- Atkinson Principles and the Toronto Star. (n.d.). *Toronto Star*, Retrieved June 1, 2004 from, www.thestar.ca/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Render&c=Page&cid=1035976365613
- Avery, Roslyn. (1998, September 13). Squeegee kids frighten woman. *Toronto Star*, p. F5.
- Bacchus, Lee. (1995, August 17). Wordly wise. Vancouver Province, p. B3.
- Bagley, Eileen. (2001, July 16). Letters to the editor column. *Toronto Sun*, p. 14.
- Banning squeegee kids. (1999, July 26). *CBC-TV - The National*.
- Barnard, Linda. (1995, July 29). Have squeegees, will scrub. *Toronto Sun*, p. 45.
- Barnes, Sally. (1996, August 19). Squeegee brats. *Toronto Sun*, p. 12.
- Benzie, Robert. (1997, August 15). The new Manhattan: Too good to be true? *Toronto Sun*, p. 12.
- (1998, July 24). Poverty activists rip into Lastman. *Toronto Sun*, p. 7.
- Bird, Heather. (1998, July 19). New wildlife in the urban jungle. *Toronto Sun*, p. C3.
- Black, Shannon. (1999, August 17). Inspector balances compassion and duty. *National Post*, p. B2.

Blackwell, Tom. (1997, June 11). Bare-breasted women OK on beach: Harris: But premier wants to draw the line. *The Hamilton Spectator*, p. B1.

----- (1998, February 14). Nip lawlessness in bud or become N.Y.: cop boss. *Montreal Gazette*, p. A16.

----- (1999, September 21). Ontario squeegee offensive leaves minister 'all wet': Opposition ridicules a law-and-order initiative that targets window-washers but ignores bigger issues. *Vancouver Sun*, p. A9.

----- (2000, March 9). Squeegee ban has little effect: Windshield washers still ply street trade despite legal ban. *Ottawa Citizen*, p. A4.

Blatchford, Christie. (1997a, May 21). Nineties people are busy bodies. *Toronto Sun*, p. 5.

----- (1997b, October 1). Ring of truth tolls in ugly cliché. *Toronto Sun*, p. 5.

----- (1997c, October 16). Someone's blowing smoke in this race. *Toronto Sun*, p. 5.

----- (1997d, November 28). Going potty over the good old days. *Toronto Sun*, p. 5.

----- (1997e, July 8). It's time to go on the offensive. *Toronto Sun*, p. 5.

----- (2000, February 12). Adults share blame in school shooting. *National Post*, p. B8.

Blizzard, Christina. (1998, August 4). Squeegee solutions just don't fly; we already have a \$9-billion youth problem - it's called education. *Toronto Sun*, p. 16.

----- (1999a, July 27). Squeegee kids are a menace. *Toronto Sun*, p. 15.

----- (1999b, July 30). Two parties, one candidate? *Toronto Sun*, p. 15.

Botchford, Jason. (1998a, August 30). Honor Di with act of kindness. *Toronto Sun*, p. 4.

----- (1998b, October 6). Privacy be damned. *Toronto Sun*, p. 4.

Bowers, Elizabeth. (1998, August 5). 'Cool' squeegee kids are milking the system. *Toronto Star*, p. A15.

Boyle, Theresa. (1998a, July 24). Squeegee activity not illegal: Lawyer Tory MPP plans legislation to wipe out problem. *Toronto Star*, p. B5.

----- (1998b, July 25). Tougher stance urged against squeegee kids. *Toronto Star*, p. A4.

- (1999a, December 31). Law, order high on Conservative agenda: More prosecutors eyed, youth justice targeted. *Toronto Star*, p. A8.
- (1999b, September 21). Tories to take swipe at squeegee kids: Proposed law targets aggressive panhandlers. *Toronto Star*.
- Brennan, Richard. (1999, November 3). New law targets squeegee kids, begging: Anti-poverty activists. *Toronto Star*.
- (2000a, December 15). Squeegee law scrubs charity; Dystrophy agency says it lost donations of \$200,000 in 2000. *Toronto Star*, p. 14.
- (2000b, February 1). Squeegee law faces challenge. *Toronto Star*.
- Brown, Jim. (1998, March 7). Warning signs show Toronto's youth crime could get worse. *Toronto Star*, p. E3.
- Burch, Brian. (1997, June 26). Cross-sweepers forerunners of squeegees. *Toronto Star*, p. A26.
- Caldwell, Rebecca. (2003, May 26). Young and shunned in Canada. *Globe and Mail*, p. R5.
- Call off squeegee war. (1998, July 29). *Toronto Star*, p. A16.
- Canada warned it may face U.S.-style murder, mayhem. (1998, February 14). *Edmonton Journal*, p. A7.
- Charron, Steve. (1998, July 2). Squeegee kid speaks. *Toronto Star*, p. A17.
- City that works? (1999, January 17). *Toronto Sun*, p. C1.
- Cofell, Donald W. (1998, July 28). Squeegee 'kids' aren't really kids. *Toronto Star*, p. A15.
- Connor, Nils R. (1997, June 18). Squeegee kids portrayed as demons, or worse. *The Toronto Star*, p. A23.
- Coyle, Jim. (1997, December 13). 'Tough' minister scared of Toronto at night. *Toronto Star*, p. A6.
- (1998, May 14). Squeegee kids face unforgiving world. *Toronto Star*, p. B1.
- Coyne, Andrew. (1998, July 30). Stuffed shirts should get a grip. *Toronto Star*, p. B1.
- Crime-busting Tories. (1998a, February 14). *Toronto Star*, p. K2.

- Cumming, Jason. (1998, June 28). Begging for a fight. *Toronto Sun*, p. 33.
- Deadman, Richard. (1999, October 5). Squeamish squeegees: We punish them for our guilt. *The Ottawa Citizen*, A19.
- DeMara, Bruce. (1998, July 30). Squeegee plan put off until October. *Toronto Star*, p. B3.
- Demian, Irene. (1998, August 4). The squeegee kid debate. *Toronto Star*, p. C2.
- DiManno, Rosie. (2000, June 17). Run, hide: Poverty throws rocks. *Toronto Star*, p. B01.
- Do something. (1998, July 16). *Toronto Sun*, p. 14.
- Downing, John. (2002, September 29). A symbol of Toronto's decline into squalor. *Toronto Sun*, p. C5.
- Drummie, Gretchen. (2001, August 4). Squeegee ban upheld. *Toronto Sun*, p. 7.
- Duncanson, John. (1998a, March 23). 3 welcome debate on crime: Tory MPPs stand behind get-tough stance. *Toronto Star*, p. E5.
- (1998b, February 12). Boothby pleads for compassion in enforcing law. *Toronto Star*, p. C1.
- (1998c, February 13) Petty crime crackdown saves cities: U.S. expert Calls for targeting of drunks, squeegee kids. *Toronto Star*, p. B3.
- (1998d, February 14). Toronto is 'very safe,' N.Y. police expert finds. *Toronto Star*, p. A7.
- Dunford, Gary. (1998, July 26). Squeezing squeegees. *Toronto Sun*, p. 6.
- Dunphy, Catherine. (1999, October 21). Work 'key' for street kids: 85% want mainstream jobs, study finds. *Toronto Star*.
- Durant, Sheena, & Neale, Jessica. (1998, August 4). Living poor on the streets. *Toronto Star*, p. C1.
- Ebden, Theresa, & Monsebraaten, Laurie. (1998, July 24). Mayor offers to meet with squeegee kids. *Toronto Star*, p. B1.
- Ebner, Dave & Spears, Tom. (1998, August 3). Time to wipe out squeegees, survey says. *Ottawa-Citizen*, p. B1.

- Edwards, Peter (1998, February 13). Youth's condition worsens. Squeegee kids undaunted by truck accident. *The Toronto Star*, p. B2.
- Elder, Jules. (1998, July 20). Street people lost in the squeegee shuffle. *Toronto Sun*, p. 17.
- Election campaign focuses on young people. (1999, May 27). *Montreal Gazette*, p. D8.
- Elton, Sarah, & Brearton, Steve. (1997). Youth and work. *This Magazine*, 31, pp. 4-5.
- Evans, Matt. (1998, July 28). Squeegee Squeeze: Treat the problem, not the symptoms. *Toronto Star*, p. A15.
- Face of poverty. (1998, June 12). *Toronto Star*, p. A24.
- \$50Gs handout for jobless kids. (1997, June 24). *Toronto Sun*, p. 3.
- Figueiredo, Fern. (1998, July 25). Letter of the day column. *Toronto Sun*, p. 15.
- Flinn, Brian. (1997, March 19). Cops want window wipers off street. *Halifax Daily News*, p. 3.
- Fotheringham, Allan. (1999, May 22). Ontario's puzzling politics. *Toronto Sun*, p. 16.
- Foster, Carly. (2002, August 20). Midnight board meeting. *Toronto Star*, p. D01.
- Fowler, Agnes (1999, September 27). No thanks works well on squeegees. *Toronto Star*
- Fox, Edward. (1999, August 9). Letter of the day column. *Toronto Sun*, p. 15.
- Fox, Linda A. (1996, November 27). Windshield of opportunity. *Toronto Sun*, p. 73.
- Freeze, Colin. (1997, July 25). Work fast, be patient, clean up. *Ottawa Citizen*, p. D1.
- Frum, David. (1995a, August 5). Seeking safety in statistics. *Toronto Sun*, p. 11.
- (1995b, November 11). The public be damned. *Toronto Sun*, p. 11.
- (1998, August 15). We read you loud and clear. *Toronto Sun*, p. 15.
- Frum, David, & Duffy, John. (1999, May 13). Liberals sleeping as society crumbles. *National Post*, p. A6.
- Funston, Mike. (1997, June 15). Squeegee people fight back. *Toronto Star*, p. A3.

- Gardner, Dan. (1999, August 25). Squeegee kids and Lilliputians. *The Ottawa Citizen*, p. A11.
- Giese, Rachel. (2002, August 24). Sugar, spice and vinegar – what girls are made of. *Toronto Star*, p. K2.
- Girard, Daniel. (1999, May 28). Harris demands tougher laws for juveniles. *Toronto Star* p. A9.
- Gold, Marta. (1999, December 4). Panhandling law isn't needed. *Edmonton Journal*, p. A18.
- Goldstein, Lorrie. (1997, December 9). Rent is a musical, not a morality play. *Toronto Sun*, p. 16.
- Gollom, Mark. (1999, July 27). Let squeegee kids have hassle-free zone: councillor. *National Post*, p. B2.
- (2000, January 31). Law in effect today to wipe away squeegee kids. *National Post*, p. A19.
- Gombu, Phinjo. (1998, July 23). Crackdown heats up against squeegee kids. *Toronto Star*, p. C1.
- (2001, January 9). Squeegee kids pose no special danger. *Toronto Star*, p. F03.
- Good deeds are everywhere. (2003, Aug 15). *Toronto Star*, p. A9.
- Gordon, Todd. (1998, July 28). Crackdown on squeegee kids is war against poor, not poverty. *Toronto Star*, p. A15.
- Granatstein, Rob. (1998, July 16). I don't feel safe any more. *Toronto Sun*, p. 4.
- Greisman, Ruth. (1998, June 23). Constant hassling is unpleasant. *Toronto Star*, p. A21.
- Gustafson, Glenn R. (2000, March 4). Toronto: Beware of Greek Games bearing gifts. *Toronto Star*.
- Hall is our choice for a new Toronto. (1997, November 5). *Toronto Star*, p. A22.
- Hanlon, Michael. (1998, August 2). Squeegees: Rebels without a cause. *Toronto Star*, p. A3.
- Harder, Jeff. (1997, May 23). Mop squeegee kids, MPPs told. *Toronto Sun*, p. 2.

- (1998, August 6). Squeegee law on tap; Harris vows he'll draft Ontario legislation. *Toronto Sun*, p. 26.
- Harder, Jeff, & Benzie, Robert. (1998, May 12). Tories may join squeegee fight. *Toronto Sun*, p. 18.
- Harding, Katherine. (2000, August 2). Council renews squeegee program. *Toronto Star*, p. B03.
- Harvey, Robin. (1999, August 9). All quiet in 'homeless park': After second night, how long can squat-in last? *Toronto Star*.
- Heinrich, Erik. (1998, June 10). Time city declared war on rudeness. *Toronto Star*, p. A19.
- Henry-Cotnam, Calvin. (2001, February 16). Letters to the editor column. *Toronto Sun*, p. 14.
- Herrell, Steve. (1998, June 23). Squeegee 'service' no service at all. *Toronto Star*, p. A21.
- Honywill, Brad. (1997a, June 12). \$200gs squeegee cash down drain? *Toronto Sun*, p. 19.
- (1997b, July 5). Wipeout: the war on squeegee kids. *Toronto Sun*, p. 19.
- (1998, November 28). \$250gs for squeegee kids; city plans job, counselling program to get them off streets. *Toronto Sun*, p. 4.
- (1999a, August 5). Activists to seize T.O. park; poverty protest. *Toronto Sun*, p. 26.
- (1999b, August 4). Mel: I'm not a thug; but critics say he's harassing street folk. *Toronto Sun*, p. 22.
- Hueson, Don. (1998, July 30). Squeegee solution: Washcloth kids. *Toronto Star*, p. A19.
- Hutchinson, Allan C. (1998, July 26). Let's call off the war on squeegee kids. *Toronto Star*, p. F3.
- Ibbitson, John. (1997, October 6). Toronto's street folk penalized for guilt they cause. *Hamilton Spectator*, p. C3.
- (1999, May 20). Harris vows to rid streets of pushy beggars, squeegees. *National Post*, p. A1.
- It looks like Mike Harris and team are all at sea. (2000, February 9). *Toronto Star*.
- Jakobek, Tom. (2003, May 3). Offer tourists improved city. *Toronto Star*, p. B04.

- Jones, Chris. (1998, August 7). Crackdown on Toronto squeegee kids called unfair. *Vancouver Sun*, p. A9.
- Jones, Vernon Clement. (2001, June 27). Squeegee kids 'test the water'. *Toronto Star*, p. B07.
- Kastner, Susan. (1997, July 27). Entrepreneurs hop on 'sticker' bandwagon. *Toronto Star*, p. E2.
- Keith, Melissa. (1998, August 18). What about poor seniors? *Toronto Star*, p. A15.
- Kennedy, Tom. (1998, June 17). Letters to the editor column. *Toronto Sun*, p. 14.
- Knight, Michael. (2001, August 10). Don't call them 'kids'. *Toronto Star*, p. A21.
- Lahey, Jack. (2001, Feb 13). Squeegee plan under fire. *Toronto Star*, p. B01.
- Lanthier, Mike. (1997, July 30). Let's rid streets of squeegee kids on welfare. *Ottawa Citizen*, p. B5.
- Lee-shanok, Philip. (1998a, July 20). Shiny squeegee fix?; 'lazy beggars' won't work: Lastman. *Toronto Sun*, p. 24.
- (1998b, July 12). Squeegees: law all wet. *Toronto Sun*, p. 26.
- (1999, August 8). Homeless bust. *Toronto Sun*, p. 4.
- Lem, Sharon. (1999, January 25). Street youth going hungry; health study shows. *Toronto Sun*, p. 27.
- Levy, Sue-ann. (1998a, May 13). Can we wipe out squeegee folk? *Toronto Sun*, p. 15.
- (1998b, November 6). City's squeegee 'fix' just won't wash. *Toronto Sun*, p. 17.
- (1998c, July 15). No matter how the public begs, beggars rule. *Toronto Sun*, p. 16.
- (1998d, June 15). Taking back Toronto's streets; panhandlers are 'out of control' say downtown councillors. *Toronto Sun*, p. 16.
- (1999a, August 23). \$645,000 for pest control. *Toronto Sun*, p. 15.
- (1999b, November 3). Cleaning up our act. *Toronto Sun*, p. 15.
- (1999c, June 2). Council fumbles election agenda. *Toronto Sun*, p. 15.

- (1999d, May 5). Councillors pitch for plums 'n' perqs. *Toronto Sun*, p. 17.
- (1999e, April 26). Squeegee kids are a sure sign of spring. *Toronto Sun*, p. 17.
- (1999f, May 24). Squeegees soak us for another \$645,000. *Toronto Sun*, p. 17.
- (2000, February 26). Is there life after squeegees?; street kids come in from the cold to learn life skills, a work ethic - even proper hygiene. *Toronto Sun*, p. 17.
- (2001, November 22). Pushy panhandlers. *Toronto Sun*, p. 15.
- Lewis-Stein, David. (1995, September 27). Harris could be playing Toronto's swan song. *Toronto Star*, p. A23.
- Lindgren, April. (1999, May 18). Harris's get-tough plans face big problems in court. *Edmonton Journal*, p. E11.
- Macdonald, Bob. (1998, August 9). What happened to our safe city? *Toronto Sun*, p. 36.
- Macdonald, Moira. (1996, July 20). Squeegee kids squeezed. *Toronto Sun*, p. 16.
- Mackie, Richard. (1999, November 3). Squeegee kids face fines, jail: Ontario crackdown will get a rough ride in courts, critics predict. *Globe and Mail*.
- Magnish, Scot. (1996, July 19). Get rid of squeegee kids. *Toronto Sun*, p. 29.
- (1999, August 20). Activists threaten to target tourists. *Toronto Sun*, p. 4.
- Mallan, Caroline. (1999, May 29). Tories set political agenda on crime. *Toronto Star*, p. B4.
- Mandel, Michele. (1996, November 17). The stowaways; the secret life of 'Chronic' and Jill, Toronto street kids living in an abandoned ship. *Toronto Sun*, p. 40.
- (1999, May 6). Reality intrudes on Mike's big day; election '99: the race is on. *Toronto Sun*, p. 5.
- Marshall, Bruce. (1997, July 3). Squeegees turn Spadina into toll road. *Toronto Star*, p. A22.
- Martin, Dianne L. (1997, February 8). Verbatim: A week of worthy words. *Vancouver Sun*, p. F12.
- Mascoll, Philip. (1999, October 10). Jakobek gets face to face with homeless: Three-week tour of streets inspires budget chief's plan to solve city's 'moral issue'. *Toronto Star*.

- McCallum, Mary. (1998, June 15). Squeegee kids aren't always the victims. *Toronto Star*, p. A17.
- McCarten, James. (2000a, April 2). Ontario to bill parents for kids' crimes: Controversial bill to be tabled Tuesday. *Halifax Daily News*, p. 8.
- (2000b, January 31). Squeegee kids, pushy beggars are now illegal. *Ottawa Citizen*, p. A5.
- Mclean, Chris. (1997, January 29). Squeegee kids scoff at job plan. *Toronto Sun*, p. 22.
- Mercer, Jeremy. (1996, July 21). Look Ahead: Street kids determined to squeegee out a living. *Ottawa Citizen*, p. A7.
- Meyer, George. (1999, August 4). Spare me the sympathy for squeegee kids. *Toronto Star*.
- Migliarisi, Gerald. (1998, July 28). Political hypocrisy abounds. *Toronto Star*, p. A15.
- Millman, Silka. (1997, August 28). Why give my wages to lazy squeegee kids? *Ottawa Citizen*, p. D5.
- Moloney, Paul. (1996, July 16). 'Squeegee kids' desperate for jobs, city council told. *Toronto Star*, p. A6.
- (1997a, June 17). A squeegee solution: \$50,000 plan would help 8. *Toronto Star*, p. A1.
- (1997b, February 4). City will fund new jobs for 'squeegees'. *Toronto Star*, p. A7.
- (1998, May 13). Squeegee jobs come under fire. *Toronto Star*, p. B2.
- Monsebraaten, Laurie. (1997, November 2). 'Time bomb' fizzles as an election issue. *Toronto Star*, p. F1.
- (1998, May 15). Welfare cuts under attack. May violate rights code, Toronto commissioner says. *Toronto Star*, p. F5.
- Morrell, Ray. (1998, August 11). Don't compare squeegee beliefs, dress codes to religion. *Toronto Star*, p. A15.
- Munro, Dan. (1996, June 26). Squeegee kids being unfairly squeezed. *Toronto Star*, p. A20.
- Niles, Russell. (1998, July 23). Letter of the day column. *Toronto Sun*, p. 15.

- Oath to squeegee by. (1997, June 26). *Toronto Sun*, p. 6.
- Ontario Law Targets City's Squeegee Kids. (2001, January 9). *CTV Canada AM*.
- Palmer, Karen. (2000, March 16). Squeegee program no clean sweep. *Toronto Star*, p. A7.
- Panel discussion on squeegee kids. (1998, July 26). *CBC Sunday Report*.
- Pearson, Mike. (1999, May 18). Cash in dinars for blue chip stock. *Toronto Star*, p. A19.
- Peigi, Penney. (2001, August 10). Squeegees should clean up. *Toronto Star*, p. A21.
- Peritz, Ingrid. (1996, August 12). No future, no hope: Rebellious teens turn to punk world. *Ottawa Citizen*, p. A4.
- Perkel, Colin. (2001, August 4). Ontario judge upholds law to combat squeegee kids. *Charlottetown Guardian*, p. B8.
- Pornographer as 'victim'. (1997, June 17). *Toronto Sun*, p. 11.
- Protecting Metro from urban decay. (1997, July 18). *Toronto Star*, p. A24.
- Rahder, Micha. (2000, February 13). *Star* reinforced stereotypes. *Toronto Star*.
- Rankin, Jim. (1996, August 8). Squeegee life, Toronto-style. *Toronto Star*, p. G10.
- (1998, May 31). Squeegee kids get squeezed. *Toronto Star*, p. A6.
- (2000, November, 28). Life on the street harsh for ex-squeegee kids. *Toronto Star*. p. E01.
- Rebick, Judy. (1999a, June 4). Harris' Ontario as the Titanic: But women and children don't get on lifeboats first. *National Post*, p. B5.
- (1999b, August 13). Stop this dirty war on the homeless. *Ottawa Citizen*, p. A15.
- Rickard, Jeff. (1999, July 30). A harmless service, or highway robbery? *Toronto Sun*, p. 17.
- Ritchie, Mike. (1998, July 23). Letters to the editor column. *Toronto Sun*, p. 14.
- Roberts, Julian. (2001, Aug 8). Law on squeegee kids is clearly absurd. *Toronto Star*, p. A17.

- Robertson, Ian. (1998, February 13). T.O. needs squeegee law: cops; truck crushed teen. *Toronto Sun*, p. 10.
- Royson, James. (1997, September 30). Vibrant culture delights people all across area. *Toronto Star*, p. F1.
- (1998a, June 14). Begging bylaw is for a city with no heart. *Toronto Star*, p. F5.
- (1998b, June 5). Helping the poor to be heard. *Toronto Star*, p. B1.
- Rozell, Suzanne. (1998, August 5). Squeegee kids speak symbolic language as old as human race. *Toronto Star*, p. A13.
- Ruryk, Zen. (1998, June 19). Lastman begs chief for help; 'tell us what we can do' to banish panhandlers. *Toronto Sun*, p. 2.
- 'Safe to squeegee' after vote by council. (1996, August 13). *Toronto Star*, p. A7.
- Salutin, Rick. (1997, June 27). An unvarnished gem from the mouth of a squeegee kid. *Globe and Mail*, p. C1.
- (1998, July 31). Why squeegee kids get no respect. *Globe and Mail*.
- Sands, Aaron. (1997, August 30). Kids steal senior's wheelchair. *Toronto Sun*, p. 4.
- Scanlan, Tracy. (1999, September 27). Squeegee kids are terrifying. *Toronto Star*.
- Schaffeler, Andrea. (1996, June 21). Squeegee squad in a wipeout. *Toronto Sun*, p. 7.
- Schwartz, Stan. (1998, July 30). Give city's squeegee kids a surveillance role, too. *Toronto Star*, p. A19.
- Several of Canada's major cities are struggling with the issue of panhandling. (1998, June 17). *CTV National News*.
- Shulgan, Christopher. (2000, January 16). The Squeegee Life. *Ottawa Citizen*, p. C8.
- Shaw, Hollie. (1998, May 8). Movement under way to wipe out squeegee kids. *Calgary Herald*, p. A17.
- Sheriff, Pete. (1999, August 21). Letters to the editor column. *Toronto Sun*, p. 14.
- Siddiqui, Haroon. (1999, May 30). The Us against Them society of Mike Harris. *Toronto Star*, p. A17.

- Skelton, Chad. (1997, June 11). Squeegee kids popping up all over: police are cracking down on the wiper brigades but few teens fear the fines. *Globe and Mail*, p. A1.
- Skewed priorities at Queen's Park. (1999, September 22). *Toronto Star*.
- Smith, Russell. (1996, April). Squeegee kids. *Toronto Life*, 30(6), 82-85.
- Sonmor, Jean. (1999, July 26). Hey Mel, cool it on the crackdown. *Toronto Sun*, p. 5.
- Spears, John. (1999, August 4). Mayor's program called attack on poor. *Toronto Star*.
- 'Squeegee' cops on patrol in B.C. (2002, July 18). *CBC-TV*.
- Squeegee kids clean up. (1997, June 12). *Globe and Mail*, p. A18.
- Squeegee kids doused. (1997, June 15). *Toronto Sun*, p. 10.
- Squeegee kids get in turf war. (1997, June 29). *Toronto Sun*, p. 14.
- Squeegee kids pass fleas to cops. (1999, August 26). *Edmonton Journal*, p. A9.
- Squeegees stayin' alive. (1997, August 10). *Toronto Sun*, p. 6.
- Squeegee truce. (1998, July 31). *Toronto Star*, p. A22.
- Squeegee wipeout. (1997, June 17). *Toronto Sun*, p. 10.
- Stancu, Henry. (1996, June 21). MPP vows to wipe out army of squeegee 'punks'; Colle hits out after downtown ambush. *Toronto Star*, p. A2.
- Stefaniuk, Walter. (1998, July 30). Callers say clean squeegee kids out. *Toronto Star*, p. B2.
- Stevenson, Mark. (1996a, July 17). Squeegee teens fight city ban. *Toronto Sun*, p. 17.
- (1996b, July 27). The view from the curb. *Toronto Sun*, p. 18.
- (1999, May 21). Harris a lying 'thug': McGuinty. *Ottawa Citizen*, p. A5.
- Steward, Hartley. (1998, May 17). My inner child carries a squeegee. *Toronto Sun*, p. C5.
- (1999a, July 27). Squeegee kids threaten no one *Toronto Sun*, p. 15.
- (1999b, August 10). The politics of homelessness. *Toronto Sun*, p. 15.
- Street kids. (1998d, November 20). *Toronto Star*, p. A28.

- Tanner, Adrienne. (2002, July 19). Warning: Buckle up for squeegee police. *Globe and Mail*, p. A2.
- Taube, Michael. (1998, July 31). Let's get them off the streets. *Toronto Star*, p. A21.
- Taylor, Bill. (1999, May 16). The other side of Friday night. *Toronto Star*, p. D15.
- (2000, January 31). Squeegee kids all washed up. *Toronto Star*.
- Tervit, Trish. (1998, August 27). 4 nabbed in playground bust. *Toronto Sun*, p. 31.
- Tesher, Ellie. (1997, December 14). Rent tears apart author's father every time it opens. *Toronto Star*, p. A7.
- Test case for Ontario's contentious Safe Streets Act. (2001, January 8). *CBC-TV - The National*.
- Therdink, Edward. (1999, July 28). Letters to the editor column. *Toronto Sun*, p. 14.
- There are 36,467 days before the year 2100 and 308 days until the new millennium. (2000, February 27). *Toronto Star*.
- Thompson, Clive. (1997, June 16). The squeegee kids. *In these times*, 21(15), pp. 39-40.
- Ticked off? Call hotline. (1998, July 23). *Toronto Sun*, p. 5.
- Timberlake, Ian. (1996, July 27). Squeegee turf war turns violent. *Toronto Sun*, p. 2.
- Timberlake, Ian, & Kingstone, Jonathan. (1998, July 22). Cops sweep 19 squeegees off streets. *Toronto Sun*, p. 4.
- Toronto squeegee kid defends her lifestyle. (1999, November 3). *CTV (Canada AM)*.
- Toronto's squeegee kids offered jobs. (1997, February 5). *CBC-TV (The National)*.
- Troster, Michael. (1999, August 4). Squeegee kids aren't kids at all. *Toronto Star*.
- Trying to wipe away teen pain in the New Society. (1995, November 2). *CTV National News*.
- Urquhart, Ian. (1999, November 3). Tory bill on panhandling targets the poor, not poverty. *Toronto Star*, p. A3.
- (2000, May 17). Judges' bill a strikeout for the Tories. *Toronto Star*, p. A33.

Voters may take aim at Tories on gun control. (2000, February 16). *Toronto Star*.

Wales, April. (1998, August 4). Cleaning windshields is not the only solution. *Toronto Star*, p. C2.

Walkom, Thomas. (1999, May 4). Tory fearmongering could backfire in election. *Toronto Star*, p. A2.

Wallace, James. (1998a, July 22). 'Nothing but thugs'; premier declares war on squeegee kids. *Toronto Sun*, p. 4.

----- (1998b, July 24). Squeegee squealers; crime commission swamped with complaints. *Toronto Sun*, p. 7.

----- (2000, February 14). The new lawman in town. *Toronto Sun*, p. 4.

Wanagas, Don. (1996a, July 16). Councillor fed up with squeegee kids. *Toronto Sun*, p. 24.

----- (1996b, August 13). Squeegee kids winners. *Toronto Sun*, p. 19.

----- (1998a, July 17). \$500gs for 100 kids; Councillors propose make-work venture for squeegee kids. *Toronto Sun*, p. 7.

----- (1998b, August 5). Squeegee breather; Lastman glad bylaw on back burner until fall. *Toronto Sun*, p. 22.

----- (1999, June 23). Worried Rae says the city's decaying. *National Post*, p. B2.

Wanagas, Don, & Warmington, Joe. (1998a, July 28). Feds enter squeegee war. *Toronto Sun*, p. 7.

----- (1998b, July 23). Mel to squeegee kids: 'out!'; Lastman says cops will wipe out thugs. *Toronto Sun*, p. 5.

Warmington, Joe. (1996, August 25). Beggars could soon be losers; cops want teeth in laws to crack down on panhandling downtown. *Toronto Sun*, p. 4.

----- (1998a, July 26). Runaway daughter spotted in Sun. *Toronto Sun*, p. 4.

----- (1998b, December 23). Squeegee 'kid' finds a new life. *Toronto Sun*, p. 4.

----- (2002, November 8). Take back T.O. streets. *Toronto Sun* p. 22.

Warmington, Joe, & Lee-shanok, Philip. (1998, July 27). Squeegee battle plan; anti-poverty group won't take 'war' lying down. *Toronto Sun*, p. 21.

- Warren, David. (1999, August 2). Squeegee kids just earning a living. *Edmonton Journal*, p. A10.
- Wayne, Jamie. (1997 July 29). Whistler, B.C., is the place to be. *Financial Post*, p. 55.
- White, Graham. (1999, November 7). Worth Repeating. *Edmonton Journal*, p. E4.
- White, Nancy. (1995, August 4). Service With A Smile. *Toronto Sun*, p. 11.
- Williamson, Linda. (1998, July 23). Bylaw envy grips exasperated city. *Toronto Sun*, p. 15.
- Window on the times. (1996, July 1). *Toronto Star*, p. A12.
- Windshield war. (1998, October 30). *CBC-TV - The National*.
- Wipeout: the war on squeegee kids; why are cops and politicians leaning on the scruffy windshield wipers? (1997, July 5). *Toronto Sun*, p. 19.
- Wirsig, Karen, & Clutterbuck, Peter. (1998, December 1). Squeegee kids: Youth need hand up to better life. *Toronto Star*, p. A22.
- Wood, Edward. (1999, September 6). Letters to the editor column. *Toronto Sun*, p. 14.
- Woodcock, Connie. (1997, January 11). Vagrancy defined. *Toronto Sun*, p. 12.
- (1998, June 20). Woodcock save us, please, from the professional 'poor'. *Toronto Sun*, p. 16.
- Worthington, Peter. (1997 September 2). Toronto needs a N.Y.-style fix. *Toronto Sun*, p. 11.
- (1998, July 21). The way to urban chaos. *Toronto Sun*, p. 15.
- (1999, June 1). Meet McGuinty: the Grits' falling star. *Toronto Sun*, p. 17.
- (2000, January 11). No one should be exempt from the law. *Toronto Sun*, p. 17.
- (2004, January 8). Dammit Doug, You left us too soon. *Toronto Sun*, p. 39.