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**COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT IN LOCAL DECISION-MAKING:
THE CASE OF OTTAWA'S RIDEAU AREA PROJECT**

by Geoffrey T. Baker, B.A.

Thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate Studies in
partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts.

Department of Political Science
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
December, 1985

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THE CASE OF OTTAWA'S PLEAU AREA PROJECT"

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ABSTRACT

The thesis is a study in multi-valued, multi-sectored, multi-level public decision-making. Its focus is the local government sector, with its special fragmentation and consequent diffusion of power. Ottawa's Rideau Area Project was selected for study because it involved four levels of government and a significant range of private sector actors.

The core argument of the thesis is that, given the fragmentation of the local government sector, effective decision-making will require special strengths in managing the conflict necessarily inherent in the process and in effecting needed collaboration across jurisdictional boundaries. The theoretical material applied to an analysis of the case is drawn from the works of Subramaniam on multi-valued choice; Howard on metagame analysis; Abonyi on stakeholder analysis; Lindblom and Dror on the issue of the limits to rationality; and several theorists on the role of project management competence in public decision-making.

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Thanks are also expressed to Professor V. Subramaniam of the Department of Political Science, Carleton University, Professor Walter Baker of the Faculty of Administration, the University of Ottawa, and Marilyn Hart, for their comments on earlier drafts of the thesis.

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INTRODUCTION

I. The Rideau Area Project and Collaborative Decision-making

Ottawa's Rideau Centre is a major shopping mall, convention centre, hotel facility, and office complex completed in 1983. Situated beside the historic Rideau Canal, adjacent to the University of Ottawa and in close proximity to the Parliament Buildings, it is now an integral part of Ottawa's downtown core. It attracts large numbers of local and out-of-town visitors, and in 1985 has all the appearances of a permanent and prosperous part of the Ottawa landscape. Yet that it exists at all, and in the precise form it does, is the result of a decision process spanning in its active phase almost a decade and, in its origins, traceable back at least two decades earlier. It was a decision process, moreover, fraught with considerable difficulty and one which, from time to time, appeared likely to end without a conclusive result.

The decision process was a fascinating one for students of public decision-making. It involved at one time or another all four levels of government -- federal, provincial (briefly), regional, and municipal -- and within each level a significant range of political and public service actors. It also involved a range of private sector actors whose co-operation was important and at times critical to the success of the process: local merchants, local and out-of-city developers, private sector architects, engineers of very considerable variety, marketing and design consultants, urban planners, local residents, organized interest groups, and the media. The challenge throughout, for those who led the process, was to bring so diverse a range of actors together in pursuit of a common goal which, on the one hand, was sufficiently clear and compelling to sustain collaborative effort over a

lengthy period and yet, on the other hand, was subject to markedly different interpretations of what, exactly, should be pursued.

The Rideau Centre, from the beginning, was one component only of a much broader Rideau Area Project, covering at its most ambitious in excess of fifty acres of the downtown area. The project first surfaced publicly in late 1972 as a revitalization scheme. Although the concept plans underwent several changes over the years, the project that was eventually implemented beginning in 1979 called for the development of the Rideau Centre as a shopping mall, convention centre and hotel complex, complemented by federal and private sector office facilities. It also called for a transit mall on Rideau Street, three pedestrian malls, related improvements in the downtown transportation and utility systems, and the construction of pedestrian walkways connecting the core development to the Byward Market and the existing federal conference centre.¹ It was an ambitious scheme, hatched in the office of a federal agency, the National Capital Commission (NCC), but significantly beyond the capacity of the commission to undertake on its own.

Its particular interest for the thesis is its value as a case study in public decision-making in a multi-valued, multi-sectored, multi-level decision situation. That it was a multi-sectored project has already been noted: its nature, size, scope, and cost were such that without active collaboration across public and private sector boundaries it could not have come to fruition, as the case material in Chapters Two through Six of the thesis documents. It was a multi-level project in a strictly governmental sense, in that federal and municipal governments were actively involved at all stages, and essentially so, given their respective jurisdictions and separate ownership of relevant land, while the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton was a required participant in matters of regional transportation and the Province of Ontario was peripherally involved at one stage on the issue of

project financing. Finally, it was a situation of multi-valued or multi-objective choice, in the sense that Subramaniam uses these terms,² in that many individual and organizational actors brought their own values to bear on the decision process. As the case material will show, the differences in the values held by key actors significantly influenced the process.

II. The Core Argument

The core argument developed through the case material and subsequent analysis is that local decision-making is frequently of a complex, diffused-power nature, given the fragmentation of Canada's local government sector. Accordingly, effective decision-making will require special strengths in managing the conflict necessarily inherent in the process and in effecting the needed collaboration across jurisdictional boundaries.

Canada's local government sector is a complex mosaic of many distinctive components, both public and private.³ Despite its local nature, it involves all levels of government, each with some real measure of autonomy but frequently needing to interact in order to reach shared goals that cannot be achieved by any one actor working alone. Conflict arises, during such interaction, from a broad and complex range of sources. These include competing political, administrative and technical needs or goals, and their underlying values; different perspectives, perceptions, expectations, and traditions; inadequate information exchange among the actors; the mobility of key actors, so that coalitions laboriously put together break down as new personalities arrive on the scene or key figures leave it; the wrongness of the times, in the sense of an unsympathetic political or economic environment; the lack of skilled leadership; other projects competing successfully for attention and resources; personality conflicts, and poor chemistry in human

relationships more generally; and the emergence of unforeseen forces such as a new era of public participation, with the new dynamic these introduce.

Resolution of the conflict which arises from such sources requires a special understanding of effective collaboration.⁴ It also requires related skills and sensitivity, together with positive attitudes and values supportive of collaboration, and these are not always present in the decision situation. Accordingly, when issues are addressed that are of a multi-valued, multi-sectored, multi-jurisdictional nature, requiring strong and collaborative contributions from several major and relatively autonomous actors, the decision process can reveal significant and sometimes insurmountable difficulties. In the case of the Rideau Area Project the difficulties were surmounted, however. From its beginnings in 1972 the decision process culminated in the Tripartite Agreement of May 15, 1979, through which the federal Department of Public Works, the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton and the City of Ottawa agreed to a specific cost-sharing formula and various land exchange arrangements to help ensure the success of the project.⁵ This agreement launched the implementation phase, which culminated in the Rideau Centre's formal opening in 1983.

III. Theoretical Considerations

To provide structure to the case study comprising Chapters Two through Six and the subsequent analysis found in Chapters Seven and Eight, a theoretical framework was required. Without this framework, in the first instance, the Rideau Area Project would not have merited special study as a topic for the thesis. Once embarked on the study, the framework was needed to ensure selectivity when confronting an intimidating range of primary and secondary case material.

The theoretical framework used here is not a carefully designed, integrated decision-making model comprising a set of logically interconnected hypotheses. Although individual models do exist that might have proved useful as a frame of reference for the thesis -- K. J. Radford's account of how complex decision problems are resolved is a good case in point⁶ -- the decision was made to adopt a more eclectic and, hopefully, more comprehensive approach. Hypotheses have been drawn from five different sources: Subramaniam's work on multi-valued choice; the seminal work of Nigel Howard on metagame theory and its companion metagame analysis; the work of George Abonyi on stakeholder analysis and assumptions-identification; the decision-making models of disjointed incrementalism and comprehensive rationality, exemplified by the work, respectively, of Charles Lindblom and Yehezkel Dror; and, finally, the extensive literature on project management, and its role in public sector decision-making.⁷

These decision models and approaches are similar in that they direct attention toward variables that may account for how and why complex decisions are made. They differ, however, in terms of the specific variables they identify as having explanatory power. The advantage, then, of drawing insights from all five sources rather than relying solely on one or several of them alone, is that there is a greater chance of targeting for study those variables that will explain the case material under study. Indeed, as will be shown below and in considerable detail in Chapter One, the five sources are complementary. Together they draw attention to the importance of four major categories of explanatory variables: prevailing ideas, including the values, perceptions and assumptions of decision-makers; the distribution of power in society and the tendency for conflict and the need for collaboration that it produces; the institutional framework, including formal organizational structures and management processes; and the decision-making

process itself, including the personal competence of decision-makers and the different decision strategies or methodologies they adopt.⁸

From Subramaniam has been drawn the concern about whether fundamental differences exist in the way politicians and officials make decisions, with politicians using what he describes as the organic political method, as opposed to the rational administrative method he attributes to non-elected officials. Common sense seems to support Subramaniam's central position that politicians and permanent public servants will enter the decision situation with different imperatives, related to different value sets; it does not support as readily, however, his assumption that each level has its own unique way of making decisions.

Nigel Howard's work is distinctive in its assertion that all human decisions involving more than one decision-maker with power should be seen as rife with issues of conflict and collaboration, as natural aspects of the situation. Going beyond Subramaniam's focus on the values of politicians and administrators, Howard brings the total complexity of the individual human being into the decision situation -- as a thinking, perceiving, feeling, evaluating decision-maker, striving for the best possible advantage from the situation in some enlightenedly-selfish manner. He also includes consideration of all actors, including "nature."

The work of George Abonyi on stakeholder analysis is complementary to that of Subramaniam and Howard. He takes the position that success in public decision-making depends in very considerable measure on how accurately decision-makers have assessed the goals, expectations and related behaviour of those with power to affect the outcome of the decision, and have taken these into account in the actual decision. He provides a methodology for identifying the critical linkages between a project and its stakeholders. Stakeholders are those specific social groups with a stake in the outcome of the project and a direct or indirect potential to influence

it. A key component of Abonyi's methodology is what he calls "assumptions-identification," a term he uses for the process of, first, identifying the assumptions decision-makers have about who the stakeholders are and what current or potential relationship they may have to the process and, secondly, improving the validity and reliability of these assumptions.

Abonyi's concept of "stakeholder" is readily extended to that of "powerholder," although Abonyi does not use both terms. Howard's metagame analysis requires, as a first step, that relevant powerholders be identified, yet he offers no specific approach for accomplishing this. Because Abonyi does provide such an approach, his work complements that of Howard extremely well. Its aim is to make certain that all stakeholders who must support a decision, if it is to be a viable one and stable over time, are identified and that their perceptions, perspectives, goals and preferences are considered.

The incrementalist/rationalist debate fits well with the three preceding elements in that it relates to a common concern with the limits to rationality in public decision-making. The case material documents public decision-makers at work, in both the rational and non-rational aspects of the decision process. To see local decision-making in the context of this particular debate seems helpful, and the case material permits certain conclusions to be drawn on this central issue.

The fifth and final element of the overall set of theoretical considerations is that of project management. Given impetus by the work of NASA and, indirectly, by writers such as Bennis and Toffler with their highlighting of the emergence of and need for temporary organizational structures, the project management method has come to be seen as a methodology for coping effectively with one-time, ad hoc projects requiring the multi-disciplinary, multi-jurisdictional contributions of distinctive units or professions. The Rideau Area Project case material shows, first,

how strong a reliance was placed on project management and, secondly, how unskilled the key public actors were in its use during the first years of project development.

IV. Objectives of the Thesis

The aforementioned models and approaches are examined more fully in Chapter One. This examination is undertaken for two reasons: (1) to make it easier to apply the models and approaches to an analysis of the case material, and (2) to prepare the ground for informed criticism related to the validity and usefulness of the models and approaches after the case analysis has been completed.

Regarding the first reason, hypotheses are drawn from the five theoretical sources and framed as questions or problem statements at the end of Chapter One. This is done to provide a guide for the subsequent description of the case material in Chapters Two through Six and for the case analysis in Chapter Seven. In this way, the models and approaches can be used to fulfill the main objective of the thesis: to draw insights from an accurate, detailed and critical account of the Rideau Area Project decision-making process so that conclusions can be reached about the fragmented nature of Canada's local government sector and the need for decision-making skills to effect collaboration among its component parts.

Regarding the second reason, an additional objective of the thesis is to comment on the validity and usefulness of the models and approaches themselves. The Rideau Area Project case provides an excellent opportunity to test some of the hypotheses identified in Chapter One, and to evaluate the applicability of the selected models and approaches to a complex decision situation. Again, to facilitate such an evaluation, a set of specific theory-testing questions is framed at the end of Chapter One to be used as a guide in Chapter Eight.

V. Thesis Organization

In developing the thesis, the material is organized as follows:

- Chapter One** addresses each theoretical consideration in turn, and draws the elements together through two sets of guiding questions -- one to be used in Chapter Seven for analyzing the case material, the other to be used in Chapter Eight for assessing the selected models and approaches.
- Chapter Two** is the first of five chapters comprising the case study. It describes the origins of the Rideau Area Project, giving the early background and showing how and when the issue to be addressed was first acknowledged as a priority concern at federal and municipal levels.
- Chapter Three** details the early federal initiatives, when the NCC asserted its leadership and entered into negotiations with private developers for the first time.
- Chapter Four** describes the first formal phase of project development, extending from 1972 to 1977, when Roderick Clack of the NCC was the acknowledged project leader and when much of the technical groundwork for the project was laid.
- Chapter Five** covers the second staff-level phase of the project during 1978, when leadership passed from Roderick Clack to Harold Lash and, soon thereafter, to Lloyd Sankey.⁹
- Chapter Six** addresses the decision-making process at the political level which began with receipt of a set of alternatives developed by the Sankey project team and culminated in the Tripartite Agreement of May 1979. It saw leadership pass formally from the NCC to the City of Ottawa, with Sankey as intermediary to the passing.
- Chapter Seven** applies certain theoretical considerations presented in Chapter One to the case material and draws the conclusions which appear warranted. The separation of case presentation from case analysis was effected in the hope that Chapters Two through Six may prove useful for instructional purposes, as teaching cases normally present the case material without analysis. The different theoretical considerations found in Chapter One provide a range of possible problem statements for guiding the analysis of the case material. The analysis and conclusions in Chapter Seven are, then, simply one student's interpretation of the material.
- Chapter Eight** assesses the usefulness and applicability of the theoretical considerations themselves in light of the case material.

Chapter Nine presents a set of final observations focused on the core argument of the thesis.

VI. Qualifying Remarks

In concluding this introductory section, some qualifying remarks seem in order. In the course of a seven-year period a great deal happens, understandably, in the process of bringing a major project to the stage where it can be implemented. Not everything that happens is formally documented, and the documents that do exist are by no means prepared either objectively or with the needs of the researcher in mind. In the case of this project the official records are voluminous, most of the key actors are still available for personal interview, and the newspaper accounts are readily accessible. Accordingly, to the bias of the case material is added, and I trust understandably, the selectivity of the case researcher. It was difficult, at times, to know what to include and what, often very reluctantly, to leave out of Chapters Two through Six. What did guide the choice of material, in every case, was its perceived relevance to the questions posed in Chapter One. Omitted, therefore, is certain fascinating material, such as much greater detail than now appears in relation to the confrontation between the two powerful egos of Roderick Clack and Lorry Greenberg. The Rideau Area Project lends itself to several case studies, therefore, of which this is only one.

Endnotes

1. A traffic map is attached as Appendix A showing the boundaries of the project and the streets and sites mentioned.
2. See V. Subramaniam, "Policy as Multi-Objective Choice," lecture five in the series, *The Science of Policy-Making: Towards a New Discipline* (University of New South Wales, Division of Postgraduate Extension Studies, 1981), available from Professor Subramaniam, Department of Political Science, Carleton

University, Ottawa (hereafter cited as Subramaniam, "Choice"). More will be said about the position Subramaniam takes in this paper in Chapter One.

3. I have taken the word "mosaic" from the draft of a paper by Eric Fleming, Ontario's Assistant Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs. The paper is entitled "The Local Mosaic: Autonomy and Collaboration in Ontario's Local Government Sector" and was based on Fleming's keynote address to the University of Ottawa's Third Local Government Forum, May 1985. The paper was made available by Professor Walter Baker, Faculty of Administration, University of Ottawa.
4. Fleming states the following: "The individuals working within the local government sector represent, themselves, an enormous range of interests, qualifications, experience, professional predilections, values, perceptions, and perspectives, and these differences can prove very important in seeking collaborative action." Ibid., p. 2.
5. A copy of the Tripartite Agreement of May 15, 1979 is attached as Appendix B.
6. Complex Decision Problems: An Integrated Strategy for Resolution, with a Foreword by Nigel Howard (Reston, Virginia: Reston Publishing Co., 1977). Radford develops a three-phase decision-making model, incorporating aspects of multi-actor, multi-valued decision situations.
7. Although the discussion in Chapter One relies on more sources than these, the key references are as follows: Subramaniam, "Choice"; Nigel Howard, Paradoxes of Rationality: Theory of Metagames and Political Behavior (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: MIT Press, 1971); George Abonyi, "SIAM: Strategic Impact and Assumptions-Identification Method for Project, Program, and Policy Planning," Technological Forecasting and Social Change 22(September 1982):31-52; Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'," Public Administration Review, 19(Spring 1959):79-83; and Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined (Scranton, N.J.: Chandler, 1968). The main source used for the project management discussion was a set of teaching materials compiled by the Department of National Defence in the summer of 1974 for its three-week course in project management. Included in this two-inch binder is a set of critical incidents, mini-cases, major cases, and a major simulation exercise. Access to the material was provided by the case writer, David Robert Baker, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.
8. Richard Simeon discusses the benefits that can be achieved by focussing on these four categories of variables when trying to account for the scope, means and distribution dimensions of public decisions, i.e., the substantive content of a decision, the means used to make and enforce the decision and the impact or range of effects of a decision. He also notes the importance of a fifth category, the environment of politics, as an explanatory factor. It will become clear in Chapter Two that the physical, socio-economic environment is a particularly powerful variable when it comes to explaining why a decision problem arises in the first place. Richard Simeon, "Studying Public Policy," Canadian Journal of Political Science 9(December 1976):548-80, especially pp. 559-78.

9. Clack was Assistant General Manager of the NCC throughout his period as project manager. Lash was a Vancouver-based consultant known to and respected by Pierre Juneau, Chairman of the NCC, who brought him in to review the Rideau Area Project in 1978. Lloyd Sankey was a Toronto-based consultant who took over the reins of the project after Clack left. He helped engineer the Tripartite Agreement of May 1979.

CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The theoretical basis of the thesis consists of a number of hypotheses drawn from five different decision-making models and approaches. This chapter addresses each of these theoretical sources, in turn. It then draws together the whole set of relevant hypotheses through two sets of guiding questions which are used in Chapters Seven and Eight for analyzing the case material and assessing the merits of the models and approaches themselves.

The discussion begins with an examination of how Subramaniam models the process of solving multi-valued or multi-objective problems. His writing underlines the key role that decision-makers' values and decision methodologies play in the public decision-making process. The chapter then proceeds to an examination of Nigel Howard's work on metagame theory and analysis, and George Abonyi's work on stakeholder analysis and the method of assumptions-identification. Both of these writers have developed structured, systematic techniques designed to help decision-makers analyze and cope successfully with complex decision situations. Their work identifies the distribution of power, the value assumptions held by decision-makers, and collaboration and conflict in the relationships among decision-makers as factors that are of central importance to the understanding of public decision-making.

The writings of Lindblom and Dror on disjointed incrementalism and comprehensive rationality, respectively, are examined next. A look at these two prominent decision-making models serves to highlight the issue of the limits to rationality in public decision-making. This focus on rationality complements Subramaniam's model, for he suggests that administrators approach decision situations as rationalists while politicians are more inclined to be intuitive. It also

follows in a complementary way from the exploration of the methodologies of Howard and Abonyi because it puts in proper perspective the validity and usefulness of attempting to make decision-making more structured and comprehensive in difficult-to-manage decision situations.

A final focus of the chapter is a theoretical concern with project management and its role in public sector decision-making. Consideration of some of the literature on project management draws attention to the need to explore organizational structures and management processes as factors that influence how and why public decisions are made.

I. Multi-valued Choice

Subramaniam approaches public decision-making as an exercise in multi-valued choice.¹ In doing so he starts from the position that a range of distinctive objectives can bear on a single decision. In a democratic society, governments must take into account the many demands of concerned and vocal individuals and groups before they decide. In relation to any given decision, moreover, they must also be sensitive to the varying objectives pursued by their own departments and agencies and by individual elected and non-elected officials.

Having acknowledged the factor of multiple objectives, Subramaniam identifies two distinctive ways of approaching multi-valued choice situations in public decision-making: the "organic political method" followed by politicians and the "rational administrative method" employed by public servants. When the two methods are properly reconciled, "at the interface of politics and public administration where both interact,"² they can lead to the resolution of multi-valued choice problems. If politicians follow the organic method and bureaucrats, the rational method, they will each arrive at some preferred position. The next step,

reconciliation, requires that they meet and compare positions to permit the politicians, as ultimate decision-makers, to arrive at a balanced decision.

To be more specific, the organic political method refers to the activities of politicians in advocating the demands of interest groups in policy discussions. It is based on the pluralist notion that there are numerous competing groups in society, each with sufficient resources to make themselves heard at some point in the decision process. It is also based on the notion that politicians are willing to let such groups have a voice if it helps them get re-elected. Theorists disagree, however, as to the specific nature of the politicians' role in advocating interest group demands. Do they act as "political entrepreneurs," as Dahl believes, and actively reflect, combine, or strike a balance among the "manifold forces" brought to bear on them in the government arena?³ Or do they, as Theodore Lowi contends, merely rubber stamp agreements that are arrived at by interest groups as they bargain among themselves largely outside government?⁴ In either case, Subramaniam's point is that multi-valued choice issues are dealt with at the political level by way of a bargaining process that sees some interest group values traded off for others and some politicians gaining more electoral support than others.

The rational administrative method of approaching a multi-valued choice situation involves the use of logical procedures to balance values, divorced from the realm of pressure group bargaining. Stokey and Zeckhauser discuss several "analytic policy choice procedures" that are available to bureaucrats as useful tools in dealing with multi-valued choice situations.⁵ For example, a bureaucrat can use the "king-of-the-mountain" technique and do simple pairwise comparisons of alternative proposals or, more ambitiously, he can assign weights to the individual attributes of some proposals. In either case, in the ideal situation a bureaucrat is

to act as a rational decision-maker, one who identifies specific goals and uses logical, analytical procedures to decide how best to reach those goals.

According to Subramaniam, the Western democratic ideal entailed a clear separation of the roles of bureaucrats and politicians: "The administrator came up with those multi-attribute alternatives with the highest overall utility by rational quantitative methods, while the politician met him with those alternatives or queries weighting the objectives of the stronger pressure groups. Then mutual discussion was expected to yield a balanced choice."⁶ It will be seen that the Rideau Area Project decision-making process provides some evidence to support the claim that politicians tend to approach multi-valued choice situations in an organic political way, separate from bureaucrats who largely use a rational administrative approach. The case material provides far stronger evidence, however, that in practice there is no clear separation of the two roles, at least at the local level of government.

Moreover, a review of contemporary decision processes at the federal and provincial levels suggests a more general lack of such separation. Canadian governments have had to cope with more and more demands from the public in the last few decades, in all areas of social, economic and cultural life, and have had to depend, more and more, on appointed officials to carry some of the decision-making load. The line of demarcation between politics and administration, if it ever really existed in the Woodrow Wilson sense, has thus been blurred. Campbell and Szablowski refer to "a new breed of bureaucrat" or "political administrator" (using Hugh Heclo's and Aaron Wildavsky's term) rather than a politically neutral civil service.⁷ Career civil servants, especially senior ones, are regularly involved with policy issues and recognize fully that they must concern themselves with political factors. As Subramaniam rightly points out -- and, again, this is drawn

out by the Rideau Area Project case -- political as well as rational evaluation of multi-valued choices occurs, to a considerable extent, at senior levels of the public service.

What Subramaniam alerts us to, then, is the importance of values in public decision-making and, following from this, the probability that actors coming to the decision situation with different value sets could tend toward different decisions on the same issue. He also alerts us to the possibility that different value sets, affected by and in turn creating different perspectives and perceptions, lead in turn to fundamentally different approaches to the decision-making process itself. If he is correct, then we should see those politicians involved in the process acting "organically" -- intuitively, impressionistically, non-analytically -- to weigh and find the resultant of the political pressures brought to bear on the situation. We should also see administrators or bureaucrats at the staff level approaching decisions in a logical, analytical, structured way. Finally, we should see the subsequent balancing of these two positions to produce politically feasible choices enlightened by the application of administrative rationality.

Going slightly beyond Subramaniam, while staying with the issue of values, a consideration of theoretical significance for this study is the extent to which the value sets of specific individuals are internally congruent. Two of the major actors in the Rideau-Area Project were Roderick Clack of the National Capital Commission, an architect by profession, and Lorry Greenberg, a former realtor who was at one point Mayor of Ottawa. Yet, Clack the professional architect was not Clack the senior bureaucrat, nor Clack the project manager, in the same way that Greenberg the realtor was not Greenberg the mayor. A related issue is what happens when value set confronts value set, both between individuals and between

organizations -- and we see considerable evidence of value sets in conflict in the Rideau Area Project.⁸

In summary, then, and using Subramaniam's writing on multi-valued choice as a starting point, a major theoretical consideration in exploring the Rideau Area Project case is the extent to which personal, professional and organizational values influenced the decision process and whether, specifically, there is evidence that politicians, from their particular value set, approached the process differently than administrators.

II. Metagame Theory and Analysis

Nigel Howard was the originator of metagame theory, building from the insights of von Neumann and Morgenstern.⁹ The theory is a form of non-quantifiable mathematics that he judged suited the calculus involved in the difficult-to-quantify world of public decision-making. From metagame theory, inaccessible to most policy-makers because of its mathematical sophistication, he derived the more manageable metagame analysis, also called the "analysis of options" method or technique. Metagame analysis is a special tool for coping with multi-actor decision-making, in a situation where decision power is shared among several decision-makers and where, therefore, one can realistically expect the decision process to be influenced significantly by individual preferences. In such situations, Howard sees significant potential for conflict in terms of preferred solutions:

Real-world policy decisions ... are "political" (in a wide sense of this word). They are not "rational" in the sense of being chosen as the appropriate means toward some set of objectives. They cannot be, since there is no single set of objectives that is being pursued. Instead, there is an element of conflict (and therefore also of cooperation) between a number of participants, each of whom is pursuing his own objectives. ... The players can prepare themselves by making a proper analysis of the interaction process before entering it.⁽¹⁰⁾

He believes there is a need, therefore, to manage this conflict skillfully through a realistic assessment of the objectives of each player, and through skill in meeting these separate objectives to whatever extent possible.

Howard developed metagame analysis while working at the University of Pennsylvania's Management Science Center, on a contract with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. His job was to help develop methods of analyzing the escalation and de-escalation of conflict and his work eventually led to applications of metagame analysis to real-world conflict problems such as the Vietnam and Arab-Israeli conflicts.¹¹

Game theory was his starting point, with its attempt to model multi-actor conflict situations in terms of the players involved, the courses of action or options available to the participants, the outcomes resulting from the courses of action chosen by the participants, and the preferences of the participants for these outcomes. Radford, Howard's close friend and colleague while he worked in Canada at the University of Waterloo and the University of Ottawa, provides the following description of the metagame model as a structured search for "decision equilibria," and relates it to the game theory from which it grew:

A main tenet of ... game theory is that resolution of a conflict situation can be sought in terms of equilibria rather than optima. An equilibrium results from a particular combination of strategy choices by the "players" involved. This combination of strategies is such that no player can benefit from moving away from the equilibrium position, so long as the other players do not. ...

... A metagame is an analytical model derived from the original game (decision situation) under consideration. In a metagame, the players are assumed to have some information about each others' strategy choices. ... If an equilibrium is found in a metagame, the policy choices contributing to that equilibrium can be the basis for a stable agreement, contract, or treaty between the parties involved, since it is a position from which it is not to the advantage of any to move.⁽¹²⁾

Howard reasoned that in all successful, dispute-resolving interactions at least a rough approximation of this type of analysis occurs, if only subconsciously and in

an unstructured way. He had had first-hand experience with senior policy-makers, through his work at the Management Science Center and, later, at the Urban Institute in Washington and the Royal Jordanian Institute in Beirut. He knew, therefore, that their normal method of confronting a policy issue, once identified, was to assemble whatever information and analytical talent they could and then to move, through informed debate and dialogue, to a position on which the decision group could agree. Ideally, minds that were competent to do so would probe, push for, assemble, dissect, rearrange, and more generally manipulate information and ideas without, normally, resorting to any structured method.¹³

The essence of metagame analysis is that it provides a structure to such common sense analysis. Through this structure decision-makers first identify all those with power to affect the eventual outcome of the situation and then, very methodically and with the help of a computer program if the number of option-combinations becomes large, formulate and analyze the feasible decision scenarios. Radford provides the following description of how this analysis proceeds:

The analysis is concerned with the stability of the situation under investigation (the particular scenario) in order to determine whether it is possible that the situation continue to exist as a result of some implicit or explicit agreement between all concerned. This is done by investigating for each player in turn the improvements to his position in the particular scenario that he could bring about by unilateral action (unilateral improvements) and any sanctions that could be brought against him by the other players. The particular scenario is said to be stable for any player as long as he believes that if he were to take one of his unilateral improvements, one or more of the other players would react by implementing a sanction. If the particular scenario is stable for each of the players under a state of the world defined by nature, then it is a possible basis for a contract or agreement between the players. If no sanction exists against a particular player, then that player may have a guaranteed improvement to his position in the particular scenario and that scenario cannot be stable. An analysis of this sort covers not only a number of particular situations, but also many possible coalitions of the players.⁽¹⁴⁾

The key objective of the analysis, then, is to search out a stable point of equilibrium, defined as that point from which no player can apply sanctions and

move to increase his own perceived advantage. Equilibrium points are different, therefore, from the objectives sometimes pursued quite diligently by policy-makers, in that to some acceptable extent they meet the objectives of all players participating in the decision process: "The existence of equilibria in a conflict situation provides the participants with promise of a measure of stability that may allow them to avoid the worst of the possible outcomes at the expense of not achieving the best."¹⁵ Until such a point is reached the decision, however strongly agreed to, remains an unstable one and any conclusions are merely temporary.

Without going further into the details of metagame analysis, what Howard has done is to develop a useful model for structuring multi-actor, diffused-power decision processes:

What has been described is a modelling procedure whereby the policy-makers charged with a problem can systematically investigate its strategic structure. This gives them a clear idea of what possible solutions exist and how each possible solution could be negotiated. They are thereby optimally equipped to begin the process of negotiating a solution with the other players... (16)

The technique helps analysts and, therefore, the decision-makers they support, to develop and work their way through various plausible scenarios until a point of stability is identified around which they believe decision-makers can first coalesce and then hold firm. It posits that the real world of public decision-making is characterized by a plurality of powerful interests. No single actor, however powerful, can edict the precise solution he wants, unless that solution satisfies the perceived minimal requirements of other powerholders.

It will be seen that the Rideau Area Project was just such a situation as Howard models, and the case material shows how Clack, in his role as project manager, failed to see the situation as it really was in relation to the diffusion of power. It will also be seen how Lash and Sankey entered into a process of

deliberately seeking out a point of stability around which the key actors could coalesce.

From metagame analysis, then, are drawn two interrelated theoretical considerations. The first is the observation that public sector decision-making is characterized by a diffusion of decision-making power among relatively autonomous decision-makers. The second is what this implies for public sector decision-making; although the decision process may evidence some objectivity and rationality, it has as its dominant elements the reality of conflict among multi-valued actors, and the need for collaboration around a point of stability which satisfies, to a sufficient extent, the aspirations of the powerholders involved.

III. Stakeholder Analysis

George Abonyi, in work with the federal Department of Regional Economic Expansion, has developed a model he calls the Strategic Impact and Assumptions-Identification Method (SIAM). He developed the basis of the model while at the University of Southern California, building from the works of Mason and Mitroff, and Mitroff and Emshoff.¹⁷ Having found the earlier works on the subject deficient when he went to apply them, Abonyi developed SIAM to flesh out the initial insights into a workable analytical model that he has applied, successfully, to several Canadian cases.¹⁸

Along with Subramaniam and Howard, Abonyi is concerned with "nontrivial" decisions, ones that involve at least two people and are characterized by conflicting interests. He disagrees with public choice theorists who assume that every decision-maker, whether we consider one individual or society as a whole, is an optimizer, looking for the best or optimal decision. Abonyi takes the position that decision-makers look for stable, "implementable" decisions that accommodate

their goals. In other words, a decision-maker starts out with certain goals or criteria he wants to achieve and believes can be delivered, and then seeks to realize them. The decision-maker's aim is to reach a stable decision wherein other people who could disrupt the decision do not, for whatever reasons. The key element of a decision for Abonyi, then, is its "implementability."¹⁹

As with metagame analysis, SIAM is designed to help decision-makers focus their attention as they engage in a process to determine how to achieve stable decisions. It is a more limited technique than metagame analysis, in the sense that it deals only with a static decision situation; there is no provision in SIAM for the analysis of future decision scenarios. Yet, it is a valuable technique for policy analysis because it helps decision-makers generate and structure the information required for informed judgements.

In direct parallel with Howard, Abonyi points to the complexity of public sector decisions in terms of the number of separate actors sharing the ultimate decision power. Where Howard focuses on powerholders (without explicitly using the term, writing instead of "players," in a manner consistent with game theory), Abonyi extends the concern to stakeholders, thereby broadening the analysis to include a much wider range of actors than Howard would consider appropriate. Presumably all of Howard's powerholders will have some sort of stake in the resolution of the issue being addressed; otherwise, their interest would not be engaged, actually or potentially. However, there can be those who have a stake in issue-resolution but absolutely no power to affect the ultimate decision. So, "stakeholder" is a more inclusive term than "powerholder," and causes us to address the needs and wants of those not directly involved in the sharing of power. Cases in point would be the inarticulate, non-mobilized poor, alienated local residents or,

even more pointedly, those not yet born whose future might be shaped by the decision.

The following extract from Abonyi shows that SIAM, through its use of the stakeholder concept, aims at achieving a comprehensive understanding of the nature of public decisions under analysis:

A project is implemented in a "milieu vivant" which includes a sphere of human activities (sociopolitical as well as economic) and a biosphere, or natural environment. The focus here is on the socio political environment, assumed to be composed of individuals who, in order to protect (and/or further) their interests, form "coalitions" with differing perceptions and interests. These social groups, which may range from amorphous alignments to structured organizations, then stand for a multiplicity of interests. They are involved in a dynamic "game" of conflict and cooperation that defines the context into which a project is introduced. SIAM introduces this into project analysis through the concept of stakeholders. This term ... refers to groups, organizations, and institutions which potentially have direct or indirect links to the project.⁽²⁰⁾

SIAM, as a methodology, identifies two complementary ways to generate a list of stakeholders, an "outside-in" and an "inside-out" approach. Abonyi argues that both approaches should be used in order to gain a greater awareness of the structure and impact of the project under study. The outside-in approach requires working from the environment to the project in an ad hoc fashion to identify who is affected by the project, who has an interest in it, and who is in a position to affect its planning and implementation. The inside-out approach works from inside the project to first model its relationships with the environment, in terms of project inputs and outputs. Then, using components of a regular open system model (inputs, transformation processes and outputs), three distinctive sets of actors can be identified, each with a perceived or potential stake in the project.²¹

At the input end, for example, in relation to the Rideau Area Project, would be the building supply companies, the building trades, the consulting firms, and the financiers providing resources to the project. In the transforming core would be

the politicians and bureaucrats charged with bringing the project to a successful conclusion. At the output end would be those ultimately served by whatever goods or services resulted from the project.

According to Abonyi, then, decision-makers should acknowledge at the outset of the decision process that complex public decisions have ramifications extending well beyond the actual core decision situation. Organizations, agencies, groups, and individuals other than those directly and immediately involved will have a legitimate stake in the result. Care must be taken, first, to identify such stakeholders at an early stage in the decision process -- or, at least, to identify those stakeholders with potential power to affect the decision -- and, secondly, to take their interests into consideration. Failing to attend to the "social soundness" of a decision -- that is, the degree of fit between a project and the needs of affected social groups -- could lead to difficulties; at a later stage what was only latent power can become actual power, and decisions taken to that point may well break down.

In addition to the concept of stakeholders, and his original method for identifying them, Abonyi uses a second and related concept, "assumptions-identification." The concept proceeds from the recognition that underlying the various positions taken by the actors in a multi-valued decision situation are certain assumptions, often implicitly accepted rather than explicitly stated. Identifying these assumptions and analyzing them can be a useful way of eliminating hidden sources of conflict. It can also be a way of ensuring that assumptions by a decision-maker concerning the identity of relevant stakeholders are surfaced and tested. The aim is to make certain that all appropriate -- and only appropriate -- stakeholders are considered.

Assumptions-identification is a key aspect of Abonyi's model. He starts from the position that the world of public decision-making is one in which conflict abounds. He sees one major source of this conflict being the tendency of decision-makers to work on the basis of untested assumptions. The following quotation from Abonyi shows how he identifies two broad types of strategic assumptions from any given project, and links assumptions-identification to stakeholder analysis to form the core of SIAM:

SIAM is best described as an interactive "search" process that aids in generating and structuring information. Its basic output involves the identification of two types of strategic assumptions for a given project. The critical assumptions are of primary importance. These are the assumptions that, given present knowledge, are judged to be important but uncertain. This uncertainty may be reduced through further data gathering and analysis, modifications in project design, or through negotiations with particular groups about specific "conflict points" associated with the project. Otherwise the sources of uncertainty and their implications, associated with particular assumptions, are highlighted in the decision process. Key assumptions follow the critical assumptions in importance. These, given present knowledge, are both important and certain. They need to be explicitly identified and monitored as project planning and implementation proceed. If any of the key assumptions become less certain over time, this may indicate the need for a reassessment of the project.

The identification of the critical and key assumptions is the output of SIAM. The procedure that generates this as output comprises five phases. The first phase involves the identification of as broad a set of stakeholders as possible, and their specific linkages to the project. Perceiving a project as a system interacting with its environment provides a useful basis for this step. The second phase requires the generation of assumptions about the current and future behavior of the stakeholders identified earlier. The third phase involves the elimination of non-essential assumptions, leaving only the more significant ones for further consideration. In the fourth phase the remaining assumptions are prioritized in order to identify key strengths and critical weaknesses of the project from the perspective of social soundness. The fifth and final phase lies outside the analysis proper. In it, the implications of the analysis are examined with respect to possible modifications of the project and/or the environment.(22)

It will become clear, as we move through Chapters Two through Six, that there were many stakeholders in relation to the Rideau Area Project and, within these, a smaller but still sizeable number of powerholders. It will also become clear that

those who were at one stage powerless stakeholders were, at another stage, powerholders and that where power did rest was not always clear, in every instance, to those who might reasonably have been expected to be sensitive to the realities of power. Finally, it will become clear that different assumptions did underlie the positions taken by major actors and that Lash and Sankey developed their own methodology and process to deal with this factor.

IV. Disjointed Incrementalism and Comprehensive Rationality

This theoretical consideration needs little elaboration. With the publication of Lindblom's "The Science of 'Muddling Through' " in 1959, the first shot was fired in the modern-day battle between the incrementalists and the comprehensive rationalists, with scholars such as Etzioni and Gershuny seeking an acceptable middle ground.²³ All parties to the debate agree that man is truly a rational animal. They disagree on the extent of his rationality, however, and his penchant for applying what rationality is possessed.

Lindblom's contention is that even the most systematic and rational of our public decision-makers lack both the inclination and capacity to approach decisions in a comprehensively rational way. Like Herbert Simon before him he sees even major policy decisions "evolving" rather than being "made." Whereas Simon writes, imaginatively, that "a complex decision is like a great river, drawing from its many tributaries the innumerable component premises of which it is constituted,"²⁴ Lindblom writes more technically of a series of incremental decisions combining, over time, into a policy or major decision:

It is a characteristic of political processes in most governments that any single office, organization, or agency pursues a never-ending series of attacks on more or less permanent, though perhaps slowly changing, problems that lie within its field of interest or authority. ... Over many years a problem may, of course, come to be regarded as solved; if so, the accomplishment is a product of a long series of policy actions.⁽²⁵⁾

And it is not only that he believes this is the manner in which decisions are made, currently; it is his view that this is the preferred way to approach decisions, given the limits to human rationality -- and especially the information limits and the pressures of time and cost. Lindblom argues, for example, in a book co-authored by Braybrooke, that decision-makers can "achieve a greatly simplified intellectual reorganization of the problem-solving process" by moving incrementally.²⁶

Like Subramaniam, Lindblom singles out values as a particularly critical concern. He highlights the difficulty of weighting and ranking values, and notes that decision-makers have to find ways to deal with their conflicting values. He states that they tend to move, more often than not, in an unstructured, intuitive, exploratory way, building from what they know and where they already are. In the end, a decision-maker can only expect to partially achieve his goals.

Lindblom is an advocate, therefore, of the approach of "disjointed incrementalism," where decisions are made, step-by-step, in response to perceived and pressing needs; he opposes the position that public decision-makers should move to all-embracing, comprehensive planning and policy-making in their attempts to come to grips in a rigorous, systematic, highly rational way with public issues. Referring back, briefly, to the earlier discussion of metagame analysis, it should be noted that Radford considers disjointed incrementalism and metagame analysis to be similar and complementary:

The relationship of the analysis of options to ... Lindblom's strategy of disjointed incrementalism is now clear. Both methods avoid the difficulties of constructing large analytical models in the treatment of complex problems. In the analysis of options, just as in ... Lindblom's strategy, one does not attempt a synoptic analysis that considers all possible scenarios at once. Instead one considers (a) the present scenario and (b) a limited number of other scenarios representing what one or more of the players may judge to be improvements. This greatly decreases the informational requirements of the analysis, just as anticipated by ... Lindblom.

The analysis of options has the additional feature that possible future scenarios can be judged with regard to their stability in the light of both natural events and the competitive actions of others involved in the situation. Moreover, the fact that the analysis of options procedure has a firm base in theory gives it a major claim in the search for a structured method of implementing the ... Lindblom strategy. Disjointed incrementalism and the analysis of options are therefore seen as mutually supporting methods for the investigation of complex decision, policy, and planning problems.(27)

In significant opposition to the incrementalists, Dror is a strong believer in both the capacity of man to apply a far greater rationality to public choice questions than he has done in the past, and the need to do so:

I do not think it is very useful to regard the future as an immutable, independent phenomenon that is completely external to man. I am much more interested in learning how man can change the future to make it what he wants. I therefore do not want merely to extrapolate the future state of our knowledge by assuming that present trends will continue. ...

We need to know how to establish and improve the rational components of optimal public policymaking. These components include: (a) examining the consistency of values and goals; (b) collecting intelligence; (c) predicting the probable results of different courses of action; (d) comparing benefits and costs; (e) constructing criteria for "best" and "good" alternatives; (f) constructing feedback systems; (g) programming systematic operations.(28)

Dror would see nothing pretentious, for example, about the comprehensive nature of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System that was developed from the work of the Rand Corporation nor, in consequence, about the Government of Canada's current attempts at a master policy and expenditure management system, in the form of PEMS.²⁹ To him and those in the same comprehensive rationalist stream, they are grand rather than grandiose approaches to public decisions.

This does not seem the place to enter into the debate. What does seem worth doing is to note, through Lindblom especially but even Dror, that there are limits to the rationality of public decision-makers. Their work raises as an issue, to be addressed through the case material and subsequent analysis, the extent to which key actors in public decisions, in both public and private sectors and across a

variety of roles, are rational in their approach. It will be recalled that Subramaniam asserts that, in general, bureaucrats will approach decisions from a rationalist stance, while politicians will not. Lindblom and Dror extend the position to cover all decision-makers.

V. Project Management

Alvin Toffler's Future Shock, first published in 1970, brought the term "ad-hocracy" into use to describe a particular organizational form of the future:

In short, the organizational geography of super-industrial society can be expected to become increasingly kinetic, filled with turbulence and change. The more rapidly the environment changes, the shorter the life span of organization forms. In administrative structure, just as in architectural structure, we are moving from long-enduring to temporary forms, from permanence to transience. We are moving from bureaucracy to Ad-hocracy.⁽³⁰⁾

Toffler himself took the concept from Warren Bennis. Bennis, with Slater, saw "the temporary society" emerging and forecast with great confidence the coming death of bureaucracy.³¹ Ponderous, inflexible bureaucracy was to be replaced by highly adaptive project structures. Through these temporary structures the necessary strengths to meet the one-time, one-of-a-kind needs of the temporary society would be assembled. Groups would form, tailored to each particular need, and once the need was met the group would disband and its members would move to new, equally temporary groups: "The social structure of organizations of the future will have some unique characteristics. The key word will be 'temporary.' There will be adaptive, rapidly changing temporary systems. These will be task forces organized around problems to be solved by groups of relative strangers with diverse professional skills."³²

Bennis saw that such temporary structures, and the temporary society more generally, would require a new style of management. It would make demands on

the manager and the members of his team that were not those for which bureaucratic experience had prepared them. In The Temporary Society, he and Slater wrote of "New Patterns of Leadership for Adaptive Organizations," and described the special attributes of the adaptive manager:

This new concept of leadership embraces four important competences: (1) knowledge of large, complex human systems, (2) practical theories of guiding these systems, theories that encompass methods for seeding, nurturing, and integrating individuals and groups, (3) interpersonal competence, particularly the sensitivity to understand the effects of one's own behaviour on others and how one's own personality shapes one's particular leadership style and value system, and (4) a set of values and competences that enables one to know when to confront and attack, if necessary, and when to support and provide the psychological safety so necessary for growth.(33)

On the particular question of collaboration in decision-making, the authors noted that due to the complexity and diversification of modern problems, a whole range of different skills and perspectives need to be brought together in problem-solving units. An important task of leaders of the new 'adaptive organizations' will be to build a collaborative climate that includes the following ingredients: "flexible and adaptive structure, utilization of member talents, clear and agreed-upon goals, norms of openness, trust, and cooperation, interdependence, high intrinsic rewards, and transactional controls, that is, members of the unit should have a high degree of autonomy and a high degree of participation in making key decisions."34

Outside the realm of scholarship, NASA wrestled with the practicalities of bringing together the enormous range and variety of strengths and resources required if Kennedy's goal of getting a man on the moon in ten years was to be met. Incredibly, the goal was met, and after his first steps on the moon Neil Armstrong paid eloquent tribute to man's organizational capacity as a key factor in the project's success:

Our goal when we were assigned to this flight last January seemed almost impossible. There were a lot of unknowns, unproved ideas, unproved hardware....

Then came the flights of Apollo IX and X, which were so magnificently successful. It began to seem that we really would get a crack at a landing. From that point on, preparations became relentless...

We were not concerned with safety, specifically, in these preparations. We were concerned with mission success, with the accomplishment of what we set out to do. A successful lunar landing I felt might inspire men around the world to believe that impossible goals really are possible, that there really is hope for solutions to humanity's problems.

The amazing thing about the whole space enterprise from its very beginnings some ten years ago was that practically everything required to make it succeed had to be invented, discovered and created -- new materials, new equipment, new vehicles, new forms of organization and new management methods.⁽³⁵⁾

One offshoot of the NASA experience was the emergence of project management as a proven alternative to bureaucracy, and of matrix structures as an alternative to the principle that many had earlier held to be inviolate, "one man, one boss." In the early 1970s the federal departments of Public Works, Defence, Transport, Indian Affairs and Northern Development, and the Post Office all moved to the use of project management.³⁶ They discovered, in the process, how much its successful use demanded in the way of new knowledge and skills, the employment of unfamiliar organizational techniques, and care in appointing and providing direction to the project manager. As late as the mid-1970s, when Canada's Department of National Defence had received authorization to acquire \$6 billion in new weaponry over an upcoming five-year period, as a series of separate projects, it was recognized that the federal public service as a whole had little in the way of successful experience in project management on which to draw in training its new project managers. Considerable resources were dedicated by the department, therefore, to developing the manuals, training courses and managerial selection skills to support the new demands of project management.³⁷

It is an interesting consideration in its own right that the planning process, leading to a decision, requires special competence in managing, in the same and

more normally understood way in which the implementation of the decision requires competent managing. The Department of National Defence, in its publication, The Defence Program Management System,³⁸ describes in very considerable detail the process involved in moving from the very first consideration of a project to its ultimate realization as a product-in-use. It separates, carefully, the process of developing the project parameters (specifications, schedule, costs) from the implementation stage, and provides in detail for the management of the project development stage under the leadership of a designated project director.

The point of presenting the above background is that when the NCC sought and was granted leadership of the Rideau Area Project, in the period 1970 to 1972, it had little or no experience on which to draw to guide ~~in~~ the use of project management as a technique to be applied to project development. A theoretical consideration in relation to the case, therefore, is the extent to which failure in project management, itself, adversely affected the decision process in its early stages. By the time Harold Lash and Lloyd Sankey came on the scene, a great deal more was known about project management; in the eight-year period from 1970 to 1978 project management became a recognized methodology and a recognized skill, and men like Lloyd Sankey had a background in the relevant process and people skills which, the case material suggests, were markedly absent in Roderick Clack.

The following overview of project management by Anthony White gives a good indication of the kind of process and people skills that underpin the approach. These are the skills that Bennis and Slater had understood would be needed in the 1970s:

The management of projects to accomplish work is a relatively new concept to the management literature. Some aspects of the New Deal programs of the 1930s were project-oriented, but it was the Manhattan Project of World War II which brought the concept into vogue.

The project concept consists of the premise that, given a goal or objective to reach, enough manpower, money and other resources can be assembled for a short period of time to reach the goal. This clearly was the reasoning behind the so-called "race-to-the-moon" of the 1960s.

There are, however, a definite set of skills which are necessary to the successful accomplishment of any project. Goals, objectives and problems must be outlined clearly -- it does no good to work for a period of time and not know if anything has been accomplished. This has been the bane of evaluators of projects and programs -- the ends are not clearly defined.

Resources must be available in sufficient quality and quantity to accomplish the job. No project will be viewed as successful if it is greatly underfunded, or if the working participants are insufficiently qualified to do specialty or technical work.

In addition, the management skills necessary to bring a project to successful fruition can be hard to find. First, a manager must be selected who is used to the idea of short-term, concentrated effort to accomplish specific goals. This manager must then be able to build, from the ground up, a team whose members complement one another in terms of skills and abilities. Once the team members are selected, the conflict cycle that arises naturally must be carefully managed to avoid detracting from the overall project goals.(39)

Addressing the factor of project management as a theoretical consideration highlights the importance of the formal structure provided for public decision-making. Subramaniam focusses on value sets and decision methodologies, Howard and Abonyi provide models for identifying the forces at work in the decision situation and dealing systematically with these forces, and Lindblöm and Drot bring into sharp focus the issue of the limits to rationality in public decision-making. This fifth theoretical consideration covers a concern with organizational structure and with the suitability of the management process itself.

VI. Analytical Questions

In previous sections theoretical considerations were identified by drawing, deliberately, from five different theoretical sources. Each of the basic decision models or approaches addressed directs attention to variables that have explanatory power when analyzing public decision-making. In some cases the approaches

share common premisses or direct attention to similar variables, but in total they provide a richer set of considerations than any one or several of them alone. To simplify the application of their insights during Chapters Seven and Eight, the approaches are drawn together more tightly, below, by formulating two sets of questions. These cover, respectively, the questions to be used in assessing the Rideau Area Project decision process, which forms the focus of Chapter Seven, and those questions to be used in testing the value and applicability of the approaches to which they relate. The resulting sets of questions are as follows:

**Questions to be used in Chapter Seven
to assess the case**

1. Who were the key actors at different stages in the process, and what was the extent and nature of their power?
2. What role did each of values, perceptions and assumptions play in the decision process?
3. What structured decision processes were used to resolve conflict and achieve collaboration while seeking to ensure that the decision process would culminate in a decision that was politically acceptable, and both managerially and technically feasible?
4. How important was the factor of personal competence -- political, managerial and technical -- in the decision process?
5. How comprehensively rational was the process, in contrast to being either incremental or political in nature?

**Theory-testing questions
to be used in Chapter Eight**

1. Does Subramaniam's distinction between the organic political and rational administrative methods of approaching public decisions hold true and prove helpful in the Rideau Area Project case? More generally, was there any consistency in the way politicians and bureaucrats approached their respective roles in the decision process?
2. Does the case bear out Howard's contention that multi-actor, diffused-power decision situations are rife with collaboration/conflict concerns? If so, how well was this recognized and accounted for by those leading the decision process?
3. Could Howard's metagame analysis have been applied at any stage to shorten the decision process and reduce or eliminate unproductive conflict?
4. Is there evidence of leading actors systematically identifying the other stakeholders involved in the process, assessing their importance to the project and their respective objectives and power, and searching for socially-sound solutions satisfactory to a wide range of stakeholders? If so, did this have the positive effect one might infer from Abonyi? If not, could the process have been improved through more-rigorous analysis using SIAM?
5. In terms of the incrementalism debate, was comprehensive rationality at work in any aspect or at any stage in the process? If not, could it have been, given the nature of the project? To what extent did the decision evolve, rather than having been made in some deliberate way?
6. Was project management a factor in the decision process? If so, how, and how significantly?

Endnotes

1. This is also known in the decision-making literature as multi-attribute or multi-objective choice.
2. "Choice," p. 3.
3. Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 227.
4. Subramaniam describes Lowi's position in "Choice," p. 6. See Robert Paul Wolff, "Beyond Tolerance," in A Critique of Pure Tolerance, edited by Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore Jr. and Herbert Marcuse (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 11-17 for a discussion of these two principal pluralist theories.
5. Edith Stokey and Richard Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy Analysis (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 1978), pp. 121-33.
6. "Choice," p. 7.
7. Colin Campbell and George J. Szablowski, The Superbureaucrats: Structure and Behaviour in Central Agencies (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1979), pp. 4, 204; and Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky, The Private Government of Public Money: Community and Policy Inside British Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p. 3.
8. Much has been written on the topic of values and organizational conflict. See, for example, Barry Z. Posner and J. Michael Munson, "The Importance of Values in Understanding Organizational Behavior," Human Resource Management 18(Fall 1979):9-14.
9. Howard provides a discussion of how he developed his theory in the Preface to Paradoxes of Rationality. He acknowledges that an important starting point was the book, J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 3rd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953).
10. Foreword to Complex Decision Problems, by Radford, pp. ix-x.
11. Howard's analysis of the Arab-Israeli conflict is one of his more readable pieces for those without a strong mathematical background. "The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Metagame Analysis," Papers, Peace Research Society (International), 19, Ann Arbor Conference, 1971.
12. K.J. Radford, "The Treatment of Complex Decision, Policy, and Planning Problems," INFOR (Canadian Journal of Operational Research and Information Processing), 14 (February 1976):39. Radford has been used as a source, rather than Howard, because he writes about Howard's work in a non-mathematical way.

13. This personal commentary on Howard was provided by a one-time university associate of his, Anne Perkins, who is at present working on her doctoral thesis in public policy-making at the University of Ottawa.
14. "Treatment," pp. 89-90.
15. Idem, Complex Decision Problems, p. 77.
16. Nigel Howard, "The Game Theoretic Breakdown of Rationality: Some Implications for Policy Analysis," Working Paper 76-6, University of Ottawa, 1979, pp. 40-41.
17. R.O. Mason and I. Mitroff, "Strategic Assumption-Making at Majestic Metals: Arriving at Strategy Through Dialectics," Study Center in Public Services Management and Policy, University of California, 9(June 1978); and I. Mitroff and J. Emshoff, "On Strategic Assumption-Making: A Dialectical Approach to Policy and Planning," Academy of Management Review 4(January 1979):1-12.
18. See, for example, "Social Assessment Module: Highway Infrastructure Version," Project Assessment and Evaluation Branch, Department of Regional Economic Expansion (July 1980); and "Lead-Zinc Smelter Strategic Analysis," Project Assessment and Evaluation Branch, Department of Regional Economic Expansion (June 1981). Abonyi asserts that his model really does work when applied to real-life situations. According to him, SIAM will soon be picked up by the Department of National Defence to be used as part of its regular project planning procedures. Interview, University of Ottawa, September 1985.
19. This is the term Abonyi used during an interview with him in Ottawa, September 1985.
20. "SIAM," p. 35.
21. Abonyi does not consider transformation processes in "SIAM"; he writes only of inputs and outputs. He, therefore, adopts a two-part, mechanistic system model that treats the inner workings of a system as an unknown "black box." This researcher prefers a three-part system model that provides an additional focus on the processes involved in transforming inputs into outputs. Such a model is especially useful for the study of complex decision-making problems, wherein the behaviour and perceptions of decision-makers are crucial explanatory factors. See Hasan Ozbekhan, "Toward a General Theory of Planning," in Perspectives of Planning, proceedings of the OECD Working Symposium on Long-Range Forecasting and Planning, October 27-November 2, 1968, edited by Erich Jantsch (Paris: OECD, 1969), pp. 45-155 for a comparative discussion of the "mechanistic" and "human action" system models of planning.
22. "SIAM," p. 36.
23. Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society (New York: Free Press, 1968); and T.I. Gershuny, "Policymaking Rationality: A Reformulation," Policy Sciences 9(June 1978):295-316.

24. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, 3rd ed., with a Foreword by Chester I. Barnard and a new Introduction (New York: Free Press, 1976), p. xii.
25. Charles E. Lindblom, "The Strategy of Disjointed Incrementalism," Chapter 5 in A Strategy of Decision, by David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom (London: Free Press of Glencoe, Collier-Macmillan, 1963):100-101.
26. Ibid., p. 123.
27. "Treatment," p. 90. Abonyi states that disjointed incrementalism and stakeholder analysis are also complementary. He believes that Lindblom's model is correct, descriptively, as an account of how decisions are made, but finds fault with it as a normative model because it lacks the necessary "teeth" that stakeholder analysis can provide. Interview, September 1985.
28. Public Policymaking Reexamined, pp. 220, 222.
29. Richard Van Loon has written several pieces on the Policy and Expenditure Management System, discussing both its intended rationality and the problems being faced in its implementation. See, particularly, "The Policy and Expenditure Management System in the Federal Government: The First Three Years," Canadian Public Administration 26(Summer, 1983):255-85; and "Planning in the Eighties," Chapter 9 in How Ottawa Decides: Planning and Industrial Policy Making 1968-1984, 2nd ed., by Richard D. French and Richard Van Loon (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1984), pp. 157-190.
30. Future Shock (New York: Random House, 1970; reprinted edition, Toronto, New York and London: Bantam Books, 1971), p. 136.
31. Warren G. Bennis and Philip E. Slater, The Temporary Society (New York, Evanston and London: Harper and Row, 1968), particularly Chapter 3, "Beyond Bureaucracy," pp. 53-76, written by Bennis.
32. Ibid., pp. 73-4.
33. Ibid., p. 122.
34. Ibid., p. 105.
35. Walter Baker, "Administrative Reform in the Federal Public Service: the First Faltering Steps," Canadian Public Administration, 16(Fall 1973):383, citing unknown source.
36. I am indebted for this insight to an unpublished research paper prepared by Jeffrey Else. While a graduate student at the Faculty of Administration, University of Ottawa, he completed a study of the incidence of "adaptive structures" in the federal public service, and included project management as one of the structures studied.
37. Canada, Department of National Defence, teaching materials for the project management course, Ottawa, Summer, 1974.

38. Canadian Forces Publication No. 125.
39. Anthony G. White, "Project Management -- Pulling it Together: A Selected Bibliography" (Monticello, Illinois: Vance Bibliographies, 1979), pp. 1-2.

CHAPTER TWO

PROJECT ORIGINS

On October 18, 1972, the Minister of Finance, John Turner, announced that the federal land in the Rideau area of Ottawa would be redeveloped as part of a plan to revitalize the overall area. Normally, such an announcement would have been made by Ronald Basford, the Minister of State for Urban Affairs. The government was in the middle of an election campaign, however, and the Rideau area fell within John Turner's constituency.

The city's mayor, Pierre Benoit, although unable to attend Turner's press conference, gave assurances of his wholehearted support for the project in a letter to Douglas Fullerton, the Chairman of the NCC. He ended his letter with the statement: "Please convey to your colleagues at the federal level my most sincere best wishes for the success of this undertaking. I hope this exercise will serve as a model for the cooperation that can and should be undertaken between the federal and municipal levels of government."¹

The essence of a project, differentiating it from normal ongoing activity, is that it has an identifiable beginning and end. It is discrete in time, and can be managed as such in terms of its specifications, scheduling and costs. Frequently, however, the choice of a starting date is arbitrary. From a stream of events the particular date is selected, with the prior events seen, therefore, as project origins. This approach has been followed, here, and the ministerial announcement of a concept plan for Rideau area redevelopment has been selected as the formal beginning of the Rideau Area Project decision-making process. It marked the first time politicians from the City of Ottawa and the federal government had come together over the issue of an underdeveloped Rideau area, to publicly commit

themselves to revitalization plans.

In keeping with the tenor of the previous paragraph the politicians did not reach this decision overnight. On the contrary, there was a lengthy period prior to October 1972 when matters were moving toward a formal project beginning, at which time interest in Rideau area redevelopment would crystallize into a commitment at the political level. It took time, and an accumulation of events, before federal and city politicians recognized the full extent of the problem and came to appreciate the need to seek its resolution in collaborative fashion.

I. Problem Recognition at the Federal Level

As early as 1937, Prime Minister Mackenzie King led a federal government initiative related to Rideau area concerns. Following in the footsteps of Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier, who, in 1893, expressed the desire to see Ottawa become "the Washington of the North,"² King commissioned the world-renowned Parisian architect Jacques Gréber to devise a plan to help beautify Ottawa and turn it into a strong capital city. Apparently, to this point in time, Ottawa had evolved as a city that responded well to the needs of manufacturing interests. The Rideau area, for example, had historically been the transportation hub of the region and, by 1870, was an active retail centre with numerous stores on Rideau Street. Yet, like other areas in Ottawa, it lacked the beauty and unique qualities about which politicians would boast several decades later. The city had not yet become "an urban community which has a very special significance for all Canadians and of which they can all feel proud... a model community, a showcase within which the results of imaginative and innovative urban planning can be displayed."³

Gréber hoped to take Ottawa in this direction through his plan of 1950,⁴ in which he recommended new traffic routes, the widening of main arteries and a greenbelt area. More directly related to the concern for Rideau area redevelopment, he made two major recommendations: (1) the relocation of the railyards from the land east of Colonel By Drive and south of Besserer Street to Alta Vista, and (2) the enhancement of the Rideau Street area east of the Rideau Canal by injecting new commercial retail space and federal office space on the vacant railyard land. The prospects of implementing Gréber's plans were adversely affected by the advent of the Second World War and only the first of these two recommendations was eventually implemented - the 3.8 acres of railyards was cleared by 1967; and by 1969 the former railway station had been converted, imaginatively, into a government conference centre. The federal government's interest in Rideau area improvement along the lines of Gréber's scheme long outlasted his specific recommendations, however, with others after King recognizing that Rideau area redevelopment could make an important contribution to the goal of a capital city worthy of Canada.

In 1958, the federal government's concern for the well-being of the nation's capital was reflected in the decision to reorganize the federal planning body for the capital area and rename it the National Capital Commission (NCC). Sir Wilfrid Laurier's government had established the Ottawa Improvement Commission in 1899, with a mandate to develop and beautify the nation's capital. This commission was responsible, for example, for the construction of the driveway alongside the Rideau Canal. In 1927 the Ottawa Improvement Commission was replaced by the Federal District Commission, which was given a broader mandate to plan for a district spanning both sides of the Ottawa River. With the passage of the National Capital Act in 1958 and its proclamation in 1959, the NCC retained responsibility

for the National Capital Region as a whole, incorporating parts of both Ontario and Quebec. Additionally, it was given express authority "to develop the capital as the guardian of and spokesman for the national interest"⁵ and was also given more public money to carry out its activities.

As Jean Pigott later remarked, whereas the predecessors of the NCC were solely concerned with ensuring the beautification of the national capital, the federal planning body assumed an overall planning role in 1958. According to Pigott it moved aggressively in the role, acting from the start "as if it was the only one with constitutional power to plan for the development of the 'national interest' in the National Capital."⁶

One of the NCC's earliest endeavours was to initiate a series of economic, marketing and planning studies in the 1960s to determine, among other things, the best way to use the vacant federal railyard land. The Parkin plan of 1962 called for the development of four large office towers, stores, a hotel, and a convention centre on the federal land.⁷ Implementation of the Parkin plan effectively died, however, when public funds were diverted to EXPO '67.

In 1969 the federal cabinet directed the NCC to prepare plans for revitalizing the Ottawa-Hull core of the National Capital Region, and this led to renewed commission consideration, in the early 1970s, of redevelopment on the federal land in the Rideau area. For the politicians, the immediate concern was to see a stronger federal government presence on the Hull side of the capital which, combined with initiatives on the Ottawa side, would help create a unified capital core. Consequently, the NCC prepared a Core Area Plan in 1971 and took several initiatives, including the construction of the Portage Bridge to serve as a link between the Hull and Parliament Hill sectors of the core area, and the establish-

ment of major federal government office accommodation in downtown Hull and in the area south of Parliament Hill.

The NCC's Core Area Plan also included the upgrading of Wellington Street to parkway standards, the provision of more residential accommodation and the advocacy of public transit rather than freeways. These recommendations were not acted on in 1971 but showed up again as objectives in the Rideau Centre plan of 1972, when NCC planners shifted their attention to redeveloping and revitalizing the Rideau area, as the remaining part of the core area requiring attention.

Studies undertaken by the NCC Socio-Economic Research Group in the early 1970s indicated the Rideau area was experiencing a severe economic decline. Whereas the Rideau Street business community had accounted for 80 per cent of the total Ottawa retail sales in 1950, that share dropped to only 21.1 per cent by 1961 and to 14.0 per cent by 1971. Moreover, the absolute population in the area was dwindling and the unemployment rate was 9.3 per cent, compared to the Ottawa average of 2.5 per cent. The NCC believed, therefore, that to truly revitalize the Rideau area it needed a comprehensive plan that would remedy the downtown economic problems, serve the federal government's objective of land development, and meet the NCC's own broad goal of beautifying the National Capital Region.

To apply retrospectively the content of an NCC report of July 30, 1973, the NCC set five specific goals for revitalization. Together, these goals indicate, first, that the NCC's approach to its mandate as a planning body extended well beyond a concern for physical development and, secondly, that it was in no way constrained in its planning to those matters where implementation was exclusively within federal jurisdiction. The five goals were as follows:

- A: To create a pleasing urban environment that responds to its physical and climatic setting.

- B: To strengthen the historic and heritage character of the area.
- C: To increase the economic potential of the Rideau Centre Area.
- D: To provide for an efficient and flexible transportation system to service the core.
- E: To provide for ancillary social services.⁸

The Rideau Centre plan of 1972

The NCC's Rideau Centre plan of 1972 was intended to address all five of the above goals, although the fifth was not considered explicitly; it was assumed that local government would address the need for social services in a revitalized downtown core. Briefly, the plan envisaged extensive redevelopment of fifty acres of downtown Ottawa bounded by the Rideau Canal, St. Patrick Street, King Edward Avenue and Laurier Avenue. A large complex named, tentatively, Rideau Square, was to be built on the 3.8-acre parcel of federally-owned land.⁹ The complex would contain, among other things, over a million square feet of federal office space, buildings for significant new commercial and cultural use, and a site for a prestige hotel. Rideau Street, between Sussex and Waller, was to be closed to traffic and converted into a climate-controlled mall, linking all existing stores.

Rideau Street through traffic would then be diverted onto a route leading to the western core of the city by way of Waller Street, the Mackenzie King Bridge and the existing Albert/Slater one-way routes. Besserer and George would become the service streets for the Rideau Street stores and provide access to a series of parking garages built as part of Rideau Square. Elevated, enclosed pedestrian malls were also to be built, extending from the Mackenzie King Bridge bus bays to the Byward Market and from Colonel By Drive to Waller Street. Further, in keeping with the goals and objectives of the 1971 Core Area Plan, the area bounded roughly by King Edward Avenue and Besserer, Waller and Wilbrod streets was to be

designated for high-rise, row and single family housing; Wellington Street was to be upgraded to parkway standards; and steps were to be taken to improve public transportation in the area.

The plan included provision for "a pivotal transfer point for pedestrian movement and public transit -- and for a possible future rapid transit system. More space was to be made available at or near this transfer point by demolishing the Daly Building, across Mackenzie Avenue from the Chateau Laurier."¹⁰ The transfer point was to be at the juncture of Wellington Street, running westward as it connected up with Mackenzie Avenue and Colonel By Drive, which would be linked together to form a major north-south traffic artery (Mackenzie Avenue was to be linked with Colonel By Drive, southward, and Sussex Drive, northward, near the Mint).

This Rideau Centre plan appeared to meet the goals identified earlier, in addressing the aim of remedying the Rideau area's economic problems and generally revitalizing and beautifying the area. To take the economic goal first, the NCC had studied the reasons for the dramatic economic decline of the Rideau area during the 1950s and 1960s. The conclusion it reached was that the Rideau Street merchants fared poorly during that period because they faced strong competition from other retail outlets.

Although it was true that Canada as a whole experienced worsening economic conditions during the 50s and 60s, and most metropolitan areas suffered slowdowns, the Rideau area was particularly hard hit. The growth of suburbs and the increasing use of automobiles after World War II led to the rise of numerous suburban shopping centres in Ottawa which succeeded in attracting shoppers away from the downtown retail centres. The Rideau Street merchants also had to face stiff competition from retail outlets on Bank Street and Sparks Street, the western

part of the city's central core, as they were undergoing expansion and renewal at that time.

To ameliorate this situation, the NCC believed that the Rideau area needed significant new commercial space, capable of once again drawing shoppers to the city's eastern core. In addition to the proposed Rideau Square shopping centre on the vacant federal land, therefore, the NCC plan also included what was billed as a bold and exciting climate-controlled mall or galleria adjoining the shopping centre at the west end of Rideau Street. Both of these retail complexes were expected to be unique attractions that would rival the shopping centres in other parts of the city. The provision for government offices and a hotel within the Rideau Square complex, and for housing in the immediate vicinity, would help ensure that the retail centres had plenty of customers.

The transportation proposals were designed to further improve conditions for Rideau Street merchants. The pedestrian walks would make it easier for shoppers to access the area. The series of parking garages built on the periphery of the Rideau Square would remedy the existing problem of insufficient parking facilities, while route changes were expected to facilitate movement in the area for pedestrian, bus and car traffic so as to make the Rideau Street stores more accessible.

In addition to their economic impact many of the transportation proposals would also serve the NCC's goal of beautifying the region. Making Mackenzie Avenue the main north-south traffic artery, rather than Sussex Drive, "would afford a splendid view of Parliament Hill from the east, create a better setting for the heritage buildings on Sussex and make possible a forecourt for the Roman Catholic Basilica."¹¹ The Rideau Square and galleria proposals, moreover, were sufficiently exciting in their design and planned uses that they would serve the goal

of making Ottawa into the special capital city the NCC believed it could and should become.

Before closing off discussion of problem recognition at the federal level it should be noted that the NCC was not the only federal agency actively concerned with upgrading the quality of the National Capital Region. The Department of Public Works (DPW) had been placed under a new Deputy Minister, John MacDonald, in January 1970. MacDonald entered DPW with a mandate from the Prime Minister to move it away from its traditional emphasis on design, construction and the administration of government-owned properties, to convert it instead into an imaginative, forward-looking realty agency. In this latter capacity it was to manage the government's multi-billion dollar inventory of land and buildings toward its highest and best use, having in mind economic and social factors as well as the physical space needs of federal departments and agencies. Where the NCC had a mandate to plan for the National Capital Region, overall, DPW was the planning agency for the realty requirements of the government itself, as well as being the developer, leasing agent and manager of federally-owned structures. In these roles it worked actively with the NCC in the planning and implementation of federal real estate activity in the Ottawa-Hull downtown core, including that taking place in the Rideau area.

II. Problem Recognition at the Municipal Level

In part as a result of the federal initiatives related to Rideau area redevelopment, but also through its own direct involvement with urban development, the City of Ottawa became aware of the problem of an economically depressed Rideau area in the late 1960s and early 1970s. That was the time when comprehensive studies of the downtown area were first being carried out. The Hammer, Greene,

Siler Associates Central Area Study of 1969, for example, commissioned by the city, the NCC and the Province of Ontario, addressed problems in the Rideau area. So did the Byward Market Study of 1971, which was conducted by the city and the NCC.

In addition to learning from these studies, however, city officials became acutely aware of Rideau area concerns through the direct pressure of local merchants. One member of the city planning staff has since recalled that by 1969 Rideau Street merchants were so upset about their declining economic fortunes that they petitioned the city to redress the situation, backing up their petition with the threat of refusing to pay taxes. Although this researcher has been unable to confirm the existence of a formal petition, it does seem clear that the local merchants were very vocal about their concerns. Further, it appears that the city responded to this pressure by approaching the NCC to ask if it was interested in doing something jointly to help improve the merchants' situation. Finance Minister John Turner acknowledged in his statement of October 1972 that "Mayor Pierre Benoit of Ottawa and Lower Town merchants have been pressing for redevelopment of an area which is popular and attractive but, economically, at a disadvantage with other districts in the capital."¹² Whether Benoit's decision to approach the NCC was taken because the city, although wanting to take the initiative, realized that successful downtown redevelopment would require more skills and more financial and land resources than the city could provide alone; or whether the city approached the NCC because "Ottawa is somewhat spoiled by the Federal presence"¹³ and therefore lacked the desire and resolve to take on a major project of its own, the result was the same -- the city helped to pave the way for a collaborative, intergovernmental Rideau Area Project decision process.

By late 1972 the forces at work had converged to make Turner's announcement possible. The city had shown its interest in and support for Rideau area redevelopment; the federal government had decided much earlier to make improvements in the city's eastern core a priority; and the NCC, with its Rideau Centre plan, had the conviction that Rideau area redevelopment was a feasible policy option.

Endnotes

1. Quoted in Walter Baker, "Revitalizing the Urban Core," Teaching Case, University of Ottawa, 1981, p. 4 (hereafter cited as Baker, "Core"). In addition to the works cited in this chapter, the following references provided background material: Rideau Area Project Team, Rideau Area Project Newspaper, Ottawa, Spring 1980, p. 2; Tim Harper, "Rideau Centre: New Downtown Vitality or an Embarrassment?," Ottawa Citizen, July 8, 1981, p. 1; Idem, "The Rideau Centre: A Modified Dream," Ottawa Citizen, July 8, 1981, p. 41 (hereafter cited as Harper, "Dream"); Roderick Clack, "The Citizen Articles on Rideau Centre Development -- Ottawa: Reports Under Byline of Tim Harper, July 8, 9, 1981," Brief to the Ontario Press Council, January 12, 1982, p. 3 (hereafter cited as Clack, Brief); Linda Allen, "Rideau Project Reports, 1963-1983," draft report prepared for David Donaldson, Director of Engineering and Surveys Branch, City of Ottawa, July, 1984, p. 1; Douglas Fullerton and Alex Morin, "A Superlative Urban Designer," Letter to the Editor of the Ottawa Citizen, July 21, 1981, p. 6; Elizabeth Kelly, Personal Files, notes on interviews with a member of the planning staff, City of Ottawa and a staff member of the NCC, Ottawa, May 1981; Walter Baker, Organization Under Stress: The Reorganization of Canada's Department of Public Works, 1970-1973 (Ottawa: Centre for Policy and Management Studies, 1979), pp. 25-36; City of Ottawa, Department of Community Development, Planning Branch and the National Capital Commission, Rideau Centre: Perspectives on the Past, Present and Future, preliminary copy, November 1, 1973, pp. 3, 30 (hereafter cited as Ottawa Planning Branch and NCC, Perspectives, November); Sankey Partnership Architects, "Rideau Area Project 1979," Information Poster, Ottawa, September 1979; and Harry N. Lash, Project Review Director, Rideau Area Project, "History of the Rideau-Viking Development Commitment," February 3, 1978, p. 6 (hereafter cited as Lash, "History").
2. Quoted in M. Phemister, Rideau Centre in Search of its Roots, City of Ottawa Archives, 1981, p. 3.
3. Canada, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, Barney Danson, Minister of State for Urban Affairs, speaking on the Speech from the Throne, debate of October 15, 1974, p. 405.

4. Jacques Gréber, Plan for the National Capital; General Report, Ottawa, 1950.
5. Canada, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, Barney Danson, speaking on the nation's capital, debate of June 23, 1975, p. 7002.
6. Ibid., Jean Pigott, speaking on the NCC, debate of January 30, 1978, p. 2365.
7. John B. Parkin Associates, architects and engineers, Confederation Square Development; a Proposal to the National Capital Commission, 1962.
8. National Capital Commission, Rideau Centre, presentation to a special meeting of Ottawa City Council, July 30, 1973, pp. 6-7.
9. Refer to the traffic map attached as Appendix A. The name "Rideau Square" was eventually changed to "Rideau Centre."
10. Canada, Minister of State for Urban Affairs, Information Release on a Speech by the Honourable John Turner, made on behalf of the Honourable Ronald Basford, Ottawa, October 18, 1972, p. 2 (hereafter cited as Canada, Information).
11. Ibid., p. 3.
12. Elizabeth Kelly, Personal Files, notes on an interview with a member of the planning staff, City of Ottawa, May 1981.
13. Canada, Information, p. 2.
14. These words were attributed to Harold Lash, former Project Review Director, Rideau Area Project, by Anne Perkins who interviewed him in May 1981. Lash made the comment in the context of a discussion about the city's involvement in planning for Rideau area redevelopment in early 1978. Anne Perkins, Personal Files, notes on an interview with Harold Lash, Ottawa, May 1981.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ACTORS, THE CONCEPT AND THE COMMITMENT TO COLLABORATION

Before moving to a chronological treatment of the events comprising the Rideau Area Project decision process in Chapters Four through Six, it seems important to indicate the strength of the commitment to collaboration, and to introduce the actors involved and the concept plan around which collaboration was to occur.

Accordingly, in this chapter material is introduced supporting the belief that, from the project's first formal beginnings, a strong commitment to collaboration existed, and that this was linked to the requirement for such collaboration, even had the philosophical commitment not been there. In the course of exploring the commitment to collaboration, the major actors are introduced and preliminary reference is made to matters of jurisdiction and power. A key circumstance related to the federal government and a private sector group, Viking-Rideau, is also introduced; at a later date this group was to become the prime developer for the Rideau Area Project. The major actors are then described more formally and the status of each as a powerholder is clarified. Finally, the concept plan for the project is outlined, as it had come to exist by mid-1974.¹

I. The Commitment to Collaboration

Turner's announcement of October 1972 specifically directed the NCC to take the lead in planning for Rideau area redevelopment. It also stated, however, that the planning process was to be a democratic one. The NCC's Rideau Centre plan was to serve as the starting point, only, from which more comprehensive plans would be developed, collaboratively. Rather than the city and other actors simply

accepting the NCC's plan, the decision process was to move beyond the confines of internal NCC analyses and evaluations into the wider context of discussion and negotiation among the major actors affected by the project. As a joint city/NCC document later stated: "The actions of both private and public sectors will be instrumental in achieving the sort of structural changes envisaged in the tentative plan. Given the complexities of the planning and implementation program, the need for an almost unprecedented level of co-operation and dedication cannot be overstated."²

The unprecedented level of co-operation would be necessary, first, because some of the NCC's proposals related to matters that were in the jurisdiction of other levels of government. The transportation proposals, for example, would require decision approval from the Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton (RMOC) and the city, depending on which streets were involved. Secondly, the potential costs of the scheme were judged to be much greater than the federal government, alone, could be expected to pay; as Turlier noted at his press conference, "the development can be fully realized only if works initiated by the Federal Government are matched by the other administrations concerned and by the private sector."³ The NCC, then, foresaw the need to negotiate with other interested parties in both public and private sectors, in order to settle, first, on an acceptable concept and detailed plans for Rideau area redevelopment and, secondly, on cost-sharing arrangements.

In a report presented by the NCC to a special meeting of Ottawa City Council on July 30, 1973, there was some indication of the extent to which the NCC had already assessed the need to engage in discussion and subsequent joint decision-making with other individuals and groups. Under the heading, "Redevelopment Areas Within the Rideau Centre Plan Requiring Multijurisdictional Co-operation,"

the NCC provided the following list of planned infrastructure works and consultations and indicated where it saw responsibility and decision power resting:

- Realignment of Colonel By Drive to Mackenzie Avenue
(primarily NCC, plus RMOC and City)
- Enclosure of Rideau Street
(primarily RMOC, plus City, NCC and property owners)
- Elevated walkways
(City, property owners and NCC)
- Regional transit, alignment and station location
(Province of Ontario, NCC, RMOC, and City)
- Provision of parking
(City and property owners)
- Utility reconstruction and relocation
(City and NCC) (4)

The list shows that, in addition to the NCC, there were at least four other major sets of actors to be reckoned with in moving toward significant revitalization decisions: public officials and politicians from each of the city, the region and the province, and local property owners. The significance of each of the actors mentioned by the NCC, as well as several who did not appear on the list, is discussed below.

First of all, the direct involvement of city planners would be necessary, as would be the involvement of senior administrators and politicians, because the city was acknowledged to have jurisdictional rights in relation to the overall redevelopment of the Rideau area, save where federal land was involved. And even in relation to federal land the federal government's policy was to follow city zoning regulations. The existence of the NCC complicated the situation normally prevailing in Canadian urban centres, where local government has a mandate to plan the city's development. In Ottawa the commission was viewed by the federal government as the most senior planner for the National Capital Region, overall, although it was understood clearly that the commission would work in recognition of the planning and development role of each municipality falling within the region.

The City of Ottawa had the sole authority to close or make changes to two local streets in the planned redevelopment area -- namely, Bessière and George Streets. It was also the appropriate level of government to bear the responsibility for taking on infrastructure works, such as utility improvements and the construction of pedestrian walkways.

The chairman, councillors and senior staff of the RMOC would also have to be involved in decisions related to Rideau area redevelopment. The RMOC had authority over regional transportation and a consequent veto power over the closing of any streets it judged to be essential to the overall regional transportation system. It would be up to the RMOC, for example, to decide whether Rideau Street would be closed in that, as of 1972, it was a regionally-owned road. Any proposed changes to traffic, utility and transit services would have to be approved and co-ordinated by the RMOC, therefore, working to some extent jointly with the city.

It was not anticipated that officials from the Province of Ontario would play a significant role in the project. Provincial authority over local matters is delegated to the city and the RMOC, with the province exerting its authority through statute, regulations and funding powers. Consultations might feasibly take place between the RMOC and the province, however, if officials from the city, the RMOC or the NCC judged it appropriate to seek additional financial assistance for expensive transportation improvements.

Rideau area property owners would need to figure prominently in the planning discussions, as would the Rideau Street merchants and any potential private developers. Local merchants could be expected to bear the costs of upgrading their own establishments as integral parts of an overall redevelopment plan, provided they were convinced the project was in their own interests. Moreover, the

NCC needed to develop some solid measure of acceptability for its proposals by affected merchants, before government action could be taken to implement them; it would have been politically undesirable for a government to make and implement decisions for the new commercial development over strong opposition from area businessmen. As a key expectation, the planned new commercial development would need to attract private developers capable of investing the very sizeable funds required.

The NCC list of planned consultations did not include any mention of meetings with the minister and senior managers of DPW, but they would undoubtedly have needed to be consulted as the project progressed. As already noted in the previous chapter, the NCC is the planning body mandated to take planning initiatives; its companion department in the realty area, DPW, does not become centrally involved in development activity in the National Capital Region until firm decisions result from the planning phase. Once such decisions are taken and implementation begins, however, leadership passes to DPW. In addition, whenever NCC planning indicates that federal office space might be a significant component in a development project, as with the Rideau Square proposal, DPW becomes a major potential developer and, as such, must be drawn into the planning.

Another potential federal actor was the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. Should the redevelopment plans end up incorporating proposals having to do with the Rideau Canal, this department would become involved because the canal was within its jurisdiction.

Finally, should the NCC have carried the objective of democratic planning to its implied limits, other groups and individuals would have needed to be consulted. These potential actors could have included the local merchants from other retail areas in the city, facing stiff competition from a revitalized Rideau area; the

residents of homes within or close to the development area whose property values or life styles could be affected; the overall national capital community, with its general interest in the well-being of the Rideau area and, finally, the media, for which any major redevelopment project would be a newsworthy event.

That the federal government was willing, from the start, to embark on the task of leading what could potentially be very difficult consultations, merits special comment. Turner's announcement of October 1972 was proof that the federal government was encouraging a collaborative approach. The Rideau Centre plan was a broad-brush concept plan, only; it lacked, for example, a timetable for implementation or any calculations of estimated costs. Turner invited "all interested groups and private individuals ... to express their views on any or all parts of the redevelopment proposals" at his press conference of October 1972. And while noting that the NCC had set "certain design and land-use principles it would want to see preserved in the redevelopment plan," it was indicated clearly that "within these principles there was wide latitude for proposals from private developers and builders."⁵

The NCC had invested considerable time in the preparation of the Rideau Centre plan and looked on it as a feasible way to achieve important objectives related to the Rideau area. It can be surmised that, in the process, a marked degree of commitment to the initial concept had been engendered. The point in time had arrived, however, when the political level, although strongly endorsing the concept, had entered it into a broader, multi-jurisdictional and multi-sectored decision arena. The commission was committed publicly, therefore, to going ahead with further development of the plan and engaging in the consultations and probable concessions that a collaborative process would entail.

What is interesting in the express commitment to collaboration is the fact that the federal government had not previously shown enthusiasm for collaborating with local interests on urban development projects. Many people were quick to point out, during the course of this research, that the federal government engaged in very little discussion with other individuals and groups when it moved ahead, for example, on the 240 Sparks, National Defence building and Tunney's Pasture projects. Marilyn Hart, a senior planner with the city from 1973 to 1980, noted that NCC officials, although expected to be sensitive to other levels of government, were not obliged to consult public opinion when they carried out federal planning directives. She contrasted them with city administrators, who had been directed and trained to use public participation techniques since the late 1960s. Hart pointed out that the federal government could have gone ahead in 1972 to develop a very major project exclusively on the vacant federal land -- and one that would, itself, have dramatically altered the face of downtown Ottawa. It could have moved ahead, rapidly, without involving any other level of government save for purchasing Besserer Street from the city to round out its federal land holdings in preparation for development.⁶

There were special reasons why the federal government became committed in 1972 to a consultative decision process related to Rideau area redevelopment. The perceived value of an open and participative planning process may have been linked in part to the fact that Turner's announcement came during the 1972 election campaign and at a time, therefore, when a participative approach could have been judged politically attractive. Probably of more significance, however, was the fact that two relevant federal policies were then in vogue.

First, by the early 1970s the federal government had developed a heightened sensitivity in relation to urban government and a concern for co-ordinated urban

development. The Ministry of State for Urban Affairs (MSUA) had been established in 1970. Although it had no direct role in the National Capital Region, it was created in express recognition of the fact that the activities of many federal departments and agencies affected urban development. The intent of the ministry was to ensure that such federal activities were co-ordinated among themselves and, in turn, with municipal/regional activities, in the interest of more effective urban development. It was the agency that provided the communication links with other levels of government and among federal departments and agencies whose activities affected the urban environment. The role played by MSUA in the rest of the country was played in the National Capital Region by the NCC with the Minister of State for Urban Affairs serving as the minister responsible for the commission to parliament. The NCC, therefore, worked in accord with the same policy of providing a communication link and seeking to ensure co-ordinated urban development.

Secondly, the Glassco Commission, reporting in 1962, had recommended strongly in favour of letting private organizations undertake whatever activities could be left safely in their hands even where a moderate case could be made, in the interests of public policy or economy, for carrying out those activities in the public sector.⁷ This position rested on a philosophical belief in the virtues of maintaining a strong private sector and, concomitantly, in keeping the growth of government within acceptable bounds. It was particularly popular in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when Peter Drucker's famous "reprivatization" principle first appeared in print,⁸ and may have been one factor in moving the NCC to work actively with private sector groups during project planning.

The first policy pointed the NCC toward collaboration with other levels of government in the pursuit of revitalized urban centres. The second policy, coupled

with the NCC's lack of implementation power, pointed the commission toward active collaboration with the private sector. As of October 1972, then, the NCC was committed publicly to a consultative process designed to refine and further develop its Rideau Centre plan with a view to moving, again collaboratively, to concrete revitalization steps.

II. Collaboration in Practice and its Limits

Evidence of the first attempts by the NCC to bring the Rideau Centre plan to the attention of other groups, subsequent to the 1972 ministerial announcement on the project, comes from the joint city/NCC report entitled Rideau Centre: Perspectives on the Past, Present and Future. The report contains the statement, "The NCC subsequently embarked on a program of public explanation and discussion of the initial preliminary plan. A series of meetings were held over the first part of 1973."⁹ The NCC met with private sector groups, including local store owners, and soon realized that its concept plan would require revision and reformulation.

To take one example, merchants from the Byward Market expressed concern about a specific proposal to upgrade York Street in the market to arterial standard. They did not want arterial traffic in their retailing area; on the contrary, they preferred more pedestrian space. As a direct consequence the NCC abandoned its proposed roadwork in favour of an alternate, mutually acceptable route, and decided to make allowance for additional pedestrian space. This example serves to underline both the preliminary nature of the original Rideau Centre plan and the status of local merchants as one group who had to be reckoned with before any structural changes could be made in the downtown area.

The NCC also began, in 1973, to develop its plans in active co-operation with the City of Ottawa. The report referred to above was published in preliminary form on November 1, 1973 and in final form in February 1974. During the period of a year, city and NCC staff collaborated to revise the original Rideau Centre plan to make it more suitable for implementation.

At this early stage in the decision process there appeared to be at least general acceptance by the city of the NCC's preliminary set of proposals. The joint report did include certain refinements of the transportation proposals, and added one new proposal for "an elevated bus only route down the length of Rideau Street, the underside of which would become the enclosed mall."¹⁰ Yet, despite such refinements, the general character of the original Rideau Centre plan remained intact. In view of the fact that the city was to find fault with the basic proposals in later years, this early consensus can be attributed to the fact that the city was involved, initially, in a very limited way. It saw itself as a minor player, only, conceding project leadership to the NCC.

The joint city/NCC report of 1973-1974 was prepared under the direction of Peter Davies from the NCC, supported by Patrick Chen from the city's Planning Department. Patrick Chen was the only member of the city planning staff working directly on the project on a full-time basis; he had been seconded by the city to the NCC's project team as of July 1973. In a memorandum of July 18, 1973, from the city's Director of Planning to his superior, the Commissioner of Community Development, it was noted that the city's involvement had so far been limited to its seconded staff member, and strong concern was expressed that too much might be presumed from this:

You may recall that ... one of my concerns at the outset of this land lease program ... was ... that the simple presence of a City staff member, as a working member of the study team, could lead to the interpretation that his involvement represented the City's official

position. ... It should be made abundantly clear to the members of Council that City staff ... have not in fact yet had an opportunity to review the matter and that, therefore, Council should take no decision which might otherwise jeopardize the City's position. (11)

Chen helped to make a presentation on the project to city council on July 30, 1973. Rather than take advantage of the situation to call for more substantial city participation, Mayor Pierre Benoit was content to leave the evolving project largely in the hands of the NCC or, more specifically, in the hands of Roderick Clack, the NCC's Assistant General Manager and leader of the Rideau Centre project team. Benoit's successor, Lorry Greenberg, later observed that Benoit did not see the full implications of the project in relation to city objectives, and therefore involved himself and the city in only a relatively minor, supportive role.¹²

The Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton (RMOC) was another level of government the NCC consulted on its plans. Regional council was briefed on the project in 1973 and some regional staff became involved in preliminary transportation studies. They helped produce analyses and evaluations of six alternative road plans for the project and were thus involved, directly, in the process of refining the original Rideau Centre plan.

III. Negotiations between the Federal Government and the Developer

Before bringing together the references already made to the major actors in the Rideau Area Project, and presenting these actors more formally, it is necessary to introduce an important step taken by the federal government which, later, was to assure the project its major developer. In late 1973 the Minister of Public Works negotiated an agreement with a private developer, the Viking-Rideau Corporation ("Viking-Rideau" was the group's official name, but it quickly became known as "Rideau-Viking" by participants in the planning process). The agreement related to

building the proposed Rideau Square complex, or Rideau Centre as it was then being called, at an appropriate future date.

The T. Eaton Company, City Parking Ltd. and J.J. Barnicke Ltd., all of Toronto, had formed the Viking-Rideau Corporation in the 1960s, although not under that name, with each taking an equity position in the company. The group subsequently began to acquire land in Ottawa to prepare for a large commercial development, to be known as Canada Centre. By 1973 Viking-Rideau had acquired a full 4 1/2 acres in the area bounded by Queen, Albert, Metcalfe, and O'Connor streets (later designated the "Canlands" by the group) and had also prepared development plans, successfully negotiated a number of occupancy agreements and obtained City of Ottawa Design Committee Approval for its concept plan. In short, by the fall of 1973 Viking-Rideau was ready to build a major new retail complex in the western core of downtown Ottawa.

As the Canada Centre project crystallized, the federal government came to see it as an inappropriate development for that particular location; the development of a large new Eaton's store on the Canlands was judged unacceptable in light of the declining fortunes of Rideau Street merchants and inappropriate, aesthetically, so close to Parliament Hill. After several exchanges, therefore, the government informed Viking-Rideau, in the fall of 1973, that it did not want the project to proceed. It would have been unwise, politically, and probably legally impossible short of expropriation, to order the developer to abandon its plans. Accordingly, the government, through DPW, began to engage in a negotiating process with Viking-Rideau.

At the culmination of such negotiating the Minister of Public Works, C. M. (Bud) Drury, through an exchange of correspondence, promised Viking-Rideau that the government would purchase the Canlands for \$22 million and permit the group

to proceed with development on the federal land in the Rideau area. In effect, this meant ignoring the cabinet policy of opening projects to tender, and also departing from Turner's specific announcement of a year earlier, that "the first phase of the development will begin when tenders are called soon for proposals for a group of buildings and covered malls on federal land south of Rideau Street between the Government Conference Centre and the new Defence Headquarters."¹³ Drury later defended the decision to avoid a call for tenders on the grounds that only Viking-Rideau would be able to deliver a major department store like Eaton's to the Rideau Centre.¹⁴

In its turn, Viking-Rideau promised to comply with the government's wishes and to develop the Rideau Centre in accord with NCC plans. The Rideau Centre, for example, was to include a department store, ancillary retail space, offices, a hotel, and parking and infrastructure improvements, although not all of these were to be developed by Viking-Rideau. The agreement also included a lease-back arrangement under which the land would be leased to Viking-Rideau for a period of forty years, with the whole acreage then reverting to federal ownership. Further, Viking-Rideau agreed that Eaton's would refrain from seeking out other opportunities to develop a store in the western core of downtown Ottawa.

In its extended negotiations with Viking-Rideau the federal government moved, with great circumspection, as negotiator rather than ultimate decision-maker. It recognized the need to share decision-making power, therefore, in this case, with the private sector. The negotiated terms of agreement were mutually acceptable. In the fall of 1973 the NCC made financial arrangements with DPW to purchase the Canlands for the agreed-upon \$22 million. The federal government also committed itself, in a letter from the Minister of Public Works,¹⁵ to giving Viking-Rideau a "right of first refusal" in relation to being the Rideau Centre's

primary developer, and promised that it would negotiate, at a later date, the basic terms of a contractual association for the Rideau Centre development. Both parties had originally wanted a single comprehensive agreement, incorporating both the sale of the Canlands and the development of the Rideau Centre. The "intention to negotiate" with Viking-Rideau was as far as the federal government could commit itself at that point in time; however, as final decisions on the integrated development of the total Rideau area would require a legal agreement with the city and the region.

Once these commitments had been made in relation to developing the federal land, formal cabinet approval of the Rideau Centre project followed. On May 1, 1974, J.E. Dubé, the recently appointed Minister of Public Works, and Ronald Basford, the Minister of State for Urban Affairs, made public announcements confirming that the federal government was strongly behind redevelopment plans. Dubé's speech, made during an election campaign, included the optimistic statement, "As many of you know, the Rideau Centre project has been percolating for the last eighteen months, but it was only recently that agreement on some of the vital portions of the plan was reached. The necessary commitment has been achieved so that we can all look forward to definite progress now."¹⁶

IV. The Actors

Bringing together and expanding somewhat the material already presented on those with a role to play in the Rideau Area Project, there were fourteen such actors, or categories of actors, each with some part of the total decision power needed to develop and implement a feasible project plan. In identifying these actors, below, no attempt has been made to assess their relative importance; the

simple structure for presenting them is a division into public and private sector actors.

Public sector actors

The federal government accounted for a large share of the project participants. There were six identifiable sets of actors from the federal government, although not all of them were major:

1. **The Federal Cabinet**, possessing the ultimate power to grant permission for federal participation in the project, to establish any guidelines it judged appropriate, and to set the level of the federal contribution to project funding.
2. **The Treasury Board** which, as the cabinet's committee on expenditure control, would act for cabinet in the authorization of financial advances to the project. Officials of the Treasury Board Secretariat would provide support to the Treasury Board, as a matter of course.
3. **The Minister of State for Urban Affairs**, having reporting responsibility for the NCC and a more general mandate to watch over the effectiveness of federal activity in urban centres and of federal/municipal relationships in urban development. Again, the minister would receive support from the staff of his department.
4. **The Minister of Public Works**, with his department's custodianship of federal properties and its jurisdiction in relation to the implementation phase of federal realty projects in the National Capital Region. With the minister should, again, be grouped the department's senior public servants and especially, in this case, the deputy minister, with the latter's strong interest in development of the National Capital Region. Also meriting special mention are those members of staff who were to work, eventually, as part of Rideau Area Project planning teams.

5. **The National Capital Commission**, as an exceptionally prominent actor from the outset of the project to the signing of the tripartite agreement in 1979. Several actors from the commission included the chairman (in effect, four different personalities, each with a distinctive contribution: Douglas Fullerton in terms of project origins, Edgar Gallant, Pierre Juneau and Bud Drury); the commission's Assistant General Manager, Roderick Clack; and Peter Spaul, Clack's Executive Assistant for several years and, later, part of Lloyd Sankey's team.
6. **The Department of Indian and Northern Affairs**, included as a potential actor only because of its jurisdiction over the Rideau Canal. Projected activity related to the canal included the NCC's original vision of a harbour alongside the Rideau Centre and a provision in the Tripartite Agreement of May 1979 wherein the federal government agreed to consider extending the canal as part of the project.

The Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton and the Ottawa-Carleton Regional Transit Commission were key actors because of the region's jurisdiction over regional transportation matters and its more general interest in regional planning. Those involved from the region were primarily the transportation staff although the Chairman, Denis Coolican, was very active during the round of political negotiations leading to the signing of the tripartite agreement in 1979.

The City of Ottawa, at both political and staff levels, was a key actor. At first the city's role was very much secondary to that of the NCC, in major part because of the personalities involved. In the final stages of project planning and throughout project implementation, however, it was acknowledged to be the prime public sector mover. In terms of personalities three mayors played significant roles: Pierre Benoit, through conceding leadership to the NCC and not asserting

the city's rights; Lorry Greenberg, who did more than anyone else to launch the process which, culminating with the work of Lash and Sankey, shifted the prime mover role from the NCC to the city; and Marion Dewar, who accepted the prime mover role for the city and gave strong support during the implementation phase. Civil service actors from the city came primarily from the Department of Community Development, Planning Branch. Planning staff were members of every project team. The city also provided the project manager, David Donaldson, for the implementation stage.

The Province of Ontario is included mainly because provincial subsidies provided some project funding; no politicians and only a small number of staff from Queen's Park were active, directly, in final stages of the collaborative decision process.

Private sector actors

The major developers of the Rideau Area Project were Viking-Rideau and, at a later stage, the Westin Hotel (replacing CP Hotels which, throughout most of the planning phase, appeared to be the potential builder of the Rideau Centre's hotel component). Although Viking-Rideau kept a very low profile, initially, its presence was an important factor throughout the project. By far the great bulk of project funding during the implementation phase was to be provided by the private developers.

Consultants provided much of the technical substance of project decisions. They included design consultants, traffic consultants, market researchers, urban planners, scheduling consultants, and landscape consultants. Of particular significance to the more general project planning decisions were Harold Lash, as analyst/consultant in breaking a decision deadlock existing at the end of Clack's

leadership, and Lloyd Sankey, as project leader in getting the decision process back on the rails.

The local merchants already operating in the Rideau area were involved in the decision process, both as part of the core around which the project was to grow and as a group whose positive co-operation could expedite project progress or slow it down. Particularly active was the Rideau Centre Corporation (RCC), organized in May 1972 with twenty-one members including the Rideau Street Merchants' Association and the Byward Market Merchants' Association. In terms of personalities, John McIntyre, Vice President of the Hudson's Bay Corporation and Andrew Irwin, the RCC's Vice President and General Manager, played key roles in setting up the corporation and in using it to seek to influence project decisions.

Public interest groups were passive during the early years of project development, but they became active in the planning process from about mid-1975 on, and continued to be involved during the period of project implementation. The Rideau Centre Public Advisory Committee, established in July 1975, had representatives from twenty-two public interest groups including the Federation of Citizens' Associations of Ottawa-Carleton which, itself, represented over a hundred citizen groups.

The media can be considered an actor, albeit a relatively minor one. Media coverage of the Rideau Area Project was quite extensive through the years and it helped, undoubtedly, to provide citizens with information about the project. It may have helped, as well, to encourage interest in and support for the project.

In total, then, there existed a formidable mix of actors having the potential to play some role in the planned revitalization of the Rideau area. In addition to the major actors there were the individual residents of homes within or close to the development area, merchants from other retail areas from which shoppers might be

diverted, and the overall national capital community. With each set of actors, moreover, there existed the distinct possibility that dominant personalities would arise -- and not always from the most predictable sources -- able to influence the revitalization in ways transcending the limits of their official or formal roles. Then, too, there was the distinct possibility of different coalitions forming among the major actors, around particular decisions.

V. The Concept Plan of 1974

Toward the end of 1973 and during the first part of 1974, NCC and municipal initiatives had led to a strong public commitment to collaboration, resting in part on a new base of federal policy and in part on the wish to move more broadly than federal or municipal jurisdiction alone would have permitted. They had led, also, to the commitment to a concept plan to orient subsequent revitalization activity -- and to a plan which, in terms of the NCC's original concept of 1972, had been refined to some extent by mid-1974 through collaborative discussions. Each of the four major elements of the concept plan as it stood in June 1974 are described, below.

The Rideau Centre

The Rideau Centre was to be built on federal land and hence under the exclusive decision control of the federal government, save that it required the region's and the city's consent regarding local street closings. It was to occupy the 8.8 acres of former railway land and was to comprise three basic elements: government office space of at least 600,000 square feet in a first phase, and a possible additional 600,000 square feet in a second phase; major commercial space of about 200,000 square feet, to be built by the federal government and leased to

the private sector and, finally, a five hundred-room prestige hotel to be built by CP Hotels on land leased from the federal government. The Rideau Centre plan of 1972 had not identified CP Hotels as the builder of the Rideau Centre's hotel component and it lacked the more refined planning details that were now included in the 1974 concept plan. The hotel was to be "a relatively low-profile, terraced, linear structure sited on a service podium extending over the entire block of federal land"¹⁷ and located alongside the Rideau Canal across from the National Arts Centre. The podium was to be on the same level as the National Arts Centre terrace, thus providing two major pedestrian spaces to be joined by a walkway over the canal, and bordered by a small harbour in front of the hotel. Vehicular services and parking were to be located under the podium and a landscaped courtyard was to be established on the podium at the east side of the hotel.

An enclosed pedestrian mall on Rideau Street

The proposal for a year-round mall or gallery, extending from Sussex Drive to Waller Street, remained intact from the 1972 concept plan, although it had been refined to a certain degree. Rideau Street was to be closed to vehicular traffic and covered by a "light, transparent self-supporting structure"¹⁸ to protect pedestrians from extremes of climate. The mall was to be about ninety feet wide and elevated pedestrian walkways were to cross it, running north-south from the Rideau Centre to the Byward Market. The concept of the mall was developed by NCC design staff, who saw it as an essential complement to the Rideau Centre.

A comprehensive pedestrian walkway system

Provisions were to be made for an east-west walkway system extending from the existing Sparks Street Mall, through the National Arts Centre on the one hand

and via the Sussex Drive/Rideau Street intersection on the other, to the Rideau Centre/Rideau Mall complex and beyond, to the University of Ottawa. This would complement the north-south system, to be established by constructing pedestrian walkways linking the Byward Market, the mall, the Rideau Centre, and the Department of National Defence Headquarters to the south of the federal land.

The original concept for the Rideau area had maximum pedestrianization as a prime objective. The idea of a continuous pedestrian network appears to have originated with city planners, and to have been incorporated, subsequently, into the NCC plan. In the early 1970s city policy required that the design of several major office/retail buildings west of the Rideau Canal include enclosed, elevated walkways crossing main arteries. The result, in relation to the Rideau Area Project, was a joint NCC/City of Ottawa vision of literally miles of pedestrian walkways, bringing the Sparks Street Mall, the National Arts Centre, the Rideau Centre, the Rideau Mall, the Byward Market, and the Sussex Drive "mile of history" (extending north from Rideau Street) into a single pedestrian system.

Major changes in the Rideau area's transportation system

The closing of Rideau Street, alone, would have required basic changes in the area's transportation system, as Rideau Street was a major east-west arterial road. In addition, however, a stated objective of the project, still evident in 1974 as it had been in 1972, was to provide an efficient and flexible transit system to serve the city core. Planning was to provide, therefore, for rapid transit to be built at a future date. In the meantime, an efficient bus service was to be developed on its own right-of-way, and provision made for extensive automobile parking. Finally, the traffic circulation system for the Rideau area was to be redesigned to accommodate the plans for a new street system, enhanced pedestrian movement,

and the provision of more parking. The NCC sought increased accessibility by different modes of transportation and the reduction of pedestrian/vehicular conflicts. Additionally, the city wanted to make certain that no traffic changes reacted adversely on the Byward Market.

It appeared, then, in mid-1974, that the Rideau Area Project was off to a firm start. On May 1 the Minister of Public Works and the Minister of State for Urban Affairs had made it known, publicly, that there was public sector commitment to a visionary concept capable of attracting and sustaining the involvement of politicians and staff at federal, regional and city levels. Wealthy private sector developers, working less visibly, were apparently committed to the very sizeable commercial investment the project required. There remained, however, the challenging task of taking the concept from vision to realization, working all the while collaboratively.

Endnotes

1. In addition to the works cited in this chapter, the following references provided background material: City of Ottawa, Department of Community Development, Planning Branch, Planning Policies: Central Area, June 1979, pp. 9, 16; Canada, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, Barney Danson, speaking on the Speech from the Throne, debate of October 15, 1974, p. 405; idem, providing written answers to Question No 3, 111 on the Order Paper, January 26, 1976, p. 10272; Rideau Area Project Team, Rideau Area Project Newspaper, Ottawa, Spring 1980, pp. 1-2; Baker, "Core," pp. 2, 7-8; City of Ottawa, Department of Community Development, Planning Branch and the National Capital Commission, Rideau Centre: Perspectives on the Past, Present and Future, final copy, February 1974, p. ii (hereafter cited as Ottawa Planning Branch and NCC, Perspectives, February); Rideau Centre Team, Rideau Centre: Summary of Work Progress, Copy, Ottawa, March 1975 with hand-written revisions by Peter C. Davies, City of Ottawa, from the team's editorial meeting of April 29, 1975 (available at City of Ottawa Archives, Rideau Area Project files), pp. 5, A1, A2, B1; Marilyn Hart, Personal Files, notes on the Rideau Area Project, Ottawa, 1980; Letters from Roderick Clark, Assistant General Manager, NCC, to Pierre Benoit, Mayor, City of Ottawa, July 30 and August 27, 1973 (City of Ottawa Archives, Rideau Area Project files); Letter from Andrew A. Irwin, Vice President and General Manager of the Rideau Centre Corporation, to Mayor Pierre Benoit, Chairman of the

- Planning Board, City of Ottawa, June 25, 1974 (City of Ottawa Archives, Rideau Area Project files); and Rideau Centre Public Advisory Committee, Rideau Crossroads: Concept for Revitalizing the Rideau Street Area, Ottawa, February 1976, revised ed., May 6, 1976, p. 3.
2. Ottawa Planning Branch and NCC, Perspectives, November, p. 1.
 3. Canada, Information, p. 2.
 4. Rideau Centre, p. 8.
 5. Canada, Information, p. 2.
 6. Interview, Ottawa, January 1985.
 7. Canada, Royal Commission on Government Organization, Final Report, Ottawa, 1962, particularly, "The 'Make or Buy' Problem," Report 10, vol. 2, Supporting Services for Government, pp. 32-59.
 8. Peter F. Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity: Guidelines to Our Changing Society (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1969), particularly Chapter 10, "The Sickness of Government," pp. 212-42. Drucker defines "reprivatization" as "a systematic policy of using ... the nongovernmental institutions of ... society ... for the actual 'doing,' i.e., for performance, operations, execution." p. 234.
 9. Ottawa Planning Branch and NCC, Perspectives, November, p. 32.
 10. Ibid.
 11. Cited in Baker, "Core," pp. 4-5.
 12. Anne Perkins, Personal Files, notes on an interview with Lorry Greenberg, Ottawa, May 1981.
 13. Canada, Information, p. 1.
 14. Harper, "Dream," p. 41. The NCC was later criticized by the Auditor General for not seeking parliamentary authority and for not following the directions of Orders-in-Council authorizing purchases, when it bought the Canlands. Canada, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, Jean Pigott speaking on the NCC, debate of January 30, 1978, p. 2365.
 15. Lash refers to this letter in "History," p. 5.
 16. Canada, Department of Public Works, "Notes for a Speech by the Honourable J.E. Dubé Regarding the Rideau Centre Redevelopment Project," Ottawa, May 1, 1974, p. 1.. Also see idem, Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, "Notes for Remarks by the Honourable Ronald Basford," Ottawa, May 1, 1974.
 17. National Capital Commission, Rideau Centre: Development Concept, Ottawa, June 1974, p. 7.

13. *ibid.*, p. 5.

CHAPTER FOUR

PROJECT DEVELOPMENT UNDER FEDERAL LEADERSHIP

By mid-1974 there was a concept plan for the Rideau Area Project, accepted as an appropriate starting-point by the federal government, the City of Ottawa, the RMOC, and the Rideau Centre Corporation. The last named was a group of local merchants who joined together in 1972 to participate financially in the project. The plan was incorporated in an NCC document of June 1974, complete with detailed graphic presentations, and had been outlined, earlier, in a joint city/NCC report of 1973-1974.¹ The material in these publications conveyed a strong sense of commitment to an exciting, visionary project that was expected to bring major benefits to the National Capital Region in general, and the Rideau area in particular.

Any early concerns that existed about the project were met, to a considerable extent, by firm assurances from the federal government that the project was to be a collaborative one. The decision process was to provide for the pooling of expertise, insights and concerns in a manner such that the end result would be a Rideau area revitalization program able to meet, as closely as feasible, the hopes and aspirations of the major actors. Public input was also to be sought, as the joint city/NCC report indicated:

Although several important citizen responses were taken into account in the initial evolution of the Rideau Centre Plan, the present study, which has been revised and extended, requires additional public input. The present concepts have been developed based on the existing development options prepared by the planning staff; it now remains for the Planning Board to bring these concepts to the public for discussion, review and modification.⁽²⁾

What in mid-1974 was an exciting vision, linked to a commitment to a democratic decision process, had to be translated into reality. It was one thing for

planners and architects to capture a broad concept on paper, and for politicians like Turner and Benoit to express a strong commitment to participation. It was quite another to take the concept forward from that point, collaboratively, and ensure that the most appropriate technical, managerial and political decisions were made, at the times they were needed. In mid-1974 there were quite literally many thousands of what Herbert Simon has termed "decision premises"³ still to be settled, accumulating into composite major decisions on project specifications, an implementation schedule, costs and, critically, sources of funding. Once agreement was reached on such vital matters, moreover, the agreement would have to be implemented.

Ahead, therefore, in 1974, were both the planning phase of the project, when the initial concept would be refined to a point where a formal agreement could be entered into by the governments concerned, and the implementation phase when the approved and appropriately funded agreement would be translated into the intended revitalization steps. During implementation a much more painstakingly detailed planning and decision process than that occurring during the pre-agreement planning stage would be required, as the implementation team sought in a very practical way to translate the final concept into actual physical structures.

There were three initial steps to be taken in moving beyond the early agreement to collaborate. These were the assembly of a project team representing the major actors, the assignment of managerial responsibility and the development of suitable decision processes. Each of these represented a key decision in its own right and the project's success was to depend, ultimately, on how well they were made.⁴

I. Establishing a Project Team

The NCC and the City of Ottawa moved to set up the Rideau Centre Team, which had its first formal meeting on July 16, 1974. This team comprised twenty-seven members in total, including representatives from the NCC, DPW, the city and the region, as well as representatives from the Rideau Centre Corporation, acting on behalf of certain Rideau Street retailers and particularly the Bay. A number of consultants hired by the NCC were also team members. Despite the tenor of the joint city/NCC report, quoted above, there was no attempt at this time to have the affected publics, such as local community associations, represented on the team; neither was the prospective developer, Viking-Rideau, represented (although CP Hotels did have one representative on the team). The political level also stayed aloof from the team process, looking to the project team's co-chairmen to represent, respectively, federal and city interests, and to keep the NCC and RMOC chairmen, and city and regional councillors, informed of developments. No formal provision was made for political review until a year after the team was first established.

The team members representing the three area governments were senior administrators and support staff. The team worked, therefore, at a technical and planning rather than political level. It was hoped that this new formal arrangement among government officials, local merchants and technical experts would facilitate consultation and lead toward a consensus on policy proposals, which could then be taken to the political level for ratification. That the governments involved were committed strongly to the goal of reaching a planning consensus is indicated by the fact that, in most cases, they assigned their most senior officials to the team. The

RMOC's planning commissioner and its commissioner and director of transportation, for example, each spent some time as members of the team.

The following gives the distribution of the team's membership:

NCC	7 members
DPW	5 members
Consultants	6 members
City of Ottawa	5 members
RMOC and Ottawa-Carleton	
Regional Transit Commission	2 members
Rideau Centre Corporation	1 member
CP Hotels	1 member

Given that all but one of the consultants on the team had their salaries paid entirely by the federal government, and their activities co-ordinated by the NCC,⁶ it is clear from the above list that membership distribution gave the federal viewpoint an extremely strong voice.

In complement to the main team a core staff group was established, consisting of the more senior, full-time people assigned to the project by the member governments and associations. This group met at the beginning of every week to develop alternative planning proposals and then reported these findings to a decision-making body which consisted, simply, of the joint chairmen, Roderick Clack, the NCC's Assistant General Manager, and Douglas Wurtele, the city's Commissioner of Community Development. The decision-making body reviewed the core staff's work and decided which proposals merited further study.

Next in line came Thursday afternoon working session meetings, where the principal members of the consulting firms met with the decision-making body and the core staff for "joint, informal consultation"⁷ to further develop and refine the proposals. Finally, the entire Rideau Centre team met every Friday to consider the proposals and to feed back comments and recommendations to the core staff to start the working process in motion, again, for another week.⁸

Within a year a senior steering committee was also established. It comprised political heads and relevant chief executives from the three levels of government, including the Mayor of Ottawa, the Chairman of the NCC and the Chairman of the RMOC. This group aimed to achieve a political consensus on how to proceed with the revitalization efforts, based on team information. Coinciding with the establishment of the senior steering committee, the project's name was changed from the Rideau Centre Project to the Rideau Area Project. The name change came in response to the city's insistence upon the distinction between the Rideau Centre, limited to development on the federal land, and the more encompassing project in which the city had to play, necessarily, a major part.

Representatives from public interest groups were finally added to the team in 1975. A publication of February 1976, Rideau Crossroads, prepared by a newly-created Rideau Centre Public Advisory Committee, gives July as the date representatives of the public were added to the team:

In the spring of 1975, the Federation of Citizens' Associations (F.C.A.) of the Ottawa/Carleton Region became acutely aware that all this planning was going ahead without direct public consultation or representation. After many weeks of negotiation between the F.C.A. and the Rideau Centre Team, it was agreed that a citizens' Public Advisory Committee should be formed to identify and present the views of the community at large on the Rideau Centre project. Three public meetings were held in June 1975, in Sandy Hill, Centretown and Lower Town, to present the Team's current plans for Rideau Centre to the citizens of Ottawa. At a fourth public meeting held at City Hall, members of the public came forward to form the Public Advisory Committee.

This group first met on July 7, 1975, named its representatives to the Rideau Centre Team, and prepared to keep the public informed through the member associations on the Committee.

Citizen participation in this project has been made possible by the voluntary efforts of many persons involved in the work of the Committee, and by a grant from the N.C.C., the City of Ottawa, and the Rideau Centre Corporation.(9)

The Rideau Centre Public Advisory Committee (PAC) went to work with considerable vigour, and in the seven months following its formation produced

Rideau Crossroads, a document replete with proposals for new directions, and then set about seeking to have its proposals adopted. The proposals are fascinating in their air of confident assurance, and in their willingness to fly directly in the face of major aspects of the concept plan. For a start the committee proposed that the name "Rideau Crossroads" be used when referring to the Rideau area and to the redevelopment project, itself. The name was symbolic of the fact that the area is "one of the main traffic hubs in the entire region, bringing people and goods to the centre of the city from the residential and commercial areas to the East and North."¹⁰ Further, the general directions of PAC's proposals were "revitalization without massive public expenditure,"¹¹ integration of the Rideau area developments with the city-at-large, the resurrection of an early proposal of a residential component, a significant reduction (to 184,000 square feet maximum) in ancillary retail space with this to be located mainly along Rideau Street, the need for a major focal point in the form of a large department store toward the eastern end of the area, and the need to do everything appropriate to making "Rideau Crossroads" a people place.

PAC ended its report with the statement that it expected "objective consideration and assessment" of its proposals. It also stressed its own legitimacy:

What we wish to stress is that this contribution to the Team's work comes from those of us who use Rideau Street's many and varied facilities, and from those who live in the community now and who will live there decades later. Our stake in the Crossroads is high -- as high as anyone's. Indeed, when the development commitment is made, it is we who must truly live with it and must try to make it succeed. The transient roles of officials (corporate and governmental) and of businesses are well understood. What we must emphasize with patience and with the utmost gravity, is the long term permanence of this community itself. We insist that it be respected and protected.⁽¹²⁾

By 1975, then, a team structure for collaborative decision-making had been set in place, with all major actors represented save Viking-Rideau, the latter continuing to make its inputs through the federal representatives. Despite the

initial optimism that planning for the Rideau area would now "proceed on a sound foundation,"¹³ within two years the team members were in a deadlock and both the overall direction of the project and the decision process itself were subjected to complete review.

II. Assigning Managerial Responsibility

Roderick Clack, the NCC's Assistant General Manager, was the acknowledged project manager, even though from the time the Rideau Centre Team was first established he shared the chairmanship of the team with Douglas Wurtele.¹⁴ Clack had provided leadership in evolving the original Rideau Centre plans of 1972 and 1974, and was judged the most appropriate person to represent the NCC in the subsequent refinement and implementation activities. Wurtele was the city's Commissioner of Community Development, and hence senior enough to rank with Clack as a co-chairman. From the start Clack appears to have been the dominant figure in giving leadership, however, with Wurtele apparently content to see this happen.

Clack's assumption of the leadership role was in part a function of his own personality, set against that of Wurtele, but also in part a function of the fact that at this point in time, despite the establishment of a co-chairman system to reflect the NCC/city partnership, the NCC was the acknowledged prime mover in the project. It had brought the initial concept plan forward. The plan centred, moreover, on the 8.8 acres of federal land, and federal funds were essential if the city and the RMOC were to avoid becoming over-involved financially. Then, too, the federal government had Viking-Rideau already committed to the project, as the major developer.

The most vital factor in Clack's leadership was his extraordinarily strong conviction of the worthwhileness of the project, and of the rightness of the concept first embodied in the 1972 Rideau Centre plan. One team member from the NCC was reported to have made the following comment:

Clack led the development of this plan, and throughout the six-year period of his leadership his faith in what it would do in transforming the city core never wavered. He saw the concept as bold, visionary, imaginative, professionally sound, and entirely capable of implementation --and as an architect of proven competence, highly intelligent and extremely hard-working, he was able to command considerable respect from team members. And even when Rod was wrong he had the capacity to convince most of us he was right.⁽¹⁵⁾

Hand-in-hand with his very considerable capacity, however, appears to have gone a major weakness; namely, an unwillingness or inability to deal with city and RMOC members in a way that would have assured their enthusiastic collaboration. A city representative on the team gave one interviewer a negative assessment of Clack, indicating that city and regional representatives had nicknamed him "Roderick Millhouse Clack" (after Nixon). The same team member reportedly said, "He was quite incredible -- he would get unmasked and still bluster through."¹⁶

This negativism was by no means universal. When the above comments were taken by a researcher and shown to Andy Irwin and John McIntyre of the Rideau Centre Corporation they reacted angrily.¹⁷ They found Clack, throughout, to be a man of integrity, not at all devious, representing the federal government strongly-mindedly but with sensitivity to the needs and wishes of other actors. Similarly, Douglas Fullerton, Chairman of the NCC during the formative years of the Rideau Area Project and Alex Morin, the NCC's former General Manager, wrote favourably of Clack in a letter to the editor of the Ottawa Citizen. They described him as "one of the few superlative urban designers who have graced the national capital since the demise of Jacques Gréber" and a man who "through the leanest of ...

years... refused to lose faith in the idea of a Rideau Centre that would complement and enhance the core of the national capital region."¹⁸

In reviewing Clack's role, and particularly his relationship with the city on the one hand and the developers on the other, an NCC colleague was reported to have made the following comment:

Seen through the eyes of the city and region he was devious, opinionated, insensitive, arrogant and obdurate. Early in the project he had come into close contact with private developers, with a strong interest in the concept and willing to invest very considerable funds in bringing it to fruition. In several conversations with NCC colleagues he contrasted unfavourably the small-mindedness of local politicians and career bureaucrats with the entrepreneurship and vision of his private sector contacts. Where the city raised questions, time and again, about his galleria, for example, he was convinced the developers saw it as innovative, exciting, and critical to the success of the overall concept.

Team members and colleagues alike saw him as a man with a mission, and a concomitant drive and conviction. In team discussions he did not tolerate any opposition to the central thrust of the NCC plan. Somehow, he managed to give the project a sense of urgency that made the city's earliest attempts to have alternatives developed to the covered mall or galleria concept seem like unwarranted delays. And as long as he led the team his primary focus seemed to be the impact of decisions on the developers, and whether they would accept them. He never seemed unduly concerned, until Greenberg came on the scene, about the impact of decisions on politicians or local citizens.⁽¹⁹⁾

Of the non-NCC team members, only city representatives appear to have provided opposition, at various points, to Clack's aggressive leadership. The position of the region's representatives, during most of the Clack period, was that their involvement was limited strictly to transportation matters, with developments on the federal land and the surrounding area being federal/city matters provided no one asked the region to foot any part of the bill. As for DPW, its representatives appear to have remained relatively quiescent; the sensitivities in inter-agency relationships required that the NCC be conceded leadership during the project planning phase, and that any intra-federal disagreements be ironed out in

private. Finally, the consultants and prospective developers worked primarily with NCC and DPW staff.

Andrew Irwin, Vice-President and General Manager of the Rideau Centre Corporation (RCC), appears to have been a member of the Rideau Centre Team who was particularly supportive of the NCC's concept plan. The three main members of the corporation he represented were the Hudson's Bay Company, Charles Ogilvy Ltd. and C. Caplan Ltd. In the three years from mid-1971 to 1974 they had spent a total of approximately \$5.5 million on store upgrading and expansion: \$3.5 million by the Bay and approximately \$1 million each by Ogilvy's and Caplan's. They planned significant further expenditures if the Rideau Area Project went ahead. In giving these figures and indicating RCC support for the original concept, Irwin stated the following:

The Corporation is anxious to see the concept of a climate controlled mall on Rideau Street between Sussex and Waller become a reality and believes this to be essential to the success of the proposed developments. At the present time it is impossible to determine the degree of financial commitment which would be required since the overall cost of the mall project has not been established. However, we are committed to participating on a one third basis with the city and NCC in the cost of the initial design phase. This study will result in an estimate of the cost of the project. Following this study our Corporation will be prepared to meet with representatives of the city and NCC to work out details of financing, constructing and operating the facility.

We strongly urge the city to accept the concepts presented by the Planning Department. We believe the success of revitalizing the area East of the Canal hinges on the degree to which the recommendations of the Planning Department are instituted. (20)

Although this extract relates, specifically, to a recommendation that the city share, with the NCC and the RCC, the costs of hiring a consultant to carry out the preliminary analysis of design and cost factors in building the proposed galleria, it does capture the more general support provided by the RCC. The location of the Bay, Caplan's and Ogilvy's made the galleria a most attractive possibility, and

Clack was seen as the staunch defender of the galleria against those who wanted less-ambitious and less-costly alternatives.

Despite evident dissatisfaction by some members of the Rideau Centre Team with his leadership style (a point that will be expanded in a later section), it was not until Clack moved the team's proposals forward for consideration by political authorities that his leadership ran into serious opposition. At the senior steering committee meeting of September 1975, Mayor Lorry Greenberg criticized Clack for not leading the team to consider alternative designs for the proposed Rideau Street mall.²¹ The team's analytical and evaluative efforts to this point had been focussed on gaining support for the original NCC galleria proposal. Greenberg demanded, first, that feasible alternatives be developed and costed and, second, that public input be sought so a more informed public decision could eventually be taken. The concern was not so much that the galleria scheme was a bad one in technical terms; it did not obviously ignore or violate important city values. The problem was that no other alternatives had been developed for the politicians to consider. Clack assumed the galleria would be accepted simply on its technical merits. He did not acknowledge the need to give politicians like Greenberg a choice, to make them feel all possible alternatives had been considered and that this particular proposal was the best one.

Shortly after the steering committee meeting, Greenberg took the initiative in calling a special meeting of the Rideau Centre Team. Greenberg was personally knowledgeable in realty development, and had been in touch with the Rideau Area Project during the years before becoming mayor, through his membership on the city's Board of Control. In addition to becoming increasingly concerned with the project, team's exclusive focus on a galleria, he had heard rumours of a federal deal related to the Canada Centre agreement, and was consequently extremely suspi-

cious of the NCC's private negotiations with the developers. Another concern he had was with the NCC's treatment of the public participation issue, as he believed active and meaningful public participation to be essential. At the team meeting he expressed his views, very forcefully and, in the process, confronted Clack on his leadership of the project and demanded to see all materials on the commitments to that point.

In words attributed to a team member who was present at this meeting, one researcher has described the confrontation between Greenberg and Clack in the following manner:

It was fascinating to watch Greenberg hitting out in every direction, searching out things he was certain were going on he felt the city had a right to know about. It was even more fascinating to watch Rod Clack break down under the pressure. Finally, he lost his cool, totally, and left the meeting. Yet Greenberg kept us all there for hours going over the project. Belligerent as hell, and every bit as arrogant as Clack, he was still a breath of fresh air and honesty.(22)

Shortly after this meeting Greenberg fired his Commissioner of Community Development. While he took this step for reasons that went well beyond the Rideau Area Project, he judged the commissioner to have been ineffectual in protecting the city's interests as Clack's co-Chairman.(23)

Greenberg's criticisms were directed, beyond Clack, at the NCC as a whole, including its chairman, Edgar Gallant, because he found the NCC to be united in its resolve to dominate the decision process and restrict discussion to its preferred position. Greenberg recalled later, in a newspaper interview, that "Every time we sat down with the NCC, regardless of what we submitted, we were told it was unacceptable. The NCC kept saying Eaton's didn't like it, Eaton's didn't like it. I said 'Who the hell is Eaton's?' because they never came to the table, but they seemed to be planning the nation's capital."²⁴ In terms of the lack of co-operation he received from Edgar Gallant between the years 1973 to 1976, Greenberg had

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this to say: "Gallant was the most negative factor in the whole development. He always saw a plot and thought someone was out to get him."²⁵

At Greenberg's insistence, the city's Planning Branch moved into high gear in developing alternatives to the galleria concept; not, Greenberg was careful to point out, because the city necessarily opposed the concept, but because he found it unacceptable that alternatives had not been at least seriously raised and explored. At his insistence, too, the involved politicians met together, separately from the team, to review the various options and planning progress, generally, from a political perspective.

Out of the city studies came the alternative of a transit mall, through which traffic would remain on Rideau Street but bridges over the street would provide covered pedestrian walkways. Yet another option was the deck scheme, through which a second-level pedestrian deck would totally cover Rideau Street with the exception of occasional light wells, and traffic would continue to flow normally on Rideau Street. Discussions continued throughout 1975 and 1976, with variations of the main options being explored at considerable length. By the end of 1976, however, the various options had been narrowed to two. Of these, an NCC report of January 1977, stated:

Two options, based on the original concept for Rideau Centre prepared by the Planning Team, have been developed to a point of acceptability in principle by all agencies involved in the project. These two options have the same amount of office, commercial and other accommodation. The main difference is in the approach to the use of Rideau Street.

The first option (Option One A) is preferred. This option shows the closure of Rideau Street to vehicular traffic between Sussex Drive and Waller Street, and the construction of a climate-controlled pedestrian mall.

The second option (Option Three Modified, known as the Deck option) is considered as a "fall-back" solution should the closure of Rideau Street prove unobtainable. This option retains the present traffic function on Rideau Street, but includes pedestrian walkways situated on a level above the street.⁽²⁶⁾

The 1977 report indicates that, despite Greenberg's intervention, the NCC team members, under Clack, continued to dominate the Rideau Centre Team planning process. The NCC had paid for several economic and pedestrian analyses of the galleria scheme to develop a stronger base of support for the proposal which it had re-named Option One.A. In spite of the city's strong advocacy of the transit mall, the above extract claims that Option One A was "preferred" and the transit mall scheme (Option Two) was not even an acceptable option. However, the report was published as emanating from the NCC alone, rather than as a joint NCC/city report.

Clack arranged for a session with the political level in August 1977, seeking to have the enclosed pedestrian mall proposal ratified. At this point it became clear that under Clack's direction the Rideau Centre Team was failing to make progress. Lorry Greenberg was present at the meeting and, in a later interview, said that he proceeded, much to Pierre Juneau's discomfiture, to castigate the NCC for its inadequate leadership and for Clack's blatant attempts at railroading the team meetings in favour of his own vision of the project.²⁷ Greenberg said he concluded by appealing to Juneau, only recently appointed Chairman of the NCC, to "get rid of Clack." Such an appeal, in itself, may have had little effect had Clack been then in the same strong favour with the NCC he had experienced under the former NCC Chairman, Edgar Gallant. However, the appeal followed immediately on a very serious error in Clack's own sensitivity to the decision climate at the political level. Clack set the stage for Juneau's acute public embarrassment at the August 1977 meeting by not providing him with enough briefing materials on the project so he could engage in informed debate with Greenberg, and by not alerting him to the distinct possibility that Greenberg would take strong issue with the NCC over its

bias in favour of Option One A. In the late fall of 1977, Clack was taken off the Rideau Area Project.

III. The Decision Process

Beginning in 1974, with the establishment of the Rideau Centre Team, three major types of decision had to be taken in relation to the Rideau Area Project in order to move the project ahead. The first and most contentious decisions were those related to the broad concept plan, in terms of its general specifications, timing and cost factors. Although these could only be made at the political level, ultimately, the project team members developed strong and sometimes conflicting views on the concept plan. The second type of decision related to the management of the project and to the decision-making process itself. The third type was the very broad range of technical decisions related to fleshing out the concept plan in terms of its technical implications, requirements and alternatives.

Concept plan decisions

Regarding the concept plan itself, Clack appears to have dominated the decision process until Lorry Greenberg became the Mayor of Ottawa. He blocked, to a significant extent, serious project team discussion of different components of the concept plan and appears to have worked outside the forum provided by team meetings to maintain support for the NCC's position. He did so, in major part, by focussing the attention of team meetings on the great mass of technical concerns that had to be resolved if the project was to progress on a reasonable schedule and, as a consequence, by keeping more controversial matters off the team's agenda.

Process decisions

There appears to have been little in the way of formal consideration, under Clack's leadership, of how best to make decisions, comparable to the process sensitivity shown, later, by Lash and Sankey. If the structure he fostered is any indication, Clack assumed that a hard-working core staff would work under the decision-making body's direction -- which effectively meant his personal direction --

to identify the technical systems the project needed. If the core staff met at the beginning of each week, received direction from him, joined with the principal members of the external consulting firms in regular working session meetings to further develop and refine any proposals, and met weekly with the entire Rideau Centre Team, then everything was supposed to work well at the staff level. When matters reached a point where political decisions were needed, the senior steering committee would meet and, hopefully, achieve a political consensus.

That this process did not work as planned is clear from a description of the team meeting held on Friday May 23, 1975, which serves to highlight the existence of major process problems. At that meeting, Clack, in his formal role as Co-chairman, made an announcement concerning confidential discussions that had previously taken place between DPW (with active NCC participation) and the Viking-Rideau Corporation. He said several decisions had been taken as a result of these discussions and the team needed to be informed of them. Three of the decisions were as follows:

1. Eaton's will be the developers of both the retail and office components of the federal development
2. City Parking will handle the entire realty side of the operation...
13. The entire Rideau Centre project will be completed and occupied by the fall of 1977(28)

Clack was thus plainly telling the other team members that they must accept some very important decisions related to the redevelopment project, taken without their prior knowledge or consent. Rather than the consultative and co-operative environment that was supposed to characterize the team's working process, what occurred in practice was confidential Public Works/developer negotiations and a "dictatorial"²⁹ approach to leadership by the NCC.

Nor, apparently, was this particular meeting much different from any other. Marilyn Hart argued in 1975 that "throughout the course of the study the NCC ... tended to steer team decisions to its own ends..... Requests made by other team members were frequently ignored ... and team meetings were frequently stormy events."³⁰ Indeed, to return to the issue of public participation raised in an earlier context, Marilyn Hart had reason to complain about the way the Rideau Area Project decision process was proceeding under Clack's direction; she felt individually frustrated in her attempts to achieve a full program of public participation in the project.³¹

In early 1975 Hart had gained the support of all the team members, including those from the NCC, for the concept of public involvement in project planning. She had raised the issue at team meetings for several months, with the help of someone she brought to the meetings, Elspeth Menendez. Menendez was the Chairperson of the Federation of Citizens' Associations of Ottawa-Carlton, a federation comprising more than a hundred separate community groups.

When Hart began preparations for the formation of a Rideau Centre Public Advisory Committee (PAC), however, she learned from Jack Ellis, one of the consultants hired by the NCC to schedule the decision-making, that all decisions would have to be taken very quickly if the entire project was to meet its implementation target date. In other words, there would be little point in

establishing PAC as a legitimate member of the decision group (whatever its cosmetic value) because the technical decisions would all have been made before the group had time to familiarize itself with the issues. Hart thus felt that the NCC had indirectly manipulated her, apparently acceding to her request (on behalf of the city) for meaningful public participation, while establishing a schedule that effectively precluded it: "It would certainly seem that the NCC are sanctioning public participation in one breath and ignoring it in another."³² Hart and Menendez did eventually have the team reaffirm its support for the city's position regarding public participation, and in mid-1975, as noted in a previous context, the Rideau Centre Public Advisory Committee was formed and two of its members were named to the Rideau Centre Team.

Tim Harper of the Ottawa Citizen criticized the NCC and, more specifically, Roderick Clack, in a very harsh and derogatory way in two parts of a six-part series of articles he wrote on the Rideau Area Project in July 1981.³³ Harper used unnamed sources to assert, among other things, that Clack verbally abused city officials at team meetings and falsified meeting minutes to suit his own purposes. Clack responded to these accusations by filing a formal complaint with the Ontario Press Council on January 12, 1982. In his brief to the council, Clack complained of the scurrilous and slanderous nature of much of Harper's writing, and of the poor attempt made by Harper to search out accurate facts and interview the relevant officials involved in the decision-making process. Clack thought it particularly inappropriate, for example, that he had not been given a chance to comment on the articles before they were printed.³⁴

In the Ontario Press council's ruling of June 11, 1982, the Ottawa Citizen was severely criticized for failing to obtain comments from Clack on the statements about him: "The Council believes that a newspaper has an inescapable obligation to

pursue vigorously efforts to obtain comment from any person about whom it plans to publish derogatory accusations, and, if possible, to publish it at the same time." Yet, it did not consider it proper to "pass judgment on the accuracy of the accusations," adding that the council "believes that public officials like Mr. Clack must expect harsh criticism at times, but they also have a right to expect they will be invited to respond."³⁵

Although no attempt has been made, here, to retrace whatever research steps were taken by Harper to determine the accuracy of his assessment of Clack's role, two general conclusions can be formulated about the process aspects of the Rideau Centre Team meetings. The first is that team members did not collaborate successfully under Clack's leadership. In his brief to the press council, Clack paints a picture of himself as autocratic leader rather than democratic conciliator. He states that he had an "unyielding vision ... of the entire Rideau Centre Project" and that he "often had to take a firm line in the planning and negotiating process which to juniors did sometimes appear uncompromising."³⁶

• Secondly, and setting aside the issue of Clack's co-chairmanship of the team meetings, one could argue that collaborative discussion was difficult to achieve because a poor decision-making structure was in place. A Rideau Centre Team set up to facilitate consultation among all the persons and groups who, ultimately, would be responsible for and affected by the redevelopment project, would have included representatives from both Viking-Rideau and citizen groups. The fact that such representation was not included from the beginning can be construed as evidence that the NCC, deliberately or otherwise, had established a decision structure that would give it a dominant role in the project's decision-making. By retaining exclusive, confidential contact with Viking-Rideau, the NCC was able to have strong input into the Rideau Centre component of the project. By avoiding

direct consultation with citizen group representatives as long as it did, the NCC had successfully removed a considerable obstacle that would have otherwise hampered or blocked its pursuit of its own particular policy interests. With the publication of Rideau Crossroads, its initial concern over the possible opposition to its concept plan by citizen groups turned out to be well-founded.

It is interesting that Viking-Rideau negotiated directly with the NCC staff, rather than with local authorities as developers usually do. The NCC staff appear to have convinced the group that a developer of federal lands could waste considerable time satisfying city requirements, only to find out later that its development plans and designs did not meet NCC approval.³⁷

Technical decisions

It remains to address, briefly, the process of making technical decisions during the Rideau Centre Team meetings. In the course of this case study a most impressive set of technical material was uncovered. It included designs in various stages, marketing studies, traffic studies, landscaping proposals, scheduling studies and a very great range of different technical analyses of alternatives. The technical material on the galleria component of the project, and alternatives to it, was itself considerable. Although this whole body of material was outside the competence of this researcher to assess, technically, it did serve to give the impression that well-qualified consultants went about their different tasks in a highly professional manner. At the technical level, therefore, very many individual technical decisions were made, in response to the concept plan and the guidance of the decision-making body. Whatever the quality of these individual decisions, of course, they were only of value, ultimately, if the project continued to evolve in a manner that made them applicable.

The Clack period of project leadership ended when he was taken off the project in late fall 1977. At that point the project was ending its fifth year, if October 1972 is considered to be its formal beginning. It looked strongly, moreover, as if the project itself might suffer an untimely end. The major public actors shared bitter feelings and there was no clear consensus on overall project directions and major premises that would have made it a relatively straightforward matter to replace Clack and move ahead.

Endnotes

1. NCC, Rideau Centre: Development Concept, Ottawa, June 1974; and Ottawa Planning Branch and NCC, Perspectives, Ottawa, November 1, 1973 - February 1974.
2. Ottawa Planning Branch and NCC, Perspectives, February, p. 67.
3. Administrative Behavior, p. xii.
4. In addition to the works cited in this chapter, the following references provided background material: "We Were Wrong," a retraction of a mistake in an article of July 9, 1981, Ottawa Citizen, July 16, 1981, p. 3; City of Ottawa, Department of Community Development, Planning Branch, "Rideau Centre -- Rideau Mall: General Information Report," from Marilyn Hart to City Council, February 16, 1977, p. 2; and Rideau Centre Team, Rideau Centre: Progress Report, Draft Copy, Ottawa, February 24, 1975, p. 31.
5. Baker, "Core," p. 10, citing unknown source.
6. Diamond and Myers was the exception. This group of design consultants was commissioned by the city, the NCC and the Rideau Centre Corporation to prepare a study of the Rideau Street mall/galleria proposals. Rideau Centre Team, Rideau Centre: Summary of Work Progress, pp. 4, 8 (Plate 3 -- "Responsibilities/Task Team Assignments").
7. Ibid., p. 6 (Plate 2 - "Working Process for Rideau Centre Team").
8. Marilyn Hart, a former member of the Rideau Centre Team, notes a discrepancy between this formal description of the team's working process, as presented in the report, ibid., and the way the process actually worked in practice. She claims that the separate meetings of the core staff group and its subsequent reporting to the decision-making body did not take place. Interview, Ottawa, January 1985.
9. The quotation is taken from a revised version of the report, distributed to members of the Rideau Centre Team on May 6, 1976, p. 3.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p. 4.
12. Ibid., p. 8.
13. Rideau Centre Team, Rideau Centre: Summary of Work Progress, p. 5.
14. Although the official team reports do not make note of this point, Marilyn Hart claims that the original structure of the Rideau Centre Team included only Clack as Chairman. Wurtele was brought in as Co-chairman soon after

the meetings began at the insistence of city and regional representatives on the team. Interview, Ottawa, January 1985.

15. Anne Perkins, Personal Files, notes on an interview with a staff member of the National Capital Commission, Ottawa, May 1981.
16. Elizabeth Kelly, Personal Files, notes on an interview with a member of the planning staff, City of Ottawa, May 1981.
17. Anne Perkins, Personal Files, notes on interviews with representatives from the Rideau Centre Corporation, Ottawa, May 1981.
18. "A Superlative Urban Designer," p. 6.
19. Anne Perkins, Personal Files, notes on an interview with a staff member of the National Capital Commission, Ottawa, May 1981.
20. Letter from Irwin to Mayor Pierre Benoit, Chairman of the Planning Board, City of Ottawa, June 25, 1974, p. 3.
21. Marilyn Hart, Personal Files, notes on the Rideau Area Project, Ottawa, 1980.
22. Elizabeth Kelly, Personal Files, notes on an interview with a staff member of the National Capital Commission, Ottawa, May 1981.
23. Anne Perkins, Personal Files, notes on an interview with Lorry Greenberg, Ottawa, May 1981.
24. Harper, "Dream," p. 41.
25. Idem, "Centre Faced NCC-City Rift," Ottawa Citizen, July 9, 1981, p. 13.
26. Baker, "Core," pp. 13-14, citing National Capital Commission, Rideau Centre, Ottawa, January 1977.
27. Anne Perkins, Personal Files, notes on an interview with Lorry Greenberg, Ottawa, May 1981.
28. City of Ottawa, Department of Community Development, Planning Branch, "Rideau Centre Study Report on Information Announced by the NCC at the Team Meeting of Friday, May 23, 1975," from Marilyn Hart to J.G. Reid, Director of Planning, Ottawa, May 1975, pp. 1-2.
29. This was the term used by Marilyn Hart in her report to Board of Control, City of Ottawa, Department of Community Development, Planning Branch, "Rideau Centre --In Camera Session," Ottawa, June 1975, p. 1.
30. Ibid.
31. Interview, Ottawa, January 1985.

32. City of Ottawa, Department of Community Development, Planning Branch, "Rideau Centre -- In Camera Session," Report from Marilyn Hart to Board of Control, Ottawa, June 1975, p. 1.
33. The following articles by Harper, printed on July 8 and 9, included specific criticisms of Clack: "Dream"; "Nine Egos Clashed to Shape the Rideau Centre Project," July 9, 1981, p. 1; and "Centre Faced NCC-City Rift," July 9, 1981, p. 13.
34. Clack, Brief, pp. 1-3, made available by Marilyn Hart who was asked by Murdoch Davis, City Editor of the Ottawa Citizen, to comment on the brief to help the newspaper prepare for the Ontario Press Council hearing.
35. Ontario Press Council, 10th Annual Report, Ottawa, 1982, p. 11.
36. Clack, Brief, pp. 4, 7.
37. Lash, "History," p. 10.

CHAPTER FIVE

PROJECT DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF EXTERNAL CONSULTANTS

Whatever disenchantment existed in the period preceding Clack's removal from the Rideau Area Project, the issues that had given rise to the commitment to move on the project in 1972 still existed in 1977. The area still needed revitalization, the federal acreage was still vacant, and the prime developers assumed that a commitment to them still existed. Moreover, the city, the region and the federal government had invested significant political and economic capital in the project over the five-year period. The option was not available, therefore, to let the project die, quietly. An added factor entering the decision process was Pierre Juneau's personal stake in seeing the project brought to a successful conclusion. His in-again/out-again experience regarding a cabinet portfolio, related to his inability to win a "safe" electoral seat, was sufficiently recent that it would have been most unfortunate had the NCC, under his leadership, become publicly identified with the demise of so major a project.¹

As the present chapter will show, the decision process did resume, and relatively quickly, assisted by the solid investigative and conciliatory work of an external consultant, Harold Lash.² In the space of an eight-month period there occurred, in succession, Lash's four-month review of project progress to that point, and four months of staff-level planning led by a second external consultant, Lloyd Sankey. In this second short period, public participation in the planning process was at a level significantly greater than at any time during Clack's period of project leadership.

The end result of the Sankey team's work, guided by a set of recommendations from Lash, was not a new vision to replace that defended so diligently by Clack. On the contrary, it was not a vision at all but a set of five transportation alternatives and a strategic plan setting out alternative land uses. The land use and transportation alternatives were sent to the political level for review and subsequent decision, and proved able to provide the focus and flexibility needed by the politicians for the hard negotiations, described in Chapter Six, which led to the Tripartite Agreement of May 1979.

I. The Lash Review

It was Juneau who took the initiative that brought the project back on track and, indeed, moved it significantly ahead. The initiative was to appoint Harry Lash to carry out a special review of the Rideau Area Project, with a view to finding the most appropriate way out of the dilemma created by the breakdown of the process led by Clack. Lash was well known to Juneau through the former's association with the NCC, and Juneau had developed a high regard for his analytical ability and process skills.

Lash was appointed on October 1, 1977. He was to investigate, with an established deadline of four months, the factors that had precipitated the deadlock between the NCC and the city and had led to a distinct lack of trust on the part of the city. He completed his review in February 1978, on schedule, and the city, federal and regional governments immediately accepted his recommendations, in full.

In a document he prepared on February 3, 1978, Lash explained the reasons for his project review in the following manner:

It became painfully evident at [the] briefing session of [August 1977] that the [enclosed mail] design proposals would be unacceptable to most

members of the City and Regional councils present, and that members of the NCC executive had major reservations about it. The NCC then decided that there were too many unacceptable elements to the total project for it to proceed as proposed, but it was also apparent that the full extent and the exact nature of the issues blocking progress were not clear. NCC then decided to undertake the present review.⁽³⁾

What this suggests is that Lash's job was to be primarily a fact-finding one; he was to examine the scope and nature of the issues blocking progress in the Rideau area revitalization efforts. Lash played a role, however, that went far beyond what one would have expected from a fact-finding review.

At the outset of his review, Lash read all the available material on the project and personally interviewed many project participants. His intention was to gather correct information from participants and then ensure that what he learned was fed back to everyone, openly, "thus enlarging the territory within which individuals and groups were psychologically able to negotiate."⁴ Lash also engaged in extensive consultations with those involved in the project, to pave the way for an easing of tensions and for developing an enthusiasm for renewed project planning. To this end, he tried his best to create a kind of personal commitment and rapport among the relevant actors that would later ensure the success of the decision structure he recommended. As one member of the city's planning staff has since remarked, Lash played the role of a "low key, quiet conciliator" when he undertook the project review.⁵ His mandate to gather information gave him the opportunity to meet the key participants; his own inclination and skills as conciliator took him the next step.

One particular task Lash set himself was to change the existing climate of suspicion in the relationship between the city and the federal government. Clark's leadership style was one factor contributing to this climate, and this would be rectified if care was taken in choosing his successor and structuring the decision

process. Lash identified a second contributor, however, in the form of the federal government's confidential negotiations with Viking-Rideau:

"The commitment to Rideau-Viking has been, to many participants, something of a mystery. So long as it remains one, and so long as this leads to a climate of suspicion in the relationships between the participants, we cannot expect much progress with planning in the Rideau area.

As the nature of the commitment and the continuing participation of the Group is a major consideration, and to some degree a constraint, on re-examination of the present proposals as well as on the generation of new or alternative proposals and immediate action plans for the Rideau area, those interested in the revitalization of the Rideau area should have a good understanding of the commitment and the circumstances surrounding it.(6)

After studying the history of the commitment, Lash was able to assure the city there was no evidence of underhandedness or illegality. He also managed to have two partners in Viking-Rideau, Eaton's and City Parking, appear at a public meeting to clear the air. Lash went to Toronto to meet with representatives of Viking-Rideau in January 1978. Against advice from DPW, he discussed with them very frankly the new philosophy he hoped would characterize the future Rideau Area Project planning sessions; namely, open discussion around a thorough examination of alternatives. He persuaded the Viking-Rideau partners that the project could not proceed in the direction they hoped unless they met directly with the non-federal participants, to show that the 1973 commitments had been entered into legitimately and should be honoured. The meeting was held in early February 1978 and proved to be successful; the suspicions were cleared, for the most part, and Viking-Rideau henceforth became a full and open member of the project.

The air was only partially cleared, however. Following the Lash review, those members of the public advisory committee who participated in the next round of staff-level planning sessions consistently called for a public inquiry into the federal dealings with Viking-Rideau. They maintained that the federal land should be

developed by public tender, and that the Rideau Centre agreement was nothing more than a "corporate giveaway," similar to what they believed took place when the federal government had private developers build Les Terrasses de la Chaudière office and retail complex in Hull.⁷

Yet, the city never sought a formal inquiry. Lash had provided Mayor Greenberg and others with enough information and persuasive arguments to convince them that no corporate giveaway was taking place and that Viking-Rideau's continued participation in the project was critical. With this matter resolved, Lash eliminated a barrier that had grown to be a significant detriment to effective city/NCC collaboration.

One of the strongest recommendations from the Lash review was that the city rather than the NCC should be the project's prime mover, although within a genuine working partnership with the NCC and the region. Throughout the Clack era city politicians had never agreed to contribute significant funding to the project, nor sought to take the lead in project planning. Lash later recalled that he had some trouble, initially, convincing the city to play a central role and exercise its legitimate decision-making authority. In words attributed to Lash by one researcher:

The city was to a degree hesitant about committing staff and resources to a project which would be so extensive and costly. Ottawa is somewhat spoiled by the federal presence; any other city would have seen that it needed to be the focal point of decision-making and taken on the challenge. Happily, both the city and the NCC came to agree with this position eventually.⁽⁸⁾

After the Lash review the city agreed to share with the NCC all costs required to support the next stage of the planning process. These costs included the salary and expenses of an external consultant to lead the project team, the costs for meetings and the salaries of participating city and NCC staff.

Lash was also successful in persuading politicians from the RMOC to participate more actively in the project. In previous years the region had been relatively passive, believing it had little to gain from the project. However, by this time regional policies were getting concerned about the lack of planning progress because considerable staff time and money had been spent on transportation studies in expectation of the project's completion.⁹ Lash assured councillors that things would be different from now on and argued that strong regional planning efforts would be critical if the Rideau Area Project was to make provision for a more efficient transportation system. The region did become more committed and transportation planners were directed to work with the new project leader Lloyd Sankey to once again consider feasible transportation schemes.

II. The New Organizational Structure

Lash recommended that a new organizational structure be adopted for the Rideau Area Project, designed to encourage full and frank discussion among all those with a legitimate interest in the project while, at the same time, ensuring that decisions were made at the political level in a reasonable time period. A second recommendation, tied to the first, was that the decision process itself be significantly revised in the spirit of open and extensive, yet relatively speedy, decision-making. Still another recommendation, and one Lash saw as vital to the successful implementation of the first two, was that an external project leader be appointed to lead the planning process. Lash wanted Lloyd Sankey to be appointed to this position, provided he proved acceptable to those he would be expected to lead. In this section of the chapter the organizational structure recommended by Lash is described, leaving to later sections a description of the planning process and an assessment of Sankey's leadership role.

A Rideau Area Project Team formed the working centre of the new organizational structure. It had the central task of producing development plans -- that is, a "Strategic Plan and set of Immediate Action Proposals" for the Rideau area¹⁰ -- within a designated period of four months. The team, headed by Sankey, was made up of consultants hired directly by him, together with personnel seconded or appointed to it by the City of Ottawa and the NCC to work exclusively on the project, more or less full time. Sankey's job was to ensure that team discussions and activities proceeded in an objective and unbiased way, and that the team functioned at arms length from both the NCC and the city.

The project team received advice from a Project Review and Advisory Group (PRAG) and was overseen by a co-ordinating committee at the official level and a policy committee at the political level. PRAG comprised representatives from all involved agencies and groups; its representativeness, therefore, was considerably broader than the previous Rideau Centre Team. Citizen representatives from the public advisory committee were formal members of PRAG, from the start, as were major Rideau area owners and developers and representatives from Viking-Rideau, CP Hotels and utility companies. Other PRAG members included government representatives from the city, the Province of Ontario, the RMOC, the NCC, and DPW. Local retailers, both large and small, were represented on the team by members of the original and still-active Rideau Centre Corporation, and by members drawn directly from the smaller Byward Market, Bytown Village and Rideau Street merchants associations.

The co-ordinating committee comprised senior officials from all three governments. These included the General Manager of the NCC, the city's Commissioner of Community Development, the Assistant Deputy Minister, Realty from DPW, and the RMOC's Planning Commissioner. The committee was

charged with responsibility for "putting forward to the Policy Committee immediately any proposals and recommendations which require official approval, action, or policy guidance from City Council, the Ministerial level, the Regional Council, or the [National Capital] Commission."¹¹ The policy committee was in this way to be kept in close touch with the evolving decisions; its members were the Mayor of Ottawa and the respective chairmen of the NCC and the RMOC.

PRAG was a forum for debate and discussion; in this forum, it was hoped, proposals could be developed that were generally acceptable to all. Only after this consensus was reached -- with careful presentation of minority views -- was the process to move on to the next step, in which the co-ordinating committee reviewed the proposals and then relayed them, together with any comments of its own, to the policy committee. The latter, in turn, moved them into the final decision arenas. In this way, "support from key people and decision makers as well as groups affected by the outcome of the scheme was thus on record before any political decisions were made."¹² Lash recognized that each PRAG member had the power, unilaterally, to block some proposals; it was in the best interests of each, however, to see that all could gain at least some advantages from the process. ~~The following excerpt from a team publication reflects this philosophy~~

well:

A large number of groups must work together if the Rideau Area is to be revitalized. No one group -- government, merchant or citizen -- has the power to override every other interest and force acceptance of its favourite plan. Further, several groups have the power themselves to stop major developments.

These facts have been recognized. Therefore, the Project Review and Advisory Group has been created. . . . PRAG is not a decision-making body, nor can it issue directives to the working team. However, unless the working team shows that it can listen to and hear the concerns of the various interest groups, there is no chance it will be able to fulfill its mandate to develop alternative proposals that are broadly acceptable.¹³

Lash hoped that PRAG members would "endeavour ... to mutually adjust their interests and trade-offs in the face of proposals being made, so that all may gain some of the advantages they seek, knowing that it is unlikely that any one member can gain every advantage it seeks."¹⁴ He was not so naïve, however, as to believe that all of the bargaining among interests would take place within the confines of the formal, structured PRAG meetings. Rather, he was careful to note that the establishment of PRAG was not meant to limit the freedom of the members to use other channels of influence, including direct contacts with relevant agencies and authorities. PRAG members were to express their opinions frankly and freely during meetings, however, so that planning for the project could proceed on a sound footing.

To help ensure the creation of a decision environment conducive to open discussion and a free flow of ideas, Lash recommended very strongly that project participants respect the right of other participants to keep some matters confidential. He also made it clear that any participant could propose changes to the structure, procedural arrangements or rules of the game, if such changes were believed warranted.

~~As a particularly significant departure from Clark's approach, Lash sought to~~ ensure that any ideas expressed at PRAG meetings would be given serious consideration at every level of the overall decision process. Through the process already noted, "the opinions and intentions of the various members with respect to possible actions or recommendations"¹⁵ would be passed on to the politicians to give them a basis for their decisions, rather than simply relaying the recorded votes of PRAG members on the merits of alternative proposals. Moreover, a proposal did not have to have the support of a majority of PRAG members to merit consideration by the political level: "An alternative scheme or significant

option or part of a scheme that is intended to fit into or be part of the Strategic Plan, and which is favoured by one of the members of the Project Review and Advisory Group may not be discarded, disregarded, or rejected against the opposition of that member except by decision of the Policy Committee."¹⁶

Provisions such as these were designed by Lash to try and prevent the frustrations experienced by project participants -- administrators, politicians and citizens alike -- during the Clack era of project planning. The recommendations for new structural and procedural arrangements would ensure, hopefully, that trust and open, consensus-developing discussion characterized the next round of planning sessions.

III. The Scope of the Planning Process

Lash went beyond structure and procedure to matters of substance, recommending that the new planning team concern itself with a broader range of planning issues than did the former Rideau Centre Team. Planning was to include a study of (1) the use of federal land; (2) transportation options for Rideau Street from the Chateau Laurier Hotel to King Edward Avenue (rather than the short strip from Sussex Drive to Waller Street examined in the previous team sessions); (3) the relationship between new development sites and other downtown areas such as the Byward Market, Confederation Square and Sparks Street; (4) technical difficulties associated with the intersection of Rideau Street, Sussex Drive, Mackenzie Avenue, and Colonel By Drive; and (5) the significance of the Rideau Canal edge of the project, including its relation to the federal land development site and the National Arts Centre. The intention was to bring every key issue of the project within the confines of structured, collaborative, multi-level discussions.

Lash's judgement about the kind of collaborative machinery and consensus-developing process needed to put the Rideau Area Project planning efforts back on track seem to have been sound. The new Rideau Area Project Team, working in conjunction with PRAG and under the guidance of the policy and co-ordinating committees, produced a report which, subsequently, proved to be a solid foundation from which the political level could move to arrive at final decisions about the project.¹⁷ In less than a year after the publication of the team's final report, the city, regional and federal politicians were able, through some very tough negotiations, to draw up a tripartite agreement with which all parties could live.

The planning successes that followed the Lash review were due in large part to the skills and management style of Lloyd Sankey, who took Lash's recommendations for a planning structure and process and made them work. He had helped Lash throughout the project review period, and was appointed as project leader of the planning stage after Lash received approval for the appointment from all the proposed members of the new policy and co-ordinating committees.

When planning began on February 1, 1978, Sankey followed closely the schedule he and Lash had already prepared.¹⁸ The schedule comprised approximate dates when regular meetings would be held and key events would take place. It broke down each of the four months of the planning stage into specific work program tasks. February was for collecting and synthesizing data; March, for preparing alternative schemes for the federal land development and the Rideau area public works improvements; April, for testing the alternative schemes; and May, for preparing reports of the team's findings. Presentations of planning results to the political level were to begin in June 1978.

As it turned out, "the proposed schedule ... was adhered to with very few amendments."¹⁹ Sankey held thirty-seven regular meetings and four open houses

or public meetings, as Lash had proposed. Meetings were also held with numerous interested parties, according to plan, although Sankey held additional meetings when he thought these were necessary. Unscheduled meetings were held for CP Hotels, the Byward Growers, Outaouais Transit, and the National Film Board, when it became clear that each of these had some stake in project planning.

In terms of the work program, extensive research was carried out into what Sankey identified as the three central revitalization issues: (1) transportation, (2) pedestrian movement and (3) building usages on and off the vacant federal land. During the data collection stage the team took inventory of the existing infrastructure system (services, utilities and transportation), land use and ownership, zoning and height limits, and pedestrian movements in the Rideau area. It also gathered information on as many feasible development options as it could identify for each of the issue areas. The team did research, for example, into numerous possible uses for the federal land site, including housing, a police station, a convention centre, a courthouse, headquarters for the National Film Board and a visual arts centre.

During the second stage of the work program, when alternative development proposals or schemes were prepared, the team developed a land use scheme for the federal land and articulated its ideas about what the surrounding lands should look like -- whether they should constitute an "aggressive retail edge" or a "soft civic/public recreational edge,"²⁰ for instance. The team used the information on existing and potential pedestrian movements and transportation patterns as the basis for drawing up transportation options for consideration. Each alternative varied according to whether it envisaged car, bus or pedestrian traffic at ground level, or above or below ground level, on Rideau, George, Besserer, Daly, Dalhousie, Freiman, and William streets.

IV. The Decision Process: an Example

Transportation planning provides a useful example of how the decision process worked under Sankey's leadership. The project team identified twenty-three options, in all. Options were eventually reduced to five through the interplay of project team and PRAG members at meetings held on April 20, May 4 and May 9, 1978:

During three meetings with PRAG, comments, concerns, recommendations, were raised by the group and duly recorded directly on the [wall-sized streetscape] drawing [of a particular option] by the team. After each meeting adjustments were made by the team reflecting the trade offs and compromises made, until an interpretation of the final five options was reached.(21)

The general rule at these meetings was to keep or adapt only those parts of an option that were acceptable to a majority of the parties. Items were rejected if they proved unacceptable in the light of eight criteria: cost, marketability, efficiency of traffic, utility/transportation accommodation, environmental suitability and impact on the existing urban fabric, political acceptance/approval, developer acceptance, and public acceptance. Regional representatives who sat as members of PRAG were ~~never asked to state their preferences for specific alternatives, per se.~~ Their ~~job~~ was to advise on the feasibility of options, the project team looking to them to give objective assessments of the estimated costs of the proposals that were developed.

Three of the original twenty-three options were easy to eliminate because they were essentially duplicates of other options. A PRAG consensus was also reached very readily on the elimination of seven more because it was agreed that "the seven solutions with cars only on Rideau Street were not aiding the revitalization of the area... ."22 Every participant in the process, then, at this point in time, wanted to see some change take place in the transportation pattern

on Rideau Street. Through an iterative process of discussion, elimination, revision, further discussion, and so on, agreement was reached on the five final options.

Briefly, the five options were as follows:²³

- Scheme I** envisioned a two-way bus transit mall on Rideau Street with provision for three lanes of car traffic at grade on George Street, westbound, and on Daly Avenue extended, eastbound.
- Scheme II** had Rideau Street closed and turned into a pedestrian mall, with both George Street and Daly Avenue widened to accommodate three lanes for cars, one lane for buses and one lay-by lane for pickups and drop offs.
- Scheme III** envisaged a pedestrian mall on Rideau Street at grade as well as a transit mall at grade minus one or about fifteen feet below ground elevation and both George Street and Daly Avenue widened to three lanes for car traffic.
- Scheme IV** had a two-way bus transit mall at grade on Rideau Street, with provision for three lanes of car traffic at grade on George Street, westbound, and at grade minus one on Besserer Street, eastbound.
- Scheme V** envisioned a pedestrian mall on Rideau Street, a transit mall and two-way local traffic on George Street (that is, two bus lanes plus lay-bys and two traffic lanes), and a six lane tunnel for two-way car traffic on Daly Avenue at grade minus one.

After identifying the five preferred options, PRAG then studied them in more detail with respect to the issue of pedestrian movements and the specific problem of the intersection at Rideau Street, Sussex Drive, Mackenzie Avenue, and Colonel By Drive. Members were then requested to list the final transportation options in order of preference. Similarly, at a public meeting sponsored by the project team on June 7, 1978 about a hundred citizens had a chance to state their preferences regarding the final five options. In both instances, transportation scheme I was favoured, largely because it entailed the lowest property acquisition, would create the least amount of environmental damage, and involved the least amount of cost for general infrastructure works -- an estimated \$4.5 million as opposed to \$6.3 million for scheme II, \$14.5 million for scheme III, \$21.7 million for scheme IV, and \$7.7 million for scheme V.

Prior to the public meeting of June 7, the Rideau Area Project Team had held open houses on March 14, April 11 and May 16. It used an "open forum structure" during these meetings to try and promote "a good dialogue between the working team and the public."²⁴ The team also circulated newsletters, free to anyone who wanted them, on March 3, April 4 and May 3, 1978. Facilitating and encouraging public participation was a very important team concern, therefore, especially as it related to the issue of choosing a transportation option for Rideau Street, because the team recognized that the consequences of this decision would be far-reaching. Mo Bundon from the City of Ottawa had full-time responsibility for carrying out the public participation initiatives. It was up to him to make sure that the public was kept informed of planning developments and given sufficient opportunity to provide planning suggestions to the team.

V. The Planning Success

The views of interested citizens were sought when it came time to evaluate the land use proposals for the Rideau area. After collecting and synthesizing research data the project team developed a land use scheme for the federal land, and prepared a description of the surrounding edges of the area. By June 6, 1978 the team had incorporated this information into a more refined and comprehensive strategic plan, in fulfillment of its mandate.²⁵ This plan, along with the related streetscapes and illustrative drawings of the transportation proposals and proposed pedestrian systems, served as the concluding material for the four-month planning stage. As was true with the transportation proposals, the conclusions related to land use were reached after much discussion and open debate.

A draft version of the land use plan, for example, was examined at the public meeting of June 7. Much earlier than this, PRAG and project team members

examined the land use proposals and tested them against the criteria of marketability, cost, utility/transportation, accommodation, environmental suitability and impact, planning and design considerations, compliance with city regulations, legal considerations, political acceptance/approval, developer acceptance, and public acceptance. The public advisory committee later commented favourably on the nature and results of this discussion and debate:

PAC representatives have been pleased by the openness of the ... planning process. PAC representatives have been pleased with the direction of the current "Strategic Plan" which shows sensitivity to many citizen concerns by advocating: (a) the inclusion of housing on Federal Lands, (b) the preservation of the architectural heritage of the area, and (c) the revitalization of the whole Rideau Area -- rather than a mere plan for the Federal Lands.(26)

The strategic plan comprised recommendations related to land use in the six parts of the study area: Rideau Street, the Byward Market, the federal land, the Dalhousie neighbourhood, the residential area northeast of George Street, and the residential/institutional/heritage area southeast of Rideau Street. It also identified those redevelopment proposals that could be acted on immediately during the project's implementation stage. The team recommended, for example, that the existing commercial strip along Dalhousie Street be maintained and encouraged, that any attempts to introduce new land uses in the Byward Market area be discouraged, and that project implementation begin with the closure of Freiman and William streets. The team insisted, in its final report of June 1978, that the strategic plan not be viewed as the last word in Rideau Area Project planning:

The ... drawing ... is not by any means a master plan for the area. It is, instead, a collection of flexible statements basically identifying major concerns in the area, and revitalization suggestions. To this end, potential uses are suggested and indications made of action/reaction; that is, if the City Parking Garage [on Besserer Street] is to be retained, then the department store must be located south of Daly, and then a new location for the possible convention centre must be found.(27)

The team was thus implying that one should not presume too much from its final development proposals; there could and should be continued revision following this planning stage, until the major objectives of the Rideau Area Project had been achieved.

The strategic plan did not comprise hard and fast conclusions about how land should be used in the area, any more than the five transportation options represented final blueprints for Rideau area traffic patterns. The public advisory committee conceded in September 1978, for example, that it still had doubts about transportation scheme I. It feared the scheme could lead to a disruption of the Byward Market and neighbouring communities through provisions to convert George Street and Daly Avenue into a pair of major traffic arteries, and was concerned that it was still not satisfactory with respect to regional traffic needs.²⁸ The project team took the position, therefore, that more detailed work would have to be done to make any one of the individual transportation, pedestrian or land use proposals ready for implementation. The important point the team was trying to make was that the various options, imperfect though they were, could serve as stepping stones from which could spring more detailed Rideau area planning and, for the first time, actual decisions. To use the team's own language, "This plan does not attempt to be a definition of the future; rather, it is a possible approach to the organization of the evolution of the future."²⁹

This type of concluding statement reflects very well the overall approach to planning fostered by Sankey and his project team and recommended, in the first place, by Lash. Both Lash and Sankey had acted, since October 1977, as conciliators, trying hard to steer Rideau area planning along a gradual path that would lead to the project's completion. Unlike Clack before them, they did not develop and defend any particular concept plan for the area. Rather, they shared

Lorry Greenberg's concern for a search for real alternatives, caring far more for process than substance. They did not particularly care which development proposals would eventually be chosen, so long as there were reasonable alternatives from which politicians could choose, and so long as there was a workable process in place that would get politically acceptable proposals to the politicians. Once they were with the political authorities, proposals could then be evaluated, and direction could be given to further refine and subsequently implement those proposals given political endorsement.

The process that Lash recommended and Sankey implemented did prove workable. As of June 1978, the Rideau Area Project Policy Committee had before it, for the first time, a set of politically acceptable revitalization proposals. Committee members could carry forward to their respective political bodies any one of the "revitalization suggestions" from the strategic plan related to land use, and any one of the five transportation options, because the politicians had good reason to believe that these proposals represented a consensus of opinion from those interested in Rideau area redevelopment.

This was certainly how the Minister for State for Urban Affairs, André Ouellet, viewed the situation. He wrote a letter to Mayor Lorry Greenberg and Regional Chairman Denis Coolican on July 7, 1978 in which he mentioned that he had been kept well informed of the team's work by the Chairman and the General Manager of the NCC. He offered the following words of praise for the job that Sankey and his team had done: "It would seem to me that the process of consultation and discussion that has been followed under the overall guidance of the Policy Committee has been an excellent one and has produced a strong consensus among all those interested in the Rideau area."³⁰

Before moving on to see how political authorities dealt with the alternatives placed before them, a final word seems in order related to the planning contribution made by Sankey and other team members from February to June 1978. A key point about the process -- and one that is not at all apparent in the existing documentation -- is that the project's prime movers over the four-month transitional period were neither city nor NCC staff, but Sankey's own team of consultants. These, respectively, were Elizabeth Davidson, an architect from Sankey's architectural firm, Ruben Nelson, President of Square One Management in charge of research for the team, and Alan Booth, a critical path scheduler. The involvement of city and NCC staff had been temporarily discontinued after Clack left the project. Staff began to concentrate on other duties while Lash carried out his project review, and when Sankey called them back for renewed planning discussions, some appear to have declined because they were "fed up and tired of fighting."³¹

Sankey, therefore, was left with a great deal of responsibility. He was expected to move the project forward in terms of sound planning, at a time when administrators and politicians alike were anxious to see some headway occur, yet he had to do this with only minimal help from staff familiar with the project. At the same time, Sankey's job was made considerably easier because he could search out a reasonable compromise from among the views of PRAG members without first having to reconcile the differences among his own team members. Certainly, Sankey would have found it much more difficult to lead a consultative, consensus-developing process had it been necessary to contend with deeply involved public servants who, like Clack, found it difficult to move away from their firmly rooted convictions.

Even though city and NCC staff did not participate as actively as they might have done in team meetings, the longstanding city and NCC positions on the transportation and land use issues were taken into account by the team. The basic information was there, developed as it had been over several years and at considerable cost. The difference was in the particular way the central issues were addressed; the Rideau Area Project had never before been examined in the open manner, replete with alternatives, that Greenberg for one had sought.

It did not matter a great deal, therefore, that NCC and city officials were not intimately involved in the planning discussions. This stage of the decision process had more to do with ensuring the political and public acceptance of development proposals than it had to do with meeting technical or administrative objectives. There would be plenty of time for administrators to participate in the process, again, when the implementation of final project decisions became the focus of concern.

Endnotes

1. Juneau was appointed to the post of Minister of Communications on August 29, 1975 only to be defeated in the Hochelaga by-election of October 14, 1975. Hochelaga was considered a "safe" seat because it had been held for many years by the Liberal Cabinet Minister, Gerard Pellétier, who had resigned on August 29, 1975 when he was appointed Ambassador to France. The by-election was won by the Progressive Conservative candidate, Jacques Lavoie and Juneau was appointed Chairman of the NCC in November 1976.
2. In addition to the works cited in this chapter, the following reference also provided background material: Sankey Partnership Architects, "Ottawa," Information Poster on the Rideau Area Project, 1977-1983, Ottawa, 1983, side 2.
3. "History," p. 8.
4. These words were attributed to Lash by Anne Perkins, based on a telephone interview she had with him. Anne Perkins, Personal Files, notes on an interview with Harold Lash, May 1981.
5. Marilyn Hart, Interview, Ottawa, January 1985.

6. "History," p. 1.
7. Rideau Centre Public Advisory Committee, "Rideau Centre: Where Are We Going?," p. 6, Brief presented at the Rideau Area Project public meeting, September 12, 1978, and attached as app. B to the report, City of Ottawa, Department of Community Development, Human Resources Division, "Highlights of Presentations," September 12, 1978. Similar views were expressed by the committee in its brief to Ottawa City Council, "Rideau Centre: At the Crossroads," October 4, 1978, p. 4.
8. Anne Perkins, Personal Files, notes on an interview with Harold Lash, May 1981.
9. Marilyn Hart claims that during the Clack era of Rideau Centre Team meetings, whenever the NCC commissioned a transportation study to support its particular proposals, the RMOC had its planners conduct a study to double check the NCC's findings. Interview, Ottawa, January 1985.
10. Harry N. Lash, Project Review Director, Rideau Area Project, Final Recommendations for Phase II Planning Stage, Rideau Area Project, Ottawa, February 3, 1978, p. 6 (article 10.3), (hereafter cited as Lash, Final).
11. Ibid., p. 5 (article 9.3.4).
12. Sankey Partnership Architects, "Rideau Area Project 1979," Information Poster, Ottawa, September 1979; side 2 (emphasis in the original).
13. Rideau Area Project Team, Newsletter no. 1, Ottawa, March 3, 1978, p. 4.
14. Final, p. 8 (article 11.4 with emphasis on "endeavour" and "mutually adjust their interests" in the original).
15. Ibid., p. 7 (article 11.2).
16. Ibid., pp. 2-3 (article 5.2 with emphasis on "except" and "Policy Committee" in the original).
17. Rideau Area Project Team, Rideau Area Project Phase 2 - Planning, Ottawa, June 1978 (hereafter cited as Project Team, Phase 2).
18. Ibid., p. 3. A copy of the schedule was also appended to Lash, Final.
19. Project Team, Phase 2, p. 3.
20. Ibid., p. 18.
21. Ibid., p. 56. Copies of the streetscape drawings written on by PRAG members at the third meeting appear in the report, ibid., pp. 57-62 (reduced in size).
22. Ibid., p. 33.

23. Written descriptions and illustrative drawings of each option appear in *ibid.*, pp. 83-98.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 121.
26. Rideau Centre Public Advisory Committee, "Rideau Centre: Where Are We Going?", p. 4.
27. Project Team, Phase 2, p. 120.
28. "Rideau Centre: Where Are We Going?", p. 5.
29. Project Team, Phase 2, p. 120.
30. App B, p. 9, City of Ottawa, Mayor's Report - Rideau Area Project, by Mayor Lorry Greenberg, July 21, 1978, attached to City of Ottawa, Special Report of Board of Control: Rideau Area Project (200-46), July 21, 1978.
31. This comment was made by Marilyn Hart, Interview, Ottawa, January 1985.

CHAPTER SIX

POLITICAL-LEVEL DISCUSSION

AND DECISION-MAKING, JUNE 1978 TO MAY 1979

In the fall of 1977 the Rideau Area Project decision process appeared to be deadlocked. Less than a year later, however, the conciliatory and planning skills of Lash and Sankey had taken the process to the point where the political level was launched on a decision path that would culminate in the Tripartite Agreement of May 1979. The aim of this chapter is to describe the interactions that took place among the political representatives involved. An attempt is made to show how a small group of politicians representing three levels of government reached their own particular joint conclusions, and then led an iterative process in which their respective political colleagues reviewed successively refined recommendations. Also described is the support provided by Sankey and members of his Rideau Area Project Team.¹

I. The Actors

There were seven key sets of actors involved at this stage in the decision process: politicians from the city, the region and the federal government participating both as policy committee members and as members of the respective government bodies from which the committee's members were drawn; senior staff as members of the co-ordinating committee; Sankey and the members of a re-established project team; members of PRAG; members of a new Design and Implementation Group (DIG); private businessmen, including local merchants and developers; and a number of interest groups operating outside PRAG. This section outlines the role played by these actors, and the interrelationships that developed

among them.

Sankey presented his final report² from the staff-level planning stage to the policy committee in June 1978. It was this committee, composed of the Mayor of Ottawa, the Chairman of the RMOC and the Chairman of the NCC, that was the main catalyst in the activity at the political level. Its task was to take the Sankey report and identify those recommended alternatives that deserved further consideration by city and regional councillors, and by federal cabinet ministers. It arranged meetings with ministers of the Crown on matters affecting the project and brought together, for discussion purposes, the relevant politicians and senior officials who were needed to resolve the project's distinctly political issues. The policy committee members, for example, in conjunction with their senior bureaucratic counterparts in the co-ordinating committee, proved to be instrumental in ironing out a cost-sharing formula for the project and in drafting other terms of the tripartite agreement such as land exchange arrangements.

The majority of councillors and cabinet ministers only came into the picture when the ideas of the policy committee were reasonably well shaped, or when decisions needed a final stamp of approval. At several times during the year-long period the policy committee members approached their respective political bodies to have recommendations approved and to receive political guidance on how to proceed with the decision process. Although most politicians, on the whole, lacked the background and time to immerse themselves fully in project details, they appeared to make a concerted effort to keep abreast of developments and to participate more strongly in the decision process than simply rubber stamping policy committee recommendations. A few examples of city council motions will be presented, later, to show the extent to which local politicians played a role in

highlighting legal and political considerations and, to some extent, in giving interest groups a chance to voice their demands.

In regard to this last point, this critical period of political decision-making was also a period of strong interest group activity. Private business and citizen groups made many formal and informal representations to city council, in the hope of bringing their influence to bear on the project more directly and to a greater degree than they had done during structured PRAG meetings. As it turned out, however, most of the decisions ultimately taken by the city did not reflect the demands of vocal groups, a point developed in a later section of the chapter.

Lloyd Sankey and certain members of his project team continued to play a major role in the decision process. Sankey was on hand to answer the questions of city councillors at council meetings on August 4 and October 4, 1978 when project matters were being considered. He was also on hand to make a presentation at a public meeting sponsored by the policy committee on September 12, 1978 and gave a briefing to the new city and regional councils after the municipal election of November 13, 1978.

Still later in 1978 Sankey and his assistant, Elizabeth Davidson, were re-hired by the city and the NCC, under a new contract, to join forces with Peter Spaul from the NCC and Mo Bundon from the city to help the policy and co-ordinating committees draft the tripartite agreement, and to keep the project moving ahead at a technical level. Sankey's services were initially contracted for a three-month period from December 1, 1978 to February 28, 1979. The contract was extended for another three months after it became clear that the tri-level administrative and political negotiations were far more complex than anyone had anticipated and, consequently, difficult to resolve without Sankey's professional assistance.

One of Sankey's duties as project leader during the preceding four-month planning stage had been to recommend an organizational structure to be used after the stage was over, and his proposed structure was subsequently adopted. The policy and co-ordinating committees were retained to facilitate political-level discussion, and Sankey's other recommendations for retaining PRAG, a project leader and a project working team, came into effect with his contract of December 1, 1978. The recommendations were approved by the City of Ottawa on October 4, 1978 with passage of the following motion: "In order to expedite the implementation of this project Staff be directed to work with other organizations as generally outlined in the Phase II Planning Report."³

The only new organization to be established on Sankey's recommendation was the Design and Implementation Group (DIG), comprising technical representatives from the city, the NCC, the RMOC, DPW, and the developers. Sankey believed that although PRAG could provide a general project review, DIG would be needed to work with the project team on purely technical matters such as project designs and work tenders. Although there would be comparatively little work of this kind until after the signing of the tripartite agreement, Sankey listed the following item as part of his planned duties for the first three-month contract period: "To work with technical representatives ... to establish technical data as the basis of existing and proposed infrastructure in the Rideau Area Project."⁴

II. Policy Committee Discussions, June to July 1978

The first significant discussions at the political level took place in late June 1978. On June 27, for example, Lorry Greenberg, Denis Coolican and the General Manager of the NCC, E. Aquilina -- the last-named sitting in for the recently appointed Chairman, Bud Drury -- met to consider some of the recommendations

from the Sankey project team report. They approved, unanimously, three proposals they believed should be passed on to their respective political bodies for approval. The policy committee agreed that: (1) transportation scheme I should be adopted and the four other alternate schemes should be presented to regional council for examination; (2) the transit mall on Rideau Street should extend to Waller Street instead of the shorter distance to Nicholas Street, provided the region approves; and (3) a pedestrian link should be established from the existing NCC building on the federal land to the federal conference centre and eventually right through to Sparks Street.⁵

On the key question of how to share project costs, an issue that Sankey had not dealt with during the preceding planning stage, the officials were somewhat more divided. Greenberg had received a letter from Drury on June 12, 1978 in which he stated that although the federal government was prepared to contribute funds it did not want to assume all project costs, or even the major portion, because it was experiencing serious fiscal restraints.⁶ Despite this letter, Greenberg proposed a cost-sharing formula at the policy committee meeting of June 27 that did allocate the major portion of project costs to the federal government. On an estimate of \$11.2 million for all infrastructure works being planned in the Rideau area -- pedestrian links, utilities and acquisitions of non-federal lands -- Greenberg suggested that the federal government pay \$7.9 million and the city, \$.8 million, with the remaining \$2.5 million to be obtained from private sector sources. It was understood that costs for the Rideau Centre portion of the proposal would be borne entirely by the federal government and Viking-Rideau, on the basis of an agreement they had yet to reach.

The RMOC supported Greenberg's proposal but, not unexpectedly, the federal government did not. In a letter dated July 7, 1978, André Ouellet wrote to

Greenberg and Coolican to remind them that the federal government was experiencing difficult times. Moreover, he insisted that "while the project is important for the revitalization of the core of the National Capital, the primary beneficiaries will be local businesses, residents and authorities."⁷ This was the same line of argument Lash had used in February 1978 to convince the city to inject more money into project planning.

Ouellet then proposed a cost-sharing formula wherein the federal government would pay 50 per cent of the infrastructure costs and the city and the private sector would share the remaining 50 per cent on an almost equal basis. Based on a total cost estimate of \$10.7 million (\$.5 million less than Greenberg's estimate), the federal share would then be \$5.4 million (or \$2.5 million less than Greenberg's proposal), and the private sector share would be \$2.8 million (or \$.3 million more than Greenberg's proposal).

Ouellet also added that the federal government was prepared to take certain steps related to the project's implementation that could represent a further federal expenditure of between \$7 and \$10 million. These steps included making the federal land available for transportation purposes, improving the existing pedestrian connections from the project area to Confederation Square, extending the Rideau Canal as part of the project, and, possibly, modifying the existing NCC building on Sussex Drive to allow better public access to the Rideau Centre complex.

On receiving Ouellet's letter, Greenberg requested a policy committee meeting for July 17, 1978 with the Minister of Public Works, Judd Buchanan. This meeting did not sit well with Ouellet, evidently, because in a letter to Ouellet dated July 18, Greenberg sought to justify his action as follows:

Our review of the municipal cost sharing as outlined in your letter gave me much concern and in order to investigate other funding possibilities I

required a meeting with the land owner ... the Department of Public Works. This is a normal approach in project development and we were endeavouring to find out what contribution to the infrastructure might be possible from the major benefitting piece of land.(8)

Greenberg was unsuccessful in his attempt to convince DPW to share some of the infrastructure costs. Although John MacKay, DPW's Deputy Minister, did attend the policy committee meeting on behalf of his Minister, he argued that further costs could not be assigned to the development of the federal land because, if they were, the development would no longer be financially viable. The end result was Greenberg's recommendation to the city and regional councils that they adopt the federal cost-sharing formula.

Greenberg still held out some hope of decreasing the city's share of the funding -- estimated at about \$2.5 million -- through provincial and regional subsidies. On July 21, 1978, he asked the region's representative on the co-ordinating committee to approach the Province of Ontario to see if it would be willing to share the costs of transportation improvements. Greenberg also hoped that "as more details are developed there may be some Regional assistance, where it can be clearly identified to the satisfaction of the Regional Staff and Council that there are benefiting improvements to Regional Facilities."⁹ To this point in time the regional Chairman, Coolican, had been adamant that the region should not provide any of the project costs.

In Ouellet's letter of July 7, 1978, the Minister raised several other issues in addition to the matter of cost sharing. For one, Ouellet expressed his full agreement with Greenberg, Coolican and Aquilina on the decision to recommend the adoption of transportation scheme I, although he made no specific reference to whether the transit mall should be extended to Waller Street. Apparently, the NCC commitment of Clack's day to a galleria for Rideau Street was now a thing of the past. Ouellet was more concerned about reasonable costs and the maintenance

of the city's "urban fabric" than with Clack's vision of dramatic change for Rideau Street:

I would be prepared to suggest to my colleagues in Cabinet that the federal government concur with the adoption of Scheme no. 1 ... Although it appears to me that certain transportation aspects of the proposal could be further improved, I certainly agree that this approach would appear to be most likely to achieve the objective of revitalizing this part of the Capital in a way that does not require extensive modifications to the fabric of the City, and at a reasonable cost. In this vein, I am pleased to see that the Policy Committee has decided not to proceed at this time with the previous scheme which would have required the full closure of Rideau Street with a Galleria. It seems to me that such a scheme would have involved unnecessarily large expenditures and created major transportation and other problems for the area.(10)

Similarly, Ouellet was largely in agreement with the policy committee on the matter of improving pedestrian flow from the project site to the city's western downtown core. As noted earlier, the federal government was prepared to improve pedestrian connections to Confederation Square and to consider modifying the existing NCC building to allow better public access to the Rideau Centre. These proposals closely paralleled the third policy committee recommendation of June 27; namely, that a pedestrian link be built between the NCC building and the conference centre as the first stage of a plan to link the project site to Sparks Street more effectively.

Representatives from the three levels of government, at least at this early stage in the negotiations, also appeared to share common views with respect to the incorporation of housing in the project and the need to effect a city/federal land exchange. Ouellet mentioned in his letter that he was prepared to support the housing proposals described in the strategic plan developed under Sankey. He would ensure the availability of appropriate assistance under provisions of the National Housing Act for any housing developments in the Rideau area's "Eastern anchor" and he would encourage Viking-Rideau to develop residential units on the federal land, provided there was a strong enough market demand. Ouellet also

indicated his willingness to recommend to Cabinet that a land exchange take place with the city, subject to a financial settlement, wherein the federal government would give the city clear title to land needed to extend Daly Avenue (from Nicholas Street to Colonel By Drive) so that the transportation scheme could be realized, and the city would give the federal government clear title to the parts of Besserer Street and Freiman Street that were needed for the Rideau Centre development.

The only bone of contention related to the land exchange issue was the status of the city's parking garage on Besserer Street. The city had expected to help finance its share of project costs by selling the garage to the developer, along with the adjacent lands, in the above-noted deal. Ouellet stated that Viking-Rideau was not prepared to buy the parking garage:

...I am advised by the Department of Public Works that the developer cannot justify the purchase of this structure. The costs involved are sufficiently substantial that the developer considers this acquisition detrimental to the overall financial viability of the project. You may therefore wish to look at this matter again and possibly consider the alternatives.(11)

This last point underlines the strong influence the developer had on the political negotiations. Not only did Viking-Rideau have the power to exercise some control over the content of individual clauses in any agreement that specifically concerned it, as in the above case; it also had a broader influence on the decision process. Ouellet provided Greenberg and Coolican with the following information:

... the developer is not prepared to reach a definitive agreement with the federal government to proceed with the development of the federal lands south of Rideau Street until a firm agreement has been reached between the City of Ottawa, the RMOC, and the Federal Government. This latter agreement would involve a decision to proceed jointly with the implementation of an accepted development plan for the area, a realistic arrangement for sharing the costs involved among the parties concerned, and a clear knowledge of all the conditions under which the developer would participate.(12)

Viking-Rideau was thus pressuring the governments involved to hammer out a tripartite agreement.

Negotiations had continued between Viking-Rideau and DPW even during the early part of 1978, when Lash was doing his project review, because the Rideau Centre design concept had always remained valid. Yet, the negotiations had never reached the conclusion of a legal, two-party development agreement. Had such an agreement been reached early in the decision process, the three governments would have had an added incentive to move ahead swiftly to implement the Rideau area public works improvements, and planning for the necessary infrastructure would have been considerably easier. It now appeared that Viking-Rideau's strategy was to delay the Rideau Centre negotiations until the outcome of the political negotiations surrounding the broader Rideau area revitalization scheme was clear. In this way Viking-Rideau was able to use its continued participation in the project to seek better conditions for the federal land development project. As one former city planner stated in an interview in January 1985, Viking-Rideau had no shortage of real power. It simply had to use the line, "If you don't give us what we want we'll leave," to get its way.¹³

III. Decisions of City Council, August to November 1978

The outcome of the discussions at the policy committee level was incorporated in the Mayor's Report -- Rideau Area Project, dated July 21, 1978.¹⁴ Greenberg, on behalf of the policy committee, set out several recommendations that he asked the city and regional councils to support. City council was to consider nine recommendations. These were as follows:

1. approve transportation scheme I and support the extension of the transit mall to Waller Street provided the region agrees

2. direct city staff to work with RMOC staff in devising a tripartite agreement for implementation of infrastructure works
3. approve the cost-sharing formula of 50 per cent federal, 25 per cent municipal and 25 per cent other sources, mainly the private sector
4. approve the proposed land exchange arrangements
5. agree to discuss the disposition of the city's parking garage with the federal government or Viking-Rideau
6. approve in principle the strategic plan proposals related to the development of the federal land, on the understanding that all development will follow normal municipal development procedures
7. direct staff to work with other organizations, as Sankey outlined in the project team's final report
8. approve the construction of a pedestrian link between the existing NCC building and the federal conference centre
9. instruct staff to prepare Official Plan amendments and zoning by-laws required by development on the federal land.

Regional council was asked to consider recommendations 1, 2, 3, 7, and 9. The region was also asked, specifically, to have its staff investigate the feasibility of extending the transit mall to Waller Street and to report these findings to council.

Greenberg's report was considered by the city's Board of Control on July 25, 1978 and the nine recommendations were placed before council for the first time at its meeting of August 4, 1978. At that meeting, however, it was decided that council would defer consideration of the recommendations for at least a month so two things could happen. First, councillors wanted the policy committee to hold an open public meeting to give citizens a chance to review and comment on the recommendations. Secondly, they wanted the city's Planning Board to write a

preliminary report on "the strategies to be undertaken by the City with regard to Rideau Centre in matters such as housing and zoning."¹⁵ The politicians, then, were calling for some background information on the matters of special concern to them -- housing, zoning and public acceptance of the development proposals -- and they were making sure, in keeping with the city's long-standing commitment to public participation, that the public played some part in the project's decision process.

The public meeting was held on September 12, 1978 and was chaired by Mayor Greenberg. About two hundred citizens attended the meeting to voice their opinions on project matters and several written submissions were also received. A review of the presentations made at this meeting indicates very little consensus across a variety of citizen and business groups on how the project should proceed.¹⁶ Taking the issue of which transportation scheme should be adopted for Rideau Street, for example, support was shown at the meeting for everything from maintaining the status quo to radically changing the existing streetscape.

A representative from the Chamber of Commerce, with support from individual citizens and Dalhousie Street merchants, argued that cars should remain on Rideau Street so small businessmen in the area could count on existing traffic patterns to bring motorists directly past their stores. Representatives from the Rideau Centre Public Advisory Committee and the Westboro Community Association expressed support for a transit mall scheme, provided this was linked to steps taken to minimize any disruption of the market area, neighbouring communities and regional traffic patterns. Rideau Street merchants, landowners and developers were out in force to extoll the virtues of a fully enclosed pedestrian mall for Rideau Street. Representatives from individual stores like Ogilvy's, Caplan's and the Bay as well as representatives from Viking-Rideau, the Rideau Centre

Corporation and the Rideau Street Merchants' Association all claimed that this was the only scheme that would successfully rejuvenate the area's retail sector. This group of private business interests was a particularly strong and persistent lobby. It had presented a brief to city council on August 4, 1978 in which it argued strongly that the city should, in fact, go beyond the concept of a pedestrian mall for Rideau Street.¹⁷ The group wanted an enclosed, temperature-controlled, multi-level shopping area down the length of the street.

City council met to consider the policy committee's recommendations, for the second time, on October 4, 1978. On a division of ten to six, all nine of the recommendations were approved, including the Rideau Street transit mall proposal. Council also called for further background studies on the project, this time requesting that detailed marketing studies be done to determine the best amount and configuration of retail development on the federal land. A particularly strong contingent of interest groups criticized the transit mall option during this meeting of October 4. Rideau Street merchants and landowners continued to lobby against scheme I. The Rideau Centre Corporation, for example, requested that council defer a decision on transportation schemes until other project matters were first settled. A brief was forwarded to council from the East End Group, an association of property owners along Rideau Street between Nicholas Street and King Edward Avenue, calling for the adoption of the enclosed mall, extended if possible to Waller Street or beyond.¹⁸

Even the Rideau Centre Public Advisory Committee, which had originally given its support, applied pressure at the meeting of October 4 to try and keep the mall from being approved. During the previous month it had become convinced that the transit mall proposal would significantly disrupt pedestrian movement, traffic patterns and environmental quality, primarily because of the provision to

turn George Street into a major regional traffic artery. The committee presented a brief to council on October 4, urging councillors to declare the Rideau area a "Business Improvement District" and to impress upon local merchants and land-owners the need for "self-help revitalization."¹⁸

As already noted, despite these signs of public disapproval from very vocal Ottawa citizens, city council went ahead and ratified the transit mall scheme. Regional council subsequently reviewed the scheme, first on October 11 and for the second time on October 25, 1978, when it gave its approval. The regional vote was somewhat closer, however, as it took Chairman Coolican to break a tie in favour of the transit mall.²⁰

Local politicians did respond positively to interest group pressures, however, in a city council decision of November 1, 1978. Perhaps to try and alleviate some of the public concern expressed about the disruptive effects of the project, council suspended the rules of procedure on November 1 to entertain the following motion: "That the City state firmly that its involvement in Rideau Centre is contingent upon adequate provision[for] pedestrian over or underpasses on George Street, and [upon] every effort being made to replace the parking currently provided on George Street in a location useful to the market area."²¹ This motion was carried on a division of nine to three.

IV. Toward the Tripartite Agreement

Further developments at the political level did not take place until several months after the municipal election of November 13, 1978. It took a considerable amount of time for Lloyd Sankey to brief the new council members on the project and to lay the groundwork for an acceptable tripartite agreement. As noted earlier, it was decided that Sankey's services should be retained for the period

December 1, 1978 to February 28, 1979. This decision had been taken on November 29 by the co-ordinating committee. The policy committee did not give its approval until January 3, 1979 and the city did not formally agree to share half of the estimated \$50,000 cost of Sankey's three-month contract until February 7, 1979. Sankey, therefore, began his work in December 1978 without a specific contract and the NCC, alone, paid his fees for the first two months.

Sankey had certain conditions working in his favour during this critical period of intensive negotiations. The general political mood in the City of Ottawa in early 1979 was one of increasing embarrassment over the failure to bring the project to its completion. Local politicians apparently felt that the whole affair had been dragging on far too long,²² and the city and the NCC were more willing than ever to invest time and money into seeing the decision process reach a conclusion, as the decision to hire Sankey indicates.

By late March 1979 a draft tripartite agreement began to take shape in the hands of the policy committee. Mayor Marion Dewar made a verbal presentation in April to the City's Board of Control, on behalf of the policy committee, outlining the contents of a draft agreement that had been approved by the committee. The Board of Control then considered this draft and recommended that council approve it, with some amendments, in a report of April 27, 1979.

Councillors finally adopted the draft tripartite agreement at a meeting on May 2, 1979 and Regional council gave its approval on May 9, 1979. Only a few items were added by city councillors as amendments to the policy committee's version of the agreement. They approved the Board of Control recommendation that the agreement specify clearly the provision for developing housing on the vacant federal land. They also supported a Board of Control recommendation related to the matter of cost sharing. The policy committee had drafted the agreement with

two different versions of the article dealing with the "Contribution of Canada" because the matter had not yet been resolved. The "City Version" stipulated that the federal government contribute 50 per cent of the actual cost of the project's infrastructure works (estimated at a total of \$13,490,500 as of April 27, 1979). The "Canada Version," however, assessed the federal contribution at 50 per cent of the estimated costs of the works, pursuant to an escalation formula, or 50 per cent of the actual costs if they ended up being less than the estimated costs.²³

The Board of Control understood that as with any capital project there was a good chance actual costs would rise above estimated costs, especially in the area of land acquisition. If the "Canada Version" of the cost-sharing agreement was adopted, the city would have to finance any increased costs after deducting the federal escalated contribution. Although the best situation for the city, clearly, would have been adoption of the "City Version," the federal government stood firm in its opposition to this proposal. The controllers recommended, therefore, that a firm basic figure be stated in relation to the federal contribution. This recommendation, approved by council on May 2, provided for a federal contribution of \$6.4 million plus escalation.

Further, the controllers made this recommendation on the understanding that the federal government had agreed, subject to formal ratification, to contribute an additional \$1 million toward the cost of extending the Rideau Street transit mall from Nicholas to Waller Street, which was not part of its original cost-sharing proposal, and to purchase the city's Desserer Street parking garage. The revenues from the sale of the garage and from redevelopment charges paid to the city were expected to go a long way toward financing the city's share of project costs.

In addition to the controllers' proposals, city councillors made some amendments to the agreement on May 2, 1979. Motions were carried to add two new

clauses. One had to do with the provision for parties to the agreement to settle serious disputes by referring them to the Federal Court of Canada. The other was an indemnity clause wherein the city agreed to protect the federal government and the NCC from any damages that might arise from the city's execution of infrastructure works.

Finally, at the May 2 council meeting councillors gave authorization to Mayor Dewar "to make such minor changes to the Agreement that will not affect the substantial matters contained therein in order to permit the proper execution of the Agreement without further Council approval."²⁴ This motion paved the way for Dewar's participation in further discussions with the region and the federal government, to work out the final form of the tripartite agreement.

V. The Tripartite Agreement of May 15, 1979

The agreement finally approved on May 15, 1979 was a political one.²⁵ It comprised all the clauses noted in the previous section, and several more, for the express purpose of formally and legally binding the three governments to proceed, jointly, to implement the Rideau Area Project. It set out in sufficient detail the conditions under which each government would be expected to participate in the project and established the broad parameters to guide administrators through the project's implementation stage. Yet, no matter how hard the politicians worked on the agreement to formalize their commitment, a great deal more work would still need to be done to flesh out the political agreement for implementation purposes. It would be up to those charged with implementing the project to spell out, through several levels of definition, the administrative and technical details critical to implementation but well beyond the capacity or interest of the politicians to define.

The bare bones of the agreement, reached as a result of close to a year of political-level negotiations, comprised the following three commitments: (1) the three levels of government would proceed to implement the Rideau Area Project, as "an overall scheme of revitalization of the central business district of the City of Ottawa east of the Rideau Canal"; (2) the federal government would lease the vacant federal land in the Rideau area "to a developer for the purpose of development"; and (3) the city and the region would alter their Official Plans, patterns of transportation and road systems to accommodate the project.²⁶

In addition to these general statements of intent, clauses were included dealing with specific terms of the agreement and obligations of the parties in the areas of federal land development, co-ordination of the project, construction of the required infrastructure, property matters, and financial matters. Each of these aspects of the agreement is described below.

Terms of the agreement

The city, the region and the federal government agreed to proceed with implementation and to fulfill whatever obligations such an agreement entailed, on the understanding that the tripartite agreement could be amended at any time by any one of them, with the approval of the others. Further, each government was given the assurance that it would not have to meet the costs of any damages caused by other parties as they executed the agreement. The federal government agreed to indemnify the city and region from such damages and the city agreed to indemnify Canada and the region. The region was not required to construct any infrastructure under the agreement and so no related indemnity clause was required.

As had been settled at the city council meeting of May 2, 1979, the agreement also specified that any one of the parties would be able to take recourse to "a judge of the Federal Court of Canada or other Court of competent jurisdiction" to resolve any dispute "which could not be resolved otherwise than by Court action."²⁷ December 31, 1985 was set as the date for the termination of the terms of the agreement, and the only way the agreement could become null and void before this termination date was if the city failed to fulfill five specific obligations by the time limit set out in the agreement. By May 1, 1981²⁸ the city was to: (1) arrange for the closing of Besserer and Freiman streets (between Nicholas Street and Colonel By Drive and between Rideau Street and Besserer Street, respectively); (2) convey clear title of that land to the federal government; (3) obtain any required capital funding approval from the Ontario Municipal Board; (4) prepare a detailed work plan and schedule for implementation of the infrastructure works and submit it to the policy committee for approval; and (5) conclude arrangements for a financial contribution of 25 per cent of the estimated costs of the infrastructure from sources other than the city and the federal government.

Development of the federal land

The only article that provided details of the federal government's intentions related to its vacant land was the following:

- a) Canada intends to lease the whole or a part of the Rideau Area Lands to private or public developers for purposes of development into a retail shopping centre, a hotel, and other identifiable uses, including a convention centre and housing, in accordance with the strategic plan ...; and
- b) Canada shall endeavour, subject to a satisfactory financial arrangement with a Developer, to incorporate the extension of the Rideau Canal into the development of the Rideau Area Lands.⁽²⁹⁾

The article, therefore, makes mention of the strategic plan developed by Sankey's project team. It also includes direct reference to housing as a possible land use,

consistent with the Board of Control recommendation of April 27, 1979 and gives effect to the promise that André Ouellet had made to the policy committee in his letter of July 7, 1978 regarding the attempt to incorporate the extension of the Rideau Canal into the project.

The federal government was not able to be more specific about the identity of the prime developer because a firm development agreement had not yet been reached with Viking-Rideau. But, it was able to define some of the conditions under which such an agreement would have to be made. The federal government agreed to "identify in any agreements entered into with other parties for the lease or development of Rideau Area Lands, the responsibility for payment to City of redevelopment charges, property taxes and business taxes."³⁰ Additionally, it would "use its best efforts to prevail upon a Developer to submit to City within six months from the date of signing of this agreement an appropriate application for a development control agreement respecting Rideau Area Lands."³¹

These conditions were in keeping with the policy committee recommendation of July 21, 1978 that all development on the federal land follow normal municipal development procedures. As soon as the developer submitted an appropriate application, it was to be the city's responsibility to execute a development control agreement and issue Viking-Rideau a building permit. A related city obligation was to plan a zoning change for the federal land because, at the time the agreement was signed, this land was designated a "Government Use Area." The Official Plan of the Ottawa Planning Area would have to be amended to redesignate the federal land a "Central Business Area" to permit a wide range of commercial uses in the proposed Rideau Centre.³²

Co-ordination of the project

The three governments agreed to retain the committee structure that had worked so well during Lloyd Sankey's period as project leader. A co-ordinating committee was to meet at least once a month and was to report to a policy committee. PRAG was to be retained. Following Sankey's innovation during the preceding year of project work, provision was also made for the co-ordinating committee to establish technical committees as it thought best.

The most significant decision on organizational structure, however, had to do with the choice of a project team leader. Unlike the Clack era of project planning, when leadership of the team was a joint NCC/city responsibility, or the Sankey era when NCC and city staff participated under the direction of an external consultant, the implementation period was to see the city solely responsible for project leadership. More in keeping with the Sankey era, however, provision was made in the agreement for the city to contract a full-time project co-ordinator if it wished to do so, under the condition that approval first be received from the co-ordinating committee.

The city's project co-ordination duties included, among other things, the preparation of a master schedule for carrying out infrastructure works, ensuring the work schedule was followed, monitoring and controlling costs, liaising with PRAG and the public, monitoring and reporting on the actions of technical committees, and exchanging information among parties to the agreement. As noted in an earlier context, the city had until May 1, 1981 to prepare the detailed work plan and schedule.

Construction of the required infrastructure

Since the project's inception in the early 1970s, rather extensive public works of an infrastructure nature had been envisaged. Accordingly, a large part of the agreement was devoted to outlining who would undertake the required construction. The agreement covered four different categories of infrastructure works: (1) general roadworks, including the construction of intersections and the widening of roads; (2) specific streetworks, including the construction of pedestrian malls, partial or transit malls, and appurtenances such as widened sidewalks; (3) pedestrian bridges; and (4) underground utilities such as hydro and telephone cables.

The only federal responsibility related to constructing the infrastructure had to do with pedestrian bridges. The federal government agreed to construct a pedestrian bridge from its conference centre to the Rideau Centre site, at its own cost to a maximum of two million dollars. It also agreed to obtain policy committee approval for the design of this bridge and to control, operate and maintain it once completed. The greatest number of infrastructure responsibilities fell squarely on the shoulders of the city. This was true for each of the categories of specific streetworks, pedestrian bridges, general roadworks, and underground utilities, as discussed below.

Specific streetworks. The city, alone, was to be responsible for designing, constructing, operating, and maintaining all streetworks planned for the project. It was to design and then call the contracts needed to construct three pedestrian malls, for example. One mall was to be built on William Street, one on Waller Street, and an enclosed mall was to be established on Freiman Street, extending in each case between Rideau and George streets.

Whereas the city was expected to have the design plans for each of these pedestrian malls approved by the policy committee on recommendation of the coordinating committee, four other specific streetworks were to require design plan approval from the region. The reason for this requirement was that all four specified streetworks, on completion, were to become part of the regional road network. The streetworks in question were partial or transit malls on Rideau, George and Nicholas streets, and widened sidewalks on Rideau Street.

In addition to the right of design plan approval, the region was given the right to ask the city to correct any defects in the completed transit malls without cost to the region. The city was also expected to operate and maintain these works.

Pedestrian bridges. The city was to design, construct, operate, and maintain a pedestrian bridge that would cross Rideau Street and, therefore, serve as a link between the Rideau Centre and the Byward Market. It was also obligated to "consider construction of a pedestrian overpass, or underpass, on George Street at no cost to Canada."³³ This latter clause was a direct result of the city council decision of November 1, 1978 wherein councillors insisted that there be adequate provision of pedestrian crossings on George Street; depending on the nature of the final design plans for George Street, the construction of an overpass or an underpass was seen as a possible requirement.

General roadworks. Installing traffic signals, reconstructing roads, widening lanes, constructing intersections, and constructing new roads were further matters to be handled by the city. The city was to design such work and call the contracts needed for its construction. Yet, because all these completed roadworks would be assumed by the region as part of its regional road network, the design and construction was to be done to requirements specified by the region, and the region retained all rights of inspection and testing related to the construction activities.

Moreover, as was the case with the construction of transit malls, the city was obligated to correct any defects in the completed roadworks at the request of the region. Unlike the specific streetworks, however, the completed general roadworks were to be operated and maintained by the region.

Underground utilities. The only work on underground utilities that was to require regional input in terms of approving the design specifications and construction contracts, was water main changes. In all other cases, the city could proceed to implement the planned activities after the co-ordinating committee approved its design plans.

Property matters

The tripartite agreement incorporated the city/federal land exchange deal that had been negotiated by the policy committee during the preceding year. The city, being named the party responsible for acquiring all land needed for the project not already owned by one or other of the three governments, was obligated under the agreement to "secure all the required consents and take the necessary steps leading to the following road closings and conveyances of land: i) that part of Besserer Street between Nicholas Street and Colonel By Drive, and ii) that part of Freiman Street from Rideau Street to Besserer Street."³⁴ The city was supposed to close these roads and convey them to the federal government, along with its own Besserer Street parking garage and appurtenant lands, by May 1, 1981.

In exchange, the federal government was to convey to the city: clear title to land that was needed to (1) extend Daly Avenue; (2) construct an intersection at Mackenzie Avenue, Sussex Drive, St. Patrick Street and Murray Street; and (3) reconstruct Colonel By Drive adjacent to the Rideau Centre complex.

The region had only one significant responsibility related to property matters. The federal government wanted title to Little Sussex Street between Rideau Street and Besserer Street, and hence adjacent to the Rideau Centre site, "in the event that Little Sussex Street is no longer deemed necessary as an arterial road in the opinion of Region...".³⁵ The region agreed that, in such an eventuality, it would close the street and convey title to the federal government.

Financial matters

The region had remained firm in its original position on project financing and was, therefore, not obligated to "incur any costs whatsoever with respect to the works contemplated in this agreement."³⁶ On the contrary, it was to take ownership of the completed transit malls and general roadworks "without any cost or debt that may attach to them."³⁷ The only expense that could accrue to the region would be the cost of its representatives if they joined any technical committees that were formed.

The federal government committed itself to paying \$6.4 million toward the estimated cost of the infrastructure works on the understanding that it could reduce its contribution to 50 per cent of the estimated cost in relation to any particular work that was not completed. The city was expected to pay the remaining infrastructure costs, after it concluded arrangements for a financial contribution of 25 per cent from private sector sources. Further, the city and the federal government were to share the costs of a project co-ordinator if one was engaged by the city, and were to arrange a financial settlement for the land exchanges. Provision was made for the federal government to include in the final calculations a minimum cash payment of \$3 million for the city's parking garage and appurtenant lands.

VI. Concluding Note

As of May 15, 1979 many important matters related to the Rideau Area Project had been settled. For the first time in what had turned out to be a long, involved decision process, the three levels of government interested in revitalizing the Rideau area had agreed on a cost-sharing formula, made specific land exchange arrangements, set a time limit for implementation, identified a list of planned infrastructure works, carefully defined the responsibilities of each party with respect to those works, and decided on an organizational structure to carry the project through the implementation stage. In other words, the vital conditions for guiding project implementation had been established.

To reiterate a point raised earlier, these formal, political decisions would not be sufficient to guarantee the project's successful completion. Project implementation staff from the city would have to take the tripartite agreement and work out the details necessary to give effect to the political directives. Nowhere in the agreement, for example, was mention made of which infrastructure work should be implemented first, or how the city should go about convincing abutting owners that Besserer, Freiman and William streets should be closed. Indeed, as of May 15, 1979 none of the concept plans for specific streetworks, pedestrian bridges or general roadworks had yet been developed, no finalized land-lease agreement had been reached between the federal government and Viking-Rideau, and the city was still a long way from reaching an agreement with private sector interests on how to share infrastructure costs.

Yet, the joint decision of May 1979 did represent a very significant project achievement. For the purposes of this thesis, the decision represented the culmination of the Rideau Area Project decision process that began in 1972 and

evolved through more than six years of staff-level and political-level decisions. It represented the culmination of this decision process because it effectively resolved the issues that had been seeking resolution since the time of John Turner's announcement of a concept plan for the Rideau area. The objective pursued during the years of project discussions and decisions was the identification of common ground on which the project's prime movers could agree and from which the implementation of the project could proceed. The Tripartite Agreement of May 1979 defined that common ground, in a necessarily general way but with enough clarity and precision that the city, the RMOC and the federal government could come together in a firm project commitment.

Endnotes

1. In addition to the works cited in this chapter, the following references provided background material: Lash, Final, pp. 6-7 (art. 10.9); City of Ottawa, Minutes of Meetings of Council (Bound), meetings of October 4, 1978, pp. 5345 and 5365, February 7, 1979, p. 924, and May 16, 1979, pp. 2925-26; Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton, "Planning Commissioner to Executive Committee on Regional Official Plan Amendment No. 8," Inter-departmental Correspondence, May 3, 1979, Annex 3, Executive Committee, Report 36 to the Council, May 7, 1979; and idem, Minutes of Meetings of the Council (Bound), meetings of October 11, 1978, pp. 3959-60, 3979, October 25, 1978, pp. 4304-5, and November 1, 1978, p. 4307.
2. Project Team, Phase 2.
3. City of Ottawa, Minutes of Meetings of the Council (Bound), meeting of October 4, 1978, p. 5348.
4. Memorandum from Lloyd P. Sankey to E. Aquilina, NCC, S. Baldwin, City of Ottawa, and R. Bailey, City of Ottawa, December 13, 1978, p. 2, attached to City of Ottawa, Board of Control, Report 5A, Item No. 3, "Rideau Centre Studies, -Department of Physical Environment (200-06-4)," February 7, 1979 (hereafter cited as Sankey, Memorandum).
5. City of Ottawa, Mayor's Report -- Rideau Area Project, by Mayor Lorry Greenberg, July 21, 1978, p. 1, attached to City of Ottawa, Special Report of Board of Control: Rideau Area Project (200-46), July 21, 1978. The Mayor's Report, hereafter cited as Greenberg, Report, has the following appendices: A, chart on "Total Costs and Suggested Cost Sharing Approach by Municipal Government," B, Letter from André Ouellet, Minister of State for Urban

Affairs to Mayor Lorry Greenberg and Regional Chairman Denis Coolican, July 7, 1978; C, Letter of reply from Greenberg to Ouellet, July 18, 1978; and D, chart on "Estimated Total Costs and Sharing of Proposed Infrastructure for Scheme no. 1."

6. André Ouellet made reference to this letter in his own letter to Greenberg and Coolican, July 7, 1978, p. 2, app. B, Greenberg, Report.
7. Ibid.
8. Letter from Greenberg to Ouellet, July 18, 1978, p. 1, app. C, Greenberg, Report.
9. Greenberg, Report, p.4.
10. Letter from Ouellet to Greenberg and Coolican, p. 1, app. B, Greenberg, Report.
11. Ibid., p. 2.
12. Ibid, pp. 3-4.
13. Marilyn Hart, Interview, Ottawa, January 1985.
14. Greenberg, Report.
15. City of Ottawa, Minutes of Meetings of the Council (Bound), meeting of August 4, 1978, p. 4458.
16. See City of Ottawa, Department of Community Development, Human Resources Division, "Highlights of Presentations," Report on the Rideau Area Project public meeting, September 12, 1978, with appendices: A, recommendations approved by Board of Control, July 25, 1978; B, submission by Rideau Centre Public Advisory Committee, "Rideau Centre: Where Are We Going?"; C, submission by Marey Gregory; D, submission by Chambre de Commerce d'Ottawa; and E, submission by Westboro Community Association.
17. The brief was entitled "Rideau Area Project."
18. "Rideau Centre," Ottawa, September 25, 1978. This brief was forwarded to council on October 4, 1978 by the Rideau Centre Corporation.
19. "Rideau Centre: At the Crossroads," p. 3.
20. The motion was, in fact, lost on a division of seventeen to ten at the regional council meeting of October 11, 1978. Yet, toward the end of that meeting a motion was passed to reconsider the vote, so the issue came up again at the next regular meeting of October 25. The vote the second time around was eleven to ten in favour of the transit mall, and it was made possible, in part,

- due to the absence of several council members who had earlier voted against the motion.
21. City of Ottawa, Minutes of Meetings of the Council (Bound), meeting of November 1, 1978, pp. 6297-98.
 22. Marilyn Hart made this observation in her personal notes on the Rideau Area Project, 1980. She claims that Mayor Dewar, in particular, expressed this concern.
 23. City of Ottawa, Board of Control, Report 11 B: Rideau Centre Project (200-06-4), April 27, 1979 (submitted to council on May 2, 1979), with attachment, Draft Agreement between the City, the Region and the Federal Government, pp. 17-18.
 24. City of Ottawa, Minutes of Meetings of the Council, meeting of May 2, 1979, p. 2761.
 25. A copy of the agreement has been attached as Appendix B (hereafter cited as Agreement). The document has been re-typed save for the last page of signatures and none of its appendices has been attached, due to the poor quality of all available copies (photocopies, City of Ottawa Archives). Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, and 9 of article 2 appear in their revised form, as they were presented in the Supplementary Tripartite Agreement of March 31, 1981, authorized by city council on April 15, 1981. The May 15, 1979 version of article 2 included much stricter implementation deadlines, which were subsequently extended through a series of amendments as it became clear that they could not be met. All references to articles of the agreement in this chapter, therefore, relate to the articles as they appear in Appendix B.
 26. Agreement, p. 1.
 27. Ibid., art. 23.
 28. This deadline was set on March 31, 1981. The original agreement of May 15, 1979 set the following, stricter deadlines: (1) parts of Besserer and Freiman streets were to be closed within six months from the date the agreement was signed; (2) clear title to this land was to be conveyed to the federal government within 12 months from the date the agreement was signed; (3) capital funding approval was to be obtained within six months from the date of signing; (4) the implementation work schedule was to be prepared, again, within six months from the date the agreement was signed; and (5) the cost-sharing arrangements were to be concluded within nine months from the date the agreement was signed. See draft agreement, attached to City of Ottawa, Board of Control, Report 11B: Rideau Centre Project (200-06-4), April 27, 1979.
 29. Agreement, art. 19.
 30. Ibid., art. 20.5.

31. Ibid., art. 2.5.
32. City of Ottawa, City Clerk, Plan of Land Use, Amendment 100 to the Official Plan of the Ottawa Planning Area, April 1980.
33. Agreement, art. 15.3.
34. Ibid., art. 2.1(a).
35. Ibid., art. 6.
36. Ibid., art 20.4.
37. Ibid., arts. 13.5 and 14.4.

CHAPTER SEVEN

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS — THE CASE

The primary aim of the thesis was to document and describe the Rideau Area Project decision-making process, as a case study, and then to analyze the case material for the insights it would provide. Chapters Two through Six presented the case material, and it is in this chapter that the case analysis is presented and conclusions are drawn.

As the title of the thesis implies, the conclusions drawn from the case material relate to the issue of collaboration and conflict in local decision-making. It was known in advance of writing the thesis that the Rideau Area Project involved complex interactions among a number of relatively autonomous actors who shared the power to make the required decisions. Moreover, the interactions took place over a period of more than six years, from the time of John Turner's announcement of October 1972 to the signing of the tripartite agreement in May 1979, and these years were rife with controversy. This controversy surrounded the sometimes bitter relations among certain project participants as well as the rather slow progress that was being made in the way of concept planning. It seemed a reasonable assumption, therefore, that a detailed case study might shed some light on the issue of how decision-makers still manage to collaborate in order to reach important public decisions, despite what are often very conflictual decision situations.

To repeat the core argument of the thesis, stated in the Introduction, it is that local decision-making is frequently of a complex, diffused-power nature, given the fragmentation of Canada's local government sector. Accordingly, effective decision-making will require special strengths in managing the conflict necessarily

inherent in the process and in effecting the needed collaboration across jurisdictional boundaries. Although Chapter Nine takes up the task, more directly, of elaborating and expanding upon this argument, in the present chapter evidence is provided from the case material that has some bearing on this basic position.

The chapter proceeds by addressing, sequentially, each of the five sets of questions posed at the end of Chapter One. The theoretical background is first reviewed, briefly, and then the relevant question or questions are restated in their original form. The case material is then analyzed and conclusions are drawn. The questions, analytical discussion and concluding insights relate to the following five topic areas: the diffusion of decision power in multi-valued choice situations; the role of values, perceptions and assumptions in the decision process; the structuring of decision processes; the role of personal competence in the decision process; and rationality in public sector decision-making. As the chapter proceeds, it will become clear that each of these topics has significant bearing on the issue of collaboration and conflict in local decision-making. This point is taken up more directly in Chapter Nine when the major case insights presented, here, are discussed in the context of the core argument.

A secondary aim of the thesis was to test the validity and usefulness of the decision-making models and approaches outlined in Chapter One or, at least, to test some of the hypotheses drawn from these theoretical sources. As with the objective of gaining insights into the nature of local government decision-making, this testing was to be based on the case material. The conclusions reached are presented in Chapter Eight.

I. The Diffusion of Decision Power

Theoretical background

Each of the theorists whose work is addressed in Chapter One demonstrates an awareness, in one way or another, of the reality of the diffusion of power in complex public decisions. They write variously of players, interest groups, stakeholders, decision-makers, and participants but, in all cases, recognize that who has power, and to what extent, is an important aspect of the decision process.

In terms of the issue of collaboration and conflict, Howard makes the fundamental point that a diffusion of decision power leads to an interactive or political style of decision-making, with an inherent potential for conflict. Such situations are conflictual to the extent that participants exercise power to try to have their own particular objectives realized at the expense of the objectives of others. Although no attempt is made in the thesis to consider the normative issue of whether it is desirable to have bargaining among a plurality of powerholders, the case material shows that Howard is correct, descriptively, when he states that such bargaining or interaction is inevitable:

The nonrational, "political" nature of social decision making should be seen not only as inevitable, but also as desirable. It cannot be avoided unless a complete monopoly of power is established in the hands of one player or complete agreement is reached between all players as regards their objectives. Either of these conditions (assuming one or other were possible) would almost certainly be undesirable. We should conclude, therefore, that the process described here is one that we should not only accept, but accept gladly. (1)

Another important and, again, very basic theoretical point related to the diffusion of decision power is raised by Lindblom. He contends that "A wise policy-maker ... expects that his policies will achieve only part of what he hopes."² This is due partly to the fact that it is very difficult to predict the consequences of any particular decision. But it also relates to the proposition that in situations of

diffused decision power, policy benefits will likely be distributed among a number of different participants in the decision. Both Howard and Abonyi take off from this point to argue that effective collaboration really means having decision-makers arrive at stable or implementable decisions that meet, to some acceptable extent, all of their objectives.

To explore the case material in the light of these theoretical considerations, the following three-part question was posed in Chapter One:

Who were the key actors at different stages in the process, and what was the extent and nature of their power?

Case analysis and conclusions

When Pierre Benoit, in a 1972 letter to Douglas Fullerton, expressed the hope that the Rideau Area Project would "serve as a model for the cooperation that can and should be undertaken between the federal and municipal levels of government,"³ he struck one of the most dominant notes of the project. From its inception it was clear that it did require co-operation across jurisdictional boundaries, although well beyond the co-operation noted by Benoit. Moreover, the case material permits the inference that in large urban centres there may be numerous occasions when multi-level and multi-sectored co-operation will be required or valuable; the decision to build the Rideau Centre is not unlike the decision taken in many other cities to build large complexes for retail, office, and other uses.

In this particular case there were four levels of government with relevant decision power, and within the federal government there were at least three distinct agencies or departments. The organized private sector was a significant set of powerholders: local merchants in the project area; the developers; the range

of consultants the project employed, deriving their power from their right to advise, and Lash and Sankey, particularly, with their leadership roles; and public interest groups who, at later stages in the project, gained a measure of power from their membership on PRAG and their legitimized and encouraged access to decision-makers. In addition to public and private organizations and groups, there were several individuals with key roles to play. Their power came in part from their role as representatives of organizations or groups and in part from personal competencies or characteristics. Clack, Greenberg, Lash, and Sankey would be included in this group. Appendix C is a comprehensive list of the organizations, agencies, interest groups, and individuals appearing in or relevant to the decision process as those stakeholders who participated directly in the process, and those who did not.

The case material related to the diffusion of power, is sufficient to permit the following conclusions to be drawn:

1. Decision power was diffused, and very significantly.
2. Decision power was not distributed evenly among the participating groups and individuals. There were major and minor powerholders and, at any single stage, there were always at least three dominant powerholders: the City of Ottawa, the NCC and Viking-Rideau. Relative power positions did change, particularly in the case of the NCC, the city and interest groups.
3. There were significant shareholders who did not directly exercise power over decisions at any one stage in the decision process. These included future generations of Ottawa residents, of course, but also the Ottawa merchants from outside the Rideau area who faced stiff competition from the Rideau Centre, local residents affected by changed traffic patterns, the contractors who benefitted significantly during the implementation phase, the very many

shoppers and convention-goers who are now benefitting from the Rideau Centre complex, and the merchants who have moved into the Rideau Centre since its completion.

4. Clack had some awareness of the diffusion of power, evidenced by the decision structure he designed and the membership of its various components. Yet, this awareness did not lead Clack to follow an interactive decision-making process. On the contrary, Clack seemed convinced that the project would be driven to an early and successful conclusion due to a combination of the following factors: the visionary nature of the NCC concept; the commission's willingness to commit funds; his own considerable measure of rapport with the private businessmen involved; the federal government's carefully guarded monopoly over contracts with the prime developer; federal ownership of the core land; and his personal ability to dominate the project's decision structure. The consequence of this stance was heightened conflict as Clack met with opposition from city and regional officials. This conflict led, eventually, to a rather bitter end to the formal planning sessions in August 1977.
5. Both Lash and Sankey had an acute awareness of how widely decision power was actually diffused and of the need, therefore, to manage the conflict inherent in the basic diffusion of power and made worse by the difficulties that arose from the Clack era of project planning. Both appeared very willing to sacrifice vision to collaboration, and both saw the need for special structures and processes to foster the required collaboration. The consequence of Sankey's efforts at leading a collaborative, interactive decision-making process, after Lash laid the necessary groundwork, was rather swift progress toward the signing of the tripartite agreement that met with the approval of the city, the region and the federal government.

II. The Role of Values, Perceptions and Assumptions

Theoretical background

The theoretical material outlined in Chapter One draws attention to the importance of values, perceptions and assumptions as factors that influence public decision-making. Taking each of these three factors in turn, Subramaniam's focus on the multi-valued nature of public decision-making is reflected in the work of Howard, Abonyi, Lindblom, and Dror. It also appears as a central concern in the literature of project management, which recognizes that the members of multi-disciplinary project teams bring different individual, professional and organizational values to the team's decision-making.

Concerning the role of perceptions, the selected theorists also recognize that different values, coupled with different role requirements and organizational and professional backgrounds, will lead to different perspectives and perceptions. Subramaniam states that politicians and administrators have different approaches to and outlooks on public decision-making, and modern problem-solving for Bennis and Slater requires "a blending of skills and perspectives."⁴ Abonyi defines stakeholders as "individuals who, in order to protect (and/or further) their interests, form 'coalitions' with differing perceptions and interests," and he notes that stakeholders tend to act "based on their perception of needs, interests, and judgments about relevant project consequences."⁵

The third and final of the three factors, assumptions, is not addressed explicitly by Subramaniam, Howard, Lindblom or Dror. Abonyi's writing is distinctive, therefore, in its emphasis on the need to identify and categorize "assumptions about [the] existing and future behaviour and preferences of affected

social groups."⁶ This emphasis is reflected very strongly in his decision model, SIAM, which highlights "assumptions-identification" as a central element.

It is clear that each of the three variables has some bearing on the issue of collaboration and conflict; the values, perceptions and assumptions of participants in the decision process can influence greatly the extent to which decisions are made in a conflictual or collaborative manner. For example, when a decision-maker seeks to realize certain values or objectives that are incompatible with the values of other decision-makers, this can be an important source of conflict. On the other hand, the presence of significant agreement on values related to the substance or content of a policy, can lead readily to collaborative decision-making efforts. According to Lindblom, "partisan discussants need some common experience, orientation, and values; otherwise discussion is fruitless and even only a way station to violence."⁷

Decision-makers can also hold and subsequently act on values about the best way to make decisions. These procedural values can relate to "rules of the game that have the effect of civilizing the conflicts"⁸ or, alternatively, to decision methods and processes that only exacerbate conflict. More generally, a decision-maker's perceptions of and assumptions about the behaviour and preferences of others can influence how he behaves in a decision situation. Again, this regular, day-to-day behaviour can have the effect of either encouraging or discouraging collaboration among decision-makers.

Recognition of the importance of these variables has led to the formulation of the following question for use in analyzing the Rideau Area Project case:

What role did each of values, perceptions and assumptions play in the decision process?

Case analysis and conclusions

Roderick Clack played a strong role over the first five years of the Rideau Area Project decision process. It seems appropriate, therefore, to begin addressing the issue of values, perceptions and assumptions in relation to his participation. As "one of the few superlative urban designers who have graced the national capital,"⁹ he brought to his role the values of a committed professional architect. As noted under the immediately preceding heading, Clack seems to have perceived his role to be that of strong-minded, visionary leader. In his brief to the Ontario Press Council, prepared in 1982, he describes himself as having had an "unyielding vision ... of the entire Rideau Centre Project" and having, often, "to take a firm line in the planning and negotiating process which to juniors did sometimes appear uncompromising."¹⁰ It was reported, moreover, that he assumed local bureaucrats would naturally be small-minded; whether this was an assumption peculiar to him or whether, as Greenberg appears to have believed, he was simply reflecting an assumption of the NCC, is not clear from the case material.

The general tenor of Clack's attempts to push some important decisions through the project team without full and open discussion indicates some measure of contempt for the judgements of bureaucrats from other jurisdictions or, at the very least, an insensitivity to them. This attitude was reinforced by his apparent respect for what he saw as imaginative, risk-taking private sector developers. If an NCC colleague is correct one of the special joys of the project, for Clack, was the opportunity to discuss his vision for the Rideau area with the developers and find them supporting it enthusiastically with a realistic awareness of the cost implications for them.

The clash of values, perceptions and assumptions between Clack and Greenberg is clearly evident in the case material, and it stands out as a major factor in the decision process. It was this clash, even in the face of shared city/NCC objectives of a very fundamental nature, that seems to have brought the Clack period of project leadership to an end. During the Rideau Centre Team planning sessions of the mid-1970s, city planners perceived the project as one dominated by the NCC, in part because their senior representative on the project team, Douglas Wurtele, appeared to lack the ability and/or the commitment to represent the city's interests forcefully. When Greenberg became Mayor the picture changed dramatically.

Greenberg brought to the project an aggressive political style, linked to an assumption that the city had let the NCC dominate the decision process, unwisely, and linked also to the perspective and perceptions of a real estate developer. Where Clack was a dreamer with a vision Greenberg had a no-nonsense, down-to-earth personality.¹¹ As a man who prided himself on being honest and outspoken, he did not look kindly on the federal government's private negotiations with the developers or, at times, on the developers themselves. His attitude to the developers was displayed in the statement, "The NCC kept saying Eaton's didn't like it, Eaton's didn't like it. I said, 'who the hell is Eaton's?' because they never came to the table, but they seemed to be planning the nation's capital." ¹²

Where Clack seems to have placed little value on the search for alternatives, at least in relation to the overall concept plan, Greenberg saw them as essential. As a developer and a politician he had come to adopt the working assumption that the generation and evaluation of alternatives was a key element in project success. This valuing of alternatives was reflected very strongly once again during Sankey's

period of project leadership, when the decision process and structure was designed to bring alternatives forward.

The clash in values between Clack and Greenberg was set against the background of a more general clash in perspectives between the NCC and the City. The perspective of the NCC was the National Capital Region in total, with the Rideau Area Project perceived as one component in a much larger development plan. For the city, however, it was a very major project at the heart of its physical, economic and social concern for downtown revitalization. The NCC placed the values of project progress and protection of the concept plan significantly ahead of public participation. The city, on the other hand, committed itself, from very early on, to the task of getting the public involved in decision-making and was understandably suspicious of secretive federal government/Viking-Rideau negotiations.

In many other ways, the Rideau Area Project was characterized by very significant disagreements over values, markedly different perspectives and perceptions and widely differing assumptions. Where the region was preoccupied with regional traffic patterns, for example, and adamant that it would play no role in financing, the NCC and the city shared a concern with the integrated development of the full fifty-acre area and were never unduly concerned over money save for the issue of a fair distribution of costs.

The developers, understandably, wanted the maximum possible return on their planned investment and whatever competitive advantage they could get. The city, on the other hand, had to consider the rights of existing merchants, the rights of neighbourhood residents, and the impact of the proposed development on such vital concerns as the preservation of the Byward Market. Further, each consultant brought his or her professional values and perspectives to the project, so that

discussions at the technical level involved the reconciliation of the values and perspectives of the marketing specialist, the transportation specialist, the urban planner, the architect, the civil engineer, the scheduler, the mechanical engineer, the utilities design consultant, the structural engineer, and so on.

Politicians, naturally, placed a high value on re-election. It is not surprising, therefore, that the decision process at city and regional levels slowed down in the months preceding municipal elections. This was especially the case from the middle to the end of 1978, even though at the time the decision process appeared to be heading strongly toward a satisfactory conclusion.

One final illustration of the role of values, perceptions and assumptions seems, particularly in order. It is the contrast between the leadership styles of Clack and Sankey. Where Clack seems to have prized the vision of a galleria very highly, Sankey prized conflict resolution and pragmatic collaboration. Operating from within the NCC, at a time when it was involved in such exciting revitalization projects as Place de Portage, Clack perceived the commission as falling naturally into the leadership role, whatever co-chairman concessions were made to the city. Sankey, on the other hand, believed that the project was predominantly one of downtown revitalization and of far greater importance to the city than to the federal government. Clack appeared more like an autocratic visionary, in sharp contrast to Sankey who acted like a specialist in conflict resolution and the fostering of collaboration; where Clack assumed that leadership meant "unyielding vision" and dominance over juniors, Sankey assumed it to imply the maximum feasible participation consistent with scheduled progress.

In terms of values, perceptions and assumptions, then, the case material permits the following conclusions:

1. Complex decision processes, where power is diffused across sectors and organizations, are situations of "multi-valued choice," as Subramaniam uses the term.
2. The existence of conflicting values is a vital factor in public decision-making and decision-makers need to handle it with care and sensitivity.
3. Even though value conflicts exist, the value differences need not impede progress if fundamental objectives are shared and the decision process itself is skillfully guided. One of the most striking aspects of the case is how a strong measure of agreement on the ultimate end to be served -- namely, a revitalized downtown core which, at the same time, was to play its proper part in "an urban community ... of which [Canadians] can all feel proud"¹³ eventually overrode the very significant sources of value conflict. Progress does require the recognition that different values exist, however. It also requires some degree of reconciliation, no matter how strongly the fundamental objectives are shared.
4. The existence of different perceptions is by no means entirely dependent on differences in values. They stem in part from differences in perspective (the city is not the region nor the NCC), in part from separate knowledge bases (the different organizational records surveyed during the case research were often inconsistent, even on the same issue), and in part from the personal disposition of the perceiver (at least one contributor of insights to the thesis, Marilyn Hart, was rather embittered by the process and this coloured her perceptions quite strongly).
5. The existence of different perceptions is an important factor in decision-making. If Clack did perceive local bureaucrats as small-minded, this necessarily affected his involvement with them. Similarly, if Greenberg saw

reason to be suspicious of federal/developer dealings, this was bound to affect the city/NCC relationship adversely.

6. Organizations and individuals engaged in public decision-making operate from different assumptions, and this factor is important to the decision process. The assumptions may be implicit or unconscious. Alternatively, they may be clear and understood but still differ. Clack's assumption of bureaucrat small-mindedness may not have been apparent even to him; however, his assumption that the galleria was pivotal to the project and hence had to be defended resolutely was clear to him and to everyone else closely involved in the decision process.
7. Successful conciliators will identify conflicting assumptions and surface these for review and reconciliation, as Lash did in relation to the Viking-Rideau/federal government relationship.

III. The Structuring of Decision Processes

Theoretical background

A common theme running through many of the theoretical positions outlined in Chapter One is the necessity for public decision-making to proceed in a structured way. The literature on project management, for example, is particularly explicit in showing that complex problems are likely to be resolved more easily and effectively if the decision process is structured properly. The project management method is built on the assumption that even extremely complex, one-of-a-kind public projects can be brought to fruition, provided a competent project team works within a structure which, while being necessarily flexible and adaptive, does proceed systematically.

In terms of regular, ongoing public decision-making activities, Subramaniam describes how the work of politicians and administrators is deliberately structured in Western democratic polities so that balanced multi-valued choices are made in a collaborative fashion. Dror goes further to argue that decision-making can be made even better if relevant knowledge from the social sciences is applied to the task of improving the existing decision structure: "We need to know how to design and redesign the policymaking structure and its process patterns."¹⁴

Along these same lines Howard and Abonyi advocate specific decision methodologies they believe can aid decision-makers to make better decisions, more systematically. Howard contends that a structured, analysis of options approach facilitates successful, collaborative negotiations among decision-makers as they search for agreement around some point of stability. Abonyi makes similar claims for his Strategic Impact and Assumptions-Identification Method, describing it as "a systematic procedure for identifying critical strategic issues that must be considered before binding commitments are taken ..."¹⁵

The question of which model or approach outlined in Chapter One matches most closely the reality of the Rideau Area Project case is considered in Chapter Eight. The present chapter addresses, more fundamentally, the question of whether decision-making was deliberately structured to resolve conflict and achieve collaboration and, if so, how. The relevant question for analysis, then, is the following:

What structured decision processes were used to resolve conflict and achieve collaboration while seeking to ensure that the decision process would culminate in a decision that was politically acceptable, and both managerially and technically feasible?

DPW, the City of Ottawa, the RMOC, OC Transpo, the Rideau Centre Corporation, CP Hotels, and the private consultants working on the project. The team was established in mid-1974 and was a staff-level one. Significantly excluded were representatives from Viking-Rideau and public interest groups. The membership distribution strongly favoured the federal government, being a split of eighteen to nine. Complementing his central team, Clack worked with a core staff group, under his personal direction, and made use of regular working sessions where the core staff and the co-chairmen (Clack and Wurtele) met with principal members of the project's consulting firms. Within a year a senior steering committee was established, comprising the Mayor of Ottawa, the Chairman of the NCC and the Chairman of the RMOC. It was not until mid-1975, and only after rigorous and persistent pressure from the city, that Clack added two public interest group representatives to the team.

Leadership of the project, in all save its political-level process, was in the hands of Clack, although he worked formally with a co-chairman from the city. Progress in staff-level decisions appears to have been the result of "a man with a mission, and a concomitant drive and conviction ... [who] did not tolerate any opposition to the central thrust of the NCC plan."¹⁶ Under Clack's direction a considerable volume and range of technical studies and related recommendations was produced -- and at this level, unlike at the managerial or political levels, Clack appears to have encouraged the identification and analysis of options where these did not depart from the overall concept plan. It was Greenberg's participation in the process, beginning in late 1975, that led to an active political-level process, the generation of alternatives to the galleria, and meaningful public participation.

Sankey also placed a project team at the centre of his decision structure. He headed the team, and its membership consisted of consultants hired directly by him

Case analysis and conclusions

Apart from the early NCC initiatives related to testing the waters for its 1972 concept plan, there was only one time throughout the Rideau Area Project decision process when an elaborate form of decision structure was not in place. This was the relatively brief hiatus period between the time Clack was removed from leadership of the project and Sankey assumed it. Even during this period Lash structured his four-month review very carefully. There were three periods of structured project discussion in all, as follows: the Rideau Centre Team planning sessions led by Clack and Wurtele from about July 1974 to August 1977; the Rideau Area Project Team planning sessions led by Sankey from about February to June 1978; and the period of political-level discussion and decision-making from about June 1978 to May 1979.

During these periods, provision was made for resolving conflict and fostering collaboration while, at the same time, keeping carefully targeted objectives in view. There were significant differences between the periods, however, and especially between the structured decision process of Clack, on the one hand, and the Lash-designed process led by Sankey, on the other. The differences bore on the relative prominence given to conflict/collaboration management, and on the extent to which participation was encouraged. A particularly significant difference between the two planning periods was the extent to which the decision process in each was formally co-ordinated. Decisions were taken at political, managerial and technical levels during these periods, yet provisions were not made equally well for moving decisions adequately from level to level.

It was noted in detail in a previous chapter that Clack worked with a project team of twenty-six members. These consisted of representatives from the NCC,

and staff seconded from the city and the NCC. The team worked with a Project Review and Advisory Group (PRAG), made up of representatives from all involved agencies and groups. It included representatives, therefore, from both Viking-Rideau and public interest groups, as well as first-time representation for the utilities and the province. Greater merchant representation was also provided. The project team was overseen by a senior co-ordinating committee at the official level, and a policy committee at the political level.

Sankey worked to ensure the activation of every one of these groups, and in the roles planned for them. The intent was to seek appropriate technical inputs, meaningful stakeholder participation in a review and advisory role, managerial coordination, and expeditious, well-informed political-level decisions. With Lash, he saw the decision process as one in which participants would "mutually adjust their interests and trade-offs in the face of proposals being made, so that all could gain some of the advantages they [sought], knowing that it [was] unlikely that any one member [could] gain every advantage it [sought]."¹⁷ PRAG meetings provided the primary forum for this adjustment process, with the policy committee receiving uncensored PRAG insights and recommendations.

Although his approach was consultative, conciliatory and open, Sankey worked to a carefully prepared schedule and with detailed work program breakdowns. He also followed a decision process that moved from issue identification, through information gathering and synthesis, to the development of alternatives and their testing against carefully developed decision criteria. He sought agreement through an iterative process of discussion, elimination, revision, further discussion and so on. He worked towards a strategic plan that was "not by any means a master plan ... [but, rather] a collection of flexible statements ... identifying major concerns ... and revitalization suggestions."¹⁸ Accompanying this flexible strategic plan was a

statement of five transportation options that had survived an options generation, review and assessment process covering an original twenty-three options. Sankey's sensitivity to public participation is shown by his establishment of a full-time representative on the team who was responsible for preparing newsletters, organizing open houses and handling other duties related to the flow of information to and from the public.

A third period of decision-making merits elaboration before conclusions are drawn on the issue of how decision processes were structured. This is the period from June 1978 to May 1979, when the decision process was primarily a political one. The process revolved around the policy committee established when Sankey was project leader, but also involved the co-ordinating committee, PRAG, a new Design and Implementation Group, and a reconstituted, Sankey-led project team acting in support of the policy and co-ordinating committees.

A special cohesion was given to the process during this period by the joint commitment to hammer out a suitable tripartite agreement based on shared values. The drafting of the agreement was largely in the hands of Sankey's team, but under strong direction from the political level which, at the same time, worked from the strategic plan and transportation options provided by the first Sankey-led project team. It was the policy committee itself, working with its respective political bodies, which had to iron out certain thorny issues. These related to cost sharing, land transfer, relative liability for implementation, conformity to established requirements of the city and the region, the developer's role, and the conflicting demands of interest groups which, by this stage, were well informed and very vocal.

As was the case during staff-level planning, the decision process was an iterative one. It moved from policy committee, to broader political discussions, to

further policy committee sessions, followed by broader political discussions. It was interspersed with special staff-level investigations requested by the political authorities and interspersed, also, with an open public meeting chaired by Mayor Greenberg. A tripartite agreement was hammered out through this process, and even with time out for a municipal election the political authorities took only a year to produce a document which committed all three levels of government to an agreement incorporating many previously contentious points.

Based on the case material, the following conclusions can be drawn concerning the structured processes used to resolve conflict, achieve collaboration, and reach a politically acceptable and technically feasible decision:

1. There was a deliberately structured decision process at all active phases of project development. This leads to the conclusion that both staff-level and political-level decision makers identify the need for a structured decision process.
2. There are significant alternatives from which to choose, in evolving a decision structure. The alternatives revolve around who will participate, in what roles, how fully, with what degree of dominance by a single participant, with what degree of genuine commitment to open communications, and with what technical and process support.
3. A successfully structured decision process appears to rest on the following minimum requirements:
 - a) careful provision for participation by all significant powerholders, at the times most appropriate to their participation,
 - b) a decision environment that fosters collaboration and reduces destructive conflict, while encouraging constructive conflict (as was evident during

PRAG meetings when transportation options were openly assessed in a constructive manner),

- c) provision for a multi-level decision process, involving processes at each of political, managerial and technical levels, with each level sensitive to the roles of the other two, and with provision for moving decisions properly from level to level, and
 - d) a blending of a strong commitment to getting results with a commitment to providing sufficient time to generate a workable consensus.
4. Technical decision-makers appear to move differently from managerial decision-makers. They are committed to well-tested technical processes and have an almost exclusive task orientation. This contrasts with the activities of managerial decision-makers who exhibit a lessened but still significant concern with technical matters and a much stronger concern with being politically sensitive. In turn, political decision-makers tend to move differently from managerial decision-makers, in their much greater preoccupation with politics, including how to respond to external pressures impinging on the decision process.

IV. The Role of Personal Competence

Theoretical background

Public decisions are still being made by human beings, however extensively the government is now using the computer. Someone or some group has to decide what issues merit attention, what resources should be allocated to examining a particular issue, how it should be examined including what decision technologies might be applied, who should be involved in various roles in the decision process, and what an appropriate decision schedule might be. And even where the process is not

formally structured, some such set of decision process issues has to be resolved as a decision evolves.

In the deliberate development of complex projects to the approval stage it has come to be realized by the Department of National Defence and others that the development process has to be managed carefully and skillfully, and that many skills are required to support the decision process. In this section the case material is analyzed in order to discover the kinds of personal skills decision-makers need to draw on in order to bring a project to fruition, and cope with the attendant needs of managing conflict and effecting collaboration.

The theoretical discussion in Chapter One indicates that there are at least three important categories of personal competence that are worth addressing in a case analysis. These are political, administrative or managerial, and technical competencies. To begin with, Subramaniam's organic political and rational administrative methods imply, clearly, respective political and administrative competence in decision-making. Subramaniam draws the distinction between the managerial skill of analyzing multi-objective choices in a logical, rational and structured manner, and the political skill of using intuition, common sense and good judgement to weigh and strike a balance among competing interest group demands.

Although the main thrust of his argument is that administrators tend to be skilled in the first sense and politicians in the second, Subramaniam acknowledges that both these skills can apply at staff and political levels. He points out that top administrators in most democracies "have become highly sensitive to political constraints by experience and they deal with pressure groups directly by delegation from the minister." He also argues that politicians should be better educated "in rational instruments of analysing multi-objective choices as the administrators acquire political sensitivity."¹⁹ The term "political sensitivity," as popularized by

Robertson,²⁰ implies that a good project leader will consider the prospective political-level response to staff-level proposals, as well as the possible political impact of different decision alternatives.

Howard sees analytical competence as a major requirement for successful decision-making but sees the need, additionally, for competence in dealing with diffused power situations through such special acts as informed negotiation, communication and the ability to search out points of equilibrium around which powerholders can reach stable agreement. He regards the art of politics, therefore, as a skill of significant value to those responsible for administrative aspects of the decision process, as well as those leading the process at the political level.

Abonyi highlights the two managerial competencies of identifying stakeholders and critical assumptions, and links these to competence in analysis. He also notes the importance of political, " 'process'-oriented skills"²¹ and technical competence which come into play when a decision-maker applies the insights he has gained from a SIAM analysis. A decision-maker may decide, for example, to modify the technical design of a project or, alternatively, to engage in "focused dialogue with particular stakeholders, resulting in change of attitude on their part."²²

Lindblom stresses the need for political skills in dealing with conflicting values and in using coping strategies so that appropriate compromises can be found among decision-makers. But he tends, generally, to see public decision-making as making lesser demands on human rationality than, say, Dror. Dror, convinced of the power of applied rationality, sees the need for managerial skill in each of the following areas: examining the consistency of values and goals, gathering information, forecasting, doing cost-benefit analyses, evolving appropriate decision criteria,

identifying/evaluating alternative solutions, constructing and using feedback systems, and establishing systematic operations.

Bennis and Slater, assessing the requirements for managing temporary projects, see the need for four managerial competencies: an understanding of large, complex human systems; the possession of and capacity to apply practical theories for "seeding, nurturing, and integrating individuals and groups" within these complex systems; interpersonal competence; and, finally, knowing "when to confront and attack, if necessary, and when to support and provide the psychological safety so necessary for growth."²³

The Department of National Defence stresses the special managerial competence required during the planning stage of project development. Anthony White lists the requirements related to competence in project management as including special skills in clarifying goals and objectives, defining problems, mobilizing resources, and building an effective project team composed of members with complementary skills and abilities who manage to work together to achieve project goals.

Starting from these theoretical considerations, the case material is examined below in terms of the role of personal competencies. The following question posed at the end of Chapter One serves to focus the analysis:

How important was the factor of personal competence — political, managerial and technical — in the decision process?

Case analysis and conclusions

Political competence. Clack showed a particular lack of political competence, both in the sense of dealing with the diffusion of power and in the sense of dealing with issues in a manner sensitive to political-level considerations. The most

striking example of this lack of competence -- and the one that appears to have lost him the leadership of the project -- is the situation in which, through insensitivity to political realities, he precipitated a confrontation between Lorry Greenberg and Pierre Juneau that proved acutely embarrassing to Juneau. Behind this incident was Clack's lack of political competence in the alternate sense; despite the strongest possible signals that the city was not prepared to live with a lack of development alternatives -- and alternatives that were meaningfully explored -- Clack continued to press for political approval of a single option, the galleria.

Greenberg, himself, showed none of the skills of the conciliator. His style was belligerent, out-spoken confrontation. But he had a good sense of what political-level politics was all about, he knew who to contact and when, he was aggressively protective of the rights of politicians against both staff and developers, and he knew when to push and when to concede -- as in the case of establishing the respective financial responsibilities of the city and the federal government. It was Greenberg who led the policy committee decision process, moreover, in the final critical year leading to the tripartite agreement.

Both Lash and Sankey demonstrated political competence, and in both senses. They understood the realities of diffused power and were skilled in the art of conciliation and compromise. They could find points of stability around which powerholders could agree, and had a clear appreciation of the role of the political level. Sankey proved adept, also, at working directly in support of the politicians in their search for the specific terms of the tripartite agreement.

Managerial competence. Two distinct styles of managing are evident in the case material: that of Clack, and that shared in common by Lash and Sankey. It has already been made clear that Clack's style tended to be autocratic, closed and

non-conciliatory, and that he placed great faith in his own strength of character and the power of the NCC vision. The style of Lash and Sankey, on the other hand, was more democratic, open, participative, and conciliatory.

In terms of the components of managerial competence noted earlier in this section, the following appears to have been the picture, using Clack and Sankey for purposes of comparison:

1. The administrative competence stressed by Subramaniam was possessed in considerable measure by both Clack and Sankey. They used logical procedures to establish objectives and Clack, particularly, worked competently to develop the original statement of project objectives. Sankey performed exceptionally well in eliciting and evaluating options, as illustrated in the case material related to transportation and land use planning from February to June 1978.
2. The stakeholder analysis and assumptions-identification competencies noted by Abonyi were possessed in significant measure by Sankey, who operated from a sense of behavioural and power realities. Like all good conciliators, he needed to understand different aspects of the decision process such as the distribution of power and the perceptions and perspectives of powerholders. His way of surfacing options and having them evaluated was not unlike Abonyi's method of assumptions-identification; it encouraged PRAG members to clarify and articulate their assumptions about the project. His broadening of the composition of the review and advisory group showed a keen awareness of the existence and rights of stakeholders. In contrast, this was not an area in which Clack was skilled, for reasons that have already been given.
3. Dror's stress on the power of applied rationality covers skills in setting goals, gathering information, forecasting, doing cost-benefit analyses, evolving appropriate decision criteria, identifying/evaluating alternative solutions, con-

structing and using feedback systems, and establishing systematic operations. Except for the last two competencies, the case material demonstrates that Sankey approached problem resolution in exactly the manner described, save that he integrated a process ability into the approach; he did all that Dror suggests is required but in a manner that showed a special sensitivity to behavioural factors. There is reason to believe that had Sankey been in charge of implementation he would have constructed and used feedback systems and established systematic operations in the same way that he carefully organized and controlled the activities related to project development. Clack, too, demonstrated most of the Dror skills, and all of them where his concept plan was not at stake. The marked difference is that he lacked the political and behavioural sensitivity of Sankey.

4. The first of four competencies listed by Bennis and Slater is an understanding of large, complex human systems. The case material does not address this directly, but Sankey's skill in manipulating so many system variables indicates he had at least an intuitive understanding of the complexity of the system with which he was dealing. As an architect, Clack may have had a professional understanding of complex physical systems. The case material shows that he was deficient, however, in fully understanding the human component.

The second skill is the capacity to seed, nurture and integrate individuals and groups into the system. This was Sankey's primary strength and one of Clack's primary deficiencies. The third and related skill, interpersonal competence, merits the same response, although Clack appears to have worked well with the developers and with local merchants. The final competence, too, is related; it is knowing "when to confront and attack ... and when to support and provide the psychological safety so necessary for growth."²⁴ That Clack

lacked this competence is clear. Taken as a whole, the case material suggests he lacked the behavioural sensitivity and calculation for this and did not apply his mind to such matters. The evidence is not as clear regarding Sankey. While the case material does not deal with behavioural issues in the required detail to identify incidents of "attacking and confronting," and so on, there is clear evidence that Sankey did have the strength in fostering collaboration the statement implies.

5. Finally, those of Anthony White's list of required skills not already covered are resource mobilization and team building. Team building implies assembling the most appropriate team in the first instance, and building it into a cohesive, effective team; on both counts Clack's competence was limited, and Sankey's very strong. Clack did appear to be adept at resource mobilization, in relation to assembling a particularly strong set of consultants; otherwise, the case material does not address this issue.

Technical competence. This is an aspect of the decision process on which the case only touches. It would have been a case in itself to have documented, properly, the range and volume of technical decision-making. Yet what is clear from the case material is that in complex projects of the magnitude of the Rideau Area Project, technical competence has a vital role to play. The politicians and managers wanted the revitalization of a fifty-acre area of downtown Ottawa in an economic and physical sense. Technical decisions were required, therefore, in relation to transportation routes, overpasses and underpasses, pedestrian walkways, pedestrian and transit malls, and so on, through an extremely numerous set of major categories of technical decision. Countless technical decisions were also required in relation to each component of each separate category.

This aspect of project decision-making appears to have gone very smoothly. This researcher did not come across any examples of glaring incompetence where, for example, the minutes of project team meetings reflected that this or that consultant required replacing because of poor performance. Nor were there examples of major time slippages caused by a failure of technical staff to deliver to schedule.

On the broad question, then, of how important the factors of political, managerial and technical competence were in the decision process, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. Each of the three competencies was related, crucially, to the quality, pace and eventual success or failure of the decision process. Political competence was required to effect the necessary compromises, to forge the terms on which the major powerholders could agree, and to move the process through the required political-level decision stages. Managerial competence was required to accomplish the necessary project development work by co-ordinating the contributions of so many different actors; it was necessary, also, to produce politically acceptable results on an appropriate schedule and at reasonable development costs. Technical competence was at the core of this very technically complex project.
2. Special care needs to be taken in choosing a project leader. The contrast between Clack and Sankey, in terms of success and failure, indicates that one key factor was their individual competence in managing a project. Sankey did have the special advantage of taking charge of the project when politicians were embarrassed about the lack of progress but, otherwise, he managed comparable factors toward a comparable end.

3. In large complex public projects, where power is widely diffused, political competence at the staff level is essential.

V. Rationality in Public Sector Decision-making

Theoretical background

The preceding section has shown that in meeting the demands placed on them decision-makers in the Rideau Area Project case acted in both rational and non-rational ways during the course of the project. In terms of rationality, the decision-makers were required to be managerially and technically competent; in terms of intuition and other non-rational qualities, the decision-makers were required to be skilled communicators and negotiators. Conclusions have not yet been reached, however, in relation to the issue of whether decision-makers approached the project from a comprehensively rational or incrementalist stance.

Did they approach the project as Dror believes they should, convinced of the fact that they can move systematically and in a comprehensive fashion to clarify objectives, explicitly evaluate a wide range of alternatives in terms of their predicted consequences and decide to implement an alternative they judge will bring the maximum beneficial results? Alternatively, did they proceed in a manner that showed them to be far less certain of their own capacity to approach decisions in a comprehensively rational way and, therefore, more inclined to move in Lindblom fashion to explore only incremental policies, building from what they knew and where they already were?

As was discussed in an earlier section of this chapter, the particular values, perceptions and assumptions of decision-makers can have a significant bearing on how a decision process proceeds. The concern here is with the value that the decision-makers placed on being comprehensively rational and on the general

decision-making approach or outlook they adopted as a result of this valuing. It would be useful to know whether success in dealing with the conflict/collaboration issues of the Rideau Area Project was due in some measure to a comprehensively rational approach or, alternatively, to an incremental approach.

From the theoretical material presented in Chapter One, it might be expected that the project was guided by a political or incremental approach since Subramaniam, Howard, Abonyi, and Lindblom all highlight the factors at work that detract from the rationality of public sector decision-making. Subramaniam argues that only a relatively minor part of the decision-making process actually relates to rational administrative activities such as using analytical procedures to identify policy goals and means. According to Subramaniam, successful decision-making rests, in the end, on the organic political activities of politicians and politically sensitive senior administrators. These top officials are drawn into situations of interest group bargaining where decisions are made more on the basis of sound judgement and common sense than on the basis of the strict application of rational analytical procedures. The rational administrative work of lower level bureaucrats only serves a supportive or advisory function, providing senior decision-makers with information to balance against the political imperatives.

Similarly, Howard states that "real-world policy decisions ... are not 'rational' in the sense of being chosen as the appropriate means toward some set of objectives."²⁵ Instead, they are necessarily political because decision-making involves the pursuit of multiple objectives and the search for workable compromises among decision-makers. As Abonyi underlines, decision-makers look for stable, implementable solutions "in a dynamic 'game' of conflict and cooperation"²⁶ rather than the best or optimal decision. The overall thrust of decision-making activities, then, for these theorists, is political rather than rational.

Lindblom takes the strongest and most explicit position against comprehensive rationality. He argues that a purely rational approach to decision-making is impossible because it "assumes intellectual capacities and sources of information that men simply do not possess, and it is even more absurd as an approach to policy when the time and money that can be allocated to a policy problem is limited, as is always the case."²⁷ Rather than wasting time trying to isolate and evaluate distinct ends and means, and trying to choose the most appropriate means to the desired ends, Lindblom advocates moving in a much less rational manner. He believes that it is better to settle on remedial, incremental policies which will achieve only part of some identified objective but which can, nevertheless, be considered good because several different decision-makers can agree on them.

It is left to Dror to defend the search for "how to establish and improve the rational components of optimal policy-making."²⁸ He advocates the use of a comprehensive process in which decision-makers first move to consistent values and goals, then collect the information they need to identify and evaluate the alternative paths to their goals, and move subsequently to put in place carefully organized operations and appropriate feedback systems. Bennis and Slater stress the potential for creating effective problem-solving units, while the project management literature tends, in general, to reflect the conviction that project specifications, cost and schedule can be established with a high degree of rigour and that the implementation process can be managed very systematically and with the same degree of rigour. At the same time, however, the conflict/collaboration issues are highlighted in the same literature, including a concern with such intangible but vital issues as the "chemistry" of a project team and the "art" of the project manager.

The intent, now, is to answer the following question:

How comprehensively rational was the process, in contrast to being either incremental or political in nature?

Case analysis and conclusions

The case material demonstrates the complexity of the issue of rationality. In the first place, because the Rideau Area Project was a project, it could be expected that it would be approached systematically. By definition, a project has an identifiable beginning and a foreseeable end. Moreover, for something to emerge as a project implies that a significant issue requiring attention has been identified and there is already some sense of the desired end. Because it is a project it also requires that attention be paid to such factors as scheduling, proper costing and developing clear project specifications.

Yet, while projects appear to lend themselves to applied rationality, the project management method has emerged, somewhat paradoxically, as a special technique for handling the considerable uncertainty inherent in large, complex projects. It is this uncertainty that gives rise to the need to assign managerial responsibility to an accountable project manager. Something may become a separate and distinct project, singled out from the mainstream of ongoing activity, simply because it is impossible to sit down in advance and develop a blueprint against which implementation can proceed. Even with the tripartite agreement, only the broadest of parameters for the Rideau Area Project were established -- and in 1972 whatever blueprint existed turned out, by 1977, to be in some of its aspects an impediment to project progress.

The Rideau Area Project was not a strikingly large one, on a world scale. Yet it took skilled and dedicated people almost eight years to bring it to the tripartite

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agreement stage. It was not that Clack was less rational than he should have been, judged against reasonable standards. He was a successful architect of proven experience. Some saw him as a superlative urban designer, and even his critics saw him as exceptionally bright, articulate and tough minded. One can visualize Clack working in conformity with Dror's stated requirements of rational decision-making to identify the objectives to be achieved, and then proceeding, logically and systematically, to map out the organizational structure, resource requirements, control structure, communications requirements, and so on. Yet, always, his rationality operated within the limits of his own personality; Clack was a person of very strong beliefs and commitment, and his attitudes to bureaucrats and private developers appear to have coloured his thinking. Because the thinking that comprised his rational processes was coloured, his rationality was limited.

If comprehensive rationality implies only what Dror describes, then it is nothing more than the systematic application of human intelligence to public problems, or a rigorous way of approaching, logically, the public issues decision-makers have to address. The case demonstrates that each of Clack, Lash and Sankey approached their respective roles in a comprehensively rational way. Notwithstanding the fact that the original decision to establish a project emerged slowly over time in cumulative response to day to day pressures, and therefore in a manner consistent with Lindblom's position on incrementalism, the decision process proper followed a rationalist model. The entire period from 1972 to 1979 was one in which a considerable number of intelligent human beings systematically focussed their combined skills on the resolution of an important public issue. An agreement did emerge, and by 1983 a functioning structure was in place that had resolved the original issue at least in very considerable measure.

Some theorists, perhaps setting up straw men, hold that to be comprehensively rational implies much more than dealing with issue resolution in a comprehensive, systematic and structured way. Lindblom and Howard, for example, tend to discuss rationality as if it implies an intellectual capacity to grasp the total complexity of an existing situation, to identify the most appropriate ways of intervening, and to forecast accurately what will happen to that situation in every respect throughout the deliberately planned interventions. If it is used to imply this then the case material demonstrates the untenable nature of this definition. Clack could not possibly have grasped even a small part of the total complexity with which he had to work. As a small instance, he had probably never been exposed to behavioural theory -- and even had he been he may not have been able, temperamentally, to use its insights.

If rationality requires divorcing the exercise of human intelligence from all other aspects of human functioning, the case demonstrates the untenable nature of this position also. Every actor in the case can be presumed to have been of reasonable intelligence, yet different actors addressed the same issues very differently, and not in a manner that suggested their intelligence was primarily at fault. They saw differently and felt differently, and applied their intelligence from different knowledge backgrounds. Their experience was different, and they worked out of organizations with different cultures.

Putting aside these two extremes, the issue appears to be the relative capacity and tendency of public decision-makers to confront issues rationally, in the sense of deliberately and systematically applying their intelligence to issue resolution. The case makes it a reasonable inference that, in this more limited sense, large complex projects are approached rationally. The decision-makers involved did strive to resolve the key issue they had identified, and seemed aware that they

were dealing with a complex project which, although rooted in history, would change the face of Ottawa significantly. The project was not a series of disjointedly incremental decisions, based on past experiences and combining by mere accumulation into a changed direction. The change was deliberately sought and systematically pursued.

The following conclusions can be drawn on the issue of rationality:

1. The decision process met the specifications laid out by Dror. To that limited extent it was comprehensively rational.
2. It did not move incrementally. From the beginning in 1972 and throughout the process the attempt was made to resolve a clearly identified issue, in a particular way, in recognition that the outcome would constitute a significant change. It was also recognized that success required moving systematically on many interrelated aspects of the project.
3. If rationality implies choosing the most appropriate means to some set of objectives then there were significant limits to rationality at work throughout the process. Trying to decide on what was appropriate meant coming to grips with complex political, managerial and technical issues, and as previous analysis has sought to show, each of these issue areas can present significant challenges related to the identification and evaluation of options. Finding the most appropriate means, moreover, could imply the application of pure, all-knowing, limitless intelligence. If it does, then it is constrained by perspective, perception, temperament, emotions, values, motivational forces, attitudes, knowledge, and so on.

Endnotes

1. Foreword to Complex Decision Problems, by Radford, p. x.
2. "The Science of 'Muddling Through,'" p. 86.
3. Quoted in Baker, "Core," p. 4.
4. Temporary Society, p. 106.
5. "SIAM," pp. 34-35.
6. Ibid., p. 34.
7. Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1966), p. 222.
8. Ibid., p. 241.
9. Fullerton and Morin, "A Superlative Urban Designer," p. 6.
10. Clack, Brief, pp. 4, 7.
11. There is considerable irony in the fact that Greenberg received a special plaque from regional council after the tripartite agreement was signed, on which the following statement was inscribed: "Given to Lorry Greenberg --The Dreamer whose dream became reality." Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton, Minutes of Meetings of the Council (Bound), meeting of May 23, 1979, p.1598.
12. Quoted in Harper, "Dream," p. 41.
13. Canada, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, Barney Danson, speaking on the Speech from the Throne, debate of October 15, 1974, p. 405.
14. Public Policymaking Reexamined, p. 222.
15. "SIAM," p. 32.
16. Perkins, Personal Files, notes on an interview with a staff member of the National Capital Commission, Ottawa, May 1981.
17. Lash, Final, p. 8 (article 11.4 with emphasis on "mutually adjusted their interests" in the original).
18. Project Team, Phase 2, p. 120.
19. "Choice," pp. 7-8.

20. Gordon Robertson, "The Changing Role of the Privy Council Office," Canadian Public Administration 14(Winter 1971): 506.
21. "SIAM," p. 49.
22. Ibid.
23. Temporary Society, p. 122.
24. Ibid.
25. Foreword to Complex Decision Problems, by Radford, p. ix.
26. "SIAM," p. 35.
27. "The Science of 'Muddling Through,'" p. 80.
28. Public Policymaking Reexamined, p. 222.

CHAPTER EIGHT

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS — THE THEORY

In this chapter the six sets of theory-testing questions posed at the end of Chapter One are addressed in light of the evidence provided by the case material. The questions deliberately narrow the focus of the analysis, in recognition of the fact that neither the discussion presented in Chapter One nor the analyses about to be presented could hope to address the full scope of the models and approaches to which reference is made.

I. Multi-valued Choice

The discussion of Subramaniam's position on multi-valued choice in Chapter One was based entirely on a single source, "Policy as Multi-Objective Choice." It would be presuming too much, therefore, to treat his material as if it comprised a detailed, cohesive decision-making model and it would certainly be inappropriate to proceed; then, to criticize his "model" for a shortcoming such as oversimplification. The comments in this section are thus limited to addressing the validity and usefulness of some important arguments presented by Subramaniam and to indicate ways they could be refined.

The preceding chapter provided evidence that the Rideau Area Project is a case example of making multi-valued choices, as Subramaniam uses the term. It was shown that the case involved a large mix of actors who brought a wide range of distinctive values, perceptions and assumptions to bear on the complex decision situation. To the extent that significant insights were obtained by considering the issue of multiple objectives or values in the Rideau Area Project case, we can conclude that Subramaniam's focus is a useful one; complex decision processes can

be viewed as exercises in multi-valued choice. What remains to be determined, however, is the extent to which Subramaniam is correct in his more specific assertions about how different value orientations shape the way politicians and administrators approach multi-valued choice problems and interact to solve them.

It would be of considerable explanatory value to confirm the following hypotheses from Subramaniam:

1. Politicians tend to approach decision situations in an intuitive, unstructured, organic political way, whereas administrators adopt a more rational, structured, analytical approach, due to their different value orientations. Politicians value the need to gain interest group support so they can be re-elected and administrators value a rational, non-partisan approach to carrying out their assigned responsibilities.
2. The real core activity in any decision-making process is the mutual discussion that takes place between politicians and senior bureaucrats at the interface of politics and administration where feasible, well-balanced decisions are formulated.
3. To the extent that the ideal of clearly separated bureaucratic and political roles does not occur in practice, balanced choices are nevertheless achieved because administrators are becoming politicized and are thus tending to practice both approaches -- they evaluate policy problems politically and rationally.

The following question was posed at the end of Chapter One to guide an analysis of this kind:

Does Subramaniam's distinction between the organic political and rational administrative methods of approaching public decisions hold true and prove helpful in the Rideau Area Project case? More generally, was there

any consistency in the way politicians and bureaucrats approached their respective roles in the decision process?

The primary source material on the project is rich in information on the activities of bureaucrats and politicians as they grappled with a complex, multi-valued choice problem. It provides some confirmation of Subramaniam's proposition that politicians tend to approach decision situations, both in setting an agenda for government decision activities and in resolving identified problems, by responding to interest group demands. According to Subramaniam, they do so because they are under pressure to gain the support of groups to ensure their re-election. Two instances from the case illustrate this point. First, the Mayor of Ottawa decided to approach the NCC in the early 1970s to see if the two governments could move jointly on redevelopment plans because he saw the need to redress the economic misfortunes of very vocal and embittered Rideau Street merchants. Secondly, city council approved a motion on November 1, 1978, only a few weeks before a municipal election, to insist that there be adequate provision for pedestrian crossings and parking facilities on George Street in the Byward Market, as vocal citizen groups had so loudly demanded.

The case material also provides evidence to support the position that administrators perform the role of trying to balance values in some logical and rational way as they take part in the process of resolving difficult public problems. The very impressive and costly set of analyses, technical studies and project team evaluations undertaken at the administrative level of government from 1972 to 1979 were exercises in what Subramaniam calls the rational administrative method of making a multi-valued choice.

Moreover, the case demonstrates how senior bureaucrats in the NCC and the City of Ottawa handled their dual role as political administrators, at once charged

with the task of listening to and balancing demands from private and public groups, as well as the further task of generating technical analyses. The two different sets of formal organizational machinery implemented during the planning stage of the process were, in effect, attempts to provide a workable structure so that both the political and administrative evaluation of decision alternatives could take place, successfully, at the administrative level of government.

In all these respects, therefore, the Rideau Area Project case supports some of Subramaniam's basic propositions. Yet, it also indicates the need for certain refinements to make the propositions more representative of real-life, multi-valued decision-making.

First of all, the case material shows that politicians and public administrators do not work, exclusively, within their respective organic political and rational administrative frameworks. Rather, they appear to move quite freely between the two frameworks and, indeed, need at times to move freely in order to effect the kind of collaboration that is necessary to solve complex problems. Greenberg approached the project as much from his background as an expert in property development as from his role as a politician, thus combining a rational administrative with an organic political approach. Similarly, both Lash and Sankey, while possessing solid technical qualifications, showed great political sensitivity and employed their own variant of the organic political method to foster the compatibility among interests that was required for the project's success. Clack, on the other hand, failed to take the project to a successful conclusion precisely because, for all his undoubted technical competence and his energetic pursuit of a rational administrative solution, he proved incapable of accommodating and reconciling the interests of divergent powerholders.

It may not be appropriate to deal with Lash and Sankey along with politicians and administrators in the same discussion, in that Subramaniam does not attempt to incorporate this third category of actors, hired consultants, into his propositions. Nevertheless, the activities of Sankey, especially, do have a bearing on the theory of multi-valued choice because he performed the role of an administrator in the Rideau Area Project decision-making process. Sankey was hired to take on the job of project leader which had been given, earlier, to a senior NCC administrator and which was to be given during the implementation stage to a senior city administrator, David Donaldson. Indeed, the fact that Sankey performed so well in his role as project leader, when compared to Clack, leads one to believe that the special skills of a process consultant may be particularly appropriate to multi-valued choice situations, and worth inculcating in administrators. From the standpoint of Subramaniam's theory, one special skill that distinguished Sankey from Clack may very well have been his ability to move freely between organic political and rational administrative frameworks or, in other words, to apply a considerable degree of sensitivity to both the political and administrative factors in public decisions.

This researcher was quite surprised to learn that Sankey played such a major role during the final stages of the political-level discussions leading to the signing of the tripartite agreement. Here, at least, one might have expected the politicians to have been capable of working out, by themselves and among themselves, the basic terms of a tripartite agreement. Conciliatory and negotiating skills are supposed to be in abundant supply among politicians. Yet, the case shows they needed the help of Sankey, the process expert, to do what was quintessentially a political job. As in the case of Sankey filling the project leader position, however, the conclusion to be reached is not that the politicians or

administrators who participated in the project were particularly inept and therefore unable to perform their roles well without outside help. The more appropriate conclusion is that even the most intelligent, capable and well-intentioned public officials may not necessarily be skilled in dealing with the unique conflict/collaboration demands of complex decision situations. If Subramaniam's propositions have been applied correctly, the ability to move freely between organic political and rational administrative frameworks appears to be part of what it takes to deal effectively with conflict and collaboration in multi-valued choice.

It is worth noting that neither the position of Chairman of the NCC nor that of Chairman of the RMOC fits readily into the simple dichotomy of organic political/rational administrative frameworks. Both positions are striking examples of how political and administrative functions are at times combined. Some NCC chairmen who participated in the Rideau Area Project had previously been administrators while others, like Drury, had been politicians. Though appointed officials, both chairmen had to deal directly with politicians and interest groups and had to try to reach political accommodations. It was Coolican, for example, as Chairman of the RMOC, who in the end broke the tie vote at regional council in favour of the transit mall so the project could receive official political approval.

A further and final possible refinement of Subramaniam's position appears necessary, given the evidence of the case material. The notion of politicians interacting with senior administrators at the interface of politics and administration does not nearly do justice to the complex nature of the interactions that occur during the resolution of multi-valued choice problems. The Rideau Area Project case shows that politicians and administrators alike have to learn to deal well not only with each other, but with powerholders outside their particular jurisdiction or sector. Moreover, in addition to politicians needing to interact well with other

politicians, and administrators with their administrative counterparts, there can be important cross-jurisdictional interfaces between politicians and administrators, resulting in a total set of political/administrative interactions of very considerable complexity. This complexity is compounded, significantly, when a range of private sector actors is added to the decision process.

It was a reasonable expectation that, at some point during the Rideau Area Project decision process, politicians at federal, regional and local levels would need to agree on basic directions, and that what they agreed on would have to incorporate what the developers and other key powerholders could accept. Yet the action which resulted, eventually, in the removal of Clack and the arrival of Sankey on the scene, developed from a political/administrative interaction across jurisdictional boundaries. This took the form of Greenberg, as the Mayor of Ottawa, confronting Clack, as the NCC's senior administrator on the project. Such interactions can indeed be very complex and can depart, greatly, from the simple model of organic political versus rational administrative positions. As an illustration, both Greenberg and Clack protected their respective territories with far more ego concern than objective rationality, and Greenberg's attack on Clack was, at least in part, from the perspective of an administrator rather than a politician.

To reiterate the major points raised above, the following conclusions can be drawn from the case study related to the validity and usefulness of Subramaniam's work on multi-valued choice:

1. Complex public decisions, involving several distinct powerholders, are invariably situations of multi-valued choice -- and conflicting values can affect the decision process significantly.
2. The values of politicians, as a group, are different from those of administrators, and do tend to include more of a concern for consensus and compromise

than for rationality. However, the individual politician and, in turn, the individual administrator can depart significantly from the respective norms.

3. The organic political and rational administrative categories can be applied to decision-making styles, provided they are not used as a clear and reliable indicator of differences in style between all politicians on the one hand and all administrators on the other. Some administrators adopt organic political approaches to decisions and some politicians adopt rational administrative. As an example, Clack's style tended to be rational administrative while Sankey's included a strong element of organic political. It seems more useful to point to political and administrative concerns in the decisions of both politicians and administrators, than to adopt the position that each will approach his or her decision-making role in a manner tied to a distinction between political and administrative methods. This is consistent with Subramaniam's normative stand that politicians ought to be formally trained in rational methods of policy analysis, in order to keep in step with administrators who are becoming increasingly sensitive to political imperatives.

II. Metagame Theory

Nigel Howard's work can be broken usefully into a concern with underlying theory, which he labels metagame theory, and a particular technique, metagame analysis, developed to apply this theory. The present section addresses metagame theory only, leaving metagame analysis to the following section. The point was made quite clearly in Chapter One that metagame theory draws attention to issues of collaboration and conflict in public decision-making. Through his study of real-world problems like the Vietnam War and the Arab-Israeli conflict, Howard came to realize that complex decisions are more likely to be resolved if decision-makers

confront, head on, the conflictual nature of decision situations and learn how to negotiate stable solutions that meet to some acceptable extent the objectives of all decision participants.

The following two questions, taken from the end of Chapter One, are designed to guide an analysis of the Rideau Area Project case material to see if it supports Howard's contentions about collaboration and conflict and the need to search out points of stability:

Does the case bear out Howard's contention that multi-actor, diffused-power decision situations are rife with collaboration/conflict concerns? If so, how well was this recognized and accounted for by those leading the decision process?

The preceding chapter addressed both questions quite fully, although not directly in relation to testing Howard's metagame theory. To move immediately to formulating conclusions; therefore, the following are judged supportable from the case material:

1. If the Rideau Area Project is at all typical, multi-actor, diffused-power situations are rife with collaboration/conflict concerns. The entire thesis, from its title on, both assumes and documents this highly significant aspect of public decision-making. To ignore the existence of collaboration/conflict concerns in such decision-making would lead to a seriously distorted picture of the real world.
2. The conflict inherent in multi-actor, diffused-power situations can be of either a destructive or a constructive nature. Good project leaders will manage conflict, therefore, to reduce its destructive aspects (for example, the lack of trust between the city and the NCC during the planning period led by Clack and Wurtele), and to stimulate its constructive aspects (for example, the

interplay of many perspectives and perceptions during PRAG planning sessions led by Sankey).

3. Good project leaders work from the assumption that there will be collaboration/conflict concerns, necessarily, in diffused-power, multi-valued choice situations. Sankey and Lash did. Clack did to some extent, although not sufficiently. The existence of such concerns is acknowledged and accounted for in a variety of ways: in setting up multi-actor project teams in the first instance; in designing decision processes to bring powerholders into close interaction; in the scheduling of decisions to allow time for developing consensus and effecting compromise; in calling on the special abilities of skilled negotiators; and in designing decision structures that function at several levels and are linked effectively from level to level.
4. Howard's central theoretical point, concerning the need to search out a point of equilibrium which satisfies all powerholders to the extent that none sees advantage in moving away from it, is amply demonstrated in the case material. Clack's failure to recognize and account for this core consideration in collaboration/conflict situations, and Sankey's success in doing so, were pivotal factors in the decision process.
5. Another of Howard's points, illustrated by his use of the term "metagame" in place of "game," is also demonstrated in the case material. The decision situation was not a static one; points of apparent stability were reached, only to have sanctions exercised by one powerholder or another so that a new equilibrium had to be found. This was the case, for example, in September 1975 when Clack first brought the Rideau Centre Team proposals for a gallery forward to the political authorities for approval. Clack thought he had developed a strong base of support for the proposals, but was to find that

members of the senior steering committee -- and, most notably, Lorry Greenberg -- were not impressed by the team's efforts. The committee exercised its power to direct the team to develop feasible alternatives to the galleria. It appears that successful collaboration/conflict managers like Lash, Sankey and to some extent Greenberg do consider first order, "what if...?" and then second order, "what if then...?" types of questions, in seeking points of stable agreement among powerholders. They do not give such consideration, however, in the precise and explicit manner proposed by Howard.

III. Metagame Analysis

The structured technique Howard developed to help decision-makers cope with complex decision situations is called metagame analysis or the analysis of options method. When applied properly it is intended to provide decision-makers with insight into the kinds of stable solutions they might be able to negotiate with other decision-makers. It is also designed to indicate how each possible solution could be negotiated, thus preparing the decision-makers for the process of multi-actor interactions:

None of the participants in the Rideau Area Project actually used the technique of metagame analysis, although it was shown in the preceding section that Sankey, in particular, behaved in a manner quite consistent with the main tenets of metagame theory, from which metagame analysis was derived.

In order to develop an appreciation for the extent to which Howard's methodology can be used to improve decision-making, the present section provides a response to the following hypothetical question:

Could Howard's metagame analysis have been applied at any stage to

shorten the decision process and reduce or eliminate unproductive conflict?

Metagame analysis requires that at least one player recognize the decision situation as a diffused-power one, requiring collaboration around an acceptable point of equilibrium. The individual player needs to be prepared and able to carry out a rigorous analysis of the situation and, in the process, to identify possible points of stability. He also needs to be sufficiently skilled in communication and negotiation so that he can bring the other players to see, first, that it is a diffused-power situation and, secondly, that the power is diffused in a particular way. The possibility then exists for all players to participate in clarifying their respective objectives and, subsequently, finding a point of equilibrium that will remain stable over time. This will be "a position from which it is not to the advantage of any to move;"¹ in other words, it will be a decision scenario in which each player believes that one or more of the other players will apply some sanction against him, if he tries to improve his position by unilateral action.

In the period of Clack's leadership only the NCC had the necessary strength to be able to use metagame analysis effectively. Any other actor could have used the analysis to identify the full set of actors, determine the objectives of each, identify the sanctions that each actor could bring against the others, and identify points of equilibrium. However, without special leadership and negotiating strengths the knowledge gained could not have been put to effective use. In the case of the NCC, Clack had the leadership role but appears to have had neither the commitment to meaningful collaboration and compromise nor the inclination and skills of the effective negotiator required to use the results of a metagame analysis.

Sankey, on the other hand, could have made good use of metagame analysis. It systematizes what he did as a matter of course. Sankey appears to have had the mind-set of a metagame analyst without the disciplined methodology. He also had the inclination and skills of the effective negotiator, as well as access to PRAG which could have been used as a vehicle for working through the metagame process to arrive at acceptable points of stability to present to the political level. Indeed, Sankey was later hired to support the political-level process. He might have been able to apply metagame analysis to identify and negotiate the acceptance of appropriate points of stability as the basis for the tripartite agreement.

The key question is whether using metagame analysis would have shortened the process and/or improved the quality of the results. This researcher has no experience in applying metagame analysis. Nor can he give a satisfactory answer based on the literature, because he is not aware of any controlled experiments from which to draw comparative conclusions. However, three observations can be made:

1. It was probably appropriate that PRAG went only as far as it did, that is, to identify options rather than seek points of agreement. It was, after all, only an advisory body without any power to make binding decisions. Moreover, whatever points of equilibrium PRAG might have found, the political authorities would have moved subsequently to find their own equilibrium points, through a process that reflected their own values rather than those of PRAG. While they showed a willingness to be informed by PRAG insights, the political authorities also showed that they were quite prepared to follow their own path in the face of very vocal pressure to move in different directions.
2. The final stage of the decision process went smoothly without a more disciplined approach, and did not take up more time than appeared reasonable.

When a decision can be made using well established, familiar approaches, such as Sankey's use of a physical model of the project, one wonders what would have been gained by adding methodological sophistication.

3. There is probably only a limited set of circumstances under which metagame analysis can be applied effectively. It is possible that it took Clack's commitment to his vision, and his lack of responsiveness to the objectives of other actors, to sharpen their awareness of the possibility of alternatives; a better, more charismatic leader might have won enthusiastic support for his vision. Clack may well have played a role, therefore, in creating a tension-filled environment in which skilled conciliators and negotiators like Lash and Sankey were valued and could operate successfully. The effective application of metagame analysis may require, then, not only a complex decision situation wherein power is diffused among individuals and groups, but acknowledgement of its complexity and a willingness to seek compromise positions.

IV. Stakeholder Analysis

The structured technique developed by Abonyi to help decision-makers cope with complex decision situations is called the Strategic Impact and Assumptions-Identification Method or SIAM. It shares a great deal in common with metagame analysis in that it also offers decision-makers a chance to gather pertinent information to prepare them for multi-actor negotiations. The end product for both methodologies is information on those points of conflict or sources of uncertainty in relations with others that must be confronted and resolved if decision-makers are going to make progress toward reaching a stable, implementable decision.

An important difference between SIAM and metagame analysis, however, is their respective starting points for analysis. Howard's metagame analysis begins with an identification of those key players with power to affect the ultimate decision who will participate directly in multi-actor negotiations. This identification of key actors is not stressed by Howard, however, as a critical and demanding step.

Abonyi's SIAM begins with a very careful identification of the broad group of actors he calls stakeholders. These are all those individuals and groups who potentially have some vested interest in the decision, either directly or indirectly. His concern, then, is not only with powerholders in a narrow sense, that is, with those who are able to influence the decision process directly; it is also with those who will be affected by the project's impact over time, beyond the actual decision stage.

Abonyi wants decision-makers to attend to a project's "strategic viability" as well as its "economic viability,"² with strategic viability incorporating considerations of long-term social impact. He sees it as vital that care be exercised in seeking a close fit between the design of the project and the needs of the broad community of affected social groups. Yet he also stresses the difficulty of achieving this fit, in a society "characterized more by ... localized and individualized interests than by societal consensus on abstract-objectives."³

If Abonyi's SIAM is a powerful tool in support of public decision-making then we should be able to see success or failure in stakeholder analysis and assumptions-identification as a factor in the decision process. We should also be able to identify points during the process when the type of disciplined process Abonyi advocates would have improved the decision process. Improvements would have come either by helping to identify and resolve underlying conflicts among stake-

holders or by helping to arrive at more politically and socially relevant decisions "that meet the needs of divergent interests."⁴

Accordingly, the following questions have been posed to test the applicability of SIAM:

Is there evidence of leading actors systematically identifying the other stakeholders in the process, assessing their importance to the project and their respective objectives and power, and searching for socially-sound solutions satisfactory to a wide range of stakeholders? If so, did this have the positive effect one might infer from Abonyi? If not, could the process have been improved through more rigorous analysis using SIAM?

There is abundant evidence of leading actors systematically identifying other stakeholders, if the term "stakeholder" is equated to that of "powerholder." The existence of a range of stakeholders was noted clearly in Turner's announcement of the project in 1972, and an NCC report of 1973 linked four major sets of actors to specific aspects of the project. The decision structure of the Clack and Wurtele project team provided for participation by a number of different stakeholders, and Lash and Sankey identified and provided for still more. In relation to stakeholders without power, there was little consideration of these, although Rideau Crossroads, prepared by the Rideau Centre Public Advisory Committee in 1976, did stress the need to consider "those who live in the community now and who will live there decades later."⁵

Although the existence of different stakeholders was recognized, their importance to the project and their respective objectives and power were by no means as uniformly considered or assessed. During the Clack era there was a noticeable lack of sensitivity to the objectives of certain stakeholders. Moreover, little attempt was made under Clack to carefully and deliberately identify what each stakeholder

wanted to see achieved. Nor was much effort spent finding ways of reconciling the competing objectives.

The reverse was true in the case of Lash and Sankey. In the words of Lash, PRAG members were to "endeavour ... to mutually adjust their interests and trade-offs in the face of proposals being made, so that all may gain some of the advantages they seek, knowing that it is unlikely that any one member can gain every advantage it seeks."⁶ The composition of PRAG reflected the results of a form of powerholder analysis in that Lash and Sankey had to give careful consideration to the issue of whose involvement was required in the project. The way in which Lash saw the significance of the Viking-Rideau/federal government relationship issue and the need to settle this indicated his awareness of power as a major factor in public decisions.

The decision process subsequently employed by Sankey reflected an understanding of the need to reconcile competing stakeholder objectives. Sankey went to very considerable lengths to make certain that the different stakeholder positions or assumptions were acknowledged and displayed. The strategic plan his team sent forward for political consideration was "a collection of flexible statements ... and revitalization suggestions"⁷ and throughout the phase of the decision process led by him, solid attempts were made to communicate, upwards, the viewpoints of all participating stakeholders even where such views were not generally shared or supported.

There is no evidence that anyone involved in the project applied structured analysis in the manner advocated by Abonyi. No one carefully mapped out a comprehensive set of project-stakeholder linkages and then categorized and prioritized this information to determine which stakeholders really had a significant bearing on the project's design, implementation or consequences. Nor did any

participants directly apply themselves to the task of using this information to assess the social soundness of the project to try to ensure a close fit between the project's design and the needs of affected stakeholders.

Informally, however, and as noted in the preceding chapter, each of Lash, Sankey and Greenberg were sensitive to the diffusion of power and the need, therefore, to bring all powerholders into the decision process. Lash, for example, did a good job of making sure that the new project team set up on his recommendation was an improvement over the earlier team in regard to the number of relevant interests who could formally participate in the planning process. As the discussion to this point has shown, this informal application of stakeholder analysis had the beneficial result predicted by Abonyi; PRAG became the setting where underlying conflicts among stakeholders were surfaced and resolved.

Where the decision process fell very short of the ideal embodied in SIAM, however, was in regard to the issue of assessing the project's social soundness or strategic viability. Very little, if any, rigorous attempt was made to consider the project's long-term social impact, unless such analysis took place in the NCC prior to the decision to move on the project, which is a period not covered by the case material. Although there was a general awareness of the broader community's legitimate interest in project results, and the impact of the project on the image of the nation's capital and the general well-being of adjacent residential communities, the focus throughout the decision process was predominantly on the project's economic impact. The project was seen, primarily, as a response to serious economic difficulties suffered by Rideau Street merchants; it was extolled as a way to bring about a better, more prosperous economic future for the downtown core. Only one group, the Rideau Centre Public Advisory Committee, really made

a concerted effort to consider how the project would affect the community-at-large. Yet, the committee's proposals of 1976, contained in its report, Rideau Crossroads, flew directly in the face of major aspects of the project concept plan, and later events showed little evidence of any lasting impact from the committee's initiative. Certainly, city councillors did not show any unanimous desire to heed the advice of the public advisory committee during the final stages of the decision process in 1978, when it again voiced concern over the possibility that the project would have a disruptive social impact.

It is also in this context that we can understand why one project participant, Marilyn Hart, was very critical of the decision to sign the Tripartite Agreement of May 1979. In an interview in January 1985, Hart made it clear that she believes the local politicians "sold everyone and everything down the river, including their own principles"⁸ by approving the proposal to build a major traffic artery through the Byward Market. She insists politicians had earlier acknowledged that such a move would likely have a disastrous effect on the quality of life in the Byward Market, but were not willing to stick to their guns if it meant jeopardizing the chances to bring Eaton's to the Rideau Centre site.

Hart's position can be understood, in part, in light of the fact that she, too, was active alongside the public advisory committee in advocating a better understanding of the social impact of the project. As a senior planner with the City of Ottawa seconded to the project team during the Clack era, Hart was involved directly in the technical discussions related to planning issues of all sorts, such as pedestrian space, traffic flows and the Rideau Centre design. Yet she believed strongly that the project should be viewed in holistic fashion, with due consideration to the way it would affect -- to use Abonyi's term -- the "milieu vivant"⁹ of downtown Ottawa, including not only technical and economic factors

but, more importantly, the social fabric of the city or the quality of life of the citizens. Apart from her success in helping to establish formal citizen representation on the project team, Hart soon became disillusioned with the decision process because of its lack of commitment to a careful examination of social issues.

To assess whether the decision to implement the Rideau Area Project was socially sound would require moving well beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the project's implementation stage as well as the resulting consequences. From the case material it would be safe to assume that a great deal of the responsibility for making the project responsive to the needs of a wide range of stakeholders -- and particularly those without decision power -- must have fallen squarely on the shoulders of the city's project manager in charge of implementing the tripartite agreement, David Donaldson. It would be interesting to find out through further research whether Donaldson made more of an attempt than the earlier project managers to engage in a strategic impact analysis along the lines Abonyi proposes, while working within the general parameters established by the tripartite agreement.

On the evidence of the case material the following general conclusions can be drawn concerning Abonyi's methodology:

1. The concept of stakeholder is a useful one. It should be refined, however, to cover both powerholders, as stakeholders with power, and powerless or non-participating stakeholders, to give full recognition to the fact that there is an unequal distribution of power within society. At times Abonyi does infer that both are important -- especially when he addresses the issue of a project's social soundness -- but in general, he fails to make the distinction clearly and explicitly. In fact, in the later stages of a SIAM analysis, when Abonyi directs

the analyst to reduce his initial comprehensive list of stakeholders by eliminating from consideration all but the key or "relevant stakeholders whose needs [the project] is to serve and/or whose cooperation is required,"¹⁰ he comes very close to equating the concepts of stakeholder and powerholder.

2. The value of the concept stakeholder is that it captures the reality that, no matter who the dominant actor is in a complex public decision-making process, many others may have a stake in the result and some will have the power to influence it. If public projects are to meet their specific short-term objectives but also have social or strategic viability in the longer term, then decision-makers need to consider the projects' social effects, including their impact on those affected individuals and groups who lack the power to influence decisions.
3. Stakeholder analysis, even when performed as unsystematically as it was by Lash and Sankey, appears to be a most useful tool in support of complex decision-making, because it can help accomplish three things. First, it opens the awareness of decision-makers to the existence of far more actors with a stake in the decision's outcome than tend to be identified through what is normally a more casual, ad hoc approach. Secondly, it raises the issue --and, again, in a disciplined way -- of goals, objectives, perceptions, and assumptions, and the case material confirms how vital an awareness of these can be to successful decision-making. Finally, it brings the issue of conflict among stakeholders squarely into the decision arena where, under favourable circumstances, it can be approached intelligently and with an awareness of its importance.

V. Disjointed Incrementalism and Comprehensive Rationality

The debate between the disjointed incrementalists, such as Lindblom, and the comprehensive rationalists, such as Dror, relates to this last point about the usefulness of stakeholder analysis as a tool in support of complex decision-making. Both Lindblom and Dror share Abonyi's concern -- and, indeed, the concern of all the decision theorists discussed in the thesis -- that decision-makers should approach difficult decision situations in a rational, intelligent way, making use of whatever decision methods or techniques will help them cope with the situation more effectively. Where Lindblom and Dror disagree, however, is on the issue of how comprehensively rational man can be in his attempts to deal intelligently with complex decisions.

To repeat the essence of material already covered in the preceding chapter, whereas Dror believes that man can exercise a great deal of control over his environment through engaging in comprehensive, long-term planning and moving in radically new policy directions if need be, Lindblom emphasizes the limits to human rationality. He takes the position that decision-makers move, and indeed ought to move, in a relatively unsystematic, unstructured way, relying more on intuition than calculation to determine the most appropriate remedial and incremental decisions to make. Factors such as the difficulty of weighting and ranking values, the costly nature of analysis, the incompleteness of usable information, and the pressures of time are what Lindblom cites as evidence supporting the claim that successful public decision-making does not and should not make the heavy demands on humans that comprehensive rationality requires and that Dror would have us believe is feasible.

It was expected, in advance of writing this thesis, that the case material might provide considerable evidence in light of which we could judge the validity of the contrasting positions of Dror and Lindblom. Accordingly, the following three questions were posed at the end of Chapter One:

In terms of the incrementalism debate, was comprehensive rationality at work in any aspect or at any stage in the process? If not, could it have been, given the nature of the project? To what extent did the decision evolve, rather than having been made in some deliberate way?

Both the theoretical background and the analysis required to form appropriate conclusions concerning the applicability and usefulness of the Dror and Lindblom decision models were presented in the preceding chapter. Accordingly, each question is rephrased, below, as a formal conclusion, and the rationale for each conclusion is presented.

1. Comprehensive rationality was at work throughout the decision process. . . If comprehensive rationality is used in the Dror sense, to mean the rigorous, systematic, well-informed application of human intelligence from a comprehensive perspective, although necessarily constrained by the limits of being human, it was apparent at all stages of the decision process. If comprehensive rationality implies a capacity to comprehend and deal with every single and interlocking facet of a total process, to reach the one truly perfect answer to the issue being addressed, then it was not apparent at any stage. If it is the application of human intelligence in a logical, objective, systematic, well-informed way from a comprehensive understanding of the interplay of political, administrative and technical factors,

then it was not apparent during the Clack period but clearly so during the Sankey period.

2. Comprehensive rationality could have been still more at work in the decision process, given the nature of the project. The untenable extremes noted in the previous chapter are avoided in answering this question. What is envisaged, rather, is a Dror approach but with behavioural and political insights. In this latter sense, the nature of the project lent itself to a comprehensively rational approach and, indeed, required it, provided it is clearly understood that, in March and Simon's sense of the distinction, both politicians and administrators aim to "satisfice" rather than to "optimize,"¹¹ and hence judge the successful application of rationality against realistic standards of accomplishment. They are prepared to accept a solution that is good enough, in preference to the search for the best solution, but approach the search for the solution in a systematic, logical, structured way.

Cities cannot be physically reconstructed, successfully, without a clear sense of the whole being created, and of technical/engineering relationships. Engineers have to carefully engineer the structures they seek to create. Moreover, a complex project like the Rideau Area Project is a distinctive entity: it has a beginning and an end; the end being sought can be reasonably clearly specified; cost and time limits can be established with sufficient precision to keep the process within reasonable bounds; stakeholders with and without power can be identified; and so on, through an extremely large range of concerns which to some significant extent can be handled systematically.

It was noted earlier that the project had emerged incrementally, consistent with Lindblom's position. Over time, many discrete decisions and

separate forces combined to produce the federal government's commitment of 1972. Yet unless the term "incremental" is stretched to cover the detailed breaking-down of a project into its separate elements, and then dealing with each of these, it is hard to detect disjointed incrementalism at work in the case material. The decision-makers were breaking new ground, and knew this, and the issue being addressed required a comprehensive, forward-looking, systematic, interrelated approach rather than a disjointedly incremental one.

3. The decision was made deliberately, at least to a significant extent. It did not emerge, incrementally. This issue concerning whether decisions evolve or are made, is central to the debate between the comprehensive rationalists and the disjointed incrementalists. If the decision can be shown to have been deliberately made, this would be clear support for the former. If it evolved, incrementally, this would be support for the incrementalists.

Despite the material presented in the immediately preceding paragraphs, a black-and-white answer is not possible in relation to this issue of decisions being made rather than evolving. Certainly, the attempt was made to move on the project, from 1972, in a deliberate way, and at many points in the process the major actors can be seen, in the case material, moving determinedly to make a variety of decisions. Moreover, as Chapter Six shows, there was a great deal of sustained and very deliberate effort on the part of many different people to draft the tripartite agreement.

Yet, the discussion of project origins showed how long it took for the issue itself to mature. Moreover, the description of how the years under Clack's leadership led, ultimately, to a breakdown in the process, indicates an evolutionary process at work to some extent. Turner's announcement brought certain forces into play, in giving federal support to a concept plan. From this

evolved a special relationship among the city, the NCC, the RMOC and the Rideau Centre Corporation. Formalizing the Rideau Centre Team in 1974 brought major actors together in a variety of relationships and, as Clack's difficulties in leading the team became clear, this set a new dynamic in motion. Greenberg's emergence on the scene gave impetus to the opposition to Clack -- and so on, as a particular decision environment evolved that bore no direct relationship to the collaboration envisaged at the outset.

There appear to be three conclusions to be drawn from the case material on this issue:

- (a) Over the long sweep of the project, the exercise was clearly one of deliberate decision-making. What resulted in 1979 can with justice be described as a conclusion to the planning phase of the process that was quite consistent with the goal expressed in 1972.
- (b) Looking behind the bare skeleton of the decision process, to the behavioural, administrative, and political forces at work, the evolution of a particular decision environment can be clearly observed. A technical solution could have been arrived at very much more quickly than was the case; however, no technical solution could be accepted without a supportive environment. During Clack's era an environment did evolve -- it was never deliberately created. This environment was destructive rather than supportive. Lash and Sankey then moved, very deliberately, to transform the negative climate into a supportive one.
- (c) Although decisions can and probably very frequently do evolve, and especially where the decision climate is a major factor, it is possible to make them, including deliberately structuring the decision environment itself:

VI. Project Management

It was noted in Chapter One that project management has emerged as a proven alternative to bureaucracy, especially designed for managing one-time, ad hoc projects that require contributions from people of different professions and jurisdictions. It was also noted that the successful use of the project management method depends a great deal on the knowledge and skills of the project manager. He must be able to select competent project team members and be skilled enough to guide those members toward the achievement of project goals.

The following questions have been posed to find out if there is evidence from the case material to support these statements. The aim in answering them is to shed more light on the issue of the applicability and usefulness of project management.

Was project management a factor in the decision process? If so, how, and how significantly?

A categorical answer can be given to the first question; project management was a factor in the decision process. Indeed, it was an extremely significant factor. The evidence for this was given, in part, in the analysis of the preceding chapter, in addressing the issue of managerial competence. Clack lacked the political and behavioural sensitivity to lead a multi-valued, multi-sectored, multi-level decision process in which power was so widely diffused. He also lacked the negotiating skill that was required to successfully apply the project management method. His failure as a project manager adversely affected the decision process in its early stages in the sense that individual conflicts among team members were not controlled and the team's efforts were not co-ordinated and channelled into the single purpose of achieving agreed-upon project goals.

In sharp contrast, the project management skills of Sankey helped to move the process to an effective conclusion. Project management under Sankey proved to be a factor that was critical to the project's success because it provided the structure and the process to allow interested partners to negotiate an agreement on how to proceed with the project.

The most important conclusion to be drawn from the case material related to the issue of project management is the reaffirmation of the position taken by the federal Department of National Defence, already noted in Chapter One and, again, in Chapter Seven. It is that the planning phase of a project, culminating in the decision to proceed in a specified way on implementation, requires managing with the same care as the implementation phase itself. However, the case material permits going further than reaffirmation; it clarifies why managerial competence in project planning or development is vital, and it underlines significant components of this type of managerial competence that a truly skilled project manager can draw on to make full use of project management. Two conclusions related to applying project management to the planning phase of a project are as follows:

1. A good project manager will manage the planning phase of a project with care because the factors against which implementation will eventually proceed have to be fashioned, deliberately. They are the product of the planning phase, in the same way that the Rideau Centre, as a physical entity, was a product of the implementation phase. In 1972 it was not at all obvious to the major actors, in any detail, what they wanted and were prepared to support collectively; it required skillful management of many factors to identify the appropriate bases of an agreement.
2. Management competence in planning or developing projects rests, largely, on effective conflict/collaboration management and political and behavioural

sensitivity. An interesting issue to explore through further research would be whether the managerial skills required to lead project planning are different in some way from those required to lead project implementation. This researcher had the opportunity to become acquainted with David Donaldson, project manager during the implementation phase, and it seems a reasonable hypothesis that where Sankey had to be a particularly skilled negotiator and especially sensitive to political and behavioural issues, Donaldson required a special expertise in dealing with technical personnel, the developers, the contractors, the unions, and the public.

Endnotes

1. Radford, "Treatment," p. 89.
2. "SIAM," p. 32.
3. Ibid., p. 33.
4. Ibid.
5. Rideau Crossroads, revised ed., May 6, 1976, p. 8.
6. Final, p. 8 (article 11.4 with emphasis on "endeavour" and "mutually adjust their interest" in the original).
7. Project Team, Phase 2, p. 120.
8. Hart, Interview, Ottawa, January 1985.
9. "SIAM," p. 35.
10. Ibid., p. 49.
11. March and Simon write that: "An alternative is optimal if: (1) there exists a set of criteria that permits all alternatives to be compared, and (2) the alternative in question is preferred, by these criteria, to all other alternatives. An alternative is satisfactory if: (1) there exists a set of criteria that describes minimally satisfactory alternatives, and (2) the alternative in question meets or exceeds all these criteria." James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, with the collaboration of Harold Guetzkow, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958), p. 140.

CHAPTER NINE: FINAL OBSERVATIONS

In this final chapter, two things remain to be done. The first is to address the core argument of the thesis in the light of what, in retrospect, appears to have been a very considerable amount of theoretical, case and analytical material. The second is to make certain observations, again based on the material presented, which, while not directly germane to the core argument, are relevant to local decision-making. It was found that the case research done for the thesis provided important insights which went beyond the intended focus on the issue of collaboration and conflict.

The core argument was given in the Introduction as follows: **local decision-making is frequently of a complex, diffused-power nature, given the fragmentation of Canada's local government sector. Accordingly, effective decision-making will require special strengths in managing the conflict necessarily inherent in the process and in effecting collaboration across jurisdictional boundaries.**

The first and most important point to be made is that this argument is a sound one. If the local government sector is taken to comprise all those organizations and individuals, from both public and private sectors, whose activities are focussed significantly on the well-being of local communities, then the sector is indeed a remarkably fragmented one. The list of stakeholders given in Appendix C attests to this. It is also quite clear that this fragmentation can lead, frequently, to local decision-making of a complex, diffused-power nature. Decision-making will be complex because of the number of actors and the set of interrelationships this fragmentation generates, and decision power will be diffused because the fragmentation is in part a direct reflection of divided jurisdiction.

Accepting that local decision-making is frequently of a complex diffused-power nature covers the opening sentence of the core argument. The next point the argument incorporates is the assertion that the complexity and diffusion of power leads to a requirement for special strengths in managing the decision process to a satisfactory conclusion, and for two complementary reasons. Special strengths are needed, first, to manage the conflict necessarily inherent in the process. They are needed, secondly, to effect the needed collaboration across jurisdictional boundaries.

It seems a reasonable inference from the theory and case material presented in the body of the thesis that conflict is necessarily inherent in a complex, diffused-power decision situation -- and conflict of both a constructive and destructive nature. Until a project leader was appointed who understood the need to actively manage conflict and effect collaboration, and was skilled in doing so, the Rideau Area Project decision process could not be brought to a satisfactory conclusion. To foster constructive conflict and lessen the negative effects of destructive conflict requires special managerial strengths, as the contrast between Clack and Sankey abundantly demonstrates. Managing conflict is not sufficient in itself; it keeps participants involved but does not necessarily lead to agreement on new directions. Accordingly, the complementary skill of fostering active collaboration is required -- and, again, this is illustrated in the contrasting effectiveness of Clack and Sankey as project managers.

Analyzing the theory and the case material has led to an identification of at least four special skills which appear to be related to success in managing conflict and fostering collaboration, making it possible for public sector decision-making to proceed effectively; even where power is diffused widely across both sectors and levels. The first is an ability to understand and cope effectively with the

complexity of the decision environment. This includes the capacity to identify the universe of relevant powerholders and to clarify how power is actually distributed across this universe. The second is the organizational capacity to make appropriate institutional provision to accommodate the environmental complexity, and hence provide a structured forum in which the needed accommodations can occur. Sankey's use of PRAG is an excellent demonstration of such skill in action, especially when placed in contrast to Clack's use of the earlier decision structure.

The third skill involved in dealing effectively with issues of conflict and collaboration is the capacity to identify the point or points of equilibrium around which powerholders can reach a stable agreement. This includes the capacity to ensure that at some early point in the decision process powerholders, first, agree that the issue is capable of resolution and, secondly, identify the general area in which to look for a solution. Participants must be convinced that collaborative action will lead eventually to a resolution of the issue along acceptable lines, before the more specific task of identifying a point of equilibrium can be undertaken.

The fourth skill required is actually a set of skills, combining into a capacity to manage. It was noted on more than one previous occasion that the decision process is as vulnerable to weak management as the implementation process; complex decision-making situations must be managed, and very competently. It seems unlikely, on the basis of the Rideau Area Project case material, that in a complex, multi-actor, multi-sectored, multi-jurisdictional decision situation the decision could simply evolve, fortuitously, without the intervention of a skilled manager capable of bringing together into stable relationship the many separate forces involved.

There are four special skills involved, then, in the effective resolution of the conflict/collaboration issues: the ability to understand, confront and analyze the complexity of the decision environment; the capacity to structure the decision situation intelligently; the capacity to foster a recognition that resolution of the issue is possible, delimit the area in which a solution can be found and, ultimately, identify equilibrium points; and, finally, the capacity to manage the search process with the managerial effectiveness more normally viewed as applicable only to the implementation process. A further observation, related to the need for such skills, is that the opportunity to exercise them will only occur if two prior conditions are met. The first is that the issue being addressed must be perceived by powerholders to merit their attention sufficiently to persuade them to move into the decision-making arena. There was a sense in the case material, at times, that Viking-Rideau might tire of the situation and stop participating in the project. Had it done so to take advantage of alternative opportunities that might have accumulated over the prolonged planning period, the project would have been dealt a serious and perhaps fatal blow. Where the issue is seen as an important one, the participants are more likely to join meaningfully in the process of finding a collaborative solution. It is much easier to cross jurisdictional boundaries when the costs of not doing so are high.

The second prior condition for the application of skills in conflict/collaboration management relates to the capacity of all major actors to recognize and confront squarely the conflict/collaboration dimensions of the decision situation. A little reflection will reveal that someone as vital to the decision situation as Clack had a genuine blind spot when it came to recognizing these dimensions of the project, and there was no one in the project with him who had the needed skills to bring him to a recognition of his blind spot. There are public decision-makers,

undoubtedly, who see conflict as invariably a negative factor and so resolutely ignore it. There are also probably others who have so strong a belief in the power of pure rationality that they believe any decision is capable of rational solution provided enough work is done to gather and review the facts.

The thesis material demonstrates clearly that there is another set of competencies involved in complex public decision-making other than the four singled out in relation to conflict/collaboration management. Coincidentally, there are again four such competencies: political (at both political and administrative levels), administrative (outside the direct area of conflict/collaboration management), technical, and behavioural. Of these, technical competence appears to be the one most readily available, either internally or through contract, while administrative competence in a non-political and non-behavioural sense also appears to be something that is relatively easy to ensure. The key competencies in leading complex public decision-making, therefore, are the political and behavioural ones. They are required, moreover, at both administrative and political levels. Those in leadership roles need to be sensitive to behavioural factors and skilled in dealing with them, simply because the people element in complex decisions is so pervasive. Equally, political sensitivity and skill are at the core of effective interpersonal and interorganizational relationships.

Apart from these conclusions related to the core argument of the thesis, several other observations can be made. For one, the process of working through the thesis has helped to put the issue of rationality in perspective. On the one hand, the case material makes it apparent that public decision-makers operate in an environment where many factors impede the disciplined, informed application of human intelligence to problem resolution. These factors include unique perceptions and perspectives; unique individual and organizational value sets; unclear or

inappropriate assumptions; the chemistry of human relationships, including likes and dislikes; inadequate amounts of usable information; time pressures; a host of pressures from other sectors, other units, other levels, and the public; attitudes and feelings such as bitterness and jurisdictional jealousies; communication difficulties; special sensitivities, as in Juneau's political "wounds"; and certain mind-sets, as in Clack's apparent intolerance for local bureaucrats. On the other hand, it provides clear evidence of the extent to which human beings do exercise their rational capacities; if it is true that the decision-makers were idiosyncratic individuals whose experiences, perceptions and emotions clouded their thinking, it is also true that they did think, and often in highly disciplined ways.

The theoretical and case material, linked to the need for analyses and conclusions, clarified for this researcher the incrementalist/comprehensive rationalist debate. In one sense the distinction between the two camps has been sharpened. It is now clear that one could approach public decision-making in a manner that stresses the limits to rationality or, alternatively, that a far more comprehensive and optimistic perspective could be taken, on the assumption that human beings are capable, at least on occasion, of transcending the identified limits; there appears to be evidence and a defensible rationale for each position. In another sense, however, the distinction now appears not to be particularly meaningful, in that Lindblom and Dror appear to be more in agreement on fundamentals than in disagreement -- and the case material seems to support some softening of the boundary between them. Neither theorist works, for example, from the two extremes described in Chapter Seven as untenable, and Dror readily concedes the existence of limits to applied rationality.

One striking feature of the case not highlighted to this point is how much time slippage can be involved in a complex, diffused-power decision situation. It would

have seemed incredible in 1972, with so many of the key actors in apparent agreement on the major outlines of the Rideau Area Project, that it would take seven years to hammer out what was essentially a written agreement to collaborate. Yet it did, and the world kept turning, and no one in public office became terribly excited about the delays until very late in the process. This leads to the observation that feet-on-the-ground politicians, dealing with items on the public agenda, have a remarkable tolerance for time slippages. It is interesting to speculate on the possible impact on the decision process of a far greater sense of urgency at the political level; certainly, by 1977 such a sense of urgency was evident, and provided a receptive climate for the project leadership efforts of Sankey.

A related observation concerns the size of the investment in the planning phase of a large public project. Everything invested between 1972 to 1979, and for at least a year beyond the signing of the tripartite agreement, was an investment purely in planning, from which the only concrete outcome was a decision to proceed. And while no attempt was made to assemble the cost figures there can be no question, given the number of public and private actors involved over so long a period, and the supplies and equipment they required, that the total costs of the planning phase were of a significant order of magnitude. This lends weight to the earlier observation that the project planning process requires competent management, covering the time and cost elements of the process as well as the quality of the end result.

One closing observation seems in order, even though it has no direct bearing on the core argument of the thesis. It relates to the prevailing assumption, found widely in the literature on local government, that local government is the creature or the creation of the province. There was a fascinating paradox apparent to this

researcher, when working through the literature and the case material, and when contacting those who were actively involved in the process. Although there was a keen awareness among the project participants from the RMOC and the city that the province plays a critical role in establishing the framework of local government -- in terms of legislation, regulations, procedural requirements and funding -- there was also a strong sense, in practice, of local autonomy. The NCC, DPW and the private sector dealt with the RMOC and the City of Ottawa as independent actors in the decision situation. Moreover, the two local governments acted, frequently, as if they were independent. On only one occasion was any direct reference made to the province as a project participant, and that was on a question of funding.

Somewhere, in the background to the decision process, the more informed major actors are aware of the power of the province vis à vis both levels of local government. With this accepted, however, the decision process then revolves around the city and the RMOC as key actors in their own right, deriving their legitimacy from their respective mandates and from their local authority to legislate, raise funds, spend, and so on. It was never apparent to this researcher that any particular local actor felt a sense of "big brother Queen's Park" watching closely over the decision process and guiding its legal dependents to a wise decision.

APPENDIX A: MAP OF THE RIDEAU AREA

APPENDIX B: TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT OF MAY 15, 1979

THIS AGREEMENT made in triplicate the 15th day of May 1979.

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA
(hereinafter called "Canada")
- OF THE FIRST PART

AND: THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF OTTAWA-CARLETON
(hereinafter called "Region")
- OF THE SECOND PART

AND: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF OTTAWA
(hereinafter called "City")
- OF THE THIRD PART

WHEREAS Canada, Region and City are proceeding to implement the Rideau Area Project, being an overall scheme of revitalization of the central business district of the City of Ottawa east of the Rideau Canal (hereinafter called the "Project") as more particularly shown on the Sketch Plan annexed hereto as Appendix "A";

AND WHEREAS Canada intends to lease certain lands generally bounded by Rideau Street on the north, Nicholas Street on the east, the Mackenzie King Bridge on the south, and Colonel By Drive on the west (hereinafter referred to as the "Rideau Area Lands") to a Developer for the purpose of development;

AND WHEREAS Region and City have agreed to alter their Official Plans and the patterns of transportation and regional and City road systems to accommodate the Rideau Area Project;

NOW THIS AGREEMENT WITNESSETH that the parties hereto mutually agree as follows:

ARTICLE 1. DEFINITIONS

In this agreement:

- 1) "Works" shall mean underground utilities, general roadworks, specific streetworks and grade plus one pedestrian bridge(s), all as more particularly described in Appendix "B" attached hereto;
- 2) "Underground Utilities" shall mean underground hydro cables, steam lines, underground gas pipes, underground sewer pipes, underground water pipes and underground telephone cables, and such other utilities as cable T.V., CN/CP Telecommunications, etc.;

- 3) "Specified Streetworks" shall mean the malls and all appurtenances to be constructed as part of the Project, as listed in Appendix "B";
- 4) "General Roadworks" shall mean all roadworks that are part of the Project except specific streetworks as listed in Appendix "B";
- 5) "Estimated Cost of the Works" shall mean and include only the estimated cost shown in Appendix "B" for the specific items;
- 6) "Pedestrian Mall" shall mean a development of a street or surface area or part thereof for pedestrian use only;
- 7) "Partial Mall" shall mean a development of a street or surface area or part thereof for combined pedestrian and designated vehicular use;
- 8) "Enclosed" shall mean the partial or entire covering of a street or surface area or part thereof;
- 9) "Arterial Road" shall mean a road under, or to come under, the jurisdiction of Region;
- 10) "Policy Committee" shall mean a committee composed of the Chairman of the National Capital Commission, the Chairman of Region and the Mayor of City; and
- 11) "Co-ordinating Committee" shall mean a committee composed of a senior representative of the National Capital Commission, City, Region, the Department of Public Works, or a nominee thereof.

ARTICLE 2. OBLIGATIONS OF PARTIES

"1) City shall, by May 1, 1981,

- a) secure all the required consents and take the necessary steps leading to the following road closings and conveyances of land:
 - i) that part of Besserer Street between Nicholas Street and Colonel By Drive,
 - ii) that part of Freiman Street from Rideau Street to Besserer Street.
- b) obtain any required capital funding approval from the Ontario Municipal Board, and advise Canada in writing that any required approval has been obtained; and
- c) prepare and submit for approval to the Policy Committee a detailed work plan and schedule for the works set out in Appendix "B", such work plan and schedule shall be approved or

amended by the Policy Committee on the recommendation of the Co-ordinating Committee. Once such approval is given in writing, the work plan and schedule so approved shall constitute an integral part of this Agreement".

- "2) City shall, by May 1, 1981, conclude satisfactory arrangements for a financial contribution of 25% of the estimated costs as defined in Appendix "B" from other sources, mainly private sector and shall so advise Canada in writing".
- "3) City shall, by May 1, 1981, or as soon as the Developer submits an appropriate application to it pursuant to paragraph 5 following:
 - a) execute a development control agreement and issue a building permit for the first stage of development in respect thereof; and
 - b) convey to Canada the existing parking garage and appurtenant lands."
- "4) City shall, By May 1, 1981, close and convey to Canada clear title to part of Besserer Street and part of Freiman Street contemplated in paragraph 1)a) above".
- "5) Canada shall use its best efforts to prevail upon a Developer to submit to City within six months from the date of signing of this agreement an appropriate application for a development control agreement respecting Rideau Area Lands."
- "6) Upon receipt of title to Besserer Street as contemplated by paragraph 4 of Article 2, Canada shall convey to City clear title to the lands required for the extension of Daly Avenue from Nicholas Street to Colonel By Drive."
- "7) In the event that the road closings, transfers of lands and other measures are not taken by the time limits set out in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of this Article, this Agreement shall be null and void and the parties hereto shall be reinstated in their original position with respect to the conveyances of lands and compensation therefore unless the Policy Committee agrees to extend any of the time limits specified therein".
- "8) a) Subject to terms and conditions being agreed upon within one year from the date of signing this agreement, Canada shall convey to Region, clear title to such subsurface rights under and adjacent to the former Besserer Street road allowance as is necessary for a rapid transit facility at an appropriate level and with sufficient access at grade; and
 - b) Region shall prepare and submit its initial requirements as noted above to Canada within six months of the date of signing of this Agreement."

"9) As soon as possible after closing and conveying to Canada clear title to Besserer Street pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 2, Canada shall:

- a) convey by Letters Patent to City at nominal cost clear title to Colonel By Drive between the south limit of Besserer Street and the south limit of Daly Avenue extended and the lands adjacent to the existing Conference Centre to the extent shown in Appendix "D" for the purpose of an arterial road for so long as the said lands are used for such purposes; and
- b) convey to City clear title to the lands required at the intersection of MacKenzie Avenue, Sussex Drive, St. Patrick Street and Murray Street."

ARTICLE 3. PEDESTRIAN MALL

City shall also forthwith take the necessary steps to establish and shall establish pedestrian malls on:

- a) Freiman Street between Rideau Street and George Street;
- b) William Street between Rideau Street and George Street; and
- c) Walter Street extended between Rideau Street and George Street.

ARTICLE 4. LAND ACQUISITIONS

City shall be responsible for acquiring all lands which are required for the project as set out in Appendix "B" and which are not already owned by Canada or Region.

ARTICLE 5. ADJUSTMENT OF LAND PRICES

1) When the lands to be conveyed pursuant to this agreement have been surveyed by Canada and the survey has been approved by City, a settlement shall be made between the parties involved as follows:

- a) the square footage set out in Appendix "C" hereto shall be adjusted in accordance with the result of the survey;
- b) the lands set out in paragraphs 1 a), 6 and 9 b) of Article 2 shall be valued on a price per square foot set out in Appendix "C" attached hereto;
- c) i) the value of the parking garage and its appurtenant land referred to in paragraph 3 b) of Article 2 and described as Part 61, Reference Plan 4R-1524 in the Ottawa Land Registry Office shall be the value thereof as at the date of the conveyance,

- ii) in the event that the said value is not agreed to by Canada and City on or before the date of the conveyance thereof to Canada, Canada and City shall, within ten days thereafter, each appoint an independent fee appraiser, and within a further ten days, the two so appointed appraisers shall appoint a third independent fee appraiser,
- iii) in the event that the appointees of Canada and City are unable to agree upon, or otherwise do not appoint the said third appraiser, or if Canada or City shall fail to appoint an appraiser, then Canada and City, or the party in default, as the case may be, may apply to the President of the Appraisal Institute of Canada to make such appointment,
- iv) upon appointment of the last of the three appraisers, Canada and City shall jointly instruct each of the appraisers to determine the value of the parking garage and its appurtenant lands as at the said date,
- v) if in the course of such determination by each appraiser any question of law or of mixed fact and law arises, such question shall be referred to the legal representatives of Canada and City for agreement, or for referral to a judge of the Federal Court of Canada or other Court of competent jurisdiction failing agreement. The appointed appraisers shall act as appraisal experts and not as arbitrators,
- vi) within ninety days of receiving his instructions, each appraiser shall submit to Canada and City jointly, his appraisal in accordance with the provisions of this agreement,
- vii) the average of the three appraisals shall be recommended to Canada and City for agreement as the said value as at said date,
- viii) Canada and City shall respectively pay the costs of the appraisers appointed by them and shall each pay one-half of the costs of the third appraiser; and
- ix) in this Article, "value" means the value determined by the Cost Approach to Value in accordance with the applicable practices of the Appraisal Institute of Canada, on the basis that the value of the site (land only) is fifty dollars (\$50.00) per square foot and excluding any value established or claimed to be established by this Agreement or by any Works constructed thereunder or by any other matter or thing done in furtherance of the Project; and
- d) A settlement shall be calculated on the basis of the values as determined above.

- 2) The settlement due, when the final calculation has been determined, may be paid in dollars or by the conveyance of land, land rights, air rights or by such other consideration as shall be mutually agreed upon by the parties involved except that with respect to the parking garage and its appurtenant lands a minimum cash payment of \$3,000,000 shall be made by Canada at the time of the conveyance to Canada; and
- 3) In the event of the entire \$3,000,000 referred to above at the time of the conveyance, then Canada will pay interest to the City on the amount unpaid at a rate of interest equivalent to the long term bond rate established by the federal Department of Finance at that time.

ARTICLE 6. STATUS OF LITTLE SUSSEX STREET

Region covenants and agrees that it will not close and convey Little Sussex Street between Rideau and Besserer Streets without prior approval of Canada and further, that in the event that Little Sussex Street is no longer deemed necessary as an arterial road in the opinion of Region, then it will be conveyed at nominal cost to Canada.

ARTICLE 7. AIR RIGHTS

Region and City acknowledge that air rights and subsurface rights will be required by Canada with respect to the lands outlined in paragraph 6 and 9 a) of Article 2 as well as Little Sussex Street between Rideau and Besserer Streets, and it is agreed that the conveyance to Canada of the necessary air rights and subsurface rights, at nominal cost, will not be unreasonably withheld.

ARTICLE 8. PROJECT CO-ORDINATION

- 1) Project co-ordination services shall be provided by City to the Co-ordinating Committee and the Policy Committee. Such services include:
 - a) Preparing a master schedule for recommendation by the Co-ordinating Committee to the Policy Committee for the carrying out of the works set out in Appendix "B";
 - b) Co-ordinating and ensuring that all the works as set out in Appendix "B" are carried out in accordance with the master schedule;
 - c) Monitoring and controlling the shared cost of the said works;
 - d) Advising the Co-ordinating Committee of any anticipated significant variations from the master schedule with a view to submitting appropriate recommendations for changes; if required, to the Policy Committee;

- e) Liaising with the Project Review and Advisory Group;
 - f) Preparing reports for the Co-ordinating Committee on issues requiring consideration by the Policy Committee;
 - g) Monitoring the actions of technical committees and preparing reports on the activities of these Committees for the information of the Co-ordinating Committee;
 - h) Monitoring the records of the costs of the works set out in Appendix "B" to ensure that such records meet the needs of each of the parties to the agreement;
 - i) Liaising with the public;
 - j) Exchanging of information between the parties hereto; and
 - k) Performing such other duties as directed by the Co-ordinating Committee.
- 2) The cost of the project co-ordination services above mentioned shall not form part of the "Estimated Cost of the Works".
 - 3) In the event that the Co-ordinating Committee agrees that there is a need at any time during the term of the agreement for a full-time Project Co-ordinator to be engaged under contract by City for the specific purpose of providing required co-ordination, Canada agrees to pay to City fifty percent of the agreed salary of the Project Co-ordinator and of his or her expenses as approved by the Co-ordinating Committee for the duration of his or her contract. The cost of the Project Co-ordinator and his or her expenses shall not exceed \$100,000 per annum.
 - 4) City shall engage the said Project Co-ordinator under contract following agreement by the Co-ordinating Committee.

ARTICLE 9. TECHNICAL COMMITTEES

- 1) Technical Committees shall be formed from time to time by the Co-ordinating Committee with such membership and terms of reference as it deems appropriate having regard to the nature of the purpose for which the committee is being established.
- 2) Each party to the agreement shall bear the total cost of its representative(s) on the Technical Committee(s).

ARTICLE 10. CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE

- 1) The Co-ordinating Committee shall be responsible to the Policy Committee and shall immediately report to the Policy Committee any matter which requires approval of Canada, Region or City on any matter on which there is some dispute and which requires resolution or decision.

- 2) The Co-ordinating Committee shall be responsible for:
 - a) Reviewing and monitoring the progress of the works as set out in the master schedule and work plan;
 - b) Reviewing and approving, or recommending for approval to the Policy Committee as required, the design plans and costs of the works;
 - c) Resolving issues or problems arising out of the implementation of the project;
 - d) Reviewing and recommending to the Policy Committee, within the financial limits set out in this agreement, the annual budget for works to be carried out during the subsequent year; and
 - e) Reviewing any matter brought up by a member of the Committee in relation to the project.
- 3) The Co-ordinating Committee shall meet from time to time as required and a minimum of once a month.

ARTICLE 11. POLICY COMMITTEE

- 1) The Policy Committee shall:
 - a) Consider any matter requiring its approval pursuant to this agreement, including approval of the master schedule and work plan;
 - b) Review and direct the work of the Co-ordinating Committee; and
 - c) Review annually the progress of the works and the recommendations of the Co-ordinating Committee in relation to the annual budget for the works to be carried out.
- 2) The members of the Policy Committee shall immediately recommend to their respective levels of government any matter on which the said Committee has agreed and which requires approval of one or more levels of government.
- 3) The Policy Committee shall meet from time to time as required.

ARTICLE 12. REGULATION OF UNDERGROUND UTILITIES

- 1) City shall be responsible for co-ordinating or designing, relocating and constructing all underground utilities normally under its jurisdiction in accordance with Appendix "B".
- 2) City shall call or co-ordinate contracts necessary for designing and implementing the said design, relocation and construction of said underground utilities.

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- 3) City shall call or co-ordinate all contracts necessary for designing and implementing all water main changes deemed necessary by Region, with the design, specifications and contracts to the satisfaction of Region, and shall pay all related costs including the costs of inspection, connection, and sterilization, by Regional personnel.
 - 4) No construction or work on underground utilities shall be commenced unless and until the design plans of such utilities have been agreed to by the Co-ordinating Committee.

ARTICLE 13. SPECIFIC STREETWORKS

- 1) City shall be responsible for designing:
 - a) an enclosed pedestrian mall on Freiman Street between Rideau Street and George Street;
 - b) a pedestrian mall on William Street between Rideau Street and George Street; and
 - c) a pedestrian mall on Waller Street extended between Rideau Street and George Street.
- 2) City shall, subject to approval of Region, be responsible for designing:
 - a) a partial mall on Rideau Street between Sussex Drive and Waller Street;
 - b) a partial mall on George Street between Sussex Drive and Cumberland Street;
 - c) sidewalk widening on Rideau Street between Waller Street and Cumberland Street; and
 - d) a partial mall on Nicholas Street between Rideau Street and Besserer Street.
- 3) City shall call all the contracts necessary for implementing the construction of the specific streetworks.
- 4) No construction or work on specific streetworks shall be commenced unless and until the design plans of such specific streetworks have been approved by the Policy Committee or the recommendation of the Co-ordinating Committee.
- 5) Upon completion of construction by City, to the satisfaction of Region, of the works outlined in paragraph (2) above, Region shall assume these streetworks as part of its regional road network. The assumption of these specific streetworks by Region shall be without any cost or debt that may attach to them.

- 6) In the event that there are any defects, imperfections or failure to meet regional standards or any other matters not to the satisfaction of the Regional Transportation Commissioner with regard to the specific streetworks outlined in paragraph (2), such defects or other matters shall be corrected forthwith by City, at the request of Region, and the cost of such correction shall not be borne by Region.

ARTICLE 14. GENERAL ROADWORKS

- 1) City shall, as required by Region, design all general roadworks within the boundaries of the project as set out in Appendix "D".
- 2) City shall, as required by Region, call all the contracts necessary for implementing the general roadworks and Region shall have all rights of inspection and testing it deems necessary.
- 3) No construction or work on any general roadworks (arterial or otherwise) shall be commenced unless and until the design plans of such general roadworks have been approved by the Policy Committee on the recommendation of the Co-ordinating Committee.
- 4) Upon completion of construction by City, to the satisfaction of Region, of the general roadworks, Region shall assume those roads as part of its regional road network. The assumption of the general roadworks by Region shall be without any cost or debt that may attach to them.
- 5) In the event that there are any defects, imperfections, failure to meet regional standards or any other matters not to the satisfaction of the Regional Transportation Commissioner with respect to the general roadworks outlined in paragraph (2), such defects or other matters shall be corrected forthwith by City at the request of Region and at no cost to Region.

ARTICLE 15. PEDESTRIAN BRIDGES

- 1) City shall design and construct a pedestrian bridge crossing Rideau Street at a level of grade plus one to provide public access from the Rideau Area Lands to the north side of Rideau Street.
- 2) Canada agrees to construct at its own cost up to a maximum of two million dollars (\$2,000,000), a pedestrian bridge from the Conference Centre to the Rideau Area Lands to facilitate public access.
- 3) City shall consider construction of a pedestrian overpass, or underpass, on George Street at no cost to Canada.

- 4) No construction or work on the said pedestrian bridges shall be commenced unless and until the design plans of such bridge(s) have been approved by the Policy Committee on the recommendation of the Co-ordinating Committee.
- 5) Region, City and Canada agree to make available, at no cost to the parties to this agreement, the air rights required for the provision of public pedestrian bridges over "General Roadworks" and "Specific Streetworks" within the Project.

ARTICLE 16. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

- 1) Region shall be responsible for operating and maintaining, within the boundaries of the project, all the works set out in Appendix "B" that are normally within its jurisdiction.
- 2) City shall be responsible for ensuring operation and maintenance, within the boundaries of the project, of all the works set out in Appendix "B" that are normally within its jurisdiction including:
 - a) all specific streetworks arising from the project; and
 - b) all public pedestrian bridges (except the one described in paragraph 2 of Article 15).
- 3) Canada shall retain control of, and be responsible to operate and maintain:
 - a) Colonel By Drive south of Daly Avenue extended; and
 - b) The pedestrian bridge described in paragraph 2 of Article 15.

ARTICLE 17. CONTRIBUTION OF CANADA

- 1) Canada agrees to contribute an amount of six million four hundred thousand dollars (\$6,400,000) towards the estimated cost of the works incurred by City, as defined in paragraph 5 of Article 1, adjusted pursuant to the escalation formula mentioned in Article 18 herein.
- 2) The contribution by Canada is made on the understanding that all works as defined in paragraph 1 of Article 1 shall be completed.
- 3) In the event that any specific item of the works is not carried out Canada's contribution shall be reduced by an amount equal to fifty percent (50%) of the estimated cost of that item as listed in Appendix "B" and as amended pursuant to Article 21.

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I. Stakeholders from Project Stage One
(October 1972 to May 1974)

<u>Stakeholder</u>	<u>Nature of Participation</u>
- NCC staff e.g. Clack, Assist. General Manager	led study team through consultations and report writing/presentations; participated in federal government/Viking-Rideau land purchase negotiations
- Patrick Chen, City of Ottawa Planner	member of study team
- RMO staff	participated in transportation studies
- DPW staff	led federal government/Viking-Rideau negotiations
- Federal Cabinet. e.g. Minister of Public Works (Drury/Dubé) Minister of Finance (Turner) Minister of State for Urban Affairs (Bastford)	negotiated agreement with Viking-Rideau; approved Rideau Centre concept plans; made public announcements regarding concept plans
- City Council	briefed on concept plans
- Regional Council	briefed on concept plans
- Viking-Rideau	owned Canlands; negotiated agreement with DPW to build Rideau Centre
- Rideau area merchants and property owners	consulted by study team

particular work in said Appendix by a percentage equal to the percentage increase in the Construction Price Index (as hereinafter defined) for March, 1979, as compared to the said index for the month in which the contract for the work was awarded.

- 2) In this Article, "Construction Price Index" shall mean the "Non-residential building construction input price index" for the Province of Ontario included in the monthly publication of "Construction Price Statistics" of Statistics Canada.

ARTICLE 19. DEVELOPMENT ON FEDERAL LANDS

In consideration of the contribution referred to in Article 17 above, City and Region acknowledge and understand that:

- a) Canada intends to lease the whole or a part of the Rideau Area Lands to private or public developers for purposes of development into a retail shopping centre, a hotel, and other identifiable uses, including a convention centre and housing, in accordance with the strategic plan as shown in Appendix "E"; and
- b) Canada shall endeavour, subject to a satisfactory financial arrangement with a developer, to incorporate the extension of the Rideau Canal into the development of the Rideau Area Lands.

ARTICLE 20. GENERAL PROVISIONS

- 1) The terms of this agreement are in effect for the duration of the execution of the approved master schedule for the implementation of works as defined in Appendix "B". However, in no event shall these terms be in effect after December 31, 1985, save and except Article 6 and paragraph 6 of Article 17.
- 2) Region and City agree that any and all amendments to official plans, zoning or other by-laws required by Region or City shall be forthwith recommended, adopted and carried out by Region or City subject to any statutory approvals.
- 3) It is also agreed by the parties to this agreement that Canada shall not make any contribution in respect of a specific work included in Appendix "B" unless the City and/or Region have acquired the lands and/or closed and conveyed as required to Canada the streets necessary for the implementation of that particular work. In any event, Canada shall not contribute to the cost of any work included in Appendix "B" that is not started prior to the date of termination of this agreement, i.e. December 31, 1985.
- 4) Notwithstanding any other clause, article or provision contained in this agreement, Region shall not incur any costs whatsoever with respect to the works contemplated in this agreement.

- 5) Canada agrees to identify in any agreements entered into with other parties for the lease or development of Rideau Area Lands, the responsibility for payment to City of redevelopment charges, property taxes and business taxes.

ARTICLE 21. AMENDMENT OF AGREEMENT

If, at any time during the duration of this agreement, the parties hereto shall deem it necessary or expedient to make any amendment to any Article, paragraph or item herein contained for the more satisfactory management of the agreement, then such amendments may be made with the approval of the levels of government concerned. Such amendments shall be supplemental to and form part of this agreement.

ARTICLE 22. INDEMNITY

- 1) City agrees to save harmless and indemnify Canada and Region from and against all or any claims, actions, causes of action, suits or demands from any source whatsoever arising from or in any way connected with the execution of this agreement or anything done or performed as a result thereof.
- 2) Canada agrees to save harmless and indemnify Region and City from, or against all or any claim, actions, causes of action, suits or demands from any source whatsoever arising from any works performed by Canada.

ARTICLE 23. FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION

Should any dispute arise between the parties hereto which cannot be resolved otherwise than by Court action, it is agreed by and between the parties that any such issues shall be referred to a judge of the Federal Court of Canada or other Court of competent jurisdiction for determination.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF Region and City have hereto affixed their corporate seal by the hand of their officers duly authorized in that behalf, and Canada has signed by Her Minister appointed for that purpose and by the National Capital Commission the date above written.

HER MAJESTY IN RIGHT OF CANADA

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY

Eugene L. Ceylan
City Clerk

Judith L. Hest
Minister of Public Works

The National Capital Commission

per *E.C. A. [Signature]*
President

Claude Chabot
Secretary

THE REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY OF OTTAWA-
CARLETON

per *[Signature]*
Regional Chairman

[Signature]
Deputy Clerk

THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF OTTAWA

per *[Signature]*
Mayor

[Signature]
Deputy Clerk

APPENDIX C: LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS IN THE RIDEAU AREA PROJECT

This appendix is divided into six parts, presenting the stakeholders who participated directly in five stages of the Rideau Area Project as well as those who did not participate at any stage. The project stages correspond, roughly, to the major headings used in Chapters Two through Six. They are as follows:

- Stage One** - the period of unstructured consultations led by NCC staff from about October 1972 to May 1974 when they tested the waters for the Rideau Centre plan of 1972
- Stage Two** - the Rideau Centre Team planning sessions led by Clack and Wurtele from about July 1974 to August 1977
- Stage Three** - the Lash project review from October 1977 to February 1978
- Stage Four** - the Rideau Area Project Team planning sessions led by Sankey from about February to June 1978
- Stage Five** - the period of political-level discussion and decision-making from about June 1978 to May 1979.

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I. Stakeholders from Project Stage One
(October 1972 to May 1974)

<u>Stakeholder</u>	<u>Nature of Participation</u>
- NCC staff e.g. Clack, Assist. General Manager	led study team through consultations and report writing/presentations; participated in federal government/Viking-Rideau land purchase negotiations
- Patrick Chen, City of Ottawa Planner	member of study team
- RMOC staff	participated in transportation studies
- DPW staff	led federal government/Viking- Rideau negotiations
- Federal Cabinet e.g. Minister of Public Works (Drury/Dubé) Minister of Finance (Turner) Minister of State for Urban Affairs (Basford)	negotiated agreement with Viking-Rideau; approved Rideau Centre concept plans; made public announcements regarding concept plans
- City Council	briefed on concept plans
- Regional Council	briefed on concept plans
- Viking-Rideau	owned Canlands; negotiated agreement with DPW to build Rideau Centre
- Rideau area merchants and property owners	consulted by study team

II. Stakeholders from Project Stage Two (July 1974 to August 1977)

<u>Stakeholder</u>	<u>Nature of Participation</u>
- NCC staff eg. Clack, Assist. General Manager and Co-chairman of the Rideau Centre Team	seven members on Rideau Centre Team; continued negotiations with Viking-Rideau
- City of Ottawa staff eg. Hart, Senior Planner Wurtele, Commissioner of Community Development and Co-chairman of the Rideau Centre Team	five members on Rideau Centre Team
- RMO and Ottawa-Carleton Regional Transit Commission staff	two members on Rideau Centre Team
- DPW staff	five members on Rideau Centre Team; continued negotiations with Viking-Rideau
- Mayor of the City of Ottawa (Benoit/Greenberg)	member of Rideau Centre Senior Steering Committee
- Chairman of the RMO	member of Rideau Centre Senior Steering Committee
- Chairman of the NCC (Gallant/Juneau)	member of Rideau Centre Senior Steering Committee
- Viking-Rideau	continued negotiations with federal government

- Rideau Centre Corporation one member on Rideau Centre Team
 - Irwin, Vice-President and General Manager
 - member property owners, retailers and merchant groups include:
 - Rideau Street Merchants' Assoc.
 - Byward Market Merchants' Assoc.
 - Charles Ogilvy Caplan's
 - Hudson's Bay

- CP Hotels and its architectural and design consultant, Webb, Zerafa, Menkes, Housden one member on Rideau Centre Team

- Rideau Centre Public Advisory Committee two members on Rideau Centre Team
 - member citizen groups include:
 - Federation of Citizens' Assoc. of Ottawa/Carleton Region
 - Action Sandy Hill
 - Centretown Citizens' Community Assoc.
 - Heritage Ottawa
 - Ottawa Senior Citizens' Council
 - Community Planning Assoc. of Canada

- private consultants: six members on Rideau Centre Team
 - Damas & Smith (traffic & transportation)
 - Murray & Murray/Mathers & Haldenby (design re federal land)
 - Diamond & Myers (infrastructure planning)
 - Strong-Moorhead (landscape)
 - Hatfield Research (market research)
 - Jack B. Ellis & Associates (process & scheduling)

III. Stakeholders from Project Stage Three (October 1977 to February 1978)

<u>Stakeholder</u>	<u>Nature of Participation</u>
- Harold N. Lash (consultant)	carried out project review on contract with NCC
- Lloyd Sankey (consultant)	assisted Lash
- Chairman of the NCC (Juneau)	appointed Lash
- DPW staff	advised Lash concerning federal government/Viking-Rideau agreement; continued negotiations with Viking-Rideau
- Viking-Rideau	continued negotiations with federal government; participated in public meeting
- City, regional and federal politicians	interviewed/briefed by Lash

IV. Stakeholders from Project Stage Four (February to June 1978)

<u>Stakeholder</u>	<u>Nature of Participation</u>
- Lloyd Sankey (consultant)	leader of Rideau Area Project Team
- Peter Spaul (architect/ planner, NCC)	member of Rideau Area Project Team
- Elizabeth Davidson (architect, Sankey Partnership Architects)	member of Rideau Area Project Team
- Mo Bundon (public liaison, City of Ottawa)	member of Rideau Area Project Team

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- Ruben Nelson
(researcher, Square One Mgt.) member of Rideau Area Project Team
 - Alan Booth (scheduler,
Boothway Project Scheduling) member of Rideau Area Project Team
 - General Manager of the NCC member of Rideau Area Project
Co-ordinating Committee
 - Commissioner of Community
Development of the City of
Ottawa member of Rideau Area Project
Co-ordinating Committee
 - Assistant Deputy Minister
of DPW, Realty member of Rideau Area Project
Co-ordinating Committee,
 - Planning Commissioner of
the RMOC member of Rideau Area Project
Co-ordinating Committee
 - Mayor of the City of
Ottawa (Greenberg) member of Rideau Area Project
Policy Committee
 - Chairman of the RMOC member of Rideau Area Project
Policy Committee
 - Chairman of the NCC
(Drury) member of Rideau Area Project
Policy Committee
 - City and regional
politicians briefed on the project
 - Viking-Rideau continued negotiations with the
federal government; member of
Project Review and Advisory Group.
 - DPW staff continued negotiations with Viking-
Rideau; member of Project Review
and Advisory Group

- RMO staff member of Project Review and Advisory Group
 - City staff member of Project Review and Advisory Group
 - NCC staff member of Project Review and Advisory Group
 - Parks Canada staff member of Project Review and Advisory Group
 - Province of Ontario staff member of Project Review and Advisory Group
 - Rideau Centre Corporation member of Project Review and Advisory Group
 - CP Hotels member of Project Review and Advisory Group
 - Rideau Centre Public Advisory Committee member of Project Review and Advisory Group
 - Rideau Street Merchants' Assoc. member of Project Review and Advisory Group
 - Bytown Village Merchants' Assoc. member of Project Review and Advisory Group
 - Byward Market Merchants' Assoc. member of Project Review and Advisory Group
 - utility companies (eg. Ottawa Hydro) member of Project Review and Advisory Group
 - other land-owners and developers member of Project Review and Advisory Group

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- Byward Growers had meetings with Rideau Area Project Team
 - Outaouais Transit had meetings with Rideau Area Project Team
 - National Film Board had meetings with Rideau Area Project Team
 - citizens of the City of Ottawa participated at public meetings

V. Stakeholders from Project Stage Five
(June 1978 to May 1979)

<u>Stakeholder</u>	<u>Nature of Participation</u>
- Lloyd Sankey (consultant)	leader of Rideau Area Project Team
- Peter Spaul (architect/ planner, NCC)	member of Rideau Area Project Team
- Elizabeth Davidson (architect, Sankey Partnership Architects)	member of Rideau Area Project Team
- Mo Bundon (public liaison, City of Ottawa)	member of Rideau Area Project Team
- General Manager of the NCC (Aquilina)	member of Rideau Area Project Co-ordinating Committee
- Commissioner of Community Development of the City of Ottawa (Bailey)	member of Rideau Area Project Co-ordinating Committee
- Assistant Deputy Minister of DPW, Realty (Perrier)	member of Rideau Area Project Co-ordinating Committee

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- Planning Commissioner of the RMOC (Wright) member of Rideau Area Project Co-ordinating Committee
 - Mayor of the City of Ottawa (Greenberg/Dewar) member of Rideau Area Project Policy Committee
 - Chairman of the RMOC (Coolican) member of Rideau Area Project Policy Committee
 - Chairman of the NCC (Drury) member of Rideau Area Project Policy Committee
 - Board of Control and Planning Board of the City of Ottawa made recommendations regarding draft tripartite agreement
 - City and regional councils (before and after the election of Nov. 13/79) considered, approved and amended tripartite agreement
 - Federal Cabinet eg. Minister of State for Urban Affairs (Ouellet) participated in tripartite agreement discussion and gave final approval
Minister of Public Works (Buchanan)
 - Province of Ontario approached for financial assistance
 - Viking-Rideau continued negotiations with federal government; member of Project Review and Advisory Group; presented briefs to City Council;
 - DPW staff continued negotiations with Viking-Rideau; member of Project Review and Advisory Group

- Rideau Centre Corporation member of Project Review and Advisory Group; presented briefs to City Council
- Rideau Street Merchants' Assoc. member of Project Review and Advisory Group; presented briefs to City Council
- Rideau Centre Public Advisory Committee member of Project Review and Advisory Group; presented briefs to City Council
- RMOC staff member of Project Review and Advisory Group
- NCC staff member of Project Review and Advisory Group
- City staff member of Project Review and Advisory Group
- Parks Canada staff member of Project Review and Advisory Group
- CP Hotels member of Project Review and Advisory Group
- Bytown Village Merchants' Assoc. member of Project Review and Advisory Group
- Byward Market Merchants' Assoc. member of Project Review and Advisory Group
- utility companies member of Project Review and Advisory Group
- other land-owners and developers member of Project Review and Advisory Group

- Chamber of Commerce 254 made a presentation at a public meeting
- Westboro Community Assoc. made a presentation at a public meeting
- East End Group made a presentation at a public meeting
- technical staff from the City of Ottawa, the NCC, the RMOC, DPW, Viking-Rideau and other developers members of Design and Implementation Group
- citizens of the City of Ottawa participated at a public meeting

VI. Stakeholders Who Did Not Participate Directly at Any Stage of the Decision-making Process

- members of the media
- individual residents of homes within and close to the Rideau area
- future generations of residents
- the overall national capital community
- merchants from retail areas outside the Rideau area
- merchants who moved into the Rideau Centre after it was built
- officials from the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs
- Treasury Board officials
- representatives from the Westin Hotel
- tourists, convention-goers and shoppers who were to use the Rideau Centre after it was built
- consultants, tradesmen, contractors, construction workers, lawyers, accountants, financiers, and city staff who were to become involved during the project implementation stage

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