INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

**ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600**

UMI[®]

**The Representation of Social Actors in *The Globe and Mail* During the
Breakup of the Former Yugoslavia**

by

Dragana Polovina-Vukovic, B. A.

**A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts**

School of Linguistics and Applied Language Studies

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

September 20, 2001

Copyright © Dragana Polovina-Vukovic

2001

**National Library
of Canada**

**Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services**

**395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada**

**Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada**

**Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques**

**395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada**

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-66844-4

Canada

***The undersigned recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
acceptance of the thesis***

***“The Representation of Social Actors in The Globe and Mail During the Break-up of the Former
Yugoslavia”***

***submitted by Dragana Polovina-Vukovic
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts***

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Lynne Young", written over a horizontal line.

***Lynne Young
Thesis Supervisor***

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Ian Pringle", written over a horizontal line.

***Ian Pringle
Director
School of Linguistics and Applied Language Studies***

***Carleton University
September 18, 2001***

Abstract

This study focuses on the portrayal of different ethnic groups involved in the war during the disintegration of Yugoslavia (1991-1999) as represented by one segment of the Canadian press. Through a critical discourse analysis of the articles that appeared on the front pages of *The Globe and Mail*, the only Canadian daily national newspaper at the time of the events being examined, the study identifies and compares the representation of different Balkan participants: the armed forces, politicians, civilians, and Western participants. The analysis illustrates that different ethnic groups were largely portrayed either as “villains” or “victims” and argues that such a portrayal served to justify Western intervention in the Balkans.

Key words: the Balkans, the West, NATO, critical discourse analysis, news, ethnic

Acknowledgments

There are many different people who contributed in one way or another to making this thesis possible. I was fortunate enough to have as a supervisor Professor Lynne Young, who profoundly advanced my education and inspired my interest in Critical Discourse Analysis. I wish to thank her from the bottom of my heart for offering me continuing help of many kinds and for both supporting and challenging me during the writing of the thesis. This stimulating professor, generous person, and a dear friend, whose sense of humor made the work less onerous, deserves the most thanks for encouraging me and believing in this project even on the occasions when my faith abandoned me.

I also have been blessed with being taught by Professor Peter Medway, a kind-hearted man and inspiring pedagogue, whose viewpoints have deeply influenced my own. His thoughtful comments on my first draft helped me to finish the writing. I owe him the deepest debt of gratitude for always being there to listen and discuss, and for helping me to clarify my views on the variety of issues. His understanding and the friendship motivated me throughout the writing of the thesis.

The graduate community in the School of Linguistics and Applied Language Studies has made me feel welcome and was always a source of support. I would like to thank the graduate supervisor Professor Devon Woods for his encouragement. I am also grateful to Instructor Natasha Artemeva for her enthusiasm and support.

A special thanks goes to my fellow student Claire Harrison for reading and commenting on the entire draft in its various stages, as well as to Shirley Cameron, Diane

Wastle, Anne Pazaver, Kristen Yip, and Jaffer Sheyholislami for their comments, ideas, and constructive critiques on parts of my analysis.

Last, but not least, I am deeply grateful to my parents and sister for always being on my side, to my brother-in-law Boris for helping me whenever my computer refused to work, and above all, to my son and husband, for their love and patience.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	iii
Acknowledgments.....	iv
List of Tables.....	viii
List of Illustrations.....	ix
List of Appendices.....	x
Introduction.....	1
Chapter 1.....	7
Critical Discourse Analysis.....	8
Roots of CDA.....	10
Critical Linguistics.....	13
Norman Fairclough`s three dimensional approach.....	17
Ruth Wodak and the Vienna School.....	23
Teun van Dijk`s Socio-cognitive approach.....	26
Critiques of CDA.....	30
Chapter 2.....	34
Methodological considerations.....	34
The analysis of the text.....	35
Actor description	35
Processes: mental, action (material), and relational.....	39
“Voices”.....	43
Quantitative versus qualitative analytical methods.....	44

Corpus and selected data.....	45
Chapter 3.....	47
A brief history of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	47
The conflict in Slovenia.....	55
The war in Croatia.....	64
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.....	74
The war over Kosovo.....	90
Actor description.....	102
Processes: action, mental and relational.....	104
“Voices”.....	106
The role of non-Balkan participants in the conflicts.....	106
The role of Canada.....	110
Actor description.....	114
Processes.....	115
“Voices”.....	117
Chapter 4.....	119
Main findings of the study.....	119
Conclusion.....	126
Bibliography.....	216

List of Tables

Table 1 – The number of published and randomly selected front-page articles.....	46
Table 2 – Ethnic composition of the former Yugoslavia.....	51
Table 3 - Distribution of mental, action, and relational processes.....	105
Table 4 – Distribution of transactive and non-transactive processes.....	105
Table 5 - Distribution of “agent” – “patient” roles.....	105

List of Illustrations

Illustration 1 – Ethnic composition of the former Yugoslavia (based on Denitch, 1994).....	51
---	-----------

List of Appendices

Appendix I - Analysis of the front-page headlines on the former Yugoslavia published in <i>The Globe and Mail</i> during the period 1991 to 1999.....	138
Appendix II - Processes: action (material), mental, and relational.....	165
Appendix III - Voices: Balkan participants.....	201
Appendix IV - Voices: non-Balkan participants.....	207

Introduction

The disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991 and the ensuing war between the country's ethnic and religious groups - the Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Muslims/ Bosniaks¹ and, later, Kosovo Albanians/Kosovars² - was the first major conflict in Europe since the end of World War II. As such, the Yugoslav war was a media event in itself, receiving intense coverage and dominating the TV screens and the press for almost ten years.

The conflict came at time of important geopolitical changes. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the transformation of cold war security alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)³ and even the United Nations (UN) - all these events form the broader context of the Yugoslav conflict.

The conflict started in Slovenia in 1991. In 1992, a war ensued in Croatia between Croatian government forces and the country's local Serbian minority from the Krajina and Slavonia⁴ regions. By April 1992, the fighting spread to Bosnia and Herzegovina among the region's Muslim, Serb, and Croat factions. In November 1995, following NATO air strikes on Bosnian Serb targets the Yugoslav conflict was officially ended when the three warring sides signed the Dayton Peace Agreement.

However, 1996 and 1997 respectively were characterized with sporadic shooting incidents in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.

By February 1998, Serbia itself was at war when the Kosovo Liberation Army⁵, an Albanian armed group, launched an attack in Serbia's southern region of Kosovo.

By March 1999 U.S.-led NATO warplanes launched a bombing campaign over Yugoslavia – the first time in the organization's 50-year history that it attacked a

sovereign nation without UN Security Council approval. At the time of the writing of this thesis (2001) another Yugoslav war continues – this time in Macedonia, between Macedonian government forces and Albanian armed groups.

Research Questions

Some researchers choose their topic, but in my case, my topic chose me. I immigrated to Canada from Bosnia and Herzegovina. My arrival coincided with the NATO bombing over Serbia. My new Canadian friends asked me many questions about the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Although people I met seemed to be informed about the Balkans, they were very often surprised by my explanations. In general, I found that people did not have a full understanding of the wars in the Balkans. Warrant Officer Matt Stopford, the member of the Canadian peacekeeping forces in former Yugoslavia, described his own experience in the following words:

[...] Upon returning to Canada, I was amazed at the ignorance of the average citizen. People would hear that you'd just got back from Yugoslavia, and they'd say 'aren't those Serb bastards?' as if they knew all about the Balkans [...] When you'd start to explain to them how we watched the Serbs get butchered by the Croats, you could see their eyes glaze over [...] For us, it was like coming home from the Second World War and telling people we'd fought *for* the Germans. Rather than try to explain things, it was easier just to let it go.

(Taylor, 2000, p. 14, emphasis in the original)

My realization that most Canadians' perceptions of the Balkan conflicts and their participants depended primarily on media accounts based on images, stories and reports transmitted by radio, television, and the daily press, acted as the impetus for my research.

The focus of my study is the portrayal of the parties involved in the Yugoslav conflict as represented by one segment of the Canadian press. The purpose is to explore

the role of media in constructing a certain discursive reality for the Canadian readership within the “public sphere, that is, social space where people as citizens are drawn into informed debates about contemporary issues of national and international interests [...] which weigh heavily on the formation of public opinion” (Chouliaraki, 1999, p. 38).

Through a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the articles that appeared on the front pages of *The Globe and Mail*, the only Canadian daily national newspaper at the time of the events being examined, my thesis identifies and compares the representation of different Balkan participants: the armed forces (both state and rebel), politicians, civilians, and Western participants. Because the identified Balkans participants belong to different ethnic groups, we can thus speak about the representation of Albanians, Slovenes, Croats, Bosniaks, Serbs, and Western participants. These portrayals prompted the following research questions:

- What are the differences among the portrayals of the different ethnic groups identified above (comparing, for instance, the armed forces in Croatia, the armed forces in Bosnia, and the armed forces in Serbia)?
- What are the changes, if any, in the representation of each group over the period of the study?
- What is the difference in the portrayal of Western participants and Balkans participants?

These questions led to perhaps the most central issues in CDA research, which are:

- Is there overt or covert prejudice in relation to different groups by the media, to what extent is it produced and reproduced linguistically, or alternatively how can it be exposed and contested by linguistic means?

If discourse is seen as 1) a form of social practice, and if 2) media discourse is an influential medium, investigation of these questions could reveal a great deal about the attitude in Canada towards different ethnic groups from the former Yugoslavia.

If there is a discursive practice of differential representation, this may contribute to the construction of particular mental models for readers and may influence the ways in which Canadian readers call for, and accept, actions taken in relation to a particular group (Young, 1998, p. 2). Inequality in discourse may influence the policies of respective state(s), in this case Canada, towards the actors in the conflict. It may also influence immigration policies, decisions related to governmental and non-governmental political assistance, and assistance in humanitarian aid. Teun van Dijk (1993) has pointed out that the consequences of "discursive racism" including ethnicism, on the lives of members of minority groups are "hardly discursive: they may not be let into the country, the city or the neighborhood, or won't get a house or a job."

Because I participated in some of the events that are the object of my investigation, the question of my objectivity in studying and analyzing these events must be addressed. Although objectivity in any absolute form is an illusion, I followed Wodak's (1999) suggestion to minimize the risk of critical bias by integrating historical, political, and sociological information in my analysis and interpretation. As well, I paid particular attention to what I was doing, analyzing and interpreting, as well as constantly trying to shift "between theory and empirical phenomena" (Wodak, 1999, p. 12).

It is also important to state that my analysis is a “light analysis” (Hodge & Kress, 1993) with the purpose not to establish “conclusive and definite truths” (Wodak, 1999), but rather to illustrate strategies adopted in the construction of different ethnic groups in the small segment of the Canadian press.

The study is organized in the following way. The purpose of the first chapter of the study is to review some of the most important theoretical and methodological characteristics of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and to explore how CDA can contribute to analysis of the media. This is followed by the discussion of my own working analytical framework in the second chapter. The third chapter presents the analysis of selected newspaper articles. In the fourth chapter I discuss the main findings of this research and draw tentative conclusions from them.

NOTES

-
- ¹ The notion of a Muslim nation is adopted by the 1963 Constitution. In 1994 Yugoslav Muslims changed their national name to Bosniaks.
- ² The word Kosovars should refer to all inhabitants of Kosovo, despite their ethnic background. However, the term has come to be used to refer to Kosovo Albanians only. The region known as Kosovo in the English-speaking world is called Kosova by its Albanian inhabitants. The Serbian official name for the same province is Kosovo and Metohija (Judah, 2000).
- ³ This organization changed its name to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1994.
- ⁴ Not to be mixed with the former Yugoslav republic Slovenia.
- ⁵ The Albanian name for this armed formation is Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (UÇK).

Chapter 1

My main objectives in this chapter are to review the roots of CDA, as well as to survey some of its most important theoretical and methodological characteristics. Since CDA has become a very diverse area of study, the survey of approaches in this review is necessarily selective. I have included approaches which have proved helpful in examining different aspects of news media texts and have showed the various ways in which media language use embodies relations of power and authority in society. The approaches I cover are the ones that influenced my own study in offering useful tools for my analysis. Thus, Fowler et al. (1979), Trew (1979), Kress and Hodge (1979, 1993) proposed analytical tools for a detailed textual analysis. Of particular importance for my own study is their discussion on transitivity, nominalizations, and passive transformations. Fairclough's (1992, 1995a, 1995b) approach offered me an opportunity to include text production, distribution, and consumption in possible explanations of why journalists represented events and participants in the former Yugoslavia as they had. I also accepted Wodak's (1996, 1999) argument that events described in newspaper articles cannot be considered in isolation from its historical background. Finally, van Dijk's work (1991, 1993, 1998) provided very important insights about the media elite and their relationships with other elite in society. His discussion about "new racism", that is ethnic inequality in discourse, also proved to be particularly useful for my own work.

In addition to the frameworks mentioned above, I also drew on the work of Theo van Leeuwen (1996), particularly on his network for the representation of social actors in English. I will talk more about this system in the next chapter.

To sum up, the approaches I have included in this review are:

- the Critical Linguistics of Fowler et al. (1979).
- Fairclough's (1992, 1995a, 1995b) Critical Discourse Analysis.
- Wodak and the Vienna School's (1996, 1999) Discourse-historical approach, and
- van Dijk's (1991, 1993, 1998) Socio-cognitive approach.

Critical Discourse Analysis

The field of CDA is heterogeneous, but despite differences in their frameworks all researchers share several key concerns. They all see language (but also other forms of semiosis, which would include visual images, music, gestures, etc.) as an "element of social practice, which constitutes other elements as well as being shaped by them" (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, Series Preface). Therefore, researchers in this field believe that "social questions, such as the question of power, race, gender, etc." are "in part questions about discourse" and that the linguistic analysis of texts can contribute in analysis of "range of social problems and issues – in the media, politics, law, the workplace, etc." (Ibid.).

CDA has an explicit "sociopolitical agenda", to uncover and make explicit unequal relations of power which "underlie ways of talking and writing in a society, and in particular to reveal the role of discourse in producing, reproducing or challenging sociopolitical dominance" (van Dijk, 1998, p. 4). Thus Wodak (1995) says that CDA practitioners "[...] aim to address what they believe to be pressing social issues which they hope to understand better, and possibly change through their analysis" (p. 206).

Similarly, Fairclough (1989) defines the goal of CDA as increasing “consciousness of language and power, and particularly of how language contributes to the domination of some people by others” (p. 4). According to Kress (1990), CDA

[...] aims to provide accounts of production, internal structure, and overall organization of texts [...] to provide a critical dimension in its theoretical and descriptive accounts of texts [...] [with] the larger political aim of putting the forms of texts, the processes of production of texts and the processes of reading together with the structure of power which has given rise to them. (pp. 84-5)

Fairclough and Wodak (1997, pp. 271 –80) and van Dijk (1998)) summarize the main tenets of CDA as follows:

- Power relations are discursive.
- Society and culture are constituted by discourses.
- Discourse does ideological work.
- Discourse is historical.
- Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory.
- Discourse is a form of social action.
- CDA, thus, addresses social problems.

Kress (1979) believes that meaning arises from an interaction with context and social activities of participants, and linguistic features come about as a result of these and other social processes. Texts have no single “unproblematic” meaning: instead, different hearers/readers will respond to the text in different ways, according to their ideological states and previous world experience. Furthermore, the meaning for each participant is not fixed but provisional and subject to further social negotiation. Such negotiation takes place within relations to power.

Van Dijk (1993) points out that CDA examines linguistic features to determine how language functions to reproduce social structures. He explains that CDA focuses on both macro and micro-level discourse patterns that signify power and legitimization of ideas. He explains that macro-level analysis includes organizational and contextual features of discursive events, such as social status, expertise, and race, while micro-level features include pragmatic, semantic, syntactic, and phonological properties.

CDA is best viewed as a “shared perspective incorporating a range of theoretical and working frameworks rather than just one school” (Bell & Garrett, 1998, p. 4). Further, as Van Dijk (1998) points out, CDA does not have a unitary theoretical framework. There are many types of CDA, which may be theoretically and analytically quite diverse, but all CDA studies are concerned with questions related to the tenets outlined above.

Roots of CDA

CDA developed, in part, from the systemic-functional model of language, whose founder is Michael Halliday, and from critical social theory, which arises from the work of the authors within the Frankfurt School. While the Hallidayan model of language is a valuable tool for description of texts, the framework of critical social theory allows critical discourse practitioners to integrate studies of texts within the study of capitalist society and the ways that communication and culture have been produced within this order.

According to Halliday (1978), the main purpose of language is to enable us to make meanings with each other in order to make sense of the world. Thus, language is seen as a semiotic system organized “along the lines of three general functions: *ideational, interpersonal, and textual*” (Stillar, 1998, p. 20). The ideational metafunction “expresses the speaker’s experience both of the external world and of her/his consciousness of her/his own internal world” (Gregory, 1982, p. 6). The interpersonal metafunction “expresses relations between speaker and hearer [...] and the speaker’s intrusion of his/her own attitude into what s/he says” (Ibid.). Finally, the textual metafunction is the “enabling” function. This means “language can effectively express ideational and interpersonal meanings only because it can create text” (Halliday, 1978, p. 21). Halliday points out that all three metafunctions simultaneously occur in all texts.

In the Hallidayan model the “internal organization of the grammar has a functional basis” (Thibault, 1986, p. iii), which corresponds to the three metafunctions specified above. Thus, the ideational metafunction is represented by *participants* and *processes* on the lexico-grammar level; the interpersonal metafunction is expressed by *mood* and *modality*, while the textual metafunction is expressed by a *theme-rheme* system and *cohesion* (Gregory, 1982; Young, 1990).

Halliday (1978) believes that language users have a sense of which particular linguistic forms are appropriate for use in particular contexts of situation. This sense of appropriate language use in its contexts of situation functions to satisfy speaker’s/writer’s individual goals. Halliday’s *register theory* “describes the impact of the immediate context of situation of a language event on the way language is used” (Eggins, 1994, p.

9). The three metafunctions “act as an interface between the internal functional organization of the lexico-grammar and the contextual variables of field, tenor and mode in the context of situation” (Thibault, 1986, p. iii). Thus, “*field* corresponds to the social activity, which is taking place and correlates with selections in the ideational component” (Ibid.). *Tenor* is concerned with the social relations among participants and correlates with selections in the interpersonal metafunction. *Mode* is concerned with the organization of text as a coherent semantic unit, and correlates with selections in the textual metafunction (Ibid., p. iv).

Many researchers in the field of CDA adopted Halliday’s view of language, which sees meaning as arising from an interaction between language and social context, and which locates the text, (and not isolated sentences), as the central object of study. Thus, Fairclough (1992) wrote that he follows systemic linguistics “in assuming that language in texts always simultaneously functions ideationally, interpersonally, and textually” (p. 6). He also argues that “approaches to critical discourse analysis which have an ideational bias are ill-equipped to capture the interplay between cognition and interaction which is a crucial feature of textual practice” (Ibid.).

In addition to Systemic Functional Linguistics, CDA is linked to the socio-philosophical orientation of critical theory. As Wodak and Reisigl (1999) point out, CDA is not interested “to study the linguistic system and its functional and semantic dimensions *per se*, but rather to establish the linguistic relations between language and institutional and political structures” (p. 8). In doing so CDA “does not pretend to be able to assume a socially neutral stance” but “allies itself with those who suffer political or

social injustice” (Ibid.). This involves, according to Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) “recognizing that critique (including critique of language) is not just academic, but a part of social life and social struggles” (p. 9). Thus, CDA wants to contribute to social movements “providing [...] a real dialogue across the public spheres” (Ibid., p. 10). Jürgen Habermas identifies the “public sphere” as the place where “public opinion can be formed”, which is characterized by the “commitments to the values of open debate and the formal equality of participants” (Marris & Thornham, 1986, p.11). Researchers believe that CDA can contribute to democratic dialogue in contemporary societies.

Critical Linguistics

The term Critical Linguistics came out of the work of Fowler et al. (1979) and Kress and Hodge (1979) in the late 1970s. Drawing on the work of Halliday previously described, critical linguists maintain that there is strong connection between language and social structure because social relations between groups of people influence linguistic behaviour. From their point of view, language is an instrument of communication and socialization, but at the same time, language serves to “establish and maintain the power of state agencies, corporations and other institutions” (Fowler et al., 1979, p. 190). Therefore, language is an instrument of control that involves “systematic distortion in the service of class interest” (Ibid.).

Assuming that linguistic meanings cannot be separated from ideology and that both depend on social structures, critical linguists believe that linguistic analysis can be a “powerful tool for the study of ideological processes, which mediate relationships of

power and control” (Ibid., p. 186). Because different texts embody particular ideologies or theories, the aim of Critical Linguistics was the critical interpretation of texts: “recovering the social meanings expressed in discourse by analyzing the linguistic structures in the light of their interactional and wider social contexts” (Ibid., p. 196). The objective was to produce an analytic method which could be used for exploring ideologies in the texts not only by linguists, but also by specialists in different disciplines (history, sociology, mass communication, etc.).

In order to uncover ideologies and power relations embedded in texts, Fowler et al. (1979) focused on textual analysis of grammatical processes of transitivity, “transformations”, modality, and classification.

Transitivity refers to types of predicates which occur in the text because “predicates carry the main responsibilities for representing the events and situations to which the text refers” (Fowler et al., 1979, p. 198). The authors suggest that it is useful for analysts to ask: “who benefits from the action”, under which circumstances, and “how are they connected to it, spatially or temporally, instrumentally or causally” (Ibid., p. 199).

The term *transformation* refers to a) nominalization, and b) passivization. *Nominalization* is the process of turning a verb into a noun, with the possible effects of obscuring agency, modality, and tense as well as turning processes into objects. Very often participants through nominalization disappear from the text and readers need context to recover them. For example, in the headline: *Weary refugees arrive in Croatia: mass deportations [had been] called a catastrophe*, nominalization (combined with

passivization) does not allow readers to determine who deported whom, thereby obscuring agency (and possibly responsibility).

The *passive transformations* – changing verbs from the active into their passive form, and vice versa – also may eliminate participants. In the example above, passivization – [*mass deportations*] had been called a catastrophe – deletes participants (the reader may ask: who called mass deportations a catastrophe?). At the same time, passivization influences Halliday's textual metafunction, changing theme – rheme relationships. Passivization allows a noun denoting the affected participant to be placed at the front of the clause where it is the focus of attention.

In addition to transitivity and transformations, a further focus of critical linguists is upon aspects of clause grammar, which have to do with its interpersonal meanings, that is, a focus on the ways in which social relations and social identities are marked in clauses through *modality*. Fowler et al. (1979) suggest exploring the use of a range of linguistic forms which are concerned with the expression of modality. These include *personal pronouns* (especially the use of “we” forms, which may be inclusive or exclusive. Inclusive “we” implicates the speaker and the audience; the relationship here is one of intimacy and solidarity. The exclusive “we” does not include the audience and serves as a distancing device. The authors also describe what they call the “corporate ‘we’” when the text speaks on behalf of an organization). Other ways in which the interpersonal metafunction is realized include *naming choices* (Mr. Clinton/Clinton/President Bill Clinton/Bill, etc.), *modal auxiliaries* (must/should, etc.), *modal adverbs*

(possibly, certainly, etc.), the use of *modal verbs* such as seem/feel/wish/try/think/want, and *demonstrative pronouns* (this - that/here -there/these - those).

The term *classification* refers in the work of Fowler et al. (1979) to the processes of a) relexicalization, and b) overlexicalization. The authors define *relexicalization* as relabelling, suggesting that this process “promotes a new perspective for speakers” (Fowler et al., 1979, p. 211). *Overlexicalization* is the use of synonymous or near-synonymous terms for expressing some area of experience. The authors illustrate this process using an article published in the *Observer*, where the phrase “loan” appeared as: “credit-deal”/“credit-bargains”/“personal loan”/“special credit schema”, etc. (Ibid.). The authors see the importance of overlexicalization in pointing to “areas of intense preoccupation in the experience and values of the group which generates it” (Ibid., p. 212).

This framework of Fowler et al. has however been criticized (Fairclough, 1992, 1995a; Boyd-Barrett, 1994) because of a “tendency towards the classic fallacy of attributing particular ‘readings’ to readers, or ‘media effects’, solely on the basis of textual analysis” (Boyd-Barrett, 1994, p. 31). Boyd-Barrett also objected because the analysis “does not seem to require [...] rigorous sampling” and because the authors did not strictly identify “[...] which media, and which sections of those media were being drawn upon to support particular conclusions” (Ibid.). However, Fowler’s et al. description of the analytical tools for textual analysis remains a very useful guide for researchers.

Norman Fairclough's three dimensional approach

As Fairclough (1992) noted, in the early days of Critical Linguistics the authors only focused on texts as product and not enough on the processes of producing and interpreting texts, which he attempted to include. Fairclough (1992) argues that Fowler et al. (1979) did not pay attention to the processes of interpretation "either those of the analyst-interpreter or those of the participant-interpreter" (p. 28) and to the fact that readers are often critical, so that ideological meanings of texts cannot be taken for granted.

Fairclough's (1989, 1992, 1995a, 1995b) approach, also drawing on the systemic functional framework developed by Halliday (1978), has three components: the first one is *text analysis*, the second component is the *analysis of discourse practice* (text production, text distribution, and text consumption/interpretation), while the third component is *analysis of social practice*, focusing in particular on the relation of discourse to power and ideology.

Fairclough (1992) developed his approach with the main objective being to bring together "linguistically oriented discourse analysis and social and political thought relevant to discourse and language" and to offer a framework which could be used in social scientific research. His focus is upon language in use or "text in context", for which he uses the term "discourse" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 62).

The first part of Fairclough's framework - *analysis of texts* – is based on systemic functional grammar. In addition to transitivity, transformations, modality, and classification, which were examined by Fowler et al. (1979), Fairclough (1992) suggests

examining “interactional structures”, such as the turn-taking system, topic control, and formulation. He argues that these features may show what kind of social and power relations exist between participants in interaction.

The second part of Fairclough’s framework - *discursive practice*:

[...] focuses upon processes of text production, distribution and consumption. All of these processes are social and require reference to the particular economic, political and institutional settings within which discourse is generated [...] The central concern is to trace explanatory connections between ways (normative, innovative, etc.) in which texts are produced, distributed and consumed in a wider sense, and the nature of the social practice in terms of its relation to social structures and struggles. (1992, pp. 71- 2)

Because different texts are produced and consumed differently depending on social context, the author believes it is necessary to investigate each of these processes. He gives an example of a newspaper article, which is produced “through complex routines of a collective nature, by a team whose members are variously involved in its production” (Ibid., p. 78). All steps in the production of the newspaper article, such as accessing sources, transforming the information in the text, deciding what to include or exclude in the newspaper, deciding whether to place the report on the front-page of the newspaper, etc., should be studied by researchers. The author also argues that consumption and distribution of texts need to be investigated because whereas some texts may belong only to the immediate context of situation (a private letter between friends, for instance), texts produced by politicians, or the media, have wider distribution and consumption. “Analysis of discursive practice” argues Fairclough, should also involve the question of “how people interpret texts in various social circumstances” (Ibid., p. 86).

An important aspect of Fairclough’s framework is the concept of intertextuality, which he adopted from the work of Mikhail Bakhtin. For Bakhtin

[...] the actual meaning [of a given utterance] is understood against the background of other concrete utterances on the same theme, a background made up of contradictory opinions, points of view, and value judgments.
(1981, p. 281)

Bakhtin's view of language as a dialogic phenomenon was named intertextuality by Kristeva in 1980. Intertextuality means that every text is an answer to a previous text, and anticipates a response of a future text. In Fairclough's words, "each text is historically linked with the others in various time-scales, including texts which are more or less contemporary to it" (1992, p. 103). Therefore, each text "must be read against the background of other utterances and events occurring in the community," including the "social language or voice characteristic of a particular group in the community" (Lenke, 1995, p. 25).

Examining intertextual relations in the press, argues Fairclough (1995a), involves questions about the relations between the news story and other discourse types within the newspaper (advertisement or editorial, for example), but also the ways in which news texts draw on other texts which have been generated outside of immediate journalistic activity, such as a government report, or a press release summarizing the major finding of scientific project. What is very important, according to Fairclough (1995a), is the "relationship between intertextuality and hegemony" (p. 102). As he explains, while intertextuality is related to how "texts can transform and restructure prior texts and restructure existing conventions (genres, discourses) [...] this productivity is not in practice available to all people; it is socially limited [...] and conditional upon relations of power" (Ibid., p. 103).

Fairclough (1992, 1995a, 1995b) distinguishes between *manifest intertextuality*, and *interdiscursivity*. Manifest intertextuality is the “case where specific other texts are overtly drawn upon within a text”, while interdiscursivity involves explorations of “how a discourse type is constituted through a combination of elements of orders of discourse” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 117). Manifest intertextuality can reveal whose voices “have privileged access to the media, and who is perceived as a reliable source of information” by reporters (ibid., 111).

The third dimension in Fairclough’s framework is *discourse as social practice*, which focuses on discourse in relation to ideology and power. Fairclough views ideology as located both in the texts and in the events. According to the author, “texts do bear the imprint of ideological processes and structures”, but ideological processes are processes between people, so one needs to discover them through “discourses as whole social events – not just through texts, which are moments of such events” (ibid., p. 118).

Fairclough believes that ideologies are most effective when they become “naturalized” and achieve the status of “common sense” (ibid., p. 87).

The notion of “common sense” was introduced by Antonio Gramsci. In the Gramscian view, the bourgeoisie are successful in projecting their view of the world as “natural”, “taken for granted”, and “legitimate”, although in fact it serves only their interests. Common sense in Gramsci’s formulation of it refers to values, meanings and beliefs which are contained in everyday practical activity, and which directly or indirectly support existing relations and asymmetries in the relations of power and authority in society. In media representation this, for example, involves the “translation of official

viewpoints into a public idiom” in such a way to be in accordance “within horizons of the understanding of various publics” (Hall et al., 1978, p. 61). Although, by definition, common-sense assumptions are common to many people, that is not the same as saying that they are universally shared.

According to Fairclough (1995a), when different social groups struggle over institutional power, alternative ideologies are generated. Thus, subordinate social groups can pose a challenge to hegemony and the consensus may be broken. Society is seen therefore as a constant struggle between ideologies competing for hegemony.

When “ideologies are built into conventions, more or less automatized”, believes Fairclough, “people may find it difficult to comprehend that their normal practices could have specific ideological investments” (1992, p. 90). Therefore, one of the objectives of CDA is to “emphasize critical awareness of ideological processes in discourses, so that people become more aware of their own practice, and become more critical of the ideologically invested discourses to which they are subjected” (Ibid., p. 90).

To sum up, using Fairclough’s framework, researchers analyze particular texts, consider the discourse practice focusing on the intertextuality of discourse samples, as well as the social practice of which discourse is part.

Although Fairclough’s framework may seem an ambitious one, I believe it connects the study of the media to the broader fields of society: politics, political economy, and history.

In terms of textual analysis of *The Globe and Mail* coverage of the Balkan wars requires the tools of SFL to describe how images of different groups are constructed for

the Canadian readership. Using these tools enables one to show how images of "our friends" and our "enemies", and other components of events in the Balkans helped structure audience response and mobilize consent to the Canadian peacekeeping missions and NATO-led attack on Bosnia and Serbia. On the other hand, a newspaper text "is not a definitively accomplished entity", but is rather the "product of interaction between a processes of production and interpretation, in which participants draw on resources of knowledge, beliefs, ideas, values and assumptions which are available to them" (Deacon et al., 1999, p. 152). To reduce the Balkan wars to only textual analysis leaves out explanations about why participants are portrayed as such. The analysis of discourse practices and discourse as social action involves, among other things, questions of media sources, journalists' self-censorship, standard media practices in crisis situations, the impact of economy on the foreign news coverage, etc. Finally, processes of production and interpretation are determined and conditioned by the "situational, institutional, and societal context in which they take place" (Ibid.). The analysis of discourse as social practice enables one to situate the war in the former Yugoslavia within broader contexts of Canadian foreign policy towards the Balkans, as well as within geopolitical context of globalization in a uni-polar world.

Ruth Wodak and the Vienna School

The Vienna School, associated with Ruth Wodak, developed a framework which has many similarities with Fairclough's three-dimensional approach reviewed above. Wodak (1996), who named her framework the Discourse-historical approach, defines it

as the study of the text in context, that is to say, discourse, where both factors are of equal importance. In their analysis researchers of the Vienna School view the historical dimension of discursive act in two ways: firstly, they always try to integrate all available information on the historical background of the discursive event. Secondly, in a number of studies (Wodak et al., 1990, 1994) they examine the "diachronic change, which particular types of discourse undergo during a specified period of time" (Wodak & Reisigl, 1999, p. 8).

Like Fairclough, Wodak sees both written and spoken "discourse as a form of social practice" and assumes that "situational, institutional and social context affect and shape discourse, and in turn, discourses influence social and political reality" (Ibid.).

This relationship between the text, discursive practice, and society Wodak (1996) explains in the form of concentric circles:

The smallest circle is the discourse unit itself and the microanalysis of the text. The next circle consists of the speaker and audiences, of the interactants with their various personality features, biographies and social roles. The next level involves the 'objective settings', the location in time and space, the description of situation. Then, the next circle signifies the institution in which the event takes place. And we could, naturally, extend to the society in which this institution is integrated [...]The integration of all these levels would then lead to an analysis of discourse as social practice. (p. 21)

Through discursive practices, explains the author, social actors "constitute knowledge, situations, social roles as well as identities and interpersonal relations among various interacting social groups"(Ibid., p. 22). This means, says Wodak, that discourses may serve to construct collective subjects like nations, ethnicity etc. Second, they might "perpetuate, reproduce or justify a certain social status quo (and "radicalized", "nationalized" and "ethnicized" identities related to it)" (Wodak & Reisigl, 1999, p.35).

Third, discourses are instrumental in transforming the status quo. Fourth, discursive practices may have an effect on the dismantling or even destruction of the status quo (and of nationalist, ethnicist concepts related to it). "On a social level," wrote Wodak, "discursive practice may influence the formation of groups and serve to establish or conceal relations of power and dominance between men and women, or between national, religious, sexual, political, and cultural majority and minorities" (1996, p. 24). Due to this reason, the main goal of CDA is "to uncover ideologies and often obscured relations of power, political control and dominance, as well as strategies of discriminatory inclusion or exclusion in language use" (Ibid.).

According to Wodak (1999), critical analysts position themselves politically, and this leads to the "prospective critique". This critique has the practical goal of change of things. It also tries to offer a solution to specific social problems. The "prospective critique" is convinced that researchers need to take sides against social discrimination, repression, domination and exclusion (Wodak, 1999, p. 8). The "prospective critique" is also motivated by the conviction that unsatisfactory social conditions "can and must be subject to methodical transformation towards fewer social disfunctionalities and unjustifiable inequalities" (Ibid.).

The author points out that researchers are not disembodied individuals, but interested members of specific societies and social groups with specific points of view. In order to avoid an overly simplistic and one-sided perspective, social critique has to be carefully and self-reflectively applied.

One methodical way of minimizing the risk of critical bias and of avoiding simply politicizing instead of accurately analyzing is, according to Wodak et al. (1994), to follow *the principle of triangulation*. This principle is one of the most salient distinguishing features of the Discourse-historical approach. Working multi-disciplinarily, multi-methodically and on the basis of a variety of different empirical data as well as background information, analysts attempt to include systematically the historical, political, and sociological dimension in the analysis and interpretation of a specific discursive occasion (Wodak, 1999, p. 10). The principle of triangulation implies using various methods of data collection (both qualitative and quantitative) and the analysis of different corpora and genres, depending on the topic in question. For example, in their study of national identities Wodak and Reisigl (1999) analyzed different data such as political speeches, newspaper articles, posters, and brochures, as well as conducting the interviews with focus groups. This enabled them to explore how the Austrian identity is formed in public and semi-public settings.

Wodak (1999) believes, echoing Fairclough, that intertextuality is an important part of analysis at all points, and points out that researchers should include other information which relates to the specific problem under investigation, such as other discourses of the same speaker/writer, other events in the same institution, etc.

Wodak and the Vienna School's approach is evident in the book *Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and anti-Semitism* (1999). Here Wodak and Reisigl studied how racism, anti-Semitism and ethnicism are reflected in discourse. The authors

offer their own model of CDA for the analysis of racist, anti-Semitic and ethnicist discrimination, which is orientated around five questions:

- How are persons named and referred to linguistically?
- What traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to them?
- By means of what arguments and argumentation schemes do specific persons or social groups try to justify and legitimate the exclusion, discrimination, suppression and exploitation of others?
- From what perspective or point of view are these naming, attributions and arguments expressed?
- Are the respective discriminating utterances articulated overtly, are they intensified or are they mitigated? (Wodak & Reisigl, 1999)

While the focus of these studies is on racism in Austria, the approach is relevant for the study of discrimination in any context. Drawing on a wide range of sources, from political speeches and legal documents to newspaper articles, television broadcasts, and everyday conversations the authors question why even today, in a post World War II society, racism and anti-Semitism are still virulent.

Teun van Dijk's Socio-cognitive approach

Like other authors in CDA, van Dijk (2000) understands discourse as a communicative event, "including conversational interaction, written text, as well as associated gestures, typographical lay-out, images and any other semiotic dimension of signification." Like others, he also believe that CDA needs "a solid linguistic basis to

account for detailed structures, strategies and functions of text and talk, including grammatical, pragmatic, interactional, stylistic, rhetorical, semiotic, narrative or similar forms of verbal organization of communicative events” as a way for observing and analyzing “macrosocial dimensions of society.” Finally, van Dijk (2000) shares beliefs that CDA has to be critical, which he explains as clarifying the “detailed conditions of the discursive violations of human rights” and other power abuses. Therefore, his approach, which is three-dimensional like Fairclough’s, “is intended to bridge the gap between the micro levels and macro levels of news analysis and between media texts and context” (van Dijk, 1988, p. 181).

Unlike many of researchers in CDA, van Dijk’s Socio-cognitive discourse analysis values the importance of the study of cognition in the critical analysis of discourse, communication and interaction. While Fairclough argues that discourse practice, that is, text production, distribution, and consumption, bridge the gap between discourse (micro level) and society (macro level), van Dijk believes that this central mediating role is occupied by cognitive structures and mental models. The author explains that the

social subsystem is constituted by social practices of discrimination at the local (micro) level and relationships of power abuse by dominant groups, organizations and institutions at a global (macro) level, where the second, macro level is cognitive.
(van Dijk, 2000)

In other words, van Dijk (1993, 2000) argues that the visible manifestation of different discriminatory practices of members of dominant groups and institutions are “based on a mental basis consisting of biased models of ethnic events and interactions,

which in turn are rooted in racist prejudices and ideologies” (van Dijk, 2000). Although the author rejects the idea that discriminatory practices are always intentional, he believes those practices always

[...] presuppose socially shared and negatively oriented mental representations of Self and Others, Us and Them. Many therefore seem to be polarized – We are good and They are bad – especially when conflicting interests are involved. (van Dijk, 1998, p.25).

The author is particularly interested in the role of the media in producing, reproducing, and sustaining ethnic prejudices throughout society. He argues that “white and male, powerful elites dominate mass media, education and public discourse in order to produce a societal consensus that all too often supports the racist ideology” (van Dijk, 1993, p. 28). This is in accordance with Porter (1965), whose research showed for example, that an average Canadian journalist is a member of upper-middle class English and French families of inherited wealth, and educated in elite schools. He is white, male, married, and tends to vote Liberal (Porter, 1965). Porter concluded that the lack of minority groups in top management perpetuates biases in favour of dominant ethnic groups and overlooks supporting ideals of liberal democracy and capitalism. More recently research conducted by Pollard (1994) showed that journalists do not fully represent, in terms of their ethnic backgrounds and gender, the various classes and groups of society. His survey of Canadian English-language media showed that a “typical member of the daily news media workforce [...] is a 35-year-old, married Anglophone male” (cited in Desbarats, 1996, p. 106). Similarly, summarizing previous researches,

Desbarats (1996) says that "Canadian journalists tend to be white [...] Minority journalists represent only 2.6 per cent of the newsroom force" (p. 107).

According to Lorimer and Scannell (1994), journalists very often leave their profession and start to work for government as information officers. The authors noted that "journalists find themselves able to move back and forth between government, private corporations and the media with relative ease. Such ease of movement illustrates the degree to which such institutions share the same basic viewpoint" (Lorimer & Scannell, 1994, p. 106).

This is in line with van Dijk's argument that the elite have their special access to, and control over the most influential forms of public discourse, namely, that of the mass media, politics, education, research, and the bureaucracies. As the ideological leaders of society, they establish common values, aims and concerns; they formulate common sense as well as contribute to the consensus, both as individuals and as leaders of the dominant institutions of society. This close link between the media and other elite in Canadian society James Winter explains using the example of the Thomson Corporation, owner of *The Globe and Mail*:

The Thomson empire is run by John A. Tory [...] Tory's father founded the law firm Tory, Tory, DesLauriers & Binnington, where Ted Rogers [owner of Rogers Communications] articulated. John A. Tory is deputy chairman and director of Thomson Corp., but is also a director of Rogers Communications Inc., as well as being on the boards of Abitibi-Price Inc., the Royal Bank of Canada, and others. His son John is a partner with Tory, Tory, DesLauriers & Binnington, but is at the same time on the board with of Rogers Broadcasting Ltd.; he was also the principal secretary to the Ontario premier and cabinet from 1982 – 1985. (1997, p. 18)

Winter concluded that:

Ken Thomson and Ted Rogers, who own two of Canadian largest "competing" media empires are virtually indistinguishable when seen through family, business

and political ties. Not surprisingly, this is reflected in the content of their news media outlets. (Ibid.)

Assuming that links between “white” elite of the media and other “white” elite in society, described above, have consequences on the portrayal of minorities in the media thus producing and reproducing “new racism”, van Dijk (1993, 1998) conducted research of various newspapers in Europe. His findings suggest that immigrants and ethnic minorities are represented in a negative light and that news about them are often restricted to the following kind of events: illegal arrival of immigrants, social problems, such as welfare and unemployment, deviant behaviours, such as violence and crime.

Critiques of CDA

Various authors have criticized CDA (for instance, Gregory, 2001; Tyrwirth-Drake, 1998; Schegloff, 1997). The major criticism of these authors directed at CDA, generally speaking, was that CDA is often short in detailed, systematic analysis of texts or talk, for instance as carried out in SFL, or Conversational Analysis. Thus Gregory (2001) suggests that CDA has abandoned the analysis of *discourse* at the expense of being critical, while Tyrwirth-Drake (1998) thinks that CDA “undermines its claims to interdisciplinary status by taking a cavalier approach to the data, and by attempting to establish its own hegemony” (p. 6).

In response, CDA practitioners very often agree that scholars in different fields “do good work on detailed textual analysis, but also find that this work unnecessarily avoids further social analysis and critique” (van Dijk, 1998, p. 4). It also should be noted

that many scholars in CDA share an interest in detailed textual analysis, as I previously discussed talking about the work of Fowler et al. (1979) and Fairclough (1992, 1995a, 1995b). It is also true that some of CDA authors include in their analysis both textual analysis and interviews with focus groups, as well as quantitative analysis (Wodak, 1996; Wodak & Reisigl, 1999; Hodge & Kress, 1993, for example).

Defending CDA methods, van Dijk argues that CDA differs from similar fields (such as SFL or Conversational Analysis) because

CDA does not hesitate to examine text and context separately, and once a feature of context has been observed...CDA may be used to explore whether and how such a feature affects or is affected by structure of texts and talks. (1998, p. 6)

Thus, CDA analysts “are not afraid to make use of their social knowledge that being black, being a woman, being young, or being the boss will most likely be evident from the way people write and talk” (Ibid., p. 9). This, of course, does not mean that CDA should “merely presuppose contextualization, but ‘prove’ it by attending to details of what social members actually say and do” (Ibid., p. 8).

In addition to the authors who object to the lack of detailed analysis, and see this as a serious weakness of CDA, the concept of CDA *ideological* analysis has been also criticized. Thus Schegloff (1997) claims that CDA imposes its own categories on participants because “it is driven by prior theorizing and can only find out what is already known”, while Tyrwhitt-Drake (1998) expresses concerns with CDA’s own “assumption of the high ground on moral issues.” Fairclough (1995a) also mentioned post-structuralists and post-modernists critique on ideology, expressed by Foucault and Baudrillard. Thus, says Fairclough (1995a) “one line of argument [Foucault’s] is that any

form of ideological critique presupposes that the critic has privileged access to the truth, whereas any such a claim is just a coded 'will to power' (p. 16).

A different argument by Baudrillard is that "the concept of ideology, which presupposes a distinction between appearance and reality is superseded" because the "distinction between image and reality has collapsed [...] so it is impossible for instance to separate the images of war on TV and the actual thing" (Ibid.).

Defending critical analysis Fairclough argues that CDA

cannot remain indifferent to questions of truth, be it matter of omissions or falsifications for persuasive purposes [...] Of course, CDA cannot per se judge the truth or well-groundedness of a proposition, but then critical discourse analysis is just one method to be used within wider critical projects. Intellectuals should not feel embarrassed about making judgments of truth: on the contrary, like other social groups, they have a responsibility to bring the particular perspective they can contribute into the public domain in debates over the great social and political issues. (Ibid., pp. 18 – 9)

From my point of view, accepting Baudrillard's thesis about the impossibility of separating reality and fiction in circumstances of wars, hides a dangerous idea that we cannot challenge the hegemony and versions of reality presented by more powerful states, which have more powerful propaganda machines. There is another issue involved here - if we really cannot distinguish between truth and falsehood, because truth is "a kind of strategy within a language game" (Baudrillard, 1995, cited in Hackett & Zhao, 1998, p. 126), as Baudrillard claims, then we also cannot distinguish between accounts of survivors of Srebrenica killing, for example, and denials of their killers. Baudrillard's "nihilist relativism" (Ibid., p 127) denies any prospect for critique of practices which are not good and gives us a pessimistic picture of world in which changes are not possible.

Using CDA as my working framework, which will be discussed in the next chapter, I hope I will be able to avoid CDA's shortcomings, and I agree with Fairclough (1995a) that

Retreating into a helpless relativism when faced with issues such as war crimes in ex-Yugoslavia, which require judgments of truth and falsity, is in my view a serious ethical failure, whatever theoretical voices may be used to rationalize it. (p. 19)

Chapter 2

Methodological considerations

In this study I will analyze the portrayal of social actors during the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia following the guidelines outlined in Fairclough (1995a, pp. 224 – 240). Fairclough's approach, as we have seen, consists of three components:

- the analysis of the text(s),
- the analysis of the "discourse practice", and
- the analysis of the "social practices".

To analyze the "discourse practice" means to analyze the processes of the texts' production, distribution and consumption, while the general aim in the analysis of the social practice is "to specify the social and hegemonic relations and structures" (Ibid., p. 239) which determine the nature of the discourse practice.

My emphasis is on textual analysis of the newspaper articles and this analysis occupies the central place in the next chapter. But there is also a constant shift "from description of the text to interpretation of both the discourse practice and the social practice in which the discourse is embedded" (Ibid., p. 231) in my analysis. I firmly believe that only analysis which includes all these three parts (the text, its production, distribution, and consumption, and different processes in the society) can offer answers to my research questions.

The analysis of the text

For detailed textual analysis I decided to focus on the following salient features of the newspaper articles:

- actor description.
- type of predications (processes) in which the actors were engaged, and
- the issue of “voices”, that is, who was allowed to speak and who did not have an opportunity to voice her/his position.

This is also in line with Wodak and Reisigl's (1999) model for the analysis of discrimination in any context, which is orientated to questions such as: How are persons named and referred to linguistically? What traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to them? From what perspective or point of views are these naming, attributions and arguments expressed?

Actor description

The characterization of social actors is one of the most important features in CDA research, and more specifically what van Dijk (1998) refers to as discourse about “us” and “them”. Social actors are obviously identified and referred to in different ways, for example, by their names, origin, position, etc. While textual analysis can give us excellent insights about social actors included in a text, what is “absent from a text is often just as significant from the perspective of sociocultural analysis” (Fairclough, 1995a, p. 5). Therefore, argues Fairclough, we need a model for analysis of text “which allows for a systemic focus upon absences through more sustained comparative analysis

of texts” (Ibid.). Such a useful system of categorization in which social actors can be represented in the English language is offered by van Leeuwen (1996). His framework “depends upon a systemic view of text as choice, operationalized as networks of systems of options which are selected amongst the production of texts” (Fairclough, 1995a, p. 5). Drawing on that system, I focused on the following dimensions in the portrayal of participants:

a) *Inclusion/Exclusion* – Social actors may be explicitly mentioned in the texts (in that case we talk about their inclusion), or may be “symbolically removed from the readers’ world of immediate experience” (we talk then about the exclusion of social actors). Van Leeuwen (1996) shows that the exclusion may be complete – when “both the actors and their activities” are excluded and when the exclusion does not leave any trace in the text. The author argues that “such radical exclusion can play a role in a critical comparison of different representations of the same social practice” (van Leeuwen, 1996, p. 39). Exclusion of social actors has been an important aspect of CDA. For instance, Trew (1979) showed that the police were excluded in a newspaper article which described how they killed demonstrators because the newspaper wanted to suppress “the fact that the white regimes apply violence and intimidation,” therefore, “the regimes and their agents [were] put constantly in the role of promoters of progress, law and order [...] but never responsible for the conflict” (Trew, 1979, cited in van Leeuwen, 1996, p. 39). In my own data this radical exclusion proved to be very important.

b) *Suppression/Backgrounding* - van Leeuwen (1996) makes a further distinction between suppression of social actors and their backgrounding. Suppression differs from

radical exclusion in the sense that there is no reference to participants anywhere in the text, but the activities in which they are involved are included. Thus, readers can ask, “who did something?”. In the case of backgrounding, participants are mentioned elsewhere in the text, so although they are more de-emphasized, the audience can track them and find out who they are. For example, in the sentence:

Three officials were reported shot to death in one town and other shootings were reported.

we talk about suppression of social actors because we, as readers, cannot recover from the text either who killed whom, or who the source of information is.

An example of the backgrounding would be in the clause *Muslim villagers massacred*, because elsewhere in the text readers are told that the Croats killed the villagers.

Passive construction with agent deletion and nominalisation play an important role in suppression and backgrounding of social actors.

c) *Genericisation/Specification* - Another important factor in the portrayal of participants is the choice between general and specific reference. Social actors may be described in general terms, as “people”, “refugees”, “soldiers”, etc., or may be identified as individuals, with their names and other individual characteristics, such as age, gender, occupation, etc.

d) *Identification/Functionalisation* - van Leeuwen (1996) distinguishes between identification, which describes social actors in terms of their ethnicity, age, religion, sexual orientation, wealth, race, physical characteristics, personal, kinship, and work

relations. Of particular relevance in my study was the strategy of explicit *ethnicisation*, that is, identification of participants according to their ethnic backgrounds, which aims to “emphasize similarity and homogeneity” (Wodak, 1999) of a particular national group.

Functionalisation refers to social actors in terms of an activity they perform. According to van Dijk’s (1998), van Leeuwen’s (1996), and Young’s (1998) findings, the “out-groups” are usually portrayed in general terms, as people without faces, while the “in-groups” are represented in terms of their individual characteristics. Van Leeuwen (1996) argues that in middle-class oriented newspapers government members and different experts “tend to be referred to specifically, and ‘ordinary people’ generically,” therefore, “the point of identification is not the world of governed, but the world of governors” (p. 47). The opposite tendency, according to this author, may be observed in working class oriented newspapers, where ordinary people are more frequently individualized.

e) *Personalisation/Impersonalisation* - van Leeuwen also distinguished between “representational choices which personalize social actors”, that is, portray them as human beings, and the choices which portray participants “by other means, for instance abstract nouns, or by concrete nouns whose meaning does not include the semantic feature ‘human’” (1996, p. 57). This strategy might be of ideological importance because it “can background the identity and/or role of social actors; it can lend impersonal authority or force to an activity or quality of social actors; it can add positive or negative connotations to an activity of a social actor” (Ibid, p. 60).

In addition to the above categories offered by van Leeuwen (1996), I also examined lexical choices used for the description of social actors. As Lemke (1995) has explained, “each different social or political point of view [...] constructs its own discourse formation; it speaks of the matter in its own way” (p. 37). Therefore, he continued, “if one discourse says that the *freedom fighters* are being kept in a *concentration camp*, while other says that the *terrorists* are being held in a *prison*, the reader has to do some substantial work to construct a unity between these discourses” (Ibid., emphases in the original). Lemke (1995) argues that the interpretation of the meanings of these two discourses depends on our position in our “social groups, defined by gender, age, social class, religion, political affiliation, occupation, etc.” (Ibid.).

Processes: mental, action (material), and relational

All strategies of representation of social actors discussed above need to be observed with respect to the roles that participants play in action, mental, and relational processes. In the Hallidayan model the term *process* is defined as “[...] anything that can be expressed by a verb: event, whether psychical or not, state or relation” (Halliday, 1976, p. 159, cited in Young, 1990, p. 48). Halliday (1976) divided all processes into three groups: material, mental, and relational.

In this study I followed Gregory’s (1982, pp. 6 - 8) model, which distinguishes between *action*, *mental*, and *relational* processes. These three groups of processes Gregory (1982) further divided according to the participant roles that are associated with them. Thus, *action process roles* are:

- Agent – “the animate or potent entity that carries out the process”: *They* killed them.
- Instrument – “the instrument used by an agent to carry out the process”: They killed them with *a mortar fire*.
- Initiator – “the animate or potent entity who/which initiates a process carried out by an agent(s)”: *The explosion* scattered people.
- Patient – “the entity (animate or inanimate) that is affected by the process”: They killed *them*.
- Resultant – “the entity that results from the process”: They committed *the crime*.
- Medium – “the entity that is necessarily involved in action processes that involve transfer”: They gave them *food*.
- Beneficiary – “the entity for whom or which the process is done”: They gave *them* food.
- Range – “the role which specifies or de-limits the process”: They won *a battle*.
- Locative – “spatial and temporal roles necessary to the process”: They left their *village*. They escaped *yesterday*.
- Means – “material involved in the carrying out of certain action processes”: They made shelter *out of wood*.

Mental processes have two participant roles – *processor* (“the one who does the processing”), and *phenomenon* (“what is processed”). Gregory (1982) classifies all processes into the following sub-types:

- Creation: *She* designed her *dress*. (*she* – processor; *dress* – phenomenon)
- Verbalization: *They* reported *exodus*. (*they* – processor; *exodus* – phenomenon)

- Perception: *They saw soldiers.* (*they* – processor; *soldiers* – phenomenon)
- Reaction: *They hate them.* (*they* – processor; *them* – phenomenon)
- Cognition: *They were thinking about them.* (*they* – processor; *them* – phenomenon).

The last type of processes is *relational*, which Gregory (1982) divides into the following sub-types:

- Attributive: He is cruel.
- Classificatory: He is a Communist.
- Identification: He is the minister.
- Locational: He is in Sarajevo.
- Possessive: They have artillery.
- Ambient: It is hot.
- Existential: There is no peace there.

In my own data, the types of processes played a particularly important part, sometimes serving as the only means of distinguishing whether social actors belonged to the group called “armed formations” or to the group of “ordinary people”. For instance, in the clauses such as *Croats attacked villages* and *Croats flee villages*, the action process *attacked* was a determining factor in classifying the *Croats* as members of Croatian armed formations, while the action process *flee* distinguished the *Croats* as ordinary people.

At the lexico-grammatical level of particular importance for my study was the transitivity system. This system can be of ideological significance, as proved in the work of many CDA researchers (van Dijk, 1991; Fairclough, 1992, 1995a; Fowler et al., 1979;

Kress & Hodge, 1979; Young, 1998; Sykes, 1985, 1987). This part of my analysis draws on the work of Kress and Hodge (1979) and Sykes (1985, 1987), particularly on their discussion about *transactive* and *non-transactive* processes. As Sykes (1985) explained, the term, transactive refers to “constellations of agent-verb-affected participant”, while non-transactive refers to “any constructions of only one participant or where other participants are unaffected by the action or process of the verb” (p. 184). She rightly pointed out that actors who “frequently appear as agents in transactives therefore are attributed power and responsibility in affecting the course of the events” (Ibid, p. 185).

Another important aspect here is whether social actors are in an active or passive role (van Leeuwen, 1996). In other words, the question is whether social actors act as “agents” in material action processes, “behaviors” in behavioural processes, and “sayers” in mental verbal processes, or are “patients” (“something is done to them”). Many studies (van Dijk, 1991, 1998; van Leeuwen, 1996; Sykes, 1985; Young, 1998) have shown that members of minority groups appear in the agent role only when they are involved in negative actions. If the actions are not negative the members of the “in-groups” most often act as responsible “agents” upon the immigrants/minorities “be it materially or symbolically” (van Leeuwen, 1996, p. 46).

For purposes of my study I was concerned with linguistic description only at primary scale of delicacy. This means that I have counted as clauses both independent clauses (for example, *Serbs attacked Croats*), and embedded non-finite clauses (*A few Serb men followed her, whistling, swearing and calling her a “slut” and worse*), but not

the prenominal adjectivalized verb derived from passives (*terrified refugees*, for instance).

“Voices”

The media reports of what happens in the world build on the accounts of other people, be they eyewitnesses, spokespersons, experts, politicians, or business leaders. What they say and how they say it has considerable influence on the angle of the news story. The question of “voices”, that is, who is and who is not allowed to speak is, therefore, one of the important issues in my study. Examination of voices in the articles shows whose perspective is given and who was considered the reliable source for information from the journalists’ point of view, and thus, “may reveal the ideological framework within which reporters work” (Young, 1998, p. 4).

What different people have to say is presented by the media either as unacknowledged background information or is acknowledged and attributed source. Bruck and Roach (1993) state that we “can speak of the media reprocessing the discourse spoken by their sources” because reporters “rearrange different parts, and create their own particular way of telling the events in the world” (p. 84). This is in line with Fairclough’s (1995b) discussion about “primary discourse” (“the reporting discourse”) and “secondary discourse” (“the discourse reported”). Both Fairclough (1995b) and Bruck and Roach (1993) argue that it is very useful to explore “the extent to which the voices of primary and secondary discourse are kept apart, or merged” (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 58). For instance, in the sentence:

"I thought that Hitler time was returning and we were going to some kind of Auschwitz," said 22-year-old Leonore Lutoli, the voices of primary and secondary discourse are clearly demarcated. This sentence produced the clause: *Albanians recount Nazi-like ordeal,* where the voices of primary and secondary discourse are still kept apart, by using the verb *recount*. The same sentence also produced the headline: *Kosovo deportations a chilling Nazi echo,* where the voices of primary and secondary discourse completely merged. The absence of quotation marks and a reporting clause suggests the translation of refugees' viewpoint into the authority of the newspaper (or "the voice of primary discourse" – Ibid., p. 62).

Quantitative versus qualitative analytical methods

There are different methods in the analysis of newspaper articles, which can be divided into two large groups: quantitative and qualitative methods. According to Wodak (1996), there has been a dispute in the social sciences about the relevance of these two methods, but they do not necessarily exclude each other. The same argument is asserted by Deacon et al. (1999), who argue that the choice of methodology depends on the research questions researchers want to address. Deacon et al. (1999, p. 114) rightly point out that whichever analytical method someone adopts s/he needs to "avoid the trap of regarding her/his own approach" as better than others.

In North America the content analysis of the media, whose purpose is to "quantify notable features of a large number of texts", has a long history (Ibid.). Berelson (1952) defined the content analysis as a "research technique for the objective, systematic and

quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” (cited in Deacon et al., 1999, p. 115). Content analysis has been applied in numerous media studies exploring news and current affairs, cartoons, comedies, sports, advertisement, etc. Researchers have praised content analysis because it is explicit, systematic and reliable (Ibid.).

In the European (and Australian) context, more popular was the qualitative analysis of the media (Ibid.). The roots of this tradition can be found in the 1930s in Europe, when the Frankfurt School theorists argued that the world cannot be empirically and scientifically “discovered” (and counted for), because the facts are social and historical products.

However, following Wodak’s (1996) “multi-method approach” and believing that both quantitative and qualitative methods are useful for my analysis, I used statistical generalizations in my textual analysis to check whether the results yielded typical patterns, but also as a guard against my own pre-existing prejudices and assumptions. This does not mean that these prejudices were eliminated completely, but, at least, as Deacon et al. (1999) rightly assert, statistical patterns can show with more credibility that there had been a trend in representing certain groups in certain ways, or in maintaining a silence about them.

Corpus and selected data

There were 429 front-page stories on the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia published over ten years (from January 1991 – December 1999) in *The Globe and Mail* and all of their headlines are analyzed (Appendix I). I decided to analyze only stories

from the front pages, since editors place the articles there that are considered to be the most important and of most interest for their readership (Geis, 1987; Parenti, 1993).

For a detailed textual analysis, I randomly selected 43 stories (see Table 1), which makes up ten per cent of front-page articles published in each year of the period under the study. These articles allowed me to identify the predominant roles assigned to participants in wars in the former Yugoslavia and to explore whether these roles changed.

Year:	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total
# Front	38	43	52	57	68	33	26	14	98	429
10 %	3.8	4.3	5.2	5.7	6.8	3.3	2.6	1.4	9.8	
# Rando m	4	4	5	6	7	3	3	1	10	43

Table 1: The number of published and randomly selected the front-page articles

Out of these 43 front-page stories, the main topic of two articles is about the conflict in Slovenia, three others focus on the war in Croatia; 24 are related to the Bosnian war, and 12 are about Serbia. The possible reasons why some of the examined wars (and their participants) received more or less attention will be discussed below.

According to the number of published front-page articles, journalists' interest in the events in former Yugoslavia gradually increased over the ten years period – from 38 front-page stories published in 1991 to 98 front-page stories in 1999. These numbers also show that the NATO military action in Kosovo was of particular interest during the examined period, because 98 front-page stories are devoted to the conflict in Kosovo,

which makes up 22.8 per cent out of total articles published on the front-page of *The Globe and Mail* during the ten year period.

The number of front-page stories decreased in the years without wars and whenever NATO and the United Nation officials were not involved in the events examined (1996, 1997 and 1998, with 7.69 per cent, 6.06 per cent and 3.2 per cent out of all front-page articles respectively). This is in line with results of previous studies on the media, which showed that in general, the media coverage of foreign countries tend to focus only on violent and dramatic happenings, such as wars, famines, and disasters (Carruthers, 2000; van Dijk, 1998). According to a 1995 study by the Pew Researcher Centre for the People and the Press (cited in Moeller, 1999, p. 18), North America media's coverage of external affairs has the following characteristics:

- "Foreign events and disaster usually must be more dramatic and violent to compete successfully against national news."
- "One-third of all international stories are essentially about the United States in the world, rather than about the world."
- "About 40 per cent of stories are about wars and terrorism involving the United States."

Similarly, Hackett (1992) suggests that due to the "high degree of dependence of Canadian media on the global agencies and on major U.S. media one might expect similarities to U.S. patterns of foreign coverage" (p. 315). His study of Canadian media confirmed that:

- “The geographical distribution of foreign news is highly skewed favouring regions that are culturally and politically similar to Canada or that involve spectacular conflict or threats to Western interests.”
- “News from the Third World is more likely to involve crisis and conflicts” (Ibid.).

Some of the wars in former Yugoslavia lasted only seven days, as was the case in Slovenia, others stretched over three years, the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. One republic – Macedonia became an independent state avoiding a war within its borders. Because of these facts, the number of articles devoted to different republics, different wars and their main actors, varies quantitatively throughout the examined period.

In terms of sources of coverage, more than 50 per cent of stories were agency reports (Reuters, Agence France Presse, Associated Press) or were reports by correspondents of the U.S. newspapers (*The New York Times*). This confirms Karim’s (2000) findings, according to which, “the coverage of foreign affairs in Canada is influenced by the manners in which American journalists perceive it – especially when considering regions of the world in which the U.S. government has strong foreign interest” (p. 14).

In this chapter I have focused on my own working framework, which will be used in the following analysis of selected newspaper articles. I have also described the corpus on which the analysis is based. The next chapter is concerned with the analysis itself, which is organized according to participants involved in the war in the former Yugoslavia, beginning with the portrayal of Balkans actors, and ending with the representation of non-Balkan participants.

Chapter 3

According to van Dijk (1998) and Wodak (1995, 2000), it is impossible to understand the discursive strategies adopted without understanding the social background against which they were formulated. Therefore, my analysis starts with a brief overview of the former Yugoslavia prior to its dissolution. This is in line with Wodak's approach, which she describes as "attempts to transcend the pure linguistic dimension and to include more or less systematically the historical, political, and sociological dimension in the analysis, theory and interpretation of a specific discursive occasion" (1996, p. 24).

The historical and political dimension of the events related to a particular republic is followed by a textual analysis of the randomly selected front-page articles, focusing on how the main actors are portrayed.

A brief history of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

The former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) consisted of six republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia, and the same number of the founding (constituent) people of Yugoslavia: Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, Slovenes, and, after the 1963 constitution, Muslims.

In addition, there were many citizens who had a national homeland elsewhere, and they were referred to as nationalities. (The expression "national minority" was seen as degrading, or associated with ideas of second class citizenship and threatened status. In its place the term "nationality" was introduced by the constitution.) These individuals,

such as Jews, Czechs, Romanians, Bulgarians, Turks, Italians, Roma and Vlachs, had been guaranteed cultural rights to preserve their sense of community and their heritage. Albanians and Hungarians, the largest of these groups, were also given local self-government in two autonomous regions in the republic of Serbia where they predominated (Kosovo and Vojvodina, respectively). The only right which the Constitution did not give to Yugoslav nationalities was the right to secede. Hungarians never demanded a change in their status, but the Kosovo Albanians began to demand the status of a republic (and, thus, the right to secession) in 1968.

All people in the former Yugoslavia had Yugoslav citizenship, but they could also choose to declare themselves as belonging to Yugoslav nation. The number of those who declared themselves Yugoslav nationals (children of mixed marriages, but also members of constituent nations who preferred to identify themselves as such and not as Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, etc.) varied between 3 and 6.2 per cent of the total population in different censuses (Crnobrnja, 1996, p. 22).

Ethnic composition of the former Yugoslavia can be seen on the map bellow, which is based on Denitch (1994).

Group	Population	Percentage of total population
Serbs	8,140,000	36.3
Croats	4,428,000	19.8
Muslims	2,000,000	8.9
Slovenes	1,754,000	7.8
Albanians	1,730,000	7.7
Macedonians	1,340,000	6.0
Yugoslavs	1,219,000	5.4
Montenegrins	579,000	2.6
Hungarians	427,000	1.9
Other (Jew, Roma, Turkish, Romanians, Bulgarians)	778,212	3.6

Table 2 – Ethnic composition of the former Yugoslavia (based on Denitch, 1994).

The concept of constituent nations (nations who made up the country) required that all federal activities (from appointments to public office, such as army generals or the rotation of the prime minister, to the distribution of federal investments and representation at cultural festivals) take directly into account the proportional representation of individuals by constituent nationality (quota system) (Crnobrnja, 1996; Woodward, 1995). Federal institutions were based on the idea of government councils in which representatives from the republics made decisions on the basis of consensus. This aimed to prevent any single national group from gaining political dominance over the state (Parenti, 2000; Woodward, 1995; Crnobrnja, 1996).

As Parenti (1999) points out, between 1960 and 1980 Yugoslavia "had one of the most vigorous growth rates: a decent standard of living, free medical care and education, a guaranteed right to a job, a literacy rate of over 90 per cent, and a life expectancy of 72 years."

Many authors agree with Bissett (1999) who argues that "Josip Broz Tito's communist regime brought unity, stability, and relative prosperity to Yugoslavia." Yugoslavia was one of the founders of the non-aligned movement and "enjoyed a high level of international prestige" (Ibid.). Yugoslavia was also the most liberal of the communist countries - its citizens were allowed freedom of travel and in "comparison with most of the other countries in the Eastern block, Yugoslavs, whether Serb, Croat, Macedonian or Slovene, were proud of their country's status and achievements" (Ibid.; also Parenti, 2000; Woodward, 1995).

However, the first problems occurred in Yugoslavia in the early 1980's after Tito's death, which coincided with the beginning of a serious economic depression. Throughout the 1970's, Yugoslavia like many other countries had borrowed heavily from the IMF and commercial banks (Woodward, 1995). From the mid-1980s on, Yugoslavia had a "foreign debt of about \$20 billion, declining production, and a worsening balance of trade, along with hyperinflation that reached almost 1,500 percent in 1989" (Woodward, 1995, p.94). Tensions grew between the republican governments and the Belgrade central government over the management of the foreign debt. The richest republics, Slovenia and Croatia, started to complain about their "exploitation" (Crnobrnja, 1996). Nationalists praised the Slovenes' and Croats' "European, civilized, efficient" traditions as opposed to the "Balkan peoples' tradition" (Woodward, 1995). Serb nationalism became a powerful force in 1987, when Slobodan Milosevic became the head of the Serbia League of Communists.

The communist regime in Yugoslavia ended in 1990, with the breakdown of the federal Communist party and the multiparty elections held in the republics from April to December of that year. Nationalist leaders, with the policies of ethnic intolerance, in all republics won the first democratic elections (Crnobrnja, 1996; Woodward, 1995).

Both Slovenia and Croatia moved rapidly towards separation. In Serbia, Kosovo and the northern province of Vojvodina lost their autonomous status through the changes in the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. According to the 1974 constitution, Serbia had within its borders two provinces, which were politically equal in the federal power structures (Crnobrnja, 1996). Internally, these provinces had a power of veto "over any of

Serbia's decisions for the entire territory of the republic, but Serbia could not block its own autonomous provinces on their territory, though they were nominally a part of the republic" (Crnobrnja, 1996, p. 94).

The new constitution changed the balance of power among republics at the federal level because Serbia now had three votes in the Federal Presidency and three delegations in the Yugoslav Parliament, which voted in unison (Ibid.). These constitutional changes led to the withdrawal of Albanians from the political and civil life of that province. Although some authors believe that constitutional changes were a sign of Slobodan Milosevic's expansionist aspirations, the main goal for Serbia was to become a republic as any other. As Crnobrnja (1996) rightly points out, for the time being "Serbian assertiveness was limited to Serbia and its internal relations with provinces" and there was no "mention whatsoever of Serbs in Croatia or those in Bosnia who would become the centre of wars to follow" (p. 96).

Many books have been written about the problem of human rights in the former Yugoslavia, especially about the violations of human rights in Kosovo, with respect to its Albanian citizens¹. The human rights that nationalities in former Yugoslavia had were broader than in any country in the world (Crnobrnja, 1996; Woodward, 1995). All Yugoslav nationalities had full cultural and educational autonomy, from elementary school to universities and academic of science. Furthermore, "minority leaders were promoted at the highest offices in political life precisely because they were minority representatives" (Crnobrnja, 1996, p. 94). If the human rights in the former Yugoslavia

were not sufficiently protected, this was “true of the rights of all citizens of Serbia proper as well, and of all other republics” (Crnobrnja, 1996, p. 96).

The conflict in Slovenia

Chronologically, the first armed clashes erupted in Slovenia at the end of June 1991. On the 25th of June both Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Unlike Croatia, Slovenia immediately took control of the border posts and replaced the posts marked SFRY with those marked Republic Slovenia, thus unilaterally changing the borders of Yugoslavia. Slovenian authorities suspended the constitution of Yugoslavia and the federal legislation on the republic’s territory and “ceased federal turnover of tax payment and the collection of customs that were legally federal” (Crnobrnja, 1995, p. 98). Federal authorities proclaimed the Slovenian act illegal and the Ministry of Defence ordered the Yugoslav army to give military support to the federal police and custom personnel to retake their places on the borders of Yugoslavia. According to Glenny (1992), the Yugoslav People Army (YPA) had 20,000 troops in Slovenia, but only 2,000, mostly conscripts, were deployed in this action. The Slovenes offered strong resistance with their territorial units. Fighting lasted one week and left dead 37 soldiers of the Yugoslav army and 12 members of the Slovenian territorial force (Crnobrnja, 1996).

The conflict in Slovenia received journalists’ attention but the coverage was not extensive. This is not surprising. The world’s media were still occupied with the events in the Gulf War, where the U.S. and Britain’s troops were directly engaged. The number of

people who lost their lives in Slovenia was not large (less than 50 people). And finally, the conflict in Slovenia started as an internal problem of Yugoslavia, without active participation of the international community. Therefore, it is not unexpected that only two articles, out of 43 randomly selected for analysis, with headlines *Yugoslav army fires general* and *Yugoslav troops battle Slovenian secessionists/Yugoslavia attacks republic*, described the conflict in Slovenia.

Although only two articles in my sample described this conflict, this makes up 15 per cent of all articles about Slovenia published during the ten-years period, so it is possible to begin to explore how the main actors are portrayed. The main participants may be identified as follows:

- Slovenian and Yugoslav* armed formations:

Slovenian	Yugoslav
Slovenian forces (3x)	Yugoslav federal troops
Slovenian territorial forces (3x)	Yugoslav army
The defence units of Slovenia	Federal forces
Slovene soldiers	Federal army soldiers
State army of Slovenia (2x)	The army (4x)
Slovenian militiamen	An army officer
Troops	Army general
Country boys	
Slovenian secessionists (2x)	
His [J. Jansa's units]	

*This group includes all citizens who tried to preserve the federation regardless of their ethnic background.

- Slovenian and Yugoslav officials:

Slovenian	Yugoslav
Slovenian defence minister Janez Jansa (5x)	Admiral Stane Brovet, the federal deputy minister
Slovenia's information minister Jelko Kacin	Federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic
The Slovenian President	General Zivota Avramovic, a Serb

Milan Kucan	(6x)	
General Konrad Kolsek, a Slovene		The Yugoslav presidency
The Slovene presidency		A federal cabinet
One official		The federal government
Slovenian officials		The collective federal presidency
		Federal army officials
		A defence ministry

- Ordinary people from Slovenia: Many residents of Ljubljana [Slovenian capital],
Marija Zver
100 people
Slovenes

It is notable that ordinary people from Yugoslavia are absent from the texts, while ordinary people from Slovenia have a presence. The absent participants are removed from a “reader’s experience” and, consequently, they do not have an opportunity to express their point of view about events.

Certain referential strategies also seem to be relevant in the construction of Slovenian and Yugoslav participants – nomination, functionalisation and ethnicisation. While nomination personalizes represented actors, the referential strategy of functionalisation portrays them as nameless characters, in terms of activities they perform. Functionalized actors are, thus, depersonalized with little possibility for readers to identify with them.

Slovenian officials are nominated and titled more often than their Yugoslav counterparts. According to van Leeuwen, (1996) middle-class newspapers tend to nominate and title high-status persons, including presidents and government ministers.

These strategies of functionalisation and nomination occur in combination with the strategy of explicit ethnicisation, which is grammatically achieved by qualifiers and modifiers *Slovenian/of Slovenia* within the head of the nominal group, and create the impression that Slovenes form a homogeneous group, with the same interests and goals. This homogenization allows for a contrast of this group with similar or different groups: in other words, this is the basis for the distinction between “us” (the Slovenes) and “them” (any other group).

Regarding the Yugoslav participants, it is interesting to note that the strategy of explicit ethnicisation is applied only in the case of General Zivota Avramovic (a Serb), who replaced General Konrad Kolsek (a Slovene who had been dismissed). Readers are not informed about ethnic backgrounds of other Yugoslav participants and without detailed knowledge about the former Yugoslavia they cannot know that, for instance, Admiral Stane Brovet, the federal deputy minister, is a Slovene, or that Prime Minister Ante Markovic is a Croat. The average reader of *The Globe and Mail* thus might get the impression that Slovenes are not represented in the structures of federal government and the army. Furthermore, it is implied that Serbian generals lead the Yugoslav army:

Leaders of Communist-ruled Serbia, which supplies most of the army's senior officers, were especially bitter in denouncing the army's performance.

This is grammatically achieved in the article by subordinating the army to Serbia, which is placed in the position of agent in a transactive action process in the embedded clause (*which [Serbia] supplies most of the army's senior officers*).

It is true that Serbs were the most numerous in the Yugoslav army, as they were in the total population of Yugoslavia. They were over-represented in the officer corps and made up 46 per cent of Yugoslav army's generals (Gow, 1996). At the same time, Serbs were under-represented in the High Command of the army, the only institution of the army that could decide about the army's actions. While Croats and Montenegrins were over-represented at the highest army's level, Macedonians and Slovenes were proportionate to their numbers in the population, which shows the effort of the Yugoslav army to "ensure that its highest executive instance was, as far as possible, a reflection of Yugoslavia's national composition" (Gow, 1996, p. 72). At the time of the crisis in Slovenia and Croatia, the Yugoslav minister of defense and his deputy were a Croat and a Slovene, respectively.

It is also interesting to note the adjective *Communist-ruled* describing the noun Serbia. As we will see later, the motif of Communism is prominent in the articles that described Serbia. It is true that Serbia at the time of the events in Slovenia was ruled by ex-Communists, but the leaders in Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Montenegro were also ex-Communists themselves. Suppression of Slovenian leaders' Communist past may have helped to gain acceptance for the Slovenes as the in-group, with whom readers would more easily identify.

Except in two cases (*Slovenian secessionists/country boys*), the chosen words for both Slovenian and Yugoslav participants (*forces/militiamen/troops/defence units/army*) connote legitimacy, something within the state order. Lexical choices are, as was proved in the work of many authors, such as Fowler et al. (1979), Trew (1979), Lemke (1995),

and others, important indicators of ideological beliefs of the stories' authors. Lexical choices used in describing Slovenian actors, for example:

State army, Slovenian minister of defence, Slovenian border posts, presidency suggest that the reporter viewed Slovenia as practically a separate state with all a state's attributions. Although at that time Slovenia was still a part of Yugoslav federation, the internationally recognized borders of Yugoslavia in the articles are represented as the property of the republic, while the republic's armed units became, in the text, the state army. This clearly reveals the perspective of Slovenian officials, which, however, did not correspond to the actual reality.

For my analysis it is important to see which types of processes participants mentioned above are involved in because, as mentioned in the previous chapter, many authors (for example, van Dijk, 1991; Fairclough, 1992, 1995a; Fowler et al., 1979; Hodge & Kress, 1979; Young, 1998; Sykes, 1985, 1987) have pointed out that the placement of the participants in the role of active agent, or in the role of the affected participant or patient may serve ideological purposes.

In terms of agency, Slovenian participants are involved in action processes in 63.33 per cent of clauses; they are sayers in verbal mental processes in 30 per cent of cases; while in 6.66 per cent of clauses they are involved in relational processes. When they are involved in transactive clauses, Slovenian participants act as agents of violent actions in more than 80 per cent of situations. Grammatically they are placed in subject position as "doers":

[Slovenian] troops had shot down at least six federal helicopters.

The defence units also seized 15 Yugoslav tanks.

Slovene soldiers manned antitank guns on a main street.

Slovenian forces also killed a Yugoslav officer.

Territorial forces retook border posts.

While the Slovenes predominantly appear as “doers” acting upon a goal/patient, the Yugoslav army is predominantly (in more than 80 per cent of cases) a patient in transactive processes. Grammatically the army is either the direct object in clauses, or subject in passive constructions:

[...] his [Janez Jansa`s] troops had shot down at least six helicopters [...]

[...] units seized 15 Yugoslav army tanks [...]

[...] Slovenian forces [...] killed a Yugoslav officer [...]

[...] five federal soldiers were killed [...]

[...] 11 members of the federal forces had been injured [...]

Interestingly, although mainly “patients” in the texts, the Yugoslav troops more often (see Appendices I and II) appeared as the agent in violent action processes in the headlines: *Yugoslav troops battle Slovenian secessionists*; *Yugoslavia attacks republics*; *Yugoslav army fires general*, *Yugoslav jets roar over Slovenia*; *tanks move into rebel republic in show of force*. Readers who are reading just the headlines are thus likely to believe that only the Yugoslav troops are responsible for violent actions, evident in suppression of Slovenian negative actions.

Although the Slovenes acted as agents in violent processes, their actions are presented as mitigated and necessary, evident in choices such as Slovenian troops *defend*,

and *retook* border posts, their officials, in a journalists' words, *begged* and *appealed* for help while talking about the army's *aggression* against the *sovereignty* of the country and called the federal army action an attempt at *permanent occupation* of Slovenia. Slovenian officials also called on Slovenes to *defend their fatherland*. This highly emotional language, which described the events as a just and legitimate struggle against a national threat, with these wordings, evoke the "patriotic discourse of nationalism [...]" and provides a political rationale" (Chouliaraki, 1999, p. 48) for the violence in which the Slovenes were involved. Slovenes are portrayed as the weaker party in the conflict, faced with the army's advantage in power (for example, Yugoslav *army tanks* move into rebel republic *in show of force*; *Jets* roar over Slovenia; federal army declares ceasefire *in ground and air attacks* on Slovenia; breakaway republics *[are]* at mercy of Yugoslav military as rumours of coup heighten tension). In this way, the image of the Yugoslav army as aggressor is perpetuated and Slovenia is presented as the weaker participant and more likely to gain sympathy from the public at large. In reality, parts of the Yugoslav army were trapped in Slovenia and were seeking ways to get out of the republic (Thomas, 1996). Indeed, the first victims in the Slovenian conflict were army conscripts, members of helicopter crews, shot down by Slovenian forces, who tried to deliver food for the army members in one of besieged garrisons (Gow & Tilsley, 1996).

Slovenian sources also appear to be more valuable or more authoritative than sources of Yugoslav officials, because the Slovenes are almost always directly quoted. Fairclough (1992, 1995b) distinguishes between "direct discourse" and "indirect discourse" and argues that it is always interesting to see whether there is "explicit

demarcation between the voice of the reporter or the newspaper and the voice of the person whose discourse is being represented" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 56). He also argues that direct discourse is usually used where the secondary discourse comes from an authoritative source and where it is dramatic and important. In contrast, Yugoslav representatives are engaged in indirect discourse grammatically realized in the form of *that*-clause.

While the voice of the journalist and the voices of Balkan participants are clearly demarcated in the texts (quotation marks; the form of *that*-clause), it is not the case in the headline of the article. There the voice of the Slovenian defence minister becomes at the same time the voice of the newspaper. Following the rule of journalism, which says that both sides involved in a conflict need to be allowed to speak, the author of the article referred to the Slovenian official, who said that his troops had shot down *six* federal helicopters. The journalist also referred to the army's sources, which spoke about *two* lost helicopters.

These two opposite statements in the headline of the article became: *Yugoslav troops battle Slovenian secessionists: 6 federal helicopters shot down as rebel republic's capital comes under siege*, where the reporter, or editor of *The Globe and Mail* appears to believe the Slovenian minister rather than a federal army statement. Not only the number of downed helicopters in the headline is that provided by Slovenian representative; also the role of agent/patient is changed. While in the text the Slovenes acted as agents ([Slovenian] troops had shot down [...] *six federal helicopters*), in the headline the responsible agent became Yugoslav troops. The statement issued by one party in the

conflict thus is presented as the truth to the newspaper's readership. It is interesting to note that there is a tension between voices (and ideologies) in this headline. The first voice sees the violence in terms of *secessionism* and *federalism* (*federal helicopters/rebel republic*), which justify the actions of the army, and put the army in the role of "in-group". The second voice appears to accept the Slovenian statement as more valuable, thus placing the Slovenes in the "in-group" position.

The war in Croatia

In contrast to Slovenia, the goal of the Croatian government was twofold: Croatia wanted not only Western recognition of its independence, but also to solve relations with members of the Serb nation in Croatia. While Slovenia was ethnically the most homogeneous of the republics of former Yugoslavia, Croatia was ethnically mixed, with around 12 per cent of Serbs living within its borders.

The problems in relations between Croats and Croatian Serbs cannot be understood without some reference to the policy of genocide against Serbs, Jews, and Roma perpetrated by the Nazi puppet regime of Ante Pavelic's Ustasha, during the Second World War.

According to the Encyclopedia Britannica (1991), Independent Croatia of Ante Pavelic "set about a policy of 'racial purification'" and officially announced that "one-third of the Serbian population would be deported, one-third converted to Roman Catholicism, and one-third liquidated" (Macropedia, Vol. 29, 1991, p. 1111, cited in Trifkovic, 2001).

This is the reason why Croatia's Serbs viewed the nationalism that accompanied the new Croatian independence movement with alarm. Croatian leadership, headed by Franjo Tudjman, restored all the symbols (flag, coat of arms, currency, uniforms, etc.) of the state that had been responsible for the mass murders of Serbs, Jews, Roma and anti-fascist Croats during the Second World War. President Tudjman also "imposed a special tax on Serbs from Serbia who had cottages in Croatia (but not on such persons from any other republic)" (Woodward, 1995, p. 229). According to Woodward, the Croatian government "did little to protect its citizens from terror in mixed communities where Croat nationalists firebombed homes, and harassed or arrested potential Serb leaders" (Ibid.). In many parts of Croatia the Serbs were "fired from jobs because of their nationality, they lost the right to use their language and with changes in the Croatian Constitution they lost the right to self-determination that was granted them by the former Yugoslavia constitution" (Ibid., p. 230).

The leader of the Serbian Democratic Party in the Krajina (region of Croatia where the Serbs had absolutely majority) announced that if Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia, the Serbs in Croatia would have a right to decide in a referendum with whom and on whose territory they would live. The day after the Croatian Parliament declared the independence of Croatia, its Serb citizens proclaimed their own "state" and declared Krajina's independence from Croatia (Woodward, 1995).

All these events led to clashes between Serb rebels and Croatian police (Crnobrnja, 1996; Woodward, 1995). The Yugoslav army served as a buffer between the

two warring sides (Crnobtnja, 1996). The Croatian war ended in 1995, after Croatian offensives in one day expelled about 250,000 Serb citizens from their homeland.

This war had all the elements of a newsworthy event, as described in the media studies (Carruthers, 2000). It happened in Europe, which is, according the studies (such as Allan, 1999) over represented in the North America's media. The number of victims was large, involving the biggest exodus of people in Europe since the Second World War. The United Nation (UN) troops were active participants in the affairs. What is more important from the Canadian perspective, during their mission in Croatia, Canadian soldiers, members of the UN troops, were engaged in their "biggest battlefield after the war in Korea" (Taylor, 2000). So it is surprising that the war in Croatia did not receive intensive coverage in *The Globe and Mail*. Only three articles in my corpus described this conflict. Two of them, with headlines *Yugoslav assault pushes Croats back/Yugoslav army makes major push into Croatia* and *Yugoslav air force attacks Zagreb* appeared at the beginning of the war in Croatia in 1991. One story, titled *Refugee columns flood Bosnia/Refugee exodus 'humanitarian catastrophe'* was published in 1995.

It is possible to identify the following social actors in these articles:

- Croat, Yugoslav , and Serb armed formations:

Croats	Yugoslav	Croatian Serbs
Croatian forces (3x)	Yugoslav army thrust (2x)	Serbs
Croatian militia (2x)	The army (2x)	Secessionist Serbs
Croat soldiers	Soldiers and men of the federal army	Serb ethnic paramilitary groups
The republic's militia	The armoured thrust	Serbia irregulars
	Yugoslav air force	
	Yugoslav navy	
	Yugoslav People's Army	

	Yugoslavia army, with its Serbian-dominated officer corps, already purged of elements willing to crack down secessionist republics	
	conscripts	
	pilots and sailors	

- the officials of Croatia and Yugoslavia, as well as one of the Serb representatives:

Croats	Yugoslavs	Croatian Serbs
The country's head of state	The Croatian chairman of the federal presidency	Slavko Dokmanovic, the former Serb mayor of Vukovar
The leader of rebel republic	The head of Yugoslavia's moribund federal presidency, Stipe Mesic, a Croatian	
Croatian President Franjo Tudjman (6x)	Prime Minister Ante Markovic, a Croat and	
Croatia's leaders	Yugoslavia's defence minister General Veljko Kadijevic (2x)	
Secessionist republic	Yugoslav leaders	
Rebel republic	The collective federal presidency	
	The Yugoslav presidency, now comprising only four pro-Serbian members	
	Branko Kostic, vice-president of the federal presidency and a Serbian ally	
	leader of the Yugoslav federal government	

- ordinary people of Croatia, and the Serbs from Croatia :

Croats	Croatian Serbs
1,000 people	Exhausted and disillusioned Serb refugees
Croats (3x)	The exodus of Serbs

Many residents of Zagreb [the capital of Croatia]	The Serb refugees
Residents of Osijek	600,000 Serbs
	40,000 refugees
	A Croatian Serb soldier who identified himself only as Neno [he is also a refugee]

Comparing the portrayal of Croat participants with previously analyzed Slovenian participants, there are notable differences. Croat officials are fully titled and nominated only in the case of their president: *Croatian President Franjo Tudjman*. All armed formations are functionalised in van Leeuwen's (1996) term, that is, they are described according to the function they perform. Readers, thus, saw them as a group, not as individuals.

Lexical choices for military formations of the Croats, as well as of the Yugoslav army, connote legitimate warfare (*troops, forces, soldiers/ army, conscripts, soldiers, navy, etc.*). In contrast, Croatian Serb forces are described as irregular, paramilitary and secessionist, which placed them in the position of the out-group. Further, the article downgrades the Serb rebels by referring to them only as *Serbs/secessionist Serbs*. By contrast, other forces are referred to as organized forces, for example, *Croatian forces/militia/soldiers/Yugoslav army, etc.* The reference to *Serbia* in the nominal group *Serbia irregulars* suggests that military personnel of another republic is engaged in the territory of Croatia. This reference to Serbia, as well as the omission of the modifier *Croatian* with nominal groups referring to Serbs, citizens of Croatia, probably gave readers the impression that Serbs were "invaders" who came from outside of Croatia. The labeling of the Yugoslav army as a *Serbian* army, members of federal presidency as

Serbian ally, and citizens of Croatia merely as *Serbs*, appeared to accept the nationalists' argument that ethnic origin was equivalent to political loyalty. For the outsiders, this label might have been confusing, for, it seemed to deny the difference between ethnic origin and republic of origin or residence.

Yugoslav officials are represented by a combination of referential strategies of nomination and explicit ethnicisation: *Croatian chairman of the federal presidency, Stipe Mesic; Prime Minister Ante Markovic, a Croat*. Foregrounding of ethnicity of Croat participants, as well as Serbian participants in the federal presidency (*four pro-Serbian members; B. Kostic, a Serbian ally*) seems to portray the conflict as a result of only different ethnic backgrounds of participants.

Croats are predominantly (in 44 per cent of cases) sayers in mental verbal processes. As agents of direct action processes they appear only in four per cent of cases, such as:

The republic's militia had thwarted the army's attack.

Croatia's offensive to regain Serb-held land forced Serbs to flee.

[...] military garrisons had been besieged by Croatian militia [...]

While during the conflict in Slovenia the Yugoslav army filled mainly patients role in action processes, in the articles about the Croatian war, it is mainly (55 per cent of cases) placed in the position of the agents in direct action processes, and they are either grammatical or logical subjects in clauses with transactive predicates. The reason for this is probably due to the fact that the army was engaged in the attacks on Croatian coastal towns, which was widely condemned by international community. At the same time,

trying to stop Croatia's secession and defending the Croatian Serbs, the army, as Crnobraja (1996) rightly pointed out, lost impartiality and became involved on the Serb side of the conflict. In other words, this social actor became the out-group. Therefore, it is not surprising that the army's violent actions are foregrounded:

Yugoslav assault pushes Croats back

The offensive had broken Croatian lines...

Gunboats of the Yugoslav navy continued to blockade Croat ports...

The Yugoslav air force attacked Zagreb...

Yugoslav army makes major push into Croatia.

Negative violent actions of Croat participants are backgrounded, placing them in the "in-group" role. This is achieved with passive constructions with deletion of agent and through nominalisation, for example:

Three officials were reported shot to death in one town and other shooting were reported...

...a police chief, deputy major and city councilman were shot dead in one town...

there are reports of shooting in other Serb-dominated parts of Croatia...

the three deaths bring to 41 number of peoples killed in Serb-Croatian violence in the republic...

Readers are not told either who killed whom (Did Croat forces kill Serbs? Did Serb irregulars kill Croats? Is the Yugoslav army shooting at Croats?), or who the source for information is. We, as readers, do not even know the name of the place where the shooting happened. The article that reported *officials killed in one town* was published on

July 2, 1991. The day before in the Croatian town of Osijek. Croat paramilitary formations of Branimir Glavas killed the mayor of Osijek and two other policemen (all of them Croats) because they maintained good relations with Serbs living there (Tanjug News Agency, July 1, 1991). Is it possible that the ethnicity of the agent and the patient in this case is suppressed because it did not "fit" with the already painted picture about the war where exclusively different ethnic groups fought each other, or where Croats were presented only in a positive light?

Serbs are never "patients" with Croats acting upon them. Even in the article which reported about the expulsion of 250,000 Serbs from the territory of Croatia (*Refugees columns flood Bosnia/Refugee exodus 'humanitarian catastrophe'*) the agency of Croats is backgrounded. This is grammatically achieved by removing Croats from the topical subject position:

[...] *Serb refugees trekked into northern Bosnia after fleeing Croatia's offensive*

Croatian Serb refugees also appeared as agents in the actions that affected innocent Bosnian Croat civilians:

Refugee exodus affected ethnic Croats living in Banja Luka and unknown number of them was evicted from their homes.

Furthermore, Croatian action is justified through action processes such as *Croatia had retaken its territory*, implying that Croatian Serbs were the occupier force, and suppressing the fact that this was the land held by Croatian Serbs for more than three centuries. Atrocities committed against Croatian Serbs (Taylor, 2000) are excluded from the texts - the journalists did not mention that some of them were killed or tortured.

Instead, Croatian Serb refugees are portrayed as a nameless and faceless group of people, preventing readers from any identification with them. Quotation marks in the headline of the article – *Refuge exodus ‘humanitarian catastrophe’* – suggest that journalist (or editor) distances herself/himself from the secondary discourse, although the source of information were the UN representatives. The reason why Croatian Serb civilians are portrayed in this manner might be in a belief that they were related to the “aggressors”, thus reporters might not have been motivated to check up on what had happened to them. In other words, although civilians, they were on the “bad” side, the side “responsible for the war.”

The portrayal of Serb civilians, victims of war in Croatia, is in sharp contrast with the portrayal of Muslim and Albanian victims, as we will see later.

Talking about the voices, the officials of Croatia and the Yugoslav officials with Croatian ethnic background are allowed to speak more often than their Yugoslav counterparts, and are almost always directly quoted. As was the case in the voices of Slovenian officials, Croatian officials used wordings related to a “patriotic discourse of nationalism” (Chouliaraki, 1999, p. 48): “*Croatia will live with me in its fight for liberation and building a new country.*” The actions of the federal army are described as *attack* on Croatia. At the same time, Croatian officials used wording, which made a distinction between “us” (Croats), and “them” (Yugoslav army):

“The barbarians attacked a symbol of Croatian power,” Mr. Tudjman, shaken, said...”

"The authorities of Croatia will respond with dignity and in civilized manner to any political or military attack on Croatia," Mr. Tudjman said.

Croatian officials, in effect, offered readers a choice between their own kind (non-barbaric/civilized) and an alien darkness (barbarians, equated with "Serb-dominated" Yugoslav army).

Croatian officials, as was the case with officials of Slovenia, seem to have been perceived by journalists as the more reliable sources of information, evident in the following example. In the article titled *Yugoslav air force attacks Zagreb/Croatian leaders nearly killed*, in the fifth paragraph we read:

A defence ministry statement said no unit of Yugoslav army had been issued orders to attack Zagreb. The ministry said it could not exclude the possibility that the attack had been stage-managed by the Croatian leadership.

The army denial is surrounded with the opposite statements of Croat officials (in paragraphs 1 – 5, and 6 - 8). However, the army's denial is not mentioned in the headlines of the article, which is, according to van Dijk (1998), the most memorable part of the news.

From today's perspective, it may not be important who attacked Zagreb, but it is interesting to see how journalists/editors made the decision to present Croatian perspective as the truth in the headline of the article.

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was more complex than that in Slovenia and Croatia because this republic was composed of three constituent nations, none of which was in the majority. Bosnia and Herzegovina was made up of close to 44 per cent Muslims, 32.5 per cent Serbs, just over 17 per cent Croats, and 5.5 per cent Yugoslavs (Woodward, 1995; Crnobraja, 1996).

The term Muslim in former Yugoslavia did not refer just to a follower of the Muslim faith. The constitution of 1963 allowed Muslim Slavs to declare themselves as a distinct nationality, “even if they were not practicing Muslims” (Karim, 2000, p. 190). As Crnobraja (1996) further explained, since 1963 “in Yugoslavia one could declare oneself a Muslim national, which was written with a capital *M* and also a follower of the Muslim faith, which was written with a small *m*” (p. 21). In 1994 the Muslims decided to change their national name to Bosniaks.

Not all Croats lived in Croatia. About 756,000 Croats lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, making up just over 17 per cent of the Bosnian population (Crnobraja, 1996). In July 1992 these Croats proclaimed their “state” of Herzeg-Bosnia within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This “state,” headed by Mate Boban, was well integrated into the Croatian State by the fall of 1991 – “its Croat citizens had been granted dual citizenship in Croatia with the right to vote in Croatian elections, and its local authorities used Croatian educational curricula, currency, state symbols (such as the flag and crest), police uniforms and car registration plates” (Woodward, 1995, p. 231).

Bosnian Croats engaged in armed clashes both with Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Similarly, not all Serbs lived in Serbia. About 1.4 million of them lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, making up 32.5 per cent of the Bosnian population (Crnobrnja, 1996). In January 1992 these Serbs proclaimed their "state" Republic of Srpska within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This "state", headed by Radovan Karadzic, was not well integrated into the Serbian State (or "rump Yugoslavia"). Thus, Bosnian Serbs had not been granted dual citizenship in Serbia with the right to vote in Serbia's elections, and its local authorities did not use Serbia's state symbols (such as the flag and crest), police uniforms or car registration plates.

The first armed conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina were preceded by political crises characterized by the fact that the representatives of Croats and Muslims in the highest political bodies of the republic outvoted² Serbs and made the decision in favour of secession from Yugoslavia.

The first civilian victims of the Bosnian war fell as early as March 1992, when regular military units from Croatia killed five Serbian families in the village of Sijekovac near the town of Bosanski Brod, and when Muslim irregulars fired at a wedding party in front of the Orthodox Church in Sarajevo, killing the groom's father and wounding the priest (Woodward, 1996; Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2000). However, many would argue that the full-scale war started on April 1992, after the declaration of independence of the new state (Thomas, 1996; Remington, 1996).

In the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, not only were there confrontations of Serbs with Muslims and Croats, but also Muslims with Croats, and even Muslims with Muslims (in the Bihac area). Another important actor in this war was NATO, which, with the UN Security Council's approval, carried out its bombing campaign (the alliance's first ever offensive action taken outside of NATO's area of operations, which did not directly serve to protect a NATO country from an aggressor) against the Bosnian Serbs.

After three years of war, three warring factions signed the Dayton Peace Accord in 1995, leaving behind huge numbers of refugees and casualties. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the refugee population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 2.74 million people (more than 50 per cent of the pre-war population). Out of that number, 43 per cent of refugees were Bosnian Muslims, 39 per cent Bosnian Serbs, and about 12 per cent Bosnian Croats (UNHCR Report, 1998).

The war in Bosnia attracted much more attention in the newspapers than the wars in Croatia and Slovenia. This war was also covered more extensively than the Gulf War (Carruthers, 2000). Such an intensive coverage might be for various reasons. Some authors suggest that the Bosnian government was able to maintain the media support because they "invoked the precedent of the Gulf conflict as an attempt to mobilize an international intervention" and because "Bosnia was seen in the developed West as an innocent victim of the war" (Gow & Tilsley, 1996, p. 108). Another view, expressed by Ignatieff (1996), was that Europe and North America were interested in Bosnia "as the theater to display their own moral profile", thus Bosnia was "the narcissistic image of ourselves incarnated in the myth of a multiethnic and multiconfessional Bosnia" (p. xii).

Whatever the reason might be, the number of articles related to the Bosnian war was very large. While two articles, out of 43 randomly selected for analysis, are related to the war in Slovenia, and three reported about the war in Croatia, the Bosnian war is described in 24 front-page articles. Their headlines are:

Militias ambush Serbian convoy/Serbian convoy attacked

Muslim villagers massacred, UN peacekeepers say/Village destroyed in a 'bloody massacre'

Haven plan offers little to Muslims of Bosnia/Enclaves could aid "ethnic cleansing"

Muslims flee Serb attack/Serbs drive Muslims into besieged enclave

Refugees raped, killed/Refugees report rapes, killings

Serb forces closing in on Gorazde safe haven/Serbs force Muslim troops from key positions

Sarajevo attack sparks anger/Bosnian leader accuses world of avoiding action

Canadians hit in Bosnia/Canadians wounded in Bosnia

Canadians endure mock execution/Canadians subjected to 'execution' ordeal

Canada pressed to back air strikes/Summit grapples with air-strike issue

UN general, Serbs at odds on status of Sarajevo airport/Milosevic must go, protesters demand

Serbs warn of hostage 'slaughter'/Don't try rescue, Karadzic warns

Serbs capture more peacekeepers/Key players study options

Serb leader declares peace plan dead/Serb leader proclaims peace plan dead

Tribunals gives Serb 20-year sentence/War-crimes sentence triggers Serb anger

Serb suspect caught off guard/Serbs named in secret indictments

Serbs face NATO cruise missiles/NATO uses cruise missiles to attack bases

NATO bombs Serb positions/NATO bombs Serb positions around Gorazde

U.S. flexes superpower muscle/Clinton boosts U.S. clout in Bosnia

NATO ready to strike Serbs/NATO forces poised to strike at Serbs

NATO threat not taken seriously/NATO unlikely to bomb Serbs, analysts say

NATO extends deadline in Bosnia/Serbs get extension to deadline

Tudjman pressed to curb Mostar hard-liners/Croats facing major decision

Bosnia factions keeping weapons/Bosnia may be on verge of arms race

This war is reported from three main perspectives: stories of attacks on besieged Muslim enclaves, particularly Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Sarajevo; diplomatic and military efforts by the developed Western countries for cease-fire and peace negotiations; and stories about war crimes and punishment of war criminals.

The social actors identified in the articles are represented as villains (Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs) and victims (Bosnian Muslims). This is achieved through the choice of naming, as well as through transitivity, as it will be shown below.

It is possible to identify the following groups of participants:

- Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb armed formations:

Bosnian Muslims	Bosnian Croats	Bosnian Serbs
Militias	Masked Croats	The Serbs (32x)
Militia fighters	Hard-line Croats	Serb forces (5x)
Muslim fighters	Nationalists and crime bosses	Serb commander

The city's [Sarajevo] defenders	M. Neletic's self styled brigade	Serbian general
The Muslims	Bosnian Croat forces	Serb gunners (2x)
Muslim troops (4x)	Croat soldiers	Serb irregulars
Bosnian army (3x)	Croatian militia	Serb secessionists
Government troops		Serb rebels
Government forces (3x)		Serb nationalists
Outgunned Muslim forces		Serb: offensive* (3x) "ethnic cleansing"* (2x) aggression* systemic terror* and rape* massacre* planes* heavy machine guns* artillery (3x)* shells* armour*
		Bosnian Serbs (7x)
		Bosnian Serb forces (2x)
		Bosnian Serb troops
		The Bosnian Serb military
		The Bosnian Serb army
		Bosnian Serb soldier
		Drunken Bosnian Serb fighters
		The captors
		Soldiers
		Simo Drljaca,** a former police chief and a fanatical Serb nationalists (3x)
		Milan Kovacevic,** the director of Prijedor's hospital (2x)
		Dusan Tadic,** a former Serb police reservist and cafe owner (3x)
		Drazen Erdemovic,** a Croat serving with Bosnian Serbs

*In van Leeuwen's (1996) terms, this is the representational strategy of *impersonalisation*. Halliday (1978) uses the term *inanimate* participants for this category.

** All actors are war criminals, convicted by the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; thus, although personalized, they are portrayed as "anti-heroes".

- Officials belonging to all three groups:

Bosnian Muslims	Bosnian Croats	Bosnian Serbs
Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic (5x)	Mate Boban, a hard-liner (3x)	Bosnian Serb military commander
The Bosnian commander	Ivica Rajic, a senior commander of Croat troops in central Bosnia	Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic (6x)
The commander of Bosnian government forces Sefer Halilovic	Mladen Naletelic	Bosnian Serb commander General Ratko Mladic
Kemal Muftic, an aide to Bosnia's Muslim president Alija Izetbegovic	Franjo Komarica, Roman Catholic Bishop in Banja Luka	General Milan Gvero (2x)
Bosnian vice-president Ejup Ganic		The commander of the besieging forces around Sarajevo, general Dragomir Milosevic
Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic (4x)		
Bosnian foreign minister Muhamed Sacirbej		
Muslim-led government in Sarajevo (3x)		

- Muslim and Croat civilians:

Bosnian Muslims	Bosnian Croats
Muslims	An old couple
Muslim refugees	Ethnic Croats
Muslim civilians	
Muslim neighbors	
1,300 Muslim civilians	
200 severely wounded Muslims	
Hundreds of wounded Muslims	
Thousands of Muslims	
Tens of thousands of refugees	
Several thousands elderly and infirm	

Most of population	
The Muslim Slavs	
Mothers and children	
Tearful women and children	
Women	
Unarmed Muslims	
Survivors	
Mirama Mujcic	
Zula Hasanovic	
Enisa Schovic	
Girls	

Serb civilians and “non-governmental” Muslims³ (35.000 Muslims loyal to Muslim leader Fikret Abdic, forced to find safety in the parts of Croatia controlled by Croatin Serbs in 1994 – UNPROFOR report, 1996)) are completely excluded from these articles, suggesting that these ethnic groups did not have any victims, or “ordinary” people.

Officials of all warring parties are nominated and titled. Lexical choices used for the portrayal of both Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs include neutral terms (for example, Serb *soldiers*, Bosnian Serb *forces*/Croatian *troops*, etc.), as well as terms with strong negative connotations (*hard-liners*, *criminal and nationalists bosses*, *self-styled brigade*, *irregulars*, *captors*, *drunken fighters*, etc). These are not words that we usually use when describing a country’s army. Negative wording, together with the personalized “anti-heroes”, convicted for the committed war crimes, and impersonalized (inanimate) social actors such as “*ethnic cleansing*”, *systemic terror and rape*, etc., serve to portray Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs as “distant others”. This wording also helps the reader to distance themselves from the represented participants.

The actions in which Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs were involved also reinforced their “out-group” position. Bosnian Croats are predominantly (in 83 per cent of situations) agents of direct violent action and they are placed in position of grammatical subject (active constructions) or logical subject (passive construction) in clauses, for example:

Hard-line Croats set fire to houses...

Croatian militia forces fights off the enemy.

Bosnian Croat forces had also sacked the Muslim hamlet of Datanska.

Croat soldiers acted to blunt a planned Muslim attack.

He [M. Naletelic] pranced on the front lines and distributed the spoils of “ethnic cleansing.”

Mr. Naletelic described how during the 1980s he robbed banks and staged terrorist attacks on behalf of the Croat nationalist community in Germany.

[...] Croat forces stepped up attacks on Muslim forces and forcibly removed Muslim civilians from the city [...]

[...] Croat forces are still holding about 1,300 Muslim civilians at a former prison [...]

Muslim villagers had been massacred by masked Croats.

Only in two clauses are Croat participants placed in a position of affected participant (“something is done to them”), where Serbs are the agent of transactive processes:

Exodus of Serbs from Croatia affected ethnic Croats living in Banja Luka.

Ethnic Croats had been evicted from their homes [...]

Serbs are represented as responsible agents in subject position in 88 per cent of transactive clauses. Serb gunners *shelled villages, killed civilians, and engaged in "ethnic cleansing"* (quotation marks in "ethnic cleansing" suggest the journalist's stand that it is euphemism which does not describe all horrors that follow when civilians leave their homes under the threat of weapons). They also engaged in a campaign of *terror and rape*, as well as in *killing in concentration camps*. The affected participants of these violent actions are Muslim civilians or the UN forces. Serbs are placed in the position of affected participants in 12 per cent of transactive clauses, with NATO forces or war crimes court as the agents of action processes: *Serbs given death penalty; war-crimes trial told of atrocities. Serb suspects caught off guard: NATO troops kill one, capture three near site of former Bosnian prison camp*. In general, only the NATO forces are portrayed as capable of dealing with the Serbs.

The major impact of the stories of atrocities (such as rape, torture, "ethnic cleansing", etc.) is directed at the core human moral values that oppose torture and senseless killing of our fellow humans. It aims at the feelings any human being holds for weaker ones (children, women, unarmed men) and at deeply held beliefs that they should be spared the horrors of war, protected under law and under all circumstances. The stories presented to the readers with such images emotionally engage any normal human being. There is a little doubt that Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs are thus presented and perceived as the "out-groups", and worthy of condemnation by the readership of *The Globe and Mail*.

The difference in portrayal of these two “out-groups” we can find in the headlines. Although mainly occupying agent roles in the texts, Bosnian Croats are never placed in the position of the agent in the headlines. If they appear in the headlines, they are in the position of the affected participant: *Muslim villagers massacred UN peacekeepers say; Tudjman pressed to curb Mostar hard-liners*. This is in sharp contrast to the distribution of agency in texts, and, as was the case previously in the articles about the war in Slovenia, it might mislead readers who just read the headlines of *The Globe and Mail*.

In contrast, Bosnian Serbs are prominent in the headlines as agents of violent actions, for instance: *Muslims flee Serb attack/Serbs drive Muslims into besieged enclave; Serb forces closing in on Gorazde safe haven/Serb force Muslim troops from key positions; Serbs capture more peacekeepers*.

It is notable that in all articles published during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnian Croats’ violent actions are backgrounded. This backgrounding is realized in a variety of ways. On the level of syntax, it is achieved through passive clauses with deletion of the agent and nominalisation, for example:

Muslim villagers massacred, UN officials say

[The Croat] attack came in retaliation for the Muslim capture of a nearby Croat village

Another way of backgrounding Croat’s violent actions is placement of these actors in the text. For instance, in the report titled *Muslim villagers massacred, UN officials say*, published in 1993, a reader does not see Croats as agents of killing,

massacring, burning houses and corps until the ninth paragraph of the article. Bearing in mind that the most prominent places in a newspaper article are the headline and the lead (first paragraph), which serve to tell readers *who did what, when, where and why* (van Dijk, 1993; Bell, 1991), this placement of main actors could be a reflection of certain reporters stance toward the actors in the Bosnian conflict.

Interestingly, when the war in Bosnia ended, articles started to appear in which Bosnian Croats (and implicitly Croatian Croats) were described in a negative light. The article with the headline *Tudjman pressed to curb Mostar hard-liners/Croats facing major decision* reported efforts of European and U.S. diplomats to persuade Croat officials in the town of Mostar (in Bosnia and Herzegovina) to accept the results of municipal elections and form joint Muslim-Croat institutions. Readers are informed that *religious buildings* (in the Muslim-Croat federation) *had been bombed* and for the first time the theme of *Croat's "ethnic cleansing"*, is introduced. This "ethnic cleansing" actually happened in the previous years of the war in Bosnia. Among other things, the article described the symbols (such as flag and coat of arms) of Croatia and Bosnian Croats "state" Herzeg-Bosnia which was last seen, according to the author of the article, *during the Fascist Ustashe state – a regime responsible for the death of tens of thousands of Serbs and Jews*. Western officials in the article said that *some military parades end with the Fascist-era call to arms* and that one of the Croat military commander Mladen Naletelic *robbed banks and staged terrorist attacks on behalf of the Croat nationalist community in Germany*. Mate Boban, the leader of Bosnian Croats, is described as a *hard-liner, who runs a network of organized crime*. In this way Bosnian Croats are

constructed as an isolated “out-group”, excluded from the civilized culture of the West. This article, particularly the time when it was published, is very unusual, bearing in mind news values as defined by the authors in the media studies. According to Bell (1991, p. 156), one of news values is “recency”, which means that only “events whose duration or occurrence fits into a 24-hour span” are newsworthy. Similarly, reports that described the fighting between Canadian soldiers, members of the UN mission in Croatia, and Croatian armed forces (which happened in 1993) were published in the Canadian press only three years later (Taylor, 2000, p. 4). Therefore it would be interesting to ask what influenced the media to pursue a path contradictory to its news values. It is hard to believe that reporters did not know about mentioned events at the time of their occurrence.

In contrast to the portrayal of Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs, discussed above, Bosnian Muslims are represented as the innocent victims of violence, realized through the choices of naming and actions in which they were involved.

It is immediately evident (see chart above) that there are many more terms referring to the Bosnian Muslim ordinary people than there are terms referring to their officials and military formations. Compared to Slovenian and Croat ordinary people, analyzed earlier, there are more cases of nomination (the referential strategy by which the actors are referred to by name), but more dominant is still the referential strategy of functionalisation. Explicit ethnicisation is most notable when reporting about victims (Muslim refugees), and it is accompanied with a numeric reference, which is grammatically realized by the number as the head of the nominal group (*thousands of Muslims, hundreds of wounded, etc.*). Muslim civilians are also classified by age

(*infants/elderly/children*), gender (*women/girls*) and kinship relations (*mothers/husbands*). These classifications allow readers to identify and sympathize with them; they are familiar, one of “us.”

When talking about officials and armed formations, ethnic reference is often omitted and replaced by the toponym *Bosnian* as modifier within the head of the nominal group. The modifier *Bosnian* classifies participants by origin, not by ethnicity, and implies that the government represented interests of all people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is misleading because both Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs did not recognize that government as their own. Further, in cases such as *Muslim troops/the Bosnian army* modifiers *Muslim* and *Bosnian* became interchangeable, although the political meaning of each was different. As Crnobraja (1996) and Woodward (1995) explain, there are no “Bosnians” in political, or ethnicity terms, except Muslims, Croats and Serbs – citizens of the recognized state Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina was an internationally recognized state, from the point of view of its non-Muslim citizens, President Izetbegovic represented only the main Muslim political party, and not the whole Bosnia and Herzegovina. Consequently, more than 50 per cent of the country’s population did not perceive *Bosnian army* and *Bosnian government* as their own. In constructions such as

The Serbs/Croats are fighting Bosnian forces, Bosnians negotiating surrender of Srebrenica to Serb forces.

readers might wrongly understand that the Serbs/Croats were an exterior element, coming from Serbia or Croatia, and that it was legitimate to chase them out, because the modifier *Bosnian* is not used within the nominal groups *Serb/Croats*.

Armed Muslim forces which did not support the government of President Izetbegovic and which sided with Bosnian Serb forces in fighting against government troops are labeled as: *rebel Muslim forces*, *Muslims loyal to warlord Fikret Abdic*, and *Abdic forces*. Such lexical choices portrayed them as the “out-group” and at the same time make legitimate the violent actions of Muslim government forces.

The Bosnian Muslims are “doers” of 24 per cent of the transactive clauses, grammatically realized in subject position, for instance:

Government forces defeated Mr. Abdic troops

Muslim defenders mass troops around Sarajevo

They are “patients” in 76 per cent of transactive clauses, which are grammatically realized either in the object position in active constructions or in subject position in passive clauses. When they are constructed as “patient”, almost always (in 90 per cent of transactive clauses) the Serbs are the agents who act on them (in 10 per cent of cases Croats are agents acting upon Muslims), for example:

40 Bosnian refugees, mostly women and children were killed by Serbs

80 Muslims had been massacred

Croat forces were still holding 1,300 Muslim civilians

Serb soldier took them [Muslims] and killed them

Serb force drove thousands of Muslims

They [Serbs] raped girls

Bosnian Muslims had been evicted from their homes

In 25 per cent of non-transactive clauses Bosnian Muslims are grammatical subjects of processes related to their victimized position, such as *Muslims flee Serbian offensive*, *Muslims flee Serb attack*, *[refugees] face harrowing journey*, *refugees had crossed front-lines*, *wounded and elderly lay*, etc. In this way the Muslims are highlighted as the main victims of the war in Bosnia.

Serbs and Croats in my analyzed sample never acted against armed Muslims, but always against civilians, mainly against women, children and elderly people:

Bosnian Muslim armed formations acted as agents in transactive processes upon animate “patients” only in two clauses in my data:

Muslim fighters fought Serbs and Croats

Government forces shot and wounded Bosnian Serb soldier, and in both cases they are fighting against armed people (note that at the same time “government forces” and “Muslim fighters” were not *killing* anybody). In all other situations, Bosnian Muslims are involved in action processes with inanimate “patients”, which backgrounds the fact that their actions were harmful for fellow humans:

Militias ambush convoy

Militia fighters attacked convoy

The city's [Sarajevo] defenders have launched offensive

Bosnian army loses position

Government troops surrounded federal army compound

In terms of “voices”, it is not surprising that the government officials, as elite persons, are allowed to speak. Bosnian government officials are fully quoted, and thus appear in clauses with mental verbal choices, but different from those used by their Croatian and Slovenian counterparts previously cited. Instead of *begging* and *appealing* for help, as was the case in the articles about the wars in Slovenia and Croatia, Muslim officials *demand*, *accuse*, *criticize* and *charge* members of the international community because they did not stop Muslim suffering. Bosnian, Muslim-led Government’s demands and accusation are legitimized since the Muslim population had been so consistently portrayed as victims through the naming and transitivity choices.

The war over Kosovo

If Bosnian Muslims were not completely portrayed as the “in-group”, because they had military fighters, this cannot be said for the representation of Kosovo Albanians. But before we examine their portrayal, as well as that of their victimizers, in terms of naming, actions and voices, I will give an historical and political background of events in which they were involved.

Kosovo, a province of Serbia, had a population of about two million in 1998, 200,000 of whom were ethnic Serbs, Montenegrins, Roma and members of other minorities, and 1.8 million (90 per cent) of whom were ethnic Albanians (Crnobrnja, 1996). At the same time, Albanians made up 17 per cent of total population of Serbia.

In 1980, immediately after Josip Broz Tito’s death, Albanian demonstrators voiced calls for Kosovo to be made a full republic. Their demonstrations were broken up

and then federal presidency declared that the situation in the province had become a threat to the constitution, integrity, and sovereignty of the country. The government imposed "special measures" which assigned responsibility for public security to the federal government instead of the government of Serbia. This was followed in 1989 by constitutional changes that limited the autonomy of the province (Poulton, 1998).

Tension in Kosovo rose when the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged in 1996 with its declared aim of achieving the Kosovo Albanians' political aspirations for independence through armed struggle (OSCE, *Kosovo/Kosova: As seen as told*, 1999). As the KLA escalated its armed attacks on Serbian police stations and stepped up its assassinations of Serbian politicians and Serbian sympathizers among the Albanian population, Serbian security forces retaliated with very strong anti-insurgency tactics.

In 1998 the United Nations Security Council called for an end to the fighting, a withdrawal of the Yugoslav army to barracks and the introduction of OSCE observers into Kosovo as monitors on the ground to ensure that both parties kept the peace. Initially the army and security forces complied with the UN Resolution, but the KLA did not stop its attacks and the army once again reacted with force. Villages suspected of harbouring KLA activists were burned and their inhabitants dispersed. According to the UNHCR reports, by October 1998 approximately 2,000 Albanians and Serbs had been killed and some 200,000 people, mainly Albanians, had been displaced within the province.

In February, the U.S. brought both sides to the negotiating table at Rambouillet, France. Under the terms of this agreement, or the "ultimatum" in Chomsky's (2000) words, a NATO-led international force was to be given access to operate in all of

Yugoslavia, not only in Kosovo. It also included a provision for a referendum to be held in Kosovo after three years to determine the province's future political status.

When the Serbs refused to sign, on March 24, 1999 NATO started bombing Yugoslavia. (In contrast to the NATO's bombing of Bosnian Serbs, this time, NATO action was not approved by the UN Security Council.) The bombing campaign lasted 78 days. It devastated the Yugoslav economy, and destroyed bridges, factories, oil refineries, government buildings, the environment, and Yugoslav military equipment.

The relationship between NATO air strikes and the mass displacement of people from Kosovo remains disputed. Critics of the NATO action argued that the air strikes indirectly caused the humanitarian disaster that followed, since they triggered more intensive Serb military activities on the ground and exacerbated the violence. NATO officials, in turn, presented the bombing campaign as justified to stop the violence perpetrated against the Kosovo Albanians. NATO also argued that the Serb offensive against the civilians was planned, and that the exodus was a fully organized expulsion, which, of course, strengthened the rationale for air strikes. However, during 78 days of air strikes, thousands of refugees fled into Albania and Macedonia from Kosovo. (According to the OSCE report, *Kosovo/Kosova: As seen, as told*, an estimated 48 percent of the Albanian population - 862,979, and 50 per cent - "more than 100,000" of the Serb population had fled Kosovo during the bombing period, March –June 1999. The number of refugees belonging to other ethnic groups who fled the province during the bombings is not mentioned in the OSCE report.)

How are these events represented in the front-page articles of *The Globe and Mail*? In my sample, 11 articles are devoted to the conflict in Kosovo, 10 of which appeared on the front-page of *The Globe and Mail* in 1999, while one was published in 1998. Their headlines are as follows:

'What world am I living in?'/Video backs refugees' tales of slaughter

Refugees told: Go or we'll kill you/Kosovo deportations a chilling Nazi echo

Boys plays dead to escape massacre/War crimes investigator builds a case

Pressure rises on Milosevic to step aside/Serbian opposition leaders wish for change of regime

Kosovo body count is 2,108 and rising/Kosovo graves may have been tampered with

Kosovo detectives describe awful scenes/Children, seniors among victims

River splits Kosovo city as hatred boils over/Mitrovica a city divided by loss and bitterness

Under fire in Serbia: 'We are not animals'/A writer's dispatches from enemy territory

Canada scraps airlift after refugees reject offer/UN commissioner asked Canada to cancel airlift

Angry China threatens to block Kosovo peace plan/NATO rejects partial withdrawal

Serb 'cleansing' shatters Kosovo/Fields blackened, barren after Serb onslaught

As I noted above, Kosovo Albanians are portrayed as the “in-group”, or as the good people to whom bad things happen, linguistically realized through the choice of naming, processes in which they participate, and in terms of voices which are heard.

Participants are named as follows:

- Albanian and Serb armed formations

Albanian	Serbian
Kosovo Liberation Army guerillas	The Serbs (6x)
Guerillas	Serbians
Kosovo Liberation Army fighters	Serbs police (3x)
Kosovo separatists	Serbian nationalists
Shaban Mehmeti, a Kosovo Liberation Army fighter	Angry Serb mobs
Hashim Thachi, KLA commander	The gang (2x)
	Gang of police
	Police officers
	Paramilitary forces (3x)
	Security forces and their dogs
	Milosevic's police (2x)
	Soldiers
	The Yugoslav army
	Military

- Albanian and Serb officials:

Albanian	Serbian
	Yugoslav officials
	The Serbs leadership
	Serbian leaders
	Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic (2x)
	Mr. Milosevic and his government
	Mr. Milosevic, 50, a nationalist and former Communist
	The pro-Milosevic politicians, hard-line nationalists all,
	Mr. Milosevic (4x)

	Mirjana Markovic, Milosevic's wife, nicknamed Red Witch.
	Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Radical party and their brutal militia.
	Milan Panic,* the Serb-born U.S. businessman/former Yugoslav prime minister
	Mr. Draskovic*, opposition leader
	Patriarch Pavle of the Serbian Orthodox Church
	Crown prince Alexander Karadjordjevic
	Bogoljub Karic*: ex-Milosevic ally/Serbia's richest tycoon/and his four siblings/accordion-player billionaire and now Serbian presidential candidate-in-waiting/Milosevic's former comrade
	Goran Svilanovic*, head of the Civic Alliance of Serbia
	Ljubomir Madzar*, an economist at Belgrade University
	Analysts
	Ognjen Pribicevic*, a research fellow at Belgrade University
	Radomir Diklic,* director of the independent BETA news agency
	Milan Protic*, director of the Centre for Serbian studies

Participants representing Serbian opposition parties

- Albanian and Serb ordinary people:

Albanians	Serbs
Ethnic Albanian refugees	Mitrovica's Serbs
Bewildered refugees	Serbs
Profesor from Pristina	
22-year-old Leonore Lutolli	
A well-dressed 26-year-old	
A young woman Irijana Zhubi, 31, with two sons	

80-year-old M. Boni	
sound technician Mr. Doda	
Dren Caka, who is 10-years-old; his mother and two-year-old sister	
105-year-old man	
One elderly man	
14-year-old niece	
Milan** Bellanica	
Mr. Popoj	
A tearful Hajrije Maksutaj, the 26-year-old mother of an eight-month-old boy; her husband	
A two-year-old child in his mother's hand	
Senior cleric [in tekke]	
60 – 100 people	
4 brothers	
13 members of family	
More than a million ethnic Albanians	
Fatmira Berisha, a slim woman, the 19-year-old student and her mother	
Dr. Flori Bakalli	
Refugee Emun Mujaremi	
Mr. Krasniqui	
Refugees from Kosovo	
Local/ethnic Albanians (5x)	
A journalist at the Pristina daily Bujku	
Ethnic Albanian majority (2x)	
50,000 ethnic Albanians	
A million ethnic Albanians	
100,000 refugees	
Ahmed Beka, a locksmith.	
Members of family	
One old woman	
The victims	
Surviving villagers	
500 bodies	
4,256 bodies	
11,334 victims	
2,108 bodies	
Shattered refugees	
Two refugee women and two infants	
Slaughtered sons	

Her husband Muhamet, a 41-year-old jeweler.	
Two sons, Granit, 5, and Gramen, 3	
Kosovo Albanians (5x)	
Albanians (7x)	
Refugees (6x)	

** Milan Bellanica is not an Albanian, but a Serbian name. It is possible that the journalist made a mistake in and wrongly spelled the name of this person.

As we can see from the table, the reporters focused on the Albanian civilians, victims of the war. There are only six terms referring to the Albanian armed formations but none referring to Kosovo Albanian officials. What is immediately evident is a high level of personalization and humanization of social actors. Both civilians and members of the Kosovo Liberation Army are nominated. Civilians are also classified by age (*14-year-old, elderly, infants*) gender (*women, men, boy*), and kinship relations (*mother, children, sons, husbands, family*), as was case with Bosnian Muslim ordinary people previously analyzed. Nomination combined with classifications according to kinship relations, gender, and age individualize Kosovo Albanians, which allows readers to identify with them. They are not portrayed as a group, but as individuals with names, families, jobs, in a word, they are like “us”. There is a little doubt that an average reader of the newspaper would sympathize with their destiny.

Kosovo Albanians are also represented by reference to their body parts in cases such as: *the legs and spinal column of the man, the headless body of woman, 2,108 bodies, 500 bodies*. Theo van Leeuwen (1996, p. 60) describes this strategy as a “form of objectivation” and argues that this strategy “adds a touch of alienation” because the

participants are not “being involved themselves.” In cases in my sample, this referential strategy serves to highlight suffering of participants and their victimized positions.

Pictures of mothers with children, and elderly people appeal to readers’ emotions and foreground participants’ helplessness. This helplessness is further highlighted in terms of participant roles and processes in which they are involved. Albanians are “patients” in more than 90 per cent of transactive clauses, with Serbs as “agents” of negative violent action, for instance:

The refugees were forced out of their homes by Serbian police.

...her [Irijana Zhubi’s] 14-year-old niece was burned to death...

13 members of Kosovo Albanian family were shot to death...

“[...] they [Serbian police] killed my husband and the brother of my husband”

In addition to this patient role, in 25 per cent of non-transactive clauses Albanians are subject of processes such as fleeing, hiding, taking shelter, died, going to [some kind of Auschwitz]. This reinforces their position as a group of people “unable to run their own affairs” (Sykes, 1987). Interestingly, in 27 per cent of clauses Albanians are sayers in mental verbal processes, when they are reporting atrocities they saw or experienced. They are always, when they are reporting events, presented as reliable sources of information. Journalists, for example, wrote:

Although there is no way to independently confirm the accounts [about killed Albanians], they are [the stories of refugees] remarkably consistent and full of credible details.

The picture of Albanians as the good people to whom bad things happen is reinforced with the portrayal of their military formations. Albanian armed forces are the “doers” in just two transactive clauses:

Pockets of Kosovo Liberation Army guerrillas sat in the woods above, sometimes daring to come down at night, braving sniper fire to rescue some of the animals.

The Albanians were poking the Serbs in the eye...now the Serbs have poked the Albanians in both eyes.

Such a portrayal of Albanians has at least two functions. First, it serves to dehumanize their victimizers, the Serbs. The logic here is pretty simple – if the Albanians are “Jews” and experienced “*the Nazi like ordeal*”, then their victimizers (the Serbs) are “new Nazis.” On the basis of actions in which the Serbs were involved (*shooting to death, burning people alive, forcing people from their homes, raping, killing children/women/elderly, etc.*) the Serbs are excluded from the readers’ (civilized, Western, democratic) world and from a “discourse of Western moralities” (Chouliaraki, 2000). Secondly, the portrayal of Albanians as helpless victims serves as justification of NATO action - bombing of Serbia on “humanitarian ground”. If the group is not capable of “running their own affairs”, then the action of NATO became inevitable. According to NATO officials, the aim of military action was “pressuring the regime to end its campaign of terror and withdraw its forces from Kosovo, as well as humanitarian

assistance to refugees and displaced people through the region" (NATO press briefings, March 1999). When he announced the NATO air attacks, on March 24, 1999, President Clinton said that NATO must act to "protect thousands of people in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive" and because Serbian forces were "moving from village to village, shelling civilians and torching their houses" (President Clinton's speech of March 24, 1999, as published in *New York Times*, March 25, 1999).

Representation of the Serbs had all the basic "portrayal of the enemy" features as described in the literature on the topic (Kress & Hodge, 1993; van Dijk 1998). Lexical choices describing their actions and participant roles have only negative connotations (*gangs, captors, security police units with their dogs, paramilitary forces*). The Serb leader, Slobodan Milosevic, is described as *imperial, aloof, authoritarian, a shrewd dictator, communist, and hard-line nationalist*. The Serbian State is portrayed as the last bastion of Communism in Europe, for example:

The Communist nomenclature rules the country.

The Communist autocracy supports Milosevic.

The Communist style of governing has not disappeared.

Serbia has never renounced its 50 years of socialism.

The Serbian economy is still state-controlled.

[The residency] is a typically splendid Communist-baroque palace [...] meant to shrink visitors down to size. (This example is interesting because the palace in question is the former Yugoslav King's palace, which did not change its exterior and interior during the communist period in the former Yugoslavia.)

She is [Milosevic's wife] orthodox Communist.

Nobody knows whether he is [Milosevic] a true Marxist believer.

He is [Milosevic] a die-hard Communist.

[The ruling party] closest ally is a coalition of Marxist parties.

Belgrade is one of the few Eastern European cities that still boasts a Museum of the People's Revolution, with a hammer-and-sickle emblem at its entrance.

The picture of the “Serb enemy” is completed with the description of action processes, where the Serbs are mostly (in 83 per cent of transactive clauses) direct agents of negative, violent actions. Grammatically they are placed in subject position and are agents who *kill, lined up men, cut off hands, separated men and women, shell, engage in systemic massacres and summary executions*, as well as in “ethnic cleansing”. All these verbs portray Serbs not as an army, but as criminals. This portrayal of Serbs as perpetrators of brutal acts, combined with that of the innocent and “weak” Albanian victims, adds to the sense of anger and disgust of readers.

When the Serbs are placed in the position of affected participant (12 per cent of transactive clauses) (“something is done to them”), NATO forces are the agents of action processes. Obviously, the involvement of NATO forces is justified – because of its capability to stop brutalities of Serbian forces, and to protect Kosovo Albanians.

It should be noted that the audience of *The Globe and Mail* was subjected to years of reports on Serb atrocities throughout the former Yugoslavia (as was seen in my analysis of wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia). When a certain theme is characterized in such a way over a long period of time in the media on a certain topic, it

could become a cognitive schema on that issue. Therefore, news that is consistent with this mental model (van Dijk, 1998) might be integrated into readers' memory without serious evaluation.

In the story of the war over Kosovo readers are allowed to choose between the clear evil of Milosevic (and everything that comes with him, like violent nationalism, "ethnic cleansing", Nazi like ordeal, and Communism) and the seemingly unavoidable use of power by NATO. This way, all other solutions (political solutions for ending of conflict) are removed from readers "field of experience".

So far I have been discussing and describing the Balkan participants and their representation in *The Globe and Mail* during the fall of the former Yugoslavia. Before I proceed with the portrayal of non-Balkan participants, I want to summarize the main findings to this point.

Actor description

All actors involved in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia were not included in the analyzed articles in my sample. Excluded were the following actors:

- members of national groups who were not engaged in the violent events in the former Yugoslavia, such as Macedonians, Hungarians, Roma, and Montenegrins.
- "ordinary" people (civilians) belonging to groups involved in violent event Yugoslavs, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, Muslims who were not loyal to the Muslim government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo Serbs and members of other Kosovo communities (Roma, Turks, etc.), Serbs from Serbia.

- Opposition politicians in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The most prominent strategy of representation of the actors was classification according to ethnicity (explicit *ethnicisation*). This strategy portrayed all groups as homogeneous, and with the same goals. Thus readers were led to think that the wars in the former Yugoslavia broke out only because of the ethnic background of participants. Political, economic, or territorial reasons of conflicts were thus completely excluded from the texts. More about this referential strategy and its possible meanings will be discussed in the next chapter.

The referential strategies of *personalisation* and *nomination* were applied to officials belonging to all warring factions. This finding is in line with previous studies in the field (van Leeuwen, 1996; van Dijk, 1993, 1998), which showed that politicians, military commanders, and government representatives are perceived by reporters as elite persons. In contrast, soldiers and members of military formations were portrayed by strategies of *functionalisation* and *genericisation*, that is, according to the function they performed, and as nameless groups of social actors. High levels of *individualisation* and *personalisation* were applied in the representation of Bosnian Muslim and Kosovo Albanian civilians, with the goal to influence the emotional response of the readership.

Regarding lexical choices used for description of different ethnic groups, it was obvious that Slovenian, Bosnian Muslim, and Kosovo Albanian participants were represented as “in-groups”, while Bosnian Croats and Serbs (Croatian, Bosnian, and Serbian) were portrayed as villains, and “out-groups”. Connecting them to Communism reinforced the negative picture of Serbian Serbs. Croats from Croatia were described in a

positive light in the articles published in the period 1991 – 1995. When the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended (November, 1995), in retrospect, readers were informed about Croatian Fascist past and brutalities which they committed against Bosnian Muslim civilians during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the articles published after 1995, Croats were clearly perceived as the “out-group”.

Processes: action, mental, and relational

Participant roles associated with different processes reinforced the picture about “good” and “bad” “guys”. Thus, Serbs were mostly responsible agents in clauses with violent material (action) processes, followed by Croats, particularly those from Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the same clauses Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians were mainly in the patient role. In addition to their patient role, Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians were often sayers in mental verbal processes, reporting atrocities they saw or suffered. These two groups were also often agents of non-transactive processes, such as *hiding, going to shelters, fleeing, etc.*, which contributed to the picture of their helplessness.

The Slovenes mostly acted as responsible agents in transactive clauses, with the Yugoslav army in the role of “patients”, but their violent actions were backgrounded in the headlines of the articles. The Yugoslav army, which were mostly “patients” of Slovenian negative actions, became the “agents” in violent transactive clauses during the war in Croatia. The Yugoslav army, which was engaged in battles in Croatia, was not perceived as impartial during this war, because it acted as the protector of Croatian Serbs.

Therefore, the foregrounding of the army's violent actions in the headlines and newspaper reports was not surprising.

Tables below show the number and per cent of mental, action, and relational processes in which different Balkan participants were involved.

Processes					
	Mental		Action		Relational
Slovenes	18	(30%)	38	(63.33%)	4 (6.66%)
Yugoslavs	12	(18.46%)	51	(78.46%)	2 (3.07%)
Croats	25	(20.66%)	86	(71.07%)	10 (8.26%)
Muslims/ Bosniaks	28	(25.45%)	68	(61.81%)	14 (12.71%)
Serbs	58	(19.20 %)	217	(71.85%)	27 (8.94%)
Albanians/Kosovars	33	(27.27%)	75	(61.98%)	13 (10.74%)

Table 3: Distribution of mental, action, and relational processes

Action processes		
	Transactive	Non-transactive
Slovenes	31 (81.57%)	7 (18.42%)
Yugoslavs	47 (92.15%)	4 (7.85%)
Croats	76 (88.37%)	10 (11.62%)
Muslims/Bosniaks	51 (75%)	17 (25%)
Serbs	188 (86.63%)	29 (13.36%)
Albanians/Kosovars	56 (74.66%)	19 (25.33%)

Table 4: Distribution of transactive and non-transactive processes

Transactive action processes		
	Agent	Patient
Slovenes	25 (80.64%)	6 (19.35%)
Yugoslavs	26 (55.31%)	21 (44.68%)
Croats	34 (44.73%)	42 (55.26%)
Muslims/Bosniaks	12 (23.52%)	39 (76.47%)
Serbs	157 (83.51%)	31 (16.48%)
Albanians/ Kosovars	4 (7.14%)	52 (92.85%)

Table5: Distribution of "agent" – "patient" roles

“Voices”

Analyzed sample (see Appendix III) showed that events were reported from the perspective of officials of the secessionist republics – Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, respectively, as well as Bosnian Muslim and Kosovo Albanian civilians. Yugoslav civilians, Croats and Serb victims were not allowed to present their point of view about the events. Yugoslav and Serbian official sources were also almost always marginalized. Comparing the voices of Serbian officials, and those of Bosnian Serb officials, the later were more often allowed to express their position.

In the next chapter I will discuss more about perspectives from which the reports are given to the readers of *The Globe and Mail*.

But, in order to finalize the analysis I will now discuss the representation of non-Balkan participants. Before I start with the actual analysis of the newspaper articles, I will briefly outline the most important decisions of the international community that influenced events during the breakup of the former Yugoslavia.

The role of non-Balkan participants in the conflicts

The record of the international community in conflict management in the former Yugoslavia is not positive (Roberts, 1996; Dyke, 1996). Having ignored the crisis during 1989-1990, the international community took actions in 1991, which “redefined the origins and aspects of the crisis as ethnic conflict and nationalist revolution” (Woodward, 1995, p. 287). Woodward (1995) argues that external intervention reinforced the

pressures that made states – political control over territory – the most valuable goal. As she further explains,

nationalist party leaders who gained legitimacy with the first democratic elections in 1990 were promoted by EC and the UN negotiators to the status of statesmen, leaders of nations struggling for independence. This international support weakened the supports for opponents of their nationalism who considered the creation of democratic procedures and guaranties of human rights within states to be more important.

(Ibid., pp. 196 – 7)

Two most important developed Western states involved in the Balkans affairs, whose decisions had been the most significant turning point in the evolution of the events in the Balkans, were Germany and the United States.

Germany played the main role in the early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Schloer (1996) said that German politicians had sympathy for the Slovenian and Croatian independence drive and were convinced that recognition of these two countries would stop the war in the region. Germany's decision about Slovenian and Croatian recognition was strongly opposed by the Western negotiators in Yugoslavia, by the UN commanders in the field, and by the UN Secretary General⁴ (Schloer, 1996; Thomas, 1996; Remington, 1996). However, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl persuaded his colleagues in the European Community on December 15-16, 1991 to recognize Slovenian and Croatian independence. The argument was that by "internationalizing the war and granting the recognition of the two republics' right to national self-determination to signal international protection, they would deter further Serbian aggression (in his view, the cause of the war) and thus bring a quick end to the fighting" (Woodward, 1995, p. 147; also Remington 1996; Schloer, 1996). The act of recognition confirmed officially

that the European Community had abandoned Yugoslav unity. At the same time, the sudden recognition “instantly converts civil wars into wars of aggression” because “federal forces, seeking to crush the secessionists in the old state, suddenly became ex-federal forces in the new states carrying no political legitimacy” (Thomas, 1996, p. 193).

The United States there was another important player in the events in the former Yugoslavia. Lukic and Lynch (1996) argue that there were inconsistencies in the United States’ foreign policy towards the former Yugoslavia from 1990 to 1993, which “reflect the dilemmas of constructing foreign policy [...] in the aftermath of the Cold war” (p. 260). During 1990 and 1991 Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, James Dobbins announced the five bases of U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia: 1) democracy, 2) dialogue, 3) human rights, 4) market reforms, and 5) unity (*Department of State Dispatch*, 1991, pp. 395 – 6, cited in Lukic & Lynch, 1996, p. 268). During this period, Secretary of State Baker visited Yugoslavia on June 21, 1991 and stated that the “United States would not support unilateral acts that threatened Yugoslav unity” (Lukic & Lynch, 1996, p. 270).

The policy of the United States towards Yugoslavia changed in April 1992, when Washington recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, and persuaded the EC to recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina. The argument for the recognition of Bosnian independence, explained by Secretary of State Baker in April 1992, was the same one used previously by Germany – the recognition should prevent the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Needless to say the full-scale war in this republic started *after* the recognition (Thomas, 1996). In the subsequent weeks the U.S. recalled Ambassador

Zimmermann from Belgrade and announced the U.S. sanctions on Serbia (Lukic & Lynch, 1996, p. 272).

We now know that the United States played a direct role in aborting the February 1992 Lisbon agreement, which was signed by leaders of all three national parties of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which could have prevented the war (Thomas, 1996). Within days of the Lisbon Agreement, the U.S. Ambassador Zimmerman flew to Sarajevo and suggested to Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic that if he withdrew his signature, the U.S. would grant recognition to Bosnia as an independent state. Izetbegovic then withdrew his signature and renounced the agreement (Remington, 1996).

Further, it is also well known today that the United State supported the Croatian offensive against Croatian Serbs in 1995, providing military training and equipment to the Croatian army. The U.S. also led the NATO attacks on Bosnian Serb positions during 1995, and on Serbia during the Kosovo crisis in 1999. The Dayton peace agreement, which ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was also the result of the work of United States officials. Ironically, by the terms of the Dayton Accords, the Bosnian Muslims were afforded less territory than they had been guaranteed by the Lisbon Agreement.

According to Woodward (1995), the most important mistakes of the international community during the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia were as follows:

- "Abandoning the Yugoslav federal government, which depended on international support for its economic and political reforms."

- “Prejudging Yugoslav army as nationalist and its action to restore order in the republics as illegitimate action.”
- “Ignoring the many citizens’ groups working to foster countrywide cooperation.” and
- “Accepting the principle of national self-determination for the independence of the newly formed states – without regard to the Yugoslav conditions of multi- nationalit and the shared rights to national sovereignty of the Titoist system” (pp. 197 –8).

Woodward (1995) further argues that these decisions made by the developed countries in the West “were making war over territory inevitable” (Ibid.). She also believes that these decisions “left very narrow space for moderates, non-nationalists, and democratic forces” (Ibid.).

The role of Canada

What was the role of Canada in the previously mentioned events?

Canada’s foreign policy towards the former Yugoslavia had similarities with the foreign policy of the United States. Thus, Canada recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia in January 1992, and of Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992. The crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina was seen in Canada as “Serb aggression, which Canada condemned and urged Serbia to stop interfering in that country” (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1999). This was followed by imposing sanctions against the former Yugoslavia, including the freezing of state assets in Canada and additional trade restrictions (Ibid.).

Canadian soldiers were part of the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces (UNPROFOR) that secured the separation zone between the Croat and Serb positions in Croatia. Until the withdrawal of the UN forces in Croatia (after Croatian offensive on the protected UN zones), Canada contributed the fifth-largest contingent to the UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia. Canada also provided 45 civilian police monitors to UNPROFOR from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. They monitored and assisted local police within the UN Protected Areas in Croatia. Furthermore, as the UN peacekeepers in Bosnia and Herzegovina Canadians undertook some of the most difficult assignments: in 1992 Canadian troops were deployed to Sarajevo; in 1993 and 1994 to Srebrenica and Gorazde, in the eastern part of the country (Ibid.).

In Kosovo, Canadian diplomats were active participants in the negotiation and conception of the OSCE monitoring mission. Finally, during the NATO campaign against Yugoslavia, 18 Canadian airplanes were involved in all phases of the air strikes.

According to Dashwood (1999), the primary motivation for Canada's participation in the UN peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslavia and in the NATO bombing campaign was humanitarian. At the same time, argues Dashwood, Canada's decision to participate in the NATO led mission over Kosovo was a "departure from Canadian foreign practice" (Ibid., p. 276).

To understand this "departure" it should be explained that an important change occurred in Canadian foreign policy during the 1990s – the shift in Canadian foreign policy approach to the sanctity of the principle of state sovereignty. While, as late as the mid-1980s, the government resisted measures against apartheid in South Africa because

of concerns about sovereignty (Redekop, 1985), on May 17, 1993 Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall remarked: "We have to reconsider the UN's traditional definition of state sovereignty. I believe that states can no longer argue sovereignty as license for internal repression" (Cooper, 1997, p. 183). This was the beginning of the *human security concept* as an important characteristic of the new Canadian foreign policy. The concept was articulated more clearly when Lloyd Axworthy became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1996 (Dashwood, 1999). Since then, the emphasis has been placed on human security, at the expense of state sovereignty. At the same time, *human security concept* implied the work through the UN organizations and diplomatic missions in trying to find non-military solutions in searching for peace. Canadian foreign policy practice has demonstrated a strong commitment to humanitarian intervention, and Canada was at the forefront of the UN humanitarian missions (Croatia, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, etc.).

However, Canadian foreign policy towards the Balkans was inconsistent in the same way as were the policies of other Western countries involved in the Balkans wars. For example, the recognition of the new states in the Balkans involved abandoning the principle of *state sovereignty* (the former Yugoslavia), with the argument that individual (and national) human rights are more important than state sovereignty as such. At the same time, the insistence that rebel Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not have the right to secede from the new states was defended by the principle of *state sovereignty*. Thus, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were seen as sovereign states with non-changeable borders. The principle of sovereignty of states was abandoned once

more during the war over Kosovo. Thus, the right of Kosovo Albanians to separate from the state (Serbia and Montenegro) was justified by *human security principle*. Interestingly, the same principle was not applied more recently in Macedonia, where Macedonian government forces engaged in fighting against Macedonian Albanian rebel groups. In this case, NATO countries, including Canada, insisted on the principle of the *sovereignty* of Macedonian State.

Although it participated in NATO actions in Bosnia and Kosovo, Canada did not automatically show willingness to intervene militarily on humanitarian grounds. Thus, Canada was initially opposed to a NATO role in Bosnia, preferring to provide humanitarian assistance under the UN. Furthermore, the government was strongly against the use of force by NATO to resolve conflict. Thus Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1993 explicitly stated that

We have energetically supported peacekeeping efforts and have constantly upheld the idea of NATO participation in a comprehensive peace plan under the auspices of the UN. At the same time we oppose and will continue to oppose proposal for military intervention that do no favor resolution of the conflict and do endanger the lives of peacekeepers.

(Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1993, p. 3)

However, Canada participated in the NATO bombing of Bosnia, which led to the “hostage crisis”. Canadian soldiers were among the UN members who were taken hostage by the Bosnian Serb forces.

Canada’s participation in the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia challenged human security agenda, and once more shifted the goals of Canadian foreign policy (Dashwood, 1999, p. 278). This time, Canadian foreign policy shifted towards an

acceptance of the idea that the use of force may be necessary and appropriate to stop and prevent humanitarian disasters without the approval of the United Nations Security Council. This change one probably needs to see in the light of the failure of UNPROFOR to protect safe areas in Croatia and Bosnia (particularly, Srebrenica safe zone). As Dashwood (1999) points out, Canada's experience in Croatia and Bosnia "meant that it was not such an illogical leap to accept a primary role for NATO in Kosovo, although preferably this would be under UN auspices" (p. 283).

As we have seen from the previous pages, foreign influence had been very important in determining the fate of the former Yugoslavia. Due to this reason it is interesting to explore how non-Balkan actors are portrayed in the articles from *The Globe and Mail*. However, it should be noted that my main focus has been on the portrayal of participants from the Balkans, so I will talk about non-Balkan participants only to the extent that they appeared directly involved with the Balkan participants in the events examined.

Actor description

It is possible to distinguish between two types of non-Balkans participants – NATO and the UN members (including the humanitarian personnel of the UN agencies). All international participants are less often genericised when compared to the Balkan participants. Heads of governments and military officials are always nominated and titled, which is grammatically realized by modifiers or qualifiers within the head of the nominal group: *UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali*, *French Lieutenant-*

General Bernard Janvier, President Bill Clinton, Yasushi Akashi, the UN's special representative, Canadian Captain Raymond Belanger, the spokesman for 12th battalion, etc. The same is true for humanitarian workers: WHO doctor Simon Mardel, Laura Voldrini, the UNHCR spokeswoman Mr. Kelly, a war-crimes investigator, Mr. Murungan, a war-crimes investigator, etc. Obviously, journalists perceived all these actors as high-ranking persons who deserved nomination.

Processes

Non-Balkan participants are mostly (see Appendices II and IV) “sayers” in mental verbal processes. When involved in transactive action processes, they are portrayed as givers of help and responsible for the law and order (the work of the war crime Tribunal).

The most striking difference in the representation of the UN compared to NATO participants can be seen in transactive action processes. When they are involved in these processes, the UN participants, especially Canadian soldiers, are very often placed in the position of affected participant (something is “done” to them), with Serbs, or unknown (deleted) responsible “agents,” grammatically realized by passive constructions, for instance: *Canadians prevented from entering Bosnia. Canada pressed to back air strikes. Canadians and others threatened with death... Canadians still held in Bosnia. Bulk of peacekeepers freed by Serbs. Canadians hit in Bosnia: Serb shells two soldiers during rescue airlift. Canadians endure mock execution: drunken Bosnian Serb fighters terrorize 11 captive UN soldiers.*

The UN soldiers are thus portrayed as helpless and perhaps incapable of doing their jobs. Such a portrayal is very unusual. As Hackett and Gruneau (2000) point out, "Canada's image as the world's peacekeeper has without a doubt been an important part of Canadian national identity during the last half of the century" (p. 166). Furthermore, some of the interviewed participants in Hackett and Gruneau's research claimed that the "continuing commitment to peace demonstrated by the Canadian Forces is a big part of the vision that binds the country together" (Ibid.). Thus it is interesting to ask why are Canadians, members of the UN forces in my sample, described primarily as "receivers" of others' actions?

Interestingly, the portrayal of Canadians changed when they acted as part or in relation to the NATO forces, for example: *Ottawa backs NATO air strikes*, *[Canadian] Warplanes await NATO's call*, *Canadians [are] in first wave of strikes on Serbia*, *Canada's role: it's the most aggressive action since Korea*, *NATO escalates bombing as Russian peace bid fails*: *Canada sends six more jets and adds \$10m in aid for refugees*.

NATO is represented in terms of strength and capability to solve all the Balkans problems. NATO is "agent" ("doer") in transactive action processes, or "sayers" in mental verbal processes, for example: *NATO has agreed to reinforce threats against Serbs*, *Britain says*, *NATO withholds Sarajevo air strikes*, *NATO approves air strikes*, *NATO escalates attacks...NATO orders air strikes*, *NATO flexes muscles over Bosnia*: *NATO jets hit Serb-held airfield*, *NATO strike aimed at Serb headquarters...NATO troops kill one, capture three near site of former Bosnian prison camp*.

NATO is never portrayed as affected participant (“patient”) in the examined sample. The portrayal of NATO as a strong, powerful force naturalized NATO’s role in the Balkans. If the Balkan participants and the UN forces were not able to confront the Serbs and their violence, then NATO’s actions, including the bombing of Bosnian Serbs and Serbs in Serbia, became completely legitimate and justified. Interestingly, NATO as the “agent” in transactive processes acts mostly on inanimate “patients” (*airfield, headquarters*); when acting on human beings, NATO actions are justified because alleged war criminals are placed in the role of “patients.” In this way, NATO’s violent actions, harmful for civilians in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, are backgrounded, while NATO’s positive actions are foregrounded. This suggests that reporters perceived NATO as the “in-group”.

“Voices”

Predominant sources of information in my data are: Canadian and the UN officials followed by the United States representatives. (Appendix IV) Politicians, military commanders and spokespersons, as well as humanitarian workers in the field are almost always fully quoted. They are also identified in relation to the organization they speak for. It is obvious that politicians, military persons, diplomats, and other representatives of different institutions dominated the coverage of the analyzed articles. Alternative voices, which would challenge these dominant points of view, were not represented in the examined reports. The Western participants’ voices served to confirm, deny, and evaluate events and actions of non-Balkan participants. They also served to

send their messages to Balkan participants, sometimes in the form of ultimatum. For instance: *In Bonn, Chancellor Helmut Kohl threatened to halt German economic aid to Yugoslavia: “Yugoslavia’s unity cannot be maintained with military violence,” Mr. Kohl told reporters. In another example, President Clinton denounced the soldiers’ capture and said that the United States will hold Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic responsible for their safety: “There was absolutely no basis for them to be taken,” Mr. Clinton said. Or, one more example: Mr. Blair bluntly warned them [Serbs]: “You cannot expect to be part of the reconstruction of the Balkans while that [having a dictator and indicted war criminal] remains so.”* Contrary to previous studies (van Dijk, 1998; Fairclough, 1995a) the boundary between the voice of news report and the Western sources is clearly demarcated.

NOTES

¹ “It is vitally important to remember that [...] indeed until 1989 it was not Serbs who were in charge in Kosovo [but] it was Albanians” (Judah, 2000, p. 41).

² The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina insisted on the consensus among national (ethnic) representatives and did not allow outvoting on majority bases.

³ Fikret Abdic, Muslim businessman and former member of the Bosnian collective state presidency had kept the Bihac region out of war and cooperated with all sides. When Mr. Izetbegovic’s government refused to accept the Owen-Stoltenberg plan that proposed a division of Bosnia and Herzegovina (in 1994), Abdic declared the autonomous Province of Western Bosnia and signed peace agreement with Croats and Serbs. Sarajevo’s government forces attacked the Bihac area and rebel Muslims fled across the border in the areas controlled by Croatian Serbs. (Remington, 1996; Woodward, 1995)

⁴ Both Lord Carrington who had been chairing the negotiations among the parties in Yugoslavia in 1991, and then UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar wrote to Hans van den Broeck, then Dutch Foreign Minister and President of the EC Council of Ministers, and to Hans Dietrich Genscher, German Foreign Minister, and expressed their strong concerns about the impact of early recognition. However, German leaders rejected these warnings. (Schloer, 1996).

Chapter 4

In the previous chapter I analyzed the portrayal of Balkan and non-Balkan participants during the breakup of the former Yugoslavia as represented in the front-page articles of *The Globe and Mail*. In this chapter I summarize the main results of the study and draw some tentative conclusions from the findings.

Main findings of the study

Measured in terms of the number of published front-page articles, there was relatively extensive coverage of Yugoslav wars, but at the same time, there was little background analysis to understand the complexity of the events in the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, all Yugoslav wars did not receive the same amount of coverage. This is understandable in terms of the coverage of the war in Slovenia, because this war lasted only 10 days and had a small number of victims. On the other hand, it is interesting to ask why the war in Croatia was not better covered, bearing in mind that this war had all the elements of a newsworthy event as described in media studies (Carruthers, 2000; Allan, 1999), as well as the fact that Canadian soldiers directly participated in it (Taylor, 2000). The Kosovo war in 1999, as we have seen, was of particular interest for reporters during the examined period, because 98 front-page stories, or 22.8 per cent of total articles published on front-pages of *The Globe and Mail* during the ten years period, were devoted to this conflict. However, the number of front-page stories decreased whenever NATO and the UN officials were not involved in the events examined (1996, 1997, and 1998, respectively). This is in line with Carruthers (2000) study which suggests that

the “distant audience presumed lack of interest in ‘other people’s wars’” (p. 234). She also argues that the “presence of troops from the reporter’s country is likely to ensure ongoing attention to that location, as the audience is imagined to share a ‘common interest’ with their armed representatives” (Carruthers, 2000, p. 234).

Although, in terms of sources of coverage, more than 50 per cent of stories were agency reports, or were reports by correspondents of the U.S. newspapers, a Canadian angle in stories was provided mostly through the statements of Canadian politicians.

The vast majority of articles focused on violent events involving Balkan participants. Overall, the Balkan area was represented as a place of violence, and in a negative light. Although during the examined period there were three years without full-scale wars (1996, 1997, and 1998, respectively), the articles from these years focused on the arrest of alleged war criminals, sporadic shootings, and turbulent changes of the governments. The Balkans were thus portrayed the same way as the Third World, which is, according to previous studies on the Canadian newspaper coverage, associated with disasters, violence, and human right abuses (Hackett, 1992). In other words, this part of world was seen as “other”.

The analysis of my sample suggested that Balkan participants were not portrayed equally. Almost as soon as the civil war began (the period 1991 – 1992), first briefly in Slovenia, *The Globe and Mail* articles began to describe the violence without any explanation of the political or economic background or reasons why this fighting was taking place. Instead, the wars in the former Yugoslavia were explained in terms of *ethnic rivalry*, the product of *ethnic hatred*, and the struggle between Communism and non-

Communism. In this way, complex political and historical circumstances were reduced to simply a struggle between attacked “tiny” and “weak” states (Slovenia, Croatia, and later Bosnia and Herzegovina) and a “Communist” expansionist Serbia under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic. Thus the analyzed articles did not question the rights of Slovenes and Croats to attack the federal army, although this was the army of the federal state of which they were a part. Instead the violent actions of the Slovenes and Croats were partially justified and presented as the fighting for *liberation*, defense of *fatherland*, and against *aggression*. The Yugoslav army was portrayed as Serb-dominated (*already purged of non-Serb elements*, *Serb-dominated*, *Serbian army*, etc.). The period 1992-1993 saw the development of the three topics about the Bosnian war: *the systematic ethnic cleansing*, *the concept of concentration camps*, and *brutal attacking of Bosnian Muslim civilians in the protected UN areas*, committed mostly by Bosnian Serbs and to lesser extent by Bosnian Croats. Finally, the reporting of the war over Serbia, in 1999, concentrated on the exodus of Kosovo Albanian civilians and NATO bombing in order to “bring peace and protect our values” (Axworthy, 1999) in the region. At the same time, the exodus of Kosovo non-Albanian citizens as well as civilians, victims of NATO bombing, remained underreported.

It is striking that while the origins of the First World War or the Second World War are studied in terms of contemporary economic and political processes, the origins of the wars in the former Yugoslavia were frequently explored with reference to the ethnicity of their participants. “Ethnicity is not in itself an explanation,” rightly points out Allen (1999, p. 3) “but rather the product of social processes.” He argues that

[...] it can be shown that they [events in former Yugoslavia] are a product of nationalities policies under communist rule, acute economic stress, local media coverage, and the machinations of politicians seeking a power base. To suggest that people kill each other in Bosnia because Muslims are Muslims, Serbs are Serbs and Croats are Croats is no more insightful than to suggest that the Iran-Iraq war was fought because the Iranian were Iranian and the Iraqis were Iraqis. The challenge is to explain why various forms of ethnicity become so significant at certain times and in certain places. (Allen, 1999, p. 29)

According to Allen (1999), many ethnic explanations of conflict are inherently racist, because they “suggest that natural division motivate action, that some social groups are inherently predisposed to violence, and that their primal barbarity can be contrasted with our humanism” (p. 31). Similarly, Slavenka Drakulic, Croat journalist and novelist, writes about her anger at Europe’s perception of the war as “ethnic conflict” and an “ancient legacy of hatred and bloodshed”:

In this way the West tells us, “You are not Europeans, not even Eastern Europeans. You are Balkans, mythological, wild, dangerous Balkans. Kill yourselves, if that is your pleasure. We do not understand what is going on there, nor do we have clear political interests to protect. (1993, p. 2-3)

The main problem is that the portrayal of wars as ethnic reduces the social and economic realities, and the complex historical causes of the wars. “Ethnic” wars seemed to be perceived to be the “consequences of qualities inherent in the character of the communities involved” (Seaton, 1999, p. 44).

One of the consequences of simplification of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was the portrayal of Balkan participants as either villains or victims. It is evident from my analysis that the journalists in the analyzed articles portrayed the Serbs (Croatian, Bosnian, and Serbian), and Bosnian Croats as the “out-groups,” both excluded from the

“civilized Western world of experience” (Chouliaraki, 1999). The victims of the war, members of these two groups, were almost completely excluded from the examined sample, and both groups were represented as consisting only of armed males, who committed only unspeakable atrocities against people of different ethnic backgrounds. The other groups involved in the wars were represented as the “in-groups,” with whose members an average reader of the newspaper could sympathize. This is especially true for the portrayal of Kosovo Albanians and Bosnian Muslims, who were personalized, individualized, and portrayed as helpless victims of non-rational and non-understandable violence.

Regarding the non-Balkan participants, there was a striking difference found in my data between the portrayal of the UN and NATO members. The UN military forces were described as incapable of doing their jobs (the protection of civilians) and weak in dealing with Bosnian Serb army. In contrast, NATO forces were presented as able to solve “the Balkan mess,” and militarily confront the Serbs (both Serbian and Bosnian).

The actions of the developed Western countries in general and the U.S.-led NATO in particular, were represented as determined by purely moral considerations. None of the examined articles challenged the legality of NATO actions in the former Yugoslavia.

According to Bissett (1999) “herein lies a new danger, because the protection of ‘human rights’ may be the cloak for a new type of imperialist military intervention worldwide.”

An important question to ask is why participants were portrayed as such. To answer this is necessary to move from textual analysis to the broader socio-cultural context of the media.

It is important to understand that the newspapers in capitalist societies must behave in accordance with a basic rule of the free market: they have to sell their product. Huge economic pressures on the media also mean that “reporting of distant conflict is often based largely on agency reports and secondary sources, not first-hand observation” (Carruthers, 2000, p. 203). Hachten (1996) explains that rising costs and inflation have made maintenance of staff overseas quite expensive for most newspapers. Western journalism thus increasingly relies on foreign nationals to help report the news. According to Hachten (1996), foreign journalists are “not only less expensive but often have a grasp of local languages and knowledge of their own countries that American journalists cannot match” (p. 25). *The Globe and Mail* did not have its bureau in the former Yugoslavia, and until the beginning of the Bosnian war reports were written on the basis of foreign sources.

At the same time, from the perspective of journalists, the pressure of producing a huge amount of news articles “eliminates the time required for thorough news-gathering, for the amassing of information from different sources, and for weighing and evaluating evidence” (Carruthers, 2000, p. 203). She cited Martin Bell as saying that “More means worse. The multiplication of deadlines takes us away from the real world, and drives us back into our offices and edit rooms” (Ibid., p. 203).

Secondly, in situations such as civil war, many reporters are faced with tight restrictions on their ability to travel, to witness events, and to speak freely with officials and local citizens. They also often risk their lives while working in war situations (Carruthers, 2000). According to Burns (1996), journalists had particular difficulty in reporting the ten-year conflict in former Yugoslavia. "By May 1994, 50 journalists were killed reporting on the fighting in former Yugoslavia, since 1991, when the country broke up" (Hatchen, 1996, p. 32).

Finally, warfare has always strained the objectivity and impartiality of journalism. Journalists are dependent on combatants for access to the sites of conflict, and this dependency can weaken journalists' impartiality. Moreover, wars mobilize emotions, and journalists end up taking sides, losing their ability to ask critical questions on behalf of the public. This was especially true in Bosnia, where foreign journalists usually stayed in besieged Sarajevo, and shared the hardship of its citizens.

Examining the performance of the western media in the covering the Bosnian war, Gow and Tilsley (1996) argue that the secessionist governments in the former Yugoslavia were able "to manipulate mass media support at both international and domestic levels" (p. 103). Thus, according to their findings, Slovenian officials, understanding the importance of the media in winning international support organized a major press center in the Slovenian capital and "fully integrated military and media strategies [...] keeping Western journalists informed" (Gow & Tilsley, 1996, p. 106). The authors further argue that Croatia was not successful in its media campaign because the Croatian officials were less organized than their Slovenian counterparts. Due to this

“many journalists looking for a story went to the front, and many of these found and reported on situations, which put Croats in compromised position” (Ibid., p. 107). Finally, Gow and Tilsley (1995) claim that Bosnia and Herzegovina was “more obviously an innocent victim,” and “an attempt to mobilize an international intervention became a part of the Bosnian government strategy” (p. 108).

Similarly, the UN Independent Commission for Kosovo points out that “an issue of critical importance is the degree to which Western media became a weapon of war during the NATO bombing campaign” (UN, 2000, p. 215). The Commission concluded that there is a need to examine questions such as “whether [...] Western media devoted sufficient resources to independent verification of NATO assertions, and whether [...] moral sympathy for the plight of Kosovo refugees make them less critical of NATO military tactics and operations” (Ibid., p. 216). My own data suggest the tendency of the reporters to accept officials of the secessionist governments, as well as Albanian refugees and Western politicians as more valuable sources of information, but they are not sufficient enough in terms of numbers to confirm the findings presented by Gow and Tilsley (1996). However, potential manipulation of the Western media by warring factions remains an interesting question to be addressed in future studies.

Conclusion

Although a limitation of this study is clearly its sample size, it nevertheless allows for some generalizations to be made regarding the initial questions posed.

- **What are the differences among the portrayals of different ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia (comparing, for instance, the armed forces in Croatia, the armed forces in Bosnia, and the armed forces in Serbia)?**

According to the results of the study, it is possible to distinguish among different military formations of all examined ethnic Balkan groups, as well as civilians, victims of conflicts, and political representatives of warring factions. The analysis revealed that there was a difference in the portrayal of armed formations. Yugoslav army, Slovenian forces, Croatian forces in Croatia, Bosnian Muslim forces, and Kosovo Albanian forces were presented as legitimate. On the other hand, Croatian Serb forces, Bosnian Serb forces, Bosnian Croat and Serb forces in Serbia were portrayed as acting in lawless ways and for the “bad cause.” Such a portrayal was achieved through foregrounding of Serbs as the “agents” of violent actions, and through the lexical choices used for description of both Serbian and Bosnian Croats formations. While Slovenian, Croatian, and Bosnian Muslim forces were described as fighting for *liberation of fatherland*, against *aggressors*, lawless armies mentioned above were described as attacking an unarmed population. Moreover, the nature of the violent actions in which they were engaged was such (*raping, cutting off parts of bodies, ethnic cleansing, and murdering in concentration camps*) that readers’ emotions were fully engaged, and the actions excluded these groups from the “discourse of Western morality” (Chouliaraki, 1999). At the same time, the Yugoslav army and Serb forces in all parts of the former Yugoslavia were described as very powerful, so none of the armed Balkan formation, as well as the peacekeeping forces of the United Nations, could confront them. The only actor capable of dealing with such a

military power was NATO. Therefore, NATO actions in the Balkan were represented as natural, lawful, and necessary.

The same dichotomy was evident in the portrayal of victims of the war – Yugoslavs, Serbs, Croats, and Muslims from the Bihac area of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were represented in the analyzed sample as groups consisting only of armed males, without women, old people, or children. If mentioned at all, victims, members of these groups were portrayed as faceless groups of people, aggregated and assimilated, without names, gender, or age. These groups were also represented as deserving their destiny, which is most notable in the portrayal of Croatian Serb refugees, who were described as engaged in the eviction of Bosnian Croats from their homes. Such a portrayal is what van Dijk (1998) calls “blaming the victim” strategy. The exodus of Croatian Serbs was the biggest exodus of people during all the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Also, Croatian Serbs lived in so-called protected United Nation’s areas, which made their situation very similar to those of Bosnian Muslim people living in Srebrenica area, or Kosovo Albanians. Despite these similarities in the status, and similarities in the number of killed and forcibly removed people, reporters appeared to choose only Kosovo Albanians and Srebrenica’s victims as worth portraying at all on the one hand, and on the other, portraying at all sympathetically.

In the analyzed sample of *The Globe and Mail* the people from the Balkans were portrayed as a primary “other” – either as cruel savages, or as helpless victims incapable of managing their own affairs. In this way, the NATO intervention in the former Yugoslavia was seen as the completely legitimate only solution for stopping the wars. All

ethnic groups were represented as homogeneous and with the emphasis on intra-ethnic uniformity. Members of each group were portrayed as having only one ethnic identity, which was non-changeable and non-ambivalent. It seems that reporters had adopted the point of view of different Balkan politicians, each of whom was trying to prove that his particular group acted always homogeneously, with common goals, and without any dissonant voices among their members.

While the ethnicity of Serbs, members of the Yugoslav army was foregrounded in order to portray the army as biased against other the Balkans groups, the ethnic backgrounds of many other participants were not mentioned at all. Thus, for example, the ethnicity of generals of Albanian origin who accepted to fight as members of Croatian armed formations, as well as the ethnicity (Slovenian and Croatian, respectively) of the Yugoslav army generals who ordered the actions in Slovenia and Croatia were not mentioned in the articles. Readers were led to believe that the Yugoslav army consisted only of Serbs who attacked unarmed members of different ethnic backgrounds. This was combined with the omission of modifiers Croatian/Bosnian with the noun groups Serbs/Croats that reinforced the impression of these groups of people as “aggressors” coming from another republic.

- **What are the changes, if any, in the representation of each group over the period of the study?**

There were almost no changes in the portrayal of the participants during the ten-year period with one important exception. The only visible changes can be seen in the representation of Croatian participants, who were portrayed as victims of Yugoslav and

Serb aggression during the war in Croatia (1991 – 1992), but less favorably in the years when the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina ended. All other participants were portrayed in the roles once assigned without any alterations.

- **What is the difference in the portrayal of Western participants and Balkans participants?**

We can talk about the dichotomy of “us ” and “them” in the representation of Western participants. While the Balkan participants were portrayed either as villains or helpless victims, Western participants were represented only as providers of help, peacekeeping soldiers, judges and investigators, responsible for the rule of the law and peaceful solutions of problems.

An interesting finding of the study is that Canadian soldiers, members of the UN forces, were described as weaker actors compared to the Balkan participants. Accordingly, Canadian soldiers were placed in the positions of “affected” participant in transactive clauses, with Bosnian Serbs acting on them. Thus, Canadians were subjected to execution ordeals, were shelled, captured, and released, in one word, they were not masters of their lives. Canadians were also represented as subordinated to unknown agents, for example *Canadians pressed to back air strikes*. Such a portrayal downgraded the role of Canadians (and implicitly the United Nations troops) and it allowed readers to accept the NATO actions in the Balkans as inevitable and naturalized. NATO forces, on the other hand, were portrayed as strong, organized, and able to solve all Balkan problems. Interestingly, although primarily a military alliance, the NATO forces in analyzed articles behaved as: humanitarian workers, helping the airlift of Kosovo

Albanians: as police forces, which captured alleged war criminals; and as censors for the Bosnian Serbs media, for instance: *NATO pulls plug on Serb television: transmitters seized in Bosnia*

All NATO actions were presented as justified through the portrayal of the helplessness of participants on the ground, and because of the “moral principles” which guided NATO actions. Thus, the bombing of civilians by NATO for crimes allegedly committed by their leaders was represented in the analyzed articles as the only possible solution for bringing peace in the region.

Finally, my question was:

- **Is there overt or covert prejudice in relation to different groups, to what extent is it produced and reproduced linguistically, or alternatively how can it be exposed and contested by linguistic means?**

I analyzed the newspaper articles focusing on the salient features of text: lexical choices, transitivity, and intertextuality understood in terms of voices heard in the articles, or manifest intertextuality in Fairclough’s (1995) terms. The network of systematic choices in the representation of social actors offered by van Leeuwen (1996) allowed me to examine whether these social actors were *included* or *excluded* from the articles, and whether they were described as personalized individuals, or as faceless and nameless groups of people.

The most notable finding was the exclusion of Serb and Croat victims of war, as well as “non-governmental” Muslims from the Bihac area. This exclusion did not leave

any trace in the articles, and without background knowledge of the former Yugoslavia and wars on its territory, an average reader could not have recovered excluded actors.

The referential strategy of explicit *ethnicisation* was most prominent in the portrayal of Balkan participants and served to “promote social cohesion in relation to groups perceived as outsiders and enemies” (Allen, 1999, p. 14). This strategy also backgrounded the social and economic causes of the wars in the former Yugoslavia.

The study revealed that *nomination* and *personalisation* were always used in the representation of elite persons, such as politicians, different officials, and military commanders. Western participants were almost always highly individualized, and their names, titles, and positions were explicitly stated. Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanian civilians were also personalized to a high degree.

The analysis of action, mental and relational processes revealed that the groups perceived as “out-groups” were predominantly in the position of responsible “agents” in clauses with violent predications, while participants belonging to the “in-groups” were placed in the role of “patients” in these clauses. This is in line with previous studies (such as van Dijk, 1993; Young, 1998), which showed that “they” are more prominent in negative actions as responsible “agents”, while “we” are placed in the position of the “agents” when actions are not violent. In the case of Bosnian Croats, the passive constructions with deletion of agent were used to background their negative violent actions. Victims were also placed as “sayers” in mental verbal processes, describing the events which happened.

I also examined “voices” in order to see who was allowed to provide her/his opinion. Canadian governmental sources cumulatively constitute the largest category, followed by politicians of the developed Western countries (most notably the U.S.), and United Nations sources. The Balkan politicians and officials (belonging to all ethnic groups) are also very often quoted and referred to. The only exceptions are officials of the Serbian government, whose point of view is not heard. Instead, Serbian opposition politicians were allowed to speak. There have been many reasons offered in the literature about the media as explanation why governmental sources are so often used in times of the crisis. Some of them include:

- Pressure of the deadlines and government officials’ accessibility to comment (Dorman & Farhang, 1987);
- “The underlying structure of Western narrative, which naturalizes certain dichotomies and social hierarchies” (Galtung, 1987);
- The relationship between press owners and senior editors, states and commercial business interests (Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Winter, 1997); and
- “Western understanding of ‘professionalism’ and ‘objectivity’ in relation who is deemed to possess such qualities” (Hackett & Zhao, 1997; Parenti, 1993).

In addition to voices of different officials, Kosovo Albanian civilians, and Bosnian Muslim civilians appeared as reliable sources of information. Their voices, as well as those of Slovenian and Croatian politicians, from time to time merged with journalists’ voices and were presented to readers as “authoritative” (the newspapers’) truth. This also reinforced the portrayal of the participants already described with the

lexical choices and transitivity system. In analyzed samples, *The Globe and Mail* did not challenge any information reported by secessionist leaders in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. In contrast, the voices of opponents of those leaders and their governments were not heard in the newspaper articles. Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and “non-governmental” Bosnia Muslims, who were perceived as “aggressors”, did not have an opportunity to express their opinions. What is more disturbing, civilian victims, members of those groups, did not receive adequate coverage. It appears that reporters perceived them as collectively guilty for the wars in the former Yugoslavia, and, thus, seemed to be less motivated to check what happened to those forcibly removed and people who were killed.

Finally, it appears that *The Globe and Mail* news articles seemed to follow the official foreign policy of Canada towards the Balkans, and did not question any decision of the government. As far as I know, there was little public debate in Canada about sending Canadian soldiers to the Balkans, especially in the war over Kosovo. Instead, this war was represented as fought in pursuit of a moral principle, with NATO as the “community of values.”

I started this research with an assumption that media discourse is an influential medium through which our understanding and judgments about social and political worlds are reinforced and challenged. I also assumed that investigation of media discourse could reveal a great deal about the attitude in Canada towards different ethnic groups from the former Yugoslavia. The impetus for such study was my involvement in the Balkans wars as well as my conviction that Canadian readers were not very informed

about the events in the Balkans. One of my hypotheses was also that discursive practice of differential representation may influence the ways in which readers call for, and accept actions taken in relation to a particular group.

I addressed those problems from the perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis. Following Fairclough's (1995b) argument that researchers "should not feel embarrassed about making judgments of truth" I tried to bring my particular perspective as a contribution to, in my opinion, one of important questions in our society.

Results of the analysis suggest that *The Globe and Mail* discursively reproduced the ideological framework that echoed ethnic inequality among various groups from the Balkans. While Serb atrocities were widely condemned, Serb suffering was minimized and overlooked. The same is true for Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims from the Bihac area. Although more studies are needed to examine the audience's responses to such a portrayal of different groups from the former Yugoslavia, it seems entirely possible that these groups received less sympathy in the press and in the readership of this press.

The analyzed data also suggests that developed Western countries, members of NATO, were depicted as the only holder of moral values and the only force capable of dealing with problems in the Balkans. The newspaper did not explore alternative possibilities for actions. Instead, it was taken for granted that the peace could be achieved only by the war. Thus, in the best Orwellian language, the bombing by NATO was presented as the *peace reinforcement*, and the *protection of our values*. Similarly, the bombing of Belgrade television station and the seizure of the Bosnian Serb radio stations

was presented as *bringing democracy to the war thorn region*. Journalists of *The Globe and Mail* in the analyzed sample did not question the right of the Western powers as outside “neutral” force to decide the fate of the region. The lack of serious public debate in Canada about these issues suggests that this ideology was taken for granted and naturalized.

The reality of the Balkans wars was presented from the point of view of different politicians and officials, particularly Canadian government representatives, while dissenting views were omitted. Thus, it seemed that *The Globe and Mail* performed the role, willingly or not, of “cohesive and integral part of State apparatus, which Gramsci called a ‘unison of economic and political aims, as well as intellectual and moral unity’” (Winter, 2000, p. 53).

My analysis confirmed my assumption that Canadian readers were not fully informed about the wars in the former Yugoslavia. These wars were described as the consequence of expansionist politics of Serbia, which together with the powerful army attacked its weaker neighbours. In this simplified story about the struggle between good and evil, NATO played the role of rescuer of innocent victims. Galtung (1989a) argues that seeing reality only as black and white reflects in general the Western approach to covering international affairs. He also argues that in this way the mythology of war making is reinforced because the “cosmic battle between good and evil serves to justify the revenge for an imagined wrong, tyrannical centralization of power, and the belief that the West stands as God’s trustee of civilization” (Ibid., p. 10).

By carrying out Critical Discourse Analysis of the media it is possible to make different ideologies transparent, and open alternative viewpoints, which is an important contribution in critical research. As Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) point out, we live in times of changes, which cause “considerable disruptions and suffering for societies, communities and individuals [...] Yet social forms that are produced by people can be changed by people” (pp. 3 – 4). This is the motivation for CDA - to raise an awareness of “what is, how it has come to be, and what it might become” (Ibid., p. 4). In this way CDA aims to open the dialogue across the public sphere, with the aim to “bring into democratic control aspects of social use of language and to advocate a critical awareness of language as a fundamental element in contemporary social lives” (Ibid., p. 9).

What I have presented here as an academic discussion of media discourse had consequences in the lives of people in the Balkans. Thus, some of them received no humanitarian aid, some of them were bombed, some of them were not granted visas in different developed countries, and some of them are still waiting to return to their homes. By uncovering inequality in discourse CDA can contribute to the changes in social practices, which affects many people, including Balkans. I am convinced that this is a worthwhile project.

**Appendix I – Analyzed the front-page headlines on the former Yugoslavia
published in *The Globe and Mail* during the period
1991 to 1999**

Participants (underlined) and processes (bold)

1991	Headlines
1	<u>Albanians</u> flood polls in historic vote: <u>first free election</u> draws 97% of electorate
2	<u>Croatia</u> endorses independence referendum: " <u>We are preparing to fight.</u> " <u>defiant Serbian villager</u> says
3	<u>Yugoslav republics</u> announce split: <u>independence proclamations by Croatia,</u> <u>Slovenia</u> could trigger civil war
4	Journey along the ridge of Yugoslavia's ethnic tension
5	<u>Yugoslav jets</u> roar over Slovenia: <u>tanks</u> move into rebel republic in show of force; <u>7</u> die in Croatian violence
6	<u>Yugoslav troops</u> battle Slovenian secessionists: <u>6 federal helicopters</u> shot down as <u>rebel republic's capital</u> comes under siege
7	<u>Yugoslav republics</u> suspend independence bids: <u>federal army</u> declares cease-fire in ground and air attacks on Slovenia
8	<u>Croat</u> elected to head Yugoslav presidency: <u>acceptance of Stipe Mesic</u> paves way for EC-mediated settlement
9	<u>Yugoslavia</u> fires army general (Konrad Kolsek): <u>commander of military action in</u> <u>Slovenia</u> criticized for using excessive force
10	<u>Yugoslav cease-fire</u> shattered : <u>army, Slovenes</u> battle in heaviest day of fighting: " <u>truce [is]</u> no longer possible "
11	<u>Fragile cease-fire</u> holds in Slovenia: <u>breakaway republics</u> [is] at mercy of Yugoslav military as <u>rumours of coup</u> heighten tension
12	<u>European leaders</u> abandon caution on Yugoslav crisis: <u>Britain</u> moves to ban third of exports, <u>Italy</u> threatens to back rebel republics

13	<u>Slovenia</u> dismisses Yugoslav ultimatum: <u>central leadership</u> moves to regain military control
14	<u>Yugoslavia</u> offers compromise: <u>Slovenia</u> can control its borders if <u>it</u> turns over customs revenue
15	<u>Agreement</u> [had been] reached on Slovenia: <u>talks to start</u> August 1: <u>border compromise</u> [had been] struck
16	Lessons of the mountain pass: <u>last week's clash in Slovenia</u> showed the effectiveness of local fighters against the isolated armour of the Yugoslav military
17	<u>Slovenian leaders</u> threaten to scuttle Yugoslav peace: <u>politicians</u> call agreement surrender. <u>presidency</u> says <u>republic</u> violated pact
18	<u>Can the roaring mouse go it alone?</u> (<u>Slovenia's economy</u> far outpaces rest of Yugoslavia but pales when <u>it</u> is compared with Western Europe)
19	<u>80 Croats</u> reportedly killed in heavy battle: <u>Yugoslav presidency</u> orders <u>cease-fire</u> in rebel republic's ethnic fighting
20	<u>Yugoslav leader</u> to ask UN to send peacekeeping force
21	<u>Yugoslav forces</u> attack Croatian port (Ploce)
22	<u>Serb, Croat leaders</u> go all out to whip up hatred and hysteria
23	<u>Croatia</u> may win freedom by losing the war
24	<u>Yugoslav assault</u> pushes Croats back
25	<u>Croatia</u> <u>cease-fire</u> violated within hours
26	Real fears and imagined horrors: in the midst of Croatia's bitter war, <u>mentally ill and frightened citizens</u> take shelter in the relative safety of a damaged hospital basement
27	<u>Croatia</u> hands out weapons: <u>Yugoslav army offensive</u> sparks mobilization
28	<u>Yugoslav air force</u> attacks Zagreb: <u>Croatian leaders</u> nearly killed
29	<u>Croatia</u> [is] silent on first night of independence

30	<u>Humans and animals fall [are] bloody victim</u> to mortar shells: <u>as Croatia's battle with Serbia drags on, the inhabitants of Osijek's zoo experience</u> acute distress
31	<u>Dangerous farce portrays</u> Yugoslav cease-fire: <u>odyssey of relief convoy heading for the embattled city of Vukovar is story</u> of failing peace
32	<u>Bosnia's sovereignty fuels</u> all out war fears: <u>Moscow talks offer</u> glimmer of hope
33	<u>Sanctions imposed</u> on Yugoslavia: <u>Canada backs</u> European Community bid for UN-sponsored oil embargo
34	<u>Dubrovnik [is] in flames</u> after fierce fighting: <u>Croatia faces</u> total war
35	<u>Croatia offers to surrender</u> besieged Vukovar
36	<u>UN willing to rush</u> force to Yugoslavia
37	<u>Yugoslav province to seek statehood</u> : <u>Kosovo's Albanians to petition</u> EC
38	<u>New normality comes</u> to a city living a nightmare

1992	Headlines
1	<u>Extremists threaten</u> truce in Yugoslavia: <u>situation</u> [had been] worsened by hate, retribution, ambitious leaders
2	<u>Yugoslavs shoot down</u> helicopter carrying peace monitors
3	<u>Canadians set to join</u> UN force (in Yugoslavia)
4	<u>Canada recognizes</u> Croatia, Slovenia: <u>Ottawa ready to send</u> troops in peacekeeping role, <u>UN told</u>
5	<u>Canada [is] contributing</u> peacekeepers to Yugoslavia: <u>1,200-troop contingent [is] part</u> of large UN force
6	<u>Militias ambush</u> Serbian convoy: <u>President</u> [had been] traded for 500 soldiers
7	<u>Serbs [are] still holding</u> refugees hostage: <u>Bosnia appeals</u> for foreign help to oust Yugoslav army "occupiers"

8	PM urges UN sanctions: <u>envoy to Belgrade</u> [had] <u>being recalled</u>. <u>consulates to be closed</u>
9	<u>UN moves</u> <u>spark</u> protests: <u>sanctions</u> <u>hit</u> Yugoslavs hard
10	<u>Canada</u> [is] <u>set to send</u> soldiers to Sarajevo: <u>Security Council approval</u> [is] <u>needed</u>
11	<u>UN General</u>, Serbs [are] <u>at odds</u> on status of Sarajevo airport: <u>100,000 protesters demand</u> Milosevic's resignation at Belgrade rally
12	<u>Canadians</u> <u>headed</u> for Sarajevo: <u>peacekeepers</u> <u>will defend</u> airport in besieged Bosnian capital
13	<u>US</u> <u>pledge to back</u> peacekeepers: <u>land mines convoy of Canadian soldiers enroute</u> to Sarajevo airport
14	<u>For Bosnians</u>, <u>more war</u> only [is] route to peace
15	<u>Leading</u> an army of peace in Sarajevo's bloodbath (Major-General LewisMacKenzie of Canadian armed forces)
16	<u>US</u> <u>backs</u> Bosnian intervention: <u>use of military force</u> [is] <u>possible to open</u> corridor for humanitarian aid
17	<u>Big powers in G7</u> say <u>no</u> to Bosnian aid: <u>Canada</u>, <u>France</u> [had been] <u>alone in urging</u> humanitarian assistance as <u>Balkan republics crumble</u>
18	<u>War in Bosnia</u> <u>stumps</u> major powers: <u>bland outdated draft statement</u> [is] <u>all CSCE</u> <u>has to offer</u> at Helsinki meeting
19	<u>Youngsters</u> <u>pay</u> price of war: <u>Sarajevo boy who lost legs</u> <u>recounts</u> mortar attack
20	A departing General's epitaph: [there is] <u>no</u> "fairy tales" of peace as <u>Canadian troops</u> <u>prepare to leave</u> Bosnia (Major-Gen. Lewis MacKenzie)
21	Refugees on convoy to nowhere: <u>thousands of fleeing Bosnians</u>, trapped at border bridge, <u>are unable to cross</u> or go back
22	<u>Fleeing Bosnian soldiers</u> <u>forced to return</u> home: [they had been] <u>accused of</u> cowardice, <u>desertion</u> by Croats
23	<u>Bosnia</u>, <u>Croatia</u> <u>join</u> forces: <u>republics</u> <u>agree to expel</u> Serb fighters if <u>world peace</u>

	<u>efforts fail</u>
24	<u>Weary refugees arrive</u> in Croatia: <u>mass deportations</u> [had been] called a catastrophe
25	<u>Canadians pick way</u> through minefield: <u>soldiers</u> [are] moving "very carefully"
26	<u>Haven plan offers</u> little to Muslims of Bosnia: <u>enclaves</u> could aid "ethnic cleansing"
27	<u>Red Cross probes</u> Bosnian atrocities: <u>Canadian peacekeepers</u> return to Croatia after month in Sarajevo
28	<u>UN tells</u> Bosnia to open camps: <u>shelling</u> closes Sarajevo airport
29	<u>France, US</u> [are] at odds over Bosnia: <u>draft resolution</u> outlines EC use of force in deliveries of food and medicine
30	<u>Big powers</u> agree on Bosnia move
31	<u>Stay out</u> of Bosnia, <u>Canadian General</u> warns: <u>MacKenzie says</u> <u>outside involvement in Balkans</u> will prolong fighting
32	<u>Croatian leader</u> tightens his grip: aware that <u>the West</u> is busy elsewhere. <u>Tudjman</u> enforces authoritarian rule
33	<u>Refugees</u> [had been] dumped back across border by Croats
34	<u>Croat leader</u> gives Bosnia ultimatum: <u>Muslim fighters</u> receive deadline to withdraw from Sarajevo area
35	<u>UN votes</u> to expel Yugoslavia: <u>assembly move</u> [is] unprecedented
36	<u>Harsh winter in Bosnia</u> could be killer, <u>UN</u> says
37	<u>UN</u> to study Bosnia war crimes
38	<u>UN move</u> to probe war crimes in Bosnia [had been] called a half-measure
39	<u>UN takes control</u> of road into Sarajevo: <u>100</u> [had been] wounded in latest fighting

40	<u>Canadians</u> [had been] prevented from entering Bosnia
41	<u>Serb soldier</u> finds killing of innocents easy
42	<u>West</u> still stymied on Bosnian action
43	<u>Serbian nationalists</u> oust Panic

1993	Headlines
1	<u>Food, medicine</u> reach starving Muslims (in Bosnia)
2	<u>Food for starving</u> blocked : hostility mounts [had been] against relief in Bosnia
3	<u>Canadian unit</u> gets risky job: aid mission in Bosnia
4	<u>Canada</u> weighs Bosnia airdrop: <u>military analysts</u> debate riskiness of US relief plan
5	<u>US planes</u> drop supplies over Bosnia
6	<u>Relief airdrop</u> misses target: <u>food, medicine</u> fall to Serbs
7	[There is] New massacre in Bosnia: <u>Muslim forces</u> provoked attack. <u>Serb leader</u> says
8	<u>Muslims</u> flee Serb attack
9	<u>Cease-fire deal</u> brings new hope for end to brutal war in Bosnia
10	Can't ignore Bosnia. <u>US</u> says : <u>troops</u> would help enforce any peace agreement
11	<u>Canadians</u> hit in Bosnia: <u>Serb</u> shells two soldiers during rescue airlift
12	<u>Serbs</u> given death penalty : <u>war-crimes trial</u> told of atrocities
13	<u>UN</u> to enforce no-fly rule: <u>death of women, children</u> halts Bosnian rescue effort
14	[There is] No solution one year later, [there are] just bodies

15	<u>Canadians</u> try to save town: troops [are] hoping to aid Srebrenica's sick and starving
16	<u>Ammunition</u> [had been] discovered on truck in UN convoy (Bosnia)
17	<u>Shelling by Serbs</u> kills 56
18	<u>Bosnians</u> negotiating surrender of Srebrenica to Serb forces
19	<u>Canadians</u> told to enter doomed town (Srebrenica)
20	<u>Srebrenica airlift</u> begins: Canadian troops to collect arms from Muslim defenders
21	Protect town, Canadians told: 150 soldiers would face huge odds if Serbs attack Srebrenica
22	<u>Karadzic</u> signs peace plan: <u>pressure by Milosevic</u> dumps Bosnia decision in lap of hard-line parliament
23	<u>Serbs</u> reject UN peace plan
24	<u>US</u> wants action on Bosnia: <u>Europe</u> also must be willing to act, Clinton says
25	Fighting shatters new cease-fire: <u>US</u> will begin bombing key Serb targets within 10 days, <u>report</u> says
26	<u>PM</u> opposes Bosnia air strike: <u>Canadian troops</u> would be pulled out of danger zone
27	<u>Bloody Bosnia</u> divides old allies: <u>Europeans</u> smart from Clinton raps
28	<u>Serb leader</u> declares peace plan dead
29	<u>Muslim state</u> called way to end war: practical move, <u>MacKenzie</u> says
30	<u>Army</u> pushed to breaking point (in Bosnia)
31	<u>Serb forces</u> bombard Sarajevo: <u>NATO</u> heading for crisis on Bosnia, <u>diplomats</u> say
32	<u>Muslims</u> accept peace proposal: <u>hundreds [are]</u> dead as Travnik falls

33	<u>Muslims</u> urged to accept carve-up of Bosnia
34	<u>Serbs, Croats</u> battle Muslims: <u>former foes</u> study plan to take biggest share of Bosnia
35	In a state of virtual chaos, <u>Srebrenica</u> offers only misery
36	<u>Pregnancy</u> [is] no blessed event in war-wasted land
37	<u>NATO</u> hedges warning to Serbs
38	<u>39</u> [have been] airlifted from Sarajevo
39	<u>Canadians</u> endure mock execution : <u>drunken Bosnian Serb fighters</u> terrorize 11 captive UN soldiers
40	<u>Illicit trade</u> denudes Sarajevo
41	<u>Mountie</u> lives on trust in ruined Sarajevo
42	<u>Muslim villagers</u> [have been] massacred . <u>UN peacekeepers</u> say
43	Gathering comforts for Bosnian women
44	<u>Heroism, human decency</u> shine through ethnic madness
45	For whom <u>the aid</u> flows (Bosnia)
46	<u>UN waffling</u> traps Canadian soldiers (Bosnia)
47	<u>Bosnia</u> wants <u>Canadians</u> ousted
48	<u>Canadian presence in Bosnia</u> queried : <u>mock execution</u> adds to unease
49	<u>Handling of Bosnia incident</u> defended : <u>Defence Minister</u> with flow of information on peacekeepers' mistreatment
50	All [is] quiet on the information front: <u>incidents in Bosnia and Somalia</u> have shown how hard it is for <u>Canadian politicians</u> to control the Defence Department
51	<u>G7</u> struggles with Bosnia question

52	<u>UN</u> has given up hope in Bosnia, <u>diplomats</u> say
----	--

1994	Headlines
1	<u>Bosnian factions</u> [are] turning on UN troops
2	<u>Canadians</u> may leave Bosnia: <u>public</u> [is] angry over Serbs terrorizing peacekeepers, <u>Chretien</u> says
3	[there is] No solo exit for Bosnia, <u>PM</u> hints : <u>major NATO players</u> look to spring review of troop commitments
4	<u>Canada</u> [has been] pressed to back air strikes: NATO has agreed to reinforce threat against Serbs, <u>Britain</u> says
5	Canada stands firm on Bosnia
6	<u>NATO threat</u> [has] not [been] taken seriously: <u>air strikes</u> appeal [is] unlikely (Bosnia)
7	<u>Yugoslav army units</u> [are] active in Bosnia
8	<u>Sarajevo attack</u> sparks anger: <u>pressure</u> [is] rising to reconsider air strikes against Bosnian Serbs
9	Stage [is] set for NATO ultimatum on Bosnia
10	<u>Canada</u> yields on Bosnia ultimatum
11	<u>Serbs</u> threaten aid workers: <u>Generals</u> rule out withdrawal , would use foreigners as "human shield"
12	<u>Serbs</u> pulling back big guns
13	<u>Serbs</u> agree to pull back guns by deadline
14	<u>NATO</u> withholds Sarajevo air strikes
15	<u>NATO</u> flexes muscles over Bosnia
16	<u>Threat of force</u> shifts the balance: <u>Washington and Moscow</u> have demonstrated

	<u>they may be the only credible players in resolving</u> the (Bosnian) conflict
17	<u>Canadian thrust</u> surprises Serbs: <u>troops</u> pull back after placing "ring of steel" around big guns
18	<u>UN show of force</u> in Bosnia collapses
19	<u>UN</u> says " <u>cleansing</u> " by Serbs killed 19
20	<u>Muslims</u> flee burning villages: <u>Serbs</u> breach Gorazde lines
21	<u>Serbs</u> propose wider truce: <u>General</u> denied Gorazde visit
22	<u>NATO</u> bombs Serb positions: <u>strike</u> near Gorazde is first ground attack in alliance's 44-year history
23	<u>NATO</u> strikes Serbs again
24	<u>Serbs</u> hold Canadians hostage
25	<u>Bosnia</u> gives West grim choice: <u>leaders</u> faced with abandoning people, principles or sending in troops
26	<u>West</u> wrings hands over Gorazde: <u>apparent lack of UN resolve</u> leaves "safe haven" at mercy of Serbs
27	<u>Serb forces</u> continue onslaught in Bosnia
28	<u>NATO</u> poised to act on Bosnia
29	<u>Ottawa</u> backs NATO air strikes
30	<u>NATO</u> delivers ultimatum to Serbs: <u>cease-fire agreement</u> for Gorazde reported after threat of air strikes
31	<u>Serbs</u> give up Gorazde attack: <u>UN</u> satisfied with pullout
32	<u>Bosnian foes</u> sign month-long truce
33	<u>Chretien</u> threatens to pull out of Bosnia: won't budge on embargo
34	<u>Russians</u> talk tough on Bosnia: <u>Serbs</u> told to give up conquered land. <u>US</u> warned on arms embargo

35	<u>Macedonia</u> reels under blockade: <u>Serbia</u> profits as <u>illicit trade</u> flourishes in Greek stranglehold
36	<u>Russia</u> pledges co-operation: <u>Yeltsin's</u> promises to G7 leaders focus on Bosnia and the Baltics
37	<u>Milosevic</u> threatens to curtail Serb aid
38	<u>Serb death camp</u> holds terrible secrets
39	<u>Guard</u> describes killings at camp (Pero Popovic)
40	<u>Noose</u> tightens on rebel Bosnian
41	<u>UN</u> extends air strike threat
42	<u>Canadians</u> make best of impossible task (Assignment Bosnia)
43	<u>NATO</u> ready to strike Serbs
44	<u>Iran</u> believed arming Bosnia: <u>NATO</u> allows suspected weapons flights to land on Croatian island
45	<u>Ottawa</u> may cut forces in Bosnia: <u>withdrawals</u> considered to free peacekeepers for new Haiti mission
46	<u>NATO jets</u> hit Serb-held airfield
47	<u>NATO jets</u> blast Serb positions
48	<u>Ottawa</u> urges neutrality in Bosnia
49	<u>Can't stop Serbs. West concedes: Bosnian war has been lost. US Defence Secretary suggests</u>
50	<u>US</u> angers Ottawa in Bosnia
51	<u>UN chief</u> threatens to quit Bosnia
52	<u>NATO</u> offering olive branch to Serbs

53	<u>Serbs</u> promise to free Canadians
54	<u>NATO, Bosnia</u> dominate summit (Conference on Security & Co-operation in Europe)
55	<u>US</u> offers (Bosnian) peacekeepers rescue
56	<u>Freed soldiers</u> [are] in high spirits : <u>55 Canadians</u> back in (Bosnian) camp
57	<u>Serb forces</u> closing in Gorazde safe haven: <u>Muslim troops</u> lose key positions

1995	Headlines
1	<u>Truce</u> boosts hopes in Bosnia: <u>shot Canadians</u> recuperating
2	<u>Van Doos suicide probe</u> ordered : <u>Collenette</u> sending two fresh battalions of famed regiment to Balkans next week
3	<u>Croatian soldiers</u> push into Serb zone: <u>122 peacekeepers</u> taken hostage
4	<u>Serbs</u> attack Sarajevo suburb: <u>mortars</u> hit supply tunnel
5	Shoot to kill , <u>UN</u> orders peacekeepers
6	<u>NATO strike</u> aimed at Serb headquarters: <u>casualties</u> reported in retaliatory shelling of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Muslim enclaves
7	<u>Serbs</u> seize UN observers: <u>Canadian and others</u> threatened with death if <u>NATO</u> resumes punitive air strikes
8	Free UN hostages, <u>Serbs</u> warned : behind facade of unity, <u>major powers</u> divided on how to cope with Bosnian crisis
9	<u>Serbs</u> capture more peacekeepers: <u>Bosnia's Foreign Minister</u> killed as <u>missile</u> brings down helicopter
10	<u>Serbs</u> offer international talks: <u>West</u> presses ahead with plans for tougher action on Bosnia (Includes map of UN hostage locations)
11	<u>Serbs</u> warn of hostage " slaughter ": any <u>attempt to rescue</u> UN peacekeepers would bring catastrophe , <u>Karadzic</u> says

12	Serbs shoot down US jet fighter: NATO launches search for pilot. <u>120 UN peacekeepers freed. more Canadians taken hostage</u>
13	Milosevic says hostages to go free: <u>captive peacekeepers being gathered for departure, sources</u> in Bosnian Serb's capital claims
14	<u>108 UN hostages freed</u> by Serbs: <u>14 peacekeepers still held</u> in Bosnia
15	<u>Canadian soldier released</u> by Serbs: <u>11 others still being held</u>
16	<u>Canadians still held</u> in Bosnia: <u>bulk of UN peacekeepers freed</u> by Serbs as <u>government troops mass</u> near Sarajevo
17	<u>G7 issues appeal</u> as Bosnian tensions <u>grow</u>: <u>leaders seek urgent return to negotiations</u> amid <u>reports of escalated fighting</u>
18	<u>Serbs free Canadian hostages</u>: <u>last peacekeepers released</u> as <u>UN caves in</u> to demands. <u>gives up</u> observation posts
19	<u>Diplomats try</u> for Bosnian peace: <u>France and Russia join in attempt to avert all-out war</u>
20	<u>Bosnia shows up</u> UN's weakness. <u>PM says</u>: <u>Chretien expresses serious doubts</u> about Canada's role in peacekeeping where <u>there is no peace</u>
21	<u>Serb tanks shell "safe area"</u>: <u>halt attack</u> on Srebrenica or <u>face strikes</u> by NATO jets. <u>UN warns</u>
22	<u>UN peacekeepers fire</u> on Serbs: <u>Dutch troops reject demand</u> that <u>everyone leave</u> Srebrenica enclave within 48 hours
23	<u>Refugees raped, killed</u>: driven from Srebrenica. <u>Muslims face harrowing journey</u>
24	<u>Europeans ponder</u> Bosnian withdrawal: <u>Chirac's talk of retaking</u> enclave <u>dismissed</u> as ploy to <u>appear resolute</u>
25	<u>Fight-or-flee choice faces</u> UN: <u>capture of Srebrenica "safe area"</u> by Serbs <u>seen as</u> turning point in Bosnian conflict
26	<u>Bosnian Serbs attack</u> second enclave: <u>Muslims in Zepa ordered to surrender</u> as <u>Chirac fails to win support</u> for military action

27	<u>Serbs poised to take Zepa</u> : <u>world weighs</u> use of force as <u>rebels vow to conquer</u> UN "safe zones"
28	<u>Serbs claim</u> second "safe area": <u>Bosnians deny</u> Zepa has fallen , say "fatally flawed" UN mission should end
29	<u>US says France backs</u> bomb plan: <u>West seeks</u> unity on Bosnia
30	<u>UN troops in Sarajevo get help</u> : <u>Britain, France dispatch</u> artillery units after <u>Serb forces kill</u> two peacekeepers
31	<u>US vote rejects</u> Bosnian embargo: <u>House delivers rebuke</u> to Clinton
32	<u>Croat blitz recaptures</u> Krajina: <u>UN officials accuse</u> Zagreb troops of using peacekeepers as human shields
33	<u>Ottawa hopes</u> for Bosnian accord: <u>agreement would bring</u> peacekeepers home in fall, while <u>government discusses</u> winter <u>pullout</u>
34	<u>Croatian victory shifts</u> military balance
35	<u>Milosevic, Yeltsin seek</u> peace policy: <u>Serbian President blasts</u> Karadzic
36	<u>Canada to bring</u> troops home early: <u>decision against redeploying</u> battalion to Bosnia could presage general withdrawal
37	<u>Refugee columns flood</u> Bosnia: <u>200,000 expected</u> after <u>Serbs routed</u>
38	<u>NATO bombs</u> Serb targets: <u>early-morning air-strikes retaliate</u> for mortar attack on Sarajevo
39	<u>Bombings brings</u> Serbs to table: <u>talks to discuss</u> division of Bosnia
40	<u>UN opens</u> supply link to Sarajevo: <u>Bosnian Serbs not consulted</u> on move, but told to comply with demands they lift siege
41	<u>Serb General defies</u> ultimatum: <u>UN considering</u> further strikes
42	<u>Pact gives</u> Serbs state within state: " <u>breakthrough-for-peace</u> " deal would divide Bosnia along ethnic lines, keep external borders intact
43	<u>Bombing prompts</u> Russian threats: <u>Yeltsin considers</u> violating treaties (in

	response to NATO's bombing on Bosnian Serb targets)
44	Serbs face NATO cruise missiles: <u>Canadian defence minister</u> defends first use of Tomahawks in Bosnian air campaign
45	Bosnian Serbs agree to move weapons: <u>NATO</u> suspends bombing campaign to allow withdrawal around Sarajevo
46	<u>NATO</u> extends deadline in Bosnia: 72 hours more for Serb pullback
47	<u>US flexes</u> superpower muscle: when <u>Clinton</u> made Bosnia a priority, <u>the elements of an enforceable peace proposal</u> began to snap into place
48	<u>US moves to rescue</u> peace talks: <u>two negotiators</u> fly to Sarajevo as <u>Bosnian government</u> threatens boycott
49	<u>Canadian troops</u> to leave Bosnia: <u>Balkan cease-fire, effective Tuesday</u> to be followed by peace talks October 25
50	"Cleansing" mars Bosnia truce: <u>NATO</u> moves toward "peace enforcement" as <u>60-day cease-fire</u> takes hold
51	<u>Bosnia forces</u> pitched to Congress: <u>Clinton plan</u> calls for 60,000 troops
52	<u>Canadian troops</u> to go back to Bosnia: <u>number [is]</u> an issue , <u>Ouellet</u> says
53	<u>Claes</u> resigns as NATO secretary-general: <u>alliance</u> left without chief executive to steer Bosnian peace-enforcement plan
54	<u>Jovial Clinton, Yeltsin</u> pledge to work for peace: <u>[there is]</u> no decision on Russians serving under NATO command
55	Killing fields of Srebrenica were wake up call to West: <u>Serbs' culpability</u> sure to surface at Bosnian peace talks
56	<u>Balkan leaders</u> [are] near peace agreement: <u>White House</u> expects accord today
57	<u>Treaty</u> ends bloody Balkan war: <u>Bosnia</u> will incorporate two republics under <u>plan</u> that leaves it divided, dissatisfied
58	<u>Going home</u> may be only a dream : <u>many Bosnians</u> face long wait

59	Back role in Bosnia. <u>Clinton</u> urges US: <u>president</u> says leadership [is] at stake in NATO bid to enforce Bosnian peace
60	<u>Canada wavers</u> on Bosnia troops: <u>cabinet</u> to discuss issue tomorrow after <u>Clinton</u> orders first 700 US soldiers sent
61	" <u>Moral obligation</u> " seen in Bosnia: <u>mission</u> risky . <u>Collenette</u> says
62	Smuggling scars Bosnia's neighbours: <u>corruption of officials</u> will affect Balkans long after <u>fighting</u> ends
63	<u>Canada</u> commits force of 1,000 to Bosnia mission: <u>better-equipped soldiers</u> won't stay more than year. <u>Collenette</u> promises
64	<u>Serb soldiers</u> face up to reality: <u>they can't win</u> , but will still fight
65	<u>Bosnian Serbs' leadership</u> proved own worst enemy : <u>wartime ineptitude</u> rules out organized resistance to peace. <u>insider</u> says
66	<u>Serb leaders</u> want more time : <u>NATO commander</u> indicates bid to delay power transfer may be granted
67	<u>Bosnian factions</u> meet deadline: <u>front-line zones</u> handed to NATO
68	Fall of Srebrenica may speed war's end: <u>collapse of UN effort</u> makes sacrifice of other enclaves likely

1996	Headlines
1	<u>Link to Bosnia</u> opens as bridge completed : <u>US equipment</u> rolls over Sava River
2	<u>Serbs</u> accused of trying to kill deal: <u>woman</u> dies in Sarajevo blast
3	<u>Bosnian Serbs</u> start washing hands clean: <u>NATO-led peacekeepers</u> see evidence of ethnic cleansing , but it's up to the UN to decide if <u>they</u> should uncover the truth
4	Bosnia war-crimes evidence [are] " overwhelming ," <u>envoy</u> says : mass murders killed 7,000 <u>human rights official</u> estimates

5	<u>Canada's Bosnian goal</u> is military : <u>war crimes</u> called civilian task
6	<u>Canada</u> casts Net for input on Haiti: <u>decision</u> looms on UN force
7	<u>Europeans</u> oppose arming of Muslims: <u>US plan</u> could renew Bosnian fighting
8	<u>Iran</u> training Bosnian army. <u>NATO</u> says
9	<u>NATO</u> to help unearth Bosnian graves
10	<u>Clinton</u> approved arms shipments from Iran to Bosnia. <u>report</u> says: <u>Dole</u> wants senate investigation to determine if <u>laws</u> were broken
11	<u>Karadzic</u> thumbs nose at bids to oust him: "the more you accuse him, the more popular <u>he</u> becomes ." <u>NATO</u> discovers
12	<u>Indicted war criminals</u> maintain power : <u>West</u> will probably agree to deal enabling Karadzic. Mladic to retain influence in Bosnia. <u>officials</u> say
13	<u>Bosnian recovery</u> [is] daunting task : <u>economy</u> depends on political stability
14	<u>Sarajevo's devastation</u> can't destroy some ties
15	[there is] No consensus in West on handling Karadzic: <u>US</u> fears <u>peace deal</u> could collapse
16	<u>Army</u> to probe conduct in Bosnia: <u>alcohol, sex incidents</u> cited
17	<u>Soldiers in Bosnia</u> accepted relationships with local women: <u>Bakovici veterans</u> fear <u>acts by a few</u> will ruin their record
18	<u>Tudjman</u> pressed to curb Mostar hard-liners: <u>failure of Croats</u> to honour election result and yield power could bring chaos to city
19	<u>Bosnian Croats deal</u> blow to peace plan: <u>refusal to accept</u> Mostar vote could lead to EU pullout
20	<u>Bosnian factions</u> [are] keeping weapons: <u>bulk of arms</u> [is] in Serb hands
21	Fighting endangers Bosnian elections: <u>US</u> pushing own agenda. <u>officials</u> say
22	<u>Tensions</u> high as <u>Bosnians</u> prepare to vote : <u>reconciliation</u> [is] low priority in nation torn by ethnic cleansing , civilian murders

23	<u>Germany expelling</u> 320,000: <u>Bosnian refugees</u> warned if " <u>they don't go</u> voluntarily, <u>they can be deported</u> "
24	<u>Abuses threaten</u> elections in Bosnia: <u>local votes</u> likely to be canceled
25	<u>Soldier sentenced</u> to prison by war-crimes tribunal: admits participating in Srebrenica massacre (Drazen Erdemovic)
26	<u>Protests challenge</u> Serbian president: <u>opposition plans</u> more marches (Slobodan Milosevic)
27	<u>Serbia retreats</u> on broadcast ban: <u>concessions</u> embolden protesters to keep up fight for democratic freedoms
28	<u>Serbian opposition dealt blow</u> : further massive protests break out as <u>court upholds scrapping</u> of vote results
29	<u>Milosevic shows</u> signs of feeling heat : aloof and <u>imperial leader</u> wrapped in chain-smoker's cloud of inscrutability
30	<u>Organizers of Serb protests</u> play to Western television: <u>students</u> hope to bring foreign pressure on Milosevic
31	<u>Serbian president to allow</u> review of election results: <u>concession</u> to protesters could lead to new vote
32	<u>Protests growing</u> against Milosevic: <u>braving threats</u> , 250,000 turn out
33	<u>Milosevic's camp holds</u> own rallies: <u>counter protests</u> staged to hit back at <u>Serbian opposition's mass</u> marches

1997	Headlines
1	<u>Serbs</u> hold up mail delivery
2	<u>Milosevic rejects</u> call to honour vote counts: <u>Serbian crisis</u> deepens as <u>opposition's hopes</u> dashed
3	<u>Milosevic dealt</u> series of setbacks: <u>army</u> refuses to intervene in protests
4	<u>Military braces</u> for more bad news: <u>reports [is]</u> due today on Bosnia incidents

5	<u>Tycoon [is] seeking to save Serbia: ex-Milosevic ally</u> has Canadian ties (Bogoljub Karic)
6	<u>Milosevic concedes</u> victories to foes: <u>continue protests, opposition</u> urges
7	<u>Serbian opposition</u> faces denuded cities: <u>mayors</u> tackle debt, empty treasures
8	Serb suspects caught off guard: <u>NATO troops</u> kill one, capture three near site of former Bosnian prison camp
9	<u>Bosnia concern overshadows</u> NATO advance: <u>admission of Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic</u> anticipated
10	<u>Canada</u> wins support for land-mine stand: <u>communiqué</u> reveals summit changes
11	<u>Ontario judges</u> speeds war-crimes arrests [Louise Arbour]
12	<u>Indicted Serb</u> buried as hero: <u>explosion</u> follows outside UN post [Simo Drljaca]
13	<u>Tribunal</u> gives Serb 20-year sentence: <u>war-crimes panel</u> focus of anger [Dusan Tadic]
14	<u>EU opening</u> door to east: <u>five ex-communist countries, plus Cyprus, to be recommended</u> for membership today
15	<u>Arrests</u> isolate Serb president [Biljana Plavsic]
16	<u>Karadzic supporters</u> expel president: <u>Plavsic</u> ousted from Bosnian party
17	<u>Karadzic</u> the fuse in Bosnian powder keg: <u>indicted Serb warlord</u> capable of blowing apart peace accord
18	<u>Tribunal</u> adopts get-tough strategy: <u>judge</u> accelerates war-crimes arrests [Louise Arbour]
19	<u>Karadzic</u> offered an out, <u>leader</u> says : <u>Bosnian Serb president</u> reveals <u>US</u> , gave suspect chance to avoid capture
20	<u>Bosnian Serbs</u> threaten NATO: <u>helicopters</u> trying to snatch Karadzic from stronghold would be shot down
21	<u>NATO</u> takes over police stations: <u>huge cache of arms</u> found as <u>West</u> throws

	weight behind Bosnian Serb president
22	<u>UN troops</u> tear-gas Bosnian Serbs: <u> mobs</u> smash peacekeeping vehicles in Karadzic's towns as <u>revolt</u> spreads
23	<u>Serbian election</u> flirts with paralysis: <u>Milosevic entrant</u> denied majority
24	<u>Troops</u> may stay in Haiti, Bosnia: "there's still a lot to be done"
25	<u>NATO</u> pulls plug on Serb television: <u>transmitters</u> seized in Bosnia
26	<u>Bosnia war-crimes suspects</u> nabbed : <u>Dutch marines</u> swoop down on two Croats linked to 1993 massacre

1998	Headlines
1	<u>West</u> urges action in Kosovo: <u>Milosevic</u> tells world to keep out
2	<u>West</u> slaps sanctions on Serbs: <u>autonomy sought</u> for Kosovo
3	<u>Serbs</u> defy sanction threat , <u>entrench police</u> in Kosovo
4	<u>Refugees</u> pour out of Kosovo villages
5	<u>A reign of terror</u> descends on Albanian villagers
6	<u>Warplanes</u> await NATO's call
7	<u>Serb cleansing</u> shatters Kosovo
8	<u>NATO</u> rehearses air raids on Kosovo: <u>Canadian planes</u> to join them later
9	<u>Milosevic</u> promises much, cedes little: <u>not one civilian</u> killed , <u>Serb</u> says
10	The slaughter in the mud of Kosovo: <u>bodies of 16 civilians</u> form a pathetic and awful scene in a province at war
11	<u>Yugoslav leader</u> gets ``final`` ultimatum: <u>air strikes</u> are imminent , <u>US</u> warns
12	<u>West</u> poised to attack as <u>talks</u> continue : <u>Milosevic</u> won't relent on Kosovo crackdown

13	<u>Suspense rises</u> in Kosovo crisis: <u>NATO approves air strikes</u> : <u>progress reported</u> in last-ditch talks with Milosevic
14	<u>West plans to keep heat</u> on wily Milosevic

1999	Headlines
1	<u>Defiant Serbs</u> bar war-crimes judge
2	<u>NATO issues</u> deadline on autonomy for Kosovo
3	<u>Kosovo talks</u> get reprieve : <u>Serbs, Albanians</u> warned that <u>NATO</u> wants results by end of week
4	<u>Milosevic</u> stands defiant against rising NATO pressure
5	<u>Albright laments</u> state of Kosovo peace talks
6	<u>Kosovo talks</u> produce only partial accord: <u>US</u> agrees to a three-week break in peace negotiations
7	<u>Kosovo</u> moves closer to the brink: <u>with peace talks faltering</u> . <u>Yugoslavia</u> prepares its troops for battle
8	<u>Serbs</u> scorn Kosovo peace pact
9	<u>Canadian</u> accused of Bosnian kidnapping : <u>police say</u> <u>Alberta man</u> joined Serb army and took UN hostages
10	Kosovo observers flee amid fears of Balkan war: `` <u>the threshold</u> <b>has already been crossed</b> .`` <u>Clinton</u> warns
11	<u>Milosevic</u> stands firm despite last-ditch pleas: <u>Kosovo talks</u> continue with US troubleshooter [Richard Holbrooke]
12	<u>NATO</u> orders air strikes as <u>Kosovo peace bid</u> fails
13	<u>Canadians</u> [are] in first wave of strikes on Serbia. <u>Canada's</u> role : it's the most aggressive action since Korea

14	<u>Canadians</u> in first wave of strikes on Serbia. Stepping into the Balkan mess a perilous precedent for NATO
15	<u>Canadians</u> in first wave of strikes on Serbia. The attack: meeting little resistance . <u>NATO unleashes</u> jets and missiles
16	<u>NATO hits</u> Serbs harder. Toronto protest turns ugly . The reaction: demonstrators start fire at US consulate
17	<u>NATO hits</u> Serbs harder. <u>Toronto protest turns ugly</u> . The attack: as bombs fall . <u>Yugoslavia hints</u> at truce
18	<u>Defiant Serbs</u> refuse to back down . The debate: <u>who gave</u> Canadians ``a licence to kill``?
19	<u>Defiant Serbs</u> refuse to back down . The conflict: <u>dogfight claims</u> two more MiGs
20	<u>Thousands flee</u> Serb brutality: <u>NATO's Solana warns</u> of humanitarian catastrophe. <u>plea</u> for ground troops made
21	<u>Russian PM flies</u> to Serbia on dramatic peace mission: <u>Primakov launches</u> personal bid to prevent massive ground war
22	<u>NATO escalates</u> bombing as <u>Russian peace bid fails</u> : <u>Canada sends</u> six more jets and adds \$10m in aid for refugees
23	<u>Pressure builds</u> for ground troops: <u>NATO admits</u> air attacks are falling short . <u>PM opens door</u> to sending Canadian soldiers
24	<u>Clinton outraged</u> as Serbs put captured soldiers on trial: `` <u>we have a long memory</u> ``. <u>NATO chief warns</u>
25	<u>Refugees told</u> : go or <u>we'll kill</u> you
26	<u>Missiles set</u> Belgrade burning : <u>strikes</u> destroy police, interior ministries: ``there are many, many victims``
27	<u>Canada offers</u> 5,000 exiles refuge
28	<u>NATO escalates</u> attacks: <u>US deploys</u> helicopter gunships, troops and missiles as <u>airlift set</u> for Kosovo refugees

29	``What world am I living in?`` : shattered <u>refugees</u> tell of murdered husbands, slaughtered sons
30	<u>Huge refugee airlift begins</u> : <u>Canada</u> prepares to welcome thousands from jammed, waste-filled camps
31	<u>Boy plays dead to escape</u> massacre: <u>his mother</u> was shot , <u>his sister</u> burned alive
32	<u>NATO rejects</u> Serb cease-fire, steps up air attacks : <u>Chretien</u> gathers cabinet for special meeting as <u>crisis</u> deepens
33	<u>Refugee airlift begins to crumble</u> : <u>some countries</u> scale back plans amid chaos in camps
34	<u>Cabinet hawkish</u> on ground troops: in a major policy shift, <u>Eggleton</u> says <u>Canada</u> wants <u>NATO</u> to consider sending soldiers
35	Ground-war tensions rise amid ``human shield`` fears: forced into the middle of battlefield
36	<u>Kosovo could ignite</u> world war, <u>Yeltsin</u> says : don't provoke a fight with Russia, <u>he</u> warns NATO
37	<u>Canada scraps</u> airlift after <u>refugees</u> reject offer, <u>Most in camps</u> prefer to stay near their homeland, <u>thousands</u> likely going to Albania
38	<u>Canadians</u> back bombing campaign [Poll]
39	<u>PM warns</u> of long air war: <u>Chretien</u> says <u>bombing</u> must continue , plays down idea of sending ground troops
40	<u>Serbs</u> accuse NATO of refugee ``massacre``: but <u>allies</u> deny accusation that <u>pilots</u> bombed civilian convoys
41	<u>NATO</u> admits bombing refugees
42	The eerie new Kosovo: <u>a beautiful land</u> has been emptied as <u>Serbs</u> dig in for war with NATO
43	<u>Tank mine</u> kills Kosovo refugees at border
44	<u>MP says</u> <u>covert Canadian unit</u> is operating in Balkans: <u>personnel</u> are on the ground in Kosovo, <u>Tory</u> says , <u>Ottawa</u> denies it

45	<u>Anti-west mood</u> grows in Russia: <u>Kosovo crisis</u> fuels pan-Slavic support
46	<u>Kosovo</u> turns doves into hawks: <u>a bombing campaign</u> that <u>Vanessa Redgrave</u> supports while <u>Henry Kissinger</u> has doubts? NATO's odd reaction
47	<u>Canada</u> sends troops to Balkans: <u>PM</u> says <u>they'll be peacekeepers</u> , but <u>critics</u> talk about combat role
48	<u>Rookie guerrillas</u> head off to Kosovo: a <u>Hamilton welder</u> and other expatriates eagerly <u>sign up to fight</u> the Serbs
49	<u>Refugee airlift to Canada</u> revived: <u>5000 from Kosovo</u> coming within days
50	<u>Kosovars</u> forced into slave labour, <u>refugees</u> say: <u>Serbs</u> described as preparing for possible ground war [Prizren]
51	<u>Peace bid</u> moves to Washington: <u>Russian envoy, Clinton</u> to discuss Kosovo day after <u>release</u> of captured US soldiers
52	<u>Russia and NATO</u> close in on Kosovo deal
53	Under fire in Serbia: `` <u>we are not animals</u> ``. <u>A journalist</u> ventures into Belgrade and <u>finds</u> its people struggling with tears, fears and frustration
54	<u>Hopes</u> rise for peace in Kosovo
55	<u>NATO bombs</u> Chinese embassy: <u>accidental Belgrade attack</u> could mean trouble for Kosovo peace bid
56	<u>Angry China</u> threatens to block Kosovo peace plan
57	<u>US</u> accuses Serbs of huge war crimes
58	<u>Arbour cleared to join</u> top court: <u>star candidate</u> can leave Kosovo war-crimes assignment, <u>sources</u> say
59	The hawk and the dove: <u>Kosovo strategy</u> splits political soul mates Blair and Schroeder
60	<u>Serbs</u> send new troops to Kosovo: <u>refugees</u> swarm into Macedonia, <u>NATO</u> steps up attacks on Yugoslav power grid

61	<u>Milosevic</u> pressed to make peace: <u>protests</u> against war spread to more towns
62	Closing in on Milosevic: <u>indictment of Yugoslav leader</u> could complicate peace process
63	<u>NATO</u> perceives Serbian softening: <u>crowded bridge</u> bombed as <u>diplomats</u> renew efforts
64	<u>Peace in Kosovo</u> is ``very close``
65	<u>Kosovo peace bid</u> gathers steam
66	<u>Pressure</u> rises on Milosevic to step aside: <u>Kosovo peace deal</u> could mean demise of Serb leader
67	<u>Kosovo peace talks</u> unravel : <u>Serb generals</u> abandon talks on withdrawal of forces
68	<u>World powers</u> [are] inch toward Kosovo deal
69	<u>Blueprint</u> established for Kosovo peace: Russia and the West strike ``breakthrough`` deal on how <u>the conflict</u> will end
70	<u>Canadian detectives</u> to join Kosovo probe: <u>homicide and other police experts</u> will be sent to help Arbour
71	<u>Stage</u> is set for end to 78-day Kosovo conflict
72	<u>A Serb soldier in Kosovo</u> is left angry and fearful
73	<u>Canadians</u> will help lead the way into Kosovo
74	<u>NATO</u> rolls into Kosovo, but <u>Russians</u> arrive first
75	<u>Serbs</u> make way for NATO: <u>Canadian forces</u> receive warm welcome as <u>huge military columns</u> sweep into Kosovo
76	<u>Gambit</u> pays off for Russia: <u>early move into Pristina</u> brings NATO concessions
77	<u>Life trickles back</u> to Kosovo: <u>refugees</u> come home . `` <u>My sons</u> <b>you're alive</b> ``
78	<u>Serbs</u> run for their lives: fearing reprisals, <u>thousands</u> flee Kosovo

79	<u>Kosovo's day of joy</u> has ugly finish: <u>ethnic Albanians</u> celebrate, then turn on panicked Serbs
80	<u>US</u> wanted to head off Russian drive into Kosovo
81	<u>NATO</u> missed warnings before <u>embassy bomb</u> blunder
82	<u>Canadians</u> try to stop urban mayhem in Kosovo: <u>violence in Pristina</u> tests NATO's ability to protect the population
83	<u>Kosovo body count</u> is 2,108 and rising
84	<u>Swelling Serb</u> protests test Milosevic's power
85	<u>Critics</u> blast army for tampering with files
86	Army knew about toxic peril in 1995: <u>document</u> revealed <u>Canadian troops'</u> exposure while serving in Croatia
87	<u>River</u> splits Kosovo city as <u>hatred</u> boils over [Mitrovica]
88	<u>Minister</u> was briefed in 1995 on soldiers' toxic risk
89	<u>Army health controversy</u> spreads to RCMP
90	<u>Whistle-blower</u> was court-martialled
91	<u>Poison mystery</u> heightens army furor: <u>investigators</u> say <u>toxins</u> may have been fed to ailing peacekeepers [Naphtha gas]
92	<u>Kosovo detectives</u> describe awful scenes: <u>Canadian investigators</u> uncovered atrocities [Vlastic]
93	`` <u>Pig Pen</u> `` and his soldiers just don't believe it
94	<u>How Bosnian tour</u> split forces couple from their child
95	<u>Scale of Kosovo atrocities</u> [is]a delicate topic
96	<u>Had to play down</u> medical risk: doctor

97	PM to pull troops out of Kosovo; with armed forces stretched to the limit. <u>Canada</u> will cut Balkans force by 1,000
98	<u>Baril</u> fears troop burnout: <u>general</u> says <u>Canada</u> would be hard-pressed to contribute more to Kosovo mission

Appendix II

Processes: action (material), relational, and mental

Balkan participants	Processes	Comment
Serbs	<u>attacked</u> Croats	action: tr
Serbs	<u>make up</u> about third of the population of Bosnia	relational
Serbs	<u>killed</u> more than 40 Bosnian refugees	action: tr
The Serbs	<u>are still on the airport</u>	relational
The Serbs	<u>are saying</u> what <u>is</u> basically correct	mental: verbal relational: attribution
The Serbs	<u>have not been able to leave</u> the airport	action: ntr
The Serbs	<u>have redeployed</u> artillery	action: tr
Serbs	<u>divvy up</u> the republic (refers to Bosnia)	action: tr
Serbs	<u>drive</u> Muslims	action: tr
The Serbs	<u>defy</u> international <u>pressure</u> to <u>pull back</u>	mental: reaction action: ntr
Serbs	<u>are</u> Moscow's traditional <u>ally</u>	relational
The Serbs	<u>are trying to broaden</u> corridor	action: tr
The Serbs	<u>must give up</u> much of the territory	action: tr
Serbs	<u>have long rejected</u> the peace plan	mental: reaction
The Serbs	<u>asked</u> Canadians	mental: verbal
The Serbs	<u>held</u> Canadians <u>responsible</u>	mental: cognition
The Serbs	<u>got drunk</u>	action: ntr
The Serbs	<u>sprayed</u> machine-gun fire and <u>captured</u> 11 men Canadian soldiers	action (2x): tr
The Serbs	<u>stood</u> them against a wall and <u>began shooting</u> into the wall over their heads captured UN soldiers	action (2x): tr
The Serbs	<u>are demanding</u> that Ukrainian troops <u>be sent</u> to Srebrenica	mental: verbal action: tr; passive

The Serbs	<u>prefer</u> Ukrainian peacekeepers	mental: reaction
The Serbs	<u>offered</u> cease-fire	mental: verbal
The Serbs	<u>pushed</u> closer to Gorazde	action: ntr
The Serbs	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
Serbs	<u>were attacking</u> government forces (refers to Bosnia)	action: tr
Serbs	<u>have recaptured</u> most of the land	action: tr
Serbs	<u>capture</u> more peacekeepers	action: tr
The Serbs	<u>retaliate seizing</u> UN troops	action: tr
Serbs	<u>dressed</u> as French soldiers and <u>captured</u> UN peacekeepers	action (2x); ntr: tr
Serbs	<u>forced</u> refugees <u>aboard</u> buses at gunpoint	action: tr (2x)
Serbs	<u>routed</u>	action: ntr
Serbs	<u>face</u> NATO cruise missiles	action: tr (NATO already started to bomb)
the Albanians	<u>were poking</u> the Serbs in the eye	action: tr
the Serbs	<u>have poked</u> the Albanians in both eyes	action: tr
Serbs	<u>gathered</u> at the bridge <u>had insisted</u> that anyone <u>could cross</u> "as long as they <u>lived</u> on this side"	action: ntr (3x) mental: verbal
The Serbs	<u>do not trust</u> the French troops	mental: reaction
"Serbs	<u>are primitives</u> "	relational: identification
600,000 Serbs	<u>live</u> in Croatia	action: ntr
One of the Serbs	<u>shot</u> a dog	action: tr
Four Serbs	<u>died</u> in the battle	action: ntr
Slavonia	<u>is populated</u> by ethnic Serbs	action: tr: passive
Christian Orthodox Serbs	<u>are faction</u> in Bosnia	relational: classification
NATO	<u>[is] ready to strike</u> rebel Serbs	action: tr
Serbs	<u>wanted to leave</u> Tuzla	mental: reaction action: ntr
Serb	<u>demand</u> s to <u>proceed</u> [convoy] without escort	mental: verbal action: ntr
The Serbs	<u>are intent on keeping</u> open "scorched-earth policy"	action: tr

The "ethnic cleansing" of Kosovo by Serbs	<u>has taken new direction</u> with refugees stories of systematic <u>deportation</u> reminiscent of Nazi Germany	action: ntr: tr
The house	<u>was burned</u> and then <u>bulldozed</u> by Serbs in an effort to <u>hide the crime</u>	action: tr: passive (3x)
Defiant Bosnian Serbs	<u>seized</u> more UN troops	action: tr
The Bosnian Serbs	<u>had correctly estimated</u>	mental: cognition
Bosnian Serbs	<u>shelled</u> Tuzla	action: tr
NATO	<u>captured</u> three Bosnian Serbs and <u>killed</u> one	action: tr (2x)
Bosnian Serbs	<u>responded to attacks</u>	action: tr
The Bosnian Serbs	<u>were certain to reject</u> peace plan	mental: reaction (2x)
The Bosnian Serbs	<u>have</u> Sarajevo under <u>siege</u>	relational: classification action: tr
Bosnian Serbs	<u>have detained</u> 370 peacekeepers	action: tr
Croatian Serbs	<u>feel betrayed</u> by Bosnian Serbs and Serbia	mental: reaction
Secessionist Serbs in Croatia	<u>shot down</u> a helicopter	action: tr
Mitrovica's Serbs	<u>are convinced</u> that the Albanians <u>are determined to drive them out.</u>	mental: reaction action: tr
Serbians	<u>feel</u> that they <u>are in fight</u> against NATO	mental: reaction relational: classification
"We	<u>are not animals"</u>	relational
The wounded man	<u>to be transported</u> to the hospital	action: tr: passive
The wounded man	<u>died</u>	action: ntr
they	<u>picked up</u> Canadians	action: tr
The captors	<u>raped and killed</u>	action: tr
they	<u>raped</u> the girls	action: tr
"he [gang leader]	<u>told me to go"</u>	mental: verbal action: ntr
"they	<u>undressed me to see</u> if I <u>had any money"</u>	action: tr mental: cognition relational: possession

The gang	<u>took</u> 1,000 German marks, identification documents and the keys of her car	action: tr
"They	<u>killed</u> my husband, and the brother of my husband"	action: tr
officers	<u>lined up</u> 6 ethnic Albanian men against a wall and <u>killed</u> them	action (2x): tr
They [officers]	<u>cut off</u> his hands afterwards	action: tr
Serb air space	<u>would be violated</u>	action: tr; passive
The <u>withdrawal</u> of the Serbs	<u>is the UN objective</u>	action: ntr relational: identification
The Serb-led Yugoslav army	<u>held</u> A. Izetbegovic	action: tr
Bosnian Serb <u>offer of</u> 24-hour safe passage for refugees	<u>have fallen through</u>	action: ntr (realizing mental)
Serbian convoy	<u>[had been] ambushed by</u> militia	action: tr; passive
the Yugoslav presidency	<u>compromises</u> only four pro-Serbian members	relational: attribution
Serbs " <u>cleansing</u> "	<u>shatters</u> Kosovo	action: tr (2x)
Serb " <u>ethnic cleansing</u> "	<u>shocked</u> the international community	action: tr mental: reaction
Serb <u>effort to "cleanse"</u> areas	<u>must be prevented</u>	action: (2x) tr; passive: modal
A Serb offensive in Bosnia	<u>is driving</u> Muslim refugees	action: tr
Serb offensive	<u>emptied</u> the enclaves	action: tr
The Bosnian Serb offensive	<u>killed</u> 35 people	action: tr
Four Serb planes	<u>were downed by</u> NATO	action: tr; passive
Serbian shells	<u>killed</u> 7 people and <u>wounded</u> 52	action: tr (2x)
Serb artillery	<u>shelled</u> the city	action: tr
NATO	<u>to silence</u> the Serb artillery batteries	action: tr
Serb armour	<u>attacked</u> Bihac	action: tr
A Bosnian Serb anti-aircraft missiles base	<u>was bombed by</u> NATO	action: tr; passive
Serb tanks and heavy machine guns	<u>opened up on</u> targets	action: tr
Muslims	<u>flee</u> Serb <u>attack</u>	action: tr; ntr

Nine-month Serbian <u>siege</u> of the city	<u>to be broken</u>	action: tr (2x); passive
Serb positions	<u>to be bombed</u>	action: tr; passive
Bosnian Serb forces	<u>have blocked</u> the highway	action: tr
Serb forces in Bosnia	<u>were locked</u> in a battle	action: tr; passive
Serb forces	<u>are not responsible</u>	relational
Serb forces	<u>overrun</u> Cerska	action: tr
Serb security forces	<u>began torching</u> village	action: tr
The Serb forces then	<u>set fire</u> to her home	action: tr
Serb forces	<u>besieged</u> Srebrenica	action: tr
Serbian forces	<u>have engaged</u> in systematic <u>massacres</u> , summary <u>executions</u> and other <u>atrocities</u>	action: tr (3x)
Serb forces	<u>staged a co-ordinate strike</u>	action: tr
Bosnian Serb forces	<u>overrun</u> government defences	action: tr
Serb forces	<u>have seized</u> most of Bosnia	action: tr
The Serb proposal	<u>has not been accepted</u> by Muslims	mental: reaction
Serb forces	<u>drove</u> thousands of Muslims	action: tr
the ugly but often repeated pattern of Serb military success	<u>is that they are followed</u> by systematic <u>terror</u> and <u>rape</u>	relational: classification (2x) (nominalized actions, 2x)
Serb <u>aggression</u>	<u>must be stopped</u>	action: tr; passive
The inquiry to Serb crimes which	<u>are committed</u> in Kosovo	action: tr; passive
ethnic Serb paramilitary group	<u>would be disbanded</u>	action: tr; modal : passive
Serbia irregulars	<u>has been supported</u> by the army	action: tr; passive
Serb secessionists	<u>are backed</u> [by Yugoslav army] and <u>seized</u> control of two-third of Bosnia	action: tr.; passive action: tr.
Serbian nationalists	<u>ousted</u> Panic	action: tr
The pro-Milosevic politicians, hard-line Serb nationalists all,	<u>dominate</u> the current parliament	action: tr
A growing rage of Serb nationalists	<u>helped</u> Milosevic	action: tr
Serb gunners	<u>opened fire</u>	action: tr

Drunken Bosnian Serb fighters	<u>terrorize</u> 11 captive UN soldiers	action: tr
The Bosnian Serb captors	<u>had made no demands</u> for their <u>release</u>	mental: verbal
Serb gunners	<u>hit</u> a NATO French plane and UN helicopter	action: tr
Serb gunners	<u>shelled</u> landing field	action: tr
A Bosnian Serb soldier	<u>was shot</u>	action: tr; passive
The soldiers	<u>started taking people off</u> the buses	action: tr
The Bosnian Serb rebels	<u>to pull</u> their artillery	action: tr
Angry Serb mobs	still <u>linger</u> on most corners	action: ntr
police	<u>had closed off</u> the area	action: tr
Serb police and soldiers. <u>backed</u> by paramilitary forces	<u>had emptied</u> whole neighbourhoods at gunpoint and <u>forced</u> tens of thousands people <u>to board</u> special train and <u>flee</u>	action (5x); tr; ntr
refugee	<u>described</u> the <u>arrival</u> of a gang of Serbian police, soldiers and paramilitary	mental nominalized action
20-30 Serb police officers	<u>turned up</u> at house	action: tr
After <u>separating</u> the men from the women the police	<u>took away</u> his brothers and <u>killed</u> them	action (3x); tr
Victims	<u>were shot to death</u> by Serbian police	action: tr; passive
Dren Caka, who <u>is 10-year old</u>	<u>waited</u> for Serb soldiers <u>to leave</u> ; his mother <u>was shot</u> ; his sister <u>burned alive</u>	relational: identification action: tr. (3x) (2x passive) action: ntr.
A few Serb men	<u>followed</u> her, <u>whistling</u> , <u>swearing</u> and <u>calling</u> her a "slut" and worse	action: tr. (4x)
Serb commanders	<u>have refused to allow</u> the UN <u>to relieve</u> Canadians in Srebrenica	mental: verbal causative
A Serbian general	<u>came</u> and <u>calmed down</u> his men	action: tr; ntr;
the Bosnian Serb supreme military command	<u>issued a statement</u>	mental realized through action: tr.
The Bosnian Serb military	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
Bosnian Serb troops	<u>had taken</u> several Dutch soldiers	action: tr

The Bosnian Serb army	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
Serb commanders	<u>called on</u> Muslims troops	mental: verbal
A former Serb police reservist and cafe owner	<u>is sentenced</u> to 20 years in prison for crimes against humanity by the UN war-crimes tribunal	action: tr.: realized through a mental verbalization
Police	<u>carry out terror campaign</u>	action: tr
Serbian police	<u>were almost blasé</u> in their continued <u>cleansing operations</u> against Kosovo's ethnic Albanians	relational: attribution nominalized actions
Police	<u>are adding</u> to the mayhem by <u>torching</u> haystacks	action: tr (2x)
Serbian leaders	<u>asked</u> the EC <u>to guarantee</u> a new cease-fire	mental: verbal (2x)
Some [police]	even <u>waved</u> to reporters as <u>wandered</u> around the deserted Albanian settlements, a Kalashnikov in one hand and a can of gasoline in the other.	action: tr: ntr (2x)
Bosnian Serb military commanders	<u>accused</u> Muslims	mental: verbal
The Serbs leadership	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
The Bosnian Serb leadership	<u>issued a statement</u>	mental: verbal, realized through action tr.
Serb leaders	<u>declare peace plan dead</u>	mental: verbal
A Croatian Serb soldier, Neno	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
Yugoslav officials	<u>confiscated</u> all documents from the <u>departing</u> Kosovo Albanians	action: (2x): tr: ntr
Refugees	<u>told</u> about Serb <u>onslaught</u>	mental: verbal nominalized action
The Yugoslav army <u>helped</u> the police	<u>repel</u> the first guerrilla <u>attack on</u> an urban area	action: tr (3x)
Serbia's liberal opposition	<u>lost elections</u>	action: tr
Serbia	<u>is becoming a safe haven</u> for indicted war-criminals	relational: classification
The Yugoslav and Macedonian foreign ministers	<u>met</u>	action: tr

The atrocities	<u>were rooted</u> in "ethnic cleansing" perpetrated in the name of a Greater Serbia	relational: location nominalized action
Exhausted and disillusioned Serb refugees	<u>trekked</u> into Bosnia	action: ntr
40,000 refugees	<u>are expected</u>	action: tr: passive
The exodus of Serbs from Croatia	<u>affected</u> ethnic Croats in Banjaluka	action: tr
Knin, the heart of Croatia's Serb rebellion	<u>was attacked</u>	action: tr: passive
The Serb refugees	<u>head</u> toward Serb-led Yugoslavia	action: ntr
Bogoljub Karic, accordion-player-billionaire and now Serbian presidential candidate-in-waiting	<u>sees</u> much <u>to admire</u> in Canada	mental: cognition mental: reaction
Ex- Milosevic ally	<u>has</u> Canadian ties	relational
Serbia's richest tycoon, 43-year-old industrialist Bogoljub Karic	<u>wants to save</u> Serbia	mental: reaction action: tr.
He [Mr. Karic] and his four siblings	<u>are landed immigrants</u>	relational: identification
Mr. Karic	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
Mr. Karic	<u>wants</u> Serbia <u>to resemble</u> Canada	mental: reaction action: tr.
It	<u>is not only</u> link between Mr. Karic and Mr. Milosevic, his former Communist Party comrade	relational
Former Yugoslav prime minister Milan Panic	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
Goran Svilanovic, head of the Civic Alliance of Serbia	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
Dozens of people in Belgrade	<u>gather</u> each night <u>to sing</u> Serbian nationalist songs and <u>dare</u> NATO <u>to bomb</u> them	action, ntr action: tr (3x)
Vidosava Paunovic	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
B. Kostic, vice-president of presidency	<u>is a</u> Serbia ally	relational: identification

Serbia, a republic of almost 10 million people	<u>has sunk deep into economic crisis</u>	action: ntr (realizing relational: attribution)
The workers from the Serbian mining town Bor	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
Mr. Draskovic, opposition leader	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
Patriarch Pavle of the Serbian Orthodox Church	<u>was at the rally</u>	relational: location
Crown prince Alexander Karadjordjevic	<u>was at the rally</u>	relational: location
Protesters	<u>demanding resignation of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic</u>	mental: verbal nominalized action
Mr. Milosevic, 50, a nationalist and former Communist	<u>has ignored pressure to quit</u>	mental: reaction nominalized action action: ntr
Mr. Milosevic and his government	<u>are accused of leading Serbia into isolation and wars</u>	mental: verbal: passive action: tr
Mr. Milosevic's former Communists and right-wing allies	<u>united to oust Mr. Panic</u>	action: tr (2x)
Mr. Milosevic	<u>is not longer ally of the Pale Serbs</u>	relational: identification
Milosevic, aloof and imperial leader	<u>shows signs of feeling heat</u>	mental: reaction (2x)
Serbia's authoritarian leader	<u>is feeling the pressure</u>	mental: reaction nominalized action
Mr. Milosevic	<u>rules his people in aloof and imperial manner</u>	action: tr
He [Milosevic]	<u>is chain smoking</u>	action: ntr
He [Milosevic]	<u>is the last Communist-era leader in Europe</u>	relational: identification
People cannot agree whether he [Milosevic]	<u>is a true Marxist believer or merely a shrewd dictator</u>	relational: classification
He [Milosevic]	<u>is an absolutist</u>	relational: classification
Mirjana Markovic	<u>is even more hard-line in her Marxist views than her husband [Milosevic]</u>	relational: attribution
He [Milosevic]	<u>still believe in Titoist kind of Marxism-Leninism</u>	mental: reaction
Mr. Milosevic	<u>resisted any reform of</u>	action: tr

	Serbia's <u>state-dominated</u> economy	nominalized action (2x)
Mira Markovic, Milosevic's wife, nicknamed Red Witch	<u>published</u> two books of memoirs	action; tr
Mr. Milosevic	<u>must learn</u> that 'we <u>need</u> a <u>solution</u> where he <u>will stop</u> the <u>murder</u> , the <u>cleansing</u> , the <u>rape</u> and <u>destruction</u> of a whole people in Kosovo.'	mental: cognition; modal; action; tr; modal (2x) nominalized action (4x)
He [Milosevic]	<u>had firm control</u> of the army, the police and the influential state information media	action; tr
Mr. Milosevic	<u>must explain</u> to 11 million Serbs why he <u>led</u> them into a losing battle	mental: verbal; modal action; tr
Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Radical party and their brutal militia	<u>told/accused/claimed</u>	mental: verbal (3x)
Serbia	<u>remains the last socialist enclave in Europe</u>	relational: identification
"Milosevic	<u>must be driven</u> from power," the U.S. senator <u>said</u>	action; tr; modal mental: verbal
The commander of the <u>besieging</u> forces around Sarajevo General Dragomir Milosevic	<u>said</u>	action; tr mental: verbal
General Milan Gvero, deputy commander of the Bosnian Serb army	<u>was quoted</u>	mental: verbal; passive
Bosnian Serb commander, general Ratko Mladic	<u>signed a cease-fire with</u> Croat general	action; tr
It	<u>showed</u> uselessness of personal guaranties of Mr. Karadzic and his military commander Ratko Mladic	mental: cognition
The office of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic	<u>issued statement</u>	mental: verbal, realized through action
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic	<u>proclaimed the death</u> of an international peace plan	mental: verbal
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal

Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic	<u>warned</u> of hostage ' <u>slaughter</u> '	mental: verbal nominalized action
Heading the list [of war-crimes suspects]	<u>are former</u> Bosnian Serbian president Radovan Karadzic, twice <u>indicted</u> , and his former army chief Ratko Mladic	relational: identification nominalized action
War-crime suspect Radovan Karadzic	<u>control</u> TV	action: tr
Mr. Drljaca	<u>drew</u> a pistol and <u>shot</u> and <u>wounded</u> one of NATO soldiers	action (3x): tr
Simo Drljaca, a former police chief and a fanatical Serb nationalist, who <u>ran</u> the notorious Omarska camp	<u>was primary target</u>	action: tr relational: attribution
Mr. Drljaca	<u>was killed</u>	action: tr; passive
Mr. Tadic	<u>was portrayed</u> in his trial as fervent Serb nationalist, who in 1992 <u>helped round up</u> his former Muslim neighbours and <u>helped torture, rape and kill</u> them.	mental: verbal; passive action (4x): tr
"You [Tadic]	<u>embraced</u> the extremist principles of Serbian nationalism, <u>using</u> knives, weapons, iron bars, the butt of a pistol, sticks, by <u>kicking</u> the victims and by <u>tightening</u> a noose around the neck of one of them. Why?" <u>asked</u> U.S. judge Gabrielle MacDonald	mental: reaction mental: verbal action: tr (3x)
Mr. Tadic	<u>offered no answer</u> , he <u>smiled</u> and <u>waved</u> at a couple of friends in the crowded gallery.	mental: verbal, realized through action: action, ntr; tr
A ten-year term	<u>was handed</u> to Drazen Erdemovic, a Croat serving with Bosnian Serb forces who <u>participated</u> in a 1995 Bosnian Serb <u>massacre</u> of	action, tr; passive action: tr nominalized action

	unarmed Muslims in Srebrenica.	
Mr. Drljaca	<u>was described</u> as "one of the most notorious police officials in the whole former Yugoslavia"	mental: verbal: passive
Tadic atrocities	<u>could not be shared</u> with neighbouring Serbia, because the Yugoslav army <u>departed</u> by the time Mr. Tadic <u>committed</u> his crimes.	action: tr: modal action: ntr action: tr
Dusan Tadic, 41	<u>was convicted</u> of 31 charges <u>alleging the torture and killing</u> of Muslim civilians in three notorious Serbian detention camps	action, tr: passive nominalized action (3x)
Mr. Tadic, who <u>denied</u> all.	<u>was not convicted</u> on any of the nine <u>murder counts</u> ; <u>rape charges</u> against him also <u>failed</u> after witnesses <u>failed to testify</u> , evidently from fear.	mental: verbal action: tr: passive action: tr (2x) nominalized action (2x)
Milan Kovacevic, the director of Prijedor's hospital	<u>was arrested</u>	action: tr: passive
An anesthetist, Mr. Kovacevic	<u>was born</u> in a Croatian concentration camp during the Second World War, a breeding ground for his virulent Serb nationalism.	action: ntr:
Yugoslav troops	<u>battle</u> Slovenian secessionists	action: tr
His [Janez Jansa] troops	<u>had shot down</u> at least 6 federal army helicopters	action: tr
Helicopters	<u>had been shot down</u> by Slovenian forces	action: tr: passive
The defence units	also <u>seized</u> 15 Yugoslav army tanks	action: tr
Slovene soldiers	<u>manned</u> antitank guns on a main street, <u>hampering</u>	action: tr (2x)

	bread delivery	
Slovenian forces	also <u>killed</u> a YU army officer	action: tr
Slovenian territorial forces	have blockaded federal barracks	action: tr
Slovenian militiamen	<u>retook</u> a border post. <u>killing</u> the federal unit's commander	action: tr (2x)
"Our country boys	<u>are usually drunk</u> .	relational: attribution
but they	<u>fought</u> with them and they still <u>won</u> ."	action (2x): tr
Marija Zver	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
Slovenian defence minister Janez Jansa	<u>suggested</u>	mental: verbal
Slovenian officials	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
Slovenian officials	<u>reported</u> about total of 20 wounded	mental: verbal
Slovenian defence minister Janez Jansa	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
He [Janez Jansa]	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
Slovenia's information minister Jelko Kacin	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
In an emotional statement the Slovenian President Milan Kucan	<u>called</u> the federal army action "an <u>aggression</u> against the sovereignty of the country" and an " <u>attempt at permanent occupation</u> " of Slovenia	mental: verbal nominalized action (2x)
He [M. Kucan]	<u>called on</u> Slovenes <u>to defend</u> their fatherland and <u>urged</u> young people serving in YU army <u>to desert</u>	mental: verbal (2x) action: tr; ntr (2x)
Mr. Kucan	<u>said</u> the army <u>occupied</u> the whole region	mental: verbal action: tr
He [Kucan]	<u>appealed</u> for help	mental: verbal
State army of Slovenia	<u>would be disbanded</u>	action: tr; modal
The Slovene presidency	<u>calls on</u> all citizens, officers and soldiers <u>to resist</u> this <u>aggression</u> against their own people	mental: verbal action: tr nominalized action

Slovenia	<u>announced secession</u>	mental: verbal nominalized action
Slovenia	<u>has been far more aggressive</u> than Croatia	relational: attribution
Slovenia	<u>went ahead with planned declaration of independence</u>	action: ntr mental: verbal
Slovenia	<u>declared independence</u>	mental: verbal
Slovenia	<u>is at war</u>	relational: identification
Other Slovenian sources	<u>reported only 6 deaths</u>	mental: verbal
He [federal prime minister]	<u>offered to meet</u> his Slovenian counterpart Lojze Peterle	mental: verbal action: tr
Mr. Kucan	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
The defiant republic	<u>boycotted meeting</u> of YU presidency	action: tr
Ljubljana, Slovenian capital.	<u>appeared under virtual siege</u>	relational: attribution
The army	<u>has been unable to dislodge</u> Slovenian territorial forces from most of the border posts	action: tr
they	<u>control</u>	action: tr
Militias	<u>ambush</u> Serbian convoy	action: tr
Militia fighters	<u>attacked the departing</u> convoy	action: tr; ntr
Muslim and Croat fighters	<u>trapped</u> half of the trucks and <u>commandeered</u> some of them	action (2x): tr
UN Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali	<u>has blamed</u> Bosnia-Herzegovina government troops for <u>initiating attacks</u>	mental: verbal action: tr
In Sarajevo, where 380,000 people <u>are suffering</u> , the city's defenders	<u>were massing thousands of troops</u>	mental: reaction action: tr
the Muslim defenders	<u>seem to be holding</u>	action: tr
Outgunned Muslim forces	<u>fought</u> Serbs and Croats	action: tr
"Muslim criminals, who	<u>committed</u> genocide against the Serb population"	action: tr
The Muslims	<u>have launched</u> a offensive	action: tr
A renegade Bosnian army commander, who <u>has been accused of running</u> a crime gang,	<u>surrendered</u> to Muslim-led government troops	action: tr (3x)

Ramiz Delalic, commander of the army's Ninth Brigade and better known as Celo.	<u>gave himself up to</u> government troops	action: tr
Pro-Celo gunmen	<u>were still resisting</u>	action: tr
A sniper from the Bosnian army, which is <u>entirely Muslim</u> in region.	<u>shot and wounded</u> a Bosnian Serb soldier	relational: classification action, tr. (2x)
Muslim troops	<u>loose</u> key positions	action: tr
Muslim troops	<u>retreated</u> from their positions	action: ntr
Bosnia's government forces and Serbs	<u>battled</u> over posts <u>abandoned</u> by <u>besieged</u> UN troops	action: tr (3x)
Bosnian government forces	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
they	<u>had added</u> another key town	action: tr
The Bosnian army	<u>appealed</u> to Serbs <u>to welcome</u> <u>approaching</u> Muslim forces as "liberators from fascism"	mental: verbal (2x) action: tr
Bosnian foreign minister Mohammed Sacirbej	<u>said</u> his country <u>may arrange to receive</u> humanitarian aid directly from any country	mental: verbal action: tr; modal
Mr. Silajdzic	<u>demanding</u> immediate air <u>strikes</u>	mental: verbal nominalized action
Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic	<u>accused</u> Serbs of <u>using</u> tanks in an assault	mental: verbal action: tr
Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
Bosnian leaders	<u>accuses</u> world of <u>avoiding</u> action	mental: verbal action: tr
Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic	<u>accused</u> the UN of <u>refusing to blame</u> Serb forces	mental: verbal (2x)
Kemal Muftic, an aide to Bosnia's Muslim President Alija Izetbegovic	<u>said</u> : "We <u>don't have</u> a chance."	mental: verbal relational: attribution
Muslims	<u>expressed</u> doubts	mental: verbal
The commander of Bosnian government forces	<u>charged</u> that Gen. Morillon <u>was duped</u> by Serbs	mental: verbal action: tr; passive
Bosnian forces	<u>surrounded</u> federal army compound	action: tr
Sefer Halilovic	<u>criticized</u> the UN	mental: verbal

	commander for <u>making an "illegal tour"</u> of Muslim areas	action: tr
Bosnian vice-president Ejup Ganic	<u>said</u> the West <u>must promise to intervene</u>	mental: verbal (2x) action: tr
Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic	<u>said</u> that	mental: verbal
his government	<u>would use</u> "political or military means" <u>to end</u> Sarajevo's <u>siege</u>	action: tr; modal (3x)
"I <u>am being held</u> prisoner." he [Mr. Izetbegovic]	<u>said</u>	action: tr; passive mental: verbal
Enisa Sehovic, who <u>spent</u> the night in the basement of her apartment building.	<u>said</u>	action: ntr mental: verbal
President Alija Izetbegovic, a Muslim.	<u>was held</u> for 24 hours	action: tr; passive
YU army	<u>freed</u> Bosnia's President Alija Izetbegovic	action: tr
Mr. Izetbegovic	<u>arrived</u> at the Bosnian presidency building	action: ntr
The army <u>accused</u>	Mr. Izetbegovic and two other members of Bosnia's collective presidency of <u>planning</u> the ambush	mental: verbal action: tr
Protected pockets around cities such as Sarajevo, where there	<u>are large concentrations</u> of Muslim	relational: identification
and where the Muslim-led government of President Alija Izetbegovic	<u>is still in control</u>	action: tr
The Muslim Slavs	<u>have nowhere to go</u>	action: ntr
Mr. Izetbegovic's democratically elected government	<u>wants intervention</u>	mental action: tr
Most of population	<u>don't want to flee</u> and	mental action: ntr
they	<u>will fight to prevent</u> Serb ethnic <u>cleansing</u>	action: tr; modal
The Muslim faction	<u>was not party to the cease-fire agreement</u>	relational: identification
In Canada more than 1,500 Muslims	<u>demonstrated</u> in Montreal and Toronto <u>in support of</u>	action: tr

	Muslims in Bosnia	
Bosnia's Croat and Muslims	<u>have signed the plan</u>	action: tr
The Muslims	<u>believe</u> the current peace <u>plan is dead</u>	mental relational: identification
Bosnia	<u>renewed pleas</u> for military <u>intervention</u>	mental: verbal nominalized action
Bosnia	<u>had right to defend</u> itself	relational action: tr
Tens of thousands of civilians in Gorazde	<u>have nowhere to go</u>	action: ntr
Muslims	<u>face harrowing journey</u>	action: tr
Sarajevo	<u>was battered</u> by federal forces	action: tr; passive
At least 350 people <u>died</u> in <u>fighting</u> since Muslim Slavs and Croats	<u>voted to split</u> from Yugoslavia	action: ntr (2x); tr (2x)
the international community	<u>is considering the creation</u> of havens for the two million Muslim Slavs in Bosnia	mental: cognition nominalized action
Safe regions	<u>would act</u> as magnets for <u>besieged</u> Muslims in Serb-held areas	action: tr; modal
Muslim havens in Bosnia	<u>would run the risk of being</u> <u>long-lasting evidence</u> of unresolved problem	action: tr; modal relational
Gen. Morillon	<u>visited</u> zones still under Muslim <u>control</u>	action: tr (2x)
Sarajevo attack	<u>sparks anger</u>	causative
Gen. Morillon	<u>found no indication of</u> <u>massacres of fleeing</u> Muslims, nor of 20,000 Muslims <u>caught</u> in the open in bitter temperatures.	mental: cognition action: tr; ntr (3x)
Bosnia's foreign minister Irfan Ljubijankic	<u>had been killed</u> by defiant Serbs	action: tr; passive
Serb forces	<u>drove</u> thousands of Muslims	action: tr
Refugees and aid workers	<u>spoke</u> of harrowing journey, women <u>carrying</u> babies and	mental: verbal action: tr; ntr (4x)

	the <u>walking wounded</u> <u>limping</u> kilometers to the safety of government territory	
Tearful women and children	<u>spoke</u> of panic and terror among thousands refugees	mental: verbal
Zula Hasanovic	<u>said...</u> "we <u>know</u> they <u>raped</u> girls"	mental: verbal mental: cognition (2x): action: tr
The exodus from Srebrenica	<u>represents</u> one of the largest single <u>movement</u> of people in the three-year old Bosnian war	relational: identification nominalized action
Refugees	<u>report</u> <u>rape</u> , <u>killing</u>	mental: verbal nominalized action (2x)
refuges	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
the captors	<u>raped</u> and <u>killed</u> in one of the biggest "ethnic <u>cleansing</u> " of Bosnia war	action: tr (3x)
Hundreds of wounded Muslims, along with several thousands elderly and infirm and mothers with children	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
they	<u>wanted to be taken</u> to safety, aid officials <u>said</u>	mental: reaction action: tr
at least 200 severely wounded people	<u>required</u> an urgent <u>evacuation</u>	mental: reaction mental: verbal nominalized action
the UN	<u>tried to airlift</u> injured civilians and children from the besieged Muslim enclave of Srebrenica	action: tr
An <u>estimated</u> 60,000 people	<u>are surrounded</u> in the Srebrenica enclave	action: tr; passive
Croat forces	<u>stepped up attacks</u> on Muslim forces from the city and <u>forcibly removed</u> Muslim civilians	action (2x): tr

In Srebrenica tens of thousands of refugees	<u>are on the brink of starvation</u>	relational action
Croat forces	<u>were still holding about 1,300 Muslim civilians</u>	action: tr
The corpses of three women	<u>were seen</u>	mental: cognition: passive
One's woman throat	<u>had been slit</u>	action: tr: passive
Survivors	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
80 Muslims	<u>had been massacred by masked Croat troops</u>	action: tr: passive
Muslim village of Stupni Do	<u>were destroyed</u>	action: tr: passive
About 260 Muslims	<u>lived in Stupni Do before attack</u>	action: ntr: tr
Survivors	have told reporters horrific tales of Croat soldiers <u>raping</u> Muslim women and <u>throwing</u> dead bodies into <u>burning</u> houses	mental: verbal action: tr (3x)
In the market in Sarajevo shell	<u>killed 68 people and wounded 197</u>	action (2x): tr
5000 non-Serbs	<u>died in camp</u>	action: ntr:
Muslims	<u>flee Serb attack</u>	action: ntr: tr
a Serb offensive	<u>is driving</u> thousands of Muslim refugees into the already <u>besieged</u> enclave of Srebrenica	action: tr
This swath of territory (Serb-seized)	<u>has largely been cleared of</u> Muslims and Croats	action: tr: passive
more than 40 Bosnian refugees, mostly women and children	<u>were killed</u> by Serbs	action: tr: passive
as they	<u>tried to flee</u> to safety in Croatia.	action: ntr
The <u>siege</u> of Muslim enclaves		nominalized action
The Muslim <u>capture</u> of Kopjari		nominalized action

Those who <u>did not flee</u>	<u>have either been besieged in towns such as Gorazde and Sarajevo, or are being terrorized in cities such as Banja Luka</u>	action: ntr: tr: passive (2x)
The <u>torture and killing</u> of Muslim civilians		nominalized action
The <u>cutting of throat</u> of two Muslim policemen		nominalized action
Massacre of <u>unarmed</u> Muslims in Srebrenica		nominalized action
Renegade Muslim forces and Serbs	<u>were attacking</u> government soldiers	action: tr
Rebel Muslim forces and Serb armour	<u>attacked</u> government forces in Bihac	action: tr
Determination of Serbs and Muslims loyal to warlord Fikret Abdic	<u>to cripple the government army, which defeated Mr. Abdic in August</u>	action: tr (2x)
Mr. Abdic	<u>is trying to recapture the northern town of Velika Kladusa, his headquarter until defeat</u>	action: tr (2x)
Abdic forces	<u>appeared to have the upper hand</u>	mental/action
Ethnic Albanian refugees	<u>flee burning villages</u>	action: ntr
Bewildered refugees	<u>took shelter</u> from searing summer heat	action: ntr
Mostly men [Albanians]	<u>formed a pathetic queue</u> at a sandbagged police checkpoint	action: tr
where they	<u>reregistered before being allowed into town</u>	action: (2x) tr: passive
the legs and spinal column of a man, the headless body of a woman	<u>lay</u>	action: ntr
The frightened refugees	<u>took shelter watched by</u> security forces and their dogs	action: tr mental: perception
The site above Orahovac	<u>was evidence of the brutality of the offensive:</u>	relational

22-year-old Leonore Lutolli	<u>said</u> : “ <u>It is like genocide. I thought that Hitler’s time was returning and we were going in some kind of Aushwitz</u> ”	mental (2x) relational action: ntr (2x)
“ <u>We are the same as Jews.</u> ” a professor from Pristina	<u>said</u>	relational: attribution mental: verbal
More than 10,000 refugees	<u>arrived</u> at the Macedonian border	action: ntr
The refugees	<u>were forced</u> out of their homes	action: tr: passive
“ <u>I saw a man in Pristina who they shot.</u> ” Enver Doda	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal (2x) action: tr
Mr. Doda, a well-dressed 26-year-old sound technician for a radio station	<u>said</u> that for Serbs people like him <u>are subhuman</u>	mental: verbal relational: identification
One elderly man	<u>arrived</u> at the border dead. in the arms of his wife;	action: ntr
he	<u>had died</u> of a heart attack after <u>seeing</u> his son <u>beaten</u> by Serbs	action: ntr; tr: passive mental: perception
A boy of about eight, dressed in a ripped and filthy jacket,	<u>became distraught</u> after <u>being separated</u> from his family	mental action: tr: passive
<u>Shattered</u> refugees	<u>tell</u> of <u>murdered</u> husbands, <u>slaughtered</u> sons	mental: verbal action: tr (3x)
Flanked by her two sons, a young woman, Irijana Zhubi, 31,	<u>told</u> reporters:	mental: verbal
“they	<u>killed</u> my husband and the brother of my husband”	action: tr
her 14-year-old niece	<u>was burned to death</u>	action: tr: passive
His 41-year-old son Zhafer	<u>saw</u> four of his brothers <u>slaughtered</u>	mental: perception action: tr
Mr. Popoj, a tall man who <u>uses</u> a walking stick,	<u>was tearful but calm as told</u> hoe a dozen of Serbs in police uniforms <u>arrived</u> in village	action: tr; ntr mental: verbal relational: attribution
Milan Bellanica’s story	<u>was backed</u> by video	action: tr: passive
Mr. Bellanica	<u>was hiding</u> in the wood	action: ntr

Ethnic Albanian women and children with multiple shrapnel wounds	<u>lay</u> two or three to a bed	action: ntr
80-year-old Mal Boni	<u>lay</u> motionless and <u>dying</u>	action: ntr (2x)
between 60 and 100 people	<u>were killed</u> in the <u>bombing</u>	action: tr; passive (2x)
Survivors	<u>could not say</u> with certainty whether the aircraft <u>were Serbian</u> or NATO planes that somehow <u>bombed</u> a civilian target	mental: verbal; modal relational: identification action: tr
Dren Caka, who <u>is 10-years-old</u>	<u>lay</u> on the floor <u>shot</u> in the shoulder, <u>pretending</u> he <u>was dead</u> :	relational: identification action: ntr; tr; passive mental: cognition relational: classification
he	<u>waited</u> as his mother and his sister <u>were shot</u> and 16 other people <u>were killed</u> ; his two-year-old sister <u>cried</u> and <u>begged</u> him for help – she <u>was burned alive</u> ; he <u>waited</u> for Serb soldiers to leave;	action: ntr (2x) action: tr; passive (3x) mental: verbal
[Canadian] <u>offer</u> for shelter	<u>had been rejected</u> by most refugees from Kosovo	mental: verbal (2x)
More than a million of ethnic Albanians	<u>were forced to leave</u> their homes, NATO <u>estimated</u>	causative action: tr; passive mental: cognition
Kosovo body count	<u>is 2,108 and rising</u>	relational (2x)
Canadian forensic team in the small village in Kosovo	<u>found</u> 4 bodies, among them – a two-year old child in his dead mother's arms	action: tr
13 members of a Kosovo Albanian family	<u>were shot to death</u>	action: tr; passive
105-year-old man	<u>was killed</u> by someone who <u>shot</u> him in the leg four or five times	action: tr; passive
Fatmira Berisha, a slim woman	<u>walked</u> bravely across the Ibar bridge	action: ntr
The 19-year old Albanian university student	politely <u>refused</u> the <u>offer</u> for an <u>escort</u> by French soldiers	mental: verbal (2x) action: tr
refugees	<u>continued to flood</u> into Albania	action: ntr

The number of Kosovo Albanians	<u>slaughtered</u> by Serbs during the <u>killing rampage runs</u> into thousands	action: tr (3x)
She [F. Berisha]	<u>walked</u> forward toward the apartment where her mother <u>was holed up</u> , alone, among the last one Albanians who <u>remain</u> on the Serb side of the Ibar	action: ntr (2x) relational
A tearful Hajrije Maskutaj	<u>described arrival</u> of Serb forces	mental: verbal action: ntr
The 26-year-old mother of an eight-month-old boy	<u>recounted</u>	mental: verbal
Muslim tekke, whose senior cleric	<u>was killed</u> , allegedly by a sniper	action: tr: passive
A journalist at the Pristina daily Bujku	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
Albanians	<u>recount</u> Nazi-like <u>ordeal</u>	mental: verbal nominalized action
Albanians	<u>reported</u> heavy <u>attacks</u> against villages	mental: verbal nominalized action
Ethnic Albanian refugees	<u>reported</u> [atrocities]	mental: verbal
Pockets of Kosovo Liberation Army guerrillas	<u>sat</u> in the woods above, sometimes <u>daring to come down at night</u> , braving <u>sniper fire to rescue</u> some of the animals	action: ntr: tr
The Serbs	<u>contented</u> that	mental: verbal
guerrillas	<u>had fired</u>	action: tr
The Albanians	<u>are reluctant to begin</u> any <u>talks</u> with Belgrade as long as the violence <u>continue</u>	relational: classification mental: verbal action: tr
Ahmed Beka, a locksmith now <u>living</u> in an abandoned Serb house,	<u>said</u> : "Serbs <u>are primitives</u> "	action: ntr mental: verbal relational: identification
A pair of Kosovo Liberation Army fighters	<u>differed</u> over whether there <u>was any future</u> for Kosovo's Serbs	mental: verbal relational: classification
KLA leader Hashim Thaci	<u>appealed</u> for calm and <u>said</u> : "Serbs <u>have right to live here</u> "	mental: verbal (2x) action: ntr
There	<u>is growing support</u> for Kosovo separatists among	relational

	Macedonia's large Albanian minority	
Croatian president Franjo Tudjman	pledged that	mental: verbal
his [Tudjman's] republic	<u>would defend its bid for independence</u>	action; tr: modal
Mr. Tudjman	<u>is in difficult position</u>	relational
Mr. Tudjman	<u>was summoned to Washington</u>	action; tr: passive
Muslim and Croat officials	<u>agreed to merge the structures of their two states</u>	mental: verbal action; tr
The authorities of Croatia	<u>will respond with dignity and in a civilized manner to any political or military attack on Croatia</u>	mental: verbal nominalized action
Croatian television	<u>showed federal armoured vehicles rolling through the city of Osijek, forcing residents to flee</u>	mental: perception action; ntr: (2x) tr
In Croatia government and local news media	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
a police chief, deputy major and city councilman	<u>were shot dead in one town</u>	action; tr: passive
The Croatian chairman of federal presidency	<u>urged conscripts to desert and "take the side of the people"</u>	mental: verbal action; tr (2x)
Croatian and federal army officials	<u>confirmed fierce clashes</u>	mental: verbal nominalized action
Croatian defence ministry	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
The head of Yugoslavia's moribund presidency Stipe Mesic, a Croatian	<u>called for soldiers to desert</u>	mental: verbal action; ntr
Prime Minister Ante Markovic, a Croat and leader of federal government	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
Mr. Mesic	<u>begged "all soldiers to refrain from mutual shooting, all pilots to stop air attacks, all sailors to return to ports"</u>	mental: verbal action; tr (3x)
"Croatia	<u>can live without me, but Croatia will live with me in</u>	action; tr; ntr: modal (4x)

	its <u>fight for liberation</u> .”	
he [Mr. Tudjman]	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
Croats	<u>put the blame</u> for the war on Serbian <u>expansionism</u>	mental: reaction action: tr
The HDZ [Croatian Democrat Community]	<u>doesn't accept the results</u> of election	mental: reaction
Many residents of Zagreb	<u>went to shelters</u>	action: ntr
“A barbarian <u>attacked</u> a symbol of Croatian power.” Mr. Tudjman, shaken	<u>said</u>	action: tr mental: verbal
YU forces	<u>attacked</u> the heart of Croatian capital	action: tr
“Croatia	<u>is independent from today</u> .”	relational: identification
Mr. Tudjman	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal
Croatia	<u>has already lost</u> one-third of its territory	action: tr
Exodus of Serbs from Croatia	<u>affected</u> ethnic Croats living in Banja Luka	action: tr
Roman Catholic Bishop Franjo Komarica	<u>said</u> that	mental: verbal
Ethnic Croats	<u>had been evicted</u> from their homes and unknown number of them <u>were moving</u> to Croatia	action: tr; passive (2x); ntr
Hard-line Croats	<u>yield</u> power in the divided Bosnian city of Mostar	action: tr
Croatian president Tudjman [is <u>pressed</u> by EC]	<u>to force</u> his Bosnian lieutenants <u>to accept</u> the result of election	action: tr; passive
A coalition of nationalist politicians and organized crime bosses	<u>are fighting</u> to prevent the <u>forming</u> of joint Muslim-Croat institutions	action: tr (2x)
They [nationalists and crime bosses]	<u>have carved</u> “ethnically pure” enclave for themselves	action: tr
The Croatian Democratic community, which <u>represents</u> more than 90 per cent of Bosnian Croats	<u>boycotted</u> the first session	relational: attribution mental: reaction
Most Croats in western Mostar	<u>want nothing to do</u> with their Muslim neighbours	mental: reaction
Hard-line Croats	<u>set fire</u> to houses that the	action: tr (2x)

	<u>Muslims were rebuilding</u>	
Although Herzeg-Bosna	<u>no longer officially exists</u> , it <u>has all the trappings</u> of the country: flags, ministers, officials	relational
Mostar and its Croat-dominated hinterland	<u>are home to prosperity</u> not <u>found elsewhere</u> in Bosnia	relational
Western Mostar	<u>is capital</u> of Herzeg-Bosna, name <u>given</u> to all Croat-held lands in Bosnia	relational
As in Croatia, much of the symbols of Herzeg-Bosna	<u>was last seen</u> during the Fascist Ustashe state <u>founded</u> in 1941 –	mental: cognition action: tr
the regime that	<u>was responsible</u> for the death of tens of thousands of Serbs and Jews	relational: classification
The red-and-white checkered Croat emblem, which <u>was banned</u> in Tito's Yugoslavia,	<u>is in almost every</u> bar, restaurant and filling station and some military parades <u>end</u> with the Fascist-era call to arms	relational action: ntr; tr; passive
In Mostar's Croat hinterland, laws and customs	still <u>encourage</u> "ethnic purity"	action: tr
Recently completed church in Grude	<u>has been decorated</u> by murals <u>depicting</u> the Croat <u>struggle</u> for nationhood; in one	action: tr; passive
Croatian militia force	<u>fights off</u> the enemy	action: tr
In another, an old couple	<u>flee</u> their burning village, apparent victim of "ethnic <u>cleansing</u> "	action: ntr nominalized action
Organized crime	<u>has flourished</u> in Croat-held Herzeg-Bosna	action: ntr
The power behind the Herzeg-Bosna	<u>is Mate Boban</u> , a hard-liner who <u>led the struggle</u> for Bosnian Croat statehood through the war years	relational action: tr
He [Boban]	<u>runs a network</u> of organized crime and nationalist politicians through his	action: tr

	underling Mladen Neletic	
He [Neletic]	<u>made his reputation</u> as the leader of the self-styled brigade that <u>fought</u> Muslims	action: tr (2x)
He [Neletic]	<u>pranced</u> on the front lines and <u>distributed</u> the spoils of "ethnic cleansing"	action: tr
Three officials	<u>were reported shot to death</u> in one town and other <u>shooting incidents were reported</u>	mental: verbal action: tr: passive
Croatia's Stipe Mesic	<u>took over</u> federal presidency	action: tr
Croatia	<u>announced its secession</u>	mental: verbal
Croatian forces	<u>were pushed back</u> by a Yugoslav trust	action: tr: passive
The republic's militia	<u>had thwarted</u> the army's <u>attack</u>	action: tr
military garrisons	<u>had been besieged</u> by Croatian militia	action: tr: passive
Muslim villagers	<u>had been massacred</u> by masked Croats	action: tr: passive
UN access to the village	<u>was blocked</u> by Croat military officials	action: tr: passive
Croat forces	<u>had used time to destroy</u> evidence	action: tr
Ivica Rajic, a senior commander of Croat troops in central Bosnia	<u>denied</u> reports of massacre and <u>said</u>	mental: verbal (2x)
Croat soldiers	<u>acted to blunt a planned Muslim attack</u>	action: tr
"We	<u>had quite a few casualties</u> on our side," he <u>said</u>	relational mental: verbal
"People who <u>know how to fight</u>	<u>faced up to</u> them [Muslims]"; he <u>said</u>	mental: cognition action: tr
The Croat <u>attack</u> on Stupni Do	<u>came in retaliation</u> for the Muslim <u>capture</u> of a nearby Croat village	action: tr
Bosnian Croat forces	<u>had also sacked</u> the Muslim hamlet of Datanska	action: tr
Croatia	<u>is ethnically mixed</u> republic	relational: identification

Historic tensions between the two ethnic groups [Serbs and Croats]	<u>have worsened</u> with the Croatian breakaway	action; ntr
Ethnic violence in Croatia, which <u>joined</u> Slovenia in <u>declaring independence</u>	<u>was reported</u>	action; ntr mental: verbal
Croatia's offensive to <u>regain</u> Serb-held land	<u>forced</u> Serbs to <u>flee</u>	action; tr; ntr
Yugoslav federal troops	<u>battled</u> Slovenian secessionists	action; tr
the federal army	<u>dropped</u> leaflets <u>warning</u>	action; tr mental: verbal
all resistance	will be crushed	action; tr; modal
five federal army soldiers	<u>were killed</u> in Slovenia <u>fighting</u>	action; tr; passive
All killed	<u>were crew members</u> of two military helicopters <u>shot down</u> by Slovenian forces	relational: identification action; tr; passive
11 members of the federal forces	<u>had been injured</u>	action; tr; passive
Countless street barricades of trucks and buses	<u>blocked</u> the army's tanks, but	action; tr;
they	<u>met little resistance</u>	action; tr
as they	<u>advanced</u> toward Slovenia's borders with Austria, Italy and Hungary.	action; ntr
The army general	was dismissed	action; tr; passive
the army	<u>has been unable to dislodge</u> Slovenian territorial forces from most of the border posts	action; tr
Slovenian territorial forces	<u>have blockaded</u> federal barracks, <u>keeping</u> them out of food and <u>preventing</u> troops from <u>returning</u> to their bases	action; tr (4x)

Federal troops	<u>have been active</u> mainly in Slovenia	action: ntr
The army	<u>had 700 tanks</u> and other armoured vehicles in the Serbian-Croatian border region.	relational: possession
a major army <u>operation</u>	<u>was under way</u> in Slavonia, an area of the breakaway republic <u>populated</u> largely by ethnic Serbs and the scene of fierce <u>clashes</u> in recent weeks.	action: ntr: tr
gunboats of the Yugoslav navy	<u>continued to blockade</u> Croatian ports	action: tr
the harbour	<u>was being bombed</u> by naval gunfire	action: tr: passive
The Yugoslav air force	attacked the heart of the Croatian capital	action: tr
the army thrust in support of Serbian irregulars	<u>could seize control</u> of Croatia's eastern region.	action: tr: modal
Yugoslav assault	<u>pushes Croats back</u>	action: tr
A defence minister statement	<u>said</u> no unit of the Yugoslav's People Army <u>had been issued order to attack</u> Zagreb	mental: verbal action: tr (2x)
Yugoslavia's defense minister, Veljko Kadijevic	<u>had ignored</u> his [Mr. Mesic] plea	mental: reaction
<u>It is plea</u>	<u>unlikely to be heard</u> by Yugoslavia's army, with its Serbian-dominated officer corps and a largely conscripted rank and file.	relational: classification: mental: passive
the objective of the armoured thrust, <u>involving</u> more than 100 tanks.	<u>was to free</u> military garrisons, <u>besieged</u> by Croatian militia.	relational action: tr: passive
Federal army officials	<u>freed</u> Bosnia's President yesterday <u>in exchange</u> for 500 soldiers' <u>safe passage</u> from the capital	action: tr (3x)
President Alija Izetbegovic, a Muslim.	<u>was held</u> by the Serb-led Yugoslav military	action: tr: passive

Muslim and Croat fighters	<u>trapped</u> half of the trucks and apparently and <u>commandeered</u> some of them	action: tr (2x)
militia fighters	<u>attacked</u> <u>departing</u> convoy	action: tr; ntr
some soldiers	<u>had been stripped</u> and <u>killed</u> .	action: tr; passive
two army colonels	<u>were among those killed</u>	action: tr; passive
Sarajevo	<u>was battered</u> by federal artillery after	action: tr; passive
Bosnian forces	<u>surrounded</u> federal army compounds.	action: tr
gunfire from the federal army	<u>killed</u> the EC Belgian observer	action: tr
the collective presidency	<u>ordered</u> Slovenia to <u>free</u> <u>captured</u> federal soldiers, <u>restore power</u> and water services to their bases and <u>allow</u> soldiers pinned down in the field <u>to return</u> to their barracks	mental: verbal action: tr (4x); ntr
The presidency statement also	<u>demand</u>	mental: verbal
The federal government	<u>sent</u> tanks into Croatia	action: tr
Federal government tanks	<u>sliced</u> through roadblocks <u>erected</u> by secessionists	action: (2x) tr; passive
Federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic	<u>proposed</u>	mental: verbal
A <u>statement issued</u> by the Yugoslav presidency, now <u>compromising</u> only four pro-Serbian members and top army officers.	<u>said</u>	mental: verbal. (2x) realized through action relational: identification
the head of Yugoslavia's moribund presidency, Stipe Mesic, a Croatian,	<u>called</u> a hastily arranged news conference	mental: verbal

Prime Minister Ante Markovic, a Croat and leader of the Yugoslav federal government.	<u>told</u> his office	mental: verbal
Admiral Stane Brovet	<u>told</u>	mental: verbal
Federal defence minister Veljko Kadijevic	<u>had secret trip</u> to Moscow	action: ntr

Non-Balkan participants	Processes	Comment
Angry China	<u>threatens to block</u> Kosovo peace plan	mental: verbal action: tr
NATO air strike	<u>must stop</u>	action: ntr: modal
Infuriated by <u>the bombing</u> of its embassy China	<u>announced</u>	nominalized action:tr mental: verbal
it	<u>will block plan</u>	action: tr: modal
until NATO	<u>calls a halt</u> to its air <u>strikes</u>	mental: verbal action: tr: nominalized action
Russian envoy	<u>postponed a trip</u> to Washington and <u>flew</u> to Beijing	action: tr: ntr:
War-planes	<u>will not stop pounding</u> targets	action: tr: modal
We	<u>will continue</u> campaign	action: tr: modal
We	<u>will not suspend</u> campaign	action: tr: modal
A B-2 bomber <u>carrying</u> satellite-guided bombs	<u>badly damaged</u> the embassy <u>killing</u> three Chinese journalists	action (3x): tr
NATO	<u>steps up attacks</u>	action: tr nominalized action
The Western allies	<u>launched increased waves</u> of strike aircraft to <u>attack</u> Serb forces	action: tr nominalized action
<u>explosions</u>	<u>hit</u> Pristhina	nominalized action action: tr
Apartment blocks	<u>were hit</u> <u>killing</u> and <u>wounding</u> a number of people	action (3x): tr: passive

Tim Khelly	<u>was gathering evidence of the "cleansing" of Kosovo</u>	action: tr nominalized action
The French medical charity	<u>set up 20 tents to provide first aid</u>	action (2x): tr
Three captured U.S. soldiers	<u>appeared</u> on Serbian TV	action: ntr

Americans	<u>should be patient</u>	relational: classification modal
The NATO campaign	<u>would achieve the goal</u>	action: tr: modal
We	<u>cannot do everything in the world but we must do what we can</u>	action (3x): tr: modal
The UN mission	<u>ended last month</u>	action: ntr
350 members U.S. unit	<u>stayed on to prepare for a peacekeeping force in Kosovo</u>	action: ntr: tr
The West	<u>tried the same strategy with Saddam Hussein isolating his regime</u>	action (2x): tr
France	<u>has also sent 150 soldiers</u>	action: tr
Investigators	<u>have dug up bodies</u>	action: tr
The NATO	<u>exaggerated numbers to justify bombing</u>	action: tr mental: verbal
investigators	<u>has found bodies</u>	action: tr
investigators	<u>believe</u>	mental: cognition
[investigators]	<u>performed autopsies</u>	action: tr
U.S.	<u>deploys helicopters</u>	action: tr
Canada	<u>offers exiles refugees</u>	action: tr
We [Canada]	<u>want to provide relief</u>	mental: reaction action: tr
Officials	<u>went</u>	action: ntr
NATO <u>attacks</u>	<u>hit unspecified target</u>	nominalized action: action: tr
NATO raids	<u>damaged the bridge</u>	action: tr
NATO missiles	<u>hit an oil refinery</u>	action: tr
monitors	<u>were shadowed by Serb thugs</u>	action: tr: passive
The UN, Red Cross	<u>began delivering the food</u>	action: tr
they	<u>hope</u>	mental
they	<u>will prevent humanitarian catastrophe</u>	action: tr: modal
German TV	<u>filmed officers</u>	action: tr
UN officials	<u>expressed fears</u>	mental: reaction
NATO	<u>bombs Chinese embassy</u>	action: tr
accidental Belgrade attack	<u>could mean trouble for Kosovo peace</u>	mental: reaction: modal
airlift	<u>[had been] set for Kosovo refuge</u>	action: tr: passive

NATO	<u>rejects</u> Serb cease-fire	mental
NATO	<u>orders air strikes</u>	action: tr
NATO	<u>issues deadline</u> on autonomy for Kosovo	mental: verbal
West	<u>slaps sanctions</u> on Serbs	action: tr
West	<u>urges action</u> in Kosovo:	mental: reaction nominalized action
NATO	<u>pulls plug</u> on Serb television: transmitters <u>seized</u> in Bosnia	action: tr action: tr; passive
NATO	<u>takes over</u> police stations	action: tr
West	<u>throws weight</u> behind Bosnian Serb president	action: tr
NATO troops	<u>kill</u> one [war crimes suspect], <u>capture</u> three near site of former Bosnian prison camp	action: (2x) tr
US	<u>moves to rescue</u> peace talks	action: tr
NATO	<u>bombs</u> Serb targets	action: tr
NATO	<u>[is] offering</u> olive branch to Serbs	action: tr
NATO jets	<u>blast</u> Serb positions	action: tr
NATO jets	<u>hit</u> Serb-held airfield	action: tr
NATO	<u>delivers ultimatum</u> to Serbs	mental: verbal
Canadians	<u>hit</u> in Bosnia	action: tr; passive
Canadians	<u>[had been] told to enter</u> town (Srebrenica)	mental: verbal; passive action: ntr
Canadians: drunken Bosnian	<u>endure mock execution</u>	action: tr
Serb fighters	<u>terrorize</u> 11 captive UN soldiers	action: tr
last peacekeepers	<u>released</u>	action: tr; passive

UN	<u>gives up</u> observation posts	action: tr
Canada	<u>prepares to welcome</u> thousands from jammed. waste-filled camps	action: ntr realizing mental
Canadians	still <u>held</u> in Bosnia	action: tr; passive
Canadian soldier	<u>released by</u> Serbs	action: tr; passive
11 others	still <u>being held</u>	action: tr; passive
Canadian and others	<u>threatened with death</u>	action: tr; passive
if NATO	<u>resumes</u> punitive air strikes	action: tr; nominalized action
Canadians	<u>[are]</u> in first wave of strikes on Serbia.	relational: locative nominalized action: tr
Canada's role	<u>[is]</u> the most aggressive action since Korea	relational: classification nominalized action
Canada	<u>sends</u> six more jets	action: tr
and	<u>adds</u> \$10m in aid for refugees	action: tr
Canadians	<u>back bombing campaign</u>	mental: reaction nominalized action
Canadian detectives	<u>to join</u> Kosovo team	action: ntr
Canadian forces	<u>receive</u> warm welcome	action: transitive; realizing mental: reaction
as huge military columns	<u>sweep</u> into Kosovo	action: ntr
Kosovo detectives:	<u>describe</u> awful scenes	mental: verbal
Canadian investigators	<u>uncovered</u> atrocities	action: tr
Canadians	<u>will help lead the way</u> into Kosovo	action: tr; modal
Canadians	<u>[had been]</u> prevented of entering Bosnia	action: tr; passive
Canada	<u>[had been]</u> pressed to back air strikes	action: tr; realizing mental; passive nominalized action
They	<u>are the first NATO personnel to be taken</u> prisoners	relational: classification action: tr; passive
Canada Whether the soldiers NATO	<u>[is]</u> loading aid plane with blankets	action: tr

Government money	<u>is going to UN. Red Cross to help refugees</u>	action: tr: (2x)
The Pentagon	<u>was investigating</u>	action: tr
Whether the soldiers	<u>had blundered across the boarder</u>	action: ntr
NATO	<u>would continue to carry the mission</u>	action: tr: modal
[international participants]	<u>said</u>	mental (144x)
[international participants]	<u>warned</u>	mental (5x)
[international participants]	<u>told</u>	mental (7x)
[international participants]	<u>suggested</u>	mental (4x)
[international participants]	<u>reported</u>	mental (3x)
[international participants]	<u>threatened</u>	mental (2x)
[international participants]	<u>stressed</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>questioned</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>asked</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>urged</u>	mental (2x)
[international participants]	<u>vowed</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>insisted</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>denounced</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>instructed</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>speculate</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>estimated</u>	mental (2x)
[international participants]	<u>called on</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>confirmed</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>noted</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>made remarks</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>expressed fears</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>held secretive talks</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>believe</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>can never forget</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>have a long memory</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>hope</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>announced</u>	mental

[international participants]	<u>have seen</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>don't like</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>get the feeling</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>recognize</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>reacted</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>discussed</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>create</u> [conditions for peace talks]	mental
[international participants]	<u>agreed</u>	mental (3x)
[international participants]	<u>accepted</u>	mental
[international participants]	<u>rejected</u> [proposal]	mental
[international participants]	<u>condemned</u>	mental (3x)

Appendix III

Voices – Balkan participants

Voices/Sources – Balkan participants		
Slovenes		
Who	Verb	Quotation
Slovenian defense minister Janez Jansa	said	direct
He [J. Jansa]	said	
He [J. Jansa]	said	
Mr. Jansa	said	
Slovenian defense minister Janez Jansa	suggested	
One officials [Slovenian]	spoke	
Other Slovenian sources	reported	
Slovenia's information minister Jelko Kacin	told	direct
The Slovenian President Milan Kucan	called	direct
He [M. Kucan]	called on	
Mr. Kucan	said	
He [M. Kucan]	appeals	
Mr. Kucan	said	direct
Slovenian President Milan Kucan	said	
Marija Zver	said	direct
Croats (Croatia)		
Who	Verb	Quotation
Government and local media [in Croatia]	said	
Croatian President Franjo Tudjman	pledged	direct
The interior ministry*	reported	
Croatian television	showed	
Croatian officials	confirmed	
Croatian defence sources	said	
Mr. Tudjman	said	direct

Yugoslavs/Croats		
Who	Verb	Quotation
Prime Minister Ante Markovic, a Croat and leader of the Yugoslav federal government	said	
Mr. Markovic	blamed	
He [A. Markovic]	said	
Stipe Mesic, a Croatian, the head of Yugoslavia's moribund presidency	call	direct
Mr. Mesic	begged	direct
Mr. Mesic	said	
Yugoslavs		
Who	Verb	Quotation
Admiral Stane Brovet, the federal deputy minister	said	
The federal army	denied	
The official Tanjug news agency	said	
The army	said	
A defence ministry statement	said	
The presidency statement	demanded	
In Belgrade a military spokesman	said	
Federal army officials	confirmed	
Military sources	were reported to have said	
Branko Kostic, vice-president of the federal presidency and a Serbian ally	told	
Tanjug	said	
The Tanjug news agency	said	
An army statement released in Belgrade	said	
Tanjug quoted Mr. Kostic	as saying	direct

Bosnian Muslims/Bosniaks		
Who	Verb	Quotation
Mr. Izetbegovic	accused	direct
Mr. Izetbegovic	said	direct
Enisa Schovic [Sarajevo's citizen]	said	direct
Survivors who managed to reach Muslim-held territory	told	
Bosnian state radio	said	
The Bosnian commander	said	direct
The commander of Bosnian government forces	said	
Mr. Halilovic	told	direct
Sefer Halilovic (by Bosnian radio)	was quoted as criticizing	
Kemal Muftic, an aide to Bosnia's Muslim President Alija Izetbegovic	said	direct
Mr. Muftic	said	direct
Bosnian vice-president Ejup Ganic	said	
Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic	said	
Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic	accused and pleaded	
Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic	said	direct
Mr. Silajdzic	said	direct
Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic	said	direct
Mr. Silajdzic	demanded	direct
Refugees [from Srebrenica]	said	
refugees	described	
Tearful women and children	spoke	
Mirama Mujcic	said	direct
Zula Hasanovic	said	direct
Bosnian foreign minister Muhamed Sacirbej	said	direct
Bosnian government forces	said	
The Bosnian army	appealed	

Bosnian Croats		
Who	Verb	Quotation
Ivica Rajic, a senior commander of Croat troops in central Bosnia	denied	direct
He [I. Rajic]	said	
Bosnian Serbs		
Who	Verb	Quotation
Bosnian Serb military command	accused	
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic	said and accused	
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic	said	direct
Bosnian Serbs	said	
The Belgrade-based news agency Tanjug	reported	
The Serbs leadership	said	
The Bosnian Serbs	said	
General Milan Gvero (by the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA)	was quoted as saying	
A statement from the command of the Herzegovina corps	said	direct
The Bosnian Serb military	said	
The Serbs	said	
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic	warned	
He [R. Karadzic]	said	direct
Mr. Karadzic	said	direct
Mr. Karadzic	said	direct
Bosnian Serb commander General Ratko Mladic reportedly	said	
The commander of the besieging forces around Sarajevo, general Dragomir Milosevic	said	direct
Bosnian Serb media	said	

Bosnian Serb leader Biljana Plavsic	said	direct
Croatian Serbs		
Who	Verb	Quotation
A Croatian Serb soldier who identified himself only as Neno	said	direct
Serbs (Serbia and Montenegro)		
Who	Verb	Quotation
Belgrade radio	said	
Ognjen Pribicevic, a research fellow at Belgrade University	said	direct
Radomir Diklic, director of the independent BETA news agency	said	direct
Milan Protic, director of the Centre for Serbian studies	said	direct
Ljubomir Madzar, an economist at Belgrade University	said	direct
Mr. Mitrovic	said	direct
Bogoljub Karic	said/vowed	direct
Vojislav Seselj	told	
Vuk Draskovic	said	direct
Vojislav Seselj	said	direct
Workers from the town Bor	said	direct
Milan Milutinovic	was quoted as saying	
Other analysts	said	
Kosovo Albanians/Kosovars		
Who	Verb	Quotation
A journalist at the Pristina's daily Bujku	said	direct
Refugees from Kosovo	tell	
Ethnic-Albanian refugees	reported	
A tearful Hajrije Maksuraj	described	direct
22 year-old Leonore Lutoli	said	direct
A professor from Pristina	said	direct
Enver Doda	said	direct

A young woman. Irijana Zhubi	spoke	direct
Zhafer Bobi	said	direct
Mr. Popoj	said	direct
Dr. Flori Bakalli	said	
Refugee Emun Mujaremi	said	direct
Mr. Krasniqui	said	direct
Victims	recounted	direct
Refugees	said	
Survivors	spoke	

Appendix IV

Voices – non-Balkan participants

Voices- non-Balkan participants		
Canada		
Who	Verb	Quotation
Canada's External minister	said	direct
Canadian officials	insisted	
Defence Minister David Collenette	said	direct
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andre Quellet	said	direct
Mr. Collonette	said	
Mr. Collenette	noted	
Mr. Quellett	said	direct
Foreign Minister Andre Quellett	said	direct
Foreign Minister Andre Quellet	said	direct
Canadian ambassador to the U.S. John de Chastelain	said	direct
Mr. Chastellain	said	direct
Bloc Leader Lucien Bouchard	said	
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney	told	
Prime Minister Jean Chretien	said	
Prime Minister Jean Chretien	was promising	direct
Prime Minister Jean Chretien	said	direct
Mr. Chretien	told	
Prime Minister Jean Chretien	said	
Major-General John Maelnnis, commander of Canadian troops in former Yugoslavia	said	direct
General Chastellain	said	direct

A Canadian soldier	said	direct
Captain David Nauss, a spokesman at Canadian Forces	said	
Mr. MacKenzie	said	
Canadian Major-General Lewis MacKezie	said	direct
Canadian General Lewis MacKenzie	said	direct
General MacKenzie	could not confirm	direct
Colonel Walter Natynczyk	noted	
Col Natynczyk	said	direct
Janet Denich, executive director of the Canadian Council for Refugees	said	
Mr. Chretien	told/said	direct
The secretary-general of the Canadian Red Cross Pierre Duplessis	said	direct
Immigration Minister Lucienne Robilland	said/told	direct
Raphael Girard, the Canadian ambassador to Yugoslavia	said	direct
Immigration Minister Lucienne Robilland	said/told	
Trade Minister Michael Wilson	said	
David Charters, an international security expert at the University of New Brunswick	said	direct
David Haglund, an international affairs expert at Queen's University in Kingston	said	direct
A senior Canadian officer	predicted	
Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy	said	direct
Mr. Axworthy	said	direct
Officials from the Department of Citizenship and Immigration	said	

The Department of Defence	said	
Madam Justice Louis Arbour	said	direct
United Nations (including UNHCR, Red Cross, WHO, the Hague Tribunal etc.)		
Who	Verb	Quotation
John Mills, a UN protection Force spokesman	said	direct
Aid officials with general Morillon	said	
UN military commander General Bertrand de Lapresle	would make the call	
UN military commander General Bertrand de Lapresle	issued a statement	
John Mills, a UN protection Force spokesman	said	direct
UNPROFOR spokesman Adnan Abdel Razek	said	direct
Major-General Philippe Morillon	said	direct
UN peacekeepers	said	
Swedish Colonel Ulf Ulricson	said	direct
Swedish medical officer Bjorn Borgvall	said	direct
Col Ulricson	said	direct
Colonel Steven Rauch	said	direct
Alexander Ivanko, the UN spokesman	said	direct
Gen. De Lapresle	requested	
Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar	said	
The UN Security Council	expressed regret	
UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali	said	direct
UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali	asked	
UN envoy Yasushi Akashi	said	

Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees	said	direct
WHO doctor Simon Mardel	said	
UN and ICRC officials	said	
UN officials in New York	said	
UN	said	
A UN official in Zagreb	reported	
UN sources	speculate	
UN sources in Sarajevo	said	
UN officials	estimated	
UN officials in Sarajevo	said	
The UNHCR	reported	
Mr. Nyberg	said	direct
The senior UN official	said	direct
Mans Nyberg, a spokesman for the UNHCR	said	direct
Mans Nyberg	said	direct
Laura Voldrini, the UNHCR spokeswoman	said	direct
Mr. Kelly, a war-crimes investigator	said	direct
Mr. Murungan, a war-crimes investigator	said	direct
Mr. Todesco	said	direct
RCMP inspector Brian Strongman	said	direct
Ms. Del Ponte	said	direct
Ms. Del Ponte	told	
Ms. Del Ponte	said	direct
Ms. Del Ponte	said	direct
Ms. Del Ponte's spokesman Paul Risley	said	
Mr. Risley	said	
Deputy prosecutor Graham Blewitt	said	
Mr. Blewitt	said	direct
Red Cross workers	said	
Christian Chartier, a spokesman for Louise Arbour	said	direct

United States		
Who	Verb	Quotation
Senate Republican Minority leader Robert Dole	said	direct
U.S. Senator Jesse Helms	said	direct
Kati Marton, chairwoman of the Committee to protect journalists and wife of influential U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke	said/described	direct
The Pentagon	said	
Mr. Holbrooke	said	direct
New U.S. Secretary of Defence, William Perry	said	direct
Mr. Perry	asked	direct
Senate Republican Minority leader Robert Dole	said	direct
U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher	urged	
U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher	said	direct
Mr. Holbrooke	said	direct
U.S. Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke	said	direct
U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher	urged	direct
White House official David Johnson	said	direct
U.S. President George Bush	warned	
Bush	said	
U.S. President Bill Clinton	said	
Mr. Clinton	instructed	
U.S. President Bill Clinton	said	direct
Mr. Clinton	called on	direct
U.S. President Bill Clinton	said	direct
Mr. Clinton	said	direct
U.S. President Bill Clinton	denounced	
Mr. Clinton	said	
Mr. Clinton	said	direct
Mr. Clinton	vowed	
President Clinton	said	direct
Mr. Clinton	said	direct

Pentagon spokesman Keneth Bacon	called	
General Wesley Clark	warned	
General Clark	said	direct
US officials	said	
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright	suggests	
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright	said	direct
US Defence Secretary William Cohen	said	
US and European diplomats	said	

NATO		
Who	Verb	Quotation
Washington and NATO	said	
NATO chief	warns	direct
Captain Bertrand Guy, spokesman for the French- led multinational brigade [KFOR/NATO troops in Kosovo]	said	direct
Capt. Guy	said	direct
NATO senior officials	said	
NATO officials	said	
NATO officials	suggested	
NATO spokesman Jamie Shea	suggested	direct
NATO spokesman Jamie Shea	said	
NATO spokesman Jamie Shea	told	
NATO's southern commander Admiral Leighton Smith	said	direct
NATO and German officials	said	
An official at the NATO headquarters	said	

United Kingdom		
Who	Verb	Quotation
British Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind	said	
British defence Secretary George Robertson	said	
British military source	says	direct
British prime Minister Tony Blair	made it clear	
Mr. Blair	warned	direct
Mr. Blair	said	
Mr. Blair	said	direct
Mark Wheeler, a London-based lecturer in Balkan history	said	direct
Britain	says	
British spokesman	said	
British Foreign secretary Douglas Hurd	said	direct
Mr. Hurd	said	
British officials	insisted	

France		
Who	Verb	Quotation
French President Jacques Chirac	said	
President Chirac	made remarks	
Mr. Chirac	said	
French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe	said	direct
French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe	said	
French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe	urged	direct
French officials	said	

Germany		
Who	Verb	Quotation
Chancellor Helmut Kohl	threatened	
Mr. Kohl	told	direct
A German officials	said	direct
A German government spokesperson	said	
Chancellor Helmut Kohl	said	direct

NATO members – other		
Who	Verb	Quotation
Italy and Turkey	said	
Belgian foreign minister Willy Class	said	

European Community		
Who	Verb	Quotation
Michael Steiner, deputy to the international community's high representative Carl Bildt	said	
Howard Fox, spokesman for the EU police	said	direct
A former chief of staff of the Western European Union police force	said	direct
The EC	said	
The European Community's mediator Lord Owen	said	direct
An EC diplomat in Belgrade	said	
EU Humanitarian aid Commissioner Emma Bonino	questioned	direct
EU spokesman Dragan Gasic	said	

Russia		
Who	Verb	Quotation
Igor Ivanov, Russia's first deputy foreign minister was quoted by Moscow's ITAR-TASS news agency	as saying	
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev	sent a message	
Russian minister of foreign affairs Andrei Kozirew	stressed	
Russian President Boris Jelcin	warned	
He [B. Jelcin]	said	

China		
Who	Verb	Quotation
Beijing	says	
China	announced	
Chinese Ambassador Quin Huasun	told/said/warned	direct
(Angry) China	threatens	

Non-specified sources		
Who	Verb	Quotation
A Western officials	said	
Military analysis	said	
Experts	say	
One Western official	said	
Analysts	said	
Military sources	said	
Officials	reported	

Bibliography:

Allan, S. (1999). *News Culture*. Philadelphia: Open University Press.

T. Allen & J. Seaton (Eds.) (1999). *The Media of Conflict*. London & New York: Zed Books.

Allcock, J. (1993). Involvement and detachment: Yugoslavia as an object of scholarship. *Journal of Area Studies*, 3, pp. 144 - 60. Sussex: University of Sussex.

Bakhtin, M. M. (1981). Discourse in the Novel. In M. Holquist (Ed.) *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Bell, A. (1991). *The Language of News Media*. Oxford: Blackwell.

A. Bell & P. Garrett (Eds.) (1998). *Approaches to Media Discourse*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Berelson, B. (1952). *Content Analysis in Communication Research*. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press.

Berelson, B. & Janowitz, M. (1952). *Reader in Public Opinion and Communication*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.

Billig, M. (1995). *Banal Nationalism*. London, Thousand Oaks & New Delhi: Sage.

Bignell, J. (1997). *Media Semiotics: An Introduction*. Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press.

Bissett, J. (1999). *Western Interference*. Available at:

<http://members.nbci.com/westannex/index.html> Visited: May, 2001.

Boyd-Barrett, O. (1994). Language and media: A question of convergence. In D. Graddol & O. Boyd-Barrett (Eds.) *Media Texts: Authors and Readers*. Clevedon, Philadelphia, & Adelaide: Multilingual Matters & The Open University.

Brookes, J. H. (1995). "Suit, tie and a touch of juju" - the ideological construction of

Africa: A critical discourse analysis of news on Africa in the British press.

Discourse and Society, 6(4). London, Thousand Oaks, & New Delhi: Sage. pp. 461 - 494.

Bruck, P. & Roach, C. (1993). Dealing with reality: The news media and the promotion Of peace. In C. Roach (Ed.) (1993). *Communication and Culture in War and Peace*. London & New Delhi: Sage Publications. pp. 71 – 97.

Burns, J. (1996). The media as impartial observers or protagonists: Conflict reporting or conflict encouragement in former Yugoslavia. In J. Gow, R. Patersen & A. Preston (Eds.) *Bosnia by Television*. London: British Film Institute. pp. 92 – 100.

R. C. Caldas-Coulthard & M. Coulthard (Eds.) (1996). *Texts and Practice Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Routledge.

Canadian International Development Agency (2000). *Canadian Assistance to Kosovo*. Available at: <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca> Visited: March, 2000

T. G. Carpenter (Ed.) (2000). *NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War*. Washington, D. C.: Cato Institute.

Carruthers, L. S. (2000). *The Media at War*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Chandler, D. (1999). *Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton*. London: Pluto Press.

P. Chilton (Ed.) (1985). *Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate: Nukespeak Today*. London & New York: Longman.

Chomsky, N. (1999). *Kosovo Peace Accord*. Available at: <http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/articles/z9907-peace-accord.htm> Visited: November, 2000

Chomsky, N. (2000). *In Retrospect: A Review of NATO's War over Kosovo*. Available at: <http://www.zmag.org/Zmag/articles/chomskyapril2000.htm> Visited: June 2001.

- Chouliaraki, L. (1999). Media discourse and national identity: Death and myth in a news broadcast. In R. Wodak & C. Ludwig (Eds.) *Challenges in a Changing World – Issues in Critical Discourse Analysis*. Vienna: Passagen Verlag.
- Chouliaraki, L. & Fairclough, N. (1999). *Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- F. Columbus (Ed.) (1999). *Kosovo – Serbia: A Just War?* New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
- Cooper, A. F (1997). *Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions*. Scarborough: Prentice-Hall.
- Crnobraja, M. (1996). (2nd edition) *The Yugoslav Drama*. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- A. Danchev & T. Halverson (Eds.) (1996). *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Dashwood, S. H. (2000). Canada's participation in the NATO-led intervention in Kosovo. In *Canada among Nations*. Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University. Ottawa: Carleton University Press. Toronto: Oxford University Press. pp. 274 – 302.
- Davis, S. G. (1996). Bosnia, the United States, and the just war tradition. In G. S. Davis *Religion and Justice in the War over Bosnia*. New York & London: Routledge. pp. 91 –117.
- G. S. Davis (Ed.) (1996). *Religion and Justice in the War over Bosnia*. New York & London: Routledge.
- Deacon, D., Pickering, M., Golding, P. & Murdock, G. (1999). *Researching*

Communications: A Practical Guide to Methods in Media and Cultural Analysis.
London & New York: Arnold & Oxford University Press.

Denitch, B. (1994). *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia*
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada (2000). *Canada and the Former Yugoslavia*. Available at: <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca> Visited: August, 2000.

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada (2000). *Crisis in Kosovo*. Available at: <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign/kosovo/text/back-e.asp> Visited: March, 2000.

Desbarats, P. (1996). *Guide to Canadian News Media*. Toronto: Harcourt Brace & Company Canada.

Drakulic, S. (1993). *Balkan Express: Fragments from the Other Side of War*.
London: Hutchinson.

Dyke, B. N. (1996). The United States, international organizations, and the Yugoslav crisis. In R. G. C. Thomas & H. R. Friman (Eds.) *The South Slav Conflict: History, Religion, and Nationalism*. New York & London: Garland Publishing. pp. 305 –315.

D. A. Dyker & I. Vejvoda (Eds.) (1996). *Yugoslavia and After*. London & New York: Longman.

Eggins, S. (1994). *An Introduction to Systemic Functional Linguistics*. London: Pinter Publishers.

Ellis, G. D. (1999). *Crafting Society: Ethnicity, Class, and Communication Theory*.

Mahwah & London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Fairclough, N. (1989). *Language and Power*. London & New York: Longman.

Fairclough, N. (1992). *Discourse and Social Change*. Cambridge: Polite Press.

Fairclough, N. (1995a). *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*.
London: Longman.

Fairclough, N. (1995b). *Media Discourse*. London: Edward Arnold.

Fairclough, N. & Wodak, R. (1997). Critical Discourse Analysis. In T. van Dijk (Ed.)
Discourse as Social Interaction. Discourse Studies: A multidisciplinary
Introduction. Volume 2. London, Thousands Oaks & New Delhi: Sage. pp. 258 –
284.

Fousek, J. (2000). *To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural*
Roots of the Cold War. Chapel Hill & London: The University of North Carolina
Press.

Fowler, R. (1991). *Language in the News Discourse and Ideology in the Press*. London:
Routledge.

R. Fowler, B. Hodge, G. Kress & T. Trew (Eds.) (1979). *Language and Control*. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Galtung, J. (1993). Preface. In C. Roach (Ed.) (1993). *Communication and Culture in*
War and Peace. London & New Delhi: Sage pp. xi -xv

Galtung, J. (1996). *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and*
Civilization. London, Thousands Oaks & New Delhi: Sage.

Galtung, J. & Jacobsen, G. C., with contributions by Brand-Jacobsen, F. K. & Tschudi, F.

- (2000). *Searching for Peace: The Road to Transcend*. London: Pluto Press in association with Transcend.
- Geis, M. (1987). *The Language of Politics*. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Glenny, M. (1993). *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War*. London: Penguin Books.
- Goldstein, I. (1999). *Croatia: A History*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Gow, J. (1992). *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis*. London: Pinter Publisher.
- Gow, J. & Tilsley, J. (1996). The strategic imperative for media management. In J. Gow, R. Patersen & A. Preston (Eds.) *Bosnia by Television*. London: British Film Institute. pp.103 – 111.
- J. Gow, R. Patersen & A. Preston (Eds.) (1996). *Bosnia by Television*. London: British Film Institute.
- D. Graddol & O. Boyd-Barrett (Eds.) (1994). *Media Texts: Authors and Readers*. Clevedon, Philadelphia & Adelaide: Multilingual Matters & The Open University.
- Gregory, M. (1982a). Mimeo I – Notes on Communication Linguistics: A Framework for Description of English Discourse.
- Gregory, M. (1982b). Mimeo II – Notes on Communication Linguistics: Semology: Predicational Structures.
- Gregory, M. (2001) Plenary paper delivered at ISFC 28, July 2001, Ottawa, Carleton University.
- Gutmann, R. (1993). *A Witness to Genocide: The First Inside Account of the Horrors of*

Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia. Shaftesbury: Element Publishing.

Hachten, W. (1996). *The World News Prism: Changing Media of International Communication* (4th edition). Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press.

Hackett, A. R. (1992). Coups, earthquakes, and hostages? Foreign news on Canadian television. In M. Grenier (1992). *Critical Studies of Canadian Mass Media*. Toronto & Vancouver: Butterworths. pp. 313 – 329.

Hackett, A. R. & Zhao, Y. (1998). *Sustaining Democracy? Journalism and the Politics of Objectivity*. Toronto: Garamond Press.

Hackett, A. R. & Gruneau, R. (2000). *The Missing News: Filters and Blind Spots in Canada's Press*. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives: Garamond Press.

Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, t., Clarke, J. & Roberts, B. (1978). *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, the Law and Order*. London: Macmillan.

Halliday, M. A. K. (1978). *Language as Social Semiotic: The Social Interpretation of Language and Meaning*. London: Edward Arnold.

Halliday, M. A. K. (1994). (2nd edition). *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*. London: Edward Arnold.

Hodge, R. & Kress, G. (1988). *Social Semiotics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

R. Hodge & G. Kress (Eds.) (1993). *Language as Ideology*. London: Routledge.

Hoggart, R. (1957). *The Uses of Literacy*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Ignatieff, M. (1996). Introduction: Virtue by Proxy. In A. Danchev & T. Halverson (Eds.) *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict*. New York: St. Martin's Press. pp. ix – xix.

Jacobsen, G. C. (1996). War crimes in the Balkans: Media manipulation, historical

- amnesia, and subjective morality. In R. G. C. Thomas & H. R. Friman (Eds.) (1996). *The South Slav Conflict: History, Religion, and Nationalism*. New York & London: Garland Publishing. pp. 331 – 349.
- James, E. C. (1995). *Seeing Ourselves: Exploring Race, Ethnicity, and Culture*. Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing.
- Judah, T. (2000). *Kosovo: War and Revenge*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
- Kaplan, R. (1993). *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Karim, K. H. (2000). *The Islam Peril: Media and Global Violence*. Montreal, Tonawanda & London: Black Rose Books.
- Kress, G. (1983). Linguistic and ideological transformations in news reporting. In H. Davis & P. Walton (Eds.) *Language, Image, Media*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher. pp. 120 – 139.
- Kress, G. (1990).
- Kress, G. & Hodge, B. (1979). *Language as Ideology*. London: Routledge.
- Lemke, J. (1995). *Textual Politics: Discourse and Social Dynamics*. London: Taylor & Francis.
- Lorimer, R. & Scannell, P. (1994). *Mass Communications: A Comparative Introduction*. Manchester & New York: Manchester University Press.
- Lukic, R. & Lynch, A. (1996). U.S. policy towards Yugoslavia: From differentiation to

disintegration. In R. G. C. Thomas & H. R. Friman (Eds.) *The South Slav Conflict: History, Religion, and Nationalism*. New York & London: Garland Publishing. pp 253 –287.

P. Marris & S. Thornham (Eds.) (1996). *Media studies: A Reader*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Meier, V. (1999). *Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise*. London & New York: Routledge.

Moeller, S. (1999). *Compassion Fatigue: How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death*. London & New York: Routledge.

Mojzes, P. (1994). *Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans*. New York: Continuum.

P. Mojzes (Ed.) (1998). *Religion and the War in Bosnia*. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

Morley, D. (1983). Cultural transformations: the politics of resistance. In H. Davis & P. Walton (Eds.) *Language, Image, Media*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. pp.75 – 104.

Nikolic-Ristanovic, V. (2000). *Women, Violence and War: Wartime Victimization of Refugees in the Balkans*. Budapest, Hungary: Central European University Press.

OSCE (1999). *Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As Told*. Available at:

<http://www.osce.org/kosovo/reports/hr/part1/index.htm> Visited: May, 2000.

Parenti, M. (1993). *Inventing Reality: The Politics of News Media*. New York: St. Martin Press.

Parenti, M. (1999). *The Rational Destruction of Yugoslavia*. Available at:

<http://www.michaelparenti.org/yugoslavia.html> Visited: September, 2000.

Porter (1965). *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada*.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Pollard, G. (1985). Canadian newswriters: A cross-media analysis of professional and
personal attributes. *Canadian Journal of Communication* 11(3) pp. 269 – 286.

Poulton, H. (1991). *Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict*. London: Minority Rights
Publications.

Ramet, P. S. (1992). (2nd edition) *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962 –
1991*. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Redekop, C. (1985). 'Constructive Dis-engagement. *Behind the Headlines*. CHA.

Remington, R. A. (1996). Yugoslavia and internationalization of the Balkans
conflict. In R. G. C. Thomas & H. R. Friman (Eds.) *The South Slav Conflict:
History, Religion, and Nationalism*. New York & London: Garland Publishing.
pp. 229 – 253.

B. Roach (Ed.) (1993). *Communication and Culture in War and Peace*. London & New
Delhi: Sage Publications.

Rogel, C. (1998). *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia*. Westport &
London: Greenwood Press.

Sadkovich, J. J. (1998). *The U.S. Media and Yugoslavia, 1991 – 1995*. Westport &
London: Praeger.

Schegloff, E. (1997). Whose text? Whose Context? *Discourse and Society*. 8(2).

Schloer, W. (1996). Germany and breakup of Yugoslavia. In R. G. C. Thomas & H. R.
Friman (Eds.) *The South Slav Conflict: History, Religion, and Nationalism*. New
York & London: Garland Publishing. pp. 315 – 331.

- Seaton, J. (1999). The new "ethnic" wars and the media. In T. Allen & J. Seaton (Eds.) *The Media of Conflict*. London & New York: Zed Books. pp. 43 –64.
- Silber, L. & Little, A. (1995). *The Death of Yugoslavia*. London: Penguin Books.
- Stillar, G. (1998). *Analyzing Everyday texts Discourse: Rhetoric and Social Perspectives*. London: Sage Publications.
- Sykes, M. (1988). From "Rights" to "Needs": Official Discourse and the "Welfarization" of Race. In G. Smitherman-Donaldson & T. van Dijk (Eds.) *Discourse and Discrimination*. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.
- Taylor, S. (2000). *INAT: Images of Serbia and the Kosovo Conflict*. Ottawa: Esprit de Corps Books.
- Thomas, R. C. G. (1996). Nations, states, and war. In R. G. C. Thomas & H. R. Friman (Eds.) *The South Slav Conflict: History, Religion, and Nationalism*. New York & London: Garland Publishing. pp. 191 – 229.
- R. G. C. Thomas & H. R. Friman (Eds.) (1996). *The South Slav Conflict: History, Religion, and Nationalism*. New York & London: Garland Publishing.
- Thibault, P. (1986). *Text, Discourse, and Context: A Social Semiotic Perspective*. Monographs, Working Papers and Prepublications of The Toronto Semiotic Circle. Volume 3. Toronto: Victoria University.
- Trew, T. (1979). Theory and Ideology at Work. In R. Fowler, B. Hodge & G. Kress (Eds.) *Language and Control*. London, Boston & Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul. pp. 185 – 213.
- Trifkovic, S. (2000). *The Real Genocide in Yugoslavia: "Independent "Croatia of 1941 Revisited*. The Rockford Institute. Available at:

<http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/NewsST042100.htm> Visited: June. 2000.

Tyrwritht-Drake, H. (1998). Resisting the discourse of critical discourse analysis:

Reopening a Hong Kong case study. *Journal of Pragmatics*. 31 pp. 1081 – 1088.

UNHCR (1999). Reports. Available at: <http://www.unhcr.ch> Visited: May. 2001.

van Dijk, T. A. (1987). *Communicating Racism: Ethnic Prejudice in Thought and Talk*.

Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

van Dijk, A. T. (1991). *Racism and the Press*. London & New York: Routledge

van Dijk, T. A. (1993). *Elite Discourse and Racism*. Newbury Park: Sage.

van Dijk, A. T. (1998). Opinions and Ideologies in the Press. In A. Bell & P. Garrett

(Eds.) *Approaches to Media Discourse*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

van Dijk, A. T. (1999). *Critical Discourse Analysis*. Available at:

<http://www.hum.uva.nl/teun/> Visited: May 2000.

van Dijk, A. T. (2000). *Multidisciplinary CDA: A Plea for Diversity*. Available at:

<http://www.hum.uva.nl/teun/> Visited: May 2001.

van Dijk, A. T. (2000). *Discourse, Ideology and Context*. Available at:

<http://www.hum.uva.nl/teun/> Visited: May 2001.

Vlajki, E. (1999). *The New Totalitarian Society and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. New

York, Ottawa & Toronto: Legas.

van Leeuwen, T. (1996). Representation of social actors in English language. In R. C.

Caldas-Coulthard & M. Coulthard (Eds.) (1996). *Texts and Practice Readings in*

Critical Discourse Analysis. London: Routledge.

West, R. (1982/1941). *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey through Yugoslavia*.

London: Penguin.

R. K. Whillock & D. Slayden (Eds.) (1995). *Hate Speech*. Thousand Oaks, London & New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Winter, J. (1997). *Democracy's Oxygen: How Corporations Control the News*. Montreal, New York & London: Black Rose Books.

Wodak, R. (1996). The genesis of racist discourse in Austria since 1989. In C. R. Caldas-Coulthard & M. Coulthard (Eds.) *Text and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Routledge.

Wodak, R. (1996). *Disorders of Discourse*. London & New York: Longman.

Wodak, R., Nowak, P. & Pelikan, J. (1990). "Wir sind alle unschuldige Täter": *Diskurshistorische Studien Zum Nachkriegantisemitismus*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

Wodak, R., de Cilia, R., Reisigl, M. & Liebhart, K. (1999). *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

R. Wodak & C. Ludwig (Eds.) (1999). *Challenges in a Changing World – Issues in Critical Discourse Analysis*. Vienna: Passagen Verlag.

Wodak, R. (2000). Discourse on unemployment in the EU: The conflict and consensus between diverging ideologies. Plenary lecture: Language and Ideology. May, 2000, Vienna, University of Vienna.

R. Wodak & T. van Dijk (Eds.) (2000). *Racism at the Top: Parliamentary Discourses on Ethnic Issues in Six European States*. Klagenfurt: Drava.

Woodward, S. (1995). *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*. Washington: The Brookings Institute.

Young, L. (1990). *Language as Behaviour, Language as Code: A Study of Academic English*. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

Young, L. (2000). *Differential representation of minorities in the Canadian print media.*

Paper delivered at ISFC 27, July 10, 2000, Melbourne, Australia.