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The Policy-Making Process of the Federal New Democratic Party
The Development of the 1983 Statement of Principles and
Objectives as a Case Study

by

Timothy David Welch

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Department of Political Science

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POLICY MAKING PROCESS IN THE FEDERAL NDP.
THE 1983 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES AS A CASE STUDY

submitted by Timothy Welch, Hons. B.A.,
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

The understanding of its internal policy-making process is essential to understanding a political party. In this paper the policy-making process of the New Democratic Party of Canada will be examined by following the creation and development of the major document at the NDP's 1983 convention, the Statement of Principles and Objectives. In the NDP, and in its predecessor the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, internal debates over policy have always occupied a significant place. The development of a new document which would state the social democratic party's principles offered a good opportunity to study the party's policy-making process.

The creation of a document over a twenty month period allows for an examination of the different actors within the NDP in the various forums for debate. The analysis of this process is situated within the literature that looks at the organization of political parties. This paper further displays an historical outlook to show how the 1983 policy making process of the NDP is tied to the party's past.

The results of this study shows that the New Democratic Party functions as a decentralized oligarchy which recognizes the necessity of formal channels for membership input. The policy-making process of the NDP indicates that the party attempts to structure itself as a democratic organization but elites end up as dominant.

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The production of this thesis requires a note of thanks to many people in the New Democratic Party. I am grateful to the three federal MP's who took time out of their hectic schedules to be interviewed. The staff at the NDP's federal headquarters on Metcalfe Street were most helpful in giving interviews and in providing information about the draft document. A special note of thanks is due Dan O'Hagan. I would also like to thank friends of mine in the NDP who have helped me in a less formal, but no less important manner.

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As a final note I would like to dedicate this paper to Andy Nicholson of the Barrie Labour Council, a working man who often became embroiled in disputes in the NDP's policy-making process. He may not remember me but I will always remember him for the inspiration he provided through the strength of his beliefs.

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Introduction: Policy Making in the Federal NDP

Over thirty years ago Maurice Duverger wrote "...present day parties are distinguished far less by their programme or the class of their members than by the nature of their organization. A party is a community with a particular structure. Modern parties are characterized by their anatomy." To understand a political party's ideology one must be able to understand its internal organization and the process by which this organization produces policies. The intent of this paper is to examine the internal policy making process of the New Democratic Party of Canada. This examination will be done by tracing the development and refinement of the major document at the NDP's 1983 convention, the Statement of Principles and Objectives. The focus of the paper will be on the process involved in creating the document, not on its programmatic contents. It is this process which will demonstrate the workings of the NDP's internal organization.

As Canada's social democratic party, the NDP is more ideological than the highly pragmatic Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties of Canada. In the NDP, and in its predecessor the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, internal debates on policy have always occupied a central place. As the party has previously had only three major documents stating the party's principles (in 1933 the Regina Manifesto, in 1956 the Winnipeg Declaration, and in 1961 the New Democratic Party

Programme), the creation of a fourth document meant that in 1983 the party would centre itself around its internal activities at least until the convention in early July.

The creation of the document involved all levels of the party: the federal caucus, provincial MLA's, the federal party bureaucracy, provincial councils, the federal party leader, local riding associations, the federal party executive and council, provincial party leaders, trade union leaders, rank-and-file party members and delegates to the federal convention in Regina. By having the document's creation result from the input of virtually every organization branch of the NDP, the development of the Statement of Principles and Objectives provided an excellent opportunity to study decision making within the party.

As an organization which must make decisions on the types of policies and programs it will support, the NDP has usually characterized itself as a truly democratic party. This idea has been trumpeted most loudly by the party's own leaders. Stanley Knowles, a major figure in both the CCF and NDP, wrote at the time of the founding of the New Party in 1961:

The entire structure of the party, its conventions, its electoral bodies, its machinery for making decisions and declaring its policies, is to be built on its membership, thus assuring full membership control.... The national convention would be the supreme governing body of the party with final authority in all matters of national policy and program. The provisions outlined in the proposed constitution thus add up to a functioning democratic organization, fully controlled by the people who compromise it.²

By looking at the production of the Statement of Principles and

Objectives, it can be seen whether the NDP operates as a functioning democratic organization. This would be indicated by the number of avenues open for the participation of party members in the drafting and refinement of the document. As well as examining the avenues open, the type of influence that these avenues allow for must also be considered. Thus the fact that input may be allowed from the mass membership does not necessarily indicate that democracy exists in the policy-making process. It is the amount of influence on adjusting policy documents that is a more reliable indicator of party democracy.

As well as looking at the participation of the rank-and-file party membership, the process of decision-making can be understood by examining the power relationships that exist within the NDP. By this it is meant determining the degree of influence that individuals and groups have within the party. The existence of elites and counter elites in the NDP would be a manifestation of these relationships. As well as the individual strengths of elites within the party, power relationships may also describe the ties, loyalties and adversities between groups.

To deal with the analysis of the New Democratic Party's internal organization and policy-making procedures this paper will be divided into five main chapters. The first chapter will provide an overview of much of the literature that has examined the organizations of political parties. The literature will include classical theoretical texts such as Michels and Duverger as well as writings on Canadian political parties. This review will centre around the many issues that the literature addresses.

These include the power and influence of the leader of the party, the pivotal role of the party bureaucracy, the influence of rank-and-file party members in developing policy, and the formation and activities of elite groups within political parties. Also to be mentioned are the external factors which influence the particular development of parties. From this review of the literature a general framework for analysis will be developed so that the New Democratic Party's policy-making process can be examined around the above mentioned issues.

Chapter two will provide an historical background of the CCF-NDP which highlights the past periods when the social democratic party has embarked upon the creation of a major policy document. The origins of the documents, which are quite important, will be examined. The conflicts which surrounded these documents will be looked at as well as noting how compromises around them were reached. The key players involved in the development of the statements will be discussed so as to give proper weight to their varying roles. The degree of satisfaction with these documents throughout the party will also be noted here. How open and democratic the party has been in encouraging membership participation in the process for creating the documents will be a theme throughout this chapter. Also described in chapter two will be important junctures in the evolution of the party throughout its fifty year history as it has often reflected the changing balance of power within the party as well as having established organizational advantages to elites within the CCF-NDP.

The third chapter will follow the two year process of creating the 1983 Statement of Principles and Objectives. From its beginning as a general wish to provide a document of what the NDP stands for to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of the Regina Manifesto, the founding ideological statement of the CCF, to the document's preparation two weeks before the convention, this chapter will have a dual focus. These two foci will be concerned with the institutional activities that are a result of structural factors in the party organization. One prong of this approach will centre around the committee of the NDP's federal council which originally drafted the statement and subsequently reformulated it. The other prong will examine the avenues made available for rank-and-file NDP members to participate in the development of the document. This will include statistical information about the number of meetings held, attendance at the meetings as well as describing what type of criticisms of the draft document were given by party members. A minor focus of this chapter will be the informal activities i.e. those not set up by the NDP's bureaucracy or federal council, which were organized to influence the development of the document. An example of this would be the activities of the Ontario Left Caucus.

Chapter four will examine the period surrounding the convention. This chapter will contrast somewhat with the previous one by concentrating on the more informal and non-structured elements of the policy-making process in the NDP.

This will include looking at the last minute introduction of a competing document by elites from some of the western sections of the NDP as well as discussing the compromise document reached on the eve of the convention. These informal negotiations and the individuals who participated in them may be seen as a central part of the policy-making process of the party. By following the activities at the convention there will be a concentration on the formal challenge put forth through the Left Caucus document. This chapter will demonstrate both accommodation and conflict among competing elites in the New Democratic Party.

The concluding chapter will tie the framework set up in the chapter on the review of the literature with the actual experience of creating the NDP's 1983 policy document. Thus an understanding of the New Democratic Party's policy-making process and its internal organization will be gained through the examination of membership participation in policy-making, through seeing the influence of the party bureaucracy, and through looking at the activities of elites and elite groups within the context of the policy-making process.

The construction of this paper requires the use of different methodologies. Secondary research is of course necessary for the review of the literature as well as in the historical chapter. The historical evidence presented will be selective to highlight only certain aspects of the social democratic parties internal activities. Primary research of the past does not appear necessary as the past eras in the CCF-NDP have been more than adequately researched by Young, Lewis, Zakuta, Morton and

3
Hackett.

Most of the research done on the creation of the document is primary. This includes interviews with NDP officials at the Ottawa headquarters to delve into the formal procedures for developing the document. Some members of Parliament were interviewed largely to gather information about the informal negotiations over the document which took place just prior to the convention. Further interviews were informally undertaken, with members of the Left Caucus among others, over the process of creating the document.

The statement, and the various drafts that it went through, further provides a valuable source of information. Although the policies contained in the documents are not of central concern in this paper, they do give good indications of what groups or elites within the party appear most influential. For background material and a general rounding out of events, use will also be made of newspaper and journal articles, including NDP newspapers, covering the convention and the development of the document.

With the completion of this study, a fuller understanding of how policies emerge from the federal New Democratic Party will be had. The NDP remains quite a distance from political power federally. It has, however, played quite an important role in Canada's political system both indirectly and directly. Indirectly the CCF-NDP has often been the innovator of many reform ideas which have become central issues of public policy debates. As members of both the CCF and NDP have bemoaned, it is they who originate popular reform ideas but it is the other

political parties, particularly the Liberals, who reap the political rewards by selling these ideas to the voters as their own. More directly the influence of the NDP's policies have been felt during recent periods of minority government, with this influence being perhaps most pronounced during the twenty-ninth Parliament which saw concessions granted to the New Democrats by the Liberal government in exchange for political support. Also the influence of the New Democratic ideas can be seen at the provincial level where NDP governments have ruled with, at least in theory, with the guidance of NDP principles.

Although the New Democratic Party may be far away from winning power federally, it has become a permanent feature in Canadian elections and Parliaments. In reiterating an earlier statement, for the NDP to be understood fully, its policy-making process and internal party organization must be analyzed and that is what this paper sets out to do.

Footnotes

1 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties. (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd. 1967) p. xv.

2 Stanley Knowles, The New Party. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited. 1961) p. 71-73.

3 Robert Hackett, "Pie in the Sky: A History of the Ontario Waffle," Canadian Dimension. (October-November 1980, volume 15 no. 1,2) p.1-72.; David Lewis, The Good Fight Political Memoirs 1909-1958. (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada 1981); Desmond Morton, Social Democracy in Canada NDP. (Toronto: Samuel Stevens Hakkert and Company 1977); Walter Young, The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF 1932-1961. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1969); Leo Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1964).

Chapter One: The Organization of Parties and a Framework for Analysis

In examining the policy-making process of the federal New Democratic Party, a framework for analysis must be established. To understand the various factors at work which affect the production of major policy statements, the NDP must be examined in light of the theoretical writings done by other authors on the organizations of political parties. This chapter will review much of the relevant literature on political party organization to set up the criteria necessary to analyse the policy-making process of the NDP.

Although over seventy years old, Robert Michels' famous statement "Who says organization says oligarchy" still provides the theme which permeates much of the writings on political parties.¹ Most authors have either tried to prove or disprove this statement or at least modify it. In defining whether an oligarchy exists and also what it is, there are many variables to consider. Oligarchy conjures up the notions of dominance and leadership. The role of the leader in a political party is therefore important in this examination. Oligarchy, however, by definition indicates rule not by one but by the few. This study must examine the collective leadership which constitutes the prominent elites in the party, as well as the leader. The bureaucracy of the party is seen by some as an element which is part of the leadership; while others see it as having a more delicate role outside of the leadership group. The position of

the bureaucracy should be pinpointed. The role of the mass membership in a political party is also quite crucial in determining whether the party functions as an oligarchy. Do the members have avenues open to them but passively ignore them or are they excluded from the decision making process by the organizational structure of the party? If and when there is dissension within the party does it come from the mass membership or from counter-elites? The composition and tactics of counter-elites provides a further rounding out in the understanding of the internal policy-making process of political parties.

Going beyond the players involved, consideration must also be given to other factors which have a bearing upon a party's policy-making process. The effects of a political parties organizational structure must be noted as it can, for example, institutionalize the power of elites in the party. The fact that a political party is an organization is in itself important, as oligarchic tendencies may be tempered by the need to achieve organizational goals through unity i.e. success in an election campaign being helped by the party being united.

A final major influence on decision-making to be discussed will be the external environment in which political parties operate. The constitutional arrangements or the political culture of a country often shapes the internal workings of a party. The existence of a federal state would be a major influence as a political party would operate on two different levels with perhaps different organizational objectives.

The question of whether oligarchy is a fair label to attach

to the policy-making process of a political party is obviously a very involved one. The consideration of much of the important literature on this question will provide insights necessary for constructing a framework for analysis about the policy-making processes of political parties. This framework will then be applied to the New Democratic Party of Canada.

The first major work to be written on the organizational aspect of political parties was Moisei Ostrogorski's two volumes Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties.²

Ostrogorski was a Russian who spent time at the end of the 19th century observing firsthand the operation of both American and British political parties. The major concern of Ostrogorski was the effects of party caucuses and party organizations on the political system.

Towards the end of the 19th century there emerged in British political parties, particularly the Liberal party, the idea of having Members of Parliaments' actions controlled by party riding associations and central party caucuses. Ostrogorski believed, a belief borne out over time, that party unity was a precondition to electoral strength.³ With the growth of political party organizations and this need for unity, the position of the leader of the party increased in strength and prestige. The leader of the party was described as "a general in command of an army...(he) practically confines his confidence to an inner circle of a few lieutenants. All the rest of the army simply receives marching orders."⁴

Ostrogorski also wrote briefly on the internal operations of

party meetings or caucuses as he observed them. He saw the debates within these caucuses as being very minimal and the programmes of the parties being produced in a very mechanical way. The lack of input by party members as indicated by Ostrogorski was due to the structural organization of party meetings:

When it is no longer a question of setting in motion large masses of men or procuring imposing manifestations, but of a select body meeting in the assemblies of the party parliament to draw up a common programme or to modify it, it is always in a mechanical fashion that the various opinions are made to agree; the divergent views are either eliminated without discussion, or even stifled by the quasi-material resistance which their authors encounter before they have even entered the assembly hall; they are overawed by the compact mass of delegates, which crushes out individual initiative or inclination, so much so that this effect and not the facilities for exchanging views, for discussion, which do not exist there, is regarded by the managers of the organization as the *raison d'être* of these great representative gatherings.⁵

This is not to say that Ostrogorski believed that once leadership was established in the party, it was irremovable. However for a challenge to the ruling elite to be successful, a counter elite organization must be formed with the result that one organizational machine replaced another.⁶ There was no cleansing or democratizing of the party. With the party being leadership dominated, Ostrogorski also saw increased influence for full time party professionals in the conduct of party affairs. He expressed his fears that party bureaucrats would "acquire an important or even predominant position in it the party..."⁷

Ostrogorski's observations of political parties becoming dominated by the leader, his supporting elites and the party bureaucrats; with the membership remaining subservient, led him to conclude that the party organization was merely a machine for the goal of winning elections. "...the parties as such tend to become simple aggregates, drawn together by the attractive force of a leader, for the conquest or the preservation of power."⁸

Ostrogorski's writings were useful observations of some of the inner workings of party organizations and a decade later they were complemented by more insights about the nature of political parties. Robert Michels' Political Parties was first published in 1911 and his "iron law of oligarchy", as mentioned earlier, has become a standard concept used in studying political parties.⁹ Michels was a member of the German Social Democratic Party, the largest mass membership party in the world at the time, and his writings reflected very much his disappointment over observations made about democracy and power within that party.¹⁰ Michels used his analysis of the anti-democratic nature of the Social Democrats, who were at the time strongly pushing for full democratic rights in both the political and economic sphere, to construct universal "laws" on the oligarchic tendencies of all political parties, all organizations and of modern democracy itself.

There were many factors which led Michels to label political parties oligarchic. One followed from the major goal of all political parties, that is, to get elected. Michels saw democracy in a political party as impossible because of its need

to be an effective electoral machine. Instead unity came to be seen as the best internal stand for a party attempting a successful election campaign.

In a party, and above all in a fighting political party, democracy is not for home consumption but is rather made for export. Every political organization has need of a "light equipment which will not hamper its movements". Democracy is absolutely incompatible with strategic promptness, and the forces of democracy do not lend themselves to the rapid opening of a campaign.¹¹

In the search for votes the political party must mitigate internal dissension and play down any policies that might be considered radical. Michels wrote, "to avoid alarming these individuals (sympathetic voters) who are still outside the ideal world of socialism or democracy, the pursuit of a policy based on strict principle is shunned...."¹²

The anti-democratic tendencies of political parties were enhanced by the increasing power of the party leadership at this time. Michels commented on the influence of the two types of leadership found in parties, personal leadership and bureaucratic leadership, on their policy-making decisions. One train of thought involving leadership deals not with the leaders but with their followers. Where Ostrogorski characterized the party leader as a general in command of an army, Michels added that this army was seemingly content in following the general. The tendency of the large number of party members was to be passive about party affairs. They would rather let others lead the party than take action themselves. Michels quotes the French socialist

Proudhon in writing "The human species wants to be governed; it will be."¹³ Apathy among the party membership in dealing with internal party decision-making was widespread. "It is only a minority which participates in party decisions and sometimes that minority is ludicrously small.... The majority of the members are as indifferent to the organization as the majority of electors are to parliament."¹⁴

Michels was very impressed by the way in which the mass membership of political parties were so deferential towards their leaders as he wrote:

In the mass, and even in the organized mass of the labour parties, there is an immense need for direction and guidance. This need is accompanied by a genuine cult for the leaders who are regarded as heroes¹⁵.... As for leaders of the highest grade, they are stifled under the honorary positions which are showered upon them. ...All this brings honour to the leader, gives him more power over the mass, makes him more and more indispensable....¹⁶

Michels further writes that along with the cult of the leader goes a more limited following towards other prominent party members such as parliamentarians. "The crowd has an incurable passion for distinguished orators, for men of great name, and if these are not obtainable, they insist at least, upon an MP."¹⁷

The prominence of MP's allowed them credibility in the eyes of the rank-and-file party members if the MP's choose to either strongly back or challenge the party leader.

While the concentration of power at the top of political parties existed because of the cult of the leader, Michels wrote that it was re-inforced by the bureaucracy developing in many

parties. The growth of working class parties in the early part of this century meant that organizations had been created with hundreds of thousands of members and quite large financial resources (Duverger was to later remark that the German Social Democratic Party was a veritable state, more powerful than some national states.)¹⁸ To manage these large groups many full-time staff members were hired, thus forming the basis of the party bureaucracy. Michels elaborates on how the positions of bureaucrats could be used to strongly influence the decision making process within the party:

...we have on the other hand to remember that an increase in the financial strength of the party, which first renders liberal payments possible, contributes greatly to nourish the dictatorial appetites of the members of the party bureaucracy, who control the administrators. ...In the hands of the bureaucracy are the periodical press, the publication and sale of the party literature, and the enrollment of orators in the list of paid propagandists. ...The concentration of power in those parties which preach the Marxist doctrine is more conspicuous than the concentration of capital predicted by Marx in economic life.¹⁹

The picture of political parties painted by Michels is one in which the leader of the party, supported by the bureaucracy, is able to effectively control the decision-making process of the party organization. The dominance of the leader is not only psychological, through having impressive oratorical skills and holding a position of prominence, but also it is structural. "Every party organization which has attained to a considerable degree of complication demands that there should be a certain number of persons who devote all their activities to the work of

the party."²⁰ By having full time occupations in politics, leaders and party bureaucrats were able to acquire greater knowledge of political affairs, develop greater skills in the art of politics and devote greater time and energy into political and party organizational matters than ordinary rank-and-file members. The expertise of the full time politician provided him with ammunition against any attacks from amateur and less organized party members. Michels accurately concluded "Effective power is here in inverse ratio to the number who exercise it."²¹

Many of the ideas brought up by Michels and Ostrogorski were further analyzed by authors after World War Two. The first major work on parties in the post war period was Maurice Duverger's Political Parties²² which first appeared in 1951. There was a difference between Duverger's writings and those that preceded him in that Duverger was more "scientific" as he provided an analytic framework for categorizing political parties according to their organization and structure. He prefaced his book with the statement, as given in this paper's introduction, "Modern parties are characterized primarily by their anatomy."²³

The classification scheme constructed by Duverger categorized parties as being either "cadre" or "mass". Cadre parties were described as a "grouping of notabilities for the preparations of elections, conducting campaigns and maintaining contact with the candidates."²⁴ Thus the party is an openly elite one where the control of the party is in the hands of a few highly skilled people. Duverger described the type of skilled persons recruited by cadre parties:

Influential persons; in the first place, whose name, prestige, or connections can provide a backing for the candidate and secure him votes; experts in the second place, who know how to handle the electors and how to organize a campaign; last of all financiers, who can bring the ~~sinews~~ of war.²⁵

Mass parties, as their name implies, rely on involving large numbers of people in their activities. Organizational characteristics of mass parties included registration of members, collection of financial subscriptions, and autonomous financing of their election campaigns. Mass parties saw the political education of the masses as their primary goal. This education inevitably involved showing the masses the correctness of the party's viewpoint and had as a consequence very directly improving the electoral fortunes of the party. The method of financing the mass party is elaborated upon by Duverger to link the party's financial base with its anti-capitalist ideology:

...from the financial point of view, the party is essentially based upon the subscriptions payed by its members. ...In this way the party gathers the funds required for its work of political education and for its day to day activity; in the same way it is enabled to finance electioneering: the financial and political are here at one. ...The mass party technique in effect replaces the capitalist financing of electioneering by democratic financing.²⁶

Also Duverger notes that, generally, conservative and moderate parties are of the cadre type while working-class (socialist parties) are of the mass type. This introduction of class into the examination of party organization demonstrates that the organizational structures are related to the existence of

external factors such as societal cleavages.

Once Duverger set up this classification scheme he went on to examine political parties to see if Michels' iron law of oligarchy still applied to parties despite their categorization as either a mass or cadre party. Duverger quite clearly was very sympathetic towards Michels' argument. He wrote "...the leadership of political parties...presents dual characteristics: it is democratic in appearance and oligarchic in reality."²⁷

Duverger examined many of the factors that Michels observed. First was the growing authority of the party leader and his supporting elite. This authority of party leaders helped bring about oligarchic control and unity within the party. "At the lower levels some important persons (member of parliament, journalist, member of the Executive) will take the trouble to go and speak in support of the semi-official candidates party members who will support the party leadership: his prestige with the members will have a considerable influence on their vote," and as Duverger expanded this description to a larger scale, "In National Congresses such personal influences upon the voter becomes more complicated and more complete. There is an art of 'working the conference' in lobbying, in undermining support for the opposition, in plotting in the wings,..."²⁸

Further support of the oligarchic law was found by Duverger in his discussion of the influence of the party bureaucracy.

These permanent officials tended to play a dominant role: since their duties put them in daily contact with the base, they easily secured appointment as delegates to congress and were thus able to exercise a decisive

influence upon the composition of governing bodies. Moreover their opposition within the party gave them immediate authority over the members.²⁹

Thus the portrayal of internal party organization given by Duverger is one which finds an oligarchy in control of the party headed by a powerful leader who, because of his position of prominence, can hold sway over the party members and is supported by a bureaucracy which can use its position as part of the party structure to strongly influence the parties decision-making outcomes.

What the leadership dominates in the mass parties is not as great a group as imagined. Although membership numbers are very impressive for many parties, the number of members who actually show any interest in becoming involved in the internal policy-making process in the party is quite small. Apathy on the part of most rank and file members was also noted by Duverger:

...within the branch for example, there is always to be found a circle of members, markedly different from the mass, who regularly attend meetings, share in the spreading of the party slogans, help to organize its propaganda, and prepare its electoral campaigns. ...The other members do no more than provide a name for the register and a little money for the chest; the militants work effectively for the party.³⁰

There are other observations Duverger made to help one understand the organization of political parties. For example the influence of external institutional factors such the electoral system of the country being examined was an important factor.³¹ Duverger argued that if the electoral system is one based on single member territorial constituencies in which the

candidates are nominated by the local associations then the candidate has somewhat of an independent power base which may be used to challenge or at least not conform with the party oligarchy. If on the other hand the electoral system is that of proportional representation, the lists of party candidates put forward to the electorate are compiled by the party oligarchy upon whom these candidates are dependent.

Another aspect of internal party organization examined by Duverger is the existence of factions within the party. Instead of these being an indication of the openness of decision-making within the party, Duverger stated "Nevertheless the development of factions is not a sign of the liberty of members and of the weakening in the authority of the leaders: rather does it point to differences of opinion between members of the ruling class.³² Each faction is itself authoritarian in structure." Factional activities were usually the result of a counter elite organizing around its own leaders. Demands from rank-and-file members do not generally instigate factional formations. In cases of disputes the mass membership does not become much more involved in decision-making, but merely decides to support one or the other of the competing elites.

Perhaps a final idea extracted from Duverger is found in his discussion of the relationship between the parliamentary representatives of the party and the party organization. The previous writings had looked at the domination of the oligarchy over the mass membership without distinguishing the parliamentary leaders from the extra-parliamentary leaders. This is very

important as much of the later literature focused on struggles between the parliamentary representatives and the party organization. With regard to this matter Duverger wrote:

...(the parliamentary representatives) must conform to the general policy of the party as defined by its congresses and controlling bodies...Nevertheless this subordination of the group is essentially dependent on the preciseness of the directives adopted by the National Congress and committees. The tactics of parliamentary representatives consist in bringing to bear on the National Congresses and committees so as to obtain the passing of general motions which leave the group the greatest possible margin of autonomy.³³

Parliamentary leaders usually got their way at party congresses because MP's had the advantage of the prestige of elected office, they are generally more able than extra-parliamentary leaders, and they have practice in the art of political manouvering from their parliamentary experience.³⁴ What Duverger was saying was that through the prestige of the party leader, who was usually the head of the parliamentary group, and the loyalty of the party bureaucracy to the leaders of the party, the parliamentary group could be seen as having autonomous power from the party organization and membership, thus becoming the area where the oligarchic domination of the party's policy-making process is centred.

Following Duverger's analysis of party structure and organization, this paper will briefly reflect on Robert McKenzie's study entitled British Political Parties.³⁵ This appeared a few years after Duverger's book and, although focusing exclusively on the British Conservative and Labour parties, the

conclusions reached allowed for important generalizations to be made. Before looking at McKenzie's conclusions, it is interesting to note that the author felt that compelled to reflect on some of Michel's statements, specifically the "iron law". McKenzie presented his own interpretation on the absolute nature of the party oligarchy as he wrote:

Michels did not mean to imply that the leaders of an organization can completely ignore the wishes of their followers. Leaders are restricted (in the sense that sculptors are restricted) by the nature of the material with which they work; but the 'material' (which for the political leader is the mass membership of his organization) can have no more than a somewhat remote and negative influence on the activities of the leaders.³⁶

This issue of the influence of the mass membership on the party's organizational relationships and its decision-making process comes up again in other peoples' writings.

The following paragraph very neatly sums up the major thrust of McKenzies's conclusions on political parties.

The distribution of power within British political parties is primarily a function of cabinet government and the British parliamentary system. So long as the parties accept the system of government effective decision-making authority will reside with the leadership groups thrown up by the parliamentary parties (of whom the most important individual is the party leader); and they will exercise this authority so long as they retain the confidence of their respective parliamentary parties. The views of their organized supporters outside Parliament must inevitably be taken into account by the party leadership because of the importance of the role these supporters play in selecting candidates, raising funds, and promoting the cause of the party during elections. But whatever the role granted in

theory to the extra-parliamentary wings of the parties, in practice the final authority rests in both parties with the parliamentary party and its leadership. In this fundamental respect the distribution of power within the two major parties is the same.³⁷

From this statement a number of conclusions can be drawn. Institutional factors such as the parliamentary system and cabinet government are of paramount importance in McKenzie's view in the centralizing of power and decision-making within political parties. This power goes specifically to the parliamentary leadership. Also McKenzie makes the point that the mass membership of a party cannot be completely ignored because it provides an organization of many thousands which is used to elect the parliamentary parties. If the membership was constantly ignored and disregarded by the parliamentary party it would be likely that enthusiastic volunteers at election time would not be forthcoming and therefore the party would suffer electorally.

McKenzie's description of the power of parliamentary representatives led to the conclusion that Michels' oligarchy had manifested itself in the parliamentary wings of political parties. McKenzie, however, was not as negative as Michels. McKenzie stated "The 'law of oligarchy' is certainly not an 'iron' law," and he backed this up by demonstrating that there had been challenges to the party's leadership which have been successful in overthrowing a leader. While Duverger rather cynically commented on internal factional disputes as merely competition between oligarchies, McKenzie saw these disputes as healthy democratic choices within political parties. Likewise when McKenzie viewed politics as a whole he was more positive

about its democratic nature. He wrote: "The essential role of the electorate is not to reach decisions on specific issues of policy but to decide which of the two or more competing teams of potential leaders shall make the decisions."³⁹

Other writings on British political parties have provided useful insights on the way political parties internally function. Richard Rose in his article "Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain",⁴⁰ gave a useful analysis of internal party disputes. Rose realized the importance of the full time bureaucrats but he cautioned that their role, previously described by Michels as supporting the party oligarchy, was a more delicate one as "Their status as pensionable party servants depends in part upon their ability to serve the leadership while keeping free from identification with factions inside the party."⁴¹ The power of party bureaucrats must be underused as they veer towards neutral stances within the party. According to Rose, this neutralism in internal party debates, for example, could be seen in the policy statements party bureaucrats draft. Documents must speak in generalities and focus on attacking the other parties so that the bureaucrats keep clear of factional disputes.

Rose developed a useful classification scheme for analyzing disputes in the party's policy-making process. Groups organized around internal party debates were labelled factions, tendencies or non-aligned. A faction is "a group of individuals based on representatives in Parliament who seek to further a broad range of policies through consciously organized political activity"; a tendency is "a stable set of attitudes, rather than a stable

group of politicians"; and non-alignment "is identification with positions supported by the whole of the electoral party rather than with factions or tendencies."⁴² Rose continued to show the centrality of Parliament in British politics, in that the relative weakness of a faction can be indicated by the prominence of the extra parliamentary party members it contains. Thus it appears that for a faction to succeed it needs prominent leaders from parliament. That the parliamentary representatives are the most prominent people in the political party and therefore hold the greatest influence over the mass membership of the party was implicit in Rose's writings. Rose went on to caution that the role of the factional leaders must also be a careful one because they, if they are not to become intransigent or politically isolated, have to act as a broker in negotiations with opposing political groups in the party.

Rose also speculated about the position of the party leader in internal disputes. He felt that the existence of factions and tendencies placed restraints upon the actions of the leader but the leader in turn, may gain strength by pitting one group in the party against the other. One question Rose raised but didn't answer was could the party leader exist as a non-aligned partisan, identified with none of the competing elites. Michels would have said no but Rose opened up the possibility that the leader, once elected, must try such a feat.

One more relevant book that draws from the British experience is Lewis Minkin's The Labour Party Conference.⁴³ This study was most detailed as Minkin examined internal Labour Party

politics from the mid-1950's to the early 1970's. Minkin's book confirmed earlier theorizing that prominent MP's and cabinet ministers have considerable influence on party debates because of their prestige. Minkin's study further agreed with McKenzie that power is centred with the parliamentary party, especially when the party forms the government.

In internal policy-making Minkin describes how rank-and-file members have had little influence on the policies put forward by Labour and how there were even little formal avenues for input. This shows that these people do have a great deal of potential influence but Minkin maintains, as Rose before him, that the bureaucrats will try to take a neutral position within the party. Going from the bureaucrats, the policy documents would be either accepted or rejected by the National Executive Committee of Labour (its functioning party executive). The decisions of the N.E.C., due in part to its prestige and also to its good relationship with trade union leaders, ensured agreement by the party conference.

One other development Minkin traces in the Labour Party is the growing sense of independence of the party conference and executive from the parliamentary party. Partially as a result of the disillusionment with the Labour governments, the oligarchic dominance of the parliamentary wing of the party may no longer be seen to be always supported by the party executive and party bureaucracy. Therefore the distance a political party is from winning office likely influences the internal relationships found in its policy-making process.

In returning to more generally theoretical concepts, Samuel J. Eldersveld's book Political Parties: A Behavioural Analysis provided an interesting hypothesis which attempted to modify and at least partially refute Michels' iron law.⁴⁴ As a result of studying American political parties, which are usually more heterogeneous in their composition than European parties because of the USA's varied regional, ethnic, and religious make-up Eldersveld saw parties as being made up of sub-coalitions. He extrapolated from this that although party organizations are hierarchical in formal structure, power in the party is shared between the leadership and the lower levels of the party. He called this type of relation a stratarchy. Eldersveld justified this claim of dispersed power by stating that:

The very heterogeneity of membership, and the sub-coalition system, make centralized control not only difficult but unwise. In the process of adaptation, then, the party develops its own hierarchical pattern of stratified devolution of responsibility for the settlement of conflicts, rather than jeopardize the viability of the total organization by carrying such conflicts to the top command levels of the party. Further the party must cope with widely varying milieus of opinion, tradition and social structure, and this encourages the recognition and acceptance of local leadership, local strategy, local power. In addition the desperate need in all parties for votes, which are scarcely mobilized at the apex of the hierarchy, results in at least some, if not pronounced deference to the local structural strata where votes are won or lost.⁴⁵

In Eldersveld's analysis it is possible for a centralization of power to occur but his remark that such an attempt would be electorally unwise is most telling. By allowing some dispersion

of power, local party members, who may have been supporters or leading members of a counter-elite in a highly centralized party organization, are co-opted into supporting the party leadership. Eldersveld's comment on the need for dispersion of power in order to cope with widely varying local milieus reflects the importance, as mentioned briefly by Duverger, of societal cleavages in party organization and decision-making. It would appear that it is easier to centralize power in a political party when there is perhaps only one major cleavage in a country than in a country which has many societal cleavages.

Cleavages are part of the external environment in which political parties operate. A country with many cleavages may thus affect parties by having them reflect diverse political cultures within one organization. Constitutional arrangements are also influenced by a multi-cleavaged society. The result for many countries, and in turn their parties, has been to come to terms with federalism. Concepts such as federalism and multi-cleavaged societies obviously lend themselves well to a discussion of Canada and now, therefore, some of the Canadian literature on political party organization and policy-making will be examined.

The first major work was F.C. Engelman and M.A. Schwartz's Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure which first⁴⁶ appeared in 1967 and was later revised in 1975. A major emphasis of the authors was the effect that Canadian societal cleavages and institutions had on party organizations. Of prime importance is the parliamentary system, transferred from Britain,

which centralizes power in the cabinet, and the single member constituency electoral system which gives activists and competing elites potential bases of power. Also noted were ethnic and regional cleavages which work against extreme centralization by necessitating local input. A final major factor mentioned was the federal system of government which "has profoundly influenced party organization in Canada. The organization of the Liberal, Conservative, NDP and Social Credit parties is so structured as to make the provincial organization the most significant unit."⁴⁷

This is not really the case with the federal Liberals as will be shown later. However centralized oligarchic control is rather difficult in the remaining federal parties under Canada's federal system because there are competing oligarchies that have very strong bases of power in the provincial organizations. The provincial parties, in fact, are often more powerful than their respective federal counterparts.

In order to classify Canadian parties, Engelmann and Schwartz borrowed Deverger's terms of mass and cadre parties. The authors differentiated the two types by stating "Our own choice for emphasis stresses the degree to which party members...participate in crucial decisions within the party organization, and through this, in influencing the party's legislative behaviour."⁴⁸

At the conclusion of their analysis Engelmann and Schwartz hypothesized:

...that the importance of the extra-parliamentary structure of a party in policy-making increases to the extent that a party has a mass type, participatory organization, a narrow support base, and a focus of appeal based on principle. A historical development outside of the governmental experience, we claim, will tend to re-inforce the importance of extra-governmental policy-making.⁴⁹

From this statement we can deduce two variables which work towards opening up a party's internal policy-making process. One is the party's origins being extra-parliamentary as opposed to intra-parliamentary. The other is centering the party's electoral campaign based on an appeal to principle. This itself focuses a great deal of attention on the party's decision making process and attempts would be made to keep the process from appearing under oligarchic control.

Concluding on the differentiation of parties. Engelmann and Schwartz seemed to indicate that any major oligarchic party will lean towards oligarchic tendencies and elite control. "In practise, the attainment of governmental responsibility has caused mass parties to adapt the latter mode, of a cadre elite run party ..."⁵⁰

The only other comprehensive overview of Canadian political parties is Conrad Winn and John McMenemy's Political Parties in Canada.⁵¹ Their analysis of party organizations in Canada was very similar to Michels as can be seen in statements such as "At the highest level of each party exists a small set of decision-makers or operating elite who exert great influence over policy and especially over election strategies"⁵² or "All constitutions provide for the democratic

participation of party members. Nonetheless all parties are governed in practice by a small group of leaders located primarily in parliament.⁵³ The entire focus of the authors' approach to party policy-making was to prove the oligarchic control of parties by elites.

There are studies dedicated to single Canadian parties which give useful commentary on internal party organization, and Reginald Whitaker's The Government Party is one of them.⁵⁴ This book examined the Liberal Party from 1930 to 1958 and recorded how the parliamentary leadership of the federal Liberals dominated the party organization. "There is very little evidence of demands for participation by the rank-and-file membership in policy making or even leadership selection in this era of the Liberal Party's history."⁵⁵ The existence of constituency MP's in the Canadian parliamentary system was one fact which divested some authority from the centre of the party, while the provincial Liberal organizations were a larger challenge to the power of the federal Liberal elite. Since the federal and provincial Liberals were not united around ideology they competed for financial and personnel resources. The Liberals held power federally from 1935 to 1957 so they were successful in attracting prominent people into the party. Also as the dispensers of federal patronage the Liberals were able to attract enough funds from corporate donors for its electoral activities. Many provincial Liberal parties became of minor importance in this period as money and personnel went instead to the federal level. Thus as a result of its federal electoral victories, the Liberal elite in Ottawa was

dominant over the provincial parties. This is the opposite of the other federal parties as described earlier by Engelmann and Schwartz.

The 1960's and early 1970's was a period when the Liberal Party engaged in a renewal both philosophically and organizationally as observed by both Joseph Wearing and David Smith.⁵⁶ Philosophically the Liberals moved leftward and organizationally they created structures to allow for an open and democratic internal decision-making process. This striving for democracy was hampered firstly, by a lack of activity by rank-and-file Liberal members due to either ignorance or skepticism.⁵⁷ Secondly, and most importantly, this experiment failed because the Liberal cabinet either downplayed or ignored the resolutions passed by the party conference. Thus although the Liberals set up a formal party organization where there were avenues for membership input, the party remained one which was controlled in oligarchic fashion by the parliamentary leadership.

This conclusion is a common one not just for the Liberals but for all parties. Most of the literature reviewed here indicates that by their nature political parties are in effect run by oligarchies. However since many authors put qualifications on their assessments of its absoluteness, it appears that Michels' law of oligarchy is not made of iron. In analyzing a political party's policy-making process to see if the term oligarchy is applicable there are key factors to be examined.

It is perhaps natural that the leader of a political party,

due to the prominence of his or her position, will be able to have an influence over the mass membership. What is important to note is whether the leader uses his or her position to stress the importance of party members agreeing with "the leader". Also to be examined is whether the leader tries to take a neutralist position by not becoming involved in factional disputes, as Rose suggested, or instead uses the position to try and eliminate the opposition within the party.

One step below the position of leader are found the elites of the party and their roles must also be looked at for understanding the policy-making process of a party. Important questions centre around who make up the elites what role they have in developing policy and controlling the party policy-making process and what support the elite or counter elites have from the mass membership of the party.

The position of the bureaucracy in the party's decision making apparatus is a key part of establishing the extent of oligarchic domination of a political party. Does the bureaucracy act as a supporter of the party leadership as Michels had written or does it tend to remain neutral as Rose and Minkin argue (and thus indicate a more open policy-making process).

When analyzing the role of the mass membership of the party several points can be raised. Firstly what are the formal avenues open for input into the policy-making process. Secondly how many members bother to get involved. Thirdly, what types of inputs are given by party members and fourthly how much this membership input actually influences the outcome of policy

statements developed by the party.

Two additional factors to be examined are the effects of party organizational structures institutionalizing elites in power and the importance of unity within the political party for conducting electoral campaigns. The former involves, for example, the existence of party constitutional arrangements which guarantee elites in the party the power to dominate it. The latter is a result of a party being centred around policy as a motivational force for its campaign workers.

Finally the influence of factors from the external environment must be looked at to determine the existence of an oligarchy in a political party. The constitutional form of government and especially the existence of federalism will play an important role.

By examining the policy-making process of the federal New Democratic Party, through looking firstly at the party's history and then in more detail through tracing the development of its 1983 Statement of Principles and Objectives, it will be determined whether the term oligarchy is applicable to Canada's social democratic party or whether a different type of internal policy process exists.

Footnotes

1 Robert Michels, Political Parties. (New York: Collier Books 1962) p. 365.

2 Moisei Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties. Volume I and II. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books 1964).

3 Ostrogorski, Volume I. p. xx.

4 Ibid., p. 315.

5 Ibid., p. 299.

6 Ibid., p. xxi.

7 Ostrogorski, Volume II. p. 349.

8 Ibid., p. 331.

9 Michels.

10 Ibid., p. 15.

11 Ibid., p. 80.

12 Ibid., p. 345.

13 Ibid., p. 367.

14 Ibid., p. 86.

15 Ibid., p. 88.

16 Ibid., p. 91.

17 Ibid., p. 91.

18 Duverger, p. 66.

19 Michels, p. 147.

20 Ibid., p. 16.

21 Ibid., p. 88.

22 Duverger.

23 Ibid., p. xv.

24 Ibid., p. 64.

25 Ibid., p. 64.

26 Ibid., p. 63.

27 Ibid., p. 133.

28 Ibid., p. 145-6.

29 Ibid., p. 154.

30 Ibid., p. 110.

31 Ibid., p. 131.

32 Ibid., p. 174.

33 Ibid., p. 194.

34 Ibid., p. 195.

35 Robert T. McKenzie, British Political Parties. (New York: Collier Books 1962).

36 Ibid., p. 16.

37 Ibid., p. 635.

38 Ibid., p. 644.

39 Ibid., p. 646.

40 Richard Rose, "Parties, Factions, and Tendencies in Britain," Political Parties Contemporary Trends and Ideas. ed. R.C. Macridis (New York: Harper Torch books 1967), p. 102-117.

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43 Lewis Minkin, The Labour Party Conference. (London: Allen Lane 1978).

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46 F.C. Engelmann, M.A. Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure. (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd. 1967); F.C. Engelmann, M.A. Schwartz, Canadian Political Parties: Origin, Character, Impact. (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada Ltd. 1975).

47 Engelmann and Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure. p. 128.

48 Engelmann and Schwartz, Canadian Political Parties: Origin, Character, Impact. p. 19.

49

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Engelmann and Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure. p. 251.

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John McMenemy, Conrad Winn, Political Parties in Canada. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited 1976).

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Reginald Whitaker, The Government Party. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1977).

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David Smith, The Regional Decline of a National Party. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981); Joseph Wearing, The L- Shaped Party. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited 1981).

57

See for example Smith, Chapter 5.

Chapter Two: Policy-Making and Past Principles

The establishment of criteria for evaluating the policy-making process of the CCF-NDP allows for some analysis of the party in a historical context. By tracing the origins and development of major statements of principles and policies in the social democratic party's past it can be observed where power lies within the party as well as what factors as outlined in the previous chapter, affect this distribution of power. This chapter will further note changes in the structure of the party which have influenced the process of decision-making.

Before outlining the CCF-NDP's decision-making structures it would be useful to briefly note the constitutional framework in which the party has had to operate since the effect of the external environment has been substantial.

Perhaps most important in Canada is the federal system of government which exists as a reflection of a society with many cleavages. The federal system has meant that there are two sovereign levels of government which both have substantial powers. This in turn influences political parties which have to organize for both provincial and federal elections. Societal cleavages have manifested themselves into the force of, for example regionalism, forces which have influenced the federal CCF and even more so the federal NDP.

A further external factor affecting the social democratic party is the electoral system of Canada. The single member constituencies have meant that CCF-NDP MP's or MLA's have the

possibility of maintaining high profile dissidence through their relative independence in a riding association. This is contrary to many European countries where MP's owe their election to the party for being included on party lists.

The adoption of parliamentary and Cabinet government in Canada has had an important influence on Canadian political parties. Due to the need of the government to maintain majority support power tends to be centralized in the cabinet and office of the prime minister. This centralization is paralleled in the party organization. The acceptance of this centralization may be tempered by a political party's origins being outside Parliament. The CCF's origins are both parliamentary and extraparliamentary in origin.

The conference in Calgary on August 1, 1932 which established the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (Farmer, Labour, Socialist) was a gathering of farmers' organizations and small labour parties who felt that the depths of the depression was the most favourable time to launch a socialist political party in Canada. Some of the organizations which came to the Calgary conference, such as the United Farmers of Canada (Saskatchewan Section) and the All Canadian Congress of Labour, had not really engaged in direct political activities while others such as Manitoba's Independent Labour Party and the United Farmers of Alberta were led by people of considerable parliamentary experience.

The conference established both a constitution for the CCF as well as a very basic program. The constitution set up the CCF

as a true federation. The national organization was a federation of provincial bodies which in turn were organized themselves as federations. Having affiliations take place at the provincial level allowed the National CCF, with its National Council and Executive¹ being the governing bodies between party conventions, to play the role of conciliator and overseer of party affairs. It also allowed the National CCF to be one step removed from some of the bitter infighting between organizations at the provincial level.²

While the organizational structures and relationships of the party were still fluid in its first few years, the CCF did undertake the production of its programmatic elements. The construction of ideological documents indicates the type of policy-making evident in the CCF in its early stages at least.

At the Calgary Conference the one hundred and five representatives of the Farmer and Labour groups³ adopted a resolution setting out the purpose of the new federation as well as adopting a fairly general eight point program which nevertheless, made it clear that the new party would be a socialist one. The resolution which stated the purpose of the CCF was drafted by a resolutions committee consisting of M.J. Coldwell, a Regina alderman representing Saskatchewan's Independent Labour Party, Robert Gardiner, a United Farmers of Alberta Member of Parliament and George Latham of the Canadian Labour Party.⁴

In addition, Coldwell, as chairman of the resolutions committee, introduced a fourteen point program that was debated

by the entire conference. The original fourteen points were constructed as a combination of proposals presented by the various organizations at their individual conventions prior to the meeting in Calgary.⁵ After discussion of the program by the entire conference the document that emerged was an eight point program.⁶ This document was considered quite radical since it called for the socialization of banking, credit, the financial system, utilities and natural resources.

Prior to the conference's conclusion, elections were held for a nine person National provisional council which spent the next year organizing the party, establishing a formal constitution and creating a full policy document for the CCF.⁷ At the January.24-25, 1933 provisional National Council meeting, N.F. Priestly of the UFA and Vice-President of CCF and W.N. Smith were appointed to draft a manifesto of principles and policies based on the eight point Calgary program.⁸ These two had further instructions from the National Council to ask the research Committee of the League for Social Reconstruction (a recently formed group of self-styled Fabian intellectuals based in the Universities of Toronto and McGill) for assistance in writing the manifesto.⁹

The manifesto's further development indicates how influential a few people were with its overall creation. Frank Underhill, the chairman of the LSR research committee, wrote the original draft of the manifesto at his Muskoka cottage in June of 1933. He then discussed it with other LSR members in Toronto such as Escott Reid and Harry Cassidy. Another draft was

rewritten solely by Underhill to provide a uniformity of style with this document being forwarded to the provisional national council on July 16, 1933, the eve of the second CCF convention in Regina.¹⁰ J.S. Woodsworth himself, the leader of the CCF, apparently only saw a draft of the manifesto about two weeks before the convention.¹¹ According to Walter Young, the National Council spent three days discussing the manifesto paragraph by paragraph making slight revisions to it.¹²

The convention in Regina was held July 19-21 with the three days being devoted almost entirely to the manifesto debate.¹³ In contrast to the NDP conventions which usually had over one thousand delegates, the Regina convention was attended by only 131 delegates.¹⁴ The size of convention would generally allow for a greater involvement in the debates by the delegates in attendance. The level of informality can be drawn from the memoirs of David Lewis who recounts that the final phrase of the Regina Manifesto ("No CCF government will rest content until it has eradicated capitalism...") "...was not in the original draft, that it was composed during a break in proceedings to assuage the Marxist hard-liners."¹⁵ The manifesto was debated section by section (there were fourteen sections in all) with the overall changes being a slight moderation of tone, although the Regina Manifesto that was proclaimed was still largely the product of the LSR intellectuals.¹⁶

To ensure this outcome, however, the party leadership was active in procuring the result. Grace MacInnis writes of her father's activities at Regina:

J.S. Woodsworth's tremendous ability to work with people rose to its greatest height at this Convention. ...Like a persuasive father, he dominated the Convention without appearing to do so, constantly explaining the reason for differences of viewpoint and phrase, mediating the hot words of debate, opening the way for new solutions, and when compromise was impossible, taking his stand clearly and influencing others by this example.¹⁷

It can therefore be noted that the process involved in creating the Regina Manifesto was a fairly top down approach with the CCF political leaders delegating responsibility to the "party intellectuals" for its creation while using the prestige of leaders to ensure the manifesto's acceptance. This generally parallels the description of internal policy-making given by Michels. However, as the CCF's organizational structure in 1933 was still largely a federation of other organizations some compromise was necessary. As mentioned previously the final phrase in the document to eradicate capitalism was a sop to the marxist oriented British Columbia affiliate, the Socialist Party of Canada. Likewise the section of manifesto on agriculture which proposed "The improvement of the position of the farmer by the increase of purchasing power made possible by social control¹⁸ of the financial system." reflected the traditional antipathy of the affiliated United Farmers of Alberta towards the banks. Finally it should be noted that the debate at the convention established a tradition of having the delegates task being one which basically would accept or reject the policies of the party leaders.

In 1950 George McHenry wrote about the CCF "In recent con-

ventions, the National Council has assumed a larger and larger role of leadership", with the council planning the agenda and procedures of conventions.¹⁹ The increasing role of the party leadership in controlling conventions and policy making of the CCF was at least a partial result of the changing party organization. By 1939 when the United Farmers of Alberta ended their affiliation with the CCF, none of the original groups from the 1932-33 period were any longer formally affiliated with the CCF.²⁰

Throughout the 1930's the CCF provincial party's were reorganized so that CCF clubs, based largely on provincial riding boundaries, were the basic organizational units, not the affiliated groups.²¹ This more clearly established the CCF as a hierarchical structure with definite lines of authority and responsibility. Leadership was to come from the top levels of the CCF not from affiliated organizations. Loyalty no longer belonged to either the UFA or the ILP but solely to the CCF.

As the decade of the depression wound down and W.W.II heated up, the concept of leadership in the CCF was becoming more defined. Throughout the 1930's Woodsworth was not only the parliamentary leader of the CCF but he was also seen as the spiritual leader of the party by many.²² Woodsworth was also the head of the extraparlimentary organization as he served as president of the CCF from 1932 until his resignation in 1940 due to failing health.²³ Although Woodsworth was not adverse to taking strong organizational action, as with the drastic

restructuring of the Ontario CCF in 1934,²⁴ he saw the CCF as more of an educational and crusading movement with a decentralized structure.²⁵ Despite the fact that "Woodsworth had opposed the development of a central party office in Ottawa and the appointment of full-time party officials,"²⁶ by October of 1938 the CCF had hired David Lewis as full-time national secretary and had acquired an office in Ottawa.

The passing of the leadership mantle from Woodsworth to the more pragmatic M.J. Coldwell in 1940 allowed a further expansion of the central party apparatus. Coldwell had previously served as national secretary in a voluntary capacity and he recognized the need for full time organizational staff as he wrote "the organization would not become effective until there was someone who could command general respect devoting his whole time to the work."²⁷ Lewis himself was a very strong advocate of a larger full time staff for the National CCF in order to help the young party's success.²⁸

More important, however, in increasing the party bureaucracy of the CCF in the early 1940's was the rising popularity of the party and the affiliation of trade unions with their financial support. The late 1930's had seen the extension of the America CIO unions organizing drives into Canada with the CCF supporting the new unions and many individual CCF'ers becoming prominent leaders in these trade unions.²⁹ Lewis was a key person moving the new industrial unions to support the CCF as he had many contacts with the union leaders³⁰ and he firmly believed that a social democratic party would not be successful without the

backing of the trade unions in the country. As a result, only two years after its formal creation the Canadian Congress of Labour (the home of the new CIO inspired industrial unions) endorsed the CCF as the political arm of labour and in return the CCF made arrangements to have trade union locals to affiliate the CCF. The actual terms of affiliation would have union delegates at conventions vote as individual delegates, not as a bloc and also affiliated trade unions would have reduced representation at party conventions so that they would be only a minority of the delegates.³¹

The repercussions of the union affiliations on the CCF were varied. A breakdown of the delegates at the national CCF conventions in the 1940's and early 1950's shows that the number of delegates representing affiliated unions were very small - usually less than 5 per cent.³² Their influence, however, was larger than the delegates numbers indicated. For example it was trade union delegates who drew up the first slate of candidates for election of officer positions at the Ontario CCF's 1946 convention - a practice subsequently transferred to federal conventions. As mentioned earlier the union leaders had close personal ties with David Lewis, the senior full time party bureaucrat in the CCF. There was also the indirect influence of the financial contributions to the CCF from trade union coffers. When a group's donations account for fourteen percent of party finances, in 1947 for example,³³ its viewpoint will likely be taken into consideration. Certain specific unions would be more influential than others through loaning of staff or annual

donations with, for example, the United Autoworkers providing the CCF with \$12,000 annually after 1954.³⁴

The money from unions combined with the increasing membership in the early 1940's (less than 30,000 in 1942 to almost 100,000 by 1944)³⁵ provided the CCF with a greatly increased financial base. This was reflected in a growing full time bureaucracy as Lloyd Shaw was appointed research director³⁶ and Alan O'Brien was hired as assistant to the leader in 1943. The budget for the national CCF increased from about \$7,000 in 1941-42 to \$17,000 in 1942-43 to \$28,000 in 1943-44.⁴⁴ In addition, by 1944 there were 109 CCF Members of Legislative Assembly's in the provinces of Canada as well as eleven federal Members of Parliament.³⁸ Clearly the CCF was becoming a professional organization not a struggling group of volunteers as was the case in the 1930's. Leo Zakuta reflected upon the expanding member of party professionals, MLA's and full-time unionists, "many of whose careers were tied more closely than ever to its the CCF's electoral success".³⁹

The early 1940's solidified the relationships of power within the party which were very influential in shaping the future policy documents in the CCF-NDP. Zakuta continued about the role of leadership in the CCF.

The inner circle did not control the party. It was simply the most influential of the various informal groups and it owed much of that influence to its close links, both personal and professional with several other groups to top CCF leaders whose lives centred less exclusively on the party. The closest and most important of these groups consisted

largely of salaried trade union officials
mainly from the unions most friendly to the
party.⁴⁰

The idea of an inner circle is echoed by Walter Young who wrote that during the national CCF's twenty-nine year history, its ruling elite included no more than twelve people.⁴¹ The twelve people listed were either MP's or full time party bureaucrats, with both types being long serving members on the national executive. The predominance was due to this elites oratorical skills, their control of party communications, their superior knowledge of party affairs and party personalities, and by the fact that they themselves became prominent personalities within the party, thus assuring them of election to the top party offices.⁴²

With the party becoming populated by many full time people the role of the rank-and-file member in policy-making was to be limited. At the 1944 CCF interprovincial conference, attended by leading personalities of the federal and provincial parties it was recorded that "the rank-and-file simply cannot be doing their ordinary job and still expect to keep up on anything that is being done in parliament or the legislature, much less be consulted on every step by the elected MLA's."⁴³

The large influx of new members in the early 1940's accentuated the minor role for membership input into policy-making. Most of the new members were more interested in immediate reforms and were therefore relatively unconcerned about ideological debates.⁴⁴ Young wrote about

...the newcomers who were, for the most part, less committed to the movement and consequently slightly discomfited by the lubrications of the firey few. The new members were prepared to accept leadership from the top and were made uneasy by the extent of participation demanded by the older members.⁴⁵

The dominance of the leadership of the party combined with the passivity of most of the CCF membership did not necessarily mean that the social democratic party was a dictatorship of the few. As David Lewis reasonably argued

A grass roots movement does not mean a chaotic, leaderless mass. It means a regular, frequent constitutional opportunity to question and to change the leadership.... The important thing was that the constituency delegates have time to study the council statements before the convention met and that constituency organizations have an opportunity to advise their delegates as to the views of the membership.⁴⁶

Lewis' views of democracy within the CCF can be seen as an alternative view which sees the party's policy-making process as an open one.

One final point to note about organizational changes in the CCF during this period was the increasing focus of power in central Canada. At the 1932 Calgary conference there was only one delegate from east of Manitoba.⁴⁷ A dozen years later the national party's headquarters was in Ottawa with the core leadership being concentrated in Ontario and overlapping with, to an extent, the Ontario CCF's leadership.⁴⁸

It can thus be summarized that by the mid-1940's the organizational structure of the national CCF was accommodative towards a situation where the leadership of the party, consisting

of senior MP's, including the leader, party bureaucrats, and leading national executive members, could initiate policies, be supported by important trade union leaders, and have the policies accepted by a largely passive membership. There was usually some opposition to the leadership's policies but the nature of these oppositions varied and will be noted later in specific examples of policy-making. Clearly Michels and Duverger's claims of a dominant leadership and a passive membership in political parties were applicable to the CCF.

The CCF's 1944 national convention provided a practical example of the workings of developing a major policy statement. In preparation for the anticipated federal election an immediate program was to be created to complement the more general statements of the Regina Manifesto. The convention was held from November 29-December 1 in Montreal. 49

Earlier in 1944 the National Council had appointed a sub-committee consisting of Caldwell, Lewis and Frank Scott (one of the founders of the LSR and current national chairman of the CCF) to write this document. They were in turn assisted by the new CCF research director Stuart Jamieson. Lewis and Scott joined Caldwell while he was on a vacation in New Brunswick during August and the three of them rearranged, updated and put together some of the earlier policy statements to come up with a comprehensive election program. 50 Worthy of note is the fact that many of these statements were written largely by the party bureaucrats (Lewis and Scott's Make This Your Canada being a prime example) often without consultation to even the National

Council, never mind the CCF convention.

The draft statement was presented to the National Council meeting of August 29-30. After many hours of debate and some changes the document was passed. Some changes in the wording and re-editing were undertaken by Scott and Lewis with the National Executive approving this final draft on October 28. Copies were then "sent to the provincial secretaries of the CCF for

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confidential information and study." There was no real attempt to draw the rank-and-file members into this documents creation. Even the 208 delegates at the convention did not receive the document in advance. The sending of the draft to the provincial secretaries a month before the convention indicates that the national leadership felt that it could not ignore the wishes of the provincial elites if there was significant opposition. The fact that the CCF now formed the government of Saskatchewan and was close to power in British Columbia and in Ontario gave the provincial parties a high profile position, especially in that the provincial and national CCF organizations overlapped to a much greater extent than their Liberal and Conservative counterparts.

Reflections by David Lewis about the debate over the document at the convention indicates that the prestige of some members of the leadership was an important ingredient in their dominance:

Unfortunately, Parliament was debating the issue of conscription as the convention met, and Coldwell, MacInnis, and other MP's were not in attendance in Montreal. The defence of the council proposal therefore fell to the

smaller group of officers and Executive members who were present.⁵⁴

The participants in the debate show how it was not really an exercise to involve the rank-and-file delegates but instead a debate between elites within the party. This echoes Duverger's observations about factional disputes within parties. Arguing in favour of the election document was Lewis, Scott, Ted Joliffe (Leader of the Ontario CCF), and George Grube (a prominent CCfer and LSR member) while the argument against was headed by Harold Winch (leader of the British Columbia CCF) and Colin Cameron (a BC MLA).⁵⁵ The arguments made by Winch and Cameron focussed on the document not being radical enough while the leadership defended the program as being a pragmatic statement for running, in effect, a mixed economy. After listening to the elite of the party and a left-wing counter elite (at this point the left-wing of the CCF had no organizational efforts behind their protestations) the convention delegates fulfilled their role which could be seen as merely a ratification of an executive decision.

After the disastrous results of both the 1945 and 1949 federal elections the CCF spent much of the 1950's trying to figure out how to reverse its gradual decline as a political force. The ideological culmination of a six year process was the Winnipeg Declaration of Principles in 1956.⁵⁷ The relevant events of those six years demonstrate a great deal about the policy-making process of Canada's social democratic party.

By 1950 there had been considerable discussion among the national officers, Executive and Council about a restatement of principles in order to help the sagging fortunes of the CCF.⁵⁸ A federal parliamentary caucus meeting held on July 22, 1950 agreed with a statement to be brought forward to the upcoming convention which would authorize the national council to set in motion the process of creating a new statement of principles.⁵⁹

The 1950 convention took place in Vancouver on July 26-28.⁶⁰ Both Scott and Coldwell made major speeches to the convention stressing the need for a new statement as Coldwell called for a redefinition "in light of new developments which have occurred in the past decade."⁶¹ The resolution which was put forward to delegates, and passed by a large majority, affirmed the Regina Manifesto but instructed the "National Council to prepare a statement of the application of democratic socialist principles to Canada and the world today."⁶² This new statement was originally proposed as an amendment to the Regina Manifesto so it was apparent that the Manifesto would not be replaced. Despite this there was some very vocal opposition to this motion by prominent leftists such as long time BC MLA Ernest Winch and Saskatchewan CCF president Carlyle King.⁶³ The national office went further to reassure skeptical members by printing Scott's speech from the convention in News Comment (the CCF national newspaper) and stating that the Regina Manifesto was not going to be rewritten. The resolution was explained as being similar to other western socialist party's rethinking their ideology.⁶⁴

At the January, 1951 National Executive meeting a committee

consisting of Lewis, Lorne Ingle (the new National secretary), Donald MacDonald (currently national treasurer and organizer and shortly to be elected Ontario CCF leader), and Andrew Brewin (prominent member of the National and Ontario CCF and future Member of Parliament) was appointed to develop proposals for carrying out the resolution passed at the previous convention.⁶⁵

The proposals from the committee were accepted by National Council which in turn appointed an ad hoc committee to draw up the new statement of principles. Young outlines the proposals:

...that the council invite suggestions from the party at large, such suggestions to be incorporated in a draft by the ad hoc committee, the draft to be submitted to the executive for approval, circulated to national council members and provincial councils for further suggestions, and then the draft and suggestions to be debated at a national council meeting. Following this meeting a second draft would be prepared by the ad hoc committee; this was to be circulated and discussed at the council meeting prior to the 1952 convention, a third and final draft then being prepared for submission to the convention itself. The ad hoc committee consisted of Lewis, Frank Scott, Brewin, T.C. Douglas, Ingle, Hazen Argue, Grace MacInnis, Joe Noseworthy, Francois Laroche, and Claire Gillis.⁶⁶

This ad hoc committee was made up of MP's and Senior party officers and also tried to give balance to the regions of the country and the ideological interests within the CCF. Regionalism, and in effect federalism, could be seen as playing a role in the policy-making process of the CCF.

The drawing up of the draft was divided into five sub-committees, each working on one section of the draft. These sections, in turn were co-ordinated and edited by the national

office and sent out to the national and provincial councils in June with a request for comments and suggestions to be made by September 1, 1951.⁶⁷ The criticisms of this draft, as cited by Lewis, generally were that the document was apologetic and not rousing enough with this criticism being directed not so much at its contents as at the style and tone of presentation.⁶⁸

The national council met again in October to hammer out the differences of opinion on the document with the resulting draft being substantially larger than a mere appendix. Lorne Ingle and Grace MacInnis were then appointed to re-edit the draft to make its language simpler and more colourful with this new document being published October 22 and circulated to all sections of the party for discussion.⁶⁹ This draft document was also published in the national newspaper, now called Comment, so that all party members would be aware of it.⁷⁰

The February 1952 National Executive meeting revealed a general unhappiness with this draft, especially from the Saskatchewan and B.C. representatives.⁷¹ With opposition from the two most important provincial CCF sections (being the government in Saskatchewan, and the official opposition in British Columbia) it was not surprising that the National Council in March, 1952 decided to postpone the creation of a new statement of principles till the 1954 convention.⁷² The 1952 convention merely voted to give the National Council "the authority to continue the work started with a view to completing the statement for presentation to the 1954 convention."⁷³

In November of 1953 National Council asked the drafting

committee headed by Brewin to come up with another draft. ⁷⁴ The National Executive meetings of May and June, 1954 considered this new draft a good discussion of the CCF approach to every day ⁷⁵ problems but inadequate for a statement of principles. This draft did not even make it to council, never mind the 1954 convention.

The January 1955 National Council meeting had the matter of a new statement of principles raised by Coldwell. ⁷⁶ The leadership of the CCF was determined to see a new statement realized. At the January 1956 National Council meeting Coldwell again raised the issue and this time was given support in a ⁷⁷ speech by Saskatchewan premier Douglas. Even though this council was attended by noted left-wingers such as Colin Cameron and H.W. Herridge, a motion was passed unanimously that the National Convention to be held in Winnipeg on August 1-3, 1956 ⁷⁸ must produce a new statement of principles. The February National Executive meeting appointed Lewis (chairman), Ingle, Omar Chartrand (Quebec provincial secretary) and Morden Lazarus (Ontario CCF Secretary) to prepare a draft statement for the ⁷⁹ convention. The Committee's draft was studied and amended at the National Executive meeting on June 16 and forwarded to the ⁸⁰ National Council meeting held on the eve of the convention.

Although not part of the formal process, this draft would have been circulated to the various provincial council and executive ⁸¹ members for comments. The draft forwarded to National Council consisted of a number of general principles which were accompanied by detailed policies but Council decided that only

the principles would be considered by the convention. The night of July 30 had council appoint a larger committee which, in addition to Lewis, Ingle, Chartrand and Lazarus, contained Douglas, Clarence Fines (former president of the Saskatchewan CCF), and Frank McKenzie (former secretary of the BC CCF).⁸²

Douglas, Fines, and McKenzie were undoubtedly helpful in ensuring the previous disagreements by Saskatchewan and BC would not re-emerge. This Committee worked through the night to present a new draft to council the next day. Council examined the draft paragraph by paragraph making still more changes before its presentation to convention.⁸³

The debate on the convention floor was not a heated one as delegates largely supported the leadership of the CCF in their efforts to "modernize" the party principles.⁸⁴ Finally with the Declaration adopted Coldwell, Ingle, MacDonald, and Lewis were appointed by National Council to do some final editing "since a number of changes were made in the course of the convention debate and needed polishing."⁸⁵

The published Winnipeg Declaration represented a very elaborate and extensive process to involve all levels of the CCF in the creation of a new statement of principles. The National and provincial executives, councils and bureaucracies all had opportunities to participate in and influence the development of the new document. There were also opportunities for rank-and-file members to submit their comments. By looking at only the events of 1956, however, it can be seen quite clearly how the elites in the National CCF, with Lewis (the bureaucrat) and to a lesser extent Coldwell (the parliamentary leader), were the main

originators and architects of the Winnipeg Declaration. The mass membership of the party was given no opportunity for input and even the convention delegates were only able to find out what the exact document they would be debating was just hours before the start of the convention.⁸⁶ The process of creating the Winnipeg Declaration also gave further evidence of the fact that the national party would like to have the provincial elites supporting them when undertaking major statements of policy.

Although the process in creating the Winnipeg Declaration covered a six year period, its importance was to be undermined in only two years as major structural changes in Canada's social democratic movement necessitated the production of yet another major document.

1956 was an important year for the CCF as it also heralded the unification of Canada's two major trade union congresses into the new Canadian Labour Congress.⁸⁷ With the decimation of the CCF in the 1958 federal election the stage was set for something that leaders in both the CCF and CLC had been discussing for a few years. The CLC convention held on April 21-25, 1958 adopted a resolution calling for the establishment of a new "broadly based political movement which embraces the CCF, the labour movement, farm organizations, professional people and other liberally minded people."⁸⁸ The 1958 CCF convention also passed this motion by a unanimous vote after realizing that at this point there was no realistic alternative.⁸⁹ In May of 1958 the CCF's National Council appointed eight people (later expanded to ten) to the newly created National Committee for the New Party to

join an equal number of representatives from the CLC.⁹⁰ The CCF representatives on the NCNP were the most prominent people from the party leadership, including Douglas, Lewis and Scott and it seemed that they would continue to constitute the leadership of the New Party, albeit with more prominent support from many of the trade union leaders.

The NCNP appointed four sub-committees, three of which were involved in attempting to bring in more organizations into the process of creating a new party, with the fourth "to work on a draft constitution and program for report back to the main committee."⁹¹

The second half of 1958 and 1959 had the NC institute a series of seminars and conferences across Canada at which the three groups (CCFers, unionists, liberally minded persons)⁹² discussed possible constitutions and programs for the new party. A number of documents for discussion purposes were published. Similar meetings were held at the various levels of the CCF and the trade union movement to consider these issues independently.⁹²

After the many preliminary consultations, in January of 1960 the NCNP issued study papers outlining a proposed constitution and program to serve as guides for discussion during a second series of meetings and seminars, culminating in the formulation by the NCNP of documents for approval by delegates at the 1961 convention.⁹³ At the founding convention of the newly christened New Democratic Party, held July 31 to August 4; the proposed program was adopted with little in the way of amendments.⁹⁴

The statement adopted at the NDP's founding convention was

ideologically similar to the Winnipeg Declaration (although the terms socialism and social democracy were avoided) but the purposes behind their creations were different. The Winnipeg document was to replace the more radical language and policies of the Regina Manifesto while the NDP's programme was not to alter ideology but merely to emphasize that organizational changes had been made in Canada's social democratic movement. In other words the 1961 document was to give the appearance of action.

The creation of New Party clubs during the three year period leading up to the foundation of the NDP was only a temporary measure as they were dissolved and their members absorbed into riding associations.⁹⁵ The major structural change with the creation of the NDP was the affiliation of a large number of trade unions to the party and their representation at NDP councils and conventions. Trade union delegates represented a substantial minority at the founding convention (631 out of 1801) although their proportion would be less at most of the later conventions.⁹⁶

The New Democratic Party in terms of its leadership and its policy-making process appeared to be little different from the CCF of recent years. The creation of the New Party Program was a lengthy one which allowed thorough consideration of it by rank-and-file members, affiliated members and soon to be members. The program was in the end work of the elites in the party and the members simply approved it. Still, the NDP's creation was, according to Walter Young, a far cry from the CCF's "If the CCF grew naturally from the grass roots, the party which succeeded it

was grown artificially from the top down, in the way the Liberal and Conservative parties came into being." ⁹⁷

The 1960's saw the NDP focusing most of its attention on elections rather than ideology but with the 1968 election putting Pierre Trudeau's Liberals in power for four years, the New Democrats turned inward. Major policy pronouncements had always emanated from the leadership at the top of the party but with the 1969 NDP convention approaching an initiative came instead from other quarters of the party. The increasing concern over the effects of foreign ownership on the economy, illustrated most prominently in the federal government's own task force on foreign ownership in 1968, and the fact that the NDP had not thoroughly addressed this issue, caused some New Democrats to take action.

The spring of 1969 saw a small group of New Democrats, most of them being academics or of academic background, gather at a series of informal meetings in Toronto to produce what would be known as the Waffle Manifesto. ⁹⁸ Its principal author was James Laxer, a graduate student from Toronto. Other important persons included in the manifesto's creation were Mel Watkins (an academic who had served on the federal government's task force on foreign ownership), Gerald Caplan (a history instructor), Giles Endicott (a trade union employee) and Ed Broadbent (who previous to his election as an MP had been an economics professor), although Caplan, Endicott, and Broadbent would later dissociate ⁹⁹ themselves from it. The manifestoes ideological thrust was to the left of the NDP, emphasizing Canadian independence from the American economy, the need for extensive public ownership,

the need for workers control, and the recognition of Quebec's right to determine its own future.

As the manifesto was circulated during the summer of 1969 it was endorsed by many academics, only a half dozen trade unionists, two prospective party leaders (Charles Taylor and Laurier Lapierre), B.C. leader Dave Barrett, officers from various levels of the party, several MLA's from Manitoba, two dozen riding associations, and the New Democratic Youth, although no federal MP's endorsed it.

The party leadership responded to this ideological challenge by having the federal executive in June of 1969 instruct David Lewis and Charles Taylor, the NDP vice-president who had earlier retracted his endorsement of the Waffle manifesto to draft, with the help of historian Desmond Morton, an alternative statement on Canadian independence and foreign ownership. The result was the document "For a United and Independent Canada."

The federal council meeting held on the eve of the October convention endorsed the Lewis-Taylor statement but also agreed to have a structured side by side debate of the two documents. The two sides had ten speakers with no more than five minutes each to argue their point. Speakers for the Waffle included Watkins, three western MLAs, Quebec delegate Laurier Lapierre, B.C. student leader John Conway, Gerry Caplan, and Paddy Neale of the Vancouver Labour Council. Speakers for the establishment leadership document included Lewis, Douglas, Broadbent, Taylor, John Marney (secretary of the Ontario NDP), and Dennis McDermott of the United Auto Workers. The vote at the Winnipeg convention

saw the triumph of the leadership position by a vote of 499 to 268.¹⁰⁴ The period right after the convention saw many more prominent New Democrats repudiate their involvement with the Waffle. The later expulsion of the Waffle caused little in the way of a disruption at the top levels of the party

While the Waffle was active it organized quite extensively as can be seen through its publication of a newsletter, collection of funds, maintaining a list of supporters, hiring organizers, maintaining a network of steering committees and issuing statements to the press.¹⁰⁵ All this activity merely served to illustrate how the Waffle had constructed itself as a group of counter elites. The Waffle's "steering committee and communications sub-committee paralleled the party's Council and Executive."¹⁰⁶ The process of creating the Waffle Manifesto involved only a few individuals and once it was drafted, the mobilization undertaken for its support, and other later objectives of the Waffle, was that of approval by the convention delegates, a position not unlike that of the dominant leadership of the NDP.

The 1970s saw the NDP achieving some real electoral successes, capturing power in the provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia. As the decade proceeded, regional tensions in Canada exacerbated. The election of the Parti Quebecois in 1976 was the most dramatic manifestation of this but tensions between the western resource producing provinces and the eastern resource producing provinces and the eastern resource consuming provinces became increasingly

pronounced. A 1974 NDP federal council meeting featured an intense debate over energy policy between David Lewis, representing the federal NDP's Ontario centred point of view, and Alan Blakeney, the NDP premier of Saskatchewan, representing the resource rich west.

Differences between federal and provincial NDP leaders had become quite important in the policy-making process of the federal NDP.

In overall structure the New Democratic Party of Canada is a federation of largely autonomous provincial parties. The sixties have seen a steady devolution of activity and influence, particularly to the five provincial sections west of the Ottawa River.

As the federal and provincial organizations of the NDP overlap (a person can only join the federal NDP by joining the respective provincial party) disagreements between the two can cause harm to, among other things, the effectiveness of electoral activities. To a minor federal political party, the prestige given by active support from two or three provincial premiers is most helpful. As the provincial party is the basic unit of organization, the withholding of the provincial NDP's full resources from the federal NDP could be very damaging in an election campaign.

Conflict of this sort arose when the dispute between the federal Liberal government and most provinces over a new constitution in the early 1980's spilled over into the internal affairs of the NDP. Federal NDP leader Ed Broadbent supported the Liberal government on the patriation of the constitution and

a large majority of the federal caucus in turn supported this position. Blakeney, the only NDP premier at the time, his Saskatchewan caucus and four MP's from Saskatchewan opposed the patriation of the constitution and the scene was set for a major confrontation at the NDP's 1981 convention.¹⁰⁹

Although this conflict was not centred around a major statement of principles or programs, it was arranged as a most important debate with each side taking turns at the convention microphones over a three and a half hour time span. Those speaking in favour of patriation included Broadbent, Douglas, longtime MP Stanley Knowles, and former British Columbia premier Dave Barrett. Those speakers who opposed patriation included Blakeney, Saskatchewan Attorney-General I. Roy Romanov, and Lorne Nystrom, the most prominent of the four dissident Saskatchewan MP's. The result of the vote had sixty-three percent of the convention delegates supporting the position of the party leadership with the minority vote being concentrated among delegates from Saskatchewan, Alberta, Quebec, the Yukon, parts of B.C. and the Left Caucus in Ontario.¹¹⁰

The results of the debate over the constitution indicated a major division between elites in the NDP. Although Blakeney was not involved in the day to day operation of the federal party he would be seen to have been considered a supporter of the establishment leadership. Blakeney, along with Barrett and former Manitoba premier Ed Schreyer, had supported Broadbent's successful federal leadership campaign in 1975.¹¹¹ Blakeney commanded considerable support and respect throughout the party

having served ten years as Saskatchewan premier, yet the federal leadership proceeded with the 1981 convention debate despite Blakeney's, and other prominent New Democrats, opposition to the federal NDP's position. This was quite a contrast to the early 1950's when the opposition of the Saskatchewan and B.C. CCF's sections effectively killed the federal party's attempt to bring in a new statement of principles. This tactic of confrontation is even more surprising given the existence of a more decentralized federalism in Canada in the 1960's and 1970's.

The federal NDP's leadership of the early 1970's in its dealings with the Waffle had opposed and triumphed over the Waffle's left-wing ideology through a head on confrontation. The Waffle, although it had organizational strength in many riding associations, lacked support in the leadership level of the federal party, in the trade union leadership, and in the stronger provincial NDP sections which supported the federal leadership. The conflict over the constitution in the early 1980's demonstrated the federal leadership's position that it could also oppose and triumph over provincial leaders who also had support in many riding associations as well as support among some NDP parliamentarians and legislative assembly men. The next two years in the NDP would deal with the creation of a new statement of principles and objectives. Perhaps the most important point to focus on in this procedure was whether the federal leadership would continue its confrontation of the counter elites within the NDP or whether policy-making would follow a path of greater compromise to include as broad a segment as possible in the

creation and support of a new policy statement.

Footnotes

¹Dean E. McHenry, The Third Force in Canada. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers 1976) p. 29.

²See for example Gerald L. Caplan, The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism, The CCF in Ontario. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited 1973) p. 50-62.

³Grace MacInnis, J.S. Woodsworth, A Man to Remember. (Toronto: MacMillan Company of Canada Limited 1953) p. 266.

⁴Young, p. 41.

⁵Young, p. 42.

⁶MacInnis, p. 267; for entire program see Michael S. Cross, The Decline and Fall of A Good Idea CCF-NDP Manifestoes 1932-1969. (Toronto: New Hogtown Press 1974) p. 18.

⁷MacInnis, p. 267-8.

⁸McHenry, p. 29.

⁹Young, p. 43.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 43.

¹¹Lewis, p. 425.

¹²Young, p. 43.

¹³Lewis, p. 425.

¹⁴MacInnis, p. 272.

¹⁵Lewis, p. 377.

- 16 Young, p. 44; for entire manifesto see Cross, p. 19-29.
- 17 MacInnis, p. 279.
- 18 Cross, p. 21.
- 19 McHenry, p. 36.
- 20 Young, p. 48.
- 21 Zakuta, p. 23.
- 22 Young, p. 28.
- 23 MacInnis, p. 267; 314-316.
- 24 Caplan, p. 59-61.
- 25 Young, p. 147, footnote.
- 26 Ibid., p. 147.
- 27 Lewis, p. 126.
- 28 Young, p. 99-100.
- *29 Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1968) p. 67.
- 30 Young, p. 84.
- 31 Horowitz, p. 73-74.
- 32 Ibid., p. 81.

33 Zakuta, p. 77.

34 Young, p. 122.

35 Ibid., p. 111.

36 Lewis, p. 139..

37 Young, p. 111.

38 Ibid., p. 111..

39 Zakuta, p. 59.

40 Ibid., p. 26.

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43 Ibid., p. 153.

44 Zakuta, p. 67.

45 Young, p. 113.

46 Lewis, p. 355.

47 Caplan, p. 9.

48 Zakuta, p. 25-9.

49 Cross, p. 24.

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72 Ibid., p. 173.

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- 87
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- 88
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- 90
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- 91
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- 92
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- 94
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- 95
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- 96
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- 97
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107 Morton, p. 159-160.

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111 Morton, p. 173.

Chapter Three: The Creation and Development of the Document

It was not too many months after the NDP's 1981 federal convention in Vancouver that the policy-making process under examination began. The development of a document of party principles offered the possibility that all parts of the New Democratic Party might become involved in debates and discussions of social democratic ideas. The avenues made open for input and the weight given to various members and groups within the party would indicate how the NDP's internal policy-making process operates.

The twenty-one months taken up with the creation and development of the NDP's 1983 Statement of Principles and Objectives can be divided into three sections. The first fifteen months will be centred around the committee of the NDP's federal council which came up with the draft document. This period highlights the influence of some of the party's leading elites as well as its bureaucratic apparatus. The next five and a half months cover the various reactions to the first published draft document by elites in the NDP that are supportive of the party leadership, by counter-elites, by rank-and-file members, as well as supplementary reactions by the party bureaucracy. The final two weeks include an examination of the convention and preceding period of conflict, negotiation and eventual resolution. The present chapter specifically outlines the first two time periods to demonstrate the nature of the policy-making process of the New Democratic Party.

The origin of the proposal to devise a new document of principles for Canada's social democratic party lies with Burnaby MP Svend Robinson. Mr. Robinson stated that he had had requests for a document which outlined the NDP's basic philosophy but no recent statements existed.¹ The New Democratic Party Programme of 1961 was a statement of programs not philosophy while the Winnipeg Declaration and Regina Manifesto really belonged to a different era, if not a different party. Robinson discussed this point with NDP leader Ed Broadbent who agreed with the idea of creating a new statement to outline the NDP's principles. In the fall of 1981 the NDP's federal council also endorsed this idea.

Former federal policy co-ordinator Dan O'Hagan concurred that the origin of the new statement was an informal one, with the idea being tossed around in discussions between Broadbent and members of the federal NDP office.² There was also a recognition in these informal discussions that the NDP 1983 convention would co-incide with the fiftieth anniversary of the Regina Manifesto, the first major statement of principles and objectives for the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. Thus, organizing the party's main platforms and aims for approval by delegates would add a nice sense of history to the convention proceedings.

The origin of the document shows that its instigation came largely from the members of the parliamentary caucus with some support from the staff members of the party's federal office. There was no push from the mass membership of the party to create a new document, except indirectly from the kind of request that Mr. Robinson described. These origins also show that there was

no strong sense of purpose behind the document's creation. The statements of 1933 and 1961 were produced to herald in a new political party. The Winnipeg Declaration of 1956 had as its goal to update and modernize the language of the Regina Manifesto. This declaration was also set in the context of the redefinition of social democratic values that was occurring at the same time in many Western European parties. The major pretext for embarking upon the creation of a new document in 1982-1983 was that it seemed like a "good idea" to coincide with a historic event in the party's history. This lack of a strong sense of purpose or sense of direction was to hamper the development of a new statement as it worked its way through the NDP policy-making process.

With the decision taken to proceed with the development of a statement of principles and objectives, the first step in the process was that of the federal council in late 1981 striking a committee from among its members to write a draft document as a basis of discussion for the entire party. As was the case with past major policy statements the federal council chose to have party members respond to its suggest document as opposed to beginning the process by simply calling for documents from all party members and moving towards a document based on these ideas. Guidance from the top levels of the party was to be the route followed.

The committee which set the tone for discussion by producing this first draft was composed of twelve members. As a reflection

of the NDP's concern with regionalism in both the party and the country the committee was explicitly composed so as to incorporate regional opinions as shown by the fact that committee members were from Nova Scotia, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British Columbia. The draft committee also included a specific woman's representative (although there were other women on the committee), the NDP president, the leader and a representative from the party's parliamentary caucus.

The exact make-up of the committee indicates that this group could largely be considered members of the party elite or at least supporters of the elite. ³ Alexa McDonough is an MLA and the leader of the Nova Scotia NDP. John Brewin is the candidate in the B.C. riding of Victoria as well as being the son of prominent CCF-NDP'er Andrew Brewin. Jean-Denis Lavigne is a former Quebec NDP leader. Jack Kinzel is an advisor to Saskatchewan NDP leader Alan Blakeney. Judy Wasylycia-Leis is a former assistant to Ed Broadbent and is currently a special assistant to the Premier of Manitoba Howard Pawley. Tony Penikett is the NDP President and the NDP leader in the Yukon. Ed Broadbent is, of course, party leader. Hilda Thomas is a three time candidate in British Columbia and a former Chair of the NDP's Participation of Women Committee. Gerry Caplan is the NDP's Federal Secretary. Bill Blaikie, who resigned from the committee following the public issuing of the draft document in January 1983, is the MP for Winnipeg-Birds-Hill.

The other three members of the draft committee were the central writers of the draft document. Jim Laxer is the recently

resigned director of federal caucus research. Dan O'Hagan, as mentioned earlier, is the former NDP policy co-ordinator. Peter Warrian, the Chair of the Drafting Committee, is a former researcher with the United Steel Workers of America who was on loan to the NDP federal office. A point to note about these three members, and actually about the remaining nine committee members, is that they all had academic backgrounds. It is a somewhat interesting parallel to the writers of the original Regina Manifesto.

Warrian produced the first working draft while Laxer and O'Hagan were involved in the incorporation of suggestions and amendments from other committee members.⁴ Thus the writing of the draft was done by three full time NDP staff members. The other committee members who assisted on the first draft were either practicing NDP politicians or assistants to politicians. The origin of the statement and its initial phase of development indicates that that policy making was instigated from the top levels of the NDP. Thereafter the party bureaucracy had the most influential role in setting the agenda for debate because discussion centred around the draft which it created.

In 1982 the committee met four times to consider the draft. During this stage three drafts were produced before the final one emerged in early 1983.⁵ Part of the difficulty within the committee was the uncertainty as to whether the document should contain only a statement of general social democratic principles, as was the case with the Winnipeg Declaration or whether it should also include a program which would contain specific

complement the principles, as was the case with the Regina Manifesto. In October of 1982, Dan O'Hagan, for example hoped that the document would have a more specific program which would outline the NDP's mid-range plans. In addition the document would state for the NDP "who we are, where we came from and where we are going." On the other hand, fellow committee member Bill Blaikie wanted a document which would be a short but comprehensive redefinition of democratic socialist ideas. He favoured a statement of principles that was meant to be inspiring for NDP members.⁶

The document that was made public in January 1983 served as the basis for the internal party debate in the following few months. (The contents of the first public draft are found in Appendix A). Although the ideology of the Statement of Principles and Objectives is not the central focus of this paper, its contents and subsequent changes may indicate what actors within the NDP may be exerting the greatest amount of influence in the policy-making process.

The eleven page draft showed that the decision made about the inclusion of specific policies as well as principles favoured the position of O'Hagan. The draft document began with some general statements about the NDP's worldly vision of society.

The New Democratic Party dedicates its energies to building in Canada and the world a society in which a truly co-operative human community and individual freedom will grow together.

The document then continued with a more focused analysis of the problems of Canadian society in the 1980's highlighting the

negative effects of the free market capitalist system, the potentially dislocating effects of new technology, and the attack of the new conservatism on social democratic ideas. The document went on to list six general principles for the party: peace and global justice; equality of the human experience; extending democracy in political, social and economic life; civil liberties and a free society; co-operation replacing competition as the guiding principle of economic and social life; and conservation and environmental responsibility. Accompanying these principles were more specific policy goals. The document concluded in a manner which was more tempered than the Regina Manifesto's declaration that "No CCF Government will rest content until it has eradicated capitalism..."

We believe in the capacity of Canadians to fashion a society based on social justice. We believe Canadians have the will to build a nation that is greater than the sum of its parts. And we believe that such a Canada will make its contribution to the creation of a new, just, democratic and peaceful world.

Copies of the draft were circulated by the federal NDP office to all federal riding associations, many of which held individual meetings to analyze and discuss the document. This is perhaps natural as a reflection of the NDP structure. Riding associations are the basic units which send delegates to conventions and propose policy resolutions. Under the party constitution the Statement of Principles and Objectives would be considered like other resolutions, being voted on by representatives of the riding associations. Proposed resolutions were always sent in advance to delegates to previous conventions.

so it was appropriate to have this very important "resolution" circulated to ridings well in advance. This early circulation to ridings also could be seen as compatible with the "democratic" tradition of the NDP where widespread discussion of ideas by party members in advance of the convention was expected. This was also the procedure used for the creation of the New Party Programme in 1961.

The draft statement was also presented for discussion at various party functions, including most provincial council meetings as well as special regional meetings held across the country. The NDP federal office called for written submissions about the document, from any member of the party.

To help insure that its message for discussion and comments on the draft were widely received by party members, the federal office placed advertisements in NDP newspapers. For example in the British Columbia's NDP newspaper, Democrat, an advertisement appeared in the February 1983 edition giving notice about the creation of a draft document of principles and objectives and "to ensure the widest range of input prior to Regina in July, ridings are urged to discuss the draft statement which will appear in the March edition of the DEMOCRAT." ⁷ This notice asked that input in the written form be mailed by March 31 to committee Chair Peter Warrian in Ottawa.

The March edition of Democrat contained the draft in its entirety. In addition this issue contained a notice which announced a special conference on the Statement of Principles and Objectives open to all members of the NDP to be held in Burnaby

on March 25 and 26.

This meeting was one of the many regional meetings sponsored by the New Democratic Party federal office in most major cities across Canada.⁸ They were held in Victoria, Burnaby (Vancouver area), Edmonton, Calgary, Regina, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Thunder Bay, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Saint John, Halifax and St. John's. The meeting began with a ten to fifteen minute presentation by someone representing the federal party office, most often a full time staff member. This presentation usually involved a description of the process involved in drafting the document as well as giving highlights of the contents of the document. Some of the later meetings, such as the Ottawa area one at which Peter Warrian was the federal office spokesperson, had the representative present some of the criticisms of the document given at previous meetings. After this presentation the meetings were opened up for general discussions which usually lasted one and a half to two hours. The role of the representatives was low key, explanatory and could not be perceived as a selling job from NDP headquarters. The role of the party bureaucrats, as the representatives of the federal office at these meetings, could be seen as one which followed Rose and Minikin's theorizings of actors not trying to become involved in ideological debates or factional disputes. As full time party staff members, the bureaucrats had drafted the document as part of their job requirements. The debates which occurred after this first draft were not to be centred around the

bureaucracy's vision of what constituted the "correct" social democratic principles. The bureaucrats' role was largely to provide a starting point for discussion. It would be up to the rank-and-file members, the parliamentarians and the different elite groups to steer the discussion towards the desired final Statement of Principles and Objectives.

Attendance at the regional meetings, which were the major organized forms for input into the policy-making process by rank-and-file members, confirmed the assessment of the literature of political parties. There was a great deal of apathy among rank-and-file members about the NDP's internal activities. For example the Burnaby meeting was attended by about seventy party members despite the fact that Vancouver area contains about half of BC's NDP membership of about 30,000. In other words, only one half of one percent of the members bothered to attend a major policy-meeting. This turnout was typical - attendance figures ranged from a low of twenty-five in Ottawa to a high of seventy in both Regina and Burnaby. This trend of apathy was also evident in the riding association meetings.

At the regional meetings there were no formal votes taken or amendments passed to the draft document. These meetings were intended as very loose forums for discussion where federal office personnel could sound out feelings from the rank-and-file members of the NDP. They would in turn try to incorporate these ideas in future drafts of the document. The regional meetings were organized as the easiest way to open up the debate on the document to a large number of party members. Since the regional

meetings had no formal basis in the constitutional structure of the NDP (unlike riding associations), there was no point in voting on the document as these meetings could not submit resolutions for consideration by the party convention.

There were, according to Mr. O'Hagan, about two to three dozen local federal ridings which held meetings to discuss the draft Statement of Principles and Objectives. An example of this was a meeting of the Ottawa Centre riding held on March 29, 1983.¹⁰ Of the five hundred and fifty NDP members in this riding, only twelve attended the meeting. This once again indicates the widespread apathy of the large majority of party members towards the policy-making process. As the Ottawa Centre riding contains within its boundaries the federal NDP office, Dan O'Hagan gave an introductory speech about the draft document. This was not typical, however, of the other local riding association meetings. O'Hagan's presentation was followed by a one and a half hour debate on the draft which was concluded by the members voting to endorse the Ontario Left Caucus alternative Statement of Principles and Objectives (which will be described in more detail later) over the federal council document. A further motion was passed to mail out copies of the Left Caucus document to all the federal riding presidents across Canada for discussion.

The endorsement of the Left Caucus document at the Ottawa Centre meeting was at least partially the result of organizational work done before the meeting was held. On February 6 an Ottawa Left Caucus meeting was held to discuss the

statement and the strategy the Left Caucus would take over its (inevitable) opposition to it. Although only eight people attended this meeting it was enough to set up the organizational ground work which proved successful at the Ottawa Centre meeting: With only twelve people attending the riding meeting, it became evident that not too much of an organizational effort was required. The examination of the Left Caucus as a faction or as a counter elite group will appear later in this chapter.

Apathy of the large number of rank-and-file members is seen again in a meeting held by the federal riding of Burnaby. With an NDP membership of over one thousand in this riding, only twenty-five turned out to discuss the draft document.¹¹ This riding meeting criticized the draft's ideological fuzziness and voted to endorse the Left Caucus document. This vote was likely influenced by the left-wing views of the riding association's sitting Member of Parliament, Svend Robinson. This example gives evidence of the party membership following the views of its prominent spokespeople, although the riding's agreement with the ideological views of its MP is undoubtedly related to the fact that the riding nominated Robinson as a candidate in the first place.

Further consideration of the draft Statement of Principles and Objectives was given at many Provincial Council (the governing bodies for the provincial NDP's between their conventions) meetings held in the first few months of 1983.¹² These took place in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, New Brunswick and Newfoundland. The

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attendance figures at these council meetings ranged from about twenty-five in Newfoundland to over two-hundred in Ontario. The make-up of the provincial council meetings included executive members and elites of the respective provincial NDP sections as well as a senior person or two from the provincial riding associations. These latter groups would likely be the leading activists organizing the electoral activities of federal ridings. As a federal party and as a party which has traditionally depended a great deal on local canvassing in election campaigns,¹³ the NDP could use the provincial council discussions on the draft to ensure that these two important above mentioned groups were given ample opportunity to participate in the party's policy-making process.

The organization of the provincial council discussions had usually a couple of hours allocated for debate on the document. The provincial councils have only an indirect link to the federal NDP's constitutional structure¹⁴ so no votes on the document were taken. The influence of the provincial councils discussions were informal as the viewpoints expressed at them were simply taken under consideration by the drafting committee of federal council.

The final major avenue for membership input on the draft document during the January to April period was from written comments. The federal office had requested that written submissions be mailed to Ottawa by March 31 so that the ideas could be incorporated into a new draft presented for approval by federal council at the end of April. By the end of the first week of April the federal had received, according to Mr. O'Hagan,

"several dozen mailed in suggestions." An exact tally was not made. The responses included suggested additions, amendments and corrections to the document, substitutions of alternative documents and advice on improving the procedures for developing a Statement of Principles and Objectives. The average length of the written submissions was four or five pages. There were three alternative drafts submitted with one of those being the Left Caucus document.

During the month of April the draft committee had to take into consideration the many written submissions as well as the reports of meetings in formulating a new draft statement. All alternative documents and amendments passed by federal riding associations were forwarded to the draft committee for consideration. Some ridings had passed resolutions which contained suggestions for amending the procedure of the policy-making process itself. As well, consideration had to be given to the many hours of discussion at the regional meetings and the provincial council discussions. The January to April period amounted to a loosely structured sounding out period of various actors within the NDP by the drafting committee (which as mentioned earlier was centred around the party bureaucrats of Warrian, O'Hagen, and Laxer).

One source of influence within the NDP that the draft committee did not have to give much consideration to at this point in time was the federal parliamentary caucus. Although a number of the ideas contained the January draft were discussed by the caucus, there were no votes or decisions taken which could

have been construed as a federal caucus "position" on the draft.¹⁵ Instead, as will be noted later, a few individual MPs involved themselves in the policy-making process through their activities with other actors or groups within the NDP.

Many of the ideas that the draft committee did have to deal with during the April redrafting period were outlined by Dan O'Hagan during an interview. Most comments were critical as the draft was perceived as being poorly written, its language labelled as uninspiring and bureaucratic. The document was also criticized for being too long as it incorporated principles, strategies, and direct programs. Some of the submissions wanted to see these different aspects enshrined in separate documents. There was also the expected criticism from the left wing of the NDP which argued that the document needed to be more clearly socialist.

One of the most frequent criticisms encountered was that of dissatisfaction with the procedures used in preparing the document. The fact that there had been less than three months for discussions and submission of written ideas upset many party members. It was felt that there was a definite need for more discussion time and that the draft should have been mailed out further in advance. The Commonwealth, the Saskatchewan NDP newspaper, reported that the draft "was consistently rejected at meetings across the country this spring, particularly party members outside central Canada. As many objections were raised to the process involved as to the drafts contents."¹⁶

The month of April was a busy and difficult one for the

drafting committee. Not only did it have to deal with the criticism of its document and write a new draft but it was in addition hampered by the occurrence of the British Columbia election which caused many of its members to be transferred to the west coast until the voting day of May 5th. Due to the amount of criticism levelled at the procedure of developing the document, the draft committee considered the idea of merely drawing up a preliminary statement for voting on at Regina in July. The creation of a complete document would be postponed until the 1985 convention. Such a suggestion had been made in a resolution passed by the Assiniboia riding association.¹⁷ However, because the process was already well on its way to completion, it seemed inappropriate to make a change at this point.

What was produced by the draft committee and accepted by the federal council during their meeting on April 29 and 30 was a brief two page Statement of Principles (See Appendix B). The drafting committee had evidently heeded the advice they had received about separating principles from programmes. The bureaucratic element of the committee appeared to be relinquishing part of its design for the document, that of combining general principles with a programme of some specifics for mid-range plans.

This revised Statement of Principles dropped its background explanations and specific programs but its tone was relatively similar to the January draft. This is not surprising as the drafters of the January statement were basically the same people who wrote the April redraft. Bill Bleikie, who resigned from the

drafting committee in January, viewed the redrafted statement as bland and uninspiring. According to Blaikie this was partially due to the fact that the drafting committee was appointed not on the basis of its members' abilities to write an inspired document but on the need of the committee to be seen as representative of regional and other interests within the party. The success of the Regina Manifesto as a document dear to the hearts of social democrats in Canada stems partially from its authors in the LSR having had a flair for writing and processing the gift of rhetorical flourish. The ensuing fifty years had seen the traditions of democratic representation of regions, women, ideologies, etc., develop in the CCF-NDP so that the perceived "correctness" of the policy-making process was more important than the final product. This situation was a reversal of a phrase associated with oligarchy, "the ends justify the means".

With the approval of the federal council the April redraft was circulated to all federal riding associations as well as mailed to delegates chosen for the federal convention (as long as the names of the delegates were known long enough in advance to reasonably receive the resolutions booklet which contained the new draft). The delegates were to informally consider this draft statement among themselves until their arrival in Regina at the end of June. As the deadline for the submission of resolutions for the convention was May 2nd (with an extension for B.C. ridings till May 16)¹⁸ there was no time for riding associations to formally respond to the April 29-30 federal council document by passing new resolutions or amendments to this very major

resolution.

The changes in the document from January to April did not really necessitate an change in response by the Left Caucus, although one emerged later during the convention. Belonging to a loosely organized faction within the NDP, centred in Ontario, that has existed for the past five years, Left Caucus members are very active in the internal policy-making process of the party, though usually as a minority voice. The Left Caucus, as its name indicates, attempts to move the NDP towards a more definite socialist stance. The production of a Statement of Principles and Objectives provided an opportunity to do just that. The Ontario Left Caucus held regional meetings in Ottawa, Hamilton, London, and Sudbury, and then organized a province-wide conference in Toronto on February 25-26 to produce its own alternative document. After two days spent almost entirely on debating principles, the Left Caucus produced a statement which proclaimed:

Our goal is a socialist Canada, a new social order based on common ownership of our resources and industry, cooperation, production for use and genuine democracy. Only socialism can turn the boundless potential of our people and resources to the creation of a world free from tyranny, greed, poverty and exploitation.19

The Left Caucus document was created as a suggestion to be examined by the drafting committee. With the appearance of the new federal council draft in April it was evident (not surprisingly) that the drafting committee had not incorporated the left-wing view into its revised statement. Therefore Left

Caucus went into the convention with the idea of presenting its document as an alternative to the federal council's. The Left Caucus document would likely lose in a vote at the convention but the debates would provide avenues for socialist education work, a task considered very important by most members on the left.²⁰

As part of its strategy to both gain support within the NDP and carry out its "educational" work, the Left Caucus document was circulated in some ridings by sympathetic party members in March. After the Ottawa Centre meeting, it was mailed to all federal ridings across Canada. By the time the deadline for submission of resolutions for the convention had arrived eight Ontario ridings had voted to endorse the Left Caucus document, although four had done so with very slight amendments.²¹

Left Caucus members were also very active through their attendance and speeches at many of the local riding meetings. Since attendance at these meetings was quite low, it was often easy for a handful of left-wing party members to attend and pass a motion to support the Left Caucus document over the federal council committee's draft document. This does not, however, necessarily mean that all party members who did not attend the riding's meeting opposed the ideas in the Left Caucus document. It simply shows that actors within the policy-making process who make full use of the avenues formally open to them can strengthen their position and influence. The Left Caucus, because of its organizational effort, achieved some success with more ridings endorsing its document after the resolutions deadline.

The organizational activities of the Left Caucus could

classify it according to the terminology of Richard Rose, as a faction. The Left Caucus is a group of individuals who seek to further a broad range of policies through consciously organized political activity. They have a functioning executive (the steering committee) which co-ordinates meetings and mailings. The Left Caucus also has secondary leadership present in many local riding associations. Contrary to the factions of Rose, though, they are not based in Parliament. Ontario MLA's Richard Johnston and Floyd Laughren had endorsed the Left Caucus document²² but were not very vocal in their support. Neither attended the convention in July. The only Federal MP to prominently support the Left Caucus document was Svend Robinson. Rose wrote, as was noted earlier, that the relative weakness of a faction can be indicated by the prominence of the extra parliamentary party members it contains. Whether this was applicable to the NDP will be more clearly revealed by the events at the convention itself. Rose also warned that factional leaders, as counter elites, must be cautious because, if they are not to become intransigent or politically isolated, they have to act as brokers in negotiations with opposing elite groups in the party. The role of the leaders of the Left Caucus as compromisers will also be examined more fully in the subsequent chapter. Its early role in the policy-making process was to provide an alternative document. The Left Caucus strength was evidently not viewed as very great by the steering committee when it prepared its April redraft. Going into the convention the Left Caucus seemed to take a stance of intransigence by pushing for acceptance of its alternative

document. At the convention this position would become much more fluid.

Through May the important activities revolving around the Statement of Principles and Objectives (now known merely as the Statement of Principles) had been taken largely by the bureaucracy of the NDP (in the drafting and redrafting of the document) and the rank-and-file membership (in the discussions at meetings and in written responses). The legislative representatives of the NDP (both federal and provincial) played a minor role through being only part of the make-up of the draft committee or members of the federal council which endorsed the committee's document. As the convention approached, however, more interest by the politicians began to be expressed. In a statement likely designed to counteract the efforts of the Left Caucus, Ontario NDP leader Bob Rae announced in late May his public support of the federal council draft statement.²³ There were no further public announcements by politicians until just the week before the convention in Regina. The shift in the focus of the policy-making process from the mass membership interacting with the bureaucracy to dominance by the elected politicians and party elite during the time period surrounding the convention will be the focus of the next chapter.

Up to this point it can be stated that the policy-making process of the New Democratic Party in creating a statement of principles began with a decision at the apex of its constitutional structure (the party leader with the support of the federal council) which was formulated in detail by the party

bureaucracy and then opened up to the mass membership of the party for comment and discussion through a number of channels. The rank-and-file members' input did influence the bureaucracy's redrafting (mostly through criticisms of scope and procedure rather than ideology). The early part of the process had also seen the faction of the Left Caucus exert little influence. The true amount of input and influence of the mass membership, the bureaucracy, the elites and counter elites, and the elected politicians in the policy-making process would not be determined until the convention.

Footnotes

1 Interview, Svend Robinson, MP for Burnaby, Ottawa, November 23, 1983.

2 Interview, Dan O'Hagan, former NDP Federal Policy coordinator, Ottawa, March 15, 1984.

3 Federal NDP Office Memo "Notes on P and O Committee." (No Date).

4 Interview, Bill Blaikie, MP for Winnipeg-Birds Hill, Ottawa, January 26, 1984.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 "Principles and Objectives", Democrat (Vancouver) February 1983, p. 3.

8 Interview, Dan O'Hagan, former NDP Federal Policy Coordinator, Ottawa, April 8, 1983.

9 "The NDP in Canada", Canadian Democrat (Ottawa), June 1983, p. 18.

10 Interview, Fred Glover, Left Caucus Steering Committee Recording Secretary, Ottawa, April 6, 1983.

11 Interview, Svend Robinson, MP for Burnaby, Ottawa, November 23, 1983.

12 Interview, Dan O'Hagan, former NDP Federal Policy Coordinator, Ottawa, April 8, 1983.

13 Morton, see Chapter four.

14 New Democratic Party Constitution (Ottawa), 1981.

- 15 Interview, Lorne Nystrom, MP for Yorkton-Melville, Ottawa, February 7, 1984.
- 16 "Convention will debate three manifestos", The Commonwealth (Regina) June 29, 1983, p. 1, 3.
- 17 Resolutions submitted to the 12th Federal NDP Convention (Ottawa) 1983, p. 104-105.
- 18 Correspondence; Chris Chilton, NDP Federal Policy Coordinator, Ottawa, February 7, 1984.
- 19 Resolutions submitted to the 12th Federal NDP Convention (Ottawa), 1983, p. 98.
- 20 Interview, Fred Gloger, Left Caucus Steering Committee Recording Secretary, Ottawa, January 30, 1984.
- 21 Resolutions submitted to the 12th Federal NDP Convention (Ottawa), 1983, p. 103-104.
- 22 Interview, Fred Gloger, Left Caucus Steering Committee Recording Secretary, Ottawa, January 30, 1984.
- 23 "NDP faces a fight", Toronto Star May 29, 1983, p. G7.

Chapter Four: Compromise and Conflict at the Convention

On June 22 of 1983 simultaneous news conferences were held by Saskatchewan NDP leader Alan Blakeney in Regina and Alberta NDP Grant Notley in Edmonton to announce their backing¹ for an alternative statement of principles. (see Appendix C). This rather surprising and dramatic announcement changed the New Democratic Party's 1982-1983 major policy making process, the creation of a Statement of Principles, from one which emphasized lower level input from the mass membership of the party to one which focused largely upon the elite groups of the party. The time period surrounding the convention in Regina saw both compromise and conflict among the elites with the role of the membership being that of giving or denying approval.

The document which Blakeney and Notley supported, commonly referred to as the western statement, came as somewhat of a surprise to the federal office of the party as they were given very little forewarning of its creation.² After the April redraft was approved by federal council, there was some dissatisfaction among certain members of the NDP, especially those in western Canada, that this draft statement still did not really speak to the whole country. Lorne Nystrom, federal Member of Parliament for Yorkton-Melville, and one of the persons involved in the creation of the western statement, has said that one of the underlying themes of the western statement was giving voice to a more decentralized populist vision in the NDP. It would be one with an appeal to Quebec and the other regions of

3
Canada.

Late May saw the beginnings of activities which culminated in the western statement. The principal organizers were Blakeney, Bill Roberts (former assistant to Broadbent who had previously worked for the Saskatchewan NDP), John Harney (former Ontario NDP secretary, onetime MP for Scarborough West, and two time leadership candidate for the federal NDP), Dick Brocter (former executive assistant to Broadbent who had previously worked as a representative for the Saskatchewan government in Ottawa), and John Richards (currently a professor at the Simon Fraser University and previously an MLC in Saskatchewan). This group of five, centred in Saskatchewan, indicated that the dissidence with the federal council document was to be organized by the people at the top of the western wing of the NDP rather than from the rank-and-file membership.

In late May and early June there were three conference calls made among the above mentioned five which shaped the creation of the western statement. The central drafter of the document was Blakeney while written and verbal input came from, according to Nystrom, ten to fifteen people, half of whom were elected politicians. After this input and the conference calls, Blakeney himself wrote the final draft to give it a uniformity of style.

The contents of the five page western statement had both a brief description and analysis of the conditions that exist in Canada and a list of general beliefs held by New Democrats. The issues in this statement which gained the most attention were its views on federalism ("However the only basis for change in the

Canadian federation can be respect for its regionalism, and for its duality"), Quebec ("While we in the NDP assert the right of the Quebecois to determine freely their own future, we hope that, in the exercise of their democratic right, they do not choose sovereignty"), and the need for an incomes policy ("An incomes policy must figure a part of a larger agreement to create a new social contract in Canada"). The positions staked out on these issues were the ones that most decisively differentiated the western statement from the federal council document.

Upon the western statement's public announcement on June 22 the question arose as to what reasons were behind its creation. Many of the explanations given emphasize that the western statement was not created only as a counter document to the federal council statement but that it was also created to display dissatisfaction over the general running of the NDP by the eastern based leadership. Davis Swann, the Alberta NDP's energy critic, although not an MLA, stated at the time of the western statement's release that "Western frustration in the party stems not so much from unhappiness with Broadbent personally as with a system of party councils and officials that has failed to stress regional concerns on such issues as the Constitution and energy pricing." Other supporters of the western statement were a little more direct in tying its creation to criticism of the party leader. Grant Notley commented "Any leadership will find movements from time to time within the party. When that happens, a leader must decide whether you want to accommodate them, co-opt them or fight them. Frankly we'd be very surprised if our

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federal leader does not take a close look at the document."

Dan O'Hagan later reflected that the western statement was really presented to make the western dissatisfaction with the party leadership known. The specifics of the statement as an input into the party's policy-making process were secondary. What the western dissidents had done was to raise their criticisms of the leadership in a public way instead of presenting them in a more private party forum such as at a federal executive or federal council meeting.
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This western criticism seems to reinforce the impact of different factors on the NDP policy-making process. The most obvious one is the effect of regionalism in Canada. If the policy process does not adequately reflect the regional interests in the country, especially when the region is the basis of the party's electoral strength (as is the case of the West within the NDP where 25 of the party's 31 federal MPs came from the three western provinces of B.C., Saskatchewan, and Manitoba)
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then it is not surprising that opposition will arise.

The above mentioned statements of Davis Swann indicate that the policy-making process is perpetuated by the party organizational structures which help to institutionalize the current leadership elites in power. This may, perhaps, be an exaggeration of the effects of organizational structures but the appearance of institutionalized power, in this case Ontario based power, allowed this idea to be perpetrated. The fact that the western position against repatriation of the constitution was defeated at the 1981 convention adds weight to the argument two years

later that the organizational structures such as the federal council or the bureaucracy were used to oppose the western view of the NDP and support the Ontario oriented view. The bureaucracy had recently been embroiled in a decision which reinforced the view of Ontario dominance as Gerald Caplan, former assistant to one time Ontario NDP leader Stephen Lewis, was hired as federal secretary over Cliff Scotton, a prominent Saskatchewan New Democrat. The effects of regionalism on internal NDP politics was apparently as large as on federal politics itself.

One additional factor which lay behind the introduction of the western statement and also in a more general sense affected this entire policy-making process, was that of electoral considerations. 1982 and the first half of 1983 had not been very good to the NDP. 1982 saw the New Democrats lose power in Saskatchewan and the spring of 1983 had seen them loose a provincial election in British Columbia which they were supposed to win. The first six months of 1983 had also seen the federal NDP faring poorly in the Gallup polls, sitting at only sixteen percent⁹ (as opposed to twenty six per cent in the early months of 1982 and twenty percent in the 1980 federal election). The literature on the organization of political parties discusses the need for party unity to wage successful election campaigns. However with the next federal election likely ten to eighteen months away and with the party's popularity apparently sagging there appeared to be an opportunity to engage in debate to try to bolster the NDP's political support. Dwindling support by the electorate was bound to result in some dissatisfaction within the

NDP and this dissatisfaction would naturally work its way into the policy-making process underway in the party at that time.

The reasons behind the public release of the western statement were important. Also important was the amount of support it had. With the statement's announcement only a week before the convention there clearly was not time enough to gauge how much support it had among the entire party membership. This was not, however, central to the statement's importance. It was the prominence of the supporters of the western statement that mattered most. Of the practising NDP politicians, Blakeney's stature in the federal party was probably second only to that of Broadbent's. Grant Notley, as leader of Alberta's official opposition and a twelve year veteran of the Alberta legislature, also carried a good deal of clout. There were no other prominent New Democrats to publicly endorse the western statement. Privately, however, ~~support~~¹⁰ was widespread. Lorne Nystrom was one of the MPs who privately was supportive of the western statement and he suggested that a large minority of federal MPs favoured the western document. Roy Romanow, the popular former attorney-general of Saskatchewan also was a backer of the western statement.¹⁰ The leadership of the NDP was going to have difficulty in gaining western support for its document as the leaders of the Saskatchewan and Alberta sections of the party would greatly influence their members at the upcoming convention. Ontario NDP leader Bob Rae's public call for the party "to pull behind Ed Broadbent"¹¹ showed support for the federal leadership by a provincial leader but it did little to help patch up the

east-west divisions that had developed in the party and spilled over into the policy-making process which would create a new Statement of Principles.

The initial response of the federal leadership to the western statement was cautious and conciliatory. Broadbent stated "I agree with ninety per cent of what's in the document,¹² and the other is open for debate." Both federal NDP secretary Gerald Caplan and Bill Knight, principal secretary to Ed Broadbent, said that the only part of the western statement which they would disagree with was the reference to an incomes policy.¹³ Caplan was also accomodative by saying that he would allow the western statement to be put on the convention agenda despite the fact that the official deadline for resolution submissions had passed a month and a half earlier.¹⁴ Evidently the rules in the NDP's policy-making process were flexible when some of the elites in the party want to give an input. Even though the western statement existed in opposition to the federal leadership, to have tried to ignore it because of technical rules would have practically been political suicide due to the prominence and importance of the statement's backers.

So as not to recreate the confrontational tone of the 1981 convention efforts were made to bring about a compromise before the convention opened. Nystrom stated that some thought was given by supporters of the western statement to taking a stance of confrontation but it was decided that an open fight probably wouldn't be in the best interests of the party. With many stories floating in the media about the leadership of Broadbent being

challenged through the issuing of the western statement, it would obviously be beneficial for the federal party leadership to work towards a compromise statement in order to quash speculation surrounding Broadbent.

During the week leading up to the convention there was a good deal of activity on both sides of the dispute. Tuesday June 28 conference calls were placed between members of the two camps. These were followed up by personal meetings later on that evening as Blakeney, Notley and Nystrom met with representatives of the federal council, party president Tony Penikett and Peter Warrian. Later Bill Knight, Cliff Scotton and Bob White, director of the United Auto Workers in Canada, were added to the negotiations to act as go-betweens. Broadbent himself was to be kept informed of the negotiations and was to approve any compromise. According to Nystrom the negotiations were tense with them almost breaking down on occasion. By two a.m. the morning of June 29 a compromise had been reached. This compromise draft statement was considered later that afternoon by the NDP executive committee for about ninety minutes. With the executive's approval the¹⁵ draft was then forwarded to federal council that evening. "And at 9:00 p.m. on June 29, just 12 hours before the convention convened, the 'compromise statement' was approved by council for¹⁶ presentation to the delegates."

This compromise draft document (see Appendix D) was, except for a slight amendment which took place in the latter stages of the convention, eventually accepted by the delegates in attendance. The contents of the draft revealed much about the

relations between elites in the policy-making process of the NDP. The compromise draft contained the framework and language of the federal council's April document while attaching to it six specific principles taken directly from the western statement. These principles were the desire to decentralize political power in Canada, the assertion of Quebec's right to determine its own future, the recognition of the right of aboriginal people to assert their own future, the endorsement of the diversity of Canada, the affirmation of a commitment to the family farm, family enterprises and small business, and the belief in the need for ecological priorities.¹⁷ The only major idea proposed by the western group that was rejected by the federal council representatives was that of an incomes policy. This indicated a number of things. First is the fact that despite the federal leadership's desire to compromise it would have been virtually impossible for the leadership to agree to the idea of an incomes policy. Even if members of the leadership had personally favoured such an idea, which is in itself doubtful, they would have found it very difficult to publicly endorse such a proposition due to their backing in the party from trade-union leaders who strongly opposed the idea of an incomes policy. Members of the labour movement did in fact, lobby against the inclusion of any form of an incomes policy in the NDP's new statement. Cliff Pilkey, president of the Ontario Federation of Labour was satisfied with the eventual compromise saying "An incomes policy would have been seen as endorsing wage controls."¹⁸ The alliance between the leadership of the NDP and

the trade-union leaders active in the party was kept intact during the policy-making process of the NDP in 1983.

The agreement between the federal leadership and the backers of the western statement indicated that there was not a very wide ideological gulf between the two groups. The most important concession granted the western wing by the federal leadership was that of opting for a more decentralized state. Even this was not an overly large sacrifice as the federal NDP in recent years had been examining the question of how centralized a federation was necessary. The rest of the principles from the western statement tacked on to the April federal council draft such as the support for greater ecological awareness of the right of aboriginal peoples were already consistent with party policy. Since the federal leadership representatives were negotiating with the prominent elites from the various NDP provincial sections there was little difference in the two sides views on questions of public ownership, for example. For the day, the western statement was made public it was likely that a compromise could and would be reached. The fact that there was not a great gulf of ideas helped ensure this. More important was the fact that the NDP leadership, already damaged from the conflict over the constitution debate at the 1981 convention, recognized that support from provincial elites in the policy-making process was important for the party to operate effectively. A major split with the Saskatchewan and Alberta leaders would not perhaps heal in time for the federal election expected sometime in 1984.

There was general satisfaction among leaders both from the

east and west. Grant Notley stated that the compromise was a major victory adding that "we set out to make it clear that, as the party returns to Regina, to its roots, the populist base of the party is ¹⁹ alive and well." Broadbent in turn received satisfaction by not having the western dissidents openly challenging the federal leadership on the floor of the convention. He said "I'm delighted. It was a rational, reasonable compromise. If anyone got a victory, it was the Blakeney-Notley group. The points they advanced were reasonable ²⁰ and we endorsed them It has reunited the party."

The unity of the party, however, was not complete. At the June 29 federal council meeting efforts were made by a few council members to try and incorporate some of the ideas of the Left Caucus document to create an even broader compromise ²¹ statement. These efforts and other informal attempts at compromise were rejected almost out of hand by the party leadership. Nystrom explained that after the exhausting compromise negotiations between members of the party leadership and the creators of the western statement, little thought was given to trying to reach a further compromise with the Left Caucus. Reaching an agreement between the eastern and western elites in the party was difficult enough. Trying to accommodate a third group, the Left Caucus, may have made a satisfactory agreement on a new statement nearly impossible. Another factor which lessened the pressure on the federal leadership to reach a compromise with the Left Caucus was the minimal support given to the left-wing document by elected or other prominent New

Democrats. As mentioned earlier the only federal MP to support the Left Caucus was Svend Robinson. Robinson's position in the party had been downgraded earlier in the year by his demotion from the position of justice critic in the federal caucus, ²² thus making his endorsement seem even less influential.

When it became evident that an east-west compromise statement had been reached but a left-right one had not materialized, the convention became the setting for organizational activities which would result in a debate. This was to be the final major forum in the policy-making process of the NDP which would create a Statement of Principles.

As was the case at previous conventions there were a number of Left Caucus meetings held during the convention to decide strategy and tactics. ²³ The participants at these meetings were largely from Ontario and Saskatchewan. The first left caucus meeting on June 30 attracted over one hundred people. This meeting centred around the strategy the left should pursue at the convention in regards to the Statement of Principles. One point of view presented was that the left should support their original alternative document while others favoured a strategy of trying to get a left-wing amendment passed to the leadership's new compromise document. Robinson argued in favour of having the left try to mold their policy statement with the establishment leadership's document rather than trying to scrap the official statement. This strategy, it was argued, had a much greater chance of success. In addition Simon Rosenblum, one of the founders of the Ontario Left Caucus, took a stance favouring the

amendment strategy by arguing that if the left could win a significant vote for its position at the convention then the left would be recognized as a force to be reckoned with.²⁴ The left voted at the meeting by a margin of three to two in favour of the amendment strategy.²⁵

The Left Caucus meetings also elected a ten person steering committee to create the necessary amendment.²⁶ This committee consisted of two members from British Columbia, four from Saskatchewan and four from Ontario. The most prominent New Democrats on this committee were Robinson, Peter Prebble, a former Saskatchewan MLA, and Hilda Thomas the three time candidate in British Columbia and one time member of the federal council drafting committee.

The creation of a group of leaders by the left, although very temporary, allows for comparisons to be made to the theorizings of Richard Rose. Rose stated that leaders of factions would attempt to act as brokers in inter party conflict. By pushing first for an informal compromise on a statement and then later opting for the amendment strategy at the convention, leading personalities involved in the Left Caucus faction showed that they indeed did not want to become politically intransigent or isolated. Barry Weisleder, an active participant in the Left Caucus who opposed the amendment strategy, later wrote "As well the Left parliamentarians and sociology professors who functioned as the non-elected leadership were pre-occupied with establishing the 'credibility' of the Left, that is to say, their own credibility as power brokers and minor position holders."²⁷

The leaders of the Left caucus came up with an amendment entitled The Regina Manifesto Amendment (see Appendix E). As an amendment it was quite lengthy. The language was more dramatic than that of the leadership statement. It proposed a new preamble and conclusion, as well as additions and replacements in the policy areas of health, agriculture, environment and energy, human rights and women's rights, peace and disarmament, Quebec, and, most importantly, social ownership. It was the section of the amendment on social ownership which would have made a compromise between the left and the leadership, if it had been attempted, unlikely. The amendment stated "New Democratic Party governments will replace corporate ownership with social ownership of the major firms in the manufacturing, resource, finance, transportation and communication industries". The more moderate establishment leadership has always viewed the demands for widespread public ownership with disdain. Although the Left Caucus had pursued its more moderate position in the NDP's 1983 policy-making process, the debate on the convention floor involving the Statement of Principles saw a traditional left-right conflict.

The structure of the debate, which took place on Friday evening July 1, saw it follow a similar format as that at the 1981 convention with the opposing sides taking alternate turns at the microphones on the convention floor.²⁸ The compromise statement was proposed by an "establishment" speaker. The left's first two speakers concentrated their attacks on the federal council statement and the third speaker introduced the Regina

Manifesto Amendment. The speakers supporting the left's position included Robinson, Prebble, Thomas, and Wayne Roberts (a leading Left Caucus member from the Toronto riding of Spadina). The speakers in favour of the federal council compromise draft included such prominent New Democrats as Blakeney, B.C. leader Dave Barrett and Nova Scotia leader Alexa McDonough. The debate was one which had the left attacking the federal council statement as bland, without focus and without reference to important NDP values such as the preservation of medicare. The position of the supporters of the leadership was somewhat defensive. McDonough stated "...the final document is not perfect. The process was not perfect. But the outcome is the result of endless meetings and massive input..."²⁹ The argument put forward by Barrett was, somewhat similarly, not an endorsement of the compromise statement's ideals but rather a plea to simply approve the document that had already proceeded so far in the party's policy making process. Barrett argued:

What we have to do tonight, is not to put something in stone...My dear friends, out there in this nation at this very moment are one and a half million unemployed people, who are crying out for leadership, tonight, here from this convention - not for referrals, not for a waste of time, but to get on with it...I have no confusion over where I stand, or what's right and wrong, social justice and economic justice, simply because a sentence is left out.³⁰

Following Barrett's rousing speech, which resulted in a standing ovation from the delegates, a vote was called on the Left Caucus' amendment. Despite all the prominent support given to the

federal council document, ³¹ forty percent of the delegates favoured the Regina Manifesto Amendment. One Left Caucus supporter tried to postpone the defeat by asking to table the endorsement of the Statement of Principles until the NDP's 1985 convention but this idea was easily defeated by the delegates. With the major debate over, the convention needed merely to endorse the compromise document. After a supportive speech by Ontario NDP leader Bob Rae the compromise statement was finally endorsed ³² by the convention delegates, with a three to one majority.

There, however, was one additional event that took place before the draft became final. On Saturday morning, July 2, the small Quebec delegation appealed to the delegates to approve a friendly amendment to the compromise statement. This amendment dropped the last eight words from a section of the statement which originally read "...we firmly believe that the aspirations of the Quebecois and all French-Canadians are realizable within a new Canadian union which leaves important jurisdictions to a central Government." ³³ Agreeing with the arguments presented that this amendment would make the NDP seem more decentralist in Quebec, the delegates endorsed it by a margin of four to one.

July 2 also saw one more last ditch attempt by members of the left to get a compromise left amendment accepted. It was essentially the Regina Manifesto Amendment without its section on social ownership. The views of the left were once again ³⁴ defeated by the vote of the delegates. The final version of the Statement of Principles (as seen in Appendix D) was made definite on July 2, 1983.

The results of the compromises and conflicts at the convention showed that although the actions of the elites in the NDP are important, they do not totally dominate the party. The federal council draft of the Statement of Principles that reached the floor of the convention was supported by most of the prominent elected New Democrats both federally and provincially yet only sixty per cent of the convention voted in favour of the statement. The dissatisfaction with the original draft, voiced by the mass membership at the various meetings held in the spring of 1983 and reinforced by the emergence of both the western statement and the Left Caucus document, was deep enough that appeals for support by prominent elites were only partially successful.

The vote at the 1981 convention had had the Saskatchewan and Alberta leader as well as the Left Caucus leaders opposing the position of the federal leadership during the convention debate on the constitution with the result that thirty-seven percent of the delegates opposed the leadership's position. At the 1983 convention with the Saskatchewan and Alberta leaders eventually siding with the leadership, forty percent opposed the leadership's position. The delegates at the convention were not to have their actions determined solely by the views of the top elites in the party.

This is not to say that the elites have no influence in the party. The fact that Blakeney, Notley and a number of federal MP's initially opposed the federal leadership in the NDP's policy-making process helped set up a mood of confrontation on

the eve of the convention. The western elites eventual support was not enthusiastic and therefore did not have as great an effect in dampening the opposition to the federal council statement at the convention.

One variable at the convention which should also be considered here is one which is virtually ignored by the literature which examined the policy-making processes of political parties. The variable is the policy itself. The Statement of Principles that had been endorsed at the convention had no great admirers. There were only those who criticized it and those who criticized it not quite as much. The arguments presented in favour of council statement, as seen earlier, were defensive and apologetic. The leaders of the Left Caucus were critical of the statement in many ways. The original supporters of the western statement, even with their agreement to compromise were critical of the final statement. Lorne Nystrom characterized the statement as something that was a lot less than it should be. The delegates at the convention had voted in favour of the statement but not by much. Most of the input by the rank-and-file delegates from across the country was critical of the process and the document's contents. Even the key people involved in the drafting committee expressed some criticism. Dan O'Hagen described the final statement as somewhat disappointing and as not being very distinguished. Perhaps the most telling criticism came from Bill Blaikie, the MP who had sat on the original drafting committee. Blaikie had described the early draft as uninspiring and saw the final statement as a document

that no one wanted to read. Blaikie commented, eight months after the statement's endorsement by the convention, that if the document was good the party would have put some sort of effort into distributing it. Instead, he said, it will be ignored and forgotten in future years.

Footnotes

1 "Broadbent expects no leadership challenge", Toronto-Star, June 23, 1983, p. A11.

2 Interview, Dan O'Hagan, former NDP Federal Policy Co-ordinator, Ottawa, March 15, 1984.

3 Interview, Lorne Nystrom, MP for Yorkton-Melville, Ottawa, February 7, 1984.

4 Interview, Jean Ethier, assistant to MP Lorne Nystrom, Ottawa, March 7, 1984.

5 "Broadbent expects no leadership challenge", Toronto-Star, June 23, 1983, p. A11.

6 Ibid., p. A11.

7 Interview, Dan O'Hagan, former NDP Federal Policy Co-ordinator, Ottawa, March 15, 1984.

8 "The NDP's Quiet Revolution" MacLean's July 4, 1983, p. 14.

9 Ibid., p. 14.

10 Interview, Jean Ethier, assistant to MP Lorne Nystrom, Ottawa, March 7, 1984.

11 "Rae will back Ed Broadbent" The Standard, (St. Catharines) June 27, 1983, p. 6.

12 "The NDP's Quiet Revolution" MacLean's July 4, 1983.

13 "NDP paper not anti-leader: officials", Globe and Mail June 22, 1983, p. 8.

14 Ibid., p. 8.

15 "NDP compromises on documents, showdown at convention averted", Globe and Mail June 23, 1983, p. 1, 2.

16 "Compromise Carries Convention", The Commonwealth (Regina) July 13, 1983, p. 14.

17 "NDP compromises on document, showdown at convention averted", Globe and Mail June 30, 1983, p. 1.

18 Ibid., p. 2.

19 "Last minute accord averts NDP showdown", Toronto Star June 30, 1983, p. A3.

20 "NDP compromises on document, showdown at convention averted", Globe and Mail June 30, 1983, p. 1-2.

21 Interview, Svend Robinson, MP for Burnaby, Ottawa, November 13, 1983.

22 "NDP worried over dwindling support", The Citizen (Ottawa) January 21, 1983, p. 9.

23 Interview, Svend Robinson, MP for Burnaby, Ottawa, November 23, 1983.

24 "Left-wing seeks fight on NDP statement" Globe and Mail July 1, 1983, p. 1.

25 "Compromise Carries Convention", The Commonwealth (Regina) July 13, 1983, p. 14.

26 Interview, Svend Robinson, MP for Burnaby, Ottawa, November 23, 1983.

27 "Concessions to the Left while Dropping Anchor On The Right", Canadian Dimension, November, 1983, p. 15.

28 "Compromise Carries Convention", The Commonwealth (Regina) July 13, 1983, p. 14-15.

29

Ibid., p. 14.

30

Ibid., p. 15.

31

Interview, Svend Robinson, MP for Burnaby, Ottawa,
November 23, 1983.

32

"Compromise Carries Convention", The Commonwealth (Regina)
July 13, 1983, p. 14.

33

"Party accepts Quebec delegates demand to amend policy",
Globe and Mail, July 4, 1983, p. 10.

34

"Compromise Carries Convention", The Commonwealth (Regina)
July 13, 1983, p. 15.

Conclusion: Understanding The New Democratic Party

While the specific contents of the 1983 Statement of Principles may prove to be inconsequential, the process which created this document proves to be very useful in understanding the internal organization and workings of the New Democratic Party of Canada. By reviewing some of the events of the development of the Statement of Principles and Objectives within the framework for analysis laid out in the first chapter, the policy-making process of the NDP may be understood.

The federal leader of the NDP, Ed Broadbent, was one of the instigators behind the move to create a new document but as this idea was in itself taken up without much of a sense of purpose, Broadbent obviously did not have as a vital concern the creation of a new statement of principles. This contrasts with the role of M.J. Coldwell in the 1950's. Coldwell let it be known repeatedly that he favored a new statement of principles to moderate the radical rhetoric of the Regina Manifesto. Broadbent merely agreed that a new statement would add a nice historic touch to the 1983 convention.

Broadbent was also a member of the federal council drafting committee which drew up the draft statement. He was not very involved in the actual drafting nor was he personally a part of the interactions between the federal office and the mass membership.

Broadbent's role at the convention formally was that of a leader who stood above and outside of the debates. Broadbent's

opening speech to the convention contained only a vague reference to the production of a new statement. "Over the course of the next few days, we will be paying tribute to our founders, and we will be reaffirming our conviction that their basic values provide the framework for solving the problems facing this nation and the world right now".¹ Broadbent attempted to maintain a position above the internal party disputes through his non-participation in the debate at the convention on the Statement of Principles.

Informally and indirectly Broadbent did involve himself in the compromise negotiations between the western dissidents and the federal council document supporters. In the late night negotiations of June 28th Broadbent was kept well informed of developments. It was necessary for Broadbent to give his approval to the final compromise document. Broadbent's concern over the compromise negotiations was understandable as much of the media had interpreted the release of the western statement on June 22 as a challenge to his leadership.

Overall the role of the party leader in the policy-making process was quite a distance from Michel's characterization of the leader absolutely dominating the affairs of the party. Although the leader tried to portray himself as not being involved in internal party disputes, the involvement of Broadbent in the compromise statement showed that when crucial activities took place, the leader used his position to influence the outcome of the policy-making process. The role of the leader is further defined by his non-opposition to the first two statements

produced by the drafting committee of federal council. As these drafts were bland reworkings of current NDP policies, Broadbent's silence indicated his approval of documents which served to maintain the status quo in the party. Broadbent's acquiescence to the decisions made by his supportive elites did not demonstrate a lack of authority in the hands of the party leader but instead showed that the potential influence of the leader did not necessarily have to be used to maintain the dominance of his ideas and his position in the party.

While the leader tried to maintain a position above the fray, the elites in the party were visibly active in and central to the NDP policy-making process. The elites in the party are made up of federal MP's, provincial party leaders, provincial MLA's, former prominent party politicians, and prominent members of the executives of the federal and provincial parties. The elites in the party try very much to use their influence to determine the outcome of the policy-making process. They are usually the central debators at NDP conventions. They also participate in the decisions of the federal executive and council as well as in the respective provincial counterparts. The drafting committee, in addition, was largely composed of elite members of the NDP.

The importance of elected members in the policy-making process of the NDP is heightened by the fact that the NDP, as a minor party in Canada has had only limited electoral success. As there are only a relatively small number of MP's their prominence is increased. The lack of electoral success by the federal party

combined with the election of NDP governments in three western provinces serves to increase the influence of provincial NDP leaders and MLA's.

The influence of the elites can be examined from two directions. One is through inter elite relationships while the other is through the relationship between elites and the mass membership of the party. The first level of interaction shows various elites in different roles throughout the NDP's policy-making process. Many elites are considered part of the collective leadership or are at least supportive of the federal leadership. The leadership is composed of key MP's, federal executive members, and members of Broadbent's personal staff who, in consultation with Broadbent, plan the short and mid-range strategy that the NDP will follow. Some of the bureaucrats in the federal office may also be considered part of the leadership depending on their degree of involvement. When David Lewis was federal secretary he was involved in all aspects of running the party, including policy-making, and was clearly part of the leadership at the NDP. Gerald Caplan, the current federal secretary, is also tied into most activities of the party, although he may not be as prominent nor as dominant as Lewis was. Other party bureaucrats with less wide ranging duties may not be as clearly a part of the leadership. The role of the bureaucracy will be elaborated upon later in this conclusion.

Supporters of the leadership are elites who have goals that are regularly consistent with those of the leadership but are not involved in the day to day operations of the federal NDP. One

such group of elites are the major trade union leaders who consistently and vocally give support to the leadership at conventions and urge their followers, largely the trade union delegates, to do the same. Another example of a supportive elite is Ontario NDP leader Bob Rae. Rae used his position of prominence to urge, on a number of occasions party members to support the leadership position on the Statement of Principles.

Other elites in the NDP have more of a fluid role in the party's policy-making process. Blakeney and Notley as provincial leaders hold elites positions in the New Democratic Party and are generally supportive of the federal leadership. When an issue arises (or using the terminology of Rose, when a tendency emerges) which finds these elites at odds with the leadership, as was the case with the idea of a more decentralized federation (this issue arising at the 1981 convention as well as with the development of the 1983 Statement), these elites try to use their position of prominence to influence the outcome of the policy-making process. The strategy chosen in 1983 was to produce an alternative western statement so as to have western concerns noted to and hopefully accepted by the leadership. This strategy was by and large a successful one. The federal leadership's willingness to negotiate a compromise statement confirmed the importance of the provincial elites.

A third path elites in the NDP follow is that of organizing themselves as counter-elites or factional leaders. Duverger described factions as being authoritarian in structure and organized around their own leaders. He further hypothesized

that factional disputes arose not because of the demands of the rank-and-file membership but because of disagreements within the ruling elite. If the Blakeney-Notley elite group was more permanently organized as a distinct faction then this description would largely be accurate. The western dissidence was organized around its leaders and it did result from disagreements within the broader leadership of the NDP. It did not arise nor did it base itself on the support of rank-and-file members. There was little in the way of elite interaction with the membership. However the western group was not an organized faction but, as stated above, reflected a tendency in the party.

The Left Caucus, in contrast, is an organized faction but it does not correspond to Duverger's description. Although some of its leading spokespersons at the 1983 convention would be considered elites (Robinson, Prebble) much of its leadership came from the active members of riding associations. One result of this was that the federal leadership felt less necessary to seek a compromise with the Left Caucus. This was despite the seemingly flexible position of the Left. Without support from many prominent elites, the leadership decided that the Left Caucus could be defeated without causing high profile dissent. The Left Caucus was also viewed by the federal leadership as not being overly important because, unlike Blakeney and Notley, it did not control any crucial provincial organizations.

The Left Caucus further differentiated itself from Duverger's description of factions by its efforts to make itself open and available to interested party members and by its

attempts to involve the rank-and-file members in its input into the NDP policy-making process. The extensive circulation of the Left Caucus document prior to the convention demonstrates how the Left attempts some form of interaction with the membership through encouraging discussion at riding association meetings.

The classification of the bureaucracy in the NDP policy-making process is less categorical than the label put on by Michels, which tagged the bureaucracy as being part of the party's leadership. The bureaucrats of Warrian, O'Hagan, and Laxer had created a statement as a basis for discussion in the party. As part of its job function the bureaucracy in effect set the agenda for the rest of the party around the statement they created. The document was uninspiring as the bureaucrats tried to write something that would not greatly upset any group within the party. By not wanting to upset the leadership, their employers, the bureaucrats produced a bland reaffirmation at the current party's policies and ideology. These bureaucrats left the major debates and compromises around the statement to the elites and delegates at the convention. The role of the bureaucracy was therefore one which was supportive of the leadership of the NDP at the beginning of the process and then became gradually inactive in the process.

When looking at the place of the mass membership in the NDP policy-making process the most obvious observation to make is that, as the literature on political parties claimed, the great majority of party members are apathetic. The number of party members who participated in the development of the statement,

through taking advantage of any of the avenues open to them, was no more than three thousand. This is from a Canada-wide NDP membership of one hundred and forty thousand.²

This lack of participation has to be attributed to apathy, as there were a large variety of methods open for membership input. Regional meetings, riding meetings, provincial council meetings and opportunities to write in were all arranged for the input of the membership. Perhaps the only valid complaint about the opportunities for membership input was that they all occurred within a fairly short period of time. Two to three months was not enough time to fully discuss and arrange widespread debate on the important and complex ideas contained in the Statement of Principles.

The members of the NDP that did take advantage of the avenues open to them were generally critical of the document, especially of its blandness. The influence of the membership on the policy-making process was minor and indirect. The April redraft of the statement tried to deal with some of the criticisms voiced by the membership. However, when it came time for the important decisions to be made about the statement, it was the elites in the party which made them. At the convention the role of the rank-and-file delegates was reduced to voting for the position of either the leadership elite or the Left Caucus counter-elite.

The party organizational structures do have an effect in helping to institutionalize the power of elites in the party. Although its importance was minor at the 1983 convention, brought

out only in the discussion of an incomes policy, the constitutional structure of the NDP which allows the affiliation of trade unions ensures an important place for trade-union leaders at party conventions and in the NDP policy-making process. The affiliation provision of the party constitution results in the existence of an important minority of trade-union delegates at NDP conventions. This helps entrench the party leadership which is supported by union leaders and most union delegates.

The constitutional structure of the NDP also affects its policy-making as a result of existing as a federation of the provincial parties. This makes certain that the leading provincial New Democrats exist as elites in the federal party as they control the electoral organizations of the party.

The control of the electoral organizations goes on to affect the unity of the party. The unity of the party in turn has an affect on the NDP policy-making process. As the federal party is very dependent on the provincial NDP organizations at election time, harmonious relations must be maintained to ensure the best possible election results. This means that the federal leadership must try to accomodate provincial elites. Quite evidently, this was the case in the development of the 1983 Statement of Principles.

The effect of the need for unity can be seen at another level of the NDP policy-making process. The NDP relies a great deal on its members for canvassing at election time. Most of the campaign workers are motivated by the policies of the social

democratic party. Therefore the NDP, to help maintain the motivation of its members, opens up its policy-making process. In the creation of the 1983 statement this resulted in making available a number of avenues for membership input.

Finally the effect of the external socio-political environment on the policy-making process is considered. As Duverger had written, the existence of an electoral system based on single member constituencies helped to provide a more open atmosphere in policy debates. If Svend Robinson was not strongly supported by his Burnaby riding association and instead was dependent upon the approval of the federal leadership as a candidate in an election, he would have likely tempered his criticism of the federal council's Statement of Principles.

A most important externality, commented upon by Eldersveld and Engelmann and Schwartz, is the existence of a multi-cleavaged society which reflects its diversity in a federal system of government. As previously mentioned, a western "tendency" existed in the NDP 1983 policy-making process, reflecting one manifestation of the Canadian diversity. The Canadian federal system of government had a very major impact on the development of the Statement of Principles, as well as on the entire New Democratic Party organization. Federalism has created two different levels of party organization which have themselves developed some divergent points of view. Federalism has caused the leadership elite present at the federal level to have a corresponding equal in most of the ten provincial units.

The changing nature of Canadian federalism in the last two

decades has affected the nature of inter-elite conflict. In the CCF and in the first decade of the NDP's existence, conflict was centred along the ideological divisions of left-wing versus right-wing. The 1970's saw the strength of the provinces increased within Confederation and this new strength was reflected in the increasing clout and independence of the NDP's provincial sections. By the 1983 convention the region oriented debates appeared more important in the party's policy-making process than the traditional left-right disputes.

The great dispersion of power in the policy-making process of the New Democratic Party makes it necessary to moderate the label of oligarchy. Elites do exist in the federal party but the federal structure of the NDP (and the country) ensures that parallel provincial elites, who can become counter elites, have a guaranteed role in the NDP. Nevertheless, although the large majority of party members are apathetic, those who chose to take part in the NDP policy-making process had a fair number of input channels open to them. Despite this the influence of the rank-and-file members was minor. The dominant actors within the NDP policy-making process were the various elites and elite groups.

3

Walter Young described the CCF as a benevolent oligarchy. This label could be applicable to the NDP although the authority of the oligarchy is now more widely dispersed due to the growing decentralization that has occurred in Canada over the last twenty years. The benevolence of the oligarchy has also increased due to some diminishing in the direct involvement of the party leader and bureaucracy in determining the outcome of the policy-making

process. The oligarchy has also become less dominant by allowing traditions of very broad input by the membership to develop in the NDP. This contrasts with the more restricted avenues of membership input (basically delegates voting at conventions) made available in the CCF.

As a party which considers itself programmatic rather than pragmatic, the New Democratic Party sees its policy-making process as central to its existence. Understanding the workings of this process, as seen through the example of developing the 1983 Statement of Principles, is important as it has frequently introduced new ideas onto the Canadian political agenda, an agenda which is usually left quite empty by both the Liberal and Progressive Conservative Parties.

Footnotes

¹
"Notes for an Address", Ed Broadbent, Agridome Regina, July 1, 1983, p. 14.

²
"The NDP in Canada", Canadian Democrat, (Ottawa), July 1983, p. 14.

³
Young, p. 156.

APPENDIX A

NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF CANADAPRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES

Comments

The New Democratic Party dedicates its energies to building in Canada and the world a society in which a truly co-operative human community and individual freedom will grow together.

The world has the capacity to eliminate poverty and want. Humankind can move beyond material goals to deepen the meaning of life. Freed from the struggle for survival, people can reach an age in which the entire human family has the opportunity to develop its full potential. It is to the fulfilment of this vision, in Canada and in every corner of the globe, that we commit our efforts.

But in these last decades of the 20th century, the gap between our vision and the reality grows ever wider.

The world is poised on the brink of a nuclear holocaust. The international economy is in disarray. The division between rich and poor grows, threatening global conflict. The irresponsible use of resources and technology endangers the very existence of life on the planet.

In Canada, a distorted economy continues to spawn unemployment and hardship. Control of Canadian resources is ever more concentrated in the hands of a few. Hard-won social services are under attack.

To more and more people it is clear that fundamental change is essential. To bring about that change through democratic means has become an urgent challenge to democratic socialists throughout the world.

New Democrats in Canada are no strangers to the struggle for change. For fifty years we have worked to build a co-operative commonwealth. Our mission now is to apply the lessons we have learned in meeting the challenges of the 1980s and 1990s.

We are confident that those challenges can be met - that Canadians in increasing numbers will support and endorse the New Democratic Party's agenda for change.

Two cornerstones of that agenda will be the attainment of social and economic justice and the guarantee of peace.

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The agenda for change must also address the issues posed by the co-existence of two peoples in Canada, each with distinct national aspirations. We believe that distinctive peoples, including indigenous peoples, can live and work together, sharing the interests they hold in common.

Toward that end we present our analysis of Canadian society in the 1980s, the principles and objectives of the New Democratic Party, and our agenda for social change.

Canadian Society in the 1980s

In the fifty years since the founding of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation and the adoption of the Regina Manifesto, the people of Canada have won many gains. Universal hospitalization and medicare. Unemployment insurance. Improved pensions. Family allowances. Constitutional guarantees of human freedoms and civil liberties. Protection for workers.

There have been some modest changes in the mix of our economy. Marketing boards are one example. More public intervention in the form of Crown corporations is another. Greater rights of employees to participate, through trade unions, in the determination of conditions of employment.

All of these have been important elements in improving the quality of life for Canadian people and in giving them some greater margin of security in what is, essentially, a hostile system of economic organization.

These were concessions won from a free enterprise capitalist economy and from its political representatives, the Liberal and Conservative parties.

In many ways, the years of sustained economic growth since World War II have tended to mask the tension between democratic socialist values and the ideology of free enterprise. Generally increasing levels of prosperity made possible apparent concessions, but concealed the fact that relative economic inequality was not changing. Economic growth permitted the development of the welfare state. It provided the base from which workers could extract concessions from industry, in the form of improved environmental health standards for example, and fostered an atmosphere of tolerance in which individual freedoms were slowly extended.

The deterioration of economic conditions that began in the early 1970s and which continues in the 1980s has unmasked that tension.

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In the day-to-day lives of ordinary Canadians, it has produced an economic and social crisis unlike any since the 1930s. In fact, this crisis may prove to be even deeper than that of the 1930s because its impact has been softened by massive public programs unheard of then.

In the 1980s Canadian policy makers tell us that "unproductive" public expenditures must be curtailed to promote "productive" private investment. They say we can no longer afford comprehensive health care or decent public pensions. They say we must abandon hopes for adequate child care and equal pay for work of equal value. They say wages and salaries must be restrained to restore "investor confidence".

All of these policies are promoted to "free the market". Free it for whom? Certainly not the powerless and the poor, the handicapped and the disadvantaged.

To protect us from the unimpeded and destructive actions of the "free" market, the political struggles begun in the Great Depression gave rise to a system of economic institutions - the very concessions referred to earlier. These institutions, which moderated the adverse effects of capitalist expansion in the post-war period, are now under concerted attack.

The Canadian crisis has been further deepened by the participation of successive Canadian governments in the world arms race - a race which diverted billions upon billions of dollars into truly unproductive expenditure - and by Canada's dependence on an American economy even more mired in the distortions of military expenditures.

Today, the economic world around us is being transformed. Corporate concentration and rationalization have put the economic health of entire nations at the mercy of transnational corporations. This scale of enterprise increases the mobility of capital and threatens to put economic activity beyond the control of national states.

Rapid changes in technology increase industrial mobility, shorten the useful life of capital and accelerate corporate demands for profit. Increasingly, in this process, the skills of workers are being fed into the memory banks of machines.

The new technology will revolutionize the service, manufacturing and resource sectors of the economy. It will greatly increase productivity in institutions such as banks, eliminating huge numbers of workers during this decade. In

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manufacturing, the introduction of robots will make possible automated production on a vast scale. Resource extraction, already highly capital intensive, will become more so.

These innovations will have a profound impact on our concept of work. Astonishing increases in productivity, coupled with limits on available resources, will make full employment as we now understand it virtually inconceivable. There will be new jobs, new ideas of what constitutes work, and greatly increased leisure. The strains that this kind of transformation will place on our values and social institutions will be enormous.

Technology can save labour and energy, extend human capacities, raise living standards and improve the quality of human life. But it can also cut off people's hands and legs, ruin lungs and hearts, deaden the mind, deepen unemployment and destroy the environment.

Managed by the corporate elite, technological change will serve only to extend the power of the powerful and the wealth of the wealthy.

Technological change can be our servant in building the equitable society of the future which we seek. But if we fail to act now to replace corporate control with democratic planning, and to place the economic system at the service of the public good, the new technology will be our master. And ordinary people will pay the price.

Taken together, these changes in economic structure and productive techniques are causing extreme dislocation within all industrialized countries. Capital rushes from "old" to "new" industries and takes advantage of its mobility to abandon whole economic regions. The resulting competition from developing nations has placed established industrial countries, and particularly the weaker ones like Canada, in jeopardy. Without a coherent national economic strategy, we will be left with two choices: to confront the industrializing Third World, or to die a slow economic death at the hands of mobile transnational corporations.

Traditional assumptions about continuing economic growth and social stability are no longer valid. For us there is no easy road back to what we thought of as 'normal' in the post-war period. If we abandon our future to the market economy and its political apologists, the patterns of recent years, unemployment and dislocation, will be the norm.

We face capitalist political parties rejuvenated by the emergence of a new right-wing ideology. They now go beyond

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the traditional justification of unrestricted free enterprise to attack the legitimacy of social democratic values.

In the coming struggle, to stand still is to retreat..

Our challenge is to move forward toward a society based on the principles of democratic socialism. And to move forward, it is urgent that the people of Canada assume command of their economy by replacing corporate control with democratic planning, and by shifting the balance in our mixed economy to one in which the public interest will be truly served.

To preserve the gains of the past fifty years and to achieve social and economic justice, there is no other road.

Principles and Objectives

For the urgent tasks which lie ahead we in the New Democratic Party are determined to mobilize our members and supporters to protect and build on the gains of the past and to erect the foundation for a society based on the principles of political, social, and economic democracy.

I PEACE IS THE FIRST IMPERATIVE IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL JUSTICE IN CANADA AND THE WORLD

Disarmament

The objective must be to achieve nuclear disarmament and create a more stable world. New Democrats believe Canada has an important and independent role to play in this struggle. We will work to place international disarmament high on the list of national priorities and to make Canada a nuclear-free zone. We rededicate our energies to end the arms race, to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to persuade the nuclear powers to end the threat of wholesale destruction.

Global Justice

The twin evils of worldwide poverty and political repression are directly linked to Canada's future and to peace. The unjust and widening gap between the world's rich and poor creates intolerable tensions. We are committed to changing the international economic order to just trade policies and to the support of progressive democratic forces throughout the world.

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We who share space on this planet share its destiny. We will work to build new international relationships - to create a new social and legal order which will conserve the resources of the earth, end the arms race and bring peace to the human family. In forging these relationships, we seek solidarity with people everywhere who are struggling for democratic socialism, national liberation, freedom from repression, and peace.

II WE BELIEVE IN EQUALITY, NOT JUST IN THE LEGAL SENSE, BUT EQUALITY IN THE FULLNESS OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE - EMBRACING INTERPERSONAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RELATIONSHIPS

Equality Between The Sexes

Women are integral participants in all productive endeavours. Our objective is to eradicate the historic obstacles that prevent women from achieving freedom, equality and human dignity - to affirm that women are full and equal partners in all aspects of life.

Redistribution Of Wealth And Power

A new distribution of wealth and power demands action on several fronts: economic planning and greater social ownership; redistribution of income through the tax system and social programs; and strengthening and extending collective bargaining rights for working people.

Full Employment

Fundamental to the concept of economic equality is the entitlement of every Canadian to a job. Changing technology can be managed in the public interest. Workers can be retrained for new careers. The meaning of work, if that be necessary, can be redefined. Full employment, with all that implies, must be a prime objective in a planned economy.

III FOR NEW DEMOCRATS, ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY IS ONLY A FIRST STEP. WE WORK TO BROADEN AND EXTEND DEMOCRACY INTO ALL ASPECTS OF POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE; TO CREATE REAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEOPLE TO PARTICIPATE IN MAKING THE DECISIONS WHICH AFFECT THEIR LIVES

Economic Planning

Canada's economic development is now determined largely by

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corporate planners whose first allegiance is private gain. New Democrats would supplant their corporate control with comprehensive economic planning, democratically controlled and regionally decentralized.

Social Ownership

New Democrats would progressively extend democratic control over the major means of production and distribution. We shall seek to increase public ownership of resources recognizing provincial jurisdictions. We advocate greater public control of the financial sector, including selective nationalization. We support co-operatives as an effective mode of social ownership. We propose a revamped, efficient manufacturing sector, with a strong, pro-Canadian direction. In advocating greater social ownership we propose more than the transfer of title of large enterprises to the state. Social ownership implies greater public accountability and the progressive democratization of the workplace.

Technological Change

New technologies in this decade will dramatically change the nature of employment. Unmanaged, the burden of these changes will fall unevenly, injuring some groups and individuals much more than others. Women, for example, stand largely unprotected in the office revolution. Individuals must be guaranteed security of income and full rights to publicly funded retraining and relocation programs. Workers must have a right to negotiate technological change. Where such change significantly affects negotiated wages and working conditions, trade unions must have the right to bargain, including the right to strike.

Democratic, Decentralized Control

From planning, to social ownership, to technological change, the key to real improvement in the economic life of Canadians is the extension of democracy. This demands new techniques to replace traditional hierarchical authority. New Democrats will seek to develop methods which will provide democratic participation regionally and in the community; and methods which will extend democracy to the workplace.

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IV WE ARE COMMITTED TO THE CIVIL LIBERTIES FOR WHICH SO MANY HAVE FOUGHT AND DIED; FREEDOM OF SPEECH, ASSOCIATION, RELIGION, ASSEMBLY AND COMMUNICATION. THEIR GUARANTEE IN LAW, COMBINED WITH A SOCIAL ORDER IN WHICH WEALTH AND POWER ARE JUSTLY SHARED, CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR A SOCIETY WHICH IS TRULY FREE

Constitutional Rights

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and patriation of the Constitution have marked an important step in the securing of rights, the division of federal-provincial powers and the continuing process of constitutional reform. We shall seek the extension of civil rights, reform of Parliament and more co-operative federal-provincial relations.

Human Rights

The fight for human rights is ongoing and unending. True equality, equal pay for work of equal value, freedom from sexual harassment, the right to privacy, the right to strike, the right of choice in reproductive matters are still to be effectively guaranteed.

Quebec

New Democrats support the aspirations of the people of Quebec to be a recognized, distinctive community within Canada. By accepting this flowering of Quebec's historical identity as a positive development, Canadians can show leadership in seeking a creative relationship between distinctive peoples which will enhance the lives of all. We are committed to a partnership between Quebec and the rest of Canada in which the aspirations of Quebecers can be realized within Confederation.

French-Canadians' Rights Outside Quebec

The rights of French-Canadian communities must be protected outside Quebec, where such communities are of significant size. These rights include constitutional recognition of French as an official language, a provincial equivalent of The Official Languages Act, and the right of the community to govern its own schools.

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Aboriginal People's Rights

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New Democrats support the struggle of Canada's original peoples for full recognition of their historic rights. These rights include a just and speedy settlement of land claims, fulfilment of treaty rights and a greater measure of self-determination and local autonomy. We also seek appropriate recognition of the rights of Metis and non-status Indian people.

V IN THE SPIRIT OF THE CO-OPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH, WE BELIEVE THAT CO-OPERATION AND MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY MUST REPLACE PRIVATE GAIN AND COMPETITION AS THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE. WE SEEK A COMPASSIONATE AND CARING SOCIETY, SERVING THE NEEDS OF ALL.

Human Services

Society has an obligation to assure that the basic human needs essential to human dignity are met. There must be equal access for all Canadians to health, shelter, nutrition, education, information and security. Beyond this, we are committed to meet the changing needs of the family, including parental leave and child care. In addition, to meet the needs of Canada's aging population we propose to provide resources and create new institutions, much as the needs of the young were addressed during the baby boom.

Multiculturalism

In addition to the French and the English, Canada includes people from many other lands and cultures. This rich diversity is a resource to be treasured. We commit ourselves to building a society in which it will flourish.

VI CONSERVATION AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY GO HAND IN HAND. WE RESPECT OUR OBLIGATION TO PRESERVE THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT AND TO PASS ON TO FUTURE GENERATIONS A BETTER WORLD, NOT AN ECOLOGICAL DEBT. ONLY THROUGH DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST PLANNING WILL ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES EFFECTIVELY TEMPER TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC DECISIONS

Environment

New Democrats place high priority on improving the quality of our environment. Every day in which we fail to deal with problems like acid rain, disposal of radioactive and other industrial wastes, water and air pollution brings us closer

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to the point of irreversible damage to our planet.

Energy

A sound energy policy will play a key role in rescuing the environment. New Democrats support the achievement of petroleum self-sufficiency as an essential step in the longer term transition to renewable energy sources. But the search for solutions to the problem of acid rain must be intensified. Otherwise, coal-fired power stations cannot continue to operate on their present scale. With respect to nuclear power, New Democrats call again for a nuclear freeze in Canada and a phasing out of existing nuclear projects as alternative energy sources become available and economically viable.

Food Policy

Canada is a major exporter of grain to the world markets. At the same time, we continue to import ever-increasing amounts of other foods for domestic consumption. In the midst of it all, our primary food producers face insecurity and uncertainty. We shall propose a food policy which promotes both good nutrition and a maximum of self-sufficiency in Canada and offers fair prices and income supports for all farmers and fishermen. The family farm will be the centrepiece of such a policy, supported by the banking of agricultural land and appropriate credit allocations. We shall seek to restore Canada's marine fishing industry by developing improved and environmentally safe methods of harvesting our ocean resources to the 200-mile limit.

OUR BELIEF IN CANADA

The New Democratic Party, like the CCF before it, is part of the Canadian experience. Our movement had its beginnings in different parts of Canada. Workers, farmers, fishermen, intellectuals - in the west, in the east, or on the prairies - were drawn together by the common desire of Canadians for a better life.

History has both pulled Canadians together and pushed them apart. As the economy and technology have changed, some regions have thrived and others have suffered. While regional identities are part of the national fabric of Canada, regional equity must be achieved.

English and French speaking Canadians have distinct historical traditions and identities. Quebec, the heartland of French Canada, has continually re-assessed its relationship

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to the rest of Canada, especially in the past two decades.

The national perceptions of English and French Canadians remain permanent and distinct, requiring constant mutual understanding, if the larger purpose of Canadian unity is to be achieved.

The fact that our country has evolved in the shadow of a much more powerful neighbour adds another dimension to our national purpose. Canada's economic and political relationship with the United States today is an expression of our country's historical dependence on more powerful nations. First France, later Britain and now the United States have sought resources and markets in Canada. Foreign domination of our economy has allowed others to set our priorities, too often with little thought for the well-being of Canadians and too often with the co-operation of our political and business leaders. This experience has confirmed the commitment of New Democrats to an independent Canada in an interdependent world.

The Canadian experience, both internal and external, has made our movement acutely conscious of the need for equality and justice in the dealings of nations, peoples and communities regardless of size and strength.

We believe in the capacity of Canadians to fashion a society based on social justice. We believe Canadians have the will to build a nation that is greater than the sum of its parts. And we believe that such a Canada will make its contribution to the creation of a new, just, democratic and peaceful world.

Source: Federal New Democratic Party Office
Ottawa. January 1983.

Statement of Principles

The New Democratic Party believes that the pursuit of peace and democratic socialism are the two imperatives of a more secure and just modern world.

We believe that as peace must prevail over war, so must co-operation and mutual responsibility prevail over private gain and competition as the guiding principles of social and economic life. We seek a compassionate and caring society, serving the needs of all.

The New Democratic Party is proud to be a part of that great worldwide movement of democratic socialist parties which have always striven to replace oppression and privilege with democracy and equality.

OUR ENDS

Socialists around the world share as their goal a society from which exploitation of one person by another, of one class by another, of one group or sex by another, will be eliminated. We believe in a society where each person will have the chance to develop his or her talents to the full. This ideal, a society based on equality, within a world of equally respected nations, is the major aim of democratic socialism.

Democracy and freedom are at the very heart of democratic socialism. We know that we must strive for those values which will uplift the human spirit. Our goal is a society in which the worth and dignity of every human being is recognized and respected, and in which differences of origin, or religion and of opinion will be not only tolerated but valued as desirable and necessary to the beauty and richness of the human mosaic.

But the human spirit cannot thrive when economic needs remain unsatisfied. And so we seek an end to material suffering, economic want and lack of opportunity.

Conservation and social democracy go hand in hand. We respect our obligation to preserve the natural environment and to pass on to future generations a better world, not an ecological debt.

Only through democratic socialist planning will environmental values effectively temper technological and economic decisions.

Finally, we are aware today in this nuclear era as never before of the dangers of war. We work therefore to achieve a lasting peace among the nations of the world, a peace based on freedom, equality and social justice among nations and within nations.

Our goals, then, are an egalitarian society guaranteeing human freedom and providing social and economic security in a world free of tyranny.

Socialists hold that together these goals form the moral basis for the political, economic and social order necessary for the future humanity.

OUR MEANS

We begin with democracy. The consent of the people, freely expressed, is at the heart of the socialist philosophy. We work to broaden and extend democracy into all aspects of human endeavour, and to create real opportunities for people to participate in making the decisions which affect their lives.

Socialists believe in planning. We reject the capitalist theory that the unregulated law of supply and demand should control the destiny of society and its members. Society can control its own destiny by

planning its future. And this planning must be an expression of the will of the people, not imposed on them from above.

Finally, socialists believe that social ownership is an essential means to achieve our goals. This means not simply the transfer of title of large enterprises to the state. We believe in decentralized ownership and control, including co-operatives and credit unions, greater public accountability, and the progressive democratization of the workplace.

OUR HISTORIC TASK

A half century ago, in the darkest days of the Depression, a group of courageous and far-sighted Canadians came together to create a new movement to build a more humane social order in Canada. That new society is of course far from achieved. And both our successes and our failures have taught us the difficulties of ever reaching all our goals.

But we are at the same time entitled to say with pride that because of the democratic socialist movement, Canada is a better place in which to live.

Our country is made up of a diversity of peoples, English-speaking and French-speaking, native peoples, and people from many other lands and cultures. This rich diversity is a resource to be treasured. We commit ourselves to building an independent country in which it will flourish.

To this unfinished task, and to the goals of equality, freedom, peace and social justice, we now re-commit ourselves. We shall never cease in our work towards reaching these ideals.

We rededicate ourselves, as well, to those means which have always characterized the socialist movement - democracy, planning and social ownership.

The New Democratic Party will not rest content until we have achieved a democratic socialist Canada, and we are confident that only such a Canada can make its rightful contribution to the creation of a more just, democratic and peaceful world.

Source: Resolutions Submitted To The 12th Federal NDP Convention.
Ottawa. 1983 p. 105-106.

IN the summer of 1933, delegates assembled in Regina for the first national Convention of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, the predecessor of the NDP. The ravages of the Great Depression had brought them together to form one party, with a determination to realize the "co-operative commonwealth", and prepared to compromise their self-interest to forge a common agenda of reform: the *Regina Manifesto*.

AMONG these Canadians was an optimistic and defiant insistence that ordinary people — despite major divisions of region, ethnic origin and social class — could act together, democratically and independently of powerful "vested interests", to realize the common good.

MUCH has changed in Canada since the *Regina Manifesto*. Stronger provincial and local governments, capable of realizing important tasks of economic and social development, have emerged. The public domain has been husbanded, and, on a scale unimaginable in the 1930s, the resource sector has created new jobs and revenue for governments.

ALSO, since that time, Quebec has emerged as a vibrant dynamic society intent on asserting its distinct identity. Whereas the interests and ideas of men dominated society then, women now rightly demand equality.

MUCH, however, remains to be done. Poverty, mass unemployment, and an unacceptable concentration of power and wealth persist as moral affronts to a society which values economic and social justice.

THE environment has been damaged, and the wastage will continue if not checked by strong measures. Many Canadians, having migrated in the millions from farm to city, now find themselves without a sense of community, living in large, impersonal cities and working in alienating surroundings.

FINALLY, the technology of war has made ours the first generation which must confront the prospect of the annihilation of our species in a nuclear holocaust.

NOW, fifty years later, we need to renew that Convention's sense of urgency, of commitment to fundamental change, and of willingness to act beyond narrow self-interest.

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IN 1933 the Canadians who met in Regina wanted immediate and radical action to end the Depression. Delegates were critical of the federal principle as a legalistic constraint on the ability of a strong centralized government to realize the general will. Those in attendance did not foresee

the advantages in decentralization of important political jurisdictions to the provinces which thereby increased the responsiveness of government to people, and permitted political change to begin in one region and spread. We can draw a measure of satisfaction from the many social changes CCF and NDP provincial governments have introduced.

IN 1983 much still remains unsettled as to the nature of Canada. However the only basis for change in the Canadian federation can be respect for its regionalism, and for its duality

WE view the demand by Canadians to decentralize, where feasible, political authority as proof that Canadians want to participate more directly in the political decisions that affect their lives

THE desire to decentralize means more than provincial rights. Our cities must assume the imprint of their citizens. Credit unions and co-operatives can provide democratic alternatives to large financial and corporate institutions

CANADIANS, however, also want a strong central government, strong enough to guarantee our national independence and our ability to forge a strong Canadian economy in the face of world competition. We want a Federal government which will guarantee to each of us a share of our national prosperity regardless of the region in which we live.

THE unique and enduring identity of the French Canadian people is a fundamental reality of Canada. Because few French Canadians attended the 1933 Convention of our party, the delegates were to underestimate the importance Quebecois attached, and would continue to attach, to the rights of their National Assembly as the guardian of francophone culture, and as an instrument for the economic development of the only province in which French Canadians form a majority.

WHILE we in the NDP assert the right of the Quebecois to determine freely their own future, we hope that, in the exercise of their democratic right, they do not choose sovereignty. We firmly believe that the aspirations of Quebecois are realizable within a new union which leaves important jurisdictions to a central government.

WHATEVER our differences may have been, it is long past due that we, in the NDP, join with those on the left in Quebec and French Canadians elsewhere, for the challenges which face us and the bonds which bind us are much greater than the differences, however profound, that have kept us apart.

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THE delegates in Regina in 1933 met as the clouds of war were beginning to blacken the skies of Europe and Asia. The darkness of their time pales in comparison to the endless night of nuclear holocaust which threatens this earth in 1983. Militarism is again rampant, and the merchants of death profit.

LET us on the left be clear in our condemnation of Soviet expansion and nuclear build-up. We must accept our responsibility to participate — within the context of an independent Canadian foreign policy — in the collective defence of those liberties and freedoms people have fought for centuries, first, to acquire and, then, to retain.

THAT said, we must with equal conviction condemn the present American Administration for its military adventurism against movements of national liberation, for its role in escalating the nuclear arms race, and for its unqualified support of the ambitions and appetites of the multinationals

★ ★ ★

NOW, as in the 1930s, the western industrial economies have suffered a serious economic crisis, and again the Right has argued that government intervention to improve economic performance would only make matters worse. To control inflation governments in the recent past, in Ottawa and other capitals, have pursued monetarist policies of restrictive credit and public spending. The result has been an immoral exchange relative price stability at the cost of massive unemployment, particularly among the unskilled, the young, and the unprotected.

WE, in the NDP, restate our commitment that government must intervene aggressively to stimulate employment during difficult economic times.

BUT government must also control inflation. At times, excess demand has been the cause, but in a society where powerful interests can set their prices, profits and incomes in terms of self-defined "fair shares", any economic shock that lowers the real income of some launches a dynamic of price-wage spiralling to "catch up". The only available alternative to monetarism is income planning in key sectors. An incomes policy must be equitable, not a means to increase corporate profits at the expense of working people

AN incomes policy must figure as part of a larger agreement to create a new social contract in Canada. Such an agreement requires co-operation among government, labour and business. Among its major components must be a renewed commitment to full employment; government encouragement for workers to organize collectively, and to participate as equals in the management of the work place and the evaluation of new technology, better public accountability of government agencies and of Crown corporations; and development of new high-productivity sectors.

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IN 1983, meeting again in convention in Regina, we rededicate ourselves to the struggle for a humane and democratic society.

WE affirm our belief in the worth and integrity of the human person. We oppose all efforts to denigrate, exploit or destroy that worth

WE affirm our belief in the human spirit, and in the need for political, religious and artistic freedom to permit its full expression. Cultural independence is paramount, as is the strengthening of our vital cultural institutions.

WE affirm that Canada is made up of a rich diversity of peoples, a resource to be treasured.

WE affirm our belief in the equality of persons, and believe each has the right to receive respect and to participate fully in our society. In particular, our aim is a society wherein men and women share responsibilities equally.

WE affirm our commitment to the preservation of the family farm, other family enterprises and small business.

WE affirm our belief that aboriginal peoples have the right to shape their own future out of their own past, and to possess the institutions necessary to survive and flourish.

WE affirm our belief in the need for ecological priorities to guide technological and economic decisions so that valuable common resources are not depleted or polluted, and global justice becomes possible.

WE affirm our belief that we, as individuals and as a nation, must do all within our power to arrest the madness of the nuclear arms race. A first step would be to declare Canada a nuclear weapons free zone.

WE affirm our belief that each of us has the right to participate fully in the decisions that affect our lives, both in government and at our place of work, either through elected representatives or by direct personal participation.

WE affirm our belief in the right of each person to work. We believe that each person has the right to realize his or her dignity and the fullness of his or her potential through creative and meaningful work.

WE affirm our belief that government has a meaningful role to play in betterment of the human condition. We shall vigorously oppose those who exploit the public domain for private profit, thereby discrediting the principle of government intervention. We recognize that it falls to us to rescue the principle of collective action through government from those of our opponents who have debased and perverted it in the pursuit of self-aggrandizement.

WE affirm our belief in the right of equal access by all Canadians to quality health, education and social services, unconstrained by the ability to pay.

WE affirm our solidarity with those who are struggling everywhere for economic, political and social justice; Their struggle is our struggle. We believe in a new, just and sustainable international economic order, in which co-operation and negotiation replace the global profit strategies of the multinationals.

WE affirm our belief in the right of people to associate, into trade unions and other associations, for the realization of shared interests.

WE affirm our belief that as a country we have the resources, the capital, the technology, and above all else, the aspirations and skills of working men and women, required to build an alternative economic future.

IT is a difficult time, a time of danger, a time of opportunity. Those who walk alone may fall victim to fear and self-doubt. We challenge Canadians to journey together as brothers and sisters in love and fellowship, knowing no fear, sharing their dreams and hopes.

THE future belongs to the human spirit, and we are of that spirit

Source: Authorized By The Committee In Support Of The
June 22nd Statement.
Saskatoon, 1983.

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

The New Democratic Party believes that the pursuit of peace and democratic socialism are the two imperatives of a more secure and just modern world.

We believe that as peace must prevail over war, so must co-operation and mutual responsibility prevail over private gain and competition as the guiding principles of social and economic life. We seek a compassionate and caring society, serving the needs of all.

The New Democratic Party is proud to be part of that great world-wide movement of democratic socialist parties which have always striven to replace oppression and privilege with democracy and equality.

OUR ENDS

Socialists around the world share as their goal a society from which exploitation of one person by another, of one class by another, of one group or sex by another, will be eliminated. We believe in a society where each person will have the chance to develop his or her talents to the full. This ideal, a society based on equality, within a world of equally respected nations, is the major aim of democratic socialism.

Democracy and freedom are at the very heart of democratic socialism. We know that we must strive for those values which will uplift the human spirit. Our goal is a society in which the worth and dignity of every human being is recognized and respected, and in which differences of origin, or religion and of opinion will be not only tolerated but valued as desirable and necessary to the beauty and richness of the human mosaic.

But the human spirit cannot thrive when economic needs remain unsatisfied. And so we seek an end to material suffering, economic want and lack of opportunity.

We affirm our belief in the need for ecological priorities to guide technological and economic decisions so that valuable common resources are not depleted or polluted and global justice becomes possible.

We affirm our commitment to the preservation of the family farm, other family enterprises and small business.

We affirm our belief that aboriginal peoples have the right to shape their own future out of their own past and to possess the institutions necessary to survive and flourish.

The women's movement has challenged us to fulfil the socialist commitment to end sexual discrimination, unequal pay and opportunity and violence against women. The crisis of technological unemployment and changes in the family must be met by socialists so that women as a group are not victimized.

The right to participate in the trade union movement, including the right to organize, to engage in collective bargaining and the right of workers to withdraw their services if necessary are fundamental in a democratic society. Workers' rights in the workplace must be defended and indeed, strengthened.

Finally, we are aware today in this nuclear era as never before of the dangers of war. We work therefore to achieve a lasting peace among the nations of the world, a peace based on freedom, equality and social justice among nations and within nations.

Our goals, then, are an egalitarian society guaranteeing human freedom and providing social and economic security in a world free of tyranny.

Socialists hold that together these goals form the moral basis for the political, economic and social order necessary for the future of humanity.

OUR MEANS

We begin with democracy. The consent of the people, freely expressed is at the heart of the socialist philosophy. We work to broaden and extend democracy into all aspects of human endeavour, and to create real opportunities for people to participate in making the decisions which affect their lives.

Socialists believe in planning. We reject the capitalist theory that the unregulated law of supply and demand should control the destiny of society and its members. Society can control its own destiny by planning its future. And this planning must be an expression of the will of the people, not imposed on them from above.

Finally, socialists believe that social ownership is an essential means to achieve our goals. This means not simply the transfer of title of large enterprises to the state. We believe in decentralized ownership and control, including co-operatives and credit unions, greater public accountability, and progressive democratization of the workplace.

OUR HISTORIC TASK

In the summer of 1933, delegates assembled in Regina for the first national convention of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, the predecessor of the NDP. The ravages of the great depression had brought them together to form one party, with a determination to realize the "Co-operative Commonwealth", and prepared to compromise their self interest to forge a common agenda of reform: the Regina Manifesto.

Among these Canadians was an optimistic and defiant insistence that ordinary people - despite major differences of region, ethnic origin and social class - could act together, democratically and independently of powerful "vested interests" to realize the common good.

Much has been achieved since the passing of the Regina Manifesto. We are entitled to say with pride that because of the democratic socialist movement, Canada is a better place in which to live. The winning of the struggle to establish unemployment insurance and medicare has changed the lives of millions of Canadians for the better.

Much has changed in Canada since the Regina Manifesto. Stronger provincial and local governments capable of realizing important tasks of economic and social development have emerged. The public domain has been expanded on a scale unimaginable in the 1930s.

Much, however, remains to be done. Poverty, mass unemployment, and an unacceptable concentration of power and wealth persist as moral affronts to a society which values economic and social justice.

The environment has been damaged and the wastage will continue if not checked by strong measures. Many Canadians, having migrated in the millions from farm to city, now find themselves without a sense of community; living in large, impersonal cities and working in alienating surroundings.

Finally, the technology of war has made ours the first generation which must confront the prospect of the annihilation of our species in a nuclear holocaust.

Now fifty years later we need to renew that Convention's sense of urgency, of commitment to fundamental change, and of willingness to act beyond narrow self-interest.

OUR COMMITMENT TO CANADA

In 1983 much still remains unsettled as to the nature of Canada. The only basis for change in the Canadian federation can be respect for its regionalism, and for its duality.

We view the demand by Canadians to decentralize, where feasible, political authority as proof that Canadians want to participate more directly in the political decisions that affect their lives.

The desire to decentralize means more than provincial rights. Our cities must assume the imprint of their citizens. Credit unions and co-operatives can provide democratic alternatives to large financial and corporate institutions.

Canadians, however, also want a strong Canadian government, strong enough to guarantee our national independence and our ability to forge a strong Canadian economy in the face of world competition. We want a federal government which will guarantee to each of us a share of our national prosperity regardless of the region in which we live.

Canadians face an enduring problem on the North American continent because of the extent of American corporate ownership of the Canadian economy. The Canadian government must serve as our collective instrument in pursuing the goal of a more independent Canadian economy in which priorities are not set for us in foreign head offices.

The unique and enduring identity of the French Canadian people is a fundamental reality of Canada. Because few French Canadians attended the 1933 convention of our Party, the delegates were to underestimate the importance Quebecois attached, and would continue to attach, to the rights of their national assembly as the guardian of their culture, and as an instrument for the economic development of the only province in which French Canadians form a majority.

While we in the NDP assert the right of the Quebecois to determine freely their own future, we hope that in the exercise of their democratic rights they do not choose independence for we firmly believe that the aspirations of the Quebecois and all French Canadians are realizable within a new Canadian union.

Whatever our differences may have been, it is long past due that we, in the NDP, join with those on the left in Quebec and French Canadians elsewhere, for the challenges which face us and the bonds which bind us are much greater than the differences, however, profound, that have kept us apart.

In 1983, meeting again in convention in Regina, we rededicate ourselves in the struggle for a humane and democratic society.

The New Democratic Party will not rest content until we have achieved a democratic socialist Canada, and we are confident that only such a Canada can make its rightful contribution to the creation of a more just, democratic and peaceful world.

Source: Resolutions Passed By The 12th Federal NDP Convention
Regina, 1983 p. 26-28.

The Regina Manifesto Amendment

(To be incorporated into the Federal Council - Blakeney, Notley amalgamated Statement of Principles document.)

(Preamble) (Addition ahead of existing preamble on the first page)

Fifty years ago, the founders of our movement gathered in Regina and proclaimed their dedication to a Co-operative Commonwealth:

"We aim to replace the present capitalist system, with its inherent injustice and inhumanity, by a social order from which the domination and exploitation of one class by another will be eliminated, in which economic planning will supersede unregulated private enterprise and competition, and in which genuine democratic self-government, based on economic equality, will be possible."

Today the world is in the grips of a dangerous social, economic, and political crisis. Mass unemployment is already a reality. Labour rights and our whole range of health and social services are under attack. Humanity itself is threatened with destruction by nuclear war. Never have we stood in greater need of fundamental solutions.

The NDP, like the CCF before it, is the creation and legacy of the struggles of generations of workers and farmers, who realized that their aspirations for a humane society could never be met within the framework of a capitalist Canada. In contrast to the NDP, the Liberals and Conservatives are the parties of the major corporations and vested interests.

Our goal is a socialist Canada, a new social order based on common ownership of our resources and industry, co-operation, production for use, and genuine democracy. Only socialism can surmount the boundless potential of our people and resources to the creation of a world free from tyranny, greed, poverty and exploitation.

(Health) (Insert between paragraph six and seven on first page.)

Today the fundamental principles on which medicine was based are under attack by free enterprise governments and the medical profession. We will ban extra billing, abolish all medicine premiums, expand medicine services, promote preventive health care and improve job safety conditions. Medical care will be provided to all Canadians free of charge.

(Environment and Energy) (To be inserted after the seventh paragraph on the first page.)

Because of the irreplaceable value of the life sustaining resources of pure air, pure water and productive land, the NDP accepts the concept of ecological sustainability as a fundamental social goal. We recognize a special duty to be a steward of nature's resources and to conserve them for future generations. Developmental activities in Canada will be preceded by a full, impartial environmental impact analysis. Public involvement in environmental decision making powers will be guaranteed.

Consistent with the principles of ecological sustainability an NDP government believes in the establishment of long term energy plans based on conservation and safe renewable energy developments. Nuclear power plants and uranium mines will be phased out, while coal, oil and gas plants will require pollution control technology to avoid acid rain.

(Agriculture) (To be inserted after the eighth paragraph on the first page.)

The NDP is committed to preserving the family farm and to ensuring a just income for Canadian farmers through a combination of an income guarantee program and the orderly marketing of farm commodities. We will expand the Canadian Wheat Board, maintain (ensure) the Crow rate, halt rail line abandonment, protect good agricultural land against urban sprawl and define agricultural land reserves for Canada. The NDP will declare plant breeders' rights illegal.

(Human Rights and Women's Rights) (Remove sixth paragraph of Our Ends (first page) and replace with these two paragraphs)

The women's movement has inspired us to renew and extend the socialist commitment to a society free from sexual discrimination. Women are still the oppressed sex, with sexual discrimination entrenched at every level of Canadian society. In the workplace, years of piecemeal reform have left women stranded in dead-end jobs. Loosely worded and poorly enforced equal pay laws and inadequate affirmative action programmes have done little to change wage discrimination and few protections exist against the massive unemployment threatened by the introduction of microtechnology. Beyond the workplace, women are still suffering from violence in the home and community, first if any transition houses, sexual harassment, and denial of the fundamental freedom of reproductive choice. There is still no free, universal, publicly funded, high quality childcare. NDP governments would give top priority to programs and legislation to end centuries of systematic discrimination against women and promote full social, and economic equality.

The NDP must be a strong and unwavering voice for civil liberties and minority rights in Canada. We seek removal of the provision in the Constitution permitting opting out of fundamental human rights. We call for the creation of basic civil rights and equality to all persons regardless of race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, political belief or physical or mental disability.

(Peace and Disarmament) *(Add to first paragraph on second page.)*

We seek an independent Canadian foreign policy. An NDP government will withdraw from NATO and NORAD. To promote international disarmament we will regulate the defense industry to eliminate profit, stop nuclear weapons testing and manufacturing in Canada and declare Canada a nuclear weapons free zone.

(Add to fourth paragraph on third page.)

We are dedicated to a world in which all nations renounce the use of nuclear weapons - a world based on the twin pillars of disarmament and economic justice.

Social Ownership *(Insert at end of section entitled Our Mission on the second page.)*

Canada is confronted by a political, social and economic emergency that demands straight-forward solutions. If we are going to stamp out unemployment, secure our independence from the multinationals and steel ourselves for sweeping technological change, we need a socialist industrial strategy based on public ownership of the decisive sectors of the economy. The flaws of capitalism are too basic, the power of the corporations too great, the chasm separating the compulsions of profit and the needs of people too wide, for anything less to succeed.

The half-measures of a mixed economy dominated by big business cannot meet the challenge. The stock-in-trade of government intervention - tinkering with monetary and fiscal policy to stimulate investment and spending - has proven bankrupt. Welfare state policies such as "progressive taxation" and unemployment insurance, though won by hard struggle, have not corrected deep-seated structures of regional and social inequality. Legislative reforms, aimed at the most blatant abuses of corporate power, are faltering. In these harsh economic times, corporations hold governments to ransom through their control of desperately needed investments. Even reform-minded governments have buckled under this pressure, and passed vicious legislation, slashing social services and trampling the basic rights of workers.

Capitalism has failed, and so have efforts to reform it. That failure puts a campaign for the socialist alternative on the immediate agenda.

New Democratic Party governments will replace corporate ownership with social ownership of the major firms in the manufacturing, resource, finance, transportation and communications industries. Only then can we plan for full employment, social equality and economic democracy.

Socially-owned banks and insurance companies will ensure that people's savings serve the people. These savings will be mobilized for massive job-creating projects in critical areas such as housing and social services. To create new wealth, a socialist government will call a halt to the U.S. drain on our natural resources and use these resources as building blocks for a rounded industrial economy. To correct a disastrous balance of payments and create new jobs, we will break from our dependency on foreign multinationals and establish our own manufacturing capability in heavy industry and high-technology equipment.

Social ownership of decisive sectors of the economy provides the basis for new economic and social democracy.

The needs of people, not profit, are the driving force of a socialist society. This wholesale reconstruction cannot be accomplished by crown corporations that perpetuate management privileges. It will be accomplished by democratizing all levels of society, and by making workers' control the touchstone of industrial relations.

Socialism will dissolve the economic foundation of one-sided management privilege by relying on the needs and creativity of people. At the centerpiece of any NDP program will be the goal of enhancing the power that people can exercise over their own lives. This includes the passage of work environment laws to expand the scope and strength of collective agreements, workers having decisive weight in every level of decision making, and ensuring that control over workers' pensions is placed in the hands of their elected union representatives. We believe in the ability of working people to manage their own productive institutions democratically.

(Replacement on Page Four - paragraph three on Quebec.)

We in the NDP assert the right of Quebec to determine freely its own future, although we hope that the aspirations of the Quebecois are realizable within a new Canadian union.

(Conclusion) *(Add onto the end.)*

The New Democratic Party is the party of the dispossessed and oppressed struggling to build a new world. We are both a social movement and a political party.

As a social movement, we support all struggles against the injustices of capitalism. Unions - together with popular organizations fighting for world peace, social equality and environmental safety - are the lifeblood of our movement. As a political party, we seek to become a government that can implement legislation to meet the needs of working people.

We do not offer just a blueprint to a better future. We offer an invitation to all Canadians to join us, as we join them, in our common efforts to eradicate a social system based on exploitation, discrimination, poverty and war. The capitalist system must be replaced by socialist democracy. That is the burning issue of our era, the only hope of humanity.

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