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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L’AVONS RÊUE
CLASS AND NATIONALISM IN QUEBEC
POLITICS: WORKING CLASS
BEHAVIOUR IN THE 1973
PROVINCIAL ELECTION

by

Judy Wasylycia-Leis, B.A.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Department of Political Science

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
October 7, 1977
The undersigned recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research acceptance of the thesis "Class and Nationalism in Quebec Politics: Working Class Behaviour in the 1973 Provincial Election" submitted by Judith Wasylycia-Leis, B.A. (Hon) in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

This study attempts to show that a class analysis of Quebec politics is necessary for understanding party support patterns and for determining the economic roots of nationalism. It focuses on the interrelationship of class and nationalism as a means for explaining the organization or disorganization of workers in Quebec.

Struggles at the economic, political and ideological levels are emphasized in order to understand the process of class formation in Quebec and to determine whether workers, defined according to their place in capitalist relations, express their class position in their electoral behaviour.

The empirical analysis of the 1973 provincial election examines the relationship between the Parti Québécois and the working class as well as the class bases of separatism. The findings, in particular high P.Q. and separatist support among trade union members with perceptions of class conflict, are congruent with the discussions of structural and organizational conditions which produce class consciousness.
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CHAPTER I

THE ETHNIC AND CLASS CLEAVAGES IN QUEBEC POLITICS: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

Class analyses of politics have proved to be fruitful in many instances and have significantly added to the store of knowledge on parties and voters in general. Despite the demonstrated usefulness of class analysis, many analysts of Quebec politics have either not recognized the significance of it or have intentionally played down the role of the class cleavage in the face of a seemingly more pervasive and dominant cleavage. The issue of nationalism has clearly dominated Quebec thought and literature and thereby profoundly affected the development of an alternative school of thought with the emphasis on socio-economic factors.

This does not mean that studies on Quebec voting have completely ignored class and economic factors. A running debate in the literature of Quebec politics has essentially revolved around the question of the importance of Quebec nationalism versus the significance of class factors. Authors have verbally expressed the need to choose between one or the other cleavage in their interpretations of Quebec politics. While the debate has been one-sided in favour of the ethnic cleavage, the recognition of class factors is at least present in the literature.
On the whole, two generalizations about the literature on Quebec politics can be made. First, the issue of nationalism and ethnicity has occupied the thoughts of a majority of writers in the fields of politics, history and sociology. Secondly, the impact of socio-economic variables on electoral choice has received minimal attention with little attempt being made to link nationalist issues to class concerns. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze both themes as they appear in the literature, to suggest gaps and problems in the literature where these two variables are examined, and to present an alternative model which emphasizes a class analysis of politics but which also relates nationalism to its objective base.

1. The Ethnic Cleavage

Ethnic concerns and the nationalist ideologies they inspire have, throughout Quebec history, been at the heart of many sociological, historical, and political analyses. In particular, the theme of ethnic politics and ethnic voting continues to be a dominant one in the literature. Serious evaluation and criticism of studies which focus largely on the ethnic cleavage can only take place after the basic tenets of the cultural interpretation are understood and after some insight into the reasons for the widespread adoption of this interpretation are gained.

In very general terms, this interpretation of Quebec politics derives from the belief that preoccupation with cultural
identity and economic inferiority in the face of Anglo-Canadian and American domination have created a situation in which ethnicity is the most important consideration in decisions made by voters and politicians. More specifically, the minority position of French-Canadians and strong nationalistic sentiments have led to ethnic voting such that the majority of French Canadians vote for the political party which is the staunchest defender of their ethnic concerns.¹ A more detailed knowledge of this viewpoint can be acquired by considering variations to the theme as presented in several major works.

The most often-expressed idea common to most of these studies is that the ethnic cleavage has crosscut all others in Quebec politics. In particular, it is argued that the ethnic concerns are so important that social class divisions are pushed into the background and thus, play a negligible role in electoral behavior. For example, Wrong emphatically states that "the most striking fact about Quebec politics is that ethnic solidarity has overridden class divisions within the French-Canadian community — at least insofar as these divisions find clear-cut political expression."² Similarly, Quinn's analysis of

¹See, for example, J. Hamelin, J. Letarte, and M. Hamelin, "Les élections provinciales dans le Québec," Cahiers de Géographie de Québec, IV (1959-1960), p. 4): "La question de l'autonomie... est devenue... un facteur déterminant du vote qui garde dans un même parti des électeurs dont les conceptions économiques et sociales sont, par ailleurs, fort opposées."

the Union Nationale suggests that nationalist issues were "so vital to a very large number of voters that the whole question of economic policy tended to be pushed into the background." 3 These and other interpretations find support for their argument by referring to the success of nationalistic right-wing parties and the relative absence of socialist groups and leftist parties in Quebec. Furthermore, it is assumed that working-class support for a party such as the Union Nationale, which cooperated closely with industrial and financial powers, is a clear indication of ethnic voting.

Two underlying assumptions appear to form the basis for most interpretations that stress the salience of ethnicity in Quebec. First, there is a tendency to view Quebec in terms of cultural and economic homogeneity. As a homogeneous culture in a minority position, French-Canadians are believed to have similar goals, aspirations, and values, all of which center around the desire to maintain their identity in the presence of foreigners. As well, economic homogeneity and the notion of a "classless" society emerged as descriptions of Quebec society. In such a society where everyone is united in a common struggle against the "aliens", class conflict is believed to be non-existent. As a result, tensions between labour and capital that developed with industrialization were treated for a long time as ethnic tensions. The term "ethnic class" as developed by Marcel Rioux and Jacques Dofny is clearly an outgrowth of this emphasis on a homogeneous,

classless society. According to these authors, the consciousness of the ethnic "we-group" in French Canada along with its homogeneous system of values inhibited the development of class conflict and class consciousness. 4

The second assumption upon which this cultural interpretation rests is an analytical separation of class and ethnic concerns. It is an either-or situation where one is weak or non-existent when the other is strong. This is particularly evident among Quebec sociologists who have felt they had to decide whether "se représenter la collectivité en termes ethniques ou en termes de classes". 5 The most well-known example of this is provided by Rioux who distinguishes between "conscience ethnique et conscience de classe au Québec". 6 He arbitrarily establishes a dichotomy between ethnic consciousness and class consciousness and proceeds to describe Quebec history in terms of the predominance of one or the other consciousness. This interpretation is only made possible by assuming that ethnic consciousness and class consciousness are two separate realities and by drawing a parallel between social class and ethnic class


at the level of consciousness. Based on these premises, Rioux concludes that ethnicity has had by far the most pervasive influence on Quebec voters, thereby hindering the development of a class consciousness. Faced, however, with the problem of explaining the Creditiste vote of 1962, Rioux concludes that both consciousness can exist at the same time in an important part of the population. The 1962 election, according to Rioux, was the first time that the lower classes were able to break through their nationalist conditioning. He also views any link between nationalist and class ideologies as a new phenomenon and predicts that as social unrest becomes more evident in Quebec, class and ethnic consciousness will become more intertwined so that "ethnic class" will not totally dominate political and electoral behaviour at the expense of "social class".

The emphasis placed on the ethnic cleavage by these and other authors appears to some extent to be the product of a society dominated by traditional political and religious elites from approximately 1850 until 1960 and by a powerful clerico-nationalist ideology which evolved from these elites. This

7 In Dofny and Rioux, op.cit., p. 307, the authors go so far as to say, "there is a risk of confusing social classes with groups based on occupation or socio-economic interests."

8 See Michaël Oliver, "The Social and Political Ideas of French-Canadian Nationalists, 1920-1945" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, McGill University, 1956). The author argues that there was no single nationalist doctrine in Quebec but that there were reactions to the right and to the left. However, he does add that the right dominated French-Canadian nationalism in the decades under consideration and that the influence of nationalist thought was extensive because of a close alliance between intellectuals and the Roman...
ideology was a reaction to English domination and served to protect the elite position of the clergy and the traditional middle classes. It idealized characteristics which were in direct contrast with the English way of life: it emphasized the primacy of agriculture as the true French-Canadian vocation and it rejected material wealth, the industrial revolution, and urbanization. As Dumont states, it rested on a selection of three elements which supposedly defined the situation of French Canadians: "nous sommes pauvres; nous sommes Français et Catholiques; et l'Anglo-Saxon exerce sur nous un pouvoir économique écrasant."  

The power of the intelligentsia in conjunction with the Roman Catholic hierarchy was so great that few dissident voices were heard:

Because of their almost complete control over the flow of information and ideas within Quebec, and the help of the state when necessary, the ideology of the traditional elites remained virtually unchallenged among les Québécois throughout the nineteen-thirties.  

By restricting the activities of the masses to certain areas and by constantly reminding them of their proper place in society, the elites were able to assert their dominance over the masses. These political and religious elites also maintained their dominant position in Quebec society by supporting the activities of the Catholic Church. (p. 339) This is somewhat in agreement with Sheilagh Hodgins Milner and Henry Milner, The Decolonization of Quebec (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1973) who speak of a monolithic nationalist ideology which was right-wing and based on Catholic dogma. (p. 131)

9 Fernand Dumont, op. cit., p. 17.

10 Milner and Milner, op. cit., p. 133.
of Anglo-Canadian and American capitalists through tax concessions, cheap land leases, and minimum government control. The nationalism of this period also favoured the foreign capitalists since it preached immorality and illegitimacy of strike action and told the workers that material wealth and industrialization did not belong in the French-Canadian nation. As a result, foreign-owned companies were allowed to pay exceptionally low wages with little fear of strikes. 11 Obviously English and American owners saw no reason to interfere with nationalist activities that essentially encouraged them to take advantage of the plentiful supply of resources and cheap labour. 12

It is perhaps understandable that many writers should interpret the apparent lack of unrest among the working classes of Quebec to mean total preoccupation with cultural identity. Nevertheless, the lack of attention paid to elite behaviour and elite control cannot be left without criticism. This, in fact, constitutes one of the major gaps in the cultural interpretation. Rioux refers to the powerful influence of the traditional elite but, at the same time, he believes that this has resulted in the


12 See Hubert Guindon, "Social Unrest, Social Class, and Quebec's Bureaucratic Revolution," Queen's Quarterly, XXVI (Summer, 1964), p. 158. He states: "The French Canadian elite was ideologically cooperative, sensitive only about its continued control over its demographic structures. This fitted in quite well with the incoming groups who could develop their economic pursuits and enterprises with minimum involvement in the local society."
"nationalist conditioning of the masses". But can it be easily assumed that the lower classes in Quebec were convinced of the merits of poverty, of the messianic mission of French Canadians, and of the teaching that the owner's and workers' interests were not in conflict? Furthermore, it is questionable whether the working classes regarded the English as their only "enemy"; whether their major concern was cultural identity; and whether they accepted, and adopted as their own, the conservative, reactionary nationalism of the traditional elites.

Any criticism of this interpretation must present an alternative explanation for working-class support of the Union Nationale since this has been one of the fundamental reasons for attributing working-class behaviour to ethnic concerns. To begin with, it must be stressed again that the cultural interpretation does not sufficiently take into account the power and influence of the elites. Rather, as Pinard states, "it derives from a simple model of the political process which states that beliefs and values of a group are a direct cause of parties which represent this group." Such an assumption must be reconsidered in light of the middle-class and clerical domination of social and political institutions. The dominant class of this period maintained its position of economic and political dominance by advancing a nationalist ideology that pervaded the

13 Dofney and Rioux, op. cit., p. 310.
legal, political, and cultural realm and which rationalized
its position of domination. The relative absence of socialist
groups prior to 1960 begins to seem understandable after
delineating some aspects of the traditional elite's influence:
1) control over La Confédération des Travailleurs Catholiques
du Canada, for a long time the only voice of the workers
recognized by the dominant elements in Quebec society; 2)
the repression of legal strikes and the prohibition of sympathy
strikes; and 3) the predominance of traditional, right-wing,
nationalistic publications such as L'Action Française, La Nation,
and L'Action Nationale. Milner and Milner give some indication
of the effects of these activities:

Because the interests of the government and the
Church coincided during this era with each
reinforcing the power of the other, the dis-
contented and frustrated social classes at the
bottom were prevented from acquiring the
necessary information or skills to challenge
their oppressors. 16

What seems to be a realistic assessment of the situation is
not that the masses were conditioned by nationalism to be.
unaware of their exploitation but that they were unable to build
their own organizations for the expression of class demands. Of

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15 According to Marx, economic domination is tied to
political domination. Class relations which arise from the
determinate relations of production will pervade the political,
legal, and ideological realm as well. In Karl Marx and F.
Engels, The German Ideology, ed. by C.J. Arthur (London:
Lawrence & Wishart, 1970), p. 64, the authors state: "The
class which has the means of production at its disposal, has
control at the same time over the means of mental production.
the ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of
the dominant material relationships."

16 Milner and Milner, op. cit., p. 118.
course it is also true that the development of a class consciousness was greatly hindered in an environment that de-emphasized class conflict and prohibited strike activity. There is no evidence, however, to indicate that this lack of a developed class consciousness was the result of a strong ethnic consciousness. It is much more likely, as Pinard states, that:

The potential for conflict was rarely given a chance of becoming activated, because more than elsewhere, the choices open to the lower classes were dictated by established elites who were monolithic enough to render the appearance of reformist or radical alternatives most unlikely. 17

Any interpretation which accounts for working-class voting behaviour in terms of nationalist tendencies is confronted with another problem. If Quinn and others are correct in stating that the Union Nationale received more support from the working-class districts than from middle-class ones, it seems, following the ethnic argument to its logical conclusion, that the working class is more nationalistic than any other class in Quebec society. Even without Pinard's evidence which shows that this is not the case 18, it is hardly reasonable to assume that the working class had a more articulated sense of the traditional nationalist ideology, which was not at all beneficial to it, than the middle class.

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17 Pinard, op. cit., p. 107.

18 Ibid., p. 98. On Table VI of this page, Pinard found that the working class had only a slightly greater tendency to be ethnically conscious than the middle class but he says it is possible that these attitudes simply reflected their ethnocentric disposition towards all other groups. Pinard also found that the greater tendency for the working class to vote UN remained the same among those who had strong nationalist attitudes as among those who did not.
who benefited directly from this nationalism. As Pinard says, "Nous croyons que l'erreur ici a été d'attribuer à la masse un nationalisme articulé que ne se trouve que dans certains groupes." 19 For ethnic voting to take place, one would expect to find: 1) the expression of ethnic concerns in all levels of Quebec society; and 2) a majority from all social classes supporting the party most sympathetic to these ethnic concerns. There is no evidence to indicate that both, or even one, of the conditions are met in Quebec politics.

The assumption of cultural and economic homogeneity must also be critically analyzed. It is clear that the traditional elites of 1850 until 1960 attempted to create the appearance of a homogeneous culture which essentially protected their own elite position in the face of economic domination. Despite all their propaganda and teachings, the shortage of land, the exodus to the cities, and the fast pace of industrialization could not be stopped or even slowed down. 20 Already in the nineteen-thirties Quebec had all the signs of being a diversified, heterogeneous society with a well-defined class hierarchy. The


20 See, for example, Nathan Keyfitz, "Population Problems," in Marcel Rioux and Yves Martin, eds., French-Canadian Society (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1964), pp. 216-244. This author found that non-agricultural industry rose by 748,000, while the number of persons employed in agriculture dropped by 17,000 between 1891 and 1951. Between 1911 and 1951, manufacturing occupations rose from 79,000 to 237,000. Also of
nineteen-forties saw increased tension between labour and management.\textsuperscript{21} It, therefore, becomes difficult to accept Rioux's notion of an "ethnic class". While French Canadians may have acted 'en bloc' during specific crises, it is at no time possible to speak of an ethnically national class. This assumes, according to Ryerson, "the rallying of an undifferentiated 'classless' national block against an equally undifferentiated adversary, les Anglais."\textsuperscript{22} Bourque and Laurin-Frenette point out quite clearly that class conflict has occurred within each nation since 1760 as well as between classes whose members are from different nations.\textsuperscript{23}

In this section it has been seen that the cultural interpretation has pervaded much of the literature on Quebec politics and has influenced numerous writers and analysts throughout significance, Keyfitz found that in 1951 only 17\% of the total gainfully employed population was engaged in agriculture.

\textsuperscript{21}Unable to join international unions, prohibited from striking, and unlikely to receive satisfactory settlement through government boards of arbitration, labour in Quebec was growing more and more militant. It was in this atmosphere that the strike of the C.T.C.C. against the Johns-Manville Company broke out at Asbestos in 1949. See P.E. Trudeau, ed., \textit{La Grève de l'Amiante} (Montreal: Editions Cité Libre, 1956), and Milner and Milner, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 150-153.


\textsuperscript{23}Gilles Bourque and Nicole Laurin-Frenette, "Social classes and nationalist ideologies in Quebec, 1760-1970," in Gary Teeple, ed., \textit{Capitalism and the national question in Canada} (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 192. This article also suggests that the term "ethnic class" is scientifically doubtful and ambiguous.
Quebec history. The proponents of this interpretation believe that ethnic concerns and the nationalism they inspire constitute the most important consideration in decisions made by Quebec voters and politicians. The premises upon which this interpretation rests are homogeneity of values in the face of foreign domination, little class conflict in a society concerned primarily with preserving its culture, and an analytical separation of class and ethnic concerns with no suggestion of their interrelationship. The cultural interpretation was criticized on the basis of these assumptions and it was suggested that the notion of a homogeneous, 'classless' society was hardly an accurate description of Quebec society. It was concluded that the proponents of the ethnic cleavage fail to consider the following: 1) the class structure and class tensions that have existed within Quebec since 1760; 2) the powerful influence of the elites in all political and social institutions and their ability to dictate the choices open to the lower classes; and 3) the specific groups or classes who actually benefited from the spread of a conservative, nationalist doctrine.

2. The Class Cleavage

The argument that nationalism is the primary determinant of party choice in Quebec is clearly open to question. Contrary to the proponents of the cultural interpretation, there seems to be basis for believing that the class cleavage plays a significant role in the alignment of Quebec voters. To say as Trudeau does that "French-Canadians on the whole never voted
for political or economic ideologies"\textsuperscript{24}, or as John Wilson does, that "in Quebec social class has virtually nothing to do with variations in partisanship"\textsuperscript{25} seem to be generalizations that are neither empirically nor theoretically supported. Rejecting these assumptions, several studies, although confined to a narrow time period or restricted to single ridings or counties, have attempted to determine the significance of social class in Quebec voting behaviour. This section will briefly look at some of these findings and will consider the implications of these findings for a class analysis of politics.

While empirical evidence of class voting is rare, considerable emphasis has been placed on the socio-economic differences between the supporters of the Liberal party and the Union Nationale from 1935 to the mid-sixties. Specifically, the party system appeared to mirror class differences in Quebec society with the Liberal party attracting considerable support from the professionals, businessmen, and white-collar workers, while the Union Nationale was more heavily supported by the working classes and by other lower paid, less educated segments of the province. Quinn's findings indicate the propensity of workers to support the Union Nationale. He points out that, in

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the elections of 1948, 1952 and 1956, there were few instances of the Union Nationale receiving less than 45% of the popular vote in the working-class districts of Montreal and Quebec and in several industrial towns. 26 McRoberts adds to these findings and indicates that, according to Gallup poll statistics, workers were more likely to vote Union Nationale than members of the middle class in 1944. 27

Lemieux's extensive work in the area of provincial politics reveals the importance of socio-economic variables for Quebec voters in more recent elections. In particular, his study of the 1956, 1960, 1962, and 1966 provincial elections concludes that: "on both the constituency and individual levels there has been a pronounced relationship since 1956 between the socio-economic factors of ethnic origin, education, occupation, and income and the vote for the two main parties of Quebec." 28 For example, in 1962 Lemieux points out that 76% of the professional people and highly specialized technicians, 67% of the office workers and salesmen, and 65% of the salaried executives were satisfied with the Liberal party. This is in contrast to 43% of labourers and domestics, 49% of skilled workers, and 51% 26 Quinn, op. cit., p. 100.


of small propriétaires and small businessmen. This division in party support, apparent to some extent in the other three elections as well, caused Lemieux to ask whether:

on peut se demander si, dans les cas extrêmes tout au moins, l'opposition d'ordre socio-économique entre les deux partis traditionnels n'est pas plus grande et surtout plus profonde qu'on le croit généralement?

The findings of Lemieux are, with some variation, repeated in several other works and provide a sound basis for developing a class analysis of politics in Quebec. However, such an analysis is complicated by the tendency of the lower classes to support the Union Nationale, and must account for this particular pattern of voting behaviour.

A rejection of the cultural explanation which explains working-class support for the Union Nationale as a case of cultural preoccupation allows for an alternative explanation based on class factors. Maurice Pinard has, perhaps, made the

29 Ibid., p. 274.


31 See L. Duglos, "Le comportement électoral du comté de Québec-est, 1956-1963" (unpublished M.A. thesis, L'Université Laval, 1964); Yves Julien, "Les élections provinciales dans le comté de Portneuf, 1936-1966" (unpublished M.A. thesis, L'Université Laval, 1968); and Jean Desrochers, "Analyse par régions des élections provinciales de 1935 à 1962" (unpublished M.A. thesis, L'Université Laval, 1965). A finding repeated in these theses is that the UN is more likely to be supported by low income, low status occupations, while the Liberal party tends to attract people who have a good education, a high social status, and are financially well-off.
greatest inroad into this area of research. In both of his major studies, The Rise of a Third Party and "Working Class Politics", Pinard suggests that the role of nationalism in accounting for the support of the Union Nationale and the Social Credit has been greatly exaggerated.\(^{32}\) Rather he asserts that the disproportionate support of the worker for the Union Nationale in 1960 and 1962 as well as the concentration of Social Credit support among small businessmen and workers in the federal election of 1962 reflect some degree of class consciousness. Concerning support for the Union Nationale, Pinard emphatically states: "it is because they are class conscious that so many workers tend to support the National Union, not because they lack class consciousness."\(^{33}\)

This pattern of voting, whereby the working class has tended to support a party with a conservative ideology, clearly deviates from voting patterns established in most developed countries. However, Pinard, Bourque, Laurin-Frenette, and others, provide explanations for this voting pattern which discourage any hasty rejection of the class analysis.

From a Marxist viewpoint, Bourque and Laurin-Frenette suggest that, while there are a number of economic, political,

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\(^{33}\)Pinard, "Working Class Politics," op. cit., p. 101. Evidence for this can be found in Table VI of the same article where the data indicate that in 1962 the working-class identifiers were precisely those with the greatest tendency to support the UN.
and cultural aspirations specific to the dominated classes, these classes lack their own ideology and political action that is opposed to the dominant classes. The working classes could, therefore, only express these aspirations and their discontent by altering the equilibrium between "bourgeois" parties, through electoral support for one or the other. The authors go further to state:

The party's ideology or type of nationalism is not particularly important, in the end, because these classes can switch from the Créditistes to the Union Nationale to the Parti Québécois, not to mention the vote for Trudeau in 1968. They will be prepared to support whatever solutions are proposed ... provided that the party in question can cleverly appeal to the discontent and exploitation which these classes endure.34

However different in ideological orientation, Pinard presents an argument that is, in many ways similar to the one outlined by Bourque and Laurin-Frenette. He postulates that the workers turned to the Union Nationale, not because of its ideology, but rather because "it was a movement well suited for the mobilization of social unrest."35 Similarly, in describing Social Credit support, Pinard concludes that the presence of economic grievances and the absence of class organizations lead to a situation where the working class is "as likely to support a conservative movement as a progressive one, whichever is most available".36

34 Bourque and Laurin-Frenette, op. cit., p. 203.
Several major points, essential to a class analysis of voting behaviour in Quebec, are repeated in Pinard's and Bouffque and Laurin-Frenette's interpretation of the working class: 1) working-class support for the Union Nationale was an expression of discontent, a protest against a system which makes no effort to alleviate depressed economic and living conditions; 2) the relative absence of class organizations which encompass the social and political life of the working class forces this class to choose between middle-class parties; and related to this 3) the powerful influence of the dominant class and its ideology inhibited the development of a working-class consciousness, dictated the choices open to the working class, and translated lower-class sentiments into non-class, ethnic concerns.

In an effort to make a further case for class voting in Quebec, despite the anomalous behaviour of the working class to support a party of the right, Pinard develops the concept of "negative class voting". This term successfully implies that Quebec's situation deviates from that found in most other economically developed countries and, at the same time, underlines the significance of the class cleavage in Quebec voting behaviour. This pattern of class voting developed in a party system where there was no party tied specifically to the working class, and where the Liberal party, appearing to be the party to the left, was rejected by the working class
because of its ties to middle-class business interests and because of its inability to solve the problems created by the economic depression. Through a coalition of working-class, rural, and populist support, the Union Nationale managed to perpetuate its stay in power until 1960. The absence of any other alternative open to the working class guaranteed the continued success of the Union Nationale despite its failure to carry out the much needed economic reforms and despite its anti-labour attitude.

The usefulness of the term "negative class voting" is less apparent when an attempt is made to distinguish between these parties on the economic left-right continuum. As Pinard himself states, "The Quebec pattern of class voting is therefore negative only for the analyst who perceives ideological differences between the parties."\(^{37}\) The lack of documentation on this matter reveals how difficult it is to make such a distinction. According to Lemieux:

> It is particularly difficult to refer to them as being right or left, assuming these terms represent ideologies and policies designed to maintain or reduce the differences between individuals and between groups of a society. Since 1936 neither one of the two parties has had a policy that has been at all constant in terms of right or left.\(^{38}\)

If no major differences appear to exist between the Union Nationale and the Liberal party, Bourque and Laurin-Frenette's


\(^{38}\) Lemieux, "Heaven is Blue and Hell is Red," op. cit., p. 260.
interpretation receives more credibility: the lower classes can only express their discontent by altering the equilibrium between the middle-class parties. By the same token, Pinard's assertion that disenchantment with the Liberal party caused the working class to turn to the Union Nationale, regardless of ideology, is, perhaps, his most valuable contribution.

In general, a significant amount of evidence has been gathered from several studies to illustrate the importance of the class alignment in the Quebec electorate. However, because of the demonstrated tendency of the workers to support the Union Nationale, the interpretation of voting patterns in Quebec has not been easy. Pinard's "negative class voting" has been one response to this deviation from the norm. Bourque and Laurin-Frenette understand the situation in terms of a dominated class, lacking its own course of political action, that is only able to change the balance between parties representing the interests of the dominant class. The literature on class voting displays a consensus of opinion on points of major significance: 1) nationalism has very little to do with the destination of working-class support; 2) ethnic preoccupations dominated the thinking of large segments of the elites and made no provision for the expression of lower-class demands; and 3) possessing some degree of class consciousness and aware of their depressed living and working conditions, the lower classes turned to the party that appealed
to their state of discontent.

3. Social Classes and Nationalist Ideologies: A Re-evaluation

A missing element in the studies of Pinard and others is an analysis of the relationship between social classes and nationalism. A class analysis of politics cannot easily avoid the issue of nationalism since it has been the main axis of French-Canadian thought for at least 150 years and since it has been equally dominant in the life of Quebec political parties. Only by linking nationalism to its class base is it possible to assess the significance of the class cleavage in Quebec politics.

Pinard emphasizes the ethnic preoccupations of the elites and the middle classes but does not come to any conclusions about the class nature of nationalist ideologies. Rather he suggests that "when ethnic preoccupations prevail over social preoccupations in a group, it is difficult to prevent individuals of different social ideologies - left, right, and centre - from rallying together if an ethnic ideology unites them." 39 This again would seem to presuppose a separation of ethnic and class concerns.

Globensky attempts to bring the two together by evaluating the significance of nationalism on class consciousness. He concludes, however, that the regressive form of nationalism

is the greatest contributor to ethnic solidarity while aggressive nationalism is conducive to an awareness of class consciousness. 40 This conclusion seems to be theoretically suspect. It seems more likely that, while nationalism may be an important factor in the development of a group consciousness, ethnic preoccupations and the nationalism they inspire emerge out of class concerns. Bourque and Laurin-Frenette point out that both regressive and aggressive nationalisms have emanated from particular classes. More specifically, they note three nationalist ideologies supported by different classes: a conservative nationalism upheld by the clergy and the traditional petite bourgeoisie; a dynamic nationalism leaning toward independence supported by the new middle class; and a nationalist ideology emphasizing socialism put forward by working-class militants and intellectuals. 41

A recent thesis by Linda Collier builds on this interpretation by showing that nationalism and class are not distinguishable and opposed. 42 Her contention that changes in


41 Bourque and Laurin-Frenette, op. cit., p. 193.

the nationalist ideology reflect changes in the underlying economic structure seems to be valid and is supported by her data which show the "new" middle class favourable to separatism and the "old" middle class opposed to it.

The theoretical grounds for assuming that nationalist ideologies are linked to specific class interests are several. First, it appears that the nation-community is tied, historically, to class structures and modes of production. Bourque, Laurin-Frenette, and Roussopoulos believe that the nation is the effect of the capitalist-mode of production and state that "the nation does not exist outside classes, but as a function of classes". However, Ryerson takes issue with this and contends that it is equally unjustified to say the nation is dissolved in classes as it is to say classes are dissolved in the nation.

He emphasizes that the nation-community embodies a linguistic and cultural identity "that is not simply an 'effect' of class" and claims that "national differences both antedate and postdate the era of the capitalist mode of production." While any involvement in this debate will be avoided, it is clear that all four authors are in agreement with

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43 Bourque and Laurin-Frenette, op. cit., p. 190. See also Dimitrios Roussopoulos, "Social Classes and Nationalism in Quebec," Our Generation, VIII, 2 (April, 1972), who states that the nation is the specific effect of the various aspects of the capitalist mode of production. (p.38)

44 Ryerson, op. cit., p. 190.

a major point that will be repeatedly emphasized in this thesis: nationalism is closely "interwoven with the shifting patterns of class relations and struggles".46

Secondly, nationalism is more than the defense of cultural values and political rights of an ethnic group. It promotes a system or a method of organization that will ensure certain values and activities defined by a particular group in the society as necessary for the growth and prosperity of the total society. Or, as Pierre Dandurand writes in his critique of Fortin's "Le nationalisme canadien-français et les classes sociales":

L'idéologie par ailleurs est dite nationale, ou si l'on veut, devient du nationalisme, lorsque la valeur nation se présente comme l'axe autour duquel s'organise un projet d'action et une définition de la situation qui sont eux-mêmes le fait d'un groupe social à l'intérieur d'une société.47

Emphasis on, and exaggeration of, the 'national will', the 'national identity', and the 'national interest', therefore become the means to maintain the dominant position of one group or class and its value-system in a society. Implicit in this nationalism is "une définition des classes et des relations qui doivent exister entre ces classes dans la nation à réaliser".48

46 Ibid., p. 224.


A shift in the pattern of class relations and the establishment of a new dominant class may, therefore, bring about a change in this definition and hence, a new expression of nationalism.

The pervasiveness of nationalism in Quebec throughout its history can be understood more clearly by considering the domination of Quebec's social structure by non-Francophones. Quebec as a whole is a dominated society, deriving its subordinate status not only from the Anglo-Canadian dominance in Quebec industry since the British conquest, but also from the more recent invasion of American investments. There is no lack of evidence to illustrate the fact that Francophone inferiority exists at the top levels of the financial and industrial hierarchies; that income disparities between the English and French of Quebec at all levels is very great; and that unemployment and poverty rates in Quebec are higher than the Canadian average. 49

The emergence of various nationalist ideologies has been a direct response by French Canadians to their position of economic inferiority. This domination should not be interpreted to mean that a class structure based on the capitalist mode of

49 This is fully documented in The Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Vol. 3A (Ottawa: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1969). It states, for example, that "In terms of income, education, or occupation, the ethnic distribution is to some extent distorted, for the disparity between those of British and French origin is more marked in Quebec than the other provinces." (p. 52). See also Israel Shames, "French-Canadian Political Nationalism in Quebec: Factors Contributing to the rise of the PQ" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Carleton University, 1972), pp. 78-96.
production does not exist within "la nation québécoise". Francophone capitalists, while dependent upon the presence of foreign owners and money, are aware that their position of power within Quebec is threatened by Anglo-Canadian and American domination of the economy. While maintaining close collaboration with English-speaking industrialists, this Francophone middle class attempts to improve its precarious economic position through nationalism. Unlike the conservative nationalism of the traditional elites and middle classes of 1850 until 1960 which stayed aloof from industrial expansion, the middle classes of Quebec since 1960 have demanded greater French-Canadian participation in the economy through what is often called "neo-nationalism". Because its economic interests are tied to foreign-owned corporations, the nationalism of Francophone financial-capitalists has been confined to such issues as greater state intervention in the economy, and greater use of the French language in business and industry.50 Changes in the pattern of class relations brought about by the rise of a technocratic

50 Some examples are: 1) the enactment of the slogan "Maîtres chez nous"; 2) the General Investment Corporation established in 1962 with the hope that it would increase the degree of French-Canadian control and ownership in the province's economy; 3) the nationalization of electricity; 4) the transfer back from the federal government to Quebec of certain powers; 5) reforms obtained from the federal government such as setting up the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, and facilitating the hiring of French Canadians in the federal civil service; 6) the events surrounding Bill 63 which evoked demands that all immigrants to Quebec send their children to Francophone schools; and 7) the passage in 1975 of Bill 22 making French the only official language in Quebec and demanding that French become the language of business in the province.
middle class have been accompanied by the appearance of another nationalist ideology. For this class, separatism becomes the only way it can establish itself as the dominant class in Quebec. However opposed, the nationalist ideologies of these two middle classes have both originated from the same source of determination to end their economic domination. While nationalism may possibly be linked to the working classes, it is clear that this has not been the case throughout Quebec history.\(^{51}\) Rather, the various nationalist ideologies have emanated from the middle class and appear to be inseparable from the concerns and values of this class.

By way of summarizing, two explanations can be provided which account for the usefulness of nationalism to the middle class. First, "investments are made in nationalism or ethnicity because they are profitable but only profitable for specific and identifiable groups."\(^{52}\) Albert Breton's reflection on the "economics of nationalism" is based on a clear perception of the role of nationalism in Quebec. Nationalism in this province, particularly since the late 1950's and early 1960's has been a demand for "changes in the international and interethnic distribution of property or ownership of the stock of wealth".\(^{53}\)

\(^{51}\)In Milner and Milner, op. cit., pp. 224-244, the authors state that a nationalism of the left emerged in the early seventies such that the lower classes are developing class consciousness through the symbols of the nation.


\(^{53}\)Ibid., p. 377.
The link between this nationalism and the middle class can be established by understanding that the rate of return from the "investment in nationality" has always favoured this class.

The nationalism of this period which attacked the foreign control of the state as well as the social control of traditional institutions emanated from the "new middle class" because it had a great deal to gain in terms of increases in high-income jobs, mobility, and opportunities for promotion. A particularly insightful description of the class interests of this indigenous middle class is provided by Hubert Guindon. He clearly shows that the class consciousness of this group of bureaucratically-employed individuals preceded the development of ethnic consciousness. Nationalism became a tool for a class "seeking and needing space for expansion, occupationally and organizationally." 54

An important characteristic of this investment in nationality is that it is done in the name of the collective good while incurring costs which must be paid for by classes that do not necessarily benefit from the changes. It was claimed in 1962 by the Liberal party that the nationalization of electricity would be in the interests of the entire population. Based on Breton's evidence which shows that the economic benefits of nationalization were small and probably nil, it seems that

takeover of private firms occurred at this particular point in time largely because of middle-class demands for more highly-paid jobs. The decision was made at a time when "despite a drive in recent years to recruit more French-speaking engineers and executives, French Canadians were still just barely present at the higher levels of administration in most of the companies." Nationalism, therefore, appears to be a middle-class phenomenon. While the propaganda effects of nationalist policies may appeal to some members of the working class, it is clear that these policies are not to their economic advantage. Rather, as Breton implies, they must help bear the costs of programmes that, while they have the appearance of redistributing income from one ethnic group to another, only redistribute it in favour of some part or all of the middle class.

The class base of nationalism can be further understood by considering benefits that are more specifically political. By making politics revolve around the issue of ethnic concerns, the political and economic elites attempt to preserve their privileged position within the province. Emphasis on the ethnic cleavage becomes a convenient means for making economic and social issues less relevant in party competition and for obscuring and nullifying potential class conflict. As Wolfinger aptly points out, "ethnic strategies divert working-class energies

55 Ibid., pp. 382-384.


57 Breton, op. cit., p. 380.
away from substantive policy demands."

Without channels available for the expression of class demands, the development of class consciousness within the working class is seriously inhibited. The power of the elites, both prior to and after 1960, in doing just this cannot be underestimated. The success of politicians in focusing attention on administrative or non-class issues during elections makes it possible for them to protect their own vested interests, without the obligation of fulfilling promises opposed by the middle class as a whole.

The major conclusion that has emerged out of this review of the literature is that there is a need for a new approach to the study of Quebec voting behaviour. The debate between the ethnic and the class cleavage is essentially a meaningless one. Any interpretation of Quebec politics must at least recognize the class base of nationalism. By the same token, any class analysis of Quebec politics must take into consideration the role ethnicity plays in the ideology of the dominant classes and of political parties. Each nationalist outburst in Quebec cannot be viewed in isolation of where it comes from and who will benefit from it. Seen from this perspective, it can be said that nationalism has to date been a middle-class phenomenon. The political implications of this are that almost every serious political party in Quebec history has had to make some sort of nationalist appeal in order to be successful at the polls.

This also rules out any simplistic interpretation which stresses nationalistic fervor of the working classes.

The value of the class analysis has not been fully explored and concern with class structure and class conflict is only beginning to find expression in the literature. The evidence of a class division in party support presented in this chapter is a clear indication of the importance of such an analysis. There is no substantial evidence to suggest that cultural preoccupation is the major activity of the provincial electorate. Nor can it be empirically proven that the working class is more nationalistic than other segments of the Quebec population. In order to understand the lack of working-class consciousness and of leftist parties, a model of political behaviour is needed which takes into consideration the power of the economic and political elites to block or redirect expressions of class discontent. The role of nationalism in obscuring class conflict and in protecting the power of the middle class is obviously a central feature of this model. In general, it is this peculiar interweave of class and ethnicity which both complicates and inspires a class analysis of Quebec provincial politics.
CHAPTER II

THE CLASS CONCEPT: THEORETICAL AND DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS

Introduction

A class analysis of politics is severely handicapped from the start due to confusion and ambiguity surrounding the concept "class". The lack of unanimity and the multiplicity of definitions in the literature on class coupled very often with the absence of a general theoretical framework within which the concept of class is employed are problematic for a study of this nature. To arrive at an operational concept of class that is firmly grounded in a theoretical framework requires either sorting through the massive array of literature on the subject or developing a new theory of class. While the former is a laborious task, the latter is clearly beyond the scope of this study and would no doubt add to the existing confusion.

Further difficulties are created by the sparseness in Canadian literature of sound class analysis which could provide a fairly concrete model of classes for the present undertaking. This impoverishment in Canadian literature is related to the emphasis on "consensus" rather than "conflict" politics. Whether the view of Canada as a "mosaic" is so deeply engrained as to render other interpretations meaningless or whether the ideological connotations of the concept have made academics shy away from the supposedly radical elements of class analysis, the effect has been either to treat the class concept in terms
of stratification, eliminating the dynamic of conflict, or to deny the validity of the concept altogether.¹

It is the purpose of this chapter to formulate a concept of class by recognizing the significance of Marx's theory of class and also by considering more recent approaches which have attempted to update Marx in response to social changes which have occurred since the nineteenth century. Above all, it is hoped that this chapter will contribute to the Canadian literature on class by retaining the dynamics of conflict and consciousness within the class concept and by providing a theoretical framework which recognizes the fundamental role of economic relationships in the rest of the social and political structure.

Class analysis began with Marx.² Since its origin, however, the class concept has been used and understood in dramatically different ways. It is particularly noticeable that

¹Leo Johnson criticizes both the North American Liberal intellectual and Marxist scholars for creating misconceptions about class in Canada and for weaknesses in their methodological approach. See "The development of class in Canada in the twentieth century," in Gary Teeple, ed., Capitalism and the national question in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), pp. 142-145.

²At the same time, it is recognized that Saint-Simon's ideas on social class may have influenced Marx's writing. As Giddens says, "No major idea in social thought is ever the product of a single mind; rather, the great thinker gives concrete expression to conceptions which are becoming formed within the intellectual climate of his time." See Anthony Giddens, The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1973), p. 9.
the history of the concept has been marked by persistent efforts to review, to revise, and to refute the Marxian notion of class. Certainly it seems fair to conclude that Marx's concept of class has been the object of unrelenting criticism. Non-Marxist sociologists have been able neither to accept the ideological implications of Marx's theory of class conflict nor to reconcile recent technological changes in society with Marx's interpretation of the evolution of capitalism. As a result, there has been a tendency to declare Marx's view of class obsolete and to replace it with a multitude of definitions, many existing in isolation of a general theoretical framework. As Dahrendorf, after citing several ambiguous definitions of the class concept, suggests:

Whoever reads these definitions may well be tempted to regard sociology as rather a frivolous discipline. Indeed, theories can neither be formulated nor refuted on the basis of these definitions, some of which are plainly bare of substance, others too profuse, and all are far removed from the original purpose of the concept of class.

This dilution of the class concept is apparent in the large body of writings by American authors as well as in much of the Canadian literature, influenced as it was by the American tradition of class analysis. Criticism of these writings provides a basis for understanding what will be considered by this study as the important elements of class.

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3. For example, Porter believes that "The capitalism that Marx wrote about has passed out of existence in a much less violent fashion than he thought it would." See John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), p. 19.

The American Tradition of Class Analysis

The predominant feature of the American tradition of class analysis is the identification of class and stratification. The use of the term class to refer to groups differentiated according to status is not at all consistent with the original purpose of the class concept. Rather than understanding classes in terms of economic relations, the American tradition views classes as layers in a hierarchy differentiated by gradual distinctions. This approach emerges out of a vision of society where class conflict is not a crucial factor and where differential ranking is a permanent and a natural condition of any society. It is tied to the belief that certain positions in society are more important than others and that high rewards such as income, status, and prestige should be attached to such positions in order to attract the best people, and hence, to ensure society's survival. This theory of stratification and class assumes individualism and equality of opportunity particularly since belief in upward mobility helps to maintain harmony and consensus in a differentiated society. The view of stratification as a permanent and a necessary characteristic of modern society provides the basis for understanding class analysis in the American tradition. Such an approach is not criticized in terms of its adequacy for explaining status differentials, but rather for

5This, according to Porter, is the 'functional theory' of stratification: it "reflects the American conservative ideology that inequality is necessary and that people more or less arrive at the class positions which they deserve." Porter adds, "The functional theories are based on a supposed social harmony, and
associating class with status. By doing so, classes are automatically conceptualized as static, permanent, and without strong conflicting interests. Furthermore, as Giddens points out, the fact that class and stratification are frequently interchanged "inevitably entails the conclusion that all societies are 'class societies'".  

The major emphasis in the American literature on class has been one of describing hierarchical systems at a given point in time. This has resulted in a multitude of definitions, each with the intent of assigning individuals to a "social class" for purposes of analysis. A very general classification of these definitions into "objective" and "subjective" can be made. "Objectivists" generally depend on accessible indicators that will best reveal differences between strata and, hence, allow for the ranking of individuals in socially superior and inferior positions. The choice of indicators does not appear to be dictated by a theoretical framework and is, for the most part, a matter of practical convenience. Depending on whether a single criterion, such as income, or a combination of criteria are employed to carry out the ranking, the effect using Ossowski's terminology is either a "simple" or a "synthetic" gradation scheme. The second scheme of plotting each person's position on thus stand in sharp contrast to Marxian theory of class conflict." (Porter, op. cit., pp. 15-18).

6Giddens, op. cit., p. 78.

a variety of dimensions, such as occupation, income, and education, has been the most popular and has resulted in numerous descriptions of "class" divisions. The major problem with both simple and synthetic gradation schemes is that the criteria for determining the number of classes and boundaries of classes are arbitrarily decided by the analyst. With the choice of the criteria left to the discretion of each writer, the possibilities are unlimited: Blishen's seven occupation classes, Warner's six-class theory, and Center's scheme of upper, middle, working, and lower classes. Such schemes make it hard to visualize social class as anything more than an artificial, statistical group, "an analytic construct imposed on a situation by the investigator." While status groups are arbitrarily defined and may vary according to the criteria employed, they are not classes which have a clear objective, economic foundation.

The "subjectivist" approach has added to this misleading view of the relationship between class and status. The subjectivist defines class according to psychological criteria and to self-perceived location in the social hierarchy. Centers

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exemplifies this position:

Class, as distinguished from stratum, can well be regarded as a psychological phenomenon in the fullest sense of the term. That is, a man’s class is a part of his ego, a feeling on his part of belongingness to something; an identification with something larger than himself.¹⁰

Class, in this sense, has no defined objective base and, as a result, it is concluded that class lines of cleavage may not conform to lines of cleavage "in the objective or stratification sense".¹¹ Yet at the same time it is assumed that classes emerge as a result of membership in a common stratum, a category which is arbitrarily determined by the analyst. While recognizing that the class concept has a subjective element, it seems clear that self-perceived location in a system of stratification cannot serve as a basis for class analysis. Such an approach might be useful for measuring identification with a status group but would not be indicative of class membership. Even then, as Parkin states, "what is often being measured is the perception of the existent status hierarchy and not our own private evaluations of the way positions ought to be socially ranked."¹²

The identification of class and status is, in general, misleading and conceptually confusing. The notion of universal stratification implies status ranking and the rejection of the

¹⁰Center's, op. cit., p. 27.

¹¹Ibid.

Identification of class and stratification requires that status groups be clearly distinguished from classes. Status groups are evaluative categorizations, ordered according to the prestige assigned to particular positions or situations in society. Whether determined by self-evaluation or evaluation of some by others, status groups are artificially and arbitrarily established, dependent upon what is considered to be prestigious at a particular point in time, and existing under the premise that certain functions are more important and worthwhile than others.

Status ranking cannot be understood simply as a function of class divisions since status groups may or may not be a consequence of economic factors. Using Weber's framework, "both propertied and propertyless can belong to the same status group." At the same time it is recognized that status is normally expressed through a specific style of life and that this is usually conditioned economically. For example, social status may derive from wealth, but ownership largely determines accumulation of wealth. Thus, as Giddens states:

While it may be agreed, however, that the bases of the formation of classes and status groups are different, nonetheless the tendency to class structuration may receive considerable impetus where class coincides with the criteria of status group membership...

The failure to distinguish between class and status tends to obscure the nature and the roots of economic inequality.


14 Giddens, op. cit., p. 112.
particularly if status is tied to consumption patterns such as the display of expensive consumer goods or time spent in leisure activities. Analyses which use such cultural characteristics as a primary input usually end up referring to 'middle-class' societies "since in North America there exists a great deal of superficial cultural homogeneity at least at the level of the consumption of, and a general conditioned desire for, mass-produced material goods."\(^{15}\)

A further criticism is that little attempt has been made to understand the relationship between status and the dominant class ideology. Status ranking or the ordering of functions according to 'moral' worth compliments and reinforces economic factors like the division of labour in the capitalist production process in that it may lead to passive acceptance about one's position as well as deference towards higher ranking officials. Furthermore, it promotes the position of the dominant class, a viewpoint elaborated by Parkin:

> It is a feature of every stratification system that those who occupy the dominant positions seek to ensure that the main attributes that they possess become widely accepted as the appropriate criteria for allocating honour...\(^{16}\)

Implicit in class analysis of politics is the study of social conflict and of organized action emerging from common economic considerations.\(^{17}\) Such analyses are rare in the

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\(^{15}\) Johnson, op. cit., p. 142.

\(^{16}\) Parkin, op. cit., p. 44.

\(^{17}\) According to Dahrendorf, "Class is always a category for
literature considered to be part of the American tradition of class theory. As a conclusion to the previous discussion, several broad explanations can be said to account for this deficiency. The most basic reason is a general reluctance to use the class dimension in analyses. What Page wrote in 1940 is in many ways still true today:

In the United States, the word "class" is symbolic of stereotyped conceptions, and is apt to convey the impression that the person who speaks of "class" is moving outside the boundaries of American culture, or indicating an allegiance to the "foreign" doctrine of Marxism.¹⁸

The result has been that when the class concept is used, it bears no resemblance to the Marxian notion of classes according to which there are two major classes defined objectively in relation to the means of production and in conflict with each other.

The outright rejection of the Marxist theory of class conflict and the tendency to replace it with a theory of stratification have reduced the value of the class concept for explaining and understanding social and political behaviour. The identification of class and stratification and the use of classes as synthetic categories have permitted sociologists to evade the dimensions of class conflict, class dominance, and class self-interest, all essential ingredients of class analysis.

Porter's work, *The Vertical Mosaic*, reveals the dilemma of attempting to understand class-related phenomena while defining class as nothing more than artificial, statistical categories. He is most often criticized for inconsistency since the linking of class structure and power structure implies the existence of "real" entities rather than nominal categories. 19

Finally, the evasion of the class dimension in analyses conforms to the view of an egalitarian "classless" society. The rejection of Marx's theory of class, the hesitancy with which the word "class" is used, and the dilution of the concept itself seem to rest on the belief "that developments in the postwar economy spell the death knell of class society and pave the way for a pluralist system in which group loyalty replaces class identification." 20 The Marxist theory of class is rejected on the grounds that it is out-of-date and inapplicable to twentieth century life. 21 It is argued that "greater economic productivity is associated with a more equitable distribution of consumption goods and education - factors contributing to a


21 This is clearly expressed in Porter, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-25.
reduction of intra-societal tensions." It is suggested that this economic growth means a rise in income levels, a high-level consumption of conveniences, an expansion of intermediary positions between manual workers and owners, and hence, the emergence of a "middle-class" society.

To proceed with a class analysis of politics requires the rejection of an interpretation of industrial society which calls for the decomposition of social classes and the minimization of class conflict. While it is not the purpose of this chapter to enter into the end-of-ideology debate, it is necessary to offer some brief criticisms of this interpretation. Myers' contribution in this area is particularly significant. He maintains that it cannot be assumed that the value system of industrial society is spread evenly throughout the society. Rather "the logic of industrialization is to create different value orientations among different social classes." Univer-

salistic and achievement norms are middle-class traits, not traits


23 This according to Janowitz and Segal is the model of the "middle-majority" society "in which the line between working and middle class is not very distinct, and there is a fusion into the life style of the middle status." See M. Janowitz, and David Segal, "Social Cleavage and Party Affiliation: Germany, Great Britain, and the United States," in Giuseppe di Palma, op. cit., p. 201.

24 Myers, op. cit., p. 261.
belonging to industrial society as a whole. This is supported by the authors of *The Affluent Worker* who conclude that:

there remain important areas of common social experience which are still fairly distinctively working-class; that middle-class social norms are not widely followed nor middle-class life-styles consciously emulated; and that assimilation into middle-class society is neither in process nor, in the main, a desired objective.

Even allowing for an increase in the prosperity of the working class and for the adoption of so-called middle-class status symbols, this does not necessarily mean a demise of traditional class loyalties.

Finally, middle-class values may help to perpetuate the myth of an egalitarian society but they cannot conceal basic economic inequalities which continue to characterize industrial society. Overall inequality makes it impossible to accept the argument for class decomposition and there is no lack of evidence to prove that such inequality exists. Of particular relevance, inequality in income distribution and a high incidence of poverty in Canada are well-documented and leave no doubt that Canada is not an egalitarian society.

While the pattern of economic


development of the United States and Canada has been considerably different from that of European societies, it is erroneous to distinguish between them on the basis of the existence or non-existence of classes. A clearer understanding of the meaning of class will allow for variations in the development of classes without neglecting the full implications of inequality.

The European Tradition of Class Theory

The European tradition of class theory has been predominantly concerned with external material relationships and not with status identification or the attributes of individuals. The emphasis has not been one of describing status rankings but rather, of understanding and explaining economic inequality and its material roots. But while the economic, objective basis of class has been accepted as fundamental, the interpretations of this fact have varied considerably which, as Bottomore suggests, "give rise to widely differing views of the significance of classes in social life and of the relations between classes." 27

The task of this section is, therefore, one of selecting from the major contributions of this tradition, those elements which are basic to the class concept.

The influence of Marx's interpretation of classes on the whole European tradition stands out clearly. Marx may not have always been consistent in his use of the class concept but this should not serve to negate the fundamentals of his model. For

Marx, classes are groups of individuals with a common relative to the means of production. It is the production process and, hence, production relations which determine class relations in the economic sphere as well as in the political, ideological realm. As Andrew states, "The class relations constitute the structure of a mode of production or, more generally, of a mode of life." 28 To understand class relations under capitalism, it is, therefore, necessary to understand the production relations in the capitalist production process. These relations are apparent in Giddens' description:

a minority of 'non-producers' who control the means of production, are able to use this position of control to extract from the majority of the 'producers', the surplus product which is the source of their livelihood. 29

Production relations are determinate and distinct from consumption and distribution relations. 30 Thus, for example, the source of income and consumption differences can be traced back to factors of production. However, it is also true, as Carchedi emphasizes, that "distribution relations play an important part in the final shaping of the economic structure and thus of the social classes." 31

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29 Giddens, op. cit., p. 28.


Or as Marx states in *The Grundrisse*:

Of course, production in its one-sided form is in its turn influenced by other elements. For example with the expansion of the market, i.e. of the sphere of exchange, production grows in volume and is subdivided to a greater extent. With a change in distribution, production undergoes a change, as for example in the case of concentration of capital, of a change in the distribution of population in city and country, etc. Finally the demands of consumption also influence production. A mutual interaction takes place between the various elements. \(^{32}\)

Marx's abstract model of classes is a 'dichotomous one. In each mode of production there are two fundamental classes: "the exploiting class which is politically and ideologically dominant, and the exploited class which is politically and ideologically dominated." \(^{33}\) These classes are engaged in relations of mutual dependence and conflict since production relations rest upon the extraction of surplus value and labour by one class from the other. This does not mean that there are only two classes in any social formation. A description of society in terms of the working class and the capitalist class exists under a pure form of capitalism. In concrete society, the economic structure is made up of several modes of production and production processes and hence, more than two classes exist. Recognition of this does not change the fact that "two fundamental classes of any social formation are those of the dominant mode of production in that formation." \(^{34}\)


\(^{33}\)Poulantzas, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

\(^{34}\)Ibid.
But even considering the distinction between Marx's abstract and concrete analysis of classes, it remains clear that Marx is not concerned with accurately describing an existing state of society. Those who have rejected Marx's concept of class on the grounds that it does not account for the rise of new middle-class occupations, have failed to grasp the central purpose of the Marxian endeavor: that which binds the theory of classes to the transformation of types of society. For Marx, class conflict is the motor force of history; class relations are not static, but are historical. His notion of the class concept is not separable from his attempts to show that social development is a result of class conflict and that the class structure of capitalism generates a new mode of production and a new form of classless order. To judge Marx's notion of the class concept in terms of its usefulness as a descriptive category is, therefore, to judge it on grounds for which it was never intended. As Dahrendorf states:

"For Marx the theory of class was not a theory of a cross section of society arrested in time, in particular not a theory of social stratification, but a tool for the explanation of changes in total societies. In elaborating and applying his theory of class, Marx was not guided by the question "How does a given society in fact look at a given point in time?" but by the question "How does the structure of society change?" or in his own words, "What is the (economic) law of motion of modern society?"³⁵"

In accordance with Marx's theory of class that links class conflict with historical progress, classes are viewed as conflict groups, as organized groups participating in political conflict.

³⁵Dahrendorf, op. cit., p. 19.
Historical development is generated only to the extent that a class "in itself" becomes a class "for itself".\textsuperscript{36} That is to say that social change occurs when a group of individuals objectively sharing the same relationship to the means of production is transformed into a united, politically conscious group, organized to press for its economic interests in a political form. This implies that for Marx classes are not just relations of production; they also have ideological and political dimensions. The bourgeoisie, having developed that class consciousness in the course of its struggle for dominance, maintains and rationalizes this position of dominance through control of the institutions of the state and by advancing its own ideology as the legitimate one. Economic, political, and ideological domination by the bourgeoisie continues to exist insofar as the class struggle is absent from the working class. For Marx, human progress can occur only after the proletariat goes through a transition from a collection of disunited workers to a politically-active organization. However, it should be stressed again that Marx is not simply describing society here; he is aware that the revolutionary character of the workers' movement is often lacking. As Edward Andrew clearly states:

This is not a purely cognitive description of the course of human events. Marx did not believe in the ubiquity of struggles between classes; it is an evaluation that class struggle will engender maximum progress of human development.37

For many writers, however, the possible victory of the working class and the subsequent reorganization of society have remained the principle criteria for accepting or rejecting Marx's theory of class. Viewing the apparent failure of the working class in general to radically change the structure of society as a major weakness in Marx's theory, many European sociologists have presented alternative schemes for understanding class inequality. They have relied to a great extent on Max Weber's analysis of class and status. Several of his ideas have had a particularly strong impact on more recent writings:

1) class situation is a result not only of ownership of property but also of possession of skills that can be offered on the market which implies a plurality of classes; 2) classes are not necessarily communities: class operates independently of the individual's perception of his situation since it is given in the structure of the market;38 and 3) the distribution of power is not directly contingent upon class interests. These assumptions paved the way for a variety of studies which downplayed the role Marx had assigned to class conflict in explaining historical change. One response which leans heavily on Weber's writing has been that status groups have become

37Andrew, op. cit., p. 464.

38For a good outline and critique of Weber's theory of class and status, see Giddens, op. cit., pp. 41-52 and 78-80.
more important than social class and have prevented the consolidation of classes in Marx's sense.  

Another response has been to view the occupational order as the backbone of the class structure. In a Weberian manner, Frank Parkin defines class in terms of market advantage: "Occupational groupings high in the scale of material and symbolic advantages also rank high in possession of marketable skills." Unlike Weber, however, Parkin views the class structure linked to a hierarchy of occupational categories, each representing a different position in the scale of material and non-material benefits, not the least of which is status. In this way Parkin's scheme is not much different from those developed by his American counterparts which present "the image of the social hierarchy as a series of levels of prestige, as a ladder with closely adjacent rungs, which individuals may climb or descend according to their capabilities." While Parkin himself states that "the flow of rewards takes the form 

39 This argument is summarized in Bottomore, *op. cit.*, p. 26.  

40 Parkin, *op. cit.*, p. 21. Giddens also leans towards the Weberian approach. He states: "Marx failed to recognize the potential significance of differentiations of market capacity which do not derive directly from the factor of property ownership. Such differentiations, it seems clear, are contingent upon the scarcity value of what the individual 'owns' and is able to offer on the market. As Weber indicates, possession of recognized 'skills' - including educational qualifications - is the major factor influencing market capacity." (Giddens, *op. cit.*, p. 103).  


42 Bottomore, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
of a graduated continuum, he also finds justification for dividing his occupational categories into two classes: manual and non-manual. This approach, although not uncommon in the European literature, neglects the importance of property ownership; it provides no real indication of one's relationship to the means of production; and it explains class primarily in terms of working conditions, advancement opportunities, and income disparities without considering what causes such different conditions of work.

A further response which derives from Weber's separation of political power from class interests is clearly articulated by Dahrendorf. While accepting a dichotomous, conflict model of classes, Dahrendorf's work is a complete departure from Marx's theory of class and not a reformulation of this theory. He argues that Marx's analysis is not applicable in what he terms "post-capitalist societies". In complete opposition to Marx, he defines class primarily in terms of authority relationships; he minimizes the potential of industrial conflict for social change; and he maintains that the coincidence of economic conflict and political conflict has ceased to exist. Dahrendorf's theory of class conflict is not by any means a supercedence of Marx's theory. A definition of class in terms of exclusion from, or possession of, authority, provides no real basis for

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43 Parkin, op. cit., p. 24

44 Other studies using this approach include: David Butler, and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain (New York: St.)
assuming an opposition of interest between classes nor any explanation for the presence of dominant and subordinate classes.\(^\text{45}\)

It also seems clear that the connection that Dahrendorf makes between class conflict and social change is not born out in his study. Rather the emphasis is on the institutionalization of class conflict, the isolation of industrial conflict from social and political life, and the diminution of violence and intensity of conflict.\(^\text{46}\)

Finally, the propositions dealing with the institutional separation of economic conflict and political conflict in "post capitalism" are, as Bottomore says, "more easily falsified than those of Marx which they are intended to replace."\(^\text{47}\)

There is little evidence to suggest that politics revolves around non-economic issues and, indeed, the opposite seems to

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\(^{45}\) As Giddens states, "the exercise of authority presupposes a (latent) opposition of interest between those in authority and those who are subject to authority. In Marx's theory, there is a definite structure of relationships, involving the creation and appropriation of surplus value, which generates a necessary opposition of interest between classes. But this is lacking in Dahrendorf's conception." (Giddens, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 73).

\(^{46}\) For elaboration of his ideas on "The Institutional Isolation of Industrial Conflict" see Dahrendorf, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 267-279.

\(^{47}\) Bottomore, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 27.
be more empirically truthful. 48 The primary significance of Marx is his analysis of the interconnections between economic relationships and the rest of the social and political structure. It is clear that Dahrendorf's analysis, which rejects the substantive content of Marx's theory, cannot be considered to be a reformulation of this theory. Nor can Dahrendorf's analysis which substitutes 'authority' for 'class' and which does not postulate any connection between class conflict and economic conditions serve to supercede the Marxian explanation of social change and progress.

The difficulties of reconstructing or reformulating Marx's theory of classes and class struggle create added impetus for understanding Marx's theory as it is and as it applies to contemporary economic and political conditions. It is a general theory with broad explanatory powers and hence, is as useful for studying Canadian political economy as it has been for studies of European societies. It provides a framework for explaining poverty in the midst of affluence, labour unrest, and economic crises within Canada. As Marchak states, it can account for anomalies that the liberal democratic theory must ignore:

Does the liberal framework explain the extent of foreign ownership and the control of the economy, the degree of concentration of ownership, the

48 As Bottimore states, "numerous studies have shown that in the European industrial countries, and to a lesser extent in the United States of America, the major political conflicts are closely and continuously associated with industrial conflicts, and express the divergent interests of the principal social classes." (Ibid.)
existence of multi-national corporations, the locus of decision-making, the financing of political parties, and the relationship between political and economic institutions.\footnote{Marchak, op. cit., p. ix.}

A Marxian analysis is considered to be a fruitful approach for understanding and explaining certain aspects of Canadian society. However, such an approach must be wary of two predicaments which Canadian Marxists often find themselves in. First, as Johnson points out, writers on the Canadian left have not shown "the deep concern for factual accuracy, indigenous theoretical elaboration, and insight into the unique circumstances of national class developments which has characterized European Marxist thought."\footnote{Johnson, op. cit., p. 144.} The lack of scientific, indigenous analysis by Canadian Marxists has made it too easy for other authors to negate the Marxian definition of class on the basis of the fragmentation of the working class in Canada, or of cultural homogeneity at the level of consumption. Secondly, criticism of Canadian literature with a Marxian perspective is somewhat justified because of attempts by some authors to fit all groups in Canadian society into either the bourgeoisie or the proletariat.\footnote{Leo Johnson is often criticized for describing Canada in terms of a very large working class versus a small group of capitalists with very few in between.} Such an approach which describes a concrete society in terms of Marx's abstract model of classes is problem-ridden in view of the complex and
diverse nature of modern industrial societies. It also diverges from the original purpose of the class concept which was for Marx not descriptive but analytical. That is to say, the purpose of a Marxian class analysis is not one of describing society with photographic accuracy, but of explaining social change and social stability in terms of class consciousness and class conflict. As Dahrendorf states, "For Marx the category of class defines one side of an antagonism which entails the dominant issues of conflict in every society as well as the direction of its development." Therefore, for purposes of this study, Marx's theory of class conflict seems to provide useful tools for understanding the real world and for explaining political developments. It is not the intention of this paper to produce a portrayal of empirical class structures but rather to determine how useful a particular notion of class is for explaining the political behaviour of the working class in Quebec.

Towards an Economic Definition of the Working Class

A study of class on the political and ideological levels cannot be undertaken without first considering the fundamental role of the economic in the definition of class. While economic, political, and ideological criteria all

52 As Dahrendorf explains, "Whenever Marx used the concept in a sociological sense, he was not concerned with describing an existing state of society. He was concerned, rather with the analysis of certain laws of social development and of the forces involved in this development." (op. cit., p. 19).

53 Ibid., p. 20.
combine to form a complete definition of class, it must be emphasized, as Poulantzas, Carchedi, and others do, that the economic structure has a principle role in determining classes. Having discussed the class concept in general terms, the purpose of this section is to define the working class from an economic standpoint, at the level of class "in itself".

Following Carchedi's example, the analysis of the working class will take place on the level of the pure capitalist structure and on the level of the capitalist socio-economic system. The first level of analysis refers only to the production relations typical of capitalism; that is to say, only those elements involved in the capitalist production of material goods and the relations binding those elements together. The next highest level of abstraction refers to the socio-economic system which is, according to Carchedi, "the totality of social relations and structures corresponding to a certain economic structure." This implies expanding the analysis in order to account for elements that are not part of the pure capitalist production process, or more specifically, the capitalist productive enterprise, but that are a part of the capitalist socio-economic system as a whole. At

54 Reference is made specifically to Poulantzas, op. cit., p. 17; and G. Carchedi, op. cit., p. 1.

55 Carchedi, op. cit., p. 9.

56 Ibid.
this level it is possible to account for developments within capitalism such as the growth of the unproductive sector, the birth of new positions and disciplines, the scientific organization of the labour process, and the rise of monopoly capitalism. This level of analysis also takes into consideration elements of the superstructure which affect the economic structure and the definition of class. As Carchedi states:

For example, class struggle and thus superstructure make necessary the introduction of production processes (e.g. provision of services by the state) different from the capitalist one and thus modify the economic structure (in the sense that this structure is not a purely capitalistic one).  

Finally, the distinction between levels of analysis should make it possible to avoid the tendency of some authors to essentially identify wage and salary earners as the working class while limiting membership in the capitalist class to those involved in the juridical ownership of the means of production.

The identification of wage and salary earners as the working class is generally problematic since it defines groups such as managers, supervisory personnel, and professionals as part of the working class. What it fails to account for, as Poulantzas states, is that all workers are wage earners but not all wage earners are workers. In other words, the

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57 Ibid., p. 7-8.

58 See, for example, Leo Johnson, op. cit.

emphasis on wages leads to a definition of class in terms of distribution rather than in terms of production relations. A description of the distribution structure does not necessarily provide an indication of one's place in the social division of labour.

The distinction between productive and unproductive workers is also problematic for a definition of the working class. While it may be possible to refer to the working class as productive labour at the level of the pure capitalist productive enterprise, such a definition appears to lose its usefulness at the level of the capitalist socio-economic system. As Carchedi points out, this definition would require including within the working class a nurse in a private hospital while excluding a nurse in a state hospital. In general, it excludes anyone who while not directly expropriated of surplus value, is expropriated of surplus labour. As Carchedi questions "Why should the form of expropriation determine the objective collocation in the class structure?" (op. cit., p. 3). For a detailed discussion of the problems involving the concepts of productive and unproductive labour see Ian Gough, "Marx's Theory of Productive and Unproductive Labour," New Left Review, No. 76 (Nov. - Dec., 1972), pp. 47-72.

According to Poulantzas, not every wage earner is a worker since not every wage earner is necessarily a productive worker. (op. cit., p. 30).
framework of analysis which considers not only ownership of
the means of production and productiveness, but also the
function performed in the capitalist production process should
provide a substantially different and less problematic
definition of the working class.

The fundamental characteristics of the working class
can be ascertained at the level of the pure capitalist
structure. At this level it is possible to understand class
in terms of a relatively simple dichotomy between owner/non-
owner, producer/non-producer, and labourer/non-labourer.
Under a pure form of capitalism, it is the owners who have
real control of the means of production and who obtain their
income from surplus value in the form of commodities produced
by the labourers who receive a wage determined by the value
of their labour power.

To be more specific, the working class at this level
is essentially defined by the production relations of the
capitalist mode of production which are the relations between
the agents of production and the means of production. Under
capitalism, the producer neither owns the means of production
nor has any control over the production process. In order to
make a living, the producer must sell his labour power to the
owners of the means of production. But the moment the producer
enters into the labour process he participates in the production
of surplus value. To summarize Carchedi, this is because the
subordination of the labour process to the surplus value
producing process is a defining characteristic of the capitalist mode of production. In other words when a labourer is involved in commodity production, he "produces exchange value in the form of commodities and so surplus value." The producer is, therefore, automatically placed in a position of subordination to the non-producer and his profit ambitions. It would seem then that the worker can be regarded, at least at the level of commodity production in a capitalist enterprise, as a productive labourer. Because the non-producer appropriates the surplus value created by the producer, the worker is also defined as exploited. That is to say, the difference between the value of the producer's labour power which he receives as a wage and the value that this labour power creates is amassed by the non-producer/owner. The worker at this level of abstraction is, therefore, the non-owner, the producer, the exploited, and the labourer and it is the correspondence between these aspects of the production relations which defines the working class.

An analysis of class at the level of the socio-economic system requires expanding this definition of the working class to account for the unproductive phases of the capitalist system as well as to allow for changes in the

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62 Carchedi, op. cit., p. 6.

63 Poulantzas, op. cit., p. 30.

64 This is a simplified version of Carchedi's sophisticated analysis. See specifically, Carchedi, op. cit., pp. 1-13.
capitalist economic structure. The broadening of this concept is directly related to the dynamics of capitalism. Under the pure form of capitalism, the concept of the working class refers essentially to industrial, manual wage-earners. With the accumulation of capital and, thus, the penetration of the capitalist manner of producing into all areas of economic activity, and with the advent of monopoly capitalism, numerous categories of people become separated from the means of production and must sell their labour power in order to survive. Changes like the capitalist organization of service activities and the growth of commercial enterprises, such as banks, commerce companies and trust companies which are tied to the needs of capital, mark the appearance of white-collar workers, service workers, technicians, and other positions to fill the functions of distributing, marketing, financing, researching, and managing. The concept of the "new middle class" has been a direct response to the emergence of such positions and attempts have been made to show that this concept is logically consistent with Marx's economic theory. The use of this concept has direct implications for a study of the working class since criteria must be established for distinguishing the new middle class from a broadened definition of the working class. Again this is necessary because of the need to avoid the conceptualization of all "unproductive" labourers as members of the middle class.

At the level of the pure capitalist production process, it was found that an agent who participates in the production
process falls automatically into either the category of labourer/producer or of non-labourer/non-producer. Carchedi takes this a step further by stating that an agent performs either the function of labour or the function of capital. In using the term 'function', Carchedi is referring to more than the technical division of labour; "its general content is determined by the social division of labour to be found within an enterprise, within a capitalist production process". Thus the distinction between labourer and non-labourer implies the performance of different general functions within capitalism. The functional element of the production relations, as outlined by Carchedi, seems to be a necessary consideration for this discussion. It is useful for defining working class at the level of the socio-economic system since at this level there is no necessary correspondence between non-ownership of the means of production and participation in the labour process. It provides the means for accounting for non-producers who are labourers and for non-owners who perform what were once functions of the individual capitalist.

With the introduction of the technical division of labour in the capitalist production process, the function of labour, previously carried out on an individual basis, is

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65 Ibid., p. 20.

66 In order to avoid being accused of functionalism, Carchedi emphasizes that "the identification of a class depends on all three elements of the production relations and not only one of them, which in the case of the functional element would not even be the fundamental one." (Ibid., p. 54).
now performed collectively. Therefore, to be a labourer under monopoly capitalism is to perform the function of the collective worker which means, as defined by Carchedi, "to take part in the complex, scientifically organized labour process as part of the collective labour-power, to produce collectively use values in order to produce surplus value." On the other side of the dichotomy, the function of capital is one of extracting surplus value. Implicit in this is the function of control and surveillance due to the antagonistic nature of the capitalist production relations. In other words, the appropriation of surplus value requires that the labourer be constantly supervised and disciplined. Under monopoly capitalism, this function also becomes a collective task:

the function of capital is not performed only by those few top managers who control the company. Now the function has become the task of a complex, hierarchically organized ensemble of people who collectively perform what used to be the function of an individual capitalist.

The significance of this discussion for a definition of the working class is that a worker is now considered to be anyone who participates only in the labour process by collectively producing surplus value and who plays no part in the capitalist functions of control and surveillance. By implication, this definition of the working class also excludes anyone who

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67 Ibid., p. 27.

68 According to Carchedi, the capitalist performs the function of control because he must impose discipline on the worker: "labour must be performed regularly, properly, and continuously. The worker... must not only re-produce his own labour-power, he must also produce surplus value..." (Ibid., p. 25).

69 Ibid., p. 31.
performs both the function of capital and the function of worker which according to Carchedi is the defining characteristic of the new middle class.\textsuperscript{70} Thus all those positions which may be essential for the production of commodities but which also involve managerial and other responsibilities necessary for the maximization of profit are not considered as part of the working class. Such a framework makes it possible to deal with the birth of all kinds of technical and scientific labour. As Gorz explicitly states:

"we shall not succeed in locating technical and scientific labor within the class structure of advanced capitalist society unless we start by analyzing what functions technical and scientific labor perform in the process of capital accumulation and in the process of reproducing capitalist's social relations.\textsuperscript{71}"

Those whose function derives from capital's concern for controlling the work process from above and for "keeping the labor force disciplined, hierarchically regimented and divided"\textsuperscript{72} cannot be considered as part of the working class. Gorz, however, takes his analysis a step further than Carchedi and assumes that technical and scientific labour are "to a large extent functional only to the particular orientation and priorities of monopolist growth."\textsuperscript{73} That is to say, he does not consider these groups necessary to the labour process not even to the

\textsuperscript{70}Ibid., p. 51.

\textsuperscript{71}Andre Gorz, "Technical Intelligence and the Capitalist Division of Labor," \textit{Telos}, No. 12 (Summer, 1972), pp. 27-41.

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., p. 28.

\textsuperscript{73}Ibid., p. 29.
extent of making the labour process more efficient or more self-fulfilling for the workers.

The definition of the working class is further expanded by considering the function of the individual or the collective worker in the unproductive capitalist production process. The unproductive enterprise such as the bank or trust company is characterized by the same production relations found in the productive enterprise and by the same subordination of the labour process to the surplus value producing process. The fact that the labourer in the unproductive sphere produces use values in the form of services does not change the fact that these services permit the commercial capitalist to share in the distribution of surplus value produced elsewhere. This is so because the commercial worker provides the capitalist with unpaid labour which helps the capitalist reduce the cost of realizing surplus value. This means that the value of the services provided by the worker is greater than the value of the labour power of that worker. This is clearly described by Carchedi:

Take the example of the commercial worker, the typical unproductive worker. Suppose the value of this labour-power is the equivalent of five out of a seven-hour working day. For the remaining two hours of the working day he does not produce value but provides the capitalist with unpaid labour. That is, while the productive worker is expropriated of his labour in the form of value, the unproductive worker is subjected to direct expropriation of labour.74

74 Carchedi, op. cit., p. 19.
As in the productive enterprise, the commercial sphere experiences the same technical division of labour that results with the accumulation of capital. The advent of the computer is particularly important for changing the once simple labour processes of accounting, bookkeeping, and banking into highly complex scientifically organized ones. Such technical advances have the effect of down-grading functions that once required high levels of skill and of placing the worker under greater control and supervision. In general, the unproductive labourer that participates individually or collectively, in the labour process by producing use values in the form of services so that the capitalist can share in the distribution of surplus value produced elsewhere is considered to be a part of the working class.

It has been assumed, but not directly stated, that the criteria established for defining the working class in both the productive and unproductive spheres are logically extended to the multitude of service organizations in the public sector. The distinction between productive and unproductive labour is not used as the basis for defining working class in order to avoid differentiating between a public and a private worker performing the same job. As well, it is not the intention of this study to treat state workers as a special social category with a unity of their own. The inclusion of state workers seems to be quite logical on the basis of the fact that juridical ownership by the state does not necessarily mean abolition of capitalist production relations.
or control of the means of production by the workers. Nationalization of enterprises does not mean a change in real economic ownership because, as Poulantzas states, nationalizations are adapted by the bourgeoisie to their own interests. It is because even when they are accompanied by a change in state power, a nationalization or a take-over of the economy by the state only changes the form of juridical ownership.\textsuperscript{75}

Furthermore, the state in a capitalist system is involved in the accumulation of capital. Without going into a lengthy discussion on the role and nature of the state, it can be said, on the basis of several studies, that 1) the state and the capitalist class are closely tied in terms of personnel\textsuperscript{76} 2) Crown corporations are profit-oriented\textsuperscript{77}; and 3) the state provides services which would otherwise be a cost to the private sector, thereby speeding up the process of capital accumulation and ensuring the continuity of the capitalist mode of production.\textsuperscript{78} These factors indicate that state apparatuses either directly accumulate capital through the extraction of surplus value which is passed on to the private

\textsuperscript{75} Poulantzas, op. cit., p. 19.

\textsuperscript{76} For a detailed discussion of this relationship, see Leo Panitch, "The Role and Nature of the Canadian State," (Unpublished paper, Carleton University, 1976).

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., p. 12.

\textsuperscript{78} This is explicitly dealt with in Rick Deaton, "The Fiscal Crisis of the State," Our Generation, VIII, 4 (Fall, 1972), pp. 11-51.
capitalist as well as going into the pockets of state officials, or provide services which permit private enterprises to improve their profit margins. Thus when a labourer employed by the state produces use values, he also participates in the production of surplus value. In some cases the unpaid labour of the public worker allows the government corporation to make a profit or to reduce the cost of producing surplus value in the private sector. There are, however, numerous groups of public workers, such as teachers, social workers, and welfare officers, who through legitimation of the capitalist system only indirectly reduce the cost of producing surplus value in the private sector.

In general, the capitalist organization of state apparatuses implies a social division of labour with the labourer performing the function of the individual or the collective worker and the non-labourer performing the function of capital. As in the private sector, the worker is defined as participating in the labour process in order to produce use values while having nothing to do with the supervision or control of the labour process.

Conclusion

This discussion of an economic definition of the working class seems to be best summarized by referring to Carchedi's final definition of the working class:

all those who do not own the means of production, who perform the function of the collective worker,
who are either exploited or oppressed and who are subsequently, (a) paid a wage which is determined by the value of their labour power, (b) are paid this income by the capitalist, and (c) are paid back either part of the value they themselves produced or are paid out of surplus value produced elsewhere. 79

This final definition is consistent with earlier expressed intentions of defining the working class in terms of production relations. It examines the economic roots of the working class rather than describing the class at the superstructural level. Thus, instead of defining the working class in terms of certain conditions of life, Carchedi's definition makes it possible to develop explanations for such conditions as dependence in work activity, subordination, fragmentation of tasks, devaluation of labour-power, wage differentials and job insecurity. It clearly refers to the position of the working class within the capitalist production process as determined by the social division of labour. The aspects of ownership, or productiveness, and of the function performed are all part of capitalist production relations and it is the correspondence between these elements which defines the working class. At the level of the capitalist socio-economic system, the term productiveness refers to more than the actual production of surplus value; it refers to any agent in the labour process who produces commodities or provides services which allow the capitalist to accumulate

79 Carchedi, op. cit., pp. 46-47. The distinction between exploitation and oppression is used to differentiate between those who are expropriated of surplus value in the form of labour, and those who are subjected to direct expropriation of labour (p. 19).
or realize surplus value.

The functional element of the definition makes it possible to distinguish the working class from those who are non-owners of the means of production but who perform roles related to the maximization of profits and to the maintenance of a hierarchically regimented labour force. However, the distinction between the working class and the "new middle class" is not always clearcut and rigid due to the dynamic of capitalism. A definition of the working class must, therefore, be able to reflect changes such as the "proletarianization" of the middle class which, as Carchedi explains, is tied directly to capitalist development:

The accumulation needs of capital also means that there is a constant tendency for capital to decrease the area devoted to the performance of the global function of capital and to increase the area devoted to the function of the collective worker. In fact, only through the latter function can capital appropriate to itself surplus labour, either in this form or in the form of surplus value. There is a constant tendency within the capitalist enterprise to reduce the number (and pay) of those agents who perform the work of control and surveillance (especially at the bottom of the hierarchy). 80

The phenomenon of "proletarianization" essentially points out the difficulties of applying a dynamic concept to a specific situation at a particular point in time. While recognizing the deficiencies of such an approach, this paper will include within a definition of the working class only those who objectively play no part in the function of capital but will not completely avoid projections about groups whose jobs may

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80 Carchedi, op. cit., p. 64.
be in the process of being down-graded, and who, therefore, may be experiencing proletarianization at the level of the political and ideological levels.

Finally, it is necessary to emphasize that an economic definition does not represent a complete and comprehensive consideration of the working class. Political and ideological dimensions are involved in the Marxian concept as well. A group of individuals defined as workers at the economic level cannot be, properly speaking, a class until it is united on an ideological basis and until it expresses its economic interests in a political form. This is an integral part of Marx's notion of class and is generally referred to as the transition from class "in itself" to class "for itself". The task of determining whether an economically defined group acts as a class at the political and ideological levels is the purpose of this study. It is complicated by the phenomenon of "proletarianization" in that a member of the middle class may be eliminated from the function of capital, thereby becoming part of the working class, but may continue to identify ideologically with the middle class. Similarly, the presence of "labour aristocracies", as referred to by Carchedi, means accounting for those who economically belong to the working class but who "develop a vested interest in the maintenance of this [capitalist] mode of production."81 With these difficulties

81 Ibid., p. 57 (brackets added).
in mind, the task of this study remains one of determining whether an economic definition of the working class has any meaning at the political level. Such a task is rooted to the assumption that the determination of the economic interests of the working class will lead to a greater understanding of political change as well as of political stability.
CHAPTER III
CLASS, VOTERS, AND PARTIES

Class analysis in Marxism goes beyond the identification of groups sharing a certain relation to the means of production. This implies that a group of workers, for example, does not constitute a class, in the fullest sense of the term as employed by Marx, without meeting certain political and ideological qualifications. A study of class behaviour that begins by objectively defining class in terms of relationship to the means of production must, therefore, be consistent with Marx's understanding of class on the political level. It is the purpose of this chapter to discuss the political and ideological dimensions of class as a basis for proceeding with an analysis of class voting. The assumption that members of a class will display political behaviour consistent with their objective class position depends not only upon the acquisition of class consciousness but also upon the behaviour of political structures themselves. This chapter will, therefore, consider both the politicization of the class cleavage in the electorate and the politicization of the class cleavage in the party system as interrelated prerequisites of class voting. This is preceded by a general discussion of Marx's theory of the acquisition of class consciousness.
which provides a framework for an empirical investigation of "class for itself".

A Theoretical Framework for a Class Voting Study

The transformation of a "class in itself" to a "class for itself" involves the attainment of essentially two interrelated attributes. The first is class consciousness, that phenomenon by which an aggregate of individuals, sharing an objectively defined social situation, is transformed into a group that is aware of its class position and its economic interests. As clearly expressed by Thompson,

class happens when some men, as a result of common experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs.¹

Unlike many authors who insist that class consciousness is variable², the use of the term in Marxism entails a fairly specific connotation. In particular, class consciousness implies not only that members of a class are aware of themselves as a distinct group, but also that they


²See for example, Angus Campbell, et.al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1966): "We presume that anyone who is class conscious is automatically aware of class. But some of those, who according to our measure are aware of class, may lack the intensity of feeling about class interest implied in the Marxian concept." (p.344)
view their interests as being opposed to those of others.\textsuperscript{3} As Ollman states, "Whether in work, politics, or culture, an essential defining characteristic of class is its antagonism in this same sphere to others."\textsuperscript{4}

The hostility that exists between classes is a direct outcome of the "zero-sum" nature of capitalist production relations whereby one class benefits at the expense of the other. The profit motives of the capitalists place them in direct opposition to the working class upon whose labour power they depend for their profits. The class consciousness of the capitalists is displayed through hostile relations to the workers, through a particular way of life and set of social values, and through attempts to maintain the established order by which its position of dominance is ensured. In contrast to this, proletarian class consciousness implies a unity against capitalist exploitation and "entails feelings of hostility towards central societal institutions and dissatisfaction with the status quo."\textsuperscript{5} The incompatibility of the interests of the


\textsuperscript{4} Bertell Ollman, "Marx's Use of 'Class'," American Journal of Sociology, LXXIII (March, 1968), p. 578.

two major classes in capitalism and the recognition of such fundamental differences by each provides the basis for defining class at the ideological level.  

A further qualification implicit in the usage of class in Marxism is the expression of class consciousness at the political level. It is particularly evident from Marx's writings that a group of workers does not constitute a class "for itself" if it fails to generalize its economic interests in a political form.  

A class-wide political organization is essential to the working class if it is to enforce its interests in the face of economic, ideological, and political domination by the bourgeoisie. This organization of the workers for political purposes is clearly inseparable from the acquisition of class consciousness. As Ollman writes:

Increased class consciousness advances the cause of political organization by creating greater interest in it, while organizational activity heightens class consciousness through the propaganda it makes possible.

Both qualifications are, therefore, essential to a class

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6 The term "ideological", as employed by Poulantzas and Carchedi, refers to the manner in which members of a class define, explain, and interpret social relations.


8 Ollman, op. cit., p. 579, footnote #33.
an analysis of politics within a Marxian framework. The task of such a study clearly remains one of empirically establishing the extent to which political behaviour can be viewed as an expression of class consciousness.

The political expression of class consciousness can take several forms but study of it inevitably seems to center around political parties. Marx, in particular, emphasizes that working-class consciousness is acquired in the transition from trade-union to political party organization. The ability of workers to organize themselves into a political party and the extent to which they support "their" party are indicative of class consciousness and of an awareness of the need for political action. The methods by which political behaviour is assessed in class terms include analyses of party structure, leadership, membership, and programme. A further method which is adopted by this study is an analysis of voting patterns. It is considered a useful approach in that the historical development of working-class, socialist parties has shown that such parties eventually participate in electoral competition.

Class voting is understood in this study as an

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expression of class consciousness. Or, as Przeworski and Soares state, "Class voting is a measure of the frequency with which individuals who belong to a class behave as members of this class (in a "class conscious" manner)."\(^\text{10}\)

If a group of workers are aware of their common interests and if a party exists to represent those interests, then there is good reason to expect that workers will vote in accordance with their class membership. Implicit in this model of class voting are several assumptions. The first is that objective position determines attitudes and perceptions and, hence, voting behaviour. An examination of the social and economic structure of society is, therefore, the first step in a class analysis of politics. At the same time, however, class voting is not considered to be a mechanical response by individuals to economic conditions. This approach is rejected because it treats class consciousness as the sum of individuals who vote autonomously for the party that represents their class interests. If class consciousness was acquired in a social vacuum, one would expect to find individuals endowed with the same traits behaving in the same way regardless of the context in which they are situated. However, this is not the case and it seems clear that the social environment plays an important

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role in the development of consciousness and accounts for variations in political behaviour. As Przeworski writes:

Much of the current social research is based on a conceptualization which treats social actors, particularly individuals, in isolation from their social environment. Individuals are viewed as though they are not living in a society which has a history, a geography, and above all social relations. ... A person who has given characteristics, treated as independent variables, is considered as a randomly chosen element of a universe. His own traits are treated as the only determinants of his behaviour.

The attempt to emphasize that class voting is not a mechanical response by individuals to economic conditions, therefore, requires that an analysis of voting be made in light of at least two considerations. First, the consciousness of a class, as reflected in such factors as communication and interaction between workers, affects the behaviour of individuals and determines the extent to which they behave in a class conscious manner. Secondly, the development of a working-class consciousness depends upon the pervasiveness of the dominant ideology or the ability of the capitalist class to protect its own interests.  

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Finally this model of class voting is consistent with Marx's theory of class conflict in that politics is viewed as a conflict of opposing interests whereby one class benefits at the expense of the other. In this model, as Butler and Stokes indicate, "more is involved than the simple belief that the parties 'look after' class interests. These interests are seen as opposed and their opposition is what the party battle is thought to be all about."\(^{13}\)

Together these assumptions about class voting provide a basis for criticizing what appear to be two schools of thought in the American tradition of class voting studies. The first school of thought, upheld specifically by the Survey Research Center, believes that attitudes are the immediate determinants of voting. The second considers socio-economic characteristics to be directly linked to voting behaviour but only to the extent that an individual responds automatically to a particular set of economic conditions. Criticism of this assumption also provides a basis for criticizing theories about "embourgeoisement" and the "end of ideology" which have emerged out of this school of thought.

Studies linked to the American Survey Research Center claim that psychological factors tell the most about voting behaviour. As the authors of The American Voter state, "we begin our search for causality at the psychological level and conceive of the voting act as the resultant of attitudinal forces." This approach links attitudes to behaviour but provides little understanding of the factors involved in the causation of attitudes. The role of the economic in determining political and social behaviour is given almost no consideration except for the suggestion that identification with a social class, or any social grouping, may help to reinforce individual attitudes and opinions and thereby account for stability of party preferences. In general the vote is seen as a choice by an autonomous individual endowed with a set of psychological traits.

In contrast to this school of thought there are numerous American studies which consider socio-economic characteristics rather than psychological traits to be the determinants of voting. However, these studies also

14 Campbell, et. al., op. cit., p. 66
15 Ibid., pp. 291-401
present the image of individual determinants of behaviour. Individuals with the same socio-economic status are said to have the same political attitudes. This image has led to assumptions about "embourgeoisement" and the "deradicalization" of the working class. A change in economic circumstances such as the acquisition of more consumer goods is said to account for the absence of class conflict and left voting. Lipset, for example, states that greater economic productivity and, hence, affluence lead to a reduction in class conflict and the integration of the working class. This implies a mechanical response by individuals to economic conditions and suggests that political behaviour changes only at the rate at which the economic situation of each individual changes.

As Przeworski and Sprague write, "Theories of embourgeoisement are based on the assumption that workers individually and independently of each other examine their interests and their situations and each automatically decides how to vote." Factors not considered are the

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way in which workers are organized, the totality of the social relations they are engaged in, and domination by the bourgeoisie at the level of the superstructure. Without considering such factors, class voting cannot be understood as an expression of class consciousness which occurs when individuals communicate and interact with each other.

A further criticism of many of the American studies on class behaviour and class voting is that voting is not considered as an expression of opposition towards another class. As Birnbaum states, for authors like Bell, Lipset, Galbreith, and Dahrendorf, the basic issue of stratification has been settled by the technical rationality of the system. 19 This view recognizes the existence of class inequalities but maintains that both the right and the left have arrived at an ideological agreement described as "conservative socialism". 20 In such a model of consensus politics, voting is related to concern over the division of the economic pie and parties represent class interests but not interests that are fundamentally opposed. Even if this model is an accurate


20Lipset, op. cit., p. 159
description of class behaviour for a particular historical situation, it remains to be demonstrated that this model represents a permanent process or that it holds true for all historical situations. To suggest that the historical development of class has ceased in advanced industrialized societies is either a normative judgement or an empirical statement which cannot be empirically supported.

These American studies, in general, understand class voting in terms of individual, autonomous behaviour rather than as an expression of the consciousness of a class. Furthermore, they "assume a society characterized by consensus, a lack of class conflict, and an absence on the part of the dominating class to protect its own interests." As in Chapter II, these studies are criticized for assuming that changes at the level of consumer goods represent a fundamental economic change and a trend towards the peaceful coexistence of classes. This belief that the issue of class conflict has been resolved neglects the fact that changes in consumerism and life style do not alter production relations nor eliminate the "zero-sum" nature of capitalism. In contrast to this approach, Marxism recognizes that economic inequalities are inherent in capitalism and that certain conditions favour the transformation

\[21\] Collier, op. cit., p. 1.
of feelings of discontent and alienation into group cohesiveness. As well, Marxism provides the analytical tools for explaining activities such as industrial disputes, trade union militancy, and the birth of radical political movements as something more than aberrations in a society where the issue of opposing class interests has supposedly been settled.

The Politicization of the Class Cleavage in the Electorate

It has been emphasized that class voting does not take place in a social vacuum. It is, therefore, necessary to outline the conditions under which members of a class become mobilized into political action. As Przeworski and Soares state:

If Marx believed that workers would vote for the left parties regardless of their class situation, there would be no need for the theory of the dynamics of class-conflict and class-consciousness. But this theory was developed precisely to delimit the conditions under which workers will become class-conscious and will vote for the left parties.²²

Clearly, the acquisition of class consciousness is directly related to the economic conditions that prevail under capitalism. Alienation, relative deprivation, and subordination to the owners of the means of production are fundamental for the development of a working-class consciousness. However, the transformation of class

²²Przeworski and Soares, op. cit., p. 63.
awareness into political action as well as the intensification of class consciousness depend essentially upon two processes:

1) the development of communication and interaction between members of the working class; and 2) the formal organization of the working class.

The development of communication between members sharing the same objective socio-economic situation is a basic requirement for class-based political activity. As Lipset states, "Close personal contacts between such people further awareness of community of interests and of the possibilities of collective action, including political action, to solve the common problems."\(^{23}\) In particular, the decision by an individual to vote for a certain party is, to a great extent, arrived at through a process of interaction with members of the same class. It is evident that certain structural conditions are more conducive than others to fostering intragroup communications. One is the number and concentration of workers. According to Przeworski and Soares, "the notion that increased numbers give workers a feeling of political strength and eventually lead to political organization and communication among the working class is a cornerstone of Marx's argument."\(^{24}\) When


\(^{24}\)Przeworski and Soares, op. cit., p. 55
workers constitute a large proportion of the population in a particular social setting, it is likely that social interaction and group discussion will occur and there is a significant possibility that an encounter between two workers will result in an additional vote for the left party. This is empirically supported by several studies which indicate that left voting increases with the size of industrial plant and size of city.

In addition to relative size of the working class, concentration of workers in and out of the workplace is important as a determinant of intragroup communication. Workers may be numerically dominant in an industrial plant but if they are required to work in small isolated units, the chances for group interaction are negligible. The

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25 This also depends, as Przeworski and Soares point out, upon the proportion of the population already voting left. (Ibid.)

26 Lipset points out that in a 1953 German survey, the combined Socialist and Communist vote among workers increased with the size of plants. Also the election returns for Workers Councils in Italy in 1954 and 1955 indicated that the larger the city and the larger the factory, the more votes received by the Communist-controlled General Confederation of Italian Labor. See Lipset, Political Man, op. cit., pp. 233-266. See also Frank Parkins, Class Inequality and Political Order (Frogmore, St. Albans: Paladin, 1972), pp. 95-96. Parkins states that "the conditions which favour the emergence and acceptance of the subordinate-meaning system are those associated with the growth of metropolitan areas of high population density."
organization of the workplace is a particularly important consideration to make when analysing the behaviour of workers in the service industries. According to Lipset,

The white-collar workers' well-known lack of organization and class consciousness may also be partly due to the small units in which they work and to their scattering among higher-level managerial personnel. ²⁷

By the same token, homogeneity of the community in which the worker lives plays a part in creating a more cohesive unified working class. The extent to which workers are involved in the same social activities as well as the extent to which they do not mingle with members of other classes are factors which enhance class consciousness.

The transformation of class awareness into political action also depends upon the formal organization of the working class. Considerable evidence exists to suggest that associations with which workers identify are influential in terms of developing class conscious political behaviour. The trade union, in particular, is considered to be an important intervening variable. Myers, for example, emphasizes that the vote for the left parties in France and in Britain is directly related to the primary group attachment of workers which, in both countries, is the trade union. Thus in France,

Workers whose "port of entry" into the industrial system is the construction industry, the controlling union of which is communist, tend to

²⁷Lipset, op. cit., p. 263.
vote communist. Others who enter the working class through trades in which the principal unions are socialist tend to vote socialist regardless of income level.\textsuperscript{29}

The orientation of the trade union and its leaders is, therefore, a key factor to consider in assessing the consciousness of the working class and, hence, the behaviour of its individual members. For Marx, the trade union is essential to the class struggle. It is the organization through which workers become a class "against capital" and take the first steps towards the creation of a nationwide political organization.\textsuperscript{29} The absence of trade unions with a radical orientation, the tendencies within such organizations toward bureaucratic conservatism, and the extent to which they limit their activities to the immediate consumer needs of the worker go far in explaining the absence of a working-class consciousness as outlined by Marx. In general, voting behaviour that is consistent with objective class position depends to a large degree upon the ideological traditions of working-class organizations, upon the course of political action chosen by trade union leaders, and upon their ability to engender commitment to collective means of achieving economic goals.


The emphasis on communication between workers and on the formal organization of the working class is directly related to the assumption that class consciousness is not acquired in a social vacuum. It is clear that the transformation of class consciousness into political action will vary according to the social context or according to patterns of interaction and association with which workers identify. It is for this reason that a class voting study must account for unique cultural characteristics, ideological traditions of working-class organizations, pervasiveness of the dominant ideology, as well as particular economic conditions. This is essential because, as Thompson remarks,

We can see a logic in the responses of similar occupational groups undergoing similar experiences, but we cannot predict any law. Consciousness of class arises in the same way in different times and places, but never in just the same way.

Variations in class-related political behaviour are also directly related to the behaviour of political parties and the channels available for the expression of class demands. To reject the class approach on the grounds that class is not the overwhelming base of party division is to ignore the role that parties play in raising consciousness and in providing alternatives. An examination of the organizational conditions under which voting takes place

\[30\] Thompson, op. cit., p. 10.
is an essential part of a class voting study and will be
dealt with in the following section.

The Politicization of the Class Cleavage in the Party System

The development of working-class consciousness and
the extent to which consciousness is translated into
politically relevant behaviour depend to a large degree
upon the behaviour of political parties. It may be the
case that election results do not serve as an indicator
of class consciousness. Rinehart and Okraku, for example,
discovered a considerable amount of working-class
consciousness at the attitudinal level in their sample
of London, Ontario, residents, but question whether
opportunities exist in Canada for the political expression
of such consciousness:

Our findings suggest that there is a reservoir
of attitudinal leftism untapped by political parties,
particularly the NDP, which has been unable to
effectively appeal to large numbers of individuals
who are disenchanted with the Canadian political
system.

In view of this, it seems that a class voting study must
be as concerned about the political, ideological, and
organizational conditions under which voting takes place
as it is about developments within the working class itself.

The most obvious organizational condition for class
voting is the availability of differentiated party

31 Rinehart and Okraku, op. cit., p. 212.
structures for the expression of class demands. This implies the existence of class parties which, to borrow Rose's definition, are parties "making a programmatic appeal to class interests and recruiting a large bloc of candidates and voters on class-specific grounds." The idea of class parties and the vision of politics as reflecting interests of fundamentally opposed classes were innovations of the socialist parties which appeared on the political scene in Europe in the nineteenth century after universal franchise. Such a vision of politics is consistent with Marx's theory of class conflict whereby the organization of the workers into a party of their own and in opposition to all other parties is a necessary step towards the abolition of the capitalist system. This view of politics runs contrary to the dominant ideology since it is in the interests of the bourgeoisie to create the impression that they are the representatives of the entire nation and to have politics revolve around non-class issues.

38 This is expressed in Robert Alford, Party and Society (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1963), p. 3; and N. S. Chi, "Class Voting in Canadian Politics," Occasional Papers, no. 1 (Carleton University, 1972), p. 3.

The absence of pure class parties is directly related to the pervasiveness of the dominant ideology throughout the party system. In particular, the ideological and institutional success of the dominant classes in disassociating themselves from a vision of politics based on class conflict is measured by the extent to which parties play the "brokerage" and "bargaining" game of politics. In a political system where parties act as brokers between a wide variety of competing claims and interests, the link between class and voting remains tenuous. While such parties may work to the advantage of the dominant class, they provide no clear cut channels for the expression of working-class demands. Even if a brokerage party appeals to and gains the support of a significant portion of the working class, there is no guarantee that class demands will be successfully met at the output level which, according to Chi, is a necessary condition for class politics to occur. Without a party that consistently represents and appeals to working-class interests, the options open to workers are limited: 1) they

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40 Gad Horowitz suggests that the brokerage theory is actually a class ideology "for it maintains that both our major parties must always be more closely related to the privileged elites than to the non-elites of our society." See "Toward the Democratic Class Struggle," Journal of Canadian Studies, 1, 3 (November, 1966), pp. 3-10.

41 Chi, op. cit., p. 4.
can support the party promising the most in terms of economic redress which, according to John Wilson, explains the link between the Conservative Party and the urban working class in Ontario in the 1930's. 2) they can, as Bourque and Laurin-Frenette suggest, alter the balance between the bourgeois parties; or 3) they can abstain from voting altogether and attempt to gain attention to their economic problems outside the sphere of parties and elections. In the absence of any channels available for the expression of working-class discontent, class interests, according to Chi, "will be repressed or sublimated into non-class demands." Class identification becomes politically less salient and workers vote as individuals on the basis of ethnic, religious, or regional appeal; short-term issues, or popularity of the candidates.

As well as corresponding to the interests of the dominant classes, the brokerage doctrine is related to aspirations of holding public office. In Canada, for


44Chi, op. cit., p. 4.
example, at least two of the national political parties believe that electoral victory is possible only by appealing to differentiated interests. As John Wilson states:

Thus it is argued that very clear limits are imposed on any Canadian political party seeking a closer relation between class and politics. If it refuses to conform to the established pattern of brokerage it will necessarily be confined to the minor status of a "protest" or "splinter" party.

The problem of electoral success does create some very real problems for parties not committed to the brokerage doctrine but attempting to define themselves in narrow class terms. In particular, parties of the left are faced with the dilemma of participating in electoral competition and of maintaining a specific working-class appeal. This dilemma, according to Przeworski, is twofold. On the one hand they face the problem of participating in capitalist democracy while remaining committed to the rejection of capitalist institutions. The second problem is the result of structural conditions: "A party representing the class which has fewer members than other classes combined cannot alone win the electoral battles." The focus on this dilemma is necessary for a class voting study since the strategies that working-class parties adopt to deal with

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45 Wilson, op. cit., p. 247.

the dilemma directly affect the behaviour of individual voters.

Participation by socialist parties in electoral competition immediately raises the question of ideological commitment. Socialist parties originate with the primary intention of organizing workers into a party of their own, opposed to all other parties and to the capitalist system in general. However, in order to achieve electoral success, these parties must appeal to differentiated interests: "The appeal to other classes or the dilution of the concept of working class becomes the only strategy by which socialist parties can make electoral success." This appeal is likely to be in the direction of groups perceived as "political allies" of the working class such as small businessmen, agricultural workers, and intellectuals. As chances for winning increase because of this broadened appeal, a "bandwagon" effect may be created in that individuals regardless of class position begin to support the party of the left.

Heterogeneity of appeal has direct consequences for the party's original commitment to working-class goals. As Przeworski and Soares observe: "These changes in the class composition of radical left parties increased their electoral

\[47\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 14.}\]
strength and the chances of winning, thereby influencing the leadership and forcing them to take into consideration the views of non-workers.\footnote{Przeworski and Soares, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 61.} The behaviour of the socialist party changes to the extent that it ceases to be the party of the working class. This is reflected not only in the weakening of its identification with working-class goals but also in the composition of its leadership, the organization and structure of the party itself, and the links it maintains with working-class organizations such as trade unions. The Labour Party in Britain serves as an example of a socialist party that changes with electoral success and eventually causes a weakening of the class alignment. As Butler and Stokes state:

> Our view is that such a weakening depends too on the behaviour of the parties themselves, especially Labour's convergence towards the Conservative position in terms of composition and outlook.\footnote{Butler and Stokes, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 119}

This is substantiated by Leo Panitch who provides evidence of structural and ideological change within the British Labour Party: 1) the Labour Party's ideology has been integrationist (stressing society's cohesiveness and denying its cleavages)\footnote{Leo Panitch, "Ideology and Integration: The Case of the British Labour Party," \textit{Political Studies}, XIX, 2 (December, 1971), pp. 185-189.}; 2) there has been an infusion of people
from other classes into the leadership of the party\textsuperscript{51}; and
3) the relationship between trade unions and the Labour
Party has been marked by considerable strain.\textsuperscript{52} The per-
sistence of these trends over a considerable period of time
suggests that the Labour Party is not highly committed to
working-class goals or sensitive to class composition. As
Przeworski and Sprague hypothesize:

Parties which are ideologically sensitive to
class composition react strongly to the presence
of non-workers among the voters. Other parties,
much less sensitive, do not care where the vote
comes from. Party traditions, the relationship
between the party and unions, the relative strength
of the left-of-socialist parties -- all may influence
this ideological sensitivity of the party to class
membership.

Socialist parties, in general, are continually confronted
with the dilemma of emphasizing either electoral success
or class purity. This dilemma results in regular intra-party
struggles and schisms and it is resolved only temporarily by
adjustments in recruitment strategy.

The manner in which the dilemma of socialist parties
is handled affects the voting behaviour of workers. It has
been emphasized that working-class consciousness is ex-
pressed through support for parties of the Left. However,

\textsuperscript{51}Ibid., p. 192

\textsuperscript{52}Ibid., pp. 195-199

\textsuperscript{53}Przeworski and Sprague, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 32
the relationship between class and party remains tenuous in the event that socialist parties appeal to non-workers and weaken their commitment to working-class goals. The establishment of a heterogeneous social base and the moderation of socialist philosophy have two possible effects upon the voting behaviour of individuals. First, it is possible that workers will continue to support the socialist party but this support is likely to arise out of considerations other than class position. Politics is less likely to be viewed in terms of class conflict, and class loyalty is no longer the primary reason for participating in politics. The other possibility which is more consistent with rigorous class consciousness is that workers become disaffected and reject the socialist party altogether. This may lead to support of viable organizations to the left of the socialist party. As Przeworski and Soares point out, when working-class parties broadened their appeal to non-workers, "it often happened that a wing of the left party or another political organization established itself independently, narrowing its appeal to workers and adopting a more purist revolutionary position." In the absence of working-class organizations to the left of the socialist parties, workers who are ideologically sensitive to class composition are left with no other alternative but abstention. Both responses indicate that a complete understanding of voting behaviour cannot

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54 Przeworski and Soares, op. cit., p. 61.
be gained without considering the behaviour of political parties and the way in which they define political conflict.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the focus of this chapter has been on class voting as a political expression of class consciousness. As such it is a study about relationships between groups and individuals and not of individuals behaving autonomously in a social vacuum. Class voting, at the highest level, is a response by a group of individuals who share the same economic place in the division of labour, who recognize that they are a part of a collectivity in opposition to another class, and who participate in politics on the basis of this class loyalty. This does not mean that the vote is an involuntary response to a set of stimuli. While voting is determined by the economic situation of individuals and hence, by their perception of their interests, it is also determined by interaction between members of the same class, by the way in which class experiences are handled in cultural terms, and by the behaviour of political institutions.

It is hypothesized that class position is the primary determinant of voting in advanced industrialized societies. However, any finding which indicates that class is not the sole basis of party division should not lead to a rejection of the class approach. As Przeworski and Soares point out:
not all workers vote as members of the working class. In most Western European countries this proportion varies between "only" 66 and 80 percent. But first, no theory will explain all behaviours. A good theory merely provides a gain in information, and class theories do explain variance.

In addition, a weak correlation between class and voting cannot be dismissed without considering class-related factors such as the ability of the parties to center politics around non-class issues, or the tendency of working-class parties to compromise class purity for electoral success.

The purpose of this chapter was to carry out a general investigation of the relationship between class and voters and class and parties. It was done so within a particular theoretical framework. The assumptions that politics is to be understood in terms of class conflict and class dominance and that class is the fundamental characteristic through which politics is viewed are based on Marx's theory of class consciousness and class conflict. However, it is not sufficient to make general statements about how a class ought to behave. The overriding purpose of a class voting study is the examination of a single real class situation in a real historical context.

55 Ibid., p. 63.
CHAPTER IV

AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CLASS VOTING IN QUEBEC: THE
1973 PROVINCIAL ELECTION

Throughout the previous three chapters, it has been argued that social classes are an important determinant of political behaviour. Further to this, class voting has been presented as an indicator of class consciousness, as a response by a group of individuals who share the same economic place in the division of labour, who recognize that they are part of a collectivity in opposition to another class, and who participate in politics on the basis of this loyalty.

The purpose of this chapter is to carry out an empirical analysis of class voting in Quebec, with particular reference to the working class, and to generally investigate the role of the class cleavage in Quebec provincial politics. In conjunction with this, an attempt will be made to empirically examine the relationship between class and ethnicity or, as suggested earlier, the class bases of separatism.

The Research Approach

The broad purpose of the analysis is to determine whether the class concept, as defined within a Marxian framework, has been transformed so as to have meaning at the level of electoral politics. More specifically, it is to determine whether workers in Quebec express their class position in their political behaviour and, by doing so, to assess the importance of the
class alignment in the Quebec electorate.

The research procedure can be broken down into three parts. The first is an analysis of party support by social class for the 1973 provincial election. The general hypothesis of this analysis is that workers in Quebec will vote for a party that makes an appeal to working-class interests and that is ideologically on the left of the economic spectrum.

It was argued in Chapter I that historically the working class in Quebec has exhibited an awareness of class interests not to the extent of organizing itself into a political party but at least in terms of registering disenchantment with the Liberal Party and turning to the Union Nationale. The arrival of a seemingly "social democratic" party, the Parti Québécois, on the Quebec political scene raises considerable interest in a class voting study and highlights the issue of ethnicity versus class. As Hamilton and Pinard write:

One of the commonplace observations about the Quebec scene is that the Liberal party is the party of the dominant business and financial interests. A frequently heard correlate is that the Parti Québécois, the party which offers a social-democratic program as well as the independence option, receives its support from the working class of the province.¹

To hypothesize that workers in Quebec are likely to vote Parti Québécois is not to suggest that the Parti Québécois offers a clearly defined socialist alternative. No documen-

tation exists to support this nor have elected P.Q. members pretended this to be the case. However, it can be substantiated that the P.Q.'s programme is basically social democratic and that it has appealed more specifically to the working class than has any other major party in contemporary Quebec politics.

The principle hypothesis of the analysis is, therefore, that the working class in Quebec votes P.Q. while the Liberal party attracts the support of non-workers or the middle class.

Class voting is not considered to be a mechanical response by individuals to economic conditions. As elaborated in Chapter III, the intensification of class consciousness depends upon the development of communication and interaction between members of the same class and upon the organization of the working class. Therefore, the second phase of the research will be to delimit the conditions under which workers become class conscious and vote for the party closest to their class interests. This involves controlling for subjective class identification, subjective proximity to one's class, perceptions of class conflict, trade union membership, and community size.

2 In an interview with Robert Burns, House Leader for the P.Q. Government on March 29, 1977, Mr. Burns stated that the P.Q. had never claimed to be a working-class party even though it was more sympathetic to the problems of the working class than any other party.

3 See for example the 1972 economic manifesto entitled "When We Will Really Be at Home". According to Shelliagh Hodgins Milner and Henry Milner, The Decolonization of Quebec, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1973) "the program is social-democratic rather than socialist, relying mainly on regulation of the economy rather than nationalization". (pp. 211-212).
While the issue of independence complicates the analysis, it is an integral part of the study. The final phase of the research will be to determine the effects of ethnicity as revealed by responses to the issue of separatism and then to ascertain the relationship between class and ethnic preoccupations. This part of the research is based on the assumption that nationalism is to some extent a class phenomenon, that identifiable groups invest in nationalism in order to enhance their class position or further their class goals. It has been argued that nationalism to date has been a middle-class phenomenon, that certain segments of the middle class support the P.Q. because they view separatism as a means for establishing themselves as the dominant class in Quebec society. While it has been suggested by some authors that lower classes develop class consciousness through the symbols of the nation, the link between class consciousness and separatism within the working class of Quebec has never been established.\(^4\) In view of the Anglo-American domination of the Quebec economy, it may be that class conscious elements of the working class view separatism as one step towards alleviating economic problems and class domination.

It is the purpose of this analysis to go beyond the assertion that the issue of independence caused a polarization of the Quebec electorate into two camps.\(^5\) As argued in the

\(^4\)In Milner and Milner, Ibid., pp. 224-244, the authors make a case for "nationalism on the left" in Quebec.

\(^5\)See Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton, "The Independence Issue and the Polarization of the Electorate:"
preceeding chapters, an issue-oriented approach to voting is lacking a framework which considers factors involved in the causation of attitudes. It sees the vote as a choice by an autonomous individual endowed with a set of psychological traits and ignores the role of the economic in shaping attitudes and political behaviour. Because of the problems with this approach, an attempt will be made in the latter part of the analysis to determine the class bases of separatism which in turn will contribute to a theory of class voting and focus on the dilemma of a social democratic party. This will be done by examining attitudes toward separatism under controlled conditions reflecting objective class and levels of class consciousness.

Definition of Sample and Variables

The sample of voters selected for analysis was drawn from the 1974 National Election Study. The analysis of respondents only from the province of Quebec yields a research sample of 702. Unlike Pinard and Hamilton who argue that separate consideration should be given to anglophones and

The 1973 Quebec Election," Canadian Journal of Political Science, X,2 (June 1977), pp. 215-259. Here the authors argue that the issue of independence was the most decisive issue of the election and that it was the determining factor in the polarization of the electorate.

6 The 1974 National Election Study was made available by the Carleton Social Science Archive. The data were originally collected by Harold Clarke, Jane Jenson, Lawrence Leduc and Jon Pammett. Neither the Carleton Social Science Archive nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretation presented here. For a discussion of the considerations which underlay the design of this survey, see: Lawrence Leduc, Harold Clarke, Jane Jenson, and Jon Pammett, "A National Sample Design," Canadian Journal of Political Science, VII, 4 (December, 1974), pp. 701 - 708.
francophones, it was decided to leave the English-speaking respondents in the analysis for several reasons. First, it is assumed that workers, whether anglophone or francophone, experience similar economic problems and that voting for a social democratic party as an expression of this discontent should cut across ethnic lines. Secondly, the number of English-speaking respondents in the sample is 84 (based on the question "What language did you first learn as a child that you still speak or understand?") and are included in the analysis in order to conserve the sample size.

Finally, the analysis was completed both with and without the English-speaking respondents. When removed from the analysis, variations were noted such as an overall decrease in Liberal support and greater support for the P.Q. particularly among middle-class francophones. These variations are consistent with the fact that 70% of the English-speaking respondents fall in the category of non-workers and that 94% of these anglophones support the Liberal party. Nevertheless, the exclusion of the anglophones from the analysis does not alter the voting patterns apparent from the original


8 Contrary to the notion expressed above that class cuts across class lines, 89% of working-class anglophones support the Liberal party. This is no doubt related to the independence plank in the P.Q. platform and to the tendency for minorities to believe that their interests are best protected by the dominant party.
analysis nor does it lead to marked changes in the statistical significance of the results. It was decided to complete the analysis with the English-speaking respondents primarily because the failure to make a distinction by ethnicity does not obscure the class-party linkage among the majority francophones.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is based on the question, "If you voted in the last provincial election, for which party did you vote?" Excluded from the sample because of totals too small for analysis are: Union Nationale (N = 17); Progressive Conservative (N = 13); New Democratic Party (N = 1); and Other (N = 5).

Independent Variable

The operationalization of the class concept which has been theoretically defined according to Marxian criteria is clearly the most problematic aspect of the research. The absence of similar studies as well as conflicting interpretations of the theoretical definition make any type of comparison or test for validity impossible. As well restrictions are imposed when working within available survey data which for the most part have limited operational definitions of class to that of socio-economic status or subjective class identification. The 1974 National Election Study, however, was designed to accommodate a much broader definition of the class concept.
It was the only survey available which invited an empirical analysis of class voting within a Marxian framework and as such was the logical choice for the research. The inclusion in the data set of the complete Blishen occupational scale as well as questions on supervisory capacity, perceptions of class conflict and attitudes on class membership makes it possible to diverge from the usual sociological definition of class based on status ranking.  

A two-step procedure is used to arrive at an operational definition of class on the economic level. First, the Blishen Occupation Scale which includes 485 occupational categories is analyzed and each category initially assessed as working class or non-working class based on criteria established in Chapter II. For the sake of simplicity and convenience, the terms non-workers and middle-class will be used interchangeably, although no attempt has been made to comprehensively define this class. Because of the necessity

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9 The most serious flaw in the data set for purposes of this study is the absence of a question on self-employment. Ideally it is necessary to exclude from the working class those who are self-employed since they are both owners of the means of production and labour and are direct workers. For a further description of the class position of the "petty bourgeoisie" see, Nicos Poulantzas, "On Social Classes," New Left Review, No. 78 (January-February 1973), p. 27.

to conserve the size of the sample, the 199 respondents classified as "Housewife", the 72 in the category of "Retired", and the 12 "Unemployed" are included in the analysis by using the "Interview Stream" procedure which refers to the respondent's former occupation or the occupation of the respondent's husband. 11

The second part of the operationalization involves controlling for the "capitalist function of control and surveillance" based on the question "How many people are working under you?" Any respondent initially classified as working class is removed from this class if the response to the above question is greater than zero. A further control is introduced by employing the question asked only to non-manual respondents: "Is your job an executive position or what?" Any respondents who fall into the category of "owner" or "manager" are excluded from the working class if previously placed there. The absence of a similar question to manual workers made it impossible to control for self-employment among manual occupations. Controls for occupations in farming are not needed since the Blishen scale includes a breakdown of farm owners, farm workers, and farm management occupations.

Throughout the procedure of operationalization, an attempt is made to include within the working class only those respondents who clearly met the criteria established

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11 Excluded from the analysis are those who fall into the following categories: Student (N = 40); Never Worked (N = 2); and Other (N = 8).
in Chapter II. Respondents whose function is doubtful or not readily apparent from the occupational description are placed in the category of non-worker. A breakdown of respondents by objective class is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working Class</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This final classification is made on the basis of the following general terms of reference.

**Working Class**

The working class is theoretically defined as those who do not own the means of production, who perform only the function of labour, whether in a productive enterprise, a service industry, or in the public sector, and who are paid a wage based on the value they themselves produced or out of surplus value produced elsewhere. The following categories of occupations are said to meet the requirements of this definition:

1) Manual labourers, skilled and unskilled, involved in the actual production, fabrication, assemblage, and repair of commodities.

2) Manual labourers indirectly involved in the material production process or employed in the service sector (e.g. janitors, cleaners, cooks, etc.).

3) Non-manual labourers in a productive enterprise
who perform only the function of labour by providing services:

a) occupations in the areas of inspecting, testing, grading, and sampling of material goods.

b) technicians and technologist engaged only in controlling the quality of commodities.

c) non-professional white-collar workers who provide clerical, bookkeeping and other services.

d) unskilled non-manual help such as messengers, watchmen, and drivers.

4) Occupations in the transportation of goods and people.

5) Non-manual labourers who perform only the function of labour in the service sectors of utilities, communications, storage, distribution, retail and wholesale trade, commerce, finance, insurance, real estate, and advertising (e.g. clerks, tellers, secretaries, telephone operators, adjustors, salesmen, etc.)

6) Professionals and Semi-professionals who traditionally have had little control over their working arrangements and who are generally supervised (e.g. nurses, dental hygienists, and physiotherapists but not teachers).

Middle Class

Since the purpose of this study is not to assign an exact class position to every group in Quebec society nor to arrive at a comprehensive, theoretical definition of the
middle class, non-workers (or the middle class for the sake of simplicity) are said to include those who do not fit the theoretical and operational definition of the working class. A somewhat detailed breakdown is as follows:

1) Where possible to discern, all owners in the productive and service sectors.

2) Any respondent whose occupation involves performing the function of control and surveillance. This includes foremen, supervisors, inspectors, regulatory officers, managers, and administrators.

3) Professionals within the productive enterprise such as engineers, economists, mathematicians, statisticians, sociologists, psychologists, accountants, and auditors who may take part in the labour process but who generally perform the function of capital. It is assumed that these occupations are involved in maximizing the profit rate of the enterprise either by control and surveillance of labour or by developing new and better products and methods. Outside the field of material production, such professionals either perform the same function within the service or public sector, or are self-employed.

4) Other, non-manual occupations in the service sector who may be necessary to the labour process but whose function also seems to be one of accelerating capital accumulation and creating profitable investment opportunities (e.g. ad and illustrating artists, product and interior designers, buyers
in retail and wholesale trade, advertising salesmen, and traders of securities).

5) Occupations involved in law enforcement from policemen to military personnel to judges are excluded from the working class largely on the basis of political and ideological criteria. Their role in terms of upholding the status quo or enforcing discipline on those groups who do not consent to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant class can in a very general sense be equated to performing the function of capital. According to Poulantzas, the police and army can be considered as part of the "repressive apparatus" of the state. Without suggesting that they are a special class, occupations in "law and order" appear to be functional to the particular orientations and priorities of capitalism and hence, are not considered to be consistent with the definition of working class.

6) Occupations in education, politics, journalism, writing, publishing, television, radio, and social work are also exempted from the working class on the basis of political and ideological criteria. The term "intellectuals" is often used to describe such occupations which directly or indirectly perform a function of legitimation within a capitalist system. As Gramsci writes:

   In the modern world the category of intellectuals, understood in this sense, has undergone an unprecedented expansion. The democratic-bureaucratic

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12 Poulantzas, op. cit., p. 47.
system has given rise to a great mass of functions which are not justified by the social necessities of production, though they are justified by the political necessities of the dominant fundamental group.13

Another description comes from Poulantzas who states that such groups constitute the "ideological apparatuses" of the state, their principal role being the elaboration and incubation of ideology.14 Furthermore, such groups as teachers, ministers of religion, and social workers are functional to the capitalist system in the additional sense of providing services which indirectly reduce the cost of producing surplus value in the private sector. The direction and selection of students in educational institutions are geared to the expected needs of industry and business, and play an important role in the reproduction of hierarchical social relations. As Gorz states:

a set proportion of adolescents must be persuaded by the impersonal process of schooling that they are incapable of becoming anything better than unskilled labour... (Conversely, those who do well at school must be convinced that they are something like an elite, that they will rise above the working class and that their success is due to their hard work, self-denial and ambition.)15

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14 Poulantzas, op. cit., p. 47.

15 Andre Gorz, "Technical Intelligence and the Capitalist Division of Labour," Telos, No. 12 (Summer 1972), p. 38. See also Poulantzas, op. cit., p. 49: "The state apparatuses: including the school qua ideological apparatus, do not create class
The exclusion of all "intellectuals" from the working class does not rule out the possibility of an alliance between the working class and intellectuals nor the prospects for proletarianization. This is particularly true for teachers in Quebec who are becoming increasingly militant, which made their classification as non-workers particularly difficult.

7) Actors, musicians, dancers, athletes, and artists are classified as non-workers primarily on the basis of uncertainty. The relationship between them and the world of production is unclear although they may, as in the case of the "intellectuals" be considered necessary for the functioning of the capitalist system at least in terms of distraction from economic problems or dissipation of discontent.

Control Variables

Several independent variables were used as controls in order to analyze class voting under conditions of heightened class consciousness.

1) Subjective class identification is based on the question, "One hears a lot about different social classes. Do you ever think of yourself as belonging to a social class?" If the answer was yes, the respondent was asked to place himself in: Upper Class, Upper-Middle Class, Middle Class, Working Class, or Lower Class. Responses to this question

division but they contribute to it and so contribute also to its expanded reproduction."
are combined to produce two subjective classes: middle and working class. Justification for doing so comes from two findings. First as shown in Table 1, the fact that only 1.5% of the respondents fall into the categories of upper, upper-middle, and lower, as well as the sharp cleft between the middle and working class underline at least the empirical utility of treating class structure in terms of two principle classes. The second finding, as shown in Table 2, indicates a significant correlation between objective class and class self-image. Of those who think of themselves as working class, 73% are in the category of objective working class and of those with a middle-class self-image, 61% are objectively defined as non-workers. The division of society into two primary classes seems to be rooted in the mind of the ordinary Quebec citizen even though the phenomenon of identifying with the middle class regardless of objective class position is still fairly strong.

2) Subjective proximity to one's class is based on the question, "Some people feel they have a lot in common with other people in their own class, but others don't feel this way so much. How about you? Would you say that you feel pretty close to other (class chosen above) people, or that you don't feel much closer to them than you do to people in other classes?" The interesting result in Table 3 is that workers who identify with the working class are far more likely to feel close to members of their own class (80.2%) than are non-workers who identify with the middle
TABLE 1

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO CLASS IDENTIFICATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Identification</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper class</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper-Middle</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Class</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>273</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>702</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2

OBJECTIVE CLASS BY CLASS IDENTIFICATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Subjective Working Class</th>
<th>Subjective Middle Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective Working Class</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective Middle Class</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 39.86 \quad df = 1 \quad p < .001 \]

Uncertainty Coefficient = .08

Phi = .32
**TABLE 3**

PROXIMITY TO ONE'S CLASS BY OBJECTIVE CLASS AND SUBJECTIVE CLASS IDENTIFICATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>workers identifying with working class</th>
<th>workers identifying with middle class</th>
<th>non-workers identifying with working class</th>
<th>non-workers identifying with middle class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feel Close</td>
<td>% 80.2</td>
<td>% 65.7</td>
<td>% 63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not feel close</td>
<td>% 19.8</td>
<td>% 34.3</td>
<td>% 36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(86)</td>
<td>(99)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 9.18 \text{ df } 3 \quad p < .05 \]
Cramer's V = .16
Uncertainty Coefficient = .02

**TABLE 4**

PERCEPTIONS OF CONFLICT BY OBJECTIVE CLASS AND SUBJECTIVE CLASS IDENTIFICATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>workers identifying with working class</th>
<th>workers identifying with middle class</th>
<th>non-workers identifying with working class</th>
<th>non-workers identifying with middle class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class Conflict</td>
<td>% 51.7</td>
<td>% 52.0</td>
<td>% 41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Harmony</td>
<td>% 48.3</td>
<td>% 48.0</td>
<td>% 58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(91)</td>
<td>(98)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 1.32 \text{ df } 3 \quad p > .05 \] (not significant)
Cramer's V = .06
Uncertainty Coefficient = .00
3) Perceptions of class conflict are taken from the question, "On the whole do you think there is bound to be some conflict between different classes or do you think they can get along together without any conflict?" The finding in Table 4 that over 50% of non-workers who identify with middle class believe class conflict exists provides some refutation to the theory that the middle class is likely to voice a belief in class harmony. The percentage of respondents who believe class conflict exists rises only slightly among workers who identify with the working class and this suggests that, at least, among Quebec voters, the idea of opposing class interests does not appear to be more salient in the working class than the middle class. Interestingly, non-workers who identify with the working class are the least likely to see class conflict. While it may be argued that false awareness of class position leads to inconsistent behaviour, this finding was unexpected since it would seem that working-class identification among non-workers might be an indication of "proletarianization".

4) A measure of class consciousness is created by

---

16 See David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), p. 69. The authors believe that the working class is much more prone than the middle class to see politics in class terms, and state: "The middle class elector can therefore identify his party with an existing social order which preserves the interest of the upper and middle classes without relying on concepts of class interest and class conflict that are so evident in working class thought."
combining the above variables. High class consciousness is used to describe those respondents whose class self-image and objective class position are consistent, who feel close to members of the class identified with, and who believe class conflict exists. Those with two out of the three characteristics are said to have medium class consciousness and all other combinations designate low class consciousness.\textsuperscript{17} While not presented here, the data show that non-workers are more likely than workers to exhibit high and medium class consciousness (72\%) and that 40\% of workers fall into the category of low class consciousness.

5) Trade union membership is derived from the question, "Do you belong to a trade or labour union?" Table 5 indicates that the relationship between objective class position and union membership is a significant one with approximately 62\% of all union members belonging to the working class.

6) The final control is community size, a variable which has three broad categories: a population of 500,000 and over; between 10,000 and 500,000; and under 10,000.\textsuperscript{18} Table 6 shows that the highest concentration of workers occurs in

\textsuperscript{17}This distribution based on a sample size of 368 is: High Class Consciousness (22.0\%); Medium Class Consciousness (44.3\%); and Low Class Consciousness (33.7\%).

\textsuperscript{18}The distribution based on the total sample size of 702 is: 500,000 and over (46.2\%); 10,000 - 500,000 (26.5\%); and under 100,000 (27.3\%).
### TABLE 5

**OBJECTIVE CLASS BY UNION MEMBERSHIP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Union</th>
<th>Non-Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working Class</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(157)</td>
<td>(428)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 13.36 \text{ df} 1 \quad p < .001 \]

Phi = .15

Uncertainty Coefficient = .02

### TABLE 6

**OBJECTIVE CLASS BY COMMUNITY SIZE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Over 500,000</th>
<th>10,000 - 500,000</th>
<th>Under 10,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working Class</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(304)</td>
<td>(161)</td>
<td>(175)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 11.01 \text{ df} 2 \quad p < .01 \]

Cramer's V = .13

Uncertainty Coefficient = .01
medium-sized communities from 10,000 to 500,000. This appears to reflect the fact that Montreal, to which the category of over 500,000 primarily refers to, has grown extensively in the areas of finance, commerce, and insurance and, hence, may not be typical of the large industrial centres referred to in Chapter III. It appears that in Quebec, there is a heavy concentration of manual workers in the smaller, industrial and manufacturing centres on the North Shore, in the Eastern Townships, and around Rouyn-Noranda.¹⁹

Data and Method

The statistical techniques employed in the data analysis are simple contingency bi-variate correlations based on tabular analysis and multiple discriminant analysis. As outlined previously in more detail, the analysis has three parts: 1) an analysis of party support by social class without controls; 2) an analysis of class voting under the controlled conditions of subjective class identification, subjective proximity to one's class, perceptions of class conflict, trade union membership, and community size; and 3) an analysis of the class bases of separatism.

Research Results using Contingency Tables

In the first part of the analysis, contingency tables are employed with and without physical controls.

¹⁹ See Dale Posgate and Kenneth McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976) for a description of the course of economic growth since 1920. (pp. 31-35)
1) Vote by Objective Social Class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québecois</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Créditiste</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(239)</td>
<td>(248)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 10.49 \text{ df} 2 \quad p < .01 \]

Cramer's \( V = .15 \)

Uncertainty Coefficient = .01

This simple bi-variate table indicates the relationship between vote and class with no controls. While the relationship is significant, it is clear that the support for the P.Q. has contributed very little to the level of significance. Working-class support for the P.Q. is only 1% higher than middle-class support for this party. Objective class position differentiates Liberal and Créditiste party supporters but the hypothesis of working-class support for the P.Q. is not supported at this stage of the analysis.

2) Measurements of Class Consciousness

a) Class Identification

Subjective class identification is used as a control variable in order to study the relationship between class and
vote among those whose class identification is consistent with their objective class position. Recognition of one's actual class position is considered to be one indication of class awareness and hence, should increase the division of party support along class lines. Table 8 shows this to be the case at least in terms of a considerable reduction in working-class support for the Liberal party and increased working-class support for both the P.Q. and Parti Créditiste.

While some polarization between classes is evident, it is interesting to note that support for the P.Q. from middle-class respondents who also identify themselves as middle-class increased slightly from the results in Table 7. Among those who do not identify with their objective class, no significant relationship between class and voting occurs. However, it is noteworthy that subjective class identification has little effect on P.Q. support whether from the objective class of workers or from non-workers, perhaps adding support to the argument in Chapter II that subjective class identification is not by itself a useful indication of class membership.

b) Subjective Proximity to One's Class

Table 9 shows that working-class respondents who feel a class attachment are less likely to support the Liberal party and more likely to turn to the P.Q. when compared with the results of Table 7. When subjective proximity to one's
TABLE 8
VOTE BY OBJECTIVE CLASS CONTROLLING FOR CLASS IDENTIFICATION

A. Consistent Identification with Objective Class Position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Workers who identify with the working class</th>
<th>Non-workers who identify with the middle class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Créditiste</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(72)</td>
<td>(131)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 6.94 \text{ df}2 \quad p < .05 \]
\[ \text{Cramer's V} = .18 \]
\[ \text{Uncertainty Coefficient} = .02 \]

B. Inconsistent Identification with Objective Class Position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Workers who identify with the middle class</th>
<th>Non-workers who identify with the working class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Créditiste</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(78)</td>
<td>(25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 2.88 \text{ df}2 \quad p > .05 \text{ (not significant)} \]
\[ \text{Cramer's V} = .17 \]
\[ \text{Uncertainty Coefficient} = .03 \]
TABLE 9

VOTE BY OBJECTIVE CLASS CONTROLLING FOR SUBJECTIVE PROXIMITY TO ONE'S CLASS

A. Close to members of one's class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>75.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Créditiste</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(145)</td>
<td>(141)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 6.09 \text{ df} 2 \quad p < .05 \]
Cramer's \(V = .15\)
Uncertainty Coefficient = .01

B. Not close to members of one's class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Créditiste</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(72)</td>
<td>(89)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 4.09 \text{ df} 2 \quad p > .05 \text{ (not significant)} \]
Cramer's \(V = .16\)
Uncertainty Coefficient = .02
class is not a factor, working-class respondents are as supportive of the Liberal party as are those from the middle class, and middle-class respondents are considerably more likely to support the P.Q. than are working class members.

c) Perceptions of Class Conflict

The relationship between class and voting when controlling for perceptions of class conflict is illustrated in Table 10. In the case of the working class, the pattern of party support is similar to that established when the effects of class attachment are controlled. Working class members who believe class conflict exists are much more likely to vote P.Q. than working-class respondents who perceive class harmony. However, the finding which diverges from previously established patterns is the increased support for the P.Q. among middle-class electors. Recognition of class conflict appears to evoke a similar reaction from both classes just as perceptions of class harmony lead to a rapid rise in support for the Liberal party among both working and middle-class members.

d) Class Consciousness

The variables of class identification, feelings of class closeness, and perceptions of class conflict are combined to form a variable of class consciousness. Table 11 shows that when these variables are combined, the original hypothesis is supported. Among the respondents in the working class who identify with the working class, who feel close to
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working Class who feel conflict exists</th>
<th>Working Class who see classes getting along</th>
<th>Middle Class who feel conflict exists</th>
<th>Middle Class who see classes getting along</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>78.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Créditiste</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(107)</td>
<td>(120)</td>
<td>(116)</td>
<td>(123)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( x^2 = 18.09 \) \text{ df6} \ p < .01
Cramer's \( V = .14 \)
Uncertainty Coefficient = .02
TABLE 11

VOTE BY CLASS CONTROLLING FOR CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

A. High Class Consciousness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Créditiste</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(42)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$x^2 = 6.15$  df2  $p < .05$
Cramer's $V = .298$
Uncertainty Coefficient = .05

B. Medium Class Consciousness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>71.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Créditiste</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(59)</td>
<td>(74)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$x^2 = 3.61$  df2  $p > .05$ (not significant)
Cramer's $V = .17$
Uncertainty Coefficient = .02

C. Low Class Consciousness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>77.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Créditiste</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(58)</td>
<td>(35)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$x^2 = .74$  df2  $p > .05$ (not significant)
Cramer's $V = .09$
Uncertainty Coefficient = .01
members of that class, and who believe that class conflict exists, there is sharp decrease in support for the Liberal party and a very significant increase in P.Q. support. When compared to the voting pattern for the working class in Table 7, Liberal support actually drops by 20% and P.Q. support experiences an increase of 17%. Among middle-class respondents with high class consciousness, there is little change from the results in Table 7.

In view of the inconsistency between these results and the direction of party support for middle-class respondents who believe class conflict exists, it seemed necessary to single out the effects of class closeness and class conflict on the relationship between class and voting. Table 12 reveals that in the case of the working class, it is the combination of the two variables which is related to P.Q. support. When there is conflict but no closeness or closeness but no conflict, working-class support for the P.Q. falls below 16%. Among middle-class voters, Liberal support remains high as long as those who recognize class conflict also feel close to the middle class. But as soon as feelings of closeness are removed, middle-class support for the Liberal party drops and P.Q. support rises to 32%.

e) Community Size

This control was introduced on the basis of the theoretical discussion in Chapter III which considers urbanization and high population density to be structural conditions
TABLE 12

VOTE BY OBJECTIVE CLASS CONTROLLING FOR SUBJECTIVE PROXIMITY TO ONE'S CLASS AND PERCEPTIONS OF CONFLICT

A. Proximity to one's class and recognize class conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Créditiste</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(64)</td>
<td>(69)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 7.33 \text{ df}2 \text{ p} < .05 \]

Cramer's \( V = .23 \) Uncertainty Coefficient = .03

B. No proximity to one's class but recognize class conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Créditiste</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(43)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 6.26 \text{ df}2 \text{ p} < .05 \]

Cramer's \( V = .29 \) Uncertainty Coefficient = .05

C. Proximity to one's Class but don't recognize class conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Créditiste</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(75)</td>
<td>(70)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 1.44 \text{ df}2 \text{ p} > .05 \text{ (not significant)} \]

Cramer's \( V = .10 \) Uncertainty Coefficient = .01

D. No proximity to one's class and don't recognize class conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>76.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Créditiste</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(42)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = .11 \text{ df}2 \text{ p} > .05 \text{ (not significant)} \]

Cramer's \( V = .04 \) Uncertainty Coefficient = .001
conducive to fostering intergroup communication and, hence, class consciousness. It is based on two interrelated arguments: 1) in large urban centres, the one link which the voter has with those around him is his class position which leads to greater class awareness and increases the likelihood of class voting; and 2) increased numbers leads to greater interaction and increases the possibilities for political organization.

An analysis of class and voting when community size is controlled for produces no significant relationship, even though the results show that support for the P.Q. varies with size of city and that it is most likely to come from workers in communities where the population is 500,000 and over. The results in Table 13 which are statistically significant show that among working-class respondents the highest P.Q. vote comes from those in the large urban centres, no doubt metropolitan Montreal. The smaller the community, the more likely workers vote Créditiste. The higher concentration of workers in communities with populations in the range of 10,000 - 500,000 (Table 6) does not result in greater working-class support for the P.Q. as might have been expected. This may reflect a more active, dynamic P.Q. campaign in Montreal and the difficulty P.Q. activists may have in establishing contact in smaller communities. As well, it may be that population size does not adequately measure type of urban community, concentration of workers, and homogeneity of community. While community size

---

TABLE 13

VOTE BY COMMUNITY SIZE CONTROLLING FOR OBJECTIVE CLASS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over 500,000</td>
<td>10,000 - 500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>62.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Créditiste</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(103)</td>
<td>(75)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 16.18 \text{ df}4 \text{ p} < .01 \]

Cramer's V = .18
Uncertainty Coefficient = .04
does not clearly differentiate working-class and middle-class support for the P.Q., it is clear from the results that the Liberal party is at its best among middle-class urban supporters and that the Parti Créditiste has a solid base of working-class support in small towns and rural areas.

f) Union membership

Union membership is clearly an important factor in party choice. Table 14 reveals that among union members,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Union %</th>
<th>Non-Union %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Créditiste</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(121)</td>
<td>(372)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$x^2 = 20.87\quad df2\quad p < .001$
Cramer's V = .20
Uncertainty Coefficient = .02

Liberal support drops to 53% and P.Q. support rises to approximately 33%. Since 63% of union members are from the working class (Table 9), it is possible to conclude that the formal organization of the working class is influential in terms of developing class conscious political behaviour. This is supported in Table 15 which compares the voting patterns of union
# TABLE 15

## VOTE BY CLASS AND UNION MEMBERSHIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Working Class who are union members</th>
<th>Working Class who are not union members</th>
<th>Middle Class who are union members</th>
<th>Middle Class who are not union members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>79.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Créditiste</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td><em>(74)</em></td>
<td><em>(162)</em></td>
<td><em>(47)</em></td>
<td><em>(200)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
x^2 = 29.99 \quad df = 6 \quad p < .001
\]

Cr\'amer's $V = .18$
Uncertainty Coefficient $= .04$
and non-union members in the working class. The difference in P.Q. support between union and non-union members is 15%. The same pattern exists among middle-class voters. Thus, while union membership distinguishes support within the working class, it also cuts across class lines and plays an important role in distinguishing P.Q. support from Liberal support as a whole.

g) Union membership and perceptions of conflict

Since union membership and perceptions of class conflict might be thought to be closely related and since the P.Q. is attracting support under both conditions regardless of class position, it was decided to observe voting patterns when the effects of both variables are controlled. Table 16 clearly shows that union membership and perceptions of class conflict are fundamental characteristics of P.Q. support. Among union members who believe class conflict exists, P.Q. support exceeds Liberal support.

h) Class, union membership, and perceptions of class conflict

Table 17 represents a final attempt to differentiate party support along class lines when controlling for union membership and perceptions of class conflict. Once again the groups most likely to vote P.Q. and least likely to support the Liberal party are working-class union members who recognize class conflict and middle-class union members who believe class conflict exists. This is particularly true for those
## Table 16
VOTE BY UNION MEMBERSHIP AND PERCEPTIONS OF CONFLICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Union Members who feel conflict exists</th>
<th>Union Members who see classes getting along</th>
<th>Non-Union Members who feel conflict exists</th>
<th>Non-Union Members who see classes getting along</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Créditiste</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td>(65)</td>
<td>(173)</td>
<td>(180)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 37.82 \quad df6 \quad p < .001 \]

Cramer's V = .20
Uncertainty Coefficient = .04
TABLE 17.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working class union members who see class conflict</th>
<th>Working class non-union members who see class conflict</th>
<th>Working class union members who see class harmony</th>
<th>Working class non-union members who see class harmony</th>
<th>Middle class union members who see class conflict</th>
<th>Middle class non-union members who see class conflict</th>
<th>Middle class union members who see class harmony</th>
<th>Middle class non-union members who see class harmony</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>80.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Créditiste</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>(72)</td>
<td>(81)</td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(96)</td>
<td>(96)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 51.35 \quad d.f. = 41 \quad p < .001 \]
Cramer's $V = .24$
Uncertainty Coefficient = .06
in the middle class where only 35% vote Liberal and 60%
support the P.Q.

Observations

Before proceeding to the final stage of analysis,
several observations can be noted:

1) Under conditions which tend to foster a working-
   class consciousness, working-class support for the P.Q.
   increases significantly. Controlling for high class conscious-
   ness, a variable which combines objective class position,
   class identification, subjective proximity to one's class,
   and perceptions of class conflict, results in a sharp drop
   in working-class support for the Liberals and a corresponding
   increase in P.Q. support. An even greater increase in working-
   class support for the P.Q. occurs when controlling for the
   combined effects of union membership and class conflict.

2) The Parti Créditiste has a working-class support
   base that is strongest among non-union members who come from
   small communities.

3) Less clear is the relationship between voting and
   the middle class. Among respondents who identify with the
   middle class, feel close to that class, and have perceptions
   of class conflict, support for the Liberal party is close to
   80%. However, this relationship changes dramatically under
   two circumstances. First, among middle-class respondents
   who see class conflict but who don't feel close to members of
   the middle class, there is a sharp increase in support for
the P.Q. Secondly, when union membership is combined with class conflict, middle-class support for the P.Q. rises to 60% and drops off to 35% for the Liberal party.

4) The findings raise the question of proletarianization among certain segments of the middle class. An attempt is made to find some support for the notion expressed earlier that those occupations classified as "intellectuals" are likely to be experiencing proletarianization or are potential allies of the working class. A simple analysis of selected occupations such as teaching, social work, writing, and painting is carried out. Although the sample size is too small to permit conclusive statements, the data indicate that among these selected respondents, 52% support the P.Q., 59% feel no proximity to the middle class, 47% feel class conflict exists, and 60% are trade union members. When trade union membership and perceptions of conflict are combined, support for the P.Q. rises to 63%. From these findings, it might be suggested that part of the middle-class support is coming from groups whose jobs are being down-graded, who recognize the contradictions of capitalism, and who feel themselves in the position of having little or no control over their conditions of work and the products of their work. 21

21See James Hutcheson, "Class and Income Distribution in Canada," in Robert M. Laker, ed., The Political Economy of Dependency (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1973), pp. 57-83. Hutcheson states, "For many working class men and women, teaching was considered a means of social mobility. It has, however, become increasingly unrealistic to consider teaching to be distinct from the working class. The example
5) The role of unions in determining P.Q. support cannot be underestimated. All findings suggest that union membership, regardless of objective class position, is the single most important determinant of P.Q. support and an extremely significant factor for understanding the polarization of the Quebec electorate. This finding creates greater impetus for assessing the links between union membership and proletarianization and for focusing on the political and ideological elements of class.

3. The Ethnic Cleavage

a) Vote and the Separatist Issue

The general direction of the thesis has been to assess the importance of the class cleavage in view of the emphasis on nationalism and the ethnic cleavage in much of the literature on Quebec politics. At the same time, the purpose has not been to resolve the debate by determining which cleavage is more significant in the Quebec electorate. Rather it is to analyze both themes so as to better understand the interweave of class and ethnicity, which, it has been hypothesized, characterizes Quebec provincial politics.

In the preceding empirical analysis of class and voting, it was found that class is not an irrelevant factor of Quebec teachers is particularly instructive here, although this phenomenon is not restricted to Quebec and teachers in Ontario are also beginning to recognize their true class position." (p. 77)
in the electoral decision and that it does explain variance. In this section, it is necessary to determine the relationship between the separatist issue and voting. Table 18 shows that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In Favour of Separatism</th>
<th>Against Separatism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>82.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Créditiste</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>(198)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 123.56 \quad \text{df}2 \quad p < .001 \]
Cramer's V = .69
Uncertainty Coefficient = .26

This relationship is an extremely strong one in that anti-separatists overwhelmingly support the Liberal party, while those in favor of separatism are likely to vote P.Q. This finding clearly supports Pinard and Hamilton who argue that the issue of independence was a determining factor in the polarization of the Quebec electorate in the 1973 provincial elections.

---

22 Based on a sample size of 343, 24.2% of the respondents either were definitely in favour of separatism or gave qualified answers to the question: "There has been quite a bit of talk in recent years about the possibility of Quebec separating from the rest of Canada and becoming an independent country. Are you in favour of separatism or opposed to it?" 75.8% were opposed to the idea of separatism.
Further support for their argument comes from Table 19 which reveals that the relationship previously established between objective class position and voting disappears when controlling for separatism. Due to the sample size, it is impossible to control for separatism under conditions of high class consciousness. Even if this would have been possible, it is not likely to have altered the finding that the issue of separatism is a primary determinant of voting in Quebec.

b) The Class Bases of Separatism

However important the issue of independence is, it does not negate the importance of the class cleavage among respondents who are highly class conscious. As previously mentioned in this chapter, the issue-oriented analysis of voting fails by not going far enough, by not attempting to see if there are economic roots to issues and attitudes. This final part of the analysis, which treats the issue of separatism as a dependent variable, is based on the assumption referred to repeatedly in the preceding chapters: nationalism is to some extent a class phenomenon and identifiable groups invest in nationalism in order to enhance their class position or further their class goals.

It has already been established that P.Q. support is highest among union members who perceive class conflict to

TABLE 19
VOTE BY CLASS CONTROLLING FOR ATTITUDES ON SEPARATISM

In Favour of Separatism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Working Class %</th>
<th>Middle Class %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>73.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Créditiste</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(26)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$x^2 = 2.33$  df2  $p > .05$ (not significant)
Cramer's $V = .21$
Uncertainty Coefficient = .04

Against Separatism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Working Class %</th>
<th>Middle Class %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>84.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Québécois</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Créditiste</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(82)</td>
<td>(99)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$x^2 = .46$  df2  $p > .05$ (not significant)
Cramer's $V = .05$
Uncertainty Coefficient = .00
exist for both the working and the middle classes. It is also clear that most supporters of separatism vote P.Q.
To clarify the relationship between class and the P.Q., and class and separatism, an analysis is carried out using the various correlates of class, union membership, and perceptions of class conflict. Table 20 shows that objective class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In Favour of Separatism</th>
<th>Against Separatism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working Class</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>(69)</td>
<td>(237)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( x^2 = .04 )</td>
<td>df1 p. &gt; .05 (not significant)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{Phi} = .02 )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty Coefficient = .00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

position provides little assistance in determining whether or not a respondent is in favour of separatism, although middle-class respondents are slightly more responsive to the idea of separatism. However, when responses to separatism are analyzed under conditions of high class consciousness, a much clearer relationship between class and separatism is established. Table 21 makes it clear that respondents in the working class and the middle class who believe class conflict exists are most likely to be in favour of separatism, 30% and 34% respectively. The relationship is statistically significant.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th></th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th></th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
<th></th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Favour of Separatism</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against Separatism</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>(75)</td>
<td>(71)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(87)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$x^2 = 12.62$, $df = 3$, $p < .01$
Cramer's $V = .21$
Uncertainty Coefficient = .04

TABLE 21

ATTITUDES ON SEPARATISM BY CLASS AND PERCEPTIONS OF CLASS CONFLICT
showing also that a belief in class harmony means almost total opposition to separatism.

Union membership, another variable related to class consciousness, also seems to shape attitudes on the question of Quebec independence. Table 22 shows that 34% of union members

| TABLE 22  
ATTITUDES ON SEPARATISM BY UNION MEMBERS  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Members</th>
<th>Non-Union Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Favour of Separatism</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against Separatism</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(67)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 5.92 \quad df = 1 \quad p < .05 \]

\[ \Phi = .15 \]

Uncertainty Coefficient = .02

are in favour of separatism as compared to 19% of non-union members. In addition, the combination of class position and union membership helps to predict attitudes on separatism. Although not quite statistically significant, Table 23 shows that 38% of middle-class union members and 30% of working-class union members are in favour of separatism.

Finally, when union membership is combined with perceptions of class conflict, a very significant relationship occurs as revealed in Table 24. Among union members who believe
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th></th>
<th>Working Class</th>
<th></th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
<th></th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Union Members</td>
<td>Non-Union Members</td>
<td>Union Members</td>
<td>Non-Union Members</td>
<td>Union Members</td>
<td>Non-Union Members</td>
<td>Union Members</td>
<td>Non-Union Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Favour of Separatism</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against Separatism</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>(105)</td>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>(132)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$x^2 = 7.27 \quad df=3 \quad p > .05$ (not significant)

Cramer's $V = .15$

Uncertainty Coefficient = .02
TABLE 24

ATTITUDES ON SEPARATISM BY UNION MEMBERSHIP AND PERCEPTIONS OF CONFLICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Union Members who see conflict</th>
<th>Union Members who see harmony</th>
<th>Non-Union Members who see conflict</th>
<th>Non-Union Members who see harmony</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Favour of Separatism</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against Separatism</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>86.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>(103)</td>
<td>(128)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 23.07 \quad df = 3 \quad p < .001 \]

Cramer's V = .28
Uncertainty Coefficient = .07
class conflict exists, 53% are in favour of separatism. This compares to 13% of non-union members who feel classes can exist in harmony being in favour of separatism and 87% of such respondents opposed to it. A comparison of union members who see class harmony and non-union members who see class conflict suggests that here the variable of class conflict is slightly more relevant than union membership for predicting support for separatism. However, when both variables are combined, those in favour of separatism are in the majority.

Observations:

1) There is a clear relationship between separatism and class-related factors. 53% of union members who believe that conflict exists are in favour of separatism.

2) Working-class respondents are less likely than non-workers to support separatism but a comparison of respondents within the working class shows that support of separatism significantly increases with class consciousness.

3) The strongest support for separatism comes from middle-class members who are union members and who see conflict. In an attempt to see whether such support is related to possible changes in the class position of groups classified as "intellectuals" a simple analysis is carried out. Although the sample size is only 18, it is interesting to note that 50% of these respondents are in favour of separatism. It is, therefore, possible that a good part of this middle-class support for separatism comes from groups who see their class
position as similar to the working class. It is also possible that this analysis adds credence to the belief that the P.Q. is appealing to groups within both classes for reasons that are quite distinct and separate.

Research Results Using Discriminant Analysis

Discriminant analysis is employed to examine the relationship between the dependent variable and a series of independent variables. A multivariate technique is found to be necessary because the contingency table analysis reveals that several variables are statistically significant predictors of the dependent variable (vote). These included objective class position, class identification, feelings of class closeness, perceptions of class conflict, union membership and separatism. Discriminant analysis is selected as the multivariate technique as it is most appropriate where the dependent variable is nominally measured. Discriminant analysis can be viewed as an exercise in classification. The methodological question in this case is how to classify observations to the nominal categories of the dependent variable on the basis of their values on a set of independent variables.24

In this case an attempt is made to statistically

distinguish among respondents who cast their ballots for each of the three Quebec political parties in 1973. In order to distinguish between voters in each party, all of the characteristics which differentiated workers in the contingency table analysis were entered into a discriminant analysis. The mathematical objective of discriminant analysis is to weight and linearly combine the discriminating variables so that the groups are found to be as statistically distinct as possible. Simply stated, this technique is employed in order to be able to "discriminate" between the voters in the sense of being able to tell them apart.

Discriminant analysis involves two steps. First, statistical tests are used to measure the success with which the independent variables distinguish between the voters in question. The discriminant function is simply a regression equation with a dependent variable that represents group membership. The resulting equation maximally discriminates the members of the sample and indicates to which group each member probably belongs. Second, as a check on the accuracy of the discriminant functions, it is necessary to classify the original set of cases in order to determine how many are correctly classified by the variables being used. Classification is achieved through a series of classification functions based on a Bayesian adjustment for prior probabilities of party support.
TABLE 25
DISCRIMINATING QUEBEC VOTERS IN 1973, BASED ON CONSTANTS
EQUAL TO THE PROPORTION OF THE PARTY VOTE ACTUALLY
OBSERVED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Discriminant Coefficients</th>
<th>F-ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Separatism</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>17.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Conflict</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>9.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Membership</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>7.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Canonical Correlation = .40
% of respondents correctly classified = 77.05%

The discriminant analysis is presented in truncated form in the interest of parsimony. All other combinations of variables did not predict well and this equation includes only statistically significant variables. The results suggest that support for separatism is the single most important predictor of the vote with union membership and perceptions of class conflict being of lesser but not insubstantial importance (Table 25). Overall, these three variables together succeeded in correctly classifying 77% of the Quebec voters in the sample with a canonical correlation of $r = .40$. This is not to suggest that social, class is not a significant predictor of the vote. Rather, social class is strongly associated with union membership and perceptions of class conflict. For example, 63% of union members are working class, and 50% of those who believe class conflict exists are working class. Technically speaking such a situation is referred to as
multicollinearity or the presence of highly correlated independent variables. What this implies is that, for example, while social class and union membership may be conceptually distinct, they are not empirically separate (i.e. they are correlated). This means that it is difficult to accurately assess the independent effects of class and class-related variables on the voting choice. In general these results suggest that class-related factors are not unimportant in predicting the voting choice, even though the magnitude of the coefficient for separatist support was greater. Inability to partition the independent effects of class and class-related factors is due to the data and cannot be resolved statistically. Such a conclusion should not be surprising because of the overlap among several of the class-related variables.

**Summary and Conclusions**

The purpose of this chapter was an empirical investigation of the relationship between class and voting and class and separatism. An attempt was made to apply Marx's theory of class conflict and class consciousness as much as it was possible within the scope of survey data. The results of the investigation show that this theory does provide a gain in information and does explain variance. While it cannot be concluded that class position is the sole or primary determinant of party support in the Quebec electorate, the findings do refute the often-stated conclusion that cultural and nationalist preoccupations dominate the political behaviour.
of Quebec voters thereby negating the effects of class.

The first part of the analysis was an attempt to determine whether workers, who recognize that they are part of a collectivity in opposition to another class, participate in politics on the basis of this class loyalty. When introducing those variables which appear to measure class consciousness and imply a high level of interaction and communication among workers, the hypothesis was supported. In particular, the introduction of variables on working-class identification, feelings of closeness to members of this class, perceptions of class conflict, and union membership resulted in statistically significant relationships between class and voting, in the direction of increased working-class support for the P.Q. and a drop in Liberal support. Although working-class support for the P.Q. increased with size of community, the relationship was not as strong as expected.

The original hypothesis was not supported in the sense that certain class-related factors resulted in a significant increase in middle-class support for the P.Q. which in some cases exceeded working-class support for the P.Q. The very high support among middle-class union members who believe class conflict exists was not expected or hypothesized although the findings do not appear to be inconsistent with some theoretical studies on class structure in Quebec. While no easy explanation for this phenomenon can be given, it seems that either some segments of the middle class are undergoing the process of "proletarianization", or that there are ideologically opposed
groups within the middle class competing for the position of class dominance. The latter is theoretically supported by Bourque and Laurin-Frenette who believe that there is a division between the "technocratic" faction of the middle class which sees its class aspirations best represented by the P.Q. and the "neo-capitalist" faction which supports the P.Q. The data also seems to support this conclusion in that the majority of the technocratic faction are concentrated in the public sector and are likely to be unionized. This faction may perceive class conflict to exist not between themselves and the working class, but between themselves and the entrepreneurs and financiers of the neo-capitalist faction. This is not to rule out the possibility of proletarianization. The simple analysis that was possible suggests that support for the P.Q. comes partly from certain middle-class groups such as teachers, social workers, and writers who are experiencing a change in working conditions and who feel intellectually closest to the position of the working class. It is also quite likely that this support for the P.Q. combines with support from sections of the middle class who are attempting to secure a position of class dominance.

The other purpose of the chapter was to empirically establish the objective class base of separatism, thereby

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showing that the ethnic cleavage and the class cleavage are not mutually exclusive. Again the results of the analysis show that support for the issue of separatism is most likely to come from class-conscious groups in both the working class and middle class. While the strongest support for separatism comes from middle-class union members who have perceptions of conflict, it cannot be concluded that separatism is a middle-class phenomenon as was suggested in Chapter I. Based on the findings, it seems possible to conclude that the highly class-conscious elements of the working class also see separatism as a tool for enhancing class position and pursuing working-class goals.

In general, the analysis has provided empirical evidence which indicates that the class alignment is an important determinant of party support, but in the process a number of new questions are raised. Primarily the questions revolve around the future and direction of a social democratic party that appeals to both workers and non-workers; the effects upon working-class voting behaviour as the P.Q. develops a more heterogeneous support base; and the potential for a left-wing political movement in Quebec. It is hoped that the answers to these questions will emerge in the following chapter which will be an attempt to place the relationship between the P.Q. and the working class in a historical context and to predict changes within each.
CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Nationalism, in its various forms, has clearly coloured Quebec politics and no doubt partially accounts for the often referred to "uniqueness" of Quebec in Canada. The purpose of this study has not been to dispute this fact, but to refute the theory that nationalism has resulted in a lag in political modernization in Quebec and prevented a class-oriented politics from emerging. The numerous studies which adopt this either-or approach (class versus ethnicity) and eventually conclude that the ethnic cleavage has dominated political life at the expense of the class cleavage provide few analytical tools to explain the tremendous amount of change and instability that has characterized Quebec, particularly since the early 1960s.

The uniqueness of Quebec and the presence of nationalism are not sufficient reasons for avoiding a class analysis of Quebec politics. This is so particularly because the uniqueness of Quebec does not extend to its economic and social development where the transition from tradition to modernity has not been unlike that in other Canadian provinces. Quebec has become more urbanized, more industrialized, and more secular and it seems reasonable to expect that it has become more divided along class lines. Certainly the increasing evidence in Quebec of industrial disputes, labour unrest, and trade union militancy would suggest this to be the case.

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A class analysis of Quebec politics was undertaken precisely because it seemed that the importance of the class cleavage at the level of electoral politics has not received adequate consideration. It also seemed necessary to re-evaluate the traditional interpretation of Quebec politics whereby cultural preoccupations are seen to have repressed class demands and to consider the interrelationship between class and nationalism.

The first three chapters of this study provided the theoretical foundations for proceeding with a class analysis of Quebec politics and for doing so within a Marxian framework. The results of the empirical analysis in the preceding chapter support the theoretical arguments of the thesis.

The findings generally show that class theory does explain variance and that the link between class and voting takes the following forms in Quebec politics: 1) workers who display high class consciousness at the ideological level tend to express their class interests at the political level by voting for the Parti Québécois; 2) class-related factors such as union membership and perceptions of conflict lead to increased P.Q. support from both workers and non-workers; 3) non-workers who theoretically have been defined as potential allies of the working class are strong supporters of the P.Q.; and 4) non-workers who identify with the middle class and feel close to members of that class are very strong supporters of the Liberal party.
Class theory also explains variance with respect to the issue of independence. Just as high class consciousness is correlated with P.Q. support so is it an indication of support for separatism. The results of the analysis not only support the theoretical argument that class and nationalism are related but go further to suggest that separatism is more than just a middle-class phenomenon as has sometimes been argued.

The purpose of this final chapter is to move somewhat beyond the empirical analysis and provide some speculation founded in a consideration of recent Quebec history with a view to understanding the process of class formation in Quebec society, the strength of the relationship between the working class and the P.Q., and the extent to which separatism is linked to working-class goals.

The classification of workers, as carried out in Chapter II, does not constitute a definition of the working class. It was stated in that chapter that a group of individuals defined as workers at the level of places in production relations cannot be, properly speaking, a class until it is united on an ideological basis and until it expresses its economic interests in a political form. An attempt was made both to avoid the conceptualization of classes as statistical categories which are not linked to historical development and to avoid a completely deterministic interpretation whose objective class relations eventually are transformed spontaneously into political
and ideological class relations. Instead, classes are considered to be determined by the totality of economic, ideological, and political relations. For purposes of refining such a definition, Chapter III sought to outline some of the conditions and agents which both assist and hinder the development of class consciousness and to show that the form of organization of political and ideological relations has an effect upon the manner in which classes are formed.

Chapter IV was an attempt to test the classification, to see if a group of workers, defined according to separation from the means of production and loss of capacity to survive without selling their labour power, can be considered a class in terms of behaviour at the level of electoral politics. What the results show is that there is a correspondence between places within the relations of production and collective political action. For example, workers, who feel the identity of their common interest and see society composed of conflicting classes, tend to support a social democratic party and to support the idea of independence. What the results do not show are the factors involved in the development of class consciousness, the manner in which classes in Quebec become organized, the reasons for the absence of a socialist party, and the effects of this form of political participation on the organization or dis-organization of the working class. Such matters must be considered since classes are defined in terms of the totality of economic, political, and ideological relations and since, as Przeworski writes, "the form of organization of ideological and
political relations has an independent effect upon the manner in which classes are formed."¹ The structure of these relations varies according to each historical situation, making it necessary to analyze the status of the class cleavage in Quebec as an outcome of particular ideological and political struggles.

A study of Quebec history reveals that struggles at the level of ideological relations have affected the organization and disorganization of classes. In particular, working-class consciousness in Quebec has developed over a long period of time and is the effect of numerous ideological struggles. For years, workers in Quebec remained disorganized due to the position of ideological dominance held by the traditional political and religious elites maintained until approximately 1960. As described in Chapter I, the clergy and traditional middle class succeeded in perpetuating a vision of society which tended to protect their position of dominance.

Throughout this period, a conservative nationalist ideology proved to be a forceful, persuasive tool for repressing class discontent, for prohibiting strikes, and for preventing workers from acquiring the necessary skills to challenge the dominant class. The choices open to the working class were clearly dictated by the established elites whose monolithic view of society pervaded the legal, religious, political, educational,

and cultural realms. When persuasion and indirect means for advancing their ideological position failed, force was used.  

While this period in Quebec history was not void of class-based disputes, it can be said that the potential for conflict was rarely given a chance of becoming fully activated.

This period of Quebec history exemplifies how the middle class, by controlling the ideological apparatuses, can hinder the development of working-class consciousness. As elaborated in Chapter I, control over La Confédération des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada, prohibition of strikes, and the pre-dominance of right-wing nationalist publications are only a few examples of the power and influence held by the traditional elites. The ideology of the traditional elites remained virtually unchallenged and, as Milner and Milner argue, this was primarily because they had "almost complete control over the flow of information and ideas within Quebec, and the help of the state when necessary".  

In more general terms, a study of any period in Quebec history shows that it is in the class interests of the established

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2See Dale Posgate and Kenneth McRoberts, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1976). As the authors state, "provincial police were used on many occasions to break up strikes that had been declared illegal. (The most notorious of these instances was, of course, the Asbestos strike in 1949.)" (p. 63)

elites to obscure and nullify class conflict, to individualize social relations, and to make politics revolve around non-class issues. They validate their ideological position through a multiplicity of forms: 1) through various types of nationalism which contribute to the legitimation of the capitalist system by perpetuating a certain vision of society and by masking undesirable aspects which run contrary to the direction imposed on social life by the dominant class; 4) through the repression of union activity (as Duplessis did in the early 1950s) or by heaping abuse on union leaders (as Bourassa did in the early 1970s); 3) through the media which in Quebec has tended to either condemn or completely ignore labour unrest and trade-union activities; and 4) through the promise of immediate social and economic benefits when social unrest is high. 7

4 See Léon Dion, Québec: The Unfinished Revolution (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1976), pp. 105-176. Dion particularly shows how the foremost political function of conservative nationalism which was dominant until 1960 may have been to uphold the status quo. He also suggests that liberal nationalism which has reigned since 1960 legitimizes state activities which primarily benefit the middle classes.


7 One example is Bourassa's 1970 election promise of 100,000 jobs during a period of high student unrest. He later blamed the FLQ for his failure to keep the promise. See Milner and Milner, op. cit., p. 206.
The dominant position of the middle class in Quebec society must also be understood in terms of its ability to dominate and direct political activities and structures. In Chapter I, a number of studies were cited which suggest that the middle class, throughout Quebec history, has expressed its class interests by supporting the Liberal party. As Hamilton and Pinard write, "One of the commonplace observations about the Quebec scene is that the Liberal party is the party of the dominant business and financial interests." This opinion is reinforced by the data of the preceding chapter. Non-workers who identify with the middle class and who believe that classes can exist in harmony are strong supporters of the Liberal party. The interest that the middle class would seem to have in upholding the status quo and in perpetuating a vision of a classless society at the political level also seems to be supported by the empirical analysis. It would seem that the middle class in Quebec has a vested interest in promoting the idea of class harmony, thereby decreasing the salience of class at the political level and bringing forth other cleavages as bases for collective identification.

The attempts by political and economic elites in Quebec to block or repress class demands at the level of political struggles have, to a large extent, been successful. Prior to the

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rise of the P.Q., major parties in Quebec were not distinguishable in terms of economic ideologies. Both the Liberal party and the Union Nationale purported to represent the general interest and, as Lemieux states, "Since 1936 neither one of the two parties has had a policy that has been at all constant in terms of right or left." The emphasis in both party platforms over the years on cultural preservation and on the ethnic cleavage has played a role in decreasing the salience of class. Ideological domination by the established elites rendered the appearance of radical alternatives unlikely and limited the political options for the working class. Middle-class domination at the ideological and political levels continues to be an important consideration in contemporary politics in terms of accounting for the absence of a socialist party and for the considerable support that the Liberal party continues to attract from Quebec workers.

The development of working-class consciousness in Quebec has meant a continuous struggle against the dominant influence of the middle class at the political and ideological levels. It is the result of a long-term process of persuasion and organization that gained in momentum after 1960 when the traditional elite's hold in Quebec was effectively challenged. As Quebec became more urbanized and industrialized, economic discontent was increasingly vocalized and began to acquire the status of a

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social cleavage. The process of class formation in Quebec cannot be fully understood without tracing the development of the working class back to the reforms of the 1960s. Rather than leading to universal well-being, social and economic changes during this period served to heighten economic discontent. Studies on the "Quiet Revolution" document that government intervention in the economy, the establishment of state enterprises, and reform of education, health and welfare institutions were directly beneficial to the middle class. However, the benefits to lower-class French Canadians were much less direct and, for the most part, workers with private enterprise experienced no improvement in their economic situation.  

In addition to creating unfulfilled expectations among Quebec workers, the reforms of this period did little to change the basic economic structure of Quebec society. As Milner and Milner write:

The basic pattern of economic control, investment and development, except for a few adjustments, basically left untouched. Foreign interests were dominant and indeed many of the reforms were designed to encourage even further foreign takeover by providing the owning class with a modern economic infrastructure.  

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10 See Vincent Lemieux, "The Political Party System in Quebec," in Dale Thomson, Quebec Society and Politics: Views from the Inside (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1973). Here the author shows that income disparities in 1968 were even greater than at the beginning of the 1960s. While liberal professions and provincial employees such as teachers improved their situation substantially, the employees of private enterprise experienced virtually no improvement at all. (pp. 111-112).

11 Milner and Milner, op. cit., p. 169.
The reticence on the part of the government to exert control over private corporations while employees in this sector gained little in the way of job security and material benefits are factors in effect at the level of economic relations which help explain working-class alienation and increased antagonism against the dominant class in Quebec during this period. In addition to these factors, Anglo-American domination of the Quebec economy and the presence of English "bosses" no doubt have made exploitation more visible to those whose surplus value is appropriated and have contributed to a developing working-class consciousness.

Economic factors such as foreign ownership, corporate concentration, and increasing technology play a fundamental role in the process of class formation. However, as Przeworski argues, class struggle does not emerge mechanically from places in the relations of production:

Class are not given uniquely by any objective positions because they constitute effects of struggles, and these struggles are not determined uniquely by the relations of production.12

More specifically, as forces struggle against the ruling ideas and express an opposing vision of society, workers become conscious of social relations. This seems to be apparent from the data in Chapter IV which indicate a strong correlation between union membership and P.Q. support as well as between union membership and separation. Similar voting patterns between class-conscious
workers and non-workers who are unionized suggest that union membership is an important factor for generating and reinforcing working-class identification.\textsuperscript{13}

The role that unions play in the process of class formation is central to a class analysis of Quebec politics. The theoretical argument in Chapter III, which states that the development of class consciousness depends upon communication between workers as well as upon the formal organization of workers, is supported by the empirical analysis. The results of this analysis seem to provide empirical support to Marx's belief that the trade union is essential to the class struggle, that it is the organization through which workers become a class "against Capital" and take the first steps towards the creation of a nationwide political organization.\textsuperscript{14} The results also seem to indicate that unionization is related to the process of "proletarianization" and to a perpetually changing class structure. The data which show that the behaviour of non-workers who are union members is similar to that of class-conscious workers seem to indicate, as Przeworski states, that "classes

\textsuperscript{13} This finding is consistent with Chi's decision to operationalize class on the basis of union membership. However, his argument that working-class identification among union members is a result of "financial inducement and conscious efforts of union maintenance on the part of union leaders" seems to ignore the role of communication and interaction of trade unions and also seems to eliminate the possibility for unions to have a radical, socialist orientation.

as historical actors are not uniquely given by any objective positions."\(^\text{15}\) However, to avoid the interpretation that teachers, writers, and other "intellectuals" belong to the working class simply because they are unionized, it is necessary to consider the relationship between struggles at the ideological level and changes at the economic level. Proletarianization seems to be related to the dynamic of capitalism, to the accumulation needs of capital which "means that there is a constant tendency for capital to decrease the area devoted to the performance of the global function of capital and to increase the area devoted to the function of the collective worker."\(^\text{16}\) The state, as well as private corporations, under capitalism has an interest in downgrading jobs, and in exerting more authority over its employees to the extent where state workers increasingly find themselves in a position of having little or no control over their conditions of work and the products of their work.

On the ideological level, unionization serves to translate feelings of antagonism towards the state into a consciousness of social relations. This appears to be a particularly accurate description of teachers in Quebec who are increasingly identifying with working-class, socialist goals. According to Milner and Milner, the Corporation des enseignants du Québec

\(^{15}\) Przeworski, op. cit., p. 9.

(CEQ) underwent a radical transformation after the teachers waged a hard and unsuccessful strike against the government in 1967. This is reflected in the 1971 position paper of the CEQ during the Common Front which stated:

The teacher is proletarianized. He receives a salary for which he sells his ability to produce at the ideological level...What must be seen in this process of degradation...is the implacable logic of a system that concentrates all the means of decision and performance in the hands of a few private owners of the means of production (or a small group of state officials in a state bureaucracy.)

In discussing the importance of the trade union at the level of ideological struggles, it is necessary to link the labour movement to socialist political objectives. As stated in Chapter III, the absence of a radical orientation and tendencies towards bureaucratic conservatism within trade unions can hinder the development of a working-class consciousness. The activism, unity, and militancy that the Quebec labour movement has displayed since the mid-1960s seems to be unprecedented in Canada and cannot be disconnected from the goals of socialism.

Without attempting an historical analysis of the trade union movement in Quebec, it is necessary to refer to several events since 1960 which can be directly linked to the organization of the working class and particularly to increasing working-class identification among provincial employees.

The early 1960s saw a tremendous growth in government

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17 Milner and Milner, op. cit., p. 209.
employees that was accompanied by rapid unionization under the encouragement of the Lesage government. As a result, "by 1970 the public sector contained 40 per cent of the unionized workers of Quebec."\textsuperscript{18} By the mid-1960s tensions between the government and its unionized employees had erupted into open conflict and Quebec was characterized by militant strikes, lockouts, and back-to-work legislation. The Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN), which had been particularly successful in the recruitment of public sector workers and which had the advantage of being a national trade union body, began to take a more decisive role in these labour disputes. In dealing with the government, the CSN leadership became more and more radical in terms of seeing the Quebec government as inevitably hostile to working-class interests and always deferential to private employers.

Increasing radicalization of the CSN was not only reflected in attacks on the government but also in severe critiques of capitalist society. Several events, outlined by Milner and Milner, exemplify the radical and socialist orientation of this trade union: 1) out of the CSN came the Caisses d’Economie, credit unions for people which would serve the interests of the members; 2) a public campaign in 1967-68 to protest the exploitation of Quebec’s natural resources by American-owned firms; 3) in 1968, the CSN congress condemned the role of the

\textsuperscript{18} Posgate and McRoberts, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 145.
CIA as an instrument of American imperialism in Latin América;
4) the 1968 CSN convention initiated the idea that trade
union objectives could not be achieved simply at the negotiating
table but required political and social involvement through
local elections, cooperatives, etc.; and 5) since 1966 a
growing evidence of support for independence among its members. 19

Along with the CSN and CEQ, another union, the Fédération
des travailleurs du Québec (FTQ) was growing in strength and
militancy. In 1970, the FTQ and the CEQ joined with the CSN
in laying the groundwork for a "Common Front" of public sector
employees. In 1972 a breakdown in negotiations over a union
demand for a generous settlement that could be applied on a uniform
basis throughout the public sector resulted in a general strike
that involved most public sector employees and lasted over a
period of two weeks. This strike involved more than just a
concerted attempt to improve the wages and working conditions
of 210,000 public employees and teachers. According to Pierre
Fournier, it involved the overall wage structure and distribution
of income in Quebec. 20 This opinion is reinforced by the
ideological documents of the CSN, FTQ, and CEQ circulated to the
membership during the period of confrontation. In particular,
the CSN document, "Ne comptons que sur nos propres moyens",


severely criticizes capitalism and imperialism in Quebec and advocates socialism and workers' control of the economy. 21

The Common Front episode appears to have had a significant impact upon the organization of Quebec workers and the development of a working-class consciousness. This is not to suggest that the grassroots membership of the unions involved was in full agreement with tactics adopted by their leaders or that the labour leaders were merely a mouthpiece for rank and file class consciousness. As well no attempt is made to suggest that the union movement was united and in full agreement with the radical critiques of the Quebec government. 22 However, the readiness of many workers to disobey the back-to-work legislation and the fact that the labour leaders had the confidence to publish and circulate their ideological documents without fear of censure from the membership imply that the events of this period involved more than the radical ideas of a few leaders and ideologues. The walkouts, strikes and occupations in opposition to the imprisonment of the three union presidents which extended into the private sector and which paralyzed Quebec for a week constitute a protest on a major scale. 23

21 See Quebec Labour (Montréal: Black Rose Books, 1972) which includes the actual CSN document and a preface by Marcel Pepin.

22 See Posgate and McRoberts, op. cit., p. 148. The authors state that in reaction to the ideology and strategy during the Common Front strike, a dissident element in the CSN broke to form the Centrale des syndicats démocratiques (CSD).

events seem to suggest is that there was a movement from the base reflecting dissatisfaction and alienation among Quebec workers who, according to Posgate and McRoberts,

were ready to accept the contention of their "radicalized" leaders that the Quebec government was, by nature, hostile to working-class interests and that, as a consequence, they were not bound to respect its authority.24

Increasing working-class consciousness in Quebec is related to numerous other forms of ideological struggle that do not necessarily appear as struggles between classes. As Przeworski claims,

The concrete actors who appear at the phenomenal level, "in struggle," in a particular historical situation need not correspond to places in broadly conceived relations of production, precisely because they are an effect of struggles about class formation.25

In Quebec the rise of new causes, numerous citizens' groups, and radical students' organizations have contributed to the intensification of class conflict and to the organization of the working class. A few examples are: 1) the Union Générale des Étudiants du Québec (GEQ) was founded in 1964 and quickly became a left-wing organization demanding free education, student participation in university administrations and a separate Quebec;26

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25 Przeworski, op. cit., p. 16.

2) The 10-day occupation of the CEGEP's in 1968 and the student support for Opération McGill, Opération Murray Hill, and Opération Alarmer 27; 3) the creation of the FRONT D'ACTION POLITIQUE (FRAP), a Montreal-based federation of committees with the aim of involving citizens in their own economic and political problems 28; 4) the massive demonstration in 1969 against Bill 63 which drew widespread working-class support; 29 and 5) the Montreal Citizens Movement which first entered municipal politics in 1974 in opposition to uncontrolled development and succeeded in putting a strong opposition into city council. 30 These organizations and activities did not specifically arise out of working-class alienation but have contributed to the articulation of ideas for social change among workers in Quebec and have resulted in a greater polarization of Quebec society along class lines. To repeat again from Przeworski, these activities must be viewed as effects of and in turn having an effect upon class formation. 31


28 See Milner and Milner, op. cit., p. 204.


31 Przeworski, op. cit., p. 17.
The articulation of working-class concerns at the ideological level has not extended to the creation of a working-class political organization. Rather, as the data indicate, working-class consciousness is expressed at the political level in terms of support for the P.Q. Throughout the 1960s, sporadic attempts by intellectuals and activists were made to organize a Francophone left-wing movement. While the RIN and the RN achieved some success in terms of mobilizing support (together collecting 10 per cent of the popular vote in 1966), none of these organizations gained enough momentum to become a major political force and all experienced internal divisions over economic and nationalist questions. It was not until 1968 when the RIN, the RN, and the Mouvement souveraineté-association joined to form the Parti Québécois that the "old-line" parties faced some competition.

The relationship between the P.Q. and the working class is a complex one as well as being a controversial subject among theoreticians on the left. Unlike Bourque and Laurin-Frenette who believe that working-class support for the P.Q. is another attempt at altering the balance between "bourgeois" parties,

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32 They included the New Democratic Party, the Parti Socialiste du Québec, le Parti républican du Québec, the Rassemblement pour l'Indépendence Nationale, le Ralliement nationale, the Front de Libération Populaire, and the Mouvement souveraineté-association.

it is argued here that workers perceived the P.Q., with its left-centre programme and its commitment to independence, to be a vehicle for economic and social change. As a social-democratic party, it proposed some fairly progressive measures such as a guaranteed annual income, better working conditions, improved health care, aid to cooperatives, and legislation to facilitate unionization of workers.34

The success with which the P.Q. attracted working-class support should also be seen within the context of one of the most intense periods of social agitation in Canadian and Quebec history. The hostility towards the anti-labour Bourassa regime, the decision by the trade union movement, particularly the FTQ, to oppose involvement in the formation of a labour political party,35 and the P.Q.'s promise for restructuring the social and economic system all combined to produce this pattern of support. It would seem that workers turn to the P.Q., not with any intention of radicalizing the organization, but because it is a party generally sympathetic to working-class concerns and a party most likely to respond to the immediate economic needs of workers.

The history of the P.Q. since its origins reveals the

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34 Parti Québécois, Programme officiel (Montréal: Editions du Parti Québécois, 1973), pp. 73-100.

35 See Arnold Bennet, op. cit., p. 125 where he states that at the 1973 FTQ convention, delegates rejected a resolution that the FTQ involve itself in the formation of a labour party.
dilemma facing social-democratic parties and draws attention to the ambiguous link between such a party and the working class. As outlined in Chapter III, the dilemma is basically one of attracting broad support in order to win at the polls and maintaining a working-class support base. The dilemma for the P.Q. itself is apparent at the level of organization and structure. It is clear that the organization and decision-making apparatus of the party is firmly in the hands of new middle class elements, as described in Chapter I, who seek to better their class position through independence and state control of the economy. The results of the empirical analysis in Chapter IV point to a strong relationship between P.Q. support and non-workers who don't feel close to the middle class and who believe class conflict exists. It would seem that a significant portion of this support comes specifically from groups involved in management, administration, organization, and planning of production who see themselves in competition with the entrepreneurs, financiers, and executives in private corporations. As Bourque and Laurin-Frénette suggest, the split and conflict outweigh their common interests. 36

Despite the middle-class nature of the P.Q.'s leadership, the formation of this party also brought together workers, trade union leaders, and left-wing activists - all looking for a radical alternative and a new political force. As the P.Q. watered down its economic policies and appealed more and more to middle-class voters, intra-party struggles began to occur.

36 Bourque and Laurin-Frénette, op. cit., p. 196.
As Milner and Milner state, a left-wing faction first emerged at the 1971 P.Q. convention when a group based on the unions' and citizens' committees openly challenged the technocrats who lead the party. 37 A more recent example of division within the party occurred shortly after the election on November 15, 1976 when the P.Q. leadership claimed it would not be bound necessarily by convention policies. In addition to intra-party struggles, the trade union movement as a whole has shown increasing disenchchantment with the P.Q. particularly since a 1971 incident when the P.Q. leadership refused to endorse the La Presse demonstration. Trade unionists were equally angered when the P.Q. waffled during the Common Front episode and hardly mentioned labour during the 1973 provincial election campaign. 38 Yet despite its moderate stance, the P.Q. managed to attract a significant portion of working-class support in the 1973 election. As stated so well by Milner and Milner:

The P.Q. seems to have succeeded in its purpose; it maintained middle class support by placing itself wholly on the side of law and order and established procedure, while it has held onto the allegiance of the working class by making it even more evident that it was the only party at all sympathetic to its needs or demands. 39

37 Milner and Milner, op. cit., p. 211.

38 Arnold Bennet, op. cit., p. 122.

The success with which the P.Q. mobilizes popular support has an effect on the organization of workers and on the salience of the class cleavage at the ideological level. The absence of differentiated party structures and clear-cut channels for the expression of class demands has a tendency to reduce the salience of class as a basis for collective identification. While class-conscious workers may continue to support the P.Q. because they see independence as a means of achieving working-class goals, struggle at the political level which is necessary for developing consciousness among disorganized workers, is absent. Economic discontent is not translated into a consciousness of social relations and the ideology of the dominant class which perpetuates the classless image of society is reinforced. Considerable support for the Liberal party among Quebec workers suggests that this is the case and that other bases of collective identification continue to play a role in the voting patterns of the Quebec electorate.

The final conclusion of this study relates to the support for separatism among class-conscious workers. In 1965 Charles Taylor wrote:

"...we can hazard the hypothesis that nationalism has little intrinsic appeal to classes lower in the social order, workers or peasants; it appeals only when it is linked with the solution of deeply felt economic ills, often by the presentation of the nationalist goal as a messianic solution to all social and economic ills. This identification succeeds with the masses in certain conditions, which are hard to determine exactly, and then nationalism becomes a mass force. This has not yet happened in Quebec, although there are signs that it might. If it does, then Quebec will accede to independence in a short space of time."
Taylor's predictions could not have been more accurate. The development of working-class consciousness in Quebec has clearly been accompanied by an interest in independence. As the results of the empirical analysis show, nationalism is not just a middle-class phenomenon. Workers who are union members and who believe class conflict exists are strong supporters of separatism. When such support is combined with middle-class elements who favour independence, the disengagement of Quebec from the federal system becomes a very real possibility.

Working-class support for independence via the P.Q. and the absence of a working-class political movement with its own distinct nationalist ideology, have led some authors to downplay the potential for a nationalism of the left. For example, Bourque and Laurin-Frenetette state that there is "no nationalist ideology or ideology with nationalist elements emanating from the dominated classes." More recent studies, however, have seen the value in analyzing the class and nationalist roots of working-class support for the P.Q. They show that there are nationalist elements emanating from the working class in Quebec and that this interest in independence grew out of the events of the 1960s.


Bourque and Laurin-Frenetette, op. cit., p. 203.

See, for example, Posgate and McRoberts, op. cit., pp. 148-160. For a discussion of socialist nationalism, see Dion, op. cit., pp. 141-162.
The development of working-class consciousness in Quebec has also been the development of left-nationalism. The ideological struggles of the working class during the 1960s and the early 1970s have persistently tended to be about socialism and independence. The most important locus of left-nationalism during the 1960s was in the trade union movement. As workers in Quebec became more organized and more aware of their common class interests, they began to see their exploitation was tied to American imperialism and Anglo-Canadian capitalism. At the same time, the expanding role of the Quebec government made Quebec workers realize that the State could be used as a lever for collective advancement if controlled by the Québécois themselves. The awareness of the interrelationship between socialism and independence began to characterize the trade union movement, and with the Common Front and the Manifestos, it became clear that a significant working-class anti-imperialist struggle for an independent Quebec was being born.

An understanding of the interrelationship between class and nationalism at the ideological level is essential for understanding patterns of support at the political level and is central to a class analysis of Quebec politics. While the P.Q.'s idea of independence may not correspond to that of class-conscious workers and trade union members, this party is the only serious social democratic force on the political spectrum which also presents the option of separatism. The
P.Q.'s success in mobilizing mass electoral support may eventually reduce the salience of class and have a disorganizing effect on the Quebec working class. However, if Quebec continues to polarize along class and nationalist lines, the future of the P.Q. may be threatened by a confrontation between those who see independence as an end in itself and those who view independence as a means to restructuring Quebec society.
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