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CULTURES IN CONFLICT
AND THE PROBLEMS OF OBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION
AS APPLIED TO FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

by

(C) William E. Dubinsky, B.A., M.A.

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A Thesis

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Degree of Master of Art in Political Science

Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario

Submitted to Professor David J. Bellamy

August, 1987

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"CULTURES' IN CONFLICT AND THE PROBLEMS
OF OBJECTIVE INTERPRETATION AS APPLIED TO
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN CANADA AND
THE UNITED STATES"

submitted by William Dubinsky, Hons. B.A.
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

Thesis Supervisor

Chairman, Department of Political Science

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Moreover, the conceptions of mass society seem to be derived from the experience of Western countries, which place emphasis on the process of economic and political modernization to transform societies into blueprints of Western democracies.

The evolutionary process also determines a different pattern of cultural traits. Such a pattern of development naturally conditions differing variations in the acquisition of adequate cultural cognizance and in the legitimacy of the greater political system. To understand the political system, the citizen must have some acquaintance with acceptable cultural conventions which permit interaction and dialogue with the institutions of government. These are particularly important with respect to the capability to establish and maintain close relationships with the bureaucracy, an important component of government with its specific patterns of input. In the final analysis, potential discomplementarities can exist, exacerbating the tendency to produce conflicts between the perceived expert and the layman.

A prime channel of input for the bureaucracy is through the presence of pressure groups. In both Canada and the United States, pressure groups have become an important tool of interest aggregation between the public and government. The concept of pluralism or the necessity of public input through organized groups has become an unofficial ideology in most Western democracies. Pluralism necessitates the organizational structure of groups as the fundamental avenue of influence with government, particularly in its day-to-day relationship with public bureaucracy.¹ Those interests which are not organized will not be heard. The rise of bureaucracy is also synonymous with the proper prerequisites needed to influence it. Pross, for example, has linked the pressure group and the bureaucracy together as interdependent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
<u>ABSTRACT</u>	1
Chapter One: <u>THEORETICAL OVERVIEW</u>	3
. Endnotes	53
Chapter Two: <u>CANADIAN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT:</u> <u>"Low on Participation, High on Reconciliation"</u>	57
. The Fishery in Atlantic Canada: Background	60
. Development in the Post-War Period (1945-1969): Bureaucratic Expertise and the Rise of the Offshore Sector	63
. The Inshore Sector: The Case of Patron-Clientelism	68
. Newfoundland: The Riding of Gander-Twillingate	78
. Prince Edward Island: The Riding of Egmont	81
. Nova Scotia: The Riding of Southwest Nova	84
. Economic Crisis, Extended Jurisdiction and the Move Towards Resource Management	90
. The Consultative Process: Structure	98
. The Problems of Fishermen's Organizations	110
. Case Study: The Nova Scotia Fishermen's Association (NSFA)	114
. Fishermen's Organizations: The Present Situation	133
. Inshore Groundfishermen and the 1986 Atlantic Groundfish Management Plan: The Case of Southwestern Nova Scotia	158
. Endnotes	168

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

	<u>Page</u>
Chapter Three: <u>AMERICAN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT:</u> <u>"High on Participation, Low on Reconciliation"</u>	181
. The American Political System: An Overview	185
. The New England Fishing Industry: Background	195
. The New England Fisherman: A Unique Anthropology	200
. The 1970s and the Background to Extended Jurisdiction	213
. American Fisheries Management: The FCMA	218
. The Problem of Fishermen's Organizations	241
. NEFMC Case Study: The Making of Groundfish Management Plans	269
. Conclusion	286
. Endnotes	288
Chapter Four: <u>GENERAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS</u>	301
 <u>BIBLIOGRAPHY:</u>	
. Books and Other Publications	
. Articles in Books/Journals/Magazines	
. Conference Papers	
. Theses	
. Documents and Correspondence	
. Newspapers and Magazines	
. Interviews	

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

	<u>Page</u>
<u>FIGURES:</u>	
1. Types of Ministerial Correspondence Received in March, 1986	88
2. Organizational Chart of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO)	100
3. Atlantic Groundfish Management Plan Flowchart	101
4. Organizational Chart of the Atlantic Groundfish Advisory Committee (AGAC)	103
5. United States Fisheries Management Framework	220
6. National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) - Current Organization Structure	221
7. Massachusetts Department of Fisheries, Wildlife, & Environmental Law Enforcement: DIVISION OF MARINE FISHERIES	237-38

APPENDICES:

Appendix A - Canada:

1. Scotia Fundy Groundfish Advisory Committee:
Terms of Reference
2. Lobster District 4-A Advisory Committee:
Terms of Reference
3. Eastern Fishermen's Federation:-
Newsletter
4. Eastern Fishermen's Federation:
Membership List

Appendix B - The United States:

1. Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council Advisory Panel
and Scientific and Statistical Committee:
Terms of Reference
2. New England Fishery Management Council Advisory Panel:
List of Member Organizations

ABSTRACT

The objective of this study is to present an analysis of the fisheries policy-making process in both Canada and the United States, specifically in Atlantic Canada and in New England.

The point to be made from this study concerns the cultural conflict between small-scale fishermen and members of the bureaucracy, particularly those in charge of public resource management and allocation. Because of the nature of the occupation of small-scale fishing, modernization, which assumes a technological component, has failed to develop among fishermen the cultural mindset of a land-based mass society.

Such a deficiency is a problem for fishermen, particularly in their dealings with bureaucrats who, with their own specific occupational environment and organizational mandate, are unable to relate to the clients for whom their decisions are made. In this context, problems arise concerning the reconciliation of differing and/or competing sources of knowledge - a case of multi-objective choice.

The magnitude of the conflict is also determined by the complementarity of the cultural mindset of the fisherman and that of the dominant political culture and ideology. Canada has enshrined the Toryist strain in its ideology, while the United States has favoured the ideology of *laissez faire*; while the latter lessens the conflict, the former exacerbates it. In the Canadian context, the discomplementarity has resulted in a system of patron-client relationships which try to transcend the differing occupational identities.

Chapter One will focus on the theoretical literature which attempts to link the cultural dichotomy to the different occupational environments and the way modernization has affected these environments. Chapters Two and Three will attempt to compare hypotheses in the contexts of the Canadian and American systems. The conclusion will attempt to return to the foregoing themes, considering them in the context of the two systems and demonstrating the continuing conflicts involved in the process of multi-objective choice.

CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

The aim of this chapter is to address the scope of the literature on the specific cultural characteristics of inshore fishermen, in order to gain a potential theory to explain their unique set of relationships towards government, including the full extent of government policy-making. The major explanation can be found in the respective occupations of the fisherman and the bureaucrat, indicative of conflicting norms and values which determine variations within the total national political culture.

In the case of fishermen, the distinctiveness of these factors will be used to hypothesize the existence of a dichotomy between their political attitudes and those of the larger land-based society. The distinction is reflected in the conflicting values and norms between administrators and fishermen. For fishermen, these different attitudes and knowledge have been a barrier in fostering the ability to gain access to the administrative system.

The cultural gulf runs not only through the continual conflict between the occupational clashes of the cultures of the bureaucrat and the fisherman; to a large extent, the conflict is also represented in the concepts concerning political culture and political participation. In the Western industrialized countries, the rise of a modern technological state has brought with it a new set of specific cultural norms and values which underpin the foundation and comprise the definition of mass society.

Moreover, the conceptions of mass society seem to be derived from the experience of Western countries, which place emphasis on the process of economic and political modernization to transform societies into blueprints of Western democracies.

The evolutionary process also determines a different pattern of cultural traits. Such a pattern of development naturally conditions differing variations in the acquisition of adequate cultural cognizance and in the legitimacy of the greater political system. To understand the political system, the citizen must have some acquaintance with acceptable cultural conventions which permit interaction and dialogue with the institutions of government. These are particularly important with respect to the capability to establish and maintain close relationships with the bureaucracy, an important component of government with its specific patterns of input. In the final analysis, potential discomplementarities can exist, exacerbating the tendency to produce conflicts between the perceived expert and the layman.

A prime channel of input for the bureaucracy is through the presence of pressure groups. In both Canada and the United States, pressure groups have become an important tool of interest aggregation between the public and government. The concept of pluralism or the necessity of public input through organized groups has become an unofficial ideology in most Western democracies. Pluralism necessitates the organizational structure of groups as the fundamental avenue of influence with government, particularly in its day-to-day relationship with public bureaucracy.¹ Those interests which are not organized will not be heard. The rise of bureaucracy is also synonymous with the proper prerequisites needed to influence it. Pross, for example, has linked the pressure group and the bureaucracy together as interdependent

in development and evolution, a function of the increasing complexity of society.²

Complexity, naturally, leads to differing complexions of the political environment and with it, a corresponding level of cultural sophistication which entails the increasing application of technology, creating an interdependence and a drawing-together of citizens. In theory, the corresponding conditions for the formation of groups are supposed to develop. At the same time, however, a case can certainly be made that complexity may not affect all parts of society in the same way. This is particularly true in the case of the inshore fishery, which has never been fully integrated into the pluralist ideology regarding the necessity for interest groups to articulate concerns and goals. Consequently, the inshore sector cannot articulate its concerns within the legitimate realm of bureaucratic conduct. The result is the initial conflict between the demands of the bureaucrat and the fisherman.

The central argument is that the inferior economic infrastructures of fishing communities do not allow the development of differentiated work environments. Such an argument is made by Edward Banfield in his study of Southern Italy; its main thesis is that the notion of corporate association is a luxury for Europe and North America. Lack of corporate association affects the potential for future economic development, which inhibits political progress.³ The important variable is the inability to maintain organization. As a result, inferior social patterns become enshrined as a part of the immediate social environment.

Societal systems are an important element in considering the reasons for the varying norms and values which characterize groups of individuals on a national or regional basis. Talcott Parsons argues that the cultural

system is instrumental in legitimating the normative order of society.⁴ The implication of this argument is the need to define the determinants or ingredients of various cultural patterns.

The determination of the normative order is a product of many factors, including some type of economic development. Technological change may create these changes, as well as the physical and natural resources. The implication is that differing levels of cultural development producing changes in the societal realm may correspond to the political system. For Parsons, the social system is the setting in which social roles exist and in which interaction occurs among the occupants (people) of these roles. The social system is only one part of the totality of human existence. Social systems do not exist in a vacuum; other components include interaction with the behavioural personality and the cultural system. Social systems are open systems which can receive and exchange resources and products with the environment. In sum, society is the result of the interdependence of each of these subsystems; the components of society are interdependent.

The implication of such an argument is that societies are not homogeneous and cannot be imposed without reference to the influence of other sub-systems, principally cultural and behavioural systems. Moreover, there is the question of specific constituencies whose cultural sub-systems vary, but are nevertheless tied to the larger social system.

Parsons defines the political system that is exclusively concerned with the function of goal-attainment. The political system is only one of the four sub-systems, the other three of which are pattern maintenance, the societal community, and the economy. The political system depends for its survival on reciprocal resource exchange.⁵ Some mechanism must be present,

not only to maintain, but to preserve the existing status quo between the institutions of government and the political system.

Formalization of societal relationships is important, since they posit the integration of society and the gradual extinction of parochial identities. Such factors as kinship, for example, are linked to a rudimentary form of societal community. Such community situations are extremely informal; very little structural differentiation is apparent. The appearance of formal structural organization of relationships, on the other hand, is responsible for a greater integrative impact, a symptom of societies advanced on the scale of modernity. In sum, the hypothesis to be derived is that structural organizational formalization is an important indicator of the extent of long-term societal integration which leads to an extinction or at least a modification in identification with immediate environments. Society can thus be defined as the inclusive system which is not tied in to any other system. The components of society are the various social organizations which are the totality of patterned relations among the members of a society, the subgroups formed in the course of these relations, and the relations among these groups and their component members.

These relationships are interdependent and exist within the realm of the entire societal system. At the same time, however, the structure of the system fosters a set of dominant values which helps hold together the totality of society. The societal system is also affected by other forces within its environment: (1) the physical-organic environment comprising the resources with which the society can satisfy its members; (2) the personalities of the members which are favourably disposed to the societal environment through a process of socialization; (3) the symbolic environment

of a system (cultural system) which helps to define the society's collective identity; and (4) conceptions of the desirable (values).

The social system provides the framework for the ordering of relationships among members. Four primary sub-systems exist within this framework which provide the foundation for action, as well as the maintenance of the greater social system: (1) adaptation, which is derived from the nature of the economy; (2) pattern-maintenance, which sanctions certain procedural norms; (3) polity or goal-attainment, which emphasizes relationships to government; and finally, (4) societal community, which aids in the continued unity and cohesion within the system.⁶

Both systems are also interdependent with regard to their internal components. The cultural system and the presumed interdependence between it and other components of the social system raise the question of the possibility of societal consistency. For Parsons, culture is the collection of symbolic systems. Culture acts as the major premise in developing normative behaviour patterns which underwrite the formation and formalization of social organizations.⁷ The motivation of social action takes place within the environment and is composed of action and non-action systems.

Four types of action systems exist which cannot exist independently of the other two - culture, behavioural organism, social system, and personality. Modern societies are distinguished from the more primitive or traditional realms by the level of differentiated existence from one another. However, these systems are simultaneously interrelated; one cannot exist without the influences of the others. Thus, culture must have or be affected by some motivating force in creating changes within society. Consistency becomes the accepted fact.

The process of social evolution envisions the increasing differentiation of the internal structures of society over time. Society itself is the autonomous system - the system which unites and links together the various sub-systems. If society is the general framework, there should exist a general set of systemic codes comprising the totality, which can vary, for example, the general ideological consensus that serves as the foundation of politics. While there are dominant ties which serve to bind together the total societal aggregate, differentiation may also result in uneven levels of cultural development. Within the greater societal system, a hypothesis can be advanced that certain variables affect the extent of differentiation within the broader societal system. Thus, some parts of the societal system, although linked to and part of the larger societal framework, vary in the extent of their exposure to certain parts of the cultural system due to varying extents of differentiation.

For Parsons, the problem of societal integration is extremely important and provides a way of analyzing variations. Cultural values may be funnelled through an increasing pattern of differentiation. The content of pattern-maintenance may thus vary, depending on the extent of the differentiation; differentiation acts as a transmission medium which can water down the content of the cultural values. As a result, distinct identities can be present within the greater societal framework.

The interdependence of the various subsystems means that the political organization is derived from a particular type of social structure. As a result, the character of the relationships which citizens have with government, and the resulting cultural values, aid in the legitimation of the various patterns of social relationships. Depending on the degree of differentiation, a hypothesis can be derived that some parts of society have

a more sophisticated approach towards the greater political system than others. The pattern of goal-attainment, while linked to the greater framework of society, has a set of different variations which may not correspond to the ideal of the cultural values which serve to legitimate certain types of political activity over others.

The focus of debate in political science emphasizes the thrust from some stage of underdevelopment, associated primarily with traditional society, to the emergence of a modern industrial state with an emphasis on technological innovation and adaptation. The central concepts in this debate focus on the characteristics of the terms "modernization", "political culture" and "political development", and the exact extent of their possible interrelationships and identifiable characteristics along a continuum from underdeveloped to developed society. The point to be made, however, is that certain factors, which are supposed to promote the patterns of change, may or may not create changes in the total attitudinal patterns of society.

If only the Western democracies are analyzed, the pluralist model incorporating the principle of group participation is not found to be part of the predominant patterns of values which have been imparted to the population. Such an orientation underlies a natural inferiority in the development of some parts of the pattern-maintenance system over others. In the case of inshore fishermen, the inferiority in the differentiation of sub-systems results in a lack of the necessary skills enabling them to possess the cultural norms required to comprehend the necessity of group formation.

The question which must be addressed concerns the extent and manner in which societal differentiation develops. The implication is that changes in any one of the societal sub-systems will result in a particular pattern of

cultural values. Change can be hypothesized to bring about variations or changes in a part of the societal system. Parsons is not so much concerned with any specific process of integration as with the manner of utilizing these changes as a tool for drawing society together. Obviously, however, the presence of development is not possible without the presence of specific preconditions which facilitate this evolution.

Given the foregoing discussion of societal integration, political science has tried to answer this question through the general realm of modernization and development. The basic framework of developmental theory has stressed a general course of societal development. The main thrust of the theory has been to assume some type of positive amelioration in the composition of society. Several approaches have evolved to explain societal development: (1) evolutionary theories which presuppose some specific path of development over time; (2) increasing societal systemness or the growing interdependence and complexity of institutional structures; (3) economic and political development which posits changes in the economic and political realm, as well as the increasing capacity to deal with challenges to the validity of such changes; and (4) modernization, the way the political system evolves from a backward to a modern society.⁸

The concept of modernization is probably the most important, since it defines the existence and characteristics of political culture and development. Modernization is a particular variation on the general paradigm of development theory. The usual discussion of this literature is carried on from a structural-functionalist perspective, underlining the capacity and tasks of the institutions of the state in maintaining and legitimating the political system. This legitimation occurs in a period of development in society which translates itself into the political realm.

Apter has broadly defined modernization as a "process of increasing complexity in human affairs within which the polity must act."⁹ The issue of complexity is assumed to lead to some form of formal mediation, usually through the development or strengthening of existing political institutions capable of coping with the variety of demands placed on them. More specifically, the parameters of modernization take in several specific characteristics: the development of differentiation, the lessening of any ascriptive allocation of resources (e.g., through kinship or territorial groups), the appearance of specialized and diversified types of social organizations, and finally, the generally increasing capacities of allocation and regulation in all spheres. The basic thrust is the emulation of a system based on Western democracies, including the formation of political parties, and the development of the diverse regulative and allocative functions of bureaucracy.¹⁰

Modernization is assumed to produce some changes in the way the patterns of goal-maintenance are transmitted to the population - the more differentiated the societal sub-systems, the greater the possibility for distortion of the original cultural patterns of maintenance. Although the societal system supplies the glue which binds together its internal parts, the cultural messages can vary. Consequently, the system's patterns of maintenance are not homogeneous, but may experience cleavages by virtue of cultural heterogeneity. Considerable variation in cultural norms is the eventual result.

In sum, uneven patterns of differentiation produce uneven patterns of development. In the case of inshore fishermen, the dichotomies in societal differentiation can best be explained by the nature of the work environment,

which has produced inferior levels of societal differentiation and, in turn, a different mode of cultural differentiation.

The general consensus on modernization assumes a development process fostered by changes within the economic infrastructure which would produce variations in the degree of societal integration. A paradoxical relationship exists between differentiation and societal integration. Societal integration is an important instrument of modernization, because it assumes a shift from local community concerns to a cosmopolitan or national identity.

Robert Merton distinguishes between localist and cosmopolitan orientations.¹¹ Localist orientations attach greater significance to problems within the immediate community. Cosmopolitan orientations display a greater attachment to matters which are beyond the immediate community boundaries. The identification of the dichotomy signifies a differing degree of societal integration. Localism represents the segmented orientation of society with a low level of national integration, while cosmopolitanism implies a much higher degree of national integration. The implication is that differentiation establishes a more cosmopolitan or modernized culture. High differentiation may be hypothesized to produce a more modernized or sophisticated method of dealing with government - for example, the formation of pressure groups and related activities to achieve long-range goals. Localism, on the other hand, would posit an internal homogeneity - a sector unable to evolve or develop the necessary heterogeneous style of differentiation. As a result, the lack of differentiation can be hypothesized to facilitate a different cultural variation, since the various sub-systems are not well developed.

The issue which must be addressed concerns the conditions which allow some sectors to become more cosmopolitan or integrated into the larger society, while others remain extremely localist in their perceptual attitudes. The issue also seems to imply the identification of cosmopolitanism with modern mass society, as well as with the implied administrative functions and other various forms of mass political activity.

A potential hypothesis to explain the phenomenon lies in the nature of the occupation, and the extent of the applicability of certain types of technological innovation in altering the basic prerequisites of the knowledge necessary to perform the needed work. The differentiation of organizational capability is a symptom of societies entering a period of industrialization. Division of labour requires the establishment of formal organization to better coordinate the enterprises which are evolving.

The paradox behind societal integration is the diversification of society as it follows an assumed linear process of development. The premise is usually couched in terms of a continuing evolution from the phase of traditional societal relationships towards modernity. Traditional society is usually associated with a primarily rural or primitive type of society, a lack of urbanization, and the absence of modern industrial infrastructure. On the other hand, modernization is characterized by some movement away from these traditional indicators. Society becomes highly urbanized; there is a shift to industrialization from the more simplistic forms of staple production, which may result in an interdependence of production tasks in manufacturing. In sum, the shift from localism to cosmopolitanism is assumed to bring with it the phases of societal integration.

Another important perspective on modernization emphasizes communication. Daniel Lerner argues that this is the result of the

development of literacy, as well as higher rates of urbanization and electoral and media participation. The net effect of these changes supposedly results in changes in the conception of the identity of the individual. Traditional society is extremely narrow with respect to the strata of participation in toto. Those societies which are in transition are assumed to be acquiring a capacity to have opinions and to participate in issues which affect them as a whole. The final result is a pattern of greater awareness of the societal environment, and of the issues which find their way onto the political agenda.¹²

Difficulty has also existed in defining distinctions between traditional and modern states. In addition, the notion is also advanced concerning the potential disparities which might develop in the evolution of structural institutions, which might not complement the specific localized tendencies. As a result, participation is very narrow. In the words of Huntington:

More than anything else, the modern state is distinguished from the traditional state by the broadened extent to which people participate in politics and are affected by politics in large-scale political units. In traditional societies political participation may be widespread at the village level, but at any level above the village it is limited to a very small group. Large-scale traditional societies may also achieve relatively high levels of rationalized authority and of structural differentiation, but again political participation will be limited to the relatively small aristocratic and bureaucratic elites. The most fundamental aspect of political modernization, consequently, is the participation in politics beyond the village or town level by social groups throughout the society and the development of new political institutions,¹³ such as political parties, to organize that participation.

In sum, traditional societies are characterized by an orientation which favours the local or immediate vicinity. Furthermore, the dichotomy exists of discomplementarity between the structural organization and a particular

sector of society. Some sectors of society can thus be alienated from the developmental process.

The existence of modern political systems posits the ability to be able to cope with a multitude of political demands. Such capacity is usually accomplished with the development of institutional structures which attempt to act as the necessary mediators of demands:

The ability of modern political systems to absorb changing demands is closely related to the development of several basic institutional frameworks. First in importance are the various executive and legislative bodies. Political parties through which the political demands of different interest groups and social movements are articulated are second, and, third, there are the centralized bureaucratic administrations. Though the tempo of development differs from place to place, all three are to some extent corollaries of any process of modernization. Their role in the institutionalization of the capability to absorb changing political demands and organization is crucial.¹⁴

The emphasis on organizational sophistication is a common aspect of changes in the total political system, which are related to changes in the greater societal environment. At this point, the question now concerns the immediate factors which produce the necessary degree of social mobilization and changes in political culture to promote societal integration.

Modernization, if it can be called a theory at all, has been subjected to extensive critique; the focus has been on a set of mistaken assumptions. One of the most important of these is the concept of the continuum, which assumes a linear process triggered by specific variables such as the advent of some form of economic development.¹⁵ A more important flaw in the framework is the treatment of this process as one which affects the polity as a whole. Some parts of society react to economic development in different ways. In sum, change may do little to alter the fundamental social structure and, with it, the underlying cultural attitudes.

Despite its initial shortcomings, the concept of modernization does give a point of reference for analysing developmental changes which occur within society. In addition, the concept has features which posit the link between social and political organizations. Social mobilization is the process by which "major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behaviour".¹⁶ The other component, economic development, which creates changes in the capabilities of the population, is highly nebulous, but nevertheless gives a framework by which to compare changes in society.

In addition to the general concept of modernization, the concept of political development also has an important role to play in the classical conceptions of societal change. Several perspectives have been offered on the exact nature and terminology of the concept. Pye, for example, tries to recognize the concept through its dimensions of equality, capacity and differentiation.¹⁷ Other writers take the concept to imply a growing capability and institutionalization of structures of the political system in order to cope with recurring demands. Organski, for example, sees political development as increasing government efficiency in the ability to allocate resources in the most efficient way possible.¹⁸ Huntington sees political development as institutionalization, the strengthening and evolution of structures which make up the political system.¹⁹

Huntington further argues that the conflict of elites is also important in defining the patterns and stability of change. Conflict rages between the new elites, whose authority derives from their educational and professional aspects, and the old elite structure based on tradition and ascription.²⁰

The notion of changes in the elite structure indicates potential changes in the way the public relates en masse to the greater political system. The coexistence of the two types of elite indicates the fundamental dichotomy of the continuing conflict between different sources of legitimation. In the case of the inshore fishery, the existence of a traditional elite is part of the age-old reliance on political mediation, as opposed to direct bureaucratic interaction, which is reflected in a model of patron-client relationships.

Political culture has long been one of the most important concepts proposing to explain the attitudes of the citizen towards the political system. Political culture posits a specific relationship to the various psychological and anthropological characteristics within society. The term was first coined by Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba in the early 1960s. In their book The Civic Culture (1963), a comparative cross-national study was undertaken to establish the perceived prerequisites of a political culture consistent with the values of democratic political systems. The study also argued the existence of particular types of political culture, as follows: (1) parochial, in which the individual is generally unaware of the political system and does little to influence it; (2) subject, in which the individual is aware of the outcomes of government, but does not participate; and (3) participant, in which the individual is active in attempting to influence the political system.²¹

If the Parsonian paradigm is to be believed, political culture is derived from the total cultural system. As a result, changes should affect the total societal system. A basic perspective sees the system as largely identical with certain phases in the modernization process. If each of the phases of political culture are synonymous with specific phases of

modernization, the logical inference should be that parochial culture should be a symptom of traditional societies, and that civic culture is supposed to be synonymous with the development of some type of mass society. Recently, however, these assumptions have been questioned. Verba (1978) has recently asserted, for example, that even parochial political cultures involve some knowledge of the political process, and may include attempts to influence government regarding allocational decisions. As a result, the definitions of various types of political culture may require revision.

The more government takes a role in such matters as welfare, the economy, housing, the educational system, the more likely the average citizen is to find himself or herself in a position where day-to-day welfare depends on government. From this perspective, the distinction among the parochial, the subject and the participant requires some revision. The parochial has a narrow view of the world; he is unconcerned with broad political issues. But that does not imply that he has no connection with government. Though his concern is narrow, he may be aware of the government's impact on these narrow concerns. He may expect the government to be of assistance in connection with such concerns, and he may be active in trying to obtain that assistance.²² In the latter sense, a parochial can also be a participant.

In sum, a parochial political culture can also have an important relationship with the greater political system, although the nature of the concerns of each system varies.

The bulk of the literature on political culture stresses the homogeneity of the general themes possessed by all citizens. As Chodak points out, however, specific cultural variations are present, depending on the complexity of the political system.²³ Many writers have neglected the significance of political culture existing independently of political systems. Moreover, the tendency has been to treat political culture as essentially a homogeneous concept applying to the entire political system. Aside from the basic conceptions of political development is the question of

variations in the political culture of highly differentiated societies. The implication is that the political culture can vary, depending on the extent of societal differentiation.

This is an especially important question, given the lack of good analyses of situations in the industrialized world. Differentiation produces new cleavages that may isolate specific occupational sectors which are part of a largely undifferentiated societal system. As a result, change has profoundly uneven effects; logically, the changes produce different modes of behaviour in the political culture. In many cases, a potential co-existence is possible between tradition and modernity.²⁴ At the same time, the fact that changes are occurring in the greater bulk of society may affect some sectors within the total societal matrix in different ways. Variations may exist among the total societal sub-systems which react differently to external stimuli.

The notion of structural change is usually perceived to be indicative of certain levels of cultural cognizance. The various values derived from the cultural system become an important issue in developing uneven levels of modernization which fail to produce differences in cultural make-up. Similarly, although there are dominant political cultures, variations can exist in the exact features of the sub-systems, particularly in the economic realm. However, legitimacy is not always built on the basis of straight economic individualism. As Parsons points out, obligations which are part of the social structure produce a separate base of legitimacy which enforces certain status-quo relationships.

Legitimacy within a particular social structure may be explained by an examination of the concept of the occupation and of how some occupations react differently to change. The ability to participate in these types of

workgroups requires a new kind of professional training and a new set of values. Apter, for example, views the concept of careers as a special type of professionalized workgroup emerging as a consequence of hierarchical or organizational differentiation which is the by-product of societal changes.²⁵ The knowledge required for these tasks encompasses a different source of knowledge and specialized skills. As a result, these occupations carry with them specific norms and values which play a role in conditioning specific cultural attitudes which may affect government.

Some sectors of the population may contain cultural attributes which serve to isolate or 'insulate' them from the dominant cultural values to which the polity subscribes.²⁶ At the heart of the debate is a proper definition of the concept of selective identity or community. Lenski and Lenski define two types of communities - geographic community is based on a notion of common spatial features, as opposed to those of cultural communities, which derive from the notion of certain common customs or traditions.²⁷ The existence of occupation has also been argued to create the conditions for a collective or community identity, specifically the extent of interaction among members both on and off the job.²⁸

The induction of individuals into an organized environment brings with it certain occupational norms and values which are socialized in the individual by virtue of his being trained for a specific position within the organization. Organizational theory has long posited the unique cultural characteristics which attend the institutionalized work environment.²⁹ Van Maanen (1978), as well as Van Maanen and Barley (1977), have linked organizational membership to the socialization of various norms and values imparted to personnel by virtue of socialization.³⁰ Specific common

attributes of the work can be said to form respective identities which attend the work environment.

Some occupations have a greater set of codes and values which are imparted to the participants as being more important than others. In the Chicago School of Sociology, many see value in the pursuit of occupation as an important component in the structuring of particular work worlds, as well as the larger social environments, which provide "incumbents with a social identity and a code of conduct, both within and outside the workplace."³¹

The significance of organization within the immediate occupational community has long been highlighted. Robert Presthus speaks of the "organizational society" which has been the product of the process of the development of industrialization, giving rise to a more structural interdependence of tasks.³² Small, pre-bureaucratic enterprises evolve into large bureaucratic operations. The make-up of society becomes more structured and complex. Evolving organization produces the pattern of socialization and inoculation of "certain approved values."³³

Technology is the instrument which creates the increasing trend towards organizational differentiation.³⁴ In this regard, the Industrial Revolution was the most profound, because it led to resulting changes in the workplace.³⁵ New innovations in product manufacturing techniques or in related industries have ultimately resulted in a greater need to be exposed to a more sophisticated set of norms and values, by virtue of the knowledge of being able to participate in the occupation, regardless of career or degree of specialization. As a result, the degree of organizational differentiation produces differing social identities, which evolve as the by-product of the knowledge and training which are part of the occupation.

Since these social identities accord certain degrees of organizational differentiation, these occupations have the potential to develop certain cultural capacities concerning collective activity through socialization of common norms and values, depending on the characteristics of the structural dynamics of the organization. At the same time, new forms of technology serve to widen and further insulate some occupations from others, since a particular occupation may require such exclusive knowledge that it inhibits meaningful communication with others. From this perspective, modernization emphasizes related developmental frameworks, which may evolve over time as new forms of technology are implemented. As a result, a specific occupation may display an inferior level of development, and the codes and values which are imparted to its participants may create an insulation from the greater societal environment. To be more specific, the lack of technological development inhibits some specific constituencies from being socialized to the dominant values to which the greater society subscribes.

A process of some type of technological innovation (e.g., industrialization) has always been synonymous with modernization. The basic thrust of the argument is that mechanization brings with it a new set of cultural norms and values outside the previous patterns of social relationships. It is possible, however, that societies may not experience the fixed set of changes in the economic infrastructure that are necessary to create changes in the cultural attitudes. A fixed process of industrialization, for example, is not the only formula to provide the necessary climate for modernization. The crucial variable of any process, however, is organizational interdependence, which aids the integration of some sectors into the larger societal system. This fact is particularly important in the case of the inshore fishery, where capitalization has

facilitated technological developments in harvesting capacity, but created very little change in the occupation itself. As will be noted in Chapters Two and Three, the practice of fishing has not changed, regardless of innovations in harvesting capacity. Furthermore, the economic infrastructure of Atlantic Canada is characterized by small-scale enterprises which are perceived to be modern and to have the most sophisticated equipment. Such enterprises, while not large-scale, still possess a hierarchy of interdependence, because of the management and direction accorded by some position of authority.

Leaving the modernization/industrialization debate aside, the crucial point to remember is that modernization in whatever form produces a degree of interdependence which binds together the elements of a land-based environment as a result of some form of technological evolution. Such conditions have never been approximated in the uncertainty of the marine ecosystem which has formed the work environment of fishermen. In sum, some work environments will encourage a more organizational approach, although technological development may alter or enhance certain occupational efficiencies or capacities.

The unevenness of the process of modernization becomes an important factor in facilitating the necessary degree of change in political mobilization, in order to result in a change in the specific cultural attitudes attending changes to the social structure. Even in cases where modernization has been arrested, very little traditional or perceived pre-modern political structure has resulted.³⁶ At the same time, however, the unevenness of modernization produces a set of cultural attitudes indicative of professionalized long-term evaluation, resulting in the emergence of some

sectors with different sets of norms and values that influence the manner with which they approach issues.

If organizational differentiation is an aspect of modernization, the conclusion can be drawn that the complexity of the organization brings about greater societal integration. Similarly, those occupations which have relatively simplistic organizational structure may not be fully integrated into the greater urban industrial society. In the final analysis, the complexity of these organizations can determine the magnitude of their social norms and values. Similarly, the fact that technology affects certain occupations differently means that there is the potential for inferior variations in the development of specific social attitudes which derive from the specific social identities of the occupation.

For the development of an occupational community to occur, the norms and values attending the occupation must contain a degree of intensity that produces a unique social structure different from the remainder of the societal system. If the principle of organizational differentiation is introduced, a potential tool of measurement may also be introduced. Formal organizational differentiation within the occupation itself becomes an important tool in ascertaining the specific socio-cultural variables on which the appropriate political system can be constructed. Land-based occupations provide stability in allowing such innovations to develop. Such conditions are irrelevant in the uncertainty of the occupation of fishing. While organizational differentiation occurs in the stability of land-based economic infrastructures, the uncertainty of marine environments denies the specific conditions for such stability. As a result, the cultural phenomenon of collective identities is not present. In sum, fishermen do not obtain such experiences as to enable them to relate to collective

projects of cooperation, whether in the economic, social or political realm. The intensity producing the social identity derives from the marine environment; as a result, the cultural norms and values can be hypothesized as radically different from the interdependence of spatial occupations.

The existence of structural organizational differentiation may also be an accurate gauge of the capacity for the emergence of certain types of political culture. In large part, the extent of the complexity of the immediate societal environment may indicate the extent of high levels of political cognizance and efficacy derived from the political culture. Political systems vary according to institutional differentiation and the capacity to absorb new issues and propose new responses in a process of modernization.³⁷ Neither are political systems completely homogeneous; they may be divided into a number of segments which may include essential components that produce a necessary foundation for legitimation. These divisions are essential prerequisites for the establishment of a state society.³⁸ The level of sophistication in governmental structure is categorized by the presence of an administrative structure, as opposed to a governmental structure. The classification 'state' applies to the presence of such structure, depending on what forms the basis of its segments, whether kinship or some other specific form of lineage. A more sophisticated form of societal differentiation emphasizes such divisions as "political parties, interest groups, political leaders with specific followers and the like."³⁹ In this sense, the political system is but a component of the pattern of social relationships.

If segmentation is an innate part of the political system, the variations in the types of segmentations are a point for consideration. If the social system is but a part of the political system, the logical

inference is that the characteristics associated with the segmented nature of the political system affect the level of societal integration associated with the phases of modernization. Given either the lack or the presence of organizational complexity in some portions of the occupational infrastructure, the capacity for organizational differentiation becomes an important factor in promoting the necessary cleavages which permit greater societal integration across occupational sectors. While some sectors may be subject to organizational development, others may not. A dualism could develop between those occupational sectors which can be integrated through organizational interdependence and those which are resistant to further organizational development.

In sum, differing levels of organizational differentiation can also be transferred into the greater political environment. If the norms and values of an occupational community differ from the dominant values of the greater polity, a potential discomplementarity is created between the dominant national political culture and ideology, and the occupational political culture and ideology.

Fishermen have never been organizationally interdependent. As will be noted later, this lack of differentiation becomes inapplicable in a unique marine environment which functions as a source of differing norms and values. Societal integration for this particular sector is impaired. However, the extent of impairment is a function of the differing national political cultures and identities existing in Canada and the United States. In Canada, the emphasis on regional cleavages is inconsistent with the

cultural attributes of the specific occupational community of fishermen.⁴⁰ As will be noted later, in terms of political activity, Canada developed a system of mediation - viz., patron-clientelism - which has tried to straddle the differing identities. On the other hand, the American system, with its emphasis on the ideology of individualism and participatory democracy, is more consistent with the attributes of this occupational community.⁴¹

The unique occupational environment can be linked to a different conception and to differing perspectives on community and society. Central to this conception is the distinction between *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society), first introduced by Ferdinand Tönnies.⁴² *Gemeinschaft* is based on an organic form of unity; the pattern of social relationships which have developed are based on patterns of kinship and friendship. In contrast, *Gesellschaft* is based on a pattern of artificial creations, the result of the spread of trade, literacy, urbanization and the development of the institutions of the state, as well as industrialization. The creation of bourgeois society is the end-product of such factors.

The concept of community has a unique place in positing societal integration or the transformation from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*. The organic unity which lies behind the pattern of social relationships is a much different basis of legitimacy than the artificiality of *Gesellschaft*. At the same time, however, variables are supposed to produce the conditions for change. If industrialization is taken to be the major variable indicative of some type of cultural change producing organizational interdependence, then inshore fishermen do not fit this pattern of societal development.

From the concepts of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, social entities can thus be derived. Social relationships result from the physical

relationships which are willed or evolve by conscious action within acceptable boundaries of society; an acknowledgement is present which stresses certain rights and obligations. Collective relationships stress certain units of analysis which have been already preconceived, but lack the ability to gain formal representation through the establishment of some individual spokesman or representative body. Social organizations or corporations are those entities which possess this ability of articulation. The most important of these is the state, with its own pattern of social relationships requiring a justification for its existence.

Tönnies also distinguishes between social norms and social values. Social norms are of three sub-categories: order, law and morality. All three accord a measure of legitimacy and certainty to the pattern of social relationships within social organizations and collectives. The justificational legitimacy of these relationships in *Gemeinschaft* situations derives from some organic bond (e.g., religion,), while *Gesellschaft* contexts sanction legitimacy through the notion of the will of the people or of those who have common interests.⁴³

Social values are divided into three groups: economic values, political values, and intellectual or spiritual values. All social values are rooted in social relationships, collectives or social organizations. The development of trade and commerce creates new values which evolve because of the change from community to society. Community and society become the poles for the differing conceptions of societal integration. Community acknowledges a different conceptual awareness than does society; the bases of legitimacy and justification of community are different from those of society. Furthermore, the awareness of the outside world is much more limited in community; patterns of authority reside in instruments close to

the grassroots, either fanatical or religious rites which are very direct and specific. Societal situations, however, place the onus on institutional differentiation. Although many of the norms and values of community and society are identical, the justification of authority in society resides in the existence of institutional interdependence. Authority derives not from personalization or from an organic source, as in community, but from the institutions transmitting the cultural norms and values. Inevitably, those norms and values which can work and relate to the societal environment are, of course, the most successful.

Interdependence becomes the crucial tool in shaping or determining the types of norms and values which are permitted to develop. In addition, such contexts will affect the evolution of the content of political culture which develops. If industrialization is the mark of a process of development, either through some model of modernization or of evolution, an examination must be made of the nature of work and the extent of the organizational differentiation which may be derived from the actual performance of tasks.

The occupational environment of inshore fishermen can be hypothesized as an environment without organizational interdependence. The occupational environment is organically oriented more towards the conception of *Gemeinschaft* than of *Gesellschaft*. Most of the anthropological literature on fishermen and fishing communities supports the view that they are removed from the mass industrial society. In their studies of fishermen in the United Kingdom, Jeremy Tunstall and Graeme Salaman draw attention to the arduous lifestyle of the occupation, which involves long hours away from the land-based environment.⁴⁴ The marine environment is one of environmental uncertainty; the removal from the land-based society produces an instability which forces adaptation. John Poggie has postulated the existence of

certain characteristics which create conditions for independence derived from the identity of the occupation itself:

Many small-scale fishermen around the world are faced with similar conditions. They are physically removed from the support and help of the land-based society. They carry out their work alone or in small groups... Decisions in the face of considerable uncertainty must be made on an individual basis, and these decisions have immediate effects on the success of fishing, on the well-being of gear, vessel, crew and self. Decisive and rapid decisions are required because of the rapidly changing nature of the ocean and the elusive prey....

In short, the environment contributes to a paradoxical conception of the fishermen as a related, but at the same time detached, part of society.

P.A. Thompson, in his study of fishermen in the United Kingdom, also echoes the same themes:

Fishing as an occupation does not automatically push men towards a single, simple way of life. On the contrary, it pulls in very contradictory directions...generally isolated and cohesive, dominated by a single industry, well aware of their special economic interests and the ways in which they are exploited...the fishermen certainly experience a powerful communal solidarity.

These contradictions provide the basis for a different set of norms and values which are transmitted through socialization. The absence of formal organizational interdependence, combined with the uncertainty of the maritime environment, produces a different style of political culture, divorced from the formalistic styles of political activity and dialogue within the bureaucracy - the epitome of organizational interdependence.

Another source of support for the cultural distinctiveness of fishermen is argued by Richard Pollnac. In his discussion of the factors which affect fisheries projects development, unique socio-cultural variables are

postulated which help explain an inability to adapt to preconceived notions of organization.

Work groups with which individuals are personally identified provide a degree of psychological security and satisfaction, and innovations perceived as threatening the structure of these groups often meet resistance...an understanding of the special characteristics of fishing communities can greatly enhance the compatibility of project design with the constraints of fishing.

In a more recent work, Pollnac argues that fishermen are insulated from the greater land-based society:

Numerous characteristics of the occupation of fishing serve to insulate fishing peoples, both geographically and socially, from the larger society within which they are found. For example, short-term variations in the availability of fish influence the hours and days that fishermen work. Currents, winds, and relative visibility of gear frequently result in nighttime or very early morning fishing activity. These work patterns differ from the more regular hours kept by people in most other occupations; hence, they serve as a factor socially insulating fishermen from non-fishing people. This insulation is enhanced by their segmentation from land-based society while at sea. Additionally, migratory fishermen are viewed as outsiders, as they follow their prey through established communities on the coast. Fishermen also tend to live along the narrow margins of the sea and, in many parts of the world...this results in residential isolation from the larger society.

The occupation of fishing is thus deemed to be a distinct occupational community:

Hence, fishing communities are a special type of occupational community. The occupation of marine fishing manifests many characteristics which, taken together, frequently result in the formation of 'community' among both the participants and their families.... Fishing communities are in many respects distinct from other types of community. This distinctness is the result of interrelationships between characteristics of the occupation, its technology, and the marine environment, and in many instances, results in a relative insulation of fishing communities from the larger societies in which they are found.

In summary, fishing communities have specific characteristics which isolate them from the remainder of society, which has the potential to be more affected by its exposure to technological innovation. In some instances, industrialization is the tool of innovation, but it is not the only one. Their work environment has not permitted the development of the necessary corporate identities; as a result, the prevailing patterns of social relationships do not encourage the spontaneous organizational knowledge necessary for group formation. The occupation, depending on its degree of organizational differentiation, can thus play an important role in determining the particular cultural attitudes which underpin the occupational identity. Given the implication that the social structure is an important determinant of political society, a hypothesis can be derived which underscores the relationship between variations in the political culture resulting from the lack of organizational interdependence.

The emergence of a modern bureaucracy can be linked to the consequences of the Industrial Revolution. For example, in the literature on the subject, Max Weber is the most prominent in his exposition of the virtues of a legal rational bureaucracy, a way of optimizing specific tasks without reference to personal subjective criteria. For Weber, the emergence of modern culture is synonymous with the need for the emergence of experts, free from personal bias, who are capable of objective evaluation and 'rational' decision-making.

Bureaucratization offers above all the optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of specializing administrative functions according to purely objective considerations. Individual performances are allocated to functionaries who have specialized training and who by constant practice learn more and more. The objective discharge of business primarily means a discharge of business

according to calculable rules and 'without regard for persons.'⁵⁰

He goes on to state that the existence of bureaucracy is an expression of the highest virtues of modern culture:

The more complicated and specialized modern culture becomes, the more its external supporting apparatus demands the personally detached and strictly 'objective' 'expert', in lieu of the master of older social structures, who was moved by personal sympathy and favor, by grace and gratitude. Bureaucracy offers the attitudes demanded by the external apparatus of modern culture in the most favorable combination. As a rule, only bureaucracy has established the foundation for the administration of a rational law....⁵¹

In the final analysis, bureaucracy is consistent with the emergence of a modern industrial society.

The existence of bureaucracy implies a general complementarity with a basic style of authority. Weber discusses the existence of three types of authority which predominate and maintain legitimacy in any political system: (1) charismatic authority, in which the personal characteristics of an individual underpin the entire political system; (2) traditional authority, in which the basis of legitimacy derives from some type of mythological justification from time immemorial; and (3) legal-rational authority, in which decisions are taken through some process of strict organizational procedure. Charismatic authority can be distinguished from the other two types in that the premises of legitimation are not amenable to any type of institutional identification. Legal-rational authority is synonymous with the identification of a type of organizational differentiation or a system of "legal formalism."⁵²

The concept of rationality has long been debated in most of the literature on decision-making.⁵³ Rationality, however, is discussed within the fundamental context of organizational development. The emergence of

such a concept can, therefore, be identified with the presence of a structured approach towards policy-making. The potential hypothesis which can be adopted is Weber's conception that rationality and bureaucracy are synonymous by virtue of the existence of organizational differentiation.

The flaw in Weber's conception is that he envisions objectivity as synonymous with the emergence of legal-rational authority, which in turn is synonymous with the rise of a bureaucracy. Legal rational bureaucracy is based on the scientific method; the norms and values which derive from this type of organization are accorded to be synonymous with the most up-to-date technology, sanctioned at a particular time and place. In effect, bureaucracy is the epitome of modernization because it naturally must adopt the most up-to-date technological innovations and the norms and values concomitant with them. Knowledge and perceptions of subsequent issues may vary, depending on the norms and values which are part of the occupation. Bureaucracy, because of its unique features and its specific procedures for dealing with and analyzing specific problems, may thus differ from other occupations with different procedures and bases of knowledge, namely the fishermen.

In sum, technological innovation is an essential ingredient in the rise of the bureaucratic organization. Neither is the relationship a static one; as technology develops, the result will be eventual adaptation to the administrative system, requiring a greater complexity in terms of the education and training needed to fulfill positions in the system. The more complex the organization becomes, the more training is required; there is a corresponding increase in the intensity which goes into the development of subsequent social identities. The corresponding set of norms and values will result in a highly sophisticated occupational sub-culture.

Furthermore, the resulting organizational differentiation allows the bureaucratic organization to be in the forefront of perceived modernity. The mandate and the internal operation of the bureaucratic model create a set of rules and conventions which its clients must follow to successfully exert their influence with government in achieving their demands. If members of a particular constituency are unable to deal with these conventions synonymous with modernity, they are subsequently considered as ignorant or lacking in the adequate faculties of rationality which, of course, has a direct bearing on the scientific method which is at the heart of the bureaucratic model. As a result, their advice and demands can, in many instances, be ignored.

The various types of authority posit the existence of certain types of legitimation which determine potential political cultures. To the extent that the various types of political culture are indicative of the various types of the legitimation of authority, the absence of organization within a certain type of occupation produces different cultural variations in the legitimacy of establishing certain links with political systems. To be more specific, certain occupational sectors, by virtue of their degree of organizational differentiation, have an occupational identity which does not sanction the use of direct organizational activity with members of the bureaucracy because of the absence of complementary norms and values.

The notion that occupations are prone to organizational differentiation assumes that institutional structure is synonymous with most work environments. The question arises as to how occupational cultures differ in professions which do not display organizational structures. Such a phenomenon exists within the inshore fishery. A relatively simplistic form of production, the inshore fishery has not experienced the organizational

interdependence which has taken hold in the more land-based occupations. As a result, the economic sub-system is quite distinct from the normal sub-systems characterizing industrial society. The resulting hypothesis is that the social identities derived from this occupation would be different from those of the remainder of society. By no means does this signify that the occupation has not experienced the benefit of technological development. Instead, the point to be made is that the types of developmental change have not produced the organizational differentiation which otherwise would have been triggered by social mobilization. At question is the compatibility of applying some types of innovation which are deemed to be inconsistent with the needs of the population at large.⁵⁴ Acheson and Reidman, in their study of New England commercial fin-fishermen, reach this conclusion: the propensity to adopt innovation must be consistent with the social and economic characteristics of inshore fishermen.⁵⁵

Modernization is assumed to produce some changes in the way the patterns of goal-maintenance are transmitted to the population - the more differentiated the societal sub-systems, the greater the possibility for distortion of the original cultural patterns of maintenance. Although the societal system supplies the glue which binds together its internal parts, the cultural patterns may vary, depending on the extent of different levels of differentiation. This is particularly true in cases where there are pockets or inferior levels of differentiation - for example, the inshore fisherman, whose immediate environment represents a different pattern of cultural transmission and acculturation. Such an orientation is determined by the nature of the occupation with its concomitant degree of differentiation.

Under certain circumstances, the definition of what is rational in terms of self-interest varies, depending on the cognitive perception of the target group. Depending on the target group involved, the degree to which technology is adopted will vary; the issue revolves around which certain types of technology can or do have an impact on producing the added social mobilization necessary to change the pattern of social identities.

Acheson and Reidman's study is significant, because it points out the usefulness of certain types of innovation. Most of the changes do little to affect the social environment of the occupation itself (e.g., changes in gear, sonar, etc.). The relationship is defined under a number of variables, including age, education, size of firm, fishing success, wife's employment; and variables measuring access to information and expectations of future opportunities.

The unifying thread which is important is the lack of any prospect for the accompanying organizational differentiation which these changes would be able to produce. All these changes do not relate to any type of functional interdependence which might alter or produce a differing type of occupational identity. Changes are adopted when they are viewed as being rational by subjective calculation of the fisherman's own self-interest. In the final analysis, the calculation is formulated utilizing his own set of evaluative criteria.

The unequal organization means that certain occupational sectors have different focuses of communication with government. As government has moved into the actual regulation of the fishery, potential discomplementarity in cultural attitudes must be mediated through the use of old links which become modified to fight the shift of power to the bureaucracy.

The model of the patron-client relationship offers a necessary alternative in the examination of the relationships of inferior levels of society. Derived from anthropology, the model posits the need for a pattern of relationships between those who desire an exchange of mutual subordinate favours - a mutual exchange between patrons, those who are capable of providing favours, and clients, those who are dependent on the patrons and who are prepared to offer them something which is valuable within the local society.

The most fertile ground for the application of such models has been in the underdeveloped world, where there is a notable absence of pluralistic political activity. The basic points of agreement between anthropology and political science see an inequality arranged in the midst of some type of environmental uncertainty and resource scarcity.⁵⁶ Contractions are formalized. An element of developmental change is built into the system, which links this model to concepts of political modernization.

The concept of transactions and how they serve as the necessary incentives to maintain relationships is particularly important. Weingrod (1968) maintains that this debate concerning patronage is the most important. Politicians use the term to refer to special favours allocated through their electoral machines in exchange for support. The implication of such an approach is that there is a built-in assumption of a fixed type of American-style participation, something which becomes institutionalized.

The anthropological variant is more relevant, emphasizing the informality of contacts which develop out of the daily routine of survival (e.g., landlord and peasant). These favours arise out of the consequence of having to organize a society to provide for certainty in daily existence.

In some instances, particularly in rural societies, the types of contacts are extremely personalized, emphasizing direct contacts. Wolf (1977) emphasizes the influence of friendship, as well as kinship, as an important identity of exchange.⁵⁷ This character of exchange evolves with changes in society and facilitates the development of a hierarchy which attempts to mediate and accommodate demands in a vertical manner. These types of relationships stress the personal level of contact. Thus, a pyramidal hierarchy is established, with a grand patron at the top who is capable of allocating resources to specific clientele.

The definition of patronage is also problematic, depending upon the type of dyad which is predominant. A simple peasant-landowner relationship, for example, is much different from a system of industrialized clientage which lies outside the realm of direct personalized authority.

In the political realm, some important questions are the appropriate structural role for the political party as a supplementary tool of resource allocation, and how the concept of patronage relates to distribution. Parties usually emerge as a necessary aid in marshalling resources to reward potential electoral supporters. The point to be made is that the political party is an important, but not always identical, tool in the aggregation of interests. In some states, depending on specific cultural variables, the principle of exchange of resources in the form of government contracts becomes extremely important; in other states, the informality of local activity is extremely important.

A patron must be distinguished from a broker. A broker acts as a mediator between himself and those who are able to dispense favours. This places an additional level of mediation in the hierarchy. If the process of

development is not set and static, such a status quo would be confirmed, depending on the extent of the development of bureaucratic organization.

Another variation on the patron-client model is the parental relationship, where the political party acts as the mediator between the demands of the potential pressure group and the public. This style of government interaction is particularly prevalent in Italy. The political party is usually hegemonic, controlling all legitimate political power. Its job is to aggregate all demands and, in some cases, to structure formal representation.

A coexistence thus occurs between modern and pre-modern communities, and their ability to deal with public bureaucracies. Some occupations are more tuned in to the necessary organizational prerequisites than others. As a result, the hypothesis can be advanced that different occupational sectors may have different capabilities in relating to government. The links between bureaucracy and respective pressure groups have long been highlighted as integral parts of the Canadian and American political systems. Simultaneously, a model of patron-client relationships makes no such assumptions; theoretically, politicians or their brokers have command of all resources necessary in the accommodation and conciliation of demands.

These alternative models are extremely important in trying to hypothesize the dichotomy which exists in fisheries policy-making, as well as the attempts of fishermen to exert an influence on day-to-day decisions made by the administrative bureaucracy. At the same time, however, the structure and ideology of the greater political system also has an effect on the existence of patron-client ties. The principle of being able to directly participate in the policy process is the product of the way the greater political system views mass participation, as well as the

complementarity of these values with those of the population. In Canada, a synthesis has thus developed in the fishery whereby the old patron-client ties act as the essential mediator and conciliator of demands with the requirements of administrative regulation. The ideology of Toryism, inherent within the Canadian political culture, restrains and circumscribes the principle of mass participation. In this way, this ideology complements and legitimates the framework of patron-client relationships. However, the links are different and reflect the differences in the extent of patron-client relationships and in how well these relationships can be approximated in the greater political culture, as well as the related institutional structures of the political system. Given the unique anthropology of inshore fishermen, the hypothesis of differing systemic structures may favour the American political system, with its emphasis on local participation at the grassroots level, as well as the ideology of liberal individualism, which favours self-reliance over collective involvement. The Canadian system does not enshrine a literal adherence to the concept of individualism; as a result, if traditional patron-client relationships are the hypothesized norm, bridging this parochialism, the implication is a discomplementarity between the local culture and the greater political culture. The existence of patron-client relationships bridges the cultural gap, promoting a measure of societal integration.

In the case of the United States, the cultural conflict is translated differently. The ideology of mass participation, synonymous with the concept of organized group activity (pluralism), is more complementary with the anthropology of fishermen. As a result, the formation of pressure groups is more consistent with the cultural attributes of fishermen. Therefore, patron-client relationships are not necessary.

In Canada, as power has shifted to the bureaucracy, a resulting hypothesis would underline the shift in the status of patrons to that of brokers. Politicians now play a brokerage role in helping to mediate and resolve problems which come up in the process of regulation. The conflict in cultural orientations also has a profound effect on the entire extent of policy-making; if there are different criteria which influence attitudes towards the political system, the basic reference points for the perception of knowledge, as well as the facts which are relevant and perceived to be legitimate, will also vary. Public policy emphasizes the behaviour of officials in decision-making situations. The centre of the debate still concerns the differences in the various models.

There are three main types of decision-making theory: rational-comprehensive, incremental and mixed scanning. Rational-comprehensive theories stress the framework used to arrive at a decision consistent with the optimum use of resources. Incrementalism focuses on the selection of goals consistent with immediate objectives; in deciding which problems are placed on the policy agenda, short-term objectives dominate over long-term planning. Mixed scanning allows a blend of both the rational and the incremental approaches.⁵⁸

The concept of rationality is the most important because it posits a certain logic and objectivity in the capability of devising decisions free from personal bias. As noted earlier, Weber placed great faith in the development of bureaucracy. Nevertheless, a precise definition of the term has eluded comparative analysis. The most popular proponent of the concept, Yezhekiel Dror, has likened rationality to the achievement of some type of economic optimum of resources.⁵⁹ Other writers, such as Howard Nigel, have dismissed the ability to achieve any concrete ideal of rationality because

of the impossibility of policy-makers ever attaining perfect objectivity. Nigel prefers instead to distinguish between objective and subjective rationality. Decision-makers attempt to apply specific procedures and concepts which are perceived to be divorced from personal bias; however, every decision must involve some reference point in ascertaining rational decision-making. Moreover, in reaching decisions, the possibility of achieving all the options and information required of objective decision-making can never be fully realized.⁶⁰

Instead of a model of rationality, Nigel argues that game theory, based on the concept of conflicting decisions by a variety of players in the policy-making process, is more relevant; the actions of one player are indirectly tied to the actions of another. The maximization of utility is not the actual aim of decision-makers.⁶¹

Rationality presupposes the existence of some style of formal organizational interdependence. Regardless of the type of model of policy-making, the important point to be made is that the assumptions which underwrite the decision-making process differ from those of other occupational environments. Given the hypothesis concerning occupational socialization, the bureaucratic culture can be thought to vary considerably from other occupational environments.

The social identity which develops can be hypothesized to have a direct influence on the perception of the importance or non-importance of some types of policy issues. Such personal biases place the concept of subjective versus objective rationality in a broader perspective. The question of the definition of an objective decision ties in with the concept of rationality. Herbert Simon, for instance, describes objective decisions as those which can be divorced from personal bias. He defines factual

propositions as "statements about the world and the way it operates...which may be tested to see whether they are true or false."⁶² Definitions of objective decisions break down precisely at this juncture. Sometimes truth cannot be verified or ascertained. This inability to agree on what is true inhibits consensus from being worked out.

Fisheries conservation and management is a unique policy sector because of the heavy reliance on verification of scientific information regarding fish stocks. In both Canada and the United States, the concept of scientific data indicates a favoured legitimacy towards data gained with the assumption of legitimacy regarding the use of scientific data as an important component in management plan development. Such data are consistent with the perceived bureaucratic notion of objectivity. At the same time, however, a hypothesis can be advanced that fishermen will have different conceptions of the meanings of objectivity and rationality. At issue is the potential for personal interpretation concerning the perception of what is rational; differing social identities can produce divergent viewpoints in the way certain policy questions are seen. The question of rationality becomes a matter of subjective over objective considerations. Such a situation derives from the norms and values which are part of the occupational environment. As a result, a clash in cultural orientations also becomes a debate over the legitimacy and relevance of certain types of knowledge over others.

For the bureaucrat, the organization defines the mandate, as well as the needed prerequisites which enter into the performance of such tasks. In any organization, planning is important to achieve long-term collective goals or "modelled tasks."⁶³ Inevitably, however, objective tasks which are part of the organization's mandate will be interpreted from a subjective

perspective. The organization will be subject to "redefined" tasks which personnel will execute using their own personal biases. Personal discretion, or the way a person interprets his/her mandate, becomes important, since specific cultural codes are applied through discretion in the execution of tasks. In a sense, this discretion is political in that the bureaucrat/administrator is making a decision on the relevance of specific demands and concerns in the making of policy. This is not to say that bureaucrats are politicians in their every-day routine; rather, the assumption is that their environment, combined with their discretion, gives them an ability to define the details and concerns of importance. If the appropriate constituency - in this case, inshore fishermen - is unable to approximate the bureaucratic identity, organizational structure and convention of input (e.g., pressure groups), the likelihood of having real input is limited.

The contradictory positions of bureaucracy in erecting the proper balance between administrative rationality and political discretion are reflected in the ongoing process of multi-value decision-making. Governments are constantly trying to balance long-term rational interests and short-term political interests. Developed by Eric Johnsen,⁶⁴ and most recently expounded by V. Subramaniam, the concept posits a clash between the assumptions of rational decision-making and individual personal biases in the allocation of resources. Subramaniam sees the problem as a combination of personal subjective interpretation, combined with the desire of organizations to sub-divide activities and responsibilities to allow them to be carried out more effectively. The result is greater subjective interpretation in the midst of narrow mandates competing to be given priority:

Every member of the organization has his own personal objectives which are different probably from the general personal objectives of other members, and substantially different from the common objectives of the firm. Secondly, all organizations divide their activities and responsibilities into several specialized sections and divisions. Thus, sectionalism leads to strong sectional advocacies with different objectives together with an undercurrent of different personal objectives of different members of the organization.⁶⁵

Subramaniam argues that multi-objective choice can be dealt with as a combination of two components: (1) the rational administrative model, and (2) the organic political method. The rational section of the dichotomy assumes that values and assumptions can be attached to certain objectives which can, in turn, be formulated into a hierarchy of alternatives for final decision. From a theoretical standpoint, the process is assumed to result in the most efficient use of resources possible, free from personal bias.⁶⁶

Some material does exist in the literature on the application of multi-objective decision-making in marine policy. Peter Gardiner, in a study of coastal zone ocean policy, has argued that the various goals or objectives of policy-making can be measured by the ranking of certain values and by the effects of particular policy options in satisfying the ranking of these values. An aggregative value can thus be derived and matched with the appropriate policy.⁶⁷

If specific values are constantly being balanced in the making of decisions, differing cultural attitudes create a conflict when considering the importance of some values over others. The potential exists for differences of opinion on the importance of some issues over others, based on the values which are given the highest priority in the determination of which policy questions are deemed important. In making these decisions, a cultural discomplementarity can result in conflicting definitions of the

importance of some issues over others, as well as conflicting definitions of the perceived solutions. In the case of fisheries conservation and management, for example, scientific data on the quantity of fish stocks is the product of a statistical estimate formula; it is impossible to count the actual number of fish - one cannot count every single fish in the ocean. As a result, the definition of problem areas and the solutions which are proposed for them becomes an exercise of subjective interpretation because of the inability to verify stock quantities.

The assumption is that some values are considered more important than others. Logically, this mere statement accords a different type of legitimacy to some values over others. Concerning fisheries policy, an argument can certainly be made that some values are more important than others. The bureaucratic context is usually viewed as having the necessary capabilities to establish a hierarchy of values, because of its perceived ability to emulate the scientific method. The problem becomes even more difficult to reconcile, given the inherent conflict between the economic concerns of users and regulators, and the attempt to blend competing philosophies and goals. The occupational backgrounds of fishermen and bureaucrats necessitate different interpretations of some concerns over others. Such factors as occupational training and education instill a differing set of socio-cultural attitudes which interpret policy questions differently; in the case of fishermen, their particular set of socio-cultural attitudes results in their failure to understand or comprehend the motivation or rationale for certain measures taken by the bureaucracy.

The implication of multi-value decision-making is that politicians will try to make decisions with short-term views of electoral maximization, while bureaucrats, who possess the expertise, will view problems or policy options

in the long term. To a large extent, the basic premises are correct; however, the assumption that such a clear dichotomy exists is erroneous. The bureaucracy, in its own definition of long-term interests, has set the parameters of the administrative rational paradigm. The basic problem arises in trying to reconcile the conflict between politics and administration, or between short-term political interest and long-term administrative interest. The differences in cultural attitudes tend to reinforce the subjective interpretations of those values which have the highest priority; fishermen's cultural inferiority results in an inability to directly deal with the bureaucratic decision-makers. In the Canadian context, the cultural discomplementarity tends to favour the politician. In most cases, the types of contracts of fishermen with government were made through their local patron-client contacts, which made the politician the important dispenser of favours and resources. Moreover, the conflict is also reinforced by fishermen's cultural inferiority in being able to deal directly with the bureaucratic decision-makers, due to their reliance on the old patron-client forms of mediation.

The cultural distinctiveness of fishermen, by virtue of the existence of their unequal anthropology, places them outside the needed bureaucratic norms and values. Group organization, a prerequisite of Canadian and American bureaucratic interface, is irrelevant. Politicians, the hypothesized traditional targets of fishermen, are also affected in that their power lies not in expertise, but in local electoral popularity, which stresses local customs and traditions forming the necessary ingredients which comprise the organic political method. Unable to provide the resources which their clients require on a day-to-day basis, the political

representatives are being reduced to the brokerage role, mediating or trying to amend the perceived excesses of bureaucracy.

The logical inference from this dichotomy is that the bureaucrat and the fisherman will define issues and priorities in different terms. This conclusion is offered by the eminent British public administrator, Sir Jeffrey Vickers, in his conception of appreciative systems as involving judgements concerning the nature of reality. In determining reality, value judgements are ultimately being expressed which emphasize the importance of some forms of information over others. These judgements are derived from the psychological make-up of the individual concerning his/her perception of the environment and its most important parts.⁶⁸

Vickers goes on to link the appreciative system to the structural outgrowth of organizations. Organizations, either through their mandates or through the occupational codes required of their personnel, can have an effect in ascertaining the important parts of any policy question. Multi-value decision-making becomes enshrined, in such a context, because bureaucratic discretion is applied when values are attached to the relevance of certain types of information over others.

The multi-value matrix corresponds to the classical cultural dichotomy stemming from the lack of occupational differentiation. The source of the fisherman's norms and values brings with it a different source of expertise, which means that he would perceive the relevance of certain issues as being more important than others. The administrator/policy-maker may view things much differently and may choose to emphasize other aspects which he perceives to be important. In sum, objective decision-making, the cornerstone of rationality, is reduced to subjective decision-making.

In the case of management and formulation, the challenge becomes one of reconciling and merging competing claims. As will be noted in Chapters Two and Three, although the basic dichotomy between politics represented by the old patron-client ties of the fishery and the administration does exist, the Canadian and American systems have handled the cultural gulf differently. Canada has chosen to enshrine the input of fishermen through an advisory process, which concentrates authority in the hands of the Minister of Fisheries, in an attempt to reconcile the multi-value dichotomy. The strength of the process emphasizes outputs over participation. The American system, on the other hand, has no reconciling mechanism; the ideology of localism enshrines the ethic of participation housed in the various regional management councils. Without the reconciling mechanisms, the conflict inhibits consensus in being able to work out and develop management plans.

Political reliance on patron-clientelism varies in both countries. The hypothesis, however, would emphasize the Canadian context as opposed to the American context on questions of management and conservation. Patron-clientelism exists, but its existence can be defined by ethnicity, which favours the local level of participation.

In summary, the major hypothesis which has been offered is that the lack of organizational differentiation has placed inshore fishermen and administrators in a perpetual conflict, producing different interpretations of reality and the relevance of certain concerns over others. These derive from the nature of the occupation. Given the nature of different political systems, the dichotomy is only partially reconciled, producing incomplete attempts to involve fishermen in the expeditious development and implementation of management plans within the formalized bureaucratic paradigm of management.

The remainder of this study will attempt to compare the American and Canadian situations. The first section will examine general cleavages in the political systems of both countries. A general background of the fishing industry in both countries will then be undertaken, to be followed by an examination of the various groups representing the industry. In both countries, there is a dearth of powerful fishermen's groups. A hypothesis will also be offered that the more successful groups are those which can help fishermen in resolving local problems brought on by regulatory intervention. Finally, the actual policy-making processes of both countries will be outlined, to illustrate the dichotomy which personifies multi-value decision-making and the role of political representatives in bridging the cultural gap.

Chapter One: Endnotes

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For our purposes, "rationality" will be considered synonymous with "the development of bureaucratic process as a way of formulating specific solutions according to some type of perceivable objective criteria and calculable results." In this definition, the differentiated organization is the necessary given.
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CHAPTER TWO

CANADIAN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT:

"Low on Participation, High on Reconciliation"

This chapter will attempt to examine the foregoing hypotheses in the context of the fishing industry in Atlantic Canada. The basic thrust of the first section will be to offer a basic overview of the industry, particularly the basic composition of the inshore sector, as well as the basic thrust of the traditional interface with government which, it will be argued, is an example of the potency of patron-client relationships.

To illustrate the unique anthropology of fishing communities, an analysis will be undertaken of the basic composition and lifestyle predominating in many small-scale fishing communities in Atlantic Canada. The basic thrust of this section is to illustrate the existence of certain norms and values, associated with the occupation of fishing, which are outside those of the basic, long-term, interdependent occupations comprising the bureaucratic milieu of operation and decision-making.

The second section of this chapter will outline the Canadian management plan process, as well as the various organizations which attempt to represent fishermen. The argument will be made that, with respect to the concept of organization, pressure groups are the most preferred mode of representation by bureaucrats when they attempt to deal with the public. While the structural organization is the bureaucratically-preferred method of public representation, such a mechanism is inappropriate for fishermen. To further illustrate this dichotomy, the case of one failed organization,

the Nova Scotia Fishermen's Association, will be considered, as well as an analysis of those organizations which try to represent small-scale fishermen in a dialogue with government, particularly the administrative sector.

An analysis will be made of the basic background and composition of the industry in Atlantic Canada. Specifically, the analysis will centre on the differing norms and values of inshore fishermen, and on the way these individuals relate to government - namely, through the process of patron-clientelism. Such prerequisites are outside the basic norms and conventions of bureaucracy. The basic discomplementarity places the two occupational sectors at different poles, particularly with respect to the way the differing occupational communities see and perceive the necessity for and the solutions to different types of policy questions and issues.

The argument which will be advanced is that these organizations are not popular in the eyes of most fishermen. For them, the central assumption of the pluralists, with its emphasis on the organization as the basic unit of popular representation, is not of cultural relevance. The role of the existing organizations, however, is not to act as a representative of the concerns of fishermen when dealing with government; but it is, rather, to act as a broker, mediating the potential grass-roots issues vis-à-vis the bureaucrat.

The failure of the structural facets of representation to arise among fishermen has meant that they have been inhibited from taking part in the structure and procedures of Canadian fishery conservation and management. Of particular significance are the specific channels of inputs for fishermen in the advisory process. From the perspective of multi-value choice, the process is heavily biased in favour of the formalized administrative norms and values. At the same time, however, a parallel process of government

interaction exists which reflects the potency of fishermen's norms and values, in the form of direct political pressure on local politicians - an acknowledgement of the legacy of the old patron-client network.

The crucial point of multi-value decision-making is the role played by the Minister of Fisheries, who must reconcile the conflict between the forms of input and advice (the bureaucrat's advice being perceived to be the expression of rational decision-making), and the short-term political interests of appeasing specific appeals by fishermen for amendments to the provisions of management plans. These types of appeals reflect the extent of the awareness of inshore fishermen vis-à-vis government. This awareness, however, occurs through a modified version of patron-clientelism, rather than through long-term group activity, to convince the bureaucrats of the justness of their cause. Fishermen are influenced by issue-specific matters with short lifespans. Only when an issue touches local fishermen directly is there a tendency to band together to achieve a common goal or purpose.

In the final section of this chapter, a case study will be undertaken of the process of making amendments to the 1986 Groundfish Management Plan in Southwestern Nova Scotia, specifically the reallocation of 10,000 tons of groundfish from the offshore sector catch quota to the inshore sector. Such a study illustrates the synthesis that has evolved in Canadian fisheries policy, in which the old patron-client networks, the extra-formal process and the traditional modes of political accommodation have been blended into the more formalized bureaucratic modes of representation. In such a context, multi-value decision-making is thus expedited and carried out with a high emphasis on outputs.

The Fishery in Atlantic Canada: Background

The fishery in Atlantic Canada is an important part of the economic lifeblood of the region. In total, the industry comprises nearly half of all fish landings. A variety of species are involved, including groundfish/finfish (e.g., cod, haddock, mackerel, pollack), as well as lobster, crab, clams, scallops, etc. In terms of volume and employment, the industry clearly holds the greatest importance in Newfoundland, followed by Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick.¹ On the other hand, as the result of the presence of lucrative lobster and scallop fisheries, the net earning power of the industry favours Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, followed by New Brunswick and Newfoundland.

It must be remembered, however, that the historical dependence on cod was instrumental in the early development of what was later to become Atlantic Canada. As early as the eighteenth century, the Grand Banks off Newfoundland became a lucrative source of salted fish for many European powers. Nova Scotia also possessed the combination of close proximity to the resource and a fortuitous climate, spurring the development of the lobster, scallop and herring fisheries, as well as the standard groundfishery.

Most of the groundfish was salted immediately, either for subsistence supplies locally, for export to Europe or, later on, for export to the United States. Salting remained the primary practice for preservation of the catch until the twentieth century, when the invention of cold storage techniques revolutionized the fishing industry, leading first to the capability of mass processing/filleting, and to the canning of fish products (see Chapter Three, pg. 201).

The rise of the modern processing companies can be directly attributed to these innovations. Corresponding changes were also under way in the

harvesting sector, which introduced the first forms of mechanization into actual procurement of the catch. Again, the degree of technology varies, depending on the size and type of fish species in question.

Bureaucratic rationality presupposes that its form of decision-making is attainable, that its decisions are capable of attaining certain goals in the most efficient manner possible. In many policy areas, the question naturally becomes one of the appropriate definition of the public interest. Ronald Manzer has argued the existence of specific policy paradigms, embodying particular government attitudes or approaches to certain policy sectors. The appropriation paradigm common in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was identified with the exploitation and maximization of resources, in order to realize the greatest benefit for those sponsoring the venture. More recently, the stance of government has begun to shift, emphasizing the principles of conservation and regulation as viable concerns.²

Changes in the paradigms necessitate a reorientation in the proper conception of the public interest. In the case of fisheries policy, the public interest is identified with wise conservation of the resource; scientific conceptions as to wise management legitimated the design and construction of new equipment necessary to exploit the resource.

Such intervention suited the basic thrust of bureaucratic expertise and the related conceptions of rational decision-making. After 1974, the basic priority changed to that of wise conservation and management, in light of the failure of the International Commission on Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) to properly conserve the resource. The fact that fish stocks collapsed meant that the bureaucratic conceptions which had guided fisheries policy for the past thirty years were questionable. It became necessary to

develop and agree upon new scientific conceptions of acceptable conservation and resource measures. In the working-out of these new conceptions, the basic policy paradigms changed and evolved, placing bureaucratic conceptions on a proper course of fisheries policy.

It is important to distinguish here between inshore and offshore sectors. As will be noted later, there has been little firm distinction in terms of boat operations. Some define the sectors by length of boat, others by the number of days spent at sea or the distance offshore at which a boat remains when at sea. Recent licensing practices have been or have centred on the classification of vessels into categories depending on either vessel length, tonnage or capable distance from shore. In the Maritime Provinces (Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick), the approach has stressed a range or distance capability based on tonnage. An inshore fisherman is defined as any fisherman or person working on vessels under 25 gross tons, while the term nearshore fishermen refers to vessels greater than 25.5 tons. In Newfoundland, four classifications are now recognized: inshore, referring to fishermen on vessels under thirty-five feet length overall (LOA); midshore, referring to fishermen on vessels ranging from thirty-five feet to sixty-five feet LOA; nearshore, referring to vessels from sixty-five feet to one hundred feet LOA; and finally, offshore, referring to vessels of one hundred feet LOA and over. Some classifications are synonymous with resource allocation practices in some fisheries, as well as the extent of the joint/plant vessel ownership.³ For the purposes of this chapter, unless otherwise indicated, an overall boat length of one hundred feet will be used as the dividing line between the inshore sector and the offshore. While the inshore sector will be the primary focus of our inquiry, it should be kept in mind that these are only rough guidelines.

The most important dividing variable is the degree of organizational differentiation distinguishing the two sectors.

Development in the Post-War Period (1945-1969): Bureaucratic Expertise and the Rise of the Offshore Sector

Developments in the Atlantic Canada fishery in the period after the Second World War must be understood in the context of a conscious government policy to provide economic development and opportunity. The Depression of the 1930s had driven many fishermen out of the industry. Subsidies and programs had started as early as 1935, when the federal government had introduced subsidies encouraging boat construction for individual fishermen operators, in order to permit them to become reengaged in the industry.⁴ The basic point to be made is that, with alternative sources of economic opportunity, decisions were made at an early stage to sponsor the creation of an economic infrastructure capable of providing and maximizing suitable public resources, in order to develop economic opportunity for small, isolated fishing communities.

These conscious policy activities reflect the basic themes in Canada regarding the growth of bureaucracy and the legacy of the ideology of Toryism. These two components have laid the groundwork for subsequent government intervention regarding long-range policy proposals.

Toryism is an ideology which has been central to the development of the Canadian political tradition, and which has been assimilated into the greater Canadian political culture.⁵ In the broadest sense, Toryism enshrines or legitimates a system of mutual obligation within a normative social order. Certain activities are the purview of certain individuals, either by virtue of their wealth or social status. Usually, this social

stratum is very small, although the spread of education and a broader base of affluence has contributed to a wider participation in recent years. Those who are not qualified to be involved in certain activities expect to be accommodated by those who are involved in them, in exchange for their continuing support of the social order.

Debate has centred on the origins of such attitudes. Horowitz, for example, in the tradition of Hartzian fragment theory, has noted the existence of different ideological fragments transmitted to Canada through immigration - first from Europe and later from the United States; in the latter case, these immigrants were the United Empire Loyalists who came north to Canada after the American Revolution. By the 1850s, such attitudes had been assimilated into the political culture. Others, like Lipset, see the existence of formative events as a crucial factor, particularly the American Revolution which launched Canada and the United States in different directions: order and stability, versus freedom and equality.⁶

The development of the Tory touch has become an important component in the political culture of Atlantic Canada. Bellamy, for example, has underlined the importance of the tradition and conservatism of Atlantic Canada, emphasizing the small-town rural values and attitudes.⁷ Others, such as Pross and Apostle, have gone further and linked the political culture to the lack of complexity in the economic infrastructure.⁸ Simplistic economic infrastructures result in the formation of marginal work world cultures, whose attitudes are hypothesized as being much different from those of the complex central work world with its emphasis on technological interdependence. The primitive economic infrastructure reinforces the reliance on Toryism as a potential tool of legitimation and accommodation within the political system.

Toryism also has had an effect on the changing and evolving responsibility accorded to government in the post-war period. The shift of power to the bureaucracy in Canadian politics has been well highlighted. Authors such as J.E. Hodgetts had observed the phenomenon as early as the 1950s.⁹ The nature of the parliamentary system has contributed to this phenomenon. The rise of the administrative state, embodying an overarching faith in rational decision-making, has also become tinged with a perception of the principle of bureaucratic expertise and intervention as being legitimate and correct. The principle that administrative knowledge has an important role to play in acting on behalf of the perceived public interest has thus become enshrined.

Viable economic sources of opportunity were created from an administrative perspective with its particular criteria and value systems concerning equity and efficiency. At the federal level, the belief in the power of administrative rationality was particularly strong in the 1950s and 1960s. A great belief was displayed in the development of organizationally-differentiated enterprises which were assumed to be the most efficient uses of capital and assistance. Moreover, Canada was very much influenced by the growing literature on organizational management, as it was developing in the United States, by such figures as Rensis Likert.¹⁰ The introduction of technology formed an increasing reliance on organizational differentiation and efficiency. These implemented a bureaucratic environment tied to organizational interdependence and the newly-developing technological models for the evaluation of potential policy options. To restate, the bureaucratic environment helped to define a particular conception of rationality concerning the proper use of resources.

The clear preference and bias of the bureaucracy is best reflected in the creation of a large, vertically-integrated sector of the fishing industry, which would combine the functions of processing and harvesting. Beginning in the early 1950s, subsidies were extended to the industry, particularly to several fish-processing companies, for the construction of large trawlers capable of employing large crews and of fishing at great distances from shore for as long as ten days at a time.¹¹ Such equipment represented a great faith in technology to improve the human condition. Assistance was seen as the highest form of rationality with its everlasting post-war faith in progress. In short, large companies evolved as a conscious expression of government policy. The bureaucratic symbiosis is reflected in the structure of these companies which, despite financial problems, were created with implicit assumptions concerning rationality and efficiency.¹² There can be little surprise, then, in the fact that the organizational culture of the large fish-processing companies approximated and complemented the bureaucratic structure. As a result, the bureaucracy bias was clearly towards the large, vertically-integrated fish companies:

The offshore sector, in terms of its organization, capitalization, accounting, and marketing procedures has attained a bureaucratic legitimacy. It is potentially more easily controlled and managed and it is integrated with other institutions such as banks and fish processing and marketing plants. It is easily assessed by current industrial-bureaucratic marketing plants.¹³

As an expression of the bureaucratic faith in rationality, the creation of the offshore sector has complicated later attempts to accommodate the changing conceptions and demands regarding wise resource conservation and management. From the perspective of multi-objective decision-making, it must be remembered that Canada was a member of the International Commission

on Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF), an organization which was dedicated to wise resource management and enforcement beyond the twelve-mile territorial limit. However, ICNAF was only as valid as the assumptions behind the scientific conceptions of the 'proper' level of resource exploitation. In a large extent, scientific conceptions are a necessary complement of rationality. The scientific method represents its own form of rationality, particularly in its emphasis on logical solutions to major policy questions. In this context, scientific data and knowledge justified the policy on fleet expansion and development. As a member of ICNAF, Canada herself contributed one of the largest scientific contingents in terms of research into safe biological conceptions. The original standard conception of perceived resource management - maximum sustainable yield (MSY), "an amount equal to the quantity of fish added to the stock each year, less the number of fish killed by natural or man-made causes"¹⁴ - was acceptable only if other nations agreed to abide by the guidelines derived from the base concept. Since this was not always the case, the result was the overfishing of many stocks, climaxing in an economic downturn in Canada by 1974.

In this context, the constant interplay between scientific and bureaucratic conceptions served to underpin the basic thrust of fisheries policy. This fact, combined with the justification of the role of government, enshrined through the Tory touch, promoted a particular approach to fisheries policy which, although tied to international efforts, served to advance the basic appropriatory thrust of Canadian fisheries policy.

Federal emphasis on the offshore sector was seen as a way of constructing a highly mobile and efficient fleet, which would best maximize public resources to create economic opportunity. Reports from the federal departments responsible for fisheries appeared to be basically expansionary

and devoted to the provision of equipment or exploitive facilities.¹⁵ The implication of such a thrust in fisheries policy development was to emphasize and favour the offshore sector in terms of the long-term future of the industry.

The Inshore Sector: The Case of Patron-Clientelism

By no means was the inshore sector neglected; substantial assistance was provided to allow the inshore sector to become reengaged in the industry, to introduce the perceived modern technology and to increase harvesting capacity. The introduction of unemployment insurance for fishermen in 1957 also contributed to the continued existence of the inshore sector. At the same time, however, the long-term intention was clearly to confine the inshore sector to a peripheral role. Clearly, this sector was not perceived as being capable of providing the most efficient approach towards development in order to give the maximum economic opportunity to a region which had few alternative sources of jobs or income. From this perspective, the offshore sector provided the best opportunity for maximizing the greatest benefit to policy-makers in promoting economic development.

The inshore fishery in this period was never regarded as a profession in the modern sense. In much of Atlantic Canada, the fishery represented only part of the total employment potential on a yearly basis. Moreover, many types of fish species could be harvested. At certain times of year, particularly in the winter, income was supplemented through employment in the forests. The point to be made is that the occupation of fishing engendered a different conception of lifestyle orientation. The relative lack of technological complexity contributed to a distinct lifestyle which

was neither stationary nor bound to any fixed position or hierarchy of tasks.

The case of Newfoundland provided the most extreme evidence of the insulation of fishing communities from the outside world. James Faris, for example, in his study of Cat Harbour, Newfoundland, draws attention to the value of kinship and close family connections as a crucial factor in explaining the composition of fishing crews, and in the continued recruitment of fishing crews and the operation of the respective boats and gear.¹⁶ The family unit became the central point around which the operation of the enterprise developed. The operation itself was determined by a system of development which placed the primary responsibility on the father, until such time as further offspring produced largely self-sufficient units:

...a man begins fishing with his sons; he holds the estate, so cleavage is impossible until he relinquishes title; sons inherit equivalent portions of a father's property, either on his death or on his retirement, but continue to fish together, as each portion is needed to make a complete fishing outfit and is of little use by itself; sons (brothers) marry and build (or otherwise acquire) houses located in the same garden. These brothers eventually accumulate gear of their own. So that by the time their own sons are ready to fish and it is no longer economical for them to fish with brothers, they cleave off from their brothers, taking their share of the gear, and form a new fishing crew. They build new fishing premises and, as a consequence, fence off their portion of the garden (the portion containing their house - ideally on a strip which forms an extension of the new fishing premises.)¹⁷

Although such a development cycle represents an ideal, the reliance on the principle of kinship is an indication of the importance of traditional sources of authority, enshrined by the presence of the father and by development through the maturing generations. Such ideas are outside the realm of the legal-rational conceptions inherent in a formalized organizational milieu (e.g., bureaucratic organizations).

Paris also discusses the particular normative order of the local society. In particular, he points out the negative sanctions derived from displaying tendencies towards leadership and authority, in any collective sense of the term. Egalitarianism is a theme which runs through the community: leadership involves making decisions which are binding on others. The implication is of a great neglect of formalized collective enterprises.¹⁸

The general socio-cultural lifestyle of the Newfoundland outport has been described in a multitude of different contexts. Anthony Cohen, for example, has discussed the politics of legitimation involving the use of myths and other folklore to legitimate and renew the social structure in the midst of transition and change. Cohen draws attention to the concept of personality as a crucial basis of support within the political realm. In particular, the success of Joseph Smallwood was attributable to his intimate knowledge of Newfoundland political culture, an important feature of outport society.¹⁹ As premier, he himself served the function of supreme political dispenser; using the Liberal Party as a generous patronage machine, candidates could be personally nominated and elected through general government programs or projects because of the unique characteristics of outport society, namely the deference to authority and the absence of collective identity or leadership.²⁰

John Szwed has drawn attention to the characteristics of interpersonal relationships in Newfoundland. Associational groups are classified according to the institutional setting in which they are based. A major conclusion drawn from the examination was the importance of specific units, notably the family and the church parish. Associations of common interest were extremely rare or non-existent.²¹

The persistence of such units as the parish and the family in any type of community activity is indicative of the importance of traditional conceptions of authority over a more secularized approach to social and political activity. Although the Newfoundland example is an extreme example, a similar situation does exist in many of the remaining fishing communities in the other four Atlantic provinces, with the emphasis on strong rural and parish values emanating from the cultural norms of fishing communities.

A more recent study of the recruitment process of inshore fishermen in Southwestern Nova Scotia, conducted by Anthony Davis and Victor Theissen, highlighted the unique familial arrangements comprising the inshore fishery. The authors argue that income, or the financial lucrativeness of the occupation, is not so important a consideration; rather, there are other considerations which are as or more important, specifically the sense of "being in control".²² The ability to be able to make decisions about matters related to the occupation is a positive asset which cannot be measured in a strict monetary sense. The work environment is also heavily weighted in favour of a more intimate pattern of social relationships, stressing the influence of friends, family and community. Income may be an important 'material' reason, but it alone is incapable of explaining the choice of occupation:

...to the men involved, this sense of experience of personal control over their work lives is situated at the heart of commercial fishing as an occupation. Equally significant is the fact that this sense of personal control is manifest in a social landscape and work environment peopled by familiars, the human constituents comprising friends, family and community. These conditions define small boat fishing as a way of life, rather than simply as a way to achieve a livelihood. While income is the primary reason for going fishing, by itself, income cannot explain the attractiveness of and the attachment to the occupation of most fishermen.²³

The implication is that different attributes are present which are outside the perceived motivations for entering the occupation found in other occupations. In their study of the recruitment of fishing crews to the Port Latour Harbour inshore fishery, the authors observe a degree of informality in contractual relationships, as well as a degree of familial links. Although there are instances of formal contractual arrangements, these are based on close familiarity of colleagues. Such contractual relationships produce a socialization of common goals and objectives.²⁴ The relationship between captain and crew is defined differently, depending on the occupation.

The presence of a francophone heritage is also important for many communities, reinforcing the distinctiveness of fishing communities, particularly in Southwestern Nova Scotia and parts of Northeastern New Brunswick. When the ethnolinguistic cleavage reinforces the coastal cleavage which is primarily oriented towards the fishery, political influence at both levels of government becomes very potent. Overt political activity in the more pluralist sense becomes irrelevant; the measure of influence is in the sheer numbers of fishermen, who are satisfied with cultivating specific patrons to accommodate their demands.

The emphasis on the strength of powerful personalities has long been the hallmark of provincial politics in Atlantic Canada, particularly in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Beck, for example, has emphasized the qualities of leadership as being key to the success of premiers such as Angus L. MacDonald and Robert Stanfield in Nova Scotia.²⁵ A very similar situation exists in New Brunswick, with successful politicians courting French- and English-speaking communities. Recruitment networks clearly favour the

existence of patron-client networks, based on a local issue and personalized response to electoral success.

From most accounts, the inshore sector has had few long-term relationships with the federal bureaucracy. R.D.S. MacDonald, for example, has noted the reliance of most fishermen on their local Members of Parliament.²⁶ To a large extent, the role was bridged through the reliance on political representatives, both at the federal and provincial levels. Such relationships are indicative of the 'Tory' legacy before the administrative revolution which circumscribed the totality of people qualified to take an active role in politics. This framework corresponds to the second phase of Noel's model of patron-clientelism, which stresses the individual politician within the important tool of the party as a whole. Given the tradition of Toryism mentioned earlier, the effect of such a system was to reinforce, rather than promote bureaucratic relationships.²⁷

The importance of the person as a source of political interaction stresses a more localist streak in the interaction of citizens with government. These relationships were much more in keeping with the unique anthropology of fishermen.

As the bureaucracy evolved in the direction of having day-to-day influence on the making of decisions, the status of Members of Parliament declined to that of mere brokers. As a result, a discontinuity developed which allowed a potential modernization of one section of the relationship, while retaining the old style of patron-client relationships.

It is important to remember that the patron-client hierarchy was extremely personalized and informal - the Member of Parliament was the acknowledged dispenser of favours and resources. The presence of personalization and a knowledge of the respective constituents is a feature

of localist politics, built into the structure of the system, although the magnitude of such a system varied from constituency to constituency. The situation in Newfoundland, for example, displayed the greatest tendencies towards patron-clientelism, particularly the high premium placed on the personalization of authority, given such variables as the size of the electoral district, communication links and the major sources of economic livelihood for the constituency - in sum, the same indicators. The pattern of patron-client relationships also functioned because of the nature of the issues involved. Instead of issues of high importance, most of the issues which arose were extremely issue-specific (e.g., unemployment insurance, wharves or related subsidies) and did not require sustained, long-term, collective action. In most cases, if these issues were resolved, very little complaint resulted. Fishermen had very few active or negative constraints; until the early 1970s, the freedom to fish was guaranteed:

Until...maybe about '72 or '73, we never had problems that involved government. Up until then, you did pretty much as you liked; if you went scalloping, you went scalloping, and you want to fish dragging, and you're free to do as you wanted.²⁸

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In short, the role of government was that of a provider, rather than a regulator. Such an attitude developed in policy-making because of the legitimacy of prevailing scientific assumptions concerning resource management and conservation embraced by bureaucratic officials responsible for fisheries policy. The bureaucratic cultural mindset, with its heavy scientific reliance, was thus legitimated.

In summary, the end of the 1960s witnessed the fruition of Ottawa's activist policy, resulting in the creation of two sectors - inshore and offshore - both of which were being accorded simultaneous access to the

fishery resource, along with foreign fishing fleets. Such a policy should be countenanced only as long as scientific conceptions of wise exploitation of the resource remained constant. As will be noted later, the result of this policy was overfishing which, in turn, resulted in economic chaos for the industry. Paradigms shifted, emphasizing a more regulatory approach to management and conservation. Allocation decisions became more complicated, in that both sectors were now struggling to be accommodated within a framework emphasizing a different definition of rationality, as well as a formal framework with which to transmit their views to government.

The different abilities of the two sectors in influencing government were also apparent in the way both sectors related to the greater political structures. For the inshore sector, a system of patron-client relationships based on the existence of Members of Parliament (MPs) or Members of the Legislature (MLAs), first as patrons and then as brokers for the greater bureaucracy, were consistent with the continuation of outmoded forms of political contact. F.G. Bailey has discussed the concept of 'encapsulated political structures, which to some degree are insulated from the greater political system.²⁹ Encapsulation was certainly not complete, in that greater political system played an important role in funnelling resources to the local structures. At the same time, however, fishermen were at a considerable disadvantage, since they were voicing their demands through their political representatives, instead of directly to the bureaucracy.

From the vantage point of political culture, an application of the Almond and Verba typology would be that of the subject type, with very little emphasis on sustained pluralistic political activity. While the offshore sector (i.e., the large, vertically-integrated fish-processors) had their own interest group, the Fisheries Council of Canada - a reflection of

a more pluralistic approach to politics and an acknowledgement of the need to conform to bureaucratic expectations - their relationship has tended to be very much with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), to the neglect of other federal departments, particularly the Department of External Affairs. Keating, for example, has highlighted the bias in his examination of international disputes with the United States pertaining to fisheries policy.³⁰

In the case of the inshore sector, very little meaningful group organization took place prior to the 1970s. The patron-client/brokerage system was deemed to be sufficient to accommodate their demands and objectives with government. Again, the paradoxical orientation of the occupation served to de-emphasize the possibility of groups forming which could be considered by bureaucrats as legitimate spokesmen for the specific constituencies represented by these groups.

This placed the inshore sector at a distinct disadvantage; as long as traditional sources of contact were maintained, there appeared to be little need to alter the arrangement. The lack of a pluralist conception regarding group organization was indicative of the inshore sector's different lifestyle, and different perceptions of the role of politics and their relationship with government.

Instead of group activity, the mode of political activity, particularly for the inshore sector, has favoured the presence of a small, local elite which functioned as the necessary parapolitical structure of mediation. A quid pro quo in terms of encapsulation allowed the system to function without direct bureaucratic interaction by fishermen themselves. This stratum of representation symbolizes the enduring localism endemic to the political structure of Atlantic Canada, vis-à-vis the administrative sector.

The existence of a group of local notables, argues Ralph Matthews, is consistent with the development of political attitudes originating within the local environment.

...the leadership of a community can come from many sources and sectors. While we habitually think of political leadership in terms of elected office-holders, those who speak on behalf of many communities are its merchants, clergymen and teachers. These are not political leaders, but leaders of the economic and socialization organizations in the community. In essence, they attempt to transfer formal or even informal leadership in one sphere of community life into leadership in other spheres. Thus, the lines between economic, social and political leadership are not as clearly drawn...³¹

If these parapolitical leaders emerge, they do so because of the social relationships originating in fishing communities. The logical inference to be made is that the presence of local notables, as part of the patron-client/brokerage hierarchy, continues to be extremely important for fishermen in dealing with the bureaucracy. The question which must then be addressed relates to the variables which sponsor the reliance on such a system of mediation over other local communities.

To test the hypothesis regarding the extent of patron-clientelism, particularly since 1977, a series of interviews with several Members of Parliament was conducted by the author, in order to try to measure the types of correspondence, both written and oral (e.g., in the form of telephone calls), received from constituents and the subjects of this communication.

The power of the MP vis-à-vis the concept of constituency service has been highlighted by Allan Kornberg in his study of MPs in the 25th Parliament.³² Ties with MPs suggest the importance of constituency-related problems which imply issue-specific concerns over long-term policy concerns. In the case of fishermen, such issues would include licensing, quotas and

unemployment insurance. The hypothesis which may be derived is that, at least at the grassroots level, the type of political motivations which provide any concerted type of relationships with government are those which are short-term and not an attempt to satisfy a particular long-term policy objective as a direct reaction by government, whether in the administrative or bureaucratic realm.

The following federal constituencies have been selected because of their general representation of certain variations in economic dependence on the fishing industry of specific electoral districts, as well as variations in the relationships between fishermen and processors.

Newfoundland: The Riding of Gander-Twillingate:

The riding of Gander-Twillingate in Newfoundland has a population of only 71,000 people.³³ Situated in the northwest corner of the province, a variety of small and isolated fishing communities are found along the coastline. The inshore fishery is crucial to the riding, along with such staple resources as the forest industry.

Like most ridings in Newfoundland, Gander-Twillingate is heavily dependent on the inshore fishery. Statistics Canada labour force figures for 1981 place the total number of workers at 27,470.³⁴ Of these, inshore fishermen total 2,175. In all age categories, most fishermen have only a Grade Nine education. Most are from 35 to 50 years old. As a depressed region, the fishery is one of the primary sources of income. Average income is only \$8,000 per capita. Most of the population in the constituency resides in the coastal communities. Cod is clearly the major species in the Newfoundland fishery; in terms of commercial demand, the fluctuations in catch levels, as well as in commercial demand, cause problems in maintaining

a permissible standard of living. Government intervention was traditionally seen as a "write-off" and done to maintain the political viability of the inshore sector. As a result, the importance of government for these constituencies can be crucial in facilitating their dependence on the fishery as their livelihood. Gander-Twillingate, like other Newfoundland constituencies, also has group representation along the coast, with the presence of various fisheries committees set up to represent and look after the concerns of each port. It should be noted, however, that the impetus for such committees came not from the fishermen themselves, but from the federal government as a condition of providing funds for "make-work" projects.

Individual fishermen tend to emphasize issue-specific concerns, over the conditions of long-term policy considerations requiring the emphasis on the politician as the dispenser of benefits. This attitude is highlighted in the person of the MP for the constituency, George Baker, first elected in 1974.³⁵ The tendency to turn to the local politician is a feature of the constituency. The MP's job is very much in the realm of constituency service: issues range from problems with unemployment insurance to appeals about licensing.³⁶ In many ways, the role of constituency service is institutionalized by the system itself: problems with unemployment insurance, for example, make the MP the logical route for mediating such inquiries.

Personalization of authority seems to be another facet of the situation in the inshore fishery. MP George Baker, for example, has "voluminous" books listing the names and addresses of his various constituents who are inshore fishermen. In many cases, most communication (writing letters and making telephone calls) is done by the spouse [wife] of the fisherman; in

this case, comparative parallels can be drawn to a study done in the United States, where the wife also acts as a necessary "stand-in" for her husband.³⁷

Correspondence also suggests the types of issues which are important in the minds of inshore fishermen. Letters range from concerns over unemployment insurance to wharf dredging and so on. One letter was written by the local union representative of the Newfoundland Fishermen's Food and Allied Workers' Union (NFFAWU), in order to aid a local fisherman in pressing his case concerning unemployment insurance.³⁸ The fact that the constituency is still primarily rural in its make-up also means that isolation is still a fact of life; this isolation plays a role in discouraging any further dislocations in terms of authority patterns.

An additional question which might be asked concerns the extent of bureaucratic proximity (i.e., the decentralization of government departments into local offices serving the smaller communities), which would encourage greater local contact by fishermen, as opposed to direct bureaucratic contact at the upper levels, particularly in Ottawa. Evidence can be cited from the amount of mail forwarded by the MP's constituency office to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans in Ottawa for the DFO response. Letters are then drafted, usually on the Minister's correspondence, to be mailed to the particular constituent. In the case of MP George Baker, he estimates that about one-third of his correspondence is forwarded to the DFO.³⁹ This fact is not surprising, given the prevalence of specific inquiries concerning licensing or quotas.

The rise of the union movement, as well as related fishermen's organizations, is indicative of this attempt to form a bottom-up response to the problems of the fishery. It is important to realize, however, why these

organizations were formed. As noted above, the Port Committees were formed as part of the federal prerequisite for make-work programs. As will be noted later, the most successful organization, the Newfoundland Fishermen's Food and Allied Workers' Union (NFFAWU) was not formed by fishermen, but by the more politically sophisticated leadership of Richard Cashin and Father Des McGrath, both members of society who possessed the needed leadership skills. These figures represent the potential personalization of rural Newfoundland, consistent with its political legacies. In the final analysis, the Union was not the spontaneous creation of fishermen themselves. A degree of leadership was essential in aiding the Union's creation.

In summary, the riding of Gander-Twillingate can be said to display certain features of occupational sub-cultures on a community-by-community basis. Such an orientation is the product of the factors that the complex set of environmental variables reinforces, rather than discourages. Personalization is important because a unique role is thus derived for the MP/MLA as the dispenser of benefits.

Prince Edward Island: The Riding of Egmont:

The riding of Egmont on Prince Edward Island is a smaller electoral district than that of Gander-Twillingate. The total population of the riding is only 30,000.⁴⁰ The constituency itself is only thirty miles long which, in terms of size [geographic area], is much easier to represent on a daily basis.

The total labour force in the riding in 1981 was 13,135.⁴¹ Of this number, 1,010 workers were classified as fishermen. Education levels in this riding also are not high, with over half of these fishermen (590)

having less than nine years of formal schooling. Most fishermen are from 35 to 50 years of age.

In comparison with the situation in Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island is significant in that the inshore fishery is an important component of the local provincial economy. Other species in the fishery include shellfish-including oysters, scallops and snow crab - which are the most valuable and highly-priced species. Traditionally, the lobster industry has been the most viable and lucrative, which aids in producing a more viable infrastructure towards government. As a result, lobster fishermen can be expected to be much more localist and ad hoc in their approach to government.

The Member of Parliament for the riding, George Henderson, a former provincial Minister of Fisheries, distinguishes between his interactions with fishermen's organizations and those with individual constituents. In the first category, organizations such as Port Committees handle requests for improvements of wharves or harbour facilities. Such issues represent basic historical needs concerning the industry. The basic initiative for the creation of such Port Committees resides in a provincial government-sponsored blueprint, to encourage a "prioritization of what their urgent needs are" in order to ensure better action by both levels of government.⁴² Other organizations, such as the Maritime Fishermen's Union (MFU) or the Prince Edward Island Fishermen's Association (PEIFA), are the major organizations, serving more of the formal political functions.

The second category favours the more individualized, issue-related matters: vessel subsidies, license transfers, and problems with the administration of unemployment insurance.⁴³ The primary conduct of such communication is by telephone, rather than letter. The difficulty in

measuring the numbers of telephone calls is obvious, given the logistical circumstances. The personalization of the prestige and authority of the MP is indicative of a more intimate attitude towards political service. Henderson finds it necessary to seek out, rather than receive, his constituents, as the following description of a weekly trip to his riding demonstrates:

...I arrive at Charlottetown at 2:00 and I'm in my office at Summerside at 3:30...I take calls on Friday afternoon or have appointments or whatever for people that live close in around Summerside and the area, from the Grand Bay area to Summerside. And if they want to see me on a personal basis...they phone and set up a meeting with me; I take those appointments on Friday afternoon. Saturday [is for] the calls that come into my office during the week, from O'Leary, Alberton or Tigonish, for example, and I call around to their homes on a personal basis....⁴⁴

In sum, Henderson pursues a very rigorous and personalized attempt to deal with and meet each and every constituent. Undoubtedly, the size of the riding makes it less likely that groups can have much of an influence. Furthermore, many of the issues involved are localized and able to be accommodated at the regional levels, rather than having to go to Ottawa for resolution.

From an economic standpoint, the fact that fishing is not the only industry in the riding also helps to diminish the importance of the fishery in purely economic terms. The magnitude of the problems is thus reduced in the total spectrum of constituency problems.

The role of the party itself is very instrumental, particularly the role of provincial MLAs. In Prince Edward Island, both the federal and provincial parties are known to tap the same party organizational resources.⁴⁵ George Henderson, for example, was able to go from provincial politics into the federal realm without any major difficulty. In many

cases, the provincial MLA may also become an important component of the patron-client hierarchy. In smaller ridings like Egmont, the occurrence of such a phenomenon would be rare. The occurrence would certainly be higher in larger constituencies, which would facilitate a greater prominence for local notables or party members in keeping in touch with issue-specific problems. Such an approach is strengthened in the case of parties of the same stripe.

In summary, Egmont displays a much more moderate balance in helping to maintain and foster the growth of patron-client networks as a tool of exchange at the grassroots level. This attitude is reflected in the placing of primordial importance on the politician, in favour of the sponsorship of possibly more institutionalized routes.

Nova Scotia: The Riding of Southwest Nova

The riding of Southwest Nova in Nova Scotia is probably one of the most important constituencies in the fishery, in terms of the differentiation of species. There is a substantial groundfishery, supplemented with the presence of fisheries of lobster, scallops, herring and clams - all the various higher-priced species. Substantial variations also occur across sectors: within the scallop sector, for example, inshore and offshore sectors are able to coexist; a unique mix is produced as a result.

The riding itself covers three counties and is about 150 miles long; its population is 66,872.⁴⁶ Sheer size alone makes this constituency potentially the most difficult to serve, in terms of reconciling the varied occupations of the constituency. The total labour force in 1981 was 29,345.⁴⁷ Of this, the total number of fishermen was 1,875. Their education achievements range from having less than a Grade Nine education,

to having a Grade Twelve education at the most. Most fishermen in the riding are between 25 and 35 years of age.

The MP's potential to play an important role is underlined by the type of problems he encounters, which can range from concerns over a wharf, as presented by the local wharf representative, to a licensing situation, concerns over a particular regulation, and so on.⁴⁸

Provincial MLAs also play an important role in funnelling demands and inquiries up the line to the MP. Hugh Tinkham, a former provincial MLA, stated that, in many cases, fishermen would call him in hopes of setting up a meeting with his then-federal counterpart, Colin Campbell.⁴⁹ Clearly, the perception of the differentiation in party systems is non-existent. The size of the riding undoubtedly promotes this style of politics, as well as the fact that there is also little distinguishable difference between the two parties. Beck has argued that this lack of differentiation in the province's political system produces an overarching reliance on the personality of the leader.

Nova Scotia's Provincial Conservative Party is a case in point. Prior to the 1950s, the Party had failed to incorporate the necessary grassroots hierarchy to effectively tap into specific patron-client concerns. This worked against the traditional issue-specific network in which fishermen themselves acted, dealing with the immediate patron hierarchy to facilitate the granting of favours. The success of the Conservatives in 1956 reflected the conscious ability to construct a party organization capable of functioning to accommodate demands.⁵⁰ In this way, the successful provincial party has been the one capable of reconciling various cleavages.

There is also strong evidence that the style of being represented by local notables and political bosses may, within the loose configuration of

the party system, still be involved directly with fishermen's causes. The most important example was Hugh Tinkham's tenure as Provincial MLA, as well as being the General Manager for the Scallop Sector of the Nova Scotia Fishermen's Association. This was an indication of the possible coexistence of traditional political affiliation in the guise of political pluralistic politics. A not-so-direct example would be Clifford Hood, Jr., a prominent local conservative lawyer, who has formed links with the fishermen and has been able to represent their interests with certain key government officials. Unlike the more traditional types of exchange, these relationships are increasingly becoming linked more to personal and professional interests (e.g., practising law) than to political advancement, although the distinction between what is and what is not political can become blurred. As will be noted later, Hood played an important part with respect to the 10,000-ton reallocation amendments to the 1986 Groundfish Management Plan in Southwestern Nova Scotia.

In sum, the character of the riding of Southwest Nova illustrates an emphasis on issue-specific matters. The displacement of parties by organizations has occurred, but these organizations have developed as part of the hierarchy which emphasizes accommodation.

In summary, all three ridings illustrate much different approaches to political interaction. The reliance on the MP/MLA is a legacy rooted in the traditional style of politics which was, in turn, rooted in the strong personalization accompanying reliance on a traditional framework of patron-client relationships. The style of interaction emphasizes day-to-day considerations over the broader, long-term policy considerations. An even clearer picture of fishermen's interactions emerges when the types and

routes of ministerial correspondence are analyzed. As illustrated in the following table of ministerial correspondence received in Ottawa for March, 1986 (see Figure 1), most of fishermen's correspondence directed to the Minister concerns basic issues related to requests for licenses. Other topics of a more sophisticated nature were not even mentioned. Of greater significance is the correspondence directed to the Minister from MPs, particularly with respect to fisheries management and small-craft harbours.

In the final analysis, the inference which can be drawn is that MPs play an exceedingly important role as potential brokers for their constituents. Moreover, the issues which fishermen themselves write about to their MPs are very issue-specific (e.g., licenses).

In many ways, the fishing industry in Atlantic Canada is an expression of the broader Canadian political system, with the emphasis on national reconciliation or the pacification of spatial interests as opposed to sectoral interests, although the two have gone hand-in-hand. In his most recent discussion of Canadian interest group politics, Pross has argued that a basic dilemma in Canada today is the irreconcilable conflict between the demands of functional representation and spatial representation.⁵¹

FIGURE 1

Types of Ministerial Correspondence Received in March, 1986

TOPICS:	CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED FROM:				
	MPs	MPPs/Prov. Ministers	Fishermen	Organizations	Individuals
Licences	21	3	42	1	1
Negotiations, Agreements	6	3	—	6	19
Allocations	4	—	3	4	30
Fisheries Management, Operations	44	7	—	5	132
Habitat	5	—	—	—	20
Science	4	—	—	1	31
Small-Craft Harbours	21	2	—	1	35
Inspection	2	—	—	3	8
Sportfishing	2	—	—	1	10
Native Fisheries	11	—	—	2	22
Admin. Topics	15	5	—	1	41
Misc.	6	5	—	7	44
TOTALS:	141	25	45	32	394

TOTAL CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED: 637 letters

Source: Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Communications Directorate, Ottawa, 1986.

2

MicroD

To rephrase this, the Canadian system has been caught between the demands of regional politics and the need to accommodate sectoral groups which may not be identified with a specific geographic location. From the perspective of multi-value choice, the dichotomy between politics and administration emphasizes certain types of advice over others. Patron-client relationships, for example, are synonymous with the geographic unit. The diversity of regional cleavages was, at one time, capable of being represented at the national level through the presence of strong regional ministers.

An argument can certainly be made that increasing technological innovation placed the bureaucracy in a much more powerful position to dominate policy-making, primarily because of the expertise which they are required to have.⁵² With the shift towards administrative expertise, certain types of issues were defined much differently, as was information concerning the various issues. In other words, the bureaucratic paradigm was able to dominate policy-making as opposed to the local organic political paradigm based on a different set of assumptions with government which has not promoted the same levels of societal integration. Given the existence of Toryism and the effective patron-client ties, the ability of fishermen to influence the bureaucracy was impaired because of the clash of differing occupational norms and values.

As Canada moved towards regulation in the form of fisheries management in the early 1970s, bureaucratic mandates were also redefined to a new version of regulation which, if anything, totally redefined the role of the individual inshore fisherman. Regulation was a much different policy paradigm than mere appropriation. The old patron-client networks function best when there are attainable allocations of the resource. When politics

becomes a struggle for prevention, rather than attainment, the rules of the game are redefined, placing government (in this case, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans) in the role of the arbitrator and determinator of which demand or piece of information is sufficiently important to be acted upon.

Economic Crisis, Extended Jurisdiction and the Move Towards Resource Management:

By the late 1960s, the warning signs of an economic crisis had already begun to appear. Declining catches had produced a brief economic slump in the industry in 1968. Although conditions recovered for a short time, a combination of high fuel prices and declining fish stocks produced shock waves throughout the industry, bringing about a total economic collapse of the inshore fishery, particularly in Newfoundland.⁵³

The collapse of the inshore fishery was, in itself, an acknowledgement of the failure of scientific rationality and of ICNAF to enforce their guidelines. With the failure of these conceptions, new principles of wise resource management would have to be formulated. It was precisely at this point that the problem began which would later have a significant affect on present Canadian fisheries policy. As Canada moved towards the extension of jurisdiction to the 200-mile limit in 1977, the difficulty of trying to reconcile both inshore and offshore sectors became more clearly defined. Scientific conceptions were now revised into a new formula - optimum sustained yield, or OSY - which attempted to balance natural mortality with socio-economic considerations. Clearly, the implementation of this concept would have to bring about a reduction in the total allowable catch (TAC). In the final analysis, any reduction in total allowable catch would be an

extremely sensitive issue for both sectors. As a new definition of the public interest evolved - namely, a more activist approach towards regulation - the need to try to involve the industry became even more paramount.

Jurisdiction was also a potential problem. Although Ottawa had been accorded control over fisheries management, the provinces had been given control over the proprietary aspects of the resource - namely, the processing and marketing of the resource. If fishing effort was to be restricted, the logical inference was that further expansions of processing plants and of fishing and processing equipment would have to be curtailed. The new scientific conceptions would not allow the same levels of effort as in the past. However, if it was impossible to reach a consensus which would satisfy both political and administrative interests, particularly for both the federal and provincial levels of government, the prospects for effective management and policy considerations would be impaired.

The federal government also faced the problem of trying to seek representation from the inshore sector. The lack of a legitimate organization that could speak for all fishermen has continued to be a problem. The fish-processors had very little difficulty in attaining spokesmen; the Fisheries Council of Canada and its various provincial affiliates (e.g., the Seafood Producers Association of Nova Scotia) were very capable of articulating their concerns. The inshore sector was not so fortunate; as noted earlier, pluralist conceptions were irrelevant and it seemed very unlikely that organizations representing fishermen would be able to develop without active aid from government. As Pross has observed, a continuing feature of bureaucracy is the creation of groups which can speak for the interests of their constituencies and, in the process of such

representation, utilize an approximation of the bureaucratic norms and values, particularly with respect to organizational interdependence.⁵⁴

The relevance of a direct dialogue with inshore fishermen was particularly important; the formulation of effective management plans could not be undertaken without effective contact with the inshore sector. As early as the late 1960s, the DFO had, with the introduction of a licensing system, begun to move towards an attempt to curtail fishing effort, or at least to regulate it. Although most observers who were outside immediate participation in the situation could predict the future course of events, the new system made little impact on the daily lifestyle of the inshore fisherman. Economic motivations were also apparent, particularly in the lobster sector where an added implication was to ensure better catches for those who were allowed to remain engaged in the industry.

The changes in the bureaucracy were reflected in the higher profile of questions concerning fisheries policy. Beginning in 1974, with the appointment of Romeo Leblanc as Minister of State for Fisheries, the status of fisheries matters within government increased to that of a line department. Although fisheries matters were temporarily handled by the Department of the Environment, of which Leblanc had also been minister for a time, the creation of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) marked the formal change of paradigm from appropriation to regulation. Corresponding changes in paradigms were also reflected in the nature of personnel. Whereas personnel in the previous appropriative paradigm were predominantly engineers, the new breed of bureaucrats were scientists, those skilled in enforcement and regulators. These administrators wielded great power over the industry. Moreover, the fact that the mandate of the DFO had been redefined also meant that the basic policy tools were drastically

different, as well as the assumptions from which the bureaucrats were working. This fact already contributed to the administrative orientation which, by its very nature, was directed towards the issuance of ordinance-style programs. In other words, the bureaucratic style of administration was being applied to the everyday operation of the industry.

By its very nature, regulation is a prohibitive, negative stance, rather than a promotive, positive one. Given the traditional lifestyle of many fishing communities, the intrusion of government into the day-to-day management of the resource ultimately meant that the fishermen would no longer be able to fish when they wished or when they felt it to be most advantageous. The impact was first felt in the system of limited entry, which the Canadian government introduced in order to eliminate, or at least reduce, those fishermen who were also engaged in other lines of work throughout the year. Classifications of full- and part-time fishermen are, by nature, an endemic part of DFO's bureaucratic intervention which took hold in the late 1970s. Bureaucratic outputs derived from the new scientific conceptions of resource management could be justified as being the product of a process of rational decision-making consistent with first principles. As a result, the public interest was redefined to that of wise regulation, which the Government of Canada would now undertake as the custodian of the resource.

The basic exposition of future federal policy was contained in the document entitled Policy for Canada's Commercial Fisheries (1978), which spelled out a basic restructuring of the Canadian fishery:

In the conviction that all levels of the fishing industry and fish trade can create a stable, prosperous sector of the economy, regionally, and nationally, the federal government proposes to intervene to ensure that fisheries development is

managed in the best interests of Canadian society. The strategies to be adopted incorporate two major shifts in policy:

- 1) The guiding principle in fishery management no longer would be maximization of the crop sustainable over time, but the best use of society's resources. "Best-use" is defined by the sum of net social benefits (personal income, occupational opportunity, consumer satisfaction and so on) derived from the fisheries and the industries linked to them.
- 2) While private enterprise, individual, cooperative and corporate, would continue to predominate in the commercial fisheries, fundamental decisions about resource management and about industry and trade development would be reached jointly by industry and government.⁵⁵

The term "best-use" is important, because it is indicative of an attempt to mesh the new components of the multi-value matrix. Scientific expertise was still a key player, because it was the only perceived legitimate foundation for discussion of resource questions. As noted earlier, the new biological conception of fisheries management - optimum sustainable yield, or OSY - was an attempt to recognize the error in forecasting stock levels, while trying to take into account various socio-economic factors. 'Socio-economic factors' became the codeword for the maintenance of the inshore fishery, but with some adjustments to enhance some viability.⁵⁶ The tool of viability, limited entry, became the necessary instrument to achieve this goal. In this way, bureaucratic conceptions of "best-use" and efficiency would be assimilated into the attitudes of the inshore sector.

The inshore sector, in short, was totally unprepared for such a turnaround in government policy. The old patron-client relationships were insufficient to deal with a bureaucratic approach to policy. The rational approach to government policy which the bureaucracy had enunciated was certainly insufficient, in light of the fisherman's basic source of

practical training, as opposed to the more formalized educational training or schooling of the bureaucrat. A brief examination of census figures for 1981 from Statistics Canada shows that most inshore fishermen still attain less than nine years of formal education.⁵⁷ This fact does not imply ignorance on the part of inshore fishermen with respect to their ability to discharge their occupation adequately. The source of their knowledge and expertise differs from that of an administrator. For the inshore sector, the continuing actions of the DFO have been greeted with a mixture of incomprehension and disbelief.

This does not mean that the inshore sector does not have any weapons in its arsenal. Any major policy has to be balanced with a concern for political considerations. These political considerations form the other important component of the multi-value matrix. Bureaucrats must ultimately seek approval for their actions from their ministers. An argument can certainly be made that the old network of patron-client brokerage is still the prime method used by fishermen in choosing to interact with government. The more fishermen there are, the more potent the pressure that can be applied. Such activity is much different from pluralist conceptions stressing the structural facets of organization. The old patron-client relationships stress informal contacts, as well as the accommodation and conciliation of specific demands or goals. In short, the style of fishermen's political contacts with government is outside consideration of the long-term need to maintain the necessary organizational spokesmen.

Political considerations mean that the bureaucracy can only hope to try to assimilate and professionalize the inshore sector through applying specific regulations regarding the manner in which fishermen carry on their livelihood. Licensing is, by its very nature, a sign of a degree of

professionalization which is the standard practice of the bureaucratic organization, given the occupational milieu of the organization combined with the specific mandate of the DFO. In the long term, the hope of the DFO is clearly to assimilate and thus eradicate, through slow and persistent activity, the perceived parochialism of the inshore sector. Over time, this trend has meant the socialization of fishermen into a rational cost/benefit attitude towards the fishery. Even the economic crisis of the early 1980s failed to alter the general thrust of federal policy: the long-term socialization of the inshore fishery into a more professionalized environment. In this way, regulations become crucial in the achievement of this end and provide a tool for preserving economic opportunity. The three objectives of The Report of the Task Force on Atlantic Fisheries of 1982 (a.k.a. The Kirby Commission) are strikingly familiar to those of the Policy for Canada's Commercial Fisheries of 1976:

- Objective 1: The Atlantic fishing industry should be economically viable on an ongoing basis, where to be viable implies an ability to survive downturns with normal business failure rate and without government assistance.
- Objective 2: Employment in the Atlantic fishing industry should be maximized subject to the constraint that those employed receive a reasonable income as a result of fishing-related activities, including fishing-related income transfer payments.
- Objective 3: Fish within the 200-mile Canadian zone should be harvested and processed by Canadians in firms owned by Canadians whenever this is consistent....⁵⁸

By 1977, a dichotomy had thus emerged in Canadian fisheries management. On the one hand, bureaucratic policies favoured the professionalization and rationalization of the fishery. Their chief emphasis was on maximizing the

best use of resources - both fish species and capital assistance. If the logical conclusion of these policies was followed, the offshore sector would emerge as the winner. At the same time, however, the inshore sector was a necessary political consideration. Political support to gain votes is not always the most economically rational or cost-effective. In short, a clash between different appreciative systems has evolved in Canadian fisheries policy, triggered by a change in policy paradigms.

This change in paradigms has contributed to a conflict between small-scale fishermen and the DFO bureaucracy. Canadian fisheries policy has tried to balance the weight of competing objectives within the parameters of multi-objective decision-making. The conflict has produced a modified attempt to restructure the inshore fishery to make it more consistent with bureaucratic perceptions of rationality and professionalism. Such conceptions derive from the structure and organizational mandate of the bureaucracy and are an endemic part of its organization. Inshore fishermen, since they do not approximate the bureaucratic cultural norms in their relations with government, find themselves trying to adapt their old patron-client/brokerage contacts to a drastically changing situation. In the final analysis, both inshore and offshore sectors would continue to exist, but with government support, which would serve to alter and modify the general character of the inshore fishery.

In the following sections, an analysis of the present consultative/advisory process will be undertaken. This process epitomizes multi-value decision-making in that certain forms of expertise are emphasized over others. Next, an examination of various organizations claiming to represent

inshore fishermen will be used to illustrate the inadequacies of specific assumptions concerning the representation and participation of fishermen in formal organizational consultation.

These organizations all labour under the basic preconceived notions of the best course of representational vehicle or philosophy which, given the localist attitudes of fishermen and their unique occupational norms and values, is discomplementary. To drive home the point, an analysis will be undertaken of one particular organization, the Nova Scotia Fishermen's Association. Finally, an analysis will be made of the present channels of interaction. An argument will be advanced that the old patron-client network is as valid today in mediating issues as it has been in the past; it is, in effect, a process which exists outside the formal organizational process of consultation. In fact, evidence also exists that fishermen's organizations also play a similar 'brokerage' role, once the exclusive domain of the politicians or local notables operating through the political party structure.

The Consultative Process: Structure

The consultative process implemented in the period from 1974 to 1976 can be viewed as a way of reconciling the dichotomy within the administrative framework. Very little input was needed before this period, since the goals of bureaucrats and elected politicians were complementary. There was only one committee in operation during this period, the Federal Provincial Atlantic Fisheries Committee (FPAFC). Composed of federal-provincial Deputy Ministers, it was designed to coordinate efforts towards modernizing the fleets.

The present consultative process developed within the period from 1972 to 1977. The structure was also accompanied by a reorganization and decentralization of the department responsible for fisheries policy to further its new conservatory mandate (see Figure 2). A series of regional offices was also established to facilitate its various responsibilities. The intent was to give an appearance of greater power over local affairs for the regional units. As will be noted later, however, the structure of the resource management system places authority at the centre in Ottawa, rather than at the various grassroots departments.

The Canadian process is not a formalized method of decision-making in which the industry is the sole and final arbiter of plans. Rather, the process is "advisory/consultative" - Ottawa can listen, but can also disregard recommendations. Multi-value decision-making is actually aided and expedited in such a process.

In the case of formulating a management plan for the groundfish resource, the following steps are observed (see also Figure 3).⁵⁹

1. Scientific Data (January to May):

Assessments of stocks are submitted to the special groundfish sub-committee, which proposes various TACs. These proposals are usually forwarded to the Canadian Atlantic Fisheries Scientific Advisory Committee (CAFSAC) by the end of May, and they are usually accepted.

The role of scientific data as the foundation upon which the whole process is based cannot be overlooked. In many respects, the data which is formulated is, at best, only a partial representation of the reality of stock levels in the ocean. Nevertheless, the fact that the process is as objective as possible is important. For administrators,

Figure 2

Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Organization Chart *

* as of March, 1986

ADM = Assistant Deputy Minister
DG = Director General

Source: Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Background Documentation, 1986.

Figure 3

Atlantic Groundfish Management Plan Flowchart

KEY: OVOWG = Offshore Vessel Owners Working Group
IOG = Independent Offshore Group

such a process is fundamentally important because it is based on fact which ties in with the professional administrative environment, as compared with other sources of knowledge used further on in the process.

2. The Atlantic Director Generals' Committee (ADGC):

The ADGC is composed of the Assistant Deputy Minister of the Atlantic Fisheries Service and the four Director Generals. Here, TAC recommendations are turned into a written plan by a special groundfish working group, whose job it is to prepare a plan specifying allocations. These allocations are finally approved, with whatever revisions might be necessary, by the ADGC.

The industry is given input at regional or Atlantic Committee meetings of the ADGC. An important role is also played by a special groundfish advisor who is a knowledgeable member of the bureaucracy. In theory, the groundfish advisor's input can be incorporated into as many draft plans as might be necessary to reach an agreement. However, the advisor is a member of the bureaucracy, with his own views on the validity of certain data and the admissibility of some data over others. Moreover, final approval by the ADGC is a necessity to have the Plan tabled at the ADAC, in step 4. Nothing can advance from this stage without reaching an accommodation with the necessary bureaucratic norms and values.

3. The Minister of Fisheries receives the plan and may request revisions before completion.

The Minister's role within the process is paradoxical. The Fisheries Act makes the Minister the supreme custodian of the resource; s/he alone has the final say on decisions. Nevertheless, the Minister

is a political official, which means that s/he must balance the political concerns with what is supposed to be the scientifically correct course to take in making allocations. In this way, the Minister epitomizes the orientation embodied in multi-value decision-making: on the one hand, s/he is a politician who must bow to public pressure; on the other hand, s/he cannot afford to give in to pressure entirely, which might completely jeopardize the perceived public interest with respect to scientific conceptions.

The purview of cabinet government also places the final authority in the centre, rather than at the grassroots level. Although the DFO has decentralized its operations to take in the local community structures of the fishery, final authority in the Canadian political system remains in Ottawa. The Minister and his/her immediate staff are thus caught between the demands of politics and the demands of long-term forecasting. Multi-value decision-making is the ultimate result; ministerial discretion is forced to ferret out the important and unimportant facts in making a decision.

As will be noted later, the Minister is under constant pressure to amend plans; in some instances, raw political pressure can have an effect, although, paradoxically, such activity further assimilates fishermen into the bureaucratic agenda. Politics becomes ultimately balanced off against a need to defend the public interest enshrined within the bureaucratic approach to policy-making.

4. The Atlantic Groundfish Advisory Committee (AGAC):

The AGAC (see Figure 4) is the formal industry mechanism of consultation. It is composed of forty members who are supposed to be

Figure 4

Organization Chart of the Atlantic Groundfish Advisory Committee (AGAC)

Source: Cheryl Ann Fraser, "Groundfish Management by Property Rights," (M.E.S. Thesis, Dalhousie University, 1984), Appendix I, p. 108.

representative of industry and the provincial governments. The AGAC actually dates back to 1974, with the formation of predecessor, the Offshore Groundfish Advisory Committee (OGAC).⁶⁰ At that time, its main focus was oriented more to processors and fishermen involved in the offshore sectors. Its primary focus centred on vessel licensing. With extended jurisdiction, its mandate was broadened to give representation to the inshore sector as well. The industry is represented through its major organizations, which are supposed to choose delegates.

The AGAC has two sections: (i) The Forum, composed of Director Generals of the DFO, members from various fishermen's and processors' organizations, union members and officials from various departments of fisheries; and (ii) The Working Group, composed of the Director of Resource Allocation in Ottawa, Regional Advisors of the DFO, a representative of the biological sciences and a quota-monitoring representative.

Regional advisory committees are a further source of input at the grassroots level. Existing for the four sub-regions of the DFO, the committees take the guidelines set down by the AGAC and try to allocate the resource within each region, to the various sectors, regions, gear types, etc. (see for example, Appendix A-1: Terms of Reference for the Scotia-Fundy Groundfish Advisory Committee). In some cases, sub-committees may exist below these regional committees in order to advise on specific management techniques or issues.

AGAC expenses are paid by the DFO. The procedure is informal, with no formal notes being taken. All advice is received by the AGAC, as well as by the Regional Directors of the DFO.

The AGAC's formal consultative function has several drawbacks. The fact that organizations form the basis of representation means that grassroots participation may be severely circumscribed or limited in order to sustain the legitimacy of the system. As will be noted later in our consideration of fishermen's organizations, inshore fishermen have been very reluctant to take part in organized, long-term, political, pressure-group activity. There can be little surprise, then, when the inshore sector is found to be rather disorganized politically in comparison with the offshore sector.

Moreover, some sectors have no fixed representation. Inshore lobstermen in Southwestern Nova Scotia have traditionally had sporadic and ad hoc representation. The inshore lobster industry is a case in point. Although the total consultative process is different, the problems posed by a bureaucratic structure are substantial, given the lack of organizational representation. The District 4-A Lobster Advisory Sub-Committee (a local sub-regional forum) has now provided for election of members of individual ports, instead of direct organizational input (see Appendix A-2).⁶¹ Nevertheless, most of the assumptions in the process emphasize the inshore fishermen as conforming to administrative assumptions regarding pluralist representation. In the final analysis, traditional social identities may conflict with formalized interest group representation, pitting fishermen against bureaucrats in the multi-value dichotomy. Thus, scientific evidence and data, by virtue of their close relationship to bureaucratic conceptions of rationality, legitimate the neglect, or at least the downplaying, of other forms of expertise - specifically, the

expertise displayed by local fishermen who have direct first-hand knowledge of the resource.

The paradigm within which the AGAC and the corresponding committees operate is clearly within the realm of scientific expertise. Kafka, in his study of the Atlantic bluefin fishery, has argued that the advisory committees legitimate debate within the scientific paradigm.⁶² By getting participation, Ottawa is able to give the whole paradigm a measure of credibility. Some concerns raised by the industry may be perceived to be illegitimate, given the administrative mandate to conserve the resource. Paradoxically, industry participation allows these conflicting objectives to be weighted and legitimated towards the parameters of scientific/professional values.

5. **The Federal-Provincial Atlantic Fisheries Committee (FPAFC):**

The FPAFC is composed of Deputy Ministers from the federal government and from each of the provincial governments involved. Essentially, before 1977, the FPAFC served as the administrative tool used to coordinate fleet expansion. Under present conditions, the clear implication is to try to ensure some measure of administrative coordination, since most provinces have programs to encourage vessel construction, as well as inspection and sale of the catch. For example, knowledge of whether or not conservation guidelines are being obeyed is, in many cases, the preserve of the provinces, since they are responsible for the proprietary aspects of the resource.

6. **The Atlantic Fisheries Ministers' Conference (AFMC):**

The AFMC is composed of the Minister of Fisheries and his provincial counterparts and provides a level of direct access for

provincial politicians, particularly for provincial fisheries ministers.

Political cooptation is at the root of this innovation. While the FPAPC is more administrative, the AFMC takes a more political approach; some politics may certainly apply, but provincial ministers, except for their immediate provincial jurisdiction, can bring very little influence to bear on management. Federal Ministers can listen and, in some cases, accede to special, minor, issue-specific concerns. Nevertheless, the Minister has the final say.

7. Final review by the Minister and his/her regional advisors. A plan is usually confirmed by January 1st in the year following initial formulation of the plan.

Another recent innovation in this process is the creation of the Atlantic Regional Council (ARC), established by the new Conservative government in 1985. Composed of representatives from all parts of the industry, the ARC reviews any "policy items that might be referred to it and provides advice directly to the Minister."⁶³ Issues can range from factory freezer trawlers to foreign vessel insurance programs. Through this forum, the Minister can 'get a handle on' what the industry is thinking about, as well as communicating concerns to the industry at large.

In short, multi-value decision-making is thus a feature of the formal consultative process; discretion by both bureaucrats and politicians must be balanced against the needs of long-term administrative rationality in fisheries management. The ultimate goal is to erect a balance between objective and subjective considerations.

The emphasis on a formal organizational structure prevents those unable to master the skills of such an environment from having a direct impact, or from having feelings of efficacy. Given the unique occupational environment of fishing communities, the resulting conclusion which can be drawn is that inshore fishermen are not equipped to deal with the formal organizational structure in terms of both decision-making bodies (e.g., advisory committees) and structures which try to represent the concerns of fishermen to government (e.g., various pressure groups). Evidence of such disaffection can be cited in the work of Apostle, Kasdan and Hanson (1984), as well as in Kearney's work on fishermen in Southwestern Nova Scotia. Both of these studies illustrate high degrees of political inefficacy with respect to formal consultative/advisory processes and their related management processes, as formulated by the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans.⁶⁴ In effect, these preliminary failures are indicative of the attempt to design structures which are organizationally pluralistic, but which have had little or no relevance to fishermen, given their unique norms and values.

The basic thrust of most of the representative structures has evolved away from preconceived bureaucratic conceptions concerning the most appropriate mode of gaining input from the public. As Pross has observed, bureaucratic prerequisites concerning pressure group activity stress the continuing existence of organizations which are cognizant of the bureaucratic environment, but which can be expected to be representative of its views. Such conceptions assume the ability of the particular constituency to give its allegiance to a particular organizational representative, as well as an ability to determine particular policy platforms which can thus be transmitted to government in an expeditious and

timely fashion and, without having to grab media attention, in a low-key manner. These skills have never been present among small-scale fishermen. In sum, as the next section illustrates, pluralist conceptions are irrelevant when applied to inshore fishermen; no one group has emerged which is capable of articulating the views of all small-scale fishermen in Atlantic Canada.

The Problems of Fishermen's Organizations:

As noted earlier, a large part of the consultative/advisory process involving inshore fishermen institutionalizes the concept of organizations capable of representing the interests of local fishermen. The main problem with this orientation has been that the concept of popular organizational representation has not been a popular solution to the problems of gaining representation from inshore fishermen. This is certainly not to deny the fact that fishermen's organizations do exist which are attempting to gain the allegiance of inshore fishermen. At the same time, however, the fact still remains that no one group exists that is capable of representing in one organization all the fishermen in Atlantic Canada. There are several groups in the region - the Eastern Fishermen's Federation (EFF), the Maritime Fishermen's Union (MFU), and the Newfoundland Fishermen's Food and Allied Workers' Union (NFFAWU) - which have come closest to this ideal, and which have been able to secure representation on the various consultative committees.

In many cases, the important thing to remember is that the impetus for the formation of these groups did not come from fishermen themselves, but from government. The drive for organization really began in 1974 when the new federal Minister of Fisheries, Romeo Leblanc, formally enunciated the

federal policy of encouraging the formation of organizations capable of representing and conveying the views of fishermen to government.⁶⁵ Such a policy, while very much consistent with bureaucratic norms and values, was certainly not consistent with the occupational attitudes which characterize the inshore fishery.

Given the foregoing analysis of the inshore fishery, several reasons suggest themselves for the failure of fishermen to form an all-encompassing organization prior to the 1970s. The political system, composed as it was of encapsulated political structures which related to the greater political world through a system of patron-client relationships, was in itself an expression of the primary mode of interaction with government. This type of interaction was consistent with the unique occupational environment of many fishing communities. Clearly, the Toryist strain had produced a *quid pro quo* in the style of political accommodation characterizing fishermen's relationships with government. The politician, recruited mainly from the various commercial, professional or clerical strata of society, was able to act as a 'gatekeeper' in funnelling the resource to the most deserving. The system was also supplemented by a healthy contingent of 'political' fishermen - respected inshore fishermen who played an active role within the community - possessing reciprocal connections with local politicians. These community figures could funnel their support to local politicians in exchange for receiving special programs or rewards. Given the appropriative paradigm and the policy consensus concerning the expansion and development of economic infrastructure, such a system was adequate to meet the issue-specific demands placed on it.

By no means does this mean that collective efforts were not undertaken by fishermen. However, the issue had to be of specific importance and had

to affect fishermen directly in order to motivate them to action. Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that collective ventures tended to be very small, based within the local community, and disbanded as soon as the issue was resolved.

One of the most important perennial issues in fishing communities - wharf repair - is indicative of this type of orientation. In any community, the wharf is an important component for all fishermen in the locality. In sum, it is an issue which affects all fishermen who make use of the facility. Fishermen in another community who do not use that particular wharf will not, of course, be concerned. In sum, the occurrence of wharf repair problems as a general rallying point for short-term cooperation was very much consistent with localist attitudes. The appropriative nature of the request was very much evident in the bureaucratic choice of which government department should look after such requests - viz., the Department of Public Works, which by its very nature is an appropriator, rather than a regulator.

The situation changed drastically in the 1970s, as the bureaucratic decision-making process with its new regulatory thrust was brought to bear on fisheries policy. Policy objectives could not be attained without more direct intervention in the local patterns and lifestyles of inshore fishing communities. The inadequacy of representation meant that some frameworks of representation would have to be created.

The response to this need was a participation by both levels of government in the funding of specific pressure groups. In so doing, the hope was to create a group capable of speaking for the majority, or at least for a plurality, of fishermen. The basic flaw in this approach was that it assumed that a bureaucratic approach could be applied to a constituency

which had previously had no experience with any type of organizational operation or orientation.

Much of the bureaucratic thinking assumed an ethnocentric bias, with the inherent assumption that, if the resources were provided, the organizational facets would appear, with accompanying skills and abilities to communicate with the administrators in acceptable ways. The occupational value systems were not complementary. This type of representation was not consistent with the political culture of most fishing communities, which did not sanction the type of political activity characteristic of most mass societies. The localism of most fishing communities, as well as their basic, informal, short-term approach to the solution of problems, were impediments to any type of long-term structural response to the difficulties of creating and maintaining groups representative of fishermen. In sum, bureaucratic conceptions of legitimate forms of representation were outside the cultural nature, attributes and attitudes of most fishermen.

For our purposes, the organizations which will be the focus of discussion will be those which have formed in the post-1974 period. A variety of classifications has been offered, in order to make some sense out of the multitude of organizational instruments which claim to speak for fishermen.⁶⁶ While generalizations are difficult, all fishermen's organizations display a necessary acknowledgement of the unique occupational attributes of fishermen. The formation of pressure groups brings with it a necessary acknowledgement of the structural facet of the group as an absolute imperative.

David Kwavnick has distinguished between the organizational and the ostensible goals of a group, the latter becoming subordinated to the interests of the former.⁶⁷ In very few cases has any type of organizational

goals been emphasized above the immediate ostensible goals. In the case of most fishermen's organizations, the acknowledgement of a need for a permanent organization is non-existent. Those groups which have been formed by the fishermen themselves have generally been on a very local basis, with very little need for the investment of time and energy necessary to foster a long-term organization.

Case Study: The Nova Scotia Fishermen's Association (NSFA)

The case of the NSFA is an instance of an organization whose features were inappropriate to the basic occupational norms of fishermen. Originally called the Atlantic Fishermen's Association (AFA), the Association was the first attempt to bring fishermen into a regional framework. Attempts at organizing fishermen date back to the 1930s.⁶⁸ Like these earlier attempts, the AFA/NSFA had folded by the early 1980s; at present, the NSFA only exists in Southwestern Nova Scotia, where it represents scallop fishermen. Since the NSFA is an inclusive illustration of the problems of organizing fishermen, it deserves special consideration, aside from the later organizational types which will be examined.

A prime feature of most literature on pressure group activity has stressed the basic assumption that the internal organization of most groups is kept up through some pattern of incentives in order to maintain the basic cohesion of the organization, as well as to encourage membership. The underlying assumption is that an individual is able to make a judgement of self-interest and to identify a collective interest in belonging to an organization. Mancur Olson, for example, has identified what he terms to be selective over purposive inducements in motivating individuals to join an organization in order to further collective action. Individuals will be

inclined to be "free-riders" if the nature of the benefits to be derived is beyond the perceived cost of group membership.⁶⁹

All groups need a special set of incentives that contribute to the ongoing maintenance of the group. Peter Clarke and James Wilson discuss incentive systems as a viable tool with which to analyze the viability of certain organizations. Specifically, they refer to three types of incentives:

- 1) material incentives, or tangible amelioration of an individual's own financial position;
- 2) solidary incentives, or certain rewards which are intangible; and
- 3) purposive incentives, or those which derive from the assigned mandate of the organization.⁷⁰

These arguments concerning incentives assume the existence of a tried method of measurement for all types of individuals and occupations. The central point to be made is that the type of incentive is derived from the specific cultural perception rooted in the pluralist ideology, which assumes that utility measurement can account for the formation of organizations, given appropriate inducements. The NSFA illustrated that, with respect to fishermen, these conceptions concerning the positive good of group organization are irrelevant. Attempts to impose preconceived representational structures on fishermen, with their different cultural mindset, were to say the least unsuccessful.

The AFA was formed "in the forecandle of a sixty-five-foot stern trawler, Lady Rosanna, March 5, 1974, in Yarmouth, N.S., out of utter frustration with bungling and misguided fishing policies of government."⁷¹ The early 1970s had created a crisis situation within the industry that had raised the awareness of every fishermen to a realization that a collective

effort was absolutely essential. The fact that foreign overfishing of fishing grounds off Southwestern Nova Scotia was allowed, or at least not deterred, at the same time that the same grounds were closed to local fishermen, proved to be sufficient stimulus for the formation of the AFA.

The AFA's main mandate was to speak with one voice to government, to create a group which could be perceived to be legitimate in the eyes of government and the rightful spokesman of all fishermen - inshore and offshore. The original structure was based on the concept of direct membership, which attempted to unite all fishermen, regardless of the sector with which they were identified. In the early days, fish processors were members of the AFA; later, however, they were excluded.

The AFA also received aid from the Nova Scotia Government, which provided \$40,000 to facilitate the implementation of viable organizational structures.⁷² As its name implies, the ambition of the AFA was to cover and represent all fishermen in the four Atlantic Provinces. Provision was made in the AFA's original constitution for a Board of Directors, which would give regional representation to the various fishermen's communities, as opposed to direct sectoral representation.

In any organization, leadership is particularly important. In order to be persuaded that the organization is at least legitimate and competent, the rank-and-file must have ~~the~~ confidence that it is being run efficiently. Robert Salisbury, for example, talks about the emergence of an entrepreneur who, to induce membership, tries to translate certain incentives into positive benefits.⁷³ Given the unique localist attitudes of fishing communities, a hypothesis which can be derived is that the personal qualities of leadership are extremely important, not only for winning the confidence of fishermen, but also in helping to think like and work with the

bureaucratic environment. In short, given the localism of fishing communities and the prerequisites of bureaucratic operation, successful leadership - either as a single person or as a collective group - must have the personal qualities to bridge the gap.

There is considerable evidence that the original members of the AFA/NSFA were able to bridge this duality. Most of the leaders had some experience in dealing with or using government services, particularly the administrative departments. As far back as the 1960s, Dick Stewart, the AFA's first Executive President and Secretary-Treasurer, had been introduced to a number of key people in the Ottawa bureaucracy through his work with local fishermen in obtaining Coast Guard patrols.⁷⁴ Wayne Thorburne, a highly-respected skipper in West Pubnico, was engaged in offshore and groundfishing, and had maintained contacts with political and bureaucratic officials in Ottawa. Such qualities were extremely rare, particularly within an occupational environment which does not place a premium on communications skills or formal administrative/organizational skills. John Coulton, for example, a later Executive Director of the NSFA, had been a field representative with the Nova Scotia Department of Fisheries.⁷⁵

These individuals approximate Bailey's theory of the cooptation of members of the local political structure by the greater political structure, in an attempt to socialize them to its own norms and values. In sum, these men had some potential for success, not only because they were part of the local community environment, but also because they had been exposed to the bureaucracy and had some understanding of its environmental functions.

The AFA, however, was never able to develop the necessary structures which would have given it an identity of its own. From the beginning, its structure was very informal, consisting of a President, a Vice President and

a Board of Directors, as well as an Executive Director.⁷⁶ From the beginning, the AFA was forced to deal with immediate issues, instead of trying to develop ongoing policy positions. For example, the issues of offshore lobster fishing and groundfish quotas tended to divide fishermen, rather than unite them. These issues were directly and personally important to fishermen and disagreement about them tended to reinforce the localist thrust in the fishery. In the case of groundfish quotas, the issue involved a continuation of the dispute over who was allowed to have access to the rich fisheries of Georges' Bank and Brown's Bank - boats under sixty-five feet in length or boats over sixty-five feet in length (i.e., inshore versus offshore).⁷⁷ The resulting cleavages were certainly a problem in such a situation; the fact that most of the boats in the inshore fleet were located in Southwestern Nova Scotia further exacerbated the problems of trying to break down community tendencies in other parts of the province with similar offshore or midshore capacities.

The question of an offshore lobster fishery was perhaps the most explosive. Traditionally, the industry in Southwestern Nova Scotia was primarily an inshore-sector industry; lobster was a higher-priced species because of high public demand. As a result, this sector became an important constituency which had to be accommodated. Thus, another important element within the industry was split along regional lines.

Dick Stewart's position as Executive Director of AFA was thus compromised from the very beginning. Unable to reconcile competing claims, the AFA was unfavourably received in other parts of the Atlantic region. Even within Southwestern Nova Scotia, support was never guaranteed at any one time.⁷⁸ In essence, Stewart faced the problem of how to reconcile the competing interests of the different fishermen's sectors. Taking a position

on one issue - for example, on different types of fishing gear - would alienate some other constituency in a nearby community. In such a situation, the importance of the personal incentives the leadership could offer was extremely marginal, given the incentives which the leadership could command. If there was any personal trust in Dick Stewart, for example, the internal divisions within the organization were insufficient to unite the AFA and to develop the necessary organizational expertise.

In 1976, a reorganization took place in which the nucleus of the AFA was reorganized into the NSFA. The decision to reorganize came about for a number of reasons, most significant of which was the failure of the AFA to gain a foothold outside Southwestern Nova Scotia. The impetus towards reorganization was also spurred on by the speech of the federal Minister of Fisheries, Romeo Leblanc, who desired the organization of fishermen in order for them to be able to deal with government.

The Province of Nova Scotia also aided the new Association by extending another grant, this time in the amount of \$50,000. In so doing, the Province alienated rival groups, which had also approached the government for financial assistance.⁷⁹ Clearly, the Province had greater confidence in the new Executive Director, John Coulton, who was not only born and brought up in Southwestern Nova Scotia, the base of the NSFA's support, but who had also been employed with the Provincial Department of Fisheries as a field representative. Like Dick Stewart before him, Coulton had a very good chance of marshalling the potential resources of the new Association, and of winning the confidence of inshore fishermen.

At the same time, however, the fact that the Province chose to aid the NSFA over other potential groups was a liability, in that it reinforced the image of the NSFA as being run by and dominated for the political ends of

government. Fishermen, reluctant to make any commitment, were given an additional excuse not to join an organization whose main perceived purpose was to "rubber-stamp" the policies of the Provincial Department of Fisheries. Moreover, the imposition of an organizational framework which was also unfamiliar to most fishermen was not an asset. The principle of fixed times for meetings and preparation of position papers was foreign to most fishermen. In sum, the organizational facets of the administrative milieu, so much a vital part of it, were foreign to the occupational environment of most fishermen who, given the old style of government interaction - namely, patron-clientelism - had had little prior contact with this milieu.

The NSFA's structure provided for a six-person Board of Directors, as well as for the provision of dues of not less than ten dollars per year. The framework of the NSFA was based on the principle of local community meetings to select the local executive officers; one member from each local executive would be named to sit on the NSFA Board of Directors. The principle of an annual convention was never implemented. In most instances, the procedure was for the Executive Director to travel to the local areas of the province, make an announcement about a meeting to be held and solicit membership, as well as views on specific issues. The annual meeting held in March consisted of the full Board of Directors.⁸⁰

Inexperience within the Association was a crucial problem. Although Coulton had contacts within the provincial government, his knowledge of the mass media was minimal. Although the possibility of a great deal of free coverage for the NSFA existed, the opportunity put its views across, which would have served to consolidate its position, was missed through inexperience.

From the beginning, the main problem was one of increasing the membership. After all, the main function of the NSFA was to make headway in areas outside the Southwestern region of the province. By November, 1978, membership had increased to 3,000; but most of the gains were made in Yarmouth and Shelburne Counties, while the rest of the province remained without any meaningful representation. Coulton himself admitted that the aim was ideally to increase membership to 6,000 people.⁸¹ More money was required from the province, however, to make this a reality. Obviously, such a statement was not a positive sign for the future.

The problems in membership derived directly from the issue of dues collection. The concept of paying for membership individually was one which held little meaning for fishermen in local communities. The challenge was to convince these fishermen that there was a need to pay dues over a fixed time period. The concept, which assumed the existence of an organizational association, was not well received by fishermen in general;

A fisherman would...pay dues [at first]...but how to collect those dues in a year or two was the big problem...[the fishermen] were slow at paying and that was the major difficulty [in sustaining the Association].⁸²

In short, dues-paying remained outside the realm of the immediate cultural conceptions of most fishermen; the notion of a regularization of support to provide an organization was not relevant. Such a financing scheme ignored the unique migratory habits of fishermen. Many were simply off on their boats, and there was little time to be concerned with the problems of who was to represent them, let alone the welfare of the Association itself.

The type of incentive system such an organization could provide—namely, long-term political representation—did not appeal to the localism of fishermen. The situation seemed to be a matter of "being too successful

in cutting off things before we got them to issues."⁸³ Most groups try to work with government behind the scenes, in order to head off issues before they become major crises. Conflicts over gear, for example, were either resolved or debated internally before they snowballed into major crises. Paradoxically, the organization's success undermined its own foundation for existence among fishermen. Instead of entrenching legitimacy by proving its utility, these functions proved only to undermine and inhibit a more long-term response to fisheries policy.

The NSFA was also being challenged by rival organizations, most notably the Maritime Fishermen's Union (MFU) which, while strong on the Eastern Shore and on the Northumberland Strait, had difficulty penetrating the NSFA's base of support in Southwestern Nova Scotia. The effect of the encroachment of the MFU was to inhibit and, in some cases, weaken further the efforts of the NSFA to mount an offensive in areas of the province where its representation was already weak.

The emphasis on personalities was also indicative of the strength of the industry over that of the organization. John Coulton, for example, felt that the confidence in him displayed by the membership was extremely important. Loyalty to the person, as opposed to loyalty to the organization, signifies a much different pattern of authority. In terms of the total incentive system, the ability of a member within a province-wide association to have direct contact with one individual of the personnel comprising the leadership is extremely unlikely. As a result, the level of personalization is not sufficient to outweigh the monetary or related socio-economic costs of membership.

The formation of the NSFA was an attempt to install an organization where none had previously existed. The problem of the personalization of

authority, however, was an impediment to the expansion of a necessary membership base. Coulton was aware, even on trips to the other side of the province, that the strength of localist considerations was obvious. For example, at one NSFA meeting in Pictou in April of 1978, such issues as fishing for gaspereaux at the Causeway Lock, tie-up facilities for fishermen in Pictou Harbour, better bait supplies or negotiations with companies regarding the coming summer's lobster prices and catch "...were more important than longer-range problems."⁸⁴ These were considerations affecting fishermen directly on a day-to-day basis; in the long term, however, if the organization could not deliver on its promises of help, the ability to maintain internal cohesion would be severely limited.

With the end of provincial assistance in 1978, the NSFA began to face the prospect of operating on its own. The fact that annual dues were raised from \$10 to \$25 did not help the process of recruitment. As a result, the Association remained a limited spokesman.

The fact that the NSFA was accorded membership on the various federal consultative advisory panels regarding fisheries management did little to advance its prospects. For John Coulton, attendance at these panels only served to increase his workload. Moreover, despite his recognition by the two levels of government as a legitimate spokesman for fishermen, the issues of regulations and quota allocations covered by these panels only seemed to split further the various sectors - regional, species and gear-type - and to exacerbate the problems between them. The NSFA could disagree with the federal and provincial governments, but many of the policy alternatives they proposed were either ignored or so 'watered-down' that they could be dismissed as unacceptable by the DFO bureaucrats, skilled as they are in

their specific methods of analysis and given their mandate to conserve the resource.

Moreover, the fact that the NSFA was being recognized was its own undoing. Short-term affluence in the fishery eroded the solidarity which fishermen had evolved over the previous three years. The extension of jurisdiction to 200 miles was greeted with optimism, and better prices and catches seemed to dissipate the crisis the industry had been experiencing. The individualism inherent within the industry reasserted itself among many who were potential members. It was impossible to organize a membership drive in the summer, given the fact that inshore fishermen were busy fishing. In many cases, the weather was just as important in determining the success of membership drives. Such uncertainty inhibited the success of the organization.

Collective bargaining was another issue that divided fishermen. At issue was the nature of the relationship between fishermen and processors. Coulton did not see the need for a union to negotiate catch prices with the processors; the NSFA was perfectly capable of doing this, if it was able to represent the majority of fishermen in the province.⁸⁵ At issue was the conception of how fishermen should be viewed: were they small entrepreneurs or were they wage-earners? The NSFA concept favoured the entrepreneurial viewpoint, as opposed to the collective unionist viewpoint espoused by the MFU. Instinctively, the question also revolved around how community relationships with the industry should be arranged. In Southwestern Nova Scotia, relationships between fishermen and processors, although strained by the problems of setting prices for groundfish, were never adversarial. In practice, many processors (former fishermen themselves) were running small, independent, or one- to two-plant operations, with very little ability to

purchase a fleet of vessels directly. Moreover, most local processors were entrepreneurs, building their operations in the same way as other fishermen. Combined with a relatively short-term affluence, there seemed to be little need for a long-term response. Strikes, for example, were considered to be prejudicial to the welfare of the entire industry, and potentially damaging to the informal contacts with government built up over the years.

A close look at the composition of the NSFA's membership can also serve to illustrate where the Association drew its support from, and how. In early 1979, the NSFA membership stood at 3,600 members, almost equally distributed across the scallop, dragger and inshore sectors. With inshore fishermen comprising 80% of the total industry, they were clearly not represented in proportion to their numbers; representation by the crucial inshore lobster sector was virtually non-existent.⁸⁶ The deficiency was due to the NSFA's inability to speak for all fishermen in the Province. The scallopers and the draggers - the more offshore sectors of the NSFA - were, in effect, subsidizing the "free-riders", particularly the inshore gillnet/groundfishery, who were, on an economic basis, the most marginal membership within the Association.

The fact that the level of free-ridership was high illustrates the problems of mobilizing a traditionally marginal constituency. Since the NSFA was trying to represent all fishermen, there was little possibility of limiting the collective good; all fishermen would benefit, whether they became dues-paying members or not. A successful set of inducements was not grounded on any kind of monetary or political basis. In many ways, the constituency did not identify with the framework of the Association.

In February, 1979, John Coulton resigned as Executive Director of the NSFA, citing as major problems, the isolation from fishermen and the endless

string of government meetings.⁸⁷ Threats were heard about the dissolution of the Association by April. A new injection of blood was provided in the form of a new proposal in a report by James Shand, a consultant to the NSFA who was employed at the time as Secretary of the Nova Scotia Egg and Poultry Producers' Marketing Board. The proposal was to raise \$300,000 through the collection of fees from dues-paying members, primarily in the scallop and dragger sectors. Under the proposed arrangement, scallopers would pay \$150 per man, while dragger fishermen would pay \$25 per foot of boat length. In addition, those members who desired to join the Association would be required to pay one percent per man of the value of their total catch.

In effect, the proposal amounted to a major reorganization. The Shand Report was the cornerstone of a public proposal, published in The Sou'wester in March, 1979. The architects of the proposal were committed to remedying what they considered to be a lack of unity caused by the "absence of a process by which fishermen can achieve agreement on what things the Association should be doing."⁸⁸ That the issue was about disagreement, rather than unity, was a clear illustration of this:

Too many members want to concentrate on the differences that divide them, rather than the similarities which unite them. Too many members are frustrated by the meetings and feel that there is no way for them to contribute and be heard.⁸⁹

The proposal addressed the issue of unity:

The solution to this problem is to organize interest groups within the Association. An interest group would consist of a group of members with a common interest....⁹⁰

In making the proposal, Shand was trying to implement a style of internal sectoral representation that could be capable of mobilizing support from all parts of the industry - from inshore fishermen, as well as

draggers and scallopers. Shand himself was appointed General Manager of the new Association. In the main, his experience in pressure group politics had been in the realm of agriculture; he envisioned the NSFA as having a future similar to that of the Nova Scotia Federation of Agriculture - i.e., acting as an umbrella over all disparate sectors which would belong by virtue of their immediate community associations. In this way, the goal was to erect a similar style of organization to function as a base from which to articulate concerns:

Well, what I had in mind was that these fishermen who were engaged in different fisheries would belong to the Association in sort of a sub-category, that being their particular fishery....⁹¹

The various groups comprising the sectoral representation framework would each be assigned a field worker who would be mandated to organize meetings and communicate the results to the Association's Board of Directors. Subjects for discussion at these meetings would include any issue relevant to the particular sector of the industry involved. If an issue involved more than one committee, the management of the Association "would be responsible for arranging the process by which the conflicts between industry segments would be resolved."⁹² Meetings would be arranged, to be composed of members from different sector committees. The aim was to try to reconcile areas of cleavage by concentrating on areas of mutual interest and by compromising on areas of interference.⁹³

The organization's structure provided for a Board of Directors, as well as a General Manager to direct its daily affairs. The major groups to be solicited in the reorganization would be herring gillnetters, scallopers, draggers with boats less than 125 feet long, long-liners, herring seiners, offshore lobstermen, and swordfishermen.

At general meetings of both potential and present members, the above proposals were to be put forward for ratification through a show of hands. In short, the refinancing scheme and the reorganization itself were further attempts to build up a classical style of pressure group activity where none had previously existed. The proposal was clearly an attempt to create a more professionalized attitude towards political representation, by finding a way to obtain the resources necessary to maintain its independence from government. In so doing, the hope was clearly to design a formal structure that would attempt a province-wide organization, while trying to preserve the values of the local communities.

The Shand proposal was, in effect, an attempt to convert the NSFA into an umbrella organization. Umbrellas, however, are extremely diffuse structures, placing power with the components, rather than at the centre. Theoretically, the structure would work if the components could be convinced to place their faith within the organization. Again, the conflict seemed to revolve around the conception of how fishermen perceived government and their realization that any type of long-term institutionalized cooperation was unnecessary, if not irrelevant, to the way in which their lifestyle and occupation operated within the community. Informality was now being replaced by formality, reflected in a structured, formal response to the problems of the industry.

A mixture of problems and issues inhibited Shand from making the reorganization a substantial success. To counter the collective bargaining philosophy of the MFU concerning fish prices, Shand had proposed the construction of a fisheries service centre in Shelburne County, which would be capable of storing and freezing fish, as well as supplying essential supplies to fishermen, thus acting as a counterweight to their excessive

dependence on the processors in price negotiations.⁹⁴ Reaction to the proposal was cool, particularly from the provincial government which had changed in 1978. The Conservatives did not support continued financial assistance to the Association, favouring an organization which could be free of perceived government influence.⁹⁵ The perceived close association with the previous Liberal government enjoyed by the NSFA could be a source of continuing suspicion to the now Conservative government. The appointment of Liberal MLA Hugh Tinkham to the post of Assistant Manager of the NSFA's Offshore Scallop Sector in March, 1979, did not reassure the government that the NSFA was no longer affiliated with the Liberal Party.⁹⁶

By the summer of 1979, the long-range goal of organizing fishermen on a provincial basis was becoming more remote. The regional storage centre proposal, for example, placed more emphasis on the local communities than on the province as a whole. Although the desire was eventually to organize outside Southwestern Nova Scotia, in order to fulfill the mandate of a provincial organization, the Association was preoccupied with trying to prevent its dissolution. A great deal of NSFA policy during this period was also not clearly defined. As a result, the NSFA came in for extensive criticism from those who felt it was not in tune with its potential membership. The Association's response was to appeal to its members for their input: "The Association's policies cannot come from the staff - they must receive them from the fishermen themselves."⁹⁷

The problem with potential members was a contradiction of the concept of organizational membership - a willingness to criticize, but not the same willingness to join the Association. With no members or resources, the NSFA's ability to take major policy positions was inhibited. The inshore sector, in particular, could fault the NSFA for making a major decision on a

certain issue, but could not agree even on the minimal requirement of organization participation - the first step in establishing the forum in which to arbitrate such an issue. Issues beyond those of the immediate community were a source of conflict, not unity.

Whether the service centre project could have succeeded is open to question. The more serious problem was to increase membership and to raise the necessary capital to permit organizational survival - in other words, to reconcile issue-specific needs with the need to erect an organization capable of providing leadership to solve specific issues. In short, it was the classic question of reconciling organization with ostensible goals.

The membership recruitment plan ran into the summer season, when all the fishermen were busily engaged. The problems of the NSFA were of little consequence to fishermen who were busy trying to make a living. By the fall, the NSFA was out of money. Jim Shand was prompted to "lay himself off" from the Association in October, 1979.⁹⁸ The event marked the formal termination of the NSFA's attempts to organize outside Southwestern Nova Scotia. By 1980, the NSFA had evolved into an umbrella organization which was, at best, ad hoc and fluid. With little membership from the inshore and lobster sectors, the NSFA decided to cease representing their concerns, although they could still form associations under the NSFA umbrella.⁹⁹

The evolving status of the NSFA as an umbrella organization can be demonstrated by the activities of the more powerful groups under its aegis, particularly the scallop sector. In March, 1980, the scallop sector was able to adopt its own constitution and a Board of Directors, while retaining direct representation on the NSFA's Board. Dues were also cut from \$150 to \$125 per person. Scallopers were clearly an important source within the organization. As a result, they could alter the representational basis of

support. The scallop sector is really the only part of the industry still under the NSFA umbrella; the present title utilized is the NSFA - Scallop Sector.¹⁰⁰

Compared to the scallop sector, the dragger sector has not been as successful. Clayton D'Entremont became the new General Manager of the NSFA after the departure of Jim Shand, and Yvon Thibault remained as President and spokesman. As prosperity began to decline in the early 1980s, the dragger sector was unable to deal effectively with a drop in haddock prices. In 1981, the draggersmen belonging to the NSFA tied up their boats, in a bid to force higher prices from the processor for their fish. Long-liners continued to fish and filled in the slack left by the draggersmen. In the end, the tie-up was ended by the promise of some type of federal aid.

In 1982, lack of interest resulted in Clayton D'Entremont's resignation, and the NSFA - Dragger Sector lapsed at that time.¹⁰¹ Only recently, a new organization, the Nova Scotia Draggersmen's Association, has formed to represent the needs of this constituency.

The central point to be drawn from this analysis is that the traditional form of organizational structure, as favoured by government, proved to be inappropriate as a representational framework for fishermen. While the Shand proposal may have succeeded, applying the concept of a fixed organizational structure, possessing a certain administrative competence to deal with government, to the migratory seasonal nature of the fishery was certainly a failure.

Organizational maintenance assumes a certain sedentariness in potential members with respect to the ability to raise funds. Fishermen are highly mobile; as Shand discovered, the summer was certainly the wrong time to hold

an organizing drive to gain membership or to talk about the virtues of the NSFA. As the general economic climate improved, fishermen became engaged in making a living, and they resumed their traditional, individual perspective with respect to their immediate community environment. Finally, the fact that the NSFA slowly disintegrated not only attests to the divisive issues involved, but also to the general loyalty to the immediate locality invoked by the occupation itself. The failure of the attempted reorganization into an umbrella framework attests, as well, to the strong pull of the local environment. In short, direct membership was a failure. Even today, the more successful organizational frameworks have provided some formulae for grassroots autonomy. As will be noted later, the most popular form of collective representation is still the small association, and some of them are financially assisted by regional offices of the DFO.

Another important point to note with respect to all fishermen's organizations, including the NSFA, is the importance of government - in particular, the bureaucracy - in fostering the specific framework for creating what are perceived to be proper forms of representation. These forms of representation are designed to be capable of satisfying the bureaucratic conventions, in order to aid in gaining appropriate spokesmen for their own tasks. Given the problems of maintaining formal organizational goals and the premium which most consultative committees place on having the appropriate representation, the effect is to divorce the average fisherman from the consultative process, rather than to allow him the opportunity of participating in it. Increasingly, bureaucratic norms and values translate into the need to retain personnel within representative frameworks which complement the administrative approach to decision-making and which have the ability to approximate the conventions and behaviours of

respective personnel. This not only requires a specific degree of occupational professionalization, but also the same type of social environment.

In many instances, fishermen are outside the professional environment. If fishermen, particularly in the inshore sector, are unable to relate to the organizational environment, the credibility of their arguments is weakened in dealing with bureaucrats and processors who are attuned to the formality of organization. As a result, the tendency towards multi-value decision-making is increased; arguments not perceived to be presented in the appropriate manner by fishermen or their representatives can be more easily dismissed by the more articulate professional bureaucrat.

Personnel in the bureaucratic environment are trained in the management of organizations and in the way they operate; indeed, most enterprises do have some expertise at using and manipulating organizational structures. Such ability is not a skill which is endemic to the occupational milieu of small-scale fishing.

In sum, the experience of the NSFA has illustrated the occupational discomplementarity in terms of the perceived biases in what administrators and fishermen desire. In the milieu of the fisherman, bureaucratic perceptions of the proper role for representation are irrelevant and serve to disenfranchise fishermen from taking an effective role in their own representation.

Fishermen's Organizations: The Present Situation:

Aside from the NSFA, there have been four basic organizational responses to the problems of representation for fishermen: -1) the association, 2) the cooperative, 3) the union and 4) the federation.

1. The Association:

This has generally been the most conducive method for utilizing the basic capacities of fishermen themselves. On the average, association membership ranges from 15 to 75 members. The pattern of meetings varies, depending on the issue or policy question on the agenda; some associations are presently inactive, due to the absence of pressing issues. Some associations, although not all, were encouraged in their formation by the local DFO officials, as a way of providing some form of representation for fishermen.

A good example of this orientation is the Bear Point/Shag Harbour/Wood Harbour Fishermen's Association (BSWFA), an organization which represents fishermen in these three communities of Southwestern Nova Scotia. The basic constitution of the BSWFA had a built-in provision specifying that 51% of the total membership should reside in these three communities.¹⁰² The issue which helped the Association to establish its local base of support was the tagging of lobster traps. Since this community was primarily one of lobster fishermen, tagging was the prime method used to identify a particular fisherman's set of lobster traps. Those traps without tags were deemed to be in operation against regulations and were confiscated. A period of extra-firm enforcement of the regulation resulted in the seizure of a number of traps. Fishermen of the BSWFA alleged that their tags were becoming dislodged in the water. But the continuing intransigence of the DFO concerning the regulation resulted in the sinking of two DFO patrol vessels off Pubnico in 1983.¹⁰³

Another example of such a style of organization is the now-dormant Island Inshore Fishermen's Association (IIFA), an organization which

formed in the peninsula region of Digby Neck in Southwestern Nova Scotia.¹⁰⁴ Total IIFA membership was only 70 members. The peninsula region includes two small islands and the only link between them is a series of car ferries which ply between the area's communities. In all, the total length of this peninsula is only 40 miles, covering the small island communities of Tiverton, Freeport and Westport. Dependent primarily on fishing, these communities were, as a result of their isolation, not traditionally disposed towards cooperative efforts.

...we had three communities on two islands...and traditionally, there were sort of three separate communities that didn't work all that well together.¹⁰⁵

The issue which triggered the group's formation was a storm which damaged fishing gear and facilities, coupled with a perceived threat that Ottawa was going to tax the monetary assistance offered. This provided a common purpose for generating some common response.

...there was a big storm and it destroyed quite a lot of boats, a lot of fish sheds, and people needed assistance...the government apparently wanted to charge income tax on the money that they sent us to get back on our feet, sort of insurance, and we got together to more or less protect ourselves there, and we built just from there.¹⁰⁶

The issue of government taxation was what touched all the communities in the area. In sum, because of this common bond, a limited organization was formed.

These types of organizations can be considered as the basic unit which bona fide fishermen will themselves utilize. In the case of both of the organizations mentioned above, the impetus was clearly issue-related. The problem of lobster tags strengthened the BSWFA, while the

resolution of other issues brought about the dormancy of the IIFA. The important thing to remember is the compactness of these units and their informality. The formulation of a constitution or a set of by-laws is extremely time-consuming, nor is it always possible to have the constitution or by-laws available when needed. In the case of one association in Prince Edward Island, the author received a much-cherished copy of its by-laws, with the provision that it be returned as soon as the author made a copy for himself.¹⁰⁷ Another organization in Prince Edward Island, the Southern Kings Fishermen's Association, nearly disbanded in 1984 through its failure to elect a new executive.¹⁰⁸

In sum, the basic association unit is generally a small and informal operation, formed in a time of crisis. Most of these associations disband with the resolution of the immediate problem, although there are some exceptions. With the formation of the Eastern Fishermen's Federation (EFF) in 1979 (see item 4 below), a further impetus was created for the formation of such organizations. As will be noted later, however, most of these small associations are themselves members of the EFF.

2. The Cooperative:

This movement is usually associated with the United Maritime Fishermen (UMF), a group which grew out of the extension movement in the 1930s at St. Francis Xavier University in Antigonish, Nova Scotia. The extension movement was firmly rooted in the tradition of self-help as expounded by the Catholic Church. Through cooperation and acting together, fishermen could accomplish common tasks.

The UMF had its greatest popularity in the three Maritime Provinces. It can be classified broadly as an economic organization in which political activity has evolved as a by-product of its *raison d'être*. The UMF drew its greatest strength in the three Maritime Provinces, as well. Many observers have linked the training of the UMF to the emergence of later organizations, particularly on Prince Edward Island, where the tradition of self-help developed the necessary local leadership ability.¹⁰⁹

The Church's role in the formation of the UMF indicates a more parochial attitude towards organization. In many rural communities, the influence of the religious leaders evolved merely because of the lack of any alternative sources of educated leadership who may have promoted a more secular attitude towards collective efforts. In many community settings, the Catholic pastor was the natural leader, the "only one that could write a letter or express in public a possible problem and solution."¹¹⁰ The community looked to the Catholic clergy for the necessary leadership and support.

Another important point to be made is that fishermen did not lead in the establishment of the UMF; rather, the emphasis came from a different sector of society, which possessed both the respect and the necessary leadership skills to make such a project a reality. The Church appealed across the basic linguistic cleavages of French- and English-speaking communities. As a result, the UMF was able to draw strength from French-speaking districts, particularly in Northwestern New Brunswick; it was one of the few organizations to bridge this gap.

The UMF appealed to the basic entrepreneurial instincts of fishermen in the areas of the processing and marketing of fish. Self-

help courses were able to socialize fishermen into a more 'professional' attitude towards fishing. The fishermen should "have control of his product from the time that he pulls it out of the water, 'til as close to the consumer as possible."¹¹¹

The structure of the UMF has also evolved over the years. Local cooperative facilities were the basic unit of the UMF. Until 1974, the UMF was a federated system. Each cooperative was composed of shareholders who had a fixed amount of capital in the organization. The shareholders would elect a Board of Directors, along with a manager who would then hire the necessary staff and personnel to run the local cooperative unit. Annual meetings of the UMF were held in March. Each cooperative was entitled to one or two voting delegates, depending on the ratio between the business done and the total value.

After 1974, the constitution of the UMF was changed, permitting fishermen who did not have processing or marketing facilities to become members. As well, the geographic structure consists of zones along provincial lines: Zone One - Nova Scotia, Zone Two - New Brunswick, Zone Three - Prince Edward Island, Zone Four - the Magdalen Islands. A board of directors consists of eleven members; three are elected from Zones One, Two and Three respectively, as well as one member from Zone Four. The remaining seven members are elected at large from the fishermen who are members and from the business leaders of the various cooperatives. Each cooperative also retains a board of directors to look after its own affairs.¹¹² In recent years, the UMF has tended to lose the progressive streak which characterized its initial founding. This is a phenomenon which characterizes all organizations, as they move from youth to maturity. The main thrust has been to emphasize the

private sector, treating the UMF as any other corporation. The decline of the influence of the Church and the cyclical periods of affluence and recession have tended to erode the solidarity of the cooperative movement.

In recent years, controversy has also centred on the UMF's role as a processor - viz., is an organization involved in the processing and marketing of fish products capable of representing the interests of individual fishermen? By 1984, the UMF was near to financial bankruptcy. Although the cooperative movement was a brave one, the future of the organization was problematic. In 1986, the UMF and the Maritime Fishermen's Union (MFU) together announced a cooperative agreement whereby the UMF agreed to offer special services to all MFU members.¹¹³

3. The Union:

From a trade unionist perspective, the main attempt to organize fishermen in the Maritimes is represented by the Maritime Fishermen's Union (MFU). The MFU dates back to the early 1970s, to a small association known as the South-East New Brunswick Professional Fishermen's Association, "...a weak lobby group which would react when there was some sort of crisis."¹¹⁴ In 1974, this Association passed a resolution requesting a revitalized organization which could effectively bargain for better prices from fish processors, as well as gain a voice for speaking to government on fishery policy issues. Along with agreement and support from groups in Northeastern New Brunswick, the decision was made to proceed with the establishment of a structure in the style of a trade union. As a result, the MFU came into being as an organizational entity in 1974. Its formal founding,

however, was not until 1977, when the first convention was held in Baie St. Anne, New Brunswick.

Conditions in Eastern New Brunswick were perhaps the most favourable for the spread of a collective response to the problems of inshore fishermen. The region was placed in a situation of excessive dependence on the prices charged by local processors, due to the reliance on the local groundfishery which was the region's prime resource. Another important factor was the Francophone Acadian heritage of many communities in this part of the province, which laid a foundation for rural collective responses to local problems. Acadian nationalism was instrumental in the early history of the MFU. The impetus for the revitalization of many local fishermen's associations was supported by rural development councils set up by the federal and New Brunswick governments to aid in the revitalization of the Acadian heritage through social and economic development. The South-East New Brunswick Professional Fishermen's Association was the beneficiary of such assistance.¹¹⁵

This Association and its sister groups throughout New Brunswick were able to hire technical expertise - the so-called social animators, who could provide a level of administrative expertise which would enable fishermen to develop a knowledge and an acquaintance with different types of organization. Gilles Theriault was just such an individual; he and six other fishermen became the organizers of the new organization, and provided the necessary link between the grassroots level of the local society and the administrative milieu of government.

A trade unionist approach was adopted after considering existing organizations in British Columbia and particularly in Newfoundland,

where the Newfoundland Fishermen's Food and Allied Workers' Union (NFFAWU) had just recently been established. This type of arrangement seemed to hold the best route for success, in that the trade unionist approach offered, if nothing else, a way of gaining price control, as well as a degree of financial self-sufficiency through the payment of dues. Opting for an association could not satisfy these prerequisites.

The MFU's establishment did not mean that the new organization could immediately discharge its functional mandate. Collective bargaining did not exist for fishermen in New Brunswick or in the other two neighbouring Maritime Provinces. The first objective was to seek changes at the provincial level which would allow collective bargaining for fishermen. By the early 1980s, amendments had finally been secured in all three Maritime Provinces. But collective bargaining was only valid if the organization could attract members to prove its worth and legitimacy. From the outset, the MFU faced the problem of persuading fishermen that trade unionism was a viable collective option. For most fishermen, unions have always meant "strikes". The classic response of a fisherman to a union has been to perceive it as an outside organization which is allowed to determine the basic thrust of what is best for them. Going on strike because of some edict from head office was not perceived to be equitable. The individualism of the inshore fisherman is very evident in such an environment. Such a philosophy was especially resisted in these terms in the more affluent areas of the Maritime Provinces, particularly in Southwestern Nova Scotia, where the species and the outlets for fish products were more diversified, thus making the fishermen more resistant to the basic trade unionist philosophy.

Initially, the MFU was able to penetrate into Northeastern Nova Scotia, where a similar history of federal government and social multiculturalism had laid the foundation for an organizational drive. The MFU did not succeed in Southwestern Nova Scotia until 1983, when it was finally able to set up a local.

The situation in Southwestern Nova Scotia is indicative of the strategy by which the MFU made inroads in the province. Interestingly, the first area which was targeted was the Acadian area. Not surprisingly, such an orientation is indicative of an affinity with an Acadian heritage. The trade unionist philosophy was not emphasized so much as the ability to represent fishermen on specific policy issues.¹¹⁶ In sum, the ability to offer representation on a number of political issues was instrumental in establishing the MFU in this area, and the aspect of collective bargaining was downplayed. In Cape Breton, however, the collective bargaining approach was used. Again, such an approach highlights the basic variation, the local diversification of species.

The structure of the MFU represents basic concessions to the localist thrust. The basic unit of organization is the Local, with the various Locals being organized on the basis of federal designated fishing zones. In this way, a certain degree of autonomy can be given to the various local community sectors. Each of the nine Locals consists of an executive, composed of the President, Vice President and Secretary-Treasurer, elected by the membership at the annual meetings, which are held at least one month before the convention of the full Union, usually held in February or March.¹¹⁷

The annual convention of the MFU is composed of representatives from the various Locals. The President and the Secretary-Treasurer are elected for the full Union, and the various provincial caucuses elect a Vice President for their respective provinces.

The highest governing body of the MFU is the Maritime Council, composed of "two out of three executive members of each local and the president, the vice president and the secretary treasurer."¹¹⁸ The Maritime Council has the power to conduct the business of the MFU between conventions, as well as to make decisions on matters of policy importance. Any decisions are ratified at the next annual meeting.¹¹⁹

The MFU has had mixed success; it is important to remember that the organization almost disintegrated in 1985, due to the failure of the New Brunswick provincial government to implement the Rand formula, which would institute a dues checkoff system for fishermen.¹²⁰ In the end, the government finally gave in. The recent alliance with the UMF was also undertaken in order to create a stronger membership base and a greater measure of support. In itself, such an alliance represents the modification of the basic trade unionist philosophy; it is a pragmatic approach which attempts to downplay this philosophy.

The emphasis on leadership for the MFU is absolutely important. In large part, loyalty to the person is just as important as loyalty to the organization. Sandy Siegel plays a role similar to that played by Gilles Theriault. The MFU representative for Local Nine in Southwestern Nova Scotia, Siegel has shown the ability to work with fishermen and with government. Having an advanced university education (a Ph.D. from the University of Toronto), he has the ability to use the language of both the bureaucrat and the fisherman and, as a result, can

better mediate the various issue-specific demands of the local industry. In this sense, the MFU can appeal to fishermen on their own terms (e.g., assisting with information on a regulation or with quotas).

In more recent times, the MFU has also acted as the participatory organization in a number of "over-the-side" sales programs to foreign factory vessels. This type of incentive is appealing to most fishermen, since it helps them in a practical way and on a day-to-day basis.

To say that the MFU is a union in the traditional sense is misleading. The structure and philosophy of the organization pay special attention to the unique community structure of the fishery. For example, many observers argue that the MFU Local in Southwestern Nova Scotia behaves more like an Association, while other groups like the BSWFA are the true heirs of union militance.¹²¹ In many regions, the MFU has always emphasized the "strong voice", instead of the more classical collective bargaining theme. The theme of strength is underlined by Gilles Theriault, in his discussion of early organizational efforts in the Acadian regions. The theme of representation was always placed before any need to negotiate price:

In terms of the MFU, we were very clear that when we started to organize the [fishing] regions, it was strictly on a voluntary basis. Those who didn't like the notion of the MFU [could say] 'fine'...and that's your choice, you don't need to be here. Those who do think there's a need for a strong voice amongst the inshore fishermen, who need to have a voice that will be heard and that will influence policy, and hopefully [help] you get a better price for your product, then stay at the meeting and we'll see what we can put together as an organization.¹²²

In the final analysis, the priority of the trade unionist philosophy, while important, was never the most dominant theme. As Theriault himself admitted, the decision to adopt the union concept was made more from a pragmatic desire for self-sufficiency, than from any strong ideological philosophy.¹²³

As noted above, the MFU was heavily influenced by the Newfoundland Fishermen's Food and Allied Workers' Union (NFFAWU), an organization which attempts to represent offshore and inshore fishermen, as well as fish plant workers. The NFFAWU dates back to 1970, when changes in the basic economic infrastructure of rural Newfoundland, wrought by the Smallwood government, was producing the first signs of social dislocation, which were derived from a movement towards higher education and urbanization.

The NFFAWU owes its basic existence to the legendary streak of populism which was endemic to the basic thrust of Newfoundland politics. The Fishermen's Protective Union (FPU), headed by William Coaker, had attempted to organize fishermen in order to break the hold of the restrictive credit system of the merchants of St. John's.¹²⁴ At the same time, it also attempted to mobilize fishermen to take an active role in politics. Although the FPU had collapsed by the end of the 1920s, the populist streak of that time prepared Newfoundland for an even stronger populist streak later on.

In the post-Confederation period, most Newfoundland fishermen were represented by the provincial government, dominated by the Newfoundland Federation of Fishermen (NFF).¹²⁵ By the late 1960s, the NFF was near collapse because of the insufficiency of resources needed to sustain the structural organization.

The NFFAWU emerged out of two components. The first component consisted of efforts by the Canadian Food and Allied Workers' Union (CFAWU) to organize fish plant workers in Newfoundland's vertically-integrated offshore plants.¹²⁶ The other component consisted of attempts to organize fishermen in Port-Au-Choix, led by Father Desmond MacGrath, with the help of Richard Cashin, a St. John's lawyer and former Liberal Member of Parliament.¹²⁷ Their efforts paid off with the establishment of the Northern Fishermen's Union in May, 1970. In later discussions with Fred Locking, the two components pooled their efforts to form the NFFAWU in 1971.

The subsequent history of the NFFAWU, and the numerous strikes which finally produced legislation giving fishermen the right of collective bargaining, are subjects which have been dealt with elsewhere and need not be dwelled upon here.¹²⁸ The important point to emphasize is the excessive community localism which was an underlying factor of the early organization. Gordon Inglis has stressed the existence of several local fishermen, who had some following in the local outport communities and whose support had given the NFFAWU the necessary degree of legitimacy and support. For example, Lester Kean, a fisherman in Bonnavista Bay, had been involved in the selling-up of the small Bonnavista North Fishermen's Association. Also, Kevin Condon, a fisherman on the Southern Shore of the Avalon Peninsula, had been involved with the problems of local fishermen and was instrumental, as Vice President of the old NFF, in attracting local support for the NFFAWU.¹²⁹

These individuals had a degree of legitimacy or authority at the community level, combined with the degree of formal education necessary

to relate to formal organizational modes of leadership; these were traits essential for dealing with the administrative arms of government. In sum, these men could bridge the gap in the differing cultural systems. The fact that the inshore fishermen were dependent on the large fish processors was certainly true, but the style and character of the social relationships which made up the basic authority patterns were outside the mainstream of mass society.

It is instructive that Father McGrath, a parish priest, was instrumental in the early organizational drives. Newfoundland politics were built around sectarian politics; often, the rural isolation of most communities emphasized the priest as the educator and leader in the community. By building up the trust of fishermen, Father McGrath was able to bring along Richard Cashin, who also benefited from the "personalized" relationships. Moreover, these two men were not fishermen; Cashin, for example, was descended from a socially-prominent Newfoundland family. His political contacts, gained through his years as an MP in Ottawa, had given him the ability to transcend the different environments. Indeed, Cashin's political service is very much in the vein of Coaker's with the FPU, with respect to the adoption of a populism sensitive to the basic grassroots culture of Newfoundland's fishing communities.¹³⁰

In itself, the NFFAWU has represented more a social movement than the formation of a trade union. A union is only as good as the size of its membership; to recruit, the basic understanding of the community is essential. The NFFAWU's basic structure, however, is thoroughly unionist.¹³¹ Two Locals exist for the plant workers and fishermen. Each Local is in turn sub-divided into branch committees which may

serve one fish plant, along with one or more communities. A three-man executive administers each committee. Offshore vessel representation is secured through the use of trawler representatives.

The two Locals are united at the peak through the presence of a 22-member Executive Board, composed of ten representatives from each Local, as well as the President and Secretary-Treasurer of the Union. The NFFAWU derives the great majority of its funding from union dues, paid on a seasonal basis, as well as from its ties to international unions.¹³²

The structure of the NFFAWU illustrates the need for a framework which recognizes the grassroots distinctiveness of the local communities. The personalization of the organization is reflected in the credit Cashin has received from many observers for his ability to hold together the various sectors of the Union. This emphasis reflects the basic legacy of the traditional style of leadership, which in turn emphasizes loyalty to the individual over loyalty to the organization.

In the late 1970s, the Union was undoubtedly strengthened by the sponsorship of over-the-side sales, particularly in herring, thus demonstrating its strength and capability as a potential spokesman for fishermen in Newfoundland. A final point which indicates the inapplicability of the basic trade union philosophy to the NFFAWU has been its failure to capture the allegiance of all fishermen in Newfoundland. Some parts of Newfoundland are still outside the purview of the Union, specifically the "Fogo Island Twillingate Area, parts of the Southeastern coast and lobster fishermen in the St. George's Bay area."¹³³ This is undoubtedly due to the isolation of these areas and

the basic community thrust which remains rooted in the specific spatial patterns of community and collective efforts.

In summary, the NFFAWU represents the adaptation of trade unionism to the unique grassroots orientations of various rural fishing communities in Newfoundland, with its distinctive community patterns. Although conditions existed which allowed for the formation of the NFFAWU, the leadership offered did not come directly from the fishermen themselves, but from the traditionally-small, educated, elite sector of the community, which had always played important leadership roles in society.

4. The Federation:

The federation concept has represented an alternative equivalent to the various union concepts which have developed in recent years. Perhaps the most predominant federation has been the Eastern Fishermen's Federation (EFF), an umbrella organization which attempts to represent a plurality of issue-oriented associations in the Maritime Provinces. The EFF, originally known as the Eastern Fisheries Council (EFC), dates back to 1979, when the federal Minister of Fisheries of the time, Romeo Leblanc, granted an allocation of squid to an organization whose job it would be to represent fishermen, in hopes of gaining a spokesman for all fishermen in Atlantic Canada. The hope clearly was that the EFC could act as an 'organization of organizations' where respective groups could come to debate, as well as to seek assistance for the many problems shared among them. From the beginning, however, the role of the organization has been subject to dispute. Some constituent members, such as the MFU, thought the EFC should confine itself to political representation and avoid engaging in

such economic activities as price negotiation and over-the-side sales, in particular. As a result, the MFU withdrew from the EFC.¹³⁴

The basic structure of the EFF is that of an umbrella, consisting of some 20 member groups, with an individual membership of about 7,500 fishermen (see Appendix A-3 and A-4).¹³⁵ The EFF has a Board of Directors consisting of a member chosen by each of these constituent organizations. The Board of Directors, in turn, elects a Chairman/President, a Vice Chairman/Vice President and a Secretary-Treasurer, and appoints the Executive Director or Chief of Staff.¹³⁶ Meetings of the EFF, at which the work of the Board of Directors is reviewed, are held four times a year. At the Annual General Meetings, general positions of a policy nature operate on a consensual basis.

The position of the Executive Director is important because it provides the necessary technical expertise in relating to government. Allen Billard, while not a bona fide fisherman, has been able to forge links with the bureaucratic environment. Such links are extremely important because of the ability of a constituent organization to call on the services of the head office in a time of crisis. The small, issue-oriented Associations, while having a general grievance, may not be able to articulate their demands according to acceptable bureaucratic procedures. Thus, reliance on the skills of an Executive Director becomes crucial, as he is the potential mediator between the grassroots level of the community and the administrative structures. In sum, the Executive Director plays a brokerage role in seeking redress from government.

A good example of this patron-clientage role is the case of the Fundy North Fishermen's Association (FNFA) in New Brunswick, a large

association which represents fishermen on the New Brunswick side of the Bay of Fundy. In 1983, local fishermen experienced problems with damage to lobster gear, resulting from a ship moving oil rigs in the Saint John Basin.¹³⁷ The Association called on the assistance of Allen Billard; a former Secretary of the FNFA, Herbert Matthews, comments as follows:

...well, years ago nothing would have been done about it. "Oh, they didn't do that much damage." Our President of our Association, Allen Billard, said he was there immediately. He was on the job and he looked the thing over and he knew the right people to contact. Due to his presence and his ability to find the right channels, why these fishermen were reimbursed for their year's loss.¹³⁸

By coming to the aid of the Association, Billard was playing a role as a patron within the larger patron-client hierarchy. In effect, he was able to use his contacts with government to bridge the gulf between the differing norms and values.

The structure of the federation is wide enough to encourage the mediation of issue-specific demands. Such mediation is an important incentive and maintains a degree of cohesion. In the words of John Kehoe, President of the Cape Breton Fishermen's Association and a Director of the EFF:

Each association can have its views down on paper, what they're looking for, and then Billard takes it from one place and then from the other...at the meeting, but each fellow's got a different problem, in other words. It just goes one after the other and it starts again.¹³⁹

Such an arrangement allows a degree of local autonomy which is important in maintaining local allegiance. The ability of the

Executive Director, as well as MPs, to act as constituency mediator is thus confirmed.

The issue-specific nature of such a structure undoubtedly contributes to the continuing problems of gaining a more direct consensus on specific positions. The problem of the heterogeneity of issues confirms the existing federation structure. Above all else, the EFF seeks the common denominator, as much as is humanly possible, without endangering the basic *raison d'être* of the federation structure itself. In short, the individualism of the fishermen is confirmed, rather than discouraged.

...because the fishery is made up of as many individuals as it is, it becomes very difficult to speak with one voice on very many issues; to speak with one voice, to try to get everyone into one, would do the individual a disservice. We have decided that it's better to have individual groups come and go and live on their ability to represent the individual interests. If there is a concern over an issue and it represents some commonality of opinion that exists, it should be heard, it should be dealt with. If that issue goes away, if the problem is solved, if there is no more community of interest remaining, then the group doesn't need to remain, and we have always been of the opinion that there are no forevers in this business, and even the EFF, if it came to the point when there was no recurring issues upon which there was consensus, then we would cease to exist. Up to this date, there have been several issues of a major, broad scope; however, we're quite prepared to admit that there aren't an overwhelming number of them; and when there comes a day when there are none, then we shouldn't exist. But, to repeat, we do not think that speaking with one voice on all issues is developmental.¹⁴⁰

The EFF's basic theme of independence is in sharp contrast to the trade unionist philosophy of the MFU. The EFF has always viewed fishermen as independent entrepreneurs, a term which usually means

those individuals who are small businessmen, owning their own equipment and having the right to sell the product they can obtain.¹⁴¹ Such a depiction clashes with the basic trade unionist philosophy of the MFU, which views the fisherman as an independent producer who, because of the lack of market competition, may sell his fish in a fixed monopoly which prevents him from trying to get the best price for his product—hence, the reliance on collective bargaining.

Aside from the basic ideological and philosophical viewpoints, an argument certainly can be made that both types of organization have had to adapt to the basic features of their particular constituency. The MFU chooses to represent this interest through collective trade unionism, which sanctions the concept of the Union Local. On the other hand, the EFF sees the problem as that of representing business entrepreneurs; its structure is an umbrella. In short, the two-tiered structure of both organizations does take account of the impossibility of involving fishermen in a framework of direct, preconceived, structural membership, which may be inappropriate, given the unique occupational milieu of the various fishing sectors.

Another perspective on this type of heterogeneity is reflected in the fact that the most important component member of the EFF, the Prince Edward Island Fishermen's Association (PEIFA), is itself an umbrella organization. The PEIFA was the result of substantial assistance from the PEI Rural Development Council, a public self-help agency set up in the 1960s to encourage community development.¹⁴² Established originally in 1952, the Association folded in 1956.¹⁴³ A revitalization occurred in 1964 amid crisis in the industry, particularly among lobster fishermen who had experienced poor

catches.¹⁴⁴ The structure of the Association in the 1960s consisted of a President and an Executive which "met once a year."¹⁴⁵ In large part, technical support for the operation of the Association was provided by the Extension Department of St. Dunstan's College, located at the University of Prince Edward Island, which permitted the Association to continue its existence.¹⁴⁶

Subsequent restructuring of the organization in 1976 has resulted in its evolution into an umbrella organization containing five geographic sections, each represented by a Local with its own Executive. The Executive for the entire Association meets at the head office in Charlottetown as the need arises, in order to discuss the concerns of the various Locals. The Executive is composed of volunteers, rather than salaried personnel; the only salaried member of the Executive is the Managing Director, who resides at the head office in Charlottetown.

In cases where the direction of the Association needs a more general decision, two members from each Local and two directors-at-large meet in Charlottetown. In practice, most of the decisions affecting one Local also affect other Locals, because of the small geographic area of the province. The fact that the province is so small means that there is a greater likelihood of maintaining a degree of internal cohesion and control. The compactness of Prince Edward Island makes it much easier to engage the Association in activist policy stances.

The PEIIFA did not employ its first Managing Director until 1976. The role of such a Managing Director was thus extremely important. In most cases in this style of organization, the Managing Director has

authority over the day-to-day direction of the organization and is, in effect, the unofficial spokesman for the organization. Moreover, because the position requires a person who is experienced as a manager, there is a certain minimum expertise which serves to facilitate bureaucratic dialogue. The necessary expertise of the Managing Director is reflected by the fact that he also acts as the chief lobbyist for government on all problems requiring political redress. Although most Managing Directors of the PEIFA have had an interest in the fishing industry, they have not been bona fide fishermen. Carl Meyers and Rory MacClellan, for example, were both educated as professionals. In the case of MacClellan, his early interest in fisheries matters came from his involvement with the self-help movement while enrolled at the University of Prince Edward Island.¹⁴⁷ As a result, he was much more tuned into the bureaucratic structures. Both Meyers and MacClellan were later recruited, respectively, by the federal and provincial Departments of Fisheries and Oceans.¹⁴⁸

In summary, the necessary bureaucratic expertise is extremely important. Such evidence is reflected in the close relationship the organization enjoys with the local DFO, which contacts the Charlottetown office of the PEIFA to gain information on specific policy issues. On the other hand, the degree of awareness of the Association at the grassroots level is debatable. Unless an issue affects fishermen directly, problems still occur in the mobilization of popular enthusiasm for the long-term maintenance of the structural facets of the organization itself:

Any adult realizes [the benefits of the Association] as soon as he comes up with a problem...it's the first place they head. If

there's no problem, they don't need anybody, but ...as soon as they get a problem, they're runnin' around sayin' "Oh, the fishermen's organization's the way to go..."¹⁴⁹

In the final analysis, an issue must touch fishermen directly before any collective effort is undertaken.

The fact that the PEIFA is a federation indicates, in itself, the strong legacy of the localism which is endemic to the rural community aspect of PEI politics. The concept of Locals as the constituent unit of the organization indicates the basic thrust of local community loyalty, based on strong rural values, as well as the traditional religious and ethnic divisions within the community.¹⁵⁰ These values are consistent with the occupational attributes of most fishermen.

The fact, also, that PEI has a substantial lobster fishery is a crucial factor in defining the problems of fishermen's organizations. Traditionally, inshore lobstermen have been the hardest to organize. The general affluence attached to the lobster fishery, in comparison with other types of finfisheries, has created problems in organization. When there are no problems, fishermen feel little need to exercise any long-term collective representation. In times of crisis, the situation becomes urgent and talk of action continues until the matter is resolved.

Although the PEI Rural Development Council has been disbanded, the organization has actually continued to exist, largely with the help of provincial funding. Although the organization formally ceased to receive government funding in 1984, there is still evidence which suggests the basic dependence of the organization on government support.

Like most groups, the initial impetus for the formation of the PELFA originated with non-fishermen, and managers of the Federation have been drawn from the university community and from former personnel of the provincial DFO. The fact that the PELFA is still a federation indicates the basic problems of direct membership. The localist streak within the Association is very strong, which means that direct membership is unlikely, given the basic adherence to local community values.

In summary, the central point to be made in considering these various types of organizations is that they illustrate the formal inadequacies of preconceived forms of pluralist activity. None of the groups have been able to gain supremacy and be perceived as the legitimate spokesman of fishermen in Atlantic Canada. These preconceived perceptions derive from the expectations of members of the Canadian bureaucracy concerning the type and manner of representation which they consider to be desirable when dealing with the public.

Although inshore fishermen may be outside the realm of structured representation, they do have some political influence. As the following account illustrates, this type of influence represents the adaptation of the old patron-client framework to the needs of formal organizational representation.

Inshore Groundfishermen and the 1986 Atlantic Groundfish Management Plan:
The Case of Southwestern Nova Scotia:

The case of the allocation transfer of 10,000 tons of groundfish from the offshore to the inshore sector in Southwestern Nova Scotia is indicative

of how the two sectors coexist and try to adapt to changing realities. The formal consultative/advisory process produced a Management Plan, but some provisions of the Plan were unacceptable to a segment of the inshore sector. Through the use of both formal and extra-formal means, the Management Plan was changed. Such a case study illustrates the dichotomy between the political interest and the perceived bureaucratic interest which underlies multi-value decision-making.

Southwestern Nova Scotia is a unique area to administer and, in many ways, one of the most difficult. A substantial inshore groundfishery resides in the area and shares much of the local resource potential with the offshore sector, which operates out of Lunenburg. Distinctions are always difficult. The term "groundfish" covers most finfish - codfish, in particular. Offshore interests are usually vertically-integrated, in that both the boats and the processing plants are owned by large companies. The main offshore employer in Nova Scotia is a modified version of the old National Sea Products, the result of government restructuring which permitted a substantial private sector presence.¹⁵¹

The inshore dragger fleet is based within Districts 4-X and 5, the area stretching from Lunenburg around to the end of the Bay of Fundy. Species such as cod, haddock and pollack can be exploited at the same time of year. This fact makes the problem of allocation more difficult because of the presence of inshore and offshore sectors which both require access to the resource to ensure their survival.

Since 1977, the management system has basically been one of negative sanctions (e.g., licenses, regulations and restrictions), rather than positive ones. Many who have studied the problems of the inshore sector link them to excess capacity - restricting stocks while not trying to

restrict overcapitalization. Moreover, there is the added problem of possibly falsified, or at best slightly inaccurate, landing data.¹⁵² This becomes particularly important in any major attempt by the scientific community to provide accurate estimates of stock availability.

Districts 4-X and 5 cover five electoral districts. For our purposes, the most important are the ridings of Southwest Nova and South Shore. Southwest Nova covers approximately the sub-division of District 4-X, the area stretching from Digby to Shelburne. The riding of South Shore covers the rest of the coastline as far as Lunenburg. A great proportion of the offshore fleet is found in this constituency, particularly in and around Lunenburg, one of the traditional ports for National Sea Products.

The groundfishery has a system of limited entry through licensing. In more recent years, this system has become more restrictive for the inshore sector. Since 1984, a system of allocations has been implemented whereby each sector - inshore and offshore - receives a proportion of the total quota. The most recent innovation is the enterprise allocation - that quota given to the large fish companies to allow for their continued existence.¹⁵³ The enterprise allocation is discretionary; firms can, if they wish, choose not to exploit their present year's quota and may instead catch it the following year. The situation naturally produces a degree of automatic bias towards the offshore sector within the formalized process, as well as a measure of further doubt as to the true nature of the stocks.

The general trend in Total Allowable Catches (TACs) since 1982 for the Scotian Shelf has been to decrease them. The inshore sector is fundamentally affected by such a decrease, although on a proportional basis, the offshore sector has absorbed the subsequent reductions. In many respects, this policy, while consistent with the objective of

rationalization of the industry, will have detrimental effects on the inshore sector.

The duality in fisheries policy, particularly with respect to the validity of the advisory process, is linked to the centralized discretionary powers of the bureaucracy. The combination of process and extra-process interaction in fisheries management is illustrated by the formulation, reception and subsequent amendment of the Atlantic Groundfish Management Plan of 1986. In recent years, receipt of the Plan by particular fishermen's constituencies has been met by their pressure for amendments, particularly with respect to TACs. The 1986 Plan, released in December of 1985, reduced net quotas from 237,000 tons TAC to 203,000 tons for cod, pollack, redfish and flounder on Georges Bank and the Scotian Shelf.¹⁵⁴ For the category ~~56~~ boats under 100 feet in length, the quotas for fixed and mobile fishermen declined from the 1985 quotas of 400 and 200 tons, respectively, to 270 and 130 tons for 1986.¹⁵⁵ The issue became a high-profile one in the inshore sector, which is highly dependent on establishing access to the stocks. AGAC was split on the matter; recommendations sent to Ottawa in early December, 1985, from inshore representatives had allowed for much higher TACs.¹⁵⁶

The Minister of Fisheries is always placed in a difficult position when a Plan is formulated. S/he can either give in to the demands of the industry, which amounts to the crudest form of short-term power politics, or consider the perceived long-term risks of endangering the health of the resource. George Baker, a prominent Liberal MP from Atlantic Canada and a former Parliamentary Secretary to Romeo Leblanc, the Minister of Fisheries, provides an interesting insight into the dilemma a Minister may face concerning TACs:

Now every single case that I've seen [concerning] quotas, if there's been loud enough objection, the Minister has stepped in and extended the thing politically, against the advice of the biologists. He can go to his MP with exactly what the biologist said...or he can stretch it a bit, and he can say to the biologists, "now look, we have to sell this to our caucus, so you're going to have to...exaggerate a bit, so we can come down to a workable rationale." He can do that, or he can come clean. But, in the end, he will lose with the MPs....¹⁵⁷

In essence, the Minister is forced to decide how much long-term security s/he must give up in favour of short-term political gain. The 1986 situation was also not improved by the fact that there had been five Ministers in the course of four years, who were subsequently unfamiliar with their own Department to a certain degree.

In this case, Ottawa decided to take preemptive action by offering a reallocation of 2,400 tons to the inshore sector, which accompanied the release of the Plan.¹⁵⁸ The inshore sector wanted much more - a 10,000-ton groundfish allocation. From the inshore sector's viewpoint, the crucial thing to remember is that, unlike past years, an organization does exist to try to represent fishermen, namely Local Nine of the MFU. Handling the controversy fell to Sandy Siegel, the local organizer for the MFU and its representative for Southwestern Nova Scotia on the Scotia-Fundy Groundfish Advisory Committee. As noted earlier, Siegel is not a fisherman by profession; he received a Ph.D. from the University of Toronto and, as a result, possesses more of the important leadership and articulation skills necessary in dealing with government.¹⁵⁹

The fact that personality is important in parochial societies cannot be overemphasized. Siegel's ability to work with the inshore sector represents his ability to gain the confidence of the clientele. Through his membership on AGAC, Siegel developed important links to the other "appreciative system"

of the administrative environment. In effect, he represents the legacy of the outsider who arrives to legitimately represent his disarticulate constituency, a phenomenon which would have been unheard of 25 years ago.

While Siegel represents a newer and more sophisticated leadership elite, the old patron-client relationships are also still extremely important in communicating with government. The allocation debate is important because of the role played by Nova Scotia's Conservative government and its local party allies. Clifford Hood, Jr., a Yarmouth lawyer, has represented a number of inshore fishermen before government conferences, as well as before the Courts.¹⁶⁰ He has also represented a number of loose interests outside the MFU on AGAC. Politically, he has close ties with the provincial and federal governments. A lawyer with a lively frankness, Hood has, through his long experience, become a trusted member of the local community. His knowledge of the local industry and his connections with government make him an invaluable spokesman.

The MFU's position on the 1986 Atlantic Groundfish Management Plan was to demand a larger reallocation than that offered by Ottawa. The issue began to heat up in February, when a special meeting of the inshore and offshore groundfish sectors, along with representatives of the provincial and federal governments, ended in a deadlock, with both sides refusing to budge.

The position of the bureaucratic/scientific establishment was summed up by Paul Sutherland, DFO Regional Director for Scotia-Fundy, when he stated that biological and scientific data could not possibly sanction another increase in TAC to accommodate all sectors. Clearly, this statement committed the bureaucracy to a fundamental position of professionalism.¹⁶¹ The bureaucrats had ruled in favour of the long-term interest over that of

the short-term. The decision would now have to be made in the political arena.

The reduction in quotas is a concern which affects the fisherman directly. It is a challenge to his ability to make a living. Siegel was present to capitalize on the crisis and to provide the technical knowledge necessary to make the fisherman's point. Interestingly, he admitted that the issue helped to increase the MFU membership drive.¹⁶² The important thing to remember, however, is that the longer a crisis lasts, the greater the potential for building support for the organization.

By the beginning of April, the Minister of Fisheries had arrived in Yarmouth to promise immediate negotiations in order to resolve the crisis.¹⁶³ The stage of crisis management was rapidly approaching. As time became more precious, the provincial media also began to give the issue greater exposure, playing up the rifts within the industry between the inshore and offshore sectors. Siegel was thus able to turn up the pressure by organizing a peaceful demonstration of 150 fishermen to press his case at DFO offices in Yarmouth.¹⁶⁴

A special meeting of AGAC, held around the middle of April, failed to resolve the issue. Tempers began to flare. Despite a willingness to compromise over the issue of the dockside grading of fish quality, the fishermen were unable to extract their total demanded allocation of 14,000 tons. The most the federal officials would allocate was 5,500 tons. In this emotional atmosphere, there was a chance the fishermen themselves might mishandle the situation - too rash a move and there might well have been an explosion.

Local fishermen met in Digby to discuss their next move. Determined to go fishing, they were in no mood to remain in port longer than the end of

April, some two weeks away. Hood was able to intervene and help the group to formulate a communique, which was released on April 22. The most important provision of this communique was the threat to go fishing if no agreement could be reached by April 23.¹⁶⁵ The media seized on this, portraying it as an act of defiance. In fact, this provision of the communique provided for fishermen to protest the continued enterprise allocation, which would be within the limits of TAC and within the limits of their Management Plan proposals presently being considered by the Minister. In no way did the accord imply any notion of breaking the law. A personal misuse of media reporting was Chris Wood's reporting in Macleans, which became the later subject of an editorial in The Atlantic Fisherman.¹⁶⁶

Such distortions were easily made, in view of the more sophisticated efforts which could be mounted by National Sea Products to explain its case for preserving the enterprise allocation. In contrast, to get their side across to the public, inshore fishermen had comparatively few resources, outside of such 'headline-breaking' attractions as the misreported April 22 communique. Inarticulate to a large extent and divorced from the greater political system, fishermen have always had trouble being portrayed in a sympathetic light by the general public. In this case, distorted media reporting intensified and aggravated an already bad situation.

At the same time, however, the coverage given to the event clearly raised political consciousness concerning the entire issue. All actors were now scrambling for some type of policy response, in order to diffuse the crisis. Crisis management was clearly in concert, here, with the broader issue of civil disobedience.

As the crisis grew in magnitude, MPs and provincial MLAs began to be pressured by their local constituents. Gerald Comeau, federal MP for the

riding of Southwest Nova, began to investigate the matter. However, in this instance, the provincial government was also instrumental, and was perhaps even more important than the federal government. On the floor of the Nova Scotia Legislature, the issue was heating up; pressure was mounting for a major reversal of government policy in Ottawa.

During the afternoon of April 23rd, telephone calls were made back and forth between Ottawa, Halifax and Yarmouth, as the Premier, the Minister of Fisheries and the DFO official responsible in Ottawa negotiated with Cliff Hood for an increase in allocations.¹⁶⁷ The agreement, announced by MP Gerald Comeau, saw the transfer to the inshore sector of an additional 10,000 tons, to allow the industry to continue fishing through the year's peak summer season.¹⁶⁸

The province's role in these negotiations illustrates how political considerations can move into the realm of fisheries policy. Since the provinces have control over proprietary aspects of their resources, the issue of dockside grading of fish quality is a provincial responsibility. As a result, the issue must have needed provincial support.

The fact that this was a compromise agreement is important. In return for an enlarged quota, the industry had to agree to dockside grading.¹⁶⁹ The inshore sector was not able to obtain what it wanted without agreeing to an added obligation imposed on it by government. In many ways, the inshore sector was coopted and assimilated into a scheme which might not otherwise have been imposed. By cooperating with the agreement, the inshore sector was left in a much less independent state, since it agreed to another plank of the bureaucratic agenda, formed from its own occupational mandate.

The DFO also convened a week-long groundfish seminar in Yarmouth to discuss the problems of the groundfishery.¹⁷⁰ The differences between the

offshore and inshore actors were clearly apparent. National Sea Products spokesmen were adamant in their insistence on continued access to automatic enterprise allocations. Representation for the inshore sector was, as in most cases, divided among a number of local association spokesmen, although the MFU got the most coverage.¹⁷¹

The fact that so little was accomplished cannot but be a warning about the problems of the future, particularly in disputes over quotas. Multi-value decision-making may increasingly make short-term pressure possible, but the important point is that of the professionalization of the industry itself. Each time local interests try to articulate certain demands, the bureaucratic agenda will draw them further into the realm of professionalization. It will do this by demanding "trade-offs" in the form of the implementation of bureaucratic proposals designed to assimilate the inshore fisherman, bringing him out of his perceived backwardness and into a more positive and progressive posture.

By imposing the bureaucratic conceptions of wise management and representation, the tendency to appeal to local politicians to act as brokers is increased, not decreased, although the organizations are also playing a role in the conversion process of demands.

In short, the two processes, with their differing conceptions of first principles, are merged. Although the Canadian system is high on bureaucratic conceptions, which are evidently translated into outputs in the form of conservation measures, the general conclusion which must be drawn is that the constituency of inshore fishermen is left outside the formal organizational milieu, since their own occupational environment does not

sanction the nature of representation. The predisposition of the fisherman is to turn to the politicians when a problem develops.

The Minister of Fisheries and Oceans is thus a reconciliator; his/her authority provides the political system with an avenue of input, although such an avenue may, in some cases, be too late, depending on the issue involved. In this sense, the Minister epitomizes in himself the two conflicting value and political systems.

There is some evidence that the DFO is learning from its mistakes. At the time of writing, in May of 1987, conflicts similar to the above have again broken out between the inshore and offshore sectors regarding allocations contained in the 1987 Groundfish Management Plan. Ottawa's response at this time has been to try to settle the matter through AGAC by announcing, at a meeting held in Montreal, that a special sub-committee would be convened to examine and resolve the question of groundfish reallocations.¹⁷² In so doing, Ottawa is forestalling the matter from becoming a crisis issue, thus allowing a more bureaucratic atmosphere, instead of permitting the issue to be taken over by a perceived short-term political process.

In summary, Canadian fisheries policy is an example of conflicting occupational value systems, those of fishermen and bureaucrats. The structure of the political system plays a role in fostering this dichotomy, which encourages strong outputs, rather than the ability of fishermen to participate in the process themselves, with an accompanying sense of efficacy. In sum, the Canadian process is high on bureaucratic activity and outputs, but low on participation and efficacy.

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Instead of through the AGAC, input for the lobster fishery is gained directly through the various regional jurisdictions of the DFO: the **Scotia-Fundy Region**, comprised of the Atlantic and Bay of Fundy coasts of Nova Scotia and the Bay of Fundy coast of southern New Brunswick; the **Gulf Region**, comprised of the coastal regions of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, specifically the Gulf coasts of Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick and Quebec; the **Quebec Region**; and the **Newfoundland Region**.
For example, the Scotia-Fundy Lobster Advisory Committee and the Offshore Lobster Advisory Committee preside over the various aspects of the inshore and offshore lobster fishery for Nova Scotia and southern New Brunswick. Below these committees are further sub-committees, depending on the lobster zones and other areas classified by the DFO. Administratively, sub-committees are based in the regional groupings of western Nova Scotia, eastern Nova Scotia and southern New Brunswick. Southwest Nova Scotia has three local committees: the District 3 Lobster Advisory Sub-Committee, the District 4-A Lobster Advisory Sub-Committee, and the District 4-B Lobster Advisory Sub-Committee. The District 4-A Lobster Advisory Sub-Committee extends from Digby to Woods Harbour (see Appendix A-2). The other Sub-Committees cover the remainder of the geographical area.
The other regional jurisdictions (as above) omit this coordinating committee, preferring to consult directly with the various regional or district committees as required.
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CHAPTER THREE

AMERICAN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT:

"High on Participation, Low on Reconciliation"

This chapter will attempt to address the hypotheses in the context of the American political system and its impact on the New England fishing industry. Unlike the Canadian situation, the argument will be made that the cultural ideology of the United States, an important component of the prevailing political culture, is consistent with the anthropology of the local industry. In large part, the political culture of the local industry ties it into the mainstream of American society. To a large extent, the cultural orientations of the New England fishing industry exist within the realm of a modernized political culture. A participatory culture does exist which has facilitated the creation and continuation of organizations to represent or assist fishermen. At the same time, however, the organization prerequisite has led to a multitude of groups, given a complementarity between the basic anthropology of fishermen and the greater ideology of local accountability, which is very much a part of the American political system.

Like Canada, the United States also extended its coastal jurisdiction, with the passage of the Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA). The management structures reflect the conflict between the administrative regulation process and the industry. Unlike the Canadian situation, the American context enshrines a measure of political leverage for the fragmented industry within the context of the regional management

councils. Although the industry may display a modernized political culture through the organization of group structures, other factors may inhibit the industry from being able to exert the necessary political pressure in national politics. In large part, this problem can be attributed to the nature of fishermen's organizations, whose fragmented and varied formats represent a compromise between the localism of fishermen and the prevailing prerequisite of pluralism or group participation, the important component of American democracy. The fragmentation is reinforced by the existence of the management process.

From the outset, it is important to realize that the American system has had a different attitude towards jurisdiction. Traditionally, jurisdiction over fishery matters resided with the individual coastal states within the three-mile territorial limit.¹ Although subsequent judicial interpretation established the federal role in fisheries management, the states have continued to exercise management jurisdiction.

Those organizations in the New England fishing industry originating prior to the 1970s were able to confine themselves to local political activity. The states continue to play a role in the management process which evolved in the 1970s. The profile of the management process, however, has been upstaged. The strong ideology of participation places the focus of management questions within the scope of the regional management councils; the result was the passage of the FMA in 1976. Rarely are politicians involved in securing amendments in such matters. Unlike the Canadian context, political representatives do not participate in trying to secure amendments to management plans. Moreover, the resulting fragmentation of the industry allows political representatives to set the agenda when dealing with the problems of the industry.

In the first section of this chapter, background information will be supplied concerning the New England fishing industry, as well as a basic description of the dynamics underlying the American political system which, in many ways, diverges drastically from the Canadian. Of particular significance is the ideology of *laissez-faire* liberalism, which places the role of government in a fundamentally different context from that of government in Canada. Localism, a corollary of American *laissez-faire*, emphasizes the conception of public accountability and input. These features are crucial in the review of the management systems which developed in the 1970s in the United States. The resulting regional management council system is high on participation, but it is also very low on outputs.

The anthropology of American fishermen will be examined in the second section of this chapter. Although there are cultural distinctions, these differences are perceived as legitimate and able to be subsumed into the greater political system. The point to be made, however, is that localism is a viable stance for the industry, given the predominance of state governments as actors in the handling fisheries matters before the 1970s. As a result, where the Canadian context of Toryism inhibited the formation of fishermen's organizations, the American system, with its emphasis on pluralism, promoted the formation of such organizations, although the groups are fragmented and favour the immediate community. Regional clout with political representatives thus results from the unity of all these groups, triggered by the emergence of issues which can get a broad consensus from the industry. As a result, long-term patron-client relationships are non-existent, although there are personalities within the industry who, under the right conditions, have the ability to broker demands by mobilizing their

members, as a by-product of either their personalities or the profile of their organizations.

An examination of the changes in American fisheries policy, particularly during the period directly before and after the passage of the PCMA in 1976, will next be discussed to illustrate the dynamics of cooperation. The fishery management process which emerged from the period from 1974 to 1976 personifies the balance between short-term and long-term interests - namely, the regional management council versus the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).

An examination of the groups which represent the industry will be undertaken to illustrate the basic thrust. Unlike the Canadian situation, these groups exist to influence the process, rather than as a tool of conscious government policy. In itself, the pluralist ideology becomes their motif of operation, although the groups which form are incapable of transcending their narrow constituencies, given the unique anthropology of fishing communities.

In the final section of this chapter, a case study will be undertaken of the attempt to implement a conservation plan for finfish. The analysis indicates the problems of getting necessary management plan measures in a timely fashion without a strong tool of reconciliation. In such a context, the problem of defining what are the objective and true assertions is compounded by endless debate and haggling over them. As a result, the ability to satisfy perceived bureaucratic, long-range interests (e.g., those of the NMFS), as opposed to short-term, political interests (e.g., those of the majority of fishermen at large), is impaired.

Exposure to the structural framework of the council process has given the industry a need to form organizations to try to influence the process.

Although the formation of representative organizations indicates the existence of a modernized political culture, the diversity of these groups indicates the basic adherence to the grassroots level. As a result, the New England fishing industry has never been able to mount the sustained cooperation needed to influence national decision-makers. The long-term clout of the industry is declining on the national scene, instead of increasing - the product of a long-term assimilation into the-procedural framework of the regional management councils.

The American Political System: An Overview

The American political system is important in terms of the basic institutional structures, as well as the basic ideological creed which is an important part of the domestic political culture. The American political ideology is that of liberalism, which emphasizes freedom of the individual from the external constraints of government.² A corollary which has been derived from this principle is the prohibition of the state from active regulation or intervention in the private free-market system.

Such an ideology also places the emphasis on the accountability of government to the individual electors. The best government is the one which is the closest to the individual. As a result, the strong tradition of localism has become enshrined in the minds of the individual. Grassroots community participation is a desired ideal. If the state is to intervene in the affairs of the individual, the structures which can best succeed are those which give the citizen the greatest degree of input and which are closest to the local community level.³

The strong emphasis on localism places the bulk of political activity at the state level. In addition, the strong ideological orientation also

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acts as an instrument of socialization for potential immigrants, whose children are exposed, and thus socialized, to the basic value systems. The result is the movement of various ethnic groups into the middle class by the next generation. Structures which are outside popular control are immediately repudiated. The United States is different from Canada in that bureaucratic mandates are not legitimated by some basic divine conception of the public interest; rather, the implication is that bureaucratic mandates are an abuse of power and authority if they are regulated by those who brought them into existence.⁴ In this sense, an administrative conception of the public interest is not legitimate. From the perspective of multi-value decision-making, the bureaucratic milieu is not considered dominant without other sources of layman knowledge. Such a phenomenon means a healthy debate about the relevance of certain facts in the way certain policy debates are handled. As will be noted later, American fisheries management incorporates this type of debate without the ability to produce outputs.

The American system is a congressional style of political system. Unlike the Canadian system where power is centralized in the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, the American system is one of checks and balances among the President (executive), Congress (legislative) and the Courts (judicial interpretation).⁵ The resulting political activity takes place in the context of a decentralized environment. An implication of such a structure at both state and federal levels is that the average political representative wields a lot more clout than his Canadian counterpart. At the same time, however, it makes much more important any resulting political activity aimed at the representative.

The party system clearly has not been able to restrain the importance of the individual political representatives. The party system in the United States is composed of two parties which serve as holding tanks for the various interests extant at the time. The main function of the parties is to nominate candidates for office. Rarely have the parties been able to maintain or represent long-term political organization or to take positions on major policy issues. Differences in ideological orientation are non-existent.⁶

The party system, combined with the unique structure of the political system, makes it difficult for third parties to develop and successfully compete for office. As a result, a great deal of discontent has traditionally been mediated through the old two-party system.⁷ Such an arrangement in itself promotes a style of mediation of demands which reflects the basic uniqueness created by the presence of distinctive cleavages. New England politics has long been synonymous with the strong ethnicity characterizing the population. The presence of large populations of first-generation immigrants, particularly in Rhode Island and Massachusetts,⁸ creates the necessary cleavage which seeks to divide the population as a whole. Traditionally, the Democratic Party has provided a loose framework for the reconciliation of such interests.

An extreme example of such a phenomenon is in Massachusetts, where ethnicity is a crucial cleavage. For many of the ethnic groups, politics has become an important vehicle for social mobility. The presence of weak party supports serves to place the person over the party label, as the main motivating factor in voting and in fostering strong party organization. In Rhode Island, for example, the political campaigns of Congresswoman Claudine Schneider and Senator John Chaffee have illustrated the emphasis of the

person over the party label.⁹ Moreover, the fact that politics is composed of the "buddy" system or prominent local notables is another sign of the emphasis of personality over policy. In many states throughout New England, the influence of the party chairman is instrumental in gaining the potential recruits necessary to build a party organization.

The weakness of the party system also means that bi-partisanship is essential in Congress, as well as at the state level, in order to present and to pass legislation. Coalitions of both parties become the rule, rather than the exception. If the issue affects one area or region, there is a greater likelihood that cooperation of Congressmen and Senators will be "horsetraded" in an effort to ensure the passage of different proposals pertaining to various policy questions.

The parties at the state level have been no less susceptible to the dynamics of change which have gripped the national parties. Indeed, the basic thrust of change in American politics has been at the state level. The parties have had to adapt themselves to changes in the community/society continuum.¹⁰ Such a continuum emphasizes the paradox of the coexistence of local spatial and functionalist concerns. The crucial component in the development of such functionalist orientations was the change in science and technology which began in the nineteenth century and which eroded the local allegiances. As a result of the differing levels of technological development, the resulting patterns of social relationships produce corresponding characteristics of the political relationships.

Technological and scientific developments produced a systemization of human relationships in large-scale corporate activity, which was responsible for the decline of the localist tendencies. The implication, however, is that some sectors of the population display inferior levels of development

in the pattern of social relationships. In turn, the structural make-up of the political party was also affected, because of its direct derivation from the social environment:

Political parties function within given environmental contexts. Both the goals which they seek and their techniques of action are closely related to the social circumstances within which they work. The most pervasive characteristics of that environment, moreover, are structural, those patterns of social organization which interconnect the shared experiences, perceptions, values and actions of different groups of people. Just as the entire social order is a system of human relationships, so is the political party. Its various facets...can be understood adequately only if each is located within a precise segment of the social and political context.¹¹

These innovations also altered the criteria for successful party recruitment, which evolved from a spatial perspective towards a functionalist one, representing the occurrence of segments of dominant economic, ethnic and religious communities. In the final analysis, the emphasis on the localist unit of community evolved towards a greater need to balance the concerns of issue-related constituencies.

The real power in the American political process is provided by the presence of interest groups. Indeed, the ideology of pluralism - namely, participation in the political process through the existence of groups with specific goals - has become the most influential part of the political system. The most successful interest groups have learned the skill of using the electronic and technical media. The lobbying of administrative and political leaders has become a permanent feature of American politics. Many observers have drawn attention to the potential harmful effects of "interest-group liberalism".¹²

In New England, interest groups have arisen due to the increasing urbanization which has promoted the importance of certain issues over

others. Doyle and Milburn have noted the evolution of interests relating to the urbanization of society; cities encompass the development of certain services which accompany their development: "there are now more decisions relating to business, labor, and insurance needs and to welfare, medical, and educational issues...."¹³ Changes in the complexion of society result in regional cleavages between urban and rural voters, producing another cross-cutting cleavage. The most extreme occurrence of such a phenomenon is in Massachusetts. Boston, the state's most populous centre, has a more sophisticated political system, which reinforces the rural/urban cleavage.

The variation in the spatial distribution of the population creates a dichotomy which contributes to the high occurrence of issue-oriented politics, dominated to a large extent by the existence of the socially-mobile. The resulting trends towards urbanization have also produced changes in the basic voter allegiances. The Massachusetts State Legislature, or the General Court, has become the home for the local, rural and city-core interests, against the urban business interests who comprise the new 'organizational' society, as personified in the ethic of professional managerialism which is in conflict with the demands of the old-style cleavages competing for supremacy. The emphasis on localism remains important:

Managerialism is a tendency observable in many areas of society - one thinks of the "managerial revolution", the literature on the organization man, and the growing political involvement of the professional class. However, in Massachusetts, managerialism and the professional classes who sponsor it are resisted by the legacy of class, ethnic, and ideological politics. The last is now losing much of its power as the demands of efficiency and new services become more vocal. But, the localism of the past...remains important. As the suburbs challenge the hegemony of the cities and towns, the political economy of the state becomes wedded to that of the nation. The struggle for political power is influenced by the differing impact of the national

political economy on the managerial classes and the industrial and town populations. This, in turn, explains the behaviour of the rural and core-city legislators in the bastion of the General Court, and also explains the divergent concepts of state and party government that transcend party cleavages.¹⁴

In sum, the result of such a dichotomy is to produce specific variations in the style of political culture. Edgar Litt discusses the four major cultures which are dominant in the Bay State:

- (1) the Patrician culture - this is associated with the prominence of upper-class families, which later became translated into the Myth of Public Service;
- (2) the Yeoman culture, or the Myth of the Past - this is synonymous with small-town rural values which are fading from the scene;
- (3) the Worker culture, or the Myth of Solidarity - this is mediated in the old two-party system; and
- (4) the Manager culture, or the Myth of Progress - this emphasizes the application of professional administrative rationality to the problems of urbanization.¹⁵

By helping to stress the differences in cultural orientations, Litt aids in substantiating the hypothesis regarding potential cultural conflict derived from the occupational milieu. In the case of the Yeoman culture, the strong distrust of the modern industrial order is indicated in the legacy of the nineteenth-century ethos:

...with its emphasis on individual initiative, its distrust of bigness in government, corporations, labor unions, and international organizations, and a personalized, informal attitude towards friends and neighbors in the school committee, the bank, and the State House in Boston.¹⁶

Given the features of the managerial revolution which has taken hold, the implication which can be drawn is that the nature of the type of work environment produces differing norms and values, producing different cultural attitudes with regard to the development of political behaviour.

The fact that the politician is a part of the pattern of social relationships leaves room for the introduction of other variables - for instance, occupation - as being instrumental in explaining the cultural variables which influence political behaviour and which, of course, inhibit acculturation into a participatory culture, emphasizing active group organization with its accompanying managerial orientation. Simultaneously, however, the strength of the localist/individual thrust is still a phenomenon which may be reckoned with; the facts that New England fishermen are part of an occupational environment which is oriented towards the uncertainties of the marine environment, as well as the absence of large-scale corporate interdependence, result in a culturally-inferior environment. The patterns and characteristics of the cleavages would be much different. The coastal location of the majority of fishermen, as well as the relative simplicity and the rural environment, place them on the margins of society, where the issues and culture of a post-industrial society are the rule, rather than the exception.

At the same time, however, the ideology of participating democracy can be hypothesized to provide the link between cultural parochialism and the greater mass of society which possesses a participatory political culture, a feature of modernization. The imposition of a participatory structure would thus impart certain skills by virtue of the need to have an influence on the organization's outputs. Groups would thus arise to cope with the organizational environment which has been thrust upon them. As a result, it

can be expected that the group ethic would apply, even to the most parochial constituencies, given the emphasis on the participatory ethic.

The conventional wisdom cited by many observers of American politics has been the phenomenon of the so-called 'iron triangles' which are composed of the tendency of the appropriate Congressional Sub-Committee to appropriate the interest group, as well as the leaders of the corresponding bureaucratic regulatory agency.

The existence of such iron triangles has been taken to be the ideal outcome characterizing the American political system. In the case of New England fishermen, such a phenomenon has not occurred, despite the probable conditions which should encourage a strong relationship between the NMFS, the chief executive department responsible for regulatory management, and the commercial fishing industry. The basic points for the formation of a relationship have never developed because of basic disagreements on the best way to develop policy options in the field of fisheries management. As a result, disagreements produce differing policy views, which government enforces against the wishes of those it attempts to serve:

...bureaucrats may espouse and enforce public policies that not only run counter to the preferences of affected business interests, but that also originate within an independent "professional" view of what constitutes right behavior.¹⁷

Foreman goes on to make a statement about the perceived public interest of bureaucracy:

Professionalism can still powerfully affect regulators by imbuing them with an inclination towards a shared public purpose as well as a set of conceptual lenses and techniques through which to pursue it. Professionals are not just specifically trained in a way of thinking; they are also, more often than not, educated to believe that certain broad objectives are important....¹⁸

The implication is that there are bureaucratic attitudes and values which are important in establishing specific attitudes towards various policy questions. In sum, particular norms and values create a specific act of orientation which helps to screen out perceived irrelevant factual considerations. Consequently, the basic dichotomy between the occupational environments of the fishing industry and the bureaucratic regulator is the main result.

Administrative discretion has also been strengthened, due to the failure of the so-called Congressional Oversight. Among other reasons, such failures are derived from the inability of Congress to spell out its intentions in the statutes, particularly in the drafting of legislation.¹⁹ As will be noted later in the section on the structure of fisheries management, these legislative vagaries within the text of the FOMA (1976) have been a problem when attempting to meet the terms of the Act, while also trying to devise suitable management plans.

In the American system, as in most political systems, politicians try to perform the tasks their electors desire. In theory, political representatives will try to maximize their power of resource allocation. In effect, politicians are building up followings which are dependent on a specific clientele in order to maximize their own chances for continued service. For example, David Price, in his study of the environmental influences on the various Congressional Committees, drew attention to the role of the policy entrepreneur: the tendency of Congressmen to set the agenda by developing proposals designed to appease a particular constituency. Such a position is reinforced by three factors: (1) the divisiveness of the issue, (2) its visibility with the electorate, and (3) the level and direction of the executive's involvement - the lower the

measure of each of these factors, the greater the likelihood that a Congressman will be able to play a role as an initiator of legislation to aid the constituency.²⁰

The role of the policy entrepreneur implies the appeasement of a potential constituency. The Congressman will act as a patron, initiating legislation to appease the specific constituency, the clients. The problem, however, is that the prerequisite for the accommodation of the clientele's demands is the presence of structural interest groups. Without the basic unity of a strong pressure group, the point of contact between industry and Congressman is inhibited.

The New England fishing industry faces this problem. Although pressure groups have formed, their fragmentation - the result of the localism inherent in the occupation - renders them insufficiently powerful to maintain the necessary influence. Paradoxically, although the industry has become assimilated into the organizational milieu, their efforts confine them to a declining regional influence as they try to apply their own appreciative systems to the process of drafting management plans. The fact that there many groups representing the industry leaves it open to the gradual assimilation of the bureaucratic values into its culture. In the long term, the bureaucratic appreciative system can thus gain ascendancy over the fishermen.

The New England Fishing Industry: Background

The New England fishing industry cannot really be referred to as one homogeneous entity or collection of individuals. Extending along the Atlantic Coast from Maine to Connecticut, the industry is focused on its important fishing centres, located at Rockland and Portland, Maine;

Gloucester, Boston, Chatham and New Bedford, Massachusetts; Newport and Point Judith, Rhode Island; and Stonington, Connecticut. The major species harvested are groundfish/finfish, as well as scallops, crab and lobster. The ports of Boston, Gloucester and New Bedford account for nearly half of the total catch in the region.²¹

Substantial inshore and offshore sectors comprise the bulk of the New England fishing industry. Although distinctions are difficult, the important point to be made is that the phenomenon of vertical integration, whereby both the fishing fleet and the processing plants are owned by the same company, is not endemic to the American fishing industry. In New England, the vast experience has been oriented towards family or individual ownership of vessels, although Rockland, Maine displays some evidence of the phenomenon in the presence of the two companies of F.J. O'Hara and Sons, and National Sea Products.²² In interviews conducted with individuals involved in the American fishing industry, the distinction between inshore and offshore was defined either by distance capability from shore, or by the number of days which vessels remain out at sea (for example, some remain out overnight, returning to port the next day, while others remain at sea for days).

A variety of classifications has been utilized to distinguish the basic demarcations. One way has been to classify by vessel tonnage. More recently, an informal internal procedure, adopted by the NMFS (the chief federal agency responsible for commercial fisheries), has been to distinguish between day boats and trip boats. Day boats are vessels which go out and return each day. Trip boats are capable of remaining out at sea for a period of up to ten days. By implication, these vessels conform to the classifications for distance and overall length in the Canadian context,

although some day boats do have the capacity to be trip boats.²³ For our purposes, the classification of vessels under one hundred feet in length will be adopted as the dividing line between the inshore sector (roughly synonymous with day boats) and the offshore sector (roughly synonymous with trip boats, excluding the extent of vertical integration).

The fishing industry is also characterized by differing types of contractual relationships, which vary from port to port. In Boston, for example, the basic trend has been towards fish landings, put up for auction at the Boston Fish Pier. In other areas such as Gloucester, fish are landed directly at the buyer's plant through some type of prior arrangement. In Point Judith, the facilities of the Cooperative perform the essential marketing functions.

Neither is a wide variety of species common to each port. New Bedford, for example, is heavily dependent upon scallops, while Gloucester derives its income from groundfish/finfish. Lobster fishing is distributed along the coastline in a collection of smaller ports. In Maine, although Portland and Rockland are the major ports, a substantial lobster fishery exists along the coastline in the many small rural harbours and wharves.

A substantial ethnic element is also common in the fishery, particularly in Gloucester and New Bedford where there are substantial first- and second-generation communities of Italian, Portuguese and Greek descent.²⁴ The strong ethnic element brings with it a set of conventions and customs promoting the specific insulation of cultural attitudes, which are different from the necessary cognizance to afford direct political activity.

The New England fishing industry dates back to the first attempts at the settlement of the continent itself. As early as the seventeenth

century, vessels were making voyages from Boston to the Grand Banks. By the nineteenth century, the ports of Boston, Gloucester and New Bedford were synonymous with the fishery.²⁵ By the early twentieth century, the industry was in decline, adjusting to the problems of wood and wind and the introduction of motorized craft. The invention of cold storage techniques, as well as the filleting of fresh fish, revolutionized the processing sector, giving it its present character, with the resulting capital-intensive techniques.²⁶

The Depression of the 1930s was a disaster for New England fishermen; fish prices tumbled, forcing many vessels out of the industry.²⁷ However, the situation was helped by the Second World War when demand for fish granted the industry a needed reprieve. Since the end of the War, the industry has been subjected to the general ups and downs of the marketplace. The United States, like other nations, was also a member of the International Commission on Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF).

To a great extent, the New England fishing industry is a matter of low domestic priority on the national political agenda. In comparison with the Canadian situation, American governments have never expected the industry to have any role as a tool of public policy. In the final analysis, the determinant of the outlook and character of the industry is the free marketplace. The fact that economic fluctuations have affected the industry can be seen from the general contraction of the total industry in terms of general employment and recruitment. Since the post-war period, the average age of fishermen has increased, while recruitment has fallen.

A 1976 study by Leah Smith and Susan Peterson also illustrated the basic obsolescence of most of the capital equipment: most vessels dated back to the 1940s. Moreover, the basic introduction of technology has varied,

depending on cost-benefit decisions. Little indigenous capital has meant the inability to modernize vessels.²⁸ In itself, this indicates the economic marginality of the industry which has promoted the economic decline.

Prior to the 1970s, the state governments were in firm control of management and commercial regulations within their respective territorial limits. The only main inter-state effort to regulate species was the Atlantic States Regional Commission (ASRC), which included all states from Maine to Florida and which was involved with proposing programs for the wisest use of the species. In no way were quota or resource allocations proposed.²⁹ Without firm management measures, the industry was subjected to periodic stock depletions which made the foundations of the commercial fishery very shaky. Technology facilitated stock depletion and the periodic marginality of the industry.

The beginning of recent political involvement with the industry originated in the 1960s, when declining catches brought on by foreign fishing, along with the high cost of domestic vessel replacement, were problems faced by the local industry.³⁰ Margaret Dewar has noted that, prior to 1976, little long-term investigation into the problems of the industry was initiated.³¹ Congressional support of the industry was mainly from a political stance, rather than a rational long-term attitude. One of the most important pieces of legislation - the Saltonstall-Kennedy Bill, passed in the late 1950s - provided subsidies for the construction of boats, as well as funds for research programs.³² Other forms of assistance included the Fishing Boat Subsidy S1006, Medical Care for Fishermen S978, the Extension of Fishing Improvement Act S998, and Seized Fishing Boats HR7117 and HR2269.³³ These measures, however, were extremely cosmetic,

without any long-term policy orientation. The theme of most measures is the preservation of the industry in order to allow it to find its own equilibrium within the marketplace. Unlike the economy of Atlantic Canada, the New England economy could absorb the unemployment caused by contractions in the industry. As a result, the industry can be allowed to find its own equilibrium in the marketplace without causing undue economic hardship to the regional economy.

The ability of the industry to secure assistance reflected the perceived crisis which contributed to the organized unity. In turn, political representatives were cognizant of the pressure coming from the industry. In most instances, however, most efforts were fragmented, devoted mostly to the state levels. Such an orientation is not surprising, given the fact that the state governments were, in effect, the day-to-day regulators of the industry. Federal politicians were thus largely beyond the range of immediate day-to-day concerns for most of the industry. Only when the industry was able to exert a form of regional unity could it fight its way onto the national agenda.

The New England Fisherman: A Unique Anthropology

A substantial literature exists on the anthropology of fishing communities. Poggie and Gersuny, in their study of a coastal fishing community in Rhode Island, have noted the general features of the marine environment which distinguish fishing from other land-based occupations:

Sociocultural, economic, and technological factors in human exploitation of the oceans are affected by variations in the maritime environment. These variations do not comprise mutually exclusive categories and, thus they separately and jointly affect the world of man...Distance from shore is a factor in social relationships between marine workers and the shoreside groups with which they interact, especially their

families. It also influences equipment needs. Currents may jeopardize fishing gear, as may rock outcrops on the ocean floor...In short, while maritime occupations are pursued in environments that share common distinctions from all land environments, differences among these environments have important effects that must be considered as well.³⁴

To restate, the adaptation to the marine environment engenders a basic set of cultural characteristics:

Each adaptation to this inhospitable [maritime] environment creates new problems...for the men engaged in maritime occupations: these might include life style, health, kinships and other social ties, as well as the obvious strains on technological adaptation. The greater the distance from land, the greater the social distinctions from the landbound normative pattern.³⁵

The study also highlights the importance of such variables as kinship, as well as the basic themes of individualism and independence which are linked to the basic psychological characteristics of those who decide to enter the industry. In questioning children of fishermen, the same predisposition to turn to fishing was quite high. These findings are also supported by findings in New Bedford, Massachusetts and Stonington, Connecticut, which also seem to bear out this conclusion, despite the larger proletarianized fleets.³⁶

Family lifestyle is also affected by the uncertainties of fishing. In particular, the wife assumes more responsibility for the actual operation of the household, as well as the raising of children. Uncertainty is a feature of most households. As well, the wife is often the spokesman for the absent fisherman. Such predispositions are reflected in the civic awareness that fishermen's wives have displayed in the community, particularly in the political realm.³⁷

A question has also arisen about the general 'emotive' commitment displayed towards fishing. R.J. Marshall, Jr., in a study of three New England fishing communities, has concluded that the occupation of fishing has a more important meaning for its participants.³⁸ The role of the occupation in the life of the individual is composed of specific variables: source of income, regulating life activity, identification and meaningful life experiences. These functions and affective orientations, if all are met, provide the necessary emotive commitment in which the occupation defines the identity, as well as the predisposition of the individual towards certain phenomena. Some variables are more important than others. New Bedford fishermen were more inclined to emphasize income as an important feature of the occupation, while Point Judith and Stonington fishermen stressed the features of "doing something I like".³⁹ A common theme running through all responses is the feature of independence associated with the occupation. The extent of fishing as "a way of life" seems to be correlated with the level of income - the lower the income, the greater the probability of following the occupation as a "way of life". In short, the basic implication is that, in many cases, participation in fishing is indicative of a greater set of occupational characteristics which go beyond the basic cost-benefit analysis or, in other words, the emphasis on occupation as a means of making a living.

James Acheson has also noted the importance of custom and convention in Maine's inshore lobster fishery.⁴⁰ The lobster fishery possesses a specific set of rules which govern the exercise of the occupation. Territoriality is extremely important; fishermen from one harbour have been known to damage traps belonging to fishermen from other ports or even those belonging to recreational fishermen. The dividing lines between most areas are only

known to local fishermen who have extensive knowledge of local geographic configurations. These rules and conventions make up a specific set of laws which are otherwise outside the realm of the state authorities.

In discussing the introductory management measures, Acheson also draws attention to the fact that management measures which do not complement the territorial unit of the social organization of lobster fishermen will run into problems. A policy recommendation which was offered was to institutionalize the existing territorial structure, rather than to impose some type of formal structural form of management.⁴¹

It is also hard for fishermen to be identified with only one species. Throughout the year, fishermen can be expected to pursue a multitude of species, depending on the cycles of species migrations, as well as specific economic factors (e.g., few alternate sources of employment). In the mid-coast regions of New England, for example, a good many lobstermen switch to scalloping or groundfishing, and some switch to herring fishing.⁴² The point to be made is that the occupation of fishing deviates from regular conceptions of professionalism. Fishery-switching is indicative of an attitude which denies the skill or exclusivity deriving from specialization in one species. In the final analysis, the occupation produces a flexibility in which more structured controls are irrelevant. In this way, the basic occupational environment is formed from a different set of considerations and needs. As a result, knowledge is derived from a much different set of norms and values through which fishermen are socialized. Given the previous discussion of the psychological/professional characteristics of bureaucrats, the potential exists for a conflict in the way certain issues are approached for further discussion within the multi-value matrix.

The anomalies in the fishery are also illustrated by the situation in Gloucester, Massachusetts. Fishermen in Gloucester, as opposed to non-fishermen, are a shared collectivity:

Fishermen in Gloucester are distinct from their non-fishing counterparts. Fishermen typically refer to themselves as "fishermen" and are seen by others in the community primarily in this light. They are not viewed, nor do they view themselves, as "employees" who simply happen to work on a boat instead of in a factory or office. Despite the various factions within the occupation, fishermen, under most conditions, present a rather unified front to others. In the fishing community they have the same problems. For example, fishing requires large amounts of time spent isolated from the rest of society; the practitioners of the trade face considerable economic uncertainty in their day-to-day fishing activities; they risk their lives even in the best of weather; they wear distinguishable work clothes; they almost always work in groups; and a lengthy learning period under scrutiny is required to become a fisherman. These features strongly suggest that fishermen are likely to create and sustain a rather tight occupational community marked by a definite insider versus outsider spirit, close bonds of mutual regard and care for the welfare of one another, and healthy respect for that most uncertain of environments, the sea.⁴³

Although there are internal divisions within the occupation (e.g., inshore and offshore sectors), reputations are made which derive not so much from the captain who has the largest boat, but from the captain who brings home the largest catch. Personal qualities become instrumental in clarifying the vessels which have the leading qualities of the fleet.

In Gloucester, the existence of the family unit is also important. The basic structure of recruitment favours such a unit, which allows sons to 'fall into fishing', although income seems to be a crucial reason for continuing to fish.

Although ethnicity is an important factor, a differentiation exists in Gloucester between 'guineas' and 'greasers' - 'greasers' are first-generation immigrants whose ethnicity brings a strong work ethic to the

fishery, while on the other hand, 'guineas' are the children of these immigrants who have^c become more acculturated and continued the fishing tradition. Attitudinal traits have been the most important distinction: 'greasers' were inexperienced but strongly dedicated to fishing; their tendency to catch as much fish as possible stems from their immigrant work ethic. 'Guineas' are the more successful fishermen. In short, an internal bifurcation exists which tends to divide fishermen, rather than unite them.⁴⁴ The importance of such a cleavage is that its division is based on the extent of ethnic identity, rather than solely by gear type or boat size. In short, the ethnic classification provides another cleavage which cuts across the inshore/offshore classifications.

Another important perspective on Gloucester fishermen centres on the ethnic factor as well. Joseph Sestak has noted the imposition of the unique Sicilian heritage permeating the local Gloucester fishing industry. In examining the reasons behind the failure of the Gloucester Fishermen's Cooperative, he draws attention to the competitiveness existing in the port, a result of the distinctiveness of the Sicilian^u heritage:

Gloucester...has not formed a cooperative because its competitiveness is not "normal". Instead, it is vicious, bitter, and personal; its enmity is forbidding. Backbiting, cheating, vindictiveness, underhanded manipulation, bitter jealousy characterize the fleet and the processors of Gloucester. The Gloucester fisherman is willing to take less for himself to prevent others from arising....⁴⁵

In sum, a basic feature of ethnicity seeks simultaneously to divide and unite the local fisherman population. The basic cultural orientations establish a unique pattern of social relationships based on the distinctiveness promoted by the presence of ethnic identities. The competitiveness wrought by these antagonisms indicates an inferior pattern

of social relationships. Such cleavages which are created reinforce the distinctive occupational insulation.

Another question which has also been addressed is the degree of technological change affecting the basic characteristics of New England fishermen. Acheson has examined the concept of technological innovation as it applies to inshore fishermen in northern New England, discussing the adoption of such devices as new primary fishing gear and radar.⁴⁶ One of the most important factors in the spread of technological innovation is the presence of localized kinship ties, as well as ties among members who fish the same species. The qualification of kinship underlies a parochial orientation towards the adoption of technology. Despite the introduction of technology, the basic cultural norms and values have not been altered. An argument can certainly be made that such technological developments do not represent any positive change in terms of a process of modernization, since resulting structural differentiation does not accommodate itself to the introduction of such innovations.

In summary, the foregoing literature supports the basic proposition of the existence of distinctive occupational cultures derived from fishing. Such norms and values are different from the land-based community. The existence of high levels of local identities is derived from the paradoxical nature of occupational solidarity and, of course, ethnicity in some ports. The fact that technological innovation indicates a general level of modernization explains the cultural inferiority of the New England fisherman. Increasing urbanization, combined with technological/organizational interdependence, failed to take hold among New England fishermen. Given this type of insulation, the political culture could still display many of the variables which personify the 'yeoman' style of

political culture, in conflict with the basic trend towards managerialism which is perceived to be a product of forces outside the immediate community environment.

The 'passing-by' of the technological age has thus left New England fishermen at the margins of society in terms of political activity. The development of the necessary participatory culture, indicative of the evolution of a structural organizational approach to human relationships, never occurred. Technological innovation has affected the fishermen, but not enough to alter the other anthropological variables of the marine environment which influence the cultural attitudes of fishermen. Unlike the Canadian context, however, the dominant American ideology of liberalism tends to foster greater societal integration. Individualism and localism, the main traits of the fisherman's occupational community, are also essential tenets of American liberalism which stresses localism and public control over the institutions of government. The bureaucratic paradigm is not dominant - the two modes of interpretation (bureaucratic versus local organic political) are thus forced into continuous conflict in the identification of policy questions and the devising of adequate remedies perceived to be able to cope with the particular problem areas. As will be noted later, the fishery management councils, an important cornerstone of fisheries management, symbolize the continuing subjective conflict.

The anthropological orientations of the industry are also important concerning the interactions it has with its political representatives. Given the American party system, which emphasizes the personality over the party structure, it can be hypothesized that such an orientation will be consistent with the attitudes presented by the unique anthropology of fishermen. As a result, the particular method of interest aggregation may

vary, depending on the extent of post-industrial development. The personalization within the parties places a premium on the capabilities of a particular politician to perform certain favours and to allocate resources. At the same time, however - given the emphasis on the structural facets of organization as enshrined in the pluralist ideology - only when the interest can form a viable on-going group can political representatives be responsive to the demands of their constituents. This phenomenon is precisely the problem underlying the New England fishing industry - a problem which worsened in the 1970s when the federal government, particularly the bureaucrats, began to assert their right to a role in fisheries policy.

Since political representatives in the United States are first and foremost individuals, the actions of party members are much more important in ensuring the popularity necessary for their re-election. Traditionally, the role of the Congressman has been much more important with respect to his/her ability to service the public's needs and desires. John Johannes, for example, has highlighted the importance of constituency service for individual Congressmen in their relationships with the public.⁴⁷ In most situations, the basic route of cases is firstly a screening by staff assistants, who then forward requests for conciliation or mediation, which is usually the responsibility of the aides who handle requests and inquiries.

In itself, constituency service implies an ability to mediate and facilitate contacts with appropriate officials or agencies. In the case of fisheries policy since 1976, a distinction must be made between constituency work on management questions and on other matters which are a part of constituency questions. The management process must be distinguished from the greater commercial/financial assistance in the industry. Moreover, the

basic thrust of the industry is on a regional basis. In most cases, the pattern of interaction favours the fishermen's organization. In the words of an assistant to Congressman Gerry Studds of Massachusetts:

The [regional fisheries] management councils manage the fish, not the Congressman...we continually tell people we don't manage the fish. We will sit and listen...but we don't manage the fish....⁴⁸

Although the interaction is mainly through organizations, this in no way means that there is not room for individual interaction. Such interaction, however, is conducted through advisory bodies which sit every month to discuss the health of the industry. While such meetings indicate a responsiveness concerning the problems of the industry, the existence of such a context channels the focus of the industry away from the 'nitty-gritty' of management and towards more financial questions (e.g., tax problems).⁴⁹ The representative is thus able to determine his own context of consultation with the industry. Topics are very much the products of 'crisis-oriented' situations, indicating the issue-oriented foundation for a collective response. More often than not, however, if a case is to be presented to government, the focus is usually through 'associations or a group of boat owners', which leaves room for specific localized tendencies.

On an individualized basis, telephone calls are the main source of communication between the industry and political representatives. Few letters are written. On matters of regulation, representatives usually refer the inquirer back to the management councils or the appropriate administrative agency.⁵⁰ Issues of a non-regulatory nature (e.g., taxes) can be dealt with by the aide. At the same time, however, these types of issues are problems faced not only by fishermen, but by any occupational sub-group. In short, although the same types of issues as are handled in

the Canadian context may also be forwarded to the American Congressman, matters pertaining to management are rarely taken on in the United States; this is unlike Canada, where the Member of Parliament is likely to handle management matters as well. The variation is thus not relevant, as it is in Canada.

The facts that the New England fishing industry is an issue of low national impact, combined with the basic industry fragmentation, prevent the basic solidification needed to establish the necessary relationships which would allow the industry to wield influence over government policy. Given the ideology of pluralism, those constituencies which do not have the ability to be heard will not succeed. Only when an effort transcends regional identifications will there be a margin of success. Such an orientation differs from the Canadian context, where the Tory notion of hierarchy promotes and legitimates patron-client relationships.

To restate this case, for any political representative to take action, he/she must hear one united voice from his constituency, rather than several disparate voices. Given the basic occupational anthropology of fishermen, the maintenance of relationships with political representatives is shifted because of the fragmentation of the industry, which produces a multitude of groups incapable of cooperating to mount an on-going lobby effort on the national scene. As a result, this tendency prevents a strong long-term relationship with the important decision-makers. This does not mean that the Congressman or Senator will not try to aid the industry; the relationship however, would be more one-sided, with the politician setting the agenda by initiating programs or measures which appease the industry, thus ensuring short-term political loyalty. Such an arrangement allows for the presence of a plurality of groups, although the extent of their long-

term representation and cohesion are never high. The result of such fragmentation can thus be ad hoc sporadic consideration of issues.

The New England fishing industry epitomizes this short-term unity. Without an issue which engenders unity, the various factions of the industry will reassert themselves, personifying the inherent localism. As a result, its level of long-term political activity is negligible; the resulting patron-client relationships which evolve thus favour the Congressman/Senator's position when setting the agenda. The divisiveness of solutions is balanced by the problems of the relatively low, long-term salience of an issue. Action from representatives signifies the broadest 'common denominator' which will aid in maximizing electoral capital, thus safeguarding the basic network of people who are able to channel their influence and convey benefits to their rudimentary clientele.

The basic inferiority of fishermen reinforces the relationships. In each community, there were always specific individuals who had ties to government. In Massachusetts, for example, prior to the 1970s, the basic mode of dialogue was through the representatives who served each port and whose job it was to communicate with state representatives and Congressmen.⁵¹ Given the limited intrusion of government prior to the 1970s, these port officials were the prime modes of contact for the majority of fishermen. Such a framework allowed clientele relationships to develop and flourish. Wharf repair, a common issue, was really the large extent of state government intervention. State management measures, particularly in the lobster fishery, were of some significance; however, the thrust was still expansionary, without seasonal closures or restrictions. In most cases, the fishermen had greater clout at the state level. Loosely-organized groups - such as the Maine Lobstermen's Association or the Point

Judith Fishermen's Cooperative - were capable of approaching their state representatives: Boston was much closer to Gloucester than to Washington. This type of proximity enables informal short-term responses to succeed in times of crisis. Regional pressure groups were not needed; the cultural mindset of most fishermen was consistent with the existing formal and informal structures of mediation. Such an orientation also had an effect on the role played by the bureaucracies at both the national and state levels.

With respect to the fishing industry, the first executive department in the United States - the Bureau of Fisheries - was established within the Department of Interior in 1903.⁵² In 1956, the Fish and Wildlife Act reorganized the old department into the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and the Bureau of Sport Fisheries.⁵³ The intent of the reorganization with respect to the industry was primarily a dedication to commercial matters and marketing. Services were provided to facilitate the smooth functioning and viability of the industry. Conservation measures and fishing effort assessments were also undertaken; however, most of the efforts initiated were on a much smaller scale - for example, financial authorizations.

The commercial thrust of the bureaucracy, particularly at the federal level, placed it on the margins of active regulation of the industry. Like Canada, the United States was also content with the *status quo* which was legitimated by scientific rational formulations on fisheries management, transmitted through ICNAF. As the crisis in overfishing undermined the old scientific foundations, the American bureaucracy also tried to redefine its mandate. This trend was reflected by the establishment by executive order in 1970 of the National Fisheries Marine Service (NMFS) within the new National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).⁵⁴ Unlike the Canadian situation, the American bureaucracy does not have an automatic hold

on any basic conception of itself as a defender of the public interest. It must try to advance its own policies; since Congress has alternate sources of information, the debate about the relative legitimacy of fact and value is further fragmented and disputed. Without a centralized pattern of authority with which to carry out and at least provide legitimacy for certain agendas and actions, bureaucrats often become more overtly political in their attempt to advance their agendas.

Given the commercial legacy of the federal role in American fisheries policy, the problems in American fisheries management become more clearly defined. Since 1976, with the passage of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FCMA), the main dichotomy has been between the need to balance these cultural conceptions of localism/community (fishermen) and the demands of professional managerialism (bureaucrats). This clash is also played out within the greater political process because of the inability to encompass the pluralist ideology and form a lobby capable of addressing and making their concerns known to Congressmen/Senators. The provision of American democracy is personified in the individualism of New England fishermen, which cannot completely bridge the gap to a group organizational response towards political activity. The situation is one of arrested modernization - groups do exist, but these constituencies do not engage in the cooperation necessary to make their long-term influence felt in national politics.

The 1970s and the Background to Extended Jurisdiction

As noted in the previous chapter, the failure to enforce regulations, both domestically and internationally, resulted in the overfishing of many stocks; as a consequence, declarations of extended jurisdiction were made by both the United States and Canada in the late 1970s. The period immediately preceding this had witnessed the first concerted attempt by the fishing industry to exert some control over the execution of fisheries policy. The general thrust of most of American oceans policy throughout the post-war period was largely devoted to the pursuit of broader foreign policy objectives, specifically the freedom of the seas which was vital to American naval interests.⁵⁵

In contrast, the local fishing industry was outside the immediate purview of relevant consideration. Direct consultation of local interests prior to the 1950s was a rarity, if it existed at all. Many of the industry's petitions for relief from unfair imports, for example, were overruled by President Eisenhower on the grounds that European countries and Canada needed markets to prevent them from being vulnerable to the scourge of communism. In any case, short-term financial assistance from Congress was enough to pacify discontent.

By the 1970s, however, the situation had worsened considerably, after ten years of foreign overfishing off American coasts. Many of the groups which formed to represent the industry have their genesis in this period. The focus of these group efforts was towards gaining control over traditional fishing grounds by extending coastal jurisdiction to the 200-mile limit. The hope was voiced that, by removing the foreigners, the fishery would be secured and could then be exploited to the full benefit of American fishermen.⁵⁶

The image of the foreigner in the 1970s was extremely potent, particularly since most foreign ships were from the Soviet Union. The United States, involved in war in Indochina, was extremely sensitive to perceived communist abuses. For the New England fishing industry, such an atmosphere was advantageous to their cause: the American fisherman - the symbol of hard work and individualism - was being deprived by foreign overfishing. The fisherman was not himself responsible for his problems; the problem was beyond his control - remove the problem and everything would be fine.

Gaining an extension of coastal jurisdiction was an important and even urgent priority for everyone involved in the industry. By extending jurisdiction, the implication advocated by the industry was that it would become self-sufficient by having exclusive domestic control over the resource. The following statement by Jake Dykstra, the President of the Point Judith Fishermen's Cooperative, is indicative of the prevailing American attitude in the early 1970s:

The 200-mile resource zone will give the US jurisdiction over more fishery resources than will be controlled by any other nation in the world. Demand for fishery products in the US and throughout the world continues to increase. With the restoration of depleted stocks, more fish will become available to US fishermen at the expenditure of less money and effort to catch them. And once the US has jurisdiction and preferential rights to catch the fish, the investment climate in the fishing industry will improve. This will enable the US to catch for domestic consumption an increasingly greater percentage of the 70% or more fish which we now import.⁵⁷

The simplicity of the solution is indicative of the weakness of the industry. Although questions were clearly present as to how a domestic regime could accomplish stock replenishment, the industry had very little conception of any need to implement a management system. There was some

conception of regulation, but awareness of the need for any domestic constraints was negligible. The formation of the coalitions of various interests was premised around the simple issue of removing the foreigners. A more technical or complex approach, which the question of management would entail, would certainly have carried a much more divisive response from the most fishermen who supported such lobby groups as the National Federation of Fishermen (NFF), as well as groups involved in the other 200-mile fisheries coalition. The point to be made is that the organizational structure was broad enough to develop the necessary organizational framework, thus creating the regional and national unity needed to make political representatives respond to industry concerns.

The symbolic potential answers only part of the question as to why the industry was able to mount the lobby. Another reason was the nature of the issue itself: foreign overfishing was something which internally unified the industry. Politicians such as Representative Gerry Studds of Massachusetts and Senator Warren Magnuson of Oregon were able to act for an industry which was speaking with one voice for the first time in many years. The unity of the industry was illustrated by the formation of such groups as the NFF in 1973, to press for extended jurisdiction and to try to act as a watchdog over government policy as it affected the local fishing industry. As will be noted later, the recent demise of the NFF symbolizes a complete collapse of any minimum consensus concerning the issue of jurisdiction.

The unity displayed in the industry coincided with changes at the federal level regarding federal responsibility towards fisheries policy. The present fisheries management agency, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), dates back to 1970 when an executive reorganization transferred the responsibility for fisheries matters to this new sub-agency

within the Department of Commerce. Although basic commercial services continued to remain the same, the emphasis on a professional approach to fisheries management in the midst of overfishing ultimately meant a redefinition of the administrative role in fisheries policy. Clearly, the stocks were being depleted. While the industry desired extended jurisdiction to rid themselves of the foreigners, the administrative perspective was also one of defining the solution in terms of an external framework of control and regulation which would be administered according to rational scientific conceptions of wise fisheries management.

From the industry's perspective, management meant extended jurisdiction; in no way did it mean a long-term, formal, domestic regime. These competing interests were at work in the eventual passage of legislation through Congress. The FOMA was passed by Congress in 1976.⁵⁸ The Act extended American fisheries management to 200 miles and provided for the establishment of eight regional management councils which were to share authority with the NMFS in the formulation of management plans.⁵⁹ The original draft of the bill was prepared by officials in the NOAA in conjunction with the appropriate Congressional Committees - specifically the House Committee on Merchant, Marine, and Fisheries; and the Senate Commerce Committee. Originally, the first draft of the bill was conservationist in tone, placing management authority in the hands of the NMFS, the NOAA's new agency for fisheries management. Such a framework would have created a centralized management authority. Most probably, the criteria for judging management issues would have been formulated from the rational bureaucratic perspective.⁶⁰

The local industry realized that it could not succeed in persuading Congress to omit the management provisions from the bill. The best

arrangement that could be made was a modified management proposal that, if nothing else, would formalize the input of the industry into the process of fisheries management. In so succeeding, the basic dichotomy in fisheries policy between NMFS and the fishing industry was forged. The structure which was formulated also reflected the basic ideology of participatory localism, which sanctioned the principle of democratic accountability to the community level. To a large extent, the bureaucratic interest was not successful. The *laissez faire* ideology, for example, was not strong enough to prevent amendments to the FCMA by local industry interests. As a result, by winning a measure of statutory participation in the management process, local fishermen found the necessary leverage to be able to offer a serious challenge to the bureaucratic conceptions of wise management policy. By allowing the industry to participate in plan formulation, a clash of orientations developed.

American Fisheries Management: The FCMA

The Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976 provided for the wise "protection, conservation and enhancement" of the fishery resource.⁶¹ These goals were to be achieved through the imposition of and compliance with seven national standards built into the Act:

1. Plans shall prevent overfishing while achieving optimum yield;
2. Measures are to be based on the best scientific information available;
3. A fishery shall be, to the extent practicable, managed as a unit throughout strength;
4. Conservation measures shall not discriminate between residents of different states;

5. Plans shall promote efficiency in utilization of fishery resources;
6. Plans shall take fishery resource variations into account;
7. Plans shall minimize cost and avoid duplication.⁶²

These standards are explicitly broad; the problem has been how to define and meet these provisions in the day-to-day formulation of management plans. Despite the publication of subsequent definitions in updates to the FCMA, a great latitude and ambiguity still exists, which is further aggravated when the institutional framework of fisheries management and the path of industry inputs are considered (see Figure 5).

The NMFS is one source of interpretation (item [1], Figure 5). The structure of the NMFS consists of five regions, each headed by a Regional Director (see Figure 6). The Regional Directors are empowered to oversee and ensure that the policies of the Secretary of Commerce are implemented within the region.⁶³ This includes review by the Regional Management Councils which are empowered to make management plans (see pgs. 231-236). The basic purpose of deliberations is to ensure that the plans follow the basic outline of the standards set down in the FCMA. Another component is the scientific arm, responsible for the acquisition of scientific data, as well as the facilities which provide this information.

The mandate of the NMFS in the fisheries management process is narrowly defined as the 'conservation' of the species "from the perspective of what is required in the Act."⁶⁴ As an executive agency and a sub-department of the NOAA, the NMFS is accountable to Congress. The interpretation of these criteria in the Act becomes tied to the occupational milieu of professional training which encompasses differing norms and values. Such differences in the occupational milieu become a perennial problem in management.

Figure 5

United States Fisheries Management Framework

* e.g., Massachusetts Marine Advisory Council, Maine Department of Natural Resources Marine Advisory Council, Rhode Island Marine Fisheries Council

** i.e., the respective departments responsible for commercial fisheries within state jurisdiction

Source: partially adapted from Stephen Greene, Washington: A Study of the U.S. Fisheries Policy Management Process, p. 30.

Figure 6

National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) - Current Organization Structure

Source: Gordon Memo regarding proposed changes in the NMFS as of February, 1987.

The interpretations of the NMFS were offset by the introduction of the Regional Management Councils (item [2], Figure 5), composed of the following: (i) the principal state officials with marine fishery responsibility, as appointed by the Secretary of Commerce from a list submitted by the respective state Governors; (ii) the NMFS Regional Director; and (iii) a remaining number (equivalent to twice the number of states within council jurisdiction) of 'public' members who have the right to vote and are appointed by the state Governors. A number of non-voting members are also present: the US Fish and Wildlife Service Regional Director, the Commander of the district Coast Guard, the Director of the Marine Fisheries Commission, and one representative of the Department of State.⁶⁵

The Councils are charged with the development of respective fishery management plans. Two major problems have been the jurisdiction of the Councils and their ability to define the proper intent in meeting the terms of the national standards. In theory, each Council has certain scientific and statistical committees responsible for supplying the necessary data. At the same time, however, the method of obtaining data can never be totally accurate; conceptions of true and factual inferences can, of course, vary, depending on the purpose and the mandate or interest of the specific personnel involved. In this sense, there is always the potential for a clash in viewpoints concerning the best and most expeditious way to realize national standards.

National standards are not the only specification which the Councils must meet. In the formation of plans, the Councils, because they are federal agencies, must meet a number of other specific criteria of legislation:

1. the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA), which requires a statement of the probable effects of the plan on the environment;
2. Executive Order 122921 (1981), which requires the Councils to reduce the amount of paperwork in the operation of the US economy;
3. the Federal Advisory Committee Act (1976), which specifies the procedural mandates of all bodies which advise the federal government;
4. the Freedom of Information Act (1976);
5. the Administrative Procedure Act (1976);
6. the Regulatory Flexibility Act (1981); and
7. the Paperwork Reduction Act (1981).⁶⁶

All these measures must be complied with in the making of management plans. In many cases, in the drafting of many of the provisions of a fisheries management plan, adherence to these measures may take additional time, in addition to the general debate which occurs concerning the proper course of fisheries management.

One of the most important conceptions of national standards is the idea of optimum yield (OY), the formulation of which reflects a differing perception of wise fisheries management. The American conception of fisheries management is also different from the Canadian. Optimum yield is defined as "the amount of fish harvested, (1) which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the nation, with particular reference to food production and recreational opportunities, and (2) modified by any relevant economic, social, or ecological factor."⁶⁷

In the broadest sense, the conception of OY is in itself a subjective conception concerning the wise use of fish stocks. The American conception

may thus differ from other broad conceptions concerning what is perceived to be the most efficient use of resources possible. Spencer Apollonio, the Commissioner of Marine Resources, points out that American OY is not the same as the Canadian conception, which ties OY to the conception of MSY (maximum sustainable yield):

The Canadians...equate optimum yield with MSY. In their mind there's no difference between the two. In our view there's a lot of difference. We're supposed to start from MSY and then modify it according to social, cultural, economic, environmental and other factors as appropriate, and the modifications and therefore the departures from MSY can be rather substantial. That means that the Canadian definition of overfishing could be very different from ours.⁶⁸

The basic conception of the wise use of resources thus may vary, depending on the exact nature of the various priorities of wise fisheries management. From this perspective, the conceptions of what is rational and what is not may differ. In theory, the concept of rationality is supposed to be able to evaluate the options and the data for satisfying this biological conception. Tim Hennessey has argued that the concept of rationality has had to adapt itself to the problems of fisheries policy. By virtue of the fact that it is impossible to obtain information that is 100% verifiable about the actual abundance of stocks, the Regional Management Council system promotes strategic instead of synoptic decision-making. Members will use only that relevant information which is sufficient to sustain their self-interest. Hennessey draws attention to the potential differences in viewpoint among the crucial players in fisheries management, a consequence of the organizational structure built into the PCMA:

Since there are numerous decision points specified in the Act, I expect the dynamics of council interactions and the triadic relationship between the Secretary of Commerce, the Regional Fisheries Management Councils, and the National

Fisheries Marine Service to generate a diversity of viewpoints and preferences. Under such a system there is a high probability that negative impacts of particular courses of council action will be brought to the surface than if the system were centrally coordinated and employed synoptic operational criteria.⁶⁹

The existence of different types of knowledge can be expected to produce different points of view concerning the admissibility of certain facts perceived to be rational. As a result, the concept of rationality becomes defined in different ways, depending on the environment from which the various players are deriving their patterns of self-interest. The logical assumption which can be made is that without any indication of what is rational, the potential for conflict is increased. In this way, the debate over the perceived objective and factual requirements for satisfying the conception of OY becomes knotted in conflict. Participation is thus used to obscure and, in some cases, delay the imposition of outputs. Although the Regional Management Councils are high in allowing industry participation, the clash of different types of knowledge hampers attempts to achieve a satisfactory definition of OY.

All three actors are competing for specific particular preferences. There is the problem of reconciling or aggregating these preferences into some achievable consensus. The structure is indicative not only of a clash in problem-solving, but also in the basic cultural environments in which all the various players are based. The NMFS, adopting the rational synoptic approach, tries to address the problem in terms of regulatory consistency, based on the presence of the best scientific data possible. The Regional Management Councils try to build coalitions from several different personal preferences as to definitions of OY. A Fishery Management Plan (FMP) may be acceptable to the Industry, but it may conflict with the professional

objectives of the NMFS. As a result, a slash in interpretation is unavoidable.

The most important source of the professional interpretation comes directly from the NMFS Regional Director. The fact that he/she is a quasi-political official means that he/she must try to advance the legitimate objectives which he/she interprets to be consistent with the basic objectives of the NMFS. In terms of relationship of the NMFS with the Regional Management Councils, its Regional Director tries, as the representative of the bureaucratic viewpoint, to stress the values and mandate of the NMFS. The full Council rarely participates in the actual formulation of respective draft management plans. Such functions are assumed by a series of oversight committees, composed of four to eight members who are knowledgeable about the industry and whose job it is to offer advice on the best conservation measures to achieve the national standards, particularly OY.⁷⁰ These members are appointed on the basis of their knowledge of the local industry and its problems. Each committee also has recourse to consult with its respective advisory committee made up of figures who are not necessarily Council members and who supply added advice and expertise. These committees are summoned at the discretion of the oversight committee, to deal with a particular problem or crisis pertaining to a particular species. Each Regional Management Council uses its own discretion in deciding whether or not to develop more specific terms of reference in its operating procedures. The Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council has done this, while the New England Council has chosen not to (see Appendix B-1).

A problem with recent advisory committees has related both to attendance and to expertise. Often, specific advisors are fishermen who are

unable to attend meetings because of the time they must spend fishing. One exception is Dan Arnold, the former Executive Director of the Massachusetts Inshore Draggermen's Association (MIDA), who served as an advisor on groundfish. While Arnold spent an enormous amount of time in administrative procedures and debate, his son was able to operate his vessel. Most fishermen are not so lucky. This type of drawback is indicative of the formal administrative assumptions which such a process signifies concerning the ability to gain formal representation. Moreover, the conception of expertise includes all users of the resource. Thus, commercial fishermen must share space on the Council and its various sub-committees with party-boat fishermen and recreational/sport fishermen. Generally, these latter interests are not commercial fishermen and do not depend on the quantifiable harvesting of the resource. More often than not, the differences in gear types and harvesting techniques produce a conflict in the respective fishing grounds. In many cases, sport fishermen have a different bias concerning the resource; they can clearly articulate their concerns, in contrast with their colleagues in commercial fishing.

The question of expertise partly stems from the composition of the different types of boat and gear involved in commercial fishing. In most cases, the rule of thumb has been not to disqualify those who have a direct 'commercial interest' in their respective fisheries. While the intention of such a ruling is laudable, the end result of this policy has been to produce personnel who may have little or no knowledge of the specific fishery in question. For example, James Costakes, General Manager of the New Bedford Seafood Producers' Association, relates an instance of a committee having no conception of what was involved in the question of meat counts regarding proper-sized scallops.⁷¹ Such problems contribute to the difficulties of

trying to devise adequate management plans when the participants are inhibited from fully participating.

In the case of formulating a Fishery Management Plan for groundfish, the following procedure is followed:⁷²

1. Identification of objectives by the general finfish committee.

The objective here is to try to establish the broad guidelines which are deemed to be the expression of OY. The committees receive scientific data which are supposed to act as a crucial guidepost in the determination of OY. Recommendations are sent to the full Council for further debate. After substantial debate, the full Council usually approves the objectives. Also undertaken are preliminary considerations under the NEPA regarding the probable environmental impact of such actions, as well as consideration of Executive Order 12044 regarding the economic impact of the proposed regulations.

Like the Canadian process, the relevance of scientific and statistical data is extremely important. The great majority of data is derived from the NMFS through its research facilities at Woods Hole, Massachusetts. In some instances, private contractors have prepared scientific studies. The Council also maintains a scientific and statistical committee which has tried to standardize some procedures, as well as to advise the Council on the biological state of the stocks. At the same time, however, the ability to obtain accurate and timely data presents difficulties in ascertaining accurate stock levels. In short, the scientific data may not be altogether accurate, which prejudices the debate over wise management.

2. Draft Preparation of the Fishery Management Plan.

At this stage, the actual recommendations for the provisions of the Plan are formulated in conjunction with Council staff. A draft FMP is composed of four documents: (i) the draft FMP, (ii) a draft regulatory analysis, (iii) a draft environmental impact statement, and (iv) those draft regulations required to carry out the plan. Interaction between the committees, the full Council and the NMFS occurs as necessary. Recommendations are sent to the full Council for approval.

The oversight committees also make use of advisory panels composed of knowledgeable individuals who will advise the oversight committee on the feasibility of specific measures. These committees are appointed by the full Council. All meetings of the oversight committees are open to the public. Although a high degree of participation is evident, the process is very vulnerable to complaints from a particular sector or interest. Such grievances serve to retard the speed of such a process. In many cases, depending upon the issues involved, the mobilization of a specific constituency can delay the passage of the Plan.

Speed is also important in determining the ability to ensure the implementation of plans. In many cases, the Council has found itself working on amendments to an existing Plan as a 'stop-gap' measure to meet a target date and, at the same time, as an attempt to satisfy certain NMFS requests for reworking after Secretarial review. Short-term amendments increase rather than decrease the power of the industry to emphasize their own self-interest and to accede to measures which stress the minimum level of external

regulation possible. For example, a limited entry system - the most direct form of resource management - has been the least favoured method; rather, the tendency has been to opt for such measures as trip limits and mesh sizes. As will be noted later, the Atlantic Demersal Finfish Plan makes an attempt to implement a management system outside the vessel allocations and limited entry.

A final point to be made is that the memberships of the oversight committees and of the full Council are changing as new appointments are made by the state governors. A member who may be gaining the necessary expertise in a policy area may not be reappointed. Indeed, an examination of the membership of the Council and the Groundfish Oversight Committee shows a radical turnover in personnel. Advisors are in a separate category, in that in many instances they may not be able to attend, due to the need to go fishing. Such problems inhibit the evolution of a sustained process with members sufficiently knowledgeable of and familiar with the relevant issues and the industry as a whole.

3. The Review Process.

The draft FMP is submitted to two simultaneous review processes: (i) it is reviewed at public hearings - notice of the Plan is published in the Federal Register and locations of public hearings are specified (both oral and written submissions are permitted); and (ii) it is reviewed by the NMFS, first at the local level by the NMFS Regional Director, then at the Washington level. The Regional Management Councils may accede to specific pressures and try to propose compromises.

The review process is notorious for the implied public pressure which can be brought to bear. The NMFS review process is also intensive: different sections of the agency review the FMP, according to the national standards. As well, the Department of State and the Coast Guard receive a copy of the Plan, if any of its provisions transgress or affect their respective jurisdictions. These analyses are crucial to the passage of the Plan. In many situations, officials may deem the Plan unworkable, given their own professional backgrounds. Such flaws may be pointed out to the Council, requesting amendments. Procedurally, this does not mean that the Plan has been rejected; however, the likelihood that Secretarial approval (step 5) can be secured is considerably reduced.

5. Secretarial Review.

Once the Council has given its final approval, the Plan is sent to Washington, where it is first examined to determine if NMFS suggestions, made at the preliminary review, have been incorporated. If the Plan is found to be consistent with the original suggestions of the NMFS, various department heads decide to approve or disapprove the FMP. In many cases, partial disapproval of specific sections may require the Regional Management Councils to work on an amendment to satisfy the disapproval. The same steps are then followed again. All disapprovals returned to the Council must be accompanied by written statements detailing reasons for the disapproval.

In itself, this step of the process is an example of multi-value choice. The fact that the Plan is reviewed by officials in

Washington with the same criteria, allows a different set of officials with different occupational criteria to interpret the national standards according to their own values and priorities. A great many of the conflicts which occur on the question of the applicability of certain proposals to specific management standards derive from differing subjective interpretations by the NMFS and the Council. Without a way to verify opinions into fact, the debate becomes a case of the Council's opinion versus that of the NMFS. The result can be divisive, resulting in deadlock or an inability to agree on the best measures to arrive at a satisfactory definition of OY.

Many times, the mandate of the NMFS as the conserver of the resource brings it into conflict with the 'economic' priorities of the industry. The Council's definition of conservation is undoubtedly influenced by its economic needs; the criteria of the NMFS may not enshrine these considerations. At the heart of the issue is the way conservation itself is defined. Since the NMFS is the perceived custodian of the resource, its strict resource management may, in many cases, obviate economic considerations. If resource management is narrowly defined, exploitation would be eliminated entirely. As a result, the conflict revolves around this cleavage between the perceptions of long-term and short-term considerations. Indeed, the management process tries to balance those antithetical objectives which coexist in such a context.

6. Regulation Promulgation.

The regulations needed to put the Plan into effect are reviewed by the NMFS Regional Director. Next, the regulations are

published in the Federal Register by the NMFS Regulations Chief in Washington, in order to receive public comments. Once comments are reviewed, the NMFS Regional Director drafts final guidelines which go through final review by the Assistant Administrator of the NMFS and the Administrator of the NOAA. Upon approval, a thirty-day publication of the Plan in the Federal Register follows. If no further objections are raised, the Plan becomes law, to take effect at a certain specified date.

This stage of review is significant, since it allows alterations or subjective interpretations in the final drafting of regulations. Perceived minor revisions can make a great deal of difference in how the final Plan is actually applied. In some cases, the result of alterations produces different interpretations of the best path for management and resource allocation.

The complete procedure may take upwards of 250 days before a Plan is formulated. As the foregoing analysis indicates, the variety of checkpoints inhibits a management plan from being formulated in a timely manner. The clash of interpretations provides the foundations for multi-value choice. The problem is precisely this: how to reconcile conflicting orientations. The strong ideology of participation defines the legitimacy of the opinions of industry on an equal footing with those of the NMFS, in defining wise conservation. The problem of who is right and who is wrong is irreconcilable, given the lack of concrete verification, until economic crises overtake certain stocks. At the same time, however, the review process institutionalizes and impacts with the NMFS agenda, since the NMFS

Regional Director and his supervisors must approve the FMP. By building in this safeguard, the hegemony of the NMFS and the resulting bureaucratic hegemony are confirmed.

The structure of the Councils enables the industry to participate on the making of management plans. At the same time, however, the focus of debate on the Councils permits political representatives to remain aloof from the politics of resource management. Interpretational conflicts between fishermen (representing the local organic approach) and bureaucrats (representing scientific rationality) focus primarily on the Council. Fishermen can participate and have control over plan formulation. At the same time, however, the plan approved by Council, with its own set of interpretations of OY, can be rejected by the NMFS because its definition of OY clashes with that of the Council. An extra-political process is non-existent because of the scope the American framework accords to the existence of subjective interpretation of specific concepts.

A large part of the reason for this is the involvement of the industry in plan formulation. This positive structural asset is consistent with the thrust towards participatory democracy, which stresses regional accountability of the individual. Where the importance of political representatives is felt is in ensuring that the structural process itself operates in the way intended. The various oversight hearings on the FMCA can thus be classified in this vein. Hearings before the Committee on Merchant, Marine and Fisheries on the FOMA are held every few years to improve the functioning of the management plan process.⁷³ The point to be made is that the political representatives can, if they so desire, avoid being involved in the long-term overhaul of the management measures.

The Regional Management Councils and the NMFS have also shared responsibility in the area of foreign allocations. The mandate follows the intentions of the FOMA to limit or at least control the activity of foreign fishing. *In the case of determining foreign allocations to particular nations, section 206 of the FOMA places the responsibility in the hands of the Councils who, through similar internal routes of consideration, determine both the species and the proposed annual foreign levels (AFL) of stock which are available. The determination further specifies that any resource allocated for foreign use must not be in demand by American fishermen.⁷⁴ Such criteria are extremely broad and, in many instances, the Councils are in a subjective interpretative conflict with the NMFS, since any recommendations must have its final consent in order to become law.

Joint ventures in which US-caught fish are transferred to foreign national fleets are also problematic; before any application can be submitted to the NMFS from foreign vessels requesting the privilege of a joint venture, the foreign country involved must have already negotiated a Governing International Fisheries Agreement (GIFA) with the US Government. Applications from such foreign fleets must also be considered not only by the NMFS, but by the Regional Management Councils through their appropriate committees for a period of 45 days, as well as by the Coast Guard, the State Department, and members of Congress. The comments of all these agencies must be taken into account by the NMFS in its final determination of whether or not to grant a permit to a foreign fleet. Given the varied avenues of consideration, many other factors may prejudice the interpretation of an acceptable foreign joint venture request.⁷⁵

The role of the states in this process also illustrates the divided and cumbersome jurisdiction system (item [3], Figure 5). The fact that each

coastal state has continued its jurisdiction within the three-mile territorial limit means that the states are an important source of fishery management measures. The Director of the Division of Marine Fisheries (DMF) in Massachusetts, for example, is a powerful official in his own right. Lobster fishermen are, in some cases, more affected by the state level, as are inshore draggers who are also affected by state jurisdiction (see Figure 7).⁷⁶

The states also have their own avenues of input. Each state maintains its own version of a Marine Resources/Advisory Commission, mandated to serve as a forum of input for debate concerning management regulation (item [4], Figure 5). The Massachusetts Marine Advisory Commission has twelve members, selected by the Governor. If there is a specific regulatory problem experienced by the industry, a petition to have the matter discussed can be made by one of the members on the Commission.⁷⁷

From the perspective of participation, the state's advisory committee structures can be described as cooptive. Input is invited, but the basic mandate of the Commission is to 'advise', rather than to share power with the Departments. On one occasion, the Rhode Island Marine Advisory Department failed even to sponsor a quorum, attesting to the problems of such a structure. In many cases, the basic problem remains one of trying to secure redress.

In many instances, the states parallel federal regulators. The fact that the Directors/Commissioners of the respective state fisheries departments are also managers in the respective Regional Management Councils serves to imprint their philosophies on the working atmosphere under which the Council operates. For example, Spencer Apollonio, the Commissioner of Marine Resources for Maine, was a very strong personality, who was known to

Figure 7

Massachusetts Department of Fisheries, Wildlife & Environmental Law Enforcement
DIVISION OF MARINE FISHERIES

* State Jurisdiction

.../

Figure 7 .(continued)

Massachusetts Department of Fisheries, Wildlife & Environmental Law Enforcement
DIVISION OF MARINE FISHERIES

(continued)

Ops. Sandwich Office Act. 0104	Pilgrim Power Plant Act. 6002	Sport Fish Survey Act. 0310	Comm. Fish. Statistics * Act. 0144
Ops. Cat Cove Lab Act. 0105	Lobster Hatchery Imp. Act. 6004	Striped Bass Survey Act. 9710	Shellfish Pur. Plant Act. 0150
Ops. Lobster Hatchery Act. 0106	Coding Aging Act. 9710	Anadromous Fish. Mgmt.** Act. 9721	Shellfish Local Aid Act. 0600
Equipment Act. 0900	Resource Assessment ** Act. 9719		Extended Fish. Jur. Act. 9706
Capital Outlay *** Act. 0900	EPA, Buzzard Bay Study Act. 9722		Comm. Fish. Mktg./Ext. Act. 9707
			Comm. Fish. Statistics ** Act. 9712

** Federal Jurisdiction

*** S.S. Research Station

Source: Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries, correspondence between the Executive Director, Philip Coates, and the author in April, 1987.

oppose regulation; the absence of regulation as a path to overfishing is perceived as a way to demonstrate to fishermen the need for more stringent regulation. Since March, 1982, the NOAA/NMFS has published final regulations which interpret its power to preempt state authority, under section 306(b) of the PCMA, should it be deemed that the respective state is not fulfilling the mandates of wise conservation and management.⁷⁸ As will be noted later, the battle over finfish represented the clash of competing orientations and attitudes which has resulted in a 'demonstration' compromise, which the NMFS is threatening to replace with its own written plan, should the New England Council be unable to further revise its latest 1986 attempt at devising a Demersal Finfish Plan.

The role played by the Secretary of Commerce is also important because of the role by which he/she and his/her immediate officials exercise power over plan review. In practice, the position of the NMFS Regional Director provides a measure of input concerning the feasibility of having specific management provisions approved. In this way, the NMFS Regional Director is making a discretionary decision, based not only on his/her legitimated expertise, but also as the result of close ongoing communications with his/her superiors in Washington. Even in instances where a draft fisheries management plan has passed the Council, the several layers of review by the NOAA/NMFA in Washington have resulted in plans being rejected and sent back to the Councils for further revision. The fact that the Secretary of Commerce, through the NOAA, has the authority to write a plan in the event of Council failure, places the Councils under the continuing threat that the Secretary will use his/her authority to override their own. Moreover, the prerequisites regarding the amount of time needed to draft a plan place Washington in a very ambiguous position with respect to the determination of

the passage of an adequate length of time before it becomes necessary to intervene. Again, the drafters of the FCMA were committed to participation in, rather than imposition of, management plans. The possibility of 'giving in to a bunch of civil servants' is not considered proper conduct for an industry devoted to the ethics of self-reliance and free enterprise.

The New England Regional Management Council, in its narrowest mandate, is supposed to be concerned only with the making of management plans. Politics, however, is fundamental to the existence of the Regional Management Council. Although the Councils do not represent any formal segment of the industry, the fact that they do exist gives them an ability to exchange views and form extra-council alliances. Moreover, the ability to involve the industry in the making of management plans serves to siphon off the discontent and the possibility of resorting to illegitimate forms of activity. In the final analysis, the industry has a greater degree of control and input into the management process.

The fact that the Regional Management Councils represent a greater emphasis on local control inevitably facilitates the industry's assimilation into the administrative organizational environment. At the same time, however, the organizational capability of many groups still resides with the immediate local leadership; in most instances, the emphasis on independence is still cited as important with respect to explaining the lack of successful regional long-term efforts. No one issue is able to affect all fishermen in the same positive manner to facilitate collective efforts outside the immediate community.

The Councils provide the organizational cooptation which, if nothing else, legitimates their mandate to conserve the resource. The debate does not revolve around the question of the need for conservation, but around the

best way to achieve conservation, personified in attempts to define OY. The debate within the Council becomes the framework where subjective views become enmeshed within the procedural framework.

The Problem of Fishermen's Organizations

In discussing the problems of fishermen's organizations, general explanations have ranged from the different types of fishermen to their strong independence. Most of the fishermen's groups in New England formed in the early 1970s to press the case for an end to foreign fishing. Fishermen have always had a basic predisposition to join organizations which have an immediate effect on their livelihood. In most instances, the basic *raison d'être* of most organizations has emphasized economic over political motivations. Fishermen also focus on the day-to-day operation of their vessels, as opposed to having the time to take a long-range look at the industry. The uncertainty of the industry ranges from the size of the catch to the price which the fishermen will receive for it at the dock. The lay system, in which each crew member receives a proportion of the total gross value after auction, is the greatest symbol of uncertainty. Another important variable which may explain the existence of structural organization is the higher educational background possessed by most of the major leaders in the industry. Two important explanatory factors are the tradition of state-sponsored education in the United States - a by-product of egalitarianism - and the importance of fishing to the specific coastal communities in New England.

The University of Rhode Island, for example, has been instrumental in aiding the development of educated leadership, particularly with the passage of the National Sea Grant Program, which made substantial funds available to

the industry for research and development.⁷⁹ The emergence of an elite which is 'plugged into' the greater administrative environment cannot be overemphasized. By no means, however, does this mean that the majority of New England fishermen are generally better-educated; the point to be made is that there are educated men and women who are capable of giving the industry the leadership it needs.

On the other hand, the fragmentation of the industry inhibits the basic thrust towards collective cooperation through the existence of three sectors: the fresh fish, the frozen fish and the imported fish sectors.⁸⁰ The interests of these sectors also have divergent trends. The aim of the frozen fish dealer, for example, is to purchase fish from local fishermen at the cheapest price possible. Within the classification of fisherman itself, conflict exists between fixed- and mobile-gear fishermen, corresponding to inshore lobstermen versus inshore draggermen. These issues are by far the most localized and they affect the industry directly; these are issues which directly affect the livelihood of fishermen. Given the thrust of egalitarianism inherent in the American political culture of participation, the principle of pressure group activity outside government sponsorship becomes important as a way of articulating demands.

By and large, cooperatives have been the most successful in their ability to attract members because of the economic contributions made directly to the fisherman's livelihood. In some areas, however - notably in Gloucester - the cooperative movement was a failure largely because of the strong ethnic factor which created a sense of distrust. Unions apply directly to a negotiation of traditional lay arrangements.

The importance of the organization itself ranks behind the role of their respective personalities who are more in the forefront. In analyzing

Council coverage, emphasis is usually placed on the personalities, rather than on the organizations represented.⁸¹ As a result, the organizations take on a different focus; the structures are present, but it is the personalities and, in some cases, their administrative skills which contribute to the basic organizational existence. In the political realm, the structural entity serves to complement and, when necessary, contribute to the personality. In effect, these figures serve, in one fashion or another, as potential brokers.

The following discussion will confine its analysis, as much as possible, to the organizations which represent fishermen. The organizations considered are by no means inclusive, but are intended as examples of the major response to collective representation. The basic point to be made from this analysis is that the unique anthropology of fishing communities effectively divorces them from groups oriented mainly to common political activity. Moreover, the plurality of groups indicates the basic localism endemic to fishermen. The basic attitudinal values are promoted by the general structure of the political system. As a result, the basic cleavage - the organizational structure versus the basic attitudinal variables of fishermen - is clearly more aggravated than reconciled.

1. The Point Judith Fishermen's Cooperative Association:

The Point Judith Fishermen's Cooperative Association traces its roots back to the immediate period following the Second World War; in the late 1940s, conflict with local fish buyers concerning the acquisition of operating equipment and supplies provoked fishermen to assume a more self-reliant attitude towards fish preparation and marketing. Seizing on the opportunity offered by Rhode Island

legislation which provided for the establishment of cooperatives which could then provide services to their members, members of the fishing community formed the Point Judith Fishermen's Cooperative Association in 1947.⁸² An important factor contributing to the formation of this Coop was the leadership provided by many fishermen who had returned from a term of military service during the Second World War. Exposure to military service provided these men with the necessary period of personnel leadership training, rendering them capable of spurring the development of a collective response to common issues.

The priority of the Coop was to develop a marketing mechanism which would guarantee fishermen a suitable price for their product.⁸³ Like any coop, it provides market strength through the presence of a collective effort, as compared to the existence of a multitude of independent boat builders. The basic thrust of the cooperative arrangement has been devoted to providing the necessary facilities and infrastructure by which fishermen could achieve better economic amelioration. To ensure a market for the industry's fish, the Coop participated in the construction of the Point Judith By-Products Plant in 1952.⁸⁴ A host of incentives are provided by the Coop (e.g., the ability to purchase food, fuel and ice at reduced prices), as well as the continued operation of a vessel insurance plan. Such incentives undoubtedly reinforce the sense of collective identity needed to sustain such a framework.

The basic marketing approach has been to market all species, not just those species which are the most profitable.⁸⁵ Facilities engage in the rudimentary preparation and marketing of various species to the Coop, providing a degree of economic solidarity which contributes to a

higher economic standard of living for its members. At present, the Coop is composed of about 210 regular members, as well as 20 to 25 probationary members who were brought in by the organization. Not all the members are boat owners; a substantial portion of the membership are crew members. There are about 90 boats involved in the Coop, with one vessel owner possessing three or four boats.⁸⁶ The Coop has a Board of Directors composed of seven members actively engaged in fishing; the Board meets on the third Tuesday of every month, or as necessary. Meetings of the full membership are held either quarterly or annually.⁸⁷ Membership is allocated through application to the Board of Directors which, through a majority vote, can either unanimously approve the application or opt to place the member on probation for a year. Upon acceptance, a member pays a one-time membership fee of \$1,000.⁸⁸

A large part of the Coop's success can also be traced to its leadership, particularly the influence of Jake Dykstra, President of the Coop for over 35 years, from 1953 until his retirement in 1982. In his own right, Dykstra had established formal links to government, being recognized by political figures as an important advisor on National Fisheries Policy.⁸⁹

The Coop's influence and clout is derived directly from its continued economic affluence. The organization's attractiveness stems from the fact that it is a producer or 'economic-oriented' association which appeals to the daily occupational needs of the industry. At the same time, however, the Coop was forced to retrench on its proposed expansion plans regarding the freezing and packing of fish products.⁹⁰ Poor economic conditions, combined with the withdrawal of financial

guarantees from the State of Rhode Island, precipitated the retrenchment. The fact that the Coop is first and foremost concerned with economic survival clearly necessitates close attention to the needs of the immediate community. Most resources available can thus be expected to go into the operation of the Coop itself, outside of requests for advice from political leaders.

The types of issues conveyed to political representatives are indicative of the localist thrust. The present General Manager of the Coop, James McCauley, related one instance regarding an appeal to Rhode Island Senator Claiborne Pell on the issue of a Spanish squid-fishing venture which was attempting to secure a permit from the State Department.⁹¹ In most cases, however, the involvement of the political representatives is negligible; the Coop is only one player in Rhode Island. As such, any efforts must require the cooperation of a number of groups to make itself heard. In the case of the Spanish squid-fishing permit application, a letter written by McCauley was sent to the Senator, who then decided to confirm the views of constituents at a meeting attended not only by representatives of the Point Judith Fishermen's Coop, but also by representatives of such groups as the Atlantic Offshore Fishermen's Association (AOFA) and several other commercial organizations, as well as the Rhode Island Marine Advisory Commission. In the final analysis, the decision to call the meeting was purely discretionary and was all the more successful because of the unified front presented.

The existence of the Coop promotes a framework for the accommodation of specific issue-oriented problems. At the same time, however, the membership size and the lack of potential for long-term

political efforts without the participation of other Rhode Island groups indicates the weakness of any political influence which local fishermen might be able to wield.

It is important to note the dependence of the Coop on the State of Rhode Island. The land on which the Coop building is situated is owned by the state government. Such a situation places the Coop in a very dependent position.⁹² The inference which can be drawn is that the Coop is, in effect, a client of the state government. A final question which might be addressed concerns the capacity for constituency-related brokerage. Quite possibly, such a role does exist, in the sense that the Coop can interpret and, in some cases, represent the needs of its members with such agencies as the NMFS. Relationships can be developed and sustained with regional personnel of the agency. Such a situation aids in the maintenance of the cohesiveness of the Coop as a legitimate spokesman.

In summary, the Point Judith Fishermen's Cooperative Association represents the example of a producers' organization which is able to appeal to the issue-specific culture of its membership. However, its membership can never be all-inclusive, thus inhibiting its ability to present and foster the organizational clout necessary to have an effect on the political representatives or to devote itself to a long-term response to political issues. At the same time, however, the Coop's practical role gives it an ability to broker various demands and problems which might be experienced by its members.

2. The Maine Fishermen's Cooperative Association:

Another example of the cooperative form of organization is represented by the Maine Fishermen's Cooperative Association (MFCA). Formed in 1965, the MFCA's main aim was to present a united front; another goal was also the collective provision of economic services similar to those provided by the Point Judith Coop.⁹³ Lester Orcutt, founder of the MFCA, had had experience as a lobsterman and a gillnetter; he felt that gear conflicts could be resolved within such a framework.⁹⁴

Membership in the MFCA never reached more than 100 members (vessel owners/crew). Unlike the Point Judith Coop, the MFCA tended to lose much of its vigour. To a large extent, the MFCA was sustained through the efforts of its long-time President, Lester Orcutt. With his death in 1977, the organization went through a reorganization which resulted in a new Board of Directors.⁹⁵ Regulatory measures emanating from the New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC) were an important motivating factor in the revitalization.

The reliance on the personalization of authority in the person of Lester Orcutt illustrates the different basis of authority essential in sustaining the organizational entity. Incentives such as group insurance - the most common organizational incentive - were clearly insufficient to sustain further membership drives. Over 100 fishermen attended the 1977 revitalization meeting, yet final MFCA membership comprised only a little over 100 members in all. MFCA membership figures for 1986 place the total membership levels at 200 members.⁹⁶ The membership mechanism provides for dues of \$200 a year, with an

additional \$100 in the first year for the purchase of at least one share of stock.

The structure of the MFCA provides for a 15-member Board of Directors, composed of eleven directors and four officers "who derive the greater part of their income from commercial fishing."⁹⁷ Board meetings are held prior to the annual meeting, which is held in Rockport, Maine. The Board of Directors are elected at the annual meeting, which is composed of designated delegates from the various ports along the Maine coastline.⁹⁸ In many cases, the groundfish industry in Maine takes a backseat to the more important lobster industry. Resulting cleavages prevent a more unified response to common problems. Day-to-day conflicts occur between fixed- and mobile-gear types, represented by lobster and groundfish fleets, respectively. Such a cleavage prevents even the most elementary forms of cooperation at the state level.

3. The Atlantic Offshore Fishermen's Association:

The Atlantic Offshore Fishermen's Association (AOFA), based in Newport, Rhode Island, dates back to 1972, to the middle of a gear conflict between the offshore lobster-pot and dragger (groundfish) sectors off the US coastline. At a fishermen's forum in February, 1972, sponsored by the Marine Advisory Service of the University of Rhode Island and the Point Judith Fishermen's Cooperative Association, a member of an eight-man organizing committee suggested the need for an offshore lobstermen's association which could mediate the conflict between lobster-pot fishermen and other sectors.⁹⁹ An expression of support led to the establishment of the Atlantic Offshore Fish and

Lobster Association (the inclusion of 'Lobster' in the Association's name was designed to indicate the unique identity of lobstermen who had come to be distinguished as a distinct occupational sector).¹⁰⁰

The position of the Executive Director was crucial to the functioning of the organization, and its first and current Secretary, Dick Allen, was and is crucial also to the Association's success. Allen is one of the new generation of professional fishermen; he has a Master's degree in Marine Affairs from the University of Rhode Island and, as a result, is more attuned to the professional milieu than most fishermen.¹⁰¹

Despite the emphasis on leadership, many fishermen did not join the organization.¹⁰² Its early financial structure was precarious; Allen even operated out of his own home. At present, he has once again returned to fishing in addition to his work with the AOFA.

A restructuring of the Association in the late 1970s led to the deletion of 'Lobster' from its name. The personalization of the organization is also reflected in the high profile of the present President, William Palombo, who is a prominent local fisherman and businessman.

The AOFA not only represents fishermen (boat owners), but also merchants, from the coast of Maine to North Carolina. The addition of merchants (fish dealers, fish processors, and other fishery-related businesses) is indicative of the community solidarity which characterizes the localism of the industry. Members of the AOFA are classified either as full members (boat owners) or associate members (businesses). Dues for all boat owners are \$200 a year; dues for

associate members start lower, depending on the appropriate classification.¹⁰³

The structure of the AOFA provides for a Board of Directors, elected by the membership. The annual meeting, however, is not as important as the mail service in helping to solicit and gauge the opinions of its membership. The Board of Directors, for example, is elected through a system of mail ballots sent by fishermen in various ports on a proportional basis. A vessel insurance program is also provided to AOFA members as one of its many incentives.¹⁰⁴

The organization also assumes a brokerage role, in that it provides assistance in the formulation of applications for compensation for damaged gear. Such a situation reflects a potential need not only to mediate internal gear conflicts, but also to establish some form of patron-client relationship with government. In this sense, such a situation represents the need to mediate an issue which affects fishermen directly.

Another significant impetus for the formation of the AOFA was the question of foreign fishing. The organization was perhaps the most important supporter of extended jurisdiction, which would remove foreign fishing. Clearly, however, this goal involves more political involvement than direct economic involvement as an occupational complement. Such a situation explains the looseness of the organizational structure. The person, then, becomes extremely important in an association whose members are rarely seen or ever assemble, although the annual meeting is a high point of the members' yearly calendar. Dependence on and knowledge of the leadership requires that he/she have a high profile and initiative. Without the

direct involvement of the Executive Secretary, very few projects would be undertaken.

In sum, the structure of the AOFA is indicative of the basic localism inherent within the industry. The regional connotation is confirmed by its very name, although the basic bias towards the local community is quite evident. As of 1987, total membership in the AOFA is only about 150 boats.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, the internal divisions deriving from mediation of fixed- and mobile-gear conflicts may, in some instances, sap organizational resources.

4. The Massachusetts Inshore Draggermen's Association:

The Massachusetts Inshore Draggermen's Association (MIDA) is most indicative of the dynamic which has evolved among small-scale fishermen in New England. The MIDA dates back to 1976, when the Eastland Committee - a Congressional fact-finding group - held hearings in Hingham, Massachusetts to get advice from local fishermen on the upcoming '200-mile bill'. The disorganization of the fishermen and their varied opinions were quite evident.¹⁰⁶ The fractious nature of the industry made a strong impression on Dan Arnold, a draggerman from Marshfield, Massachusetts. A reading of a preliminary draft of the FCMA convinced Arnold that domestic provisions were going to have an important effect on local fishermen. The result was that Arnold, along with Frank Mirachi, a friend of his who fished from Scituate, Massachusetts, formed the MIDA.

The basic thrust of the organization has largely been informal; it relies on a "core group of people who are sufficiently concerned about events that affect us to participate in decision-making."¹⁰⁷

Membership is accorded on an individual basis, with captains paying \$100 a year (including their boats), while crew member members pay only \$25. Associate memberships also exist for fishery-related businesses and individuals who have an interest in supporting the Association.

The basic objective of the MIDA is to gain representation for inshore draggers on the multitude of government bodies and agencies. Dan Arnold served on the NEFMC as an advisor and was also a member of the Massachusetts Marine Advisory Commission.

The types of issues with which MIDA has concerned itself are indicative of the concerns of its constituency. The most important success was the provision of special vessel insurance. As well, the basic issues of concern still include limited entry and the future imposition of quota allocations. Until his recent retirement, Arnold published an Association Newsletter out of his home in an attempt to mobilize opinion on certain issues.¹⁰⁸

Despite its leadership, the MIDA still remains a relatively regional organization, confined to Massachusetts. Arnold himself took a position 'front and centre' in the many debates and representations which had to be made to the NEFMC. Without the assistance of his son, who took over operation of their fishing vessel, Arnold could not have spared the time to attend the myriad of meetings and hearings necessary.

The informal framework of the MIDA reflects the cultural localism of most inshore draggers. The fisherman's attachment to spatial identifications and the distinctiveness of his issue-related problems inhibit long-term organizational cooperation. Factionalism, defined by personal animosity or unspoken status, is also a problem:

One of the constant problems for MIDA, as for many other fishermen's organizations, is the difficulty of organizing fishermen. Despite being the only statewide fishermen's organization, MIDA does not claim a majority of inshore fishermen. One reason may be that Massachusetts fishermen are traditionally very port oriented. It is easy to organize around local problems such as town wharves... Sometimes there are factions or cliques in different ports. One group of fishermen won't join an organization because another group, whom they don't get along with, did join.¹⁰⁹

Such an orientation stems from the unique characteristics of fishermen.

Frank Mirachi describes this in the following terms:

If there's an underlying reason for the low membership, it's the attitude of "turn your back". Most fishermen aren't the kind who fit into a business or industry type of organization. They are loners, self-reliant.¹¹⁰

In sum, the basic cultural orientations are crucial in creating problems in fostering the collective organization. Moreover, unity is also inhibited by the continuing cleavage with lobster fishermen represented by the Massachusetts Lobstermen's Association.

5. The Massachusetts Lobstermen's Association:

Unlike the MIDA, the Massachusetts Lobstermen's Association is much more organized and structured in its manner of representation. The Association was established in 1963 "by a group of lobstermen outraged at the lack of conservation protection their bread and butter resource received under the law."¹¹¹ The lobster fishery is a homogeneous sector; its needs and goals are much more distinctive than those of groundfishermen.

A feature of the Association is the provision of representation; the organization has representation on some fourteen regulatory boards and bodies. Moreover, it is also able to provide lucrative insurance rates to its members; several group association plans also exist. A series of educational forums and symposia are also sponsored and a host of legal services are provided.

Perhaps the most important feature of the Association is the self-enforcement of conservation/management regulations. The enforcement officials, employed by the Massachusetts Division of Marine Fishermen (DMF) are paid by the Association. Such a framework is indicative of a clientele relationship empowered to act at the state level.

The Association has also engaged in a number of lobbying activities, particularly at the state legislature, but also at the federal level. A monthly newsletter is also circulated to Association membership. Such political efforts are strengthened by the fact that the Association represents nearly 1,200 members, as of the end of 1986.¹¹² Many attribute the success of the Association to its Executive Director, Bob Barlow.¹¹³ The profile Barlow had in the industry reflected a degree of loyalty to the person.

The success of the Association is better highlighted by an examination of the decision-making structure. The most important component, the Board of Delegates, is elected every two years on a geographic basis. Members are elected from the following five geographic regions, resulting in a total of 65 members: (i) from the New Hampshire border to Saugus, Massachusetts; (ii) from Saugus to Quincy; (iii) from Quincy to the Cape Cod Canal; (iv) from the Canal to the Rhode Island border; and (v) the Cape and islands. The Board of

Delegates elects an eleven-member Board of Directors, including the Executive Director. The Board of Delegates and the constituted Board of Directors of the Association meet monthly to review the activities of the Executive Directors. Membership is accorded on a full or associate basis; annual meetings are held each January in Hyannis, Massachusetts.¹¹⁴

The structure of the Association reflects the strong localism pervading the industry; by ensuring a measure of spatial representation, the various communities can preserve a degree of autonomy and power when choosing those responsible for influencing the general manner of representation with respect to the highest body of the organization.

It is also important to remember that there is a more crucial set of local authorities who have nothing to do with the direct conservation and management of the industry, and whose local activities are just as important to its daily occupational operation; these authorities are also the target of such associations as the Massachusetts Lobstermen's Association:

...local authorities - who play a very significant part in the fishermen's life - have nothing to do with the management of the species but have everything to do with dock space, mooring space, where they can load and unload, where they can store their gear, and all of those operating circumstances are controlled by local communities, and those things haven't changed. They are still dealing with harbor masters...councils, and mayors....¹¹⁵

These concerns reflect the nature of the ongoing issues which are of direct relevance to the everyday concerns of fishermen. As

a result, the ability of any organization to have positive impact on these concerns is also a positive incentive for membership.

The continuing competition with the draggermen contributes to the cleavage which permanently divides Massachusetts draggermen from lobstermen. As a result of this continuing cleavage, the DMF is placed in the position of being forced to arbitrate between these two sectors. Furthermore, in many cases, the Association's legislative proposals have trespassed on the interests of the MIDA. The most recent proposal debated at the Massachusetts State Legislature is a bill proposed by the Association which would eliminate the landing of lobsters on board draggers, thus eliminating what the Association perceives as "an increasingly trawl fishery for lobsters," as well as the specific environmental consequences of trawling for lobsters.¹¹⁶ Such a measure, of course, ignites opposition from the MIDA, which tends to see the dangers of "creating a resource monopoly for one set of fishermen."¹¹⁷ Despite the looseness of the MIDA and related groups, over 200 draggermen, in an attempt to voice their views, protested the measure at a meeting of the State Legislature's Marine Fisheries Committee. Such conflicts illustrate the lack of any common consensus. However, the issue, because of its direct economic importance to MIDA supporters, was sufficient to ignite MIDA membership into a show of strength, which served to distinguish their distinctive needs as separate from those of the lobstermen.

6. The Maine Lobstermen's Association:

The Maine Lobstermen's Association is a much older association than its counterpart in Massachusetts. Formed in 1954, the main

purpose of the Association was to meet "the need of Maine lobstermen to have a collective voice to speak on the fishermen's behalf at the state lawmaking level."¹¹⁸ Presently, it tries to represent fishermen at all levels of government. The emphasis on the state level reflects the fundamental importance of the lobster industry in Maine, which makes up a substantial proportion of the local industry as a whole.

The rural complexion of Maine emphasizes and reinforces the local community atmosphere of fishing communities. Several other lobstermen's associations in Maine, such as the Southern Casco Bay Lobstermen's Association, have memberships that have only comprised up to 75 people. The spatial particularities in Maine inhibit a unified collective response, although the lobster sector is a potent political interest at the state level.

Membership has always been a problem for Maine lobstermen's associations. For many years, the problem was just trying to encourage members to pay dues. In the early 1960s, membership was close to 1,000; by 1974, the membership had dropped to a "hard core of 300."¹¹⁹ Trap limit disputes between fishermen on the eastern and western coasts of the state created the decline in membership.¹²⁰ In 1987, although membership stands at over 1,000 members again, there are over 5,000 lobstermen in the state. Until 1979, the Association did not even have a full-time executive; most organizing time was on a voluntary basis. Edward Blackmore, President of the Association since 1973, was a part-time salaried employee. It was not until 1979 that a full-time salaried executive was finally hired.¹²¹ The publication of monthly newsletters in the Maine Commercial Fisheries News attempted to mobilize and promote the goals of the organization.

The first issue which helped raise the profile of the Association was not a fishery conservation measure, but concerned a conflict with the Internal Revenue Service regarding the designation that sternmen crew on boats were employees of the vessel owner. The Association fought the ruling by hiring a lawyer, and it finally succeeded in having legislation passed to amend the law.¹²²

The present structure of the Association provides for a Board of Directors, one-third of whom are elected alternately at every annual meeting for three-year terms. Full members pay dues of \$35, while associate memberships are also provided. Annual meetings of the Association are held in June of each year.¹²³ The most important incentives of the Association are undoubtedly the vessel insurance program and the various health insurance programs.

The importance of the lobster fishery in Maine is also reflected in the establishment by the Department of Marine Resources (DMR) of a special Lobster Advisory Council, set up in 1979 to advise and make recommendations to the Commissioner of Marine Resources on matters relating to the lobster industry.¹²⁴ Ed Blackmore is Chairman of this body, reflecting the clientele relationship which the organization maintains with the DMR.

Although attempts were made to unify local groups in Maine in the 1970s, most efforts have been to no avail. There are also some ties between the Massachusetts and Maine Lobstermen's Associations. In many instances, representatives have occasionally attended each other's meetings.¹²⁵ The crucial difference distinguishing the two industries is that Maine's lobster fleet is primarily an inshore fishery, while the Massachusetts industry has also had, at one time, the presence of a

substantial offshore dragger lobster fleet, something which was banned in Maine in the early 1970s. Closer cooperation does not seem to be possible.

7. The New Bedford Seafood Producers' Association:

The New Bedford Seafood Producers' Association dates back to 1936.¹²⁶ The Association is composed of about 90 vessel owners - boats which are owned by a single owner, rather than a company. New Bedford's fishery is also more distinct because of the substantial offshore scallop fishery in the port. Furthermore, the port also has a substantial unionized presence with crewmen who are members of the local Seafarers International Union.

The broad mandate of the Association is to encourage and enhance the general development of the local industry. The structure of the Association provides for a Board of Directors, composed of 22 members plus officers; the Board meets once every two months. Annual meetings of the Association are held in December of each year. Special meetings of the Board of Directors can be called by the President as deemed necessary. Full and associate memberships are available. Dues for vessel owners are determined by a complicated formula of 30¢ a foot plus \$10 and are not to exceed \$30. Associate members pay \$125 a year.¹²⁷ This Association is not a political one, but it is heavily involved in commercial production. A substantial marketing plan for the preparation of various species aids in getting these species into the marketplace.

The Portuguese element of New Bedford, like the Italian element in Gloucester, is crucial in explaining the localism of the port. A whole

range of community services exists, built around the Portuguese identity and community.¹²⁸ This type of cleavage both determines and reinforces the parochialism of the community. A wide range of support and ethnic organizations give rise to a whole variety of customs and traditions. In short, the basic cultural distinctiveness of the port creates a different set of social relationships which are outside the land-based social system.

8. The Gloucester Fishermen's Wives Association:

The Gloucester Fishermen's Wives Association (GFWA) is indicative of the type of cleavage existing in the port of Gloucester. From the outset, the point should be made that there are other fishermen's wives associations in existence, particularly in New Bedford, and also in Maine (inspired by the revitalization of the Maine Fishermen's Cooperative Association). The GFWA is considered here as being representative of the basic *raison d'être* of such organizations.

The Gloucester Fishermen's Wives Association was formed in 1976 with the goal of promoting the passage through Congress of the 200-mile bill.¹²⁹ The model used was that of the United Fishermen's Wives Association of New Bedford.¹³⁰

The formation of the GFWA reflected the tradition of ethnicity and self-help in Gloucester. Moreover, the fisherman's wife has always played the role of family spokesman in a context where the husband is absent from home for most of the time. The GFWA acts as a support group in the community, aiding in drumming-up support for various causes. The GFWA is able to undertake a series of self-help projects in the area, raising money to support a series of charities, and

projects for the fishing community. The strong ethnic identity is undoubtedly important in fostering the important cultural homogeneity necessary to sustain the organization. At the same time, however, the ethnic tie undoubtedly indicates a reinforcing variable which implants a different set of cultural variables that distinguish such groups from most 'Yankee' groups. The structure of the 'GFWA provides for a Board of Directors which meets monthly. Committees are constituted on the basis of experience, as well as on a volunteer basis.¹³¹

The influence of the GFWA illustrates the basic thrust of ethnic politics important to Gloucester. The civic orientation personified by such groups undoubtedly presents the family unit as an important source of political knowledge which no politician can ignore. One of the most celebrated incidents involved the efforts of Congressman Nick Mauvroules to negotiate a deal with the Governor of Massachusetts whereby Gloucester would gain a seat on the NEFMC. Such efforts underlie the thrust by which politics operate in the port. Moreover, the GFWA is confined to the port of Gloucester, indicating the basic thrust of the localism which pervades the local community.¹³²

9. The New England Fisheries Steering Committee and the National Federation of Fishermen:

The New England Fisheries Steering Committee (NEFSC), along with the National Federation of Fishermen (NFF), have attempted to organize fishermen on a national basis, as well as a regional one. In both cases, the organizations collapsed or just 'fizzled out' due to the lack of local support. Both of these organizations are examples of the

failure to mount more collective efforts outside the immediate community level.

- a. The NEFSC dates back to late 1969, to the middle of NMFS hearings in New Bedford concerning proposed yellowtail flounder regulations.¹³³ Aware of the problems of presenting a unified industry front on matters of government policy, Gayle Charles of the Provincetown Cooperative attempted to bring a variety of commercial and industry organizations together to speak with one voice. By 1974, the NEFSC had grown to about 20 member organizations.¹³⁴ The organization also provided for associate members not directly involved in the industry, but who nevertheless have an interest in it. In the associate member category are a number of government agencies, including the NMFS Regional Office in Gloucester and the Gloucester Fisheries Commission, as well as the departments in Maine and Massachusetts responsible for fisheries matters, indicating a potential framework of clientelism.

For the first three years of its existence, the NEFSC revolved around Gayle Charles, who was its President and only Executive Officer; an executive was not appointed until 1971. In 1972, an executive reorganization was undertaken, providing for a President, three Vice Presidents, a Secretary and a Treasurer. Each Vice President was responsible for a specific liaison or issue sector. Specific committees were also developed in matters of legislative drafting and review. Most of the decisions are determined through consensus.¹³⁵

The NEFSC also received substantial assistance from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Economic Development Administration (EDA) and the New England Regional Commission (NERC).¹³⁶

In 1974, the organization received an Executive Director, Howard Nickerson, its most visible and vocal architect.

The NEFSC drew its greatest strength in the period directly before and after the extension of jurisdiction in 1976. The NEFSC's interests ranged from extended jurisdiction to the provision of financial assistance for the establishment of fishermen's organizations. The NEFSC was one of the few groups that attempted to establish a national presence through lobbying in Congress.¹³⁷ Nickerson himself could be considered as a potential broker, in that he devoted a great deal of his time to reading and deciphering documents and complicated federal and state legislation. At the same time, however, the NEFSC provided training for an elite who were later to be recruited by other smaller associations and organizations. As a result, the personalized contacts developed through association with the NEFSC helped contribute to the presence of a patron-client network which could take the concerns of the industry to the appropriate political and administrative leaders. In the broadest sense, the NEFSC provided a forum in which various interests could debate issues and articulate their concerns.

The NEFSC's membership structure illustrated the problems of direct recruitment. Its dependence on government for organizational solvency meant that the reduction in federal priorities could cause problems. Reductions in the budgets of the respective federal agencies did, in fact, toll the death knell of the NEFSC. The organization had managed to obtain a full-time staff and Executive Director by early 1979. Field representatives and officers were retained in Maine to drum up membership there.¹³⁸ In early 1983, the NEFSC suspended operations due to insufficient funds.¹³⁹

Some observers have linked the demise of the NEFSC to the establishment of the New England Fisheries Development Foundation (NEPDF); this foundation was created with funds provided by the NMFS and was intended to promote private and public aid in the commercial expansion of the industry. Many members of the NEFSC expected the NEPDF to succeed it and to take over performing many of its functions.

- b. The National Federation of Fishermen (NFF) represents an attempt to unite all fishermen in the United States under the banner of a national framework. Prior to 1973, the NFF drew most of its support from the West Coast.¹⁴⁰ With extended jurisdiction becoming a prime issue in the United States, the NFF decided to mount an effort to try to organize fishermen, not only in New England, but in all regions of the United States. The national headquarters of the Federation was established in Washington, DC.

The NFF was instrumental in the early debates on extended jurisdiction, particularly on the question of the prerogative power of the NMFS in the eventual fishery management framework. Although the bureaucratic power of the NMFS has been a prime target of the NFF, particularly on conservation and management questions, the Federation also took an interest in many of the economic problems which have plagued the industry. The most important activity was the 1980 'policy option' proposal concerning rising fuel prices. In this case, however, the issue was one of common concern to the entire industry.¹⁴¹

Despite its best efforts, only 30 member organizations were represented in the NFF. The functioning of the NFF was naturally impaired because of its dependence on funds derived from product assessments. The basic structure of the Federation provided for

eastern and western regions, each one presided over by a President.¹⁴² For a while, the President of the Eastern Region was Jake Dykstra of the Point Judith Fishermen's Cooperative. Full meetings of the Federation were infrequent. The customary role of the Federation was to speak or act on the national stage, while its constituent members acted in their own interests at the state and regional levels.¹⁴³

The position of Executive Director was crucial to the profile of the Federation. Lucy Sloan has been credited with creating and maintaining the high profile of the NFF.¹⁴⁴ Through columns in The Maine Commercial Fisheries News (later called The Commercial Fisheries News), she tried to inform the industry of developments in Washington. Her basic position was one of hostility towards the NMFS, citing its insensitivity to the concerns of fishermen's communities. Such a posture established her as a leading personality in the industry.

The NFF's operation in Washington consisted of Sloan and her legal counsel, Richard Sherwood. In March of 1987, the Federation ceased operations in Washington, largely because of a lack of funds. A plurality of the constituent groups were unable to contribute, through product assessments, the necessary funds to keep the Federation in operation. In the case of its New England membership, most of the organizations interviewed by the author indicated that the NFF was a source of 'technical help', aiding constituent organizations to set up meetings and conferences with the appropriate politicians and officials. In the words of an Executive Director of one such organization:

...if we wanted [the NFF] to represent us, we would communicate our views and then have them represent us on that basis. The representation may be

collaborative. We may go down there and, for instance, we don't spend a lot of time in Washington; therefore, we use our list of contacts. What we could do is set up a series of meetings through the NFF representative.¹⁴⁵

In short, the ability to provide a meeting house of 'who to see' was important. Representation on major policy questions was not aggregated to gain a policy consensus. The constituencies preferred to handle policy positions themselves, rather than going through the national organization.

The problems associated with continual efforts to channel support to the NFF are best illustrated by the following comment, made by Dan Arnold of the MIDA:

Time and again, at meetings I hear fishermen get up and say, "What we need is a lobbyist in Washington." "Who did you think that little girl [Lucy Sloan] is?" "What little girl?" I say to them, are you willing to support somebody? It is so frustrating....If I could say to the [MIDA], we are going to double your membership fees and that money is going to rejuvenate our Washington presence, I would probably end up with 25 members.¹⁴⁶

In sum, fishermen are paradoxically willing to take a stand on the need for a lobbyist, but unwilling to support the industry on a long-term basis.

The foregoing analysis is indicative of the general fragmentation of groups within the industry. Groups are based on state, town or some other sectoral basis. Although there are groups, the industry has not been able to forge closer cooperative efforts which would lead to a heightened sense of political influence. The cultural cleavages and the general lack of

economic resources beyond the immediate daily occupation both serve to inhibit any attempts to forge the necessary organizational response.' To a large extent, the organizational profile is influenced by the accommodative structures of the Regional Management Councils.

The NEPMC, for example, accords a maximum degree of local control over the management process. Given the localism inherent within the industry, the present management structure appeals to its individualism. Since the industry controls the drafting of management plans, various factions do not need to cooperate to influence a more inaccessible management structure. In the final analysis, the Council system, based within the environment of a multitude of species, extends the maximum amount of participation and reinforces the profile of leaders possessing the ability to represent specific parochial interests.

On the other hand, the Councils have alerted the industry to the need for organizational participation. A segment of the industry may block a measure only if it is strong enough to exert political pressure on the Council structure. Exposure to the procedural structure of the Council has resulted in the formation or involvement of structures representative of the various interests. The fragmentation of these organizations is a by-product of the multi-value matrix which sanctions subjective interpretation. Although the Council system was the product of a compromise between the NMFS and local fishermen, the institutional framework created marked an attempt to impose a system of rational administrative management, while at the same time trying to create substantial industry involvement.

The difference between the Canadian and the American systems hinges on this very point. The American management system gives the Councils - the instrument of the industry - the direct responsibility of drafting

conservation and management measures. In other words, the industry has a great deal of power in the making of these plans, although the NMFS has final say in approving the plans. Both sides become equal partners in the process, which is unlike the Canadian system where the industry's opinions are advisory. The New England fishing industry is thus granted a degree of domestic leverage, although the industry's factionalism, reinforced by its own organizational entities, makes it difficult to attempt to aggregate the various interests into a common consensus. If there is a disagreement over the effectiveness of certain measures, the resulting conflict is harder to resolve.

A second and more important clash is that between the industry and the bureaucracy, as represented by the NMFS. Given the differing occupational environments, considerable disagreement can develop when determining measures which will be consistent with the provisions of the FMCA. A definition of rational long-term conservation may produce substantial friction. When political considerations are introduced by the industry to satisfy its own economic self-interest, conflict is magnified. As the following case study concerning the attempts to implement an FMP for groundfish illustrates, the definition of rationality can become a matter of subjective versus objective interpretations, which together make up the framework of multi-value decision-making.

NEFMC Case Study: The Making of Groundfish Management Plans

The attempts by the NEFMC to implement an FMP for groundfish indicate the problems of participation, as well as the differing appreciative systems present in American fisheries management which comprise multi-value decision-making.

When the NEFMC began to work on an FMP for groundfish in 1977, the NMFS had already proposed a management plan which officials felt would stabilize depleted stocks and develop a solid foundation for future fisheries management.¹⁴⁷ The goals of management - mainly concerning overfishing - were very broad, allowing Council agreement without wasting time on debating the 'fine print'. Most of the scientific data and the original management measures were imported directly from ICNAF, providing for a series of complex quota provisions on various species of cod, haddock and yellowtail flounder. In addition, restrictions on mesh size in certain areas were also introduced to protect spawning. Minimum catch sizes for cod and haddock were also introduced.

By September of 1977, local fishermen were in an uproar over the provisions: permissible quotas were insufficient to keep fishermen engaged in their business of fishing.¹⁴⁸ In many cases, the provisions were so complex and involved that the resource could still be overfished, since it was impossible to enforce the provisions. Provisions for by-catch allowances and percentages of species per trip, although conceivably formulated by the professional administration, were not feasible, given the composition of the fleet which was supposed to comply. For most fishermen, such limits were a direct threat to their livelihood. Competition, the heart of the fishery, would be impaired. Moreover, there was also a perception in the industry that such measures were inequitable. Many opinions were offered as to the best way to remedy the situation. Many fishermen expected the Council to be able to change regulations immediately, not realizing that the Secretary of Commerce had the final word. For Council members, particularly those on the groundfish oversight committee, discontent was especially disconcerting, given the fact that they were

representatives of specific sectors and dependent for their appointments on the goodwill of the respective state Governors.¹⁴⁹ In the end, a compromise was worked out which allocated quotas by vessel, rather than by total poundage.¹⁵⁰

The formulation of the 1978 groundfish plan, which began in September of 1977, immediately ran into the problem of obtaining the best scientific data possible. This, of course, prejudiced attempts to define basic management objectives for OY. Data was late because of problems in getting the research vessel, the *Albatross*, out of port.¹⁵¹ As a result, the groundfish oversight committee decided to extend the provisions of the 1977 plan with modifications for equitability, in order to have something in place by January 1, 1978.¹⁵² The groundfish oversight committee plan provided for 4,000 pounds per man per trip (and one share for the vessel) for cod; 1,000 pounds per man per trip (or 10% of the total catch) for haddock; and 5,000 pounds per man per trip to a limit of 25,000 pounds for yellowtail.¹⁵³ As far as the NMFS and several fishing constituencies were concerned, such proposals were not sufficient. The Council was clearly caught between having a plan rejected or giving in to local pressure. The Council decided to postpone until the following day, and a recess was called. Later that evening, the meeting, at which there was public attendance, was suddenly reconvened and a new motion was proposed. Much to the dismay of the public, a vote was called in the midst of the debate, effectively cutting off further discussion. The motion was passed, an action which was greeted by those present with much anger.

Without scientific data, the possibility of Council even being able to define an acceptable OY was further inhibited. Original levels of species worked out by the oversight committee tried to reflect local economic

considerations, as opposed to those of the NMFS concerning wise resource management, which favour the biological aspects of the scientific data. The groundfish oversight committee had prepared a series of amendments which were forwarded to Washington; they provided for "(1.) raising the haddock optimum yield to 20,000 metric tons from 8,000 metric tons; (2.) indicating a 2,000 MT quota of haddock for recreational fishermen; (3.) implementation of a 'no-discards' rule; and (4.) allocation of quotas by vessel size classes."¹⁵⁴ The period also witnessed the closure of the cod and yellowtail fisheries by the NMFS, which cited the fact that its figures showed that the industry had satisfied existing quotas within 800 tons of exceeding quota levels.¹⁵⁵ This closure added to the heightened political atmosphere; pressure began to be exerted on the Council for higher quotas. Dan Arnold of the MIDA, for example, hinted that present top limits were insufficient and that in the future, his membership would have to falsify landing data, further distorting any semblance of good scientific data.¹⁵⁶ The economic implications of the present status quo were also emphasized by Stanley Bayley, who was then Vice President of the MFCA, in an exchange with NMFS officials: "'There are 118 boats in this organization that have to pay the mortgage. Remember you're talking 20-cent fish.'"¹⁵⁷

The Council's groundfish oversight committee responded by proposing an amendment to the original four amendments, which opted to delay the imposition of OY guidelines until the full FMP was implemented; such a move would have allowed short-term increases in species quotas. The argument offered was that since the Council was unable to define long-term management objectives, restrictions represented by OY were not feasible. Gordon of the NMFS countered with a motion to amend Peterson's motion to provide for new OYs "that took into consideration actual and predicted fishing catches for

the period previous to the new fishing year (that time when the completed Plan went into effect).¹⁵⁸ The effect was to annul the Council's amendment. Since OY involves a debate over basic objectives - the hub of the conflict - it is not surprising that the first step in the overall process (the debate about objectives) had become deadlocked.

In late 1978, the groundfish oversight committee defined the overall objectives of the Groundfish FMP as follows:

The overall objective of the Plan...shall be to generate over the period of the Plan the greatest possible joint economic and social net benefits from the harvesting and utilization of the groundfish resource, ensuring that by the end of the period the relevant groundfish stock shall be in conditions which will produce enhanced and relatively stable yields from the groundfishery in future years.¹⁵⁹

From the main objectives, several sub-objectives were also derived:

- a. Prevention of abrupt changes in the relative shares of domestic user groups in the resources.
- b. Freedom of decision-making and choice for individual participants in the fishery should be maintained to the greatest possible extent.
- c. Inducement of diversification in the groundfishery towards increased utilization of species other than cod, haddock, and yellowtail.
- d. Minimization of management regulations, subject to attainment of the overall objective.
- e. Minimization of enforcement costs, subject to attainment of the overall objective.
- f. Provision for accurate and consistent economic, social and biological data required to monitor effectively and assess the performance of the fishery relative to the overall objective.¹⁶⁰

Such objectives undoubtedly appeared fine on paper, but the actual definition of such measures in a concrete formula for outputs would be the

problem. Objectives 'a' and 'c', for example, could well come into conflict, given the economic capacity of fishermen to raise the capital necessary to expand fleet capacity.

Parallel to the problem of finding the most equitable balance to OY was the question of limited entry, or limiting the number of fishermen engaged; this question was always under the surface of debates regarding quotas and conservation. For many fishermen, such a measure was not feasible. From the rational bureaucratic perspective, such a strategy was the most efficient way to reduce resource pressure. For the fishermen, given their own occupational environment, limitations on their freedom to engage in fishing infringed on their seasonal flexibility. Members of the NEFMC were very much aware of a conference on limited entry, being held in July of 1978, which debated the usefulness of the concept.¹⁶¹ As will be noted later, the failure of the Council to deal with groundfish management served to continually advance efforts of the NMFS to introduce limited entry as an ultimate solution to fisheries management.

Although the NMFS approved the Council's quarterly quota allocations for the Gulf of Maine, closures of the cod fishery in 1979 were also undertaken as a preemptive measure to prevent overfishing. Debate also continued concerning the definition of OY. The deadline of October 1 for review and implementation had to be postponed again. Concerns were voiced from a number of quarters, particularly the fixed-gear fishermen, who produced substantial debate about mesh sizes among members of the groundfish oversight committee.¹⁶² Several amendments were also offered and passed, including the extension of the current groundfish plan to January, 1980, as well as the request that the FMP be revised in light of the current capacity of the industry.

The Council also opted to try a different approach to groundfish management in the development of an Atlantic Demersal Finfish Plan (ADF-FMP), which would approach resource allocation from outside the traditional realm of vessel class allocations, and seasonal and trip limits. Such a new procedure would require a new definition of plan objectives. As a result, the decision was to work on an Interim Groundfish Plan which could be put in place while the ADF was being formulated.

Three years had now passed and there was still no meaningful Council plan. Moreover, the fleet itself was expanding rapidly without any constraints. As a result, added pressure to increase catch limits was already being felt. The work plan which would be used to formulate the Interim Groundfish Plan attempted to address resource management through closures and mesh sizes.¹⁶³ In no way was the problem of increasing fishing effort addressed. Amendments had completely distorted original OY objectives. At the same time, however, the current plan had to be kept in effect to prevent a situation where no updated FMP would be in place. In short, a process of short-term amendments was developed simultaneously with work on the Interim Groundfish Plan which, if everything went well, could be implemented in a year.

The Interim Groundfish Plan hearings illustrate the problems of satisfying all segments of the industry. Criticism was heard from Maine fishermen concerning the minimum mesh size. In the end, the groundfish oversight committee was forced to compromise - a mesh size of 5-1/8 inches during the first year, to be followed by an increase to 5-1/2 inches in the second year. The final plan which passed through the full Council incorporated the concept of mesh sizes; but a proposal for the continuation of trip limits was defeated. By the time the plan was implemented in April

of 1982, increasing fishing efforts produced a glut on the market, driving prices down.¹⁶⁴ Although attempts were made to delay implementation, the Secretary of Commerce, through emergency action by the NOAA, pushed up the implementation of the plan to April. In August of 1982, the plan was suspended for three months, being reinstated by the NOAA in October with the provision that institution of the 5-1/2 inch mesh provision would be moved up to April, instead of October of 1983.¹⁶⁵

A crucial development in the fishery management process was the publication by the NOAA of "reworked" definitions of the seven national standards. Two of the definitions - those on overfishing and on the role of scientific data in the determination of OY - were the most important:

...overfishing is a level of fishing mortality that jeopardizes the capacity of stock(s) to maintain or recover at a level which can produce maximum biological yield or economic value on a long-term basis under prevailing biological and environmental conditions, except in certain situations. For example, harvesting the major species of a mixed fishery at its optimum may result in the overharvest of a minor (smaller or less valuable) stock species. In another case, solving a particular problem may necessitate pruning larger fish from the population....Care should be taken to identify the cause of the downward trends.¹⁶⁶

In the case of the "best scientific information available,"

The fact that scientific information includes, but is not limited to, information concerning a fishery that is incomplete does not prevent the preparation and implementation of an FMP (Fishery Management Plan).... Scientific information includes, but is not limited to, information of a biological, economic, or social nature.... If there are conflicting facts or opinions relevant to a particular point, a council may choose among them, but must justify the choice.¹⁶⁷

The two terms illustrate the ambiguity which the bureaucrats had defined. Despite these definitions, the problems were still compounded, particularly

since the Councils had to identify causes, as well as definitions as to what indeed was overfishing or the best scientific data possible. Again, perceptions in such a system varied. The viewpoints of the NMFS could conceivably differ from those of the industry, whose source of knowledge was not necessarily professionally- or scientifically-oriented. There was little way, for example, to be able establish a yardstick of objectivity. In short, the perceptions and definitions of these terms would necessarily differ; the legitimacy of participation in the process through the Councils virtually tied the process into enormous procedural wrangling, without gaining outputs in the form of timely long-range management plans.

In the case of the ADF, the NEFMC defined the basic objectives to manage the species with a minimum of regulation. A policy statement on the special ADF oversight committee, which took a year to produce, was immediately opposed by Allen Peterson, now the NMFS Regional Director.¹⁶⁸ Nevertheless, a basic plan was worked out which was submitted to public hearings.

Opposition came first from the gillnetters, who persuaded the Council to re-examine its mesh policy, citing problems in making the transition to a larger mesh size. In response, the Council amended the plan to provide for mesh sizes in Georges Bank of 6 inches, exempting special mesh for redfish in the Gulf of Maine. Other amendments included extending the mesh area and designating minimum mesh sizes in the Gulf of Maine. However, the 6-inch mesh drew fire from Gloucester and from the offshore redfish fleet. As a result, the ADF was stalled in Council.

Despite these setbacks, hearings were held in early 1985. While these hearings were under way, many in the NMFS had prejudged the ADF to be unapprovable and had thus decided to opt for a variety of alternatives,

should the Interim Plan expire without a viable successor. Such conflicts highlighted the ever-increasing tension between the Council and the NMFS concerning final management authority.¹⁶⁹

In any case, the ADF passed through hearings and was given approval by the NEFMS; it was then sent to Washington for approval. In January of 1986, the NMFS announced a complete disapproval of the ADF; the ball was back in the Council's hands and they had to draft a new plan. The NMFS' main objection was that the plan did not live up to the first national standard. The mesh sizes offered were deemed insufficient to slow 'fishing mortality'. Finally, perceived closure of the yellowtail flounder fishery was also deemed inadequate.

The root of this conflict is most certainly the dispute over interpretation. The NMFS perceives the resource to be the highest priority, while the Councils perceive the need for the resource to have an economic benefit also in the immediate short-term objective:

The council thinks it must take conservation steps. However, it sees little merit in conserving fish stocks if the measures make it impossible for fishermen to fish for a living. So, ADF seeks to strike a gradual balance, gradual rebuilding of the stocks with continued fishing - OY modified by economic and social factors.¹⁷⁰

In sum, a conflict was evident in the relevance of particular priorities and objectives in trying to erect a balance - in short, a case of multi-value choice.

By rejecting the ADF, the NMFS also seemed to be trying to advance its own professional agenda concerning wise resource management. Bill Gordon, the head of the NMFS, told the Councils to try and strive for trip limits and limited entry, as well as other measures which would facilitate the verification and compliance of fishermen with regulations. Gordon also

warned the Council that if it could not come up with suitable alternatives, the NMFS would draft its own plan. In so doing, the implication was clearly to try to 'modernize' the industry by implementing measures which were perceived to be the most 'rational' and effective in securing a framework of wise resource management.¹⁷¹

The rejection of the ADF also coincided with the pronounced attitude of the NMFS in stressing these professional measures in order to fulfill its mandate. The emphasis of the NMFS on limited entry reflects the agency's own perceptions concerning the best route to wise resource management. Under Anthony Calip, the newly-appointed Administrator of the NOAA, a special 'Blue-Ribbon' panel was formed in March of 1986 to inquire into the effectiveness of the American fishery management system. The basic thrust of the report was that biological conservation of fish stocks should be given higher priority over perceived social and commercial considerations.¹⁷² The implication was that those measures should be advocated which could meet these priorities in the most effective way possible - namely, limited entry. A management study released in June of 1986 advocated such an orientation:

- * The key to management in many fisheries is effort control.
- * Too many fishermen - commercial and recreational - are trying to catch too few fish. In addition, technological improvements increase catching efficiency. Limited entry rights to the opportunity to fish through individual share quotas, bidding on availability of such quotas, lotteries or some other means must be implemented, whether or not this is accomplished through modifications of the [FOMA] itself.¹⁷³

The NMFS goes on to state the perceived consequences of continued open-access entry: a depletion of stocks which would be in contravention of the agency's mandate.

The results of open access entry are excessive pressures on limited stocks, chronic economic instability, and severe allocation problems. Ordinary management systems and elaborate regulations (restricting gear, kind of catch, areas and seasons) have served to protect some fish stocks, but have not stopped overfishing or reduced economic inefficiency.¹⁷⁴

In short, the NMFS has been making its own determination concerning the proper allocation of resources. The basic findings of the final report were that the NOAA should take a greater hand in defining the concept of OY: recommendations included the mandating of the Councils to determine only allocations, leaving the NOAA/NMFS to set the acceptable biological levels of actual species exploitation.¹⁷⁵ The NMFS would bake the pie; the Councils would have the job of carving it up.

Naturally, the Councils have found such an approach unacceptable, since it would automatically mean a loss of the power to determine, among other things, the acceptable amount of fish which can be harvested. Such measures are an indication of subjective interpretation, from the professional bureaucratic perspective, given the mandate and occupational environment. Economic interpretations from the subjective perspective, however, opposed such an orientation.

With the rejection of the ADF, the Council found itself beset with problems when it attempted again to deal with the difficulties of groundfish management. A minority report, consisting of justifications for the Council's position, was forwarded to the NMFS, along with a revised version of the ADF. A one-year approval was given with "great reluctance", as well as the provision that further amendments would have to be developed to further restrict groundfish catches before October 1, 1987, or the plan would expire.¹⁷⁶

In February of 1987, the NMFS began to draft its own version of what it considers to be the most equitable form of resource conservation and management.¹⁷⁷ Measures provide for expanded mesh sizes, as well enforced trip limits, something the Council still opposes. Limited entry has not been opted for; instead, the NMFS will incorporate measures which it deems are in the best spirit of the objectives laid down by the ADF.

Presently, the Council is also working on an amendment with which it hopes to address NMFS concerns. Hearings have not been too promising; most of the crucial parts of the plan have serious problems. The Council finds itself in a position of acceding to the NMFS' demands to write its own provisions.

The foregoing account illustrates the problems of reconciling the differing perspectives of the industry and government. The length of time it takes to prepare an FMP is offset by the inability to merge competing conceptions of wise resource management. The fact that the Councils accord the industry a role in the preparation of FMPs is a different outlook on the legitimacy of participation. From the viewpoint of the industry, the legitimacy of participation - the result of the prevailing ideology - grants the industry a control over the process which is most intrusive to the daily occupational lifestyle of fishermen. As a result, the Councils become the focus of the issues involved; the political representatives play little part in this regard.

A central question which must be asked concerns the role of the Councils outside their narrow function of formulating management plans. As a quasi-political body, the Council provides the necessary organizational context which accords the industry a forum for debate. The forum brings

together all the major players in the industry, who thus become acquainted with one another. Most often, the importance of such structures lies not only in the formal procedures, but in the informal ones; the formal record is not as important as the one which goes on behind the scenes. One past industry member stated that the goings-on in the 'corridors' were more important than the formal proceedings.¹⁷⁸ Such activities cannot arise unless the formal context is present.

Although the Council provides the organizational framework, it contributes simultaneously to its fragmentation. By erecting a framework for the discussion of management questions, divisions within the industry become more pronounced and divisive. In itself, such conflicts contribute to the fragmentation, inhibiting the prospects for greater cooperation. The operations of the Councils are facilitating an important assimilation process.

Mark L. Miller and John Van Maanen argue that American fisheries management is becoming subject to increasing administrative rationality, the result of emerging structural organization. They draw particular attention to the assimilation of individual fishermen into the values and norms underlying collective political activity with the establishment of the Council system through which adaptations developed:

...in the early public council sessions, fishermen generally spoke and went on record as individuals. This was, to a degree, effective, in part because they had something to say to relatively naive council members and staff were intimidated by the presence of "rough and ready" fishermen in formal meetings and their stylized use of an expressive vocabulary. But, as this tactic lost its novelty, its influence waned and fishermen began to learn techniques of collective mobilization, such as arriving at council meetings in mass. Again this strategy was initially effective, council members were unaccustomed to grass-roots political activism and the possibility (and realization) of public ridicule. With confidence gained through these public

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activities, fishermen began to use the media (particularly television) to further pressure policy-makers. This resulted in carefully scheduling demonstrations, making prepared statements, heightening the social drama surrounding an issue by meeting (and, hence, being filmed) at the docks or in the harbor.¹⁷⁹

In effect, the imposition of organized structures has placed a set of prerequisites on the industry. From this perspective, the organizational facets of the Council are assimilating the industry into the norms and values of collective political activity, which is indicative of the process of modernization inherent in the American political culture. Various sectors of the industry accommodated themselves to the process by forming groups to represent them. At the same time, however, the organizational emphasis contributes to a multitude of groups arising, instead of an attempt to put aside narrow cleavages (e.g., fixed- and mobile-gear fishermen, regional locations, ethnicity, etc.). As a result, the process of modernization works at cross purposes: although fishermen are being socialized to collective responses to representation, the organizational responses tend to remain fragmented, revolving around the particular issue or constituency.

The pluralist foundation for participation revolves around the notion that resource allocation can best be influenced by the group or interest which has the tools to 'make the most noise' - the greater the resources and membership of the organization, the better the prospects for influencing government. Given the fragmented nature of the New England fishing industry, the existence of the Regional Management Councils confirms the fragmentation by allowing the various and diverse groups to air out their grievances, each trying to advance the interests of its own sector, not only

against each other, but also against the differing subjective interpretations of the NMFS regarding fisheries management.

The assimilation of the industry into the Council framework slows down the process of agreeing on what is presumed to be the wisest course of resource management. In the long-term, however, the prerequisite of organizational formation will exacerbate the traditional tensions within the industry. In so doing, the political divisions within the industry will allow the NMFS to 'socialize' the Councils into the national bureaucratic framework by advocating such measures as limited entry and trip limits - the subjective solutions which the NMFS feels will allow it to fulfill its mandate as the conserver of the resource. Given the ultimatum the NMFS gave the NEFMC regarding the provisions it desired in the current attempts to draft an amendment to the ADF, combined with the NMFS' own efforts to draft suitable provisions should the Councils fail to satisfy the criteria of the NMFS, such professional socialization is already under way.

Evidence also suggests that the NOAA is also trying to force the issue concerning the conflict over proper subjective interpretations of resource management and conservation. Congressional amendments to the FOMA in 1986 required the NOAA to revise, on a yearly basis, the basic uniform standards which are supposed to define the criteria by which the Councils are, in turn, supposed to formulate management plans.¹⁸⁰ The reasoning behind this new approach was to give the NOAA greater control in directing the Councils in their attempts to meet the spirit of the FOMA, particularly with respect to the national standards. As of July, 1987, a pre-published document containing uniform standards, released for public consideration, advocates allowing the NOAA to "assess and set a maximum species mortality number for each species which the Councils would then try to meet."¹⁸¹ Moreover,

another regulation would establish the necessary guidelines for procedural operations of the Council, including the hiring and firing of staff.¹⁸² Reaction from the Councils has, of course, been negative; Anthony Calio (Assistant Administrator of the NOAA) has been accused of trying to implement the 'Blue-Ribbon Report' to cut the power of the Regional Management Councils. The present position of the NEFMC is that these are just guidelines; since they are not written statutes, they do not apply to its deliberations.¹⁸³ Both sides are on a collision course - a collision which will likely occur in the not-too-distant future, as these two important institutions continue to debate these important measures.

The fragmentation of the representation wrought by the Council system will also affect the little political interaction that fishermen will have with their political representatives. The multitude of groups will make it more difficult to have a positive impact on the ability to have a sustained influence on national fisheries policy. As the industry becomes more organizationally cognizant through the Councils, the multitude of groups which will emerge will be insufficient to sustain the degree of national cooperation necessary to mount a lobby effort in Congress. This faction will automatically lead to a regionalization of the industry, leaving it to the concerns of a few representatives whose constituencies contain individuals involved in commercial fishing.

In the long run, the localization of the industry will make it much easier for Congressmen to set the terms of debate through their own initiative. In the long term, on issues of financial assistance, the ability for the representative to act as a policy entrepreneur will be confirmed. At the same time, however, the representative will have greater discretion over the type and timing of such aid and benefits. On matters of

conservation and management, the thrust of the FOMA will remain unchanged. It is interesting to note that oversight hearings held since the early 1980s on the FOMA by the House Committee on Merchant, Marine and Fisheries, and the subsequent Congressional amendments, have failed to alter drastically the balance of the management framework through direct legislation. On the question of the power of the NOAA/NMFS to set its own biological criteria of fisheries management, these actions have been set through an indirect Congressional amendment requiring guidelines for uniform standards, as opposed to direct Congressional action.¹⁸⁴ Although there occurred both minor changes to the criteria by which FMPs could be disapproved by Washington, and also a reaffirmation of the Council's general responsibility for fisheries plans and their preparation, the basic procedural process has not been altered. In short, the clash over measures underlying the protracted struggle over the best means of achieving wise resource allocation and management will continue.

Conclusion

The central argument made in this chapter is that a basic cultural conflict between fishermen and bureaucrats exists, but within the different context and structure of American politics. The ideology of local participation, an important part of the American political culture, is consistent with the basic localism of fishermen. Given the American emphasis on democratic participation through the formation of groups, the result has been a plurality of groups, instead of one large regional lobby. While the introduction of the Regional Management Councils, emphasizing the legitimacy of participation, has assimilated the fishermen, giving them the necessary organizational expertise, it has institutionalized the perennial

conflict which will ultimately divide the industry and diminish its national political influence, as well as its ability to resist the appreciative system represented by the bureaucratic professionalism of the NMFS.

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184. United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Oversight Report on the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, submitted by John B. Breaux, Committee Chairman, September 1, 1981, Serial No. 97-B (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981).

CHAPTER FOUR

GENERAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing study has attempted to examine the relationships which fishermen have with government. The theme advocated throughout the study has concerned the conflict between small-scale fishermen and the demands of the bureaucratic administrator, particularly those who have become responsible for fisheries conservation and management.

The theoretical framework proposed is a developmental structure of modernization that is associated with the nature of the occupation. Modernization has been linked to an increasing structural interdependence in the pattern of social relationships. The organizational variable has been used as an indicator of the extent of the modernized polity.

Occupation has been used as an indicator of the extent of organizational development. The hypothesis advanced is that the norms and values attending the qualifications required for the performance of specific jobs impart specific cultural attitudes, which enable the participants to become accustomed to the formal participatory framework which is synonymous with the modernized polity. Traditionally, the tool which was behind the development of occupational organization is the introduction of technology, which has allowed an increasingly sophisticated set of norms and values which are then socialized to its personnel. The rise of bureaucracy is an example of this phenomenon. The environment in which a bureaucrat functions involves an interdependence and a hierarchy of tasks with the accompanying

expertise. In sum, the organizational environment requires a certain cultural level, denoting the extent of integration into the mass polity.

On the other hand, some occupations may not be amenable to organizational innovation as the result of developments in technology. From this perspective, the case of small-scale inshore fishing is an example of the relative absence of organizational coordination. By no means does this mean that the occupational milieu has not been exposed to technological development. The point to be made is that the actual performance of the occupation may not be altered with the introduction of technology. The fisherman personifies this orientation. His source of occupational knowledge is not derived from a structural organizational environment. Substantial studies have illustrated the occupational uniqueness attending the occupation of small-scale fishing as a distinctive work environment. The knowledge inherent in fishing is derived from the specific parameters of the marine environment. These uncertainties transmit the values of individualism and egalitarianism. A differing pattern of social relationships results, producing an attachment to the immediate community. In sum, these cultural attitudes are outside the general realm of mass society. As a result, the style of political activity is also different, controlling the general institutional framework of the greater political system. The sources of motivation for political activity are deemed to be issue-specific, reflecting the localism inherent within the political culture of small-scale fishermen.

The lack of organizational interdependence within the occupational environment is also a determinant in the development of pressure group activity. The pluralist model of political activity assumes a level of knowledge, as well as the resources necessary to be able to develop the

structural facets of organizational activity. A lack of contact with organizational forms of work serves to divorce a particular constituency from forming a structural framework for the articulation of its demands which can transcend the narrow spatial identifications which occur.

Given the basic occupational environments of bureaucrats and fishermen, the logical inference which can be drawn is that there is a cultural conflict between the appreciation systems of the two occupational sectors. Such an orientation can also be expected to produce a dichotomy in the way both sectors view certain policy questions, as well as the relevance of certain factual data. The presence of a dichotomy comprises the general matrix of multi-value choice, which tries to distinguish between short-term political considerations and long-term considerations, associated with long-term administrative decision-making. In both Canada and the United States, this conflict has intensified with the extension of jurisdiction, which has brought the bureaucratic arm of government into fishery management and conservation. The definition of rational decision-making becomes a matter of the importance of subjective over objective decision-making. The magnitude of this conflict is a product of many factors, specifically ideological consensus and institutional differences of the greater political system.

In the Canadian context, the strain of Toryism inherent within the political culture serves to legitimate bureaucratic involvement in decision-making as a legitimate defender of the long-term public interest. From the vantage point of inshore fishermen, their pattern of political contacts has been biased towards a series of patron-client relationships oriented towards dependence on political representatives (MPs, MLAs) for the mediation and resolution of issue-specific demands. The direct intervention of

bureaucratic decision-making in the 1970s has necessitated an adaptation of the old patron-client framework to the preconceived demands of bureaucratic decision-makers, who favour the political organization as the desired unit of government interaction.

Canadian fisheries policy has been part of public attempts to maximize employment in parts of Atlantic Canada, which has few alternative sources of employment. The institutional process regarding fisheries management and conservation accords the industry a measure of input; however, their input, articulated through the structures of the management process, is treated as advice, rather than as direct policy decisions. Final decision-making authority regarding management plans resides with the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans, with the application of bureaucratic norms and values. The reconciliation of appreciative systems falls to the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, who tries to balance the advice of his bureaucrats against the short-term demands of inshore fishermen, articulated through their political representatives, a legacy of the patron-client framework.

The involvement of government in the formation of fishermen's organizations reflects bureaucratic perspectives on the proper procedural norms of representation. These organizations attempt to broker demands across the appreciative systems. Such a function is of higher priority than the role of political representation - the role which government has prescribed.

The American context embodies a different attitude. The ideology of classical liberalism stresses the conception of participatory democracy, with its accompanying principle of government closest to the people. The notion is also stressed that democracy is identified with the pluralist ideology, stressing the existence of organized pressure groups to articulate

demands. The New England fishing industry encompasses features of the ideological consensus. Participatory democracy encompasses the localist thrust contained within the anthropology of small-scale fishermen. The strong ideological orientation has resulted in a narrower focus of political activity. As a result, patron-client relationships are non-existent. Given the pluralist ideology, the ability to exert political pressure is only successful when an issue can be devised to unify the industry.

Unlike the Canadian context, the New England fishing industry has never had a conscious policy orientation. The free market has been its *raison d'être*. Extended jurisdiction was an issue which unified the industry, permitting a loose organizational framework. Since 1976, the fragmentation of the industry has reasserted itself within the framework of the New England Fisheries Regional Management Council (NEFMC), which empowers the industry to draft Fishery Management Plans (FMPs) to be approved by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). Paradoxically, however, by exposing the industry to its structural forum of procedural deliberations, the Council structure has encouraged the formation of groups to represent the narrow constituencies. At the same time, the fact that participation is enshrined further exacerbates the localist cleavages of many of the factions in their attempts to interpret the ambiguous wording of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (1976). In these efforts, the industry is in conflict with the bureaucratic regulations symbolized in the NMFS, which must ultimately approve all FMPs.

The multi-value matrix is played out within the Councils, as its participants grapple with the problem of bridging the gap between long-term and short-term interests, in the continuing attempts to define optimum yield (OY). The structure of the process does not have a mechanism which can

simultaneously balance conceptions and promulgate measures in a timely fashion. With the fragmentation inherent within the industry, political representatives can set the agenda in such a way as to attempt to appease the industry. The multitude of groups means that the likelihood of sustained pressure to force an issue onto the national agenda is remote. As a result, the industry is left to work out an accommodation with the bureaucratic professionalism of the NMFS. Opposition to the bureaucratic conceptions of the FCMA will inevitably facilitate the decline of the limited political power of the industry in the long term.

In both Canada and the United States, fishermen are being thrust into the bureaucratic environment. This movement towards bureaucratization is being accomplished in different ways. In Canada, the provisions of management programs are imposed from above, giving the industry a voice while measures are implemented. In New England, those same provisions are formulated by the industry, to be overruled by the bureaucracy in many cases. Clearly, the bureaucratic regulators will be able to succeed, although the cost for long-term resource availability will be inhibited.

From the viewpoint of modernization as a function of structural organization, the American context has permitted modernization. Groups do form, but their fragmentation inhibits long-term collective cooperative effort. In short, the case is one of arrested modernization. The participatory culture is present, but tinged with the localism promoted by awareness of the differences which divide, rather than unite.

In Canada, the structural facets of modernization are less apparent. Groups do exist, but their formation was aided by leadership outside the industry. Fishermen are oriented primarily towards those groups which serve

their community directly. Their relationship to government blends the duality of bureaucratization, modified by patron-clientelism.

Given the previous circumstances, the question which must be addressed concerns the ability to balance the needs for participation versus the urgency to develop viable management frameworks. There is clearly a need to adapt the appreciative systems to ensure a balance, particularly in instances where the public is unaccustomed to the assumed or prescribed demands of input. For students of modernization, the assumed modes of societal development fail to explain the present orientation among small-scale fishermen. In both countries, fishermen are, for the most part, still outside the participatory culture which is endemic to pluralism, despite the efforts of decision-makers to facilitate changes in the cultural anthropology through preconceived notions of progress. These frameworks will have to be further modified to achieve the balance which is essential in a policy sector of multi-value decision-making. The challenge is how to devise a framework to adapt the modernization of bureaucracy to the parochialism of the occupational sub-culture of fishermen. For specialists of public policy, this task is the greatest challenge that lies ahead.

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- Baker, George. Member of Parliament for the Riding of Gander-Twillingate, Newfoundland. Interview with the author in Ottawa, Ontario, January 23, 1987.
- Belliveau, Sterling. Member of the Bear Point/Shag Harbour/Woods Harbour Fishermen's Association. Telephone interview with the author, February 7, 1987.
- Billard, Allen. Executive Director of the Eastern Fishermen's Federation. Telephone interview with the author, January 28, 1987.
- Blackmore, Edward. Executive Director of the Maine Lobstermen's Association. Telephone interview with the author, January 31, 1987.
- Bruce, Walter. President of the Prince Edward Island Fishermen's Association. Telephone interview with the author, February 18, 1987.
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- McCauley, James. President of the Point Judith Fishermen's Cooperative Association. Interview with the author in Point Judith, Rhode Island, December 15, 1986.
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- Matthews, Herbert. Former Secretary of the Fundy North Fishermen's Association. Telephone interview with the author, February 10, 1987.
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- Pike, Jeff. Aide to Congressman Gerry Studds (Massachusetts) of New Bedford, Massachusetts. Telephone interview with the author, February 17, 1987.
- Rittigers, Jon C. Acting Executive Director of the National Marine Fisheries Service in Gloucester, Massachusetts. Telephone interview with the author, February 18, 1987.
- Sanfillippo, Angela. President of the Gloucester Fishermen's Wives Association. Interview with the author in Gloucester, Massachusetts, December 26, 1986.
- Shand, James. Former General Manager of the Nova Scotia Fishermen's Association. Telephone interview with the author, February 17, 1987.
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- Tate, Roy. Executive Director of the Massachusetts Lobstermen's Association. Interview with the author in Scituate, Massachusetts, December 19, 1986.
- Theriault, Gilles. Former Executive Director of the Maritime Fishermen's Union (MFU). Telephone interview with the author, February 5, 1987.
- Thurber, James. Former Executive Secretary of the Island Inshore Fishermen's Association. Telephone interview with the author, February 3, 1987.
- Tinkham, Hugh. Former provincial Member of the Legislature for the Province of Nova Scotia. Telephone interview with the author, January 20, 1987.
- Verga, Tony. Executive Director of the Gloucester Fisheries Commission. Interview with the author in Gloucester, Massachusetts, December 29, 1986.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A-1

SCOTIA-FUNDY GROUND FISH ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Terms of Reference *

Purpose:

The purpose of the Scotia-Fundy Groundfish Advisory Committee is to advise the Department of Fisheries and Oceans on matters pertaining to the management of groundfish within the Scotia-Fundy Region.

Scope:

The Scotia-Fundy Groundfish Advisory Committee will be a focal point for federal-provincial, processor-fishermen consultations on matters relating to resource allocation, harvesting and processing, including:

1. The annual Atlantic Groundfish Management Plan.
2. The establishment of Total Allowable Catches.
3. The allocation of both domestic and foreign quotas.
4. Other regulatory measures such licensing, mesh size and gear restrictions.

Membership:

- A. The Committee will consist of representatives from associations of fishermen, processor associations, and federal and provincial governments.
- B. Each association will be entitled to nominate an individual of its choosing. The legitimate expenses incurred to attend Scotia-Fundy Groundfish Advisory Committee meetings by that individual will be paid by the federal government at prevailing rates.
- C. If an association wishes to nominate more than one individual, such nominations would be considered within the Committee on an understanding that attendance will be at the expenses of the nominating organization.
- D. The Committee shall be chaired by a representative of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Scotia-Fundy Region.

* Department of Fisheries and Oceans

APPENDIX A-1 (continued)

Administration:

- A. A per diem allowance of \$50 will be paid only to individuals who would be losing incomes as a consequence of their attendance at Scotia-Fundy Groundfish Advisory Committee meetings. This would normally be self-employed fishermen during the fishing season.
- B. The Committee will meet several times a year, and in special circumstances on an emergency basis.
- C. No formal voting procedure will be entrenched in the Committee structure, but rather it will operate on a consensus basis.
- D. Summary minutes will be prepared and distributed by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans.

Working Groups:

The Committee will be supported by a permanent federal working group. Other working groups with federal and provincial, processor and fishermen representation may be established on an *ad hoc* basis to deal with specific problems.

Sub-Committees:

A Sub-Committee in each of the three management areas will advise the Department respecting area-specific management strategies. Input relative to the Atlantic Groundfish Plan and to issues of a Regional nature will be via the Regional Committee.

APPENDIX A-2 (continued)

<u>Stats District</u>	<u>Port Cluster</u>	<u># of Candidates to be Elected</u>	<u># of Alternates to be Elected</u>	<u># of Nominees to be Nominated</u>
32A	Clarks Harbour Newellton Swim Point West Head	2	2	at least 4
32B	Bull's Head Cripple Creek Daniel's Head Northeast Point	1	1	at least 2
32C	Bear Point Fall's Point Forbes Point Lower Woods Harbour Prospect Point	2	2	at least 4
33A	Abbott's Harbour Dennis Point Ledge Harbour Lower East Pubnico	1	1	at least 2
33B	Camp Cove Morris Island Lower Surrence's Island Maise's Point Sluice Point	1	1	at least 2
33C	Little River Harbour Porter's Cove Tuna Wharf Wedgpoint * including Pinkney's Point	2	2	at least 4
34A	Kelly's Cove Town Point Yarmouth Bar Yarmouth Harbour * excluding Pinkney's Point	1	1	at least 2
34B	Cheggoggin Dyke Cheggoggin Point Port Maitland	1	1	at least 2

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APPENDIX A-2 (continued)

<u>Stats District</u>	<u>Port Cluster</u>	<u># of Candidates to be Elected</u>	<u># of Alternates to be Elected</u>	<u># of Nominees to be Nominated</u>
32A	Clarks Harbour Newellton Swim Point West Head	2	2	at least 4
32B	Bull's Head Cripple Creek Daniel's Head Northeast Point	1	1	at least 2
32C	Bear Point Fall's Point Forbes Point Lower Woods Harbour Prospect Point	2	2	at least 4
33A	Abbott's Harbour Dennis Point Ledge Harbour Lower East Pubnico	1	1	at least 2
33B	Camp Cove Morris Island Lower Surrence's Island Muise's Point Sluice Point	1	1	at least 2
33C	Little River Harbour Porter's Cove Tuna Wharf Wedgepoint * including Pinkney's Point	2	2	at least 4
34A	Kelly's Cove Town Point Yarmouth Bar Yarmouth Harbour * excluding Pinkney's Point	1	1	at least 2
34B	Cheggoggin Dyke Cheggoggin Point Port Maitland	1	1	at least 2

.../

APPENDIX A-2 (continued)

<u>Stats District</u>	<u>Port Cluster</u>	<u># of Candidates to be Elected</u>	<u># of Alternates to be Elected</u>	<u># of Nominees to be Nominated</u>
36 & 38	Belliveau's Cove Cape St. Mary's Church Point Comeauville Meteghan New Edinburg Saulnierville Weymouth North * including Weymouth	1	1	at least 2
37 & 38A	Coast Guard Wharf Cove Wharf Fish Point Irish Town Northeast Cove Southeast Cove Tiverton * excluding Weymouth	1	1	at least 2
37 & 38B	Centreville Digby Wharf Gulliver's Cove East Ferry Little River Sandy Cove East Sandy Cove West Sea Wall Whale Cove	1	1	at least 2

The normal term of office for the elected members and alternates shall be two (2) years. Initially, one-half (7) of the elected members and alternates shall be elected for one year and the method to determine what half will terminate their one-year mandate shall be decided upon by the members of the Lobster District 4-A Advisory Committee.

2. Department of Fisheries and Oceans Appointments: The Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) shall designate four (4) permanent members and four (4) resource members. Members of the latter would be invited to attend meetings as the need arises or when their presence is requested.

Permanent Members

Area Manager
Senior Advisor for Invertebrates
Area Conservation Chief
Head, Fishermen's Services

Resource Members

Biologist
Economist
Marketing Advisor
Legal Counsellor

.../

APPENDIX A-2 (continued)

3. **Nova Scotia Department of Fisheries:** The Nova Scotia Department of Fisheries may designate one (1) representative.
4. **Organizations:** Recognized lobster-related organizations are eligible to one (1) member at large each; the Bear Point/Shag Harbour/Wood's Harbour Fishermen's Association (B.S.W.F.A.), the Maritime Fishermen's Union (M.F.U.) and the Offshore Lobster sector have been identified.

Voting Power:

All of the above shall have active membership, but only the elected fishermen identified under membership category number one (1) shall have voting rights (see page 6, Order of Business, Item No. 6).

Vacant Seat:

Where a seat becomes vacant, the Lobster District 4-A Advisory Committee shall deal with it as it arises.

Number of Members:

The number of members in each category listed above, as well as the eligibility for membership, may be reviewed annually by the Lobster District 4-A Advisory Committee.

Co-Chairpersonship:

A dual chairpersonship shall be appointed to the Lobster District 4-A Advisory Committee:

1. One person shall be appointed by the DFO prior to the first official meeting after the election, or whenever the office becomes vacant.
2. One person from the Committee membership shall be elected by the fourteen (14) elected members; this nomination shall be at its first official meeting after the election of the Lobster District 4-A Advisory Committee members or whenever the office becomes vacant; this nomination shall be made by a motion clearly moved and seconded; and, in the case of more than one nomination for the position, voting shall be carried out by secret ballot.

The Co-Chairpersons are *ex officio* members of every committee and shall chair every meeting; otherwise, a chairperson shall be appointed among its members. The term of office for the lobster licensee chairpersonship shall not exceed one year without re-election. Elected members may request a review of this position at any time.

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APPENDIX A-2 (continued)

Secretary:

The order of business of each meeting shall be recorded, prepared and distributed by a secretary appointed by the DFO.

Observers:

All meetings of the Lobster District 4-A Advisory Committee shall be opened to observers, unless otherwise specified.

Any representation(s) from observers to the Lobster District 4-A Advisory Committee shall be at the invitation of either Co-Chairperson.

Standing Working Group:

A working group shall be appointed by the Lobster District 4-A Advisory Committee for a period of one year. Under the direction of the Lobster District 4-A Advisory Committee, the working group shall meet as deemed necessary, in order to:

1. prioritize issues for discussion;
2. plan agenda items for the Lobster District 4-A Advisory Committee;
3. prepare discussion papers; and
4. deal with other issues as deemed necessary.

All issues must be brought before the Lobster District 4-A Advisory Committee for final approval.

Ad Hoc Committee:

The Lobster District 4-A Advisory Committee shall appoint ad hoc committees as deemed necessary.

Accountability & Responsibility of Elected Members:

An attempt will be made by the Lobster District 4-A Advisory Committee to realize a forum whereby the elected members shall be accountable and responsible to their respective communities (port clusters), creating an opportunity where concerns of particular communities (port clusters) or special fishing interests can be discussed in their respective port clusters.

Administration:

1. A DFO-authorized per diem allowance shall be paid only to members who would be losing income as a consequence of their attendance at committee meetings. This would normally be self-employed fishermen during the fishing season.

.../

APPENDIX A-2 (continued)

2. Expenses incurred by the members attending the meeting shall be reimbursed, subject to Treasury Board guidelines.
3. When an elected member is unable to attend a meeting of the Lobster District 4-A Advisory Committee, it is his/her responsibility to advise his/her elected alternate to attend.

Regular Meetings:

1. The Lobster District 4-A Advisory Committee shall meet at least once a year and as many times as deemed necessary by the Co-Chairpersons.
2. All meetings shall be called and chaired by the Co-Chairpersons.

Special Meetings:

Notwithstanding the above, a special meeting of the Lobster District 4-A Advisory Committee may be called upon written consent of at least five (5) members of this said Committee; this request must be handed to either Co-Chairperson at least five (5) days prior to the date of the scheduled special meeting.

Quorum:

All meetings of the Lobster District 4-A Advisory Committee shall require a quorum of eight (8) elected members, plus at least one DFO representative, before said meetings can be declared official.

Order of Business:

1. Prior to meetings, a prepared agenda shall be mailed out, when possible, or made available to every member of the Lobster District 4-A Advisory Committee. This agenda shall be reviewed for final approval at the onset of the meeting.
2. The minutes of the previous meeting shall be read, corrected if necessary, and approved.
3. Old business shall be dealt with.
4. Correspondence shall be dealt with.
5. Miscellaneous and/or new business shall be dealt with.
6. The Committee shall seek to operate on a consensus basis; when consensus cannot be achieved, the elected members only shall be polled for their positions; the advice of the Committee shall not be based on simple majority, but shall reflect the distribution of the vote. The position of every member shall be recorded.

.../

APPENDIX A-2 (continued)

Amendments:

Amendments to these Terms of Reference may be made at regular Committee meetings.

A notice in writing of such an amendment must be given at a previous general meeting of the Lobster District 4-A Advisory Committee.

Speaking for Your Local Association on National and International Committees.

[illegible]

EFF SUMMER '83

LA FEDERATION DES PECHEURS DE L'EST EASTERN FISHERMEN'S FEDERATION

1. CENTRAL NORTHUMBERLAND FISHERMEN'S ASSOC.
MR. CLIFF THOMSON
P.O. BOX 2224
CHARLOTTETOWN, PEI
C1A 4B4
566-4050 (O)
894-5445 (H)
2. FUNDY WEIR FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION
MR. WALTER KOZAK
P.O. BOX 471
SAINT ANDREWS, NB
EOG 2X0
529-3210
3. ST. JOHN COMMERCIAL FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION
MR. DALLAS MOYER
RR 7 ACAMAC
SAINT JOHN, NB
E2L 3W7
635-1227
4. FUNDY NORTH FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION
MR. HERBERT MATTHEWS
RR 4
SAINT GEORGE, NB
EOG 2Y0
755-2832
5. EASTERN KING FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION
MR. WALTER BRUCE
ELIMIRA POST OFFICE
PEI
COA 1K0
357-2638
6. SOUTHERN KING'S & QUEEN'S FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION
MR. EDWIN MCKIE
RR 4
SOURIS, PEI
COA 2B0
583-2017 (H)
687-2506 (WHARF)
583-2007 (FATHER)
7. EASTERN SHORE FISHERMEN'S PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION
MR. STAN PUROY
P.O. BOX 193
EASTERN PASSAGE, NS
BOJ 1L0
465-6891 (SHED)
465-5591 (H)

APPENDIX A-4 (continued)

16.	GRAND MANAN FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION
MR. KLAUS SONNENBERG
P. O. BOX 123
SEAL COVE
GRAND MANAN, NB
EOG 380	662-8525
17.	EAST COAST SALMON FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION
MR. JOE BAGNELL
P.O. BOX 7
LOUISBOURG, NS
BOA 1MO	733-2699
18.	PRINCE COUNTY FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION
MR. JOE CAISSIE
RR 3
WELLINGTON, PEI
COB 2EO	854-2325
19.	BOTSFORD FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION
MR. REG PAULEY
RR 1
PORT ELGIN, NB
EOA 2KO	538-7700
20.	SOUTH SHORE GILLNETTERS ASSOCIATION
MR. ED BOUTILIER
RR 1
HUBBARDS, NS
BOJ 1TO	228-2487
275-4217
477-3107

-N.B. AREA CODE 506

-N.S. AND PEI AREA CODE 902

APPENDIX A-4 (continued)

8. N.S. FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION (SCALLOP SECTOR)
MR. PAT AMIRAULT 742-9185 (O)
355 MAIN STREET 637-3354 (O)
YARMOUTH, NS 762-2032 (H)
B5A 4B3
9. BAY OF FUNDY DRIFTNETTERS ASSOCIATION
MR. ALLEN ABBOTT
RR 2 659-2527
LEPREAU, NB
EOG 2H0
10. CAPE BRETON ISLAND FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION
MR. JOHN KEHOE
RR 1 DESCOUSSE 226-2792
CAPE BRETON, NS
BOE 1A0
11. ISLAND'S INSHORE FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION
MR. JAMES THURBER
FREEPORT 839-2643
DIGBY COUNTY, NS
BOV 1B0
12. NORTH SHORE FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION
MR. RAY SHIELDS
RR 2 886-2872
KENSINGTON, PEI
COB 1M0
13. CENTRAL NS FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION
MR. STEVEN MORASH
PEGGY'S COVE 823-3497 (O)
HALIFAX, NS 823-2303 (H)
SOJ 2N0
14. SCOTIA FUNDY SEINERS ASSOCIATION
MR. SHELDON D'ENTREMONT
WEST PUBNICO 762-2702
YARMOUTH, NS
BOW 3S0
15. NORTHUMBERLAND FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION
MR. R. GARY CAMERON
RR 3 485-8435
PICTOU, NS
BOK 1H0

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20.06.88

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