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Truthful Fiction and Spiritual Crisis

by:

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A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Department of Political Science

**Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
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the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
acceptance of the thesis,

TRUTHFUL FICTION & SPIRITUAL CRISIS

submitted by

Jason Muscant, B.A.

in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT

This analysis of Plato's *Republic* will attempt to reconcile a quandary found within its text. In *Republic*, the protagonist Socrates represents a beautified vision of the philosophic way of life. This way of life is dedicated to the vigilant pursuit of truth, and the cultivation of the soul to facilitate this pursuit. However, throughout the text, Socrates consciously tells and promotes lies as he sees fit. Through this thesis, I intend to demonstrate that Socrates' use of fiction is not antithetical to promoting the search for truth. To accomplish this, I intend to argue that Plato recognizes a difference between a lie in speech, and a lie in the soul. Furthermore, while the lie in speech can be used to reorient others towards the pursuit of the "Good", the lie in the soul prevents this from ever occurring.

While the approach of this work can be understood as a thematic textual analysis of *Republic* and several other supporting Platonic dialogues, this thesis will follow a strict methodology of argumentation. In the "Introduction", I intend to present the argument at hand, and situate the assumed contradiction within the body of the Platonic dialogues. I will then introduce the lie in speech/lie in the soul dichotomy as a hypothetical solution to the problem. The rest of the work will be dedicated to justifying and defending this hypothesis.

Because content is inseparable from context within Plato's hermeneutical world, in the first chapter, I will attempt to analyze the contextual parameters of the argument. This chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section will examine the actual location where Socrates' noble fiction comes into being, and explain its significance. In

the second section. I will introduce the characters involved, and suggest how their unique personalities affected Socrates' lying.

The second chapter of the thesis will build on the first by discussing the notion of spiritual crisis. Through this discussion, I will elucidate upon Platonic "wholeness". It will be suggested that all knowledge is personal knowledge, and that the condition of spiritual crisis occurs when the metaphors used for personal knowledge fail to appropriately imbue meaning upon experience.

Chapter Three will "bridge the gap" between the first two chapters by explaining that the context of the *Republic* is primarily Athens in spiritual crisis, and because of this, all of Socrates' entourage possess lies in their souls. I will argue that Socrates' use of fiction was an attempt to destroy these lies, so that the other characters in the dialogue can re-orient themselves into a pursuit of virtue. To accomplish this, I will divide this chapter into three sections. The first section, using Thucydides as a resource, will support the proposition that Plato's (and Socrates') Athens was in a spiritual crisis. In the second section, I will demonstrate how Socrates used fiction to combat the lies in his entourage's souls. I will explain the potential for, and consequences of, a misappropriation of a microcosmic order on a macrocosmic structure, and use *Republic's* Book V as a source to defend the claim that Socrates feared its occurrence. Finally, in the third section, I will bring this issue to modernity by using Hobbes' *Leviathan* and Nazi Germany as modern examples of this misappropriation.

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Acknowledgements

This project began almost a year and a half ago, when my then current professor, Dr. Horst Hutter, recommended the study of lies within the *Republic* as an interesting area of study. Following his advice, I attended to the issue in a paper for the course. I however, due to the immense scope of the topic, I felt that despite the completion of the paper, I had barely begun to scratch the surface of the issue. This paper makes me feel the same way. I can say this because I have completed the work required of me, and yet, so much still remains unsaid.

When I began to write this thesis, I intended to contend with the possibility of reconciling a benevolent Socrates with the frequency of his lies. However, as I furthered my pursuits, the work took on a life of its own. By its end, I realized that this work was not simply about the use of a particular fictitious story, but really about the relationship between philosophy, politics and living well.

Man only lives well when he is growing and learning. Intrinsic to human nature is the need to interact with the world of people, places, and things that envelops human existence. We touch the world around us with every sense we possess, and we integrate each experience into the conglomerate of ideas, thoughts and past experiences we commonly refer to as our mind or soul. It is this mind, soul, or integrated conglomeration of past experiences that gives meaning to our experience. Our ability to qualify new experience hinges upon the effort we as humans put in to cultivate our minds. When it comes to learning or experiencing something new, all we have to go on is our aptitude for metaphorical learning, the way in which we apply what we have already integrated (or know), with that which we have not (do not know).

Philosophy, as the love of wisdom, is a way of life dedicated to the cultivation of the mind, or as I will refer to it in this work, the tacit dimension. Human contentment, in opposition to this, is the condition where personal experience is always comfortably explained by the tacit dimension. It is for this reason that philosophy always emerges in a period of crisis, for most people would feel no need to cultivate the mind, when they are comfortable with their experience.

However, history dictates that at times, the ability of the tacit dimension to properly explain new experience breaks down. New experience *feels* disjointed, and we begin to doubt who we are, and what we have become. This condition is what I, borrowing from Dr. Tom Darby, will refer to as spiritual crisis.

The Athens of the *Republic* is in a condition of spiritual crisis. The danger of this, as this paper will argue, is that when experience no longer feels connected to who we are, we do not always choose to shape ourselves to better adapt to new experience. Instead, we as humans tend to repress this feeling; we argue that it is not we who need to change, but the world around us. Then we try to impose order on a supposedly chaotic world, and we attempt to reconstruct the world in our own image.

Dr. Maben Poirier, another professor to whom I am in debt, always argued that politics was the art of making do with an imperfect human condition. By imposing our order upon a world that we see as chaotic, we are in actuality not practicing politics, but Gnosticism, in attempting to create heaven on Earth. It is this attempt at ordering the universe that I will refer to in this paper as the misappropriation of the microcosmic order on the macrocosmic structure. Unfortunately, often the consequence of trying to create

heaven on Earth is the realization of the opposite occurrence. Apparently, the road to hell is paved with good intentions.

This paper is about much more than truth and lies; it is about how to live. Borrowing from Strauss, I discuss the need for philosophers to be prudent, so that their words are not misused. I introduce the role of the Greek concept of *techne* in this process of misappropriation, and defend the role of Socrates' lie in preventing its occurrence. I hope to provide the context from which this argument takes places, and to this end, I argue why this context is particularly significant.

However, what is important to note is that this not a dead issue. Spiritual crisis is not a distinctly Athenian occurrence, for the West of the new millennium is contending with the same issue. We are very much in the midst of creating a veritable, technological "Second Reality" which questions what it means to be human. A man can live with a sheep's heart and we can clone sheep. We witness the boundaries of fantasy and reality blurred through television by "Survivor" and "Big Brother". The Internet threatens the whole notion of space, and according to Kojève, we now exist in the null period after the end of time consciousness. The Holocaust has shown us the realized horror of instituting this misappropriation, but we do not see the act itself as evil, but the act of evil people. We tell ourselves that it was simply the product of maniacally evil people, and that if it were benevolently directed, we can, through it, create a new Eden. We have stepped over the threshold into a millennium, where we teeter, as Niemeyer wrote, between nothingness and paradise. For this reason, it is our responsibility to evoke this discussion.

Introduction

It is my intent to study the words of a reputed liar. Over and over again, Plato's character Socrates conceals truth when he sees fit, makes up stories when he deems it necessary, and directly lies to his interlocutors if he perceives it to be advantageous to his cause. This is obviously problematic, for as a beautified fictional character representing the philosophical way of life, a lying Socrates can only evoke the presence of severe contradictions within the body of the Platonic dialogues.

One of the most intriguing apparent contradictions within Plato's masterpiece *Republic* arises within his discussion of the relationship between the philosopher and truth. The philosopher, as a lover of wisdom, is one who also loves truth. This must be, for it is "entirely necessary that a man who is by nature erotically disposed toward someone care for everything related and akin to his boy,"¹ and wisdom, as implied by Socrates, is more akin to truth than anything else. This connection is reinforced when Socrates asks the question, "Will they say that philosophers aren't lovers of that which is and of the truth?" with Glaucon responding, "That would be strange."²

The term *implied* must be used when discussing Plato's association of wisdom and truth, because there appears to be some discrepancy in Plato's choice of phrasing. In the Bloom translation, when Socrates asks Glaucon, "Now could you find anything more akin to wisdom than truth?" he responds in a quick and precise manner, asserting with certainty "Of course not."³ However, in the Grube translation, this certainty is not

¹ Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, trans. Allan Bloom, Ithaca: Basic Books, 1991, line: 485c

² *Ibid.*, line: 501d

³ *Ibid.*, line: 485c

directly shared. When the question is posed to Glaucon, this translation has Glaucon giving no answer. Instead, he poses a question, “How could one?”⁴ When glossed over quickly, this question appears rhetorical, and implying an affirmation of the relationship. However, given that this work is founded on a principle of logographic necessity, nothing found within the boundaries of its pages deserves to be simply “glossed over”.

Socrates chooses not to answer Glaucon’s question, and instead asks Glaucon if it is possible for the same nature to love both wisdom and untruth, to which Glaucon replies “In no way,” in the Bloom translation, and “(it is) not possible at all,” in Grube’s. It appears that the two translators are giving two distinct messages. For Bloom, the character Socrates is quite clear in his presentation of the friendship between wisdom and truth. For Grube however, the discussion is a little opaque, as there appears to be significance in juxtaposing the uncertainty of Glaucon’s first response of “How could one?” with the force of his second. Glaucon’s testimony can be understood as saying that while it is definite that the philosopher cannot love both falsity and wisdom, it remains to be seen whether truth is always in close proximity of that wisdom. Is Grube’s translation suggesting a possibility that “untruth” can sometimes be found “closer to wisdom” even if the philosopher hates the lie?

At a more basic level, the discrepancy between the two interpretations epitomizes the problematic nature of understanding the relationship between truth and wisdom. In *The City and Man*, Strauss provides his readers with this insight:

“...One cannot take seriously enough the law of logographic necessity. Nothing is accidental in a Platonic dialogue; everything is necessary at the place where it occurs...all Platonic dialogues are radically fictitious. The Platonic dialogue is based on a fundamental falsehood.

⁴ Plato, *Plato’s Republic*, trans. G.M.A. Grube, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1974 . line: 485c

a beautiful or beautifying falsehood, viz. on the denial of chance.⁵

It is for this reason that the Platonic dialogue can be falsely likened to a dramatic masterpiece, as it creates a world that reflects that of human experience exceptionally, despite being built on a radically fictitious logographic necessity. However, the recognition of Platonic dialogue as a drama to be experienced is neglectful, in that it fails to account for some of the most fundamental elements of Plato's writing.

When remembering Shakespeare's great tragedy *Hamlet*, one recounts how Hamlet, in the interest of proposing dangerous social criticism, had an acting troop perform "The Mouse Trap". In it, the actors mirrored the deeds of the diabolical Claudias in the assassination of his brother and the repossession of his wife and kingdom. This did not remain within the realm of the drama, for we, at the third degree of separation, were still involved in the fathoming of the experience. While the characters reflected upon the circumstances, we, as readers, reflected not only upon the experience, but also upon the reflection of the experience. One can find the same manipulation of distance in the *Tempest*, with Prospero's use of the "Mask" to evoke unseen spirits.

This reflection upon reflection is the act performed by Bloom and Grube in the translation of Plato's dialogue *Republic*. When approaching the text, they attempt to achieve understanding (*noesis*), by the application of reason (*dianoia*) upon that which they sensually experience through their eyes, and opine upon (*pistis*). In Book IV, Socrates explains "It's plain that the same thing won't be willing at the same time to do or suffer opposites with respect to the same part and in relation to the same thing."⁶ If the embodiment of philosophy is at this moment telling the truth, than all things must apply

⁵ Strauss, Leo "On Plato's Republic" taken from *The City and Man*, Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1964, p. 60

to this rule, including *Republic* itself. By consequence, the reader would have to see either Bloom or Grube or both fundamentally incorrect in their interpretation and translation of the debated passage, given that both worked from the same primary text. However, if the same set of Greek words (as truth) can by consequence both lead towards and away from wisdom, one begins to call into question their relationship.

To remove oneself from this argument, one would have to suggest that truth could have very different meanings, depending upon with whom it comes into contact. If justice is found in the practice of what “makes him naturally fit”⁷, could it not be said that the just interpretation and translation for each is itself subjective? In essence, if each translation of justice begins with the naturally fitting standpoint of the person, each person’s understanding of justice is dependent upon both the recognition of a need for a unique standpoint, and on the unique standpoint itself. This would seem to validate Strauss’ argument on esoteric/exoteric writing found in *Persecution and the Art of Writing*. However, if this is the escape, can it not help but make a liar out of the Socrates who just said the impossibility of an entity to endure opposites simultaneously? Is truth always closer to wisdom than fiction, or is it the other way around?

This question is asked in light of Socrates’ contrivance of a noble lie, “one of those lies that comes into being in case of need” in discussing the foundation of the “city in speech”.⁸ The use of this noble fiction is situated directly after the character Socrates’ discussion on the evaluation of children with guardian personalities, to determine which ones have the attributes required for leadership. After suggesting that one loves the most what one deems self-beneficial, Socrates suggests that those who are to lead must be

⁷ Plato (Rep. Bloom) *Op. Cit.* line: 436b

⁸ *Ibid.*, line: 433a

“entirely eager to do what they believe to be advantageous to the city and would in no way be willing to do what is not.”⁹ Glaucon reinforces this belief by assenting with a yes and identifying these people as “good men”. Socrates and Glaucon then begin to discuss the need for testing these children by making sure that they cannot and will not be “charmed by pleasure or terrified by fear.”¹⁰ They then agree that the young guardians must be exposed to fears and pleasure to test them, to identify those that cannot be tainted by bewitchment. By bewitchment, Socrates intends a form of seduction by which the powerful emotions of joy and fear aroused by these tests persuade the young guardians to abandon their “intelligent endurance” (the most exemplary definition of courage given in the *Laches*) of purpose, in lieu of the potential to embrace or hide from these emotions.

Once the ruling body has been isolated from the rest of the guardians (the auxiliaries who assist the rulers), Socrates asks Glaucon, “Could we somehow contrive one of those lies that come into being in case of need, of which we were just now speaking, some one noble lie to persuade, in the best case, even the rulers, but if not them, the rest of the city...” that the guardians should rule, and that they rule in the interest of the city. Then, Glaucon responds by asking Socrates what kind of fiction he has in mind. Socrates delays his response, and then begins to profess a “Phoenician thing” which can be used to motivate the leadership of the city in speech to rule for the benefit of all. In his “Translator’s notes”, Bloom mentions that the Phoenician story to which Socrates is referring is that of Cadmus, who founded Thebes with giants who sprang from the earth after the teeth of a slain dragon were sown by him. In the second Book of his work, *The Laws*, Plato’s Athenian stranger argues that, “this myth is a great

⁹ *Ibid.*, line: 414c

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, line: 412e

example for the lawgiver of how it is possible to persuade the souls of the young of just about anything.”¹¹ Furthermore, it follows that the lawgiver should seek only the convictions that would do the greatest good for the city, and that by using such myths the lawgiver could facilitate the development of a shared voice and purpose for his community. Socrates justifies its use by reminding his entourage that the poets, who have traditionally served as the moral authority in Athens, have previously used this myth for the same purpose.

This myth begins with Socrates appealing first to rulers and soldiers, by explaining that the “rearing and education we gave them were like dreams” for while they believed it was happening to them they were actually under the earth being fashioned and reared by the earth who is their common mother.¹² Now that they have completed the formation process, the earth has sent them up, so that they can plan for and defend the land, which is their mother, and that they should know that in protecting other citizens, they protect their brothers.¹³

After a quick interruption by Glaucon, Socrates continues the lie by explaining to these same leaders and protectors that although all in the city are certainly brothers, “the god, in fashioning those of you who are competent to rule, mixed gold in at their birth.”¹⁴ The auxiliaries have been mixed with silver, while the craftsmen and farmers have been mixed with bronze and iron respectively. Although it is more likely that each type of person will have a similar-type offspring, it can happen that a silver child be born from a golden parent, or a golden child from silver or any other type parent. It is the god’s

¹¹ *Ibid.*, line: 413c

¹² Plato, The Laws of Plato trans. Bloom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, section: 664a

¹³ *Ibid.*, line: 414d

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, line: 414e

commandment that the first responsibility of the ruler would be to watch over the children, to see what metal is mixed with their soul, so that each child can be thrust out among the people of their similar type. This will be ensured, as an oracle will be created for that city which will state that the city “will be destroyed when an iron or bronze man is its guardian.”¹⁵ This is obviously a lie, for even Glaucon states, “It wasn’t for nothing that you were for so long ashamed to tell the lie.”¹⁶ However, Socrates, the character that best represents the philosophic nature, and who should by his own standards love only the truth, is prepared to propagate the lie, citing utility as a justification.

Leo Strauss, in his work, *The City and Man*, alludes to a possible escape from the paradox. While recognizing that the Platonic dialogue is radically fictitious, he continues to argue that the dialogue has the ability to recognize and elucidate upon key elements of reality. Leon Craig, in his work *The War Lover*, takes up the argument of Strauss, when he suggests that the problem of understanding Platonic dialogue is the same problem as understanding the world.¹⁷ In all of Plato’s dialogues, including *Republic*, all written information is qualified by the particular *cosmos* established by Plato. The names given to characters, the location, the phrasing of the responses, the choices of speakers, the unsaid words, the gestures and so forth, all color the discussion forwarded by those involved in the dialogue. There is more, for as Craig identifies, “the age and outward appearance and social class and political status and popular reputation” also influence behaviour.¹⁸ The characters do not argue as machines, but as people: flattering, boasting,

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, line: 415a

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, line: 415c

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, line: 414e

¹⁸ Craig, Leon “Prologue” taken from *The War Lover: A Study of Plato’s Republic*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996, p. xxvi

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. xxvii

swearing, threatening, and often embarrassing themselves, revealing more of their personality than they ever intended to.

It is this malleable nature of language as a whole that allows for a division between a lie in speech and a lie in the soul. When the character Socrates discusses speech in the *Republic*, he links it with fine music, gracefulness, and fine rhythm, as elements that establish a truly good and fine character.¹⁹ It is essential to note that the other three attributes are all elements of artistic creation. If, for Socrates, the use of language can be understood as an artistic practice, this understanding must fashion the structure in which the dialogue takes place.

Within Plato's piece of artistic creation (or drama within a drama), several different characters are using the artistic tool of language. This tool itself has no intrinsic value, as it is only a tool for manipulating acting characters. When Polymarchus inherits Cephalus' argument in the first book, he rejects the notion that justice unqualifiedly requires truth, as he recognizes the need to subject verbiage to the greater need of giving to "each what is owed to him."²⁰ And so follow all the other characters of the dialogue, expounding their selves through the vehicle of language. However, despite the fact that words do not possess any intrinsic truth-value, they are far from impotent, for it is only through language that the dialectic form can emerge.

When discussing dialectics in his work, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, Pierre Hadot remarked "what counts (for dialectics) is not the solution of a particular problem, but the road travelled to reach it: a road along which the interlocutor, the reader, and the disciple

¹⁹ Plato (Rep. Bloom), *Op. Cit.*, line: 400d

²⁰ *Ibid.*, line: 331e

form their thought, and make it more apt to discover the truth.²¹ In *Republic*, dialectics are referred to as “deliverance from bonds and the turning around from the shadows.”²² It has the power to rouse the best part of the soul and leap it upward towards the contemplation of the “Good”. It is a discourse “without any help from the senses but by reason”, which elevates its willing practitioners to a vantage point from where they can distinguish objects from their pure and applied identities.²³ As Cushman notes in *Therapia: Philosophy for the Sick Soul*, “Nothing less than the power of dialectic is able to yield apprehension of the ultimate object of knowledge.”²⁴ Only the receptive practice of dialectics can transform the person into an entity that can, if only in fleeting moments, perceive elements of greater reality. When Hadot argues that the subject matter of a dialogue is less important than the method applied to it, he does so with the understanding that dialectics are comparable to mental exercises, in that they train human cognitive faculties, and convert them into receptors for the truth of the “Good”.

This conversion occurs through a dialectical purification process identified with the Socratic *elenchus*. The purpose of the *elenchus*, as Cushman notes, is to resolve confusion and contradictions among espoused opinions (*doxa*) by separating the true from the false.²⁵ In the *Meno*, after Socrates has subjected a young boy to the *elenchus*, he asks Meno to observe the change in him, for while “at the beginning he did not know...nor does he know it now, but then he thought he knew it. Now however he does feel perplexed. Not only does he not know the answer, he doesn’t even think he

²¹ Hadot, Pierre, *Philosophy as a Way of Life* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1996 p. 92

²² Plato (Rep Grube) *Op. Cit.*, line: 532c

²³ *Ibid.*, line: 532c

²⁴ Cushman, *Therapia: Philosophy for the Sick Soul* p. 169

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 172

knows.”²⁶ This is the essence of the Socratic *elenchus*, as it is a method applied at the consent of both parties, which clarifies a subject of thought by examining all assumptions and hypotheses, and sifting through ill-considered opinions. Once purified, the mind, according to Plato, can engage in dialectics, “doing away with hypotheses and proceeding to the first principle where it will find certainty.”²⁷

This is not simply a destructive process, for to examine hypotheses is to refer them to some higher principle as their necessary justification.²⁸ In an ordered universe, there must be a greater good to which each good finds its justification, its *raison-d’etre*. This “Good”, as a first principle, is non-hypothetical. The *elenchus* attempts to clear the mind from false opinion and the double ignorance that follows from it (believing one possesses knowledge despite being ignorant). When Plato mentions the “doing away with hypotheses”, he intends this: Hypotheses, in their limited capacities (as they cannot assume to embrace the total richness of experience) always point beyond themselves to something else.²⁹ Even knowledge is not beneficial to its owner, unless it is knowledge of the “Good”. Nothing, with the exception of this first principle, possesses any element of transcendental truth within it. It is for this reason that the character Socrates equates intelligence with proximity to the “Good”, for nothing besides the “Good” is intrinsically intelligible or self-evident. Through the dialectical stance, the mind is able to achieve a position of mutuality with the “Good”. When exposed to the first principle, the mind can recognize the connection between the hypotheses and the “Good”. Grube reaffirms this.

²⁶ Plato, “Meno” taken from *The Collected Dialogues of Plato: Including the Letters*, ed. Huntington Cairns and Edith Hamilton, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973, line: 84a

²⁷ Plato (Rep Grube) *Op. Cit.* line: 533d

²⁸ Cushman, *Op. Cit.*, p. 175

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 179

when he explains that in that the previously unproved assumptions can consequently be deduced from knowledge, they cease to be hypotheses.³⁰

With this understanding of truth established, one can return to the “noble fiction” used by the character Socrates and determine whether his action opposed it. One is forced into the conclusion that within the structure of the fictional “city in speech”, the character Socrates’ lie in speech is simply an artistic creation that attempts to illustrate elements of reality. Its words do not protest to have any intrinsic truth-value, but they are intended to elevate the city to a level of mutuality with its previously anointed good, that being justice. It therefore serves the macrocosm’s first principle by directing the city towards it. When we recognize this myth outside the realm of the “city in speech”, and connect it to the body of the *Republic* as a whole, it becomes quickly identifiable as an ungrounded hypothesis, just as any other. It takes its place in the greater dialectic of the work as a “springboard” from which the reader can launch himself towards the first principle. In that Socrates’ noble fiction aids in the conversion of the reader towards the proper reception of the “Good”, it cannot be seen as a lie. Quite oppositely, this particular “lie in speech” must be seen as possessing a viable connection to essential truth.

While this argument may appear to be difficult to accept, it is not unfounded in Plato’s other writings. In his *Seventh Letter*, Plato uses the following passage to explain reality:

I certainly have composed no work in regard to it, nor shall I ever do so in the future, for there is no way of putting it into words like other studies. Acquaintance with it must come rather after a long period of attendance on instruction in the subject itself and of close companionship, when, suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, it is generated in the soul and is at once self-sustaining.³¹

³⁰ Grube, G.M.A. “Translator’s note #15” taken from *Republic*, Book VII, line: 533c

If Plato protests that in no way can reality be identified through words, one can make the argument that the vocalized lie is no longer a corruption of reality, as it never assumed to possess an understanding of reality in the first place. The vocalized lie becomes the artistic expression that was previously described. However, the consequences for a lie in the soul are much more severe, for it receives no such pardon for its intentional deception. For if the human experience of truth is dependent upon a particular condition of being developed by “a long period of attendance and close companionship to being”, a corruption of that condition, or a “lie in the soul”, can prevent that experience. If reality is to be explained through the *telos* of the “Good”, and intelligence is equivalent to proper aiming at its fulfilment, then a soul in falsehood removes it further from kinship with it.³²

The character Socrates introduces his discussion on the make up of the human soul by identifying it as a divided entity, possessing many “diverse desires, pleasures and pains.”³³ These desires are sub-classed into three greater divisions of the soul, with each derived from a particular motor of human action. The first of which is spoken of is the desiring part, or the *epithumetikon*, for which *eros* is the motivation. Its appetites include the desire for “eating, drinking, sex and all their followers.”³⁴ Socrates also mentions that this part can also be equated with money loving, for all these appetites can be satiated through money. The second element for Socrates is the *thumoeides*, or that “with which a man becomes spirited.”³⁵ Guided by the *thumos*, this section is identified as the element of the soul that is fiery, and is dedicated to the achievement of power, victory,

³² Plato, “Letter VII” taken from *The Collected Dialogues of Plato: Including the Letters*, line: 341d

³³ Cushman, *Op. Cit.*, p. 24-25

³⁴ Plato (Rep Bloom) *Op. Cit.*, line: 431c

³⁵ *Ibid.*, line: 580e

³⁶ *Ibid.*, line: 580e

and high repute. Socrates labels it as the honour-loving aspect of the human, and is identified always with courage. Distinct from the other parts of the soul is the *logistikon*, or the rational, calculating element of the human being. In that it is in constant pursuit of truth, his part is associated with a love of learning, and the philosophic nature as a whole.

As elements of a complete soul, these divisions do not and cannot manifest in individual vacuums. Human experience dictates that these appetites can work independently and often conflict with one another. Plato's Socrates exemplifies this through the story of Leontius, a man who found himself in internal conflict as to whether or not to look at executed corpses that were lying near him. In the text, Socrates explains that "(Leontius) desired to look, but at the same time he was disgusted."³⁶ His erotic desire to sensually experience the vision of executed bodies was in conflict with the rest of his being. Upon being overcome by his desire, he pushes his eyes wide open, rushed towards the corpses, and spouted with anger, "Look you damn wretches, take your fill of the fair sight."³⁷ proving that anger can war against the appetites.³⁸

³⁶ *Ibid.*, line: 439d

³⁷ *Ibid.*, line: 440a

³⁸ This short account is by no means a complete presentation of the depth and insight of the Leontius myth. Leontius, just as Socrates was in the first book of the *Republic* is travelling from the Piraeus probably towards Athens. He, representing every human, is an entity trapped within the metaxy of the ever-changing Earth and the permanent pattern of change of the stars, the physical and the metaphysical, the mundane and the divine. Notice that he was facing upwards until being tempted at a base, sensual level to experience dead corpses. These dead corpses are of men who were executed, whose physical boundaries had been violated, and whose internal/external structure of dichotomy had been dissolved. This is more than a casual pointing towards our current fascination with horror movies and car crashes, as it notes the basic human desire to achieve human synthesis, so that we can sympathize with Dickinson's "I heard a fly buzz when I died."

Overpowered by this primordial desire, Leontius turns around, and in doing so, his soul orients itself towards erotic fulfilment, and the *epithumetikon* overcomes the *logistikon*. In spite of this, Leontius is self-conscious, and aware of his actions. The logical element of his self enlists the aid of the angry element of his soul to "make war" against his unlawful desires. So even in his moment of absolute weakness, he is still able to find strength enough to address his eyes as "damn wretches".

In Leontius we find the condition of every man, and in his struggle we see our own to overcome that which is base, so that we bring ourselves to that afore-mentioned level of mutuality with the "Good".

Because these appetites have a tendency of conflicting, Socrates explains that there exists a virtue that serves to maintain order in the chaotic soul. The virtue of orderliness is moderation, and it is defined as a "mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires, as men say when they use...the phrase stronger than oneself."³⁹ For Socrates, moderation is much like a harmony, as it spreads through the whole of the being. It is an agreement made between the naturally worse and naturally better as to which of the two must rule, both in the city and in the individual.

It is through moderation that the philosophical individual recognizes both the multiplicity of the soul, and its natural hierarchy of appetites.⁴⁰ This hierarchy mirrors that of the city in speech, where the few guardians use the auxiliaries to govern over the profit-earning class. For Plato, it is the philosopher's *logistikon* that uses the *thumoeides* to control and moderate the individual's sensual appetites. This is important, for it is this form of regulation that allows the philosopher to experience transcendent reality. If the character Socrates is correct in understanding justice as pursuing that which each of us is meant to pursue, then the only just soul is that which pursues the "Good". It is only the rigidly moderated soul that can experience truth, as it understands to pursue it outside the realm of human knowledge. The lie in the soul begins to emerge out of a lack of moderation, in which the natural hierarchy of appetites is restructured, causing the individual to pursue truth in the wrong manner.

When the character Socrates says "to be ignorant... is what most men want to avoid,"⁴¹ he makes a formidable statement. By suggesting that men seek to avoid being

³⁹ Plato (Rep Bloom) *Op. Cit.*, line: 430e

⁴⁰ Craig, *Op. Cit.*, p. 95

⁴¹ Plato (Rep Grube) *Op. Cit.*, line: 383b

ignorant about reality, he forwards the position that all error is done involuntarily.

Subsequently, as Cushman notes, the character Socrates ill-prepares the reader for an understanding of the complications of the Platonic conception of ignorance.⁴²

For Plato, there is a harmless form of ignorance that can be identified with a lack of information about essential Being. The ignorance is coupled with self-recognition of ignorance, and is best exemplified by the Socrates of Plato's *Apology*, who is recognized by the Delphic Oracle as the wisest because he knows he has no knowledge of the "Good". It is this ignorance within the moderated soul that inspires the person to achieve moments of clarity, while accepting the fact that outside these moments reality is inaccessible.

This simple ignorance is distinct from the double ignorance caused by a lie in the soul. It is a state of folly, where the man possessed of it thinks he is wise, even though he is not: "It is to think that one knows what one does not know."⁴³ Within this state of double ignorance, the ignorant man wilfully deludes himself into believe that he has achieved knowledge of reality, and stubbornly holds to that belief. The cause of this form of ignorance is what Cushman refers to as the "old error of turning reality upside-down and identifying the real with objects of becoming."⁴⁴ The ignorant man not only tries to find transcendence in the material world of man, but also blindly asserts and cherishes his opinions as truth.

The result of this condition is illustrated in Plato's allegory of the cave, where the doubly ignorant man's devotion to opinion keeps him prisoner. There is contentment

⁴² Cushman, *Op. Cit.*, p. 62

⁴³ Plato, "Socrates' Defence", taken from *The Complete Dialogues of Plato: Including the Letters* line: 29b

⁴⁴ Cushman, *Op. Cit.*, p. 63

in the self-imposed bondage, where shadow is happily accepted as reality.⁴⁵ They cannot see the light directly, as these bonds prevent them from turning towards the light behind them. They are ignorant voluntarily, as their intentional misrepresentation of reality is spurred by the sorcery of sensuous pleasure that Socrates requires the guardians to overcome. "Because this appetency masters the whole nature" the self-incurred ignorance is stubborn, and resists enlightenment.⁴⁶

Thus, one can perceive why a lie in the soul is a more significant corruption of truth than is a lie in speech. By restructuring the natural hierarchy of appetites so that the *epithumetikon* exerts dominance over the rest of the self, the mind is forced to understand reality through the senses. The reconstructed soul forces man into a self-deception to which he is pledged, and unless by good fortune his "affectional bias" can be altered, he is doomed into double ignorance, and consequently enslaved by it.⁴⁷ The doubly ignorant man will not ascend towards the good, and by consequence will never achieve a moment of clarity. He is destined to remain in the cave of shadowy opinion, without ever realizing, or desiring to realize, that he does not even see.

It is with this understood that one can begin to envision another possible escape from the paradox. In the *Theatetus*, the character Socrates refers to his art as "midwifery", in that he facilitates the birth of souls. Socrates states that "the highest point of my art is the power to prove by every test whether the offspring of a young man's thought is a false phantom or instinct with life and truth."⁴⁸ Although he himself has no wisdom to give, he can help others bring birth to admirable truth. He recognizes

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* p. 65

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 67

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 67

⁴⁸ Plato, "Theatetus" taken from *The Collected Dialogues of Plato: Including the Letters* line: 150a

that some men who leave his charge prematurely have miscarriages of thought, caring more for false phantoms than truth, and fall into bad company (Crito, Alcibiates, etc.).⁴⁹ He has the ability to bring on or allay the pains of mental conception, and is aware that some have never conceived at all.

This maieutic art can be seen as a cause for the “good fortune” which alters the affectional biases of men trapped in double ignorance. Through the purifying process of the *elenchus*, Socrates forces his partner into the recognition that the reality perceived through the senses (caused by the reconstruction of the soul’s hierarchical appetites) is not the transcendental truth it was perceived to be. Though Socrates admittedly has no wisdom to give, he can facilitate others into the recognition of their own ignorance. From there, the individual can restructure his own internal hierarchy. Once purified, Socrates can use dialectics as a means of cultivating the individual’s tacit self, so that he might reach the necessary level of mutuality required for fleeting clarity.

With this explanation given, one can return to the noble fiction introduced at the beginning of this introduction. While Socrates’ noble fiction is obviously a physical impossibility, the context from which it is said is of the utmost importance. It must not be forgotten that Socrates is speaking before a large group of young men, highlighted by the brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus. These two brothers, and especially Glaucon, are described as “Sons of Ariston, divine offspring of a famous man” who are destined to rule Athens.⁵⁰ They have shown great intelligence, and an alarming aptitude at elucidating the position of injustice. Glaucon himself already has shown disinterest in the “city of pigs”, as this city lacks the relishes he feels it requires for human life. Also,

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, line: 151a

⁵⁰ Plato (Rep Bloom), *Op. Cit.*, line: 368a

Socrates is well aware that these two men initially sided with Thrasymachus, and continued his argument when he fell silent.

Knowing this, it would seem that this setting would be a perfect opportunity for the character Socrates to begin his work on the reconstruction of Glaucon and Adeimantus. If not, his *daimon* would not let him continue. In the brothers, Socrates sees one man who needs to learn the lesson of moderation (Glaucon), and another who needs to discover his anger and his appetites (Adeimantus). In the implementation of this myth, Socrates hopes to introduce both these lessons to the brothers. On a more basic political level, it could be strongly suggested that Socrates proposed this myth so that they would remember their lesson when they became strong political voices. Also, by reinforcing the notion of ruling for the benefit of all, Socrates begins to allow the brothers to question why they wish to rule. This could be the “good fortune” which they require for the process of self-reconstruction to begin. If this is the case, it can be argued that the philosopher is not lying, but instead allowing for his charges to refocus upon the truth of a first principle.

Despite its attempt at properly treating the subject of truth, lies, and their relationship to the philosopher in Plato’s *Republic*, it is painfully obvious that thus far, it itself is nothing more than an ungrounded hypothesis, of no greater quality than Socrates’ sophism in the first book of the *Republic*. It must be understood to truly begin grasping the meaning of Platonic dialogue, one must fully enter Plato’s hermeneutic circle. Thus far, this work has not done this, and instead stands at the door, attempting to observe through the peerhole, rather than entering the home itself. And yet, it cannot be completely wasteful, for as demonstrated in the allegory of the line, it is only upon the

reflection of hypotheses that one can orient oneself towards knowledge. Perhaps this introduction has successfully brought us to Plato's door, and now it is time to open it.

This work will attempt to contextualize, ground, and elucidate on both the noble fiction referred to at the beginning of this text, and the arguments presented which allow the relationship between truth, lies, and the philosopher to be seen as cohesive and intelligible. Finally, this work will attempt to illustrate how this understanding can apply to some of the more influential writings of today. This is important work, for no time in history has ever resembled the twentieth century as much as Socrates' Athens. To study their condition is to better know our condition. To know Socrates is to know us. However, due to the enormous scope of such a project, it will have to be studied in stages.

Because the content of Platonic thought is indiscernible outside of the particular context of his writing, in the first chapter, I will attempt to "set the stage" of the discussion by explaining the contextual parameters of the argument. Divided into two sections, this chapter will provide the background information necessary for understanding the use of the particular "noble fiction" in question. In the first section, this work will discuss the physical location where the dialogue takes place. I will discuss the significance of the discussion occurring in Polymarchus' house, which itself exists both between and outside Athens and the Piraeus. In the second section, this work will evoke a discussion on the personalities involved in the discussion from which the use of the noble fiction emerges. By discussing Socrates, Glaucon, Adeimantus and Polymarchus as dramatic characters, I hope to illustrate how the particular personalities of the characters involved influence the direction and style of the discussion. From this, I

will introduce some of the perceptions of the characters involved. By illustrating the contrasting expectations of Socrates and his entourage, I intend to suggest that these differing expectations caused the need for Socrates to evoke the noble fiction in question.

Chapter Two will be concerned with a discussion on spiritual crisis. By initially describing Plato's twofold understanding of wholeness, this chapter will proceed to explain spiritual crisis as the condition in which a person (or many people) can no longer reconcile new experience with previously held practices and perceptions. I will argue that all knowledge is personal knowledge, and that within a spiritual crisis the means of knowing required for personal knowledge is forgotten. I will conclude the chapter by defining the Greek term *techné*, and explaining how it, as a means of knowing, can inappropriately be used to attempt to reconcile spiritual crisis.

I will conclude this work with a third chapter entitled, "The Lie in the Soul, the Noble Fiction, and the Misappropriation of the Microcosmic Order". In it, I will argue that within *Republic*, Socrates' entourage all possess lies in their souls, causing them to misunderstand the Socratic project. Because of this, Socrates uses the "noble fiction" as a means of removing them from this condition, so that they can truly understand his message, and begin conforming their souls to become more receptive to virtue and wisdom. To accomplish this, I will divide the chapter into three sections. The first section will defend the proposition that Socrates' Athens was in a condition of spiritual crisis. Drawing from Thucydides, this work will illustrate that the Athenian body had lost their sense of being after their terrible defeat in the Peloponnesian War. In the second section, I will demonstrate how and why Socrates used the "noble fiction" to combat lies in the soul. This work will explain why Socrates feels the need to do so, by

explaining the potential for and consequences of leaders misappropriating a microcosmic order on a macrocosmic structure. Finally, in the third section, I will use Hobbes' *Leviathan* and Nazi Germany as modern examples of this misappropriation.

Chapter 1: The Context of the Argument

"Nothing is accidental in a Platonic dialogue; everything is necessary at the place where it occurs. Everything which would be accidental outside of the dialogue becomes meaningful within the dialogue...all Platonic dialogues are radically fictitious. The Platonic dialogue is based on a fundamental falsehood, a beautiful or beautifying falsehood, *viz.* on the denial of chance." *The City and Man* - Leo Strauss

One of the prevalent difficulties of attempting to transpose the practice of philosophy to the written word is the recurrent need to overcome the inherent limitations of the written word itself. In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates argues that a written manual is analogous to a painting, in that both products "stand before us as though they were alive."⁵¹ By using "as though", Socrates suggest that writing and painting share the condition of being nothing more than an image of living speech. This is supported by Socrates' recognition that both the painting and the written work are static in content, and cannot answer questions. For Socrates, "they maintain a majestic silence...they seem to talk to you as though they were intelligent, but if you ask them anything about what they say, from a desire to be instructed, they go on telling you just the same thing forever."⁵² Because the written word is static in content, its composition cannot adapt itself to its particular readership. As Socrates notes, both those who have no business to read it, and those that cannot understand it can read the written work. There is no opportunity for prudently adapting the message for those who read it. The person that is serious about his ideas, as Craig notes in his Prologue to *The War Lover*, "On Reading a Platonic Dialogue", treats them "as does a sensible farmer treat his seeds, sowing them only in

⁵¹ Plato, "*Phaedrus*", taken from Plato: Collected Dialogues Including the Letters ed. Hamilton, section 275e

⁵² *Ibid.*, 275e

appropriate soil, which has been properly prepared.”⁵³ Socrates asserts that the dialectician “selects a soul of the right type”, so that the ideas implanted in that soul can develop the ability to defend themselves and those who use them, and eventually breed new ideas. Because any literate person can appropriate written work, it cannot choose to expose itself to only the proper souls. Therefore, neither the breeding of new ideas, nor the assurance that the written content will not be misused can be guaranteed. Craig writes, “Cognizant of the strengths and weaknesses of written speech...Plato crafted a novel literary form which could fully exploit the one while greatly attenuating the other.”⁵⁴ The Platonic dialogue succeeds in allowing for the full vitality of the philosophic “Being-in-the-world” by concretely situating it in living experience. Within the Platonic dialogue, living people with veritable agendas find themselves interacting with the philosophic way of life, as embodied by the character Socrates. “In a Platonic dialogue, just as in live conversation, the age and outward appearance and social class and political status and popular reputation of a person influence,” how Socrates behaves, and how others treat him.⁵⁵ The participants in the dialogue have particular strengths and weaknesses, and these details all affect the mood and process of the dialogue. Also, these participants do not simply argue dispassionately, but flatter, boast, swear and threaten, while they interrupt each other, whisper, and jostle in the background. Very often, what is being said in the dialogue is overshadowed by what is not being said.

By using the dialogue form, Plato not only avoids the static nature of traditional written work, but also allows himself the opportunity to provide esoteric messages within

⁵³ Craig, Leon Harold, “On Reading a Platonic Dialogue”, taken from The War Lover: A Study of Plato's Republic, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994 p. xiv

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. xxvi

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xxvii

his writing. Because each reader associates himself differently with the plethora of characters and situations, each person places himself in a unique position *vis a vis* the messages of the dialogue itself. Consequent, Plato has the opportunity to allow his text to make certain suggestions to some character types, and different ones to others. Also, the dialogue format allows Plato to provide one message for the casual reader, and another for the more dedicated reader. It is not surprising that each time a reader re-enters the world of the Platonic dialogue, a new message is found or discovered. Because the reader exists in the world, his "Being-in-the-world" changes, and thus his relationship to Plato's works changes. The Platonic dialogue never becomes static, because the reader himself is fluid in nature.

To begin to address the plethora of messages found within the Platonic dialogue, one must use all of his talents and energies to reconstitute Plato's characters in one's own life. It is only when the context of the dialogue merges with the context of the readership, that one realizes that questions can be asked, as one finds oneself in direct conversation with all the important kinds of men one will meet in the world. "In any event, psychoanalysis of this kind is essential for asserting, correcting, completing and recasting the otherwise inadequate arguments which occupy centre stage."⁵⁶ It is for this reason that the Platonic dialogue can be falsely likened to a dramatic masterpiece, as it creates a world that reflects that of human experience exceptionally, despite being built on a radically fictitious logographic necessity. However, as previously mentioned, to recognize it simply as a drama to be experienced misses out on one of the fundamental elements of Plato's writing.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. xxviii

In the "Introduction", it was suggested that when the character Hamlet wished to propose dangerous social criticism, he had an acting troop perform "The Mouse Trap". In it, the actors mirrored the acts of the diabolical Claudius in the assassination of his brother the king, and his repossession of his wife and kingship. This did not remain within the realm of the drama, for we, at the third degree of separation, were still involved in fathoming the experience. While the characters reflected upon the circumstances, we, as readers, reflected not only upon the experience, but also on the *reflection* of the experience.

This is important, for at the very beginning of the text, we are aware that the character Socrates is recounting a story that he has already had an opportunity to reflect upon. We, as a reading audience, are not only reflecting upon the events of experience, but upon the *reflection* connected with them. Plato's dialogue is not simply a drama, but a drama within a drama, or a "play within a play".

The consequences of this distinction are quite severe and relevant, and will be much more thoroughly explained through the allegory of the line later in the text. However, briefly it must be mentioned that of the four divisions, the realm of sense perception or experience is linked with the second section of opinion (*pistis*). The reflection upon opinion leads to the third section of reasoning (*dianoia*). It is only upon reflection of reasoning, or third degree reflection, that one achieves the fourth and highest level of experience, understanding (*noesis*). It is Plato's intent to facilitate our movement towards this state of *noesis* to achieve moments of clarity.

By following this reason, each book in the *Republic* can be seen both as separate, and as a scene of the play within the play. It is for this reason that so much emphasis

must be put on context. Content does not exist outside of context, and we, as readers are as much content as context. Book III is no exception to this rule, and it serves as the second to last scene of the first act of the *Republic*, with the conclusion of the creation of the "city in speech". Note that it is fictitious in the same way that the dialogue is, as it does not incorporate chance into its vision. It in no way can be seen as the political aim of either the historical Socrates, the character Socrates, or Plato himself. It is a macrocosm that reflects a microcosm, so, in essence, man is not a political animal, for it is the *polis* that is a "humanlike" construction.

Because the content of Plato's writing is indivisible from the given context, this chapter will outline the provided context from which Socrates, in *Republic*, introduces the use of the noble fiction. This project will be divided into two sections: (1) Location, and (2) Characters and their Perceptions of the Endeavour. By providing this contextual analysis, I hope to breathe life into this discussion.

Section I: Location

Book I of *Republic* begins with Socrates remembering (re-membering, or piecing together in the present what was in the past) his trip down to the Piraeus with Glaucon, where he went to say a prayer to the goddess, and see “how they would put on the festival, since they were now holding it for the first time.”⁵⁷ He then mentions that the Athenian procession was no more fine than the Thracian, and that after prayer and “looking on”, he and Glaucon returned upwards towards Athens. One need only look to these phrases to recognize a familiar theme. Socrates, by going down to the Piraeus and praying, is participating in a particular set of ritualized practices that traditionally find their meaning in the shared overarching metaphors of the Athenian body. For an Athenian, prayer has meaning because the Athenian citizen prays to an Athenian divinity, while partaking in an Athenian ritual.

While Socrates’ intentions were to pray to the new goddess, his motivation was wonder. It was Socrates’ fascination with witnessing the new festival that motivated his trip with Glaucon to the Piraeus. Furthermore, Socrates concluded that the Thracian festival was no less fitting than the Athenian. By accepting both festivals as equal, Socrates is validating a very non-Athenian perspective of piety. In doing so, he is suggesting that meaning of his actions concerned with piety is not rooted in the shared metaphor of the Athenian citizenship.

⁵⁷ Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, 2nd ed., trans. Allan Bloom, United States: Basic Books, 1991 line: 327a

This is significant when put in the perspective of Socrates' use of past tense to discuss his visit to the Piraeus. In so far as Socrates is "re-membling" a past occurrence, he is reconstituting, or re-ordering, the past into the present. What he is reconstituting is a self-referential relationship with the *cosmos*, or the macrocosmic order. This relationship is both Athenian and non-Athenian. It is Athenian because of Athens' particular condition of spiritual crisis, and their consequent availability for wonder and philosophy. It is non-Athenian because it breaks with the ritualized Athenian tradition, which, due to the condition of spiritual crisis, has lost all meaning.

Of the new Socratic relationship to the cosmological order, several pieces of information can be gleaned from this first passage. First, the cosmos can be understood as containing both an upper and lower dimension, as represented by the Piraeus and Athens. Socrates "goes down" to the Piraeus from Athens, and attempts to "press back" towards Athens. Noticeably, the upper and lower dimension of the whole can only exist as "upper" and "lower" because of their coexistence. Athens is higher in comparison to the Piraeus, just as the Piraeus is only lower in comparison to Athens. It is the relationship that they share that constitutes the being of each element, so they cannot be isolated and still understood for what they are. This is not to suggest that there is no mediating force governing the relationship between the elements, for there are border guards who serve to maintain the equilibrium of this relationship. Socrates recounts that as he and Glaucon made their way back to town, "Polymarchus, son of Cephalus, ordered his slave boy to run after us and order us to wait for him."⁵⁸ Joined by Glaucon's brother Adeimantus, Niceratus, and others, Polymarchus, through compulsion (and not

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, line: 327b

persuasion), overtakes Socrates and Glaucon, and takes them to his home situated between the Piraeus and Athens.

If Socrates is in the process of reconstituting his relationship to the macrocosmic order through his recollection of his trip to the Piraeus, one must recognize the importance of the consequential location of Polymarchus' house within this schema. The whole *cosmos* is greater than the sum of its parts, for what equally constitutes the whole is the relationship shared between its parts, and each part to the whole. If in this Book, Athens and the Piraeus represent the two constitutive elements of the cosmological whole, what allows the whole to exist is the boundary between them. Because each element is needed to represent the upper and lower dimension, it is the dividing boundary that allows for Athens to be the upper element and not the lower, and the Piraeus to be the lower element and not the upper.

Socrates chooses Athens and the Piraeus to represent the upper and lower elements of the whole, and these choices represent the truly revolutionary elements of Socrates, and I contend Plato's, vision. In Book II of *Republic*, Socrates begins his attack on Homeric poetry, arguing that in his "city in speech": there is no place for it, as it provides a false representation of what the gods truly are. Notably, because the poets, with Homer as the greatest of all, were considered to be the moral authority of his time, this is a particularly dangerous argument that could only be made at that particular time in that particular place. Why this is so will be explained shortly. Of the poetry Socrates proposes to ban, Socrates states, "Then, we musn't accept Homer's-or any other poet's- foolishly making this mistake about the gods and saying that:

Two jars stand on Zeus' threshold
Full of dooms-the one of good,
the other of wretched:

and to the man to whom Zeus gives a mixture of both." experiences both.⁵⁹ Homer depicts Zeus and the gods that he rules over as being the dispensers of fortune, and thus the makers of fate. Within this system, there is no place for human responsibility or political necessity. Humans do not have to be responsible for themselves or each other, because their fates are dependent upon the will of the gods. In the Homeric system, man, as a living being, exists within a cycle of nature, where he lives below the realm of the gods, and above the realm of the shades. Nature, as the force that governs human existence, is the continuous process of birth, maturity, decay and death, and acts independently of human action. However, these repetitive stages can only be known and understood through human perception. The gods, as boundless entities, lack the constitutive element of their creation, human mortality. Because of their immortality, they lack the set of limits and possibilities that imbue meaning upon experience. They are eternal bodies without souls, and this made evident by the frequent intervention of the gods within human experience. In Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, after Apollo is confronted by the chorus for convincing Orestes to murder his mother Clytemnestra (for her murder of his father Agamemnon), Apollo cries, "But I shall give the suppliant help and rescue, for if I willingly fail him who turns to me for aid, his wrath, before gods and men, is a fearful thing."⁶⁰ It is only by intervening in Orestes' affairs that Apollo can understand the true tragedy of Orestes' condition. By failing to avenge his father's death, he is doomed by

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, line: 379d

⁶⁰ Aeschylus, "*Eumenides*", taken from *Aeschylus I: Oresteia*, trans. Lattimore, New York: Washington Square Press, 1972, line: 232-234

Athenian traditional law. By avenging his father's murder, he would be forced to murder his mother, and then violate a non-traditional moral law.⁶¹

If the ancient pantheon of gods can be seen as bodies without souls, the shades that live below the earth in Hades can be seen as the exact opposite. As souls without bodies, the shades are fully aware of their limits and possibility for action. However, because they lack bodies, they have no means for performing action. While in Hades, Odysseus learns from Teiresias that "any ghost to whom you give access to (the) blood will hold rational speech with you, while those whom you reject will leave you and retire."⁶² Without any connection to physicality, the shades cannot speak, and it is only when a shade actually consumes blood that he or she can reacquire the most basic and fundamental element of human existence, speech. When in conversation with Achilles, who is recognized as a "mighty prince among the dead, Achilles can only respond by saying, "spare me your praise of Death. Put me on earth again, and I would rather be a serf in the house of some landless man, with little enough for himself to live on, than king with all these dead men that have done with life."⁶³ Without a body, Achilles cannot act or affect change, and thus the life of a poor serf is better than being a prince of the dead. To be honoured as a god means nothing if one is impotent to affect change.

If the elements of the Homeric cosmological system are the gods (eternal bodies without souls) as the upper, and the shades (eternal souls without bodies), the constitutive boundary that separates these two elements is the human race. The gods can only be recognized through human prayer, and thus it is prayer and sacrifices that establish

⁶¹ It is for this presentation of a non-traditional approach to virtue that forces me to believe that Aeschylus might be the tragic poet most akin to Plato. It would be a very interesting study to examine the connections between the *Oresteia* and the *Euthyphro*.

⁶² Homer, *Odyssey*, *Op. Cit.*, p. 175

relationships between man and the gods. In the same way, the shade can only maintain any meaningful existence through the memory of the living. The first shade Odysseus meets in Hades is that of Elpanor, one of his own men. Elpanor begs Odysseus “to remember me then and not to sail away and forsake me utterly...”⁶⁴ It is through human memory that the shade is able to maintain any form of relevance once it has left the realm of the living. Just as the wily Odysseus find himself struggling between life and death, stranded aimlessly in the metaxy between the will of the gods and his eventual death, it only when Odysseus overcomes his *hubris*, and realizes that this position between the gods and death *is the human condition*, that he can go home and live a human life.

Socrates’ reconstruction of the human relationship to the macrocosmic order completely inverts the Homeric traditional description. Socrates goes *down* to the Piraeus to celebrate the festival of a new goddess. The festival, the goddess, and the innovation of torch race on horseback, as elements of physicality are all elements of the lower element of the Socratic *cosmos*. Noticeably, the two mental processes involved with experiencing a festival, *eikasia* (imagination) and *pistis* (opinion), are represented in Socrates’ allegory of the line by the lower section of the line, which is concerned with appearances. The Piraeus itself embodies the eternal bodies without souls. In Socrates’ inverted cosmological order, the eternal bodies without souls represent the *lower* element of the whole.

By contrast, because Socrates went *down* to the Piraeus, a return to Athens would require a re-ascension. In the Athenian body, Socrates recognizes the only opportunity to practice philosophy. In the *Crito*, Socrates asks Crito, “What will (I) do in Thessaly but

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 184

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 173

feast, as if (I) had gone to a banquet in Thessaly? As for those conversations of (mine) about justice and the rest of virtue, where will they be?”⁶⁵ Socrates cannot leave Athens, because the philosophic soul is the Athenian soul, and to leave Athens would be to deny his own Being-in-the-World. Noticeably, Socrates recognizes that only place where dialogue about virtue can exist is in Athens. When considering the mental processes required for meaningful dialogue to occur, the two most important are *dianoia* (reasoning) and *noesis* (understanding). These two processes are represented in Socrates’ “allegory of the line” as elements of the higher division of the line, which is concerned with essences, or souls, of the material in discussion.⁶⁶

While it is obvious Socrates intends Athens to represent a form of connection to dialogue, it is equally apparent that the Athenian soul lacks the body required to perform action. This ungrounded dialogue, or “soul without body” is best represented in the prolific role played by the sophists in educating the future leaders of Athens. In *Apology*, Socrates, in his traditionally ironic fashion, makes reference to some of these sophists. Socrates explains, “Each of these men (referring to Gorgias, Prodicus and Hippias) can go to any city and persuade the young, who keep company with anyone of their own fellow-citizens they want without paying, to leave the company of these, to join with themselves, pay them a fee, and be grateful to them besides.”⁶⁷ In that these sophists can maintain this practice *in any city*, they do not teach what is specific to the Athenian body.

⁶⁵ Plato, “*Crito*”, taken from *Five Dialogues*, line: 53e

⁶⁶ When Socrates asks his traditional “*ti esti?*” question, he is essentially asking, “What is the relationship between the appearance of an entity (as discovered through *eikasia* and *pistis*), and its soul (as discovered through *dianoia* and *noesis*). The failure of any of his interlocutors to properly answer the question is unavoidable, because as they all attempt to know entities through their own particular means, their inherent limitedness from being mortal prevents them from being able provide a full answer. To be able to account for the fullness of definition required by Socrates would necessitate the interlocutor to exist outside of time itself. Because only divinity can do that, Socrates does not expect to receive a proper answer. His intent was simply to provide a forum for the questions to be pondered upon and reconsidered.

Furthermore, they do not teach a rediscovery of self, or recognition of what it is to be Athenian, but only the technique available to dismiss the consideration of such a question. Most importantly, the sophists practice this for money, thus demonstrating that wealth is more important than loyalty to a shared set of practices and perceptions. For Socrates, words mean nothing unless supported by action, and he demonstrates this in *Apology* by imploring his accusers to chastise his children if they care for money over “the right things”.

If in the Socratic schema, the upper and the lower dimensions of the cosmological whole are represented by Athens (eternal souls without bodies), and the Piraeus (eternal bodies without souls), the constitutive boundary between these two realms is represented again by human beings. In essence, the drama of this scene is one where Socrates is pressing towards Athens begin his practice of reformulating the boundary between the upper and lower, where he is captured by the border guards who defend the boundary. Polymarchus, and the group of men that accompany him, are the boundary. Socrates recounts that while pressing homeward, Polymarchus’ slave boy took hold of his coat and said, “Polymarchus orders you to wait.”⁶⁸ When Socrates attempts persuade the border guards to let him and Glaucon pass, Polymarchus responds, “Could you really persuade if we don’t listen.”⁶⁹

Polymarchus and the rest of the border guards are aware of Socrates’ plot, but are unsure if they should allow it to come to pass. Consequently, they take him to a holding cell (Polymarchus’ house) on the border, yet outside the scope of the cosmos, where no one other than them can hear what is going on. There, in the “terrible” outside, they give

⁶⁸ *Apology*, *Op. Cit.*, line: 19e

⁶⁹ *Republic*, *Op. Cit.*, line: 327b

him the opportunity to defend himself, and convince them that what he is about to do is correct. In this respect, Bloom is correct in his assertion that *Republic* is the true apology of Socrates, for Socrates must defend himself against all the bastions of the old Athenian tradition, so that the thumotic border guards will allow him to escape and reformulate the boundary for them to defend.

From this, one can begin to understand the significance of the location of Polymarchus' house. Firstly, it is located on the border of the upper and lower realm, and thus in the metaxy of the two dimensions. However, it is also located outside the scope of the given cosmological order itself. In Part One of his masterpiece *Faust*, Goethe wrote:

Oh, happy who still hopes to rise
Out of this sea of errors and false views!
What one does *not* know, one could utilize,
And what one knows one cannot use...
Oh, that no wings lift me above the ground
To strive and strive in his pursuit
In the eternal evening light
The quiet world would lie below
With every valley tranquil, on fire every height,
The silver stream to golden rivers flow.⁷⁰

By "rising from a sea of errors and false views", Goethe suggests that in order to understand an entity in its completion, one must take, as Hadot defines it, a "view from above." While the philosopher must always ground his thought in experience, he at times must be "in the world but not of it". He must attempt to stand in Goethe's "eternal evening light", and look down upon the world from an outside perspective. In *Republic*, Plato uses the allegory of the cave to demonstrate this same necessity. While the lover of

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, line: 327c

⁷⁰ Goethe, *Goethe's Faust* trans. W. Kaufmann, New York: Anchor Books, 1990, lines: 1064-67, 1074-79

wisdom must live in the cave, he must be able to remove his shackles and step out into daylight, and look in from the outside. Because Polymarchus' house exists outside the established cosmological structure, it provides Socrates the opportunity to present to all the thumotic border guards this same view from above.

The presence of Cephalus, who is Polymarchus' father, and master of the house only further reinforces this. In his "Interpretive Essay", Allan Bloom writes of Cephalus, "The passions of youth led him to bodily pleasures, and it is only with the body's decline that he turns to the things of the soul."⁷¹ Cephalus was born to some wealth, and managed to increase his holding by becoming an arms dealer. According to Bloom, Cephalus was not an Athenian but a metic, an alien who is allowed to settle in Athens that has no civil rights or privileges. By being an arms dealer, Cephalus had no particular loyalty to any warring party. He is thus apolitical, having no friends and enemies to mitigate between. Cephalus' apolitical nature causes him to isolate himself from any form of overarching political structure, or the set of practices and perceptions that accompany political allegiance. When this is considered in retrospect of the Socratic account of the Athens-Piraeus cosmological structure, Cephalus could be classified as standing outside of it. He has no loyalty to erotic pleasures, as he has deserted their pursuit. His questionable loyalty to piety and speeches is contingent upon his inability to receive pleasure from any other pursuit. His lack of dedication is made evident when he deserts his discussion with Socrates, invoking a shamed Polymarchus to exclaim, "Am I not the heir of what belongs to you?"⁷² In so far as the location of the discussion occurs within Cephalus' home, this distance from direct political involvement is reinforced.

⁷¹ Bloom, Allan, "Interpretive Essay" taken from The Republic of Plato trans. Bloom, p. 313

⁷² *Republic*, *Op. Cit.*, line: 331d

Socrates, as a prisoner of Polymarchus and his entourage, is being held captive in a location where no one can see or hear what he has to say. It provides him with the opportunity to direct political thought in the third person. Instead of thinking directly about political action, by taking a distant stance, he is able to think about political thought. It is this distance that allow for all involved in the discussion (including the reader) to engage in the process of reflection, which is a necessary component of understanding.

Section II: Characters and their Perceptions of the Endeavour

It would seem prudent to begin any discussion of the various characters in *Republic* by introducing some information on Plato's protagonist Socrates. However, due to the enormous scope of attempting to isolate who the character Socrates is across the scope of the entire Platonic corpus, I will limit my discussion of Socrates to the character who is presented to the readers in the early stages of *Republic*, where the "noble fiction" in question was spoken.

It is my contention that the character Socrates is the least believable and "real" character circulating within the dialogue (and often monologue) of the *Republic*. Socrates is not so much a character as he is a beautified embodiment of the philosophical way of life. When characters interact with Socrates, they are interacting with philosophy itself. Inspired by the same wonder that gives birth to philosophy, Socrates makes himself available to all who have the propensity and courage to enter into his vicinity, and experience the bombardment of doubt and questioning that is consequential to their meeting. Socrates is never alone in a dialogue, and his monologues are tools used to reawaken true dialogue, or to illustrate the potential danger of dogmatizing philosophical questioning.

As a character, Socrates' name of "Sure Strength" makes reference both to his consistency of purpose, and his ability to use and misuse the tools of his trade. Because the philosophic way of being can be seductive to different people in different ways, Socrates has access to all forms of rhetoric, irony, and logic to engage unique minds with.

He is not above flattery or reprimand, as both flattery and reprimand can motivate different people to become acquainted with the philosophical tradition. He has an erotic love for wisdom, and cannot help be attached to the young men with the talent and ability to engage in philosophic dialogue.

In so far as the character Socrates embodies the spirit of the philosophic way of “Being-in-the-World”, he does not protest to have truth to teach. What Socrates does provide is both a methodology for others to become aware of and introduced to the truth they can know by being elements of a cosmological order, the forum for doing so, and assistance for bringing this truth forth. Importantly, Socrates’ likens his work to that of a midwife, but not a nurse. Socrates can assist in the birthing process of wisdom, but once the wisdom is born, his responsibility over it is finished. It is the parent’s responsibility to care for it, and have it grow properly.

The character Socrates appears to differ substantially in each dialogue. However, I contend that this is so because Socrates, as a fictional character, has no substance other than his consistency of project. As an embodiment of philosophy, Socrates is the eternal questioner, the breaker of boundaries in thought. It is Socrates’ intent to cultivate the minds of those with potential for great political power. Socrates seeks out these men, because philosophy is concerned with asking the questions “Who am I?” and “Why am I?” The lover of wisdom recognizes that the answers to these questions are always shaped by the particular set of practices and perceptions held to by the person. It is the politically powerful that have the opportunity to mould and shape these practices and perceptions, if they have the ability. The midwife provides the space for a baby to be born, just as Socrates provides the clearing for wisdom to emerge. In the same fashion,

the philosophic way of life is the required methodology for destroying the overarching metaphors that dictate over these practices and perceptions, so that new ones can take form. However, philosophy only works through negation. Just as Socrates' *daemon* only tells Socrates what not to do, the philosophic way of being only negates metaphors that are inherently flawed or obsolete. This work will later explain that the consequence of using philosophy to create rather than tear down is to establish the worst form of political order, dogmatic tyranny.

Because philosophy cannot be used to build new metaphors, it must be used to condition the right kind of soul, so that the right person, who lives philosophically, can make the most prudent political decisions about rebuilding the overarching metaphors. Politics is never about creating the ideal state, but about making do with the unavoidable imperfection of humanity. Both Plato and Aristotle make mention of this when they discuss the unavoidable dissolution of all regimes. Two of the characters in *Republic* who appear to have this "right kind of soul" are Glaucon and Adeimantus.

In addressing the character of both Glaucon and Adeimantus, Socrates mentions that he "had always been full of wonder" at their nature.⁷³ He cites a poem written by Glaucon's lover about their distinction in the battle of Megara, by referring to them as, "Sons of Ariston, divine offspring of a famous man."⁷⁴ From these two phrases alone, one could begin to understand much about the two brothers. If the character that best represents the philosophic way of life is "full of wonder" at their nature, it becomes evident that these two sons of a man whose name translates as "Best" (Ariston), are destined for greatness. They are two potential timocrats with a noble background, who

⁷³ *Ibid.*, line: 367e

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, line: 368a

will become powerful voices in the Athenian Assembly. It will be their voices that greatly effect changes made in the practices and perceptions of the Athenian body. By recognizing their prowess at war, Socrates reflects upon their courage. Courage, as defined by Laches in the *Laches* is a form of intelligent endurance that allows for the courageous man to both recognize the proper times to persist and retreat, and the resolve to follow through with the analysis. It is this form of courage that is attractive to philosophic “Being-in-the world”, as it mediates between the time for the destruction of overarching metaphors, and the time to leave them continue their function of connecting people to the cosmological structure in which they circulate.

Socrates’ courage is not simply passive and contemplative, for courage emerges out of an “inner fire” referred to by Socrates as *thumos*. A thumotic character is motivated by shame and the fear being shamed to take violent action. Thumotic violence does not limit itself to physical violence, but it always implies the destruction of given boundaries that were previously erected. When the *thumos* is controlled intelligently, it becomes courage. However, when the rage is uncontrolled, it almost always results in a greater shame for the angry man. This is directly discussed in the *Laches*.

The *Laches* opens with Lysimachus asking, on behalf of Melesias, two well-known generals, Nicias and Laches, whether fighting in armour would be a “form of instruction or practice (that) would make (their sons) turn out best.”⁷⁵ Nicias proudly praises training in armour fighting for several reasons. Firstly, he argues that it is a good idea for the young to spend their time not in leisure, but in improving their bodies. According to Nicias, armour training “is in no way inferior to gymnastics exercises and no less strenuous, and, at the same time, this and horsemanship are forms of exercise

especially suited to a free citizen.”⁷⁶ Armour fighting is a useful skill to know in war, especially if ranks are broken, and one is forced to fight in single combat. According to Nicias, a man with this skill “would suffer no harm at the hands of a single opponent, nor even perhaps at the hands of a larger number, but he would have the advantage in every way.”⁷⁷ More importantly, however, the study of armour fighting will inspire interest in another form of instruction, that being tactics. When tactics are mastered to the extent that a man takes pride in his tactical abilities, he consequentially begins to learn the whole art of the general. Armour fighting, given this, is the starting for “all the studies and pursuits which are fine and of great value for a man to learn and to practice.”⁷⁸ Most importantly, however, Nicias argues that knowledge of armour fighting will make a man “bolder and braver in war than he was before.”⁷⁹

Laches is completely unsatisfied with Nicias’ account. He first suggests, from a practical perspective, that if armour fighting was as beneficial as Nicias says it is, then the Spartans would themselves be teaching it, which they do not. More importantly, Laches argues that the possession of a *techné* does not guarantee its proper use. By giving the example of Stesilaus, the expert in armour fighting who humiliated himself in battle, Laches illustrates that the virtuousness of a person precedes the acquisition of any *techné*, and is thus independent of technical knowledge. If a coward, according to Laches, has mastered the art, he would only appear more rash, where others who were jealous would only scrutinize a brave man. It is only the man who is “outstandingly

⁷⁶ Laches, *Op. Cit.*, line: 179d

⁷⁷ Laches, *Op. Cit.*, line: 182a

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, line: 182b

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, line: 182c

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, line: 182c

superior to the rest” that could avoid becoming the laughingstock of all who meet him.⁸⁰

For Laches, there is a substantial difference between possessing a skill and knowing when and how to use it. In the same spirit, Socrates recognizes a large difference between possessing the attributes required for accomplishing a goal (inner fire), and knowing how and when to properly use it (courage).

Despite all that Glaucon and Adeimantus share in terms of character and heritage, they have fundamentally different personalities, as reflected in their names. Glaucon, or Gleaning, is reputed by Socrates to be as “always most courageous in everything.”⁸¹ Craig refers to Glaucon as an imaginative and restless spirit, and this is exemplified with Glaucon’s conduct throughout the dialogue. After Socrates has devastated Thrasymachus in a verbal joust, Glaucon’s desire for recognition is provoked, rather than recognizing the potential for a shaming experience. Rather than acquiescing to a stronger power, Glaucon challenges Socrates’ strength, asking him, “Do you want to seem to have persuaded us, or truly to persuade us, that it is in every way better to be just than unjust?”⁸² With a strength and vigour that matches his name, Glaucon’s major character flaw is his lack of prudent moderation. Glaucon is constantly awaiting the opportunity to break boundaries to pursue his desires. However, Glaucon has not learned to selectively choose the opportunities for breaking boundaries in both thought and action.

While Adeimantus shares many of Glaucon’s positive attributes, he is Glaucon’s polar opposite in one significant manner. Adeimantus’ name translates as “Dauntless”, or resolute. Adeimantus shares Glaucon’s courage, intelligence and potential for greatness. However, his resolute character leaves him somewhat hesitant towards pursuing his

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, line: 184c

⁸¹ *Republic, Op. Cit.*, line: 357a

desires. Adeimantus possesses the prudence that Glaucon lacks, but lacks the inspiration required to enforce change by implementing his desires into becoming reality.

Importantly, Adeimantus is not timid, only overcautious, and while he must be more like the aggressive, sleepless hounds of the city in speech's guardian class, Glaucon must learn how to contain and channel his aggression.

It is the particular character traits of Socrates, Glaucon and Adeimantus that affect each of their unique understandings of the Socratic search for justice. At the beginning of Book II of *Republic*, Glaucon recognizes that Thrasymachus has not been proven wrong, only "like a snake, has been charmed more quickly than he should have been."⁸³ He and his brother Adeimantus then implore Socrates to demonstrate, from his knowledge, why justice in itself is superior to injustice, despite the potential benevolent consequences of either. Adeimantus' asking for a definition of justice in itself is itself equivalent to Socrates "ti esti" question. Thus, by asking Socrates to give a technical definition of what justice is, Adeimantus successfully reverses the *elenchus* on Socrates, putting Socrates in a bind. Socrates is both compelled to defend justice, for it is his intent to revitalize his thumotic company's interest in virtue. However, Socrates does not have knowledge of the divine that is equivalent to a *techne*. To his credit, Socrates responds that he is at a loss of what to do. "On the one hand, I can't help out. For in my opinion I'm not capable of it...On the other hand, I can't not help out. For I'm afraid it might be impious to be here while justice is being spoken badly of and give up and not bring help while I am still breathing and able to make a sound."⁸⁴ After being persuaded by

⁸² *Ibid.*, line: 357b

⁸³ *Ibid.*, line: 358b

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, line: 368b

Glaucon and the rest of his company to “not give up the argument, but rather to seek out what each is.”⁸⁵ Socrates agrees to lead the investigation.

It is important to note that Socrates only agrees to participate in “seeking out the truth and benefit of both” justice and injustice. While Socrates does not have a technical answer of what justice is, or for that matter any aspect of the macrocosmic order is, he does concede that he has the ability to help others find the answers for themselves. In the *Theatetus*, Socrates refers to his art as “midwifery”, in that he facilitates the birth of souls. Socrates informs the reader that, “the highest point of my art is the power to prove by every test whether the offspring of a young man’s thought is a false phantasm or instinct with life and truth.”⁸⁶ Although he himself has no wisdom to give, he can help others bring birth to truth. It is in this role that Socrates intends on participating in the search, and he justifies this by referring to his whole entourage (himself included) as men who are not clever. Despite Socrates clear admission of ignorance, Socrates’ entourage appears to dismiss the statement as standard Socratic irony, and, as made evident by the text, this greatly affects their understanding (or misunderstanding) of the Socratic project.

In introducing the discussion on justice, Socrates remarks that in his opinion, justice on its own is very difficult to see, even for a man who sees sharply. He argues, “If someone had...ordered men who don’t see sharply to read little letters from afar and then someone the thought that the same letters are somewhere else also, but bigger and in a bigger place,” it would be in their interest to read the bigger letters first, and then proceed to the smaller letters.⁸⁷ It is from this perspective that Socrates evokes the creation of a

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, line: 368c

⁸⁶ Plato, “*Theatetus*”, taken from *The Collected Dialogues of Plato: Including the Letters*, ed. Cairns, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973 line: 84a

⁸⁷ *Republic, Op. Cit.*, line: 368d

city in speech. This city is to represent *man writ large*, and as a metaphor for the microcosm, makes the microcosm easier to understand. Because this city is purely fantastic, there is no suggestion that Socrates, from Book II to Book IV, has any intention of making direct political commentary. The study of the city in speech is supposed to be the study of man through the metaphor of the city. However, because Glaucon and Adeimantus are thumotic men with a desire for glory, they understand Socrates' words to be a teaching of how to properly build and lead a polis. They wrongly perceive the philosophic pursuit of virtue to be a lecture on the *techne* of leadership.

Consequently, at several instances during the creation of the city in speech, Glaucon and Adeimantus make commentary that suggest they have not understood Socrates' intent of using the city as a metaphor for the human soul. In the first construction of a fictitious city, Socrates provides the brothers with the most simple of cities, where the citizens will live off breads prepared with barley meal and flour, drink wine, build their own homes, and make their own clothing and shoes. Glaucon, in response to this project, interrupts, saying, "You seem to make these men have their feast without relishes."⁸⁸ For Glaucon, the city in speech is only fit for sows, as it neglects the luxuries necessary for someone of his stature. If Glaucon were fully aware that the city was directed to be a metaphor for the soul, his commentary on the need for luxuries would make little sense.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, line: 372c

⁸⁹ I believe that a major factor in Socrates' choice to build a city in speech is the intent of seducing Glaucon and Adeimantus. In *Alcibiades I*, Socrates seduces Alcibiades into studying with him by romancing him with thoughts of political power. Glaucon is being romanced with a similar opportunity, the chance at building a complete city, and thus learning a *techne* of how to build and rule. Glaucon is truly enthralled with building a macrocosmic structure, or polis, in his own image. Although this is unsubstantiated, I believe that this construction is as much a test for Glaucon and Adeimantus as it is a search for justice. Glaucon is a thumotic character that needs to curb his appetites if he is to rule well. Adeimantus needs discover his to rule well. The project of Book II-IV is as much an attempt to bring the

When Glaucon complicates the project of the “city in speech” by introducing the need for luxuries, Socrates explains that to bring luxuries into the city is to introduce the need for war. This goes unchallenged, because all of the men surrounding Socrates are thumotic characters who crave the opportunity for glory in war. For Socrates, war emerges out of the need to compromise the physical boundaries of the *polis* and take resources found outside those boundaries to maintain the “unlimited acquisition of money” required to live luxuriously.⁹⁰

If the *polis* desires luxuries, Socrates argues, “the city must be bigger, and not by a small number but a whole army, which will go out and do battle with invaders for all the wealth and all the things we were just now talking about.”⁹¹ Glaucon responds to this comment by asking why the citizens themselves cannot take up arms and defend their borders. I contend that this is a far more poignant question than Glaucon is aware of. By being a citizen who has enjoyed success at war, Glaucon is thinking of his desires at that moment. His question appears to suggest the thought, “As the leader of the city, I would like to win glory and fame by winning wars.” Socrates will cater his answer to this response, by creating a guardian class that resembles Glaucon. However, what is more important to the question is its relevance on the human soul. By asking why the citizens cannot take arms, Glaucon, through the metaphor, is also asking why the soul must be divided into discernable parts. How come the warring element of the soul is isolated and unique from the rest of the soul’s constitution? Socrates is aware that the human being cannot be so divided, as on the microcosmic level, the human being is a whole, because

two brothers to a position where they are capable of practicing philosophy, having justice in the soul, as it is to discover justice through the project itself. Glaucon and Adeimantus fail the test, and Book V is the result of their failure.

⁹⁰ *Republic, Op. Cit.*, line: 373d

there are no discernable boundaries separating its constitutive elements. However, as Adeimantus implored Socrates to give (despite its impossibility) a complete definition of justice, what was being asked of Socrates was to give a definition of justice equivalent to a *techné*. While the concept of *techné* and its implications will be discussed in the next chapter, what can be said is that one of the elements of a *techné* is its ability to break down its subject material mathematically into its constitutive parts, and then rebuild the whole with these parts. Socrates must remain dedicated to the “One man, one art” premise established at 370a-c, because of the requirements placed on him at the outset of the search. When one examines Socrates’ response to Glaucon’s question, it must be recognized that Socrates is wading between his answer (what he knows for him), the proper answer (what best answers the question at hand), and the prudent answer (what is safe to tell those listening). Socrates’ mediation between these three poles is what constitutes the majority of the *Republic* as a whole.

Socrates asks Glaucon, “Will a man, if he picks up a shield or any other weapon or tool of war, on that very day be an adequate combatant in a battle of heavy-armed soldiers, or any other kind of battle in war?”⁹² By asking this question, Socrates appeals to Glaucon’s pride, forcing Glaucon to concede that not every person has either the natural ability or learned aptitude for being successful in war. Thus, the guardian class becomes a necessity, for it is composed of only those with the ability to be successful at war. They agree that in order for people to take part in the guardian class, they must have both the natural aptitude, and the proper education and training from childhood on.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, line: 374a

⁹² *Ibid.*, line: 374d

From this point, Socrates and Glaucon engage in a discussion about what constitutes a person with the natural aptitude for guardian status, and how they are to be educated. Craig writes that the guardian class can be seen as “a dangerous class of men armed with teeth, of ‘meat-eaters’.”⁹³ They are described by Socrates as having the sharp senses of a dog with the “irresistible and unbeatable spirit” to maintain their intelligent endurance in the face of everything. Most importantly, however, any potential guardian must be spirited, or possess the thumotic nature shared by Glaucon, Adeimantus and the rest of his entourage. However, this provides a problem, for the spirited guardian must also be civilized. The guardian must always be aware of who his friends and who his enemies are. He cannot be a wild beast⁹⁴, living “ignorantly and awkwardly without rhythm and grace.”⁹⁵ He must be educated to be warlike but moderate, and learn to make war only on his enemies, when it benefits the people and the land that he protects. It is in this context that Socrates proposes the noble fiction, as the earliest part of the guardian’s education. By explaining that all guardians are born of the earth, Socrates intends for the guardians to be inspired to defend their boundary as if it is their own mother, and that all of the men that share in its defence are like brothers. In propagating this lie, Socrates suggests that the rulers, or complete guardians (those that can guard over enemies from without and friends from within) can influence the young, or auxiliaries, to enforce the rulers’ convictions. However, the question that must be asked is why such a story is necessary. In the next chapter, I will discuss the condition of spiritual crisis.

⁹³ Craig, *Op. Cit.*, p. 7

⁹⁴ Interestingly, when making reference to Thrasymachus in Book I, Socrates exclaims that he flung himself into the conversation like “a wild beast”. Thrasymachus, in this instance, is a perfect example of a spirited personality that lacks civility. He lashes out without prudence, is unable to differentiate between friends and enemies, and does not act with any reserve or prudence.

⁹⁵ *Republic*, *Op. Cit.*, line: 411e

where the shared set of overarching metaphor are no longer successful in making sense of experience. Chapter Two will then identify the “noble fiction” as an attempt to form a connection between human experience and the cosmological structure. With this accomplished, this work will explain *techne* as another method of dealing with the condition of spiritual crisis, and then discuss its flaws.

Chapter II: Tacit Knowing, Techne and Spiritual Crisis

“ I shall reconsider human knowledge by starting from the fact that *we know more than we can tell.*”

The Tacit Dimension – Michael Polanyi

In the Introduction, I made reference to the importance of the virtue of moderation in Plato's *Republic*, and its relationship to a twofold notion of ignorance. The first form of ignorance, a lack of information about essential Being, is fundamental to the human condition. Because humans are mortal, and thus elements existing within a given cosmological structure, they are limited. They cannot completely know the macrocosm into which they are thrown from birth, and participate in until death. Although all humans are ignorant in this manner, not all are aware of (or choose to recognize) this condition. It is only those with just souls, who have moderated their appetites to do what they are best fitted for, that have the opportunity to achieve the clarity required for recognizing this condition. Of these just souls, some have the courage to persist in the search for a better understanding of the cosmological order in which they live. Philosophy is the way in which these moderated souls live in the world.

Coupled with this simple form of ignorance is a more malevolent double ignorance, or as previously referred to, lie in the soul. When a man suffers from double ignorance, he has forgotten (or been self-deluded into forgetting) his condition of fundamental ignorance. He chooses not pursue a further understanding of the cosmos, as

he believes he already possesses a complete understanding of it. He tries to find transcendental truths in the material world, and cherishes *doxa* as elements of *noesis*.

In the same Introduction, I suggested the possibility that Plato recognized a difference between a lie in speech and a lie in the soul. In light of this distinction, it is my contention that Socrates' noble fiction should not be considered a lie, but in fact an attempt by Socrates to remove the lies he found in the souls of Glaucon and Adeimantus. In telling the noble fiction, Socrates is concerned with directly (in the allegory), and indirectly (with Glaucon and Adeimantus) facilitating the proper moderate ordering of the human soul, so that the soul can be virtuous. However, before such an argument can be made, one must first be aware of what Socrates understands a well-ordered human being to be. This chapter will provide a brief discussion of what Socrates perceives to be a properly ordered soul by first discussing "man-in-himself", and secondly, man's "Being-in-the-world". I will argue that man reconciles his existence as both "man-in-himself" and "man-in-the-world" by establishing relationships between the two modes of being. This work will suggest that the pursuit of wisdom is the attempt to establish such relationships, and in so far as humans always learn metaphorically, these relationships are built upon overarching metaphors. I will then introduce spiritual crisis as the condition that exists when these relationships are no longer successful at reconciling these two modes of being. I will conclude this chapter by returning to the issue of *techne* that was alluded to in the previous chapter. I will explain how *techne* could mistakenly be seen as one way of attempting to reconcile spiritual crisis.

In expressing his feelings about discussion, the character Laches, in Plato's dialogue *Laches*, states that he is both of one and two opinions. When listening to a man

who is discussing virtue, or any sort of wisdom, and that man is himself virtuous and thus knowledgeable about the subject of virtue, he is “delighted beyond measure and (he) compare(s) the man and his words, and note(s) the harmony and correspondence of them.”⁹⁶ This man is the true musician, as his words and deeds harmonize in the true Hellenic mode, the Dorian mode. However, when the man whose actions do not agree with his words speaks, it is an annoyance to him, and the better he speaks, the more *Laches* hates him. It is for this reason the Laches welcomes the coming of the Socratic *elenchus*, for although he has no knowledge of Socrates’ words, “his deeds show that he is entitled to noble sentiments and complete freedom of speech.”⁹⁷

For Laches, the man qualified to speak of virtue is himself a virtuous whole. He is a whole, because he is more than the sum total of all his parts, and thus more than a man who can both speak and act. He is a whole because each element of his being is engaged in self-referential relationships with each other element, and with the entire conglomeration of elements itself. In that these relations constitute what each of the elements are, it is functionally impossible to separate one element from another, and to break down the whole into its constitutive parts. While this may appear confusing, Laches’ musical metaphor sheds much light upon his discussion. In the Dorian mode, combinations of notes are played simultaneously to create harmonies. Within these harmonies, the individual notes themselves disappear into the greater sound of the harmony being created. The harmony itself is more than a simple conglomeration of its elements, for its sound cannot be divided into its constitutive parts, for its existence

⁹⁶ Plato, “Laches”, taken from *Plato: Collected Dialogues*, ed. E. Hamilton, trans. B Jowett, New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1963, line: 188d

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, line: 188d

depends on the self-referential relationships between these elements, which themselves serve to blur the boundaries between each note.

Socrates addresses the question of a well-ordered soul in Book IV of *Republic* through the allegory of the city in speech. Book IV opens with Adeimantus asking the *epithumetic* question of how Socrates proposes to keep the guardian class happy without providing them with the necessary luxuries for a good life. Socrates responds by explaining that the happiness of a city is in “a whole city, not setting apart a happy few and putting them in it.”⁹⁸ This statement is fundamentally important to the Socratic position, when one reconsiders that the city in speech is *man writ large*. If Socrates’ city in speech is an image of man, created to allow a penetrating interpretation of the human condition, Socrates is clearly sending the message that man is not happy if he only indulges in luxury. The importance of this statement can found both contextually and in content. Contextually, this is a message given directly to Adeimantus, the potential timocrat who needs to be more aware of his desires. Part of Socrates’ project was to arouse Adeimantus’ dormant desires. By asking about luxuries for the guardians, Adeimantus demonstrates to Socrates that his desires have been successfully inflamed. Socrates uses his response as a reminder to Adeimantus that while desiring is important, he must always desire for the benefit of his whole entity. Luxuries assuage the desires of the flesh, but fail to satisfy the desire for honour or wisdom.

In content, this statement establishes a bridge for Socrates to evoke a discussion on moderation. Socrates follows this point by reasserting that the guardian class must be both compelled and persuaded to think first of the whole, so that they do their job well. Socrates argues, “We must let nature assign to each of the groups its share of

happiness.”⁹⁹ By this, Socrates implies that each element of the city in speech receives happiness by following their own nature, and part of that nature is the recognition that the good of the whole supersedes the good of the part. Because the whole of the city is maintained by the relationships formed between its elements, and its elements to the whole, these elements can only exist in themselves in reference to each other and the whole. Therefore, the preservation of the element itself is dependent on the priority of the whole to itself. Again, while this may appear confusing, Laches’ musical metaphor can provide clarity. Man, or the city in speech, at its best functions as a harmony. This harmony is not only dependent upon the notes that compose its sound, but on the particular relationship, each note has with the other, and with the harmony itself. For the note in the harmony to maintain the attributes it has within the harmony, the harmony itself must firstly be preserved. Without the presence of the proper harmony, the note no longer possesses the same musical “being”. Therefore, in order for the note to remain authentic to its own potentiality for being, it must primarily serve the needs of the whole.

With that said, Socrates can make the call for a moderation of wealth, citing wealth and poverty as two things that hinder the production of a craftsman. The guardian class must be prevented from becoming either rich or poor, as wealth, “produces luxury, idleness and innovation, while (poverty) produces illiberality and wrongdoing as well as innovation.”¹⁰⁰ If the leadership of the city in speech lives moderately, the city will be governed moderately. Consequently, according to Socrates, “As long as (a) city is moderately in the way it was just arranged, it will be the biggest.”¹⁰¹ The city in speech

⁹⁸ *Republic* (Bloom), *Op. Cit.*, line: 420b

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, line: 241c

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, line: 422a

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, line: 423a

will grow moderately, only up to the point in its growth which it is willing to remain a unified whole. It will protect itself from innovation, and even play will be monitored to prevent lawlessness.¹⁰² The number of laws proposed and enforced will be limited, for if too many laws are put into force, the guardians will, “spend their lives continually setting down many such rules and correcting them, thinking they’ll get hold of what’s best.”¹⁰³

According to Socrates, the city in speech is good because it is wise, courageous, moderate and just. Its wisdom is embodied in the guardians’ knowledge of rulership, and its courage is embodied in the auxiliaries that defend the city from within and without. What binds the city in speech together is the virtue of moderation. Socrates argues, “Moderation is surely a certain kind of order and mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires.”¹⁰⁴ Each element of the city in speech, whether it is the moneymakers, the defenders, or the rulers, has particular desires that accompany their position within the city. For the city in speech to be moderate, all of these desires have to be subordinated to the proper functioning of the city as a whole. The city is forced to succeed because whether or not they wish to, the smaller calculating element of the city must rule, and rule in the interest of the whole. It is in this way that the city can be stronger than itself, as “that which is better by nature is master over that which is worse.”¹⁰⁵ The desires

¹⁰² By denying the availability of innovation in the city in speech, it appears that Socrates, through the metaphor, is proposing a human with a form of “pre-fall contentment”. By “pre-fall”, I am suggesting a human condition lacking self-consciousness resembling that of Adam and Eve before their “fall from grace” and expulsion from Eden. I do not believe that Socrates has this in mind, for Socrates does not envision the well-ordered soul to mirror Homer’s Lotus Eaters. Socrates does not allow for innovation in the well-ordered soul because when the soul is properly structured, it has a consistent relationship with the macrocosm in which it participates. Man connects with the cosmos by persistently doing what is best fitted to their being in the world. Innovation is necessary to recreate lost connections, or develop new ones *when they are necessary!* However, because the city in speech is an image for a soul with a consistent connection to the cosmos, there is no place for innovation within it. In essence, if necessity is the mother of invention, there exists no necessity in this image.

¹⁰³ *Republic* (Bloom), *Op. Cit.*, line: 425e

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, line: 430e

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, line: 431a

pursued by the city are always simple and moderate, as they are always accompanied by intelligence and right opinion, as provided by the calculating guardians. Unlike wisdom or courage, the virtue of moderation, "stretches throughout the whole...making the weaker, the stronger, or those in the middle...sing the same chant together."¹⁰⁶

Moderation is not found within any particular element of the city, but in the entire city's shared relationship to the whole of its being, thus the city is moderate only when the whole city is moderate.

It is with this said that Socrates can provide a preliminary definition of justice for the city in speech. The just, or well-ordered city exists when each member of the city recognizes the rule that "each one must practice one of the functions in the city, that one for which his nature made him naturally most fit."¹⁰⁷ Justice involves minding one's own business, and thus provides the power by which moderation, courage and prudence all come into being and remain preserved within the city. It is a balance where wealth cannot allow one person of the moneymaking class to buy into either the auxiliary or guardian class.¹⁰⁸

It is at this point in the discussion that Glaucon replaces Adeimantus as the active member of the discussion. The city in speech has been built, and it is time for Glaucon to use it, and reduce its example to the level of man. Adeimantus, who Socrates wished to see become more spirited, is allowed to participate in and witness the culmination of the building process. Glaucon is sufficiently spirited, but needs to learn moderation, and so he replaces his brother to participate in a lesson about moderation in the human soul.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, line: 432a

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, line: 433a

With the premise that the justice described in the city in speech mirrors the justice of well-ordered human soul. Socrates asks Glaucon about the soul's constitution. Socrates wishes to know whether humans learn with, become spirited, and desire with separate parts of the soul, "or do we act with the soul as a whole in each of them once we are started."¹⁰⁹ Glaucon has no answer for Socrates, so Socrates addresses his own question in the following manner. He first establishes that the soul cannot perform opposites at the same time, and then uses the example of a human body to suggest that when an entity is divided into elements, each element can act independently, despite being part of the same whole (hands can move while feet stay still). It is then argued and consented to that desiring and "non-desiring" are opposites. From these statements, Socrates constructs a more vivid example of thirst to answer his own question. Glaucon, in response to and agreement with Socrates, explains, "Each particular desire itself is only for that particular thing itself of which it naturally is, while the desire for this or that kind depends on additions."¹¹⁰ To thirst is simply to desire drink, while the conditions pertaining to the particular instance of thirst account for the specificity of the manner in which the thirst is satisfied. While the condition of thirst is always a need for drink, "heat would also cause the desire for cold as well; and where coldness, something hot..."¹¹¹

In this frame of opposites, Socrates argues that things can either be related to a kind of thing, or to only a thing, "That is itself". Knowledge, as an example, can be related to all forms of learning, or a specific kind of learning. Knowledge as learning

¹⁰⁸ It is money that allows injustice to go unseen, and Glaucon provides the readership of an example of this with the introduction of the Gyges ring in Book II. Socrates has not forgotten this, and consequently responds to this by suggesting

¹⁰⁹ *Republic* (Bloom), *Op. Cit.*, line: 436b

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, line: 437e

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, line: 437e

itself differs from the particular knowledge of constructing houses. Thirst, for Socrates, is a longing for drink and a striving towards it. The soul of a thirsty man wishes only for drink, and yet some men in some circumstances are not willing to drink. Socrates asks, “Isn’t there something in their soul bidding them to drink and something forbidding them to do so, something different that masters that which bids?”¹¹² Glaucon asserts that he shares that opinion, concluding that the human soul must be divided into desiring elements, which either agree or conflict with each other.

Socrates suggests to Glaucon that they primarily accept that there at least two elements that differ from one another, “naming the part of the soul with which it calculates the (*logistikon*) and the part with which it loves, hungers and thirsts, and is agitated by the other desires, the irrational and desiring (*epithumetikon*), companion of certain replenishments and pleasures.”¹¹³ As mentioned in the Introduction, while the *logistikon* is motivated by a love of learning and the philosophic nature as a whole, *Eros* and the fulfillment of physical satisfaction motivate the *epithumetikon*. Because of their differing motivation, these two elements often find themselves in conflict, and it is this conflict that evokes the presence of the third element of the human tripartite soul, the *thumoeides*. The *thumoeides*, or “the part that contains spirit and with which we are spirited,” is motivated by the desire for honour and victory. It is always identified with courage, and it serves to maintain the boundary between the *logistikon* and the *epithumetikon*.

When harkening back to the city in speech, it can be seen that the guardian class finds its equivalent in the *logistikon*, the auxiliaries find theirs in the *thumoeides*, and the

¹¹² *Ibid.*, line: 439c

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, line: 439d

moneymakers are equivalent to the *epithumetikon*. It was argued that justice in the city in speech was found only when each element of the city's population restricted itself to what it was naturally fitted for, and respecting the boundaries between class divisions. The guardian class would rule because it was most naturally suited for rulership, and the authority of its rule would be defended and enforced by the auxiliary class. The moneymaking class continued to pursue wealth within the guidelines established by the guardians and enforced by the auxiliaries. The city's wisdom was embodied in the guardians, its courage in its auxiliaries, and its moderation in the entire city's ability to subordinate immediate natural desires to the needs of the whole. With this said, Socrates reminds Glaucon, "we must remember that, for each of us too, the one within whom each of the parts minds his own business will be just and mind his own business."¹¹⁴ In the well-ordered, or just soul, the calculating element rules over the desiring element, and enforces this rule through the anger and courage of the spirited element. This process is exemplified in the previously discussed Leontius myth, where Leontius' calculating element used the soul's anger to invoke disgust when Leontius could not restrain himself from looking at mutilated corpses. The role of education, through music and gymnastics, is to bring these three elements into accord, so that the soul may have the wholeness praised by Laches in the *Laches*. Moderation, in this instance, can be understood as when "the ruling part and the two ruled parts are of the single opinion that the calculating part ought to rule and don't raise faction against it."¹¹⁵ When a soul is immoderate, and one element of its composition rises up against the good of the whole to rule, the soul is in a state of imbalance, or injustice. However, when a man "doesn't let each part of him mind

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, line: 441e

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, line: 442c

other people's business, or the three classes in the soul meddle with each other, but really sets his own house in good order and rules himself... harmonizing the three parts exactly like three notes in a harmonic scale." he is internally just, and thus well-ordered and whole.¹¹⁶

This is not a complete presentation of the well-ordered human being, because the human does not exist in a vacuum. The just man is virtuous because despite being whole at the microcosmic level, he recognizes that at the macrocosmic level, he is simply one participating element in the harmony of the patterned change that is the cycle of nature. Virtue is thus properly doing what one is fitted for, in so far as the virtuous man recognizes the need to strive for wholeness at the microcosmic level, and the need to both create self-referential relationships with other elements of the whole, and to seek out the whole at the macrocosmic level.

It for this reason that I believe Aristotle can identify man as a "*zoon politikon*". Aristotle is not simply suggesting that man must either live in cities or engage in politics to achieve its fullest potential. I believe that Aristotle intends to suggest that the actual definition of man hinges on man's ability to create these relationships. The polis is itself a metaphor for man's being-in-the-world. The polis mirrors the cosmos in that it transcends its constitutive elements. Men live and men die, but it is the established relationships between the living, and interestingly enough the living and the dead, that maintain the wholeness of the polis. In so far as politics is the art of shaping these relationships to maintain the wholeness of the polis, man is a political animal in this manner as well.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, line: 443d

It was mentioned that within the polis, wholeness was maintained through relationships both between the living, and the living and the dead. It may appear awkward to suggest that the relationship between the living and the dead actually reinforces the constitution of this polis. However, consider Plato's notion of the "terrible", and one can begin to recognize what is being suggested. A whole is whole because it not only encompasses the entirety of its scope, but also places firm boundaries around what is within its scope. To recognize what exists outside the scope of the whole is to know the "terrible". Thus, the whole also contains its opposite within in, by being able to define what is outside of its boundaries as "that which exists outside of its scope. Through the Leontius myth, or through a simple recognition of the human fascination with a car crash, any reader or observer can recognize that humans are fascinated with looking at mangled bodies. I contend that the reason for this, as argued by Darby in *The Feast*, is that humans are fascinated by the violation of human physical boundaries. However, this is itself an insufficient statement. The reason for this fascination is because by witnessing the violation of this human boundary, they are able to know "the terrible", what exists outside the scope of the human physical boundary. Thus, Emily Dickinson can write "I heard a fly buzz when I died," because at that moment of death, a person can truly know what exists outside of their physical scope, and thus for a moment achieve complete wholeness. Therefore, if wholeness does require a notion of the terrible, the polis must entertain some form of relationship with its opposite. Importantly, the opposite of the polis as a political structure is revolution, the opposite of politics is tyranny, and the opposite of being is death. Thus, the polis acts in the interest of preventing revolution, politics is the art of preventing tyranny, and man lives in the

interest of preventing his own death. This does not mean that the wise man lives in fear of dying, any more than political action is always taken in the interest of preventing tyranny. However, the wise man attempts to live well, for, as Goethe writes, "...the spirit looks neither ahead nor behind. Only the present is our happiness." Just as every political institution decays and dies, each institution attempts to maintain its wholeness for as long as it is justified.

While it may be that the polis provides the forum for speech and political action, and thus provides the well-ordered human the opportunity to build self-referential relationships with other people by integrating them as either friends or enemies, what remains to be seen is how the person can build similar relationships with the rest of the cosmological structure in which he lives. The pursuit of wisdom is the attempt to build these relationships, and in so far as the pursuit of wisdom is always carried out metaphorically, these relationships are bridged by metaphors. Man understands the world around him, and pursues further understanding by applying what he does know to what he does not know, and integrates new findings into his personal set of metaphors used for connecting with the world around him. It is this personal set of metaphors that Michael Polanyi refers to as the "tacit dimension".

In his work, *The Tacit Dimension*, Polanyi begins with the supposition that humans know more than they are able to directly articulate, and this has been demonstrated through Gestalt psychology. Humans have the ability to recognize particulars without being able to give an account for them. This is not a revolutionary finding, for Socrates himself, in Book X of *Republic*, attacks Homeric poetry on the grounds that Homer has the same ability to recognize particulars of the human condition

without being able to ground them in a justifying system. Polanyi's break with the Gestalt psychologists is his return to Plato, for according to Polanyi, Gestalt should be understood "as the outcome of an active shaping of experience performed in the pursuit of knowledge."¹¹⁷ This shaping of experience is the product of what Polanyi refers to as the "tacit power by which all knowledge is discovered... and held to be true."¹¹⁸ Tacit power, for Polanyi, is the ability to achieve an understanding of new experiences by juxtaposing them with the set of integrated experiences already absorbed into the human faculty for knowledge. In essence, tacit power is metaphoric power, for it is always concerned with applying what one does know upon that which one does not know.

The basic structure of tacit knowing always involves the use of two terms, one which the person attends from, or the *proximal* term (metaphor), and the one which the person attends to, the *distil* term (experience). According to Polanyi, "Such is the *functional relation* between the two terms of tacit knowing: *we know the first term only by relying on our awareness of it for attending to the second.*"¹¹⁹ It is only by focusing upon the distil term through the proximal, that the distil term is imbued with a particular meaning for the human engaged in a new experience. It is the metaphor that gives the new experience meaning, as it provides the context necessary comparison and contrast, grouping and dividing. In essence, just as politics imbues meaning upon human interaction because it provides the methodology and forum for the division of friends and enemies, tacit knowing imbues meaning upon man-world interaction, as it provides the forum and methodology for grouping and dividing experience.

¹¹⁷ Polanyi, Michael, The Tacit Dimension New York: Doubleday & Company, 1966, p. 6

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 6

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 10

Polanyi uses the example of a probe to help demonstrate how tacit knowing occurs. He writes, "Anyone using a probe for the first time will feel its impact against his finger and palm. But as we learn to use a probe...our awareness of its impact on our hand is transformed into a sense of its point touching the objects we are exploring."¹²⁰ In the process of tacit knowing, new experience is always prodded and poked by the experience previously integrated into the set of metaphors that imbue meaning upon human experience. These metaphors that make up tacit dimension are unique to each person, as no two lives proceed exactly the same way and in the same order. When a new experience occurs, it is internalized into the tacit dimension and becomes part of the self. The extension of the tacit dimension, like the use of a probe, become the extension of the self, and when the person recognizes how to use it, it can be an effective tool for understanding the world around him.

The issue of the necessity for a tacit dimension of knowing is at the forefront of Plato's dialogue *Meno*. In the *Meno*, the character Meno inquires about the possibility of engaging in a search for a definition of virtue. When Socrates admits to not being able to define what he is searching for, Meno asks, "How will you aim your search for something you do not know at all? If you should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing that you did not know?"¹²¹ This question is more than a simple question about methodology, for it is an attack on all forms of research and thought, which presume to be concerned purely with explicit knowledge.¹²² Socrates responds to this question by asking Meno, "Do you realize what a debater's argument you are bringing

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 12

¹²¹ *Meno*, taken from *Five Dialogues*, *Op. Cit.*, line: 80d

¹²² From a modern perspective, this is the focus of the relativism and philosophical realist attack on the empirical scientific method espoused to by thinkers such as A. J. Ayer and David Easton. By assuming

up?”¹²³ Socrates is aware that all research starts with the recognition of a problem to be solved. If the problem is diagnosed properly, then the research can be successful. If diagnosed poorly, the results of the research will fail to correspond with the reality of the problem.

Thomas Kuhn, in his work, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, makes this point explicit. According to Kuhn, the practice of ‘normal science’ is deeply rooted in past scientific achievements that “some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practices.”¹²⁴ These achievements, according to Kuhn, possess an enduring quality to attract adherents, and are sufficiently open-ended to leave in its wake a plethora of puzzles to be resolved by these adherents. These achievements are what Kuhn refers to as paradigms, in that they serve to constitute models of practices and perceptions from which particular trends and traditions of scientific practice and research are formed. These paradigmatic orders constitute the way in which scientists approach their fields, for “Men whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practices.”¹²⁵

Noticeably, according to Kuhn, the acquisition of a paradigm is considered a sign of

a fact-value distinction, the modern empiricist attempts to divorce the human participation from the neutral findings derived from the scientific method. In agreeing with this line of criticism, I contend that the empiricist who chooses to limit all findings to those derived through particular forms of testing are themselves involved in the discovery process. Secondly, because all empirical findings are discovered and processed by the human sensory and cognitive apparatus, the human again cannot help but be directly involved in the discovery process. Finally, on a simple level, the scientist has infinite opportunities to record infinite data with infinite variables. And yet, the scientist chooses which data is most important. That choosing process is itself a manifestation of human involvement. The revolutionary scientist is the one who proposes the right questions to ask, while it is the normal scientists, or lab rats, that do the grunt work. The character Socrates will argue that it is through the process of *anamnesis*, or recollection, that man acquires the ability to ask the right questions. Socrates argues that man is born with a soul that has intimations of the macrocosmic order, and the search for wisdom is the process by which man creates a clearing for his forgotten wisdom to be evoked into Being. While one need not accept Socrates’ argument in full, it does shed light on the need for an explanation for the human capacity for non-explicit knowledge.

¹²³ *Meno*, *Op. Cit.*, line: 80e

¹²⁴ Kuhn, *Op. Cit.*, p. 10

maturity in the development of any given scientist. The paradigm serves to establish avenues of inquiry for a scientist, just as it provides a guideline for the formulation of questions. It dictates methods of questioning, identifies the relevance of particular findings, and plays a dominant role in giving meaning to investigation and its results.

Kuhn writes, "To be accepted as a paradigm, a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted."¹²⁶ However, a paradigm is not often an object for reproduction. This is to suggest that a paradigmatic structure should not be dismissed as a fleeting, illogical and fictitious set of premises. "Instead, like an accepted judicial decision in the common law, it is an object for further articulation and specification..."¹²⁷ John Haugeland, in his essay "The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism", writes, "A *paradigm* is a major scientific triumph, so impressive in breaking new ground, and yet so pregnant with unfulfilled possibilities, that a technical research tradition coalesces around it as a model."¹²⁸ The paradigm could be understood as an established, regulated zone from which information about the world comes into presence. The acceptance of a paradigm is the agreement to participate in a select set of rules and obligations that govern the methodology of scientific study, and the material studied. Kuhn argues that the paradigm contains, "The existence of a strong network of commitments-conceptual, theoretical, instrumental, and methodological."¹²⁹ It is this responsibility for its terms, and

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 17

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 23

¹²⁸ Haugeland, John "The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism" taken from Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998

¹²⁹ Kuhn, *Op. Cit.*, p. 42

acceptance of the paradigmatic rules that distinguishes normal science from any other human practice.

The Socratic problem is much like the Kuhnian paradigm in so far as they both establish the boundaries that dictate the methodology, scope and depth to which any research can be practiced, recorded and used. The parameters set for the research into a solution of a problem are set by the problem itself. However, this evokes a paradox of its own kind, for to search for a solution to a problem is an absurdity. To know the required parameters for the discovery of the solution to a problem, one must have an understanding of the problem itself. As Socrates argues, a man “cannot search for what he knows-since he knows it, there is no need to search-nor for what he does not know, for he does not know what to look for.”¹³⁰

The acceptance of a tacit dimension provides a way out from this paradox. By suggesting that not all knowledge is explicit knowledge, Polanyi, or for that matter Plato, can suggest that man, through his tacit awareness of the world around him, has inklings of the parameters that define the problems he faces. It is this non-expressible inkling that guides and shapes the direction and methodology of the research done to solve the problem. As Polanyi writes, “Our whole articulate equipment turns out to be merely a tool-box, a supremely effective instrument for deploying our inarticulate faculties.”¹³¹ Research is nothing more than an effective subsidiary process to true genius, which is itself an authentic relationship to a developed tacit awareness of the world. In this respect, all knowledge is personal knowledge, as research is limited to the fulfilment of

¹³⁰ *Meno, Op. Cit.*, line: 80e

¹³¹ Polanyi, Michael, “Understanding Ourselves”, taken from The Study of Man: The Lindsay Memorial Lectures given at the University College of North Staffordshire, 1958 London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958, p. 25

answers preconceived by the human tacit dimension. In this respect, "the whole universe of human sensibility-of our intellectual, moral, artistic, religious ideas-is evoked...by dwelling within the framework of (a) cultural heritage."¹³² Once again, it becomes evident why Socrates cannot leave Athens to escape his impending death. Socrates' way of being in the world is a product of his Athenian background, just as Athens is the only political institution in his world that would provide the necessary conditions for the practice of philosophy. For Socrates, being Athenian is more than a set of privileges and responsibilities. Athens is the means by which Socrates develops the self-referential relationships that allow him to be Socrates. The metaphors that imbue meaning and consequently dictate Socrates' practices and perceptions are inseparable from Athens itself.

Socrates refuses Crito's offer of escape because of the impending damage his escape will do to the laws of Athens. Socrates posit that if the laws themselves were to ask Socrates what he intended by fleeing, would they not ask, "Do you not by this action you are attempting intend to destroy us, the laws, indeed the whole city, as far as you are concerned? Or do you think it possible for a city not to be destroyed if the verdicts of its courts...are nullified and set by private individuals?"¹³³ By compromising the sanctity of Athenian law, Socrates would be effectively damaging the ability of the polis to mediate human experience by imbuing it with meaning. If the polis is responsible for providing the conditions necessary for human interaction and the development of the Athenian tacit dimension, Socrates, who is reputed for his interest in virtue and wisdom, would by fleeing be destabilizing and thus hindering the polis' ability to do so. It is for this reason

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 39

¹³³ Plato, "*Crito*", taken from Five Dialogues, line: 50b

that Socrates fears being recognized as an “enemy of the government” and a “destroyer of laws”, with no one to have social intercourse with or talk to.¹³⁴ By divorcing himself from Athens, and then attacking its sanctity, Socrates would essentially be divorcing himself from his own tacit dimension, and attacking the shared overarching metaphors of the Athenian citizenship. Both the internalized metaphors Socrates uses for understanding the world, and the shared metaphors of the Athenian people, would be damaged to the degree that Socrates could no longer be Socrates, and the Athenian people would be hindered from being Athenian.

If this were the case, what would be the condition of Socrates in Thessaly? Socrates, as a just man, is whole because his soul is properly moderated and ordered. His entire being is composed of elements engaged in self-referential relationships with each other and with the whole. And yet, Socrates’ experiences in the world would no longer be understandable through the probing of his tacit dimension, as both the internal and external metaphors used to imbue experience with meaning would no longer be successful at doing so. One could explain this simply as “Socrates-in-himself” failing to properly correspond with Socrates’ “Being-in-the-World”.

Kuhn discusses this phenomenon in the realm of natural science through the term crisis. According to Kuhn, the process by which the crisis itself comes into presence begins with a blurring of the paradigmatic boundaries, which attempt to compensate for the presence of recognized anomalies. These anomalies are further inspected, causing the scientific field of study to shape itself differently. Scientists begin expressing discontent with the difficulty of the anomaly, and attempt to rearticulate the paradigm in ways to accommodate the finding. These scientists’ claims are juxtaposed with one another in

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 53b-d

competition, while the scientists see the goal of their field to resolve the difference. In searching for resolution, these scientists isolate the anomaly more precisely, push the rules of normal science, and attempt to generate speculative theories. The crisis itself peaks in this period, when theories are thought out to replace that which is no longer appropriate. The crisis can only find end in one of three situations. In the first, the normal science of the old paradigm sufficiently contains the crisis-provoking anomaly, and all returns to as it was. In the second, the problem resists, but it is determined by the scientific community that they lack the tools to rectify the problem, and so they table the discussion, leaving it for future generations to concern themselves with. In the final situation, a new candidate for paradigmatic status emerges, and overthrows the old paradigm. It should be noted that this is not a cumulative transition. "Rather," according to Kuhn, "it is the reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals, a reconstruction that changes some of the field's most elementary theoretical generalizations, as well as many of its paradigm methods and applications."¹³⁵ When the transition to a new paradigm is complete, the scientists ascribing to it accordingly change their goals and methods, while, through its own naturalizing effect, the paradigm shift almost removes from memory any devotion once had to the old paradigmatic order.

By borrowing from this tradition of discussion, Tom Darby expropriates the notion of crisis and the blurring of boundaries into the political by means of the spiritual crisis. According to Darby, spiritual crisis occurs when the set of practices and perceptions used by a person to explain and justify his experience can no longer successfully do so. The person, who is both a unity unto himself, and an element of a larger macrocosmic order, loses the ability to reconcile himself as both "one", and part of

¹³⁵ Kuhn, *Op. Cit.*, p. 85

a "many".¹³⁶ Because of this, the person's action no longer makes sense to him, and he is consequently susceptible to deep sentiments of self-alienation. Although such a crisis provides the person with an opportunity to experience the wonder necessary for reconstituting a relationship with the macrocosmic order, this act of reconstitution is often difficult, and requires a particular type of individual with a very particular form of education. Because of this, the common effect of a spiritual crisis is that the person, divorced from his position within the *cosmos*, assumes that there is no macrocosmic order to participate in. When this occurs, there are two particular outcomes that may come into being. In the first outcome, the person, seeing no justifiable meaning for action, ceases to act purposely, and reduces himself to a missionary of self-denial, preaching a counterfeited virtue, and romancing the strong into joining his cause. Nietzsche himself refers to these people as sickly, for they find themselves, "reopening old wounds, wallowing in self-contempt and depression."¹³⁷ The condition of sickness implies one where man cowers from his own potentiality for being.

The second potential consequence, and quite possibly the more dangerous option, is that the person assumes that because there is no cosmological structure in which to participate, humans have the opportunity (or responsibility) to reconstruct a macrocosmic order in their own image. By doing so, the person or people would then apply the order they knew from their own microcosmic perspective, on a macrocosmic scale. Thus,

¹³⁶ The whole body of Pre-Socratic philosophy concerned itself with reconciling the philosophical problem surrounding "the one and the many". For the Pre-Socratics, who attempted to give a direct attestation of Being, the difficulty of discussing what *is* emerged out of everything being in a state of flux, and being's consequent transient nature. Plato does not make the same attempt. He instead discusses particular "presencings" of Being, and discusses these "presencings" in terms of "man" and the "polis". For a further evocation of the "one and the many", one need only look at Heidegger's return to Heraclitean philosophy.

¹³⁷ Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values, trans. Anthony Ludovici, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1984 #233

instead of rebuilding a macrocosm/microcosm dichotomy, the two spheres would be merged into one. It is in this context that *techne* can be misused into becoming one means of alleviating the suffering caused by spiritual crisis.

The term *techne* itself is often an elusive one, as it finds itself embedded in so many modern English words, such as technocrat, technique, and most prominently in technology. To find the best translation of *techne* into modern English, one needs to look at the definition provided by Martin Heidegger in his work, "The Origin of the Work of Art". In it, Heidegger is quick to note that *techne* is not synonymous with modern notions of practical performance, craftsmanship or art. "The word *techne*," Heidegger suggests, "denotes rather a mode of knowing."¹³⁸ This kind of knowing can be seen as the process by which truth, as produced by the "good", reveals itself to the human actor. For the Greeks, knowing was always related to the sense of vision, as it consisted in *aletheia*, or the uncovering of beings. *Techne*, as a means of knowing, was understood as the process by which being that is hidden reveals itself to the knower. The *technites*, through his works, becomes the agent by which "beings come forward and be present."¹³⁹ The classical craftsman is not an innocent reflector of truth, for in knowing truth through *techne* the craftsman evokes reality through his work.

In addition to this, there are several characteristics of *techne* that allow its practice to be understood as unique. Primarily, the *techne* has a particular subject matter, and one can see this as evident throughout the whole body of *Republic*, with Socrates' insistence that one person must always concentrate on one job. In the second Book, Socrates asks Adeimantus, "...Does one person do a better job if he practices many crafts or- since he's

¹³⁸ Heidegger, Martin "The Origin of the Work of Art", taken from Poetry, Language, Truth, New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1971 p. 59

one person himself- if he practices one?"¹⁴⁰ Adeimantus responds, "If he practices one," and this becomes an underlying premise to the whole text. A shoemaker is only a shoemaker, just as farmer should only be a farmer.

Secondly, the ideal *technē* is mathematics, in its ability to break down any whole into its constituent parts, and reformulate these parts into a whole. Thus, the *technites* can fully account for his knowledge, as he has the ability to deconstruct and reconstruct wholes into and from parts. The knowledge of a *technites* in this respect is total and self-referential. One can witness this exemplified in Socrates' attack on Charmides in the dialogue *Charmides*. In this dialogue, Socrates bestows the onerous task of giving an account of modesty upon young Charmides. After two failed attempts, Charmides suggests, "I have just remembered having heard someone say that temperance is minding one's own business. Tell me if you think that the person who said this is right."¹⁴¹ An angered Socrates responds by calling him a thieving wretch. Noticeably, Socrates was not angered at Charmides' reverence for Critias, but that Charmides, who is reputed of being devoutly temperate, chose to cower and look outside his own discourse, rather than acknowledging he lacked total knowledge. The true *technites* does not have to look outside the spectrum of his craft to visualize the emergence of being.

Thirdly, a *technē* can be taught by one who possesses it to one who does not. Provided the apprentice is willing to learn, the *technites* can teach the apprentice his craft. Even if the apprentice builder has never built a house, the apprentice can be taught how. Once taught, the apprentice becomes a builder. Furthermore, when the master builder decides he no longer wishes to build houses, he does not lose possession of his technical

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 59

¹⁴¹ "Republic" taken from *Plato: Complete Works*, ed. Cooper, line: 370b

knowledge. Associated with this is the final characteristic of *techné*. Once one becomes a *technites*, one generally uses the status to provide for oneself financially. One can observe this dimension of *techné* played out in the accusations of Socrates made by Meletus in Plato's *Apology*. One of the charges against Socrates laid out by Meletus was that Socrates, like any other possessor of technical knowledge, taught his beliefs to others, and in particular, corrupted the Athenian youths. In his defence, Socrates explained, "...If you have heard from anyone that I undertake to teach people and charge a fee for it, that is not true..."¹⁴² Socrates, unlike the possessor of a *techné*, had no positive doctrine to teach, nor did he use his knowledge for financial gain. By establishing, that he, unlike the *technites*, does not directly teach or charge fees, his testimony serves to reinforce the notion that technical knowledge is commonly taught and sold.

Thus, when examining the use of the term *techné*, one understands a very particular method of evoking reality. This method of evocation provides a clearing into which aspects of reality reveal themselves. However, in that it is limited in scope, not all of reality is brought into presencing. The *technites*, through his knowledge, is consistently able to re-present the same elements of reality, and thus can give an account of the presencing from the perspective of his craft. In so far as the *techné* can repeat the results of re-presentation, it is able to master this act. Not only this, the *technites* can teach others the process of evocation, and this knowledge can be used for financial benefit.

¹⁴¹ "*Charmides*", taken from Plato: Complete Works, ed. Cooper, line: 161b

¹⁴² "*Apology*", taken from Plato: Complete Works, ed. Cooper, line: 20d

However, despite the *technites*' ability to give an account of the relationship between his evocation and its limited results, his knowledge fails to account for the relationship between elements of reality, and reality itself. It is for this reason that Socrates, in the *Apology*, can criticize the craftsmen as seeming to have the same fault as the poets, in that "each of them, because of his success at his craft, thought himself very wise in other most important pursuits, and this error of theirs overshadowed the wisdom they had."¹⁴³

The pursuit of "technical" wisdom is especially dangerous in a period of spiritual crisis, because the constitutive boundary between the macrocosm and microcosm is so obscure. The *technites*, unable to recognize any ordered macrocosmic structure outside of his successful, craft-based re-presentation of reality, is subject to making the assumption that there is no ordered macrocosm to relate to. Consequentially, the *technites* would then assume that his craft did not create the necessary conditions for the presencing of reality, but instead served to effect and shape a new, human macrocosmic structure, superior to any other that humanity ever falsely believed in. Thus the *technites*, as a microcosmic unit within the patterned change-man dichotemic structure, through his microcosmic wisdom, reconstitutes a macrocosm (or overarching metaphor) *in his own image*. The product of this reconstitution of the understanding of *techne* is what I will refer to as the "ideology of *techne*".

In his work, *Between Nothingness and Paradise*, Gerhart Niemeyer defined ideology as, "the subordination of contemplative theory to the *libido dominandi*, which manifests itself in the building of closed systems around dogmatically will "positions", in reductionism of both scope and materials of analysis, and in the determination to

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, line: 22d

substitute “Second Reality” for the reality given to man.”¹⁴⁴ In order to properly elucidate upon the full meaning of this definition, I will approach its analysis in stages.

By initially explaining ideology as a subordination of contemplative theory to the human will to dominate, Niemeyer is consciously opposing ideology with the classical approach to pursuing wisdom. As demonstrated in Polanyi’s explanation of the tacit dimension, the classical approach to wisdom involves formation, not information. To achieve awareness of the macrocosm, the wise man cultivates his tacit dimension by building and developing the set of internal metaphors that imbue meaning upon his experience. This cultivation process conforms the cognitive and experiential faculties into a clear receptacle of the macrocosmic reality, so that elements of that reality can be touched and integrated into the tacit dimension. As previously mentioned, by integrating these elements, and consequently creating new self-referential relationships with the world around him, the wise man achieves greater clarity and understanding of both the macrocosmic order, and his relationship to it.

In order to develop that sense of clarity, the wise man must have a particular predisposition to cultivate. In other words, in order to build self-referential relationships with the macrocosmic order, the man pursuing wisdom must approach his pursuit with a complete attitude. The wise man must be attentive, and receptive to the clues that are shed by the macrocosmic order. The faculties of explicit knowledge cannot disturb the openness of the tacit dimension, or else the clearing provided for the reception of these clues will be compromised. The practitioner of ideology approaches the knowing process in a completely contradictory manner. As Poirier writes, “He very much comes upon the

¹⁴⁴ Niemeyer, Gerhart, Between Nothingness and Paradise, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971 p. 142

scene with a preconception or plan in mind, to meet the exigencies of his preconceptions.”¹⁴⁵ Rather than subordinating himself into an attentive position, the practitioner of ideology actively seeks to force the universe to reveal itself to him. He has a pre-conceived plan or schema of how the macrocosmic order exists, and it is through the filter of this schema that he intends to force the universe to reveal itself to him.

It is this elevation of the accepted schema that Niemeyer refers to as the building of closed systems around dogmatically will positions. The schema utilized by the ideological thinker is a product of the creative genius of either that particular thinker, or another thinker from which it was borrowed. Because is entirely the product of creative genius, the plan itself is non-referential, as it requires no conformation to the reality of the macrocosmic order. Therefore, the schema does not need to make any reference or connection to anything that exists outside its own boundaries. For the ideological thinker, the boundaries of the schema are the boundaries of what *is*, and because the boundaries are subject to the creative genius of its originator, it provides the ideological thinker with a world that contains nothing more and nothing less than the scope of what *he wills to be*. It is entirely self-sufficient, having no reason to go beyond itself, and is thus mistakenly closed, not recognizing the validity of any element of the macrocosmic order that exists outside the scope of its boundaries. The ideologue, always content by his findings (due to the fact that he has set his own parameters), holds tight to the delusional schema, sustaining its existence by willing it to be true. It is only recognized as flawed by those who have not lost contact with the macrocosmic order. For the

¹⁴⁵ Poirier, Maben, Ideology, taken from POLI 470 course handouts, Concordia University

ideological thinker who assumes the schema to be correct, every discovery made through the schema goes unchallenged.

By referring to the dogmatically held will positions as being reduced “of both scope and materials of analysis, Niemeyer recognizes that no matter how ingenious the established schema may be, it can never achieve the degree of richness and subtlety of the true macrocosmic reality. The reason for this is simple. Because the schema is a product of a limited being that is only one element of the macrocosmic order, the schema can only draw on the genius of that particular human being. In that a limited human can never know the whole of the *cosmos*, any human construction fails to achieve the completeness of the macrocosmic order. Consequentially, the ideological thinker is destined to encounter a dissonance between “the imagined pseudo order and the order given to man, and this dissonance creates in man something in the nature of a bifurcated experience of the world.”¹⁴⁶ This dissonance causes the ideological thinker to interact with the world from the perspective that something is not right with the world, for the order that imbued meaning upon his experience is put in conflict with the plethora of clues about the macrocosmic order he encounters in the world. To use Kuhnian vocabulary, the boundaries and methodology for study established by the affirmed paradigm cannot contain the countless amount of anomalies found by the thinker. Yet, the ideologue cannot give credence to the finding of these anomalies, for to do this would be to contest the sanctity of the original schema, to which he holds dogmatically. Instead, the ideological thinker represses his concern, believing it is the fault of his own flawed cognitive faculty for not properly acting within the guidelines set by the true schema.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 3

This uncertainty, as reflected by the last element of Niemeyer's definition, motivates the ideologue into clinging tighter to the certainty of the paradigm or schema. The ideological thinker, in experiencing this uncertainty, is subject to believing that there is no macrocosmic order outside the one created through the application of the ideological schema. By denying the existence of the macrocosmic order, this man ceases to attempt to conform himself to beholding the truth of the *cosmos*, for he does not believe in the existence of any transcendental truth. Instead, he feels the need to apply his microcosmic schema upon the world around him, so that this world can have order. It is this order that Niemeyer refers to as "Second Reality". The true ideologist, by interacting with the world around him as if it is shapeless and chaotic, assumes that the universe needs to be ordered for the benefit of mankind, and that he, through the genius of his microcosmic schema, has the means of establishing that required order. Instead of attempting to build self-referential relationships with other elements of the macrocosmic order, he actively attempts to name, define, and constitute the world around him in the image of his schema, and consequently, *in his own image!*

Given this, it is not difficult to imagine that while the condition of spiritual crisis can provide the classical, theoretical thinker with the opportunity to renegotiate relationships with the macrocosmic order, it also (and more likely) provides the opportunity for the instrumentation of the ideology of *techne*. Because spiritual crisis occurs when the constituting self-referential relationships between the macrocosm and the microcosm break down, it can be seen as a catalyst for renewing human wonder, and establishing new ways for humanity to interact within the world. As Darby writes, in the concluding sentence of *The Feast*, "This wonder could broaden the horizon, for it would

entail another choice. This choice would be real and courageous, for to wonder is the beginning of philosophy, and to philosophize is to have the courage to be a man."¹⁴⁷ It has already been suggested that establishing self-referential relationships with other men, recognizing one's own boundaries, and using these to develop a connection with the ordered macrocosm (*cosmos*), are all constitutive of man's being. If philosophy is the courage to be a man, then it is the love of wisdom that allows a man to recognize and accept his own limits and possibilities, so that associations with both other men and the *cosmos* can be made. Thus, crisis can provide the conditions that must pertain in order for humanity to question about who they are (and why they are), and consequentially rediscover a love for a particular form of wisdom that will lead them towards the answers that they seek.¹⁴⁸

However, the choice to return to philosophy in the time of spiritual crisis is the most difficult, and consequentially the least likely to occur. Spiritual crisis marks the breach between man-in-himself and man-in-the-world, and the conglomerate of internalized and overarching metaphors used by the man to explain his experience fail to satisfactorily give meaning to this experience. Because of this, it is much more likely that when a man finds himself in the position of being unable to make sense of his own

¹⁴⁷ Darby, Tom, The Feast: Meditations on Politics and Time Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982, p. 227

¹⁴⁸ The notion of wonder shares much with Heideggerian guilt. In the section *Understanding the Appeal, and Guilt*, of his great work *Being and Time*, Heidegger explains that Dasein's (or the authentic man in the world) guilt should be understood in terms of a lack. This kind of lack, as explained by Heidegger, "is a failure to satisfy some requirements which applies to one's existent Being with Others." (58:282) When Dasein hears the call of his conscience, he recognizes that he is not living authentically, and thus not living the way he is fitted for. In recognizing that he has been hiding from his true nature, Dasein experiences guilt. It is for this reason that Heidegger can argue that "*Being-guilty does not first result from an indebtedness, but that, on the contrary, indebtedness becomes possible only on the basis of a primordial Being-guilty.*" (58:284) Who Dasein owes is Dasein itself, and what it owes is an authentic existence, where it makes its own fundamental choices on how to be in the world. Wonder, like guilt, is the vehicle by which man is motivated to reinvestigate who he is and what he is fitted for.

experience, he will turn to a form of wisdom that produces tangible, repeatable results. This wisdom would be completely human in scope, and would provide the illusion that the fissure between the macrocosm and the microcosm was repaired, despite the fact that it only furthered the blurring of their boundary.

Techné, as a teachable, accountable means of knowing that can consistently produce tangible results, appears to be a perfect escape from the feelings of alienation brought by the state of spiritual crisis. *Techné* itself can become the schema from which closed systems of dogmatically held “will positions” can be built. However, because *techné* can never account for the relationship between the elements of reality evoked by its practice and the macrocosmic order, an ideology of *techné* makes no attempt at rebuilding those forms of connections. Instead, the technical ideologue remains isolated in his “Second Reality”, believing that the chaotic universe is his to mould in his own image. The ideological thinker fails to reconcile the dissonance between man-in-himself and man-in-the-world, because he dismisses man’s being-in-the-world as the subjective whim of his own personal discretion. He then represses the anxiety caused by this unresolved dissonance, believing it to be the product of his existence in a chaotic world, which has yet to be ordered. Consequently, he uses all of his energy to apply his personal ideology as a means for ordering the macrocosmic structure.

It has been argued that the virtuous man is virtuous because he only does that which he is fitted for. His soul is well ordered and moderate, so that he can achieve the authenticity requires for truly being who he is, and thus doing what he should do. Throughout the *Republic*, Socrates stresses the importance of the proper education and cultivation of souls, so that these souls can be content wholes in of themselves, and just

citizens in the realm of the political. I contend that when the authenticity of the soul is compromised, where the man chooses not to recognize his twofold nature as both a singular whole, and an element of a greater whole (one and the many), the man is in a condition best exemplified by the term “lie in the soul”. This condition is marked by the afore-mentioned “double ignorance” of not recognizing one’s own ignorance of the macrocosmic order, and the propagation of the ideology of *techné*. Through the ideology of *techné*, the man with the “lie in the soul” attempts to reconcile his repressed frustration by attempting to apply his microcosmic order, or schema, on the macrocosmic structure. Plato is fully aware of the potential for the misappropriation of the microcosm upon the macrocosm, and uses whatever means necessary to avoid its coming to fruition.

In the next and final chapter, I will defend the proposition that Socrates’ use of the “noble fiction” was a direct attempt to remove the “lies in the soul” he found in his entourage, so that his attempts at conforming their tacit dimensions to be more receptive to universal clues were not misunderstood as direct political doctrine. To do this, I will first demonstrate that Athens, during the time of Plato’s writing, was in a condition of spiritual crisis. Secondly, I will defend the notion that Socrates’ entourage had lies in their souls, and that these lies prevented them from properly understanding what Socrates has professed to do. I will then forward the fear of a misappropriation of the microcosmic order on the macrocosmic structure as the reason for Socrates’ need to use the noble fiction. Finally, I will conclude the chapter and work by presenting Nazi Germany as a modern manifestation of this misappropriation, as a means of discussing the continuing relevance of this discussion.

Chapter III: The Lie in the Soul, the Noble Fiction, and the

Misappropriation of the Microcosmic Order

“To be unable to have done with an experience is already a sign of decadence. This reopening of old wounds, this wallowing in self-contempt and depression, is an additional form of disease; no “salvation of the soul” ever resulted from it, but only a new kind of spiritual illness...” *The Will to Power* – Friederich Nietzsche

In the “Introduction”, I asked the question of how one could reconcile the embodiment of the philosophical way of life, the veritable truth seeker, as a consistent liar. By evoking the “noble fiction”, I demonstrated that Socrates even recognizes his own willingness to lie when he sees fit. Up to this point, this work has attempted to provide the necessary contextual information for answering this question. This chapter will respond directly to the question asked, and attempt to bring this discussion into modernity by discussing how this argument can relate directly to the twentieth, and now the twenty-first century.

Socrates protests that each man should do what he is best fitted for. In doing so, Socrates recognizes that both the natural aptitudes, and the consequential tacit dimension of each human being are exclusive, causing each person’s set of practices and perceptions to be unique. Because the pursuit of knowledge is always personal, in its constant application of what one does know to what one does not, the diversity of human perspective always results in the diversity of human interpretation.

In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates criticizes the written word’s inability to adapt itself to the particular context of its readership. He notes that both those that have no business to read certain material, and those who will not understand the material, have equal

opportunity to read a written work. Consequently, the written word is subject to grave misuse or misunderstanding. Leo Strauss is aware of this when he, in *Persecution and the Art of Writing*, evokes the concept of esoteric writing. Not everyone is fit for hearing and understanding the same message. One must always consider the audience before one decides what message is to be conveyed, and the method of conveying it. This awareness of the audience that one is writing or speaking to is one element of prudence, a political virtue to which Socrates holds dear.

When one re-examines the context within *Republic*, where Socrates professes the uses of this “Phoenician thing”, one primarily recognizes that Socrates is discussing the education and conditioning of the guardian class. In essence, within the context of the city in speech, Socrates is discussing how someone with the natural aptitudes best exemplified by the guardian class, can effectively develop their personal tacit dimension to achieve the greatest authenticity. If this person is naturally thumotic, with natural aptitudes best fit to defend a polis from within and from without, how does one cultivate the person’s soul, and thus his being-in-the-world, so that he can do best what he is fitted for, and develop the required self-referential relationships with other people, and the world around him? The noble fiction, from this perspective, is a means by which Socrates intends to shape the souls of the guardian and auxiliary classes, so that they become more effective receptacles for the clues provided by the macrocosmic order about the truth of their being. Its intent, despite being fictitious, is to prevent the condition of the lie in the soul, where the wise guardians forget they rule in the interest of the whole, and the thumotic auxiliaries forget that they do not rule, but enforce the guardians’ law.

Socrates introduces the noble fiction as “one of those lies that come into being in the case of need...”¹⁴⁹ The need for this lie is twofold, as it firstly confirms the auxiliaries’, or young guardians, role as enforcers of the guardians convictions. Secondly, by identifying the whole city as brothers born of different metals, it enforces the need for the guardians and auxiliaries to always rule and protect in the interest of the whole political body, without trying to establish a legacy of their own. Socrates explains that because all are related, parents can produce children of different compositions. Therefore, “the god commands the rulers first and foremost...to keep over nothing so careful a watch as the children, seeing which of these metals is mixed in their souls.”¹⁵⁰ By propagating this lie, Socrates intends on dismissing the most seductive motivation for ruling in one’s own interest: immortality through a legacy of power. By removing lineage as an attribute of leadership, the noble fiction inspires rulers to rule for the benefit of their whole family, the city, and not simply their immediate family.

However, this only represents the surface meaning of Socrates’ use of the noble fiction. The city in speech, from its introduction in Book II of *Republic*, has been presented as a metaphor for the human soul. In introducing the city in speech, Socrates instructs his entourage that, “There is, we say, justice of one man; and there is, surely, justice of a whole city too.”¹⁵¹ Upon Adeimantus’ consent, Socrates engages upon the construction of an allegorical city, so that its findings can be reapplied to the search for human justice in the soul.

Socrates does not engage upon this project alone, but invites Glaucon and Adeimantus to share in the construction of this allegorical city. He inflames their

¹⁴⁹ *Republic*, trans. Bloom, line: 414b

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, line: 415b

passions by offering them a chance to participate in the most glorious of political acts, the building of a city. Thus, Socrates offers Glaucon and Adeimantus an opportunity to fulfill ambition neither of them ever dreamed of. Bloom notes, in his *Interpretive Essay*, "The founders of a city are much more powerful and revered than are its tyrants. All succeeding generations honor them; they have none of the obloquy attached to the tyrant."¹⁵² Both Glaucon and Adeimantus, as previously mentioned, are young thumotic men, motivated by honor and desiring to rule. By inviting them to play the role of the leading builders of the city, Socrates gives them the opportunity to achieve the greatest honor by building a city in their own image. Because the city will be built in their own images, the building process within Books II – IV of *Republic* allows for the consistent revealing of their souls. By offering them a city to build, Socrates successfully seduces Glaucon and Adeimantus into revealing their internal compositions, so that Socrates can engage them, and shape them.

If Socrates' intent, during the construction of the city in speech, is primarily to cultivate the souls of Glaucon and Adeimantus, while secondarily affecting his entire entourage, what role does the noble fiction play in doing so? Given that the success of the city hinges upon the clear division of interests, and the ability of the thumotic auxiliaries to enforce the guardians' law, a blatant weakness comes blaring to the forefront. How does one convince the thumotic character to subordinate himself to the rule of a physically weaker guardian? In the microcosmic order of the human soul, it is difficult, though possible, to have anger controlled by reason. However, in the political realm, thumotic personalities, because they are motivated by a love of honor, generally

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, line: 368e

¹⁵² Bloom, *Interpretive Essay*, p. 343

intend on ruling to achieve the greatest amount of honor. There is nothing to prevent a thumotic personality from becoming a tyrant, breaking all necessary boundaries required for ruling over all, in the interest of personal glory.

Because Socrates' entire entourage, hi-lighted by the two sons of Ariston, are all thumotic, nobly bred, potential timocrats, with a lust for glory and rule, Socrates is well aware that these young men are destined to become powerful voices in the Assembly. According to Socrates, "nature assign(s) to each of the groups (guardians, auxiliaries and money-makers) its share of happiness."¹⁵³ If these men are naturally born to rule, they must be compelled and persuaded to rule in the interest of the whole city, "so that they'll be the best possible craftsmen at their jobs," and thus be happy.¹⁵⁴ They all possess the natural aptitudes necessary for rulership, but lack the proper conditioning required for ruling well. The conditioning they are lacking is the well ordered, just soul, that prioritizes the love of wisdom over the love of honor.

In this chapter, I will argue that Socrates' Athens is in a period of spiritual crisis, and that Socrates' entourage, as a product of this condition, do not recognize any form of cosmological structure to connect to. Instead, as demonstrated by Glaucon and Adeimantus' unsettling defence of injustice in Book II, they understand the world around them as a chaotic ball of clay, ready to be shaped. They have no interest in reconciling their being-in-themselves with their being-in-he-world, for they understand their being-in-the-world as a product of their will. They do not see themselves as political beings, but visualize the political as the arena in which they assert the order of their being upon

¹⁵³ *Republic, Op. Cit.*, line: 421c

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, line: 421c

the world. It is for this reason that Socrates' thumotic entourage are attracted to Socrates, for they see in Socrates a *technites* who can teach them the *technē* of rulership.

Socrates' entourage are all in the condition of the "lie in the soul". They all crave honor, desire political power, and will eventual be the ruling voices in the Athenian political body. If, while possessing lies in the soul, these men do acquire the political power they crave, it is highly possible for them to use their political power to enforce their personal, disoriented schemas of interpretation upon the entire *polis*. In essence, they will have the opportunity, and motive, to misappropriate their microcosmic orders upon the macrocosmic structure. Plato clearly argues against this, and the utopian/distopian vision of *Republic's* Book V demonstrates Plato's fear of this potential misappropriation. Therefore, it is Socrates' intent to attempt to reorient the souls of Glaucon and Adeimantus, and consequently his entire entourage, so that his words are not misunderstood as the basis for a *technē* of leadership, and then used to support a dogmatically held, microcosmic will position to be enforced at the macrocosmic level. It is my contention that Socrates' noble fiction is one of the tools used by Socrates to affect this conversion.

In order to support this contention, this chapter will be divided in the following manner. In the first section, I will demonstrate why Socrates' Athens must be seen as in a condition of spiritual crisis. Because of this condition, I will argue in the second section that Socrates' entourage had lies in their souls, and that this affected their understanding of Socrates. This section will also demonstrate how Socrates used the noble fiction as a means to reconstitute the disoriented souls of his entourage. In presenting Socrates' fear of a misappropriation of a microcosmic order on a macrocosmic

structure. In the third section, I will discuss why Socrates felt that this reconstitution was necessary. I will conclude this work by bringing this argument into modernity. In a fourth and final section, I will discuss Hobbes' *Leviathan*, and Hitler's Nazi Germany, as two examples of modern misappropriations of microcosmic orders on macrocosmic structures. This is not to suggest that Plato directly foresaw either of these two occurrences. However, I will suggest that it is possible that Book V of *Republic* had the same relationship to classical Greek philosophy that Nazi Germany had to modern German philosophy, with each being an imprudent misappropriation of a personal order on the political structure.

Section I: Athens in Spiritual Crisis

Spiritual crisis exists when human experience within the macrocosmic order no longer makes sense, as it is seen to be bereft of meaning, and lacking any sense of belonging or direction. Crisis, as Darby argues, "is about an acute disjunction between that which most concerns us and the common or overarching metaphors we embrace in order to find something common in the manifold of varied and dense experience."¹⁵⁵ In essence, the relationship between the microcosm and macrocosm is out of place, because the boundary that both separates and brings them together has eclipsed. Thucydides documents Athens' fall into this condition, through the destruction of the Athenian morale during their concurrent military failure in the Peloponnesian War. From the period marked by Pericles' Funeral Oration, the Melian debate, to Athens' final defeat, the Athenian sense of self dissipates, only to be replaced by fear and uncertainty.

One needs only to look at the content of Pericles' *Funeral Oration* to begin to understand the strength of the Athenian conviction at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. Pericles, as Finley Hooper recognizes in his work, *Greek Realities: Life and Thought in Ancient Greece*, was the mainstay of the Athenian spirit.¹⁵⁶ Because of his "intellectual gifts and for his general reputation"¹⁵⁷, Pericles was asked to take part in a public funeral for those who had been first to die, by making an appropriate speech in praise of the dead. Knowing that the Athenian morale was going to be challenged by the

¹⁵⁵ Darby, Tom *On Spiritual Crisis, Globalization and Planetary Rule*, p. 2

¹⁵⁶ Hooper, Finley, *Greek Realities: Life and Thought in Ancient Greece* Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978, p. 284

¹⁵⁷ Thucydides, *Op. Cit.*, Book 2:34

potential length and severity of the war. Pericles directed his oration towards evoking the shared overarching metaphors of the Athenian body.

Pericles begins his oration by questioning the appropriateness of his speech itself, recognizing that an oration that appeals to a person's love of honor has the possibility of making listeners jealous and incredulous. However, he justifies the institution by recognizing that it has been established and approved of by their shared Athenian forefathers, and thus it is his responsibility to follow the tradition set by these long dead men. Because of this, Pericles explains that he will begin by speaking about their shared ancestry, since it is the right and proper thing to do so. He declares, "in this land of ours there have always been the same people living from generation to generation up till now, and they, by their courage and their virtues, have handed it on to us, a free country."¹⁵⁸ This shared ancestry, distinct from any other recognized lineage, has possessed a shared set of virtues that have allowed Athens, as a political unit, to remain consolidated and strong throughout the passing of history. It is this distinct set of virtues, which manifests itself in the set of practices and perceptions of the Athenian body, that render Athens as Athenian, and the strength of the Athenian body is their participation in Athenian virtues.

These virtues are the Athenian overarching metaphors, and Pericles uses this introduction as an opportunity to evoke them. He first praises the Athenian democratic government, where "everyone is equal before the law."¹⁵⁹ In the Athenian democracy, actual ability has greater importance than class membership, no one is put into political obscurity because of poverty, and Athenian political and day-to-day life are free and

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 2:36

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 2:37

open. While none of this is necessarily factually accurate, this view of Athenian democracy represents the Athenian aspiration towards a benevolent political order.

Pericles next evokes Athenian military pride, by mentioning their particular attitude towards military superiority. According to Pericles, Athenians rely “not on secret weapons, but (their) own real courage loyalty.”¹⁶⁰ Unlike the Spartans, who invade Athenian territory by bringing allies, the Athenians launch assaults from abroad by themselves, and, despite fighting on foreign soil, are often victorious. Their military virtue lies in their “way of meeting danger voluntarily, with an easy mind, instead of with a laborious training, with natural, rather than state-induced courage.”¹⁶¹

According to Pericles’ oration, there is an inherent dignity to being Athenian, unmatched by any other body of people. They have a love of beauty and wisdom, and make friends by helping others, rather than expecting benefits in return. For Pericles, “our city is an education to Greece, and... in (his) opinion, each one of our citizens, in all the manifold aspects of life, is able to show himself the rightful lord and owner of his own person, and do this, moreover, with exceptional grace and exceptional versatility.”¹⁶² Athens is the benchmark to which every other political entity aspires, as no invading enemy is ashamed at being defeated, and a qualified leader governs every subject.

As Hooper notes, Pericles makes it clear of the dead that “their lives had been richer in every way than those of other men. They had given up life itself that their fellow citizens might continue to enjoy the benefits that they had known.”¹⁶³ In refusing to compromise their tactical positions, accepting the glorious risk of death, and willing to

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 2:39

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 2:39

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 2:41

¹⁶³ Hooper, *Op. Cit.*, p. 285

part with every luxury to strike down an enemy, the Athenian dead were courage made manifest. The intelligent endurance displayed by these men was worthy of their city, and their death occurred, "in a small moment of time, the climax of their lives, a culmination of glory, not of fear."¹⁶⁴

Pericles closes his oration by stating that the government would care for the widows and children of the lost citizens. He suggests that the women be have honourably, for the "greatest glory of a women is to be least talked about by men."¹⁶⁵ With his oration finished, he then asks all to depart. Hooper notes that equally important to the content of the oration was Pericles' stylistic approach. The speech had an undeniable ring of dignity, and it praised all things Athenian, despite not being a "sentimental harangue".¹⁶⁶ Pericles did not sing the praises of Athens to his audience, but instead reminded a group of equals of something they already knew. In Pericles' oration, one witnesses an unabashed presentation of the overarching metaphors that imbue meaning upon the Athenian existence. Being Athenian means possessing a set of practices and perceptions shaped by these same beliefs. In so far as Pericles is able to make such a speech as a funeral oration, it must be recognized that the entire Athenian body, at least tacitly, were products of these beliefs.

And yet, if one examines the position of the Athenians during the 416 *Melian Debate*, it becomes quickly apparent that Athens has somewhat fallen away from her devotion to this set of Athenian metaphors. In her harsh treatment of Melos, Thucydides presents Athens in the role of an arrogant and ruthless power, disjointed from the lofty presentation of Pericles' funeral oration.

¹⁶⁴ Thucydides, *Op. Cit.*, 2:42

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 2:46

Thucydides introduces the Melians as a colony from Sparta that had first refused to join the Athenians, in the interest of remaining neutral throughout the war. However, after the Athenians, “had brought force to bear on them by laying waste their land, they had become open enemies of Athens.”¹⁶⁷ This is significant, as Melos did not pose any military threat to Athenian sovereignty, or even to the Athenian conquest of the Peloponnese. The Athenian representatives were completely aware of Melos’ insignificance when they attacked, and justified their use of force by stating that sharing friendly terms with Melos would be a sign of weakness, while their hatred is evidence of power. When considering the military virtuousness espoused by Pericles in his funeral oration, it becomes evident that Athens has lost her faith in a heroic conception of war. The taking of Melos was essentially purposeless, according to the previously established set of Athenian metaphors. There was no glory in the taking of an insignificant power, no elements of Homeric heroism, no stories of devout piety, unwavering courage, or even financial benefit.

After laying siege to Melos, the Athenian army sent a delegation of representative to “negotiate a settlement” between the two parties. Upon entering a discussion, the Melian representatives appealed to the reputed Athenian sense of justice. The Athenian representatives responded by saying, “when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of justice depends on the equality of the power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.”¹⁶⁸ Foreshadowing the Thrasymachan argument of Book I of *Republic*, the Athenian representatives reduced justice to the ability of the stronger to take advantage of

¹⁶⁶ Hooper, *Op. Cit.*, p. 286

¹⁶⁷ Thucydides, *Op. Cit.*, 5:84

the weaker. Again, this represents a fall from Periclean virtue and traditional Athenian sensibility, for the Athenian body always envisioned itself to be engaged in just political action, whether or not they were. The dismissal of justice is itself a dismissal of the Athenian overarching metaphors, as one cannot reconcile Homeric justice with a might makes right argument. The Melian representatives, in response to this, appealed to Athenian sense of fair play, asking whether the Athenian subjects would accept their treatment of Melos as proper. The Athenians replied by arguing, "So far as right or wrong are concerned they think there is no difference between the two."¹⁶⁹ To disbelieve in any notion of right or wrong is completely antithetical with the traditional Athenian love of wisdom, for it is impossible to love wisdom without any sense of truth. According to the traditional Athenian sensibility, knowing truth implied participation in the divine, for the gods were the rulers of the cosmological order. To deny the existence of given truth is to question the sanctity of the pantheon itself.

This questioning of the pantheon occurred again in the Melian debate in a more direct manner. After the Athenian representatives completed their attack on the notion of hope, the Melians argued that they "trust that the gods will give us fortune as good as yours, because (they) are standing for what is right against what is wrong..."¹⁷⁰ In saying this, the Melians adopted a similar stance to the one that Athens itself adopted against Darius, "the great King who had come in 490 to punish the insignificant Athenians for interfering in a corner of his mighty empire."¹⁷¹ The Athenians blatantly disregarded the sanctity of the pantheon, as they responded by saying, "Our opinion of the gods and our

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 5:89

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 5:97

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 5:104

¹⁷¹ Hooper, *Op. Cit.*, p. 305

knowledge of men lead us to conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule whatever one can."¹⁷² The gods, according to the Athenians, struggled amongst themselves, and thus they could be seen to care no more for justice than humanity did. Again, by rejecting the sanctity of the divine, the Athenians furthered their break from the traditional Athenian sensibility cultivated by their shared set of overarching metaphors. As a lover of beauty, wisdom, honor and all virtue, Athens traditionally considered itself to be a favourite of the gods. By this presentation, Athens has divorced itself from this position, seeing itself as a power unchecked by any means of force.

While the trials and tribulations of the gruelling war forced Athens farther and farther from their traditional set of perceptions and practices, their war effort provided them with a temporary and incomplete means of imbuing meaning upon their experience. Their participation in the war became the standard by which all experience was judged, and all action was directed towards fulfilling the objections of war. The condition of spiritual crisis, where experience becomes completely ungrounded, accurately describes the condition of the Athenian citizenship after their defeat in the Peloponnesian War. To recognize the validity of such a claim, one needs only to re-examine Thucydides. Of the defeated Athenian army, Thucydides writes:

And then there was the degradation of it all and the fact that all without exception were afflicted, so that, although there may be some lightening of the burden when it is shared by many others, this still did not make the burden seem any easier to bear at the time, especially when they remembered the splendour and the pride of their setting out and saw how mean and abject was the conclusion. No Hellenic army had ever suffered such a reverse. They had come to enslave others, and now they were going away frightened of being enslaved themselves; and instead of the prayers and paeans with which they had sailed out, the words to

¹⁷² Thucydides, *Op. Cit.*, 5:105

be heard now were directly contrary and boded evil as they started on their way back, sailors travelling on land, trusting in hoplites rather than ships...¹⁷³

After its devastating military loss, the Athenian citizenship was discouraged and lost. Athens, which had once prided herself on her intellectual, cultural and naval superiority, had been reduced "sailors travelling on land". One can see the significance of Thucydides' words when one compares the condition of the Athenian citizenship to Homer's Odysseus. Odysseus, a king (thus tied to the land), wanders at sea until he is able to overcome his *hubris*, learn his actual limits and possibilities, and return home to his kingdom with a reformulated purpose.¹⁷⁴ The Athenians, who had left by sea with a purpose in hand, instead returned home as a lost people. They no longer had a purpose or a sense of who they were as a people, and despite their history as a naval power, they were reduced to return home by land. Their faith and devotion to the gods had been replaced by words which boded so evil that Nicias was required to remind them that he had hope because he "has worshipped the gods as (he) ought, and (his) conduct towards men and has been just and without reproach."¹⁷⁵

Athens' condition of spiritual crisis is directly made reference to in the first Book of *Republic*, with Socrates' attempt to reconstitute a relationship with the macrocosmic order. Book I of *Republic* begins with Socrates (Sure Strength) remembering (re-remembering, or piecing together in the present what was in the past) his trip down to the Piraeus with Glaucon (Gleaming), where he went to say a prayer to the goddess, and see

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 7:75

¹⁷⁴ Noticeably, Odysseus' return home culminates in sexual intercourse with Penelope in his bed, which is itself built directly into a long-leaved olive tree. The image of the bed being embedded in nature, and of Odysseus' actions in the bed, both symbolize Odysseus' renewed commitment to his purpose as a King, and of the future fertility of his lands under his care. For another example, one can also look at Jessie L. Weston's *From Ritual to Romance*, and her discussion of the Fisher King.

“how they would put on the festival, since they were now holding it for the first time.”¹⁷⁶

He then mentions that the Athenian procession was no more fine than the Thracian, and that after prayer and “looking on”, he and Glaucon returned upwards towards Athens.

One need only look to these phrases to recognize a familiar theme. Socrates, by going down to the Piraeus and praying, is participating in a particular set of ritualized practices that traditionally find their meaning in the shared overarching metaphors of the Athenian body. For an Athenian, prayer has meaning because the Athenian citizen prays to an Athenian divinity, while partaking in an Athenian ritual.

While Socrates’ intentions were to pray to the new goddess, his motivation was wonder. It was Socrates’ fascination with witnessing the new festival that motivated his trip with Glaucon to the Piraeus. Furthermore, Socrates concluded that the Thracian festival was no less fitting than the Athenian. By accepting both festivals as equal, Socrates is validating a very non-Athenian perspective of piety. In doing so, he is suggesting that meaning of his actions concerned with piety is not rooted in the shared metaphor of the Athenian citizenship.

This is significant when put in the perspective of Socrates’ use of past tense to discuss his visit to the Piraeus. In so far as Socrates is “re-membering” a past occurrence, he is reconstituting, or re-ordering, the past into the present. What he is reconstituting is a self-referential relationship with the *cosmos*, or the macrocosmic order. This act of reconstitution would only be necessary if the original relationship was no longer in place. Socrates’ relationship is both Athenian and non-Athenian. It is Athenian because of Athens’ particular condition of spiritual crisis, and their consequent availability for

¹⁷⁵ Thucydides, *Op. Cit.*, 7:77

¹⁷⁶ Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, 2nd ed., *Op. Cit.*, line: 327a

wonder and philosophy. It is non-Athenian because it breaks with the ritualized Athenian tradition, which, due to the condition of spiritual crisis, has lost all meaning.

If Socrates' Athens is in a period of spiritual crisis, this condition must have some kind of effect on the "being" of the characters in *Republic*. In the next section, I will discuss the effect of the condition of spiritual crisis on the interaction of the characters in *Republic*. Given the negative impact of spiritual crisis, I will discuss how Socrates uses the noble fiction as an attempt at restoring order in his entourage's chaotic souls.

Section II: The Effect of Spiritual Crisis and the Role of

The Noble Fiction in *Republic*

It has previously been argued in the work that the most common potential consequence of spiritual crisis is the possibility for the ideology of *techné*. In the first Book of *Republic*, Socrates remains consistently opposed to that occurrence, and because of this demonstrates the inadequacy of technical knowledge for discussing the macrocosmic order. Socrates asserts the importance of his attack on *techné* by introducing it with an oath to Zeus. He appropriates Polymarchus' argument that justice is to give everyone what is fitting, and transposes it into the language and metaphor of a *techné* by stating, "In the name of Zeus, if someone were to ask him, 'Simonides, the art called medicine gives what that is owed and fitting to which things?' what do you suppose he would answer us?"¹⁷⁷ Polymarchus tacitly accepts Socrates' innovation, and argues that drugs, food and drinks to bodies, is what is owed. While the details of Polymarchus' answer are themselves unimportant, three elements of his response are relevant to this discussion. Firstly, the ease by which Polymarchus accepts the translation into the *techné* metaphor is somewhat unsettling. This unsettling feeling is magnified by the ability of the *techné* allegory to translate a discussion of justice on the macrocosmic scale, i.e. justice is to help one's friends and harm one's enemies, to one on the microcosmic scale, in discussing the particular justice of a particular vocation at a particular time, thus blurring the boundaries between the two dimensions. David

¹⁷⁷ *Republic, Op. Cit.*, line: 332c

Roochnik, in his work *Of Art and Wisdom: Plato's Understanding of Techne*, submits that, "Plato understood the basic "flaw" of the (*techne*) analogy *from the beginning*: if *arête* is assumed to be knowledge, and *techne* is the model of moral knowledge, an unacceptable consequence—namely, *arête* is not knowledge—ensues."¹⁷⁸ This analysis is proved to be correct by Socrates himself, as the entire Socratic criticism of Polymarchus' argument was directed solely at the technical (of *techne*) implications of his statement, and not the statement itself. In fact, Socrates' own Book IV conclusion that "justice is doing what one is fitted for" only reinforces Polymarchus' position. However, Socrates' challenges Polymarchus' ability define justice, which would entail isolating the subject matter, pointing out the boundaries that set its limits and possibilities, and breaking it down to its constitutive parts. Socrates calls for a definition with the mathematical accuracy required of technical knowledge. However, because justice, as all virtue, exists both as a microcosm, and an element of the macrocosm, this analysis is impossible. As mentioned earlier in this work, the relationships in which elements of the macrocosm are engaged in are themselves constitutive of the element. It is impossible to give a proper definition of any element that isolates the element from other elements, or its position within the whole, just as it is impossible to define a musical note outside of its scale, key, and position within a harmony. If this is the precision required by a *techne*, then a *techne* cannot be the means to understand the relationship between the microcosm and the macrocosm.

¹⁷⁸ Roochnik, David, *Of Art and Wisdom: Plato's Understanding of Techne* University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996 p. 132

It is for this reason that Plato writes of Thrasymachus that, “hunched up like a wild beast, he flung himself at us as if to tear us to pieces.”¹⁷⁹ Thrasymachus, as a *sophist*, has a personal stake in the discussion. Because a *sophist* earns his living on the claim that he possesses a *technical* knowledge of virtue, he *himself* is on trial in Socrates’ conversation. In his enraged state, Thrasymachus is persuaded (and paid for) to use his knowledge as a *technites* to explain to his audience what justice is. After denouncing Socrates as someone, “unwilling himself to teach”, Thrasymachus, in the interest of winning a good reputation, instructs his listeners that, “the just is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger.”¹⁸⁰ Once again, Socrates, as a master of rhetoric, attacks the precision of the argument, and not the argument itself. Socrates begins his refutation with Thrasymachus’ premise, and forces Thrasymachus to concede that while it is just to obey the rulers, the rulers sometimes make mistakes. Because the ruling body can make mistakes that are harmful to the ruling body, and all laws must be followed, justice can equally be what is disadvantageous. At this point in the discussion, Cleitophon offers Thrasymachus a way out through relativism. Cleitophon argues that what Thrasymachus said was “that the advantage of the stronger is what the stronger *believes* to be his advantage.”¹⁸¹ By using the term *believes*, Cleitophon offers an option that removes the required precision necessary from a *technē*. Thrasymachus, whose reputation and financial security is dependant upon his ability to give a mathematically precise answer, cannot accept Cleitophon’s suggestion. Book I proceeds with Socrates administering a verbal beating onto Thrasymachus, and concludes with Socrates demonstrating his technical superiority in the art of rhetoric. By the end of the Book, Socrates has

¹⁷⁹ *Republic, Op. Cit.*, line: 336b

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, line: 338c

successfully reinforced Thrasymachus' position that justice is the advantage of the stronger, for Socrates never once challenged the validity of Thrasymachus' claim. Instead, he has only demonstrated that he is a more powerful rhetorician than Thrasymachus. It is for this reason that Thrasymachus remains silent for most of the remainder of text, for his point has been made, and he accepts Socrates' superiority.

It is Socrates' superior use of rhetoric that allows him to accept the mantle of *technites* in Book II. Glaucon recognizes that Thrasymachus has not been proven wrong, only "like a snake, has been charmed more quickly than he should have been."¹⁸² He and his brother Adeimantus then implore Socrates to demonstrate, from his knowledge, why justice in itself is superior to injustice, despite the benevolent consequences of either. Adeimantus' asking for a definition of justice in itself is itself equivalent to Socrates "ti esti" question. Thus, by asking Socrates to give a technical definition of what justice is, Adeimantus successfully reverses the *elenchus* on Socrates, putting Socrates in a bind. Socrates is both compelled to defend justice, for it is his intent to revitalize his thumotic company's interest in virtue. However, Adeimantus is not asking this question with the intent of demonstrating the inherent failure of *techne* to account for virtue. Adeimantus is asking the question because he really wants to know! As products of spiritual crisis, and men who intend on breaking boundaries in the realm of action, Adeimantus and Glaucon are actually asking for technical answers. Socrates does not have knowledge of the divine that is equivalent to a *techne*. To his credit, Socrates responds that he is at a loss of what to do. "On the one hand, I can't help out. For in my opinion I'm not capable of it...On the other hand, I can't not help out. For I'm afraid it might be impious to be

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, line: 340b

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, line: 358b

here while justice is being spoken badly of and give up and not bring help while I am still breathing and able to make a sound.”¹⁸³ After being persuaded by Glaucon and the rest of his company to “not give up the argument, but rather to seek out what each is.”¹⁸⁴ Socrates agrees to lead the investigation.

It is important to note that Socrates only agrees to participate in “seeking out the truth and benefit of both” justice and injustice. While Socrates does not have a technical answer of what justice, or for that matter any aspect of the macrocosmic order is, he does concede that he has the ability to help others find the answers for themselves. In the *Theatetus*, Socrates refers to his art as “midwifery”, in that he facilitates the birth of wisdom in human souls. Socrates informs the reader that, “the highest point of my art is the power to prove by every test whether the offspring of a young man’s thought is a false phantasm or instinct with life and truth.”¹⁸⁵ Although he himself has no wisdom to give, he can help others bring birth to truth. It is in this role that Socrates intends on participating in the search, and he justifies this by referring to his whole entourage (himself included) as men who are not clever. Despite Socrates’ clear admission of ignorance, Socrates’ entourage appears to dismiss his statement as standard Socratic irony, and, as made evident by the text, this greatly affects their understanding (or misunderstanding) of the Socratic project. Glaucon and Adeimantus believe Socrates to be a political *technites*, a “technician” who possesses the teachable skill of governing. They have already witnessed Socrates’ use of might throughout the first Book of

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, line: 368b

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, line: 368c

¹⁸⁵ Plato, “*Theatetus*”, taken from *The Collected Dialogues of Plato: Including the Letters*, ed. Cairns, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973 line: 84a

Republic, and they understand his words as teachings of how to achieve political power and rule.

In introducing the discussion on justice, Socrates remarks that in his opinion, justice on its own is very difficult to see, even for a man who sees sharply. He argues, "If someone had...ordered men who don't see sharply to read little letters from afar and then someone thought that the same letters are somewhere else also, but bigger and in a bigger place," it would be in their interest to read the bigger letters first, and then proceed to the smaller letters.¹⁸⁶ It is from this perspective that Socrates evokes the creation of a city in speech. This city is to represent *man writ large*, and as a metaphor for the microcosm, makes the microcosm easier to understand. Because this city is purely fantastic, there is no suggestion that Socrates, from Book II to Book IV, has any intention of making direct political commentary. The study of the city in speech is supposed to be the study of man through the metaphor of the city. However, because Socrates' entourage has taken him to be a *technites*, and they assume Socrates' words to be the direct teaching of a *techné*, from their perspective, the boundary between what is the macrocosm and what is the microcosm becomes clouded.

Consequently, at several instances during the creation of the city in speech, Glaucon and Adeimantus make commentary that suggests that they have not understood Socrates' intent of using the city as a metaphor for the human soul. They see themselves as Socrates' "guardians", and misinterpret their project of building a city in speech as a blueprint for building a successful political regime. In the first construction of a fictitious city, Socrates provides the brothers with the most simple of cities, where the citizens will live off breads prepared with barley meal and flour, drink wine, build their own homes,

and make their own clothing and shoes. Glaucon, in response to this project, interrupts, saying, "You seem to make these men have their feast without relishes."¹⁸⁷ For Glaucon, the city in speech is only fit for sows, as it neglects the luxuries necessary for someone of his stature. If Glaucon were fully aware that the city was directed to be a metaphor for the soul, his commentary on the need for luxuries would make little sense.¹⁸⁸ In Book III, Socrates introduces a discussion on what form of music that concerns song and melody will be allowed to remain in the city in speech. He then leads the brothers into allowing the Dorian and Phrygian modes, as they appropriately imitate the sounds of the courageous man in battle, and the man who performs a voluntary peaceful deed. This discussion of harmony is a direct reference to Laches' speech, and his preference for the man who lives as the Dorian mode, with word and deed in unison. When Socrates mentions this, he is intentionally reminding his company that the city is *man writ large*. Adeimantus does not pick up on this. Socrates attempts to remind him by continuing his argument, suggesting all the instruments that must be banned from the city. Disturbed, Adeimantus can only respond to Socrates propositions by saying, "At least so our argument indicates."¹⁸⁹ If Adeimantus were truly aware that this city was a metaphor for the human soul, he would not be disturbed by Socrates' selection of music or instruments.

¹⁸⁶ *Republic, Op. Cit.*, line: 368d

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, line: 372c

¹⁸⁸ I believe that a major factor in Socrates' choice to build a city in speech is the intent of seducing Glaucon and Adeimantus. In *Alcibiades I*, Socrates seduces Alcibiades into studying with him by romancing him with thoughts of political power. Glaucon is being romanced with a similar opportunity, the chance at building a complete city, and thus learning a *techné* of how to build and rule. Glaucon is truly enthralled with building a macrocosmic structure, or polis, in his own image. Although this is unsubstantiated, I believe that this construction is as much a test for Glaucon and Adeimantus as it is a search for justice. Glaucon is a thumotic character that needs to curb his appetites if he is to rule well. Adeimantus needs to discover his appetites to rule well. The project of Book II-IV is as much an attempt to bring the two brothers to a position where they are capable of practicing philosophy, having justice in the soul, as it is to discover justice through the project itself. Glaucon and Adeimantus fail the test, and Book V is the result of their failure.

¹⁸⁹ *Republic, Op. Cit.*, line: 399d

However, as the boundaries between the microcosm and macrocosm seemed blurred to Adeimantus, he responds as if he feels the city itself less pleasant to live in.

In Book IV, Adeimantus once again questions about luxuries, when he asks Socrates, “What would your apology be, Socrates, if someone were to say that you’re hardly making these men (the guardians) happy...” as they receive no benefits for their rule.¹⁹⁰ Later in the Book, he asks the thumotic question, “How will our city be able to make war when it possesses no money, especially if it’s compelled to make war against a wealthy one?”¹⁹¹ In spite of this, Socrates continues to build his metaphor by finally defining (three times in different words) justice in the city as, “each (class division i.e. ruler, auxiliary, money-makers) one must practice one of the functions in the city, that one for which his nature made him naturally most fit.”¹⁹²

I have argued that Socrates’ use of the noble fiction was a response to Glaucon and Adeimantus’ misinterpretation of the Socratic project. Socrates is concerned with restoring order to a chaotic Athens, which suffers from spiritual crisis. It is his intent to use his maieutic arts to re-inspire the Athenians into pursuing virtue. Because of the spiritual crisis, the traditional methods of pursuing virtue are no longer functional. Homeric poetry, and the poetic tradition that follows it, can no longer be the authority on virtue, as Athens, through the Peloponnesian War, has burned that bridge. Socrates’ project is to inspire the building of new bridges, or relationships, to serve the old position of imbuing meaning upon human experience. These relationships can only begin to be built on the individual level, when one recognizes the need for them. On the macrocosmic, or political level, a political entity can only begin to build these

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, line: 419a

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, line: 422a

relationships when it is prepared to practice politics, the art by which a political entity differentiates friends from enemies, right from wrong, in the interest of making do with an imperfect human existence.

For the individual to recognize the need to establish self-referential relationships, he first has to become authentic to who he is. This move to authenticity requires a reforming of the self, through the cultivation of the tacit dimension, so that he can hear the clues that the macrocosmic order presents to him about who he is. To use Heideggerian terms, in order for a person to achieve authenticity, the person must be resolute. Resolute Dasein, according to Heidegger, is prepared to make its own choices, as it has a clear view of its options, and the determination to decide which option it wills to take. This resoluteness cannot be seen as an ungrounded metaphysical category, as Dasein can only be resolute within the world. Heidegger illustrates this when he expresses that "Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concerned Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others."¹⁹³ It does not "withdraw itself from actuality", but instead forces Dasein into confronting what is possible.¹⁹⁴

In order for a political unit to re-engage politics, and thus begin to practice political action, its composition must become political. By this, I mean that group of people who are to compose the political unit must be willing both to take action, and to identify themselves as a unit. In order to do so, the people who are to compose the political unit must concede some form of shared identity, as defined by a particular selection of overarching metaphors. It is for this reason that every political unit

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, line: 433a

¹⁹³ Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1962 60:298

has been drafted in the wake of a founding myth, for without a shared constitution of being, no group of people can ever unify in the practice of separating friends and enemies.

Socrates is aware that Glaucon and Adeimantus have misunderstood his project, and that they consequently identify themselves as actualized “guardians”. They perceive Socrates’ discussion on the guardian class not as a description of the logical element of the human soul, but a lesson on how they, as future guardians of Athens, should rule over the lower classes. Socrates uses this to his advantage with the propagation of the noble fiction. I contend that Socrates’ noble fiction is used as an attempt (although an unsuccessful one) to restructure both Glaucon and Adeimantus’ being-in-themselves, and being-in-the-world, by discussing how to educate the guardian class. In that Socrates’ argument in *Republic* always has a macrocosmic and microcosmic meaning, Socrates allows each part of his noble fiction to relate to one level of meaning. The first section (414d-e) primarily attempts to influence their being-in-the-world, while the second (415a-c) primarily attempts to shape their internal constitution.¹⁹⁵ One needs only to examine the messages conveyed by these two sections to recognize how the noble fiction could fit this role.

Socrates introduces the first section of his noble fiction by explaining, that he will “attempt to persuade first the rulers and the soldiers, then the rest of the city, that the

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 60:299

¹⁹⁵ I use “primarily” because I believe there are obvious political implications made when Socrates discusses maintaining the purity of classes. Earlier in the text, I mentioned how this removes the possibility for achieving immortality through lineage. There is also suggestion in the second section of separating rulers from the desire for honor and wealth. I do not wish to diminish either of these messages, as they are both significant to the Socratic argument. However, due to the scope of this work, I will not investigate these two implications. Instead, I will acknowledge the correlation between this section, and Socrates’ Book IV composition of the tripartite soul.

rearing and education we gave them were like dreams.”¹⁹⁶ By using persuasion as the means to convey the message, Socrates harkens back to the first Book of *Republic*, where he is overtaken by force and brought to Cephalus’ house. Socrates offered to persuade his captors to do otherwise, but they argued that they would accept no such persuasion. By using persuasion, Socrates is putting in their mind the idea that when they do come to rule, they should not rule with iron fists. The success of the polis is contingent upon the establishment of a shared sense of being, and this shared sense of being cannot exist when a leader dominates by force.

This cultivation of a shared sense of being, is reinforced by Socrates’ referring to their rearing and education as dreamlike, and therefore fictitious. “In truth”, according to Socrates, “at the time they were under the earth within, being fashion and reared themselves...”¹⁹⁷ In that they all were fashioned in the same manner, under the same earth, Socrates’ citizens would understand themselves as possessing a common heritage. It is Socrates’ hope, that by recognizing the importance of a shared founding myth, Glaucon and Adeimantus might realize the necessity of reuniting the Athenian community in the same way. Consequently, when it was their opportunity to lead and rule, they would take from this lesson the need to unite through a shared set of Athenian metaphors.

Socrates concludes the first section by stating that after they have finished being crafted, the earth, which is their mother, sent them up to the surface. And then, according to Socrates, “as though the land they are in were a mother and nurse, they must plan for and defend it, if anyone attacks, and they must think of the other citizens as brothers and

¹⁹⁶ *Republic, Op. Cit.*, line: 414d

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, line: 414d

born of the earth.”¹⁹⁸ This section is the most significant; as it summarizes the complete lesson that Socrates intends Glaucon and Adeimantus to learn. By referring to the earth as both a mother and a nurse, Socrates intends for both the guardians, and indirectly Glaucon and Adeimantus, to recognize a shared heritage, lineage and home. There is a responsibility for this earth, because it was the earth that raised the citizens as a family. The citizens also have a responsibility for building relationships by protecting other citizens. The message to the two brothers, and to the rest of Socrates’ entourage, is clear. To properly live politically, citizens of a political unit must primarily recognize the inherent commonality of all citizens, and use that commonality to build self-referential relationship with each citizen, and with the political unit itself. When the political unit becomes whole (in that all of the citizens are involved in self-referential relationship with the other citizens, and with the political unit itself), it can act politically by establishing boundaries. Socrates explains that these boundaries must be planned for and defended, and by this suggests through the allegory that political action involves erecting and holding boundaries between the familiar and the “terrible”, the friend and the enemy.

However, it is Socrates’ contention that one can only properly live politically if his soul is properly ordered. With justice defined in the city, Socrates uses the metaphor to translate a definition of human justice. Socrates introduces his discussion on the make up of the soul by identifying it as a divided entity, possessing many “diverse desires, pleasures and pains.”¹⁹⁹ These desires are sub-classed into three greater divisions of the soul, with each derived from a particular motor of human action. The first division Socrates names is the *epithumetikon*, or the desiring element, which can be equated to the

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, line: 414e

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, line: 431c

money making class in the city in speech. The second element is the *thymoeides*, “with which man becomes spirited.”²⁰⁰ This section is identified as being the fiery element of the soul that is motivated by the love of honour, victory, and power, and can be equated to the auxiliary class of the city in speech. The calculating element, or the *logistikon*, is the third element of the human soul, which, in the best conditions, governs the body as the guardian class governs the city. Justice, as Socrates presents it, occurs when one “doesn’t let each part in him mind other people’s business or the three classes in the soul meddle with each other...the three parts, (harmonize together) exactly like three notes in a harmonic scale...”²⁰¹

This is the message that Socrates attempts to send to Glaucon and Adeimantus in the second section of the noble fiction. In the second section, Socrates explains that although all citizens are certainly brothers, those competent to rule were mixed with gold at birth, the auxiliaries, silver, and the farmers and craftsmen, iron and bronze. In saying this, Socrates makes reference to the human soul as being a composite of differing elements. Just as the city is successful when each group of people perform their proper task, in the interest of benefiting the whole, so too does the soul work in that fashion. Each element of the soul has its own unique erotic longing, and the soul is well ordered when each of these longings are subordinated to the needs of the whole. The logical faculty must use the soul’s inner fire to rule over its lesser appetites. Socrates states that the first and foremost responsibility of the guardian is to maintain the purity of each class, for the destruction of the polis is predicated on the mixing of classes. In professing this, Socrates is arguing that the internal hierarchy of the soul must always be maintained, so

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, line: 580e

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, line: 443d

that the soul remains well ordered and authentic. This again is a direct message to Glaucon and Adeimantus. Socrates is aware that the souls of Glaucon and Adeimantus, due to the Athenian spiritual crisis, are not properly ordered, causing them to practice the ideology of *techne*. By presenting this noble fiction, Socrates, through the veil of the guardians, attempts to suggest the need for internal reconstitution. In reshaping their souls, Socrates hopes that Glaucon learns the lesson of moderation, so that he can subordinate his love of honor to the pursuit of wisdom, and that Adeimantus learns to channel his inner fire to pursue his desires more efficiently.

Thus, when examining the messages of the noble fiction, it becomes apparent why Socrates is not violating his love of truth by propagating it. The noble fiction is Socrates' tool for fighting against Glaucon and Adeimantus' lies in the soul. By using it to reconstitute their souls so that they can begin to reconnect with the macrocosmic order, Socrates' noble fiction is in the service of truth, of helping these brothers give birth to discoveries of who they are, and what being human entails.

However, it has yet to be established why it is so important for Socrates to use the noble fiction to combat the lies in their soul. Socrates takes great interest in these "divine offspring of Ariston" because he is aware that when one practices the ideology of *techne*, it facilitates the misappropriation of a microcosmic schema, or a schema of being-in-oneself, upon a macrocosmic structure. This misappropriation is dangerous, because it likely causes the emergence of a tyrannical regime. This is demonstrated in the fifth Book of *Republic*.

After Socrates has completed his discussion of the city in speech, he is prepared to move on to a discussion on the types of regimes that match the different types of souls.

However, he is once again interrupted by Polymarchus, who defers to Adeimantus by asking him, "Shall we let it go or what shall we do?"²⁰² Adeimantus responds by "speaking aloud", stating that Socrates has robbed them of "a whole section of the argument," by not discussing the role of women and children in the city of speech.²⁰³

From this question, Socrates receives a final confirmation of what has occurred. Socrates intended to lead a discussion in search of answers, and proposed the development of a fictitious "city in speech" to use as a metaphor for the human soul. By studying the human soul, Socrates intended to learn about virtue, which is, as previously defined, man's relationship to the *cosmos*. By studying the microcosm, Socrates intended to learn about its relationship to the macrocosm, and thus learn about the macrocosm itself. It was Socrates' primary intent to use this discussion to influence his entourage to begin a reinvestigation of their relationship to the macrocosmic order in which they live. However, Socrates' company misinterpreted his project.

It was mentioned earlier that it is men with thumotic natures the guard the boundary between the microcosm and the macrocosm, the knowable and the terrible. These thumotic men are the shepherds that guard the flock, and are the "stronger" that Thrasymachus makes reference to in his discussion of justice. Each member of Socrates' entourage could be considered as one of these thumotic men, and that is why they overtook Socrates in the first place. In the city in speech, Socrates' notion of justice hinged upon the agreement of the auxiliary class to serve the guardians, just as the shepherd agrees to protect the flock for the owner. However, within the macrocosmic order, this argument breaks down. Thumotic men do not easily acquiesce to rulers, for

²⁰² *Ibid.*, line: 449b

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, line: 449c

they wish to rule themselves. When they used force and persuasion to commit Socrates to begin a study of justice, they interpreted what they perceived as Socrates' wisdom to be a *techné*. From Socrates, they intended to learn how to build and rule a city. Because they understood Socrates' words to be teaching a *techné*, they neglectfully disregarded the boundary between the macrocosm and the microcosm. Consequently, they appropriated the discussion of the microcosm upon the macrocosm, and assumed they were talking about the building and governance of a real city. From that context, Socrates had failed to give a full account, because he has neglected to mention the role of women and children.

When Socrates is asked this question by Adeimantus, he is greatly disturbed, as he did not want to discuss this issue. Socrates did not want to make *direct* political commentary. However, because he was asked to further develop the city element of his previous discussion, he once again finds himself trapped. To continue the discussion of the city in speech outside of its intended role as a metaphor for the microcosm, would be to simply further its misappropriation. However, he is not in a position to simply disregard all that has already been said. Having only one choice, he continues the discussion, but under his terms. In continuing the argument, Socrates discusses the process of unifying power and wisdom as that which occurs in three waves, or three births.

The first wave that Socrates refers to occurs through men and women exercising naked together in the gymnasium. Socrates suggests that, "In making a woman fit for guarding, one education won't produce men for us and another women..."²⁰⁴ Because men and women share similar natures, their education for guardianship should also be

shared. Therefore, Socrates can make the argument that female guardians will “clothe themselves in virtue instead of robes,” and share in the duties of guarding the city.²⁰⁵ In essence, what Socrates is describing is a de-eroticisation of the relationship of men and women.

Socrates’ second wave occurs when women become the communal property of men, where “no woman is aloud to live privately with any man.”²⁰⁶ Children, consequently, are to be reared commonly, isolated from their parents, so that no parent knows his or her offspring, and no child knows its parents. The major significance resulting from this wave is the destruction of the barrier between the public and the private realm. Hand in hand with the removal of the private realm is the destruction of the household environment. Given that within the household structure, the mother taught the children until they were old enough to be tutored, its destruction also removes the woman’s responsibilities of early childcare and education.

The culmination of the unification of power and wisdom comes with the rule of the philosopher. Socrates’ third wave cannot take place unless, “the philosophers rule as kings or those now called kings and chiefs genuinely and adequately philosophize, and political power and philosophy coincide in the same place...”²⁰⁷ The king, as presented by Socrates, is a man who loves power, and by extension has no reserves about breaking boundaries in action. There is no act that a king cannot or will not commit if it serves his needs. The philosopher, as a lover of wisdom, is also prepared to break boundaries, but only in the realm of thought. It is his love of wisdom and truth that propels him to it, and

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, line:456d

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, line:457a

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, line:457c

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, line:473d

nothing will prevent him from seeking that which he covets. The unification of the philosopher and king is an entity bound by nothing, and when examined closely, very much mirrors the character Socrates himself.

However, when the results of this unification are examined, it becomes quickly apparent that the rule of the philosophic nature is the “best possible condition” for the microcosm (man), but the political rule of the “philosopher-king” is very much a matching distopia, hence the worst of all possible worlds. In the world of the philosopher-king, humanity is bred like horses, for Socrates can argue that, “there is a need for the best men to have intercourse as often as possible with the best women.”²⁰⁸ Intercourse with women is given “along with other prizes and rewards.”²⁰⁹ while children are torn apart from their parents, and brought “into the pen to certain nurses who live apart in a certain section of the city.”²¹⁰ This is completely unnatural, in so far as it severs the social and biological tie between mother and child. In this political system, procreation needs to be regulated, for when the boundaries between the public and the private are removed, regulation is needed to prevent incestuous relationships. No adults who have not been united for breeding are allowed to have intercourse, for “when a man still of the age to beget touches a woman of that age if a ruler has not united them...he’s imposing a bastard, an unauthorized and unconsecrated child, on the city.”²¹¹ Because of this, it would be incorrect to recognize Socrates’ three waves as a plan of political action. Socrates uses these three waves to demonstrate the ridiculousness and danger of misappropriating a microcosmic order upon the macrocosmic structure.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, line:459d

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, line:460b

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, line:460d

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, line:461b

Section III: Bringing Plato to Modernity

While Socrates' presentation of the misappropriation of the microcosmic order on the macrocosmic structure may appear comical, one needs only to look at "The Introduction" to Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* to find a more striking example of this misappropriation of the microcosm onto the macrocosm. In "The Introduction", Hobbes makes reference to sets of microcosm/macrocosm dichotemic structures, and then equates their relationship. When Hobbes writes, "Nature (the Art whereby God hath made and governes the World) is by the Art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an Artificial Animal,"²¹² this statement is being made: elements of the World (micro) are to G-d (macro), as man (micro) is to the Artificial Animal (macro). The boundary by which the first dichotomy is regulated is Nature, and it is through Nature that the macrocosm, or "overarching metaphor" is able to regulate experience. Because man is an element of the World, his experience, as occurring within the first dichotemic framework, is mitigated and thus explainable through Nature. However, Hobbes continues to explain that, "For by Art is created the great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, which is but an Artificial Man: though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose protection and defence it was intended."²¹³ In writing this, Hobbes' message becomes clear. Through art (*techne*), man has been able to create a new boundary between the overarching metaphor and the underlying concern. Because this boundary is also constitutive in

²¹² Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1986 p. 81

²¹³ Ibid., p. 81

nature, the variables established by this boundary have changed. When the boundary between the macrocosm and the microcosm is *techne*, the microcosm becomes man, and the macrocosm becomes Leviathan, or the state. However, in so far as man has **created** the Leviathan, and that the Leviathan is of greater stature and strength than man, man's creation is greater than him, and thus greater than G-d's creation. Because man's creation is greater than G-d's, and because man has succeeded in creating something greater than himself (something G-d debatably cannot do), Hobbes argues that man is greater than G-d. This appears somewhat confusing until one examines this argument mathematically. When Hobbes introduced the macrocosm/microcosmic systems, he does so as equivalent ratios. G-d, through nature making man, is equivalent to man, through *techne*, creating Leviathan. Notice, in the first system, it is the macrocosm that creates the microcosm in its image (G-d creates man). In the second, the microcosm re-creates a macrocosm in its own image (man creates Artificial Man, Leviathan). Because the ratios in the two systems are equivalent, one must understand the argument as stating "***a*** is to ***b***, as ***c*** is to ***d*** (In this statement, ***a*** represents G-d, ***b*** elements of the world, ***c*** man, and ***d*** Leviathan)." Because they are equivalent ratios, the mathematic relationship between ***a*** and ***b***, must always match that of ***c*** and ***d***. Therefore, because ***d*** is greater in value than ***b***, the value of ***c*** (man), must always be greater than the value of ***a*** (G-d). Hence, man is greater than G-d.

When examining Socrates' presentation of the three waves, several elements of Socrates' description translate easily to elements of Nazi practice. In so far as both males as females participated equally as participants in the Nazi project, one can see an example of the de-eroticisation of women. In Socrates' first wave, men and women train for battle

together in the gymnasium, while in Nazi Germany, men and women participate together in the killing machine. The infiltration of Nazi propaganda into children's schools, the use of children and the incredible strength of the Nazi youth wing are quite similar to Socrates' second wave, where children are raised communally, outside the private jurisdiction of a parent/child relationship. In actuality, the whole destruction of the private sphere in Nazi Germany reinforces this connection. If Hitler was a leader who broke boundaries in both thought and action, and was bound by nothing, Hitler can be seen as a potential consequence of Socrates' third wave, the rule of the philosopher king.

Michael Marrus, in his work, *The Holocaust in History*, argues, "In the final analysis the destruction of the Jews was not so much a product of laws and commands as it was a matter of spirit, of shared comprehension, of consonance and synchronization."²¹⁴ The Nazi "Final Solution", the Nuremberg Laws, and all the eugenic projects that are associated with the Nazi project, are all consistent with a misappropriation of a microcosmic scale upon the macrocosm. This is only reinforced by the fact that Nazi soldiers carried particular collections of quotations from Nietzsche with them. Nietzsche, whose message was intended to influence a particular few individuals on the microcosmic scale, was appropriated "en masse" as an aid for transmitting the macrocosmic message. However, to fully grasp the connection between Socrates' warning and Nazi fascism, several key questions must be asked. Firstly, was Germany in a period of spiritual crisis before Nazi fascism, and was Nazi fascism a proposed solution? Secondly, is Nazi fascism a misappropriation of a microcosmic order on a macrocosmic scale? Finally, was this misappropriation facilitated by *techné*? Jeffrey

²¹⁴ Marrus, Michael R., The Holocaust in History London: Penguin Books, 1987 p. 49

Herf provides the answers to these questions, in his work *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, culture and politics in Weimar and the Third Reich*.

In his book, Herf explains that the history of the Weimar Republic is customarily divided into three periods. "The first period", begins Herf, starts in November 1918 with the German defeat in World War I, "followed by the imposition of the Versailles treaty, revolutionary upheavals from the Left, civil war and counterrevolutionary armed response from the Right."²¹⁵ Within this period, the German population witnessed the French occupation of the Ruhr, and escalating inflation rates that angered the middle class and "weakened the strength of the republic's strongest defenders in the trade unions and in the Social Democratic Party."²¹⁶ This period was replaced by what is recognized as a "stabilization period", in which the German population was bombarded with American Fordism, causing it to re-orient itself to goals of fiscal efficiency. While this period could be categorized by "expanded investment and rationalization in industry", it did not succeed in consistently restructuring German institutions. The German people, having lost their sense of self in what they perceived to be the tragic ending of the First World War, could not properly restore their sense of selves within the model of American Fordism. The American attempt at applying their microcosmic order upon Germany, a distinct microcosmic unit on the global scale was a failure. Consequently, between 1929 and 1933, "unemployment and political extremes grew, the centre parties shrank, (and) the lower middle class became attracted to the Nazis..."²¹⁷

²¹⁵ Herf, Jeffrey, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, culture, and politics in Weimar and the Third Reich New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996 p. 19

²¹⁶ Ibid., p. 19

²¹⁷ Ibid., p. 20

Herf explains that within the German Right after World War I, there existed a multitude of writers who voiced opinions for a more nationalist ideological approach. These writers, collectively known as the “conservative revolution”, argued against the Weimar Republic, identifying it with “the lost war, Versailles, the inflation of 1923, the Jews, cosmopolitan mass culture, and political liberalism.”²¹⁸ With its members including some of Germany’s most noted intellectuals, such as Spengler, Junger, and Mannheim, the conservative revolutionists were found to be quite attractive to the middle class, and the revolution took place “in and around universities, political clubs, and magazines.”²¹⁹ They influenced the German people to recover their lost soul, and to hark back to “the modern battlefield and trenches”, where they were most German.

With this as the context behind the evolution of Nazi fascism, it is easy to notice that Germany was in a period of spiritual crisis after their defeat in the First World War. The proud German people, who would have conquered Europe without the *deus ex machina* entrance of the United States into the War, had been reduced to impotence. The nationalist ideology that had brought them to the pinnacle of their glory had been smashed, replaced by internal fracturization, American cultural imperialism, and social alienation. They, like the Athenians after the Peloponnesian War, had lost the essence of who they were, and could not fathom what they had become. The “German Soul”, or the set of practices and perceptions that defined the particular German experience of existence, was irreconcilable with the contemporary condition of the German population individually and nation as a whole. In post World War I Germany, the German population was a lost people.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 21

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 24

It is in this historical context that Nazi fascism emerged. Nazi fascism attempted to reconstitute a German understanding of self that was able to account for their defeat in the First World War. This new understanding of self would recognize that Germany itself was not the cause of its own demise. Instead, it would understand that, "Jewish abstraction was alien to the autonomous life element of the German *Volk*."²²⁰ It was "Jewish materialism" that had infiltrated and poisoned the purity of the Aryan race, and consequently tarnished its primal life instinct. Nazi fascism, from the Nuremberg laws to the "Final Solution", was recognized as a means by which the Germany people remove themselves from their spiritual crisis by being able to explain their experience through the shared overarching metaphor of the German *Volk*.

It was previously mentioned that Nazi soldiers carried a particular selection Nietzschean aphorisms in their pockets. This is significant to note, because the microcosmic order drawn upon by the Nazis was borrowed from Nietzsche. In his *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche writes, "the more normal sickliness becomes among men-and we cannot deny its normality-the higher should be the honour accorded the rare cases of great power of soul and body, man's *lucky hits*."²²¹ To begin to understand the ramifications of sickliness among men, it is probably easiest to compare it with Nietzsche's understanding of health. In *The Will to Power*, Nietzsche suggests that a man is healthy "when he can laugh at the seriousness and ardour with which he has allowed himself to be *hypnotized* to any extent by any detail in his life."²²² From this, one can initially ascertain that health is not primarily a degree of physical well being, but a

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 192

²²¹ Nietzsche, Friedrich. *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufmann New York: Vintage Books, 1989, 3rd Essay, #14

²²² *The Will to Power, Op. Cit.*, #233

condition of self-acceptance. To be healthy is to love oneself enough that man, as Nietzsche puts forth, "is ashamed of his repentance."²²³ In so far as sickness is in opposition with rare cases of great power of soul and body, it should not be assumed that health excludes the physical realm. This is demonstrated in Nietzsche's claim that purely psychological practices should themselves be decried as dangerous to the health. As he rightly suggests, "No invalid is ever cured by prayers or by the exorcising of evil spirits."²²⁴

When a man is ill, according to Nietzsche, it is his very goodness that is sickly. The man finds himself "reopening old wounds, wallowing in self-contempt and depression."²²⁵ For Nietzsche, sickness is the condition where man rejects his own excellence, and repents his power. When in this condition, man cowers from his own potentiality, and focuses all his energies on regret and remorse. In essence, man is no longer man. With this understood, the reader can move back to the original statement, and begin to interpret Nietzsche's diagnosis. For Nietzsche, it is becoming more and more normal for humanity to reject its own humanity. Rather than striving for excellence, it finds itself wallowing in self-pity. Man has lost its manhood. Furthermore, in those rare instances where man does act, as man should, he does so blindly, without recognizing the significance of the action. It is for this reason that Nietzsche can identify these moments as "*lucky hits*".

Nietzsche concludes the first paragraph of the aphorism by stating, "...we should protect the well-constituted from the worst kind of air, the air of the sickroom," and then

²²³ *Ibid.*, #233

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, #233

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, #233

asking, "Is this done?"²²⁶ For the reader, the question now becomes, "What is the air of the sickroom, and how does this endanger the healthy?" This question is answered metaphorically in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, through Zarathustra's conversation with the fire hound.

Zarathustra begins his discussion by explaining that the earth "has a skin, and this skin has diseases."²²⁷ In so far as the earth's skin is the location of these diseases, it must be understood that the air of the sickroom exists throughout the face of the earth. Therefore, there is no physical area of the world where bad air does not exist. This is significant in so far as it is plain that Nietzsche does not suggest that healthy man should be isolated and preserved; it is the air itself that must be purified.

According to Zarathustra, the "fire hound" has polluted the air, which is itself one of the earth's diseases. The fire hound, which feeds from the surface of the earth, is described as being "salty, mendacious, and superficial", which darkens the world with ashes and smoke.²²⁸ In professing to support freedom, the fire hound sells the belief that if man treats life with contempt, life will rise again "with godlike features, seductive through suffering; and verily, it will yet thank you for having overthrown it."²²⁹

It is only when Zarathustra recommends to the fire hound and its scum-devil associates that they let themselves be overthrown so that they could return to life, that the reader fully understand what the fire hound represents. When Zarathustra makes his recommendation for "all that is weak with age and weak in virtue", he refers directly to

²²⁶ *Genealogy, Op. Cit., Third Essay, #14*

²²⁷ Nietzsche, Friederich, "*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*" taken from, *The Portable Nietzsche* trans. Walter Kaufmann, New York: Penguin Books, 1976, "On Great Events" p. 242

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 243

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 243

kings and churches.²³⁰ When the hound interrupts Zarathustra by asking what a church is, Zarathustra snaps back, "This is a kind of state...but be still, you hypocritical hound! You know your own kind best!"²³¹ However, just as the state pollutes the air with its smoke and scum, so to does the church, for it is itself a kind of state. Both believe themselves to be "talking out of the belly of reality", each wanting to be recognized as the most important.

In transmitting the microcosmic perception upon the macrocosm, Nazi fascism made the assumption that the whole of German culture was sick. Deeply embedded in the core of all Nazi ideology stood the premise that the entire German soul was being polluted by "the power of money...the Jewish materialist suffocating embrace of (German) life elements."²³² Nazi fascism saw in the Jew what Zarathustra noticed in the "fire hound". The German world was blackened and polluted by the parasitic Jew, who fed off its strength and hid behind the cloud of his own lies. Herf notes, "At the centre of all Nazi views...stood a mythic historical construction of a racial battle between Aryan and Jew, blood and gold."²³³ This is fundamentally correct, for in misappropriating Nietzsche's arguments upon a macrocosmic scale, Nazi fascism determined that the culminating element in the revitalization of the German *Volk* would be the purge of its disease, and the reawakening of its self-responsibility. In Heideggerian terms, the German *Volk* could only achieve the authenticity required for resoluteness if they prepared themselves to hear their call to conscience.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 244

²³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 244

²³² Herf, *Op. Cit.*, p. 193

²³³ *Ibid.*, p. 189

It is through the metaphor of cultural sickness that one can fully understand the Nazi treatment of the Jews that lead to the Final Solution, and the concurrent revitalization of German culture. In a January 30th, 1939 address to the Reichstag, Hitler warned his listeners, "If the international Jewish financiers outside Europe should succeed in plunging the nations once more into a world war, then the result will not be the bolshevisation of the earth, and thus the victory of Jewry, but the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe."²³⁴ Nazi fascism was distinct from any other form of fascism because it was grounded on the anti-Semitic notion that identified the Jew as the product of the "bad air" which poisoned the German soul. Because of this, the Nazi treatment of the "Jewish Question" could be paralleled to a doctor's treatment of a disease. German legislation weakened the position of the Jew in German society, just as an antibiotic attacks and weakens a virus. By placing the entire Jewish community in ghettos, the Nazi regime was able to isolate the "Jewish disease". Most horrifically, by implementing the Final Solution, through eugenics projects and concentration camps, the Nazi regime put into motion the means by which the entire "disease" would be destroyed, leaving no lingering effects. Finally, Hitler's personal interest in creating a museum to document his triumph over the Jewish problem can also be understood as a means of documenting a case study, so that in case a similar problem occurs, one could reference his "success".

If Nazi fascism was a misappropriation of a Nietzschean microcosmic order upon a German macrocosmic state structure, and it was used as means of removing the conditions of a post World War I German spiritual crisis, did *techné* have a role in allowing this misappropriation to occur? To this question, Herf adamantly argues yes.

²³⁴ Marrus, *Op. Cit.*, p. 37

In *Reactionary Modernism*, Herf argues that within the period of post-First World War Germany, a cultural tradition that he calls reactionary modernism grew to become the Germany ideology within the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. Reactionary modernism, as an important current within Nazi ideology, attempted to reconcile anti-modern German nationalism and modern technology. For the reactionary modernist thinker, "Germany could be *both* technologically advanced *and* true to its soul."²³⁵ As antitechnological views could only lead to national backwardness and impotence, it was the view of the reactionary modernist thinkers that it was only through the development of technology that Germany would have the power to recover its lost soul.

Herf notes that ideologists have the ability to "transform sentiment into significance and make it socially available" through symbolism, metaphor and analogy.²³⁶ The effect of the reactionary modernists was the ability to bring the discordant meanings of *Technik* and *Kultur* into a unified framework. Culture was traditionally identified with the *Gameinschaft* (community) existence, and thus embedded in a language of blood and community. Technology, associated with the *Gesellschaft* (society) existence, was traditionally embedded in the language of modern materialism. It was this set of metaphors, practices, and perceptions that Nazi fascism associated with the Jewish community. As a people without a land of their own, the Jewish people represented the love of wealth and productivity associated with the *Gesellschaft* experience. Consequently, the success of reactionary modernism was the ability to resituate technology in the language and metaphor of the *Gameinschaft*: "community.

²³⁵ Herf, *Op. Cit.*, p. 3

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 16

blood, will, self, form, productivity, and finally race.”²³⁷ Thus, the *Autobahn* became a symbol of German power, just as the trench warfare of World War I became symbolic of the vigilance of the German *Volk*.

By integrating technology into the language and metaphors of the German *Volk*, Nazi fascism was able to translate the microcosmic Nietzschean principles into the macrocosmic structure of the entire Nazi Germany. In essence, the advancement of technology, and the “technologizing” of Germany was the condition that must pertain in order for the misappropriation of Nietzsche to occur. It was the National Socialist goal “to liberate technology from the domination” of Jewish materialism.²³⁸ The propagation of Nazi ideology depended on, as Herf recounts, “An appeal to liberate a will or *telos* said to inherent in the forces of production from restrictions imposed by the existing bourgeois social relations of production.”²³⁹ The will that the German people had been convinced to liberate was their own, and that will was technology. Without technology, the boundary between community and society, culture and civilization, could not be blurred to allow the misappropriation of the microcosm upon the macrocosm.

If one commits to thoroughly reading Plato, a particular trend may emerge in one’s experience with the writing, and that is the recurrent discovery of the sentiment, “do what you are best fitted for.” It is the inherent goal of all humans to excel at being human, to search for inner completeness and consistency. To order oneself is to seek out the consistency which best fits one’s own nature, and strive to maintain that consistency to live the best life. However, Plato warns, do not assume that because one has been successful at finding inner consistency, that one is fundamentally complete. While one

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 16

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 192

could be successfully at harmonizing one's inner diversity, every human is still an element of a macrocosmic whole. For Plato, that whole is patterned change. For us, it may very well be something different.

To lose sight of that macrocosmic whole, or *cosmos*, is tantamount to experiencing a spiritual crisis. Spiritual crisis is the inability to reconcile one's own experience with any previously held set of metaphors, language, signs, or symbols. This condition could inspire the creation of new metaphors, signs, language or symbols that serve to mediate the relationship humans have with the *cosmos*. Because this is often a difficult choice, it is more common that the people choose to dismiss the existence of the macrocosmic whole all together. Consequently, people traditionally put their faith in something that produces tangible, if not complete, results. In Plato's time, it was a *techne*. At the turn of the twenty-first century, it is technology.

The danger of dismissing the *cosmos* in its entirety is that we, as humans could conceive of the universe as something void of order, and waiting for an order to be established. Socrates is aware of this danger, and through the use of the noble fiction, he attempts to reshape the means by which his entourage engages the world around them.

Plato warns, through the fifth Book of *Republic*, that drawing an order from the microcosmic realm to apply to the macrocosmic structure is tantamount for disaster, for it creates not the best possible regime, but the worst possible regime. It is his hope, that by reordering their souls, so that their lust for honor is moderated and dominated by their will to rule for the best interest of all Athenians, he can prevent the coming of tyranny, what he considers to be the worst possible order.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 193

The Nazis, in misappropriating incomplete elements of the Nietzschean doctrine (incomplete, as Nietzsche was entirely anti-nationalistic), created the worst possible regime... a tyranny. This tyranny was responsible for a set of unique atrocities that only serve to further demonstrate its status as perverse and evil. When one examines elements of Nazi fascist doctrine in retrospect of Socrates' "Three waves", one can only further recognize the full consequences of this misappropriation.

Epilogue

Que tu viennes du ciel ou de l'enfer, qu'importe
O Beaute! Monstre enorme, effrayant, ingenu!
Si ton oeil, ton souris, ton pied, m'ouvrent la porte
D'un Infini que j'aime et n'ai jamias connus?

Hymne a la Beaute – Charles Baudelaire

This philosophical life is a way of being in the world in which the practitioner of philosophy dedicates the essence of his existence to cultivating his self, so that he can be an open receptacle for the intimations of truth provided for him by a universal and hence macrocosmic order. Only a human can be philosophical, for it requires a self-conscious recognition of human limitation and mortality. Wisdom is not a prize to be won, nor a platform of human aptitude to be reached. It is instead a condition of being that recognizes human limitation, yet works within the given guidelines to experience as much as possible, so that the conglomeration of internalized past experiences becomes more and more subtle at identifying new experience.

It is for this reason that the philosopher has no answers to give, for all his knowledge is personal knowledge. As human life is of finite duration, and the multitude of experiences within the universe are infinite, one can never have complete clarity and understanding when defining experience. The philosopher's wisdom is threefold. Firstly, the philosopher, in being aware of the human condition, has dedicated his life to pursuing experience, and thus can give a subtle (though not complete), definition of experience. Secondly, the philosopher is able to recognize that as his development of experiences is distinct, no one can understand him with the same certainty that he understand himself. In essence, each person possesses his own tacit dimension, which he uses for understanding the same way the philosopher does. The philosopher's wisdom allows him

to recognize that some people do not have a sufficiently, or properly developed tacit dimension, to allow them to approximate the knowledge that he wishes to share. Thirdly, given the first two aspects, the philosopher's wisdom allows him to mitigate between the two, giving him the judgement to decide what to share with whom, and how to share it.

It is in this context that I can evoke Socrates' "noble fiction", and state that it cannot be seen to share the same characteristics of a lie. When one looks at the manner it was used, who it was used for, and why it was used, the noble fiction must be seen as the exact opposite. Socrates used the noble fiction, as a way of addressing a truthful message to Glaucon and Adeimantus. Only through this vehicle of fiction could the brothers understand Socrates' meaning, and perhaps learn from it. The use of this fiction demonstrates both prudence and purpose, and although it was not entirely successful in the scheme of the dialogue, the reader of *Republic* is successfully influenced by Socrates' words.

But what of Socrates' purpose? I have argued throughout this work that Socrates used the noble fiction to remove the lies embedded in the souls of his entourage and that he did so to prevent them from misunderstanding his search for justice as a lesson on the *techné* of rulership. I then furthered the argument by stating that Socrates' feared this misunderstanding, because it could allow Glaucon and Adeimantus an opportunity for recognizing the universe as lacking order, and that it was their responsibility to misappropriate their personal senses of order upon the entire political unit. If this is a reasonable interpretation, as I believe it is, then one must ask the question: Is this misunderstanding distinct to this scenario, or possibly much further reaching? Strauss wrote about the need for philosophical texts to be written esoterically, because there

always has been a struggle between politics (the art of making do with imperfection) and philosophy (the search for the fleeting moments of perfection). Can this suggest that all searches for wisdom, if misappropriated from the personal realm onto the macrocosmic realm, have the potential for becoming ideological, or tyrannical? And what of modernity? Can one argue that the entire modern project is a misappropriation of Baconian principles upon the entire western, and now global world? Is Rousseau's Geneva an actualization of this misappropriation? Is More's *Utopia* ideologically similar to the Nazi project, and is *Gulliver's Travels* and conscientious attack on all of this? These are all questions that need to be asked, if we are to have the courage to be human into the next millennium.

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