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**SOUTH-SIDE CAPE-BRETON MINERS:
A SOCIOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF PRE 1879 TO 1951 TRANSFORMATIONS**

BY

KIRBY ABBOTT

B.A. (HONS) SAINT MARY'S UNIVERSITY

**A Thesis Submitted To The Faculty Of Graduate Studies
And Research In Partial Fulfillment Of The Requirements
For The Degree Of Master of Arts**

**Department of Sociology And Anthropology
Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario
Fall, 1985**

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ISBN 0-315-29842-1

The undersigned hereby recommend to
The Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
acceptance of the thesis,

SOUTH SIDE CAPE BRETON MINERS:
A SOCIOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF PRE 1879 TO 1951 TRANSFORMATIONS

submitted by

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in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

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January, 1986

ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on the historical transformation of four key institutional sites of action and experience--1) workplace, 2) state intervention into industrial relations, 3) trade union, and 4) formal politics--with reference to the class power of South Side Cape Breton coal miners and the broader balance of class forces.

Using the case of class relations based on South Side Cape Breton coal mining, and through a process of interweaving theory and 'facts', this thesis attempts to illustrate and analyze how the key institutional sites influenced, and were influenced by, the logic and nature of class power at strategic historic conjunctures.

Following the establishment of a conceptual framework, the chapters present the transformations chronologically and identify general historical periods which loosely correspond to significant recompositions in the miners' power.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

If nothing else, this thesis has reminded me that most individual creations are never the sole product of the creator. In my case, the following people, in one way or another, were highly significant in the thesis' construction; and I would like to thank them.

Dennis Olsen and Wally Clement--my committee. Del Muise for reading a draft version. Wendy Watkins for helping me with my 'bold' and unsuccessful attempt to subordinate computer technology to my needs.

In addition, I owe a special debt to my family, Fran, 'Moose' and Marion. It is very clear that these people have been, and continue to be, a foundation in a wide spectrum of my thoughts and actions. Without their help, I would not be here (in more ways than one).

A special debt--emotional and intellectual --but also financial (we have a relationship based on debt) is due to Sandra Harder.

As always, the ideas contained in this thesis are not representations of the diverse mind set of the above mentioned people. The thesis, however, is influenced by them. My only regret is that I

did not incorporate all of their ideas, or spend
more time with them--for I would have continued to
learn more.

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ABBREVIATIONS

A.A.I.S.T.W.	Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers
A.M.W.	Amalgamated Mine Workers of Nova Scotia
BESCO	British Empire Steel Corporation
C.C.F.	Co-operative Commonwealth Federation
C.I.O.	Committee For Industrial Organization
C.M.L.P.	South Side Cape Breton Coal Mining Labour Process
C.P.C.	Communist Party of Canada
D.E.V.C.O.	Cape Breton Development Corporation
Disco	Dominion Iron and Steel Company
District 26	District 26, United Mine Workers of America
Domco	Dominion Coal Company
DOSCO	Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation
<u>G.B.G.</u>	Glace Bay Gazette
G.M.A.	General Mining Association
G.W.V.A.	Great War Veterans Association
I.D.I.A.	Industrial Disputes Investigation Act
I.L.P.	Independent Labour Party
International	International Executive of United Mine Workers of America
<u>M.L.H.</u>	Maritime Labour Herald
M.W.I.U.N.S.	Mine Workers' Industrial Union of Nova Scotia
M.W.U.C.	Mine Workers' Union of Canada
<u>N.S.M.</u>	Nova Scotia Miner

O.B.U.	One Big Union
P.M.A.	Provincial Miners' Association
P.W.A.	Provincial Workmen's Association
P.M.U.	Progressive Miners' Union
R.I.L.U.	Red International of Labour Unions
S.P.C.	Socialist Party of Canada
S.W.O.C.	Steel Workers Organizing Committee
U.M.W.A.	United Mineworkers of America
U.M.W.N.S.	United Mineworkers of Nova Scotia
W.P.C.	Workers' Party of Canada
W.U.L.	Workers' Unity League

INTRODUCTION

Those familiar with the Canadian working class know that miners have been one of the historically most militant occupational groups in the country. In addition, most realize that the Cape Breton miners, at one time, were the most radical of all Canadian miners. Perhaps it might be recalled that during the 1920s there were a series of violent struggles led by articulate Workers' Party of Canada members, which were crushed by unprecedented waves of federal militia.

Provincially, the miners are central to an understanding of the Nova Scotia working class. Up to World War II they comprised slightly less than half of all unionized workers. In many respects they were the vanguard (or perhaps more appropriately, the rear guard) of the province's working class, winning major trade union and political rights that others have taken for granted.

Yet, for those familiar with the Cape Breton miners 'then' and 'now', an obvious question arises. Why were they so strong and now so weak? What happened to cause such a change? At one time these miners were so radical, now no trace of radicalism appears. The state which was once experienced in the form of militia men now owns and operates the mines as a social

project. Since the 'big strike of 1925' there have only been two District wide strikes. There are no communists amongst the miners and in the last federal election a former union president of more than 20 years ran for the Conservatives.

This thesis seeks to understand how and why the South Side Cape Breton miners became so threatening then weak. The reason for choosing the South Side miners over a study of all Cape Breton, or provincial miners, is a result of 'scaling down the research problem'. Each major coal mining area--the North Side; Springhill and Joggins; Thorburn, Stelarton, Westville, New Glasgow--has a related yet very distinct history. The incorporation of these histories within the general question of study was unfortunately too broad for a piece of M.A. work.

Yet, at the same time, a study of the South Side miners should prove enlightening. Since the turn of the century the South Side miners were employed by one major coal company--the Dominion Coal Company--and have consistently accounted for approximately 50% of all the provinces' coal miners and 60-65% of provincial, coal production (see Appendices A, B, C). Since 1893, the South Side has been the major provincial coal area and, at times, the most economically strategic in Canada. In addition, if a scale of more or less

militant is used, the South Side miners have generally been the most radical overall. This, however, is a general point that must be qualified by a historically, specific inquiry, as much of the early radical activity occurred on the mainland.

The South Side of industrial Cape Breton lies south of the Sydney harbour and comprises the coal communities of Glace Bay--at one time the largest coal town in Canada--New Waterford, Reserve, Dominion and Langan (see Maps 1,2). The North Side, located north of the harbour, is the other area of Cape Breton coal mining and consists of North Sydney and Sydney Mines. In between, lies Sydney, a steel centre. In total the area of industrial Cape Breton was, during the thesis' period of study, the major industrial centre east of Montreal.

The thesis focuses on four institutional sites of action and experience: 1) the workplace, 2) the trade union, 3) state intervention in industrial relations and 4) formal politics--with reference to South Side miners' power and the broader balance of class forces based on the South Side coal industry. By focusing on specific moments of historical transformation this thesis attempts to suggest how the key institutions were both, influential and influenced by the development of South Side miners' power from

the pre 1879 to 1951 period.

Given this, the title is misleading. This is not a sociological study of the South Side of industrial Cape Breton--as a social formation comprised of a totality of institutions located within a larger region. More specifically it is a study of four institutions within that totality. This thesis recognizes that the study of selected institutions--to the neglect of other sites of class activity--cannot make implicit or explicit claims to study the society in general. Furthermore, this thesis does not examine non-class social relations--such as ethnicity or gender--and for that reason alone could not make claims of understanding the totality.

Given that these key institutions (workplace excepted) are not solely the immediate social construction of South Side miners, the examination of these institutions necessitates, at times, general references to actions outside the specific South Side activity. For example, formal political power and state industrial relations intervention developed within a provincial and federal context; and the organization of trade unionism, developed within a provincial and later international framework.

Thus, while generally focusing on these key institutions with reference to South Side miners'

power this thesis makes no claims to study the whole social formation. Nor does the thesis analyze those institutions of focus in a distorted way by severing their process from the broader provincial, national or international reality in which they existed.

In another sense, the title is also misleading if the reader presupposes that this thesis analyzes miners in terms of their individual actions, and experiences. The unit of analysis is at the level of a social group, or more appropriately, social class. It is a study of how miners as a class, not as individuals, acted within the historical period of inquiry.

The identification of certain institutions as 'key' was based on a complex interaction with theory and historical research prior to the actual identification of those sites as key. As in most sociological works there is a distinct, yet interrelated, difference between methods of 'inquiry' and 'presentation' (to use Johnson's--1983:156--terms) in the overall research process. The initial 'inquiry' into the history of the South Side miners began two years prior to the 'immediate' researching of this thesis and was sparked by Braverman's (1974) Labor and Monopoly Capital and Frank's (1979) The Cape Breton Coal Miners, 1917-1925. Since then, and even during the 'presentation' stage

of this thesis, a dynamic interaction between 'theory' and 'historical facts' has occurred. With the general underlying question--how and why did the miners become so threatening then weak--constantly posed within the real financial and time limitations of M.A. work, it was decided to focus only on the most influential areas of class interaction. The criteria used to select key sites was simple--'where did the major activities occur that sustained and shaped the way in which the miners, as a class, interacted with the dominant forces'. Implicit in this interrogation is a prior understanding of the miners' historical activities and a theoretical underpinning which focuses on "class in itself". Thus, the selection of these institutional sites as 'key' was 'a priori' in the sense that emphasis on class relations existed. It was not a priori in the sense that their selection was arrived after a lengthy and rigorous interrogation. Unlike other institutions, time and time again an understanding of those key sites remained central if a very general grasp of South Side miners' power was to be acquired.

Finally, as the title suggests, this work is more sociological than historical. It is not a piece of history in the narrow sense of a short chronological period of study which is intensively investigated. It is not a history of South Side miners'

power nor the key institutions. Rather it is a history of their most significant moments of movement and transformation. While partly based on historical works such as Wade (1950), Logan (1948), MacEwan (1976), MacGillivray (1971), Frank (1974, 1979), Reilly (1979), McKay (1983a), White (1977) and Earle (1984), to name a few--the thesis is more sociological. The work is concerned with broad general movements and tendencies which are analyzed at greater levels of abstraction than usually common in historical work. It is the analysis of 'historical facts' at higher levels of abstraction which allow the investigation of such a broad period to be more sociological yet historical given its ability to be comparative between various conjunctures and/or periods.

In the first chapter--Establishing a Conceptual Basis--the theory and methodology used in the selection, interpretation and comparison of 'historical facts' is presented. The purpose of that chapter is to generally make visible and clearly state (unlike formal historical works) the 'method of inquiry'. In that respect this chapter explicitly demarcates specific theoretical and methodological positions and thus simultaneously rejects others. Potential points of debate, therefore, lie within every page of the conceptual and substantive

chapters. The purpose of this thesis is not to discuss, contrast or evaluate various theoretical propositions with the aid of the South Side miners as a case study, or, to take stock of a vast number of possible points of conceptual debates existing in the substantive works on the South Side mining industry. Such an exercise--if adequately undertaken--would entail additional hundreds of pages to the thesis' length. Most importantly, such an exercise would be immediately irrelevant, as the major stress on attempting to understand the general development of key institutions vis-a-vis miners' power would be subordinated by a massive theoretical exercise. While the critical evaluation of various theoretical propositions is of fundamental importance--that intellectual process occurred in the 'inquiry' stage of the theses' development. The thesis, as it is 'presented' to the reader, is by no means the 'total' thesis--but the most latest moment in a broader intellectual process. In that regard, what is 'presented' in the conceptual chapter is an end product--based on a dynamic process of contrasting theory with other theory and historical facts. As indicated, the original interest in the sociology of Labour and South Side miners was sparked by Braverman and Frank respectively (two works of conflicting conceptual frameworks). Upon reading

this thesis it will be evident that the author does not see the world through the spectacles of Braverman or Frank--and in that respect acts as a testament to the author's claim that a dynamic interaction of theory and facts preceded the 'presentation' of this thesis. If there are any remnants of theoretical debate embodied within the thesis it is largely with a type of sociological analysis that over-emphasizes the influence of structural economic forces to the neglect of politics, ideology and class agency. It is an underlying debate with an 'economism' that was firmly grasped by the author as an undergraduate. In this sense, the hidden debate with a general economic approach is the author's debate with his past--and as such is further testament of the 'learning process'.

As a consequence of theoretical problems being worked out prior, and hidden from, the 'presentation' stage of the thesis, there is no need to 'test the theory' by posing a host of theoretical questions which are subsequently 'solved' as the thesis develops (in reality these questions are not solved during the presentation stage but made to appear so). While that type of format of thesis presentation is quite common in M.A. thesis work, the author has chosen another route--and has already resolved the theoretical

questions 'behind' the reader's back.

This thesis will not pose the standard format of appearing to test theory on the basis of 'evidence' acquired from the case study of South Side miners. Again, the purpose of this thesis is not to test theories --but to use theory to help understand the rise and fall of the South Side miners' power. A conscious result of using this type of thesis format is the ability to discuss the reciprocal influence of key institutions on miners' power in a way that can better grasp a sense of the dynamics and dialectics implicit in the process of historical transformation. Instead of seriously disjointing a sense of the historical process--by setting up general theoretical questions --the selected theoretical propositions are interwoven with historical facts. While this way of relating theory with facts is admittedly less common in M.A. sociological theses; it is equally legitimate and a consequence of what the author wishes to accomplish. Perhaps the most famous example of a piece of sociological history that relates facts to theory in this way would be Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire.

Following Chapter Two--which deals with the establishment of class relations based on a newly emerging Nova Scotian coal industry--the subsequent substantive chapters correspond to major shifts in

South Side miners' power. Again, it was felt that organizing the chapters to correspond to periods of historical transformation--rather than a chapter for each key institutional site (for example)--would give the reader a better grasp of the complex and uneven process of miners' power and class relations.

Chapters Two to Five cover general periods in which the miners' power significantly shifted. Chapter Two covers the pre 1879 to 1899 years and witnesses the origins or 'birth' of the industry, villages, and key institutional sites of focus which formed the basis of future class interaction. During this period the 'traditional' class relations were based on a form of paternalism which was distinctively characterized by the 'individuality' of negotiations between miner and master in the individual pit villages. Implicit in the organization of this order was a large degree of real control over the labour process by miners who negotiated most matters individually, without an institutionalized collective action--the trade union. The local master held considerable formal control over class relations with a general absence of state intervention into labour disputes, and a limited presence of contested formal political power, given the restrictions of the franchise which effectively prevented worker participation. Near the end of this

period, amidst economic crisis, the terrain of class relations drastically shifted. In response to the experiences of unstable economic realities the miners unionized and formed an institutionalized collective basis to negotiate many aspects of work. In addition, they were the leading force in the winning/granting of the franchise to the province's male workers. The state intervened in profound ways by becoming involved in the regulation of labour disputes and constructing the industry along monopolistic lines. By the end of this period the basis of state, worker and company interaction emerged.

In Chapter Three, covering the 1899-1921 period, the miners unevenly, yet increasingly, acted in collective and more militant ways by creating their own formal political party and by becoming much more aggressive trade unionists. Despite minor technological innovations, which occurred in the previous period, the miners retained a firm grasp of their real control over the labour process. Interrelated with these developments was the expansion and sophistication of state intervention in the formation of what can now be considered an industrial relations system. It was during this period that the 'traditional' modes of class interaction based on paternalism met their 'death'. The miners established themselves as an

'oppositional' force.

In Chapter Four, covering 1922-1925, the economic development of the coal industry--which both reached its peak and began its decline in the previous period--experienced a crisis in which the exploitative pressures were intensified by further concentration and centralization of capital. Experientially, the exploitative nature of class relations were fully exposed to the miners who began--for the first time--to collectively struggle. In response the state reacted with an unprecedented wave of coercion in an attempt to contain and break the miners. During this period the miners became an 'alternative' power and contributed significantly to the deepening economic, political and ideological crisis of the conjuncture.

Chapter Five covering 1926-1951, deals with a significant yet relatively neglected period of inquiry. During this period the miners were recomposed from an 'alternative' to 'oppositional' force with the logic of collective action becoming less of struggle and more of compromise. Framed within, though not solely determined by, a period of absolute de-industrialization, the radicalism of trade unionism and politics were reworked along more conciliatory lines through a series of ideological battles amongst the miners. Active, in attempting to manage the options

of de-industrialization and the miners' radicalism was a new logic of state intervention. By the end of this period the basis of class compromise and co-operation were established. The most significant expression of this was found in the miners' active participation in accepting their subordination to capital at the point of production and their capitulation of real control over the labour process.

All historical facts used in Chapter Two to Four, and some in Five, are taken from existing sources. In this sense, most of the 'facts' are 'old'. They ~~are~~ however, for the most part, analyzed, organized and interpreted in 'new' ways that the original authors did not intend (or perhaps would not even agree with). Generally speaking, the shedding of 'new light' on 'old facts' results because: 1) no previous study has attempted to explicitly discuss why the South Side miners' power is the way it is at a specific point in history, 2) no previous study has attempted to focus on miners' power vis-a-vis the identified key institutional sites over such a broad chronological period, and 3) in most major historical works, which focus on some limited historical aspect of the class relations based on the South Side coal industry, there exist a host of implicit and explicit points of debate over the conceptualization of social formation and

key institutional development.

In addition to being somewhat original in the posing of new questions to old facts, this thesis goes beyond the major body of historical studies on the South Side coal industry by going beyond 1926. With the exception of White (1977) and Earle (1984), which deal with aspects of trade unionism and formal politics from 1930 to 1940, and MacEwan (1976), the vast majority of research has focused on periods of intense class confrontation and/or aspects in the miners' rise as a threatening force (up to 1926). Unfortunately very little work focuses on how the miners were recomposed as a non-militant, nonchallenging, accommodating and corporatist type of force. Those aspects of the 'other side of the coin' should not be neglected if a better understanding of the dynamics of class interaction is to be acquired. By being able to see, both, the conflicting and compromising periods--through the broad chronology used in this thesis--it is hoped a better (less distorted, historically specific) understanding of South Side class relations can at least be posed.

Hopefully, this thesis will also prove to be controversial when it poses new questions and light on old facts and understandings. Hopefully, it will lead to discussing an area that needs to be discussed.

--how did and does this class, which was once so radical, become, and continue to be so weak in the 1980s? Hopefully, this thesis, by covering so broad a period, can force, and pose, 'broader' questions which cannot be sustained by the existing historical inquiries of limited chronology.

How strong were the South Side miners at a given point in history? How could the South Side miners, as a class-in-itself, sustain so many types of class action on the threatening to accommodating spectrum? How did the key institutional sites of action and experience contribute to this? What impact does the period of 'compromise' have on the miners of 1985?

CHAPTER ONE

ESTABLISHING A CONCEPTUAL BASIS

"No Theory, No History"

- F. Braudel

As previously noted, the purpose of this chapter is to generally make visible and clearly state the 'method of inquiry' used to select, interpret, and analyze historical facts and the nature of social formation, class power and key social institutional development.

Given that the process of conceiving, both theoretically and methodologically has been done behind the readers' backs, the content of this chapter should be seen as the 'end product' of a process which previously contrasted various conflicting theoretical propositions with historical facts.

Thus, apart from clearly ~~establishing and~~ making visible how the author conceived historical facts, the chapter simultaneously 'cues' the reader how the social formation and key institutions are understood in this thesis. At one and the same time what is being presented is not only how class power and the key institutions have generally been conceived by the author, but how class power, the trade unionism, the formal politics, the nature of state intervention, and the workplace are abstractly conceptualized with reference to South Side miners.

The usage of the propositions in this chapter,

then, are the product of a previous theoretical debate and empirical investigation. As a consequence of using this type of research process this thesis does not implement a commonly used format of 'setting up' a series of theoretical propositions which are subsequently tested against empirical evidence supplied by a case study. Rather, the conceptual propositions contained herein are 'set up' for the reader, not to be tested, but to present the 'basis' of how the areas of focus are understood by the author--to demonstrate how the author thinks and has constructed his version of 'history'.

Generally speaking, the propositions contained in this chapter presented in a way which corresponds from broader to more specific levels of social organization--conceptualizing first, social formation, then, key institutions. Key propositions are elaborated in the footnotes when it was felt by the author that they deserve greater clarification.

Throughout the thesis, particularly with reference to the more specific aspects of class power and key institutions, the theoretical and methodological propositions are illustrated with the selection and discussion of interwoven facts.

(1:1) THE DYNAMICS OF AGENCY AND STRUCTURE

The fundamental unit of analysis for this

thesis is 'social class'; defined generally by a group's relation to the means of production.¹ Implicit in the identification of 'class' as the fundamental social group is the primacy of the means of production as a social structure which loosely determines the character of the complex of institutions to be analyzed in the study of the social formation as a whole.²

The major premise of this thesis is that the predominantly capitalist social formation is a 'structure in process' whose basic organization and 'logic of development' is a product of the dynamic and complex dialectic which exists between the actions³ of the fundamental classes within a reciprocally influencing relation of the structure of the totality.

Thus, the history of the 'structure in process' is a history of the relationship between agency and structure and, is therefore, not a "history without a subject" (to use E. P. Thompson's reference to Althusserian structuralist analysis).⁴

It is a history of "active historical beings, who are 'subject' and 'object' at once, both agents and material forces in objective process" (Wood, 1982:59).

As Murdock, et. al. (1977:16, cited in Clow, 1984:122) note, an understanding of the laws of motion should be based on a reading of Marx which "uses the notion of determinism and conditioning not in the narrow sense but in the much looser sense of setting limits, exerting pressures and closing off options". It is therefore essential to identify the fundamental institutions within the structured totality which at any one moment define, to an extent, the behavior of social groups; as well as identify those actions of the groups which are influential in shaping the transforming character of society. As Clow (1984:123) notes: "an understanding of the mechanics of the capitalist development of a particular social formation requires a detailed knowledge of the specific struggles that produce it."⁵ The analysis must understand how "social relations are structured in particular ways and operate in part behind men's backs" (Johnson, 1979:54); and in turn how the structures are transformed at a particular moment through social action (or lack of) which may or may not be consciously intended by its actors. The analysis must therefore "distinguish organic movements (relatively permanent) from movements which may be termed 'conjunctural' (and which appear as occasional,

immediate, almost accidental)" (Gramsci, 1983:177)⁶

Given the inherently uneven development resulting from the complex reciprocal relation of agency and structure, this understanding of society has implications for the construction of an adequate theory or model of explanation.) As structural reductionist, capital-logic, or determination theories are of extremely limited use when analyzing capitalist development of a particular social formation, this thesis adopts a general approach which has been labelled a theory which is 'contingent' or 'indeterminate' (Jessop, 1982:136), a 'class theoretical' or a "theory of the articulation of the structured totality" (Hall, 1981).⁷ "In this way the theoretical object can be reproduced as the complex synthesis of multiple determinations and is made fully determinate at its chosen level of abstraction and complexity (Jessop, 1982:136). The adoption of such a theoretical system allows for an analysis specific enough to evaluate the reciprocal relation of class agency and capitalist structure; organic tendencies and conjunctural specificities.

Within such a general approach, the understanding of the dynamics of the social formation must grasp the dialectics of such an inherently uneven development through clearly tracing and analyzing

the relationship between the fundamental classes and their actions which are inextricably related to various institutional forces. The development of the social formation which is inherently uneven, as opposed to a dynamic which is inherently teleological or inevitable (the inevitability of socialism included), is a partial result of the centrality of class actions. With respect to the accumulation process Jessop (1983:89) notes:

. . . the accumulation of capital is the complex resultant of the changing balance of class forces in struggle inter-acting with a framework determined by the value or form. . . although the basic parameters of capitalism are defined by the value form, form alone is an inadequate guide to its nature and dynamics . . .

In short, the development of capitalism is not simply the result of the unfolding logic of capital. Its development is not structurally determined, but structurally influential on class acts, which at the same moment of the process, are reciprocally influential. The degree and nature of the reciprocal influence is of course a matter of concrete investigation.

The assertion that social relations structure class struggles must not be interpreted in a mechanical fashion . . . Moreover [the] . . . mechanism of determination is reciprocal in the sense that while the structured totality of economic, ideological, and political relations constitute at each moment of history the conjuncture of class struggles, these struggles in turn have the effect of transforming or preserving these relations. In other words, while objective conditions determine the limits of class struggles;

these struggles can transform such determinations by altering economic, ideological, or political relations.

(Przeworski, 1977:377, 385; brackets mine)

Just as the logic of development within capitalism cannot be pre-determined; the objectively defined economic interests which underpin the actions of classes (in particular the working class) cannot be assumed. In short, while the interests of the fundamental classes can be considered 'opposed' in a structural sense, or 'in the long term'; the immediate economic interests as defined within the objective realities of the conjuncture may not be irreconcilable (to use Przeworski's phrase). The reasons why it may be in the immediate interests of workers to advance capitalism are: 1) capitalism is an economic system in which all members depend on the production and reinvestment of a surplus product in order to maintain the economy and material welfare; 2) the working class has nothing to sell but its labour power for a wage in order to sustain itself; 3) a socialist revolution, necessary for the construction of an alternative economy, may lead to an immediate and prolonged reduction of the material welfare of all members (see Przeworski, 1980a, 1980b; Przeworski and Wallerstein, 1982).

In conjunction with the actions of class,

the uneven development is partially a result of the particular social formation's, or region's, integration within a broader network of forces operating within a provincial, national and/or international context. While the inner logic, or development, of any region or social formation is historically specific; the conditions within which its history is made are not solely a product of the actions of its own members. For example, the South Side miners were influenced by decisions made in Ottawa, Montreal corporate board-rooms, and Washington trade union headquarters. The social formation encounters, shapes and is shaped by the broader forces which are, influential in determining, to some extent, its history. Any attempt to analyze the development of a region must identify key 'outside' economic and political forces which are of central importance in understanding the process of uneven development; or again in Cape Breton's case, underdevelopment. For example, in what way did the inherent tendency of capital to develop unevenly influence the immediate economic options of the South Side miners?

By way of the consideration of the factors contributing to uneven development (the influence of class action; broader social forces). and conceptualization of societal development; E. P. Thompson has noted that "history [as opposed to] simply

class struggle] is its own motor" (brackets mine).

The social formation, then

is not seen as a simple unit . . . , but as a necessarily complex, differentiated, antagonistic 'whole'. The further attempt to trace these general shifts in class relations through to their impact on particular communities, particular fractions of the class, particular local economies, is a crucial stage in the analysis (Clarke et. al, 1979:35).

In the analysis it is essential, at all moments, to not only list the causes which made an 'event', but also attempt to prioritize, explicitly and/or implicitly, the causes in order to "establish some hierarchy of causes which would fix their relation to one another, perhaps to decide which cause, or which category of causes, should be regarded 'in the last resort' or 'in the final analysis' . . . as the ultimate cause, the cause of all causes" (Carr, 1983:90). If not, the analysis, as E. H. Carr notes, is similar to a Kafka novel "in the fact that nothing that happens has any apparent cause" (1983:94).⁸ While this thesis does prioritize the primacy of class relations, hence the economic structuring of social relations, as broadly determining the social formations organization and development, it in no way suggests the specific nature or character of these relations, organizations or development.

. . . intrinsic to the process of expropriation is the process of class struggle, whose specific outcome must, by definition, remain unpredictable. Marxist theory can point us in the direction

of class struggle as the operative principle of historical movement and provide the tools for exploring its effects, but it cannot tell us apriori how that struggle will work out. And indeed, why should it? What Marxist theory tells us is that the productive capacities of society set limits of the possible, and, more specifically, that the particular mode of surplus-extraction is key to social structure. It tells us, too, that class struggle generates historical movement. None of this makes history accidental, contingent, or indeterminate. For example, if the outcome of class struggle is not predetermined, the specific nature, conditions, and terrain of struggle and the range of possible outcomes, certainly are historically determinate . . . (Wood, 1984:105).

In an explicit attempt to move beyond a crude and vulgar economistic reductionist approach, this thesis in no way excludes other key influences, contingencies, etc., or predicts a logic of development without the concrete investigation of 'historical facts' which are specific to key conjunctures. The 'historical fact'; "whose explanation is to be found in past history and in the social conditions of the present" (Gramsci, 1983:224) must be identified in the analysis without sole focus on structure or agency.

A common error in historic-politic analysis consists in an inability to find the correct relation between what is organic and what is conjunctural. This leads to presenting causes as immediately operative which in fact only operate indirectly, or to asserting that the immediate causes are the only effective ones. In the first case there is an excess of "economism", or doctrinaire sedantry; in the second, an excess of "ideologism". In the first case there is an overestimation of mechanical causes, in the second an exaggeration of the voluntarist and individual element . . .

If it is true that man cannot be conceived of except as historically determined man - i.e. man who has developed, and who lives, in certain conditions, in a particular social complex or totality of social relations - is it then possible to take sociology as meaning simply the study of these conditions and the laws which regulate their development? Since the will and initiative of men themselves cannot be left out of account, this notion must be false
(Gramsci, 1983:178,224)

Through this theoretical understanding of history and methodological understanding of historical writing, Marx's famous passage in the essence of the thesis's inquiry.

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past (1977:96)

Any inquiry of a 'structure in process' must be able to illustrate how 'men do make their own history' but in a way that is 'not under circumstances chosen by themselves'.

(1:2) REPRODUCTION AND MAINTENANCE

Within such a dynamic historical conceptualization of agency and structure it is important to stress, that while economic social relations do structure the totality they do not solely determine or reproduce that totality.

Although the economic level is, in this form of society, massively determining, the social relations which characterize such societies of private capital and the market cannot be sustained, recreated, reproduced within the sphere of reproduction alone. The conditions for capitalist production and reproduction of its social relations must be articulated through all levels of the social formation - economic, political, ideological . . . (Hall et. al. 1981:201)

The actions of the class, like the definition of their immediate economic interests, are in no way themselves "predetermined" and are therefore uneven. They are not actions of supports, reflects or trager (bearers) of the economic structure of social relations which objectively identifies or situates their class position. The members of the class are actors whose actions, mediated through a consciousness⁹ - formed through "experiencing" a lived material reality - sustain, recreate, influence and/or destroy key institutions that compose the totality.

\ The concept of 'experience', then, means precisely, that 'objective structures' do something to people's lives [and] . . . that objective determination - the transformation of productive relations and working conditions - never impose themselves

on "some nondescript, undifferentiated raw material of humanity" but on historical beings. The bearers of historical legacies, traditions, and values. This means, among other things, that there are necessarily continuities cutting across all historical transformations, even the most radical, and indeed that radical transformations can be revealed and substantiated precisely - only? - by tracing them within continuities (Wood, 1982:50-58, citing Thompson, 1968:223).

Implicit in the process of 'experience', is therefore, the inextricably embodied processes of socialization, and fetishization, of various social institutions and relations that compose that totality.

To assume that class actions are mediated through consciousness is not to suggest that those actions are based on a 'class consciousness'. Nor should it be assumed that the consequences of various acts were consciously intended or realized before and/or after the act. As Gramsci (1983:333) noted:

The active man-in-the masses has a practical activity, which none the less involves understanding the world in so far as he transforms it. This theoretical consciousness can indeed be historically in opposition to his activity. One might say that he has two theoretical consciousness (or one contradictory consciousness): one which is implicit in his activity and which in reality unites him with all his fellow-workers in the practical transformation of the real world; and one, superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed

Like the totality in which class members interact, their group consciousness is a very dynamic process, continuously being reshaped through the transformation of the lived experience of the material world on

on which it is based. Because of this dynamic it is necessary for analytical reasons that the consciousness possessed by a class will be considered to be composed of a particular type (as opposed to 'levels of a class consciousness'). The specific type of consciousness possessed by a class is defined by the class's particular conceptualization of, or way of thinking about, the social world in reference to the authority of workplace relations at a given conjuncture.¹⁰ This point is of a crucial analytical distinction.

We . . . must recognize that a developed and organized revolutionary working-class consciousness is only one, among many such possible responses, and a specific ruptural one at that. It has been misleading to try to measure the whole spectrum of strategies in the class in terms of this one described form of consciousness and to define everything else as a token of incorporation. This is to impose an abstract scheme onto a concrete historical reality. We must try to understand, instead how, under what conditions, the class has been able to use its material and cultural "raw materials" to construct a whole range of responses (Clarke et. al., 1979:45).

A particular type of consciousness formed through a lived experience guides social action. Different types of consciousness (whether the miners' 'class consciousness' of 1922-1925 or 'paternalistic consciousness' of the pre 1879 period) can hold the possibilities of guiding distinctly different types of class action. The possibilities of distinctly different types of social action, that emerge with

the formation of a particular type of consciousness are always of extreme historical significance; regardless of whether it guides incorporating or militant acts.

To talk of capital is to talk of a social relationship - a relationship based upon the exploitation of one class by another. Social class is, about how people exploit and are exploited and also how they understand this. To split off the one from the other - 'exploitation' and 'understanding' - as if they are in some sense separate spheres of society, is to misunderstand both.
(Nichols and Beynon, 1977:76)

Given the way in which a class experiences a lived material reality, the formation of a particular type of consciousness is inherently uneven and therefore never held homogeneously by all class members (see Clements, 1977 and Meszaros, 1978). Furthermore, as Meszaros (1971:87) stresses, "the failure to understand the dialectic of reciprocal determinations can also result in assigning absolute autonomy to consciousness". While stressing that political and ideological factors are key in any analysis this section has, constantly referred to the economic realities as massively structuring - and hence attempts to avoid an idealist analysis.

While the economic structure is massively determining, the development of capitalism is not simply a result of the 'unfolding logic of capital',

but is effected by class members whose experience of a lived material reality is mediated through consciousness and articulated through action at various institutional sites. At any moment, the totality structures the possible actions economically, ideologically and politically. In this sense Clarke et. al. expand Marx's previously quoted passage so that it takes on a fuller dimension.

A social individual, born into a particular set of institutions and relations, is at the same moment born into a peculiar configuration of meanings, which give her access to and locate her within 'a culture'. . . . Men and women are, thus, formed, and form themselves through society, culture and history Each group makes something of its starting conditions - through this 'making' through this practice, culture is reproduced and transmitted.

(Clarke et. al., 1976:11)

The totality of the social formation must be considered not solely by its economic institutions, but also by the ideas and political relations embodied in these institutions.

By recognizing the objective nature of ideological and political relations, this framework permits us to analyze the effects of these relations upon the process in the course of which classes are continuously organized, disorganized and reorganized (Przeworski, 1977:385).

As a capitalist social formation is fundamentally an economic order, and in its totality a 'cultural order',¹¹ the ideological political dimension of class relations are key elements in the reproduction of

of productive relations. Influenced by the balance of class forces¹² and the development of the capitalist social formation, the form of class interaction

. . . . is not given but made. The subordinate class brings to this 'theatre of struggle' a repertoire of strategies and responses - ways of coping as well as resisting. Each strategy in the repertoire mobilises certain real material and social elements.

(Clarke et. al., 1979:44)

Within the realm of possibilities of social formation, maintenance and reproduction, there can emerge a conjuncture of rupture (a crisis of revolutionary potential), or a conjuncture of hegemony or consensus and compromise (in which the subordinate class actively supports the dominant class). The former witnesses a disjuncture of capitalist productive relations, the latter an expansion of productive relations and a capitalist cultural order in general.

Conceptually, hegemony, "is used as an analytic boundary which constantly circumscribes attempts at resistance and limits their possible outcome" (C. Williams, 1981:20) and can be defined as:

The moment when a ruling class is able to coerce a subordinate class to conform to its interests, but to exert a 'total social authority' over subordinate classes. This involves the exercise of a special kind of power - the power to frame alternatives and contain opportunities, to win and shape consent, so that the granting of legitimacy to the dominant classes appears not only 'spontaneous' but natural and normal A hegemonic cultural order tries to frame all competing definitions of the world within

its range. It provides the horizon of thought and action within which conflicts are thought through, appropriated (i.e. experienced), obscured (i.e. concealed as a "national interest" which should unite all conflicting parties) or contained (i.e. settled to the profit of the ruling class). A hegemonic order prescribes, not the specific content of ideas but the limits within which ideas and conflict move and are resolved. Hegemony always rests on force and coercion, but "the normal exercise of hegemony . . . is characterized by the combination of force and consent . . . without force dominating excessively over consent". (Clarke et. al., 1976:38-39 citing Gramsci 1971:80)

Hegemony is an active process which is constantly being reworked through negotiation, resistance and struggle. The development and maintenance of hegemony involves a continual struggle for influence over the ideas, perceptions and values of the members of the different classes (Hunt, 1976:180). While fundamentally based on the economic foundations of capitalism--the structure of dependence imposed on the wage labourer (Przeworski, 1980:126)--hegemony is not a given, but must be 'made'. Based on the economic foundations of hegemony--the necessity of profit for 'universal expansion' capitalists can appear as bearers of the 'universal interest' (Przeworski, 1977:375 citing Gramsci's ideas): Class relations, like all social relations, "constitute structures of choices within which people perceive, evaluate, and act". Therefore, under "normal" circumstances when hegemony is not threatened, this exercise of coercion is

masked by the appearance of "voluntary" conformity with the requirements of capitalist development. Even when force is used, "the attempt is always made to ensure that force will appear to be based on the consent of the majority, expressed by the so-called organs of public opinion".

(Przeworski, 1980a:59 citing Gramsci, 1971:80)

Within the realm of possibilities of social formation maintenance and reproduction, it is possible to have the productive relations reproduced without having a hegemonic order established. The extreme variant of this moment would be one in which the system is reproduced through the coercion of a militant, perhaps 'class consciousness' working class; as was the case from 1922 to 1925 in the South Side. With reference to this moment Gramsci (1983:275,276) has commented:

That aspect of the modern crises which is bemoaned as a "wave of authority". If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer "leading but only dominant" exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the great masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies and no longer believe what they used to consist precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.

It is also possible that the social formation may experience a severe economic crisis, yet not a crisis of authority, or a possible crisis of revolutionary potential; as in the post World War II period of the South Side.

Thus Gramsci argues that the most favourable conjunctures for proletarian revolution do not necessarily occur in those countries where capitalism is most

advanced but may emerge instead where certain structural weakness in the fabric of the capitalist system make it least able to resist an attack by the working class and its allies (1978:345). Likewise, although economic crises may cause the state to tremble and/or objectively weaken it, they cannot in themselves create revolutionary crises or produce great historical events (Gramsci, 1971:184,199,233,235,238). Instead the impact of economic crises depends on the strength of the institutions of civil society as well as political institutions and on the resulting balance of social forces (Gramsci, 1971:230-239,243,257-270) . . . This means that a revolutionary movement cannot restrict itself to economic struggles but must combine them with political and ideological struggles . . . (Jessop, 1982:145)

As Carnoy (1984:79) elaborates:

. . . crises could only lead to action if mass consciousness was there, and ready to go into action - so it was development of this consciousness that would produce revolutionary change, not the declining rate of profit . . . increased impoverishment is only one element in the possibilities for raising this consciousness.

In short, the possibilities of 'crisis' must be understood in the same way as the general development of capitalism. There exists no predetermined logic which inevitably sends the forces of production into ultimate conflict and contradiction with the relations of production. Rather, such a contradiction is made through specific acts of classes and must be considered within the specific, economic and political and ideological context of the conjuncture in which they arise.

It is in the consideration of the 'structure in process' through the general dynamic historical

framework suggested here, that Williams (1977:121) stresses a key methodological point:

In authentic historical analysis it is necessary at every point to recognize the complex inter-relations between movements and tendencies both within and beyond a specific and effective dominance.

To rework Williams' terms, such an analysis must distinguish between class movements which are 'traditional' (elements of class acts which arise from and reproduce past class relation), 'oppositional' (class actions which emerge in response, but within the framework of an effective bourgeois dominance), and 'alternative' (actions which confront and challenge and are outside of the framework of the effective bourgeois dominance). Such an analysis must identify both key organic movements and conjunctural specificities which are influential in shaping class relations and actions within the generally identified process of the capitalist social formation's development.

(1:3) CENTRAL AREA OF FOCUS

By paying close attention to key influences in the broad development of the social formation through the general conceptual framework established above, it will be possible to analyze, in a more limited scope, a fundamental shift in the balance of class forces arising from the productive relations of the South Side Cape Breton coal mining labour process (CMLP). Of central focus in the analysis are 'key' institutional sites of experience and action¹³ which, within the general context of the transforming social formation, are highly influential in the organization and disorganization of class power. Through the identification of fundamental organizational changes in the workplace, trade union, state intervention into labour disputes, and formal politics; important aspects of the general development and transformation of the miners' power will be traced and analyzed. In this sense, the analysis is one in which, several important institutions are specifically analyzed in relation to the broader economic, political and ideological forces that structure the totality--in an attempt to suggest how and why the miners as a class developed and transformed into an 'alternative' and subsequently recomposed into an 'oppositional' force.

Given the particular process to be studied, the limited scope of inquiry distorts the fuller understanding of the developments of class forces, for it highlights acts and experiences at certain institutional sites while neglecting an adequate study of other institutions of the civil society. Therefore it is important at all times to be aware of the limitation imposed by such a restricted scope of study, and at the very least establish the broad context in which the specific acts and experiences emerged.

As a consequence of the thesis' narrow focus on the four institutions, this study cannot concretely examine or explain the way a class, or more specifically, the miners' consciousness and power is formed.¹⁴ Instead the thesis will only suggest how the miners' consciousness and power is influenced by the experiences and actions at the key institutional sites.¹⁵

Central to the understanding of class forces is the organization of the workplace or production process.¹⁶ Within a capitalist framework, the general logic of development is one that is structured by the quest for profit. Therefore as Jessop (1983:89) previously noted, class actions are implicitly structured but not solely defined or determined by the value form. In short, the development of a specific organization of production is shaped through a process of

negotiation, resistance, and struggle amongst classes within a reciprocally influencing value form. It is in this understanding that Marx (1977:225) discussed one aspect of the workplace; the length of the working day:

There is here, therefore, an antinomy, right against right, both equally bearing the seal of the law of exchanges. Between equal rights force decides. Hence is it that in the history of capitalist production, the determination of what is a working day, presents itself as the result of struggle, a struggle between collective capital, i.e., the class of capitalists, and collective labour, i.e., the working class.

Given the nature of workplace development a general discussion of labour process organization involves the question of power and control. From the outset, the problem is a complex one, as Friedman (1977:82,83) notes:

The word 'control' has caused confusion when applied to productive activity because it has been used in both an absolute sense, to identify those 'in control' and in a relative sense, to signify the degree of power which people have to direct work . . . Top managers are still 'in control' in that they, in their role as representatives of capital, continue to initiate changes in work arrangements and continue to exercise authority over the work activity of others. Also the products of workers' labour still belong to the capitalists. On the other hand, one wants to allow the possibility that changes in organization of work or decisions about work may increase the power which workers may exercise to act within production according to their own judgement and their own will (over such things as their work pace) the particular tasks they do and the order in which they do that work . . . The notion of relative control is also complicated by the desire to identify 'progressive' changes from the workers' point of view . . .

On this point it may be useful to distinguish changes in work organisation and decision making which workers have fought for, and those which managers have initiated . . .

For the purposes of this study, 'control' will be discussed in a 'formal' and a 'real' sense. Discussion of 'formal' aspects of control will deal with the nature of power relations that loosely structure the productive relations. Included are considerations of the social aspects of capital structure at various levels (from individual local ownership to monopoly and the class respective repertoire of strategies). 'Real' aspects of control will be discussed relatively, through reference to previously existing organizations of the CMLP. In this sense the study of the 'real control' is a study (to use Gooderich's term) of the invisible frontier of control; "a frontier which is defined and redefined in a continuous process of pressure and counter pressure, conflict and accommodations" (1975:26).

When it is considered that the influencing class actions are guided by a consciousness and forces formed in and outside of the point of production (see Williams, 1981:25), the dynamics of workplace organization acquires its full dimension. Within the framework of competitive capitalist social relations in general:

conflict occurs within the definite limits imposed by a social and historical context. Yet this context rarely determines everything about work organization. After technological constraints,

the discipline of the market, and other forces have been taken into account, there remains a certain indeterminacy to the labour process (Edwards, 1979:15)

Given this, the workplace, at any particular conjuncture can be an 'arena' of class conflict or a 'contested terrain' as in 1938 when mechanization of the CMLP was resisted; or it could also be an 'arena of class compromise' or 'accommodating terrain' as in 1948 when mechanization was accepted. The particular description is one that must be defined by the specific examination of the historically dynamic and concrete reality in which it exists. The workplace, then being the basis of massively determining economic structure is a social process. It is the product of a 'social and historical context' that is economically, politically and ideologically defined.

A key moment in its development, and the balance of class forces in general, occurs if workers begin to negotiate working conditions through collective action. With this single social reorganization from individual resistance, as in the pre 1879 period of paternalism, to collective struggle, as in the post 1879 years; the social order contains dynamic possibilities. Influenced by the experienced reality of the totality in which they live and work, the workers seek to influence and shape their existence as a group. At this moment, such as in the 1880s when South Side

miners unionized, the formation of a group creates an expanded arsenal of possible resistive and aggressive strategies.

In general structural terms, the workers organize "not as producers but as wage earners" (to use Gramsci's phrase) and thus the formation of a trade union is a reactive response to immediate conditions defined within capitalist relations. However, from this social group arise a number of potential acts, none of which can be assumed. It cannot be assumed that the workers are immediately class conscious, a class-for-itself, and will begin to 'fight it out', as they did from 1922 to 1925. Nor can it be assumed that an organization of wage earners inherently accept capitalist social relations and collectively bargain in a way defined by Hyman (1975:121) as "the art of the possible within a narrowly defined framework for possibility". From a structural standpoint it must constantly be recognized that "trade unions are dialectically both in opposition to capitalism and a component of it" (Anderson, 1967:264). Therefore, if a union becomes an organization which solely negotiates wages within the fluctuating market, as in the 1880s or 1940s, its actions cannot be considered 'natural' or organizationally inherent. Rather, such actions are a product of its historical development.

For analytical purposes (following Freeman, 1982) an investigation of a union must analyze causes external and internal which have influenced its development at any one point. Such an analysis incorporates not only state and class relations, but also the political and ideological history of the organization's members. If a trade union appears to be 'economistic', 'incorporated' or 'apolitical', the analysis:

should explain precisely how and in what sense capitalism has driven a wedge between the economic and the political - how and in what sense essentially political issues like the disposition of powers to control production and appropriation; or the allocation of social labour and resources, have been cut off from the political arena and displaced to a separate 'sphere'.
(Wood, 1981:67)

As with the emergence of a trade union, the state's¹⁷ influence in defining the nature of the balance of class forces, is extremely significant. The state is key in reproducing and shaping the political, economic and ideological conditions necessary for the reproduction of a historically specific 'social order' based on capitalist social relations. In this sense:

Gramsci speaks of the capitalist state as 'the instrument for conforming civil society to the economic structure'. That is to say, the state plays a critical role in shaping social and political life in such a way as to favour the continued expansion and reproduction of capitalist social relations (Hall et. al., 1981:261).

While the actions of the state act in the interests of capital its development is not

epiphenomenal.¹⁸ "As Guiseppe Vacca (1982:56-57) notes with implicit reference to Gramsci:

If, therefore, there is a basic historical correspondence between economic and political forms; if the state is composed of institutions which allow the dominant class to realize its unity; if the politically dominant class is always the one which dominates in the relations of production, all this is still insufficient to determine the concrete forms of the state. The particular features of the state derive in fact, from the ways in which the rulers and the ruled relate, relations in which the balance of power changes.

In attempts to reproduce and maintain the social order, state action involves a combination of methods based on force, as in 1922-1925, and consent (active participation), as in pre 1909 or post World War II years. The specific nature of the combination is defined by the balance of class forces and the nature of class action. As a result the relation between the two modes is dynamic and uneven. It is therefore important to realize that consensus and coercion are not separate and distinct methods; "consensus is not the opposite of--it is the complementary face of domination" (Hall et. al., 1981: 216).

Given the possible context in which state forms develop, a state based on coercion has limitations, while one based on consensus is more expansive. The transformation to methods based on consensus implies the necessary inclusion of a variety of class interests, and occurs through the uneven process of resistance,

struggle and negotiation between classes. With the emergence of consensual methods, the state is 'recomposed' politically and ideologically; as in 1898 when miners were able to vote in elections.

Generally speaking, this historical moment of recomposition marks the initial emergence of the 'liberal democracy' as the principal politics of maintaining social order. At this point, broad based political parties form; working class action enters the terrain of the state, and the masses actively participate in the reorganized state through political alliances with other classes and/or fractions through participation in formal politics. In addition it is extremely important to note that the masses acquire rights within a bourgeois legal framework that are defined by the judicial system.

As with the state in general it is important to note that the nature of law (labour relations law in particular) is a product and instrument of class struggle, which develops unevenly through being formed and forming the relations of class power:

If every state tends to create and maintain a certain type of civilization and of citizen (and hence of collective life of industrial relations), and to eliminate certain customs and attitudes and to disseminate others, then the law will be its instrument for this purpose (together with the school system, and other institutions and activities). (Gramsci, 1983:246)

Embodied in this legal process of state intervention; through various bureaucratic departments, judicial systems, commissions of inquiry, and 'legitimate coercion' by the police, are aspects of coercion and ideology (see Hunt, 1976:180). "The rules of law not only define social relations but confer rights and powers upon certain categories of individuals" (Hunt, 1976:182).

With respect to the inextricably linked emergence of formal politics, vis-a-vis parliamentary representation, the working class through the party system has its interest (however they may define them) represented. As 'interests' are consciously defined through the workers' experiences and therefore imply ideological and economic considerations within a conjunctureally defined set of options they may in fact choose to support parties which represent a fraction of the capitalist class such as the Liberal or Conservative parties. On the other hand, they may form and choose to be represented by a party based fundamentally on working class interests; such as the Independent Labour Party of 1917. Given this dynamic of political representation,

the history of a party, in other words, can only be the history of a particular social group. But this group is not isolated; it has friends, kindred groups, opponents, enemies. The history of any party can only emerge from the complex

portrayal of the totality of society and state
... (Gramsci, 1983:151)

The party, then, like the state in general, the trade union and the workplace are distinct yet never separate institutions. While at a very general level they all embody distinct types of behaviour, they are fundamentally interrelated through class interaction. Given this, when discussed with reference to specific case studies, the particular nature and relationship with each other is one that is defined through concrete investigation.

(1:4) SUMMARY

The general conceptual framework has basically argued that the social formation at any one moment is a product of class action in reciprocal interaction with the structured totality. The specific content and form of the social formation's organization and development is based on the balance of class forces and therefore any dynamic transformation of the social order must be analyzed in its economic, political, and ideological complexity.

Within the thesis' more limited problematic is an analysis, which incorporates the understanding of social formation transformation as discussed above, at 'key' institutional sites of experience and action. Based on a prior investigation of the CMLP's history, these specific institutions have been identified, in a very direct way, as sites which have been extremely influential in the process of class interaction. They have been identified as key because they were all (as opposed to other institutions), directly involved and distinctly significant in the shaping of South Side miners' power. By focusing on how these sites were influenced by and influential in the formation and transformation of workers' consciousness and various acts at a number of historic conjunctures it will

be possible to trace and analyze key moments in the dynamic of miners' power.

The following four chapters, then, analyze the transformation of miners' power. The chapters are organized in a way which generally reflects the development of that power. Chapter Two examines key moments of the identified institutions which were influential in establishing the 'traditions' of class relations (pre 1879-1898). Chapter Three examines the emergence and establishment of an 'oppositional' force (1899-1921). Chapter Four examines the rise of an 'alternative' force amongst South Side miners (1922-1925). Chapter Five examines the recomposition of this militant solidarity into a less threatening and challenging power (1926-1951).

By way of this format, which explicitly recognizes the severe analytical problems of such crude categorizations of a dynamic and uneven process, the very basic conceptual framework will be greatly elaborated and expanded through the implicit and explicit interweaving of theory and historical facts.

NOTES

1. Within the context of this thesis, class is objectively defined by a group's relationship to the means of production. Fundamentally, the two classes in this case study are the capitalists, who rent the mines from the state, and own the means of production through stock ownership, labour power as well as the mined coal; and workers or miners, who sell their labour power for a wage in the form of piece rate, or salary, or combination of both.

As such, this definition refers to a 'class-in-itself'. In order to clarify the meaning of this concept, and how it is different from the polemics established by key writers, (such as Przeworski [especially 1977]), and Thompson (1978), to name only a few it is possible to objectively identify class by economic criteria, and at the same time not assume the class's political or ideological nature, nor assume its future behavior or interests. All three writers, in an attempt to construct a polemic on which to argue a radically opposed view (whatever that may be), attack the crudest and most vulgar Marxist interpretation of class. This variant of Marxism, is indeed quite rare, but is quite useful to demonstrate the importance of agency in the formation of a social formation. For example, Przeworski (1977:348) comments:

In the deterministic version, objective relations necessarily become transferred into relations define interest and since politics is a struggle about realization of interests it becomes a matter of deduction that objective positions, the positions in the relations of production, become "reflected" in expressed interests and political actions one way or another, sooner or later, objective class relations spontaneously "find expression" at the level of political activity and consciousness.

What he is attempting to demonstrate is the severe analytical limitations, when the class interests, politics and ideology are assumed. In an effort to resolve this problem (and in a way made famous by Thompson) he recognizes (p.343) that:

economic, political and ideological conditions jointly structure the realm of struggles that have as their effect the organization, disorganization or reorganization of classes. Classes must thus be viewed as effects of struggles structured by objective conditions that are simultaneously economic, political and ideological.

Ironically, in an attempt to counter an economistic perspective which reduces a class-for-itself into a class-in-itself, Przeworski reduces a class-in-itself into a class-for-itself.

This thesis argues that both conceptual positions are extremes and polemics in every sense of the word. Furthermore, this thesis identifies class objectively but realizes that the politics and consciousness are formed through the experience of a complex and historic material reality.

In short, class is identified objectively, and methodologically and acts as a unit of analysis used to reference the influenced and influencing behaviour of their groups. Class is always present, regardless of whether or not the group is conscious of that sociological fact. A particular type of consciousness and range of behaviour is not always held by a class. Assumptions regarding ideology and politics are always based on concrete investigation.

2. Although primacy is given to class relations, and it is assumed that the economic social structure loosely defines the nature of the social formation, the thesis' conceptual framework does in no way suggest explicitly or implicitly that all social action can be analyzed with reference to class. In fact this thesis admits there exists a wide range of social actions that 'Marxist' or 'Gramscian' perspectives cannot comprehend, except in a most crude and vulgar way.

The most serious handicap, as defined by immediately practical relations; is a full comprehension of the structure of gender relations. While it is, of course, possible to define a group's relation by class and discuss members with reference to their spouses' class affiliation (in which case a class analysis is stretched to its breaking

point) to analyze gender relations. Such attempts must be considered crude and vulgar. If the researcher is truly interested in studying the gender structure of power; gender and not class must be the unit of analysis. While gender and class relations of power do intersect they are, for the most part two distinct structures of power which cannot be reduced into the logic of the other.

3. By actions, it is meant not only struggle between classes; but also class behaviour which is resistive, accommodating, compromising and negotiating. Resistance refers to those actions which are reactive to situations not immediately created by the class. Struggle refers to those actions which are aggressive and active in nature. It is assumed that the working class is always 'present at its own making' (to use Thompson's phrase out of context). This included periods in which they consciously acted in a direct way against capitalist class power, as well as periods when they consciously support the actions of capitalists. To emphasize and analyze key moments in the transformation of the social formation at only conjunctures in which struggle occurred is to romanticize the history of the working class, and by definition, exclude most of their history. Periods of struggles are of course, extremely important moments to analyze; but they are also relatively rare moments.
4. Hence, implicit throughout this thesis is an argument against 'vulgar marxism' (see Hobsbawm, 1973), 'scientific socialism' (see Przeworski, 1977) or 'Newtonian Marxism' (see Thompson, 1978). By this it is meant that any understanding of history which is teleological, inherently determined or evolutionary and defined solely by a mode of production independent of human action and will. Such perspectives are 'fetishizations' which assume a logic of motion that is based solely on the appearance of historical development. Implicit in such an understanding is a conceptual model best described as a 'self-generating conceptual universe' which is 'idealist' (see Thompson, 1978: 13). To argue against an analysis which is 'structural reductionist' or even 'structural abstractionist' (to use Miliband's reference to the 'early Polantz'as') is not to reduce the necessity

of neglecting an understanding of determination of economic social relations' (as Mouffe, 1983 would have us do). By going beyond this narrow conception, we do not have to go to the other extreme (E. G. 'Mouffe, 1983), which is not only 'beyond Gramsci' (to use Mouffe's phrase) but arguably beyond the fields of sociology and history; and maybe beyond Foucault (if that is possible!).

Productive forces established the ultimate conditions of the possible, but the range of productive relations that can be sustained by any set of productive forces is quite broad; and the various changes in production relations that have occurred cannot be explained simply by reference to the development of productive forces (Wood, 1984:102).

In short, it is possible to identify social relations which are fundamentally 'economic' without having to give them sole influence or determination (see forthcoming article by Peter Meiskins and Ellen Wood, 'Beyond Class? A Reply to Chantal Mouffe'; cited in Wood, 1983). It is also, therefore possible to distinguish between what is known as "production 'as such' or 'in general' and production as it exists, as a social process in socially and historically determinate forms" (Wood, 1981:71 referring to Capital 3 p.818) and retain a Marxist perspective of development which is not unilinear.

5. In short, what Clow and other 'marxists' social analyses want is an interpretation of history and society which incorporates the movements of the working class. Hence it is an argument against what has been identified (Panitch, 1981 and Schmidt, 1981, in the SPE special issue) as a 'Schumpertarian' understanding of development, in which the dominant behaviour of elite capitalists are, for the most part, the focus of economic and societal development (see also Foster, 1984 for an excellent overview of this trend in Canadian Political Economy). Such a 'one sided' analysis, largely exemplified by the 'young' Clement (of 1975 and 1977 works) and Naylor (1972) is guilty of "inverting moments within a process" (to use Marx's phrase from The German Ideology); thus inherently, a bourgeois interpretation. However, to accuse these writers of 'leading us down the

Bourgeois path' is not really significant. If they wish to construct such a path that is their choice, whether we choose to follow it is of our own, and not their, making.

To create a historical understanding based on the actions of the 'great men' has long been established.

Ch. Kingsley succinctly put in his inaugural lecture as professor of history at Cambridge in 1811: "The new science of little men can be no science: because the average man is not the normal man, and never yet has been: because the great man is rather the normal man, as approaching more nearly than his fellow to the true "normal" and standard of a complete human character . . . to turn to the mob of your theory of humanity is (I think) about as wise as to ignore the Apollo and the Thesis, and to determine the proportions of the human figure from a crowd of dwarfs and cripples". (Stedman Jones in 'History: The Poverty of Empiricism')

What this thesis argues, following Clow and the many others is that; an analysis of the history of a capitalist social formation must include at every conjuncture an analysis of working class and capitalist class actions. In the words of J. B. McLachlan, the one time leader of the Nova Scotian coal miners;

I believe in education for action. I believe in telling children the truth about the history of the world, that it does not consist of the history of kings or lords or cabinets. It consists of the mass of the workers, a thing that is not taught in the schools. I believe in telling children how to measure value, a thing that is not taught in any school.

Any analysis must include the 'dialectics' of class relations. In the same vein, as Sacouman argued in the same SPE issue as Schmidt and Panitch, any analysis that claims to be national in scope must include the working class movements in all regions and not just "Upper Canada". Two recent examples of this "Upper Canadian Political Economy" with respect to working class formation and mining

are by Drache (1984) and Clement (1983) respectively.

Drache, in his article "The Formation and Fragmentation of the Canadian Working Class: 1820-1920", discusses Maritime development on the opening page, then on the second page notes that, "Although the Maritimes had developed a surprisingly sophisticated labour force with its own traditions and institutional features, by the end of the nineteenth century the exodus to central Canada had already begun." On the same page (in fact on the next line) Drache proceeds to reduce the Maritime working class to the concept of "reserve army of labour" for Central Canada. He then (two sentences later) says "while significant in their own right, restrictions of space do not allow elaboration of the events that led to the Maritimes acting as a labour reserve for the rest of Canada." In the accompanying footnote he refers the reader to the well known Sacouman and Brym (1979) edited volume and other work. He includes "The role of women in the development of Atlantic Canada's labour market is examined by M. Patricia Connelly and Martha MacDonald, "Women's Work: Domestic and Wage Labour in a Nova Scotia Community". Needless to say the article continues to analyze the 'Canadian' working class without discussing the Maritimes. From the perspective of Maritime Political Economy such an article is commonplace. The 'Upper Canadian' political economist reduces the Maritime labour movement to the level of a reserve army of labour, says for 'restrictions of space' he cannot elaborate (restrictions which are self imposed); and to top it off reduces the role of women in Maritime development to one article! It is unscholarly work such as this which is responsible for the ever increasing disrespect Upper Canadian political economists are receiving by many of their Maritime counterparts.

In the case of 'Canadian' mining, under the title "The Subordination of Labour in Canadian Mining" Clement (1983) states in the opening line of his introduction that the paper "traces class transformations within Canadian mining by using International Nickel Company as a case study." While he does make a brief reference to other types of mining in other regions, the paper, for the most part deals with INCO.

While not as bold as Drache, the fundamental problem

when analyzed from a regional perspective, is the rather large claim of studying a problem on a national level and the subsequent exclusion of the Maritimes from the analyses.

6. The conjuncture can be defined as the set of circumstances which determine the market in a given phase, provided that these are conceived of as being in movement, i.e. as constituting a process of ever-changing combinations a process which is the economic cycle . . . In Italian the meaning of 'favorable or unfavorable economic situation (occasions)' remains attached to the word 'conjuncture'. Difference between 'situation' and 'conjuncture': the conjuncture is the set of immediate and ephemeral characteristics of the economic situation . . . Study of the conjuncture is thus more closely linked to immediate politics, to 'tactics' and agitation, while the 'situation' relates to 'strategy' and propaganda, etc. (Gramsci, 1983:177)

The study of history, is the study of the transforming relationship of conjunctural realities within organic tendencies. History is, in the words of Carr (1983:87), a "study of causes". Implicit, is theory which selects and identifies 'key' historical facts and 'key' historical moments; explicit in the process is the theoretical analyses of these key facts and moments. In short, as Paul Willis (1978) states:

There is no truly untheoretical way in which to 'see' an 'object'. The 'object' is only perceived and understood through an internal organization of data, mediated by conceptual constructs and ways of seeing the world. The final account of an object says as much about the observer as it does about the object itself.

In this sense:

The facts of history cannot be purely objective, since they become facts of history only by virtue of the significance attached to them by the historian. Objectivity in history --if we are still to use the conventional

term--cannot be an objectivity of fact, but only of relation, of the relation between fact and interpretation, between past, present, and future. I need not revert to the reasons which led me to reject as unhistorical the attempt to judge historical events by erecting an absolute standard of values outside history and independent of it. But the concept of absolute truth is also not appropriate to the world of history--or, I suspect, to the world of science. It is only the simplest kind of historical statements that can be judged absolutely true or false. In a more sophisticated level, the historian who contests, say, the verdict of one of predecessors will normally condemn it, not as absolutely false, but as inadequate or one-sided or misleading or the product of a point of view which has been rendered obsolete or irrelevant by later evidence. (Carr, 1983:120)

"Objectivity", if the term is to be used, is a result of consistent relation between levels of general and technical (to use Parson's terms) methodology and theory.

Within the thesis's framework it is understood that social formation development is a dynamic continuous and complex process. In order to analyze this process the analysis will be historical (in reference to time) and comparative (in relation to the various conjunctures). Key historical facts will be analyzed within the context of key conjunctures; and in turn related and compared (to other key conjunctures), in order to trace and grasp a sense of development. Implicit in the identification of a key fact and a key conjuncture is theory. This 'conceptualization' implies 'taking stock' of the various elements identified, and then comparing them to another, or series of historical moments in order to explicitly illustrate the transformation of the process. The exploration of the changes are guided and informed by the theoretical framework. From a methodological standpoint this implies 'charting' the changes in economic, political and ideological forces, and the specific movement at the particular institutions, with reference to the transformation of working class power.

7. This thesis opposes 'theories of determination --in which determined and determinate concepts exist--in a way that are "not properties of the real world but are properties of theoretical systems" (Jessop, 1982:136). On theoretical as well as moral grounds the general framework adopted argues against Hegelian readings of Marx and those perspectives which consider individuals and groups as passive trager (see in particular Thompson, 1978 especially p.97).
8. In a similar view Anderson (1980:10) notes "Brecht once remarked that if human behaviour appears unpredictable, it is not because there are no determinations, but because there are too many."
9. In this context, ideology refers to not only 'systems of thought', 'conceptions of the world' etc. (see Hall, 1978:46) but also the broad forces responsible for its production (see Williams, 1978). Thus ideology, is a concept which operates, in this thesis, at a high level of abstraction and refers to a cultural definition of societal organization possessed by a class(es). Consciousness, as it used in this thesis, is a 'lower level of concept' which refers specifically to the way in which the authority of workplace relations is concretely defined at a particular period in history.
10. To elaborate; it is meant that at any one moment in history the objectively identified class, has formed and is subject to a particular definition and understanding of "workplace authority". Given that this definition is constantly being reworked the possibility of a number of definitions, hence types of consciousness can exist throughout a historical period.
11. The 'culture' of a group or a class is the peculiar and distinctive 'way of life' of the group or class, the meanings, values and ideas embodied in institutions, in social relations, in systems of beliefs, in morals and customs, in the uses of objects and material life. Cultures is the distinctive shapes in which this material and social organization

of life expresses itself . . . these structures
- of social relationships and of meaning
- shape the on-going collective existence
of groups . . . culture, then, embodies the
trajectory or group life through history:
always under conditions and with 'raw materials'
which cannot wholly be of its own making.
(Clarke et. al., 1980:10,11)

12. Class, or more specifically, miners' power refers to the degree of ability that miners have to challenge and undermine the authority of the capitalist class. Such power, is identified by a comparison of the miners' repertoire of strategies at various points in history. The balance of class forces refers to the the historically comparative degree to which the fundamental classes exploit/subordinate or challenge (economically, politically and ideologically) the other.

13. Based on a prior understanding of the CMLP's history these institutions have been defined as key because they, unlike others in the social formation, were directly influential in shaping the basic nature of the balance of class forces. It is within these dynamic institutions that many, though of course not all, significant influences within the broader structural forces occurred.

14. As consciousness is a dynamic and continuous process, such a conceptualization is a theoretical abstraction. It can only be conceptualized as a variety of 'rational abstractions' which are defined in reference to an established criteria. In this case, the particular content of the miners' definition of work place authority will be operationalized by

1) examining the District and/or Provincial union executives' perspective on: the mining company; its officials and owners, the state, the larger social formation; with reference to the members of the union.

2) assessing the degree of support by the rank and file for the union executives' perceptions.

The content of the union executive's definition of workplace authority, and the support (or lack thereof) by the rank and file can be constructed by loosely examining the areas listed below:

PROVINCIAL OR DISTRICT 'UNION EXECUTIVES'
PERSPECTIVE'

- content of union meetings (especially Annual Conventions)
- motions passed/supported/forwarded
- motions rejected/voted against/ vetoed
- content of issue and type of action proposed
- content of public addresses, statements
- content of personal correspondence
- content and type of involvement in politics
- content of other forms of communication such as newspapers

RANK AND FILE degree of support

- content of union meetings (especially Annual Conventions)
- attendance
- motions forwarded/supported/passed
- motions rejected/voted against/vetoed
- forms of action taken on
- resistance
- negotiation/compromise
- struggle/strike
 - reason (wages, productive relations, sympathy)
 - length
 - numbers participating
- form of strike
 - procedure in accordance to established legal or traditional framework
 - slowdown strike
 - hundred percent strike
 - wildcat
 - sabotage
 - absenteeism
- degree of support for executive in public addresses
- degree of support for executive in politics
- participation in politics
 - degree of support by the content of party platform

By looking at these areas, in key moments, and in relation to other key conjunctures, the degree of support by the miners for a definition hence the particular type of miners' consciousness can be established for that particular moment under study.

15. For the purposes of this narrow focus of the formation of miners' consciousness and the nature of the miners' power through lived material reality, this study takes into consideration;

1) WORKPLACE

- industrial relations of company (aspects of formal control)
- organization of the workplace/production process (aspects of real control)
 - hours of work
 - method of payment
 - types of work
 - degree of control over labour process
 - organization of supervision
 - organization of work groups
 - organization of technology

2) TRADE UNION (at a District level)

- relations with International
- ability to realize and maintain demands
- degree of democracy (the capacity for the rank and file's demands to be expressed by the executive)

3) STATE (Federal and Provincial)

- industrial relations intervention (legal/coercion)
- method of resolving labour disputes
- method of regulating labour and coal market

4) FORMAL POLITICS

- organization of party system at and between both levels
- various platforms of parties
- degree of class interest and alliance vis-a-vis various parties
- degree of support for various parties
- degree of articulation and success of miner support by party

For a theoretical discussion of these sites and experiences see: Hall et. al. (1981) with reference to the state and politics; Hunt (1976 and 1981) with references to the law; Marx (1975), Nichols and Beynon (1977), and (with limitations) Burawoy (1979) with reference to the work place; Clements (1978), Williams (1981), and Freeman (1982) with reference to the trade unions. With general reference to the overall process of fetishization see Marx (1977), Olman (1980), and Meszaros (1971).

16. By production process it is meant not only the labour process but also valorization process (see Friedman, 1977).

17. The state is a complex of institutions, including government but also including bureaucracy (embodied in the civil service as well as in public corporations, central banks, regulating commissions, etc.) the military, the judiciary, representative assemblies, and subcentral government (Panitch, 1977:6).

This thesis distinguishes between a federal state, and a provincial (subcentral) state. While each is somewhat interrelated; they are fairly autonomous.

18. As Gramsci (1983:381) notes;

The claim, presented as an essential postulate of historical materialism, that every fluctuation of politics and ideology can be presented and expanded as an immediate expression of the structure, must be contested in theory as primitive infantilism and combated in practice with authentic testimony of Marx, the author of concrete political and historical works.

In this sense, the logic of state development, is conceptualized in a way similar to Hall (1981), Gramsci (1983) and Sassoon (1978). Thus, an argument against 'capital logic' theories of state development; such as Halloway and Picciotto (1977), Muller and Neussuss (1975) and Blanke et. al. (1978), is implicit in this thesis.

CHAPTER TWO

FROM AN INDIVIDUAL TO A COLLECTIVE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS:
THE TRADITIONS OF PATERNALISM, PRE 1879-1898

"The foolishly elated directors chuckled over the easy success which attended their first endeavour to add to the already handsome dividends, and unwisely came to the conclusion that the men were as clay in the hands of the potter . . . The response to the announcement was immediate; the men came out as a single unit . . ."

- Robert Drummond, 1926:27

The scope of this chapter includes a province wide--not just South Side--focus. This is a period in which the key institutions and broader class relations based on the coal industry initially emerged. Given that most activity in this dynamic process was located outside of the South Side, and on the mainland, it is felt a province wide focus is necessary to grasp the historic beginnings of the key institutions.

Theoretically it is important to stress that the unit of analysis for this study is class-in-itself (as distinguished from the polemics of 'Althuserian' and 'Thompsonian' conceptions exemplified in Thompson, 1968 and Przeworski, 1977). Identification of the miners, as a working class, is based solely on their relationship to the means of production. A specific ideology, or consciousness, politics, and definition of economic interests possessed by the miners is therefore not assumed, nor required for the miners to be a class. While class is structurally determined, the politics and ideology of the class are not. As a consequence, one of the tasks which results from this type of conceptualization vis-a-vis the concerns of this thesis is the need to trace the politics and

consciousness of the miners throughout their history in order to concretely define what they were at, various historic periods and in relation to the key institutional sites of action and experience. A broader aspect of this process of concretely defining the consciousness and politics of the miners--particularly with a project that covers such a broad chronology--is to constantly keep in mind that the politics and consciousness are dynamic and everchanging. Given the broad concerns of this thesis--to trace the miners' power--Williams (1977:121) stress on constantly keeping in mind, explicitly and implicitly, the movements and tendencies of the balance of class forces is 'crucial in the thesis' analysis. At all times, during every page of this and subsequent chapters, the discussions and presentation of facts are always done with the purpose of trying to find out how the miners' power relates to the dominant class at, and between, various conjunctures in history. The reader; should at all times retain a dynamic and historic perspective throughout this, and subsequent, chapters--never seeing the events solely in themselves --but in historical comparison with the past balance of class forces.

The period covered in this chapter can generally be conceived as one of 'paternalism'--in which most aspects of class negotiation occurred between

the individual miner and the local mine owner or manager. Given that this was a period of emergence, the nature of class relations, to adopt William's term, can be considered 'traditional'.

At a lower level, this thesis is concerned with how the miners' power and nature of class relations was influenced by, and influenced, the four key institutional sites of action and experience. Near the end of this period the miners, through a process of experience (as it is understood with reference to Wood, 1982:50-58) with a transforming coal industry began to redefine their economic interests in less individualistic, and more collective, ways. The obvious expression of this transforming logic of class interaction was in the establishment of a miners' union. Theoretically, it is important to stress at the outset that while the miners vis-a-vis the union were organized "not as producers, but as wage earners" (to use Gramsci's phrase), and that the formation was 'reactive' to the realities of capitalism, there was nothing to suggest that the miners' union was an inherently 'economistic' or 'compromisal' institution. Such an assumption cannot be sustained on the facts, nor presumed. Rather Anderson's (1967:264) position that "trade unions are dialectically both in opposition to capitalism and a component of it" has been adopted. The specific nature of the union

is defined by concrete investigation. Clearly, it would be erroneous to see the miners' unionization as 'economistic' or 'compromisal' given the context of paternalism from which it arose.

With reference to the organization of the workplace, this chapter stresses a basic theoretical proposition established by Marx in chapter seven of Capital(1) and reaffirmed by Braverman (1974:100) --"workers who are controlled only by general orders and discipline are not adequately controlled, because they retain their grip on the labour process itself". Despite minor technological innovations introduced with the coming of monopoly capitalism, the South Side miners held considerable real control. Apart from theoretical elaborations in this chapter on the formal/real control distinction, and concerns about the influence of the workplace on the miners' consciousness, this thesis argues that retention of real control over the labour process was one of the most significant elements in the ability of the miners to challenge the dominant forces. The importance of this point cannot be stressed enough. Partly due to the fact that the South Side miners were able to retain real control well into the 1940s, this feature of class relations has, by some authors, been treated as a 'universal' or 'natural' feature of mine organization. The unfortunate consequence

has been to ignore, or at least substantially downplay, class power at the point of production.

During this period, the state began to emerge and eventually establish a profound presence within the interaction of class forces based on the industry. Theoretically, it is important to stress that the development of the state cannot be seen within a 'capital logic' perspective (see Holloway and Picciotto, 1977; Muller and Neusus, 1975; or Blanke, et. al., 1978), nor as a mere epiphenomenon of economic forces. As the history of the industry is revealed it will be evident that the economic forces were inextricably linked to political developments--a relationship based on 'public' ownership of the mines. The state was active towards, and reactive to, the coal industry --with the concrete form of broad state development being shaped by historically specific forces (see Vacca, 1982:56-57; Gramsci, 1983:381).

With theoretical reference to state intervention into labour relations, it is important to see the state's role as one which attempts to reproduce and shape the economic, political and ideological conditions necessary for the maintenance of class relations through a host of coercive/consensual means (Hall, et. al., 1981:chapter 7). During this period the provincial state began its initial intervention to both 'manage'

the industry and aspects of labour relations. In most respects the state's activities in the management of these areas was somewhat adhoc--with any systematic and comprehensive strategy being developed at the period's end. Given the context within which state intervention rose--the intervention into the previously sacred terrain of paternalist relation on the legitimating basis that the mines were 'publically' owned--the economic, political and ideological dimensions of state intervention are clearly and dramatically revealed. Following Hunt (1976) this chapter illustrates theoretically how the legal intervention into the industry was a product of class forces which not only reproduced and maintained economic relationships--but also ideological aspects as well.

Related to emergence of state strategy in economic and labour relations development, and the fragmentation of a paternalist order, was the entrance of miners into formal politics upon the establishment of Liberal Democracy. Theoretically, the major concern with respect to this development is in the way in which class interaction is reworked--with a significant separation of 'economic' and 'political' spheres of interest (Przeworski, 1977:343-344, 1980b; Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980).

As has been previously noted, the selection

of these specific theoretical positions with reference to the key institutional sites, of course, contains implicit debate with other possible ways of conceptualizing that exist in the literature. The selection of these general positions has been based on previous integration of theory with facts and was guided, at a more general level, by the way the author conceptualizes the broader social formation development --as illustrated in the previous chapter in discussion of structure and agency.

In an even broader sense the selection of these theoretical propositions are fundamentally essential if one is to acquire a 'theory of articulation of the structured totality' (to use Stuart Hall's phrase) or a 'theory of the contingent' (Jessop, 1982:136) --and assume a degree of indeterminacy in class interaction. A consequence of adopting this broad theoretical approach-- which was extremely well suited for the concerns of this thesis--is the absolute necessity of providing detail to not only illustrate theoretical propositions but to also illustrate and explain, how and why certain activities happened the way they did. In this sense, the amount of detail contained in this thesis is presented not simply to give the reader more information, but to present an adequate summary of events/periods which can act as an explanatory force. Theory, in and of

itself, cannot explain historically concrete events.

(2:1) PRE 1879 NOVA SCOTIA COAL VILLAGES: A PERIOD
OF PATERNALISM

It is unfortunate, that relative to the 1879-1925 period, the pre 1879 class relations of the Nova Scotia coal industry have been researched very little. While it can reasonably be assumed that class relations of the pre 1879 period were structured within a paternalistic social order, much research remains to be undertaken if an adequate understanding of the dynamic recomposition and transformation of class forces is to be firmly grasped.

The period before and after 1879 (very generally speaking) demonstrates the differences between a 'paternalistic' and an emerging institutionalized collective workers' action; in short two significantly different logics of class interaction.

According to Brown (1899:32) the first written record of Cape Breton coal was by a French governor of eastern Acadia, Nicholas Denys, in 1672. The fields changed from French to British custody and remained largely undeveloped despite a notable rise in production that resulted from the War of 1812 (Reilley, 1979:3).

Through a bizarre series of events the entire mining rights of the province were transferred from the Duke of York to the General Mining Association

(GMA) of London in 1825 (Brown, 1879:56; Reilley, 1979:5; MacLeod, 1981:30). Under the GMA twelve new mines were opened; and production increased in excess of 600% from 1831 to 1840 over the previous decade (Drummond, 1912:11). The GMA also attempted to establish itself in the American market by underselling and appointing agents in various U.S. cities (MacLeod, 1981:304). Their efforts were minimal, particularly when a \$1.75 per ton duty was imposed by the U.S. in 1842 (MacLeod, 1981:305). Only within the conditions of Reciprocity, established in 1854, did Nova Scotia coal exports expand into the U.S. (Reilley, 1979:9; MacLeod, 1981:305; Frank, 1979:17). It was at this stage that the capitalist coal industry "threw aside its swaddling clothes" (Drummond, 1912:11).

Apart from establishing new markets, the GMA was the first Nova Scotian mining enterprise to implement consistently scientific mining techniques through the use of 'room and pillar' methods (MacLeod, 1981:308; Drummond, 1926:18). In addition to this practice, the entire labour force was imported due to an absence of local skilled miners (Muise, 1980:79; MacLeod, 1981:306). It appears that these miners possessed a great deal of independence from the mine manager and overman (underground manager at that period). As a provincial government official noted:

The colliers are considered as tradesmen, and as such paid higher wages. They fix their prices and will not consent to admit any other persons into the works. Two-thirds of their work can be done by labourers and yet they insist upon doing the whole themselves. . . . In some pits, labourers perform services equally severe, but these men are not allowed to touch the work of the miners. Sometimes the miners take an apprentice who by the payment of a fee obtains the standing of a miner, but the employer cannot send a man among them. (cited in Martell, 1945:171)

Given the absence of an institutionalized collective workers' organization many aspects of work, including wages, were negotiated individually between miner and manager (McKay, 1983a:691; Reilly, 1979:111). When some aspect of work affected a number of miners it was common for the group to delegate a representative or two to approach the 'big house', if the manager could not be found near the pit, and resolve the problem. (Drummond, 1911:5,6). Part and parcel of this initial immigration of British miners, in many mining villages, was the physical and social construction of somewhat closed economic and political system in which a series of unequal, yet, mutual obligations, based on class interdependence, was deepened through a supply of company housing and credit at the company stores.

Despite the recognized lack of research on this period it seems safe and reasonable to assume the pre 1879 period of class relations were maintained within a 'paternalistic' social order (see Reilly,

1979:109-112; McKay, 1983a:691-696; MacGillivray, 1971:24). By paternalism it is generally meant, a particular way, or form, of maintaining a fundamentally capitalist social order, by means of authority and power that is distinctively directed by individual class members. As Palmer (1983:19) notes, this form of power arose out of economic, political and ideological conditions which are generally identified with 'early Canadian society'--physical separation, diverse subeconomies, at a time prior to the "establishment of powerful state, welfare services and impersonal labour market". While an argument could possibly be made that all the above social conditions could not be applied to the Nova Scotia coalfields, it can be said that the local mine manager or owner possessed a wide range of powers which--only through the development of class forces and reorganization of capital--would slowly fragment. Through this process of 'fragmentation and expansion' the powers essential to regulate class relations, and the social order in general, would develop within institutions that were as yet 'unborn'. The most notable of which would be the Liberal Democratic parliamentary form, the Departments of Mines and Labour and the trade union.

As McKay (1983a:695) notes, paternalism

"thrived best in the most stable economic environments". Its most notable aspects with respect to the work place specifically, and community in general, were; the governing through tradition and unwritten conventions, a labour process directed by independent and skilled workmen that was largely unsupervised and unmechanized, the centrality of the manager and underground manager whose authority extended "beyond the confines of the work place to take in many aspects of social and political life" (McKay, 1983a:691,694). The employer, while appearing to have a 'natural right' to direct and influence many aspects of work and social life was limited, just as the worker was, by a set of economically based moral obligations.

Perhaps the most significant example of obligation which maintained class relations under paternalism has been indentified by Reilly (1979:111, 112):

bargaining over coal prices occurred with some intimacy. The miner was himself an independent craftsman, selling the coal he cut to the operator, so a sense of partnership existed between the employer and the employee Control of the workplace operation rested in the miners' hands. Under these conditions it was accepted that good times in the coal were to be shared by all, as were the bad. The miners were therefore willing to tolerate unavoidable hardships, such as low wages, for the sake of the survival of the industry. As late as the 1870s the miners did not define their interests as being essentially different from those of the coal operators. This conciliatory

attitude clearly limited the extent to which miners could act collectively to defend their interests, and reflected a lack of class consciousness among them.

Again, despite the acknowledged lack of research on this period, the most noticable elements of the miners' definition of workplace authority, or consciousness can be identified, for analytical purposes, as a 'paternalistic' consciousness. Embodied within such a fetishization of class relations by the miners were; the assumption of a manager's 'natural right' to a loose and broad formal authority over work relations; the independent role of miners with regard to most aspects of real control over work, and the mutual economic and moral interdependence of both miner and master.

Given this, as noted above by Reilly and previously elaborated in the conceptual chapter, a particular type of consciousness guided and limited the nature of class action. The most clearly identified aspect of class action mediated by a paternalistic type of consciousness, was its individuality. Collective behaviour in the negotiation and resistance was, relative to succeeding periods, highly exceptional. As a result of this basic social fact, the potential strength of the miners was therefore weak. This is not to say that resistance and struggle were not present, but rather that it occurred in an individualistic,

or at times spontaneously collective, rather than an institutionalized collective form.

During the reign of the GMA monopoly, which lasted up to 1858, the literature cites few acts of resistance of a collective nature. In 1837, 1840 and 1842, three strikes, in response to wage reductions, occurred (MacLeod, 1981:429; Reilley, 1979:26). The 1842 strike lasted twelve weeks and witnessed the cancellation of credit at the company store and the subsequent retaliation in the form of rock throwing at the manager's house by miners' wives and children (Reilley, 1979:26). Within this type of social order, the above incidents illustrate the explosive potential of paternalism. As Palmer (1983:18) notes; "paternalism responded to the tug at its arm or the poke in its face as much as it noted the bowed head and the doffed cap". The 1842 episode also suggests a spontaneous redefinition of authority resulting from a breakdown of traditional behaviour in which mutual obligations are deconstructed through the quick actions of individual identities (as opposed to complex institutions). The possible redefinition of a situation within a paternalistic social order exposed in sudden ways, the way in which a protest could expand beyond class relations, involve non class members, and thus embody dimensions of 'community'--given the unique features

of a single industry village or town.

Perhaps 1876, when the mine manager at Albion Mines (Pictou) had the whole community against him in what he described as a "reign of terror" (MacLeod, 1981:429) provides a clear example of such a solution.

In 1858, the structure of the Nova Scotian coal industry, hence the stable economic environment in which paternalism 'spawned' best, was significantly altered (if only temporarily) through the destruction of the province wide monopoly held by the GMA. In 1857, largely through the influence of local capitalists, the provincial government came to an agreement in which the GMA would receive lower royalties for a select forty-four square miles of various coal fields in exchange for the breaking of the monopoly (Reilley, 1979:8; McKay, 1983a:21; MacLeod, 1981:316). The economic result of this political manoeuvre--which actually began in 1848--was the emergence of a competitive economic liberalism in the province. As McKay (1983a:13) notes, the first mine opened within this new and dynamic context could be described "as a natural embodiment of a political-scientific awakening". Local entrepreneurs, motivated primarily by the economic prospects of Reciprocity in 1854, influenced government action which led to Nova Scotia's first, and last, 'mining fever'. When the agreement took effect in

1858, eight new mines were opened. By 1867, 79 pits were operating; 45 of which produced under 3,000 tons yearly (MacLeod, 1981:316). While numerous operations were undercapitalized, six of the companies incorporated between 1862 and 1865 were valued at \$1,000,000 with an additional nine mines capitalized from \$100,000 to \$300,000 (MacLeod, 1981:316). The sixties and seventies were, to use Drummond's (1926:18) words, 'epochal'.

The fragility of this initial industrial development within what was still a highly mercantilist oriented economy was suddenly realized, with the collapse of many small enterprises in 1866, when Reciprocity was abrogated and coal was charged to a U.S. duty of \$1.25 per ton (MacLeod, 1981:317). From 1867 to 1872, it was noted that no companies had paid dividends (McKay, 1983a:84). With the exception of Springhill's benefitting from the InterColonial Railway--a product of the politics of Confederation (McKay, 1983a:115)--this general crisis was deepened in 1871 when the short-lived Canadian tariff on U.S. coal was dropped by the new federal state (McKay, 1983:84). In 1879, largely as a result of the reinstatement of the tariff through the National Policy and the new possibility of rail transportation, Nova Scotia coal was able to establish itself in the expanding Maritime

and important Quebec markets (Frank, 1979:18; MacLeod, 1981:326).

Highly influential in the transformation of the coal industry were the actions of the provincial state. In many respects, as the breaking of the monopoly revealed, the history of the development of the Nova Scotia state and coal fields were inextricably linked. Both required each other for economic well being; a logic which unevenly yet increasingly led to a higher degree of unstable interdependence (as was later expressed through a series of crises in subsequent years).

This relationship was fundamentally structured by the coal royalty--payment of 'rent' to the province by the capitalist interests for the right to extract the 'publically' owned coal fields. The royalty was an institutionalized economic, political, and ideologically defined social relation which maintained the interdependent, yet not necessarily homogeneous, interests of state and capital. As McKay (1983a:184) notes:

The peculiarities of the Nova Scotia industry had important ramifications for the political structures of the coalfields and their centrality to provincial political life in general. It took very little to 'politicize' economic issues in the coalfields, when their political dimensions were obvious to all.

In 1848 the first significant manoeuvre by the provincial government occurred with the demand

for full legal possession of mining and mineral rights from the British Crown (McKay, 1983a:10). In 1849, the province acquired these rights and as result it was able to establish the coal royalty.

Directed and influenced by a number of real economic interests the provincial government broke the GMA monopoly (Reilly, 1979:8; MacLeod, 1981:316; McKay, 1983a:21) and let loose the brief era of competitive capitalism in the coal industry. Initially, the state interferred very little with coal development; maintaining a general policy of "laissez-faire" (McKay, 1983a:21). The reason for this policy, apart from its obviously newly transformed economy, was ideological (Liberalism) as well as organizational (McKay, 1983a:22, 25). Previous to 1858, there existed no state apparatus that could have possibly played an influential developmental role. The initial logic of bureaucratic development in the regulation of the industry began in 1858 in order to facilitate the granting of leases and collection of royalties which arose from the boom it had, indirectly, created. The first occupant of the Inspector Mines Office, established in 1858, spent most of his time collecting royalties, rather than inspecting mines (MacLeod, 1981:379). Largely recognized as a political appointment, the office was actually abolished in 1861; only to be reopened the following

year and filled by another person with more suitable 'loyalties' (McKay, 1983a:397).

Increasingly influential, both directly and indirectly, in the complex logic of bureaucratic and legal development were not only politicians and capitalists, but also miners. The miners responded in more collective and spontaneously militant ways to the experienced realities of the transforming coal industry. While realizing the limitations, given the lack of evidence, MacLeod (1981:435) claims that between 1858 and 1879 the British skilled miners had "lost a great deal of the control and independence they had exercised formerly - owing perhaps to the heavy influx of unskilled labourers into the mines during the boom of the sixties" (see Reilly, 1979:112, 113). During this period Pyke (1970:33,34,42) describes an 1864 Sydney mine strike in which the Militia intervened, a three month strike in 1868 at Cow Bay, a series of strikes which concerned wages and hours from 1872 to 1874, and an 1876 strike at Sydney Mines in which the Militia again intervened (Frank, 1979:294; MacGillivray, 1980).

The 1864 strike was significant for it marked the initial, yet ad hoc, entrance of the provincial state into the previously sacred terrain of worker/manager relations. While the incident was relatively

unique for its period, it marked the initial development of state power to contain those 'micro-crises' of class relations that could not simply be contained by a paternalistic authority. In response to a request made by the GMA manager, for aid to assist in the eviction from company houses, a bill was passed that made illegal "any use of coercion or force by an employee against any other employee or against his employer" (Pyke, 1970:34).²

In 1873, the province passed the 'Mining Act of 1873'; and very basic health and safety, and labour, regulations were legally established. Unlike the previous 1864 bill, its emergence was not indirectly influenced by Labour. As MacLeod (1981:404) noted, the Act was "almost entirely the product of pressures exerted from within government"; or more specifically a product of the Inspector of Mines in response to the extraordinarily high accident and fatality rate of the Nova Scotia coal fields.³

For the first time, the Act gave the state vis-a-vis the Inspector of Mines, legal powers to ensure adequate mining conditions, and set the initial foundation for a comprehensive regulatory apparatus that in time would increasingly be influenced in what was to become a tripartite struggle over the authority to define 'safe' working conditions.⁴

Like the previous 1863 legislation the Mining

Act can be considered an articulation of class forces in existence at that time. At no place in the Act, like the 1864 Bill, were there hints of workers' rights nor a mediating discourse, or ideology, which suggested workers were in fact considered to have rights. Both pieces of legislation were, at one and the same moment, a maintenance of power and a reflection of power, as it existed in that conjuncture.⁵

The Act was based on a similar British bill passed the previous year. "It was noticable that all the clauses in the British statute protecting salary rights of miners were deleted" (Pyke, 1970:45).⁶ In Reilly's (1979:28,29) words;

The Provincial Mining Act of 1872 (sic) retained a traditional view of ~~the~~ collier, who was expected not to infringe on the rights of his employer nor presume to have a voice in politics. The Act protected private property and kept workers outside of the policy making sphere of the company, hindering the men's ability to protest poor safety conditions and having their wages unprotected.

The Mines Act of 1873, however, did not remain in its original form for long. Within the context of a turbulent industry, the Act, like the State in general, became increasingly influential and influenced by a slowly shifting balance of class forces.

2

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 1010a
(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)

**(2:2) 1878-1898: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INSTITUTIONAL
BASIS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION**

In 1879, at Springhill, the Provincial Miners' Association (PMA) was formed (see Reilly, 1979:chapter 2; MacLeod, 1981:429-432; McKay, 1983a:698; Logan, 1948:168-169; Drummond, 1926:27-30; Forsey, 1982:346).⁷ Initially the union emerged and expanded on mainland Nova Scotia and included lodges at Springhill, Westville, Stellarton and Thorburn. In 1881, based on a decision made the previous year, the PMA began to organize Cape Breton miners who complained of low wages, a long 12½ hour day, high prices at company stores and dishonest checkweighmen (Reilly, 1979:37).

Within the first six months of organizing, approximately 50% of the miners were easily unionized (Reilly, 1979:37), with lodges in Sydney Mines and Glace Bay areas (Reilly, 1979:37; Drummond, 1926:62-72). The test of the PMA's⁸ power, with respect to organizing South Side miners, came in 1882 when the GMA's Lingan operation was unionized. While the strike arose over the firings of P.W.A. workers, it developed into an attempt by the GMA and other operators to break the union (see Drummond, 1916:79; Forsey, 1982:346-354). During the strike, Cape Breton operators formed

the short lived 'Cape Breton Managers Association' whose object was "to render abortive any action on the part of any lodge to infringe on the prerogative of its members, such for instance as the dismissal of men without stated cause" (cited in Drummond, 1926: 74). In addition to this, the GMA attempted to use 'scabs' and successfully requested the intervention of the militia.⁹ Despite these efforts, the managers' association disbanded as a result of lack of financial support from other non-GMA managers, and the fairly peaceful strike was 'won' by the miners 13 weeks later. The strike resulted in; a written agreement which established a number of basic working conditions, a wage reduction and the blacklisting of 6 active P.W.A. members (Drummond, 1926:85; Reilly, 1979:61). The most significant result was the establishment of the P.W.A. in the South Side and the subsequent acquisition of a 'non-compulsory' check-off in 1887 (Frank, 1979:295). Consequently, 1882 can be considered the historical point at which the institutional basis for collective workers' action was initially established on the South Side. While workers continued to negotiate many aspects of the job individually, the establishment of the P.W.A. created a new set of possibilities of class interaction and thus redefined the balance of class forces.

Organizationally, the P.W.A. consisted of lodges at the local level, one sub-district for each of the three coal fields, and one Grand Council which was the general legislative and administrative body (Logan, 1948:166). The Grand Council executive was elected by the rank and file's delegates who met twice a year. A key position in the P.W.A. was the grand secretary--the highest paid and only full time position--who was highly active in the organization and regulation of union affairs (Logan, 1948:166). While many members of the Grand Council were delegates appointed by their lodges, and the sub-councils were able to invoke new regulations--providing they did not contradict the constitution--a significant amount of power was in the hands of the grand secretary. This proved true during the formative years of 1879 to 1898 when the P.W.A. was greatly influenced by the reign of a single grand secretary, Robert Drummond.

Of importance, with respect to P.W.A. activity and as an expression of the mediating consciousness of the union leaders, if not the membership, were what Drummond termed the "objects" of the Society. Prior to becoming a member of the P.W.A. the candidate was read the objects of the society; a brief list of ideals which clearly reflected the consciousness and agendas of the leading members (Drummond, 1926:29-32). These objects included:

- not to wage a war of Labour as against Capital
- by material concession between employers and employed seek to have the work carried on to the advantage of both.
- not to drive trade by oppressive measures from the locality.
- to secure fair remuneration for labour by legitimate means.
- to help in the removal of any cause; which hinders advancement, mentally, socially or morally.
- not to indulge in visionary theories nor; imagine there is a good time coming when plenty shall be a matter of work call.
- in taking a stand against what we consider misdirected impositions of employers, we must not ourselves be unreasonable. —
- if equity be the base of all our actions then only can we say to our employers "Give the labourer his hire."
- while maintaining your own opinion, duly respect the opinion of others.

Embodied within these 'objects' was a type of consciousness which maintained an institutionalized collective of workers (a union), in a manner which was, however, somewhat harmonious with Capital's interests. In this sense, the new emerging consciousness

was an expression of the way in which the paternalistic social order had transformed 'experientially' as well as structurally. For analytical purposes, such a consciousness will be referred to as a 'producer consciousness'--"a populist critique . . . which claimed labour alone was the source of value . . . (and) saw no direct exploitation of labour by capital; but rather saw labour and capital as the two legitimate and interdependent partners in industrial life" (Frank and MacGillivray in Fraser, 1976:18-19; brackets mine). Implicit in such a conceptualization was the assumption of 'mutual interests' between worker and capitalist (see Palmer, 1979:chapter 4; MacDonald, 1975).

Mediated by this consciousness, was the restricted approval by P.W.A. executive, for the use of the strike as a source of power to transform aspects of work. Given the conceptualization of class relations as 'harmonious' and 'mutually beneficial'; the use of the strike was considered a strategy of 'last resort' (Logan, 1948:171) and to be used only when "the survival of the union was at stake" (Reilly, 1979:70). In this sense, the following quotation by Robert Drummond (1926:49) clearly exemplifies the way in which the creation and use of workers' strategies--such as strikes and trade union organizations--were guided by such a consciousness.

the [Grand] Council of the Society exerted its influence to avert strikes among its members. Suppose the members of a local had a grievance which the employers would not adjust, that local could not come out on strike without the consent of Council; if it did then it had to go a warfare on its own charges, or in other words it would receive no pecuniary assistance from Council. Many a strike was averted by the imposition of the Council. The Grand Secretary never once influenced a lodge to engage in a strike (brackets mine)

As a consequence of this practice, only four strikes--Westville (1880); Lingan (1882), Pictou (1887) and Springhill (1890)--were ever supported up to 1898 by the Grand Council (see Drummond, 1926:36, 40-44, 53, 75-85, 103-104; Logan, 1948:170-171; Reilly, 1979:52-71; Forsey, 1982:351-358).

While militancy and local strikes were more common at the lodge level (see MacLeod, 1981:432, McKay, 1983a:698), the provincial P.W.A., in general, appeared to be very conciliatory, if not totally passive and somewhat constraining. Up to at least 1898, the P.W.A. was both a force which transformed miners' potential power and class relations, and a power which helped maintain the class relations from which it emerged. To use Anderson's (1967:264), phrase, the P.W.A. was "both in opposition to capitalism and a component of it."¹⁰ For this reason it is important to situate the miners' power at that point in history. In the midsts of trade union emergence, initial state

developments in the coal industry, and on the eve of the monopoly capitalism (1893), there appeared aspects in the maintenance of power which were produced through a paternalistic social order, as well as those which were referred to as a "new era of industrial relations" (Reilly, 1979:VI). On one hand there is no doubt that the initial emergence of a collective organization meant a new logic of industrial relations which included the potentially (if not always realized) stronger organizational basis of a new collective power amongst miners. The emergence of this collective organization amongst miners, mediated by a 'collective consciousness', was an expression of a fundamental shift away from a paternalistic order--whose distinctive feature had been individuality of thought and action amongst class members. On the other hand, the coal industry in Cape Breton, up to 1892, was comprised of 8 relatively small companies whose managers continued to personally negotiate many aspects of work--wages included (McKay, 1983a:708; Drummond in Brown, 1899:123).

While it could remain a point of debate as to when the 'era' of paternalism ended, it seems evident that the 1879 to 1898 period contained aspects of both the 'traditional' and 'new' systems of industrial

relations. With reference to miners' power; the emergence of a collective organization--though not collective negotiation or bargaining--and a producer consciousness do not suggest a sudden and complete establishment of an 'oppositional' force. Instead, the miners' development at that historical point suggests a somewhat less challenging threat to the mine owners' power. In this regard, the P.W.A. can be seen as an organization which "gave miners an institutional basis from which to criticize the excesses of paternalism" (McKay, 1983a: 698).

Politically, the P.W.A. began to gain power through the amending of the Provincial Mining Act, the introduction of arbitration legislation, and the recomposition of the provincial state form into a Liberal Democracy. Though, of course not solely on its own; the P.W.A. was influential in all these developments.

As mentioned, the Mining Act of 1873 was a response by forces within the provincial bureaucracy to the transforming conditions of the coal industry. In 1881, in the wake of 44 deaths caused by an explosion at the Foord pit (Westville), the P.W.A. successfully demanded "a place in the regulatory apparatus" of the Mining Act (MacLeod, 1981:442-445). Through considerable governmental lobbying, on Drummond's

part, the Act was ammended to include; more regular mine inspections through the appointment of deputy inspectors, three "workingmen" on every coroner's jury, the ability of two miners to form a committee and 'officially' inspect and report on the conditions of their respective mine" (MacLeod, 1983:239).

In 1891, Drummond's influence was enhanced through the winning/granting of the franchise in 1889, and his inclusion in the Legislative Council vis-a-vis the Liberal Party. The P.W.A. was then able to acquife further amendments. Among the further amendments were the rights of miners' committees to examine the scene of an accident and the right of miners to prosecute managemnt by affidavit (MacLeod, 1983:240). Thus, the Mining Act was a somewhat remarkable and complex development in which formal legal power and aspects of mine authority had been subsumed by the state and then reworked through the politics of the conjuncture into 'victories' and 'rights' for the miners.¹²

In addition, the P.W.A. acquired some limited success over Management's traditional hiring rights through the establishment of the certificate system in 1891 and mining schools in 1888 (MacLeod, 1983:241). Under the certificate system, overman, underground managers, and later miners, shotfirers, hoist and

haulage men were all required to pass examinations and acquire certificates for competency prior to working (MacLeod, 1983:241-245). Furthermore all miners who worked at the coal face had to acquire two years of experience prior to taking charge of a work area (MacLeod 1983; Reilley, 1979:51,72,95; Drummond, 1926; Logan, 1948:172-175).

A piece of labour legislation which was solely initiated by the P.W.A., was the Provincial Miners' Arbitration Act of 1888. The arbitration contained in the Act was somewhat compulsory, as it allowed for the imposition of a small fine against whichever 'party' failed to obey the appointed committee's recommendations. Following the payment of small fines, however, both parties could negotiate with whatever strategies they saw fit (Drummond, 1926: 120-121). While the P.W.A. saw this legislation as protective of their interests, the managers identified the compulsory aspects as a restriction of their traditional abilities to negotiate. As a consequence, the Act was only used on two occasions, and slowly withered away due to Management's constant evasion and the state's failure to enforce the Act (see Reilley, 1979:79-80 and Logan, 1948:171,180).

Despite its eventual lack of impact on redefining the balance of class forces and collective

bargaining, the Act is of historical importance for its introduction indicated a significant shift in the government's perspective on labour relations. In 1871, Attorney General Martin I. Wilkins noted "the servant was always under the authority of the master. The man who paid another wages had the right to control his actions as a general rule . . . (Nova Scotia House of Assembly, Debates, 25 March, 1871, cited in Pyke, 1970:33). At that time the government had taken a "hands off" policy towards labour matters and, in general, all disputes were negotiated between worker and manager. Only in exceptional moments, such as 1869 or 1876 did the state intervene--and then in a coercive way--totally lacking any sophisticated apparatus or mediating ideology to further regulate class interaction. Seventeen years later, with the emergence of an increasingly profitable industry, the establishment of a Department of Mines and Mine Act, the formation of the P.W.A. and the working class vote, the government had reconsidered its role to the point that the introduction of a very unique bill --the Arbitration Act--occurred. In this very new context the new Attorney General stated, upon the bill's reading;

. . . the principle of the bill is one which is extremely radical; far more so than in any principle which is ordinarily introduced in measures which

pass the Assembly. It is an effort, an attempt on the part of the State to interfere with private contract between employers and employed and in that respect it is a very important principle, and one which is to be considered in every possible consequence not only in the relation of mere matter of contract between coal mine owners and employers, but in all the relations of life because if you once introduce the principle that the Legislature can counsel parties to be guided by any other principle, than that of free contract, you at once open the door for the Legislature to interfere in all matters of that character . . . (cited in Drummond, 1926:117-118).

While Longley's speech proved slightly premature--given the slow death of the 1888 legislation --it reflected an initial consensual shift towards state intervention in labour relations. In this sense, 1888 marked the beginning of the state's contribution to the slowly emerging 'new era of industrial relations'. Slowly, the once concentrated and sacred power of the individual paternalist, to formally control and direct Labour, was beginning to fragment and be reworked within a loose tripartist framework. The 'holy trinity' of State, Capital, and Labour was being established.

The most far reaching development in the recomposition of class forces and state action, however, was not in areas of labour legislation but in the realm of formal politics. Again, through the partial influence of the P.W.A. vis-a-vis Drummond, the miners were granted/won the franchise in 1889. Upon the workers' entrance into the previously exclusive domain

of bourgeois politics, the miners' formal political power was simultaneously created and incorporated. The most significant aspect of the state's recomposition into a Liberal Democracy was the incorporation of the miners' class interests (however they may be defined at any particular conjuncture) within limits defined by the bourgeois democracy in general (see Przeworski, 1980b; Offe and Wiesensthal, 1980), and the Liberal and Conservative parties specifically.¹³ This incorporation generally influences the logic of legal development and formal politics. Through this significant contribution to a fundamental institutional separation of economic and formal political spheres the emergence of Liberal Democracy is highly significant in the shaping of class interaction. (see Przeworski, 1977: 343-344).

As periodically suggested, law becomes an "arena of struggle" (see Hunt, 1981:3) in which the fundamental classes seek rights, protection and benefits. As Premier Fielding noted, in 1893, to mine managers: "the law could no longer be molded at the will of the mine owner" (MacLeod, 1981:433, citing Fielding in CMR, vol. 12, no. 3, 1893:38). In a similar vein the Canadian Mining Review referred to Drummond as "the little man who . . . legislates without check" of hinderance in the provincial parliament in return

for a pledge of the labour vote" (vol.11, no.11, Nov. 1892, p.180, cited in MacLeod, 1981:433; see also Logan 1948:165). Embodied within this, and all, legal development was also an ideological dimension--in the sense that law "conveys or transmits a complex set of attitudes, values and theories about aspects of society" (Hunt, 1976:182). A prime example was Drummond's notion of 'equal justice' which he used in reference to the amendments to the Mining Act. In his words, there "now existed "equal justice for all . . . one law for the men and the same for the masters" (Trades Journal, Sept. 16, 1891; cited in MacLeod, 1981:458-459). In addition this example illustrates the way in which social relations, or power relations between class members defined in law, can be 'fetishized' (see Hunt, 1976:183). In Drummond's case the mediating and sustaining ideology of the legal development, was one of 'Liberalism'; an ideology whose general emergence was identified with the breaking of the GMA monopoly in 1858.

Furthermore, as Przeworski (1977:373) notes;

"the structure of bourgeois state" has at least two effects: it separates the economic from the political struggles and it imposes a particular form upon the organization of classes in each of those struggles. Trade unions become organizations separate from political parties, and the organization of classes assumes a representative form.

In this sense, the recomposition of state form contributed to the reworking of the miners' power by institutionally defining the P.W.A. separate from formal political power, and by creating the structural basis through which economy and politics could develop as interrelated--yet distinct--spheres.¹⁴

A further consequence of the recomposition was the emergence of the possibility for the state to increase its legitimacy and thus become more 'expansive'. The initial significant moment in this process, and the consequential mode of intervention, was the participation of the workers' representatives in the government through political parties.

Apart from the changes in the Mining Act, the 1888 Arbitration Act, and the winning/granting of the franchise, the state introduced one other significant piece of legislation in 1893. In many respects it was the most profound, for it literally transformed the class structure of the coal industry and introduced an epoch of monopoly capitalism. The bill--"An act for further encouragement of coal mining"--established American interests, in the South Side industry, under the tragically ironic heading of the Dominion Coal Company (Domco). Under Domco all Cape Breton mines, with the exception of the GMA's North Side holdings, were merged. By 1913, Domco would

virtually control all provincial coal mines (see MacGillivray, 1979; McKay, 1983a:181,203; Reilley, 1979:18-19; MacLeod, 1981:319-320; Frank, 1979:21-23; Forsey, 1926:5; Schwartzman, 1953). As would be the case with future coal mergers, Domco was formed by large vertically integrated economic interests that sought a healthy coal producing company to prop up weaker coal consuming firms (Schwartzman, 1953; McKay, 1983a:231). Primarily directed by Boston, and to a lesser extent Montreal and Nova Scotian interests, the company was formed amidst bold promises of large scale development in exchange for a 99 year lease on the Cape Breton fields and a fixed 12½ cent per ton royalty (MacGillivray, 1979:55). The deal had been in the making for approximately one year (see MacGillivray 1979) and as McKay, (1983a:181) notes:

It was both a simple and complex event, both a response to an immediate political situation and a structural change of permanent consequences. As a simple political event it can be seen as a brilliant move on the part of Fielding, who transformed the Liberal Party into a hegemonic presence, the party par excellence of the new age of corporate capitalism.

The state had radically transformed the economy and in so doing had become actively involved in the industry in a way that was unprecedented in nature. The basis of motivation for this 99 year,

long term commitment was fundamentally the royalty (McKay, 1983:186). As Fielding noted "the coal royalties are practically our only source of revenue, apart from Dominion subsidy". (cited in McKay, 1983a:187). In 1872 the coal royalties composed 7% or approximately \$54,000, of provincial revenue; by 1900 it reached 41% or approximately \$414,000 (McKay, 1983a:195). It was clear that the Liberal Party--through the 'granting' of the working class franchise, the successful incorporation of Drummond, and the formation of Domco --had indeed constructed itself into a (broadly defined) hegemonic force.

Blessed by Drummond (Logan, 1948:174), Fielding's 'coup' established the structural basis of capitalist underdevelopment and was legitimized in a way that has become standard for his successors --almost one hundred years later;

I believe the people will support any ~~government or party that brings in capital and~~ skill for the development of our mines, and I believe too that the people will not be particular whether that capital and skill comes from Great Britain or from any other part of the world provided it comes . . . (Fielding cited in McKay, 1983a: 198).

On the basis of 1889 to 1893, Fielding was successful in shaping the economic and political development of the province and harnessing their dynamic --as a dynamic which was of 'universal interest' for

all classes.

The development of monopoly capitalism also had a significant impact in the workplace with the introduction of mechanized coal cutting machines (see MacLeod, 1981:542; Reilley, 1979:83; McKay, 1983:197; Frank, 1979:221).¹⁵ Previous to the introduction of mechanized coal cutting, coal was cut by hand.

During this period, mining was carried out through the room and pillar method, in which two miners worked in a work area, or 'room', which was approximately 20 feet wide; its height dependent on the thickness of the coal seam. Generally speaking, the 'cycle' of mining involved a series of interrelated jobs which were, up to 1893, all carried out by a miner and his 'buddy' or co-worker (who quite often would be a father, brother, or in-law). The 'cycle' can generally be summarized as follows.¹⁶

1) undercutting: by way of a handpick, the miners would 'undercut' the coal seam in their room, known as the 'face'. Through a series of swings of the pick (in horizontal and/or vertical strokes) the bottom half of the face was cut, and thus left the upper half of the face to 'overhang' over the newly created cavity. The seams reached from 18 inches to 20 feet in Nova Scotia, with averaging 4 to 6 feet.

2) boring or drilling: with the aid of a u-crank drill a hole was bored into the overhang at a desired angle and depth.

3) blasting: the hole was filled with blasting or gunpowder and fitted with a fuse. Once the fuse was ignited, the miners ran for cover and the overhanging coal was 'blasted down' leaving a cloud of coal dust. This job sped up the process of winning coal, as it was quicker than handpicking the overhang.

4) handloading: the blasted down coal sat on the ground or on the floor of the room. It was shoveled into an awaiting cart or box. The cart was marked in order to identify the miners who mined the coal, and was either pushed out of the room by themselves or a labourer. Then the cart was hauled by horses to the pithead and weighed by a checkweighman.

5) timbering: the newly advanced roof and floor of the room were 'brushed' or cleaned of overhanging or piercing stone and the room was then 'squared'. Timbers were used to construct roof supports to help prevent stonefalls and cave-ins.

6) tracking: in some pits, rails on which the carts sat, were advanced up to the face. Then, providing complications did not occur, (which was rare), the cycle could be repeated.

While the above is a general description (based on Frank, 1979:220-224; McKay, 1983a:chapter 5 generally; MacLeod, 1981:314-315 and Dix, 1977) of the work process at the coal face it was quite possible for the two miners to have a 'loader' work with them, or have a 'shotfirer' who went from room to room. In addition to the miners (to use a formal classification of the term) at the point of production there were other mine workers who were responsible for haulage and transportation, the development of the mine workings, ventilation, and maintenance of road and air ways. The largest occupation, however, was the miner, who by the 1920s still accounted for "more than half" of underground workers (Frank, 1979: 221).

Of importance in understanding the mine is a grasping of the way in which it was collectively experienced by its occupants. Fundamental to the ideas embodied within the social institution of the mine is what McKay, (1983a:588) has referred to as the 'mining mentality'--a collective experience or outlook held by all members, regardless of class, and formed through a 'sharing' of the mine's dangers. More than any other, non-universal, historically specific aspect of the mine, which may have, on appearance, been a distinguishing characteristic (such as, hard

manual labour, a large degree of control over production, a large amount of independence from supervision, etc.) this fundamental experience of the pit remained long after the workplace was transformed with electric lights, Anderson shearers and the presence of overmen. It is this aspect of work in the mine which is most significant and constant in establishing the basis of a 'collective outlook' amongst miners. With respect to this, McKay, (1983a:588,594) notes;

What the traditional left-wing approach misses is the ambiguity of the mining mentality, which can sustain different ideologies and remain nonetheless a coherent and identifiable tradition. There was much about the miners' outlook that was collective without necessarily being class consciousness.

In short, while the common and shared experiences of the mine establishes the foundation of a collective outlook it does not inherently, or inevitably, sustain a militance, resistance or accommodation vis-a-vis the maintenance of class power at the point of production.¹⁷ The particular type of consciousness, is historically specific and influenced by the organization of work at a particular moment, in conjunction with a number of other institutional sites of action and experience.

A key feature of the organization of the work place during this period--aside from the relatively

high occupational homogeneity--was the large degree of control and independence held by the miners. This is somewhat a product of "geology, which was "always significant in setting limits on work by way of thickness and decline of "seams, percentage of methane gas, composition of roof and floor, to name a few. An excellent illustration of how significant these geological factors were can be seen in reference to Domco's No.1 Colliery;

. . . the labyrinth of workings (Dominion No.1 Collierys in 1904 totalled over one, hundred miles.) drastically reduced management supervision and promoted a palpable sense of "independence" among the miners, equally reinforced by the 'system of payment, under contract by output (MacLeod, 1983: 246).

As it was generally organized at that time, the work place sustained and reproduced an 'independence' amongst mine workers--who possessed a significant amount of 'real control' through which many immediate decisions were made. While a limited number of underground officials were present, it appears they were more responsible for co-ordination than control, and thus indirectly furthered a collective mentality amongst all mine members, regardless of class (see also McKay, 1983a:594).¹⁸

For the most part management maintained control 'formally' through a variety of ways; the most immediate being payment by piece rate for 'miners'. Fundamentally, the strength of the piece rate lay within the structure of capitalism itself--the structural

alienation of the miner from ownership of the means of production and mines. The fact that the miner had nothing to sell but his labour power was the basis of the piece rate's success in maintaining control and ensuring production. More specifically, the piece rate was one of the few ways management could control the worker and production given the geological structuring of the workplace, and the nature of room and pillar mining, which effectively prevented any substantial amount of supervision (see also Friedman, 1977:47). Furthermore, the experience or fetishization of the piece rate and absolute surplus value production on the miners' part contributed to this sense of independence (see also Burawoy, 1979:17-19 for a general theoretical discussion). To the miner a 'pay' was dependent on the amount of coal that he and his butty cut and loaded and therefore not all aspects in the cycle of work. If the coal didn't come, perhaps because they might have had to spend their workday cleaning a stonefall, they didn't get paid. However it is important to stress, not all mine workers were miners in the formal sense of the term and therefore some were paid a day or datal rate.

Apart from the piece rate, management also possessed a number of strategies to maintain class relations. These included the economic dependence

imposed on the miners and their families through the establishment of company housing and stores (particularly with respect to the South Side), the individual negotiations of the piece rate, favouritism, blacklisting, and hiring and firing. In addition, the state increasingly supported and reworked the repertoire of strategies implicit in Management's formal control and thus further strengthened the economic, political and ideological dimensions of power that lie outside the point of production.

Ironically, managers maintained class relations but did not directly control the point of production. As Braverman (1974:100) notes; "workers who are controlled only by general orders and discipline are not adequately controlled, because they retain their grip on labour process itself". It was then a great paradox that the mine was a work place in which its workers were so proletarianized yet so free (McKay, 1983a:568). Shaping this "miners' freedom" was a formal control which structured the nature of class relations, and real control which defined the nature of the workplace. Given this, this thesis does not see both modes (formal/real) of control as opposite ends of a single spectrum (as most labour process literature does). Instead, both are considered to be two fairly distinct, yet somewhat interrelated

modes on control.

With respect to the introduction of coal cutting machines or 'iron men'; the workplace was partially transformed through a division of labour. The machines were either radial cutters or single percussion varieties and replaced the handpick in the task of undercutting. The operator, referred to as a 'machine runner', went from room to room undercutting the face. Sometimes the work was carried out in the evening, so the miners could return to work with coal already cut. All other aspects of the mining cycle, except for the intrusion of the machine runner, were maintained by the miners. As a result, their work became somewhat fragmented, yet at the same time they retained general control (see Frank, 1979:220-224; Dix, 1977). Given the organization of the workplace at that time, the cutting machine was a time saving device but only indirectly increased general mine production; handloading remained a 'bottleneck' in the production process as only so much coal could be loaded in a room at any one time (see Dix, 1977; McKay, 1983a:478). Based on a survey of work in West Virginia mines; handloading occupied 51% of total work time in the room (Dix 1977:31). While the introduction of mechanization in Domco's mines was uneven, 79% of the coal was cut by machines in 1902 (see Frank 1979:222; Schwartzman 1953:106).

Aside from its immediate effects within the workplace, the introduction of the iron men had two important ramifications. The first, was its contribution to the erosion of the certificate system. As noted, a system was established in which all miners had to spend a defined period in the pit and pass an examination prior to working at the face. In order to facilitate the introduction of mechanization, 'yankee machine men' were brought into the mine while the P.W.A. executive 'looked the other way'--their ineligibility was not protested. This action facilitated management's ability to set a precedent regarding hiring through which they successfully eroded the certificate system. The union subsequently lost a considerable amount of influence in the areas of hiring and safety (MacLeod, 1981:544).

The second and most obvious consequence was an increasing split between the rank and file particularly in the South Side and the P.W.A. executive. During the initial period of introduction, the iron men were opposed by the miners while Drummond gave 'official' support to the companies. Drummond favoured the introduction as a way to lower production costs and thereby indirectly create jobs through the expansion of new markets (MacLeod, 1981:543). This act is of importance for it illustrates how trade unions, or

more specifically, individuals within trade unions can maintain and reproduce the subordination of the rank and file within the general logic of market influences (to be discussed later). This event was one aspect of a growing rift which had previously developed with executives' support for Mining Act amendments which restricted the use of naked flame lights and gunpowder (MacLeod, 1981:438). Deepened by protests from miners concerning the overcrowding of mines--the mining population increased from 2241 to 3655 during 1880 to 1890 (MacLeod, 1983:246)--and low wages (Reilly, 1979:85), a general context of rank and file protest was established. This protest and discontent intensified with the 'company store dispute' from 1896 to 1898.¹⁹ During this period the P.W.A. membership, including the entire Cape Breton sub-council, left and joined the Knights of Labour (see Reilly, 1979:chapter 5; Logan, 1979:179). Within this context, the P.W.A. was organizationally in shambles. In 1898 Drummond resigned.

As his absence partially illustrated, Drummond's influence upon the nature of the P.W.A. was significant. His resignation was a rejection by the rank and file of his particular perspective on, and way of, negotiating with management.

Drummond's particular perspective on, and

way of negotiating with management was clearly identifiable. Constantly during his reign he sought not to 'wage a war between labour and capital', and "urged men to live 'furgally and economically' because 'the future outlook for labour does not warrant the throwing away of wages' . . . " (Drummond in P.W.A. Minutes, p. iv cited by Reilley, 1979:52).²⁰ For Drummond strikes were a "last resort"; "a necessary evil . . . for lacking anything more modern (in Logan, 1948:171) and were less effective than change through governmental reform. In McKay's words he was;

a Manchester Liberal transformed by the structural imperatives of his time into an advocate of consolidation and protection. Like Fielding, although following a different trajectory, he was an example of a new liberalism, divorced from free trade and at home in a world of monopolies . . .

While Drummond was formed by the influences of his time, so too were the rank and file. Experiencing 'real transformations, in their work and pay, that were rooted in an industrial structure that was shifting from 'cut throat' competition to an emerging and expanding monopoly; the miners' protests were at the heart of the P.W.A. reorganization and emerged from this historic social context. Within this context, a redefinition of miners' interests, new demands, strategies, and tactics were beginning to emerge from the 'traditions' of paternalism.

Theoretically, the redefinition of interests which mediated the miners' initial move towards unionization and subsequent revolt against Drummond must be seen as being based on the dynamic process of 'experience' (as discussed by Wood, 1982:50-58)--of interaction between the miners and the personified realities within which they interacted on a daily basis. Given that the nature of the accumulation process is shaped by the balance of class forces (Jessop, 1983:89) an understanding of the miners' experience is central if the accumulation process based on ~~the~~ C.M.L.P. is to be analyzed. The accumulation process, in short, is not solely a product of actions and experiences at the point of production. The most obvious examples of 'outside' influences would be the emergence of a miners' union and state regulation of the industry and labour disputes. Based on experiences in, and outside, of the point of production the miners were not "clay in the hands of the potter" or "some nondescript undifferentiated raw material of humanity" as (Thompson would say); but active historical agents who experienced the formal and real aspects of labour process control. The sudden structural shifts of economic-political forces; whether experienced in the transformed nature of class relations that resulted from the destruction of the G.M.A. monopoly of 1858, the abrogation of

Reciprocity in 1866 or the state intervention of strike breaking militia in 1882, all significantly contributed to the miners' redefinition of class interests. In this regard, Nichols and Benyon's (1977:76) stress, that a structural analysis of 'exploitation' cannot be split off from how it is 'understood' by the workers, is of central importance if the accumulation process is to be grasped.

As a class, the miners, throughout every ~~moment~~ of their history, were simultaneously objects and subjects--being influenced and influencing the world around them (Wood, 1982:59). This 'world', at any one moment, structured not only the economic, but also ideological and political realities (options and content of thought and action) which they in turn worked within to 'make their history' through a 'reciprocal' relationship of agency and structure (Przeworski, 1977:377,385; Clarke, et. al., 1976:11). Indeed, if it is assumed, as it is, that the accumulation process is shaped and influenced by the balance of class forces, we must therefore always consider the way in which the required political and ideological forces help reproduce, shape and maintain a specific content of class relations necessary for the accumulation process (Hall, et. al., 1981:201). The miners influenced the accumulation process of the 1880s by not being 'clay

in the hands of the potter', they made their history in a way that was structured by the political, ideological and economic realities of that conjuncture. By doing so they redefined the nature of the balance of class forces and structural forces helped create a new conjuncture--a new reality--that was different from the one that existed in the 1850s, or would exist in the 1900s. While the economic, ideological and political forces did structure the miners' thoughts and actions, there is nothing in their history to suggest that the structures narrowly defined what the miners' specific activities would be. The structural influence must therefore not be understood in a narrow, or mechanical, sense (Murdock, et. al., 1977:16)--"the will and initiative of men cannot be left out".

Guided by this thesis' theoretical understanding of social formation development (as elaborated in Chapter One), it is of extreme methodological importance to refer to the changing economic, ideological and political realities that reveal and produce, and every moment, new possibilities which will enable one class to challenge or subordinate the other. Indeed, the methodological imperative to constantly 'chart' the miners' actions with reference to these dynamic structural realities is one of the paramount features and concerns of this thesis.

In 1899, on the eve of the next century, the importance of keeping in mind the changing structural realities was slowly being learned--through practical experience--by politicians, company officials and miners alike. The balance of class forces was slowly--sometimes quickly--shifting and being redefined from that which had existed before and during Robert Drummond's reign.

Along with the sudden shifts of economic forces that resulted from the breaking of the G.M.A. monopoly, the uneven market forces of Reciprocity and introduction of monopoly capitalism, or the quick redefinition of the logic of formal politics through the emergence of Liberal Democracy, were also ideological transformations. Not only were the economic and political reality of class relations being redefined, but the content of the definition of that reality was also changing.

NOTES

1. The wave of immigration to the Maritimes ended, for the most part, during the 1840s and 1850s (see Muise, 1980; Frank, 1979:73, with reference to Cape Breton). Initially, skilled miners were brought into the region from Britain by the GMA and thus establishing mining villages in Sydney Mines in the 1830s, in the Glace Bay, Reserve Mines and Port Morien areas in the 1850s and 1860s. New Waterford was not seriously developed until the second decade of the 1900s.

The succeeding migration into the Cape Breton industrial area during the "Boom" of 1890-1910 came from the Maritimes in general, and rural Cape Breton in particular. Key to this period of industrialization, with reference to the ethnic and religious structuring of a "common experience" amongst miners, was the substantial entrance of rural Cape Bretons; first generation descendents of Catholic Scottish crofters who entered the highlands up to the 1830s (see Muise, 1980:82-84).

2. The GMA requested troops on the last day of the sitting of legislature. The Premier, J. W. Johnston, introduced the bill, and all three readings were passed before lunch. The troops organized prior to the passing of the bill but arrived four days later due to transportation problems. In conjunction with black listing, eviction from company houses, and 'scabbing', the strike ended. In the following years the bill was used in a very selective fashion depending on the context. Following Confederation, the militia came under federal jurisdiction, and the province used 'specials', or hastily appointed police forces if coercion was required. (see Pyke, 1970:38)
3. MacLeod (1938:226) notes that up to 1900 the Nova Scotia coal industry had the highest rate of major coal mine disasters. Between 1866 and 1875 there had been 4.08 deaths per thousand men. Between 1876 and 1885 one in thirty would not survive work in the pits.

4. For the first time, a knowledgeable mining man was appointed Inspector of Mines in 1864. In 1873 he could, for the first time, legally prosecute workers, or owners, for failing to obey mining rules. Maximum fines were \$80 for company officials and \$8 for workers (MacLeod, 1981:399,404-405). In practice only one manager was prosecuted in 1877.

In addition, the inspector was allowed to inspect mining conditions and order any changes in its workings. Thus in a legal way, the inspector, as a representative of the state, challenged the managers' and workers' traditions of working the mine.

In another direction the Act 'legitimized' the manager's authority. The Act allowed the manager to make suggestions of possible amendments while at the same time denying this possibility to the miners. The miners also 'lost' some power through the introduction of coroner's juries whose members did not necessarily have to be mining men, to investigate accidents. Previously, such cases were heard by juries which usually contained miners who were knowledgeable about the intricacies of mining.

Miners could also be charged by, but could not charge; managers, owners or agents--unless they received written permission from the Inspector or Commissioner of Mines (MacLeod, 1981:410; for a detailed analysis of the Act and its applicability see MacLeod, 1981:404-414).

Fundamentally the Act was a significant piece of legislation for what it attempted to do was increase the authority of the manager through 'legitimizing' it with state sanctions; thus an attempt to subsume managerial authority under state authority. Therefore, it was not simply a piece of legislation designed to reproduce class relations, but in effect, construct and maintain the authority of the state. The 'legitimizing' basis for this subsumption of managerial authority lay in the state's role as the keeper of a publicly owned resource.

5. This was a period when the Attorney General stated: "the servant was always under the authority of

the master. The man who paid another's wages had a right to control his actions as a general rule . . . " (in Pyke, 1970:33).

6. The reason for this, the Commissioner of Mines claimed, was that the Nova Scotian miner, unlike his counterpart in Britain, "was not under the control of a master and therefore needed no protection in law" (in Pyke, 1970:45).

With reference to labour, the bill did restrict boys under ten from working, and those under twelve from working in excess of 60 hours per week (24 hours more than his British counterpart). When the Opposition protested the establishment of a restriction, the government responded that work in excess of 60 hours per week would limit the child's right to have access to an education (Pyke, 1970:45).

7. The specific issue which sparked the strike and eventual formation of the P.M.A. was a reduction. Workers were informed by a company official, Robert Drummond, that the wage reductions they accepted were not a result of depressed market, as the company claimed, but an attempt to increase revenue. In short, the company's notice was based on the manipulation of the tradition of voluntary wage reductions and the misconceived assumption "that the men were as clay, in the hands of the potter" (Drummond, 1926:27).

8. The P.M.A.'s name was changed to the Provincial Workman's Association (P.W.A.) in 1881 when membership included non-mine workers. In that year a New Glasgow glass works and a spike factory were unionized (see Forsey, 1982:346; Reilly, 1979).

9. Drummond (1926:81) tells a story of how, on his way back from Scotland, he boarded a ship which carried miners hired as strike breakers by the GMA. During the voyage he convinced the miners to join the union and therefore undercut the company's 'use of scabs'.

10. It is fairly easy to imagine how this statement was experienced both as representatives of capital and elite paternalistic figures--by various Cape Breton managers during the moment in which their pits became unionized. Some like R. Brown at Lingan demanded the intervention of the militia to crush the organization, and were willing to fight. Others such as McKeen at Caledonia spoke to miners previous to their vote and discussed the uselessness of unionization. Some, like D. J. Kennedy made impassioned speeches entitled, "Unions as Curse" (Drummond, 1926:63-69). Still, others like J. R. Lithgow realized the potential advantages when he later stated:

I came to the conclusion long ago that the advent of the miners' union has been an advantage to all of us. Open ruptures between managers and men have been less frequent and the many little differences that must and will arise, have been settled more speedily and after a more intelligent, businesslike manner than before the existence of the present organization . . . before the Union the managers were continually pestered by the individual complaints of their workmen . . . It is much easier to arrange matters affecting a hundred or two, men with an intelligent committee (Drummond, 1926:94-95).

While the P.W.A. represented a new strength among miners and therefore new possibilities of negotiation it also contained the potential to be incorporated en-masse.

11. Some articulations which suggested a continued existence of paternalism could be seen when; a P.W.A. lodge was named in honour of the manager (see Reilly, 1979:111), a wage cut was voluntarily accepted (see McKay, 1983a:739), or when miners at the P.W.A. picnic in 1885 actively took part in the "event which caused the greatest excitement"--the presentation of a gold headed cane to the most popular mine manager (see Drummond, 1926:110).
12. For a detailed discussion of these developments; with particular reference to the mine managers' response, see MacLeod (1981:448-454).

13. Pyke (1970:48) cites the first working men to run for office (federal) was in 1874. In 1882, an active P.W.A. man ran unsuccessfully, as an independent (Reilly, 1979:88). In 1886, two candidates--including Drummond who was approached by both parties--ran for the Liberals (Reilly, 1979:90). It was not until 1889 however that the personal property franchise was amended and miners could vote. Nova Scotia women could not vote until 1920.
14. This is not to suggest that "the political dimension is somewhat extraneous to capitalist relations" (Wood, 1981:81; see Burawoy, 1983, for a theoretical elaboration). It is to suggest that 1889 marked a significant development in the process of economic and formal political, institutional separation. In this sense, the development of the "separation of powers" contributed to the fragmentation of paternalism.
15. Apart from the introduction of coal cutting machines the Dominion Coal Company also introduced endless haulage systems, larger coal wagons; the construction piers and shipping facilities, and a wash plant (MacGillivray, 1979:57; see also Frank, 1979:23; MacKay, 1983a:202).
16. For a scattered description of work prior to 1893 see Martel, 1945, Drummond, 1911:4, Drummond 1926:18-19, MacLeod, 1981:312-131; Frank, 1979:219-221, Brown, 1899:52, Reilly, 1979:2224, McKay, 1983: chapter 5. With respect to prior technical innovations see MacLeod (1981) concerning room and pillar mining (p.307), machine hoist (p.326), underground transportation (p.335) and submarine mining which began in 1865 (p.405).
17. This is a very important point as it is quite common for various studies to "equate miners with radicalism"--based on assumptions concerning the nature of work organization and mine fatalities. In an excellent discussion concerning these matters see McKay (1983a:524-568, 652).

18. This is an important aspect of the mine and the

officials role. It has been far too common in labour process studies to assume the presence of management means 'control' and not 'coordination'. For an extreme example of this in the literature see Clawson (1980).

19. The 'company store dispute' developed over a two year period and basically concerned the demand by miners, particularly in Cape Breton, to be paid in cash in order to purchase supplies from independent merchants and thereby obtain a small amount of economic freedom. During this period Cape Breton miners were idle throughout winter months as iced harbours prevented shipping. As a result they were forced to purchase highly priced goods and live on company store credit. During the summer months they slowly worked off their debt, sometimes never seeing the cash, and would then be forced into obtaining credit the following winter.

The miners demanded that the P.W.A. executive introduce legislation requiring payment by cash, but Drummond refused when Domco threatened to shut down all stores if they were not going to be fully used.

In the battle that ensued, Drummond temporarily suspended two Cape Breton lodges. In addition he also blocked legislation introduced by miners and independent merchants (Logan, 1948:175-177; Reilly, 1979:chapter 5).

20. Embodied in his perspective was an attempt to make miners, 'respectable members of society'. When asked, during the 1889 Royal Commission on the Relations of Labour and Capital, if the miners, as a class, have improved under the P.W.A., he responded; "there is no doubt of it. Bring a thousand men together and thousand men of no other trade will beat them as far as sobriety and good behaviour are concerned. We have had as many as 2,000 men assembled at picnics and not a single one of them drunk". (Kealey, 1973:440)

CHAPTER THREE

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
THE EMERGENCE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF AN 'OPPOSITIONAL'
FORCE, 1899-1921

"Socialism vs. Capitalism"
the slogan of the Socialist
Party of Canada which ran
South Side candidates during
this period.

Within the 1899-1921 period the South Side coal industry expanded to what proved to be its maximum capacity. Accompanying this increase in production, was the expansion of the number of Domco mines, workforce and South Side mining communities.

During this period the key institutions, which initially emerged in the previous period also fully developed and became established. Through an uneven process, the miners emerged and later established themselves as a collective 'oppositional' force.

Highly significant developments vis-a-vis the trade union, state and company occurred during the early part of this period which contributed to the emergence of a sophisticated industrial relations system and collapse of paternalism. In 1905 South Side miners began to negotiate collectively with written contracts for the first time. Theoretically this event, as well as future trade union developments, was significant for it contributed to a centralization of decision making power into the hands of executive and away from the rank and file (Buroway 1979:51). In addition it also contributed to the separation of 'economic' and 'political' spheres of class action.

Highly significant in reworking class negotiations away from a paternalistic mode was an unprecedented level of state intervention through the invention and

application of the 'Industrial Disputes' Investigations Act (1907). In this regard the law was indeed the instrument through which the state attempted to eliminate certain customs and attitudes in order to disseminate others (see Gramsci, 1983:246-7; Hall, et. al., 1981:67). It was during this period that a mature tripartist system of industrial relations was established. As the 1909 strike, and subsequent developments, would illustrate, this was a period in which a sophisticated and cohesive coercive/consensual method of state intervention to contain the inherently unstable class relations was based.

Near the end of this period, and within the realities of an increased strategically important national coal industry, the miners asserted more aggressive trade unionism. This increased militancy was paralleled with formal political developments as experienced in the form of a highly successful working class party.

Combined these events suggested a significant, and potentially more explosive balance of class forces. While neither class undertook direct attacks against the other (1909 excepted) the new economic, political and ideological realities suggested the miners' action was one of a "war of position" (Gramsci, 1983:206-209, 229-239).

(3:1) THE EMERGENCE OF AN 'OPPOSITIONAL' FORCE:

1899 - 1916

Following Drummond's resignation the P.W.A. slowly regained and expanded its membership under the leadership of the new Grand Secretary, John Moffat. Through a series of recruitment drives, within the context of an expanding coal industry and the creation of the Cape Breton steel industry, the P.W.A. membership rose in excess of 8,000 by 1905 (Logan, 1948:176; Reilly, 1979:182). In addition to the organizing of steel workers, the P.W.A. won 'closed shop' in many mines through the series of small strikes between 1906 and 1907 and acquired members in every provincial mine (Reilly, 1979:182; Logan, 1948:176; Miffilen, 1951:22).

Organizationally the Grand Council's powers had been somewhat diffused. While the key executive positions were still elected by delegates

at Grand Council meetings--and not the rank and file--increased autonomy to decide matters such as strike coordination, was won at the sub-council and lodge level. (McKay, 1983b:8; Logan, 1948:177). In contrast to the Drummond years the Grand Council narrowed its scope of political lobbying, stress on legislative reform, its restriction of the strike weapon, and focused its strategies on more immediate economic aspects (Reilly, 1979:181; Logan, 1948:177).

During the early part of this period, the coal industry had expanded greatly and provincial coal production rose from 1,682,713 long tons in 1893 to 7,203,913 long tons in 1913 (McKay, 1983a:230; the South Side accounted for the majority of provincial production). One crucial factor in the expansion of the coal markets was the creation of the Dominion Iron and Steel Company (Disco) in 1899 at Sydney and the Nova Scotia Steel Company at Sydney Mines in 1900 (MacGillivray, 1979:66; Frank, 1979:25, 14). In 1901 both Disco and Domco's controlling interests were transferred to a Montreal group under James Ross (MacGillivray, 1979:68; Forsey

1926:68) Largely as a result of the steel industry, local sales rose from 996,000 tons in 1898 to 2,139,000 by 1905. It increased further in 1913 to 3,342,000 and thus accounted for 51% of total sales (Forsey, 1926:13). While U.S. sales declined, the Quebec market expanded and became the next largest market, accounting for 34% of sales in 1914 (Forsey, 1926:13). The stability of the industry was somewhat insured during the early part of the period as meetings amongst provincial coal operators were held in Boston in 1904, 1906, and 1907 to regulate sales and prevent underselling (McKay, 1983a:224).

During this period, Domco developed a number of mines and invested two and a half million dollars in Dominion No.2 Colliery (MacLeod, 1981:320). By 1902, 3,100 or 47% of the labour force in the provincial coal industry was hired at the South Side by Domco (MacLeod, 1981:320). The other major Cape Breton coal company, Nova Scotia Steel and Coal, which had bought the remaining GMA operations on the North Side in 1900, had 710 employees (MacLeod, 1981:320).

This expansion of industry and employment was accompanied a substantial population expansion of industrial Cape Breton from 18,005 people in 1891 to 57,263 people in 1911 (Muise, 1980:86). With respect

to the South Side, the population increased from 9,378 to 26,665 during the same period (Muise, 1980:86). The South Side, as well as industrial Cape Breton in general, experienced its most significant industrial and population expansion during the early part of this period. In comparison to previous periods it was definitely the most dynamic. Based on the events of 1893, this was a period of industrialization, in which class relations were significantly transformed.

Within the P.W.A./Domco relations, the industrial relations system was transformed primarily as a result of the expansion of industry and employment. In this regard the transformation was, for the most part, organizationally imperative given the increased number of workers and operations.² During this period, the emergence of collective bargaining through written contract, and federal state intervention through the creation of a network of labour legislation established an industrial relations system that was quite different from previous modes of negotiation. While the emergence towards this 'new era in industrial relations' initially began with the formation of the P.W.A. and provincial state intervention vis-a-vis Mines Act and Miners' Arbitration Act, this thesis argues that the significant break with traditional paternalistic modes of negotiation occurred during this period.

In 1905, the P.W.A. and Domco negotiated a set of written rules, embodied in ~~contract~~ form, which regulated many aspects of work and pay (McKay, 1983a:803; Reilly, 1979:183; Miffelen, 1951:23; and MacDonald, 1909). As one aspect of the new industrial relations system, this 'legal' document was a significant change from the nature of past negotiations which were predominantly individualized and verbal. For the first time many traditional roles of Management and Labour were made into 'rights' which defined the formal limits of class action at the work place. Included were wage schedules for various occupations of mine workers, clauses which gave management the right to regulate labour, and also a clause which forbade the stoppage of work during a grievance (MacDonald, 1909:72-80).³

While these formal 'rights' were, in practice, defined through a process of negotiation, resistance and struggle, the contract did establish a basis and structure for future negotiations. Also significant was the 'collective' nature of this bargaining process as it marked a substantial contribution to a process in which formal negotiating power would be transferred from individual miners to union representatives (see Burawoy, 1979:51). As a result the centralization of decision making established a loss of individual

autonomy, yet at the same time reworked their power in a more collective fashion. A further aspect of this process was the deepening of the previously initiated separation of formal political and economic aspects of class relations through the expanded role of the P.W.A. in the economic sphere.

Largely as a result of broad national transformations in the key unionized, economic sectors, the federal state through consensual methods--the Conciliation Act of 1900 and the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act of 1907 (I.D.I.A.)--intervened in an unprecedented way and institutionalized itself as a 'third party'.

Although the provincial state had initially ventured into the industrial relations of the coal industry vis-a-vis the Miners' Arbitration Act, its practical application proved of limited use given Management's refusal to participate. The second and final usage of Act was in 1901 when the P.W.A. successfully won a 10% wage increase from Domco (Forsey, 1926:18-19; Logan, 1948:177-178; McKnight, 1932:1).

The following summer, the federal Conciliation Act of 1900 was used to resolve a dispute at Sydney Mines, and thus marked the shift of labour regulation, with respect to the coal industry from the provincial to federal state. The Act was implemented again in

conjunction with the militia, during the 1904 Disco steel strike at Sydney (Logan, 1948:178; Forsey, 1926:18-19). In April 1907 the newly created I.D.I.A. was used for the first time in Nova Scotia at Springhill in order to regulate an 'illegal strike'.

In practice, the I.D.I.A. was more intervening than the Conciliation Act. Under the legalities of the Conciliation Act, the Minister of Labour (or appointee), had the power to intervene as an 'observer' into any dispute between Labour and Management. At the request of either Labour or Management, the intervening government representative could appoint a conciliation board to facilitate and attempt to resolve the points of contention. At the request of both Labour and Management, the Minister could appoint a non-binding arbitrator to attempt to resolve the dispute (see Craven, 1980:231; Jamieson, 1973:ch.5).

The I.D.I.A. was more intervening in the sense that it possessed the legal power to assert the 'third party' role of negotiator and enforcing negotiation to occur. Under the I.D.I.A., disputes were investigated by a board that included two representatives; one from Labour and Management, and a third selected by the two. If the two parties failed to select a third it was decided by the Minister or appointee. The board would investigate the dispute

through quasi-judicial powers and suggest a method of resolving the conflict. During this period, known as the 'cooling out period', no strike or lock out could occur. The final report and recommendations were not binding, if not accepted by the two classes. In such cases, the report would be published in an attempt to mold 'public opinion' and pressure for an agreement. Also at this time both parties could begin to negotiate in whatever way they chose. There were no clauses which demanded Management recognize labour's right to negotiate (see Craven, 1980:287).

The I.D.I.A. was an attempt to shape and define the nature of class action through limiting Labour's most important strategy--the strike. Specifically, the legislation attempted to incorporate Labour's power and limit the strike's effectiveness through the institutionalization of a mandatory negotiation process vis-a-vis the cooling out period. Under the I.D.I.A., a strike prior to the cooling out process was 'illegal'. Without argument, the I.D.I.A. was the most far reaching single piece of labour legislation ever introduced into the coal industry. Ideologically the I.D.I.A. was "heaven-sent weapon for capital" as it manipulated "the near-universal respect for the law, which the non-violent character of the labour movement reveals so well" (McKay, 1983b:41; see also

Craven, 1980:ch.9).

While the I.D.I.A.'s formation was to some extent influenced by Labour through the experiences of the Conciliation Act and the 1906 Lethbridge coal strike, the Act was primarily a product of the federal Department of Labour within the context of transformed economy. More specifically, it was an attempt by the Deputy Minister of Labour, Mackenzie King, to ensure the constant production of 'public' utility sectors which were unionized (coal, transportation and public service industries; see Craven, 1980:288; Whittaker, 1971; Baker, 1983). From 1902 to 1913, the national consumption of coal tripled (McKay, 1983a: 261). With reference to Nova Scotia in general and the South Side in particular, the miners' power increased significantly given their employment within a now monopolized industry and the increased strategic importance of coal.

Given the development of the structural separation of the state from the economy--a separation experienced in the form of the Liberal Democracy as well as the distinct nature of 'publicly owned' mines --King manipulated the appearance of 'separate interests' if not always 'impartial interests', in order to legitimize this unprecedented legal intervention (see Craven, 1980:ch.3 for specifics). Mediated by King's belief

that "private rights should cease when they become public wrongs" (in Craven, 1980:268), and within the structural context described above, King was able to create and use labour legislation in an attempt to secure and consequently reorganize the traditions of industrial relations. In this sense Gramsci (1983: 246-7) notes:

If every state tends to create and maintain a certain type of civilization . . . and to eliminate certain customs and attitudes and desinate others, then the law will be the instrument of this purpose . . . The law is the repressive and negative aspect of the entire positive, civilizing activity undertaken by the state. The activities of individuals and groups, etc. must also be incorporated in the conception of the law; praiseworthy and meritorious activity is rewarded, just as criminal actions are punished (and punished in original ways), bringing in 'public opinion' as a form of sanction.

Organizationally, the I.D.I.A. was a tripartist or corporatist institution. Following Panitch (1981) it is important to stress such an institution was, or is, inherently fragile, given that it is an attempt to contain dialectically antagonist interests, and that such an institution does not assume the neutrality of the state. Furthermore, the I.D.I.A. contributed to the centralization of decision making within the trade union--which was already developing with the creation of a contract--by forcing representatives to negotiate on the membership's behalf.

Ideologically, the state attempted to mediate

the I.D.I.A. through a liberal discourse of 'fairness' and 'equality' (see Craven, 1980:157,191). The success of the state in maintaining and reproducing this discourse throughout the process amongst actual class participants, however, was contingent upon the actual social and historical context of the particular negotiations.

Although the I.D.I.A. in itself was a consensual method of industrial relations; the coercive aspect of force must be considered as the ever-present "complimentary face" of state intervention (see Hall et. al., 1981:216). In conjunction with the general legitimacy of the state, force underpinned the I.D.I.A.'s success. While King noted that force destroys "the very spirit it (the I.D.I.A.) is desired to create and maintain he was willing to use force if negotiations vis-a-vis the I.D.I.A. broke down" (brackets mine; cited in Craven, 1980:85-86). Although the militia did enter disputes at previous conjunctures--in an adhoc fashion--the smooth cohesion of the consensus/coercion nature of state intervention was suddenly experienced for the first time in the South Side coal industry during the 1909 strike.

Previous to the 1909 strike, the miners experienced a steady decline in real wages that was in sharp contrast to the 1898-1905 years. As Wade

(1950); see also Reilly, 1979:183) notes the cost of living had increased 22% from 1905 to 1910 while wages increased 6% for 'datal men' and remained constant for contract miners. Intertwined with this drop in earnings was a growing discontent amongst many South Side miners when the 1908 Domco contract was negotiated independent of the rank and file (MacEwan, 1976:23; Forsey, 1926:21; Shields, 1900:19; Wade, 1950). The frustration with the new P.W.A. executive had initially developed from the experiences of the disastrous 1904 steel strike. During that particular strike steel workers walked out while fellow P.W.A. members-- remained working. In addition the strike almost bankrupted the P.W.A.; and thus illustrated the severe limitations of the organization for resistance and struggle, (see Forsey, 1926:20; Logan, 1948:178-179; Reilly, 1978:183; MacEwan, 1976:16-17; Frank, 1979:296).

Emerging from these experiences was a reform movement that advocated more militant trade unionism generally, and affiliation with the United Mine Workers of America (U.M.W.A.) specifically. As early as 1902 affiliation with the international union (as it now had members in Alberta) was suggested, and by 1906 U.M.W.A. representatives were surveying the Nova Scotia fields (Frank, 1979:296; Wade, 1950; Canada, 1909:11). The possibilities of affiliation became real in 1907

when eight lodges decided to join U.M.W.A. ranks (Logan, 1948:185; MacEwan, 1976:19-20). At a May Grand Council it was decided to hold an affiliation referendum. The miners voted 2860⁸ to 2448 to support the U.M.W.A. in June (Logan, 1948:185; see also MacEwan, 1976:21; Wade, 1950).⁵ In Cape Breton the vote was 1888 to 1296, in favour of the U.M.W.A. (Logan, 1948:185; MacEwan, 1976:21; Wade, 1950). Given that only 5308 miners out of a possible total of 10,000-11,000 voted, the Grand Council ruled the referendum 'unconstitutional' at September 1908 meeting in which U.M.W.A. supporters were barred (Logan, 1948:185; MacEwan, 1976:21; Wade, 1950; Shields, 1960:22-25). At that point, the two factions began full scale recruitment. Following the lead of Springhill, U.M.W.A. forces in Cape Breton under the leadership of Scottish immigrant J. B. McLachlan began to organize. Six Domco mines on the South Side and two Scotia Steel mines on the North Side were organized immediately.⁶ By January 1909, six additional locals were formed with another four being established by the year's end (see Logan, 1948:184-189; Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:19-21; Forsey, 1926:21-22; Frank, 1979:296; Reilly, 1979:183-184). On March 2, 1909, District 26 of the U.M.W.A. was formed in Sydney with J. B. McLachlan, Dan MacDougall and J. D. Moss as the provisional executive (Wade,

1950; MacEwan, 1976:26). By this time the U.M.W.A. had the support of approximately 2600 of the 5400 Domco workers (Forsey, 1926:22). By early 1909, two factions of workers--one composed of miners who supported the now 'traditional' P.W.A., the other composed of miners who advocated a more 'oppositional' position towards coal companies--had been established.

The following week, the province's coal operators stated in Truro;

it is unanimously resolved by all the coal companies attending this meeting . . . that the agitation being carried on by the organization known as the United Mine Workers of America to gain control of labour in the mines is fraught with much danger to the Nova Scotia industry and is likely to result in the loss of a large part of our trade to the Americans. It is further resolved that the attempt of a foreign organization to control our mines should be resisted in every possible manner and a course of action agreed upon. (Sydney Daily Post, September 19, 1908 and Labour Gazette, 1909:1029; cited in Mellor, 1983:27; Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:26).

With the refusal to recognize the new union now established, and the subsequent mass firings of U.M.W.A. members, the stage was increasingly set for a strike.

Given the split amongst the miners, the nature of the 1909 strike was extremely complex as each attack against the U.M.W.A. by the state and/or Domco was simultaneously a measure of protection for the immediate interests of the P.W.A.. From a fundamentally economic perspective, Domco's and the

P.W.A.'s interests were not identical. The former required the maintenance of production and chose to support the less militant of the two unions; the latter required work and protection for its members. As a result, it was in both parties' interests to form an alliance of sorts despite, on appearance, the bitter irony of the alliances amongst different classes.⁷ A consequence of this 'logic of interests' was the characteristically uneven support given by the various groups to the state at various points in 1909-1910.

Initially it was the U.M.W.A. which applied for the I.D.I.A. in order to force recognition and stop the mass firings Domco was undertaking (see Forsey, 1926:23-24; Logan, 1948:88; Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:27-28). The P.W.A. previously opposed such legislation and Domco refused to call witnesses and appointed a board member only when threatened to attend by subpoena (MacEwan, 1976:27; Wade, 1950). Despite evidence to the contrary, the board ruled 2 to 1, that discrimination did not occur. Furthermore, the board stated that "foreign officials sitting in Indianapolis should not have the power to decree that Nova Scotia miners, even without a grievance, must stop working and thereby cripple a great Nova Scotian industry" (cited in Labour Gazette, 1909:1231). Perhaps the clearest statement which illustrated the essence

of the I.D.I.A.'s attempt to incorporate all 'parties', to appear neutral and 'objective', and simultaneously to ensure the maintenance of class relations can be seen in the following excerpt of the report;

It is by no means clear to your Board that any right exists on the part of Department of Labour to enforce upon any company . . . Undoubtedly, under certain circumstances, such a recognition results in convenience of various kinds in the transaction of the delicate relations which must always subsist between employer and employees . . . we think it ought to be left to the discretion of the company as to how far it will officially recognize any organization having its central authority outside the Province (in Labour Gazette, 1909:196 cited by Wade, 1950).

Through the board, which was initially requested by the U.M.W.A., Domco was given 'official' approval by the Department of Labour to negotiate in whatever fashion it chose. Within a week of the report, Domco fired every U.M.W.A. leader in addition to over one thousand miners (Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:28). During the same period Domco began full scale evictions of U.M.W.A. miners from company housing, formed a fully paid police force of 625 men, and constructed bunkhouses on mine sites which were then encircled with electric wire (Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:28-29; Mellor, 1983:31-34; Shields, 1960:48).

With the situation steadily worsening and options to negotiate reduced; the U.M.W.A. men on the South Side chose to go on strike on July 6, 1909.⁸

Immediately now supporting the I.D.I.A., Domco officials claimed the strike was 'illegal' as no 30 day notice to strike had been given, they then posted notices threatening fines, evictions and blacklisting (Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:30; Mellor, 1983:37). The following day Domco, later supported by the P.W.A., was successful in requesting the federal Militia, on the basis that the U.M.W.A. was striking 'illegally' and minor picket line clashes occurred (Wade, 1950; Forsey, 1926:24; MacEwan, 1976:21; Logan, 1948:188). Simultaneously, 3000 strikebreakers were brought in, housed in the newly constructed bunkhouses, and protected by special constables and troops (see McKay, 1938b:27; Forsey, 1926:25). Thus the previously mentioned cohesion of state consensual/coercive intervention system, and the subsequent strength created by the new individual relations, was experienced with a suddenness that was unprecedented.⁹ The entire process of state intervention --from the I.D.I.A. report to militia intervention --occurred within a period of four months.

Under troop protection from the 'foreign' union, P.W.A. men and 'scab' labour--imported from as far away as Bulgaria--were able to produce 7000 tons of coal per day within two weeks of the strike's beginning (Forsey, 1926:25; Wade, 1950; Shields, 1960:89; MacEwan, 1976:33). Given that normal production

was 10,000 tons per day (MacEwan, 1976:33), the withdrawal of labour power by the U.M.W.A. was not as effective as it could possibly have been.

In conjunction with Domco's strategies of maintaining formal control through increased firings, blacklisting, evictions, cancellation of credit, spying and arrests--special legislation arising from the "Dominion Coal Company vs. Bousfield et. al." case made picketing illegal and thus further limited the U.M.W.A.'s power (MacEwan, 1976:37; see also Wade, 1950; Shields, 1960:70-72; Mellor, 1983:41-70). Despite the approximate expenditure of \$1 million by the International U.M.W.A. offices, and following winter spent in tents, U.M.W.A. men slowly went back to work in April (MacEwan, 1976:37; Forsey, 1926:26; Wade, 1950). On April 27, 1910 the U.M.W.A. capitulated, having been defeated by Domco, the state and P.W.A.. While the U.M.W.A. continued its struggle in the Springhill region until May 27, 1911, membership slowly declined and the District 26 charter was revoked in 1913 (MacEwan, 1976:37-38; Wade, 1950; Logan, 1948:187; Forsey, 1926:26; Mellor, 1983:70).

In many respects the 1909 strike was the most brutal of all South Side strikes for it cut sharply across family, community and class lines. For most miners, regardless of union affiliation, the 1909

strike was their first experience with the full dimension of the new industrial relations system. It was during the unfolding of these events that the full dimensions of class and state power, and consequently the limits of miners' power were experienced by all mine workers.

The 1909 strike was significant, for the dominant forces immediately contained an emerging 'oppositional' force. Yet, it was also ironically significant for its legacy--the experience--and contribution to the reworking of the miners' consciousness. Throughout this entire period, as indicated first by the forced resignation of Drummond and subsequently the growing dissatisfaction with the P.W.A., there was an unevenly emerging 'oppositional' force amongst miners. The split, articulated by the 1909 strike, was between those who retained the established P.W.A. conciliatory nature of class relations and those who proposed a more militant and aggressive negotiating action towards Domco. In this respect, the 1909 strike was a strike in which one group of workers clung to a conception of work relations that was mediated by a 'producer consciousness', while an opposing faction perceived the same relations through a 'reworked' producer consciousness--in which the exploitative, as opposed to the harmonious, nature of class relations was emphasized.

In shambles, organizationally, and bankrupt financially, the leading U.M.W.A. members began to reorganize the union movement and enter formal politics. Politically, the Socialist Party of Canada (S.P.C., established in Canada in 1905) acquired sufficient members to form a charter in 1907. By 1909 locals were established in Sydney, Sydney Mines on the North Side, and Dominion No.6 and Dominion on the South Side (Frank and Reilly, 1979:85-86). Support for the S.P.C. grew during and after the 1909 strike and by 1911 a candidate had run unsuccessfully in both the provincial and federal elections of that year, acquiring 713 and 223 votes respectively (Frank 1979:302; Frank and Reilly, 1979:95; MacEwan, 1976:42). Although the provincial S.P.C. results were similar to those of a P.W.A. candidate--who ran under the Independent Labour Party banner in 1904--the emergence of the S.P.C. marked the emergence of a 'third party'. Ideologically, the S.P.C. was distinct from the 'traditional' parties having run under the slogan "Socialism vs. Capitalism". (Frank, 1979:302; Frank and Reilly, 1979:95). In the 1916 federal election, J. B. McLachlan acquired 1,038 votes--14.1% of the votes received by the winning candidate in the entire riding and 26.7% in the Glace Bay area--thus increasing S.P.C. support (Frank, 1979:302; Frank and Reilly

1979:100, 106; MacEwan, 1976:42).

With respect to trade union organizing, the oppositional forces began to regroup and attack the P.W.A. as early as 1911 for its inability to acquire wage increases. In that year the P.W.A. executive had 'negotiated' a two year contract which contained no wage increase, and a subsequent three year contract in 1914, which saw a small 6% increase for 'datal men' (MacEwan, 1976:39-40). Given that the cost of living had increased 8% from 1910 to 1915, or 29.7% from 1905 to 1910, the real wages of miners had actually declined. Despite the increased national demand for coal, which resulted from the declaration of World War I, Domco coal prices remained fixed through long term contracts and the company lost a considerable portion of the Quebec market to U.S. coal--due to increased freight rates (MacEwan, 1976:39-40; Forsey 1926:30,49; Wade, 1950; Logan, 1948:188-189). In addition to the increased cost of living, the economic context of the province's coal and steel industries was transformed in 1909 and 1910 when \$5,000,000 of Domco common stock was merged to Disco interests under the corporate heading of the Dominion Steel Corporation. Shortly after, the Cumberland Railway and Coal Company of the Springhill area was incorporated within this merger and the industries increasingly came under

the rule of a monopoly interest (see Schwartzman, 1953:128; Forsey, 1926:11; McKay, 1983a:229-230).¹⁰

Within this economic context, the old U.M.W.A. forces formed the United Mine Workers of Nova Scotia (U.M.W.N.S.) and began to organize miners in 1916. Within the year 'about half' of all Nova Scotian miners were organized. As a result of the serious threat posed by this development, Donco reopened negotiations and the P.W.A. demanded a 30% increase in wages. At approximately the same time both the U.M.W.N.S. and the P.W.A. applied for conciliation under the I.D.I.A.. Faced with the real possibility of a repeat of 1909, and in the context of the War, the federal Department of Labour established a Royal Commission (the Chisholm Commission) to investigate (Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:44-45; Logan, 1948:189-190; Forsey, 1926:49-50).

On May. 5, 1917, the board proposed wage increases which amounted to 12½% for all mine workers in addition to a variety of wage increases and bonuses. In the midst of a "government propaganda campaign" (MacEwan, 1976:45), the board successfully convinced both unions to form a single unified union. (Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:45; Logan, 1948:190; Forsey, 1926:50).

Through a series of meetings, the P.W.A.

agreed to form the Amalgamated Mine Workers of Nova Scotia (A.M.W.) providing there was no attempt to join a non-provincial union. A key moment in the A.M.W.'s formation came when leading P.W.A. executives declined, or dropped out of, the A.M.W. elections of September, 1917. A consequence of their decision was to leave the slate open to the more militant U.M.W.N.S. officers. During the subsequent election, the '1909 U.M.W.A.' leaders--Silby Barrett, Robert Baxter, and J. B. McLachlan--along with four board members, were elected president, vice president and secretary treasurer respectively (Wade, 1950; Logan, 1948:191; MacEwan, 1976:46).¹¹

Internally developed through a rank and file--whose perspective on work relations was transforming through the recent experiences of the new industrial relations system--and externally supported and legitimized by the federal state; the A.M.W.N.S. leaders acquired recognition in a way, and within a conjuncture, that was very different from 1909.

Ideologically, the A.M.W.N.S. constitutional preamble was in stark contrast to that of the P.W.A.'s --under the Drummond regime--and somewhat reflected the transformation that had developed amongst the miners in the redefinition of interests;

Whereas, a struggle is going on in all nations

of the industrial world between those who labour and those who appropriate the wealth resulting from social labour. This irrepressible struggle over the distribution of the proceeds of labour is ever bringing more and more strength to the working class and imposing upon it ever greater duties and responsibilities; And believing that all rivalry, whether between individual workmen or organizations, can bring to them only disastrous results; . . .

We therefore declare it to be our irrefutable duty to join hands and forces to form all miners and mine labourers in Nova Scotia into a trade union for the purpose of securing to its members the social value of their labour and procuring such legislation as may be required from time to time. (cited in Frank, 1979:301)

It was clear that miners in Nova Scotia in general, and the South Side in particular, had transformed considerably since the days of Drummond. A growing militancy was developing that was first clearly visible with the 1909 strike, and then subsequent events. In the context of a transforming industrial structure--which had real effects on class interaction--the miners were becoming more conscious of those interests which were distinct from the coal companies. On the basis of these experiences and understandings they began to act, and thus influenced class interaction, in new ways.

(3:2) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN 'OPPOSITIONAL' FORCE:
1917-1921

During this period, the emerging dynamic of 'oppositional' forces which had initially developed amongst the U.M.W.A. men of the '1909 years', continued its expansion and became generally established amongst South Side miners. Within the immediate economic political and ideological realities of the region, the nature of the miners' actions, articulated primarily through trade union and formal political developments, can be referred to as a 'war of position'. In short, a type of nonconfrontational, strategic, action that occurs within a conjuncture that does not inherently sustain open class conflict (see Gramsci, 1983:206-209, 229-239).

Further contributing to the establishment of an oppositional force were; the return of World War I veterans to conditions of rising unemployment, the symbolic attachment to the Winnipeg General Strike and Russian Revolution as examples of alternative working class actions, and the politicization of the New Waterford Explosion of 1917 in which 65 men and boys died.¹²

Based on the argument that a large and powerful union was required to successfully negotiate with the recently consolidated coal companies, the first

convention of the A.M.W. voted for its officers to discuss affiliation with the U.M.W.A.. By March 1918, through a series of elections, U.M.W.A. affiliation was supported by 98% of the rank and file (see Frank, 1979:307; Wade, 1950; Logan, 1948:191; Forsey, 1926:51; MacGillivray, 1971:14).

Through federal Department of Labour intervention, the initial hesitancy of coal companies declined and a general agreement of recognition of the U.M.W.A. was formalized in February 1919, thus establishing what MacGillivray (1971:14) has referred to as a 'coup de grace'. During the tripartite negotiations, the U.M.W.A. was able to acquire the 8 hour 'hoisting day', classification of datal jobs, and check-off; while the companies received a written statement which guaranteed District autonomy of the union and a clause which noted that Nova Scotian miners would not seek the much higher wages of their American counterparts (Wade, 1950; Frank, 1979:308; Forsey, 1926:51-52; McKnight, 1932:11; Miffen, 1951:44; Shields, 1945:48; MacEwan, 1976:55; Logan, 1948:191).

Organizationally, the re-emergence of the U.M.W.A. both maintained and reproduced the miners' increasing power to negotiate given the large financial and supportive capacities that District 26 could now draw upon. An aspect of this power was that South

Side miners were integrated within a union structure that was not totally of their own making or direction. Given the province wide organization of the new trade union and a province wide monopoly in the industry, province wide negotiations were established. In addition to furthering the 'centralization process' within the union, this establishment also effected the logic of negotiating amongst South Side miners. Now much of their negotiating activities were contingent upon the activities of miners outside the area. A vote against a contract in the South Side could be overturned by District wide results. In addition, while the District, subdistrict and local officers were all elected by the rank and file, any constitutional changes to union government could not conflict with the broader International constitution. Therefore, under the constitution, the International body had the authority to collect union dues, allocate strike funds, veto District called strikes and revoke District charters if 'unconstitutional' action occurred. Apart from its integration at the International level, the District U.M.W.A. was distinctly unique from the P.W.A., ideologically--as it retained A.M.W.'s executive members and constitutional preamble--and democratically--as it allowed for pit head elections of officers on an annual basis (see Frank, 1979:317).

Under the U.M.W.A. the miners continued to regain lost wages. Previously, increases of 14.2% in May of 1917, 16% in January 1918 and 5.1% in July had helped to regain real wages lost since 1905 (see MacEwan, 1976:57-58; also Wade, 1950; Forsey, 1926:50; McKnight, 1932:10). In November 1919, under the I.D.L.A. (the McKinnon Board), the U.M.W.A. acquired industry-wide pay rates by occupation and a general 9% wage increase with options to renegotiate during the life of the year long contract (Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:58; Forsey, 1926:52). This was significant for it developed the need for district-wide negotiation and thus further accentuated the collective nature of the bargaining.

Politically, the support of the S.P.C. developed on a much broader scale in 1917. In that year, the Cape Breton branch of the Independent Labour Party (I.L.P.), under the presidency of McLachlan, was formed with financial aid coming from local unions (MacGillivray 1971:15; MacEwan, 1976:47; Frank, 1979:304; Frank Reilley, 1979:100). The platform of the party was;

To give expression politically to the hopes and aspirations of the working class alone and by use of the ballot to establish the working class ownership and democratic management of all the social means of wealth production and distribution at the earliest possible date. (Halifax Herald, October, 1917:2526; cited in Frank, 1979:304-305).

In the December 1917 federal election, the I.L.P. candidates increased previous S.P.C. support in Cape Breton South-Richmond by winning 3,667 and 3,615 votes in the dual seat riding (see MacEwan, 1976:47-48; Frank, 1979:305). In the mining areas, the party had won 37.66% of the vote with 52.55% in New Waterford (Frank; 1979:305). In the July 1921 provincial election, the I.L.P. allied itself with the United Farmers and the G.W.V.A. forming the 'Farmer-Labour Party' (see MacKenzie, 1969; MacEwan, 1976:70; Frank, 1979:309,320). All candidates--D. W. Morrison; Forman Waye, Joseph Steele and Arthur Richardson--won by large margins in the four member riding of Cape Breton County; winning 65% of the vote (Frank, 1979:320-321; MacEwan, 1976:70-71). This was an extremely significant moment for it marked the first time that miners successfully elected a working class party. Provincially, the Farmer-Labour Party won 11 seats and became the Opposition Party to Premier Murray's Liberal Government (MacEwan, 1976; MacKenzie, 1969).

Despite an electoral setback for McDachlan, in the 1921 federal election¹³ the miners began to establish themselves as a non-allied class force in provincial and federal politics. Intertwined with these trade union and formal political developments

was the creation of the Maritime Labour Herald (M.L.H.) --an independent working class weekly paper whose content, under the direction of McLachlan and the W. B. Cotton (of Cotton's weekly fame), provided a working class perspective on local issues (MacGillivray, 1971:57; MacEwan, 1976:74).

Amidst these ideological and political transformations were also economic developments which significantly redefined the nature of class relations and the dynamics of production. Despite protests from several Dominion Steel directors and a lengthy debate in Parliament, the British Empire Steel Corporation (BESCO) was incorporated in Halifax on May 22, 1920, under the presidency of Roy Wolvin, and became the largest industrial in Canada (see Forsey, 1926:37; Frank, 1979:29-35; MacEwan, 1976:59-61; MacGillivray, 1971:31-42; Schwartzman, 1953:151; Wade, 1950). BESCO merged the Dominion Steel Corporation, Nova Scotia Steel and Coal, and Halifax Shipyard, and therefore controlled 85-95% of the province's coal production and all of the steel industry (Schwartzman, 1953:151-173). With no injection of new capital, the financial structure of the corporation was quickly identified as 'flimsy' and 'watered down' as total stock value was in excess of existing assets in the range of \$54 million (see Frank, 1979:35-37).

MacEwan, 1976:61; Forsey, 1926:38; Frank, 1976a:21).

In order to remain financially afloat, BESCO required an annual \$8 million operating profit to meet commitments on preferred stock; with additional profits required for investments in fixed capital stock or dividends on common shares (see Frank, 1979:35-37). Given that the coal operations were the only profit making sector (Frank, 1976b:163), and given that Wolvin made no financial distinction from sector to sector (Frank, 1979:42), the maintenance of a profit making coal industry was central to BESCO's strategy of survival. The imperatives imposed from the distant board rooms on the province's coal industry, were further intensified due to an overall decline in coal production which began in this period. Production in Cape Breton had peaked in 1913, at 6.3 million tons and had dropped to 4.5 million tons by 1920 (Frank, 1979:42), as a consequence of a lost Quebec market and decline in steel production during the post-war period. Between 1917 and 1921 man-days worked and coal production declined substantially by one third (Frank, 1976b:163). Clearly, the industry was in economic crisis.

Shortly following the reorganization of capital, the U.M.W.A. District Convention called for further wage increases to counteract the rising cost

of living (MacEwan, 1976:62; Forsey, 1926:53; Wade, 1950). Through a series a fruitless tripartite negotiations in the form of another Royal Commission (the Quirk Commission), the U.M.W.A. threatened to strike if its demands were not met (MacEwan, 1976:62; Forsey, 1926:53; Frank, 1979:330). In a final attempt to avert such action, the federal state intervened on work stoppages through the establishment of a grievance procedure of unprecedented sophistication. Specifically it attempted to harness the mine, or pit, committee --a previously established group of mine worker representatives who inspected the working conditions of their respective pits--as a mediator or regulator of individual disputes. If the pit committees failed to resolved the dispute, the grievance was, to be taken up by the District executive, and if still unsuccessful sent to arbitration. Throughout this procedure, the Agreement stipulated that production was to continue. Also included, was the absolute right of management to hire, fire and assign work (see Frank, 1979:235-236,249-251). The Agreement, then, was an attempt by both the federal state, and BESCO to contain and unrealistically prevent, a stoppage in production by the now threatening miners.

Through a series of stormy debates between the executive--who argued for the wage package--and

the rank and file--who argued over issues concerning their traditional rights in the pit, the Agreement was eventually accepted by a vote of 6,499 to 4,490 (Frank, 1976a:91; Frank, 1979:331; MacEwan, 1976:63; Forsey, 1926:55; Wade, 1950; Logan, 1948:201). As the cost of living was beginning to slow down, the 1920 rates turned out to be the highest real wages the miners would acquire until the 1940s and acted as a reference point during future wage negotiations (Frank, 1976a:91). The acceptance of the Agreement also marked a new, if brief, stage of class regulation at the point of production. In this sense, the 'First Montreal Agreement' was 'technically' the high point of consensual industrial relations since, possibly, the days of paternalism.

Intertwined with the development of the First Montreal Agreement was the federal state, whose actions were of increased consensual intervention. Beginning with the Chisholm Commission of 1917, a pattern of extra-I.D.I.A. tripartism vis-a-vis Royal Commissions slowly emerged. Increasingly the federal state took a very active role in attempting to organize class negotiations in order to contain the possibilities of production stoppages. By 1922 the coal industry continued to become increasingly more strategic as 45% of all Canadian coal (MacGillivray, 1971:24) was

mined by a well organized and potentially explosive group of Cape Breton miners.

In many respects the developments of this brief period established the economic, political and ideological parameters of a conjuncture which could intensify a growing militancy. Structurally the emergence of BESCO created a situation in which mine managers would eventually have to increase the rate of exploitation; thus directly redefining the interests of Capital and Labour on less common, and more antagonistic grounds. Combined with the political and ideological transformation of the miners and their strategic power as national suppliers of fuel, class relations were inherently structured towards conflict. Through the Montreal Agreement, the state attempted to contain this possibility by exchanging high wages for industrial peace through a grievance procedure.

In conjunction with the constant reference of institutional developments to the balance of class forces, as they define and are defined by the structural realities of specific periods and/or conjunctures, it is useful, methodologically, to generally refer at various moments to each class 'repertoire or strategies' (as understood in Clarke, et. al., 1977:44-45).

Historically, significant options within

the miners' repertoire were 'created' with unionization, the uncontested retention of real control over the labour process, and the establishment of a working class party. Theoretically, the potential range of concrete types of resistive, challenging or accommodating activity has been developed or 'guided' by the way the class has defined the authority of workplace relations --in short, by the type of miners' consciousness.

By contrasting various historical moments (as discussed methodologically in footnote 6, Chapter One) it is possible to grasp a sense of development --or dynamics--in the miners' power as their repertoire of real and potentially possible actions and thoughts are expanded, created or dissolved. From an early point in history, in which the miners' actions with a local master were 'individualized' with no immediate potential of an institutionalized collective negotiating force, or way of thinking which mediated such action, the miners had 'created'--over a period of less than 50 years--an unevenly emerging and more challenging power. Historically speaking the miners' power, as a challenge to the dominant forces, was on the 'rise'. Despite the creation of an elaborate state system of intervention to complement Domco's repertoire of black-listings, evictions, cancellation of credit, etc., the miners were not able to be easily contained

--politically, ideologically, or economically. Indeed, the inherent stability which necessitated the increased intervention vis-a-vis the I.D.I.A. and special royal commissions, was clearly visible.

Mediating, and implicit, within the miners' changing repertoire of strategies was consciousness (as methodologically defined and applied in footnotes 10, 14, and 15 of Chapter One). As noted in Chapter One, the specific type of consciousness possessed by a class is defined by the class's particular conceptualization of, or way of thinking about, the social world in reference to the authority of workplace relations at a given conjuncture and is formed through a process of 'experience'. A particular type of consciousness can hold the possibilities of 'guiding' distinctly different types of class action on the basis of how and what the class considers to be its interests and relationship to another class. Under what has been identified in this thesis as a 'paternalistic' consciousness it was noted with reference to Reilly (1979:111,112) that "as late as the 1870s the miners did not define their interests as being essentially different from those of the coal operators. This conciliatory attitude clearly limited the extent to which miners could act collectively to defend their interests . . . " Admist the 'experience' of the

turbulent economic crisis and market fluctuations the miners began to redefine their interests and eventually formed a 'producer' consciousness which, while sustaining an institutionalized collection of fellow miners, still defined, or retained, a wide range of interests as mutually compatible with the local coal company. Guided by this consciousness the actions of miners were different than that which had previously existed. During this period, the producer consciousness was being unevenly reworked, or recomposed. Theoretically, this development --particularly the events of 1909--clearly reveal a significant characteristic of consciousness formation. Given the way in which a class experiences a lived material reality, the formation of a particular type of consciousness is inherently uneven and therefore never held homogeneously by all class members (see Clements 1977 and Meszaros 1978). While the recomposition of this consciousness was highly uneven it is still possible to grasp a sense of its dynamics which suggested the redefinition of interests along more oppositional, and less mutual interests. Furthermore, given the real experienced intervention of the state--in sometimes violent ways--the miners were also making a distinction between their interests and the state's interests. The best articulation of this would perhaps be found in the creation of their own formal political party.

Combined these dynamic developments in the reworking of the miners, and dominant forces, respective repertoire of strategies suggested a serious transformation in the nature of the balance of class' forces based on the South Side Cape Breton coal mining labour process. To use Clarke's, et. al. (1979:44) phrase--the 'theatre of struggle' was indeed transforming.

NOTES

1. This is not to say that lobbying or participation in formal politics stopped completely, or that subsequent efforts were of lesser significance.

In 1889 the provincial government began to contribute to the Nova Scotia Miners' Relief Fund (established 1886) and further financed a death benefit in 1903.

In 1910, the Employers' Liability Act was passed and formed the basis for the 1915 Workman's Compensation Act. The latter piece of legislation was more liable in a strict sense as the worker was not forced to prove the employer's fault in order to receive benefits (see Logan, 1948:181-184).

Of significance with reference to this type of legislation is the way in which the state shaped the definition of 'cause of accident' or 'channelled' any 'political impetus' that may have resulted from accidents or explosions (see McKay, 1983a:658 and Taylor, 1984 for a general discussion of this process with specific reference to the No.26 Colliery fire at Glace Bay in 1979, and the 1982 sinking of the Ocean Ranger).

2. This is an argument which is in some respects similar to one developed by Pentland (1979 and 1981). Basically, given the changed corporate and labour market structures, personal modes of negotiation (such as verbal individualized contracts) could not be maintained. Inextricably linked to the structural transformation of the economy was a transformation in labour legislation that was mediated a liberal discourse, which reflected the 'freedom' of the 'open' labour market (Pentland, 1979:13). In conjunction with this ideological dimension was the basic organizational necessity of a bureaucratic regulation of labour given the numbers of workers involved.
3. In the contract were guidelines outlining a general grievance procedure. If the pit manager and union representative could not resolve a dispute it was referred to the General Manager. Throughout the grievance procedure work was to continue.

Any amendments which resulted from the grievance were to be in written form and effective immediately. Certain clauses, such as absenteeism without permission from the manager, were strengthened with the threat of fines.

Management also had the right to hire, fire, and assign workers to various types of work and were also required to supply all mining tools and supplies. In addition, the contract included a comprehensive wage schedule for each occupation in each Domco mine. The contract rates covered work under normal working conditions as well as special rates when contingencies in work arose. (see MacDonald, 1909:72-80)

4. During the negotiations the P.W.A. proposed a 15% increase for datal men and other increases for other workers while Domco demanded wage deductions amounting to \$100,000. The P.W.A. being unable to strike given limited financial resources, applied for an I.D.I.A. inquiry. Unilateral (non-rank and file) settlement was reached and a minimal raise for mine workers and decrease for some occupations was established. The contract which replaced the 1905 one was binding until June 1, 1916. (see Forsey, 1926:20-21).

5. The vote was for an "improved P.W.A." or affiliation with the U.M.W.A. By "improved" it was meant the creation of a strike fund and a rank and file election of P.W.A. Grand Council executives. The breakdown of the results were as follows:

	For P.W.A.	For Affiliation with U.M.W.
Cape Breton	1296	1888
Inverness	418	96
Pictou	645	54
Cumberland	89	822
	2248	2860

(see Logan, 1948:185; Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:221; Shields, 1960:24).

6. The South Side organized were No.6 at Donkin, No.11 and No.4 at Glace Bay, No.1a at Dominion, No.11 at Reserves Mines, No.12 at New Waterford. The North Side mines were Florence and Princess at Sydney Mines (Labour Gazette, 1908-1909:961; Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:220).

The first lodge to affiliate was the original P.W.A. lodge; the Pioneer Lodge in Springhill. As McKay (1983a:693,800) notes, the Springhill miners were in struggle not only with the P.W.A. executive but with management over control over the workplace. From 1888 to 1917 the nature of work was being reorganized by management from the paternalist to autocratic methods of control.

7. It is in this sense misleading to refer to the P.W.A. as a 'company union' (see Mellor, 1983; MacEwan, 1976, for examples). Such a perspective fails to grasp the realities of this alliance in its political, ideological and economic dimensions. The P.W.A. was not directed by company officials but by the P.W.A. executive supported by its members. Their actions were based on what they perceived to be their own, and not the company's interest.
8. While miners in the Springhill region did walk out, miners from the North Side did not strike. At that point the P.W.A. was not recognized by the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Corporation (Wade, 1950).
9. The clearest example of the coercive nature of the state in the South Side was experienced on July 31, 1909, when the U.M.W.A. men were on a parade of support from Glace Bay to the nearby Dominion. As they crossed from one town into the other, they were met by a number of soldiers with a machine gun perched on the steps of the local Catholic church. Not wanting to challenge the militia the parade headed back toward Glace Bay (see Shields, 1960:67; McKay 1983b:43; Mellor, 1983:57).

10. Like the original merger of the South Side fields of 1893, this consolidation was a further attempt, by controlling interests; to prop up sagging holdings elsewhere; most notably Disco losses (see Schwartzman 1953:chapter 4; McKay, 1983a:229,231).
11. Silby Barrett was originally from Newfoundland and had worked for the U.M.W.A. since 1902 in Ohio and had later been U.M.W.A. board member during the 1909 strike. Baxter, like McLachlan, was a Scottish emigrant miner and had come to Cape Breton in 1900. McLachlan came from Scotland in 1902. He was born in 1869, and entered the pits at age eleven. By the time he was sixteen he was elected secretary of his local union. By 1900 he had been active in trade unionism, socialist politics and was blacklisted from Scottish coal fields (see Wade, 1950; Mellor, 1983:16; MacEwan, 1976:15,41).
12. During the War, approximately 25% of Cape Breton miners enlisted (Frank, 1979:297). Upon their return, they confronted a general condition of rising unemployment resulting from a decrease in coal and steel production. Many became active within the trade union movement and formal politics through the Great War Veterans Association (GWVA) (see Frank, 1979:309-310; MacEwan, 1979:69; Frank, 1976a:31).

On May 1, 1920, miners in District 26 of the U.M.W.A. walked out for a one day protest against the arrest of the Winnipeg General Strike leaders (see Frank, 1979:317; MacGillivray, 1971:46). In addition left wing leaders within the U.M.W.A. began to symbolically make reference to 'red' and 'bolshhevik' struggles and the Russian Revolution (see Frank, 1979:317; Frank, 1976b:165).

On July 26, 1917, in No.12 colliery at the New Waterford, 65 men and boys were killed in an explosion. At the initial coroner's jury, company officials were found guilty of 'gross neglect'; a similar result held by a Department of Mines investigation. Following the reports there was a general lull of governmental inactivity which failed to bring charges against Domco until miners threatened to strike. A Supreme Court trial resulted in the indictment of Comco officials for manslaughter. The February 1918 trial of those officials was

postponed. The trial was then held on October 28, 1918 at which Judge Mellish--a previous BESCO lawyer presided. At the trial's commencement, the jury on Mellish's instructions found the officials not guilty after 15 minutes of deliberating (MacEwan, 1976:48-50; see also Frank, 1979:227; McKay, 1983a:564,665).

13. While McLachlan, along with running mate E. C. Doyle won only 32.63% of Cape Breton South Richmond' dual riding, they won 57.12% of the vote in the mining district (Frank, 1979:323). During the election McLachlan was 'framed' by his chief competitor W. F. Carroll by way of an astute political manoeuvre. Based on a 'letter' Carroll charged McLachlan with secretly agreeing to a forthcoming 33% wage reduction. On the night of the election, a debate was held between the two candidates in which Carroll produced the 'letter'. Immediately following this, a band began to play, drowning McLachlan's voice, while Carroll left the hall.

Following the episode, a special edition of the Sydney Record was distributed, not sold, with the headlines reading: "Carrol Produces Conclusive Proof Against McLachlan". The papers had been printed previous to the debate (see MacEwan, 1976:76-77).

CHAPTER FOUR

THE RISE OF AN 'ALTERNATIVE FORCE':
CLASS STRUGGLE AND CRISIS, 1922-1925

They must forget all the
ethics that they have been
taught about the property
of the owners
- J. B. McLachlan

This was a period in which the miners became an 'alternative' force. During this period the dynamic of an increasing power amongst South Side miners intensified. Framed within the new exploitative pressures imposed on Domco through BESCO, and a shrinking coal market, the miners rose as an 'alternative' force and began to struggle--creating new and unprecedented strategies.

If the miners' actions during the previous period can be considered, for analytical purposes, a 'war of position', the type of action that developed within the immediate conjuncture of the South Side from 1922 to 1925 can be considered a 'war of manoeuvre', a type of directly confrontational action identified as class struggle that occurs within a conjuncture that inherently presents and sustains structural possibilities of open class confrontation (see Gramsci, 1983:206-207, 229-239). This was a 'conjuncture of crisis'.

It is at all times theoretically and methodologically important to remember that a conjuncture is composed not solely of the economic structural realities, as they define the options of classes at a specific moment in history; but by necessity, implies political and ideological dimensions also. A conjuncture of crisis implies that it is not sufficient to have just an economic

crisis within the social formation--but must contain a political and ideological crisis as well. The intensification of the rate of exploitation, or crisis of market, in and of itself, will not inevitably cause a conjuncture of crisis. It is rather a more complex product of economic, political and ideological historical factors.

Thus Gramsci argues that the most favorable conjunctures for proletarian revolution do not necessarily occur in those countries where capitalism is most advanced but may emerge instead where certain structural weaknesses in the fabric of the capitalist system make it least able to resist an attack . . . (Jessop, 1982:145 citing Gramsci, 1978:345)

As Carnoy (1984:79) elaborates:

. . . crises could only lead to action if mass consciousness was there, and ready to go into action --so it was development of this consciousness that would produce revolutionary change, not the declining rate of profit . . . increased impoverishment is only one element in the possibilities for raising this consciousness.

During this period, and to be understood within the historical development of the miners' consciousness, this thesis argues that the miners became 'class' conscious. This recomposition was solidly based on their experiences with concrete actions undertaken by the state, company and trade union leaders and developed out of their past understanding of class relations.

Based largely on a process of fetishization with the changing key institutional sites of action

and experience the miners began to think and act in ways distinct from any previous period.

In the process the miners became an 'alternative' force in the sense that both their actions and thoughts were directly challenging to, and beyond the effective containment of, company and state and even international trade union authorities.

(4:1) THE RISE OF AN 'ALTERNATIVE' FORCE: 1922-1925

In late December 1921, with the termination of the 'First Montreal Agreement', the full weight of the imperatives that BESCO had forced on its coal sector were experienced by the miners when a 33½% reduction in wages was announced (Forsey, 1926:55; Logan, 1948:201; MacGillivray, 1971:62; MacEwan:1976:79; Frank, 1976b:164; Frank, 1979:255,332; Wade, 1950). Given that the financial structure of BESCO did not permit an investment of fixed capital stock to increase the rates of exploitation through relative surplus value production, the quest for profit took the form of a wage cut. Experimentally, such a strategy is by far the most dangerous as it is a direct attack against the worker and exposes, very clearly, through a process of fetishization, the economic basis of class relations. Within a context in which an 'oppositional force' had been previously established amongst miners, this action, like subsequent BESCO actions, radicalized and politicized the miners in a way that remained unprecedented in South Side mining history.

Following a series of appeals and counter-appeals based on a variety of readings of the I.D.I.A., another board recommended a 29% reduction retroactive to January 1, 1922. This was rejected by a province wide vote of 10,305 to 486 (Frank, 1979:255; MacEwan, 1976:80-82; Forsey, 1926:56-58; Wade, 1950). On February

22-25, the District executive was instructed at a special convention to renegotiate with BESCO and regain wages established in 1921. (Frank, 1979:334; Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:81) The result of the subsequent meetings, known as the 'Second Montreal Agreement' --an eight month contract which was very similar to what the previous I.D.I.A. Board had suggested--intensified an already existing split between executive members (MacGillivray, 1971:66; Frank, 1976:334; MacEwan, 1976:82). The 'right wing' of the executive, led by Robert Baxter and Silby Barrett, pleaded for the rank and file to accept the Agreement; while the 'left wing' led by McLachlan, rejected the offer and demanded more. On March 14, 1922, the 'left' won by a vote of 8,109 to 1,352, and the 'Second Agreement' was flatly rejected (Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:83; Frank, 1979:334).

Within the first three months of negotiation the responses to BESCO's reduction had not only split the executive, but had also led to a series of lootings of a Glacé Bay company store and an unevenly supported 'slow down strike' amongst South Side miners (Frank, 1976b:171; Frank, 1979:235,334; MacGillivray, 1971:67; Forsey, 1926:57). On March 16, 1922, amidst scattered debates and a split District executive, McLachlan called for a province wide 'slow down strike' (MacEwan,

1976:83; Frank, 1976 :174; Frank, 1979:256-257; Wade, 1950; MacGillivray, 1971:67-69). Strategically, this tactic was borrowed from the Scottish coal fields and fit well with the economic and 'ideological' organization of the work place. As noted, the labour process was highly labour intensive and composed of daily paid mine workers--'datal men'--and piece rate miners 'contract men'. Given the organization of valorization, the company had to retain the salaried mine workers if production continued at a minimal rate. The key to the slow down was that unsupervised miners could regulate production albeit at reduced wages, to a level at which the mine lost on a daily basis (see also Frank, 1976 :172-175; Frank, 1979:254-257). In this sense, the piece rate system was a crude mechanism of control, based on economic coercion, that simultaneously embodied an unsupervised aspect in the pit. It was this aspect which ironically gave the miners their strategic power in the pit. Ideologically, the adoption of this tactic was justified on the fetishized basis of the piece rate--"two-thirds work for two-thirds pay"--and the miner's traditional right to work unsupervised, their own hours at their own pace. When it is considered that these notions confronted the equally respected values of 'hard work', 'fair day's work' and the economic realities of an

existing scarcity of available shifts resulting from underemployment--the adoption of this tactic expressed a new militancy and power amongst miners (see Frank, 1976 :173; Frank, 1979:257]. Perhaps the strongest ideological challenge to this tactic came during an exchange between McLachlan and the federal Minister of Labour when the miners were accused of being "un-British, un-Canadian and cowardly to pretend to be working for a fair wage rate while declaring to the world that only partial and grudging services will be given" (James Murdock in Frank, 1979:257; and Wade, 1950).

Given that it had previously been known that the International U.M.W.A. would not financially support a strike at that time, and that Cape Breton coal production would not peak until the summer season; 'striking on the job' was indeed astute strategically (Forsey, 1926:57; Frank, 1976 :172; Wade, 1950). By March 23, 1922, the complete District supported the slow down and a House of Commons debate on the 'Eastern Crises' on March 30 was provoked (MacGillivray, 1971:70-73; MacEwan, 1976:84-85; Frank, 1979:257-258). In addition, Prime Minister Mackenzie King recalled the previous I.D.I.A. board, and at the request of a number of mining town mayors appointed another one

(the Scott board) on April 30, 1922 (Forsey, 1926:58). The Scott Report, like its predecessor offered very little and consequently was a total failure (see MacGillivray, 1971:74; Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:85-86).

Following the dismal proposals suggested through the Scott board and with no developments of improved negotiations in sight, a special District 26 Convention was held on June 24, 1922 in Truro (MacEwan, 1976:85; MacGillivray, 1971:75; Frank, 1979:336; Frank, 1976:181). It was at this convention that the 'left wing' gained District 26 power, when the 'right wing' resigned after heavy criticism for its 'conciliatory' behaviour towards BESCO demands (see Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:85). Furthermore, the convention was strategically unlike previous ones, given the delegates' support for a clear political and ideological shift. During the proceedings, a motion to seek affiliation with the Communist International's, Red International of Labour Unions (R.I.L.U.) was passed, Tim Buck as representative of the new Communist Worker's Party of Canada (W.P.C.) spoke and the adopted report of the Policy Committee ended with the following statement;

We proclaim openly to all the world that we are out for a complete overthrow of the capitalists state, peaceably if we may, forcibly

if we must, and we call on all workers, soldiers and minor law officers in Canada to join us in liberating labour (in Frank, 1979:337; Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:85-86; Frank, 1976 :181; Forsey, 1926:58; MacGillivray, 1971:75).

While, of course, the rhetoric of such a bold statement cannot be taken literally; its presence can be interpreted as both; the development of a new reality within South Side politics, and simultaneously the broader political and ideological transformation of a conjuncture based fundamentally on the reorganization of BESCO's imperatives which framed the possibilities for the left wing's rise. The continuation of this development was subsequently expressed and reproduced on August 15, 1922, when the rank and file overwhelmingly elected the complete left wing slate in District 26 elections (Frank, 1979:339; MacEwan, 1976:86; MacGillivray, 1971:80; Frank, 1976 :182; Wade, 1950; Forsey, 1926:59). In that election, 'Red' Dan Livingstone, Alex S. McIntyre, McLachlan--all newly recruited W.P.C. members--were elected president, vice-president and secretary-treasurer respectively (Frank, 1979:339-340).

Prior to this election, favorable negotiations with BESCO and Premier Murray had developed on August 12, 1922. When the executive--McLachlan included--wired back to tell the membership to postpone a planned August 15 strike date, they were rebuked during a series of rank and file organized meetings held

throughout the South Side area (Wade, 1950; MacGillivray, 1971:78-80; Forsey, 1926:59). Aside from the highly illustrative fact that the strike was initiated by the South Side rank and file--beyond control of the radical left wing executive--it is also extremely significant to note that the strike was a "100%" strike.

Unlike previous strikes in which maintenance, pump and fan men remained in the mine to remove water and gas, a 100% strike entailed the departure of all mine workers. The possibility of a mine's destruction through water and methane build up become realities. Like the slow down, the miners' real control of the pit was manipulated into a source of power. However, unlike the slowdown, a 100% strike is much more extreme economically, politically and ideologically. The irony of this tactic lies in the simultaneous possibilities of the destruction of the miners' only source of income, BESCO's private property, and the provincial government's 'publicly owned' mines. Thus, more than any other tactic, the 100% strike accentuates the strategic features of the strike weapon,--the manipulation of the fragile structural economic, political and ideological interdependence within which workers, capitalists and the state interacted. It was the miners's most threatening weapon.

As a form of struggle, it was unprecedented on the South Side. Realizing the nature of the new tactic, in all its dimensions, McLachlan told the miners;

They must forget all the ethics that they have been taught about the property of the owners . . . No worker must be left on the job taking care of the property of the owners while they grinned like hyenas as they starved the workers back to submission. The workers must remember that they are pitting their empty purses; and the empty stomachs of themselves and their families against the millions of the operators. (M.L.H., 1922, July 29; in Frank, 1979:259).

On midnight, August 15, 1922, the 100% strike began. The response from both levels of the state was quick. Federally, under the legalities of the Militia Act, 450 and a subsequent 500 troops were sent to Cape Breton County (see MacGillivray, 1971:81-84; also MacEwan, 1976:88-89).¹ Provincially, Cape Breton County was declared a police zone and a 1000 member special police force was organized and sent (MacGillivray, 1980:100; MacEwan, 1976:89).

On August 26, 1922 an agreement--a 40 cent and 12½% increase over the imposed January contract for datal and contract respectively, and the discontinuation of the grievance and work stoppage clauses as outlined in the 1921 contract--was tentatively reached (Frank, 1979:252,260; MacGillivray, 1980:101; MacGillivray, 1971:88; MacEwan, 1976:89; Frank, 1976). Financially, the miners had resisted the 33% reduction

(which the right wing executive had initially capitulated) and accepted a reduction of approximately 18.9% (Frank, 1976:170). On August 31, the contract was widely accepted by the miners "under the muzzle of rifles, machine guns and gleaming bayonets with the further threatened invasions of troops" (Livingstone in Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:89; MacGillivray, 1980:101-102).

While initially resistive in nature the action amongst South Side miners was transformed into struggle through the active implementation of a new set of strategies which were accepted, or legitimized, and 'spawned' by the transformed realities of the 1921-1922 conjuncture. In itself, and despite the ideological dimension of the tactics used, the strike of 1922 was fundamentally an economic struggle over the price of labour power. In this sense, the succeeding strike of 1923 was of greater significance strategically, vis-a-vis the recomposition of the balance of class forces, as it involved struggle on a much broader scale and embodied an alliance with striking steel workers.

Prior to the actual 'sympathy strike' by the miners, the Sydney steel workers were attempting to have their union, the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers (A.A.I.S.T.W.) recognized

3

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 1010a
(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)

since its formation in 1917 (MacEwan, 1976:91; Logan, 1948:250-251; MacGillivray, 1971:93). In the early months of 1923, the intensification of the steel workers' demands, for an 8 hour day and recognition, and previous developments amongst the coal miners led to the introduction of a provincial police force in Cape Breton for the purposes of "erradicating Bolshevism" (the new Premier, E. H. Armstrong, Sydney Post, March, 1923, cited in MacEwan, 1976:91). Amongst the provincial police's first activities in the maintenance of South Side 'law and order' were the arrests of several W.P.C. organizers, the searching of District 26 officers' and executives' homes, beatings and establishment of a spy system (MacEwan, 1976:94-96; Wade, 1950; MacGillivray, 1971:104-106). On June 28, 1923, the steel workers walked out amidst minor clashes; thus legitimizing the entrance of 1,150 militia members on June 30 (MacGillivray, 1980:102). On July 1, with reinforcements of more provincial police, a brutal series of mounted police charges were made into crowds of steel workers, women and children (MacGillivray, 1980:103; MacEwan, 1976:96-97; MacGillivray, 1971:108-117).

Following these violent attacks, the District 26 executive called for a 100% strike, in an attempt

♦ to force BESCO's recognition of the steel workers' union and the withdrawal of police, on July 3, 1922 (see Wade, 1950, 1980:103; Frank, 1979:345; MacEwan, 1976:97-99; MacGillivray, 1971:116). Initially, the strike began on the South Side, but by July 12 "the fight against Armstrong" had spread province wide (MacEwan, 1976:98) with additional U.M.W.A. locals in Alberta also walking out (Wade, 1950). Again, the response immediate; McLachlan and Livingstone were arrested on July 6, and held without bail until July 11 (MacEwan, 1976:102). At this time 'nearly two thirds of the province's revenue' now came from the industrial Cape Breton area (MacGillivray, 1971:24).

Simultaneously there were similar responses, albeit from a different trajectory, by the International U.M.W.A. under the authority of John L. Lewis. Beginning with the 'left turn' of the 1922 District convention, the subsequent application to the R.I.L.U., the defeat of the 'right wing' during the previous elections, and the use of the 100% strike; a control struggle mediated along conflicting ideological lines, had developed between the International and District executive (see Frank, 1979:341-345; MacGillivray, 1971:105-108). In addition, the confrontation deepened during the June 1923 District 26 convention when delegates voted to disregard Lewis's orders to ban Communists

from future elections and respect the 1922 contract by not going out on strike (Frank, 1979:343).²

On July 17, 1923, two weeks after the 100% strike began, Lewis revoked the District 26 charter, barred the executive from holding future office, and appointed a provisional executive under the leadership of Silby Barrett. In addition, the payment of the check-off was paid directly to District offices thus slowly draining the locals of their autonomous financial power (MacEwan, 1976:105). Within the following week and a half, miners from the various South Side locals returned, defeated, to the pits. By August 2, 1923, those steel workers who were not blacklisted or arrested also returned, defeated (Wade, 1950; MacGillivray, 1971:131; MacEwan, 1976:109).

While the immediate actions of John L. Lewis were highly influential, his actions were of much broader significance. In Lewis's letter to the deposed District 26 president; 'Red' Dan Livingstone, he wrote:

I am familiar with the constant intrigue between yourself and your evil-genius, McLachlan, and your revolutionary masters in Moscow . . . no doubt the present strike in Nova Scotia corresponds with your idea of a revolution against the British government and is in pursuance thereof . . . you may as well know now as any time in the future that the United Mine Workers is not a political institution, and cannot be used to promote the fallacious whims of any political fanatic who seeks to strike down the established institutions of his government (cited in Frank, 1979:350).

In essence, as suggested by the above quote, the struggle between the International and District was over the ability to define and establish the nature, or 'limits', of trade unionism. In conjunction with provincial and federal states, and BESCO, the International--through the revoking of the charter--had begun a process of shaping District 26 in a way that was in conflict with the developing radicalization. Given this, the process of defining the limits of trade unionism into an increasingly 'economistic' or 'incorporated' mold must not be seen as structurally inherent (as Lenin 1902; Trotsky, 1926 or Michaels, 1915 suggest), but rather as a process of struggle within a historically defined social context (see Gramsci, 1983:162; Przeworski, 1980b:127). Within the immediate events of 1923, Lewis modified the framework of future politics within the District. While he modified, he did not inevitably redefine the limits of District 26 unionism and in that sense simultaneously expressed both his power, and weakness, over the rank and file.

With the imprisonment of McLachlan for 2 years for seditious libel on October 31, 1923; and no sustained effort by the deposed forces--for fear of a reoccurrence of a '1909 split'³--the 'provisional' executive began to negotiate a new contract (Frank, 1983; Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:chapter 9; Frank,

1979:357). This round of negotiations was significant for it illustrated how Lewis's attempts to redefine the nature of District 26 to his own designs had reduced the negotiating power of, and democracy amongst, the miners.

In November, 1923, BESCO began negotiations for another one year contract (to start on January 1, 1924) by announcing a 20% wage reduction. Despite the absence of a strike call by the provisional executive, the South Side miners walked out to protest BESCO and the District executive. Faced with a wild cat strike, Barrett began negotiations through conciliation with the federal Department of Labour and Premier Armstrong, and reached agreement on February 11. On February 15, miners went back without yet knowing, nor endorsing, the content of the new agreement--a procedure unprecedented since the days of the P.W.A. (Wade, 1950; Frank, 1979:262,358; MacEwan, 1976:122-124; MacGillivray, 1971:156).

Further illustrations of how, the nature of, and outcomes of, the negotiation process were influenced by the authority of the executive and their interrelated ideological definitions of what a 'trade union should be' (see Nichols and Benyon, 1977, chapter 9) can be found in the 1924 settlement. In this contract

the provisional executive agreed to; 1) the restoration of those 'managerial' rights which were included in the 1921 'First Montreal Agreement', 2) the prohibition of the 100% strike, 3) the prohibition of financial support, by locals, to the now W.P.C. influenced M.L.H. newspaper--in exchange for--1) a written agreement by BESCO for union check off (all previous check off agreements were voluntary) and closed shop, 2) a 30 cent and 6% increase for datal and contract men respectively. (Wade, 1950; Frank, 1979:262,359; MacEwan, 1976:124; Forsey, 1926:62)

Essentially, the 1924 'agreement' was an exchange for a less militant trade union which would capitulate certain 'rights' to management and no longer invoke its most powerful weapon--the 100% strike--in return for the legal institutionalization of this particular type of trade union through a guaranteed check off and closed shop. The obvious weakness of the agreement was that it was not of the rank and file's making and thus was an inherently weak and premature truce. On March 6, 1924, the provincial vote amongst miners was 5622 against 3163 for (3614 to 1747 against in the South Side area). Faced once, again, with a dissatisfied membership, the provisional executive chose to use its power by ignoring the vote and signed the contract (Wade, 1950; Frank, 1979:263,359; MacEwan,

1976:124). Thereafter, Barrett resigned (either voluntarily or on Lewis's request; see MacEwan, 1976:125, Wade, 1950; MacGillivray, 1971:161) and was replaced by another Lewis appointee. In response to the unilateral signing of the contract, the South Side rank and file continued their independent action by holding an 'outlaw' District 26 convention on May 15, 1924. With this manoeuvre, the possibility of a raid by the One Big Union (O.B.U.) and the early release of McLachlan on March 6, the International representatives scheduled the reinstatement of District 26 autonomy for a September 29th convention (Wade, 1950; MacGillivray 1971:168-170; MacEwan, 1976:126; Frank, 1979:360; Frank, 1983).⁴ During that convention a transition executive was elected by the delegates and rank and file elections were scheduled for November 3, 1924. On November 3, the W.P.C. supported Left Wing 'Slate'--John W. MacLeod (president), Joe Nearing (vice-president), Alex A. MacKay (secretary-treasurer) and William Hayes (international board member)--was elected and a modified autonomy was restored (Frank, 1979:361; Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:127; MacGillivray, 1971:170).⁵

Shortly after the election, negotiations for the 1925 contract began with BESCO, again, calling for 20% reduction in wages. On December 31, 1924,

with negotiations stalled at a 10% reduction BESCO applied and received an I.D.I.A. board--thus making a potential strike 'illegal'. The District 26 executive refused to participate in the board, given the previous defeats under the Act. Simultaneously the Privy Council declared the I.D.I.A. 'ultra vires' in response to legal developments with the Toronto Hydro-Electric Commission.⁶ Following a further deterioration of negotiations--in which Premier Armstrong was active--the systematic cancellations of credit at the company stores and reduction in shifts at a number of militant South Side pits, District 26 executive called for a 100% strike on March 6, 1925. (Forsey, 1926:63-66; Wade, 1950; Logan, 1948:456; Frank, 1979:264,364-365; MacGillivray, 1971:178-186; MacEwan, 1976:129-134)

At this point, the tripartist system of negotiation, which had previously begun its unsteady wavering, collapsed completely in the midst of organic and conjunctural crises. The collapse reflected the fragility on which the dialectics of tripartist negotiation were based (Panitch, 1981). Within a dynamic that included a powerful militant solidarity amongst miners who were struggling against the introduction of below subsistence wages, and the horizontally and

vertically over extended BESCO, there was little room for negotiation vis-a-vis the state. Within this terrain of class struggle the I.D.I.A.'s purpose had been exhausted; both in its capacity to modify class action and in its ability to intervene as an "impartial umpire". Throughout the crisis of 1922-1925, the U.M.W.A. no longer 'won' under I.D.I.A. boards or under the ad hoc investigation's by Royal Commissions, the Prime Minister's Office, or various Premiers. In conjunction with the violent intervention of the militia and troops, methods of state intervention had definitely 'destroyed the spirit which the I.D.I.A. was intended to create'. Perhaps this development was best reflected in a letter from John W. MacLeod to Prime Minister King (January 20, 1925) when he formerly refused a further board of investigation;

We do not doubt the sincerity or honesty or purpose of any such board and we mean no discourtesy to it, but we have been through this experience frequently and the procedure is familiar to us. And eventually we will be confronted with the batons of the Provincial Police, and the bayonets of the Canadian Militia as the final reason for us to accept a cut, when we ask for no more than human treatment for our workers and their women and children. . . . yet whoever criticize this corporation is termed 'Red' and he must walk with great circumspection to avoid the jails of our country. . . . We have long since abandoned the effort to obtain a fair hearing before the public (King Papers, cited in MacGillivray, 1971:176).

The experiences of state coercion--an act which was carried out to break the miners' militant solidarity--contributed significantly to the radicaliza-

tion of the miners, and therefore, the subsequent collapse of tripartist collective bargaining. As a partial consequence of the the delegitimization of the state, but based more broadly within the economic, political and ideological transformations of class relations, the miners' strength had developed beyond the constraining limits of collective bargaining. In this sense, this period was a period of crisis -- a crisis of authority for the provincial state and federal Department of Labour (see Hall et. al., 1981: 216; Gramsci, 1983:210). For the provincial government, the crisis was intensified as their term of office was to expire on July 28, 1925 (at the latest). As a result, and in conjunction with a 'changing public opinion' in the miners' favour, Premier Armstrong refused BESCO's pleas to call for the militia (MacEwan, 1976:135,143).⁷

During the next three months the situation worsened. Despite relief from various groups across the country and meagre strike funds from the International U.M.W.A., mining families were literally starving. By April it was estimated that 31,986 people in the mining districts were on relief. In addition, the now infamous statement of J. E. McLurg, BESCO's vice-president, reflected the structural realities of the strike, and further increased hostilities;

Things are getting better everyday. they stay out
Let them stay out two months or six months,
it matters not; eventually they will have to come
to us . . . they can't stand the gaff. (Sydney
Post, March 10, 1925 in Wade, 1950)

When asked what was referred to as the 'gaff',
he responded; "the privation and attendant hunger"
(Wade, 1950; Frank, 1979:336-368; MacGillivray, 1971:190-
193).

Following further rejections by BESCO to
negotiate with "communists"; the District 26 officers
sought to utilize what remaining advantages they had
in order to force a settlement. On June 4, U.M.W.A.
men abandoned the New Waterford power plant, thus
cutting off power to both BESCO operations and the
town of New Waterford. Through a series of confronta-
tions between pickets and BESCO police, the power
plant changed hands several times during the week.
On June 11, 1925, a group of approximately 700 to
800 men and women stormed the plant. During the battle
with BESCO police, one miner, William Davis, was killed.
It was at this point, that the 1925 strike climaxed.
Through the night a series of fires and lootings of
company stores occurred. By June 30, a number of
company stores and surface buildings at various pitheads
were among the 22 torched BESCO properties (see Wade,
1950; Frosey, 1926:76; Frank, 1979:222-268; MacGillivray,
1971:202-205; MacGillivray, 1980:103-105).

Following the events of June 11 'iron times' came to the South Side when Premier Armstrong sent in the provincial police and requested the federal militia under the recently revised Militia Act. By the time all had arrived, there were approximately 2000 troops--double the size of any previous force. Despite the federal Department of Labour's success in getting the maintenance men back to work, BESCO refused to come to a settlement (MacGillivray, 1980:103-105; Frank, 1979:268; Wade, 1950; MacGillivray, 1971:205).

It was not until the terrain of formal politics had shifted as a consequence of the June 25 provincial election that negotiations towards settlement seriously developed. On that day the Liberal party--a dynasty of 43 years of uninterrupted power--was destroyed in the midst of the coal crisis when the Tories won 40 out of 43 seats. Given that the Liberals under Fielding had developed their power through a strategy of 'developing' the coal industry, it was ironic, and perhaps somewhat fitting, that their political destruction was based on the economic crisis of the coal industry's monopoly capitalism. Also indicative of the penetrating and exhausting influence of the economic crisis was the disorganization and in-fighting within the I.L.P.. By 1922, the W.P.C. was highly influential within the I.L.P. and ideological

splits began to develop. On June 9, 1924, with limited funds, the destruction of the M.L.H. and the major concern of defeating the Liberal government; party delegates split in a 34-23 vote in favour of running candidates over supporting the Conservatives. In conjunction with these factors, Armstrong, reorganized the four seat riding of Cape Breton County into two two-seat ridings in an attempt to have the rural vote lessen the mining vote. On election day, despite approximately 37% of votes cast in the mining areas for the I.L.P., the Tories swept the riding (Frank, 1979:353-357, 372-374; MacGillivray, 1971:208-209; MacEwan, 1976:143-145).

The first actions of the new Premier, E. N. Rhodes, were to establish a truce in the coal fields. On July 17, 1925, Rhodes called the provincial police off and on July 20 he met with District 26 executive and BESCO officials. During the initial round of negotiations BESCO stuck to its demands and called for a 25% drop in wages for three months and a 15% reduction during subsequent months, and cancellation of a U.M.W.A. check-off. By August 1 Rhodes had secured a six month contract which included; reduction of wages to the 1922 level (about a 6% decrease), a rank and file vote on the check-off question; a rebate of 1/5 provincial coal royalties to BESCO, and a Royal

Commission to investigate the industrial relations of the industry. On August 5, the miners voted in favour, and the 1925 strike ended. (Frank, 1979:374-375; Forsey, 1926:78-79; MacGillivray, 1971:211-212; Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:145-147)

During this period the South Side miners had developed into an 'alternative' force--in the sense that they had developed and created a militant solidarity which had expanded beyond the constraining limits of BESCO, the state's labour legislation, and even the U.M.W.A. International. Only through open and unlimited coercion of a special provincial police force, mass arrests, blacklistings, the revoking of District 26 autonomy--in the context of below subsistence living conditions--were the miners forced back into the pits.

During the complex development of 1922 to 1925, the miners had created new strategies of struggle such as: the 'sympathy strike', 'striking on the job', the '100% strike' and the looting and destruction of BESCO property. Mediating this unprecedented nature of class action was a 'class consciousness'. Relative to all preceeding types of consciousness identified in the development of the miners action, the distinctiveness of this type of consciousness was that it clearly identified the coal company's interests in direct

and total opposition to their own interests. Unlike previous conceptualizations of workplace relations, a class consciousness focused solely on the exploitive features of class relations. The recomposition of consciousness into this type, of course, was rooted firmly in the experience of a quickly transformed set of class relations whose fundamental logic of interaction was economically structured. Specifically, the imperatives imposed on Domco by BESCO--the corporation in which the increasingly exploitative need of monopoly capital culminated--redefined the nature of class relations in a way that inherently supported conflict.

The period of the early 1920s was a period when the "material forces of production in society came into conflict with the existing relations of production". The collision was not inevitable in a structurally determined sense, but was rather a product of a complex historical process. As illustrated, the development into an alternative force was an uneven process which involved interaction amongst the miners and between classes. Within the nature of the national coal market the economic pressures of economic forces were uniquely defined by the financial structure of BESCO.

The miners' power, however, was limited

when extracted from its regional context. In the face of national and provincial economic forces, there was no 'alternative' force amongst the provincial or national working class. In this sense, the internal and external forces defined the ideological, political, and economic crisis along regional lines. Perhaps Cape Breton can be considered an island--geographically, economically, politically, and ideologically--which was surrounded by a sea that was not solely of its own making.

The potential of fundamental social change inherent within the immediate South Side was framed by larger forces which influenced its containment. In this sense;

No social order ever disappears before all productive forces for which there is room in it have been developed; and new, higher, relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the society (Marx, Preface, 1859).

As Gramsci (1971:106-107, cited in Sassoon, 1982b:136)

notes, and as argued above:

It goes without saying that these (in the Marx 1859 Preface) principles must be developed critically in all their implications, and purged of every residue of mechanism and fatalism. (brackets mine)

Thus while this economic, political and ideological crisis existed; its construction and outcome was not narrowly structurally determined by economic forces.

What Marxist theory tells us is that the productive capacities of society set limits of the possible, and, more specifically, that the particular mode of surplus extraction is key to the social structure. It tells us, too, that class struggle generates historical movement. None of this makes history accidental, contingent, or indeterminate. For example, if the outcome of class struggle is not predetermined, the specific nature, conditions, and terrain of struggle and the range of possible outcomes, certainly are historically determinate . . . (Wood, 1984:105)

Crisis in Chinese is composed of the characters for 'danger' and 'opportunity'--it is a type of historically specific social situation of a variety of potential realities. Understood in this sense, the following quote identifies key aspects which are applicable to a situation similar to 1922-1925 South Side.

If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer "leading" but only "dominant" exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the 'great masses' have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe previously, etc. The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born . . . (Gramsci, 1983:275-276)

Within the events of the 1920s, the Liberal Party, BESCO and District 26 were seriously disorganized. The State, Capital and Labour, though changed in nature, remained structurally intact.

NOTES

1. Under the Militia Act, the Canadian Militia was under the jurisdiction of the Federal state. However, the initial step in calling in the militia was at the municipal level through a signed request by a municipal authority. Once the request was made the federal state was technically obliged to send the troops.

Once the troops were present, the municipal authority who signed the request was the only person who could order withdrawal. The Commanding Officer of the militia could only reduce, but not disband, the number of soldiers. Upon the withdrawal of the troops, the federal state could bill the municipality for costs.

In the case of the South Side during the 1920s, the militia was called in under the Militia Act in 1922, 1923, and 1925. Each intervention was initially requisitioned by County Court Judge E. Finlayson, under the protest of Glace Bay Mayor D. W. Morrison (MLA from 1922, 21-25 and later U.M.W.A. District 26 president). See MacGillivray, (1980) for details.

2. In response to Lewis's increasing intervention, the left wing, through their paper, the M.L.H., noted:

The miners of Nova Scotia will refuse to allow Lewis to order them what to think, they will elect whoever they please to District offices, and will fight to the bitter end to prevent Lewis smashing the ranks of the District organizations. (June 30, 1923; cited in MacGillivray, 1971:107).

Following Lewis's revoking of the District charter and demands for the resumption of work, president MacIntyre responded:

The membership has unanimously pledged itself to not return to work until the troops are removed and our officers released. . . . this struggle is supported by the trade unions of Canada and it is a political struggle of Canadian workers against an evil force

which we have suffered for years. Our International must understand that its jurisdiction does not give it the authority to prohibit workers in Canada from waging a political struggle against the use of armed forces to smash the labour movement (in Wade, 1950).

3. The M.L.H. advocated a 'no split' position;

Despite the desire of BESCO, Lewis, and the government of this province, there is not going to be a split in the miners' union. District 26 belongs to the miners of Nova Scotia. It is their organization and they intend to control it. The lessons of the years 1909 and 1910 have taught them the folly of having two organizations fighting against each other. (July 22, 1923, cited in MacGillivray, 1971:131).

4. Following his early release, McLachlan became editor of the M.L.H. On September 24, 1923, the M.L.H. offices were partly burned. Arson was suspected to have been carried by either BESCO, the O.B.U., or the right wing of the U.M.W.A. The M.L.H. was renovated but again destroyed by fire on April 16, 1925. (see MacGillivray, 1971:161, 198; MacEwan, 1976:121,141; Shields, 1945:52).

5. All executives, with the exception of MacLeod, were W.P.C. members (see Frank, 1979:338; MacGillivray, 1971:170; MacEwan, 1976:127; Wade, 1950).

6. In response to these developments, Premier Armstrong introduced the Industrial Peace Act. The first part contained legislation similar to the I.D.I.A., the second part embodied features of compulsory arbitration. Given the establishment of compulsory features, the Act was opposed by Labour and Capital (with BESCO being the exception) and was never used. (see Forsey, 1926:73; MacGillivray, 1971:199).

7. Based on the suggestions by Prime Minister King, and included in a Royal Commission report dealing with the 1923 steel workers' strike the Militia Act was slightly amended. Now (1924) troops had to be requisitioned by the provincial Attorney General and the subsequent costs were to be paid by the province (see MacGillivray, 1980:102).

CHAPTER FIVE

FROM CLASS STRUGGLE TO CLASS COMPROMISE:

THE RECOMPOSITION OF AN ALTERNATIVE FORCE, 1926-1951

"joint co-operative action
by both parties to bring about
increased production . . . is
vital and necessary for the
stability and prosperity of the
industry, the communities and
the people affected . . ."

-Freeman Jenkins

While the preceeding substantive chapters have covered the 'rise' of the miners' power, this chapter covers the period in which the 'decline' of the miners' power was established.

Through an uneven process, the miners were 'recomposed' from an 'alternative' to 'oppositional' force. Within a deepening economic crisis in the coal industry, the miners reacted and acted in less militant ways to the changing realities of class relations. Implicit in this process was not simply a containment of an 'alternative' force by Domco and the state, but an actual re-working of class negotiation into a more 'compromising' logic. Perhaps the best reflection of this development would be the uneven shift in miners' support given to the right-wing activists over the radical militants.

By the end of this period, trade union and ~~formal working-class politics were more narrowly defined~~ within a 'left/right' arena of social democracy that effectively excluded the participation of communist leaders and supporters. The actions and consciousness that were broadly supported by the rank and file of 1922 to 1925 were reworked. In this regard, the 'left wing', ~~formal~~ political and trade union activities were redefined in ways less challenging to Domco and

the State.

In the workplace, fundamental changes within the capitalist production process occurred. A shift in the method of mining--from 'room and pillar' to 'longwall' allowed for a greater geographical concentration and supervision of the workforce within the pit. In addition, full mechanization of remaining room and pillar and longwall faces further intensified the division of mine labour. By 1951, a tradition of work which had generally been established for 60 years had been destroyed. With this subordination of labour by capital, the effective seizure of real control of the labour process was established by Domco. Implicit in this fundamental shift in the 'power of the pit' was the dominance of Domco--whether personified by engineers above ground or overmen below ground--over the miners in determining the general direction of work at various points of production located throughout the mine.

Key to this reorganization of the workplace in particular, and recomposition of miners' power in general, were the provincial and federal states. Based on the 1945-46 Royal Commission on Coal, the federal state demanded and eventually financed the mechanization of the mines. Posed economically and ideologically

in a 'mechanize or shut down' ultimatum (that also was echoed by Domco) the state was effectively able to influence the miners into an accommodating stance. In addition, the federal state also attempted to 'prop up' the industry through a series of subventions and subsidies. In conjunction with the special conditions of World War II federal labour legislation, the provincial state was also active in the regulation of class relations through key amendments in the Coal Mines Regulation Act, the creation of the Trade Union Act, and the establishment of the Department of Labour. Combined these activities marked a fundamental shift in the mode of state intervention in industrial relations from coercion to consensual methods of containment.

Theoretically, it is important to realize that this thesis argues that the objectively defined economic interests which underpin the actions of classes (in particular the working class) cannot be assumed to be immediately dialectically opposed. The immediate economic interests as defined within the objective realities of the conjuncture "may not be irreconcilable" (to use Przeworski's phrase). Clearly the conjuncture of 1922-1925 contained economic, political and ideological realities which structured intense struggle. The succeeding period of 1926-1951 was not a period in which the economic crises was intensified with further increases

in the absolute surplus value production; but was rather a period in which all classes concerned negotiated in an attempt to save the industry from a possible total collapse. From the workers' point of view 'co-operation' with the interests of the dominant forces--in order to save jobs--was required. Implicit in this was an uneven, yet significant, recomposition of previous ways of acting and thinking towards company and state. In this respect the economic realities of the province's coal industry and the state's influencing of options within that economic reality structured what Przeworski has referred to as, "the material bases of consent"--in which the miners' action was unevenly recomposed from struggle to compromise.

In a very general sense, this dynamic period of the class relations based on the CMLP can be seen as a 'passive revolution'--"a molecular social transformation which takes place as it were beneath the surface of society" (Hoare and Smith in Gramsci, 1983:46) and "which relates changes in politics, ideology and social relations to changes in the economy" (Sassoon, 1982b:129). Gramsci (1983:59) appropriately referred to the recomposition of the balance of class forces that emerged within a 'passive revolution' as a "'revolution' without a 'revolution'". The "'passive' aspect consists in preventing the development of a revolutionary

adversary by 'decapitating' its revolutionary potential" (Sassoon, 1982b:133). Generally speaking, "this is a process in which the state partially transforms a potentially powerful and threatening force through reformism, and strategic incorporation in an attempt to stabilize and restrict class struggles to a limited economic--corporate terrain (see Sassoon, 1982b:129-133).

(5:1) THE UNEVEN DECLINE OF AN ALTERNATIVE FORCE: 1926-1936

While the miners' action of 1922-1925 can be considered a 'war of manoeuvre', the period of 1926-1936 was one of retreat and reorganization--a 'war of position'. Within the broader pressures of the industry's deindustrialization--identified by pit closures, shrinking markets, state subsidization, and attempts to manage long term phase-out--the once militant solidarity amongst miners began to unevenly fragment through a process of struggle between 'left' and 'right' factions.

Following the resumption of work in 1925, three pits remained closed, thus leaving eleven South Side and two North Side pits (see MacEwan; 1976:147; Earle, 1984:36). The closure of pits--in order to 'rationalize production--had apparently been suggested "as early

as 1921". by Domco's and BESCO's president, Roy Wolvin (McKnight, 1932:15).

Wages continued to decrease since their initial decline in 1922. Based on the 1925-26 Royal Commission (the 'first' Duncan Commission), wages were reduced 10%. In the 1926 contract there was a small increase of 3% for the lowest paid mine workers and a profit sharing clause. The profit sharing clause was removed from the 1930 contract as no 'after-dividend' profits were paid to the miners. By 1932, wages were 58.6% of what they were in 1921. (See Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:148, 159; McKnight, 1932:9).

However, the extent of the continued crises was most revealed by the level of unemployment. By early 1930, the Depression contributed to a continued decline in production and man days worked. From 1926 to 1931, the number of man days worked per year dropped from 230 to 140, and further declined to 102 in 1932 (see Sacouman, 1979a:113; White, 1977:45; Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:160). Virtually all provincial mine workers experienced a temporary lay off; with almost half losing 25-28 weeks during the year of June 1930 to June 1931 (Sacouman, 1979a:114).

Throughout this entire period, however, there was conscious effort on the part of most mine workers to split what work was available (unlike the 1980s)

and not fight amongst themselves for what work remained.

During the 1926-29 period Domco continued to make profits of 6.9% to 4.1% (Schwartzman, 1953:197). In 1928, however, BESCO was financially reorganized on a more stable basis and was later renamed under the new corporate heading the Dominion Steel and Coal Corporation (DOSCO). As a consequence of the miners' resistance to wage cuts BESCO had accumulated a \$5.7 million deficit (see Frank, 1980:292-293). Wolvin (who was now known in the area as 'Roy the Wolf') resigned, and was replaced by C. B. McNaught as president of the corporation and its subsidiary holdings.¹

Throughout this period the State played a less intervening and non-coercive role. Through the Duncan Commission, a 10% reduction in wages and abolition of the check-off was recommended. In addition, the Commission attempted to isolate some bad management practices, communist militants, and general economic conditions as the major causes of the 1920s strikes.

The most significant act by the provincial state, however, came in the 1927 amendments of the Coal Mines Regulation Act. The key change was a clause which made it mandatory for the coal companies to check off union dues and maintain a closed shop (MacEwan, 1976:149). For approximately 50 years non-compulsory

check off had existed in South Side mines. Now, the U.M.W.A.'s survival had been legally assured by the State. Implicit in this incorporating legislation was the ability to maintain a particular type of trade union and institutionalize a more stable collective bargaining framework in which the company could not attempt to crush the union. The importance of this process could be seen in future years when radical left-wing members of the U.M.W.A. were expelled from union affiliation and thus consequently fired by Domco under its ability to maintain a closed shop. In this sense the new legislation was a "complex dialectic" which simultaneously gave workers rights but defined them within a framework that sustained the stability of class relations at the workplace.

The State, however, was less active in containing the increasing level of unemployment in the industry. In 1931 the provincial government introduced the Miners' Settlement Act and attempted to reduce the number of unemployed miners by relocating them on farms. In total, 1,098 were transferred (see White, 1977:74). The government contributed meagerly to municipally run relief programs. With the high percentage of layoffs, a large portion of miners were partially dependent on relief. In 1932 the maximum payment for a Glace Bay family--regardless of size--was \$10 (Earle, 1984:37).

At this time 1,321 Glace Bay families (6,338 people or 31% of the population) were on relief (White, 1977:65). In response to the generally low and poor system of relief, a 1932 Glace Bay U.M.W.A. local called for the province to create and implement a program of unemployment insurance (McKnight, 1932:14).

Federally, the State attempted to 'prop up' Nova Scotian coal through a number of subsidies and subventions so that it could compete with U.S. coal in the Ontario and Quebec market. In 1931, the U.S. coal tariff, being 50 cents in 1870, was increased to 75 cents. The Domestic Fuel Act of 1927 provided subsidies for the construction of coke plants that used Canadian coal. In 1930, a similar act subsidized iron and steel plants that used Canadian coal. In May, 1931, under Orders-in-Council P.C. 1300, the transportation of Nova Scotian coal was subsidized. This was expanded in 1932. Between 1928 and 1936 the transportation of 8 million tons of coal was assisted at a cost in excess of \$7 million (Canada, 1946:565-567, 573-576; Schwartzman, 1953:231-240).

Politically, the miners were in disarray during the early years of the period. In the October, 1925 federal election, McLachlan--while still a W.P.C. member--ran as the I.L.P. candidate and finished a distant

second behind the Tories. The I.L.P. placed a close second in the September, 1926 federal election, when D. W. Morrison again lost to the Conservatives. In the 1928 provincial election Forman Waye and McLachlan placed a distant third--even behind the infamous Liberals! This defeat was a significant blow for I.L.P. During the 1930 federal election no working class candidate ran for the Cape Breton South, or any other, riding (see Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:152-157; White, 1977:55).

Trade union politics had also been disorganized for left-wing members, as a similar shift to the right had developed amongst the rank and file executive. In August, 1926, John W. MacLeod was re-elected over Robert Baxter but the remaining left-wing executives were defeated. MacLeod was shifting towards the right and had dropped his I.L.P. membership and joined the Conservatives. In 1928 he was defeated by D. W. Morrison, who was backed by the left (MacEwan, 1976:151).

Prior to Morrison's election the radical left wing attempted to form a new union--The Progressive Miners' Union (P.M.U.)--in June, 1928. This moment marked the first attempt by the left wing in general, and W.P.C. in particular, to organize miners outside of the U.M.W.A. The movement was largely ineffectual

and two leading activists were expelled from the U.M.W.A., and consequently fired by Domco (MacEwan, 1976:152; White, 1977:48).

The radicals, largely influenced by the W.P.C., again attempted to create another new and independent union during the 1930 contract negotiations. In December, 1929, McLachlan formed a new weekly paper--the Nova Scotia Miner (N.S.M.)--which acted as the "Organ of the District 26 Left-Wing Committee". By February 15, 1930, the N.S.M. called for a new union to "wipe out the U.M.W.A. in Nova Scotia". On February 14, at a Glace Bay sub-district meeting, a March 15 meeting was proposed in order to form a new and independent union. At the March 15, "outlaw" convention--chaired by McLachlan--only two 'official' and four 'unofficial' locals were present. At the meeting, the Mine Workers Industrial Union of Nova Scotia (M.W.I.U.N.S.) was formed. Given the real lack of support, the M.W.I.U.N.S. never established itself as a viable option and "was never to become more than a paper organization" (Earle, 1984:56).

On March 28, 1930, the poorly negotiated contract was 'ratified' by the provincial membership by a 5,188 to 3,434 vote. During the referendum the radical Phalen and 1-B locals in Glace Bay--whose membership exceeded

2,000--were barred from voting. The District 26 executive claimed these locals had collected 'more votes than members' (see Wade, 1950; White, 1977:50-55; Earle, 1984:38-56; MacEwan, 1976:152-159). Following this 'victory' for the right wing, six activists in the M.W.I.U.N.S. were expelled from the U.M.W.A., and three leaders of militant locals were 'contained' and not allowed to run in District elections. Upon their expulsion, the six were subsequently fired under 'closed shop' regulations. These members were expelled under the U.M.W.A.'s communist clause "which prevented self-proclaimed communists from holding union affiliation".² The implementation of this clause, and the general struggle that had been going on between the International and District 26 since 1923, must be seen as an aspect of the much larger process of shaping the union's nature along more conciliatory lines. Under the increasing authority of John L. Lewis, a systematic process of eliminating threatening and challenging forces had previously begun across the United States and Canada during the 1920s. By 1927 much of Lewis's opposition --in particular the American Communists led by William Z. Foster--was contained. By 1944, a U.S. governmental study identified 21 out of 31 Districts which "lacked the authority to elect their own officers and organizers"

(Logan, 1948:207; Dubofsky and Van Tine, 1977:112-131, 450; Earle, 1984:4-11, 56; White, 1977:48; MacEwan, 1976:151-153).³

With the unchallenged re-election of Morrison in August, 1930, the right wing--aided by the 1927 Coal Mines Act and "communist clause"--within a general context of rank and file support had won the leadership over the previously dominant left-wing forces. Combined with the 'no-show' during the 1930 federal election, the ineffectiveness of M.W.I.U.N.S., and the closure of the N.S.M. in June, 1930, the left wing appeared shattered.

The apparent death of the left wing, however, was short-lived. In November, 1931, negotiations for another two-year contract began. During negotiations DOSCO demanded wage cuts of 10%-14% and the eventual closure of four pits; two of which were in the South Side. The closures were to result in the estimated loss of 2,500 jobs and were unlike the 1925 closures in which most miners were hired at neighbouring pits. With the subsequent breakdown in negotiations, the provincial government struck another Royal Commission (the 'second' Duncan Commission) in early 1932 (Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:161,162; Earle, 1984:62,63).

In essence, the strategy of pit closures vis-

a-vis the Duncan Commission marked the first significant attempt by the State to come to grips with a coal market that had begun to decline in 1913 and enter economic crises in the Post-World War I years. In a general sense it marked a shift in state strategy of managing coal 'development' to one of managing 'de-industrialization'. Clearly, the good times of plentiful coal royalties were on the slow decline. In 1933, Nova Scotia received \$1,184,388 for public works--the largest provincial payment given by Ottawa. Unlike the 1922-25 political-economic manoeuvres, which attempted to coerce the miners into offsetting the coal crises through wage cuts, 1932 clearly marked the beginning of a strategic process of industrial 'phase-out'. During the Commission's hearings it was revealed that 2,515 men, or approximately 25% of the provincial mining force, were to be fired from the closure of four pits. In addition, another pit--No. 2 in Glace Bay--was to be closed and its workforce 'divided' amongst the neighbouring pits. In conjunction with this strategy--known as the 're-allocation plan'--annual coal production was to be dropped from 7,031,000 to 5,684,000. Should coal demand increase, the laid-off workforce--acting as a reserve army of labour--could be rehired by existing pits. Combined with the proposed wage reductions,

it was estimated that 60 cents per ton could be saved (see Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:161-163; Earle, 1984:63; Miffilen, 1951:70; Nova Scotia, Minutes, 1932:64-125, 145-159, Exhibits, L,M,KK,TT,EEE; White, 1976:75). On February 20, the Duncan Commission reported, and recommended a 10%-12½% wage reduction and the reallocation plan.

It was fundamentally on the basis of this political-economic development that the rank and file became radicalized and began to support the left wing. During the 1932 negotiations the left had advocated total opposition to the wage cuts and closures. The U.M.W.A. executive, realizing they would not get strike funds, argued for acceptance of wage cuts and opposition to the 'reallocation plan'. In this sense the U.M.W.A. had had its options somewhat defined for them and were structured indirectly into acting as a vehicle for the Duncan Commission.

As early as January 23, 1932, McLachlan, through the N.S.M., advocated militant action and the use of the 100% strike (see N.S.M., January 23, 1932 in MacEwan, 1976:163). While the left was beginning to acquire a following, it is important to note that the 100% strike call was unheeded and thus reflected the transformed nature of the miners' militancy, at that historic

moment, in contrast to the 1922-1925 period.

At a March vote amongst the provincial rank and file the Duncan Report was rejected.⁴ On April 18, 1932, at a special convention it was decided to re-enter negotiations and have another referendum on whatever proposals came out of renewed DOSCO/U.M.W.A. meetings. If the contract was rejected, a strike was to be called. Prior to the acceptance of this motion, the Policy Committee had forwarded two reports--a majority report and minority report. The majority report (written by five right-wing members) suggested acceptance of the wage cuts and opposition towards reallocation, but no strike--essentially the U.M.W.A.'s executive position. The minority report (written by two left-wing members) proposed a pit-head vote to decide on "whether we stay in the U.M.W.A. . . .". Upon a 77 to 57 rejection of the majority report, president Morrison voted the minority report 'out of order' (Wade, 1950; Earle, 1984:66-69; White, 1977:58-59; MacEwan, 1976:164-165).

Following Morrison's manoeuvre at the April convention and the subsequent acceptance of a wage cut by the provincial rank and file through a poorly worded referendum, it appeared the right had succeeded

in containing the emerging left-wing force.⁵ However, South Side left-wing forces began to actively organize into a new union and attempted to stop pit closures. They were partly successful in the latter effort and kept No. 11 in Glace Bay and Florence on the North Side open;⁶ thus preventing what the U.M.W.A. considered somewhat 'inevitable'. At a June 18, 1932 meeting the 'second' Amalgamated Mine Workers of Nova Scotia (A.M.W.) was formed.⁷ Throughout the summer recruiting continued and locals were established at all major Cape Breton pits and Stellarton on the mainland. By September, 14 locals and an estimated membership in excess of 4,000 miners were represented by the A.M.W. (see Wade, 1950; Earle, 1984:71-72, 75-77, 81-85; Bjarnasson, 1965:chapter 9; MacEwan, 1976:165-166, 169-170; Mifflin, 1951:72; White, 1977:59).⁸

On September 19, 1932, the A.M.W. held its first convention and thus the left-wing activists re-established themselves within the context of a re-emerging radicalism amongst the rank and file. Organizationally, the new union was more democratic than the U.M.W.A. The most obvious difference was that it was a provincial organization. Secondly, it was more 'industrial' in nature and allowed membership to certain workers which had previously been denied

U.M.W.A. affiliation. According to the constitution it sought to direct action on the basis of rank and file referendum. The executive was to consist of a president, vice-president, and secretary-treasurer. Only the latter was to be a full-time position, with the remaining two posts occupied by working miners. Salaries of the executive were not to exceed those of an average miner. The locals were entitled to have "maximum possible autonomy" and were allowed to establish membership fees. The union advocated abolition of the check-off by DOSCO and enabled dues to be paid by members voluntarily--a strategic point in its fight against the U.M.W.A. (see Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976: 175-176; Earle, 1984:90-94).

Ideologically, the following constitutional preamble was sustained by the members, and thus very generally reflected the re-emerging radicalism:

Modern society is divided into two classes. . . . the interest of their (capitalist's) own class . . . must be diametrically opposed to the interest of the non-owning working or producing class . . . We firmly believe that the capitalist system can no more function effeciently, and that we can expect only intensified exploitation and unemployment with all the misery and privations that follow in its wake until a new system is ushered in which will economically emancipate the workers from wage slavery which rob them at the point of production.

(A.M.W. Constitution in U.M.W.A. papers, reel 6, P.A.N.S.)

Contrary to claims made by Logan (1948:204), the A.M.W. was not a product of the Toronto based communists led by Tim Buck (see Wade, 1950). While the A.M.W. was strongly influenced by communists--especially at the South Side level--it was not a member of the Communist Workers' Unity League (W.U.L.).⁹

Methodologically, it is useful to conceive of the South Side miners as composed of three factions: 1) those who were, or supported the U.M.W.A. (the 'right'); 2) those who were, or supported, communists and; 3) those who were militant, yet non-U.M.W.A. nor active communist supporters. The latter two groups composed the A.M.W. (generally referred to in this period as the 'left'). In this sense the A.M.W. can be considered an alliance of sorts. It is more difficult, however, to assess which A.M.W. faction possessed the largest number of members.¹⁰

In many respects, the first elected A.M.W. executive--John Alex MacDonald (president), Clarie Gillis (vice-president) and Bob Stewart (secretary-treasurer)--reflected this alliance. Stewart was a member of the Communist Party of Canada (C.P.C.; previously known as the W.P.C. up to 1924) while MacDonald's status is unclear (see Earle, 1984:109

-110). Gillis was definitely not a communist and had in fact previously expelled a U.M.W.A. member under the "communist clause". At the same time he was obviously not a U.M.W.A. supporter. Gillis, formerly president of the rebellious Phalen local and one of the three U.M.W.A. members banned from holding District Office in March, was also the co-author of the 'minority' report during the April 18 convention which sought a new union. (Earle, 1984:51; MacEwan, 1976:159).

As Earle (1984:Chapter 4) stresses, the first year proved to be strategically critical in the A.M.W.'s life. During the September, 1932 to May, 1933 period there appeared to be a solidarity amongst the factions within the A.M.W., and the union membership peaked. At this time, Earle (1984:149), on the basis of "admittedly rather vague and questionable data", estimates that A.M.W. membership included up to 70% of Cape Breton miners.

Despite attempts, the new union failed to have the provincial government organize a referendum on union affiliation and also failed to be recognized by Domco and other DOSCO subsidiaries despite provisions in the Miners Act which 'guaranteed' recognition. On December 30, 1932, DOSCO negotiated a new contract with the U.M.W.A.. Upon its ratification by U.M.W.A.

locals the contract went into effect and was applied to all miners regardless of union affiliation (see Earle, 1985:154; White, 1977:103-104).¹¹

In April, 1933, DOSCO let the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company (which owned the Acadia Coal Company and Florence and Princess mines on the North Side) enter into receivership. The Eastern Trust Company subsequently demanded a 25% reduction in the North Side miners' wages (Schwartzman, 1953:262; Earle, 1984:153).¹² In conjunction with DOSCO's refusal to collectively negotiate, these events increasingly necessitated a major A.M.W. strike if it was to acquire DOSCO and State recognition and defend against North Side wage cuts.

On May 8, 1933, an A.M.W. convention was held; as noted:

This was clearly a set of circumstances that called for the militant unity of miners, yet the A.M.W. convention was to reveal serious underlying dissension within the union's ranks, contradictions between the leaders and the lead, between communists and their close supporters and other factions, between the more and less militant spirits among the miners.

(Earle, 1984:156).

While it seems the radicals were in the majority, a number of controversial motions--such as affiliation with the Communist Mine Workers Union of Canada (M.W.U.C.) and celebration of May Day--were tabled in order to

prevent any clear splits. The most crucial motion that was passed instructed executive officers to distribute strike ballots, if a letter to government and company officials--requesting recognition of mine committees--was not positively responded within ten days. If a strike was to occur it was to be District wide. (see Earle, 1984:157-163)

In response, the Premier restated his position of 'noninterference' and thus indirectly supported the U.M.W.A., given Domco's refusal to recognize the possible A.M.W. strike (Earle, 1984:165). Combined, these manoeuvres suggested an immediate situation which was strikingly similar to the events preceeding the 1909 strike.

Key strategic moments, within the broader realities, occurred between May 23 and June 18, 1933. On May 23, the executive decided not to send out strike ballots despite a negative response from the government and DOSCO. In its place, miners were to be 'educated' and a strike vote would be held in 'three to four' weeks time. On May 31, A.M.W. secretary Stewart called for a province-wide strike for June 5, following a North Side rank and file rally. On June 4, the strike call was postponed and a full rank and file strike vote was to be held

on June 9. At the vote only 25% to 50% of A.M.W. men voted--an expression of their unwillingness to strike yet not vote against supporting fellow North Side miners. By June 18, 1933, the A.M.W. decided not to pursue strike action in the immediate near future. (See Earle, 1984:165-171).¹³

It was clear that the A.M.W.'s effectiveness was severely limited. Given the existence of an unwilling membership, no strike fund, a potentially hostile state, the continuation of work by U.M.W.A. men--all within the broader economic context of a large reserve army of labour and reduced coal market--any withdrawal of A.M.W. labour power would no doubt have been suicidal. (see also, Earle, 1984: 172)¹⁴

Developing alongside the re-emergence of the miners' trade union militancy vis-a-vis the formation of the A.M.W. was a similar transformation in formal politics. During the August, 1933 provincial election, the miners as a group reorganized from their 'no show' at the 1930 federal election. Implicit in this development, given the nature of the conjuncture, was the decision by the communists to run independently, and the factionalization of the miners into a number

of working-class parties.

Again, the provincial ridings of the area were redefined. Now, the South Side consisted of two one-seat ridings--Cape Breton East, composed primarily of Glace Bay; and Cape Breton Center, composed of Dominion, Reserve and New Waterford. Within these two ridings were a combination of Labour political parties. In Cape Breton Center was I.L.P., led by A.M.W. activist Tom Ling. In Cape Breton East were the C.P.C., under the title of the "The United Front" led by McLachlan, and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.) led by Dawn Fraser (the poet).

The move by McLachlan and the C.P.C. was strategically significant for it marked the party's first attempt to run independently. Previously, McLachlan, while still a C.P.C. member, ran within the I.L.P. Fraser received backing from the Glace Bay Labour Club when they decided to support the C.C.F.'s entrance into the South Side. This group represented the U.M.W.A. leadership and had Silby Barrett as its president. (See MacEwan, 1976:171-173; Earle, 1984: 116, 128-129; White, 1977:65, 77-81)

Quickly, the political lines between the 'United Front' and C.C.F. were demarcated. In June, 1933, the historic battle of social democracy versus communism

was personified when McLachlan heckled Woodsworth during a Glace Bay rally (see Earle, 1984:133 citing the Glace Bay Gazette, June 15, 1933). Previously, McLachlan had attacked the Glace Bay C.C.F.:

They are as fine a bunch as ever didled a cosy job out of the workers, or usurped their funds, or burned workers' papers, or jailed their leaders, or any other distinguishing features of good C.C.F. leaders. In building up the bosses third party in Canada they ought to appear, if not useful, at least ornamental. They have considerable practice in swindling the working class and can belly crawl to the master better than most . . .

(Earle, 1984:129-130, citing the N.S.M., February 25, 1933)

In Glace Bay, the Communists won 1,737 votes, thus gaining more support than any labour candidate since 1926, while the C.C.F. gained a total of 297. Combined, both parties were far behind the Liberals who won the riding by 23 votes with 3,655 votes. In Cape Breton Center, the I.L.P. gained only 587 votes and lost to the Liberals who had 3,263 votes. While the working-class parties as a whole recovered from their 1926-1930 defeats--with the communists winning slightly less than 20% of the Glace Bay vote--they did not come close to winning either riding. Provincially, the Liberals--almost destroyed in 1925--came back and won under the new Premier, Angus L. MacDonald, who attacked the Tories on 'Harrington's

Hoax', the 'reallocation plan' and the steel plant closure to name a few. (MacEwan, 1976; Earle, 1984: 136; White, 1977:81)

Almost immediately upon MacDonald's victory, the new government was asked by the A.M.W. to enforce the Coal Mines Regulation Act and provide a check-off of union dues. The move to acquire the check-off was in contradiction with the A.M.W.'s initial stance which advocated voluntary payments dues. Throughout this period the A.M.W. was virtually on the edge of bankruptcy as members were not contributing to the union's fund. In conjunction with the enlargement of the executive board, the failure to hold elections as scheduled, the resignation of Clarie Gillis (although he continued to be active) and the previously mentioned inability to receive recognition and strike; the A.M.W. was increasingly in a struggle for its survival. (White, 1976:104; Earle, 1984:182-191, 239; MacEwan, 1976:178-180; Wade, 1950).

In November and December, 1933, the A.M.W. received a temporary reprieve when Premier MacDonald directed Domco and other DOSCO subsidiaries to check off dues to the union of the individual miner's choice and follow the legalities of the Coal Mines Regulation

Act. By December, the A.M.W. began to establish itself financially, while the U.M.W.A. International rebated \$60,000 back to the District during 1932 to 1936 in compensation for lost dues. (Earle, 1984: 191; White, 1977:104; MacEwan, 1977:177; Wade, 1950).

On March 29, 1933, the MacDonald government amended the Coal Mines Regulation Act by stating that the individual coal company was no longer obliged to check off dues for more than one company, if it chose not to. Thus, the legislation was to be applied at the level of the individual subsidiaries despite the fact that negotiations had been undertaken at the provincial or corporate level. The union to acquire the check-off (if the company decided, after the vote, if it wanted to deal with only one union) would be that union which acquired the majority of votes at an annual referendum. The voting was to be undertaken by miners signing and presenting their individual card to a company authority, and not by secret ballot.

In conjunction with the 1927 amendment to the Coal Mines Regulation Act, and U.M.W.A.'s subsequent utilization of it vis-a-vis the "communist clause", the 1933 amendment was extremely significant for it marked a shift in state intervention into industrial

relations back to a consensual mode. Unlike the crisis period of 1922-1925 in which the State attempted to 'break' the miners; the events of 1927 to 1933 were attempts to 'contain' the miners. This shift in motion from breaking to containing (see Hall et. al. 1981:212) was of course possible given the lack of power possessed by miners as a whole--expressed most clearly in the A.M.W.'s members inability to strike and the U.M.W.A.'s members' decision to be non-confrontational. In 1933 the provincial government contained the A.M.W. forces through legislative changes. There was no need to recall the provincial police or summon the federal militia, as those miners affiliated with the A.M.W. were unable to challenge the State and company. Given the A.M.W.'s decision not to mount a strike--let alone a 100% strike--the provincial state could define the parameters of the A.M.W.'s actions. The leaders and followers of this once 'alternative force' were forced to participate, if it continued not to strike, by campaigning at a yearly referendum. Recognition was therefore a regulated process. This manoeuvre, referred to as the U.M.W.A.'s "life insurance policy" (MacEwan, 1976:178), was an astute strategy.

A highly significant aspect implicit in this

shift towards 'containment' was the ability of the provincial state to appear more 'neutral' and autonomous than it had during the early 1920s (see Hall et. al.; 1981:204-205). The effect of this was that the state was able to reproduce industrial 'peace' by not contributing to, or provoking, a struggle --as it had with coercion during the early 1920s. Thus, the overall development of state intervention revealed a complex dynamic in which coercion intensified short-term struggle in the process of 'breaking', in order to establish the conditions of long-term 'containment'. This was a dynamic which contributed to the structuring of class action as well as class experience.

On November 15, 1934, the first referendum was held and involved all DOSCO coal companies. After the final voting, the U.M.W.A. 'won' the South Side by acquiring 4,157 votes to the A.M.W.'s 3,332. Within the South Side, the A.M.W. won Glace Bay (2,887 votes to 2,298) and lost New Waterford (1,859 to 445) thus shifting the total Domco vote in the U.M.W.A.'s favour. Provincially, the A.M.W. won over the U.M.W.A., 6,181 votes to 5,520. Given that the check-off was applicable at each individual company, and not DOSCO as a whole, this overall 'victory'

translated into the A.M.W.'s defeat. The A.M.W. managed to win the check-off at the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company pits but failed to acquire the check-off at Domco, Cumberland Railway and Coal (Springhill) and Acadia Coal (Stellarton)¹⁵ (see MacEwan, 1976:179; Earle, 1984:224). The A.M.W. was thus effectively contained at the South Side and provincial level.

Following this defeat, the South Side A.M.W.--forced into a situation of even less opportunity--chose to retreat. Initially they attempted to enter with the U.M.W.A. into a joint negotiating team. The U.M.W.A. refused, realizing it was the 'official' and 'legal' representative of all Domco miners. Perhaps the event which best reflected the realities of the situation occurred in January 1935. During the January, 1935 A.M.W. convention--which was going on at the same time the U.M.W.A. and Domco were negotiating an upcoming contract--a delegation of 13 A.M.W. men left the convention and entered Domco offices and demanded to negotiate. The Domco officials refused, saying they had no obligation to the A.M.W., while the U.M.W.A. stood behind its state--supported claim that it 'represented' the miners. The A.M.W.

representatives were ordered out of Domco offices and the U.M.W.A. later signed a two-year contract. (See Wade, 1950; Earle, 1984:226-229; MacEwan, 1976:181).

The following year (November 15, 1935) the second referendum produced similar results and the A.M.W. received recognition at only the North Side pits. (Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:181; Earle, 1984:236; White, 1977:107).

Just prior to the second referendum a federal election was held on October 14, 1935. In this election McLachlan, facing possible arrest, ran as a member of the "Communist" party in what turned out to be his final campaign. Again, working class politics was split with D. W. Morrison running as a member of the "Reconstruction" party. This party was formed by M. M. Stevens, former Conservative M.P. who left Prime Minister R. B. Bennett's Conservatives. The C.C.F. did not run locally in this election. Supporting Morrison, however, were Dawn Fraser (previous C.C.F. candidate) and Clarie Gillis. Like the previous provincial election, the alliances formed by the activists of working class politics were distinguished along social democratic/communist lines.

Federally, the Liberals under King defeated

Bennett's Conservatives. Locally, the outcome of the election was extremely significant for the South Side working class politics in general and Glace Bay in particular--given the amount of support for the C.P.C. Within the riding as a whole the results were:

Hartigan	Liberal	10,409
MacDonald	Conservative	7,335
McLachlan	Communist	5,365
Morrison	Reconstruction	5,008

Within Glace Bay, Hartigan received 2,704 votes, McLachlan won 2,570 and Morrison had 1,685. While combined, the two working-class parties received 10,373 votes; the C.P.C.'s return was better than that of any working-class party since the 1921 triumph. At this moment, within the realm of formal politics, it could be argued, that the South Side miners were their most radical. (See MacEwan, 1976:185-187; White, 1977:181-93; Earle, 1984:137-139)

The dynamic support that was increasingly emerging for the local C.P.C., however, was suddenly, and ironically, aborted by the C.P.C. itself--and not the miners as a whole. Based on the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, national parties were instructed to form a "Peoples" Front with those

social democratic organizations it had previously attacked, in an attempt to resist the emerging fascism in Europe. The impact of this strategy was highly significant for it pressured the South Side C.P.C.; in general, to form an alliance with social democrats --in the midsts of real increasing support. As a consequence, the communists prevented the possibility of themselves becoming an established independent formal political force and removed the "communist" option from the miners political realities. In this sense, and as Earle (1984:140) notes, the C.P.C. literally 'deserted' the working class. (See Avakumovic, 1975:Chapter 4; White, 1977:II; MacEwan, 1976:188-189; Earle, 1984:140.).

This strategy also contributed to the dynamics of the A.M.W. and Canadian trade unionism as a whole.¹⁶ Shortly following the November, 1935 check-off vote, the national C.P.C. abolished the W.U.L. and began to pressure the local C.P.C. into reuniting the A.M.W. with U.M.W.A. forces. A number of local communists such as Bob Stewart were active in this process. Others, most notably McLachlan, resigned from the party in protest to this strategy.¹⁷ The move by the local C.P.C. toward reunification, however, was

part of a much broader rank and file movement of unity. With the continued inability to acquire collective bargaining, a number of South Side locals sought reunification throughout December and January. Initially, the A.M.W. attempted to reunite outside of the U.M.W.A. structure. By March, 1936, both sides agreed upon reunification within the U.M.W.A. providing: 1) District autonomy could be assured from the International, 2) constant progress reports were made to the membership on negotiations, 3) full rank and file referendums on all tentative contract agreements with DOSCO, 4) pursuit of increasing wages during future negotiations, 5) ensure the future adherence by the Coal Mines Regulation Act by all parties. Following the approval by John L. Lewis, both sides were united. On the North Side, however, the miners remained with the A.M.W. until November, 1938. (Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:181-183, 188-189; Earle, 1984:240-246; White, 1977:108-111).

Politically, a similar reunification occurred. In 1936 the District 26 convention officially supported the Cape Breton Labour Party. The activists within the party were composed of both C.P.C. members (such as Stewart), moderates (such as Clarie Gillis) and right-wingers (such as Silby Barrett and D.W. Morrison).

The party ran a candidate, Rev. William Mercer, in Cape Breton East (Glace Bay) but did not fight for the Cape Breton Center seat (New Waterford area).

In the Cape Breton East riding, Mercer lost to the Liberals, 4,172 to 3,430; while the Liberals won Cape Breton Center and the province (MacEwan, 1976: 189-192; White, 1977:11-121).

Combined, the 'reunification' of formal political and trade union factions must be seen as a defeat for the left wing, in general, and those who supported the radical communists in particular. While it is true that the left wing remained active in trade unionism and formal politics; they did so within a framework fundamentally defined by the right wing. It was the left wing that capitulated to the right wing. While the re-entrance of the left wing into the U.M.W.A. did change the nature of that trade union, and made it more militant--in immediate character as well as potentiality--the union had undergone organizational changes that remained after reunification. Shortly into the struggle with the A.M.W., the payment of U.M.W.A. dues from DOSCO was transferred from the local to District level; in order to prevent the financing of the A.M.W. locals. (MacEwan, 1976: 175). This structure of check-off payments was never

reversed, and the locals lost a highly significant amount of autonomy by losing financial control. The transfer of the check-off returned the locals to a financial status that had only previously existed in 1923, when the District charter was revoked. In addition, District elections were changed from being held annually to every two years in 1934 (Earle, 1984:264-265). Thus, the District executive gained increased autonomy from the rank and file. Combined, these two developments reduced the democracy within the union, and indirectly enhanced the power of the right wing.

Within the 1926-1936 period the left wing activists regained substantial support--but only briefly and not to the extent it had from 1922 to 1925. Throughout the period, the militant miners faced an alliance of power that was, in general, similar to 1909--the state, the company, and a group of miners that would continue working should a strike occur. In addition, however, was another institution --the Catholic Church--whose impact was highly significant in defining the balance of class forces. While the Catholic Church is not one of the key institutional sites of focus in this thesis, its impact during

this particular period cannot be ignored.

Through the 'Antigonish Movement' the Catholic Church was indirectly able to undercut the re-emerging dynamics of miners' radicalism, and thus influence class relations in a way which it had not done previously. With the introduction of consumer co-operatives such as stores, housing and credit unions, and educational programs into the predominantly industrial area of Cape Breton, the Church was somewhat successful in establishing a 'middle way' of alleviating the economic hardships. Simultaneously it provided an ideology that was consistent with the 'collective' outlook of the miners, but attacked the fundamental premises of communism. The Movement's educational program entered the South Side in 1932 through the reformed Alex MacIntyre--the former W.P.C. member and vice-president of the 1923 District 26 executive--in a strategic attempt to undercut the communists' support. In 1932 credit unions were introduced into the South Side, stores in 1934 and housing in 1938 (see Sacouman, 1979a, 1979b, 1976 for an extensive study; Trenholm, 1977; White, 1977:Chapter 4).

While the immediate alliance of various institutional forces resembled 1909, the broader

dynamics of both situations was quite different. In 1909 an oppositional force was emerging--the miners' militancy was 'rising'. In 1932-36 the militancy amongst South Side miners was unevenly being recomposed from an 'alternative' to 'oppositional' force--its militancy was 'declining'. Unlike the post 1909 years, the 1926-36 years were a general period of retreat and defeat for left-wing activists. Compared to the 1922-25 period, the South Side miners, as a whole, clearly possessed less power in their ability to challenge the authority of state and coal company. Perhaps the most evident expression of this would be the miners' inability to strike--let alone sustain a militant and threatening action such as the 100% strike.

Clearly many South Side miners, especially those in the New Waterford area, did not wish to support the left wing and militant trade unionism and politics--and chose to support the right-wing leaders. Many of these men had previously been more militant both in thought and action and their shift to support to men which they previously refused to support partly reflected the recomposition of the miners' power.

Another group of South Side miners, especially those in the Glace Bay area, chose to support the left wing and militant trade unionism and politics. A consequence of this uneven, non-homogenous, experience was a split within the miners' ranks and a crucial blow against the militant miners. Politically, the struggle along social democratic/communist lines prevented the working-class candidates from winning elections. The split also previously undercut the militant miners' power, as their effectiveness in a strike would have been ineffectual. In conjunction with the broader realities of the industry's de-industrialization and world Depression--a large reserve army of labour, declining coal market and pit closures--any non-unified action against Domco would have proved suicidal. It is perhaps somewhat ironic, that the economic realities of the period which radicalized a significant portion of miners also limited the effectiveness of possible militant action that could have been translated from those ideas. Very clearly, the specific nature of the economic, political and ideological terrain of 1926-1936 did not sustain or support class struggle.

A consequence of the organization of this

conjuncture was the ease with which the provincial state contained the re-emerging militant force. With the rewording of a few paragraphs--an act totally insignificant on its own--the social relations (in all of its dimensions of power and authority) involved in this process enabled a once powerful group of men to be significantly less powerful. There was no need (in what turned out to be the first and last round of strategy) to bring in the militia; the South Side miners were divided and non-challenging.

The South Side Miners as a whole, and those militant miners in particular, did not re-emerge as an 'alternative' force. The miners, were being, once again, recomposed as a class force. The events and dynamics of this period established the conditions of what proved to be the rise of right wing and social democratic forces, and the end of the 'alternative' force which had been led by communist members and supporters. Thus, the conditions for the demise of 'alternative' actions and ideas amongst South Side miners was established.

Though of course not related, yet at the same time highly symbolic, was the death of J. B. McLachlan on November 3, 1937, at age 67. With the demise of the miners as an 'alternative' power was

also the death of its greatest and most dynamic representative. He was a charismatic leader who influenced, and was influenced by, the realities of the history of class relations based on the C.M.L.P. Throughout the history of the C.M.L.P. he stood not as a mere 'representative' but also as a dynamic actor who had influenced the nature of class relations more than any other individual miner. In many respects his life--with all of his defeats and victories--was also the life of the South Side miners' power.

(5:2) THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF AN OPPOSITIONAL
FORCE: 1937-1951

The previous period witnessed a real shift in the balance of class forces in general and the power of the South Side miners in particular. From 1926 to 1936 the miners' power was unevenly recomposed from a once militant and united force into an increasingly less threatening and challenging power. During the 1937-1951 period the recomposed power that began to emerge, through 'reunification' of formal political and trade union factions, continued to develop and was institutionalized as an 'oppositional' force. In this sense, the inherent weakness suggested by the term, 'reunification', is revealed--the 'left' and 'right' factions did not come together and form a power similar to the one prior to the split of 1932. Implicit in this process of 'reunification' and recomposition was a dynamic which increasingly lessened the possibilities of alternative actions and thoughts from emerging within the immediate realities of 1937-1951. During this period significant changes in the key institutional sites not only effectively contained, but also influenced and shaped, the South Side miners' consciousness and action.

1

Within the realm of formal politics, the key development was the establishment of the C.C.F. At the August 5, 1938 District 26 convention it was unanimously resolved to affiliate with the C.C.F. This move was unsolicited and unknown to the C.C.F. (there was no provincial C.C.F.) and marked the first time a union joined the national C.C.F. party. More importantly, however, was the key way in which the entrance of the C.C.F. shaped and redefined the realities of South Side working-class politics. Apart from the brief period in which the C.P.C. chose to run independently, social democrats and communists had allied together through the I.L.P. At the C.C.F.'s first provincial convention in May 26-27, 1939, it was established--as was done across Canada--that those who were members or active supporters "of any political party or organization not affiliated with or not eligible to affiliation to the C.C.F." could not be a C.C.F. member (C.C.F., 1939:6; see MacEwan, 1976:216; see also Auakumovic, 1975:102). In addition, all funds and organizational materials from the Cape Breton Labour Party had previously been turned over to the new local C.C.F. While by no means determining in itself, these manoeuvres were highly significant strategically as it defined C.P.C. members and active

supporters outside a 'substantial' area of working class politics. Thus, the nature of struggles within the 'left/right' arena of working-class politics would increasingly be within more narrow organizational and ideological limits. The communist 'option' was substantially reduced as a real alternative and the 'left' was fundamentally redefined along less radical (social democratic) lines. At the convention, the initial establishment of the 'right' and 'recomposed left' was represented with the election of the provincial executive; Froman Waye (president), D. W. Morrison (vice-president); with Silby Barrett and Clarie Gillis amongst its board of councilors (White, 1977:125-137; MacEwan, 1976:196-205, 216-217; MacLean, 1977:21-28; C.C.F., 1939).

Throughout the period of 1936-1951, the South Side C.C.F. was highly successful--both in Glace Bay and New Waterford--and acquired substantial support from rank and file miners. Increasingly, as White (1977:137) notes, the C.C.F. won broad support over the C.P.C. during the initial period of establishment. With the December 5, 1938 provincial by-election of Cape Breton Center and federal election of March 26, 1939, the miners re-established themselves as a 'recomposed' political force with C.C.F. victories.

In those elections Douglas MacDonald won the provincial riding while Clarie Gillis won the federal seat of Cape Breton South. During the 1941 provincial election of October 28, D. N. Brodie and Douglas MacDonald won Cape Breton East Center respectively. Combined with the election of Donald MacDonald in Cape Breton South (Sydney) three C.C.F. representatives sat in the Liberal dominated government. In 1945 the federal election of June 11, and provincial election of October 23, saw the election of Gillis, Michael MacDonald (Cape Breton Center) and Russell Cunningham (Cape Breton East) for the C.C.F. In this year the provincial C.C.F. became the Opposition party in government. However, given that the party was composed of only two members--the two Cape Breton C.C.F. members--and that the Tories were not represented, their effectiveness was extremely limited.¹⁹ (MacEwan, 1976:201-205, 239, 240, 248-252; MacLean, 1977:33-37).

The 1945 provincial government, in many ways, reflected the constant weakness of the C.C.F. to attract mainland Nova Scotia workers and independent commodity producers. While miners and steelworkers of industrial Cape Breton had allied themselves with a provincial and federal working-class party, their

formal political power was effectively limited given the absence of similar developments in mainland Nova Scotia and the Maritimes in general. MacLean (1977:30) estimates, on the basis of the C.C.F. provincial membership lists, that during the 1940s and early 1950s over 70% of the membership came from Cape Breton County. In this regard the limitations imposed on the miners by the provincial and federal structure of formal political power were clearly illustrated. Unlike the structure of trade union power, vis-a-vis a single employer, formal politics inherently necessitates an organization of class power amongst a variety of workers amongst different industries and sites of employment. This type of organization has never been successfully established at the Nova Scotian or federal level. In this respect formal politics within the Liberal Democracy has been structured in a way which organizes class members as 'citizens', whereas the trade union organizes class members as 'workers'. Thus the organization of class interests politically has inherently been more uneven: (See Hall et. al. 1978:chapter 7; Przeworski, 1980A, 1980B; Offe and Wiesensthal, 1980).

Developing simultaneously to the emergence and establishment of the C.C.F. were key developments

in the organization of the production process. Throughout this period, and beginning in 1913, Nova Scotia coal production had substantially declined despite continued importation of predominantly U.S. produced coal to Central Canadian markets. As western Canadian coal had not established itself in this market, the continued importation of coal was a direct blow to Nova Scotia. In 1935, Canada imported 13,009,098 tons of coal, or approximately 50% of all coal consumed. Out of these 13 million tons, 12 million went directly into Central Canadian markets and undercut Nova Scotian coal which cost more to produce and transport, (Gray, 1936:1,4,7, 10,17; Gray, 1945). At this time most U.S. and DOSCO pits were mechanized, except for Domco's. Given that Domco's daily output was 19,000 of Nova Scotia's 26,000 tons (McCall 1936:461), that well over 50% of total operating costs were attributed to labour, and the federal government refused to construct adequate tariff walls, a program of mechanization was increasingly proposed (Cameron, 1944:3-5; MacNeil and Kalbheen, 1932.).

On May 26, 1938, Domco officials introduced, and began testing an electric 'Sampson' coal cutter and 'Joy' loader in the newly developing No. 20 colliery in Glace Bay.²⁰ Providing successful testing of mechanized mining, Domco had plans to initially establish

10 cutting/loading units during the next year and a half of the the mine's development (Sydney Post, May 25,26,30, 1938).

Immediately, the affected miners of No. 2 mine (Phalen local)--who were not allowed to attend testings of the machine--were concerned about job displacement. At a May 30 meeting the effects of mechanization were debated. The District executive stressed that they did not wish to 'impede progress' so long as the benefits of mechanization were shared by all. In addition, D. W. Morrison stressed he believed short-term unemployment would result, but had assurances from Domco that all workers would be rehired as production expanded. In response rank and file sentiment, led by Clarie Gillis, feared that 'electrification' would result in Glace Bay being turned into a 'ghost town'. It was further noted that Domco estimated a single production unit of 11 men could produce 250 tons of coal per shift while the present organization of work required 25 men (Sydney Post, May 30, 1938).

On May 31, the Phalen local voted 1,212 to 92 against 'electrification' (Sydney Post, June 1, 1938). At the same time production tests were still being undertaken. On June 8, the men in No. 20 refused to haul the mechanically cut coal and left it sitting

in cars thus blocking the main haulage point. A committee comprised of Clarie Gillis, Joe Matheson, and John R. MacNeil informed Domco that the mine would not be operated until an agreement upon mechanization had been established (Sydney Post, June 9, 1938). As a consequence 89 (initially estimated at 75) men who had been working in No. 20 were out of work. At a June 12 meeting, Phalen local protested the 'lockout' as a breach of contract and motioned a District levy to assist all laid off men during their period of unemployment. Gillis argued that the laying off of these men was only the beginning of what would happen if mechanization was established (Sydney Post, June 13, 1938). On June 16, the District executive supported a sub-district levy and proposed that Domco continue coal production in the usual method while electrification was negotiated (Sydney Post, June 17, 1938). On July 4, Domco restated its demand for mechanization and the conflict remained unresolved.

At the August, 1938, District convention it was resolved that mechanization of all mines in the future not be undertaken until government legislation which would secure safe operations and create a system of unemployment insurance was established (Sydney Post, August 17, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 27; November 14, 1938).²¹ On November 13, the Phalen local again reaffirmed their

position (November 14, 1938).

On January 24, 1939, Domco began to disassemble the cutting/loading unit which had remained in the pit since the tie-up began (Sydney Post, January 25, 1939).²² Mechanical loading was not re-introduced back into Domco pits until 1948--ten years later.

Clearly 1938 was a key year in the process of workplace organization. Based on solidarity, Phalen local members refused to allow the introduction of mechanized loading and thus reproduced their effective real control over the labour process. In addition to preventing further unemployment they contradicted the Minister of Mines, Domco officials and even International U.M.W.A. officials who declared that "technological progress cannot be stopped, annuled, or circumscribed" (see Sydney Post, May 30, 1938). In this sense--on a theoretical level--the events suggested an argument against technological determinism and adoption of a framework which adequately gives focus to the power inherent in class negotiation over the organization of specific labour processes (see Friedman, 1977:chapter 4).

Previous to the 1938 strike/lockout was the uneven emergence of a new method of mining--the 'longwall'. This method, already common in other DOSCO

mines, was not widely used until 1928 at No. 12 colliery in New Waterford (Naish, 1977:1). Throughout the late 1920s and 1930s the longwall was established in the South Side. In 1925 it accounted for 0.5%, in 1930 for 21%, in 1935 for 32.6% and in 1940 for 32.7% of Domco's total coal output (Mifflen, 1944:342).

The key factor which influenced the adoption was geological. As room-and pillar mining became 'submarine'--going deeper below the sea bed and farther offshore--pressures on pillars and roof supports intensified. As early as 1923-1925 pressures exerted on some rooms was so great that pillars began to break up (Doxey, 1953a:5; McCall, 1936:471). A consequence of the intensification of roof pressure was the enlargement of pillar size and thus a reduction in percentage of coal able to be extracted. In a cover of 200-300 feet, the mining of a coal seam between 5½ to 7 feet thick required pillars 32 by 48 feet in size (50% of coal left in pillar). At a depth in excess of 650 feet, a 45 by 61 foot pillar was required (58.5% of coal left in pillar) (McCall, 1936:470; Frost, 1931:11). As a general rule, longwall mining could not develop in a mine unless there was, at the minimum, 100 feet of strata above the workings for every foot of the seam's thickness (a seven foot seam would require a

minimum cover of 700 feet; see Frost, 1931:10).

Physically, the dimensions of the longwall are very different than the room and pillar work area. Initially, the face of a longwall was generally 250 feet. Later through a process of 'cut and trial' over a period of years, a 500 foot face was generally adopted (see Doxey 1953a:6; DOSCO, 1949a:13). The width of the work area (from face to the the back or 'gob') usually varied from 4½ to 6 feet--the depth of the undercut into the face. Roof control was key as it was essential to obtain the smallest possible work area in order to discourage a mass cave in along the 500 foot wall. The only cavity in existence at the longwall, then, was the immediate work area.²³ By manipulating roof control, through the construction of 'pack walls' and supports, the roof was 'induced' to sink, or collapse, behind the work area as the face advances (see McCall and Miffelen, 1944:469).

The immediate advantage of this system over room and pillar, is that it allows for the extraction of virtually all coal in the seam--no pillars are necessary as the manipulation of roof control along the narrow work area is undertaken. As a consequence, a 3,500 ton output in one longwal colliery was obtainable through 3,600 feet of face, while similar output in

a room and pillar colliery, with seams of equal thickness, required 25,000 feet of face (Mifflen, 1941:342). MacNeil and Kalbheen, in 1931 (page 289) estimated that the "opening-out" of one longwall face was equivalent to that obtained in the "mining area of fifteen or more rooms". Thus, the immediate feature of longwall is the concentration of production in a small geographical area. Implicit in the organization of work is a greater concentration of workers around specific points of production. The independence and autonomy of miners at the face vis-a-vis the room- and pillar method is decreased as a much larger group of miners are assembled at the longwall face. The miners are now constantly supervised by an overman--whose co-ordination and control functions are increased.

Under the longwall system a 24-hour cycle of work was involved (the following description is based on: Kalbheen and MacNeil, 1932:290-298; McCall, 1936: 470-478; Doxey, 1953b:4-7; McCall and Mifflen, 1944: 465-473; Naish, 1977a:2-3). From 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. the coal was blasted down from the face and hand loaded. From 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. the pack walls were built up and roof supports were constructed. From 11 p.m. to 7 a.m., the face was mechanically undercut and prepared for the loading shift (see in particular McCall, 1936:475;

and McCall and Mifflen, 1944:473; and Martheleur, 1946:229 for variations; see Appendix "D").

During the 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. shift a series of holes were bored, using compressed air drills at various strategic spots along the face. Once the coal was blasted down an 'army of men', situated every 20 feet, loaded the coal onto a conveyor system that ran along the face. At this point, the width of work area was $4\frac{1}{2}$ to 6 feet. Supporting the roof were two 'chock lines' that ran parallel along the face. The first chock line was 3 feet from the face. The individual chocks (a 6" by 6", $2\frac{1}{2}$ ' long, hardwood block) were located side by side at 7-10 foot centers. As the room was loaded, thus revealing the newly advanced face, a third line of chocks was situated between the face and conveyor belt. Behind the chock line farthest from the face was the 'waste' or 'gob'. The gob, composed of pack walls was situated at 50 foot centers. As the face advanced it was essential that the strata be induced to cave in behind the last chock line and between the pack walls.

During the 3-11 shift, the pack walls were built up, closer to the newly advanced face. In addition, the third chock line farthest from the face was

systematically drawn, thus inducing the roof to cave into the gob. Again, this required another 'army of men'--the exact number contingent on the actual length of the face and geological conditions.

During the 11-7 shift, the coal was undercut and the conveyor system dismantled and moved closer to the newly advanced face. A Mavor Coulson compressed air cutting machine was generally used to make an undercut, or 'kerf', of $4\frac{1}{2}$ to 6 feet deep.

A further consequence of the centralization of output provided by the adoption of the longwall was the centralization of the main haulage system and its respective workforce. The coal loaded at the face was transferred out of the work area and fed onto a 'telescopic loader' (see Appendix "E"). At this point the coal was then dumped onto a conveyor belt onto a chute and fed into awaiting coal cars. The telescopic loader, mounted on tracks, advanced as the longwall progressed--keeping in line with the conveyor system at the face. The loader straddled the belt conveyor which was lengthened every 50 foot advance of the coal face. At a point of 1,800 feet of advancement, a new loading point was usually constructed. In this way both miners and mine workers' actions became more co-ordinated and geographically concentrated and thus

came under more constant supervision. In addition, the division of labour became more fragmented through the introduction of 24-hour shift work. Within the shifts, miners' work became more specialized in the sense that each specific task was broken up amongst a group or a single miner. While this process clearly reduced the amount of real control possessed by individual miners, the miners as a whole still retained considerable power over the workplace. In contrast to the organization of work vis-a-vis hand loaded room and pillar, however, the company had made indirect gains.

As in 1938-1939, the miners manipulated their real control over the labour process into a source of power and the mine became a site of struggle. Unlike the 1938-1939 events, the '1941 slowdown strike' was not undertaken to resist mechanization, but to force the resignation of District 26 officers and acquire better wages within the context of a wartime economy. Immediately preceeding the slowdown was a growing dissatisfaction with District 26 executive negotiation efforts and federal conciliation boards which had proposed small wage increases that attempted to further restrict the 'parameters of negotiation'.²⁴ In this context the struggle in 1941 was not simply limited to events at the point of production but was another movement in

the process to define the nature of collective bargaining by the District executive and (to a lesser extent) the State.

During this period, the provincial and federal states increasingly intervened legislatively in an attempt to contain class relations at the workplace. Provincially, the Department of Labour and the first Trade Union Act in Canada was established in 1932 and 1937 respectively. While these developments were largely ineffectual for miners--as they had already acquired many of these new rights through the Coal Mines Regulation Act--it was indicative of the transforming nature of class relations within the province as a whole.²⁵ The jurisdiction of the federal state was expanded to include 85% of all industrial activity when the I.D.I.A. was broadened under the 1939 War Measures Act, to cover the 'war industries'. Again this new legislation did not directly influence the miners as they had previously been under the federal jurisdiction of the I.D.I.A.²⁶ Two new areas of federal legislation--in addition to the I.D.I.A.--were influential on the mining industry. Through orders-in-council P.C. 7440 (issued September, 1940) wages obtained during 1926-1929 were assumed "fair" and further wage increases would be increased 5% for every 5% increase in the

price index. With this order, the federal state attempted to not only restrict strike possibilities through the I.D.I.A., but also increasingly regulate and define the limits of wage negotiations. In addition and as a consequence of large military enlistment by miners the federal government, with the aid of the National Selection Service and province, prevented further recruitment of miners. Some miners--notably contract miners--were actually recalled from service in order to counteract the labour shortage and restriction of production. (Canada, 1946:87, 292-295; Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:226; MacLean, 1979:50-71).

With P.C. 7440 in effect the MacTague Tribunal sat in December 1940 following the breakdown of negotiations leading to the 1941 contract. The establishment of a tribunal, should negotiations fail, was previously recommended by the MacTague board during the 1939-40 contract negotiations. The tribunal recommended, on March 13, 1941, a 10 cent increase on Domco's basic wage and a 10% raise in rates for particular classes of mine workers. As MacEwan (1976:230) notes, the small wage increases--not even advanced to levels possible under P.C. 7440--were justified again on Domco's ability to pay. Furthermore, the tribunal's offer was to be retroactive to February 1, 1941 provided District

executive signed within 30 days. If the contract was not signed within 30 days the payment of wages would be retroactive from the day it was signed (MacEwan, 1979:229-231).

On April 30, 1941, the District executive-- in a 5 to 3 vote--decided to sign the contract without a rank and file vote. On April 11, the contract was signed. In response, the Cape Breton locals met on April 15 and decided to walk out the following day. Shortly after the walk out began, an April 18 Glace Bay convention decided to return to work while the matter was being investigated. At the same meeting the resignation of Morrison and McKay was unanimously called upon (MacEwan, 1976:232).

At an April 21, 1944 meeting amongst Cape Breton locals the resignation of Morrison and McKay, and a U.M.W.A. International investigation, was demanded. The executive refused to resign and an International investigation was held. The investigation proved ineffectual and did not question the leadership of District 26 executive (MacEwan, 1976:232).

It was at this point that the Cape Breton rank and file manipulated their real control over the labour process into a source of power through 'striking on the job'. The slowdown strike spread quickly amongst.

Cape Breton pits. Miners at the point of production curtailed output by roughly 50% while men on datal rates made contributions to compensate their reduced income (MacEwan, 1976:233).

Primarily, the slowdown strike was a struggle between the rank and file and District, and International executive, to shape the nature of the District. Secondly, it was a struggle against the state and DOSCO--to acquire better wages and re-define the strict limitations on collective bargaining that were imposed during the war. While communists, or radical trade unionists were active, the struggle was not shaped along 'left/right' lines which had existed prior to the demise of the A.M.W. (see Miffen, 1951:83). The struggle of 1941 was not between a radical left and a right wing faction, but seemed to be more immediately concerned with the removal of the District executive. Given the realities of the trade union politics, this shift meant increased support for the 'recomposed left'. In an attempt to simultaneously challenge the District executive, the state, and Domco, the miners chose to reduce production. 'Striking on the job' of 1941 was interesting when contrasted to its usage of the early 1920s. On this occasion a reduction of output and subsequent breaking of a collective agreement was used

to challenge, and not enhance, the power of the executive. In the 1920s the executive called for striking on the job while the 1941 executive labelled it 'illegal' and sought to prevent it.

On July 3, the International appointed Silby Barrett in charge of District 26 affairs and retained the services of Morrison and McKay. Barrett attempted to stop the slowdown through the expulsion of 13 activists on the grounds of dual unionism at a July 15 tribunal. Following a mass rank and file rally protesting this action, the 13 men were officially expelled from union membership for two years.²⁷ John L. Lewis threatened to revoke the charters of several locals if production did not increase by July 25. In response to threats by all South Side locals that they would resign their own charters should certain local charters be revoked, Lewis extended his deadline to August 1. On August 1, local charters were not revoked but local funds were 'frozen' by the District on International orders (MacEwan, 1976:234).

By the end of August, DOSCO began to implement its own strategy of mass firings in an attempt to break the rank and file protest--and indirectly aid union authorities. By September 4, 1,400, including the entire workforce at No. 12, were without work (MacEwan,

1976:235-236).

Shortly after, DOSCO's strategy proved successful in breaking the miners. By September 24, the Cape Breton locals announced that full production would resume shortly, upon responses from telegrams sent to Prime Minister King and John L. Lewis. Following evasive responses, and more negotiations, production was increased and the major demand, for the resignation of District executives, was capitulated by the miners. Included amongst the accepted terms of settlement were the re-hiring of all men, the release of the local's funds, the eventual reinstatement of the expelled members and the re-opening of contract negotiations (MacEwan, 1976:236).

While the District executive of 1941 did remain in power, they were soundly defeated in the October 13, 1942 election. The new executive members were Freeman Jenkins (president), Tom Ling (vice-president), Adam Scott (secretary-treasurer) and John Alex MacDonald (international board member). With this election of the executive--three of whom were highly active A.M.W. members--a shift towards the 'recomposed left' occurred.²⁸ At the same time, the 1942 election contributed to the continuing process of the centralization of District executive power away from the rank and file. Beginning

in 1942, all District elections were subsequently held every four years (Earle, 1984:265; MacEwan, 1976:270). Thus increasingly the relationship of the executive to rank and file was becoming more autonomous. Implicit in this development is the potential for a decreased direct and indirect participation by the membership in union politics and the defining of short and long term 'interests'.

On August 13, 1946, the District executive was re-elected for another four years. Prior to this, province-wide bargaining with all DOSCO coal subsidiaries, acting as a single unit was re-established in 1944. With the 1944 contract, miners also acquired an increase of \$1.04 per day and 'two-weeks' paid vacation period (MacEwan, 1976:266,270).

In November, 1946, the District executive--backed with a rank and file vote which supported a strike should negotiations breakdown--entered talks for a 1947 contract. Initially the union's chief demands were a \$2.50 per day raise, and additional 15% increase for cutters, loaders, borers, and shot-firers, and 15 cents per ton royalty towards the creation of a better pension and contributions through a levy on produced coal for a welfare fund. The corporation's chief demands were the abolition of all 'task jobs',

the negotiation of rates for mechanized mining and the payment of a \$1.00 increase based on an increase in production of one ton per man day. Essentially DOSCO wanted production increased to 1939 levels, which were approximately one ton per man day above 1946 figures.²⁹ The union refused any wage schedule contingent upon production (see U.M.W.A., 'Memo of Meetings on Wage Negotiations, November 28, 1946'; MacEwan, 1976:271).

With the quick breakdown in negotiations, the miners walked out as the contract expired on January 31, 1947 (see Glace Bay Gazette, January 31, 1947; Halifax Herald, January 31, 1947; MacEwan, 1976:271). On January 30, a conciliation board had been established by federal Minister Labour Mitchell, who had previously cautioned Jenkins that the board had 14 days to investigate the dispute prior to a strike. Following two days of walk-out, Jenkins ordered the miners back to work during the board's term. He later defended this action on the basis of preventing an 'illegal' strike. (Halifax Herald, January 30, February 3, 4, 1947; U.M.W.A. Mitchell to Jenkins, January 11, 1947; Sydney Post, March 3, 1947).

On February 15, following submission of conciliator Carol's report and a last minute meeting in Ottawa, on February 14, the miners again walked

out. Essentially the report had recommended a \$1.40 wage increase and establishment of a welfare fund. While the 40 cents was retroactive as of February 1, the remaining \$1.00 was contingent on increased production of one ton per man day. The 40 cent hike was to be paid by the federal government (see G.B.G., February 7, 10, 13, 14, 15, 1947).

At this stage the miners remained out of the pits until May 26, 1947--about three months. On May 23, they voted in favour of an agreement which established a \$1.00 per day wage increase and an additional 40 cent per day contingent upon increase output to 1939 levels within a six-month production period (Halifax Herald, May 20, 21, 24, 1947; G.B.G., May 26, 1947). Apart from the miners' increased output, the wage increase was to be financed by the federal government--which contributed \$8 million--and a \$2.50 increase per ton in the price of domestic coal (Halifax Herald, May 20, 21, 28, 1947).

The settlement, however, proved premature and miners again walked out on May 29. Following the commencement of work, Domco attempted to implement some of the '58 clauses' which were previously understood, by the U.M.W.A., to be under further negotiation during the six-month production period. Upon the attempt

to implement certain clauses--particularly those which single shifted Nos. 11 and 18 collieries, changed the direction of face work and stopped the custom of riding raikes to the surface following the completion of a job--mass rank and file protest from affected pits emerged (see U.M.W.A., "Memo of Meetings on Wage Negotians", May 26, 28, 1947; G.B.G., 26, 29, 30, 31, June 5, 1947). The miners remained out until June 11, when various clauses were either resolved, or agreed to be negotiated within a six-month period (G.B.G., June 3, 6, 11, 12, 1947).

The strike of 1947 was the first District strike in 22 years--since 1925. Like all strikes, much is revealed about the nature of the workers' power and the broader balance of class forces. When contrasted with previous District strikes, much is revealed about the changing nature of class forces. Clearly the 1947 strike, when contrasted to the struggles of the 1920s, was very different in both its dynamic and intensity of class conflict.

Unlike the strike of 1925, 1947 was not a struggle against ultra-exploitation based on increased absolute surplus value production. As a consequence, and to be understood within the transforming nature of the miners' power since 1926, the 1947 class relations

were not totally opposed--both in terms of economic distribution or in definition of class interest. It was clear that 1947 allowed more 'space' for negotiation, or 'compromise', than the economic realities on which the class struggle of the 1920s spawned.

Key in reshaping the economic terrain of the 1940s was the federal state, through the huge amount of subsidies poured directly or indirectly into DOSCO's coal sector. Apart from the subsidies previously mentioned, the state had a wartime arrangement with Domco that covered the company against any losses, including those production stoppages resulting from strikes. This subsidy was in effect until March 31, 1947 (see G.B.G., February 20, 21, 25, 1947; Halifax Herald, March 5, 21, 1947; MacEwan, 1976:271-272). The subsidy was formed in 1942 under the Emergency Coal Production Board and was used to encourage a steady supply of coal by encouraging mine expansion. In 1949 the subsidy was revoked for all companies except Domco. Rates were made on the basis of the previous fiscal year. By 1946 Domco had received \$15,204,505 out of a national total of \$22,721,120 (Canada, 1946:556-558). Yet at the same time the 1947 strike was not simply a conflict over the distribution of 'surplus' or wages. Fundamentally, the significance of the strike was that

it centered solely around the question of 'production' and 'efficiency', not in the narrow sense--as all strikes usually do--but in a broader sense that questioned the 'future' of the industry. At the same time that negotiations began, the 1946 federal Royal Commission on Coal (Carroll Commission) reported.³⁰ Its findings were widely publicized by the federal government. Contrasting the low level N.S. output with its U.S. counterpart and the high level of state subsidization, the Commission called for the stoppage of state financial support and mass mechanization of DOSCO mines. The report made it clear that full scale mechanization was the only way that the industry could survive within the capitalist coal market. The Commission noted that output per man day in Domco pits was 1.6 tons in 1946, while figures U.S. coal imported by Canada in 1944 ranged from 5.08 to 6.77 tons (Canada, 1946:83).

Given the way that the structure of the national coal industry and market had developed, the years of 1947 and 1948 were turning points for the South Side industry. It was during these years that the political-economic realities of the industry were confronted. The question of wages, production and markets directly framed the actions of miners, owners, and politicians.

The years of 1947 and 1948 did not see a 'quick fix' to the crisis; as was done in the 1920s by BESCO's wage reductions, or in 1932 by DOSCO's 're-allocation plan'.

As the conjunctural realities of the 1920s inherently structured and sustained class struggle, the conjunctural realities of 1947 structured class actions toward 'compromise' and 'co-operation'. By 'compromise' it is meant that "workers consent to the perpetuation of profit as an institution in exchange for the prospect of improving their material well being in the future" (Przeworski, 1980b:135). The compromise also includes economic concessions by the capitalists in the sense that they agree to re-invest and create long-term benefits for both classes. Furthermore, the structure and logic of 'compromise' "is not always stated explicitly" (Przeworski, 1980b:135); that is:

the consent which underlies reproduction of capitalist relations does not consist of individual states of mind but of behavioral characteristics of organizations . . . social relations constitute structures of choices within which people perceive, evaluate and act. They consent when they choose particular courses of action and when they follow these choices in their practice. Wage earners consent to capitalist organization of society when they act as if they could improve their material conditions within the confines of capitalism.

(Przeworski, 1980a:33).

During 1947, unlike 1922-25, the class structure was not brought into question--either through action or thought. The miners of 1947 were faced with the real possibilities of massive 'industrial phase out'. In many respects the compromise--to continue the industry through increased productivity--was already made for them. Clearly there was no local alternative employment and out-migration to Upper Canada had already begun.³¹ One of the many interesting aspects of the 1947 strike was that at no time did DOSCO, the U.M.W.A. or the State ever argue that: wages should not be increased, that production should not be raised, or that increased productivity was not central to the industry's future. District president Jenkins stressed the need for "joint co-operative action by both parties to bring about increased production which is vital and necessary for the stability and prosperity of the industry, the communities and the people affected thereby" (G.B.G., May 22, 1947)--hardly similar to the perspective taken by the leaders of 1922-25.

During the strike--in order to fight against wages being tied to production--the U.M.W.A. and C.C.F. charged DOSCO with inefficiency for its failure to mechanize the mines (see Sydney Post, March 7, 1947; Halifax Herald, March 22, 27, 1947). On March 28, 1947,

District 26 sent the provincial government a letter asking them to approach the federal government for financial assistance.

The settlement of the strike and the reconstruction of the industry is impossible without temporary continuation of subsidies and the investment of at least \$6,000,000 in modernization.

(Halifax Herald, March 29, 1947; see also G.B.G. and Toronto Daily Star same date.)

At no time during the strike, or subsequent negotiations during the summer and fall of 1947, were there any pithead votes--as in 1938--on whether mechanization was to be accepted. In this context, the choice of whether or not to mechanize was not presented to the membership--the choice had already been made for them.

Unlike the District strikes of 1909 and the 1920s, the 1947 strike was distinguishable for its lack of rank and file activity. While, of course, the miners were present by voting for a strike and withdrawing their labour power, they did not show the initiative of the early 1920s, 1932-35 or 1941. At no time was the rank and file aggressive in an attempt to influence the strike's outcome. With the exception of 30 men 'sent' to Halifax docks to protest the unloading of imported coal, there were no pickets at DOSCO properties or coal consuming plants (see Sydney Post Record, March 5, 1947; Halifax Herald, March 5, 1947; G.B.G.,

March 5, 25, 1947). There were no mass parades, demonstrations, rank and file meetings and the 100% strike tactic was not used. Only when DOSCO attempted to implement its '58 clauses' at the strike's end did the rank and file become militant. Upon DOSCO's failure to negotiate "fairly", mass pickets were established at Nos. 2, 20 and 1B collieries. Maintenance men were also withdrawn at 1B for two days, but later put back in with the local president arguing that the action was 'unconstitutional' (G.B.G., May 30, 1947). During the strike, miners guarded major roadways in the South Side area in order to prevent the marketing of 'bootleg' coal. While this activity was somewhat successful, it contributed to minor infighting amongst the miners. At one point, Jenkins attempted to control the digging and distribution of bootleg coal and had actually expelled some miners from union participation for disobeying orders when one Glace Bay local refused to follow the restrictions (G.B.G., March 12, 17; Halifax Herald, April 7, 22, 1947; Sydney Post Record, April 23, 1947; MacEwan, 1976:273-274).

Obviously, when the above activities and the calling back of the miners after the initial January 31 walk-out are considered, the strike was 'strategically' poorly organized. This was partly explained by the

fact that this was the first strike in 22 years. As Hyman (1972:11 referring to Hicks, 1932:146) notes, "weapons grow rusty, and a union which never strikes may lose the ability to organize a formidable strike, so that its threats become less effective."

Apart from the real lack of experience in organizing a strike--and framed within the 'compromisal' nature of the economic reality and the historical context of a recomposing rank and file--was a process of increased centralization in decision-making which discouraged active membership participation. Historically, the International executive had remained on the periphery of District 26 negotiations. In 1947, however, they were active. Initially, they persuaded the District to reduce its wage demand from \$2.50 to \$1.40 per day. In April, much to Jenkins's surprise, it was announced in the Provincial Assembly that members of the International had met with DOSCO officials in Montreal. District 26 officers later 'caught up' with the negotiations in Ottawa several days later (see Halifax Herald, April 1, 1947; G.B.G., April 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 1947). On April 30, Jenkins went to the International headquarters and a "counter proposal" was jointly created. This meeting led to meetings in Ottawa and Montreal

of May 14 and 17 and the eventual settlement of the strike. At every stage in the negotiations, International members were present (G.B.G., May 8, 12, 14; Sydney Post Record, May 2, 8, 9; Halifax Herald, May 1, 6, 13, 1947). Throughout the strike the International was unsupportive financially--despite the keeping up of contrary appearances. Total aid was \$50,000 plus substantial loans to be repaid in full. During the strike weekly relief was \$5.00 per married couple, \$3.00 per single miner and \$1.00 for each dependent up to a maximum payment of \$10.00. It was estimated that total assistance amounted \$70,000-\$80,000 per week. (See Sydney Post Record, March 30; G.B.G., March 1, 28, 1947). By the strike's end the District was financially exhausted and as a consequence the union's paper, the Glace Bay Gazette, went under (see U.M.W.A., 1948). The paper was originally purchased in 1943 and like the M.L.H. and N.S.M.--though less radical--had been the voice of the U.M.W.A. and C.C.F. With its demise was also the extinction of a working-class paper in the South Side.

The role of the provincial and federal state was also significant in the shaping of class interaction. Unlike previous District strikes the state (at both levels) did not provoke rank and file militancy by

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entering into the South Side with militia or police. In this sense the absence of experiencing the state in a coercive form reduced the possibilities of the miners being radicalized. As a consequence--through a process that began in post 1926 years--the state intervention was continuing to take new shape organizationally and experientially. This development was a complex process for the basis of its success lie in the maintenance and reproduction of a less threatening working-class--a force which the state's non-coercive power was shaped and was reciprocally influenced by. The miners of 1947 were not directly challenging and were economically, politically and ideologically containable. In the realities of 1947 the state contained the miners through threats of revoking subsidies if productivity did not increase (see Halifax Chronicle, 'Government Ready To Aid If Settlement Can Be Reached', April 2; Halifax Herald, February 20, 21, April 1, 1947). This position by the state clearly revealed its transformed economic relations with the Nova Scotia coal industry. American coal was dominating the central Canadian market and Nova Scotia coal was constantly declining in its share of Canadian-produced coal. In addition, petroleum products were becoming competitive

as an economically viable energy source. Compounded with the increasing expenditures in subsidies, the coal fields--hence the miners--declined in strategic economic importance to the federal state. At the same time the economic importance of the federal state to those dependent on the industry increased.

Throughout the strike the federal state refused to enter or facilitate negotiations despite constant pleas by the U.M.W.A., C.C.F., the N.S. government, press and mining town mayors (see Halifax Herald, March 14, 17, 18, 19, 26, 27, 29; Sydney Post Record, March 7, 26; G.B.G., March 7, 22, 27, 1947). Unlike previous strikes, it consistently chose not to intervene directly.

The provincial state maintained a similar stance and was criticized by the U.M.W.A. for its "do nothing attitude" (Toronto Daily Sun, March 31, 1947). In 1947 there was no provincial police, no "bolshevism" to "eradicate", and no 'alternative' challenge by the South Side miners within the transformed conjunctural realities.³² Perhaps one of the best examples of the extent to which the provincial state's relation vis-a-vis the South Side miners had transformed occurred on March 27 when C.C.F. Opposition Leader Cunningham asked the government to postpone the Throne Speech

4 OF 4

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS
STANDARD REFERENCE MATERIAL 1010a
(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)

in order to debate the strike. The response from the Premier was that the strike was now in its sixth week and he did not think the matter was of "such urgency" to necessitate the postponement of the Throne Speech (Halifax Herald, March 27, 1947). This was clearly not the same Liberal party or government of 1925. For the fiscal year ending November 30, 1949, the coal royalty amounted to \$713,186 of the province's total revenue of \$35,404,211 (Nova Scotia, Journals of the House of Assembly, 1950:lvi,xxix).

Like the federal state, the Province chose to contain the miners through indirect, non-coercive and non-confrontational ways. In this respect the Province secured a steady supply of imported (U.S.) coal throughout the strike in order to maintain domestic and industrial needs and undercut the strike's effect. On February 28, Minister of Mines, L. D. Currie announced that the government had secured enough coal to meet the province's requirement for 90 days (Halifax Herald, March 1; see also Halifax Herald, March 4; Sydney Post Record, March 5).

Domco also shaped the miners' activity through a non-confrontational mode of negotiation. During the strike--given the federal subsidy which covered losses up to March 31--Domco could literally afford

to do nothing. Throughout the strike the company remained quiet and did nothing to provoke the miners (the '58 clause' episode excluded). In this regard the effective relationship between state and company was clearly illustrated. The subsidy--which was as much an institutionalized economic, political, and ideologically defined social relation as the royalty--was highly effective in securing 'labour peace'. Through the lessening of Domco's exploitative imperatives, the possibilities of structuring negotiation towards conflict were reduced.

Combined with this, was Domco's choice to seek surplus value production by tying wages to productivity and not through absolute wage reductions. At no time did the company deny that the miners should not receive an increase in wages and the standard of living. If anything, it attempted to tie increased productivity and wages with the 'universal interests' of both company and miners.

In addition to the complex ramifications of this strategy it is extremely important to note that Domco sold its houses during the war and had not reopened its stores following the 1925 crisis.³³ This was significant for it was a disarmament of previously key weapons in the company's strategic repertoire.

Indeed these weapons--of cancellation of credit and eviction--were implemented since the earliest class struggles.

The effect of the re-organization of company power--which should be understood in relation to the increasing legal containment of the miners--was that it increased the 'invisibility' of company authority and thus was one less avenue through which the miners could potentially be radicalized. To extend beyond the scope of this study, it appears this development also had profound implications on redefining family and community relations vis-a-vis Domco. Clearly the possibility of radicalizing the miner's family and community as a whole was greatly reduced. Historically, the evictions and cancellation of credit had contributed to the development of South Side class struggles to embody the broader dimensions of community.

The 1947 strike was the first District strike which did not contribute to an economic, political or ideological crisis. Furthermore, it is important to recognize the relationship of ideology to economy. Unlike the 1920s the deepening economic crisis of the coal industry was not accompanied by an epiphenomenal deepening ideological crisis. As suggested--with reference to how the miners' thoughts and actions were

influenced by the key institutional sites of action-- a significant transformation of their consciousness was occurring.

Through an uneven process during the post 1926 period the miners began to rework their conceptualization of the social world with reference to the authority of workplace relations. By 1947 they were clearly, no longer 'class consciousness'--they did not see their interests in direct opposition to the company's. Instead, interests between the classes, began to re-emphasize those aspects which were of mutual concern. They began to see a fundamental relationship between themselves and Domco. Furthermore, not only did the miners' conceptualization identify broad areas of mutuality but it did so in a way that was 'active'. The miners actively participated, through active accommodation, in an attempt to secure the industry's future. For lack of better term, this thesis argues that the South Side miners, at that point, possessed a 'corporatist consciousness'. The selection of the term 'corporatist' is used to suggest a narrow, short-term focus of thought and action on the acquisition of material benefits through participation with capitalists in a shared economic development.

As a consequence of the economic realities

of the industry's 'productivity crisis' and the way in which it was politically manipulated by the federal state, a class compromisal action developed. In the case of the South Side, the recomposition of miners' class action--from struggle to compromise--embodied the transformation of the miners' consciousness and formal political activity. With the changing economic realities, the 'conciliatory' right and 'recomposed' left wing of trade union and formal politics re-emerged --through a process of struggle in post 1926 years-- and acquired leadership.

With this process was the further division of economic and political interests and the establishment of social democratic reformism. In this regard:

The tenacity^a of working class 'economism', however, derives precisely from its correspondence to the realities of capitalism and the ways in which capitalist appropriation and exploitation actually do divide the arenas of economic and political action, and actually do transform certain essential political issues--struggles over domination and exploitation that historically have been inextricably bound up with political power--into distinctively 'economic' issues.

(Wood, 1981:67)

Apart from trade union and formal politics, the 'productivity crisis' also had implications on the social organization of the workplace.

From 1948 to 1951, what had been dreamed about by Domco engineers since the first decade of the 1900s

finally became a reality--the introduction of mechanical loading. Previously, mechanical loading had not been introduced for a complex number of factors which involved labour, geology and economics (see Schwartzman, 1953:223-228, 257-262 for a discussion of financial factors).

In 1946, American mechanization experts conducted feasibility studies in Domco's mines. Domco's report noted (1946:1-2) that since 1938, when mechanization was resisted:

the loading of coal by mechanical means has been given wide publicity in the press and elsewhere, and there is now a growing realization on the part of mining labor that mechanical loading is necessary where possible of accomplishment, not only to lighten their labours, but to enable the industry in Nova Scotia to survive, and if necessary, expand.

Elsewhere similar comments were echoed (see Gray, 1945; Mifflen, 1944; Cameron, 1944). The report cited as key the following comments made by the U.S. experts:

We believe that there are very definite possibilities for increased productivity by increased measure of mechanization. This possibility is, of course, largely contingent upon labour's attitude.

As previously stressed and illustrated, "labour's attitude" towards mechanization had changed since 1938.

The workplace of 1949 was an 'accommodating', not 'contested' terrain. During 1947, District 26 executive negotiated the rates of pay for mechanized mining (U.M.W.A., 1948).

Based on 1939 production figures the report estimated \$3,748,000, over a five-year period, was required to mechanically load 40% of all coal produced. These figures discussed the mechanization of the room and pillar system only. Out of the total expenditure, \$2,248,000 was required for machinery and \$1.5 million for a centrally located wash plant to clean the mechanically loaded coal.

In 1949, Domco received a \$7.5 million loan from the federal government, under the recently passed "Maritime Coal Production Assistance Act", which largely financed the mechanization of the mines.³⁴

On November 29, 1948, electrical mechanized loading of the room and pillar method began at No. 20--the site of resistance in 1938. The significance of mechanized loading was that it 'freed' production from the limitations that were imposed by manual loading and thus allowed the coal cutting machines to realize their potential. In addition, an organizational basis on which to fully fragment and co-ordinate various elements in the cycle of mining was established.

Generally speaking, coal was cut with a Sullivan 7B cutter and then loaded by a 8BU Joy loader and transferred upon a series of conveyors. The loader and cutter constituted a unit and were responsible for the ongoing production of five rooms. The machinery

was trackless, and transported from room to room on a Joy caterpillar T2 truck.

Under this system of mining all working done in the 5 rooms was completely fragmented; with each worker(s) responsible for a specific task. Generally speaking, the new division of labour was:

Loader Operators	2
Cutter Operators	2
Borers	2
Shiftmen	2
Mechanic/electrician	1
Shotfirer	1
Overman	1
Total:	11

As each worker(s) was responsible for a different moment in the cycle of production the constant working of five rooms was co-ordinated, and controlled by the overman. (See DOSCO, 1949a:21-25, 1949b; Naish, 1977a).

In the longwall method, the introduction of a mechanized loading system was more problematic given the nature of this system. In addition, the problem was intensified by the fact that the required technology was not available as longwall operations did not exist in Western Canada or the U.S.

In the U.S., the Joy Manufacturing Company

had created a "continuous miner" which cut and loaded coal in a simultaneous operation without the aid of drilling and blasting. The machine, however, was for room and pillar mining and could not be adapted for longwall. In 1949, Domco began to create its own longwall continuous miner--the DOSCO Miner--with the aid of Joy. This independent invention, by a single company faced with its peculiar production problem, was extremely unique in the coal industry. While the DOSCO Miner has been criticized for being 'mechanically awkward', its introduction was highly significant for it illustrated, in dramatic fashion, the way in which Science was appropriated by Capital in its attempts to increase production and indirectly subordinate Labour (see Braverman, 1974:chapter 7; Edwards, 1979:chapter 7). Through this active process, DOSCO had resolved its last productivity problem. The workplace was, to use a phrase common amongst engineers, "revolutionized". In March 1949, the first DOSCO Miner was tested. By 1951, 13 more were manufactured and Miner began its regular use in the pit (Naish, 1977:4-8; Frost, 1952:3-16; DOSCO, 1951:7).

The Miner was electrically powered and consisted of a jib which was comprised of a number of cutting chains running parallel to one another. The jib protruded

into the coal face and was slowly raised--from the floor to the roof of the seam--cutting the coal in the process. The face was cut 4½ feet deep--the width of the jib. Upon the completion of a cut (from floor to roof) the machine was moved further along the face on its caterpillar treads.

The key innovation in longwall mining under a DOSCO Miner was the elimination of all drilling, blasting and handloading tasks. While the manual work of 'crib work' remained, the army of handloaders was completely replaced by the Miner's crew. It was estimated that this new method required only 57% of the man power necessary under the handloading system (Doxey, 1953b: 17-18). Like the previous handloading system, shift work was required. Unlike the previous mode, the system had two production shifts; during which the coal was cut, roof supports, conveyors and cables were all advanced. In the third shift, necessary repairs and construction to the work area and machines were undertaken. (Doxey, 1953b; DOSCO, 1949a:25-30; Naish, 1977b:4; Doxey, 1957:14)

On the following page is a typical division of labour:

FORCE REQUIRED FOR DOSCO MINER LONGWALL

	SHIFTS			
	DAY	NIGHT	BACK	TOTAL
Face Crew:				
Miner Operator	1	1	0	2
Asst. Operator (move cables)	1	1	0	2
Face Supporters	4	4	0	8
Operating Crew:				
Moving Conveyors	4	4	0	8
Moving Cables and Water Lines	3	3	0	6
Loader Operator	2	2	0	4
Mechanic	1	1	1	3
Electrician	1	1	1	3
Face Crew:				
Draw, Props, Building Packs	14	14	0	28
Support Machine Turning	2	2	0	4
Brushers	0	0	6	6
Back Brushers	0	0	4	4
Road Makers	0	0	2	2
Haulage Crew:				
Main Landing	2	2	1	5
Deisel Operators	1	1	1	3
Brake Men	1	1	0	2
Filling Station Repair	1	0	0	1
Overmen	1	1	0	2
Shotfirer for Roadway Brushing	0	0	1	1
TOTAL:				94

(Source: DOSCO, 1949A:28)

With these technological innovations, in both longwall and room and pillar, a fundamental shift from hand to mechanical power was established. As Doxey (1935b) noted, it was probable that coal was now cut, loaded, and hauled up to the ~~the~~ surface without ever being touched by a human hand.

Following the introduction of a fully mechanized labour process in 1948 and 1951, an uneven reorganization occurred amongst Domco pits. In 1951 only 6.1% of production was mechanized. By 1956 that figure rose to 54% and continued to increase (Doxey, 1959:9).

Organizationally the innovation meant the subordination of Labour by Capital and the loss of real control by the miners over production. Perhaps the best expression of this fundamental transformation was the abolition of the piecerate. The piecerate--as has been illustrated--was a social institution which allowed for capital to guarantee production in a labour process which excluded its direct participation. The maintenance of the piecerate was in this sense an expression of Capital's lack of real control in the regulation of production. With the subordination of Labour by Capital, the piecerate was abolished and all mine work --even at the face--was paid by a datal rate. While this process did express a major victory for Domco

at the point of production, this thesis in no way suggests that management completely acquired total real control over the labour process. The miners would always, even up to present day, retain a significant amount of control in the regulation of the labour process. However, a key shift in control was won by management with the reorganization of Domco's 1948-1951 labour process (see DOSCO, 1948, "The Art of Supervision...").

Implicit in this reorganization was also the destruction of a tradition of work that had remained relatively unchanged since the turn of the century. With the reorganization of the labour process (through the destruction of independent work areas and hours) and the valorization process (through the replacement of a daily rate for piece rates) was the general destruction of a workplace culture that promoted a sense of independence. While a "collective mentality" would still be retained through the sharing of the mine's dangers, the strong sense of independence which the miner experienced and fetishized through the isolated nature of his work and method of pay was significantly altered. The miners who entered the Domco pits of the 1950s entered a world different than the one previously encountered by their fathers and grandfathers.

The period of 1926-1951 was a period in which the South Side miners were recomposed from an

'alternative' to 'oppositional force.'

Framed within a shrinking and more competitive national coal market, this recomposition was significantly influenced by fundamental transformations at the four key institutional sites of action and experience.

Within the realm of formal working class politics the C.P.C.'s effectiveness was disseminated through a division within the party and struggle with a powerfully emerging social democratic party. With the subsequent rise of this 'oppositional party' was the elimination of a real alternative formal political option in South Side politics.

In the trade union, the radical left--again as an 'alternative' form of action and thought--was also effectively eliminated by right wing/'recomposed' left wing forces. Upon their defeat was the emergence of a more conciliatory and economistic type of trade unionism. Thus, the organizational and ideological establishment of a type of trade unionism that was in struggle with a radical left wing since 1922. The last breath of the possibility of the radical left was sighed during the the 1950 District 26 election. During that election Bob Stewart, former A.M.W. activist, and C.P.C. member, unsuccessfully attempted to run against Jenkins. While it appeared Stewart had majority support

amongst the miners. Jenkins--through a series of manoeuvres--declared Stewart ineligible. On voting day Jenkins won by acclamation (MacEwan, 1976:282-283). ³⁵

The logic of state intervention into industrial relations--and the unions' interaction with the system--also underwent a fundamental shift. Unlike 1925, labour disputes were effectively contained through legislative means. Generally speaking, the union was contained through a network of labour legislation. With a brief moment during 1941 the union did not seriously struggle against, question, or refuse the legal intervention of the state.

Within the workplace, a fundamental shift in ³the real control of the workplace was acquired by Domco when the workplace was reorganized through technological innovation. During 1948 and 1951 the South Side miners lost their effective control in the regulation of production.

Combined, these institutional changes--within the reciprocally influencing economic, political and ideological realities--were significantly influential in recomposing the consciousness and action of South Side miners. Situated within a deepening crisis in the industry, the miners' activity was increasingly one of compromise and less of struggle. Mediating

these developments was the uneven recomposition of thought, from a 'class' to 'corporatist' consciousness.

Confronted with the historical development of a deepening coal industry crisis--which embodied political, ideological and economic dimensions--the South Side miners were faced with the historical dilemma of struggle or compromise. Given the historical nature of the conjuncture, the latter option became the reality.

If consent is "manufactured" (to simultaneously use Burawoy's unfortunate term and stand it on its head) it is a process that is not confined to the social activity that occurs within the colliery gates. The fundamental essence of compromise or consent--or any other type of class action--is economic. While ideological forces are implicit, the basis of consent is economic. The "productivity crisis" which the state, Domco and South Side miners were finally forced to confront found, what Przeworski (1980a, 1980b, 1982) theoretically refers to as "the material basis of consent". Throughout this period the miners increasingly acted and thought in more conciliatory and accommodating ways in order to secure the future of their employment. Reform, not open frontal attacks, was the class action of the period.

At a much more broader level of analysis, the

recomposition of class forces can be conceived of as a "passive revolution". Unfortunately such a discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis for greater, more intense, focus of other institutional sites--the church, school system, family, media--is required. What did the elimination of a working class press, the rise of the welfare state, the increased enrollment in school as opposed to the pit, the Antigonish Movement, and the impact on the family of 24 hour shift work, the loss company housing and stores, have on the reworking of class relations? If the transformation of class relations based on the CMLP is to be understood fully these areas must also be investigated.

It was during this period that the reformist activity and thought--the re-emergence of an oppositional force--was established (see Sassoon, 1982b for a discussion on the relationship of reform and passive revolution). In order to avoid accusations of being 'teleological', this thesis does not claim that from 1951 onward a steadily declining power amongst miners was inevitable. It simply argues that by 1951 key institutional transformations which contributed to the structuring of a less challenging power were established. With the luxury of retrospect it can be seen that these economic, political and ideological trends

did in fact deepen.

In 1968, the Cape Breton coal industry--a product of accumulating crisis--was ironically taken over by the federal state through the Cape Breton Development Corporation (DEVCO). Accompanying this economic reorganization was the massive 'phase-out' of collieries. While the mandate of DEVCO was to foster economic growth and employment, the number of South Side miners employed was reduced by over half.

Contributing to this process was increased technological innovation. In the late 1960s the army of men required to do roof support work was replaced by a series of hydraulic supports which advanced themselves mechanically. In addition, the more powerful Anderson Shearer replaced the DOSCO Miner and allowed for a more compact conveyor system.

In 1956, Caledonia local of District 26 passed a motion which allowed it to drop its C.C.F. affiliation. In 1956 Cunningham lost his provincial seat while Gillis was defeated in 1957.

Upon the 1950 District elections Jenkins was accompanied by three new members who "long have been fighters against left-wingers and Communist party-liners in Cape Breton labour" (MacEwan 1976:285 quoting Jenkins in Sydney Post Record, August 21, 1951). In 1954 Jenkins

was defeated by Tom McLachlan, the son of J. B. McLachlan. Unlike his father, he was not a radical or communist party member.

The next District strike was 34 years later in 1981.

NOTES

1. It is interesting to note the different perspectives on Wolvin's resignation and BESCO's departure. At his final meeting as Domco president, the BESCO board of directors noted:

. . . . The Directors desire to express their regret that M. Wolvin after nearly nine years . . . should retire from active participation in the direction of their affairs.

During his tenancy of office Mr. Wolvin has had almost constantly to cope with adverse conditions of one sort or another against which he has made a gallant fight, never relaxing his efforts to maintain the integrity of the companies which he had succeeded in bringing within the scope of the Corporation.

In his administration of their affairs he has exhibited marked business ability, keen foresight and undaunted faith. . . .

The Directors desire to express their appreciation of Mr. Wolvin's qualities as an administrator of large affairs and of his patience and courtesy in conducting the business of this board. . . .

(Minutes, Dominion Coal Company, February 2, 1928)

While the BESCO directors were praising Wolvin's keen administrative talent, Dawn Fraser--the popular Glace Bay poet--had this to say:

"Cape Breton's Curse, Adieu, Adieu"

The Bosses couldn't stand the gaff -
Oh, let me write their epitaph!
Let's see, now - how should I begin?
Here lies a monster, born of sin,
Of sin, corruption, fraud, and worse -
Adieu, Adieu, Cape Breton's curse

(continued on following page)

Since that black day when first your hand
Grasped in its evil clutch our land,
Like some fat leech you played your part
To suck the life-blood from our heart,
Bred famine, riot, murder too -
Cape Breton's curse, adieu, adieu.

'Twas no avenger laid you low,
Your end was painful, sure and slow;
Ah, filthy monster, now confess,
You died of your own rottenness.
May Satan's imps attend your hearse -
Adieu, adieu, Cape Breton's curse.

(Fraser, 1978:84-85)

2. This clause was in effect from April 1, 1927 to March 31, 1929 and emerged from the International U.M.W.A. convention of 1927. As the regulations of the U.M.W.A. exist only within the time span between conventions, the failure to re-introduce the clause accounted for its short, but significant life.

3. The International U.M.W.A. was experiencing a crisis of its own. At that time the International possessed \$185,000 and saw its membership of bituminous miners drop from 450,000 to 200,000.

(Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:163)

4. The Report was rejected provincially by a margin of slightly more than 1,000 votes. Within the South Side, however, the Report was rejected by a vote of 4,626 (Glace Bay Gazette, March 22, 1932 cited in Earle, 1984:66; see also MacEwan, 1976:164; Wade, 1950)

A couple of days prior to the vote, Premier Harrington announced to the media that he had acquired a 'million-ton' coal order which would enable continued production at the 4 pits to be closed. This manoeuvre was known as "Harrington's Hoax" and the coal order later proved unfounded (see MacEwan, 1976:163-164).

5. In May, 1932, the rank and file voted acceptance of the wage cut. The question--"Are you in favour of the proposed wage agreement in preference to a strike?" (Sydney Post, May 26, 1932 in MacEwan, 1976:165)--was formed in a somewhat peculiar fashion. Provincially, the miners voted 5,198 to 1,598 in favour of accepting a wage cut over the only remaining option of a strike. During the vote, No. 11, 1-B, and Phalen locals in the South Side were banned from voting as they were no longer paying dues to the District. However, their combined vote would still not have been able to change the decision (see Wade, 1950; Earle, 1984:69; MacEwan, 1976:165; White, 1977:58).
6. No. 14 and Thorburn, on the mainland were closed. In New Waterford's case, 140 foreign-born miners and families were deported back to their original countries; with provincial and federal governments, and Dosco paying expenses. This move further contributed to a growing resentment towards U.M.W.A. executive who had not opposed the plan (Halifax Chronicle Herald, May 9, 1932 in McKnight, 1932:20).

While No. 14 was closed, most of its workforce was double-shifted amongst remaining pits and New Waterford did not suffer the full social consequences of a pit closure (Wade, 1950).
7. The 'second' Amalgamated was strategically named in reference to the A.M.W. of 1917-1919 years, which had preceeded the U.M.W.A. District 26.
8. Based on the results of affiliation votes taken at the U.M.W.A. locals during the summer of 1932, Wade (1950) compiled the following, using the Glace Bay Gazette and Nova Scotia Miner as sources.

	<u>AMALGAMATED</u>	<u>U.M.W.</u>	<u>APPROX.</u> <u>MEMBERSHIP</u>
<u>SYDNEY MINES</u>			
Florence (July)	422	61	894
Princess (August)	591	59	700
<u>Glacé Bay</u>			
Victory (No.24, July)	262	86	425
Caledonia (NO.4, July)	328	169	600
Mechanics (July)	195	49	?
*Plus 4 Locals (June)	?	?	3400
<u>NEW WATERFORD</u>			
No.12 (August)	482	50	781
No.16 (September)	107	29	700
<u>STELLARTON</u> (September)	557	92	900
<u>INVERNESS</u> (September)	480	2	500
<u>OTHERS</u>	-----NO VOTE-----		

*The '4 locals' were the founding locals of Phalen, 1-B, Reserve and No.11. Of note are the small proportion of votes cast in New Waterford and the unknown number of A.M.W. or U.M.W. supporters in the four founding locals. For a discussion of the pit by pit voting see Earle (1984:71-85).

9. The W.U.L. was formed in January 1930 in order to create communist unions outside the established ~~Trades and Labour Congress (T.L.C.) and All Canadian Congress of Labour (A.C.C.L.)~~. The directive for this manoeuvre came from Comintern and was not a product of Toronto--the C.P.C. headquarters (Avakumovic, 1975:73).

The basis of this strategy lie in the Comintern's belief that world capitalism was entering a stage of crises which presented revolutionary possibilities during which "the socialist parties would act as the 'last reserve' of the old order" (Avakumovic, 1975:54). The decision to now organize outside of the existing parties and unions in contrast from--the 'boring from within' tactics, as had been previously done--was made in 1928 (Avakumovic, 1975:chapter 2).

In the Canadian context this meant attacking the T.L.C. and A.C.C.L., as well as the C.C.F., on the grounds of being 'class collaborators', 'labour fakers', and 'social fascists', etc. (Avakumovic, 1975:68-69).

In the South Side context there was always a degree of autonomy and tension between Toronto and South Side C.P.C. For example, the formation of the P.M.U. had occurred prior to the official shift in tactics. The South Side communists had traditionally based their strategies on the immediate realities of the area over the directives of Toronto or Moscow (see White, 1977:48).

While the A.M.W.'s emergence was partly a product of the local C.P.C.'s influence, the degree to which Toronto was influential is a point of debate. Aside from Wade (1950), Logan (1948) and MacEwan (1976), the reader should refer to two scholarly works--Earle (1984, in particular page 20) and White (1977, in particular page 51) for two somewhat contrasting positions.

10. This methodological question is somewhat complex given the dynamics of the A.M.W. and the nature of the C.P.C.

In 1931 leading C.P.C. members were arrested and convicted in Ontario thus making the Party illegal and contributing to the secrecy of membership. Furthermore, membership to the C.P.C. was select and not all those who supported the party were members. Thus it is difficult, for methodological purposes, to establish 1) which leaders were representatives of the party, and therefore 2) what was the extent of support for these leaders.

Understood within the realities of the A.M.W.'s emergence and decline, the problem becomes even more difficult given the 'anti-communist' presence within the union. While both communist and non-communist followers entered and left the A.M.W. at approximately the same period, they did so on somewhat different agendas and trajectories (the latter following the new party line of creating a "Popular Front" against world fascism established in 1935). Thus, while the factions within the A.M.U. began to split, one group did not move

away from the other and consequently revealed the extent of representation. Instead, as will be seen, both groups stamped back into the U.M.W.A. Given this, it seems many of the actions of the A.M.W.--such as the tabling of the motion, to affiliate within the W.U.L.--are susceptible to a 'dual reading' which can sustain an argument that one group had more influence than the other.

11. In November, 1932, Premier Harrington attempted to meet with Morrison and John Alex MacDonald, but was unsuccessful when the A.M.W. demanded all executive members present. During this period the A.M.W. requested a government organized referendum (see Earle, 1984:153-154).

12. It is not known if this was a conscious strategy on DOSCO's part in order to counteract the failure of all mines identified in the reallocation to be closed. (see Earle, 1984:107 n.88)

13. Premier Harrington made arrangements to pay the receivers \$30,000 towards the \$300,000 debt of Scotia Steel. As a consequence the wage reduction was redefined to one that averaged 15%. On June 16, North Side miners voted 912 to 400 to go back to work (Earle, 1985:170).

14. That republic has lost nothing but the semblance of respectability. Presentday France was contained in a finished state within the parliamentary republic. It only required a bayonet thrust for the bubble to burst and the monster to spring forth before our eyes.

Why did the Paris proletariat not rise in revolt after December '22? The overthrow of the bourgeoisie had as yet been only decreed; the decree had not been carried out. Any serious insurrection of the proletariat would at once have put fresh life into the bourgeoisie, would have reconciled it with the army and ensured a second June defeat for the workers.

(Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 1977:167-168)

15. According to regulations, the vote was to be held on one day only. At the end of this day the provincial vote was 5,058 to 3,520 in the A.M.W.'s favour. The voting was kept open for another day and the U.M.W.A. acquired an advantage.

Following this, the A.M.W. protested and received an injunction. However, it was subsequently turned over by the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (see MacEwan, 1976:179; Earle, 1984:224; White, 1977:105).

16. Following the 'party line' of the Seventh Congress, the C.P.C. abolished the W.U.L. and affiliated with the T.L.C. (which was affiliated with American Federation of Labour; AFL).

Accompanying this development, but from a totally different trajectory, was the formation of the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) in 1935 in the U.S. The CIO, distinguished from the AFL by its strategy to organize industrial workers, was led by John L. Lewis within the favorable political context of the 'New Deal'.

Initially the CIO did not attempt to organize Canadian industrial workers. These workers were initially organized by Canadians--many former W.U.L. men. With the unionization of DOSCO steelworkers in 1937, the CIO entered into Canada. By 1936, the major unions were the U.M.W.A., Steelworkers Organizing Committee (SWOC), and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers (see Abella, 1973:1-6).

It is important to note, however, that the application for SWOC membership had been made by Sydney steelworkers who were previously organized by leadership which had been C.P.C. influenced. In 1937, Silby Barrett was appointed SWOC director for Canada (see MacEwan, 1976:207-212).

17. McLachlan resigned in protest to the C.P.C.'s "People's Front" strategy of re-aligning with social democratic organizations. In chapter 14, "The Last Days of J. B. McLachlan", MacEwan (1976) exorcises the evil demon of communism from McLachlan and transforms him into a social democrat and CCF

supporter: If anything, his resignation would suggest the opposite political dynamic. McLachlan's resignation was in protest to the authority of the Toronto C.P.C. and their attempt to re-align --a manoeuvre of class compromise, or class collaboration--and move away from independent communist activity. In this sense McLachlan remained distinct from the C.C.F., and the U.M.W.A. in general, by refusing to join fellow C.P.C. members. See also Earle (1984:127, n.25,144) for a significant contribution to this highly contentious issue.

18. "At the time of the first World War", Frank (1979: 80-81) notes that Catholicism was the predominant religion in the South Side and accounted for 77.6% of religious affiliation in Reserve, 70.5% in Dominion, 68.7% in New Waterford and 49.9% in Glace Bay. The Catholic Church was established in Glace Bay in the 1860s and about 1908 in New Waterford (Frank, 1979:95).

During periods of class conflict the church, generally speaking, supported the dominant power. The most blatant example of this has already been noted with reference to a 1909 parade that was stopped by soldiers who had mounted a machine gun on the steps of a local church. Most actions, however, took the form of anti-communist church sermons and lack of support for the striking miners (see Frank, 1979:95-100).

In 1909, one church composed of a large P.W.A. congregation was known as the 'scab' church. In another, a P.W.A. man, responsible for collection resigned his duties given that the predominantly U.M.W.A. congregation refused to make donations. At another church, Father James Fraser was transferred by the bishop when the manager of No.2 colliery protested the housing of evicted U.M.W.A. families (Frank, 1979:97).

By the 1920s the church reached "a low ebb among the coal miners" (Frank, 1979:98).

During the class struggle of the 1920s the Catholic paper--the Antigonish Casket, took an anti-communist stance and noted "Let us hear no more of the Red International, or of any alliance

between Sovietism and Canadianism. The two things will mix no more than oil and water" (Casket, April 13, 1923, cited in MacGillivray, 1971:100).

Simultaneous to the developments of the early 1920s, but framed within the broader economic realities which sustained the class struggle, were political developments within the Roman Catholic Diocese of Antigonish (which covered Eastern Nova Scotia). This period saw the emergence of a new position and action towards working people--largely personified by Fathers Moses Coady and J. J. Tompkins who were highly influenced by Pope Leo's encyclicals. By the early 1930s the church's actions towards miners, steelworkers, fishermen and farmers were significantly altered through the introduction of marketing, producer and consumer oriented co-operatives.

In 1932 an extension department of Saint Francis Xavier University was established in Glace Bay and credit unions, stores and housing projects soon followed in the South Side (see Sacouman, 1979a, 1979b and 1976). Implicit in this development was the maintenance of democracy and a collectiveness mediated by an anti-communist yet anti-capitalist set of ideas.

19. In the 1938 provincial by-election the results were: MacDonald (C.C.F.) 3,093, MacKinnon (Liberal) 2,614, Stephenson (independent Liberal) 1,229. During this election the Tories did not nominate a candidate and chose not to oppose the government during the commencement of World War II.

In the 1939 federal election Gillis received 11,582 votes, followed by Hartigan (Liberal), 11,364, and Nunn (Conservative), 9,719.

During the 1940 provincial election the results for Cape Breton were C.C.F. (3,819), Liberal (2,210), and Conservative (1,167). In Cape Breton East they were C.C.F. (6,191) and Liberal (4,049).

In the 1945 federal election Gillis won 14,103, Liberals (9,517), Conservatives (6,898), and Maddin Labour-Progressive (C.P.C.) received 854 votes. Provincially, Cunningham won Cape Breton East with 5,226 votes while the Liberals received 2,703 and the Tories 995.

20. In its infancy No.20 colliery was originally named No.9. The name was changed in June, 1938 (see Sydney Post, June 9, 1938). No.20 was, at that stage, being developed to work the 'Harbour seam', was located 400 feet above No.2 workings. The engineering of this mine, in keeping with the 'reallocation plan', attempted to work coal along the shore line and share main haulage ways with No.2 in order to economize.

The choice of No.20 was for geological reasons. Obviously the decision did not consider the disposition of the miners as miners were from one of the militant locals--the Phalen local.

21. Given that South Side pits were gaseous the increased dangers presented with electrification, relative to compressed air, were a constant point of concern.

22. On January 30, the Phalen local decided that all 'locked out' miners would return to work before any new men were hired. On February 1, Domco offered the miners 70.6¢/ton as a basic contract rate. Phalen members refused the offer and attempted, unsuccessfully, to acquire a substantially better rate. The stand-off continued until May 4, 1939 when rates similar to the ones initially proposed were accepted by a 796 to 331 margin. On May 11, 1939, production--using radial cutting machines--resumed (Sydney Post, January 30, February 2, March 20, May 4, 5, 11, 1939).

23. There are two types of longwall--'advancing' and 'retreating'. In advancing, a seam of coal is mined and accompanying roadways and tunnels are mined and constructed as the mine progresses towards greater depths. In retreating, the necessary roadways and tunnels are driven to a specified distance. Then the mining of coal is undertaken at the point at which the development work stopped--working back to the original point of the mine's entry.

The length of the face--like all aspects of longwall mining--were developed over a series of 'cut and trials', time studies, and analysis

throughout the system's development. Initially the first mechanically cut faces were composed of two 250 foot faces worked side by side with individual haulage points (see Doxey 1953b:3-6; McCall, 1936:472).

24. Prior to this, the negotiations for the 1939 contract had been badly handled by District executive. In 1933, when the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Corporation went into receivership province wide negotiations between DOSCO and District 26 fragmented into smaller bargaining units--along company lines. When receivership ended in August, 1930, District 26 attempted to regain province wide rates but DOSCO refused. As a consequence Acadia Coal Company and Old Sydney Colliery (formerly the North Side mines in 1938) miners were working at rates below Domco's and had been without a contract since 1933 (see Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:225).

On August 22, 1939, a poorly negotiated contract was rejected by referendum. Consequently, the U.M.W.A. applied for a conciliation board--the MacTague board--which was appointed in January, 1940. In March the Board dissolved rents and coal payments owed by miners since February 1, proposed very small wage increases and recommended that miners be prohibited from voting on the contract. The small increases were justified on the companies ability to pay and the Board noted, "Labour is entitled to a fair living wage on advancing standards consistent with the ability of the particular industry to pay" (Labour Gazette, 1940:322 cited in Wade, 1950). As Wade (1950) illustrates, the MacTague board's understanding of DOSCO's ability to pay was confused. MacTague cited \$190,000 profits available for wage increases in 1939. In fact, profits after depreciation, but before any payments to security holders were roughly \$1,300,000. A 5% wage increase would have required \$600,000 thus leaving \$7,000,000 --the actual amount paid to bond and preferred shareholders in 1939. MacTague's proposed increases amounted to \$150,000. Furthermore, in passing this increase MacTague stressed it was undertaken "largely at the expense of common shareholders who had no dividends since 1923". As Wade (1950)

notes, all common shares were held by DOSCO.

The MacTague board recommendations, along with its respective counterparts for the North Side and Acadia Coal, were all rejected by a split District executive. At the August 26 - September 6 District Convention, the MacTague Report, and a call to put its findings before a referendum were rejected. A policy committee report calling for a work stoppage if a province-wide contract could not be secured, was ruled out of order by D. W. Morrison. In the end a motion to ask for U.M.W.A. International guidance prior to a strike vote was passed. (Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:228)

On October 15, 1940, the right-wing members (consisting of Morrison, P. G. Muise, A. A. McKay, and Silby Barrett) were re-elected by a narrow margin. Upon their victory the MacTague award was placed before a vote--in contradiction to what was established at the convention. The award was accepted by a narrow margin provincially (3,609 to 2,765). In the South Side, Phalen locals refused to vote--as did the North Side miners. The remaining locals voted against (2,695 to 1,603) while the New Waterford locals voted against (1,029 to 556). The contract was finally ratified but expired on January 31, 1941. (Wade, 1950; Wade, 1976:229)

25. The 1937 Trade Union Act of Nova Scotia was the first provincial legislation of its time in Canada. It arose within the immediate realities of DOSCO's steelworkers attempting to organize as SWOC members and collectively bargain with the corporation. The initial drafting of the bill was undertaken by steel worker activists and based on the Coal Mines Regulations Act in the midsts of an upcoming election.

Upon receipt of the steelworkers request by Liberal Premier A. L. MacDonald, the Opposition Party presented "An Act Respecting the Rights of Employees to Organize" in an attempt to upstage the Government. On April 17, 1937, the bill, now amended, was passed and the rights of the trade unions to collective bargaining became established (see MacLean, 1979:53-68; Wade, 1950; MacEwan, 1976:210-212).

At one and the same time the 1937 legislation gave and defined workers' rights. While the emergence of the Trade Union Act was a real victory for workers--as they were now able to maintain an organization without coercive harassment--the state attempted to restrict their potential power and ensure they would act in a "lawful manner". At the point of the bill's introduction, there was the fear by the dominant forces of 'what might happen' if the workers were, or were not, granted these rights. Implicit in the process was an attempt by politicians and capitalists, and even members of factions of the working class to define the nature of the 'new' trade unionism. Often the active participation of trade unionists to mediate the incorporation of workers' power is ignored in discussions of labour legislation.

Perhaps a clear example of this process can be found on April 13, 1937, when trade unionists and businessmen met government officials. One trade unionist--George MacEachern--a steelworker activist and C.P.C. member warned of an impending strike should the legislation be rejected (Halifax Herald, April 14, 1937 cited in MacLean, 1939:57). Silby Barrett, C.C.F. member and John L. Lewis, 'right-hand man' in Canada noted:

The most fertile field for Bolshevism is where the workers are not permitted to organize. Go into Minto, New Brunswick, and you'll find more Bolsheviks than anywhere in Nova Scotia because of the conditions under which men are compelled to work. (Halifax Herald, April 14, 1937 cited in MacLean, 1939:57)

26. As previously noted the I.D.I.A. was declared 'ultra vires' in the midsts of the 1925 stike and replaced by the Industrial Peace Bill. In 1926 the province then allowed the I.D.I.A. to be applicable in the jurisdictions it had previously been responsible for (see Canada, 1946:293-294; Logan, 1948; MacLean, 1979:49-50).

In 1944 the I.D.I.A. were incorporated within the Dominion Wartime Labour Relations (N.S.) Act established in 1944. With the formation of the Wartime Labour Relations Boards across Canadian

provinces, the Wartime Labour Relations legislation was administered. (see MacLean, 1979:80-81; Canada, 1946:294)

Within the unique context of the Canadian economy during the war, Canadian Labour became increasingly militant in its demands for a better standard of living and trade union rights, similar to those acquired in the U.S. 'Wagner Act' of 1935. In Canada, as a whole, union membership increased from 359,000 to 832,000 from 1939 to 1946. (MacDowell, 1978:176). In Nova Scotia the figures in membership were 18,182 in 1936 and 41,982 in 1943 (MacLean, 1979:50). Both provincially and federally, strike days reached near unprecedented highs.

During these developments the federal state was extremely reluctant in establishing legal rights for collective bargaining. As Pentland (1979:19) notes, "It is sad but true that Canadian employers as a group--and Canadian governments--have never taken a forward step in industrial relations by intelligent choice, but have always had to be battered into it."

Only as a consequence of explosive strikes --most notably the Kirkland Lake strike of 1942, the steel strike of 1943, and the increasing threat of a massive C.C.F. breakthrough, did the federal state introduce P.C. 1003. P.C. 1003 guaranteed the right to organize collectively, be recognized, and bargain collectively (see MacDowell, 1979:194; Webber, 1985:57).

As MacDowell (1979) stresses, these rights were not only won--through a process of struggle --but also defended when the state later attempted to revoke the protective legislation. In 1947, with the ending of the National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, P.C. 1003's rights were incorporated within the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act in 1948 (see Panitch and Swartz, 1984 for a discussion of this process and its impact in relation to present day legislation).

27. At the rally, miners spoke below a banner which read "DOWN WITH HITLER AND SILBY BARRETT".

The 13 men were allowed to continue working but could not vote or participate in union affairs. Most of these men were activists at the local level. Their resignations were refused by their respective locals (MacEwan, 1976:234).

28. Following the election, the right wing attempted to preserve their power. While P. G. Muise left his office MacKay, Morrison and Barrett tried to remain. MacKay was appointed as chairman of a DOSCO industrial relations board; Morrison was appointed, by Lewis, as "Special Representative of the International President in District 26"; Barrett argued that his term of office did not expire until April 1, 1943. Following the 'termination' of Barrett's post in April, he was subsequently appointed "International Representative of the U.M.W.A. of Canada" (see MacEwan, 1976:235-236).

29. A key factor in the reduced production was a decline in the number of skilled miners working at the face. This had been a 'problem' throughout the entire period and was a consequence of high enlistment and low contract rates. In 1943 there were 774 less face men than 1939. (see MacEwan, 1976:267)

30. This was the same Carroll that chaired the conciliation board in February, 1947 and ran against J. B. McLachlan in the 1921 federal election.

31. In May 1946 there were 4,100 unemployed. By May 1947 the number rose to about 10,000 (see MacEwan, 1976:258). In 1947 the federal Department of Labour relocated, or (to use MacEwan's--1976:258 --term) deported, 2,642 Nova Scotians. Out of that number, 1,627 were from Cape Breton.

During a Parliamentary debate Minister of Labour, Mitchell, accepted Clarie Gillis's challenge to transfer 2,200 Cape Breton veterans who were jobless to areas of employment. Upon his acceptance the Phalen local wired Mitchell stating that the offer was not applicable to 'temporarily unemployed workers' (see Halifax Herald, April 18, 19, 1947).

32. The provincial Minister of Mines, Michael Dwyer, attempted at least on one occasion, 'red bait' the District executive. He noted, "Communist ideas are being instilled into the minds of the workmen in all parts of Nova Scotia. . . . There would be no strikes if there were proper leaders, not men who are working for someone in Moscow, and if we don't do something about it, some day we will be working for a Russian boss". (Evening News, March 27, 1947).

33. Some stores were sold while others--like the one at New Waterford were leased to the T. Eaton Company. During the war all houses were sold off--usually to the mining families who had lived in them.

On September 18, 1928 and October 22, 1931, the Domco land used as streets was transferred to the towns of Glace Bay and New Waterford respectively.

34. As MacEwan notes (1976:286) payment of \$4.5 million plus interest was still outstanding when the company was taken over by the federal state in 1968.

35. Stewart was fired by Domco during a February 1950 work stoppage at Caledonia pit. On February 21, Jenkins vetoed District board motion to establish a relief fund for Stewart. On March 18, Jenkins verbally announced Stewart was no longer a union member.

On May 1, Stewart was declared ineligible to run in upcoming elections. During this period he was acquiring a substantial following. On June 2, election day, Jenkins was the only nominee while Stewart's nomination papers were "destroyed" (see MacEwan, 1976:280).

SUMMARY

With reference to South Side miners' power and the balance of class forces from pre 1879 to 1951, this thesis has focused on key developments in; the workplace, trade union, state intervention into industrial relations and formal politics.

As illustrated, the history of the South Side miners' power and balance of class forces has been dynamic. From the pre 1879 to 1925 period the miners' ability to threaten and challenge the effective dominance of the state and Domco increased or 'rose'. From 1926 to 1951 the potential of the miners to actively challenge the dominant forces declined or 'fell'.

Within the former period, the thesis has identified three relatively distinct phases in the process of an increasingly threatening power. From pre 1879 to 1898, Nova Scotia miners in general began to negotiate the nature of class relations in a collective form that slowly became institutionalized. During this period negotiations occurred within a 'traditional' structure of class relations--paternalism--which was distinctive for its generally individualistic action between individual miners and local owners/managers.

From 1899 to 1921; a 'new era' of class interaction developed with the establishment of monopoly

capitalism, state intervention into industrial relations and formal political participation within the Liberal Democracy--all of which were 'born' in the previous period. Interrelated within these developments were the establishment of a collective miners' action through the trade union and non-allied political party which negotiated on the rank file's behalf. Combined, these institutional transformations contributed to a fragmentation and expansion of a structure of power that had previously been negotiated by individuals. Given the acknowledged lack of research and the general province-wide focus used in the pre 1879 period's analysis--and the fact that mass industrial development and employment occurred during the early years of 1900--this study has resisted any temptations to undergo a major comparison between these first two periods. However, this thesis argues that the South Side miners emerged and established themselves as an 'oppositional' force during the 1899 to 1921 period. This was a period in which the miners' action was identified as one of a 'war of position'--a type of strategic positioning in the process of class interaction.

The subsequent period of 1922-1925 class relations was one of crisis--a 'war of manoeuvre'--in which the threatening dynamic continued to develop

into 'an 'alternative' force. This period of South Side miners' action was one of intense class struggle. The dominant forces were not able to effectively contain the actions and thoughts of the miners in a way that could reproduce the accumulation of capital.

During the post 1925 period of 1926 to 1951, the South Side miners were again 'recomposed' as a class force. Unlike the previous period their ability to challenge Domco and the state did not expand or intensify. With the re-establishment of an 'oppositional' force amongst South Side miners was the simultaneous ability by Domco and the State to effectively shape the parameters of class interaction and the basis of a new type of class action identified as 'compromisal'.

Contributing to--and an aspect of--the general transformations of the South Side miners' power were the 'key' institutional sites of action and experience.

WORKPLACE

With the exception of the introduction of coal cutting machines under Domco in 1893, there were no significant changes in the organization of the workplace until 1948 and 1951. Prior to this development, the South Side miners retained considerable control over the immediate aspects of the production

process--carrying out a largely unsupervised, manual labour. As Braverman (1974:100) notes; "workers who are controlled, only by general orders and discipline are not adequately controlled because they retain their grip on the labour process itself". In this sense the worker, up to 1948-1951 retained considerable 'power in the pit' as a consequence. At best, Domco's most effective weapon to ensure production was the piece rate. This method of formal control was largely ineffective in its ability to influence the immediate production process (see Friedman, 1977:47). The miners continued possession of real control over the labour process simultaneously enabled the reproduction of that real control--as 1938 clearly illustrated. The agency of miners (as in their resistance against mechanization), however, was not the sole factor responsible for the reproduction of their power in the mines. In a fundamental sense, the miners' possession of real control was initially a consequence of geology as the room and pillar method necessitated the scattering of hundreds of points of production throughout the mine.

The fetishization of the workplace organization--miners' real control, absolute surplus value production through payment by piece rate, the unsupervised nature of room and pillar mining--fostered

a sense of independence amongst miners. Framing this historically specific experience, however, was the 'sharing of the mine's dangers' which shaped a "mining mentality" and established the basis for a 'collective outlook' amongst mine workers (see McKay, 1983a:588,594). As has been illustrated, the consciousness of the miners was not formed solely on the experiences of the mine; but was a much broader process involving sites outside the point of production (in argument with Burawoy, 1979).

Implicit with the possession of real control was the potential to manipulate it into a source of power and weapon in a strategic arsenal--as illustrated with the 100% strikes and slowdowns of the 1920s and 1941, and the 1938 strike at No.20. While technically the use of these tactics was, always possible, the manipulation of real control into a source of strategic power was a social practice that was historically rare. It is crucially important to situate such tactics within the broader social and historical context from which they emerge and acquire their full dimension of social significance (see Edwards, 1979:15).

Within a conjuncture quite different from 1938, mechanization was actively accommodated in 1948 and 1951 in room and pillar and longwall

respectively. In conjunction with the geological imperatives that slowly forced many Domco pits to switch to the longwall method, the CMLP was fundamentally reorganized. Real control was won/capitulated to Domco and relative surplus value production was undertaken through the tremendous increase in the organic composition of capital. These changes significantly altered the material basis of the tradition of thought and action which comprised the "miners' freedom". Under the unevenly applied process of relative surplus value production vis-a-vis mechanization--Capital did indeed "become a mysterious thing" (Marx, 1975:392, see 389-398 for a discussion of the fetishization of the labour and valorization process).

TRADE UNION

During the 1880s South Side miners became collectively organized within a trade union--the P.W.A.. At one and the same moment, the establishment of this organization created the potential for the miners to challenge Domco (or its preceeding companies) or be incorporated, en-masse, by it.

Continually, this thesis has argued, and illustrated that the nature and limits of the miners' union is a matter of concrete, historical, investigation. While there has been a general uneven tendency for the union to have its power centralized away

from the rank and file and to be concentrated, these features were not inherently inevitable and are suggested by Lenin, 1902; Trotsky, 1916; and Michaelis, 1919. These developments were not organically inherent, but, rather, a process of struggle, resistance and negotiation within the class, and between the classes. (Internal and external factors, see Rosenberg, 1973).

Green's wide ^{to} section of ideas might be said to have a good understanding of the teeth and bones of the various theories, but not, in my view, showing there is no single universal tendency for features of a union to be anti-democratic or anti-economic.

The process of centralization in the decision making process began when some initially organized and elected representatives of the process developed with the creation of a contract, the expansion of a province-wide bargaining unit, the maintenance of the I.D.I.A., the transfer of funds from local to District level, the affiliation with an international body, and the lengthening of executive elections from one to four years. This process was not linear but was one of struggle - from the founding of Diamond, to revoking of the 1923 charter, to the emergence and decline of the A.M.W.. It was a political process in which the miners by revolt, participation, or acquiescence, were present.

Throughout the process of South Side miners' unionism there has been an uneven tendency for the organization to be more 'conciliatory' or 'economistic'. This has been a complex development which involves actions amongst miners, and Domco and the State. As had been illustrated, the nature of the trade union has been constantly defined and redefined in both thought and action partly through a process of interaction amongst factions within the union. Based on their non-homogenous experiences, their respective definitions of what a trade union should be have mediated their activities (see Nichols and Benyon, 1977:chapter 9). As early as the Cape Breton P.W.A. sub-council's revolt against Drummond in the 1890s a clear tension developed amongst miners and between the executive and rank and file, over decisions of tactical strategy and negotiating stance. The initial split into factions matured into a sophisticated trade union political system that existed into the early 1950s. As early as 1917 a split occurred along 'left/right' lines. Through a process of struggle the left (being radical, nonconciliatory and aggressive) dominated the right but was later 'defeated' by a 'recomposed' left (along noncommunistic, social democratic lines) and the re-established right wing. It is extremely important to stress that these struggles

did not occur within a vacuum, but were based on the rank and file's experience which changed from conjuncture to conjuncture. Implicit in this process was a constant redefinition of interests within the options created by the changing economic, ideological and political realities. This thesis argues that significant shifts in the miners' ability to challenge the dominant forces through their union occurred with the emergence of the 'radical left wing' in the 1920s and with their effective defeat in the mid 1930s. Upon this defeat, and the establishment of the 'right/recomposed left wing', was the elimination of a nonconciliatory, radical type of unionism that both maintained and helped reproduce a militancy through its leaders and newspapers.

STATE INTERVENTION INTO LABOUR RELATIONS

Constantly influential in the history of class interaction and in defining the nature of trade unionism and collective bargaining, was state coercive/consensual intervention. Generally, four basic periods of intervention can be identified.

In the first period, prior to 1881 (Foord pit disaster), the provincial state's actions were ad hoc and/or relatively ineffectual. Basically, any legal interventions reproduced Capital's dominance. This period is of importance, however, for it marked

the initial attempt by the state to subsume and rework managerial authority, under the 'legitimacy' of the state, into 'rights'.

From 1881 to 1921, the miners at the District or provincial level influenced and were influenced by the federal and provincial organization of state power. In this regard, the logic of state activity towards the South Side was not solely a product of the South Side experience, but rather the broader provincial and national class interaction as well. During this period the state attempted to contain and shape class interaction through consensual means. With the emergence of the I.D.I.A. during the "new era of industrial relations" the state was able to institutionalize itself as 'third party'.

During the succeeding period the miners' power expanded beyond the state's constraining legal network. In this highly dynamic period the provincial and federal state's authority was questioned by South Side miners, thus shifting state intervention along coercive lines through the introduction of the federal militia and provincial police (see Hall et. al., 1981:216; Gramsci, 1983:210). The irony of this tactic was that it both intensified, yet significantly contributed to the breaking of the South Side miners, and thus partly established the limits and nature

of class regulation in the succeeding period.

In the succeeding period of 1926 to 1951 the provincial and federal state was able to successfully "contain" the South Side miners through key changes in the Coal Mines Regulation Act, Wartime federal legislation, the withdrawal of militia and police forces and the payment of subsidies. All these actions contributed to the de-escalation of class struggle by limiting the possibilities for conflict.

Implicit in the organization of state power and the shaping of class power was the 'experiential' or ideological dimension. Constantly the state's legitimacy and role was interpreted by miners in a way which was determined by the historical social context. These perspectives ranged from Drummond's conception of 'equal' justice, to MacLeod's refusal to participate in conciliation, to Jenkin's recalling the miners back to the pits in order to avoid an "illegal strike". At one and the same moment the state is influenced by, and influences, miners' actions. Key shifts in this dialectical process came with the emergence of the I.D.I.A., the shift to coercion in the 1920s and the subsequent strategy of 'containment'.

FORMAL POLITICS

With the emergence of liberal democracy, in 1889 the South Side miners constructed political power and capital which were eventually incorporated. This political movement was initially a political force for its contribution to the institutionalization of consensus of the growing class, not related to the distinction between 'economic' and 'political' spheres and the role played the local class interaction (cf. Przeworski, 1977: 171).

The struggle over formal political power is highly organized and supports an institutionalization of conflict over the realization of internal interests within limits of 'democracy' (Przeworski, 1980: 12-29). Unlike the structure of the informal economic power, the organization of formal political power organizes members of 'all classes of citizens'—in ways which are less susceptible to be divided along class lines. This was dramatically illustrated throughout the history of the South Side miners' formal political history. Initially the South Side miners were represented by 'traditional' political parties. With the establishment of a working class party in 1917, the South Side miners became a real political force. Despite the substantial electoral success, the potential political power of the elected representatives was never realized, given the provincial and

federal nature of formal political power. As there were very little corresponding working class developments occurring outside of the South Side, the local MLA's or MP's influence was ineffectual.

Within the South Side working class politics, and through a process somewhat similar to trade union developments, the nature of the miners' political party was formed through a process of struggle and compromise amongst various factions of miners with respective interests. Within the sphere of South Side formal politics key shifts, which influenced the miners' power, occurred with the emergence and subsequent defeat of a radical 'alternative' party (ILP, CPC forces) by an 'oppositional', social democratic party (CCF).

STRUCTURE IN PROCESS

Significantly influenced by developments at the above mentioned key institutional sites of action and experience were the South Side miners' power and in turn, their ability to influence the accumulation of capital. As Jessop (1983:89) notes;

. . . the accumulation of capital is the complex resultant of the changing balance of class forces in struggle inter-acting with a framework determined by the value form . . . although the basic parameters of capitalism are defined by the value form, form alone is an inadequate guide to its nature and dynamics . . .

Implicit and explicit in the understanding of the South Side miners' power is thus not only the objective identification of the economic, but also political and ideological dimensions of class interaction (see Przeworski, 1977:377-385; Hall et. al., 1981:201). If the historical development of class forces and accumulation process is to be grasped it must be conceived of as a 'structure in process' --in which class agency and the economic, political and ideological structural realities are reciprocally influential at various historical moments.

The assertion that social relations structure class struggles must not be interpreted in a mechanical fashion Moreover [the] . . . mechanism of determinism is reciprocal in the sense that while the structural totality of economic, ideological and political relations constitute at each moment of history the conjuncture of class struggles, these struggles in turn have the effect of transforming or preserving relations (Przeworski, 1977: 377, 385, brackets mine).

The breaking of the 1858 GMA monopoly and subsequent rise of competitive capitalism, the establishment of monopoly capitalism in 1893, the 'crisis of market' in the early 1920s, the reallocation of 1932 and the 'crisis of productivity' of the post World War II period dramatically illustrated the fundamental way in which 'economic' forces shaped the arena of class interaction based on the C.M.L.P. Yet, to speak of the South Side's coal industry,

and the class interaction as narrowly framed and determined by economic forces would be profoundly misleading, given the intense and active role played by the State. The accumulation of capital based on the C.M.L.P. did not increasingly develop, centralize and concentrate from investment based on an initial unit of capital. Rather, the accumulation process was highly uneven--being imported and exported from a variety of sources in sometimes sporadic and illogical ways. The process in itself was not linear. In addition the process actively involved with political forces--the participation of the provincial and federal states. The state--as an aspect of a broader process of class interaction--was key in the breaking of the GMA monopoly and creating an era of competitive capitalism, in establishing monopoly capitalism under Domco, in constructing the national coal market through manipulation (or lack of) of the tariff, in the mechanization of the mines, and in 'propping up' the industry through massive subsidies. Constantly, the dynamic of the South Side coal industry was significantly influenced by formal political power--a power failed to be realized by the Nova Scotia working class--through accumulation strategies and labour legislation. In this sense it is more appropriate to speak of the accumulation process based on

the C.M.L.P. as a political-economic process.

Constantly the South Side miners, as a class, were not "clay in the hands of the potter" but active participants, whose actions were mediated by a consciousness formed through an experience of specific conjunctural realities. Their actions influenced the accumulation process in a variety of ways. At times the miners, reproduced the system through the production of surplus value or influenced accumulation through wage negotiations or by resistance towards labour process reorganization. At other times, most notably in the 1920s, it chose to challenge the accumulation process. At all times, the miners activity occurred within a set of economic, political and ideological realities which influenced and shaped the possibilities of class interaction. In addition, these realities did not simply structure and define the miners' actions but were in turn reciprocally influenced by the miners' actions as well. The political-economic reality, whether through the creation of cut throat competitive capitalism, the pressuring through national coal market manipulation or the intensification of exploitative imperatives imposed by BESCO's financial structure, significantly defined and shaped the parameters of action for the miners. In turn the miners redefined the conjunctural realities

moment to moment, by forming a union, by acquiring or losing strategic power as their importance to the national coal industry fluctuated, or by struggling. In a much broader sense they too were both victim and participant in the uneven development of capitalism through the emergence of an economic underdeveloped region which offered little alternative employment. This is not to say that the political-economic forces were as influential and shaped by the South Side miners as those structural forces shaped the miners. It is rather to note that the miners were present and influential in the industrial development and that the degree to which 'reciprocal influence' occurred is a matter of historically specific investigation.

Furthermore, the process of class agency with the reciprocally influencing political-economic forces reveals the ideological dimension through which 'experience', which forms a particular type of consciousness, mediates and guides action. As illustrated, the uneven process of redefining the authority of workplace relations throughout the history had implications for the way South Side miners acted; through their trade union, political parties, towards the company and State, and at the workplace. Historically, this has implied a wide spectrum of individual and collective acts which range from compromise to active struggle. These transformations in

in consciousness (from paternalist, to producer, to class, to corporatist) were firmly rooted within the lived material realities. Significant redefinitions of interests occurred within the turbulent establishment of competitive capitalism; the struggles of the 1920s and the forces of de-industrialization of the 1930s and 1940s. In this sense Gramsci's (1983:327) statement holds true; ". . . the contrast between thought and action cannot but be the expression of a profounder contrast of a social historical order." --as an expression of the conjunctural realities of possible activity. Yet, the consciousness is not a mere reflection of the economic reality, nor is its development slightly autonomous, lagging behind economic transformation (see Williams, 1980:31-35). While the 1920s was a period of economic and ideological crisis, the 1940s as a period of deepening economic crisis did not witness a corresponding deepening ideological crisis. Unlike the South Side miners of the 1920s, the miners of the 1940s stressed the 'universal interests' amongst co-operating classes. Furthermore, the consciousness of the South Side miners was not solely reactive, but also active in the sense it mediated and guided (opening up new ways of thinking and acting) actions which in turn influenced the economy. In this sense the relation

between ideology and economy must be seen as highly interactive and dynamic. However, this is not say that the South Side miners' definition of workplace authority was not based on the material reality in which they lived and defined their interests. Implicit in this understanding of consciousness formation is a dynamic historically materialist process. In the midst of the early 1920s class struggle Robert Drummond did not reappear and acquire leadership. During the battle of 1925 Robert Drummond was near death, writing a book appropriately name Reflections and Recollections of a Former Trade Union Leader which criticized the irresponsible actions of radical leaders.

With this understanding of consciousness it can be argued that the South Side miners were reciprocally influenced by ideological forces. At one and the same moment, the consciousness through which their actions were mediated also defined their interests and class relations, and in this sense closed off or created new ways of acting and thinking. Robert Drummond and his membership did not vote for Communists, or carry out a 100% strike. But they should not be expected to have done so. They were not experiencing "gleaming bayonets", machine guns mounted on church steps, or 33% wage cut. They did not see their interests in direct opposition to the

company's.

In this regard, it is important to stress that;

A social individual, born into a particular set of institutions and relations, is at the same moment born into a peculiar configuration of meanings, which give her access to and locates her within 'a culture' . . . Men and women are, thus, formed, and form themselves through society, culture and history. . . (Clarke et. al., 1976:11)

As partly illustrated with reference to the South Side miners' power, the key institutions of sites and experience were influenced and influential in different ways at different conjunctures--creating specific types of action and thought at various historic moments. The emergence of these various types of action and thought contributed to the rise of an 'alternative' and subsequent 'oppositional' force. This recomposition was not simply the work of passive agents of supports whose actions were narrowly determined by structural forces--but, by an active class whose actions at various sites were reciprocally influenced by structural forces between the past and present. If the miners were recomposed as an oppositional force we must note that often this subordination;

is secured only because the dominant order succeeds in weakening, destroying, displacing or incorporating alternative institutions of defence and resistance thrown up by the subordinate class. (Clarke et. al., 1976:37)

It was only (slowly and uneven) during the 1926 to 1951 period that Domco and the state were able to effectively contain the South Side miners. Amidst the 'productivity crisis' and the preceeding ideological battle amongst miners the dominant forces had for the first time been able to frame real economic, political and ideological options in ways that could be effectively incorporated in crisis-free ways. In this sense, this thesis argues that by the post World War II period the basis for the reproduction of a hegemonic organization of power was established.

This involves the exercise of a special kind of power - the power to frame alternatives and contain opportunities, to win and shape consent It provides the horizon of thought and action within which ~~conflicts~~ are thought through, appropriated . . . obscured . . . or contained. A hegemonic order prescribes, not the specific content of ideas but the limits within which ideas and conflict move and are resolved . . . (Clarke et. al., 1976:38-39 citing Gramsci, 1971:80).

By the late 1940s the South Side miners' nature of trade unionism, collective bargaining, formal political activity and workplace were institutionally organized in a way which sustained an oppositional force. By general definition, speaking in relation to the 1922-1925 period, the miners were successfully contained. Within these "circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past" the basis for a 'hegemonic arena' of class

interaction established the possibilities of future class activity.

The South Side miners, of course, made and continue to "make their own history" from the historically specific nature of their present situation.

As illustrated, through the wide spectrum of activity and thought sustained by the South Side miners as a class-in-themselves, the making of their history is an active and creative process.

APPENDICES AND MAPS

APPENDIX 'A'

OUTPUT IN (2,000 lbs). TONS FOR DOMCO AND
PROVINCE FOR VARIOUS N.S. FISCAL YEARS

<u>Year</u>	<u>Domco Output</u>	<u>Total Provincial Output</u>
1900	1,930,425	3,238,245
1913	4,719,614	7,203,913
1923	3,505,627	6,179,690
1933	2,251,980	3,663,671
1939	3,866,020	6,027,617
1949	3,844,915	6,196,322

(N.S., Journals of the House of Assembly, Mines Reports,
1901, 1914, 1924, 1934, 1940, 1950).

APPENDIX 'B'

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES FOR DOMCO AND PROVINCIAL COAL MINING INDUSTRY FOR VARIOUS N.S. FISCAL YEARS

<u>Year</u>	<u>Domco</u>	<u>Provincial Total</u>
1900	3,109	6,626
1913	6,452	12,664
1923	6,190	12,806
1933	6,181	11,884
1939	7,384	13,456
1949	6,862	11,964

(N.S., Journals of the House of Assembly, Mines Reports,
1901, 1914, 1924, 1934, 1940, 1950)

APPENDIX 'C'

DOMINION COAL COMPANY, LIMITED

HISTORY OF COLLIERIES - GLACE BAY DISTRICT

Colliery	Location	Seam	Year Opened	Year Closed	Remarks
Stirling Emery Old Bridgeport	Glance Bay Reserve Bridgeport	Harbor Emery Phalen	1872 1873 1830	1896 1893 1898	First opened by level from shore. Shaft sunk in 1894 by Henry Mitchell. Slope and shafts. Slope workings abandoned and shaft sunk in 1872. Changed ownership several times.
Lorway Gardiner	Reserve Gardiner Mines	Lorway Gardiner	1871 prev. to 1871	1873 1893	
No. 1A No. 1B No. 2	Dominion Bridgeport New Aberdeen	Phalen Phalen Phalen	1894 1924 1899	1927 1955 1949	No. 26 Colliery worked through 1B. No. 9 and No. 20 Colliery worked through No. 2.
No. 3 Caledonia No. 4 No. 4	Passchendaele Glance Bay Passchendaele	Phalen Phalen Emery	1900 1866 1900	1915 1961 ?	(May 31) Year closed not known. Reopened in 1913 as No. 11. Including East Slope. Opened and closed several times during this period.
No. 5 Hub No. 7	Reserve Glance Bay	Phalen Hub	1872 prev. to 1871	1938 1918	
International No. 8 No. 9	Bridgeport New Aberdeen	Harbor Harbor	prev. to 1871 1899	1915 1923	Worked through same shaft as No. 2 Colliery
No. 10 No. 11	Reserve Passchendaele	Emery Emery	1905 1913	1942 1949	Old No. 4 at Passchendaele re-opened. First opened in 1900.
No. 20	New Aberdeen	Harbor	1939		Worked through same shaft as No. 2 Colliery.

APPENDIX 'C' continued

HISTORY OF COLLIERIES - GLACE BAY DISTRICT (continued)

Colliery	Location	Seam	Year Opened	Year Closed	Remarks
No. 23	Dominion	Gardiner	Not Worked		Old material shaft No. 1A Colliery sunk to Gardiner seam in 1926. Not worked.
No. 24	Glance Bay	Emery	1919	1953	
No. 25	Gardiner Mines	Gardiner	1941	1959	
No. 26	Bridgeport	Harbor	1942		Worked through same shaft as No. 1B Colliery

APPENDIX 'C' continued

DOMINION COAL COMPANY, LIMITED

HISTORY OF COLLIERIES - MORIEN DISTRICT

Colliery	Location	Seam	Year Opened	Year Closed	Remarks
Schooner Pond	Schooner Pond Morien	Emery Phalen	1872 Shaft not completed	1874	Shaft started west of Long Beach Road in 18, stopped at 250' and now completed. Located 1/4 mile north of No. 6.
Ontario (Clyde) Gowrie	Donkin Morien	Phalen Gowrie	Prev. to 1871 Prev. to 1871	1890 1890 1897	
Blockhouse	Morien	Harbor	Prev. to 1871	1888	Machinery seized by Gov't. in 1888 for Royalty.
North Atlantic	Morien	Gowrie	Prev. to 1871 1899	1911	Shaft 200' from Shore opened by Ochiltree MacDonald in 1899. Taken over by North Atlantic Collieries in 1907.
South Head	South Head (Morien)	Wilson	Prev. to 1871	1877	
Broughton	Broughton	Tracey	1904	1907	Reopened in 1913; closed in 1916 C.B. Coal Iron & Rly. Co.
Dom. No. 6	Donkin	Phalen Gowrie	1804	1925	
No. 21	Birch Grove	Gowrie	1910	1925	
No. 22	Birch Grove	Gowrie	1918	1930	

APPENDIX 'C' continued

DOMINION COAL COMPANY, LIMITED

HISTORY OF COLLIERIES

LINGAN - VICTORIA DISTRICT

Colliery	Location	Seam	Year Opened	Year Closed	Remarks
Lingan (Halls Slope)	Lingan	Phalen	1873	1886	In the Mines Report for the year 1872 mention was made that slopes were extended & levels driven under the sea. This is the last mention of this Colliery in the Report.
Old Victoria	Low Point	Harbor	Prev. to 1871	1878	
Barachois	Lingan	Hub	Prev. to 1871	?	
Barachois Slope	Lingan	Hub	1884	?	No mention made of this Colliery in the Mines Report later than 1884.
New Victoria	Low Point	Harbor	1883	1897	Reopened in 1914 as No. 17 Colliery.
No. 12	New Watf'd.	Harbor	1907	1932 1925 August 1962. 1921	36,000 tons only extracted during this period - see New Victoria.
No. 14	New Watf'd.	Harbor	1907		
No. 15	New Watf'd.	Phalen	1910		
No. 16	New Watf'd.	Phalen	1911		
No. 17	New Watf'd.	Harbor	1914		
No. 18	New Watf'd.	Phalen	1938		

(Source: Notes, Coal, Beaton Institute)

MAIN HAULAGE WAY FOR LONGWALL

APPENDIX 'D'

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(Canada, 1946)

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