

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.


The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600





Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

**CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO:
ASYMETRICAL INTEGRATION IN NORTH
AMERICA**

by
JIMENA JIMENEZ, B.A. M.A.

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Political Science

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
August 2005
Copyright © Jimena Jimenez, 2005



Library and
Archives Canada

Published Heritage
Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Bibliothèque et
Archives Canada

Direction du
Patrimoine de l'édition

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

0-494-08334-4

Your file Votre référence

ISBN:

Our file Notre référence

ISBN:

NOTICE:

The author has granted a non-exclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distribute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or non-commercial purposes, in microform, paper, electronic and/or any other formats.

The author retains copyright ownership and moral rights in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

AVIS:

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou autres formats.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur et des droits moraux qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis.

While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis.

Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privée, quelques formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de cette thèse.

Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant.

Canada

Abstract

This thesis examines the question of whether economic integration has led to political integration in North America. Under the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), trade and cross-border economic connections have intensified across North America. NAFTA has produced pressures for coordination and cooperation around a number of areas such as transportation, border infrastructure and the environment. Additionally, the events of September 11th 2001 added a new security dimension that Canada, the United States and Mexico have to manage alongside economic concerns. The accelerated economic and non-economic linkages across North America have prompted government officials, the business sector, scholars and other interested parties to speculate about the future of North America and whether North America will develop any accompanying political superstructure.

Based on an examination of the environmental and border control policies within North America, this dissertation argues that economic integration does not lead directly to political integration. There are a number of intervening variables that shape the rate and nature of political integration in North America. The findings suggest that institutions and intersubjective factors play a large role in mediating integration. Institutions provide a space or forum in which policy actors can interact, communicate, cooperate and get to know each other better reconstructing notions of “us” and “them”. The existence of an institutional space allows policy actors to alter the cognitive framework of cross-border interaction. Additionally, the existence of positive or negative intersubjective factors play a key role in the integration process. The case studies demonstrate that only when there is positive movement along the intersubjective front is there a corresponding upwards move towards higher levels of political integration. The findings of the dissertation challenge dominant theoretical frameworks that suggest economic integration will automatically and inevitable lead to political integration. The North American case suggests that while economic integration does create pressures for increased cooperation and coordination, any ensuing political integration project will be mediated by institutional context, intersubjective understandings and the historical specificity of each bilateral relationship.

Acknowledgements

I would not have completed this dissertation without the help, support, and encouragement of a number of people. In particular, I would like to thank Laura Macdonald, my supervisor, for her direction and assistance in focusing my research and shaping the thought process that eventually formed this dissertation. Her comments and advice greatly strengthened this dissertation.

I would also like to thank Dr. Glen Williams for the contribution he made to this dissertation. His expertise, suggestions and guidance especially in my historical analysis, undoubtedly, made this a better dissertation. As well, his advice influenced my view and treatment of integration in ways that I had not anticipated.

Dr. Leslie Pal has an ability to conceptualize the policy process that added a great deal to my examination of integration and my conceptualization of methodological issues. This dissertation greatly benefited from his advice and I appreciate his assistance.

I gratefully acknowledge awards from Carleton University and the Government of Mexico that enabled me to carry out research in Mexico City.

Colleagues at Foreign Affairs Canada, the Canadian Embassy in the United States and the Canadian embassy in Mexico were instrumental in providing a lot of first hand knowledge of issues pertinent to my research. I would especially like to thank Barry Davis for his support; he was always ready to lend a helping hand.

A number of individuals like Dr. José Luis Valdés at the Centro de Investigaciones Sobre América del Norte in Mexico City made my stay in Mexico memorable and welcoming. They shared their knowledge with me and also were helpful in recommending individuals in Mexico that I should interview.

I would like to thank the numerous individuals in Ottawa, Washington D.C. and Mexico City that I interviewed. They willingly shared their valuable time, information, and knowledge thereby directly contributing to the shape and quality of this dissertation.

I would not have been able to get through this process without the support and encouragement of some amazing friends. In particular Heather Macrae, Julie Brennan Kirsten Fried and Rachel Laforest were my saving graces. Thank you for listening to my monthly rants. Thank you for letting me cry on your shoulder. Thank you for laughing with me when I needed to laugh.

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my family. To my parents Rina and Mario, because without their intellectual and moral support I would not have been able to even write this dissertation. To my father who instilled in me a love of knowledge and of learning. To my mother, who gave me a love of life, which was necessary to live a balanced life while completing my studies. I am who I am because of you. I thank my sisters Marcela and Camila for putting up with me throughout the years. They always encouraged me and they always believed that one day, I would finish.

Most of all, I owe this dissertation to my husband, Norm. This dissertation would never have been completed without his unwavering support and encouragement. Without his patience, assistance and love – I would not be here, writing these words. I owe this dissertation to you. And to Linda, because Norm forgot you.

CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO: ASYMETRICAL INTEGRATION IN NORTH AMERICA

Table of Contents

<i>Abstract</i>	<i>ii</i>
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	<i>iii</i>
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	<i>viii</i>
Introduction	1
<i>Central Questions</i>	<i>8</i>
<i>Thesis and Hypothesis</i>	<i>9</i>
<i>The North American Reality</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>Political Integration in the North American Context</i>	<i>23</i>
<i>Methodology</i>	<i>33</i>
<i>Data</i>	<i>38</i>
<i>Overview of the Thesis</i>	<i>39</i>
Chapter One – Theoretical Approaches to North American Integration	43
<i>The European Context and the Introduction of Integration Theory</i>	<i>45</i>
<i>Traditional Theories of Integration</i>	<i>51</i>
<i>The Ascendancy of Economic Approaches to Integration</i>	<i>63</i>
<i>Economic Theories of Integration</i>	<i>65</i>
<i>Alternative Theories of Integration</i>	<i>77</i>
Chapter Two – Historical and Political Legacy: Canada, the United States and Mexico in a North American Region	106

<i>The United States in North America</i>	110
<i>Canada in North America</i>	119
<i>Early History: From the War of 1812 to the First World War</i>	121
<i>The War Years</i>	127
<i>The Free Trade Era</i>	133
<i>The Canada-Mexico Relationship</i>	144
<i>The United States-Mexico Relationship</i>	150
<i>Independence to Revolution</i>	152
<i>The NAFTA Era</i>	163
<i>The Trilateral Relationship in the Post-NAFTA Era</i>	176
Chapter Three – The Environment and North American Political Integration in the pre-NAFTA Era	183
<i>The U.S.-Mexico Pre-NAFTA Environmental Era</i>	185
<i>Degree of Institutionalization in the U.S.-Mexico Pre-NAFTA Environmental Era</i>	189
<i>Degree of Cooperation in the U.S.- Mexico Pre-NAFTA Environmental Era</i>	196
<i>Degree of Intersubjectivity in the U.S.- Mexico Pre-NAFTA Environmental Era</i>	203
<i>The Canada-U.S. Pre-NAFTA Environmental Era</i>	207
<i>Degree of Institutionalization in the Canada-U.S. pre-NAFTA Environmental Era</i>	208
<i>Degree of Cooperation in the Canada-U.S. Pre-NAFTA Environmental Era</i>	213
<i>Degree of Intersubjectivity in the Canada-U.S. Pre-NAFTA Environmental Era</i>	221
Chapter Four – The Environment and North American Political Integration in the NAFTA Era	228
<i>Background on the NAFTA Environmental Regime</i>	233

<i>Degree of Institutionalization in the NAFTA Environmental Era</i>	237
<i>Degree of Cooperation in the NAFTA Environmental Era</i>	260
<i>Degree of Intersubjectivity in the NAFTA Environmental Era</i>	274
Chapter Five – Border Control in the Pre-NAFTA Era.....	283
<i>The Pre-NAFTA Border Era</i>	287
<i>The U.S.-Mexico Pre-NAFTA Border Era</i>	288
<i>Degree of Cooperation in the U.S.-Mexico Pre-NAFTA Border Era</i>	289
<i>Degree of Intersubjectivity in the U.S.-Mexico Pre-NAFTA Border Era</i>	292
<i>The Canada-U.S. Pre-NAFTA Border Era</i>	298
<i>Degree of Cooperation in the Canada-U.S. Pre-NAFTA Border Era</i>	299
<i>Degree of Intersubjectivity in the Canada-U.S. Pre-NAFTA Border Era</i>	302
Chapter Six – Border Control in the NAFTA Era.....	307
<i>The NAFTA Border Era</i>	312
<i>The U.S.-Mexico NAFTA Border Era</i>	313
<i>Degree of Cooperation in the U.S.-Mexico NAFTA Era</i>	313
<i>Degree of Intersubjectivity in the U.S.-Mexico NAFTA Border Era</i>	317
<i>The Canada-U.S. Border NAFTA Era</i>	325
<i>Degree of Cooperation in the Canada-U.S. Border NAFTA Era</i>	326
<i>Degree of Intersubjectivity in the Canada-U.S. Border NAFTA Era</i>	330
<i>The Post- 9/11 Border Era</i>	337
<i>The U.S.-Mexico Post-9/11 Border Era</i>	340
<i>Degree of Cooperation in the U.S.-Mexico Post-9/11 Border Era</i>	341
<i>Degree of Intersubjectivity in the U.S.-Mexico Post-9/11 Border Era</i>	344

<i>The Canada-U.S. Post-9/11 Border Era</i>	350
<i>Degree of Cooperation in the Canada-U.S. Post-9/11 Border Era</i>	352
<i>Degree of Intersubjectivity in the Canada-U.S Post-9/11 Border Era</i>	356
Chapter Seven – Conclusion: A Political Integration Project in North America?	363
<i>The Relationship Between Economic and Political Integration</i>	366
<i>The Role Played by Institutions and Intersubjective Factors</i>	368
<i>Political Integration is Mediated or Filtered through Already Existing Processes</i>	369
<i>Low to Moderate levels of Political Integration that Vary across Policy Fields Characterize North America</i>	371
<i>Asymmetrical Integration</i>	372
Appendices	379
References	399
<i>Interviews</i>	399
<i>Other Sources</i>	402

List of Abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BCNI	Business Council on National Issues
BECC	Border Environmental Cooperation Commission
BEC-PACS	Border Environment Plan Public Advisory Committee
BEIF	Border Environment Infrastructure Fund
BLMs	Border Liaison Mechanisms
BLTs	Bilateral Border Task Force
BNC	Binational Commission
CBP	Customs Border Protection Agency
CCEC	Canadian Council of Chief Executives
CEC	Commission for Environmental Cooperation
CLC	Commission for Labor Cooperation
CUSP	Canada-U. S. Partnership
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
EC	European Commission
EEC	European Economic Commission
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
ENGOs	Environmental Non Governmental Organizations
EU	European Union
FAST	Free and Secure Trade

FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FIRA	Foreign Investment Review Agency
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
GACs	Government Advisory Committee
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GSC	General Standing Committee
GLWQA	Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
HLCDGC	High Level Contact Group for Drug Control
IBAR	Intergovernmental Body of Alternative Representatives
IBET	Integrated Border Enforcement Teams
IBEP	Integrated Border Environment Plan
IBWC	International Boundary and Water Commission
IDCP	Institutional Development and Cooperation Program
IIRIRA	Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act
IJC	International Joint Commission
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service???
IPE	International Political Economy
IR	International Relations
IRCA	Immigration Reform and Control Act
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialization
JMT	Joint Ministerial Committee
JMUSDC	Joint Mexico-United States Defence Committee

JPAC	Joint Public Advisory Committee
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur
MFCMA	Magnuso Fisher Conservation and Management Act
MSG	Military Study Group
NAAEC	North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
NACs	National Advisory Committee
NADBank	North American Development Bank
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEP	National Energy Program
NGOs	Non Governmental Organizations
NORAD	North American Aerospace Command
NORTHCOM	Northern Command
PAN	National Action Party
PJBD	Permanent Joint Board of Defense
PRD	Party of the Democratic Revolution
PRI	Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party)
PRONASOL	National Solidarity Program
SEA	Single European Act
SSANA	Sistema de Seguimiento de la Aplicación de la Normatividad (Environmental Enforcement Monitoring System)
SPP	Security and Prosperity Partnership

Introduction

On January 1, 1994 Canada, the United States, and Mexico entered into the North American Free Trade Agreement: a purely economic agreement that focused largely on the reduction—and ultimately on the elimination of—trade barriers between the three countries. A few years later, Vicente Fox, President-elect of Mexico, travelled to Ottawa and Washington D.C., where he circulated a bold new proposal for a “NAFTA Plus”. The proposal would have, in effect, deepened NAFTA to embody a common market complete with institutions, common policies, and the free movement of labour among the three countries (Hakim and Litan, 2002, 7). More recently, in April of 2001, Jean Chrétien, then-Prime Minister of Canada, met with American President George W. Bush and Mexican President Fox at the margins of the Summit of America in Quebec. Together they issued the “North American Leaders Statement”, which acknowledged the linkages, exchanges, and cooperation underway between governments, business peoples, and diverse members of civil societies within sectors like transportation, education, health, justice, environment, and security. They also stated the following:

We have come together as leaders of Canada, Mexico and the United States, North American neighbours who share common values and interests. The ties that link us—human, social, cultural and economic—are becoming stronger. Fully realizing the tremendous potential of North America is a goal we share.... [W]e will work to deepen a sense of community (North American Leaders Statement, 2001).

These developments were indeed remarkable given that the three countries created NAFTA for predominantly economic reasons. In fact, in contrast to the European Union, NAFTA is based on a shared economic architecture, with no accompanying political, social, and cultural infrastructure (O’Brien, 1995, 716). Despite the purely economic nature of the NAFTA, however, the preceding anecdotes indicate the growing recognition

by governments of the non-economic linkages emerging in North America. Canada, the U.S., and Mexico are tied together by more than just geography and trade: they are connected by cultural factors and migration patterns; they face similar challenges in areas of environment and security; they participate in the shared management of important resources like water. All of these factors coalesce to form pressures towards integration into a North American region.

The debate about the future of North America is fought between those who maintain that political integration will inevitably occur under NAFTA and those who maintain that NAFTA has no political dimensions. Or, put differently, the debate about the future of North America is currently fought between those who believe that economic integration will gradually lead to political integration and those who sustain that economic integration will not result in political integration.

In the theoretical literature, one of the first and most commonly used definitions of integration was provided by Ernst Haas, who defined political integration as:

...the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones. (Cited in Mikkelsen, 1991, 3).

Lindberg provides a similar definition:

The process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision making process to new central organs and; (2) the process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new center (Cited in Mikkelsen, 1991, 4).

These traditional definitions of political integration clearly describe an advanced stage of the political integration process. They contain an explicit political or

governmental component involving the existence of new types of political centres and a centralized coordinating decision-making authority that overrides the sovereignty of national jurisdictions. Presumably, high or deep integration would also include high levels of cooperation and coordination in order to arrive at a stage where a new centre of power is jointly created and where sovereignty is transferred. Additionally, it might include the development of a shared sense of destiny and identity amongst and between actors who participate in the process (Nye 1968, 2001, 871).

In the North American context, Daniel Schwanen proposes a treaty of North America that would build on existing and mutually beneficial connections between the three countries—one that takes into account the relationship between economic relations and other important issues like “security, immigration, development, and the environment” (Schwanen, 2004, 11). Schwanen also notes that continued North American integration must involve the publics of each country “in the benefits of integration and decisions concerning that process” (Schwanen, 2004, 11). Accordingly, a successful North American political integration project would extend positive examples of cooperation and develop institutions that would, for example, promote fair trade relationships and aim to eradicate regional inequalities (Schwanen, 2004, 53). Additionally, a North American political integration plan would include a *projet de société* ensuring all citizens and sectors have a stake in the integration process. My view is that such a political integration project would not only help correct some of the deficiencies of NAFTA and address market failures imposed by pure economic integration, but also that it would assist in creating a more democratic and socially equitable region that benefits all North Americans.

Of course, not all observers agree that a political integration project is the way to go. Indeed, the incipient forces that are driving North American linkages and connections have prompted interested observers and academics alike to enter into a broad debate about the future of North America and the possibilities for political integration under NAFTA. Usually, the debate begins with those who point to the convergent cross-border trends that signify a gradual coming-together of North American societies and economies. As Hakim and Litan stress, "...[e]ven if the three governments take no further steps [to integrate] the economies, societies, cultures and institutions of the three countries should continue to integrate on their own accord" (Hakim and Litan, 2002, 28). According to this perspective, the question for the governments of North America is not one of deciding whether to integrate or not. From this point of view, that process is already under way. The question is, rather, one of deciding whether NAFTA is enough and whether governments should seek to manage the existing organic processes of integration (Hakim and Litan, 2002, 28).

For instance, the official view of the Mexican government is that although NAFTA has been clearly successful in the economic domain, it needs to be deepened if it is to address some of the real inequalities that characterize the region and if it is to successfully deal with security problems—both of which have the potential to threaten advances already made under NAFTA. To this end, Mexican officials have called for a North American community similar to the EU, with a common market, the free movement of labour, infrastructural development, social policy coordination and common institutions (Rozental, 2002, 73-86).

In the Canadian political context, the official government response does not match

the enthusiastic tone of their Mexican counterparts. Canadian officials responded coolly to Fox's proposal of a "NAFTA plus". In general, the Canadian government recognizes the importance of the trilateral relationship, but remains vague on identifying a clear path to promote it (Pastor, 2001, 3). One possible reason for the Canadian government's cautiousness in responding to Fox's call for a "NAFTA plus" is that a deepened integration project might signify a loss of political autonomy and result in asymmetrical integration. On the other hand, Canadian policy makers recognize that they cannot afford not to participate in any broader community project, especially if they hope to address economic concerns.

Despite the Canadian government's oscillating position, some Canadian scholars have pressed for deeper integration. For instance, former Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy has actively promoted new instances of trilateral cooperation that clearly move beyond trade. Axworthy calls for revamping the North American partnership. He invokes the model of a "condominium", "where there is shared decision making on common interests, with the freedom to decorate and manage each unit according to individual tastes" (Axworthy, 2003, 107). This North American condominium would, in effect, broaden the scope of NAFTA by ensuring the inclusion of environmental protection, fair labour practices, and democracy. Additionally, Axworthy maintains that such a model should be based on a renovation of security to include concerns originating not only from terrorism and drug trafficking, but also environmental degradation, natural disasters, and diminishing resources. This new North American partnership would not only seek to redress old NAFTA issues, but would also ensure the creation of an overall framework with Mexico in which to deal with the U.S., rather than relying on an old ad hoc, reactive

system of bilateral management that too often handicaps Canada's ability to negotiate with the U.S. (Axworthy, 2003, 96).

On the U.S. side, Robert Pastor, a well known U.S. academic who studies North America, agrees that NAFTA is simply not enough. NAFTA is silent on many issues that, if not addressed, threaten the future of North America. For instance, NAFTA does nothing to lessen the economic gap between the three countries. NAFTA is institutionally deficient and therefore countries have no way of cooperating and consulting to avert a crisis. NAFTA also ignores the contradictions of integration. It opens the door to trade, thus opening the door to illegal activities (Pastor, 2001, 5). Pastor's solution is thus to use NAFTA as the foundation for the development of a North American Community (Pastor, 2002: 91-2).

It should be mentioned that Pastor, although in favour of further integration, in no way represents the official response by the U.S. government to Fox's proposal to deepen NAFTA. Indeed, in a visit to the U.S., just days before 9/11, Bush appeared somewhat blind-sided by Fox's proposal of a "NAFTA plus" (Serrano, 2003, 60). Bush did, however, signal that Mexico was a main priority on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. But the September 11 attacks derailed any hopes of working on a "NAFTA plus" and reaching any type of immigration accord. It is doubtful that legalization of Mexicans in the U.S. was ever on the U.S. agenda, as debates about the security of the region after 9/11 demonstrate. The U.S. has made it clear that it expects Mexico's cooperation on security issues but has remained vague on the link between Mexico's migration goals and those of American Homeland Security. As Hristoulas states: "State department officials have stressed that although migration is an important issue in the bilateral relationship, it

is presently unrelated to U.S. homeland security" (Hristoulas, 2003, 41).

In stark contrast to those who wish to deepen integration, others maintain that NAFTA has not led to any significant degree of political integration, nor should it ever. Generally, those who hold this view stress how politically unrealistic and difficult a move to political integration might be. For instance, in a May 2002 article in the *Globe and Mail*, Canadian scholar Stephen Clarkson asks "What's in it for us?" He argues that many of the recent publications exploring enhanced integration ignore the effects of already existing integration. Clarkson cites that free trade has not increased Canadian standards of living and, more seriously, NAFTA is an economic treaty that acts as a de facto constitution that severely constrains government action in the public sphere. In the words of Clarkson: "If the integration medicine has failed to cure, why should we accept heavier doses of it...?"

In a similar vein are other nationalist critics who argue that further integration with the U.S. compromises Canadian sovereignty. Economist Andrew Jackson sustains that grand integration schemes jeopardize "distinctive Canadian values on defense, international affairs, and immigration and refugee issues," which limits Canada's ability to pursue its own social model (Jackson, 2003). A number of sectors in Mexican society including the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) who hold opposition in the Senate also display a great deal of scepticism towards further economic integration with the U.S. In April 2002, the PRI-dominated Senate denied President Fox permission to visit the U.S., protesting what some opposition party members believed were Fox's increasingly pro-U.S. policies (Serrano, 2003, 62). An article entitled "Travel Ban Reflects Frustration with Fox", written by Kevin Sullivan and published in the *Washington Post* April 11

2002, describes how for the first time in history the Mexican Senate used its constitutional powers over presidential travel to prohibit Fox from travelling to the U.S. and Canada. PRI Senator Silvia Hernandez, president of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that the decision to veto Fox's trip was based on the President's continued reluctance to consult the Senate on important issues. Others also complained that Fox's "cozying up" to Washington had resulted in few changes in the domestic level and had clearly not benefited Mexicans.

In this dissertation I argue that the polarized debate between on the one hand, those who argue that economic integration will lead to political integration, and on the other hand, those who maintain that economic integration will not lead to any ensuing political integration process leads to simplistic and problematic predictions that largely obscure the complex nature of integration in North America.

Central Questions

Several questions emerge from the above discussion of the debate that presently frames the study of political integration in North America. This dissertation addresses the principle question of whether North American economic interdependence has led to pressures for political integration. I ask does economic integration in the form of the NAFTA lead to political integration? Has political integration emerged in North America as a result of NAFTA? If so, how has political integration emerged across policy fields? Put differently, what kind of political integration surfaces in North America and what are the factors driving or impeding political integration?

Thesis and Hypothesis

In this thesis, I examine the patterns of interaction in the North American region in two policy areas: border control and the environment. Based on this analysis, I make a number of points.

In response to my main question does economic integration lead to political integration, I argue that the intensification of economic connections between Canada, the United States and Mexico does not directly lead to political integration. A number of intervening variables including historical processes, prior institutional contexts, existing intersubjective understandings, and disintegrative factors mediate political integration, affecting its rate, shape, and nature. As a result, I argue that any form of political integration in North America is complex and variegated, characterized by an uneven, two-speed development model of integration.

Dominant integration theories present a teleological and inevitable view of the integration process. They believe that economic integration will induce or result in convergent social or political processes or complete political integration (the transference of political authority from the national to supranational level). The North American case demonstrates that although economic integration does produce integrative, centripetal pressures—to ameliorate border management structures; to improve security systems; to address environmental challenges exacerbated by economic pacts; to coordinate transportation infrastructure—it does not follow that a corresponding move to adopt a supranational structure that replaces national authority should be expected *avant la lettre*. Political integration in North America must be understood within a framework that recognizes how pressures for integration are mediated or filtered by the historical

specificity of the existing Canada-U.S. and U.S.-Mexico relationships, prior institutional contexts (the patterns of interaction developed in each relationship), existing perceptions of “us” and “them”, and a number of disintegrative factors (the asymmetrical nature of the broader trilateral relationship, the prevalence of sovereignty, U.S. unilateral actions, and domestic interests). It is my belief that these factors together will shape the outcome of political integration in North America.

This main hypothesis is supported by evidence derived from two case studies. Additionally, the findings from my case studies offer a response to the question of the manner in which political integration has emerged in North America. I argue that what is generally found in North America is moderate to weak levels of political integration, depending on the policy area at hand (thus accounting for its uneven nature). For example, in the policy area of the environment I found moderate degrees of political integration. This is explained by the existence of an institutionalized space for cooperation that has given the three countries the opportunity to modify the intersubjective framework. Institutions act as critical intervening variables in that they provide a forum for interaction, which allows actors to become familiar with each other, develop trust and confidence, thereby leading to opportunities to alter the cognitive framework. Higher levels of institutionalization, combined with more positive attitudes in the intersubjective area (positive feelings towards each other, more friendliness, an increase in trust, high levels of confidence in each other, increased communication), resulted in greater movement towards political integration and fewer asymmetries.

By contrast, the area of border control is characterized by much lower levels of political integration. Even though strong movement towards increased cooperation exists

in this area, the lack of a stable institutional framework within which to deal with border issues limits opportunities for intersubjective development, which is necessary to lay the groundwork for achieving higher planes of political integration. The result is high levels of cooperation within a context fraught with asymmetrical and disintegrative factors, suggesting that integration can be high in the area of cooperation, but comparatively low in the intersubjective domain. The latter illustrates the uneven nature of political integration in North America. Additionally, the findings of the border-control case study prove that despite high levels of cooperation, there does not have to be an analogous move towards political integration. Cooperation can function alongside high levels of disintegrative factors leading to no movement towards political integration.

Moreover, political integration in North America is two-speed in nature¹. By this I mean that political integration is more advanced between Canada and the U.S. than between the U.S. and Mexico. Canada and the U.S. share a much more institutionalized relationship, one marked by cooperation and positive attitudes, thus accounting for the more advanced rates of political integration. The less institutionalized and more contentious history of U.S.-Mexico relations has resulted in much lower levels of political integration to date, despite President Fox's intentions. The result is the emergence of a varied, two-speed integration model capable of accounting for the uneven

¹ The EU is also varied and complex. Indeed, presently, the EU is grappling with how best to balance the uniformity goals with the multi-speed and varied reality of the EU. Three main approaches are contributing to this debate about the nature of European integration, a "multiple-speed Europe", an "a la carte Europe", and a Europe based on 'variable geometry'. All three approaches recognize that the ability of member states to participate in the EU will vary due to diverse geopolitical interests, socio economic structure and historical experiences. The approaches differ in how they view this process unfolding and what general prescriptions member states should follow (See Donnelly and Hawes 2004, www.fedtrust.co.uk/admin/uploads/PolicyBrief7.pdf). In the North American case, there is virtually no official recognition that a two-speed process is in operation, what the implications are for the future of the North American region, and what actions should be taken to address this imbalance.

nature of political integration in North America. Political integration in North America is uneven and asymmetrical. Hence, in order to challenge the simplistic conclusions reached by dominant integration theories, and to more adequately address the complex nature of the integration process in North America, I situate my research in an institutionalist-constructivist framework that is specifically adapted to the case of North America.

In order to capture the multivariate and complex nature of political integration in North America, I adopted a neo-institutionalist-constructivist approach. This particular combination is, I believe, the best approach with which to highlight important socio-political variables at work in the integration process. This is not to say that economic variables do not play a role and are irrelevant. Indeed, in the North American region it is economic forces that in part influenced state actors' decisions to pursue the NAFTA in the first place. Additionally, in the current post-9/11 context, it is the business sector that has been particularly active in pushing forward proposals for the harmonization of a broad range of policies that extend the market liberalization project—a factor that has ramifications for North America as a region (McDougall, 2004, 28). Economic drivers do not, however, adequately explain some of the social and political forces that I point to as mediators of political integration. Economic drivers interact with other political and social variables to produce political integration. By focusing on the socio-political dimensions, I believe we gain a more complete understanding of the integration process in North America.

I argue in this thesis that part of the confusion surrounding the debate on the political dimensions of the NAFTA stems from two issues: one, the Euro-centric nature of integration theories, and two, the fact that the North American integration experience

has been analyzed from predominantly economic-oriented standpoints. Turning to the first point, many scholars of integration base their analysis and conclusions about North American integration on the European experience. For instance, Robert Pastor stresses that one need only look at “the longest-lasting, most successful experiment in integration among sovereign states—the European Union[—…]” to arrive at implications for the North American integration experience (Pastor, 2001, 8). Similarly, Peter Smith, a scholar of the Americas states that the Americas “have much to learn from the European Community” (Smith, 1993, 2). In his book-length study of regional integration, Smith explores the topic by focusing on the European experience and generating guidelines for the Western Hemisphere. As Smith states: “We distil lessons from the European experience and try to imagine what would happen if they were applied to the Western Hemisphere” (Smith, 1993, 2-3). The use of the European model as a benchmark for comparison is certainly not surprising considering that, as discussed in the next chapter, the founders of integration theories based their findings and indeed their entire theories on the direct experience of Europe in the post-War period. Thus, as Rosamond states:

The founders of integration theory imagined that generalizations would emerge from their intensive case study of the European communities. The results could then generate hypotheses for the study of regional integration in a more general sense. Such aspirations are made explicit in the work of the early theorists of European integration, such as Karl Deutsch (1957), Ernst Haas (1961;1968), Phillippe Schmitter (1971), Joseph Nye (1971), and were more or less integral to the foundations of the *Journal of Common Market Studies* in 1962 (Rosamond, 2000, 16).

The Euro-centric nature of traditional integration theories have led scholars to export and apply these theories and their findings to the North American case even though the regions differ. In terms of origin and founding purpose, for instance, the EU and NAFTA are significantly different. The EU’s origin had to do with the devastating

effects of two wars that consequently prompted the European leaders to construct a deliberately united Europe. As the European preamble to the treaty for the European Coal and Steel Community notes, the European establishment of a community or union would replace “age old rivalries” and bring together “peoples long divided by bloody conflict” (cited in Pastor, 2001, 28). Second, the Europeans have constructed a complex institutional infrastructure to support the political integration project. Institutions like the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court all function as supranational entities that direct EU policies and uphold the end goal of uniting member countries into an integrated Europe (Pastor, 2001, 29). Third, notwithstanding economic and social differences, the European member countries are more balanced and equal in terms of power. Indeed, one of the most important goals of the EU is to reduce the disparities between its wealthy and poor members. EU structural aid policies help to achieve relative social and economic parity, in an effort to reduce the gap between rich and poor members (Pastor, 2001, 29). In contrast, NAFTA was created in response to purely economic interests, with goals designed to eliminate barriers to trade and create a secure market that increased the competition of firms (Pastor, 2001, 96). Moreover, North American leaders intentionally avoided creating an institutional structure to channel the integration project. In fact, the North American region is practically devoid of supranational institutions. The institutions that do exist, like the NAFTA Free Trade Commission or the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), are minimalist in composition and possess limited powers (Mckinney, 2000, 243).

Perhaps the most important feature that differentiates the North American region from Europe is the imbalanced and asymmetrical nature of the trilateral relationship

between the three countries. The sheer political and economic magnitude of the U.S. puts Mexico and Canada at a considerable disadvantage when dealing with the U.S., resulting in power asymmetries between Canada, the U.S., and Mexico (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002, 180). The co-existence of a political heavy-weight with two much smaller, much weaker powers and the asymmetries generated by their interaction, to a large extent, structures the North American complex.² Associated with this is the fact that although each country is an equal partner in NAFTA, the North American economic landscape is, in reality, constituted by two separate bilateral relationships: Canada-U.S. on the one hand, and Mexico-U.S. on the other.³ Integration in North America is also shaped by much more pronounced disintegrative pressures when compared to the EU, such as loss-of-sovereignty claims, domestic issues, and unilateral attitudes due to the existence of a U.S. hegemon. These four distinct features challenge the relevancy of transferring the European model of integration to

² The EU is also characterized by asymmetries, however, they are not as pronounced or as overwhelming as those that define North America. Jennifer Welsh explains that no country in modern history has come even remotely close to the United States' current hegemony in the world system, whether viewed through an economic, military, or political lens. Even Germany, the largest power in the enlarged EU, has much more limited powers than the U.S. (See Welsh 2004, 35). Moreover, the EU has a "built-in counter-asymmetric" system that through various institutional mechanisms and a qualified majority voting system in the Council of Ministers mitigates the potential power of any one state from controlling the whole system (See Clarkson 2002, 26). Compare this to NAFTA's purposefully-weak institutional structure accompanied by a superpower that is highly skeptical and suspicious of institutions that might diminish its sovereignty.

³ There are of course multiple and even bilateral relationships operating in the EU context. Subgroups of member states cooperate on special issues that are of particular interest to them. For instance, in 1985, West Germany, France and Benelux countries cooperated outside the framework of the EU to create what eventually was referred to as Schengen cooperation, in order to facilitate passport-free travel across national boundaries. In the European literature this concept is referred to as 'close cooperation', or the idea that member states can engage in certain European projects that do not involve all member states. However, as stipulated in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, the expectation is that 'close cooperation' be aimed at furthering or contributing to the goals of the Union. Additionally, 'close cooperation' is open to all member states who wish to participate in the project. Indeed, in the case of Schengen cooperation most EU member states eventually joined the agreement (See Donnelly and Hawes 2004, www.fedtrust.co.UK/admin/uploads/PolicyBrief7.pdf). By contrast, in the North American case, the lack of a common North American trilateral space in which to cooperate means that bilateral relationships tend to dominate.

North America and point to important political and social variables in the North American region that are left unaddressed by core integration theories.

The North American Reality

To further shed light on the geographic, political, economic, and socio-cultural realities that uniquely define North America, I will briefly outline certain empirical realities that define North America as a region.

North America constitutes the largest economic region in the world. North America is inhabited by about 413 million people, and together the three countries yield 37 per cent of annual total global economic output. Gross Domestic Product for the continent was valued at US\$11.5 trillion in 2001, a figure equivalent to the economic output of the EU and Japan combined (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002, 39). From the outset, it is apparent that NAFTA conjoined three very different countries. Although each has in common a shared economic space, there exist significant economic and social differences between them. The U.S. is, by far, the economically dominant partner, accounting for close to 89 per cent of all North American economic output in 2001. Canada is the eighth largest economy in the world and the second largest in the region. In stark contrast stands Mexico, a developing country where economic production in 2001 was slightly over US\$9,000 per individual. Mexico ranks 55th in the world based on GDP per capita. Additionally, quality of life indicators put the U.S. and Canada well ahead of Mexico, who lags far below its North American partners in most indicators. For instance, in terms of literacy rates, Canada and the U.S. surpass Mexico by nearly 10 per cent. As well, Canada, and to a certain extent

the U.S., have more evenly distributed income, whereas Mexico faces significant income disparities and poverty problems (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002, 39).

Table 1.1

Comparative Statistics for NAFTA Countries				
		Canada	U.S.	Mexico
Total population (millions)	2000	30.8	283.2	98.9
GDP per capita (PPP \$U.S.)	\$	27,840	34,142	9,023
	Ranking	7	2	55
UN Human Development Index Ranking	2000	3	6	54
Income inequality (share of income – in %)	Poorest 10%	2.8	1.8	1.3
	Richest 10%	23.8	30.5	41.7
Life expectancy at birth (years)	1970-1975	73.2	71.5	62.4
	2000	78.8	77.0	72.6
Total fertility rate (per woman)	1970-1975	2.0	2.0	6.5
	1995-2000	1.6	2.0	2.8
Infant mortality rate (per thousand)	1970	19.0	22.0	79.0
	2000	6.0	7.0	25.0
Adult literacy rate (% age 15 and older)	1985	99.0	99.0	85.3
	2000	99.0	99.0	91.4

Source: UN Human Development Report – 2002

Political differences also differentiate the three countries. For instance, Peter Smith highlights the fact that Canada is a parliamentary electoral system, whereas Mexico and the U.S. have a presidential system. He also distinguishes federalism from “provincial/state autonomy which tends to be relatively higher in Canada, (although possibly changing) low in Mexico, and intermediate in the United States” (Chambers and Smith, 2002, 7). Additionally, cultural differences also separate Canada and the U.S. from Mexico. Mexico, for instance, has historically defined itself as a Latin American country and Spanish is the dominant language. Notwithstanding the French Canadian population, or minority groups in the U.S. like Latinos, Canada and the U.S., unlike Mexico, share a British link and similar English-speaking dominant groups. It is not

surprising, thus, that there exists little impetus for a North American *projet de société* among the civil societies and publics of the three countries. Public opinion polls repeatedly show that the North American public remains indifferent about a North American identity and attached to “maintaining differences in national public values and separate political identities” (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002, 42). Nevertheless, despite some of these strong differences, no one can deny the intensification of economic links between the three countries.

Chapter Two outlines in detail how almost fifteen years after the inception of NAFTA, trade and investment among the three North American partners has reached unprecedented proportions. The U.S. is the largest trader within NAFTA, with bilateral trade-flows with Canada and Mexico reaching \$930 billion in 2001, an increase of close to 350 per cent since the 1990s. Canada has witnessed the slowest growth of bilateral trade, with bilateral flows to and from Canada 189 per cent higher in 2001 than 11 years earlier—signifying a 215 per cent increase in exports in conjunction to a 157 per cent jump in imports. Of the three countries, Mexico has made the most gains in trade, with bilateral trade with Canada and the U.S. increasing by a total of 431 per cent since the early 1990s. Mexico’s total trade with Canada and the U.S. in 2001 was \$376 billion (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002, 54-5).

The increase in trade since NAFTA affects each of the three bilateral relationships, demonstrating the extent to which the North American economies are connected. The bilateral trade relationship between Canada and the U.S. is the most important, totalling \$569 billion in 2001, which is a 185 per cent increase over 1990 levels. In comparison, Canada and Mexico share the smallest bilateral trade relationship,

exchanging \$14.8 billion in merchandise exports in 2001. Although small, this number is growing. Thus the Canadian and Mexican trade relationship represents the fastest growing bilateral trade relationship. Bilateral trade has increased between the two countries by 517 per cent since 1990. The U.S. and Mexico share the second largest bilateral trade relationship in the region, with both countries exchanging goods valued at \$361 billion in 2001. The trade between the two countries has grown by 428% since 1990 and thus exceeds the growth in trade between Canada and the U.S. from 1990 to 2001 (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002, 58-67).

The variations between the three NAFTA partners and the differences that distinguish North America from the EU indicate that there exist key political factors that not only define the North American region, but that shape the rate and nature of political integration. Simplistic explanations of integration derived from European based theories miss these important factors. To complicate matters even more, theories that have most closely been associated with the North American integration experience are economic in nature, relegating important political and social forces to the background. For instance, the ideas underlying first the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and later NAFTA were based on neo-liberalism. Moreover, neo-liberal tenets of reduced state intervention, unfettered markets, and minimal regulatory institutions have fundamentally influenced the form of one-dimensional, economic-based integration presently found in North America. Additionally, the main theoretical framework that has arisen to challenge the neo-liberal basis of North American integration tends to be economicist. Critical international political economy (IPE), although problematizing the very underpinnings of neo-liberal prescriptions, largely focuses on the relevancy of the economic domain in

shaping society to the exclusion of other important political, social, and cultural forces. Thus, while critical IPE might be useful in elucidating certain variables in the integration process (e.g. how the business sector in all three countries is pushing for deepened integration to abolish national differences that pose barriers to increased economic integration and how this force might influence the political integration process), this approach on its own offers an incomplete assessment.

The study of North American integration is caught between the European models on the one hand, and economic-oriented approaches on the other, blinding it to the specificities of the North American case. As I argued earlier, the historical specificity of each bilateral relationship, the prior ideas and assumptions, the broader asymmetrical trilateral relationship, and the disintegrative factors like sovereignty claims and domestic interests mediate the process of North American political integration. For instance, prior historical processes, the patterns of interaction developed in each relationship, and past models of communication and contact mediate the political integration process in North America. Thus as Gabriel Jimenez, and Macdonald note:

In fact, Mexico's relative underdevelopment and resulting pressures for-out migration to the far wealthier U.S. economy, as well as a long history of hostility, conflict and mutual misunderstanding with the United States and lack of contact with Canada, threaten to impede Mexico's ability to be treated as equal within the North American context (Gabriel, Jimenez and Macdonald, 2003: 36-37).

Mexico's history of conflict with the United States, in contrast to the friendlier and more institutionalized history of Canada-U.S. relations, results in a variegated, two-speed integration model, which accounts for the uneven nature of North American integration. Simplistic regional integration models that merely export European generalizations miss these important factors. Similarly, economic-oriented critical IPE

and neo-liberal approaches that have arisen in the North American context also fail to capture some of the specificities that shape the North American region. They subsume important social and political dimensions under the economic sphere (Rosamond, 2000: 85). Thus, for instance, they fail to interrogate the role of institutions in the integration process. How then do institutions act as intervening variables that alter the political integration process? What role might cooperation dynamics have in the integration process? Economic based approaches have difficulty conceptualizing these important dimensions that exert some influence on the integration process.

Additionally, some of these theories adopt a mechanistic and automatic view of the integration process that miss some of the factors at work that account for the complex and varying nature of the regional integration. For example, neofunctionalism, the most well-known theory of integration, itself derived from the European experience, maintains that integration in one sector will “spill over” into other sectors (O’Brien, 1995, 696). Absent, however, is an adequate analysis of what causes actors to decide that “spillover” is necessary or that supranational institutions are best-suited to serve their needs. Similarly, critical IPE and neo-liberal approaches to integration overemphasize the role the economic system plays in structuring society. These views miss some of the factors at work that not only account for the complex and varying nature of the regional integration process, but that define North American political integration. It should be noted here that the same criticism can be levelled at the institutional framework that I use to analyze political integration in the North American context. Institutional theories lack an adequate analysis of agency. They simply assume that actors will create institutions to facilitate cooperation, but they do not seek to inquire if cooperation in an institutional

context has any transformative effects. Institutionalists, thus, do not interrogate the intersubjective side of cooperation and fail to determine whether practices of cooperation change ideas of self and other, us and them.

This type of formulation obscures the complexities of the North American case. As we will see when we look at recent border control policies in North America, the case study of the borders demonstrates that more cooperation does not necessarily lead to a positive move towards political integration. Cooperation can take place within an advanced asymmetrical context where high degrees of disintegrative factors operate. The result is little advancement on the intersubjective front and therefore a limited move towards political integration.

European-based and economic theories of integration also lack an adequate analysis of agency. These theories appear to overlook a crucial subjective component of the integration process. The rationalistic assumptions that dominate integration theories prohibit them from attributing more than a minor role to ideational factors like interests, culture and ideas. The consequence is limited analysis of the dynamics of change, transformative processes, and intersubjective practices—all of which are necessary to assess whether, over time, institutionalism, cooperation, and state interaction really do result in identity changes that cause subtle shifts in the behaviour of states, which are capable of triggering a real move towards or away from political integration. By intersubjective factors I refer to trust, confidence, better communication, and stronger interpersonal and professional relationships. These factors can lead to significant positive changes in each partner's view and treatment of others, shifts in perceptions and worldviews that can induce movement towards political integration. Inversely, by

negative intersubjective factors, I refer to suspicion, mistrust, and malcontent that can cause partners to develop or intensify negative views of each other, which can cause a move away from or a reversal of the political integration process.

In other words, analyzing political integration solely by evaluating the role of institutions and cooperation is simply not enough, due to the fact that it is possible to have high levels of cooperation and institutionalism without a corresponding positive move towards political integration. This is certainly the case in the area of border controls, where U.S. anxieties over security after 9/11 have prompted calls for fortified borders within North America. Consequently, in order to protect their interests, Canada and Mexico have promoted “Smart Borders”, a move that reflects less of a genuine move to construct continental security structures and more of a desire on the part of Canada and Mexico to avoid the U.S.’s “heavy handed security measures” (Gabriel, Jimenez and Macdonald, 2003, 9).

I make the case, then, that due to their underlying assumptions, these theories are unable to acknowledge the varied and complex nature of integration. Integration is not so straightforward, and it is characterized by a variety of push and pull factors that shape its rate and nature.

Political Integration in the North American Context

Based on the particularities of the North American case, I develop my own definition of political integration. I advance a more flexible definition of political integration that, unlike Haas and Lindberg’s definition, does not immediately seek to impose a new legal or political superstructure over Canada, the U.S., or Mexico’s own

national systems. I define high political integration as made up of three elements: formal institutions with organizational components attached to them, a coordinated cooperation framework, and high levels of positive forms of intersubjectivity resulting in a shared “we” identification. Formal institutions with organizations attached to them are necessary because they provide a rule-bound space where countries can interact and get to know each other.

My interpretation of political integration acknowledges that a cooperation framework with clear guidelines, roles, and rules for cooperation is vital. A cooperation framework also recognizes that there are areas of mutual interest that require coordinated and strategic management. I also acknowledge that failure to cooperate in areas of deep interdependence could result in economic or security consequences. As a result, developing complimentary or comparatively similar policies is beneficial to all parties. My definition of political integration supposes that some degree of a shared sense of common identity or mutual obligation is involved, to the extent that separate political actors develop a sense of camaraderie, collegiality and feel that it is important and even natural to work together in the management of transnational problems.

In this sense I define political integration as the process whereby separate countries are joined together to harness their ability in resolving mutually recognized challenges. This definition of political integration, like Schwanen's Treaty of North America model, recognizes that at present, the countries of North America are not yet ready to erect supranational institutions. Accordingly, my definition of political integration emphasises practices of cooperation and coordination that allow countries to pursue sovereign agendas without compromising existing linkages, institutions, and

integrative processes in North America.

Joseph Nye simply defines integration as “forming parts into a whole or creating interdependence” and then breaks down the concept of integration into economic, social and political integration (Nye 1968, 2001, 858).

Nye observes that scholars of integration have widely used Bela Balassa’s conceptualization of economic integration. Balassa defines economic integration as the “abolition of discrimination between economic units belonging to different national states” (Nye 1968, 2001, 860). Balassa also suggests five classifications of economic integration ranging from the most minimal form of economic integration—a free trade area, to the highest form—complete economic integration (Nye, 1968, 860).

Social integration refers to the study of transactions between states and can be defined as “the creation of transnational society or the abolition of national impediments to the free flow of transactions” (Nye 1968, 2001, 861). Nye suggests that “of the three types of integration, political integration is by far the most ambiguous and difficult [to define]” (Nye 1968, 2001, 864). He adds that to arrive at a more clear conception of integration, it is useful to focus on four measures or subsets of political integration: degree of institutionalization, policy integration, attitudinal integration, and security community (Nye 1968, 2001, 865). I use two of Nye’s categories of political integration and build on his model by adding degree of cooperation to evaluate and obtain a well rounded and comprehensive picture of political integration in North America. Additionally, as I will point out later, each category also corresponds to either the institutional or constructivist theoretical frame of reference.

First, I begin by examining levels of institutionalization. Note that I only examine

degree of institutionalization in the environment case study, where formal institutional structures exist, and not in the borders case study, which is an example of a non-institutionalized policy area. I analyze degree of institutionalization by focusing both on organizational design features, or what some refer to as “formal authority,” and on informal authority. By formal authority I mean what Mumme and Moore refer to as the “policymaking activities of any executive agency called its autonomy” (Mumme and Moore, 1990, 663). They go on to note that by formal authority they mean the degree to which an agency has policy discretion in a given area (Mumme and Moore, 1990, 663). Formal authority is derived from organizational features like the rules and procedures that define an institution such as their mandate, enforcement capabilities, and public participation mechanisms. These aspects of organizational design guide and constrain the actions of member governments that participate in institutional settings, thereby orienting them towards the achievement of a specific goal. I examine organizational design features like enforcement, public participation mechanisms, and mandates in order to gauge their impact on governmental actors. I also consider informal authority when evaluating levels of institutionalization. Haas, Levy and Keohane maintain that in an environment where sovereign states are the principle agents it is unrealistic to think that institutions can effectively constrict government action and remain autonomous by exercising enforcement powers (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993, 394). Rather, institutions can be effective by making use of informal sources of power. Mumme and Moore explain it this way: “informal authority arises not by statute, but from the resource endowment, substantive functions, political context, and other variable and subjective factors...which affect the practical influence and policy discretion of the agency in its administrative and

political environment" (Mumme and Moore, 1990, 663). Institutions can exercise informal authority by encouraging cooperation and building epistemic communities that alter policy direction. Hence, even if an institution is weak in the institutional design domain (enforcement powers and public participation mechanisms) it can still influence policy directions.

The second category that I use to evaluate political integration in North America is degree of cooperation. In order to do so, I use regime theory, a subset of institutional theory. Regime theory borrows heavily from institutional theory. But rather than stressing the importance of purposefully designed, formal institutions above all else, regime theory studies the less formal interaction of state activities, or regimes, and postulates that cooperation can occur without the existence of formal organizational structures. Keohane states that regimes are decentralized, loose structures that provide a framework that facilitates cooperation.

Regime theory is particularly well suited to examine the non-institutionalized policy area of border control. Regime theory also provides a viable definition of cooperation that I can use to gauge degrees of cooperation. Cooperation can be defined as the process whereby the behaviour of separate states "are brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation which has been referred to as policy coordination" (Keohane, 1984, 51). Cooperation occurs when "actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination" (Keohane, 1984, 51). Acts or practices of cooperation can take the form of agreements, accords, work groups, memorandums of understanding, and other informal activities. The assumption is that as instances of cooperation increase, state actors get to

know each other better, communicate more effectively, and develop understanding, confidence and trust, which leads to beneficial arrangements that reduce institutional deficiencies and market failures, and, most importantly, to cooperation.

The final category I use to assess political integration in North America is the existence of positive or negative forms of intersubjectivity. Golob explains that intersubjectivity is composed of two equal and interconnected dimensions of the self: “a subjective self-schema, or the story one tells to oneself about what makes the self unique, and an intersubjective assessment of the meaning of the self and its role in a society of states based upon how one is viewed by others” (Golob, 2002, 11). Policy actors thus form behaviour and action based upon these two elements. By positive or negative forms of intersubjectivity I am referring to signs or symbols that would indicate either the existence of trust, confidence, and strong communication, or inversely, those signs that signal suspicion, mistrust, ill feelings, and negative sentiments as characterizing how actors view and treat each other. These intersubjective factors will to some degree determine whether a move against or in favour of political integration will take place.

To inquire into the logic of intersubjectivity, whether positive or negative, and its effect on state behaviour, I use constructivist theory. Constructivism allows me to gauge whether cooperation and actor interaction has had transformative effects on the interests and behaviours of all three states. Put differently, I ask whether cooperation has led to the internalization of new understandings, new roles, and ideas—transformations that produce shifts in behaviour of states. In turn, the latter shifts may lead to a move toward or away from political integration, thus an assessment of them is integral to assessing political integration in North America. So, in the U.S.-Mexico case, for example, I

question whether cooperation in the post-NAFTA era has eradicated historical feelings of mistrust and suspicion, or whether already existing negative feelings have simply intensified. By shedding light on the nature of discourses, constructivism allows me to discern which of these possibilities has prevailed. Simply evaluating political integration from an institutional and cooperative dimension will not produce an accurate picture of integration in North America, as high levels of institutionalism and cooperation can operate in conjunction with low levels of negative forms of intersubjectivity. To evaluate discursive shift, or what I refer to as intersubjective understandings, I will examine integration discourse—the language of integration—for evidence of transformative processes.

I then use these three categories to develop a scheme that allows me to differentiate between levels of integration: high, medium, and low. Each level corresponds to one of the subtypes of political integration. Table 1.2 illustrates the varying levels of political integration that can exist and how each relates to its subtype.

Table 1.2

	Degree of Institutionalism	Degree of Cooperation	Intersubjective Factors
High Political Integration	Existence of strong organizational structure that constrains the actions of member governments through powerful enforcement mechanisms and strong public participation instruments.	A coordinated system of management. An existing framework of cooperation. The existence of agencies with clear roles in the cooperation process and with clear cooperation mandates. High levels of cooperation with NGOs.	High levels of positive factors like trust, confidence, friendliness and communication. Positive interpersonal relationships between political actors. Identity shifting processes that result in positive outlooks towards each other. Perception changes in worldviews.
Medium Political Integration	Existence of weak organizational structure that is dependant on governments. Institutions with weak enforcement powers and poor public participation instruments. However, does contain informal authority capabilities that produce the conditions by which cooperation is facilitated.	The slow development of a cooperation framework. An uncoordinated system of management with no clear cooperation mandate or agency roles. Some contact with NGOs exist.	Existence of some disintegrative factors such as claims to sovereignty. Operation of asymmetrical relations. Some feelings of mistrust and suspicion exists easily resulting in misunderstanding and poor communication. However, all these factors are not so strong that they can totally block action.
Low Political Integration	No evidence of organizational capabilities attached to the institution. Informal powers are weak, thus it is unable generate cooperation.	No development of a cooperation framework. Reactive and sporadic contact between officials. Contact exists only when crisis or urgent situation develops. Limited to no contact with NGO groups.	High rates of negative disintegrative factors in operation such as loss of sovereignty claims, domestic factors, nationalist sentiments that interfere with or at times block cooperation. Strong feelings of suspicion, distrust, ill will lead to limited communication.

The above table draws distinctions between three levels of political integration. High or deep integration is characterized at the institutional level by the existence of strong institutions with organizational structures attached to them. These organizational structures contain centralized decision making authority that can override the jurisdiction of previous national settings. Enforcement mechanisms ensure that member countries adhere to a rule-bound framework. Strong public participation mechanisms act as another type of enforcement measure that ensures that actors comply with rules and remain accountable. In the realm of cooperation, high integration is characterized by the existence of a framework of cooperation that includes a mandate for cooperation, clear rules that designate a process for cooperation, the identification of agencies involved in the process, as well as an understanding of their roles. High integration also involves advanced cooperation with NGOs, which are consulted in decision-making processes. Finally, in the intersubjective area, high forms of positive integration lead to positive forms of contact and cooperation. Factors like trust, confidence, positive personal relationships, and strong communication are evident in high levels. This transforms the way state actors perceive the dynamics of self/other, and allows for the constitution and consolidation of group identities. Accordingly, the centripetal, integrative force of positive shared intersubjective understandings—a shared “we”—works to limit the centrifugal pull of disintegrative factors.

High integration serves as a benchmark to produce a description of medium and low integration. Medium or moderate political integration is characterized at the institutional level by the existence of organizational design features like enforcement mechanisms and public consultation mechanisms. These features, however, are not yet

strong enough to constrain action. Moderate levels of institutionalization also contain elements of informal authority that enable institutions to ensure conditions that will facilitate cooperation. In terms of cooperation, medium levels of integration are characterized by the slow development of a cooperation framework. This framework is not yet at an advanced stage and lacks both clear rules of cooperation and well defined agency-roles in the cooperation process. Additionally, only some contact with NGOs is in evidence. For example, state actors may pursue cooperation with NGOs for purely instrumental reasons, without incorporating their demands or view points into policy. On the intersubjective side, moderate political integration includes some discernible feelings of mistrust and suspicion, which leads to misunderstanding between state actors because of poor communication and contact. In addition, disintegrative factors such as asymmetrical power relations and sovereignty claims are present; however, these are not so overwhelming as to completely block action.

Low or weak political integration is mainly characterized by the existence of very weak institutions with no organizations attached to them. These institutions do not have the power to execute their mandates and they are highly dependant on governments; they have weak public participation mechanisms and their enforcement capacities are severely limited. Cooperation consists of sporadic contact between officials, occurring only when an urgent situation requires it. Low integration is also characterized by high levels of disintegrative factors (e.g. sovereignty demands) and shows signs of limited to no positive movement in the intersubjective area. Negative forms of intersubjective factors are present, preventing the creation of a functioning framework of cooperation.

Before closing this section, two factors should be noted. First, it is important to

clarify that degree of institutionalization, if defined solely as meaning complete independence from external influence, is misleading (Mumme and Moore, 1990, 664). Rather, as I mentioned earlier, it is important to examine an institution's informal authority, such as its ability to generate cooperation. An institution, thus, may be deemed institutionally deficient (in the organizational sense) if evaluated on the basis of structural features, but may achieve moderate levels of institutionalization if its informal attributes are taken into account.

Second, it should be highlighted that the intersubjective level acts as the primary intervening variable causing a real shift from one stage of integration to another. Evidence from both case studies demonstrates that, for example, high levels of cooperation can coexist with negative intersubjective factors (low degrees of intersubjectivity, as defined by my table), leading me to deduce that the level of intersubjectivity is the deciding factor. If there is strong evidence of positive forms of intersubjectivity, then this should correspond with a shift towards higher levels of political integration. On the other hand, if strong levels of cooperation exist alongside low degrees of intersubjectivity, there will be no corresponding shift in levels of political integration and political integration will remain shallow or low.

Methodology

The above arguments are developed through an analysis of state interaction in both the case study of the borders and environment during the pre-NAFTA and NAFTA eras. I focus on the period beginning a few years before the implementation of the 1993 NAFTA, through to its inception, and up until NAFTA's 10 year anniversary in January

2004. Examining this specific time period enables me to document how NAFTA has affected political integration. Additionally, I also include an analysis of North American borders in the post-9/11 era in order to gauge the particular impact of 9/11 on political integration. The merit of choosing these two particular case studies is that one allows me to examine political integration with the existence of institutions, while the other allows me to assess political integration in North America in the absence of an institutional structure. The environment is an example of an institutionalized policy area due to the many bilateral institutions and the existence of the trilateral CEC, which provides a trilateral institutionalized area for environmental cooperation. The existence of institutions will allow me to assess whether they are a necessary component of the integration process. Do institutions really facilitate cooperation? The case study of the environment proves that although institutionalization is relatively weak (limited enforcement powers, poor public participation mechanisms and funding sources), the mere existence of an institutionalized space or forum within which to cooperate, provided by the environmental side accord, has allowed countries to construct a framework for cooperation that enables other positive forms of intersubjective factors to develop. Despite the existence of disintegrative factors, countries have some means to address them, which, in the long run, may lead to higher levels of political integration.

As mentioned earlier, the policy area of border control in North America is defined by lower levels of political integration. Borders provide an example of a non-institutionalized policy area, insofar as they contain no organizational structures. There exists no bilateral or trilateral organization that regulates borders. Rather, what exists is a series of instances of cooperation—like bilateral accords and agreements—that function

to manage borders and, in effect, constitute a regime. This is certainly the case in the area of borders, where cooperation has increased at an unprecedented rate, especially post 9/11, despite an absence of institutions. Cooperation is being driven by practical issues such as transnational problems and crises that force countries to cooperate.

My analysis of political integration in the North American context is important because, to date, no one has undertaken a serious study of North American integration that evaluates with clear categories of integration across policy domains. Rather, what exist are general predictions about whether integration exists or not, without clear indicators to verify the nature and rate of political integration in North America. My study will directly contribute to knowledge in the area of North America, so that policy makers will be able to begin to think strategically about how to address the changing North American landscape. Additionally, my study is innovative because of its theoretical contributions to integration studies. For instance, notwithstanding Roussel and Golob's contributions, my application of constructivism to North America is somewhat novel. Prior studies have largely applied constructivism to the European model and thus the North American case was deprived of valuable insights that shed a new light on the integration process. As well, my particular application of an institutional-constructivist framework to the study of North American integration not only challenges the dominance of either Euro-centric or economicistic approaches to the study of integration, but also makes its own innovative theoretical contribution.

Given that I took a constructivist approach to studying political integration, I relied on semi-structured interviews in order to tap attitudes. In order to ensure confidentiality and to ascertain that interview subjects were comfortable with divulging

information, I addressed confidentiality in the consent form that interviewees were asked to review and sign. The consent form explained the techniques I used to protect interviewee confidentiality and ensure anonymity. I coded interview subjects with numbers. For example, government representatives were coded as 00 and then a number was added. So the first government representative was coded as 001. Records of interview data and audio recordings were stored in a locked cabinet in my home office. The consent form also delineated an interview subject's rights. Interview subjects had the right to stop the interview at any time. If the interview subject wished to exercise this right, the interview-material already gathered was immediately destroyed in front of the interviewee. Apart from interviews, I consulted a broad range of primary documentation such as parliamentary debates; I analysed periodicals, leaders' statements, and public opinion polls to determine whether or not subjective factors in favour of political integration were present. The evaluation of a variety of sources allowed me to cross-reference interview data. I should mention at this point that, for the most part, I focused on the attitudes and opinions of federal actors in the three countries who handle the North American file and those who work on the North American environment and border files. Federal actors define whether integration is in the best interest of their country and are active in strategically designing the future of North America. Having said this, I recognize that the nation-state is not a unitary actor and that sub-federal actors like state and provincial officials play a role. It is important to keep in mind that the attitudes of civil society actors and, more particularly, the dynamic between state and civil society actors will exert some influence on the shape and rate of political integration in North America.

A second benefit of using this framework to study political integration in North America is that it enables me to formulate a series of general conclusions about the integration process in North America. I can do this because my methodological framework allows me to look at each subtype of integration in relation to other subtypes. Put differently, I can examine each subtype of political integration alone, or in relation to other subtypes. For example, the case study of the borders demonstrates that high levels of cooperation can exist in the absence of institutions. My methodological framework would thus allow me to attribute less causal significance to institutions in the case of the borders. As well, this approach allows me to account for and explain the uneven and varied nature of political integration in North America. Again, by examining the case study of the border, I can clearly differentiate between more advanced levels of political integration in operation at the Canada-U.S. border, compared to much lower levels of political integration found at the U.S.-Mexico border. A history of mistrust, ill-feeling, and conflict, combined with lower levels of institutionalization and even lower levels of discursive integration, account for the limited levels of political integration found at the U.S.-Mexico border. There also exist different levels of political integration depending on what policy area is being studied. For instance, in the area of the environment there have been moderate levels of political integration, compared to much more limited levels on the border. The NAFTA-created institutions in this policy area created greater scope for cooperation and increased the opportunity to modify cognitive frameworks. Higher levels of institutionalization, combined with more positive attitudes in the discursive area, resulted in greater movements for political integration and less asymmetry.

Data

I carried out research for the dissertation in Ottawa, Mexico City, and Washington D.C. between September 2001 and April 2003. My two year employment from 1999-2001 as the North American integration officer in the then U.S. Division of Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) in Ottawa enabled me to gain first-hand knowledge of my topic and easily develop governmental contacts who I could then interview. During the research phase I employed qualitative methods, primarily informal semi-structured interviews with governmental actors of the three countries in each of the two policy areas concerned. I began by conducting six informal interviews with academics and governmental actors in the general area of North America and trilateral relations in order to obtain background information to begin interviewing in the specific policy areas. Once I had a satisfactory understanding of the relevant context, I began formal interviews. In total I conducted 54 interviews: 21 with Canadian officials, 16 with American interviewees and 17 with Mexican government officials and members of academia. The government actors I interviewed were selected because of their key positions in each of the policy areas. I also chose to interview specific governmental employees because they were recommended to me by some of the contacts I had made while working for DFAIT. A list of interview questions is included in Appendix A.

A large part of the information I gained through the interview process and observation activities was confirmed through primary documents such as Ministerial speeches, leaders' statements, and press releases. Additionally, a number of government contacts shared with me some of the first-hand material such as meeting notes, working group minutes, and government decks. I also used a wide range of secondary documents

like academic journals and texts.

Overview of the Thesis

The findings of my research and the arguments developed in this dissertation about the nature of political integration in North America are outlined in greater detail throughout the dissertation. In Chapter One, I situate the project within the theoretical literature on integration. I review traditional European-based and economic-based theories of integration and sustain that political integration in North America is best investigated through an institutionalist-constructivist lens. The identification of integration within the confines of the European model right from the start prescribes the creation of an overly institutionalized international superstructure. However, the North American case demonstrates that any form of trilateral cooperation and coordination that takes place is not organized along a new supranational level. This is due to the fact that core integration theories overlook factors such as past patterns of communication, attitudes political actors hold about one another, and prior institutional contexts. Any ensuing integration process is filtered through these variables. An institutionalist-constructivist framework, on the other hand, allows me to bring in the contributions of other approaches to integration that shed light on important intervening variables and are thus better adapted to analyzing the North American experience. In Chapter Two, I map the historical forces that have contributed to the formation of North America as a region, with special emphasis on the differences that distinguish the Canada-U.S. and U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationships and some of the asymmetrical and disintegrative variables that define North America as a region. I argue that the specificity of each bilateral relationship, along with the existence

of disintegrative factors, influences the particular rate and nature of political integration. Consequently, political integration is uneven, two-speed, and thoroughly complex. In Chapter Three, I examine the case study of the environment in the pre-NAFTA era. I illustrate how, for the most part, environmental institutions are weak and have poor enforcement and public-participation mechanisms. Additionally, cooperation is organized along bilateral lines. Cooperation is sporadic, and irregular, leading only to limited movement on the intersubjective front. Weak levels of intersubjectivity have an important intervening effect on the nature of integration, one that European-based and economicistic theoretical models do not recognize. Chapter Four introduces the NAFTA environmental framework, where bilateral and trilateral institutions have provided a stable institutional space in which to treat environmental issues. This institutional forum has, in turn, allowed the three countries to engage in a process of cooperation and triggered intersubjective changes that have led to moderate levels of political integration in the policy area of the environment. As well, Chapter Four explains that in the NAFTA era cooperation is structured along trilateral lines, which indicates the existence of a tentative, coordinated North American system in which to manage the environment.

In contrast to the higher levels of political integration in the environment, I demonstrate in Chapter Five that the area of borders is characterized by much weaker levels of political integration. The lack of an organizational framework from which to manage borders signifies that there has been little opportunity for positive forms of intersubjective to develop, thus no corresponding movement towards political integration. Indeed, the border-control policy area challenges the findings of neofunctionalism in general because it demonstrates that cooperation and coordination on border matters does

not lead to the creation of new international structures of political authority.

The findings of Chapter Six further prove the above point. In Chapter Six, I discuss the additional impetus towards cooperation under the new NAFTA framework. In this case, the pressures produced by NAFTA and 9/11 on systems of border management did not result in any corresponding move to the reorganization of national policies along supranational lines. As the chapter explains, cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico and Canada and the U.S. in the NAFTA and post 9/11 eras significantly increased. Despite the increase in cooperation and the new drive towards trilateral security in the form of a North American security perimeter, however, there was no accompanying movement toward higher levels of political integration. Thus political integration in the area of border control remains low.

My conclusion places the North American case and its main findings within integration literature and the broader “deep integration” debate being advanced by certain actors in North America. In addition to shedding light on the political integration process, the North American case advances our understanding of key themes in the study of integration including the relationship between political and economic integration, the role intervening variables like institutions and intersubjective factors play in the integration process, and the uneven and varied nature of integration itself. I find, ultimately, that economic integration does not directly lead to political integration. A variety of push and pull factors mediate the political integration process, including the policy area considered, institutional contexts, and historical processes. I also find that political integration in North America is asymmetrical without any consideration for social and political implications of integration, sovereignty concerns, or the democratic deficit that

currently exists.

Chapter One – Theoretical Approaches to North American Integration

The events in Europe after the Second World War provoked a remarkable amount of theorizing on the causes of integration and whether the formation of supranational governance structures in the economic arena would lead to a wider movement for political integration (Rosamond, 2000: 1). At the time, the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, and later the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1978 had generated a whole set of institutions and instances of cooperation that indicated that Europe was undergoing a period of deep “transformation in which the established patterns of political authority were being radically reordered” (Rosamond, 2000: 10). These post-war European developments led theorists to ponder over what Deutsch calls “[t]he fundamental problem of international organization or how to create the conditions under which stable, peaceful relations among nation states is possible and are likely” (Deutsch, 1970: 33). These issues not only provided a ripe environment for debate about the significance of integration, but also provided a framework in which to think about the nature of integration in general and the specific case of North American integration.

In this chapter I outline the theoretical framework I use to analyze political integration in North America. I begin by reviewing what can be referred to as traditional theories of integration that originated in the European context and delineate how these Euro-centric approaches to integration not only came to dominate the study of integration, but have shaped the very parameters of the concept of integration. I argue that this literature fails to adequately conceptualize the nature of political integration because core integration theories automatically assume that economic integration will

lead to convergent political processes. More concretely, I argue that this theoretical model does not inquire into the particular dynamics that define the North American regional bloc. I sustain that North America is structured by two facets: One, the North American regional bloc is characterized by the co-existence of one superpower and two much weaker powers. The enormous political and economic dominance exercised by the United States puts Canada and Mexico at a significant disadvantage when negotiating with the United States. The political landscape is thus asymmetrical.⁴ These asymmetries in turn generate nationalist responses in each of the weaker countries, which engenders a “sovereignty” discourse that has implications for the broader integration project. Two, the North American region is defined by two separate bilateral relationships: the Canada-U.S and U.S.-Mexico relationship. Any approach to integration must take these tendencies into account because of their ability to place an enormous influence on the shape of a political integration project.⁵ In the case of North America these factors prevent high political integration, as defined by neofunctionalism, from emerging. I then outline the general shift that took place in the study of integration in the 1980s, when the proliferation of regional economic trading blocs in other parts of the world led to the ascendancy of economic theories of integration. It is important to focus on this shift because the study of North American integration is closely associated with economic theories of integration. Finally, I delineate my own approach to North American

⁴ The huge power asymmetries between a powerful U.S. that by far surpass the two much weaker powers in economic fortitude, military capability, population, and cultural influence is fundamental to shaping the North American continent. By contrast, the recently enlarged EU is composed of 25 states all varying in size (See Welsh, 2004). Moreover, the EU is a community where sovereignty is pooled so that asymmetries are less prominent. There is no such system to correct the balance in North America.

⁵ As established in the introductory chapter, the EU is also characterized by bilateral relationships. However, these relationships operate within a multilateral context which over time has taken on increased relevance. In contrast, the lack of a North American “public space” signifies that bilateral relationships prevail.

integration by focusing on the contributions made by alternative approaches that challenge both the Eurocentric and economicistic nature of theories that arose in the context of North American integration. Although a number of approaches, each with their own assumptions, and principles exist to conceptualize integration, I focus largely on neo-institutionalist and constructivist theories, which I believe are most useful in the particular case of North American integration. With a combination of these approaches, I derive whether, and to what extent, political integration exists in North America.

The European Context and the Introduction of Integration Theory

Post-war events in Western Europe led to the formation of theory around the concept of integration. In my introductory chapter I point out that integration is an elusive concept that often defies exact definition. Nye explains that efforts to define integration encounter two different kinds of problems: First, diverse theorists define the concept of integration differently. Second, there are questions as to the effectiveness of comparing regional integration processes. According to Nye, “[v]arious authors have cast doubt upon the similarity of integration processes in Europe and less developed areas” (Nye, 1968, 855). I turn now to the first point about the difficulties inherent in formulating a precise definition of integration.

Even the most simplistic definitions of integration, which define it as constructing a whole out of separate parts or joining together independent units into a new entity, is left open to ambiguity. For instance, integration is often confused with and used interchangeably with intergovernmental cooperation, political unification, and political community (Nye, 1968: 856). For some, integration appears to signify consultation over

foreign policy issues. For federalists, it has meant the establishment of new federal institutions. Others equate integration with ad hoc bargaining between sovereign states, a definition more akin to intergovernmental cooperation than to integration per se (Smith, 1999: 5). Complicating matters even further is the fact that theorists are unsure as to whether integration refers to a process, or to the end product of a process, or both. There are also different types of integration—economic, social, and political—that relate to each other in varying degrees (Nye, 1968: 858). These different types of integration lead to perplexity and, ultimately, to the proliferation of more questions than answers. For example, what levels of economic interdependence must a particular grouping of national economies achieve before being considered integrated? Is the end process of economic integration a customs union, a common market, or a monetary union? Does economic integration lead to political integration, or is it the other way around? Must a certain level of social integration occur before political integration can take place? Clearly, arriving at the meaning of political integration is often a messy, muddled endeavour.

One of the first definitions of political integration can be attributed to Deutsch who defined political integration as the attainment of “institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among [the] population” (cited in Nye, 1968, 857). Here, Deutsch is referring to the specific creation of a security community that does not necessitate the creation of new supranational centres that transcend the nation state. On the other hand, theorists like Haas and Lindberg suppose integration to demand the reordering of national authority into a new supranational area of political activity. More recent literature on integration defines it in broader terms. Rosamond takes William Wallace’s definition as

an example. Here, integration is defined as “the creation and maintenance of intense and diversified patterns of interaction among previously autonomous units” (cited in Rosamond, 2000, 13). The differing versions of integration lead to a number of methodological issues and point to different facets of the political integration process, which, ultimately, adds to the complexity of defining integration.

The second problem associated with political integration has to do with the comparability of regional integration schemes. In other words, can the European integration experience act as a model for broader statements about the integration process? Can the theoretical postulations derived from the study of the European case be transferred to other regional schemes?

Of course integration is not strictly a European occurrence. Mattli notes that integration schemes existed since the 1960s in other regions:

In the 1960s the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), Andean Pact and Central American Common Market were launched. In the 1990s... new integration projects were started in Latin America the most notable being Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR) comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay...In Asia – the most notable regional grouping is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) formed in 1967. In 1992 members agreed to establish gradually an ASEAN Free Trade Area. One of the most rapidly expanding groups in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC). It was launched in 1989 by Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Canada, the United States and the ASEAN countries (Mattli, 1999, 3).

Even though Mattli correctly highlights the diversity of regional integration models, integration theory has traditionally been associated with the most advanced and the largest integration model—that of the European experience. For example, Sweeney draws a close link between the ECSC and neofunctionalism, the earliest theory of integration. She sustains that “the Treaty of Rome which created the European Economic Community in January 1958 also created a laboratory in which neo-functionalists theorists

could extensively investigate just how their idealized constructs would work in the real world" (Sweeney, 1984, 2). Hence, European integration was viewed as a model for integration methods in other parts of the world. Others argue that the European case is a distinct phenomenon that arose out of particular historical conditions and therefore should not be replicated in other regional settings (Rosamond, 2000, 17).

The problem of comparability was first studied by Haas in an essay that juxtaposed the European and universal integration processes. Haas asked what "functional equivalents" could be transferred to other non-European cases. He states, "[e]ven if we cannot transpose processes and blockage[s]...in Europe to Latin America unscathed and unamended, we can specify the conditions in Latin America that may provide alternative media toward the end of greater unity" (Haas, 1966, 316). Haas postulated that successful integration would occur when three background factors were present: pluralistic social structure, high levels of economic and industrial development, and close ideological patterns among participating members (Haas, 1961, 375). Haas concluded that non-European areas would have trouble emulating the European experience due to "strong varying environmental factors" (Haas, 1961: 389). As Haas put it:

I hope to show where the fundamental differences between Western Europe and Latin American economies and political situations limit the applicability of the European model to LAFTA, where the Europe of 1953 is not comparable to the Latin America of 1967 (Haas, 1966-1967: 316).

The issue of the comparability of the European model also resonates in the North American case where recent European expansion has spurred reflection on the feasibility of a similar North American Community. For instance, President Fox of Mexico has avidly promoted a move towards a European-style union. However, as delineated in the

introductory chapter, in terms of origins, purpose, and design, the North American case is significantly different from the European case. With regards to origin, for instance, NAFTA, rather than being driven by deep security interests, is driven by economic motives like dismantling barriers to trade and investment (Pastor, 2001, 96). With regards to purpose, no explicitly political aspirations define the North American case. NAFTA is a free trade area with no common policies to address transnational issues. In terms of design, the EU has an extensive base of supranational institutions that help support, sustain, and propel the integration project forward (O'Brien, 1995, 718). NAFTA, on the other hand, is practically devoid of institutional structure—an intentional decision arrived at by the NAFTA partners. Consequently, the institutions involved were purposely created to be weak with little independence from government (McKinney, 2000, 243). Moreover, the North American case is further complicated by the existence of one powerful partner and two weaker countries making for an imbalanced and asymmetrical trilateral relationship. As Canadian scholar Reg Whitaker put it in his testimony to Canada's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade:

The vastly disproportionate weight of the U.S. within NAFTA means that where political decisions are being made, they are almost invariably the decisions of the U.S. administration and Congress, the courts, and various administrative and regulatory agencies of the U.S. government...Indeed, an important question that remains to be answered is whether, given the power imbalance, the EU example has any relevance for Canada (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002, 180).

The differences that define the North American model will influence and shape the rate and nature of integration, thus theoretical approaches must take these differences into account. Unfortunately, these focuses are absent in much of the literature that takes the European experience as its example. For instance, Rosamond stipulates that neofunctionalism, the theoretical approach most closely associated with integration, "can

be read at one level as a theory provoked by the integration activity among the original six member states (Rosamond, 2000, 10). Neofunctionalism arose directly out of integration activity in Europe. Given traditional integration theories' intimate link with integration tendencies in Western Europe and the ambiguous and hazy nature of defining integration in the first place, it proves difficult to find a theoretical fit for North America. Haas proposes searching for functional equivalents of particular features that propel integration (Haas, 1966-1967, 341). Nye suggests dividing the concept of political integration into different types and developing specific categories for the various subtypes of political integration (Nye, 1968, 856). I focus on political theories that can be specifically adapted to the particular case of North America. To this end, I adopt an institutional-constructivist approach to the study of integration in North America. This approach is not tied to any particular geographical area and, in fact, is imported from general international relations theories that study political phenomena. Additionally, this enables me to evaluate whether and to what extent political integration has occurred in North America by focusing on three aspects of political integration: degree of institutionalization, degree of cooperation, and degree of intersubjectivity—each of which is associated with my chosen theoretical model. But before elaborating on the specific theoretical model that I adopt, I will first focus on what I will call traditional theories of integration that developed as a response to the events that occurred in post-war Europe. These theories set the initial parameters of the theoretical debate that frames the study of integration. Accordingly, it is important to begin with an understanding of the theoretical postulations developed within this context.

Traditional Theories of Integration

What I term “traditional theories” are those that emerged from a critique of realist theories of international politics and went on to dominate the study of political integration. At the time, Europe was recovering from a war that led many International Relations (IR) scholars to contemplate the question of the prevention of war (Rosamond, 2000, 48). As Rosamond states:

What seemed to be at stake in Western Europe were not just the Westphalian nation-state, but also the interstate system that grew outwards from this territorial way of organizing government. The great rows that developed within early IR were about the alleged relationships between the states system and war or, conversely between ‘post-national’ forms of organization and peace (Rosamond, 2000, 1).

The radical reorganization of governance structures in post-war Europe produced a forum for the invention of new theoretical work that could conceptualize events occurring in Europe. Classical realism’s view of world politics and state behaviour in the international arena did not resonate well with the intense interstate cooperation that occurred in Europe.

Realism makes several assumptions about state interaction in the international arena. First, realism is state-centric: proponents believe that states are the most important actors in the international system. Other, non-state actors like multinational corporations and transnational groups thus play a diminished role in world politics (Kauppi and Viotti, 1987, 63). Realists, for the most part, believe that states act according to rational principles. It should be noted that realists concede that states can make poor choices that do not always appear rational. But generally rationality prevails and state actors are able to understand their interests and develop strategies designed to enhance these interests. Thus, as Mayer notes, “actors have stable preferences or interests, consider the alternative choices available to them, predict the consequences of their choices, evaluate likely

outcomes in terms of their interests, and choose the strategy with the highest expected value" (Mayer, 1998, 17). Secondly, realists adopt an inherently conflictive view of the international system. Anarchy is the dominant characteristic of world politics due to the lack of authority above the state (Kauppi and Viotti, 1987, 48). This leads to an absence of an overriding power that can enforce common rules. Thirdly, in this context, self-interested states compete for power and security in the international arena and may use force in pursuit of these interests. Thus in the realist framework, predictions about international outcomes are based largely on the balance of power and the strategic interaction between states (Kauppi and Viotti, 1987, 49-53).

This classical realist view of the world was popular for quite some time because it provided logical and easily understood prescriptions about world politics and the behaviour of states. It also seemed broadly consistent with the nature of the Cold War international system. The anarchic environment of the world system, where there is no principle authority and the risk of war is high, caused states to pursue survival by elevating military and security factors to the forefront in order to maximize their power.

The realist approach was eventually modified and advanced by the arrival of neorealists like Kenneth Waltz. In particular, Waltz was concerned with developing a systemic theory of world politics. Waltz believed that classical realism needed to develop an understanding of structure and how the structural properties of anarchy in particular imposed a set of limits on state interaction in the international arena. According to Waltz, the international system is made up of units (ie. states) that are equal. Rosamond explains it better than I can: the crucial factor is "the distribution of capabilities across units (a system level attribute). This refers to how much power state *a* possesses *in relation* to

state *b*, *c*, and so on. State behaviour will vary with the distribution of capabilities so that structural change will alter patterns of conflict and cooperation" (Rosamond, 2000, 132, original emphasis). For neorealists like Waltz, structure is crucial in accounting for the behaviour of states in the international sphere and how "the structural properties of anarchy provide particular sets of limitations upon possibilities for action in international politics" (Rosamond, 2000, 132). Anarchy can produce some kind of order, but not of a sustained nature because of the competitive and rational character of state interaction in the international arena. This does not, however, signify that cooperation can never take place. States can form alliances and cooperate, but this type of behaviour is conditioned by the issue of relative capabilities. Rosamond thus goes on to say: "[t]he interests and actions of the most powerful states constitute the nature of the system and any alteration in this distribution of capabilities is likely to induce alterations in unit behavior" (Rosamond, 2000, 132).

This neorealist depiction of international relations has some merits. For instance, through its numerous variants, (hegemonic stability theory, balance of threat theory, power-of-the-weak thesis) neorealism can explain some facets of international politics between marginal and much stronger states. It explains how Canada or Mexico, at certain historical conjunctures, might have made "sovereignty" concessions to the U.S. due to asymmetries of power. Neorealism is helpful in clarifying why Canada or Mexico preferred to form an alliance with the U.S. to resolve security dilemmas posed by external threats. But even though neorealist insights highlight certain factors, they remain silent on other factors that I believe are necessary to provide a more complete assessment of the integration process.

For example, Keohane and the neo-liberal institutionalist camp take issue with the realist notion of the centrality of the state, along with its supposition that states are unitary and rational agents. The latter are not wholly refuted, but appear somewhat relaxed in a neo-liberal institutionalist perspective. It is also more open to the idea that states are not the only actors in world politics, especially as interdependence and globalization increase. Because of this, other actors like domestic groups and NGOs become important in influencing policy (Cohn, 2000, 75). This is especially true in the case of North America and the policy area of the environment, where an epistemic community has formed to influence the integration process. Keohane also criticizes neorealism for overlooking the rate of transaction flows and how transactions and evolving patterns of interdependence between state actors and non-state actors alter the structure of the world system (Keohane, 1986, 17). For example, neorealism encounters difficulties when addressing advanced, liberal-democratic states that cooperate along economic lines like NAFTA and EU countries. In the case of North America, one could argue that powerful economic forces have encouraged interdependence and led to the formation of NAFTA. Presumably, this act of interdependence would discourage the use of force against a member country because the prosperity of all partners would be put at risk.

To be fair, defenders of neorealism state that integration has never really been part of the neorealist research agenda. Its focus on the systemic level causes it to insert the EU into a broader structural context and thus European integration is seen as part of a movement towards a bipolar system: “The EU is viewed as a mechanism for interstate cooperation that fulfilled the survival imperative of a group of West European states in

the context of an emerging bipolar order, and perhaps was driven by the preferences of the most powerful states in that game" (Rosamond, 2000, 133). In a similar vein, a neorealist perspective would argue that the emergence of the EU is a by-product of the growth in power of the U.S. EU member states cooperate in order to counterbalance the power of the U.S. (Gegout, 2003, 11).

These neorealist depictions of interstate politics do have some merit insofar they highlight the relationship between national interests, the security environment, and the balance of power. They make some allowances for the importance of institutions, but only in the sense that institutions affect the balance of power. Conspicuously absent from the neorealist equation are factors like norms, domestic interests, and values—all of which I argue are crucial to understanding the nature of the North American political integration project.

Stephen Waltz suggests that the existence of a threatening state generally propels other states to form an alliance with other states that might have similar security interests (Roussel, 2004: 4-5). But again, this view treats institutions as secondary elements. Institutions are only reflections of power relations and do not exercise an autonomous impact on state behaviour. Thus it becomes unnecessary from this perspective to explore any intersubjective understandings that might arise from state interaction. Hence to recapitulate, the neorealist view offers a limited understanding of the factors that I want to highlight in this study.

Aside from neorealism, the other IR theory that has dominated the study of integration is functionalism. Functionalism arose in the late 1950s to develop a political theory of regional integration. Early functional theorists like Mitrany studied the

experience of the EC to develop some of the early formulations of functionalism.

Mitrany, viewed by many as the father of functionalism, maintained that economic and social cooperation between states would become more important and take over the place held by the territorial state (Eastby, 1985: 2-3). Put differently, Mitrany believed that the modern nation state no longer “served as a useful agent to political community” (Eastby, 1985, 4). Mitrany sustained that public welfare was better served by a political community. He observed that “...the permanent end of any political community was to make its members happy” (Hass cited in Eastby, 1985, 3). The nation state upheld dogmatic tendencies that distracted politicians from fulfilling the public good. Transnational institutions would bring citizens together and replace warfare (Eastby, 1985, 12).

Mitrany’s view of the international system included a number of task-oriented international institutions that could efficiently address human issues. Functional organizations would be organized according to the specific nature of the function, “the conditions under which it has to operate, and to the needs of the moment” (Mitrany in Rosamond, 2000, 35). These task-oriented organizations would eventually lead to attitudinal changes among those who were involved in the organization. The “practical experience of functionalism in action” would generate the production of other similar functional agencies. This intricate web of organizations would encourage and reinforce dependency and discourage conflict (Rosamond, 2000, 36).

Mitrany’s early functional work produced the foundation for neofunctionalism. His emphasis on moving beyond the nation state, the sectoral logic of functionalism, and in general his conception of the post-Westphalian order, all resonate in neofunctional

principles. However, notwithstanding some of its innovative postulations, criticism of functionalism abounds. Some accuse it of being overly technocratic and overly deterministic. The type of functional logic predicted by Mitrany might be able to operate in technical areas but would have difficulty when it encountered areas like trade and production due to the competitive nature of the market place. Indeed, in *A Working Peace*, Mitrany himself admits that he can explain the functionalist logic in shipping and aviation spheres, but the application of functional principles to complex systems of international finance and trade would necessitate “fundamental alterations to the behavioural logic of firms, markets and financiers” (Rosamond, 2000, 40). This criticism is linked to a second one: that functionalism was based on a view of humans as essentially good and rational (Eastby, 1985, 52). Rosamond thus explains that, “[t]o some extent, functionalism was blinded by its own rationality, which was a rationality premised upon the primacy of human needs” (Rosamond, 2000, 40). Functional logic possessed a strong belief in the ability of cognitive change in human actors. Unfortunately, humans do not always display this capability and even if they did, functionalism does not account for how or why humans change. Put differently, functionalism, like its neofunctionalist variant, lacks an analysis of the subjective component in political action. In response to these criticisms, the initial functional propositions offered by Mitrany were reformulated by neofunctionalists. Neofunctionalists valued the principles advanced by Mitrany’s functionalism, but believed that they should be reconstituted in a manner so that the analyst could systematically and rigorously examine international relations and make predictions about regional integration (Eastby, 1985 63). Among other things, their reformulation included a critique of functionalism that took issue with the technocratic

and economicistic orientation of functionalism and the abstraction or separation of the political from the economic and technical. Mitrany's version of pure functionalism sustained that the ECSC was a functional body independent from the political domain. It, therefore, did not act in the political sector (Sweeney, 1984, 12). However, the creation of the ECSC signalled the relevance of the relationship between the political and the economic or the functional, and opened up the space for neofunctionalists to make their contribution. One of neofunctionalism's central concepts is that of "spillover", or the idea that integration in one sector will lead to integration in other sectors. The idea is that there exist some sectors within industrial economies that are so interdependent that it is counterproductive to treat them separately. Thus, attempts to integrate some functional sectors will lead to the integration of other interrelated sectors (O'Brien, 1995, 697).

Neofunctionalism, as described by Lindberg and Haas, also contains an explicit political element, or what was referred to as "political spillover". In this view, political actors such as interest groups, parties, and governments will undergo a learning process during which it will be realized that their interests are better served by seeking supranational instead of national solutions. As such, they will refocus their activities to the new centre, a process that will lead to political integration (Mikkelsen, 1991, 5). This reconceptualization of functionalism in its newer variant contains an explicit emphasis on the political and on the role of interest groups. It therefore rejects the earlier functionalist tendency to neglect interest groups and their role in affecting the integration process.

In this view, interest groups and elites play a major role in the integration process. For instance, elites are needed to support the integration process and grant it legitimacy. Once state actors realize the gains to be made by interdependence, they will commit to

the process. As Sweeney explains it, “the actor perception” of these groups is important (Sweeney, 1984, 20). Additionally, groups like NGOs aid in shifting attention to the regional level and cause state actors also to look toward this level (Sweeney, 1984, 21). Eventually, the dynamic generated by interest group activity would result in the above mentioned process of political spillover. Sweeney quotes Haas and Schmitter to define political spillover:

...integration can be conceived as involving the gradual politicization of actors' purposes which were initially considered ‘technical’ or ‘non controversial’. Politicization implies that the actors, in response to miscalculation or disappointment with respect to the initial purposes, agree to widen the spectrum of means considered appropriate to attain them. This tends to increase the controversial component, i.e., those additional fields that of action which require political choices concerning how much national autonomy to delegate to them. Politicization implies that actors seek to resolve their problems so as to upgrade common interests, and, in the process delegate more authority to the center (Haas and Schmitter cited in Sweeney, 1984, 23).

For some time, this neofunctional explanation of the integration process was assumed to be logical and correct. However, real-life events in Europe and a number of significant criticisms posed by scholars from different camps caused neofunctionalists to reassess their ideas. In particular, French President Charles de Gaulle's boycott of the EEC in 1965, a move that resulted in the “Luxembourg Compromise”, which, in effect, stated that member states could block any initiative that they felt they could not support and dealt a fatal blow to neofunctionalism (O'Brien, 1995, 698). The French Presidents' actions proved not only that nation states were still the primary political actors and that supranational institutions were very much at the mercy of member states, but that forces of disintegration were also present in the process. The intergovernmentalist Stanley Hoffman stressed this point when he spoke of the ‘logic of diversity’ as a countervailing force to the logic of integration. The logic of diversity refers to differences in “domestic

determinants, geohistorical situations and outside aim" (cited in Mikkelsen, 1991: 8).

Functionalism ignores the disintegrative forces that can represent barriers or obstacles to integration.

The prevalence of disintegrative forces and how they shape the rate and nature of integration also challenges the teleological and linear orientation of neofunctionalism.

The EC did not have to eventually develop into a new political unit. Integration may be uneven and heterogeneous, often operating at a stop and go mode, with both moments of integration and moments of disintegration. As Mikkelsen explains:

...integration may be depicted as a dialectical process determined by the twin forces of a 'logic of integration' and a 'logic of disintegration'. The 'logic of integration' contains the logic of spillover, but it also encompasses aspects of interdependence and security. The 'logic of disintegration' consists of adherence to symbols of sovereignty, the diversity of the member states and other aspects of interdependence and security (Mikkelsen, 1991: 18).

In summary, the shift from functionalism into neofunctionalism sought to explain the experience of the EC in the 1960s. From a theoretical perspective, both functionalism and neofunctionalism made some important inroads. Both, for example, challenged the central position occupied by realism in the international arena and realist notions of power politics by adding and analysis of institutional transformation occurring in Europe after the Second World War. Additionally, neofunctionalism developed concepts and an entire theoretical framework to understand the potential European move to political integration (Rosamond, 2000, 73). Although neofunctionalism developed within the context of European events it does offer some, albeit limited, insights into the integration process. For instance, neofunctionalism highlights the important role that interest groups and NGOs play in the integration process. Integration is not just mediated by states and state actors, but also civil society sectors in sectors like the environment, labour,

migration issues, and human rights. All exert either pressures for or against integration. Second, neofunctionalism's focus on "political spillover", on a "learning process", and "actor perception" is also relevant in the North American case since, in the end, it is this learning process that will trigger attitudinal changes in the perceptions or world views of political actors. Unfortunately, neofunctionalism does not undertake a comprehensive analysis of the subjective side of integration. It does not dig deep enough to probe where actors' perceptions come from or why intersubjective factors play a role in the first place. Neofunctionalism simply assumes that political actors will eventually recognize that their interests will be better realized by supranational institutions. Neofunctionalism also neglects how asymmetries and sovereignty affect the integration process. Again, it simply assumes that political integration will eventually occur, but without paying attention to the shape and nature of it. For example, in the North American case, the overwhelming asymmetry that characterizes the relationship makes for asymmetrical, unequal integration. Similarly, the "sovereignty" response that asymmetries cause in the weaker partners will also shape the rate and nature of integration.

The above discussion also raises the question of whether neofunctionalism has the capacity to explain similar processes of integration in other parts of the world, a point that casts some doubts on the relevancy of European-based theories to the case of North America. Given neofunctionalism's close connection with the experience of Europe, there is some doubt as to whether this approach could tell us anything about processes in other regional settings. For instance, in the case of North America, neofunctionalism is of limited utility because there really has been no move on the part of North American political actors to create a political union. In fact, in the North American example,

governments have deliberately resisted the pull of integration by creating weak institutions that are highly dependant on governments. Additionally, factors like sovereignty and powerful differences between countries act as barriers to any form of political integration. Any neofunctional variant would have to take into account these disintegrative forces that define the North American experience, and shape the rate and nature of any political integration project. As well, realism, as discussed earlier, fares poorly in the North American context. Realism and neorealism's preoccupation with war and power politics ignores economic motivations for cooperation. The real issue comes down to difficulty in assessing the subjective side of integration on both the part of neofunctionalism and realism. For instance, in the case of North America, powerful economic forces have encouraged interdependence and led to the formation of the NAFTA. Presumably this act of interdependence would discourage the use of force against a member country in this sort of arrangement because the prosperity of all partners would be put at risk. Realist assumptions about world politics and state relations are embedded in a structural framework that prevents it from adequately exploring the subjective side of international relations and the political consequences derived from cooperation.

In sum, the preceding section focused on dominant integration theories like neofunctionalism that arose directly out of a concern to interpret events taking place in post war Europe. To date, the creation of NAFTA and ensuing political movement has not yet sparked the same degree of theoretical interest. Although, as O'Brien notes, "it created a larger market than that of the newly named European Union" (O'Brien, 1995, 693). The consequence is limited theoretical analysis of North American integration.

Additionally, whatever analysis does exist succeeds only in exporting European-based theoretical formulations to the case of North America. Furthermore, the approaches that have arisen around the North American case are economicistic and thus are silent on many of the social and political forces that shape the nature and rate of North American political integration. Indeed what one finds in the North American case is a theoretical debate between neofunctionalism, critical IPE, and neo-liberal approaches. This prevents alternative political theories from making their mark. However, before commenting on this debate, I will backtrack to the demise of neofunctionalism and the ascendancy of economic approaches to integration.

The Ascendancy of Economic Approaches to Integration

The demise of supranational activity in Europe in the 1960s followed by the oil crisis of 1973 led to the general perception by integration theorists that not only were nationally-oriented policies of recovery more dominant, but also that little was occurring in Western Europe. The slowdown in momentum of integration tendencies led not only to the demise of neofunctionalism, which, up to the mid 1960s, had dominated the field of integration studies, but also to the emergence of intergovernmental theories of European integration (Rosamond, 2000, 75).

Intergovernmentalists resisted the centrality of the state and argued that France's momentary withdrawal from the EC in 1965 represented the renewed importance of the state (Rosamond, 2000, 75). Others were concerned with the domestic determinants of national preferences. However, by the 1990s, various events in Europe and elsewhere in other parts of the world resuscitated scholarly attention to integration (Rosamond, 2000:

98). I will not get into the neofunctionalism-intergovernmental debate that dominated the study of European integration for quite some time except to say that intergovernmental critiques of neofunctionalism opened up the field of integration to other non-European based approaches to integration. Indeed, by the 1990s events in Europe and in other parts of the world revived scholarly interest in integration and opened up a space for alternative theories (Rosamond, 2000, 98).

At the time, Europe was experiencing a deepening of the integration process. Indeed, Europe was witnessing significant institutional activism. The most important materialization of this was the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987. The SEA outlined a schedule for the realization of the Community's internal market. It also sought to create an area for the free movement of capital, goods, and people (Rosamond, 2000, 99). The creation of the internal market also led to, and provided the rationale for, as Rosamond notes, "the decision regarding Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) taken at the Maastricht European Council in December 1991, which in turn produced the Treaty on European Union (1992)" (Rosamond, 2000, 99).

Aside from the institutionalized momentum created by the SEA, regional blocs in Asia, North America, and in other parts of the world generated renewed interest in integration studies that questioned the primacy of European-based integration approaches like neofunctionalism. The new dynamism displayed in Europe of course led theorists to reconsider neofunctionalism. However, it was recognized early on that neofunctionalism needed to be significantly modified if it was to say something more substantial about integration (Rosamond, 2000, 100). Additionally, instances of regional integration elsewhere in the world attracted interest from other non-traditional sources. For instance,

the creation of the NAFTA in 1993 led to a greater emphasis on the role of economic factors in propelling integration.

Economic Theories of Integration

Undoubtedly, the neofunctionalist versus intergovernmental debate dominated the study of integration for quite some time. However, the evolution of the EC/EU and the abundance of regional economic integration blocs in other parts of the world attracted attention from areas like critical IPE. It should be noted from the outset that, as I mentioned earlier, critical political economy approaches make their principle interjection not so much as theories of integration per se, but more as a general critique of the neo-liberal logic that drives the formation of regional economic blocs like NAFTA. Critical IPE begins by elevating the primacy of the global political economy. It recognizes that states are important in the world system but that they interact with other relevant actors like firms and other social forces, such as gender and class. Secondly, critical IPE recognizes that global economic structures can influence actors' behaviour, but that these structures themselves can experience change through the action of agents in the world system. Thirdly, a critical IPE approach acknowledges the role of normative processes such as ideas, knowledge, and ideology that can function as sources of power when deployed by dominant groups (O'Brien, 1995, 702).

Critical IPE's main concern with the inner logic of the global political economy and the transformative changes occurring within its structure well positions it to study the economic forces that led to the division of the world into regional economic blocs.

The decade of the 1990s witnessed the proliferation of regional blocs that

explicitly promoted the increased liberalization of trade, what Mittelman terms the “new regionalism” (Mittelman , 1996, 189-191a). The “new regionalism” was different than the regionalism of the 1930s. Mittelman explains that the period of the 1930s was marked by auto-centric regionalism, where world trade plummeted and protectionist measures were adopted by states. The “new regionalism”, in contrast, was extroverted in nature insofar as it involved an opening up to external market forces (Mittelman, 1996, 189-191). Thus the new regionalism in the 1990s refers to the amalgamation of economic arrangements among groups of geographically-bound states like NAFTA, Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), or the ASEAN (Smith, 1999, 4-5).

Critical IPE theorists view regional blocs as bound up with the concept of globalization. Mittelman argues that if globalization is defined as “the compression of the time and space aspects of social relations” then regionalism is one facet of globalization (Mittelman, 1996, 189). Regionalism can be thought of as both a chapter of, or as a response to, globalization. For instance, some believe that increased regional activity in the 1980s arose in response to globalization. Rosamond explains it this way:

...regions could be construed as a loci of resistance to globalization, as protective blocs erected by economic actors confronted with the ‘chill winds’ of globalization imperatives. Here, the very existence of regions, as well as the tendency in some instances to pool elements of authority, could be seen as the attempt of actors (most obviously states) to recapture executive capacity that been lost domestically (Rosamond, 2000: 181).

On the other hand, regionalism can be viewed as a stepping stone to globalization. Thus, as Stephen Gill argues, powerful business actors in conjunction with elite state actors reorganize themselves into regional blocs in order to facilitate and extend global economic forces (Gill, 1995, 71-9). Similarly, Pannitch sustains that states, in their formation of a trade region, act as the “authors of a regime that defines and guarantees

through international treaties with constitutional effects, the global and domestic rights of capital” and the facilitation of economic globalization in general (Pannitch, 1996, 85).

Whatever one takes regionalism to be, it is clear that the proliferation of pockets of regional activity in diverse parts of the world have led to a consideration of economic theories of integration and critical IPE approaches who remain sceptical of NAFTA.

For instance, the study of integration in North America has been dominated by the economic sphere and economic neo-liberal integration theories that subsume the political under the economic. This is perhaps not surprising considering that the NAFTA was negotiated with specific economic goals in mind and lacked an accompanying political or social architecture. The objective was solely to remove trade and investment barriers, assuming “that the social, economic and political consequences of dismantling those walls will be trivial” (Pastor, 2001, 5). NAFTA was part of a big business strategy to eliminate barriers to trade. Even post-9/11, powerful business interests continue to influence the shape and rate of integration in North America by calling for policies that would virtually erase the border and abolish differences across a wide range of national policies—all with a view to keeping the flow of goods running smoothly across North America. For instance, Wendy Dobson of the C.D. Howe Institute in Canada argues that 9/11 provides a “window of opportunity” to advance a “big idea” approach to integration in the form of a customs union, a common market, or a strategic bargain. The goal would be to eliminate obstacles to “flows of people, and capital as well as goods and services” and achieve deeper integration (Dobson, 2002, 1).

Neo-liberal ideas have provided the rationale and the foundation for economic arrangements like NAFTA. It should be noted from the outset that it is difficult to extract

an exact neo-liberal based theory of integration, partly because neo-liberalism rests on “tenuous empirical claims and demonstrates a lack of intellectual rigour” (Larner, 2000, 9). Moreover, Larner goes on to say that those who identify neo-liberalism as, “either a policy response to the exigencies of the global economy, or the recapturing of the political agenda by the New Right” simplify and undermine the prevalence and manifestation of neo-liberalism (Larner, 2000, 6). Rather, Larner argues that “neo-liberalism cannot be reduced to a single set of philosophical principles or a unified political ideology, nor is it necessarily linked to a particular political apparatus” (Larner, 2000, 21). Nevertheless, it is clear that many of the defining characteristics of NAFTA are indeed neo-liberal.

Neo liberalism is a term used to describe a shift in world order that, as Stephen Gill notes, involves:

..the growing structural power of capital, relative to labour, and relative to states. This neo-liberal shift involves, then, the growing strength and positional power of neo liberal ideas, their application in the practices and organizational forms of key social institutions (for example, state, market, international organization) and the configuration of material power relations and a redistribution of wealth (with the growth in the power of capital, relative to labour) (Gill, 1995: 69).

Many of the main tenants of neo liberalism are not new and in fact originate from the classical economic liberalism that emerged in the nineteenth century after the publication of Adam Smith’s *The Wealth of Nations*. The market was promoted as the most optimal way of organizing economic life and advocated the suspension of government intervention in economic affairs (Martinez and Garcia, 2000, 1). In particular, classical economic liberalism introduced a new form of specialization whereby “modern industry separates the production process into compartments, each performing a difficult task...[T]hese separated producers and buyers and sellers [are] identified with nations,

[and] the international division of labour refers to the specialization of [each] country in a particular trade or product (Mittelman, 1996, 4). This type of economic organization was dominant in the U.S. from the 1800s until the 1930s, when the Great Depression and the ideas of John Maynard Keynes posed a challenge to economic liberalism. What made neo-liberalism new was “a policy framework—marked by a shift from Keynesian Welfarism towards a political agenda favouring the relative unfettered operation of the markets” (Larner, 2000, 6).

Additionally, a change in the international division of labour also took place in the 1960s. Mittelman notes that a restructuring that includes the creation and expansion of a global market for both labour and industrialized sites began to emerge. He explains that a global market for labour production caused the fragmentation of labour, the “subdivision of manufacturing processes into multiple partial operations” (Mittelman, 1996, 4-5). The expansion of capital thus requires a restructuring between third world countries and industrialized nations.

Neo-liberalisms’ basic assumptions include an emphasis on the individual, freedom of choice, market security, *laissez faire*, the extension of the market, and minimalist government (Larner, 2000, 7). These neo-liberal principles formed the underlying principles of NAFTA, where a powerful epistemic community in each country adopted neo-liberal principles to advance the NAFTA.

Both the actions taken by the business community in Canada and state actors in Mexico are exemplary in demonstrating neo-liberal principles. In both cases, free trade was presented as the only or most viable option. In the Canadian case, an increasingly aggressive and protectionist U.S. position convinced business and state actors that they

required a mechanism to insulate themselves from U.S. protectionist forces. As O'Brien notes, one of Canada's negotiators for the 1989 Free Trade Agreement with the U.S. observed that:

As the only industrialized country without free access to a major consumer market, Canada's prospects for diversifying from excessive dependence on volatile international resource commodity markets hinged on enhanced and secure access their giant neighbour to the South (Gordon Richie cited in O'Brien, 1995, 705).

Similarly, the Canadian government's Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Macdonald Commission) advocated a free trade deal with the U.S. to rid Canada of protectionist-associated problems. Thus, in the Macdonald Commission's Summary and Conclusions section of its Report, it states:

Our most important market is the United States...More, better, and more secure access to the U.S. market represents a basic requirement, while denial of that access is an ever present hazard. We are extremely vulnerable to any strengthening of U.S. protectionism. Early bilateral negotiations with the United States could provide opportunities for the two countries to negotiate reduction or elimination of tariff and other barriers to cross border trade...(Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, 1985: 10).

The Commission clearly espoused neo-liberal prescriptions to make Canada "a lean, mean, competitive economic machine" (O'Brien, 1995, 705). The Commission sustained that trade should play a central role in the Canadian economic tradition. As Clarkson states, "trade liberalization offered a large threatening stick, it would force firms to become competitive with their international rivals or face extinction (Clarkson, 2002, 29). Thus in the words of the Macdonald report: "...Canada must have better access to world markets. Free trade arrangements both with the United States and on a multilateral basis would greatly assist Canadian industry to become more competitive and productive" (Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada,

1985, 3).

The Macdonald Commission was largely influenced by the powerful Business Council of National Issues (BCNI), now known as the Canadian Council of Chief Executives. The BCNI was made up of the chief executive officers of one hundred and fifty leading Canadian corporations (Langille, 1987, 42). During the lead-up to the 1989 Free Trade Agreement, the BCNI functioned as an interest group that was extremely active in making the idea of free trade a viable option in the first place. As I will explain in Chapter Two, the BCNI entered into a complex strategy of hegemonic organization that would guarantee them the macro-economic climate and conditions for competition in the world market (Langille, 1987, 70-8). The BCNI argued that the only way to fix the structural problems of Canada's economy was to pursue a policy of free trade with the U.S. The BCNI was concerned about the increasingly nationalist economic policies that the Canadian government had implemented. In effect, they sought to reverse what they viewed as a dangerous economic position. Indeed, a statement from the BCNI's second chairperson expressed concern over:

...the apparent inability of the Canadian economy to operate with maximum efficiency, the increasing confrontation between and among various segments of society and the growing worry that the increasing share of the nation's production being handled through government was not an efficient and effective way to assure the highest standard of living for most Canadians" (in Langille, 1987, 48-9).

In Mexico, the severe economic shocks of the 1980s convinced Mexican policy makers to liberalize the economy. Neo-liberal arguments used in the Mexican context sustained that for a smaller, developing country like Mexico an economic program based on "liberalization, privatization and deregulation [was] the surest recipe for triggering high levels of growth, efficiency, and productivity" (Wise, 1998, 41). Mexico would

stand to gain the most from entering into a liberalized trade agreement with Canada and the U.S. Carol Wise explains some of this neo-liberal logic in the following quote:

As closer integration triggers dynamic changes in terms of scale economies, the less developed participant is expected to benefit disproportionately through an acceleration in the rate of productivity growth and an increase in the rate of capital formation. Overall, the net welfare gains in terms of production, employment, and consumption are predicted to outweigh the losses (Wise, 1998, 5).

Agreements and new laws by the government of de la Madrid and subsequently by the Salinas Administration supported neo-liberal tenants and sought to lay the groundwork for neo-liberal initiatives. For instance, the 1985 Mexico-U.S. Business Community submitted a bilateral proposal to deal with subsidy dispute problems between both countries (O'Brien, 1995, 708). Another important stage in liberalizing the economy came in the form of Mexico's Foreign Investment Regulation (New Regulations) in 1989. This presidential proclamation enabled foreign ownership in Mexico. It changed Mexico's Foreign Investment Law of 1973 and allowed for increased foreign investment (O'Brien, 1995, 709).

In terms of the U.S., Rupert notes that an influential coalition of social forces who supported "intensified market-led globalization" in the form of NAFTA formed (Rupert, 1997, 143). Instrumental in the pro-NAFTA contingent was the Business Roundtable, an elite business organization composed of the Chief Executive Officers of the largest U.S. corporations. The Business Roundtable designed a strategy to ensure that NAFTA became a reality. Rupert sustains that one of the principle arguments used by the Roundtable and by other pro-NAFTA supporters to ensure the passing of the NAFTA was the following:

First, it was claimed that NAFTA would encourage greater specialization according to comparative advantage, that this specialization along with

intensified continental competition and greater economies of scale would result in significant efficiency gains, and that in those ways NAFTA would produce lower prices for consumers and, in the long-run, more jobs and higher incomes continent-wide. These economic benefits were expected to be relatively greater for the smaller Mexican economy and more modest for the larger American (Rupert, 1997, 143).

The Business Roundtable approach was both to endorse NAFTA because of the instant business opportunities it would provide and to ensure that a broader neo-liberal agenda was entrenched. Indeed, Sandra Masur of Eastman Kodak, one of the most powerful business corporations backing the agreement, sustained: "The companies of the Roundtable are seeking across-the-board liberalization of trade in goods, services and investments" (Masur cited in Rupert, 1997, 143).

The above discussion serves to highlight some of the neo-liberal arguments made during the promotion of free trade as a policy alternative for Mexico, Canada, and the U.S. The arguments had the effect of making free trade a viable option carried out the implementation of key neo-liberal strategies. For instance, one crucial neo-liberal position is that the state should be rolled back and the market left to function unfettered. The Macdonald Commission report, for instance, states that "...governments should pull back from direct intervention in managing aspects of the operation of the economy, placing greater reliance, instead, on the operation of market forces (Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, 1985, 3). Often, neo-liberals used vague and questionable arguments concerning the inevitable, automatic forces of globalization.

These arguments for the virtues of free trade and associated policies have become one of the primary drivers of economic integration and have directly contributed to the form of economic integration presently found in North America.

Critical IPE approaches to integration launch a direct challenge to neo-liberal principles. Examining the IPE critique of economic integration is important because it directs our gaze to some of the powerful economic forces that drive the North American integration project forward. Critical IPE challenges some of the very notions that support neo liberal principles and argues that they should be questioned and not taken as ‘common sense’ or reality. The case of Mexico can be cited as an example here. Much was made during the NAFTA negotiations of how much Mexico would benefit from the NAFTA. Mexico would attract capital and more jobs by entering into NAFTA. But important questions were left unexplored like what type of jobs would be made available. Would there just be more “maquiladora-type jobs...based on low wages, and producing social and environmental disruption...”? (Cameron and Grinspan, 1993, 12). What about human capital questions? What about standards of living in rural Mexico? Critical IPE addresses these questions rather than ignoring them. Critical IPE theory calls into question neo-liberal visions of NAFTA as a win-win situation and postulates that such predictions are “always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox, 1995, 31). Critical IPE theories also stress the role of ideas and ideology. For example, Cox maintains that ideas are central to the ways in which human actors are organized collectively in the structural relationships of world order. World orders are predicated upon and supported by a broad range of ideas that regard existing political and social relations as natural and inevitable. Cox refers to this approach as “problem-solving” that “takes the world as a given.” In terms of NAFTA, powerful business groups used neo-liberal rhetoric to convince governments and the public that NAFTA was the only solution to deal with the forces of globalization. Against this, critical approaches are “concerned with how the existing

order came into being and what the possibilities are for change in that order" (Cox, 1995, 32).

In addition, critical IPE theories claim that complex economic predictions that lack an understanding of political and social dimensions are highly suspect. For instance, critical IPE questions neo-liberal views on the role of the state. Neo-liberal approaches claim that the state should be rolled back in order to allow markets to function unfettered. But rather than viewing the role of the state as eroding, critical IPE posits that the nature of the state has simply changed. Robert Cox captures the evolving character of the state in what he labels the internationalization of the state (Panitch, 1996, 84-96). Cox maintains that the state reorganizes itself and works with the capitalist class to secure a "new constitutionalism for disciplined neo liberalism" (Panitch, 1996, 85). Hence the state is not transcended or rendered irrelevant as current theories of globalization maintain. Rather, the state is an active player in organizing a regime which guarantees the global and domestic rights of capital. In the case of NAFTA, all three North American states played an active role in reorganizing themselves to form a regional bloc. Regionalism was viewed as a way to deal with the growing power exercised by the EU and Japan. NAFTA offered a way to compete with these regional power blocs (Wilkinsun, 1993, 35).

The emphasis placed on the political role of the state, or on the role of the political in general, is what distinguishes critical IPE from neoclassical economic theories. Critical IPE argues that the real importance of NAFTA is not in the economic, but the political realm. As Macdonald puts it, "the real importance of the FTA and NAFTA... lies not so much in their economic impact on levels of trade and investment but in their political

implications (Macdonald, 1997, 183). Specifically, some argue that NAFTA and similar trade agreements function as a type of policy framework that binds each country's policy decisions. Campbell, for instance, argues that NAFTA operates as a type of vice that conditions the actions of future elected governments (Campbell, 1993, 94). Moreover, a critical IPE perspective might posit that NAFTA is part of a broader neo-conservative project seeking to embed market principles in society. Gill calls it a "commodification" process, which he defines as the "propensity of capitalist society to define and quantify social life in market terms" (Gill, 1995, 87). Social relations are conditioned and arranged by market forces that significantly erode the social structure of society, while empowering large corporations and big-business-oriented governments like the United States.

Critical IPE approaches are certainly valuable in that they highlight the importance of the global political economy and domestic class forces influencing governmental behaviour. Indeed in the North American case, it appears that the principle determinant of integration has been a need to ensure the continued functioning and expansion of capital. A critical IPE approach is particularly useful in its focus on the powerful role that a transnational neo-liberal epistemic community played in supporting and passing NAFTA. Starting with a critical IPE, rather than neofunctionalist lens, one can clearly view this. Unfortunately, critical IPE heavily emphasizes the primacy of the economic sphere in shaping society and relegates to the background the influence of other social forces. To be fair, critical IPE's intention was never to generate a theory of integration. Its function is mostly to highlight the relevancy of the economic sphere and its role in advancing regional integration processes. Furthermore, critical IPE also allows

a role for change. It sustains that the contradictory nature of economic forces like globalization opens up the space for counter-hegemonic processes that have the power to transform the dynamics of the system (Mittelman, 1996, 207). This is certainly an important point to note. However, critical IPE's heavy dependence on economic factors to explain political and social processes makes it unable to adequately interrogate other variables like institutions and intersubjective factors. For example, critical IPE does not provide sufficient insight into the policy areas such as environment and border control. Thus, in order to better understand some of the social and political forces that influence the integration process in North America, I examine political theories of integration, with particular emphasis on neo-institutional and constructivists approaches.

Alternative Theories of Integration

Up to this point, I have reviewed integration literature that, although useful, will not be used to highlight what I feel are important variables that shape the political integration process in North America. This is not to say that these theories (realism, neofunctionalism, critical IPE) are not important. They all provide possible explanations for the enigma of political integration in North America. Realism, for instance, highlights the asymmetries and power relations that characterize North America. Neofunctionalism brings to light an important political element of the integration process and attributes a role to interest groups and NGOs. Critical IPE elucidates the way economic forces have particularly influenced the integration process in North America. All these theories pinpoint important elements of the integration process. On their own, however, they are not enough to provide a thoroughly convincing picture of the integration process. For

instance, how do institutions matter in the integration process? Can the interaction generated in an institutional context alter actors' perception of each other in a positive way? Will this lead to transformative processes? What about non-economic transnational challenges like those having to do with security? How can economic approaches explain the unprecedented rate of security cooperation that took place post 9/11? What role do ideas, norms, and values play? To inquire into some of these questions I will turn to two alternative political approaches to integration: neo-institutionalism and constructivism.

What I term alternative theories of integration are alternative in the sense that they challenge the primacy of some of the traditional Eurocentric approaches to integration, like neofunctionalism. To reiterate, the study of European integration has been confined within the parameters of traditional integration theories like neofunctionalism, theories that obscure the possible contributions of other IR theories. Indeed, the ascendancy of contemporary theories like neo- institutionalism and constructivism are part of a broader debate about the relevancy of IR theories in general to the study of the EU. On one side of the debate are those who claim IR theories are not well-suited to address the intricate nature of the EU (Rosamond, 2000, 157). IR, goes the argument, is concerned mostly with "interactions among states or at least between members of national executives" (Rosamond, 2000, 157). The complex, institutional, and multi-actor web that makes up the EU defies interrogation by IR theories. Rosamond states that to suggest that IR is only about states is indeed a narrow way to think about IR. Moreover, Rosamond argues that the EU has acquired many of the features associated with national political systems. The primacy of the nation state in EU politics signifies that IR can import some of their tools to analyze the EU (Rosamond, 2000, 159). This is particularly applicable to IR theories

that address the agent-structure problem like constructivism. Additionally, the revival of neo-institutional theories in political science and the increasing importance of regime theory in IR have some direct bearing on integration (Rosamond, 2000, 164-6). It is to these theories that I now turn to.

Neo-institutional theories place institutions at the centre of their analysis. They challenge the primacy granted to the individual by behavioural and rational approaches, which assume that individuals act autonomously based on rational calculation or personal utility and are uninhibited by institutions (Peters, 2000, 11-21). Individuals do not necessarily act autonomously; constraints are imposed on actors by structural factors such as the institutions that these actors participate in (Peters 2000, 11-21). Thus, in this view, analysts would benefit from beginning with institutions rather than focusing on individuals as the primary unit of analysis. No doubt, individuals should be accorded some relevancy considering they ultimately make choices, but institutionalists sustain that these choices are for the most part conditioned by their participation in institutions.

Arriving at an exact definition of “institution” is a complex endeavour made difficult by the fact that there seems to be no agreed upon definition of it. Political Scientists use the word “institution” loosely and have a tendency to use various elements of institutions like regime, organization, and convention synonymously. For instance, Peters suggests that institutionalists equate “institution” with formal structures “like a parliament to very amorphous entities like social class” (Peters, 2000, 28).

For example, Young notes that variations in “extent, formalization, direction, and coherence” are innate to institutions (Young, 1989, 23). At one end of the spectrum are informal, loose, arrangements in which actors are unrestrained by rights and rules. At the

other end are arrangements characterized by “central planning and pervasive rules governing the actions of individual members” (Young, 1989, 24). For March and Olson, institutions do not have to adhere to a formal structure. Rather, they are best defined “as a collection of norms, rules, understandings and...routines” that define appropriate action (Peters, 2000, 28). Others stress the formal aspects of institutions. They attach rules and procedures like enforcement mechanisms and public participation instruments to institutions. For example, in his study of the effects of environmental institutions, Bernauer defines institutions as “sets of international regulations and organizations that were intentionally established by preexisting states through explicit, legally or political binding, international agreements in order to regulate sources of negative externalities affecting the environment (Bernauer, 1995, 352). Bernauer’s definition of institution thus endows them with more formal elements.

To avoid confusion, some authors feel that it is better to adopt a broad definition of institution and then divide it into more specific components. Keohane argues that there are three types of international institutions: formal intergovernmental organizations, international regimes (with unequivocal rules agreed upon by governments about specific sets of issues), and conventions (with tacit rules and understandings that influence the expectations of actors) (Keohane, 1984, 3-4).

Krasner also notes that distinctions may apply. Regimes, for instance, can be defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures” around which actors’ “expectations” intersect in a particular area of international relations (Krasner, 1983, 2). Similarly, Keohane defines regimes broadly as sets of devices or practices and expectations that produce a loose framework “to help

actors overcome barriers to agreement” thereby facilitating cooperation (Keohane, 1982, 354).

Organizations are created to administer regimes and are thus embedded in or grow out of regimes (Young, 1989, 37-47). Organizations have a staff, a budget, an administration, and a mandate to realize a particular objective. Young defines organizations as “material entities, possessing physical locations, personnel, equipment, and budgets. Equally important, organizations generally possess legal personality in the sense that they are authorized to enter into contract, own property, sue and be sued, and so forth” (Young, 1989, 32). Organizations also have enforcement and public participation mechanisms that orient members to comply with rules and ensure that goals are met (Young, 1989, 71).

It is important to note that regimes do not necessarily need to be accompanied by organizations. This is indeed the case in the border-control policy area where, in effect, what exists is a regime without an elaborate organizational structure. By contrast, in the area of the environment, what one finds are both an environmental regime and several organizations that work in conjunction with or through that regime. Regimes and organizations are distinct, but linked. As well, the necessity “for the elaborate organizational structure... is a function of the character of the regime” (Young, 1989, 47).

For practical purposes, most institutional theorists link these distinct components and do not distinguish between them. Keohane notes:

The distinction among conventions, regimes and organizations is not as clear in actuality as this stylization might seem to imply... Perhaps without exceptions, international organizations are embedded within international regimes: much of what they do is monitor, manage, and

modify the operation of regimes. Organization and regime may be distinguishable analytically, but in practice they may seem almost coterminous (cited in Ryan, 2001, 7).

Similarly, I recognize that the word “institution” covers all of the above variations since all, to some extent, are practices or contexts that “prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and shape expectations” (cited in Ryan, 2001, 7). Thus, Young defines institutions as “behaviourally recognizable practices consisting of roles linked together by clusters of rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles” (Young, 1989: 196). Or, as Haas, Keohane and Levy put it “by ‘institutions’ we mean persistent and connected sets of rules and practices that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations” (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993, 5).

Institutions can either be regimes (a decentralized and loose set of practices that facilitates cooperation and may or may not have organizations attached to them), organizations, which may or may not be attached to regimes (consciously designed, permanent, structures with staff, budgets and compliance mechanisms), or conventions (informal practices) (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993, 5).

For the purposes of this dissertation, I will make a distinction between regimes and organizations. Both, in a broad sense, constitute “institutions” since they order practices and constrain action. However, I will stress the informal, loose, and decentralized nature of regime. Regimes, in this sense, rather than imposing strict mandates for what states must do and how they act, facilitate cooperation in a loose framework. Organizations, on the other hand, are formal structures that have been purposefully created to realize a precise objective. Institutions also contain certain features that designate them as institutions. For example, they have a staff, a budget and an entire administrative bureaucracy that executes a particular mandate. Additionally, as

Lowndes explains: “Institutions [organizations] have a legitimacy beyond the preferences of individual actors. They are valued in themselves and not simply for their immediate purposes and outputs” (Lowndes, 1996, 182). This gives organizations a sense of permanency in that they are persistent, physical structures.

Now that “institution” has been defined it is possible to continue on and examine the tenets that make up institutional theory. Institutionalists believe that policy actors might choose to create institutions because they generally diminish uncertainties and result in better political outcomes. More specifically, institutions are formed to correct “market failures”. A market failure “refers to a situation in which the outcomes of market mediated interaction are suboptimal” (Keohane, 1982, 335). In the case of environmental issues in North America, environmental NGOs (ENGOS) forced the three governments to recognize that unfettered trade without some sort of regulatory control could adversely affect the environment and indeed result in a market failure. Trade agreements like NAFTA, by bringing important economic benefits could result in the cultivation of unsustainable practices that degrade environmental conditions and threaten the future of generations to come (Mayer, 1998, 74). Thus in this sense, institutions are formed to correct market failures and coordinate inert state cooperation in areas of mutual concern. In the case of border control, the creation of a border regime is a direct response to market failure issues. NAFTA had proven successful in encouraging unprecedented levels of trade. But this formula contained hidden economic pitfalls or “market failures”. NAFTA had succeeded in accelerating trade flows by eliminating barriers to trade. However, eliminating obstacles to trade had contradictory effects. Keeping the border open for trade also opened it to illegal activities (Flynn, 2003, 110). Put differently, the

conditions that produce economic prosperity also yield increased opportunities for illegal transactions such as those associated with drugs, illegal migration, terrorism and other criminal activities. Paradoxically, if measures are put in place to control the border and reduce the flow of illegal activities, then the economic lifeline of North America is also compromised. To avoid being caught in this dilemma, border officials have created a border regime with cooperation instruments such as the U.S-Mexico Border Liaison Mechanism and the Canada-U.S. Partnership (CUSP).

Second, institutions correct structural inefficiencies, or more specifically, they correct problems associated with the lack of a stable structure, lack of information, poor communication, lack of a clear legal framework to establish liability for actions, problems of mistrust, uncertainty, and risk (Keohane, 1982, 338). These factors impose transaction costs and create barriers to effective cooperation and coordination. Institutions correct these structural imperfections.

Finally, state actors form institutions because they increase the likelihood of cooperation between states by enhancing what Haas, Keohane and Levy call the “contractual environment,” which enables the maintenance of international agreements (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993, 401). By “contractual environment” the authors refer to an environment in which states are able to make credible commitments, to enact joint rules with reasonable ease, and to monitor each other’s behaviour at moderate costs so that strategies of reciprocity can be followed” (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993, 19). Simply put, institutions provide a forum in which actors can get to know each other, develop favourable assumptions about each other, and develop trust—all factors that facilitate cooperation. Institutions can therefore provide monitoring and compliance

services, and produce reliable information narrowing the range of expected behaviour and reducing uncertainty (McKinney, 2000, 18).

At least four schools of thought exist in institutionalist literature: rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, normative institutionalism, and international institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996, 936). Rational choice institutionalism draws from the tools of the new economics of organizations, which stress utility maximizing concepts. According to this perspective, political actors behave in an instrumental manner according to utility-maximising preferences. These preferences are exogenous to the institutional context. In other words they are defined *a priori* to an actor's entrance into the institution (Kato, 1996, 556-7). Hence, actors form institutions to maximize the attainment of their own preferences. Institutions provide a framework in which to maximise utilities and thus the development of "an institution is a result of an effort to reduce the transaction costs of undertaking the same activity without such an institution" (Hall and Taylor, 1996, 943).

Historical institutionalism developed in response to group theories of politics and structural functionalist approaches that were dominant in political science in the 1960s and 1970s. From group theories, historical institutionalists borrowed the claim that conflict among groups for scarce resources is central to politics. However, they sought to better explain the distinctiveness of national political outcomes and the inequalities that mark these outcomes. Historical institutionalists were also influenced by the way structural functionalists saw the polity as an overall system of interacting parts (Hall and Taylor, 1996, 937-8). Historical institutionalists' main contribution to an institutionalist perspective is to reject the "traditional postulate that the same operative forces will

generate the same results everywhere in favour of the view that the effect of such forces will be mediated by the contextual features of a given situation often inherited from the past" (Hall and Taylor, 1996, 941). In other words, historical institutionalism stresses the importance of understanding social processes as historical phenomena (Pierson, 1996, 304). Institutions have a course of evolution; the policy choices made when an institution is being formed will have a determinate effect over the institution and policy choices in the future. This idea is summed up in the concept of "path dependency", which means, quite simply, that institutions follow a path. Institutions will evolve and change, however, "the range of possibilities for that development (of the institution) will have been constrained by the formative period of the institution (Peters, 2000, 65). For most of the duration of its existence, the institution will function in accordance with the decisions made in its initial state of existence. So, for instance, past policies influence subsequent policies. However, historical institutionalists do allow some room for change in moments of "critical juncture" or "moments when substantial institutional change takes place thereby creating 'a branching point' from which the history developed moves onto a new path" (Hall and Taylor, 1996, 942).

The new institutionalism, and the drive towards changing the behavioural and rational focus of political science, really came from the work of what is referred to as normative institutionalism. Normative institutionalists assign a central role to the norms and values of institutions in explaining behaviour (March and Olsen, 1996, 247). In a normative conception of institutions, individuals are not atomistic, utility-maximising, or rational with preferences exogenous to the political process. Individuals, rather, are embedded in a series of relationships with others in an institutional context. They are

influenced by their institutional attachments and institutions that condition systems of meaning for individuals (Peters, 2000, 26). Institutions contain norms, rules and routines, or what March and Olson call a “logic of appropriateness”, that influence how members of an institution act. Institutions impose powerful normative values, they create systems of meaning that commit members to behave in particular ways (March and Olsen, 1996, 252).

Finally, one other variant of institutional theory worth considering is what Peters labels international institutionalism or regime theory. Regime theory is particularly well equipped to address the specific nature of North American political integration. Regime theory arose as a response to the complexities that characterize the world system. In particular, Robert Keohane, one of its principle advocates, was curious about the nature of cooperation in the international arena. He believed it was no longer useful to characterize world politics as an anarchical state of war with little room for cooperation between states (Keohane, 1984, 7). If international politics were really a state of war, then institutionalised patterns of cooperation on the basis of some shared common goals would not exist (Keohane, 1984, 7-9). How then can one explain the nature of cooperation between states in the international arena? In essence, regime theory attempts to answer these questions of cooperation by focusing on state action within the framework of regimes.

Regime theory is particularly useful in its analysis of cooperation. Cooperation is a central concept in regime theory and one of the indicators I use to evaluate political integration. When states have shared interests among them, cooperation can emerge and regimes can be constructed. Keohane defines cooperation as, “a process through which

policies actually followed by governments come to be regarded by their partners as facilitating the realization of their own objectives" (Keohane, 1984: 51-2). Keohane extends his definition of the concept of cooperation by stating that cooperation does not operate in isolation and that one should seek to understand patterns of cooperation:

We need to analyze cooperation within the context of institutions broadly defined as in terms of practices and expectations. Each act of cooperation or discord affects the beliefs, rules and practices that form the context for future actions. Each act must therefore be interpreted as embedded within a chain of such acts and their successive cognitive and institutional residues (Keohane, 1984, 56).

Cooperation must therefore be examined within the context of associated actions, shared expectations and beliefs in order to be understood.

Keohane maintains that international regimes facilitate cooperation. Why? Because regimes embody principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that enable cooperation. All of these elements contain injunctions about behaviour that prescribe action. For instance, principles define "purposes that their members are expected to pursue", norms prescribe illegitimate and legitimate behaviour, and rules specify the rights and duties of members (Keohane, 1984, 57-9). Basically, then, regimes provide a type of social-action system in which actors operate to reduce uncertainties and eventually make mutually beneficial agreements. As states cooperate, they get to know their partners; they can begin to predict each others' actions and the range of unexpected behaviour is reduced, thus making mutually beneficial arrangements possible.

I adopt some of the tenets of institutionalism to extract part of the theoretical framework I use to analyze political integration in North America. Institutional theories are not usually associated with the study of North American integration. The weakness of formal institutions in the North American context means that few scholars have paid

attention to how institutions might act as variables that affect political integration. Rather, as we have seen, the study of North American integration has been dominated by the debate between traditional European based theories like neofunctionalism and economicistic theories like neo-liberalism and critical IPE. However, I believe that these approaches are short-sighted because they blind the analyst from an inquiry as to how institutions matter in the political integration process. Institutions matter because of the way formal institutional structures (organizations) and regimes affect political outcomes. Specifically, an institutionalist perspective will allow me to examine some of the findings of both my case studies.

It proves difficult to evaluate the concept of “institution”. Bernauer notes that “[e]very analyst who has tried knows that it is difficult to conceptualize and measure institutions as explanatory variables” (Bernauer, 1995, 352). Nevertheless, institutional theory endows me with the necessary tools to determine how institutions alter the political integration process.

Specifically, institutional theory informed my analysis in Chapter Three and Four, as well as my case study of the environment. I examine the organizational attributes of the International Boundary Water Commission (IBWC), International Joint Commission (IJC), Border Environmental and Cooperation Commission (BECC), and the North American Development (NADBANK)—all organizations that accompany the North American regime. Environmental scholars explain that usually the most straightforward way to evaluate organizational effectiveness is the degree to which a particular environmental regime meets its objectives. In the case of the North American environmental regime this would mean the degree to which it is able to improve and

preserve the North American environment and whether the organizations attached to the regime are contributing to environmental improvement. Organizational design features like enforcement mechanisms and public participation mechanisms are purposeful attempts to alter the “institutional arrangement in the interests of achieving identifiable goals” (Young, 1989, 217). Organizations that display and are able to effectively manage these features will be able to execute their mandate and shape policy development.

Mumme and Moore suggest that the ability to constrain the actions of participants in an organization toward achieving some specifiable goal can also be referred to as “formal authority” (Mumme and Moore, 1990, 663). Formal authority is vested in the degree to which a given organization can act independently from member governments and thereby direct governmental action on a given issue. Thus, to determine degree of institutionalization, I focus on particular organizational features like its enforcement mechanisms, its ability to meet its mandate, and public participation instruments.

It is important to note that institutional strength (in terms of enforcement and public participation mechanisms) is not the only way to gauge effectiveness. Indeed, as Mumme and Moore note, “[t]he ability of an agency to control its institutional destiny and shape the development of policy in its domain is enhanced, though not determined, by the presence of these factors” (Mumme and Moore, 1990, 664). Indeed, Haas, Keohane and Levy suggest that there is limited evidence to suggest that institutions enforce rules (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993, 398). The reason for this is that institutions, in their organizational form, cannot effectively constrain the actions of sovereign governments. In a broader context in which sovereign states are still the primary agents, it is misleading to believe that institutions will inhibit the action of

governments. Haas, Keohane and Levy put it this way: “if the rules and practices of international institutions are inconsistent with the realities of power...they become meaningless” (Haas Keohane and Levy, 1993, 5). They go on to say that, “[s]tates maintain control; the institutions themselves are typically quite weak” (Hass et al, 1993, 18).

This approach is useful because it suggests that institutional strength is not only a function of organizational design features, but it is also vested in informal power capabilities that enable institutions to produce the conditions for cooperation. So an institution may be defined as weak in the organizational domain, but strong in its informal authority.

Institutions exercise informal authority when they alter policy direction. Institutions can influence the course of policy direction in a number of ways. In particular, Haas, Keohane and Levy stress that “epistemic communities” can play a key role in influencing policy direction.

Epistemic communities have been a subject of study for both neo-liberal institutionalists and constructivists (Adler and Haas, 1992, 367-70). Haas defines an epistemic community as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within the domain or issue-area” (Haas, 1992, 3). Epistemic communities are important because they can help elucidate new issues, generate concern on a given issue, diffuse knowledge, generate discussion and criticism, and generate information—all of which in turn alters actors’ perceptions of an issue, thus changing the course of policy development (Haas, 1992, 15). Institutions alter and influence the course of policy

direction because they mobilize epistemic communities, provide the conditions for cooperation, and provide a space for interaction between multiple stakeholders.

To evaluate the degree of institutionality I will pay particular attention both to organizational structure and informal sources of power. I also use institutional theory, in its regime variant, to gauge degree of cooperation. I will examine all informal instances of cooperation in both the area of the border and the area of the environment. The assumption is that the more state actors cooperate, the more they will get to know each other, communicate and develop understanding, which increases trust and instances of cooperation.

Regime theory postulates that interstate cooperation forms a pattern of regularity and generates beliefs and meaning around cooperation that may lead to further cooperation. This is an important point. The norms, values, symbols, and systems of meaning generated around the framework of cooperation can eventually form the basis for further cooperation. The question is why. What accounts for the shift in identity in the North American complex that might lead the three countries to consider political integration? How have perceptions, roles and ideas changed? What external factors are prevalent? What internal factors are operating in the relationship? Regime theory tells us only half the story. It tells us why states may form cooperative frameworks in the first place. It tells us about the nature of cooperation and it tells us about how this may lead to increased cooperation in other areas. But it does not tell us why. To a certain extent, like institutionalism, realism or functionalism, regime theory is entrapped within the constraints of rationalism. Rationalism treats the identities and interests of actors as exogenously given (Adler, 1997, 392-394). In other words, these theories are based on an

epistemological framework that assumes actors interests as a given. This is not to say that rationality and instrumental calculus does not exist. Rational-based theories are all useful in explaining decisions, but excluded from these views is an analysis of the implications of a decision to cooperate and how this process transforms the nature of state interaction. To get the other half, and arrive at a more comprehensive picture, I will focus on constructivism, which rather than taking the interests of states for granted, assumes interests are malleable and subject to historical processes. Additionally, regime theory has trouble explaining disintegrative factors. Put differently, the existence of cooperation does not necessarily have to lead to better communication, trust, and even friendliness. Cooperation can take place within a system characterized by conflict and disintegrative factors such as sovereignty and, asymmetrical power relations. The result may be a break down of communication and even a regression in any interstate relationship. So to get a more accurate and complete picture of integration in North America I will turn to constructivist theories.

Constructivism picks up where other theories leave off. Interestingly enough, it picks up the debate with a critique of regime theory and some of its intersubjective qualities. If, as Keohane sustains, regimes are social institutions around which expectations converge enabling cooperation, then regimes have an intersubjective quality. That is, when Keohane talks about norms, interests, and principles he is allowing a space for identities and transformation of identities. They are not just a given. Kratochwil and Ruggie explain this better:

The emphasis on convergent expectations as the constitutive basis of regimes gives regimes an inescapable intersubjective quality. It follows that we know regimes by their principled and shared understandings of desirable and acceptable forms of social behaviour. Hence, the ontology of

regimes rests upon a strong element of intersubjectivity. Now, consider the fact that the prevailing epistemological position in regime analysis is almost entirely positivistic in orientation. Before it does anything else, positivism posits a radical separation of subject and object. It then focuses on the ‘objective forces’ that move actors in their social interactions. Finally, intersubjective meaning, where it is considered at all, is inferred from behaviour. Here we have the most debilitating problem of all: epistemology fundamentally contradicts ontology! (Kratochwil and Ruggie cited in Christiansen et al, 1999: 533).

These debates and criticisms have contributed to what some have dubbed ‘the constructivist turn’ in international relations theory. Constructivism arose as a reaction to the rationalism that dominated in IR in the 1980s. Their main targets were neorealism and neo-liberal institutionalism (regime theory). Both approaches adhered to the same rationalist principles resulting in a constricted debate about the behaviour of rational egoists (Waever, 2004: 202). This narrow debate opened the space for interpretive approaches to make their interjection. In particular, interpretive approaches highlighted the inconsistencies in regime theory. Christiansen, Jorgen and Wiener thus recount that the first move to constructivism occurred when it was identified that there was a “lacking match between the concept of ‘regime’ as entailing converging views on norms, principles, rules and decisions in a specific issue area, on the one hand, and an epistemological framework that assumed actors’ interests as a given, on the other” (Christiansen et al, 1999: 534).

Put another way, regime theory and rationalists in general could not completely explain the choices, preferences and interests of actors since these elements were assumed to be stable and exogenous. Interests were inferred from a primarily material structure (Risse, 2004: 161). One way to resolve this puzzle was to focus on sociological factors - culture, ideas, values and norms. By elevating these sociological variables and making them central to analysis, constructivism challenges the fixed interpretation of the

world advanced by rationalist theories. Constructivists put forth the claim that actors interact with culture, norms, worldviews, and values. Thus, the second move towards constructivism came about with the realization that structure “was not established by the principle of anarchy, but resulted from social interaction between states” (Christiansen et al, 1999: 534). Finally, the third move is due to the creation of a research design based on the importance of shared norms in international politics (Christiansen et al, 1999: 534). The three moves have contributed to the recent ascendancy of constructivism in theorizing integration.

Constructivism pushes the parameters of integration theory by problematizing and analysing ideational factors like culture, norms, values, and ideas that characterize patterns of behaviour between states at the international level. But before delving into the details of constructivism and how its best suited to highlight the variables I focus on, some methodological points need to first be considered. First and foremost, it should be noted that constructivism is not a theory like realism, neofunctionalism or institutionalism. Hopf underlines this point, he states, "...constructivism is an approach, not a theory. And if it is a theory, it is a theory of process, not substantive outcome. In order to achieve the later, constructivism must adopt some theory of politics to make it work" (Hopf, 1998: 196). As an approach, constructivism is useful in that it emphasizes “the ontological reality of intersubjective knowledge and on the epistemological and methodological implications of this reality” (Adler, 1997: 322-323). Constructivism uncovers certain aspects of international politics that were formerly neglected and examine how these factors can have practical and real implications.

It is important to understand that the interpretive school is broad and wide ranging

including postmodern, poststructural, and constructivist approaches among others. All of these approaches share some fundamentals. They all, for example, believe that actors do not inhabit a pre-given world; rather numerous worlds with plural interpretations exist. They also concede that the world actors perceive is partly constructed by them through social and historical processes. Thus actors also interpret the world. By extension, “precisely because meaning and interpretations are context dependant - there are always multiple contexts” (Wilber, 1999: 163). Additionally, they all agree that these principles should be engaged to study IR (Hopf, 1998: 182). However, having accounted for their shared perspectives, it is also important to note where these approaches diverge.

Postmodernist and poststructural approaches are the most radical of the interpretive bunch in that they adopt a relativist position that denies the possibility of all truth claims since reality cannot really be known (Risse, 2004: 165). Radical approaches believe that objectivity, if it exists at all, is a product of social relations and social interaction so that we cannot really know what reality or truth is since everything is socially constructed. So there is no one universal truth. The result, if taken to its logical end, is extreme diversity, confusion and fragmentation. Constructivists adopt a more conventional and moderate stance. They do not follow the postmodern path to its logical end. Instead, constructivism removes the ontological extremism of more radical approaches by accepting that the real world, and by extension IR, is determined by both material and social reality (Adler, 1997: 324). Thus, by employing constructivism, the ontological extremism of more radical approaches is removed. Hopf summarizes the moderate constructivism position well. He states:

Conventional constructivism, while expecting to uncover differences, identities, and multiple understandings, still assumes that it can specify a

set of conditions under which one can expect to see one identity or another. This is what Mark Hoffman has called “minimal foundationalism,” accepting that a contingent universalism is possible and maybe necessary (Hopf, 1998: 183).

It is this more conventional constructivist approach that I employ in my analysis of political integration in North America.

As already mentioned constructivisms’ main contribution to the study of integration is that not just material factors but also ideational factors matter as well. Normative elements such as culture shape behaviour (Adler, 1997: 320-323). This ontological claim leads to epistemological implications for how international actors operate, for institutions and for social change. I have already pointed to the first constructivist principle, that ideational factors are important. Secondly, these ideational factors like ideas, culture and values define and shape identity. To put it differently, identities constitute interests and action. And third, constructivists propose that agents and structures are mutually constituted. Structures and agents do not exist independently of each other. They are in a constant state of interaction with each other shaping and being shaped by each other (Prise and Reus-Smit, 1998: 267). This last claim can be summed up by the term intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity is defined as the meaning that is derived out of interaction (Wendt, 1992: 396). To put it differently, meaning or identity between actors is formed through dialogue and interaction.

These three principles make up the core of a constructivist account, and more importantly, enable one to inquire into the dynamics of social change. As stated in the previous section, integration theories like Keohane’s liberal internationalism, assume that the interest of international actors are exogenous. The result is limited inquiry into change or agency. For our purposes, constructivism makes one of its most important

contributions in its analysis of change or agency. Its emphasis on intersubjectivity or that the meaning and identity between actors is derived out of interaction and dialogue, signifies that interests are not just exogenous, they are endogenous. There is a connection between structure and agency or environment and actors. Wendt puts it this way; “Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors’ ideas about how the world works... Identities and such collective cognitions do not exist apart from each other; they are “mutually constitutive” (Wendt, 1992: 399). So in essence, meaning and identity are formed through interaction, which in turn leads to the creation of a social act. As Wendt states, “the process by which egoists learn to cooperate is at the same time a process of reconstructing their interests in terms of shared commitments to social norms” (Wendt, 1992: 417). When cooperation is repeated enough times, perceptions of self and other begin shifting and changing.

Constructivism is also useful in its dissection of power and how it is exercised in international affairs. Some would argue that an analysis of power does not fit well within the constructivist realm. The concept of power sits much more comfortably within the parameters of realist theory and is at odds with an approach that seeks to emphasize “intersubjective factors”. Adler argues that on the contrary, a normative analysis of power is important to any understanding of world politics insofar as it has “consequences in the social and physical world” (Adler, 1997: 323).

In the constructivist view, power has both a normative and physical dimension. Power is not just about military and economic resources; it also involves the ability to produce and reproduce meaning, interests, identities, and practices. Adler notes that the capacity “to create the underlying rules of the game, to define what constitutes acceptable

play, and to be able to get other actors to commit themselves to those rules because they are now part of their self-understandings is perhaps the most subtle and most effective form of power" (Adler, 1997: 336). Thus, the ability to produce intersubjective meaning is also a form of power because an actor is able to frame the parameters of what is acceptable, or not, making some interpretations appear more plausible than others. In this sense, the U.S. is not only the dominant partner because it has a bigger economy or a bigger military. The U.S. is dominant because as a result of its resources it has the ability to shape discourse. And even if the U.S. chooses not to use its power, the other partners' perception of asymmetries alters the relationship. The point here is that the ability to shape ideas and interests can become a powerful strategic instrument (Rosamond, 2000: 120).

Before continuing to demonstrate how I apply constructivism to the case of political integration in North America, I would like to delineate that constructivism does not reject rationality per se, or some of the theories that subscribe to it. Rather, constructivism aspires to add a sociological element to rationality (Rousell, 2004: 72). A constructivist approach, does not deny that rationalist-based theories do not account for interests, preferences or ideas. Consider, for example, neorealism and regime theory. Both assume that material power, in its military or economic dimensions, affect interstate behaviour and determine change (Hopf, 1998: 177). Regime theory uses economic interests as an explanatory variable for integration. These theories do not negate that interests or preferences exist. Rather, these theories are "centred on instrumental interests that are *a priori* assumed to be most important ones..." (Matlary in Rossamond, 2000: 173). For constructivists, on the other hand, ideas, interests, norms and values are

causally central to analysis. Indeed, for constructivists both material and discursive power (power of knowledge, ideas, culture, values, ideas, language) are crucial for a well rounded picture of international politics.

Moreover, some even argue that constructivism occupies a middle ground between rationalism and more radical interpretive approaches because it seeks to understand how both the material and subjective realms interact to produce policy outcomes. Constructivism is thus a compromise between both schools of thought (Adler, 1997: 330). Political actors are rational agents able to make instrumental choices but as Roussel maintains, any objective reality is mediated through the subjectivity of actors. Roussel elaborates on this point well:

States remain rational actors capable of making cost-benefit calculations and of elaborating strategies, but at the borders of this rationality lie vast areas where forms of subjectivity have room for action. The first of these areas is found anterior to rationality, because intersubjectivity plays a determinative role in the very shaping of identity and of interests: it is only when these are formed that states can start to develop rational policies (Roussel, 2004: 73).

Constructivism thus aims to bridge the divide between rationalist and interpretive approaches. It is only by considering both, that a complete picture is arrived at.

When applied to North America, constructivism empowers the analyst to answer why and how North American integration is at the present stage and whether institutionalism and cooperation have really led to positive forms of intersubjective practices. For instance, the shift to an understanding of how to cooperate and the discovery of a language of cooperation in the case of the environment in North America can best be explained by a focus on constructivist theory which equips us to analyze how identities and interests can change over time and produce shifts in the behaviour of states. Using a constructivist perspective rather than using approaches that assume interests to be

exogenously given, we can understand this dynamic between the three countries. In this case, the act and process of cooperating in an institutionalized trilateral space provided by the CEC enabled the countries to learn how to cooperate and to construct a language of cooperation. This is especially important because as countries construct a framework of cooperation, other intersubjective processes take place. Trust, confidence and familiarity are generated, enabling state actors to reconstitute the identity of the other. Predispositions are broken down, cultural and social barriers are challenged, enabling positive forms of cooperation and transformative processes. It is equally important to note, however, that interaction will not just automatically and inevitably lead to positive forms of cooperation or political integration. Put differently, cooperation may be conflict-ridden. This point is often lost in most of the constructivist literature which emphasizes the good things over the “bad things in world politics that are socially constructed” (Checkel, 1998: 339). As Checkel notes:

There is a tendency in the recent work to consider only ethically good norms, such as those imposing a stigma on the use of nuclear or chemical weapons, those that helped bring the cold war to an end, or the global norms that facilitated the demise of apartheid (Checkel, 1998: 339).

So it is equally important to examine conflict or misunderstanding in the relationships between countries and how that conflict arises. Put differently, constructivism can inquire into the logic of discursive shifts whether positive or negative and their effects on the behaviour of state actors. Moreover, constructivism is equally useful in gauging the disintegrative factors such as sovereignty concerns and misunderstandings that can lead to the breakdown of cooperation and can halt or reverse the integration processes.

The concept of sovereignty has been widely used by all three countries as an argument against political integration. For instance, in an article dedicated to examining

symbolic politics at the Canada-U.S. border, Stephanie Golob argues that the symbolic use of “sovereignty” by the Canadian and U.S. governments works directly against efforts to create a genuine North American Community. Golob sustains that despite overwhelming institutionalization and cooperation on border issues post 9/11, the way both governments employ “sovereignty” at the border indicates the extent of ideological disjuncture between the two NAFTA partners (Golob, 2002: 35). Golob uses a constructivist framework to uncover the hidden meaning behind official discourses advanced by government representatives. Golob reminds one that the state; “justifies its primary role in the international system and its monopoly over the use of force at home by mediating between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’, and that mediation happens - literally and symbolically - at the border” (Golob, 2002: 3). She goes on to say that, “[w]hat stands between (Canada and the U.S.), symbolically is the border...it (border) remains for the two national governments – in identity terms expressed in foreign policy –what divides ‘us’ and ‘them’” (Golob, 2002: 6). In the U.S. case, assertions of sovereignty are embedded in ideas of “American Exceptionalism”, manifest destiny or morally based notions of American superiority (Golob, 2002: 18). This identity based on a subjective “sense of uniqueness” translates in the North American case to rejections of deepening integration and resistance to being tied down by rule-based institutions: both of which would signify a loss of U.S. power. In the Canadian case, loss of sovereignty claims have more to do with the Canadian preoccupation with ‘distinctiveness’. For Canada, sovereignty signifies the right to a distinct Canadian identity from an overwhelming U.S. presence (Golob, 2002: 17-18). These two interpretations of sovereignty found in post 9/11 official borders discourse act as an obstacle to deeper political integration and can

only be uncovered by applying constructivist methods to the study of borders.

The example of 9/11 also highlights constructivism's usefulness in analyzing the domestic-international dichotomy. The domestic-international dichotomy can exert significant influence on the nature of political integration. As O'Brien notes; “[i]t is the interplay between systemic forces and regional/ national/ transnational/ responses that provides the best explanation for present regional integration...” (O'Brien, 1995: 720). For instance, domestic scepticism about U.S. motives in Mexico may affect how far the Mexican government can move the political integration process forward and how domestic issues operate as a disintegrative factor. The Mexican public displayed high levels of anti-American sentiments after 9/11 and did not appear to share much solidarity with their American neighbours over the event. Thus, in part to not appear to come out as too “pro American”, President Fox expressed “tepid expressions of support” (Flynn cited in Clarkson and Banda 2003: 13). The Mexican response was “domestically determined by a historical mistrust” of the U.S. (Clarkson and Banda, 2003:12). Mexico’s response came up smack in the face of traditional Mexican foreign policy and a history of suspicion toward the U.S. Instead, Mexico became caught up in an internal debate about an appropriate reaction. Examples such as this one can lead to conflict, mistrust, and ill feelings between state actors stalling or even reversing the political integration process.

This chapter has reviewed some of the main theoretical literature surrounding the study of integration. Conventional models overlook important intervening variables like institutions, and ideas and assumptions actors have about each other. Economic-based models also pay inadequate attention to non-economic factors that I argue account for the nature of political integration in North America. Thus, notwithstanding important insights

that other theoretical approaches might offer on the integration process, I will focus on a combination of constructivism and neo-institutional theory to formulate my theoretical framework and my methodology. Constructivism is useful because it allows me to interrogate how intersubjective factors play a crucial intervening role in the political integration process. It delves into the subjective realm and can therefore inquire into the logic of how identities, roles, and interests are transformed over time leading to a move to political integration or inversely a shift to conflict and political disintegration. To this end, in the following chapters, I examine integration discourse or what can be called the language of integration as evidence for state identity construction. I look at official speeches, leaders' statements, and interview data to determine whether subjective factors in favour of political integration processes are indeed at work, or if the reverse is true. Negative intersubjective understandings that prevent a move towards higher levels of political integration may also be in operation. In addition, I examine whether the discursive strategies employed by state actors clash with or contradict what occurs on the ground. In terms of institutional theory, the objective is to determine to what degree institutional integration is occurring and whether institutions perform a critical mediating function in the integration process. I examine specific organizational features such as enforcement mechanisms and public participation mechanisms to determine to what degree they are in operation. As well, I examine informal sources which also endow it with institutional strength. I also use a subset of institutional theory, regime theory, to determine the degree of cooperation. Cooperation in the form of agreements, accords, meetings, memos, and work groups can lead to a social act. It can be argued that as cooperation increases between actors, communication increases, actors get to know each

other better, levels of trust increase leading to the development of better cooperative frameworks that decrease uncertainty among participants about each other. Inversely, cooperation may operate along purely functional and technical lines and does not have to result in better relations among policy actors. So one factor we will be looking for is the degree of cooperation. Do high levels of cooperation exist? Do high levels of trust exist? Higher levels of cooperation may result in some of what constructivists stress: identity formation, role changes and intersubjective practices. The opposite is also true, high levels of cooperation can exist within a conflict-ridden context and do not have to lead to trust or positive transformative processes. The combination of all these approaches into one single theoretical framework will allow me to account for the highly complex and varied, two-speed and uneven nature of political integration in North America. It will also help to elucidate why high levels of political integration are non-existent in the case of North America.

Chapter Two – Historical and Political Legacy: Canada, the United States and Mexico in a North American Region

In this chapter I map out the historical and political forces that have not only led to the formation of North America as a region—forces that eventually propelled Canada, the U.S. and Mexico to enter into NAFTA—but, more specifically, I examine forces that have contributed to the differences that structure each bilateral relationship. These differences account for the asymmetrical and varied shape of political integration in North America and have a conditioning effect on the rate and nature of political integration. The distinct patterns that make up the Canada-U.S. and U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationships undermine what can termed the “grand narrative” of integration theory: the functionalist claim that economic integration will, more or less, automatically lead to political integration. Additionally, this chapter challenges the explanations provided by economic approaches to integration that I discussed in the previous chapter. Economistic approaches on their own cannot sufficiently explain the character of the integration process because they leave important factors out. Indeed, as this chapter will show, prior intersubjective understandings, institutional contexts, and patterns of cooperation in each bilateral relationship structure or mediate the political integration process. This chapter will thus lay the ground work for the argument I make in subsequent chapters that high levels of economic interaction do not necessarily have to coincide with or lead to advanced levels of political integration. Rather, as this chapter demonstrates, intersubjective understandings and forms of institution-building developed over time have a substantial effect on any ensuing political integration process.

In documenting the emergence of two distinct bilateral relationships that put pressure on the political integration process, this chapter elucidates several key points.

First, this chapter emphasizes the importance of geopolitics in the early history of North America. For example, the United States's failure to dislodge Britain in the War of 1812 and Canada's continued reliance on the Crown for protection signified that Canada was able to ward off U.S. annexationist tendencies in the early history of the relationship (Granatstein, 1989, 5). In contrast, Mexico had no imperial protector. Mexico found itself in a state of utter chaos and political instability after the Wars of Independence with Spain and was unable to resist annexationist pressures from expansionist Americans (Skidmore and Smith, 2001, 217).

This early geopolitical context set the tone for the evolution of the bilateral relationships. This chapter also demonstrates the relevance of looking at the values and norms held by political actors. It is this realm that partly explains why political integration is more advanced in the case of Canada and the U.S. than in the case of the U.S. and Mexico. As we will see, Canada and the U.S. share a number of connections—their position within British North America in the early history of the relationship, a common Anglo-Saxon background and language—that over time have enabled Canada and the U.S. to develop shared norms and facilitated cooperation and institution building. Indeed, the existence of a “shared racial roots” ideology that bound the U.S., U.K. and Canada cannot be underestimated. Kramer argues that racial Anglo-Saxonism not only evolved “as a self-conscious bond” linking Britons and Americans at the turn of the 19th century, but also, more importantly, it functioned to organize geo-political action and cooperation. Thus the recruitment of Anglo-Saxons by both Americans and Britons involved not only acknowledgement of shared racial identity, common language, deep family connections, and a shared intellectual heritage, but also a political rationale for

imperial and colonial acts (Kramer, 2002, 1-4). This is an important point to note because it in part explains American treatment of Mexicans in the late 19th century. As Kramer notes, “By the late nineteenth century, it was a racism built against a multitude of opponents and innumerable violent frontiers. British Anglo-Saxons had...wrenched land away from Mexicans” (Kramer, 2002, 5). Mexicans were not of the same descent and clearly did not fit within Anglo-Saxon cultural framework. Canada, on the other hand, fit comfortably within an imagined Anglo-American empire (Kramer, 2002, 16). The U.S. and Mexico had more trouble developing positive intersubjective understandings. Thus right from the beginning, the early conflict that characterized their relationship and the mistrust it generated set the context for the development of the bilateral relationship. Moreover, Mexico’s semi-authoritarian system led to corrupt electoral politics and a one-party system that has prevented the U.S. and Mexico from relying on shared political values that could inform institution building and mechanisms of conflict resolution⁷.

Additionally, and this will become clearer when reviewing the case studies, this chapter demonstrates the usefulness of an institutionalist-constructivist theoretical framework. Specifically, a constructivist-institutionalist combination elucidates how

⁷ I am not suggesting that the U.S. is democratic and that Mexico is undemocratic. Indeed, both countries experienced civil wars in the 19th century between more or less liberal factions. In fact, Mexico’s liberal faction modeled its demands for reform on U.S. political rights and institutions. For example, specific legislation in the Mexican Constitution such as Article 123 was influenced by the American labour movement. However, liberalism succeeded more in the U.S. than in Mexico where a pre-revolutionary elite, in order to contain revolutionary forces and resolve the deep political ruptures within the Mexican polity, consolidated and institutionalized their power through a one-party system that has directly led to a semi-authoritarian state (See Hellman. 1983, 22-31).

institutions act as intervening variables in the integration process. Institutionalists maintain that institutions structure behaviour. Moreover, institutions do not merely structure agents, institutions and agents exist in a state of interaction with each other, where they influence and are influenced by one another (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998, 267). Thus, in the case of North America, the norms and patterns of interaction established in the early years of the relationships informed the genesis of institutions in later years. Additionally, interaction and cooperation within an institutional context allows policy actors to alter the cognitive framework, which modifies previously held intersubjective understandings and, at the same time, leads to the creation of new intersubjective understandings.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section outlines the character and political culture that defines the United States, focusing on U.S. aspirations in the late 19th century and how they influence the particular nature of interactions. The second section delineates the emergence of the Canada-U.S. bilateral relationship with an emphasis on the particular patterns established in the formative years of each country's history. This section also briefly diverges to document the emergence of a Canada-Mexico relationship and the barriers that both countries encounter when cooperating. The third section discusses the development of the U.S.-Mexico relationship—again with a focus on how prior ideas and assumptions mediate the kind of political integration that arises in the U.S.-Mexico context. The final section briefly touches upon some of the outstanding issues of the North American relationship and the remaining impediments to integration that have developed in the NAFTA period.

The United States in North America

The overwhelming force and dominance of the United States positions it not only geographically, but also symbolically at the centre of North America. The U.S. both links Canada and Mexico, and separates them from each other. More importantly, Canada and Mexico have, to some extent, developed their national character in opposition to the U.S. Thus we begin with a discussion of the historical processes and values that shaped the development of the U.S., which, in some way, help to explain the particular features of political integration in North America.

In an article dedicated to examining the Canada-U.S. relationship through a constructivist lens, Stephanie Golob argues that the construction of a U.S. identity founded on a sense of distinctiveness and “uniqueness” has functioned to prevent the establishment of a “we” identification that necessary to establish a more symmetrical and egalitarian North American community.⁹ Indeed, the symbolic construction of an “us” that is different, exceptional, and in some ways superior to all others acts as a significant obstacle for deep political integration and manifests itself in asymmetries of power that mediate the political integration process and account for its varied and complex nature.

⁹ Golob notes that Canada has also actively participated in forging a distinct national identity to “protect the nation from the neighbor’s design on its sovereignty, security and identity.” Golob cites Macdonald’s National Policy, Canada’s lynchpin role in the “North American Triangle,” and Canada’s “middle-power multilateralist” role as examples of policies that have all served to legitimate the state and paint Canada as distinct and autonomous from its southern neighbour (See Golob, 2000,12). Similarly, Williams notes that despite some strong cultural similarities between Canada and the U.S. at a world level, Canadians actively construct an image of orderliness, conservatism and civility that distinguishes them from their more unruly neighbours (see Williams, 2004, 21).

Scholars of U.S. foreign policy have argued incessantly about the defining elements that explain U.S. behaviour in the world. Buzman argues that there are four features that explain U.S. behaviour: liberalism, moralism, isolationism, unilateralism and anti-statism (Buzman, 2004, 4). Lipset maintains somewhat differently that American ideological underpinnings reveal a predisposition towards: antistatism, individualism, populism and egalitarianism (Lipset, 1990, 26). Still, others use binary oppositions like isolationist versus interventionist or “hawks and doves” that largely obscure other alternative formulations from making their interjections (Mead, 2001, 176). American foreign-policy scholar Walter Mead argues that there are four basic schools of foreign-policy thought that have shaped how the United States conducts its foreign policy. These are, respectively, the Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Wilsonian, and Jacksonian approaches, which are grounded in “regional, economic, social and class interests”. U.S. foreign policy emerges from the mixture of these currents of thought within a democratic political process (Mead, 2001, 85). Mead’s approach is valuable because he provides a more balanced and overarching method from which to examine U.S. foreign policy and makes the case that at any given time strands of each operate simultaneously to keep each other in check (Mead, 2001, 54).

One core strand of U.S foreign-policy thought is what Mead labels Wilsonian, the belief that “the United States should be pushing [its] values among the world and turning other countries into democracies whether they like it or not” (Mead online, 2003). This notion of a “unique” American project is rooted in the United States’s early revolutionary experience and in the Protestant values of the early settlers. At the time, many of the early Protestant settlers who had fled England fearing persecution for their religious beliefs had

sought to create what some have dubbed the first modern nation (De Palma, 2001,10). They rejected and revolted against what they felt was a tyrannical, oppressive centralized British state and founded a nation based on powerful principles and ideas about individual rights, freedom of choice, and egalitarianism.

Some argue that this historical experience translated into the American idea of “exceptionalism”. Buzman states that, “[b]y exceptionalism is meant the distinctive qualities that differentiate the US from other states” (Buzman, 2004, 3). Golob includes the “Puritan work ethic, the experimental nature of American popular democratic institutions, or the moral superiority of the U.S. as the Promised Land and the pinnacle of political development” (Golob, 2002, 18). Mead argues that the experience of the early settlers produced the belief that the U.S. had both a moral and practical obligation to spread its principles of liberty and democratic values around the world. In fact, Wilsonians maintain that the “security and success of the Revolution at home demands its universal extension throughout the world” (Mead, 2001, 181).

Another strand of American foreign policy thought can be found in the Hamiltonian tradition. Hamiltonians view an alliance between the national government and big business as the principle way to secure the United States’s place in the world and to keep other countries from becoming too powerful and threatening U.S. interests (Mead online, 2003).

Hamiltonians are commercially oriented and they elevate trade and business above all else. For Hamiltonians, both prosperity and peace can be attained by creating a world-wide trading system. Indeed, as Mead remarks, “[t]he expansion of trade, and the substitution of the win-win strategy of commerce for the zero-sum game of war, would

become important Hamiltonian aims in the twentieth century" (Mead, 2001, 103). The promotion and expansion of trade and globalization in fact constitutes one of the most central strands of U.S. foreign policy thinking: the belief that foreign policy includes "questions of the relationship of the American economy to the international economic system" (Mead, 2001, 79).

In the early history of the United States, Hamiltonians were primarily concerned with securing the "freedom of the sea"—the idea that U.S. citizens, goods and ships should have the freedom to travel and trade wherever profitable opportunities presented themselves (Mead, 2001, 106). Later, after the Cold War, Hamiltonians felt they had the "unique opportunity to develop a world-wide trading and finance system based on the unchallenged might of America's military forces and on the dynamism of its economy" (Mead, 2001, 268). NAFTA is part of this strategy.

Henrikson argues that the concept of an economic union not only with North America, but the entire hemisphere, dates as far back as the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 and is derived from the idea that the U.S. has as a distinct role to play in the Americas, specifically in fostering prosperity and democracy (Henrikson, 1995, 162-3). Despite the fact that it was Canada who initially pushed for the 1989 Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and Mexico who first proposed NAFTA, both trade pacts furthered U.S. economic goals that had been a historical priority.

The United States's regional trade vision was, to some extent, influenced by economic trends taking place around the world. For instance, one of the United States's main reasons for entering into NAFTA was to respond to the growing regionalism that characterized the international political economy. NAFTA would allow the U.S. to re-

position itself within the international political economy. In addition, the slow pace of the GATT's Uruguay Round negotiations convinced U.S. policymakers that multilateral bargaining over trade was becoming ineffective at moving U.S. commercial interests. It seemed only natural for the U.S. to look towards its North American neighbours for possible answers (Wise, 1998, 9).

For example, the FTA abolished "tariffs in commodity trade in industry and agriculture; liberalized Canadian controls of foreign investment; provided national treatment for American firms operating in Canada" (Thompson and Randall, 1994, 284). In terms of NAFTA, the pact enabled improvement of U.S. export performance and improvement of U.S. exports to Mexico. On the investment side, NAFTA would provide U.S. firms with cheap labour in Mexico and significantly liberalize investment regulations in the areas of pharmaceuticals, oil and natural gas industry, and the agricultural sector (Thompson and Randall, 1994, 294). Perhaps more importantly, from an economic standpoint, both agreements situated the U.S. at the centre of a powerful trading bloc that could compete on the world stage.

Another core strand of U.S. foreign policy is what Mead labels Jeffersonian. Jeffersonians have historically questioned the Hamiltonian and Wilsonian impulse to become involved in foreign entanglements. Jeffersonians maintain that the principle goal of American foreign policy should be to safeguard American values and democracy at home, rather than exporting them abroad (Mead, 2001, 75). Jeffersonians hold fast to the belief that America, as a nation of the new world, had the rare chance to start fresh, "to build a system of liberty of the purest revolutionary principles" (Mead, 2001, 181). Thus the conservation of the essence of the Revolution has been the most important objective

for Jeffersonians. Becoming involved in enterprises abroad could poison the Revolutionary project at home and might unnecessarily entangle the U.S. with corrupt and dangerous dictators abroad and in wars that would threaten U.S. values (Mead online, 2003).

Finally, Mead argues that an account of U.S. foreign policy would be incomplete without an examination of Jacksonian politics. Jacksonian impacts on U.S. foreign policy has been profound and enormous (Mead, 2001, 259). Jacksonian policies and principles are difficult to comprehend because, as Mead explains, “Jacksonianism is less an intellectual or political movement than it is an expression of the social, cultural and religious values of a large portion of the U.S. population” (Mead, 2001, 226).

Jacksonians believe in the integrity of the “folk community” that is tied together by shared values and a shared destiny (Mead, 2001, 226). The principle objective of government in both the foreign and domestic spheres is to protect and promote the “well-being—political, moral, and economic—of the folk community” by any means possible, so long as they do not infringe on the liberties of the folk community (Mead, 2001, 238).

One way of understanding the Jacksonian belief system is to highlight their deep commitment to civil liberties, especially when it allows them to defend their deep adherence to the Second Amendment: the right to bear arms (Mead, 2001, 225). The right to protect oneself by bearing arms exemplifies, for Jacksonians, the very pinnacle of freedom that enables a person to live as an individual. Individualism is another principle that characterizes Jacksonian politics. Individuals are duty-bound to “seek satisfaction and salvation through whatever means the individual finds helpful” (Mead, 2001, 233).

The four narratives of foreign policy have shaped how American political elites

and the public look at the world beyond themselves. More importantly, for our purposes, they also help to explain U.S. behaviour in North America.

For instance, both the Wilsonian and Hamiltonian schools of thought can, at times, be interpreted as displaying interventionist impulses. The religious moral foundations of American politics combined with the belief in American exceptionalism, or the belief in the superiority and universality of American liberal values, gives U.S. foreign policy a missionary element that has rationalized and justified American intervention in foreign countries.

Wilsonian policies are problematic on a number of fronts. First, not all U.S. foreign policy has unfolded in a Wilsonian fashion (Mead, 2001, 170). Indeed, sometimes to achieve Jacksonian or Hamiltonian goals the United States has supported undemocratic regimes. This puts U.S. foreign policy in a contradictory position. Additionally, aggressive unilateral behaviour evokes nationalist responses from both Canada and Mexico, placing sovereignty concerns at the heart of national debates in both countries.

The Hamiltonian school can also be interpreted as interventionist in that it promotes globalization and neo-liberal values across the globe in order to achieve its goal of establishing a global trading system. This Hamiltonian free-trade philosophy also creates opposition within certain sectors such as environmental groups, labour unions, and other civil society groups that are concerned about the negative externalities generated by unfettered trade, as was the case during NAFTA negotiations (Mead, 2001, 271).

Hamiltonian impulses also shape the way political integration is managed in North America and largely determine the composition of political integration. By this I

mean that political integration in the present context is shallow, founded on neo-liberal principles and economic goals, and devoid of any social or institutional supports, despite the Mexican governments repeated calls to deepen NAFTA.

In contrast to both the Hamiltonian and Wilsonian schools, it is possible to argue that the Jeffersonian camp is isolationist. For example, the United States's apparent dislike of any deep integration project or North America institutions can in part be explained by isolationist impulses. Participating in a North American multilateral forum might force it to cede its sovereign and subordinate power. The Jacksonian school of thought is probably the most problematic from a North American stand point because it is the most aggressive and unilateral of the bunch. Mead sustains that Jacksonian foreign policy most closely resembles realist principles. Jacksonians believe that the international arena is sharply divided between those outside and those inside the folk community. As such, the United States "must be vigilant and strongly armed. [Its] diplomacy must be cunning, forceful...At times [the U.S.] must fight pre-emptive wars" (Mead, 2001, 246). These defining characteristics of the Jacksonian approach often play out in the North American context. For example, the division between those inside the community and those outside of it excluded groups like the Mexican "other" making it more difficult to build a participatory North American integration project.

The operation of all these core U.S. approaches to foreign policy are of course compounded and intensified by the overwhelming political, cultural, and economic dominance of the U.S. at both the regional and international level. The U.S. first emerged as a world power in 1898, but it was not until the end of the First, and later, the Second World War, that the U.S. emerged as a superpower. Cox puts it this way, "the fact...is

that by 1945...[the U.S.] happened to be in charge of a majority of most of the world's economic resources, the majority of its military capabilities and a network of bases stretching across two oceans and four continents" (Cox, 2004, 11). After the Second World War, the U.S. was in control of more than half of the world's economic output, 70 per cent of the world's merchant marines, three quarters of all agricultural products, and 90 per cent of global natural gas (Cox, 2001, 314). Another way of gauging the rise of U.S. hegemonic power is to list the numerous important contributions the U.S. made to world order. Cox notes that the U.S. was extremely important in the containment of some of the largest threats to global capitalism after 1974. The U.S. injected an enormous amount of money into the recovery of Europe. It stabilized Asia and it had a large role in recovering the world economy by designing and supporting a new international financial system (Cox, 2001, 315). The Cold War also contributed to the U.S.'s hegemonic position. The threat of the Soviet enemy provided the U.S. "with almost the most perfect of all imperial ideologies" (Cox, 2004, 12). The U.S. now had a legitimate excuse to develop and expand its policies by forging strategic military alliances and rebuilding the global economy to defend the "free world" from the Soviet threat. What Cox labels the "new American Empire" developed in the 1990s. The fall of the Soviet Union, and Europe and Japan's failure to wage an earnest challenge to the U.S.'s hegemonic position, once again reinforced U.S. global dominance. By the time of NAFTA, the U.S. had the largest national economy in the world. Starting in 1993, and through to 2001, 23 million new jobs were created in the U.S.. Additionally, the U.S. increased its GDP by 4.5 trillion. In a *Policy Options* paper dedicated to the topic of North American economic integration, Earl Fry observes that the US \$4.5 trillion growth of its GDP is greater than

the entire production of any other country in the world (Fry, 2003, 6).

At stake here is the manifold way in which some of the defining features of American political culture—exceptionalism, isolationism, unilateralism—determine American behaviour in the political arena and undermine aspects of the integration process. More importantly, these factors not only trigger defensive reactions from Canada and Mexico, but act as a significant barrier to the formation of a North American political community by preventing the mutuality necessary to construct one.

Canada in North America

In this section I examine how Canada has managed its relationship with the U.S. I emphasize that despite serious moments of discord and tension, especially in the Chrétien and Martin era, a consultative tone was a relative constant in the bilateral relationship. The latter, for the most part, prevented tensions from escalating and ensured the eventual resolution of conflict between the two countries. This set the stage for the development of the bilateral relationship and informed the creation of instances of cooperation and institutional development in later stages of the relationship.

Canada–U.S. relations have been described as being characterized by a level of tranquillity, stability, and success not often seen in international politics, especially considering the asymmetries between the two countries. Indeed, historical evidence suggests that a long peace developed between both countries after 1814, one that still exists to this day. Roussel points out that this is all the more extraordinary considering that “nothing similar existed between the US and its other North American neighbor, Mexico” (Roussel, 2004, 112). The calm and orderly nature of the Canada-U.S.

relationship owes much to several factors: One, as mentioned earlier, there are a number of structural factors associated with both countries' place in British North America, which exerted some influence on the Canada-U.S. relationship. Second, Canada and the U.S. share similar norms and values. They share common racial and linguistic characteristics that make it much more difficult for the U.S. to "other" Canadians and vice versa. The third factor follows directly from the previous one in that shared political values allowed Canada and the U.S. to establish a consensual and institutionalized approach to the management of joint areas of concern. Thus, as Thompson and Randall point out, "[w]hat was significant about the twentieth century Canadian-American approach to the outstanding points of contention was the effort to institutionalize and depoliticize the mechanisms of conflict resolution" (Thompson and Randall, 1994, 72). This is an important point to note because, as I will flesh out in subsequent chapters, the much more cooperative and institutionalized nature of the Canada-U.S. relationship accounts for the more advanced levels of political integration found in both the Canada-U.S. environmental and border control policy areas, when compared to the case of the U.S. and Mexico. This also helps explain the uneven and varied nature of political integration that characterizes the North American region as a whole.

Despite the more institutionalized and conciliatory tone of the Canada-U.S. relationship it has not all been smooth sailing. Indeed, one of the more peculiar features of the Canada-U.S. relationship has been Canada's perpetual search for a balance between continental integrationist forces—those forces pushing for closer relations with the U.S. in order to derive economic benefits from association—and nationalist forces that fear that more integration weakens political autonomy and precipitates the loss of

Canadian identity (Hoberg, 2000, 35). This simultaneous push and pull factor adds a level of complexity that informs questions of political integration in the Canadian context.

I will examine these issues by mapping out the history of Canada-U.S. relations in three periods: the early history of relations from the War of 1812 to the start of the first World War, the war years including the second World War and the Cold War, and the free trade era including the two countries' entrance into both the Canada-U.S. FTA and NAFTA.

Early History: From the War of 1812 to the First World War

The early formative period of the Canada-U.S. relationship was undoubtedly filled with moments of tension and ongoing quarrels. Reasons for conflict stemmed from a variety of factors like boundary disputes, fishing rights, and economic problems; however, conflict was in part due to the uncertain and tentative nature of this early period.

After the American War for Independence, the newly formed United States and the colonies that would eventually become Canada existed in a tumultuous context as part of British North America. Reginald C. Stuart remarks that “Americans had only begun to learn to live together instead of as a collection of English Colonials. The War for Independence had created a foundation for Union, but now Americans had to get to work on the upper stories of their nation” (Stuart, 1988, 4). Canada, not yet a country at this time, worried about U.S. aggressive tendencies expressed in the U.S. goals of Manifest Destiny (Thompson and Randall, 1994, 11). Indeed, Canada was formed in relation to incidents occurring in the U.S. Seymour Lipset, an American political scientist, captures it well when he states, “Americans do not know but Canadians cannot forget that two

nations, not one, came out of the American Revolution (Lipset, 1991, 1). Events like the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the American Civil War all had ramifications in the north and triggered the official unification and birth of Canada in 1867 (De Palma, 2001, 198).

Nevertheless, despite fear of an expansionist neighbour, and the growing pains associated with this formative period, Canada and the U.S. began to sow the seeds of interdependence that later characterized the relationship. Important to note here is the fact that the U.S. and British North America established border ‘détente’. Stuart observes that, “[t]he United States never build up its military forces in the North between 1815 and 1871, and no government pursued a policy of force against the British North American provinces” (Stuart, 1988, 92).

Second, Canada and the U.S. started to forge economic ties as the U.S. began to replace Britain as Canada’s number one economic partner. McDougall observes that although Canada has played a more or less inconsequential role in the “dynamics of great power rivalry,” interesting enough, “it has been some kind of adjunct to the world’s last three pre-eminent players: France, Great Britain and the United States” (McDougall, 2004, 7). Thus, as Williams notes, “Canada has been located firmly within the economically developed centre of the international political economy” (Williams, 1994, 13).

William notes that partly because of its dependence on natural resource production, Canada has been more exposed to the twists and turns of the global economy. Resource products endure uneven cycles of demand and competitors can effortlessly supplant traditional suppliers. In response, Canada has sought a privileged economic

trading relationship with its biggest clients (Williams, 1995, 23-24). Until the latter half of the 19th century, many of Canada's resources were destined for Great Britain under an imperial tariff preference system. When this tie was lost, Canada began the process of forging an economic relationship with the United States. By 1854, Canada had negotiated the Reciprocity Agreement, which obtained free access for Canada's resource exports in exchange for the United States's navigation rights on the St. Lawrence and the fishing rights of the Atlantic colonies (Williams, 1995, 24). The Agreement lasted only 12 years, from 1854 until 1866, due to U.S. commercial interests and protectionist tendencies that pressured Congress to withdraw from the agreement (Hoberg, 2000, 38). Although in operation for only a short period, Canadian businessmen retained a relatively positive image of the Reciprocity years and called for the re-negotiation of trade agreements with their southern partner. Nevertheless, as Williams notes, "through Westward expansion and development of the wheat economy", Canada once again "re-established its pattern of resource staple export dependency on Britain" (Williams, 1995, 24). Successive Canadian governments attempted to negotiate a similar reciprocity treaty in 1874-5 and later in 1911, but the U.S. proved unreceptive (Roussel, 2004, 118).

The inability to negotiate a trade agreement with the U.S., however, was only a momentary setback. Indeed, both economies were slowly becoming integrated. For example, as Williams states, "[t]he growing sophistication of American industry became in part predicated on ready access to Canada's new staple resources: pulp and paper, minerals, and energy. And, it is hardly surprising that U.S. direct-investment in Canadian resource industries sought to secure this access. As early as 1926, Americans owned one-third of Canadian mining and smelting. By 1963, they owned one-half" (Williams,

2004,11).

Accompanying the economic links were migration patterns and the emergence of a borderland that further connected the two countries. Right from the early days, a sizeable number of Canadians have headed south. Between 1870 and 1900, more than a million Canadians went south in search of employment opportunities in industrial America. Between 1896 and 1914, some Americans retraced the steps taken by Canadians years earlier and headed to Canada in search of cheap farmland. By the 1920s, Canadians again resumed their trek southbound, and from the period between 1919 and 1930, over one million Canadians had made it to the U.S. (Thompson and Randall, 1994, 115). The intermingling of Canadians and Americans seemed a natural “spillover” of shared ancestry and history that facilitated cross-border movement. After all, notwithstanding French Canada, Canadians and Americans were both made up of dominant groups that shared common racial and linguistic characteristics, which enabled communication and facilitated transactions. In the early period, Stuart observes, “American borderlands began to see the provincials as neighbors as the British regime in the provinces began to be distinguished from the people it ruled” (Stuart, 1988, 7). The British provinces offered commercial opportunity, tourist value, and “potential recruits to American republicanism” (Stuart, 1988, 6). However, despite evidence of close connections and linkages, the growing dependence of the Canadian economy on U.S. markets was accompanied by growing fears of U.S. dominance, especially in the economic sector.

As McDougall notes, historically, Canada has wielded a number of mechanisms of state intervention—subsidies, foreign ownership restrictions, government ownership

and the like—in order to ward off dependency on the U.S. (McDougall, 2004, 11). One such example of “defensive expansionism” in the early period was Conservative Prime Minister John A. Macdonald’s National Policy of 1878, which was designed to create a tariff wall that would revive Canada’s weak manufacturing sector and effectively resist the American economic pull. Thompson and Randall note that Macdonald’s National Policy paradoxically led to U.S. capital investment in Canada and resulted in “the presence of wholly owned subsidiaries of American corporations in Canada” (Thompson and Randall, 1994, 57).

Needless to say, possible trade agreements with the U.S. represented a threat to Canadian economic and political autonomy and Canadian identity. Conservatives were especially wary of the U.S., and, as Shore puts it, in the debates ensuing from a possible trade pact with the U.S. in 1911, “Canadian Conservatives raised the spectre of annexation to defeat the treaty, and the Liberals in the next election” (Shore, 1998, 339). The Liberals, represented by Mackenzie and later by Wilfred Laurier, on the other hand, were in favour of free trade and did not fear U.S. annexation. Roussel notes that Liberals perhaps even admired American ideas and institutions (Roussel, 2004, 130). Thus when Laurier was eventually elected in 1896, he negotiated a new reciprocity agreement in 1911. But the agreement was short-lived, and with the help of Conservative cries of American expansionist goals, the Conservatives won the next election and dismantled the agreement. Another one would not be reached until 1935 (Hoberg, 2000, 38). The divergent views supported by Conservatives and Liberals demonstrated Canadian ambivalence about their U.S. neighbour. Once again, at one end of the spectrum existed integrationists who sought to benefit from economic integration with a large partner; at

the other, were those who focused on the costs associated with economic integration, those who wished to maintain an autonomous political identity. The constant push and pull complicates questions of Canadian integration in North America and it will eventually have to be grappled with.

Nevertheless, underlying these contradictory forces was a backdrop of institutional relations and problem solving mechanisms that clearly differentiated the Canada-U.S. relationship from the U.S.-Mexico relationship. At an early point in the history of their relationship, both countries experienced a process of value convergence that facilitated the construction of institutions and mechanisms for cooperation (Roussel, 2004, 139). Conflict, of course, was still an issue, and this was evident in disputes over pelagic sealing and the question of the Alaskan frontier (Randall and Thompson, 1994, 72). A couple of key points that should be mentioned here concern the settlement of conflict between Canada and the U.S. in their early histories: First, disputes were eventually settled by some form of arbitration that led to the signing of treaties; second, both countries dealt with outstanding matters by specific methods of establishing joint investigative, or ad hoc commissions. In turn, the strategies used “not only enabled the definitive solution of the conflict at hand, but also offered implicitly the bases for future relations between the countries” (Roussel, 2004, 133). Thompson and Randall label it a “bureaucratic and scientific approach” to conflict resolution. They state:

This preference to avoid diplomatic disputes that might become hotly debated public issues paralleled the emergence of a more bureaucratic and “scientific” approach to conflict management during the years of progressive reform...the thrust of the Progressive Era was toward organization, systematization, stability, and conflict reduction. This approach found a harmonious echo in Canada...It was thus not surprising that the United States and Canada sought to establish bilateral bureaucratic institutions to deal with contentious common problems (Thompson and

Randall, 1994,72).

This method of dispute settlement would be used to deal with numerous matters of contention. It did not always work and commissions would be dissolved almost as fast as they were created. Additionally, the results would not always meet with Canada's approval. Canada and the U.S. were able to construct this particular method of conflict resolution because of a variety of factors in the area of norms and values that made cooperation viable in the first place. Although Quebec does not fit so easily within this framework, both countries shared a British link and common Anglo-Saxon socio-cultural roots that permitted them to relate to one another. Moreover, although Canada and the U.S. developed distinct political cultures, they shared common liberal democratic values such as respect for the rule of law and respect for equality. Accordingly, these informed their external affairs. Both countries also had similar levels of economic and social development and were, for the most part, stable countries.

The War Years

During the war years, beginning with WWI and up to the Cold War, ties between the two countries were solidified. WWI was important not because of any significant military cooperation between Canada and the U.S., but because the two countries were ideologically joined by the existence of a common enemy (Thompson and Randall, 1994, 96). The war was depicted in both the American and Canadian mindset as a struggle for freedom and democracy. The war years also established the perception in both countries that Canada-U.S. relations differed significantly from relations between European countries. As Shore notes, “[the] war had turned Europe into North America’s ‘they’. Canadians and Americans saw how in Europe, authoritarianism and militarism had

triggered the most extensive bloodshed the world had ever seen. North Americans, on the other hand, had been far sighted enough to leave their border undefended and to resolve conflicts peacefully” (Shore, 1998, 354). World War Two and the Cold War further solidified this “we” identification. More importantly, both events facilitated the transition from “peaceful coexistence to a common defence” replete with institutions for military cooperation (Roussel, 2004, 143).

The war years were also marked by an increase in economic cooperation, which further solidified economic interdependence between the two countries. Indeed, no longer did Canada turn to Britain, who had been severely weakened economically by the war effort (Thompson and Randall, 1994, 203). Granatstein puts it this way: “It was a two-way North American street now, and the North American triangle, if it still existed at all, was a casualty of the world wars” (Granatstein, 1989, 40). The war era entrenched a continental division of labour, in which Canada functioned as a specialized appendage of the U.S. economy (Williams, 1995, 24).

Canada’s resource producers had benefited from Canada’s role as a resource “storehouse” for the United States. However, Canada’s strength in resource industries was not mirrored in the manufacturing sector. Williams notes that in the 20th century, manufactured products made up the most important sectors of world trade. Unfortunately, Canadian manufacturers had repeatedly failed to develop a robust manufacturing sector—especially in technologically innovative categories (Williams, 1995, 25). Williams explains that in its early history, Canada chose a particular industrial scheme that influenced the evolution of Canadian manufacturing to this day. Beginning with Macdonald’s National Policy tariff, key economic and political actors made choices that

had a number of repercussions. Indeed, rather than exploring policies of “international specialization through the production for world markets of a number of technologically innovative lines,” Canadian political and economic elites chose a “protective tariff structure...with a production process borrowed from foreign industrialists. Its two major components, import replacement and technological dependence,” when joined together, resulted in an industrial structure that limited opportunities for growth beyond its domestic market (Williams, 1994, 24).

The United States benefited from Canada’s early industrial choices. Canada’s proximity to the United States, its tariff sheltered domestic market, and its tariff privileges as part of the British Empire made it an ideal site for U.S. branch plants and American industrialists who, by the 1920s, had secured a dominant role in Canada’s most innovative industrial sectors. Between the 1940s and mid-1970s, this model was deepened as U.S. companies enjoyed the Canadian market as a section of their own domestic operations. William recounts that “[t]ypically, an administrative division of the North American market would establish a Canadian ‘satellite plant’ to satisfy regional demand in this country..., while research and development as well as exports were centred in the U.S. parent plant” (Williams, 1995, 28).

Also, Canada and the U.S. jointly participated in the post-world-war General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which reduced tariffs between the two countries, and the 1965 Canada-U.S. Auto pact Agreement (Williams, 1995, 31).

The war years were also significant in inducing cooperation around the idea of a common defence of North America. The threat of war in Europe and the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor prompted the two countries to establish joint security and defence

cooperation. One such example in the Second-World-War period was the creation of the Permanent Joint Board of Defense (PJBD) in 1940. The PJBD was to produce studies on sea, air, and land defence issues. The PJBD was composed of civilian and military personnel from the two countries, and it was to act as an instrument of consultation and negotiation in the common defence of North America (Willoughby, 1979, 110-25).

The Cold War led to even more security links including the formation of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) in 1957 and both countries' participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. Additionally, a whole host of new agreements and arrangements were created to address the economic aspects of defence. Roussel also points out that increased cooperation in the post-Second-World-War era was based on an idea of a North American international order that was different from those of Europe and Soviet Communism. Thus, as Roussel notes, “[t]heir discourse, formed by the experience of the war against fascism and the emergence of the Cold War, was based on Canada and the U.S. being partners in the ‘free world,’ whose relations were based upon a common Western liberal political heritage” (Roussel, 1994, 211). Consequently, defence cooperation during this era rapidly increased and was further institutionalized by the expansion of existing cooperative efforts and the facilitation of new instances of cooperation.

Increased economic and defence cooperation, one might argue, left Canada in a weak position with little room to exercise its political autonomy. But although Canadian power was relatively weak in relation to defence and economic relations with the U.S., it was fairly strong in terms of the protection of borders and culture.

Williams observes that, “defense, of course, is not to be confused with the

abrogation of national sovereignty" (Williams, 2004, 20). In areas considered key to the definition of Canadian identity, the Canadian government pursued nationalist policies designed to portray an image, both at home and abroad, of a distinct Canadian identity. Williams notes that some examples of how Canada still retained autonomy included, "Canada's maintenance of trade ties with China and Cuba during the Diefenbaker years, and Prime Minister Pierson's 1965 call for a pause in the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam" as well as several others (Williams, 2004, 20). Canada also vigilantly guarded its autonomy in areas that potentially compromised Canada's boundaries and territories such as its fishing rights, the apportionment of water from the Great Lakes, and the Canadian North (Williams, 2004, 21). Canada's distinct-identity discourse was not only limited to territorial issues, but also deployed in service of Canadian culture. Smith notes that Canada has frequently perpetuated the view that Canada is morally superior to its violent and chaotic neighbour. As Smith notes, "in the very act of celebrating Canadian society's difference from what lay south, turn-of-the-century Canadian nationalists made clear the measure in which their contrast-dependant signalizing of order, conservatism, and 'Britishness' took the individualist and chaotic society next door as its foil and pivot" (Smith, 2000, 11). As I have argued earlier, this perpetual anti-integrationist resistance by Canadian nationalist forces operates alongside economic pressures for integration, and thus mediates the rate and nature of political integration between Canada and the U.S.

In addition to elevating an identity discourse that demonstrated its distinctiveness and autonomy, Canada lobbied for more equality within an asymmetrical defence relationship. Roussel highlights the fact that cooperation and institutionalization in the war years reflected a particular type of agreement between Canada and the U.S.: "[T]he

U.S. obtained a clear commitment from Canada in favour of the common defense; Canada obtained a guarantee of its territorial sovereignty" (Roussel, 2004, 204). This tacit compromise between the two countries is evidence of a more egalitarian relationship between the two countries, albeit within an asymmetrical framework. Guidelines for security and defence cooperation existed because of the efforts of Canadian officials who pursued a proactive strategy to ensure Canadian participation in the defence of North America. Agreements like the 1947 Joint Canada-United States Defense Public Statement and the 1958 Canada-United States Joint Ministerial Committee on Defense were Canadian initiatives that demarcated rules for cooperation. Briefly, they include agreement to cooperate on issues affecting the joint defence of both countries; the exchange of information at a Ministerial level; the harmonization of military equipments and protocol; and "supervision by the host country of all joint military projects or activities. Neither country was to obtain permanent rights in the other as a result of these undertakings" (Roussel, 2004, 204).

Participation in these cooperative mechanisms and institutions gave the Canadian government some room to manoeuvre, something that Canada would otherwise have forfeited had it not participated in defence activities. Through these measures, Canada has dealt with an "American military presence that, in a crisis, might have been much more onerous than [it] turned out to be" (Roussel, 2004, 221). This is certainly better than having no participation at all, and it allowed Canada some degree of sovereignty. Moreover, norm definition and cooperation in an institutional forum allowed political actors from the two countries to get to know one another, and to develop trust and confidence. Additionally, cooperation under the rubric of security enabled the two

countries to apply and refine the process of cooperation learned from the work of previous institutions like the International Joint Commission. Shore sustains that the proliferation of instances of cooperation in the war years was ultimately made possible by each country's shared cultural roots and respect for an open democracy. Similar traits in turn facilitated a learning process between the two countries, in which understandings of the "other" were reinvented. These reinventions were enough to develop, as Sadler puts it, a North American "cognitive region" that was different from other areas (cited in Shore, 1998, 354).

The Free Trade Era

The period leading up to the ratification of the 1989 FTA, through to the signing of NAFTA, was a tumultuous time in Canadian history. The entrenching of free trade policies stirred strong debates between nationalist and continentalists, which set the policy context for the decisions of Canada's main political and economic figures.

In the political arena, Canada clearly emerged as a middle power with a new strategy based on an activist role in the international arena (Macdonald, 1995, 43). Canada's international role had been gradually evolving since the Second World War. Before the 1940s, Canada had pursued an economic and foreign policy closely aligned first with England and eventually with the United States. However, the events of the Second World War and the dangerous superpower rivalry of the Cold War convinced Canadian political actors that a new approach to the post-war order was necessary (Macdonald, 1995, 42). Canada's middle-power role was accompanied by an emphasis on multilateralism. Multilateralism included a focus on international organizations and

the role they could play in stabilizing an uncertain world. Institutions like the United Nations would promote collective security and prosperity based on notions of democracy, respect for the rule of law, and a liberal economic order (Roussel, 2004, 197). An expanded focus on international institutions was also a way to advance Canadian national interests. Participation in international institutions provided an avenue to balance and offset U.S. dominance. Canada had long been preoccupied with U.S. economic influence, however, in the post War period, this preoccupation took on a new found urgency. U.S. investment in the Canadian economy had begun to accelerate rapidly, which resulted in a number of consequences, the most important of which included Canada's loss of control over its national economy. Studies published by various academics and governmental sectors in the 1960s even suggested that the limitations imposed by continental economic integration with the U.S. affected Canada's ability to exists as a "distinct social formation" (Williams, 1995, 30). In the cultural realm, U.S. culture dominated the film, music, literary, radio and sport industry. Canada's response, which remains much the same to this day, was either to protect Canadian culture with regulative and tariff measures, or promote it through subsidies. All of these measures were—and still are—seen as necessary to preserve Canadian identity and the Canadian way of life.

But despite these efforts, Canada and the U.S. were more connected then ever. For example, economically, Canada "continued to be organized on a continental basis" (Williams, 2004, 13). In terms of North American manufacturing plants, however, Williams outlines that instead of existing as "satellites" that would have developed a sizeable number of "miniature-replica lines," they had evolved in a rationalized manner (Williams, 1995, 28). Rationalization is modelled after the 1965 Canada-U.S. Auto Pact

agreement and signifies specialization of production in a restricted range of lines for the whole region. Continental rationalization was facilitated by decreased Canada-U.S. tariffs, which were the result of both countries' participation in GATT, and the severe devaluation of the Canadian dollar, which created a favourable climate for American firms to capitalize on relatively cheap Canadian labour.

Williams highlights the point that the organization of the Canadian economy into a continental rationalized model did not in essence lead to any major changes. As he states, “[m]ost American-owned Canadian factories were no closer to becoming highly efficient and technologically advanced plants capable of autonomously generating world competitive products. In both the miniature-replica satellite and continentally rationalized production models, managerial authority, research and development, and export marketing all remain the prerogatives of the U.S. parent firms” (Williams, 2004, 14).

Canadian unease with the overwhelming U.S. presence in all aspects of Canadian life culminated in the late 1960s with the rise of nationalist policies and Trudeau's creation of national agencies like the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) and the National Energy Plan (NEP), all measures implemented to regain control over the economy and natural resources.

Canada's move to curtail U.S. dominance by promoting nationalist policies faced a strong backlash from Canadian business interests, provincial governments, the Federal Conservative party, and the U.S. who feared that the creation of national agencies established a harmful precedence. Moreover, Trudeau's interventionist policies threatened to destabilize Canada's “special relationship” with the U.S. Indeed, Canada's move to regain management control over important Canadian sectors and the

advancement of a multilateral strategy through Trudeau's Third Option was paradoxically at odds with Canada's simultaneous pursuit of a "special relationship" with the U.S—a notion that has figured prominently in Canadian political discourse and was first clearly articulated during the First World War (Macdonald, 1995, 41). The idea of a "special relationship" was strengthened during the following two wars and later resurfaced during FTA and NAFTA negotiations, where Canada attempted to seek protection from U.S. unilateral protectionist trade policies. Canada's contradictory strategy of simultaneously seeking independence from the U.S. while advancing a "special relationship" elucidates the complex nature of the debate that frames integration between the two countries. Additionally, framing the debate in contradictory terms hampers the Canadian governments' attempt to develop a clear foreign policy with respect to Canada's role in North America.

By the mid 1980s, the Canadian business community's discomfort with what it felt was too much government intervention in the economy, the backlash Trudeau's policies had ignited south of the border, and the severe economic recession, lent support to a continentalist position and opened the door for the 1984 election of the Conservative Mulroney government, which eventually passed the FTA in 1989 (Williams, 1995, 30).

Williams notes that the passionate debate between the continentalist and nationalist schools of thought provided the intellectual framework from which to consider policy options. Williams stresses that that choice has always been available to Canada's economic and political actors. Canada's initial position within the British Empire, no doubt, exerted some influence and hindered Canadian economic and political development. Similarly, U.S. economic and military power have no doubt functioned as a

constraint, but as Williams observes, “from the 1870s to 1970s Canada’s political and economic elites” reached “policy and investment decisions that together established an overall direction for the evolution of [its] manufacturing sector” (Williams, 1994, 137). He continues by pointing out that both the Canadian public and academics, along with the political and economic class, have, for the most part, supported a sizeable degree of continental economic integration. In other words, Canada’s economic linkages to the U.S. have afforded Canada a certain degree of prosperity (Williams, 2004,14). Consequently, national debate on the subject has been largely focused the nature of integration, not whether integration ought to take place.

The continentalists were pro-free-trade and believed that increasing economic integration with the U.S. would lead to growth and prosperity. Continentalists also feared U.S. protectionist measures would shut them out of the U.S. market. NAFTA, or so it was argued, would secure access to the U.S. market for Canadian firms. Nationalists, on the other hand, were in favour of increased domestic control over the degree of continental integration. Nationalists, thus “preferred to use the Canadian system to lever favourable deals from U.S. firms and to promote Canadian entrepreneurs” (Williams, 2004,15).

A reading of Canada’s decision to pursue the 1989 FTA and later NAFTA reveals that Canada’s main reason for entering into the agreement was to avoid U.S. protectionist tendencies. Indeed, by the end of the 1960s, the U.S. faced a balance-of-payment problem, combined with high inflation and unemployment problems that led the U.S. to adopt increased protectionist policies. The U.S. has a long history of launching measures to protect its own industries. The Reagan administration was using unfair protective measures against its biggest trading partner (Williams, 2000, 265). American

protectionism threatened to “disrupt....a Canadian resource and manufacturing production system that by the mid 1980s had become largely based on assumed low tariff access to U.S. markets” (Williams, 1995, 31).

Thus, the Canadian move to adopt a free trade strategy was more about curtailing U.S. protectionism rather than a genuine effort to achieve free trade. In fact, liberalized trade had already taken place before the 1989 FTA and under the GATT during the 1960s and 1970s. Canada had hoped that a rule-based agreement, in the form of a Canada-U.S. FTA, might force the U.S. to accept rules and at the same time offer Canada defence from the full weight of U.S. power (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002, 32). Thus, as Robert K. Rae notes:

..it is very much in Canada’s interest, because of its relative size to the United States, because it is a smaller economy, because it is a smaller country, because we are so dependant on trade and on access to markets and, in particular, on access to the United States’ market, it is in Canada’s interest always to have a comprehensive rules-based system in place that allows us not simply to depend on the kindness or generosity of our trading partner, but rather on the existence of clear rules, which are enforceable, which are transparent, and whose adjudicative value is widely and broadly accepted by the parties to the dispute (Robert K. Rae cited in Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002, 130).

The Canadian business community also had a stake in a free trade pact with the U.S. As the previous chapter delineated, the BCNI actively pushed the Canadian government to pursue an FTA in order to ensure a macro-economic climate that would allow the BCNI to compete in the world market (Thompson and Randall, 1997, 119). Not unrelated to the BCNI’s success was the ideological discourse in which the trade deal was framed. For instance, both Reagan and Mulroney, the key figures that pushed the deal, advocated a neo-conservative ideology.

The ascendancy of a neo-conservative discourse that backed free trade was, of

course, part of a neo-liberal approach to integration. Indeed, as my theory chapter outlines, the study of North American integration has been principally dominated by an economic framework that has provided the basis for economic agreements like the NAFTA.

The most important point to note about the FTA is that it entrenches continentalist policies “in a transparent attempt to pre-empt any future Canadian challenge to the continentalist status quo from the nationalist school” (Williams, 1995, 32). Indeed, the 1988 election pitted pro-free-trade Conservatives against anti-free-trade Liberals (Hoberg, 2000: 39). The nationalists, represented by the Liberals, managed to launch momentarily a powerful campaign against free trade. They believed that a free-trade pact with the U.S. would adversely affect Canadians (Williams, 1995, 33). The nationalists struck at the heart of Canadian identity issues, but despite their strength, the Conservatives managed to pass the FTA. By the time NAFTA negotiations were underway, the nationalists had lost much of their appeal, and in 1994, five years after the passing of the FTA, Canada entered NAFTA, which included Mexico in its free-trade area. The FTA, and later NAFTA, cemented the economic integration already underway between the two countries.

It is now commonplace to note that Canada and the U.S. share a trading relationship with the biggest bilateral flow of income, goods, and services in the world. In 2001, two-way trade amounted to a staggering \$569 billion. Trade between the two countries comprised 60 per cent of total intra-regional trade in 2001. Northbound exports from the U.S. to Canada were \$218 billion; southbound exports to the U.S. from Canada were \$351 billion. Thus it is not surprising that each country is the other’s largest trading

partner. However, this statement should be qualified by noting that although the U.S. is the most important export market for Canada, Canada is not as important to U.S. exporters. Only 22 per cent of U.S. exports go to Canada and a staggering 87 per cent of Canada's exports flow to the U.S.. (Appendix B-Figure B.1 maps merchandise trade between Canada and the U.S.). Canada is not as dependant on the U.S. as a source of imports. Due to rapid increases in imports from China and Mexico, the U.S. is declining in importance. Indeed, in 1998, 68 per cent of Canada's imports originated from the U.S.; three years later, this fell to 64 per cent. On a similar basis, Canada is more significant as an export destination than as a source of imports for the U.S. The share of U.S. imports coming from Canada has somewhat decreased, reaching 19 per cent in 2002 (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2001, 58-9).

Nevertheless, although the Canada-U.S. trading relationship is decreasing in importance, a closer view of the bilateral relationship reveals the deep economic connection between the two countries. In terms of trade by product, Canada and the U.S. exchange a broad spectrum of product types. Nevertheless, in either northbound or southbound trade, the principle amount of exports came from a few important product groupings. As Appendix B-Figure B.2 notes, in the case of trade from Canada to the U.S., four major classifications of merchandise make up almost two-thirds of all Canadian exports to the U.S.; motor vehicles and parts accounted for 23 per cent of total in 2001; crude oil, petroleum, natural gas, coal, and other fossil fuels accounted for 16 per cent of southbound trade; Canadian machinery and equipment exports comprised almost 14 per cent of total exports destined to the U.S.; and forest products made up a little over 10 per cent of southbound trade. In the case of the U.S., two product categories made up just

over half of all northbound trade between Canada and the U.S.; U.S. exports of machinery and equipment comprised under one third of total northbound trade in 2001; and motor vehicles and parts made up 18 per cent of U.S. shipments to Canada. See Appendix B—Figure B.2 (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2001, 60).

Investment also constituted a large portion of the economic linkages between Canada and the U.S. For example, Canadian investment in its neighbour rose from \$60 billion in the early 1990s to \$154 billion in 2000—a gain of 157 per cent. U.S. investment in Canada was a bit higher in 2000 at 186 billion. The U.S. was significantly more important as a destination for Canadian foreign direct investment (FDI), with the U.S. receiving over half of Canada's total FDI world wide in 2000. In comparison, Canada made up 10 per cent of U.S. FDI for the same year. (Appendix B—Figure B.3 graphs the foreign direct investment between Canada and the U.S.). (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2001, 61-2).

By no means is the trading relationship between the two countries equal. McDougall notes that the U.S. market now makes up over 80 per cent of Canada's exports. The staggering levels of trade dependence can of course be traced back to the 1920s, when the U.S. replaced Britain as Canada's largest trading partner (McDougall, 2004, 9).

Before moving on to the next section, I should point out that although Canada and the U.S. share nearly \$200 billion in combined FDIs, the smaller size of the Canadian economy signifies that “U.S. direct investment since World War II has held a dominant share of Canada's most modern and productive manufacturing and mining sectors”

(Williams, 2004,12). Additionally, the U.S. has been the destination of a staggering majority of Canada's international trade. As Williams explains, much of the trade between the two countries is intra-firm, between U.S. parent firms and their Canadian subsidiaries (Williams, 1994, 14-15). As the 2002 report of the Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Partners in North America: Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and Mexico", states, Canadian industries are more and more "operating with a view of North America" specifically as part of their domestic market. The report goes on to say that in practically all Canadian industries growth in exports to the U.S. market surpassed the augmentation in overall manufacturing shipments through the 1990s, suggesting that an increasing percentage of Canada's domestic production is geared towards the U.S. market, and that the North American market is more and more pivotal to the continental success of Canadian firms.

The report states that:

As a result, the nature of trade within North America is changing in many industries, reflecting the effects of free trade and economic integration. Increased competition and intra-firm trade in North America frequently lead to greater industry specialization as firms or individual plants adapt their production to exploit comparative advantages and to meet the needs of specific niche or regional markets. This specialization may refer to industries focusing on specific product types or on specific aspects of the overall production process (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 70).

Consequently, the nature of trade in North America is changing to intra-firm trade. Intra-industry trade concerns the balance of two-way trade flows within particular industries. If a certain country dominates trade in a certain industry, then levels will be low. In Canada, this is true of several resource-based industries, where Canada is a substantial net exporter, as in the forest and fossil fuel areas. But if trade between two countries in a particular industry is comparatively balanced, this signifies a degree of market

specialization within that industry. In Canada, this is the case for a number of industries like steel, machinery, transportation equipment, and high-tech products.

For example, since the 1965 Auto Pact, the automotive sector has been an example of a deeply integrated industry. Principle automobile companies run plants in North America, trade substantially between parent firm and subsidiary, and depend on the free continental flow of goods across the border to offer just-in-time delivery services. Due to economic links with the auto industry, the steel sector is also highly integrated. Steel producers in both countries compete on a regional basis for contracts, and they, too, rely on an efficient border. Additionally, specialization in different facets of steel production and the prevalence of intra-firm trade means that a single product can cross the border numerous times throughout the production process. (Appendix B—Figure B.4 charts Intra-Industry trade between Canada and the United States in 2001). (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002, 70-1).

As the history of the bilateral relationship suggests, Canada and the U.S. shared, for the most part, a peaceful and consultative relationship. The positive nature of the relationship is, first, a result of shared racial and cultural roots, a shared language, and similar political cultures, which then enabled the two countries to partake in a shared process of norm and value convergence. This, in turn, led each country to internalize positive views of the “other”, which, at times, developed into a shared perception of “we”. Ultimately, this manifold process informed institution building and facilitated instances of cooperation. Together, these factors account for the closer nature of the Canada-U.S. relationship—in comparison to the U.S.-Mexico one—and explain the uneven nature of political integration in North America. Furthermore, an historical

reading of the Canada-U.S. relationship suggests that integration is not as straight forward as functionalism would have us believe. Political integration, it would seem, is filtered through institutional and intersubjective contexts, which affect the integration process.

The Canada-Mexico Relationship

I now turn to the examination of the nature of the Canada-Mexico relationship, which, in sharp contrast to the Canada-U.S. relationship, is newly emerging. It is a relationship constituted by limited levels of contact, and, undoubtedly, the most fragile and tenuous of the bilateral relationships in North America. The Canada-Mexico relationship barely registers on the political radar screen; it is marked by ambivalence towards one another, as well, each country displays a general lack of knowledge about the other. Of course, the introduction of NAFTA has helped to solidify and encourage new linkages; however, the growing bilateral relationship between Canada and Mexico has always encountered the same problem: the staggering power of the great elephant that divides them, and the historical relationship each country shares with it (Gutierrez-Haces, 1995, 58). Both of these factors have had the effect of causing Canada and Mexico to largely ignore one other, and together this forms the largest barrier to establishing a North American community. What is found, then, in the Canada-Mexico case is little to no evidence of shared intersubjective understandings, which are necessary to the process of norm construction, positive understandings of the “other”, and for the development of a shared “we.” As such, it is not unreasonable to argue that a North American political integration project must address the weak mutuality between Canada and Mexico if it is to properly

take root. Without a strong sense of mutuality, political integration would be shallow and marked by a democratic deficit. Put differently, the case of Canada and Mexico demonstrates that North American political integration is currently weak in terms of its intersubjective social dimension.

The ambivalence that each country displays towards the other has historical antecedents. Canada's colonial links to Great Britain, combined with the United States' hegemonic position in the region, caused Canada to turn either to its mother country or to the U.S.. Mexico, on the other hand, usually forged links with its Latin American neighbours. But even when Canada and Mexico had a shared interest in establishing links and promoting common strategies, their location next to a hegemonic giant, "overrode any political or commercial decision they might [have tried] to mutually establish" (Gutierrez-Haces, 1995, 66). One notable exception was during the long reign of Porfirio Diaz (1896-1910), when Canadian companies, acting on behalf of Britain, profusely invested in Mexican hydroelectric plants, telephone companies, and modes of transportation like the railroads. Indeed, as De Palma notes, at that time Britain and Canada represented 29 per cent of Mexico's foreign investment (De Palma, 2001, 58). The period of investment was short-lived, however, and Canada's involvement in Mexico tapered off dramatically in 1910 amidst the Mexican Revolution. Contact established thereafter was often sporadic, mostly economic in nature, lacking a viable political strategy, and always tempered by the behemoth between them (Randall, 1995, 17).

Perhaps one of the biggest impediments preventing a Canada-Mexico alliance was U.S.-British relations. From the post-revolutionary period, through to the First World War, Canada-Mexico relations were largely conditioned by U.S-British influence

(Konrad, 1995, 31). For example, Konrad notes that Canadian imports of Mexican products like coffee and bananas were handled through U.S. brokers. Furthermore, Britain's dominance over Canadian foreign affairs complicated any Canadian attempt to negotiate a trade pact with Mexico (Konrad, 1995, 31). World War II also served to hamper any Canada-Mexico alliance. On the Canadian side, for instance, Mackenzie King's interest in joining what was then the Pan American Union in 1945 was received negatively by the Roosevelt administration, who viewed a Canadian role in the Americas as an unwelcome "extension of British power" (Randall, 1995, 18). At the time, Canada was viewed by the U.S. as still existing under Britain's protection. On the Mexican side, the conflict with Britain over Mexico's 1938 expropriation of British-owned oil companies also negatively affected Canada-Mexico relations. Britain had severed diplomatic ties with Mexico, thus effectively breaking Canada's along with them, at least temporarily (Randall, 1995, 19). The Cold War also limited Canada-Mexico cooperation. The 1961 U.S.-led Bay of Pigs invasion and the 1962 Missile Crisis dissuaded Canadian policymakers under Pearson from seriously expanding their links with Latin America.

Despite the overwhelming constraints and conditions placed on Canada-Mexico relations, the two countries did establish some links. These were predominantly economic in nature, and little resembled a joint strategy for cooperation in the non-economic realm. Indeed, after the establishment of official diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1944, the first instances of contact were strictly economic. For instance, in 1947, following a trade mission to Mexico, Canada entered into its first trade agreement with Mexico. In 1953, Canada participated in another trade mission to Latin America, in which Mexico was pinpointed as a promising area of growth (Randall, 1995, 21).

In 1965, Lester B. Pearson's Liberal government continued the trend of viewing Mexico as a potential opportunity. Canadian economic interest in Mexico goes as far back as the late 19th and early 20th century, when both Canada and Mexico were searching for ways to diversify their trade and investment with a country other than the United States. C.D. Howe, Canada's Minister of Trade and Commerce during the 1953 Trade mission to Mexico, summarizes it well, "as in Canada, the whole area is in the process of economic expansion with higher production, rising living standards and increasing import requirements. We are natural trading partners, each in need of what the other can supply" (Randall, 1995, 21).

The economic orientation of the relationship was unaccompanied by a strategic political vision for non-economic cooperation. One notable exception, however, was the period from the late 1960s to the 1980s. This period saw the publication of "Foreign Policy for Canadians", Trudeau's attempt to refashion Canadian foreign policy. From the Canadian point of view, Canada and Mexico shared many commonalities, most of which, as Randall puts it, "derived from their relationship with the United States" and included the establishment of their own respective autonomous economic policies, the development of their own natural resources policies, and the maintenance of a healthy distance from their powerful, shared neighbour (Randal, 1995, 24). The Trudeau years culminated with the creation of the Third Option, which advocated Canadian diversity of trade, and investment from the U.S. to Latin America. The Trudeau years also witnessed the emergence of a wide range of Canada-Mexico contacts including the establishment of the 1968 Joint Ministerial Committee (JMT). The JMT meets annually to encourage joint cooperation in various areas like those to do with foreign policy, the environment, and

tourism. During this period, the two countries also participated in a joint strategy to broker peace in Central America and temper U.S. intervention in the region (Randall, 1995, 29). But aside from this interval, Canada-Mexico links remained shallow. At the time of the introduction of NAFTA, Canada's interest in Mexico remained largely economic, evident in increased provincial economic contacts between Mexico and provinces like Ontario and Quebec, joint ventures between small and medium sized businesses, and the operation of large Canadian firms like Bombardier in Mexico (Gutierrez-Haces, 1995, 18).

NAFTA, of course, resulted in an unprecedented amount of economic cooperation and an increase in trade between the two countries. For example, since NAFTA, two-way trade between Canada and Mexico more than doubled to \$14.8 billion in 2001. In 2003, Canada was Mexico's second largest export market, while Mexico was Canada's fourth largest export market (Jannol, Meyers and Jachimowicz online, 2003). (Appendix B—Figure B.5 charts the merchandise relationship between Canada and Mexico from 1990 to 2001). The value of trade between both countries is certainly not large in comparison to both the Canada-U.S. and U.S.-Mexico trading relationship, but it has increased astoundingly since the inception of NAFTA. In total, bilateral trade between Canada and Mexico has grown by 517 per cent since 1990 (Standing Committee on International Trade and Foreign Affairs, 2002, 62-3).

With regards to trade by product, Appendix B - Figure B.6 demonstrates that Canadian shipments to Mexico are composed of a combination of manufacturing and agriculture products. In 2001, Motor vehicles and parts constituted slightly more than one-fifth of the total, and were followed by machinery and equipment. Agricultural

products like cereals and oil seed made up 19 per cent of total exports to Mexico. Mexican exports to Canada were largely concentrated in motor vehicles, and machinery and equipment. They account for over half of all Mexican exports to Canada. (See Appendix B—Figure B.6 (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002, 64).

With regards to investment, FDI flows south from Canada to Mexico. And NAFTA has significantly altered the degree of investment activity between the two countries. For instance, Canadian investments in Mexico grew from \$245 million in 1980 to \$3.5 billion in 1990. (Appendix B – Figure B.7 charts the FDI between Canada and Mexico). (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002, 66).

Political cooperation and the creation of common intersubjective understandings were obstructed by the undemocratic nature of the Mexican state. The election of Vicente Fox in 2000, the first alteration in political power, seemed to pave the way for greater cooperation. Fox wished to expand the Canada-Mexico relationship to include institutionalized and political connections. It was hoped that this might not only offset U.S. power, but also help Mexico attain similar levels of economic development as Canada and the U.S.. Unfortunately, Canada feels that this mandate is unrealistic: “Mexico and Canada cannot possibly make a sandwich”, a Mexican Foreign Minister, Manuel Tello Macia, once said, “There is too much meat in between” (cited in De Palma, 2001, 58). The meat, of course, refers to the overwhelming power of the U.S. and the difficulty of both countries seeing beyond it. It is especially difficult for Canada, which has based a large part of its foreign policy on preserving the “special relationship” between the U.S. and Canada. Trilateralizing that relationship by including Mexico is not

always seen as in line with Canada's best interests. For instance, in an interview I conducted in 2002, an official from the North American division of Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade sums up the Canadian position:

I think what holds us back is a certain realism on a couple of the relationships. The Canada-U.S. element of North American Community is of primary interest to Canada. The management of that relationship is front and centre. Certainly since 9/11 it's been all consuming and anything that interferes with the management of that relationship is not seen as constructive. So, in dealing with a border issue you don't want to complicate it by adding a trilateral element at this stage.

In brief, the above section has indicated that various symbolic barriers operating at the intersubjective realm stand in the way of the development of a Canada-Mexico "we". Most noteworthy is Canada's reluctance to trilateralize the North American relationship. Thus, notwithstanding growing economic connections, Canada and Mexico's bilateral relationship is weak overall. Historical perceptions of "us" and "them" and the absence of a shared "we" between Canada and Mexico—spurred by the U.S. that geographically and politically stands between them—present a significant barrier to any North American political integration project.

The United States-Mexico Relationship

Perhaps no case refutes and challenges the embedded assumptions of functionalism more than that of the U.S. and Mexico. The deeply asymmetrical nature of the U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship, the staggering difference in their development levels, and the distinct nature of each country's internal political system are all factors that have some mediating influence on the degree and nature of political integration. These factors also account for the different levels of political integration found in the U.S.-Mexico relationship when compared to that of Canada and the U.S..

Possibly the most significant difference between the Canada-U.S. and the U.S.-Mexico relationship is the marked “absence of an institutional framework” that has historically characterized Mexico’s relations with its northern neighbour, along with “a complex pattern” of ad hoc, reactive cooperation that only emerges in response to perceived crises (Serrano, 2003, 48). Unlike the U.S.-Canada relationship, “no security community existed between the U.S. and Mexico, in the form of a shared institutions, beliefs and values” (Gabriel and Macdonald, 2004, 7). To be sure, between 1940 and the late 1980s the countries cooperated in what Gonzales and Haggard term a “loosely coupled” security community or strategic partnership to ward off foreign threats (Gonzales and Haggard, 1998, 295). However, this strategic alliance was not deeply institutionalized and was more the result of economic necessity, or a common perception of a foreign threat, than a consequence of a genuine convergence of normative priorities and values (Gonzales and Haggard, 1998, 305). Additionally, even though NAFTA brought on an unprecedented amount of economic cooperation, heightened American concerns over cross-border externalities in the form of drugs and illegal migration, combined with growing anxieties over Mexico’s tenuous democracy, have resulted in a succession of U.S. unilateral and repressive actions that demonstrate that certain kinds of cooperation can exist within a conflict-ridden framework. Or, put differently, what is found in the U.S.-Mexico case is no positive movement on the intersubjective front, thereby proving that high levels of cooperation can co-exist alongside negative forms of intersubjectivity. The results are less advanced levels of political integration in the U.S.-Mexico case. I will examine these factors by looking at the U.S.-Mexico relationship at three historical junctures: Mexican independence through to the Mexican Revolution;

U.S.-Mexican cooperation from the 1940s to the late 1980s; and the evolution of the relationship from the 1990s through NAFTA and into the post-9/11 period.

Independence to Revolution

Unlike Canada, Mexico has demonstrated a defensive and sceptical attitude towards closer ties with the U.S throughout the course of its history. During the 19th century, through to the 1910 Mexican Revolution and its aftermath, the nature of Mexico's relationship with the U.S. has been predominantly conflict-ridden. Several factors can account for the turbulent nature of this period, and a number of geopolitical forces can be understood to have shaped the form and nature of the U.S.-Mexico relationship. As Kramer suggests, one such factor was Mexico's chaotic internal situation after its independence from Spain. Another, is the absence of a 'shared racial roots' discourse between Mexico and the U.S. Each country has its own distinct culture, language, and heritage, and Mexicans were defined as falling outside the realm of the Anglo-American racial framework. And being excluded from such a racial framework had consequences. As Kramer states, "Anglo-Saxons were said to be the possessors and progenitors of unique 'free' political values and institutions...[O]nly Anglo Saxon bodies could carry the germ of liberty across space and time...[and they] inevitably extirpated the weaker races with whom they came into contact" (Kramer, 2002, 6). Mexicans did not share either a common descent or what an Anglo-American view might refer to as "administrative ability". Indeed, some viewed Mexico's state of internal unrest and instability was a result of Spain's failure to successfully administer a functioning colony. Kramer quotes Beveridge on this point, who maintained that the Spanish had lost its

colonies because it was “no longer a successful administrative race as the English [were]...or as the American people are coming to be” (Kramer, 2002: 14). This points to several important geopolitical forces at work.

Dominguez and Fernández de Castro note that Mexico’s domestic instability in its quest to establish a strong central state after independence contributed significantly to the frail nature of the relationship in this period (Dominguez and Fernández de Castro, 2001, 8). Regional internal factions attempting to establish control led to social and political conflict. Indeed, as Gonzales and Haggard state; “[b]etween 1821 and 1857 there were fifty changes of the presidency, thirty six different governments, and over one hundred different foreign ministers” (Gonzales and Haggard, 1998, 301). Mexico’s clear inability to successfully institute a central state opened the door to foreign intrusion and U.S. expansionist impulses (Gonzales and Haggard, 1998, 301).

The U.S. was not, however, the only country to intervene in Mexican affairs. In this formative interval, Mexico confronted Spanish attempts to reclaim its former colonial territory, and a United British, Spanish and French front in 1862. In 1864, Napoleon’s Maximilian of Habsburg, with the support of the French army, succeeded in becoming emperor of Mexico.

The U.S. was the most aggressive of the bunch, not only due to regional interests in ridding the continent of external forces, but also because the United States was entering into an expansionist period. The annexation of Texas in 1845, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, which ceded a large portion of Mexican territory to the U.S., and repeated U.S. intervention in the Mexican Revolution, are all examples of U.S. expansionist tendencies that directly affected the development of the bilateral relationship

and informed perceptions of “us” and “them”.

In an interview I conducted with him in February 2002, Alejandro Estivil, Assistant to Mexico’s Undersecretary on North America in the SRE, explains how historical events have led Mexico to adopt a defensive attitude:

We have to understand that Mexico has been a country that has been invaded. During its formative years, mostly in its first century of existence, Mexico was invaded constantly. This provoked that Mexico became a defensive country against the possibility of external invasions. Historically, the situation has changed. Other forms of invasion exist. Nevertheless, a country does not abandon its historical processes that fast.

External intervention has also set the tone of Mexican foreign policy. Indeed, as Benítez and Deare explain, the principles that shape Mexican foreign policy— independence, autonomy, respect for sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states—are directly a result of the overwhelming power and size of the United States: “Given the asymmetry in size, Mexico has conducted its foreign policy based on these principles in an attempt to reduce the amount of direct intervention by the US into the internal affairs of Mexico” (Benitez and Deare, 1).

This early period was not, however, entirely saturated with conflict. There were moments of relative calm, but they remain just that, moments. After 1877, the U.S. and Mexico entered into a more peaceful stage of the relationship. According to Gonzales and Haggard, “[t]he territorial settlements of the mid-century proved enduring, political relationships were cooperative, and economic integration expanded rapidly” (Gonzales and Haggard, 1998, 302). This was largely due to internal improvements in Mexico associated with the rule of Porfirio Diaz. Diaz instituted liberal economic changes that were aligned with U.S. economic interests, and these changes enabled American investment in Mexican land (Gonzales and Haggard, 1998, 302).

The relative placidity of the Porfirio Diaz era ended along with the demise of his regime and the Mexican Revolution of 1910. The Mexican revolution was a bloody and complicated affair. It was caused by a series of internal domestic political factors, and popular dissatisfaction with the dictatorial rule of Porfirio Diaz, which had lasted for thirty years (Hellman, 1983, 3). As some have argued, the revolution was also “anti-foreign and anti-American in its focus and origin” (Gonzales and Haggard, 1998, 303). Indeed, as Mexican academics observed, the Mexican Revolution was “an intervened civil war” (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001, 9). The U.S. intervened a number of times, beginning with the 1914 overthrow of General Victoriano Huerta’s rule in Vera Cruz (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001, 38).

The Mexican Revolution began in 1910 with the goal of replacing Diaz as president. It was a call for clean elections and ended with the establishment of a new constitution in 1917. For our purposes, there are two key points to be made about the revolution: First, the revolution legally entrenched some of the principles that came to define Mexican foreign policy. Most notable was the assertion of Mexico’s right to control its own land, water, and natural resources. Article 127 of the constitution stated that “The nation shall at all times have the right to establish regulations for private property which the public interest may dictate, such as those regulating the use of natural resources for conservation purposes or ensuring a more equitable distribution of public wealth.” (Hellman, 1983, 21). Second, the revolution was the precursor to a post-revolutionary arrangement that directly led to the entrenchment of a single party system and a semi-authoritarian regime. This is a crucial point because one of the primary obstacles to cooperation and to creating shared intersubjective understandings is the

undemocratic nature of the Mexican political system.

Cameron and Tomlin observe that if one looks at Mexico's political system from a historical perspective, "the Mexican political system is one of most stable and enduring systems of government in the world" (Cameron and Tomlin, 2000, 210). Mexico's relative political stability, especially compared to its Latin American neighbours, is a result of the dominance inherent in a one-party system and the strength of presidential power that it ensures (Cameron and Tomlin, 2000, 210).

In the aftermath of the revolution, Carranza, Obregon and Calles, what Hellman refers to as the Northern dynasty, and the dominant leaders of the armies of the revolution were principally concerned with the consolidation of dispersed regional or local interests or strongmen "who ruled whole sections of the republic like personal kingdoms" (Hellman, 1983, 30). They warned that "[t]he autonomy exercised by the regional bosses or *caciques* threatened to build into a centrifugal force capable of pulling the frail unity and peace established after the revolution" (Hellman, 1983, 30). Consequently, the goal was to establish a strong central state, not only secure the situation, but to shore up the power of the northern sector. Thus, a single party system was formed, which provided an institutional framework for centralized authority and ensured the dominance of the new ruling class born of the revolution. The ruling coalition ruled through presidential succession, thereby solidifying power (Hellman, 1983, 15). Ultimately, this was the same semi-authoritarian system that would begin to unravel in the 1970s through a series of events that opened up a space for Mexico's democratization.

The preceding section outlined how conflict was the predominant feature that characterized the U.S.-Mexico relationship, from Mexico's independence to the

revolutionary period. This is not to say that momentary, ad hoc instances of cooperation did not exist. One prominent example in the environmental sector, which I discuss in Chapter Four, was the establishment of the International Boundary Commission in 1889 (IBWC). However, the semi-institutionalized nature and cooperation of the environmental sector is the exception rather than the norm. It does not apply to other areas “where more ad hoc and informal means of bilateral problem solving prevailed” (Gonzales and Haggard, 1998, 309). This was certainly the case in the revolutionary period where the cooperation that arose was often shallow and ruptured quickly. Americans were especially hostile over the treatment of U.S.-nationals and their property during the revolution. For instance, in 1938, Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas expropriated foreign owned oil companies. The U.S. reacted by slapping down economic sanctions on Mexico. The looming threat of a world war, however, and the possibility that Mexico would form an alliance with Japan, Germany, and Italy, led the U.S. to seek an alliance with its troublesome southern neighbour.

1940-1980s

World War II brought about a sizeable degree of cooperation, as well as a level of institutionalization between both countries that was quite remarkable given the countries’ conflict-ridden past. But these instances of cooperation were more the result of a perceived foreign threat, rather than the consequence of a growing trust, an increased friendliness, or a convergence in norms. Moreover, the institutionalized wartime cooperation was dismantled immediately in the post-war period (Gonzales and Haggard, 1998, 305).

As various scholars of U.S.-Mexico relations observe, between the 1940s and the 1970s, Mexico and the U.S. developed fairly stable relations. Some even describe this particular historical conjuncture in terms of a “special relationship” (Gonzales and Haggard, 1998, 305). The looming war in Europe, and the foreign challenges that it presented, resulted in an increasingly complacent U.S. neighbour. The U.S. hoped to secure an economic and political alliance with Latin America that would halt potential enemy threats. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy, for instance, and the ensuing Inter-American conferences were U.S. attempts to establish stable, security partnerships (Gonzales and Haggard, 1998: 297). The U.S. even exercised restraint when Mexico decided to nationalize oil companies under Cárdenas rule. For its part, Mexico was able to exercise some independence in its foreign policy, so long as it cooperated with the U.S. when U.S. key political interests were at stake. As Mario Ojeda states:

The United States recognizes and accepts Mexico’s need to dissent from U.S. policy in everything that is fundamental for Mexico, even if it is important but not fundamental for the United States. In exchange, Mexico cooperates in everything that is fundamental or merely important for the United States, though not for Mexico (Ojeda cited in Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001, 18).

Thus, in the management of their relationship, the U.S. and Mexico appeared to follow this tacit understanding. Mexico would abstain from supporting the Germans in World War II and later, in the Cold War, the communists; in return, the U.S. would cease interfering in Mexican internal affairs. From the Mexican perspective, the asymmetries in the relationship and its proximity to the U.S. made it difficult for Mexico to either form alliances with others in order to counterweight U.S. power, or to develop its own military and economic clout to counter U.S. dominance. Instead, Mexico had to choose between allying with the U.S., or a policy of abnegation. Both were problematic. Alignment risked

permitting too much U.S. influence in Mexican security affairs, and abnegation meant Mexico could not deal with some of its own security challenges, which in fact arose out its relationship with the U.S. As Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro suggest, “Mexico’s security dilemma …was that it must cooperate…with the only source of threat to its international security, and that, in so doing, it must compromise some of its security goals for the sake of achieving others” (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001, 35). Mexico chose to do both: it decided to bandwagon with the U.S. on important strategic issues, while simultaneously hoping to balance U.S. power by pursuing its own limited version of an independent foreign policy.

This policy seemed to work for both parties. The U.S. agreed with it strategically because of the growing possibility of a world war. Gonzales and Haggard quote Vasquez and Mayer on this point:

They could not resort to force, for that would destroy a policy more vital than oil to the US government: the creation of an inter-American alliance within the setting of the Good Neighbor policy. Nor were they willing to encourage Cárdenas’s internal enemies for fear that the resulting inability might lead to the replace of his administration by a more conservative one. In the Mexican context, that could open the door to fascist and Falangist groups” (Cited in Gonzales and Haggard, 1998, 306).

Strategic interests on Mexico’s part also existed. For one, German Submarines had sunk two Mexican oil tankers, which prompted Mexico to declare war on Germany, Italy, and Japan, thus they were aligned on the same military path as the U.S. (Gonzales and Haggard, 1998, 306).

Additionally, there were economic interests at stake for both countries. In 1942, the two countries entered into a trade agreement, and, in 1943, the Mexican-American Economic Cooperation Commission was created. The early 1940s also witnessed both countries participate in the first of the Bracero Agreements (Haggard and Gonzales, 1998,

307). The first Bracero Agreement was triggered by a wartime labour shortfall in the U.S. This 1942 agreement granted Mexican labourers the right to work in the U.S. on a provisional basis (Ganster, 1997, 145). The Agreement was a type of temporary, contract labour program where young Mexican males typically worked in agriculture for a six to twelve month period (Dominguez and Fernández de Castro 2001, 150). The Bracero program eventually extended past the wartime period expanding into other areas beyond agriculture with approximately 4.5 million Mexicans working in the U.S. The Bracero Program was officially terminated in 1964 because of growing opposition, mainly by religious and labour groups, however, the legalized, organized, and orderly nature of the program stands in sharp contrast to the present-day migration disharmony.

Military and security coordination during World War II reached an all time high. The major example was the creation of the 1942 Joint Mexico-U.S. Defense Commission (JMUSDC), designed to coordinate military action and to enable Mexican purchases of military gear (Dominiguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001, 39). A year later, in 1943, the countries established the Mexican-American Economic Cooperation Commission in order to resolve trade disputes (Gonzales and Haggard, 1998, 307).

In terms of the U.S., after the Second World War Mexico was no longer a priority. The U.S. no longer feared Mexican alignment with the enemy. Additionally, the U.S. pre-occupation with the Cold War caused it to turn even farther away from Mexico. The combination of all these factors resulted in a de-institutionalization of the relationship. As Gonzales and Haggard note: “[w]ith the end of War, the factors that had contributed to the forging of a loosely coupled security community were reversed” (Gonzales and Haggard, 1998, 307).

After the end of the War, the formal security and economic alliance began to unravel. Security relations became distant and largely symbolic. The nature of cooperation was also shallow and thinly institutionalized. The JMUSDC, for instance, only existed as a “social forum, it issued its last updated combined defense plan in 1955” (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001, 40). Mexico also participated at “the lowest possible level” in Inter-American security forums (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001, 40). Otherwise, it cautiously pursued other international objectives to balance U.S. power. For instance, Mexico had diplomatic relations with both the Soviet Union and Cuba after its 1945 revolution. Mexico also attempted to curtail U.S. Cold War intervention in Latin America, most notably in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Additionally, Mexico participated in various international institutions like the Organization of American States with the goal of counter weighing U.S. dominance in the region (Hristoulas, 2003, 28). Mexico also pursued its independence in the economic realm with a policy of import substitution industrialization (ISI). The idea behind ISI was to nurture the economy through subsidies, protection, and an expanded role for the state in the economy (Mayer, 1998, 34). Mexican trade protection around this time involved both high tariff and non-tariff barriers. As well, government played a large role in the economy through state ownership of strategic industries and extensive regulation. This economic model allowed Mexico to alter the “composition of its international trade to a considerable degree, thus avoiding dependence on the U.S. (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001, 11). Indeed, few areas in the post-war relationship were as diverse as economic policy. The U.S., for instance, as one of the main proponents of trade liberalization in the region and chief negotiators of the GATT, moved in the opposite

direction (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001, 29). Canada-U.S. cooperation in this period also stands in stark contrast. Both participated in the GATT, and later in the 1989 Canada-U.S. FTA, which entrenched already existing economic integration between the two countries.

To recap, even though the U.S. and Mexico established new forums for semi-institutionalized security and economic cooperation, these mechanisms of cooperation were gradually dismantled in the years after the war. Cooperation was thus demonstrably weak, transient, and thinly institutionalized. It flowed neither from an organic process of value convergence, nor from increased trust between the two countries. Cooperation was merely a *de facto* response to the perception of a common threat. Moreover, even when shared interests were present, Mexico had difficulties in putting aside its defensive and nationalistic attitude. For instance, Serrano notes that even the JMUSDC that was created during wartime was subject to “interpretations of the content, scope and implementation of agreed issues—including access to Mexico’s airspace and the use and construction of parts and radars” (Serrano, 2003, 48). But despite Mexico’s hesitancy and cautiousness when cooperating with the U.S., the period between 1940 and 1970 worked well for both parties. On the U.S. side, Mexico proved a fairly stable neighbour that did not collaborate with foreign enemies. On the Mexican side, Mexico had to align itself and cooperate with the U.S. on fundamental security related issues, but could still exercise some form of limited independence in other areas. Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro summarize the Mexican position well. They state that “Mexico’s international security strategy of abnegation...had contained U.S. influence on defense and security matters in Mexico. It did not entangle Mexico in severe international disputes far from its shores...”

[I]nternational security abnegation served well to manage relations with both the U.S. and other countries" (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro 2001, 41). However, while traditional geopolitical threats had declined, new trans-boundary issues arose, which led to increased U.S.-Mexico conflict.

The NAFTA Era

NAFTA has been widely hailed as an important turning point in U.S.-Mexico relations. It broke with Mexico's long history of resisting the powerful pull of its northern neighbour. NAFTA also generated an unparalleled amount of cooperation between the two partners (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001, 14). NAFTA's birth was a result of deep changes in Mexico's foreign and economic policy, and more minor changes in the U.S.'s economic priorities.

In terms of the U.S., NAFTA was a way to redefine its conflictive relationship with its unstable neighbour to the south. The United States's move towards NAFTA reflected political interests pertaining to Mexico. For instance, Paul Krugman maintains that for the U.S., NAFTA was a foreign policy issue. U.S. cooperation in NAFTA was perceived as support for liberalization reforms, and, moreover, as a way for the U.S. to control its troublesome southern neighbour. If the U.S. chose to reject NAFTA, it would have been a throw-back to the days of a shaky and contentious U.S.-Mexico relationship. Salinas's government was by no means a model of democracy, but at least it represented openness, liberalization, and an opportunity to break with a history of bad relations (Krugman, 1993, 18).

For Mexico, the decision to negotiate NAFTA would have been impossible

without changes at the international, economic, and political levels. In the economic realm, Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies were no longer an option. ISI had proved highly successful until the early 1970s, and had resulted in high rates of growth and low inflation (Castillo, 1995, 102-3). By the 1950s and 1960s, Mexico saw growth rates of 7 and 8.6 per cent (Pastor and Wise, 2003, 180). Some even referred to this period as the “Mexican miracle”. But by the 1970s the ‘miracle’ was beginning to unravel.

Beginning in the 1970s, a whole series of economic, social, and political events coalesced to unleash the necessary forces that led to Mexico’s democratic transition in July of 2000. In a recent article devoted to NAFTA’s political impact, Cameron and Wise argue that mounting political crises since the 1970s not only challenged the specific modernization strategy pushed by the PRI, but in fact led to the erosion of Mexico’s authoritarian regime (Cameron and Wise, 2004, 319-20). This is an important point to grasp, not only because it helps elucidate some of the transformations that Mexico has undergone in the NAFTA period, but also because it is Mexico’s particular brand of authoritarian politics, and some of the corrupt practices that emanate from it, that have at times acted as a barrier to cooperation.

Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro note that Mexico had long been able to fend off international criticism with respect to its semi-authoritarian political system (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001, 106). The U.S. refrained from pressing for regime change because, despite some failings, the Mexican political system proved relatively stable. And indeed, the PRI was able to gain some political capital both internally and externally. On the external front, the existence of an opposition in

Congress since 1939 gave the PRI some semblance of legitimacy. Internally, the ISI model of development had produced impressive annual growth rates of 6 to 7 per cent in the period from the 1950s to the 1970s, which convinced the public that “the PRI was indeed delivering on the nationalistic and distributive goals of the Mexican Revolution” (Cameron and Wise, 2004, 310).

Wise and Cameron observe that one of the first signs of wear-and-tear on the system occurred in 1968 when the government brutally cracked down on university student protesters (Cameron and Wise, 2004, 310). The government’s violent response revealed two factors: First, it signalled that the Mexican ‘miracle’ had not benefited everyone. Increasing inequality was a prevalent feature of this miracle, and, by 1977, the lowest 20 per cent of the households controlled only 2.9 per cent of the nation’s income, while the top 20 per cent controlled 57 per cent. The repressive roots of Mexico’s political system were revealed, as well, in the process.

As mentioned earlier, the centralized nature of the Mexican political system had been consolidated after the revolution into a single-party framework. The PRI ensured hegemony through a corporatist structure. Cameron and Wise explain the inner logic of the corporatist system and the way it was used to ensure PRI dominance:

The various sectors of Mexican society (labour, business, the popular sectors, and peasants) were compelled to join state-sanctioned organizations that were linked vertically to the single-party regime, and the PRI’s complete control over the federal budget helped it to buy off civic discontent concerning the actual limits on political pluralism. When patronage failed to keep dissenters in check, the PRI proved adept at mixing inducements with strategic disincentives to quiet its enemies, including the use of disappearances and coercive force (Cameron and Wise, 2004, 310).

The student movement represented a group that could not be co-opted into the system. Oil price shocks in 1973–4 led to uncertainty and instability both in the economic and

political spheres (Cameron and Wise, 2004, 310).

President Echeverría's response to economic stagnation was to nationalize and heavily invest in a number of industries. Echeverría relied on foreign loans to save floundering industries and raised the foreign debt from \$280 million to \$3 billion between 1970 and 1975. But despite these efforts, the economic situation was still serious. Echeverría's dependence on loans led to growing inflation, which, combined with a negative trade balance, resulted in a 50 per cent devaluation of the peso (Hamilton, 2002, 306). By the time Echeverría's successor Lopez Portillo arrived on the scene, the discovery of oil had momentarily relieved the economic situation. The government utilized the augmented revenues from the growth of oil exports, in addition to foreign loans, to build up industries. Increased spending levels and the influx of foreign capital led to an "overheated economy and dramatic growth inflation" (Hamilton, 2002, 307). It also led to massive capital flight. Hamilton notes that Mexico's weakness became especially noticeable with the recession of the 1980s, which led to a decrease in commodity prices in the world market. As well, U.S. interest rates soared from 6.5 per cent to 16.7 per cent between 1977 and 1981, making it more difficult to service the debt and leading to more capital flight. In 1982, Mexico announced it was unable to meet its debt obligations (Hamilton, 2002, 307).

Mexico was bailed out by foreign creditors, especially from the U.S., who had banks heavily involved with Latin America. The U.S., along with the International Monetary Fund, provided a huge bailout loan to Mexico that severely punished the most vulnerable sectors. In 1982, one million Mexicans became unemployed (Hamilton, 2002, 307).

The economic crisis that culminated in 1982 had a number of consequences. Cameron and Wise sustain that it resulted in electoral reforms that ultimately led to the 2000 election of Fox and to Mexico's transition to democracy (Cameron and Wise, 2004, 311). I will address this point in more detail later, but at this conjuncture, it is important to note two factors: First, the events that led to the 1982 crisis prompted what Cameron and Wise call the first critical turning point or democratic opening. They note that "the electorate's dismay over the rising political repression and new economic uncertainties was gathering steam at the ballot box" (Cameron and Wise, 2004, 310). The result was that the PRI facilitated a number of political reforms that gave opposition parties an opportunity to take part in the political process by capturing an increasing number of congressional seats. The reforms were initiated to appease a growing number of dissatisfied Mexicans who were simply not benefiting from the system (Cameron and Wise, 2004, 311). Additionally, the severity of the 1982 crisis diluted the corporatist system that had enabled the PRI to keep challenges to its power in check. No longer could the PRI rely on a patronage system, which had previously allowed it "to buy off civic discontent" (Cameron and Wise, 2004, 310).

Second, the worsening economic situation convinced Mexican policy makers that drastic economic reforms were needed. According to Castillo, the new de la Madrid administration confronted three economic objectives necessary to stabilize the situation: "finding a solution to the foreign debt; stabilizing the crashing economy; and undertaking structural change to permit a growth free from addiction to foreign debt" (Castillo, 1995, 107). The seriousness of the 1982 shock surprised Mexican officials, who faced rising inflation and a massive outflow of capital. And even though de la Madrid undertook

numerous efforts to remedy the crisis, Wise and Cameron note that few inroads were made: “Growth in the period of 1982-1987 was -0.9 percent, and per capita growth was -2.3 percent. Inflation rose to 83.7 percent, discouraging foreign investment and outflow of portfolio capital” (Wise and Cameron, 2004, 311). The unravelling of the economy left successive Mexican administrations in the 1980s and the 1990s with the impression that what was required was not only the restoration of growth in the domestic economy, but a fundamental restructuring of the whole Mexican economy.

In 1985, the de la Madrid government had begun to reverse Mexico’s protectionist policies, and by the end of 1985, de la Madrid had taken the major step of applying to join GATT. President Lopez Portillo had attempted this in 1979, but his efforts were met with strong resistance. He backed away. However, by 1989, Mexican exports had nearly doubled and imports soared. This signified that by the end of the 1980s, the Mexican economy was intimately intertwined with international commerce. Most of these ties were with the US. Mexico had become the United State’s third largest trading partner. As Mayer puts it, “the growth in trade and investment represented a kind of ‘silent integration’, which, in both countries, created interests that had a stake in free trade” (Mayer, 1998: 36). In Mexico, one of those free trade advocates was Carlos Salinas de Garter, who would become Mexico’s next president.

Salinas’s goal was not only to reduce tariffs and privatize most of Mexico’s state-owned enterprises, but ultimately to achieve closer economic relations with the U.S. Salinas recognized that the U.S. was becoming extremely important to Mexico. Mexican concentration of economic interaction with the U.S. had been growing rapidly since Mexico had opened up its economy. Much of Mexico’s exports went to the U.S. The U.S.

was also the main source of foreign capital for Mexico (Hristoulas, 2002, 8). In addition, the international context was changing. Europe was too preoccupied with forging its own union to take much notice of Mexico (Mayer, 1998, 41). There were also political forces at work, and they convinced Mexico that working with the U.S. was a viable alternative. The end of the Cold War also tempered U.S.-led policies in Latin America, and conflicts that had previously led to confrontation between Mexico and U.S. officials disappeared (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001, 22). So, by the beginning of the 1990s, the economic and political context that had long defined U.S.-Mexico relations had changed.

From the point of view of Mexican policymakers, it no longer made sense to treat the U.S. as a threat to national security (Hristoulas, 2002, 8). Rather, Mexican policymakers began to see the value of Mexico's geopolitical position next to the United States. It accepted its position with the United States and, by extension, North America. As Alejandro Estivil, Executive Assistant to Mexico's Undersecretary of State for North America, pointed out to me in an interview I conducted with him in February of 2002:

There was also a recognition in Mexico that we are a very marked geopolitical country. Mexico had to recognize that it would not find a bilateral relationship that could offset the demanding relationship with the United States...In the past, we cultivated antagonism toward the United States, which was a way of offsetting such a demanding relationship. The qualitative change was the acceptance that the United States will be demanding. But to the extent that we accept this, we will get everything we can possibly get out of it since we are geopolitically marked. This is the qualitative difference generated with the new administration...the level of trade, the border, it all implies that our great link is with North America.

The result was a change in the Mexico-U.S. relationship—from one of confrontation, to one of cooperation.

The embrace of a neo-liberal economic model had economic and political ramifications. Economic restructuring impacted wages, which were now only half of the

levels of the 1980s (Hamilton, 2002, 308). The privatization of firms led to increased unemployment and migration to the U.S. De la Madrid's economic reforms and "the reversion to old-fashioned fraud in regional elections" was met with scepticism within the PRI. Indeed, the PRI eventually split when former PRI member Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas formed the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Cameron and Wise note that the division within the PRI, and the formation of a new party, was the first major challenge to PRI domination (Cameron and Wise, 2004, 311-12). By the time of the 1988 election, the PRI faced a worthy opponent. And even though Salinas was declared the winner in an extravagantly fraudulent election, the PRI lost two-thirds of the congressional majority.

Salinas eventually secured the passage of NAFTA for Mexico. He continued de la Madrid's denationalization trend. He also reduced Mexican restrictions on foreign capital by introducing the 1994 Foreign Investment Law. The law opened up areas previously deemed off limits to foreign ownership (Hamilton, 2002, 311). Salinas also passed the Agrarian Law of 1992 , which reversed previous agrarian reforms. As Hamilton states, "the new agrarian law deal[t] a devastating blow to the small peasant and ejidal producer" by dividing and selling land to domestic or foreign corporations (Hamilton, 2002, 311).

By far, the centre piece of Salinas's rule was the negotiation of the 1994 NAFTA. Cameron and Wise note that Salinas's success in passing the NAFTA "displayed a new kind of statesmanship for the PRI" (Cameron and Wise, 2004, 313). By connecting his own internationalist objectives with symbols associated with the Mexican Revolution, Salinas presented NAFTA and the neo-liberal model as part and parcel of Mexico's modernization process. Salinas launched the National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL), a social scheme aimed to provide subsidized food and services to the poor (Hamilton,

2002, 314). PRONASOL was also part of Salinas's strategy to win back the electoral support he had lost in the 1988 election. He and the PRI succeeded in winning the 1991 election by initiating social programs like PRONASOL, but also by introducing further electoral reforms to convince the public that the PRI was changing. Salinas made changes to the election code and created an independent Federal Electoral Institute (Cameron and Wise, 2004, 311-12).

As part of a PRI comeback, Salinas knew he had to revive a dismal economy by creating jobs and expanding wages. Cameron and Wise explain it this way: "By tying the Mexican peso to the US dollar according to a fairly tight crawling peg in late 1987, and by simultaneously offering an unprecedented expansion of consumer credit, the average consumer's dollar purchasing power soared". In the 1990-91 period, Salinas achieved a growth rate of 4.6 per cent and per capita growth of 3.2 per cent, while bringing inflation down and restoring capital inflows (Cameron and Wise, 2004, 314).

Salinas's bold economic strategy would eventually collapse, but in the mean time Salinas regained electoral support and the PRI won the 1991 mid-term election and later the 1994 presidential election. Negative economic pressures were resurfacing, however. Mexico had a huge trade deficit and Salinas had relied too heavily on portfolio capital entering Mexico. In a word, the Salinas administration had oversold its economic model (Cameron and Wise, 2004, 314). Inequality was worsening, leading to public demands for political reform. Political and economic events came to a head in December of 1994, when Mexico experienced another severe economic crisis. Moreover, the Zapatista uprising on the day NAFTA went into effect, the assassination of the PRI presidential candidate Colosio three months later, and the murder of the PRI Secretary General in

September of 1994 suggested that the PRI could no longer maintain control over the situation. Social and political reforms were inevitable.

On the economic front, the situation was similarly grave. Inflation in 1995 rose to 52 per cent, and unemployment skyrocketed. While a massive \$50 billion package from the U.S. would save Mexico's crashing economy, repeated economic setbacks and deep dissatisfaction with the PRI resulted in a shift in public support to opposition parties like the PRI and PAN (Hamilton, 2002, 317). Zedillo himself had a hand in bolstering opposition support. Rather than employing old school political practices, Zedillo instituted another round of political reforms, which would directly lead to Fox's PAN victory in 2000. In the 1997 mid-term elections it was clear that the PRI's power had been weakened. The PRI lost its absolute majority in Congress, the PRD won the mayoralty race in Mexico City, and PAN took six state governorships (Cameron and Wise, 2004, 318).

Some argue that the election of Fox, the transformation of the Mexican political system, and the success of NAFTA has ushered in a new era of U.S.-Mexico relations. NAFTA did, of course, generate an extraordinary amount of cooperation. On the economic front, trade between the two countries has increased by more than 428 per cent since the 1990s, and Mexico is now the United State's second largest trading partner. In 2001, the U.S. and Mexico exchanged \$361 billion worth of goods, comprising 38 per cent of all intra-North American trade. Like Canada, the U.S. is Mexico's most important export destination, making up almost 89 per cent of Mexico's total exports at a global level. The U.S. is also Mexico's largest importer, accounting for 73 per cent of Mexico's imports. On the other side of the equation, 14 per cent of total U.S. exports come from

Mexico. Having said that, Mexico is quickly growing in importance as a market for U.S. exporters, with U.S. exports to Mexico rising 375 per cent since 1990. (Appendix B—Figure B.8 maps the U.S.-Mexico trade relationship between 1990 and 2001). (Standing Committee, 2002, 66-7).

With regards to trade by product, trade between the two countries is concentrated in machinery and equipment, with motor vehicles parts accounting for almost 60 per cent of export products shipped by Mexico to the U.S. in 2001. Mexican exports to the U.S. also included clothing and textiles, and scientific and technical instruments. Trade from the U.S. to Mexico is also concentrated in machinery and equipment, accounting for 39 per cent of total U.S. exports. (Appendix B—Figure B.9 charts the trade by product relationship between the two countries). (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002, 67-68).

In terms of investment, U.S. investment in Mexico has grown rapidly since the late 1980s, and since the implementation of NAFTA. In 2001, U.S. investment in Mexico amounted to \$35.4 billion (USD), an increase of 243 per cent over 1990 levels. Investment in the U.S. from Mexico is minimal, but has increased since NAFTA reaching \$2.5 billion (USD) in 2000.

The U.S. is Mexico's most important source of FDI, accounting for 55 per cent of total FDI in 2000. For the U.S., Mexico comprises 44 per cent of the stock of U.S. investment. (Appendix B—Figure B-10 maps FDI between 1982 and 2000 and details the investment relationship between the two countries). (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2001, 69).

NAFTA has also propelled a remarkable amount of environmental cooperation, as

we will see in Chapters Three and Four. But a closer look at other areas of cooperation, notably those concerning drugs and illegal immigration, reveals serious problems in the relationship. In brief, despite unparalleled economic and environmental collaboration under the new framework of NAFTA, escalating conflict over immigration and drug issues demonstrates weak levels of trust between the two nations, and highlights the fact that cooperation can exist within a conflict-ridden framework; or, that cooperation in one area can co-exist with deep disagreements in another.

Indeed, as the borders chapter delineates in detail, each country's response to the drug and undocumented migration issues reveal deep schisms and divergences in the intersubjective realm. Often, without prior consultation with Mexico, the U.S. has unilaterally used force to either block the flow of drugs or undocumented migrants from Mexico to the U.S. From the U.S. perspective, the constant flow of negative externalities has signalled a "loss of control" of the border (Serrano, 2003, 55). This perception of "loss of control" has been coupled with a growing awareness of the prevalence of corruption in Mexico.

The long reign of a single, dominant party system, evidence of rampant human rights violations, and indications of election rigging have led some to label Mexico as "the perfect dictatorship" (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001, 106). Gonzales and Haggard note that before NAFTA, and even before the economic crisis of the 1980s, the U.S. refrained from criticizing Mexico in exchange for the political stability ensured by PRI dominance (Gonzales and Haggard, 1998, 323). But, as mentioned earlier, a number of events, with roots extending back to the 1970s, shed light on Mexico's problematic democratization.

Mexico's struggle with democracy definitely adds another level of complexity to the bilateral relationship and places further stress on the intersubjective realm. Gonzales and Haggard sum up the effects of Mexico's long tradition of authoritarian rule on the bilateral relationship with the U.S. They state: "Perhaps in no other area is the difference between the United States and Mexico as profound as this one; until Mexico has achieved something resembling a modern democratic political form, it is impossible to imagine its relations with the U.S. enjoying the intangible sense of community that suffuses the U.S. - Canadian relationship" (Gonzales and Haggard, 1998, 325).

The Mexican response to aggressive U.S. action varies depending on the issue at hand. The border chapter lays out Mexico's position in detail, but what is important to note here is that there have been significant disharmonies in how each country interprets and perceives each issue, signalling that something is deficient at the intersubjective level. With respect to drugs, Mexico has defined drug trafficking as a danger to its own national security, but not so much because it shares the United State's perception of the problem. Rather, Mexican policy makers decided to contain the drug threat in order to simultaneously contain the threat posed by U.S. intervention. The case of immigration is even more complex because Mexico clearly does not share the United State's perception of the issue. Mexico does not define undocumented migrants as a "threat," and in stark contrast to the U.S. position, frames the immigration issue as a socio-economic one.

The perceptual gap between the two countries highlights several points. First, it undermines the cooperation and institutional gains made under the rubric of NAFTA. For example, the U.S. move to clamp down on and militarize the border has taken place within a NAFTA framework that has encouraged institutional cooperation and the

opening of borders for the free movement of goods and capital. This contradiction broke with the newfound framework that NAFTA had introduced. NAFTA introduced a novel way of addressing cross-border externalities, be they drugs or immigration. According to Serrano, “security cooperation would now itself be tied into the net of structural factors making for closer integration and tighter interdependence. No longer a backhander, security cooperation would now be a card in a full hand” (Serrano, 2003, 54). Thus, the NAFTA implemented another level of institutionalized cooperation in the trade area. Mexico hoped that the institutional relations developed under NAFTA would carry over to security and immigration issues. But the U.S. continued unilateral action within an era of all-time-high levels of cooperation and institutionalization, thus proving that the asymmetries in the relationship still existed, and that cooperation can exist within a broader, conflict-ridden framework. However, the lack of a positive movement on the intersubjective front translates to no movement on the political integration front, and therefore discredits the grand narrative of integration. Economic integration thus does not necessarily have to lead to political integration, and high levels of economic integration can co-exist with minimal levels of political integration.

The Trilateral Relationship in the Post-NAFTA Era

I began this chapter by recounting how North America, as both an idea and a concept, is only gradually beginning to emerge. However, the processes that have contributed to the formation of North America as more than just a geographic and economic region have long been at work. NAFTA is but the latest chapter in the story of North America.

North America has, for all intents and purposes, become a single domestic market,

effectively completing what the GATT process and the 1989 Canada-U.S. FTA first started. Confronted with a competitive global market, firms in all three countries are specializing production and making use of comparative advantages and regional strengths (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002, 52). If measured solely by trade and investment flows, NAFTA has performed extremely well and has far surpassed the expectations of even its most ardent supporters. A 2002 report by Canada's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade states that the enormous rise in trade within North America was due largely to the increased importance of trade in each of the three countries. In terms of trade, for instance, Canada and Mexico have become the United States's largest trading partners. Also, Canada-Mexico trade has more than doubled since the inception of the NAFTA (Jannol, Meyers and Jachimowicz online 2003). The combined merchandise trade of the three NAFTA partners was estimated at \$945 billion in 2001, an increase of almost 350 per cent since 1990. As Appendix B—Figure B.11 on Trade Across North America shows, Mexico has made the most gains in trade since the start of the 1990s. Its combined total trade with Canada and the U.S. grew to \$376 billion in 2001. Mexico's exports to its North American partners was 484 per cent higher than 11 years earlier. Undoubtedly, as the biggest economy in North America, the U.S. is the largest trader. Bilateral trade with Canada and Mexico amounted to \$930 billion in 2001, a growth of 247 per cent over 1990 levels. Out of the three partners, Canada has witnessed the slowest growth in bilateral trade. Bilateral flows to and from Canada were 189 per cent higher for 2001, as compared to 1990, accounting for a 215 per cent increase in exports and 157 per cent growth in imports. Appendix B—Figure B.12 outlines the interdependence between the three countries (Standing Committee on

Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002, 56).

The enormous growth in trade among NAFTA partners has led to an increasingly linked North American economic zone of activity. Due to the strength of the U.S. economy, however, economic growth in Canada and Mexico is more and more dependant on the performance of the U.S. economy. This is especially the case for Canada, which exports most of its goods to the U.S. Consequently, Canadian economic growth falls in step with U.S. economic growth. Mexico, on the other hand, is not as economically dependant on the U.S. However, as the Mexican economy becomes more trade-oriented, U.S. influence grows as well (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002, 57). Additionally, and as recounted earlier, NAFTA has particularly accelerated the investment relationships within North America. Clearly, the Canada-U.S. investment relationship is the largest, but trade and investment between the U.S. and Mexico is not far behind.

The unprecedented growth in the trade and investment relationships between the three countries has cemented economic linkages in North America. North American firms are becoming increasingly integrated across borders. All three countries export similar classifications of goods into the North American market, indicating that Canada, the U.S., and Mexico support linked industries—not to mention similar product and process specialization (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002, 57). In short, the economies of Canada, the U.S. and Mexico are operating as a single continental North American market. Much of the trade between the two countries is intra-regional trade—usually between U.S. parent firms and their Canadian or Mexican subsidiaries. For example, in 2001, trade between Canada and the U.S. comprised 60 per

of total intra-regional trade. Trade between the U.S. and Mexico accounted for 38 per cent of all intra-North American trade (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002, 58-66). Additionally, Canadian provinces have forged their own deep economic relationship with neighbouring American states. In 2002, for example, Canada was the top export market for 39 U.S. states. Ontario is the United States's fourth largest trading partner, with a total of almost \$245 billion in 2002. In the same year, Michigan (\$657 billion), New York (\$23.5 billion), and Texas (\$14.6 billion) all have enormous trade relationships with Canada. In terms of Mexico, total Ontario exports to Mexico in 2002 reached \$1 billion (CD). Additionally in 2002, Texas exported close to \$20 billion to Mexico, Michigan exported \$15 billion, and California exported approximately \$14 billion (Jamul, Meyers and Jachimowicz, 2003, 2).

The economic linkages between the three countries, and the existence of a single, continental economic market, have important implications for political integration. In the North American context, powerful push factors emanating from the business community (especially in Canada) are propelling the political integration agenda forward. McDougall explains the rationale behind recent business efforts with respect to political integration. He states that, "the single most important qualitative change leading to deeper integration between the two countries has been the extensive rationalization of multinational firms over the past two or three decades. This has intensified the commercial and managerial interest in eliminating the effect of the border" (McDougall, 2004, 13).

McDougall notes that in the late 20th century, the main player lobbying for the liberalization of markets is the Transnational Corporation (TNC). The TNC is effectively what is operating in North America. It consists of a rationalized regional production

system, in which a parent company, situated in this case in the U.S., manages the various aspects of a firm's production process located throughout North America in order to derive benefits from comparative advantage (McDougall, 2004, 14). This creates enormous pressures for the speedy and efficient movement of goods across national boundaries (McDougall, 2004 14).

It is not surprising that the business community in Canada is pushing for change that, some would argue, is something akin to political integration. As McDougall observes, the need to ensure the free flow of transactions at the border makes the adoption of similar policy environments and the retrenchment of national differences attractive to the business community (McDougall, 2004, 14-16). Indeed, as Chapter Seven points out, the business sector has been the principle champion of proposals that would virtually eliminate national differences in immigration and refugee policy, economic policy, and defence and security policy, without any regard for social, political, or environmental consequences.

Aside from some of the economic benefits and implications of NAFTA, it is also important to take into account some of the non-economic benefits derived from it. For instance, one could argue that NAFTA has made the three countries more aware of each other, and that NAFTA has led to an increased movement of people across borders. NAFTA has spurred educational exchanges between students of the three countries. The Carr, Kahlo and O'Keefe exhibit, funded by the cultural agencies of the three governments, has exposed each country to the artwork of the others. A North American youth conference in 2000 at Ottawa's Carleton University brought together young leaders to discuss the future of North America. NAFTA can also claim credit for reintroducing

Canada and Mexico to each other. NAFTA is helping to overcome each country's history of disregard for each other and to increase their knowledge of the continent. For instance, since NAFTA came into effect, new areas of cooperation have been developed between Canada and Mexico. NAFTA has also led to an unexpected link between civil societies of the three countries. They now mobilize and band together on issues of shared concern within the agreement. NAFTA has also resulted in numerous environmental accords and institutions that address environmental concerns.

NAFTA, no doubt, has generated a whole host of economic and non-economic connections. However, there are many issues that NAFTA has left out and that remain outstanding, both in the economic and non-economic realm, which may have to be resolved before it is deepened. Critics especially point to some of the unresolved dispute resolution mechanisms and Chapter 11 deficiencies that need to be addressed. Both Canada and Mexico's principle reason for seeking the NAFTA was to seek exemption from U.S. protectionism. Unfortunately, to the detriment of both, the U.S. has not consistently abided by the rules. Ongoing disputes over softwood lumber, steel, sugar, trucking and agricultural products attest to this fact. Many argue that the current rule-based framework in place is clearly inadequate. One way to resolve these issues is to move beyond NAFTA, to expand it to include some of the social dimensions that are missing—a subject that I will treat in my concluding chapter.

In sum, this chapter has mapped out the historical and political forces that account for the complex and varied nature of political integration in North America. In it, I suggest that the nature and degree of political integration in North America is filtered through the different patterns of Canada-U.S. and U.S.-Mexico relations. In contrast to

some of the postulations put forth by core integration theories like neofunctionalism, economic integration does not directly or automatically lead to political integration in a linear or straightforward manner. Rather, political integration in the North American context is especially influenced by two primary intervening variables: institutions and intersubjective factors. Institutions provide a forum to reorder the cognitive context; intersubjective processes, be they positive or negative, can either stall or propel the political integration process. These issues will be examined in more detail in the proceeding chapters, which address the environment and border control case studies.

Chapter Three – The Environment and North American Political Integration in the Pre-NAFTA Era

This chapter will determine whether and to what degree political integration occurred in the policy domain of the environment during the pre-NAFTA era. I argue that political integration during this time frame was a relatively muted phenomenon, discernible in very limited degrees in some contexts, and in others, not at all. As well, the pre-NAFTA environmental regime was characterized by a two-speed bilateral system. Trilateral cooperation was non-existent; instead, relations were bilateral in nature, with little contact between the Canada-U.S. and U.S.-Mexico border environmental systems. By “two-speed”, I mean that, although the pre-NAFTA era is characterized overall by extremely low levels of integration, the nature and rate of integration still varies depending on which bilateral relationship is considered. Each relationship is characterized by a singular history; each relationship is marked by unique integrative and disintegrative features. By way of example, the more friendly and peaceful history of Canada-U.S. relations, despite some degree of conflict and poor cooperation around the issue of acid rain, meant a slightly more advanced, but nonetheless low level of political integration. In the U.S.-Mexico context, disintegrative factors related to Mexico’s perception of the U.S., significant domestic differences in how each country views and deals with environmental issues, and the asymmetrical nature of U.S.-Mexico pre-NAFTA relations in general amounted to even lower levels of political integration than in the Canada-U.S. case. Broadly speaking, the limited and sporadic nature of cooperation and the fragmented composition of the pre-NAFTA environmental era resulted in no movement on the intersubjective front. Policy actors had little opportunity to get to know one other and modify the cognitive framework. The consequence was little opportunity

for political integration to take root. It should be noted, however, that despite the extremely limited levels of political integration found in this period, the institutions and instances of cooperation existing in this interval facilitated the construction of a tentative, albeit weak, framework for cooperation, which, in turn, established a foundation for the creation of other instances of cooperation.

The findings of this chapter provide evidence that supports one of the initial arguments I make in the introductory chapter. That is, that any movement towards or against political integration is mediated by the already existing bilateral relations, institutional context, and other disintegrative factors. In particular, as both the examples of U.S.-Mexico marine relations and the Canada-U.S. acid rain conflict illustrate, Canada and Mexico's disadvantaged position vis-à-vis their larger, more powerful neighbour generates asymmetries that have a significant impact on levels of intersubjectivity.

To analyze the limited levels of political integration in North America with reference to the environment I examined the three subtypes of political integration identified in the introductory chapter: degree of institutionalization, degree of cooperation, and degree of intersubjective integration. To gauge levels of institutionalization I examined both formal and informal aspects of institutions, including formal design features like ability to meet its mandate and its enforcement mechanisms. Additionally, I looked at informal powers like the ability to create conditions for cooperation. In terms of cooperation, I examined the nature of instances of cooperation, whether a viable framework for cooperation existed, and whether or not some contact with NGOs existed. With regards to the degree of intersubjectivity, the idea is to

determine whether instances of cooperation led to any positive or negative transformative processes that altered policy actors' perception of the "other".

The issues covered in this chapter are relevant because they provide the foundations from which to review the findings in Chapter Five and the degree of political integration in the area of the environment during the NAFTA period. Only by assessing what occurred in the pre-NAFTA era is it possible to accurately gauge the impact of economic integration on political integration. This also allows me to determine whether the establishment of trilateral institutions for environmental cooperation really acts as an intervening variable in the integration process.

This chapter is made up of two sections. The first part describes the features that define the U.S.-Mexico pre-NAFTA environmental era, and then examines the nature of political integration in that period. The second section examines the characteristics of the Canada-U.S. pre-NAFTA era, and then assesses whether and to what degree political integration existed at that juncture.

The U.S. - Mexico Pre-NAFTA Environmental Era

U.S.-Mexico relations on environmental issues before NAFTA were institutionally weak, with sporadic and shallow efforts at cooperation resulting, at best, in little to no levels of political integration. Moreover, the limited levels of political integration were influenced and shaped by the asymmetries that characterize the broader pre-NAFTA U.S.-Mexico relationship, along with other disintegrative barriers associated with cultural differences and distinct political systems. However, before delving into a detailed examination of this era, I will briefly outline the major environmental issues that shape the U.S.-Mexico

bilateral environmental relationship: water, air pollution, and hazardous and industrial waste.

Water Quality and Supply Issues

In terms of water quality, surface and ground water along the border is endangered by sewage, pesticide, and pollution from industrial and hazardous waste. The latter deteriorated water quality almost to a point where it is no longer potable (Ganster, 1996: 165). With regards to water supply, the arid nature of the U.S.-Mexico border region complicates the already complex problem of water apportionment. Water is in alarmingly short supply and, in the future, both countries will have difficulty supplying the growing population of the border region (Ganster, 1996: 166). Complicating this matter is the fact that all waters in the border region are allocated by the 1944 Water Treaty. According to environmental scholar Stephen Mumme, the treaty failed to deal with: “1) the apportionment of water from several lesser rivers and streams intersecting the boundary and 2) the apportionment of ground water underlying the frontier” (Mumme, 1986: 81). Combined with the growing industrialization and urbanization of the border region, and the looming climatic changes, large scale water transfers and water availability are even further complicated (Szekely, 1993: 38).

Air Pollution

Air quality is a trans-border problem in the border region. Air pollution takes the form of, among other things, industrial pollution from factories, vehicle pollution, and electrical power generation. All sources of air pollution are transported from one country to another

by wind (Ganster, 1996: 167). This is a particular problem of the U.S.-Mexico border region where the rapid growth of twin cities has magnified the importance of addressing air pollution challenges.

Hazardous Waste

The growth of the maquila industry has inevitably led to an increase in industrialized waste dumping along the border region. Industry has abused the lax enforcement on the Mexican side by improperly dumping, storing, and discharging chemical waste. This has serious ramifications not only for the water quality and supply of the region, but also adversely affects the human population (Ganster, 1996: 167).

The severe nature of environmental issues along the U.S.-Mexico border can be explained in part by the growth and vibrancy of the border region. For instance one of the most important growth industries in the border area is the 1965 Border Industrialization Program (BIP). The BIP stimulated employment, population growth, and industrialization, which has significantly impacted the quality of the environment in the border region (Mumme, 2000: 897). The program was created to increase employment in Mexican border cities and originally led to a moderate degree of success. However, by the mid 1980s, the maquila industry witnessed annual increases in employment that, according to Ganster, averaged more than 20 per cent (Ganster, 1996: 146). Table 3.1 demonstrates the number of plants and growth rate of the maquila industry between 1974 and 1993.

Table 3.1 Number of Plants and Workers in the Maquiladora Industry, 1974-1994

Year	Number of Plants	Annual Growth Rate of Plants	Number of Jobs	Annual of Growth Rate of Plants
1974	455		75,970	
1975	454	-0.2	67,210	11.3
1976	448	-1.3	74,500	10.8
1977	443	-1.1	78,430	5.3
1978	457	3.2	90,700	15.6
1979	540	18.2	11,370	22.8
1980	620	14.8	119,550	7.3
1981	605	-2.4	130,970	9.6
1982	585	-3.3	127,050	-3.0
1983	600	2.6	150,860	18.7
1984	672	12.0	199,680	32.4
1985	750	13.1	211,970	6.2
1986	890	17.1	249,830	17.9
1987	1,130	26.4	305,250	22.2
1988	1,400	24.1	369,490	21.0
1989	1,670	18.6	429,730	16.3
1990	1,938	17.1	460,260	7.1
1991	1,910	-1.2	467,350	1.5
1992	2,080	8.4	505,700	8.2
1993	2,170	4.4	540,930	7.0

Source: Ganster, 1996.

The growth of the maquila industry was accompanied by rapid population growth in the U.S.-Mexico border region, fuelled in part by waves of Mexicans who sought better employment opportunities. Table 3.2 portrays annual growth rates of twin cities by decade.

Table 3.2 Annual Growth rate of Twin Cities by decade

City & State	1940-50	1950-60	1960-70	1970-80	1980-90
San Diego, California	6.4	7.1	2.1	2.6	2.4
Tijuana, Baja California	13.4	9.8	6.4	4.0	5.0
Calexico, California	1.9	2.4	3.3	4.3	2.6
Mexicali, Baja California	12.8	10.4	4.4	2.5	2.5
Nogales, Arizona	2.0	1.8	2.3	7.5	2.2
Nogales, Sonora	7.7	6.3	3.4	2.7	4.9
El Paso, Texas	3.5	11.2	6.1	3.2	1.9
Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua	9.4	7.5	5.1	3.3	3.8
Eagle Pass, Texas	1.3	6.6	2.7	3.9	-4

Piedras Negras, Coahuila	7.6	7.6	-.04	7.2	3.6
Laredo, Texas	3.1	1.8	1.4	3.3	3.0
Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas	7.0	4.9	5.0	3.0	0.8
McAllen, Texas	6.9	6.3	1.5	7.6	2.4
Reynosa, Tamaulipas	3.4	8.1	6.6	3.4	3.2
Brownsville, Texas	6.1	7.5	9.1	6.2	1.5
Matamoros, Tamaulipas	11.0	7.3	4.2	3.1	3.5

Source: Ganster, 1996.

Combined with rapid population growth, tremendous industrialization has had serious environmental impacts on the ecosystems and populations of the border region.

The next section will outline the institutional, cooperation and intersubjective elements of the U.S.-Mexico pre-NAFTA environmental era, while focusing in greater detail on the disintegrative barriers that shape the rate and nature of political integration.

Degree of Institutionalization in the U.S.-Mexico Pre-NAFTA

For the most part, the U.S.-Mexico pre-NAFTA environmental era was characterized by weak levels of institutionalization, if assessed from the formal organizational standpoint.

The only institution that existed in that period, the International Boundary Water Commission (IBWC), dealt in an extremely limited manner with environmental problems that confront the border region and contained poor enforcement and public participation mechanisms.

The 1944 Water Treaty between the U.S. and Mexico established the IBWC as the principle bilateral institution to treat territorial issues and water management issues (allocation of water, waste water treatment, sanitation, and water quality). The IBWC is mandated to maintain clearly the boundary line between the U.S. and Mexico, including the supervision and management of public works situated on the boundary, and to resolve

disputes originating from that boundary (Mumme and Moore, 1990: 670). The IBWC also performs investigate-liaison, quasi-judicial and administrative duties (Mumme, 1986: 75).

The IBWC has generally been thought of as a relatively effective institution. Mumme, an expert in U.S.-Mexico environmental relations, states that “the International Boundary Water Commission may well represent the finest example of functional cooperation in transboundary resource management between highly dissimilar countries anywhere on the globe” (Mumme, 1993, 93). Indeed, since its birth, the IBWC has been recognized as a successful trans-boundary resource management institution. Operating under the authority of the 1944 Water Treaty, the IBWC has actively initiated many water-related activities including building water storage facilities and diversionary works on the Rio Grande and Colorado rivers, monitoring water flows, operating hydro-electric dams, and other such activities (Mumme, 1986: 76). Additionally, the IBWC’s scope and mandate have been broadened to include other functions not previously built into the original Water Treaty (Mumme and Moore, 1990: 676).

Despite some of the IBWC’s successes, however, environmental groups have criticized its lack of enforcement powers, its limited mandate, and its unresponsiveness to new constituencies and the public alike (Mumme and Moore, 1992: 769). Indeed, the changing conditions and pressures along the border region—the growth in population, the increase in border industrialization programs, and the enormous stress these factors put on urban services, including water supply, sewage and sanitation—represent new challenges for the IBWC (Mumme, 1993, 96).

One of the most pressing concerns expressed by environmentalists is the IBWC's poor response to the full range of environmental problems plaguing the border region and its lack of enforcement power. Moreover, when it does choose to address an environmental problem related to water it does so in a slow, cautious, incremental manner—an approach that environmentalists regard as incommensurate with the gravity of the environmental problems along the border. This is due to the IBWC's method of investigating problems and its jurisdictional authority, which limits the IBWC to environmental matters outlined in the 1944 Water Treaty. Clearly this condition limits the range of issues the IBWC can address (Mumme, 1993, 103).

The IBWC has also been scrutinized for its lack of public consultation. Under the 1944 Water Treaty, "there is no regularly prescribed procedures for public participation and review of the IBWC's operations" (Mumme, 1993, 98). The 1944 Treaty gives the IBWC considerable discretion in public relation matters and is, therefore, not obliged to provide any public participation mechanisms. The IBWC is also under no obligation to disclose its information, making it difficult for state and local governments, and the public to access information. The IBWC's closed approach to decision making is not in tune with the increasing complexity of present environmental issues, which, ultimately, require consultation.

The IBWC's institutional weakness hardly seems surprising considering that, as Mumme and Moore maintain, the IBWC primarily enables joint action while protecting national sovereignty. However, although the IBWC can be defined as weak in terms of formal statutory authority, the IBWC does exercise a type of informal power. As Mumme and Moore claim:

[I]nformal authority arises not by statute, but from the resource endowment, substantive functions, political context, and other variable and subjective factors such as leadership which affect the practical influence and policy discretion of the agency in its administrative and political environment (Mumme and Moore, 1990: 663).

Mumme goes on to explain that institutional design dimensions like those of technical expertise and constituency support can also give an institution a certain degree of power (Mumme and Moore, 1990: 663). An institution thus endowed, is able to achieve goals and develop as an institution. In this respect, the IBWC has fared well. Chapter One outlined that one of the ways institutions correct structural inefficiencies is by supplying information that governments can use to make intelligent decisions. In the case of the IBWC, environmental scholars agree that one of the IBWC's greatest sources of informal power is its monopoly over technical data and technical expertise. The IBWC is headed by Commissioners who are required to be engineers and they must operate a "complex array of water works, hydroelectric projects and sewage facilities" (Mumme, 1986: 86). The IBWC's technical expertise is additionally enhanced by its monopoly over border environmental data (Ingram and White, 1993: 155). This mandate endows the IBWC with technical jurisdiction, enabling it to resolve binational disputes. Put differently, the IBWC's technical expertise allows it to address issues from a scientific perspective, giving it a type of functional authority that governments rely on. The IBWC thus offers technical solutions not influenced by the ebb and flow of partisan politics (Mumme, 1986: 90).

Apart from its technical expertise, the U.S. section of the IBWC in particular has actively cultivated a domestic political clientele that ensures the security and permanency of the IBWC (Mumme, 1990: 669). For instance, the U.S. section of the IBWC has successfully performed a whole range of service-like functions for its border-state

clientele. So, even though the IBWC has not been active in building support with NGOs or the public, it has been effective in securing support from elite political clients. It should be noted here that the Mexican section of the IBWC is significantly less client-focused than its U.S. partner. Mumme notes that the Mexican section “has little imperative to court politically the border states and municipios it serves”; it focuses more on national interests (Mumme, 1986: 89). The national orientation of the Mexican section can be explained by the centralized nature of the Mexican political system, which even presently constrains effective environmental action and definitely acts as a disintegrative barrier inhibiting political integration. One of the defining features of the pre-NAFTA Mexican political system is a strong centralism that permeates every policy sector including that of the environment. The Mexican section of the IBWC is a case in point. The Mexican section falls under the jurisdiction and indeed forms a part of the Mexican Foreign Ministry. As such, it exercises little institutional autonomy from the Foreign Ministry (Mumme, 1986: 88-89). However, even if the Mexican section operated in a less centralized federalist system, the nature of environmental politics in Mexico is such that environmental issues are not given a high priority.

The evolution of Mexican environmental policy from the 1970s until the late 1980s has been shaped by several factors: the low priority given to environmental issues by governmental actors; the general ineffectiveness and weakness of Mexico’s environmental agencies, which have little power to enforce environmental laws; the near lack of public access to environmental information; and poor resources allocated for the address of environmental problems (Wallace, 2001: 62). Hogenboom notes that even though some environmental gains were made, notably the improvement of environmental

legislation, the enforcement of legislation and environmental standards remained comparatively weak, contributing to a large gap between formal policy and practice (Hogenboom, 1998: 106). Government attention to environmental policy was often stronger during Presidential campaigns, but, for the most part, the governments of Echeverría, López Portillo, de la Madrid, and Salinas only engaged in “varying degrees of symbolic and rhetorical attention to environmental issues in order to contain political pressure on the political regime” (Wallace, 2001: 61). But the nearly-absolute neglect of enforcement persisted. In particular, government enforcement agencies were just not equipped to address environmental challenges. Specifically, they lacked financial and material resources, experienced personnel, and, as Hogenboom notes, they lacked the enforcement authority to carry out tasks (Hogenboom, 1998: 107). There was simply little political will and little commitment to enforce environmental policy. Governmental actors were more interested in achieving economic growth (Hogenboom, 1998: 107). Additionally, there existed no strong environmental movement to influence environmental policy. Moderate environmental NGOs (ENGOS) were often co-opted into the political system and, as such, their role remained limited (Hogenboom, 1998: 107). All of these factors influence how the Mexican section interacts with the U.S. section and can potentially act as disintegrative factors that limit political integration.

The semi-authoritarian and corrupt nature of the Mexican political regime has also affected NGOs’ access to environmental information and the political decision-making process in general. In the pre-NAFTA environmental era, critical ENGOS were actively repressed, intimidated, censored or, in some cases, paid off by a political regime that exercised severe control over dissent (Wallace, 2001: 33). Indeed, even when reacting to

foreign pressure over environmental degradation, or when in the midst of a presidential campaign that sought to appease and gain the environmental vote, the Mexican government engaged in largely symbolic efforts to implement and enforce environmental laws (Wallace, 2001: 28). Additionally, weak avenues for environmental participation were created that allowed moderate, less critical, environmental groups to contribute extremely limited input to the environmental process; even then, this was usually after decisions had already been made (Wallace, 2001: 90).

Beyond the repressive nature of the political system in Mexico, there were other factors inhibiting the development of a genuine and strong environmental movement in Mexico. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, only a small and powerless group of academics paid attention to environmental issues. With the de la Madrid administration, however, environmental issues started to gather momentum. At the time, environmental problems were beginning to attract global attention. Indeed, a few global environmental organizations and reports cited Mexico's environmental failures (Wallace, 2001: 33). As well, domestic public awareness increased, at least notionally, due to several serious cases of environmental degradation in Mexico City. But, despite the public's and government's increased awareness of environmental issues, Mexican NGOs faced several internal barriers. To begin with, Mexican NGOs were small and concentrated in Mexico City, inhibiting the development of a national environmental movement. Groups often lacked resources and expertise. As well, poor communication and limited contact between NGOs and other non environmental NGOs constrained the development of solidarity networks, which increase and intensify political pressure (Wallace, 2001: 49). Wallace also notes that another defining characteristic of Mexican NGOs is their

predisposition to reproduce aspects of Mexico's political system. He explains that they often use the very tactics and strategies of the government: "environmental NGOs at the local level sometimes employ the same clientelist strategy (of giving and binding) as government agencies and the PRI" (Wallace, 2001: 50).

Based on the above outline, it would be inaccurate to label the IBWC as institutionally weak; if judged by its formal authority powers, the label would be accurate. As the above section highlights, however, judging an institutions' effectiveness and strength solely by its public participation and enforcement mechanisms overlooks the realities of power and the political context in which institutions must operate. The IBWC must operate within the bounds of its member governments. To this end, the IBWC's assets in the informal realm grant it a certain degree of power. Thus we can conclude that in the institutional realm, the IBWC contains low to low-moderate degrees of institutionalization.

Degree of Cooperation in the U.S.-Mexico Pre-NAFTA Environmental Era

The previous section outlined the parameters of institutionalization in the pre-NAFTA era. For the most part, the only institution in operation, the IBWC, contains weak institutional design features. The IBWC, however, does exert some degree of influence in the informal realm. Nevertheless, the seriousness of the environmental situation along the border, combined with the unresponsiveness of the IBWC, resulted in a general awareness and mobilization of environmental constituencies that acted to pressure governments on the importance of creating other mechanisms that could address the shortfalls of the IBWC and, at the same time, deal with the new environmental problems

confronting the border region (Mumme, 1996: 206). The consequence was the emergence of a variety of instances of cooperation in the pre-NAFTA environmental era.

As explained earlier, cooperation is centripetal: it requires policy actors to coordinate their behaviour, bringing disparate actions together in a series of coordinated events. Examples of cooperation run the gamut from treaties and accords, to informal memos, workgroups, meetings, and conferences. Since the mid 1970s, a whole host of conferences have taken place between environmental officials, scholars, environmental groups, and members of the public troubled with the environmental situation at the border (Bath, 1986: 66). However, many of these events were sporadic, separate, isolated; they dealt with environmental issues on an ad hoc basis. Not until the 1980s was the first framework for coordinating environmental problems constructed (Szekely, 1992: 611). In 1983, the U.S. and Mexico implemented the landmark executive-level agreement on environmental cooperation, the US-Mexico Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement on the Border Area, now known as the La Paz Agreement (Mumme, 1996: 208). La Paz was significant because it was the first agreement to stipulate and institutionalize an approach to cooperation. La Paz called for Mexico and the U.S. to work cooperatively to address environmental issues, namely reducing air, water, and land pollution due to the growing maquila industry along the 2000 mile U.S.-Mexico border, under a general environmental cooperation framework (Mumme and Duncan, 1997-1998: 44). At the time, the severity of the environmental situation along the border demanded a new and more effective approach—one that the IBWC was simply not equipped to address. The La Paz agreement was the new bilateral institutional mechanism designed to help remedy the serious environmental issues faced at the border. It created various

bilateral working groups that met on a regular basis to address border pollution problems (Ganster, 1996: 169). The working groups eventually produced a series of five annexes, or bilateral executive agreements, which created concrete schemes of cooperation on various pressing environmental concerns. The annexes resulted in the construction of various sanitation plants and facilities; copper smelters were closed or frozen at their current capacities; monitoring devices at the border were instituted; information between the two countries was more readily exchanged, while new and more severe environmental regulations for the region were put in place (Mumme, 1996: 208).

La Paz is significant for various reasons. First, it represents the first binational consultative framework for cooperation on environmental matters. Article six of the agreement established guidelines for the method of cooperation including: “coordination of national programs; scientific and educational exchanges; environmental monitoring; environmental impact assessment and periodic exchanges of information and data on likely sources of pollution” (Fernandez de Castro, 1996: 182). In addition, the agreement appointed national coordinators for both nations, resulting in regular meetings between environmental officials and technical personnel in both countries, who specified the exact agencies to be involved in border environmental issues (Environmental Protection Agency in the U.S. and Secretaria de Desarollo Urbano y Ecología in Mexico). The agreement also involves state and local officials previously excluded from the decision making process (Bath, 1986: 66). The result was direct communication between environmental officials on both sides of the border.

Nevertheless, despite many of the advances in cooperation attributed to La Paz, it alone could not adequately address the grave environmental situation at the U.S.-Mexico

border. In particular, La Paz contains no timetables for action and does nothing in terms of punishing those who do not abide by the annexes. Instead, the annexes only specify consultation, notification, or exchange of information mechanisms (Mumme, 1992: 546-549). La Paz's public participation mechanisms are also weak. Under Article Nine of the Agreement, states and municipalities are invited to participate in some meetings. But, in general, discretion about the dissemination of information is left up to the national coordinators (Mumme, 1992: 560). And so, for instance, other groups like NGOs, local governments, and academic institutions with an interest in environmental issues may not be included. In addition, La Paz lacks adequate mechanisms for informing the public on environmental issues (Mumme, 1992: 547).

The La Paz agreement was created to address the limitations of the IBWC, and it was followed by the three-phase Integrated Border Environmental Plan (IBEP), begun in 1992, which aimed to correct the shortfalls of La Paz. The IBEP was negotiated within the framework of the La Paz Agreement as an additional annex and actually involves the IBWC Commissioners and La Paz National Coordinators (Szekely, 1993: 45). However, the two agreements differed in a number of ways. Most noticeable is the fact that the IBEP is more comprehensive. It includes precise plans of action and concrete proposals for resolving environmental problems along the border region (Fernandez de Castro, 1996: 184-187).

The IBEP also improves on La Paz's poor participation mechanisms. In the first stage of the IBEP plan (1992-94), Border Environment Plan Public Advisory Committees (BEC-PACS) were to be created to advise each national government on environmental border problems. The Plan also called for the creation of sister-city intergovernmental

advisory groups at municipal levels that would advise on environmental problems. In addition, the IBEP invites state and local agencies to participate in the process (Mumme, 1992: 559). IBEP also improves on La Paz's poor access to information instruments. It commits both countries to a program of expanded access to environmental information provisions. Countries were expected to develop education programs and publications in order to raise citizens' awareness of environmental concerns (Mumme, 1992: 562).

Although the IBEP was meant to institute concrete projects to resolve environmental issues, it was criticized for stopping short of committing countries to specific environmental projects and lacking an implementation plan. It was, therefore, without a long term plan of action and was, as some have called it, "a plan to plan" (Herzog, 2000: 85). In addition, the IBEP's funding capacity was especially weak. The plan promised what some believed was an unprecedented level of financial support for environmental problems—US\$589 million distributed over two years. The figure seemed huge, but, in the end, was altogether insufficient to address environmental border problems. Wallace states that actual estimates of the region's needs ranged from US\$4.5 billion to US\$10 billion. The \$589 Million figure was measly in comparison to the latter estimates, indicating little commitment to environmental concerns (Wallace, 2001: 69).

Although the emphasis in this section is on U.S.-Mexico cooperation, it is worthwhile determining the extent of Mexico-Canada cooperation on environmental matters. It should be noted at the outset that no trilateral cooperation between Canada the U.S. and Mexico existed in the pre-NAFTA period. Indeed, as Mumme and Duncan state, one of the defining features of the pre-NAFTA era is what they call "fragmented bilateralism". As they note:

Its main features were parallel borders, with relatively independent systems of rules and institutions for managing environmental problems along those borders; agreements specifying management protocols and institutional responses in a substantively separate, non comprehensive, and discoordinate fashion; irregular patterns of communication and diplomacy, driven substantially by perceived crisis; and management priorities driven almost exclusively by social rather than ecological concerns (Mumme and Duncan, 1997-98: 45).

What did exist in the pre-NAFTA environmental era was limited cooperation centred on three relationships: U.S.-Mexico, Canada-U.S., and an emerging Canada-Mexico relationship. Canada-Mexico cooperation was spurred by a joint recognition of transboundary sources of pollution, which required their cooperative efforts (Szekely, 1992: 608-609). Thus in 1990, Mexico and Canada began a period of expanded cooperation. The countries held their 7th Ministerial Committee Meeting where they decided to strengthen already existing cooperation on migratory species, and expand cooperation efforts in new areas such as restoration of fresh water supplies. Probably the most significant aspect of the meeting was the ministers' acknowledgement, for the first time at the bilateral level, of "the need for international cooperation to confront serious global problems such as ozone depletion and climatological change" (cited in Szekely, 1992, 609). This meeting prepared the groundwork for the signing of the agreement on Environmental Cooperation between Mexico and Canada. The agreement was signed March 16, 1990 by the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of Mexico. It expanded the zone of cooperation to include atmospheric environmental issues like climate change, acid rain, atmospheric ozone and air pollution issues. Meteorology and climatology problems were also included in the expanded zone of cooperation (Szekely, 1992: 609). In the negotiations prior to the agreement, the Mexican president called on Canada to cooperate with Mexico on common issues affecting both countries. Canada

accepted Mexico's proposal by signing the agreement and recognizing that Canada and Mexico share continental environmental problems that they must work on together (Szekely, 1992: 613). The agreement also formalized some of the commitments made by both countries in the 7th Ministerial Meeting on Migratory Species. Article Two commits Canada and Mexico to cooperate on protection and conservation of migratory species like the monarch butterfly, Canada geese, and ducks. Article Four further stipulates that an MOU to deal with migratory birds and the monarch butterfly should soon be concluded (Szekely, 1992: 584).

Despite some advances in Canada-Mexico cooperation in the pre-NAFTA era, cooperation between the two countries was minimal. One reason for this is the fact that Canada and Mexico do not share a border. Another issue may be, as Pastor points out, that Canada and Mexico find it "hard to see each other over the expanse of the U.S." (Pastor, 2001, 147). Each nation's preoccupation with the U.S. reduces their interest in cooperating with each other.

In sum, the above section described instances of cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico in the pre-NAFTA environmental era. It was found that small steps were made to establish a more formal framework of regular interaction between American and Mexican environmental officials. La Paz, for instance, established the first cooperative framework that not only set out a method of cooperation, but also institutionalized cooperation in a regular policy space. This bonded officials along a legitimized transnational axis, which led to more productive communication, and, eventually, to the birth of the IBEP and the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation—all indices of further cooperation.

Degree of Intersubjectivity in the U.S.-Mexico Pre-NAFTA Environmental Era

The preceding section highlighted that a number of instances of cooperation were generated in the pre-NAFTA period. For the most part, these mechanisms for cooperation were weak, involved little public participation, and dealt with the grave environmental situation facing the border region in a limited manner. Despite their weaknesses, however, they did succeed in creating a cooperative framework for addressing environmental problems. For instance, they established the parameters of cooperation between the two countries, the actors involved in the process, and a strategy or agenda for cooperation. This is important because cooperation has social consequences. The more political actors cooperate, the more they understand each other; this fosters trust and expands the field of communication, which can motivate transformative processes and movement in the political integration process. Put differently, examining intersubjective functions acts like a cross-reference. Because cooperation can take place within a highly asymmetrical and conflict-ridden context, examining them allows us to determine whether cooperation has led to positive results.

For the most part, it appears that there was no move towards political integration in the pre-NAFTA environmental era. This is due not to the existence of a multitude of disintegrative elements like asymmetries and sovereignty claims, but to the simple fact that it was just too early to tell. La Paz was still a nascent agreement and officials were just beginning to work within its bilateral channels. However, some positive signs were present, and these would help lay the foundation for an eventual move towards political integration in the long run.

For example, compared to the negative, conflict-laden nature of the broader U.S.-Mexico relationship in the 1980s, some progress did occur in terms of the countries' environmental relationship. Of course, this increase must be situated within the broader disharmony of bilateralism that characterized the period leading up to the early 90s—a period strained by undocumented Mexican migration, aggressive U.S. unilateral action, and drug-related conflicts (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001: 10). Environmental scholars agree that the only successful and constructive area of cooperation was that of the environment. As Hogenboom states: “[b]etween 1983 and 1986, environmental protection was in fact the only policy issue on which some results were obtained at the yearly presidential meetings, ironically lending an image of continuity to the tense bilateral relations at the time” (Hogenboom, 1998: 93).

Indeed, because of the IBWC, the environment was the only institutionalized area of the relationship. Although weak, the IBWC still created a space for legitimate, rule-bound cooperation. Additionally, the environmental domain is marked by some levels of cooperation. La Paz instituted the first cooperation framework, and the IBEP brought together officials from La Paz and the IBWC in a shared area of cooperation. Explanations for the relative success in the environmental arena also look to the nature of environmental issues themselves. They are less tense than security issues and are often motivated by a genuine desire to resolve environmental problems. Moreover, environmental officials recognize that environmental problems are transnational; as such, true bilateral cooperation is necessary to resolve them. Additionally, some public opinion polls conducted in the pre-NAFTA period show that the public of all three countries was concerned with environmental matters. In an article using 1990 World Value Survey

results, Kanji maintains that the finding provided support for the proposition that “those North Americans concerned about the environment also turn out to be more supportive of the idea of “doing away with political borders” (Kanji, 1996: 198). Kanji sustains that, from an ecological perspective, the transboundary nature of environmental issues is best-suited to a continental approach:

Ecological deterioration is likely to affect all North Americans, regardless of their nationality, and dealing effectively with such issues may require a continental outlook, one that may inevitably push North Americans to unite and work together in an even broader global environmental context (Kanji, 1996: 183).

This is not to say that the environmental relationship between the U.S. and Mexico in the pre-NAFTA period was without irritants. One area that generated plenty of friction was U.S.-Mexico marine relations. In fact, as then Mexican president Lopez Portillo maintained in his address to American policy makers in Washington, U.S.-Mexican relations in this area typified all the tensions of the broader bilateral relationship (Cicin-Sain et al. 1986: 769). In an article exploring U.S.-Mexico marine relations, Cicin-Sain, Orbach, Sellers and Manzanilla explain that, beginning in the late 70s and continuing on until the 80s, marine relations between the two countries went from accommodating to increasingly conflictive, and finally reached a standstill in the 1980s (Cici-Sain et al., 1986: 772). At the time, two very different fishery management regimes came into contact and subsequently clashed. In 1976 both countries established a 200 mile extended jurisdiction fishery zone. In April of that year, the U.S. Congress passed the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MFCMA). The Act formed a new fishery conservation zone that gave the U.S. sole management authority over fisheries in the designated zone. Its goal was to deter foreign fishing off the coast of the U.S. and to conserve fishery resources through regulatory action (Cicin-Sain et al., 1986:

774). In contrast to the limited nature of the U.S. MFCMA, Mexico established the Exclusive Economic Zone which gave Mexico jurisdiction over all marine resources found within the 200 miles radius. The Mexican Act coincided with the fact that the Mexican government was at the time launching an extensive fishing development program which sought to position Mexico as a world wide fishing power (Cisin-Sain et al., 1986: 776).

The differences in the actions taken by the U.S. and Mexico in 1976 led to a significant discord between the two countries. In essence, this was part of a broader set of domestic differences: different political systems; histories; divergent perceptions of their respective global roles; and, perhaps more fundamentally, discontinuous views of each other (Cisin-Sain et al, 1986: 772). The most significant difference, however, is the asymmetrical nature of the relationship. Mexico, a developing country, shares a border with the world's most powerful and wealthy nation. This influences how the two nations perceive each other, and, undoubtedly, affects the rate and nature of political integration (Cisin-Sain et al, 1986: 780). From the Mexican point of view, Cisin-Sain, Orbach, Zellers and Manzanilla sustains that there exists "a clear, highly developed sense of nationalism combined with a sizeable dose of wariness about U.S. intentions" (Cisin-Sain et al, 1986: 781). Indeed, Mexico's emphasis on "sovereignty" over marine resources is a manifestation of nationalism and a response to an entire history of U.S.-intervention in Mexican affairs.

The role played by fisheries in each country's national economy and social system is also shaped by asymmetries. For Mexico, fisheries are primarily sources of food production and job creation. For the U.S., on the other hand, fisheries are used to improve

trade, or to be conserved for recreational sport (Cisin-Sain et al, 1986: 784). The differences of utility are significant.

Another distinction must be made in the area of politics and governance. In the United States, the policy system in place to deal with environmental problems is highly decentralized with multiple points of entry. For instance, powerful tuna-interests exert considerable dominance over the U.S. marine position and in marine relations in general (Cisin-Sain et al, 1986: 789). The system is open to numerous governmental actors and non-governmental actors who exert pressure on environmental issues (Sellers, 1986: 784). The Mexican system is the exact opposite: highly centralized with direction coming down from the President, or his close representatives, and subject to little group pressure.

Notwithstanding the serious nature of environmental conflicts that characterized the U.S.-Mexico pre-NAFTA era—and the disintegrative issues that these conflicts threw into relief—the environmental relationship was not completely paralyzed. Small cooperative advances were made, allowing for the possibility of movement on the political integration front. Moreover, even though levels of institutionalization were weak throughout this period, cooperation still took place, albeit within a weak institutional structure.

The Canada-U.S. Pre-NAFTA Environmental Era

Overall, the Canada-U.S. pre-NAFTA environmental era was characterized by a small degree of political integration within a highly asymmetrical context. That said, it was still more advanced than the severely limited levels of political integration found in the U.S.-Mexico relationship in the same period. This is due in part to the more mature,

advanced, and friendly nature of the broader Canada-U.S. relationship, which, to some extent, must be understood to mediate the political integration process. Higher levels of cooperation defined the Canada-U.S. pre-NAFTA environmental era, propelled in part by the existence of public actors in both countries who mobilize around environmental issues and push to have their concerns heard. Having said all of this, it should be noted that political integration in this period operated within a highly asymmetrical system, a factor that can also influence the nature and degree of political integration. Conflicts related to management of water resources, air pollution, and the disintegrative issues that arose from these moments of discord, ensured that political integration remained weak and that little movement on the intersubjective front took place. These tensions also illustrate that cooperation does not necessarily provide a direct link to the trust and amicability needed for a positive move towards political integration. Cooperation can occur within a highly conflict-laden context, which can prevent movement in terms of political integration.

Degree of Institutionalization in the Canada-U.S. Pre-NAFTA Environmental Era

Overall, the Canada-U.S. pre-NAFTA era was characterized by weak levels of institutionalism. The only institution created to address environmental challenges had a limited mandate that was largely dependant on its member governments. Moreover, it had no actual enforcement powers, which severely limited its power base. Similar to the U.S.-Mexico IBWC, the Canada-U.S. International Joint Commission (IJC) was created to address water issues in a border region with many rivers and some of the world's largest lake flows. The IJC is the only binational institution that exists to manage Canada-U.S.

environmental challenges. It derives its authority from the 1909 Boundary Water Treaty, a treaty drafted to create a joint dispute-mechanism to deal with boundary waters (Carroll, 1983: 43). The IJC was designed to accomplish this goal and is tasked to “consider and approve works, both in boundary waters and downstream on transboundary streams that affect the water level at the boundary” (Lemarquand, 1986: 235).

In terms of structure, the IJC is made up of three Canadian members appointed by the Governor General for fixed terms and an equal number of U.S. members appointed by the president for as long as the president deems necessary. Each section is composed of a full-time chairman and operates with a small full-time staff (Carroll, 1983: 44). The two sections of the IJC, in effect, operate as a single unit. They are organized into two sections for organizational purposes, but are not separate in any legal sense (Carroll, 1983, 46).

The IJC’s main role can be divided into administrative, quasi-judicial, arbitral, and investigative components (Carroll, 1983: 43). Of these, the IJC’s investigative function is by far its most important. When asked by governments, the IJC can investigate particular issues related to transboundary water along the Canada-United States border. This process is called a “reference”; governments submit a reference to the IJC, who then selects a board of officials from both countries to undertake a study of the issue. Although officials are members of their respective governments, they are expected to act independently. The advisory board will write a report that then acts as the basis of the IJC’s deliberations and actions. The IJC may decide to hold consultations before deciding to issue an attached condition. As a follow up, the IJC can appoint a control

board “to monitor the approved activity and to advise it on progress and on any needed changes” (Lemarquand, 1993: 72).

Lemarquand notes that the IJC has a reputation as one of the “most active and successful international boundary water institution[s]” (Lemarquand, 1986: 235). Canada and the U.S. hold it up as an example of a long history of successful bilateral cooperation. Indeed, many cite the IJC’s independent and impartial nature as an important measure of its success. For instance, despite its binational structure, the IJC operates in a unified fashion, rather than as two separate national delegations catering to their respective governments’ interests (Bilder, 1972: 519). Another positive feature of the Commission has been its technical expertise and the use it has made of special joint technical and advisory roles. The various boards appointed by the IJC, like the Water Quality Board and the Science Advisory Board, provide formal reports and recommendations to the IJC (Carroll, 1983: 44). A third area of success has been its ability to respond to a wide number of environmental problems. The IJC has been able to adapt to the changing nature of environmental problems. The IJC plays a central role in Great Lakes issues and is responsible for monitoring and evaluating the progress of Great Lakes matters (Lemarquand, 1993; 72).

Despite the IJC’s effectiveness in certain areas, it is still weak if evaluated according to its organizational design features. Like its counterpart, the United States-Mexico IBWC, the IJC suffers from a limited mandate and limited powers. The IJC’s mandate and scope of action is narrow; it is tightly regulated to deal specifically with water issues. This is largely because the Canadian and American governments created the IJC with the sole intention of upholding the Boundary Waters Treaty (Caldwell, 1993:

14). Water and water pollution issues, however, have changed drastically since 1909, yet the IJC remains limited in its capacity for action. In addition, the role of the IJC is largely determined by the demands of both governments. In theory, the IJC has an independent, quasi-judicial role. Lemarquand notes that the commissioners who make up the IJC, “...do not act under instruction of or as representatives of their government”. (Lemarquand, 1993: 68). But practise does not always correspond with theory, as one critic of the IJC has suggested: “IJC commissioners are appointed largely for faithful political partisanship. They are politically appointed and are expected to hold commitments in check and see that nothing occurs that could embarrass the president” (Caldwell, 1993: 24). Further, the IJC is completely dependant on governments when it comes to references. The IJC cannot itself suggest a reference, that is, develop a watchdog role, and governments are not required to accept IJC advice or even respond to advice when it is solicited (Lemarquand, 1993: 85). This endows the IJC with an advisory role that puts it at the mercy of governments. Hence, as Lemarquand notes, the IJC is only useful to the extent that governments want it to be useful. Governments “can easily lose confidence if they receive politically unacceptable advice” that they regard as outside of the boundaries of the IJC (Lemarquand, 1993: 68).

In terms of public-participation mechanisms the IJC is more advanced than the IBWC. The IBWC was given complete control over its public participation agenda, thus it is not required to consult the public (Mumme, 1993, 106). The IJC, on the other hand, is required to administer public hearings, allowing stakeholders to take part in the process. The hearings are scheduled well in advance, and notice of meetings must be publicized. As well, most of its records are available for public scrutiny and the IJC

publishes a monthly newsletter recounting commission activities. These provisions make the IJC significantly more transparent than the IBWC (Mumme, 1993, 106).

In sum, the IJC displays weak organizational design features. Its weakness lies in its poor institutional design features, such as its limited enforcement abilities. Even though the IJC is more transparent than the IBWC, it is, arguably, weaker than its Mexican counterpart. The investigative authority of the IJC is not accompanied by any independent policing authority, which would allow it to pursue references of its own accord. Its advice, ostensibly impartial, is non-binding, and member states are under no obligation to accept, or even respond to it. In comparison, the IBWC has the power to initiate investigations and make recommendations to governments (Mumme, 1993, 105).

But these organizational weaknesses are not anomalies. On the contrary, they are wholly in-step with the narrow and limited niche carved out for the IJC by member governments. As Lemarquand notes:

The usefulness of the IJC is based on the confidence that the governments have in it as their advisor and facilitator. When governments for strategic or policy reasons prefer diplomatic approaches to institutional ones, the IJC will have little opportunity to prove itself (Lemarquand, 1993: 89).

An attempt by the IJC to enforce solutions outside of the original parameters set by its member governments will injure the credibility, durability, and utility of the IJC (Lemarquand, 1993: 91). In other words, if the IJC begins to resemble an aggressive institution, it will quickly lose what little authority it has.

What the IJC is capable of doing effectively is gathering information. One of its principle areas of strength is its ability to form technical boards comprised of officials from both countries, according to Lemarquand. These officials discuss data, sift through technical information, and establish agreed-upon technical facts. Lemarquand observes

that when dealing with international environmental issues, “agreed-upon facts are the first step in reaching agreement” (Lemarquand, 1993: 77). Lemarquand also states that the IJC plays an important mediating function by bringing together a variety of groups and stakeholders in a common space to deal with transboundary problems. Hass, Levy and Keohane note that functions such as these give an institution the subtle ability to influence policy direction. Thus the weak formal authorities of the IJC do not completely overshadow its informal capacities. Indeed, as regime theory postulates, the ability to enforce or constrain the actions of member governments is not the only measure of a strong institution. Rather, in a context where sovereignty and power prevail, institutions that generate cooperation in order to alter policy direction can be characterized as strong (Hass, Keohane, Levy, 1993: 399).

Degree of Cooperation in the Canada-U.S. Pre-NAFTA Environmental Era

The numerous examples of environmental cooperation between Canada and the U.S., before NAFTA, indicate a functional level of cooperation between the two countries, especially when compared to the U.S.-Mexico relationship. The pre-NAFTA period saw the development of two separate bilateral accords: The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (1972, 1978, and 1987) and the 1991 Air Quality Agreement. These formal agreements made ongoing cooperation, to some extent, necessary; the two countries were now committed, at least in very specific contexts, to bilateral processes. The IJC often played the role of a coordinating agency, moderating these various instances of cooperation. In this way, the IJC can be regarded as an indicator of the more advanced levels of cooperation between Canada and the U.S. Again, this maturation is relative; it is

evident when considered alongside the less coordinated and sporadic nature of cooperation that characterized the U.S.-Mexico relationship during the pre-NAFTA period. Further, it seems necessary to invoke the tired, but no less useful distinction between quality and quantity: despite the prevalence of cooperation during the pre-NAFTA period, it is important to examine the nature and tone of that cooperation. Disputes over issues like acid rain demonstrate that it is not an easy process, and that it can periodically erupt in conflict. Cooperation, then, can be fraught with discontent. This issue will be elaborated upon in the intersubjectivity section. To evaluate the nature and extent of cooperation in the Canada-U.S. pre-NAFTA era, I will focus on the major instances of cooperation that characterized this period, determining whether there are some efforts at policy coordination among them.

The Canada-United States Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements

The Great Lakes comprise the largest fresh water system in the world. The Great Lakes Basin holds one-fourth of the world's fresh water supply. Nearly 300 lakes, rivers, and streams flow by or cross the 4,800 mile length of the border between the two countries (Sadler, 1986: 361). Not only are Canada and the U.S. geographically connected by the Great Lakes, but one third of the entire Canadian population and almost three-quarters of all Canadian manufacturing are located within the Basin (Rabe, 1997: 411). On the other side of the border, the Basin is home to one in seven Americans, while one-sixth of the national income and over one-fifth of manufacturing employment is produced in the Basin (Dworsky, 1986: 294). These figures and facts indicate the immense importance of the Great Lakes region for both Canadians and Americans.

As early as the end of the nineteenth century population problems associated with the Great Lakes were becoming apparent when, as Williams indicates, an annual average of 85 typhoid deaths were linked to Great Lakes water consumption (Williams, 1992: 14). By the 1950s over 7 billion litres of waste were being dumped on a daily basis into the Great Lakes. In the 1960s pollution levels were so alarming that worried observers declared that Lake Erie was dying (Williams, 1992: 15). Mounting public pressures led governments to forward a reference to the IJC, who were asked to determine the extent of the pollution and what to do about it (Carroll, 1983: 130). Less than a decade later, and after much negotiation, Canada and the U.S. signed the first Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.

The 1972 agreement (renegotiated in 1978 and slightly revised in 1987) was, as Munton and Kirton note:

...an agreement on general water quality objectives and specific regulatory standards and on the collaborative monitoring of subsequent progress, along with mutual commitments to implement national programs to achieve these objectives (Munton and Kirton, 1994: 61).

The Agreement was negotiated to address water pollution problems, which were now of great importance. Sources of pollution included eutrophication, defined as the “accelerated aging of the Lower Lakes due to excessive nutrients”, waste disposal from local municipalities and industries, sedimentation, and waste from commercial vessels. All of these posed serious threats to the quality of the Great Lakes (Munton, 1994, 61).

The agreement established broad objectives for water-quality in the Great lakes. To meet these goals each country committed itself to the development of a series of national standards for the bounded waters of the Great Lakes. The IJC was appointed to

oversee the implementation of the agreement, giving it an expanded role in Great Lakes water management. The IJC is especially responsible for:

...collecting, analyzing and disseminating relevant data and information; surveillance of water quality in the Great Lakes system; monitoring of the effectiveness of governmental programs to achieve the common water quality objectives; coordinating activities to improve water quality; tendering advice and assistance; and recommending legislation and programs.(Bilder, 1972: 505).

The IJC is, in effect, the institutional “watchdog” over the agreements (Rabe, 1997: 416). It is responsible for evaluating progress and making sure goals are met (Lemarquand, 1993: 72). To support and assist the IJC, the Great Lakes Water Quality Board, the Science Advisory Board, and the Great Lakes Regional Office in Windsor were created (Lemarquand, 1993: 72). All three are examples of binational cooperation spurred on by the original agreement.

By the late 1970s the first GLQWA had proved successful in some areas. However, the detection of persistent toxic pollutants through the use of new technology prompted the governments to broaden the 1972 Agreement in 1978 (Schwartz, 1994: 490). Lemarquand notes that the 1978 Agreement “adopts a radical approach to boundary water quality” partly because the Agreement commits the two governments to a policy of “zero discharge of toxic substances or a policy of “virtual elimination” of toxic wastes and the clean up of conventional pollutants (Lemarquand, 1993: 72). It also empowers the IJC to evaluate progress and to report on water quality every two years (Lemarquand, 1993: 72). By the 1980s there was more concern about the breadth of the agreement. At the time, the far more dangerous, but mostly invisible toxic chemical pollution of the lakes, was becoming evident. This realization led to the signing of the Protocol, which

amended the 1978 GLWQA. The 1987 agreement specifies precise time lines for cleaning up the 42 areas of concern identified by the IJC (Williams, 1992: 15).

The Canada-United States Air Quality Agreement

Perhaps the most contentious issue between both countries in the pre-NAFTA period was that of acid rain. This debate dominated the bilateral agenda for the duration of the 1980s. It hung like a dark cloud over the broader Canada-U.S. relationship. In the early 1970s the IJC warned of the dangers of acid precipitation (Carroll, 1983: 252). By 1979, a Canada-U.S. report put forth the first scientifically verifiable data on the origins and effects of acid rain (Munton and Kirton, 1994: 64).

Acid rain can be defined as “a complex set of physical and chemical phenomena by which gases, especially sulphur and nitrogen oxides, emitted mostly from industrial processes, are transported through the atmosphere and transformed into acidic compounds” (Munton, 1997: 328). Acidic compounds are then deposited on land and water surface with serious and irreversible effects on water, fish, forests, soil, and humans (Munton, 1997:328). The bulk of acid rain contamination comes from the United States. The 1979 report, for example, estimated that 70 to 80 per cent of transboundary air pollution was produced in the United States and had the potential to affect some 750,000 lakes in Eastern Canada—14,000 of which were, to some extent, already acidic (Munton, 1994: 64). The results of the report prompted Canada to seek a bilateral acid rain agreement with the U.S. Additionally, the Canadian public became very aware of the issue and acted as an effective source of political pressure. In fact, Williams maintains that when Canadians were polled about what they thought was the most important issue

on the bilateral agenda, 45 per cent chose acid rain (Williams, 1992: 10-11). Initially, officials were hopeful that an agreement could be reached easily. In 1980, the countries signed a memorandum of intent that committed both governments to negotiating an agreement; by 1982, however, the U.S. had abandoned the negotiations (Williams, 1992: 12). Not until 1991 did Canada and the United States finally succeed in negotiating the bilateral Air Quality Agreement. The agreement committed the two countries to reducing sulfur dioxide emissions by a little less than 50 per cent by 2000. In addition, the Agreement requires both countries to coordinate efforts in monitoring the effects of transboundary air pollution (Menz, 1994: 9). The agreement also established an intergovernmental Air Quality Committee that oversees the implementation of the Agreement and reviews the progress made. The Air Quality Committee created two subgroups, one that addresses emissions reduction and one that addresses scientific resources and monitoring (Munton and Kirton 1994: 65). Unlike the Great Lakes agreements, the Air Quality Agreement does not give the IJC any direct role. The IJC can only convene public hearings and then submit a summary of the proceedings. But, as Munton and Kirton note, the IJC is not allowed to prepare its own report (Munton and Kirton, 1994: 65).

In sum, it appears that there was a significant amount of cooperation between Canada and the U.S. during the pre-NAFTA era. Both the Great Lakes agreements and the Air Quality Agreement spurred a multitude of other instances of cooperation. The IJC and its involvement in water quality issues created three control boards, two technical boards for the management of Great Lakes levels and flows, one study board on diversions and consumptive uses, and a few special committees.

Cooperation in the pre-NAFTA period was also marked by a degree of coordination among the various initiatives. For example, before the inception of the GLWQA, water pollution problems were handled in an uncoordinated and un-integrated fashion. The advent of it “reflects a more comprehensive, integrated and basin-wide approach to Great Lakes pollution problems [than had] previously been undertaken” (Bilder, 1972: 546). The GLWQA formally recognizes the IJC as the principle institution and overseer for all Great Lakes pollution problems. It also outlines the steps by which both governments address pollution problems and how they cooperate on joint pollution matters.

The Air Quality Agreement is important in its own right because it establishes the first framework for addressing air quality issues. The 1909 Boundary Water Treaty had provided a framework of cooperation for transboundary water issues, but no similar pact existed for air issues (Munton and Kirton, 1994: 65). The Agreement also provides provisions for monitoring and evaluating implementation strategies by the two governments. This framework provides a mechanism for cooperation on a particular issue and, over time, this may lead to further cooperation and institutionalization.

These agreements and instances of cooperation certainly represent improvements on the previous ad hoc and uncoordinated system that governed the Canada-U.S. environmental relationship. The basin-wide ecosystem approach promoted by the GWLQA also reflects a truly integrative attempt to manage water issues (Caldewell, 1993: 11). Bolstering this increase was the emergence of public involvement and bilateral cooperation among NGOs. The inclusion of NGOs distinguishes environmental policy from borders policy, the latter being dominated and shaped largely by business interests.

Binational groups like Great Lakes United and the Center for Great Lakes suggest an increasing regionalization of public concerns (Lemarquand, 1993: 84). A possible reason for this is the fact that a large proportion of the Canadian population resides near the Great Lakes and environmental issues directly affect the lives of residents. As a result, interested citizens form environmental groups, lobby governments, and press for change. NGOs, while active in the U.S.-Mexico case, played a more limited role than in the case of Canada and the U.S. In particular, Mexican NGOs were less effective in the pre-NAFTA era because of the repressive nature of Mexico's political regime. This comparatively hostile climate, beyond limiting the ability of NGOs to affect policy, stifled their organizational development. Moreover, in the Canada-U.S. case the policy area of the environment is characterized by many bilateral and intergovernmental groups. The very existence of these groups serves to legitimize and promote bilateralism, especially when dealing with environmental problems. As Lemarquand remarks, most notable are those technical groups whose research is conducted beyond their own national lines. They are not truly bilateral in composition, but work together to produce joint "binational" studies. The most well known "partnerships" include: the U.S. National Research Council and the Royal Society of Canada; the Conservation Foundation and the Institute for Research on Public Policy (who jointly published a document on the Great Lakes in 1990); the National Wildlife Federation and The Canadian Institute for Environmental Law and Policy (Lemarquand, 1993: 85). Various water management agreements between states and provinces also emerged in the 1980s like the 1985 Great Lakes Charter, and the 1986 Great Lakes Toxic Substance Control Agreement (Lemarquand, 1993: 85). These agreements and studies do not only indicate high levels

of binational public involvement in Great Lakes issues, they also constitute a significant matrix of integrative and cooperative forces.

The integrative, centripetal movements in the Canada-U.S. pre-NAFTA environmental case were tempered, however, by strong disintegrative counter-currents. Sharp differences stemming from asymmetries of power between the two countries emerged during periods of poor cooperation over the issue of acid rain. Although Canada and the U.S. eventually resolved the issue, the transboundary air pollution problem has been a persistent irritant to their environmental relationship and their broader relationship in general. Thus, instances of cooperation during the pre-NAFTA period must be situated within an asymmetrical, conflict-laden context, which I will explore further in the next section.

Degree of Intersubjectivity in the Canada-U.S. Pre-NAFTA Environmental Era

In this section I will determine whether cooperation has led to transformative intersubjective developments, which indicate movement towards or away from political integration. Constructivists maintain that cooperation is a social process capable of reshaping identities and interests (Wendt, 1992: 417). If its frequency increases, conceptions of self and other start to shift. This can lead to subtle changes in the behaviour of states, which can potentially trigger a move towards or away from political integration. In the Canada-U.S. pre-NAFTA case, the various instances of cooperation in matters of the environment were not automatically followed by the emergence of positive forms of intersubjective processes. Simply put, cooperation existed in a conflict-ridden context that hindered any move towards political integration.

The most compelling example of conflict framing practices of cooperation is that of acid rain. Discontent over the issue of acid rain permeated the entire bilateral relationship, thus challenging the traditional problem-solving approach that had historically characterized Canada-U.S relations. The debate began after the U.S., under President Ronald Reagan, withdrew from the 1982 talks. Canada then accused the U.S. of neglecting bilateral and international treaty obligations. These accusations were followed by the launch of a public relations campaign designed to raise U.S. awareness on the issue and lobby Congress (Williams, 1992; 12). American scepticism about Canadian proposals can be explained by a series of factors. One, Reagan's focus was centred on revamping the U.S. economy, which, from the U.S.' point of view, required rolling back environmental standards (Munton, 1997: 329-337). As a result, the administration avoided any type of action on the issue by insisting that more scientific research was necessary on the topic. Second, strong political opposition from various sectors hindered political compromise. A powerful and effective coalition of electric-utilities companies, industry, coal companies, and miners opposed any environmental regulatory action (Munton, 1997: 329). American politicians, on their part, pointed a finger at Canada's domestic environmental standards and its failure to meet them. Continual bickering between the two countries set the tone of what would be the decade long acid rain negotiation, which saw no progress until the final years of the Reagan administration. U.S. environmental groups had succeeded in raising public awareness and ensured that acid rain would remain on the political agenda. Additionally, divisions formed within the electric-utilities and coal-interest alliance (Munton, 1997: 337). Finally, in 1991, the Canada-U.S. Air Quality Agreement was signed.

The acid rain conflict demonstrates a number of points. First, it suggests that although a number of cooperative elements existed in the Canada-U.S. pre-NAFTA period, they existed against a backdrop of conflict. Thus cooperation does not necessarily lead to the friendliness and trust needed for a positive move towards political integration. The tone of the broader Canada-U.S. bilateral relationship in the pre-NAFTA period was, admittedly, less than cosy. Mulroney's predecessor Pierre Trudeau attempted to reverse aspects of Canada-U.S. economic integration by announcing the National Energy Program, which was to some extent created to regain control of Canada's economy. As Jockel notes:

To the incoming Reagan administration, deeply committed to as free a flow of goods and capital across borders as possible and worried about the decay in America's global competitiveness, the NEP was almost inconceivable. Talk in Ottawa of "NEP-ing" other sectors of the Canadian economy, made matters, from the United States perspective, still worse (Jockel, 1985: 691).

Part of the problem, from Canada's point of view, was its position of environmental dependence and the lack of symmetry when dealing with the U.S. For instance, in the case of the Great Lakes, Lemarquand sums up the nature of the pre-NAFTA Canada-United States environmental relationship when he states that "the United States by the weight of its population, the use it makes of shared water resources, and the thrust of its domestic politics, dominates the boundary water relation" (Lemarquand, 1986: 225). In the late 1980s Americans outnumbered Canadians three to one around the Great Lakes Basin area. The Basin area is also an industry centre and generates about one sixth of American national income (Lemarquand, 1986: 228). The result is that the United States makes greater use of water resources in the area. But although the U.S. consumes more water resources, Great Lakes issues do not command the same attention

in Washington as they do in Ottawa (Lemarquand, 1986: 226). But with the Great Lakes commanding less political attention in Washington, Canada must rely on American domestic interest groups that are allied with Canadian interests, who then exert pressure on Congress. As Lemarquand notes, it can be argued that for Great Lakes issues like pollution or acid rain “international agreements will be as progressive as domestic American policy” (Lemarquand, 1986: 28). This makes for an asymmetrical environmental relationship and accounts for the weak levels of institutionalism found in environmental agreements. Basically, the same dynamic applied to the case of air quality. Canada’s environmental air quality was being compromised by pollution originating from areas outside of its control (Munton, 1997: 342).

Although conflict prevailed in the Canada-U.S. before NAFTA, it was eventually resolved successfully. Part of the reason for this lies in the nature of environmental politics in general and in the semi-institutionalized nature of the broader Canada-U.S. relationship. Like in the U.S.-Mexico case, the transboundary nature of environmental issues forces nations to cooperate. In the acid rain example, unilateral Canadian action would be ineffective, thus explaining the aggressive and persistent action of the Canadian government. As Munton explains:

The only feasible option is for Canada to seek American cooperation in the form of reduced emissions in the United States. And therefore, on issues such as acid rain— or, for example, water pollution in the Great Lakes—Canada pursues international agreement as a way of securing an American commitment to deal with the sources of water [that] are necessarily common problems (Munton, 1997: 343).

Yet another factor accounting for the eventual resolution of environmental conflict is the significant presence of domestic actors and NGOs involved in transboundary issues. For instance, Munton notes that the Clean Air coalition in the U.S. included not only urban

residents conscious of acid rain issues, but wilderness and conservation groups. These groups helped put acid rain on the political agenda and acted as a political force that lobbied congress (Munton, 1997; 345). The Clean Air coalition acted as an epistemic community that redefined interests on the issue of acid rain. By focusing attention on acid rain and shaping how the problem of acid rain was viewed by the U.S. public, the coalition was responsible in some part for redirecting policy to the improvement of environmental conditions.

Another factor that ensured resolution of environmental issues was the nature of the broader Canada-U.S. relationship. In contrast to the U.S.-Mexico relationship, where a history of conflict prevented institutional mechanisms from emerging, the Canada-U.S. relationship is characterized by what Jockel labels a “semi-institutionalized management structure”. Governments before and during the Mulroney-Reagan era had actively cultivated a consultative framework replete with Ministerial and Leaders meetings and a variety of contacts at the working level that recognized the growing interdependence of the two countries (Jockel, 1985: 709). Jockel explains that the consultative mechanism rested upon a continentalist approach to the relationship, a factor that can be understood in constructivist terms. Constructivism would highlight the significance of Canada and the United States’s shared understanding of a continentalist vision that acts as a backdrop to the relationship. At an early stage in their relationship Canada and the U.S. went through a process of value convergence—the construction of a shared “we”—founded on the idea that Canada and the U.S. shared a relationship that was qualitatively different than any other. Despite moments of strong tension and conflict in their environmental relationship, both countries could rely on this idea of a shared continentalist vision that

would endure the strain produced by conflict. By gauging the effect of norms and values on social interaction we can better determine the ramifications of sharing a continentalist perspective. In the U.S.-Mexico case, for example, these compatible attitudes were missing, thus preventing the emergence of a semi-institutionalized structure.

In sum, the Canada-U.S. pre-NAFTA environmental era displayed low levels of political integration, although these levels were more advanced than in the case of U.S.-Mexico. The major institution that characterizes that period, the IJC, is limited in scope and institutionally weak. The weak nature of the IJC reflects governments' adherence to territorial sovereignty principles. The IJC was intentionally created to be weak so that it would be unable to curtail governments' right to adhere to territorial sovereignty principles. In the intersubjective realm, there was also limited movement towards political integration. The dominance of the U.S. in terms of population and resource consumption placed Canada in a position of environmental dependence. This led to an asymmetrical power relation, fomenting conflict and ill feelings. However, despite the weak integrative nature of Canada-U.S. pre-NAFTA environmental era, some inroads were made. The multitude of cooperative examples and the active involvement of non-governmental actors in the area of the environment ensured that environmental problems were addressed. Additionally, the semi-institutionalized nature of the broader Canada-U.S. relationship, itself based on shared attitudes and a continentalist outlook, provided a stable foundation to ensure the resolution of conflict.

In conclusion, this chapter has pointed out that non-existent to very limited levels of political integration were found in the pre-NAFTA environmental era. For the most part, institutions were weak, cooperation was sporadic and reactive, and limited positive

movements occurred in the intersubjective arena. Instead, the pre-NAFTA environmental regime was characterized by asymmetries and bilateral relations – both factors that I sustain account for the virtually non-existent levels of political integration and lends weight to my argument that any ensuing political integration process is superimposed upon already existent patterns of communication, behaviour, and perceptions.

Nevertheless, it should be made clear that although political integration is extremely scarce in both cases, it is slightly more advanced in the Canada-U.S. case due to shared norms, ideas and values amounting to a shared “continentalist” perspective. No such approach characterizes the U.S.-Mexico case. Additionally, the Canada-U.S. environmental domain is characterized by the existence of NGOs that directly impact the political integration process, partly explaining why political integration is more advanced between Canada and the U.S. There were also no trilateral forms of cooperation and very limited Canada-Mexico cooperation. It is important to understand the features that comprise the pre-NAFTA environmental regime because, as the next chapter shows, these are the differences that the NAFTA environmental regime and the trilateral CEC will attempt to correct.

Chapter Four – The Environment and North American Political Integration in the NAFTA Era

The previous chapter focused on the Mexico-U.S. and Canada-U.S. pre-NAFTA environmental regimes. Although the rate and nature of political integration varied in each specific case study the pre-NAFTA environmental regime was, for the most part, marked by low levels of political integration. The environmental system before NAFTA was characterized by limited institutions that lacked enforcement power and public participation mechanisms. Bilateral cooperation took place, but it was usually uncoordinated with poor points of contact between stakeholders. In some cases, cooperation was a purely reactionary response to specific conditions. Trilateral cooperation between the three countries was virtually non-existent and competing sovereignties, power asymmetries, and divergent perspectives hindered cooperative efforts.

The NAFTA environmental system was created to modify and correct the deficiencies of the pre-1994 environmental regime. The North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (NACEC, or simply CEC, hereafter), the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission (BECC), and the North American Development Bank (NADBANK) were created to “strengthen, broaden, provide greater coordination and infuse greater regulatory content into what we have loosely referred to as the North American environmental management system” (Mumme, 1997-1998: 45). Perhaps the most significant difference between the pre-NAFTA and NAFTA environmental regime is the existence of trilateral institutionalized cooperation. The advent of the CEC created an institutional forum for cooperation between Canada, the U.S., and Mexico, which has altered the North American environmental space.

The purpose of this chapter is to explain whether and to what extent political integration is taking place in North America in the policy area of the environment. I argue that unlike the area of borders—where much lower levels of political integration are extant—the environmental policy domain shows moderate levels of political integration. This is the case because NAFTA institutions like the trilateral CEC introduced a new institutional framework or forum that in turn led to opportunities to modify the cognitive frameworks of principle actors. The combination of the existence of institutions with the development of more positive attitudes resulted in a greater movement toward political integration, a reduction in asymmetries, and the mitigation of disintegrative factors. In comparison, the policy area of the borders is marked by much lower levels of political integration. This is explained in part by the absence of an institutional framework that prevents political actors in Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. from addressing intersubjective differences. The lack of an institutional space in which to address border issues reinforces asymmetries and exacerbates disintegrative factors. Without this type of rule-bound space, political figures cannot interact along legitimized points of contact; they cannot confront attitudinal disharmonies or challenge pre-conceived notions of self and other. The latter are centripetal processes integral to the disruption and dismantling of disintegrative barriers.

This chapter demonstrates the relevancy that should be assigned to mediating factors like institutions and positive forms of intersubjective understandings – a point that economicist and European-based integration literature fails to capture. As I have argued, institutional and intersubjective variables play a critical role in the political integration process. As well, it should be highlighted that NAFTA did exert pressures for the creation

of an institutional framework that addressed some of the negative externalities associated with economic integration. Intensified commercial transactions affect the natural habitat and communities located in the border region. However, this does not directly result in a transference of loyalty to new supranational institutions. Indeed, as this chapter demonstrates, the new trilateral institution created to deal with environmental challenges operated strictly within the boundaries set by national governments. No supranational allegiance was visible.

In documenting the emergence of moderate levels of North American political integration in the realm of the environment, this chapter demonstrates the importance of institutions in the integration process. Institutionalists argue that the existence of institutions not only helps correct structural inefficiencies, but facilitates cooperation by strengthening the “contractual environment”. Institutions provide a space where policy actors, presumably through interacting with one another, develop more sophisticated and productive relationships. Although institutionalization is not a precondition for cooperation or even an increase in cooperation—the case study of the borders shows that cooperation can increase and flourish in the absence of institutions—it can be instrumental in its development and maturation. In the case of the policy-area of the environment, institutionalization seems sufficient to produce moderate levels of political integration. As I noted earlier, realist and economic theories fail to explain this outcome.

This chapter also shows the utility of using constructivist theory when analyzing political integration. Constructivism allows us to interrogate the processes of attitudinal change and to determine what effects these have on the mindset of political actors. For instance, in the pre-NAFTA era limited contact and cooperation between environmental

officials resulted in limited opportunities for productive discursive-shift. Institutions were weak, with extremely poor institutional design features; cooperation was sporadic, fraught by conflict, and restricted. In contrast, the NAFTA environmental era had a more advanced institutional framework, enabling the modification of cognitive frameworks. The existence of an institutional space for cooperation led to movement on the intersubjective front. Therefore, while enforcement mechanisms are weak, the existence of the CEC and other NAFTA-affiliated environmental institutions have encouraged dialogue and the development of an epistemic community on environmental issues.

Like the pre-NAFTA era, levels of political integration in the NAFTA era vary depending on which bilateral relationship is considered—the U.S. and Mexico, or the U.S. and Canada. This is because political integration in North America is mediated by the historical specificity of each bilateral relationship. Hence, in the policy area of the environment, we usually find more advanced levels of moderate political integration in the Canada-U.S. case than in the case of U.S.-Mexico. This is due to the more mature institutional context developed by Canada and the U.S., as well as their more convergent perspectives. In addition, disintegrative factors like sovereignty and domestic differences attributed to diverse political systems will generally influence the rate of political integration in the North American environmental domain.

The issues raised in this chapter are important because the environment is one of the only policy areas in North America where institutionalized trilateral cooperation exists. The CEC has created an institutional niche where the three countries can interact, which allows one to assess the barriers and obstacles to trilateral integration and how they impede or shape the nature and rate of integration.

To evaluate political integration in this policy area, I again focus on three subtypes of political integration: degree of institutionalization, degree of cooperation, and intersubjective integration. To assess institutional strength I looked at the rules and procedures that define an institution and then determine whether it is strong and capable of acting autonomously. I specifically examined the enforcement capabilities and public participation mechanisms. Institutions that do well in these categories will, ostensibly, have the strength to execute their mandates and shape policy development (Mumme and Moore, 1990: 664). Additionally, it is important to take into account the informal authority of an institution, such as its ability to generate and facilitate cooperation. To examine the cooperative elements between Canada and the U.S., Mexico and the U.S., and then trilaterally between all three, I specifically looked at cooperation practices in the NAFTA environmental regime: informal agreements, accords, memorandums of understanding, meetings, committees, workgroups and other informal activities. I then determined whether policy actors engaged in a process of policy-coordination through these practices. To evaluate intersubjective factors, I relied on interview data, which allowed me to determine whether a process of identity formation was in fact occurring. Additionally, I drew on leaders' statements, newspaper articles, and polling data in order to determine whether relevant attitudes and interests had changed over time, signalling positive shifts in the behaviour of states that could, in future, lead to stronger elements of political integration.

This chapter is composed of two sections: The first reviews the debate that led to the creation of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and its accompanying institutional framework. The second examines the composition of

the NAFTA environmental institutional structure; it evaluates political integration in the NAFTA period and assesses the impact of economic integration on institutional development.

Background on the NAFTA Environmental Regime

The announcement of a potential North American free-trade agreement and the responses this elicited from citizens and civil-society groups in each of the three countries forever changed the course of trade agreements and had a number of implications for governance in North America. Prior to the NAFTA debate, transnational links between NGOs were limited and NGOs did not immediately make the connection between trade and the environment. Indeed, even though the 1989 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) negotiations between the U.S. and Canada had caught the attention of Canadian environmental groups, there was little interest from NGOs on the U.S. side of the border (Meyar, 1998: 74). Links between U.S. and Mexican NGOs were similarly uncoordinated and U.S. NGOs had neither the contacts, nor the knowledge of Mexico in general required for the creation of a viable community (Wallace, 2001:72). But the announcement of a possible North American-wide trade agreement changed all of that, setting in motion a process of transnational cooperation between NGOs. It is worth pointing out that a potential trilateral trade agreement did not arouse similar debate in the area of border control. Indeed, one of the key differences distinguishing border-control from environmental policy is the level of public debate. The environmental area was marked by unprecedented levels of public participation from NGOs, who successfully drew links between trade and the environment. In contrast, the principle civil-society

sector interested in border-control policies were business groups, who pushed for border harmonization as a way to move goods more freely across North America.

The NAFTA negotiations, officially initiated by the Bush administration in 1990 and concluded by the Clinton administration, were highly complex. On the U.S. side, both Bush and later Clinton, described NAFTA as the greenest trade agreement in history (Wallace, 2001: 4). The Bush administration made arguments that assumed a strong environmental regime was the consequence of economic wealth. NAFTA would ostensibly generate higher incomes for Mexicans, thus enabling them to afford environmental protection. Additionally, free trade would encourage the export of environmentally friendly technology and the flow of information between countries, resulting in better environmental management (Wallace, 2001: 5). During his presidential campaign, Clinton, when pressured by Bush to state his position on the NAFTA, indicated his pro-NAFTA stance, but to appease democratic supporters he agreed to supplement the agreement with side environmental and labour agreements (Meyer, 1998: 165). Clinton questioned Bush's link between trade and the environment and sought instead to push for changes within Mexico (Wallace, 2001: 94).

The clash between NGOs and the governments of North America over a possible trade agreement began when Bush sought to obtain fast-track negotiating authority from Congress. By then, however, it was apparent that this would be no ordinary trade negotiation. Indeed, a wide array of groups had organized to oppose fast-tracking the negotiations in order to ensure that certain qualifications would be met before approval (Meyer, 1998: 68). The environmental opposition lobbied congress throughout the negotiations, and even though some of the more radical environmental organizations felt

short-changed by the supplemental environmental accord, the environmental opposition had succeeded in drawing the link between trade and the environment. Moderate ENGOs sustained that although industrialization and trade bring important economic benefits, they can adversely affect the environment. ENGOs also argued that any international agreement would pre-empt domestic laws as a consequence of national differences in environmental regulations and enforcement laws (Mayer, 1998: 74-75). NAFTA would have to ensure the protection of domestic laws and enforce environmental standards if it was going to deal with this issue.

Mexico was yet another area of concern for environmentalists. Mexico had advanced environmental legislation, but the corresponding enforcement was lax (Fox, 1995: 52-53). Mexico had few human and financial resources to address environmental concerns, a problem compounded by a legal system favouring the rights of business and development over the protection of the environment. Environmentalists argued that the nature of the Mexican system would attract businesses from the U.S. and Canada, who, in search of lax environmental standards, would then set up shop in Mexico (Fox, 1995: 52-53).

To critical ENGOs, the NAFTA debate and its environmental consequences were more about the neo-liberal model that NAFTA was based on (Hogenboom, 1999: 153-4). Critical ENGOs sustained that an equitable development model for the region should include not just environmental provisions, but a distinct political and economic order based on democracy, justice and economic redistribution (Wallace, 2001: 77). Moderate ENGOs, on the other hand, were not opposed to economic liberalization. As Wallace notes, "moderate groups accepted the NAFTA proponents' claims of the necessity for

economic liberalization and growth, or at least perceived this as inevitable and declared that economic expansion should be accompanied by environmental safeguards” (Wallace, 2001: 76).

The ideological split between environmental groups strongly influenced the outcome of the NAFTA environmental debate. The environmental coalition broke down, enabling government, especially the Bush administration, to exploit its divisions. The administration, knowing that it would never accept the conditions of critical ENGOs like the Sierra Club or Green Peace, sought to work with moderate groups that were more accepting of NAFTA (Benton, 1996: 2163- 2166).

In the end, moderate ENGOs and Clinton consented to pass NAFTA along with strengthened supplemental side-accords. They agreed to what, in its final form, became the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), a supplemental environmental accord to NAFTA and the trilateral CEC. Additionally, two institutions were created to deal with the situation along the U.S.-Mexico border: the BECC, and the NADBank. It should be mentioned that both Canada and Mexico were reluctant to consent to a supranational institution with enforcement powers (Munton and Kirton, 1997: 463). Canada feared that the induction of trade sanctions set a dangerous precedent that would provide U.S.-protectionist forces with a chance to “overwhelm the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement protection that Canada currently enjoyed” (Munton and Kirton, 1994: 71). The Mexican government was even more reluctant than Canada to negotiate an environmental accord that it felt unfairly targeted Mexico. (In their previous free trade agreement negotiations Canada and the U.S. had not negotiated an

environmental side-accord, so why should Mexico?). In the end, however, both Canada and Mexico grudgingly agreed to negotiate the accord.

Degree of Institutionalization in the NAFTA Environmental Era

In this section I will determine degree of institutionalization in the NAFTA era; I argue that overall evidence from my assessment of institutional design features—used to determine the strength of these institutions—indicates that NAFTA-era institutions demonstrate low to moderate degrees of political integration. To assess the degree of institutionalization in the NAFTA era, I examine the enforcement and public participation features of these institutions and determine whether they can act independently and autonomously of member governments. Like Kirton, I ask have they “build a strong rules-based regime that constraints the actions of member governments?” (Kirton, 1997: 461). Additionally, I ask whether there has been some institutional improvement of pre-NAFTA institutions, their role in the new NAFTA environmental system, and if this points to an increasingly coordinated North American system of environmental management.

The most important institution of the NAFTA era is the trilateral CEC. It is widely viewed as the most advanced of the NAFTA institutions. Unlike the NAFTA Free Trade Commission, the CEC is a genuine institution. As Janine Farretti, the former executive director of the CEC noted in her testimony to Canada’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade: “[The NAFTA Commission] doesn’t have a body or secretary in one place; it’s made up of sections of the three governments that get together and work together. So it’s a virtual organization in that regard...” (Standing Committee

on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002: 154). That is, the CEC is not just “an assemblage of national sections, periodically coming together as a joint institution, but a single permanent, trilateral organization (Munton and Kirton, 1994: 74). It has a physical location, an executive director, and a full-time staff with a mission and mandate that it must execute (Munton and Kirton, 1994: 74). The NAFTA Free Trade Commission and Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC) are generally viewed as much weaker institutions. The CLC, for instance, seems to command very little support from either government or labour in the three countries. On the government side, the composition of the CLC and its powers (or lack thereof) reflects “the caution of their governments” (Pastor, 2001, 75). The three countries, in other words, had no intention of creating a supranational institution. Labour groups also expressed scepticism over the CLC’s inability to assign remedial action in cases where labour abuse has been demonstrated (McKinney, 2000: 48).

The CEC is the trilateral organization created to carry out the provisions of the NAAEC, the charter designed to incorporate environmental safeguards into the NAFTA. Although other institutions were created to deal with environmental issues in the NAFTA environmental regime, like the bilateral BECC and the NADBANK, the bulk of this section will focus on the CEC, the main institution that aims at correcting the deficiencies of the pre-NAFTA environmental system.

The CEC is composed of the Council, the Secretariat, and the Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC). The Council is the governing body of the CEC and is made up of the three environmental ministers of each country. The Council is in effect the policy-making body of the CEC (Mumme and Duncan, 1997-98: 46). In addition, the

Council must also encourage the effective enforcement of environmental regulations, promote cooperation to improve regulation policies (Article 10 3-4), and make recommendations on the adoption of policies and approaches by member states (Article 10 (2)).

The Secretariat is the administrative body of the CEC and is located in Montreal, Canada. It is headed by a rotating executive director who is appointed by the Council for a three-year term (Mckinney, 2000: 93). Aside from the Director, the Secretariat is staffed by a small bureaucracy made up of representatives from each country. The Secretariat's main role is to provide "technical, administrative, and operational support to the Council and to committees and groups established by the Council" (Cited in Mumme and Duncan, 1997-98: 47). Additionally, one of the Secretariat's most important responsibilities is to publish an annual report that summarizes the CEC activities and expenses. This report reviews "to what extent each of the member countries is living up to the terms of the NAAEC, [and includes] data on how each is enforcing environmental regulations" (Mckinney, 2000: 94). The Secretariat can also assess environmental conditions in each of the member countries and can review grievances submitted by governments, organizations, or an individual who feels that a particular party is failing to enforce environmental laws (Mumme and Duncan, 1997-98: 47).

The third major component of the CEC's structure is the JPAC. The JPAC fulfils the goal of bringing public input to the work of the CEC (Mckinney, 2000: 105). It was created to ensure citizen participation in the CEC mandate and activities. The JPAC is comprised of 15 citizen members, five from each country, who represent citizens and groups concerned with North American environmental issues (Kirton, 1997: 475). The

JPAC's main function is to provide information and advice to the commission on any issue related to the agreement (Mumme and Duncan, 1997-98: 48).

Along with the three main components of the CEC, there exist additional mechanisms designed to aid the CEC in various matters. The National Advisory Committees or NACs are organizations designed to advise governments on the responses from civil society. To date, all three countries have formed NACs (Commission for Environmental Cooperation, online, 2005). Article 18 of the NAAEC also establishes Government Advisory Committees (GAC). GACs consist of representatives from federal or state/provincial governments who provide advice on the development of the agreement. To date, the U.S. is the only member nation that has formed a GAC.

The three main functions of the CEC are mandated by the NAAEC, the governing charter stipulating the tasks that the CEC is expected to carry out. For my purpose, the ten objectives of the NAAEC can be divided into three broad, principal objectives. They include setting environmental standards, enforcing environmental standards, and promoting cooperation—all with the goal of improving North American environmental conditions. I will focus largely on the issue of enforcement, one of the key areas through which the CEC achieves its main goals.

The NAAEC provides two types of enforcement action. Article 14 of the NAAEC allows the CEC secretariat to address submissions from persons or organizations in any member country who feel that one of the member countries is not enforcing its environmental regulations. Under Article 14, an NGO or interested person can petition the secretariat only if they have encountered harm from a country's non-enforcement. If, based on a report, the Secretariat finds that the complaint is valid, the accused country is

given an opportunity to respond to the charges. After receiving a response, the Secretariat then decides whether a factual record is merited. Factual records outline the details of the case, the complaints, and the results of the Secretariat's assessment (McKinney, 2000: 116).

In addition to Article 14, Article 22 Section 1 of the NAAEC gives the CEC regulatory power that allows it to impose sanctions on a country that has been accused of demonstrating "a persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce its own environmental laws" (NAAEC Article 22 (1)). Kirton explains that when one country suspects another of this offence it can initiate a complaint, which obligates the CEC Council to "establish an international arbitral panel to report, provide a remedial action plan and if necessary levy monetary funds" (Kirton, 1997: 466). Furthermore, if fines are not paid, the Council can impose trade sanctions on the violating country (*ibid.*).

The CEC's public participation mechanisms also function to ensure member governments comply with environmental rules and regulations, and live up to the provisions of the NAAEC. The JPAC ensures that citizens and groups concerned with the North American environment can voice issues and advise the Council on important environmental matters. Additionally, Article 14 also functions as a public participation instrument in that it obligates the three countries to meet the goals of the NAAEC by holding them publicly accountable.

Aside from the CEC, two other organizations addressing environmental inefficiencies of the United States-Mexico pre-NAFTA regime were created: the BECC and the NADBank. Both institutions were created in 1993 as part of NAFTA, however, they do not fall under the NAAEC. Indeed, the BECC and NADBank are in part, a result

of the major asymmetries between the U.S. and Mexico. They are strictly bilateral institutions in that they involve only Mexico and the U.S. Both institutions were created specifically to deal with environmental problems along the U.S.-Mexico border and to aid communities on both sides of the border in carrying out environmental infrastructure projects (McKinney, 2000: 161). There has been some question over the years as to whether in particular the NADBANK could be expanded to include participation from the Canadian government. This proposition is usually advanced by Mexican officials who often make the argument that the only way to alleviate illegal immigration, crime, and other forms of unlawful activity is to help Mexico achieve prosperity and reduce disparities through the allocation of regional funds (Pastor, 2001, 135). These suggestions are usually dismissed by Canadian officials who point out that Canada does not share a border with Mexico and, that it is politically unfeasible from a domestic perspective for Canada to transfer Canadian taxpayer's money to Mexico. In other words, it is not presently in Canada's interest to invest in Mexico through regional plans *a la* Europe. As such, both the BECC and NADBANK remain strictly U.S.-Mexico bilateral institutions.

The BECC and NADBANK are a direct result of some of the inadequacies of the pre-NAFTA U.S.-Mexico environmental regime. The IBWC and La Paz were viewed as having outmoded and limited mandates that, as Mumme and Pineda explain, "neglected certain issues or were overtaken by developments that changed binational priorities" (Mumme and Pineda, 2002). Heightened public awareness over the health and environmental unsustainability of the U.S.-Mexico border resulted in intensive lobbying by a cross-border coalition that saw the NAFTA debate as an opportunity to advance their agendas (Mumme and Moore, 1999: 755).

The BECC's mandate is to "promote and certify environmental infrastructure projects along the U.S.-Mexico border" (Varady et al., 1996: 90). The BECC accomplishes this goal through two functions:

- (1) to assist states, localities, and private investors in coordinating, developing, analyzing financial feasibility, analyzing socioeconomic benefits, and arranging financing for environmental infrastructure projects in the border area and 2) certifying applications for financial assistance to the NADBANK or any other financial source that may request such certification (Mumme and Moore, 1999: 760).

The BECC, rather than developing or managing projects itself, helps local communities to ameliorate environmental conditions. Thus, in essence, the BECC operates as a technical assistance organization that reviews any project that requests funding from the NADBANK (Varady et al., 1996: 91).

The BECC must ensure that projects meet particular criteria. Project sponsors must fulfil human health and environment, technical feasibility and project management, and community participation and sustainability development criteria (Varady et al., 1996: 97). To help communities meet this criteria the BECC has instituted Technical Assistance Programs that help border communities prepare proposals for BECC certification, allowing them to become eligible for funding considerations from NADBANK and others (Carter, 2001).

In addition to its certification programs the BECC has several different programs that aid communities in achieving project certification criteria: the Project Development Assistance Program (PDAF), Capacity Building Needs and Solid Waste Technical Assistance Program, the Management Trainee Program, the Sustainable Development Program, and the High Sustainability Recognition Program (McKinney, 2000: 165).

The Agreement that establishes the BECC commits it to meeting the goal of public participation. This, in part, stems from what environmentalists felt was the closed nature of past institutions. The BECC has an obligation to include public participation throughout. First, it must ensure that the public gets a chance to comment on project certification and on BECC's general guidelines and procedures (Varady et al., 1996: 94-95). The BECC must also hold a minimum of four public meetings annually in order to ensure public accessibility. One other way of ensuring that public participation goals are met is to integrate the public into its programs. For instance, every project must fulfil public participation criteria by ensuring community participation, thus project leaders must submit a community participation plan if they wish to acquire certification (Mumme and Pineda, 2002)

BECC is composed of a Board of Directors, a General Manager and an Advisory Council. The Board of Directors is made up of five members from each country and includes the national coordinators of each country's environmental ministries and its IBWC Commissioners—the latter members are non-voting. The Board also includes three voting members from each country, a member of the border public, one from a border municipality, and one representative of a border state (Mumme and Moore, 1999: 670).

The NADBank is the other bilateral institution that came out of the NAFTA regime. The NADBank works with the BECC to deal with environmental infrastructure at the United States-Mexico border (McKinney, 2000: 168). Its main objective is to fund environmental infrastructure projects related to water supply, waste water management and solid waste management projects certified by the BECC. There are two main ways

that the NADBANK provides communities with capital to fund infrastructure projects. The NADBANK can give out grants from its limited Border Environmental Infrastructure Fund (BEIF), or through loans. As of 2001, the U.S. and Mexican governments had donated a total of \$304 million in paid-in capital to the NADBANK. However, when combined with NADBANK's callable capital—the lending capacity of the NADBANK is approximately \$2 billion—this \$304 million sum seems rather paltry (Kourous, 2000).

The NADBANK Board of Directors is composed of three U.S. members and three Mexican, with a chair that alternates between both countries. The U.S. members are the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Treasury, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administrator. The Mexican members are the Secretary of Finance and Public Credit, Secretary of Social Development, and the Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development (Browne, 1996)

The three institutions discussed above make up the NAFTA environmental regime. The CEC is by far the most developed of the North American institutions and is often pointed to as an example of how future institutions should be structured in the North American context. Formally, it has genuine supranational characteristics that empower it to override the authority of national governments (Mumme & Duncan, 1997-98: 49). Additionally, institutional design features like those related to its mandate, regulatory and enforcement powers, and public participation mechanisms also contribute to its highly institutionalized nature. Thus, as Kirton and Munton note:

It also marks a step toward organizational and procedural supranational governance on the broader North American continent through the establishment of an international organization with potentially important majority voting provisions, and perhaps sufficient provisions for public participation to create a new centre of political activity and legitimacy on the continent (Munton and Kirton, 1994: 69).

For example, the environmental charter that governs the CEC, the NAAEC, endows the CEC with various enforcement authorities that give it the appearance of having genuine supranational characteristics capable of overriding state sovereignty. Enforcement provisions like Article 14 and Article 22 Section (1) obligate member countries to enforce their own environmental laws and regulations (Kirton, 1997: 468). Additionally, the CEC has a large public participation component. Through Article 14 submissions and JPAC, the public is given direct access to the process, which allows an avenue for raising concerns. These supranational qualities are important because, according to integration theories, these are what define an institution as strong. The ability to exercise independence, the ability to constrain the actions of member governments through enforcement, and the allowance of public participation all suggest a high level of institutionalism.

Despite the CEC's apparent institutional strength, a closer look at it reveals deficiencies in the area of enforcement. For instance, when examining Article 14 submissions Mckinney observes that:

For those who expected the NAAEC to greatly improve environmental conditions in North America or to cause much more stringent enforcement of environmental laws, the functioning of the CEC must be a disappointment.... In only two cases have factual records been developed, and in only one of those has the factual record been made public. Even in the case in which the factual record was made public, it contained not a single recommendation (Mckinney, 2000: 116).

A glance at Table 4.1, which contains all CEC submissions from 1995 until 2004, supports Mckinney's claim.

Table 5.1 CEC Submissions

	Party Concerned	Date Filed	Status	Latest Update
AAA Packaging	Canada	12/04/2001	Terminated	The thirty-day term expired without the Secretariat receiving a submission that conformed to Article 14(1). Under guideline 6.2, the process was therefore terminated.
Aage Tottrup	Canada	20/03/1996	Closed	The thirty-day term expired without the Secretariat receiving new or supplemental information from submitter(s). Under guideline 8.1, the process was therefore terminated
Alca - Iztapalapa	Mexico	25/11/2002	Closed	The thirty-day term expired without the Secretariat receiving a submission that conformed to Article 14(1). Under guideline 6.2, the process was therefore terminated.
Alca - Iztapalapa II	Mexico	17/06/2003	Open	The Secretariat received a response from the concerned government Party and began considering whether to recommend a factual record.
Aquanova	Mexico	20/10/1998	Closed	The final factual record was publicly released.
BC Hydro	Canada	2/04/1997	Closed	The final factual record was publicly released.
BC Logging	Canada	15/03/2000	Closed	The final factual record was publicly released.
BC Mining	Canada	29/06/1998	Closed	The final factual record was publicly released
Biodiversity	Canada	21/07/1997	Closed	The thirty-day term expired without the Secretariat receiving a submission that conformed to Article 14(1). Under guideline 6.2, the process was therefore terminated.
CEDF	Canada	26/05/1997	Closed	The thirty-day term expired

				without the Secretariat receiving a submission that conformed to Article 14(1). Under guideline 6.2, the process was therefore terminated.
Cozumel	Mexico	17/01/1996	Closed	The final factual record was publicly released.
Cytrar I	Mexico	11/08/1998	Closed	The Secretariat determined not to recommend the preparation of a factual record. Under guideline 9.6, the process was terminated.
Cytrar II	Mexico	14/02/2001	Closed	The Council voted not to instruct the Secretariat to prepare a factual record.
Cytrar III	Mexico	15/08/2003	Open	The Secretariat received a response from the concerned government Party and began considering whether to recommend a factual record.
Dermet	Mexico	14/06/2001	Closed	The thirty-day term expired without the Secretariat receiving a submission that conformed to Article 14(1). Under guideline 6.2, the process was therefore terminated.
El Boludo Project	Mexico	23/08/2002	Open	The Secretariat informed Council that the Secretariat considers that the submission warrants development of a factual record.
Environmental Pollution in Hermosillo	Mexico	14/07/2004	Open	The Secretariat notified the submitter(s) that the submission did not meet all of the Article 14(1) criteria and the submitter(s) had 30 days to provide the Secretariat with a revised submission that conforms with Article 14(1).
Fort Huachuca	United States	14/11/1996	Closed	Under guideline 14.2, the Secretariat proceeded no further with the submission.
Gasoline Spill	Mexico	7/09/2004	Open	The Secretariat

in Tehuantepec				acknowledged receipt of a submission and began a preliminary analysis of it under the guidelines.
Great Lakes	United States	28/05/1998	Closed	The Secretariat determined not to recommend the preparation of a factual record. Under guideline 9.6, the process was terminated.
Guadalajara	Mexico	9/01/1998	Closed	The Secretariat determined that the revised submission did not meet the Article 14(1) criteria and terminated the process under guideline 6.3.
Hazardous Waste in Arteaga	Mexico	27/01/2004	Open	The Secretariat determined that the submission met the criteria of Article 14(1) and requested a response from the concerned government Party in accordance with Article 14(2).
Home Port Xcaret	Mexico	14/05/2003	Closed	The thirty-day term expired without the Secretariat receiving a submission that conformed to Article 14(1). Under guideline 6.2, the process was therefore terminated
Jamaica Bay	United States	2/03/2000	Closed	The thirty-day term expired without the Secretariat receiving a submission that conformed to Article 14(1). Under guideline 6.2, the process was therefore terminated
Lake Chapala	Mexico	10/101997	Closed	The Secretariat determined not to recommend the preparation of a factual record. Under guideline 9.6, the process was terminated.
Lake Chapala II	Mexico	25/05/2003	Open	The Secretariat received a response from the concerned government Party and began considering whether to recommend a factual record.
Logging Rider	United	30/08/1995	Closed	The thirty-day term expired

	States			without the Secretariat receiving a submission that conformed to Article 14(1). Under guideline 6.2, the process was therefore terminated.
Metales y Derivados	Mexico	23/10/1998	Closed	The final factual record was publicly released.
Methanex	United States	18/10/1999	Closed	The Secretariat determined to proceed no further because the matter is the subject of a pending judicial or administrative proceeding.
Mexico City Airport	Mexico	7/02/2002	Closed	The Secretariat determined not to recommend the preparation of a factual record. Under guideline 9.6, the process was terminated
Migratory Birds	United States	19/11/1999	Closed	The final factual record was publicly released.
Molymex I	Mexico	27/01/2000	Closed	The thirty-day term expired without the Secretariat receiving a submission that conformed to Article 14(1). Under guideline 6.2, the process was therefore terminated.
Molymex II	Mexico	6/04/2000	Open	The Secretariat submitted a final factual record to Council for Council's vote on whether to make the final factual record publicly available.
Montreal Technoparc	Canada	14/08/2003	Open	The Secretariat placed a work plan on its web site or otherwise made it available to the public and stakeholders.
Neste Canada	United States	21/01/2000	Closed	The Secretariat determined to proceed no further because the matter is the subject of a pending judicial or administrative proceeding.
Oldman River I	Canada	9/09/1996	Closed	The Secretariat determined not to recommend the preparation of a factual record. Under guideline 9.6,

				the process was terminated.
Oldman River II	Canada	4/10/1997	Closed	The final factual record was publicly released.
Oldman River III	Canada	10/09/2004	Open	The Secretariat acknowledged receipt of a submission and began a preliminary analysis of it under the guidelines.
Ontario Logging	Canada	6/02/2002	Open	The Secretariat posted a request for information relevant to the factual record on its web site.
Ontario Power Generation	Canada	1/05/2003	Closed	The Secretariat determined not to recommend the preparation of a factual record. Under guideline 9.6, the process was terminated.
Ortiz Martinez	Mexico	14/10/1997	Closed	The Secretariat determined that the revised submission did not meet the Article 14(1) criteria and terminated the process under guideline 6.3.
Pulp and Paper	Canada	8/05/2002	Open	The Secretariat posted a request for information relevant to the factual record on its web site.
Quebec Hog Farms	Canada	9/04/1997	Closed	The Council voted not to instruct the Secretariat to prepare a factual record.
Rio Magdalena	Mexico	15/03/1997	Closed	The final factual record was publicly released.
Spotted Owl	United States	30/06/1995	Closed	The Secretariat determined not to request a response from the concerned government Party. Under guideline 8.1, the process was therefore terminated.
Tarahumara	Mexico	9/06/2000	Open	The Secretariat posted a request for information relevant to the factual record on its web site.

Of the 46 submissions filed since the inception of NAAEC, only nine produced a factual record. However, even if this number had been higher, there is no guarantee that matters

would be any different. A factual record is a report that simply clarifies the facts of the particular case in question. It makes no recommendations, and even if it did, these recommendations would be in no way binding.

Similarly, Article 22 Section (1) is also weak. To date, no disputes have been filed under Article 22 and it is probable that none ever will be. In testimony before Canada's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, environmental expert Pierre Marc Johnson explained why Article 22 Section (1) provisions were likely to remain unused:

These provisions have not had to be applied up to now because they're...tantamount to a nuclear "press the red button". If you say you're going to challenge a country's behaviour, when it comes to implementing its own environmental legislation, by saying that it's systematically not doing its job, you're pretty close to a declaration of commercial war here before you go to sanctions (Johnson Cited in Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002: 154).

It is difficult to imagine even a hypothetical case where the U.S. government would be outvoted by a Canadian-Mexican majority. As Munton and Kirton note: "it is more likely that any prospective Canadian-Mexican majority would be exercised in the discretion of supporting national prerogatives and governmental discretion given the even greater sensitivity about sovereignty...in the two smaller NAFTA countries" (Munton and Kirton, 1994: 75).

On closer scrutiny, public participation mechanisms also show signs of deficiency. In principle, the NAAEC ensures a major public participation component through the JPAC. JPAC members represent different sectors of the public in each country and they advise the Council on North American environmental matters. Ostensibly, this provides interested members of the public with a direct avenue to voice their concerns. JPAC members are selected by their governments in Mexico and Canada,

however, and appointed by the president in the case of the U.S., This casts a reasonable degree of doubt on whether the public is actually represented. It is not at all difficult to imagine a situation in which governments select a representative for her allegiance, rather than her ability to give the best advice (Sanchez, 2002: 1388). Further, there is no obligation to act on public concerns, as Lorie Frigerio, the NAFTA coordinator at the U.S. EPA noted in an interview I conducted on 24 April 2002 :

There's no obligation to do what the public wants, but there [is] public pressure...To the extent that other countries agree on that particular topic—is U.S. is the problem and you got Canada and Mexico agreeing and you got a big public as well at that meeting it's going to have some impact politically.

Issues of information accessibility also weaken the CEC's public consultation mechanisms. For instance, many groups who submit a complaint under Article 14 are clearly disadvantaged in terms of access to information. Peasants and border farmers do not have ready access to documentation, computers, or telephones, making it difficult for them to submit a successful complaint (Wilder, 2000: 889). Additionally, the CEC does not provide the necessary structures (e.g. legal and support services) that disadvantaged groups need to plea their case (Herzog, 2000: 983).

The BECC and NADBank fared even more poorly in the institutional front, reflecting their relative youth as institutions and their uncertain, tenuous futures. Indeed, recent debate over the expansion of the NADBank challenges their role in the North American environmental regime and highlights a number of issues that point to their weakness as institutions.

In March 2002, President Bush approved a reform scheme that aimed to increase the financing capacity of the NADBank, which extends the reach of both it and its sister organization the BECC. In April 2004, President Bush signed into law H. R. 254, which

authorized the implementation of those amendments proposed two years earlier. The recommended changes were also passed by the Mexican Senate in April of 2003 (North American Development Bank online, 2005). The legislation is the culmination of a broader movement by both the U.S. and Mexican governments, NGOs, and community groups to increase the effectiveness of each institution. While it is still too early to tell whether the mandated reforms will strengthen the institutionality of BECC and NADBank, the ensuing debate and some of the proposed changes reflect issues that threaten their effectiveness and sustainability. For instance, one of the key recommendations for improvement involved expanding the geographical scope and capacity of both institutions. The charter governing BECC and NADBank mandates that they deal with water infrastructure issues within a 100 kilometre-wide zone on each side of the U.S.-Mexico border. The institutions do not look at environmental infrastructure problems associated with air quality, nor are they responsible for the clean-up of hazardous waste sites. Mumme and Moore suggest that part of the problem lies with the fact that the BECC is a reactive rather than proactive agency: “[I]t has little capacity to plan or set the agenda for environmental improvements for the border region at large, no regulatory authority, and no structural adjustment capacity beyond what might be indirectly achieved through its projects (Mumme & Moore, 1999: 761). Presently, under the new mandate, BECC and NADBank are given an expanded jurisdiction, allowing them to address the environment and health of communities within 100 kilometres from the U.S. border and 300 kilometres from the Mexican border (U.S. Department of State online, 2005).

Another issue indicating weak levels of institutional strength are the limited funding capacities of the BECC and NADBank. The BECC is a resource-poor institution with a relatively small operating fund. The fund is adequate to sustain internal activities, but severely limits the scope of BECC's programming. As such, it can only certify projects for funding consideration by the NADBank (Mumme and Moore, 1999: 767). The NADBank, in comparison, has a much larger funding capacity. Before the amendments, NADBank had a total paid-in capital of \$450 million and a total lending capacity of nearly \$3 billion. As of December 2002, however, NADBank had only approved nine projects totalling \$24 million and distributed \$11 million in loans (108th Congress Report, House of Representatives). Put simply, NADBank is a tight-fisted organization. But the severity of the need for infrastructure along the U.S.-Mexico border continues to grow. To remedy NADBank's financing situation, new legislation passed in April 2004 increased NADBank's ability to extend affordable financing by extending "its Low Interest Rate Lending Facility from \$50-\$100 million and [permits NADBank] to make grants and concessions out of its paid-in capital" (North American Development Bank online, 2005).

BECC and NADBank have also had problems with public participation mechanisms. In the case of BECC, these deficiencies have been present since its inception. Early on and behind closed doors its board of directors decided to adopt "restrictive rules of procedure governing public interaction with BECC" (Graves, 1999). The rules state that citizens interested in raising concerns at public meetings must make BECC officials aware of their intentions 15 days prior to the meeting. Additionally, the

Board can determine who can or cannot speak. Linda Taylor, the U.S. official who cast the official “no” vote against this rule, maintains the following:

...the rules contradicted promises that BECC would promote unprecedented public involvement and transparent decision-making. The rules “do not facilitate, and could in fact be used to substantially curtail, public participation”(cited in Graves, 1999).

Admittedly, BECC has incorporated an unprecedented degree of public participation in its proceedings if one allows for its youth as an organization, but critics maintain that more can be done to increase the quality of outreach to the public and the quality of compliance with project-certification community requirements (Mumme and Pineda, 2002). The NADBank has received the brunt of the criticism due to its inaccessible structure that incorporates little public participation. NADBank board meetings are closed to the public and decisions are based on “economic and financial considerations” (Mumme and Pineda, 2002). Its modified charter attempts to remedy this by requiring NADBank to hold at least two public meetings annually (North American Development Bank online, 2005).

To be sure, the sister institutions’ reformed mandate is supposed to address many of these institutional deficiencies. But it remains to be seen if these changes will have real effects along the U.S.-Mexico border.

Overall, after using factors like enforcement capabilities and public participation mechanisms to gauge whether these new NAFTA institutions have created a strong rule-based regime—a regime capable of limiting the actions of member governments—one must conclude that these are weak institutions in terms of formal authority and organizational capabilities (Kirton, 1997:461). This failure should not be surprising. These institutions were, after all, ornamental to the more fundamental process of securing

domestic support for NAFTA; they were concessions made to placate opposition and are in no way evidence of a “fundamentally enduring commitment to environmental values on the part of the three governments” (Kirton, 1997: 480). Governments had no real intention of creating a strong institution that could act as a new centre of political activity or limit the sovereignty of national governments. As a consequence, the CEC, for instance, is unable to act independently from governments. Mumme and Duncan echo this point by illustrating the extent to which the CEC has been micro-managed by various government bodies who subject the CEC to a large degree of interference. (Mumme and Duncan, 1997-1998: 50). For instance, both NACs and GACs are designed to provide advice on CEC issues and to keep Council members informed and aware of CEC activities. The Intergovernmental Body of Alternative Representatives (IBAR) also operates in a similar manner. Assisting IBAR is the General Standing Committee (GSC), comprised of a variety of senior and mid-level officials from the three countries. The GSC plays a direct role in the functioning of the CEC, acting as a go-between for the Secretariat and member nations. The existence of these governmental bodies has meant that federal actors are able to interact with the CEC Secretariat more frequently than their role on the Council provides for. Beyond some of the federal actors that participate directly in the process, sub-federal actors are also involved in the process. Provincial or state actors have significant jurisdiction on environmental issues and therefore seek to influence CEC activities directly. Sub-federal actors are interested in defending their jurisdiction and interests and can accordingly provide significant resistance to some CEC activities (Mumme and Duncan, 1997: 51).

Nevertheless, despite faring poorly when evaluated according to organizational design, the NAFTA institutions did achieve some degree of success. For instance, in the few years since their existence, new NAFTA-based institutions like the BECC and NADBank have improved the environmental management capacity of the pre-NAFTA institutions and represent an improvement in terms of institutional strength. As Wallace maintains:

The BECC and NADBank have brought environmental infrastructure projects to dozens of border communities, benefiting more than 6 million people in the border region in communities that previously lacked the administrative or financial capacity to build and manage such systems. No other institutions, public or private, have been able to provide such benefits to border communities (Wallace, 2001: 163).

For instance, by March of 2005 105 projects had been certified by BECC. These projects have made some gains in improving the health and well being of communities along the border. BECC has also improved pre-NAFTA public-participation mechanisms. The founding agreement of BECC and NADBank obligates BECC to share information with the public on all projects that request assistance or certification; the BECC is required to allow the public a chance to comment on its general guidelines and is expected to receive complaints from groups impacted by a BECC project. In addition, the BECC certification process requires projects to incorporate community involvement to achieve certification (Mumme and Pineda, 2002). These commitments to public participation address the lack of public accessibility in the old regime. Even the constitution of the BECC board demonstrates its commitment to public participation issues. The Board of Directors represents regional interests by including provisions for state, local and public participation (Mumme and Moore, 1999: 761).

Finally, the BECC and NADBank institutional framework has forever altered the way U.S.-Mexico institutions manage water issues. The IBWC is now more aware of the public's environmental concerns and it now faces increasing pressure to respond to citizen based concerns (Mumme and Moore, 1999: 763). The treaty that established the IBWC does not require the inclusion of the public in decision-making procedures or even take public concerns into account. But more recently, the fact that IBWC Commissioners serve on the BECC board has forced it to re-examine the role of the public. For instance, the US section of the IBWC has adopted a plan that focuses on public participation. As Mumme and Pineda state: "Its statement of 'Organizational Values' emphasizes Performance Values stipulating "responsiveness to the needs of all stakeholders" and Process values that include 'openness and trust in all relationships' and 'participative goal setting with decisions made at the lowest practical level' (USIBWC cited in Mumme and Pineda, 2002: 9).

These advances indicate that the new NAFTA-based institutions like the CEC and BECC do represent some improvement over the old pre-NAFTA institutions. The CEC, for example, provides the first institutionalized trilateral space in which the three countries can interact. In addition, many of the new institutions like the BECC have expanded mandates, enabling them to address new environmental challenges facing the border region. Furthermore, the new institutions have more sophisticated public-participation mechanisms that allow for the inclusion of citizen concerns. These advancements indicate that despite a weak institutional structure, a low to medium level of institutionalism exists in the NAFTA environmental regime.

Degree of Cooperation in the NAFTA Environmental Era

The above discussion of NAFTA-based institutions indicated that, although defined weak according to institutional tenets, other features show evidence of low to medium levels of institutionalism in the NAFTA era. This should result in increased opportunities for cooperation. To evaluate environmental cooperation in the NAFTA era, I examined: First, the levels of cooperation that new NAFTA institutions like CEC, BECC and the NADBANK, have enabled. Second, I examine the links between the institutions from the old regime like the IJC or IBWC and the new NAFTA institutions. This allows me to assess whether a genuine, coordinated North American system of environmental management exists. I found that, despite a low-medium degree of institutionalism, a high level of cooperation exists in the NAFTA regime. This can be explained by the fact that NAFTA institutions have created a formal structure of interaction where countries and civil societies have the opportunity to develop sophisticated networks of communication, thus creating more favourable conditions for cooperation.

Environmental officials that I interviewed and environmental scholars agree that cooperation levels have reached an all-time high in the NAFTA era, showing a marked improvement from the pre-NAFTA era. For instance, Mark Spalding of the University of California, San Diego feels that “today there is cooperation. I have seen a dramatic growth in increased cooperation between governments, especially at the federal level” (Quoted in Carter, 2001: 74). Similarly, environmental scholar Stephen Mumme of Colorado State University speaks of an increase in U.S.-Mexico cooperation in the NAFTA era:

We’ve seen considerable institutional development coupled with the growth of citizen interest and public participation to include a growing

number of groups, organizations, and programs dealing with environmental concerns in the border region (Mumme cited in Carter, 1999: 2).

Environmental officials interviewed in Canada, Mexico and the U.S. echoed this point. For instance, in an interview I conducted on 09 September 2002, Bill Nitze, Assistant Administrator for International Activities from 1994-2001 at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency comments on the cooperation induced by the CEC:

It has certainly increased interaction among environmental officials and I hope through the JPAC it has increased interaction among non-governmental organizations as well. My sense is that it has helped. I think the CEC has provided a forum for them to think collectively about the environment and North America in a way that they had not otherwise. Before it was all bilateral.

In an interview with the author on 20 July 2002, Victor Shantora, who was acting director of CEC in 2002, also commented on the growth of cooperation and on the fact that other non-NAFTA countries will ask the CEC for its expertise when “making the case with their own country”. He observes:

Absolutely through these cooperation mechanisms like task forces, working groups and that sort of thing, the degree of cooperation has grown. We now find that [other] countries will ask us to do things and coordinate things since we can do things that they can't or we say things about environmental issues and how pressing they are that helps them make the case with their own country because an outside party is telling them that there are issues here.

Deepening cooperation is one of the main goals of the CEC. The CEC recognizes that encouraging and advancing cooperation between the three member countries is critical to improving North American environmental conditions. Through public consultations in the three countries and through its own experimentation in the area of cooperation the CEC sustains that the best method of deepening cooperation is through advancing two specific functions: public participation and capacity building. Thus as the 2002-2004

North American Agenda for Action states: “NAAEC embodies the commitment and belief that environmental protection and conservation efforts are enhanced and multiplied through strong mechanisms for public participation” (North American Agenda for Action, 2002-2004: 3). For instance, working in partnership with NGOs, community groups, scientific experts, academics, business groups, and governmental actors has numerous positive effects. First, bringing together various stakeholders helps create a shared comprehension of key environmental issues, which in turn facilitates arriving at solutions for complex problems (North American Agenda For Action, 2002-2004: 1). Second, by convening diverse groups in a shared space the CEC builds communication links among them that result in more effective answers. Third, “network building” between the various groups “will help build capacity” (North American Agenda for Action, 2002-2004: 2).

Capacity building is a particularly important focus for the CEC due to the inclusion of a ‘developing’ country in the agreement. The CEC understands that “lasting environmental protection and conservation strategies can only be sustained by building national capacities to design, implement and maintain the policies and measures that are adopted in the region” (North America Agenda For Action, 2002-2004: 3). Helping Mexico build capacity is critical in addressing environmental problems that spill over like, for example, those of long-range atmospheric pollutants. Canada and the U.S.’s efforts to address these problems would be futile without the participation of Mexico (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002: 155). Consequently, the CEC has focused much of its efforts in Mexico. The CEC focuses on training activities, educational programs, scientific exchange, and etcetera. The efforts

seem to be paying off. For instance, in 1996 Mexico began to develop an information system to evaluate environmental compliance programs at national, regional, and local levels. In 1999 the Sistema de Seguimiento de la Aplicación de la Normatividad Ambiental (SSANA) (Environmental, Enforcement, Monitoring System) was established. SSANA is an environmental information system that provides up-to-date data on environmental pollution problems, and the mechanisms in place to remedy them. In addition, SSANA has a section in which community complaints are filed and actions undertaken with regards to these complaints (Wallace, 2001: 135). Mexico is also working on an environmental compliance index that will remedy environmental enforcement and monitoring shortfalls. The index's purpose is to provide a more accurate evaluation of compliance efforts. As well, it informs the public about the level of environmental compliance. It includes data pertaining to industry by sector, pollutant types, and the legal obligations accompanying them (Wallace, 2001: 135).

The CEC's four programs—Conservation of Biodiversity, Pollutants & Health, Environment, Economy & Trade, and Law and Policy—are the main mechanisms through which cooperation takes place. Each program has specific goals that are achieved through specific projects, but these projects are expected to accomplish the broader goals of public participation and capacity building, with the overall goal of deepening cooperation. Concrete examples of cooperation propelled by the work programs include:

Environment, Economy and Trade

- Trade in Environmentally-Preferable Goods and Services
- Assessing the Environmental Effects of Trade
- Financing in Support of Environmental Protection and Conservation

Conservation of Biodiversity

- Strategic and Cooperative Action for the Conservation of Biodiversity in North America
- North American Bird Conservation Initiative
- Terrestrial Species of Common Conservation Concern
- Marine Species of Common Conservation Concern
- North American Marine Protected Areas Network
- Closing the Pathways of Aquatic Invasive Species across North America
- North American Biodiversity Information Network

Pollutants and Health

- Cooperation on North American Air Quality Issues
- North American Pollutant Release and Transfer Register
- Capacity Building for Pollution Prevention
- Children's Health and the Environment in North America
- Sound Management of Chemicals

Law and Policy

- Environmental Management Systems to Promote Compliance and Environmental Performance
- Comparative Report on Environmental Standards
- Environmentally Sound Management and Tracking of Hazardous Waste
- Enforcement and Compliance Cooperation
- Sustainable Use and Conservation of Freshwater in North America (Commission for Environmental Cooperation online, 2005).

BECC and NADBank have also expanded zones of cooperation. The BECC, for instance, created the EPA's Border Environmental Infrastructure Fund (BEIF) and the 1997 NADBank–EPA agreement gave the NADBank jurisdiction to manage the BEIF. BECC and NADBank have also established programs that strengthen border utilities' capacities. Also in 1997 BECC created the Project Development Assistance Program to provide assistance for groups seeking certification. Similarly, in 1997 NADBank created

the Institutional Development Cooperation Program (IDCP) to assist public utilities in becoming more effective. By October 2000, IDCP had assisted 71 communities in a total of 98 projects (Carter, 2001). In 1998 the NADBank established the Utility Management Institute “to train the border region’s utility professionals in long term utility organization, administration, finance and management” (Carter, 2001).

Another example of cooperation propelled by NAFTA and related institutions is citizen or NGO participation in the environmental arena, particularly in Mexico. Wallace notes that a wave of citizen participation is slowly transforming Mexican politics, thanks in some part to the NAFTA:

The NAFTA, arguably, can be credited with embarking a process of opening Mexico to global influences and encouraging the formation of watchdog citizen groups to monitor and evaluate the social and environmental aspect of Mexico’s economic shift (Wallace, 2001: 175).

Wallace goes on to say that before NAFTA, the Mexican government still undertook public manipulation exercises in order to better the government’s image. But NAFTA and its associated institutions have added a level of transparency to the process that exposed the Mexican decision-making process and holds the Mexican government more accountable (Wallace, 2001: 175). For instance, the ESSA/Mitsubishi example demonstrates the increased level of environmental activism present in Mexico. At the time, the Zedillo administration was advancing an industrial project that would expand governmental coffers by millions of dollars annually. Mexican NGOs along with other international NGOs launched a five-year campaign to put a stop to the process. In 2000 Zedillo responded to NGO concerns and halted the process. Zedillo did not want to risk revealing the huge gap between official Mexican environmental policy and what actually occurred in practice (Wallace, 2001: 178). Mexican NGOs, through the use of the

internet, the media, and concerted action with international NGOs, had managed to force the government to reverse its decision. What is especially significant about this example is that before NAFTA, this issue would never have even made it to the media. Instead, it would have quickly been suppressed by corrupt government practices.

Aside from cooperation propelled by the new NAFTA institutions, there also existed new instances of cooperation altogether. One of the major examples is the Border XXI program. The program has its roots in the 1983 La Paz Agreement. Border XXI expanded La Paz's work groups from six to nine to include environmental information resources, environmental health, and natural resources work groups (Carter, 2001). These groups meet on an individual basis and then convene annually at a general meeting. Border XXI's primary goal is to promote sustainable development in the U.S.-Mexico border region by incorporating public participants, devolving authority to local institutions, and through inter-agency cooperation (Water and Sustainable Development Report, 2000).

Border XXI has been hailed as a successful example of improved bilateral cooperation. As Mumme notes, "there is little doubt that federal bilateral interactions have increased and intensified under the Border XXI mantle in the 1990s." Mumme goes on to state that the program has led to a doubling of agencies involved in environmental issues and has provided a much more institutionalized approach to the treatment of environmental challenges at the border (Carter, 2001).

Another way to examine cooperation in the NAFTA period is to assess the linkages between NAFTA and pre-NAFTA institutions. Links and cooperation efforts between diverse institutions that make up the North American environmental regime are

important in an era marked by limited funding and a lack of political commitment to environmental issues. Additionally, when links appear between the various environmental agencies, a coordinated system of environmental management begins to emerge, which signals an increasingly integrated system; a system, moreover, that is necessary to address judiciously the serious environmental problems in the post-NAFTA era.

One such linkage is that between the IBWC, BECC and NADBank. BECC is dependant on NADBank and IBWC for project implementation and approval (Mumme and Moore, 1999: 760). For instance, IBWC Commissioners serve as ex-officio voting representatives on BECC's board of directors. BECC's board members recommend whether projects are accepted or rejected (*ibid.*, 765). In addition, projects that have water-related issues require IBWC oversight and, on some occasions, even management (Mumme and Moore, 1999: 766). Agency interdependence between IBWC and BECC also runs in the opposite direction. Mumme and Moore note that the BECC and Border XXI process has led the IBWC to prioritize non-traditional environmental concerns in water management. For instance, the IBWC now occupies a supporting role in domestic water infrastructure development while still grappling with core treaty mandated issues. The Commission now supervises the activities of domestic water facilities in Douglas-Aqua Prieta, Ambos Naco and Mexicali (Mumme, 2001). The IBWC is also more involved in the activities of the Border XXI Program Water Work Groups. Additionally, the IBWC has been compelled to integrate the concerns of non-traditional groups when addressing policy matters as a result of its work with the BECC and Border XXI.

Mumme and Moore explain that this has persuaded the IBWC to consider more cooperative relationships with local communities (Mumme and Moore, 1999: 769).

Cooperation within the North American environmental regime is, however, not without discontents. First, the NAFTA environmental regime does not yet represent a fully coordinated and integrated system of environmental management. Despite progress made in this area, an effort to avoid duplication between the various agencies and to avoid serious turf wars has weakened links between institutions, although a few do exist. The IJC was instructed by the Canadian and American governments to clarify the roles between the CEC and IJC. Both play a central role in environmental affairs in North America. In an IJC response to a request for proposals on how to best assist governments to meet the challenges of the 21st century the IJC expressed concern over duplication between the two agencies. The IJC feels that CEC initiatives in the area of water management have a significant impact on its own activities. For example, the CEC undertook a study of water management at both the Canada-United States border and the Mexico-United States border. In its report the IJC outlines the bilateral nature of the work that the trilateral CEC is undertaking and states the inappropriateness of CEC actions in this domain. The report states that the IJC must be left to handle transboundary environmental cooperation issues on its own, while the CEC should focus on trilateral issues (The IJC and 21st Century online, 2003). The report stipulates that the IJC and CEC are pursuing discussions that will establish a cooperative relationship, however, this is as far as cooperation has gone.

The lack of cooperation between the IJC and CEC is mirrored in other cooperative situations between the institutions of the North American environmental regime.

Problems in terms of cooperation are also visible in the various work program areas. Both the CEC and Border XXI work groups experienced varying degrees of success depending on the nature of the work group at hand. For instance, in an interview I conducted 22 August 2002, Rita Cerutti of Canada's Environment Canada commented on the positive nature of cooperation, but stressed that levels varied between the different programs:

It depends on the meeting and topic. In general I would say [cooperation is] positive, but it's very much topic-specific. In the area of biodiversity the meetings have been positive. [The] tone is positive. In the trade, economy and environment area, it has taken a while. Initially when we started discussions, I wouldn't say there was a lot of trust, but it was very cordial. Countries had specific positions involving trade and the environment. There may be those who don't want to talk about mixing trade with the environment. I think we have moved to a point in that area where people have interacted a lot more in the three countries. There is more respect and there is a greater willingness to do cooperative work in that area. In Pollutants and Health, maybe it was the people that were involved in those meetings. [They were] excellent. They established a really good rapport with the help of the CEC. They made the SMOC program into one of the most successful programs anywhere in terms of how you can cooperate and achieve results on a regional scale. Good will, a lot of trust, and three countries with different needs and view points. In the Law and Policy area—by nature, enforcement people were very cautious in the beginning...Participation in the Wildlife and Enforcement area—where they have a lot of training, [have done] a lot of capacity building[, and] a lot of work with Mexico—they have really developed the relationship between the three countries. We wouldn't have chatted...if it had not been for the CEC. So trust between the three countries has really gone up...in this area. So, in general [the experience has been] very positive.

Progress on Border XXI resembles the CEC situation. Some Border XXI work groups have barely met. They are required to meet once a year but additional meetings are not mandated, thus some groups simply don't make the effort to meet and have not progressed past the collection of information and problem identification stage (Carter, 2001) 3).

As in the U.S.-Mexico pre-NAFTA era, another barrier to effective cooperation is the structure of the Mexican political system. The highly centralized Mexican political system makes the development of regional and locally based approaches, which are often necessary to address regional and locally based environmental problems, extremely difficult. Indeed, with the five year Border XXI program in its final stages, one of the major proposals for reorganizing its successor is to design it according to geographic regions, thereby increasing local responsibility for supervising projects and promoting cooperation. A more regional approach “would recognize the unique problems faced on the different parts of the border” (Carter, 2001). However, there exist some doubts as to whether the Mexican federal government would be willing and able to devolve power to state decision-makers. As Carter notes:

[I]n Mexico, ongoing attempts to delegate responsibility for environmental policymaking to state and local governments have not yet translated into substantial change. All 31 Mexican states have enacted environmental statutes that clarify authority between state and local levels. However, environmental policymaking in Mexico generally remains dominated by the federal government. Further decentralization of responsibilities and finances in Mexico is fundamental to greater state-to-state, community-to-community, and cross border collaboration (Carter, 2001).

The centralized nature of the Mexican political system and the obstacles it poses to cooperation are representative of a more fundamental problem that existed in the pre-NAFTA period and persists in the NAFTA era: the problems of NGO's access to information and the political process in general. Undoubtedly, as I recounted earlier, some positive strides have been made. Nevertheless, there remains room for scepticism. In particular, Wallace points to the corrupt and inefficient nature of the Mexican judicial system as perhaps comprising the biggest barrier to accessing information. Szekely adds

that the weak nature of the Mexican judicial system is characteristic of the “precarious situation of democracy in the country” (Szekely, cited in Wallace, 2001: 196).

A citizen’s or an NGO’s extremely limited access to the judicial system in presenting an *amparo* offers a telling example. An *amparo* is the principle legal instrument that enables Mexican citizens to challenge the legality and constitutionality of any type of government action (Wallace, 2001; 193). The *amparo* process is first complicated by the fact that to launch one, the citizen or NGO in question must first prove that it has legal standing. To achieve legal standing, the citizen must introduce evidence that proves that government action has had a direct effect on “his or her personal or patrimony in contravention of a personal right explicitly recognized by law (Wallace, 2001: 193). The difficulty in proving that government action has harmed a citizen is one of the main reasons for why *amparo* suits are easily thrown out of court. The second factor complicating the process is the often complex, confusing, bureaucratic, costly, and exhausting process that a citizen must go through to launch an *amparo*. Indeed only “11 [per cent] of those admitted to court are successful in simply presenting the case” (Wallace, 2001: 194). But even if a citizen is successful in launching an *amparo*, most suits go un-enforced .

Clearly, there exist numerous obstacles to collaboration in the NAFTA environmental era. However, the strengths of these institutions must not be overlooked. At a minimum, the cooperation generated in the NAFTA era indicates that cooperation can occur despite weak organizational structure. That is, although an institution is weaker in the domain of institutional design (i.e. enforcement powers and public participation mechanisms), it can still act as a framework for cooperation. The mere existence of an

institutional space with rules, norms, and principles in which government officials can interact, creates shared expectations about behaviour and reduces uncertainty, thereby engendering conditions for cooperation (Keohane and Martin, 1995: 42). Weakness in the institutional-design area, operating in tandem with higher degrees of cooperation, also challenges some of the notions inherent in the main integration literature. The automatic, simplistic view that assumes strong institutions must result in greater possibilities for cooperation leads to simplistic predictions that obscure the complex nature of the integration process. In fact, the case of the CEC reveals that strong cooperation can coexist with low levels of institutionalization, thus accounting for the integration process's complex and varying nature.

Second, and related to the above point, the cooperation evident in the post-NAFTA era makes clear that in a context in which sovereign states remain the principle actors, institutions cannot effectively restrain the actions of governments. This is played out in the case of the CEC, where the CEC operates within a complex web of state actors who, to a large extent, exercise control over CEC activities. The lesson one can draw from this example is valuable and tells us something about the form future institutions should take in North America. For instance, in a context where the intention of political leaders was to leave them out altogether, institutions that attempt to curtail the sovereignty of governments are doomed to come up against numerous political roadblocks, if not fail altogether.

The CEC's inability in the enforcement area does not necessarily make it a weak or irrelevant institution. In particular, its ability to generate cooperation among the three countries through capacity-building and public participation measures grants it a subtle

form of power that, in the end, can still help accomplish the goal of making governments enforce environmental regulations and improve environmental conditions in North America.

Haas, Keohane, and Levy argue that institutions can alter policy direction by promoting governmental interest in an environmental issue, building administrative and political capacity, and managing and resolving problems of collective action (Haas, Keohane, and Levy, 1993: 399). Institutions that perform these functions are deemed effective because, in their own subtle way, they have the ability to change the course of policy direction. Institutions can act as intervening variables by altering the political dynamics between states (Haas, Keohane, and Levy, 1993: 23).

The CEC is already uniquely positioned to execute all of these functions. For instance, the 2002-2004 North American Agenda for Action stipulates that the CEC has several roles: it can act as convenor, research and policy analyst, and information hub (North American Agenda for Action, 2002-2004: 2). As a convenor, the CEC plays the role of an “honest broker” who brings together a broad array of actors in the form of an epistemic community. The development of a relationship with these sectors through specialized projects aids the CEC by allowing it to draw upon these connections to influence government on a particular issue (Smith, 2001: 52). As Haas, Keohane, and Levy state: “[s]ometimes such a process of redefinition of interests occurs through the interaction of institutional activity and networks of scientists and experts known as epistemestic communities” (Haas, Keohane, and Levy, 1993: 22). Additionally, playing the role of research and policy analyst and information hub enables the CEC to produce high-quality research that interested actors could then use to lobby government, search

for solutions, and present alternatives (North American Agenda for Action, 2002-2004: 2).

As we see in the next section, the new NAFTA-based institutions' success in the area of cooperation, especially that of the CEC, should result in some discernible movement along the intersubjective front since institutions create a permanent space for interaction, which in turn enables intersubjective understandings to shift and change.

Degree of Intersubjectivity in the NAFTA Environmental Era

Evidence from my interviews with environmental officials in the three countries suggests that the most marked changes have occurred in the intersubjective sphere. Although it is still too soon to tell whether a high degree of political integration will develop in the North American environmental arena, it is clear that the preconditions for its evolution are in the process of being established. For instance, various key actors in the CEC explained that the most remarkable consequence of the CEC has been its creation of a specific policy niche that institutionalizes cooperation, thus enabling important intersubjective developments. Consider the following quote from an interview I conducted on 04 April 2003 with Israel Nuñez, Director of the CEC in Mexico City:

The CEC has a very particular niche due to its original location...It's a small commission where confrontation doesn't generate many results. Cooperation...allows us to experiment. The Commission is like a laboratory where we can experiment [with] many things and the risks are relatively small. So it allows us to work on things, approach issues, that in other forums would be more difficult to approach.

Similarly, in an interview with the author on 09 September 2002, David Strother from the Sound Management of Chemicals project, an initiative under the Health and Pollutant workgroup, comments that the CEC:

...provides an institutional framework for the three countries to work together in. Quite often it's a discussion forum where the countries then go back and take a national option to implement ideas, policies, approaches, technology that have been in principle agreed on, but in a legally non binding way.

The above quotes highlight that the CEC has institutionalized cooperation between the three countries. Before the advent of the NAAEC and the CEC, the three countries would deal with environmental priorities either domestically or bilaterally. Now officials try to find the intersection between the domestic, the bilateral, and the trilateral. This is a genuinely novel approach. Countries are beginning to realize that environmental problems must be dealt with cooperatively in order to be resolved. In an interview with the author on 22 August 2002, Rita Cerutti at Environment Canada states:

The passing of NAAEC has made cooperation more formal... We each have our own domestic environmental priorities. We get together trilaterally and say, well, these are my priorities for Canada. What meshes? What is important for us from a trilateral perspective where we can add value and all of us can in some way help with our own environmental objectives? That's how environmental management changed. Before it was domestic. We worked with the U.S. and factored that in. But [with] Mexico, we didn't think in a North American way. Since the passing of the NAAEC we are thinking more as a region. It is not first and foremost at the top of our minds when we make a decision because we're not quite there yet. But yes, more and more from an environmental view we are realizing that pollutants cross boundaries. Yes, we can't solve this on our own, yes it's worthwhile to be in a relationship with Mexico and the US to talk about these issues.

In turn, the interaction and experimentation that the CEC has enabled is causing actors to re-evaluate their roles and their ideas about each other. Worldviews are being altered, and preconceived notions of the "other" are being reconstituted. In an interview with the author on 04 April 2003, Israel Nuñez, Director of the CEC in Mexico City, comments on this process:

There's also another way we influence each other. It's very subjective, intangible, [and] that has a very practical effect—we know each other, we

have broken barriers or prejudices, and we have cooperated instead of entering into a confrontation. We have tried to be respectful. Being respectful means that I can understand that when the U.S. says I can't do this, when there is a rational explanation, because the U.S. is prepared to give a rational explanation. And they for their part trust that when Mexico says I can't do it, it's not because Mexico doesn't want to or is hiding something. We trust, we have arrived at a level of trust that has allowed us to work together in an area that could be very controversial....and yes there's a mutual influence in terms of trust, of knowing each other and of the manner of action.

The above process is extremely important because it helps address many of the disintegrative factors or obstacles that inhibit the integration process. Issues of trust, confidence, stereotypes and misconceptions can all be addressed through intersubjective processes. This is an absolutely necessary precondition for the development of a North American political integration project. However, as mentioned earlier, it is still too soon to speak of high levels of political integration. Rather, what exists in the intersubjective realm is high-moderate levels of positive forms of intersbjective processes that are still affected by conflict and disintegrative factors.

Having said this, a multitude of Canada-U.S. and U.S.-Mexico environmental conflicts in the NAFTA era reveal that at least in the bilateral arena, there are still unresolved issues that threaten to seep into the North American environmental relationship and dilute important intersubjective advances already made.

Perhaps the most serious point of contention between the U.S. and Mexico for this period has to do with water. Environmental-border scholar Lawrence Herzog observes that water, and the environmental issues associated with water, will become one of the most critical foreign policy issues facing countries like the U.S. and Mexico who share a border and transboundary resources (Herzog, 2000, 6).

The U.S.-Mexico borderlands potentially face a severe water shortage, water apportionment, and water contamination problem. No matter which way one approaches the issue, the result is always the same: in the coming years, the U.S.-Mexico borderlands will be characterized by water scarcity. On the Mexican side, adequate water supply has become a matter of critical importance. In 2001 Mexico's National Water Commission reported that Mexico's water supply is already at less than half of that of the 1950s. Victor Lichtenberg, Mexico's Secretary of Environmental and Natural resources states that about 12 million Mexicans lack access to drinking water (Kelly, Solis, and Kourous 2001). On the U.S. side, the water shortage especially affects farmers in Southern Texas and U.S. agricultural producers who calculate their losses at close to \$400 million annually (Kelly, Solis, and Kourous, 2001). The problem is compounded by numerous climatic, geographical, and economic factors—namely the arid nature of the U.S.-Mexico border region, the tremendous economic growth of the region brought about by NAFTA, and the drought presently characterizing the border region (Kelly, Solis, and Kourous, 2001).

The population along the U.S.-Mexico border region has exploded in recent years. The San Diego-Tijuana region is one of the most rapidly expanding areas of the border. Additionally, unprecedented rates of trade under NAFTA have “accelerated the growth of border manufacturing centres and sparked a rise in export-oriented agriculture” (Kelly, Solis and, Kourous, 2001). Environmental degradation in the region of course predates NAFTA, but NAFTA has only made it worse (Herzog, 2000: 341). For example, in a 24 May article published in *The New York Times*, Mexico's Water Secretary Alberto Szekely is quoted as stating that; “[the U.S. and Mexico] have been promoting growth as

if there were no limit [but] water is one". He continues: "Both sides were warned long ago that something like this would happen. But they were working on free trade and avoiding political issues like this." The arid nature and recurring drought that characterizes the border region also exacerbates matters.

The water shortage reached a political boiling point at the end of May 2002, when President Fox missed a deadline for presenting his proposal to repay Mexico's water debt to the U.S. Under the terms of the 1994 Water Treaty which governs and divides the flow of water in the Rio Grande Basin, Mexico is expected to share the water of the Rio Grande with the U.S., in exchange for waters from the U.S. portion of the Colorado River. Since 1992 however, Mexico has run up a water deficit of 1.5 million acre feet, or a few years worth of normal water supplies. A 24 May 2002 article published in the *New York Times* recounts that in order to pay the debt, Fox offered to prepare a strategy for repayment. Fox had also petitioned President Bush to loan Mexico \$420 million to build a new leak-proof water system. However, despite Texan farmers' claims that Mexico is hoarding water that it could give to the U.S., many in both countries argue that Mexico simply does not have the water it owes to the U.S. Silvia Hernandez, Head of the Senate Committee on North American relations states it bluntly: "The water the U.S. is demanding doesn't exist. The plan won't work."

The severity of the U.S.-Mexico water dispute highlights a number of important disintegrative barriers that are still extant. For one, the water crisis points to asymmetries in power and resources. For example, President Fox's request to President Bush for a loan to upgrade Mexico's water infrastructure signals financial inequities that place Mexico at a disadvantage when addressing environmental challenges. There also exists

inequities in water access and distribution in the border region. While communities on both sides of the border deal with water access issues, Mexico's per-capita consumption rate is 5,000 cubic meters of water per person. There is also no clear identification with a shared "we"—a factor that is crucial to any integration project. Rather, both the U.S. and Mexico show clear signs of an "us versus them" attitude.

Like the U.S. and Mexico water dispute, conflict between Canada and the U.S. in the NAFTA period reflects the increased importance of transboundary resources in the bilateral relationship. Similar to acid rain in the pre-NAFTA period, the Pacific Salmon dispute, which reached a boiling point in 1997, threatened to disrupt the entire bilateral Canada-U.S. relationship. In brief, there was no consensus on the amount of fish that could be caught, and each country accused the other of taking more than their quota (Axworthy, 2003: 93). Pacific Salmon migratory patterns make them particularly susceptible to "interception" (Caldwell, 1999:2). Pacific salmon are an "anadromous" species, which simply means that they spawn in fresh water, migrate to the ocean, and then return to their native rivers to spawn again and complete their life cycle (Buck and Waldeck, 1999:3). Their migration patterns cut across the Canada-U.S. boundary, making them especially vulnerable both to "being harvested or interception" by countries other than their host countries. Caldwell explains that salmon stocks from Canada and the U.S. "head North from their rivers of origin, reaching the end of their northward migration in Alaskan and adjacent waters and then return by a southerly route to their rivers of origin to spawn" (Caldwell, 1999: 2).

Repeated interception from fishermen in both countries led to several aggressive confrontations between the Alaskan and British Columbian governments and reached a

stalemate in 1997. In the past, retaliatory actions between the countries led to the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty. The Treaty established an international commission to replace aggressive behaviour “with coordinated conservation of the regional salmon stocks and equitable sharing of the bounty” (Huppert, 1995: 4). However, by 1992, interception was on the rise again and in 1994, after the two countries failed to agree on annual fishing regulations, the salmon war resumed yet again (Huppert, 1995: 4). The situation was exacerbated during the summer of 1997 Canadian, when fishermen blocked a U.S. ferry in the port of Prince Rupert (Axworthy, 2003: 93).

The dispute was finally resolved after the U.S. and Canada agreed to work outside of normal channels and appoint an “eminent-persons” approach that would depoliticize the whole process. The end result was a new comprehensive agreement reached in 1999 (Axworthy, 2003: 94).

Although the Canada-U.S. salmon dispute was resolved successfully, the events leading up to the 1999 agreement highlight that in the absence of a clear framework that governs dispute-settlement, power politics prevails. As Lloyd Axworthy, the former Canadian foreign minister at the time of the negotiations, explains; “[i]n many areas...there is only the push and pull of political power where we are handicapped by an unequal bargaining position” (Axworthy, 2003: 96). Indeed, many Canadians felt that the 1999 agreement was more beneficial to American interests and that Canadian concerns came up short (Buck and Waldeck, 1999: 16). Clearly, a reactive, crisis-driven approach does not work in Canada’s favour. Rather, an overall framework or institutional context capable of tempering asymmetries is needed.

Another issue that arose during these negotiations, was the extent to which American domestic policies influence international politics. On the Canadian side, although Aboriginal, provincial, commercial, and recreational interests all had a stake in the process, it was the federal government who had sole responsibility for the management and negotiation of fisheries. Donald McRae, chief Canadian negotiator for the 1999 agreement, observed that the U.S. government was but one of five groups at the table: Tribes representatives, state representatives from Washington, Oregon and Alaska, and other domestic groups were also at the bargaining table representing U.S. interests. Donald McRae thus explains: "The U.S. federal government was able to do nothing unless the states and the Tribes agreed and past experience showed that the U.S. federal government had difficulty forging an agreement among its domestic interests" (McRae,2001: 269). And indeed, even though U.S. interests eventually signed the agreement, the negotiation process demonstrated how an international agreement could be hijacked by diverse American interests. More specifically, it demonstrated that the Canadian government must lobby U.S.-interests if it wants to get its point across.

Both the U.S.-Mexico water conflict and the Canada-U.S. salmon dispute have implications for the North American political integration project. They both indicate that even though advances were made in the intersubjective arena at the trilateral level, in the bilateral realm, conflicts resurfaced. The danger is that conflict in the bilateral realm could disrupt advances in the trilateral environmental agenda. Disputes also demonstrate the predominance of bilateral relations; trilateral relations remain very much on the backburner. Water and salmon-related conflict suggests that cooperation and positive intersubjective transformative processes function better when the issues at stake are less

contentious. High-profile issues that carry symbolic value run the risk of infringing on each nation's sovereign right to its resources. Additionally, bilateral tensions also serve to remind us how political integration in North America is uneven and two-speed in nature. For example, the Pacific Salmon dispute was eventually resolved through a process of adjudication and political goodwill. Canada and the U.S. appointed an eminent-persons committee composed of technical experts. Indeed, the 1999 agreement stresses scientific and technical cooperation that focuses on dispute avoidance (McRae, 2001: 275). Thus, the agreement, like many others that came before it, is based on a proven method of conflict resolution. In the U.S.-Mexico case, no committee or work group was appointed to depoliticize the water issue meaning that power politics tended to dominate.

This chapter has argued that moderate degrees of political integration exist in the NAFTA environmental era. Institutions, although weak, represented an improvement over institutions in the pre-NAFTA system. They also displayed the ability to facilitate cooperation. Cooperation also increased substantially in the NAFTA era and functioned within a broader framework for cooperation. Perhaps the most important point to note about the NAFTA environmental era is that it institutionalized trilateral cooperation between the three countries. The trilateralization of cooperation within an institutional context enabled policy actors to engage in intersubjective processes that led to positive understandings of "the other". This is an important point to note because it indicates that the existence of an institutional context does act as an intervening variable that affects the political integration process.

Chapter Five – Border Control in the Pre-NAFTA Era

In this chapter I examine the case study of border control in a North American context. Borders are extremely important in the analysis of political integration and community because if integration is not occurring at the borders then it is difficult to conceive of it occurring beyond the borders. It is often here that the first signs of integration emerge, and it is here that these signs remain visible. The daily interactions and exchanges that occur between peoples on both sides of the border, between government officials involved in the political management of borders, make this locus an ideal laboratory for the evaluation of political integration.

In this chapter I examine whether and to what extent political integration is occurring in the field of border-control policy during the pre-NAFTA period. I maintain that the pre-NAFTA border era was defined by none to severely limited levels of political integration. The extremely limited levels of political integration that characterize this period can be explained by highlighting several issues. First, in stark contrast to the policy area of the environment, no semblance of organizational structure existed in the pre-NAFTA border era. Although institutional theory points out that strict organizational configurations are not necessary to facilitate cooperation, the findings of this chapter demonstrate that cooperation in a loose, decentralized framework or regime, is simply not sufficient to enable the construction of positive intersubjective understandings. This is not to say that cooperation did not exist. Cooperation did take place, but in a loosely structured format that was too irregular and sporadic to result in positive intersubjective understandings.

This chapter also highlights that cooperation does not always have a positive

outcome. Institutional theory—especially in its regime variation—implies that cooperation will have positive outcomes. Regime theory does state that cooperation is not inevitable. Cooperation necessitates strategic action and negotiation (Keohane, 1989: 11). However, it is implied that cooperation necessarily results in positive outcomes and that policy actors are better-off cooperating in order to achieve mutual goals. For example, Keohane states that an economic regime “characterized by opportunities for mutually rewarding exchange under orderly sets of rules provides incentives for peaceful behaviour...” (Keohane, 1989: 11). While this may be true, regime theory fails to point out the consequences of cooperation in highly asymmetrical and conflict-ridden frameworks. In the case of border control in the pre-NAFTA era, conflicts, asymmetries, and ill feelings stalled movement on the political integration front. Furthermore, the broader historical and political circumstances framing the bilateral relationship result in a varied and two-speed political integration model. This is why we find both none and minimal levels of political integration processes operating simultaneously. Due to a generally more positive bilateral relationship, as well as to the existence of a regime to manage their shared border, the Canada-U.S. case displayed at least minimal levels of political integration. The U.S.-Mexico case, on the other hand, is characterized by no political integration—a fact that owes much to the troublesome history of the broader U.S.-Mexico relationship. Additionally, what exists in the U.S.-Mexico case is sporadic and reactive cooperation rather than a management regime.

In explaining the nearly non-existent levels of political integration found in the pre-NAFTA border era, this chapter demonstrates the important insights made available by utilizing both institutional and constructivist theories. Institutional theory, especially

in its regime variant, is helpful in its analysis of cooperation and its description of regimes. It postulates that regimes do not have to be accompanied by organizations (permanent institutions with enforcement mechanisms, public participation instruments, mandates, and budgets) in order to facilitate cooperation. Regimes are loose, decentralized mechanisms that facilitate cooperation. This is an important point to note about regime theory because, as the case of the borders in North America illustrates, there exists no trilateral or even bilateral organization component to deal with borders. Rather what exists are a series of bilateral accords and agreements that function as a regime to manage borders and address the economic and security issues associated with the management of borders. Hence, although regimes do not contain a formal rule-bound framework, regimes can still provide the necessary structure that enables cooperation to take place.

This chapter also elucidates the importance of using a constructivist framework to examine political integration. Through its reliance on norms, values, and ideas constructivism enables one to determine whether cooperating in a regime really leads to positive intersubjective understandings, or if it merely facilitates cooperation on a given issue.

Examining the case study of border control in the pre-NAFTA era is important for a number of reasons. First, it is important to interrogate state interaction at the border because, on the one hand, the border is the traditional marker of state sovereignty. The border is symbolically tied to a state's perception of "us and them". On the other hand, the border is literally the space where forces of integration—the flow of goods and services, trade, and people—clash with traditional patterns, institutions, and conceptions

of self and other. The way each nation addresses these seemingly contradictory forces will impact any ensuing integration process. Second, an analysis of borders pre-NAFTA reveals that integration is not as automatic and inevitable as some theoretical approaches would have us believe. Third, it is critical to analyze border control in the pre-NAFTA era so that we can gain an adequate idea of whether increased economic integration under NAFTA really has an impact on the political integration process.

To evaluate political integration at the borders I focus on two subtypes of political integration: degree of cooperation and level of intersubjectivity. I examine only these two categories of political integration because, unlike the case study of the environment, the border case study is marked by an absence of organizational structures. To gauge levels of cooperation, I examine the type of operational practices that existed between Canada and the U.S. and the U.S. and Mexico in the pre-NAFTA era. Specifically, I examine the principle agreements, accords, working groups, and other informal activities. I examine whether contact or coordination existed between and amongst instances of cooperation, which would indicate the existence of a border regime. I also evaluate political integration by examining intersubjective factors like examples of discourse in the form of leaders' statements, newspaper articles, polling data, and semi-structured interviews to determine whether practices of cooperation have led to positive identity-shifts or transformative processes that may eventually lead to a move towards political integration.

This chapter is divided into two sections: the first describes the issues and dynamics at the U.S.-Mexico border and it is followed by an examination of cooperation practices and intersubjectivity in the pre-NAFTA period. The second explores the dynamics that define the Canada-U.S. border in the pre-NAFTA period and is again

followed by an assessment of levels of cooperation and intersubjectivity for that period.

The Pre-NAFTA Border Era

The Pre-NAFTA border era is characterized by no political integration between the U.S. and Mexico and low levels of political integration between Canada and the U.S. The slightly higher levels of political integration found in the case of Canada and the U.S. demonstrate how distinct historical trajectories, prior institutional choices, and cognitive perceptions not only affect practices of border cooperation, but also shape the rate and nature political integration in North America. Indeed, Canada and the U.S. shared a more institutionalized and consensual approach to border management. Institutions like the Joint Board of Defence and NORAD institutionalized security cooperation in semi-permanent forums, where actors can get to know each other and engage in intersubjective processes. Additionally, longstanding ties between Canada and the U.S. in the informal Anglo-American alliance with Britain, and later as North American partners in the North American Alliance during the Cold War, solidified relations between the two countries and contributed to the construction of a shared “we”. In contrast, U.S.-Mexico border cooperation was sporadic and largely reactive, functioning only in moments of crisis. The deinstitutionalized nature and limited scope of U.S.-Mexico cooperation owed much to patterns of conflict and mistrust that characterized the early history of the broader bilateral relationship. That then set the context for the development of the bilateral border relationship. Additionally, the U.S.’ aggressive and unilateral behaviour towards the influx of Mexican migrants crossing the border based on powerful racist notions of the “other” limited shared intersubjective understandings that could develop higher levels of

political integration. Moreover, corrupt handling of contentious issues by Mexican state-actors and Mexico's suspicious feelings toward its northern neighbour prevented it from participating in a stable security community with the U.S.

Finally, before moving on, I should point out that I do not deal systematically with the issue of public participation in this case study. Aside from the business sector, which increasingly has been pushing for open borders in order to reduce what McDougal refers to as "system friction", the border area is not characterized by widespread civil-society participation. Moreover, the border-control policy domain is defined only by bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico, and Canada and the U.S. Canada and Mexico do not share a border, thus there is no corresponding Canada-Mexico border cooperation in the pre-NAFTA era.

The U.S.-Mexico Pre-NAFTA Border Era

U.S.-Mexico border relations in the pre-NAFTA period were, for the most part, conflict-ridden with only limited attempts at cooperation. The context for the evolution of relations between the two countries was set in the early history of the bilateral relationship. The contentious nature of the bilateral relation is in part a product of some of the territorial disputes between the U.S. and Mexico in the late 19th century. In particular, U.S. interventionist and expansionist tendencies resulted in the cession of Texas and the loss of a large portion of Mexican territory. These early events set the tone for the rest of the relationship. Additionally, the nature of cooperation was shallow and deinstitutionalized. As well, there was virtually no positive intersubjective transformation. The U.S. and Mexico did not share common understandings of border

issues or security threats. Levels of political integration are thus weak at best, and at worst, non-existent.

The U.S.-Mexico border region is one of the busiest and most traversed regions in the world. It spans the 3,181-kilometre dividing-line between the U.S. and Mexico and includes territories up to 100 kilometres from the border, on both sides. The region can also be divided along state lines. In Mexico: Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon Sonora, and Tamaulipas. In the U.S.: the southern parts of Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas (Rueda, 2001, 143). Presently, approximately 11 to 12 million people live in the Mexico-United States border region. Despite walls and barriers demarcating the two sides, this border is characterized by high levels of daily interaction between a border population that often shares historical and socio-cultural bonds. Citizens on both sides share the same water, air, and geography. They also share problems: immigration, crime, pollution, and drugs (Rueda, 2001:144). But despite shared historical roots, despite transborder connections that link these communities, the pre-NAFTA United-States Mexico border regime is characterized by very few instances of high-level border cooperation.

Degree of Cooperation in the U.S.-Mexico Pre-NAFTA Border Era

Only two principal instances of cooperation existed between the U.S. and Mexico in the pre-NAFTA era, the most of important of which was the 1981 Mexico-United States Binational Commission (BNC). The BNC was created to address the relevant crucial issues that might affect the broader U.S.-Mexico relationship. Officials at the highest level of both governments meet annually for a one or two day period to discuss pertinent

issues. One of the action groups established under the BNC is the border cooperation group, which carries out investigations and technical-level consultations in order to submit recommendations to governments on important border issues (U.S. Department of State Online, 2005).

The second major example of cooperation was the establishment of the 1942 Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission (JMUSDC). The JMUSDC was created during WWII to coordinate military and security cooperation between the two countries. Serrano notes that JMUSDC's main objective was to investigate and cultivate joint defense strategies in three areas: "hemispheric defense, bilateral security relations, and the defense of California" (Serrano, 2003, 49).

While the above mechanisms of cooperation are certainly important, they are severely limited and clearly inadequate to handle the wide array of pressing issues around the U.S.-Mexico border. Perhaps the biggest challenge to cooperation in the pre-NAFTA period is its purely reactive and deinstitutioanlized nature. Both the JMUSDC and BNC are extremely limited in scope, having the capacity to handle only immediate problems that may have wider repercussions for the broader relationship. There is no real long-term integrative vision or strategic plan to manage the border. Indeed, in an interview I conducted in Mexico City in 2002 one official at the Borders Section of the Mexican Foreign Ministry put it this way:

We don't have a single binational institution that handles all the border region.... It makes sense because there are many different organs that handle specific areas of the border. It is not integrated. We don't view the border from a global perspective since it is so complex. If one issue becomes really important we evaluate it and consider it under the Binational Mexico-U.S. border group. It's a more decentralized system

Thus cooperation in the Pre-NAFTA period, for the most part, existed only in moments

of perceived crisis where the urgency of the situation demanded it.

The JMUSDC is just such an example of crisis-induced cooperation. Serrano notes that between 1938 and 1942 the U.S. and Mexico had serious difficulties in agreeing on the substance, breadth, and execution of important security issues like the use of Mexico's aerospace and the erection of ports and radars. Serrano explains that only when a dire fear of foreign threat arose, like during the Pearl Harbor attacks or when the Germans sank two Mexican vessels, did interests converge enough to facilitate cooperation (Serrano, 2003, 49). Moreover, the weakly institutionalized cooperation that existed under the JMUSDC during the war years was, for the most part, was dismantled and reversed not long after it was first implemented (Gonzales and Haggard, 1998: 305).

Hence, what existed in the U.S.-Mexico pre-NAFTA period was sporadic, shallow and minimally institutionalized cooperation. No framework of cooperation or a regime existed. Regime theory suggests that regimes can facilitate cooperation because they contain norms, rules, principles, and procedures that allow political actors to understand each other, get to know one another, and create stable expectations about each other (Keohane, 1984: 101). Regimes are also associated with a convergence of values that enable cooperation. At stake in the U.S.-Mexico case is that the reactive and sporadic moments of cooperation that existed were “brief or too narrow to have lasting impact on the public consciousness of both countries” (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001, 13). The result was a limited number of weakly institutionalized cooperation mechanisms, which did not amount to an overall framework for cooperation. Border officials had little opportunity to interact with each other, they were prevented from establishing a common discourse, and they failed to break down existing norms.

Ultimately, the reasons for this bleak image of cooperation during the pre-NAFTA period can be found in the historical and political circumstances that typify the broader bilateral relationship.

Degree of Intersubjectivity in the U.S.-Mexico Pre-NAFTA Border Era

The U.S.-Mexico pre-NAFTA border era is marked by lower degrees of positive intersubjective understandings. In other words, high rates of disintegrative factors were in operation leading to negative intersubjective understandings and divergent ways of interpreting border security related issues. Both Mexico and the U.S. exhibited a distinctiveness that prevented them from developing the mutuality necessary to provoke positive intersubjective understandings of each other. These significant differences are a by-product of historical processes.

As Chapter Two points out, formative events in the early history of the U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship, like the U.S. annexation of Texas and the Mexican-American War that saw Mexico relinquish over forty percent of its territory to the U.S., established patterns of behaviour and interaction between the two countries that would then establish the context for future action. Conflict and tension marked the early stages of the relationship (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001: 9). In Mexico, it bred strong nationalist sentiments, suspicion, and mistrust that permeated its relationship to the U.S. On their part, Americans did not trust their southern neighbour who they felt was corrupt and lacking a viable democracy. The early patterns of behaviour combined with negative intersubjective perceptions of each other led to no convergence of interests that would enable the U.S. and Mexico to construct a shared security community.

Especially telling is the manner in which Mexico and the U.S. have dealt with the issues of drugs and immigration in the pre-NAFTA period. In each instance, the U.S. and Mexico engaged in behaviour that conveyed negative perceptions of the “other”. This is the case because, as constructivist theory sustains, actions have meanings attached to them that tell ‘us’ about ‘them’ and vice versa. Interactions create perceptions and expectations about each other, affecting past beliefs and future actions. The issue of illegal narcotics, for example, and how each country addressed it reinforced negative perceptions held by both countries.

The issue of drugs has not always been contentious. The U.S. and Mexico to some extent have cooperated on drug interdiction. Both countries share a “U.S. prohibitionist approach to drugs”, thereby facilitating cooperation (Andreas, 2000: 7). In the early years, drug smuggling across the U.S.-Mexico border usually involved Mexican-cultivated marijuana and heroine and was a “low intensive low maintenance” activity (Andreas, 2000: 7). However, in the 1980s, in an effort to curb drug trafficking, U.S. officials launched a campaign against cocaine-trafficking through the Caribbean and South Florida that would indirectly affect Mexico. The U.S.’ focus on the Caribbean-Florida route prompted Colombian smugglers to cooperate with their Mexican equivalents and, as Andreas states, “Mexican smuggling quickly became incorporated into a far more profitable and sophisticated transnational enterprise” (Andreas, 2000: 17). Beginning in 1969, the U.S. began to launch a series of unilateral offensives to curb drugs crossing into the U.S. from Mexico. The 1969 Operation Intercept closed the border for twenty days and acted as a form of economic blackmail that forced Mexico to cooperate with the U.S. (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001: 42). In the 1980s the U.S.

engaged in more aggressive and unilateral action to stop the flow of drugs from Mexico. In 1985 the U.S. embarked on Operation Intercept II after the murder in Mexico of U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agent Enrique Camarena. Operation Intercept II closed down the border for eight days and again forced Mexico to cooperate with the U.S. The U.S. also passed aggressive legislation such as the U.S. annual certification process, which imposed trade sanctions and cut off aid to countries who took part in drug related activities.

Visibly disturbed by aggressive U.S. behaviour, the Mexican government felt it had little choice but to cooperate with the U.S. In 1988, for instance, Mexican president de la Madrid unveiled the Programa nacional para el control de drogas 1995-2000. The National Drug Program declared drug trafficking a risk to Mexico's national security. The National Program exemplifies Mexico's security policy in this area. Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro explain it well:

The first priority...was to safeguard Mexican national security, protecting national sovereignty, the effective jurisdiction of the Mexican state throughout the national territory and the strength of the nation's private and public institutions. The second objective was to protect the health of Mexican citizens. The third goal was to foster international bilateral and multilateral cooperation based on the principle of co-responsibility (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001: 43).

The above quote describes how Mexican leaders viewed the security threat emanating from U.S. drug interdiction policy. Drugs, in effect, posed a double threat: one deriving from drug trafficking and one deriving from aggressive U.S. unilateral action. The Mexican objective was both to contain the threat of drugs and limit the threat posed by U.S. intervention (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001, 43).

The drug conflict between the U.S. and Mexico is complex. Both countries are enmeshed in a push-and-pull relationship that is difficult to disentangle. Serrano observes

that the failure of U.S.-Mexico drug cooperation “depends on which side of it you are on. Impartiality is impossible. Both sides are right and wrong” (Serrano, 2003, 58). If one comes at it from the Mexican perspective, then the problem is U.S. aggressive enforcement policies. First, U.S. interdiction efforts to eradicate cocaine smuggling through its Caribbean and South Florida route in the 1980s resulted “in changing the methods and routes of smuggling: out of the air and [onto] the ground, and from the southeast to southwest border. This forced Colombian smugglers into a strategic alliance with their Mexican counterparts, radically transforming the balance of power in the smuggling business” (Andreas, 2000, 16). Secondly, the severity of Reagan’s interdiction policies in the 1980s succeeded in reorganizing the Mexican drug world, “pushing the less daring and weaker participants out, and leaving the more ruthless in” (Toro, 2005: 6). Thirdly, U.S. import-price differentials of heroine and cocaine were rising rapidly and, as Serrano observes, “[t]o the extent that tighter interdiction increased the total volume of exports needed to deliver a ton of cocaine, it helped stimulate the demand for drugs in the U.S.” (Serrano, 2003, 57).

On the other hand, if regarded from the United States’ point of view, one’s perception of the drug problem radically shifts. From this standpoint, it was “Mexico’s permissiveness and relatively stable patterns of corruption” that facilitated drug trafficking (Serrano, 2003, 57). Widespread corruption in Mexico, from the disassembling of the Dirección Federal de Seguridad in the 1980s to the assassination to of U.S. Drug enforcement Administration Agent Enrique Camarena , provided a ripe opportunity for the drug trade to flourish and contributed to the U.S.’ perception of Mexico as a threat.

In short, both positions hold some truth. Mexico has struggled with a corruption problem. But the U.S.' unilateral and aggressive behaviour also contributes to the problem. Regardless of who is to blame, the example of U.S. and Mexican action towards drugs at the border tells us something about the nature of cooperation in the pre-NAFTA era. Cooperation did exist, but it was often forced and accompanied by significant disagreement "over the meaning and content of regional and bilateral security threats" (Serrano, 2003, 48). There was no attempt to "create a binational system of norms" or even a regime that would facilitate drug cooperation (Meyers and Papademetriou, 2001, 144). Mexico cooperated but only to placate the U.S. The U.S, on the other hand, aggressively fortified the border to wrest its control from criminal elements (Andreas, 2000: 14). However, as Andreas explains, when a state is perceived to have "lost control" of its border, its very legitimacy and authority is accordingly diminished. The border is a richly symbolic place, a place that defines one state from another, and with it, state-actors derive their legitimacy and reinforce their territorial clout (Golob, 2002, 3).

The case of immigration is even more complicated, starting with the fact that the U.S. and Mexico interpret undocumented migration in completely different ways. For the U.S., undocumented migration is a law-enforcement issue, while Mexico views it through a social and economic lens (Andreas, 2000: 7). From the U.S. point of view, the common perception is that there is "a loss of control of the border with Mexico" (Serrano, 2003, 55). In the 1980s , the growing number of undocumented migrants crossing the border and residing in the U.S. combined with the flow of illicit drugs contributed to a perception of a border under siege that had to be protected (Serrano, 2003, 55). Additionally, U.S. efforts to fortify the border had the unintended consequence of

fuelling the growing people-smuggling industry and creating a harsher and more violent environment for undocumented migrants (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001, 153).

Dominguez and Fèrnandez de Castro note that “[t]he perception of migration differs, understandably, between a country that sends migrants and one that receives them” (Dominguez and Fèrnandez de Castro , 2001, 152). In the U.S., Mexican migrants are portrayed as people who take jobs that are otherwise available to Americans and as a strain on the welfare and education systems. In Mexico, migrants are viewed as “courageous, hardworking individuals who sacrifice for their families” (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001: 152). The Mexican governments’ usual approach to the issue of migration “has been to avoid abrupt changes in U.S. immigration policy “and ensuring that the U.S. market remains open to Mexicans (Dominguez and Fèrnandez de Castro, 2001: 153).

The fundamentally divergent perceptions of the immigration problem preclude cooperation efforts and have resulted in an escalation of aggressive action on the part of the U.S. Complicating the immigration conflict even further is the fact that, as Andreas notes, the U.S. and Mexico “nurtured the development of a symbiotic relationship between Mexican workers and U.S. employers” (Andreas, 2000, 18).

From the end of the First World War until the mid 1960s, Mexicans legally migrated to work for a period of six months to one year under the Bracero Guestworker Program (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001: 151). The Program was abolished in 1964, but Mexicans continued to cross the border in search of employment. However, beginning in the 1960s and culminating in the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. imposed a

number of measures aimed at deterring migrants from entering the country. Motivated in part by economic recession and by domestic pressures that took offence at a more visible and growing illegal migrant population, the U.S. passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 which sanctioned employers who hired undocumented migrants (Andreas, 2000: 18). The U.S. also strengthened its border with Mexico and in 1993 right before the implementation of the NAFTA, the Clinton government launched an unprecedented campaign to militarize the border.

U.S. border control actions only exacerbated the already tense relationship. Through its actions, the U.S. signalled to Mexico that Mexican migrants were unwanted. Also, the enforcement of the border was about domestic politics. The U.S. engaged in aggressive action to convince a domestic audience that it was regaining control of the border. In this sense, the U.S. offensive with respect to drugs and immigration was about legitimating state authority since the state “justifies its primary role in the international system and its monopoly over the use of force at home by mediating between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’; that mediation - happens literally and symbolically - at the border” (Golob, 2002, 4). Hence, a constructivist reading of U.S. and Mexican behaviour with respect to drugs and immigration reveals signs of asymmetries and conflict that prevented the mutuality necessary to construct a shared border-security regime.

The Canada-U.S. Pre-NAFTA Border Era

In marked contrast to the tense and conflict-ridden nature of the U.S.-Mexico pre-NAFTA borders era, the Canada-U.S. pre-NAFTA borders era was characterized by a largely peaceful and consensual approach to the management of borders and by higher

levels of institutionalized, and positive cooperation. Consequently, levels of political integration, although still low, were higher than in the U.S.-Mexico pre-NAFTA border era where none to severely limited levels of political integration were found. Additionally, Canada and the U.S. shared common, tentative, intersubjective understandings and participated in a process of norm construction that in turn informed instances of cooperation—again resulting in comparatively higher levels of political integration in the Canada-U.S. pre-NAFTA border era.

Degree of Cooperation in the Canada-U.S. Pre-NAFTA Border Era

The Canada- U.S. border is 8,895 kilometres long, making it nearly two and a half times longer than the Mexico-United States border. Approximately 90 percent of the Canadian population lives within 160 kilometres of the border, a figure that stands in sharp contrast to the 13 percent of the American population that lives near the border (Meyers and Papademetriou, 2001, 46). The Canada-U.S. border region is marked by a high degree of interdependence that existed long before the advent of NAFTA. As Ackelson notes:

The Northern borderlands are what Oscar Martinez, in his well known categorization of borderlands, would call ‘interdependant,’ possibly moving toward an ‘integrated’ status; this categorization is based on the level of cross-border movement and suggests a “symbiotic link” fostered by stable relations, economic dependence, and numerous bi-national socio-cultural interactions” (Ackelson, 2000, 17).

Ackelson’s comment is not far off the mark. The linchpin of the Canada-U.S. border relationship is economic links (Meyers and Papademetriou, 2001, 45). But the relationship is based on much more than economic connections. The regions that straddle the border are tied by migration patterns, environmental issues, health and safety issues,

and socio-cultural issues (Meyers and Papedimitrious, 2001, 45-46).

Two principle instances of cooperation, in conjunction with a host of smaller, less formal practices of cooperation, operated in the Canada-U.S. pre-NAFTA border era. The result was the formation of a regime or framework of cooperation for the management of the border. During World War II, Canada and the U.S. established their first institutional mechanism for security cooperation in the form of the 1940 Permanent Joint Board of Defense (PJBD). The PJBD's purpose was to establish the cooperative defense of North America and to provide a space for interaction and dialogue on relevant military issues. The institution still exists to this day (Hristoulas, 2003, 26). The other major instance of cooperation in the pre-NAFTA period was the 1957 North American Aerospace Command (NORAD). NORAD is led by both Canadian and American forces. Its main objective is to provide early warning of a potential missile and air attack (Hristoulas, 2003, 27).

Other less institutionalized instances of cooperation were also evident in the Canada-U.S. Pre-NAFTA border era. One such mechanism was the 1988 Bilateral Consultative Group (BCG), created to address transnational terrorist threats. Senior officials from relevant departments and agencies meet annually to coordinate American and Canadian counter-terrorism policies. In addition, day to day and on-the-ground, cooperation in the training and the development of anti-terrorism projects was facilitated through the BCG (Cusp, 2000: 52). There were other, lower profile examples of cooperation as well, including committees and workgroups like the 1946 Canada-U.S. Military Cooperation Committee and the 1953 Joint Military Study Group (MSG) (Roussel, 2004,194). Finally, the Canada-U.S. pre-NAFTA border era also witnessed the

establishment of rules or guidelines for cooperation. Agreements like the 1947 Joint Canada-U.S. Defense Public Statement and the 1958 Canada-U.S Joint Ministerial Committee on Defense clearly outlined the rules for security cooperation between both countries.

The above-mentioned examples of bilateral cooperation functioned to form a regime that simply didn't exist in the case of the U.S.-Mexico relationship. Instead, the latter was fragmented, ad hoc, and dominated by reactive instances of cooperation that did not add up to a coordinated system. Canada-U.S. border instruments, on the other hand, operated as sets of practices that provided a loose framework to facilitate cooperation. Instances of cooperation were also more institutionalized than their U.S.-Mexican counterparts. The PJBD was a case in point. The PJBD followed a specific format; it was modelled like a commission made up of equal personnel from each country. Members interacted in rule-bound meetings, discussed common interests; as such, they depoliticized conflict. Additionally, any recommendations put forward by the PJBD were, for the most part, based on consensus (Roussel, 2004,183).

Aside from the more institutionalized nature of cooperation, Canada and the U.S. also developed a tacit understanding of the rules of cooperation with respect to security management. Numerous agreements emerging in this period contained explicit guidelines on the form that cooperation should take, which helped to equalize an otherwise highly asymmetrical relationship. In the case of the U.S. and Mexico, theirs was an even more asymmetrical relationship in the pre-NAFTA era, one that failed to develop common intersubjective understandings and, accordingly, one that failed to cooperate. Thus the difference between both sets of bilateral relationships can be found by exploring the

intersubjective arena. It is to this point that I now turn to.

Degree of Intersubjectivity in the Canada-U.S. Pre-NAFTA Border Era

As the above section pointed out, what was most striking about Canada-U.S. pre-NAFTA cooperation was the effort made to institutionalize and depoliticize methods of cooperation (Thompson and Randall, 1997, 72). The prevalence of this approach is all the more surprising considering that the U.S. did not share this same approach with Mexico, its other neighbour, despite the fact that both Canada and Mexico share a highly asymmetrical relationship with the U.S. Why then was the Canada-U.S. relationship in the pre-NAFTA period marked by more positive instances of institutionalized cooperation? The answer to this question can be found by inquiring into the intersubjective realm of the Canada-U.S. Pre-NAFTA relationship.

As the history chapter delineates in detail, commencing with the official formation of Canada, both countries gradually began to participate in a shared process of norm construction, and the creation of common intersubjective understandings in turn influenced practices of cooperation. Put differently, Canada and the U.S. took part in a process of value convergence that facilitated cooperation at an early stage in their relationship (Roussel, 2004, 139). Roussel points out that Canada and the U.S. were able to take part in a process of value convergence because they shared a similar background and language, had a similar culture, and upheld similar liberal democratic values like respect for the rule of law and respect for equality (Roussel, 2004, 232). These factors in turn enabled both countries to gradually develop positive perceptions of “self” and “other” and favourable assumptions about each other. One telling example is each

country's actions in demilitarizing the border after the American Civil War.

Following the American Civil War, Britain chose to focus on Europe and left the newly formed Canada to fend for itself. Canada, however, chose not to defend its border against the U.S. Canada was militarily weak after confederation and the new government preferred to "pass the [defence] buck" onto Britain and spend funds in other areas. The U.S. also had no incentive to fortify its border with Canada. Exhausted U.S. soldiers wanted to return home after the Civil War and any remaining soldiers were put to better use in removing the French from Mexico (Shore, 1998: 342). Additionally, U.S. annexationists felt that force was unnecessary in the case of Canada. Sean Shore puts it well:

...Canadians, after all, were North American cousins, "bone, as it were, of our bone, flesh of our flesh, deriving their origin from the same Anglo-Saxon source". Forceful annexation of these cousins, while probably not difficult from a military standpoint, would be "rape-like imperialism", and unbecoming of American democracy (Shore, 1998: 338).

Thus, with neither country willing to defend it, the undefended border became a fact.

The demilitarization of the border fostered trust and symbolized 'non aggressive intentions towards one another' (Shore, 1998: 344). This is because, as constructivists maintain, actions also convey meanings about "us" and 'them" that generate a learning process. Actions operate within a social context; they affect not only previously held beliefs, but future actions as well. Shore quotes Wendt on this important point:

The first social act creates expectations on both sides about each other's future behaviour...Based on this tentative knowledge, ego makes a new gesture, again signifying the basis on which it will respond to alter, and alter again responds, adding to the pool of knowledge each has about the other, and so on over time....If repeated long enough, these 'reciprocal typifications' will create relatively stable concepts of self and other regarding the issue at stake in the interactions (Shore, 1998: 34).

Hence the mutual demilitarization of the border: it first occurred because Canada and the

U.S. shared similar values and cultures, but demilitarization then generated additional opportunities for political actors to recast positive images of “us” and “them”, which in turn fuelled more cooperative practices and eventually consolidated a context for future action.

There were other intersubjective processes at work in the pre-NAFTA border era that convinced Canadian and American political actors that they shared similar norms and values. One such example was the idea of a shared North American community (excluding Mexico) whose identity differed from that of Europe’s. The idea began to take shape in the WWI period and was afterwards reinforced. Canadians and Americans looked across the Atlantic and saw Europe’s blood-stained, striated landscape and took note of the differences: “The former [Europe] based on perpetual bloodshed, militarism, intrigue and autocracy, the latter [North America] on the century of peace, the undefended border, democratic institutions and Anglo-Saxon heritage” (Shore, 1998, 335). Additionally, Canada participated in the Anglo-American alliance in which Canada played a key role as mediator between England and the U.S. Both countries also became members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 (Thompson and Randall, 1997: 92).

Canada and the U.S. shared a common identity that was distinct from that of Europe. Political discourse during the war period emphasised the emergence of this North American identity. For instance, this excerpt from a lecture given by the American Rev. James Macdonald articulates the symbolic and political importance of the inclusive Canada-U.S. “we”:

These two North American democracies are, indeed, Europe’s second chance...North America inherited a world idea, not for her own sake, but

for the world's. The United States and Canada are trustees for all humanity. Before the world's judgment seat we must give account of our stewardship (Cited in Shore, 1998: 354).

Canadian political rhetoric was equally characterized by similar conceptions of a distinct North America based on shared political values. Consider an excerpt of a letter sent to the American finance Minister by his Canadian counterpart:

We have in your time and mine always been good neighbours. Occasionally, a verbal brickbat has been thrown across the fence but we have always sympathized with each other when brickbats have come from any foreign source. In our attitude towards constitutional liberty and all social problems our people are very much alike and understand each other better I think than any other two peoples in the world today. The struggle in a common cause will I am sure greatly cement our friendship and respect for each other (Cited in Roussel, 2004: 153).

Thus to recap, it is evident that despite their differences, Canada and the U.S. shared intersubjective understandings and positive perceptions of each other that influenced mechanisms of cooperation. The common belief in a "North America" (excluding Mexico) based on a common liberal democratic order and the mutual decision to demilitarize the border reinforced previously held positive perceptions of each other, which resulted not only in more positive forms cooperation, but in the operation of deeper institutionalization at the Canada-U.S. border than in the U.S.-Mexico border.

Having said all of this, it is important not to make too much of shared values and positive forms of intersubjective understanding. For example, one could argue that Canada's position as a British dominion in the early history of the relationship in part explained Canada's ability to resist U.S. annexationist pressures. Mexico had no such link to Spain, and thus could not rely on a counterweight. Secondly, for most of the nineteenth century it appears that Canadian political elites were critical and distrustful of their American neighbour. Roussel notes that Canadian political elites viewed American

democracy as being “too ‘pure’ and prone to majoritarian excesses” (Roussel, 2004, 125). Mistrust of America was also reflected in the periodic outbursts of national sovereignty discourse at moments when Canada felt discomfited at the size, weight, and proximity of its American neighbour. Macdonald’s National Policy of 1878 and later the National Energy Program are examples of sovereignty initiatives created to curtail U.S. dominance and to establish some degree of policy autonomy. These initiatives reveal that cooperation was not always harmonious and that there was disjunction at the intersubjective level accounting for the low levels of political integration found in the U.S.-Canada pre-NAFTA period.

In conclusion, limited levels of political integration were found in the area of border control in the pre-NAFTA period. The restricted levels of political integration can be explained by a number of factors. First, the area of border control is characterized by no organizational structures from which to manage borders. Rather, what we find is the operation of a highly decentralized framework for cooperation or a regime. The looser and more informal nature of regimes is not as conducive to regular interaction and contact. Second, due to the nature of the border area and its link to policy actors’ perceptions of territory, sovereignty, and identity it is much more difficult to develop shared positive intersubjective understandings of “we”. Both of these factors exert some influence on the rate and nature of political integration in North America.

Chapter Six – Border Control in the NAFTA Era

The changing landscape of the borderlands and border regions that straddle the U.S.-Mexico and Canada-U.S. international boundary is rife with contradictions. On the one hand, there are massive amounts of trade and goods flowing through it with the help of NAFTA and economic integration. The discourse that accompanies the movements of goods is often celebratory, calling for less stringent borders and unimpeded integration. On the other hand, borders have been fortified and act as symbols of deterrence against the flow of those people and goods deemed unwanted. This gives borders the unique status of disappearing at the same time as they are becoming increasingly important. This chapter addresses the issue of whether NAFTA has had an impact on levels of political integration at North America's borders. I ask whether, and to what degree, political integration is taking place in the area of border controls during the NAFTA period.

It is commonplace to point out that NAFTA has resulted in unprecedented amounts of trade and that it has accelerated the forces of economic integration. Indeed, the very success of NAFTA has had an effect on border management practices and systems of border infrastructure creating increased pressures for cooperation. 9/11 has had a similar effect in that it highlights the critical need to improve the “software” of border management in order to balance security with economic interests (McDougal, 2004: 12). In this chapter I argue that despite the strong economic and security forces that propel integration forward, there still exists a low degree of political integration in the borders policy domain. This is a result of several factors: First, there is little positive movement on the intersubjective front. Second, border control policy lacks a permanent institutional space in which to treat borders, meaning that policy actors have minimal

opportunities to interact and communicate on a regular basis. Their ability to modify cognitive frameworks that determine perceptions of “self and other”, “us and them” is, therefore, severely limited. Third, the area of borders is intimately linked to the issue of sovereignty and policy actors’ conventional understanding of “otherness”, which makes it more difficult to achieve progress. I should highlight at the outset that there existed minimal Mexico-Canada participation on border matters. Cooperation largely functioned within bilateral parameters. Canada and Mexico do not share a common border, thus Canadian officials remain especially reluctant to cooperate with Mexico on border matters. Having said that, there is an increasing awareness among Canadian officials that “[t]he situation on the Mexican border has a strong impact on U.S. laws and policies affecting both borders” (Canada-U.S. Partnership, 2000, 21). As such, Canadian officials are increasingly working with Mexico on initiatives like modernizing governance practices. Indeed, since the election of President Fox in 2000, Canada has been actively collaborating with Mexico on all six points of the Fox Reform Agenda including governance, promoting democracy, strengthening civil society, and defending human rights (Canadian Embassy in Mexico online, 2005).

The findings of this chapter challenge the basis of more conventional theories of integration, namely neofunctionalism, which implies that integration is automatic and straightforward. Indeed, the border control policy area demonstrates that, notwithstanding unprecedented levels of cooperation to deal with economic and security concerns, there has been no corresponding move towards political integration. As constructivism suggests, actors can participate in a regime, but ideas and interests do not have to change for “the better” over time. Thus cooperation can operate along high levels of

asymmetrical and disintegrative factors. The consequence is virtually no movement on the intersubjective front and therefore a limited move towards political integration. Moreover, the historical and political contexts in which the broader bilateral relationships are rooted make for different levels of political integration at play in each border, illustrating again the relevance of prior institutional and ideational factors in mediating political integration. The consequence is that lower levels of political integration exist at the United States-Mexico border region, informed by a history of mistrust between the two countries, while the Canada-United States border is defined by medium levels of political integration, the latter facilitated by a long history of cooperation on border issues and a more positive relationship in general.

Additionally, the significant disjuncture between practices of cooperation and intersubjective understandings points to the clear development of an asymmetrical model of integration. Indeed, as both the NAFTA and post-9/11 sections of this chapter demonstrate, political integration is largely U.S. dominated with Canada and Mexico playing reactionary roles that attempt to address the power imbalances produced by the inequity of the North American relationship. Moreover, the limited levels of political integration are devoid of any of the factors that might eventually enable the evolution of a more symmetrical form of political integration such as mechanisms of public participation, an institutional structure that would help inhibit asymmetries and generate positive forms of intersubjective understandings, labour rights, and other important social and political variables.

In accounting for the lower levels of political integration found in the borders policy domain this chapter emphasizes the relevance of drawing on both institutional and

constructivist theory. Regime theory, as a subset of institutional theory, points out that regimes facilitate cooperation. This is certainly the case in both the U.S.-Mexico and Canada-U.S. case post-9/11. Regime theory also enables me to examine degrees of cooperation—one of the categories I use to analyze political integration. I thus examine the main instances of cooperation that characterize both the U.S.-Mexico and Canada-U.S. border regime. However, regime theory on its own is not enough to gain a comprehensive understanding of political integration in the border control policy area because it does not substantially inquire into the intersubjective aspects of cooperation. To arrive at a fuller understanding, I rely on constructivist theory.

This chapter also demonstrates the viability of using constructivist theory in evaluating political integration. As mentioned earlier, cooperation along border issues has risen to all-time-high levels, especially in the Post-9/11 era. But despite more cooperation, there has been no corresponding positive shift in the intersubjective realm. By this I mean that cooperation can take place within a highly asymmetrical and conflict-ridden context that does not necessarily lead to positive intersubjective understandings. Thus, evaluating political integration solely from a regime standpoint is clearly not enough. To acquire a more complete picture of political integration in North America with relations to borders, constructivism must be brought to the forefront. A constructivist focus on identities, roles, ideational factors, and discourse enables the interrogation of state interaction or behaviour that on the surface might appear as irrational (Golob, 2002, 11). For example, after 9/11, Canada and Mexico promoted and actively participated in a number of “Smart Border” policies and cooperation practices that, at first glance, appeared to be leading to the establishment of a common North

American security framework. Indeed, the U.S. push for a North American security perimeter may be viewed as representing a trilateral and institutionalized approach to border policy. However, on closer interrogation Canada and Mexico's move to heightened cooperation with the U.S. on border issues is less a genuine move to establish a shared North American security front and more evidence of a need to manage aggressive, unilateral U.S. security policies (Gabriel, Jimenez and Macdonald, 2003: 9). Thus constructivism's ability to interpret the meaning behind "easily-measurable economic and strategic" state interests and analyze historical and symbolic political gestures on the part of state actors can more adequately explain what on the surface appear as straightforward practices of cooperation (Golob, 2002, 11).

Focusing on the case study of the borders in North America is important because the border is the space where economic and security forces interact. The outcome of these forces' interaction shapes the nature of political integration in North America. Again 9/11 serves as an interesting example. It demonstrates the increasing importance of assessing the relationship between both economic and security tracks and the interplay between both spheres. Security imperatives, if left to function unimpeded, could halt the economic integration project by shutting down the borders. On the other hand, if trade goes unimpeded, then countries risk leaving their borders open to terrorists (Flynn, 2003, 111). The balance between both forces thus mediates any resulting political integration process.

This chapter is composed of two sections. The first part examines cooperation practices and intersubjectivity. First, I analyze the U.S.-Mexico relationship and then move on to the Canada-U.S. border relationship. I pay particular attention to whether

NAFTA had any effect on border policies, practices, and perceptions. The second section of this chapter evaluates political integration in the post-9/11 period to determine whether the events of September 11 led to increased cooperation and transformative processes that resulted in higher degrees of political integration in both the U.S.-Mexico and Canada-U.S. cases.

The NAFTA Border Era

The NAFTA border era is characterized by low to moderate degrees of political integration, with the U.S. and Mexico experiencing lower levels of political integration in comparison to the more moderate levels found at the Canada-U.S. border. The degree of political integration operating in this period reflects the new realities of the NAFTA era. Indeed the advent of the NAFTA introduced a new level of institutionalized border cooperation in North America. The unprecedented increase in cross-border trade prompted officials at both borders to take part in a number of new cooperative initiatives that could efficiently manage the high trade flows. Indeed, even though the border-control policy area is characterized largely by government to government and very little civil society cooperation (excluding business groups) there were some, albeit limited, evidence of NGO involvement. Participation under the Canada-U.S. Partnership (Canada-U.S. Partnership) included not just the business sector, but NGOs, community groups, and academic participation (Canada-U.S. Partnership, 2000: 18). However, the contradictions found at the borders tell another story. For even as the three countries moved to facilitate economic flows by opening up the borders to trade, the U.S. engaged in a massive offensive on its southern border and later attempted to ‘Mexicanize’ the

northern border, indicating that high levels of cooperation can coexist alongside high levels of asymmetries and negative forms of intersubjectivity, thus accounting for the low levels of political integration that define the NAFTA border era overall.

The U.S.-Mexico NAFTA Border Era

As mentioned earlier, the U.S.-Mexico NAFTA border era is characterized by low levels of political integration. To be sure, cooperation increased and functioned within a regime in the U.S.-Mexico NAFTA era. Additionally, cooperation extended to other non-governmental sectors and was better coordinated across border agencies. However, despite increased levels of cooperation in the NAFTA era, there existed other indicators that revealed that cooperation existed within a highly asymmetrical context with little movement on the intersubjective front. The nature of cooperation and the existence of high-profile U.S. enforcement policies at the border suggest that the new cooperation framework introduced by the NAFTA was not powerful enough to contain drugs and migration-related conflicts, thus accounting for low levels political integration. The United States took unilateral actions that forced its much weaker partner to cooperate reluctantly, but always within the context of a highly asymmetrical framework.

Degree of Cooperation in the U.S.-Mexico NAFTA Era

By far the most important border mechanisms in the NAFTA period are the Border Liaison Mechanisms (BLMs). BLMs were created in 1991 with the goal of promoting the speedy and immediate fix of incidents at the border that might affect the broader U.S.-Mexico relationship. Indeed, as Denis Linskey, the coordinator of United States-Mexican

border affairs at the Office of Mexican Affairs in the U.S. State Department, puts it in an interview conducted with the author in 19 September 2002: the general purpose of the BLMs is to “prevent regional local issues from becoming national problems.” Thus, BLMs operate as a type of early warning mechanism that alerts both Mexican and U.S. officials of local problems that need to be resolved immediately in order to avoid repercussions at the federal level. BLMs are headed by the consuls of both countries. There are 10 BLM’s that cover the 3,181 km of the border from the Tijuana/San Diego region to the Brownsville/Matamoro region. Three sub-groups operate under a BLM: the Migration/Protection and Facilitation of border crossings sub-group, the Public Security and Civil protection sub-group, and the Social and Economic Development sub-group. (Mecanismos de Enlace Fronterizo, 2005).

One area in which increased levels of cooperation are especially visible is in the area of drugs. For example the United States-Mexico Plenary Group on Law Enforcement was founded in 1995 by the attorney generals of both countries and meets four or five times a year (Paterson, 2001, 1). The main objective of the group is to exchange information and cooperate on anti-drug and crime related violence at the border (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001, 45). Other activities include training of Mexican police, intelligence gathering, and the creation of cross-border task forces to deal with crime (Paterson, 2001, 1). Even more important than the aforementioned example was the creation of the 1996 High Level Contact Group for Drug Control (HLCGDC) (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001: 46). The HLCGDC was the first official high-level group created to “coordinate and manage bilateral security relations from the policy to the operation level” (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro,

2001: 41). The HLCGDC meets twice a year and provides a space for joint counter-narcotics cooperation.

Contact and cooperation under the HLCGDC has in turn spurred more cooperation. For instance, in 1998 both countries created Bilateral Border Task Forces (BLTs), which operate as bilateral drug and law enforcement units along the border. The countries also established a bilateral working group for military issues and counter-drug cooperation. Additionally, Mexico agreed to various law enforcement training initiatives in which Mexicans were trained by American military, law enforcement, and navy personnel (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001: 45-46).

Aside from participating in the above mentioned task groups, commissions and workgroups, the U.S. and Mexico also worked together to hash out a plan for drug-related cooperation. For example, in 1997 the two governments jointly worked on and published the *United States-Mexico Bilateral Drug Threat Assessment*, which was the foundation for the 1997 Declaration of the United States-Mexico Alliance against Drugs. This initiative mapped out a binational counter-narcotics plan. Finally, in 1998 the United States-Mexico Bilateral Drug Strategy was issued (Dominguez, and Fernandez de Castro, 2001: 45).

It should be noted that there was also evidence of increased levels of interagency coordination in the U.S.-Mexico NAFTA era. The pre-NAFTA era was characterized by primarily government to government cooperation at the federal level. Cooperation between states and local governments was extremely limited. The advent of the NAFTA was marked by an increase in federal and state cooperation on both the U.S. and Mexico side. For example, BLMs institutionalized state and local government cooperation with

federal authorities. Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro note that BLMs have aided border personnel at multiple levels establish on-going communication (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001: 143).

The marked increase in instances of cooperation and the creation of a framework for drug and security related cooperation in the NAFTA period suggests that perhaps a regime is in operation. The multitude of instances of cooperation resembles a loose, decentralized structure that facilitates cooperation. Moreover, the nature of cooperation in the NAFTA compared to the pre-NAFTA era differs significantly. For one, cooperation is more regularized, rather than existing in an ad hoc and purely reactive fashion. As well, cooperation is more coordinated, with attempts made to construct a framework for cooperation. Seemingly improved cooperation in the NAFTA era can be partially attributed to a profound shift in the relationship, especially on the part of Mexico. Indeed, as chapter three points out, broader changes in Mexico's international context, its domestic situation, and economy enabled Mexican leaders to reorient their nationalist foreign policy. This dramatic reorientation culminated in the 1990s with the inception of NAFTA. Mexican leaders, through the NAFTA, signalled to the world that Mexico was serious about economic reform and democracy (Hristoulas, 2002: 8-9). Put another way, a qualitative change in how Mexico viewed its own position and its relation with the U.S. resulted in an increased willingness to cooperate. Mexico's newfound willingness to cooperate could perhaps be read as a reflection of a growing mutuality on the part of both countries that facilitated cooperation. However, the nature of cooperation and the U.S.'s imposition of policies that militarized the border tell a different story; a story made more accessible when viewed through a constructivist lens.

Degree of Intersubjectivity in the U.S.-Mexico NAFTA Border Era

The previous section revealed the increased amount of cooperation that took place between the U.S. and Mexico in the NAFTA period. Indeed, NAFTA can be credited not only with accelerating the pace and prevalence of cooperation, but also for engendering a new spirit of cooperation. Mexican officials who I interviewed pointed to the more positive attitudes between the two countries. In an interview at the North American section of the Mexican Foreign Ministry in 2002, a border official had the following to say on the matter:

Gradually there has been greater closeness between Mexico and the U.S. We have left behind traditional problems. For instance, we do not have a "narcotizada" relationship. There has not been this problem that narcotrafficking occupies the central core of discussion between Mexico and the U.S. We now talk about migration, about agility of crosses, other issues beyond drugs. Fox spoke about trust in Washington; both countries have more trust. This has provoked [changing] attitudes [from] government to government...The U.S. does not have to impose. Now we know we have to work together. We have to share more information; we have to communicate more because the situation demands it. We cannot reproduce the past situation because new challenges demand that we trust in each other. There has been a formidable change; you notice it in all sorts of meetings.

Similarly, In an interview I conducted on 19 September 2002, Dennis Linskey, the coordinator for the U.S.-Mexico border in the U.S. State Department commented on the "constructive" and "frank" nature of the relationship. He states:

....I think the relationship has matured, I think there is more of a realization that this relationship is so complex at so many levels that we should not allow any one issue to dominate it, because what happens when that one issue goes awry, everything else in the relationship does too. The United States was guilty of this when everything was put onto the focus of the narcotics issue.

Positive perceptions and attitudes were also evident in official leaders' statements. For

example, there was much fanfare around Bush's first official visit to a foreign country at the start of his presidential term. Bush decided to visit Mexico, a choice that U.S. officials touted as a sign of Mexico's importance in U.S. national priorities and a visit that concerned Canadian officials. In a Joint Press Availability after the announcement of Bush's visit to Mexico with the then Mexican Foreign Secretary Jorge Castañeda, former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell had the following to say:

President Bush's decision to travel to Mexico as his first official foreign visit is powerful evidence of the special place Mexico holds in our national priorities. Our dealings with Mexico impact...the lives of millions of Americans. Our common borders is no longer a line that divides us, but a region that unites our nations, reflecting our common aspirations, values and cultures (Washington File online, 2004).

President Fox also made a point of making the U.S. the site of his first official visit when he began his presidential tenure. Fox chose to redefine the U.S.-Mexico relationship based on what he labelled "un principio de confianza" or the principle of trust. In his oratory to U.S. Congress he established the parameters of this new relationship, which in the past had been too often characterized by mistrust. He stated:

I stand before you today with a simple message. Trust needs to be the key element of our new relationship... I am sure that many on both sides of the border would rather stick to the old saying that good fences make good neighbors... This perception has deep roots in history. In Mexico, they derive from a long-held sense of suspicion and apprehension about its powerful neighbor. And in the United States, they stem from previous experiences with a political regime governing Mexico which for the most part was regarded as undemocratic and untrustworthy... We are now bound closely together, whether in trade or tourism, economic or family ties. Our links are countless and ever growing... That is why our two great nations must go forward together to establish wider and deeper forms of cooperation and understanding. In this task, trust will be essential to achieve our goals...Simple trust, that is what has been sorely absent in our relationship in the past, and that is what is required for us to propel and strengthen our relationship in the days, weeks, and years to come. Let us foster trust between our societies. Let us build trust along our common borders. Let us take the road less-travelled-by and build confidence every step of the way. Only trust will allow us to constructively tackle the challenges our two nations face as we undertake to build a new partnership in North America (House of Representatives online,

2001).

The positive tone of official discourse in the NAFTA era certainly leads one to believe that high levels of positive intersubjective understandings were present and that at some levels, both Mexico and the U.S. communicated signals that indicated a new spirit of cooperation.

Mexico, for example, expected that the unprecedented amount of institutionalized economic cooperation ushered in by the NAFTA would “spillover” into the security domain. Put another way, Mexico hoped that any problems would now be handled along the new cooperative trajectory.. Serrano explains it well:

Drawing on the “security regulation” paradigm, security cooperation between Mexico and the U.S., Post-NAFTA, has proceeded in the belief that the political will to cooperate and to act in concert is all that is needed to meet external challenges and to regulate negative spillovers from tighter economic interdependence. The conviction is that solutions will simply flow from the maximization of bilateral cooperation (Serrano, 2003, 54).

In a 1999 communiqué issued after a visit with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Mexico’s Foreign Secretary Rosario Green echoed this point. Chancellor Green hoped that this new process of deepening cooperation would affect the whole bilateral relationship in a positive manner. Fernández de Castro and Dominguez paraphrase Chancellor Green on this point. They note that, “Specifically, Mexico hoped that both governments would work to ‘avoid surprises’, compartmentalize segments of the relationship so that a deterioration in one arena would not affect others, and ‘agree to disagree’ some times so that some specific disagreement would not jeopardize the overall relationship” (Dominguez and Fernández de Castro, 2001: 48).

The U.S., to some extent, also had a stake in making cooperation work. From an economic stand point, NAFTA was viewed as the first platform from which to initiate a

wider process of trade-liberalization throughout the entire hemisphere. Accordingly, both the Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations worked to institutionalize economic cooperation. Moreover, in 1995, the U.S. Secretary of Defense visited Mexico to engage in bilateral security discussions. Fernández de Castro and Dominguez note that William Perry was the first U.S. Secretary of Defense ever to visit Mexico and to encourage cooperation on drug issues (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001: 44).

The above discussion no doubt paints a positive and harmonious picture of U.S.-Mexico relations in the NAFTA era. Based on the discussion up to this point, it would appear that a transformative process occurred at the intersubjective level leading to positive perceptions of one another. However, the rise of U.S. border-control policies associated with drugs and migration issues at the U.S.-Mexico border, even in an era where institutional cooperation had reached all-time-high levels, indicates that cooperation does not necessarily lead to positive transformative intersubjective processes. Indeed high levels of cooperation can take place within a conflict ridden context.

Even before the implementation of NAFTA, the U.S. displayed heightened concerns about the enormous influx of Mexicans illegally crossing into the U.S. as the Immigration Reform and Control Act 1986 (IRCA) attests to. However, what is interesting to note about the NAFTA period is the tension between the new spirit of cooperation promoted by the NAFTA and the rise in border enforcement operations like Operation Gatekeeper, Operation Hold the Line, and Operation Hard Line, which were highly visible demonstrations of force involving hundreds of agents during the 1990s (Andreas, 2003, 3-4). Put another way, even as the border was becoming more frequently traversed, more open to open to the flows of legal trade and travel, “policing

trends...reinforced the border as a barrier against illegal flow" (Andreas, 2000, 3).

Similarly, U.S. preoccupation with drug trafficking at the border resulted in the imposition of unilateral law enforcement policies, which were designed to intercept drugs even in a context in which U.S. and Mexican officials elevated the celebratory discourse of economic integration. Andreas notes that bilateral drug cooperation, reflected in "highly visible but misleading indicators" of a joint commitment to drug eradication, was part of a consciously crafted image projected in order to successfully pass NAFTA (Andreas, 2000, 17). However, numerous instances of U.S. unilateral action conveyed a different image. For example: from 1997 to 1999, the Clinton Administration increased the number of border patrol agents from 3,384 to 6,213 along the south-western border (Dominguez and Fernández de Castro, 2001: 45); between 1990 and 1998 the Immigration and Naturalization Service came close to tripling its personnel while Drug Enforcement Agency agents doubled. Law enforcement budgets also grew to unprecedented rates with budgets rising from U.S. \$1 billion in 1993 to U.S. \$1.7 billion in 1998 (Serrano, 2003, 55-56). Moreover, in 1997, Mexico was subjected to two certification processes through the 1986 Omnibus Act.

Through these measures, the U.S. signalled to Mexico that they had negative perceptions of Mexico despite the economic success of the NAFTA. For even as Mexico made gains in the fight on drugs, the U.S. continued its offensive at the border. The U.S. believed that Mexico was a corrupt country that provided a haven for drug traffickers (Serrano, 2003, 58). There is of course a kernel of truth to the U.S. charge of corruption, however, conveniently left out of the equation is how U.S. drug policies have directly contributed to and aggravated the drug problem. For instance, Andreas sustains that U.S.

law enforcement tactics at the border have encouraged drug flows. Andreas states that: “Even while failing to control illegal border crossings, law enforcement has shaped their location, routes, methods and organization” (Andreas, 2000: 11). Ironically, the border offensive took place in the context of NAFTA and during calls for a borderless economy. Indeed, it would seem that NAFTA itself has contributed to drug problems. Andreas explains it well:

First, a perverse consequence of increased Mexican drug enforcement was to create more opportunities for corruption and increased incentives for smugglers to corrupt those doing the enforcing, and this in turn attracted more intensive U.S. media attention and congressional scrutiny. Second, NAFTA simultaneously drew more political attention to the border and made the task of border drug interdiction more complicated. Pressured by law enforcement, smugglers were turning more and more to commercial trucking as a cover, and the sharp post-NAFTA rise in the volume of trucks crossing the border made the difficulty of weeding out such drug shipments increasingly apparent (Andreas, 2000, 17).

This politically charged context exacerbated the situation and provided the U.S. with political ammunition to escalate fortification policies.

These instances of American unilateral intervention even in an era of increased institutionalization and cooperation led Mexican policy makers to the believe that they had no choice but to cooperate, rather than face the threat of unilateral action on Mexico’s “sovereignty” and “institutions” (Dominguez and De Castro, 2001, 43). In this instance, cooperation was not the process or result of increased and interaction that had changed each country’s view of the the other, but was a situation, rather, in which Mexico felt forced to cooperate. Indeed, most instances of cooperation were initiated, led, and dominated by the U.S.. For example, at the request of the U.S., Mexican Bilateral Border Task Force personnel were trained on the U.S. side, along with Mexican navy and anti narcotic units. Mexico also agreed to permit U.S. ships and aircraft to enter Mexico

in order to conduct detection missions (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001, 46). Most, if not all instances of cooperation focused on law enforcement and ultimately sought to fulfil American interests. Key Mexican priorities such as illegal migration were conspicuously absent. For instance, in the post-NAFTA period President Fox had made it clear to Bush that he wanted some form of regularization and mobility for Mexican migrants. The free mobility of Mexican migrants would help Mexico deal with its development gap and provide jobs for Mexicans. But aside from delivering empty rhetoric, the United States simply did not cooperate on key issues of Mexican interest and chose instead to pursue their law-enforcement policy.

The above discussion highlights that U.S.-Mexico cooperation in the NAFTA era took place within a highly asymmetrical framework. Although Mexico had hoped that the new cooperation trajectory introduced by the NAFTA would spill over into the security domain, NAFTA was not powerful enough to contain conflicts related to drugs and illegal migration (Dominguez and Fernandez de Castro, 2001, 43). The U.S.-Mexico border was thus the site of capital contrasts and contradictions in the NAFTA period. As Serrano put it: “[i]n one direction flows the massive tide of free trade. In the other, flows the massive securitization by Washington of drug control and migration policies” (Serrano, 2003, 53). Intersubjective relations and understanding were far from harmonious in the NAFTA era, especially on the part of the U.S.

Andreas suggests that high-profile border enforcement strategies are “less about deterring the flow of drugs and migrants and more about re-crafting the image of the border and symbolically reaffirming the state’s territorial authority (Andreas, 2000, 4). Thus the symbol of a border under duress, or, as Andreas calls it, the narrative of “loss of

control” at the border, provides an avenue not only to legitimize escalation policies, but more importantly to justify the use of state power to establish “moral boundaries” between those allowed within and those who are not (Andreas, 2000, 23). This is because, as constructivism maintains, political boundaries are invented. According to Golob:

Once we recognize the invented nature of political boundaries we see that borders are designed not only to keep external enemies out, but to define who and what is worth defending within those barriers, and why that particular state has the legitimate right to do so. The state justifies its primary role in the international system and its monopoly over the use of force at home by mediating between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside;’ that mediation happens at the border (Golob, 2002, 3).

Border-policing strategies designed to deter drugs or illegal immigrants are also about consolidating a particular image of the state. State actors manipulate the symbol of the border to legitimize state action and score political capital. Andreas notes that, “while the actors occupy social roles that have normative expectations attached to them, they can be creative and entrepreneurial occupiers of those roles. In other words, they can comply with but also manipulate the normative environment within which they are embedded” (Andreas, 2000: 13).

On its part, Mexico felt let down, but its position as the much weaker partner forced it to cooperate reluctantly with Washington’s policies. So even though security cooperation has occurred, it has taken place with much “foot-dragging” on the part of Mexico. As Serrano put it, “security cooperation depends on a shared view of both the means and goals of security policy. When the views diverge, the cooperation can still continue, but in the manner of a tandem bicycle with one free wheel” (Serrano, 2003, 54). Hence instances of cooperation took place within an over determined and conflict-ridden context, thus accounting for the low to low-medium levels of political integration.

The Canada-U.S. Border NAFTA Era

In contrast to the U.S.-Mexico border, where relatively low levels of political integration characterized the border region, medium levels of political integration were evident in the Canada-U.S. border region in the NAFTA era. The medium levels of political integration were especially reflected in the multitude of institutional instances of cooperation found at the border forming an integrated system of border management. Border discussions between Canadian and U.S. officials in the NAFTA era were also of a non-criminalized nature, usually centred on facilitation and infrastructure issues. This was of course sharply distinct from the securitization dominating U.S.-Mexico border discussions during the same period. Explanations for the more advanced levels of political integration found in the case of the U.S. and Canada usually look to the much friendlier and consultative nature of the broader Canada-U.S. relationship. Additionally, mutual intersubjective understandings of security matters often resulted in comparatively more advanced levels of political integration between Canada and the U.S. in the NAFTA era, as did the existence of a functioning regime around border issues that resembled liberal internationalist prescriptions.

Nevertheless, despite progress made at the northern border toward a more integrated system of border management, there remained divergent perceptions of “us” and “them”, even in an age where the border was open for trade and investment flows. The Ressam incident and U.S. attempts to fortify and securitize the Canadian border point to a disjuncture in the ideological realm. Moreover, Canadian attempts to differentiate a shared Canada-U.S. “we” from a Mexican “them” remained a potential

barrier to constructing a shared, trilateral North American identity.

Degree of Cooperation in the Canada-U.S. Border NAFTA Era

The Canada-U.S. border NAFTA era is characterized by high degrees of cooperation.

Numerous instruments of cooperation functioning in a coordinated system of cooperation were present in the NAFTA era. Mechanisms for cooperation overtly attempted to integrate approaches to border management, thus allowing it to resemble a regime.

Despite high levels of cooperation, however, the rationale and inducements behind them were usually initiated and led by Canada. This was an effort to reduce the asymmetries in the relationship, rather than on the result of a genuine convergence of a North American “we”.

The NAFTA era witnessed the emergence of a number of bilateral agreements that addressed border management issues as well as crime related issues. For example, in 1995, Prime Minister Chrétien and then U.S. President Bill Clinton met for a summit and announced what is now known as the Canada-United States of America Accord on our Shared Border or what is commonly referred to as the Shared Border Accord. The accord was the first of its kind to initiate a dialogue on border management reform. Under the accord, both governments committed themselves to: enable the flow of people and goods, provide stronger protection against illicit activities, and diminish costs to both the government and public (Gabriel, Jimenez and Macdonald, 2003: 11). The accord was also significant because it recognized that bilateral cooperation was necessary to accomplish these goals. Under the accord, activities aimed at addressing border congestion problems and initiatives to improve relations between customs and

immigration officials on both sides of the border were undertaken. But for the most part, initiatives were customs-related (Gabriel, Jimenez and Macdonald, 2003, 10).

In 1997, with the help of law enforcement officials from a variety of Canadian and American law enforcement agencies, Canada's Citizenship and Immigration institution and U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services cooperated to develop a strategic regional plan for migration issues called Border Vision. The aim of Border Vision was to deal with migration problems before they reached the two countries. Under Border Vision the two countries agreed to regularly exchange intelligence information and map trends on illegal migrant smuggling in an effort to develop strategies to prevent illegal migration (Canada-U.S.Partnership, 2000: 49-50). Border Vision was broken up into five workgroups: the Transboundary Working Group, the Intelligence and Enforcement working group, the Regional Strategies working group, the Asylum working group, and the Business Facilitation working group (Canadian Embassy in Washington online, 2005).

Also in 1997, Clinton and Chrétien agreed to establish a bilateral consultative mechanism to address cross-border crime issues. Led by the Solicitor General of Canada and the Attorney General of the U.S., the Cross Border Crime Forum brought together over 60 officials from Canada and the U.S. to deal with transnational crime-related issues. The forum was initially created to address smuggling across Eastern regions of both countries. But its past successes, including improved cooperation and information sharing between the two countries and the increasingly transnational nature of crime, led to the expansion of the forum to include the entire border and other issues such as organized crime, kidnapping, money laundering, and telemarketing fraud (Canada-U.S.

Partnership, 200: 51-52).

Another instance of cross-border crime cooperation was the creation of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET). IBETs were created in 1996 by Washington State and British Columbia police, immigration and customs officials. These officials created binational teams to work on cross border crime issues. IBETs were built on the idea of partnership and on sharing information so as to prevent illegal activities and acts of terrorism (Canada-U.S. Partnership, 2000: 49). The goal of IBETs are to ensure an open border for business and a closed border for crime. IBETs originally focused on drug smuggling issues, but were later expanded to include terrorism (Flynn, 2003, 116).

Perhaps the most important high-level border cooperation mechanism in the NAFTA era is the Canada-U.S Partnership Forum (CUSP). CUSP was initiated in 1999 by Lloyd Axworthy, then Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister, and Madeline Albright, then U.S. Secretary of State. Their intent was to encourage high-level talks among governments, border communities, and other stakeholders in order to manage and build “a border for the 21st century” (Canada-U.S. Partnership, 2000, 3). The aim of CUSP was to design an integrated approach to the management of the border. In order to accomplish these goals,

a framework for cooperation was created. It would enable governments to:

1. Consult with government agencies on progress in cross-border cooperation.
2. Promote high level dialogue among federal, provincial/territorial, and local authorities, border communities and stakeholders towards a common vision for border management, and
3. Identify emerging issues and long-term trends in border collaboration (Canada-U.S. Partnership, 2000, 17).

CUSP meetings were noteworthy for the participation of a wide range of stakeholders.

For example, aside from Canada's Foreign Ministry and the U.S. State Department, other participants included: federal departments involved in managing the border, the private sector, NGOs, academic communities, state governors, provincial leaders, members of parliament, and U.S. congressional staff (Canada-U.S. Partnership, 2000, 18). What eventually emerged from these meetings was the prescription for a border based on a "risk management" approach that would later serve as the model for the Canada-United States Smart Border Declaration.

In sum, the multitude of agreements and forums centred on the management of the Canada-U.S. border in the NAFTA era indicate that relatively moderate levels of cooperation were in operation. This is not surprising considering the broader NAFTA context and the extent to which higher economic integration led to pressure for more cooperation. Indeed, the very success of NAFTA affected border management practices that predated it. The outstanding growth in trade post-NAFTA was not accompanied by the adoption of new infrastructure that could facilitate the increased flow of trade and people. The consequence was bottlenecks at the border and congestion that resulted in significant delays, none of which was conducive to business (Meyers, 2000: 257). Increased trade also affected service at the borders. Meyers explains that cross-border trade between Canada and the United States mainly occurred at four ports of entry, significantly hampering the ability of the limited number of immigration and customs personnel to do their jobs (Meyers, 2000, 258). Clearly, then, the sheer volume of trade had "outmatched the quantity of border machinery and the infrastructure capacity in place to deal with it" (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 164). These issues prompted officials to partake in new instances of institutionalized

cooperation that functioned to form a regime.

From a liberal internationalist perspective, Canada and the U.S.'s shared interests has enabled them to form a border regime. Mechanisms like the CUSP and Border Vision aimed at blocking illegal activities, while at the same time keeping the border open for trade. This shared understanding enabled the creation of new instances of cooperation. Additionally, instances of cooperation were clearly more advanced than those found at the southern border. CUSP, for instance, sought to implement an integrative approach to border management that would harmonize border policies. Border instruments in the Canada-U.S. NAFTA era also sought to build a framework for cooperation, which appointed the relevant agencies and departments that would be involved in the process and further delineated a process for cooperation. Also noteworthy is the fact that a model for border-cooperation attempted to include participation from a variety of stakeholders including NGOs, rather than merely those from government and the business sector. This is important because, in contrast to the area of the environment, border management had to this point been led by government actors and business groups who had a stake in keeping the border open for trade. Visibly missing was the inclusion of NGOs who add a level of accountability and public participation to the process. However, despite the discussion and interaction generated by these bilateral instances of cooperation, these did not result in high levels of positive forms of intersubjectivity.

Degree of Intersubjectivity in the Canada-U. S. Border NAFTA Era

The Canada-U.S. NAFTA era contains moderate levels of intersubjectivity hindered by power asymmetries that then effect border instruments. Moreover, the emerging desire,

evident in U.S. discourse, to construct an increasingly “Mexicanized” northern border, combined with Canada’s efforts to resist trilateralizing border management, itself evident in the elevated Canada-U.S. “special relationship” discourse, pointed to a disjuncture in the intersubjective realm that acted as a significant barrier to the construction of a North American security community.

Stephanie Golob notes that one way asymmetries of power manifested is in an asymmetry of attention dimension. U.S. military and economic dominance at times materializes in an asymmetry of attention (Golob, 2002, 120). The result is as Robert Keyes of the Canadian Chamber of Congress in his testimony to Canada’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade notes, a policy of ‘benign neglect’ with respect to the border (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002: 165).

Lack of political will, of course, was evident on both sides of the border, but it was especially pronounced on the American side. Particular U.S. border agencies as well as certain segments of the Washington policy community at times displayed neglectful tendencies and paid insufficient attention to a border with deteriorating infrastructure, services, funding, and staffing levels—even as NAFTA, and FTA before it, had ushered in unprecedented levels of trade. Canada, on the other hand, could not adopt a similar strategy. Its economic dependence on the U.S. meant that it had to actively engage the United States “in developing a coherent long-term bilateral approach to border management” (Gabriel, Jimenez and Macdonald, 2003, 12). As an economically dependant middle power, living next to a superpower, Canada was forced to develop “a set of tools to help it handle the structural asymmetries of negotiating with the United

States" (Kitchen, 2003, 2). The consequence for Canada was the active negotiation of initiatives such as CUSP and Border Vision, which would recast the U.S.'s attention on the border, keep the border open for trade, and allow Canada to manage some of the structural asymmetries in the relationship. This underscores the severity of the disjunction that existed between the two countries' visions of the border.

The above assessment reveals that cooperation, at least in this instance, was less about a convergence of ideas on how to best manage the border and more about Canada trying to keep structural asymmetries in check, while maintaining access to the U.S. market. Having said this, in issues that have both a domestic and international dimension, the reality of the situation is far more complex, with cross-cutting interests and pressures at work on both sides of the border.

For example, in the highly contentious context of the introduction of House Resolution 2202, the initial Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Canada joined forces with sympathetic U.S. interest groups, congressional members, and state representatives who were mindful of the potential effects of Section 110 of the IIRIRA. Section 110 would call for the registration of all non-Americans by Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS), which would severely impede cross-border travel at the northern border (Ackelson, 2000, 22). Ackelson notes that this initiative "would [have] cripple[d] cross-border interaction and severely interfere[d] with the neo-liberal NAFTA goals of free trade" (Ackelson, 2000: 23). Others, like Democratic Congressman Patrick Kennedy, voted against the legislation on the grounds that it was racist:

This mean spirited bill... heightens the fear, hysteria, and anti-immigrant fervour that are running rampant across this country. For this reason, I

could not in good conscience support this legislation...Have we become so desperate that we must resort to these drastic measures? Creating an Orwellian society in which individuals must present a card to verify their legality refutes everything that is right and good about America. It is blind and unfair. It fans the flames of prejudice (Cited in Ackelson, 2000: 27).

Anti-Section 110 sentiments from both U.S. border officials and Canadian trade and other groups demonstrate that various U.S. and Canadian interests are at play in the resolution of an issue. So, in this case, the U.S. did not fully ignore Canadian interests.

Nevertheless, in the NAFTA era, Canada was preoccupied with access and facility issues at the border. However, the United States's growing concern over security at their southern border also had negative effects for Canada.

In the post-cold war era, the principle 'enemy' and focus of U.S. concern was illegal immigration from Mexico, which resulted in the increased fortification and militarization of the southern border. Between Canada and the U.S., the border at the start of the pre-NAFTA period was relatively peaceful and decriminalized. The nature of the border was a product "of a broad consensus reached between the two countries about the management of foreign policy and the nature of common threats from the region" (Gabriel, Jimenez and Macdonald, 2003, 9). In the period after the Cold War, Canada and the U.S. continued to cultivate a shared vision of security. Golob recounts Canadian and U.S. thinking at the time:

After the end of the Cold War and into the "age of globalization" dawning in the 1990s, both countries began a rethinking of the nature of "security" policy which was all the more detached from the traditional, territorial notion of self-defense. The concept of "human security" was championed by Canada's then-Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, and Clinton administration military cuts were coupled with talk of expanding the definition of security to encompass non-military areas such as migration and disease. These changes in rhetoric and policy did not preclude a role for the protection of the "homeland," but certainly did locate the main security threats in areas of the world far removed from the zone of prosperity formed by the two North American nations (Golob, 2002, 9).

However, the advent of both the FTA and NAFTA, which had put a renewed focus on the border, along with the shift in U.S. interpretations of national security threats added a new dimension to the northern border. The U.S.'s focus on the criminalized nature of the U.S.-Mexico border affected the northern border when the U.S. moved to implement policies and legislation that would treat both borders as essentially the same, despite their radical differences. The most significant of these, of course, came in the form of Section 110 of the 1996 IIRIRA. As mentioned earlier, Section 110 required the INS to implement a system of entry and exit that would document any non-American arrival and departure at the border. These measures would severely cripple the economic life-line of the border (Ackelson, 2000, 22). Upon realizing the implications of such legislation, Canadian government officials, business groups, and border communities quickly mobilized and succeeded in blocking Section 110. The United States' unilateral imposition of security measures reminded Canadian officials that they were in fact dealing with a superpower, and that their relationship was accordingly unequal. More, it alerted Canadian officials of an increasingly alarming trend towards the securitization of the Canadian border.

The issue of protection at the Canada-U.S. border did not permeate border discourse until the Ressam incident in 1999. In December of that year, U.S. officials apprehended Algerian terrorist Ahmed Ressam as he was attempting to enter the U.S. from Vancouver with a truck full of bomb-making equipment (Flynn, 2003, 115). Even though U.S. attorney general John Ashcroft eventually conceded that it was Canadian authorities who had first alerted U.S. officials of Ressam, public discourse had already soured. Canada was now a haven for terrorists—a lax nation whose permissive attitude

towards borders and immigration had now made it a seed-bed for security threats. Republican Representative Lamar Smith, the original architect of the 1996 IIRIRA, labeled Canada a “Club Med for terrorists” in his opening statement to hearings before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary. Congressman Smith stated that border policy “created a situation where terrorists, and also illegal aliens, alien smugglers, and drug smugglers, [were] increasingly using Canada as a transit country en route to the United States” (Right cited in Ackelson: 2000: 27-28).

The Ressam incident convinced American policymakers that terrorists were lurking in Canada. As one Canadian official at the North American division of Foreign Affairs Canada stated in an interview I conducted in 2002:

Prior to Ressam, I don't think they thought it was a threat at all. There were the articles that would come out from time to time about Canada being a Club Med for terrorists. Basically, formerly, CSIS or CIC officials who were taking the positions publicly that we had systems in place or that we harbored terrorists, that was out there but it really hadn't penetrated into the U.S. until Ressam. And once Ressam hit, there was a heightened concern in the U.S. as a series of articles post-Ressam dealt with this and there were Congressional hearings etc.

Before Ressam, the U.S. focus had mostly been on Mexico because of the criminalized nature of the United States -Mexico border. However, after the Ressam incident, Canada became an increasing concern to Americans. Chris Gregory, former border officer in the North American division of Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs comments on the same issue in an interview with the author in May 2000. He states:

... I think what happened in December of 1999 is Ressam was caught at the border. Ever since then there was a new dynamic in play and that was whether or not there was a threat from the North, and whether or not something should be done at the U.S.'s northern border to mitigate that threat. This was sort of a new issue for Canada to deal with and for the northern States to deal with. I think before December 1999 there was just

no perception of a threat, certainly not of a terrorist threat.

The attempt by some segments of the U.S. government to, namely Smith and other Republicans, to recast the Canadian border as a new terrorist threat clashed significantly with the NAFTA-associated rhetoric that promoted a borderless economy and with the liberal internationalist view that greater economic interdependence results in improved and friendly cross-border relations (Andreas, 2000: 6). Indeed, active U.S. perceptions of an increasingly “Mexicanized” northern border acted as a symbolic barrier to the creation of a North American approach to managing the borders. Canada’s resistance to American attempts to treat both borders the same and its attempts to promote a much ‘different’ northern border—the construction of an ‘us’ (Canada-U.S.) different from a ‘them’ (Mexico)—clearly rejects and undermines a truly trilateral and North American approach to borders.

Specifically telling is Canada’s elevation of the so called “special relationship” discourse that undermines the trilateralization of borders. As noted in Chapter Three, Canada’s belief in a “special relationship” with the U.S. has its roots in the war years, which cemented a shared perception of North America, a “we” based on a peaceful model of resolving inter-state conflict and liberal values, as opposed to a European “they” engulfed in war and bloodshed. This belief in a North American identity facilitated the creation of a common defence front in times of war. However, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the U.S. seemingly neglected this shared vision and concentrated on its own interests, while Canada, on the other hand, occasionally resuscitated this idea. This is especially noticeable in Canadian attempts to resist U.S. or Mexican overtures to treat the two borders equally.

Consider the following quote from an official I interviewed in 2002 at the North

American division of Foreign Affairs Canada:

Mexicans have been pushing and pushing to have some kind of trilateral perimeter discussion and they were picking up a little bit on the White House initiative that came out of the Homeland Security Directive. The Directive said, well we should have, we should deal with our Mexican border and, our Canadian border, both security and facilitation; we made it clear that that's not on. It's complicated enough trying to have U.S. and Canadian customs sorting out their issues and all the other players. We are not going to bring in the Mexican equation.... because the two borders are totally different. U.S. concerns about the Mexican border, and U.S. concerns about our border are completely different, the whole set of issues, they are not about to have NEXUS and Customs Self-Assessment. We are already there and we want to take that to the next plane. They are still dealing with traffic, and so we're not going to slow down our efforts.

Canada's clear rejection of a North American approach to the borders presents a significant obstacle and repudiates the mutuality necessary to construct a North American community. Thus, in sum, apparent all-time-high levels of cooperation around border issues are not accompanied by significant positive changes in the intersubjective realm. The resistance on the part of the U.S., reflected in its attempts to unilaterally "Mexicanize" the northern border, and the unsuccessful Canadian attempt to construct a North American "we" that excludes Mexico do not translate to high degrees of North American political integration.

The Post-9/11 Border Era

The 9/11 attacks on the U.S. had dramatic effects on the Canada-U.S. and U.S.-Mexico border regimes and on the continental border management agenda. At first glance, it appears that institutionalized cooperation in the post-9/11 era, propelled by economic and security concerns, reached levels that even surpassed rates of cooperation established under NAFTA. Facilitated by prior historical perceptions of a shared North American identity, and strong patterns of contact and interaction, Canada and the U.S. participated

in numerous forums that resulted in unparalleled levels of cooperation. The U.S. and Mexico, with much different historical, institutional, and cultural patterns of contact also took part in an array of cooperation mechanisms, albeit to a lesser degree when compared to Canada and the U.S. According to neo-functional theoretical postulations, new levels of cooperation should translate to, as Golob puts it, “a seed for the kind of mutuality....essential to constructing a ‘North American’ identity (Golob, 2002, 24). This, in turn, should result in higher levels of political integration, at least in the case of the U.S. and Canada, and moderate levels of political integration in the case of the U.S. and Mexico. However, despite cooperation increases in the post-9/11 era, a closer examination of Smart Border and perimeter policies at both borders revealed inconsistencies and signs of divergence that consequently led to medium levels of political integration between Canada and the U.S. Resistance was especially pronounced in the Mexican case, where Mexico’s response to American security policies after 9/11 was shaped by a past history of antagonistic relations and by other domestic policy concerns (Clarkson and Banda, 2003, 12). In addition, the lack of institutionalization and cooperation on a trilateral basis accentuated the persistent bilateralism inherent in the trilateral relationship, which further arrested movement towards political integration.

9/11 sent a shock that stunned the United States and reverberated throughout North America and the world. The U.S.’s immediate response was to unilaterally impose a security level one alert, which required that border personnel inspect every vehicle passing through the border (Flynn, 2003, 10). The systemic shocks of 9/11 also affected how the U.S. thought about the world and its role within it. It led U.S. officials to reorder their entire set of paradigms, elevating security and counter terrorism above everything

else. From a constructivist perspective, the existence of the new social situation created by 9/11 led to a “breakdown of the consensus about identity commitments” (Wendt, 1999: 49). No longer were prevailing conceptions of equality under NAFTA and harmonious relations under increased economic integration viable. Rather, for the U.S., an appropriate role/identity was now based on a hard-line counter-terrorist ideology. In other words, 9/11 became an ideal pretext for the U.S. to legitimately construct a new identity and role for itself. This novel identity was based on an understanding of a new enemy defined broadly as “terrorism” and in the new practices associated with defining this elusive enemy (Croucher, 2004: 4).

This first stage gave way to another, in which not only ideas about the self were re-examined, but also the very structures of ideation. Thus the U.S. engaged in broad structural changes. As Clarkson and Banda state:

Its rise was confirmed by the creation of a new set of security-themed institutions. The U.S. Attorney General set up the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force. The Department of Justice established another fifty-six joint terrorism task forces and ninety-three anti-terrorism task forces. A colour-coded Homeland Security Advisory System was put in place. Final evidence of paradigm shift was the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which was created out of twenty-two separate existing agencies to give counter-terrorism its institutional base within the Beltway (Clarkson and Banda, 2003, 9-10).

This second stage of redefining the American self, along with its associated practices, opened the path to a third stage in which the identity of others also changed. Wendt puts it like this:

...it is not enough to rethink one's own ideas about self and other, since old identities have been sustained by systems of interaction with *other* actors, the practices of which remain a social fact for the transformative agent. In order to change the self, then, it is often necessary to change the identities and the interests of the others that help sustain those systems of interaction (Wendt, 1992, 421).

To this end, the U.S. delivered security changes that applied to its neighbours in an “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” fashion, effectively reordering the existing paradigm (Cited in Clarkson and Banda, 2003: 13). However, as this chapter will go on to delineate, Mexico, and Canada to a lesser extent, had difficulty reconstituting themselves to align with U.S. security needs. The North American peripheries displayed significant disjunctions and negative perceptions in the intersubjective realm that prevented any shared North American identity from emerging. Consequently, any resultant integration is asymmetrical, U.S.-led and dominated, without any accompanying mutuality.

The U.S.-Mexico Post-9/11 Border Era

The adoption of the 2002 U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership both elevated and deepened rates of institutionalized cooperation in the Post-9/11 era. At a theoretical level, it is not difficult to account for the deeper institutionalized levels of cooperation. For, as constructivist theory suggests, the dramatic effects of 9/11 provided a moment of crisis in which actors reassessed pre-existing conceptions of self and other based on the new situation at hand (Wendt, 1999, 418–419). The U.S. thus adopted a hard-line counter-terrorist approach, while Mexico re-examined its own position and embarked on a number of institutional changes designed to address the new security dilemma. These new instances of cooperation formed what resembled a regime. However, Mexico’s resistance to reorienting its security priorities to fit U.S. security needs and the different interpretations of security demonstrated by both countries resulted not only in a regression in the bilateral relationship, but also indicated that high levels of cooperation

could coexist with negative forms of intersubjectivity.

Degree of Cooperation in the U.S.-Mexico Post-9/11 Border Era

There is no doubt that 9/11 accelerated cooperation and coordination between the U.S. and Mexico. In various bilateral, high-level meetings both Mexican and American officials commented on the excellent nature of cooperation between both countries. For instance, on April 20, 2003, the *Universal* commented on the increased cooperation. Cooperation between both countries customs agencies was at an all-time high. Constant contact between customs officials on both sides of the borders permitted wait times to become shorter and prevented bottlenecks from forming. There was also an unusually high amount of contact, communication, and cooperation between high-level officials and on-the-ground officials.

American officials also noted the increased amounts of cooperation and commented publicly on Mexico's willingness to cooperate. An article entitled "Mexican Border Express Lane Sought" written by Will Weissert and published in the *Los Angeles Times* on March 6 2002 noted that in a news conference between Tom Ridge and Mexican Minister of Governance Creel, Ridge stated that the Fox administration had been receptive to American concerns, and that they had shared "unprecedented amounts of information."

It is hardly surprising that cooperation increased. The backlog at the border and the potential economic fallout convinced Mexican officials that cooperation was absolutely necessary. Additionally, the U.S. had security concerns with respect to Mexico, centred on the view that Mexico's weak security and immigration structure

might fall prey to terrorist organizations (Andreas, 2003: 32). Due to the already militarized nature of the U.S.-Mexico border, fewer security changes were necessary than at the Canada-U.S. border (Clarkson and Banda, 2003, 12). Nevertheless, immediately after the attacks, Mexico engaged in a number of anti-terrorist tactics that resembled Mexico's old strategies of fighting drugs and the United States's ongoing tactics to deter illegal immigrants. For instance, the Mexican government stopped and interrogated hundreds of people of Arabic heritage, prohibited the entrance of citizens from particular countries, and gave American officials data on possible terrorists in Mexico (Flynn, 2003: 12). In response to U.S. pressure, Mexico beefed up the policing of its border with Central America. According to Stephen Flynn, "Mexico is doing Washington's police work. Indeed, Mexico's border enforcement initiatives may be viewed as a 'thickening' of the American border, with Mexico becoming a 'buffer zone'" (Flynn, 2003, 13). The Mexican government also made some legislative changes and proposed a new intelligence gathering law to Congress. They are designing a new national information database and a number of technology-enhancing projects that will allow it to better detect criminals (Andreas, 2003, 12). Fox also took steps to clean up internal institutions charged with security issues (Andreas, 2003, 38).

The hallmark of institutional cooperation was the 2002 U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership. The Border partnership was a way of addressing security threats at the same time as those of trade and facilitations interests. It included 22 points that address issues pertaining to the secure flow of people, secure flow of goods, and secure border infrastructure. Under the agreement, both countries pledged to work on developing mechanisms and systems that would allow for the smooth and rapid flow of legitimate

people and goods, while also addressing security concerns. As an instrument of cooperation it was more advanced than previous pre- and post-NAFTA instances of cooperation. It was more explicit than the Binational Commission set up in the 80s and the Border Liaison Mechanisms in the 90s, thus it elaborated a clear framework for cooperation in the 9/11 era. It also institutionalized regular and day-to-day border cooperation between the two countries (Andreas, 2003: 38).

However, even though the Border Partnership certainly represents the most advanced arrangement between the two countries to date, it is still weak, especially when compared to its Canada-U. S. counterpart. Indeed, the U.S.-Mexico plan is framed within the confines of the broader historical bilateral relationship. For example, the U.S.-Mexico plan has only 22 points of agreement compared to the 32 points contained within the Canada-U.S. plan. This discrepancy can be accounted for by an extra section in the Canada-U.S. plan that addresses the integration and coordination of functions between both countries. The U.S.-Mexico agreement lacks such a section because the U.S. and Mexico have not yet reached a point in their relationship where they can begin to undertake these tasks (Gabriel, Jimenez and Macdonald, 2003). In an interview I conducted in 19 November 2002 with Demetrios Papademetriou of the Migration Policy Institute in Washington D.C. he refers to this as ‘differing levels of intensity’:

We’re asking a different level of intensity on the part of Canada than on the part of Mexico. [With Mexico] the 22 points are about indefinite kinds of immeasurable outcomes. With Canada, every 6 months an agreement has to be reached. It’s more progress oriented in Canada, more action oriented. In Mexico it’s aspiration oriented...

The significant disparity in levels of intensity are, of course, a reflection of broader issues in the U.S.-Mexico relationship. Mistrust, conflict, and ill feelings have historically characterized the relationship and play out in border instruments. For

instance, as a March 1, 2001 article in the *Washington Post* quoted Tom Ridge as saying, “...although the Canadian accord is a good starting point...the U.S. has concerns about Mexico that must be addressed, including reducing the flow of illegal immigrants and curtailing drug trafficking”. One can discern similar views when examining the U.S.-Mexico Smart Border plan in detail: point 11 of the agreement on the deterrence of Alien Smuggling; point 21 on Combating Fraud; point 22 on Contraband Interdiction—all make reference to what the U.S. believes is the criminalized nature of the U.S.-Mexico border (Gabriel, Jimenez, and Macdonald, 2003: 33). In addition, factors like drug trafficking along the border, illegal immigration, and the corruption that has been prevalent among Mexican customs and immigration officials are reflected in border instruments like the U.S.-Mexico Smart Border Accord. The weak nature of the U.S.-Mexico plan, the lesser emphasis placed on cooperation and coordination, and some of the criminalized aspects of the plan suggest that while a hazily-defined regime may exist, it lacks the corresponding change at the level of interests, norms and ideas, or intersubjective understandings. It is to this point that I now turn.

Degree of Intersubjectivity in the U.S.-Mexico Post-9/11 Border Era

The U.S.-Mexico post-9/11 era contains low levels of intersubjectivity (not quite as low as those found in the NAFTA era) resulting in low degrees of political integration. Put another way, there were high levels of disintegrative factors such as negative perceptions of the “other”, feelings of mistrust and ill will between the two countries, and prevalent asymmetries in the relationship. These factors may not necessarily block practices of cooperation, but can result in divergence and disjunction in the intersubjective realm,

precluding the feelings of mutuality necessary to cause positive movement on the intersubjective front.

Signs of divergence emerged immediately after 9/11 on the part of both countries. In each case, both the U.S. and Mexico sent signals, either through action or political rhetoric, which communicated distinctiveness. Distinctiveness was more pronounced in the case of the less powerful partner who was unable to completely alter itself to fit with U.S. security demands. Clarkson and Banda put it this way:

...overall paradigm reordering in Mexico was more reluctant—physically, institutionally and fiscally. The authorities did not provide counter-terrorism with an autonomous institutional base...Mexico's responses were domestically determined by a historical mistrust that kept its paradigm set from becoming fully congruent with the United States... (Clarkson and Banda, 2003, 12-13).

Domestic squabbling rooted in historical perceptions of the U.S. and a general discomfort with the way the U.S. had reordered its security policies in the aftermath of 9/11 conditioned Mexican behaviour and determined how far Mexico was willing to go.

The first signal of divergence can be found in Mexico's tepid response to 9/11. As Serrano puts it: "9/11 may have been difficult to comprehend for the Mexican public, but it was not traumatic...Mexico's response to the terrorist attacks was delayed, distanced, and clearly mishandled. The lack of public and spontaneous expressions of sympathy and swift official acts of solidarity...all spoke of the depth of Mexico's alienation from the U.S...."(Serrano, 2003, 47). In an interview I conducted on 12 September 2002, Deborah Meyers of the Migration Policy Institute in Washington D.C. put it in similar terms: "Canada came out very strongly in support of the U.S., much stronger than Mexico, and that was noticed politically...Fox was really quiet compared to the Canadian government, and so that was good I think for Canada, to be really seen as a friend and a partner and a

neighbour.” Fox’s weak and delayed response can be explained by domestic determinants. Party opposition combined with public scepticism in Mexico “vis-à-vis rapprochement with the U.S.” influenced how far Mexico could accede to the U.S. without appearing to sacrifice sovereignty (Serrano, 2003, 52). Fox, of course, quickly recovered when he perceived U.S. disdain over the quality of Mexico’s response and pushed for cooperation, not because Mexico shared a common perception of the situation with the U.S., but because of Mexico’s own interests. First, and most importantly, the virtual closure of the border after 9/11 created concerns about Mexico’s economic life-line. Cooperation with the U.S. in the form of a Smart Border plan was viewed as a way to facilitate commerce and reduce costly delays at the border. Second, a Smart Border accord was seen by the Fox administration as a way to regain lost ground and return to their NAFTA Plus agenda, which includes an immigration deal with the U.S. A final factor is that Mexico believes that there should be congruency and consistency with respect to U.S. treatment of North American borders since all three countries participate in the same trade agreement. In an interview on 01 February 2002 with Patricia Vasquez at the Mexican Foreign Ministry border section she highlighted this point. She thus states: “..there should be the same treatment for all members. Due to migration issues we don’t receive the same treatment. We have different problems at the border. The borders are different in their daily operation, but the border concept is the same throughout.”

Mexico’s official endorsement of the idea of a North American security perimeter also reveals a similar line of reasoning. But before explaining Mexico’s acceptance of this perimeter, some brief background information to frame the context of discussion is necessary.

Sometime in the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. developed the idea of a North American perimeter. In an interview on 19 November 2002 with Demetrious Papademetriou of the Migration Policy Institute in Washington he defines “perimeter” as the following:

....it means what Ambassador Cellucci says it means. We gradually, over time, begin to shift energy away from the physical border but we balance our energy on trying to prevent it from coming into North America in the first place. The perimeter concept is about pushing the physical border away from North America. As one of the by products of the price of doing this we will have stronger levels of cooperation in terms of coming into the U.S. This requires higher levels of intelligent cooperation. This sharing will have to become organic.

Hristoulas explains that a continental perimeter is a three tiered concept. At one level, it includes an amelioration of border efficiency by implementing more intelligent approaches to processing border examinations. This is the most basic form of security perimeter and, to some extent, is already in place through the Smart Border plans. A second level involves the reconceptualization of the way the border is conceived, defined, and located. Canada, the United States and Mexico would work away from the territorial border in order to decrease the need for inspection at the border itself. Problems would be addressed before actually reaching the physical border. The third and final level is the most advanced form of perimeter. It includes harmonization of immigration, customs, and national security policies that would ultimately eliminate border inspections altogether. This third level also involves a cognitive and symbolic dimension that enables the three countries to first agree on shared visions of what a common North American immigration and security policy might be (Hristoulas, 2003, 32-33).

In principle, Mexico accepts and has actively promoted the idea of a security perimeter in its foreign policy discourse (Hristoulas, 2003, 39). Reasons for this again go

back to Mexico's own interest in deepening NAFTA and the immigration question. Mexican officials viewed 9/11 as another avenue to pursue its immigration goals, and argued that an immigration deal between the two countries that legalizes migrants is the answer to secure borders. Fox's point is that as long as many immigrants are undocumented, the U.S. will not have as much control over who is crossing the border. Several quotes from interviews I conducted in 2002 with Mexican officials mirror this view. One border official in the North American section of the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores (SRE) said the following:

In the same manner, we could face many problems in terms of a lack of coordination and institutions in all three countries if we don't jointly think about security—whether it's in terms of criminal activity or part of the everyday security of people. One concrete example is: what are the guarantees that individuals will have in the three countries if we have greater interregional mobility? That is why the idea of a perimeter security is very important. It would draw the authorities of each country closer to discussing these issues. This would eventually lead us to an important part of the integration process that we are generating, which is the harmonization or standardization of many norms...security does not necessarily signify problems of narco-trafficking, etc... It obliges us to think about how to organize ourselves with common rules

In another interview conducted on 10 April 2002 with Mexican Jose Luis Avila at the National Population Council it is put even more directly:

[One] of the components of this security [perimeter] has to be an...agreement [for] orderly and secure immigration. Why? Because the way in which the migration phenomenon has been managed increases risks and uncertainties about what is happening in the border region. I would think that the plantamiento of security on border supposes security for migrants and for the actual immigration authorities.

Clearly, then, as the above discussion has demonstrated, Mexico has pursued U.S. security cooperation but only in a limited manner, partly to ensure that economic damage was minimal and partly to find another way to address its own immigration concerns.

On its part, the U.S. expects Mexico's cooperation on security matters and even

welcomes Mexico's support of a security perimeter, but has remained vague on Mexico's linking its migration goals with American homeland security concerns. As Hristoulas states: "State department officials have stressed that although migration is an important issue in the bilateral relationship, it is presently unrelated to U.S. homeland security" (Andreas, 2003: 41). On the contrary, U.S. actions with respect to Mexico indicated that the U.S. continued to view Mexico as a threat. Indeed, in its quest to reorder the security paradigm Post-9/11 and legitimize its actions in a new security context, the U.S. tied undocumented migration to terrorism.

One notable example was the alignment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) war on terrorism with U.S. immigration control policies. In his statement to the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, the Commissioner of the Customs Border Protection Agency (CBP), Robert Bonner, notes that: "The very existence of CBP makes us vastly better able to protect our nation from all external threats whether illegal migrants and illegal drugs, terrorists, terrorist weapons, including weapons of mass destruction" (Statement of Commissioner Robert C. Bonner online, 2004).

Bonner's statement linking terrorism to undocumented migration perpetuates the view that migrants pose the same level of threat to the U.S. as terrorism. Croucher notes that when the U.S. tightened its border with Mexico, it carefully guarded who had access to the national community and who did not. Invariably, Mexican migrants were caught in the cross-fire, not only because many of them were attempting to cross the border without documents, but also because immigrants have become part of U.S. terrorist discourse Post-9/11. Croucher explains it well:

Immigrants and open borders stayed on the U.S. political agenda after 9/11, but now as purported causes or contributors to terrorism, and as such, a central target of efforts to defend the American nation. Homeland (in)security has since focused overwhelmingly on tightening the borders and policing non-citizens—documented and undocumented (Croucher, 2004, 22).

Mexico was decidedly disappointed with the U.S.'s elevation of security to the top of its agenda at the cost of other issues like migration. The result was a regression in the relationship between the two countries, which highlighted the fact that "prior ideological harmony and warm personal ties were not enough to accommodate a drastic shift of the hegemon's paradigm set" (Clarkson and Banda, 2003, 20). Even though Mexico cooperated with the United States in its counter terrorism strategy, it did so for its own reasons and "it did not develop a special institutional base for it" (Clarkson and Banda, 2003, 23). Mexico-United States relations after 9/11 also demonstrated how cooperation only functioned when it coincided with U.S. policies and how U.S. power runs counter to principles of equality under NAFTA. Hence what exists Post-9/11 in the U.S.-Mexico context is unequal, asymmetrical and weak political integration. The U.S.'s new terrorism discourse has enabled it to exact high rates of cooperation from its southern neighbor. However, that cooperation has not taken place under the rubric of a liberal internationalist cooperation thesis that assumes more cooperation will lead to harmonious border relations. Rather, what the U.S.-Mexico case reveals is that cooperation can coexist with low levels of intersubjective understandings resulting in no movement towards higher levels political integration.

The Canada-U.S. Post-9/11 Border Era

9/11 triggered a series of responses from the U.S.'s northern neighbour that resulted in

increased degrees of institutional cooperation that far surpassed NAFTA levels. Indeed, one could even argue that a shared security regime was at work. The Canadian public and the Canadian government shared a common perception of a terrorist threat and greatly sympathized with their southern neighbour contributing to a “sense of ‘we-ness’” between the two countries (Golob, 2002, 13). Canada also managed, for the most part, to realign its policy framework to correspond with that of the United States (Clarkson and Banda, 2003, 5). A long history of military and security cooperation with the U.S. and a more positive overall bilateral relationship in general facilitated policy reordering in Canada and congruence with American policies. Evidence of this came in the form of the Canada-United States Smart Border Accord and several other measures such as the creation of a Canadian ad hoc cabinet committee on Public Security and Anti Terrorism, and numerous instances of both high level and on-the-ground cooperation between Canadian and American officials. However, despite empirical evidence suggesting that Canada and the U.S. had reached ‘new levels of mutuality’ in the post-9/11 border era, a constructivist reading of their relationship signals that perceptions of “us versus them” and sovereignty-related concerns, especially on the part of Canada, have remained active and dominant. In particular, the way Canada symbolically uses “sovereignty” resists the kind of “mutuality” necessary to translate into a move towards high political integration. Moreover, Canada’s continued resistance to trilateralizing border and security issues further complicates Canada-United States border dynamics in the post-9/11 era. Thus, in the post-9/11 era, Canada-United States border relations are still being managed in an overall framework of asymmetry and interdependence that accounts for only medium levels of political integration.

Degree of Cooperation in the Canada-U.S. Post-9/11 Border Era

In contrast to the tepid Mexican response to 9/11, Canada reacted more swiftly to the events in the United States. Even though both Mexican and Canadian administrations came under attack for not moving fast enough in addressing American security concerns, Canada moved decisively to implement a number of measures to address security issues and appease domestic interests that feared economic repercussions. Canada, like the U.S., in effect began by reordering its national institutional structure. Some of those initiatives include:

- Bill C-36;
- An allocation of \$7 billion for five years to an assortment of terrorist control and border related measures;
- Canada implements the *Anti-Terrorism Act* in 2001;
- Canada amends the *Aeronautics Act* in 2001 in order to facilitate the ability of Canadian air carriers to work with the U.S. The Act also provides passenger and crew data to foreign governments;
- The *Public Safety Act* increases the governments' ability to prevent terrorist attacks and protect citizens;
- A new 2002 Immigration and Refugee Act focuses on those targeted as a threat to security
- Canada ratified 10 of the 12 UN anti terrorism conventions (DFAIT, 2003).

Canada and the U.S. also worked together on a number of new fronts. For example, they cooperated to solidify the U.S. anti-terrorist military campaign. Canada sent 750 soldiers to Kandahar to participate as a section of the United States army task force in 2002 (Clarkson and Banda, 2003, 15).

Canada and the United States also made improvements to already existing bilateral border instruments. For instance, the new Smart Border plan built and improved upon the CUSP. Bilateral cooperation was also increased under the IBETS. Originally

established in 1996, IBETS were significantly expanded in the post-9/11 era. The declaration established 14 IBET regions with 12 in operation for May of 2003 (U.S.-Canada Partnership in the War on Terrorism, 2005).

In addition to improving and expanding old mechanisms many new instruments were created in the post-9/11 era:

- The U.S. Attorney General and Canada's Minister of Citizenship and Immigration along with the Solicitor General signed the Joint Statement of Cooperation on Border Security and Regional Migration Issues in 2001. The Statement contains instruments to deter security threats while managing legitimate travel;
- In December 2001 the U.S. Attorney General and Canada's Solicitor General signed an agreement to improve fingerprint data between the RCMP and the FBI;
- In 2002 both countries signed the Safe third Country Agreement in order to account for the flow of refugee claimants between the two countries;
- *Joint Teams of Customs Officials* were established in various ports to target marine containers which may pose a threat. (DFAIT, 2003).

In October 2001, Prime Minister Chrétien created an ad hoc cabinet committee on Public Security and Anti-terrorism to rework existing laws, regulations, and programs related to national security. The Cabinet Committee in fact represented an example of institutional integration rather than cooperation in the sense that the Committee was intentionally designed to meet a specific goal. It should be noted, however, that although the Cabinet Committee can be defined as an institution in the broad sense of the word, it has no organizational qualities attached to it like enforcement or public participation mechanisms. It functions only as a common space where officials can meet to discuss security issues.

Another example of institutional integration is the Northern Command or NORTHCOM. NORTHCOM is a U.S. invention and was created as a “defense mega-structure” that coordinates the entire U.S. military forces under its umbrella (Clarkson

and Banda, 2003, 13). NORTHCOM also has geographical responsibility for Canada and Mexico and thus implicates the two U.S. neighbours. At present, it is not immediately clear how NORTHCOM could affect Canada. The United States has been slow in releasing details about the implications on Canada-United States defense relations (Report 102). What is clear is that NORTHCOM may signify deeper military integration with the United States.

Undoubtedly, the most important cooperation measure taken by both countries came in the form of the Canada-United States Smart Border Declaration. The Declaration was signed in December of 2001 and included a 30 point Action Plan based on four pillars: 1) the secure flow of people; 2) the secure flow of goods; 3) secure infrastructure, and 4) coordination and information sharing (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002, 93). The goal of the declaration is to create a Smart Border for the 21st century by focusing on high-risk targets and managing them without impeding the flow of legitimate people and goods (Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002: 167). As discussed above, the Canada and U.S. plan is more advanced than its U.S.-Mexico counterpart; it reflects a much higher level of intensity and is more action and progress oriented.

The more intense nature of integration is explained by the content and nature of the agreement in comparison to the United States-Mexico one. The latter plan is less ambitious than the former and reflects the criminalized nature of the United States-Mexico border. For instance, the primary concern with immigration and drug-trafficking along the U.S.-Mexican border make for differing agreements. For example, in the area of Secure Flow of People in the Canada-U.S. agreement, the points suggest movement

towards compatibility of immigration criteria. In the case of Mexico, the stress is on dealing with problems associated with human smuggling. In the area of Secure Flow of Goods, the goal of the Canada-U.S. agreement is to develop an ambitious pre-clearance system that would be physically separate from the borders. In the case of Mexico, the objective is merely to continue to develop mechanisms to encourage the exchange of information and technology. Finally, in the area of Secure Infrastructure, the emphasis in the Canadian case is on improving already existing infrastructure and developing intelligent transportation systems. In contrast, the Mexican case places emphasis on identifying priority infrastructure projects to avoid bottlenecks (Gabriel, Jimenez and Macdonald, 2003: 31). Hence, as a result of a much broader, positive bilateral relationship based on a history of consultation, cooperation, and trust, the Canada-United States model is much more advanced than its counterpart, showing a significant degree of harmonization of policies and representing a higher level of institutionalism.

The Canada-U.S. Smart Border plan has also spawned two other key instances of infrastructural cooperation. The Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program created fast-lanes for pre-approved low-risk drivers and commercial shipment in order to free custom personnel at the border to concentrate on high risk crossers and goods (Golob, 2002, 25). Also important is the recently resuscitated NEXUS program, which established similar fast-lanes for pre-approved low-risk travellers.

These instances of cooperation indicate that cooperation increased a great deal in the Canada-U.S. post-9/11 era. Indeed, as U.S. Ambassador to Canada Paul Celluci was quoted as stating in a 2002 conference on security issues, cooperation on border issues before 9/11 was certainly “good”, but after 9/11 they became “extraordinary” (Standing

Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002: 97). Cooperation was also more institutionalized and more advanced, as in the case of the Canada-U.S. Smart Border Declaration. Finally, instances of cooperation in the post-9/11 era demonstrated gradual evolution and the continuation of previous instruments. For example, the declaration embraces plans initiated in the 90s by the Shared Border Accord and the CUSP. CUSP objectives aimed at reinventing the border management processes were encompassed within the declaration (Andreas 2003, 16). But despite the increased nature of cooperation, it does not necessarily mean that it will result in an accompanying move toward higher levels of political integration. Indeed, as the next section demonstrates, negative degrees of intersubjectivity were present in the Canada-U.S. post-9/11 era. Certain symbolic and ideology-laden behaviour on the part of both countries and the way identity and the border were recast through the prism of security proves that, as constructivism suggests, cooperation and interaction do not necessarily lead to any positive transformative effects that will then change the behaviour of states' interactions with each other.

Degree of Intersubjectivity in the Canada-U.S. Post-9/11 Border Era

Despite the gains made on the cooperation front, a number of real and symbolic gestures on the part of both governments indicate that low levels of intersubjectivity or negative forms of intersubjectivity exist, preventing positive transformative behavioural changes on the part of each state. Indeed, what various literal and symbolic gestures suggest is that identity-defined borders are very much in vogue even in a globalized age where unprecedented flows of trade and people cross the border.

The first signal indicating that divergent interests and interpretations existed despite ever-increasing cooperation after 9/11 was the way the U.S. framed 9/11 and Canada's reaction to this interpretation. For the U.S., 9/11 was defined entirely through a security prism even when security conflicted with economic integration goals. 9/11, through a U.S. lens, highlighted the crucial need for improving security and enforcement at the border. Whether it was real or imagined, U.S. decision-makers feared that terrorism existed in Canada and thus we began to see in the U.S. security discourse the continuation of a trend to redefine the northern border as a terrorist threat. As we have seen, the redefinition of the northern border had already begun pre-9/11 with the capture of Montreal-based Ahmed Ressam, which heightened preoccupation with security and terrorist concerns at the Canada-United States border. So much, in fact, that although no Canadian connection was found between terrorists who participated in 9/11, immediately after the incident, the media and the American government speculated that the terrorists had entered the U.S. from Canada. It was later proven that no terrorists had entered the U.S. from Canada. In fact, they all entered with visas directly to the U.S. As Adelman states: "Though the 9/11 terrorists evidently entered the U.S. legally... The weak link thesis often focused on Canada" (Adelman, 2002: 15). Similarly, Andreas states that "[e]ven though none of the nineteen hijackers involved in the 9/11 attacks entered across the border and in fact had been issued visas by the U.S., some U.S. media reports have depicted Canada as a safe haven for terrorists" (Andreas 2003: 8). Even a former high-level INS official had the following to say when it was pointed out in an interview that the terrorists did not come from Canada:

That doesn't matter, that doesn't matter because of the terrorists that came over at the Millennium was from Canada, and because of that, now there

are a couple of other examples, there have been a couple of other examples, I don't remember them...So you know, that's all it takes (Interview in Washington D.C., November 2001).

The perception of Canada as a threat, though largely unfounded, permeated public consciousness and legitimized U.S. policies at the border. It also allowed the U.S. to conveniently construct a dangerous "other" to support state-legitimizing and sovereignty directed policies. Thus the U.S. moved to implement a section of the recently adopted Patriot Act, which tripled the number of agents at the border, in effect militarizing the Canada-U.S. border.

The reconceptualization of Canada as a potential terrorist threat significantly alarmed Canadian officials. First among Canadian concerns was the economic impact of 9/11. Consider the following quote from a Canadian official I interviewed in 2002 at Foreign Affairs Canada:

You have increased pressure to tighten up and tightening up means a threat to economic prosperity. We had immediately, post-September 11th, ...long line ups and we had decreased flows....Now, we have a combination of factors, we have post-September 11th, we have economic recession, we have security concerns related to post-September 11th that aren't really facilitation problems...the bottom line is our border communities are suffering economically and demanding action of some kind...

For Canada, it was primarily a question of economics and securing access to the American market. But this economic question was accompanied by a need to balance economic concerns with American security concerns. As one official I interviewed in May 2002 at the North American Division of Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs put it:

... the allegations—unfounded—of a Canadian connection, but nonetheless allegations that continued to persist in the American media and in the minds of Congressmen and decision-makers. It made us realize that we had to do something in order to avoid that happening again. What if there

is another terrorist attack? What if there is a Canadian connection? What if, despite the fact that 25 per cent of American exports come from Canada, they just decide to close down the border? And so, there is kind of a two-pronged attack. The first prong was for the government to get its act together on the public security side....But also we have to turn our mind to the economic side. These two parallel objectives, public security and keeping the border open so our economies can prosper.

For Canada, the solution was the Smart Border Declaration. The declaration was an attempt to manage the process and balanced the twin goals of trade and security. Further, it demonstrated that any resulting institutionalized cooperation in the post-9/11 era was not representative of a genuine move towards higher levels of political integration. Rather, it was driven by American security concerns and Canadian fears of American unilateral actions that could have economic consequences. Indeed, the Smart Border rhetoric of partnership obscures the fundamentally different interpretations of security and by extension the divergent views of a North American community. It amounts to what Stephanie Golob states is a “recipe for integration under asymmetry without mutuality, and it is one which puts the future of the North American integration project at considerable risk”(Golob).

Perhaps the most powerful sign of a divergent mutual identification on the part of Canada and to a certain extent on the part of the U.S. is found in the perimeter debate. In stark contrast to Mexico, Canada has remained vague, aloof, and decidedly cool to the idea of perimeter. Early on in the debate, Canada expressed seemingly contradictory views on the idea of perimeter. On the one hand, the Canadian government cited sovereignty concerns as a reason for remaining cool to the idea of perimeter. For instance, in a speech delivered to the U.S. Foreign Policy Association of New York, then-Canadian foreign Minister John Manley expressed reservations about the notion:

I have to say I have not responded positively to talk of a perimeter because

it has not been adequately defined. To some degree, we are getting caught in semantics - what's in a perimeter? By any other name it might be a communityin which we assure our mutual security...by seeking greater compatibility in how we manage the flow of goods and people through our common border. The border must remain—talk of anything else is simply not on the table... (Cited in Kitchen, 2002: 3).

Canada's reluctance to adopt perimeter discourse reflects deeper issues related to sovereignty concerns. Adopting the most advanced form sounds too much like harmonizing immigration, customs, and security policies to those of the U.S. As a weaker country, Canada might have to bend its will to U.S. demands again resulting in unequal asymmetrical integration. The concept of perimeter also does not correspond to how Canadian officials have formed notions of sovereignty at the border. The way the border is managed with the U.S. relates to Canada's sovereignty concerns and its desire to preserve national identity and culture, and thus explains why Canadians tend to favour maintaining some type of border. Beyond the sovereignty issue, Canada also expresses concerns over perimeter for fear of trilateralizing the bilateral border relationship they share with the U.S. Consider the following quote from an interview I conducted on 04 July 2002 with Marc Lortie, the Assistant Deputy Minister of the Americas in Canada's Foreign Affairs Ministry :

On the 21st of September we met with Castañeda on border management, and he told us that since the last 10 days we have faced, both of us, border problems, big line-ups, trucks, disruption of flow of goods, people. Border issues are a big problem. Why don't we sit the three of us together to try to resolve it? We said no, we prefer to sit down with the Americans on a bilateral basis.... because we feel that the problems of the southern border and the northern border were very different.

The Canadian government feels that the borders are fundamentally different and that trilateralizing borders would impede some of the advances already made on the Canada-U.S. border. Canada does not appear to be particularly receptive to the idea of

cooperation with Mexico on border issues. Besides the fact that both countries do not share a border, Canadian officials felt that problems on both borders are fundamentally different and therefore should be dealt with bilaterally. Canada's rejection of a trilateral approach to management of the border represents an important barrier to North American political integration, one that would certainly have to be overcome.

Nevertheless, even while expressing both sovereignty and trilateral fears, Canada recognizes that cooperation on perimeter security with the U.S. makes economic sense. As Hristoulas notes, "a policy where the United States inspects almost every single vehicle entering the U.S. from Canada would be absolutely devastating to the Canadian economy...[T]he goal of perimeter security from a Canadian perspective would be encouraging the rapid movement of legitimate travellers and promote efficient customs administration and clearance of freight"(Hristoulas, 2002b: 12).

Canada therefore understands that being positioned outside of a perimeter is not an option. Canada's contradictory response and hesitancy over the perimeter issue seems to be reflective of a resurgence of the "special relationship" thesis that Canada has advanced historically throughout its relationship with the U.S. Not participating in perimeter might, in Canada's eyes, signify the loss of its "special relationship" with the U.S. However, accepting perimeter might result in a loss of political autonomy. Both positions sit in tension with each other, and would have to be resolved before Canada decides to support a North American security community.

In conclusion, this chapter has examined the degree of political integration in the area of border control during the NAFTA and post-9/11 periods. What it found were low levels of moderate degrees of political integration in the U.S.-Mexico case. The moderate

degrees of Canada-U.S. political integration can be explained by focusing on the nature of the border control policy area. The borders are intimately tied to a state's perception of "us" and "them" and to notions of sovereignty, so much that it is difficult to propel movement towards higher levels of political integration since this would presumably entail inclusive notions of "we". Nevertheless, security and economic concerns still drive cooperation, even without a corresponding shift in the intersubjective realm. This translates to the operation of asymmetrical integration in the NAFTA border control era. Furthermore, the manner in which political integration is developing in this area suggests that policy actors can coordinate and adjust national policies to meet the goals of tighter integration and security concerns without any accompanying adjustment in all of the factors deemed necessary to introduce a more symmetrical model of political integration. Hence, there is no major link between high degrees of economic integration and high degrees of political integration which I define as containing institutions, coordinated, and regularized cooperation frameworks, and high levels of positive forms of intersubjective understandings. That is high levels of economic integration can exist in conjunction with low levels of political integration (in this case defined by negative forms of intersubjective understandings that prevent a shared "we" identity from emerging, high levels of disintegrative factors, ad hoc and largely reactionary cooperation, and no institutional context).

Chapter Seven – Conclusion: A Political Integration Project in North America?

The purpose of this dissertation has been to examine the broad question of the relationship between economic integration and political integration. More specifically, I analyzed the North American case and whether economic integration has resulted in higher levels of political integration. In addition to showing the obstacles that limit political integration in North America, my goal in undertaking this project was to derive a series of observations about the political integration process more generally.

To be sure, NAFTA has clearly intensified already existing economic links between Canada, the United States, and Mexico and further cemented a single continental North American market. The success of NAFTA in both increasing and solidifying economic ties between all three partners in turn generated associated pressures.

In the policy area of the environment, expanded trade affected ecosystems and populations along the border and beyond. Consequently, governments created a complex institutional structure to jointly manage environmental challenges. In the area of border control, the enhanced movement of goods, services, and people across North American borders not only produced pressures to ameliorate and amplify transportation systems, but has also yielded pressures to improve the management of borders. As well, 9/11 added a new security dimension to the question of economic integration. The emergence of a heightened U.S. security discourse in response to 9/11 exposed the vulnerabilities of an open border for trade and raised the importance of protecting and safeguarding borders to a critical level.

Especially, but not exclusively since 9/11, political and academic debates abound on the future of North America. In the North American context, the parameters of

discussion on the relationship between economic and political integration has been hampered by first, the interpretation of the North American integration experience within the confines of the European model, and secondly, a simplistic and narrow debate between those who feel that economic integration will lead to political integration and those who continue to disassociate the economic and political dimensions of integration. In this dissertation I have argued that both these factors set the initial parameters and context of the political and academic discussions that frame the concept of integration.

My argument is that economic integration does lead to pressures for cooperation and coordination at a political level, but not in a straightforward, inevitable, automatic, and teleological manner. Rather, I sustain that political integration in North America is complex and variegated, characterized by an uneven, two-speed, development model of integration. Moreover, the pressures for collaboration and coordination induced by economic integration do not necessitate the substitution of national political systems with supranational structures. I believe that my analysis of political integration in North America—through its examination of the case studies of the environment and the border—makes several contributions to the study of political integration:

1. Advanced economic integration requires adjustments in each country's national policies in order to provide the necessary support system needed to sustain high degrees of economic integration. However, contrary to some of the core theoretical formulations associated with integration, economic integration does not inevitably result in joint decision-making structures or supranational institutions. Instead, what exists is a type of low level model of political integration that has taken a highly informal, ad

hoc, and uneven form in North American. As a result, this type of political integration disregards important social and political factors, is non-transparent, and largely inaccessible to civil society forces (especially in the area of border control, less so in the environmental domain).

2. Theoretical models of political integration must take into account the role of intervening variables like institutions and intersubjective factors.
3. Any movement towards political integration will be superimposed upon already existing bilateral relations, institutional structures, and domestic political cultures.
4. Depending on the policy area at stake, North America is currently characterized by weak to moderate degrees of political integration and is unlikely to move beyond this point in the foreseeable future.
5. The power imbalances in the trilateral relationship give the U.S. significant leverage to set the policy agenda. The result is asymmetrical integration.

My investigation of political integration in the North American frame of reference is significant because it sheds light on the actual nature of political integration in the areas of border control and the environment. What exist in the current debate about North American political integration is vague forecasts and predictions that function to confuse and complicate the policy framework used to evaluate political integration. My analysis will add to knowledge in the area of North America so policymakers will be able to

develop more policy relevant strategies that address the evolving North American region. My study also makes some novel theoretical contributions to integration literature. For example, my specific application of an institutionalist-constructivist framework to the study of integration not only questions the dominance of both the European-based or economicistic approaches to the study of integration but elucidates important social and political factors that for the most part have been neglected.

In the following pages, I address each of these points in turn, thus developing my conclusion that economic integration does not directly lead to political integration. The case of North America demonstrates that there are a number of intervening variables that shape the rate and nature of integration, thus accounting for its uneven, complex and two-speed nature.

1. The relationship between economic and political integration

What I have referred to as the ‘grand narrative’ of integration theory or neofunctionalism maintains that economic integration will automatically and inevitably lead to political integration. As mentioned earlier, the case of North America demonstrates that contrary to neofunctional postulations, economic integration does not automatically or directly lead to high political integration. I define the latter as having strong institutions that can constrain the actions of member governments, a coordinated framework of management, and high levels of positive forms of intersubjective factors (e.g. trust, confidence, mutuality, shared identification, established transnational “we”). The case study of the border control in Chapters Five and Six is particularly telling. In both the Canada-U.S. and U.S.-Mexico case, intensification of trade linkages increased the importance of

updating the “software” of border management (McDougall, 2004: 12). Consequently, Canada and the U.S. and the U.S. and Mexico adopted a series of new cooperative and joint mechanisms to better manage the border and ensure speedy and effective movement. Additionally, the intersection of trade and security after 9/11 indicates that security is also an area that has to be jointly managed, not only to sustain the current rate of economic integration, but also to protect the citizens of North America.

With regards to the area of the environment, Chapters Three and Four highlight that the transnational nature of environmental problems spawned a series of agreements and institutions aimed at jointly addressing environmental challenges. Increased trade under NAFTA also put pressures on ecosystems and populations in each country. Consequently, the three governments created new bilateral institutions and a trilateral institution from which to treat environmental problems. However, it should be noted that Canada, the U.S., and Mexico have not yet adopted a supranational structure that supersedes national authority (like neofunctionalism assumes) to manage border and environmental challenges, be they bilateral or trilateral in nature. Rather, the NAFTA partners adopted cooperation practices and joint policies that reflected low levels of political integration.

Indeed, as Chapter Six indicates the case of border control exhibits that high levels of economic integration can exist without an institutional backdrop and within a highly asymmetrical, conflict-ridden framework. Consequently, the form of low level political integration in the North American case is lacking an institutional context that could mitigate power asymmetries, characterized by the absence of mechanisms to address the existence of a democratic deficit, and without any consideration of important social

and political factors that might create a more socially equal model of integration. Hence, there is only a weak relation between high degrees of economic integration and more advanced stages of political integration. Indeed, the appropriation of new and improved border management techniques, coordinated policies, and more instances of cooperation are not the result of any particular learning process that inculcated in the three countries a genuine, volitional desire to adopt supranational policies and participate in a highly integrated system.

2. The role played by institutions and intersubjective factors

The findings from my case studies challenge the relevancy and applicability of both European integration models and economic-based approaches to integration. The use of the European model as a benchmark obscures some of the social and political factors that shape and influence the rate and nature of political integration. Similarly, the theories most closely associated with the North American integration process—like neoliberalism and international political economy—subordinate important political and social forces to economic factors. The confinement of the study of integration to these parameters obscures the potential contributions of other important theories to our understanding of the political integration process in North America. For instance, my findings indicate that both institutionalism and constructivism make important theoretical contributions.

As Chapter One pointed out, institutionalists argue that institutions play an important intervening role in the integration process. Institutions improve the “contractual environment” by establishing rules, generating information, and

implementing enforcement mechanisms. However, more important to my thesis, institutions provide a forum (in addition to other factors) for interaction, communication, and cooperation. Institutions, even if weak, still provide a legitimized space in which political actors can interact, communicate, and alter intersubjective relations, thus enabling actors to, at the very least, break down previously-held negative understandings of each other. The case study of the environment in the NAFTA era is particularly instructive here. Chapter Four pointed out that the existence of the CEC introduced a new trilateral space in which actors could get to know each other and reconstruct existing notions of “us” and “them”, thus enabling a shift at the cognitive level. In sharp contrast to the latter is the area of border control, where the absence of a formal institutional space precluded actors from forming positive intersubjective understandings of each other.

My findings also point to the crucial role that intersubjective factors play in the political integration process. The case of North America reveals that high levels of cooperation can exist without corresponding levels of positive forms of intersubjective factors. Put differently, my research indicates that the key intervening variable is intersubjectivity. Only when positive movement occurs in the latter category will there be a corresponding move to higher degrees of political integration.

3. Political integration is mediated or filtered through already existing processes

Any centripetal movement towards political integration is conditioned by the historical specificity of existing Canada-U.S. and U.S.-Mexico relationships, prior institutional contexts, and existing intersubjective understandings. These factors point to important political and social variables that economic based theories leave out. Additionally, these

factors characterize the North American region and consequently influence the rate and nature of political integration in North America. Political integration in North America must be understood within a context that recognizes how pressures for integration are mediated through these variables.

Chapter Two demonstrated that the historical and political contexts in which the broader bilateral relations are rooted mediate the political integration process. For example, important geopolitical forces in the early stages of each bilateral relationship set the context for the evolution of the relationships. In the case of Canada and the United States, Canada's colonial status enabled it to ward off U.S. expansionist tendencies. Mexico, on the other hand, was left unstable after independence from Spain and was unable to resist aggressive American actions. Moreover, Chapter Two elucidated the importance of examining patterns of communication between actors, and their intersubjective understandings of each other. Canada and the United States' shared Anglo-Saxon heritage, common language (except Quebec), family connections, and similar cultures enabled the two states to develop generally positive impressions of one another and facilitated the production of shared norms. This in turn influenced processes of institution-building and the overall nature of the bilateral relationship. Mexico and the U.S. had more difficulty developing positive images of each other. They shared neither a common language, nor similar culture, nor ethnic roots. Additionally, an American perception of a corrupt Mexico, fuelled by the semi-authoritarian nature of Mexico's political system, and a Mexican perception of an aggressive and demanding neighbour were not conducive to developing positive intersubjective understandings of each other. As a result, political integration in the North American case is developing unevenly along

a two-speed track model. Associated with this point is the fact that the disjuncture found in the intersubjective realm in the case of the U.S. and Mexico signifies that a democratic deficit characterizes the political integration process. Limited effort has been made to develop a shared “we” identity that might help even political integration across North America.

4. Low to moderate levels of political integration that vary across policy fields characterize North America

What is generally found in North America is moderate to weak levels of integration, depending on the policy area considered. As Chapters Three and Four demonstrate, what exists in the policy area of the environment are moderate degrees of political integration that can be explained by the intervening role that I assign to institutions in the integration process. Institutions provide a forum for the reordering of the cognitive framework, enabling actors to re-examine their perception of the “other”, the relation of “us” to “them”. Thus, as Chapter Five indicates, the existence of the trilateral CEC in conjunction with positive attitudes in the intersubjective area (a willingness to cooperate, existence of trust and confidence, better communication) resulted in greater movement towards political integration and fewer asymmetries. As well, the policy area of the environment is characterized by the active participation of NGOs. This public participation dimension ensures that policy issues are kept on the political radar screen, adds transparency to the decision-making process, and creates pressures for enforcement. Finally, policy actors appear to display a genuine interest in addressing environmental challenges. Likewise, environmental problems are transnational in nature thereby

requiring joint cooperation.

In contrast, Chapters Six and Seven exemplify that political integration in the area of the borders is characterized by much weaker levels of political integration. The absence of an institutional framework within which to address border issues severely restricts opportunities to improve negative intersubjective perceptions and engage in identity-formation processes that can in turn lead to higher levels of political integration. The border-control policy area is also distinguished by limited public participation. Apart from the business sector, which has played an active role in calling for the reconfiguration of the border to meet both security and trade objectives, involvement by the NGO community has been limited. Additionally, progress is much more difficult to achieve in the area of borders since borders are traditionally linked to perceptions of sovereignty, territory, and identity. Thus, political integration is more likely to function in “soft” issues rather than in “hard” issues.

Asymmetrical integration

The principle defining feature of the North American relationship is the co-existence of the world’s largest hegemon with two much smaller, marginal powers. The overwhelming political, military, and economic power of the United States immediately puts the two much weaker countries at a disadvantage when dealing with their powerful neighbour and generates huge power asymmetries that in turn exert an influence on the political integration process. For example, in the aftermath of 9/11, Canada and Mexico responded to the U.S.’s heightened security anxieties by implementing Smart Border policies and participating in numerous instances of cooperative practices. This might lead

one to assume that increased cooperation in turn generated interaction and, perhaps, created positive intersubjective understandings. However, a closer glance reveals that Canada and Mexico cooperated with the United States more as a way to protect their economic interests from aggressive U.S. unilateral action than because of a genuine convergence of attitudes and interests. Indeed, 9/11 demonstrates that Canada and Mexico had trouble reordering their domestic infrastructure to meet U.S. demands. And a detailed glance at Smart Border policies reveals U.S. security interests dominate at the expense of other interests like Mexican migration concerns. Smart Border policies do not reflect a broader attempt to construct a more coherent, trilateral vision of the borders.

My analysis of political integration in North America through an examination of both the case studies of border-control and the environment reveals that there are a number of factors that policy-makers must consider before taking any steps to deepen any integration project. In particular, my study highlights that political integration in North America, is not inherently “good”, nor does it always promote “good” values. It can be asymmetrical, reflecting and perhaps intensifying already existing power imbalances. Some argue that North American political integration advances predominantly the goals of big business, while neglecting other important social-political questions. Others argue that political integration might severely limit policy autonomy in important social, environmental, and labour issues (McDougall, 2004: 25).

Indeed, in the aftermath of 9/11, there has been a proliferation of proposals by both the business and non-business sector in Canada, and to a lesser extent in the United States and Mexico, that have evaluated the idea of deepened North American integration. 9/11 specifically exposed the vulnerabilities of an open border. It also elucidated the

degree to which the Canadian, American and Mexican economies, for all intents and purposes, are tied together in a single North American regional market. It is thus hardly surprising that the business community has been the principle architect of closer economic integration.

The business sector has in effect called for the reordering of the North American political and economic space to deepen North American integration and facilitate both economic and security concerns (Gabriel, and Macdonald, 2004: 89). These integration schemes, while differing in scope and breadth, advance the view that greater continental integration is needed to achieve prosperity. In chapter Two I recounted how one of the principle driving forces propelling the three countries towards political integration has been the extensive rationalization of the economic landscape. For example, Wendy Dobson of the C.D. Howe Institute explains in a paper entitled “Shaping the Future of the North American Economic Space: A Framework for Action,” that the border was virtually eliminated for certain sectors like the auto industry. She notes, “...efforts by officials in both countries to reduce border congestion and related transaction costs...seemed about to be reversed. Nowhere was this truer than in the auto industry, for which the border has largely been erased, beginning with arrangements made in the 1965 auto pact. Common ownership in the industry has also been an important factor in the rationalization of production on both sides of the border. Most trade is now intrafirm” (Dobson, 2002: 16).

For the business community, it was imperative to keep the border open to trade. Permanent security measures at the border would, “raise transaction costs, acting like an added tariff on two-way trade” (Dobson, 2002: 16). As such, the business sector has

called for a “grand bargain” with the United States to reduce the border-effect. A “grand bargain” is not the preferred incremental approach that Canadian officials usually use to negotiate with Americans. Rather, such a “Big Idea” seeks to capture the attention of American officials. The “Big Idea” approach would “open new bargaining possibilities in which Canada can leverage its advantage in exchange for what it wants and is otherwise unlikely to obtain” (Dobson, 2002: 20). Grand schemes of integration proposed by the business sector usually link Canadian economic prosperity with issues of defence, security, and energy. The idea is that to secure American attention, Canada must include Canadian “initiatives in areas of strength that are of particular interest to Americans” (Dobson, 2002: 20). Wendy Dobson sustains that one area of key interest is energy. Canada could secure access to the American market by providing energy security for the U.S. (Dobson, 2002: 14). In the area of defence, Canada could increase spending and make a “distinctive Canadian contribution of a world-class capability for North American defence” (Gabriel and Macdonald, 2004: 93). Business proposals also include attempts to reconfigure the border. For example, one of the principle business groups in Canada, the Canadian Council of Chief Executives (CCCE), calls for “reinventing borders” by expanding the already existing Smart Borders program to include some type of North American common identity card and a joint border institution in order push the border outwards (Gabriel and Macdonald, 2004: 92). In a related vein, the Bank of Canada has called for a more open and integrated labour market to take advantage of the opportunities offered by North American economic integration (cited in Hart and Tomlin: 8). Finally, business initiatives argue for improved economic efficiency through the review of existing regulatory frameworks and harmonization of policies (Gabriel and Macdonald, 2004: 92).

The pursuit of the “grand bargain” or “big idea” by the business community has come under attack by nationalist critics who warn of the social and political ramifications of deeper integration. For example, in his 2003 article “Canada’s Secret Constitution”, Stephen Clarkson argues that enhanced continental integration would only further act as an external constitution that “provide a rule book for political systems” and effectively “locking in constraints on what governments are allowed to do.” Business sector proposals would also give corporations free reign to challenge any political or social issue that comes under the jurisdiction of either provincial or federal governments. Grand schemes in effect weaken public rights.

Economist Andrew Jackson similarly sustains that grand integration schemes threaten Canada’s distinct values in issues like immigration, foreign affairs, defence, and industrial policy. In particular, “the big idea is a bad idea” because it directly endangers the Canadian social model. As Jackson states, “Specifically the ‘big idea’ challenges our necessary ability to shape industrial development, to control our energy sector and move towards a more environmentally sustainable economy; to levy taxes at the level needed to maintain a distinctive Canadian social model” (Jackson, 2003).

The polarized views that frame debates on North American integration do little to elucidate the nature of the integration process in North America. My study sought to shed light on the shape and nature of integration North America. I argued that political integration is complex, uneven and two-speed in nature, filtered through existing historical processes, institutional contexts, and intersubjective understandings. Additionally, my study has especially elucidated the asymmetrical and imbalanced nature of political integration in North America. As I sated earlier, integration does not always

lead to “good things.” The above examination of business sector proposals to deepen North American integration reveals that the reality of power asymmetries are not considered. McDougall suggests that the business communities’ interest in keeping the border open for trade above all else is practically an embrace of political integration (McDougall, 2004: 5). If this is the case, then the way that political integration is developing in North America must be examined. I contend that presently, the lack of institutions, the operation of bilateralism over trilateralism, and the power imbalances that define the North American region make for asymmetrical integration. Any integration project proposed must address this imbalance.

Additionally, both advocates and critics of the ‘Big Idea’ neglect to take into account institutional context which my study has demonstrated is important. Institutions provide a space to address disjunctions in the intersubjective realm. They provide a forum in which policy actors can interact on a regular basis, communicate and develop favourable perceptions about each other possibly leading to a shared identity. As well, institutions to some extent constrain asymmetries from functioning at full force. The crucial intervening function that institutions play is largely overlooked in the debate. Indeed, the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) – the most recent trilateral initiative released by all three countries contains no real emphasis on institutions. Instead, the SPP has advanced a series of working groups and meetings designed to identify the necessary steps governments must take to meet the interlinked goals of security and prosperity (SPP online, 2005). While this is an important first step, it still lacks an institutional context that regularizes cooperation and can address gaps in the intersubjective realm. The SPP also appears to be structured in an ad hoc and informal

manner.

As I have already mentioned, I would argue that any political integration project would have to seriously consider the role that institutions can play in the integration process. My study also shows that any integration proposal would have to undertake an examination of sovereignty concerns—one of the major issues that any integration project would have to address were it to overcome prevailing asymmetries. Third, there needs to be an analysis of the social values and attitudes that would accompany any integration project wishing to include the participation of the publics of all three countries. Put another way, an integration project would have to address the democratic deficit that currently characterizes North America (Welsh, 2004: 44). Finally, business schemes especially would have to take into account other issues like immigration, development, and the environment (Schwanen, 2004: 11). This dissertation's analysis of political integration in North America makes a number of contributions to the study of political integration that contributes to reasoned analysis of the future of North America. In particular, as this dissertation has sustained policymakers need to pay greater attention to the institutional setting, intersubjective factors, and power asymmetries that shape political integration.

Appendix A

Community Questionnaire

1. What is your name and current position in your department?
2. The NAFTA has created high levels of economic integration in NA and as a consequence it has created trilateral cooperation at social and cultural levels. In this context, what trilateral aspects does your department handle?
3. Define a North American community? How do you define the concept of community?
4. Does there exist the trilateral environment/climate so that integration at non-economic levels can continue to take place?
5. At what point in time did your department decide to get involved in the trilateral agenda? Why does your department feel it is necessary to work on trilateral issues related to North America?
6. What is your department's mandate with respect to North America? What are your policy objectives?
7. From the point of view of your department, what are the strategic factors that need to be considered for the creation of a North American community?
8. Are there problems or challenges that can be considered transnational, or in this case trilateral? Does your department cooperate with your counterpart in the U.S. and Mexico?
9. Has there been increased cooperation between the three countries due to integration? What has been the tone of this cooperation?

10. What barriers exist between the three countries for cooperation?
11. Do you feel that creation of a North American community affects national sovereignty? How?
12. Does the bilateral U.S.-Mexico relationship affect the trilateral relationship?
What about the bilateral Canada-U.S. and Canada-Mexico relationships?
13. What kinds of inequalities exist in the trilateral relationship?
14. Do you think that a North American community exists or could exist?
15. Do you feel that the three governments should develop a community? Why?
16. What barriers exist towards building a North American community?
17. Do you feel that border problems between the U.S.-Mexico and Canada and the U.S. present a problem for community?
18. If a community should be developed, what are the steps that Canada should take to get to the point of building a community? What should the United States and Mexico do?
19. In what areas should cooperation exist so that a community can be constructed?
What changes should take place in the trilateral relationship so as to construct a community within the NAFTA framework?

Border Questionnaire

Background questions

1. What is your name and current position at your department? For how long have you been in this position? Previous position?

2. What aspects of borders issues does your department manage? How do you see your department's mandate regarding the border? What are your policy objectives?
3. How do you see the border? What role do you see the border playing?
4. What is your view of the relationship between border management and sovereignty? How do your U.S. and Mexican colleagues approach this question?

Pre-September 11th

1. How was North American economic integration affecting management of the border? How was border management changing? What mechanisms were being developed to deal with the pressures associated with increased traffic across the border? Where these problems anticipated when the FTA and NAFTA were signed? Do you think that increased economic integration increased security risks?
2. As integration proceeded, were you seeing increased cooperation and coordination between the U.S. and Canadian officials at meetings concerning border issues? What were the remaining obstacles to effective border management on both sides?
3. How did your department view the U.S.-Mexican border and its impact on the management of the U.S.-Canadian border? How has your department approached United States-Mexican border issues: have you been involved and was there a move toward trinational discussion of or cooperation around border issues (or

Canadian-Mexican cooperation?) What binational or trinational mechanisms exist (i.e. CUSP)?

4. Should there be a North American approach to the border or separate binational approaches? What are the advantages or disadvantages of binational vs. trinational approaches?
5. Where did the concept of a “perimeter” approach to North American security come from? What does a perimeter approach mean, in your view? What is your (or your department’s) view of this approach

Post-September 11th

1. What has been the impact of September 11th on the management of North American borders?
2. How has September 11th changed the views of U.S. officials or the U.S. public about their border with Canada?
3. How do you think Canadians’ view of the borders has or will change?
4. What strategies or actions has the Canadian government adopted with regard to U.S. policies or perceptions?
5. In the context of the events of September 11th, what do you think the options available to Canada in the management of the U.S.-Canada border are? (e.g. perimeter approach vs. other approaches?)
6. Do you think harmonization of policies on immigration, security, and other policies are or should happen post September 11th?

7. What are the implications of September 11th for Mexico and the trinational agenda?

Environment Questionnaire

Background Questions

1. What is your name and current position at your department?
2. What aspect of the NAFTA environmental system does your department manage?

What is your department's mandate regarding environmental issues and the NAFTA.

3. What are your policy objectives?

Core Questions

4. Are there environmental challenges that can be classified as transnational?
5. How were those challenges managed before the passing of the NAFTA? Were they handled bilaterally with the U.S.? Was Mexico included?
6. How has the passing of the NAFTA and North American economic integration affected the management of environmental issues? How has environmental management changed?
7. As integration proceeded, did you see increased cooperation and coordination between U.S., Canadian and Mexican officials concerning the environment? Was there an increase of meeting at the governmental levels? Did you observe that officials from the three countries wanted to work together and saw value in it?

Because of increased contacts was a new relationship being forged? Do you view your American and Mexican colleagues with more trust?

8. What is your view of the relationship between environmental management and sovereignty? How do you and your US and Mexican colleagues view this issue?
9. How has the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation enabled cooperation among the three countries? What binational or trinational mechanisms exist to manage environmental problems? Are these mechanisms effective? What kind of problems do you see with them?
10. Should there be a North American approach to environmental management? What advantages/disadvantages exists with a North American approach? Should there be a binational approach? What advantages/disadvantages exist with a binational approach?
11. How do the environmental challenges along the U.S.-Mexico border affect Canadian environmental issues?
12. Do you think convergence or harmonization of environmental policies and standards would be useful?
13. Do you work with the CEC? How and in what capacity?
14. Are there any last comments you would like to make?
15. Can you suggest anyone in Canada the U.S. or Mexico that I should talk to?

Commission for Environmental Cooperation

Background Questions

1. What is your name and current position at the CEC?
2. What aspect of the NAFTA environmental system does the CEC manage? What is the CEC's mandate regarding environmental issues and the NAFTA.
3. What are your policy objectives?


Core Questions

4. Describe the overall structure of the CEC?
5. Which actors are involved in the CEC and how does the CEC cooperate with them?
6. How does the CEC deal with the issue of national sovereignty?
7. What kind of projects does the CEC undertake?
8. What are the goals of your project? (Not specific goals of each project but what general, overall objectives can the CEC accomplish through projects?)
9. Do you think that the CEC through its role in the NAFTA environmental regime and through its projects has established cooperation and increased interaction between the three countries?
10. Describe the nature of cooperation and interaction between the three countries?
How do countries cooperate? What is the atmosphere like? Have roles changed?
Do actors act differently now with each other than when the CEC was first established? Has the behaviour of the North American states changed?
11. Has there been a move to more integrated environmental regional management?
12. Should there be a North American approach to environmental management?
What are the advantages and disadvantages?

13. What barriers would be encountered when trying to implement such an approach?
14. Do you think convergence or harmonization of environmental policies and standards would be useful?
15. Are there any last comments you would like to make?
16. Can you suggest contacts in the U.S. or Mexico that I should talk to?

Appendix B

Figure B.1



Source: "Partners in North America. Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and Mexico". Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. December 2002.

Figure B.2

Top Canadian Exports to the United States				
	1990		2001	
	\$millions	% of total	\$millions	% of total
Motor vehicles and parts	31,218	28.0	80,120	22.8
Fossil fuels and related	12,828	11.5	54,855	15.6
Machinery and equipment	9,503	8.5	29,075	8.3
Electrical/electronic mach. & equip.	5,705	5.1	18,966	5.4
Wood and wood products	4,370	3.9	16,340	4.7
Paper products	7,819	6.8	15,952	4.5
Plastics and articles thereof	1,865	1.7	10,968	3.1
Aircraft and spacecraft	2,114	1.9	9,705	2.8
Furniture, furnishings, prefabricated buildings	1,548	1.4	7,951	2.3
Aluminum and articles thereof	2,485	2.2	7,196	2.1
Sub-total	79,256	71.0	251,127	71.6
Others	32,301	29.0	99,607	28.4
Total	111,557	100	350,734	100

Source: Parliamentary Research Branch using data compiled by Industry Canada


Top US Exports to Canada				
	1990		2001	
	\$millions	% of total	\$millions	% of total
Machinery and equipment	18,782	19.4	49,854	19.7
Motor vehicles and parts	20,917	21.6	46,760	18.4
Electrical/electronic mach. & equip.	11,338	11.7	30,989	12.2
Plastics and articles thereof	3,046	3.1	10,589	4.2
Scientific/technical instruments	3,180	3.3	9,398	3.7
Paper products	1,590	1.6	5,901	2.3
Fossil fuels and related	2,533	2.6	5,842	2.3
Articles of iron or steel	1,822	1.9	5,669	2.2
Rubber and articles thereof	1,367	1.4	4,270	1.7
Furniture, furnishings, prefabricated buildings	1,098	1.1	4,213	1.7
Sub-total	65,671	67.8	173,485	68.4
Others	31,134	32.2	80,026	31.6
Total	96,805	100	253,511	100

Source: Parliamentary Research Branch using data compiled by Industry Canada


Note: All figures in Canadian dollars

Source: "Partners in North America. Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and Mexico".


Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. December 2002.

Figure B.3

Source: "Partners in North America. Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and Mexico". Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. December 2002.

Figure B.4

Source: "Partners in North America. Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and Mexico". Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. December 2002.

Figure B.5

Source: "Partners in North America. Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and Mexico". Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. December 2002.

Figure B.6

Top Canadian Exports to Mexico				
	1990		2001	
	\$millions	% of total	\$millions	% of total
Motor vehicles and parts	94	14.4	568	20.9
Machinery and equipment	74	11.2	406	15.0
Meat and edible offal	15	2.3	272	10.0
Cereals	9	1.4	256	9.5
Oil seeds, fodder, medicinal plants, etc.	1	0.1	253	9.3
Electrical/electronic mach. & equip.	63	9.6	109	4.0
Edible animal prods (dairy, eggs, etc.)	73	11.1	88	3.2
Aircraft and spacecraft	42	6.4	67	2.5
Rail transportation	0	0.0	65	2.4
Paper products	37	5.6	62	2.3
Sub-total	407	62.1	2,146	79.2
Others	249	37.9	564	20.8
Total	656	100	2,711	100

Source: Parliamentary Research Branch using data compiled by Industry Canada


Note: All figures in Canadian dollars

Top Mexican Exports to Canada				
	1990		2001	
	\$millions	% of total	\$millions	% of total
Motor vehicles and parts	414	23.6	3,844	30.1
Electrical/electronic mach. & equip.	322	18.4	3,168	26.1
Machinery and equipment	557	31.8	2,142	17.7
Furniture, furnishings, prefabricated buildings	10	0.6	538	4.4
Fossil fuels and related	57	3.2	431	3.6
Scientific/technical instruments	10	0.6	249	2.1
Woven clothing and apparel	8	0.5	180	1.5
Vegetables, roots/tubers	17	1.0	157	1.3
Fruits and nuts	79	4.5	150	1.2
Beverages, spirits and vinegar	47	2.7	121	1.0
Sub-total	1,519	86.9	10,780	88.9
Others	229	13.1	1,340	11.1
Total	1,749	100	12,120	100


Source: Parliamentary Research Branch using data compiled by Industry Canada

Note: All figures in Canadian dollars

Source: "Partners in North America. Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and Mexico". Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. December 2002.

Figure B.7

Source: "Partners in North America. Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and Mexico". Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. December 2002.

Figure B.8

Source: "Partners in North America. Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and Mexico". Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. December 2002.

Figure B.9

Top Mexican Exports to the US				
	1990		2001	
	\$millions	% of total	\$millions	% of total
Electrical/electronic mach. & equip.	9,037	25.7	51,730	25.4
Motor vehicles and parts	4,266	12.1	40,688	20.0
Machinery and equipment	2,786	7.9	28,206	13.9
Fossil fuels and related	6,170	17.5	15,814	7.8
Scientific/technical instruments	780	2.2	7,272	3.6
Woven clothing and apparel	647	1.8	7,233	3.6
Furniture, furnishings, prefabricated buildings	767	2.2	6,061	3.0
Knitted or crocheted clothing, apparel	102	0.3	5,196	2.6
Vegetables and roots/tubers	1,076	3.1	2,772	1.4
Articles of iron, steel	363	1.0	2,392	1.2
Sub-total	25,985	73.8	167,364	82.2
Others	9,220	26.2	36,147	17.8
Total	35,205	100	203,511	100

Source: Parliamentary Research Branch using data compiled by Industry Canada

Note: All figures in Canadian dollars


Top US Exports to Mexico				
	1990		2001	
	\$millions	% of total	\$millions	% of total
Electrical/electronic mach. & equip.	6,549	19.8	38,485	24.5
Machinery and equipment	4,762	14.4	22,622	14.4
Motor vehicles and parts	3,958	12.0	17,103	10.9
Plastics and articles thereof	1,469	4.5	10,258	6.5
Fossil fuels and related	985	2.9	5,103	3.2
Scientific/technical instruments	1,188	3.6	4,968	3.2
Paper products	769	2.3	3,599	2.3
Articles of iron or steel	524	1.6	3,022	1.9
Organic chemicals	733	2.2	2,882	1.8
Cereals	1,032	3.1	2,361	1.5
Sub-total	21,973	66.4	110,407	70.2
Others	11,129	33.6	46,769	29.8
Total	33,102	100	157,177	100

Source: Parliamentary Research Branch using data compiled by Industry Canada


Note: All figures in Canadian dollars

Source: "Partners in North America. Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and Mexico".


Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. December 2002.

Figure B.10

Source: "Partners in North America. Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and Mexico". Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. December 2002.

Figure B.11

Source: "Partners in North America. Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and Mexico". Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. December 2002.

Figure B.12

Source: "Partners in North America. Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and Mexico". Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. December 2002.

References

Interviews

<u>Canadian Interviews</u>	
Ben Roswell, Customs Branch, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency	May 2001
Greg Goatee, Director General, Program Strategy Directorate, Customs Branch, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency	May 2001
Emile Di Sanza, Director, Motor Carrier Policy, Transport Canada	May 2001
Chris Gregory, Policy Analyst, United States Transboundary Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade	May 2001
Michael Welsh Director, U.S. Division Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade	May 23, 2001
Kevin O'Shea Director, U.S. Division Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade	May 23, 2001
Rosio A La Tore	January 30, 2002
Cathy DeCoste-Whitlock, Policy Analyst, U.S. Transboundary Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade	May 2002
John Allen, Director General, North American Bureau Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade	May 2002
Taki Sarantakis, Senior Director Infrastructure Canada Policy and Priorities	May 2002
Brian Stephenson Former Senior Policy Advisor to Lloyd Axworthy Foreign Affairs Canada	June 12, 2002
Michael Brock, Director General Foreign Affairs Canada International Cultural Relations Bureau	June 12, 2002
Marc Lortie, assistant Deputy Minister Of the Americas, Foreign Affairs Canada	July 4, 2002
Victor Shatora, Acting Director, Commission for Environmental Cooperation	July 20, 2002
Rita Cerutti, Deputy Director,	August 22, 2002

Environment Canada, International Policy and Coordination Branch	
Marie-Josee Langlois, Senior Economist, International Coordinator Toxics Pollution Prevention Directorate, Environmental Protection Service Environment Canada	August 22, 2002
Demetrios Papademetriou * President and Board Member Migration Policy Institute	November 19, 2002
David Brackett, Special Advisor Environment Canada Global Climate Affairs	December 17, 2002
Marcello DiFranco, Trade Commissioner, Mexico Division North American Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade	February 5, 2003
Margaret Hill, Director, Research Infrastructure Canada Research and Analysis	February 20, 2003

American Interviews

Doris Meisner Former Commissioner US Immigration and Naturalization Services *	November 2001
Luis Cabrera, Minister, Embassy of Mexico in the United States *	September 2002
James Benson, Deputy Director for Mexican Affairs, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, State Department *	September 10, 2002
David Strother, Senior Advisor in Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, US EPA *	September 9, 2002
James Derham, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, State Department *	September 9, 2002
Bill Nietze, former Assistant Administrator for International Activities, US Environmental Protection Agency *	September 9, 2002
David Strother, Senior Advisor Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics US Environmental Protection Agency*	September 9, 2002
David Biette, Director, Canada Institute Woodrow Wilson Centre *	September 10, 2002
Deborah Waller Meyers, Policy Analyst, Migration Policy Institute *	September 12, 2002
Paul Fitzgerald, Deputy Director for Canada, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, State Department *	September 13, 2002
John Dawson, Mexico Desk, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, State Department *	September 13, 2002

Denis Linskey, Border Affairs Unit, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, State Department *	September 19, 2002
Greg Sprow, Deputy Director, Policy Planning Unit of Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, State Department *	September 20, 2002
Lory Frigerio, NAFTA Coordinator, US Environmental Protection Agency*	September 24, 2002
<u>Mexican Interviews</u>	
Politicos Bilaterales, Direccion General para America del Norte, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores **	
Lic. Fabiola Rodriguez Barba, Jefe del Departamento de Politica Interna de Canada, Direccion General para America del Norte, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores **	February 2002
John Feely, US Embassy in Mexico**	
Enriquez Escorza, Director para Asuntos Fronterizo, Direccion General para America del Norte, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores **	Feb. 2002
Lic. Patricia Vasquez Marin, Subdirector para Asuntos Fronterizo,Direccion General para America del Norte, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores **	Feb. 1, 2002
Lic. Alicia Fuentes Roldan, Jefe de Departamento para Mecanismos Institucionales y de Coordinación, Direccion General para America del Norte, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores **	Feb. 11, 2002
Alejandro Estivill, Coordinador de Asesores del Subsecretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores **	Feb. 13, 2002
James Lambert, Ministro Consejero, Embajada de Canada **	February 28, 2002
Heidi Kutz, Jefe de la Sección Política, Embajada de Canada **	February 28, 2002
Michael Grant, Jefe de la Sección Económica, Embajada de Canada **	February 28, 2002
Rafael Fernandez De Castro Professor and Academic Dean International Studies Department Instituto Technologico Anutonomo de Mexico (ITAM) in Mexico City**	March 2002
Lic. Luis Fernández Tovar , Administrador de Asuntos Aduaneros para America del Norte, Aduana Mexico**	March 4, 2002
Hesiquio Benítez Díaz, Director de Servicios Externos, Comisión Nacional para el Conocimiento y Uso de la Biodiversidad**	March 8, 2002
Embajador Andrés Rozental, Presidente, Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales **	March 11, 2002

Carlos Tirado Zavala, Coordinador de Relaciones Internacionales e Interinstitucionales, Secretaria de Gobernacion **	March, 26, 2002
Jose Francisco Anza Solis, Subdirector para Asuntos **	April 3, 2002
Mathew Witosky, International Environmental Attaché, United States Embassy in Mexico **	April 9, 2002
Lic. Jose Luis Avila Consejo Nacional de Pobalcion **	April 10, 2002
Alberto Fierro Garza, Director para Canada, Direccion General para America del Norte, Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores **	April 13, 2002
Dr. Jorge Santibáñez President, El Colegio de la Frontera Norte**	April 2003
Israel Nunez, Direcctor, CEC in Mexico City **	April 4, 2003

Unless otherwise noted, all interviews took place in Canada.

* interview took place in Washington D.C.

** Interview took place in Mexico City

Other Sources

Ackelson, Jason. 2000. "Navigating the Northern Line: Discourses of the U.S.-Canadian Borderlands." Presented at the International Studies Association meeting, Los Angeles.

Adelman, Howard. 2002. "Canadian Borders and Immigration Post-9/11." *International Migration Review*. 36(1): 15-36.

Adler, Emanuel. 1997. "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics." *European Journal of International Relations*. 3 (3) 319-363.

_____ and Peter Haas. 1992. "Conclusion: epistemic communities, world order, and the creation of a reflective research program." *International Organization*. 46(1):367-390.

_____ and Michael Barnett. 1998. *Security Communities*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Andreas, Peter. 2000. "The Smuggling Game: Symbolic politics and Strategic Interaction across the U.S.-Mexico Border." Presented at the International Studies Association meeting, Los Angeles.

_____. 2003. "A Tale of Two Borders: The U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico Lines after 9/11." In *The Rebordering of North America: Integration and Exclusion in a New*

Security Context. Ed. Andreas, Peter and Thomas J. Biersteker. New York and London: Routledge.

Axworthy, Lloyd. 2003. *Navigating a New World: Canada's Global Future.* Toronto: Ontario: Alfred A. Knopf Canada.

Bath, C. Richard. 1986. "Environmental Issues in the United States-Mexico Borderlands." *Journal of Borderlands Studies.* Vol. I, (1): 49-72.

Benitez, Raul and Deare. n.d. "U.S-Mexico Defence Relations at the Beginning of the 21st Century: Conflict, Cooperation and Outlook". Washington, DC: National Defence University.

Bennett and Herzog, Vivienne and Lawrence A. Herzog. "U.S.-Mexico borderland water conflicts and Institutional Change: A Commentary." *Natural Resources Journal.* 40 (4): 973-988.

Benton, L. M. 1996. "The Greening of Free Trade? The Debate about the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Environment." *Environment and Planning.* 28(12): 2155-2177.

Bernauer, Thomas. 1995. "The Effect of international Environmental Institutions: How we might learn more. *International Organization.* 49(2): 351-377.

Bilder, Richard. 1972. "Controlling Great Lakes Pollution: A study in United States-Canadian Environmental Cooperation." *Michigan Law Review.* 70(3): 469-556.

Browne, Harry. 1996. "From Great Expectations to Uncle Scrooge: Waiting for the NADBANK." *Borderline.* 4(11).

(<http://us-mex.irc-online.org/borderlines/1996/bl30/bl30nad.html>).

Buck, Eugene and Daniel Waldeck. 1999. "RL30234: The Pacific Salmon Treaty: The 1999 Agreement in Historical Perspective." (<http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/marine/mar-36.cfm?&CFID=4064779&CFTOKEN=45964225>).

Buzman, Barry. 2004. "American Exceptionalism, Unipolarity and September 11: Understanding the Behavior of the Sole Superpower." Presented at the International Studies Association 45th Annual Convention, Montreal.

Caldwell, Brad. 1999. "The Pacific Salmon Treaty: A Brief Truce in the Canada/U.S.A. Pacific Salmon War." Presented at Annual Winter Meeting of the Dartmouth Lawyer's Association, British Columbia.

Caldwell, Lynton. 1993. "Emerging Boundary environmental Challenges and Institutional Issues: Canada and the United States." *Natural Resources Journal.* 33: 9-

31.

- Cameron, Maxwell and Brian W. Tomlin. 2000. *The Making of NAFTA: How the Deal Was Done*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Cameron, Maxwell and Carol Wise. 2004. "The Political Impact of NAFTA on Mexico: Reflections on the Political Economy of Democratization," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*. 37(2): 301-323.
- Campbell, Bruce. 1993. "Restructuring the Economy: Canada into the Free Trade Era." In *The Political economy of North American Free Trade*. Ed. Grinspan, Ricardo, and Maxwell Cameron. New York, New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Canada. 1985. *Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada*.
- Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. 2000. *Canada-U.S. Partnership: Building a Border for the 21st Century*. Ottawa, Ontario: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
- Canada. Parliament. 2002 Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Partners in North America: Advancing Canada's Relations with the United States and Mexico*.
- Canadian Embassy in Mexico. 2005. Diplomatic Relations.
<http://www.dfaid-maeci.gc.ca/mexico-city/political/menu-en.asp>
- Canadian Embassy in Washington. Immigration Cooperation. 2005.
http://www.dfaid-maeci.gc.ca/can-am/washington/border/immigration_coop-en.asp#THEper cent20BORDERper cent20VISIONper cent20COOPERATIONper cent20PROCESS
- Carroll, John. 1983. *Environmental Diplomacy: An Examination and a Prospective of Canadian - United States Transboundary Environmental Relations*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Carter, Nicole. 2001. "State of Binational Cooperation Today, Prospects for the Future". *Borderlines*. 74(9) No. 1.
(http://www.americaspolicy.org/borderlines/2001/bl74/bl74coop_body.html.).
- Chambers, Edward, and Peter Smith. 2002. *NAFTA in the New Millennium*. Ed. Edmonton, Alberta: The University of Alberta Press.
- Checkel, Jeffrey. 1998. "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory." *World Politics* 50(2): 324-48.

- _____. 1999. "Social Construction and Integration." *European Public Policy* 6 (4): 545-560.
- Christiansen, Thomas, et al. 1999. "The Social Construction of Europe." *Journal of European Public Policy* 6(4): 528-44.
- Cicin-Sain, Biliana, Michael Orbach, Stephen Sellers and Enrique Manzanilla. 1986. "Conflictual Interdependence: United States-Mexico Relations on Fishery Resources." *Natural Resources Journal*. 26: 769-792.
- Clarkson, Stephen. 1993. "Economics: The New Hemispheric Fundamentalism." In *The Political Economy of North American Free Trade*. Grinspun, Ricardo, and, Maxwell Cameron. New York, New York: St. Martin's Press.
- _____. (2000) "Apples and Oranges: Comparing the EU and NAFTA as Continental Systems". Working Paper 2000/15, Florence: European University Institute.
- _____. 2002. *Uncle Sam and Us: Globalization, Neoconservatism, and the Canadian State*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- _____. and Maria Banda. 2003. "Congruence and Conflict: Canada's and Mexico's Response to Paradigm Shift in the United States." Presented at International Studies Association 44th Annual Convention, Portland.
- Cohn, Theodore. 2000. *Global Political Economy: Theory and Practice*. New York, New York: Addison Wesley Longman Inc.
- Commission for Environmental Cooperation. 2005. Who we are/Council.
http://www.cec.org/who_we_are/council/nac/index.cfm?varlan=english
- Commission for Environmental Cooperation. 2005. Our Programs and Projects.
http://www.cec.org/site_map/index.cfm?varlan=english
- Croucher, Sheila. 2004. "Homeland Insecurity: Ambivalent Attachments and Hegemonic Narratives of American Nationhood Post-9/11." Presented at the International Studies Association meeting, Montreal.
- Cox, Michael. 2001. "Whatever Happened to American Decline? International Relations and the new United States Hegemony. *New Political Economy* 6(3): 311-40.
- _____. 2004. "The Empire's Back in Town: or America's Imperial Temptation-Again." Presented at the International Studies Association 45th Annual Convention, Montreal.
- Cox, Robert. 1995. "Critical political Economy" Ed. Bjorne Hettne. *International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder*. London: Zed.

Del Castillo, Gustavo. 1992. "Convergent Paths towards Integration: The Unequal Experiences of Canada and Mexico." In *North America Without Borders*. Randall, Stephen, and Herman Konrad. Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary Press.

_____. and Gustavo Vega Cánovas. 1995. *The Politics of Free Trade in North America*. Ottawa, Ontario: The Centre for Trade Policy and Law.

De Palma, Anthony. (2001). *Here: A Biography of the New American Continent*. New York, New York: PublicAffairs.

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Border Backgrounder: Canada's Actions Against Terrorism Since September 11. 2003.

<http://www.dfaid-maeci.gc.ca/anti-terrorism/canadaactions-en.asp>

Deutsch, Karl. 1970. *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of definition and Measurement*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company Inc.

Dobson, Wendy. 2002. "Shaping the Future of the North American Economic Space: A Framework for Action." *Commentary-Borders Papers*. No. 162. C.D. Howe Institute.

Dominguez, Jorge and Rafael Fernandez De Castro. 2001. *Between Partnership and Conflict: The United States and Mexico*. New York, New York: Routledge.

Donnelly, Brendan and Anthony Hawes. 2004. "The Beginning or the End of the Beginning? Enhanced Co-operation in the Constitutional Treaty." *The Federal Trust: European Policy Brief*. (November):7.
(<http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/admin/uploads/PolicyBrief7.pdf>).

Dworsky, Leonard. 1986. "The Great Lakes: 1955-1985." *Natural Resources Journal*. 26: 291-336.

Eastby. John. 1985. *Functionalism and Interdependence: The Credibility of Institutions, Policies and Leadership*. Lanham, MD. : University Press of America Inc.

Fernandez-de Castro, Rafael F. 1996. "Cooperation in U.S.-Mexican Relations: An Emerging Process of Institutionalization." Ph.D. diss. Georgetown University.

Figueras, Jose Carreno. 2002. "Analizan México-EU seguridad fronteriza." 12 January.

Final Report Water and Sustainable Development in Binational Lower Rio Grande/Rio Bravo Basin. 2000. Joint Research Project between the Houston Advanced Research Center and The Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey. Texas. 1-18. (http://www.harc.edu/mitchellcenter/mexico_mexico_reports/ch08_international_setting.pdf).

- Flynn, Stephen. 2003. "The False Conundrum: Continental Integration versus Homeland Security." In *The Rebordering of North America: Integration and Exclusion in a New Security Context*. Ed. Andreas, Peter and Thomas J. Biersteker. New York and London: Routledge.
- Fox, Annette Baker. "Environment and Trade: The NAFTA Case." *Political Science Quarterly*. 110, 1 (Spring 1995): 49-68.
- Fry, Earl. 2003. "North American economic Integration." *Policy Options* XIV(8): 1-20.
- Gabriel, Christina, Jimena Jimenez and Laura Macdonald. 2003. "Toward North American "Smart Borders": Convergence or Divergence in Border Control Policies"? Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Portland, Oregon.
- _____. and Laura Macdonald. 2004. "Of Borders and Business: Canadian CorporateProposals for North American "Deep Integration." *Studies in Political Economy*. 74(Autumn):79-100.
- Ganster, Paul. 1996. "The United States-Mexico Border Region and Growing Transborder Interdependence." In *NAFTA in Transition*. Randall, Stephen and Herman Konrad. Calgary, Alberta: the University of Calgary Press.
- Ganster, Paul, 1997. "On the Road to Interdependence? The United States-Mexico Border Region". In Ganster et al., *Borders and Border Regions In Europe and North America*. San Diego, CA: San Diego State University Press.
- Gegout, Catherine. 2003. *The US Presence within the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) System: The Relevance of Neorealism and of the Security Community Concept*. Florence: European university Institute.
- Gill, Stephen. 1995. "Theorizing the Interregnum: The Double Movement and Global Politics in the 1990s." In *International Political Economy: Understanding Global Disorder*. Ed. Bjorne Hettne. London: Zed .
- Golob, Stephanie. 2002. "North America Beyond NAFTA: Sovereignty, Identity, and Security in Canada-U.S. Relations." *Canadian-American Public Policy*. December: 1-45.
- Gonzales, Guadalupe, and Stephen Haggard. 1998. "The United States and Mexico: A Pluralistic Security Community?" In *Security Communities*. Adler, Emanuel, and Michael Barnett. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
- Granatstein, J. 1989. *How Britain's Weakness Forced Canada into the Arms of the United States.*" Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press.

- Graves, Scott. 1999. "Structuring Public Participation in a Binational Institution: Citizen Activism and BECC Policymaking." *Borderlines*. 53 (7). (<http://us-mex.irc-online.org/borderlines/1999/bl53/bl53becc.html>).
- Grinspan, Ricardo, and Maxwell Cameron. 1993. *The Political economy of North American Free Trade*. New York, New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Haas, Ernst. 1966-1967. "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America". *The Journal of Common Market Studies*. 5: 315-343.
- Haas, Peter. 1992. "Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination." *International Organization*. 46(1):1:35.
- _____. Robert Keohane, and Marc Levy. Ed. 1993. *Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Haces, Maria Teresa Gutierrez. 1995. "Canada and Mexico: The Neighbor's Neighbor." In *NAFTA in Transition*. Eds. Randall, Stephen, and, Herman Konrad. Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary Press.
- Hall, Peter, and Rosemary Taylor. 1996. "Political Science and the three new Institutionalisms." XLIV: 936-957.
- Hakin, Peter, and Robert Litan. 2002. *The Future of North American Integration: Beyond NAFTA*. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Hamilton, Nora. 2002. "Mexico." In *Politics of Latin America: The Power Game*. Vanden, Harry, and Garry Prevost. New York, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hart, Michael and Brian Tomlin. "The Coming Policy Shift in Canada-U.S. Relations." Cente for Trade Policy and Law.
- Hellman, Judith. 1983. *Mexico in Crisis*. 2d ed. New York, New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers Inc.
- Henrikson, Alan K., 1995. "The U.S. 'North American' Trade Concept: Continentalist, Hemispherist or Globalist?" in Donald Barry et al, *Toward A North American Community: Canada, the United States and Mexico*. Boulder CO: Westview Press.
- Herzog, Lawrence. 2000. *Shared Space: Rethinking the U.S.-Mexico Border Environment*. Sna Diego, California: Center for U.S.-Mexico Studies.
- Hoberg, George. 2000. "Canada in North America Integration." *Canadian Public Policy* Vol. XXVI (2): S35-S50.

Hopf, Ted. 1998. "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security*, 23 (Summer): 171-200.

House of Representatives. 2004. Address by his Excellency Vicente Fox, President of the United Mexican States.

<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r107:11:/temp/~r107MTo7Wd::>

Hristoulas, Athanasios. 2002. "Canada, Mexico and the North American Security Perimeter: The Twist and the Tail?" Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico.

_____. 2003a. "Trading places: Canada, Mexico, and North American security." In *The Rebordering of North America: Integration and Exclusion in a New Security Context*. Ed. Andreas, Peter and Thomas J. Biersteker. New York and London: Routledge.

Huppert, Daniel. 1995. "Why the Pacific Salmon Treaty Failed to End the Salmon Wars." SMA 95 1-27. Seattle: University of Washington School of Marine Affairs.

Ingram, Helen and David White. 1993. "International Boundary and Water Commission: An Institutional Mismatch for Resolving Transboundary Water problems. *Natural Resources Journal*. 33(1): 153-175.

Jackson, Andrew. 2003. "Why the 'Big Idea' is a Bad Idea: A Critical Perspective on deeper Economic Integration with the United States." Canadian Labour Congress. (http://www.canadianlabour.ca/index.php/Jobs_Economy/Why_the_Big_Idea_Is_).

Jannol, Rebecca, Deborah Meyers, and Maia Jachimowicz. 2003. Fact Sheet #3: U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade and Migration.

http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/three_us_mexico_canada_trade.pdf

Jockel, Joseph. "The Canada-U.S. Relationship after the Third Round: The Emergence of Semi-Institutionalized Management." 1985. *International Journal*. 4(Autumn): 689-715.

Kato, Junko 1996: "Institutions and Rationality in Politics. Three Varieties of Neo-Institutionalists". *British Journal of Political Science*. 26: 553-582.

Kauppi, Mark, and Paul Viotti. 1987. *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism and Globalism*. New York, New York: Collier Macmillan.

Kelly, Mary, Arturo Solis and George Kourous. 2001. "The Border's Troubled Waters." *Borderlines*. (November) 9:10.
<http://us-mex.irc-online.org/borderlines/PDFs/bl83.pdf>.

Keohane, Robert. 1982. "The Demand for International Regimes." *International*

- Organization.* 36: 325-356.
- _____. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- _____. 1986. *Neorealism and Its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- _____. 1989. *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- _____. and Lisa Martin. 1995. "The Promise of Institutional Theory." *International Security*. 20 (1): 12-20.
- Kirton, John. 1997. "The Commission for Environmental Co-operation and Canada-US Environmental Governance in the NAFTA Era," *American Review of Canadian Studies*. (Autumn): 459-486.
- Kitchen, Veronica. 2002. "Re-Thinking the Canada-United States Security Community." Presented at the International Studies Association meeting, Portland, Oregon.
- Kramer, Paul. 2002. "Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910," *Journal of American History*. 88 (March): 1315-53.
- Krasner, Stephen D. 1983. *International Regimes*. Ed. Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Konrad, Herman. 1995. "North American Continental Relationships: Historical Trends and Antecedents." In *NAFTA in Transition*. Eds. Randall, Stephen, and Herman Konrad. Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary Press.
- Kourous, George. "NADBANK Update." *Borderlines*. 73(8). (<http://us-mex.irc-online.org/borderlines/2000/bl73/bl73NADBANK.html>).
- Krugman, Paul. 1993. "The Uncomfortable Truth about NAFTA: Its Foreign Policy, Stupid." *Foreign Affairs*. 72(5): 13-19.
- Kupchan, Charles. 2003. "The Rise of Europe, Americas Changing Internationalism and the end of U.S. Primacy." *Political Science Quarterly* 118(2): 205-231.
- Langille, David. 1987. "The Business Council on National issues and the Canadian State." *Studies in Political Economy*. 24 (Autumn): 41-85.
- Larner, Wendy. 2000. "Neoliberalism: Policy, Ideology, Governmentality." *Studies in Political Economy* 63 (Autumn) 5-25.

- Lemarquand, David. 1986. Preconditions to Cooperation in Canada-United States Boundary Waters." *Natural Resources Journal*. 26: 221-242.
- _____. 1993. "The International Joint Commission and Changing Canada-United States Boundary Relations." *Natural Resources Journal*. 33(1): 59-91.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1990. *Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the U.S. and Canada*. New York, New York: Routledge.
- Lowndes, Vivien. 1996. "Varieties of New Institutionalism: A Critical Appraisal." *Public Administration* 74(Summer): 181-197.
- March, James, and Johan Olsen. 1996. "Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions." *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration*, 9(3): 247-264.
- Martinez, Elizabeth, and Arnoldo Garcia. 2000. What is "Neoliberalism"? A Brief Definition.
<http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=376>
- Mattli, Walter. 1999. *The Logic of Regional Integration*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
- _____. 1999. "Explaining Regional Integration Outcomes." *Journal of European Public Policy* 6(1): 1-27.
- Mayer, Frederick. 1998. *Interpreting NAFTA : The Science and Art of Political Analysis*. New York : Columbia University Press.
- McKinney, Joseph. 2000. *Created from NAFTA: The Structure, Function and Significance of the Treaty's Related Institutions*. Armork, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.
- Macdonald, Laura. 1997. The Politics of Canada's Foreign Economic Relations. In *Understanding Canada: Building on the New Canadian Political Economy*. Wallace, Clement. McGill-Queen's University Press.
- _____. 1995. "Canada and the "New" World Order." In *Canadian Politics in the 1990s*. Whittington, Michael, and Glen Williams. Scarborough, Ontario: Nelson Canada.
- _____. 2004. "Globalization and Gender in Canada." Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Convention, Chicago.
- McDougall, John. 2004. In *The Art of the State, Volume II: Thinking North America*. Vol. 2(7): 33-50. Toronto, Ontario: The Institute for Research on Public Policy. (<http://www.irpp.org/indexe.htm>).

- McQaig, Linda. 2001. *All you can Eat: Greed, Lust and the New Capitalism*. Toronto, Ontario: Penguin Canada.
- McRae, Donald. 2001. "The Negotiation of the 1999 Pacific Salmon Agreement." *Canada-United States Law Journal*. (27): 267-278.
- McRoberts, Kenneth. "Quebec: Province, Nation, or "Distinct Society"? In *Canadian Politics in the 1990s* Ed. Whittington, Michael, and Glen Williams: Scarborough, Ontario: Nelson Canada.
- Mebs, Kanji. 1996. "North American Environmentalism and Political Integration." *The American review of Canadian Studies*. 26(2): 183-204.
- Mead, Walter. 2001. *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Shaped the World*. New York, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Mead, Walter. 2003. "U.S. Foreign Policy and the American Tradition." Institute of International Studies UC Berkeley.
<http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people3/Mead/mead-con2.html>
- Menz, Frederic. 1994. "The North American Environment: Economic and Public Policy Issues." *North American Outlook*. 4(3): 3-22.
- Meyers, Deborah. 2000. "Border Management at the Millennium" *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 30:(2): 255-268
- Meyers, Deborah and Demetrios Papademetriou, 2001. *Caught in the Middle: Border Communities in an Era of Globalization*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Mikkelsen, Jeppe. 1991. "Neofunctionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC." *Millenium: Journal of International Studies* 20: 1-22.
- Miller, Bill. 2002. "In Mexico, Ridge to Discuss Border." *Washington Post*, 01 March.
- Mittelman, James. 1996. "Rethinking the "New Regionalism" in the Context of Globalization." *Global Governance*. 2:189-213.
- Mittelman, James. 1996. *Global Critical Reflections*. Ed. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
- Mumme, Stephen P. 1986. "Engineering Diplomacy: The Evolving Role of the International Boundary and Water Commission in U.S.-Mexico Water Management." *Journal of Borderland Studies*. Vol. I(1): 73-108.

- _____. and Scott Moore. 1990. "Agency Autonomy in Transboundary Resource Management: The U.S. Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission, U.S. and Mexico." *Natural Resources Journal*. Summer 30: 661-684.
- _____. 1992. "New Directions in United States-Mexico Transboundary Environmental Management: A Critique of Current Proposals." *Natural Resources Journal*. 32(3): 539-562.
- _____. 1993. "Innovation and Reform in Transboundary Resource Management: A Critical Look at the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico," *Natural Resources Journal*, Volume 33 (winter): 93-120.
- _____. 1996. "Environmental Management on the Mexico-United States Border: NAFTA and the Emerging Bilateral Regime." *American Review of Canadian Studies*. 37 (Summer): 205-216.
- _____. and Joseph Nalven. 1988. Vol. III, No. 1. pp. 39-67. "National Perspectives on Managing Transboundary Environmental Hazards: The U.S.-Mexico Border Region"
- _____. and Pamela Duncan. 1996. "The Commission for Environmental Cooperation and the United States-Mexico Border Environment." *Journal of Environment and Development*. 5(2): 197-215.
- _____. and Pamela Duncan. 1997-1998. "The Commission for Environmental Cooperation and Environmental Management in the Americas." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*. 39 (4): 41-62.
- _____. and Scott Moore. 1999. "Innovation Prospects in U.S.-Mexico Border Water Management: The IBWC and the BECC in Theoretical Perspective." *Government and Policy*. 17(6) 753-772.
- _____. 2001. "Reinventing the International Boundary Water Commission." *Borderlines*. 79(9).
<http://us-mex.irc-online.org/borderlines/2001/bl79/bl79ibwc.html>
- _____. and Nicolas Pineda. 2002. "Water Management on the U.S.-Mexico Border: Mandate Challenges for Binational Institutions". Washington, D.C Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.1-20. (<http://www.colson.edu.mx/Estudiosper cent20Pol/Npineda/MummePineda-English.pdf>).
- Munton, Don. 1997. "Acid Rain and Transboundary Air Quality in Canadian-American Relations." Autumn: 327-358.
- _____. and John Kirton. 1994. "North American environmental Cooperation: Bilateral, Trilateral and Multilateral." *North American Outlook*. 4(3): 59-85.

North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation. *North American Agenda for Action 2002-2004*. Montreal, Canada.

North American Development Bank. 2005.

http://www.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/intl/fy2006/tabc12_nadBank.pdf

Nye, Joseph. 1968. "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement." *International Organization*, 22(4): 855-880.

O'Brien, Robert. 1995. "North American Integration and International Relations Theory." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* XXVIII (4): 693-728. ????

Panitch, Leo. 1996. "Rethinking the Role of the State." In *Global Critical Reflections*. Ed. Mittelman, James. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher's Inc.

Pastor, Manuel and Carol Wise. 2003. "A Long View of Mexico's Political Economy: What's Changed? What are the Challenges?" In *Mexico's Politics and Society in Transition*. Ed. Tulchin, Joseph and Andrew Selee. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publisher's Inc.

Pastor, Robert. 2001. *Toward a North American Community: Lessons from the Old World for the New*. Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics.

_____. 2002. "NAFTA is Not Enough: Steps toward a North American Community." In *The Future of North American Integration: Beyond NAFTA*. Ed. Hakim, Peter and Robert Litan. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Paterson, Kent. 2001. *Deepening U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation*. Interhemispheric Resource Center's Americas Program.
<http://www.americaspolicy.org/reports/2001/bl84.html>

Peters, Guy. 2000. *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism*. London, England: Biddles Ltd.

Pierson, Paul. 1996. "The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis." *Comparative Political Studies*, (29)2:123-163.

Price, Richard, and Christian Reus-Smit. 1998. "Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism". *European Journal of International Relations*. 4(3): 259-294.

Rabe, Barry. 1997. "The Politics of Ecosystem Management in the Great Lakes Basin." *The American Review of Canadian Studies*. 1997(Autumn): 411-436.

Randall, Stephen. 1995. "Sharing a Continent: Canadian-Mexican relations since 1945."

In *Beyond Mexico*. Ed. Daudelin, Jean, and Edgar Dosman. Ottawa, Ontario. Carleton University Press.

Risse, Thomas. 2004. "Social Construction and European Integration." In *European Integration Theory*. Ed. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez. London: Oxford university Press.

Rosamond, Ben. 1999. "Discourse of globalization and the social construction of European Identities." *Journal of European Public Policy*. 6(4): 652-68.

_____. 2000. *Theories of European Integration*. New York, New York: St. Matrin's Press.

Roussel, Stephane. 2004. *The North American Democratic Peace: Absence of War and Security Institution-Building in Canada-US Relations, 1867-1958*. Kingston, Ontario: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University Press.

Rozental, Andrés. 2002. "Integrating North America: A Mexican Perspective." In *The Future of North American Integration: Beyond NAFTA*. ed. Hakim, Peter and Robert Litan. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Rueda, Leonora. 2001. "La frontera an las relaciones Mexico-Estados Unidos: una mirada al nuevo milenio." In *Las relaciones de Mexico con Estados Unidos y Canada: una mirada al nuevo milenio*. Suarez, Rosio, Remedios Gomez Arnau, and Julian Castro Rea. Mexico, D.F.: Centro De Investigaciones Sobre America Del Norte.

Rugman, Alan, John Kirton and Julie Soloway. 1999. *Environmental Regulations and Corporate Strategy: A NAFTA Perspective*. New York, New York: Oxford University Press.

Rupert, Mark. 1997. "Globalization and contested common sense in the United States". In *Innovation and Transformation in International Studies*. Gill, Stephen and James Mittelman. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Sanchez, Roberto. 2000. "Governance, Trade, and the Environment in the Context of NAFTA". *American Behavioral Scientist*. 45(9): 1369-1393.

Sadler, Barry. 1986. "The Management of Canada-U.S. Boundary Waters: Retrospect and Prospect". *Natural Resources Journal*. 26(Spring): 359-376.

Safarian, Edward. 1996. "The FTA and NAFTA: One Canadian's Perspective." In *A New North America: Cooperation and Enhanced Interdependence*. Doran, Charles and Alvin Drischler. Westopt, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers.

Schwanen, Daniel. 2004. "Deeper, Broader: A Roadmap for a Treat of North America" In *The Art of the State, Volume II: Thinking North America*. Vol. 2(4): 3-60. Toronto,

Ontario: The Institute for Research on Public Policy.

Schwartz, Alan. 1994. "Canada-U.S. Environmental Relations: a look at the 1990s." *American Review of Canadian Studies*. 24(4): 489-508.

Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores. Dirección Para Asuntos Fronterizos: Mecanismos De Enlace Fronterizo. 2001

Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America. 2005.
<http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp?id=443>

Serrano, Monica. 2003. "Bordering on the Impossible: U.S.-Mexico Security Relations after 9/11." In *The Rebordering of North America: Integration and Exclusion in a New Security Context*. Ed. Andreas, Peter and Thomas J. Biersteker. New York and London: Routledge.

Shea, Andrew. 2001. *Balancing the Need for Security and Trade*. Ottawa, Ontario: The Conference Board of Canada.

Shore, Sean. 1998. "No Fences make good Neighbors: the Development of the Canadian-U.S. Security Community, 1871-1940." In *Security Communities*. Adler, Emanuel, and Michael Barnett. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Skidmore, Thomas and Peter Smith. 2001. *Modern Latin America*. 5th ed. New York, New York: Oxford University Press.

Smith, Allan. 2000. "Doing the Continental: Conceptualizations of the Canadian-American Relationship in the Long Twentieth Century." *Canadian-American public Policy*. 44: 2-75.

Smith, Peter. 1993. *The Challenge of Integrating Europe and the Americas*. London, U.K.: Transaction Publishers.

Smith, Ryan. 2001. "The Effectiveness of the NAFTA Environmental Regime." Honor's Essay. Carleton University.

Stuart, Reginald. 1988. *United States Expansionism and British North America, 1775-1871*. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press.

Sweeney, Jane. 1984. *The first European Elections: Neofunctionalism and the European Parliament*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press Inc.

Szekely, Alberto. 1986. "Transboundary Resources: A view from Mexico." *Natural Resources Journal*. 26(4): 661-694.

_____. 1992. "Establishing a Region for Ecological Cooperation in North America."

Natural Resources Journal. 32(3): 563-622.

_____. 1993. "Emerging Boundary Environmental Challenges and Institutional Issues: Mexico and the United States." *Natural Resources Journal.* Winter 33: 33-46.

The IJC and the 21st Century: Response of the IJC to a Request by the Governments of Canada and the United States for Proposals on How To Best Assist Them to Meet the Environmental Challenges of the 21st Century. 1997.
[\(http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/html/21ste.htm\)](http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/html/21ste.htm).

Thompson, John, and Stephen Randall. 1994. *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies.* 2d ed. Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press.

The U.S.- Canada Partnership in the War on Terrorism. 2005.
http://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/canada_final_report.pdf

Toro, Celia. 2005. "The U.S. and Mexico Against Transnational Organized Crime: Exploring Changes in Sovereign Prerogatives and Capacities".

US Embassy in Mexico. "A Border Community United-The U.S.-Mexico Border."
<http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/eborder-mechs.htm#3>

United States State Department. 2005. U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission.
<http://www.state.gov/p/wha/ci/mx/c10787.htm>

United States State Department. 2005. North American Development Bank-Border Environmental Cooperation Commission Reform.
<http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/8920.htm>

United States. Office of the Press Secretary. 2001. *North American Leaders' Statement.* April 2002.
www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2001/2482.htm

United States. Statement of Commissioner Robert C. Bonner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security, July 22, 2004.
http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/speeches_statements/archives/2004/072204_reform.xml

Verady, Robert, et al. 1997. 'The U.S.-Mexican Border Environment Cooperation Commission: Collected Perspectives on the First Two Years.' *Journal of Borderland Studies.* 11(2): 89/119.

Waever, Ole. 2003. "Discursive Approaches." In *European Integration Theory.* Ed. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez. London: Oxford university Press.

Washington File. Joint Press Availability with Mexican Foreign Secretary Jorge Castaneda and Secretary of State Colin Powell. January 30, 2001 (<http://canberra.usembassy.gov/hyper/2001/0130/epf203.htm>).

Welsh, Jennifer. 2004. "North American Citizenship: Possibilities and Limits." In *The Art of the State, Volume II: Thinking North America*. Vol. 2(7): 33-50. Toronto, Ontario: The Institute for Research on Public Policy. (http://www.irpp.org/books/archive/AOTS2/folio_7.pdf).

Wendt, Alexander. 1992. "Anarchy is What States Make of it". *International Organization*. 46:2: 391-425.

Wilber, Ken. 1999. *One Taste: The Journal of Ken Wilber*. Boston, Massachusetts: Shambhala Publications Inc.

Williams, Glen. 1992. "Greening the New Canadian Political Economy." *Studies in Political Economy*. 37(Spring): 5-30.

_____. 1994. *Not for Export*. 3d ed. Toronto, Ontario: McClelland and Steward Inc.

_____. 1995. "Regions with Regions: Continentalism Ascendant." In *Canadian Politics in the 1990s* Ed. Whittington, Michael, and Glen Williams: Scarborough, Ontario: Nelson Canada.

_____. 2004. "Regions within Region: Canada in the Continent." In Williams, Glen, and Michael Whittington, *Canadian Politics in the 21st Century* 6th edition, Toronto: Nelson.

Wilkinsun, Bruce. 1993. "Trade Liberalization, the Market Ideology, and Morality: Have we a Sustainable System. In *The Political economy of North American Free Trade*. Grinspun, Ricardo, and, Maxwell Cameron. New York, New York: St. Martin's Press.

Willoughby, William. 1979. *The Joint Organizations of Canada and the United States*. Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press.

Wise, Carol. 1998. *The Post-NAFTA Political Economy: Mexico and the Western Hemisphere*. Ed. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Young, Oran. 1989. International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.