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CUBAN MIAMI: Exile Nation in a Global City

by

Lisa Drouillard

A thesis submitted to
The Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Institute of Political Economy
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario

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CUBAN MIAMI: Exile Nation in a Global City

submitted by Lisa Drouillard, B.A.Hons.
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the development of a strong Cuban-American national identity and enclave economy in Miami, Florida and significance of the community's national projects for the city's ascendance as a global city. Theoretical analyses of nationalism, global cities and ethnic economic enclaves are explored and critiqued in order to develop and understanding of the economic, political and cultural interface between particular locale's and global actors. At the heart of this analysis is the contention that global cities are not merely the product of choices made by multinational corporations and financial institutions but arise in part out of the quotidian engagement of a wide variety of local actors in global political and economic affairs. In the Miami case, the strength Cuban-American nationalist project and the rise of the Cuban enclave economy have affected the way the city interacts with global economy and have profoundly shaped the blueprints for Miami's future.

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INTRODUCTION

Even a cursory analysis of the political discourse of Miami's Cuban-American enclave is likely to jar one's understanding of what constitutes *local* politics and what lies within the realm of international affairs. Beyond the perennial focus of Miami's public officials on events outside of their borders, residents and visitors display a confusion over the location and relevance of national boundaries. American tourists sense they have entered into a foreign land when visiting South Florida, Cuban immigrants living elsewhere "return" to Miami to feel at home in Havana, and travelers leaving the city may pass billboards reading: "Now re-entering the United States of America." (Rieff, 1987:29) When residents refer to Miami as a 'truly international city' or the 'capital of Latin America', they make reference to many of the structural characteristics that have led an number of academic analyses to categorize Miami as a new 'global city', comparable in character and function with New York or London. Global cities theorists have established Miami's rank among international business centers on the basis of economic criteria (the location of transnational corporate headquarters and banks in the city, the region's advancements in telecommunications facilities, transport systems and producer service sectors). For many members of the Cuban enclave, however, the Miami's 'global city' image is a reflection of the transformation in outlook and culture that they themselves have directed.

Unlike other locales that have been classified as 'global cities', Miami does not have a long history as a center for international or regional trade and finance. In

contrast to the city's humble origins as a tourist town of some 300,000 residents in 1960, the profile of the city's growth and development over the past thirty years is truly impressive (Viglucchi, 1996:1A). The city ranks among the world's largest international banking centers with a total of 135 financial institutions and holds the fourth largest concentration of foreign bank offices in the United States (Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce 1997; Sassen, 1994:80). The city's neighboring ports move more containerized cargo to Latin America than any other American city (Bussey, 1997:15BM). The Miami International Airport is second only to New York's Kennedy Airport in the number of foreign passengers and volume of cargo transported (Portes & Sassen, 1995:475). The Miami Free Trade Zone is also the largest in the country and the only privately owned facility of its type in the world (Sassen, 1994:81; Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce, 1997). Miami has also become a critical node in the nation's international drug trade. While the significance of this important sector of the local economy is very difficult to gauge, it is clear that the drug trade has been a significant source of global trade and finance linkages between Miami and Latin America.

Given these developments, scholars examining the phenomenon of global cities such as Saskia Sassen, John Friedman, Alejandro Portes, and others, have recently come to recognize Miami's place in the hierarchy of global command and control centers. Their studies have generally concluded that the city's history as an immigration center has been central to the establishment of a local political economy

conducive to the production of economic control capabilities (Portes and Sassen, 1995; Sassen, 1991:315-16; Grosfoguel, 1993). Indeed, the expansion of the city's immigrant population since the initial influx of Cuban exiles in the early 1960s has been the salient characteristic of change in the city. Dramatic changes in the city's demographic composition -- from 4 percent Hispanic in 1950s to 49 percent in 1997 -- have proceeded in tandem with the locale's economic transformation (Perez-Stable and Uriarte, 1993:140). The Miami Metropolitan Area has the largest proportion of foreign-born residents of any American city and remains the most desirable point of migration in the Caribbean Basin (Grosfoguel, 1993:164). Given these distinctive characteristics, global cities analyses have used Miami as a case study to assess the relationship between immigration and the emergence of global city functions (Sassen and Portes, 1995:471). Unfortunately, much this scholarship has limited the assessment of the role of immigrant enclaves to the value of immigrant labor.

The literature describing Miami's recent transformation has provided a great deal of analysis of the structural characteristics that have attracted multinational headquarters and financial institutions to the area. As such, the perspectives on the city's defining characteristics have generally provided a very top-down view of the city from the perspective of global economic actors. Given this focus, studies of Miami's contemporary development have largely avoided any assessment of the implications of local perspectives on the city's place in the global political economy

or the dynamics of labor and capital relations in the city's expanding immigrant communities.

A View from Cuban Miami

In the thesis that follows I would like to expand the discussion of the role of immigrant enclaves in 'global cities' by analyzing the relationship between the political and economic history of Miami's Cuban enclave and the establishment of the appropriate conditions for the city's development as a global command and control center. This analysis will begin by drawing insights from 'global cities' analyses and 'ethnic economic enclave' studies which explain how certain locales come to excel as service and production centers in such a way that they become the command centers of the global economy. In its analysis of global city development and functions, the thesis will focus predominantly on the work of three scholars who have studied the development of global city capabilities in the Miami context: Saskia Sassen, Ramon Grosfoguel and Alejandro Portes. Each of these scholars have provided insights into different aspects of the city's development. Examined collectively, these analyses also provide a fairly exhaustive list of the essential structural features which comprise the contemporary global city. It is anticipated that a more involved dialogue between global cities and ethnic enclave scholarship will in itself produce a better comprehension of a locale's capacity to shape the terms of its insertion into the global political economy and to interface directly with international actors.

To address some of the limitations of the global cities scholarship under review, and in an attempt to incorporate elements of the local narrative explaining Miami's development, the thesis will merge the insights of the global cities analyses with the study of nationalism in immigrant communities. The thesis will attempt to respond to the apparent need for analysis of social institutions and cultural events which shape local, regional and global economies. The thesis will attempt to broaden the discussion of local agency in the study of Miami as a 'global city' through the examination of the material and discursive construction of a national identity within the Cuban enclave and the impacts of these endeavors on the course of the city's development.

Underlying the analysis that will follow is the contention that Miami's Cuban enclave has not built merely a strong ethnic community or enclave economy, but has been involved in a process of 'nation building' within the city. This thesis will borrow from the work of Benedict Anderson and his colleagues for a definition which describes the nation as a "community imagined through the artifacts of collective sacrifice, (Balakrishnan, 1995:65)." It will explore how construction of a strong national identity in the Cuban American enclave has affected local labour relations, the city's ability to mobilize the population to garner state and federal resources, and the level of skill with which local institutions negotiate with international actors on matters of politics and economics. An examination of 'long distance nationalism' in Little Havana will serve as a point of departure for

understanding some of the reasons why the Cuban-American nation has fared better than other ethnic communities in terms of material success and political power.

By invoking an analysis of Cuba's national imagination, we might come closer to an understanding of how, despite the absence of any accountable leadership, the Cuban enclave has developed a socially regulated local economy. The analysis of Little Havana's national projects will attempt to explain how the enclave has come to command significant personal sacrifices from members of the community over the past thirty years. As well, I will also emphasize the effects of the Cuban national project on the locale's view of the world. Building on Arjun Appadurai's glossary of terms describing the fluid and irregular vistas on social, political and economic landscapes (*ethnoscapes*, *mediascapes*, *finanscapes*, etc.) the thesis will discuss the development of a local *globescape* (Appadurai, 1994:328). This term will be used to suggest the scope and angle of vision of the global political economy which has been framed by local actors' historical, cultural and political situation. I will argue that the nature of local actors perspectives on global processes, and their understanding of the capacity of the community to act on various political and economic issues on different geographic scales, will influence the way the locale will interface with global actors.

Through an analysis of the Miami case and a discussion of various works explaining the city's development, I hope to elucidate the need for a frame of analysis in which the maturation of 'global cities' can be as a process which involves a constant dialogue between, and reordering of, spatial scales of power in the global

political economy. The thesis will survey the roles of various actors in the city's development in order to assess the convergence between paths of ethnic nationalism, the development of a tightly knit enclave economy and the emergence of a command center for the Caribbean and Latin American economy in Miami.

Actors and Structures

The population under study will be referred to alternately as Cuban-Americans, émigrés, immigrants, entrants or exiles. While the politics behind these labels can often cause agitation within the enclave (as many insist that they are differentiated from other immigrants by their status as political exiles, and others have been granted a lower status by their classification as “entrants” by immigration officials), I would like to stress that my use of these appellations does not necessarily attempt to convey these differences in meaning. One of the central aims of this analysis is to focus attention on the experiences and perspectives of Miami's Cuban who have shaped the city's development over the past thirty years. The thesis will examine the heterogeneity of Cuban experiences and voices within the enclave and the development of a hegemonic narrative dictating the perspective of *el Cubanísimo* (the most Cuban) on issues of local economic development and politics. While the agency of this diverse group of immigrants will be discussed in the context of struggles within the enclave for the power to represent the group, the discussion of the “Miami Cuban perspective” will generally refer to the dominant narrative.

The discussion of other actors in the Miami story, Latin American elites, agents of the federal state, the “island Cubans”, the city's African American

community and non-Hispanic White population is organized around the relationships of these groups with the Cuban community. Space does not permit an explication of the diversity of perspectives within each of these groups and the list of distinct groups interacting with the Cuban enclave in Miami is by no means exhaustive. That the “Cuban perspective” often pervades the dominant taxonomy of Miami’s key players employed in this study is evident in the exclusive classification of the majority of Miami’s native white population as non-Hispanic. In the paper, I will often use the short-hand term Anglo when referring to these individuals despite the evidence that this too may be a problematic category. “Where but in Miami” asked the president of the local B’nai B’rith Anti-Defamation League, “can a guy with a name like Teitelbaum be classified as an Anglo? (Croucher 1997:18)”

The discussion of various international and state institutions which have affected Miami’s development will also be limited to those related to the Cuban settlement and the enclave’s national projects. It is important to note that while the thesis will attempt to draw some distinction between the apparent mandate and perspectives of the different institutions and agents which have interacted with the Cuban enclave, I have not attempted to establish the degree of autonomy of various Cuban-American political organizations from the institutions of the federal state which have supported them financially. The focus of this analysis will be on the dialogue between different institutions and agents and the Cuban enclave and within the community itself.

Organization

The thesis is organized into three main sections and a concluding chapter. The first chapter will attempt to show the congruity between the insights of the global cities literature, ethnic enclave studies and scholarship on immigrant nationalism and will also draw up the relevance of each of these analyses for the Miami case. The chapter will present an argument for the eclectic use of theory in the thesis by illustrating the contributions of each body of scholarship.

Chapter Two will present the story of Cuban Miami by interpreting the influences of a number of actors over the events in the Cuban community. As much of the available literature on Miami has either cast members of the enclave in the role of instruments of the U.S. state or the transnational capitalist class, or has presented the community as a model of entrepreneurial spirit and of pluck, this analysis will attempt to explain changes in the local landscape as products of different dialogues between the Cubans and other agents. As such, I will present the Miami story using a series of exposes on a selection of these relationships. The chapter will be broken down into sections examining the roles of the federal state, particular members of the Latin American elite, Fidel Castro and the "island Cubans", Miami's non-Hispanic White community and the African American community. I hope that the analysis that will follow will convey my own irresolution over which actors have had the greatest singular impact on Miami's development, and the experience of Little Havana.

The third chapter will examine several important events and projects which have influenced relations among Cubans in Miami, and the enclave's interaction with

outside actors. The central elements of nation-building discussed in the work of Anderson and Balakrishnan -- militarism, control over communication and expression, and the construction of a discourse of national unity -- will be used as organizing themes to discuss the history of the Cuban community and the blueprints for the future of the nation. I will focus on events which have influenced the creation of local institutions and power relations which have increased the locale's ability to shape the terms of its interface with the global and regional economies and to change the community's understanding of their own political and economic boundaries.

The concluding chapter will discuss the changes in *globescapes* from places in Miami that have emerged out of the history of Cuban national projects in the city.

Chapter One: Global Cities, Economic Enclaves and Immigrant Nations

Miami has become the site of a number of political and economic projects of interest to contemporary studies of globalization, urban development, and ethnic nationalism. Over the past two decades, the character of that space has been transformed dramatically in the purview of powerful players in the global economy and in the eyes of local residents as well. The development of a strong producer services sector, the concentration of multinational corporate headquarters, and changes in the demographic and aesthetic landscape of the city have been attributed to the availability of a number of critical resources and infrastructures developed in tandem with the locale's history as a major port of entry for Cuban immigrants. There is a good deal of disagreement, however, on the extent to which the process of global city development can be seen as the culmination of the history of the Cuban presence in Miami.

In an analysis of the Miami case, Sassen and Portes maintain that the recent transformations in the Miami economy are not merely an extension of the area's development as a center for Latin American trade created by the Cuban enclave, but correspond to more complex global logics of capital. In assessing the role of immigrant enclaves in the shift in local development, they concentrate on the human capital resources found in the enclave such as a well educated bilingual population, a culture of entrepreneurialism, and a knowledge of international servicing stemming from the enclave's well developed

import/export sector (Sassen & Portes, 1995:476). Anxious to establish that Miami's recent trajectory of development is distinct from the city's development as a regional trade center, the authors downplay the role of the Cuban enclave given the evidence that it is not at the helm of this global economy command post. The article attributes many of the city's prior developments to the involvement of the city's immigrant community and to the Cuban enclave's distinctive relationship with both the federal state and international actors. In the analysis of the city's recent transformation, however, the enclave is seen as merely a pool of relatively cheap labour holding valuable bilingual and bicultural skills. The Cubans, they say "were Miami's comparative advantage in the interurban competition for international business (Portes & Sassen, 1995:476)".

This collaborative effort exemplifies a lack of productive communication between the discoveries and conclusions of case study analyses in urban development and global cities scholarship generally. Portes's research is characteristic of the rich material analyses of contemporary Cuban American political economy which have been published in the last decade. His work emphasizes the importance of a number of social capital resources created within the enclave which have contributed both to the loyalty/security of its low-wage workers and to the enclave's successful integration into larger markets. The global cities framework has the potential to set this analysis in the context of global trends toward agglomeration of production and management facilities.

Work by global cities scholars such as Saskia Sassen displays an understanding of processes occurring simultaneously across space which arise out of the imminence of circumstances of other strategic sites in the global economy. Other studies of Miami's development as a global city provide an assessment of other consequential projects played out in Miami such as the site's use as a geopolitical command post, the production of ideological symbols, and the creation of an imagined national homeland.

Sassen's analysis, which examines the dynamics of global cities through study of the lower circuits of capital would be supplemented beneficially by case study analyses of cultural and political circuits of power at the local level. While much of the recent scholarship on global cities does incorporate analyses of the social infrastructures which shape development opportunities within a locale, it often fails to examine the role of the local population as agents of the city's development as a key site in the global political economy. Often the residents of global cities are treated as mere proprietors of resources which may attract international business. In the existing literature on Miami as a global city, tendencies toward economic determinism have given rise to oversights and obstructions which have stunted communication between global cities scholarship and local chronicles of Miami's recent history.

In an effort to reconcile the competing conclusions of academic analyses and local histories narrated by business and political leaders within Miami's

Cuban enclave, this chapter will introduce an analysis of local transformation predicated on the dynamics of immigrant nationalism. In particular, the analysis of Benedict Anderson on “long-distance nationalism” will be used to provide insight into the correlation between Little Havana’s national projects and the transformation of the form and function of Miami’s spaces. Through this analysis the social capital resources such as relations of trust and “entrepreneurial spirit” which are deemed to be central elements of global city developments will explained as the end products of social and political projects rather than as exogenous variables.

Immigrant Resources

One of the key propositions organizing Sassen's study of global cities is that the global economy is "materialized in concrete processes in particular places and are dependent on localized conditions (95:32)". She argues that the expansion and internationalization of markets has contributed to the centralization of certain key functions of economic management and has catalyzed the overhaul of industrial production in certain key sites. The development of particular labor market conditions and geographies of production gives rise to the expansion of new producer service sectors and the grafting of new industrial paradigms on local production processes such that they may serve particular functions in the global economy. Contrary to analyses of globalization which hold that financial

and producer service industries are becoming increasingly “footloose,” this analysis holds that the social and economic geography of global cities provides advantages which keep firms relatively “place-bound”.

Sassen examines the relations of production within both the high-income service sector and seemingly “backward” sectors of the urban economy to uncover how the development of global city functions is reliant on the polarization of incomes and social status within and between different groups in a locale. The expansion of the population of high-income service professionals and managers initiates a process of gentrification which, in turn, generates a demand for labour intensive consumer services (such as specialty boutiques, gourmet food shops and maintenance of luxury apartment buildings). These service industries are dependent on a stable pool of flexible, low-wage workers (Sassen, 1991:279). In a similar fashion, the trends toward customization of production and smaller production runs have made the urban manufacturing sector more labour intensive and dependent on cheap and flexible labour. Sassen also notes that high-income urban gentrification also drives up the cost of real estate adding another variable which encourages the use of subcontracting to households and sweatshops at sites not zoned for manufacturing, thus capitalizing on rent-free production spaces (Sassen, 1991:280,315). The analysis of the role of immigrant neighborhoods and labor markets in global cities employed in Sassen’s work is useful in that it examines how immigrant labour and enclave markets have

become important assets in the global city economy in that they may solve a number of problems inherent to contemporary transformations in urban development. The case study analyses of immigrant participation in the informal sector in *The Global City* presents ethnic enclaves as dynamic environments which hold the potential to rejuvenate inner city neighborhoods, to create informal institutions of training and to catalyze of highly innovative markets.

The presence of immigrant communities can provide a locale with the "collection of resources" catalogue as follows:

cheap, willing and flexible labor supplies; entrepreneurial resources in the form of individuals willing to engage in the long hours and often low returns involved and the availability of family labour; various informal credit arrangements that make possible small scale capital formation; and a supply of low-cost space available for a multiplicity of uses (Sassen, 1991:290)

These resources provide immigrant communities with the "favored structural location" in the competition for entrepreneurial opportunities and for new types of jobs generated by the information economy and post-industrial restructuring (Sassen, 1996:36).

Sassen notes that immigrant communities can also serve as a vehicle for concentrating investments in the rehabilitation of residential districts in inner city regions which might otherwise have been abandoned, making up-scale gentrification more feasible later on. Immigrant settlement can create a low-cost equivalent of gentrification, generating a demand and supply for a wide range of goods, services and workers. *Global Cities* notes how the development of a

variety of ethnic enclaves, "like the cosmopolitan work culture of the new professionals, are yet another form of internationalization of global cities (Sassen, 1991:336)."

This account of the resource makeup critical in the development of global cities resource demonstrates how sectors which are often overlooked or perceived as anomalous to the development of advanced management and information sectors are in fact important components of advanced urban economies (Sassen, 1991:124,337; 1996:33-40). It also helps to dispel explanations of the rise of the informal economy and the casualization of work which blame the down-grading of manufacturing and service job on the presence of large supplies of vulnerable immigrant labour (Sassen, 1991:285). The process of income polarization is understood as a response to the needs for flexibility in the markets for labor and space created by integration in the global economy. The informalization of work provide an "opportunity structure that avoids or compensates for various constraints"(Sassen, 1991:289).

The Miami case seems to fit very well into this template of global cities characteristics. The establishment of first the Cuban enclave has provided the city with a well organized and regulated network of low-wage labor, has created institutions which support entrepreneurial activity, and has set in motion the cycles of low-income and upscale gentrification described by Sassen. The prevalence of informal work relations and entrepreneurial activity supported by

casual and family labour in Miami's ethnic enclaves are also understood as important components of the city's growth dynamics. The description of informal labour markets within the enclave as an "opportunity structure" seems germane in the Miami case, given the propensity of many immigrants to chose informal employment among co-ethnics to integration into the lower ranks of the formal economy.

Unfortunately, Sassen's analysis avoids any consideration of whether the formation and expansion of the informal and casual labour market in global cities is the result of *both* conditions created by advanced capitalism *and* the propensity of immigrants to engage in types of employment which are unpalatable other workers. This analysis misses an opportunity to move beyond, rather than debunk, the hypothesis that immigrants are over-represented in the informal labour market and the low-income service sector due to their "assumed propensity to replicate survival strategies typical of their home countries (Sassen, 1991:285)."

Sassen explains the genesis of global cities through an analysis of the lower circuits of capital and the relationship between interdependent service providers is viewed as a series of exchanges of service products which can only be exploited within limited space and time. The catalyst behind the agglomeration of service providers is ultimately the need to *accelerate* the rate of these transactions, rather than to maximize competitive advantage by establishing

relations of trust, understanding of common interest, or creative union¹ (Sassen, 1995:41). Institutions supporting trust and innovation in immigrant neighborhoods and or other working communities are considered only as advantages in the interurban competition for international business rather than as components of development which are central to the establishment of a competitive edge in producer service industries or in the development of an effective management and control center. The implications of this focus on competition between locales are at odds with Sassen's central argument that global city capabilities are embedded in place.

While the collection of accounts of the various sectors presented by Sassen lend insight into the economic landscape of a number of global cities, her work leaves important questions unanswered with respect to how immigrant enclaves have come to play the roles they do in these centers. In an era of high structural unemployment, why is immigrant labour preferred or used more frequently than other highly marginalized sectors of labour, particularly that of African Americans? Moreover, how should we assess the causes of the success or failure of various immigrant groups in their exploitation of opportunities in the new economy, or their role as agents in the production of the circumstances for

¹This critique owes a debt to Kevin Cox (1995:218-19) who explains the dependence of firms on localities with reference to a wide range of geographical, social and human capital resources which provide them with the right environment to produce innovation. In this analysis speed of transactions is critical, but it is as dependent on social relations between firms as it is on geography and technology.

the transformations of locales into world cities? What keeps the immigrant enclave alive long enough to concentrate investments of labour and capital and to change the space of inner city neighborhoods?

Miami's Multiple Strategic Functions

Ramon Grosfoguel's work compliments that of Sassen by providing and analysis of the roles of federal and local states in the development of the Cuban economic enclave in Miami and in the transformation of the locale into a global city. His work recognizes global cities as places which are shaped by the logics of military domination and ideological influence, as well as the dynamics of the global economy (1993:158). While the list of political and economic projects which Grosfoguel examines in the Miami context is not exhaustive, it leads us closer to an understanding of some of the non-economic logics that have shaped the city's development. It also offers a greater understanding of how social and economic relationships forged in the city's history as a military command post and immigration center have created valuable linkages between the city and an international community of power brokers in multinational corporations, Latin American elites, military organizations, and communication and media enterprises .

Evidence provided in this study is at odds with the claim that the Cuban enclave has not "made it in the American economy" through massive

governmental assistance (Portes and Zhou,1992:491). Grosfoguel notes that the federal state's investment in the community, provided in order to create a symbolic "capitalist showcase" and also a geopolitical command post in Southern Florida, has had a dramatic effect on Miami's development. The initial strategy of Immigration and Naturalization Service programs concentrated Cuban settlement in Miami and thereby contributed to the city's establishment as the "most desirable migration point in the Caribbean Basin (Grosfoguel,1993:165)."

The establishment of a major CIA headquarters in the region contributed significantly to the economic stability of the enclave during its first decade by providing over 12,000 jobs, transnational social networks, and massive telecommunications and transportation infrastructure. Enclave development was subsidized further by Small Business Association loans, government training programs and welfare provisions through the Cuban Refugee Program. Given that approximately \$1.3 billion (US) in social capital were invested in Miami between 1960 and 1977 through various federal state programs, any oversight or understatement of the federal state's involvement in the city's development would be negligent (Grosfoguel, 1993:161).

Above and beyond the federal state's role in supporting the Cuban enclave, Miami's infrastructural orientation toward Latin America can be attributed in part to the city's history as a military command post. The combination of CIA involvement in the political economy of the city and the

participation of Cuban exiles in anti-Communist struggles around the world precipitated the use of Miami as a key geopolitical site in the Western Hemisphere. The social and political relationships which were born out of Miami's geopolitical role eventually served as a channel for enormous investments from Latin American elites seeking security for their families or political asylum and then found the city to be stable refuge for their investments as well (Grosfoguel,1993:166).

The task of developing a historical analysis of the complex relationship between the establishment of the Cuban enclave, the federal state investment in the city, and the city's development as a command and control center in the global economy is both formidable and productive. Like most accounts of the state-enclave relationship in Miami, however, Grosfoguel's analysis has largely ignored the role of local state, community institutions, or local agents in this development (See Pedraza-Bailey, 1985; Arguelles,1982). Where the locale once performed functions of military domination and ideological influence for the American state, the structures arising out of the state support of the Cuban nationalist movement are now exploited by transnational corporations in their production of economic control. Throughout this narrative on the history of Miami, it seems that the Cuban immigrants have remained foot soldiers of one description or another since their arrival in South Florida.

This analysis takes some important initial steps toward understanding the

variety of control functions this emerging global city has manifested over its history, but it maps various projects to different stages in time rather than accepting the multiple uses of city spaces that take place concurrently. The city's position as a key site of geopolitical power and ideological influence over the region has shaped the hierarchy of ethnic groups in the city, the discourse of local politics, and the terms on which individuals in the community interacts with the nation state and international actors. Rather than seeing Miami as a tool used by powerful outside agents over different stages, a closer examination of the city's network of evolving institutions might allow us to gauge the influence of different agents on the city's development and contemporary political economy.

Ethnic Enclave Advantages

The literature on ethnic enclaves has contributed a wealth of insight into the social forces which enclose immigrant community economies and provide them with both dynamism and stability. The research of Portes and his colleagues has offered a compelling analysis of why enclave labour markets have responded more effectively to the current disposition of the global economy. Their case studies of ethnic enclave economies have also examined social institutions which have supported the success of particular enclave enterprises.

Ethnic enclaves are defined in the literature as: "a concentration of firms owned and operated by an identifiable cultural minority in a physical space which

employs a significant proportion of workers from the same minority (Portes and Jensen, 89:929)." The establishment of an ethnic enclave is explained as a function of the availability of sufficient capital within the immigrant community and the presence of an extensive division of labor initiated by the pattern of immigration flows. In the Miami case, the relocation of an enormous segment of the Cuban bourgeoisie is said to have enabled the establishment of a strong entrepreneurial class which would capitalize on the needs of later waves of immigrants for jobs and cultural products (Portes & Bach, 1985:203). The institutional completeness of an enclave - the ability of members to satisfy virtually all of their own consumer and labour needs - can provide a tier of firms which support the commerce of multinational firms with key services and simultaneously infuse the core of the ethnic economy with new capital and jobs. Both culturally and economically, immigrants can utilize enclave space as a sanctuary from the discrimination of the host society and labour market and mature as entrepreneurs engaged with actors on the global scene, sometimes bypassing cultural assimilation into the host national culture or integrating with the larger local or national economy.

The importance of human capital investments in the success of ethnic enclave firms is conceived as secondary to that of particular social relations which expedite economic transactions by creating relations of trust and confidence (Portes & Zhou, 1996, 1992; Portes & Jensen, 1992, 1989; Portes &

Bach, 1984). In their analysis of immigrant enclave success stories in the United States, Portes and Zhou attempt to explain a paradox of urban restructuring which is poorly explained in most global cities analysis:

Tens of thousands of immigrant workers keep arriving in the same cities that are said to be losing industrial jobs. These immigrants, many of them illegal and unskilled seem to have little trouble finding employment in the sectors from which domestic workers are said to be expelled by lack of work. Hence the peculiar American Paradox of rising labor-market marginalization of native-born Blacks and Puerto Ricans, along with growing numbers and employment of third world immigrants (Portes & Zhou, 1992:497).

The emergence of an immigrant business class is a phenomenon of critical importance to the development of global cities capacities in that it changes the nature of labour relations and raises the ceiling of professional mobility for members of the enclave (Portes & Zhou, 1992:498). Participation in enclave employment provides workers and firms with a degree of economic security and protection from the discrimination they may encounter in the mainstream economy, and also provides the locale with distinctive capabilities to respond to changes in the global economy and trends in industrial restructuring. Portes's work provides a nuanced understanding of the correlation's between the social relations which frame market transactions in the enclave and the locale's ability to develop a dynamic and flexible labour force and production capabilities.

Throughout years of research into the Cuban economic enclave, Portes has attempted to dispel the myth of the "Golden Exile" – an interpretation of

Cuban-American history which claims that most Cubans who have succeeded in American business have done so by virtue of the transfer of their class status to Florida soil with the generous help of the federal state (Portes & Zhou 1992:491; Portes & Bach, 1984). This analysis has illustrated through empirical research that the human capital endowments of the Cuban enclave are comparable to those of other immigrant and minority groups, and even that the wave of immigrants who arrived during the Mariel Boat lift in 1980 were among the most marginalized and categorically despised groups of immigrants ever to arrive on American shores (Portes & Jensen, 1989; Portes and Stepick, 1985). Where human capital endowments and the conditions of reception have contributed to the success of different enclaves, Portes claims, is in the way these variables have heightened the cognizance of discrimination against their national group by the host society and thereby increased enclave solidarity (Portes and Bach, 1985:333).

In this analysis, the success of the Cuban community in Miami is predicated on the ability to capitalize on social institutions such as "bounded solidarity" and "enforceable trust" which are cultivated by a heightened awareness of group difference. The concept of "bounded solidarity" explains why immigrant communities serve as vehicles for concentrating resources to rehabilitate neighborhoods and expand local markets for goods and services. This social capital resource is a product of majority groups' discrimination of

immigrants and the creation of an environment characterized by a heightened sense of awareness of group difference, common struggles, and collective destiny. Portes and Zhou give the following scenario illustrating the economic reach of "bounded solidarity":

As consumers, immigrants manifest a consistent preference for items associated with the country of origin, both for their intrinsic utility and as a symbol of representations of a distinct identity. As workers, they prefer to work among "their own"...As investors they commonly opt for firms in the country of origin or in the ethnic community (Portes & Zhou, 1992:513).

These preferences and tendencies are cultivated largely out of resentment of the pressure from the host community to accept a low place in the local ethnic economic hierarchy and also pressures to assimilate culturally. Discriminatory conditions of reception of immigrants in a locale initiate a "revalorization of the symbols of common nationality and [privilege] of the ethnic community as a place where the status of underprivileged menial labour can be avoided (Portes and Zhou, 1992:514)." In the last instance, however, 'ethnic solidarity' on the part of entrepreneurs and managers of capital is not explained by primordial feelings of kinship, or even of responsibility toward co-ethnics, but demonstrates rather how these relations have a rational market basis. Members can conduct their business transactions with greater confidence knowing that malfeasance can be punished by ostracism from the enclave which will have both social and material consequences for the offender. "Bounded solidarity," is supported by the complementary institutions of "enforceable trust"(Portes and Stepick,

1993:134).

In the Cuban American enclave, the institutions of enforceable trust have indeed facilitated access to capital and to reliable cheap labour. Much of Little Havana's business development has been capitalized by "character loans" offered by Cuban bankers prepared to extend credit on the basis of their social position in the community rather than by an assessment of business plans. The penalties for betraying the trust extended to debtors would have far greater social and material implications than those meted out by creditors outside of the enclave (Portes and Zhou, 1992:515, Portes & Stepick, 1993:132-3). These institutions of trust and corresponding sense of obligation to the community ultimately provides ethnic entrepreneurs with the ability to call upon symbols of cultural solidarity to alter the terrain of labour disputes in their favor. The ethnic enclave provides both preferred access to jobs and start-up capital for new immigrants but also provides conditions under which entrepreneurs can make claims on workers' or debtors' loyalty.

This examination of the embeddedness of economic development in social relations within the community provides some flesh to the assessment of the role of immigrant communities in local economic development. Rather than merely providing a catalogue of the enclave's human capital resources, this analysis illustrates how the enclave provides social institutions which are exploited by recent immigrant searching for both employment and community security and by

entrepreneurs requiring cheap and acquiescent laborers. These resources and relationships, Portes maintains, give enclaves like Little Havana the flexibility to respond global economic trends that are manifested in the local political economy.

A highly problematic outcome of this analysis, however, is the conclusion that given a better understanding of the essence of the growth dynamics of communities such as Little Havana, other communities could use their development path as a model. The explicit proposition that Cuban enclave should be taken as a model of self-sufficiency for other minority groups evident in Portes and Zhou's analysis negates the importance of the federal state's role in these success stories and the conditions under which the discourse of community loyalty was established in the Cuban-American case. Further analysis of the Miami case suggests that the relationship between state structures and immigrant communities is not merely relevant to the study of the conditions of reception of immigrant groups, but can lead to a greater understanding of the multiple projects animated in particular sites.

Also absent from this analysis is any examination of how institutions in the enclave economy may have evolved out of social struggles within the community and through their political and social relations with a variety of other actors and institutions outside of the economic realm. While the Cuban economic enclave may have provided the city with certain institutions and labour

market conditions which make a “good match with new conditions of manufacturing and service,” we can not assume that they were established to support these functions (Portes & Zhou, 1992:499).

The exclusive focus on the function of the enclave as an institution which organizes low-wage labour and supports entrepreneurial investment also ignores the roles played by Miami Cubans as power brokers capable of interfacing with federal state and international actors. Like the analyses of global city developments provided by Sassen and Grosfoguel, the ethnic enclave studies avoid any treatment of enclave members as agents which shape the relationships between the locale and the global economy.

The *Globescape* from a Local Nation

The studies of global cities and ethnic enclaves provide insight into the development of the Cuban enclave economy in Miami and the establishment of the conditions for the city's ascendance to global city status and each are supported by a wealth of empirical analysis and historical surveys. Undertaking a variety of explanations of why Miami, rather than, say, Houston or New Orleans, has become the region's emerging global city, each of the authors' explanations of the dynamics of change in the locale is limited by a focus on how a local environment meets the demands of multinational firms or producer service sectors. As such, they provide little analysis of local dynamics

that have shaped the way residents of Miami have reached beyond their borders to re-conceptualize their role in the regional and global political economy. The cultural and political projects which have shaped the landscape of Miami and therein catalyzed various trajectories of change in the city's development, are virtually invisible in these studies.

Sassen and Portes' collaborative work ignores a definite congruence of implications in their own empirical research and their appreciation of the significance of social experiences that shape markets and production processes are appended only as afterthoughts. Similarly, contemporary analysis of geopolitical and ideological dynamics influencing the city's development, though generally thorough and provocative, has not examined the dynamics which originate in the city itself. The primary concern in the literature on Miami's recent transformations is to take stock of the resources necessary for effective management and production in advanced capitalism. The conception of such *resources* is not broad enough to capture the value of social and political relations which contribute to the development and execution of a city's strategic functions in the global economy or the extension of a locale's political reach across international borders. The general conception of the agents occupying the globalized spaces of cities is limited to the financial power brokers, management professionals and elite figures in international politics. The spatial extension of immigrant communities across local and national boundaries, both in their

political imagination and the reach of their economic power is rarely addressed.

While there is often an underlying concern with issues of distribution of wealth and power in the literature on global cities, most studies largely ignore the implications of local political or social environments for the way cities interact with outside agents. The strong tendency towards evaluating patterns of local development merely as responses to global economic change seems to arise out of an implicit understanding of a totalizing power of capital and out of the premise that there is a direct correspondence between spatial scale and power (Cox, 1995:223; Beauregard, 1995:240). The acumen of the global cities and ethnic enclave analyses would be complemented by an approach to case study research that would treat local actors as both the agents and the objects of economic and social transformations and which would recognize the different scales and places of power and struggle within one space.

The Miami case provides us with a rich example of an emerging global city where a large segment of residents have intertwined political and economic interests in events which simultaneously influence local daily life, the regional political economy, and global political and economic currents. While the city has become of interest to political economists and economic geographers as a control centre in the global economy and as post-industrial production site, the dynamic which keeps the city thoroughly engaged with global flows of power is ethnic nationalism. When fleshing out the analysis of the social context of both the

city's labour relations and international affairs it seems impossible to ignore the relationship between the political and cultural projects of the exile and the city's rapid progress down a distinct path of development over the past thirty years.

Benedict Anderson's conception of nationalism as "an imagined political community" allows us to examine the basis of local institutions of solidarity, trust and coercion that are exploited in the city's production of goods and services. It will also help us to understand how political and social space has become internationalized through the expansion of grassroots politics up and out of their expected geographic reach (Anderson, 1991; Smith, 1994). The thesis will examine the origins and character of the institutions of "bounded solidarity" described by Portes through an analysis of the project of nation-building in Cuban Miami. It will also assess the impact of the Cuban exile's national projects on the creation of a political and economic space that is not merely international in flavour (owing to the cultural contributions of its multi-ethnic population), but that has become re-territorialized in the image of the *Havana de Ayer* (the Havana of Yesterday). For members of the Cuban national movement, as for power-brokers in the realm of finance, the relevance of national borders in the conduct of their business has changed significantly.

Anderson's work has focused on two significant factors which have generated nationalist movements and ethnic identity that are closely linked to the broader dynamics in the rise of capitalism: mass communications and mass

migrations (Anderson, 1992:7). While this analysis focuses mainly on institutions of nationalism that were established in tandem with the development of industrial capitalism in the 19th Century, communication/ translation and displacement/exile remain as central features in the development of post-industrial nodes of production and management as well. In surveying the Miami case the significance of the discourse of militarism and the materiality of military investment also appear as important elements in the locale's national projects.

Anderson has identified similarities in the processes of nation-building in different historical contexts and has proposed that the establishment of a common identity and sense of place involves either actual or imagined returns from exile. The Cuban enclave shares with the early American colonies a project of re-shaping the space where they have landed in the image of a place they remember. The exile does not merely share an identity or destiny by virtue of a common birthplace, but by their collective memories of being torn from it and through their efforts to (re-)create a *New York* or *Little Havana*. An understanding of the commonalities between Cuban Miami's nationalist projects and the dynamics that shaped earlier constructions of other imagined communities help to explain the cohesiveness and trust which makes the enclave an efficient production site, and also how the city has developed its own particular *globescape* that has allowed members of the enclave to see and to seize opportunities outside of state borders.

The experiences of displacement and reception provide compatriots with lessons defining their place in history and begins a process of mobilizing a hybrid cultural identity (Smith, 92:184). However, the interpretation of common experiences and memories is by no means an unambiguous or uncontested historical process. The construction of a national identity and destiny are projects that are forged out of a dialectic between competing discourses of memory and conceptions of the national interest (Purvis, 1996:11). Both the demographics of experience in a particular assembly of immigrants and the social and political conditions of resettlement limit the room for cultural manoeuvre, but nationalists do engage in projects of invention of tradition, reification of historical figures as heroes and mapping out a nostalgic landscape of the “old country” which are contested by competing nationalisms.

Among the conditions of reception that help to solidify the sense of collective identity in an immigrant community, struggles over language and translation are important processes in the creation and reproduction of a nation in exile. While the use of a common language may not be a sufficient condition for the establishment of institutions of loyalty and trust within a group of immigrants, the imposition of a language of state on a linguistic group can sharply delineate the boundaries of a community of co-nationals and heighten the sense that members do not belong outside of the enclave. The sense of exile becomes stronger among young bilinguals, as Anderson has noted, who are

educated in a language other than their mother tongue and can thus recognize the manner in which their own language is devalued by the state and the majority population. Reclaiming that vernacular becomes a significant component of the struggle for recognition of a national identity (Anderson, 1994:319). In a similar fashion, ethnic cuisine, musical traditions and all manner of folklore become recognizable as national symbols and are strongly articulated by younger immigrants where such cultural products might be taken for granted by older immigrants, and especially by co-nationals remaining in the home country.

While many immigrants may create a shared identity under conditions of alienation from both the host society and the sending nation, there is considerable skepticism over the extent to which the fraternal bonds of nationalism as a cultural system are sufficient to command ultimate sacrifices in times of war. Gopal Balakrishnan and John Breuilly have each noted that the focus on the cultural and linguistic components of nationalism in Anderson's work is at odds with one of the author's central organizing questions in *Imagined Communities*. What makes it possible, Anderson asks, "for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings?" (Anderson, 1991:7; Balakrishnan, 1995:66; Breuilly, 1985:73) Balakrishnan contributes an analysis of the experience of war as a significant force which calls up the national imagination which is generally dormant in everyday life. He concludes that:

The purity and fatality of national imaginings do not arise spontaneously from the social organization of vernacular language,

but through the risks of membership in a 'community of life and death'. [The nation] speaks the voice of fate when it speaks in one voice, and this is usually and most pointedly in times of war (Balakrishnan, 1995:68)

While contemporary "long-distance nationalists" ultimately seem to be unaccountable for their actions given the security provided by their new residence, the Miami case provides some evidence that the discourse of military valour is still a central animator of national imaginings (Anderson, 1992:13). The cenotaph remains as a primary nationalist symbol around which Cuban immigrants of varying political persuasions can recognize their common struggles and objectives. As well, participation in wars of national liberation continues to represent the ultimate evidence of *cubanidad* (or cuban-ness) within the enclave. In the Miami context then, Balakrishnan's definition of the nation as a community imagined through the artefacts of collective sacrifice seems very apt (Balakrishnan, 1995:65).

The case study analysis that follows will highlight three main elements of Cuban -American nation-building: the pace of international migration, control over communication and translation, and military engagement. Each of these elements of the Cuban national experience in Miami have manifested both material changes in the city and effects on the self-image of many exiles. The story of Miami which follows in the next chapter will elucidate the difficulties of disentangling the economic success of the Cuban enclave and of Miami from the processes that have created an imagined national community in Little Havana.

Convergent Paths

Contemporary studies of nationalism help to illustrate the bearing of the community's language struggles, inter-ethnic tensions, moral commitments and loyalties on the creation of places in the Miami landscape where no easy distinction could be drawn between local politics and international affairs. An explication of the local discourse of the "community of collective sacrifice" brings this analysis towards an understanding of the nature of the ties of trust and responsibility upon which the institutions of "bounded solidarity" are built. In the absence of any resolution on the terms of group solidarity among those who have travelled similar journeys (over time and in separate crafts) one might expect the social alienation in immigration centres such as Miami to be the cause of agitation and waste. Tracing this history, then, should help us to understand why the apparent result of the mass migrations propelled by the labour needs of advanced capitalism (among other forces) have helped to generate a new type of ethnic hierarchy and order in global cities -- one which has largely replaced the Fordist division of labour based on class, race and gender. The re-territorialization of the Cuban nation in these locales also has served as a catalyst for low-income gentrification and the growth of enclave markets - ultimately pulling new immigrants towards these places and thus ensuring the continuity of an influx of vulnerable new participants.

The case study analysis that follows will build on an understanding the correlation between the multiple projects that have shaped Miami's development that has been cobbled together from the insights of the disparate collection of scholarship discussed above. Sassen and Grosfoguel provide analyses of global city development as reactions to processes at the global scale of political economy, while Portes and his colleagues examine the role of ethnic enclaves as critical components of the city's growth prospects. The debate generated by these more economic determinist studies of global cities has established the significance of non-economic processes through which globalization is materialized in particular places. In a study of a locale where the local foreign policy is dominated as much or more by Cuban American National Foundation than by any consortium of financial interests, the assertion of the voice of local actors in globalized city spaces is critical. The incorporation of Anderson's analyses of the creation of imagined nations is evoked by the particularities of Miami's globalized grass-roots politics. Miami's exile community has moved beyond the export influence or cash remittances to political movements abroad. It has asserted power through the creation of an immigrant nation in which interacts with international actors on its own turf and seeks to build an economic future for Cuba on its entrepreneurial successes in the global city.

CHAPTER TWO: Miami's Stages

If anything, the opposition both of non-Cubans in South Florida, and more implacably, the Castro regime itself strengthened the Miami Cuban's passionate allegiance to the idea of return in much the same way that lovers who hold themselves aloof tend to fan the flames of desire in those they have captivated.

--David Rieff, 1993

The chapter that follows will attempt to convey the story of Cuban Miami as it has been narrated by academics, journalists, and participants in contemporary debates on Cuban identity and Miami's development path. The approach employed here will highlight the conjoined plots of the stories of Cuban national development and the transformation of Miami as a political and economic space. This history will be presented through a series of exposes on the roles played by a number of key actors and institutions in the American federal state, Castro's Cuba, the Latin American elite and the local political arena. Treatment of the intertwined plots and dynamics of the construction of a Cuban national space in Miami's will be reserved for the chapter that follows.

These stories overlap and impress upon each other in a manner that makes their separation seem highly artificial. The motive behind this presentation is to highlight the distinct motivations and logics of a broad array of participants in the city's transformation from a resort town to a global city. These stories are not presented in any order of the importance of the agents or structures discussed, nor is the list of actors and institutions exhaustive. The movement from analyses of processes at higher geographic scales down to the local perspective is

shaped by the template created by the theoretical analysis which mapped the creation of global cities to the processes of national communities.

The first section will recount the involvement of the U.S. federal state in both the development of the city's physical infrastructure and the social and political institutions of the Cuban community. As well, the impact of massive military and social service investments into the community for the city's economic successes will be assessed in relation to the city's wealth and the sense of ethnic difference among the exiles. While many studies have attributed Miami's rapid development directly to state support and investment in the Cuban enclave, few analyses have discussed the community's responses to the state's various postures of paternalism and instrumental support for the Cuban nationalist cause. The analysis presented here will attempt to show the federal government's impact on the business resource landscape and cultural and political terrain as part of one process mediated by the Cuban community.

In a similar fashion, the second section will discuss the influence of Fidel Castro's Cuba on the city's history. Political processes and decisions on the island have transformed the size and composition of the city's labor market as much as they have shaped the exile community's image of themselves and of their common enemies. The analysis will attempt to show the equal importance of the demographic changes catalyzed by Fidel Castro and the personal and collective responses to Cuba and the "island Cubans". The mirror image of

Havana's and Little Havana's political outreach into Central America will also be discussed to illustrate how Miami's responses to Cuba have engendered linkages between the city and other states.

Political, economic and cultural ties between Miami and Latin America will be the subject of the third section of the chapter. Little Havana's engagement in anti-Communist struggles in Central America appears as an extension of the community's relations with the American military as well as an expansion of the web of social networks between Miami and many Latin American elites. Beyond the community's political involvement in the affairs of other countries their story is widely conceived as one which falls within the ambit of Latin American culture and history. For many in the community, the establishment of Miami as the 'Capital of Latin America' is seen as a process of recreating the place they left behind¹. The flow of Latin American immigrants, tourists and capital through this new hub will also be addressed in this section.

The response of Miami's Anglo and black communities to the influx of Cuban immigrants and the changes they have effected in the locale will be addressed in the fourth section of the chapter. Often overwhelmed by the transformations of their city generated by the Cuban immigration, the native

¹In the brief period of Cuban independence before the Cuban Revolution (from 1899 to 1959) Cuba had become, arguably, the center of elite tourism, high culture and international investment in Latin America. The island was an important hub of immigration both for Europeans arriving to take advantage of the sugar economy and of Caribbean migrant laborers. (See Pérez Firmat, 1989; Boswell & Curtis, 1984:18).

community's response has been composed of moments of charity, and reactions of distrust, resentment, and hostility. The discussion of the position of the Cuban enclave in the local political arena and society will address the competition for jobs and assistance between groups, the position of the city's labor unions towards the Cuban immigrants, and the contest for representation and power in municipal politics. It is recognized here that the receiving community shaped the success of the Cuban enclave both by their positive responses to the immigrants and by hostile and alienating gestures which solidified the enclave's sense of 'bounded solidarity'.

Geopolitical Command Post and Capitalist Showcase

Every refugee who comes out [of Cuba] is a vote for our society and a vote against their society.

--U.S. Representative Walter Judd, quoted in
Masud-Piloto

Cold War politics strongly influenced the development of Miami's global city infrastructure, the establishment of a strong ethnic economic enclave and the evolution of the Cuban nationalist movement. Throughout the first three decades following the Cuban Revolution, the region served as a military intelligence command post as well as a "capitalist showcase." Successful exiles provided symbolic capital that helped to legitimize U.S. foreign policy and aimed to embarrass and challenge the Cuban government (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985:163;

Grosfoguel, 1993:160). Three central projects aimed at upsetting the Castro regime affected radical changes to the Miami landscape: the Cuban Refugee Program (CRP), the Bay of Pigs invasion and the establishment of a major CIA headquarters at the campus of the University of Miami.

The initial decision of the Eisenhower government to welcome the first wave of Cuban immigrants to South Florida was ostensibly based on a calculation of humanitarian concerns, the propaganda value of a mass exodus from Cuba, and the possibility of employing exile forces to overthrow the revolution (Masud-Piloto, 1996:33). Between 1959 and 1962, a population of over 153,000 immigrants emigrated to the Miami region, draining skilled workers and professionals from the Cuban labor market, and thrusting the resort town into the space of both Cold War politics and another country's national struggles (Azicri, 1982:56).

Given the émigré's symbolic importance, the Cuban "exile colony" received a level of specialized care and a command of resources unparalleled in the history of U.S. immigration (Azicri, 1982: 59; Mohl, 1986:8). At an estimated cost of around one billion dollars, the Cuban Refugee Program invested in housing, healthcare facilities, education, and job placement (including assistance in the translation of job skills and professional qualifications) (Masud-Piloto, 1996:49; Pedraza-Bailey, 1985:47). This obliging treatment provided the émigrés with the financial, technical and human capital they would need to both

succeed economically and the re-establish many institutions of Cuban culture in a new locale. Not surprisingly, the program induced an even greater exodus. It also shaped the establishment of a set of political and socioeconomic interests in the Cuban community that were very different from those of other U.S. minority groups and the local population (Azicri, 1982:59).

A final component of the CRP was the resettlement of thousands of émigrés across the country to prevent an unmanageable concentration of refugees in Miami. This strategy had two largely accidental yet significant effects on the Miami Cubans: it enabled the creation of a complex network of social, professional and financial relations across the country which have strengthened the incorporation of Cuban businesses in the larger U.S. economy, and it "exiled" thousands of Cubans from an imagined homeland in Miami (Allman, 1987:294; Portes and Stepick, 1993:104).² Only a decade after the costly resettlement project, thousands of Cubans had begun to migrate back down to Miami either to vacation, to conduct business, and ultimately to resettle.³ By 1980, the immigration from the North came to surpass the flow of immigrants involved in the Mariel boatlifts from Cuba and the influx of Haitian refugees that year (Allman, 1987:324). Many returning Cubans have expressed sentiments of

¹² García has noted how the Union City, New Jersey area became a "satellite of Miami" where offices and branches of many Miami businesses were established and whose politicians campaigned in south Florida (1996:85).

homecoming emerging out of this last migration:

From the moment I arrived, I knew I had returned to the Cuba that my parents had always described to me as a kid growing up in Los Angeles...And Miami is the only place where the Cuba they loved and taught me to love still exists (Darío Moreno, quoted in Rieff, 1993:134)

The resettlement programs thus provided Miami with the quality of being just-out-of-reach for many Cuban immigrants attempting to re-establish their lives in the United States. When many immigrants gained the financial independence to decline the foster care provided by the state, they returned to a place that had been transformed by visions of a Cuban home similar to those they may have harbored through their winters in Milwaukee or New Jersey.

The engagement of thousands of Cuban exiles in America's Cold War struggles served to consolidate the position of Miami as the space of an exiled Cuban nation and also drew millions of dollars into the local economy. The manner in which the exiles were recruited and organized in their participation in the Bay of Pigs invasion reinforced the community's sense of exceptionalism and historic purpose. The U.S. collaboration with exile political groups began during a period when the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA were prepared to launch an American invasion of Cuba justified in terms of Hemispheric security. When the Kennedy administration chose to employ a

³ By 1978 an estimated 40% of the Cubans living in Miami had moved there from another part of the country (Portes and Stepick, 1993:104)

strategy of facilitating an insurrection within the island assisted by the landing of Cuban exile forces, the operation was framed in the discourse of national self-determination (Forment, 1989:56). Ultimately, the dismal failure of the invasion created a number of significant cultural and political by-products which helped to solidify the unity of the Cuban enclave: it shattered the hopes of an imminent return for the exiles; it provided the Cubans with a history of military valor and monument of 114 national martyrs; it created a profound distrust of the commitment of the American government to the Cuban exile's nationalist cause and illuminated the rifts between Cuban and American interests; and lastly, it necessitated subsequent long-range programs to involve the exile community in American military initiatives in order to maintain control over further independent attempts at insurrection that would have inevitably ensued (Didion. 1987:19; Masud-Piloto, 1996:48).

Throughout the next three decades the "exile colony" was used as a pool of agents in sabotage initiatives and military campaigns across the Caribbean Basin and Central America, and in the establishment of the country's second largest CIA station at the University of Miami (Grosfoguel, 1993:159). This development had an enormous impact on the city's infrastructural orientation toward Latin America, eased the absorption of the Cubans into the local labor market, and heightened the militarism of the Little Havana discourse. With an estimated 12,000 Cubans on its official payroll by the early 1960s, the CIA

became one of Florida's largest employers (Stepick, 1992:41). The CIA also supported over fifty front businesses from boat shops to travel agencies and real estate firms, and channeled money into the enclave's numerous *periodiquitos* (community newspapers focused on Cuban politics) (Grenier & Stepick, 1992: 11; Arguelles, 1982:38). The magnitude of financial assistance provided by the CIA headquarters would allow one to attribute much of Miami and Little Havana's economic success to this influence alone. The Cuban-CIA relationship had as great an impact on the enclave's associations with international actors, on its relationship with the broader community, and on its internal cohesion.

While the Cubans were recruited to participate in a number of sabotage and intelligence gathering initiatives directly sponsored by the American government after the Bay of Pigs invasion, the conditions of retreat from the Cuban Missile Crisis profoundly altered the relationship between the CIA and the enclave. Operations employing exile groups for conducting raids and other forms of direct contact with the island had to be moved to other countries such as Nicaragua and Costa Rica. This change of venue served to radicalize many of the nationalist groups and operations, as is noted by Cristina García in *Havana, USA*:

The CIA found it difficult to control the groups on its payroll; raids canceled by CIA personnel in Miami were frequently carried out anyway by the impatient émigrés. Exile groups independent of CIA control conducted their own paramilitary operations. Frustrated by what they perceived to be the United States' half-hearted attempt to overthrow Castro, they performed raids,

established their own intelligence networks and infiltrated their own guerrillas into Cuba (García, 1996:127).

Despite the investment of hundreds of millions of dollars into anti-Castro military initiatives the need to establish the impression that the U.S. was not involved in the exile group's operations encouraged the appropriation of these battles by the Cuban community. The attempt to distance the American government publicly from the Cuban's military struggles contributed to the sense of betrayal already present in the exile. The relocation of many exile military operations to other locations in the Caribbean Basin helped to strengthen the social and military network between members of the enclave and the governments of other Latin American nations.

The American trade embargo against Cuba also inadvertently reinforced Miami's economic relationship with the rest of Latin America by making the exploitation of Cuba's international network a necessity for the exile entrepreneurial class. The banning of commercial relations between the two countries, coupled with the wave of expropriations of property in Cuba, cut the exiles off from traditional sources of income and further isolated the community from the "island Cubans". This impregnable division of economies encouraged the myth of the "Golden Exile" within the enclave as it made it possible for many members Cuban community to make inflated claims to ownership of sugar mills, plantations and other inaccessible enterprises in pre-Revolutionary Cuba which were largely unverifiable (Allman, 1987:299). The maintenance of the embargo

has become a touchstone of American foreign policy toward Cuba that could be defended by administrations wishing to secure the political support of the enclave without committing to more confrontational tactics, and long after any persuasive arguments could be made for military initiatives in defense of national security.

The federal government's long-term investments in the enclave easily surpassed expenditures of any other immigrant settlement policy. The budget for the Cuban Refugee Program exceeded that of the entire Alliance For Progress initiatives and has been touted as the American's most successful "international development programs"(Grosfoguel, 1993:161; Stepick, 1992:40). Assistance to the nationalist movement's military and political struggles has also been extraordinary. Nonetheless, a sense of betrayal by the Americans remains a powerful and unifying element of exile discourse. This has not only allowed members of the enclave a claim on the loyalty and patronage of their co-ethnics, it has also provided a thread of continuity with past Cuban nationalist struggles which were organized and fought from the South Floridian command posts. Portes and Stepick have noted a common theme in the Cuban(exile)-American relationship:

Had not North Americans, after all, always put their own interests first? Had they not, after helping to liberate Cuba from Spain, then imposed the Platt Amendment? Had they not supported various dictators, even while they hosted successive groups of exiles working to overthrow those same dictators? Had they not...armed the expeditionary force against Castro and then abandoned them at

the Bay of Pigs? Finally, had not Washington traded away the exile's ability to confront Castro directly in exchange for its own security? All in all, 'a very spotty record. (Portes and Stepick, 1993:196)

Ultimately, Kennedy has taken a place second only to Fidel Castro in the rank of the most hated men in Little Havana (Didion, 1987:84). Despite the volley of insults between the two men and the clamorous public hostility between the two states, it was the capacity of the two governments to negotiate solutions to the problems of the Cuban exodus that transformed incidents of defection into an organized institution of immigration which has altered dramatically the demography of South Florida (Allman, 1987:282).

The Golden Exile of Gusanos: a collaborative effort

The attempts by the U.S. to win the vote for their society coupled with Fidel Castro's strategy for externalizing dissent culminated in the establishment one of the largest and the most orderly entrances of legal immigrants to the United States by a single national group in this century. Characteristically turning a political embarrassment on its head, Fidel Castro used the departure of thousands of Cubans as a representation of the purging of the weakness and cowardice of the Cuban bourgeoisie. The exodus was interpreted by the Revolutionary government as a process that would ultimately benefit the progress of the nation:

Those who go are inept or unadaptable to the new life...It is the

normal exodus that takes place when the people take the power in their own hands and liquidate the exploitation and the privileged classes. Their departure does not damage the revolution, but fortifies it, as it is a spontaneous purification (Raúl Castro, quoted in Masud-Piloto, 1996:52).⁴

In their politicization of the exile, the Cuban government helped to project the myth that all exiles were upper class *Batistianos* who were afraid of losing privilege and status. Early on in the exodus, those who expressed any inclination toward leaving were branded *gusanos* or dirty worms and were treated in such a way that most arrived in the U.S. despising both Castro and the norms of the Revolution regardless of their initial motivations for leaving (Lockwood, 1990:173; Bender, 1973). Both the Cuban and U.S. governments also made it extremely difficult for the émigrés to maintain personal relations with their families and communities in Cuba as visits home were unheard of and contact by phone or mail was very difficult.⁵

Regular flights from Havana to Miami were permitted by both countries until the Missile Crisis. Due to the break in diplomatic relations between the two

⁴Likewise, Castro had stressed in several of his own speeches, "Let them go to Miami! Each time a boatload of parasites leaves...the Republic comes out ahead." (Pedraza-Bailey, 150)

⁵Successful attempts by exiles (from the Mariel exodus) to return to Cuba later showed that the permanence of the exile was dictated more by discourse than by policy. The ultimatum was underscored by the billboard addressing those leaving from Camarioca that warned: "In the years to come, how many will hope, how many will be weeping to return, to set foot again on the land which they betrayed and which they looked down upon (Lockwood, 1990:285)".

countries in 1961, the United States began to waive the visa requirements for any Cuban immigrants who were "fleeing Communist oppression" (Masud-Piloto, 1996:34). Given the suspension of direct flights between the two countries following the Cuban Missile Crisis, those who arrived between October 1962 and September of 1965 had to travel through a third country, most commonly Spain or Mexico. This gave the Miami community a brief respite from the flood of refugees and allowed the exile community in Florida a quiet period of resettlement. The passage of a slow stream of exiles through a third country also necessitated a migration route that served to establish social ties with other Spanish speaking countries while creating a homeland destination in South Florida for those who struggled to reunite with family (back) in Miami (García, 1996:35).

In 1965 Fidel Castro once again blew wind in the sails of another wave of Cubans exiles by announcing that all Cubans with families in the United States would be allowed to leave the island. The exodus began with an immense boatlift from the Port of Camarioca that created crises of both safety and bureaucracy on both sides of the Florida Straits. The imbroglio was resolved by a collaboration of efforts to regulate the departure of Cubans manifested in the Memorandum of Understanding between the two countries which initiated the "freedom flight" airlift program. The U.S. government provided free air passage to over 260,000 Cubans during this period -- a program that constituted

the largest airborne refugee operation in American history (Masud-Piloto, 1996:68).

Relations between the two countries improved significantly during the presidency of Jimmy Carter and the stream of Cuban immigration continued, but the two governments had largely ceased to push and pull Cubans to Florida's shores and the flow of migrants tapered off significantly by the end of the decade. The relative peace between the two governments allowed the relationship between the exiles, the "island Cubans" and the Cuban government to improve dramatically as well. In the late 1970s, the members of the exile community traveled back to the island as visitors and became involved in negotiations regarding both the release of political prisoners in Cuba and the pace and composition of migration.

The United States' "open door policy" toward Cuban immigration allowed Cubans on both sides of the border to take control, in general terms, of U.S. immigration policy (Masud-Piloto, 1996:48). An internal political crisis in Cuba in the Spring of 1980 compelled the Cuban government to take advantage of this faculty. Following an endeavor by several hundred Cubans to seek asylum at the Peruvian embassy in Havana, Fidel Castro sought to export political discontent from the island by exploiting and testing the United States' willingness to treat all Cuban immigrants as political refugees. More than at any other moment, Fidel Castro's decision altered the composition and the situation of the Cuban enclave. By not only unloading several hundred criminals and

homosexuals onto the boats of exiles who had come to retrieve family members, but by encouraging an exodus of 125,000 citizens of modern, revolutionary Cuba, Castro had injected a different class of immigrants into the exile community. The Mariel boatlift crisis tested the ability of the three parties concerned -- Cuba, the United States and the Exile -- to collaborate on a solution and exhausted the abilities of all agents concerned to cooperate cordially thereafter. President Reagan's second Cold War helped to keep the door ajar for Cuban immigrants throughout the next decade, but the memory of Mariel affected the transformation of the *balseros* (rafters) of the 1990s into illegal immigrants (García, 1996:80).

Throughout the history of the migration, the pace and the composition of the exodus was dictated by Cuban responses to the unfolding of the revolution: the first émigrés feared persecution or loss of livelihood given their past support of the Batista regime; increasingly, others left in response to the nationalization of various industries and the virtual elimination of entire sectors of entrepreneurial employment⁶; others grew disillusioned by or impatient with the course of revolutionary change on the island; and ultimately, many exiles began to leave given the frustrations with shortages in consumer goods, the limitations

⁶The nationalization of the small commercial sector in Cuba in the late 1960s prompted a dramatic exodus of service workers and small business owners, offering a partial explanation of the "entrepreneurial spirit", and high propensity toward small business ownership in the community which has so often been touted as the key ingredient in the Cuban enclave's success in America (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985:34).

placed on the accumulation of personal wealth, and the opportunity to leave a life in a developing country for one in the United States. Correspondingly, Cuban migration has been characterized by an inverse correlation between the date of departure of exiles and their social class. As the numbers of incoming professionals, and immigrants with independent capital resources declined in the first decade of the exile, the later arrivals became the working-class, low-waged employees of the "golden exiles". The demography of the exile population was shaped by agreements between the two countries which allowed relatives of the first wave of immigrants to reunite with family in the U.S. Young men of draft age were held back, blacks and poorer families were generally excluded given their lack of family ties within the exile, and women, children and the elderly were over-represented in the first waves immigration (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985:31).⁷

Throughout the first two decades of the exodus, immigration agreements between the Cubans and Americans made the composition of the immigrant community more racially homogeneous and helped to preserve social institutions dependent on family relations. The staggered arrival of poorer and darker skinned immigrants ultimately enabled a transplantation of the pre-Revolutionary

⁷T.D.Allman has noted that by forbidding the exit of military-age males and encouraging seniors and unattached mothers to go to the U.S., that Castro inadvertently helped to strengthen the social fabric and stability of the exile community. Elderly immigrants served as care-givers for the large number of working mothers in the community, and a large population of young uprooted men has never predominated in the Cuban enclave as is common in other Latin communities in the U.S. (Allman, 1987:301)

Cuban social class structure to Miami (Portes and Stepick, 1993:147). The Cuban government provided individuals with a rationale for leaving, but the strategy of exporting dissent was dependent on American cooperation.

Above and beyond the role played by the Cuban government in shaping the demographic composition of the exile in Miami, decisions and dialogue on the island had a considerable impact on the strength and solidarity of the community and the political projects undertaken in Miami. That Fidel came to personify the spirit of the Revolution both on the island and abroad enabled the exile to channel their hostility towards one common enemy rather than suffer the ambiguities of fighting against a historical process or revolutionary dynamic among their compatriots on the island. For decades, the community has sought to answer Castro's famous "History Will Absolve Me" speech with a political and economic triumph that would prove ultimately who was on the losing side of history. By formulating the émigrés as *gusanos* (dirty worms), *escoria* (scum), and *apatridas* (people without a country), Castro inspired their determination to choose their own descriptors. Often, however, the labels affixed by Castro stuck to the émigrés long after their arrival in Miami. Just as some of the earlier immigrants were eager to accept their classification by Castro as Cuba's bourgeoisie, many attempted to distance themselves from those entrants from Mariel whom Fidel had labeled social misfits or delinquents (Azicri, 1982:67). This discursive construction of difference did more to recreate Miami's social

classes as did any differential in human capital endowments among the various waves of immigrants.

The minutiae of Cuba's foreign and domestic policy have been followed closely by the exile community from the onset of the Revolution, and have prompted reactions and parallel policies in Little Havana. In 1971, for example, Miami learned that Castro had canceled the celebration of the Epiphany on the Island because it disrupted the sugarcane harvest. In response, members of the enclave organized the *Parada de los Reyes Magios* (Three King's Day Parade) which grew into an annual event of major cultural significance and nationalist symbolism (García, 96:96). Fidel Castro's conciliatory gestures toward the community and proposals for dialogue with the exile in the late 1970s created conflicts between emergent pro- and contra-*dialogo* forces that divided families, destroyed business relations, and prompted violent attacks. In turn, Fidel Castro's willingness to exploit the exile's longing for communion with their families in Cuba during the Mariel crisis both ended the dialogue and strengthened the position of Miami's most rabid contingent of Miami's right-wing voice.

Cuba's foreign policy has also been mirrored by the exiles' intervention into the politics of other nations, and by attempts to shape immigration to the United States and ultimately to Miami as well. Castro's relations with various governments and political movements across the globe have prompted the exiles to assist with, or lobby for, parallel intervention by the American federal state,

and has also generated responses from local political groups and city officials. Expressions of mutual support between Castro and Nelson Mandela's ANC, for example, prompted members of the exile to protest the Mandela's visit to the city in June of 1990. In view of Fidel Castro's relationship with Mandela, neither the Miami mayor, nor the Dade County city manager saw it fit to give the ANC leader any official recognition or key to the city in spite of the significance of the visit for the city's black community (Croucher, 1994:190). Resolutions passed by the Miami City Council have, in fact, officially classified Mandela and all other political and cultural figures who supported the Cuban Revolution as *personae non grata* in the city.

In keeping with this standard of response to Cuban foreign policy, Fidel's reception of the Nicaragua's Sandinistas as comrades and allies prompted the exile community to rally support for the flow of refugees from that country, who were referred to as "our Nicaraguan brothers"⁸. The more the Cuban government came to the aide of the revolution in Nicaragua, the more the exile community pumped support into the Contra struggle and fought for the rights of Nicaraguan elites fleeing the country (Grosfoguel 1995:165)⁹. In their fight

⁸Cuban-American City Manager Cesar Odio was bestowed with the title of "father of the Nicaraguan Refugees" for his role in organizing the city's reception of these exiles (Lazo, 1988:1B)

⁹Senate investigations in the Iran-Contra scandals have revealed references (in the North Diaries) to an \$80,000 payment to retired Lt.Col. Oliver North by Cuban exile leader Jorge Mas Canosa. While his involvement in the Iran-Contra affair was not proven in the hearings, it is not disputed that Mr. Mas helped organize a

against what was the alleged campaign by Castro to "export revolution" to Central America the Cuban-American community forged political, economic and social ties with many Latin American elites which contributed significantly to the city's development as the "American Capital of Latin America".

Latin America and the Enclave

The exile's engagement in counter-revolutionary activities in Central America represents a continuation of an arrangement of mutual support between the Cuban and Latin American elites and the U.S. military. The dictatorships of Nicaragua, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic joined forces with the United States and the Cuban exiles in the realization of the Bay of Pigs Invasion. Other exile groups worked out of Costa Rica, Puerto Rico and Venezuela to lead an abortive attempt at insurrection within Cuba in 1963 and several others in the ensuing years (Forment, 1989:54). As noted earlier, the Kennedy-Kruschev accords which followed the Cuban Missile Crisis forced many exile groups to move their military operations to other countries in the Caribbean Basin. Beyond the exile's cooperation with other Latin American nations in paramilitary initiatives, the Cuban diaspora spread across the hemisphere enlisted the aid of anti-Communist elites in hundreds of exile political organizations. These alliances between state officials, Latin America's elite families and members of

program to provide medical assistance to the contras in the early 1980s (Dugger, 1988:23A).

the exile community strengthened both the nationalist movement in Miami and the city's business linkages with Latin America.

Latin American banks were among the first institutions to capitalize on Miami's pool of Cuban managers and professionals who held both the language skills and experience in U.S. business (Stepick, 1990:187). A number of small banks were established in the 1960s with Latin American capital whose owners put the management of their firms in the hands of recently emigrated Cuban bankers (Portes & Zhou, 1996:506). The norms of business at these smaller Latin institutions were apparently very different from those of Miami's more established Anglo banks. Cuban's seeking start-up capital for new businesses were granted loans upon consideration of their social standing in the community and the reputations of their families in Cuba, rather than on the basis of their business plans (Portes and Stepick, 1993:132). The significance of this practice of securing loans with family honor will be discussed in detail later, but it is significant to note that this practice within the enclave was made possible by the trust of Latin American capital in the institutions of Cuban business. These investments in the Cuban enclave reaped large returns in the short term and in the establishment of relations of trust and goodwill with the Miami Cubans. By the end of the 1970s, the assistance of Latin American elites in the political struggles of the exile and the economic establishment of the enclave were being returned by what had evolved into a powerful political and economic ally.

The relationship established between the Cuban community and a number of Latin America's elites through common anti-Communist or counter-revolutionary conflicts created both the material and ideational preconditions for Miami's development as the hub of Latin American investment and immigration in the U.S. In many instances, the city became the command and control center for Central America's civil wars. While Honduras played host to the majority of Nicaragua and El Salvador's anti-Sandinista and Contra military camps, Miami became the center for the production of propaganda, financing and planning in Central America's counter-revolution (Grosfoguel, 1995:159). The environment offered by Miami has been described as a "Casablanca-like atmosphere of plotting and intrigue (Gugliotta, 1987:178).

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, political and economic instability in Latin America allowed Miami to capitalize on its geographic, political and cultural comparative advantage as the gateway city to the Americas. As the Cuban enclave had strong linkages with anti-Communist elites throughout the hemisphere, Miami became a popular safe haven for political elites and businesspeople searching for security for their capital and their families. In 1979, Miami was the initial location where Nicaragua's Somoza family established their operations. A large number of Salvadorean elites moved their families to the area and transferred their capital to Miami-based banks at the onset of their civil war (Grosfoguel, 1995:165). Apart from the Somozas,

approximately fifteen thousand Nicaraguan exiles transferred their assets to Miami banks in the late 1970s and many moved their belongings into new condominiums in the city's most fashionable districts (Portes & Stepick, 1993:152). Miami's dependence on exiled investment from across the hemisphere made the impact of events in the political economy of Latin American nations both immediate and relevant to daily life in the city.

Cuban-American representatives to the state legislature lobbied for support for the Contras and to secure generous provisions for Nicaraguan refugees settling in South Florida (such as lower tuition rates for Nicaraguans at state universities and the granting of licenses for Nicaraguan doctors to practice in the state) (Portes and Stepick, 1993:167). City officials also provided the Nicaraguans with emergency shelters and job-placement assistance. Given that American Immigration and Naturalization Service and the State Department were more interested in keeping the Nicaraguans at home¹⁰, it was a curious reception for the Nicaraguan entrants who were "not welcomed by the government and society at large,... [yet] were still granted access to local resources by dint of political kinship with an established refugee community (Portes and Stepick:1993:166)¹¹". For many migrants from the Caribbean Basin, Miami was

¹⁰As many federal officials were interested in both controlling the tide of refugees into the U.S. and were also encouraging those opposed to the Sandinista's to stay at home to fight with the Contras (Portes and Stepick, 1993:156).

¹¹It should also be noted that the INS continued to deport Nicaraguan aliens from other parts of the country after establishing a policy allowing the refugees in

a destination somewhere in-between North and Latin America.

The patterns of settlement established by the Cuban exiles were replicated at an accelerated pace by the Nicaraguans, who also arrived in waves of progressively poorer immigrants. Many professionals and skilled workers initially experienced downward mobility as they readjusted to their new environment, but they were able to rely on the established Cuban community rather than the American government for advocacy and support in their resettlement. Many were hired on at Cuban-owned enterprises or used their social connections with Cuban bankers to obtain financing for their own businesses (Portes and Stepick, 1993:153). The Central Americans also became the proprietors of the "low income gentrification" projects initiated by the Cubans. By the early-1990s many commentators noted how the Little Havana district of Southwest *Calle Ocho* had truly become Little Latin America, while the Cubans moved on to less humble districts (Martin & Gerhke, 1993:1A; Santiago, 1994:17SA).

While the Cubans generous reception was extended only to particular groups of émigrés based on their class and politics, other working class immigrants have also found the Latin atmosphere created by the Cubans irresistible despite the intense competition for jobs in the city and the possibility that they might fare better in other cities. (Fields & Whitefield, 1996:22BM)

Miami to remain (Portes and Stepick, 1993:158)

The attraction of immigrants to the city's Spanish-speaking and clannish economic enclaves has, however, added fuel to the fire of Miami residents who have often blamed the combination of immigration, bilingualism and enclave insularity as the recipe for all of the city's woes.

The Local Arena

Miami's immigrant and African-American communities have often compared their own successes and struggles to those of their Cuban neighbors. The disparities between the fortunes of Miami's ethnic groups have engendered at times envy and emulation of the enclave's independent successes, or bitterness and outrage at the preferential treatment extended to the Cuban émigrés and their political allies. Imitation has indeed been the sincerest form of flattery for the Cubans who take their conspicuous dominance in ethnic bargaining as a sign of the legitimacy of their often imperious manners of negotiation. When other Miamians have responded to the Cuban community with hostility or resentment, they have provided the Cubans with evidence that they are a persecuted minority group forced to struggle for respect and representation (Croucher, 1994:195).

The black community in Miami has remained at the bottom of a hierarchy of ethnic and class status that has been radically reconfigured over the past thirty years. This has been often been considered to be one of the hidden costs of Miami's dramatic development as a globalized production site. As the Cuban

émigrés began to settle in Miami, members of the black community offered a cautious welcome and unwarranted warning about their dim prospects in Miami's xenophobic political economy. A black activist, quoted in *City on the Edge*, recalls the strange transition in Miami's ethnic politics:

In those days, I said to Cubans in a speech that there was going to be a time when white folks are going to treat you all like niggers. They're going to put you again in your place as they do with all minority groups. But unlike Black Americans, Cubans had no history of being kept in their place, and as a result, they responded differently...Now, in 1987, you hear whites telling us that we should form an alliance with them to keep Cubans in their place. I say, "I've had my experience with you all. Don't tell me now that you and I can buddy-buddy because you're trying to keep Cubans from doing what is right for their own (Portes & Stepick, 1993:14)."

By all accounts, the Cubans did not receive the treatment which other minorities had come to expect. The Cuban émigrés did push black workers out of whole job categories, their mulatto children were allowed access to all white schools in the early 1960s, they drew a disproportionate amount of economic assistance, including 66 percent of the total number of loans granted by Miami's Small Business Association between 1968-1979 while blacks received only 7.9 percent (Mohl, 1983:87; Grosfoguel, 1993:160). Nonetheless, many people in the black community continued to direct their anger at the system that permitted this unequal treatment rather than at the émigrés themselves. Even in the direct contest of ethnic politics that emerged out of the visit of Nelson Mandela, the Black community responded to the disrespectful treatment of their community by

organizing an international boycott of the City of Miami, rather than lashing out at Cuban businesses or organizations in their midst ¹².

Drawing on the lessons from both their own history and that of the successful Cubans, members of the black community have reinforced the effectiveness of the Cuban enclave's obstinate cohesion and resistance to assimilation. "*When things were colored*," emphasized a Black community leader, "then the same kind of business enclave existed that exists in the Cuban community, in the Jewish community, also existed in the Black community, because the consumer base was contained (Portes & Stepick, 1993:217)". This reinforcement of the perils of integration has not only strengthened the position of the Cubans on the merits of their clannish economy, but has also encouraged academics such as Alejandro Portes to expound the virtues of the ethnic enclave model of urban development and immigrant resettlement.

Miami's native white community has often been more willing to blame the tide of ethnic violence and the integration of the city into the global drug trade on the Cubans themselves and on the tolerance of alien norms of behavior in the city. The Anglo community (or non-Hispanic Whites as they have been labeled

¹²The "Boycott Miami Now" campaign urged Blacks across the U.S. to take their tourist dollars and conventions elsewhere (Croucher, 1994:190). That organizers were unconcerned about the effects this course of action may have on the economic impact his action may have had on their own community gives evidence of the economic marginalization of blacks in the city (whose participation in the hospitality job market is very low) and also of the distinction and precedence of enclave or minority group interests over the recognition of the common interests of the city as a whole.

by census takers who have bureaucratically formulated Miami natives as the ethnic Other) initially extended the Cubans a cautious welcome when the first wave of wealthy émigrés arrived. Miami's churches and synagogues played a critical role in early refugee relief efforts and were generally sympathetic to the plight of the émigrés, but the city soon became overwhelmed by the exodus and many residents resented being saddled with a crisis created in another country (García, 1996:19). When federal aid did begin to pour in many residents were both grateful for the relief but dismayed by the lavish treatment of the émigrés. From these early stages onward, the Anglo community voiced resentment for the Cubans who were at once too successful, too independent, yet too great a drain on the public purse (Rieff, 1987:71). One community leader noted this contradiction in perspectives on the émigrés. "I wonder who really upsets the whites most," he asks, "the poor Cuban on welfare or the rich Cuban with three Cadilacs and a Mercedes out buying the country (Croucher, 1997:21)."

Many in the Anglo community lamented the Cuban penetration of job sectors that had traditionally been their domain, and they often blamed the immigrants for the downward pressure on wages. In their reluctance to accept the Cubans into Miami's labor unions, however, many working class Miamians encouraged the trends toward informalization and non-union contract work that was carried out primarily by immigrants in the city. Some of the exclusionary practices of the city's unions, particularly in the building trades, were born

largely out of racism and took the form of referral systems and English language exams (Grenier, 1990:33; Stepick, 1990:192). An equally important rift between union organizers and the Cubans came out of an inability or unwillingness to accept the Cubans' personal and political priorities. When trade unionists expressed the sentiment that "The union movement will prosper in Miami when the Cubans find out they are workers first and exiles second," they effectively issued the Cubans an ultimatum to which they would never respond positively (Arguelles, 1982:36). Likewise, the assertion by labor leaders that the unions' political focus should be exclusively on domestic issues was at odds with many Cubans' experience and prerogatives¹³.

On a number of occasions, Miami natives have voiced their dismay at the Cubans' obsession with homeland issues and international politics and have demonstrated their discomfort with elements of the city's international flavor. Throughout the first two decades of the Cuban occupation of their town, the disgruntlement of these Miami residents was manifested mostly through the editorial pages of the *Miami Herald* and through bumper stickers and billboards reading "Will the last American to leave Miami please take the flag" (Soruco, 1996:41; Rieff, 1987:29).

¹³The history of Cuban trade unionism in Florida long before the Revolution gave evidence of the congruity between labor activism and nationalist endeavors, as many of the leaders of Cuba's fight for independence from Spain, including Jose Martí, used the shop floors of South Florida's cigar factories as a platform from which to launch their national project (See Poyo, 1991)

In response to the rush of Latinization in Miami after the Mariel boatlifts, the city's English-speaking community lashed out in a more direct attempt to re-establish the Americanness of their own space. Since 1973 Dade County had been declared officially bilingual and offered a variety of public services in both Spanish and English. In 1980 the crisis of the Marielitos strained relations between the Cubans and the Anglo population culminating in a citizen-generated initiative to prohibit "the expenditure of county funds for the purpose of utilizing any other language than English, or promoting any other culture than that of the United States (Stack and Warren, 1990:16)".

While the anti-bilingual ordinance had little substantive impact on the availability of services, the political battles that it incited helped to cement Cuban-American solidarity (Stepick, 1992:42). The overwhelming support of the Anglo community for the ordinance strengthened the perception that the Cubans were not being afforded a voice in their community proportionate to their contributions to its development. It also compelled the Miami Cubans to make minority status part of their reactive ethnic discourse from this point onward (Baloyra, 1991:131; Croucher, 1994:195)¹⁴. Exile leaders did not merely claim they had a right to express themselves in their own tongue, but asserted the

¹⁴Organizations that would become very powerful Cuban-American political lobby groups such as the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) and the Spanish-American League Against Discrimination (SALAD) were born in part out of the mobilization against the language ordinance (Stack and Warren, 1992:177)

dominance of the Spanish language in the locale. Frank Soler, the first editor of *El Herald* remarked after the anti-bilingual ordinance was passed: "Oh well, we'll just have to go back to using one language. Spanish, I mean. (Rieff, 1987:36)".

While the county's anti-bilingual ordinance marked an important victory for those in the Anglo population exasperated by the buzz of foreign tongues all around them, it was merely a triumph in the realm of bureaucracy. By the mid-1980s it had become evident to many non-Hispanics that an unstoppable process of acculturation in reverse had overtaken the city. Ultimately, many of Miami's white residents have reacted to the changes in their city by enrolling in Spanish courses themselves or by leaving the city altogether (Grenier & Stepick, 1993:XIV; Lawrence, 1991:2C).¹⁵ The exodus of primarily working- and middle class non-Hispanic whites has been striking in that residents have not been able to find refuge in the outskirts of the city, as major suburban areas in Hialeah, Sweetwater and Coral Gables were latinized in tandem the Cuban enclave's multiple success stories and with the search for investment outlets for Latin American elites. Changes in the entire Dade County area have been dramatic enough to compel many native Miamians to emigrate North in order to find a more familiar cultural environment and have

¹⁵ Miami Herald publisher David Lawrence Jr. urged Miami residents not to resist Miami's growing multicultural flavor and business environment and to "get on the ball" and enroll in a foreign language class (Lawrence, 1991:2C)

thereby thus intensified the changes to the city's demography (Portes and Stepick, 1993:17).

The 'white flight' phenomenon in Miami has not been predicated on the encroachment of immigrant or minority ghettos, as is the case in many North American cities, but rather on the frustrations of immersion in a foreign culture and the loss of hegemonic control over political and economic institutions. In the wake of the anti-bilingual ordinance, many in the Cuban community became American citizens, voter participation among Cubans soared, and the enclave began to strengthen its voice in local and state politics (Stepick, 1992:40). As Stack and Warren have noted, the symbols of Cuban-American nationalism have become conspicuous elements of Miami's political landscape:

Local political campaigns, even among non-Cubans, have at times become contests over who is more anticommunist, who has been the more vigorous supporter of Ronald Reagan, or who was most directly involved in the Bay of Pigs Invasion.(Stack and Warren, 1990:21)

Both the generous reception provided to the Cubans by members of the Anglo community and the expectation of the exiles' imminent retreat allowed many Cubans to wait out the first two decades of the exile as though they were merely caught at the airport fighting for a speedy return home. Events such as the anti-bilingual ordinance inspired collective indignance within the enclave, and encouraged many members to finally unpack their political bags and to stake out their own political territory on the local level.

Staking Out Space

While the enclave has constructed its cultural, political and economic institutions upon a foundation of generous state support, the Cuban community has succeeded in reconstructing the social landscape of the city to the extent that natives of Miami seem like the aliens in the new territory. The creation of a Cuban homeland and a latinized international space in Miami has been a process that can not be explained in reference to any single variable such as the endowments of the Cuban Refugee Program, vilification by the Cuban state, international political jockeying, the respect of downtrodden minority groups or the alienation from mainstream Floridian society. The contingent processes of nationalization and internationalization were born out of circumstances particular to Miami over the past three decades and have been shaped by economic and political hegemons who have engaged residents in a dialectic process of re-establishing boundaries and changing the meanings of places. By approaching the study of an emerging global city through an analysis of the changing meanings of space for its residents, rather than only for corporate executives, the importance of events and processes that change the *globescape* from the city can be evaluated as part of the dynamic of local development.

It is not in the purview of this study to try to establish who have been the winners and losers of these processes of re-territorializing and de-territorializing, though some preliminary insights on these questions may be apparent. Of

interest here is how the changes in Miami's worldview have shaped how and why residents have fastened upon certain opportunities for development. Social struggles within a locale and among agents acting at different geographic scales create dynamics in the social, political and economic landscapes while arousing changes in sentiments towards places. In the Miami context, agents discussed in this chapter shaped the locale's immediate geography and changed the vision of the world outside. For many Cubans, the island was transformed from a land without toothpaste from which one escaped into a paradise lost by the same social forces which animated the re-construction of Miami in the aesthetic and economic image of Havana. Following similar logics, the international political discourse of *Nuestra America* and approach to the pan-american economy have emerged out of the enclave's ability to speak as a nation among siblings throughout the hemisphere. The chapter that follows will describe how that national voice has emerged within a community whose experiences of class, race and exile vary dramatically.

Chapter 3: The Next Havana

Cuba was like a first lover who was snatched from our arms. We live in anguish remembering how good we had it then, how much happier we were. And yearning for our return, everything we have done has been in preparation for the return.

Mercedes Cros Sandoval, social anthropologist,
Miami-Dade Community College

As the analysis in the last chapter has attempted to demonstrate, the images and social definitions of the Cuban community have changed constantly with the social and political terrain of Miami and with the position of those describing the group. The Cubans have alternately (and concurrently) been described as the economic saviors of a marginalized resort town and a burden on the local economy, gangster drug dealers and hard-working immigrants, right-wing extremists and civic-minded defenders of democracy. While one might expect a range of perspectives on the defining characteristics of any ethnic group, the shifts in the dominant images of the Cuban immigrants responding to changes in the configurations of social and economic power have been striking. Nonetheless, the Miami Cubans have been almost invariably judged by outsiders as a homogeneous group despite the fact that the makeup of the Cuban population in Miami is as varied as the opinions on the qualities of the enclave.

The composition of various waves of Cuban immigrants arriving in Florida over the past thirty years has been extremely diverse with regard to class origins, political perspectives, race, and experiences in Cuba. Yet the contemporary image of Cuban Miami as a monolithic political and cultural unit

has become part of the dominant social and political narrative of and within Little Havana. As noted earlier, a number of academic analyses and local residents have credited much of the enclave's economic success to Cuban Miami's clannish environment. In many ways, the struggles to claim and control the defining characteristics of *cubanidad* and to uphold a doctrine of exile unity have been among the most significant and the most violently contested projects of Cuban-American nationalism within the émigré community.

Many of the milestones in Little Havana's development as an immigrant enclave have been unique to the Miami experience and contingent on the particular historical context of the Cuban settlement in the locale. A number of themes in this history, however, can be seen as characteristic of the projects of nation building more generally: the construction of military heroes and other national symbols, the struggles for control over communication and language, the pronouncement of a unified national voice in the regional and global political economy. The aim of this chapter is to examine the relationship between these national projects, material changes in the Miami landscape and changes in the city's imagined political and economic destiny. Set in the context of the reception and treatment of the Cuban exiles outlined in Chapter Two, this chapter will describe the internal dynamics of the Cuban makeover of Miami.

The chapter will examine four elements in Cuban Miami's national history that have had an impact on Miami's political and economic status as the "Capital of Latin America": militarism, control over communication, exile unity and the

recreation of a Cuban national space. These themes will be examined through a number of cases which illustrate the connection between Cuban-American nation-building and changes in local politics, labor markets, communications infrastructure and concrete plans for the city's future. The chapter will begin with an analysis of the exiles' anti-Castro military engagement and the employment of this history in the development of a discourse of militant political conservatism in local politics. It will then examine the confluence of political and economic projects in one powerful Cuban Miami family's control over communications infrastructure and the channels of political expression. The third section of the chapter will assess the bearing of the rhetoric of exile unity on internal labor regulation and the ability of local elites to translate their personal economic successes into symbols of Cuban-American national progress. Last, the chapter will examine how the reproduction of a Cuban cultural landscape in Miami has allowed many exiles to establish and imagine connections between their own experiences and those of daily life in contemporary Cuba. This imagination of transnational Cuban unity and simultaneity of experience has been manifested in pragmatic blueprints for a South-Florida - Cuba political and economic unification in the post-Castro era. This last section will highlight the relationship between cultural reterritorialization by the Cuban-Americans and the city's transformation into a not quite American, not yet Cuban internationalized space.

Miami's Soldiers

Cuban Miami has its own national martyrs. Exile militants in the city share the security and lack of accountability of “long-distance” nationalists in other American immigrant communities, but the proximity of Little Havana to the Cuban original has made it possible for members of the immigrant enclave to remain actively engaged in Cuba’s military battles. Cuban-American soldiers have experienced a transformation in profile and power as dramatic as the changes in Miami itself: those who returned from the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion dejected and humiliated in their homeland have developed economic and political strength in Miami which they have used in their fight *la causa* (“the cause”) on a global stage. This ascendance has was not merely the recompense for their nationalist sacrifices on Cuba shores, but was born out of militant national struggles in their new place as well.

The initial wave of exiles landing in South Florida shared a common class background and phenotype. There was, however, a wide variety of exile political organizations and militant groups established in South Florida in the early 1960s which manifested the radical differences in experiences and political projects within this first group of immigrants. The contemporary images and realities of Little Havana’s unified right-wing political agenda is in part the product of successive struggles between these different political factions in the Cuban community. The ability of Miami’s ultra-conservative political groups to claim the soldiers of Cuban Miami’s cenotaph to the martyrs of the Bay of Pigs

Invasion as their brethren remains a powerful political tool. Contemporary nationalist groups consistently recall the collective sacrifices of the enclave's military history both to make claims on the loyalty of co-nationals in Miami and in to assert their right to dictate the political and economic treatment of Cuba in the international realm.

A study by Carlos Forment has detailed the battles between the various exile political movements opposing the Cuban Revolution over the support of different institutions of the American state and Latin American governments. The study demonstrates how each of the different political and military operations shaped the ideational and material preconditions for the rise of the enclave as a "moral community" rather than a mere ethnic economy (Forment, 1989:60). Forment's analysis traces the history of the ascendance of the exiles conservative political organizations in the wake of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion and the subsequent vilification of the Kennedy administration and notes how these events catalyzed a discourse of ethnic communitarianism that promulgated a distrust of the Americans and others outside of the enclave (Forment, 89:64). He relates this history to the contemporary economic success of the Cuban enclave, noting the following correlation:

If the enclave entrepreneur can today invoke the collective claims in order to legitimize his patriarchal system of capital-labor relations and contribute to group cohesion it is because the militants and terrorists had earlier inculcated the community with these same notions (Forment, 89:73)

In laying the groundwork for this study the author provides even greater insight into the process by which disaffected exiles were transformed from citizens to political exiles and then from exiles into militants (Forment, 92:52). He notes that the transition from exile was often empowering for many Cubans, particularly those who had felt the helplessness of seeing their property nationalized or those who had become politically paralyzed by their allegiance to an overthrown regime. When the immigrants arrived in South Florida, many found that political non-alignment was as dangerous as becoming an ally to a losing faction of exile militants.

While Forment's analysis may overstate the significance of one important variable that has shaped the rise of the ethnic enclave (the triumph of a hegemonic conservative moral-political discourse), it evokes the intensity and violence manifested in the definition of the Cuban-American nationalist identity. The struggles of competing claims on moral authority and legitimate representation of this ethnic community have been played out not only in the realm of discourse - the circulation of words - but also in battles claiming human lives. From the onset of the exile, nationalist rhetoric has been made credible by this immediate foreground of violent experience within the enclave.

As the Cuban émigrés became citizens of the United States, many began to use their political and economic resources as Americans to advance their projects for returning from exile. By the early 1980s the attempts to overthrow the Castro regime through assassination attempts or hit-and-run attacks on the

Cuban coastline had largely ended (Soto, 1988: 1B; Meluza, 1986: 6C). The heroes of the enclave's armed struggles generally remained as the leaders of the new national projects, though both their tactics and the objects of their political messages had changed dramatically. As the significance of the Cuban voting block and economic clout grew, the symbols of the exile experience, the fervor of anti-Castroism, and the militant commitment to shaping the future of Cuba became powerful means for municipal and state politicians to mobilize the support of the powerful enclave (Mohl, 86:8, Stack and Warren, 1990:16). The imprint of Cuban-American militarism is evident in the electorate's avid concern with each candidate's involvement in the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the veterans of which still hold an important qualification for holding public office in Miami in the 1990s.

A 1996 congressional race in Dade County provides an example of the salience of the symbols of militant nationalism in exile politics. The two candidates, Lincoln Diaz-Balart and Javier Souto, held almost identical profiles on policy issues but were engaged in an acrid battle for the title of *El Cubanísimo*. The contest was said to turn on the following "emotional litmus tests": "who has fought the longest and hardest for a free Cuba, who's Republicanism is the truest and which one really represents the mass of hard-working, taxpaying Cuban Americans"¹. In his campaign, Souto, questioned the

¹ Given the fact that no Democrats were running for the congressional seat, the race was decided by the Republican Primary.

other candidate's devotion to *la causa* ("the cause") and stressed his own background as a Bay of Pigs veteran (Viglucchi, 96:1B). Diaz-Balart, however, could make a claim to be among a new class of Cuban nationalists, engaged in international political endeavors to expedite change in Cuba rather than "just standing up on a desk and shouting".

Diaz-Balart placed his political plan of action within the same history of militant nationalist struggle in which Souto had actively participated. Part of his winning platform, however, was his promise to Cuban-Americans was that he would bring *la causa* into the 1990s by attacking Fidel Castro through international political institutions and by shaping the terms of Cuba's integration in the global economy. His central mandate "to ask Congress to petition the administration to advocate an international embargo against the Castro dictatorship" illustrates one of the many instances where the exigencies of responding to the Cuban American nationalist establishment has prompted local politicians to become deeply engaged in international politics, albeit within a tightly circumscribed political discourse (Miami Herald, 1992:26A).

Cuban Miami's history of militant nationalism has supported a powerful political intolerance in the community that has shaped the development of the seemingly homogeneous national voice among Cuban Americans. Appearances by "communist sympathizers" such as Jane Fonda and Gabriel García Márquez or Nelson Mandela have consistently sparked protests and the boycott of sponsors, and audiences would not only would be not only heckled at the door

but also frisked by Miami Police (Didion, 1987:120; Portes and Stepick, 1993:137; Rieff, 1993:106). In 1979, over twenty bombs were detonated in the homes and businesses of supporters of a more open dialogue with Cuba (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985:29; de los Angeles Torres, 1990:30; Azicri, 1982:66). In the 1980s, violent campaigns of censorship were launched at the Cuban Museum of Art and Culture, Teatro Nuevo, the Miami Theater Festival, the Miami Herald and many individual artists and journalists (García, 1996:197, Portes and Stepick, 1993:138, El Nuevo Herald, 1996:1A)

In June of 1996, for example, plans to present a concert by a visiting Cuban performer were canceled after a molotov cocktail was thrown through the window of the venue and the Cuban Patriotic Junta (representing 138 exile organizations) had called for a boycott of all sponsors. Two other concerts involving Cuban artists incited violent protests that same month (El Nuevo Herald, 1996:1A, Lantigua, 1996, 81). Ninoska Perez, a spokesperson for the Cuban American National Foundation and radio personality placed the attacks in the context of the Cuban American nation's experience with violence:

This is a city of victims. If you ask anyone on the street, they will all tell you that they have relatives or friends in [Cuban] jails or that they have problems because their families remain divided since they left Cuba...When these people are accused of intolerance, I ask 'intolerant compared to whom?' These are not crimes or acts of terrorism that can be compared to those which have taken place in Cuba (El Nuevo Herald, 1996: 1A).

A decade earlier, when community members closed down a cultural event based on the suspected communist leanings of one of the artists (a Cuban émigré

living in New York). their actions were defended by a Little Havana resident with these sentiments:

A person who has not suffered, who has not had relatives killed, can say coolly that there must be freedom of expression. We know better. It is too hard that they come here, to our center, to tell us these things (Portes and Stepick, 1993:138)

Several significant sentiments are encapsulated in these reactions: the most apparent is the understanding of a distinct code of rights and freedoms inside Miami; second is the sense that Cubans whose politics are not analogous to that of the establishment are considered as outsiders; last, is the conviction that Miami has become “our center” – the capital of the Other Cuba.

In the Cuban enclave, the sacrifices made in the efforts to “liberate” the island Cubans have shaped the political and economic climate of Miami in a number of significant ways. Most apparently, it has limited dramatically the scope of political discourse within the city. Cuban American militarism has also shaped the use of Miami as a space of global commercial and cultural exchange. While local politicians and businesses in many metropolitan areas have actively encouraged international business and cultural exchange, Miami’s City Commission and Chamber of Commerce have had to balance the desire to grow as a global city with the need to show support for *la causa cubana* (Birger, 1992:13BM). In one sixteen month period in the early 1980s city officials issued twenty-eight formal resolutions and city ordinances dealing with U.S. foreign policy which were predominantly symbolic expressions of anti-Communism and

anti-Castroism (Tomb, 1983:1C). One of the straw vote questions posed by Miami's City Commission allowed voters to resolve the issue of whether "the funds of the City of Miami [should] be expended to finance, in whole or in part, any multinational commercial or cultural conference or convention where representatives of Communist-Marxist countries have either been scheduled to participate or invited to attend? (Stack and Warren, 1990:18)" These events provide an illustration how the entrenchment of militant Cuban nationalist discourse in Miami politics has encouraged city officials to become engaged in issues of international politics while it has also shaped Miami's integration into the global economy.

Mas Communication

Bay of Pigs veteran Jorge Mas Canosa and his immediate family have come to command an enormous amount of control over both the political channels of communication in Miami as well as the city's international communications infrastructure. Jorge Mas is the chairman of the powerful international lobby group the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF). He is also the chairman of the board of a leading international telecommunications firm, MasTec, the president and CEO of which is Mr. Mas's son, Jorge Jr. A profile of the political and business ventures of the Mas Canosa family, and the institutions they control, provide an intriguing illustration

of the way Cuban national projects have shaped and directed important commercial ventures in the city. While inferring direct causal linkages between Jorge Mas' rise as a powerful political figure and the phenomenal growth of the family's international telecommunications firm may be problematic, the impression of a Cuban nationalist political agenda on the family business (and vice versa) is apparent in a number of instances. The concentration of political and economic power in the Mas Canosa family is not a unique circumstance in Miami, as a handful of rum and sugar baron families have also played important roles in Cuban American business and politics.² This case is particularly significant, however, given the concentration of power over communication and political expression in Miami's political economy.

In June of 1997, a survey by Hispanic Business magazine noted that Miami's MasTec ranked as the third largest Hispanic business in the United States, with annual revenues of \$473 million and is also the nation's largest employer among Hispanic businesses (Fields, 1997:1C). While the company is managed by Jorge Jr., the presence and political position of Jorge Mas Sr's nationalist politics have had an impact on MasTec's corporate vision and direction. When describing his career in relation to that of his powerful father,

²Both the Bacardi and the Fanjul families and the corporate entities they control have, for example, played important roles in lobbying for the Helms-Burton Act, and are active in National Association of Sugar Mill Owners of Cuba, a lobby group campaigning in the United States for the full restitution of some 157 sugar mills in Cuba. (See Marquis, 1995; 1C)

the young president and CEO of MasTec stated: “I don’t walk in his footsteps, I am extending them (Bussey, 1996:18BM).”

When the company was formed in 1994 through a merger of Jorge Mas Sr.’s public works contractor group Church and Tower and a major Miami telecommunications construction firm Burnup & Sims, the Miami Herald business columnist noted that Mas Canosa’s status immediately had made the stock more appealing (Halpern, 1996:36BM). The company’s expansion into the Latin American telecommunications industry in its first two years proceeded at a dizzying pace. Between March 1994 and February 1995, MasTec established subsidiaries in Argentina, El Salvador, Venezuela, Ecuador and throughout the Caribbean (Whitefield, 1995:1C). The company has positioned itself to take advantage of the trend toward privatization of telecommunication services throughout the Americas and Europe. In a recent purchase of the Spanish telecommunications company Sintel, MasTec acquired a \$604 million contract for construction services in Spain and South America as well as an important bargaining chip in the Cuban American community’s relationship with Spain – one of Cuba’s largest trading partners (Bussey 1996:18BM). Jorge Mas Sr. has stated that he hoped to use the purchase to gain leverage in influencing Spain’s policy toward Cuba (Russell, 1997).

Preparing for the future of Cuba has been an important consideration for the telecommunications firm. From the onset, it was assumed that MasTec

would be “well-positioned to take advantage of the explosive future potential in the rebuilding of Cuba’s telecommunications infrastructure (Halpern, 1996:36BM)”. Indeed, the Jorge Jr. and Sr. have stated on several occasions that MasTec sees its own destiny and that of the island as closely linked. Rebuilding Cuba’s infrastructure, including its telephone system, would be a major part of any Post-Castro economic reconstruction. “It is the Mas family goal,” noted a company spokesperson, “to build it into a significant company so when Cuba opens up, they will be a big player” (Bussey, 1996:18BM). The enormous demand for better communications infrastructure between the U.S. and Cuba would also make these ventures economically as well as politically satisfying for the Mas Canosa family. Due to the outdated technology in Cuba and the restrictions by both the U.S. and Cuban governments, only 500,000 calls to Cuba were completed out of 60 million attempts in 1993 (Faiola, 1993:1C).

Critics of the CANF supported Helms-Burton bill have charged that the Act’s requirement that post-Castro Cuba grant “permits to privately owned telecommunications and media companies” to qualify for U.S. aid has been included in large part for MasTec’s benefit (Marquis, 1995:1C). Mas Canosa and CANF president Francisco Hernández have also recently urged Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to impose sanctions on the Italian telecommunications company STET, which is involved in a joint venture with the Cuban government

to upgrade the Cuban telephone system ³(Cardenas, 1997) While the claims that Mas Canosa has engaged in these political endeavors for his own business gains may be overstated or inaccurate, the family's political and economic projects often appear closely intertwined.

Since CANF's inception in 1979, the lobby group has succeeded in raising the profile of Little Havana nationalism from talk radio terrorism and community center rhetoric to the UN Human Rights Commission and the Society of International Business Fellows⁴. The Foundation's methods of political action have been both chilling and awe-inspiring. Since its establishment, CANF has poured \$3.2 million (U.S.) into the American political system in support of Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Jesse Helms and Senator Robert Toricelli, among many others (Globe and Mail, 1997:A6). CANF has also demonstrated its control over many of the channels of communication and political expression regarding Cuban politics on both sides of the Florida Straits.

In 1991, CANF members succeeded in mounting a violent campaign to temper the critical stance of some Miami Herald journalists toward the embargo-tightening Toricelli

³ Under the provisions of the American Libertad legislation which calls for the denial of visas to the US for officers of international companies "trafficking in property illegally confiscated from American citizens." (Rosenberg, 1996:1A)

⁴ These are among the institutions to which CANF have recently made presentations regarding international policy toward Cuba (Mas Canosa, 96; Luis Zuniga, 97).

Bill (Stepick, 1992:43). Mas Canosa encouraged advertisers to boycott the Herald and Nuevo Herald, the paper's vending boxes were defaced and smeared with excrement. The Foundation commissioned huge banner ads placed on the back of city buses which read: YO NO CREO EN EL HERALD - I DON'T BELIEVE THE MIAMI HERALD (Fonzi, 1993, 119; Miami Herald, 1992:12A). Jorge Mas declared the campaign over once he felt the coverage of the exile community had become "more objective," and after the Herald's editor David Lawrence published a lengthy statement defending the papers editorial freedom the headline of which pleaded "COME ON MR. MAS, BE FAIR"⁵ (Lawrence, 1992:12A). In the wake of these events, the Inter-American press organization and the human rights group Americas Watch blamed the Foundation for creating a climate of intolerance and fear in the community which were "damaging to the cause of free speech" (García, 1996:152; Fonzi, 1993:119; Kornbluh and Elliston, 1994:194).

As chairman of Ronald Reagan's Advisory Board for Cuba Broadcasting, Mas Canosa securing the federal public funds to establish Radio Martí and TV Martí and then administered America's media war on Cuba for over a decade (Kornbluh and Elliston, 1994:194). These media have been used to "break

⁵In a 1995 editorial special to the Herald, Mas Canosa claimed that "the Herald is blindly bent on destroying the humanitarian and patriotic work of the foundation and my own personal credibility even at the cost of printing lies, engaging in disinformation, and systematically ignoring facts (Mas Canosa, 1995:9A)

Castro's information monopoly" by providing a mixed broadcast of American baseball scores, Mas Canosa's campaign speeches for his leadership in the new Cuba, and stories providing "alternative views of the country's own condition" (Spicer Nichols, 1984:35; 1990:30). These broadcasts cost the American government over \$40 million dollars to establish and \$15 million dollars annually thereafter (Spicer Nichols, 1990:30). A study by the General Accounting Office on the effectiveness of TV Martí have shown that the station could only be received by a minute number of viewers during only a few minutes of un-jammed broadcast time each day (Kornbluh and Elliston, 1994:195, GAO:1992:4). In light of this evidence it appears as though Radio and TV Martí have been maintained to fulfill the needs of the émigré community rather than those of the "island Cubans".

Radio and TV Martí are no mere "broadcasts to nowhere" as policy critics have understandably called them. For the national projects of the exile, the millions of dollars spent to establish and maintain this media provided the symbols of an imagined audience living in step with the exile just an AM radio-wave away. The rhetoric of Jorge Mas, which has so often been legitimated by its translation into U.S. foreign policy, has confirmed boundaries of the imagined regional geography of the Florida Cubans. When asked by the newspaper *El País* in Spain whether he believed Americans would take over Cuba if Castro fell, Mas replied "That's bull----. They haven't even been able to take over Miami! If we've kicked them out of here, how could they possibly take over our own country?(Chardy, 94:1B)"

By moving beyond (though never abandoning) localized rhetoric and bullying of the earlier militant exile groups, Jorge Mas Canosa and CANF have shaped the exiles' image of its own power and place. MasTec's candid use of its business relations to further the Mas' nationalist goal has also provided other Miami Cubans with an example of how political and economic projects can be combined without detrimental effects on either moral authority or the bottom line.⁶ The endeavors of both CANF and MasTec have not merely brought exile politics and Cuban American business into the purview of a higher geographic scale of political governance and economic power, they have also altered the significance of spatial boundaries of the American, Cuban-American and Cuban nations in the discourse and imagination of the exile.

Little *Habaneros*: Exile Unity and the Enclave Economy

The human capital endowments and political and economic interests of the "Golden Exiles" who control the Cuban American National Foundation are generally very different from those of the socially marginalized *Marielitos* of 1980 exodus. Despite this apparent heterogeneity in the émigré population, the discourse of exile unity has been asserted with greater force with each new wave of Cubans arriving in South Florida. Cuban immigrants did not arrive in Miami

⁶The combined family wealth derived from the Mas Canosas' interest in MasTec reached \$586 million in 1997, making them Miami's richest Hispanic family according to Hispanic Business Magazine (Hispanic Business, 1997; Whitefied, 1997:1A).

as Little *Habaneros*, but their incorporation into the enclave community and economy has often involved an oath of allegiance to the institutions of Little Havana.

Throughout the first decade of the Cuban Revolution, the exodus was largely middle and upper-middle class but it grew to represent a larger segment of the Cuban population with each passing year. By the time of the arrival of Mariel boatlift, the makeup of the exodus had changed so dramatically that the new entrants were almost unrecognizable as Cubans to many members of the enclave. “There were not that many Blacks in Cuba,” was an often heard remark in 1980, “these are Angolans” (de los Angeles Torres, 1990:33).⁷ Given differences in national cultures and personal experiences between these groups of immigrants, the Marielitos could just as well have arrived from a different continent. Perhaps more than any other event, the crisis created by the Mariel exodus created a great strain on exile unity. Surviving this crisis would be critical for the cultural reproduction of *cubanidad* in Little Havana and for the consolidation of the economic enclave.

News coverage of the Marielitos tarnished the image of the enclave and the city by focusing on the criminal profiles of many of the immigrants and on the riots that occurred within the settlement camps (García, 1996:70). After years of adulation by the media as a “model minority,” many Cubans in the enclave

resented the negative attention that the Marielitos had brought to their city. The exile media largely accepted the negative portrayal of the immigrants proffered by both Castro and the American press (Duany, 93:168; Azicri, 1982:67). Many of the new entrants initially complained that they encountered more discrimination within the émigré community than from Americans as a whole (García, 1996:73).

For many exiles who had not experienced revolutionary Cuba firsthand, the arrival of 125,000 new entrants in 1980 confirmed many of the fears their once idyllic society had degenerated into a population of delinquents, homosexuals and “anti-socials” (de los Angeles Torres, 1990:33).⁸ Beyond the apparent racism and homophobia that motivated much of the ostracism of the Marielitos, the differences between the enclave and the new Cubans cast doubts onto the notions of simultaneity of Cuban experience and culture across the Florida Straits. The new immigrants had also experienced and participated in Revolutionary Cuban society in a manner very different from that of most of Miami’s émigrés, and thus suffered a nostalgia for a different nation than the one

⁷ A Cuban American city official in Miami also noted that “the Marielitos are mostly black and mulattos of a color I never saw or believed existed in Cuba” (Portes and Stepick, 1993:21).

⁸ Hardened criminals, mental patients and other entrants classified as “deviants” did not exceed 5% of the total population of this population, but the images of violence and derangement permeated both popular media and local discourse (Azicri, 1982:68; Portes and Stepick, 85:496).

Little Havana sought to recreate.⁹

Despite the trauma and tension caused within the Cuban community by the Marielito crisis, incorporating the mass of émigrés into the Cuban-American economy and society became an important process in the development of the enclave. Finding a place for the Marielitos within the enclave allowed members to maintain the assertion that “the only thing separating the Cubans of the island and the Cubans of the exile is one man - Fidel Castro”(Mas Canosa quoted in Rieff, 1993:68). It also provided a new pool of workers who were beholden to the older members of the exile, who had provided the Marielitos transportation to the United States and then facilitated their settlement¹⁰.

The Mariel entrants received a better reception into the Miami labor market than the wave of Haitian immigrants who also arrived in 1980, though their incorporation into the enclave economy was much slower than the Cuban émigrés that had preceded them. By 1983, the unemployment rate among Mariel entrants was 27 percent or three times the rate of the total Cuban population(Portes and Stepick, 1985:512). A 1985 study by Portes, Bach, and Jensen shows that 45% the Mariel entrants were employed by co-nationals, while 28% were self-employed (cited in Portes and Zhou, 1992:505).

⁹ A Nuevo Herald article on changes in political tolerance in Miami noted that the *recien llegados* (recent arrivals) had introduced “Cuba’s modern culture to exiles who had been stuck in the sepia-toned memories from more than three decades before (El Nuevo Herald, 1996:1A)

The Cuban economic enclave provided the new immigrants with opportunities for employment and advancement substantially greater than those available to other immigrants with similar skill sets (Portes & Jensen, 1989:932). The corollary of the provision of these opportunities, however, has been the employment of national solidarity as a vehicle for subjugation by Cuban employers (Grenier, 1992:40). The impact of the discourse of exile unity on the Cuban participation in South Florida's trade unions has been addressed by Portes and Stepick:

Union organizers have reported that whereas Cuban workers in mainstream firms would join unions, the same workers in Cuban-owned firms would be next to impossible to organize. The adversarial union-management relationship appeared inimical to the bond between workers and owners created by a common past and a common political outlook...If the exile's political discourse had been more tolerant and less militant, it probably would not have been so effective in reinforcing the social capital on which their collective business advancement was cemented. (Portes and Stepick, 93:140)

In the development of the ethnic enclave economy, exile unity has implied an alliance between labor and capital wherein workers would be expected to submit to high levels of exploitation by co-nationals in order to someday reap their benefits of membership in a dynamic national economy. Despite the differential in state support for immigrant settlement between the different waves of émigrés, stories of the initial weeks or months of menial labor endured by

¹⁰ Hundreds of Miami Cubans personally assisted with the boatlift in the hopes of transporting friends and relatives from the island. Many endured a harrowing return trip in boats cramped with strangers (Masud-Piloto, 1996:68).

members the “golden exiles” before achieving their success in America have effectively framed this exploitation as each immigrant’s “tour of duty” on the lower echelons of the enclave ladder.¹¹

Cuban Americans who have relied on their social networks and the labor of their co-nationals have been granted the status of national heroes. Restaurateur Felipe Valls, for example, has made millions of dollars selling Cuban comestibles in a dozen Miami restaurants, many of which are acclaimed as culinary institutions of Little Havana. In the process, he has not only laid claim to nine blocks of Calle Ocho which the state legislature has named after him, but he has also been commended for “helping thousands of immigrants start new lives with work as cooks, waitresses and dishwashers” (Martin, 92:1E)

The combination of entrepreneurial savvy and Cuban social ties have also generated both community esteem and profits for *Hispanic Business 500* member Remedios Diaz-Oliver (Hispanic Business, 1997). Her success as an international distributor of small containers was predicated in part on her willingness to secure “character loans” to other Cubans (Portes and Stepick, 1996:130). In the mid-1960s Diaz-Oliver asked her employer to extend \$30,000 in credit to a man she knew as a successful manufacturer in Cuba who was attempting to rebuild his business in South Florida (Owens, 1988:9BM). She

¹¹ Even the briefest biographies of major figures in Cuban-American business and politics includes the resume of service positions they or their parents have endured. (See Whitefield 1995:1C, Bussey, 1996:18BM, Owens, 1988: 9BM; Viglucci, 1992:1B).

offered to pay off the debt out of her salary if the client could not do so. When the man paid the account and Oliver-Diaz's commissions grew. Using this extension of trust allowed Diaz-Oliver to expand her client list substantially, both within Miami and throughout Latin America and eventually start her own company. Both local press and the *Hispanic Business Magazine* have highlighted the Diaz-Oliver case as an example of the economic benefits of community solidarity. "She had no problem finding customers," noted one business columnist, "She had more than a button-down company from the Midwest could ever hope to find in Miami (Owens, 1988:9BM)."

The Valls and Oliver-Diaz cases illustrate a strong relationship that has appeared between the discourse of Cuban entrepreneurialism and that of exile unity. The Cuban success story has become a defining element in the enclave's collective identity. Conversely, nationalist rhetoric has bolstered relations of trust and stability in commercial and labor relations. Members of the enclave's cadre of bankers and industrialists (who often hold leading roles in exile politics as well) have been candid in their retrospective association of nationalist ideals and the enclave's economic success. Retired banker and civic booster Luis Botifoll has inquired rhetorically about the relationship between motives of enclave entrepreneurs and the Cuban national project. "Could it be," he asks, "that unknowingly we wanted to show the world that we could be uprooted without being destroyed?" Miguel Gonzalez-Pando, a senior academic at Florida International University, has described the history of the enclave's development

in a similar fashion:

Each new accomplishment in the economic field became like a victory...We saw this thing almost as a crusade. The opening of each new store sent the message: We're winning, we're winning and we'll show the world (Whitefield, 1995).

This interpretation of the 'Cuban Miracle' in Miami often has allowed enclave enterprises to frame labor and client relations in the context of a greater national project. In the melodrama of daily business in Little Havana profits could represent victories in an epochal battle for the future of the exiles' homeland. Cuban-American historian Cristina García has explained the historic significance of the enclave success story in *Havana, USA*:

They wanted to prove to their compatriots back home what could be accomplished. That the community had accomplished so much in so little time, they argued, was testimony to the old-fashioned values of thrift, hard work and perseverance and a symbol that God was on their side (García, 96:111).

In many ways this rhetoric of nationalist entrepreneurialism was a product of the political construction of Cuban Miami in the context of Castro's vilification of the wealthy *gusanos*, and the American discourse of the "Capitalist Showcase". The schedule and composition of the waves of Cuban immigration also provided the demographic circumstances that contributed to the establishment of a stable yet exploitative division of labor among the Cubans. Within this context, the institutions which have reproduced the discourse of national unity have been critical elements which have shaped responsibilities and freedoms between buyer and seller, lender and borrower, employer and worker

in the ethnic enclave (Portes and Stepick, 93:139). The economic and social gains of maintaining relations of loyalty among co-nationals have encouraged many members of the enclave to turn inward for their investment capital, for entrepreneurial mentors and low-wage workers.

Twin Cities

Just as the enclave evolved into an “institutionally complete” economy where most of the Cuban-American’s commercial and labor needs could be satisfied internally, a full spectrum of Cuban cultural institutions were recreated in Miami as well. Members of the enclave have painstakingly reproduced the aesthetic and cultural environment of an imagined Havana in their new milieu. These projects of re-territorialization have not only allowed the exiles to establish a sense of place in Miami, the transplanting of Cuban streets, Cuban businesses and Cuban meeting places has also given them a sense of connection with their co-nationals on the island. The institutions the Cubans have recreated in Little Havana have allowed newcomers from the island to choose the pace and the extent of their adaptation to American society. Imagining the similarities between the two places has kept the dream of re-integration into Cuban society alive for many exiles, and has shaped the blueprints for incorporating Cuba into Miami’s economy as well.

Cubans in Miami began to stake out their territory in earnest following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1962. With all hopes of imminent return

shattered, many Cubans began to invest in homes and businesses and to rebuild cultural institutions they had left behind. The most common cultural institutions to be re-created in Miami were community associations that represented the township divisions of pre-Revolutionary Cuba called *municipios*. The new *municipios en exilio* re-united the former inhabitants of particular townships and were initially used to co-ordinate assistance to new arrivals from particular areas of Cuba (García, 1996:92). Over time, these organizations became more formal meeting places to celebrate patron saint days, publish notices of births, marriages and deaths from both the Miami and Havana *municipios*, and later were used as voter registration and/or political headquarters and as halls of reception for new immigrants from each region (Boswell, 1993:144). A network of these organizations was ultimately established which represented virtually every district of Cuba (with 110 recognized *municipios* in Miami), and each would serve as a virtual municipal government-in-exile, led by their own “mayors” which were elected by a transplanted constituency (Allman, 1987:300).

Most *municipios* also funded treasuries supported by modest taxes for financial assistance to members as well as for newsletters detailing the situations of former residents now in exile which often advertised the names of members who offered professional or commercial services (García, 1996:92).

Both the flow of personal information from the “island Cubans” and the re-establishment of Cuba’s social geography allowed the émigrés to imagine that life in exile was somehow proceeding apace with experiences in the original

municipios. This myth of simultaneity has allowed many Miami Cubans to confirm that the Cuba of their imagination is still real, that they have not lost their places in Havana, and that the rhetoric of return continued to represent a viable end to their exile.

In a commercial equivalent to the re-creation of Havana's *municipios*, many Cuban-American establishments have taken the names of popular Cuban businesses or have attempted to resume long-standing Cuban enterprises with the greatest possible continuity. In Miami, many Cuban businesses claim lifespans that began long before the Cuban Revolution¹² and multitudes of professional organizations and labor unions have been re-established with the ubiquitous suffix *en exilio* appended to their letterheads¹³. Establishing this continuity has allowed many Cuban businesses to maintain their Cuban and international clientele and to build on their pre-Revolutionary reputations in the exile and Latin American business community.

Maintaining this kind of continuity between the Cuban and Cuban-American experience has played a central part in the continued expectation that

¹² Advertisements for Cuevas Cigars, posted on Miami's tourist information website, for example, boast a history of excellence in cigar manufacturing that dates back to 1915. The Caballero Funeral Home was founded in Cuba in 1857 and transplanted to Miami in 1963. It provides traditional funeral service facilities which allow Cubans to the tradition of keeping all night vigils for their loved ones (Martin, 1995:1J)

¹³ These included the National College of Cuban Pharmacists in Exile, the National College of Cuban Lawyers in Exile, Association of Cuban Veterinary Doctors in Exile, the Federation of Telephone Workers of Cuba in Exile, among many others (See Footnote 24, García, 96:234).

the “island Cubans” and the “Cuban communities abroad” will be re-united peacefully in a Post-Castro future. Following the demise of socialist governments in Eastern Europe, the Miami Cubans prepared feverishly for this reunion. Guarione Diaz, the president of the Cuban American National Council¹⁴ has described the channels of connection that have kept the exiles abreast of the Cuban situation and how these might affect the exiles’ return:

Most of [those who will return] carry a good deal of information about Cuba and the births, burials, weddings and divorces in the lives of their friends and relatives during their absence. Those in Cuba would know about them, too, through years of sporadic exchanges of photos, letters, telephone calls, and even messages sent by Miami Spanish radio stations. Cubans returning permanently then would have access to modern transportation and instant communications...Population movements between Cuba and the United States may take on new dimensions once Cubans can travel normally... Furthermore, a free Cuba and its citizenry may show a special appreciation for Cuban Americans who exercise political and economic influence in the United States on their behalf. (Diaz, 1990: 23A)

The possibility of return forced many Cubans to evaluate their attachments to both Miami and Havana. Convinced of the extension of common national goals carried by the Cuban people on both sides of the Florida Straits, the exiles began to fantasize about the landscape of the new homeland and create the blueprints for a South Florida-Cuba transborder area (Chardy and Alvarez, 1991:1A). Many Cuban-Americans began to contemplate arrangements that would allow them to live half the year in Cuba and half in Miami (Ojito,

¹⁴ A political and community development organization whose mandate is to “help Hispanics adapt to life in the United States” (Verdecia, 1988:23A)

1990:1A) “Havana and Miami would be more than sister cities,” said Mayor Xavier Suarez, “they would be so close they would call us twins (Chardy and Alvarez, 1991:1A).” The corresponding expectation of enormous traffic between the two cities encouraged many Miamians to invest in the city’s transportation infrastructure. One Miami builder noted that after Castro’s fall “the docks of Miami and Key West won’t be large enough for the materials to Cuba (Dribble, 1990:1B.)” This same perception has been echoed in the optimism and concern of county, state, and national authorities who have drafted plans for and made investments in Miami’s infrastructure, particularly the Port of Miami and Miami International Airport, in preparation for the expected expansion of trade and movement of travelers (Chardy and Ojito:93:4B).

This fervent anticipation has shaped the Miami economy in many ways in recent years. Many exiles have attempted to keep their employment contracts short and their assets liquid when the possibility of return or at least reinvestment in Cuba became imminent (Rieff, 1993:179; Diaz, 1990:23A). One Realtor in the predominantly Cuban suburb of Hialeah stated in 1990 that 15 percent of his clients who were trying to sell their houses were doing so because they anticipated change in Cuba (Dribble 1990:1B). Another Real Estate agent predicted that despite this trend in property sales among Miami Cubans, Miami property values would rise because exiles from other states would flock to Miami to be close to Cuba (Chardy and Alvarez, 1991:1A).

Contingency planning for Cuba had become a major industry in South Florida by the early 1990s. Conferences and roundtables sponsored by the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce, the University of Miami's North-South Center, CANF and even private consultants have provided the Cuban community with opportunities to debate the appropriate legal system, trade and foreign relations, economic growth sectors and political leadership of a "Free Cuba" (Ojito and Chardy, 93; Dribble, 90; Chardy and Alvarez, 91).¹⁵ The provisions of the Helms-Burton Act which allows Cuban-Americans to make claims on lost family property in a post-Castro Cuba, has stimulated a huge demand for legal experts who can assess the implications of the Act and the legitimacy of competing claims of former residents of Cuba (Whitefield, 1996:22BM).¹⁶

After seven years of heightened tension in anticipation of the post-Castro frenzy, the New Year's toasts to "Next Year in Havana" have lost some of their potency, but the interest in events in Cuba has not waned significantly for the enclave. Most Cubans in Miami did not respond to the changes in Cuba with plans to transplant their business operations entirely, but instead began to make

¹⁵. In one week in November, 1993, five conferences were held on issues of post-Castro reconstruction, sponsored or presided over by the following figures or organizations: the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce, the Governor's Commission on a Free Cuba, Senator Robert Torricelli, CANF, the University of Miami North-South Center, and the Cuban-American Bar Association's Cuban Law Project (Chardy, 93:1B)

¹⁶Helms-Burton outlines the obligations and conditions a new Cuban government must meet in order to qualify for U.S. aid. (Whitefield, 1996:22BM)

preparations to expand their businesses across the Florida Straits. Given the growth of overseas business conducted by Cuban firms such as MasTec and many others, it seems that the much of the enclave's plans for economic expansion are finding other avenues despite the absence of an emerging market in the homeland. Constructing the blueprints for a new Miami-Havana economy which would serve as the ultimate Latin American gateway may very well have given many Miami Cubans the opportunity to establish a vision of the future of their place in the global economy, even if the space belonging to the "island Cubans" can not be incorporated in these plans.

Grassroots Globalization

In an article discussing the participation of migrant laborers and local activists in international political issues, Michael Peter Smith described the phenomenon of "globalization of grassroots politics" (Smith 1994). In his comments on the transnational political practices that have emerged among transnational migrants and refugees he argues that many studies of economic and cultural globalization have underestimated the capacity of "ordinary people to think and act simultaneously at multiple scales and to fashion a global oppositional politics by their practice (Smith, 1994:31)." Anderson's study of long-distance nationalism also suggests that immigrant communities exhibit an unflinching ability to transgress international borders and to exploit opportunities to advance their projects on multiple scales of power (Anderson, 1992).

The Miami case provides an excellent case study of these capabilities.

Cuban national politics have not only kept the enclave engaged with the day to day affairs of their co-nationals on the island, but has drawn them into public debate and grassroots political action on a vast spectrum of global issues – by sending toys to Contra children in Nicaragua, supporting appeals to the UN Human Rights Commission or by demonstrating against international visitors like Nelson Mandela. In many ways, however, this case represents a mirror image of the movement of political practice across scales described by Anderson and Smith. Rather than merely exporting their influence through cash remittances abroad or by carrying their political message through their travels as displaced workers in the global economy, the Miami Cubans have succeeded in interacting with global actors and economies within their own space. Interest and action concerning the future of Cuba have reached upward out of the *municipios* into the realm of global trade and finance and international politics. The discourse of a common national purpose has provided direction to the relations between workers, consumers and investors in Miami's Cuban community. Thirty years of this quotidian debate over the design of Miami's future in relation to Cuba has manifested changes in the city's foreign policy and its development initiatives which have profoundly affected the way the locale interacts with actors on all scales of the global political economy.

Conclusion: Miami's Imagined Geography

Miami at its beginnings was not the center of anything; it did not serve as a "marketplace" for a settled hinterland, of which there was very little, and it did not sit at the "break" between alternative transportation routes...Miami did not attract industrial capital or industrial labor, and it did not produce anything significant. Nor did it serve as a commercial hub for agricultural products, or for any other good. (Portes and Stepick, 1993:204)

There are variety of explanations for the ascendance of Miami from the marginal tourist town described above to the epicenter of global trade with Latin America. For some analyses, the massive infrastructure investments by the federal state explain the enclave's economic success and city's rapid development (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985; Grosfoguel, 1995). For other analyses, the dramatic changes in the city's demographic makeup have provided the basis of their explanation of Miami's new international role (Perez-Stable and Uriarte, 1993).

Ethnic enclave research has sought to demonstrate how an ethnic division of labor in the city which has provided a "good match" with the emerging structure of opportunities in the New International Division of Labour (Portes and Zhou, 1992:499) More broadly, global cities scholarship has helped to explain why many multinational headquarters and other powerful actors in the global economy have chosen the city for their operations.

It has not been my aim to sift through the competing perspectives on the origins of Miami's recent transformation in order to determine which was the definitive catalyst of economic change in the city. Instead, the preceding

chapters have attempted to describe the local struggles which have effected a transformation the posture of the city in the national and global political economy. The central organizing theme of this analysis has been the contention that the emergence of an imagined Cuban-American nation within Miami has shaped the city's internal politics as well the way the city interacts with actors and institutions in the global political economy. Cuban projects for coming home from exile, either through the dream of resettlement on the island or the attempts to transplant an imagined nation, have shaped Miami's development as a nodal point in the global flows of power, wealth and information.

Building on the insights of the ethnic enclave scholarship we can see how the discourse of national unity among Cubans has been instrumental in the creation of a new type of social regulation of economic activity within the enclave. The commitment of older émigrés to incorporate of successive waves of émigrés as into the enclave economy as the low-wage employees has fueled the successes of enclave businesses and has engendered a relatively organized incorporation of an enormous flow of immigrant labor into Miami's economy. In a similar fashion, the institutions of "bounded solidarity" and "enforceable trust" have provided an opportunity structure for both debtors and creditors, while reinforcing social norms in the enclave and providing stability and flexibility in the capitalization of small business investment.

In the face of the erosion of the post-war institutional framework for a labor-capital compact linking wages to demand and profit realization, the

emergence of a new form of social regulation in ethnic enclaves may increase the tolerance for polarization of incomes in the global city. Cuban Miami is home to the largest concentration of Hispanic multimillionaires in the United States¹⁷, yet Hispanics also comprise 39 percent of very-low-income households. (Hispanic Business:1997; US Dept. of Housing and Urban Development 1997). The discourse of Cuban national unity in Miami has emphasized the importance of providing opportunities for recent arrivals, as well as the loyalty to Cuban bosses who promise to pass on the tricks of their trade.

Cuban national politics have also influenced the city's development as a hub of Latin American immigration and tourism. The enclave's apparent determination to not only maintain their language and culture in the city, but to make Miami an international center for Spanish language media, has transformed the image of the city in the purview of Spanish-speakers across the globe. In the imagined geography of many Latin American immigrants, Miami has become the "nearest place" to their country of origin, regardless of the distance of their journeys. The fact that "we speak English" signs outnumber those advertising "Hablan Español" in many of Miami's neighborhoods and suburbs also illustrates an attractive environment for Latin American tourists and as well (Viglucchi, 1986:1B).

¹⁷ Out of Hispanic Business magazine's 1997 Rich List of 80 Hispanic-Americans whose net worth is greater than \$25 million, 21 are Miami Cubans (Hispanic Business, 1997)

The discursive construction of Miami as the “Cuban-American homeland” has also anchored social ties between the enclave, the “island Cubans”, and communities of the Cuban Diaspora throughout the Americas and Spain. Pilgrimages by out of town visitors to the “Other Cuba” have not only contributed to tourism and real estate investment in the city, but they reflect and confirm the perceived changes in Miami’s cultural and political space. The creation of Havana’s “twin city” in South Florida has allowed residents to imagine a future for the city which would allow them resolve the tension between loyalties to both Cuban and American identities by altering the boundaries between the two nations. In their preparations for this long-awaited reunion, Miami Cubans have succeeded in making their city feel as Latin as American.

Whose Global City?

Much of the global cities literature grants the residents of these places (other than corporate executives) little agency in the process of determining the way cities interface with global actors or structures. Most often, immigrant communities are cast in a supporting role as the purveyors of flexible labor, as neighborhood renovators, or as cultural translators. This narrow perspective ignores the multiple channels of communication and power between cities like Miami and the global population within its reach.

Given the evidence that working conditions of ethnic enclaves and the situations of marginalized workers do matter in the global cities analyses

surveyed here, I would suspect that the oversights mentioned above are the function of what Michael Peter Smith has called the global-local duality in social theory. The conception of local space as a “cultural space of stasis, ontological meaning and personal identity” is set against definition of global space as the site of dynamic change (Smith, 1994:24). This understanding of the uses of local space greatly hinders one’s ability to grasp the significance of Cuban Miami’s employment of the municipal political arena as a base for a war on international communism. This paper has attempted to emphasize the way grassroots politics and local economic development in Miami have embraced global themes, and have thus shaped the way city has responded to changes in the global political economy.

My own research into the impression of international events on the local vernacular has been limited by the research method employed. A profile of the local narrative describing Miami’s economic and political development has been developed from materials from the archives of the *Miami Herald* and *El Nuevo Herald* through online subscription, surveys of the publications of Cuban-American political organizations such as CANF, Brothers to the Rescue, and others, and by the wealth of contemporary journalistic profiles of the city by authors such as David Rieff, T.D. Allman and Joan Didion. In addition to the compelling analyses of the city’s social makeup compiled by these journalists, both Portes & Stepick and Gustavo Perez Firmat have stepped out of their usual academic frameworks of analysis (economic enclave studies and literary criticism respectively) to tell the story

of Miami through more subjective analyses. This work has also benefited greatly from the preponderance of academic studies of Miami undertaken by Cuban-American academics. In particular, Cristina García's contributions as a novelist of the Cuban-American experience and as a historian of Cuban Miami have been particularly useful. While these research tools are no replacement for more a participatory derivation of local perspectives, I believe they provide my analysis with a sufficient understanding of the dominant themes of the Cuban-American discourse to support the claims made in this thesis.

Where is the Nation?

The thesis has been organized in such a way that theories of ethnic nationalism have been used to fill the voids of global cities scholarship regarding the treatment social relations between actors in the global economy. This was not the original aim of my analysis of Cuban Miami, however.

Much of the inspiration for this work was drawn from a short conference presentation on immigrant nationalism by Benedict Anderson delivered at Carleton University in the Spring of 1995. The presentation provided a number of case studies of immigrants to the United States and Canada who not only provided financial support for nationalist movements in their home countries, but shaped nationalist ideology via e-mail and even financed their own campaigns for political office with their salaries from middle class jobs in North America. Anderson's analysis of the ease with which "long-distance nationalism"

translated their economic successes in immigrant enclaves into political clout in the home country seemed highly relevant to the Miami case.

Initially, Anderson's profile of "long-distance nationalists" as an individual who can engage in serious politics in another country without fear of the consequences for themselves or their immediate families evoked the image of the Cuban American monsters of my own imagination (Anderson, 1994:327).

In an attempt to make sense of this meddling in affairs of the Cuban people, this analysis sought to explain how the discourse of Cuban-American nationalism was reproduced in an American community over a period of more than thirty years.

The entry into global cities analysis was born out of the realization that the émigrés have maintained their *cubanidad* by transforming the city into a place that reflected their national identity. Ultimately, the understanding that Miami has become a place that is not quite American, not quite Cuban, or Haitian, or Nicaraguan, has made it easier to grasp how the city's residents have become so at ease with reaching beyond their local and national borders.

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