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**The boundaries of dissent: News as discursive practice
in the constitution of global protest**

by

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B.A. (Hon.), York University (1998)**

**A thesis submitted to the faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of**

Master of Arts

**Department of Mass Communication
School of Journalism and Communication**

**Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
September 4, 2001
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**The boundaries of dissent: News as discursive practice
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submitted by Michael Santianni, B.A. Hon.

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of Master of Arts

Thesis Supervisor

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Abstract

This analysis outlines a theoretical strategy with which the discursive construction of the social field implied by globalization can be studied. My first conclusion is that globalization is best understood as a mutually causal relationship between its economic, political, and cultural elements. These relationships define a context within which new sites of conflict other than those bounded by material interests have emerged, giving rise to “new social movements”. Together, these conclusions suggest looking at globalization as primarily a field of competing symbolic constructions of the global. The social practice of news discourse is taken as an appropriate venue for this study, recognizing that, like all discourses, its effect is not merely representative but *constitutive* of the organization of subjects within this field of competing constructions. An analysis of news coverage of recent anti-globalization protests reveals a disjuncture between discursive spaces that, at this point, precludes from emerging a more comprehensive vision of what globalization is and/or should be.

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Introduction

The project of solidifying a global free trade agenda has been confronted with a collection of opposition bent on restoring a role for “civil society” in the shaping of this process. Protest actions directed at global economic institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank seem to have gained in momentum since the first such action during the Uruguay Round of negotiations in 1994 that ultimately led to the creation of the WTO. Recently, protests in Genoa, Quebec City, Prague, Davos and Seattle, to name a few, have attracted a cacophonous assortment of public interest groups, NGOs, and radical action. Broadly, these groups have contested, among other issues, the rights of these global institutions to entrench trade regulations that disregard the jurisdictional sovereignty of national states, the imposition of trade regimes that may adversely affect developing nations, labour rights, and natural environments, and the permanent installation of a capitalist ethos that may jeopardize and supplant local cultures.

Globalization, they say, is above all a movement of a global elite, conveniently engineered to effectively displace and ignore the legitimate demands of the nascent global citizenry. Globalization, as it is conceived within these institutions, they claim, circumvents the democratic legitimation that can only be provided by civil society. In my analysis, I have selected two such cases of these protest actions – Seattle in 1999, and Quebec City in 2001 – that I have taken to be emblematic of the scene of these meetings and protests.

Protest action in Seattle in November and December of 1999 was ceremoniously dubbed the “Battle in Seattle”, a Mohammed Ali-esque nomination that at root invokes

the “clashes” between protesters and the two levels of law enforcement mobilized allegedly to curtail violence and injury. The “target” of the demonstrations was a week-long series of meetings between delegates representing the 135 member nations of the WTO. The agenda was far from decisive or agreed upon; after the collapse of the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment earlier that year, the Seattle meetings were supposed to have resulted in consensus on the agenda for a new round of negotiations. In addition to warnings by protest groups of the adverse effects that a global trade agreement would portend, between countries there were “[d]eep schisms over agriculture, developing country issues, rules against dumping and labour standards” (Scofield, 4 December 1999, A14). One of the more famous conflicts was, and remains today, between active proponents of sanctions against countries that fail to adhere to specific labour and environmental standards, and the developing countries for whom the absence of such standards is one of the only competitive advantages that they possess against superior Western (or Northern) economies. In the end, the Seattle round accomplished little more than to temporarily smooth out differences enough to keep these nations “at the table” for the next round of talks (Scofield, 1999b, A10).

Despite this divisiveness, protest groups massed in Seattle streets in numbers estimated to be as high as 40,000 (Krebs, 2001), to show their opposition to many of the principles of economic globalization. As news media reported excitedly, what were largely intended to be “peaceful” demonstrations degenerated into prolonged and sometimes violent confrontations with Seattle police and the National Guard. Arrests were reported to number between 400 and 600. Police were criticized heavily by protesters and civil rights groups who perceived their actions as excessive. Further, police

tactics were taken as a sort of micro-instance of the repression of the “global underclass embodied on a macro level by these negotiations. This repression, these groups claimed, served to maintain the secrecy with which the global elite was attempting to concretize an oppressive capitalist regime behind the back of civil society. News reports emphasized that these protests effectively “thwarted” important events on the itinerary, including the opening ceremonies, speeches by luminaries such as United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and scheduled meetings between delegates who were consigned to their hotel rooms by the throngs in the streets. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, many reports claimed, the collapse of the negotiations was not an effect of the protests, but of the conflicts endemic to the global trade-liberalization project itself.

The Summit of the Americas, held in Quebec City in April of 2001, was a meeting of 34 leaders of member-nations of the Organization of American States (OAS), whose purpose was to draft a text that would create the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). While the proposed hemispheric agreement is not, strictly speaking, a global agreement, it takes as its objective the establishment of a free trade zone by 2005. It also features what was considered at the time to be an historic inclusion of a “democracy clause”, requiring countries to abide by certain standards of democratic governance. This provision would ostensibly “[p]revent countries from participating in the trade deal if there is any ‘unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the democratic order of a state’” (McCarthy, 2001, A11). Leaders of the most developed nations – President George W. Bush, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, and Mexican President Vicente Fox – took centre-stage at these meetings, but the rifts between the interests of developed and developing countries that marred the Seattle round were again evident. Leaders of the smaller nations

urged that varying conditions of economic development among the member-nations – mainly between rich and poor – be respected and recognized in the pace of reform.

Delegates agreed to continue talks toward the ratification of the draft text, which had been compiled only weeks earlier, and a further round of meetings was scheduled to be held in Argentina in the near future.

Again, although these negotiations were not definitively global in scope, the opposition to the Seattle round resurfaced in Quebec City. Their criticisms, overall, were much the same: that the imbalances between the richer and poorer nations of the region would be exacerbated by a uniform application of “standards” of labour rights, national treatment, environmental protection, etc.; that cultures would be compromised by the imposition on local populations of conditions and cultures designed to attract newly-available foreign capital; and that the FTAA circumvented true democracy by failing to consult civil society on a substantive level. This last contention was seemingly confirmed by the construction of what these groups derisively dubbed the “wall of shame”, a 3.8-kilometre perimeter fence erected allegedly to protect the assembled leaders from reprisal by angry protesters. Further, the initial reluctance of the organization to release the draft agreement publicly smacked of the alleged secrecy that opposition groups said undermined the democratic legitimacy of the agreement. These same groups claimed victory when it was promised that the text would in fact be made available after the Summit, but they have since denounced the copies circulated among NGOs and the general public as incomplete texts.

Again, media reports detailed the conflicts that ensued in the streets between protesters – variously estimated by police and protesters respectively at 25,000 or 50,000

in total – and authorities. Arrests in this case were reported at around 400, and a pronounced division was established in news accounts between the peaceful demonstrations and the “handful” of radical, anarchist activists who were held largely responsible for the violence. Some protesters tried – and sometimes succeeded – in bringing down parts of the infamous perimeter fence as a symbolic gesture of outrage at the alleged secrecy of the negotiations. Media attention was focused on the so-called “red zone” near the fence. This was where “militant radicals” and police exchanged volleys of tear-gas canisters, and the trucks of various Canadian media reporting on the events sat – inside the fence – in curious contrast to the action happening just beyond them.

Again, police tactics were denounced by civil rights advocates. They claimed that the indiscriminate use of tear gas not only dispersed the “anarchists” at the fence, but also effectively discouraged a show of opposition by more “moderate” activists and citizens. The peaceful marches, they complained, were relegated to the green zones that wound through the city, but far removed from the site of the contested meetings. NGOs collectively declined an offer to meet with delegates, in a pledge of solidarity with all of those who would still have been left outside the fence, and hence, outside of what should have been a more directly inclusive process.

Much like the negotiation process and the motley assemblage of countries in various states of economic and political development, opposition to the agreement was and is characteristically fragmented. This is a point that some accounts have made abundantly clear; at best, there is yet only an embryonic, “real” alternative agenda being presented. The Siena Declaration of 1998 was designed by a collection of NGOs to be a sort of position paper that would provide some of the missing coherence, but its critics

might suggest instead that it typifies a movement that is long on accusations and doom saying, and short on recommending viable solutions. In its first point, the Siena

Declaration articulated a generalized version of the critique, which states that

corporate-led economic globalization, as expressed and encouraged by the rules of global trade and investment, would lead to an extreme volatility in global financial markets and great vulnerability for all nations and people. These rules have been created and are enforced by...global bureaucracies that currently discipline governments in the area of trade and financial investment. This volatility is bringing massive economic breakdown in some nations, insecurity in all nations, unprecedented hardships for millions of people, growing unemployment and dislocation in all regions, direct assaults on environmental and labor conditions, loss of wilderness and biodiversity, massive population shifts, increased ethnic and racial tensions, and other disastrous results. Such dire outcomes are now becoming manifest throughout the world, and are increasing daily (Siena Declaration, 2001).

Despite the general consensus on the critique, the growing resistance to global capitalism, or corporate or economic globalization, has followed many divergent paths to places like Seattle and Quebec City. While some groups move for increasing involvement in shaping the course of global trade and investment, other groups move for urgent and complete withdrawal, and disbandment of the so-called global elite. It might be unfair to say that this accurately characterizes the oft-mentioned split between radical, "violent" opposition and the more peaceful variety, but my guess is that the subtleties that otherwise exist across all of these positions are still largely inaccessible to most of the "general public".

This is not only an effect of the predominant characterizations of the conflict, but also of the overwhelming abundance of perspectives from which globalization has been critiqued. Indeed, any cursory introduction to this opposition is of necessity reduced to a certain selectiveness in characterizing this resistance. Further, there is a tendency to have to rely for this characterization on the more visible NGOs, at the expense of less visible

and arguably more “grassroots” organizations whose relative organizational constraint leave their positions and demands less well formulated and disseminated. But in general, these groups have benefited from an extensive on-line community that has helped coordinate protest efforts with networked “calls to action”. Additionally, they provide discussion fora for opponents of globalization to debate and share information, and offer advice to would-be activists, such as how to be sufficiently prepared or contact legal counsel in the event of an arrest, etc. The flexibility of Internet communication has led directly to the creation of entities such as the International Forum on Globalization, whose members drafted and signed the Siena Declaration, and the Direct Action Network, which aids the types of coordination of groups mentioned above. It is perhaps the most central paradox of this movement that the globalization of communications media has been essential to mobilizing anti-globalization sentiment.

Notwithstanding this paradox, there are other conflicts that in some ways hamper the consistency of the opposition. For example, labour organizations such as the International Federation of Labour (IFL) have made demands for the establishment of labour standards that would effectively prevent developing countries from gaining competitive advantage by way of child labour or tax labour laws. Clearly, this is a move for the globalization of economic conditions, and not a fundamentally anti-globalization position. By contrast, the United Steelworkers of America protested in Seattle against WTO regulations that would have forced the U.S. to remove anti-dumping laws. These are, of course, laws that served a protectionist rationale that is, in some circles, characteristically “anti-globalization”. In Canada, the Council of Canadians has warned that ratification of the General Agreement on Trade and Services “could deliver a

deathblow to cherished public services such as Medicare and education, as well as to Canadian control of our water and culture” (Council of Canadians, 2001). To an extent, resistance to global capitalism exists within the tensions between moves for further globalization (mostly in areas of “social reform” such as the enforcement of civil rights, or environmental protection such as the Kyoto Protocol that the U.S. has been criticized for abandoning) and the protectionism that groups say is essential to preserving the sovereign rights of nations to administer social goods to their citizens.

The above introduction is not intended to impugn the objectives or efforts of the various groups that together comprise this nascent global resistance. On the contrary, the above can be taken to situate this fragmentation as a natural response to the complexity of globalization on the whole. The question that it begs, therefore, is how and under what conditions can global protest be effective in realizing these disparate objectives? Politically, the net effect of the groups’ actions on these global institutions – in terms of policy changes, for instance – is the domain of another type of analysis, and not a question, however important, with which the study of communication is equipped to deal. But communication studies can suggest insights into the communicative processes in which these groups are implicated, by which these groups can articulate their objectives to wider audiences, and by which further support can be mobilized. Their extensive use of the Internet to coordinate action tells us, among other things, that the ubiquity of the conditions and effects to which they point makes them more reliant on these communicative processes as the path of globalization extends outward.

Ultimately, this study is motivated by a personal concern with the current trajectory of globalization. Aside from the academic interest that these issues might hold,

looking at globalization in this way helps us keep in perspective how these changes resonate within local spheres of influence. Unearthing some of the tacit processes by which our social environment is mediated can help equip “ordinary citizens” with interpretive tactics that can fuel a reappraisal of how their worlds are shaped, and a better recognition of their role within these processes. It also gives us a current and concrete example of how the nebulous and abstract entities that help shape our lives do just that. Globalization is still a nascent social construction; demonstrating how this type of construction is realized can hopefully allow for a more assertive and informed participation of individuals within it. Indeed, it can help to arrive at the decision of whether participation toward the kind of change that these movements suggest is even warranted. Ideally, it provides tools with which people can see beyond these constructions and assess them based on more comprehensive standards.

In what follows, I will suggest that the constitution of the total scene of these negotiations and protests in news discourse, to this point, has prevented the construction of a discursive space that would allow a more poignant connection to emerge between globalization and the localized manifestations of opposition. This is to say more generally that the struggles of oppositional movements to organize a coherent resistance has not been aided by the dominant attitudes both represented and constructed by a discourse upon which “we” rely to inform political behaviours. There is a particular ideological effect that textures this discourse, one that emerges not simply out of the imposition of the capitalist ethos of the new global elite, but which is equally reliant on the discourse of news as a social practice.

In chapter one, therefore, I set the context for the discussion by giving a more detailed assessment of what is entailed by economic globalization, and what the mutual ramifications are for structures of power and civil society, and for culture in general. I draw on the work of theorists of globalization such as David Harvey and Arjun Appadurai to situate globalization within a particular trajectory of capitalism and its expansion and reconstruction of global space. The cultural situation of this reconstruction, however, is not solely determined by these material or economic processes. Rather, culture retains an autonomy that gives rise to the radical reflexivity that removes it in the main from the auspices of traditional (or pre-modern) legitimations. This is a formulation of the “mutual determination” thesis of theorists like Harvey and Jameson, but I attempt to refrain from the economism that these theories often suggest. The point is that globalization can be conceived of as part and parcel of the ascendance of what has often and contentiously been called post-modernity. This state of affairs, politically speaking, is ambivalent. For one, it has decidedly shifted the domains of power and accountability to more global structures that threaten to elide the accountability of power to civil society. At the same time, these conditions have opened newer cultural and political spaces in which resistance can be constructed.

To assess the main theorizations of these new spaces, in the second chapter I analyze the development of social movement theory, from its modern inception in the Marxist idea of the emancipatory role of the working class, through to the contemporary emergence of “new social movements”. These new movements, following the main proponents of “new social movement theory”, are also situated within the same conditions that have shaped globalization, most notably the condition of reflexivity. The

conditions of post-modernity, as Harvey calls them, have resulted in the formation of movements and classes that cannot be defined in terms of economic class divisions. Instead, there occurs a transcendence of class beyond material interests (post-materialism), classes that embrace objectives such as identity that are more properly cultural or symbolic. Evolutionary sociologists, notably Touraine, therefore shift the central conflict posited by Marxism to one of the production of the social, which posits a field of multiple and competing axes of conflict – the field of historicity – that together are formative of society and its central values (insofar as these still exist).

Classes are thus not determined, but probabilistic, and are bounded more by their symbolic positioning within this field than by pre-determined economic disparities. This view of social production suggests a more pivotal role for the symbolic-discursive processes that have been mobilized in the construction of these new sites of conflict, and therefore these processes – in this case language – offer a starting point for understanding particular contexts of social change. An appropriate site for analysis, therefore, are media that, by their “public-ness”, are largely responsible for registering the particular conflicts that characterize globalization as the current “field of historicity”. I take news media as the most appropriate of these sites.

To arrive at an analysis of the conditions of news discourse, chapter three turns to language and discourse, and specifically how discursive practices are formed out of the intimate linkages between discourse and power theorized by writers such as Foucault and Bourdieu. The theory of discursive practices maintains that language is not merely representative but constitutive of subjectivities and social action, and therefore that class positions are actually constructed within the discursive practices in which they are

articulated, and not outside of them. Following John B. Thompson, therefore, the study of ideology, while still concerned with how symbolic systems maintain structures of domination (in this case through the construction of class identities), is more concerned with the totality of the *particular* practice than with locating the roots of ideology in simplistic notions like “bias”. Further, ideology is analyzable only within the conditions particular to a specific discourse, which means that each specific practice requires a methodology specific to the discourse. In the case of news discourse, I look to the principles of critical discourse analysis, which makes use of the constructionist perspective on language as constitutive of social reality, and thereby provides room for understanding the organization of class positions and subjects within news discourse. What is particularly relevant in this instance is the constitution of the action of subjects, in two specific elements of the “coherence” of news texts: transitivity structures, or transformations, and the structure of propositions advanced by the text that together delimit its overall meaning.

The focused analysis of chapter four uses these principles to chart a methodology appropriate to the constitution of the subjects of globalization in news coverage. Here I analyze sample sets of coverage from the *Globe and Mail* of the protest actions in Seattle in 1999 and Quebec City in 2001. First, I perform a content analysis with particular regard to the ways in which the actions of different classes of the text are constituted, and some of their interrelationships defined. Then I direct a more “qualitative” analysis toward the areas of particular interest as indicated by the content analysis. What this chapter shows is that protesters and authorities are both assigned a dominant role in coverage. The protesters, however, are more consistently constructed as active but “goal-

less” participants in the “war zone” that is set up as a defining element in the discursive space of protest. The analysis also shows that there are considerable overtures made to what I call the “unspecified” class, whose position can only be understood in relation to how it is “called into being” at various times by the other classes. The dominant interpellation of this class in this case is as an imagined democratic engine behind the global trade agenda, which amounts to the suggestion that the protesters are not fundamentally representative and therefore lack the legitimacy of governments and institutions alike.

The relationship between protesters and trade delegates is constituted through the intersection of two propositions: the theme of active hindrance, which positions protesters as physical obstacles to the delegates, and the inference of the negotiating process as sanctioned by democracy. But these actors appear only infrequently on the same stage – the street, where the interaction is constituted overwhelmingly by the hindrance proposition. The space wherein they might appear in a sustained and constructive tension – that of a dialogue about global trade – is foreclosed in the withholding by the discourse of the resources needed to construct that space.

The construction of a discursive space open enough to accommodate both the scene of protest and the scene of trade negotiation would require some difficult and contentious changes to these representations/constitutions of action. In the conclusion, I will suggest some questions that this very general recommendation inspires, as well as some potential areas for further thought and study. The first step, of course, is the understanding that can be provided only through an explanation of the complex of conditions that shape this discourse on globalization and its opponents.

I. Globalizing power, globalizing resistance: Setting the context

My main question throughout this chapter is: on what condition can global protest movements be effective? The question is motivated by the fact that the traditional grounds of social protest – class, locality, identity – have been transformed by globalization. As a result, the global protest movement – or perhaps more accurately the anti-globalization protest movement – finds itself having to operate within narratives and with terms which seem to render tenuous the very possibility of its existence. For example, it is very difficult to mobilize world opinion around the critique of an ostensibly coherent global trade and finance system (although it is anything but), when the critique itself is perceived as particularistic and disorganized. In other words, the allure of global trade is that it “delivers the goods”, and that this accomplishment is in turn furnished by democracy and the consensus that it implies. On the other hand, the protest movements that are the main concern here enjoy no such democratic legitimation, mainly because any legitimacy of this kind would have to be stretched across a number of different and sometimes conflictual causes and agendas. This task may be too unwieldy even for consensus and democracy.

Numerous authors have dealt with these often paradoxical phenomena within globalization. The disputes over whether globalization is part of an ongoing secular process, a postmodern break with modernism, the latest stage of capitalist exploitation, or whatnot, while they inflect the particular manner in which individual authors pose the question, should not obscure the fact that they all tend to pose a very similar question. Hence, while there is much to disagree with in their writings – especially the manner in which they reactivate traditional Marxist themes under superficially new names, and the

way in which they evince a nostalgia for the past – there are also some interesting questions worth rescuing from their particular agendas.

In this chapter, I will first provide a cursory account of some of the institutional players in economic globalization, as well as more theoretical accounts of the implications of changes in the global economy for structures of power and resistance. I will look to the “sociology of globalization” to underscore the mutual determinations of economy, politics, and culture that characterize the overall context of this era. This will be the central thesis of this chapter: that as much as globalization in the cultural sense should be *situated within* global economic conditions – as an heuristic or explanatory tool – we cannot hold in this case to a view of economic determinism “in the last instance”. Rather, “global culture”, and the conditions which facilitate its emergence, retain an autonomy that leaves them available to construct and assert resistant subjectivities and formations. Some of the debate that has radiated around the notion of post-modernity (or high-modernity, or late modernity) and globalization is therefore helpful in pointing to these conditions.

The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to outline a strategy for understanding how global protest movements are mediated. If the “grievances” of protest groups – as well as their organization, modes of communication and mobilization, etc. – are informed by their situation within a particular context, then we must attempt to understand the way in which that colours the responses *to* these groups and their actions. Likewise, the processes and decisions against which movements protest constitute significant obstacles to any social or political project rooted in civic participation or a reinvestment in ideal-typical democracy. Globalization serves a dual role. On the one hand, it is the (admittedly

amorphous) enemy against which protest movements “resist”. On the other hand, it also eliminates the traditional fora in which authorities have traditionally been held responsible for their actions. While being a good object of resistance, therefore, it also dissolves the ground of resistance.

Once “glocalized” (Robertson, 1992), economy and politics obey neither the logic of the local nor that of the global but draw selectively – and some would say inequitably – on both. That is, a crucial aspect of globalization is the transformation which it has wrought upon our conceptualizations of space, and how social actors negotiate these (new) spaces toward strategies of power and tactics of resistance. In some ways, the anti-globalization movement moves in lock-step with its demonized counterparts in global capital, as they revise and expand their ideas of space as both resource and constraint; in this respect, they echo strangely this “global capital” which has also created its own new places and spaces out of the transformations of globalization (Mosco, 1999).

Introduction to economic globalization

Globalization can usefully be conceived as a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power (Held et al., 2000, p. 2).

Theorists of globalization from a variety of disciplines have acknowledged that the phenomenon possesses differential political, economic, cultural, and ecological variations and consequences. The differences concern not only various processes, effects, and so on, but also the theoretical and intellectual perspectives mobilized as part of the analysis. Having said that, it is not my intention to provide an exhaustive account of the

myriad ideologies, debates, and prognostications that have emerged. What I do hope to provide is a basis for understanding the context, both empirical and theoretical, for the development of a notion of global resistance. Although the nascent *global opposition* represents a wide array of concerns that traverse all of the above dimensions of globalization, it also holds the economic and financial policies of particular institutions largely responsible for the more unsavoury effects of globalization. In a sense, the global protest movement seeks to reassert a measure of coherence, to name a center, and to impute responsibility, even as the entire system which gave it birth and against which it protests tends to deny that very possibility.

Globalization in its economic form describes both an empirical phenomenon – the opening of trade in goods and services between economies – as well as a normative stance which prescribes, amongst others, the creation of advanced market economies out of the developing economies of the former Third World and the transitional economies of the former Communist bloc. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), globalization involves “increasing integration of economies around the world, particularly through trade and financial flows”: basic trade in goods and services; capital movement flows (including and especially direct foreign investment); increased movement of labour capital; and increased flows of knowledge and technology, including “production methods, management techniques, export markets and economic policies” (IMF, 2000, pp. 2-3). As a prescription for economic development, then, globalization broadly means the adoption of a set of globally enforceable trading principles. In the words of the World Trade Organization (WTO), “[t]he multilateral trading system is an attempt by governments to make the business environment stable and predictable”,

rendering trade “freer” and more competitive, transparent, and inclusive and beneficial to developing economies (*The introduction to the WTO*, 2000, p. 3).

Some observers claim that modern globalization is the culmination of an historical and quasi-natural process whose beginnings go back centuries, as early as the advent of “Christian universalism”, and probably earlier (see Held et al., 2000; Shaw, 2000). In its economic form, however, modern globalization is usually said to begin near the end of the 19th century, when trade between the colonial powers flourished. After a hiatus in the early to mid-20th century during which protectionist trade policies gained the ascendant, the global project was renewed with the establishment of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1948. The GATT provided the first “rules” of a nascent global trading system, albeit one shaped by the ideological polarization of the Cold War. While the GATT was originally of greatest interest to the most powerful economies, it eventually became more inclusive with the Uruguay Round ending in 1994. That round saw the creation of the WTO as the arbiter of an emerging global trade regime.

It is often said that one consequence of this global regime is the decline of the nation-state as a sovereign economic (and, some would say, political) unit. The performance of national economies is indeed increasingly linked to global capital flows. According to both the World Bank and the IMF, however, this very fact requires a paradoxically heightened emphasis on domestic macroeconomic policy in order to provide the “macroeconomic stability to create the right conditions for investment and saving” (IMF, 2000, p. 8). As a result, governments are urged to shift from protectionist policies which may be engineered to assist vulnerable groups or regions, and to “pursue

policies that encourage integration into the global economy while putting in place measures to help those adversely affected by the changes” (IMF, 2000, p. 9). The welfare state and the framework it gave to the public sphere is replaced by a model of “co-ordinated multilateral action”. As a result,

politicians are witnessing a reconfiguration of state power and political authority. This is articulated most visibly in the shift from government to multilevel governance as states have become embedded within global and regional regimes. In essence, in a more complex transnational world, states deploy their sovereignty and autonomy as bargaining chips in negotiations involving coordination and collaboration across shifting transnational and international networks (Held et al., 2000, pp. 13-14).

WTO Director-General Mike Moore, in a speech that addressed the issue of multi-layered trade and recommended a new round of trade negotiations, said that “while regionalism can be a positive force and provide an important complement to the multilateral system, it cannot be a substitute – this means above all that we need to push hard for a new round which is the surest way to ensure that regional and multilateral interests converge” (WTO, *Globalizing regionalism*, 2000).

As a result, an increasingly important role devolves to independent and private international institutions, such as debt-security and bond-rating agencies, “that fulfill rating and advisory functions that have become essential for the operation of the global economy” (Sassen, 1999, p. 23). This does not mean that globalization is or will become a zero-sum proposition as regards the sovereignty of national states. Indeed, as Saskia Sassen (1999) states, the creation of any new global regimes of legality and governance that may consolidate a global economic system entails negotiation between this system and its “instantiation” through national policy mechanisms (see also Storper, 1997).

What is clear is the important role of global economic and financial institutions that monitor the relations among member-states. Chief among them is the WTO, the organization against which much recent global protest has been directed. According to its website – part of a recent initiative toward greater “transparency” – the WTO consists of 140 member countries which account for over 90% of world trade, and that operate under binding agreements which provide “legal ground-rules for international commerce” (WTO, *Principles*, 2000). Among its primary functions are (1) the provision of a forum for multilateral trade negotiations and dispute settlement; (2) the review of national trade policies, with a mandate to monitor and discipline (through trade sanctions enacted voluntarily by members) countries taking measures that are “inconsistent” with the various trade agreements; (3) technical assistance and training programmes for member nations; and (4) effective co-operation and integration with other institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, to “achieve coherence in global economic policy-making” (IMF, *WTO and IMF*, 2000).

A number of agreements govern the activity of members, including recent agreements and additional proposals pertaining to basic regulations in telecommunications, information technology, electronic commerce, liberalization of agricultural trade, and financial services, “covering more than 95% of trade in banking, insurance, securities and financial information” (WTO, *Golden jubilee*, 2000). The institutional ideals of globalization – economic stability, competitiveness, open market access, inclusiveness – guide the consensus-making process by which multilateral agreements and membership bids are negotiated and ratified, both within the community of WTO members and by national governments. In the words of Director-General Mike

Moore: "If globalization underscores nothing else, it is the logic of global rules for global firms operating in a global marketplace....[M]ore and more the New Economy creates a single economic space which is indifferent to distance, time, and geography" (WTO, *Globalizing regionalism*, 2000).

But the paradoxical interplay of global, national, and regional regimes (of which Sassen, 1999, and Held et al., 2000, remind us) persists despite the efforts toward economic harmonization. Within the "indifferent" economic space embodied by the WTO and the multilateral agreements, resides a complex weave of "plurilateral" groups and agreements. The European Union (EU), the "Quad" (Canada, United States, Japan, and the EU), the Cairns Group (representing members in favour of agricultural trade liberalization), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), are examples of the layering of trade organizations that complicate the picture of a truly global trade regime. It is striking that these groups are organized not simply along regional divides but rather according to trade imperatives which are not always consistent with geographic proximity or even economic parity.

To counter the perils of regionalism, Moore has encouraged the commencement of a new round of negotiations – the last round was the one that "failed" in Seattle in 1999 – to reinforce the case for multilateral liberalization of economies (*The WTO: New issues*, 2000). To assist in the project of integration, several other global organizations serve as official observers to WTO proceedings, including the United Nations, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the IMF, World Bank, and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). So while the heralds of globalization present it as a prescription

for harmonized economic development, and even while governments continue to accede to organizations such as the WTO, economic globalization can still accurately be characterized as an embryonic phenomenon, requiring, in Moore's view, an unabashedly aggressive campaign of persuasion – through the rhetoric of free market and economic development – and incorporation of nations not yet members (ibid.).

Sociology of globalization: Toward a theorization of transnational civil society

Social theorists of globalization have seized upon the transformative effects of economic globalization. Beyond the theoretical differences that plague any attempt to explain the constitution of the new “global order” – or indeed whether “it” is in fact new, certifiably global, or even ordered – one notion seems to arise rather insistently in the “sociology of globalization”: the formation of a *transnational civil society*. The proliferation of opposition groups to economic globalization and to the “global economic governance” allegedly imposed by globalization (Sassen, in Gill, 2000, p. 11), begs the question of whether it is possible to sustain a global civil society of the type that Kant had envisioned in his utopic “cosmopolitan society.” Kant had imagined “a global nexus of responsibility in which individuals – and not only their representative organizations – can directly take part in political decisions” (Beck, 2000, p. 70).

The existence of political opposition is, of course, hardly new. What is different in this instance, however, are the context and situation of global capital as an “alternative framework” for political power and the changes which this new framework brings to the constitution of culture and civil dissent. Three main issues are germane: (1) the shift in the location and structuring of power under globalization, especially in the local-global nexus that governs political action, both in its hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forms;

(2) the relation of economy and culture, perhaps helpfully formulated in terms of the debate surrounding “globalization as post-modernity”; and (3) transformations in space and communication. No doubt there are countless other areas of enquiry, and it naturally remains important to remember the causal interconnectedness of these three issues. The overriding question remains: is this new civil formation possible, sustainable, or even *happening* in any kind of unreified, qualitative way? I cannot reasonably offer an answer at this point. Nevertheless, I hope to show that there is a profound ambivalence to the global redrawing of the territories of both power and resistance, an ambivalence felt more profoundly by oppositional movements. This is because along with the opening of new spaces for civil society and political action comes the recasting of other boundaries – spatial, economic, social, cultural – which delimit the efficacy of resistance to economic globalization.

Shifting locations of power

The economic geography of globalization is marked by increased fluidity created by the dissolution of trade barriers and advances in electronic communications technologies, as well as by normative claims to “fairness in trade” which transcend local conditions of production. All of this comprises what Saskia Sassen calls a “new geography of power” in which the jurisdictional claims of nation-states – at one time the bearers of authority in matters economic, political, and social – are diminished, even as “actual” territorial divisions are left untouched:

Globalization leaves national territory basically untouched, but it is having pronounced effects on the exclusive territoriality of the national state – that is, its effects are not on the territory as such but on the institutional encasements of the geographic fact of national territory (1999, p. 19).

The two principle mechanisms at the heart of this change – deregulation and privatization – are institutionalized through the creation of new regimes of legality. In some ways, these regimes rely on their implementation by individual states, through ministries of finance and the like, and in other ways, they are “designed to *avoid* institutions of the national state” (emphasis added - *ibid.*, p. 18). The arbitration mechanisms of the WTO comprise one such means by which a new regime is constructed in some instances to supersede national policies. The same rationale has motivated the inclusion of Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). This provision ostensibly gives transnational corporations legal recourse against governments whose own policies conflict with the principles of free trade. In 1998, for example, Canadian laws against the exporting of PCB-contaminated waste were rescinded after U.S. companies threatened to challenge the law under this NAFTA provision. Even after the ban was repealed, U.S. companies sued the Canadian government – and won, in one case reaping upwards of \$10 million in compensation (Public citizen, *Canada slapped*, 1998).

This glance at a much more sophisticated argument introduces one tension at the core of discussions of the political import of globalization. What is often called the “local/global nexus” in this debate (see for instance Harvey, 2000, p. 84) generally posits a definitive shift to newer global structures of power. What remains at issue is the question of “whose” hands have molded these structures as well as their implications for citizenship and civil society. Some of the crucial but broader questions are asked and answered ad infinitum in any tome on globalization, but should be addressed again here. Specifically, what characterizes these “global structures of power”? How is

accountability addressed in light of this transition, and as a consequence, how can political opposition be articulated?

Sassen's concept of "geographies of power" is useful for this discussion. On her assertion that national states are affected only inasmuch as the role and structure of national institutions are transformed, however, Harvey fundamentally disagrees. In *Spaces of Hope* (2000), Harvey's project of redemption for Marxist critique, he argues adamantly that the "reterritorializations" forged in the expansion and transition of capitalist economies (i.e., from industrial to advanced economies) disrupt the geographic conditions for class insurgence. Complicit in these "spatial strategies" are "mediating institutions" such as the IMF and the World Bank, which, in the process of the attempted equalization/homogenization of markets, interrupt the dialectic of local, material conditions and the universality of exchange, obtaining independent power while remaining "territorially based and biased" (Harvey, 2000, p. 36). Harvey adds that the rhetoric of a "level playing field" for capital flows is untenable, due to the existence of multiple sites of accumulation with varying conditions of production and, hence, varying degrees of amenability to these flows. The persistence of capital in inscribing itself geographically on a global level brings a transformation in the *evidence* of power imbalances, but not in the fundamental nature of these imbalances in a mode of production which is formally unchanging. To Harvey, globalization is merely (but not "merely") another stage in the ongoing capitalist production of space, fostered by a globalized bourgeoisie. Accordingly, it is clear that Harvey remains convinced that class struggle is the dialectical motor force of history, that history's knowable trajectory lies in

the resolution of that struggle, and that, in the last instance, economic conditions drive all else.

The argument is similar to that of Fredric Jameson in his appropriation of Mandel's tripartite periodization of capitalism, in which the third and current stage is that of "multinational capitalism". Jameson goes further to suggest that this stage actually represents capitalism in its purest form, as it entails "a prodigious expansion of capital into hitherto uncommodified areas," especially in the realm of culture (Jameson, 1991, pp. 35-36). Similarly, Leslie Sklair's notion of a "transnational capitalist class" suggests that this class "is not made up of capitalists in the traditional Marxist sense", but extends to include any actor involved in the composition of a new political order organized around the promulgation of the agenda of global capitalism. Thus,

[t]his class sees its mission as organizing the conditions under which its interests and the interests of the system (which usually but do not always coincide) can be furthered within the national and local context. The concept of the transnational capitalist class implies that there is one central transnational capitalist class that makes system-wide decisions, and that it connects with the TCC in each locality, region, and country (Sklair, 1995, pp. 71-72).

Clearly, Sklair posits a fundamentally conspiratorial construction of the global by an elite with consistent objectives, imposing this vision on an underclass that itself has little part in this institution. This notion, however, is contested in the maneuverings of resistant classes that themselves have impacted upon the trajectory of global change (which will be discussed later).

The existence of "supranational" power does not eliminate local or national power. Instead, what emerges is a "nested hierarchy of spatial scales" – household, community, nation, globe – within which both power (capital) and opposition (labour)

negotiate (Harvey, 2000, p. 75). This ambiguity in the organization of power has the state, on one hand, losing relative control over capital flows even as, on the other, it is obliged to become more interventionist, since it remains the locus for any “backlash” to the perceived effects of globalization (ibid., p. 65).

The obverse of Harvey’s thought is what we might call “geographies of resistance”, or how an effective opposition to capital must always account for the periodic spatial re-organizations of capital. Specifically, the “place-boundedness” of social movements – their ties to “structures of feeling” (Williams) peculiar to places and communities – results in limitations that must be transcended in order to create a unified opposition: “The universalism to which socialism aspires has, therefore, to be built by negotiation between different place-specific demands, concerns, and aspirations” (Harvey, 2000, p. 55). According to this model, the opposition to NAFTA, articulated mainly as a defense of national frontiers in the face of plurilateral trade, failed because it neglected to articulate itself on both spatial scales simultaneously. Harvey makes the case that many left-wing movements – especially the labour movement – have unduly placed the locus of opposition within the defense of “the nation state against supra-national governance” (Harvey , 2000, p. 50). Instead, these movements must expand their tactics toward reconciling different and conflicting politics that might exist across transnational lines. Consequently, the effective articulation of opposition requires not only an expansion of resistance but also specific attention to resolving the contradictions that may inhere between political action on each scale, and ultimately facing the problem of uniting myriad local oppositions into a “general oppositional interest” (ibid., p. 81).

From another perspective, the new mutual-embeddedness of spatial scales leads to a shift in “disciplinary regimes”, as the legitimization of the multinational system simultaneously penetrates and replaces more localized rationales for the delivery of social goods. The emphasis on “macroeconomic stabilization” is captured by Stephen Gill (2000) when he calls the theory underlying global political-economy “new constitutionalism”, and views it as essentially the expansion of the precepts of its socio-economic adjunct, “disciplinary neo-liberalism”. That is,

ideal-typical neo-liberal state formation incorporates legal and quasi-legal, indeed constitutional “mechanisms of restraint” to lock in not only macroeconomic but also microeconomic policy in ways that involve a clear separation of the economic and political to lessen the possibility for democratic accountability (p. 16).

Discipline, therefore, is now mediated through the market; local and transnational economic policies converge at the point where independent states must vie for investment, and in so doing prove the “reliability of the institutional framework” through standards derived by global mediating institutions such as the World Bank (World Bank, in Gill, 2000, p. 4). To underscore the ambiguity of the “structural power of capital” in terms of the local-global nexus, Gill emphasizes that the importance of the national state is articulated within social institutions and forms of social control. An example, according to Gill, are juridical systems, which “ensure that the owners of capital determine how production takes place” (ibid., p. 5). Civil society is effectively cut off from decision-making, and new crises in social reproduction emerge as the most vulnerable populations take the brunt of the systemic inequalities of liberalized trade. Concessionary offers of inclusion in “safely channelled areas” are made to secure a new legitimization after the old one – “central material concessions to the working-class

associated with the construction of the post-war order,” especially national social welfare programs – has been eviscerated (ibid., p. 18).

National populations are affected by administrative cost-cutting measures, usually affecting socially-oriented policies and programs traditionally associated with a welfare-state model of governance, as governments attempt to shore up financial resources and stability, and earn the confidence of investors. A clear example of attempts to have governments “lock in” their constitutional commitments to global trade policies, regardless of local contingencies or demands, follows from Mike Moore of the WTO in a speech in November 2000. Here, he states that “[f]urther trade negotiations are an insurance policy against pleas for protection when economies turn down. If governments are negotiating to liberalize trade, they are less likely to give in to pressure to slam the door on imports” (*The WTO: New issues*, 2000). According to Gill, this type of long-term constitutional agenda is typical of the ethos of global capitalism, inspiring agreements such as NAFTA and the European Union (EU), where “withdrawal has costs in terms of policy reversal as well as threat of international censure” (Gill, 2000, p. 16). The disciplinary power of global capital takes over where the neo-liberal state leaves off, imbricating and embedding state policy formation more firmly within the inertia of globalization – increasingly the ambit of the newly-globalized corporate elite.

Bauman (1998) textures Gill’s radically materialist account by tying the spatial transcendence of this “supra-local elite” and the persistent immobility of a global underclass, to an understanding of the global as a perspectival construct. The difference in mobility of these two classes is registered in the ability of the extraterritorial elite to reconstruct the chosen spaces of production, depriving local populations of meaningful

control over space while binding them more effectively to it. At the same time, the mobility of power transcends space itself; power – that is to say capital (see Harvey, 1990, for a similar argument) – is effectively codified in flows of information that are increasingly global and insulated from local conditions and subjects. Political fragmentation ensues from the global expansion of power structures and the collision of these structures with more place- and culturally-specific circumstances. This fragmentation – celebrated by both Maffesoli (1996) and Melucci (1989) as a way of “relativizing” and thereby weakening power structures – serves economic globalization by increasing the social distance between localities already separated by space, and by decentering power: “One of the most seminal consequences of the new global freedom of movement is that it becomes increasingly difficult, perhaps altogether impossible, to re-forge social issues into effective collective action” (Bauman, 1998, p. 69).

Bauman suggests that this process is an extension of a history of administrative systems that seeks to render power more opaque and “variable” elements more visible. He traces this condition back to the Bentham/Foucault Panopticon model, and further to the rise of perspectivism in aesthetics during the Renaissance. The idea, simply put, was “that [any viewer] placed in that point will see the spatial relations between objects in exactly the same way” (ibid., p. 32). The control of space and the control of perspective dovetail in the redrawing of boundaries for the purpose of maintaining structures of power. Globalization to Bauman is most profoundly a hegemonic perspective of spatial organization and flows of power that legitimates an increasing class disparity, and the formation of a global ruling class unfettered by spatial conditions such as locality. Again, while Bauman adds to Gill’s materialist critique by underscoring the importance of

perspectivity in the construction of the global, he understates the extent to which this same perspectivity can give rise to counter-hegemonic constructions that challenge the infallibility of the elite's vision of globality. For instance, there is little besides the root determinism of economic power to suggest that the transcendence of locality – and other “place-bound” conditions – cannot lead to a more expansive critique of the effects of corporate globalism. The suggestion, of course, is that this is exactly what is happening – at least on the surface – in the nascent global protest movement. The ambivalence of these spaces is still profound; it registers both in the explosion of positions from which the critique of economic globalization is launched, but also in the difficulties faced in coordinating and mobilizing these disparate positions.

Ulrich Beck (2000) likewise argues that globalization is equivalent to the formation of “world society,” which “must be theorized and empirically investigated as the horizon within which capital, culture, technology and politics merrily come together to roam *beyond* the regulatory power of the national state” (Beck, 2000, p. 107). The increasingly transnational character of politics assigns a newly political role to transnational corporations (TNCs) “*beyond* the political system”. What Beck calls “subpolitics” describes the ability of TNCs to export jobs to more attractive locales, their role in maintaining an international division of labour, and in solidifying a new system of international competition in which potential sites of investment scramble to lure capital by whatever means necessary (ibid., p. 4). The ideology of globalism, the unrestrained functioning of the global market, again renders power diffuse – the regime of “globally disorganized capitalism” is in fact no regime, with no singular hegemonic power and no identifiable structures of governance (ibid., p. 13). This is not to be mistaken for no

governance, however. What Rosenau (in Beck, 2000) has called “governance without government” nevertheless imposes rules of action for any emergent transnational actor, based on the “ideology of neoliberalism”. That is, the welfare-state mandate of governments to regulate the economy is left out and/or suppressed, and one could go further to suggest, as would both Sassen and Gill, that the priority of regulatory power is in fact reversed. For in their schema, the “structural power of capital” tends toward a structuring of national policy and legal systems in accordance with the imperatives of global trade and economic policy.

All of the above theorists present relatively dystopian views of global capitalism, owing largely to a shift of power from local and national structures to global actors beholden to a neo-liberal market ideology, notably TNCs and such transnational institutions as the WTO. Some of these writers, however, also agree that the redrawing of “geographies of power” opens possibilities for other spaces in which a new conception of civil society – what Beck and others (e.g., Robertson, 1992) call “globality” – might flourish. While corporations have been accused of running roughshod over local environments, cultures and customs, etc., the recent proliferation of NGOs has served to hold these companies accountable and to reorient their policies. The success of those opposed to Shell’s plan to dispose of an unused oil rig by sinking it (Giddens, 1998, pp. 49-50), demonstrates one particular version of how a global civil society has emerged. “The new movements, groups and NGOs thus are able to flex their muscles on the world scene and even global corporations have to take notice” (ibid., p. 50). Further, Sklair points to the Green movement as the best example of global sub-political resistance, measured in part, and somewhat ironically, by its propensity toward structural absorption

within global capitalism and an emerging divisiveness between hard-line environmentalists (“deep greens”) and a more moderate “global environmental elite” (1995b, p. 82). Longstanding attempts at global trade unionism, dating back at least to the Communist Manifesto (1848), however, have tended to fail, owing to a systemic inconsistency in the presence of labour organizations within “TNC-owned industry” (ibid., p. 73). In Sklair’s estimation, and in contrast to Beck and Giddens, global NGOs have suffered the fate identified by Todd Gitlin (1980) in his study of the SDS (Students for a Democratic Society): their impact has tended to be marginal, or where more significant, largely “responsive” or favourable to TNCs.¹

As I have indicated, while the major theorists of economic globalization have identified some of the newly prevalent conditions of globalization, they have tended to over-emphasize the degree to which economic conditions are directly productive of the constitution of global cultures, including the prospects for a “global civil society”. The questions begged, therefore, are how, where, and to what effect these new spaces for resistance have otherwise been opened up. Moving toward answers to these questions will hinge on an understanding of the confluence of changes in the configuration of territorial/geographical space, and in the area of ideological and cultural space. The mutual constitution of economic and cultural processes and phenomena – the redrawing of economic space by the hand of global capitalism especially, but also the adjacent autonomy of cultural constructions – suggests that what are often called “unintended” openings and possibilities will arise out of the ideological transformations required to

¹ Sklair’s contentions, it must be added, are undermined both by an overly dismissive treatment of the breadth of the activities and general presence of NGOs, and more recent evidence which leads others (such as Beck and Giddens) to different conclusions.

sustain the “comprador mentality” upon which global capitalism is maintained. The issue of these “openings” is best addressed through an analysis of the implications of globalization for culture.

Global culture and the cultures of globalization

The terms global cultures and cultures of globalization indicate, in their differences, some of the reasons for which a discussion of “culture” is vital to this analysis. First, economic globalization has unleashed certain conditions which have enabled new constructions of culture both to produce and reproduce various cultures and forms of social interaction. Second, globalization is itself an ideational phenomenon which requires its own culture-ideology and must therefore be approached as both constitutive and transformative of any conceivable global cultural phenomenon. As power relocates itself – whether in the in-between of local, national, and “supranational” forms of governance, or in globalized flows of information and currency – the institutional structures which have traditionally served as the contexts for the formation of identities and cultures yield to new contexts and frameworks which necessarily affect notions of subjectivity and agency.

The cultural sea-change associated with globalization has often, and somewhat problematically, been dubbed *post-modernism*, a term usually invoked to describe changes in aesthetics and culture. Post-modernism is variously defined (again contentiously) either as a break with modernity (Lyotard, 1981), an interruption in a continuing project of modernity (Giddens, 1990), or a logical expansion of the cultural imperative/legitimation necessitated by a shift to global or multinational capitalism (Harvey, 1990; Jameson, 1991; Lash and Urry, 1994). I shall not entertain a debate of

such magnitude. The tensions that obtain amongst these perspectives also speak reasonably well to the contradictions that still – decades after the debate was launched – both plague and animate any understanding of contemporary cultural contexts for political and social action.

In any case, three factors prove significant to the above excursus on economic globalization: (1) the play of the local-global nexus, which imprints on transformations in the production of culture; (2) the importance of flows, specifically, as we have seen above, the reduction of impediments thereto, and hence the radical acceleration of the transmission of information and cultural forms; and, most importantly, (3) the extent to which these changes result in an ambivalent rendering of *openings for* and *constraints upon* the possibilities for concerted opposition to economic globalization, or any object of resistance, for that matter. Furthermore, as has also been expressly argued in this chapter, the “mutual constitution” of cultural and economic forms (Harvey, 1990) or the semi-autonomy of culture (Jameson, 1991) defines the interaction between these conceptually distinct realms of social being. Thus, “[the] interrelationship of culture and the economic here is not a one-way street but a continuous reciprocal interaction and feedback loop” (Jameson, 1991, p. xiv). With these points in mind, this discussion will be structured around a few markers of what can alternately be called cultural globalization, globality, or post-modernism: Harvey’s conception of “time-space compression”; Appadurai’s designation of the cultural “landscapes” that obtain in globalization; the concept of reflexivity that has recently dominated the debate around subjectivity; and, however briefly, some ruminations about the state of ideology in this new cultural milieu.

Harvey makes the case that it has been historically strategic for capitalism to adjust spatial and temporal conditions of production, and further that these changes reverberate clearly in the broad sphere of culture, what he identifies in part as the “mode of social and political regulation” which provides the social stability requisite to accumulation (1990, p. 121). Particular conceptions of time and space and their intersection are formative of social values and identities, the aesthetic dominant of the time, and the mediation of individual and collective identity:

As space appears to shrink to a ‘global village’ of telecommunications and a ‘spaceship earth’ of economic and ecological interdependencies – to use just two familiar and everyday images – and as time horizons shorten to the point where the present is all there is (the world of the schizophrenic), so we have to learn how to cope with an overwhelming sense of *compression* of our spatial and temporal worlds (Harvey, 1990, p. 240).

Without having to go into the entire trajectory of the change, Harvey charts this compression in terms of the transition from a Fordist to a post-Fordist regime of accumulation. This shift occurred in response to the “rigidity” of the Fordist mode, which suffered in the 1970s a decline in economic demand and growth and a compensatory inflationary monetary policy. This was compounded by the problems of a newly-globalizing financial system based on “long-term and large-scale fixed capital investments in mass production systems that precluded much flexibility of design and presumed stable growth in invariant consumer markets” (ibid., p. 142).

In response, the “experiment” of flexible accumulation began in earnest to address the rigidities of Fordism, including those in the areas of labour, organization, management, and production – especially of new types of commodities which could respond to the vagaries of consumer demand, in part by accelerating the turnover time of consumption. It is here, according to Harvey, that

[f]lexible accumulation has been accompanied on the consumption side...by a much greater attention to quick-changing fashions and the mobilization of all the artifices of needed inducement and cultural transformation that this implies. The relatively stable aesthetic of Fordist modernism has given way to all the ferment, instability, and fleeting qualities of a postmodernist aesthetic that celebrates difference, ephemerality, spectacle, fashion, and the commodification of cultural forms (ibid., p. 156).

In addition, the attempted expansion of consumer markets coalesced with a drive toward specialized production, which required an intensive investment in technological innovation, especially in communication systems, such as telecommunications and satellites, that could effect the abolition of the very temporal and spatial constraints at the heart of time-space compression. As Vincent Mosco argues, “the proliferation of channel capacity for communication and information transactions suggests that specialized and customized media products for increasingly fragmented audiences are one concrete consequence of the process” (1996, p. 75).

Because post-Fordism accelerated the turnover time of cultural consumption, the production of cultural values and identities turned to an aesthetic of the ephemeral, the primacy of the image in culture and politics, and the production of events and spectacle. The overall effect is the “disembeddedness” of social and individual identities from any experiential unity of time, similar to Touraine’s (1992) claim that as consumerism has come to define cultural practice, the ethos of fragmentation so vital to consumer capitalism has usurped the centrality of class conflict that informed social protest in the past. The flipside of this proposition, according to Lash and Urry, is that a sophisticated and reflexive consumption practice has emerged, leading consumers to turn a more critical eye to the objects of consumption, even as the time-frame for consumer decision-making has diminished. The result has been nascent notions of consumer entitlement – a

transferral of the rights of citizenship that were formerly the domain of national or state affiliation. These notions have subsequently informed the various critiques of, and movements against, consumer capitalism, such as the environmental movement (Lash and Urry, 1994, p. 297).

As a result of global capitalism, a surge in the global mediation of cultures displaces cultural production from its rootedness in place and tradition, leading to the development of a pastiche “museum culture”. Whereas the aesthetics of modernity had featured the “spatialization of time” – the inscription of cultural memory in the spatial configurations of art – the postmodern aesthetics of consumption celebrates the displacement of the subject from the intersection of space and history. But as Harvey suggests, the effect of a crisis of identity is in part to incite individuals to “search for secure moorings in a shifting world”, and “place-bound identity” becomes a necessary construction (1990, pp. 302-303). This leads, however, to a disparate localization of oppositional movements unable to mobilize over space, lending to the fragmentation of interests and identities necessary to sustain the flexible production/consumption of post-Fordism.

One fundamental supposition that Harvey makes is the homology between economic “flows” and the flows of cultural forms and social relations, resulting in a codification of cultural values within money and commodity exchange. That is, as culture is coded in an increasingly volatile monetary system – based not on material production and exchange but on flows of speculative capital within an integrated global economy – there arises a tendency toward the volatility of a cultural identity unfettered by material conditions of social reproduction. It is the accelerated and globalized flow of these

“signs” – capital and images, especially – that forms the basis for Lash and Urry’s critique of “disorganized capitalism”. In terms of culture, these flows of signs – not to mention flows of people, as labour markets expand and places are commodified and “consumed” by a burgeoning tourism industry – are characterized by their ability to operate outside of the boundaries and contexts of the nation-state, resulting in part in an openness to different cultures and a willingness and ability to experience these cultures in mediated forms. Thus, the crucial element in postmodern culture is the “global networks of communication and information”:

This has a number of implications: that the symbolic forms transmitted by the technical media of mass communication are central to contemporary cultural forms; that these developments greatly expand ideological scope since they enable symbolic forms to be transmitted to extended audiences dispersed in time and space; they permit new kinds of social interaction, what Thompson terms “technically mediated quasi-interaction” (Lash and Urry, 1994, p. 307).

These new “sociations” are, predictably, ambivalent in effect and implication. In circumventing or “hollowing out” the state, other “traditional” institutions, and previous conceptions of nationhood, new “small communitarian public spheres” are given fertile ground to develop, both within networks of communication and in actual socio-political structures. On the other hand, “the absence of a national context for policy” could leave populations formerly dependent on state protection significantly more vulnerable (Lash and Urry, pp. 324-325). Conversely, this could also further privilege the nascent “supra-local elite”, entrenching and exacerbating a global class disparity.

At the risk of becoming repetitive, there are elements in these accounts that are helpful, and elements that my analysis will suggest are plainly inaccurate. The helpful elements include the exposition of how globalization is embedded within flows of culture

that have been dramatically accelerated, so that the flux of cultural-symbolic transmission makes it difficult for some communities to hold on solely to traditional political and cultural aspects. This, as I have noted repeatedly, is definitively ambivalent, because it creates new openings both for symbolic systems that reproduce power *and* systems that challenge it. The inaccurate elements are thereby exposed: the thesis of the determination of these cultural spaces by the economics of globalization, so that the conditions for the construction of these resistant spaces are produced and therefore anticipated within the culture-ideology that sustains global capitalism. This is the paradox that lies at the heart of Harvey's theory, in spite of his "mutual determination" thesis. A weak move for the semi-autonomy of culture is betrayed by the implication of capital's total capacity for structural adaptation to new and potentially resistant cultural constructions. To anticipate, chapter two will deal with the ways in which social movements have become effectors of social change *independently* of economic class divisions, which would remain central to basically materialist accounts of change such as that of Harvey. These "new" movements have shifted the locus of analysis from this materialism to a focus on how the semi-autonomy of culture registers in their symbolic constructions of new social conflicts and subjectivities.

More suitably, then, Appadurai places the various global flows within what he calls the "new order of instability in the production of modern subjectivity" (1996, p. 4). Again, the locus of this subjectivization is found in the interactions between locality and globality, and in a renewed role for "imagination" in contriving the possibilities for subjects, collectivities, and agency, as the traditional bases for these constructions are diminished. Appadurai uses the figure of various landscapes to represent the "dimensions

of global flows”; these landscapes, therefore, are “perspectival constructs, inflected by the historical, linguistic, and political situatedness of different sorts of actors: nation-states, multinationals, diasporic communities, as well as subnational groupings and movements” (ibid., p. 33). In their fluidity and irregularity, these landscapes are navigated and negotiated in order to construct “imagined worlds” which assemble these landscapes into more acculturated conditions of existence.

Ethnoscapes are formed of people, as a result of migration and motion, and the mobility that is encouraged, and sometimes necessitated, by time-space compression. Technoscapes involve global flows of technologies, including the localization and/or concentration of technological centres, and the role of TNCs and transnational investors. Thus,

[t]he odd distribution of technologies, and thus the peculiarities of these technoscapes, are increasingly driven not by any obvious economies of scale, of political control, or of market rationality but by increasingly complex relationships among money flows, political possibilities, and the availability of both un- and highly skilled labor (ibid., p. 34).

The movement of capital is the territory of financescapes, an increasingly complex and accelerated movement whose analysis requires competency in understanding its immense scope and complexity. Mediascapes assume a more privileged role in this analysis, being the terrain of the distribution of technologies of mediation which allow greater scope to the dissemination and circulation of images. In turn, mediascapes enable the construction of “repertoires of images, narratives, and ethnoscapes...in which the world of commodities and the world of news and politics are profoundly mixed” (ibid., p. 35). The interplay of these “fictional landscapes” and those of actuality provokes a “blurring” of the two which results in different degrees of imagination being invested in the

construction of a world-image. Further, mediascapes provide scripts and narratives according to which articulations of self and Other are contrived and played out as, for instance, “fantasies that could become prolegomena to the desire for acquisition and movement” (ibid., p. 36).

Finally, ideoscapes involve images that pertain to the formation of ideologies and counter-hegemonic movements, usually ascribed in Appadurai’s schema to states and their dissidents. These ideas, for want of more precise terminology, are based initially on the “Enlightenment worldview”, in which was “presupposed a certain relationship between reading, representation, and the public sphere”, presumably the very relationship which alternately idealizes and decries the “objectivity” of journalistic practice (ibid., p. 36). Ideoscapes consist of “keywords” that have evolved from this tradition – such as representation, freedom, democracy – and have become the centerpieces of globally disparate ideologies and politics as a result of the increased mobility of information (mediascapes). These ideoscapes are largely contingent on their situation among a host of factors, including prior traditions and political cultures, and the nature of particular audience practices and conventions.

Appadurai’s main point is to stress the “disjunctures” between these various flows: while each is governed by its own logic and therefore moves in accordance with its own structure of “constraints and incentives”, so too does each act “as a constraint and a parameter for movements in the others” (ibid., p. 35). The abiding logic of the “mutual constitution” premise is certainly reinforced and complemented by this assertion. There are, however, other notable implications. First, the dissonance – both semantic and pragmatic as Appadurai notes – among ideoscapes presents some rather obvious

difficulties to an inclusive or expansive “counterideology” geared toward a global economic system. Of course, the extent to which effective resistance, itself an admittedly imprecise and indefinable term, requires this kind of ideological integrity is certainly worthy of further debate (which will be engaged in part in the next chapter). However, further research and theory could presumably expand Appadurai’s formulation in order to account for the formation of ideoscapes that hinge on embryonic formations of global governance, ostensibly directed through the institutions of global trade and finance discussed previously. That is, what are the central tenets of a nascent ideoscape constructed around these interests, and can the answer to this question motivate and inform an apposite counterhegemonic ideoscape? Can the profound “perspectivity” of these constructs even afford either of these possibilities? And lastly, to what extent have non-Enlightenment idea-systems expanded in a more reciprocal manner, offering their own non-Western keywords that may or may not further confound the culture-ideology that could sustain the notion of global protest and/or allow it a greater reach?

These changes in the construction of culture(s) are related to and implicated in the concept of *reflexivity* that has preoccupied much recent sociology. Anthony Giddens (1990) introduces the concept as the constant re-examination of social practices “in the light of incoming information about those very practices, thus constitutively altering their character” and removing them increasingly from the authority of tradition (p. 38). This has created an uncertainty characteristic of “high modernity”,² as the project of knowledge acquisition is destabilized and interrupted by the persistence of its own

² In this text Giddens contests the claim that society can be characterized as post-modern, owing to logical inconsistencies that inhere in the central tenets of the theory of post-modernity. Instead, what is often called post-modernity is rather “modernity coming to understand itself” rather than the overcoming of modernity as such” (p. 48).

process. That is, as “reason” has developed conceptual technologies to account for change – broadly, the realm of science, including and especially social science – these concepts become part of the currency that redefines and revises social practices, and the process continues in an almost circuitous fashion. Thus, “[t]he point is not that there is no stable social world to know, but that knowledge of that world contributes to its unstable or mutable character” (ibid., p. 45). Here we see a particular confluence of this idea and the formation of ideoscapes, where the globalization of knowledge and image systems increasingly replaces tradition in the determination of social and political practices.

The result, according to Lash and Urry (1994), is in part the formation of community along lines other than tradition – reflexive communalisms that are more the result of calculated choice than of filiation or inert traditions. Reflexivity also provides for an enhanced ability of subjects to apply subversive frameworks for action to technologies designed along more-or-less hegemonic lines. As Dyer-Witheford argues in relation to Marx’s account of the “general intellect”, capitalism requires as part of its internal logic both the individual development of intellectual skills and “the increasingly social nature of activity required for techno-scientific development, which unfolds not on the basis of individual effort but as a vast cooperative endeavour” (Dyer-Witheford, 1999, p. 220). While not succumbing to the prophetic optimism of Marx’s original formulation, Dyer-Witheford does allow that this activity has led in part to the emergence of, for instance, subversive media practices and organizations that are responsible for “springing hundreds of leaks and counterflows within capital’s communication apparatus” (ibid., p. 228).

The counterpoint to this relatively sanguine note sounds most profoundly in the realm of ideology, which for our purposes can be associated with the ideoscapes discussed above. To quote Jameson at length:

If the ideas of a ruling class were once the dominant (or hegemonic) ideology of bourgeois society, the advanced capitalist countries today are now a field of stylistic and discursive heterogeneity without a norm. Faceless masters continue to inflect the economic strategies which constrain our existences, but they no longer need to impose their speech (or henceforth are unable to); and the postliteracy of the late capitalist world reflects not only the absence of any great collective project but also the unavailability of the older national language itself (1991, p. 17).

This condition is a product of what Lash and Urry call “hermeneutic reflexivity”, or the increasing construction of meaning and culture based not on tradition but on more contrived (in a neutral sense) concatenations of individual and collective identity. Society enjoys (or suffers, depending on one’s point of view) a decline of the meta-narratives of Marxism and other modernist projects of social theory in the face of the immensity of globalization and its cultural-ideological counterpart, post-modernism. Ultimately, this means that ideology as it has been conceived within these narratives is conceptually sundered from its root intellectual framework; it is no longer solely the servant of either capital or, critically, the dialectical materialism that would chart an historically-determined path *beyond* ideology and toward emancipation. More accurately, new forms of ideology mirror the “free-floating” nature of structural power that has disentangled itself from the nation-state.

So the conditions of both post-modernity and globalization complicate the workings of ideology conceived as an effect of distortion that offers us only “false consciousness”, thereby preventing the oppressed classes the vision to move toward their own liberation. Globality complicates this picture of one “central conflict” – by

demonstrating the autonomy of culture, and the newfound possibilities of creating alternative narratives of oppression and emancipation that shift this conflict. Therefore, as the specific socio-historical situation of ideology, the conditions of globality and postmodernity implore analysis to remove this stigma of distortion from the conception of ideology. The proposal for understanding ideology that I will engage in chapter four, based mainly on Thompson's formulation (1984, 1990) is basically this: that there no longer remains any privileged position from which the "real" ideology and the "real" reality can be assessed (or indeed the justification for maintaining that such a position exists). Reality, in short, is a social construction, one that emerges from the particular assemblage of cultures and symbols that is the work of a constellation of different and "relatively" autonomous discourses. Social contexts – and therefore social change – are not phenomena that certain symbolic processes represent adequately and that other symbolic processes *fail* to represent adequately. These symbolic constructions are the very stakes of social struggle; the object is not only winning positionality vis-a-vis other pre-existent classes (i.e., the Marxist dialectic), but *the ability to define that conflict and as such define those classes and their action.*

This is one primary contribution of discourse as a form of social action: it is ideological not because it supports a particular economy of power that is somehow constructed beyond discourse, but because discourse is the very means through which this organization is effected and realized. These discourses have to be analyzed in the context of their construction, which means approaching them as socially and historically embedded and having particular conditions that determine their effectivity as discursive

practices. This socio-historical situation has been the subject of the current chapter, and the issue of ideology will be revisited more substantially in a later chapter.

What the disappearance of the “central” ideology indicates, therefore, is the absence of a singular hegemon that is the defining characteristic of “disorganized capitalism”, leading to an ostensible vacuum of both power and resistance. This conclusion is neither overly sanguine nor entirely pessimistic, for it is out of these still-undetermined spaces that both strategy and counter-strategy have room to emerge.

Conclusion

[T]he fact that worldwide strategies are now seeking to generate a global space, their *own* space, and to set it up as an absolute – is another reason, and by no means an insignificant one, for developing a new concept of space (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 105).

Some of these terms – globalization, local/global nexus, geographies of power, flows and –scapes of culture – are all useful conceptually to delimit, in however an imprecise manner, the complexion of the situation. What none of them provide, however, is further explication of the construction of the space of the global within language – the spaces within which actors move, mobilize meaning, and assert the particular visions of global society that are the bone of contention. This exercise is essentially one of (re)connecting the abstraction of language with social action. Henri Lefebvre, therefore, postulates the need to close the “yawning gap that separates this linguistic mental space from that social space wherein language becomes practice” (ibid., p. 5). In this case, what is imperative is understanding how shifts in dominant configurations of the global – in how it is constituted in language and other forms of representation – (re)produce thought-

structures and social practices that are mobilized by either hegemonic actors or their oppositional counterparts.

Lefebvre's concept of "social space" speaks to the materiality, however inaccessible *outside* of language and discourse, of globality:

(Social) space is not a thing among other things, nor a product among other products: rather, it subsumes things produced, and encompasses their interrelationships in their coexistence and simultaneity – their (relative) order and/or (relative) disorder. It is the outcome of a sequence and set of operations, and thus cannot be reduced to the rank of a simple object. At the same time there is nothing imagined, unreal or 'ideal' about it as compared, for example, with science, representations, ideas or dreams. Itself the outcome of past actions, social space is what permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 73).

The task of a unitary theory of space, according to Lefebvre, should be to "decode" or demystify the production(s) of social space, to reveal the myriad relationships "between 'subjects' and their space and surroundings" (ibid., p. 18).

This discussion has focussed thus far on one particular social space, that of the global, in theorizing some of the changes in the production of this space. As flows (of commerce, labour, information) are dictated increasingly by a globalizing trade regime, and as a consequence the boundaries of nation-states become more porous and open to these flows, so too does the "landscape" – economic, political, cultural, ideological – that may inform opposition to this regime. The implication of both Appadurai and Lefebvre is that all of these spaces must be understood in their necessary mutuality as elements that can be harnessed together toward a more concentrated view of global protest as existing within and responding to this constructed space.

The construction of the global registers variously and "ambivalently" in a number of phenomena: in the ostensible undermining of the jurisdictional claims of nation-states,

best represented in Sassen's "new geography of power", through the creation of new regimes of legality; in the emergence of a "supra-local elite" marked in reference to a growing importance of and disparity in powers of mobility; and in the expansion of systems of "disciplinary neo-liberalism" in which new long-term "constitutional" guarantees become central to global trade and replace the fiscal rationale of the welfare state. On the other hand, as was discussed briefly, this "globalization of politics" not only diffuses structural power, but also extends and exposes it to new forms of opposition, observed notably in the above example of Shell's thwarted disposal of an oil-rig. This will become clearer in the chapter to follow.

The designation "post-modern" has served loosely to name many of these changes, which include: the acceleration of cultural flows and therefore the displacement of aesthetics and subjectivity from a rooted consciousness of place and history; a consequent expansion and fragmentation of ideoscapes; a related perspectivization and reflexivity of notions of subjectivity and collectivity that, while they provide the very conditions for opposition, might render a global project of resistance difficult in the least; and, the disappearance of a singular hegemon and ideology against which opposition is directed. Again, as a consequence of these changes, we find evidence of more reflexive and interrogative social practices – especially in the area of consumption – that in part have fueled and informed particular oppositional movements. New "small communitarian public spheres" have emerged in response, many emerging initially from very different conceptualizations of the "central" problem. What we see in the case of anti-globalization protest is the attempt to reconcile these divergent diagnoses of the symptoms of economic globalization. What we also see – so far – is the profound difficulty that the necessary

fragmentation of opposition has had to undergo in making this coordination happen. In any event, it is to the development of these “new” so-called public spheres to which I will turn next.

II. “Think globally, act globally”: Social movements and new spaces of protest

Social movements often stand in as indices of either qualitative social change or of the collective demands that incite these changes. Of course, any discussion of “social change” – especially given the complexity which characterizes globality or globalization – will be affected by the nebulous contours of this term. Consequently, social movement analysis has moved on two fronts, both problematizing the notion of social change – how it happens, how it is marked, who claims its mantle, etc. – and also relating it to the workings of social actors or the machinations of complex systems, or a combination of both. This intellectual endeavour has been easily acclimatized to the culture of post-modernism – the determinist specter of last-instance explanations has been tidily and fashionably relegated to the dustbin of modernist epistemology. While Marxism, the archetypal modernist theory of social change, remains available for reformulations, post-modernism as both culture and social theory has pointed the way toward a more sophisticated and nuanced version of sociality. But it is more with the relative demise of singular explanations that I am here concerned than with the messy array of theory that finds itself bearing the moniker of post-modernism. Simply, if qualitative social change is still a societal imperative and still ultimately achievable, where (im)precisely may it be located, and for a start, where do we begin to look?

For some social movement theorists, the postulation of “new social movements” has been the logical starting point. According to Steven Buechler, new social movement theory is a diverse field unified by a few common themes; for example, the decline of social class and the ascendancy of other status factors in determining identities and motivations, and, as a corollary, a shift to “post-materialist” values and the “politicization

of everyday life”, ostensibly making movements “less susceptible to traditional forms of social control and co-optation by the conventional political system” (Buechler, 2000, p. 47). In other words, the construction of alternative social spaces is not delimited by the parameters of direct political action or recourse to unified theories of socio-political determination. In part, globalization has fostered the opening of different spaces for action, ostensibly by removing social identity from the purview of spatio-temporal location and easing the construction of competing ideoscapes through globalized communication. The determination of social meaning is no longer the sole domain of entirely consistent ideologies, however conceived. Instead, it is, in a typically post-modern fashion, over-determined by a host of competing and interacting ideas, practices, and modes of being that, lacking legitimation by some grand epistemological enterprise, are characterized as “invented” or “socially constructed”. Analysis should, therefore, pay close attention to the discursive and symbolic practices that, even in the absence of singular material determinants, can offer insight into the way “social change” registers with collective action.

Nonetheless, the apparent attempts to unify the disparate concerns of collective actors, in the “global actions” of Seattle, Prague, Quebec City, etc., confront social movement theory with a notable challenge. The focus of these groups on the perils of economic globalization would seem to belie the demise of economic class-based activism, or at least offer evidence of a more pointed awareness of the mutual determinations of social and cultural meaning and global economic practices. Similarly, these “new” collective actors confront the challenge of globality: how to articulate opposition to global economic forces in the face of a global culture bedeviled by

ideological fragmentation. That is, first, how does protest “find” the slippery places of global capital sufficiently to assert a compelling presence? And, second, is it possible for activism to make the move of “going global” while observing its own well-worn maxim, “Think globally, act locally”? The local-global nexus might appear to have imploded in the reformulated *modus operandi* of global activism.

This chapter will investigate the problem of global protest first by exploring the development of recent social movement theory, and especially the analysis of new social movements. This discussion will highlight new social movement theory in general as a more suitable analytical framework within which to interrogate the complexion of global protest. Specifically, what is clear is that theoretical paradigms that posited collective action as either necessary historical movement, or extra-systemic and deviant psycho-social behaviour, have yielded to an “evolutionary” sociological tradition that understands social movements as vital complexes of societal learning, offering essential productive resources with which society can reflexively constitute and define itself. Further to this, the accompanying emphasis on social movements as cultural constructions relatively freed from economic determination provides a credible justification for studying these movements in terms of their symbolic importance – of the part they play in determining the “stakes” of the “new” social conflicts and crises, the prescription of alternative forms of identity and social action, and ultimately, visions of the global “we”. My argument is that in order to embrace the complexity and mutuality of symbolic/discursive constructions and the actual structuring of society, a study of global protest must analyze the ideational structuration of social protest that is a significant factor in the “production” of society.

This having been said, a couple of caveats apply. The emphasis on predominantly Western groups has been notable, which is in no way an intentional neglect of significant non-Western movements. However, most of the social movement organizations comprising the new “global networks” of protest involved in the Seattle and Quebec City actions have Western origins, and hence receive the bulk of news coverage.

Additionally, the term “social movements” refers to a vast and variegated catalogue of causes, subcultures, “alternative lifestyles,” ideologies, spiritualities, etc., each with its own organizational forms and modes of being. While it may seem self-defeating for an argument pleading for the importance of discourse analysis to claim any term unworthy of investigation, it is more a matter of theoretical facility that compels me to leave the term “social movements” relatively uninterrogated. It might suffice for now to invoke Ray’s assertion that “social movements are ambiguous phenomena which lack a clearly definable form or trajectory, and are better understood with reference to the social environments or opportunity structures in which they operate” (Ray, 1993, p. 59). Hence, understanding “social movements” as objectifiable phenomena is far less important than recognizing and interpreting their socio-political and hence cultural-symbolic situation, which is the broader objective of this analysis.

Social movement theory: Shifting theoretical contexts

Generally speaking, social movement theory can be viewed as an attempt to negotiate, on one hand, the material constraints and opportunities for collective action, and, on the other, the symbolic interventions made by collective actors both in the lives of individual members and of society at large. The problem for most contemporary

theorists lies in the need to identify larger systemic tendencies that evoke or delimit collective responses, while reserving some space for the autonomous maneuverings of the actors themselves. Simply put, the resilience of capitalist systems worldwide - in spite of their periodic crises or inherent contradictions (Bell), and in the objectionable and progressive colonization of lifeworlds (Habermas) – begs the question of the real possibilities for substantial social change. Yet the mere existence of social movements is enough to complicate matters by throwing into relief opposition to the domination and injustice inherent in social structures. Indeed, one significant thesis of recent theorists such as Melucci (1996) is that oppositional movements at minimum signal the onset of systemic crises and possible directions for corrective change. The residue of this debate is of course whether social agency still retains the fortitude to effect significant (i.e., revolutionary) transformation, or whether the power of system integration merely absorbs this agency in system-compatible ways, maintaining structural differentiation while emitting only the *signs* of social change.

The legacy of Western social movement theory goes back to Marx, whose dialectical epistemology pitted the owners of capital against the productive forces of labour, resulting ineluctably in an historically-determined transition from capitalism to socialism. In this schema, labour becomes the quintessential social movement, providing both a coherent explanation for social change and a theoretical mold in which all social conflicts could be cast. As Stephen Buechler (2000) points out, the evolution of sociology has owed largely (but not entirely) to a dialogue with Marxism, and social movement theory is no exception. For while undoubtedly offering an instructive analysis of the structural determinations of social conflict, Marxist sociology has also provided some

fruitful ground for critique. In positing class conflict as the primary catalyst for social action, Marxism needs to assign to labour (and capital, for that matter) a congruity of interests, behaviours, and social practices that some have claimed is easily undermined by the fractal social structures inherent to advanced (or postindustrial) capitalism.

Related to this is the accusation that the determinism of class conflict is a quasi-tautological proposition that cannot account for the uncoupling of class identification and economic determinations in advanced capitalism. As we will see, the proliferation of markers of affiliation other than those of class – notably the tellingly ambiguous conception of “identity” – will make up in part the central problematic of new social movement theory. One of Melucci’s central criticisms of Marxist sociology is that it is, in a sense, precisely anti-sociological. That is, in reducing social relations to a universalist conception of class conflict, Marxism obscures the intangible social processes that inform social conflict and that are rooted in particular spatio-temporal circumstances. Thus, “[i]t was only under the conditions of capitalist production during a distinct phase of the development of Western industrial societies that this temporary coincidence between economic ‘form’ and social relationships of production came into existence” (Melucci, 1996, p. 45). Power is not circumscribed within material antagonism alone, but also devolves to other types of social class and relations of domination.

In addition to Marxism, what Buechler calls “classical collective behavior theory” also held sway in early accounts of social movements, resting on “collective behavior [as] a unitary concept that may be manifested in a variety of ways but can ultimately be understood by a single explanatory logic” (Buechler, 2000, p. 20). Whereas Marxist accounts rested on the premise of social movements as a somewhat objectified and

unitary “actor” engaged in an historicist narrative of class struggle, early collective behavior theory privileged the psychology of collective action, leading to a number of its own blindspots.¹ First, “collective behaviour” as an all-inclusive concept was insensitive to the distinctions that obtain between its different forms; a peculiar equivalence was registered between organized protest, social movements, panics, riots, etc. The emphasis on social-psychological processes also led theorists such as Herbert Blumer to classify social movements and collective behaviour in general as “contrasts to everyday, recurrent, and organized social life” (Gusfield, 1994, p. 67). This differentiation between collective behaviour and rational, “organized” social life derives in part from an influential distinction between “crowd” and “public,” adapted by Robert Ezra Park from Gabriel Tarde’s initial formulation (McPhail, 1991, p. 7). What Park eventually characterized as “heterogeneous and critical publics” were distinguished from “homogeneous and uncritical crowds” by the psychical phenomenon of “circular reaction”, derived from Gustave LeBon’s assertions that once in the collective situation, individuals “mutually infect each other with their thoughts and feelings”, thus eviscerating the collective capacity for subjective rationality (Park, in McPhail, 1991, p. 8). These ideas dovetailed with emergent theories of the evolution of modernity that stressed massification and atomization as root causes of a pervasive anomie: “It was the distinctive prediction of mass society theory that the most isolated and alienated individuals would gravitate toward participation in collective behavior because it offered one of the few available social anchors for such individuals” (Buechler, 2000, p. 27-28).

¹ This statement and what follows is a general characterization of classical collective behaviour theory, much in accordance with that provided by Buechler (2000), which may not do full justice to the range of theories within this school. It should suffice, however, as a means of charting some broader paradigm shifts in social movement research. For more nuanced accounts, see Buechler (2000), and McPhail (1991).

The social-psychological perspective taken by Blumer approached social movement activity as part of a generalized category of collective behaviour, inevitably perceived as infectious, irrational, and deviant. In a similar move, albeit one advanced from different theoretical premises, structural-functionalist theories, such as Neil Smelser's seminal adaptation of Parsonian functionalism, privileged the structural rationality of interrelated "action systems" to account for collective behaviour. As a response to periodic structural strain (systemic crises or contradictions, "deprivations", etc.) arising in conditions of "structural conduciveness" to collective behaviour, "generalized beliefs" are formed to provide meaning and motivation for collective actors to subvert or "short-circuit" appropriate channels of social action. Because they collapse different levels of acceptable social action into one moment of mobilization, "generalized beliefs are inherently irrational cognitive responses to structural strain that can nonetheless provide powerful incentives for action. Generalized beliefs can take differing forms, including hysteria, wish-fulfillment, hostility, norm-oriented beliefs, or value-oriented beliefs" (Buechler, 2000, p. 26).

This overstatement of psychological factors proved theoretically restrictive. It limited the scope of agency to "public rationality" filtered through the disciplinary apparatus of institutional action, implicitly reifying existing hegemonic structures and legitimating more extreme responses to the essential "nonrationality" of collective behaviour² (ibid., p. 30). The denial of social agency to participants in collective action prevented theorists from assigning the latter the political import that it would eventually

² It should be noted that contention exists within accounts of collective behaviour theory regarding the non-rationality thesis. Eyerman and Jamison, for example, point out that "Differences concerned the interpretation of this fact, that is whether it should be viewed positively as adaptive behavior or negatively as irrational or deviant behavior, and how it was to be explained, in terms of changes in individual attitudes and beliefs or in terms of structural strains" (1991, p. 13).

demand, an import that the “resource mobilization” paradigm of social movement theory would recognize as pivotal. Furthermore, this totalization of collective behaviour had two important consequences. First, it left the subtlety of degrees of participation inaccessible; no allowance was made for participation that took a less visible or openly subversive form, as populations were divided unambiguously into participants and non-participants in collective action. Second, and related to the first point, an unwarranted “myopia of the visible” rendered theorists blind to both the cyclical nature of protest – the tendency of collective action to oscillate between tactical poles of visibility and latency (Melucci, 1988, 1996; Tarrow, 1991) – and the intentional aspects of collective behaviour that made it more a component of institutional life, and not less.³

Buechler’s instructive “sociology of knowledge” analysis of the evolution of social movement theory suggests that the same processes of modernization that have precipitated different mobilizations have also had concomitant effects on sociological analysis of these mobilizations. Accordingly, Doug McAdam suggests that the prevalence of pluralist political theory up until the mid-20th century contributed to the perception of collective action “through the lens of deviant behavior” (Buechler, 2000, p. 31). In a pluralist polity – premised on equal institutional access for a multiplicity of groups – any extra-institutional action could only be explained away as abnormal. Moreover, in the cajoling prosperity of the United States in the 1950s, apparently the high period of

³ It is important, however, not to overstate this critique and the ensuing transition to new paradigms, as the remnants of much of this theory are contained within new theoretical models. For example, Smelser’s notion of structural conduciveness bears a notable relation to Tarrow’s (1991) later conception of cycles of protest, there is a notable fit between Smelser’s theory of value-oriented movements and Touraine’s idea of historicity, and the symbolic-interactionist approach taken up by Blumer is later revisited in the reconstruction of a more viable cognitive approach to social movements (Eder, 1993; Eyerman and Jamison, 1991).

classical collective behaviour theory, any lurking internal threat to the system was displaced or externalized in the drama of the Cold War:

In an era in which relations between management and labor appeared harmonious, when race relations had yet to “heat up”...when images of technological progress and material affluence were ubiquitous...there was simply no room in the American celebration for recognizing deeply rooted, highly politicized conflicts of interest....It is more than a little ironic that the conceptual tools of collective behavior theory find considerable applicability in the analysis of McCarthyism; the imagery of hysteria rarely found a more congenial home than in the anticommunism of the 1950s (ibid., p. 32).

It was the insurgence of “new” conflicts embodied in the wave of countercultural verve of the 1960s that prompted a re-theorization of social movements. The variegation of social conflict in this period, notably along lines of race, gender, and age, exploded assumptions of systemic integrity and functionality, and expanded the traditional Marxist critique of domination to loci of conflict other than class. Theories that emerged in this period varied, but the Marxist paradigm gave way to a general schema “in which society is conceived of less as a place of confrontation between social classes than as a space in which the logic of domination unfolds through repression mechanisms in the strict sense of the term” (Touraine, 1988, p. 23). As Eyerman and Jamison attest, student actions in Western Europe and the United States in the late 1960s proved to be significant interruptions to collective behaviour theory. Structural-functionalists, for instance, found it difficult to understand that one of the more “integral” institutions devoted to system maintenance and reproduction – the university – could possibly become a breeding ground for dissent, especially among “the most adjusted of social groups, university students” (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991, p. 19). Traditional Marxism, similarly, left no room for the historical agency of a social group that at best could be lumped in with other

“alienated members of the middle class” (ibid., p. 20). What was clear was the emergence of “new social movements” with significant investments in social and political change that – owing largely to the blind spots of collective behaviorism – had been stewing, relatively undetected, beneath the surface of “institutional” social life.

A sometimes radical reworking of Marxist and Weberian theoretical paradigms was prompted in part by this new activism, and in part by the ensuing recognition by theorists such as Touraine and Melucci that conceptualizations of social movements situated within the context of industrial capitalism had been eclipsed by the birth of post-industrial capitalism (this will be explored more fully below). These theories reinstated power and conflict – as opposed to the functionality of systems – as central to the understanding of “new social movements”, leading to some significant challenges to the assumptions of collective behaviour theory. For one, these new theories established a conceptual distinction between *collective behaviour* as such and *social movements*, and challenged the presupposition that social movements could be defined as “non-institutional behaviour”. As a result, more rigour was poured into arguments for the inherent rationality of social movements, and social movements began to be interrogated not on social-psychological premises, but in terms of their tactical relation to the larger political environment, as social and political institutions in and of themselves (Buechler, 2000, p. 34).

The “resource mobilization” paradigm, therefore, began to investigate social movements not from the vantage point of individuals forming collectivities toward the satisfaction of particular motivations, self-definitions, or cognitive processes, but in terms of the political efficacy of social movement organizations and “industries”:

Success here is defined as a function of how clearly organizational goals are defined and how effectively its available resources – people, material, and ideas – are put to use both in mobilizing support and in seeing to it that the established institutions take seriously the aims expressed by the movement (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991, p. 24).

By reinvesting in the political and organizational operations of social movements, however, resource mobilization theorists neglected “the cultural and symbolic life that necessarily underpins such strategic actions” (Buechler, 2000, p. 38). This “mesolevel” approach to the organizational life of collective action disembedded social movements both from macro-social and -historical contexts, and the more immediate, micropolitical conditions and expressions that invigorate collective action.

It is precisely here that the colossus known clumsily as new social movement (NSM) theory makes its entrance, to redress this inattentiveness to both micropolitical and macrostructural questions. Generally, NSM theory takes on the task of linking more definitively changes in broader political, economic, and social structures – usually articulated in the naming of new societies (postindustrial society, information society) – with changes in the nature and construction of collective consciousness. Not surprisingly, a central problematic is the recession of class consciousness as the primary motivation for collective mobilization. Indeed, Baker et al., claim that “the declining importance of class appears to be the major factor in accounting for the decline in the explanatory power of social characteristics as a whole”, meaning that the burden for theory is to expand its conceptual repertoire to account for a vast multiplicity of social processes that occur over particular histories and social spaces (in Pakulski, 1995, p. 69). It is a daunting initiative, no doubt, but one that, even in its failings, refuses to underestimate the complexities of

social change in a society whose productive capacity relies precisely on its ability to make use of its own complexity.

According to Buechler, NSM theory is characterized by the following themes: theorization of social-structural conditions as a background to the construction of new movements; a view to new social movements as distinctive responses to either modernity or post-modernity; a sensitivity to the plurality of social determinations that transcend economic class; an emphasis on the social construction of collective identity and its importance to the overall functioning of social movements; the “politicization of everyday life”, encapsulated perhaps most famously in the dictum “the personal is political”; a shift in central values, characterized by the term “post-materialism”; the increasingly important role of symbolic forms of resistance, in new attempts to elide both structural constraints on the everyday and conventional forms of opposition; and finally, the preference expressed by movements for decentralized and egalitarian organizational structures, important partly as an expression of a new organic/holistic ethos espoused by many of these movements (Buechler, 2000, pp. 46-48).

Admittedly, this cursory summary hides much of the variance and nuance that exists between some of these theories. With that said, and with a more integrative task at hand, some of the core and mutually inextricable issues that shape NSM theory are: the differentiation of class definition and hence the displacement of “traditional” class conflict; the ascendancy of *identity* as a fundamental terrain of social struggle; and the dialectic of materiality and ideation characteristic of a reflexive construction of society. All of these issues are situated more or less consistently within the debate around the

evolution of modernity (or post-modernity, depending on the writer), and the attendant transcendence of industrial capitalism in advanced or post-industrial capitalism.

“The crisis of class politics” - The construction of class consciousness and conscious constructions of class

New social movements, conceptually speaking, represent a fundamental sundering of the traditional linkage between economic class and collective action. This link is, of course, most famously posited by classical Marxist theory, which, with an underlying messianic spirit, holds out an emancipatory moment embodied in the revolution of the proletariat. The irresistible movement of history and the collective realization of agency intersect to produce a conception of a collective actor that is historically given, embedded in a *telos* of class struggle. The development of class consciousness, a necessary intermediary between the force of history and dialectical transcendence of the working class, is structurally determined by the relation of humanity to material contingency in the historical form of industrial capitalism. In the emergence of new social movements, however, the class-class consciousness dyad pulls apart; so too does the equivalence between economic class and collective action. Hence the seemingly interminable problem of what to make of what remains, or, if *anything* remains, that can properly occupy the theoretical void left after the farewell of class determinism. NSM theory essentially starts at this void, and points to a copious supply of would-be successors in heralding the new dynamic relationships between systems, social movements, and social change.

NSM theory contextualizes these new movements conceptually within the emergence of post-industrial society. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the

corrective flexibility of the post-Fordist regime emphasized a social practice built around the politics of consumption – the ostensible self-definition that ties identity, roughly speaking, to the ephemerality of cultural consumption, instead of traditional anchors such as class affiliation. In this way, new social movements are, by David Harvey's standards, born precisely as postmodern phenomena. What is postmodern about them, moreover, is the general refusal to allow the imposition of any stable or coherent ideology, that is to say of a collection of superstructural elements that sustain a particular mode of production and its implicit relations of power. Earlier, the Critical Theory of Adorno and Horkheimer had premised their revisionist Marxism on the expansion of technical rationality into the cultural and aesthetic realms, such that popular culture constituted a more egregious and impenetrable masquerade for the underlying social relations of production. Social reproduction relied on the banality of a culture deprived of its emancipatory potential by the rationalization of aesthetic form. The various movements of the late 1960s, however, signalled that the scope of social resistance had expanded to encompass not predominantly relations of production, but the very reproductive functions of power that had permeated most facets of social life. This resulted in oppositional movements that rallied around the micropolitics of gender, sexual practice, civil rights, and youth – all social markers that transcend the “central conflict” that informed traditional notions of class.

An “evolutionary” sociology, such as that of Habermas and Touraine, accounts for these phenomena by pointing to changes in the evolving relationship between the dominant social organization – which includes the mode of production – and “modes of learning”. Post-industrial society is therefore not marked by a decisive break with the

rationalizing tendencies of modernity but rather by the extension of the principles of modernity to new forms of social practice. Habermas' critique of the rationalization theses of both Weber and the Frankfurt school articulates the premise of the evolutionary perspective. In basic terms, while Weber could only posit the evolution of rationality in dominant organizational forms (bureaucracy), Habermas argued that a unified rationality also underpinned extra-systemic life-forms (communicative action), and that the process of modernization embodied in the technicization of social organization was not, as Weber contended, the only possible path to modernity. The formation of new resistant social classes and movements exemplified the pathologies of lifeworld colonization, and expressed a form of "suppressed modernity": "the *logic* of potential but unrealized communicative possibilities" superseded by "the *dynamics* of actual historical development" (Ray, 1993, p. 39). This idea fits loosely with Giddens' structuration thesis, in which both institutional and social structures are mutually and reflexively implicated as both enabling and constraining social action. As itself an outgrowth of rationalization processes, the reflexivity of modernity dictates that linear rationalization, as in the Weberian formulation, cannot continue unaltered, so that bureaucratic institutions or relations of production will not be the sole influence on social praxis, and will be subject to influence from other sectors of society.

John Urry reformulates this idea to explain the emergence of "causal powers" other than a singularly determined class structure: "The causal powers of capitalism are highly complex and mediated, and cannot in a simple sense be reduced to a single interest or a set of necessary social and spatial patterns. Nor can labour be reduced to a single interest, nor can it be claimed that labour has insignificant causal powers" (1995, pp. 171-

172). Class is a multi-levelled construct: it encompasses relations of exploitation, the exertion of causal powers, sets of social organizations that articulate a cohesive project, a structure of places within organizations defined by particular assets, and looser congregations of people with “common social characteristics”. On this last point, “[t]here is necessarily a complex relationship between class as ‘places’ and class as ‘persons’, since over a lifetime people may occupy places within different classes, and the social composition of such places will affect the degree to which, and the forms in which the powers of a given class come to be realized” (ibid., p. 173).

This translation of social conflict from the economic sphere to more political and cultural domains means that social movements and collective action have to be defined within particular socio-historical conditions. Against the structuralist explanations of Marxism and collective behaviour theory, new social movements are essentially over-determined by an abundance of social positions from and around which movements can mobilize. In this way, according to some (Touraine, 1981, 1987; Ray, 1993; Eder, 1993), social movements have only truly emerged during the period of modernity, for it was only then that metaphysical and other “metanarrative” explanations could be eschewed for a more rational questioning of socio-cultural orientation. But out of the same tradition, the diffusion of administrative power is executed as a new form of Taylorism; the development of technical and social-scientific knowledge enables the penetration of administrative logic into lifeworlds.⁴ Knowledge, learning processes, cultural resources – all describe the ways in which society is increasingly characterized in its ability to act upon itself, to have a transformative effect on its own organization, depending on the

⁴ Melucci’s paramount example is the intervention of science into biological reproduction, such that social experiences of birth and death are irretrievably altered (Melucci, 1988, p. 110).

differential distribution and allocation of productive resources (see Touraine, 1988, 1995; Eder, 1993; Melucci, 1988, 1996). Hence the “programmed society”, one of Touraine’s seminal notions that describes the administrative shift from exploitation to “manipulation”:

In market capitalism, the wage-earners are the dominated class because they are subject in the labor market to the power of those who hold capital. In the programmed society, directed by the machinery of growth, the dominated class is no longer defined in terms of property, but by its dependence on the instruments of social and cultural integration (Touraine, 1995, p. 185).

The proliferation of these instruments of integration defines the “information society”, in which, according to Melucci, a proliferation of codes – technical, cultural, social – governs the resources of social production. So a reinvestment in the “sociology of action” is prompted by the increasing ability of actors to disengage themselves from systems of reproduction – such as metaphysical or metasocial determinations of class (economic or religious orders) – in order to participate in the “production of cultural models” (Touraine, 1988, p. 11). These cultural models together comprise a “field of historicity”, which, according to Touraine, is the new stake around which social conflict is organized. The reflexivity of social production decrees that social actors simultaneously operate within this field of historicity and struggle over the resources used to define it. Thus, “classes fight for control of the cultural field, for the management of the means whereby the society ‘produces itself’, that is economic accumulation, a mode of cognition and a representation of the capacity that a society has to act upon itself” (ibid., p. 49).

Power, nonetheless, is still evident in sets of legitimizing discourses that strategically conflate cultural values with social norms, and this juxtaposition is the

equivalent of the rationalization of power. That is, power is rationalized when the basic cultural relativism (to some, equivalent to anarchy) that this situation might otherwise portend is suppressed by discourses that identify one particular cultural orientation – of many alternative orientations – as a standard for action (e.g., constitutional democracy). The ideological work is done when these particular norms are no longer identified as cultural values, but somehow transcendent of mere “culture” – they become, like democracy, a legitimate and universalizable mode of social organization. An incisive critique, says Touraine, needs to have conceptual tools with which to disentangle these terms, to maintain an eye toward ideological forms, while also refusing the possibility “that the whole of the categories of social practice represents a coherent implementation of dominant ideology” (ibid., p. 55). To digress somewhat, globalization is one such nascent set of norms; it registers, in my estimation, in an observable *but still not total* consensus on the inevitability of global free trade and the harmfulness of protectionism.

It is imperative that the newfound complexity of social production be observed; it is a matter of acknowledging the dialectic of structure and agency, while reserving access to those sites in which domination persists. Eder, therefore, proposes to understand the construction of class and collective action in terms of a mutual situation of these two “levels” with another mediating variable, which is culture. The old tautological determination of class and class consciousness cannot explain collective action not fundamentally rooted in working-class politics; the recourse to economic class as the exclusive explanation of collective action does not hold, especially in light of collective action that transcends and crosses class divisions. Rather, class structure is relevant as a macro-structural context within which the cultural construction of meaning operates to

“texture” (Eder’s term) collective action. Thus the “cultural logic of action spaces” refers to an architecture of class in which class consciousness is replaced by a reflexively-defined set of life-forms⁵ which negotiate the translation of class position into collective action. That is, class structure retains a role of quasi-determination, but it cannot be understood or analyzed independently of the cultural logic that defines it. For Eder, this is most fruitfully investigated in terms of “universes of discourse” within which the conditions for both social structure and social action are communicated among actors.

The concept of class itself, says Eder, is a “probabilistic construct”, an ultimately arbitrary organization of culturally-defined attributes and their distribution among individuals. The objectification of class structure is based on the circulation of this symbolic organization; the relative explosion of class formations (discussed below) makes this insight particularly salient. Eder therefore proposes to replace a traditional, hierarchical conception with a network model of class distribution, an attempt both to make sense of middle-class cultures and to allow for a definition of class structure that recognizes inequality *and* reciprocity as elements in its construction:

It allows us to understand the interdependencies between classes, the dependency of the exploiter on the exploited, the ruler on the ruled, the “cultured” on the “uncultured”. These reciprocal relationships are certainly biased – there is inequality built into reciprocity. Inequality, however, does not destroy reciprocity; rather it is a dynamic element in its reproduction (Eder, 1993, p. 11).

The notion that a certain reciprocity can exist alongside forms of domination is important. Perhaps its importance is indicated, in the last fragment of the quote, by the grammatical ambiguity of the reproductive relationship between inequality and reciprocity. The

⁵ Eder defines life-forms as “symbolically organized action spaces that coordinate the subjective motivations of people in a non-subjective way....” (Eder, 1993, p. 10).

struggle over historicity is not only weighted unevenly – so say both Touraine and Eder – but the supposed levelling of power structures in the “culturalist” triumph of identity politics may work to conceal and even reproduce these same structures. Breaking the hold of unitary class determinations therefore holds implications for the newly abundant sources of class construction, and especially for the promise of fomenting any sort of cogent opposition.

Producing the social: Identity and the resources of meaning

“Identity” is now the discursive residence of this liberation of historicity, and it assumes a focal position in NSM theory. The response of NSM theory, broadly, has been to take a constructivist approach to the analysis of social movements and collective action. Working from the social construction of class structure, Eder attempts to reconstruct the position of the “new middle class”: whereas in traditional class structures the middle class was positioned strictly in relation to the working and capitalist classes, the new middle class is new precisely because it is engaged in a more autonomous struggle over its own positioning. This requires new investments in identity, a focus on the “good life” and “consensual social relations” which defines the cultural space of new social movements and the middle class.

The social dichotomy that is invented and ultimately defended is one in which the exclusion from a society allowing for identity and expressive individualism is the dominant criterion. The culture of the new social movements contains an element of dichotomizing social reality, namely the idea of *exclusion from the social means of realizing identity* (Eder, 1993, p. 175).

Eder’s reinvention of this tripartite class division is admirable, given the social and cultural complexity that characterizes post-industrial society. It would have been

more compelling, however, had he not insisted on relying on fallacious distinctions between “social facts” and “natural symbols” as a justification for limiting his notion of class identity. That is, he claims that mobilizations around issues of gender and ethnicity “are constructed on the basis of ‘natural symbols’”. Classes, on the contrary, exist as social facts, i.e., as collectivities socially constructed on the basis of socially defined symbols. This is the basic difference between class and any other criterion identifying collectivities” (ibid., p. 182). What is particularly mystifying about this claim is that it would seem to belie the constructivist methodology of its author. Feminist theories, for example, have often attempted to unpack socially-contrived narratives of “natural” gender and sexual differences, demonstrating that the codings of these divisions have more to do with registrations of power and domination than with any defensible concept of naturalism.⁶

An attempt to interrogate the social-facticity of prevailing constructions of gender differences might have yielded insight into the expansive range of identity criteria from which the “new classes” have to draw. Moreover, Eder might not have felt compelled to reify the new middle classes based on this arbitrary distinction, much as was done within the traditional conceptions of class that Eder critiques. Endeavouring to delimit a particular class based on its quest for the “good life” through “consensual social relations” is another curious move; it is questionable at best that these characteristics are points of distinction for any social group. The more compelling question should concern

⁶ See for example Butler (1991). Also, Nancy Fraser’s (1985) critique of Habermas’ concept of “bracketing” would seem to apply here as well. That is, if social conflict is now embedded in the struggle over the structuring of class, based on “the conflict over the means of an ‘identitarian’ existence”, then the designation of gender outside of this class structure is tantamount to denying it a place within the field of historicity, much as the bracketing of “private” concerns within the public sphere in Habermas’ formulation perpetuated gender inequality by enabling masculinity to stand in as the “neutral” gender within public discourse.

how these (vaguely universal) social objectives are negotiated symbolically in the social practices and relations that may better define these new classes.

Nevertheless, the designation of an “identitarian” ethos in post-industrial culture is fairly consistent within NSM literature. Melucci (1996) offers an “analytical space” in which social production – the production of human action – is understood in conjunction with the formation and recognition of identity, by freeing the concept of social production from its moorings in the historical development of capitalist industrialization. Melucci attempts to overcome the metaphysics of conflict (e.g., Marxism) by positing conflict within the social relationships that govern and determine social production. Production is always a process of reciprocal recognition – of those who produce social goods, the content of which, as explained previously, is today increasingly informational and cultural. But at its core social production is always reliant on processes of symbolic mediation, or the attribution of meaning to human action such that this mutual recognition of producers is achieved. This mutual recognition makes possible a certain social appropriation of these goods, and therefore exchange is the fundamental process by which human action is given meaning. Therefore, “Production is a social relationship which involves reciprocal recognition of the identity of the producers and which, because of the fact, makes exchange possible....A theory of social production therefore implicates a theory of identity” (Melucci, 1996, p. 46). The point is that the conditions for the construction of identity are always contingent on the particular mode of production, which is not necessarily tied exclusively to *material* production. Social production is paradoxically determined by the situational constraints of a particular society, and the

reflexivity of human action which ensures that these constraints will nevertheless remain subject to human action.

The ascendancy of the politics of identity construction and defense would seem to evince this process of productive reflexivity. This works both at the level of self-identity and collective identity, which has often assumed a privileged place in much social movement analysis. In the first case, self-identity becomes a conscious construction of an individualized narrative, operating amongst a plurality of personae and existential choices, and subject to the revisionism promoted by cultural systems fueled by the perpetual novelty of the image. What is significant here is not personal identity in itself so much as how these constructions interact with “external” identity constructions which are more or less imposed from without.

The politics of identity have come to encompass – as has globalization – the translation of macrolevel structural processes onto the patterns of “everyday life” – in both succumbing to and resisting the disciplinary strategies of apparatuses such as “global capitalism”. One of the systemic strategies that effects this discipline is differentiation, in which the constructed nature of individual and collective identities is taken to its logical pluralistic conclusion, resulting in a fragmentary “identity politics” that simultaneously resists and obligates increasing systemic integration. Melucci writes of the negotiation of difference by social movements:

The issues they raise are inextricable from the problem of how difference can be accommodated in a differentiated society, in which both of the horns of the dilemma must necessarily be kept together: a differentiated society can function only based on the acknowledgment and valuation of differences, but, at the same time, the increased differentiation of the system calls for a proportionate intensification in the operation of its mechanisms of integration (Melucci, 1996, p. 188).

The politics of identity respond to the systemic imposition of modes of action that do not correspond to the invented meanings within particular life-forms.

These abstractions of identity mark a shift from what Buechler calls a struggle against domination or exploitation – such as the insurgence of labour movements – to the struggle against subjection. Drawing on Foucault, Buechler maintains that identity necessarily implies resistance to microphysical forms of power that try to administer identity through “regimes of power and surveillance”, such as the technocratic administration of reproduction, or the commodification of identity particular to advanced capitalism (Buechler, 2000, p. 151). Moreover, in conditions of social and subjective reflexivity, identity construction is a perpetual endeavour – new conflicts emerge as the meaning of action becomes the stake in most relations of power. Identity thereby becomes political, as it is the struggle over this meaning that defines the relationship between administrative systems and the lifeworld. It can also make modes of social practice ambiguous and ambivalent phenomena, illustrated by the disintegration of the public/private divide. For example, the various “green” movements are in part predicated upon an holistic recognition of the connection between local practices and “lifestyle choices”, consumption especially, and ecological conditions on a planetary scale. Buechler suggests by this example that the increasing penetration of techno-administrative systems into the “private” has helped to cultivate a social consciousness that acknowledges the microphysics of power and resistance: “If power has taken up residence in the niches of everyday life, movements that seemingly politicize the personal

are simply logical responses to shifting forms of control and domination that have already politicized the terrain of supposedly private life” (ibid., p. 154).⁷

Ray’s appropriation of the Habermasian paradigm offers the notion of decentering, in which subjects reject conventional forms of authority – religion, polity, tradition – and look to modes of discourse to interrogate themselves and the collective, and construct identities on this basis. Thus, “subjects enter a plurality of roles which are defined by specific norms and expectations, as clients, consumers, workers, parents, students, party members etc., none of which individually exhausts the capacity for adopting different identities” (Ray, 1993, p. 33). This is constructive for two reasons: first, it realizes the critical potential stored in the construction of “new” identities, and thus in new social movements. Second, in emphasizing public discourse as the site from and in which these identities are derived and articulated, it highlights the importance of the symbolic – the codification of social meaning especially through language – as an appropriate venue for the interrogation of systemic impositions on social actors, and their responses.

This is so also because, despite the theoretical tension existing between Foucault and Habermas, the notion of microphysical resistance implied by the microphysics of power can be reconciled with the Habermasian location of emancipation in the discursive moment. By demystifying the “background consensus” always implicit in communication, and recognizing that even “purely” instrumental action is underpinned by the communication of socially-constructed norms, microphysical resistances become a

⁷ Alternatively, Ray (1993) suggests in agreement with Habermas that the interpenetration of regulatory systems and lifeworlds can marginalize alternative modes of regulation by displacing them into the status of subcultures, “alternative lifestyles”, etc.. “Green consumerism” is one way by which legitimation is effected without any real transfer of power, by localizing global-systemic contradictions and avoiding interruption of the dominant mode of production (Ray, 1993, p. 66).

matter of public import. Thus, “human freedom and empowerment is none the less extended by bringing [microphysical registrations of power] as far as possible into the public-linguistic realm”. Furthermore, the arbitrary distinction made between “interest” and identity – where the former is equated with political or economic objectives and the latter with cultural or “personal” matters – is disintegrated in “expressive” movements that aim at the “decolonization of the lifeworld” (ibid., pp. 29, 62).

Naming the world: Structure and symbol

Control over the production and appropriation of symbolic resources – of language, discourse, meaning – becomes the object of the struggle over the field of historicity. Frame analysis of social movements has developed in recent years to understand the movement of meaning from social movements to the larger cultural milieu as an ideational process in which movement organizations “draw upon existing mentalities and cultures to create action-oriented frames of meaning” (Tarrow, 1993, p. 186). The resonance of particular frames depends on the nature of their elaboration out of selected master frames, which “provide a grammar that punctuates and syntactically connects patterns or happenings in the world,” thereby providing a larger ideational context for more local framing processes (Snow and Benford, 1993, p. 138). The point, briefly, is the recognition that the symbolic is integral to the functioning of these movements and their broader contribution to the production of society. Moreover, this entails an admission that social movements are, ideally speaking, full and equal players in the struggle over meaning, which in turn means that conceptions of ideology and hegemony must become flexible enough to account for competing discourses. This does

not, however, negate the imbalances that still permeate this hegemonic struggle; rather, it reinforces how imperative it is to detect the traces of these inequities in the production of meaning and identity.

As I have outlined in the previous chapter, the study of ideology must account for this flexibility by locating the ideological effects of symbolic systems within the context of their construction. That is, because reality is ultimately accessible only through discourse, symbols, etc., and because no one position any longer retains exclusive licence over the truth-value of symbolic systems, ideology can only function within *socially constructed* discourses that are instituted within, and according to the conditions of, particular socio-historical locations. In this case, we have emergent conditions that posit the relative autonomy of cultural constructions to the extent that production, although still occurring within realms we can properly call material, is a specifically symbolic-discursive social endeavour that harnesses the production of competing symbolic systems, narratives, “life-forms”, etc.

Melucci captures the essence of the juxtaposition of the material and the ideational in the struggle for control of social production, a complex positional battle the victor of which ultimately gains the power to decide how society and its constituents parts are *named*:

Inequality cannot be measured solely in terms of distribution and control of economic resources; analysis of structural imbalances in society should refer more to a differentiation of positions which allots to some a greater and specific control over master codes, over those powerful symbolic resources that frame the information. The access to these primary codes is not distributed randomly and it corresponds to a distribution of social positions and power. But this is a new way of thinking about power and inequality, which, to reiterate, are still “structural” in many ways but more temporary than in the past and more related to the production of nonmaterial resources (Melucci, 1996, p. 179).

“Postmaterialism” is the preferred term for the social values that have been shaped in part by the acknowledgment of the importance of these nonmaterial resources. The term encapsulates the evaporation of the “central conflict” between labour and capital, and expands the aegis of politics to include issues of lifestyle, identity, and spirituality.

But it is nonetheless a contentious designation, as it infers some discernible rift between the “material” conflicts of old, and the struggles taken up by “new” movements that have been informed nonetheless by the objectives and tactics of prior movements. The women’s movement, for example, is taken as the quintessential postmaterialist movement, and yet it has for decades rallied around inequitable employment policies and standards as a manifestation of patriarchal beliefs. Moreover, the primary mobilization of “middle-class white” women exposed the gross intransigence of thinking about the “central conflict”, which was slow to appreciate the myriad inequities that operate within and across economic divisions: “If the feminist demands of middle-class women do not qualify as ‘post-materialist’, the term is even less appropriate for describing the demands of working-class women or women of color, for whom feminism has always included a quest for greater material security” (Buechler, 2000, p. 141).

The new movements responding to global capitalism on the whole demonstrate the insufficiency of dichotomizing material interests and concerns over the self-production of identity and society. It is on this point that the congealing of formerly disparate movements in the opposition to global capitalism acquires a deeper significance. The “global” actions of Seattle and Quebec City were struggles over precisely how to name those struggles. The use of particular terms – “globalization”, “free trade”, “democracy” – was consistent among all of the actors, but what typically

and strongly defied consensus was on whose terms they were to be defined, by which standards their legitimacy as actual practices and processes would be evaluated, and what the referents of these terms would look like. The struggle in these actions was primarily symbolic, a mediation of the new density of power and opposition in the face of the holistic complexity of the ongoing construction of global life. They were, in effect, “cultural laboratories”, to borrow Melucci’s phrase, in which actions and responses would be measured, calculated, and translated into formulae which could govern the untangling of the “new crises” that permeate society as a whole. This is mainly a positive phenomenon, according to Melucci, for “collective action functions as a new media which illuminates the silent and arbitrary elements of the dominant codes as well as publicizes new alternatives” (Melucci, 1989, p. 62). The question is to what extent the dominant codes also govern the delimitation and subsequent reception of the communicated alternatives.

In these terms, what is interesting about the new anti-capitalist protest is that it registers recursively on the level of identity: not only do identity-formations inform the articulation of grievances, the enactment of protest actions and cultures, etc., but the notion of “global protest” – the meanings and symbolic resonances that comprise this notion – has become a cultural reference point unto itself. But at the heart of the dialogue between the so-called global elite and so-called global protest movements is an ordering of two fundamental questions. The first concerns the supposed effects of globalization – among others, the aggravation of regional inequities in resources, protected standards of living, including labour standards; the profound ecological consequences of the relaxation of environmental standards that might accompany global competition; the

homogenization and/or interruption of traditional cultures increasingly reliant on Western capital flows; the decline of the social security net that was once the signature of a developed world seemingly determined to guarantee at least the opportunity to achieve the “good life”, however defined.

The second question may override this first one, or, posing the first may be a prerequisite for arriving at informed responses to the second. And it appears increasingly to be the question that global protest asks its so-called adversary in global capital. The question is: how do and should we define globalization, and more importantly, how are the resources that generates this definition organized and distributed? The importance of posing this question is that it encapsulates the very problematic toward which analyses of communication and discourse have always tended. What is the “background consensus”, the taken-for-granted solubility of our social environment in our guiding suppositions that motivates and energizes action (or inaction)? Articulated in this way, the adversarial dialogue between the forces of global capitalism and its critics moves decisively into the realm of public discourse, onto the very terrain of social and symbolic production – the field of historicity.

We have done away with a singular notion of ideology, because thought-systems such as class consciousness are no longer singularly determined. But we have not “levelled” class structure to the point of admitting that structural disparity no longer exists, and therefore the persistence of these inequities must retain its role in the discussion. If the “microphysics of power” schema is to be followed, we can look no less than everywhere to detect and dissect discursive/symbolic power. In this case, we have to find the location that best approximates the arena of public discourse. I will contend that

news discourse – the social institution that has assumed the largest responsibility for communicating the conflicts around “globalization” – should be the prudent starting point. It is also a fundamental step that almost all of the preceding theory, despite its immense value in preparing this kind of analysis, has failed to fulfil in any substantive way. We need to interrogate the techniques involved in mediating our social environment, in producing the symbols and narratives that form particular and collective frameworks for understanding the choices of social production and the decisions that direct this process.

III. Naming the world: Language and the constitution of the social

My contention in this chapter will be that while analyses of the projection and framing of alternative discourses by new social movements have been fruitful, we must also examine the discursive processes operating externally to these oppositional voices. These are processes that can obscure, delegitimize, or silence, almost imperceptibly, movements that want to be expansive and “legitimate”. Indeed, “a social movement must establish itself as a serious and sympathetic agent of change through communication with the general public. It must thus establish itself through communicative action to a wide audience as a force to be taken seriously” (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991, pp. 138-139).

The fundamental struggle that now exists - and which is embodied dramatically in these protests – is over the resources invested in the naming of the world. “World” here is not meant in its “planetary” connotation but as the apprehension of lived society, the root processes of being and social institutions that establish commonalities and allow for the subsistence of life-forms, cultures, etc. The struggle, therefore, is over who has the right to define reality. These worldly processes always happen within and are modulated by institutions or institutional contexts – we do not invent the world from nothing but from within the contexts into which we are inserted. Global financial institutions, multinational corporations, oppositional movements, governments, cultures, individuals – these are all “things” that exist “out there”, as objects of apprehension and sense-making. They make up the processes and contexts upon which we rely to inform decisions and “social action”. It is therefore incumbent upon social agents who view themselves as responsible and as sharing in the definition of reality to acknowledge the sometimes dire

consequences of these entities and their actions, which in turn requires that we recognize the materiality of social production, broadly speaking. Oppositional social movements often take the view that intervention is demanded by wrongful practices that threaten the everyday lives of “real” people in “real” situations, and their intervention has had consequences for the implementation of actual social change.

This, of course, is an encapsulation of the “foundationalist” position which claims that thought and action are based on the unproblematic apprehension of phenomena “as they exist” and offer themselves to basic perception. It is also a stance frequently found in such intellectual technologies as the “human sciences”. The foundationalist approach views language as essentially transparent; it represents the world in its pristine authenticity, and foundationalism leaves the act of representation itself unproblematicized, raising questions neither of the viewer’s position nor of the transformative potential of description itself. Words and other signs simply stand in for material referents that exist in autonomy from these systems of representation.

The critique of this view – and there are many subtly distinct versions – maintains that language actually possesses a “constitutive” function to which we must attend. This realist position claims that the distinction between subject and object, between world and speaker, obscures the fundamental ways in which practices of signification themselves constitute the objects of perception. Language, here, is not transparent and neutral but dense and problematic; it contributes to the positioning of the perceiving/speaking subject. This is what Ian Angus means when he states that inquiry into social processes must transcend the presupposition of the unitary subject in order to understand “the constitutive function of rhetoric in forming subjects and interpellating

them into the social formation” (Angus, 2000, p. 6). Others such as Bourdieu (1994) base the social critique of language on an understanding of structuralist-linguistics, notably of Saussure and, later, of Chomsky. When he postulated the existence of a “closed” referential system in which meaning is registered only in the difference between signifiers, Saussure opened the way for social theories of language and discourse by exposing the structural operation of meaning and the contextual embeddedness of speakers. When linked to historical and social analysis, this view of language could help us understand the construction of discursive hierarchies, equivalences, and subject positions over time and within specific social and institutional milieux. The fundamental point is that discourse must be situated within a theory that considers it a social practice, an act of institution/constitution that actively delimits the boundaries of future subjectivities and action.

This is what the writings of Bourdieu and others contribute to Saussure’s synchronic and ahistorical exposition of discourse. Bourdieu

forcefully argues that any attempt to construct an autonomous and homogeneous object of linguistic analysis – whether Saussure’s *langue* or Chomsky’s “competence” – is bound to lead astray, for it conjures away the social-historical conditions under which a particular language or competence is constituted as legitimate, is acquired by some speakers, imposed on others, and reproduced as the dominant form of language use (Thompson, 1984, p. 7).

Bourdieu and others see language not merely as the field of the play of signifiers but, also and more importantly, as the field in which the play of signifiers is governed by relationships of power. Within discourse inhere the multifarious linkages between language, power, subjectivity, and agency. The linkages can elucidate the social

construction of meaning and, ideally, point to possibilities of signifying anew, and hence effecting “real change”.

However, it is important to understand that this is all that discourse analysis, strictly speaking, can do. As Angus explains, discourse analysis cannot yield alternatives that are intrinsic to or that follow “naturally” from the analysis. This is so because analysis must begin from an account of social experience that is taken, somehow, to already “exist”. It is because of these variables that stand somehow “outside” but in turn inform a particular discursive analysis that discourse analysis itself will always begin from a constructed position. Angus suggests that because analysis is, at some moment inevitably, obliged to depart from a situation that is curiously pre-existent that the response by this analysis is necessarily closed off to that particular analysis (Angus, 2000, p. 159). This is not an easy notion to grasp, but perhaps best explained this way: what discourse analysis accomplishes, by deconstructing the “naturalness” of a given discursive formation, is to touch off the creation of an infinite series of further naturalized points that only subsequent analyses can remedy through deconstructing the discursive situation suggested by the conclusions of the first analysis. If I were to suggest in the analysis to follow, for instance, that the discursive rendering of global protest should be corrected owing to the fact that it is socially constructed, and by implication “unrepresentative”, my conclusions would have to inspire a subsequent deconstructive effort to unearth the “‘hidden origin’ that inheres in any discursive field” (ibid.)

That said, a discursive approach to social phenomena acknowledges language as a primary system of meaning, as an elementary unit in the constitution of the “social imaginary”. I therefore situate myself in opposition to the bifurcation “discourse/reality”,

and reject the criticism that the tendencies of post-structuralist analysis render the two irreconcilable. Indeed, it is often claimed that formulations of the absolute indeterminacy of meaning are merely post-modern celebrations that suggest the irretrievable loss of any real social or political importance of language. This criticism can be founded on, for example, a reading of Foucault that suggests that language simply reproduces power in particular historical configurations, leaving no room for agency, or the Derridian notion of *différance* which posits an infinite deferral of meaning and hence the impossibility of authorial intention. But, as Angus suggests, the criticism that discursive theory “reduces” social action to language is ill-conceived and preserves an arbitrary separation between language and action (Angus, 2000, p. 11). Acknowledging the importance of discourse in the analysis of social phenomena means recognizing language as a primary mode of action, with “real” social effects and resonances.

Moreover, according to Melucci and Buechler, and as I stressed in the previous chapter, new social movements challenge these notions by appropriating the “play” of signification just enough to produce not only new complexes of identity while keeping one eye on the material struggles of subjects, but also to signal that the critique of the production of codes – language being one – is now firmly entrenched as a societal imperative.

In this context, then, the analysis of news discourse, in particular, can produce important insights into how processes of signification can be shot through with prevailing constructions of the social and political world, constructions that work reflexively *within* an economy of “symbolic power” while simultaneously *maintaining* the very conditions of domination. Social movements have traditionally opened new spaces of signification

and social practice, and NSM theory in particular has emphasized the potentially emancipatory role of the symbolic in this process. I want to stress, however, that I am not merely taking the side of NSM theory against other views of social change and agency. On the contrary, I want to recognize that NSM theory brings something new but that it, too, operates within systems of signs and signification, and that many of the criticisms that can be addressed to its predecessors can also be addressed to it. This is perhaps a further invocation of Angus' above critique of the limitations of discursive analysis. The mere fact of recognizing the constitutive potential of language does not mean that we suddenly use it well, intelligently, for emancipatory purposes or in any other way which can be qualified as beneficial. What is required, in the end, is an approach that can understand how the reproduction of power and social structures – as both conditions and products of the contest over the field of social production – are embedded within communicative processes that are fundamental to our understanding/imagination of the world.

In a sense, this is the classic question of the balance between the system and the actor, between institutional constraint and human agency, between the weight of structures and the lightness of being, between determination and free will. I want, therefore, to locate myself as clearly as possible. In this chapter, and drawing upon Bourdieu's notion of symbolic violence and Foucault's paradigmatic analyses, I will begin to address the relations of power to discourse. With this, and also strongly inspired by Foucault, I want to consider the status of the subject in discourse, including the ways in which, to borrow an Althusserian phrase (but not adhering strictly to its theoretical implications), it is "interpellated by social structures". I will apply this idea that subjects

are positioned by and within discourse to draw out its implications for the subjects of news discourse – namely, readers/audiences and journalists. This relationship is part of the overall set of conditions that constitute news as a discursive practice, and as such a specific mode of social action. All of these together – the analysis of the relation of discourse to power, the status of the subject in discourse, and especially as it is situated within particular discursive practices – should cause us to reconsider the question of ideology. To this end, I draw upon Thompson's (1984) reformulation of the critique of ideology. I then appeal to critical discourse analysis, a theory that builds from the post-structuralist critique of representation and retains a project that aims to uncover how relations of power are inscribed within discursive and ideological structures. This theory will inform a particular methodology for understanding how various subject positions – or classes – are articulated in the analysis to follow in the next chapter.

Part of what makes a critique of the type I am proposing so important is the existence of social agents who have harnessed the inherent creativity of language in order to expose and respond to the otherwise invisible power structures with which language bears a relationship. Indeed, the very fact that resistance occurs at all, in any ostensible form, implores us to reject both the attempts of structuralism (broadly speaking) to foreclose the possibilities of diachronic, historically-specific subjectivity and action, and those readings of post-modernism that suggest the radical denial of critical subjectivities. That new social movements have managed to “offer the possibility of new projects, new ways of viewing the world and of organizing social life” (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991, p. 145), attests to the reality of what Angus calls “voicing”, that is to say the emergence of social actors who use language in a new way, who lend it a new “voice”. The emergence

of such actors is the construction of new or “unexpressed” social beings who condense previous events in a “refiguration of common sense” that can make us see the need for “remedial action” (Angus, 2000, p. 150). It is a sort of interpellation¹ in resistance, as new subject positions – the “green consumer” for example – are “called into being”.

I mean this to say that while new formulations are created by the active work of agents, these articulations also arise in some fashion out of existing discourses, thus lending them some measure of structure. This is not an Althusserian interpellation, therefore, because individuals are not “hailed” by material social structures or institutions *per se*, but rather by the ways that discourse is and can be mobilized by agents located in particular social positions that are in turn created out of these discursive formations. Green consumerism is critical of existing environmental and consumer practices, certainly, but its existence owes as much to the discursive space afforded it within society as it does to the active resistance of agents to these practices. Hence, the “green consumer” is “called into being” by the system, but also seizes the system to say things the system neither foresees nor wants. Of course, questions remain: is this hailing enough to sustain the type of fractured, pluralistic ethic of opposition characteristic of post-industrial ideology (Thompson, 1984)? Is the call of new social movements muffled, as it were, by mediating discourses premised on a vocation of “informing” through constructions of objectivity? It seems that these questions, despite their anachronistic appearance in the era of computer-mediated communication, are evoked all the more

¹ It should be clear that I am using this word not strictly in accordance with its Althusserian definition. As a term, however, it does allow a certain preservation of a notion of ideology within a theory of discursive practices, or the sense that discourse is a social phenomenon that actively positions subjects in ways not entirely under their control. But I am losing the term from its root materialist connotations, so that it refers more to the functioning of the discourse than an attempt to make some unproblematic causal link between discursive and economic structures.

forcefully by the standing evidence that, “in fact”, social/critical theory still has resistant practices to interrogate and inform.

Language and power

It is as though these taboos, these barriers, thresholds and limits were deliberately disposed in order, at least partly, to master and control the great proliferation of discourse, in such a way as to relieve its richness of its most dangerous elements; to organise its disorder so as to skate round its most uncontrollable aspects....We must conceive discourse as a violence that we do to things, or, at all events, as a practice we impose upon them; it is in this principle that the events of discourse find the principle of their regularity (Foucault, 1972, pp. 228-229).

To account for the mutual implication and functionality of language and power, in this view, is to affirm a couple of conclusions. First, it is to recognize the constructionist position that social and material phenomena are not “given” to the world and are not merely invested with *a priori* significations such that the only thing required is an appropriate system of nominalization which would facilitate communication and social exchange. On the contrary, these phenomena are given to consciousness (although this term too is profoundly interrogable) *by* language, so that it is the organization of subjects and objects in discourse that provides them with the meaning that we often take as intrinsic.

Second, power cannot be located singularly, nor is it unilaterally exercised, so that a given collection of power-bearing subjects impose from a quasi-transcendental position a calculable effect, or series of effects, on the dominated. Subjection, as we will see later on, is a ubiquitous and reciprocal – or “dialogical” (Falzon, 1998) – registration of power that could not occur without this very reciprocity. This needs to be stressed: the power described here and found in discourse analysis is not unilateral power, from top to

bottom, exercised by the powerful upon the powerless. It is a reciprocal relationship in which those with some tactical advantage use the tools (language) at their disposal to advance their interests but in which the tactical advantage may potentially and suddenly shift. Discourse analysis, therefore, reveals the social relation as expressed in language to be in the nature of an “agonistic” or a “game”, the result of which is the ordering of society into more-or-less reliable hierarchies of individuals, subjects, phenomena, etc. As Eder suggested in the previous chapter, therefore, understanding the organization of class positions is both to recognize their ultimately constructed nature and to posit a tacitly sanctioned circulation of these identities that can conceivably conceal class domination beneath the cloak of pluralism.

Foucault’s rejection of both humanist and metaphysical ontologies, and of their accompanying epistemologies, informs a notion of power that defies precise structural location or identification.² Power, in perhaps Foucault’s most famous formulation, is intimately bound up with knowledge, such that the ability “to know” the discrete objects that comprise the world constitutes, in specific historical institutions and practices, the realm of power. Although Foucault’s work on power is fundamentally irreconcilable with an attempt to locate this power in systemic domination, his incisive analyses do underscore that knowledge is an entirely contingent structure, one that presupposes the construction of standards by which phenomena (and this extends to subjects as well) can be measured and categorized. “Classification is an instrument of control in two directions: control over the flux of physical and social reality...and society’s control over conceptions of that reality” (Kress and Hodge, in van Leeuwen, 1996, p. 46). The

² I am aware here of a risk of offering a rather facile presentation of Foucault’s more dynamic formulations of power. My only defense is that space compels me to strive for brevity, so hopefully this selective extraction of some basic ideas will prove sufficient toward the aims of this chapter.

exercise of power is an implicit recognition that existence is fundamentally disordered – that is, it is the striving to suppress the boundless meaning of the world by imposing structure on it. As such, “every interpretation of the order is an arbitrary imposition or a violent practice” (Shapiro, 1992, p. 270). Language – or more broadly, discourse – is a primary mechanism by which this structure is inscribed, in all sorts of institutional practices, and most profoundly in the intimate spheres of the subjective.

In this way, Foucault dismisses the representational or foundationalist view of a language that more or less truly reflects an objective and separate dimension of existence, and which would favour a view of discourse as not constitutive but representational:

The various objects, roles, events, and actions that are part of our everyday discourse are discursive objects; they are phenomena that have meaning within ways of speaking and understanding that *are* the power and authority systems of the society....Linguistic domination is not a strategy in the self-conscious and immediate sense in which a person or group is said to dominate another with resort to particular categories and rhetorical styles. The strategic dimension of linguistic practices for Foucault is institutionalized. It is already implicit in what the groups and individuals in a society “know” about each other (Shapiro, 1981, p. 162).

Discourse is a device of surveillance, a mechanism of control that is effective because it structures all communication, it governs all social exchange, or the play of tensional forces that define power. The effectivity of “discursive practices” is that they are internalized within the very instruments of social being and control to such an extent that they become undetectable as such. Naturalization of the symbolic organization that discourse imposes – for example, the discourse of law – is essential, for “modern power is tolerable on the condition that it mask itself – which it has done very effectively” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. 130).

It is under the conditions of power that both knowledge – as a correlate of, but not identical to, power – and truth are constituted. The actual embodiment of this truth, again, depends on the particular historical situation of the discursive practices that simultaneously define and legitimate it – and which in turn are legitimated by truth.

Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth, that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true (Foucault, 1980, p. 131).

One such technique is the attribution of authorship, the presence of which serves to delimit different forms of discourse, but the absence of which is equally meaningful, as in the scientific discourses which, arising in the 17th century, “were accepted on their own merits and positioned within an anonymous and coherent conceptual system of established truths and methods of verification” (Foucault, 1977, p. 126). The point is that authorship is ultimately a construct, one of many strategies that inscribe classificatory structures within texts and knowledge. A suitable “analytics” of historically-situated power can only proceed by interrogating particular forms of discourse – or “regimes of truth” – and the strategies they contain that institute the power of classification, in effect controlling the social distribution of meaning.

Bourdieu, in a somewhat different fashion, offers an analysis of linguistic practices that privileges their differential operationality in a linguistic market. This market operates homologously to other functioning markets (economic, cultural, etc.), positioning utterances within a field of discourse that offers the possibility of accruing profit to the speaker, depending on the position of the particular “expressive style” within the overall economy. But the linguistic economy does not operate autonomously from

other economies; rather, it functions within a complex of conditions that only together can assign symbolic power to a statement or set of statements. Again, this approach is grounded in Bourdieu's critique of the notion of linguistic competence formulated by Chomsky, as well as Austin's notion of linguistic performativity, which is the idea that outcomes can be produced simply through proclamations by speakers invested with the requisite authority. Instead, Bourdieu asserts that performativity demonstrates that a "closed" linguistic analysis cannot account for the sociological grounding of linguistic power; that for any utterance to be effective, it requires the operation of recognized institutions that afford it legitimacy and/or authority (Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 73-75).

But whence comes this delegated authority? To begin, Bourdieu does not appear to give a priority to language in the exercise of power, as did the early Foucault. But he does acknowledge, first, the importance of language in the institution of social division because, as Saussure assured us, the attribution of meaning through a system of difference is the axial principle of signification. Second, he ascribes to language a key role in the imposition of a "knowledge effect", or "theory effect", which gives language and cognition (which is in turn structured by language) priority in circumscribing social action, and not the "mechanical determination" such as that implied by traditional Marxism. Political power depends on the primacy of symbolic power, which condenses all forms of capital (economic, social, political, etc.) "when they are perceived and recognized as legitimate" (ibid., p. 230). But this subjective process of cognition operates within a "space of relations" that also objectively structures the action of the "probable classes"³ which are obliged to move within it by virtue of the labour required to acquire

³ Again, by referring to "probable classes" I am appropriating the view that sees class formations as discursive phenomena, and not solely or primarily determined by material or economic measures. That classes "exist in

capital within the social economy. Here Bourdieu's theory seems conflicted, for while making a type of "last instance" proposition for symbolic power, he nevertheless recognizes a sphere of action outside of the symbolic – a paradox with which he seeks to carve out a middle ground between what he calls "nominalist relativism" and the "realism of the intelligible". It is this relation between objective structure and symbolic system that defines "the production and imposition of the legitimate vision of the world" (ibid., pp. 231-235). And much like Touraine and Melucci, Bourdieu tells us that

Knowledge of the social worlds and, more precisely, the categories which make it possible, are the stakes *par excellence* of the political struggle, a struggle which is inseparably theoretical and practical, over the power of preserving or transforming the social world by preserving or transforming the categories of perception of that world (ibid., p. 236).

It might be helpful, in trying to come to grips with this complex relation between objective structures and symbolic processes, to defer to Angus' notion of the simultaneity of the representative and constitutive functions of language. What Angus calls "the materiality of expressive forms" – not just forms of communications media, but the articulation of real social effects and relations – is predicated upon the opening of a "primal scene of communication", an instituting of ways of knowing and understanding that is particular to societies that exist in specific spaces and times. Rather than merely conveying or transmitting meaning to and from subjects, media of communication coalesce in a specific historical constellation to constitute that very scene:

[T]he representative and constitutive aspects of communication are interwoven in the same communicative act. In phenomenological terminology, every communication act is simultaneously a "mundane" act within the given world-horizon and a "transcendental" act of constitution

probability" means that it is only through understanding the consensual or dominant symbolic organization of class positions that we can understand class relationships at all. It is through this organization that classes "move" and are "acted upon", through the various degrees of legitimacy that are afforded them by way of the prevalent discursive strategies that I will be outlining further in this chapter.

of that horizon....A contemporary rhetoric thus has less to do with persuasion in the sense of yielding assent to a given content, than with a deeper persuasion, inherent in every expression, to assent to the form of awareness that is manifested through the content (Angus, 2000, p. 41).

The “deeper persuasion” effected by the primal scene needs to be unearthed by a theory of discourse that is sensitive to the individual situation of media and discourses within this horizon of understanding. In this case, this means understanding news discourse as a *particular* expression of an organization of subjects in a social and political space. It entails accounting for the importance of this discourse to the structuring of the possibilities of social action. One way to suggest this would be to say that discourse not only reproduces a class structure in consensual and familiar ways, but just as importantly, it reproduces the “consensuality” of this structure. To understand this consensuality, though, is first to recognize that we are not dealing with a generalized discourse, but with a particular discursive formation possessed of a specific set of discursive rules that govern and generate this “feeling of consensus”.

Writing classes: News discourse as a discursive practice

Reactivating the audience: Theorizing the relationship between “newsreaders” and “newsmakers”

The preceding theories of the way power is inscribed in discursive relationships can be used to interrogate news discourse. Specifically, these are the ways in which news discourse helps to structure social action and ultimately write the world in relatively “consensual” terms that do not merely reflect how the world *is*, but actively determine the horizons of the future social choices that will produce or construct how the world *will be*. First, however, it is worthwhile to consider the role of the audience, for as influential as Foucault and Bourdieu’s analyses have been, they have been almost ineluctably prone to

the criticism that they more-or-less radically deny the possibility of agency. Agency in the context of “readership” can be taken to mean an active appropriation of texts and discourses, toward some actualization of projects of self-realization or identity construction. There are no straight lines to be drawn from the production of texts to the construction of subject positions, world-views, or social relations; instead, the appropriation and (re)production of social meaning is an interminably conflictual process that always contains the traces of struggle and opposition, and as such betrays the structuralist determinations posited (often implicitly) by some of these thinkers, Bourdieu especially.

This is the critique, and it is a well substantiated position that has informed the nominal “cultural studies” position, and some of the following theories of news discourse. The more interesting articulations of this position, especially in the area of news discourse analysis, strike a very delicate balance between it and a critical understanding of the operation of power within this discourse, and within the process of social construction in general. Simply stated, it is possible to conceive of audiences in an ideological role that need not undermine the status of reading as *activity* – as not so much a cognitive absorption of things “as they are”, or readers as passive subjects waiting for infusions of meaning, but as a practice wherein reading coincides with writing, so that social beings are always actively engaged in a construction of the world, but are bounded in this endeavour by the available resources of reading. Fundamentally, these are resources of meaning that are circumscribed by “real” social relations that bear a dynamic and reflexive relationship with the discourse that articulates and thus contributes to their reproduction. This is by no means a decisive resolution of the entrenched

structure/agency dilemma, but it allows for more nuanced accounts of how the matrices of social being are assembled. The following ideas, therefore, reflect this position and relate it specifically to the analysis of news discourse, which is the task at hand.

The first thesis concerning the positioning of audiences relates to the critique of subjectivity, which, briefly restated, holds that the unitary subject is itself a discursive abstraction or construction, the product of particular discursive formations embedded within specific historico-temporal configurations. In terms specific to news analysis, the “reader” is primarily a category, a construct within an established discourse that derives from its position within the complex of relations that comprise what we take to be “news”. For example, one might consider the notion, advanced most notably by political-economic critique (see Schudson, 1997), that the “reader” is in fact the “product”, sold to advertisers and therefore implicated in the political-economic structure of the news industry.⁴ However, taking the reader as given, which this approach does, works to obscure the discursive practices that define what it is to be a reader of news, what this practice entails, and what presuppositions readers bring to the act of reading. Moreover, it occludes the relationships between readers and other subjects involved in this discursive construction, especially the “producers”, whose social position vis-à-vis their audience in part imbues this discourse with the authority that makes it particularly effective *as news discourse*. So the analysis of the discursive construction of these subject positions within news – including among them readers, journalists, and the “objects” of news – should endeavour to understand how these positions are inscribed within the discursive practices

⁴ One of the more famous, though problematic, articulations of this is provided by Dallas Smythe, who through his formulation of “audience labour” suggests that audiences are not merely recipients of the “free lunch” of media content but actually “labour” to construct themselves as the commodity which media industries trade back and forth. See Smythe (1981).

of news production, which in no way excludes the act of consumption, as it is the active appropriation of these “imposed” categories that helps to establish continuities in the production of the discourse.

However, while we should not simply accept the reader as “given” and should recognize its socio-historical embeddedness, which limits the effectivity of texts, we should also beware of moving to the other extreme and claiming that the reader is somehow outside the text. For if we take the “active audience” proposition to its logical extreme, there would be little reason to suggest that we should have any semblance of social agreement, or the textual coherence that lets texts appeal to and be comprehensible for readers. While this may appear to be a facile counter-argument, it does beg a crucial question, one echoed by Nicholas Garnham (2000): “Society is demonstrably unequal in its distribution of both material and symbolic resources and the life chances associated with them. Thus there is a permanent problem of explaining how such a society is legitimized” (p. 123).

The “subjectification” of news-readers happens partly through the mundane practice of assigning particular structures of style, more-or-less consistently employed throughout the production of news. In this way, readers are guided into anticipation of specific codes of interpretation, codes which reproduce assumptions about what readers know, what readers “ought” to know, and perhaps most importantly, what readers “want” to know or know about. Again, this does not necessarily contradict the idea that audiences are active, for it is a specifically interpretive practice that enables readership, or the access to “different kinds of structurings of knowledge which appear to be used in the shaping of discourse into coherent texts” (Fowler, 1991, p. 43). But in the process,

certain presuppositions are brought to bear on this reading practice that inhere within the imagined relationship between readers and journalists. This “imagining” is mutual, for as much as audiences turn to producers of news for “information” about the world (ostensibly a relation of dependency), and harbour conventional expectations of how this information is to be presented, so do producers construct an imagined audience to which this presentation is tailored. The point is that the nature of this relationship is one of a constructed reciprocity – as Hartley puts it, echoing Hall *et al.*, the language of news is intended to reflect “its version of the rhetoric, imagery and underlying common stock of knowledge which it assumes its audience shares and which thus forms the basis of the reciprocity of producer/reader” (1982, p. 95).

Of course, journalists are not outside these structural processes of subjectification; more, their positioning within the nexus of subjectivities that comprise news discourse is crucial to its effectivity. I do not intend here to belabour the assignment of authority to the news text, but it is important at least to consider briefly the construction of the subject of the news producer. From the outset it should be clear that any conspiratorial notions of journalistic bias – as in Herman and Chomsky’s *Manufacturing Consent* (1988) – are outside the realm of this discussion. This is not to say that “bias” does not exist, but rather that it is a subordinate concern to the production of the newsmaker within the discourse, as a social category through which we imagine that information is sifted and processed, with the help of an organization of values that guides the journalist. It should be clear, however, that “we” as a totality – notably in political culture – have contributed to the definition of these values, through collectively-shared abstractions such as objectivity, truth-value, journalistic integrity. As David Eason (1988) claims, these

notions have been shaken periodically by violations of these “sacred trusts”, such as the infamous Janet Cooke scandal⁵ – on one hand demonstrating the esteem in which we hold the occupation, and on the other questioning any absolute claim to the hegemonic function of journalism. The Janet Cooke incident involved a dialogue of contentious factors, rooted in local circumstances, that led to a more engaged critique of objectivity and the institutional practices that coalesced to define for a community of journalists what it meant to be factual, truthful, and trustworthy (ibid.).

But while pointing to the declining credibility of journalists in the eyes of the public after this scandal, Eason makes an interesting and contentious point, and I believe a claim for “objectivity” can be and is still based on a couple of ideas. First, as Eason suggests, following the explosion of diversity and the emergence of a postmaterialist politics in the 1960s and 1970s, debates flourished within the profession regarding the role of the journalist, with the “New Journalism” suggesting a more aesthetically informed and subjective method for communicating with an increasingly diverse public. He argues that the profession maintains within itself a nostalgia for a “simpler” time when the contradictions of journalism under postmodernity had yet to appear (Eason, 1988, p. 223). What particularly rattled both journalists and readers in the Janet Cooke case was that it demonstrated in practice that the boundary between fact and fiction could no longer be looked to as a failsafe location. This would logically appear, as Eason maintains, to lead to a decline in the confidence of the public in journalism as a whole – to disabuse a reading public of their illusions that journalism presents a reliable version of

⁵ Janet Cooke was a *Washington Post* journalist who won the Pulitzer Prize in 1980 for a feature article about the composite character “Jimmy”. Eason points out that once the “untruth” of the story was discovered, reaction within the community of journalists was not only emphatically disapproving, but devolved to a discourse on race, the politics of equal opportunity hiring, and the “predicament of middle-class black reporters as mediators between a predominantly white management and audience, and a black ghetto underclass” (Eason, 1988, p. 213).

reality. If Eason's account is to be believed, however, the general discussion still radiates around notions of truthfulness and objectivity, because in spite of the exposure of Cooke's indiscretion – which was perhaps only a radicalization of other conventional practices – readers still maintained an expectation of honesty and integrity. Moreover, the disaffected public sought an outlet for representing the disparate voices of the new political landscape – a medium that could help institute the reciprocity newly engendered by the politics of fragmentation. In spite of Janet Cooke, there remained an expectation of the maintenance of journalistic objectivity, and of journalism as an approximation of a public sphere that was ostensibly threatened by the fragmenting political landscape. Readers were holding onto this nostalgia for the simplicity of times passed as much as were journalists.

Eason's critique is flawed because it posits the construction of these expectations primarily within a professional dialogue between journalists, and ignores the historical and continuing role of the "reading public" in this construction. He makes no broader link between these imaginings and the social, except to suggest a lag between newer public expectations for journalists and the journalists' expectations of themselves. This is his main point, in spite of his concluding claim that

[r]eporting, after all, does not merely register some reality outside itself but is a symbolic process for naming and evaluating the world, for creating our collective reality. Journalism, however, is only one of the ways we do so; it is part of a larger social fabric where it influences and is influenced by our ways of making sense (ibid., p. 220).

This is all very well, but the problem is that in his appraisal the journalist as professional is alone held responsible for setting the boundaries of journalistic standards. In contrast and response, I suggest that the journalist is not the product exclusively of her

relationship to “one text”, or one profession considered in its historical context, but as a space of interpellation. Journalists are not only subjected to the authority of convention or occupational practices and standards, but of a full range of discourses that constitute the terrain of ideology. Readers and journalists are mutual constructs, existing within a particular discursive practice that in total positions them and creates their meaning.

Redistributing class positions

In addition to this basic interpellation as reading subject, news discourse contains the residue of what Morley (1980), citing Pêcheux, calls “interdiscursivity”, by which subjects are hailed by a multiplicity of discursive formations, resulting in an overdetermined complex of potentially conflictual subject positions. It is short-sighted, at best, to posit a “one text/one subject” relation as an object of investigation, rather than a determinate space of interpellation wherein this cacophony of subjectivities is somehow reconciled – what Laclau calls a process of “disarticulation/rearticulation” of oppositional subjectivities within ideological discourses (in Morley, 1980, p. 164). News discourse is therefore a distillation of some of these interpellations. It should be possible to “re-disarticulate” the subject positions that are constructed within this discourse, in conjunction with other discourses in which the subject is also positioned. Further, these positionings, warns Morley, must be considered concretely within their specific social situation. Thus, “the subjects implied/implicated by the text are...always already subject within different social practices in determinate social formations – not simply subjects in ‘the symbolic’ in general. They are constituted by specific, historical forms of sociality” (ibid., p. 170).

Readers are not simply *implied* by the texts they read, they also occupy positions in the world which they bring with them to the reading of these texts. The proposal informing the following chapter is to analyze news coverage of recent global protest as a distillation of these particular interpellations, couched within a discursive practice that performs a dual ideological function. Thus, news discourse works to reconcile, through a process of “scripting” or “reduction”, the disparate subject positions that comprise these ideological subject-spaces. This is part of the active work of constituting the discursive spaces in which the discrete relations of subjects, classes, actions, spaces, etc., are organized and acted upon.

Here again we turn to the metaphorical importance of language as form, as a system of ordering principles that creates inclusion while simultaneously maintaining a priority of differences. The principle of difference is immanent to language as a system; however, the question of *which* differences and *for what ends* is a matter of social-symbolic organization. The version that I adopt builds on Kress’ (1996) appropriation of the notion of “habitus”, originally formulated by Bourdieu to designate the constellation of predispositions and competencies that constitute social practice at large, and subjects more specifically, within an economy of social-structural positions. These habitus are “*generative and transposable* in the sense that they are capable of generating a multiplicity of practices and perceptions in fields other than those in which they were originally acquired” (Kress, 1996, p. 17).

I want to apply this formulation by suggesting – in line with Eder’s notion of classes as probabilistic constructs – that the linguistic habitus activated in the moment of “news readership” reconstitutes social boundaries based on the conceivable totality of the

reading subject constructed by the experience of reading news. This totality is constructed from the stock of available presuppositions that the reader invokes in the act of reading. These presuppositions appear within the text as particular discursive structures that constitute subjects and actions. By these “strategies”, the immensity of possible (or probable) class positions that is the peculiar legacy of new social movements (see chapter two) can be reined in, classified and categorized in such a way that they cannot defy the boundaries that have already constituted these classes as something that can be written about. These boundaries are a measure of the coherence that texts require to function (see the discussion of critical discourse analysis, below).

This is not to suggest that “real” class positions do not exist, but that part of the ideological function of news discourse is to (re)constitute these divisions, in part by generating symbolically new sites of conflict (e.g., law and order issues, or contradictions within certain class formations) that serve as an effective redistribution of class structure which helps to “dissimulate” social relations – or at least, how these relations might be articulated by other, non-hegemonic actors. It is in the interdiscursivity of the experience of reading, unearthed by careful analysis and extrication of the constitutive discourses that comprise news language, that this redistribution can be detected. However, we must also be aware of the fact that this approach, if not qualified as such, also implies a transcendent position from which the dissimulation – and conversely, the real – can be assessed, a particularly tricky maneuver that seems immanent to the critique of ideology. But it would also seem that pulling the plug on some notion of ideology would leave us, again invoking Garnham, with insufficient explanation as to why structures of

domination and subjection are maintained despite a political culture claiming to be premised on the pursuit of “the good life”.

Language and ideology

Toward a useful conception of ideology: John Thompson

John B. Thompson (1984, 1990), through a series of analyses of positions on ideology, rescues ideology from both its post-modern and neo-Marxist oblivion, reinstituting the notion as one that attempts *critically* to explain the preservation of social domination occurring in particular contexts, and not as an innocuous concept engineered to explain any systematic organization of guiding principles that might support or legitimate any social formation. The latter is what Thompson calls a “neutral” conception of ideology, embodied, as he claims, in many versions of the ideology thesis, such as that propounded by Lenin⁶. Importantly also, this neutral variation of ideology permeates NSM theory – ideology is seen as one among a host of organizational “resources” that movements can employ to effect coherence and togetherness. Melucci, for example, offers that “[i]deology emerges as one of the main tools which can be used to guarantee integration”, or that “the control of ideology...is an important leadership resource, being as it is necessary in the continuous adaptation of symbolic representations to the present state of the movement” (Melucci, 1996, pp. 352, 353).

⁶ According to Thompson, Lenin was one of the first to move for the development of a “socialist ideology” that would be strategically capable of representing class interests, and presumably avoid the possibility that the “spontaneous trade-union consciousness” that was emerging at this time would be unrepresentative or damaging to this interest (Thompson, 1990, p. 45). This detaches the concept from its Marxian formulation, which would have ideology as a pernicious force exclusively for the sustainment of bourgeois rule, one that evolves naturally out of the class dialectic, and therefore a condition that would eventually be transcended with a successful proletarian revolution.

In these versions, ideology is the ambit of any social group that makes an attempt to become “for itself”, to represent purely to itself and to the world a coherent agenda, and a thought- and symbol-system that aligns with this agenda. Thus

Ideology, according to the neutral conceptions, is one aspect of social life (or form of social inquiry) among others, and is no more nor any less attractive or problematic than any other. Ideology may be as necessary to subordinate groups in their struggle against the social order as it is to dominant groups in their defence of the status quo....[I]deology may be a weapon which is orientated towards victory but towards no particular victor, since it is in principle available to any combatant who has the resources and skills to acquire it (Thompson, 1990, p. 53).

Instead, in Thompson’s critique, ideology can only be employed in the service of domination, to sustain the social stratification characteristic of a particular society. The “critical” conception of ideology holds that *“to study ideology is to study the ways in which meaning (signification) serves to sustain relations of domination”* (Thompson’s emphasis; Thompson, 1984, p. 130).

Actually, in my estimation Thompson’s interpretation of ideology is a composite of what he considers neutral and “critical” conceptions of this term. He extracts from Marx’s writings a notion of ideology that both verges on neutrality and confounds the association with Marx, as it does not lay emphasis on material conditions for its impetus. This “latent” conception of ideology is defined as “a system of representations which serves to sustain existing relations of class domination by orientating individuals towards the past rather than the future, or towards images and ideals which conceal class relations and detract from the collective pursuit of social change” (ibid., p. 41). There is a sense here in which ideology retains a connection to dialectical materialism in “class domination”, which we can assume to be conceived of in economic terms. But there is also a measure of autonomy granted to these symbolic constructions, in that by the force

of “immaterial” phenomena such as the weight of tradition, these constructions themselves can generate conditions that can either sustain or interrupt the status quo, and are not determined ultimately by the material base of production (ibid.). So it is that the relations of domination described in this latent conception of ideology pertain not only to economic divisions, but social disparities that register across a variety of the constitutive conditions of individual lives, such as gender, race, etc. This, of course, is the fundamental basis for the burgeoning of the identity politics that are the birthright of the new social movements (see the previous chapter).

Ideology in this view operates primarily through symbolic forms, but it is not immanent to the symbolic forms themselves. That is, these forms have to be mobilized toward sustaining a particular order of domination in a particular socio-historical situation, and therefore ideological critique has to treat these historical conditions as also productive of these significations.⁷ The other implication of restricting discussions of ideology to domination is that we can only identify “ideology” as those symbolic forms that participate in preserving social relations. The slogans of protest movements, for instance, are not ideological if they are making the characteristic and intentional attempt to subvert “dominant” messages, marking an important departure from the neutral conception of ideology that would include these messages as merely countervailing and particularistic ideological forms. We can assume, however, that these same slogans *are* ideological if they have been harnessed in some way to other ideological forms – such as commercial culture – or actively appropriated by other institutions that mobilize these meanings to the ends of social domination.

⁷ We can understand this as another in the line of criticism directed at synchronically-driven theories of some branches of linguistics, as noted above.

What this highlights, importantly in my view, is that ideology does not need the intentionality of authorship either to exist or to be effective. It is a condition of meaning, but one that is subject to the entire “primal scene of communication” for its expression and meaning – it must often rely on multiple mediations that distance it from any “original” formulation, and therefore confound any exhaustive search for ideology in things like editorial or journalistic “bias”. This suggests also that the messages of “subversive voices” are not necessarily beneficial and uncontrived, or that they express fundamentally sound truths that are covered over by the illusive work of ideology. Thompson is very careful to strip the notion of its pejorative connotations – ideology defined as necessarily spurious, “erroneous”, etc. – while at the same time attempting to avert the neutralization of the concept that he claims has characterized most contemporary formulations. Thus, “the characterization of symbolic phenomena as ideological does not directly and necessarily imply that these phenomena are epistemologically flawed” (ibid., p. 57).

Nor does a critical conception of ideology need to presume a “social cement” effect of ideology, whereby the markers of social stratification are somehow smoothed over and a shared set of core values or beliefs – the “dominant ideology” – effects social stability. Thompson suggests that, on the contrary, it is the incredible fragmentation of dissensus in recent Western society that has helped to preclude cohesive political opposition to “the system”. This is a partial effect of a differentiation of standards of adjudication among different modes of social production; for example, “the insulation of the economy and the polity, which prevents questions of industrial organization from appearing as political issues” (Thompson, 1984, p. 33). In lieu of the dominant ideology

thesis, Thompson moves for a view to the complex of forms and practices that weave together to sustain relations of domination, especially in a society characterized by this kind of fragmentation. This splintering makes salient the specific contextualisation of ideology; differences in the way in which ideology is instituted – which includes practices of interpretation and “acting upon” – can exist across not only different classes and cultures, but in terms of discursive practices or symbolic forms that presuppose different rules and codes of reception. To cite an easy hypothetical, we might consider the differences in the registration of the kind of “civil dissent” enacted in Seattle and Quebec City between news discourse and a situation-comedy television show. Quite simply, these are two *potential* symbolic-ideological forms that instill divergent audience expectations and structures of reception. They could both convey the same ostensible content, with diverse ideological effects, and vice-versa. What is important, therefore, is removing the stigma of universal coherence from the concept of ideology, to more clearly understand the particular way that ideology operates in specific situations.

The emphasis on symbolic forms in this case stresses their constitutive function, so that significations are not ordered by social phenomena that exist independently of these forms. This is a departure from the Marxian conception, and even post-Marxist adaptations such as that by Althusser, which, although granting some priority to the symbolic processes of subjectification, posits the infamous last-instance determinism of economic production. Both of these versions tend to ossify the objects and conflicts around which symbolic production is mobilized; they maintain a foundationalist view of social organization that denies the constitutive function of symbolic processes in constructing, changing, or sustaining the very processes – notably economic production –

that these thinkers would assign causal priority. Turning to language, “once we recognize that ideology operates through language and that language is a medium of social action, we must also acknowledge that ideology is partially constitutive of what, in our societies, ‘is real’” (Thompson, 1984, p. 5).

These are the basics of Thompson’s notion of ideology, which I believe is suitable for this analysis, for the following reasons. First, it maintains that we can dispense with assuming that all ideology is nefarious, while nevertheless locating it within particular instances of subjection. Second, and relatedly, it retains the semi-autonomy of culture by insisting that while symbolic forms are the primary mechanisms for the institution of ideology, they are not immanently ideological. In this way, he avoids the pitfalls of a totalizing account and moves for a “depth-interpretation” model that sets significations against their particular and partially-constitutive social and political horizons. Third, and following some of the claims made in the previous chapter, it liberates the more popular “critical” versions of ideology (i.e. Marx) from the trappings of economic determinism, making it available as a critical tool for the analysis of domination across other lines of social conflict.

Lastly, and this is perhaps most important for this analysis, by linking ideology up specifically with ubiquitous symbolic forms, he makes a special case for the importance of language to ideology. As Catherine Belsey puts it, “Ideology is inscribed in signifying practices – in discourses, myths, presentations, and re-presentations of the way ‘things’ are – and to this extent it is inscribed in the language” (1985, p. 42). In the next section, I will work from Thompson’s view of language and ideology into a discussion of critical discourse analysis, to suggest how this school of analysis has formulated some

methodological tools amenable to understanding the workings of ideology in news discourse.

An introduction to critical discourse analysis

If we add to the real complexity of the sentence...we can see that few commuters on the 8:05 from Brighton would have the energy to perform the mental gymnastics required. Especially as they would have to perform them not once, but just about a dozen times on every full line of newsprint they scan. After all, the crossword is there for mental exercise (Hodge and Kress, 1993, p. 22).

The fundamental assumption – in line with the above discussion – is that language is a particularly important site of ideology, because of its intimate relationship with power, and its role as a constitutive element in the structuring of social relations and processes. The authority of a particular act of language derives from its position within a structured hierarchy of possible utterances, made from speaking positions organized within a similar economy within which each utterance is differentially assigned a degree of legitimacy. Discourse is structured ideologically at two interrelated sites: in production, which is usually the access point for political-economic critique, and in reception, in the establishment of structures of discursive coherence that anticipate an audience and conform to the discursive codes particular to that discursive formation. Thus, “a text is written *for* an audience and the anticipation of its reception by that audience is part of the conditions of the production of that text itself” (Thompson, 1984, p. 195).

Language is ideological because it is properly a form of action. Discourse is an intervention by and upon social actors, precisely because of its function as constitutive of the way we imagine our relationship to the world, to other actors, and our mode of understanding the interaction of “others” in this world. In this definition, Thompson

comes strikingly close to espousing an Althusserian notion of practice, which, according to Fowler, is “an intervention in the social and economic order, and one which in this case works by the reproduction of (socially originating) ideology” (Fowler, 1996, p. 3). Both language and action therefore presuppose an act of interpretation, an act made possible not by a categorical and static determinacy of meaning – a condition held by proponents of the dominant ideology thesis – but, says Thompson, precisely because interpretation is a fundamentally open process: “Relations of domination are sustained by a *mobilization of meaning* which legitimates, dissimulates or reifies an existing state of affairs; and meaning can be mobilized because it is an essentially open, shifting, indeterminate phenomenon” (ibid., p. 132). This is not to say that discourse and its effects on the world cannot be structured; quite clearly, my position, echoing Thompson, is that there is a generalized ideological effect that harnesses signification by appealing to the structures specific to a discursive practice. Indeed, interpretation paradoxically requires both openness and structure to be ultimately possible, and to be effective as the kind of social intervention that Thompson describes.

The structures of particular discourses, according to Thompson, are reconstituted each and every time that structure is appealed to by a discursive actor (a reader of a newspaper, for instance). As Thompson further points out, this process is part of the “symbolic reproduction of social contexts”, which is also the reproduction of the social relations involved in both the production and reception of the discourse: “That is, the meaning of symbolic forms, as received and understood by recipients, may serve in various ways to maintain the structured social relations characteristic of the contexts within which the symbolic forms were produced and/or received” (Thompson, 1990, p.

153). What I think Thompson fails to emphasize sufficiently is the extent to which occurs, alongside this structural reproduction of the relations of the production/reception of symbolic forms, a reconstitution of social divisions not ostensibly involved in the production of the discourse.

This, in my estimation, is an important piece of the work of ideology: the capacity of certain discursive practices, by virtue of the interpretive rules inscribed in the discourse, and the extrinsic social-symbolic power afforded it, to distribute and redistribute social positions. In a nutshell, discursive practices, with more or less efficacy, define and determine class positions, through the reductive “symbolic violence” that is the domain of discourse. In terms of social context, discourse takes the immensity of available significations, and renders it coherent according to general expectations of the discourse (the “things” it can talk about with authority), and the elements of meaning that have been repeatedly reconstituted in ways particular to that discursive formation. “A discourse”, says Fowler, “provides a set of possible statements about a given area, and organizes and gives structure to the manner in which a particular topic, object, process, is to be talked about” (Fowler, 1996, p. 7).

These elements of meaning, and their effects as forms of ideology, are the concern of a school of theory called critical discourse analysis (CDA). Broadly speaking, by merging the technical and methodological elements of linguistic analysis with a critique of ideology, CDA endeavours to unearth structures of social domination (in Thompson’s terms) that generally lay undetected beneath discursive practices. CDA entails an expansive definition of discourse. Elements of news discourse that are analytically up for grabs include photographs, newspaper layout, sequence of news

stories in television newscasts, etc. (see for example Kress and van Leeuwen, 1998; Allan, 1998). In this case, however, I will restrict my comments for the most part to the study of language, focusing on some basic CDA proposals for the analysis of linguistic structures.⁸ But the attention to the expansive nature of discursive forms does indicate firstly the insistence of CDA on heeding all of the shortcomings of “closed” linguistic analysis, particularly its inattention to the social and historical contexts of particular discourses, and its inability to recognize the constitutive role of language in relation to social structure. In what is considered a founding and seminal work in the field, Hodge and Kress propose CDA as a method of analysis that

directly opposes the founding assumption of traditional linguistics, that there is an object, “language”, which is identified especially with the phonological and syntactic regularities of a language, which is a social fact that exists, in its unity and coherence, outside and prior to any particular linguistic act which instantiates it (1993, p. 203).

Further, “Critical discourse analysis explores the tension between these two sides of language use, the socially shaped and the socially constitutive, rather than opting one-sidedly for one or the other” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 55).

Second, because of this sensitivity to matters of context, CDA has flourished as a tool for the analysis of media discourse, and this also for a number of additional reasons. For one, the institution of ideology presumes a certain ubiquity (although not total) of discursive competence, on the part of both the producers and the consumers of this discourse. Mass media in particular dramatically enhance the dissemination of these different competences – or, *habitus*, to use Kress’ reformulation of Bourdieu – and

⁸ I do not want to presume here that CDA is uniform in the nature and development of analytical approaches. Indeed, as Garrett and Bell (1998) make clear in the introduction to their volume, authors in the tradition of CDA have diverse areas of concentration. CDA, therefore, is “best viewed as a shared perspective encompassing a range of approaches rather than just one school” (Garrett and Bell, 1998, p. 6).

therefore comprise an attractive site for more comprehensive studies of discourse. Simply, ideology assumes a “public-ness” of discourse that critical linguistics, the theoretical predecessor of CDA, made a specific target of analysis. Here CDA merges the critical and neutral conceptions of ideology, emphasizing “discourse as the instrument of power and control as well as...discourse as the instrument of the social construction of reality” (van Leeuwen, in Morrison, 1996, p. 233). CDA provides a way into media discourse as an institution of ideology, but one that can take into account the entire complex of ideological forms that exist within particular relationships between media, discourses, and discursive and social actors, by keeping true to the task of considering the contextualisation of discourse as a social practice.

Many of the authors that are included in this field, especially Fowler (1991), van Dijk (1988; 1988a), and Fairclough (1995), have isolated news discourse as a fruitful object of study, for a few important reasons. News discourse, for one thing, is perhaps the most recognizable approximation of the “public-ness” of discourse, which as noted above makes it especially fertile ground for ideological critique. It is both reflection and constitution of the background consensus that necessarily informs how we make sense of our political situation, especially how we classify and anticipate the actors in these “stories”. News, above all through the sanctity of the notion of objectivity, purports to have a “declarative” function – basically, it claims to tell us what has happened, who is responsible, who has been affected, etc. The moment of this declaration in part defines the relationship between producers and consumers of news, and exists in the background of news as an overall discursive practice. There is no shortage of work pointing out how the illusion of objectivity is constructed (see for example Tuchman, 1978), but it is an

example of the type of “element of meaning” that a discursive practice reproduces implicitly at the moment of its activation – in this case, both the moment of making news and the moment of reading it. Every discursive practice relies on these types of conditions; news, however, being one of the primary discourses that we rely upon ostensibly to inform social action, requires special attention to the ways in which dominant social structures are codified within these taken-for-granted conditions.

The aspect of news discourse that I will emphasize, both here and in the analysis to follow, is how it delineates class positions within particular news contexts, mainly through the characterization of the actions of these groups. This is a process of positioning actors by situating them within specific discursive spaces, by constituting their negotiation of this space by assigning them actions and hence identities that are primarily relational to other actors (and their actions) in the same space. Van Leeuwen defines the question that concerns CDA vis-à-vis the positioning of social actors as one about the discursive rendering of social practices:

[H]ow are social practices transformed into discourses about social practices – and this both in the sense of what means we have for doing so, and in the sense of how we actually do it in specific institutional contexts which have specific relations with the social practices of which they produce representations (van Leeuwen, 1996, p. 38).

CDA associates these positionings with various discursive strategies that produce subjectivities that are more or less visible, active or passive, or ideological, in the sense that their “agency” is downplayed in favour of constructing scenes of action that are distanced from the singularity of the event and familiarized in models of coherence that “make sense” for the reader. There is a wide array of such strategies; I will only outline a few here that are particularly relevant to this study. These strategies, for my purposes, can

be divided into two main categories: first, what are variously called “transformations” or “transitivity structures”, which refer specifically to the way that subject roles are constituted syntactically; and propositional content, through which the larger meanings of the text are linked with smaller units of meaning in the text.

i) Transformations

Transformations are defined by Hodge and Kress as “a set of operations on basic forms, deleting, substituting, combining, or reordering a syntagm and its elements” (1993, p. 10). They pertain in this case to the “transactive model” of syntax, where a sentence contains a model of action effected by a subject onto an object (or another subject). In this case, we might consider the hypothetical example: “Police arrest protester”. In this example, “police” is constituted as the agent of the action, commonly denoted by the “left-hand” position of the actor, and the “protester” becomes the “patient” or the recipient of the action. This is an “active” syntactic construction, and is not technically a transformation; it is privileged as a sort of base syntactic formation upon which transformations can be effected, although in the interests of avoiding assumptions about which constructions are “normal” and which not, I use the word “activation” and consider it equally to the “true” transformations. The next type is “passivization”, and in a simple formulation this strategy would simply entail switching the position of the agent and patient roles: “Protester arrested by police”, or, “Protester arrested”. The latter example is what is usually called “agent deletion”, in which the presence and agency of an actor is presumed but not made explicit. The last type, nominalization, refers to the transformation of an action or process into a nominal form: “Arrests made at protest”. In

this example, both “arrests” and “protest” are nominalizations of actions that could otherwise be constituted by the activation strategy.

Propositionally, as both Fowler and Hodge and Kress note, there is little to choose between these constructions – they all involve the same actors, the same action, and presumably the same outcome. But each construction is a different “strategy” because it represents a discursive and hence ideological choice, and moreover it embeds it within syntax, a structural condition of language so intrinsic to its operation that, in the practices of interpretation that are generally so automatic, it can easily go unnoticed. In this way, “[the reader] is continually coerced into taking surface form as the real form; and that surface is a radically transformed version of the originally chosen linguistic form” (Hodge and Kress, p. 28). “Coerced” is perhaps too strong, but this quotation does convey the sense that these transformations have certain mystificatory potentials; the latter two examples in the last paragraph, in deleting actors, imply different degrees of responsibility for the event to the patient role than the first example. Echoing Halliday, Fowler suggests that “transitivity is the foundation of representation: it is the way the clause is used to analyse events and situations as being of certain types” (Fowler, 1991, p. 71). Moreover, representation implies choice, and so the particular transformational choices made within the discourse are always ideological – not only do they represent choices made, but perhaps more importantly, interpretive options suppressed and foreclosed (*ibid.*).

It is better to understand these implications contextually, so the next chapter will provide further explanation of how these strategies work. Briefly, however, CDA literature attributes some main effects to these transformations, and I will introduce a few

of them here. Both of the “proper” transformations are best understood as products of the work of backgrounding/foregrounding – they can work to obscure or circumscribe the roles that certain actors play in events, in favour of other narrative elements that conform more to the expectations of audiences in decoding the text. The ideological motivations for these strategies can often be masked in functional explanations; Fowler suggests that passivization often occurs in headlines, where economy of print space is essential, or when agents can be assumed from the context, or are assumed to be “immaterial” (Fowler, 1991, p. 78). These reasons show the extent to which these choices can be construed as products of routinized journalistic practices, such as headlines, or “common-sense” decisions that assume a relatively consensual interpretation of what makes an agent “immaterial”, or known from the context.

Nominalization is also a technique of backgrounding, but in this instance it is agency in total that is deleted, so that events and processes assume a mechanistic, pre-determined quality. The ideological effect here is the hypostatization or reification of the definitive relationships between actors involved in the “event” – “arrests made” compresses the physical and legal act of arresting an individual accused of breaking the law into an institutional exercise. Combined with the nominalization “protests” – another compression of a complex of actions, motivations, and relations between actors – the reader is given the sense that these two “events” are implied together almost naturally. Further, nominalization of action deprives the event of the element of time – the processual nature of the action(s) is objectified, removed from the sequence of causative forces that has led to this particular state of affairs. “Globalization” is perhaps the most overwhelming example, because as a still relatively contested definition, it nevertheless

holds within it a vast number of actors and actions, processes, histories, implications, events, that grossly exceed any connotation of the word itself.

ii) Propositional structures

Whereas the study of transformations focuses on individual syntactic choices as signifying elements, the analysis of propositions is more concerned with making connections between smaller grammatical and lexical structures and the broader meaning of texts. The construction of effective propositional content is coterminous with effecting “coherence”, which means basically that the individual elements of sentences, or paragraphs, or texts, come together in a way that makes sense for the reader, both in her/his understanding of grammatical structure, and in the semantic work that correlates the reader’s presuppositions about the events or actors depicted with the words on the page. Because “the ability to construct coherence is dependent upon the resources readers have access to[,] their identity”, coherence as a strategy is manifest in the text as an expression by the journalist of his/her expectations of readers’ coherence models (Gough and Talbot, 1996, p. 227). This is not necessarily an effortful or conscious process – this is where the ideology of news discourse re-enters, in the formation of generalized assumptions about what constitutes the “common-sense” of the story, about how presumably disparate coherence models of readers can be subsumed within one discursive space or set of narratives.

Van Dijk (1988) explains the effectivity of coherence strategies in terms of the interplay of macropropositional and micropropositional content that forms a “macrostructure”, or an organization of “global coherence”. Forming macrorules that govern the operation of the macrostructure is a process of semantic reduction of

complexity; “macrorules operate rather straightforwardly by reducing details and normal components of political macroacts and by the application of general and particular political knowledge” (van Dijk, 1988, p. 37). Macrorules effectively reflect the presuppositions of the reader, because they draw on and make use of an anticipation of the reader’s prior knowledge of the macroproposition, or topic, of the text (e.g., “Police arrest protesters”). A prominent example of a macrorule in this case is what van Dijk calls the “construction rule”, in which “we can replace a sequence of propositions that denotes the usual conditions, components, or consequences of an act or event by one macroproposition that denotes the act or event as a whole” (ibid., p. 32).

One way that this can be accomplished is by the construction of “scripts”, with which we return to the designation of actors, for this discursive strategy reduces complexity by inserting actors into presupposed roles that define *a priori* what actions can be assigned to particular actors in the context of that specific event. Protesters, to anticipate the analysis, protest; this is the elemental presupposition that informs how a reader approaches a story about a protest action. Of course, this characterization omits a host of other elements – such as motivations, history of the opposition, other actions in which the group or individual has been involved, etc. – that may have been included under a different ideological vantage point. Fowler points to the generalization of issues of public order as one such construction, a technique that involves an indiscriminate characterization of all types of acts designated “public violence”. Among other things, this type of script “encodes a view of the world which assumes the polarization of groups, conflict of interest, and the desirability of the repression or destruction of ‘them’

(demonstrators, hooligans, etc.) by the legitimated agents who work on behalf of ‘us’” (Fowler, 1991, p. 144).

The constitution of actors within texts is therefore also subject to these types of propositional strategies; Van Leeuwen (1996) outlines a number of these constructions, which often involve a combination of transformational and propositional work. Again, this is a matter of specifying different types and degrees of agency in certain events, and it should be noted that these strategies are highly contingent on the nature of the story, the author’s mode of address, etc. Functionalization designates actors in terms of what they do, stressing the actions assigned to them as constitutive of their identity within the particular situation. This is often indicated by the transformation of a verb into a descriptive noun, such as “protester”. On the other hand, identification or essentialization refers to the representation of actors by “what they are” – a reliably static condition of their being that is evoked recurrently when these actors appear, such as “Canadians”, or “citizens”. Nomination, when actors are named or titled specifically, is a strategy usually reserved for actors in elite positions, or those “accessed voices” who are often called upon to offer direct comments, judgements, etc., connoting a degree of veracity and/or relevance to the actor’s statements.

These strategies and their implications are fairly straightforward; I have offered the preceding merely as a cursory glance at some of the different methods that CDA scholars employ in their analysis. And of course, I have selected many of these examples according to their relevance to the analysis to follow. But by way of concluding this section, I want to highlight some of the connections between these strategies and the conception of ideology that I have presented via Thompson. The work of engendering

coherence in news texts makes use of the presuppositions of the readers of news, of linking up models of comprehension that audiences bring to texts by structuring information in ways that conform to these presuppositions. But at the same time, CDA emphasizes that these structures are always choices, because within the complexity of an event such as a protest action – an event involving thousands of conceivably independent actors, countless discrete actions and interweaving relationships – strategies of reduction must be deployed to render the event comprehensible. On the surface this is a contradiction, for if coherence requires making information amenable to readers' assumptions, these must already, in a word, "exist". In a sense, they always do exist, but not so simply; the presuppositional models of readers are not just activated, but constituted and reconstituted in the practice of reading news. In this way, structures of common-sense are erected that circumscribe how events, actions, political processes, *can* be understood, and this is the fundamental reduction that news discourse accomplishes.

I have referred to these structures as "discursive spaces", which are fields of comprehension wherein actors move and act in relation to other actors within the same space, and it is these relations on which depends the institution of the "meaning" – or the macroproposition – of the text. The main effect of the construction of a discursive space is the distribution of class positions, in the sense that actors are classified predominantly within these spaces in a differential arrangement that will determine the identities of each actor. True to the critique of an economistic view of class formations, these classes will be defined only in ways that are particular to that space; so, "protesters" are defined beyond whatever economic status they may hold, because the relationships within which they are constituted in that space (to "authorities" especially) are not always

economically driven. Conceivably, these actors can exist within other, possibly conflicting discursive spaces, and again, it is the selection of discursive spaces appropriate to the scene that is being rendered in the text that marks the work of ideology. Syntactic transformations delimit how and to what effect actions unfold – who is assigned agency or blame for an occurrence, which actors are foregrounded or backgrounded and to what effect. Propositions combine the many elemental units of meaning in the text (I have covered only a very few here) in ways that register meaning in accordance with readers’ understanding of that particular discursive space. But again, it must be stressed that these spaces are constituted *by* the discourse at the same time as they are invoked to make sense of it. Because of this, readers are implicated in the instituting of ideology, and the act of reading news becomes one of the defining moments of the overall discursive practice of “news”. The practice of discourse – not just its production – is always an intervention in the social, because it is constitutive of how the social is ordered, and therefore plays a defining role in the preservation of structures of domination, however these may be defined.

Summary

In this chapter, I have argued that discursive practices do indeed constitute a site of ideology, or at least a particular conception thereof, and that news discourse in particular is a resource that can offer a glimpse into how particular discursive practices can work to institute ideological effects. I posited, mainly through the work of Bourdieu and Foucault, the intimate connections between language, power, and social order, and the “constitutive” function of language that has informed the critique of traditional

linguistic theory. I also suggested some of the discursive conditions under which news discourse can be effective, and specifically the mutual constructions of journalist and reader that partially create these conditions. From there it was necessary to arrive at some workable notion of ideology, and I did this with the help of John B. Thompson's comprehensive explorations of the theory of ideology, linking his proposal to reintroduce a critical conception of ideology, to the project of critical discourse analysis. After an outline of some of the analytical tools of CDA that have proved especially helpful in the forthcoming analysis, my conclusion is that news discourse as a social practice becomes ideological, in total, by constructing particular discursive spaces that circumscribe the action of particular classes, thereby defining the class itself within that particular space. As I will again suggest in the next chapter, it is when these classes are confined to these spaces, at the expense of situating them in other potentially more interesting or appropriate ones, that news discourse can make a contribution to the sustainment of "dominant" (not universal) understandings of class positions and actions.

IV. Constructing discursive spaces:

A discourse analysis of news coverage of global protest

This chapter will detail the analysis that has followed from some of the questions and suggestions posed in the preceding chapters. The broad question is: how are social actors constituted within particular narratives and dramas set within the context or scene of “global protest” (or “anti-globalization protest”, which is oddly and paradoxically co-terminous). Following this, how do these constructions of actors and their actions work to structure or delimit, in terms of their production, the meanings and understandings attributed by news readers to the broader complex of these actors? Put another way, this analysis endeavours to understand how news as discursive practice in the context of globalization – through the positioning of social actors, through the distribution of definitions of class and the relationships between these representations, through the circumscription of power, resistance, and “common sense” as an outcome of this distribution – operates as an institution of ideology.

I will first outline the methodological details involved in this particular analysis, with the aim of clarifying the assumptions that have informed and guided this study, and justifying them according to the object of analysis. Next, I will present the findings of the quantitative content analysis, mainly in terms of the frequency and consistency of subject positions found within the news text. Following from this, I will undertake a study of the propositional content of the coverage, employing an approach most similar to that of critical discourse analysis, as explained in the previous chapter. This textual analysis will work off of the indications of representativeness that the content analysis will detail, toward a more specific exploration of how the texts operate to construct modes of address

and action that together comprise a particular ideological articulation of what global protest is, and how it relates to globalization as a similarly articulated vision of what the world is. The reason for presenting the analysis in these two stages is that the content analysis will hopefully point to a few notable trends consistent with my hypotheses, in turn lending justification to the discourse analysis to follow. More importantly, my hope is that content and discourse analysis will work here in complementarity, so that the conclusions inferred by the quantitative study can be explained further by the study of the propositions of the texts – which is to say the link between the formal aspects of the text and the contextual situation of its subjects that together enable the text to mean something.

Part 1: Content analysis

The sample unit

For this study, the sample unit is comprised of two non-consecutive weeks of news coverage in the Globe and Mail. The news stories in the first sample set, dated Monday, November 29, 1999, to Monday, December 6, 1999 inclusively, all concern the “Seattle round” or “Millennium round” of trade negotiations by the World Trade Organization and its member nations, with emphasis on coverage of the protests that occurred in Seattle during these negotiations. The second sample set, dated Monday, 16 April, 2001, to Monday, 23 April, 2001 inclusively, is comprised of coverage of the “Summit of the Americas”, a meeting of member-nations of the Organization of American States (OAS) in Quebec City, again with emphasis on articles describing the

protest actions directed against those negotiations. As there is no edition of this newspaper published on Sunday, each sample set contains 7 articles, and 14 in total.

Articles were first chosen based on the availability of front-page coverage, and in these cases, “lead” headlines were given priority. The Quebec City sample set is comprised strictly of front-page selections, and includes the continuation of the article on subsequent pages in the front section of the newspaper. By contrast, the Seattle set has only two front-page selections and their accompanying continuations, with the remaining five items chosen according to their prominence in the appropriate subsection of the *Globe and Mail*’s front section, in this case “International News”. The reason is simply that the *Globe and Mail* did not run front-page stories every day. Further, sometimes when it did run front-page stories, the stories were not strictly-speaking “news” stories but had a more editorial feeling to them. So in the interest of abstaining from debates about journalistic or editorial bias, and maintaining an eye toward more “authorless” textual constructions, I decided to avoid editorial-style texts that appeared on the front page. One particular marker of texts of this type is an inordinately prominent “byline”, for example, “Madelaine Drohan: In Seattle”, and often with an accompanying photo of the journalist. The more editorial and argumentative approach of this type of journalism has other indicators, for instance, the invocation of the first- or second-person subject: “Whether you agree with their points of view or not...” (Drohan, 1999, A1). While there may be some justification for considering news discourse within the full plurality of modes of address (i.e., “hard news” vs. “editorial” styles), my goal was not to consider the editorial stance of the newspaper, or to question the advisability of placing an editorial-like story on the front-page, but to examine newstories that rely for their

legitimacy at least partly on the factual authority that we often ascribe to these authorless modes of address. So rooting out individual or institutional editorial biases is not the intent of this analysis, and further, this approach would have unduly complicated both the selection of the corpus and the analysis.

Similarly, the choice of only one newspaper offers the opportunity for a more rigorous concentration and explanation of the “micropropositional” content of the coverage, and again obviates the need to explore the “bias” thematic that often creeps more-or-less silently into cross-textual analyses. This is not to say that “bias” – based on factors such as ownership, the imagined audience, etc. – cannot “exist” in the way it is often defined, but more importantly that it is of lesser import to understanding the deeper, more fundamental properties of news discourse, as it is situated within the context of particular “issues” and events, that inform the background knowledge, or ideologies, that direct and maintain the ordering of the social.

For while the identification of the aforementioned causes of “bias” can lead to the formation of testable hypotheses, it ultimately relies on a political economic critique that is founded on the very notions that the trajectory of “new social movements” undermines. As I demonstrated in chapter two, both the development of these movements and their theorization are evidence of a decline of “last instance” explanations of the Marxist variety, even though in some respects these movements developed with an investment in neo-Marxist adaptations of the classical critique. Instead, there occurred an expansion of alternatives for founding a critique of “progress”, alternatives that were not confined to the realm of political-economy proper, but also the redressing of inequities rooted in the symbolic, manifested in the evolution of “identity politics”. Although these social

inequities still maintained a weak correlation with economic stratification, their existence within classes defined apart from the Marxist class dialectic compromised attempts to explain class relations solely based on the latter. Rather, classes exist in “probability”, as constructs that exist primarily within the symbolic organization that informs social action, an organization that is not determined by particular actors, as in the alleged biases of media ownership, but must be understood as a general ideological condition of which the press is only one manifestation, albeit an important one.

But as I also demonstrated in chapter two, this cannot be read as a justification for sundering the realms of the symbolic and the material, for inasmuch as material inequities are still recognized within the symbolic order – and this remains in the case of global protest – they have to be understood partially as products of the articulations of class that occur within discursive forms. Marxist political-economic critique presupposes these relations in a way that has been clearly undermined by this development, for the probability of these classes dictates that they can be formulated along lines that do not correspond with the central conflict of the material organization of society. This type of critique, therefore, asks to apply a set of fundamental *a priori* assumptions that cannot correspond to the nature of the analysis, and in any case, in assuming their veracity, would obviate the point of undertaking the analysis at all. In so far as questions of “bias” are usually mapped out by a critique of this type, they cannot be a focal point of this analysis.

My intention in limiting the sample unit in this manner is to allow a manageable consideration of the full range of subjects constructed within these texts. In other words, I have favoured expanding the range of subject variables at the expense of a larger body of

material. It is my contention that a limited sample of this type proves more amenable not only to quantitative study of the “content analysis” variety, but also a qualitative, “textual” analysis that allows a more explicitly interpretive approach. Practically speaking, expanding the sample unit much beyond what is here presented would have required more emphasis on statistical aspects, to the detriment of reflection upon textual features, compromising the more balanced tack attempted here between quantitative and textual-interpretive analyses. This is to say that this study neither relies upon nor rejects wholesale the helpfulness of content analysis. As an analytical tool, and even across such a small sample, content analysis performs some important functions. It offers mainly a preliminary confirmation that the trends assumed to exist within the sample do exist, and with a frequency that would justify reaching particular conclusions, in turn fuelling further analysis. It is therefore an exercise not in statistical exhaustivity, but rather of typicality. On the other hand, the actual study may also contradict the assumptions that informed the selection of sample material, which may either wholly refute some of the hypotheses, or texture the analysis with contradictions that can make for an arguably more sophisticated study.

But in the selection of an analytic schema, the classification of contents required by this type of study can implicitly make a claim to veracity that it cannot sustain by itself. That is, this classification, if not explained to the reader and tempered by a complementary analysis, can hide the assumptions that aided the selection of contents and the method of classifying them. This is to recognize that the object of study and the study itself cannot be separated, nor should they be. The very assumptions that enable an understanding of news discourse about global protest fold into this analysis mainly in the

method of classification proposed below, and especially in the delineations between subject positions. Therefore, the function of the content analysis here is primarily heuristic; it is not intended as statistical extrapolation – or to justify its own conclusions merely by the reliability of the method – but as a prelude to a “thick description” of the content. The “common sense” view of global protest and globalization, therefore, lends to its own critique because it provides the starting point – a neat and generally consensual classificatory schema of actors in the drama. Because of this, the methodology of a discourse analysis of this type has to be constructed relative to the context that the particular discourse constructs. In this case, the broad objective of this analysis is to understand how a certain vision of globalization is constructed through news discourse, which first requires that this understanding, in some way, already exists. There is therefore no reliably objective method, but only methods whose relevance and reliability can be tested reasonably against the background of their assumptions.

Analytic categories

Each text was analyzed along two main axes, “class of actors”, and “representation of action”, as shown in the “Tables of actors” provided in the appendix. First, I arrived at a classification of subject positions operant within the texts, based on the frequency of their appearance, and on their relevance to the central narrative. These positions are correlated across the two sets as much as possible; however, a certain variance was unavoidable, as some of the actors did not appear in both sets. Specifically, the class “trade negotiators” in the Seattle set was not prevalent in the Quebec set, as the Summit of the Americas was framed mainly as a meeting of heads of state and did not

involve the WTO. The class “trade negotiators” in the Seattle set, therefore, was substituted with the class “Summit participants” in the Quebec set. Also, the category “governments” in the Seattle set is intended to refer to government officials of WTO member nations acting in their capacity as governments – President Clinton or Prime Minister Chrétien as examples – as opposed to the capacity of officials as “trade negotiators”. For instance, although the “representative” political function of these officials is theoretically constant both within and outside of trade negotiations, there is a sense in the text in which “domestic duties” must be distinguished from actions and processes occurring in a space “outside” these local jurisdictions. This rings particularly true in the Quebec set, in which Chrétien is consistently made to address the “local” issue of the perception of the excessive “security measures” enacted in Quebec City.

Actors described using the pronoun “we” were also counted. It should also be noted that this tally required a particular interpretive maneuver on my part, in order to determine which class was being suggested by this designation. This is justified by way of suggesting, with more detail to follow in the analysis of the discourse, that inclusionary appeals to what I have designated the “unspecified” class – often the imaginary “we” – are made by each class at different times and to different ends. This indicates that the “we” is best thought of not as a discrete category of actor, but more importantly as one of the spoils of the struggle over the definition of the social, or the naming of the world. The “we” is the location of ideology, because it invokes an ostensibly collective determination of the bounds of action, and it is also ultimately a floating designation that is called into being by specific classes within particular discursive forms. The effect of this hailing, in short, depends on the very discursive “strategies” within discursive forms

such as news. So the “unspecified” class is the very thing toward which discursive strategies are aimed, and therefore it retains an important role in this discussion. It is not as “actors” that this class proves central, however, but truly as a “probable class”, because it is the positioning of its boundaries that the other classes hold as an objective. The “we” is not an actor who acts in this drama, but even in its absence will be acted upon through the general assumption of its existence.

Secondly, the actions of these classes of actors were categorized according to whether they were constituted in the active voice, the passive voice, or in the nominalized form, as defined in the previous chapter. I have made no distinction in my rudimentary tabulations between the “author’s voice”, quoted text, or an implied attribution, such as a paraphrase, with the reasoning that as significant as some of these discursive choices can be, the tabulation of these “voices” as very raw data is primarily to lend some direction to the discourse analysis following. It is at that point that the attribution and placement of quotes and paraphrases will be considered in more detail, after they have been situated within sites that the content analysis has indicated to be potentially fruitful for analysis. Having said that, quoted passages are noted in the “Tables of actors” in the appendix, by the addition of single quotation marks and a mention of the speaker in parentheses after the quote.

In terms of the description of actions, I have included the full range of actions in the tabulations. Therefore, no statistical distinction is made between, for instance, physical actions depicting confrontation and more “neutral” actions such as a declaration or statement. Again, as explained in the last chapter, formal elements of structure, such as the syntax that determines active and passive voice, must be considered alongside the

particular lexical choices that allow for specific connotations, such as the difference between “said” and “complained” in the description of a declarative action. Each action, whether isolated within a clause or sentence or occurring with other actions within the same unit, is tabulated separately. Therefore, a phrase such as “Sheila Katz of the Canadian Labour Congress said unions gave the offer some thought, but rejected it”, contains one discrete actor, in “Sheila Katz of the Canadian Labour Congress”, and three discrete actions: “said”, “gave the offer some thought”, and “rejected it”. Incidentally, these three actions are attributed in this schema to different analytical classes, which begs an explanation of some categorical assumptions that would inform such a choice. In this case, it is assumed that “unions” can be considered to be part of the broad oppositional class of protest groups. The action of Katz – “said” – is therefore attributed to the class “protest leaders”. The subsequent actions – “gave the offer some thought”, “rejected it” – are attributed to the class “protest groups”, as it is the “unions”, and not specified leaders, to whom the action is attributed.

At this point, it should be made clear that the differentiation both of actors and types of action is remarkably untidy and, to be performed with linguistic precision, requires an amount of analytical sophistication not possessed by this writer. I would maintain, however, that the endeavour, while not without its flaws, is nevertheless worthwhile, in that it will lend to and balance a fruitful demonstration of how the principles of critical discourse analysis can be applied toward a comprehensive account of a particular instance of communication. Further, having a sense of the frequency and consistency of these designations, even within a limited sample such as this one, helps to justify the closer analyses of the actual “content” of the coverage, which will follow.

Specifically, this provides the opportunity, after having mapped out some general trends among all of the coverage, to isolate a few texts that show these trends in a sample that is more manageable for a pointed discourse analysis. The benefits of the exercise, in my estimation, far outweigh the potential methodological shortcomings.

The selection of nominalizations is restricted to “verbal” nominalizations, that is, the nominalized forms of verbs, such as “protest march” (two nominalizations), and does not include nominalized forms of adjectives. This is again in the interest of maintaining a manageable sample, and in this case that means a focus on nominalization as a strategy of passivization, of generalizing or naturalizing action and, in some cases, deflecting agency, or a strategy of reification or mystification, by which social choices and processes may be consigned to latency within the nominalized form. That said, there is an extent to which all nouns are in a sense nominalizations, that within all nominal forms linger unspoken actions; Fowler has remarked that nominalization is a predominant capacity of the English language (1991, p. 79). The importance of this is that it calls into question any analytical delimitation of this kind of formal property of language. “The fence”, for example, contains within it the possible and implicit actions “to fence” or “to fence off”, both of which may by some interpretive licence be made applicable to this analysis. But otherwise innocuous-seeming nominals, such as “group”, with the implicit actions “to group” or “to group together” are not formally different; there is no immanent rationale for privileging one over the other as salient for this analysis and further, it is likely that either and both, again by some creative maneuvering, could be made relevant to this study.

It has been made clear that content analysis, while sometimes dressed in positivistic or empiricist garb, requires such choices and justifications. Formally, the manner in which I have limited my sample of nominalizations is ultimately justified only by the task that I have declared and the cultural relevance that these nominals suggest in this particular context. In a study of news coverage of neurological disorders, for instance, the nominalization “protest march” would not take on the same import as it does in this case. In some ways, this is both a criticism and a justification of this particular analysis. For by unearthing the assumptions that I have made in preparing this analysis, we are allowed a glimpse of the process both embodied within this study and the construction of news discourse in general. The cultural presuppositions made in either case inform the way that the objects of discourse – news and public discourse about globalization, or theoretical discourse about discourse itself – are acted upon.

Some preliminary figures and trends

Any numerical analysis of this kind contains some anticipations both of findings and conclusions, anticipations and assumptions that guide and inform the selection of variables, measures of frequency, consistency, etc. In this case, and following from the explanation of the syntactic transformations that are highlighted here, strategies of activation, passivization, and nominalization have been given priority in this study. My assumptions, generally speaking, were as follows: firstly, that the class “protesters” would be the agent most often constituted actively, with a preponderance of “aggressive” verbs that would situate them as the initiators of the confrontations between themselves and police, and assign them an agency mainly of violence and disorder that maintains a

definitive division between the protesters and more “legitimate” actors and institutions. “Authorities”, I assumed, would be most often constituted passively, both in the use of the passive voice and the nominalization of actions, such as “arrests”. Governments and the rough classes “negotiators” and “participants” would also be constructed as passive agents, as relatively anonymous, again with the anticipated effect of granting them the silent legitimacy and authority with which their positions as “leaders” and “officials” are imbued. These are not exactly surprising or innovative assumptions, no doubt, but firstly, it is arguable that assumptions ever are, and nonetheless, these are the ones that informed the above methodology, and hence also the following findings.

I have organized these findings according to two broad categories: frequency, expressed in absolute values, simply a counting of the number of times to which a group was referred, etc., and then compared between sample sets; and consistency, meaning how consistent similar findings were across particular sets of variables and sample sets. I looked specifically for 1) consistency within classes and across the different transformations; 2) consistency across classes, according to similar transformations; and, 3) consistency across the two sample sets, Seattle and Quebec City, to chart the similarities and differences in coverage that might provide some clues as to certain transitional dis/continuities over the span between the events. Again, these trends help to isolate the sites for a more pointed textual analysis – where these assumingly meaningful continuities and discrepancies are found provide some starting points for a closer analysis of the ways in which the text actually “works”.

Frequency

Tables 1.1 and 1.2 provide an extraordinarily simple glimpse at the percentage of times each actor appeared. From my tabulations, then, the class “protesters” received the most direct references over the course of both weeks of news coverage. In the Seattle set, this class was followed rather distantly by “governments”, “authorities”, and “trade negotiators”, while in the Quebec City set, “Summit participants” followed second, and behind them in order, “Summit participants”, “government”, and a tie between “authorities” and “unspecified”. These findings can be rather reliably construed as testimony to the prominence of all of these classes in both of these news events; in both sets, all five of the classes above are the most frequently mentioned. Of the classes of actors common to both sets, “protest groups” were referred to least frequently in both sets. Overall, in terms of active voicings, rankings were fairly similar. In both sets, and in total, “protesters”, “governments”, “authorities”, and “negotiators/ participants” all ranked in that order in active reference.

Table 1.1 – Tabulation of actions – Seattle set

Actor	References (%)	Active (%)	Passive (%)	Nominalization (%)
Protesters	26.7	27.5	13.5	10.9
Governments	17.0	21.3	3.8	6.2
Authorities	14.5	19.2	31.4	11.6
Trade negotiators	13.5	9.8	26.5	54.2
Miscellaneous	9.2	8.0	2.7	2.5
Unspecified	7.8	4.5	17.8	13.5
Protest leaders	5.1	4.2	–	–
Protest groups	4.8	4.9	3.2	4.4
NGOs	1.3	0.7	1.1	1.5

Table 1.2 – Tabulation of actions – Quebec City set

Actor	References (%)	Active (%)	Passive (%)	Nominalization (%)
Protesters	27.4	31.9	12.6	16.6
Summit participants	16	12.9	28.7	34.2
Government	12.3	14.1	4.2	5.3
Unspecified	10.8	7.6	13.3	10.2
Authorities	10.8	14.1	35.0	13.9
Protest leaders	8.6	12.5	1.4	7.5
Miscellaneous	6.8	3.0	2.8	8.0
Protest groups	5.2	1.1	2.1	3.7
Other dissenters	2.2	2.7		0.5

In passive constructions, however, authorities ranked first in both sets, followed by negotiators/participants, unspecified actors, and protesters, in that order in both sets. Next in frequency were government actors, although they were passivized dramatically less than the next closest category, protesters, by an average of 9.1%. In the count of nominalizations, “trade negotiators/Summit participants” ranked first in both sets, in each by a fairly wide margin between that class and the next most frequent (an average of 42.6% in the Seattle set, and 17.6% in the Quebec City set). Ranked behind this class in the Seattle set were “authorities”, “unspecified”, and “protesters”; in the Quebec set, “protesters”, “authorities”, and “unspecified” ranked in that order behind the lead class. Again, the class “government”, though prevalent in direct references, was surprisingly low in terms of nominalizations, with a frequency of, on average, 39.6% less than the lead class in this area.

Consistency

i) Consistency within actor classifications

The first way that I measured consistency was across transformations and within particular actor categories, for the purpose of gauging how each actor’s actions were constituted in comparison to other constituted actions by the same actor in the total set.

Again, each figure is calculated as a percentage of the total number of actions in that category (e.g., activation, passivization, nominalization) for all actors. I have also calculated a mean for all actions constituted for a specific actor, with an indication of the proximity of each individual number of actions to this mean as an indicator of relative consistency. The aim is to achieve a general sense of under- or over-representation in each of these modes of reference of action *within* each class, before moving to a broader, comparative view of these consistencies.

Table 2.1 – Total representation of action, including variance with mean

Actors	Active	Passive	Nominalization	Total [Mean]
Protesters	163 (74)	43 (-46)	61 (-28)	267 [89]
Government Negotiator/Participants	98 (52)	13 (-33)	27 (-19)	138 [46]
Authorities	62 (-6)	90 (-33)	213 (90)	365 [123]
Unspecified	92 (6)	108 (22)	58 (-28)	258 [86]
	33 (-12)	52 (7)	50 (5)	135 [45]

() variance related to mean

The class “protesters”, as shown above in Table 2.1, is above its mean of representation of action in the active category, and below its mean in both the passive and nominalization categories. The greatest variance (positive) with the mean is in activation, indicating that protesters were represented most disproportionately in the active voice. By contrast, the class “authorities” is above its mean of representation of action in both the activation and passivization categories, but below the mean in the nominalization category, and its greatest variance from the mean is a negative variance in nominalization. “Governments”, like protesters, are above their mean in active reference, and below it in both passivization and nominalization, with a greater variance (positive) in active representations. The class “trade delegations” is by contrast below its mean of representation of action in both the active and passive categories, but dramatically above

the mean in nominalization, which is also of course its greatest variance. Lastly, the “unspecified” class is below the mean in active references, but above in both passivization and nominalization, with its greatest variance being a negative one in terms of active reference. Incidentally, this variance is the least of all of the greatest variances across the actor categories.

ii) Consistency across classes

To compare consistencies across these classes, Table 2.2 below offers a preliminary view. What it tells us is that, in terms of their own means of representation of action, protesters, governments, and authorities were consistently over-represented in the active voice, while trade delegations and “unspecified” actors were under-represented. According to these means, only authorities and unspecified actors were over-passivized, while protesters, governments, and trade delegations were under-passivized. Lastly, trade delegations were the only class consistently over-nominalized, and dramatically so, while the other four classes were nominalized in negative disproportion to their means. Another helpful approach is to arrive at an index of total consistency across classes and total representation of action. To this end, I used a very simple formula to calculate the average variance between all three numbers (activation, passivization, nominalization). That is, differences between the three possible equations, all in positive numbers, were simply added together and divided to arrive at a mean, as illustrated in table 2.2 below. This crude calculation nevertheless gives an index of overall consistency across classes.

Table 2.2 – Mean variance of total representation of actions

Actors	Mean variance	Greatest variance, individual action
Unspecified	12.6	-12 (active)
Authorities	33.3	-28 (nominalization)
Government	56	+ 52 (active)
Protesters	80	+ 74 (active)
Negotiators/ Participants	100	+ 90 (nominalization)

Correlated loosely with the index of consistency in table 2.1, this table suggests some rather obvious conclusions. Overall, the “unspecified” class enjoyed a greater equity among the three main types of representation of action, while the trade delegations were represented with much greater variance between the three types. These numbers, however, bear a striking comparison with the largest variance of the representation of action for each class in individual categories, suggesting again a fairly strong correlation between the degree of overall variance, and the degree to which each particular class is drastically under- or over-represented in particular ways. This speaks to dominant trends in the constitution of each class: protesters, for instance, are notable for the highly disproportionate active constitution of action, and the “unspecified” class is notable for a higher degree of consistency among modes of action. On the whole, however, trade delegations offer the most interesting results, as this is the class with the strongest variance, negative or positive, both overall and within the specified category (in this case, nominalization). I would suggest, from these numbers alone so far, that the nominalization of the trade delegation class is the most poignant overall trend in news coverage in terms of consistency across classes.

iii) Consistency across sample sets

The overall continuity of some of these trends across sample sets is also fairly important. This is especially so when this coverage is, as in this case, across two non-consecutive weeks, in every case by different authors, and dealing with two events in different venues, occurring over a year apart. I have organized the information according to type of representation, to accentuate the consistencies across the sets. The tables indicate both the absolute number of items in each category, as well as this number expressed as a percentage of the total number of that type of representation for all classes. It should be noted that while it is easy to isolate and chronicle similarities, the multitude of differences makes the selection process more challenging. I have done my best here to highlight both differences that do and do not conform to my suspicions.

a) Total references

Table 3.1 – Comparative – Total references to actors

<i>Seattle</i>			<i>Quebec City</i>		
Actor	References	References (%)	Actor	References	References (%)
Protesters	99	26.7	Protesters	89	27.4
Governments	63	17.0	Summit participants	52	16
Authorities	54	14.5	Government	40	12.3
Trade negotiators	50	13.5	Unspecified	35	10.8
Miscellaneous	34	9.2	Authorities	35	10.8
Unspecified	29	7.8	Protest leaders	28	8.6
Protest leaders	19	5.1	Miscellaneous	22	6.8
Protest groups	18	4.8	Protest groups	17	5.2
NGOs	5	1.3	Other dissenters	7	2.2
Total	371		Total	325	

Table 3.1 shows that the class “protesters” are clearly and consistently most often referred to overall, and that the gap between this class and the class referred to second most often is fairly substantial. This gap is accentuated by the relative lack of variance among the next four classes most frequently represented – while there is an average

10.6% difference between the first- and second-ranked classes in this table, there is only an average of 6.5% difference between the second- and fifth-ranked classes, with the margin of variance between the two sets being 1.7% and 2.6% respectively. What this suggests, apart from the notable similarities between the numbers for the protester class, is that they are also consistently represented more in each set. According to this, and relative to the differences among the other classes, the protesters are convincingly the dominant actor in this coverage. Furthermore, the difference within class categories across both sets is never more than 5%; the government class, for instance, had the highest variance in references between the two sets, with a decrease of 4.7% between coverage of Seattle and that of Quebec City, while the protesters had the lowest variance, increasing by only 0.7% between Seattle and Quebec City. Overall, therefore, the proportion of the mention of actors is highly consistent across the two sets of data.

What is different across these sets is primarily the rankings of the classes, shown clearly in Table 3.1. Again, however, changes in rankings are not drastic; the broad class “trade delegations” showed the most marked change, ascending from the fourth-most referred-to class in Seattle coverage, to the second-most mentioned actor in the Quebec City coverage. Coupled with the limited difference between each actor’s percentage of reference, this result appears to be negligible.

b) Activation

Table 3.2 – Comparative – Active representations of action

Seattle			Quebec City		
Actor	Active	Active (%)	Actor	Active	Active (%)
Protesters	79	27.5	Protesters	84	31.9
Governments	61	21.3	Government	37	14.1
Authorities	55	19.2	Authorities	37	14.1
Trade negotiators	28	9.8	Summit participants	34	12.9
Miscellaneous	23	8.0	Protest leaders	33	12.5
Unspecified	13	4.5	Unspecified	20	7.6
Protest leaders	12	4.2	Miscellaneous	8	3.0
Protest groups	14	4.9	Other dissenters	7	2.7
NGOs	2	0.7	Protest groups	3	1.1
Total	287		Total	263	

A look at the active representation of actors in Table 3.2 reveals other remarkable consistencies, except in this case they lie mainly in the rankings of classes, and not as much in the individual variances of these representations within class categories between sets. As illustrated, in both sets of coverage the actions of protesters were most often constituted in the active voice, followed in order by governments, authorities, and trade delegations. Both protesters and trade delegations showed a decline in active representations from Seattle to Quebec City (4.4% and 3.1% respectively), while governments and authorities both experienced an increase in active representations (7.2% and 5.1% respectively). Trade delegations had the most negligible net variance between sets, and the protest group class the largest. The net variance between sets proved to be the biggest inconsistency; in terms of comparison to total references, average variance was 5%, compared to a 2.7% total average variance between sets in the total of references. Accordingly, a few classes, such as governments and protest leaders, had relatively substantial net changes, but there was little consistency of changes across classes. That is, if we separate the most prominent groups into a simple opposition/

establishment division – protesters/protest leaders versus governments/delegations/authorities – we see that both of the oppositional classes had increases in terms of actively constituted action, while the actions of two of the establishment classes showed a decline in active constitution from Seattle to Quebec. This trend is confounded, however, by the fact that the trade delegates class showed an increase, albeit a small one, in actively-voiced action between the sets.

c) Passive constitutions of action

Table 3.3 – Comparative - Passive representations of action

Actor	Seattle		Actor	Quebec City	
	Passive	Passive (%)		Passive	Passive (%)
Authorities	58	31.4	Authorities	50	35.0
Trade negotiators	49	26.5	Summit participants	41	28.7
Unspecified	33	17.8	Unspecified	19	13.3
Protesters	25	13.5	Protesters	18	12.6
Governments	7	3.8	Government	6	4.2
Protest groups	6	3.2	Miscellaneous	4	2.8
Miscellaneous	5	2.7	Protest groups	3	2.1
NGOs	2	1.1	Protest leaders	2	1.4
Protest leaders	0		Other dissenters	0	
Total	185		Total	143	

If we consider again the easy division of classes into an oppositional/establishment schema, the results for passive constitutions of action, shown in Table 3.3, are very much opposite to the above. In this case, authorities, trade delegates, “unspecified” classes, protesters, and governments, comprise the first five ranked in order of frequency. What is similar to the above figures for activation is that these rankings are consistent across the sample sets. There is, however, a great deal less net variance, both in total and within particular classes, as no class had a net change of greater than 5%. The group that varied the most was the “unspecified” class, declining 4.5% from Seattle to Quebec City, and the group that varied the least was the “miscellaneous” class, showing a

0.1% increase from Seattle to Quebec City. The largest net gain in passivization was the authorities (3.6%) – interestingly, this is consistent with the decrease of this same class in active representations between the sample sets. It is also worth noting that there is a substantial drop in both sets between the top-two classes, authorities and delegations, and the “unspecified” class, although this drop in Quebec City is almost double (177%) the variance between the same classes in the Seattle coverage. There is, however, another substantial drop between the protester class and governments in both the Seattle and Quebec City samples (9.7% and 8.4% respectively), although, unlike the above disparity between delegates and the “unspecified” class, this disparity declined over time. Other differences between the sets in this case, as the table clearly shows, are negligible.

d) Nominalization

Table 3.4 – Comparative – Nominalization (Nominal.)

<i>Seattle</i>			<i>Quebec City</i>		
Actor	Nominal.	Nominal. (%)	Actor	Nominal.	Nominal. (%)
Trade negotiators	149	54.2	Summit participants	64	34.2
Authorities	32	11.6	Protesters	31	16.6
Unspecified	31	11.3	Authorities	26	13.9
Protesters	30	10.9	Unspecified	19	10.2
Governments	17	6.2	Miscellaneous	15	8.0
Protest groups	12	4.4	Protest leaders	14	7.5
Miscellaneous	7	2.5	Government	10	5.3
NGOs	4	1.5	Protest groups	7	3.7
Protest leaders	0	--	Other dissenters	1	0.5
Totals	275		Total	187	

The figures for nominalizations in the coverage are perhaps the most striking in their inconsistencies across the sample sets (see Table 3.4). In terms of ranking, the only consistency is within the delegates class, which has the most nominalizations related to it in both samples. In both sets, authorities and protesters are fairly close in their percentages, although while nominalization in the case of protesters rose 5.7% from

Seattle to Quebec City, it increased only 2.3% in the same frame for authorities.

Government nominalizations also showed consistency, declining only 0.9% between the samples. Perhaps most noteworthy are the figures for the delegates class, which, although retaining a good margin of frequency in both sets (42.6% in Seattle, 17.6% in Quebec City), showed the largest net change of any actor in total (20.0% decrease).

Some general conclusions

It might help to gain perspective on these figures and trends to keep in mind some of the assumptions that, as I outlined above, informed how I undertook to analyze the above data. By no means were these initial suspicions confirmed in total; there were quite a few unanticipated results and trends that testify to the overall complexity with which news discourse is fashioned. There were, however, a number of core assumptions that were more or less vindicated by some of these results. These are probably most manageable when divided amongst the classes of actors, as were the initial assumptions, but I will confine the following comments to only the five most frequently mentioned classes.

Firstly, protesters, in all of the different types of analyses, were most frequently referred to, and most frequently and disproportionately constituted in the active voice, and much less frequently and disproportionately less represented in passive transformations. This is mainly a confirmation of suspicions, that protesters would be assigned a good amount of the “net agency” accounted for in news coverage of protest events. This agency, as explained in the previous chapter, is most dominantly read as responsibility; emphasizing the agency of a particular class of actors accentuates their role in events, shaping their involvement as more direct and effectual, and therefore also

increasing the degree of potential culpability assigned to this class. The protester class was certainly prominent in the indicators appropriate to this reading, both positively – as in active depictions – and negatively, as in a relative lack of passive transformations related to this class.

In comparison, there were strong indications that the class “authorities” was often constituted in a more passivized and anonymous way, with a preponderance of passivized actions as evidence. What is surprising, however, is that this trend is somewhat contradicted by the tendency for authorities to also be constituted, disproportionate to their “means of representation” (see Table 2.2), more in the active voice and less in the nominalized form. Of course, relative to protesters, authorities were far less frequently referred to in the active voice, a finding consistent with the fact that across coverage they remain the actor most likely to be passively represented. Passivization as a discursive “strategy” implies a more legitimized or socially sanctioned role in events – agents act almost anonymously, as if their actions are perceived to be on behalf of all participants. In this case, from these preliminary findings, we might read this action as the maintenance of social order, as the upholding (note the nominalization) of consensual standards of behaviour that ensure the safety of citizens (or in this case, the “unspecified” class), and the preservation of the “democratic process”.

Like the class “protesters”, “governments” enjoyed a decent consistency across samples, although results for this class were also surprising. Specifically, contrary to my assumptions, governments were more likely to be represented actively, and were consistently low in terms of the frequency of passive representations and nominalizations. In fact, this class was consistently second only to protesters in the frequency of active

references. Again, these findings suggest a higher attribution of agency to governments than I had expected. More importantly, these findings also set the government class apart from what I had assumed to be its institutional cohorts, in the authorities and delegates class, especially in its relative deficit of passivizations and nominalizations.

Governments, judging from these results, maintained more than either of these classes an active and identifiable role in these events, although Table 3.2 suggests a greater proximity to the authorities class in active representations.

The broad class “trade delegates”, which includes the class “Summit participants” from the Quebec City sample and the “trade negotiators” designation in Seattle sample, showed mostly anticipated results. This class was extraordinarily and consistently high in related nominalizations, both in relation to its mean of representations and in comparison to other classes. It was also consistently second only to authorities in passive representations, and in the comprehensive analysis of the data in Table 3.3, these two classes show a noticeably intimate relationship. As with authorities, these results suggest an anonymous legitimacy that is seen to be consensually afforded to institutions such as the WTO. They oversee and direct a process that happens of its own accord, following natural tendencies and seeing through results that are systemically and systematically produced.

The “unspecified” class – designated to include identifiers such as “people” or “citizens”, and taken to represent the general populace – was most consistently represented across transformations, but showed an overall tendency toward passivization and nominalization. Because this class is relatively undefined, there is a value to understanding its role primarily in relation to other classes, and doing so yields some

interesting suggestions. What is significant, I would argue, is the relative consistency with which this class of actors is constituted similarly with certain other classes according to the particular transformation. Specifically, the unspecified class exhibited a very similar frequency of passivization to protesters, and a similar frequency of nominalization to authorities.

As both of these transformations are strategies of “agent deletion”, and combined with the relative equity with which this class is represented across transformations, despite the “opposition/establishment” bifurcation used previously, we could infer for now that this class comprises a sort of neutral standard of action. While it does not play an active role in the events, there is a sense in which it exists relationally, as a reference point from which to assess the actions of some of the other classes. Perhaps this class is a discursive embodiment of the imagination of consensus, or “common sense”, among a community of imagined readers, who would hypothetically apply the same standards of evaluation to the events represented in the news coverage. It is “we” who have thrown consensual force behind the process of economic globalization, or who have authorized the limits to both active dissent and sanctioned law enforcement. These actors actually effecting these results then rely imaginably on “us” for their agency. But paradoxically, one of the things that a deficit of active constitution can signify is a tendency to assume a “patient” role in events, to be the object upon which the action of agents takes its effect. The undefined “we” implied by this class are these patients, to which the production of effects is directed, but with whom an implicit (but I would suggest over-valued) consensus of judgment resides.

Many of the above suggestions are based solely on the evidence presented so far, evidence which taken alone is insufficient to making some of these claims. But, as promised, they do isolate some important sites for closer enquiry.

Part two: Textual analysis

In this section, I have selected four separate days of coverage, two from each set – dated 1 and 6 December, 1999, and 21 and 23 April, 2001 – for a more focused textual analysis. These specific texts were chosen as the most representative of the trends presented above, as determined by a specific count of their content and a further correlation of results with those from the total sample. The content – divided into “analytic categories” (classes) and types of action – and details of authorship of these selected articles is provided in table form in the appendix (Tables of actors).

Naming classes

The organization of classes is a social transaction in which understandings of “we” – of the class of consensus – are the main currency. This class provides the fundamental relational position from which others are defined. These other classes are not necessarily defined in antagonism or opposition, and indeed may enjoy the sympathy, registered discursively, of this unspecified class. But the first move in this organizing process is naming, which sets more-or-less definite boundaries of what these classes mean, and how and what actions will be attributed to them within particular contexts. Here I have selected a few of the groups most referred to, in order to make some suggestions about how these groups are classified.

The class “protesters” was most often classified functionally, in terms of the activity that they were performing or the behaviour they were exhibiting. The most popular designations were “protesters” and “demonstrators”, indicating pretty clearly that these actions comprise the most reliably definitive characteristic of this group. Notably, however, the actions of this class were often without a “goal” – rarely was it made explicit against what or whom these people were protesting, or alternately, what it was exactly that they were “demonstrating”. Failing this clarity, and acknowledging that the essence of these class designations lay quite obviously in the actions of this class, it is reasonable to suggest that the “goal” of the general behaviour of protesting is largely unimportant. What does seem to be important in defining this class is a bundle of local actions that collectively comprise this action, including “achiev[ing] their goal of thwarting the opening ceremonies” or “surrounding the building”. These stated actions all evince localized intentions, objectives that taken together delimit the act of protesting.

But this is a sort of circular process of definition that confuses a broader designation of a group of actors, acting with the intention of effecting “global” change, with a set of more local acts with only directly local effects. For instance, in one sample article, out of a total of 23 references to protesters, while 16 of these were functionalizations of this class, only two mentioned either the WTO or “free trade and globalization” as the goals of oppositional action. Further, one of these latter mentions was a reference to “anti-WTO crowds” in this article, which qualifies as an essentialization of the groups rather than a functionalization, suggesting that the quality of being “anti-WTO” bears little clear relation to the action of “protesting” against this same institution. It also hints at a translation of “protesting” as an action into a

classification proper, identifying protesters “in terms of what they, more or less, permanently, or unavoidably, are”, and entrenching this position in the distribution of class positions in the paradigm of protest actions, as one that can reliably be called forth once the same model of action is invoked (van Leeuwen, 1996, p. 54). But the most important conclusion is that to be “a protester” is to be an actor with only those localized goals that already comprise a consensual version of what it means to be “a protester”. An understanding of the larger objectives of the group is not required.

Protesters are also defined primarily in terms of quantity or size that often suggests the enormity, and by association, the dangers of a mob formation. “Thousands of protesters”, “huge crowds of activists,” or “the masses of demonstrators” are all examples of the tendency to quantify this class, in general or more specific terms, evoking a conflictual “mass” that represents both the potential for violence, and a paradoxical representativeness suggested by the size of the numbers. This representativeness, however, is undermined by the relative absence of the “global goal”, as explained above, and further by a process of differentiation that is imposed on this class. This occurs particularly in a distinction between “peaceful” protesters, and a “small, unruly group” that is given responsibility for the physical damage and violence that happens alongside the marches and “legitimate” demonstrations. In one article, this is accomplished most effectively by anchoring this split within a professed dissatisfaction of the latter group with the tactics of the former :

Much earlier, at the afternoon demonstration, Naomi Andrews from Middlebury College in Vermont, was among a group of 15 protesters. She said she opposed the North American free-trade agreement and is writing a research paper on how it has harmed the poor in Mexico. Ms. Andrews was accompanied by Allison Parker, an environmental studies student who

was in Quebec to protest against the trade deal. She called it a licence to damage the environment.

As they wiped tear gas out of their eyes with water, Ms. Andrews expressed anger with the radical demonstrators.

“This riot makes me sick. People throwing rocks and stones give people here a bad name,” she said.

The pivotal moment in terms of differentiation occurs at the designation of “the radical demonstrators”, but other earlier stages of this construction are important. First, the author grants a legitimacy to Parker simply by naming or “nominating” her, which distinguishes her from the masses in a manner usually reserved for elite subjects (see van Leeuwen, 1996). The mention of her education also goes to a particular authority to speak, and the specific connection made between this education and her opposition further sets her apart from the “goal-less” protesters, as having a more deliberate and institutionally-approved opposition than the latter. Moreover, the research paper suggests a channelling of oppositional energies that is sanctioned by the particular institution of the university and, by extension, society, in sharp contrast to those “throwing rocks and stones”.

Here the shift from the author’s voice to that of Parker at the end of the passage is significant, because it effects the differentiation between the “radical demonstrators” and the “legitimate protesters” through direct appeal to the voice of the latter – this is a double and recursive move of instantiating the distinction and allowing the already-legitimated actor to entrench it through declaring the division from the legitimated position. The technique of nomination, suggesting at least a contextual authority, is coupled with the more “sublimated” protest behaviours embodied by the research paper and an expressed anger toward the “other protesters”, offering the division within this class as one both acknowledged within these communities and specifically rooted in

differences among practices. Again, however, the matter of goals, or at least the possibility of consensus among these two groups about what it is they actually oppose, is subordinated to the differentiation that “exists” between non-violent and violent. Paradoxically, this tension is almost eviscerated, or at least complicated, by the authors’ tendency to emphasize physical confrontations between police and protesters, while occasionally maintaining that the non-violent protesters comprised the majority of this class (this is explained more fully below). Any coherence that this class might otherwise have is compromised by the institution and erasure of the division within it, and the contradictions that result.

The authorities assume the distinct role of dramatic counterpart to the protesters – they appear in the same sets of action, and are also fairly likely to be quantified or referred to in terms and metaphors that establish a militaristic sensibility. They together comprise “riot squads”, or assemble in “a phalanx of police officers”, and at one point in the coverage, “attacked in waves of 50 at a time”. This class is usually constituted in this type of regimented formation that conveys a sense of order or purposeful organization, even despite the fact that this class too, like the protesters, is often positioned without a specific goal – “police”, the most frequent designation, does not explicitly offer to or against what or whom an action is directed. But there are other clues, and they are often embedded within some of the other representations of this class, specifically those that conjoin the designation with the goal of action, such as “riot squads”, “riot police”, or “national guardsmen”. In contrast to the “protesters”, whom are defined only by the self-referential actions that characterize the act of protesting, “riot police” relate to a goal that is already explicitly assigned a social value – such as an assumed non-desirability of

riots. Similarly, “riot squad” does not differentiate between goals in the way that the divide is registered between peaceful and “riotous” protesters, which amounts to a generalization of disorder that typifies accounts of these occurrences.

Therefore, in the following, the above distinction is nullified in the constitution of the actions of police that are tacitly sanctioned to address disorder:

About 300 armed state patrol officers and two units of unarmed national guardsmen have been ordered in to keep the streets clear this morning.

Last night, riot police charged forward block by block, forcing protesters away from downtown with clouds of tear gas and pepper gas.

Several hundred people defied the curfew order, milling about the streets. A small unruly group smashed the windows of a Starbucks store, looting it of bags of coffee.

The police, unlike the protesters, embody a coherence of purpose that the interpellation of the protesters does not realize. There is no division of practice, there is no confusion as to which police act appropriately and which do not, because in contradistinction to the protesters, the localized actions of the police are subordinated to the overall goal of these actions, which is providing an ordered response to acts of violence such as riots. It just so happens that, as in the above passage, there are few cues to the reader to delineate between the protesters “forced away”, those “milling about the streets”, and those that “smashed the windows of a Starbucks store”. This is because the object of the action of “riot police” is presupposed in the act of naming them, and their actions become partially constituted as necessary responses to an overall goal – the protesters – and no significant differentiations or contradictions are allowed to inhere within this action.

The class “trade delegations”, like the protesters, was also frequently functionalized, but the effect of this strategy is somewhat different in this case. First, many of these functionalized descriptions – “the leaders”, “trade negotiators”, “trade

representatives” – contain the goal of action within the title, with the exception of “the leaders”. But secondly, there is an interesting comparison to be made between articles that emphasized the protests as the main event, and those that focused on the meetings between negotiators. For example, and following van Dijk’s suggestion that the headline more or less clearly states the macroproposition of the text, we have such a comparative perspective between the headlines “Protests turn Seattle into war zone” and “Delegations pick up pieces after failure in Seattle”. In the first text, where protesters are clearly the dominant actor, the class “trade negotiators” is functionalized only twice, as “organizers”, or in reference to “WTO director-general Mike Moore”, but assigned the more passive role of “delegates” five times in the same article. The second article, by comparison, constitutes these actors more often as “trade negotiators”, “trade representatives”, “WTO members”, “trade ministers”, etc., whereas the word “delegates” does not appear at all.

There are a couple of important differences here: first, that the text emphasizing the protest actions constructs the “delegates” in the nominalized form, diminishing the agency of this class, and heightening the ambiguity of its definition through this construction. That is, to whom or what does the nominalized action “to delegate” refer? Is it a power delegated to these actors by someone, or is it someone or something, such as power, that this class is delegating? These are two radically different forms of action – the former constitutes the delegate firmly in the role of patient, as recipient or beneficiary of an action by an unspecified agent. The other sense implicitly constitutes this class as agent, as holder of power and enactor of some practice that produces effects on other actors. But this distinction is mystified in part by the nominalization of “to delegate”, and in part by the absence of the implied goal that is found overwhelmingly in the second

text. “Trade negotiator”, while nominalizing the action “to trade” and thus performing another order of agent-deletion, is nonetheless more explanatory than “delegate” – it quite clearly posits these actors within the context of a specific action, whereas “delegate” is loaded with the above ambiguities.

The important point here is the textual situation of this difference between “protest-focused” coverage, and “negotiation-focused” coverage. In the first context, this class is passive, patient, and obscurely-nominalized actor, presumably in an event that does not rightly involve them. After all, these delegates play no active part in the protest, and as such there is an implicit disconnect between their passive role in this event and their active role in the negotiations, which is more explicitly rendered in the second “negotiation” article. Hence the following excerpt depicting a “clash” between police and protesters that had involved one of the delegates:

The most serious street confrontation took place yesterday afternoon, as demonstrators tried to prevent one delegate from pushing through the lines. An armoured truck roared up, carrying riot police. Dozens more converged from other areas, lining up across the road. The air soon filled with tear gas and thick clouds of smoke from a series of concussion grenades.

Then a fire broke out, enveloping both police and protesters in more smoke and producing scenes likely before witnessed in Seattle....

These “scenes”, however, despite a seemingly tight chronology that would seem to involve the delegate in the events, curiously omit the lone delegate (an additional index of passivization and even victimization, especially in the face of the multiple “demonstrators”) from this space. The fact that only “police and protesters” were enveloped by the smoke is part of this curiosity – it is as if the delegate around which the scene is first established vanishes at the entrance of the new players. There is no script for

this actor, at least not in this scene. This is an important point, and one that will be followed up further in the following section on the interaction of classes.

Lastly, the “unspecified class”, relating particularly to these four sample articles that I have selected, has been used to refer to action with no specific agent, as in “a fire broke out”; an implied observer, as in “scenes likely before never witnessed”; critics or commentators who are not constituted as taking part in the events, but whom are also not named specifically, as in “critics who do not believe freer trade leads to prosperity for all” , or “Many pessimistic future WTO talks can overcome sticking points”; or, lastly, the imagined class of consensus, most often referred to as “we”, as in ““We have witnessed a very sad day”” or ““people who are opposed to what we are doing””. It is this last category on which I would like to focus, because it engenders the consensus that underpins ideology, but I will only offer some brief comments here. This class will be more fully discussed after I explore other elements that are vital to its construction.

The “we” is a deeply conflicted class, a class that seems to oscillate between agent and patient roles, and not only across different actions, but within the same ones. The following passage quoting Prime Minister Jean Chrétien is noteworthy for this reason:

“I’d like to point out that all the heads of state were elected democratically,” he said.

“There will always be people who are opposed to what we are doing, but look at the progress that democracy has made today”.

Now, there may be some argument with my categorising the “we” in this case as unspecified, instead of under the “trade delegations” class, but I have done so in part because of the confusion that this entire passage creates with regard to the function of this class. The overtures to democracy, or the appeals to a democratic process, seem to infer

an active participant role for this class in the development of trade regimes, although this is accomplished through Chrétien's passivization of this role ("were elected democratically"), and the substitution of "democracy" for the investment of action in this process. My argument is that the "we" in this case is very closely linked with democracy, suggesting universal participation in a process that succeeds in spite of the "people" – the "others" in this address – that oppose it.

One of the peculiarities of the constitution of this class is that it is always effected by "accessed voices" – the author must always defer to other speakers to represent this class. This is mainly because in the interests of maintaining "objectivity", the author must refrain from participating in the positioning of this class, which would be commensurate with declaring an ideological position (a contradiction since ideology always attempts to conceal its ideological nature). The constitution of this class therefore relies in part on who positions it – in this case, it is Chrétien, whose own position as "world leader" evokes the very democratic process by which "we", in this case, are constructed. It is a recursive move similar to the legitimate/violent differentiation of protesters invoked by having the differentiation voiced by the actors already constituted as "legitimate". In this case, it also allows for the reader to be addressed directly, in "look at the progress that democracy has made today", creating the second-person position usually reserved for editorial-style texts, as in the Madelaine Drohan example cited above (p. 131). It is only with direct quotes such as this that readers are directed to do anything other than read – it is the most explicit steering of reception and reflection allowable in this discourse. And in the constitution of the "we", these directions are most often conferred to figures of authority; in the three instances in this limited sample that "we" are mentioned

specifically, two of these mentions were attributed to Chrétien, and one to Mike Moore, the director-general of the WTO. While not necessarily overwhelming evidence of the workings of hegemony or ideology, it does point to a certain fit between journalistic choices concerning modes of address and the symbolic economy – specifically, that those in positions of power tacitly enjoy the privilege of establishing the discursive boundaries of who “we” are.

The interaction of classes

There are two main axes of interaction that I wish to focus on in this section: the protester/authorities interaction, and the protester/delegations interaction. Quite clearly I am privileging here the role of the protesters in the development of these interactions and the overall narrative. I argue that this emphasis is justified mainly by the above evidence suggesting that protesters are indeed the dominant actors, by virtue of frequency of appearance and the proportion of active constitutions of action (see Table 3.4). These two relationships have one thing in common: they reconstitute what the protest groups would deem the central conflict in these actions in a way that effectively displaces dissent. In the first case this is more obvious: writing the protest action as a scene of battle between two warring actors, replete with militaristic metaphors, is endemic to coverage of protest action. It shifts the conflict from one between “civil society” and the various powers involved in the cementing of global free trade agreements, to a crisis of order which pits authorities against demonstrators. Thus, “A demonstration is treated as a potential or actual disruption of legitimate order, not as a statement about the world...” (Gitlin, 1980, p. 271). This is not to suggest that there can or should be a simple reversal of these

conflicts to redress this displacement and arrive at the “real” conflict, represented in an absolutely truthful way. But this is also not to say that the former articulation of the conflict – the preferred version of many of the protesters, as it happens – is not an available option. This option is foreclosed through this displacement of dissent.

The second interaction, between protesters and the trade delegations, is a bit more complex. This involves a similar displacement of the conflict, but one in which the two are engaged in an entirely different struggle, one in which these classes are not constructed equally as combative contestants. Rather, the protesters are constituted frequently as an active and physical hindrance to the delegates, and by extension, to a process – globalization – that is often articulated as evolving somehow without the active involvement of any actors, along a trajectory dotted with static terms such as “trade” and “development” that conceal the process and agency required by this evolution. The protesters are not just impeding trade delegates, but an entire process that carries the weight of centuries of such developments, toward a system that “itself” is given the responsibility for the distribution of wealth and the “good life”.

Protesters and authorities

We observe again that macroreduction in the press is based on deletion of irrelevant local details, and on the script-based subsumption of normal conditions, components, or consequences under a higher-level macroaction, in which actors may be represented only by their role designations (van Dijk, 1988, p. 40).

The metaphor of battle or war is appropriate to the relation between protesters and authorities on both mundane and strategic levels. In the mundane sense, both entail physical conflict between two identifiable parties with opposing objectives, both involve claims to success or victory, etc. It is a seemingly natural comparison to make. In the

strategic-discursive sense, however, the reduction of this relation to this metaphorical event of war is more significant. As the above quote from van Dijk suggests, it is a useful encapsulation of a complex and tumultuous sequence of moments, reduced to a singular macro-action that has resonance for readers. It also provides, as van Dijk suggests, a central drama within which actions are pre-scripted, and actors assigned roles before the action begins. The following suggests a certain symmetry between two exemplary articles, one from the Seattle coverage, and one from Quebec City:

Seattle (1 December, 1999)	Quebec City (21 April, 2001)
"Protests turn Seattle into war zone" [hl]	"Fortress Quebec is breached" [hl]
"an extraordinary day of civil unrest...left the city looking like a war zone" [1]	"about 5,000 demonstrators <i>clashed</i> with riot police" [c]
"riot police <i>charged</i> forward" [4]	" <i>Militant</i> protesters <i>crashed</i> through the most hated symbol...and confronted riot police" [1]
"One group of protesters... <i>rampaged</i> unchecked" [17]	"Protesters renewed their attempts to <i>breach</i> the fence" [5]
"a <i>fleet</i> of 50 buses" [20]	"The area near the fence looked like a war zone" [20]
" <i>Thick-plated armoured vehicles</i> roared up and down the blocked-off streets" [27]	"One of the <i>casualties</i> of the violence was a meeting" [21]
	"police <i>advanced</i> " [26]
	"officers moved quickly to fill the <i>breach</i> " [29]
	"demonstrators <i>launched</i> their latest offensive against the fence" [31]
	"Many demonstrators sought <i>refuge</i> " [33]

A few trends in the preceding stand out, the most obvious of which is the repetition, in both samples, of the term “war zone”. Relatedly, both headlines state a macroproposition that transforms the two cities directly into spaces of battle – into these very “war zones” – and the author quickly establishes the militaristic connotations of the events, either in the lead paragraph or the photo caption, indicating a high degree of relevance of the “battle scene” in the overall script of protest in news. As Fairclough reminds us, such prominent placement of such a proposition (the equation of protest with combat) is a strategy of foregrounding information, in this case an interaction that is constructed as fundamental to understanding the development of actions (1995, p. 119).

The main element in this scene is confrontation, which entails a measure of physical conflict, and is often represented iconically by specific markers of the confrontation and ensuing damage. Consider the following:

Throughout the day, the heart of Seattle was the scene of tear gas, smoke and flames, pepper spray, concussion grenades, broken windows, black-clad riot police and huge crowds of activists opposed to free trade and globalization.

Or the scene can be rendered by what is constructed to be a generalized representative frame of the overall event:

Helicopters hovered over the crowd as riot police shielded themselves from flying stones, cans and balloons filled with paint, even hockey pucks and golf balls.

Of course, both of these examples contain the requisite elements of the battle theme, but they also involve a relatively high level of passivization of both actors, again suggesting naturally-evolving events. There is also a low level of explicit coherence structures – those structures that link propositions or clauses together to inscribe the meaning of the text. The coherence of the text in this case relies more on the accessibility of the

presuppositions that the text brings to bear. In the first example, the elements of the scene can be listed discretely, and “black-clad riot police and huge crowds of activists” can be mentioned without any further explanation of their interaction, because it is presupposed in a model of comprehension that automatically inserts these two actors in mutually-combative roles. The following is also exemplary:

Then a fire broke out, enveloping both police and protesters in more smoke and producing scenes likely never before witnessed in Seattle, despite a long history of labour and environmental activism in the area.

Here the logical connection between the presuppositions of the reader and the rendering of the “war zone” is developed, by the contrastive clause¹ “despite a long history of labour and environmental activism in the area”. It is this clause that marks the implicit assumption that these “scenes” are traditionally equated with this type of protest (labour and environmental activism), a proposition which is notably absent from the sentence, but indicated strongly by the preposition “despite”. This kind of coherence strategy is also realized by direct “archetypal” comparison, in this case between the action in Quebec City and that in Seattle, specifically here in the reference to the “Black Bloc”, an alleged anarchist protest group: “That group was blamed for violence during Seattle globalization talks in 1999”. Here the group and the violence associated with it make the consensual link between the events, choosing this link over the conceivable options of the substance of the opposition or the trade negotiations against which opposition was directed.

Engendering the conflict in these terms is an effective (re)positioning of oppositional groups as participants in the customary violence associated with these protests. Similarly,

¹ A contrastive clause is an example of the form of local coherence structure that Fairclough calls “extension”, where “one clause extends the meaning of another by adding something new to it” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 121).

authorities are redrawn as mutual participants in combat, instead of appendages of the institutions targeted in resistance.

To restate, the rendering of the “war zone” is a strategy of displacement, in this case of the “substantial” issues that would involve the protesters in a dialogue with those they deem responsible for the flaws of global trade initiatives. Privileging the combat metaphor is exercising an ideological option to institute a distribution of class positions and actions that simultaneously appeals to and constitutes a model of understanding that equates protest action primarily with battle.

Protesters and trade delegates

It should be noted first that this interaction is arguably less prominent than the protesters-authorities interaction explained above. There are two main themes in this interaction: first is the primary constitution of the interaction as one of active hindrance of the delegations by the protesters. The second theme, which extends from the tendency of the actions of delegations to be nominalized, is the articulation of the trade negotiation process as a natural and consensually sanctioned process that evolves largely of its own accord. Trade is a system, or at least part of a system, which is tied historically to the project of democracy and therefore implicitly to consensus. Taken together and stated simply, the protesters are constituted, by virtue of this interaction, as impeding a consensual, “rule-bound” system informed by the democratic process. But another feature of this interaction that must be dealt with is the fact that it is only infrequently direct and as such implicit – it is only a marginal and almost phantasmic interaction that forms the background to the “real” conflict, which is that between the protesters and authorities. However, what is absent is often as or more important than what is present in texts, and

the fact that this relationship exists in conspicuous absence is certainly significant. This point will be explored in more detail in the following section on discursive spaces.

The first theme, or macroproposition, is aptly stated up front in the coverage. The sub-headline of April 21, 2001, informs us that “Activists topple riot fence, delaying summit’s opening”, quickly establishing the primary relevance of the hindrance theme. The following comprehensive look shows the frequency of this theme in the coverage:

<i>Seattle (1 December, 1999)</i>	<i>Quebec City (21 April, 2001)</i>
“an extraordinary day of civil unrest that threw a global trade meeting into disarray and left the city looking like a war zone” [1]	“Activists topple riot fence, delaying summit’s opening” [shl]
“thousands of protesters achieved their goal of thwarting the opening ceremonies of the World Trade Organization conference” [2]	“Militant protesters crashed through...and confronted riot police in a successful bid to disrupt opening events” [1]
“the hall remained largely empty as few delegates dared wade through the walls of protesters surrounding the building” [7]	“As summit leaders were about to start their afternoon meetings yesterday, about 5,000 demonstrators gathered...and threw down a large portion of the fence” [7]
“Those delegates who managed to push and shove their way through came in wiping their eyes and blowing their noses from the tear gas that pervaded the air” [8]	“violence during Seattle globalization talks in 1999” [10]
“United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan made it into the hall, but other speakers on the schedule to open the conference didn’t” [9]	“The area near the fence looked like a war zone as riot squads were rushed through in buses to trouble spots and a cloud of tear gas enveloped a wide area. The summit site was immediately locked down and the opening of meetings delayed by at least half an hour” [20]
“The most serious street confrontation took place yesterday afternoon, as demonstrators tried to prevent one delegate from pushing through the lines” [13]	“One of the casualties of the violence was a meeting between Caribbean leaders and U.S. President George W. Bush, which was cancelled after the protest prevented the leaders from reaching Mr. Bush’s hotel” [21]
“anti-WTO crowds blockading the streets leading to the WTO conference site” [16]	“Tear gas was even getting into some hotels where several South American delegations were staying” [31]

“the leading U.S. labour organization, which is fighting the free-trade policies of the WTO because it fears jobs will be lost due to cheap labour in Third World countries” [19]

“[Georgetti] said too much emphasis on free trade results in worse working conditions.... ‘We need better rules so that trade benefits us instead of taking away jobs.’” [23]

“At one point, as Mr. Pettigrew was working his way through a crowd, he spotted someone surging towards him and bolted, thinking he was about to be ambushed” [25]

“WTO delegates could be seen wandering aimlessly around the outside streets, briefcases in hand, their expensive suits in glaring contrast to the often garish garb of the protesters” [32]

“‘I’m annoyed, but I’m not mad’, said Avgouleas Stefanos, a WTO delegate from Greece. ‘But we’d like to get in there [the talks] to discuss the issues they’re concerned with’” [33]

6 December, 1999

“the masses of demonstrators who slowed down last week’s trade ministers’ conference” [4]

“Most trade officials said the collapse of their talks had nothing to do with the protests, the police presence and the havoc in the streets of Seattle” [22]

“But Mr. Pettigrew conceded that the boisterous protests did filter in through the police barriers and thick walls of the conference centre” [23]

“‘It wasted precious time’, he said” [24]

23 April, 2001

“As well, an estimated 25,000 people peacefully to protest against the leaders’ plans to pursue a free-trade area of the Americas” [sic] [19]

“[Chrétien] rejected any suggestion that the protesters outside the fence had more legitimacy than the leaders inside” [20]

There are a total of 25 total allusions to the relationship between these classes, but only four of them have anything to do with the substantive tension between the classes

that relates to the nature of the negotiations, or the nature of the opposition. The other 22 posit the hindrance proposition as either a direct result of the actions of the protesters, or situationally, again evoking a general scene in which this hindrance is a main part of the traditional narrative of protest. Hindrance or disruption is, after all, the prime objective of any demonstration, or so the myth goes.

But the interaction between the two classes is tenuous; eight times are both actors mentioned in the same paragraph, and only twice is there any effect of the action, meaning a direct agent-patient interaction. In these instances, true to the differential between the two classes in constitution of action, the protesters are constituted as the agent in the act of disrupting or preventing access of a delegate (“demonstrators tried to prevent one delegate from pushing through the lines”). Only once in paragraphs in which both classes are mentioned are the actions of the delegate class constituted actively, in “dared wade through the walls of protesters”, but this action also presupposes a response to a potential danger (“dared”), which is again articulated through a metaphoric reference to the group of protesters as “walls”. Similar also is the articulation of “masses of demonstrators who slowed down last week’s trade ministers’ conference”. In these metaphors, the predominant characteristics of the protester class – the tendency to amass in large groups, and hence the propensity for violence – is integrated within the constitution of the hindrance theme of the protester-delegate relationship.

In all other instances, one or both of these actors are either wholly absent, either evoking the effect of the scene of battle, which immediately calls into being the protester-authorities interaction as the causative element, or transformed by strategies of nominalization. In the first case, the evocation of the battle metaphor is accomplished

metonymically², through reference to elements of the scene that taken together comprise its meaning in this context. Some of the most noteworthy elements include the fence, which actually functions both as a convenient metaphor for the divide between the dissenters and the delegates in terms of access to policy construction, and a metonym of the battle scene in general, a physically manifest battle-line (the toppled fence, the “area near the fence”). Nowhere is this as evident as in the sub-headline of 21 April, which features two constitutive clauses – “Activists topple riot fence,/ delaying summit opening”. If the fence is considered in the above metonymic sense, the first clause establishes the protesters’ active participation in the battle, with “Activists” in the active, left-hand position in the clause. The second clause establishes the disruption, and cements the causal relation between the clauses – another extensional strategy that provides additional information to establish the coherence of the proposition. Another important metonymic element is the tear gas, which ceases for the instant to be a mechanism of discipline and control deployed by the authorities, and instead takes its place alongside other indices of the battle. In these examples, the tear gas simply appears, wafting into hotels to bother “annoyed” delegates, consuming entire areas, or forcing delegates to wipe their eyes to deal with its effects, thus asserting a ghostly manifestation of the battle metaphor.

The other strategy of agent-deletion in this case is nominalization, which figures frequently in this relationship. As already discussed, this is a strategy of passivization, by

² Weedon, et al., in the language of semiotics, define metonymy as “the relation of a signifier to the rest of the signifying chain – that is, to a relation whereby meaning is constantly deferred and can only be said to reside in the relations between elements of the signifying chain as a whole” (1980, p. 205). Their definition is further related to a Lacanian paradigm of language, but for my purposes, this definition, which emphasizes the meaning-relation of one element to the perceived whole, so that that element effectively stands in for the totality of the chain of signifiers, is sufficient.

which events or objects are privileged over the actors and processes that are involved in their construction. We have already seen how in measures of frequency and consistency the delegates class is the subject of nominalization (see Tables 2.1 and 3.4), and I have already commented that the nominalization of this class was one of the most notable trends in the above content analysis. In these examples, nominalization functions in a way that gives a sense of the negotiations as an agent-less phenomenon. The appeal to the accomplishments of democracy by Chrétien, noted above, is an implicit articulation of this phenomenon – democracy provides a point of coherence in which many of these nominalizations fit as constituent parts of an overall system. Some of these examples include: *global trade meeting, World Trade Organization conference, conference* [three times], *free-trade policies, free-trade area, trade, summit's opening, opening events, meetings, delegations, delegate, talks, the collapse of their talks*. As Fowler notes, nominalization is a strategy often seen in official and legal documents, in a dominant discourse of the elite that reserves a sense of authority, which defers ultimately to the notion that it is, implicitly at least, sanctioned by consensus (Fowler, 1991, p. 79).

It is this consensus, embodied in the legitimacy that derives from the democratic process that Chrétien invokes, that offers the ideological basis for the deletion of the actors – of those that “meet”, or “confer”, “delegate”, “talk”. And while the above examples are perhaps not as official-sounding as other nominalizations, they do still confer an aura of importance to the goings-on. These terms – conference, meeting, delegation – connote events in the domain of the elite, those with the knowledge and authority to deliberate together on matters of such severity.

To combine these two strategies – the hindrance proposition, agent-deletion, and nominalization of official processes – I argue that this constitutes this interaction in a very specific and hence limiting way. It calls on the “protest as battle” metaphor, firstly, to establish the primarily disruptive effect of the actions of the protesting class on the delegates. One might object that the protesters, as well as the delegates, were often passivized in this interaction, hence diminishing the responsibility of the former for the effects on the latter. Perhaps so, but considered in tandem with the rest of the evidence – the overall tendency of protesters to be constituted actively, and the relative absence of authorities in the above interaction – I argue that a disproportionate degree of agency still is assigned to the protester class. Once the hindrance theme has been established, the actions of the delegates class are constituted in a way that ties them almost intrinsically with a process legitimated through consensus, justifying the deletion of this actor in these constitutions (e.g., nominalization). The protesters, therefore, are doing more than impeding the actions of delegates – they are impeding a process with consensus on “its” side.

Conclusion - Across discursive spaces

These two interactions demonstrate the extent to which the practices of different classes are articulated discursively within particular arenas of action. It is by this that I take the notion of “discursive spaces”: these spaces are delineated by boundaries that are set primarily by the presuppositions (a manifestation of ideology) that the text invokes to establish coherence for the reader. These presuppositions are constituted through discursive strategies that have been called “scripts”, “themes”, “propositions”, etc., that

guide the practice of interpretation, and in so doing reconstitute the boundaries of these spaces. I have focused here on only a couple of the more prominent ones: the battle narrative or metaphor, which characterizes the relationship between authorities and protesters, and the overall “impediment to consensus” narrative that structures the protesters-delegates interaction. Together these form a coherent discursive space, which can be summed up as the following: the chaos in the street is the main event and conflict, which in turn disrupts the trade negotiations also taking place. The discussion to this point has been mainly toward identifying the elements, relationships, and strategies that constitute this space. This is the discursive space that is foregrounded in coverage, as shown partly by the higher proportions of total references and active constitutions of action assigned to the actors in this space.

But in overall coverage of these events, there is another discursive space that is usually backgrounded: the space of the actual trade negotiations. This space is governed by an entirely different set of rules and elements, and is perhaps most conveniently symbolised in the Quebec City coverage as “inside the fence”. Fortunately, there were two articles in the sample unit – one in each set – that were devoted specifically to this space, and both, not suprisingly, came after the negotiations had ended and the “main conflict” subsided. Because it is not the main focus of my analysis, I will devote only enough attention to it to tease out a couple of the elements of this space. My main point, however, will be to show the noticeable disjuncture between these two spaces; they are starkly different terrain, dominated by different sets of actors and dramas. The evidence of this also suggests why the displacement of dissent is such an easy proposition:

discursively, and ideologically, there is not yet a discourse – certainly not a news discourse – accommodating enough to reconcile these two spaces.

The first indication of this disjuncture is in the overall number of references to particular actors. Whereas protesters only found their way directly into these articles three times, the trade delegates class was referred to a total of 20 times, and constituted actively 19 times, in comparison to the one active constitution of the protesters. Similarly, authorities were not at all referred to directly, and were attributed only one passive action in both articles. Although the delegates were the dominant actor in both texts, they were also most often passivized (28 times) and nominalized (50 times). Further, actions of this class that were represented actively were often of the “weak” variety, with no clear goal or patient implied. For example, delegates “finally took their leave”, “could not agree”, “recommitted themselves”, “made concrete progress”, etc. With no patient or goal, with almost self-referential action that targets not another class, but the actor themselves, the articulation of any conflict is diminished, and the cohesiveness of the group is reinforced.

Even the macroproposition of the Seattle text, which does emphasize the “failure in Seattle”, represents the delegations as acting in concert – “picking up pieces” – with the failure at least providing an element of agreement. Any disagreement within this class is toned down, as in the following:

Europe could not agree with food exporters such as Canada on how to treat agriculture, and Europe also wanted the rich countries to give a lot more leeway to developing countries.

These are mostly lexical choices – “could not agree”, “also wanted” – that are substantially irreconcilable with a more directly conflict-oriented discursive structure. By way of comparison, imagine the following bit of fiction:

Protesters *could not agree* with riot squads on how to treat civil dissent, and protesters *also wanted* national guardsmen *to give a lot more leeway* to anarchist groups.

This is an insincere and facetious piece of writing, but I think it illustrates the point. But in case it has not, consider the same “real” passage fictionalized again, but this time using some of the lexicon of the protest discourse:

Europe *clashed* with food exporters such as Canada on how to treat agriculture, and Europe *launched their latest offensive* to get the rich countries to *surrender* to developing countries.

As a case in point, it was difficult to imagine appropriate substitutions – nothing in the protest lexicon could genuinely match “give a lot more leeway”. This is a discursive space with one actor acting “weakly”, without conflict, in the absence of the struggle that governed the “battle-hindrance” space. This is also quite possibly why much of the action is nominalized; events like “the talks” can easily replace direct action, because in that case there is no agent-patient relationship to define it as action.

So we have on one hand a discursive space not only riddled with conflict between classes – protesters and authorities – but also within classes, specifically the protesters, emphasizing the coherence of one and the contradictions that plague the other. On the other hand, we have a discursive space that is occupied mainly by one actor, characterized by actions within this space that are self-referential and that tend to emphasize the coherence of this group. As I have suggested, this is what discursive spaces entail: they set boundaries for the action of the particular actors that move within them. They are also, like any other type of space, relational, which means that how that space is perceived depends on the position of the perceiver, which is in turn determined by its discursive constitution. I am thinking here specifically of the “we” class, which as I

have said is implied as a sort of standard-bearer, the “silent majority” that occupies all of these spaces, if often implicitly as a part of the audience, as a citizen of democracy, as one of those put off by, or alternately, sympathetic to, these protests.

I will hazard only some reflections on the limited evidence as to how this “unspecified class” is positioned in these spaces. We can employ a creative, if simplistic, piece of logic work to arrive at the conclusion that this class represents the missing and fundamental link in the disjuncture between these spaces. First, I have already suggested that “we” are implied in the interpellation of the delegates class, as an invisible machinery of consensus – which is registered for instance in the agent-deletion strategies often associated with this class, the conferred ability of powerful figures such as Chrétien to be the only ones offering a specific positioning of the public, etc. Now, “we” are also (invisibly) present in the other discursive space, the space of protest, although we retain a similar role, because we accompany, via the democratic process, the trade delegates struggling through the *melée* to keep the process on track, and our safety lies with the agencies in which we entrust the enforcement of public law.

If I were to suggest generally, as have many before, that the remedy to ideology in news discourse is to restore a “balance” to representation, then the following is the implication. In issues of social conflict and social change, perhaps undue focus has been placed on the unjustly favourable press given to hegemonic actors and the unfair and unfortunate representations of non-hegemonic actors. Perhaps more attention needs to be invested in how this “neutral” class – the unspecified “we” – becomes a vital symbolic resource more crucial to the coherence of these narratives than many of the other actors. The construction of the discourse around these issues may implore us – as the “active”

audience – to put more intentionality into this positioning “for ourselves”. As would suggest the theory of discursive practice, as I have appropriated it, “we” – as subjects implicated in the construction of the discourse, as participants in the particular reciprocity that maintains the organization of class positions and therefore the effects of ideology – sustain a role in deciding if and how this positioning should be revised in light of the significant shift in the context of social change implied in the complexity that comprises “globalization”.

Assessing the appropriate venues for this revision is as imprecise as locating the conflicts that characterize the “field of historicity”, as Touraine would have it. It is possible that this is already happening in a very gradual sort of process touched off by the nominal new social movements. Maybe this is exactly that of which Michel Maffesoli writes in *The Time of the tribes* (1996) when he suggests that the turn to “everyday practice” is a form of resistance to a political order that, once saturated with signification that conceals the vitality of meaning, yields to sociality and identity as “above all the willingness to be something determined” (1996, p. 65). Perhaps Baudrillard is right when he suggests that the only available strategy of the masses in a system whose functioning relies on information is simply to withdraw, to short-circuit the institutional connections that in part inform how the “we” gets defined and mobilized in discourses such as this. Nonetheless, as I suggested earlier, recognizing that social conflict, injustice, etc., still “exists” makes it necessary to keep investigating the discourses that sustain these imbalances, so that “we” can understand how the choices of social production are communicated and therefore bounded.

Conclusion

Restating the argument

I have presented in the preceding pages a fairly vast assessment of the context within which a discursive analysis of the trajectory of globalization should be undertaken. By way of conclusion, therefore, I wish here to rein in all of these ideas and offer them again in a way that both condenses their main points and extrapolates their connections.

In chapter one, I suggested that far from being a primarily economic phenomenon, globalization is best understood in terms of the mutual determination of material and symbolic/cultural elements. This first chapter, it may be clear by now, is best viewed as an attempt to set the context for the ensuing discussion. I first sketched the economic “realities” of globalization – especially the recent investments in global financial institutions, the transferral of certain powers from national to global contexts, and the newer imbrications of different scales of decision-making that complicate the understanding of economic flows. Then I attempted an appraisal of recent intellectual efforts at understanding globalization, especially the ideas of Harvey, Bauman, Giddens, and Appadurai. I concluded that, taken as a whole, these writers are perspicacious in their assessment of some of the changes wrought by globalization on the social and cultural landscapes, although the overwhelming tendency of some of these theories (Harvey especially) was to reduce these phenomena to changes in the material mode of production. Culture, in this sense, becomes merely a supportive adjunct of an economic system that follows – with some determinative contextual changes – the trajectory of capitalist development as envisaged by Marxist theory. This tends to undermine the need to see culture as equally determinative of globalization since the Marxist approach

reduces it to an effect of economics. What I discovered in surveying the field of new social movements, however, is that this implicit emphasis on the central conflict between capital and labour – whatever its time-specific concatenation – is compromised by the formation of classes (in the sense of an ordering of groups of social agents) along lines that do not abide primarily by this context. I will return to this shortly.

But again, what these theorists of globalization offer is a set of basic questions that concern the changes in cultural milieus that have been mutually determined by the transition to a more globalized economy. Specifically, and simply stated, globalization is both causative and epiphenomenal of a context defined by a shift away from the security of traditional legitimations – of history, religion, tradition – and towards an awareness of multiple and potentially uncoordinated causative elements. Appadurai describes this multiple and uncoordinated set of causative elements by referring to the disjuncture between the various “scapes” of global flows. Hence, financescapes, mediascapes, ideoscapes, etc., are all comprised of flows of information, culture, capital, each with its own logic, but all coming together with the others to influence the directions of the flows. None is superordinate or determinate all on its own, but all are textured by the others in such a way as to comprise collectively a horizon for understanding global change. In some ways, the engine for these flows is what Giddens (and many others after him) have called reflexivity. This notion characterizes the era of globalization, because it is to the perpetual re-examination of social practices – abetted by increasingly sophisticated social-scientific technologies – that the metaphysics of tradition yield, thereby heightening the instability (not necessarily to be taken as a pejorative term) of social production. The tensions and contradictions that mark globalization – in the variety of

agents vying to shape it, of the myriad connotations that are associated with the word – are a case in point.

Related to this, I pointed to some of the ways that these thinkers have understood concomitant changes to civil society. Notably, the relative absence of a singular hegemon, such as an identifiable ruling class, or the absoluteness of the national state, leaves a certain void of power that could potentially disable civil society. The welfare-state model of governance similarly recedes, and an openness to transnational investment becomes the new legitimation for local governments. Further, the political fragmentation that ensues from a more globally-homogeneous trade regime with disparate local conditions and cultures threatens to leave opposition localized, disorganized, and hence ineffective. But some theorists are more sanguine, pointing to the surge in NGO involvement in global trade and commerce as an indication of the emergence of a “global civil society”. Indeed, the main point is that the conditions (of reflexivity) that led to the destabilization of traditional political structures have also fueled the opening of new spaces of resistance. Some of these spaces are filled by the cacophony of “new social movements” that emerge from the rubble of traditional (economic) class divisions.

These movements are the express topic of the second chapter, in which I charted the changing efforts of social movement theory to account for the role of these groups in the overall context of social change. The main thing to keep in mind is that there is a particular connection between these oppositional groups and the conditions that have given rise to globalization. The emergence of both has indicated the extent to which solely materialist objections and critiques, notably Marxism or its more recent formulations, are insufficient to explain the dynamics of change. Collective actors, at first

relegated to the status of collections of mutually-infected deviants, eventually assumed a more legitimate place in the political landscape; they came to be seen as rational and effectual agents, working towards collectively defined goals. Significantly, the legitimization of social movements as viable political actors coincided with the explosion of “new” and variegated conflicts that pulled apart the classical Marxist view of collective opposition as an expression of the will of the proletariat, itself seen as a necessary moment in the ongoing historical project of emancipation.

The new conflicts, not surprisingly, gave birth to new movements, and to a branch of theory aptly called “new social movement theory” that incorporated an evolutionary perspective with an often hermeneutic endeavour that emphasized the creative role of movements in indicating new loci of conflict, and new strategies of social change. Here NSM theory lines up partially with globalization theory, for it is partly in the change in the conditions of cultural and social production associated with post-modernity that these movements are given room to flourish. The expansion of realms of subjection and domination in this period beyond the central conflict, coupled with the burgeoning reflexivity that evolutionary sociology sees as characteristic of modernity, allowed these movements to apply specific forms of reason and rationality in resistance to the now more identifiable micro-spaces of power. Increasingly, these conflicts were located in the realm of the symbolic, which came to replace material production as the locus proper of social integration (or social production). The “field of historicity” is the place in which the specific historical conditions of this integration – here the move toward globalization – merge with a plurality of life-forms (cultural-symbolic models of being and action) to define the mechanics of change. Hence the proliferation of “identity politics”, within

which movements such as feminism challenged conventional (for lack of a better term) definitions of being with its own symbol systems that – by dint of their particular rationalities – undermined prevailing power structures through these symbolic challenges.

Classes are therefore “probabilistic constructs”. They do not necessarily obey the logic of economic division (although they can), but rely more on how they are organized and distributed through symbolic systems within which is engendered the reciprocity that is paradoxically necessary to maintaining social hierarchies. More simply put, there is a measure of consensus that dictates how classes are defined and relate to one another, and it is this consensual distribution of class positions that defines a society at a particular historical location. All of this pleads the case for a “symbolic turn” in the analysis of social movements, which some branches of theory, such as frame analysis, have attempted. What it also begs is a look at the inherent public-ness of social movements, both in how they attempt to effect change through the mobilization of symbolic resources, and how these efforts may be delayed, hindered, or otherwise thwarted by symbolic strategies also prevalent in public discourse.

In chapter three, therefore, I turned to theories of discourse and language as tools for analyzing how symbolic strategies are enacted. Chapter three begins from two main premises: first, the constitutive, and not merely representational, function of language, and second, the intimate linkage between language, social order, power, and subjectivity. Together these premises suggest that the analysis of social production, including the probabilistic or symbolic organization of class structures, has to begin from the very site of the structuring of social action. This site is discourse, or specifically here, language, because not only is it where the social imaginary (as the definition of what appears to be

real) is harboured, but also because language is itself fundamentally a form of action. Following Bourdieu and Foucault, language and power are bound up in the preservation of relations of power, although these two do come at the problem very differently. What they do seem to agree upon is the notion that discourse must be considered as a practice – specific conditions obtain around discursive production that delimit the value of what is said, who it can be said to, in what contexts, etc. For Bourdieu, this is best conceived of as the play of different economies that are theoretically distinct, but mutually effective, such as the linguistic economy, the cultural economy, etc. For Foucault, these practices most effectively serve the ends of power when they are inscribed undetectably within the operation of administrative systems such as the law. In any case, the position of the speaker, the place of the utterance, the position of the “receiver”, etc., all must be considered as both formative of, and constructed by, the operation of the discourse. Discourse thus (re)constructs the subjectivities that are invoked each time that discourse is deployed.

I took news discourse to be the most appropriate site for understanding the discursive construction of global protest and globalization. As one such discursive practice, news comes equipped with its own constructed subjectivities, specifically those of the journalist and the reader, that are imbued with reciprocal expectations and measures of authority. This includes constructing and affirming models of coherence, by which news texts “make sense” to readers. News texts are primarily reductive; they insert phenomena into categories ordered in terms of this coherence, or what readers will expect or “want” to find in a particular text about a particular issue. In the case of anti-globalization protest, this reduction, or “symbolic violence”, is performed mainly in

terms of the organization of possible subject positions – or classes – within the text.

Class boundaries are therefore constituted and reconstituted in the total practice of news discourse, which, in the name of the “active audience” thesis, involves equal measures of the production and reception of the text.

Because power structures persist within these imagined class positions, however, it proved necessary to work with a notion of ideology to provide access to these imbalances, and it is the work of Thompson that appeared most conducive. Thompson’s conception of ideology does a couple of important things: it rescues the term from the neutrality that it had been consigned to in recent formulations, preserving it as a tool for understanding the symbolic sustainment of relations of power. To repeat his axial formulation: “*to study ideology is to study the ways in which meaning (signification) serves to sustain relations of domination*” (Thompson, 1984, p. 130). This is a sense of ideology that, while borrowing the emphasis on domination from the Marxian conception, also allows a certain amount of autonomy to these significations.

It also removes, in this case, the illusion that ideology is somehow perpetuated by particular agents working in concert, as opposed to a generalized condition or set of strategies endemic to social production itself. Therefore, ideology is not always illusory (although it can be), and not always erroneous. Lastly, *pace* the “social cement” theory of ideology, it does not have to work toward cohesion, but can be equally effective in creating or maintaining or highlighting dissensus. The upshot of this is that no entirely consistent theory or methodology can be used to root out ideological phenomena; each is situated differently, and will therefore require different tools particular to that context.

The methodology most amenable to this task, in the case of news discourse, is “critical discourse analysis” (CDA) which takes as its project uncovering the evidence of social domination that lies beneath linguistic and other discursive structures. Like most discursive practices, the effectivity of the ideological work of news discourse is how it positions subjects or constructs subjectivities, and organizes these subjects in the discursive spaces of the news text. Critical discourse analysis considers this work largely in terms of “discursive strategies” that are commonly employed to register the coherence that activates the discourse. The first group of such strategies that I selected were transitivity structures, which refer to how the actions of subjects can signify differently depending on the syntactic ordering of the action in text, making these structures “the foundation of representation” (Fowler, 1991, p. 71). Transitivity, or transformations, refers basically to a difference between subjects and actions constituted actively and passively, so that there are variances between classes regarding their role and prominence in the events, and the quality or significance attributed to their actions.

The second of these strategies is broadly defined as propositional structures, which in this case refers to the way that individual elements of the text – syntax, lexicon, “layout”, etc. – are organized so that an overall meaning, or macroproposition, can be produced. What I took from CDA, broadly speaking, is firstly that coherence models, as an instance of ideology, both reflect and constitute the expectations of readers of the discourse, and indeed of the discursive practice on the whole. Secondly, the way this is done is by the “reductive violence” that is the function of all discourse (although, as mentioned, news discourse has its own particular strategies of reduction), the ordering of “discursive spaces” that circumscribe the actions of the subjects that move within them.

These spaces, in the analysis that followed, are a construction of the discourse, and not “pure” creations of the actors themselves, although a certain complicity in this process – as news subjects – cannot be denied. And reading subjects occupy these spaces as well, because the function of discursive spaces is to suggest the organization of class positions that fully implicate the reader who is equally “hailed” by and to his/her position within the discursive practice.

With a methodology inspired by the above ideas, in chapter four I first performed content analysis of a corpus of news texts from the *Globe and Mail* concerning the protest actions in Seattle in 1999, and in Quebec City in 2001. I will refrain from revisiting this in any detail, but suffice it to say that the results of this analysis were used to indicate a certain typicality of textual constructions – to point to areas of interest for a more qualitative study of how subject positions and actions, and ultimately the above discursive spaces, were constructed within the text. One of these areas of enquiry included the tendency for protesters to be assigned a substantial share of “net agency” in the events, being the class most frequently mentioned, and with their actions being depicted predominantly in the active voice and much less so in the passive voice. Authorities, too, meaning police and other law enforcement agencies, figured decisively in events, although relative to my assumptions, the results here were slightly more ambiguous than those of the protesters. Trade negotiators, on the whole, were most consistently represented/constituted passively – especially through the strategy of nominalization, which I defined as a way of concealing agency both of that specific class and generally, so that processes take on a driven, consensually-sanctioned character that displaces them from an assessment of the actions of subjects.

Lastly, I pointed to what I called the “unspecified” class (in the interest, ironically, of being as “objective” as possible) as a sort of imagined standard-bearer of the actions of other classes, against which these actions take on the dominant significations that comprise in part the coherence that the text both appeals to and effects at the same time. This class, too, is a passivized class, and I suggested that this produces an ambivalent sense of the role of this class. While it is this class – in terms like “citizens” of democracies – that ostensibly provides the consensual motor force for these trade agreements and global decisions, thereby assuming an implicitly active role in the events, the tendency to be constituted passively, as “patients”, also suggests that this class bears more profoundly the effects of what is happening in the text. This is also to say that this class is somewhat of a resource for the other classes, as a relational abstraction malleable enough to be mobilized by other classes (at times deliberately, at times not quite so) to specific political ends. The unspecified class is therefore the “public or “the silent majority”, or that group to which all actors refer in order to legitimate their actions. I will expand on this shortly.

The next step in this analysis was to gather a sense of how these classes were named. Protesters, on the whole, were actors without a goal. This consigned them to localization, thus removing them from the global context into which they presumably would insert themselves. This was often rendered in the division established between violent and non-violent demonstrators, a division that is quickly and silently erased by other aggregative strategies that lumped them all into one category. This class was thereby left without the coherence that the other legitimated classes enjoyed. Its incoherence became visible precisely in the opposition of the protesters to the class of

authorities. The authorities were granted a large measure of coherence because they were focused on the realization of an overall goal – the maintenance of “law and order”. No such goal was granted to the protesters.

I then analyzed these classes relationally, that is to say in the context of their relationship with other classes. It is here that what are alternately called “scripts” or “narratives” begin to emerge, models of coherence that position subjects more effectually and set boundaries on how their actions are to be understood, or what elements of the relationship are foregrounded or backgrounded. I concluded that the protesters/authorities relationship was by far the most prominent, and that it was constituted in the trope of the battle scene, which was further entrenched as *the* appropriate metaphor for this type of action. The protesters/negotiators relationship was thematized as a combination of active hindrance, with the protestors hindering the negotiator class, and therefore the democratic representativeness of the negotiator class. The protesters appear to have the project of impeding the global trade agenda which is itself writ as a politics sanctioned by the democratic process.

I concluded by making some overtures to a notion of discursive space, which in its construction sets discursive boundaries on what actions can be attributed to which actors. These are bounded spaces within which actors move, and which thereby comprise a particular organization and/or hierarchy of class positions. I claimed that in this case, two distinct spaces are constructed – the space of protest and the space of global trade negotiation. What characterizes the relationship between these spaces is that there is strikingly little interplay between them; discursively, we are hard-pressed to find a point of reconciliation that would effectively allow the full complexity of this entire process to

be shown. Only one space can be evoked at a time, and the consistency between Seattle and Quebec City in terms of when the second space is appropriate is telling. Generally speaking, when the first space is occupied, when there is activity in the trenches, the actors on the second stage are silent. Only when the main actors – the police and the protesters – have concluded their “dialogue” does the second stage illuminate and the understudies get their opportunity. It is on this notion that I would like to continue the discussion, and point to a few further conclusions.

Whither public opinion?: Imagining new spaces

My conclusion is to imagine the existence of a discursive space that could accommodate all of the actors involved, in a way that approximates the spaces of civil society that have been stretched over the new globalized spaces of power. Clearly, globalization has serious consequences for civil society. Indeed, if civil society is defined at least partly in its function as a check, watchdog, what have you, to structures of power that are now undergoing very complex changes, there is no alternative but to assent to the impact of globalization. It is therefore imperative for any kind of operational “global civil society” that this discursive space be constructed, so that the intimate connections between the “action” on the street and the action at the table can at least be given consideration. My analysis indicates that this space has not yet been constructed and that the connection between global civil society and the global exercise of power has not yet registered. However, this is certainly not to say that it cannot or will not happen. I want to start from this general conclusion and work back through its implications.

These results, conclusions, suggestions, etc., entail a few pivotal questions concerning the way that structures of power and opposition have changed in this latest era of globalization, and as a corollary, what the function and effect of news coverage has and can be on this landscape. Fundamentally, these are relatively unanswerable questions concerning how audiences – citizens, the “we”, individuals, the nominal public sphere – relate to media content, and these are questions that continue to elude researchers, insofar as conclusive evidence is the goal of study. First, the authors that I cited in chapter one are ambivalent about the effect of the observed political changes on the effectivity of civil society and oppositional groups. Either the changes are deleterious to the possibility of cementing opposition, or they open new spaces wherein new demands and new strategies can be articulated to greater effect. In either case, what is the role of news media in this state of affairs?

The short answer is that this role is as ambivalent as the prospects for effective opposition. If civil society is harmed by the changes brought on by globalization, one might suggest – as have many others before, again with ambivalent conclusions – that the “social value” of news coverage of important events like these increases, and consequently, so does the responsibility of news outlets to maintain all of the sacred trusts of that profession (objectivity, even-handedness, etc.). If one assumes that the burgeoning of groups such as NGOs, new social movements, and other resistant formations, owes to the opening of political space – a conclusion reached by more “hopeful” writers such as Melucci – then the media retain importance as a resource through which these groups can “get the message out there”. Either way, the media

remain a force that must be accounted for in any analysis of how globalization – in both its institutional and oppositional embodiments – is constructed.

I have presented what could easily be read as an indictment of news discourse and the distorted representation of protest movements falling generally under the rubric of “anti-globalization”. Admittedly, in trying to extract some pertinent questions from the more skeptical commentators on globalization, I may not have discouraged this reading sufficiently. Harvey and Bauman, although writing from different traditions, would likely approach this sort of coverage of global protest as part of a repertoire of cultural/ideological forms that primarily supports a proto-capitalist ethos of development. It is easy to conclude from my analysis that news readers do not get “all the facts”, that the political-economic structures of news media and their embeddedness within this ethos predispose them to affirming this particular ideological viewpoint. Surely there is more to global protest than marches, accusations of police brutality, vandalism, or the contemptible prevention of democratically-elected leaders from dutifully protecting our economic interests. There have to be substantive programs, agendas, and demands that get shuffled behind the spectacular displays of hostility and the debates over whether the actions of either of the parties were warranted. Even the well-intentioned questions about the true nature of democracy that emerged after the infamous perimeter fence was erected in Quebec lead us slightly astray.

While I can subscribe to the notion that the particular coverage that I studied does not adequately present the substantive concerns of the groups protesting in Seattle and Quebec City, a reading of my analysis that would implicate these constructions as “distortions” is itself a misreading. As I pointed out in chapter three, echoing Thompson,

presupposing a distortive effect of ideology – such as the “inversion of reality” thesis of traditional Marxism – is at best problematic, because it assumes a vantage point from which all of reality may be assessed and evaluated “as it really is”. At its worst, this is a fundamentally authoritarian position that pretends to know the “real” reality and therefore to instruct others in it. The critique of foundationalism and of Chomskyian linguistics makes this contention difficult to support; the world and the objects in it do not exist in such a way that their apprehension and representation can be measured confidently in terms of fidelity to this world and these objects. In short, perception does not grasp pristinely a pre-existing world unaffected by the very act of perception; perception also shapes the thing perceived. Representation takes the form of discourse, of words linked into sentences imbued with attitudes, structured in narrative, reliant upon other discourses, and so on. In representing the world, therefore, discourse also constitutes the world and the objects in it.

It does so in tandem with the complex of social conditions that together defines these particular discourses as practices. Indeed, to the extent that a discourse is produced from a particular point of view or location (it implies positionality), that it circulates through specific pathways, that it is reproducible and gives purchase to further statements (it is neither closed nor irrational), it is a social practice. These practices involve the totality of human subjects implicated in the discourse as initiators, receivers, relays, observers, etc. Ideology, therefore, is not an effect of distortion initiated by one agent and passed along nefariously to hapless and passive recipients. Ideology is more accurately a *condition* of discourse and communication, much as the reductive work of the discursive

practice of news in constructing and abiding by models of coherence is fundamental to the possibility of meaning being registered at all.

But this does not mean that ideological phenomena are not worthy of study, because they do still play *the* central role in maintaining the relations of power and domination that in part shape our discursive practices. As much as ideological contentions are not necessarily false, neither are they unquestionably true – the objective of giving voice to other positions, as the alleged foundation of a pluralist polity, demands that we at least unpack these structures of representation to see how they might “miss the point”, or something to that effect. This is what I have done here. I have demonstrated, with the help of critical linguistics and some specific examples, how dominant attitudes about social protest are codified within linguistic and discursive structures. I concluded from this analysis that the registration of anti-globalization protest in news discourse draws upon previous knowledge, previous narratives, as well as notions of common sense in order to produce representations (coherence structures) typically associated with protest action. Further, in maintaining a discernible distance between the spaces of the protest and of the trade negotiations, this discourse has worked to undermine a movement that has attempted *at the very least* to bring the need for reinvestments in a notion of global civil society to public attention.

So it becomes logical to ask: what kind of effect do these representations of global protest actually have on people’s opinions or attitudes toward globalization? I do not think I have to point out the difficulties in assessing this question. The most appropriate tool at our disposal, the public opinion poll, has been condemned by Baudrillard as an exercise in the circuitous simulation that characterizes post-modernity – a society without

depth, relying ironically upon self-generated information about itself to maintain an integration that is therefore robbed of its vitality, as people become extensions of media, and not *vice versa* (Baudrillard, 1995). Unless one wishes to hitch a political program to Baudrillard's rather aporetic pronouncements, however, a sense of what the public "knows", how it knows it, and how and by what this knowledge is commonly affected, is essential. Bruce Robbins, quoting Derrida, says:

the fact that "public opinion" is a specter, "present as such in none of the spaces" where it is held to be, does not mean one can "*simply* plead for plurality, dispersion, or fractioning....For certain socio-economic forces might once again take advantage of these marginalizations and this absence of a general forum." The question is, "How then to open the avenue of great debates, accessible to the majority, while yet enriching the multiplicity and the quality of public discourse, of evaluating agencies, of 'scenes' or places of visibility?" (Robbins, 1993, p. xii).

Understanding what is known – as flawed as any measure of this might be – gives over to an understanding of what needs to be known. This does not mean that we replace the distorted representation of global protest with an accurate depiction, thereby converting or liberating the millions who suffer the delusions of capitalism worldwide, but rather that we offer this imaginary public the symbolic resources that could facilitate another definition of what this public "is".

What if, for instance, the tacit equation of the democratic public (the "we") with the consensually-built machinery of economic globalization were not so much reversed as interrogated in order to allow the public to *identify with* rather than merely *observe* the forces of protest? What if our models of coherence, seemingly entrenched in the repertoire of symbols and narratives from which news discourse draws, were able to transcend the localized exigencies of protest actions to encompass a reconciliation of the

action with the objects of resistance? It might be useful at this point to revisit Lefebvre's notion of social space:

(Social) space is not a thing among other things, nor a product among other products: rather, it subsumes things produced, and encompasses their interrelationships in their coexistence and simultaneity – their (relative) order and/or (relative) disorder. It is the outcome of a sequence and set of operations, and thus cannot be reduced to the rank of a simple object....Itself the outcome of past actions, social space is what permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 73).

This conception again points to the recognition of the constitutive effect of discourse on “real” spaces. Global space, in terms of the flows of culture, capital, people, ideas, etc., is determined, at least in part, by how are conceived the discursive spaces that shape the global political landscape. What if the discursive and social space of the global is gradually redrawn so that narratives allow oppositional subjects to move more *critically* – as opposed to more violently, or disruptively – within it, and to contribute more equitably to the texturing of this space? There could be many such strategies to avert the foreclosure of meaning that news discourse so often achieves, but whose responsibility is it to ensure that these discursive opportunities are made available?

This question is easily the most difficult to answer, especially from a perspective that acknowledges, as I have, the reciprocity of power and domination, and the implication of all actors in the formation of discursive practices. So, again, we return to public opinion. Have the anti-globalization protests, despite their representation, had any impact on public opinion? And does public opinion have any impact on the exercise of authority?

One reliable opinion poll on the subject was conducted in April, 2000, by the Angus Reid Group (Ipsos-Reid, 2000). It posed questions specifically about the WTO,

including its overall impact and the impact of the Seattle action on people's attitudes.

General conclusions are drawn in the media release by Tom Neri, President of Angus

Reid's U.S. Operations:

The protests (against globalization) may generate a lot of media attention, but trade issues are barely on the general public's radar screen, especially in the U.S....Even with 'The Battle in Seattle,' hardcore opposition to globalization remains a minority-held view. However, what we also found was that it wouldn't take much for Americans to retreat behind trade barriers if they felt their jobs and their standard of living were being squeezed (Ipsos Reid, 2000).

According to this study, 64% of Canadians believed at the time that the WTO has had a "positive impact on the economic and education situation in the world", although only 45% believed its impact on Canada has been more beneficial than harmful (as opposed to 17% who believed the opposite). So there is a general, if not staggering, approval of the WTO in Canada – only 21% believed that the WTO has had a negative impact on the world economy. Interestingly, however, when asked if they favoured free trade or protectionist policies, Canadians were virtually split; where 50% favoured free trade, 45% believed that protectionist policies were preferable, and only 5% fell into the "don't know" category.

A cynical reading of these results might simply suggest that many Canadians are ignorant of the WTO and its underlying agenda. A more moderate view might look at these figures as an indication that many Canadians, although approving of what the WTO has accomplished to this point, would move for changes to this agenda that would restore some of the control over national economies to domestic policy-makers. I would suggest that it is most likely a bit of both.

More specific to this analysis, of course, are the results that showed that of the 78% of people aware of the WTO, 79% were aware of the Seattle protests. The impact of the protest was highly variable. 10% of respondents became more favourable to the WTO, while 21% became more opposed to the WTO. Perhaps most interestingly, 66% felt that their attitude toward the WTO was not affected whatsoever by the protest. Still keeping in mind the caveats concerning polls as a measure of public opinion, there are a number of ways to decipher these figures. What my analysis would likely suggest is that the 66% who claimed to be unaffected by the protests actually illustrate the ambivalence that results from the separation of the discursive spaces. Indeed, my analysis indicates that this 66% is *unaffected* because it has not been given the tools with which to choose either for or against, and that the tools were not given because the discursive spaces (of the protester and the negotiators) were consistently held apart. *Most* people reached no further conclusions about the WTO because the issue was not contextualised.

However, the interpretation of poll results should orient us towards another problem. The assumption in such interpretations is that news reports *inform* public opinion, that they *shape* public attitudes, and that the outcome of these activities of information and shaping are captured in public opinion polls. Polling, therefore, establishes a continuum between (a) what is said, (b) how it is represented and circulated, and (c) public behaviour. While such a continuum may exist, we should be wary of drawing hasty conclusions. Is it fair to say that people interpret information *as it is presented*, that is to say in a manner consistent with the intentions of those who present it? There are strong reasons to doubt this, and we need not refer to the abundant literature

on the so-called “active audience” to find evidence for our doubts. We need only look at public behaviour in light of well-known media representations.

For example, ex-President Bill Clinton was the object of a barrage of highly unfavourable news coverage revolving around the “Lewinsky Affair”, yet public opinion polls showed consistently a rise in his popularity. There appears to have been, in this specific instance, a clear break between the content of news – and probably between the intentions of some of the suppliers of the news – and the interpretation of the public. Indeed, it seems to indicate that the public can be fairly detached from the directionality of news flows and their presumed intentions. It may indicate the irrelevance of the media in some instances of public opinion formation or, also, the unintentional and uncontrollable outcomes of media activity.

That said, the inconsistencies revealed in the Ipsos-Reid poll between attitudes toward free trade and protectionism (almost equally divided) and attitudes towards the WTO (preponderantly favourable), might also point to a disjuncture between how “the public” is informed about local/national politics and the nascent global politics of trade. What might be interesting to see is whether protests concerning more identifiably local issues – such as the OCAP protests in Toronto in 2000 – had any more impact on public opinion than the Seattle protests seem to have had. Indeed, the severe decline in Ontario Premier Mike Harris’ popularity, in a province that has elected him twice very convincingly, might speak to this point somewhat. This is certainly not conclusive, but just one of many possible implications of these numbers.

The fact that 66% of respondents claimed to be unaffected by the protests and that 21% claimed to have become more negative to globalization as a result of the protests

should lead us to conclude that the media discourse of global protest does not result in any singular or clear outcome. We cannot approach this discourse in a way that totalizes it in terms of its effects on "public opinion". The very presence of opposition points to the fact that discourses and spaces which provide alternatives to prevailing ideas *can* be constructed – this was the one of the main points of chapter two. The leaks that are sprung, in Dyer-Witheford's terminology, in the hegemony of media discourses are perpetually in evidence, especially in the frequent disjunctures between "public opinion" and what they are told via news media. It is tiresome, at best, and noxious and arrogant, at worst, to assume that people are simply pre-disposed to believing and conforming to what they hear in the media. The links between the intentions of speakers, the representation and circulation of those intentions in the media, and public behaviour need to be tracked with infinitely more care. Public opinion exists but apparently not conveniently.

Still, there is a difference between activating criticality within discursive spaces that already exist, such as the Lewinsky Affair, and directing that same criticality toward the construction of spaces without the provision – yet – of the resources necessary to do so. This in turn leads us to consider again – and always with an acute awareness of the socio-historical location of the audience, the issue at hand, prevailing media structures, our ways of apprehending and knowing – the ways in which embryonic discursive spaces can be created. This is not a question of media bias or of the gullibility of the public, or even of the uncritical acceptance of the legitimacy of democratic mechanisms to offer the comfort that everything is going as "we" have planned. It is rather a matter of uncovering, as I have attempted, the strategies implicit in the discourses which inform

how we construct and negotiate new political scenes, possibilities for change, or the appropriation of new “voicings” to address nascent and formative conditions.

So what is to be done? To suggest simple remedies in a situation of such complexity is to put the cart before the horse, because it is actually the complexity that opens possibilities for change. First, as Thompson shows, we must recognize the specificity of ideological processes. As each situation is unique, it is unlikely that a single blanket methodology can ever be applied everywhere; each phenomenon is contextually driven and, as such, theory and practice have to adapt to the context. Therefore, the fact that I have in this particular analysis argued against turning “bias” into a central issue or category does not mean that in future, and in another context, it could not properly become so.

Likewise, it is tempting, especially in light of the nature of media discourse, to propose some reforms to media behaviour; for instance, one might suggest the establishment of publicly-sponsored committees or reviews to undertake this type of analysis and recommend appropriate measures of content regulation. But media reform or regulation, in this case, is both unwieldy and unjustified. First, as I have established that no comprehensive methodology can be applied to every case like this (and this is the recognition that global protest is in no way the only available example, but simply one of the more current and salient), we would inevitably face an explosion of possible areas of investigation, and therefore an equal number of particular methodologies and proposals for reform.

Further, a program of media reform, to have legitimacy, would have to be motivated by the force of public awareness and demand, and the above poll suggests

strongly that this demand simply is not (yet) there. Ultimately, to impose content regulation on news outlets, which would seem to be the ineluctable site of reform, threatens the possibility that these measures could at some point be mobilized *against* the interests of these publics. Lastly, the underlying philosophy of the idea is entirely at odds with the view of ideology as a shared condition of discourse, because it implies that media are somehow unilaterally “doing something wrong” that needs immediate correction. Clearly, I do not subscribe to such a reductionist perspective on the (inter)relationship between media and audiences.

The need for further study in this area, however, is inspired by the complexity of the situation, the conclusions that I have offered, and the relative dearth of similar analyses (although Angus has a set a high standard in *Primal scenes of communication* [2000]). This should not be confined to news discourse; there are other media specific to other cultures in which globalization is also written.¹ What is also necessary is to continue to invest in and nurture the ongoing project of “media literacy”, in such things as educational institutions and the more “emancipatory” potentials of new media such as the Internet. Additionally, we need to continue to emphasize the linkages that exist between the formation of critical publics or “civil society” and comprehension of the play of media discourse and the constitution of the world as “we” know it.

¹ For example, Marie Gillespie (1997) writes of the use of the video cassette recorder by Hindi families in Britain, and how this use has become implicated in discussions about the reproduction or subversion of parts of traditional Hindi culture.

Appendix
SEATTLE ROUND – PRESS COVERAGE – GLOBE AND MAIL: NOV. 29 – DEC. 6, 1999
TABLE OF ACTORS – Dec. 1/99 – A1

Note: The following tables are not exhaustive of the articles used in the content analysis. They are taken to be a representative sample of these texts, provided in the interest of indicating the methodology used in both parts of the analysis.

Headline: Protests turn Seattle into war zone: Anger over free-trade talks sparks a day of anarchy in the streets
Author: Rod Mickleburgh

Analytic Classification	Descriptors used	Action (active)	Action (passive)	Nominalization
Authorities	"police" [c], "Mayor Paul Schell" [2], "about 300 armed state patrol officers and two units of unarmed national guardsmen" [3], "riot police" [4], "black-clad riot police" [6]	"imposed a 7 p.m.-to-dawn curfew" [2], "charged forward block by block, forcing protesters away from downtown" [4]	"a tear-gas canister thrown by police" [c], "A state of emergency was declared" [1], "have been ordered in" [3],	"concussion grenades" [6],
Protesters	"a protester" [c], "thousands of protesters" [2], "protesters" [4], "a small unruly group" [5], "huge crowds of activists opposed to free trade and globalization" [6], "the walls of protesters" [7], "Several hundred people" [5]	"makes a peace gesture while standing over a tear-gas canister" [c], "achieved their goal of thwarting the opening ceremonies" [2], "smashed the windows of a Starbucks store, looting it of bags of coffee" [5], "surrounding the building" [7], "defied the curfew order, milling about the streets" [5]	"Protests turn Seattle into war zone" [hl], "Anger over free-trade talks sparks a day of anarchy in the streets" [shl], "civil unrest that threw a global trade meeting into disarray and left the city looking like a war zone" [1],	"Protests" [hl]
Protest leaders				
Protest groups				
Governments				
Trade negotiators	"WTO organizers" [7], "few delegates" [7], "those delegates" [8]	"had booked the ornate Paramount Theater to kick off the new round" [7], "dared wade through" [7], "who managed to push and shove their way through came inwiping their eyes and blowing their noses from		"free-trade talks" [shl], "global trade meeting" [1], "World Trade Organization conference" [2], "WTO" [6], "delegates" (2) [7] [8], "conference" [9],

Unspecified		the tear gas" [8],		"the heart of Seattle was the scene of tear gas..." [6], "the tear gas that pervaded the air" [8]	"war zone" (2) [hl] [1], "free trade" "globalization" [6]
Miscellaneous	"United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan" [9]	"made it into the hall" [9]			

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hl = headline
 shl = sub-headline
 c = caption

Appendix
SEATTLE ROUND – PRESS COVERAGE – GLOBE AND MAIL: NOV. 29 – DEC. 6, 1999
TABLE OF ACTORS – Dec. 1/99 – A11

Headline: Police clear streets of Seattle after mayor sets curfew
Author: Rod Mickleburgh

Analytic Classification	Descriptors used	Action (active)	Action (passive)	Nominalization
Authorities	<p>"Police" "mayor" [11], "riot police" [13], "Dozens more" [13], "police" (4) [14] [16] [28] [29], "Police with tear-gas launchers and what appeared to be rubber-bullet guns" [27], "A line of two dozen police officers" [28], "six or more officers" [27]</p>	<p>"converged from other areas, lining up across the road" [13], "used tear gas, pepper spray and rubber bullets to disperse anti-WTO crowds" [16], "wore thick, black boots, shin pads, heavy vests, steel helmets and visors" [26], "hanging off the sides" [27], "decided to break up a group of sit-in protesters", "wearing gas masks, fixed their riot sticks and began jabbing them into the protesters' backs" [28], "took out tiny canisters of pepper spray and began spraying the group at close range" [29], "ripped off the protesters' protective bandanas and applied the stinging spray right into their eyes" [29], ""stabbed me in the back with their billy clubs"" (McNichols) [30], ""They were ripping and twisting people's arms, spraying them in the face"" (Hendess) [31]</p>	<p>"An armoured truck roared up, carrying riot police" "The air soon filled with tear gas and thick clouds of smoke from a series of concussion grenades" [13], "Only 22 people had been arrested" [15], "were also in evidence. Thick-plated armoured vehicles roared up and down the blocked-off streets" [27], ""the brutality against peaceful protesters"" (Hendess) [31]</p>	<p>"concussion grenades" [13], "in full force" [26], "the police action" [31]</p>
Protesters	<p>"all those who are demonstrating on the outside"" (Clinton) [12], "demonstrators" [13],</p>	<p>"who are now demonstrating on the outside"" (Clinton) [12], "tried to prevent one delegate from pushing through" [13], "anti-</p>	<p>"Violence is never an appropriate way to settle differences"" (Moore) [11], "one of the largest protests in the city's history wound</p>	<p>"protests" [18], "the march" [19],</p>

SEATTLE ROUND – PRESS COVERAGE – GLOBE AND MAIL: NOV. 29 – DEC. 6, 1999
Appendix
TABLE OF ACTORS – Dec. 1/99 – A11

	<p>"protesters" (2) [14] [29], "anti-WTO crowds" [16], "One group of protesters wearing masks and dark clothing" [17], "the march of more than 25,000 people" [19], "Several thousand demonstrators from Vancouver" [20], "a group of sit-in protesters" [28], "the protesters" (3) [28] [29] [32], "Ronnie McNichols, 19, of Vancouver" [30], "Kim Hendess, also of Vancouver" [31], "peaceful protesters" "people" (Hendess) [31]</p>	<p>WTO crowds blockading the streets" [16], "rampaged unchecked through several downtown streets, hurling newspaper boxes through storefront windows and threatening bystanders" [17], "joined the throngs" [20], "refused to move" [29], "sought treatment at a nearby first-aid station" [29], "said" [30], "said" [31]</p>	<p>uneventfully" [18], "The march of more than 25,000 people was organized by" [19], "brought to Seattle" [20]</p>	
Protest leaders	<p>"Canadian Labour Congress president Ken Georgetti" [21], "Mr. Georgetti" [22]</p>	<p>"said" (2) [22] [23],</p>		
Protest groups	<p>"the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, the leading U.S. labour organization" [19]</p>	<p>"is fighting the free-trade policies of the WTO because it fears" [19]</p>		<p>"American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations" [19], "U.S. labour organization" [19]</p>
Governments	<p>"President Bill Clinton" [21], "Officials for Canadian Trade Minister Pierre Pettigrew" [24], "Mr. Pettigrew" (2) [25], "someone from the Swiss</p>	<p>"planned to talk to protesters" [12], "I strongly, strongly believe" (Clinton) [12], "he told reporters yesterday, while taking care not to endorse the violence" [12], "refused to let him move far</p>		

Appendix
SEATTLE ROUND – PRESS COVERAGE – GLOBE AND MAIL: NOV. 29 – DEC. 6, 1999
TABLE OF ACTORS – Dec. 1/99 – A11

	embassy" [25], "the Swiss minister" [25]	from his hotel and cancelled a news conference" [24], "was working his way through a crowd...spotted someone surging towards him and bolted, thinking he was about to be ambushed" [25], "chasing after Mr. Pettigrew to ask him to meet" [25]		
Trade negotiators	"WTO director-general Mike Moore" [10], "one delegate" [13], "the WTO" [19], "WTO delegates" [32], "Avgouleas Stefanos, a WTO delegate from Greece" [33]	"wandering aimlessly" [32], "like to get in there" (Stefanos) [33]	"the official ceremonies were cancelled" [10]	"delegate" [13], "free-trade policies of the WTO" [19], "regulations" (Georgetti) [22], "emphasis on free trade" [23], "delegates" [32]
Unspecified	"citizens" [22],	"we have witnessed a very sad day" (Moore) [10]	"The most serious street confrontation took place" [13], "a fire broke out, enveloping both police and protesters in more smoke and producing scenes likely never before witnessed in Seattle" [14], "jobs will be lost due to cheap labour" [19], "too much emphasis on free trade results in worse working conditions..." [23], "a news conference planned to highlight the Canadian contribution to an advisory centre" [24]	"street confrontation" [13], "no reports of injuries" [15], "other confrontations" [16], "cheap labour" [19], "trade" [23], "a news conference" [24], "the Canadian contribution" [24]
Miscellaneous	"reporters" [12], "only 22 people" [15], "workers" [22]			

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Appendix
SEATTLE ROUND – PRESS COVERAGE – GLOBE AND MAIL: NOV. 29 – DEC. 6, 1999
TABLE OF ACTORS – Dec. 6/99 – A10

Headline: Delegations pick up pieces after failure in Seattle: Many pessimistic future WTO talks can overcome sticking points
Author: Heather Scofield

Analytic Classification	Descriptors used	Action (active)	Action (passive)	Nominalization
Authorities				"the police barriers" [23], "the police presence" [22]
Protesters	"the masses of demonstrators" [4], "Environmentalists and protesters" [20]	"slowed down last week's trade ministers' conference" [4]	"the boisterous protests did filter in" [23], "It wasted precious time" (Pettigrew) [24]	"the protests" [22] "the boisterous protests" [23]
Protest leaders				
Protest groups	"Friends of the Earth, an international non-governmental organization" [21]	"declared" [21]		"an international non-governmental organization" [21]
Governments	"a defensive U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky" [3], "Washington" [4], "trade ministers" [4], "Prime Minister Jean Chrétien" [6], "the United States" [6], "Mr. Chrétien" [7], "the U.S. Council of State Governments" [7], "Europe" (3) [10] [12], "Canada" (2) [10] [12], "the rich countries" [10], "developing countries" (2) [10] [11], "Developing countries" [11], "the United States" [12], "poor countries" [12], "Ms. Barshefsky" [13], "trade ministers and world leaders" [15], "Canada" (Pettigrew & Vancilief) [16], "Trade Minister Pierre Pettigrew and Agriculture Minister Lyle Vancilief" [16], "ministers" [17], "developing countries" [19], "Mr. Pettigrew" [23]	"insisted", "shut the summit down without issuing a final joint statement" [3], "urged the United States" [6], "said" (2) [8] [24], "also wanted" [10], "depend on for growth" [11], "hardened its position" [12], "called for a time-out" [13], "told" [14], "vowed to try again" [15], "believes that" (Pettigrew) [16], "said in a statement" [16], "conceded" [23],	"U.S. dedication to the free-trade process is waning, pointing to" [4], "a poor effort in organizing them" [4], "the U.S. refusal to negotiate changes" [11], "[anti-dumping regime] which...is used...to block the inflow of cheap goods" [11], "[U.S.'s hardened labour position] sidelined a softer compromise position" [12]	"U.S. dedication" [4], "lack of drive", [4], "the U.S. refusal to negotiate changes" [11], "exports that developing countries depend on for economic growth" [11], "a statement" [16]

Appendix
SEATTLE ROUND – PRESS COVERAGE – GLOBE AND MAIL: NOV. 29 – DEC. 6, 1999
TABLE OF ACTORS – Dec. 6/99 – A10

Trade negotiators	<p>"Delegations" [hl], "trade negotiators" [1], "trade representatives" [2], "the World Trade Organization" [2], "the WTO" [5], "WTO members" [9], "many WTO members" [11], "the WTO" [12], "WTO members" [18], "The WTO" (Friends of the Earth) [21], "trade officials" [22], "the trade ministers" [24]</p>	<p>"pick up pieces" [hl], "finally took their leave, having failed to launch the new round of free-trade talks they had hoped for" [1], "tried to put the collapse of their talks behind them" [2], "could not agree" [9], "say" [11], "will meet in Geneva...to continue their debate" [18], "said" [22],</p>	<p>"there were few indications that future attempts will be more successful than last week" [2], "the launch of a new global round and there has never been any question or wavering or second thoughts or any action inconsistent with that single objective" [3], "the differences...are not so great that they couldn't be solved" "whether there's political will to launch" (Weekes) [5], "Four days of talks to agree on a blueprint for future trade liberalization reached an impasse" [9], "no satisfactory conclusion could be reached" [13], "Discussions are already under way" (Pettigrew) [16], "Anything agreed upon in Seattle will...be carried over" [17], "the other topics that were up for discussion" [19], "the collapse of the talks had nothing to do with the protests" [22]</p>	<p>"Delegations", "failure" [hl], "WTO talks" [shl], "free-trade talks" [1], "the World Trade Organization" [2], "future attempts" [2], "the launch of a new global round", "any action" (Barshefsky) [3], "a final joint statement" [3], "the talks" [4], "political will" (Weekes) [5], "the WTO" [5], "international trade-liberalization efforts" [6], "negotiations" (Chrétien) [8], "talks" (2) [9] [16], "future trade liberalization" [9], "no satisfactory conclusion" [13], "the talks" [13], "trade-liberalization talks" [15], "the foundation has been laid", "a future agreement" (Pettigrew) [16], "routine negotiations" [18], "their debate" [18], "negotiations" [18], "discussion", "tariff reductions", "special considerations", "competition, investment" "antidumping measures" [19], "their talks" [22]</p>
Unspecified	<p>"Many" [shl], "The citizens of Seattle" [1], "many" [4], "the city of Seattle" [25]</p>	<p>"reclaimed their besieged streets" [1], "see" [4],</p>		<p>"the free-trade process" [4], "protectionism" [6]</p>

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SEATTLE ROUND – PRESS COVERAGE – GLOBE AND MAIL: NOV. 29 – DEC. 6, 1999
TABLE OF ACTORS – Dec. 6/99 – A10

		“...We watch with concern” (Chrétien) [7], “get rid of the trade ministers” [25]		
Miscellaneous	“trade consultant John Weekes, Canada’s former ambassador to the WTO” [5], “...certain voices in your country” (Chrétien) [7], “reporters” [14]	“said” [5], “urge a fortress America approach” (Chrétien) [7]		

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APPENDIX
QUEBEC CITY SUMMIT – PRESS COVERAGE – GLOBE AND MAIL: APRIL 16-23, 2001
TABLE OF ACTORS – Sat., Apr. 21/01 – A1

Headline: Fortress Quebec is breached
Author: Jeff Salot, Rhéal Seguin, and Colin Freeze

Analytic Classification	Descriptors used	Action (active)	Action (passive)	Nominalization
Authorities	"riot police" (3) [c] [1] [2]. "police" (2) [4] [5]. "Inspector Rob Poeti of the <i>Sûreté du Québec</i> " [8].	"shielded themselves" [2]. "said" [4]. "confirmed" [5]	"is arrested yesterday" [c]. "the total number of arrests had jumped" [5]. "a prison that had been specially cleared for summit arrests" [6]. "the protected area" [7]. "Three arrests were made" [8]	"arrests" (2) [5] [8]. "summit arrests" [6]. "the barrier" [8]. "the <i>Sûreté du Québec</i> " [8]
Protesters	"A bloodied protester" [c]. "about 5,000 demonstrators" (2) [c] [7]. "Activists" [shl]. "militant protesters" [1]. "the crowd" [2]. "Demonstrators" [3]. "four people" [4]. "a person connected to an anarchist group" [4]. "two of the leaders of yesterday's demonstrations" [4]. "Protesters" [5]. "more than 36 people" [5]. "dozens more" [6]. "groups opposing globalization" [7]. "those breaking through the wall" [9]. "members of the Black Bloc" [9]	"clashed with police [c]. "crashed through the...fence" [c]. "topple riot fence" [shl]. "delaying summit's opening" [shl]. "crashed through" [1]. "confronted riot police" [1]. "used a catapult...to lob teddy bears" [3]. "renewed their attempts to breach the fence" [5]. "had joined them" [6]. "gathered" [7]. "threw down a large portion of the fence" [7]. "appeared to be members of the Black Bloc" [9]	"Fortress Quebec is breached" [hl]. "a successful bid to disrupt opening events" [1]	"a successful bid" [1]. "demonstration" [4]. "attempts to breach the fence" [5]
Protest leaders				
Protest groups	"an anarchist group believed to be the Black Bloc" [4]. "the Black			

APPENDIX
QUEBEC CITY SUMMIT – PRESS COVERAGE – GLOBE AND MAIL: APRIL 16-23, 2001
TABLE OF ACTORS – Sat., Apr. 21/01 – A1

	Bloc" [9]				
Governments					
Summit participants	"summit leaders" [7]				
Unspecified		"were about to start their afternoon meetings" [7].		"the most hated symbol of the Summit" [1]	"summit's opening" [shl], "afternoon meetings" [7], "globalization" [7]
Other dissenting voices					
Miscellaneous					

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Appendix
QUEBEC CITY SUMMIT – PRESS COVERAGE – GLOBE AND MAIL: APRIL 16-23, 2001
TABLE OF ACTORS – Sat., Apr. 21/01 – A9

Headline: Protesters topple fence at summit
Author: Jeff Sallot, Rhéal Seguin, and Colin Freeze

Analytic Classification	Descriptors used	Action (active)	Action (passive)	Nominalization
Authorities	"the authorities of Canada" [13], "a phalanx of police officers" [15], "police" (5) [19] [22] [23] [24] [25], "riot squads" [20], "RCMP Staff Sergeant Mike Gaudet" [28], "officers" [29], "riot police" [30]	"are repressing the peaceful demonstrations" [13], "attacked in waves of 50 at a time, banging on their shields and pushing back the demonstrators to re-establish the barrier" [19], "'if they're throwing it'" [24], "advanced only after" [26], "said" (2) [28] [29], "adding that" [29], "officers moved quickly to fill the breach" [29], "attempted to clear the area" [30]	"is dragged away" [c], "one of those arrested" [11], "two provincial police helicopters hovered over the crowd" [19], "riot squads were rushed through in buses" [20], "a cloud of tear gas enveloped a wide area", "The summit site was immediately locked down and the opening of meetings delayed" [20], "canisters of tear gas were fired into the crowd" [22], "the canisters were fired almost directly at demonstrators" [23], "the elaborate security scheme worked as planned" [28], "in preparation for today's massive march" [30], "All entrances and exits were closed" [32]	"a phalanx" [15], "the barrier" [19], "the elaborate security scheme" [28], "the security measures" (Gaudet) [29], "the breach" [29], "preparation" [30],
Protesters	"Protesters" [hl], "one of those arrested" [11], "as many as 25,000 people" [12], "the demonstrators" [13], "those that struggle there for such a just cause" [14], "Rob Altemeyer, 32, who works in a recycling program at the	"topple fence" [hl], "got over the fence" [c], "'who struggle there'" (Castro) [14], "climbed onto the remnants of the crumbled fence", "addressed a phalanx of police officers" [15], "shouted" [16], "began chanting" [17], "threw a rock" [18], "was swallowing mouthfuls of pepper spray" [18], "retching and spitting"	"A much bigger demonstration is planned for today" [12], "it would be loud and peaceful and would be directed away from the fence to focus on denouncing the proposed trade deal rather than clashing with the police" [12], "the protest prevented the leaders from reaching" [21], "canisters lobbed back by protesters" [26], "Although gas canisters were the most favoured	"protest" [11], "demonstration" [12], "projectile" [27], "massive march" [30], "the afternoon demonstration" [34]

Appendix
QUEBEC CITY SUMMIT – PRESS COVERAGE – GLOBE AND MAIL: APRIL 16-23, 2001
TABLE OF ACTORS – Sat., Apr. 21/01 – A9

	<p>University of Manitoba" [15], "Twenty or so people" [17], "someone" [17], "everyone", "Mr. Altemeyer", "people" [18], "the demonstrators" [19], "demonstrators" [22], "Protesters wearing gas masks" [23], "the crowd" [23], "Nick, 23, from Barrington, Ont." [24], "protesters" [26], "the demonstrators" [31], "Protesters" [32], "Many demonstrators" [33], "Naomi Andrews from Middlebury College in Vermont", "a group of 15 protesters" [34], "Ms. Andrews" "Allison Parker, an environmental studies student" [34], "Ms. Andrews" [35], "the radical demonstrators" [35], "'People throwing rocks and stones" (Andrews) [36], "'people here" (Andrews) [36]</p>	<p>"washed out his eyes with water" [18], "covered their faces with goggles and handkerchiefs" [22], "tossed many of the canisters back" [23], "'we can throw it back" (Nick) [24], "he had graduated from university the previous day" [25], "launched their latest offensive" [31], "burned toilet paper" [32], "sought refuge" [33], "said she opposed" [34], "is writing a research paper" [34], "to protest against the trade deal" [34], "wiped tear gas out of their eyes" "expressed anger with the radical demonstrators" [35], "'People throwing rocks and stones give people here a bad name'" (Andrews) [36]</p>	<p>projectile, broke paving stones, water bottles and at least one empty fire extinguisher were also used" [27], "'part of the security fence did come down'" (Gaudet) [29], "was accompanied by" [34], "'This riot makes me sick'" (Andrews) [36]</p>	
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Appendix
QUEBEC CITY SUMMIT – PRESS COVERAGE – GLOBE AND MAIL: APRIL 16-23, 2001
TABLE OF ACTORS – Sat., Apr. 21/01 – A9

Protest leaders	"well-known APEC protester Jaggi Singh, the de facto leader of the Anti-Capitalist Convergence" [11], "An organizer" [12]	"said" [12],		
Protest groups	"That group" [10], "the Anti-Capitalist Convergence, the group that led yesterday's protest" [11]		"That group was blamed for violence" [10]	"the Anti-Capitalist Convergence" [11]
Government				
Summit participants	"Caribbean leaders" "U.S. President George W. Bush" [21], "the leaders" [21], "Mr. Bush" [21], "several South American delegations" [31]	"were staying" [31]	"the opening of meetings" [20], "was cancelled" [21], "a licence to damage the environment" (Parker) [34]	"globalization talks" [10], "the proposed free trade deal" [12], "the opening of meetings" [20], "a meeting" [21], "delegations" [31], "the North American free trade agreement" [34]
Unspecified	"people" [22], "the crowd" [22]		"as many as 25,000 people expected" [12]	
Other dissenting voices				
Miscellaneous	"Witnesses" [11], "Cuban President Fidel Castro" [13], "the people of Cuba" (Castro) [14], "dozens of reporters and workers who live outside the area" [32], "the poor in Mexico"	"said" [11], "was not invited to the summit, sent a message...condemning the brutal manner" [13], "wish to express" (Castro) [14], "live outside the area" [32]	"an unofficial translation of the message says" [14],	"our sympathy and admiration...behaviour...just cause" (Castro) [14], "translation" [14]

Appendix
QUEBEC CITY SUMMIT – PRESS COVERAGE – GLOBE AND MAIL: APRIL 16-23, 2001
TABLE OF ACTORS – Sat., Apr. 21/01 – A9

[34]					
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Appendix
QUEBEC CITY SUMMIT – PRESS COVERAGE – GLOBE AND MAIL: APRIL 16-23, 2001
TABLE OF ACTORS – Mon., Apr. 23/01 – A1

Headline: Clock now ticking on free-trade deal
Author: Shawn McCarthy

Analytic Classification	Descriptors used	Action (active)	Action (passive)	Nominalization
Authorities			"tear gas was used heavily to control protesters" [3],	
Protesters	"protesters" [4]			
Protest leaders				
Protest groups				
Government	"Prime Minister Jean Chrétien" [3], "Mr. Chrétien" (2) [4] [9]	"concluded the summit by insisting" [2], "said he was pleased" [4], "met with" [5], "discussed U.S. proposals" [5],		
Summit participants	"leaders of 34 countries" [1], "the leaders" (2) [4] [8], "U.S. President George W. Bush and Mexican President Vicente Fox" [5], "summit leaders" [6], "Leaders from less developed countries" [11], "Mr. Bush" "president" [12]	"recommitted themselves" [1], "had made concrete progress" [3], "acknowledged" [6], "won the agreement" [8], "insisted" [11], "require massive support" [11], "was attending his first summit since becoming president" [12], "'listened a lot, and learned a lot'" (Bush) [12]	"Clock now ticking" [h], "Acknowledging" [1], "an ambitious timetable for negotiating a sweeping free-trade deal" [2], "U.S. proposals to raise North American energy production to meet its growing needs" [5], "Faced with critics" [6] "who do not believe free trade leads to prosperity for all" [6], "there is still much to be achieved if the Summit of the Americas process is to be relevant" (declaration) [7], "the final declaration said" [7], "the agreement...to allocate more than \$30-billion (U.S.) to a series of projects aimed at improving	"free-trade deal" [h], "a sweeping free-trade deal" [1], "an agreement to negotiate a free-trade area" [2], "the adoption of a clause" [2], "U.S. proposals", "North American energy production", "its growing needs" [5], "freer trade", "prosperity" [6], "the agreement" [8], "free trade" [11], "economic and social development" [11],

Appendix
QUEBEC CITY SUMMIT – PRESS COVERAGE – GLOBE AND MAIL: APRIL 16-23, 2001
TABLE OF ACTORS – Mon., Apr. 23/01 – A1

				economic and social conditions” [8], “the summit closed” [9], “who have too often been marginalized or left out” (Chrétien) [10], “free trade and democracy alone won’t answer their needs...they require massive support from the richer countries to finance economic and social development” [11]	
Unspecified	“critics” [6], “our people” (declaration) [7], “each citizen” (Chrétien) [9], “those in our societies who have too often been marginalized or left out” (Chrétien) [10],	“who do not believe” [6], “to fulfill their full potential and to contribute to the development of society” (Chrétien) [9]	“less developed countries” [11], “there are challenges ahead of us” (Bush) [13]	“democracy” [2], “the results” [4], “their well-being” [7], “the development of society” (Chrétien) [9], “challenges” (Bush) [13]	
Other dissenting voices					
Miscellaneous	“countries with unelected governments” [2], “two regional development banks” [8]				

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Appendix
QUEBEC CITY SUMMIT – PRESS COVERAGE – GLOBE AND MAIL: APRIL 16-23, 2001
TABLE OF ACTORS – Mon., Apr. 23/01 – A8

Headline: PM lauds police restraint at summit
Author: Shawn McCarthy

Analytic Classification	Descriptors used	Action (active)	Action (passive)	Nominalization
Authorities	"police" (2) [18] [20]	"showing restraint and discipline" [20]	"were arrested" [18], "security fence erected around the site" [18]	"police restraint" [hl], "restraint and discipline" [20]
Protesters	"Critics of free trade" [17], "A total of 392 people" "bands of protesters, most of them young" [18], "an estimated 25,000 people" [19], "the protesters" [20]	"met before the summit and protested throughout the weekend argue that", "have attacked the summit's antipoverty agenda" [17], "confronted police" [18], "to protest against" [19], "had more legitimacy" [20]		
Protest leaders				
Protest groups				
Government	"PM" [hl], "Mr. Chr�tien" [16] [24], "the Prime Minister" [20], "Canada's International Trade Minister, Pierre Pettigrew" [24], "Mr. Pettigrew" [25]	"lauds police restraint" [hl], "praised" [20], "rejected any suggestion" [20], "said" [21], "even played down" [24], "has been lobbying to clarify the clause" [25]	"complaints by...Pettigrew" [24]	"complaints" [24]
Summit participants	"President Bush" [14], "the leaders" (3) [15] [19] [20], "'all the heads of state'" [21], "Mr. Bush" [23]	"are going to meet those challenges" [14], "said" (2) [14] [23], "sent a signal" [15], "have endorsed the proposed FTAA" [16], "said he campaigned on free trade...and remains	"endorsing a democracy clause" [15], "plans to pursue a free-trade area of the Americas" [19], "the North American free-trade agreement has benefited" [23], "the functioning of the chapter of NAFTA that has allowed investors	"challenges" [14], "the proposed FTAA" [16], "economic development" [16], "the liberalization of trade" [17], "plans to pursue a free-trade area" [19], "free trade" [23], "last November's election" [23], "the North American

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QUEBEC CITY SUMMIT – PRESS COVERAGE – GLOBE AND MAIL: APRIL 16-23, 2001
TABLE OF ACTORS – Mon., Apr. 23/01 – A8

		committed to it" [23]	to sue governments" [24]	free-trade agreement" [23]
Unspecified	"people who are opposed to what we are doing" (Chrétien) [22], "Mexico, Canada and the United States" [23], "governments" [24]		"were elected democratically" (Chrétien) [21], "'the progress that democracy has made today'" (Chrétien) [22]	"any suggestion" [20], "legitimacy" [20], "'the progress that democracy has made today'" (Chrétien) [22], "NAFTA" [24],
Other dissenting voices				
Miscellaneous	"Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide", "his political opponents" [15], "Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez Frias" [16], "investors" [24]	"must move to correct deficiencies", "stop attacks on his political opponents" [15]		"voting system" [15], "attacks" [15], "the exception of" [15], "damages over expropriation" [24]

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