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THE RADICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION --
An Inquiry into the Resolution of Self-Determination Conflict
Without Violence

by Melina Buckley

© July 1988 by Melina Buckley

**A Thesis submitted
to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts
in International Affairs**

The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

**Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada**

July, 1988

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**THE RADICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION --
AN INQUIRY INTO THE RESOLUTION OF SELF-DETERMINATION
CONFLICT WITHOUT VIOLENCE**

submitted by Melina Buckley, B.A. (Hons.)
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

Thesis Supervisor

Director
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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the dilemma created by self-determination conflict. On the one hand, conflicts over self-determination pose a threat to peace and security because of the violent manifestations which appear endemic to this type of struggle. On the other hand, these conflicts can be beneficial to the extent that the outcomes create a better relationship between the collectivities involved. A solution to this dilemma is offered by the conflict resolution approach. By emphasizing the functional aspects of conflict over the dysfunctional ones, this approach allows one to rethink the logic of the development of self-determination conflict. From this viewpoint, the nature of self-determination issues, the role of violence in conflict and the nature of conflict processes themselves are re-conceptualized. This reconceptualization of the dilemma leads to the creation of a framework of analysis which focuses on the discovery of alternatives to violence. The main elements of this framework are power, influence, legitimacy and stability. In turn, this analytical framework is applied to the Jurassien struggle for self-determination in Switzerland in the post-Second World War era.

INTRODUCTION

The international order is being undermined by conflict arising from quests for self-determination. The Basque separatist movement in Spain, the Tamil secessionists in Sri Lanka and the Palestinian struggle for a homeland are three examples of this grave threat to peace and security. An ever-increasing number of states around the world, both the developed and the underdeveloped, face problems of ethnic, or other forms of, tension which may lead to self-determination demands. These demands are challenging, in turn, the territorial integrity of states, the state system and international law. Clearly, such challenges posed by the nature of conflict over self-determination illustrates the urgent need to suppress the often violent manifestations which result.

Alternatively, the logic of this entire conventional portrayal of the problematique can be reassessed. Is it the self-determination demand which causes the conflict, and hence is responsible for the violence? Or is it the internal and international order of the state system which inhibits the processes of self-determination? The differences in these two perspectives is central to the questions examined in this thesis. Rather than seeing conflict over self-determination as the source of the violent behaviour, self-determination is seen as a process

through which collectivities create a new order. This definition is arrived at by exploring the implications of the essences of the concepts of self-determination and conflict resolution. This radicalization creates a framework through which the problems of violence in the resolution of self-determination conflict can be critically assessed.

Conflict resolution, as an approach to social phenomena, seeks to understand the essential elements of conflict. This understanding is sought in order to enhance our capacity to deal with the negative impact of conflict on social relationships. Conflict resolution, as a process, is the focussing of this knowledge on human interaction in conflict situations. In exploring conflict resolution, one searches for the fundamental roots of the conceptions of conflict within this primary context of individuals and groups in society. These general assumptions allow for a more thorough understanding of the processes of self-determination conflict. Consequently, they widen our perception of what have been taken to be the 'inherent' limitations of resolving self-determination conflict without the use of violence. This broadening of the reality of conflict situations and the related enhancement of our recognition of the potential for resolution are the radical implications of conflict resolution.

The purpose or terminal value of self-determination is the termination of conflict through the creation of an acceptable or legitimate relationship between the collectivities in question.

Thus, the quest for self-determination can be seen as a conflict resolution process. Self-determination attempts are conflict resolution processes because they are intended to remove the sources of conflict; the relationship between the collectivities which does not allow one group to fulfill its goals as determined by the psychological and material needs as they are defined by the individuals who gain self-identity through the group. It is this structure which allows the dominant group to pursue its needs and defined interests at the expense of the minority group that creates the conflict. Changes in the structure of the relationship achieved through self-determination can be conflict resolution outcomes to the extent that they are accepted as legitimate by the parties directly involved because they are perceived as fulfilling the needs of both (or all) groups.

The outcome of self-determination conflicts are readily identified as resolving the conflict because the ends are (at least theoretically) acceptable to all parties. That is, the outcome is functional for the society. However, greater difficulty is encountered when the process itself is viewed as resolution. This difficulty is engendered by the view that the actual process is marked by dysfunctional characteristics, with the use of force and violence often predominating at least in some phases of the process.

The reason for emphasizing the dysfunctional properties of self-determination conflict is that the perspective of analysis is usually that of the dominant group, and by extension, the state.⁽¹⁾ The dominant group sees conflict as functional when it appears to maintain the system and as dysfunctional when it operates against the system's stability. The dominant group is more likely to see the status quo as the preferred scenario since the dominant group shapes the state policies and hence can enforce its interests at the expense of the minority group. This emphasis on the status quo reveals a short term perspective which either does not recognize the latent conflict endemic to the system or reflects a position of hegemony which can enforce the status quo through a mixture of force and consent. (Gramsci, 1971). Other states tend to take the same perspective, since the state system hinges on the mutual reinforcement of state structures up until the point where a state is no longer viable (Wesson, 1978; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982).

The ascription of the properties of functional and dysfunctional conflict thus reflects perceptions of stability and legitimacy. These perceptions of the stability and legitimacy of the political system will vary according to the position of the group in the structure of the relationship. A minority group will view its subordinate position within a state as detrimental and illegitimate when the structure unjustifiably impinges on its

1 See discussion of the state in Chapter One.

ability to fulfill the needs of its constituents. The minority will see the situation as potentially unstable when alternative structures can be conceived, through self-determination. The status quo will be seen as inherently dysfunctional and change will be seen as functional if it moves the system closer to being able to fulfill the group's self-determined needs.

On the other hand, the dominant group will tend to see the status quo as inherently stable and legitimate. Change will be viewed as functional only if it can be seen as maintaining or enhancing the dominant group's ability to fulfill its needs. Thus, change must be seen as a transition from a stable and legitimate relationship to a more stable and legitimate relationship through stable and legitimate means!! Any possibility of processes or outcomes which can be interpreted differently will be seen as dysfunctional, and therefore to be avoided, controlled or suppressed. All of these possibilities will be measured against the perception of the status quo as stable and legitimate.

The interpretation of the functional and dysfunctional properties of a conflict is both highly subjective and highly influential on the actions and reactions of groups in conflict. The tendency to view outcomes of self-determination as at least potentially functional but the processes as inherently dysfunctional creates a dilemma: the road to eventual stable and

legitimate relations between collectivities appears to be achievable only through the use of violence and also, beyond a certain point of mobilization, stoppable only through the use of violence.

In attempting to understand this dilemma, this thesis will challenge the assumption that the process of self-determination necessitates the use of violence and is therefore inherently dysfunctional. It will examine how it is possible for self-determination conflicts to be resolved without the use of violence and still achieve, or even have a better chance of achieving, outcomes which fulfill the needs of both the dominant and the minority groups. In order to show that violence is not necessary, one must first understand why it is used, for only in this manner can alternatives be found. For what we really need to know is:

Under what conditions will a group which holds an illegitimately ascendant position within a web of group relations accept or actively work towards an improvement in the standing or circumstances of a group or groups less well placed? (Caddick, 1982, p.150).

The goal of the group seeking self-determination through the restructuring of the relationship is to challenge the dominant group's illusory perception of the stability and legitimacy of the status quo. This "re-education" of the dominant group can occur in a variety of ways depending on the existing circumstances, the creativity of the minority group, and the

receptiveness of the dominant group. Often, the minority group will use violence which escalates to costs of maintaining the status quo. This "re-education" appears to be an essential step in the process of conflict resolution, one which makes the switch to accepting a major change in the system or of the system possible. Violence is inherently unstable and illegitimate, it cannot be other wise. However, violence is not the only means to change the perception of the status quo, it may only be the most obvious one. The examination of the nature of alternatives which can play this "educative" role is central to this thesis, for if the alternatives do exist then the processes of self-determination can no longer be seen a priori as characterized by dysfunctional elements.

One aspect of the importance of finding and understanding these alternatives is the nature of the influence process in a conflict situation. Research has shown that cooperation develops in a situation where the interests of both groups are taken into account in the behaviour of one group thereby producing reciprocal behaviour in the other (Axelrod, 1984; Deutsch, 1973; Osgood, 1962). The dynamic by which influence takes place is critical to the reaction of the dominant group; a sense of threat is more likely to be taken to "prove" the dysfunctional potential of change rather than open up the group to seeing the functional potential. The link between the use of violence and subsequent influence processes such as negotiation is thus also central.

This thesis attempts to understand the role of violence and alternatives to violence through two main approaches. The first approach is conceptual, isolating and discussing the various factors which can potentially affect the resolution of self-determination conflicts. In particular, emphasis is placed on the re-conceptualization of the main issues and terminology in relation to the radicalized framework of the thesis. This re-conceptualization is presented in three parts. Firstly, the nature of self-determination conflict is assessed. Following from this re-thinking of self-determination, a second chapter contains a critical assessment of conflict theory and the role of violence in conflict. Thirdly, this critique of conflict theory is taken further through a discussion of conflict resolution and alternatives to violence in conflict processes. A normative conception of discourse, based on the work of Jürgen Habermas, is presented as a valuable concept to guide this examination of the methods of communication and decision which characterize conflict and conflict resolution.

A second approach is more analytical, striving to understand the reality of resolution and, more often, non-resolution of self-determination conflicts with and without the use of violence. Building on the ideas explored in the first section, the second sets up a framework of analysis for finding and applying alternatives to violence and relates it to the Jurassien bid for self-determination in Switzerland. The results are

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discussed through a comparison with the Basque struggle for self-determination so that the value of the analysis can be ascertained.

The ideas and arguments presented in this paper must be read within the context of the purpose envisioned. The aim is first and foremost an attempt to raise questions about the way social scientists look at conflict between groups. The questions arise from a belief that there are serious flaws in the way conflict has been, and to some extent still is being analyzed. Questions also arise as to the practice of conflict resolution, stemming from a profound sense that these practices can be improved. Finally, questions arise from the view that there is a connection between the deficiencies of the theoretician and the practitioner. This questioning suggests that the ways in which the prevailing social science utilizes and operationalizes concepts objectify and reify a limited image of conflict and conflict resolution.

Originally, this paper was to have focused upon understanding the negotiation of self-determination conflicts as a problem of an asymmetrical power relationship. This starting point reflects a general fascination in negotiation research with the fact that weaker parties can 'win' a conflict (Zartman, 1976): a fascination which derives from the assumption that there must be some kind of functional or 'localized' symmetry at the table in order for negotiation to occur (i.e., Tedeschi and

Bonoma, 1977; Bacharach and Lawler, 1981). This assumption is captured in a recent article discussing "negotiating from asymmetry" in the context of the North-South stalemate:

Whereas negotiations take place most productively under conditions of equality and trade-off, when parties are equally capable of contributing to a common good without which they would equally suffer, these productive conditions are lacking in situations of power asymmetry. One side has power, the other side is hurting: one likes things the way they are and the other wants to change them, without the means to make the other hurt more than it would hurt itself if its demands were not heeded (Zartman, 1985, p.121).

This emphasis upon power both gives rise to a puzzle and makes it impossible to find the missing pieces necessary for the solution. In the terms of this paper, the demand for power symmetry makes negotiation appear impossible until the weaker party empowers itself. This empowering is discussed both in tactical and structural terms. In some cases, the negotiation process itself is seen as mediating the power structure (Zartman, 1985) while for others the negotiation process is an extension of the power relation (Louche, 1982). One paradox is set up: negotiation is both a process of power and a process which attenuates the role of power. Even those who discuss the need for structural change create problems as to the role of power in this change. These approaches imply a type of voluntariness; that a power relation is open-ended (Ng, 1980, p.250) and therefore that alternatives for the enhancement of power are always possible. If power is essential to structural change then violence becomes a credible and justified alternative when no

other "empowering" mechanisms are available.

Faced with, on the one hand, this neat summing up of the essences of power and symmetry in a negotiating situation, a researcher tends to focus on, and raise questions within, this framework. Faced, on the other hand, with the anomalies which are created and for which only unsatisfactory or paradoxical hypotheses can be formulated, a researcher tends to ask questions about the framework itself. Conflict resolution dictates that both processes and outcomes should be acceptable to all parties directly involved. If change can occur only as a process of power then where power is absent it must be fabricated through confrontation. Does this mean that conflict resolution processes cannot take place in a relationship structured by asymmetrical power? One would hesitate to answer this in the affirmative, at least until supporting evidence was brought forward to show the necessity of this dismal conclusion. Perhaps resolution seems impossible because of the limits placed on our conceptions of what are the necessary prerequisites for conflict resolution. The search for "all other means" of empowering a relatively weak party is quickly exhausted, making violence appear justified, but this could be because the alternatives are also seen as being processes of power and coercion (Burton, 1979, p.174). Change must be legitimate and stable and yet, in this analysis, cannot be. The analysis itself underscores the power and stability of the status quo.

One way to deal with these anomalies is to widen our conception of the processes which are critical in conflict and conflict resolution. Power cannot explain the process of resolving conflicts on its own. This necessity for widening our viewpoint is captured by Niels Bohr's conception of a "framework of complementarity." In trying to reconcile the 'quantum postulate' with the continued use of concepts of classical physics, Bohr formulated his "epistemological lesson" which can be seen as a contribution "to the general philosophical clarification of the propositions underlying human knowledge" (Bohr, 1937, p.289).

Simply stated, complementarity suggests, "that a single description will be insufficient to exhaust the definition of a phenomenon" (Buckley and Peat, 1979, p.155). A "framework of complementarity" reconciles two apparently mutually exclusive descriptions of a single phenomenon. This reconciliation is made possible by a revision of presuppositions as our knowledge increases and allows us a better understanding of that phenomenon (Folse, 1985).

Our inability to understand some of the processes of conflict resolution could stem from the primacy of power in our framework for understanding politics. A reconciliation of the paradoxes briefly outlined above could potentially be achieved through a widening of our framework to include another central

concept: legitimacy.

The foundations of this framework are provided by a school of global politics characterized by the central concepts of world society and human needs. This viewpoint is primarily associated with the work of John Burton and his colleagues. In this approach the fundamental unit of analysis is the individual and its political form, the identity-group. Conflict and change are seen as arising not solely from economic, value and power differences but also from the suppression of human needs for security, dignity, identity, and adequate participation in and control of one's own destiny. Thus, alongside power, the world society approach postulates that social and political relationships are defined by legitimacy, in the sense that relationships are sought out and reinforced because they are accepted by individuals as aiding to satisfy their needs. The specific meaning and importance of these divergences from a traditional or 'realist' approach will be discussed throughout the paper, as the differences between conclusions reached by a 'power-only' and this widened "framework of complementarity" are compared.

This thesis is an attempt to move toward a specification of Burton's concept of "process": "the means of change in the specific direction of human needs, it is the link between evolution and revolution, it is the means by which change takes place by a combination of needs theory and participatory

discussion in respect of particular issues" (1979, p.220). The explication of possible elements in the "process" is informed by recent research in the socio-psychological understanding of human interaction. In defusing the dilemma of self-determination by showing that such conflicts can indeed be resolved without the use of violence, this paper also takes steps toward exploring how this type of resolution can be brought about. This dual nature of the analysis flows from the radical implications of the conflict resolution approach. Conclusions which the paper draws must be seen as theoretical and tentative until they can be further substantiated. The goal is, however, to explore new ways of viewing conflict; corroboration of these thoughts must follow. Thus, like Bohr's work, this thesis must be read "not as an affirmation but as a question"(Bohr, 1958, p.77).

CHAPTER ONE

THE NATURE OF SELF-DETERMINATION CONFLICT: IDENTITY, STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTER-ETHNIC GROUP RELATIONS

Ethnic conflict is generally regarded to be one of the most intractable types of conflict, and therefore the most difficult to resolve. This truism is reflected in the literature, and one could argue helps to sustain state policies which aim at controlling or suppressing ethnic conflict. For the literature suggests that to encourage the activation of ethnic conflict will ultimately result in open-ended spiralling conflict marked by violence and bloodshed. In this vein, ethnic relations are seen as putting together the characteristics of large size, vague boundaries, loose and unstable organization, internal diversity, diffuse relationship, ascriptive membership, high stakes, multiple and symbolic issues and historical embeddedness(including rigid stereotypes); "small wonder that ethnic conflicts are volatile, easily subject to runaway escalation and often difficult to resolve by conventional bargaining and mediation tactics" (Williams, 1977, p.168). Similarly, the search for national identity has been found to dominate the rhetoric of justification for the use of violence (Newman, 1979, p.29). One author suggests that fatalities which can be attributed to ethnic conflict amount to about ten million

for the period 1945-74 (Isaacs, 1975, p.5). Research focuses on the 'facts' which shore up this understanding, and this profile of ethnic conflicts in the twentieth century serve as proof of the need for suppression. Research and state policies thus reinforce each other and this understanding of ethnic conflict.

Another approach is to critically examine this truism: what factors create this apparent intractability? Why do ethnic conflicts appear to be unresolvable without the use of violence? Are all ethnic conflicts unresolvable without the use of violence? Before this truism can be accepted it must be broken down into its components: which aspects of ethnic conflict serve as obstacles to resolution? Are there any counter-balancing elements of the conflicts which could conceivably aid in their resolution? Once these elements have been isolated a reconstruction of our understanding will be possible; the potential for conflict resolution processes which would emphasize the functional and diminish the dysfunctional aspects for the society in question will be ascertained.

This second approach underlies the analysis in this chapter. Ethnic conflict will be studied in one major form which it has taken, the quest for self-determination. Self-determination will be reviewed both as a concept used in the analysis of ethnic conflict and as a force in political development in the modern era. This review will be followed by an examination of the key

elements discussed in terms of three main areas which guide one's understanding of this type of conflict: the nature of identity issues, the nature of the state and state sovereignty and the nature of inter-ethnic group relations. A better understanding of these three areas informs the view of the intractability of self-determination conflicts and will guide the subsequent discussion of which factors are or are not conducive to the peaceful resolution of conflict.

SELF-DETERMINATION: IDEA AND REALITY

The integration of the myriad of small states to form the state of Germany in the mid-nineteenth century, the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire into the 'successor states' in 1919, the separation of Algeria from France in 1962, and the quest for self-government and control over resources on the part of many of the indigenous peoples of the world today can all be seen as examples of self-determination. This brief list of examples illustrates the complexity of this phenomenon. Is it really one phenomenon, or many? If it is to be considered as one phenomenon, what are the essential elements which link up the great variety of self-determination conflicts?

Self-determination can only be understood through the conception of the "self". At one level of analysis, the "self" is the individual. In this way self-determination can apply to

any search for freedom from control by external sources. Thus, the struggle for nuclear disarmament is a quest for self-determination, in the sense that the threat of nuclear destruction powerfully restricts the autonomy and potential for self-realization of all human beings.

The extreme of this viewpoint is that:

The quest for self-determination, at its core, is not a national or any other group aspiration, but the aspiration of the individual human being to the vague notion of "freedom" and the "good life". It is only because the institutionalization of individual self-determination is not (or not yet) possible that the aggregation of "I's", the "Us" is substituted (Ronen, 1979, p.8).

The understanding expounded in Ronen's thesis that self-determination is in some way a temporary phenomenon can be seen as mistaken. Self-determination is not a state of being which can be achieved. It can more fruitfully be seen as an ongoing and continuing process, or a series of processes, of becoming. Determination has a dual meaning: definition and resolution (in the sense of the will to choose and to decide). The "self" cannot be defined solely in the singular term for identity is always relational. The nature of identity is created through interaction.

The definition and resolution of "self" is achieved not through contract, or partial devolution of autonomy to others on the basis of self-interest, but through community. Community is

used to describe interactions based on commonalities and shared beliefs (Sibley, 1978); interactions which give rise to cooperation. The quest for self-determination is the process through which we as individuals define ourselves and resolve our lives in conjunction with others with whom we identify. Self-determination is an ongoing process because the community may continually be re-defined. Individual self-determination without reference to others can therefore be seen almost as a contradiction in terms; "the basis for the assertion of one's own identity is not really self-identification, but intersubjectively recognized self-identification" (Habermas, 1979, p.107).

Self-determination is understood politically as a desire for self-government; as an extension of the democratization of politics. This desire relates to the idea promulgated by the French Revolution that the right to rule is vested in the people and operates through popular sovereignty. This political conception of nationhood is joined by the German ethnic conception of nation and together create the belief that rule by alien people is illegitimate (Despres, 1984). As formulated in the Wilsonian conception (Pomerance, 1982), self-determination is critical to the flourishing of democracy within the state and to minimization of conflict both internally and externally. The Leninist conception focuses on the nation as a force of political and economic development as a transition to class identity

(Connor, 1984). Subsequent reformulations of the Wilsonian and Leninist conceptions have tightened the link between ethnic homogeneity and self-determination. Ethnicity has become the crucial principle of legitimation and the cause of delegitimation of states, regimes, and governments (Rothschild, 1981), as the principle that one should be governed by those with whom self-identification is possible. More and more, self-determination in this sense is becoming accepted as a fundamental right. This thesis focuses on self-determination as the quest for definition and resolution through identification and autonomy on the part of ethnic minorities in the post-colonial era.

Gudmunder Alfredsson outlines five ways in which the rights of self-determination can be understood (1982, p.294). These are:

(a) The right of an entity to determine its international status sometimes referred to as external self-determination. Nations, colonial peoples, territories deprived of independence by means of occupation, and various types of minorities could constitute sub-categories of beneficiaries. According to the list of factors adopted by the General Assembly in the early fifties and the General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), the exercise of self-determination by non-self-governing territories can result in independence, free association, or integration.

(b) The right of a state population to determine the form of government and to participate in the government, sometimes extended to include democratization or majority rule and sometimes called internal self-determination.

(c) The right of a state to maintain its national unity and territorial integrity and to govern its affairs without external interference and without

violation of boundaries.

(d) The right of a minority within or even across state boundaries to special rights not only protection and non-discrimination, but possibly the right to cultural, educational, social and economic autonomy for the preservation of group identities. Indigenous peoples want to have property rights added to this list of special rights.

(e) The right of a state and of a state population, especially claimed by the developing countries, to cultural, social and economic development.

Alfredsson is quick to point out that "no matter how desirable a universal and ongoing application of all forms of self-determination would be, it is nevertheless necessary to acknowledge that acceptance of one form does not automatically lead to the adoption of another"(p.295).

The difficulty in implementing these forms of self-determination may be more than a question of acceptance of these definitions by the international community or recognition of them in international law. It is possible to imagine competing claims for self-determination using these definitions. The 'right of a state to maintain its national unity and territorial integrity' could be challenged by demands on the part of that state population's competing claims for a role in determining the forms of government and for participation in that government or by minority demands for special rights. These demands need not challenge the territorial integrity of the state such as would occur if, for example, secession was called for. The government of a state could perceive itself to be threatened by lesser

demands which could impinge on its structure as a single unit; on its right to self-determination on that unified basis.

These competing claims for self-determination can be better understood in the wider context of political organization in the modern era. These forms are based on the European experience of state-making and nation-formation and their ideal integration in the nation-state. The key elements in this formulation are people and territory (Knight, 1985). National states defined the areas with stable populations within which the process of state-building and nation building could take place. These processes can be understood in many ways. Smith (1981) suggests that these processes encompass the two main forces of political change in the last two centuries: the 'ethnic revival' as the movement toward enshrining ethnic identity through social and political organization, and modernization as the rationalization of social and political organization. The nation is a people with a sense of mutual loyalty stemming from perceptions of common identity and a common past, with these factors leading to a desire for a politically common future. By this definition the nation is the vehicle for the 'ethnic revival'. However, the nation can also be seen as a political "community of purpose", a grouping based on the common interests of embarking upon the process of modernization (Rustow, 1968, p.70). Thus, the nation defined in this sense could be seen as the vehicle for the rationalization of the state system.

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Individual identification as part of a nation can thus have a variety of bases and can change. The state has a less flexible definition as it is inextricably bound to territory. In this way, the modern state can be provisionally defined in a neutral way as a "legal and physical entity, with an effective system of government, a bounded container for the contents of a particular area, which includes the people, resources and a means for communication and movement" and as the "chief custodian of overall social order, it is a monitor, comptroller and arbitrator" (Knight, 1982, p.517).(1) Loyalty and identification are not critical to the state in the same manner as they are for the nation. The state defines its population; peoples themselves define their affiliation to the nation.

These two are not by necessity competing organizations. In the ideal of the nation-state, the two are synonymous; patriotism, as loyalty to the state, and nationalism, as loyalty to the nation, are one. The two are not always identical, but this alone does not engender conflict. Multiple loyalties are possible. A French-Canadian can feel loyalty to and identity with the Quebecois nation while at the same time identifying with, and giving loyalty to, the Canadian state. These multiple loyalties can encompass shifts of emphasis over issue-areas; a Quebecois may hold identification to the nation as a priority in cultural

1 This is not the definition of "state" utilized in this paper. See discussion p.38-44.

and linguistic matters and the state on matters of security. Problems arise when these multiple loyalties come into conflict, notably when a dilemma arises over the form of the political community.

One way to explain the variety of forms of self-determination is to examine the patterns of the development of nations and states. These patterns seem to produce 'waves' or 'eras' of types of self-determination issues. The first wave can be discerned in the foundation of the nation-state ideal in Western Europe beginning just prior to the nineteenth century. The framework of the dynastic states allowed for these dual processes. In Smith's words; "At each step the 'nation' was being formed within the state; each advance in state-making produced an equivalent step towards nation formation" (1983, p.120). These processes were carried out by the dominant group often at great expense, including great costs to the cultural minorities within the territory (Smith, 1983; Tilly, 1975). The identity of the nation and state were determined by the strongest groups who could best control their destiny. In this first wave, self-determination served mainly as an integrating force, where populations joined together to form the greater political community. Examples of self-determination as a disintegrative force are fewer in this era, but could include the independence of Greece and Belgium, the Austrian refusal to join a unified German state, and the growth of Hungarian demands for autonomy

within the Austrian Empire. Similar processes occurred as this example was transferred to the "New World" through colonizing immigrants.

A second wave of self-determination is rooted in the first wave and began concurrently with it, for the second can almost be seen as a reaction to the unifying tendencies of the dominant nations. This reaction can perhaps most clearly be seen in the revival of ethnic consciousness in East Central Europe where the state machinery was not as strong as in the West. Stemming from a sense of distinctiveness awakened by cultural and linguistic renaissance, these national groups promulgated political demands for recognition of special rights or autonomy within the Austrian Empire or, in the case of Poland, for reunification. These demands were voiced in different ways through rebellions in the "Spring of Nations" and at the Pan-Slav Congress in 1848 and later through political parties in the Austrian Reichstag. The success of this wave was intertwined with the international environment. The Balkan states gained independence in great part due to the foreign policies of the Tsars of Russia and the diminishing strength of the Ottoman Empire. The nations of the Austrian Empire gained their right to self-determination partly through the skill of their leadership during the First World War but also because of the 'conjunction' (Snafer, 1982) of these actions with the ideas of Wilson and Lenin and the rapid decline

of the empires due to the War effort. War and subsequent peacemaking allowed for large-scale territorial readjustments. The peacemakers were the victorious Great Powers, with the smaller nations having varying degrees of input into deciding their own destinies.

The third wave can be seen as having its formative stages in the earlier era. As the 'nation-states' of Europe gained control over their own territories, they also sought to expand outward in the great colonial reach of the latter part of the nineteenth century. This outreach touched all the continents and superimposed colonial administrations onto a huge variety of indigenous forms of social and political organization. As some of the second wave of modern self-determination cases were being settled at the Paris Peace Conferences, the fate of some of the colonies was decided through the Mandate System under the supervision of the League of Nations. Of the many factors which led to an awakening of these colonized peoples, the common experience of the World Wars and the enshrinement of the principle of national self-determination in the Atlantic Charter and later the Charter of the United Nations can be mentioned. The era of decolonization had begun its slow march spreading, or more perhaps more accurately attempting to spread, the idea of the nation-state over much of the globe. This process generally took the form of the dependent peoples claiming the right to external self-determination within the territorial framework of the colony.

These three waves have created a legacy of an ideal that all nations or people should have the right to have control over all aspects of their destiny which is central to the fourth ('post-colonial') wave of self-determination attempts. This recognition of the force of collective identity has not, and perhaps cannot, be fully implemented. Obstacles to this implementation lie in part in the linking of the rights of collective identity to territory and to the state apparatus: the 'nation-state'. Many of the current demands for self-determination do not encompass demands for an independent territorial state. These demands are often, at least at first, voiced in terms of requests for special rights or autonomy on the part of a minority group within the state. Separation becomes an option when the nation by its own self-defined terms cannot achieve its self-determination within the existing state. The host state cannot always deal with the challenge to the image of national unity and the political and economic reorganization that any of these demands entail.

Three distinguishing facets mark these four successive waves of claims of self-determination. The first is the scale of groups organizing themselves as nations. While during the first wave self-determination acted as a force to integrate individuals as members of groups into larger communities ideal for the processes of modernization, the subsequent waves have brought

demands which create smaller units. This relates to the second point that more and more the basis of the nation is being defined in ethnic rather than political terms. The nation as a vehicle for the 'ethnic revival' has a more exclusive nature whereas the nation as the vehicle for modernization is more inclusive. A third factor is the international environment. As previously mentioned, the orientation of the global system is toward the protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state despite the fragility of a given state's ability to exist as a viable entity. This orientation creates a rigidity in the territorial organization of communities in the present era in contrast with the relative fluidity of the early modern world system.

These waves seem to outline a general pattern of changing identification with the political community, the nation. Sometimes the changes are superficial and often continuity is the marked characteristic of developments. In the case of demands for special rights in whatever form made on the part of minorities, the needs these requests reflect are not all new. These demands for self-determination become audible when the combination of the internal organization of the group, the actions of the state and the global environment together create the potential for a re-definition of the political identity of the individuals as a collectivity based on ethnic distinction (Bertelsen, 1979).

It is the variety of elements in this 'conjunction' (Shafer, 1982) which make self-determination issues appear to be many phenomena. An examination of these elements helps to illustrate the key points of comparison both within each 'wave' and across the various 'waves'. Points of contrast can thus also be understood. This examination can lead to a better understanding of the nature of self-determination conflict and to possible explanations of successes and failures of the achievement of self-determination in specific cases. These elements are discussed here in terms of variables relating to four factors: the group, the host state, the quest for self-determination, and the global environment. These variables are summarized in chart form using examples to help define the nature of each variable.(2)

The nature of the national group can be examined in three interrelated ways. The first way is to outline the characteristics of the group; its size and location within the state (in relation to the rest of the population), the bases of national identity, resources and forms of organization. The bases of national identity are premised on (a) how the group is "self-categorized", and how it is categorized by others (Allardt, 1979) and (b) the dimensions and degrees of difference from the majority or other groups within the state. Forms of organization

would include both socio-cultural and political forms, support for these organizations, and cohesion within the community. These two variables are dynamic and emphasis will be placed on these variables as they relate to the quest for self-determination, although the importance of historical and competing forms of these variables should also be recognized.

Two other approaches to understanding the nature of the group comprise analyses relating to the place of the community in the state and links to an extra-state community which defines itself in the same manner. In order to describe the place of the group within the state, this analysis must include reference to the origins of the control relationship, the existing rights of the group and the social, economic and political importance of the community to the state. Extra-state links involve either a relation to a dominant group in another state, to a minority group in another state or to a more diffused group.

The characteristics of the host state include those factors which are relatively unchanging: size, geography, resources, the political nature of the state (the system of government, the role of government in society, etc...), the ethnic nature of the state (national or multinational) and those factors which have a more changeable nature. The dynamic elements would include attitudes of the majority or the dominant group and the policies of the state.

The conjunction of these sets of variables form the background for the demands and the process of pursuing self-determination. Variables which are directly involved with the quest are the demands themselves and the methods chosen for to achieve them. The demands must be understood in terms of the overall aims as defined by the leaders and accepted by the masses, and might therefore include a spectrum reflecting differences within the movement and should be seen as evolving over time. The nature of demands by differing groups can be understood in terms of how they affect the existing relationship with the state. Suhrke and Noble (1979, p.11) suggest that these demands "can be placed along a continuum, where at one end, they concern resource allocation within the state and, at the other end, separatism and irredentism". Autonomy and institutional changes would be located in the middle of this continuum. The methods of achieving these goals should be looked at in terms of levels of violence, and forums within which the actions are carried out as well as through discerning the classes of action themselves.

The global environment cannot be regarded as a single unit. However, the general "ideological climate" in terms of responses to the type of self-determination demand being voiced can be ascertained as "hostile", "mixed" or "receptive" (Bertelsen, 1979). More specifically, the nature of allies outside of the host state and their initiatives and responses with respect to

the community or state must be seen as an important variable.

It becomes clear very quickly that few of these variables are either static or isolated. Part of the necessity of examining these components separately is to attempt to reassemble them in terms of specific interrelationships and to see the evolution of the interactions between the variables over time. Some interrelationships could be proposed on the basis of logical analysis; for example, that the location of the group and its importance within the state would affect the policies of the state, or that the methods chosen by the group interact with the policies of the state. A closer scrutiny of this context is essential to the formulation and application of problem-solving approaches which transform and resolve the conflict. It is clear that each case will have a different constellation of interrelating factors, but it is also possible that patterns would emerge, especially between similar types of quests for self-determination (for example on the part of indigenous populations in the democratic countries settled mainly by West European immigrants).

Despite this seemingly complex and endless array of possible relations, a scrutiny of the historical development and evolution of self-determination conflicts allow a reconstruction of these elements into three fundamental characteristics: the identity issues, the nature of state sovereignty, and inter-ethnic group

relations. These three are chosen because they are seen as characteristics which give rise to the perception of self-determination conflict as highly volatile and as creating intractable problems. The choice does not preclude a view that other factors also contribute to this intense nature. The choice does suggest, however, that these three can be seen as major elements which are present across the spectrum of self-determination conflicts in the post-colonial period.

SELF-DETERMINATION ISSUES: IDENTITY

A multitude of issues can arise from a conflict over modes of self-determination. They reflect an infinite variety of interests defined in objective terms and a range of more subjective needs which shape the conflict. The demands which are voiced change over time and different demands may be voiced by members of a group at the same time. Self-determination may be achieved in many ways. This accounts for the difficulty in formulating issues which characterize these conflicts. A second aspect of this problem is that the issues are forged through the conflict process itself (Apfelbaum and Lubek, 1976).

Despite this infinite variety, self-determination issues can be discussed according to the two main goals; an end to discrimination and a beginning of recognition as a distinct but equal entity. These in turn reflect the central need which fuels

self-determination: identity.

Ethnicity is one aspect of a collectivity's self-recognition in the eyes of outsiders (Fishman, 1976, p.16). Ethnic identity is based on paternity, primordiality and patrimony (Fishman, 1976, pp.17-21). Paternity is the recognition of putative biological origins, an inherited constellation acquired from one's parents as they acquired it from theirs, and so on. Ethnic identity is primordial because it has the character of primacy. At the base of ethnic identification is a genealogical myth or ideology, the need for and search for felt historical depth, or put another way, the "root" which give individuals and collectivities a feeling of continuity and permanence (Fishman, 1976, p.18). Ethnic patrimony is the more interpretative and changeable element of identity. This is the behaviour which is carried out in order to express membership, an element highly related to, but not synonymous with, culture. Patrimony is the means of being a member of an ethnic group, while paternity is the means for becoming a member.

Ethnic identity does not, however, exist in a vacuum. It is always the product of interaction between groups which leads to consensus on, or consent to, the criteria of group alignment. As Royce(1982, p.54) put it:

Ethnic identity at its core involves negotiation within constraints. Ascription is only a small part of the claim to an ethnic identity. Further, achieved qualities, are essential if an ethnic

identity is to be maintained successfully. The constraints on the tactical use of ethnic identity arise from a variety of cases: physical, social, psychological and structural.

Identity is difficult to conceptualize in the abstract but easier to define in terms of attitude and behaviour; social belonging and loyalty. A crucial aspect of an individual's identity is composed of self-evaluation in comparison with others and the feelings of attachment created by this comparison process (Allardt, 1979, p.39). Multiple loyalties are possible and indeed almost necessary in modern societies where individuals have to be able to perform many tasks and to operate in many separate realms of life. This capacity for multiple identity and loyalty in itself suggests that self-determination can take place in numerous ways, in all likelihood even simultaneously.

Two critical aspects of this process of ethnic identification have been hypothesized. These are the requirement for the establishment and maintenance of a positive self-concept (Tajfel, 1978; 1982) and the desire for a birthright (Scheibe, 1983; Devos, 1975). The former is said to be achieved through a social identity with one group relative to another group. The latter is described as a "fictional grant of identity that is supposed to remain with an individual throughout life" (Scheibe, p.140). These facets merge in ethnic identity with the result that personal survival is inextricably linked to the historic continuity of the group (Devos, 1975, p.18).

This emphasis on the root of identity within the formulation of self-determination issues underscores the fact that an understanding of their nature cannot be based primarily on cognitive conflict (Tajfel, 1985, p.160). Although there are very real cognitive aspects such as the distribution of resources, and political access which can best be understood in terms of relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970), these issues alone do not explain the conflict. Approaches to self-determination which focus on this level of interest such as centre-periphery and internal colonialism and other utilitarian theories which describe ethnic identity as a "mask of confrontation" worn in the political arena (Despres, 1984) while useful, cannot account for the resurgence of ethnicity and self-determination conflict where these inequalities do not prevail (Lijphart, 1975). It is essential that ethnicity be regarded as a phenomenon rather than an object of political manipulation (Fishman, 1976, p.38). This suggests that identity is better seen as a root rather than a tool of conflict (although identity is sharpened through the conflict). It is not simply that resources are allocated unequally but more fundamentally that they are not allocated on the basis of the collective identity and the equal participation of the community in the process of redistribution which explains self-determination conflict.

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intergroup relations based on linguistic differences, his typology of concerns can be extended to cover other aspects of ethnicity. The types of relations differ along two dimensions. The first dimension is the form of categorization. Categorization can take place in three ways: categorizations mainly performed by others (usually the dominant group), both categorizations by others and self-categorizations and mainly self-categorizations. The second dimension is the form of segmentation between groups. Segmentation is exhibited through: a hierarchical cultural division of labour, territorial distinctiveness or occupational segmentation, and no cultural division of labour. The combination of mixed self- and other categorization and territorial distinctiveness or occupational segmentation gives the greatest likelihood of a spontaneous balance between the groups. Problems of discrimination tend to occur when there is a hierarchical division of labour joined by categorizations predominated by the majority. The tendency toward problems of recognition arise in situations of self-categorization by the minority and no cultural division of labour.

Allardt's classification underscores the potential for flexibility in ethnic identity-formation. The state structure, ideologies and policies can have a profound impact on the political aspects of ethnic identification (Brass, 1985). In this sense, it is possible to see the formation of identity and

identity-issues as a process involving three sets of struggles: (1) within the ethnic group itself for control over its material and symbolic resources, which involves defining the group's boundaries and its rules for exclusion and inclusion; (2) between ethnic groups as a competition for rights, privileges and available resources and (3) between the state and the groups that dominate it, on the one hand, and the populations that inhabit its territory on the other (Brass, p.5-9).

Issues relating to the identity of the group seeking self-determination through the acceptance of their self-defined and self-resolved autonomous interests are the crucial ones. These issues can often be formulated only through conflict. Violence becomes part of the process because this self-determination issue challenges the legitimacy of the regime, delegitimizing its right to speak on behalf of the challenging collectivity.

STATES AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY

One feature which contributes to the intractability of self-determination conflicts is the threat which the minority group makes to the state. A critical element in the resolution of conflict will therefore be the nature of the state, flexibility within the dominant group as to the potential for change in the state, and the nature of the challenge which the minority group makes to the state.

It must be seen that few minority groups ever challenge the existence of the state through demands for separation, and that even fewer groups makes such a challenge before other forms of self-determination are explored. Often, at least today, the central issues are allocations of economic, cultural and political resources within a state on a new collective basis. Such demands clearly show an element of shared interest between the dominant and minority groups in maintaining the territorial integrity of the state itself (Suhrike and Noble, 1979, p.12). However, even these less radical demands challenge the state, for there is a reluctance on the part of the dominant group to rethink the traditional bases and inequalities of the state and in particular a reluctance to admit to the legitimacy of separate treatment for the non-dominant group on the basis of ethnicity. For example: "The real threat posed by the current Indian demand for acceptance as Indians in Brazil is to the Brazilian self-image. The Indians pose no physical threat to the Brazilian state, but they do present an ideological challenge"(Maybury-Lewis, 1984, p.223). In this sense, there can be a consensus on the idea of the state without consensus on the idea of the nation or nations, that is with respect to the "abstract concept jointly-held" which defines the relationship between the society and the state (Schmid, 1981).

In order to understand the nature of this challenge one must appreciate the ideology of the nation and state in the modern era. This ideology is centered on the concept of sovereignty.

The basic principle of the concept is that every sovereign has absolute, exclusive and perpetual jurisdiction over the territory comprising the state. These sovereign claims do not exist simply against all other states but also against all of the state's constituent members (Macfarlane, 1974).

The term sovereignty is used to denote the collection of functions exercised by a state and the rights of a state in international law. In this latter sense, the state has the right of equality (with other states), the right to independence, and the right to self-determination (Delupis, 1974). States have developed in a state system, and sovereignty has set the rules for relations between these entities. Consequently, other states have a stake in upholding the existence of all other states until they are no longer viable (Buchheit, 1978) and sometimes beyond this point (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982). States can therefore be seen "as the privileged but not unassailable entity" of political organization (Buchheit, p.221).

Internally, sovereignty is used to describe governmental authority as being under no higher authority, as the supreme embodiment of power so that "what its will has determined; it has the right to enforce" (Laski, 1968, p.38). To utilize the concept in this sense, without reference to the basis of sovereignty, the people, is to ascribe rights, interests, and needs to the state itself. A state cannot have needs. In personifying the state, sovereignty becomes a theory concerned

with the justification of the possession of capacity (Foucault, 1980, p.103).

One difficulty in separating the concepts of nation and state is the extended, integral concept of state which can be used to understand the functions of the modern state. This conception is elaborated by Gramsci who defines the state in terms of both political and civil society (1971, p.12):

These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of 'hegemony' which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of 'direct domination' or command exercised through the state and 'juridical' government.

This integral conception is rejected by liberal interpretations of the modern state which posit a separation of state and society through the processes of differentiation of the public and private spheres in the nineteenth century (Birnbaum and Badie, 1983). The superficiality of these divisions and the movement toward reintegration under the strains of advanced capitalism are also investigated in a rejection of both of these formulations of the state (Habermas, 1975).

The vision of the state as a neutral arbitrator between groups can only be maintained in a system where an equilibrium of group interests in the state is present. Asymmetries in the ability of specific groups to further their particular interests through the state, turning them into generalized interests of the

structure and institutions of the state, negate this neutrality. In this sense, the dominant group(s) and the state become one. The suggestion that "the political system in complex state societies is the central and primary mechanism for the regulation and termination of the more serious conflicts" (Williams, 1977, p.331) may therefore be irrelevant in self-determination conflict where the dominant group's interests have become state interests.

Justification of the use of power cannot reside in the existence of the state or government itself (although in some analyses and many policies it does). Justification resides with those who empower the rulers with the right to rule: the people or nation. Self-determination thus challenges the basis of sovereignty, for the right to rule can no longer be granted by the undivided collective. The redefinition of the nation must mean, to a greater or lesser degree, the redefinition of the state.

The concept of sovereignty has to be rescued from its legalistic and absolute character. Absolute and equal sovereignty is a fiction. Sovereignty is relative: the more power an entity has the more sovereign it is (Klein, 1974). This relativity can also be seen internally in the devolution of sovereignty in federal states. The internal ideology of the state will thus be a crucial factor in the potential for the resolution of self-determination conflicts without the use of

violence.

The impact of the idea of sovereignty on societal organization can only be understood in conjunction with the concept of territoriality. Recognition of this need for "an increasingly geographical conception of man" (Braudel, 1980, p.52), is made in spatial conceptions of the state. The "significance of territory" is in the designation of the relationship which is established between a community of politically organized people and their state; a relationship which had a material, concrete and definite character as well as a "psychosomatic" nature (Gottmann, 1973). The link between sovereignty and territory is reflected in the expanding territorialization over air and ocean spaces and the hardness of the concept of sovereign territory despite technological incursions on the potential for achievement of full control. Gottmann suggests that the strength of the popular concept of land as the basic resource for survival and optimization as well as the view of territory as the "sacred land of our ancestors" explain this durability. The state, by in some sense being the manager of everyday life, decreases the 'space' between territory and people (Urry, 1985, p.26).

In the pursuit of self-determination in the post-colonial era, ethnic groups are faced with the twinned ideologies of nation and state. Change must occur in this rigid framework of

national and state ideologies, linkages between dominant groups and the state, the relationship between sovereignty and territory, and the state system.

INTER-ETHNIC GROUP RELATIONS

In examining the role of inter-ethnic group relations as an obstacle to the resolution of self-determination conflict, three patterns of explanation must be reviewed. The first is the mainly sociological interpretations of interactions of ethnic groups. The second is the study of politics in plural societies. The third is a socio-psychological approach to understanding majority-minority group relations in general.

The discussion of inter-ethnic group relations gives us little reason to be optimistic about the resolution of self-determination conflict. Many of the sociological studies are descriptive showing us that ethnic conflict is intractable rather than how and why. Often, these analyses reflect a social integration perspective. Thus, the difference in values between the dominant culture and sub-cultures (Wolfgang and Ferracuti, 1967), the ascriptive element (Singh, 1979), and the quality of terminal identity which embraces and integrates lesser identities (Devos, 1983; Symmons-Symonolewicz, 1983; Epstein, 1978) assigned to ethnicity, are all seen to serve as fuel for violent conflict.

The barrier to accommodation is viewed as the emphasis on past origin which determines present status and the inherent 'contrastiveness' of ethnic divisions (Devos, 1975).

Those sociologists subscribing to a more conflict-oriented model of society see ethnocentric responses as escalating in situations of greater conflict of interest (Levine and Campbell, 1972), thus, narrowing the room for compromise. Most theorists see the development of inter-ethnic relations in terms of ethnic stratification and waves of domination (Blalock, 1982; Francis, 1976; Shibutami and Kwan, 1965, Mason, 1970) and logically proceeding to social integration as the only means to manage conflict. These interpretations from the systemic point of view tend to objectify the boundaries and make-up of ethnic groups. These conclusions can be contrasted with the earlier definitions of ethnic identity which emphasize at least some aspects of negotiability and change in group interactions.

Political theorists concerned with explaining patterns of conflict and cooperation in deeply-divided societies where integration does not appear feasible have contributed two models to our understanding of inter-ethnic group relations. These are the consociational and control approaches to conflict management. Stability rather than conflict resolution is the focus of these approaches, however, these research findings help to illustrate

the possible conditions for inter-ethnic group accommodation.

The consociational model (Lijphart, 1968, 1977; McRae, 1974; Lembruch, 1975; Daalder, 1984) based on European experiences, holds that accommodation is possible between highly-divided segments within a society on the basis of their distinctiveness. In short, consociationalism is the management of conflict between groups through negotiation by the elites and segmental autonomy (a form of minority rule in which the minority governs itself in areas of the minority's exclusive concern) (Lijphart, 1977, p.41). Self-determination of both groups is made possible through an understanding, and constant reinforcement, of the need for cooperation. Related explanations of intergroup cooperation emphasize the role of cross-cutting cleavages and linkages across groups which prevent "pyramidal-segmentation" in conflict management (Mayer, 1968; Aunger, 1977; Levine and Campbell, 1972). Lijphart (1977) and Steiner (1974) both outline the specific conditions which make compromise between cultures more likely. These include: the number of parties is kept small, interaction is frequent, meetings are less formalized and less public, stable leadership structures, long-time frames between initial consultation and decision-making and more centralized decision-making structures. Of considerable importance are alternative forms of decision-making to the Anglo-American norm of majority rule which have major systemic ramifications (Lijphart, 1984). Consensual systems encompass critical institutional safeguards

against perpetual majorization of the non-dominant groups and evidence alternative decision-making forms such as non-decisions, decisions by interpretation and "amicable agreement" (Steiner and Dorff, 1980).

The control model (Lustick, 1979;1980) holds that stability in culturally segmented societies is the result of sustained manipulation of the subordinate segment(s) by the superordinate segment within a given society. Here, the distinctiveness and separateness of the sub-units leads not to a balancing of the dual interests but by the domination of the superordinate group's interests. An application of these two models to the Canadian situation (Cannon, 1982) suggests that stability within a system can be attributed to each of these models when a long-range view is adopted.

What are the factors which explain these practices of accommodation? These factors are the structural (degree of segmentation), institutional, and attitudinal composition of the relationship between the collectivities (McRae, 1983). Much of the explanation for inter-ethnic conflictual or cooperative interaction will thus be found in the historical development of the specific case and the behavioural manifestations of intergroup conflict. The interrelationships between these five dimensions of interactions (structural, institutional, attitudinal, historical and behavioural), as modified or

reinforced by the societal rules, will shape intergroup interactions.

An understanding of inter-ethnic group relations also depends upon the nature of dominant-minority relationships. Dominant-minority interactions are seen as stable and complementary relative to dominant-dominant or minority-minority group interactions (Patterson, 1985, p.214). This stability must be understood for it is one of the key aspects which solidifies patterns of behaviour making conflict resolution more difficult.

A minority is a group which "has less" but is not necessarily less numerous; the behaviour and social categorizations are more important than size (Allardt, 1979; Apfelbaum, 1976).

Minorities are characterized by their categorically lowered life chances. Their identifying characteristics whether physical or cultural, serve only as a source of visibility. It is the relative powerlessness of minority groups that defines their disadvantaged situation, underlying their exclusion from participation in the institutions of the larger society (Zaman, 1981, p.18).

Three types of minorities are outlined by Gruner (1968). These are: (1) essential minorities, arising from basic characteristics such as language or religion; (2) structural minorities, arising from group disadvantage in the prevailing social or economic order; and (3) accidental minorities, arising from issues of the day.

Minorities are defined relative to the dominant group. The dominant group is recognized by its identification with society as a whole (Schemerhorn, 1970, p.56). The minority group is an obstacle to this identification and may therefore be subject to suppression, toleration or conversion. Domination is a "form of interaction in which the superior generally acts so as to make the subordinate react to him, but in a manner chosen by the superior" (Simmel, 1955, p.181). Minorities by definition will have differential success in adhering to prevailing norms and hence, social rewards, relative to the dominant group which determines both norms and rewards (Swakov, 1979, p.219).

Some of the general factors illustrating the nature of inter-ethnic relations are integrated in a socio-psychological approach to intergroup relations. In attempting to understand why negative responses occur, Henri Tajfel and his colleagues have formulated a theory of intergroup relations based on the assumption of a human need for a positive self-concept. The theory holds that (1) categorization by segmenting the world into groups, gives both a necessary order to a person's world and a locus of identity. (2) Groups to which one belongs give identity for that person to the extent that (3) comparisons of it (or them) with other groups are favourable. The result is (4) the obtaining of some positive distinctiveness vis-à-vis others. A group therefore aims to differentiate itself from others in order to achieve or maintain superiority on some existing and

situationally relevant dimension of comparison. The theory hypothesizes that a minority will reject the status quo of inequality when it perceives that the system of domination is unstable and illegitimate, a process to which we will return later in the paper.

This approach also leads to an understanding of some of the most usual type of dominant response to minority demands for change. This response tends to be ethnocentric and works toward the reduction of guilt through justification of circumstances in the existing structure. This response is in keeping with the theory that groups want to maintain superiority through distinctiveness.

A second potential response is for the dominant group to accept the accusations of discrimination and lack of recognition and agree to participate in process of change. Factors involved in the blocking of this response include the role of social myths which reduce the dominant group's ability to treat the other group in an equitable fashion because they are different and therefore not deserving of the same treatment as themselves. Other factors include the hypothesis that contrasting conceptions increase in conflict and that depersonalization of the other group allows for continued mistreatment. These hypotheses are underscored by experimental results. Of particular interest are the contrasting results in Prisoner

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Dilemma games in which the group is more likely to be unfair in the treatment of opponents than are individuals (Brown and Ross, 1982). While the pessimism of this theory in offering explanations for the negativity of inter-ethnic relations is acknowledged here, the theory also offers potential solutions. an understanding of the roles of social myths and depersonalization that lead to justification of relations of domination may also be helpful in finding ways to initiate alternative, positive intergroup processes. This idea underlies the thesis that if one can understand the role of these processes in conflict, alternatives to them will form a part of the process of conflict resolution.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ANTITHESIS OF DISCOURSE: VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT

Self-determination conflicts are difficult to resolve since the interlocking elements of identity, the nature of the modern state and the problematic tone of inter-ethnic relations generally create an apparent intractability. These factors along with others give edges of attitudinal, institutional, and structural struggle rarely found together in other types of conflict. While the conflicts can be described in terms of conflict over interests, the more unresolvable aspects are comprised of perceptions of conflict at the levels of values and needs.

These points can be illustrated by the case of Quebec. Quebecois demands for recognition do not solely threaten Canadians' pocketbooks through increased taxes, they threaten or can be perceived as threatening, their lifestyles through acceptance of bilingualism and they challenge their values of democracy and equality through majority rule by forcing the recognition of the role of English Canadians in subordinating French Canadian values, identity and autonomy. At an even more fundamental level these demands could be perceived as violating

English Canadians' need for identity; although in this case such does not appear to have occurred. Perhaps this can be explained in part through the ability and tendency of Canadians to hold a French- or English- (or Other-) Canadian identity and a Canadian identity coexistentially and to hold these identities for the most part without conflict. This example underscores the fact that an approach to this type of conflict must be focused on the values and needs of groups as they are translated into goals and interests, rather than solely on the goals and interests themselves.

Our understanding of the nature of self-determination conflicts must be taken one step further by asking what factors in these conflicts make them conducive to the use of violence. General conflict theory and theories about the role of violence will be reviewed in this context. The potential definitions of violence are discussed as they pertain to the functionality of the phenomena. From this review four functions are examined: violence and identity, violence and legitimacy, violence and power, and violence as a mechanism of conflict resolution. This exploration is synthesized into an understanding of the dynamics of violence as it relates to the discourse of conflict.

CONFLICT THEORY AND SELF-DETERMINATION CONFLICT

Many definitions of conflict focus on conflicts at the level

of interests, so that conflict is said to occur when there is a recognized "state of divergent interests". This view assumes a level of functional symmetry in the power relationship and a homogeneous view of the rules of the game with each party accepting the other's role, if not specific position, as legitimate. Providing solutions to these conflicts is relatively simple since the conflicts are structured (formés), expressed (formulés) and definable (formulables) (Apfelbaum and Lubek, 1976). Conflict is described as a state and conflict resolution is seen as the substitution of one state, where conflict exists, to another state, where conflict does not exist. This approach is taken both by 'order theorists' who view stability and balance as the norm with conflict as an aberration, and by 'conflict theorists' who view conflict and change as consistent phenomena of society. The difference between these views is the ascription of functionality or dysfunctionality of conflict within the social system, not the nature of conflict.

Other approaches which go beyond this rather static view of conflict do exist. Rather than being a type of behaviour which occurs in set parameters, conflict can be seen to exist at three levels, namely, the structural and the attitudinal, as well as the behavioural emphasized above (Mitchell, 1981). Because of these qualities the actual source of conflict may be undefined and it is through the process of conflict itself that definition occurs. Similarly, the relative power position may be set by the

structure, but the ability to attain the goals in conflict is a product of the process of conflict itself. Resolution is therefore seen as a transformative process in which the functional elements of change elicited through the conflict are enhanced, and the dysfunctional elements are minimized.

Another distinction made in conflict theory is between 'realistic' and 'nonrealistic' conflict (Coser, 1956, p.156). Realistic conflict is a functional alternative in the sense that it arises from a frustration of demands whereas nonrealistic conflict reflects a need for tension release and is not oriented toward specific results. With this type of distinction then, many self-determination conflicts which cannot be voiced as explicit demands are deemed to be 'nonrealistic' and therefore to be treated as unproductive and as targets of suppression.

From this overview, it is possible to see that many theories cannot accommodate the type of conflict engendered by a quest for self-determination. Self-determination conflict can be characterized as "domination-recognition conflict" with struggles against the former and for the latter through the redefinition of social identity (Apfelbaum and Lubek, 1976, p.82). In contrast to conflict over divergent interests, these conflicts are undefinable, unexpressed and unconstructed; there are no fixed or determined ends other than undoing oppression. The ends, and in fact the opponents, crystallize during the course of conflict.

In these types of conflicts negotiation does not appear to be an immediate alternative. This is apparent because:

- (1) The general aim is to change the power relationship rather than force the powerful party to yield and negotiate a compromise.
- (2) The minority group does not aim to initiate dialogue with their dominating opponents as long as the latter set the rules of the dialogue.
- (3) Prior to negotiation, there exists a need to reassert for others as well as for themselves, their very existence, their right to have a say in the development of society, and in the determination of the rules of the game (Apfelbaum, 1974).

It is this need to be heard outside the set parameters of the relationship which is seen as leading perforce to violence. Violence is used because the interactions in this type of conflict cannot move directly toward reaching an optimal compromise. It is a more indirect process of offensive attack, the communication of demands, alerting signals of existence, and the self-determination of needs which makes the use of violence plausible, acceptable, and, some would say, necessary. Contentious behaviour must precede problem-solving modes of action.

The first approach to understanding conflict outlined above cannot be used in the case of self-determination conflicts because it accepts a priori the status quo as the framework for the resolution of conflict. As Apfelbaum suggests in her

critique of the game-theoretical model of conflict which predominates conflict research:

...it excludes the possibility (or at least the perceived possibility) of challenging the legitimacy of moving the conflict to terrains other than those defined by the initial situation. Within the situation itself, no alternative is explicitly available to the subjects which could allow this challenge (1974, p.136).

The structural qualities of inherent inequality appear to shape the conflict situation to the point where the group's needs and interests cannot even be ascertained or voiced and much less fulfilled without violent conflict. One must understand these structural aspects which make violence almost 'necessary' in order to posit alternatives to this type of behaviour.

There is a need for a more useful definition of conflict which can take into account the variety of levels and types of conflict. In this thesis, the term conflict will be used to denote a situation in which there is a breakdown of consensus on a matter of mutual interest, of a divergence in views as to what the 'reality' of the relationship is, or what it 'ought' to be. The process of conflict is synonymous with discourse to the extent that the interactions and communication are a part of consensus formation. Conflict is not always the equivalent of discourse because moves can be undertaken to negate the need for consensus (for example by destroying the opponent or reducing it to submissiveness). The extent to which violence is a part of discourse will depend upon the potential (rather than the actual)

ability to create conditions which further consensus-formation.

VIOLENCE: THE BASES OF DEFINITION

It is possible to summarize from a survey of literature on violence that:

(1) Violence is most likely to occur when a minority is no longer willing to accept evaluations placed on it by the dominant group (Gurr, 1970).

(2) Violence is most likely to occur when there is resistance to, or the expectation of resistance to, the demands of the group (Walter, 1969).

(3) Violence occurs because it is a substitute for numerical support (DeNardo, 1985).

(4) Violence is most likely to occur as a show of power so that the minority can compete as an equal with the dominant group (Nieburg, 1969).

(5) Violence arises out of political impatience (DeNardo, 1985; Gamson, 1975).

This list of situation can be translated into three main functions:

(a) Violence is a show of capacity to disrupt the status quo. It is therefore a challenge to the power of the state.

(b) Violence is a challenge to the legitimacy of the state, or the structure of the dominant-minority relationship.

(c) Violence aids in the creation of identity (Fanon's thesis).

Definitions of violence range from the very broad -- social conflict equals violence (Mackenzie, 1970) -- to the very narrow -- the taking of a human life (Dick, 1979). An

operationalization of 'violence' is not essential at this point. What is more crucial are the aspects which distinguish the various definitions and hence the roles assigned to violence in conflict. At a most fundamental level, the definers of violence can be classified into 'maximizers' and 'minimizers' of violence (Walter, 1969, pp.47-8). Maximizers of violence see force, physical coercion and violence as the heart of political organization and for them violence is therefore a decisive expression of power in response to conflict. For minimizers of violence, cooperation is at the heart of political organization, with legitimate authority acquired in many ways other than violence. For minimizers, violence is an indication of breakdown, an aberration rather than a norm.

These distinctive assumptions inform the definitions of violence, and hence the role and function advocated for violence in politics. Violence can either be equated with power or viewed as the exact opposite of power; it can be the opposite of reason or highly rational; it can be legitimate in some circumstances or never legitimate.

Despite this polarization of views on the nature of violence in conflict situations, a basis of similarity can be found on which further explanation is made possible. Violence is with few exceptions seen as an instrumental form of action. Violence cannot be coherently valued in itself (Arendt, 1970; Dick, 1979;

Simpson, 1970). If violence is to be seen as instrumental then its interpretation must depend upon the relationship between means and ends. Even where violence is incidental (rather than planned) to conflict, it is to be judged through its results.

The rationality of violence is therefore dependent upon its own consequences. These consequences must be viewed in terms of both the first effects and the long-term results, in terms both of the probability of success and of achieving the same through non-violent means. In a carefully reasoned argument concerning when the victims of oppression are justified in resorting to deadly violence, five necessary but not sufficient criteria of justification are seen to exist (Dick, 1979). These are: (1) injustice, to the extent that the scope of oppression is greater than the violence (i.e., arrested development of potential personality in which greater social injustice results); (2) lack of prematurity, the exhaustion of all peaceable alternatives as the prerequisite; (3) lack of gratuitousness, only if its contribution to success cannot be equalled by other less objectionable means; (4) lack of wastefulness, it must promote liberation from oppression and not be solely a release of frustration; and (5) legitimacy, the general duty to promote any positive good is more important than the duty of preventing (and still more causing) suffering.

Those who view violence as irrational do not do so a priori

but because it tends "to give rise to distress itself and yet is uncertain to achieve its ends" (Honderich, 1970, p.12) and that it succeeds only when sufficient support for the demand exists already (Van den Haag, 1970; Gamson, 1975; Gurr, 1970).

One very elegant refutation of the use of violence is premised on the belief that violence is in the realm of passionality and is therefore outside the control of reason (Cotta, 1985). A linguistic analysis of the structural dimensions of the act of violence suggest that because of five characteristics violence cannot be rational. These five characteristics are: (1) immediacy, since violence is an act which reveals itself without allowing that between will and action a distance is established in which mediation can take place; (2) discontinuity, since the act does not extend itself and is therefore destined to exhaust itself; (3) disproportion to the end, for no intention is held towards aiming at an end in a calculated manner; (4) non-durability, since it exhausts itself without acquiring consistent duration; and, (5) unexpectedness, both of rise and exhaustion of its direction and result.

At the heart of this analysis is the idea that violence causes a loss of the possibility of personal communication and dialogue. It does so because it cannot recognize and coexist with the other. Violence does not even encompass unilateral communication, for it does not communicate, it imposes. It is

"activity-contra" in the sense that it is a structure of action which both imposes and constrains without the consent of those affected(Cotta, 1985). Violence is the antithesis of discourse.

For Cotta (1985, p.54), a much less external consideration between the valued end and the act itself must be construed, namely that "acts express a value in the very process of its self-construction, and not only in view of its finality". If one is to fight for justice, one must do so in a just manner, or injustice will result. The use of violence will have an unalterable impact on the ends because it imposes on the opponent without allowing the opponent to change.

One aspect of the difficulty in defining violence is the highly subjective nature of our perception of it. Violence is an interpretive rather than a descriptive word (Simpson, 1970). What is interpreted as violence depends to an extent on the cultural norms and traditions of a given group. The violence of an act will often be determined by the values which one assigns to the ends achieved. In fact, the label of violence usually means that we do not accept the rationale for the act. If we accept its necessity, we stop referring to it as violence, for we go through a process of neutralization, justifying the action to the point where we see it as rightful and perhaps even obligatory(Ball-Rokeach, 1972; Williams, 1981).

In his discussion of the use of the term aggression, Gergen (1984) suggests that it is a descriptor which is not linked to the realm of immediate observation, even indirectly. Rather, it, and similar words describing interaction, are linguistically grounded, for their definition is exhausted by an inventory of linguistic contexts in which they are embedded (Gergen, p.57). The limits of this phenomenon are lodged within the common conventions of discourse. The constituents of aggression are that it is animate, interdependent (two parties), undeserved or inappropriate, intentional and causing of pain or harm (Gergen, pp.58-63). The negotiation of aggression which leads to a construction of reality has both implicative and pragmatic implications. This means that the labelling of an action as aggressive serves to achieve certain social effects. Thus, in this case, if an individual or group is said to be aggressive, by implication, punishment may result.

Another interpretation of aggression which pursues this interactive character emphasizes the genuine divergence in the points of reference between actor and recipient (Mummendy et al., 1984). In particular, the temporal sequence (especially the judgment of the starting point) will differ (Mummendy et al., p.74). The elements of the construction to be judged in the conception of aggression include mutual interpretation, situation, context, temporal progress and those divergences of perspective dependent upon position within or outside the

specific interaction. Factors which influence the definition include interpretation of norm deviation, intent, injury and the avoidability of injury.

The element which is highlighted in this research is the "social character" of the perceived harm (Mummendy et al., 1984). It is this context which supplies the participating individuals with information about what is to be accepted and what is to be rejected. The "social character" comprises the social and historically relevant ideologies and myths about what, at a certain time and within a certain social context, is the tolerable range of action when norms of justice or norms of appropriateness are violated (Mummendy et al., p.102). This viewpoint raises exciting questions about what could make individuals or groups homogeneous as actors as well as victims of violence and which elements facilitate the shared perception of suffering harm. It also raises depressing examples of situations in which a majority of individuals in a given society can condone aggression against a given minority group. Thus, in speaking of a murderer, there is unlikely to be general support for his or her evaluation of adequacy, while as regards state policies "unfortunately for millions of victims, in the majority of cases a considerable social consensus exists" (Mummendy et al., p.103). This imbalance in acceptability, often used in protection of "counteraggressive" violence, may be especially true in cases of collective aggression in the "egoist" or "nationalist" interest (Birnbacher, 1984, p.160).

The interpretation of what constitutes violence will thus depend on the viewpoint of the interpreter, a factor which is critical in the use of violence in a self-determination conflict. The opposite positions of the groups and the fact that this distance is exacerbated by the difference in cultural views of what is violent increases the likelihood of difficulty in interpreting violent actions and their purposive intent. Responses other than counterviolence are thus difficult to formulate.

Below the highly subjective interpretation of violence there lies common ground for recognizing violent acts. Violence must exceed certain bounds of normalcy and propriety, standards which are not purely subjective or cultural. The stable core of the application of the term violence arises due to the equal human concern about susceptibility to injury and pain (Simpson, 1970), although not to the destruction of property. Refrains from violence in themselves are acts that recognize the acceptance of the basic needs of the opponent, laying the ground for an exploration of common interests.

An important distinction is held by many authors between the use of violence and the use of force. The use of force is seen as different from violence because it need not be physical since its effect can be imposed on the mind, because it is used by a

legal institution and because it is used only toward a justified end (Cotta, 1985, p.57). This distinction will often mean that in a self-determination conflict the minority group will be utilizing violence while the dominant group (as long as the methods used by the state are legal) will be utilizing force, even if the actions are identical.

Another distinction which is made, to the disadvantage of oppressed groups, is that a situation cannot be inherently violent. Thus, poverty and deprivation are not violence because although they violate and restrict they are not seen to be intentionally inflicted (van den Haag, 1979, Cotta, 1985). Those who view these types of structural conditions as violence tend to accept the need for violence in order to offset this oppression (Harris, 1976). Structural violence and behavioural violence are similar in that they both deny communication of interests by those affected. Because of the lack of agency in a direct and specific relationship, it may be more useful to utilize the term structural conflict to denote the structurally violent conditions, but the similarity of the imposition upon the target should be recognized.

The life chances of people in a community are not so much the result of somebody somewhere making a series of decisions or non-decisions to that effect, but largely because certain social mechanisms, principles and assumptions are taken for granted. This dimension is quite beyond the reach of behaviourism (Ng, 1980, p.12).

VIOLENCE AND IDENTITY

One of the primary roles ascribed to violence is its part in shaping the identity of a minority group. Through oppression the minority group has become "invisible" to the extent that it has no say or control in its own life and thus has lost its identity (Apfelbaum, 1974). Beyond this role in group formation there is the "Fanon thesis" that an oppressed man has, following the dominant group's view, defined himself as evil, stupid, dirty and thus must act violently in order to free himself both politically and psychologically (Fanon, 1960). Social-psychological studies have affirmed this in the finding that both dominant and minority groups identify themselves vis-à-vis the dominant group, thus creating contradictions within the individual's view of him- or herself if the identification is with the of that minority (Deschamps, 1982).

Despite the belief in this expressive function, violence will rarely be used by more than a small minority of the oppressed group. In fact, there is a high correlation between the use of violence and the small numbers of a movement (DeNardo, 1985). Reasons for this correlation include the link between the use of violence and the unwillingness to compromise as well as the link between repression and the strengthening of "purists" who are more willing to use violence than to compromise. A related aspect is the role of violence in the mobilization of the

group. The rationale for terrorism is that it is the first step toward mobilization where the group is immobilized by repression through the revealing or disabling of the repressive apparatus of the state. However, this function appears to not be fulfilled because such conspiracies are more dangerous as they grow bigger and the political dynamics of recruiting changes as violence increases (DeNardo, 1985). The personal decision to join becomes more complicated and difficult as the relative substantial political preferences of the regime and the radical demands are scrutinized more closely, a moral evaluation of tactics takes place, and the personal costs of repression are assessed.

Violence can play a role in identity formation and mobilization, but need it? The long term repercussions of the use of violence in the definition of identity necessitate the search for alternative bases of organization. Alternatives can be found in an interpretation of Fanon's work. In attempting to reconcile Fanon's awareness of the deleterious effects of violence on the human personality with his advocacy of the use of violence, Perinbaum (1982) suggests that distinctions can be drawn on the basis of definitions of violence which Fanon used. In particular, it is suggested, the emphasis should be placed on the context of the violent act. In illustrating the different ways in which Fanon used the term violence in his written work, Perinbaum concludes that:

...it is clear that he distinguished between violence, meaning coercion and physical force and

holy violence [beyond violence], suggesting a destructive force creative beyond belief, and frightening beyond comprehension, compelling and dangerously powerful, irresistible and fearful to approach, easy to comprehend, yet mysterious and sacred." (1982, p.6).

Thus, by stressing the contextuality of violence and understanding the systematic and structural violence of colonialism, it is possible to understand Fanon's call for violence in terms of creative action of powerful proportions needed to combat oppression. "Violent action" could therefore be part of identity-formation and a conflict resolution process by being aimed for change rather than against the oppressor.

VIOLENCE AND LEGITIMACY

The use of violence is justified by those who use it but not justified by those whom it is used against. The process by which this justification takes place is often termed legitimation. Violence cannot be legitimate because in order to be legitimate it must be accepted by both parties (including those upon whom it is inflicted). It must also sustain the needs of the parties but violence can be rational only in the short term, relating to specific ends, if at all. Violence is the capacity to impose, or the act of imposing, one's will upon another, where the imposition is held to be illegitimate (Macfarlane, 1979, p.46). Given this nature, why is the link between legitimacy and violence so strong in the literature regarding the latter's use?

One explanation of this linkage derives from Weber's definition of the state as the monopoly of physical coercion and therefore having "the right to physical violence" which is "assigned to all other associations or individuals only to the extent permitted by the state" (Weber, 1984, p.33). The right to use violence is premised on the legitimacy of the state. This is taken to mean that the use of violence by the state is legitimate. Groups therefore attempt to attain legitimacy for their use of force in order to strengthen the legitimacy of their demands.

This interpretation is really turning Weber's arguments upside-down. The state is not legitimate because it can legally use violence. Nor is the use of violence by the state a priori legitimate. The state can use violence legally because it is using the power or authority vested in it to satisfy the needs, interests and values of its constituent people.

In reality then, minority groups are attempting to justify their use of violence by removing justifications for the state's use of violence. They are in fact challenging the power of the state: you no longer represent us therefore we will use violence in the same way you do, illegitimately. As one detailed empirical study found, "the intensity and scope of normative justifications for political violence vary strongly and inversely with the intensity and scope of regime legitimacy" (Gurr, 1970,

p.120). Violence works against the legitimacy of the state and thus toward the legitimacy of the group's demands.

VIOLENCE AND POWER

Violence is seen by many as the most flagrant manifestation of power. The willingness to use violence is, according to this perspective, a show of power, one which can equalize parties which are highly unequal in terms of other resource measurements. Thus the prescription is clear:

The capacity and determination to exact unacceptable costs from the enemy, even at great costs to oneself, may be the only means by which a small nation or minority group can maintain respect for its independence, values, demands and political bargaining power, while avoiding the escalation of violence to extreme ends (Nieburg, 1969, p.12).

For others though, the use of violence is a recognition of powerlessness, an attempt to break through to political effectiveness (Sharp, 1973; Carter, 1973; Arendt, 1970; DeNardo, 1985). Power stands in the need of numbers and violence is managed by just a few. In this view, the great potential power of the minority is "the unwillingness of the majority to save the status quo" (Arendt, p.42). The prescription is clear: win over the assent of the majority to a new structure through influence. Violence cannot produce assent, it can only promote acquiescence and obedience through coercion. A political relationship with a foundation in violence can never become legitimate (Mitchell, 1984).

The fundamental assumption about the nature of power is what separates the two arguments. For the first, power is built upon competition, upon the capacity to control the behaviour of others. Here, power is seen as the end-goal of politics. The second argument is based on cooperation, on the belief that power is based on collaboration, on the human ability to act in concert and is therefore always the property of a group. Power needs legitimacy if it is to be more than pure coercion, therefore legitimacy is the end-goal of politics. This difference finds a metaphor in the distinction of whether the government depends upon the people or the people upon the government.

VIOLENCE AS A MECHANISM OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

An explanation of the potential use of, and the role of, violence in self-determination conflicts leads to a review of the impact of violence on conflict resolution processes. Violence is seen as a mechanism of conflict resolution because it is a signalling device of dissatisfaction to authority and because it is a symbol of the seriousness of commitment, the will and the ability to be heard (Coser, 1967, p.96). The reasons given are much the same as those explored in the discussion of violence and conflict. Violence is a productive force because it plays a positive function by shaping the conflict and in so doing shapes conflict resolution by enforcing adjustive sequences. This interpretation gives rise to questions about the dynamic between

conflict and conflict resolution processes which is discussed in chapter three. Of more immediate consequence, however, is the specific role of violence on processes of resolution such as negotiation. Once again, opinion is divided as to the impact of the use of violence.

A few authors see violence as beneficial to the negotiation process in the early stages. This phase, which is accordingly described as competitive even when there is no violence, creates differentiation which is more likely to lead to resolution than if it has not occurred (Stephenson, 1982). Others would expand this to suggest that in an open or violent conflict situation, negotiations are more likely to develop a cooperative climate (Louche, 1982). These findings suggest that violence helps through accentuation of differences, defining issues, and thus making a convergence of interests possible. Is violence a necessary factor in bringing about successful negotiation?

It would appear not. Other researchers have found that violence, as one type of coercive action, is an obstacle to conflict resolution through negotiation because it enhances hostility. In using violence, the need for internal justification often leads to viewing the other as evil and thus "deserving" of the harmful acts. Other potential results of the use of violence are changes in the actual goals of the parties, incorporation of violence in the self-conception of the

participants (even passive ones), and shifts in the limits of acceptable behaviour (Janis and Katz, 1971). All of these will have an impact on the relationship which is the outcome of a violent conflict (Sharp, 1973, pp.800-805). Violence, in defining the conflict, may delimit the situation to the degree that conflict resolution is no longer possible. Conflict resolution can only succeed where the needs of both parties are recognized and acted upon. Violence negates the discourse through which a better understanding of mutual interests, and mutual or parallel goals and outcomes are made possible.

THE DYNAMICS OF VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT

Violence can be understood within the context of the interaction between the actor and the recipient. This dynamic will shape the impact of the violent acts upon the conflict. These dynamics will in turn differ according to the interpretation given to the violent interaction. Violence will thus be considered to be an element of discourse to the extent that it engenders the possibility of a shared interpretation between the actor and the recipient. This potential is not great, but will vary along the three main classifications of political aggression: symbolic violence, systematic violence and structural violence (Windisch, 1979).

These three types of violence, as defined by Windisch, differ according to form, content and significance. Symbolic violence is an active-imaginative symbol which stands for change; it will have historical and political dimensions and is future-oriented. Systematic violence on the other hand, is pure violence. It is always against something and has an atemporal quality, seeing itself as valid forever. Systematic violence is used when change itself is the enemy. Structural or institutional violence are instruments of repression which are accepted as part of the system. These instruments can include laws, the administration of justice, the bureaucracy and the police.

Symbolic violence which takes the form of demonstrations and so forth, is the most conducive to discourse. It plays a role in initiating a reinterpretation of structural violence by forcing the latter to become part of the discourse and understanding of the status quo. The pure negation of systematic violence is the antithesis of discourse.

This attempt at defining the nature and the role of violence in conflict illustrates the utility of the concept of complementarity. Opposing definitions of violence can be reconciled through their relation to the concept of discourse and together describe a wider range of the attributes of this phenomena. Communication is essential to discourse, therefore

only violence which can be interpreted by the recipient as communicative interaction can be part of the conflict resolution process.

As one researcher into the political use of violence concludes:

Men's resort to political violence is in part unreasoning, but it does not occur without reason. Ignorance is almost always among its causes: sometimes ignorance of its consequences by those who resort to it, more often ignorance by those who create and maintain the conditions that inspire it. But political violence is comprehensible, which should make it neither necessary nor inevitable, but capable of resolution (Gurr, 1970, p.359).

Our capacity to resolve the dilemma of violence, which appears to have a potential in recreating discourse and yet simultaneously is the negation of discourse, depends on our ability to understand the processes of conflict and conflict resolution. This understanding guides the search for alternatives to violence in conflict.

CHAPTER THREE

DISCOURSE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONFLICT: CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND ALTERNATIVES TO VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT PROCESSES

CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Conflict situations arise between parties who perceive themselves to have mutually incompatible objectives, incompatibilities which reflect underlying sources of conflicting interests, values, or needs. These perceptions of conflict represent an absence of consensus on common interests. Conflict is thus seen as a state of affairs in which the achievement of goals by the parties to the relationship appear to be mutually exclusive, based on incongruent views of how the goals can be achieved consensually. Conflict is the outcome of a particular social or political relationship which structures the determination of goals of the parties and their ability to achieve these goals. Conflict must also be seen as a process in which the sources or causes of the conflict are defined and the decision mechanisms to deal with the conflict are created. This process may be limited to a questioning of the specific issues which create the conflict situation or it may involve a questioning of the entire relationship. In utilizing the term 'conflict' one can be referring to a particular state of being, the conflict situation (or conflict structure in the sense of

goal-issues, behaviour and attitudes), conflict as the outcome of a particular structure (the wider relationship between the parties), and conflict as a process of defining the sources of conflict and searching for the means to deal with the causes.

Conflict resolution can also be seen in terms of state of affairs, outcome and process. Conflict resolution characterizes a state of affairs in which the attitudes, behaviour and goals of the relevant parties are perceived to be compatible. It is an outcome which is an agreement accepted by all the relevant parties about the way in which their relationship is to be conducted in a cooperative manner. Conflict situations will still arise, however, the definition of the problem and the tools which are necessary to resolve it are provided by the relationship itself, which is therefore self-sustaining. The relationship itself will not be questioned in future conflict (until sufficient change occurs to warrant a new determination of how the relationship is to be conducted). The process of conflict resolution is the course by which conflict processes are shaped so that the functional aspects of the conflict are maintained and carried through to a beneficial conclusion, while the dysfunctional elements are minimized or eliminated.

There are obvious parallels in the definition of conflict and that of conflict resolution. In the case of seeing the two as states of being, it is easy, at least conceptually, to

distinguish them by the presence or absence of a conflict situation which can be resolved within the existing relationship. Likewise, the outcomes are reasonably easy to differentiate; a relationship which creates conflict but not adequate means to deal with the conflict versus a relationship which gives rise only to conflict which can be dealt with in a manner acceptable to the parties themselves.

It is in distinguishing conflict resolution processes from conflict processes that the greatest difficulties arise. The two processes are identical in the sense that they characterize the search for, and activation of, behaviour which satisfies the desires of the parties to deal with their perception of the situation. Because of this similarity, writers often use the terms interchangeably so that, as already pointed out, both violence and negotiation are variously described as processes of conflict and as conflict resolution processes.

A finer distinction between the two concepts appears to be critical to an understanding of the potential for conflict resolution in self-determination conflict. In appreciating these differences, the factors which allow for the resolution of conflict, in contrast to other ways of dealing with conflict, can be clarified. This differentiation can be explored in terms of the two-staged sequence which appears to be necessary to any process which deals with conflict, that is, definition and decision. These stages are illustrated through a comparison of

the major types of conflict and the variety of means to achieve definition and decision.

The stage of definition is characterized by the objectification of the conflict situation. The state of conflict is objectified when the parties, through their perception and behaviour, recognize the elements of conflict. In this sense, the conflict process is neutral because the definition does not encompass value judgments as to the causes of conflict. The same conclusions can theoretically be reached by any observer or participant. The processes of definition move away from this analytic neutrality to the extent that intersubjective validity is salient or absent in this objectification. Thus, in a process of conflict resolution, definition or re-definition of the conflict takes place through consensus-formation by the parties directly involved. The conflict is finally defined only when the parties reach agreement on the 'reality' of the situation. In contrast, a process of conflict determination, where the conflict is pursued to a conclusion and won or lost, the definition of the situation occurs completely separately in the minds of the parties. A similar absence of consensus occurs in a conflict settlement process in which definition is imposed by outside parties. Some other processes of dealing with conflict, such as management, do not work towards definition since they emphasize only control of the manifestations of the situation. Other processes such as avoidance or prevention, can take place only if conflict or potential conflict is already defined.

Some conflicts are easier to define in a consensual manner than others. Disputes are states of conflict in which the parties to, and interests in, the situation are visible, acknowledged and defined. The degree of shared perception means that the disputants need only find the most appropriate decision process. The extent to which dispute resolution is also conflict resolution will vary according to the continuing saliency of processes and outcomes which are mutually acceptable.

Manifest conflict characterizes situations in which conflict behaviour is evident, arising from some perception of mutually incompatible objectives, but in which underlying sources of conflict are not completely apparent. Manifest conflict is thus visible and acknowledged but not completely defined. At this point, a conflict settlement or management process could be undertaken, 'solving' the conflict to the extent that its causes were known. However, another step must be taken before conflict resolution can occur. The manifest conflict would have to be re-defined through a transformative process so that subjective perceptions of the incompatibilities would be explicated, distortions removed and consensus achieved.

A third category of conflicts are situations in which mutually incompatible objectives exist but have not yet been activated. Conflicts are stopped from becoming manifest because of the elements of the structure of the relationship between the

parties. This category includes latent conflict in which the parties recognize the incompatibility of goals but do not or cannot do anything to change the situation and incipient conflict in which one of more of the parties does not recognize the existence of a conflict. Here, the process of definition is even more essential since behavioural indicators are more or less absent (or at least unfocused). A similar type of conflict is the category of protracted social conflict (Azar, 1981), in which structural properties (ethnic, religious, linguistic, economic) have affected the overt behaviour of the interaction creating a "complicated causal network" that makes these conflicts difficult to 'solve'. Protracted social conflict can also be seen as the result of conflict settlement or management processes in which conflict behaviour is minimized without reference to underlying causes (Burton, 1979).

All three of these types of conflict have structural properties which make conflict resolution processes appear to be inapplicable to the existing situation. A deeper process of transformation which would restructure the relationship is necessary in order for resolution to be possible. This restructuring, leading to definition of the conflict, can be seen as part of the conflict resolution process to the extent that the means to achieve it take into account the community of interests of all the parties in the relationship, not solely the interests of the disadvantaged.

Conflict resolution processes are seen as inapplicable in these types of conflicts where structural change can only be envisaged at the expense of one party. One example of this structural impact on a conflict situation is in an asymmetrical relationship. Here one party has an overwhelmingly superior position because of control over resources and valued positions in a society relegating another party to a consistently subordinate position. The subordinate group is deprived in the sense that it has no avenue to oppose the dominant party without bringing down unbearable costs upon itself. In some cases the deprivation is so extensive that the party cannot recognize the conditions which are arresting its ability to pursue its interests, values or needs. Re-structuring could occur either through redistribution of desired resources and positions or through according legitimacy to the need for an improved situation. This re-structuring is made possible by a 'space' in the relationship of domination (Moore, 1979) through which the domination can be recognized by the dominated, thereby beginning the process of definition. There is no reason to assume a priori that this creation of space cannot be encompassed by the conflict resolution process. It is noted, however, that the means to accomplish this distancing which have been utilized most frequently are ones which negate the relationship rather than focusing on the relationship.

The second stage, that of decision, furthers the distinctions made between the various processes which are initiated in attempts to deal with states of conflict. The preceding discussion has outlined the role which the structure of the relationship can play in shaping the process chosen. Some relationships are structured so that the outcomes of conflict are disputes and therefore definable, whereas others give rise to manifest, latent or incipient, or when exacerbated, protracted social, conflict in which case the relationship itself needs to be re-defined. The structure of the relationship has a similar impact on the decision processes chosen to deal with the state of conflict. In some relationships, these processes are regulated by proscribed rules and often by institutions which apply the rules. In other relationships, the process aimed at arriving at these decision mechanisms is more arduous. This variety is described as the "cooperation-conflict" mix of a given social system which sets the standard of what is legitimate struggle and what is not (Himes, 1980).

The term conflict process could be used to describe the search for and application of decision mechanisms when not linked to any normative view of what should be taken into account in either pursuing or analyzing such a process. In contrast, there are processes in which this search for and application of decision mechanisms are evaluated in terms of their legitimacy based on differing perspectives. Conflict determination

processes occur when the strategic interests of one party and the optimal outcome for that party are salient. Conflict settlement and management processes enhance the utilities of an outside party, sometimes seen as the social system as a whole, or the powerful outside parties within the system.

Conflict resolution processes necessitate procedures to decide the conflict which are agreed upon by the parties directly involved. This agreement is reached on the basis of acceptance by each party of the other party's interests (as they have been defined by the transformative process) which recognize the community of interests between the parties. Therefore, the outcome of the conflict resolution process is always framed in terms of the interdependence of results, also recognizing this standard of legitimacy, that is, the acceptability of the outcomes in the minds of the parties. On this basis of cooperative decision mechanisms, mutually acceptable conclusions and future cooperation are made possible.

Processes of conflict resolution are aptly characterized by the terms discourse and transformation. Discourse is a continuous exposition of thought which is communicated, through which some consensus is achieved on a particular matter on which originally differing views were held. Discourse proceeds by reasoning which does not necessitate sticking severely to the main subject but encompasses any thoughts which help to clarify

distortions and lead to consensus. The main conditions which facilitate discourse are the absence of power as a salient factor in relations between the participants and the authenticity of participation, in the sense that participants desire to achieve consensus (Habermas, 1971). In this way, the understanding which is reached is a reasonable and voluntary one and not a deceptive (or merely compulsory) consensus (Habermas, 1973, p.17).

This consensus brings about a transformation of the conflict. It alters the form of the conflict by furnishing the participants with a widened framework through which joint-decision-making occurs. In conflict processes there is a boundary between the opponents, since each is trying to deal with the perception of incompatible objectives on its own, within its own system. In conflict resolution processes, the boundary is removed through discourse so that in effect, the parties see themselves as part of a single system.

Discourse as a model reveals the most critical factor in the achievement of conflict resolution. This factor is the relationship between value and act, means and ends, tactics and principles, process and outcome. The process must express the values of conflict resolution to the same extent as the outcome. Cooperative relationships are built through cooperation. Tactics such as violence which negate the potential for discourse thus negate the possibilities for conflict resolution. This approach

reverses the traditional emphasis in politics of the ends justifying the means since here both the means and the ends must be independently justifiable.

THE BASES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: INTERESTS, VALUES, NEEDS

This approach additionally follows from a view that the central values and needs of humankind (such as freedom, security, equality, respect, dignity and justice) can only exist if they are shared (Himes, 1980, p.256). This belief is essential to conflict resolution. In order to understand this root, one must explore the words that one uses to describe goals: interests, values and needs and the interaction between these descriptive concepts. As Burton has noted (1981, p.145):

A more difficult distinction to make is that between values or interests and needs. This distinction is important in the explanation of why win-win outcomes may be possible. Values and interests relate to those goals of individuals and parties and cultures that are specific. They form a hierarchy of priorities and are subject to change in content and hierarchical order. Needs relate to universal goals. Security, for example, is sought by all persons, in all cultures, and in all circumstances. There are other needs that seem to be no less universal such as identity. They are not subject to change, like temporary or cultural values and interests, nor are they necessarily in short supply. Their allocation can therefore lead to win-win outcomes.

One way to understand these concepts is to view them in terms of levels of primacy in the sense that they are derived from the fundamental level, of basic human needs, and flow upward

in terms of how individuals and groups choose to pursue these needs. Needs are elements which are essential to human survival, growth and development. They encompass both basic physical needs and psychological ones. This latter category is harder to define since it is difficult to prove the existence of a given need. Burton and his associates rely on Paul Sites' control theory (1977) as a fruitful elaboration of human needs. Sites argues that human beings control the environment to meet needs which are described not as specific secondary needs but abstract psychophysiological processes which are in interaction with the environment but are not now directly observable. He reviews investigations into human needs and outlines the following lists: safety needs, belongingness and love needs, esteem needs and needs for self-actualization (Maslow); recognition, new experience, response, security (Thomas); relatedness, transcendence-creativity, rootedness-brotherliness, frame of orientation identity-individuality (Fromm). He also discusses the study of ethnologist Robert Ardrey, who postulates needs for identity, stimulation, security and territory in the behaviour of animals.

Sites (1977, pp.35-45), himself, proposes two groups of human needs. The first group consists of the need for response, stimulation, security and recognition-esteem which are gratified within a framework of identity. Once these needs are satisfied in the development of the individual, he or she will have needs

for the second group which are the need for distributive justice, meaning, rationality and control.

In postulating the existence of these needs, there is no attempt to link them directly to behaviours. Rather, they form a basic set of assumption as to why humans act to control their environment in order to satisfy their needs through culture, values and norms.

In his work, Burton(1979) illustrates the utility of this approach. He condenses these assumption into the concept of role; that roles are taken to further the gratification of these basic needs. Thus, a critical problem in conflict resolution is 'role defense' because of the linkage between the needs that one has and the means through which one attempts to achieve these needs. Peaceful change occurs when the transition from a role or set of roles can be made directly to another role which is perceived to further the achievement of needs.

Values are the underlying implicit bases for judgment and evaluation of a social situation. They represent conceptions of the desirable which provides criteria for decision-making. Values emerge in the interaction process and continue to exist as long as they are thought to be useful (Sites, 1977, p.15). If needs are seen as the fundamental source of human action and interaction, values are the cultural mediators between these needs and the possible means of achieving them. Values lie

behind norms, which are the more specific standards of behaviour prohibiting or limiting variations away from the acceptable standard, and establishing sanctions against impermissible deviations.

Value dissensus or value incompatibility are conflicts of values which arise between parties possessing partially or wholly different sets of beliefs about desirable end-states, political and social structure, and the basic nature of the circumstances within which relationships exist. Conflict resolution processes attempt to shift the focus away from the valued-means of achieving needs to the analytical realm of all possible means of joint or parallel achievement of mutual needs.

Interests are the operationalization of values which play a descriptive role in making reference to a party's wants or preferences. This concept implies that the enhancement of interests is to the party's good or advantage. Interests are generalized assumption of pleasure connected with the ideas of the existence of an object or of an action (Habermas, 1971, p.198). Interests are in turn translated into goals, or consciously desired outcomes, conditions, or end-states.

Conflict resolution necessitates a transformation in the perception of interests. This transformation can occur in two ways. One of the ways that interests are transformed was

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outlined in the preceding discussion on gaining an understanding of the interrelationship between needs, values, interests and goals.⁽¹⁾ Emphasis on the fundamental level illustrates how flexible interests and even values can be. Focusing on interests gives rise to perceptions of incompatibilities as being fixed, with solutions therefore appearing to be either win-lose or at most, capable of compromise within a fixed set of outcomes. When linked directly to needs, or whatever one chooses to call basic underlying sources of behaviour, attitudes and perception, interests appear to be much more malleable. Win-win solutions appear to be possible.

Freedom has been characterized as a zero-sum concept (Royce, 1982): the more freedom one individual or group has, the less free is another related individual or group. It is, however, difficult to accept this characterization as fundamentally correct. The means by which one chooses to achieve 'freedom' may result in the enslavement of another, but there are many possible modes of attaining freedom. As has been argued in this thesis, a more holistic understanding of freedom would encompass both the end-state of being free and the means of achievement, of becoming free. This argument could be held for most of the other sources

¹ This understanding of the interrelationship answers the criticism that Burton's work does not deal with conflict over material goals (Brown, 1981). It is not that the existence of conflict over material goals is not recognized but rather that from this perspective it is the needs which give rise to a definition of goals in material terms which is the root of the conflict and hence the object of conflict resolution attempts.

of conflict. Conflict over resources, whether divisible or not are usually the symptoms rather than the cause. The radical implication of the conflict resolution approach is that conflicts are only zero-sum in a fragmented framework. The resolution of 'unresolvable' conflicts depends upon the loosening of interests which are derived from needs in an isolated or fragmented point of view, that is, without recognition of the interdependence of the parties. Interests depend on context, for they can be perceived as antagonistic or merely at cross-purposes and they can be perceived as mutually-held or parallel depending on the situation. Conflict resolution attempts to redefine the relationship between fundamental needs and the chosen interests through an emphasis on the intrinsic relationship between means and ends.

A second, interrelated, approach is to widen the framework from which the interests are measured. Ultimately, the movement is toward acting in terms of the mutual interest. This widening also encompasses a longer term view. What appears to be of interest today is always interpreted on the basis of the past, but it must also be seen in terms of future outcomes. This deepening and widening of the perception of what is the interest of an individual or group leads to what could be conceived of as a "pure interest", an interest unmasked of distorting influences. This "pure interest" could be seen as the resolution of the tension inherent in social interaction:

There exists an uneasy truce between desires and justice, a dialectical link between self-interest and moral behaviour. What a group wants is difficult to separate from what it thinks it deserves...while self-interest exerts a dominant influence on social relations, it is possible to distinguish conceptually and empirically between normative and non-normative elements. (Royce, 1982, p.138).

A note must also be made concerning whose needs this purified interest represents. If one is to assume that individuals or identity groups are the primary actors, then one may need to question institutionalized interests to the extent that the two are separate. States do not have needs although it is possible to refer to such entities as having interests, to the extent that the interests of the population and those of the system are synonymous. This endowment of interests in the state must remain a shorthand for this linkage. This community of interest forms the legitimate grounds of political interaction: individuals empower their representatives who become the state apparatus on the basis of common belief in the common good. The relationship is not a contractual one in which the trade-off of interest from the individual is permanent.

One critical aspect of restructuring a dominant-minority relationship is this transformation in the perception of interests. Conflict can easily be dismissed as unresolvable when they are labelled zero-sum or situations of pure opposition. Socio-psychological needs, as the fundamental base of the definition of interests, are always potentially positive sum, that is, when the fulfillment of needs of both parties together

will be greater than that which each party could have alone. Interests that flow directly and logically from this base would also be positive-sum. Only interests which are defined apart from their ultimate rationale, or examined without a full context, can be zero-sum.

If you have an interest in killing me, then my death is theoretically a win-lose situation. I cannot be both dead and alive (the latter being my interest). However, such an interest does not arise spontaneously, at that moment, free from connection to other phenomena. Such contextless or fragmented interests are examples of dislocation caused by a psychopathic condition. The solution is analysis of the roots of such an interest and consequent transformation into a rational interest connected to its originating source.

In essence, conflict is the inability to reconcile interests, but rarely is it the irreconcilability of interests. Conflict situations often create conditions which objectify and rigidify these perceptions of irreconcilable interests. Conflict resolution processes create conditions in which mutual analysis transforms the fragmentation of interests between groups (where it is irrational) and fragmentation of interests over time.

Further exploration of the conceptual bases of conflict resolution will be undertaken through discussion of the constitutive elements of conflict resolution processes. These

elements comprise both governing principles and illustrative techniques. The former include: justice, interdependence, cooperation and alternatives. The latter include: negotiation, non-violence, problem-solving and third parties. These concepts and the ways in which they enhance the potential for the resolution of a conflict situation will be related to recent advances in socio-psychology in order that the ideas are clarified and linked to human interaction.

JUSTICE

The ideal of fairness is fundamental to conceptions of justice. Reciprocity and mutual obligation are similarly essential to human interaction. Yet, social situations and acts which are perceived as unfair are continually being perpetrated, and often 'justified' in the language of reciprocation. The commitment to justice is necessary for effective social change (Austin, 1981, p.123); it can also be a strong source of justification of the status quo and hence, resistance to change (Lerner, 1981). In some sense, legitimacy and justice are similar attributes given to a relationship or act but based on different criteria. The former is a social attribute describing something which is accepted on the basis of satisfaction of needs of an individual or group while the latter is a moral attribute used in reference to internal criteria of what is acceptable as being fair (Williams, 1981, pp.24). In self-determination

conflicts the problem is that the relationship is not legitimate for the minority but has been 'legitimated' by the dominant group. Similarly, the relationship is one of injustice for the minority which has been 'justified' in the view of the dominant party.

The perceptions of justice on behalf of the parties are mutually exclusive and complementary in the sense of jointly describing the situation. Conflict resolution must create a framework in which the notions of justice are shared by the parties to the conflict. In order to understand what this framework entails, one must investigate the definition of justice and the conditions through which injustice becomes acceptable. On this basis it is possible to recognize the elements which would constitute movement toward a mutual conception of justice.

In understanding justice as a value located in social interaction, it cannot be defined as an absolute principle, as an intrinsic property of the human cognitive structure or as completing a formal equation (Sampson, 1983, p.184). Rather, justice entails a process "whereby people collectively determine, without domination of either ideological or physical force, the validity of various claims that are put forth" (Sampson, p.185). Essential to justice in social interaction is the perception of sameness, "that 'I' and 'Other' are not distinct psychologically" (Lerner, 1981, p.202). Or, in other words, "the capacity of addressing oneself within the frame or standpoint of others"

(Sampson, 1981, p.110). Comparability is essential for "we evaluate how fair our situation is by appraising the situation of another who is similar in most relevant respects"(Austin, 1979, p.274).

In viewing justice as process, one can overcome some of the problems encountered by other approaches which highlight justice as a state of being. Equity theory (Walster and Berscheid, 1981; Adam, 1983) assumes the possible existence of an equitable state (equity as one form of justice) so that inequitable relations are seen as causing distress both to those parties to the relationship who commit injustice and to the recipients. Critiques of equity theory point to the static and oversimplified explanation of the process of justification (Deutsch, 1985, p.25). In particular, the theory is found to be contextless, to overemphasize the individual, to portray the range of distress as universal, to see values as independent of structure, and to not adequately distinguish between interaction in the public and private spheres (Tajfel, 1982, p.150). Of greatest difficulty in applying the "equity outlook" is that it is argued to apply among the members of a social group, creating conditions within its own boundaries which help to promote equitable behaviour (Walster, 1973).

Problems of injustice arise because of the boundaries which one creates in order that justification is possible. It is this

socio-cultural context of justification which is crucial; this restrictive conception of social reality which must be widened in order for change to occur (Tajfel, 1983, p.439).

In his investigation of distributive justice, Deutsch outlines the factors involved in both an individual's conception of what he or she is entitled to and the obstacles which block the sense of injustice in the victimizer (1985, pp.52-62). An individual's conception of what he or she is entitled to is influenced by: (1) ideologies and myths about justice that are dominant and officially supported by the society, (2) the amount of exposure to ideologies and myths in conflict with the above, (3) experienced changes in satisfaction-dissatisfaction, (4) knowledge of what others who are viewed as comparable are getting, and (5) bargaining power. The sense of injustice in a victimizer is blocked by: (1) justification, (2) situation is seen as improving, (3) belief that one cannot do anything without making oneself a victim, (4) belief that one is doing all that one can already, (5) ignorance or lack of contact, (6) perception of the situation as hopeless, (7) exclusion of the victim from his or her definition of community in which moral standards are applied, (8) fear of victim or other victimizers, (9) perception of personal interests as opposed to the victim's interests.

These factors illustrate the processual and structural conditions which can affect views of justice both for ourselves

and for others. Moore's study (1979) of situations of injustice demonstrates how social and psychological conditions make anesthesia to injustice possible. His findings show how the power of the illusion of historical necessity, permanency and inevitability blunt the potential for moral outrage on the part of victims and victimizers alike. Particularly strong are mythical-moral illusions linked to the causality of the injustice. In order to feel moral outrage people must define their situation as human injustice; when one can learn about causes there arises the possibility of change (Moore, p.491). The acceptance of injustice is more than a rationalization of domination, it is one aspect of the psychological adaptation to the fact of subordination and powerlessness (Moore, p.461; see also Adams, 1978).

This variety of social myths, psychological barriers, and their underlying status and power differentials create a social reality in which injustice is not seen by the individual or group, for the situation is seen as 'factual' and 'objective' (Tajfel, 1982, p.163). Justice can become a motivating and activating factor in conflict resolution only once the situation is no longer perceived to be just and when all participants are deemed worthy of the same justice.

Movement toward widening the boundaries of justice so that it encompasses both the majority and the minority group occurs

through finding avenues which depict the similarities of both groups. In self-determination conflicts this is made particularly difficult by the dual struggle for an end to discrimination and a beginning of recognition, for equality with the majority and distinction from the majority.

The strategy for coping with domination which is contrastive and self-affirmative (as opposed to one of assimilation) occurs precisely through collective resistance to the inferiorized position. Adams describes this process of "resubjectivization of the reified subject", as the community arises out of the collection of atomized individuals, in three stages (1978, pp.80-82). These stages are: (1) the recognition of identity, (2) the recognition of divergence between one's own group's and the other group's interests and (3) the totalistic polarization governed by the idea(s) of alternatives. These elements of the process of recognition through re-identification and differentiation can play a positive role in the re-conception of justice when the reinterpretation of identity is seen as different but positive by both groups (Cairns, 1983, p.294). This process can however make the pursuit of justice more difficult unless it is complemented by actions which emphasize the commonalities of identity either in personal terms as individuals, or in terms of the wider community of human beings.

The process which is the counterpart of categorization, is particularization. Whereas categorization is influential in explaining prejudice leading to injustice, particularization gives rise to processes of individualization, through which group members are treated as individuals rather than as members of the group. Thus, particularization helps us to understand the opposing results of interaction, tolerance (Billig, 1985, p.86). Billig argues that these twin processes are integrally linked on both the cognitive and linguistic levels. For:

If the world can be categorized in different ways, then the choice of one particular categorization can be seen as being part of an argument against another way of viewing things, and is to be defended by argument against argument...Thus a statement assuming a categorization can be opposed by a statement asserting a particularization (ibid., p.97).

The tension between the minority group's needs to be identified as separate and equal at one and the same time will lead to contradictions through which the dominant group can escape re-evaluating the situation. This response is particularly likely to occur in situations which allow the dominant group to manipulate the superficial contradictory tendencies. However, in novel situations with novel arguments, the minority group can elicit novel, previously unformulated responses from the majority (Billig, p.99; Moscovici, 1976). Even if the specific arguments are rejected, the dominant group will be, in some manner, influenced by the interaction, forcing it to relinquish part of its objectified view of the minority.

Particularization may therefore be the first step toward perceiving and then changing the situation of injustice.

INTERDEPENDENCE

The difference between interdependent relations and dependent relations is that in the former there is a strong element of independence for each party. The illusion of dependence of a minority group upon the dominant group in a given society is a product of the myths which legitimate the system of domination. The perception of an interdependent fate is the sine qua non condition for group processes to be set in motion (Tajfel, 1982, p.502). This understanding of group relations is elaborated by Deschamps (1982, p.87):

Groups exist within a system of mutual dependence; they acquire a reality which is defined in and through their interdependence. They are not pre-existing closed spheres each of which would be able to engender its own specific system of meanings. It cannot therefore be said that each group has its own interpretation and values; groups exist as something which is concrete and 'objective' only in the context of some values which are common to the society as a whole.

The groups define themselves in relation to the same norm. The problem in a system of domination is that the norm is almost exclusively linked to the identity of the majority, thus making it appear to be a situation of dependence. Change in this system takes place on two planes: on one plane the minority must be able to redefine its own identity relative to the majority,

emphasizing its independence; and on the second plane this redefinition of identity must be negotiated within the context of the interdependence of the groups within society. When the coexistence of these two facets of change within a system of domination is not achieved, separation, as the extreme of independence, is likely to occur.

Domination arises in the ongoing "dialectic of intergroup relations" which is the "blocking off process by which the sum of possibles are made impossible" (Adams, 1978, p.7). Self-determination is one process by which the impossibilities are transformed into possibilities, the choice of which can take place within the context of interdependence of the groups or by separation of the groups. In the second scenario, a new type of interdependence based on history and geography of the groups replaces the old relationship. One of the critical factors in deciding what type of change will occur is the nature and saliency of the interdependence between the groups and the degree to which it sets the context for the redefinition of intergroup relations.

One way to describe the influence of the perception of interdependence of fate is the concept of collective cognitive image or représentations sociales (Apfelbaum, 1979; Moscovici, 1976; Doise, 1980; Herzlich, 1972). This image of the power relation that binds the two groups, which is shared by the

members, may be all that is necessary to change inter- and intra-group behaviour (Apfelbaum, 1979, p.195). This image which is historically determined by the structure of the relationship defines the position of the groups vis-à-vis each other. The concept defines both the process and substance of the image of the relationship; an image which shapes the selection and assessment of information and the inferences which an individual or collective subject makes during the course of interaction (Herzlich, 1972, p.303).

The représentations sociales in the context of dominant-minority relations can take the form of grouping, the operation of marking into "us-them" categories and that of degrouper in which all of the group's autonomy, even its ability to use independent norms, is withheld (Apfelbaum, 1979). The collective cognitive image can thus deny any sort of contractual power to one group and may even deny this group's right to exist as an autonomous and legitimate co-actor in the relationship (Apfelbaum, p.196). The image reinforces the structure of domination by creating a mythical standard of a homogeneous social body, a type of 'universal rule'. The image works to the extent that the 'universal rule' is internalized and there is a related loss in the shared general belief of independent existence.

discourse creates a situation of conflict for the minority group. Whereas the dominant group cannot be in contradiction with this point of reference, the minority is inferiorized by the conflict between the imaginary social identity and the de facto identity of the group (Deschamps, 1982, pp.89-90). This dependence and inferiorization leads to a reification of consciousness which results in atomization and individual strategies of coping with domination (Adams, 1978, p.80). The solution to this contradiction is regrouping, the re-establishment of positive identity through the writing of the history of the minority group on its own terms (Apfelbaum, 1979, pp.202-204). From this position, interaction can be directed toward the redefinition of the collective cognitive image of independence and interdependence.

Domination can be seen as blocking off the cognition of interdependence. A re-establishment of this cognition occurs through a perception of the complementarity of interests necessitating cooperation, rather than the opposition of interests which leads to coercion (Deutsch, 1985, p.62). The nature of this interdependence will vary according to the dimensions and degrees in which a society is organized on the basis of reciprocity. It could be argued that one factor which will aid in the achievement of self-determination as a conflict resolution process is the ability of the groups to create, clarify or broaden the existence of the cognition of

interdependence.

Interdependence occurs when entities are linked in some manner. This linkage can be positive, a situation of "promotive interdependence", or negative, "contrient interdependence" (Deutsch, 1985,). These types of interdependent relations can further be distinguished along five variables: cooperative versus competitive, the power distribution (equal versus unequal), task-oriented versus social-emotional, formal versus informal and according to intensity and importance (Deutsch, p.66).

One direct manifestation of the degree to which the interdependence of the groups within a society is part of the collective cognitive image, is the basis of the evaluation of outcomes of conflict between those groups. Various means for this evaluation are outlined in the literature, all of these illustrate the need to relate outcomes to several levels of success or failure. Thus Kriesberg (1982) discusses outcomes relating to (1) each party, (2) relations of a conflict party to other parties, (3) relations between struggling parties and, (4) the system(s) of which the adversaries are a part while Williams (1977, p.320) links outcome evaluation to (1) the attainment of goals, (2) the acceptance of end-states, and (3) the acceptance of norms for a continuing future relationship.

Royce (1982) attempts to break down each of these levels of evaluation into its components in order to illustrate the

dynamics of this process. She suggests that the evaluation of self-interest occurs through a process of relating rewards relative to needs (absolute rewards); relative to others; relative to expected outcomes; relative to "deserved" outcomes (expectations based on experience), and desired outcomes (hope).

The argument here is that the levels and means for evaluation are in flux in a self-determination conflict characterized by the attempt at redefining the collective cognitive image which guides intergroup relations. Thus conflict resolution will occur to the extent that positive interdependence is salient in the process. Violence can play a role in illustrating interdependence, but the message is negative since violence involves at minimum the ability to exact costs and at maximum can involve the negation of the relationship. While violence may be reflective of the oppressive nature of the dominant system, it does not furnish the basis of a better relationship, be it a relationship changed by through internal adjustment or through separation.

The building of promotive interdependence can occur, and arguably must occur, for both the waging and reconciliation of conflict (Pelman, 1974, p.241). Once the "regrouping" and unilateral emancipation has psychologically freed the minority from domination, the group will be in a position to redefine the reality of the relationship with the majority. This redefinition

will include an understanding of common interests and therefore the need to cooperate. The promotion of this "interrelated structure of reality" can occur through mutual recognition of superordinate goals. Sherif (1966), in one of the early studies of interdependence, describes the concept of superordinate goals as "those that have a compelling appeal for members of each group, but which neither group can achieve without the participation of the other". Superordinate goals work to create a situation that both reduces psychological resistance to the change and by conveying information that can lend itself to a favourable interpretation of the opposing group (Pelman, p.234). Of critical importance is the element of voluntariness; while violent or other unilateral actions can exemplify aspects of interdependence, the lack of volition on the part of the recipient in the interaction can more often result in resisting a reinterpretation of the collective cognitive image of the relationship.

COOPERATION

Interdependence is the basis of both the concept of cooperation and non-cooperation. Cooperation is directly linked to reciprocity. Thus, reciprocity is used to define cooperation (Axelrod, 1984), or, alternatively, cooperation is seen to be the result of the reciprocity norm (Nemeth, Swetlund and Kanki, 1974). One explanation of cooperation is that it evolves from a

reciprocal process in which perceived reactivity is salient (Apfelbaum, 1976, p.121). Cooperation is based on shared, equal social control which ensures that the other is amenable to influence (Apfelbaum, p.151). A similar definition is used by Deutsch who states that cooperation entails legitimizing the other's interests (1985, p.66). Reciprocity is in turn linked to interdependence, "the gains (or failures) of one party are also the gains of the other" (Worschel, 1979, p.264).

In utilizing reciprocity as a starting point for a conceptualization of cooperation, one can avoid definitions of cooperation which accept one-sided cooperative behaviour based on a power disparity. Thus, while it has been argued that "hegemony is related in complex ways to cooperation and to institutions such as institutional regimes" and "cooperation may be fostered by hegemony and hegemons require cooperation to make and enforce rules" (Keohane, 1984, p.46), the definition of cooperation used in this thesis would not include such cooperation based on coercion. As used here, cooperative behaviour necessitates the recognition and legitimation of each party's self-defined interests and not simply the dominant party's elaboration of these interests, or interests structured by the hegemonic situation of unequal relations.

The same factors which inhibit the recognition of interdependence (and for that matter the application of justice)

inhibit the development of the reciprocity norm. Because of these inhibitions which are seen as resulting from the power structure, the minority group must find a way to share in the creation of norms or rules of the game in order for change to occur (Apfelbaum, 1979, p.156). Interestingly, it is argued that cooperation can be used to create cooperative relations.

Under various experimental conditions, including ones specifically geared to inter-ethnic group relations, cooperation was found to have a potential for bringing about generalized intergroup attitude change (Cook, 1984, p.183). In comparing the results of group interactions in cooperative versus competitive settings, the former were held to result in more constructive interaction patterns, greater support and acceptance, more accurate perspective-taking, more differentiated views of the others, higher self-esteem and greater success in achieving goals (Johnson, Johnson and Maruyama, 1982, p.202). Cooperation helps to reduce the salience of intergroup distinctions (Worschel, 1979, p.265) in part, apparently, by counteracting the tendencies toward depersonalization (Horowitz and Rabbie, 1982, p.270).

Factors which facilitate the emergence of cooperation have also been studied. These elements are similar to those which promote the recognition of interdependence: communication, the dissemination of positive information, and the posing of superordinate goals (Worschel, 1979). Axelrod argues that the

foundation of cooperation is not really trust, but the durability of the relationship (1979, p.183). Cooperation occurs more easily in interactions which were made to appear durable, frequent and concentrated, where the identity and the actions of the others were recognizable. This perception can be facilitated by (a) making the future more important relative to the present interaction, (b) changing the payoffs to the players of possible outcomes, and (c) teaching the players values, facts, and skills that promoted cooperation. Studies which tend to highlight trust in the establishment of cooperation (Marwell and Schmitt, 1975) emphasize improving the relationship by reducing inequity and interpersonal risk. In the absence of such improvement, and particularly in situations characterized by danger if collaboration fails, or situations of inequality, the tendency is toward protection through stricter societal rules (Edgerton, 1985).

All of the studies point to the strategic use of non-cooperation in the development of cooperative relations. In Axelrod's work, this is illustrated in the TIT FOR TAT strategy formulated by Anatol Rapoport, in which cooperation is the baseline and non-cooperation is used in reaction to noncooperative actions, with a return to cooperation as soon as the other party does so. The dynamics of this strategy are similar to that of GRIT (Osgood, 1962) in which collaboration initiates gradual and reciprocal movements toward reduction in

tension and increased collaboration. GRIT is a more sophisticated cooperation policy since it can take into account the cognitive impediments to reciprocity by increasing the ability to perceive and interpret cooperative acts (Larson, 1987). Non-cooperation can also be used to emphasize interdependence, and hence, the need to cooperate. In a different vein, a "pacifist" strategy has been shown to promote cooperation (Marwell and Schmitt, pp.170-186). Here, the message is pure cooperation and the unconditional refusal to act unilaterally to harm the other. Success depends on the communication of intent, the previous level of conflict in the relationship, the societal background of the participants and the absolute size of risk (the injury which can be inflicted from a single act of exploitation). While pacifism of this sort, by itself, may not be applicable in self-determination conflicts, it is possible to see its value in conjunction with the other mixed cooperation-non-cooperation strategies, for example in the issue-areas where the dominant group is most threatened. Reducing the absolute size of the risk of exploitation is critical to the development of cooperative relations. The attenuation of costs and promotion of benefits to be achieved through cooperation may be the first step toward conflict resolution.

ALTERNATIVES

Alternatives are essential to change. The discussion of the

conceptual elements necessary for conflict resolution have all exemplified this to some extent: alternative myths to serve as the basis of justice, alternative criteria for the collective cognitive image to enshrine interdependence, alternative collaborative forms of interaction to encourage cooperation. It is the awareness of the possibility of alternatives, particularly when the present situation is in conflict with the superordinate values of justice, fairness and equity of the intergroup relationship, which initiates the search for change (Moore, 1979).

A system of domination is founded on the non-comparability of groups based on the overwhelming impact of the dominant group's norms and interests. The perception of alternatives leads to a recognition of the unjust relationship between the groups destabilizing the relationship. Relations of inequality are stable only in the absence of cognitive alternatives or cracks in the collective cognitive image which create the possibility of alternatives. If the cause of the instability cannot be grounded on other levels and incomparability restored, the relationship loses acceptability. It is this interaction between "perceived instability and illegitimacy of the system of differentials which is likely to become a powerful ingredient of the transition from a minority's acceptance of the status quo and the rejection of it" (Tajfel, 1978b, p.78).

This process is described by Tajfel (1978a). The perceived illegitimacy plays four roles in intergroup relations. These are: (1) an awareness role -- which helps to solidify the group and increases group saliency; (2) an insight role -- which focuses the search for alternative positions; (3) a motivational role -- as an activity-energizing agent; and (4) an ideological role -- which gives voice to the struggle for justice. The perception of instability and illegitimacy of the existing relationship allows for comparability of the status quo of the groups. The minority group will attempt to change the relationship so that it is based on a new shared perspective in which the former 'inferior' characteristics can now acquire a positively-valued distinctiveness. The dominant group wants to retain the status quo of incomparability and attempts to do so by creating new forms of distinctiveness or by enhancing old ones. The final step is the legitimation of the new comparative image created by this interactive group process.

The reception of the minority group's new self-evaluations will depend on the degree to which the majority's identity is threatened. Generally, attempts to introduce change in the existing relationship "is more likely to be acceptable if each expects to gain from the change than if either side expects that the other will gain at their expense" (Deutsch, 1985, p.62). More specifically, in cases of the redefinition of identity a medium level of threat tends to result in the reinforcement of the principal characteristic of distinctiveness for the dominant

group but the acknowledgement of parity on alternative dimensions (Brown and Ross, 1982, p.160). In a low threat situation, the minority group generally is accepted to be better on one attribute while at a high level of stress all minority claims to distinctiveness are rejected (Brown and Ross, p.161).

It is critical to note that the availability of alternatives is as important for allowing processes of redefinition of identity on the part of the dominant group as it is for the minority. Variables which affect the dominant group's ability to change the nature of the interactions with the minority group include: (1) the extent to which the differentiation in question is the only or major means by which a positively-valued social identity might be maintained; (2) the presence or absence of subgroupings within the in-group (dominant group) who continually draw attention to the conflict of values inherent in the status quo; (3) the presence of a third party onto which major responsibility for ensuring justice and legitimacy can be unloaded, and; (4) the extent to which other forms of recognized 'justice' can be invoked to maintain or undermine the status quo (ie., first come first served, rewarding of merit, rewarding of past sacrifice, just reward for risk undertaken) (Caddick, 1982, p.152-154). All of these variables necessitate the formulation of alternatives to the status quo of relations. Of particular importance is the perception on the part of the dominant group that the injustices can indeed be corrected:

Where justice for, and fair treatment of,
an illegitimately disadvantaged group is only

partially possible, the social identity benefits gained by acting in this manner are reduced and members of an illegitimately super-ordinate group are more likely to act so as to justify and maintain their superiority (Caddick, p.152).

Noting the essential character of alternatives both in forming the need for a redefinition of identity and thus intergroup relations and in providing the content for these changes is only the first step. Of equal importance is understanding the methods which a minority can use to win acceptance of its alternative proposals.

One starting point is to discuss alternatives as a unilateral move, as an exit from the intergroup relation. The concept of alternative used in this manner denotes a substitution for a mutually agreed outcome. In research on negotiation this idea is captured in the acronym BATNA, the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (Fisher and Ury, 1981). BATNAs refer to the choices which exist for a party outside of agreement with the other party. A BATNA thus implies the limits to an agreement (Lax and Sebenius, 1985, p.170) by setting the contours of what is minimally acceptable. In this way a party can improve its relative power position by withdrawing, extending its power network by cultivating alternatives, or by changing goals and denying alternatives to the other party (Emerson, 1962). Overly-optimistic perceptions of alternatives can thus restrict the potential for agreement (Lax and Sebenius, p.178).

The utility of this conception of alternatives as a power-balancer in a majority-dominant relationship is questionable. These situations are often characterized by a limited supply of viable alternatives (Ng, 1982, p.203). Social mobility which allows for "exit" from a given system is not always possible, especially when the disaffected group is not essential to the continued functioning of the system (Tajfel, 1975).

A second conception of alternative which is applicable to intergroup relations is not framed within the structure of the power relationship but is based on the source of minority influence. Here, the emphasis is on the potential rather than the limits of agreement. The essential resource of a minority is its ability to get the majority to reject the status quo (Arendt, 1970). It can do so by setting up an apparently insoluble social problem and then refusing to compromise, thereby blocking negotiations (Mugny, 1982, p.20). The minority creates social instability and thus uncertainty by breaking the social contract, the latter being the rules of the game according to which the minority must conform to the majority. Resolution can occur only through the dominant group's adoption, or at least, movement toward the alternatives proposed.

This process does not entail instant acquiescence but social change which takes place in the context of the tensions between the position of the minority and that of the majority. In order

to be successful, the minority position must be defined by the difference vis-à-vis the dominant norms. The group must be able to furnish a coherent alternative to it (Mugny, p.34). The alternative must be seen as different but stable. The consistency of the minority position, both over time and across situations, ensures recognition of its content. The autonomy which engenders this move acts both to affirm its reception by the dominant group and to re-affirm (or recover) the autonomous nature of the minority group.

Mugny suggests that this type of influence process works because the alternative mediates the relationship between the population (society) and the power (state) within a system. The relationship between the minority and the state is essentially antagonistic, but a potential for social influence exists between the minority and the population. The interrelations which are given by the population to the relationship of antagonism between the minority and the state will shape the influence effects which are possible. The minority group's consistent position must be recognizable through the power consensus which exists between the population and the state, hence the emphasis on firmness, commitment, autonomy and stability. This strategy of focusing on an alternative can only work where minority-population relations do not exceed a certain level of conflict where they are broken off because the social cost of the new identity is too high (Mugny, p.43).

The consistent alternative model of intergroup relations works because it teaches the others to respond in an independent manner. The minority's behaviour is not coercive, it does not oblige the population to choose its categories of response (Moscovici, 1976), but rather furnishes an alternative which must be interpreted through the formulation of new categories.

It is true that if the responses of the influence source are experienced in the subjects as coercion, as an obligation to choose its categories of response rather than others, then the subjects would be strongly motivated to regain their freedom by moving away from the proposed categories of answers, that is, by polarizing (Moscovici and Neve, 1971, p.203).

These propositions are reinforced by more general findings that majority influence tends to work by adoption of the exact same position while minority influence tends to encourage innovation and the production of solutions which have not before been offered (Nemeth and Wachtler, 1983).

The minority influence is not direct but often latent and delayed, especially where the power is repressive (Mugny, p.36). Influence occurs without the group being liked; it works because it makes the majority question its own position by putting that position into direct conflict with the minority, then, "shaken in their own position, the consistency and confidence with which the minority holds its position provides an anchor, a stable way of viewing the world" (Nemeth and Wachtler, 1974, pp.538-40). The

image of the minority and the form of the alternative generated in the course of the interaction are decisive. While being consistent, the minority must avoid "blocking behaviour" on the part of the majority. It does so by retaining a flexible and non-dogmatic negotiating style (Mugny, 1975; Moscovici and Neve, 1971; Paicheler, 1976; Nemeth, Swetlund and Komki, 1974).

NEGOTIATION

Negotiation is one process through which two or more parties seek to do better than they could through individual action. As in the definition of conflict outcomes more generally, the emphasis on power as the primary element reduces the utility of the concept of negotiation in unequal or asymmetrical power-relationships. The applicability of the process of negotiation for self-determination conflicts is questioned. The problem may lie in the context of the definition of the term negotiation and more specifically its relationship to the term bargaining.

Negotiation and bargaining are used both interchangeably and to define one another in much of the research on negotiation (i.e., Rubin and Brown, 1975). It will be argued here that a useful distinction can be made between bargaining as an interactive process of power and negotiation as an interactive process of influence. The meanings of the concepts of power and influence will be discussed more fully in the next chapter. At

this point, it is sufficient to note that a power process consists of movement away from a given position necessitated by external circumstance while influence denotes movement away from a given position because of intrinsically acceptable criteria. While both negotiation and bargaining may be described as "voluntary resource exchange" (Tedeschi and Bonoma, 1977), the nature of the 'volition' is different in each process.

In a bargaining system, the interaction is directly related to the power-relation. The deciding factor is how much of the power of the parties is usable, and therefore can be brought to bear on the specific conflict, rather than the power relationship more generally. Thus, there can be "tacit" bargaining, where the power can affect the direction of the interaction without being mediated by direct communication.

With this definition of bargaining, it is easier to understand the assumptions about the impact of power which

guides, either explicitly or implicitly, negotiation research.(2) Rubin and Brown (1975, p.199) state that "the smaller the amount of power in the system, the more effectively are bargainers likely to function." Under conditions of unequal relative power, the more powerful party tends to behave exploitatively and the weaker, submissively (Rubin and Brown, p.199). Bacharach and Lawler (1981, p.183) argue that symmetry (at least functional symmetry) is preferable because "equal power produces more effective bargaining than unequal power" but also because of the assumption that the outcome should reflect the power situation. In this latter sense, symmetrical relationships are more conducive to integrative outcomes because they allow for the equal distribution of rewards. Tedeschi and Bonoma (1979, p.215) radicalize this assumption by examining the fine line between bargaining and coercion in situations of power disparity. Often 'bargaining' takes place after structural changes in power relations have taken place, and not as a means of making them take place (Zartman, 1985, p.132).

2 Symmetry is difficult to assess and realize especially given an extended view of the power differentials which exist between parties. Höglund and Ulrich (1972, p.24) suggest these "dimensions of asymmetry in conflict relationships" where "full symmetry is obtained when, and only when - there are two parties of approximately; (1) the same level of organization; (2) the same order of magnitude, and (3) the same power potential, (4) interacting with the same intensity, (5) in the same spheres of interaction, (6) with the same value system, (7) having mutually exclusive goals with the same degree of offensivity, (8) on the same value system, (9) with the same norms regulating their conflict behaviour." It must also be borne in mind that conflict itself is a "symmetrizing agent", and that the degree of symmetry will therefore be changing throughout the course of conflict.

Negotiation processes are broader forms of interaction which are not limited by the power framework. In negotiation, the parties work toward a mutually acceptable understanding of their relationship of interests and underlying needs. The outcomes are the construction of an interrelated reality to replace the structures which were absent or had broken down, the rules of the game through which conflict resolution can occur. In self-determination conflict, negotiations occur aimed at both maintaining and altering the system simultaneously. Verbal communication though discursive intercourse is essential to negotiation. Movement away from initial positions occurs through the acceptance of a given argument. In this sense, the negotiation process can mediate, rather than simply reflect, power relations.

In many conflict situations both negotiation and bargaining processes are present. A fruitful avenue for research is the examination of the conditions under which one will prevail over the other in shaping the outcomes of the interaction. A second problem of terminology relates to the use of the word negotiation as the equivalent of the formal aspects of negotiations which can have the more narrow and precise meaning of determining the details and drafting an agreement. Similarly, the term bargaining has a dual meaning: 'power-bargaining' which shapes the contours of the potential agreement, and bargaining over the

specific elements which occurs either simultaneously or after the overall framework has been achieved.

A resolution of this terminological dilemma is to clarify the conceptual basis of the terms. Firstly, the distinctions between negotiation and bargaining writ large and the more specific, explicit process of real (or pretended) rearrangement of common and conflicting interests is a question of context. The first usage refers to creating and maintaining the will and the ability to come to terms, whereas the second refers to the facilitation of an agreement. Secondly, the distinction between negotiation and bargaining is one of the nature of the interactive process. Negotiation is by definition a reciprocal linguistic interchange which results in the shared view of the conflict relationship which is accepted on the basis of internal criteria (and hence is legitimated in its process). Bargaining is a joint (but not necessarily collaborative) exchange based on each party's ability to control the outcome based on its relative power position on the issues in conflict. The outcome is accepted as a result of external criteria of not being able to accomplish more unilaterally, and is therefore subject to revision when the external criteria, including the power relationship, change.

NONVIOLENCE

The potential for nonviolence as a mechanism of conflict resolution will depend on one's understanding of the dynamics of nonviolence in conflict. As in the distinction between negotiation and bargaining, the impact of nonviolence will depend on the framing context of power or influence processes. Nonviolence is restrained action calculated to change another's behaviour for a social or political purpose without the use of, or threat of, physical restraint, injury, or destruction of one's opponent or its property (Stiehm, 1972, p.22).

Nonviolence and violence are not a simple dualism, the dichotomy between action and non-action. Nonviolent action differs from milder peaceful responses to conflict such as conciliation, compromise and negotiation (Sharp, 1973, p.65). In a study of the politics of nonviolence, Sharp argues that nonviolence exploits the ever-present potential for extreme variability in the power of the contending groups (Sharp, p.460). This exploitation takes place through the withdrawal of the consent of the disadvantaged to the system of which it has been a part. Although Sharp couches his arguments in terms of power, his explanation of how nonviolence works suggests the impact of influence which changes the power relationship.

This suggestion can be demonstrated in a discussion of the

dynamics of nonviolent change. Nonviolence demands "reflective cognitive control" on the part of the minority group who must be able to hate the policies of the opponents but not the opponents themselves, respecting the human rights of the oppressors but not their actions (Pelman, 1974, Deming, 1971; Sharp, 1973). In setting up constructive opposition, the group attempts to prevent the choice of violence and spark the search for alternatives. The resultant restructuring of the situation occurs because the opponent is allowed or encouraged to grow rather than be coerced into changing (Bondurant, 1971). One can thus distinguish the pursuit of non-violence in this conceptualization, referred to as "principled non-violence" (Wolto, 1982, pp.416-33) or "non-violence as process" (Oppenheimer, 1968, pp.402-02) from tactical nonviolence. Tactical nonviolence is the the use of nonviolence as one form of coercive action within a repertoire of other types of action which could include violence. The choice of action would depend on the group's assessment of the strategic utility of the nonviolent method.

Sharp is able to distinguish three ways in which nonviolent action can result in change (1973, pp.700-770). Two of these methods of persuasion can be seen as processes of power while the third is a process of influence. In "nonviolent coercion", the dominant group has not changed its mind and prefers to continue the struggle but cannot because the power and means of control have been taken away without the use of violence. Basically,

repression has failed and the system can no longer operate. In "accommodation", the dominant group does not agree to the changes but concludes that the demands (or some of them) must be granted. This signifies an adjustment to the shift in power.

"Conversion" occurs when the dominant group wants to make the changes desired by the nonviolent activists. Sharp treats the factors which influence conversion separately from those factors affecting the other modes of change. These factors include those which are internal to the minority group and those which are external but which form the relationship. The external factors which he cites are: the degree of conflict interests (i.e., the community of interests); the social distance between the groups; the personality structure of the dominant group; the belief and norms of the majority; and the role of third parties. The internal factors are the minority group's ability : to refrain from violence and hostility; to gain the opponent's trust; to refrain from humiliating the opponent; to carry out constructive work; to make visible sacrifices; to make personal contacts with the opponent; to demonstrate trust of opponent and to develop empathy, good will and trust toward the opponent. All opponents must be seen as potential allies.

The potential for nonviolence as a method of conflict resolution must also be seen as relative to the goal of the conflict.

Those who advocate group nonviolent resistance would be likely to describe the world as a non-zero-sum game, the parties involved profit or are punished equally. Still, there is a balance point where each will maximize his profit. To reach this point, the different parties may have to exchange trust. Some would say group nonviolence consists of a series of endeavours to reach this balance point. It would seem that everyone would be prepared to go this far with nonviolent resisters -- pay-off coincides with power. Resistance becomes serious and is resisted, when it goes beyond trying to get the most for everyone out of the existing system, that is when it tries to change the stakes in, or the rules of the game (Stiehm, 1972, p.113).

This passage adequately sets out the outline of the struggles by nonviolence within a system versus struggles which aim at altering the system itself.

It is difficult to accept the logic that nonviolence will work only where it does not challenge the status quo of power. This is especially true if one accepts Sharp's strong argument that nonviolence is in essence a renegotiation of the power situation. Nonviolence works because the actions used illustrate the withdrawal of legitimacy from the system. It works by producing assent on the part of the dominant group to a renegotiation of the bases of legitimacy. In doing so, it remains a non-zero-sum situation.

PROBLEM-SOLVING AND THIRD PARTIES

Problem-solving approaches are critical to conflict resolution. Problem-solving is a process by which the analysis of the situation is rendered explicit, made specific, laid out in an orderly fashion and followed in a conscientious fashion (Goldstein, 1981). In conflict resolution, problem-solving is carried out by the actors directly involved and provides the specific information the relevance of which is determined by the actors (Burton, 1979, p.37).

Problem-solving works to define the problem: once the 'real' (as in intersubjectively valid) problem is defined, the conflict is already partially resolved. Problem-solving approaches encapsulate the conceptual bases of conflict resolution, emphasizing fairness, the interdependence of parties and the need to cooperate, and the importance of alternatives. They capture the normative principles of conflict resolution: participation and autonomy.

Most models of problem-solving approaches are linked to the necessity of third party involvement (Burton, 1979, Fisher, 1985; Mitchell, 1981b). The role of the third party in these scenarios is seen as facilitative and consultative since it aids the parties to shape the process rather than to act as mediator or intervenor in the conflict. The specific functions are suggested as: inducing mutual positive motivation for problem-solving, improving the openness and accuracy of communication, diagnosing

the issues and process of the conflict, and regulating the interaction among the participants (Fisher, 1985, p.10).

Other studies of intergroup conflict similarly emphasize the utility of a third party. The success of nonviolence is to some degree dependent upon third parties (Oberschall, 1980, p.320; Sharp, 1973), and third party action can effectively take the form of non-cooperation (Pelman, 1974, p.246). The difficulty in self-determination conflicts is in the identification of potential third parties. As illustrated in the discussion of the concept of alternatives this can be segments of the majority population. In this manner, the existence and promotion of this independent public opinion whose support can be mobilized to put pressure on the agents of social control of the state, is a critical goal. These agents do not however have the characteristics of a third-party in a problem-solving model, that is, impartiality, moderate and equal knowledge of the contending parties, low power over them and high control over the consultative situation (Fisher 1985, p.9). These demands for a disassociated third party necessitate going out of the conflict system.

The difficulties in locating a third party with the appropriate characteristics suggests the need for a wider view of the concept of third party, with a finer appreciation of the ways in which third party intervention affects the conflict

relationship (Fisher and Keashly, 1987). One interpretation of a third party is its ability to mediate between the parties directly involved in the conflict. This conception of an intermediary can potentially be separated from the notion of agency. In this way, an idea or principle, technique or process can mediate the conflict interaction. As long as the intermediary, whether animate or inanimate, is acceptable to both parties and does not impinge on the participation of the parties in the process of resolution, there is the possibility for it to play a role in the development of discourse and consensus between the conflicting parties.

THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The focus on discourse and the transformation of conflict broadens our understanding of the alternatives to violence in self-determination conflict. Delegitimation of the status quo can occur through a series of communicative interactions guided by the principles of discourse. Conflict resolution is possible when discourse and change are an intrinsic part of the creative process as well as the final outcome.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE "LATENT NEXUS" OF THEORY AND REALITY: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

Various conceptual interrelationships have been introduced in an attempt at understanding how self-determination conflict can be resolved without violence. The thesis has taken an explicitly normative approach in the sense that it attempts to demonstrate how such an understanding can "broaden the reality" of self-determination as a conflict resolution process. Any explanatory power which these concepts might have must therefore be focused on enhancing this possibility -- "the latent nexus of theory and reality" (Habermas, 1973). Toward this end, this and the following chapters make an initial evaluation of the more abstract explorations of the previous chapters.

THE FRAMEWORK OF CHANGE: POWER, INFLUENCE, LEGITIMACY AND STABILITY

The resolution of conflict without violence is dependent upon the ability to change. Change is essential because the process of resolving conflicts entails the movement, on behalf of all parties, away from positions which reflect a fragmented view of reality to an intersubjectively valid view achieved through consensus. The elements used to construct the concepts relevant

to conflict and conflict resolution in this thesis can thus be synthesized in an explication of the nature of political change.

Is change to be understood as a process of power or a process of influence? This distinction may at first be hard to grasp. The implicit assumption of much of political (and social) studies, even those directly concerned with the concept of power, confuse the two so that power is seen as the sole source of influence and that influence is the exercise of power (for example Bell, 1970; Tedeschi and Bonoma, 1977; Kruglanski, 1970). In intergroup relations this means that the degree of conformity corresponds to the status of the group and that dependence on the authority of the dominant group is the principle source of influence (Moscovici, 1976, p.58). Moscovici suggests that part of the problem is an absence of a verb form for the concepts of influence and power, leading to the use of the two interchangeably. In order to understand the underlying mechanisms, however, one must treat each concept as autonomous, without denying the analogous consequences which are possible, or accepting that the two are associated in some way.

In his work, Moscovici argues that power, whether it is coercive or normative, works in the process of social control while influence works in the process of social change. Influence procedures work not through dependence but through the search for consensus, with the critical variable being behaviour styles

rather than dependence (Moscovici, 1976, p.222). Power has a more extrinsic impact on its target. Whether power acts through restraint or coercion or on the normative basis of expertise and legitimacy of role, the target's behaviour is controlled but the movement is not necessarily adapted internally.

Influence results in the modification or restructuring of perceptions, judgments, opinion and behaviours: it is a process of innovation, not conformity or control. Influence, therefore results in a new psychosocial identity (Mugny, 1981, p.49). Other researchers with different backgrounds concur in this definition: influence is seen as needing to include change and is described as transactional in nature (Gamson, 1975, p.60). In contrast, power is the capacity to control the behaviour of others, directly or indirectly impinging on another individual or group. It can therefore be unidirectional and ca.. force a specific outcome rather than causing a shift in the possibility of an outcome as through influence processes.

Power, and thus control, is reinforced through processes of legitimation which contribute to social control and reduces the cost of coercion. Legitimation, in this sense, is a complex social product, a collective judgment that attributes the qualities of "goodness" and "righteousness" to behaviour (Ball-Rokeach, 1972). It denotes an acceptance of the status quo and has behavioural manifestations of compliance and an attitudinal

character of generalized sense of identity with and feelings of obligation to the regime (Gurr, 1970, p.185).

Legitimacy as a key basis of power is directly linked to stability. Stability is the system's ability to survive without losing its essential form (Lijphart, 1977). It is measured in terms of constitutional durability, legitimacy, governmental efficiency, and civil order (Aunger, 1977) or in terms of persistence, continuity and non-occurrence of political violence (Saunders, 1980). Instability is marked with uncertainty and uncertainty is a sign of the questioning of legitimacy.

The interconnection of power, legitimacy and stability in the political science framework create an overemphasis on the permanence of the order of the status quo. Stable change is limited to such changes as the system is designed to accept.

The extent to which a political system may be characterized as 'unstable' at any given point in time varies in direct proportion to the extent to which occurrence or non-occurrence of changes in and challenges to the government, regime or community deviates from the previous system-specific 'normal' pattern of regime, government, community changes or challenges; a pattern which will itself vary over time (Sanders, 1980, p.66).

Discontinuity becomes a synonym for instability. Stability as an end-goal of politics, as fabricated by legitimated power without reference to other objectives, is an empty rationale for a system. For:

Even if the cybernetic dream of a virtually instinctive self-stabilization could be realized, the value system would have to be contracted in the meantime to a set of rules for the maximization of power and comfort; it would be the equivalent to the biological base values of survival, at any cost, that is ultrastability (Habermas, 1970, p.60).

Stability is only one moment out of a continual process of social change, the creation and reduction of divergences (Mugny, 1981, p.46). Stability, and one could say power, can perhaps best be viewed as linked to other system values such as optimization. This idea is analogous to the distinction made between a 'homeostatic' system in which there is a tendency toward stabilization of a terminal state and a 'homeorhetic' system where change occurs not to keep the system constant but to keep it developing in a normal way (Waddington, 1978).

Stability is used to reinforce patterns of domination, making the stratified system appear natural or right to its participants, advantaged and disadvantaged alike (Shibutami and Kwan, 1968, p.134; Tajfel, 1981). Legitimation judgments are reinforced through formal social control and are thus representative of the majority position (Ball-Rokeach, p.78). And yet, situations of inequality are by their nature unstable "since they are grounded on unilateral threats rather than mutually established norms" (Apfelbaum, 1974, p.151) and because the inferiorized group will try to restore equality (Apfelbaum, 1974, and Ullman-Margalit, 1972, pp.170-71).

Change is brought about through a reconsideration of the legitimacy of the relations between groups. Delegitimation occurs by an internal (rather than a societal standard) of what is rational, a process of making explicit and self-conscious attacks of the ultimate grounds on which a system of legitimacy is predicated (Bensman, 1979, p.37). This usage of the concept of legitimacy widens the scope of the concept from the specific ruler-ruled relationship (Friedman, 1981) and addresses itself to all social forms and all facets of the social relationship between groups (Sampson, 1985, p.152). Legitimacy involves the acceptability of social actors of the ways things are in their society (Sampson, 1985, p.154; Burton, 1979; Mitchell, 1984). By definition then, it requires that the various claims of different segments of the society can in principle be justified in a process of rational consensus (Habermas, 1975, p.91). Whereas consensus is objectified and thus linked to stability (Partridge, 1970, p.73), consensus here is seen as a process of social influence (Heustove and Jaspars, 1982, p.120).

This process of achieving rational consensus is the ongoing legitimation of the system. It is, thus, one critical location of change in the social relationship. The process takes place through the tension between three interacting assessments: the legitimacy of intergroup relations as it is perceived by the disaffected group(s); the legitimacy of the relationship as perceived by other groups involved; and the objective definition

of legitimacy as ascertained through the rules of the game, regulations and structure (Tajfel, 1981; 1982). Tensions between these views of legitimacy create the perception of instability.

A variety of interaction can be initiated to deal with this instability. This instability can be controlled through power, freezing an unstable status quo. It can be destabilized further through a battle for power which can lead to reinforcement of the illegitimate system or the creation of a new system which will be viewed as illegitimate by some (and therefore unstable). Or, it can be changed through a process of influence which widens the adaptive capacity of the system, creating the possibility of discourse and consensus formation. This third possible course follows from the radical implications of conflict resolution.

ANALYZING CHANGE: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ENHANCEMENT OF DISCOURSE

The latent nexus of theory and reality is the avenue chosen here to answer the tantalizing quote reproduced in the introduction. The quote raises the question:

Under what conditions will a group which holds an illegitimately ascendant position within a web of group relations accept or actively work towards an improvement in the standing or circumstances of a group (or groups) less well placed? (Caddick, 1982, p.150).

The fulfillment of these conditions would constitute conflict resolution by creating a new basis for cooperative relations within which conflict could be dealt with in an acceptable

manner. The framework of analysis which will guide the pursuit of the enhancement of discourse and the transformation of conflict is divided into three parts. The first part of the framework sets out the ideal conditions for conflict resolution, while the second part outlines the elements of the existing situation which must be taken into account. The third part is the link between the two and suggests the intervening factors which have the potential for uniting the abstract and the concrete.

The implicit question in this analysis is the extent to which the structure of self-determination conflict is set and the extent to which it can be manipulated. The assumption which is carried throughout this thesis is that all situations, and particularly situations of conflict, are marked by impermanence. Conflict resolution as an approach and a process is premised on the negotiability of 'reality'. The degree of flux and the ability of the minority group to tap this flexibility will vary from situation to situation. The choice of self-determination conflicts as a focal point was made in part because of the relative permanence which is attributed to these situations, making them appear unresolvable and prone to lead to violence. The emphasis here has been to look for alternatives to this explanation. The framework of analysis seeks to exploit this interrelationship between the 'actual' and the 'potential' in a given conflict, for perceiving the potential is the first step

toward actualizing it. It is therefore on this basis that the analysis will be evaluated.

As noted earlier, the goal of conflict resolution is the creation of shared perceptions by the parties of the reality of their relationship so that subsequent interactions can be made with these shared perceptions in mind. The conditions which facilitate this are those which open up the 'reality' held by all the groups so that the broader, holistic view can replace the fragmented one. The desire is therefore to minimize processes of power between the groups and maximize the processes of influence. More specifically, the guiding principles of the interaction are justice, interdependence, cooperation and alternatives.

The existing situation is difficult to portray without undue objectification. For analytic purposes, the situation will be described from the point of view of both the disaffected and other groups within the system as well as by the 'objective' standpoint of the rules, regulations and structures of the system. The discrepancies between these perspectives will be an important source guiding the search for alternatives and helping to guide clarification of distortions in the attempts at creating discourse.

This context will shape the descriptors which will be used to illustrate the existing situation. The elements of

description are expected to vary (at least in emphasis) from each perspective. They will include variables introduced in chapter one and elaborated in the first appendix; variables relating to the national group, variables relating to the host state, variables relating to the quest for self-determination, and variables relating to the global environment. These factors shape the overall context of discourse. Emphasis will be placed on intergroup relations as they evolve on the interrelated dimensions of structure, institutions, attitude, history and behaviour. This focus is made because these elements of the status quo are those which can most directly guide the search for factors to enhance discourse and the choice of methods for the transformation of the prevailing conditions.

The needed intervening factors follow from a comparison of the theoretical and the practical conditions. The practical circumstances can, at least hypothetically, be changed. The conceptual guide to these factors are those outlined in the framework of change. The starting point must therefore be the delegitimation of the system. The legitimacy of the system will first be questioned by the minority group through regrouping of identity, the recognition of the injustices and the promulgation of alternatives. This process must encompass both the rejection of inequality of the structure of the relationship and the de-objectification of the social myths which serve as foundation to the system.

The second aspect of delegitimation is the demonstration of the need for rejection of the system by the dominant group. This goal can be achieved by influencing the dominant group's view of the status quo by creating the perception of the instability of the system itself and not the perception of the minority group as the unstable element within the system. This goal is achieved by directing discourse toward the ideal conditions for conflict resolution; on the subjects of justice and injustice, dependence and independence, cooperation and competition, and alternatives to the status quo. The minority group must find the appropriate forums for this discourse and initiate the creation of rules and norms which minimize the attempts at power settlement and maximize influence through discourse. These transformations are achieved through the counteracting of the depersonalizing tendencies of intergroup conflict and more specifically through negotiation, nonviolence, problem-solving and third parties. These methods can be facilitated through alliances with members of the dominant group as well as alliances outside the system. The three parts of the analysis are summarized in Table I.

TABLE ITHE FRAMEWORK OF CHANGE IN SELF-DETERMINATION CONFLICT

SOURCE: Compiled by author

The three parts of the framework of analysis should not be viewed as fully separate parts to be ontologized and hypostatized. The arrows symbolize the interactions between thoughts and action: the ideal conditions affect the perception of the present and guide the interaction directed at the future; the existing situation affects the perception of the possible ideal and shapes the interaction directed at change; the intervening factors, whether hypothetical or real, affect the variety in perceptions of the ideal and stop the perception of the existent circumstances as permanent.

This framework of analysis furnishes the opportunity to demonstrate the potential for self-determination conflicts to be resolved without the use of violence. The framework is applied in the next chapter to an illustrative case, the Jurassien separatist movement in Switzerland in the post-Second World War period. Aside from showing that it is indeed possible to resolve self-determination conflict without violence, this attempt, along with comparisons of specific aspects of other self-determination conflicts made in the subsequent chapter, allows a degree of evaluation of some of the conceptual relationships discussed in this thesis. In particular the following chapters attempt to show the ways in which the structure, process and outcome of a conflict situation are affected by conflict resolution. The aim is not to 'test' the framework or concepts in any way. The principle of 'testing' is alien to the approach taken here, which

emphasizes understanding rather than explanation. Rather, the goal is to evaluate the utility of this approach in general and more specifically to review certain aspects of the arguments presented in this paper.

CHAPTER FIVE

SELF-DETERMINATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE

La question jurassienne is a contradiction of the Swiss system. It can be seen as a contradiction both in the sense of being an exception to the system and as a reflection of Switzerland. The quest for self-determination on the part of the French-speaking Jurassiens of the Bern canton is to be considered an exception because it contradicts the general principles which have developed over the centuries to safeguard the diversity within unity of the Swiss state (Bassand, 1975, p.139). It is to be considered as a reflection of the latent contradictions which are present in the Helvetic society today (Windisch and Willener, 1976, p.3). Whichever view is taken of the Jura question, the critical factor will be the ascertainment of the constituent elements of the Swiss socio-political system.

Switzerland is described as a conflict resolution system (Mayer, 1968, p.738). This attribution is based on the principles which have developed historically in order to maximize consensual solutions to the successive waves of conflict which have arisen. The system is not "miraculous rather it is a

working system premised on certain fundamental notions of coexistence" (Steiner and Dorff, 1980, p.2).

A historical study of this ability to "wage peace" outlines the foundations of the system of conflict resolution through a discussion of the methods which have been used to reach consensus (Lloyd, 1958). From the fifteenth century onwards, the two general lines of procedure utilized were resolution "in Minne" and resolution "in Recht". The first procedure which literally means "in love", connotes a process of friendly compromise embracing conciliation and mediation. The second set of procedures were those proscribed "in law" through arbitration as laid out in the pacts between the cantons. Lloyd suggests that mediation was generally more successful, based as it was on voluntarism, the principle of mutual consent and the need to convince a third party of the reasonableness of a given position. The initiative of the mediator often took the form of direct appeals to citizens and negotiations occurred within the context of popular consent. At the root of this system was "enlightened self-interest" where peace was perceived to be one of major concern to all members of the confederation.

Discourse between the Swiss today draws upon this heritage. The working principles of this discourse are given as political will, the multiplicity of interaction ("one is always a minority vis-à-vis someone") and conflict regulation (Gruner, 1968).

Alternatively, emphasis is placed on the common political will to constitute a federal system, an identity for each community and good communication (Schnyder de Wartensee, 1981).

Conflict regulation is further broken down into the components of: the avoidance of hardening positions; the influence of diverse means of accomplishing resolution; the influence of the cantonal system on political federalism and the emphasis on equity and balance in politics (Gruner, p.537).

Other principles of the Swiss system can be recognized (Schnyder de Wartensee, pp.64-68). The political will is described as being composed of general conceptions recognized by the population as a whole and the legal structures and institutions which conform to these conceptions of the complementarity of the different communities and solidarity against outsiders. The identity of these communities is considered to be upheld by the large degree of autonomy in cultural, political, and economic matters. Communication or reciprocal information exchange is guaranteed by the will to understand the other and by the respect of that other's differences and need for development. The maintenance of an equilibrium between will, identity and communication is seen as critical to the functioning of Switzerland.

The Jura question is presented as a contradiction to the normal Swiss discourse, both because the ends -- separation and creation of a new canton -- would prevent cross-cutting cleavages and the enhanced interaction between groups and the means -- extreme demands and unwillingness to compromise, did not conform to this established system (Steiner, 1974, pp.119-121). (1) However, it will be argued here that the quest for self-determination of the part of the Jurassiens was a process of conflict resolution. The extent of the search for consensus reflects a breakdown of the Swiss discourse (Windisch and Willener, 1976, p.5).

Central to the Swiss system is the emphasis on local autonomy and the role of territory in the protection of the former (Wiegandt, 1981; Sanguin, 1983). These two related factors are merged in the structure of the canton. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the canton in historical, political, economic and cultural terms. It is the locus of primary sovereignty in Switzerland. The canton is a state which acts as intermediary between its people and the larger federal state (Reynold, 1968, p.347). Switzerland is however, a federalism of political units. Despite guarantees for the principle of equality of the four national language, cantonal boundaries are historically not linguistically determined.

1 Although, separation and creation of new cantons is an established method of conflict resolution in Switzerland with precedents in the 15th century (Unterwalden into Obwalden and Nidwalden, and the division of Appenzell (1597) and Basel(1833) (Lijphart, 1977, pp.96-97).

The Jura is a unique case as it is a territory which was annexed to the canton of Old Bern by international agreement at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Prior to the annexation, the Jura had been an independent territory and was part of revolutionary France for two decades. Therefore, although there are other plurilingual cantons in Switzerland, none exemplify the complex factors which serve to separate the Jura from the remainder of the Bern canton on historic, economic, and the Northern portion, religious dimensions (McRae, 1983, pp.200-213).

In the nineteenth century, these factors led to numerous self-determination attempts, which are outlined by Bassand(1975, pp.142-43). The explicit causes of these attempts include authoritarian control by Bern, anticlericalism of the Bern government, discrimination against Jura Catholics, the tendency to Germanize the Jura and the need for reinforcement of the Jurassien cultural identity. The aims of the movement, under a variety of leaderships, were alternatively the defense of the traditions of the Jura, the creation of a canton or an autonomous region and, in 1834-36, re-attachment to France. The North Jura was consistently the most adamantly separatist of the region.

One of the methods which was used to enhance the position of the Jura during the nineteenth century was the petition (Ruffieux and Prongué, 1972). From 1831 to 1846, the petition was used not

to enlarge political rights but to maintain the guarantees of the 1815 agreement, especially the protection of the cultural attributes of the region. From 1850 onward, the thrust of activity was toward direct democracy as a means of reinforcing the particularism of the local government. The petition was also used to widen these safeguards by linking them to larger issues such as railroads.

The latest stage of the quest for self-determination on the part of the Jurassiens was sparked in 1948 by l'affaire Moeckli. The specific episode was the refusal of the Bern government to accept the nomination of Moeckli, a Jurassien, for an important post because his mother tongue was French. The furor created by this outrage acknowledged the conflict between the Jura and Bern, providing a focus for the Jurassien activists. The direct result of the incident was the formation of the Comité de Moutier and its formulation of a report on la question jurassienne which was presented to the Bern government.

The report concisely described the situation in the canton from the perspective of the Jura. It is described as being inspired by a constructive spirit and recommended for its attempt to search for a solution within the cantonal context rather than the "purely negative" separatist solution (Graedel, 1950, p.50).

The demands, which are outlined in the report on the basis of this perception of the existing situation, are comprehensive and reflect a variety of interests linked to the protection of identity. These include: the relocation of the archives of the historical independent Jura (Eveché de Bale); decentralization of the administration of the canton; equality of the languages in administration; extension of French educational facilities and retrenchment of German ones; specific seats allocated to the Jura in the conseil des états; specific economic institutions and financial structures and public works projects to encourage the economic development of the Jura as well as a Jurassien court of appeal (Comité de Moutier, 1948, pp.41-48). The final and primary demand was for juridicial recognition of the Jura as a distinct entity and the double sovereignty of the canton; one for the people of Bern and one for the people of the Jura, to be exercised jointly. This recognition was seen as essential because the Bernois tendency since 1815 had ben quite naturally a unifying one while the Jurassien tendency was autonomist (Comité de Moutier, p.47). Only on the basis of this, mutually accepted distinction would these tendencies be arrested from evolving toward antagonism. Constitutional recognition of this situation was seen as fundamental, the choice of the specific legal avenue for its establishment was seen as negotiable.

The reception of this report in Bern was favourable and the government moved to answer some of the Jurassiens' demands. This

response was formalized in the 1950 amendment to the cantonal constitution so as to recognize the existence of a distinct 'peuple jurassien' and grant equal status to French and German as cantonal languages. This recognition was reinforced by various administrative reforms. However, the institutional safeguards called for in the declaration of shared sovereignty and a second chamber were not carried out.

The government representatives argued that state sovereignty resided in the totality of the people of both the Old canton and the Jura and that the existence of a second chamber would give the Jurassiens the power of veto (Graedel, 1950, p.53). The constitutional changes in effect gave the Jura the status of a minority which was seen by the government as a move to strengthen the region's influence.

The compromise proffered by the Bern government was not accepted by the vocal elements of the Jurassien movement, although the majority of the Jurassien population acquiesced in the changes. The constitutional revisions did not sufficiently, define and give limits to the right of autonomy. In the words of Béguelin, one of the movement's leaders, "conviction is not enough, there has to be the means" (Béguelin, 1953, p.9). In rejecting the compromise the leadership of the Rassemblement jurassien (RJ) opted for self-determination through the creation of an independent canton. The movement was able to convince the

government of the need for a referendum on the question of the establishment of a new canton, a referendum that was held in 1959. The referendum was defeated throughout the canton, even by a slim majority in the Jura itself. In opposition to this overall cantonal current, the question was strongly endorsed in one area, namely in the three districts of the Northern Jura.

The development of the Jurassien quest for self-determination in the 1950s illustrates the breakdown of discourse in this aspect of the Swiss system. La question jurassienne was treated by Bern as a problem which it needed to 'solve' for the Jurassiens. For the people of the Jura, it was a question of participation in the reformation of the system so that they could have a voice, as Jurassiens, in future change. The state had the structural advantage of a system of majority rule. The effective use of the majority rule cut off discourse, marginalizing the Jura through minority status. The Bern government, alone, held in its hands the ability to reform the institutions of intergroup relations (Graedel, 1950, p.57).

A study of political decision modes which shape interparty decision-making suggests that majority rule can heighten hostility among the losing minority and the dominant group, and that other forms of decision -- including amicable agreement, decision by interpretation and non-decision -- contribute to peacefulness (Steiner and Dorff, 1980). In Switzerland, the

principle of majority rule is somewhat attenuated. In Bern, however, at the level of the popular vote, the Jura could consistently and systematically be "minorized", by equality (Windisch and Willener, 1976, p.71). This effect which is labelled both "majorization" and "democratic totalitarianism", is demonstrated by Béguelin. He lists the referenda upon which the Jurassiens have been "majorized" by the German-Bernois from 1869 to 1972 (1973, pp.231-36; see also McRae, 1983, p.206). The number of votes upon which the Jurassiens "pronounced themselves in opposition to the canton of Bern" is 113 (Béguelin, p.231). The issues in contention range from economic matters to federal issues of defense and penal law, from social, cultural and ecclesiastical issues, to votes on reform of the cantonal constitution.

Faced with the structural, institutional, attitudinal, behavioural and historical impacts of a system of domination, the Jurassien leadership perceived self-determination through the creation of an alternative system to be the solution. The need to protect identity was intimately linked to territory: a new canton of the Jura. This form of demand for self-determination was a contradiction: rejuvenation through the creation of a new canton and diminishment through the weakening of an old canton. The contradiction is reflective of the system. As was pointed out in answer to the question, Un canton du Jura -- Pourquoi? :

Les cantons sont les dépositaires de la vie
intellectuelle et de la culture des

différents peuple comprise de la Confédération suisse. Ils assurent à ces peuples le maintien de leurs droits ethniques et leurs caractere propres. Le peuple jurassien est un peuple différent du peuple bernois, il veut donc etre admis à jouir des avantages que procure la vie des cantons (Fell, 1976, p.32).

THE FRAMEWORK OF CHANGE: THE 1960s

Within the context of the situation, it was possible for the dominant group, the Bernois, to ignore the Jurassiens. the lethargy of public opinion in the canton aggravated the situation, allowing the conflict to ripen (Luthy, 1972, p.7). The Bern government handled the situation with little imagination, adamantly refusing to discuss autonomy (Mayer, 1968, p.738). The opposing positions hardened.

Two reasons are suggested for this reluctance to deal with the Jura question. The first is ignorance of the essential characteristics of the affair (Shaffter, 1959, p.54). The second, and interrelated, reason is the attitude of the majority, that their interests were supreme and unquestionable. The nature of the majority's view of its interests is based on the perception of inseparability of their interests from that of the canton (and perhaps of Switzerland) (Secretan, 1968, p.535). In reference more generally to German-French relations within the state it is suggested that the injustice and "préjustice" which result from dominance, unification and discrimination processes,

start with the tendency for the pretense of action alone. Because of this attitude there is no need for pretended compensation, acts of compromise or need to relate actions to values of tolerance or reciprocity (Zermatten, 1973, p.257).

The "logic of the majority" is based on the inability to take a perspective of relativity, to recognize the arbitrariness of all single points of view (Windisch and Willener, 1976, p.70). The majority has a predisposition toward considering its identity, its truth, its normalcy as the only real and valuable identity, as the truth and the normal (Windisch and Willener, p.71). The result is a devaluation of the 'other'. The Bernois believed themselves to be able to afford their ignorance of the Jurassiens because they were the majority.

The policies which follow from this logic are ones which neutralize the differences between the groups. Neutralization occurs through belittling the dimensions upon which the minority seeks its own identity, the adoption of an 'attitude moyenne' so that the conflict is not recognized and elements of unity are reinforced. In this case the Bernois' interpretation of the status quo was undertaken through manipulation of the unity of the canton. Thus, differences became abstraction, of little relevance (Windisch and Willener, 1976, p.82).

The actions of the majority can be interpreted as negative:

the Bernois were against separation rather than for an improvement in intergroup relations. The Jurassien movement, on the other hand, had a positive plan: 'un projet autonomiste' (Windisch and Willener, p.2).

Analyses of the 1960s in the Jurassien quest for self-determination highlight the negative aspects of the interactions. The RJ is said to have "deliberately chose[n] to escalate the conflict" (McRae, 1983, p.187) by leading a "bitter uncompromising campaign" (Schmid, 1981, p.128). The perspective of these analyses is the systemic one, for they can at the same time recognize the functionality of these disturbances in the ultimate resolution. The RJ acted with "unswerving commitment to independence" (McRae, 1983, p., 207). This strategy evolved on two fronts. Internally, regrouping was achieved through the founding of organizations for youth, students, women and the Jurassiens living elsewhere and the building of networks of communication and association (Bassand, 1975, p.142). Complementary to this internal regrouping was the establishment of the fact of a Jura outside of the group; in the canton, in the country and in the world. One route taken was active participation in the conferences and institutions of the French-speaking minorities of Europe and Canada.

The most noted aspects of the RJ's attempt to influence the structure of discourse on the Jurassien question are the group's

tactics of disruption and demonstration. The interpretation of the dynamics of these tactics and the degree of 'violence' which they represented vary throughout the literature. The impact of these tactics, is however, fairly unified: only the demonstrations and violence on the part of the mobilized minority seemed capable of keeping the question in the public view (McRae, 1983,p.207).

The emphasis here is on movement towards an understanding of how the change in the system to allow for discourse was wrought. The minority was faced with a domination system which appeared to be closed to their influence beyond certain narrowly controlled limits. The aim was to delegitimize the system opening up the potential for influence; "to struggle to create a dialogue between equals without fixed conditions" (Béguelin, 1964). The disruptive tactics were mainly of a symbolic nature, attempting to break into the facade of unity and stability of the system. Illustrative instances include: the flying of the Jurassien flag, burning of symbols of the Bern canton, hanging of signs on the entrance of the Bern city hall, and the occupation of the Swiss embassies in Paris and Brussels.

More damaging acts were perpetrated by the Front de libération jurassien (FLJ), a small organization which was not affiliated with the RJ. These incidents included: the burning of army barracks and farms, the bombing of a bank, the sabotage

of bridges and the breaking of a railway line. These episodes occurred from 1962 to 1964. They ended in 1964 when three members of the FLJ were arrested and convicted in a federal court.

It is difficult to ascertain the relationship between the actions of the FLJ and those of the RJ. The RJ repeatedly disavowed the FLJ's actions (Gasser, 1978). In the strong reactions to the terrorist attacks the RJ was blamed as morally responsible (Mayer, 1968, p.739). Aside from measures of blame, the combination of the forceful acts which challenged the status quo initiated two processes.

The first process which was triggered was 'counterviolence' on the part of those groups within then Jura which were opposed to separation. This opposition created an atmosphere of antagonism from all sides, shattering the veneer of consensus and thus the context for compromise (Gasser, 1978, p.67). Of particular importance for the Jurassien movement was the repressive reaction of the authorities. For example, when police stopped and arrested a FLJ attempt to disrupt railway lines there were angry demonstrations on the part of the Jurassiens who denounced the methods of Bern. The slightest provocation on the part of the Jurassiens were used to denigrate the struggle for self-determination. The Bernois could point to such acts and say "see this is what separatism is" and "these acts are not Swiss"

(Windisch and Willener, 1976, pp.77-081).

This function of revealing the breakdown of the consensus of the 'reality' of the Jura in the canton of Bern led to a second manifestation. The heightening and extension of the perception of conflict led to the emergence of the "third force". The third force consisted of groups desiring to reopen discourse on la question jurassienne. The three groups were the "mouvement pour l'unité du Jura" composed of deputies of the Bern chamber, and members of the federal government leading ultimately to the creation of two mediation commissions which reported on the conflict (Commission confédérée de bon offices, 1969; 1971), as well as other interested individuals endeavoring to play a mediating role.

THE NEW DISCOURSE: STRUCTURE, PROCESS, OUTCOME

The elements which are attributed to being the root of the difficulties on the resolution of the Jura question are: (1) the intransigence of the separatists; (2) the heavy-handedness of cantonal authorities; and, (3) the sharp structural and attitudinal variations within the Jura (McRae, 1983 p.190). These factors can also be seen as aspects of the dynamic between the tensions of the existing situation, and the possibilities for the future. In this manner, it can be stated that they ultimately aided the process of conflict resolution by shaping, or reshaping, the structure of discourse between the Jurassiens and

the Bernois.

The essence of a quest for autonomy is that the process of reaching autonomy is produced by autonomous action (Bäumlin, 1971). The interactions between the Jurassiens and the Bernois in the 1960s moved the discourse away from a situation in which the structure of discourse was what was good for the canton of Bern as defined by the dominant group. This movement necessitated reinterpretation of the interest of the diverse groups within the canton. These fundamentals of the parameters were voiced in a conflict between identity (of the Jura) and security (of the canton) (Charpilloz, 1976, pp.113-118).

These parameters were filled out in the work of the Commission de vingt-quatre, a body of inquiry set up by the cantonal executive. Its mandate was to give a full report on the situation, with no alternative excluded. Without reaching any specific conclusions, the Commission outlined the structures, attitudes and interest groups which were shaping the conflict.

The RJ used the structure which it had in part created, in order to limit the discourse to the question of separation: not to if and in what ways autonomy could be achieved, but how a new canton could be built. It refused to cooperate with the Commission and with the federal mediation commissions and did not participate in the debates in the cantonal legislature on decentralization and autonomous status. La question jurassienne

was narrowed to the principles and mechanics of the referendum. And so, the alternatives of enhanced autonomy, the election of a Jurassien Assembly to work out an acceptable solution and the creation of two half-cantons for the North and South Jura, were relegated to the sidelines of discourse.

The obstacles to the acceptance of the idea of a referendum, was the Bernois perception of separation as an all or nothing situation, in which they were the potential losers (Luthy, 1972, p.66). The question had to be translated into the terms of on what conditions the Jura could remain in Bern. Once it had reached a point where retrenchment was possible only through the eradication of separatism and the enhancement of dominant traits, separation could be viewed no longer as a threat to security but as an enhancement of security and peace (Secretan, 1968, p.532).

The outcome of this process of conflict resolution is divided. On the one hand, thanks in part to the skillful management of the federal government and other organization, there is now a separate canton of the Jura accepted by all Switzerland. On the other hand, the canton comprises only the three Northern districts of the Jura region. This outcome can be seen as creation of the dilemmas which can be forged by the need for a compromise between the need for self-determination and the modalities of achieving self-determination. The process and outcome of self-determination as conflict resolution has in this

case create a consensually arrived-at relationship which may be able to structure the cooperative discourse. However, many obstacles lie in the way of the resolution of la seconde question jurassienne (Mertenat, 1980, pp.74-79).

CHAPTER SIX

SELF-DETERMINATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A DISCUSSION AND PRELIMINARY EVALUATION

Self-determination conflict cannot be resolved without system change. This is true because struggles for self-determination are by definition a form of structural conflict in which the structure of the relationship between the parties is itself the source of conflict. The framework of change presented in this thesis is based on this understanding and attempts to use this basis to analyze the degree to which elements of the existing system furnish the potential for conflict resolution. In a sense it is a prism through which the potential for peaceful change can be perceived.

The utility of this framework in enhancing the perception of the potential for conflict resolution in situations of self-determination conflict will be reviewed in this chapter. This review will be undertaken through a discussion of the Jura case and through an introduction to a more violent struggle for self-determination, the Basques in Spain. These discussions will be followed by a preliminary evaluation of the framework.

THE JURA CASE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The analytical framework discussed in chapter four and outlined in Table I serves as the basis for an assessment of the Jurassien struggle for self-determination as an example of conflict resolution. The interaction of elements of the existing situation, ideal conditions and intervening factors allow us to interpret the impact of the systemic elements which were present and the added factors which contributed to change; the relationship between the actual and the potential.

I. IDEAL CONDITIONS

- creation of a context
of shared perceptions

- fragmented view of reality
replaced by a broader,
intersubjective view

- maximization of influence
processes

- minimization of power
processes

- guiding principles:
 - justice
 - interdependence
 - cooperation
 - alternatives

2. EXISTING SITUATION

NATURE OF GROUP:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -united on linguistic/historical grounds -divided on religious grounds and geographically -invisibility, lack of recognition as separate group
NATURE OF STATE:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -federal -multinational -liberal democratic
NATURE OF QUEST:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -greater autonomy through recognition of sovereignty within or outside of canton -secession from Bern, but not Switzerland
NATURE OF ENVIRONEMNT:	neutral to supportive

2. EXISTING SITUATION

INTERGROUP RELATIONS: PERSPECTIVE OF:

	JURASSIEN	BERNOIS	"OBJECTIVE"
<u>structure-</u>	minority-dominant	minority-dominant	minority-dominant
<u>institutions-</u>	majorization	democratic	potential to majorization
<u>attitudes-</u>	lack of recognition of separate interests	canton-wide interests	limited recognition of separate interests
	discrimination controlled	fair system	some discrimination
<u>history-</u>	autonomy greater discrimination centralizing tendencies	limited recognition of past injustices viewed as corrected	-----
<u>behaviour-</u>	views Bern action= ignorant of needs acting in only way possible compromise impossible in existing situation	views Jura acting in "un-Swiss" way views own behaviour as seeking compromise	-----

3. INTERVENING FACTORS

A. FACTORS CONTROLLED BY MINORITY:

1. increase in visibility through internal organization, creation of forums in canton, Switzerland and internationally
2. de-legitimation of system through persistent demands for recognition of group and of separate interests of group; creation of perception of the instability of the relationship [including use of symbolic violence]
3. presentation of coherent and consistent alternative; denial of potential of negotiating on other grounds

B. FACTORS NOT CONTROLLED BY MINORITY:

1. third parties within canton and Switzerland
2. sympathetic public opinion
3. problem-solving undertaken by government-sponsored commission

The Jurassien example illustrates quite clearly the steps taken toward conflict resolution. This process was facilitated by the nature of the political system and particularly the political culture which allowed the minority group to find allies within the dominant population. This is not to say that the existing situation dominated the resolution process. In

particular, it should be noted that the ideal conditions of an intersubjective view of the relationship and the minimization of power processes were present. The lethargy and apathy on behalf of the dominant group is in itself a power process. It was the interaction of the groups which was crucial in the replacement of power processes by influence processes and the creation of a shared perception of the situation.

The role of alternatives within the resolution of the Jura conflict is worthy of closer examination. While the Jurassien leadership was able to establish that the creation of a new canton was the only alternative available, the manner in which this was established was problematic. The rigidity of the style of presenting the alternative almost led to the destruction of the newly-created discourse by the inflexibility of the group during negotiations over the referendum (McRae, 1983). In the end the minority population rejected this inflexibility, thereby saving the resolution process.

SELF-DETERMINATION AND VIOLENCE: THE BASQUES AND THE SPANISH STATE

The process and outcome of the Jurassien quest, as outlined above, release us from the imposing dilemma of self-determination conflicts. Resolution of such conflicts is possible without violence. This initial finding based on an analysis of the

radical implications of conflict resolution opens up the broad parameters of the possibilities of conceptualizing and undertaking violence-free conflict processes in a situation of structural conflict. These parameters will be filled in as we gain further understanding of the essential elements which constitute a relationship structured for conflict resolution.

These findings while freeing us from the initial dilemma of the apparent necessity of violence, do not free us from the frequency of the use of violence in self-determination conflict. One step toward a deeper understanding of the elements which lead to conflict resolution, is to analyze the structure, process and outcome of self-determination conflicts which are marked by the use of violence.

As a counterpoint to the unfolding of events in the Jura case, a brief analysis of the Basque national movement in the Spanish state will be made. This treatment will be more cursory than that of the preceding illustrative example. It is presented here in order to serve as a contrast to the Swiss system and to widen the basis of the preliminary evaluation of the conceptual framework developed throughout the paper. The Basque movement was chosen because of the prominence of their quest for self-determination, and because of the similarities to the Jura example both in time period and European location.

Like the Jurassiens in Switzerland, the Basques' quest for self-determination is based on a distinct historical relationship with the host state. Traditionally, the Basque nation had a distinct position in the Spanish state, negotiating for special rights directly with Madrid. The bases of distinctiveness are the symbols of the Basque ethnic identity. These symbols include: the language, Euskera, Basque history of independence both outside of and within Spain, the myth of superiority of the Basque social and moral order (Heiberg, 1979, p.195), "racial" or genetic differences including a unique blood type, and the community ties based on the concept of "collective nobility" (Greenwood, 1975, p.83). The Basque concept of identity is highly politicized and integral: "a true Basque can only be a Basque nationalist" (Heiberg, 1979, p.187).

Language and religion hold very different positions in Basque identity in comparison with their role in Jurassien identity. Euskera has mysterious linguistic origins bearing no similarities to Spanish. It is spoken by a minority of individuals identifying themselves as Basque, but its recent rejuvenation in education and literature has been an important development in the quest for self-determination. In this sense, language does not primarily define national identity but it is an instrument by which nationality could defend itself (Shabad and Gunther, 1982, p.447). Roman Catholicism unites Basques with the Castilian majority in Spain. However, the role of the lower

clergy in safeguarding Basque identity and in addressing violations of human rights against Basques and Papal recognition of this separate identity and the rights that it should entail (da Silva, 1975, pp.233-34) diminish the saliency of this commonality in the minority-majority relationship.

The structure within which the post-Second World War Basque struggle for self-determination was formed was the Franquist state. The Franco regime was able to contain dissent and the promotion of alternatives through a combination of coercion and material benefits (Payne 1976, p.97). In contrast with this generalized political apathy, "opposition attitudes [were] probably more diffused and widespread there [in the Basque region] than anywhere else in Spain except Barcelona" (Payne, p.98). Within this repressive atmosphere, there could be no legitimate opposition parties, despite the existence of nationalist Basque party, the PNV, which was organized at the turn of the century. The PNV continued to operate clandestinely with a strategy based on the belief that democracy would inevitably follow from the demise of Franco and that with democracy would come autonomy (Guy, 1983).

The absence of legal avenues for the pursuit of Basque nationalist goals during the Franco period is generally understood to be the reason for the development of the ETA whose strategy of action - repression - action was formulated in an

attempt to reveal the repressive nature of the regime and to engender public support for the nationalist cause (Guy, p.52). Beginning in 1968, the group began to organize and carry out assassinations. In the period between the trial and Franco's death (1968-1979), 234 people were killed by the ETA. Most of these were carefully selected targets, particularly policemen and members of the Guardia Civil. More recently, attacks have occurred in public places such as railway stations.

The cycle of coercion - violence - counterviolence is viewed as being inescapable given the conditions in Spain during this period. Thus, the "violence while regretted is understood to be inevitable in view of the violence which provokes it" although in a "democracy ETA activities would be superfluous" (Hollyman, 1972, pp.224-231).

The transition to democracy which began after Franco's death increased the types of activities which Basque nationalists could undertake. In May 1978, widespread demonstrations and other extra-parliamentary activities were organized in the streets of the Basque country. As democratization proceeded, negotiations leading up to a referendum occurred. The outcome, the Statute of Autonomy, resulted in Basque control over their own police force, powers to raise and spend taxes, powers over industrial and economic policy, and much of the industries, resources and planning of a local nature (Janke, 1980, p.17) . Despite this

apparent success, it is important to note the continued dissatisfaction on the nature of autonomy which the Basques enjoy within the Spanish state. This dissatisfaction arises from both the process through which autonomy was achieved and the substance of the agreement. There was a marked difference between the draft which the Basque leaders submitted to Madrid and the one which was submitted for the referendum. Displeasure was evidenced through the low turnout for both the constitutional referendum, where 54% of the Basque electorate abstained (in comparison with a state average of 32.2%) and the referendum on autonomy, where 41% abstained (Coverdale, 1979, pp.122-23). The differences in perspective have not been bridged: "how very different the situation looks when seen in Bilbao, San Sebastian or Vittorio" (Hills, 1980, p.358).

Violence can be ascribed as having four roles in the process of the achievement of autonomy on the part of the Basques. It is viewed as resulting in the hardening of attitudes on all sides (Medhurst, p.191). The state's response is seen as having helped to politicize previously indifferent segments creating a degree of solidarity amongst the potentially competing forces within the Basque nation. (Medhurst, p.192). The activities of the ETA kept the self-determination issues in the public eye at a time when there was a scarcity of forums. The group also empowered the mainstream party, the PNV. This was particularly evident during the constitutional negotiations: the PNV, "consistently impressed

on Madrid that if nationalist demands as peacefully pursued by PNV were not met, the national community would give support to ETA methods" (Heiberg, 19781, 384-5).

The ETA announced in 1978 that it was renouncing violence and would seek to eventually become a legal political party. Its violent activities did not completely cease and in 1982 its self-dissolution was announced once again. However, the violence continues, if on a reduced scale and if carried out by fewer people with less public support.

An evaluation of the Basque quest for self-determination vis-à-vis the Jurassien quest must center around the dimension of violence. The factors which appear to have created the "need" for violence focus on the nature of the Spanish political system. The lack of forums and independent public opinion should be emphasized in this respect. However, this cursory review of structure, process and outcome in the Basque case do not bear out this "need" for violence. From the conflict resolution perspective as summarized in the framework for change, the use of violence did not advance movement toward the ideal conditions. Both during the Franco and post-Franco periods, violence negated the potential for an intersubjective understanding of the conflict. Thus, the discourse created through the combination of ETA and other nationalist activities was not an equal, participatory one and the changes wrought through legal-

constitutional change has not created the basis for cooperative relations between the regional and central governments. The goal of self-determination has not been achieved because Madrid continues to control the final meaning of "autonomy" within the Spanish state. And, the violence continues.

THE FRAMEWORK OF CHANGE: AN EVALUATION

The framework of change links the conceptual explorations of this paper with the attempt to analyze conflict situations. The greatest strength of the framework is its ability to shape these analyses without objectifying the perception of the conflict. In particular, the important first step of defining what the conflict is is simplified because no one variable or party needs to be selected. Rather, it is the complex interrelation of factors within the existing situation which can be laid out. As such, the framework is a problem-solving tool. Similarly, it has the potential to guide the direction of resolution because it can describe the elements of stability within the system.

Three weaknesses of the framework can be drawn out from this first application. The first is the lack of clear rationale for the separation of some of the elements between the categories of intervening factors and the ideal conditions. In part, this problem arises from the intrinsic relationship between process and outcome in conflict resolution. The second weakness is that

the conceptions of justice, interdependence, cooperation and alternatives in the ideal conditions are normative concepts but within a conflict situation there will be various perceptions of these values which would have a more relative character. Difficulties might arise in analyses which depend on the separation of the normative from the non-normative usages of these terms. The third weakness is that the overarching values of conflict resolution, namely participation, autonomy and community, while being adequately expressed in the model of discourse, are not sufficiently represented within the framework of change.

CONCLUSION

This inquiry into the radical implications of conflict resolution has created a context for the questioning of the way we view self-determination conflict. This context has revealed the duality of these implications. A better understanding of conflict resolution as an approach helps to resolve the dilemma of the actual use of violence in self-determination conflict and illustrates the utility of the approach in the potential resolution of specific self-determination conflicts. This dual nature, which allows us to understand both that resolution is possible and how it can be achieved, is intrinsic to this approach and is captured in the concept of the "latent nexus" of theory and reality. This dualism is also reflected in conflict resolution as a process. At this level, it entails that the values inherent in the process of resolution shape both the means and ends of the situation.

These implications in turn raise three main questions: What is the nature of conflict? What is the nature of self-determination? What is the nature of power in the conflict resolution process? The nature of the questions themselves are perhaps more important than any specific answer, for it is the process of rethinking the ways in which these subjects are

conceptualized which is essential in the exploration of conflict resolution.

In setting out the terrain of the questioning of the concept of conflict, and more specifically the conceptions of violence in conflict, several relationships have been elucidated. These relationships include the need to view conflict as state, process and outcome and to view conflict in relation to conflict resolution. This questioning is simplified by relating conflict to the model of discourse. In doing so, it becomes clear that conflict between groups takes place on both the physical and the symbolic planes (Breakwell, 1983, pp.196-7), thus highlighting the role of communication and communicative interaction in conflict moves.

In establishing the utility of conflict resolution to seemingly "unresolvable" conflicts, this thesis has grappled with the centrality of power in the study of social and political relationships. The method chosen for this challenge has been the framework of complementarity: the reconciliation of apparent contradictions through finding alternative and sometimes opposing conceptions which offer the potential of a fuller understanding of the phenomena. This struggle with the concept of power occurs at two levels: the level of interaction between the groups (encompassing behaviour and attitudes) and the level of the structure of the relationship.

At the level of interaction, the preoccupation with power and dependence has been discarded because it proffers an incomplete understanding of the process of change (Moscovici, 1976, p.62). Alternative explanations which allow us to see how a minority group can influence a dominant group have been sought. This exploration has been centered on the concept of influence and its elaboration in relation to model of discourse. Central to this inquiry into influence as a counterpoint to power has been the question of under what circumstances "being just or fair is relevant to the maintenance or establishing of a satisfactory concept of self" (Caddick, 1982, p.149). This focus leads to an investigation of elements such as the psychological, social and linguistic barriers which block discourse and to "opposing processes" (Billig, 1985, p.82) which facilitate the development of justice, interdependence, cooperation and the search for alternatives within the minority-dominant interaction.

While the process of power must be counterbalanced by the process of influence in order to increase our understanding of interaction, at the structural level, legitimacy serves as a complementary concept to power. The central questions here relate to the de-legitimation of a system of inequality which blocks self-determination. This questioning is hampered by the problem of the legitimated illegitimate system. The concept of legitimacy is problematic because of its close relationship with power: "legitimacy once implied the political restraint and

reason inherent in law, unfortunately it stands now as a critical part of the conceptual apparatus of domination" (Rosen, 1979, p.87).

This linkage between power and legitimacy is especially problematic in situations arising from claims for self-determination on the basis of ethnic distinctiveness. For where integration has not been achieved in the first place, delegitimation is not a "system crisis" in the Habermasian sense since the state apparatus is not aimed at ensuring administrative rationality but ethnic privilege (Adams, 1985, p.215). Thus "...legitimacy concerns are reduced to self-preservation. What furthers the ethnic group in power is legitimate; what risks its hegemony may not be entertained" (Adams, p.215).

Some theorists attempt to resolve the apparent contradiction of the legitimation of the illegitimate by emphasizing the distinction between a system's or government's legitimacy and the citizen's belief about legitimacy (Stillman, 1974). In this approach, there is the assumption that one can separate "rational" from "irrational" legitimacy (Glassman, 1979). Thus, Ragowski describes what is legitimate government in segmented societies (1974, p.165). The conditions for this "objective" legitimacy are that, in fact if not in form: (a) it is not a majoritarian system in the legislative sphere, (b) it is not (except in rare cases of equal strength of segments) egalitarian in the judicial sphere, (c) segments rather than persons are

taken as the constitutive elements of society and (d) segments are weighted in rough proportion to their probabilities of coalition. Similarly, Buchheit argues that a rational determination of the legitimacy of a self-determination claim can be determined by balancing the general interests of the "world community" (which is equated with the state system) against the claimant's arguments for a right to self-determination (1978, p.228).

In appealing to some external, "objective" and "rational" standard in their attempts to separate coercive from legitimate power, these authors do not escape the central problem. There can be no external standard for determining legitimate and illegitimate relationships for: "The power of deeply entrenched cultural myths is their ability to determine views of the world, social and physical which are conceived to be objectively true" (Tajfel, 1984, p.709). Thus, external standards do not deal with the existence or destruction of these "irrational" legitimacy claims, or with their role in a conflict situation.

An alternative approach to this dilemma, followed in this thesis, is the radical separation of relationships based on power from those based on legitimacy (Banks, 1984, pp.69-71). Relationships which are structured by power processes cannot be subsequently legitimized because in order to be legitimate they

must be intrinsically acceptable to the parties.⁽¹⁾ Explanations of legitimation which separate the structuring of relations (especially those which envision violence as a means of creation and legitimation, (Denitch, 1976; Bowyer-Bell, 1979)) from subsequent processes fragment the essential relation between means and end. This conception of legitimacy allows for a better understanding of the nature of change in the structure of the relationship between the minority and dominant groups. An understanding which is strengthened by relating relationships based on power and legitimacy to the various conceptions of stability.

Self-determination has been utilized in this thesis to conceptualize the struggle for definition and decision on the basis of distinctiveness by a minority group vis-à-vis a dominant group. The position taken is that self-determination is better conceptualized as a conflict resolution, rather than a conflict, process since the achievement of self-determination is aimed at the creation of a mutually-acceptable relationship structured toward cooperation. However, quests for self-determination appear to engender conflict because of the context within which they arise: "self-determination claims continue to present themselves in opposition to other self-determination

¹ Interestingly, these two approaches are present in the differences between Gramsci and Lenin and their views on the ways in which power should be seized through revolution. See discussion in Ferrarotti, 1979).

claims and not to non-self-determination claims or anti-self-determination claims" (Pomerance, 1982, p.73).

The ultimate implications of the conflict resolution approach is that self-determination can be equated with conflict resolution in the wider sense that it is through legitimate relationships that individual and identity-group fulfillment occurs. These ultimate conditions will be facilitated as our capacity for fulfillment grows through the structuring of relations toward participation, autonomy and community. Perhaps it is through these conditions that answers, rather than questions, will be found. And perhaps such answers will lead to the founding of a world community based on self-determination as it is enounced in this thought by Saint-Exupéry:

Although you are different from me,
my brother, far from harming me,
your existence enriches mine.

APPENDIX ONE --
TOWARD A CLASSIFICATION OF SELF-DETERMINATION CONFLICT

The title of this appendix suggests that movement toward a classification of self-determination conflict is both useful and possible. The conflict resolution approach is based on a certain faith in the utility of strengthened analytical tools. It is also based on the belief that subjective factors play an important role in the development of conflict processes. Attempts at the classification of a particular type of conflict situation stem from these fundamental beliefs. Such attempts, and more specifically the one elaborated upon here, can therefore best be seen as an exercise designed to broaden our understanding of the patterns and commonalities of a given type of conflict across specific instances. This in turn enhancing our ability to analyze and, hence, aid in the resolution of such conflicts.

The following pages are an initial attempts at filling in the parameters of the classification of self-determination issues introduced in Chapter One of this thesis. The variables which are argued as shaping the potential parameters of classification are reiterated below. Following this listing is an attempt at applying the classificatory framework to the intricacies of the example of the Jurassien quest for self-determination.

A CLASSIFICATION OF SELF-DETERMINATION CONFLICT1. VARIABLES RELATING TO THE NATIONAL GROUP(a) Characteristics of the Group -

demography
percentage of the state population
location

(b) Bases of National Identity -

self-categorization
categorization by others
dimensions of difference

(c) Forms of Organization -

social
cultural
religious
political
other
degree of support
cohesiveness of community

(d) Place of Group in State -

origins of control relationship
existing rights
social, political, economic importance
of group in state

(e) Extra-State Links to Groups of Identical /
Related Identity

3

OF/DE

3

MICRO

2. VARIABLES RELATING TO THE HOST STATE

(a) General Characteristics -

size
geography
resources
demography

(b) Political / Ideological Characteristics -

political nature:
 system of government
 role of government in society

ethnonational nature:
 national ideology
 cultural institutions

(c) Characteristics of Dominant Group -

organization
role in state
attitudes toward minority group(s)
nature of alliances dominant group-minority group

(d) General Policies Toward Minority Group(s)

3. VARIABLES RELATING TO THE QUEST FOR SELF-DETERMINATION

(a) Nature of Demands -

overall aims of leadership
 degree of acceptance of aims by minority population
 existence of alternative leadership
 existence of alternative goals
 degree of change in system envisioned by demands

(b) Nature of Methods -

forums
 types of action pursued
 dynamics of response
 degree of violence

4. VARIABLES RELATING TO THE GLOBAL SYSTEM

(a) General -

"ideological climate" } for this type of
 position in international law } self-determination
 quest

(b) Nature of Allies Outside the Host State -

other states
 other national groups
 international organizations
 non-governmental organizations

**ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE -- THE JURASSIEN QUEST FOR
SELF-DETERMINATION, 1948-1979**

1. VARIABLES RELATING TO THE NATIONAL GROUP

(a) Characteristics of National Group

DEMOGRAPHY Jura -

	<u>1920</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>
Total	116,692	130,853	145,423
French-Speaking		86,405	92,748
German-Speaking		28,359	29,897
Other Languages		1,928	8,208
% French		75	76
% German		25	24

North Jura -

Total	53,821	58,397	67,261
French-Speaking	45,827	48,673	55,221
German-Speaking	7,292	7,076	5,717
Other Languages	702	2,648	6,323
% French	85.2	83.3	82.1
% German	13.5	12.1	8.5

1. VARIABLES RELATING TO THE NATIONAL GROUP

DEMOGRAPHY South Jura -

	<u>1920</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>
Total	54,384	60,387	64,179
French-Speaking	40,364	43,800	41,000
German-Speaking	12,949	12,060	--
Other Languages	1,071	4,507	--
% French	74.2	72.5	
% German	23.8	20.0	

Laufon -

Total	8,487	12,089	14,000
French-Speaking	214	275	--
German-Speaking	8,118	10,761	--
Other Languages	115	1,053	--
% French	3.0	2.0	
% German	97.0	98.0	

Population by Religion -

	<u>1920</u>	<u>1960</u>
Jura -		
% Protestant	45	41
% Catholic	55	59
North Jura -		
% Protestant	15	16
% Catholic	85	84

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Population by Religion -

	<u>1920</u>	<u>1960</u>
South Jura -		
% Protestant	84	74
% Catholic	16	26
Laufon -		
% Protestant	86	87
% Catholic	14	13

PERCENTAGE OF
STATE POPULATION

Jura in Bern Canton

<u>1860</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>
23%	17.2%	13.7%

LOCATION

Canton Bern (see Map I on following page)

Districts -

North Jura -

Delémont
Franches-montagnes
Porrentruy

South Jura -

Courtelary (+
Moutier Laufon)
La Neuveville

Map 2

SOURCE: McRae, 1983 p. 192

1. VARIABLES RELATING TO THE NATIONAL GROUP

(b) Bases of National Identity -

SELF-CATEGORIZATION

Jurassiens; French-Speakers; Swiss;
part of Romandie and Francophone
world. In North, Catholic: In
South, Protestant.

CATEGORIZATION BY
OTHERS

Lack of recognition of separate
identity; to a degree seen as
Bernois; some discrimination on
the basis of language and religion.

DIMENSIONS OF
DIFFERENCE

language: French-speaking in a
German canton

religion: (in North) Roman
Catholic in a Protestant
majority canton

history: myth of independent
Jura; not part of Old
Bern; annexed through
international treaty

culture: Romand

1. VARIABLES RELATING TO THE NATIONAL GROUP

(c) Forms of Organization

SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL

diversity of social and cultural organizations based on regional linguistic distinctions; increase in number of and support for Jurassien associations from 1950s onward

RELIGIOUS

religion important in political affiliation and on position on self-determination issue

POLITICAL

on self-determination issue:

Rassemblement jurassien
Union des patritotes du Jura
Groupement interparties pour l'unité
Front de libération jurassien

on other issues:

parties organized both Canton-wide and within Jura around a variety of interests

Bern:

Parti des paysans, artisans et bourgeois
Parti socialiste
Parti radicale
Jeune Berne
Alliance des indépendents
Parti chrétien-sociale

Jura:

Parti libéral-radical
Parti démocratique chrétien-sociale
Parti socialiste
Parti des paysans, artisans et bourgeois
Parti chrétien-social indépendant
Parti libéral-radical indépendant

DEGREE OF SUPPORT

support varied across institutions strongly based on regional distinctions in Jura and in Bern

COHESIVENESS OF
COMMUNITY

main division by religious cleavage also slight economic differential North-South

1. VARIABLES RELATING TO NATIONAL GROUP

(d) Place of Group in State -

ORIGINS OF
CONTROL RELATIONSHIP

Congress of Vienna Reparations;
"forced marriage" (Mayer, 1968
pp.732-3)

EXISTING RIGHTS

up to 1950 general political and
civil rights of all Bernois
citizens with some of guarantees
for cultural rights safeguarded by
annexation treaty

1950 - Constitutional change -
recognition of the 'peuple
jurassien'; equality of French and
German languages

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC,
POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF
GROUP IN STATE

peripheral - politically the Jura
is a minority guaranteed seats in
the main executive body
economically - the Jura is
integrated but until recently has
had slower economic growth than
surrounding regions; historically-
the agricultural and primary
sectors are more important in the
north, while the south is more
fully industrialized

(e) Extra-State Links to Groups of Identical/Related Identity

no direct counterpart

sense of kinship with: rest of
Romandie in Switzerland, France
(affected by French Gaullism),
Francophone minorities in Western
industrialized states.

2. VARIABLES RELATING TO THE HOST STATE

(a) General Characteristics -

GEOGRAPHY small, mountainous, landlocked
split urban-rural

RESOURCES advanced capitalist; wealth based on
industry rather than primary resources

DEMOGRAPHY	<u>Switzerland</u>	<u>1880</u>	<u>1980</u>
	Total	2,832,000	6,366,000
	% German-Speaking	71.3%	65.0%
	% French-Speaking	21.4%	18.4%
	% Italian-Speaking	5.7%	9.8%
	% Romansch-Speaking	1.4%	0.8%
	% Other Languages	.02%	6.0%
	<u>Bern</u>	<u>1880</u>	<u>1980</u>
	Total	532,000	912,000*
	% German-Speaking	85%	84%
	% French-Speaking	15%	8%

* adjusted boundaries after formation of
Jura canton

2. VARIABLES RELATING TO THE HOST STATE

(b) Political/Ideological Characteristics -

POLITICAL NATURE

System of Government

Switzerland

federal
liberal democratic
direct democracy through referenda
multi-party system
majority rule attenuated through consensual
practices
collegial and representative executive
linguistic representation in public service
constitutional guarantees of linguistic/
national rights

Bern

same institutional base as above; but
majority rule not attenuated by consensual
practices and informal guarantees of
representation of Jurassiens

Role of Government in Society

Switzerland

decentralized government
minimal federal intervention

ETHNONATIONAL NATURE

National Ideology

multinational
multilingual

Cultural Institutions

decentralized
freedom/tolerance of various groups
and forms of organization
especially in post-WWII era
pre-WWII legacy of segmentation as a
cause of friction between linguistic
and religious communities

2. VARIABLES RELATING TO THE HOST STATE

(b) Characteristics of the Dominant Group

ORGANIZATION	historical, linguistic and religious relative homogeneity diversity of associations
ROLE IN STATE	strong majority economic importance assured control of government/state institutions
ATTITUDES TOWARD MINORITY GROUP	varying; neutral to tendency to view movement toward assimilation as beneficial; unwillingness to recognize differences; some discrimination on basis of language and religion
NATURE OF ALLIANCES BETWEEN MINORITY AND DOMINANT GROUP	relationship not hostile (although hostile reaction to Jurassien demands); apathy; willingness of Bernois individuals to seek mutually acceptable solution

(d) General Policies Toward Minority Group -

SWITZERLAND (federal government)

neutral
not directly involved because intra-
versus inter-cantonal nature of conflict
attempt at mild intervention through
mediation
safeguarding acceptance by Swiss population
of new canton

BERN

willing to recognize identity; not willing
to recognize need for stronger safeguarding
of identity
ignore demands
emphasize unity of interests and stability
of status quo
1970s- acceptance of need for change through
referenda

3. VARIABLES RELATING TO THE QUEST FOR SELF-DETERMINATION

(a) Nature of Demands -

HISTORICAL	increased safeguards for cultural autonomy to a lesser extent - separation and creation of a new canton
AIMS OF LEADERSHIP	Rassemblement jurassien - separation and creation of a new canton
DEGREE OF SUPPORT BY MINORITY POPULATION	mixed; low-medium in 1950s; medium-high throughout 1960s in the North;; low in the South
ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP	<p>in South Jura -Union des patriotes jurassiens (status quo, increased safeguards for language and culture)</p> <p>Front de libération jurassien - creation of new canton through violent revolution</p>
ALTERNATIVE DEMANDS	increased autonomy within state; creation of two half-cantons for the North and South Jura
DEGREE OF CHANGE IN/OF SYSTEM ENVISIONED BY DEMANDS	<p>Bern - medium to high (loss of 7% of population, 1,463 square kilometers of territory)</p> <p>Switzerland - low - creation of new canton acceptable method of change within system (with precedents).</p>

3. VARIABLES RELATING TO THE QUEST FOR SELF-DETERMINATION

(b) Nature of Methods -

FORUMS	outside of Bern political structure <u>Le Jura libre</u> other media public forums not political institutions
TYPES OF ACTION	internal organization communication within Jura, Switzerland and beyond refusal to negotiate on terms set by Bern government
DYNAMICS OF RESPONSE	ignorance and lethargy of Bern government refusal to listen and communicate on equal terms branding of separatism as "un-Swiss" hardening of positions strengthening of separatist movement in North and status quo orientation in South
DEGREE OF VIOLENCE	low

4. VARIABLES RELATING TO THE GLOBAL SYSTEM

(a) General Attitudes Toward Particular Type of Self-Determination Quest

"IDEOLOGICAL CLIMATE"

mixed; supportive on the part of other ethnic minority groups: neutral to negative on the part of states

POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

question of domestic jurisdiction not interpreted as question of international law because demand challenges nature of state rather than existence of Swiss state

(b) Nature of Allies Outside of Host State

STATES

France - impact of "Vive le Québec libre" speech and French Gaullism generally no direct state support

OTHER NATIONAL GROUPS

supported by other minority groups in Europe and Canada; particularly Francophone minorities

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

negligible

NON-GOVERNMENTAL

ORGANIZATIONS Communauté ethniques de langue française

Carleton University
Ottawa, Canada K1S 5B6

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