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**PUBLIC SPHERE, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND GLOBALIZATION :
REFLECTIONS ON TURKEY'S UNEASY MODERNIZATION**

by

FEYZI BABAN, B.A., M.A.

**A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and
Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of**

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

Carleton University

Ottawa, Ontario

February 1999

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Chair, Department of Political Science

Thesis Supervisor

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February 8, 1999

ABSTRACT

In recent years, the intensification of the globalization process and reactions to it by particular groups and identities, has raised awareness of the question of difference in nation states. National identity for a long time has been able to establish itself as a hegemonic entity by marginalizing other identities. The recent local and global pressures on nation states, however, has brought about new conditions within which identities are being remade and negotiated. This thesis aims to develop an understanding of the process whereby identities are redefined within the globalization process. It also explores how identity formation occur through peaceful negotiation. The thesis argues that the current globalization process is transforming the condition of particularity - or identity. The intensification of the globalization process locates identity formation at the intersection of local, national and global levels. As national discourses lose their defining power in the identity formation process, identities and groups once marginalized by national narratives are now claiming representation in their respective identities. The greater presence of difference within nation states does not, however, automatically lead to a peaceful and just coexistence unless there is a framework within which the negotiation of being together can take place and which permits the crisscrossing of identities. The thesis works with the concept of the **public sphere** to discuss a framework that might facilitate the pluralistic formation and negotiation of identities. In its original form, the public sphere has the potential of providing a pluralistic environment within which different identities can negotiate their differences. In modern societies, however, the public sphere has failed its promise of plurality due to the hegemonic representation of national identity. Yet, in present day complex societies the public sphere can fulfill its pluralistic promise by gaining its autonomy from the national discourse and recognizing the importance of representing identities in their own right. The second part of the thesis focuses on Turkey to illustrate these theoretical debates. The Turkish example demonstrates how, in one local context, the relationship between national discourse and the public sphere affects the identity formation process.

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INTRODUCTION

1. The Question of Identity and Difference

Difference is a fundamental part of human existence. We establish our identities by distinguishing ourselves from others. Our identities are sources of ourselves. They help us make sense of our surroundings, locate us in a certain historical and spatial context and connect us to our past and future. Our identities provide us with the freedom to interact with others. Yet, they can also act as a prison that prevents us from opening ourselves up to others and transforming ourselves in the process.

The relationship between identity and difference is a difficult one as it contains peaceful as well as violent dimensions. On the one hand, it makes our social existence rich and creates endless possibilities for social interaction. On the other hand, it has a disruptive potential which divides us and can lead to social conflict. Throughout history, being different (the Other) too often has been perceived as a threat and has usually been a source of persecution and marginalization. Being 'not one of us' but 'one of them' has usually been reason for exclusion and marginalization. Belonging to the "wrong" religion, to a "primitive" group, to a certain gender or sexual orientation or to an other nation has often been perceived as a threat, something which needs to be controlled and ruled. The relationship between identity and difference very often involves a power relationship which stems from the fact that the stability of a certain identity depends on the marginalization and exclusion of others. Moreover, the stability of identity is also

secured when it establishes itself as an unchanging category, an essential being in the world.

Within this context, my thesis attempts to address the conditions within which identities are defined and enter into relationships with each other: What is the process by which identity is defined as a fixed category and asserts itself as a hegemonic entity by marginalizing others? What is the impact of the increasing globalization of world affairs on the process of identity formation? What are some of the alternative ways in which we can understand identity formation beyond the formulation of identity/difference as a relationship of power and domination to that of understanding identity as a relational category? And finally, what could be the normative framework which facilitates the redefinition of identities through negotiation rather than domination and marginalization?

There are several sources from which these questions emerge. The primary source of these questions is in fact personal. Until I started my Ph.D., I never thought that my identity could be open to question. It was given, stable and comfortable. I was brought up with the belief that Turkish identity is located within the parameters of the West. I identified others who did not feel comfortable with that definition of Turkishness as not understanding the true meaning of modern Turkish identity. I viewed those who identified themselves with traditional values as people who need more education to understand and internalize the modern Turkish identity. What I did not initially question was that the modern Turkish identity may not be as naturally grounded. When I started to work on my Ph.D. in Canada, I met others who did not see Turkey as belonging to the Western tradition. The literatures I studied raised questions, suggesting that

identity is not something that is given, unchanging and essential. This led me to think about the process by which we identify ourselves as belonging to one particular identity but not another. I became interested in the process which defines me as Turkish despite the fact that my family, like that of most Turkish people, comes from various ethnic backgrounds. I also became interested in the process which established my understanding of Turkish as a "true" identity against which others were judged.

Apart from my personal experience, the international events of the post-socialist era served to highlight the "difference" question. The war in Bosnia so clearly demonstrated that the relationship between identity and difference can be a very violent and destructive one. Day after day I watched people who were displaced from their homes and towns because they belonged to one identity not another. I watched old people leaving their homes and communities, walking with thousands of others, all of whom were trying to escape from persecution. Even children were not free from the politics of identity and difference. Before they had developed their own sense of self, their identities were imposed on them. Many others were killed and put into concentration camps simply because their identity was a threat to others. All this happened in a place where there had been a high level of intercommunal exchange. Soon after, the same scenario repeated itself in Rwanda. If Rwanda and Bosnia provide powerful examples, there are other cases that demonstrate how easily the relationship between identity and difference can become a violent one.

2. The Question of Identity at the Crossroads of Modern and Poststructuralist Discourses

The understanding of identity in the modern discourse is an ambiguous one as, on the one hand, it emphasizes the centrality of human consciousness in understanding and rearranging the social and physical environment. Yet, on the other hand, the same special emphasis on consciousness creates a belief that the modern subject is free from social and physical constraints. Modern thinkers have identified human reason as the source of sovereignty of the modern subject. They have claimed that the modern subject is centered and in control of "his " surroundings.¹ Endowed with the liberating power of reason, the modern subject has developed a sense of identity as a fixed category. As the individual has controlled and ordered his social and physical world with his reason, he has also been able to develop "his" own identity as "his" own choice. The Enlightenment conception of identity has assumed that identity is a conscious choice revealed through reason.

Marx pointed out that there are structural forces that condition individual action. Although structural forces come into being as a result of human action, they operate independent of it. Marx's analysis was particularly important as it questioned the optimism of Enlightenment thought, but also because it pointed out that human consciousness is not always above its social and physical environment. Marx was, however, also a modern thinker who believed that human consciousness was capable of

¹ John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, (London: Fontana, 1967).

revealing the true sense of its identity and capable of directing the course of history. It was Althusser who carried the marxist discourse to the level where human agency was removed from the center and became subject to structural forces such as relations of capital and ideology.² Although Althusser was criticized for destroying the autonomy of the agent and turning it into a puppet of structural forces³, he rightly questioned the Enlightenment confidence in the sovereignty of the human agent. His argument was particularly important in indicating that neither rational human action nor identity are essential qualities but are, to a large degree, products of the social environment.

Poststructuralist writers have carried Althusser's argument further. Foucault has shown how the liberating voice of modernity goes hand in hand with the regulative and controlling aspect of modernity. The confidence of the modern subject as the master of his surrounding may not be entirely true within the existence of the various discourses which control, normalize and regulate the actions of subjects.⁴ Moreover, Foucault has pointed out that the discourses which are the products of modern subjectivity, such as schools, clinics, prisons and scientific disciplines, function as mechanisms of power which regulate and control the actions of human agents.⁵ Foucault's depiction of modern subjectivity is bleak and dark: it does not leave much room for conscious human action, since agency is conditioned by various discourses of power. Yet, his argument is a

² Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, (London: Verso, 1966).

³ E.P. Thompson, *Poverty of Theory*, (London: Merlin Press, 1978).

⁴ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, (London: Allen Lane, 1975).

⁵ Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization*, (London: Tavistock, 1967) and Michel Foucault, *Birth of the Clinic*, (London: Tavistock, 1973).

warning to the arrogance of modern thinking. His analysis reminds us that we are not always consciously in control of our lives and identities. More importantly, apart from obvious power sources such as the state or capitalism, Foucault tells us that our social environment is filled with micro power structures that condition our way of thinking and our choice of action. The statements that we make to define things, and our ways of knowing and counting things, condition, in part, our choices of action. Foucault's analysis of the modern subject is a reminder that there is nothing essential about our identities. Although Foucault does not talk about national identities, his analysis of the modern subject challenges the belief that national identities are somewhat fixed entities and have essences that makes them different from others.

National identities constitute an important part of modern subjectivity. Although nationalism plays an important role in the representation of modern societies, national identity is an ambiguous entity. It claims, on the one hand, to transform pre-modern tribal identities into universal citizenship where those particularities become part of a whole. On the other hand, it contains pre-modern roots in that one ethnicity establishes itself as a hegemonic representation of a nation. The claim of universality in nationalism is usually nothing more than the universal representation of one dominant ethnicity. The civic aspect of nationalism, however, masks the ambiguous nature of national identity as it usually represents the nation as a community whose foundational principle is a universal citizenship. Despite the civic dimension, however, national identity is always an uneasy category as its very existence depends on the assimilation of particularities into a whole.

The assimilation process requires the representation of the nation as an inevitable and fixed entity. In other words, the assimilation of particularities into a national identity relies on the national ideology to represent itself as a fixed and unchanging identity. This representation of the nation is a social construction that is established through narratives, myths and the reinvention of histories as well as through the institutions of the state. Benedict Anderson points out the constructed nature of national narratives by arguing that nations are "imagined communities".⁶ They are imagined communities because they are representations of certain histories, traditions and symbols. Although Anderson's analysis is not a Foucauldian explanation of the emergence of modern nationalism, like Foucault, Anderson emphasizes the constructed nature of national identity. Anderson's analysis tells us that there is nothing fixed and essential about national identities. Instead, they are representations of imaginations that usually involve power relations in order to incorporate certain groups and identities into their representation of the community.

The postcolonial literature makes a contribution to the critique of modern subjectivity and national identity from outside Western discourse. The particular challenge that postcolonial criticism brings to the understanding of modern subjectivity is the problematization of the "Othering" process through which modern subjectivity distances itself from the colonial other. Postcolonial criticism highlights the power relations through which modern subjectivity exercises itself over the colonial subject. By pointing out the uneven relationship between the modern subject and its colonial other, postcolonial criticism questions the claims of modernity, such as the unwavering

⁶ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, (London: Verso, 1983).

belief in reason and progress. Edward Said's *Orientalism* is probably the single most important work to stimulate further work in postcolonial criticism. Said has forcefully argued that the ontological distinction between the Occident and the Orient licenses the West to produce knowledge about, and thereby to rule over, the Orient.⁷ This same ontological distinction also contains a power structure which establishes the hegemony of the modern self over the postcolonial other. Modern epistemology plays a crucial part in establishing an uneven power structure between the Orient and the Occident. In his later work, Said proposes a contrapuntal reading to reveal the dichotomy between the modern self and the colonial other by reading a text from center and periphery contrapuntally. Such a contrapuntal reading reveals the intertwined nature of the self/other dichotomy and the power structure embedded within this dichotomy.

Another postcolonial critic, Homi Bhabha, argues that the encounter with the colonized is a destabilizing experience for the colonizer as it brings out the insecurity of the identity of the colonized.⁸ Postcolonial criticism presents an important intervention because it challenges modern subjectivity from the outside. Postcolonial criticism demonstrates that the process through which the modern self is constructed operates through a self/other dichotomy. The stability of the modern self depends upon its ability to establish itself as a hegemonic representation. Postcolonial criticism thus not only highlights the power relationship that exists in this self/other dichotomy but it also demonstrates the instability of the modern self.

⁷ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1978)

⁸ Homi Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse", *October* 28 (1984), pp.125-133

My thesis engages, through friendly dialogue, with the poststructuralist and postcolonial literature. The poststructuralist critique of the modern regime and the postcolonial questioning of the modern subject form the departure point from which I attempt to develop my analysis of why identity and difference is a problematic issue in modern nation states. The poststructuralist critique scrutinizes modern categories such as truth, subjectivity, objectivity and meaning. Contrary to the common argument that poststructuralism represents a break from modern discourse, I see the poststructuralist critique as integral to the modern discourse. Modern thinking was revolutionary precisely because it invested its energy in belief that the human agent had the capacity to change the conditions of her/his life. Endless questioning and curiosity are fundamental properties of the modern regime which refuse the absolute closure of any category. Modern thinking was at the center of questioning the absoluteness of God and the power of monarchs. It celebrated the capacity of the human agent to resist absolute powers and categories. The historical experience, however, has proved that this same emancipatory discourse can easily become an oppressive one. The poststructuralist critique warns and reminds us that the emancipatory promise of the modern regime is not a given phenomenon but depends upon our ability to keep the tradition of questioning and critique alive. Thus poststructuralist critique represent a development, rather than a rejection, of modernity. Accordingly in my thesis I avoid establishing a polarity between the poststructuralist critique and modern discourse. Instead I rethink the question of identity and difference by engaging in a dialogue with the poststructuralist literature to reflect upon why, in modern times, identity is a difficult question with which to deal.

The works of Edward Said and Jurgen Habermas provide the background around which I build a dialogue between poststructuralist critique and modern discourse. In his groundbreaking work of *Orientalism*, Said used Foucault's analysis of discourses to demonstrate how the Orient was constructed as part of a power relation between the Occident and the Orient. Foucault's argument on power/knowledge guided Said's thesis. Said is also a strong believer in the modern idea which puts hope in the ability of the human agent to emancipate herself/himself from oppressive power structures. In fact, his emphasis on contrapuntal reading is an attempt to go beyond dichotomies to demonstrate the relational nature of identities. Habermas appears to be the lone defender of the Enlightenment principles. Despite his commitment, Habermas illuminates why Enlightenment principles failed to fulfill their promises in modern times. He launches a critique of modernity from within itself to reconstruct the emancipatory promise of the modern project. His seminal work on *Communicative Rationality* and the debates that he engages over Germany's unification and its legal framework are attempts to find, within the modern discourse, answers to the challenges that have emerged in the wake of the twenty-first century.

My thesis is not about the reconstruction of the modern project. Nor is it about a poststructuralist critique of modernity. My thesis attempts to contribute to understanding identity in late twentieth century and its negotiation in human societies. As such, any debate about the question of identity cannot be indifferent to the debates that address the rethinking of modernity in the late twentieth century. The way we define ourselves is largely influenced by the premises of modern discourse. For this reason, any analysis that aims to understand the way identities are defined and negotiated should pay attention to the transformation that modernity itself has been going through.

3. Redefinition and Negotiation of Identities in the Global World

The thesis has two principal objectives: to understand the process that leads to the definition and redefinition of identities within the globalization process and to explore how the identity formation might take place as a result of peaceful negotiation.

For a long time national discourses were able to marginalize and silence particular identities within the borders of nation states. Forces unleashed by globalization alter the voice of national discourse and provide the space in which particular identities can claim recognition. Globalization now forces us to deal with the demands that emerge from these particular identity positions. The thesis outlines the effect of globalization on identity formation. Of particular importance is the way in which globalization alters the relationship between universality and particularity, a relationship which has played a key role in defining identities in modern times.

The thesis also argues that even though globalization forces us to face the challenge of difference and otherness, it does not offer us any guarantees that recognizing difference will lead to a peaceful co-existence. Instead, it opens up the process of identity formation to various conflicting forces that are not always progressive and peaceful, on the one hand, while enabling new possibilities for exchange and peaceful co-existence between different identity positions on the other.

If, in an increasingly global world, identity is the particular expression of a certain culture, meaning, value system and tradition, its particularity only becomes meaningful

in its difference from others. Yet, the relationship between identity and difference is not necessarily a peaceful one. In fact, it often contains unexpected tensions and violent outbreaks which can make the relationship between different identity positions an uneasy one. The thesis argues that there is a need for a normative and institutional framework that eases the tension between different identity positions and facilitates dialogue and negotiation between them. The public sphere offers such a normative and institutional framework within which identity formation can occur as a result of the peaceful negotiation of differences. Despite the fact that the public sphere failed in the past to fulfill its promise of fostering plurality within nation states, it still has the potential to revive itself. The thesis argues that the public sphere holds a normative promise of mediating between universality and particularity, and thus facilitating the negotiation of different identity positions that would enable common reference points to emerge.

The relationship between particularity and universality is particularly important to the formation of identities. Identity is not only defined through differentiation from others but also in its particularity as contrasted to that which is universal. Universalization attempts to homogenize and systematize the chaotic nature of difference. It is not specific to modernity. Religious epistemologies had their own systems of universalization that systematized and homogenized other value systems that emerged from particulars. The modern regime emphasized reason and a particular type of knowledge that emerged from the exercise of reason as the basis of universality. In the modern regime subjectivity was a derivative of the exercise of reason. Whether in its

religious or secular form, universality is a "regime of representation"⁹ which elevates a certain particularity to the role of universal. Religious epistemologies legitimize their status of universality by being God's word. Modern epistemology, however, derives its source of universality from reason's assumed ability to apply as a governing law in every situation. Human affairs are said to be governed by general laws that emerged from the universal application of reason.

The division between the Occident and the Orient is particularly important in demonstrating the logic of universality in the modern regime. Ever since the Enlightenment established the hegemony of reason over religious epistemology as the basis of knowledge, the Occident has taken a form of hegemony over the Orient. The Orient has been represented as lacking Occidental rationality. The Occident and its political and ideological forms have been granted the status of universal against which the value systems and life choices of the Orient could be judged. The antagonistic relationship between universality and particularity has created an uneven relationship between the Occident and the Orient in which the Occident has been licensed to establish its hegemony over Orient due to its universal status.

The antagonistic formulation of universality and particularity in modern discourse makes the peaceful negotiation of identities difficult and locks the process of identity formation into a series of binary oppositions. Modern nation states nicely demonstrate

⁹ Christina Roja De Ferro describes regime of representation as "space of encounter between the past, the present and the future; a space of encounter between the self, the other and the external world, a place of encounter between the inside and the outside. It is a space of desire and a temporal space", Christina Roja De Ferro, "The 'Will to

the logic of universality in modern discourse. National identities establish themselves as fixed and homogeneous entities. Their claim to universality hinders them from dealing with particularity. The stability of national identity depends on its ability to absorb and assimilate particularity into a representation of national identity. Modern subjectivity, whose source of meaning is reason, regards as marginal identities that do not fit into its system of representation.

My thesis explores the way in which the relationship between universality and particularity changes within the context of globalization. It argues that the current globalization process creates a new relationship between universality and particularity which has far reaching consequences for the formation of identities. While globalization is not an entirely new phenomenon, its present condition transforms the modern regime's claim to universality. The new condition of universality that emerges out of the present globalization process puts an end to the homogeneous universalization of the modern regime. The multidimensional and contradictory nature of globalization casts doubt on the political, economic and ideological forms of modernity.

There are several interrelated factors that contribute to the emergence of the new condition of universality: on the one hand, the emerging economic forces of globalization create new sources of inequality within and between nation states. On the other hand, an increased interaction between different cultures, groups and people undermines the homogeneous tone of the nation state which in turn provides a greater space for the manifestation of difference. This increased and rapid interaction between cultures and

groups of people alters the representation of western culture as the universal regime. It results in a relativization of the modern regime and draws attention to the fact that western culture is but one particularity among others. Currently, the globalization process results in a heterogeneous universality which, with inherent risks and inequalities, provides greater space in which difference can be manifest.

As the universal and the particular are in constant interaction, the condition of particularity has been undergoing a transformation similar to that of the condition of universality. One significant trend is that national identities, once considered stable, are now fragmenting along ethnic, linguistic and cultural lines. Globalization plays the important role of locating identity formation at the intersection of local, national and global levels. The national level loses its previous hegemony as local and global levels gain significance in the way people define themselves. In other words, national discourses are not the only narratives that shape people's identities. Groups and identities that have long been marginalized by national narratives manifest their particularity by engaging in political struggle at the local and global levels. This multiplication of identity positions within nation states reminds us that heterogeneity and multiplicity are fundamental to the human condition.

The present condition of universality and particularity, however, raises questions regarding the formation and negotiation of identities. National identities has been able to establish themselves as hegemonic entities because of their ability to marginalize difference and particularity that exist within them. The fact that identities and groups once marginalized by national narratives are now claiming representation in their respective identities raises the question of how identities are formed and how claims for

recognition are negotiated. Claiming representation for difference does not automatically lead to a peaceful and just coexistence unless there is a framework within which the negotiation of being together can take place and permit the crisscrossing of identities. Claiming representation, without taking into consideration that identities are not fixed entities but are redefined as a result of social interaction, does not promote a pluralistic social environment. Instead, it fosters an environment where differences are represented as isolated separate enclaves. This has often been the case in the modern regime where the claim to universality has projected identities as fixed entities and denied the possibility of the transformation of identities through social interaction. Similarly, the claim to absolute particularity involves a refusal to recognize that identities are relational entities constructed in relation to each other. Claiming recognition for difference is therefore not merely a political act but also an ethical one which comes with responsibility for others. Responsibility for others means that in claiming recognition for one's identity, one needs to engage and negotiate with others, understand value systems and the choices that they entail and to accept that one's own identity is a social product which is always formed in relation with others and open to change. This understanding of identity entails a framework which goes beyond interest-based identity politics.

My thesis works with the concept of the **public sphere** in order to develop a framework that might facilitate the pluralistic formation and negotiation of identities. For Jurgen Habermas, the public sphere is a dialogical social space in which citizens engage in debate about affairs that are related to their lives. Habermas promotes dialogical reason as a tool for negotiation in modern societies. Despite its dialogical promise, the public sphere in modern societies fails to address the question of identity.

This is due, in part, to the hegemonic representation of national identities. *The public sphere's ability to accommodate difference is all too often curtailed by the dominance of national narratives which see national identity as the only legitimate identity of the public sphere.* Habermas' account of the public sphere is silent on the question of identity and the hegemonic role of national narratives in dominating the public sphere. Habermas' failure to discuss the hegemonic representation of national identity, and its impact on the ability of the public sphere to accommodate different identities, prevents him from seeing the shortcomings of the ideal public sphere. In fact, the same silence leads him to conclude that the manifestation of difference, in the form of various identities in the public sphere, leads to the fragmentation of the public sphere along the lines of interest-based politics.

My thesis, however, argues that in present day complex societies the public sphere can fulfill its dialogical promise only by recognizing the importance of representing identities in their own right. The representation of identities as themselves in the public sphere does not necessarily lead to an interest based identity politics if the public sphere is sensitive to the question of power and has its autonomy from national discourse. The argument that identity does not belong to the realm of the public sphere because universal citizenship provides an equal opportunity to each and every citizen to participate does not hold. The hegemonic representation of national identity means that universal citizenship does not guarantee equal participation and representation in the public sphere. Furthermore, the situatedness of identity in social affairs challenges the assumption that the public sphere offers a power-free environment in which citizens can engage in a public deliberation.

The remaining part of the thesis focuses on the example of Turkey to illustrate these theoretical debates with an actual example. Turkey presents an interesting example as the public sphere has traditionally operated as an integral part of the nation. The public sphere in the Turkish Republic has operated as a social space where the modern nation represented itself. As the public sphere emerged integral to the nation building process, it lacked the autonomy to accommodate different identities and groups and was hostile to the manifestation of any difference. The Turkish national identity's claim to universality has been achieved, however, at the expense of marginalizing ethnic and religious identities and their allocation to the private realm.

After the 1980 military takeover, particular identities and groups found a greater space in which to claim recognition as the public sphere gained a certain degree of autonomy from the national discourse. The unintended consequence of the 1980 military takeover was the erosion of the Kemalist discourse which had constituted the backbone of nation building in Turkey. As the Turkish economy was more deeply incorporated into the world capitalist system and as there was increasing interaction between civil society organizations and international organizations, the Kemalist discourse lost its power to control the parameters of national ideology. The foundations of the public sphere became open to challenge from particular identity positions. The greater autonomy of the public sphere proved to be beneficial to the manifestation of identities previously marginalized by the Kemalist national identity. At the same time, however, the Turkish example is also one which lacks a normative framework that would enable identities to be negotiated. The claims for recognition in the public sphere made by religious and ethnic identities are not directed towards negotiation but rather towards establishing their own hegemony in the public sphere. Similarly, the dominant secular and national

identity refuses to engage with others in redefinition of national identity. Thus the struggle for recognition in the public sphere takes a form of communitarian politics in which various identity positions attempt to establish their hegemony in the public sphere. The absence of a normative and legal framework which would establish a process of negotiation of identity claims leads to the creation of a public sphere in which politics becomes a struggle to impose one's value systems over others.

4. A Note On Method

The thesis is unconventional in its approach to methodology. It is not strictly a theoretical thesis. Nor does it use a case study to "prove" hypotheses derived from the theoretical literature. The thesis aims to develop a critical understanding of the process within which identities are formed and negotiated through analysis of the Turkish experience. In order to develop a critical understanding of identity formation, it engages a dialogue with different sets of literature that explain the process of identity formation. Presenting differing and often conflicting views is often a way of criticizing the existing literature in order to develop one's own solution to a problem. Instead, my thesis brings out the points of crossover in the different sets of literature to develop a fresh understanding of the process of identity formation. These points of crossover demonstrate the converging concerns and arguments of otherwise seemingly opposing sets of literature. Bringing out the conflicting views in different arguments is a critical and useful intellectual exercise but without the application to a concrete example, it does not contribute great deal to the understanding of an actual problem. There is always a danger of being charmed by the procedures of an intellectual exercise and losing sight of what the intellectual argument actually means in the case of a real life problem. It is for

this reason that I try to develop my own critical understanding of the process of identity formation by engaging in a constructive dialogue with several different sets of literature and then illustrate those debates by reference to Turkey's experience.

Being sensitive to how an intellectual practice demonstrates itself in an concrete instance does not rule out a rigorous theoretical analysis. I pay special attention in the thesis to defining and discussing different arguments as clearly as possible. Theoretical rigor is also part and parcel of a reflexive study which refuses to endorse a single view in an orthodox fashion. Reflexivity in this way neither means a relativistic plurality, in which no view is better than an other, nor "scientific objectivity" which requires detachment of the observer/writer. It simply points out that one's own point of view is open to debate and challenge

The question of identity has been of interest to various disciplines from philosophy to sociology to political science to political geography. As the subject matter is located at the intersection of several disciplines, the thesis is interdisciplinary in its approach. A subject such as identity/difference reminds us of the arbitrariness of disciplinary boundaries and can not be addressed within the borders of a single discipline such as political science. The thesis, however, applies a framework in which debates in various disciplines are put into perspective. It recognizes the fact that debate on identity contains a certain degree of abstraction and should be sensitive to the question of language, discourse and meaning as they play a key role in the formation of identities. The methodological approach which the thesis employs assumes that these levels can only be meaningful in their economic, political and ideological contexts. It discusses the abstract dimension of the question of identity within the political, economic and

ideological contexts which shape the meaning and discursive dimension of identity. The meaning and discursive construction of identities are explained within the context of interaction of these three levels. As Althusser pointed out, these levels have a certain autonomy in shaping social formation. The methodological approach in the thesis shares the basic Althusserian argument but moves away from it as it refuses to give the primacy to the economic level in the last instance. Instead, it examines them in their distinct realms and explores the ways in which they interact to give way to certain social formations.

Finally, the thesis focuses on Turkey as an illustration of theoretical debates in one local context. Following Appadurai's recent description, the chapters on Turkey are not intended to be case studies but illustrations of one local articulation of the relationship between the public sphere and national discourse.¹⁰ Turkey represents an interesting example in terms of how the traditional relationship between universality and particularity played a role in the identity formation in a non-Western context. The tension between the national discourse and the public sphere exists in all modern societies to various degrees but particular the articulation of that relationship and its impact on the identity formation is contingent upon the local conditions of each country

¹⁰ Appadurai describes the way he discusses India in his recent book as follows: "But I hasten to plead to India-in this book-is not to read as a mere case, example, or instance of something larger than itself. It is, rather a *site* for the examination of how locality emerges in a globalizing world, of how colonial processes underwrite contemporary politics, of how history and genealogy inflect one another, and of how global facts take local form", Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large : Cultural Dimensions of Globalizations*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pg.18

For instance, the Turkish example is interesting in terms of its relationship with modernity and modern subjectivity. Turkey is one of the very few non-Western countries not colonized by the European powers. As a result the Turkish modernizing elite could adopt modernity as complete Westernization without making a distinction between the two. In this respect, Turkish modernization was a totalistic project which not only aimed to create a new nation but also to transform the agents of the new nation state into modern subjects. Such ambition resulted in a universalistic understanding of identity which refused to give legitimacy to other subjectivities. The public sphere played a role in the implementation of this universal interpretation of identity and its relationship with particularity. The increasing influence of the globalization process has been such that it has broken the hegemonic relationship between this universal interpretation of identity and the public sphere which has enabled particularities to claim a space in the public sphere. Turkey thus offers an interesting example of how the globalization process affects the relationship between the national discourse and the public sphere in a local context.

The first two chapters examine the relationship between universality and particularity in order to discuss the changing nature of the forces that shape the formation of identities. The first chapter focuses on the condition of universality by discussing the characteristics of the globalization process. It is argued that as the globalization process calls into question the key assumptions of the modern regime, it alters the modern regime's claim to universality. The result is a heterogeneous universality in which there is a greater possibility for particular groups and identities to make claims for representation. The second chapter concentrates on the condition of particularity within the context of globalization. The chapter argues that the formation of identities now

takes place at the intersection of the local, national and global level. This weakens the hegemony of national discourses responsible for reproducing national identities and gives greater autonomy to particular groups and identities in which they can distance themselves from national identity. The chapter warns against the danger of "ultimate particularism" and explores different ways of interpreting the process of identity formation in the globalized world. The third chapter put forwards a framework within which identity formation can occur through peaceful negotiation. The chapter calls for a reexamination of the concept of the public sphere in order to address the question of multiplicity in nation states. It argues that, despite the fact that the public sphere in nation states has failed to address the question of difference, it has the normative potential to provide a framework within which identities are remade as a result of peaceful negotiation. It starts with a critical examination of Habermas' formulation of the public sphere and offers an alternative understanding of the public sphere to address the question of difference. The remaining four chapters concentrate on the Turkish example in order to illustrate the theoretical points that I have addressed in the first three chapters. The fourth chapter examines the emergence of the modern public sphere in the later Ottoman Empire and its reconstruction the Turkish Republic. The fifth chapter focuses on the practices that formed the modern public sphere in the Turkish Republic. The emphasis is on the problematic relationship between the categories of the nation, the people and the public. The chapter argues that as national discourse have curbed the autonomy of the public sphere, the public sphere has failed to address the question of difference. The sixth chapter discusses the conditions that has led to the decline of the hegemony of the national discourse. The result is an increasing autonomy for the public sphere and greater possibility for particular groups and identities to seek recognition in the public sphere. The seventh chapter focuses on the various forms of

struggle that are employed by political Islam to challenge the boundaries of the modern public sphere. Here it is argued that, despite the recent pluralization of the public sphere and the manifestation of the difference within it, the lack of a normative framework which defines the rules of negotiating identities results in a communitarian politics in which identities engage in political struggle to establish their hegemony in the public sphere. The peaceful formation and negotiation of identities requires the critical rethinking of how the national public sphere operates.

CHAPTER I

UNIVERSALITY WITHIN GLOBALIZATION

Introduction

There has recently been a fundamental shift in the organizational principles of nation states which has had an impact on the way cultural identities now manifest themselves within borders of nation-states. There is a common resurgence against the idea of sameness which national identities tend to impose. This thesis argues that the resurgence of particular identities, along with the manifestation of plurality and complexity within nation states, are reflections of the newly emerging relationship between universality and particularity. This chapter begins to locate the main currents influencing this new relationship between universality and particularity, focusing on the characteristics of globalization that have given rise to this new condition of universality.

Although globalization is not a new phenomenon, having formed an integral part of the modern regime from the beginning, the current phase is transforming the modern regime's claim to universality. In modern times, universality had taken the form of such key assumptions as: reason as a key to truth; belief in the primacy of progress and the concept of the individual as the center of social life. From this perspective, particular identities and social formations that did not fit into this definition of universality were deemed marginal. As defined in the modern regime, universality has been unable to accommodate particularities defined as marginal due to the fact that the whole relationship between universality and particularity has been based on the antagonism of these two concepts. In other words, the existence and reproduction of universality has traditionally been contingent upon marginalizing the particular. This

has been most obvious within national ideologies where the logic was solely based on consolidating particular identities into a universal one. Despite the fact that national identities were simply universal representations of a particular identity, their hegemonic position seemed to marginalize other identities within nation states.

This chapter argues that the current phase of globalization is producing a new form of universality that calls into question the key assumptions of the modern regime. This opens up possibilities for groups and identities located on the margins, enabling them to make claims for recognition. The condition of universality has thus become heterogeneous. Heterogeneous universality does not, however, immediately guarantee a more peaceful relationship between universality and particularity. It does, however, provide new possibilities for accommodation of difference and plurality.

The first section focuses on sources of universalization in the modern regime and different explanations of the globalization process in the literature. The globalization process attracts attention from almost all disciplines of social science. This widespread attention indicates the fact that globalization is a multi-dimensional and multi-faceted phenomenon which can not be reduced to one single determining force. Multiple, and mostly contending, discussions on globalization mark the ambiguous and heterogeneous character of the process. The chapter will identify the ambiguity and heterogeneity of the globalization process by discussing divergences and convergences in the literature. Following this, the chapter will focus on the condition of heterogeneous universality and its fundamental difference from homogeneous universality as traditionally defined by the modern regime.

1.1. Globalization as Universalization

Globalization has been the center of attention in almost all branches of the social sciences for the last decade now. Globalization is not, however, a new phenomenon. Rather it has been a distinct feature of modernity manifested in the claim to universality. Depending upon one's viewpoint, universality can be attributed either to the logic of capitalism, which rejects national and cultural boundaries; to the primacy of reason which assumes universal applicability; or to the idea that secular and political power emerges from the individual rather than from a supranatural power. In contrast to these perspectives, I argue that it is the combination of the three autonomous, but interrelated, political, ideological and economic properties of modernity that has been responsible for the claim to universality. Before looking at how the present state of globalization alters this understanding of universality, it is necessary to give a brief summary of those properties that created the universal effect.

The revolt against religious knowledge as the basis of knowing the world led to a new understanding of the human agent. Human consciousness, rather than religious dogma, was believed to be the principal source of knowledge. This belief gained its full momentum with the emergence of the Enlightenment around the sixteenth century, a movement which emphasized the primacy of the human reason. Reason was supposed to free human agents from religious dogma and ancient social relations, opening up endless possibilities through which an individual could achieve true freedom.¹ The main target of the Enlightenment, however, was to supersede the Christian world view that had defined the basis of what could be considered legitimate knowledge. As opposed to

¹ Gay quotes Kant's famous sentence which summarizes the focus of the Enlightenment tradition: "man realizing his potential through the use of his mind". P. Gay, *The Enlightenment : An Interpretation, Vol.1: The Rise of Modern Paganism*, (London: Wildwood House, 1973), pg.21

supranatural religious knowledge, knowledge based on reason was said to be found only in the physical world and known only through the sensory capabilities of human intellect.²

The idea that human reason, rather than God's word, was the basis of knowledge and truth was supposed to free individuals from the constraints of religion and tradition.

Enlightenment thought assumed that human consciousness was a universal property which was geared toward the progress of humanity as a whole.³ For Enlightenment

thinkers, history was not a series of events preordained by God, but progress

orchestrated by human consciousness. The universality of human consciousness which

was manifest in reason promised a common future for all humanity that was free from

religious and other traditional forms of knowledge. It was the first time in human

history that human communities were compared, classified, known and also ruled over

according to criteria of universal reason.⁴

² For more see N. Hampson, *The Enlightenment* (London: Penguin, 1969) and R. Porter, *The Enlightenment*, (London: Macmillan, 1990).

³ The universal tone of the Enlightenment thought is well manifested in the following lines written by Diderot to Hume in 1768: "My dear David, you belong to all nations, and you'll ask an unhappy man for his birth certificate. I flatter myself that I am, like you, citizen of the great city of the world" Quoted in Gay, *The Enlightenment*, pg.13. The tone of the cosmopolitanism in these lines is far ahead of what has been achieved in recent phase of globalization. Similarly, the idea of universality is an important aspect of both Kant's and Hegel's philosophy. Kant in his short essay titled "What is Enlightenment" states that Enlightenment is the maturity of "man" to think for himself, and universal reason was the force that would bring "man" out of dogma and superstition. Hans Reiss, *Kant's Political Writings*, ed, trans. by H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). In "Perpetual Peace" Kant recognizes the differences between states and traditions but this does not prevent him from outlining general principles that had to be applied regardless of differences between states and traditions. For Kant, these principles are informed by the "categorical imperative" and have a built-in universal nature. This built-in universal nature makes possible the application of those principles regardless of differences. For Hegel, history was an expressive totality which portrays "all the different aspects of social formation are mere reflections of some basic principle, some core, some center which informs the whole" Alex Callinicos, *Is There a Future for Marxism?*, (London: Macmillan, 1982). Both Kant and Hegel attempted to find ways to go beyond particularities of various kinds, such as culture and identity, to achieve a universal criteria.

⁴ Undoubtedly Said is one of the most elaborate attempts to show how the universalization of a certain type of reasoning turned into web of power network by producing a knowledge about the "other". Similarly Larraín points out how European

The primacy of the human agent as the legitimate source of knowledge challenged the political power of the monarch as the worldly representation of God. If knowledge and truth emerged only from the human agent, then sovereignty should also rest only within the human agent as well. The ascendancy of the view that a secular political power rested in human beings marked the end of the sovereignty of the monarch and gave way to the emergence of popular sovereignty with the modern state as its administrative unit.⁵

The legitimacy of the idea that political power rested in the individual also led to the concept of the citizen as the active participant in the social order which, in turn, marked the end of the concept of the obedient subject. The legitimacy of political power in the modern regime has become contingent upon accountability to citizens.⁶ This necessitated an institutionalization of impersonal power which required a set of executive, judicial and legislative institutions with clearly defined powers and separate political realms.⁷

The remarkable shift in the organization of economic life that started to take place around the seventeenth century contributed to, and reinforced, the changes taking place in the ideological and political realms. Markets concentrated around cities became important centers which attracted large number of people from rural areas. With the

identity was privileged in relation to other peoples and civilization by assigning a universal role to the reason. Jorge Larraín, *Ideology & Cultural Identity: Modernity and the Third World Presence*, (Cambridge: Polity Press 1994).

⁵ For more on the ascendancy of secular political power see Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, vol. 1*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) and Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire 1875-1914* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), pp. 84-111.

⁶ Roland Axtmann, *Liberal Democracy into the twenty-first century, Globalization, Integration and the Nation-State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), pg.11. Turner also elaborates on the relationship between the ascendancy of the individual as the legitimate source of political power and capitalism. Brian Turner, *Citizenship and Capitalism* (London: Allen&Unwin, 1986).

⁷ Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990)ch.7.

help of technological innovations, the production of goods increased and their transportation from one place to another became increasingly easy.⁸ The increased interaction between diverse geographical locations, the concept of production for profit, the commodification of labor, and the increasing role that money played created new social conditions which led to the dissolution of old loyalties and stratifications. In sum, the development of capitalism went hand in hand with other ideological and political developments. The idea of the primacy of the individual found a natural expression in the capitalist system as the expression of pursuing self-interest and happiness.⁹ Furthermore, the European settlement and colonization of remote corners of the world turned capitalism into a global economic system. Plantations in North America and the Caribbean, mining in Latin America, and tea and rubber plantations of India and Ceylon, are examples of networks of the economic system that connected lands and people in a way that had never happened before.¹⁰ The struggle for colonies, new markets and raw materials not only turned capitalism into a global economic system but also transformed modernity into a reality of everyday life in many parts of the world.¹¹

⁸ For more on the developmental cities as markets see R. Porter, *English Society in the Eighteenth Century*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990) 2nd. edition. For increasing exchange between cities see P. Langford, *A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727-1783* (Oxford: Clarendon Press)

⁹ Adam Smith was the first one who established the connections between the mechanisms of a capitalist economy and the surrounding political and ideological environment. In his analysis individuals who seek to maximize their self interest are the generators of public good. Furthermore, Smith reaffirms John Locke's assertion of rights and liberties, particularly the existence of private property, as the fundamental assumption of the capitalist economic system. In other words, individuals can maximize their self interest, and the public interest, within the existence of political liberties. Smith's unfettered belief in the synchronicity of individual and public interest could only be questioned after two world wars and terrible economic depressions. For more see Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, ed. Campbell and Skinner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).

¹⁰ Stuart Hall, "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power" in *Formations of Modernity*, ed. by Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert and Kenneth Thompson, (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1997) pg.191.

¹¹ Wolf sees the history of the whole humankind as "a totality of interconnected processes, and inquires that disassemble this totality into bits and then fail to reassemble it falsify reality. Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982) pg.4.

The practices that led to the emergence of the modern regime are, of course, much more complex and multi-dimensional than suggested above. I have, however, singled out the ideological, political and economic dimensions as central characteristics of the modern way of seeing things. These central characteristics are assumptions behind the claim to universality. It is not simply capitalist expansion or the primacy of reason nor the popular sovereignty and the state which constitute the claim to universality. Rather, it is their interconnected but, relatively autonomous, operation that has reinforced the assumptions behind modern ways of thinking and given its institutions a universal quality transcending particular identities and locations.¹² Enlightenment thinkers and early theorists who attempted to account for the emerging dynamics of modern life, however, did not have any doubt about the universality of modern forms.¹³ This

¹² Said in his *Orientalism* pointed out that it was not the capitalist system which necessitated the colonization of other peoples and lands, but a mind set which justified such action. Edward Said, *Orientalism*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), Introduction. Reason was supposed to be a universal property that transcends the particularities. This suggested that any particularity, whether it was an individual or a group of people, that did not conform with principles of universal reason was either a lesser individual or a less developed people who needed to be governed and ruled. As Said argued, only within the existence of such an ideological framework, was it possible to pursue the colonialist expansion needed to extract material resources from remote lands. Colonization established itself as an acceptable practice as a result of autonomous but interconnected ideological and economic spheres.

¹³ The Enlightenment thinkers such as Montaigne, Rousseau, Diderot, Burke and Hobbes gave accounts of why "savage people" were different from "Christians". In their account, the emerging properties of Enlightenment culture were the measure by which the difference of "savage people" could be explained. For more see Hall, "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power", pg.218-219. Todorov provides an excellent analysis of how philosophers such as Gobineau, Renan, Tocqueville and Michelet attempted to explain other cultures and peoples with the parameters of European culture. Lack of what existed in European culture in other cultures constituted their backwardness. For more see Tzvetan Todorov, *On Human Diversity*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994) chs.2&3. Later on founders of modern social theory problematized the difference of "others" by looking at what they "lacked" in their social structure in terms of modern social forms. Weber for instance explained Islam by contrasting it with the West, and Marx classified Asian countries under the "asiatic mode of production" where the level of relations of production had not yet reached the Western levels. For more see Bryan Turner, *Weber and Islam* (London: Routledge, 1974) and Bryan Turner, *Marx and the End of Orientalism* (London: Allen&Unwin). In the fifties and sixties, modernization theory argued that traditional societies would follow the same path with other modern

metaphysical perception of universality masked the fact that universality of the modern regime is not a timeless truth but is a historical condition.

National Discourse as a Representation of Universality

National discourse is particularly important in understanding the representation of universality within the modern regime. Whether nationalism is a modern phenomenon or not is a contested issue, and modern day nations undoubtedly have roots in older ethnic identities.¹⁴ However rooted modern national identities may be in pre-modern ethnic identities, modern national discourse differentiates itself from pre-modern national communities. Locating itself within the logic of the modern regime, modern nationalism makes a claim for universality by utilizing the following two important elements: 1) centralization of a political structure within a given territory and (2) homogenization of identity through the marginalization of others.

Modern nationalism was able to differentiate itself from earlier nationalisms of the medieval era by utilizing a centralized political structure whose constitutive force is reason. Modern national discourse claims to construct a political community based not on kinship or tribal connections but rather on reason and its ability to form institutions which create a sense of community. Anthony Smith may be right in criticizing those who would make a sharp distinction between modern nationalism and its pre-modern version.

societies. Old forms of social life gave way to new forms in traditional societies.

¹⁴ Anthony Smith argues that traces of ethnic traditions in modern nations are inherited from pre-modern life. He emphasizes that modern national narratives construct their history by drawing on pre-modern ethnic roots and derive their meaning from myths and symbols which were related to those ethnic identities. For more see Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) and Anthony Smith, *National Identity*, (London: Penguin, 1991). Even in his most recent books he argues that in order to understand the appeal of nationalism in the age of globalization "both the longer time-frame and the recovery of the ethnic substratum are needed". Anthony Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in an Global Era*, (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), pg.6.

Yet, modern national discourse is indeed different from its previous version in its ability to claim community. Most importantly, modern national discourse uses economic, political and ideological forms of modernity to claim national community. In other words, it is assumed that modern national discourse derives its claim for universality, not from ethnic or kinship ties, but from modern institutions, including the state. The assumption that the state corresponds to a nation in a given territory enabled modern nationalism to use the resources of the state to claim a political community as a national community. The government's control over a territory, its ability to arrange economic redistribution and political consolidation, its control over education systems, and its ability to reconstruct a common memory through a revitalization of myths and symbols provide the background against which modern nationalism constructs itself as a universal discourse. Smith acknowledges the fact that moving to a civic nation includes steps such as "movement towards universally recognized homeland", "economic unification of all members", "turning ethnic members into legal citizens, mobilizing them on common civil, social and political rights" and "reeducating masses in national values, myths and values".¹⁵ He does not, however, explain nor acknowledge the role of the modern regime in enabling national discourse to assimilate various different groups into one national community. Nor does he explain the ability of modern nationalism to represent itself as a rational, legal discourse, despite the fact that beneath that legal-rational discourse there is usually a painful process of assimilation of various groups into one national identity.

Benedict Anderson rightly points out the role of the modern regime in modern national discourse's claim to universality. According to Anderson, print capitalism, with its ability to create a common discourse among otherwise disconnected groups of people, the

¹⁵ Anthony D. Smith, "The Origins of Nations", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 12/3, 1989, pp.349-56.

impact of reformation and the spread of administrative centralization all played a crucial role in establishing nationalism as a representation of community.¹⁶ Anderson points out that print capitalism was the "institutional space" which enabled the communication of a national language to occur across a territory. The communication of a national language enabled the "imagination" of national identity to establish itself as the dominant form of identity within the nation-state.

Similarly, Gellner emphasizes the importance of modern thinking in the ascendancy of nationalism. In his account, national identity emerges as the natural consequence of industrialization as a new social environment required individuals whose loyalty did not lie with traditions and tribes but in the universal institutions of the nation state.¹⁷

Gellner provides an account of nationalism in which universal education and literacy, together with the emergence of new industrial and governmental structures, provide the ground for national community. Gellner offers a somewhat functionalistic interpretation of nationalism where nationalism emerges as a natural consequence of the modern regime.

Hobsbawm links the emergence of national discourse with the modern imagination within which traditions were reinvented to stabilize modern national identity. Similar to Gellner, he argues that primary education, public ceremonies and rituals as well as public monuments were instrumental in establishing the nation as a tradition.¹⁸ His interpretation points out an interesting paradox in that national discourse represents itself as a traditional force even though the very process which claims a traditional role for nationalism is a modern one.

¹⁶ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London:Verso, 1983) pp.36-46

¹⁷ Ernest Gellner, *Nation and Nationalisms* (Blackwell: Oxford, 1983) pp.55-62

¹⁸ Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)

All of the above suggest a close link between the institutional forms of the modern regime and the ascendancy of nationalism. The institutional capacity of the modern regime enabled nationalism to establish itself as a universal discourse from which meaning of community is derived. Contrary to pre-modern forms of nationalism, modern nationalism's claim to universality is based on the institutional capabilities of the modern regime and the civic principles where membership in a national community is based, not on ethnic and kinship ties, but on a legal framework which outlines the foundations of citizenship in a given national community.¹⁹ Modern nationalism's civic claim is confronted by the fact that national identity represents itself as the universal identity. This is where the line between modern and pre-modern nationalisms are blurred. Albeit different from ancient forms of nationalism, modern nationalism still attempts to hegemonize identity despite the fact that it bases itself on a civic virtue. In order to understand modern nationalism's claim to universal identity in a given community, we have to turn to the second source of universality in national discourse: the homogenization of identity through the marginalization of others.

In other words, modern national identity pushed particular ethnic, tribal and religious identities aside. National discourse offers a membership based on citizenship which guarantees that anyone who fulfills certain legal requirements can become a member of a national community. Its offer for membership, however, is also contingent upon the agreement to be represented by the dominant national identity. Modern national discourse's attempts to consolidate particular identities into homogeneous single national identities constitutes a direct contradiction to its civic promise. Despite the fact that the

¹⁹ Hugh Seton-Watson for instance introduces a very sharp distinction between old medieval nationalism and the new modern nationalism. He suggest that nation in its old meaning came close to ethnic definition whereas the new nations are based on civic nation. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, (Methuen: London, 1977). pp.6-10.

civic aspect of nationalism assumes that national community is open to plural representation, national discourse attempts to represent the nation through a dominant singular identity. This representation of the nation by a homogeneous identity marginalizes other particular identities and attributes an essential quality to national identity. Some accounts of modern nationalism, in fact, accept this essentialism as part of national discourse. This chapter is not so much concerned with primordial accounts of nationalism which perceive it to be an organic property of a community.²⁰ It is rather interested in the contradiction in the logic of modern nationalism which, on the one hand, rejects the homogeneous logic of ethnic and tribal nationalism, but, on the other hand, attempts to consolidate particular identities into homogeneous national identity. This very contradiction puts strain on the possibility of creating a pluralistic community.

Even though nationalism's claim to universality and its impact on the pluralistic community exist in every modern society to varying degrees, its existence is particularly visible in non-western national discourses. Nationalisms that emerged after decolonization often provide examples of how national identity attempts to eradicate, in many cases violently, former particularities by establishing itself as the legitimate identity of a nation. While nationalism in a non-western context emerges as a resistance to colonial rule, it simultaneously adopts the logic of the modern regime in which the nation is represented through homogeneous national identity.²¹

²⁰ For examples of primordialist account of nationalism see Pierre van den Berghe, *The Ethnic Phenomenon*, (New York: Elsevier, 1979), Christopher Badcock, *Evolution and Individual Behaviour*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991) and Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution" in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States*, (New York: Free Press, 1963)

²¹ Chatterjee calls this a derivative discourse where nationalism in postcolonial societies takes a form of reverse orientalism. He argues that, on the one hand, nationalism in postcolonial countries accepts the rational-secular framework of modern discourse, and, on the other, it attempts to preserve the autonomy of the national identity. Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp.38-52.

What Chatterjee calls a derivative discourse also indicates an ambivalence in non-western contexts because despite nationalism's attempt to "narrate" the nation as a continuous and natural entity, it is marked with control and power which erases "difference" and "otherness".²² This problematic relation between national identity and the Other poses a serious problem for the realization of a pluralistic society in which the Other can be represented in her/his own right. Furthermore, national identity's claim to universality eradicates the possibility for a dialogue between the self and the Other which could lead to a hybridization of identities.

The belief in the universality of national identity and modern forms of life has resulted in the particularization of local forms of life, culture and knowledge. Traditional identities and local life styles were supposed to disappear as national identity and modern life established itself in different parts of the world. It is this belief that equated universality with modernity and that understood the history of modernity as the pre-ordered progress towards a common destiny. The history of modernity, however, is full of ruptures and discontinuities that deny the existence of the idea of an uninterrupted progress.²³ The dilemma of the modern regime is that universality could only be realized at the expense of the elimination of particularity.²⁴

²² Homi Bhabha, "Introduction", in Homi Bhabha (ed.) *The Nation and Narration*, (Routledge : London, 1990), pp.1-7

²³ History of colonialism, imperialism, two world wars, and the holocaust are examples of ruptures that occurred within the modern regime on a global scale. A closer look inside many national discourses also reveals that there are countless practices indicating that the general momentum of modernity has been a discontinuity rather than progress.

²⁴ Works of Levinas and Derrida establish the linkage between desire for sameness and the elimination of particularity. Levinas provides an excellent account of the dilemma between totality and its realization in modern regime. For more see Immanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1969). Derrida explains the logic within which sameness and otherness has been tied to each other in modern philosophy. For more see Jacques Derrida, *Margins*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) and Jacques Derrida, *The Ear of the Other* (New York: Schocken Books, 1985).

Globalization brings out new forces which alter the way universality and particularity interact within the context of modern life. Within the short history of the modern regime, local cultures and traditional communities had an antagonistic relationship with homogeneous national identities and modern forms of life. The world capitalist system, nationalist ideologies and instrumental rationality as a dominant form of producing knowledge marginalized local cultures and traditional communities as well as particular identities within nation states. Resistance from local cultures and particular identities to the universalizing force of the modernity was considered an unresolvable tension which required either that locals be dissolved within the body of universal modernity, or that they be marginalized and eventually disappear. Local forms of economic activity did not have any chance within the borders of the world capitalist system that creates a complex relationship of dependency between the core and the periphery. Similarly, the dominance of a national identity did not allow the manifestation of ethnic, traditional or gender based identities outside the boundaries of national ideology. Instrumental rationality privileged a certain type of knowledge, that which was based on observation and empirical facts, at the expense of traditional forms of knowledge.

The current state of globalization alters the universal voice of the modern regime. The nation-state is said to lose its ability to reproduce its own identity. Capitalism is still a dominant economic force but its ability to draw boundaries between core and periphery is not so obvious. The flexible organization of production and "disorganized" distribution of labor on a global scale create new conditions that are not easily controllable. The unifying voice of reason as the source of modern knowledge has been under attack by various groups within the West. Forces that are operating within the context of globalization have posed challenges to key institutions and ideologies responsible for claim to universality.

Even though forces shaping the global state of affairs are diverse and do not constitute a coherent structure, they transform the traditional relationship between universality and particularity as particular forms of human existence find a greater space to challenge the unified voice of the modern regime. The ambiguous nature of globalization contains different possibilities in itself, and the final outcome is far from clear. It is important to see globalization as an incomplete process which contains a paradoxical trend consisting of a strong tendency towards further particularization as well as towards increasing universalization.

1.2. Globalization: A Heterogeneous Process

This section of the chapter aims to illustrate the heterogeneous nature of the globalization process by focusing on various accounts of globalization within the literature. This review provides the argument that globalization is not simply an extension of the world capitalist system nor a cultural phenomenon. It is, rather, a complex process that consists of political, economic and cultural components.

Providing a full account of the literature on globalization is a real challenge not only because almost all of the branches of the social sciences have something to but also because new literature is added daily to this already well-developed area of research.

The following summary of the literature on globalization will focus on various accounts which highlight different dimensions of the process. This section will be organized around four main themes: "globalization as a derivative of the world capitalist system"; "globalization as late modernity"; "globalization as a cultural phenomenon"; and "globalization as a socio-historical process".

Globalization as a derivative of the world capitalist system

This account locates the globalization process within the logic of the world capitalist system. It sees globalization as the functional outcome of a new phase of capital accumulation which goes beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Transnational financial networks and the internationalization of production enabled capital accumulation to take place outside the boundaries, and to a large degree outside the regulative mechanisms, of the nation state. Borderless international finance has become a crucial player in the transnationalization of the world capitalist system as the enormous amount of capital now concentrated in the international financial markets is beyond the regulation and control of national governments and, in most cases, surpasses them.²⁵ It is both complexity and ungovernability, according to Harvey, that makes the international financial system so global that "an English buyer can get a Japanese mortgage, an American can tap his New York bank account through a cash machine in Hong Kong and a Japanese investor can buy shares in a London-based Scandinavian bank whose stocks are denominated in sterling, dollars, Deutsche Marks and Swiss francs".²⁶

The transnationalization of financial services is also reinforced by changes in production and services that are more and more carried outside the geographical limitations of the state. Transnational companies, with the help of communication technologies, can easily shift their production from one country to another without much difficulty. The whole

²⁵ The power and the transnational character of the financial markets was obvious during the crash of European monetary system that resulted in the withdrawal of the British pound. The British central bank did not have the financial power currency speculators had. The crash of the Barrings bank, caused by single trader in Singapore, is another example of the lack of regulation regarding the international financial markets. The Mexican crisis in 1994 also proved that macro and microeconomic balances of many countries have to comply with the expectations of foreign investors and currency speculators.

²⁶ David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, (Oxford : Blackwell Publishers, 1991) pg.161.

world becomes a workshop where production takes place regardless of geographical differences. King sums up the whole process by stating that "Germany's largest industrial city is Sao Paulo in Brazil".²⁷

The geographical dispersion of production creates opportunities for developing countries to improve their investment and level of industrialization by attracting foreign capital. At the same time, it creates enormous power disparities at the expense of people living in those countries as well as of people living in developed areas from which capital flows. The transnationalization of production and services means the deregulation of industries to create favorable environments for transnational companies and investors as well as the breakdown of former arrangements between labor and business. As is the case with international financial markets, the international organization of production and services slips away from the regulatory practices of national governments.²⁸

Proponents of World System theory argue that the geographically diverse nature of the division of labor requires the free flow of commodities, goods and labor through permeable borders and breaks the link between production and territory.²⁹

Globalization is thus seen as an inevitable outcome of the further development of capital accumulation in that reproduction of capital accumulation requires it to expand beyond its previous territorial arrangements. The endless accumulation of capital, which is now beyond the border of nation-states, creates a tension between heterogeneity and

²⁷ Anthony King, *Culture, Globalization and the World*, (Binghamton: Department of Art and Art History, State University of New York, 1991), pg.69.

²⁸ For instance, in the production of one GM car, six different countries are normally involved; engines come from Brazil and Australia, automatic transmission from North America, axes from Japan. And this parts are also assembled in different geographical locations such as South Africa and Europe. For more see Anthony G. McGrew & Paul G. Lewis et al., *Global Politics*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992). In the service sector, telecommunications industries, especially telephone and cable companies, are also becoming truly global organizations.

²⁹ Samir Amin, "The Future of Global Polarization", *Review*, Summer 1994, XVII,3, pp.337-347.

homogeneity. According to this account, the nation-state constitutes the universal which loses its ability to reproduce itself due to the international nature of the capitalist system. In other words, the tension between universalism and particularism is a result of the increasing ease with which particulars challenge the universal framework of the nation state.³⁰ Globalization thus appears to be the unavoidable consequence of the present workings of the world capitalist system. The defining characteristic of globalization is its reinforcement of unequal distribution of wealth among different parts of the world and the growing discrepancy between the developed and underdeveloped parts of the world³¹

Forces shaping the global state of affairs, which are located both above and below the nation-state, have a direct impact on the institutions and actors of nation-states. The inevitable growth of international economic interconnectedness and the multiplicity of actors operating within the complex web of global networks diminishes the state's ability to regulate the economic and political realm of bounded territories. The forces of globalization put pressure on the institutions and mechanisms of nation states as it involves a growing interpenetration of the human condition. As a result of "scope (stretching)" and "intensity (deepening)", democracy and sovereignty are being removed from their traditional settings.³² The role of traditional power brokers, such as parties, trade unions and interest groups, is fundamentally dislocated by the growing international organization and forces. Thus the regulatory ability of the nation-state is

³⁰ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Geopolitics and Culture*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp.184-199. Similar argument can also be found in Immanuel Wallerstein, "Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the Modern World System", *Theory, Culture and Society*, Jan 1990, Vol.7, no.2/3, pg.31. and Immanuel Wallerstein, "The End of What Modernity", *Theory and Society*, Aug. 1995, Vol.24, No.4, pg.47.

³¹ Samir Amin, "The Challenge of Globalization", *Review of International Political Economy*, Summer 1996, Vol.3, No.2, pg.216

³² Held and McGrew, "Globalization and the Liberal Democratic State", *Government and Opposition*, Vol.28, No.2, pg.264

challenged from above, as well as from below, by local and regional groups. Territoriality, sovereignty and democracy are reconstituted in the process.³³ Even though globalization gives rise to a significant increase in "weak public governance by national governments", "operation of MNCs as stateless actors", "declining economic power of labor" and "growth in multi-polarity in the international political economy", it does not necessarily turn nation states into puppets of global forces.³⁴ States are still the only institutions that can provide "legitimacy for supra governance mechanisms" despite the fact that the internationalization of economic forces is itself an inevitable force.³⁵ If globalization is an inevitable force, then it is imperative to have new sets of institutions and rules to regulate capital which can fill the gap that emerges from 'weak public governance' on a national level.

Accounts that place globalization within the logic of the world capitalist system perceive the tension between universality and particularity as a direct outcome of the conflict between nationalist discourses and the growing internationalization of the capitalist system.³⁶ In particular, proponents of the world- system perspective argue that the logic of the world capitalist system determines the way in which universal categories of the modern regime interact with particular identities and cultures. It is within this

³³ *ibid.*, pg.285. For similar accounts see David Held, *Democracy and Global Order*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995)chs.5&6 and David Held "Democracy and the New International Order" in *Cosmopolitan Democracy* ed. by Archibugi and Held (Cambridge:Polity Press, 1995) pp.96-120.

³⁴ Hirst and Thompson, "The Problem of 'Globalisation':International Economic Relations, National Economic Management and the Formation of Trading Blocks", *Economy and Society*, Vol.21, No.4, pg. 361

³⁵ Hirst and Thompson, *Globalization in Question*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), chs.6&8.

³⁶ Although economism is apparent in their work, Hirst and Thompson deserves attention and appreciation for the fact that their work demonstrates effort to construct an agenda for the left. They rightly point out that the deregulation "hype" that accompanied globalization is very much in harmony with the new right agenda, whereas the left are in a disadvantaged position as a result of the inability of national governments to regulate capital accumulation. In this framework, global governance becomes an important opportunity to develop new mechanism to regulate capital accumulation.

context that culture becomes a critical reference as it provides the means by which new forms of resistance can be articulated against various forms of universality. The most repeated criticism of this perspective is its economism which is justified as it fails to do justice to the autonomous processes of the political, cultural and ideological dimensions of global state affairs. It ignores the fact that every material structure, including the economy, is a complex articulation of discursive practices that have ideological, cultural and political dimensions.³⁷

A multi-dimensional process like globalization requires an account that recognizes the complexity of seemingly contradictory, but also complementary, political and cultural practices that are taking place within a global state of affairs. Nevertheless, the accounts of globalization which see the capitalist world system as the most important factor draw attention to a crucial aspect of globalization: that the concentration of capital accumulation at the global level poses serious challenges to the rights of wage earners, to the viability of redistributive policies and also to the ability to sustain democratic discourses.³⁸ As the market and capital become increasingly powerful in influencing

³⁷ The predominance of the economy has been an ongoing controversy within the left. Foucault, for instance, provides an account of a discursive construction the political economy in the nineteenth century which challenges the dominance of the economic level, Michael Foucault, *The Order of Things : An Archeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973). By drawing on Foucauldian analysis, Dean draws attention to the complex articulation between material structures and discursive practices as constitutive elements of social formations, Mitchell Dean, *Critical and Effective Histories*, (New York: Routledge, 1994). Holton takes a Weberian approach to show how cultural and political practices influence the working of economic life, as well as economic life effecting political and cultural practices, Robert J. Holton, *Economy and Society*, (New York: Routledge, 1992). And finally, Althusser was one of the first who had a systematic attempt to remedy the serious problem of crude economic determinism inherent in orthodox marxist discourse. His effort was to restore the autonomy and the importance of political and ideological level in social totality, Louis Althusser, *For Marx* (New York: Verso, 1990) chs. 3, 6&7 and Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971).

³⁸ Barry K. Gills, " 'Globalisation' and the 'Politics of Resistance' ". *New Political Economy*, Vol.2, No.1, 1997, pg.13. Similar arguments can also be found in Manfred Bienefeld, "Capitalism and the nation state in the dog days of the twentieth century" in *The Socialist Register* 1994, Ralph Miliband & Leo Panitch (eds.) (Merlin Press, 1995).

the political, cultural and social aspects of everyday life, they turn into a hegemonic discourse which inhibits the functioning of the democratic regimes.³⁹ The political decision making process moves out of the sphere of democratic polity as the executive branches of democratic states, which receive their legitimacy from the electorate, lose their power to regulate capital and market. It is for this reason that this approach is justified in drawing attention to the destructive nature of the globalization process and to the importance of resistance against a world view that sees the whole globe as the playground of capital accumulation.⁴⁰

Globalization as a Cultural Phenomenon

There are accounts of globalization at the other end of the spectrum that treat it as primarily a cultural phenomenon. While they refer to the role of economic and political forms, globalization is viewed first and foremost as revolving around the transformation of cultural forms and spaces.

Stuart Hall's work is particularly representative here. Hall outlines the dimensions of the cultural politics that define the content of the globalization process as follows:

1) post-imperial spaces, 2) post-colonial spaces, 3) global mass culture and 4) global postmodern.⁴¹ The post-imperial and post-colonial spaces are two spatial

constructions in which the cultural politics of globalization occurs. The reorganization

³⁹ Ohmae's account of globalization represents one such orthodoxy which does not allow any alternative voices other than global market forces, Kenichi Ohmae, *The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy*, (Harper Collins, 1990).

⁴⁰ Christine B.N. Chin & James H. Mittelman, "Conceptualizing Resistance to Globalisation", *New Political Economy*, Vol.2, No 1, 1997, pp.25-37 and also James H. Mittelman (ed.), *Globalization: Critical Reflections* (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1996).

⁴¹ Stuart Hall, "The local and the global: globalization and ethnicity" in Anthony D. King (eds), *Culture, Globalization and the World-System*, (Binghamton: Department of Art and Art History, State University of New York, 1991), pp.26-35.

of those spaces after the era of decolonization is the background against which global mass culture operates. As Hall explains, global mass culture "is dominated by the modern means of cultural production, dominated by the image which crosses and re-crosses linguistic frontiers much more rapidly and easily, and which speaks across languages in a much more immediate way".⁴² Although global mass culture operates at the intersection point of those contradictory spaces, it is centered in the West and has a peculiar form of homogenization.⁴³ The content of the global mass culture, however, is not unitary and is far from being fixed and secure, because it is "still in tension within itself with an older, embattled, more corporate, more unitary, more homogeneous conception of its own identity".⁴⁴

While dominated by the West in general and by the US in particular, the immense interaction between post-imperial and post colonial spaces through global mass culture forms a new reality, that of the "global post-modern". The disorganized and contradictory character of the global postmodern creates a new interaction between universality and particularity where the universal does not have its unified moment as it did previously and therefore can no longer contain particularity. Even though globalization may appear to have a universalizing force, it relies on differences and fragmentations. Global capital accumulation, especially within the case of the production of signs and codes, as well as services, depends on particular preferences, rather than commonalities.⁴⁵

⁴² *ibid.*, pg.27

⁴³ *ibid.*, pg.28

⁴⁴ *ibid.*, pg.32

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, pg.37 also Stuart Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity", Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert and Kenneth Thompson (eds), *Modernity, An Introduction to Modern Societies*, (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), pp.595-634.

Appadurai explains the workings of the globalization process through disjunctures which manifest themselves in five dimensions of global flow : "(a)ethnoscapes, (b) mediascapes, (c) technoscapes, (d) financescapes and (f) ideoscapes."⁴⁶ The tension between universalization and particularization within globalization, or in Appadurai's terms between cultural homogeneity and cultural heterogeneity, takes place within disjunctures that emerge from the cultural flows of globalization. For both Hall and Appadurai, flows of cultural exchanges, which are the result of population movements, and the integral role that reproduction and representation of cultural codes across borders play in capital accumulation, create complex webs of global flows. These global flows displace the traditional relationship between the universal and particular and give way to a double process in which there is a growing tendency for homogenization as well as heterogenization.

Cultural exchanges and population movements on a global scale lead to a condition of heterogeneity where it becomes difficult to resist acknowledging the existence of other cultures. Production and reproduction of signs are now as equally important as the production of material goods. In other words, in late modernity, the complete consumerization of signs becomes an important part of capital accumulation.⁴⁷ With the help of information technologies, rapid transmission of cultural codes enables the rapid

⁴⁶ Arjun Appadurai, "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy", *Theory, Culture and Society*, Vol.7, 1990, pg.296

⁴⁷ Baudrillard, in his earlier and less controversial works, points out the illusory relationship between use and sign values, and criticizes the orthodox marxist discourse for ignoring the importance of sign value. For more see Jean Baudrillard, *The Mirror of Production*, (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1975) and Jean Baudrillard, *For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign*, (St Louis: Telos Press, 1981). In his later works he focuses on the relationship between the reproduction of signs and the construction of reality. These later works are important in pinpointing the relativization of meaning systems in connection to the reproduction of signs over and over again. However, since his analysis is very much embedded in the relativization of meaning, it becomes impossible for him to put his arguments into a critical framework. For his later position on the subject see Jean Baudrillard, "The Year 2000 Has Already Happened", in *Body Invaders: Sexuality and the Postmodern Condition*, (London: Macmillan, 1988) and Jean Baudrillard, *Fatal Strategies*, (London: Semiotext, 1990).

reproduction and consumption of cultural codes in different parts of the world.⁴⁸

Although this rapid transfer of cultural codes and signs may initially imply cultural homogenization, it results rather in a constant transformation of cultural codes with these codes assuming different meanings in different local contexts. Similarly, the increasing number of population movements in the form of travel and migratory movements contribute to the interconnectedness of different cultures and facilitate a greater cultural heterogeneity. For instance, diaspora communities from former colonies displace the national narratives of Western centers by altering the romantic memories of colonial discourse. Colonial memories are no longer about unknown and exotic places and people, for example, but refer to a living together and reorganization of social space.⁴⁹

Bhabha argues that the ambivalence of colonial discourse is manifested in its "paranoia" and anxiety' that surfaces as soon as it leaves the home and encounters the colonized in the colonies.⁵⁰ Diaspora communities reverse this process by creating the same ambivalence within the centers of the former colonial powers by forcing colonial narratives to engage with or encounter their past. Centers of former colonial powers become ambiguous places where colonial discourse is reproduced and rewritten and displaced. They are also places that manifest hybridity, that is to say, places where migrants always live straddling the border of two cultures, one which is their homeland and the other, their new country. Migrants have to reconcile their identities within the

⁴⁸ For more on the reproduction of signs as part of capital accumulation see Scott Lash and John Urry, *Economies of Sign & Space*, (London: Sage, 1994)

⁴⁹ For more on the development of diaspora communities in the West see Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp.48-65, Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, (New York: Routledge, 1994) pp.123-170 and Henry A. Giroux, *Border Crossings*, (New York: Routledge, 1993) pp.230-250.

⁵⁰ Hommi Bhabha; "Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority under a Tree Outside Delhi, May 1817", *Critical Inquiry*, 1985,12:1, pg.152

intersection of two countries, cultures and languages. It is because of this that the identities of diaspora communities are always in flux, open to rearticulation and contain conflictual elements within. Unlike the homogeneous and separated representations of colonized and colonizer, the reality of living together lends itself to an interconnection between the identity of colonizer and that of the colonized.⁵¹

The interplay between "the world market and cultural identity, between local and global processes, between consumption and cultural strategies" are important processes which define the cultural aspect of globalization.⁵² For instance, rap music, which emerges out of the frustration of young African Americans, is quickly consumed by second generation Turkish youth in Germany to express their own frustrations. Similarly, the unified designs of Benetton stores, McDonalds or KFC stores connect different communities constructed around similar consumption patterns.⁵³ The above mentioned cultural flows of globalization suggest that globalization is not simply a process of

⁵¹ This is particularly visible in present day Britain. Diaspora communities from former colonies challenge and displace the colonial discourse from within by questioning different representations and subjectivities. The group of artists coming from these communities places the question of the colonized's experience within the discourse of colonizer by discussing the ambiguities existing within the discourse of colonizer as well as that of colonized. They also demonstrate the complex process within which subjectivities are reproduced in those discourses. This complex process is manifested eloquently in Salman Rushdie's *Midnight Children*, *Satanic Verses* and *The East and the West*. Movies such as "My Beautiful Laundrette" and "Bhaji on the Beach" are excellent in showing fluidity of subjectivity both in diaspora communities and in the countries in which they live. They also pinpoint the process of reproducing identities through each other.

⁵² Jonathan Friedman, "Cultural Logics of the Global System", Mike Featherstone (eds), *Global Culture: Nationalisation, Globalization and Modernity*, (London:Sage, 1990), pg. 312.

⁵³ Recent IBM commercials are perfect examples of how global consumption patterns operate in the background of global culture. They also give a perfect illustration of how particularities interact in the global cultural system. In almost all of the commercials, the common underlying characteristic is the particular community that is relatively isolated from the modern life - whether it be monks and nuns in monastery, bedouins in the Middle East market, natives in the rain forest or greek fishermen in the Aegean sea. They are as much apart from each other as they may be from the modern regime, but they have one common element; that is their IBM machines. Their IBM machine is what connects and makes them part of the same community.

homogenization but one in which there are also strong tendencies towards heterogenization. Cultural flows of global relations make cultural interconnectedness part of the modern life. For this reason, the question of "cultural integration" and "cultural disintegration" goes beyond the state-society level and operates on a trans-societal level.⁵⁴ Cultural flows that are located in the center of the globalization process necessitate going beyond the boundaries of the state as the level within which questions of difference manifest itself. Global exchanges such as migration, international production, cultural flows and information make it possible to talk about transsocietal cultural processes that have an autonomy from the sphere of state-society. The autonomous realm of transsocietal cultural processes constitutes "third cultures", "which themselves are conduits for all sorts of diverse cultural flows which cannot be merely understood as the product of bilateral exchanges between nation-states"⁵⁵ According to Featherstone, the existence of third cultures contradicts the modern attitude of identifying through binary dichotomies such as homogeneity/heterogeneity or integration/disintegration. Rather, he argues that "we need to inquire into the grounds..... involving the formation of cultural images and traditions as well as the inter-group struggles and interdependencies, which led to these conceptual oppositions becoming frames of reference for comprehending culture within the state society which then become projected onto the globe".⁵⁶ He suggests that the existence of a global level, with its conceptual challenges, creates a new space where new identities and political struggles can be formed independent from the framework provided by the nation-state.

"Third spaces" and the conceptual challenges which their existence brings open up a new set of conditions for the relationship between universality and particularity. It makes it

⁵⁴ Mike Featherstone (eds), *Global Culture: Nationalisation, Globalization and Modernity*, (London:Sage, 1990), pg.1

⁵⁵ *ibid.*, 1.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*,.2

possible to go beyond the binary dichotomies of state/society, national/international or universal/particular. The existence of another level in which identity and different political projects can be expressed reveals that particularity is not limited or determined, as Wallerstein would argue, by the tension between international and national discourses. Rather, it provides a fresh look at different processes and forces operating in the background of how universality and particularity is defined. Furthermore, it opens up a space for further negotiation between universality and particularity; that is particular discourses do not have to be limited to national boundaries, but may use the alternative space to renegotiate their position vis-a-vis the universal categories.⁵⁷

Not everybody, however, agrees with calls for a new level of analyses to grasp the nature of cultural flows within globalization. For instance Smith argues that there is nothing new about a "global culture" because earlier imperial forms of cultures were as eclectic and simultaneously, as standardized.⁵⁸ What is different today, however, is that, the pre-modern cultural imperialisms that were neither global nor universal, but were tied up to their places of origin, whereas today's emerging global culture is tied to no place and no period.⁵⁹ What makes the present-day global culture fundamentally different from the earlier forms is its "timeless" and "technical" character.⁶⁰ Although global and national cultures are similar in the sense that they are both constructed,

⁵⁷ This alternative space that is created at the intersection of global and national discourses has begun to be used successfully by grassroots movements centered around diverse issues such as environment, sex and ethnicity. Diaspora communities are effective in engaging in political projects that neither fall into the boundaries of their homelands nor second countries. Unfortunately, thus far, this form of politics has been successfully mobilized by ethnic communities in a more subversive way. The best example of this is the role of Croatian and Serbian communities in Canada, or the role of Jewish communities in the U.S. Environmental movements are also very effective in mobilizing groups beyond the boundaries of national discourses.

⁵⁸ Anthony Smith, in Mike Featherstone (eds), *Global Culture: Nationalization, Globalization and Modernity*, pg. 176.

⁵⁹ *ibid*, 177.

⁶⁰ *ibid*, 177

unlike global cultures, he argues, national cultures are constructed by historical identities and very much time bounded and particular. Global cultures are essentially timeless and universal entities which lack historical identities and where there can "be no human memories to unite humanity".⁶¹

The accounts which concentrate on the cultural dimension as the key force within globalization share the view that the world has "become one network of social relationships, and between its different levels there is a flow of meanings as well as of people and goods".⁶² Interconnection of local cultures through global networks creates the world culture in which people are both cosmopolitans and locals.⁶³ That is to say that the world culture is constructed within the blurred boundaries of cosmopolitanism and localism. The cosmopolitans are important in creating the world culture, even though they are situated locally, because they can have a non-hierarchical understanding of the other. Within the world culture, cosmopolitanism fosters an understanding of one's other through interaction, rather than antagonistic struggle.

Globalization as Late Modernity

Accounts which examine globalization in relation to the condition of late modernity emphasize the multi-dimensional nature of transformations that are taking place within the context of shifting structures of the modern regime. Common to works in this account is a certain degree of periodization and the relation between globalization and the late modernity.

⁶¹ *ibid.*, 179.

⁶² U. Hannerz, "Cosmopolitians and Locals in World Culture" in Mike Featherstone (eds), *Global Culture: Nationalisation, Globalization and Modernity*, pg.237.

⁶³ *ibid.*, pg.237.

According to this approach, globalization itself becomes a defining characteristic of late modernity. It is not necessarily related to, or defined by, the internationalization of the economic system but rather is viewed as a multi-dimensional process: changes in diverse areas of life such as architecture, politics, culture and economics transform the modern regime. Factors such as disorganized and flexible production techniques (or "post-fordism"), the growing importance of finance capital and services within capital reproduction and the commodification of signs and cultural forms, coupled with the speed by which these activities reproduce themselves, have a direct impact on how cultural, political and social aspects of society are organized.⁶⁴ The speed by which transactions and travel occur in different parts of the globe creates a completely different perception of time and space than that of the classical modern regime and leads to what is termed "the postmodern condition".⁶⁵ In a compressed time-space differentiation, time goes faster, distances become much shorter and the world becomes a smaller and faster-paced place. In Harvey's words, " we have been experiencing ... an intense phase of time-space compression that has had a disorienting and disruptive impact upon political-economic practices, the balance of class power, as well as upon cultural life".⁶⁶ It is this time-space compression that constitutes the core of the globalization process which, in turn, results in a high level of volatility of goods, people, ideas and codes. In Harvey's analysis, globalization becomes a multi-dimensional phenomenon that is constituted and regulated by a complex interaction of economic, political and cultural practices. While emphasizing the importance of capitalism within the equation, Harvey carefully avoids presenting capitalism as the core of late modernity or globalization.

⁶⁴ David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1990), chs.2&3

⁶⁵ *ibid*, 260-307

⁶⁶ *ibid*, 285

This time-space stretch, which is a distinct feature of late modernity, manifests itself as an increased degree of risk on a global scale.⁶⁷ The ontological security of the industrial phase of modernity, where communities and individuals can relate to the external world in a more coherent and stable way, gives way to risks that are perceived to be global in nature. In the industrial stage, risks were systemic, predictable and controllable. By contrast, in a risk society, life is identified with ontological insecurity and perceived to be unpredictable as risks are now viewed as coming from a variety of sources and as having a global tendency such that risks, from the environment to political explosions, are no longer confined to a specific geographic area.⁶⁸ The disintegration of previous social arrangements such as the family, class structure, and urban life prepares the ground for a new condition of existence for individuals. The crisis of national discourse and the internationalization of capitalist production increase the level of risk and unpredictability in late modernity. The insurance principle based on foreseeability, compensability and the limitation of hazards in time becomes obsolete in this global state of affairs where the welfare state loses its control over these principles. Globalization appears to be the condition of late modernity whose main characteristic is the loss of certainty and growing awareness that risk is pervasive throughout all aspects of life. This gives way to a new condition of "Western" modernity where an "occidental mixture of capitalism, democracy, government of laws, and so forth, is antiquated and must be renegotiated and redesigned."⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society*, (London: Sage, 1992), pp.9-18

⁶⁸ *ibid*, 36-37

⁶⁹ Ulrich Beck, *The Reinvention of Politics*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), pg.6. Beck also argues that emergence of "reflexive modernization" becomes a framework within which risk societies function. "Reflexive modernization means self-confrontation with the effects of risk society that can not be dealt with and assimilated in the system of industrial society- as measured by latter's institutionalized standards", Ulrich Beck, "The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization", in *Reflexive Modernization*, ed. by Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), pg.6.

As risks - or contingencies - increase within the global state of affairs, modernity develops a tendency towards greater reflexivity. The mode of the modern regime was such that contingencies and ruptures were once thought to be anomalies and disturbances. Within the context of globalization, however, contingency and rupture now become a dominant feature of late modernity.⁷⁰ Within late modernity, the world capitalist system, the international division of labor, the world military order and the nation-state system are four distinct areas that form the globalization process.⁷¹ The interaction between these four dimensions of globalization is perceived to be shorter as a result of time and space condensation, another distinct condition of late modernity. Time and space shrinkage enables the rapid reproduction of 'signs' and "cultural codes" as well as "goods" and "services" on a global scale.⁷² This rapid reproduction of signs and cultural codes, as well as of material goods, requires institutions to continually adjust themselves to meet these new conditions as new situations continue to emerge from the intense global interaction. For this reason, risk and reflexivity become two sides of the same coin since any increase in risk can only be countered by greater reflexivity among institutions, cultures and identities.

Some of the works in this literature tend to put more weight on the world capitalist system as the engine of the globalization process. For instance, Jameson argues that there are three phases of capitalism; market capitalism, monopoly capitalism and late capitalism. According to Jameson, market capitalism is distinguished by the growth of industrial revolution and is largely limited to the national discourses. Monopoly capitalism is expansionary in nature giving way to the rise of imperialism and the exploitation of distant markets while late capitalism is characterized by the rise of

⁷⁰ Anthony Giddens, *Consequences of Modernity*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), ch.1

⁷¹ *ibid*, 71

⁷² Scott Lash and John Urry, *Economies of Signs&Space*, (London: Sage, 1994) chs.3&5

multinationals and the globalization of capitalism.⁷³ What is considered unique in the last phase of capitalist development is the complete commodification of all aspects of life including the aesthetic realm. It is also unique because it operates outside the realm of nation states in such a way that different parts of the world are linked through similar process as part of a complex web. Thus there is a crucial process taking place in late modernity; the commodification of all aspects of life on a global level. According to Jameson, globalization need not be a pluralistic process, but rather "this whole global, yet American, postmodern culture is the internal and superstructural expression of a whole new wave of American military and economic domination throughout the world".⁷⁴ The core of the universalization process that is taking place in conjunction with globalization is the commodification of the whole world under the totalitarian domination of the US. As this domination is produced through a variety of sources, such as the global media, entertainment, and life styles, it hides behind a multiplicity of meanings and cultural forms which constitute the schizophrenic nature of postmodern culture. In this context, globalization feeds the relativization and the loss of meaning in social life and displaces the old forms of political forms including class politics.⁷⁵

The main difference between accounts which see globalization as the derivative of the world capitalist system and accounts which explain it as a form of late modernity is that the latter sees globalization in relation to a complex transformation that is taking place in modernity. Instead of tying globalization to the transformation of capitalist system, they outline a new condition that is emerging out of transformations taking place in economic, political and cultural forms. Risk, reflexivity and late modernity are common themes that formulate the changes in a variety of areas of life. Similarly,

⁷³ Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism Or, The Cultural Logic Of Late Capitalism*, (Durham:Duke University Press, 1992) pp.35-36

⁷⁴ *ibid.*, 5.

⁷⁵ *ibid.*,31.

despite differences in explaining globalization, these later accounts tend to see globalization as a condition of late modernity that is distinctly different from traditional modernity. Globalization refers to a new condition that emerges within late modernity and transforms the culture of modernity.

Globalization as a Socio-Historical Process

The founding fathers of modern social theory, Marx, Weber and Durkheim, attempted to explain the process leading from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*, albeit from different perspectives. Yet, the idea of moving from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* as the central preoccupation of modern social theory is informed by the enlightenment principles of history as progress, an evolution towards the self-development of human communities. Modern social theory's occupation with universality predates the works of Marx, Weber and Durkheim. From Comte to Saint-Simon theorists were preoccupied with the notion of global society or what could be termed the "interconnectedness of human communities". Saint-Simon paid particular attention to the integrated system of European states, the spread of industrialism, and the emergence of global culture.⁷⁶ It was his belief that the spread of industrialism would do away with provincialism and particularity and would foster cosmopolitanism and universality.

Sociological theory has long been regarded as identical to the study of national societies. In the context of increased internationalism, however, the interest in the world as a whole regained its importance. This can be seen in the work of Roland Robertson, who in recent years made a unique contribution to the analysis of the study of globalization. While following the tradition of classical social theory, Robertson differs from it on

⁷⁶ Brian Turner, *Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism*, (London:Routledge, 1994), pg.345

several important grounds. Aware of the teleological nature of the classical social theory, he warns against seeing globalization as a new step within the evolution of the modern regime.⁷⁷ Globalization is not simply a "consequence of modernity" but a "general condition which has facilitated the diffusion of general modernity".⁷⁸ This condition of globality requires the boundaries of social analysis to expand beyond the nation-state and requires a conceptual framework which "refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole".⁷⁹

Globalization marks a historical moment within the relationship between universality and particularity. Unlike the way in which classical social theory formulated the relationship between universality and particularity as antagonistic forces, universality in the global age is not an absolute signifier; neither is particularity something that needs to be ruled over and controlled. Instead there is now a "twofold process involving the interpretation of the universalization of particularism and the particularization of universalism".⁸⁰ What this suggests is that, on the one hand, recognition of particularity gains a universal status, and on the other, that universality itself becomes a particularity.

Once the universal is not the absolute signifier whose existence depends on the marginalization of the particular, the question of cultural and political coherence becomes an important issue.⁸¹ In a global world, according to Turner, differentiation,

⁷⁷ Roland Robertson, "Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity" in *Global Modernities*, ed. by Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash and Roland Robertson, (London: Sage, 1995), pg 27. A similar warning can also be found in Fuat Keyman, *Globalization, State, Identity/Difference*, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997), pp. 25-27

⁷⁸ *ibid.*, 27.

⁷⁹ Roland Robertson, *Globalization*, (London: Sage, 1992), pg. 8

⁸⁰ *ibid.*, 100

⁸¹ Turner, *Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism*, 112.

relativization and socialization become important in explaining the new socio-historical condition. The globalization process is linked to the condition of postmodernity in that the global condition fosters heterogeneity and plurality. According to Turner, within this globalized postmodernity there is a new multiculturalism which challenges the traditional meaning of the nation state in such a way that "globalization brings about increasing diversification and complexity of cultures by interposing a variety of traditions within a given community. Cultural globalization, therefore, forces upon modern societies, and upon intellectuals in particular, a new reflexivity about the authenticity of cultures, their social status and the nature of cultural hierarchy".⁸²

Although globalization refers to a shift from modernity as we know it, it is not necessarily a new step in the evolution of modernity. Rather, it represents a rupture or ambiguity within modernity which challenges the long established assumptions of the modern regime.⁸³ Smart puts forward the idea that "the rediscovery of ethno-histories and the global diffusion or crystallization of modern political forms have been identified as contributing to the multiplication of ethnic nationalisms, an enlargement of the actual and potential 'world of nations', and the persistence of diversity".⁸⁴ Moreover, he argues that the ambiguity which is emerging from the process of globalization requires a new conceptual framework that should accommodate the question of diversity and multiplicity.⁸⁵ The need to recognize diversity and multiplicity, however, cannot be addressed within the limited scope of society.⁸⁶ Multiplicity and diversity, embedded within the globalization process, challenge the assumptions of the universality of modern discourse as truly a Western discourse. With globalization, the identification of

⁸² Ibid, 184

⁸³ Martin Albrow, *The Global Age*, (Stanford:Stanford University Press, 1996), pg.90-97

⁸⁴ Barry Smart, *Postmodernity*, (New York:Routledge, 1993), pg.143

⁸⁵ *ibid*, 142

⁸⁶ *ibid*, 135.

the West as the core of modernity is declining and giving way to multi-centered new forms. The universal narrative of modernity as a Euro-American discourse is now being challenged by different narratives such as Islam or Confucianism.⁸⁷

1.3. Globalization as a New Form of Universality

The diversity within the various literature on globalization, on the one hand, draws attention to the complexity of structural changes that are taking place under the rubric of globalization. On the other hand, it provides critical points from which to give an approximate picture of globalization. The following points tend to summarize the critical points of intersection within the literature as well as the points of diversion:

- a) Globalization is a derivative of late modernity (Harvey and Jameson) or of the postmodern condition (Smart, Turner and Featherstone) and entails the complete commodification of all aspects of life (Lash and Urry, Jameson);
- b) Globalization is inherently a Western, and especially American (Hall and Jameson) phenomenon, and is a direct outcome of a new capital accumulation resulting from a world capitalist system (Wallerstein), which produces a new polarization between the North and the South (Amin);
- c) Globalization results in a time-space compression (Harvey) or stretching and deepening (Held, Hirst and Thompson) or compression of World (Robertson) that directly alters the way time and space is perceived and conceptualized;
- d) Globalization opens up a political space that goes beyond the nation state as a medium of politics (Held). It is mediated between alternative spaces (Hall and Appadurai) or between internationalization and localization (Robertson), and the Third spaces

⁸⁷ *ibid*, 150

emerging from the globalization process are new sites within which identities and political strategies are reorganized (Featherstone).

e) Globalization increases the degree of risk that human communities must cope with (Beck), together with the possibility of a greater degree of reflexivity (Giddens, Lash and Urry).

The points listed above indicate a major change in the way human communities are organized and identities are defined. In this context, while it may be premature to suggest that globalization will mark the end of the modern regime as we know it, on a conceptual level, at least, the following trends are observable regarding the content and impact of globalization

- a) the content of globalization is far from being unitary, and the process itself is multidimensional. This multidimensional nature of the globalization process increases the level of ambiguity on economic, political and cultural levels;
- b) unlike the classical forms of modern regime, globalization is both modern and pre-modern. On the one hand, it is identified with speed, further integration and unification, while on the other, it fosters the revival of traditionalism and particularization of human communities;
- c) the globalization process alters the modern commitment to unity, order and the singular meaning. Proliferation and multiplication of particularities results in a relativization of meaning in such a way that the Enlightenment contention of reality as independent of human subjectivity, "waiting" to be discovered by the right mind becomes obsolete.
- d) finally and most importantly, globalization creates a new condition of universality which is far from being unitary and authoritative. The condition of ambiguity opens up new possibilities for particularities that have long been marginalized by the unitary

voice of modernity, as well as brings new risks that may emerge from the ultimate particularization of meanings, identities and human communities.

Conclusion

This chapter argued that existing globalization process alters the relationship between universality and the particularity in the modern regime. As the globalization increases contact between nations, groups and cultures, it creates a space within which particular identities have an opportunity to challenge the hegemonic representations of national identities. The growing inability of national identities to reproduce their hegemonic representation is an indication that identity formation process is shifting out of the domain of national ideologies. Both global and local levels now participate in the formation and remaking of identities in nation states. The ambiguous nature of the globalization, however, constitutes a warning in that increasing manifestations of particularities may not necessarily result in more peaceful environment.

Globalization itself should be problematized and its inherent contradictions and emerging power structures revealed. The paradoxical nature of the globalization is in nowhere clearer than the fact that it is used by the New Right as a pretext to dismantle the welfare state and other gains of the Left over the last forty years, as well as by the progressive theorists to argue that new transnationalization of human communities will create greater freedom for individuals. It is in the moment of ambiguity there are always a possibility for alternative forms of politics with new actors who have long been marginalized. The same moment of ambiguity, however, is open to reactionary movements and politics. Because of this the globalization process is identified with risk.

In a global state of affairs which contains a complex web of interactions and unforeseen risks, the condition of universality is far from being absolute and complete. It is rather open to redefinition and has to acknowledge and accommodate the existence of multiplicity and difference. As Robertson argues, the condition of universality within the global state of affairs is such that universality and particularity do not have to be in antagonistic terms.⁸⁸ Universality and particularity - or identity/difference, homogeneity/heterogeneity- within the global state of affairs can appear to be mutually inclusive and reconstruct each other through constant renegotiation.

⁸⁸ Robertson, "Glocalization:Time-Space and Homogeneity-Heterogeneity", pg.27

Chapter II

IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE IN THE GLOBAL WORLD

Introduction

If the previous chapter focused on the concept of globalization in order to discuss the condition of universality within late modernity, this chapter will look at the condition of particularity within late modernity. The concept of identity as a form of particularity attracts as much attention as the concept of globalization. It seems that the present period of modernity is witness to a trend in which identities once considered to be stable are no longer considered to be so. National identities once considered unified are now fragmented along ethnic, linguistic and cultural lines. Although the sudden collapse of state and public discourse within former socialist regimes made the fragmentation of national identities most visible, this same trend is also visible in democratic regimes. This indicates that fragmentation of identities within national discourses is not just simply a question of lack of democratic regime. It indicates a deeply rooted problem within modern societies with respect to accommodating particularity.

The trend towards a fragmentation of identities has sparked a growing interest in how people define themselves, and in people's need to differentiate themselves from others by means of identifying with certain historical memories, meanings, and symbols. Equally important is why people change the way they identify themselves. The debate about identity arises from the fact that, within late modernity, the meaning behind membership in a certain class, ideological group and nation is not as certain as it once was. It is harder to define today what it means to be a member of a national community,

of a gender category, or a member of an ethnic community than it once was. Identity has probably never been as stable and secure as we previously believed to be. Rather, it is that the nation state and discourses of modernity were able in the past to create the illusion that identities existed as unified and fixed entities. In contrast, we are now witnessing a trend in which the process of remaking personal and communal identities is marked by the tendency to move towards particular and micro units in a time when the world is becoming "one" place as result of globalization. There is now this double process of simultaneous particularization and universalization. The emergence of particularity in the form of ethnicity, gender lines, racial boundaries and sexual orientations challenges the modern framework in which particularity and difference were understood as something that had to be contained. The modern idea of containing particularity within universality is now difficult to sustain, and that difficulty points out the need for a new framework within which particular identities can express themselves freely.

This chapter argues that globalization is a powerful force which destabilizes the established parameters of identity formation in two interrelated and equally important ways. First, globalization transforms the traditional relation between universality and particularity such that particular forms of human existence are able to find a greater space in the global state of affairs from which to challenge the unified voice of the modern regime. Second, globalization cuts the tie between identity and the nation state by turning identity formation process into an interplay of global, local and national levels. That is to say that, nation state is no longer able to exercise its hegemony over how individuals define themselves. Globalization cuts across the national discourse in such a way that, at one level, identity formation is transformed by the forces that operate outside the realm of nation state, while, at an other level, national identity is

also fragmented by the emergence of pre-modern ethnic roots, which were thought to have been erased by the homogeneous discourse of the modern nation state.

In the following section, the chapter will discuss the condition of particularity within the modern regime by looking at how and why identity or particularity was thought to be fixed and singular. Thereafter, the chapter will focus on the condition of particularity which emerges within the context of globalization. It will then discuss the ways in which the question of identity can be addressed within the new framework of universality and particularity.

2.1. The Ontological Security of Identity Within Modernity

The claims from various identity positions to receive recognition within nation states cast a doubt on the very understanding of identity within modernity which assumes that the "self" is a unified entity. National identities construct themselves as unified and timeless entities with a fixed meaning and past.¹ Contrary to how they define themselves, nation states are actually clusters of disparate groups and cultures that have been consolidated under one dominant identity.² This consolidation process has not always been a peaceful process nor is it complete and, in most cases, it entails the violent suppression of various groups and identities under the banner of a dominant

¹ Stuart Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity" in *Modernity: An Introduction of Modern Societies*, ed. by Stuart Hall, David Held, Don Hubert and Kenneth Thompson, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), pp.613-615.

² Ernest Renan argues that nations of Europe, far from being homogeneous, are a mixture of various nationalities: "France is Celtic, Iberic and Germanic. Germany is Germanic, Celtic and Slav. Italy is the country where ... Gauls, Etruscans, Pelagians and Greeks, not to mention many other elements, intersect in an undecipherable mixture", Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation?" in *Narrating the Nation*, ed. by Homi Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 14-15. The same is true for non-Western nations who are also mixtures of different races and ethnic groups.

national identity. Despite the representation of national identities as homogeneous entities, they actually have a multiplicity of identity positions.

Globalization challenges the dominant regime of representation within nation states which was the marginalization of particular identities. Globalization, on the one hand, erodes the unified voice of the national identities which creates greater space for particular identities to manifest themselves. On the other hand, the universalizing effect of the globalization process also triggers a reaction from particular identities since they see global flows as a threat to how they express themselves. Mercer argues that "identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is displaced by the experience of doubt and uncertainty".³ Mercer is right in the sense that the inability of national identities to reproduce the regime of representation which privileges universal national identities against the particular ethnic, cultural and sexual identities fosters the belief that identity is a problematic issue in late modernity.

Globalization, with its embedded risks and opportunities, generates doubts and uncertainties that erode the security of national identities as unified subject positions. Before elaborating on the way in which globalization challenges the ontological security of national identity, it is necessary to look at how and why this ontological position became hegemonic in the modern regime. After all, the representation of identity as a unified and homogeneous entity has contributed to the formulations of universality and particularity as an antagonistic relationship, a formulation which has become the central logic behind how the question of identity/difference is formulated within modernity. In fact, globalization (or late modernity) is not the first moment in history

³K. Mercer, "Welcome to the Jungle" in *Identity*, ed. by J. Rutherford, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990), pg.43.

when identity has become a problematic issue. Calhoun states that "... discourse about identity seems in some important sense distinctively modern- seems, indeed, intrinsic to and partially defining of the modern era".⁴ He further adds that "[t]he discourse of self is distinctively modern, and modernity distinctively linked to the discourse of self... Modern concerns with identity stem also from ways in which modernity has made identity distinctively problematic".⁵ Calhoun is correct to point out that identity- or self- is one of the key preoccupations of modern thinking as modern subjectivity emerged from the discovery of the "self" which was free from the traditional constraints of religious and communal restrictions. It is the modern subject who is endowed with the "power of will" and is capable of shaping "his" own destiny, of creating "history", not a docile powerless entity in the world.⁶

The modern subject is not simply a construct of the modern imagination but very much a historical entity whose roots are embedded into the previous modes of "understanding the role of human beings in the world".⁷ Notwithstanding the influence of Christian

⁴ Craig Calhoun, *Critical Social Theory*, (Cambridge:Blackwell, 1995), pg.193

⁵ *ibid.*, pg.194

⁶ There are numerous works discussing the sources of modern subjectivity. Accounts of historical context within which modern subjectivity has emerged can be found in the quartet of Hobsbawm; Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, (London: Cardinal, 1962); Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital*, (London:Cardinal, 1975); Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987) and Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes*, (London:Abacus, 1995). For equally historical but also a critical assessment of modern subjectivity see Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison*, (London: Allen Lane, 1977); Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, vol.3: the Care of the Self*, (New York: Pantheon, 1986) and Michel Foucault, "Afterword: the Subject and Power" in Michael Foucault: *Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, by H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, (Brighton: Harvester, 1982).

⁷ Taylor demonstrates that the sources of the Enlightenment ideal of modern self were influenced by the Christian tradition's understanding of the self. For more see Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989) esp. part 3&4. Connolly also explores the sources of the modern self as far back as St Augustine. He draws parallels between how historical consciousness is portrayed in St. Augustine and the way it was imagined in the modern regime. For more see William E. Connolly, *Identity/Difference*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) Introduction and Ch.5

epistemology on the construction of the modern self, modern thinking challenged the ontological premises of the medieval world within which the human agent was the passive bearer of religious truth. A shift occurred from locating sovereignty in the divine truth embodied in the monarch, to sovereignty of the modern subject embodied within the modern self. Moreover, the modern self's rejection of religious belief as the divine truth necessitated an existence of a system of representation that would provide a source of order and unity in an inherently chaotic world. Enlightenment thinking, therefore, effectively replaced the universality of religious knowledge with the universality of reason as the core of modern subjectivity. The modern self, whose core is constituted by reason, is thought to be unified, homogeneous and fixed, with no contradictions and ambiguities. Benhabib points out three crucial elements of Enlightenment thinking which led to the representation of subjectivity as a universal category: (i) "self-transparent and self-grounding reason", (ii) "a disembodied and disembodied subject" and (iii) "an Archimedian standpoint, situated beyond historical and cultural contingency"⁸. The above points, emphasized by Benhabib, explain the ontological security of identity in modernity. Reason, as the constitutive core of the modern self, not only rules out any ambiguity or multiplicity within subjectivity, but its claim to universality denies the historical and cultural situatedness of subjectivity. The modern understanding of subjectivity as a unified and homogeneous category underlies the logic which assumes that the stability of subjectivity can be guaranteed only through the marginalization of that which does not fall into the domain of reason. In other words, any particularity, which is seen to be operating outside the domain of reason, is a threat to the stability of the self.

There is, however, a contradiction within the modern formulation of universality that defines the self as a unified category. The contradiction is such that, on the one hand, it

⁸ Seyla Benhabib, *Situating the Self*, (New York: Routledge, 1992), pg.4.

attempts to break with the framework provided by religious epistemology. Yet, on the other hand, it produces this same logic of universality which informed the religious thinking. In the traditional Christian epistemology there was no "rational connection" between the universal and the particular and universality was that which was revealed by God and as the property of divine authority, was opaque to human reason.⁹ It was this tradition with which modern epistemology attempted to break. The unconditional revelation of a universal to the particular, according to the Enlightenment thinkers, was thought to be the cause of the powerlessness of the human agent. Similarly, Enlightenment thinkers looked to the rediscovery of ancient philosophy to help break these ties with the Christian tradition. Ancient philosophy conceived of universality in fully rationalist terms such that there was thought to be a rational connection between the universal and the particular and, more specifically, that the universal was accessible to the particular through "reason".¹⁰ Since the particular - the self- is endowed with reason, the universal is not only fully accessible to particular but rejects a distinction between the universal and the particular. This formulation of universality and particularity disregards any distinction between the two categories and elevates a certain particularity to the level of universality.¹¹

⁹Ernesto Laclau, "Universalism, Particularism and the Question of Identity" in *The Identity in Question*, ed. by John Rajchman, (New York: Routledge, 1995), pg.96

¹⁰ *ibid.*, pg. 96-97

¹¹ For more on this see R. Williams, *Keywords*, (London : Fontana, 1976). John Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* is also representative of thinking which establishes the relation between universal and particular via reason, J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, (London: Fontana, 1967). Similarly, Descartes situated reason as the center of modern subjectivity. In Descartes reason appears as a universal category of human mind and is free from time and space boundaries. René Descartes, *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). For a critique of primacy of reason as the source of subjectivity see Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979).

Despite the fact that they conceptualize the relationship between the universal and the particular in different ways, both Christian and modern epistemology have one thing in common: a dislike of particularity which they view as a source of disorder.

Particularity was always seen to be something deviant, deviant that is from the content of the universal, and as that which rejects the "truth" which is viewed as something which exists out there, and which is waiting to be revealed to the human mind in its timeless form. That which was deviant from the universal was viewed as the particular, and identified as needing to be controlled or ruled over.

The modern regime was especially sensitive towards the issue of universality because it lacked the ontological security of divine truth. In a system where the universal was identical to God, Truth was something which could not be contested, and therefore, enjoyed an unchallenged hegemony. The decline of religious epistemology as a basis by which truth and falsity, or good and evil, can be determined posed a serious challenge to modern thinking. The absence of any ground upon which truth and falsity could be built was thought to be relativization of the meaning.¹² As the existence of particularity inevitably necessitates a relativization of truth and also challenges the universality of reason, it was confined within the borders of the universal. The universality of reason constituted the ontological security of the modern regime, which in turn guaranteed the unitary nature of the modern self. In the modern world where human beings were in control of their own destiny, universality of reason and unity of identity were indispensable to order. The dilemma, therefore, between universalism and

¹²The tradition in the modern philosophy that was represented by Nietzsche, Hume and Heidegger took an opposite stand to argue against efforts trying to eliminate the relativization of the truth as an attack on particularity. From the early days the Enlightenment tradition, rather than being a unified discourse, was marked by these two contradictory positions over the conceptualization of truth and particularity. The historical conditions that emerged out of the industrial revolution established the vision that calls for the universality of reason as the means by which to achieve unity and order as the hegemonic vision.

particularism in the modern regime was resolved by turning the particular experience of the seventeenth century Europe into the universal. That is to say that, the stability of the modern self was contingent upon the creation of a universal regime of representation out of the particular experience of seventeenth century Europe.

It is only by looking at the historical development of modern identity that we can understand the impact of this seemingly abstract discussion on the relationship between universality and particularity. In addition, it is also necessary to provide the historical background of how a certain particular experience gained the status of universal category in order to demonstrate that universalization was not, in fact, an abstract philosophical categorization, but an actual historical process. What was privileged as the universal modern self was, in fact, embedded in the social, political and economical transformations of seventeenth century Europe. What emerged from this process was the sovereign subject of the modern regime : the bourgeoisie.¹³ To summarize, the historical construction of the modern self was the result of processes occurring on three interrelated levels:

a) on an ideological level it was identified with the universal reason;¹⁴

b) on a political level it was identified with national identity;¹⁵

¹³ Hobsbawm in his trilogy- *The Age of Revolution, The Age of Capital and The Age of Empire*- tells the story of the political, economic and social historical background within which the modern self was made.

¹⁴ Derrida writes extensively on the ideological role of reason in constructing the modern subjectivity. For more see J. Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978) and J. Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982).

¹⁵ Gellner's account of nationalism probably is the strongest in terms of putting nationalism at the center of modern identity, Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Hobsbawm and Anderson, less so than Gellner, portrays national identity as integral to the modern regime. For more see Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) and Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (London: Verso, 1991).

c) on the economic level it was identified with the industrial revolution and capitalism.¹⁶

It was a male dominated bourgeoisie identity that emerged out of this historical transformation as that which was elevated to the universal representation of the modern self. Moreover, all other experiences which lay beyond the domain of this historically specific experience were considered to be a particularity, a deviant from the universal. By virtue of being deviant, the particular had to be controlled and ruled over by the universal. Within Western discourse, those relegated to the status of particular include women, peasants, non-propertyed, blacks, and countless ethnicities that formed nation states. Also deemed to be outside the universal framework of western discourse were pagans, aliens, primitives, orientals, and savages.¹⁷ Human agency was, therefore, deemed to belong only to the sovereign Western male Christian subject who found his particularity in the foundations of 17th century Europe. The fact that the sovereign subject- or the source of modern identity- was the agency which was believed to be able to comprehend and control the external reality was not the problem in and of itself, but, rather, the problem lay in its "incarnation" as the universal. The sovereignty of the modern self could only be secured by defining "himself" against "his" others, by silencing, marginalizing, normalizing, and converting them. Levinas argues that this privileged ontological status of the modern self involves an "ethico-political violence"

¹⁶ The commodification of labour required individuals who are free from communal loyalties and who identify themselves as citizens rather than as particular communal groups. For more on the relationship between capitalism and modern identity see Derek Sayer, *Capitalism and Modernity: An Excursus on Marx and Weber*, (London: Routledge, 1991). In addition, Capitalism, especially its form of mass production, was oriented towards the homogenization of processes, products and tastes.

¹⁷ The chapter will later focus on the postcolonial argument which problematizes the modern self by looking at its relationship with the non-western other. Bhabha is one of the prominent figures of postcolonial criticism who scrutinizes the universality modern self by demonstrating its problematic relationship with non-Western other. For more see Homi Bhabha, "Freedom Basis in the Indeterminate" in *The Identity In Question*, John Rajchman ed., (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp.47-62

towards the other, or the particular, which is outside the sphere of the universal.¹⁸ This ethico-political violence of identity, or in Levinas' words "imperialism of the same", results in seeing the other, or particular, as a threat, in a "self-passion" to incorporate the other to eliminate the danger.

This problematic relationship between universality and particularity, together with the desire to fix the meaning of identity, to freeze it in time, to separate it from the particular and to render it ahistorical constituted one of the main contradictions of the modern regime. Universal reason and the autonomy of human action as the engine of history were said to be identical to justice, virtue, equality, freedom, and happiness.¹⁹ It is, indeed, the constant focus of the Enlightenment on progress, freedom and emancipation that made it one of the most promising narratives of humankind. The fundamental principles of the French Revolution, those of liberty, fraternity and equality, later on became the basis of modern Western liberal democracies. Yet, the era of emancipation, freedom, equality and justice also coincided with the era of colonialism, imperialism, genocide, and the Holocaust.²⁰ This is the tragedy of the Enlightenment, being identified with freedom and equality as well as responsible for colonialism, imperialism, and wiping out other cultures. The desire to fix the meaning of identity, the desire to represent identity as a unified and coherent category, lies at the center of the tragedy of the modern self.

¹⁸ Emmanuel Levinas, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas", in *Face to Face with Levinas*, ed. By Richard A. Cohen, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1986), pg.347

¹⁹ Richard Bernstein, *The New Constellation: The Ethical Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity*, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), pp.33-34.

²⁰ Bauman provides a powerful account of how modernity was able to produce an unimaginable atrocity like Holocaust, Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989).

On the one hand, the modern regime, on the one hand, took the task of freeing human agents from the constraints of the traditional world, while on the other it made them prisoners of unity and sameness. Furthermore, the dynamic between self and the other which existed within modernity produced a regime of unequal representation in which the other was always explained through the categories of the self and was denied a representation in its own right. Whether it was the colonial subject, or a particular cultural or ethnic identity, the other was controlled and ruled over by the self.²¹ Moreover, the universalization of a certain particularity in the modern era denied the possibility of negotiation between universality and particularity and resulted in an unequal representation of identity in which the particular was always marginalized at the expense of the universal.²² Whether it was national, sexual or Western identity, the logic of identity formation in the modern era was based on a negative dialectic of the self/other dichotomy. This dichotomy portrayed identity formation as a problematic and negative process in which the formation of identity is assumed to be realized only as a result of marginalizing particularity. Similarly, the existence of the universal, as a category which is nothing but another particularity, and whose existence can only be secured through the marginalization of particularity, rejected the possibility that identity is a historical phenomenon which is formed at the intersection of various cultural, social, political and economical experiences. Historical experience usually indicates to us that, unlike its representation, identity formation is instead a complex process which always involves a constant negotiation with others.²³

²¹Fuat Keyman, *Globalization, State, Identity/Difference: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Relations*, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997), pp.161-162.

²² For different interpretations of this point see Anthony Cascardi, *The Subject of Modernity*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

²³ Literature probably does a better job than the social sciences in explaining the historical complexity of the formation of identities. In their novels and stories writers such as Salman Rushdie reveal the dense and textured nature of identity and their complex components. They are also able to reflect the historical experience in which the

2.2. Disunity and Fragmentation of Identity in Global World

The globalization of world affairs has resulted in an increase in the interaction between global, local and national levels and that intense interaction between these three levels results in a proliferation of identities within nation states as well as within the international arena. The blurring of boundaries between global, national and local levels creates a move towards greater multiplicity that may appear in the form of fragmentation of national identities along ethnic lines, reassertion of diaspora identities, questioning of dominant forms of sexual identity and challenging gender categories. This new condition that emerges from the intensification of globalization process challenges ideological, political and economic practices that were the constitutive logic of identity formation in the modern era. While it would be premature to conclude that the globalization of world affairs restores the historicity of identity, it would be appropriate to argue that globalization challenges the security of modern self and increases the chances for a greater self-reflexivity which provides space for negotiation within identity formation.

One significant consequence of globalization is how its impact on the perception of time and space affects the security of the modern self. As a result of the intensification of globalization there is a time and space compression in which distances shrink and the pace of everyday life becomes faster.²⁴ This time-space intensification is particularly

daily negotiations do take place to form and reform identities despite the fact that modern thinking rejects the very idea of negotiation as an essential part of identity formation.

²⁴ David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989)pg.240, David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp.122-123, Jorge Larraín, *Ideology and Cultural Identity*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994) pg.151 and Ankie Hoogvelt, *Globalization and the Postcolonial World*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997), pg.119.

important for the definition of identities as it cuts across national discourses and local communities. It increases the relationship between different locales and communities, rearranges their relationship with the nation state, it creates new alliances and brings out new actors. Giddens argues that modernity marks a distinction between place and space.²⁵ Place refers to an idea of locale whereas space is identified with "relations between 'absent' others, locationally distant from any given situation of face-to-face interaction."²⁶ In pre-modern societies, however, the distinction between place and space did not exist as most of the interaction was limited to a local activity and interaction between distant locales was not significant. Globalization, with its impact on time-space perception, redefines the relationship between space and place in which the distinction between these two concepts once again disappears. This time, however, local activity is highly interconnected to relationships with distant others to the degree that that which occurs in distant locations and with distant others becomes a local activity.

The disappearing line between space and place, which is a distinctly modern phenomenon, increases the sensitivity about the situatedness of identities. As identities are more open to interaction with distant locales and remote places, their meaning becomes open to reinterpretation. The nation state loses its ground as being the territory within which identities are remade. Instead, identities are located in a web of local, national and global flows. This constant and intense interaction between local, national and global levels not only increases the sensitivity about the role of place and space in identity formation, but it also renders singular identities of the modern era insecure and open. Furthermore, within the context of global affairs identities can not avoid interaction with others, but must live with others and be transformed by them.²⁷

²⁵ Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), pg.18

²⁶ *ibid.*, pg.18

²⁷ Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1997), 185-199.

The speed of interaction occurring between spaces and places, and to the multiplicity of forms within which these interactions take place between different identity positions, diminishes the security the modern self once enjoyed within national borders. As Beck argues, the ontological insecurity that is enforced by the risk oriented nature of the globalization process plays an important role in the ongoing crisis of the modern self. It is in these crisis moments when identities can be easily manipulated by different political strategies, may turn inward looking and strive for closure in a world that is in constant chaos and flux. Yet, these moments of crisis also provide possibilities and open spaces for new configurations that challenge the old representations of identities and enable identities that are formerly marginalized to gain recognition. The rapid collapse of socialist regimes, the eruption of ethnic nationalisms, the ungovernability of liberal democracies and the fragmentation of national discourses along ethnic, gender and racial lines, have raised concerns that chaos was becoming chronic in late modernity. There is a concern about the way national discourses are being reorganized, or have disintegrated altogether as a result of the ungovernability of democratic regimes and unpredictable changes that are taking place within the world capitalist system.

The position that identifies the multiplication of identities and the fragmentation of the modern self with chaos is in fact one which believes that this self is, and should be, centered and stable. The complex forces that are emerging as a result of globalization, however, point out that, far from being stable and centered, identity is a historical product which is shaped by various political, economic and ideological practices. Hall stresses the significance of the forces operating in globalization by arguing that "different subject positions are being transformed or produced in the course of the unfolding of the new dialectics of global culture".²⁸ The forceful existence of global

²⁸ Hall, op.cit, pg.19.

forces decreases, for instance, the importance of national discourses as the unitary of core of community and presents serious questions about the nature of community, politics, sociality and territoriality that in turn have a profound impact on the way human agents define and relate themselves to their surrounding environment. Hall argues that one of the main contributions of poststructuralist thought is that, unlike modern thinking, it draws attention to the fact that identities are far from being secure and protected.²⁹ Contrary to the Enlightenment skepticism towards the historical embeddedness of identities, for Hall "social identities were formed in, and stabilized by, the huge, long-range historical processes which have produced the modern world.³⁰ Industrialization, the world capitalist market, public and private life, the sexual division of labour, the emergence of the nation state and the identification of Westernization with modernization are some of the forces that formed the modern constitution of subjectivity and identity.³¹ Hall argues that the missing link between the representation of the modern self, and the historical framework in which it was formed resulted in an ahistorical perception of identity in the modern regime. His call for the restoration of the historicity of identity is also a call for representation of the identities in their complexity and a call for recognizing the fact that identity does not exist in a vacuum but is formed within the context of various economic, political and cultural practices and is constantly remade within the changing parameters of those practices. While it would be premature to conclude that the globalization of world affairs restores the historicity of identity, it would be appropriate to argue that globalization challenges the security of modern self and increases the chances for a greater self-reflexivity which provides space for negotiation within identity formation.

²⁹ Stuart Hall, "Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities" in *Culture, Globalization and the World-System*, ed. by Anthony King, (Binghampton: Department of Art and Art History, State University of New York, 1991), pg. 45

³⁰ *ibid.*, pg.45

³¹ *ibid.*, pg.45

Interaction between the global, local and national levels has placed national, sexual and racial identities in a state of insecurity. Insecurity, together with multiplication of identities, by no means results in chaos. The very existence of this insecurity also makes it more difficult to represent identities as ahistorical and essential categories. Insecurity serves as a reminder that identity is a historical product which is always situated in a political, economical and cultural context. This feeling of insecurity, however, may give rise to a defensive reaction, which tries to stabilize identity by isolating it from others. This is certainly true in the case of irridentist ethnic nationalisms and xenophobic movements in liberal democratic regimes. In Europe, in particular, there is a significant rise in xenophobic movements which carry themselves from the margin into the mainstream political landscape.³² Growing hostility towards Others, and the need to protect "national identity" from them are reactions to the everyday existence of Others who live as citizens within national societies. Migratory movements are much more intense within a global world, which is composed of immigrants, exiles and refugees displaced as a result of the uneven development of world capitalism which generates a human flow from developing to developed countries. Many of these groups of people are on the move in search for better economic opportunities or to escape political prosecution. Migratory movements create diaspora communities within the centers of the West, the majority of which come from former colonies. Diaspora communities exist in various countries, not simply as visitors, but also as residents who claim the same rights as other citizens. Turks in Germany, North Africans in France, Pakistanis and Indians in Britain, all claim to be part of the national

³² In France, for instance, the mainstream right is now hostage to the racist National Front which holds the key for local political councils in 22 regions. Furthermore, the National Front has steadily received 15% of the national votes for the last 15 years forcing its way into mainstream politics. The National Front's message heavily relies on anti-immigrant sentiment and its emphasis is on the perceived threat from immigrants directed towards French identity. The Front's ability to push the government agenda is already obvious in France as previous governments have changed immigration rules to make immigrants and refugees stay in the country more difficult. For more see "France's right-wing disarray", *The Economist*, March 28th - April 3rd 1998, pp.46-47.

communities in which they live. Their claims question the stability and meaning of French, British and German national identities. The reaction to Others to protect "identity" is not simply limited to the centers of the West. Political Islam in Muslim countries voices discontent with the intrusive presence of Western forms of life. At the center of political Islam's claim is the return to the fundamentals of religious belief, the recovery of an authentic religious identity and the elimination of all external elements that threaten this identity.³³ Similar sentiment is also present in the claims of the New Christian Right in the United States which sees religious revival as the condition for reestablishing moral values that are under threat.³⁴ In all of these examples, identity is perceived to be under threat, a perception which arouses the desire to protect identity and its meaning from changing.

Despite the fact that throughout the world there are examples of movements reacting to the global condition, there are also other examples where multiplicity and heterogeneity are becoming part of the everyday life and of national discourses. Although political Islam reacts to the intrusive nature of modern life and claims to revive the authentic Islamic identity, both its claims and its politics are undeniably interwoven with modern forms of life. Politicization of Islamic identity in Muslim countries is not only far from "backward looking" but is increasingly articulated within the political discourse of the modern regime through such means as political representation and the utilization of modern technology. More importantly, political Islam increasingly uses religious symbols and mechanisms as a language for modern problems such as education, welfare and health.³⁵ Similarly, the existence of diaspora communities in the centers of West create hybrid identities which always live in the border of two cultures, the one being

³³ Aziz Al-Azmeh, *Islams and Modernities*, (New York: Verso, 1993), pp.23-36.

³⁴ Peter Beyer, *Religion and Globalization*, (London: Sage, 1994), pg.122.

³⁵ Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics*, (New Jersey :Princeton University Press, 1996) pp.28-36.

the homeland and the other the new country. As suggested in the first chapter, hybrid identities resist the essentialization and closure of identity as they are always in flux and open to rearticulation.³⁶ Even in the most hopeless conditions, such as in Bosnia, resistance to an essentialization of identity exists together with an extreme form of xenophobia. Throughout the Bosnian war, there were Bosnians who rejected the clearcut ethnic divisions which were imposed on them by ultra nationalists and the international community. Rather, they embraced the heterogeneity of the Bosnian identity, resisting the division of Bosnian identity along ethnic lines.³⁷ Despite the fact that these Bosnians were not represented in the international media and peace plans, their presence posed and continues to pose to ultra nationalists who argue that there is no such thing as a Bosnian identity and that the only legitimate identity is an ethnic one.

The above examples suggest the fact that identity in the global world is not a simple issue. There is neither a growing chaos nor a happy multiplicity emerging from the global condition. In the present stage of globalization, there is an undeniable force of particularity. However, it remains to be seen how this blossoming of particularities will affect future configurations of identity formation. The multiplicity of identities and the reactions which is directed towards countering insecurity are themselves manifestations of the interplay between the forces of homogeneity and heterogeneity - or universality and particularity. This interplay between universality and particularity is not, however, simply a pluralistic practice because the very nature of the interplay contains power relations. People are not all located at the same location vis-à-vis these global flows. As Doreen Massey argues, some people are in the place of controlling global

³⁶ Nederveen Pieterse provides an explanation of hybridization that emerges from the global condition. For more see Jan Nederveen Pieterse, "Globalization as Hybridization" in *Global Modernities*, ed. by Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash and Roland Robertson, (London: Sage, 1995), pp.45-68.

³⁷ Rabia Ali and Lawrence Lifschultz eds., *Why Bosnia*, (Connecticut : The Pamphleteer's Press, 1993).

flows whereas others are in the position to receive them without choice.³⁸ Flows and movements of globalization represent a "highly complex social differentiation". There are differences in the degree of movement and communication, but also in the degree of control and of initiation. The ways in which people are placed within a 'time-space compression' are highly complicated and extremely varied.³⁹ Similarly, what we call hybridization is not a simply a mix and match but an outcome of complex power relations. Hybridity is "part of a power relationship between center and margin, hegemony and minority. It indicates a blurring, destabilization or subversion of that hierarchical relationship."⁴⁰ The process within which hybridization takes place is an uneven and asymmetrical but is one which nevertheless is open to 'reconfiguration' and thereby the subversion of hierarchy between center and periphery, and self and other. Moreover, this process is not always peaceful. In many cases it is conflictual and painful.

Nowhere is this process clearer than within national discourses. In the past, the homogenizing effect of modern national discourse was crucial to establish a unified modern self.⁴¹ National identities in the modern era represented themselves as dominant identity positions within national public spheres. This dominant representation of a national identity was achieved at the expense of other identities that were deemed to be marginal and as belonging to the private sphere. One consequence of this recent blossoming of particularities is that national discourse is ineffective in operating as the unified core of the community and of identity and therefore unable to control the representation of identity. Hegemonic national narratives are being challenged by specific histories with a claim to their particularity not only in the

³⁸ Doreen Massey, "A Global Sense of Place", *Marxism Today*, June 1991, pg.25-26.

³⁹ *ibid*, pg.26.

⁴⁰ Nederveen Pieterse, "Globalization as Hybridization", pg.56

⁴¹ For the homogenizing effect of modern nationalism see Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

former socialist regimes, where the political system collapsed suddenly without a ready replacement, but also in western and postcolonial sites. The reaction against the universalizing logic of modern national narratives is displayed in particular histories, in rediscovered memories that were buried in distant past and in long forgotten narratives as well as in the desire for ultimate difference and particularity.

In extreme cases, such as the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Republics, the empty space that has opened up as a result of the collapse of public sphere⁴² has been filled up by rival ethnic identities. The loss of a public sphere as a place in which differences can be negotiated, or where strategies to gain recognition can be formed, forces particular groups to turn inwards. The crisis of public space is also visible in liberal democratic regimes. While the charge that modern liberal public discourse has been insensitive to difference is justified, the public sphere has also provided a common space within which differences can be negotiated and where identities can engage in political projects to gain recognition. In the absence of a public sphere and rules that regulate, politics becomes an activity aimed at protecting one's own community.

The content of the modern public sphere and national discourses are particularly contested by groups and identities whose existence have been marginalized by national narratives. Their difference from national identity is the source of tension in which the content of national narrative is contested. Diaspora communities and cultural minorities are groups whose identity is always defined by their otherness. This serves as a constant reminder of particularity within the supposedly homogeneous body of the nation. National identity is now challenged and questioned in everyday life over issues as diverse as education, religion, women's issues, food, clothing and art styles. The

⁴² The role of public space in identity formation will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.

challenges raised daily by particular communities become the foundation upon which identity and difference are constantly reproduced. The large Muslim community in France, the communities of former colonies that settle in England, the "gastarbeiters" in Germany and the immigrant communities in North America are just some of the examples of particular discourses that demand inclusion in national discourses.

The above examples illustrate the struggle to redefine the boundaries of what a national identity is, what it represents, who is included and who is excluded from its borders. The very meaning of national identity is transformed by the power struggle over whether a national identity is dominant in the public sphere or whether other identities have a right to be represented in the public sphere as themselves. Similarly, the power struggle over who is included in the definition of national identity questions the constitutive core of national discourse. As mentioned earlier, the growing salience of local and global levels, along with a national level, increases the intensity of the struggle to challenge the dominant representation of national identities in the public sphere. The context within which a redefinition of identities is taking place within national discourses can be described as follows:

a) Globalization is not just a homogenizing force which results in unification and sameness. Rather, it is a process that triggers local responses which challenge the universal effect of globalization. The dispersion of capitalism throughout different geographical locations, along with the emergence of new power centers and rapidly changing cultural codes and life styles enable local forms to develop their own responses to globalization. The inability of national narratives to reproduce themselves provides additional space to these previously marginalized identities within which to gain recognition as themselves.

b) That interaction between the universal effect of globalization and the particular manifestation of identity is a power struggle which contains asymmetrical relations and hegemonic practices. For this reason there is always the possibility of a progressive redefinition of identities as well as for an irridentist and xenophobic interpretation of identities.

c) The simultaneous existence of universality and particularity within globalization reiterates the historical dimension of identity and exposes the fact that universality is nothing but a representation of a certain particular as the universal identity. That is to say, the content of the universal is always open to renegotiation and redefinition by particulars.

Celebrating particularity does not, however, necessarily result in a better and more just human condition. What is important is to be able to question and problematize the conditions within which different manifestations of particularity take place. It is equally important to reveal how a certain particularity is represented and what kind of power struggle is involved in its quest for representation. It is only through the constant questioning of the representation of particularities that the danger of representing identities as universal and unchanging entities can be eliminated. Furthermore, discussing the representation of identities in relation to the political, economic and cultural contexts enables one to realize that identity is a historical and situated product and that it is always open to change as a result of the constantly shifting context. This very challenge that is brought about by the globalization process requires a careful examination of strategies with which identities are represented and mobilized. The next section of this chapter will discuss the various ways of representing identity in the global world.

2.3. Remaking Identities in the Global World

Earlier it was argued that representation of identity can be an important source of tension as well as a liberating political struggle in a global world. Given the fact that globalization is still an open-ended process with unexplored and unfinished projects, representing and redefining identities is also open to contending strategies that present alternative readings of identity. The following section presents possible strategies for providing alternative representations of identity in a global state of affairs.

Globalization With Centered Subject

This perspective emphasizes the homogenizing dimension of globalization which seeks to restore a universal dimension within the modern regime. The presence of a multiplicity of identities challenges this universal framework and the restoration of it. For this reason globalization is viewed as a force which would organize human communities around the same economic and political, if not cultural lines. This perspective of globalization reinvokes the traditional Enlightenment belief that identity can and should be consolidated through the process of universalization. Two central arguments define the nature of this perspective: the first one is that globalization is the universalizing force which brings diverse human communities together around the same political and economic project. The other one is that identities in a global world are essentially separated and exist with distinct central cores. Fukuyama's "End of History" thesis, Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" argument and Kaplan's "Coming Anarchy" and "Journey to the Ends of the World" are group of works that unite around three assumptions: (i) the centrality of Western modernization, (ii) imagining identities as homogeneous and separated units, demarcated in their respective discourses and

cultures, and (iii) a call for ahistorical universalization of the modern regime to deal with the chaotic human condition that arises from the globalization process.

Of these, probably, the most controversial is Fukuyama's "End of History Argument".⁴³ Fukuyama's reading of late modernity, informed by Hegel, argues that, as a result of the non-existence of main ideological differences, the dialectic of human history as a struggle of negatives has come to an end. The triumph of liberal democracy and market economy in the globalization process gives Fukuyama the confidence to argue that human communities are destined to converge around these basic principles. The simplicity and naiveté of this argument received a great deal of criticism.⁴⁴ What is important within the context of this chapter are the implications of Fukuyama's depiction of global state of affairs for the representation of identities. Declaring the end of history as a cessation of antagonism between conflicting moments amounts to a conceptualization of the universal that erases the tension which emerges from the manifestation of difference. Furthermore, the universal political and economic project is indifferent to the existence of particulars, to their right to be different, and to their historicity. Fukuyama not only oversimplifies Hegel's position on the dialectic as the engine of history, but also the centrality of difference as a basic human condition.⁴⁵

⁴³ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, (New York: Freen Press, 1992).

⁴⁴ For one of the most elaborate criticisms of Fukuyama see Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, (New York: Routledge, 1994), especially pp. 14-16 and 54-74.

⁴⁵ Despite the fact that Hegel launched his criticisms on the Kantian abstract, ahistorical universalization, he nevertheless acknowledged the progressivism in modernity by pointing out the fact that human history reaches its absolute point where the universal becomes the "only" particular and , therefore, free from the harassment of the conflicting moments. This constitutes the end of history as the stage where all the particulars are dissolved into the universal and become one. Hegel, on the one hand, restores the historicity of the universal by criticizing the ahistorical categorization in Kant. However, on the other hand, he did not go as far as Nietzsche or Heidegger, both of whom endorsed the complete historicity of the modern regime. This in-between position of Hegel makes his analysis open to conflicting interpretations. The left Hegelian position is also important in revealing the simplistic reading of Hegel by Fukuyama. For more on the left Hegelians see Jurgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*,

The contradictory progressivism in Hegel charms Fukuyama into arguing for the primacy of liberal democracy and market capitalism as a way of eliminating difference. While criticizing Fukuyama for his simplistic vision of history, Huntington reproduces the logic of identity in a similar fashion. Unlike Fukuyama, he still believes that conflict will exist in human affairs, but in late modernity the nature of this conflict is going to be civilizational. The conflict will emerge, not from competing ideologies, but from fundamentally different values or what he calls different civilizations.⁴⁶ In a similar apocalyptic tone, Kaplan presents a vision of chaos emerging in late modernity. For Kaplan, one of the causes of this emerging chaos is civilizational breakdown. He neatly places different regions of the world into the civilization classifications, views them as if they are separate from each other according to civilizational borders, and treats each civilization as if it has nothing to do with what goes on in another part of the world. His reference point is western modernity and his main problem is the failure of western modernity to live up its classical principles.⁴⁷ Kaplan's argument is complementary to Huntington's in that it maps the cultural conflicts and civilizational breakdowns that are emerging as a result of a "clash of civilizations".⁴⁸

Common to all of these arguments is their perception of identity as something which exists in a vacuum, as a separate unit with an essential core and fixed meaning. They are aware of the crisis of modernity in global world, but rather than seeking the causes of this crisis within the inherent contradictions of basic principles of the modern regime, they see the solution in the restoration of those very principles. They neither acknowledge the fluidity of identities that crisscross between different human

(Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1992) pp.51-75.

⁴⁶ Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, 1993, 72 (3), pp.22-28

⁴⁷ Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994.

⁴⁸ Robert D. Kaplan, *The Ends of the Earth*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1996), pg.440

communities and civilizations, nor accept the fact that human communities and civilizations are much more interrelated than as they represent them to be.

To attempt to reconstruct the modern regime as a universal form in a global world is not only conceptually problematic, but would also have disastrous political consequences. As argued earlier, one of the principal mistakes of the modern regime is its treatment of difference and identity. The darkest moments of modern times are, in fact, a result of attempting to erase difference for the sake of order by first attempting to fix the meaning of identity and second by targeting particularity as deviant because it is a source of contingency. To promote this same perspective as a solution to the crisis of modernity will have tragic consequences in a global world of close interaction and rapid movement.

In the moment of ambiguity where identity does not enjoy its formerly established sense of security and stability, the types of arguments discussed above seem to offer very tempting and clear cut answers. They provide an easy and applicable framework, something which policy makers frequently favor to identify and explain emerging identities. The popularity of such arguments demonstrates that they are not simply naive and problematic arguments that can be ignored, but rather arguments that need to be taken seriously because they may have a real impact on how identity formation is understood in a global world. The logic of these arguments manifests themselves in the representation of identities by reactionary movements within the Western and non-Western countries. The Christian Right and Militia Movements in North America or in ultra nationalist right wing movements in Europe and the resurgence of Political Islam and Ethnic Nationalisms in different parts of the postcolonial world are manifestations of a representation of identity as that which is an unchanging category with an essential core. At the core of all these movements is the dislike towards the Other, a fear of

interaction and of being transformed by the Other. They all share the view that identity needs to be protected from impurities and external elements in order to safeguard its true meaning. Difference is something that needs to be eroded in order to preserve order and stability. Whether in the case of Fukuyama, Huntington, or Kaplan or conservative critics of modern society, the attempt is always the same: to perceive identity as existing in vacuum, as isolated and frozen in time with an essential meaning.⁴⁹ This reading of identity rejects any kind of interaction between differences. There is only one true identity. What does not fit into that true identity is particular, an impurity and deviant. In a world of flourishing particulars this reading of identity is ready to repeat all the wrong doings of the modern regime. It poses serious dangers to a stable and peaceful coexistence of different communities and life styles.

Globalization Without a Subject

An alternative way of reading the question of identity in a global state of affairs is to reject any kind of universality from the outset, emphasizing the importance of particularities in their own right. This approach, which includes the major contributors of poststructuralist thought, would reject the role of the universal in the constitution of identity. The conflict between universality and particularity in the modern regime has led Poststructuralist writers to express complete disbelief in any kind of universal form that may provide common points of reference between distinct particularities. This skepticism towards any kind of universal categories is without any doubt morally justifiable on the grounds that in the modern regime what was said to be the universal was indeed a historically specific particular experience. While the

⁴⁹ It is interesting to note that in Turkey for instance Huntington's article is very popular among radical Islamists. When I mentioned this to him in his talk he gave at Carleton University in May 1997, Huntington was somewhat irritated by the suggestion that he and radical Islamist share the same view of identity.

poststructuralist assault on the modern regime has different dimensions, a large portion of it addresses the representation of the modern self as autonomous and homogeneous, in addition to the Enlightenment obsession with assimilating particulars into a universal discourse.

Foucault's discussion of the way in which historically specific discourses are responsible for the creation of the modern self is directed towards unmasking the ahistorical conceptualization of identity in the modern regime.⁵⁰ Foucault's genealogies reveal how different "disciplinary powers", which operate in different areas of social life such as schools, prisons, hospitals, control, police and regulate bodies as well as lives of individuals. His work depicts the modern self as simply a fiction of Enlightenment idealism.⁵¹ For Foucault, the disciplinary power which operates through various discourses attempts to create "a human being who can be treated as a docile body".⁵² This is, without a doubt, a very serious attack on the autonomy and sovereignty of the modern identity. Foucault rejects the possibility of a universal discourse from which the sources of an autonomous identity can be drawn. Moreover, by depicting the subject as a powerless product of discourse, he eliminates any possibility for "conscious" action.

⁵⁰ For works discussing identity and Enlightenment universality in particular see Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, vol.3: The Care of the Self*, (New York: Pantheon, 1986), Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment", in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. by Paul Rabinow, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power", in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, ed. by C. Gordon, (Brighton: Harvester, 1980) and Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

⁵¹ Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, (London: Tavistock, 1965), Michel Foucault, *Birth of Clinic* (London: Tavistock, 1973) and Michel Foucault, *Archeology of Knowledge* (London: Tavistock, 1972).

⁵² H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, (Brighton: Harvester: 1983) pg.135.

Like Foucault, Lyotard is another poststructuralist who expresses discontent with the concept of a unified subject and a universal core as the source of it. According to Lyotard, any attempt to create a universal representation is necessarily a totalizing act which results in unequal power relations in the representation of particular forms.⁵³ In other words, his conviction is that by definition, universality is in direct contradiction with the existence of particular forms. From this argument, it follows that the Enlightenment obsession with universality as the source of order is a grave injustice to particular forms of cultures and knowledges that do not necessarily fall into the domain of this so-called universal. According to Lyotard, no social organization- whether society or international community- can have a unified core. Rather they consists of various "language games".⁵⁴ He further states the tragedy of the modern regime lies in the failure to acknowledge the existence of language games and related power networks, and to construct a meta narrative as the core of social organization.⁵⁵ This extreme skepticism towards any kind of universal discourse leads him to argue that the basis of the social is the particular which is identified with different language games. Lyotard rejects any kind of totality as a source of social terror based on the argument that each and every particular language game is not only fundamentally different from one another, but any attempt to bring them together around a dialogical framework will result in the oppression of one particularity by another.⁵⁶ Lyotard denies the viability of a common core within which different subject positions can be negotiated. Lyotard's argument on subject and particularity has many similarities with that of Derrida. Yet, as will become clear later on in this chapter, while emphasizing the totalistic

⁵³ Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1988).

⁵⁴ Interview with Lyotard, *Diacritics: A Review of Contemporary Criticism*, vol.14, No.3, Fall 1984, pg.17.

⁵⁵ Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1980), pp.XXIII - XIV.

⁵⁶ Jean-Francois Lyotard, "The Differend, the Referent, and the Proper Name", *Diacritics*, Vol.14, No.3, Fall 1984, pg.11 Lyotard in *Differend* further elaborates on this argument of incompatibility of language games in forming a mutual understanding.

dimensions of modern thinking, Derrida clearly departs from the nihilistic skepticism of Lyotard.⁵⁷

Calhoun rightly charges the poststructuralist argument as presenting the subject as ahistorical as a result of the fact that the poststructuralist argument, in general, and as discussed by Lyotard in particular, explains the construction of identity with reference to linguistic practices.⁵⁸ In this regard all of the social, political, and economic variants that have a historical effect on the way in which the modern self was made became obsolete. For this reason, it is important to note that Foucault differs from other poststructuralist in his effort to illustrate the historical bases of the modern self.⁵⁹

Although the poststructuralist discussion of the modern regime is extremely important in indicating the historically situated nature of identities, it still poses two serious problems in understanding the nature of identities in late modernity. The first is the rejection of universality from the outset, and the second is a denial of the autonomy of the human agent. Common to all poststructuralist writers is their dislike of

⁵⁷ In order to avoid misrepresentation it should be noted that the skepticism towards the modern self is demonstrated, but not limited to, poststructuralist thought. Rather, this skepticism had been present throughout the modern regime. The autonomous and centered nature of the modern identity had been problematized in works such as Althusser's structural marxism, Saussure's linguistic theory and Lacan's psychology. These arguments developed from one another. For example the work of Althusser was influenced by both Lacan and Saussure. Similarly, the poststructuralist thought built its arguments from the debates put forward in the sixties. It can also be added that the roots of skepticism can be traced back as early as Nietzsche and Heidegger. In fact, the effect of Nietzsche and Heidegger on both Foucault and Derrida is very significant.

⁵⁸ Craig Calhoun, *Critical Social Theory*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pg.110.

⁵⁹ Here it is important to note one significant difference that exists among poststructuralist writers : discourse and textuality. Foucault takes the historical construction of discourses as the basis of modern identity, whereas Lyotard and Derrida focus on textuality as a linguistic practice in shaping the nature of identity. Naturally Foucault's insistence of the role of discourse, especially significant in his works on prison, sexuality, madness, is historically more sensitive. For more on this see Elenor MacDonald, "Feminist, Marxist and Poststructuralist Subjects", *Studies in Political Economy*, Summer 1991, No:35, pp.43-72.

universality as a core for a system from which a core of social system is derived. The western metaphysic which Derrida discusses, the totalizing discourses discussed by Foucault, or the metanarratives discussed by Lyotard are all examples of the type of universalizing and ahistorical dimensions of modernity which produce identity in dichotomous terms by privileging one identity over another and by fixing the meaning of identity as a timeless entity. While the rejection of universality seems to have a liberating effect on long-repressed particularities, this very rejection will naturally raise the question of what kind of possible interaction there might be between various groups and identities. If the historical tragedy of the modern regime was that it constructed the moment of interaction as occurring through a discourse that is universal but also ahistorical, totalizing and containing unequal power distributions, the rejection of this historical mistake by eliminating any kind of universal reference point is equally problematic as it leaves us with nothing but isolated particulars that have no possibility of coexistence or dialogical interaction.

The second problem is the impossibility of rethinking the concept of identity in dialogical and relational terms. If we accept the fact that what we call identity is produced by various discourses and meta narratives and is a specific language game, then all we can do to discuss the existence of particularity in its "authenticity", and approve that there is not much of a possibility for human agency to have an effect on those discourses and metanarratives. A discursive reading of identity which is formulated by the poststructuralist thought tells us that identity is simply a product of various discourses that are operating beyond its control. And the textual reading of identity argues that identity is nothing but a particular language game. That the textual reading of identity emphasizes the incompatibility of language games reaches the point of essentialism in that any possible interaction between different language games becomes impossible due to the incompatibility between them. The modern self becomes a passive

bearer of these various discourses and narratives, of which it is a product. In other words the identity becomes entrapped not once but twice in the sense that it not only loses its ability to negotiate and interact within the framework of the universal, but it is also locked into its specificity as an "authentic" particularity.

What are the consequences of a poststructuralist reading of identity within the global state of affairs? The first argument to be made is that in late modernity, where globalization displaces the established political, economic and social forms of modernity, there is a strong need for reconceptualizing how identities are made and represented. Poststructuralist thought provides an important tool to understand what went wrong in modernity but offers little help as to how to reconstruct identity formation process. At best, poststructuralist thought enables us to reflect on modern forms of identity construction.

The second argument concerns location of identities with respect to the universalizing tendency of the globalization process. As noted, one of the driving forces of globalization is the contradictory tendency towards universalization and, at the same time, a desire for further particularization. In its displaced form the modern regime and the world capitalist system are dispersed all around the world as a universal regime and this is the framework within which particular identities and cultures must manifest themselves. Rejecting the existence of this universalizing tendency of globalization categorically would leave no space for particularities to negotiate with the universal within which they operate. In other words the desire for particularity to gain recognition and to reassert itself in its own right would become a futile political project. Since there is no subject position from which the other can speak, the only way to represent the otherness is to emphasize its particularity. This emphasis on particularity against universality is, however, self-defeating in that it totally ignores the power relations between the

particular and the universal.⁶⁰ In other words, the separation of the particular from the universal, as seen for example in the form of nativist arguments, totally ignores the power relations between the particular and the universal. Without a renegotiation of the universal, the unequal power relations that exist between the universal and the particular.

Nowhere is this point made more clear than it is in the case of the remaking of identities in the form of new national identities which we are currently witnessing around the world. The insistence in the nativist position that identity is that which is culturally authentic, in the name of protecting identity, further marginalizes the particular identities.⁶¹ No matter how persistently particularity is emphasized, the process of globalization, together with the encompassing nature of the world capitalist system, and the concept of global culture as a signifier, reproduce existing power relations. In addition, such pure particularism necessarily leads to an essentialism in which the specific instances of particular discourse are believed to be only accessible by members of that particular discourse. Such insistence on the authenticity of particular identities and cultures totally ignores the fact that identity formation itself is a relational process.

⁶⁰ Ernesto Laclau in his "Universalism, Particularism, and the Question of Identity" excellently shows how this type of pure particularism is articulated in the Apartheid policy of South Africa. While defending the separate developments, defenders of Apartheid policy appears to be in favor of total isolation. Yet, separate development and isolation can not explain the unequal distribution of power relations between white and black races. Ernesto Laclau, "Universalism, Particularism, and the Question of Identity", in *The Identity in Question*, ed. by John Rajchman, (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp.93-110.

⁶¹ For a good case study which demonstrates how that logic ended up representing identities as essentially separated units in the Yugoslavian conflict see Renata Salecl, "The Crisis of Identity and the Struggle for New Hegemony in the Former Yugoslavia" in *The Making of Political Identities*, ed. by Ernesto Laclau, (New York: Verso, 1994)pp.205-232.

To summarize, globalization is a contested space open to different political, economic and cultural strategies. It contains gross power imbalances and universalizing tendencies. Yet, at the same time it also brings important opportunities through which the importance of heterogeneity and multiplicity can be recognized. The only way to have a strategic point within this contested terrain is to be able to engage in different forms of negotiation and thereby to articulate different subject positions in order to create a hegemonic position, which in turn will advance a specific particularity but also continuously contest the content of universal discourse. For this reason it is important to reconceptualize identity in order to provide new possibilities for enlightened action, as well as to rework and remake the meaning of the universal.

In a highly globalized world in which identities are insecure and constantly being remade by the global forces affecting assumptions of traditional political forms, a celebration of the ultimate particularity will eventually result in reproducing the same logic of the modern regime. The modern regime attempted to represent identities as unified, unchangeable with a fix meaning. In a similar fashion the celebration of particularity without any kind of universal discourse does so by attempting to fix the meaning of identity as a specific particularity without the possibility of interaction with other particularities. After having seen the tragic consequences of the Yugoslavian, and the Rwandan crises, in addition to the claims made by an emerging new fascism in Europe, by corrupt dictators in the developing world, by political Islam, and by the militia and Christian Right movements in the U.S., it becomes vital to resist any attempt to fix the meaning of an identity both from either a universal or a particular position. In most of the cases mentioned above the outrageous claims made by each of these groups are justified within the name of cultural authenticity and particularity. Corrupt dictators declare human rights alien to their cultures, Islamists declare democracy alien to Muslim culture, nationalist thugs that controlled the former Yugoslavia declare different

groups that lived there for centuries alien to each other, the new right in Europe declares all minorities and immigrants alien to the principles of European society and militia groups in the U.S. declare the multiplication of identity positions as an insult to the authentic American identity. All of these are examples that clearly indicate that struggling to preserve an ultimate particularity is as dangerous as struggling to preserve an ultimate universal identity and, in the end, produces the same results. Recognizing the importance of difference is, however, only a first step. The next step needed is the ethical and political responsibilities that would enable particularities to co-exist peacefully without being subject to totalitarian practices.

Globalization with Multiple Subjectivities

The third way of reading identity is as a refusal to understand identity formation as a dichotomous conceptualization of universal and particular, but rather to view the relationship between the universal and the particular as a complex and heterogeneous structure of identities. The promise of this reading is that identities are inherently heterodox and heterogeneous in their making and they can be articulated into different political strategies. There are three approaches that can be grouped within this alternative reading. Despite the differences in their conceptual framework, all three approaches attempt to reconceptualize the making of identities beyond the classical universal and particular dilemma. Notwithstanding their differences, they have important commonalities in their ethical and political concerns as well as the way in which they understand identity formation. To emphasize their points of convergence is crucial in order to have a substantial and constructive reading of identity formation. Moreover, it is crucial in order to construct a representation that can effectively challenge those efforts that wish to see identities in the global world as hostile enclaves, separated from each other by cultural boundaries. These approaches are: a)

reconstruction of identity through hegemony, b) reconstruction of identity through interactive universality and c) reconstruction of identity through hybridity .

Reconstruction of Identity Through Hegemony

Mouffe argues that "the social agent is constituted by an ensemble of subject positions that can never be totally fixed in a closed system of differences. It is constructed by a diversity of discourses, among which there is no necessary relation but a constant movement of overdetermination and displacement. The identity of such a multiple and contradictory subject is therefore always contingent and precarious, temporarily fixed at the intersection of those subject positions and dependent on specific forms of identification".⁶² She further argues that the "overdetermination of some subject positions by others makes the partial fixation of subject positions possible. These partial fixations are, however, always open to new challenges".⁶³ In this framework, hegemony is the key concept in explaining the constant effort of fixing the meaning of identity. Asymmetrical power relations between different identities put some in a favorable position vis-a-vis others. This is why alliances between different identity positions, that is the articulation of different subject positions within the same project in order to construct a hegemonic position, is key to the remaking of identities.⁶⁴ The

⁶² Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*, (New York: Verso, 1993), pg.33

⁶³ *ibid.*, pg.34

⁶⁴ One of the best example of such a political situation is the successful political movement against the Christian Right's attempt to push the what is call "Bill 19" in Oregon in order to scrap the political liberties given to the Gay community. In a very heated and charged political struggle in 1992, in Oregon, the Christian Right's effort was defeated by a coalition of gay, jewish and catholic groups. Catholic and jewish groups supported the Gay movement because of their past suffering in a predominantly protestant community. These groups perceived the Christian Right is the resurfacing of the protestant domination. This example shows how identities that would under normal circumstances contradict one another can be incorporated within the same political project in order to create a hegemonic position.

inevitability of the constant rearticulation of identities allows Mouffe to challenge the classical Enlightenment belief that identities are stable and have fixed positions that are clearly differentiated from one another. The ahistorical dimension of abstract modern self was largely responsible for the modern contention that the issue of power and domination is not really a concern of the identity formation. However, the history of the modern self documents that modern identities came into being as a result of asymmetrical power relations and the domination of one subject position by another. This leads Mouffe to argue that it is important to recognize the existence of the constitutive role power plays in identity formation and representation. What is important is not to eliminate the power but to find the ways that would channel power relations such that they would allow identities to rearticulate themselves to provide representation of themselves.⁶⁵

The argument put forward by Mouffe requires a cautious- or maybe a qualified- acceptance as an alternative to the classical representation of identity. Initially, the picture drawn by Mouffe suggests a classical "adversarial politics" that has its roots in a Machiavellian power game as well as in a Hobbesian "state of nature".⁶⁶ It is a social arrangement where different identities engage in a power struggle to gain recognition and to establish a hegemonic position and a social interaction identified with conflict, interest and power. It rules out the possibility of a peaceful coexistence as well as a consensus among different interests. There is more than enough evidence in Mouffe's

⁶⁵ This position was first put forward by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, (New York: Verso, 1985). Since then Mouffe has further elaborated on this position. For more see Chantal Mouffe eds., *Dimensions of Radical Democracy*, (New York: Verso, 1992) and Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*, (New York: Verso, 1993).

⁶⁶ Mouffe's analysis heavily relies on Carl Schmidt for a definition of politics that could be an alternative to the classical liberal tradition. Carl Schmidt is also well known for his dislike of liberal definition of politics as a consensus and negotiation. He instead advocates a "friend-foe" distinction as the core of political activity in which political is the struggle over power between friend and foe. For more see Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1971).

argument that would justify such an adversarial political setting. But there are also certain assumptions operating in the background which are not emphasized that have the potential to go beyond adversarial politics.

There are two crucial points which need to be made in order to further clarify the position taken by Mouffe, and subsequently by Laclau: the first concerns the definition of universality and the second one, the impact of Derrida's work that exists in the background of Laclau and Mouffe. Laclau accepts that universality is incompatible with particularity. Yet he adds that it cannot exist without particularity. He argues that "this paradox cannot be solved, but that its non-solution is the very precondition of democracy. The solution of the paradox would imply that a particular body would have been found, which would be the true body of the universal... If democracy is possible, it is because the universal has no necessary body and no necessary content; different groups, instead, compete between themselves to temporarily give to their particularisms a function of universal representation".⁶⁷ Laclau's endeavor is such that no single particular can be privileged as a universal, but the content of the universal can only be filled as a result of historical experience. In other words, the universal "misses" its fullness and is always open to displacement and dislocation by the particular. This formulation of the universal and the particular as a way of going beyond the classical dichotomy enables the particular to assert itself without necessarily taking the nativist position. Yet, this opening comes with one strategic question: If the content of the universal is open to renegotiation and is understood in its historical context, depending on the articulation by a different particular, what are the possibilities of reactionary moments emerging as a universal discourse? In other words, how can it be guaranteed that a fascist movement cannot establish a hegemonic moment as a universal

⁶⁷ Ernesto Laclau, "Universalism, Particularism, and the Question of Identity" in the *The Identity in Question*, ed. by John Rachman. (New York: Routledge, 1995), pg.107.

body, or an ultra-nationalist ethnic group as the core of a nation? If the content of the universal depends on the historic outcome of the configuration between particularities, then it may very well be possible for any kind of authoritarian, exclusionary xenophobic movement to establish its hegemony as a universal discourse. In order to elaborate on the possibility of reactionary movements establishing themselves as universal moments, and how it can be avoided, the discussion must turn to the second element in Laclau and Mouffe, that of the Derrida connection.

The background of the definition of politics and identity in Laclau and Mouffe is provided by Derrida's concept of Differance and excess meaning.⁶⁸ For instance, when Mouffe argues that the 'fully inclusive political community can never be realized and there will always be a 'constitutive outside', an exterior to the community that is the very condition of its existence' or, similarly, when Laclau argues that 'the universal is the symbol of a missing fullness and the particular exists only in the contradictory movement of asserting at the same time a differential identity and canceling it through its subsumption in a nondifferential medium' , they both play with Derrida's concept of Differance. According to Derrida, the meaning of objects and subjects are always determined by the difference between themselves, and since the perception of such difference always shifts according to different perceptions and readings, it is impossible

⁶⁸ Of all poststructuralist theorists Derrida is the most ambiguous one. His insistence on ethics and responsibility for the Other, on the one hand, presents a strong foundational basis, and his theory of Deconstruction, on the other, engages an endless practice of differences between language games, objects, meanings and subject positions. This ambiguity in Derrida distinguishes him from other poststructuralist writers for the simple fact that one dimension of Derrida still takes the Enlightenment concept of reason and ethics seriously. Norris makes a strong case for Derrida's insistence on foundationalism. For more see Christopher Norris, *Derrida*, (London: Fontana, 1987); Christopher Norris, *Uncritical Theory*, (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1992) and Christopher Norris, *The Truth About Postmodernism*, (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993). Bernstein also argues that Derrida is clearly different from other poststructuralist writers because he constantly elaborates on the importance of ethic and responsibility for other, Richard J. Bernstein, *The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity*, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992) pp. 172-199.

to fix the meaning of objects and subjects. This interplay of difference⁶⁹ results in the fact that the very moment that a certain meaning of an object or subject is fixed, there is always an external element which displaces its fixed meaning. Reading identity from this perspective renders the closure of identity impossible. Instead, it points to the relational nature of identity, that is that identities are only constructed in relation to each other by way of their differences. Rejection of any foundation as a core of identity is further advanced in Derrida's work through his discussion on an ethics of responsibility or the responsibility for others. One of Derrida's main concerns in discussing the relational character of subjects and objects is to "deconstruct" the modern obsession of finding an "Archimedian point" that would fix the meaning of subjects and objects forever. In his work he demonstrates the futility of this effort. Furthermore he argues that such an effort is unethical due to the fact that it always delimits the existence of the Other in its own right.⁷⁰ His discussion of difference makes an effort to unmask the process that silences, rules over and marginalizes the Other.⁷¹ For Derrida there is no ethical position unless there is an acceptance of the Other as other. He argues that "[w]ithout [letting the other be in its existence and essence], no letting-be would be possible, and first of all, the letting-be of respect and of the ethical commandment addressing itself to freedom".⁷²

This rather extended discussion of Derrida is justified on the grounds that Derrida, in his own writing, provides the necessary foundation to challenge not only the dominance of the universal but also closure of the particular as well. He is not ready to sacrifice

⁶⁹ Here is the only brief simplification of complex theoretical framework of Derrida's work on difference. For more see Jacques Derrida, "Différance" in *Margins of Philosophy*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

⁷⁰ This is discussed in Jacques Derrida, *Limited Inc.*, ed. by Gerald Graff, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993).

⁷¹ Derrida's the discussion of Apartheid forcefully revisits the strategy of closing the meaning to exclude and silence the Other. Jacques Derrida, "Racism's Last Word", *Critical Inquiry*, 12, Autumn 1985, pg.290

⁷² Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978)

the particular for the sake of the universal and vice versa. He acknowledges the importance of the particular for what it is but also warns against any kind of effort that may close the meaning of the particular. This clarifies to a great extent the earlier concerns that a reactionary movement might establish itself as a universal discourse. It is unfortunate that the concept of responsibility and ethics do not find a great resonance in Laclau and Mouffe's discussion on difference and politics. The absence of these concerns make their work vulnerable to the charge of anti-foundationalism and dangerous relativism.

Derrida's insistence on the availability of excess meaning as a way of disabling identity from closing itself, and on the ethical responsibility for the Other as other, together with Laclau and Mouffe's reconceptualization of politics and identity, has much potential for advancing the classical definition of identity formation. Campbell, for instance, brings this insight of Derrida to the realm of international politics. He argues for the importance of having endless possibilities in which to remake identities and for openings in which to resist any kind of authoritarian closure of the system.⁷³ Two of the biggest catastrophes of the post-cold war era- Yugoslavia and Rwanda- demonstrate that the most hideous crimes can only be committed when there is a systematic effort to fix the meaning of identities, to cut the relationality between them, and to ignore the responsibility for the Other

Reconstruction of Identity Through Interactive Universality

On the other side of the spectrum there are theorists who are classified "critical theorists", who problematize the way in which the universal is conceptualized in the

⁷³ David Campbell, "Violent Performances: Identity, Sovereignty, Responsibility" in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, ed. by Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwill, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1996).

modern regime. Instead of rejecting the Enlightenment tradition from the outset, they attempt to work with the concepts and framework provided by it and to reconstruct them in such a way that the particular will not be marginalized and excluded.⁷⁴ Earlier critical theorists such as Adorno, Marcuse, Horkheimer and Benjamin questioned the negative dialectic of the Enlightenment, that is why modernity's liberating discourse took a totalizing turn. Their analyses forcefully bring out the authoritarian face of the Enlightenment. In most of the cases, however, their works were influenced by an extreme level of pessimism; almost to the degree of dismissing the possibilities of challenging the authoritarian dimension of modernity. Given the fact that they were writing during the aftermath of the Second World War, their pessimism is perhaps justified.⁷⁵ It was Habermas who took the task of bringing constructive force of the critical theory to propose alternative ways of looking at modern forms of social life.

Habermas engages in a long and committed effort to tackle the totalitarian dimension of instrumental rationality which dominates all other possible alternative ways of reasoning in the modern regime. His theories of "Communicative Action" and "Discourse Ethics" are directed towards an endeavor of reconstructive action and reasoning from an alternative perspective.⁷⁶ Seyla Benhabib follows Habermas in discussing the

⁷⁴ The most vocal of these theorists is undoubtedly Habermas. Earlier critical theorists were also devoted their energy to demonstrate the totalistic tendency of the Enlightenment tradition. The most significant ones are Theodor Adorno *Negative Dialectics*, (New York: Seabury, 1973); Max Horkheimer, "The End of Reason", *Studies in Philosophy and Social Sciences*, Vol.9, 1941; Max Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*, (New York: Seabury Press, 1947); Max Horkheimer, *Critique of Instrumental Reason*, (New York: Seabury Press, 1974); Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, originally published in 1947 and translated by John Cumming, (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972) and Herbert Marcuse, *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

⁷⁵ For a historical overview of the development of Critical Theory see Rolf Wiggershaus, *The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance*, (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1994).

⁷⁶ Jurgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols.*, (Boston: Beacon, 1984, 1987) and Jurgen Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1990).

importance of reconstructing modern concepts in a similar fashion. Her discussion of universality and instrumental reason slightly differs from that of Habermas. Within the context of this chapter, Benhabib's effort to develop a new conceptualization of universality is crucially important for the potential it has to offer regarding possible openings for identity formation within the global world.

What Benhabib calls the "post-Enlightenment project of interactive universalism" is radically different from Enlightenment universalism in the sense that it is "not legislative, cognizant of gender difference not gender blind, contextually sensitive and situation indifferent".⁷⁷ In order to formulate this alternative form of universality, Benhabib suggest two steps: a "shift from a substantialistic to a discursive, communicative concept of rationality" and "recognition that the subjects of reason are finite, embodied cogitos".⁷⁸ Benhabib's intervention is directed towards the ahistorical representation of self within the framework of Enlightenment universality. She challenges the Kantian framework that tells us that reason is out there independent from historical and social conditions, waiting to reveal itself to human agency. Instead she suggests that reason is embedded within human history and sociality. Her task is to restore the historically situated character of identity. According to Benhabib this can only happen if there is a shift towards a dialogical conceptualization of reason. It is only through dialogical reason that the historical and context specific nature of identities can be negotiated. Similar to Laclau's argument on universality, she insists on the discursive power of individuals to assert the situated nature of self "in the name of universalistic principles".⁷⁹ These universalistic principles are nothing other than respect for the Other and treatment of one another as concrete human beings.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Seyla Benhabib, *Situating the Self*, (New York: Routledge, 1992), pg.3

⁷⁸ *ibid*, pg.5

⁷⁹ *ibid*, pg.8

⁸⁰ *ibid*, pg.31

According to Benhabib the conditions of interactive universality can be realized under these principles, and the discursive power of individuals can be asserted and renegotiated within the name of these principles. These principles are the basis upon which the claims of the particular can be based. Furthermore, the legislative voice of instrumental rationality that has marginalized the Other in the modern regime may be challenged through the discursive space provided by those principles. Legislative reason can be turned into a historically specific and sensitive reasoning through constant interaction between the universal and the historically situated particular.

Benhabib's effort to reconstruct the universal through an interactive reasoning and historically situated self is surprisingly similar to the effort described above. Even though the positions taken by Benhabib and Derrida are supposedly opposite in terms of the way they treat the principles of the Enlightenment tradition, their remedy for the universalizing and authoritarian tendency of the modern regime is very similar. Unlike Benhabib, Derrida locates himself outside the Enlightenment tradition. However, like Benhabib, he emphasizes the importance of the ethical position that entails a responsibility for the Other and the acceptance of it as it is. Both theorists aim not only to restore the importance of particularity and to emphasize the historically situated nature of the particular vis-à-vis the universal, but also to restore the importance of the ethical position that would enable the peaceful coexistence of particulars.

Benhabib's argument is crucially important for understanding the mobilization of identities. The most violent outbursts of conflicts occur in places where the public discourse has suddenly collapsed. Ethnicity fills that space which is left empty by the collapse of the public realm, the very realm which made formulation of identity positions. Aware of the problems that exist in the classical public realm, Benhabib

attempts to redefine it in order to provide a dialogical sphere in which identity and difference can be renegotiated without falling into exclusionary closure of identities.

Reconstruction of Identity Through Hybridity

This far, various approaches mentioned above operate within, and emerge from, modern discourse. This final approach is rather different in its orientation because it is represented by the Other who has been kept outside the realm of modern self. Postcolonial criticism situates itself outside of modern discourse in order to question the universal function of the modern self. It displaces the self/Other dialectic by displaying the process that is involved in the making of the modern self in relation to its other.⁸¹ That is to say, postcolonial criticism casts a doubt on the centrality of the modern self as the "true identity" through which the particular can be understood. Bhabha argues that "postcolonial criticism bears witness to the unequal and uneven forces of cultural representation involved in the contest for political and social authority within the modern world order."⁸² Postcolonial criticism rejects the notion that the Other can only be represented by the modern self by restoring silent and forgotten memories and histories. The distant voice of postcolonial criticism, and its insistence on the possibility of a multiplicity of heterogeneous histories, poses a direct contrast with the notion of identity as a unified self. Representation of the other through its own voice in different discourses is only part of the Postcolonial challenge. It also finds ways to formulate and represent identities. In other words it attempts to show

⁸¹ For more about Postcolonial Criticism see Homi Bhabha, "Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of ambivalence and Authority Under a Tree Outside Delhi, May 1817", *Critical Inquiry*, 12:1, 1985, H.A. Giroux, *Border Crossings*, (New York: Routledge, 1992), G. Prakash, "Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World: Perspectives from Indian Histography", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 32, 1990 and Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, *The Postcolonial Studies Reader*, (New York: Routledge, 1995)

⁸² Homi Bhabha, "Freedom's Basis in the Indeterminate", *October*, 61, 1992, pg.46.

alternative ways within which identities develop different forms of coexistence. The task of postcolonial criticism is twofold: to displace the unified representation of identity by disturbing its central location and to offer a new ground within which the self and the Other can meet.⁸³

Within the context of this chapter Edward Said and Homi Bhabha will have central importance because of their constant effort to situate identities within their historical context. Both Said and Bhabha emphasize the heterogeneous nature of identity, its shifting grounds and its hybridity. This is a powerful action to resist representations directed towards freezing identities as well as to reveal that actual human experience is much more mixed and colorful. They counteract the legislative and administrative voice of modern rationality, which argues that identities can only exist in their enclaves and are constituted by their essential core, by continuously exhibiting the different historical experience.⁸⁴

⁸³Literature clustered around what is called Postcolonial criticism is by no means unified in its dealing with modernity, identity and the Postcolonial Other. For instance, Spivak demarcates herself from attempts to create a new ground for alterity, or a communicative ground between modern self and its other for the simple fact that any kind of attempt to found a new ground will inevitably result in the reproduction of power relations that shaped the nature of relation between the self and the other. Her criticism on Subaltern Studies group is a good example of her position. For more see Gayatri C. Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak" in *Marxism and Interpretation of Culture*, ed. by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

⁸⁴It is not a coincidence that Postcolonial criticism is advanced by Literary Criticism. Said explores the historicity of the postcolonial Other and the experience of empire through the 19th century novel, Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1993). Literature with its alternative forms of representing the human experience always indicates the multiplicity and heterogeneity of identities. Literary forms of representation challenge the borders drawn by national narratives and their operationalization through various administrative techniques grounded in the modern state. Achebe for instance discusses forms of representation of the multiplicity of human existence, Chinua Achebe, "Named for Victoria, Queen of England", *New Letters*, 40:3, 1973. In recent years Salman Rushdie, in his novels, exhibits the hybridity and heterogeneity of human existence. It is no wonder that he is a target of groups that feels uncomfortable and challenged by the hybrid and fluid nature of identities. After being sentenced to death by the fatwa of muslim zealots, he was banned in India with his last novel "Moor's Last Sigh" for offending the racist and fascist hindu leader. In both *Satanic Verses* and *Moor's Last Sigh*, Rushdie presents a different human condition in which timeless and frozen subjects of national and religious narratives are made meaningless

Edward Said partly relies on poststructuralist theory to show how the western self created its identity by negating the non-western self as oriental, and how cultural forms of the western discourse operated as a universal signifier to justify colonialism. Yet, he also distances himself from poststructuralist rejection of the Enlightenment tradition. Despite heavy criticism for trying the impossible, Said utilizes anti-humanitarianism while simultaneously committing to the category of the human subject. As one of the prominent spokespersons and representatives of Palestinian identity in the U.S., Said knows very well that a total displacement of the human subject will have a destructive effect on the marginalized identities and groups. In this framework, Said's definition of "border intellectual" and his "contrapuntal reading" is not only a strategy for the displacement of the modern self but also an important opportunity to redefine the subject as a category ⁸⁵

Contrapuntal reading, Said argues, refers to a process of being "able to think through and interpret together discrepant experiences, each with its particular agendas and pace of development, its own formations, its internal coherence and its system of external relationships" ⁸⁶ That is to say that "in reading a text, one must open it out both to what went into it and to what is excluded".⁸⁷ Said's definition clearly indicates that contrapuntal reading requires a juxtaposition of the nonsynchronized and discrepant points that exist in a particular discourse. This is why Said particularly insists on accounting "for both processes, that of imperialism and that of resistance to it, which can be done by extending our reading of the texts to include what was once forcibly

by the historical richness of crisscrossings between identities.

⁸⁵ Said in his *Culture and Imperialism* elaborates on these concepts in order to restore the confidence in the category of human subject.

⁸⁶ Edward Said, "Intellectuals in the Post-Colonial World", *Salmagundi*, 1, 1986, pg.56

⁸⁷ Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, pg.67

excluded".⁸⁸ In this respect, the ability to read the discrepant histories of the colonizer and the colonized together enables one to see what is included in and excluded from colonial discourse.

As a way of revealing the inconsistencies embedded in a certain discourse, contrapuntal reading goes hand in hand with Said's definition of border intellectual. Said defines himself as someone who "is in and out of things, and never really of anything for very long".⁸⁹ Thus to be an exile, and to be in and out all the time, means to live on the border, and to provide a specific articulation of a subject position which has a certain distance from both his/her culture and that in which s/he is forced to live. The strangeness and homelessness of the border intellectual provides the opportunity to mediate between different discourses, rather than internalizing them. Said explains this position as follows: "[T]hese countries are the three in whose orbits I was born, grew up, and now live. Although I feel at home in them, I have remained, as a native from the Arab and Muslim world, someone who also belongs to the other side. This has enabled me in a sense to live on both sides, and try to mediate between them".⁹⁰ Such a subject position has indeed enabled Said to read the colonial discourse contrapuntally; books such as *Orientalism*, or his latest book *Culture and Imperialism*, could only have been written by someone who was able to see the discrepant moments that exist in colonial discourse. The contrapuntal reading, especially visible in his latest book, enabled him to show "how it was that the imperial European would not, or could not see that he or she was an imperialist and, ironically, how it was that the non-European in the same circumstances saw the European only as imperial".⁹¹

⁸⁸ *ibid.*, pg.67

⁸⁹ Said quoted in E. Shoat, "Antinomies of Exile: Said at the Frontiers of National Narrations" in *Edward Said: A Critical Reader*, ed. by Michael Sprinker. (Blackwell, 1992), pg.122

⁹⁰ Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, pg.xxiii

⁹¹ *ibid.*, 162.

Said historicises the way identities define themselves. The ability to read contrapuntally prevents one from closing his/her identity as a final moment. It enables human agency to see subjectivity as nothing but a product of contradictory discourses. There are possibilities for a human agent to move strategically by distancing himself/herself by identifying the contradictions, and playing them against one another. Furthermore, the concept of the border intellectual is a real call for cosmopolitanism that would reject the strict boundaries of a single identity and would permit the expression of the richness of human experience

Like Said, Homi Bhabha's account of the relationship between colonizer and colonized explains how multiple subject positions can be articulated through the gaps and inconsistencies of the signifying mechanism. Homi Bhabha criticizes Said, in his 'Difference, Discrimination, and the Discourse of Colonialism', for creating a binary opposition between colonizer and colonized, and for failing to see the "ambivalence" and the "anxiety" of the colonizer when "he" is outside his own discourse. Despite the fact that he agrees with Said that Orientalism is a hegemonic discourse creating the identity of the other and reproducing the power relations between the colonizer and the colonized, he also states that colonial discourse becomes extremely "anxious" and "paranoid" as soon as it moves away from the safe environment of home. The colonizer, in the process of colonization, constantly attempts to control the colonized by defining the identity of the colonial subject and by converting and assimilating it. Bhabha argues that such assimilation, or in his terms "mimicry", through the assumed universality of the colonizer self becomes a fragmented point in which the identity of colonizer and colonized takes a form of "hybridization". Hybridization makes the ambivalence of the identity of the colonizer discernible and reveals the gaps and inconsistencies in the discourse of colonization. Moreover, it creates a space for the colonial subject to articulate her/his

hegemonic point through those gaps and inconsistencies. Bhabha argues that "[i]f the effect of colonial power is seen to be the production of hybridization...[it] enables a form of subversion... that turns the discursive conditions of dominance into the grounds of intervention".⁹² This hybridization process marks the impossibility of a fixed universal subject position; yet its assumed existence provides a space in which the new subject position and resistance can be created. It is for this reason that Bhabha argues that the discursive formation of colonialism not only justifies the existence of colonial administration, but also enables the possibility for resistance. The direct encounter with the other reveals the tragedy of the colonial self as a universal body and shows how the colonial self is open to fragmentation and deconstruction through the ambiguities of its own discourse. It is not surprising that the most severe and radical resistance to colonial administration was articulated by natives who were educated in colonial schools. If glorified notions of Western thought, such as equality, liberty and fraternity could not show the colonizer how colonial discourse contradicts its own fundamental basic values, they certainly create the opportunity for the colonized to create a counter hegemonic action. The very inconsistency lying at the heart of colonial discourse and the tragedy of the colonial self's appeal to universality, become the sources of native resistance.⁹³

⁹² Homi Bhabha, "Signs Taken for Wonders", pg.154

⁹³ Julia Kristeva presents a similar attempt to question and redefine the universality of the modern self. Kristeva argues that since the subject is the product of a play of signs within the signifying chain, the subject can not be single and unified, but plural. That is to say there is no one single subject position, but plural subjects. According to her the unified Cartesian subject is nothing but a product of Western metaphysics. Julia Kristeva; "Oscillation Between Power and Denial", in *New French Feminism*, ed. by Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron, (University of Massachusetts Press, 1980)pp.165-166. Her portrayal of the modern self as products of discourses does not mean that these subject positions are passive bearers of discursive practices. Although they are produced by different discursive practices, their plurality and, in Lacanian terms, their being "in process" ensures their reproductions over and over again. Kristeva writes that "we are no doubt permanent subjects of a language that holds us in its power. But we are subjects in process, ceaselessly losing our identity, destabilized by fluctuations in our relations with the other..." Julia Kristeva, *In the Beginning Was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith*, (New York: Colombia University Press, 1987) pg.9. Kristeva's definition of the subject makes a strong case for the existence

Hybridization, which plays an essential role in both Bhabha's argument about the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized and in Said's argument about border intellectuals, demonstrates the fragmentation and the plurality of subjectivity which defies any claim for a fixed and unified identity, and which constantly relocates and rearticulates the content of universality. Postcolonial criticism presents an alternative representation of otherness, and provides the possibility for other ways of explaining how identity formation in the global world can be understood. The arguments of Bhabha and Said are particularly important as a way to resist the pure particularism of the nativist position, or the representation of ethnic identities as homogeneous. They propose an identity formation that is not passive but which actively intervenes in the rearticulation of the modern self by reworking the very ambiguities of national discourses and ethnicities as fixed identities.

To see the ambiguous and discrepant points that are inherent in national discourses by juxtaposing non-synchronous and marginal experiences, directly intervenes in the global representation of the ethnic self as a fixed identity. That is to say, contrapuntal reading offers an important opportunity to challenge the representations of identities through binary oppositions and to prevent a hegemonic representation of ethnic identity. It does so by revealing the inconsistencies within a given identity discourse and creating a space for the articulation of new subject positions. Thus, contrapuntal reading shows that history is not a unilinear process but rather one which is full of fragmentations, unequal developments and experiences, and discrepant moments. As Homi Bhabha points

and possibility of multiple subject positions who are able to work through ambiguities in a signifying chain. Uncertainties and gaps in the signifying chain provide a space for the articulation of new subject positions and an opportunity to deconstruct the previous subject positions. These uncertainties in the signifying chain appear to be the source of resistance points through which alternative hegemonic practices can be articulated. The radical nature of Kristeva's definition of the subject lies in its recognition of subjectivity as a source of action, but at the same time, at its denial of human consciousness as the center of knowledge. The similarity between Kristeva, Bhabha and Said displays the points of contacts between poststructuralist and postcolonial theories.

out, unlike the universalist notion of global culture, today's culture is both "transnational" and "translational".⁹⁴ It is transnational because "contemporary postcolonial discourses are rooted in specific histories of cultural displacement such as for example: in the middle passage of slavery and indenture; in the voyage out of the colonialist civilizing mission; in the fraught accommodation of postwar third world migration to the West; or in the traffic of economic and political refugees within and outside the third world". It is translational because "such spatial histories of displacement- now accompanied by the territorial ambitions of global medial technologies- make the question of how culture signifies, or what is signified by culture, rather complex issues".⁹⁵ Such examples of multiplicity and "pastiche" once more exhibit the tragedy of the modern self's appeal to ahistorical universality. Said in his *Culture and Imperialism* shows how the dominant discourses of the modern regime are displaced and deconstructed by those who live on the border. The concept of border intellectual, however, is not limited to those who are actual exiles. It is applicable to everyone who accepts to live on the border.

All three approaches discussed above, notwithstanding their differences, converge around two central points: their skepticism of a unified and singular modern self and their embrace of multiplicity as integral to the human condition. They all indicate that this close-knit interaction between identity and its claim to universality in the modern regime is the tragedy of the modern self, which inevitably produces unequal power relations and results in exclusion and marginalization of particularities. They also acknowledge the fact that in globalization it is crucial to accept particularity and multiplicity as a fundamental human condition. What makes these approaches fundamentally different from a poststructuralist position is their commitment to the

⁹⁴ Homi Bhabha, "Freedom's Basis in the Indeterminate", *October*, 61, 1992, pg.47

⁹⁵ *ibid*, pg.47

human agent as a source of critical action. They do not see problems which the modern self presents as reason to dismiss the human agent altogether. By juxtaposing the various arguments discussed above, the following points can be extrapolated in order to provide an alternative way of looking at how identity formation and representation can be understood in a global world:

i) the necessity of challenging the ahistorical nature of universality in modernity. All undertake to restore the historicity of the claim to universality: Derrida, through his concept of Différance, Laclau through his concept of universal as an incomplete moment, Benhabib through interactive universality and Said and Bhabha through contrapuntal reading and mimicry. They also all share the idea that a historically defined universal will open up the space required to build a common ground and common principles upon which to build ethical discourses. Moreover, they agree that identity will not derive its universality from an ahistorical timeless mental category. Instead universality will be reshaped and renegotiated by the historical experience of human agents.

ii) rejection of pure particularity just as they reject ahistorical universality. The ultimate particularity, they are all aware, will result in the same logic that produced the modern self. Furthermore, as is clear in both Derrida and Benhabib, this will result in the complete disappearance of ethical concerns that would make the peaceful coexistence of particulars. The ethical principles that call for responsibility for the Other, which is visible both in Derrida and Benhabib, provide the moral ground upon which peaceful interaction based on negotiation between different particulars can be realized.

iii) representation of identities in their fluidity and multiplicity. Derrida offers the most radical notion by putting forward an argument that refutes any closure for any

particular identity. Benhabib restores universality to protect the multiplicity of particulars while Said and Bhabha emphasize the hybridity of identities to show that it is impossible to freeze the meaning of identity because of the simple fact that human experience is rich and intertwined. Moreover, all emphasize the relational nature of identities in their construction. Unlike the official national narratives which represent each identity as having its essential constitutive core, they counterargue that identities can only be constructed and made meaningful in relation to one another.

These points have two crucial consequences for the way identity formation is understood. The first consequence is that, beyond the theoretical debates, these points of commonality demonstrate that beyond the publicized differences between poststructuralist, critical and postcolonial theories, there are many points of intersection that enables a constructive dialogue. Their position on the way identities are represented in the modern regime and the relation between universality and particularity shows that they share the same concerns in terms of restoring the multiplicity of human experience. It is the intention of this chapter and of the thesis, in general, to argue that the conceptual richness that may arise from a constructive dialogue between these different positions will provide an indispensable tool to refute the homogenization of identity formation.

The second consequence is that, despite the efforts of turning identities inwards, and isolating them from one another as the only means for human existence in global politics, there are strong voices coming from different dimensions and ready to challenge the hegemony of the existing approaches. These strong voices are not just simply abstract theoretical reflections but also political interventions that would enable one to reconceptualize ethnic, national, racial and sexual identities as well as the boundaries of communities within which they seek recognition. These political interventions warn us

against so called "fault lines" that put identity in a vacuum and ignore the multiplicity of human experience . As opposed to this idea, these interventions advise that identity should be understood in relational terms. They also emphasize that difference and an acceptance of identities as plural comes with the concept of responsibility, that is responsibility for the Other. Far from being isolated, identities are always constructed in relation to one another, a relational condition that entails a responsibility for one another

Conclusion

The chapter emphasized that representation of identity in modern nation states has resulted in a marginalization of cultures and identities and their assimilation into dominant identities. Moreover, as particular forms of human existence find greater opportunity to express themselves in the global world, it is crucial to recognize heterogeneity and multiplicity of identities. The increasing interaction between global, local and national levels enables marginalized groups and identities to seek alternative ways of expressing themselves, claiming recognition and representing themselves in their own voice. This multiplication of identities, together with the universalizing tendency of the globalization process, brings out new challenges for addressing this new condition of universalization and particularization. Although accommodating heterogeneity and multiplicity is vital for a peaceful coexistence in a global world, a means to address the ways in which identities are made and represented in the global world is equally important. Representation of identities involves relations of power within which there are contesting claims as to how a certain identity is formed and represented.

This chapter has outlined several alternative strategies which address the question of identity in the global world. It has argued for the strategy which sees identity formation as involving multiple subjectivities, emphasizes that identity is a historical product and always open to change through negotiation. Moreover identity can only be understood in relational terms. That is to say, far from being isolated and essential entities, identities are deeply related to each other. Why is it important to understand identity in relational terms or to emphasize the responsibility for the Other? One of the important consequences of the globalization process is its transformative effect on political and social space, as well as time-space complexions. All of these dimensions create new possibilities for different articulations of subject positions that can not be explained within the domain of a singular identity logic. Furthermore, as a result of radical shift in how identities are made, national society, the national community and the politics that takes place in those spaces become contested concepts that require rethinking and redefinition. Globalization entails a redefinition of the polity, not only in its national dimension, but also in its global and local dimensions. The moments and processes that exist within the globalization process, in which identities are reformed and remade makes it impossible to assume that identities are fixed or that they can be turned into frozen entities. What the short history of modernity tells us is that trying to seek order and stability within the confines of a universal by eliminating of particularity and difference results in gross injustices. In late modernity, we have come to terms with the fact that difference and particularity are fundamental to the human condition. Recognition of this fact forces us to rethink how we understand the way in which identities are constructed and represented. In a global, world where the question of identity becomes a contested issue, it is important to discuss new ways of understanding identity. The tragic crises of short post cold-war period tell us that thinking about identity within the context of the traditional modern conceptualization is disastrous. It is also a moral obligation to resist the belief that differences can not exist together and

therefore should be separated by creating individual enclaves. In this respect, both modern and poststructuralist positions present serious ethical problems. The former insists on the homogeneity of identity, whereas the latter insists that any interaction between different identities unavoidably results in an unequal power relations. These two positions must be resisted morally if we wish to have a world as a place where difference and plurality can exist without conflict. It is important to emphasize this point, because the coming era of human history will be identified with these concerns as homogeneous national identities are further fragmented. If we do not want to live in a world that has been divided into micro units, designated according to ethnic and tribal lines, it is important to read identity formation from a perspective that allows the ethical and moral ground of experiencing multiplicity in harmony. The following chapter will discuss the ways in which such perspective can be formulated in nation states.

CHAPTER III

IDENTITY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Introduction

The previous chapter argued for an interpretation of globalization with multiple subjectivities. Because globalization increases contact between different groups and cultures, the question of difference becomes an important issue for nation states. Almost all nation states host variety of cultures and identities who refuse to be defined by the dominant national identity. In some cases these groups may be late comers but in most of the cases they are particular ethnic and cultural identities marginalized by the dominant national identity. The chapter further argued that simply acknowledging the existence of such identities is not enough. The challenge is to provide a pluralistic environment in which differences between these groups and identities can be negotiated peacefully.

This chapter will concentrate on the concept of the public sphere as a way to address the negotiation of differences in modern nation states. It will put forward the argument that the public sphere offers a normative framework in which differences can be negotiated without being polarized. Yet, there is a deeply problematic relationship between the public sphere and national discourse. While the national public sphere, in its ideal form, aims to foster the autonomy of the individual and to promote plurality, actual national discourses have curtailed the autonomy of the individual and worked against plurality. This problematic relationship between the public sphere and modern national discourse lies at the center of a seeming contradiction making the manifestation of

difference in national discourse a deeply problematic issue.

The lack of autonomy of the public sphere from national discourse has been detrimental to manifesting difference within nation states. Nevertheless, the public sphere is still a vital concept by which to achieve the peaceful coexistence of difference and still provides a framework where claims for difference can be negotiated. As Benhabib argues, "[t]he struggle over what gets included in the public agenda is itself a struggle for justice and freedom"¹

Despite the fact that it is through the modern national public sphere that difference has been normalized and homogenized, the public sphere also has a dialogical quality which has the potential to facilitate the negotiation of difference. The public sphere has the potential to accommodate difference and plurality without segregating difference and to encourage dialogue among identity positions and permit crisscrossings between identities. Furthermore, this dialogical capacity permits the questioning and self-reflexivity of identity, preventing closure of identities as essential entities. However, the public sphere can only fulfill its dialogical promise if it gains its autonomy from the national discourse and has a cosmopolitan quality.

The following section will elaborate upon the Habermas's definition of public sphere and discuss why, in its ideal form, the public sphere falls short of addressing the issue of difference and particularity. In the next section, emphasis will be put on the problematic relationship between the public sphere and national discourse. Final section will look at how cosmopolitan public sphere would permit the peaceful manifestation and coexistence of difference and plurality.

¹ Seyla Benhabib, *Situating the Self*, (New York: Routledge, 1992), pg.94.

3.1. The Public Sphere and the Manifestation of Difference

The concept of the public sphere has received growing attention since the translation of Habermas' "The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere" (referred as the Structural Transformation thereafter) in 1989.² Habermas set himself a dual task in the Structural Transformation: the emergence and the transformation of the bourgeoisie public sphere and to analyze its function in late societies. He equates the emergence of the public sphere with the emergence of modernity. In other words, the public sphere is a direct product of modern thinking where politics take place within the boundaries of the nation state and the economy moves out of the sphere of household. Furthermore, the public sphere is an essential component of the modern polity where particular groups and identities are dissolved into the national discourse and the state emerges as an institution where political power is consolidated. The public sphere is an essential component of the modern polity, according to Habermas, because it contains the elements of addressing the primacy of the individual and the role of "his " reason in creating a modern society. In its ideal form, the public sphere fosters plurality and participation within society. Since it is based on communication and critical debate, it allows differences to be reconciled in a public forum. This is, according to Habermas, the core of modern thinking as well as autonomous action and rational agency. That is to say that the public sphere provides the space for rational individual as the principle of agent. At the same time it also provides the institutional framework within which rational individual's action take place.

He defines the public sphere as that which

: Even though the book published in 1962 in Germany it took 27 years to become available in English. Since then the work initiated a substantial debate about the way politics is mediated in modern societies.

... may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public; ... regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labour. The medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without historical precedent: people's public use of their reason.³

As is clear from Habermas' definition, the public sphere is a modern phenomenon because it emerges within the context of the modern state and capitalist relations of exchange.⁴ It is the social space between the state and civil society where political action, in the form of debate between state and society and among private citizens, takes place.⁵ The public use of critical reason is the constitutive element of public debate because the public sphere is the societal space where reason is put into full use to guide the public debate of private people about their affairs. Furthermore, reason is the medium of the debate in the public sphere; it facilitates communication as well as social integration. Habermas attributes a universal role to reason as the medium of communication in the public sphere, a common medium which defines the boundaries of public debate.

The possibility of critical debate, however, rests on the principle of equality of citizens in the public sphere. In a public sphere where citizens experience unequal status, open public debate becomes impossible. This is why, according to Habermas, there is a substantial difference between the public sphere and civil society. Civil society is a space that is outside the realm of the state whereas the public sphere is the social space within which the state and society negotiate. Habermas defines civil society as "more or

³ Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1992), pg.27

⁴ Habermas in fact devotes a whole chapter on the historical context of the public sphere, Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Ch.1

⁵ Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, pg.30

less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, and movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in the private life spheres, distill and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public sphere".⁶ Civil society contains inequalities that emerge from the private sphere of family and commodity exchange. The public sphere is, however, in its ideal form free from those power relations that operate within the private sphere.

Habermas points out that:

[t]he line between state and society...divided the public sphere from the private realm... The private sphere comprised civil society in the narrower sense, that is to say, the realm of commodity exchange and social labour; imbedded in it was the family with its interior domain. The public sphere in the world of letters; through the vehicle of public opinion it put the state in touch with the needs of society".⁷

This clear line between public sphere - and civil society - or the private sphere is particularly important for the achievement of the principle of equality in the public sphere. Since open public debate can only take place among individuals who are situated equally, inequalities and power imbalances that may emerge from the private realm of civil society would prevent healthy public debate. The power imbalances that may emerge from relationships between different identity positions, as well as from the relations of production and market, are properties of the private sphere. Citizens are assumed to take part in the public sphere without these power relations. That

⁶ Jurgen Habermas, "Further Reflections on the Public Sphere" in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. by Craig Calhoun, (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996), pg.367. It is interesting to note that only in Habermas' most recent work the relationship between civil society and the public sphere is clearly defined. In *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* civil society has a more Hegelian connotation in that it is the realm of commodity exchange and social labour. In *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* Habermas argues that the public sphere received its normative status with the "self articulation of civil society" Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, pg.74.

⁷ Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, pg.30-31

assumption rejects the possibility that power relations that exist in the private sphere can also be present in the public sphere.

Habermas also points out that the public sphere's ability to promote the common good derives from the fact that citizens use universal reason as the basis of the public sphere. Civil society, however, reflects different groups and identity positions that may not utilize universal reason in their private life. As universal reason is assumed to be readily available to every citizen, it operates as the equalizer within public debate. According to Habermas, civil society lacks such a common form of mediation and operates as the realm of pure difference.

This sharp distinction between the public and private in Habermas, and the public sphere as the space where politics in the form of dialogue take place, is very similar to the definition of public sphere in Hannah Arendt. Like Habermas, Arendt locates political activity within the public sphere. Political action in the public sphere takes place in the form of a speech by which citizens, as equals, engage in debate and conduct the affairs of the political community.⁸ Again similar to Habermas, Arendt differentiates the political realm from the family and the market. The realm of politics is thought to be similar to the political space of Greek polis where there is a clear separation between the matters of the political realm and family and labour.⁹ The political realm, which is located within the borders of the public sphere, is about "human activity based on the human potential for freedom".¹⁰ As opposed to this, family and labour are outside the political realm and belong to the realm of the private which is

⁸ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, (Chicago: The Chicago University Press, 1958), pp.25-28.

⁹ *ibid*, pp.28-38.

¹⁰ Eli Zaretsky, "Arendt and the Public/Private Distinction" in *Hannah Arendt & The Meaning of Politics*, ed. by Craig Calhoun and John McGowan, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pg.219.

the realm of the "necessities of life".¹¹ The public sphere loses its liberating potential, according to Arendt, whenever "the necessities of life" move out of the private realm and move into the public sphere. When this occurs, the public sphere loses its main function of creating a "good life for community" and of fostering freedom because it becomes involved with distribution and necessity.¹² Thus, the public sphere in Arendt is the social space where through constant debate, people do become a community, in other words the space where social integration occurs. In contrast, the private realm is the realm of particularity identified with individual needs and desires.¹³ The invasion of the public sphere with concerns of the private realm prevents individuals from being citizens able to debate matters of public interest and leads them instead to "behave as economic producers, consumers, and urban city dwellers".¹⁴ Arendt believes that an invasion of the public sphere by the concerns of the private realm is the end of politics as a vehicle of building community through debate and deliberation.

Habermas and Arendt's formulations of the public sphere emphasize the importance to a healthy public debate of separating the public and private. Habermas, like Arendt, places economy and family in the private sphere while literary and scholarly journals, business letters and coffee houses were essential in establishing a forum among groups of people who otherwise would not have a chance to engage a public debate.¹⁵ That the

¹¹ *ibid.*, ch.2.

¹² Arendt's analysis of the French Revolution reflects her views on the role of the public sphere. She argues that the French Revolution lost its sense of creating freedom and building community when it started to deal with issues of "social" such as poverty and general economic problems. Instead of dealing with freedom, it started to deal with the problems of life and lost its potential to facilitate the "good life" for community. Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution*. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973), pp.90-91.

¹³ Roland Axtmann, *Liberal Democracy into the Twenty-First Century*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), pg.52.

¹⁴ Seyla Benhabib, "Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and Jürgen Habermas", in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. by Craig Calhoun (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1992), pg.75

¹⁵ Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, pg.30-37.

private realm for both is a realm of particularity is the reason why they argue for a distinction between the public and private. According to Habermas and Arendt, as the critical use of reason in the public sphere is about creating a public good and providing a tool for social integration, entrance of particularity into the public sphere in the form of needs, social issues and recognition of difference would degenerate the public sphere into an adversarial space where particular claims seek recognition without a regard for the public good. Furthermore, the presence of particularity in the public sphere poses another challenge to the public use of universal reason as particular claims and identities may not necessarily subscribe to universal reason as the only medium of debate.

Habermas, in fact, points to the problem of sustaining a reasoned debate in the case of mass participation. The inclusion of different groups such as women, workers and peasants into the public sphere means an inclusion of different identities and interests whose private life experience may not fall into the domain of enlightenment reason. As more groups are included in the public sphere, and as market relations come to dominate the public sphere, the line between the public and the private tends to disappear. According to Habermas, the more the state and public sphere are involved in the private realm the more the public sphere degenerates. The neutrality of the public sphere is rendered meaningless as a result of the inequalities of the private realm becoming more public. Habermas points out that the public sphere turns into an area in which to articulate private interests; and that, the dialogical aspect of the public sphere turns into a conflictual friend-foe relationship.

Moreover, the divide between the public and private becomes thin as the state's role in social issues increases. Habermas points out that the regulatory practices of the welfare state on the economy and private life through its social policies, on the one hand, aim at

providing a better distribution of resources, while, on the other, these same policies lead to an adversarial politics concentrated around distributional policies. This created, according to Habermas, a "repoliticised social sphere in which state and societal institutions fused into a single functional complex that could no longer be differentiated according to criteria of public and private".¹⁶ As the state's involvement becomes more comprehensive in the areas of sickness, unemployment, health and education, the family's role decreased considerably. Habermas argues that the family loses its role of "the transmission of elementary tradition and frameworks of orientation".¹⁷

According to Habermas, the entrance of different actors and social issues in the public sphere negatively affected the possibility of having critical rational debate. The content of the public debate shifts to the issues of the "life's necessities". In other words, the public sphere is no longer the place of the rational critical debate of saloons, coffee houses and print media, but becomes the place where debate over the life's necessities occurs. Habermas further points out that

When the laws of the market governing the sphere of commodity exchange and of social labour also pervaded the sphere reserved for private people as a public, rational critical debate had a tendency to be replaced by consumption, and the web of public communication unraveled into acts of individuated reception, however uniform in mode.¹⁸

Once public debate becomes a pattern of consumption in that debate is conducted with the help of paid experts, the elements of culture, which constitutes the public debate, are also commodified. As Habermas argues, discussion now becomes a "business". The consumption oriented culture, and the role of intellectuals in this, paves way for an uncritical public sphere where the public is a consumer of expert opinion.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, pg.148.

¹⁷ *ibid.*, pg.155.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, pg.161

Furthermore, public space turns into an arena of struggle among bureaucrats, interest groups and parties.¹⁹ Habermas makes a direct reference to an adversarial type of politics which results in fragmentation of the public sphere. As opposed to the communicative and critically oriented public sphere, the public sphere in modern societies becomes a place of adversarial politics where the public-private distinction is blurred by the struggle for recognition and resources. Far from being a social space where a rational critical debate takes place, the public sphere now becomes the ground where legitimacy for state and group action is sought and "critical publicity is supplanted by manipulative publicity".²⁰ The media plays an important role in the fragmentation of the public space since it engineers the consensus and "the consent".

Habermas indicates that the public sphere loses its critical potential once the line between public and private disappears. While he is right to note the fact that adversarial politics, in the form of struggle for resources and recognition, prevents a healthy public debate which aims to create a public good, his explanation of the degeneration of the public sphere makes his account extremely vulnerable to the critiques of feminists, minorities and other groups who were historically excluded from the public sphere. That the activity of politics belongs to the public sphere overlooks the fact that the relations of private sphere, such as family, workplace, education as well as sexuality, are political matters. Although Habermas is justified in his assertion that the public space has degenerated into a conflictual space and that its dialogical aspect is lost, he fails to provide an explanation of how justice and fairness can be addressed in the private realm.

¹⁹ *ibid*, 176

²⁰ *ibid*, pg.178

In fact, for a long time, feminist scholars have insisted on the problems of separating the public from the private. Gender relations were traditionally thought to be properties belonging to the private realm, or properties confined to intimate family. It was also feminists who argued that these supposedly private matters have a restricting role on the participation of women in the public sphere.²¹ Benhabib argues that, for example, "[t]he model of a public dialogue based on conversational restraint is not neutral, in that it presupposes amoral and political epistemology, this in turn justifies an implicit separation between the public and the private of such a kind as leads to the silencing of the concerns of certain excluded groups".²² Separating the public from the private denies the public forum to groups and individuals who struggle to have a public debate about inequalities of the private realm.

Moreover, for both Habermas and Arendt the division between the public and private is also seen necessary to realize the condition of equality in the public sphere. Individuals do experience inequalities in the private realm, but they are equal citizens in the public sphere. By virtue of being equal citizens, they are assumed to have full access to public debate. Yet, even after previously excluded groups were legally entitled to participate in the public sphere, there were still other obstacles preventing individuals from participating fully in the public sphere.²³ Contrary to the suggestion that the principle of equality gave full access to the public sphere, power relations which emerge as a result of different locations of individuals in relation to capital accumulation become a

²¹ Benhabib argues that "the way in which the distinction between the public and private spheres has been drawn has served to confine women and typically female spheres of activity like housework, reproduction, nurturance and care for the young, the sick and elderly to the private domain, and to keep them off the public agenda in the liberal state" Benhabib, *Situating the Self*, pg.108. She further argues that the distinction between the private and public has justified the domination of women.

²² Benhabib, *Situating the Self*, pg.82

²³ Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy", in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, pg.119.

part of the public sphere and have an impact on the ability of citizens to take part in public debate. The distinction between the public and private hides the mechanisms of power and the marginalization of certain individuals within the public sphere.

How do we account for the discrepancy between the promise of the public sphere as the critical social space which fosters the manifestation of difference and the above mentioned problems which block the manifestation of difference in the public sphere?

Despite its promise of fostering plurality through debate, the public sphere has worked as a mechanism of exclusion and has hidden inequalities which exist within the private realm. The discrepancy between the promise of the public sphere and its actual historical manifestation can be found in its two constitutional properties: the primacy of the individual in conducting the affairs of community and the formation of public will through the use of universal reason.

The primacy of the individual in conducting the affairs of community is essential to the existence of critical public debate. Healthy public debate requires citizens to be free and capable social agents who are in control of their own affairs. The role of reason is particularly important because it transforms "subject" into "political citizen"; that is, it provides people with the tools to become agents rather than bearers of supranatural forces or subjects of monarchs. Habermas rightly points out that unless there is public use of reason by private individuals, it is not possible to talk about the existence of the public sphere. In the ideal form of the public sphere, as private citizens are primary actors, plurality and multiplicity become a foundational principles. In fact, both in Habermas and Arendt, the public sphere appears to be the social space which fosters pluralism and participation.²⁴ Similarly, their account of the public sphere pays

²⁴ Arendt's account of the public sphere is particularly strong in its emphasis on pluralism and the role of the public sphere in fostering pluralism in modern societies. For more see Kimberley F. Curtis, "Aesthetic Foundations of Democratic Politics in the

particular attention to the capacity, and ultimate sovereignty, of human agents to conduct their own affairs. Moreover, critical public debate as the vehicle for participation places an emphasis on the dialogical aspect of the human condition where private individuals freely express themselves in conducting their own affairs. Dialogue as a form of politics not only reinforces the condition of plurality in the public sphere but also enables a negotiation of difference. This emphasis on the primacy of citizens as the sole agents is the liberal aspect of the ideal form of the public sphere.

Equally important for a well-functioning public sphere is, however, the formation of the public will. Calhoun argues that the "importance of the public sphere lies in its potential as a mode of social integration".²⁵ The formation of the public will represents the integrative aspect of the public sphere in which the debating public finds a common medium to define the public good. This aspect of will formation in the public sphere is far removed from the classical liberal tradition in which individuals are represented as atomistic agents whose existence is prior to the society. The classical Hobbesian-Lockean liberalism represents individuals as rational agents who are "competitive" and "pursuing their own interest" and defining their "own good".²⁶ The liberal tradition puts the emphasis on the "individual good" and recognizes plurality in the pursuit of self interest whereas in the ideal form of the public sphere, the formation of the public will is viewed as a condition for social integration. This aspect of the public sphere resembles the Rousseauian General Will formation which aims to replace "arbitrary particular wills with the general will of the entire body of citizens".²⁷ In this context, the public sphere has at its center a project of community. Individual free will becomes

Work of Hannah Arendt" in *Hannah Arendt & The Meaning of Politics*, pp.27-52.

²⁵ Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, pg.6

²⁶ Roland Axtmann, *Liberal Democracy into the Twenty-First Century*, pg.37.

²⁷ Keith Michael Baker, "Defining the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century France" in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, pg.193.

important in defining the societal project, not as a particular interest but as an expression of finding a common medium to formulate a public good.

The simultaneous existence of Hobbesian-Lockean liberalism and the Rousseauan Republicanism creates an unresolved tension in the public sphere. The Rousseauan General Will contradicts the idea of the public sphere as a place where citizens come together with different interests. Similarly, Lockean liberalism is not in tune with the idea that differentiated subject positions come into a debate with a common reference to formulate public good as Lockean liberalism sees the interest of the individual prior to that of the society

Habermas' solution to this contradiction is the public use of universal reason. Habermas believes that since reason is a universal property of private citizens, it can provide the framework within which a common reference point can be found. Individuals may be different and have particular life experiences and claims. Reason is, however, is that which is in common and which brings individuals together to reconcile their differences. Reason, as a medium of debate in the public sphere, therefore, assumes the equality of citizens as participants in the public debate and presupposes the division between public and private as particular differences are irrelevant within the public sphere. The emphasis on universal reason as a reference point to reconcile differences and to facilitate public debate lies at the core of the problems of the modern public sphere. Historical experience demonstrates that public will formation, through universal reason, is not really a vehicle for negotiating difference. It is, rather, a form of homogenization which marginalizes difference which does not belong within the domain of universal reason. This problematic logic is nowhere more clear than the manifestation of national narratives which usually receives very little attention in the

debate about the role of the public sphere in modern societies

3.2. National Discourses and the Manifestation of Difference in the Public Sphere

In the recent debate on the role of the public sphere in fostering multiplicity, the relationship between nationalism and the public sphere receives very little attention. Habermas's account of the public sphere, for instance, ignores the relationship between national discourse and the public sphere. He emphasizes the bourgeois character of the public sphere but he fails to acknowledge its national dimension. Nation state and nationalism is particularly important in thinking about the function of the public sphere as a space of multiplicity and dialogue. The importance of nationalism, in that context, comes from the fact that the project of nation building is inherently a project of community building and involves a formation of 'general will' that manifests itself in the qualities of national narrative. The role of the public sphere as a space of multiplicity and negotiation is not always in harmony with the national will formation. The healthy functioning of the public sphere depends on its autonomy from the national discourse.

People, Public and Nation

Calhoun argues that there are three interrelated "modes of claiming a political Community" : "people, public, and nation".²⁸ Even though there is a tendency to use these three terms interchangeably, he indicates the importance of making a distinction between them. According to Calhoun, " 'public' posited a differentiated citizenry;

²⁸ Craig Calhoun, *Critical Social Theory*, (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1995) pg.238.

'people' emphasized a difference between rulers and ruled but the unity of the ruled; and 'nation' implied a unity of the whole".²⁹

While Calhoun points to a very important distinction in the way modern society is structured, he does not discuss the implications that such a distinction might have for the role of the public sphere in fostering multiplicity and the negotiation of difference. Yet, the differentiation between these three concepts is important because they demarcate the boundaries between the ruler and the ruled in a modern polity. The boundaries between people, nation and public determine the way in which democracy and plurality can become a norm in a given nation state.

Calhoun points out that the term people refers to the body of citizens with which sovereignty rests while nation refers to the unit which is represented both by people and the state. If the boundary between people and nation disappears, the state and the people become the same entity. Fascist regimes, for example, demonstrate what happens when the boundary between people and nation disappears and people can, therefore, only exist for the purpose of the state. When the state and people become the same entity, the public sphere, as the space between people and the state, ceases to exist. The existence of the public sphere, therefore, depends on the autonomy of the people from the state. The autonomy of people from the state is not, however, adequate for a pluralistic public sphere to exist. In order for the public sphere to be able to accommodate difference and facilitate the negotiation of difference, there must be a clear boundary between the public sphere and national discourse. In contrast to the unifying logic of "people" and "nation", the public requires that difference exist in the modern polity. Habermas' insistence on the centrality of the public sphere in modern political discourse is, to a large extent, due to its quality of enabling difference to exist.

²⁹ Calhoun, *Critical Social Theory*, pg.238.

There is, however, a tension between the public sphere and the concepts of "people" and "nation". Both people and nation operate on the basis of homogenization and oneness. The consciousness of being a people and the project of nation building requires a unity of community where citizens channel their aspirations and goals into a shared project. There emerges a tension between plurality and difference and the requirements of being a member of same national community. For this reason, contrary to the ideal form of the public sphere, the modern public sphere fails to allow the manifestation of differences and turns into an extension of national discourse.

The history of the modern public sphere demonstrates that the public sphere, to a large degree, is overpowered by national narratives.³⁰ In other words, the modern public sphere is, in fact, first and foremost a national public sphere. Despite the fact that there will always be differences between nation states in terms of the degree to which national narrative dominate the public sphere, the question of plurality in the public sphere is related to the power of national discourse. Nationalism limits the boundaries of the public sphere when the question of inclusion is, to a certain degree, determined by national discourse whose logic of operation is based on homogeneity and unity. The homogeneity of national discourse is usually secured by excluding particular groups and identities from the public sphere, an act which inherently disrupts any possibility of critical public debate. For example, national discourse prevents claims of certain groups and identities from being debated in the public sphere. Calhoun rightly argues that "[b]ecause the nation is understood as unitary and integral, nationalist thought

³⁰ Geoff Eley makes a strong argument in pointing the historical dominance of national discourse in the public sphere, Geoff Eley, "Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures" in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, pp.289-339. Also Geoff Eley, "Nationalism and Social History", *Social History*, 6 (1981), pp.83-107.

discourages notions of multiple and multifarious publics; it typically rejects claims to the quasi-autonomy of subnational discourses or movements as divisive".³¹

Calhoun argues by its very nature nationalism rejects multiplicity and calls for homogenization. It excludes particularities that refuse to participate in the process of homogenization. The hegemonic presence of national discourse preconditions the framework of public debate in such a way that what can be discussed and cannot be discussed are defined by the parameters of national discourse. Given the fact that modern nation states are compositions of heterogeneous groups, the national narrative is written by dominant group(s) by marginalizing and excluding others. Calhoun points out that "[w]here nationalism or any other cultural formation represses difference, however, it intrinsically undermines the capacity of a public sphere to carry forward a rational-critical democratic discourse".³² In order for the public sphere to emerge as a space of debate and negotiation, as well as a space of multiplicity, there is a need for a clear definition of the boundary between the public sphere and nationalism as well as the autonomy of the public sphere from national discourse

Nationalism, Identity and the Public Sphere(s)

The tension between the public sphere and nationalism brings out the question of identity in modern societies because the condition of plurality is directly related to who is represented in the public sphere. In the ideal form of the public sphere, individuals are supposed to take part in the public debate as citizens; their particular background is supposed to be irrelevant to the form and content of public debate. Habermas' insistence on the separation of public and private, and the importance of representing private

³¹ Calhoun, *Critical Social Theory*, pg.243

³² *ibid*, pg.243

individuals as citizens, rules out the fact that citizens have particular identities and claims that emerge from these identity positions. Quite the contrary Habermas believes that the category of citizen, who does not carry his/her particular identity in the public sphere, is vital for a healthy public sphere. The fact that citizens are equal in the public sphere, by virtue of their ability to use reason, presupposes that identity formation is not relevant to the boundaries of the public sphere but is something which takes place in the private sphere. Since, according to Habermas, identity formation is an intersubjective matter that occurs in the private realm, it is assumed that citizens enter the public debate with already stable identities.³³

The assumption that private identities are irrelevant within in the public sphere poses real problems in terms of fostering plurality and negotiation difference. Since national identities establish themselves as dominant identities in modern public spheres, the representation and participation of identities other than the national identity is usually hindered in the public sphere. National identities enjoy a hegemonic position in the public sphere and their hegemony depends on their ability to marginalize other identities and keep them in the private sphere. In national public spheres, whether it is assimilation or resistance, there is always an issue of identity. The place of diaspora communities or immigrant groups vis-à-vis the national discourses in which they live are perfect examples of how the struggle for recognition in the public sphere remakes identities. Identities are remade through groups participating in national discourses other than their own, and by resisting certain aspects of these identities. Similarly, marginalized ethnic groups that struggle against the hegemonic representation of national identity also demonstrate the identity making dimension of the public sphere. By virtue of the fact that national identities establish themselves as hegemonic identities

³³ Calhoun, "Plurality, Promises and Public Spaces", in *Hannah Arendt & The Meaning of Politics*, pg.246

in public spheres, the assumption of an equality of citizens becomes obsolete.

Furthermore, the hegemonic position of national identity reinforces power imbalances between national identity and other particular identities which in turn, makes the assumption that the principle of equality is sustainable within the public sphere obsolete.

The formation of identities in modern societies paints a contrast with the assumption that citizens participate as equals in the public sphere.³⁴ The public sphere is not only an arena in which there is a constant struggle for recognition and redefinition of identities but it also involves power relations which establish some identities as hegemonic and marginalize others. This very process of identity formation leads to a constant struggle for redefinition and resistance to hegemonic identities. Far from being neutral places as described by Habermas, the national public sphere contain power relations which situates individuals and groups in different locations vis-à-vis resources. The way identities are situated in the public sphere determines not only their mode of representation but also their access to resources and ability to participate in public debate. In this framework, both the assumption of neutrality, and the division between the public and private, operates as vehicles to keep identities marginalized outside of public debate. In most cases, national identities establish themselves as "legitimizing identities" whereas groups and identities who are marginalized by them

³⁴ Castells outlines various forms of identity formulations in modern societies : legitimizing identity, resistance identity and project identity. He argues that legitimizing identity is "introduced by the dominant institutions of society to extend and rationalize their domination vis-à-vis social actors" while resistance identity is "generated by those actors that are in positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination, thus building trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society". In addition project identity emerges "when social actors, on the basis of whichever cultural materials are available to them, build a new identity that redefines their position in society and , by so doing, seek the transformation of overall social structure". Manuel Castells, *The Power of Identity*, (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), pg.8

engage in active resistance for representation in the public sphere. In certain cases, as mentioned by Castells, they even aim to transform the very nature of identity in the public sphere.

Because there is always a struggle for identity recognition, there are always other alternative publics that form and attempt to open up a space within the dominant national public discourse. Habermas' dismissal of the identity forming role of the public sphere results in his failure to acknowledge the existence of these other alternative publics. Geoff Eley criticizes Habermas for designating the public sphere as a bourgeois sphere and argues that subaltern groups, radical intelligentsia as well as other social classes such as the peasantry and the working class, also utilized a reasoned exchange and form alternative publics.³⁵ According to Eley, the historical evidence proves that other publics resisted that were capable of reasoned exchange and were marginalized by the dominant discourse in the public sphere. Similarly, in a non-western context, the resonance of the French revolution also led to the idea of reasoned debate and of a public sphere. He criticizes Habermas for idealizing "its bourgeois character" and ignoring "alternative sources of an emancipatory impulse in popular radical traditions".³⁶ Eley corrects Habermas' argument by noting that, in fact, alternative publics, with agents other than the bourgeois, always existed in modern societies.

Similarly, despite the fact that national discourse dominated the public sphere in nation states, there have always been alternative publics that were marginalized and pushed into the private sphere by the national public. The national character of public spheres is more visible in non-Western nation states where public spheres emerged as part of

³⁵ Geoff Eley, "Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures", in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, pg.304

³⁶ *ibid.*, pg.306.

the nation building process.³⁷ Whether it is on the basis of religion or ethnicity, there has always been alternative formulations of public spheres that challenge the hegemonic representation of national identity in the public sphere. These alternative publics and counter publics "invent and circulate counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs".³⁸

The public space which is reserved exclusively for the bourgeois class or national identity, fails to identify the ways in which power establishes itself in the public, how the hegemony is constructed as well as how resistance and emancipatory action emerges. Nancy Fraser stresses the engagement of alternative publics in the public debate by arguing that "... in stratified societies, arrangements that accommodate contestation among a plurality of competing publics better promote the ideal of participatory parity than does a single, comprehensive, overarching public".³⁹ The existence of the competing publics offers a perspective on the public space which is not unitary and exclusionary but rather a very dynamic one where competing publics interact with one another, engage in different alliances and reproduces themselves. It is a public sphere whose properties are constantly changing.

By recognizing that different identity positions always exist within the public sphere and that the nature of public debate itself remakes these identities, it can be easily argued that identities are not fixed entities but are constantly changing categories with a possibility for crisscrossing and hybridization. Acknowledging the identity-forming nature of public space ensures that issues from the private realm are included within the public, and that this does not necessarily lead to an antagonistic friend-foe

³⁷ The following chapter will concentrate on the Turkish case to demonstrate how public sphere emerged as part of the nation building process.

³⁸ Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy" in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, pg.123.

³⁹ *ibid.*, pg.122.

framework. If, as Habermas suggests, identities in the public are already fixed, stable and coherent, the reconciliation of differences become impossible. Since Habermas in the Structural Transformation fails to recognize the identity-forming aspect of the public space, he equates pluralization of the public space with a "conflict of interests" and "refeudalization". Of course, in certain cases, refeudalization does occur and sometimes interests will clash. However, there are also many other cases where, through debate and interaction, new identities emerge which make compromise and consensus possible. The very fact that identities in the public sphere are not stable and can be remade enables the possibility of a renewal of the dialogical aspect of the public sphere.

The public sphere is not, and should not be, an exclusive social space of one dominant group. The democratic nature of the public debate is contingent upon that fact that not only are the boundaries of the public space flexible but the fact that the public sphere enjoys autonomy from the national discourse. The next section will concentrate on alternative ways of thinking about the public sphere that would encourage its emancipatory potential as a space of multiplicity and dialogue.

3.3. Rethinking the Public Sphere

If national discourse hinders the promise of pluralism in the public sphere and the public sphere marginalizes difference, can we insist on the emancipatory dimension of the public sphere? Does the public sphere fulfill its promise only in its ideal form but fail to fulfill them in the actual historical experience? Afterall, Habermas basis his description of the public sphere on a historically specific phenomenon which emerged

around the 17th century Europe and disappeared in late nineteenth century and its actor was exclusively the bourgeoisie. Arendt's definition of public sphere offers little more than that of Habermas. Her description comes closer to the idea of the Greek polis where politics in the public sphere is the domain of privileged citizens while the mundane necessities of everyday life and the particularities of the private sphere are kept outside the public domain.

Despite the fact that the actual historical experience of the public sphere do not present a truly pluralistic democratic space, this chapter argues that the public sphere has a potential normative power to facilitate the negotiation of difference. As a social space where politics can take place, under certain conditions the public sphere provides a space for dialog through which the emancipatory dimension of the Enlightenment thought can be realized. The history of the public sphere indicates that this dialogical dimension has not yet been fully realized in modern societies due to conditions discussed earlier in this chapter. The final section of this chapter will argue for a framework which would revive the normative dimension of the public sphere. In the absence of such a normative framework, politics is reduced to a struggle for self-interest and exclusion. Struggle for recognition is, undoubtedly, an indispensable part of politics but gaining recognition does not mean too much unless there is a framework which would facilitate the peaceful co-existence of different identities and groups. Habermas, in his recent work, acknowledges this fact and puts the emphasis on a normative framework in order to facilitate the pluralistic dimension of the public sphere. Before moving on to Habermas' recent attempts to revive the ideals of the public sphere, the chapter will look at two alternative ways of negotiating difference in society: liberal and communitarian arguments.

Liberal and Communitarian Argument on the Negotiation of Difference

Discussing ways to negotiate identity and difference is a crucial step in reestablishing the autonomy of the public sphere from national discourse. There are two alternative ways of negotiating difference both of which claim to provide greater representation of difference in the national public sphere. They are: a)the communitarian insistence on the recognition of autonomy of collective identities, b)the liberal assumption of recognizing the particularity of individual identities.

This chapter argues that both the liberal and communitarian reformulations for negotiating difference do not offer a real alternative to the ideal form of the public sphere. The liberal tradition, with its emphasis on the primacy of individual, overlooks the possibility of negotiation and dialogue in the public sphere. Instead, the liberal argument advocates a friend-foe form of public sphere in which each and every individual is treated as an autonomous unit with a particular definition of the good that is not questioned. In contrast to this approach, the communitarian alternative proposes a public sphere which is identified with the primacy of particular communities. If liberals tries to protect the particular good of individuals, communitarians attempt to protect the particular good of communities. From opposite directions, both arguments produce the same logic of non-negotiation of identities. Furthermore, both liberal and communitarian arguments propose a framework in which justice and fairness in the public sphere is realized through a set of procedures and rules. Both of these positions

view human interaction as that which needs to be regulated through procedures. Both positions overlook the fact that there is another dimension of human interaction: the learned knowledge of everyday interaction.

The communitarian critique of liberalism highlights the fact that the liberal system is not sensitive to the value systems of particular groups. Communitarians argue that while liberalism guarantees equality within its value system, this does not necessarily mean that particular groups have a chance to create their own space in the public sphere.⁴⁰ The lack of attention to the communitarian aspect of societies in liberal discourse leads to the elimination of particularities of some.

Furthermore, communitarians criticize the modern belief which views the "good life" as an ideal shared by all members of a community.⁴¹ According to communitarians this is an injustice. It is an injustice because it overlooks the fact that there may be different definitions of "good life" which emerge from different belief systems of different communities. To remedy this it is vital to recognize the autonomy of collective identities in the public space and accept that collective identities may have different definition of "good life".⁴² The reasoning which lies behind the insistence of recognizing the autonomy of collective identities in the public is twofold: a) skepticism towards the principle of equality and b) an acknowledgment of the situatedness of identity.

⁴⁰ For an outline of the communitarian argument see Stephen Mulhall & Adam Swift, *Liberals & Communitarians*, (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1992). For more on the communitarian argument see Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, (Duckworth: London, 1981) and Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, (Duckworth: London, 1988). Also Charles Taylor, *The Sources of the Self*, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989) and Michel Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, (Basic Books: New York, 1983)

⁴¹ Seyla Benhabib, *Situating the Self*, pp.78-79.

⁴² Taylor, for instance, argues that in the case that there is danger to the survival of a particular community, it is justifiable to grant special rights that would allow the community to ensure its survival, Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition" in *Multiculturalism*, ed. by Amy Gutman, pp.25-73.

Communitarians are, in general, skeptical of the modern belief that citizens are located equally in the public sphere when in fact they are able to express their particular definition of "good life" in the public sphere. For this reason, communitarians point to the necessity of acknowledging the autonomy of communities and of recognizing their definition of the good life as legitimate. Rather than promoting a common definition of the good life, communitarians argue that the public sphere should acknowledge a particular definition of the good life and implement the necessary normative and institutional frameworks to protect those particular goods.

The communitarian critique of modern society is correct to note the problems inherent to the way in which the public sphere operates. In particular, their critique of the equality principle and the situatedness of identity goes to the heart of the problem of why the modern public sphere fails to address difference and particularity. There is, however, a potential danger in rearranging public life around the autonomy of communities and their particular goods.

First of all, acknowledging the autonomy of communities and respecting their definition of a particular good may not necessarily correct the power imbalances that emerge from the various economic and political structures of modern society.⁴³ Given the fact that individuals and groups in modern societies are connected to each other through complex economic and political structures, acknowledgment of the autonomy of particular identities in the public sphere would not place economically and politically disenfranchised groups in a better position in the hierarchy of production relations or participation in the political process. Furthermore, the public sphere, which is based on the autonomy of communities, would box individuals into identity positions and would

⁴³ Habermas' response to Taylor is strong on this point, Jurgen Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State", in *Multiculturalism*, pp.107-148.

not allow the crisscrossing between identities. That is to say, individuals would only be represented within the boundaries of their community but not by their individuality. As communities are acknowledged as actors in the public sphere, negotiation of identities would not take place in the public sphere.

In contrast to the communitarian reorganization of the public sphere, the liberal argument attempts to reinforce the centrality of the individual in the public sphere. Following the principle of equality, the liberal argument emphasizes the abstract individual and his/her rights in the public sphere as a condition of justice.⁴⁴ The liberal argument criticizes the ideal form of the public sphere for its attempt to reach a common discourse among all citizens. The liberal position points out that the process which leads to the creation of a common value system and norms in the public sphere can not be reached without violating the primacy of the individual. In other words, as there can not be a common framework which would gain the consent of all interested parties, such a common framework can only be achieved at the expense of the primacy of the individual. The foundational dimension of the public sphere is viewed as an injustice to the uniqueness of the individual.⁴⁵ For this reason, the liberal position abandons the idea of finding commonly shared values and norms in the public sphere. Instead it attempts to establish a procedural framework within which the uniqueness of the individual is protected.⁴⁶

As mentioned earlier both liberal and communitarian argument fails to offer a solution to how difference can be negotiated in the public sphere in order a crisscrossings between identities. Their procedural understanding of difference fails to acknowledge how

⁴⁴ For more on the liberal position see John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

⁴⁵ Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1989).

⁴⁶ John Rawls, *Theory of Justice*.

"learned knowledge" of everyday interaction contributes to the way identities communicate each other to negotiate differences and to reach compromises. Harry C. Boyte draws attention to the role of "phronesis-or practical wisdom" as the knowledge of everyday interaction in the public space. He agrees that in modern societies the growing importance placed on interest mediation, through large scale organizations such as political parties, labour unions and interest groups, reduces the role of the action of an ordinary citizen into a "life making effort". Yet, he also notes that, in order to incorporate competing publics into "history making" efforts, and to transform their role from mere protest into one of participation and responsibility, a greater concentration on the concept of "phronesis", or "practical wisdom" is required. He states that "[p]ractical wisdom involved the insight and practical theory accumulated through action around common issues in the space of public life"

When practical knowledge, or phronesis, is eliminated from the public debate all that remains is technical knowledge. Technical knowledge can not capture the subjective dimension of the everyday practical interaction, power struggle and the simple interaction between people that can lead to a hermeneutic understanding and learning. Such knowledge has a potential for generating a better understanding between groups that initiate debate in the public space. Boyte argues that the separation of institutional life and technical knowledge from the living experience of the people and their immediate knowledge results in a antagonistic situation where political action can only be articulated around good and bad.⁴⁷ Boyte cites several examples of present day politics in the public space such as prayer in the schools, abortion, environment and AIDS, all of which are channeled into institutional lines of technical knowledge and removed from the everyday concessions and negotiations of people. Each of these issues are identified with

⁴⁷*ibid.* pg.350

clashes and with a moral good and bad. He puts forward that

[w]hat gets lost in an inflamed and excessively ideological politics is the moral ambiguity and open-ended, provisional quality involved in the pragmatic tasks of the public world, where the search is not for "truth" or final vindication but rather appropriateness, fit, agreement, adjudication, and provisional, if sound, resolution of pressing concerns. In a problem solving public, there are few saints or sinners. Rather there is an interplay among a variety of interests, values, and ways of looking at experience. Knowledge is not simply divided between categories like objective and analytic, or subjective and emotional. In a public sphere of actors as well as talkers or protesters, no one is simply a victim or an innocent. Power is not seen as one-directional or radically moralized. Questions of justice and social transformation enter more or less directly and explicitly, but however they appear, everyone bears a measure of responsibility for the solutions to the problems of the public that have been pragmatically identified.⁴⁸

I have cited Boyte in full because his statement is particularly important in establishing that not every aspect of human interaction can be regulated and put into procedural frameworks.

The interaction of everyday life, which is not always happy and peaceful, provides individuals with knowledge that would facilitate the negotiation of differences. What Boyte refers to as practical wisdom, or *phronesis*, has always been an integral part of human communities. The interaction of differences, their shared experience and history results in a pragmatic human understanding. The collective memory carried by practical wisdom informs the actions of human communities. Such memory is accumulation of the shared experience and learning. In modern times, technical knowledge has largely marginalized this knowledge of shared experience and responsibility. The modern state and its ideology of nationalism are a case in point. Wherever the state deals with the issue of human togetherness it deals within the framework of distribution of resources and designation of the national public space

⁴⁸*ibid.*, 350.

through endless technical policies. Society organizes itself along the same lines by creating its own civil institutions that would counteract or negotiate with the state. In this framework, negotiation of difference soon becomes a fight over material resources and moral codes without any concession or genuine dialogue. In some countries this turns into pure interest politics, whereas in others it becomes a violent clash of difference

It would be naive to suggest that the reactivation of phronesis can be the solution to the reconstruction of the public space in late modern societies. The complex and layered institutional structure of modern societies does not permit phronesis to become the center of common action. Yet, as Boyte suggests, making institutions sensitive to the common action of everyday life and reorganizing them around other mediums of knowledge, could sensitize the institutions of the public space to the subjective aspect of society. Furthermore, together with the institutional framework, the increased role of practical wisdom would introduce identity into the public sphere and tools to negotiate the differences emerging from different identity positions.

3.4. Negotiation of Identities and the Cosmopolitan Public Sphere

Boyte's attempt to revive the role of phronesis points to an alternative way of addressing the question of difference in the public sphere. It alerts us to the dangers of reducing the question of identity/difference to that which can only be dealt through legal/procedural processes. A revival of phronesis is not, however, enough to ensure that the public sphere can effectively address the questions and issues that emerge from identity claims. In a global world where the representation of difference becomes a

forceful issue and particular identities refuse to be marginalized by national identity, the national character of the public sphere constitutes an obstacle for a pluralistic, social and political environment. In order to ensure that difference is not a threat but an indispensable quality of social and political life, the public sphere should become a cosmopolitan space in which the existence and negotiation of different identities is an integral part of public life.

Cosmopolitanism usually finds a greater resonance in the international realm than in domestic politics. Cosmopolitanism was embedded into Enlightenment thinking with the belief that reason and progress would move human societies towards the same destiny where everyone shared the same universal ideals. Condorcet expressed this Enlightenment form of cosmopolitanism, arguing that "from now onwards independent of any power that might wish to halt it, has other limit than the duration of globe upon which nature has cast us".⁴⁹ In *The Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose* Kant explained how eventually human communities would move away from the differences that produce conflict and converge, instead, around reason.⁵⁰ Later, in *Perpetual Peace* he gave a blueprint of a cosmopolitan international order organized around the principles of reason.⁵¹ In the *Communist Manifesto* Marx and Engels effectively captured the expansionist and global logic of capital accumulation and stated that workers' interest do not rest in national loyalties but in comradeship with workers all around the world.⁵² Fukuyama's *End of History*, however, represents a radically different type of cosmopolitanism than that of Marx and Engels'. For Fukuyama and the new right cosmopolitanism is a convergence around values of global market capitalism.

⁴⁹ Richard J. Bernstein, *The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity*. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), pg.34

⁵⁰ For more see H. J. Reiss., (ed.) *Kant's Political Writings*, trans. H.B. Nisbet, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

⁵¹ *ibid.*

⁵² Karl Marx and Frederic Engels, *Communist Manifesto*, (London: Verso, 1998).

In contrast, I argue that, before it becomes a force in the international realm, cosmopolitanism needs to take root in the domestic realm of nation states. In the present state of globalization cosmopolitanism is particularly important for the domestic politics of nation states as all nation states host different cultures and life styles within. Contrary to the classical Enlightenment belief that cosmopolitanism entails a sameness and convergence around a set of essential universal values, I argue that cosmopolitanism requires an environment in which difference is accepted as a defining characteristic of any society. Furthermore, cosmopolitanism entails a social and political environment in which differences do not exist as isolated particularities. A cosmopolitan environment allows, instead, the dialogue and negotiation between different identities and the emergence of new ones as a result of this negotiation process. Cosmopolitanism, therefore, requires what Said calls "border intellectuals" who are located in-between cultures and comfortable with living with difference.

If the public sphere is to fulfill its potential of fostering pluralism and to provide a space in which differences are peacefully negotiated, it should have cosmopolitan qualities rather than national ones. How, then, does a national public sphere become a cosmopolitan one? There are three important points that needed to be addressed in order to orient the public sphere towards cosmopolitanism:

a) rather than being the property of the private realm, identity and claims emerging from identity positions are matters of public debate. The institutions of the public sphere should allow identities to participate in public debate to settle their differences through negotiation.

b) the process of settling differences should not assume that dialogue and negotiation are free from power and domination. Instead, public debate should be geared towards unmasking relations of power and domination that prevent the peaceful negotiation of identities;

c) the institutions and forums within which public debate takes place should not be based on fixed legal procedures but should themselves be open to debate and questioning.

Claims emerging from identity positions can challenge the foundations and the processes of public debate. The same process of questioning can also apply to identities themselves which ensures that identities are not fixed entities but are open to change as a result of negotiation and change.

If the representation of identities and the negotiation of differences among identity positions are fundamental properties of a cosmopolitan public sphere, a framework within which representation and negotiation of identities take place is equally important. In fact, in his recent works, Habermas acknowledges the impact of such a framework within which particularity can be dealt in the public sphere. He argues that particular life histories first find a space of expression in the life-world before entering into the public sphere as topics of discussion⁵³. In their various positions, individuals are exposed to systemic deficiencies; these deficiencies are experienced privately in shared life-worlds. Then, "the communication channels of the public sphere are linked to private spheres - to the thick networks of interaction found in families and circles of friends as well as to the looser contacts with neighbors, work, colleagues, acquaintances, and so on..."⁵⁴ For Habermas the public sphere continues to find its impulses in the private sphere but he acknowledges that there is not a clear-cut distinction between the public and private spheres.

⁵³ Jurgen Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996) pg.365.

⁵⁴ *ibid.*, pg.366.

Habermas' acknowledgment that particularity is not limited to the private realm but finds an expression in the public matters is a step towards addressing the question of identity within the pluralistic promise of the public sphere. He, then, proposes a framework to address the question of particularity which aims to foster the dialogical aspect of the public sphere. Habermas believes that the "political public sphere is appropriate as the quintessential concept denoting all those conditions of communication under which there can come into being a discursive formation of opinion and will on the part of a public composed of the citizens of a state" ⁵⁵

One of the challenges is to discover "how, under the conditions of mass democracies constituted as social-welfare state, a discursive formation of opinion and will can be institutionalized in such a fashion that it becomes possible to bridge the gap between enlightened self-interest and orientation to the common good, between the roles of clients and citizen".⁵⁶ One of the ways to bridge this gap is to bring modern law, which is a formal-legal coercion, within the parameters of rational debate. Habermas also proposes to reorganize institutions such that they can adapt to the discursive will formation. He argues that "[o]ther institutions too may be interpreted from this same perspective of a legal institutionalization of the general conditions of communication for a discursive formation of will, as, for example, the regulations concerning the composition and mode of parliamentary bodies, the responsibilities and immunities of elected representatives, the political pluralism of a multiparty system, the necessity for broader based parties to package their programs so that they appeal to various interest constellations, etc.". ⁵⁷

⁵⁵ *ibid*, pg.446

⁵⁶ *ibid*, pg.449

⁵⁷ *ibid*, 450.

Would Habermas' suggestion that communicative rationality should guide the public debate provide a cosmopolitan orientation for the public sphere? In fact, he recognizes importance of addressing the concerns of particular identities in the public sphere in order to allow a pluralistic social and political space. Yet, he proposes a highly legal and procedural framework within which communicative aspect of the public sphere can be revived. That legal-procedural framework does not address the question of power and domination in the public sphere. Habermas revives the modern logic in that proper procedural framework is assumed to provide an equal access to participation in the public sphere.

While Habermas is aware of the criticism that he has paid little attention to the impact of the public sphere on identity formation, he still refuses to acknowledge that particular identity positions are integral parts of the public sphere. Instead he introduces a complete legal framework to reformulate the relationship between the system and life-world and to permit concerns from the private life to be a part of the public debate.⁵⁸ Despite the freshness of his reformulation of the public sphere, in the light of the normative ideals of Enlightenment thinking, Habermas' theorization is disabled by the lack of attention towards identity and power; the two central phenomenon that are integral to a cosmopolitan public sphere.

A dialogue between the work of Habermas and that of Benhabib and Derrida could, however, contribute Habermas' normative framework in terms of providing a cosmopolitan orientation to the public sphere. For instance, with respect to the persuasiveness of power and the closure of identities, Derrida insistently puts forward ethical principles of responsibility and respect for the Other. Bernstein argues, the reason "why [Derrida's] writings are at times so powerful and disconcerting is that he

⁵⁸ *ibid.* chs.3&4

has an uncanny (unheimlich) ability to show us that at the heart of what we take to be familiar, native, at home- where we think we can find our center - lurks (is concealed and repressed) what is unfamiliar, strange, and uncanny"⁵⁹ In other words, Derrida constantly points out the stranger in what is thought to be the self. His ethical concerns are directed towards ensuring that the self is not comfortable with its own center. This is why his writings insist on an endless questioning of centers. Similar to Edward Said's concept of border intellectual, the concept of exile is always in Derrida's writings; In *Structure, Sign and Play* the concept of exile plays an important role in rethinking the established categories and securing positions and calls for an endless questioning of what is to be our center, our identity and authority.⁶⁰ He also points out that such an endless questioning should not result in rejection of all categories, but rather it means avoiding being comfortable in any one category. Moreover, he warns us that it is very easy to slip into the comfort of established centers. Derrida's call for questioning the established centers and secure identities, together with respect for the Other are grounds for a more cosmopolitan oriented public sphere, where the very basis of the public space as well as that of identities, are open to questioning and remaking.

Unlike other poststructuralist writers, Derrida recognizes the importance of a normative framework. Yet, his normative framework is different from that of Habermas in that he accepts the fact that even the normative framework he advocates may slip into closure. Derrida's warning against closure and his advocacy of endless questioning is nothing other than the classical enlightenment principle of skepticism. This is why Derrida's work, rather than being antagonistic to Habermas can be seen as complementary to the Habermasian formulation of the public sphere. His work warns

⁵⁹ Richard J. Bernstein, *The New Constellation*, (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1992), pg.174

⁶⁰ Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" in *Writing and Difference*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp.277-280.

us that there are no guarantees that closure would not occur with the Habermasian normative framework. Furthermore, Derrida's warning against the closure of identities and his care for the Other provides the opportunity to think about the nature of identity in the public sphere. Given the fact that identity and subjectivity are an indispensable part of public life, Derrida's normative framework provides the opportunity to think about difference in the public sphere.

Benhabib is closer to the Habermasian normative framework. Yet, she is also aware of some of the problems posed by Habermas' normative framework, particularly in the case of identity. She points out that the need for an universal framework in the public sphere does not negate the fact that "subjects of reason are finite, embodied and fragile creatures"⁶¹. She also calls for an universal framework while "insisting upon the discursive power of individuals to challenge such situatedness in the name of universalistic principles, future identities and, as of yet, undiscovered communities."⁶² She agrees with Habermasian discourse ethics as the basis of public space but she also calls for a "radically proceduralists" model of the public sphere, neither the scope nor the agenda of which can be limited a priori, and whose lines can be redrawn by the participants in the conversation".⁶³

Unlike Habermas, Benhabib not only acknowledges the identity producing function of the public sphere, but also indicates that identities are situated within the public sphere. She sees different identity positions as the subjects of reasons who continuously redefine themselves and the boundaries of the public sphere. In contrast to liberal and republican versions of the public sphere, Benhabib offers a model of the public sphere that would accommodate a cosmopolitan environment. Bringing communities together

⁶¹ Seyla Benhabib, *Situating the Self*, pg.5.

⁶² *ibid*, pg.8

⁶³ *ibid*, pg.12.

and developing a hermeneutic understanding of societal development at the institutional level and at the personal level requires a concept of participation which is in tune with the idea of modernity.⁶⁴ The idea of participation in the community, in a reflexive and dialogical manner, is what fosters the inclusion and enhancement of the meaning of community. A public sphere that depends on participation eliminates the danger of polarization. Benhabib outlines the difference between liberal and participatory-based public space as follows:

Public space is not understood agonistically as a space of competition for acclaim and immortality among a political elite; it is viewed democratically as the creation of procedures whereby those affected by general social norms and collective political decisions can have a say in their formulation, stipulation, and adoption. This conception of the public is also different than the liberal one, for although Habermas and liberal thinkers believe that legitimation in a democratic society can result only from a public dialogue, in the Habermasian model this dialogue does not stand under the constraint of neutrality but is judged according to the criteria represented by the model of a "practical discourse".⁶⁵

Like Habermas, Benhabib also realizes that the restoration of the public sphere does not come from a sociological analysis but from a normative ideal. This normative ideal is one in which all of the interested parties in the public sphere engage in a debate in a practical discourse. She also notes the importance of the existence of multiple publics. Benhabib further proposes that "[i]f the agenda of the conversation is radically open, if participants can bring any and all matters under critical scrutiny and reflexive questioning, then there is no way to predefine the nature of the issues discussed as being ones of justice or of the good life itself prior to the conversation".⁶⁶ Her work extends the debate to the areas that were previously excluded from the public debate and thereby emphasizes the subjective dimension of the public sphere. Incorporating of the issues of the private realm into the public debate makes negotiation of difference in the public

⁶⁴ *ibid.*, pg.85

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, pg.87

⁶⁶ *ibid.*, pg.89

sphere easier. Even though Benhabib does not address the issue of national identity in the public sphere, the opening up of public discourse to other groups and identities will curb the dominance of national identity in the public sphere.

The truly dialogical and cosmopolitan public space can only emerge in an environment where there is no procedural distinction between justice and good life, interest and need, norm and values and finally, public and private. Derrida's ethical concerns are nothing more than affirmation of what Benhabib argues concerning the need to reform the level of participation and the scope of public debate. Arguments put forward by Derrida and Benhabib provide ways to improve Habermas' reformulation of the public sphere in a way that national orientation of the public sphere can give a way for a cosmopolitan one.

Conclusion: Globalization, National Identity and the Public Sphere

In modern times the nation state has been the container of the uneasy relationship between universality and particularity. The logic of universality in modernity found its political manifestation in national identities. The consolidation of political power within the state together with the territorially bounded national market, made it possible for national discourses to establish themselves as the logic of universalization within nation states.

The forms of global politics and institutions are challenging the absolute nature of national governance. As indicated in earlier chapters, there is now a complex web of relationships linking the global, national and local levels. In many cases, the

concentration between global and local levels bypasses the national level. The increasing presence of the global and local levels in national affairs has an impact on the ability of the state to reproduce a unified national identity. Furthermore, nation states are now host to different cultural identities whose claims for representation renders homogeneous national identity unsustainable. The inability of the state to reproduce national identities provides a new opening in the public sphere. Simply put, this opening is the autonomy of the public sphere from national discourse. As the nation state loses its ability to produce national identity as the dominant subjectivity within the public sphere, the public sphere gains its autonomy from it and becomes a social space wherein many differences try to gain for recognition.

The autonomy of the public sphere, however, is not immediately synonymous to a plural social environment where different identity positions can find easy access to represent themselves. As the second chapter indicated a plurality of actors in the public sphere may manifest themselves in violence, at worst, and in adversarial politics, at best, unless there are mechanisms that would enable the public sphere to operate as a space of plurality, dialogue and negotiation. There is a belief that the pluralization of the public space and the erosion of national identity will unavoidably lead to the fragmentation of modern societies. It is also argued that such fragmentation is further enhanced by a contradictory and conflictual relationship between the global and the local levels. As globalization intensifies its universalizing tendency, local groups and particular identities may become more reactionary. This could lead to irredentism and balkanization of nation states. The logic behind this argument, however, assumes that the relationship between global and local levels is essentially contradictory.

This chapter argues, however, that the consequence of globalization offers other possibilities: the outcome does not have to be violence or fragmentation of modern societies. This new dimension of global/local interaction within national discourses requires a critical rethinking of how identities are made and remade in the public sphere, and the dialogical dimension of the public sphere as a facilitator of identities. That rethinking process not only requires a public sphere autonomous from the national discourse but also a cosmopolitan environment in which no single identity establishes itself as the legitimate identity of the public sphere. The last section of the chapter elaborated on how the recent work of Habermas and a possible dialogue between his work and those of Derrida and Benhabib which promote a cosmopolitan orientation of the public sphere.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE EARLY TURKISH REPUBLIC (1800-1940)¹

1808	9 September, Mahmut II becomes the Emperor and signed Sened-i Ittifak- (Turkish Magna Carta) recognizing the rights of his subjects.
1826	Mahmut II, after a bloody revolt, abolishes the traditional Ottoman army, the Janisseries, and forms a modern army
1827	First modern medical school is founded in Istanbul
1839	3 November, Declaration of Gulhane Receipt, known as Tanzimat, restricts the powers of the emperor and recognizes rights of Ottoman subjects.
1840	First private newspaper: Ceride-i Havadis
1856	Declaration of Reformation further advances Tanzimat by declaring that all Ottoman subjects are equal irrespective of their religious background. End of the Ottoman Millet System and move towards universal citizenship.
1861	Foundations of the Ottoman Science Society
1867	Foundation of the Young Turk society. Young Turks later on became actors in efforts to modernize Ottoman Empire.
1876	23 December, Declaration of the First Constitution. Ottoman Empire becomes a constitutional monarchy.
1877	19 March, First Ottoman Parliament opens.

¹ *Turkish History Vol.3: Ottoman Empire 1600-1980*, (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1988); *Turkish History Vol.4: Contemporary Turkey 1908-1980*, ed. by Sina Aksin,

1880	Sultan Abdulhamit abolishes the constitutional regime.
1889	Foundation of the Ittihat ve Terakki. Ittihat ve Terakki association became an important actor in limiting the powers of the sultan and governed the Empire during the First World War. The Ittihat ve Terakki led the modernization of the Ottoman state institutions.
1908	Revolt by army officers who belong to the Ittihat and Terakki forces Sultan Abdulhamit to bring the constitutional regime back and the second constitutional period starts.
1913	Ittihat ve Terakki under its leaders Enver, Cemal and Talat pashas forms a government.
1914	The empire enters into the First World War.
1918	The First World War ends and allied forces occupy Istanbul.
1919	5 May, Greek forces, with the encouragement of the Allied forces land in Izmir to start occupying Anatolia. 19 May, Mustafa Kemal leaves Istanbul and lands in Samsun, town on the Blacksea coast, and Turkish War of independence starts.
1920	12 January, The last Ottoman parliament assembles and declares Misak-i Milli, a document declaring borders of present day Turkey. After the declaration of the Misak-i Milli, British forces close down the parliament. April 23, the First Turkish Grand National Assembly meets in Ankara as representative of the Turkish nation.

1922	<p><i>26 August</i>, Defeat of the Greek army in Sakarya and liberation of Izmir.</p> <p><i>1 November</i>, Mustafa Kemal abolishes the sultanate</p>
1923	<p><i>24 July</i>, Signing of the Lausanne Treaty which recognizes the Turkey's present days borders and provides Turkey with international legitimacy</p> <p><i>29 October</i>, The Turkish Republic is proclaimed. Mustafa Kemal became the first president and Ankara became the capital.</p>
1924	<p><i>3 March</i>, the parliament abolishes the Islamic caliphate. Kurdish associations and newspapers are closed the same day</p> <p>Law for the unification of the education system and closure of islamic public institutions was accepted by the parliament.</p> <p><i>20 April</i>, The new constitution was accepted</p>
1925	<p><i>13 February</i>, Kurds revolt in the eastern provinces. The rebellion is suppressed in June</p> <p>February- November, religious orders and brotherhoods are suppressed, the fez is abolished, the western calendar adopted</p> <p><i>11 May</i>, Foundation of Ankara Law school</p> <p><i>5 June</i>, End of the first experiment with the multi-party system. the Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Partisi is closed.</p>
1926	<p><i>17 February</i>, Swiss civil code enacted</p>
1928	<p><i>10 April</i>, Secularism is established as the ethos of the state and Islamic references are removed from the constitution.</p>

	<i>1 November</i> , introduction of the Latin alphabet.
1930	<p><i>17 November</i>, The second experiment with the multi-party system: Fethi Okyar forms a Serbest Cumhuriyet Firkasi (Free Republican Party)</p> <p><i>23 December</i>, religious riots in Menemen, near Izmir. Riots are followed by trials and executions.</p>
1931	<p><i>15 April</i>, Foundation of the Turkish Historical Association</p> <p>Metric system is adopted.</p>
1932	<i>12 July</i> , Foundation of the Turkish Language Association.
1933	<p><i>31 May</i>, Reformation of the Istanbul University. Jewish professors who are forced out of German universities come to Istanbul to form new departments.</p>
1934	<p>Turks ordered to take family names, parliament grants Mustafa Kemal the surname Ataturk.</p> <p><i>12 May</i>, women given the right to vote.</p>
1936	<p><i>1 September</i>, Foundation of language, history and geography departments in Ankara university.</p> <p><i>5 June</i>, Foundation of the conservatory in Ankara.</p>
1937	Kurdish revolt in Dersim is suppressed.
1938	Ataturk dies, Ismet Inonu succeeds him as president.

Chapter IV

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

Introduction

The previous chapter stressed the importance of the public sphere in fostering representation and negotiation of different identity positions in nation states. The public sphere, however, fails to allow representation of differences if national discourse dominates the process of claiming a modern society. In that case, national discourse colonizes the public sphere and establishes national identity as the only legitimate actor of the public sphere while forcing all other identities into the private sphere.

The foundation of the Turkish Republic represents a particular example of how national discourse used the public sphere as a vehicle to represent the nation as a homogeneous entity. Since the public sphere operated as an integral part of the nation building process, it failed to allow particular identities to represent themselves. Instead, the modernizing elite in Turkey viewed the public sphere as the space where the modern Turkish nation represents itself. For this reason, they engaged in an active construction of the public sphere as part of the nation-building effort.

As stated in the Introduction, the tension between nationalism and the public sphere exists in all modern societies to varying degrees and takes a different form in each local context. The relationship between nationalism and the public sphere in Turkey was largely determined by Turkish modernizing elite's interpretation of modernity. Since they identified the process of modern nation building as complete Westernization of all

aspects of life, they refused to acknowledge alternative interpretations of modernity that might have emerged from different identity positions. Therefore they utilized the national discourse to create a homogeneous modern nation. Instead of facilitating representation of differences, the public sphere became an integral part of the national discourse in order to ensure the dominance of the national identity.

This present chapter will concentrate on the historical and institutional background which led to the emergence of the public sphere in Turkey. This historical account of the early forms of the public sphere in the Ottoman Empire is crucial in understanding the nature of the public sphere in the Turkish Republic. It is usually assumed that the Turkish Republic represents a clear and radical break from the Ottoman past. The modernizing elite in Turkey certainly saw the Turkish Republic as the total opposite of the Ottoman system. Like the modernizing elite, Islamists adopted the same assumption and argued that the Republican elite artificially planted the idea of modernity in Turkey. Social change is more complex than these simple assumptions indicate. Despite a seemingly radical break with the Ottoman tradition, the ideas which led to this break were not new. The Republican elite built their ideas of modernity and modern society on debates and practices which emerged in the late Ottoman Empire.

In the first section, the Republican elite's interpretation of the public sphere will be discussed. The next section focuses on the historical origins of the public sphere in the Ottoman Empire in order to trace the roots of the Republican thinking. The Ottoman Millet system will be contrasted to the modern public sphere as the Republican elite's interpretation of the public sphere was a reaction to the heterogeneous nature of the Ottoman social structure. This will be followed by an examination of the impact on global forces on the Ottoman Empire which played an important role in the emergence of the public sphere. In the final section composition of the forces which formed the

Republican elite and their understanding of identity and difference in the public sphere will be discussed.

4.1. The Kemalist Interpretation of the Public Sphere

Habermas points out that the public sphere is a modern concept that came into being only once the philosophical and political properties of the modern regime became clear. Public use of reason in the social space between the state and society is only meaningful within the parameters of the modern regime where the state emerges as a political organization and where reason replaces the epistemology of the religion. The importance of Habermas' work comes from the fact that he establishes the direct link between the emergence of a modern political community and the debating public. The modern political community realizes the same social solidarity, once provided by religion and tradition, through the public's use of reason as a common medium.

Turkish modernization after the establishment of the Republic represents a particular example where the active construction of the public sphere functioned as a vehicle to create a modern society. The Kemalist elite defined their mission as that of creating a modern nation out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. The creation of a modern nation was identical to the creation of a modern national public sphere where the use of reason became the basis of this new political community. As the Other of Europe, for the modernizing elite, the Ottoman Empire represented everything that was at odds with modern life. The gap between the traditional structure of the Ottoman society and modern forms of life convinced the modernizing elite that modernization should entail a top-down transformation of traditional society into a modern nation. The Kemalist understanding of how to create a modern nation was identical to a complete Westernization of society including everyday aspects of life such as dressing, proper

language and social interaction. According to Kemalist cadres, the public sphere, therefore, was the space in which the modern nation represented itself. As the public sphere functioned as a vehicle to create a modern nation out of a traditional society, it had, from the beginning, an exclusionary character hostile to difference, and especially to that difference not in harmony with what a modern nation represents. The creation of a public sphere in Turkey was a societal project that was designed and controlled by a modernizing elite.

Public sphere will reflect the political, ideological and economic environment upon which it is founded. For instance, British and French public spheres have different orientation even though they share the same properties, such as social progress and rational communication. In the French case, it was the "physiocrats" who were responsible for the development of the public sphere whereas in the British case, the public sphere spontaneously emerged as the natural development of market relations and the bourgeoisie.¹ "[T]he physiocratic conception of opinion publique" aimed at making sure that 'the public had to be instructed in [the] truth before its judgment could properly constitute an enlightened public opinion'.² The public sphere, in the French tradition in particular, and in the Republican tradition, in general, functions as the site of social integration where the general will of society replaces particular wills. It is a guided and instructed social space where reason is communicated to the public by the

¹ Baker rightly points out that this distinction is due to the different political discourses emerging from the Enlightenment tradition. The French case is an example of Rousseau Republicanism which "obsessed with replacing arbitrary particular wills with the general will of the entire body of citizens, whereas the Liberal tradition, as in the case of England, depends on "the principles of the rights of man and the division of labor, with its impulse to exorcise political will entirely through the general rule of reason". Keith Michael Baker "Defining the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century France" in Craig Calhoun (ed.), *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), p. 193. Hence, the Republican tradition in its Rousseau version sees the realization of the rule of reason as the formulation of the General Will. The Public sphere is the social sphere where the general will replaces all particular wills.

² Baker, "Defining the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century France", pp194-195.

Enlightened elites.³ As discussed in the previous chapter, the public sphere contains both Lockean liberalism and Rousseauian Republicanism. The French case leans closer to the Rousseauian tradition whereas the public sphere in Britain is identified with Lockean liberalism. For instance, Habermas takes the British version as the basis of his description of the public sphere. Even though he mentions the French and German cases, his blueprint of the public sphere is based on the British public sphere.

The construction of a Turkish national public space was, in many ways, similar to the French experience. Given the fact that the Ottoman Empire had close ties with France and that the global effects of the French Revolution were highly felt in the Empire, the physiocratic tendency of the Turkish modernizing elite is not surprising. This physiocratic tendency manifested itself in the Turkish modernization as an "Enlightened" elite responsible for the creation of the modern nation. Baker's description of a "physiocratic" tradition is quite visible in the statements and public addresses of Kemal Ataturk and his close friends. On more than one occasion Ataturk clearly stated that his mission was to bring the average individual to the level of contemporary civilization. He added that such action would require effectively and quickly educating the average person. It is for this reason that he chose to identify it as a "Coups", rather than as an evolutionary process.⁴ In his speeches, Ataturk gave specific references to the French Revolution as the most effective way of achieving change. On one occasion he even described the French Revolution as a slow process in achieving change and stated that the

³ An initial impression of the Republican public sphere suggests that there is a significant difference between Republican and Liberal versions of the public sphere. It can be argued that the Liberal version of the public sphere is more compatible with the question of difference due to the perception that public opinion is realized through the use of reason by private citizens. However, recent critiques of the liberal public sphere suggests that, in terms of accommodating difference, the liberal public sphere is no better than the Republican one. For more see Chapter 3.

⁴ For more see Afet Inan, *M. Kemal Ataturk'un Karsbad Hatiralari*, (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Yayinlari, 1983)

Turkish nation did not have that much time.⁵ Thus, for Atatürk and his friends, the process of modernization was not a natural process - at least in the case of Turkey - and would require radical action by elites with a clear understanding of this modernizing mission. In order to realize his goal, the new society had to be crafted very carefully by the elite who understood modernization and Westernization as the one and only universalistic project.

Since the Turkish modernizing elite did not make a distinction between modernization and Westernization and understood modernity as a universal regime, the project of nation-building could not be a partial modernization but had to be a complete Westernization. This is why they did not choose the path taken by Meiji Japan in which modernization was understood primarily in technical terms. Instead, the Turkish case was a complete Westernization which required transformation of social, cultural and religious codes. At the core of the Kemalist interpretation of the public sphere is the tacit acceptance of the division between Occident and Orient and the superiority of the former.⁶ As Keyman argues "...while accepting the epistemic and moral dominance of Western civilization, thereby employing the epistemological and ontological distinction between the Occident and the Orient, the Kemalist will to civilization attempted to transform the passive Oriental subject into an active one...".⁷ According to this framework, the careful construction of the public sphere was seen to be imperative to

⁵ İsmail Habib Sevuk, *Atatürk İçin*, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1981)

⁶ This easy acceptance of the superiority of the Occident presents an interesting case among the cases of non-western nationalisms. Keyman argues that this is partly because of the fact that Turkey did not have the colonial experience and was not constructed as a colonial subject. Even though Turkey had a war of independence against Western countries right after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, it did not have the colonizer and the colonized relationship with western modernity. Fuat Keyman, "On the Relation Between Global Modernity and Nationalism: The Crisis of Hegemony and the Rise of (Islamic) Identity in Turkey", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Fall 1995, 13, pp.93-120.

⁷ *ibid.* pg.103.

the realization of the project of Westernization and also to the creation of a modern nation.

The Republican elite's interpretation of modernity, however, has its roots in the late Ottoman Empire. Their interpretation of modernity was a response to heterogeneous Ottoman social system in which separate communities organized autonomously. The Kemalist elite has identified this heterogeneity as a source of weakness, an obstacle to the realization of community which is oriented towards same ideals. Even though they reacted to the Ottoman system and attempted to create a new community, their interpretation of modernity has been influenced not only by the Ottoman intellectual tradition but also by the political culture of the Ottoman Empire.

4.2. Heterogeneous Universality and the Ottoman Millet System

The emergence of the public sphere predates the Turkish Republic, going back to the nineteenth century. Creating a space between the subjects and the Sultan became a pressing issue when the sweeping force of nationalism reached the Ottoman Empire. The obvious dominance of Europe and the waning power of the Ottoman Empire forced the elite to reform the administration, creating new institutions with the expectation that the adaptation of modern governing techniques would restore the already declining Ottoman power.

The emergence of the public sphere in the Ottoman Empire, and its radical reconstruction in the modern Turkish Republic, need to be seen as a response to the distinctive Ottoman social and administrative system called the *Millet Sistemi* (The System of Nations). A geographical entity that stretched from Africa to Europe, the Ottoman Empire had a heterogeneous, multi-religious and multi-ethnic population

which made dealing with difference and particularity an important issue. In terms of the way in which it dealt with particularity, Ottoman universality was radically different from the universalism of the modern nation state. Rather than creating a unified single community, the Ottoman "millet system" ensured the existence of community rights and organizations of the non-Muslim groups in the empire.⁸

The Ottoman administration divided the population into two major groups or millets: Muslim and non-Muslim. Every non-Muslim group or sect was an autonomous millet with its own leader representing the millet. The leader of each millet was the mediator between his community and the administration. In addition, every millet had complete autonomy in religious matters as well as in the regulation of everyday life from education, marriage, health, communication and social security. The millets of the Ottoman Empire were subject only to the penal code of the administration. Thereafter, they had complete autonomy guaranteed by declarations. The organizational structure of the millet system not only gave autonomy to the major religious communities but it also permitted the autonomy of sects and other groups. This system of autonomous communities guaranteed the existence, and relative equality, of different groups, ethnicities and religions within the same administrative unit without subjecting them to a single unitary core.⁹ The Ottoman Millet system reflected the plurality of the population by recognizing the autonomous organization of different belief systems and

⁸ First it needs to be noted that Millet (Nation) had a different connotation in the Ottoman case. It did not designate the nations as we understand them in the modern sense but religious communities. Eryilmaz points out that "millet" in its Arabic meaning refers to a group of people who accept a certain belief system and to the Ottoman administration that was based on the communities of belief. Bilal Eryilmaz, "Birlikte Yasama Duzeni: Osmanli Millet Sistemi", *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, Winter 1994, Vol.5, pg.92. Only after the emergence of modern nationalism does the word millet also designated nations based on culture, language and ethnicity.

⁹ For more on the Ottoman Millet system see Bilal Eryilmaz, *Osmanli Devletinde Millet Sistemi*. (Istanbul: Agac Yayincilik, 1992) and Kadir Canatan, "Toplum Tasarimlari ve 'Birlikte Yasama Felsefesi'", *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, Winter 1994, Vol.5, pp 98-108.

was a clear indication of that fact that Ottomans did not pursue an active assimilation and subjugation policy like other major world empires such as the British Empire.¹⁰

While the Ottoman system was pluralistic in its orientation, nevertheless, clear boundaries were established to differentiate the Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Like the Islamic *Zimmi* Legal Code, the Ottoman system recognized the distinctiveness of non-Muslim communities but placed them under Muslim protection. This two tier society, *Millet-i Hakime* (sovereign nation) and *Millet-i Mahkume* (subjected nation), was an indication of the hierarchic structure of the millet system where Muslims were first class inhabitants and non-Muslims second class. The autonomy and the freedom of the non-Muslim communities was conditional upon their acceptance of Muslim dominance.

Moreover, the Ottoman millet system attempted to segregate the communities or millets. From dress codes to building regulations to *mahalle* (community) organizations, the administration attempted to segregate the communities with visible signs.¹¹ On the one hand, the millet system guaranteed the autonomy of communities, while, on the other, it strictly segregated them. The structure of the millet system can be described as heterogeneous universality in that the central administration did not seek homogeneity and sameness as the core of social integration.¹² The segregation of this patchwork of

¹⁰ Eryilmaz, "Birlikte Yasama Duzeni: Osmanli Millet Sistemi", pg.97.

¹¹ For instance Armenians were supposed to use red for their hat and shoes, Greeks were supposed to use black, Jews used blue and muslims used yellow. Again, non-muslims could not ride horses, were nor allowed to walk in public baths without slippers and were ordered to use different towels than those of muslims. Eryilmaz, "Birlikte Yasama Duzeni: Osmanli Millet Sistemi", pg. 96.

¹² The structure of the Ottoman millet system may supply an interesting angle for the current debate on liberalism and communitarianism. As opposed to the abstract universalism of liberalism, the Ottoman system is organized around the specificity of the community. The similarity between the current communitarian argument and the Ottoman millet system is evident in the fact that they both understand the formation of identity within the context of community. For more on the liberal-communitarian debate see Stephen Mulhall & Adam Swift, *Liberals & Communitarians*, (Cambridge:

autonomous communities ruled out the formation of a universal modern public sphere where there was a single space that brought the state and society together. The Ottoman millet system was distinctly different from the modern concept of nation as it was organized around the concept of a community of communities.

The heterogeneous universality of the Ottoman millet system did not recognize the individual as the primary unit, but rather organized its system according to a communitarian principles. Despite the fact that the Empire called itself Islamic, the administration did not attempt to use Islam as the unitary core of the society thereby promoting greater heterogeneity. With such qualities, the millet system poses a sharp contrast to modern nationalism and the public sphere where there is a common core of society and a single space of interaction between the state and society. It is, in fact, impossible to talk of a public sphere in the millet system as the concept of segregated autonomous communities rules out the possibility of a single administrative and social space. The millet system is particularly important in understanding the later developments of creating a modern society out of the Ottoman social structure. Both Ottoman reformation and thereafter Turkish modernization focused their efforts on replacing the social structure of the millet system with a single society organized around a modern system of administration.

4.3. The Emergence of the Public Sphere and the End of the Millet System.

The introduction of the modern administration into the Ottoman Empire and the reformation of the Ottoman social and political structure was far from being entirely driven by internal forces. In fact, the global expansion of European powers from seventeenth century onwards had a direct impact on the Ottoman Empire. As early as

Blackwell, 1995).

the seventeenth century, changes in Europe started to have resonance in the Empire. The Ottoman administrators and intellectuals became aware of the fact that the Empire was losing its superiority due to the extraordinary transformations that were taking place in Europe. In the meantime, the Ottoman Empire became open to the effects of political, economic and ideological transformations of Europe. Ortayli argues that modernization- or Westernization- in the Ottoman Empire was started, not by naming the process of modernization outright but because of such pragmatic reasons as modernizing the army and finances.¹³ Despite the fact that the engagement with modernity sprang from such pragmatic reasons, the idea of modernization, or Westernization as it was called, became a central focus of the Empire; an issue that could not be ignored and yet that produced a feeling of unease.

The interaction between the Empire and Europe increased with the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world economy. People, ideas and goods made inroads into the Ottoman society. Moreover, Ottoman subjects, especially Christian subjects, carved out a new economic sphere which rested on trade with Europe. In addition to the old economic system which rested upon agriculture, a new economy emerged that was linked to the world capitalist system. Kasaba describes this integration of the Ottoman Empire as "from two worlds to one".¹⁴ According to Kasaba, as early as the late seventeenth century, new forms of circulation of goods, people and money became visible in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁵ The incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world economic system led to the dissolution of the Empire effectively ending the medieval Ottoman system. From the seventeenth century onwards the globalization process started to erode the boundaries of the medieval world with the capitalist system as its engine. Trade and

¹³ Ilber Ortayli, "Batılılaşma Sorunu", *Tanzimat Donemi Cumhuriyet Ansiklopedisi* Vol.1, (Istanbul: İletisim), pg.137.

¹⁴ Resat Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy : The Nineteenth Century*. (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), pg.11.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, pg.28.

the circulation of goods, people, and also, more importantly, ideas linked communities and distant corners of the world which were otherwise economically, socially and culturally separated. The emerging Ottoman economic system was peripheral in that it did not experience the growth of industrial production and the emergence of a new class structure.¹⁶ This said, however, an urban middle class emerged which largely consisted of Christian subjects of the Empire and which developed a European life style. This emerging middle class of the Ottoman Empire was, however, far from being a bourgeois.

The globalization process had a crucial impact on the Ottoman System, not only in terms of integration into the world economic system, but also in terms of integration of ideas and life styles of remote locations to which Ottomans had not previously paid attention. For centuries, Ottomans represented the powerful Other against which Europe constructed its own image. For the first time, however, the events and ideas of Europe became a concern among the elites and intellectuals of the Ottoman Empire. In this

¹⁶ The lack of capitalist development in the Ottoman Empire, and the reasons for it, have been explained from different angles. Bernard Lewis attributes the lack of capitalist development in the Empire to islamic traditions. Closely resembling well known orientalist arguments, he points out that islam has been a determining factor in the Empire's relationship with the West and has had an impact on the development of modern institutions. Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe*, (New York: Norton, 1982). Kasaba provides a more historically grounded explanation for the lack of capitalist development in the Empire. He illustrates the process within which the Empire was incorporated into the world capitalist system and the Empire's peripheral location in the system. Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: The Nineteenth Century*. Sevket Pamuk also explains the phases of capitalist development in the Ottoman Empire by locating it within the general framework of world capitalist system Sevket Pamuk, *The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1920-1913: Trade Investment and Production*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1987) Inalcik provides an extensive analysis of the Ottoman Economic Structure and its crisis by drawing on Ottoman archival material Halil Inalcik, "The Ottoman Economic Mind and aspects of the Ottoman Economy", *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1970) pp.207-218 and Halil Inalcik, "Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire", *Journal of Economic History*, 19, 1969, pp.97-140. Kucukomer also argues that the biggest obstacle of the modernization of the Empire was the lack of a traditional feudal system whose dissolution provided the ground for new classes. Kucukomer argues that the Ottoman system lacked social and economic structures that would have permitted the development of new classes Idris Kucukomer, *Duzenin Yabancilasmasi*, (Istanbul: Alan, 1989).

respect, it would be misleading to argue that the globalization process affected the Ottoman Empire only on economic grounds. The incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world economic system was part of the complex relationship that the Ottoman Empire started to develop with modernity. Kasaba rightly argues that, during the process of integration into the world economic system, the deterioration of the empire and its radical reformation took place simultaneously. The Ottoman economy became dependent on the world economy on the one hand. On the other, it showed "very impressive signs of vitality during the nineteenth century", including a series of infrastructure projects.¹⁷

The incorporation of the Empire into the world economic system, on one level, revealed the declining power of the Ottoman Empire. On another level, however, Ottoman administrators, intellectuals and ordinary subjects, became engaged with the economic, political and ideological forms of modernity. On a political level, nationalism entered into the Empire as a powerful social force which had a lasting impact on the Ottoman Millet system. Nationalist movements in the Ottoman Empire started in the Balkans among non-Muslim communities of the Empire in the eighteenth century gradually reaching Muslim subjects. With the emergence of modern nationalism, and the incorporation of the Empire into the world economic system, the Ottoman administration started to lose the control over the production and circulation of goods as well as over the movement of people and control over the means of violence.¹⁸ The intensity of the trading relationship between the Empire and Europe increased the

¹⁷ Resat Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy*, pg.1

¹⁸ Kasaba, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy : The Nineteenth Century* explains the radical and rapid shift in the Ottoman Economy in the 18th century in relation to the world economic system. Bruce McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Empire, Taxation Trade and the Struggle for Land*, (Cambridge University Press, 1994) and Donald Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881-1908*, (New York: New York University Press, 1983) provide a detailed analysis of increased economic and political relationship in the 18th and 19th centuries between the Ottoman Empire and Europe.

contacts between Ottoman subjects and European countries. Non-Muslim communities, especially the Greeks, and those from the Balkans, were quick to establish trading relations with Europe. This initial economic and cultural contact put the medieval administrative system at odds with the emerging modern regime in Europe in that the administration not only began to lose its control over the economic system but also found it difficult to sustain the political structure of the millet system. The blossoming of nationalist ideas among Muslim and non-Muslim communities, introduced a national dimension into religious communities decreasing the influence of religion in defining these communities. For example, we see a fragmentation of the orthodox community through Greek, Serbian, Armenian, Bulgarian nations; similarly among the Muslim communities there emerged a Turkish, Albanian and Arab nationalisms.¹⁹ The communities started to identify themselves in terms of the modern nationalist terminology and this made the functioning of the Millet system increasingly impossible. The heterogeneous millet system based on religious communities could not respond to the challenges of nationalism. As nationalism gained popularity among multi-ethnic and multi-religious communities of the Empire, administrators attempted to counter this growing nationalism by redesigning the relationship between communities and the central administration. The attempt was to create a single community out of patchwork of communities.

The Tanzimat Declaration (*Tanzimat Fermani*), which was announced by the Sultan in November 3, 1839, was the first attempt to redefine the relationship between the communities and the Palace. European powers were particularly influential in the

¹⁹Karpat outlines the foundations of modern nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, Kemal Karpat, *An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973). For more on Balkan nationalisms see Richard Clogg, *The Movement for Greek Independence, 1770-1821*, (London: MacMillan, 1976) and Leften Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453*, (New York: Rinehart, 1958).

formulation of the declaration. As they developed strong ties with the Christian subjects of the Empire, they intervened directly in the administrative matters to protect the rights of the Christians. In a way Tanzimat was a departure from the heterogeneous structure of the community of communities; it was an effort to reform the medieval administrative system through modern principles. The Tanzimat established a new form of governance in three different spheres: (1) the sovereignty of the Sultan was restricted, (2) protection of property and life was taken out of the absolute rule of the Sultan and guaranteed by universal legal codes and (3) the will of the executive was to be carried out by a series of law rather than by the medieval legal system.²⁰ The Tanzimat declaration established the system of universal law and various executives in order to restrict, for the first time in history, the authority of the Sultan. Furthermore, the Tanzimat declaration also guaranteed the protection of the life and property of all Ottoman subjects. Even though the Tanzimat Declaration did not change the overall administrative structure, it had an important consequence for two important areas: (a) the relation between the sultan and the subjects (b) the equality of the Ottoman subjects. By restricting the absolute powers of the sultan, establishing a rule of law and recognizing the equality of the subjects the Tanzimat declaration prepared the ground for the foundation of the public sphere. In other words, the principles that were put forward by the Tanzimat paved the way for a modern citizenship and a single community to be organized around the same legal and political structure. The Tanzimat also marked a departure from the Millet system as it laid the ground for the end of autonomous communities.

The Declaration of Reform (*Islahat Fermani*) , which was announced on February 18, 1856, further developed the principles of the Tanzimat Declaration. In the Declaration of Reform several new measures such as the establishment of the central bank, the

²⁰Tevfik Cavdar, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi*, (Istanbul: Imge Kitabevi, 1995) pg.22

creation of the state budget and mixed courts, were taken which would further modernize the administrative structure. Moreover, the Declaration of Reform once more emphasized the equality of Ottoman subjects and announced the abolition of privileges. This was particularly noteworthy because, given the fact that Muslims were the privileged community of the empire, this was the first step towards a universal citizenship with equality before the law and administration. Cavdar argues that Islahat was more important for the non-Muslim subjects than the Muslim ones in that it attempted to create a new community based on the concept of Ottomanism where the new community would determine the identity of the subjects.²¹ Even though Ottomanism did not become official policy, the Islahat attempted to create a new community with a new meaning which was in tune with new forms of the modern nation state.

Although the principal motive of the reforms was to modernize the Ottoman system in order to restore the dissipated power of the empire, they inadvertently decreased the importance of the particular communities and shifted the center to the emergent semi-legal public sphere. The dilemma of the reforms soon became noticeable by way of two interrelated developments. First, the reforms undermined the most important building block of the Ottoman Empire, that is, the cluster of autonomous communities. Second, the new reforms did not go far enough to satisfy the desire of the empire's non-Muslim communities of becoming a people and a nation. It was clear that modern nationalism was at odds with the heterogeneous structure of the Ottoman Empire. The Declaration's attempt was carried further with the second constitutional reform on July 24, 1908. With the opening of the national assembly, *Ittihat ve Terakki* (The Committee of Union and Progress) became the key player in the administration, effectively ruling out the influence of the Sultan and engaging in a radical remaking of the Empire along the lines of Ottomanism. Yet the idea of Ottomanism that was put forward by some intellectuals

²¹ *ibid*, pg.24.

and by Ittihat ve Terakki never found support among the non-Muslim communities of the Empire, which were already on the way to forming their own nation states, and failed to keep the Empire together.

4.4. The Intellectual Origins of Modernity in the Ottoman Empire

Administrative and legal reforms were not the only encounters with the modern regime. More influential perhaps were the ideas that shaped modern thinking in Europe. Starting around the seventeenth century, the idea of modernity became a central concern among the Ottoman elite. In the beginning, this concern came out of a practical concern that the Empire was losing its traditional power vis-à-vis Europe. This decline of power forced the Ottoman administrators to closely look at what was happening in Europe and to take some of the innovations to reform the medieval system of the Empire. What was once a pragmatic concern however soon became a deeply troubling issue among the Ottoman intellectuals. The Empire was located within Europe but found itself at odds with the newly emerging political, economic and ideological forces that were shaping Europe. The ideas of freedom, progress, and popular sovereignty, as expressed in modern forms of government, found popularity among the members of the Ottoman Elite. The real question that occupied the intellectuals, however, was the question of how these ideas could live together with the traditional values of Ottoman Empire. The question of the degree to which traditional Ottoman values could live together with modern forms of life soon became a debate which not only occupied Ottoman intellectuals but also the Republican elite.

Yeni Osmanlılar (New Ottomans) was one of the first groups who pronounced the concepts of nation, freedom, public and the right to participate in government. Sinasi, who was the leading figure and the founder of the movement, declared the state should be

in service to its citizens and not the other way around.²² Namik Kemal was another leading figure in the movement who actively promoted the idea of freedom and the nation but also was at great pains to find ways of adopting the modern regime to the values of the Ottoman Empire

Jon Turk Hareketi (the Young Turk Movement) carried the *Yeni Osmanlilar's* endeavor further. They actively engaged in printing and publishing, aimed at discussing ideas such as freedom and the role of monarchy as well as the idea of nation and public. For instance, Ahmet Riza Bey attempted to find a convergence between Islamic values and modern science by arguing that Islam is compatible with the positivist world view.²³ Murat Bey (Mizancı Murat) also believed in the compatibility of the modern regime with Islamic values and promoted Turkish nationalism as the basis of the new community rather than Ottomanism. He first suggested that the social contract be the basis of a new arrangement between the Sultan and the subjects. He even went as far as describing the state as a firm that was in the business of serving people. Unlike Ahmet Riza and Murat Bey, Abdullah Cevdet believed in modernity and secularism in its totality. For him, there was no middle way, only the total adoption of the modern regime. Prens Sabahattin was another important figure in the movement who had a clear outline of the new society based on an ideal of human beings, the theory of education and the society that would realize this ideal, and finally, the social theory that would enable the analysis of modern societies.²⁴ Prens Sabahattin also believed in the decentralization of the administration and a liberal economy. Compared to other Ottoman intellectuals of the time, he was surprisingly liberal and a strong supporter of decentralization.

²² Cavdar, *Turkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi*, pg.27.

²³ *ibid.*, pg.59

²⁴ Serif Mardin, *Turk Modernlesmesi*, (Istanbul: Iletisim, 1992) pp.81-98

When we look at the brief summary of the intellectual movement in the Empire that actively engaged with the question of modernity, we see an ambivalent attitude towards modernity. Some thinkers tried to find a point of convergence between traditional values and modern forms of life while others saw these two as antagonistic and called for the complete Westernization of the Ottoman society. This divide within the intellectual tradition also manifested itself in the Republican period and still finds its resonance in contemporary Turkish society.

Together with administrative reforms and a penetration of new ideas within the elites of the Empire, there emerged a semi-public sphere in the Ottoman Empire after the Tanzimat. Serif Mardin in fact argues that the Tanzimat prepared the ground for the emergence of the public sphere. The intelligentsia, and the printing media that they initiated, further strengthened the idea of a common social space.²⁵ It is true that the administrative reforms of the Tanzimat, together with the debate among intellectuals about a possible resolution of modern forms and traditional structure of the Empire, fostered the idea of the public sphere. Yet, Mardin argues that the role of the intellectuals was rather limited in terms of their influence over the general population. While this is a valid observation, the intellectual debates of the late Ottoman Empire did shape the ideological orientation of the Kemalist elite which carried the limited Ottoman reforms to its ultimate point of complete Westernization. The Tanzimat and Constitutional reforms laid the ground for a modern administration and created a space between administration and the population. The Ottoman system did not, however, present a clear idea about the identity of the new society. Different ideas from Islamism to Ottomanism were represented as the social cement of an already dissolving empire. It was not until the Republican period that there was an active engagement to create an

²⁵ Serif Mardin, *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, (İstanbul: İletisim, 1992) pg 30.

identity for the new community and to construct a public sphere that would represent this identity.

4.5. The Popular Base of the Republican Elite and Resistance in the Public Sphere

The Republican elite's understanding of modern society was a response to the traditional Ottoman political and social system. Their ideas regarding modern society, progress and tradition were, however, influenced by the intellectual tradition of the Ottoman Empire. The clash between so-called modern and traditional forces had already emerged in the final years of the Ottoman Empire. This clash played a significant role in shaping the nation building process in Turkey. In this process the Republican elite has always assumed the role of protecting the modern outlook of the nation. They considered the resistance to their particular understanding of modernity as traditional and reactionary. Even though resistance to the agenda of the Republican elite was heterogeneous, and motivated by various actors with different political goals, those who resisted were marginalized as reactionary forces aimed to destroy the nation. The Republican elite (or the Kemalist elite) derived its support from three key players: the military, the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia. All three players were not only influential actors in the Ottoman administrative system but also the ones who first came in contact with modern ideas and a modern administration.

It is often suggested that as the military played a key role in the foundation of the Turkish Republic, it assumes a central responsibility in protecting the basic principles of the Kemalist modernization. In fact, Atatürk and most of his cadres came from military ranks. As the Empire collapsed and its territory was occupied by the Western powers, it was largely the army officers under Atatürk's leadership who mobilized a

popular resistance in Anatolia to the occupation forces creating an alternative administration in Ankara. After winning the national liberation war, Atatürk and his cadres set up the task of founding a modern nation out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. The military elites' interest in forming a nation based on modern principles was a reflection of the late Ottoman military. The military was one of the first institutions in the Empire to have been modernized and its officers went through extensive training in Western countries.²⁶ Like other army officers, Atatürk was the product of a modernized military education and spent time in the Prussian army and observed the changing life in Europe.

The bureaucracy was another key player in consolidating the regime in the new Republic. Like the military, schools that educated bureaucratic cadres had reformed to adopt the modern administration. Unlike the traditional Ottoman bureaucratic system, which was hereditary and based on personal ties to the Sultan, the late nineteenth century Ottoman bureaucracy was already a Weberian organization whose cadres were educated in the modern schools.²⁷ Bureaucrats quickly became uneasy with the Sultan's hesitant approach in introducing the modern reforms into the Empire. After the collapse of the Empire, the bureaucrats became the natural allies of the military in founding a modern nation. The strong and well-organized bureaucratic structure of the Empire became the backbone of the administration in the new Republic.

The secular intelligentsia was another key actor in the nation building process. As noted earlier, there was already a secular intelligentsia in the Ottoman Empire who saw Westernization as a solution to the Empire's declining power. It is sometimes stated that

²⁶ Sina Aksin, "Siyasal Tarih", in *Osmanlı Devleti 1600-1908*, ed. by Kunt, Aksin, Odekan, Toprak and Yurdaydin, (Istanbul: Cem Yayinlari, 1988), pp.73-89

²⁷ Serif Mardin, *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, (Istanbul: İletisim Yayinlari, 1992), pg.56.

modernization in the Empire started in the translation section of the External Affairs Department.²⁸ Young bureaucrats who were educated in the Western schools and responsible for the translation of texts published in the West became involved in ideas that were coming from the West. The secular intelligentsia of the Ottoman Empire became part of the Republican elite and assumed an important role in creating a modern nation. In the early years of the Republic, intellectuals were given the special role in schools, universities and cultural and political organizations of transforming society.²⁹

The Republican elite mainly came from the urban centers and was always suspicious of the rural areas. As the rural areas were more conservative and traditional, they viewed them as locations where reactionary forces could derail the process of creating a modern nation. Because of this, the Republican elite envisioned a tightly controlled public sphere in which only the modern face of the nation would be represented. According to Gole, their perceived threat to the regime provided the rationale for "political authoritarianism".³⁰

Despite the fact that the Kemalist elite was able to establish its version of modernity as a hegemonic discourse, differing views on modernization have persisted throughout the history of the Turkish Republic. The landowners of Anatolia, religious groups, the Kurdish nationalists and the left were the main opponents of the Republican elite. Atatürk had cooperated with all these groups during the liberation war and the first National Assembly in Ankara was heavily dominated by Anatolian notables, religious leaders and Kurdish tribal leaders. Atatürk and his cadres were aware that these groups

²⁸ Yalcin Kucuk, *Aydin Uzerine Tezler*, (Istanbul: Tekin Yayinlari, 1983).

²⁹ Turker Alkan, *Gelisen Ulkelerde Aydinlar ve Siyaset*, (Ankara, 1977).

³⁰ Nilufer Gole, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey" in *Civil Society in the Middle East*, ed.by Augustus Richard Norton (Leiden : E.J. Brill, 1996), pg.20.

would not share their idea of creating a modern nation as resistance had already been forming throughout the liberation war.

In contrast to the radical views of Ataturk and his cadres, the opposition in the first assembly organized itself under the name of a Second Group. The Second Group was an eclectic group of deputies. Some of these deputies were committed to the Sultan and Islamic values whereas others disagreed with the growing power of Ataturk and his close friends.³¹ The group that was against the absolute power of Ataturk and his close friends consistently argued against a one-man rule and were strong advocates of political and economic liberalism.³² Even though the actual leaders of the Second Group were eliminated from the Second National assembly their followers founded both the Progressive Republican Party and the Free Republican Party. Despite the fact that these two parties were short lived and the country was then led by a single party regime until 1950, opposition has remained alive and has manifested itself whenever possible. When the regime became multi-party system in 1946, the Democratic Party was established by the deputies who parted with the Republican people's Party and quickly became a serious force and won the elections in 1950. In addition its opposition to the authoritarian rule of RPP, the Democratic Party advocated economic liberalism and provided a platform for conservative groups who were not at ease with radical Kemalist reforms.

³¹ For more on the role of the Second Group and its influence on Turkish politics see Ahmet Demirel, *Birinci Meclis'te Muhalefet*, (Istanbul: İletişim, 1995, 2nd edition).

³² The Second Group's insistence of political and economic liberalism is largely ignored by the official history of the Republic. Instead, the Second Group has usually been portrayed as being consisted of deputies who conservative and traditional and were threatened by the progressive and revolutionary aspect of the Kemalist modernization. Demirel's work challenges the interpretation of the official history and provides a new account of the Second Group, Ahmet Demirel, *Birinci Mecliste Muhalefet*.

When the Democratic Party became a serious threat to Kemalism, the army intervened in the political process in 1961 to protect the hegemony of the Kemalist paradigm. Immediately after return to the normal political life, opposition groups formed the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*) and in the early seventies the Islamist opposition formed National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*). When the party was closed down by the constitutional court, Islamists formed the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*)

In 1980, a military takeover closed all the parties. Once again, however, normal political life was soon restored. Old political cadres now formed the True path Party which was the follower of the Justice Party while the Islamist opposition formed the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*). It should be noted that the parties mentioned above by no means constitute a monolithic block in their political and ideological orientation. For instance, the cadres who formed the Islamist National Salvation Party, followed by the Welfare Party, departed from the center right parties due to ideological differences. Common to all of these parties, and cadres who formed them, however, was a distance from the specific interpretation of modernity in Turkey. They reacted to the authoritarian, top-down approach of the modernizing elite. Although they were not themselves entirely democratic when they gained power, nevertheless, they showed a tendency towards decentralization, liberalization and also traditionalism. Their political and economic claims consistently pushed the boundaries of the institutional framework to shift the grounds of the public sphere in Turkey. At certain moments they were successful and while in other circumstances they were met with the resistance by the governing elite and bureaucracy. Nevertheless, they have consistently resisted to the homogeneous and restricted nature of the public sphere in Turkey.

The Kurdish movement and the Left were less fortunate in organizing opposition to the Republican's understanding of modernity. The Republican elite viewed Kurdish nationalism as a threat to the unity of the modern nation. As their understanding of the modern nation was a reaction to the Ottoman millet system, they believed that any acknowledgment of Kurdish nationalism would fragment the nation. There were 16 revolts between 1924 and 1938 that were initiated by Kurdish groups.³³ All of these revolts were suppressed by the army. As these revolts also contained a religious dimension, they provoked the worst fears of the Republican elite: religion and ethnicity. Because of this, the state exercised heavy control over any movement that expressed Kurdish nationalism. During the sixties, Kurdish claims were voiced by the urban and politicized Kurdish youth and found a greater expression in the seemingly liberal framework of the 1960 Constitution.³⁴ At this time, the Kurdish claims found allies among the Left which represented the Kurdish situation as one of exploitation and underdevelopment. The 1980 military takeover put an end to the limited expression of the Kurdish claims. Claims for public recognition of any identity became a constitutional crime in the 1982 Constitution and the generals increased the level of oppression in the Southeast Part of the Turkey which helped the PKK (Kurdish National Party) to become an significant force in the region.

The Left has also had an uneasy relationship with the Republican regime. As the Republican elite was aware of the Soviet interest in Turkey, they exercised heavy control over leftist organizations. The leaders of the Turkish Communist Party supported the foundation of the Republic, in principle, but were critical of the governing elite. In 1925 leaders of the Turkish Communist Party were arrested and the

³³ Kemal and Kirisci and Gareth Winrow, *Kurt Sorunu Kokeni ve Gelismisi*, (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayinlari, 1997), pg.105.

³⁴ *ibid.* pg.113

party was closed.³⁵ After the Communist movement went underground, leftist groups organized around socialist parties and left-leaning labour unions. The Left movement gained considerable recognition during the sixties and the Socialist Party had representatives in the National Assembly. The Left, however, did not constitute a significant threat to the Republican regime as it was fragmented into various different groups. The labour unions probably had the most significant impact during the sixties as they were able to mobilize working class Anatolian migrants in big cities. The Left, including the labour movement, experienced a major setback as the military regime banned all labour unions and leftist groups and jailed leftist intellectuals.

Despite the tension between the center and the periphery and the alienation that the reforms created among the rural population, the peripheral life remained, to a large degree, untouched by the reforms. The Kemalist reforms had a larger impact on the high Islam of urban center than on folk Islam of rural areas.³⁶ The Kemalist elite were not as adamant in changing the face of the rural areas as they were in the case of urban centers. As mentioned earlier, they were committed to erasing the influence of Islam from public life from individual to institutional level. Apart from such institutional reforms as the secularization of the state and the education system, they reformed the everyday life from dress to arts. Reforms affecting the daily life style of masses such as Western hats, Turkish prayers, women's dress and their inclusion in the public life, banning of religious orders created the biggest grievances against the regime. A large number of people identified these new institutional and everyday life changes as external and threatening to traditional ways of living. There emerged a discrepancy between the modern identity that was projected by the modernizing elite and the identity of large

³⁵ Tefik Cavdar, *Turkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi*. (Istanbul: Imge Kitabevi, 1995) pg.290

³⁶ *ibid.* pg.286.

groups of people. The Kemalist elite wanted to close that gap and consolidate the modern Turkish identity by introducing solidarity provided by the Republican ideology.

During the multiparty years, religious and ethnic groups attempted to establish themselves in the political realm in order to change certain practices of everyday life such as prayers, education and dress codes as well as the manifestation of Kurdish identity. It is important to note that, contrary to the assumptions defining the public sphere, the movements and identities refused to stay in the private sphere and struggled for inclusion in the public sphere. Furthermore, the strategies of resistance to the principles of the public sphere indicate the importance of the public sphere in identity formation since no single group and identity could express itself in its singular form. The different forms of resistance necessitate a crisscrossing between different groups and identities. The religious movement, for instance, expressed itself both through liberal right wing parties as well as its own movements. Similarly, the Kurdish identity was articulated into the leftist movement of the seventies. Far from being a unified place whose main defining principle was solidarity, the Turkish public sphere has been a political space where groups and identities struggled for greater inclusion as well as attempted to redefine the boundaries as well as the content of the public debate. The real of opening in the public space had to wait until the second half of the eighties.

4.6. Identity/Difference In the Turkish National Public Sphere

As the Republican regime experienced a significant resistance from different segments of the society, they approached plurality with suspicion. Thus, rather than promoting the plurality and difference, the public sphere in Turkey functioned to establish the hegemony of the national identity and the Kemalist interpretation of the modernity. The

development of the public sphere in Turkey had two separate trajectories. The first was the establishment of the institutional bases of the public sphere and the second, the creation of the modern subject of the public sphere.

Habermas suggest that the public sphere emerged as an autonomous social sphere only after a centralized state, as the form of administration, had replaced the monarch and market relations had replaced the production and exchange mechanisms of feudal society.³⁷ The modern subject with "his" consciousness and reason was naturally fit to operate in the new social environment. There was a simultaneous development of the public sphere's institutional framework in Europe and the emergence of the modern subject

In contrast to European experience, in the last period of the Ottoman Empire, and in the early years of the Republic, the institutional base of the public sphere did not develop along with the emergence of the modern subject. For this reason a new order was needed to ensure the systematic introduction of the institutions of the public sphere and the creation of the modern subject as the agent of this sphere.

³⁷ Habermas in earlier sections of *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* establishes the link between the modern state and the public sphere: "... finally, the elements of political prerogative developed into organs of public authority; partly into a parliament, and partly into judicial organs. Elements of occupational status group organization...developed into the sphere of 'civil society' that as the genuine domain of private autonomy stood opposed to the state", Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, pg.12. The simultaneous emergence of public authority and civil society creates a social space called "public sphere" where civil society and public authority engage in negotiation. Following this, Habermas indicates the importance of the market in this process. "The economic activity that had become private had to be oriented toward a commodity market that had expanded under public direction and supervision; the economic conditions under which this activity now took place lay outside the confines of the single household; for the first time they were of general interest", Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, pg.19. It was the growing relations of the market and the expansion of capitalism from the local level to the national level that contributed to the consolidation of the state's central authority and the development of civil society as a counterforce.

The Kemalist paradigm thus envisioned a public sphere whose boundaries were drawn by the principles of "secularism, nationalism, rationalism and republicanism".³⁸ The modernizing elite saw these four concepts as the foundation of the public sphere. For this elite Republicanism referred to a sovereignty based on the people, whereas secularism ensured the implementation of a new legal code and the elimination of the influence of religion from public life and from institutions in the new society. Turkish nationalism provided an identity for the new nation. The Kemalist elite was aware of the fact that the Ottoman reforms failed to raise the consciousness of an identity among Ottoman subjects as belonging to the same community. As the national identity, Turkishness was supposed to act as cement to create a homogeneous society. Rationalism constituted the mode of logic for institutional and personal development within the new Republic. The institutions and citizens of the Republic would not operate on the basis of old traditions but rather on the basis of reason. The Kemalist elite designed the Turkish public sphere as the social sphere where the above mentioned qualities of the modern nation could manifest themselves. These principles not only constituted the foundation of the legal and administrative institutions of the public sphere but also attempted to define the identity of the citizens of the new nation. A heavy emphasis on the transformation of the individual as a rational agent indicates that the Kemalist elite opted for the total transformation of society concluding that, unless the agents of society are transformed into citizens of the modern nation, the implementation of modern institutions would fail to achieve the modern nation.

In the Turkish case, an administrative system did not emerge simultaneously with a class structure. For this reason, Kemalists felt the need to impose from above a modern administrative system and a legal framework that would facilitate the development of a

³⁸ Ilkay Sunar, "State, Society, and Democracy in Turkey" in Vojtech Magtny and R Craig Nation (ed.), *Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power* (Westview, 1996).

capitalist economic system in Turkey. The state's active involvement in the creation of capitalist economic system eliminated the distance between the public authority and the private economy. Instead, in order to create a modern capitalist economy, the economy was part of the public put under the effective supervision of the state. The modernizing elite adopted statism³⁹ as an economic policy because they were suspicious of the autonomous space that might have emerged from private economic activity. By keeping economic activity under state tutelage they aimed to control the social development of different groups.⁴⁰ This argument is usually justified by the fact that the new Republic did not have an entrepreneurial class who could engage in private economic activity.⁴¹ State action was needed not only for costly and large scale investments in infrastructure but also for creating a productive bourgeoisie.⁴²

³⁹ For the development and application of statism in the Republic as a dominant economic system see Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de Milli İktisat 1980-1918* (Istanbul: Yurt, 1982)

⁴⁰ Ahmet Insel, "Devletçiliğin Anatomisi", *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, Vol.2, pp.419-425.

⁴¹ Gocek gives an illustration of the merchant class and the development of a limited bourgeoisie class during the final years of the Ottoman Empire. Her account establishes the link between the entry of Western goods into the Empire and the rise of urban culture in cities. She also notes the significance of religious minorities in this process. They appear to be the main groups trading with the West and coming under Western protection. They mainly made up the commercial bourgeoisie of the Empire. Fatma Muge Gocek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), especially chapter 3. The dominance of religious minorities in capital accumulation is probably one of the reasons why the Republican elite were sensitive about tightly controlled national economy. Since the financial ruin of the Empire was blamed on the inability of the Empire to control its own economic affairs and on the dominant role of minorities on the economy, the Republican elite saw economic independence as a prerequisite of political independence. This was very clear during the negotiations of the Lausanne Peace Treaty. Even though Representatives of the New Republic, especially İsmet İnönü, were flexible on territorial issues during the negotiations, they exhibited a greater inflexibility on the issues of Ottoman Debt and capitulations. Correspondence between Atatürk and İsmet İnönü clearly demonstrates that Atatürk put a greater emphasis on economic independence than territorial gains. For more see Hasan İzzettin Dinamo, *Kutsal Baris* (Istanbul: Cem Yayınları, 1986).

⁴² Birinci İzmir İktisat Kongresi (The First İzmir Economic Congress) laid down the ground for a nationally based economy controlled by the state in 1923. In his opening speech to the Congress, Atatürk tells the audience that the new Republic lacked the human capital necessary for rapid economic development. He adds that the majority of the population worked in the rural sector and that it was vital to develop the other sectors of the economy if Turkey was to realize a modern society. Mustafa Kemal

In Europe, the development of a private economy and the emergence of classes as part of the capitalist economy were partly responsible for the emergence of the autonomous space between state and society. Habermas's devotes considerable attention to how the development of a private economy and of the players of private exchange relations opened up a new space outside the central administration. The state's control of the economic development in the Turkish Republic, however, did not allow for the same autonomous space to develop outside the domain of administration. Instead, it allowed the state to control different segments of society and integrate them into the project of nation-building. The Kemalist paradigm viewed the development of the capitalist economy as part of the nation building process and, therefore, initiated control over its forces and players. The complete control over the development of economic forces and players further decreased the possibility of an autonomous public sphere to develop. The state's control over economic development, together with principles of secularism, nationalism, republicanism and rationalism, reflects a complete societal project in which different segments of society would direct their efforts to creating a modern nation. From economy to politics, the Kemalist paradigm envisioned a totalistic project which expresses itself as a Rousseauan General Will. This totalistic aspect of the Kemalist project posed a sharp contrast to its second dimension : the creation of an autonomous individual as the rational agent of the public sphere

For Habermas that which makes the public sphere distinctively modern is reason as the medium of social integration and communication. The role that reason plays is particularly important because it transforms "subject" into "political citizens": it

Ataturk, "Opening Speech for the First Izmir Economic Congress" in *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kùltürün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin 6 Oku* by Taha Parla (İstanbul: İletişim, 1992)pp.249-253. Also, Cemil Kocak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, (İstanbul: Yurt, 1986) and Yahya Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi (1923-1950)*, (İstanbul: Yurt, 1986)

provides them with tools to become agents, not just simple bearers of supranatural forces. Habermas rightly points out that unless private individuals use reason in public, it is not possible to talk about a political public sphere. The social space or public sphere only becomes possible in the case that citizens themselves take part as their own agents in dealing with the state and among themselves. The emergence of the modern subject in the West was only possible after the emergence of the Enlightenment that fostered the idea of the human subject free from religious and communal boundaries. It was a subject who was in control of its own destiny. From Weber to Durkheim, the transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* has constituted the central axis of social theory. It is only after this transition that it becomes possible to identify the autonomous subject who plays a central role in the emergence of modern public spaces. Habermas argues that initially the bourgeoisie emerged as the rational agent of the public sphere. Situated against the monarch and aristocracy, and developing a new form of economic activity, the bourgeois transformed the space between state and society by creating an autonomous social space where reason was the medium of communication.⁴³ This gave the bourgeois the role of the modern subject. In Turkey, the Kemalist elite acted on the assumption that such an autonomous modern subject was absent in the Turkish case. Therefore, they realized that the creation of the public space in Turkey required more than the creation of institutions. It required the creation of the autonomous modern subject. The public sphere emerged as the social space where the autonomous modern subject would be visible and operational.

Mardin argues that the Kemalist elite saw the communitarian organization of the traditional Turkish society as a serious obstacle to the creation of this autonomous

⁴³ For more on the creation of autonomous public sphere and the role of bourgeoisie in its creation see Jurgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992) pp.14-26.

subject.⁴⁴ The *gemeinschaft* nature of the *mahalle* ⁴⁵ system, with its strict Islamic moral value system in its center, did not provide a sphere of independent action for the individual. Putting the community before the individual, the communitarian *mahalle* system not only obstructed the autonomy of the individual but also eliminated any difference that was not in harmony with the values of community. In addition, the *mahalle* system, with its cell-like organization, created islands of communities within the city which were very much in tune with the general organization of Ottoman society as distinct and separated "millets". Generally the millet system and the organization of cities around the *mahalle* system was said to be responsible for the lack of civil society in late Ottoman society. This distinctive character of the Ottoman system kept the traditional societal organization intact and did not allow civil society to emerge as an autonomous social sphere.⁴⁶

The Turkish modernizing elite knew that in order to create a modern nation state, they had to break with the *gemeinschaft* of the *mahalle* system and form an autonomous social space in which the modern subject would be the agent. Mardin argues that Atatürk was aware of the monotonous and uniform nature of the *mahalle* community and the obstacles

⁴⁴ Serif Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din Ve Laiklik* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları 1992), pp.72-73. The same article was also published in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Özbudun eds. (London: C.Hurst and Co., 1981) pp.191-219

⁴⁵ Even though Mahalle in its technical description indicates an administrative system within a city, according to Mardin it is also a social space where the average Ottoman subject used to spend his/her life. Mahalle is a self contained space where residents receive their education, celebrate marriage and birth as well as where deaths are mourned. The center of the mahalle is a mosque where the imam acts not only as a religious leader but also a community organizer. For more see Mardin , *Türkiye'de Din Ve Laiklik*, pp.73-74. That the defining characteristic of the mahalle system was a strong and strict application of its communal value system ensured individual compliance with these values. It was, for instance, common for mahalle residents to bust into the houses of single women when there was gossip involving a relationship with a man. In the Ottoman literature and traditional Ottoman theater, themes focusing on the structure of mahalle and the relationships in it occupy an important place.

⁴⁶ For more on the development of civil society in late Ottoman society see Serif Mardin, "Türk Toplumunu İnceleme Aracı Olarak Sivil Toplum", *Defter*, No.2, December-January 1987, pp.7-16 and Ali Yasar Sarıbay, *Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve İslam*, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994).

it posed to the emergence of modern subject. He was determined to break with the communitarian system by introducing a series of reforms ranging from education to the control of religion.⁴⁷ Similarly Sarıbay points out that the modernizing elite, in order to create a sphere of individual autonomy, aimed to replace community with society, *gemeinschaft* with *gesellschaft*. For them, it was society, with its diversified division of labour and freedom from religious and communal constraints, and not the community, that would provide the basis for individual autonomy.⁴⁸

The shift from community to modern society required a public sphere free of the traditional elements of 'community' which would provide autonomy for the individual. . On the one hand, the Turkish modernizing elite understood the modern subject as the basis of a truly modern nation and the agent of the public sphere. On the other, they attempted to create a public sphere as the basis of the national community. The paradox of the Turkish public sphere was that rather than being a social space of different subject positions and interests, it was a homogeneous national space whose boundaries were fixed by principles of nationalism, secularism, republicanism and rationalism. None of the boundaries of the public sphere were open to negotiation. Sarıbay argues that the Republican regime created another communal project by trying to replace the traditional community with a national one.⁴⁹ The nation-building process, in turn, gave way to a totalistic project which dominated the public sphere and marginalized the representation of different subject positions in the public sphere. The public sphere in the Turkish Republic had a paradoxical nature in that, on one level, it

⁴⁷ Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din Ve Laiklik*, pg.76. Mardin also argues that Atatürk was significantly different from his comrades in the sense that he paid more attention to the concept of "individual autonomy". He argues that, given that during his time fascism and communism were rising as totalitarian systems, he clearly stayed away from populist dictatorship. Serif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi* (İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları, 1992)pg.18.

⁴⁸ Sarıbay, *Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve İslam*, pp.146-148.

⁴⁹ *ibid.*, pg.148.

aimed to permit individual autonomy, while on another level, it restricted the individual's autonomy in order to consolidate national identity.⁵⁰ This paradox largely stems from the fact that Atatürk and the modernizing elite identified the creation of the modern subject and the formation of a modern national public sphere as the same process. There is therefore an antagonistic relationship between the manifestation of difference in the Turkish republic and the operation of the public sphere.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the tension between the manifestation of different identity positions and the dominance of national identity, exists to varying degrees in the public sphere of all modern societies. One of the reasons why the modern public sphere failed to realize its emancipatory potential as a space of plurality and dialogue is that national identities established themselves as dominant identity positions in the public sphere by marginalizing other identities and groups and by preventing them from representing themselves in the public sphere.

This tension is particularly visible in the Turkish case and had a deep impact on how identity and difference interacted in the Turkish public sphere. Since the Kemalist paradigm saw the public sphere as the place where the modern nation was represented, any representation of identities and groups, not in harmony with the principles of Kemalist nation-building, was excluded from it. The Turkish identity was the only identity that was permitted to express itself in the public sphere. All other ethnic and religious identities were considered to be private identities and excluded from the public sphere. The Kemalist practice of modernization was particularly radical in its

⁵⁰ Even though historically specific conditions of Ottoman Empire and the New Republic differentiates the Turkish public sphere from its European counterparts, both Turkish and ideal forms of public sphere are similar in eliminating and normalizing difference in them. In the previous chapter I outlined the criticisms directed towards the ideal form of the public sphere. Most significant was one which argues that the rational subject of the public sphere was a historically specific bourgeoisie class and its universal status was guaranteed by marginalizing and homogenizing differences in public sphere.

organization of everyday life in the public sphere. From dress codes to education and from popular music to social interaction between the sexes, it involved a radical transformation of society.

Conclusion

The public sphere in Turkey was, and still is, an exclusionary social space closed to difference and plurality. The goal of creating autonomous subjects, with the capability of using their reason, has been at odds with the project of creating a new society and a new community whose representation is limited to a particular interpretation of modernity by the Kemalist elite and represented by the Turkish identity. Rather than preparing the ground within which an autonomous subject can act, the public sphere in Turkey acted as a vehicle through which to create a new community whose dominant agent was the national identity. For this reason, there has been a constant tension in the public sphere between the dominant national identity and other identities who were marginalized by it.

This tension is constantly reproduced by the following defining characteristics of the public sphere in Turkey:

- a) the public sphere was first and foremost a national space and it functioned as an integral element of the nation-building process. As the public sphere had little autonomy from the national discourse, individuals are represented in the public sphere are determined by the parameters of the national discourse;
- b) In order to ensure the hegemonic representation of the national identity, the Kemalist paradigm established a very clear boundary between the public and private by

designating the public as the sphere of progress, civilization, modernity and rationality; and the private sphere as the sphere of religion, tradition and ethnicity; and

c) Due to its exclusionary nature, the public sphere had an identity-forming process which actively engaged in the making of a modern, rational identity but also which was constantly challenged for other identities that were deemed to be traditional. This challenge for representation in the public sphere resulted in the constant remaking of what is called the modern national identity and the traditional religious and ethnic identities.

These practices are primarily responsible for creating a public sphere that was hostile to differences and which portrayed the national community as an undifferentiated whole. The next chapter will concentrate on specific practices that prepared the ground for the above practices to emerge as the defining characteristic of the public sphere.

Chapter V

Nation, People and Public Sphere in Turkish Modernization

Introduction

The last chapter outlined formation of the public sphere in the Turkish Republic, which constituted an integral part of the nation-building process. The defining characteristic of the public sphere was its hostility to identity positions different from the hegemonic national one. The Republican regime made effective use of the categories of the nation, the public and the people with the process of nation building. The dominance of the nation and the people over the public sphere was largely responsible for the inability of the public sphere to accommodate different identity positions. Instead, as an integral part of the national discourse, the public sphere helped to establish the national identity as the only legitimate actor of the public sphere.

This chapter will discuss the practices through which this problematic relationship between nation, people and the public was established. The first section will look at the Kemalist definition of nationalism and its effect on the public sphere. This will be followed by an explanation of how the definition of "peoplehood" further curtailed the autonomy of the public sphere and its ability to allow different voices to represent themselves. In third section the practices that formed the public sphere in Turkey such that it became an integral part of defining the national identity and peoplehood will be examined.

5.1. National Discourse and the Public Sphere in Turkey

As we have seen the idea of nationhood had already made inroads into the Ottoman Empire during the 19th century. The multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman Empire came under the growing influence of nationalism in the late part of the eighteenth century. Similar to emerging nationalisms in the Empire, Turkish nationalism grew as a response to a disintegrating Ottoman social structure and aimed to define a new identity for the Muslim population of the Empire.

Before Turkish nationalism became a dominant force among various Muslim communities of the Empire, the Ottoman intellectuals, and in particular the Sultan Abdulhamit, attempted to frame Ottomanism as a unifying identity of Muslims in the Empire.¹ Ottoman intellectuals soon realized that Ottomanism, with Islam as its unifying ideology, would not be sufficient to create a new community out of the diverse Muslim population of the Empire. Once it became clear that various Arab communities rejected the idea of Ottomanism, increasing their attempts to separate from the Empire, Turkish nationalism emerged as the way to define a new identity for the peoples of Anatolia without moving outside the boundaries of the Empire.² Even though the initial phase of the Turkish nationalism was not based on a proclaimed ethnicity of Turkish people³, it soon developed an ethnic character and claimed an area of influence outside

¹ For more on the Ottomanism see Mumtaz'er Turkone, *Siyasal Ideoloji Olarak Islammciligin Dogusu*, (Istanbul: Iletisim, 1994) especially Chapters four and five. Ilber Ortayli, *Imparatorlugun En Uzun Yuzyili*, (Istanbul: Belge, 1987) explains the background leading to the idea of Ottomanism.

² Masami Arai, *Jon Turk Donemi Turk Milliyetciligi*, (Istanbul: Iletisim 1994), Chapter 3. In his work Arai provides an analysis of the *Genc Kalemler* (Young Pens) journal and its role in the formulation of early phases of Turkish nationalism.

³ Despite the attempts to formulate an ethnic base for the Turkish identity, the Turkish identity represents an ambiguous category which can not be defined as a pure ethnic

the existing boundaries of the Empire. Yusuf Akcura in 1904 formulated the idea of a Turkish nation based on race⁴ which contained the Muslim population of the Empire as well as the Asian and east European people who shared the same language, ethnic background and traditions. Akcura's attempt to define Turkish nationalism attempted to move away from Islam and the Ottoman identities as the core of the new community and place Turkishness as the unifying element of the identity.

Contrary to the ethnically based Turkish nationalism of the late Ottoman era, the Turkish nationalism defined by the Republican elite was based on civic principles. It aimed to unify the ethnically heterogeneous populations of Anatolia under a new community. In other words, in the Republican era Turkish nationalism was an attempt to create a modern society out of a diverse group of peoples who were not connected to each other in any way other than religious solidarity. As the Kemalist paradigm rejected religion as a constitutive part of the identity in the new Republic, the only other way to create a modern society out of the diverse populations of Anatolia was to unite them around a national identity. Ataturk and his cadres saw national identity not only as a unifying force but also as the basis of modern citizenship.

identity. Even though Ottomans generated from frontier Turkic tribes of Anatolia, the cosmopolitan nature of multi-ethnicity was more of a defining characteristics of the Empire than Turkishness. Even more interesting is the fact that in the Ottoman Empire the category of Turk represented nomadic tribes and was usually used in a pejorative way. Aydin explains the development of the category of Turk and its meaning in the Empire. He reports from D'Ohsson's *Tableau General* in the 18th century in the Empire the category of Turk was only used for the nomadic people of the Asian deserts and the Ottoman subjects were called Ottomans. He also notes that in the same work it was mentioned that Ottomans did not understand why Europeans referred to them Turks since this word contained a pejorative meaning. Suavi Aydin, "Etnik Bir ad Olarak 'Turk' Kavraminin Sinirlari ve Genisletilmesi Uzerine", *Birikim*, Vol. 71-72, March-April 1995, pg.56. Rather than being the defining characteristic of the Empire, the ethnic category of the Turk was a general description given to the Ottomans by Europeans. In this framework, similar to other ethnic nationalisms, Akcura's attempt was to construct a shared past and culture upon which an ethnic identity could be constructed.

⁴ Yusuf Akcura, *Uc Tarz-i Siyaset*, (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Yayinlari, 1987).

Ataturk and his cadres saw their mission as one of creating a modern society out of a traditional social structure in which members identified themselves as subjects rather than citizens on whom popular sovereignty was based. Thus, the Turkish modernizing elite engaged in an active construction of "public", "people" and "nation". The consciousness of "peoplehood" was necessary to create a community. The ethnic diversity that existed among the former Muslim population of the Empire posed a real challenge to the implantation of the idea of peoplehood. The category of nation also required that the people identify with an administrative unit, that is, with the state. Finally, the creation of a modern differentiated public was necessary if they were to establish a modern political community in which individuals acted as sovereign individuals rather than as subjects.

In the process of nation building, the nation dominated and controlled both the people and the public. The Kemalist elite was suspicious of the heterogeneity envisioned by the Ottoman structure. Plurality and heterogeneity were viewed as sources of national weakness. In order to protect the new community the Kemalist elite emphasized the unity between the ruled and the ruler, the people and the nation, at the expense of a differentiated public. As a result, the public sphere became an extension of the national discourse where national identity established itself as the dominant identity.

The 1927 Republican People's Party (RPP)⁵ programme stated that the characteristics that make a nation are shared language, shared feeling and a shared ideal. The Party was

⁵ Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) was founded on September 11, 1923 by Ataturk. Since then it controlled the political power until it lost the second multi-party elections on May 14, 1950. The RPP was the main tool of implementing the modernizing reforms in Turkey and the ideology of Kemalism has been put into practice by the RPP. Until May 14, 1950 the RPP and the state was identical. Tuncay argues that the history of the political history of modern Turkey can not be separated

established as vehicle to take necessary measures to ensure the creation of a shared language, feeling and ideals among the people.⁶ Similarly, the 1931 Party Programme stated that the nation as a social and political whole consisted of people who have the same language, feeling and ideals.⁷ In Atatürk's speeches and his writings nationalism occupies an important place. Similar to the Party Programme, Atatürk described nation as "people who live on the same land, subject to the same legal framework and who share the same language and moral values".⁸ He further made a distinction between tribe and nation and stated that these two concepts are usually confused and used interchangeable. For Atatürk, nation is a political unity whereas tribe is a racial one.⁹ He also agreed with Ernest Renan's definition of nationalism which stated that shared history and the will to live together are the basic constitutive premises of a nation. However, Atatürk's vision of what a nation should be differs from the Ottoman understanding of nation.¹⁰ As opposed to the religiously defined and gemeinschaft-oriented nations of the Ottoman Empire, Atatürk projected a political community, or a gesellschaft, that is not defined and separated by religious solidarity. There are two important elements of nationalism

from the RPP since the RPP was thought as the representative of the state and the nation. Mete Tuncay, "Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi", *Cumhuriyet Donemi Turkiye Ansiklopedisi*, (Istanbul: Iletisim) pg.2019. For more on the role of the RPP in the Turkish modernization see Tarik Zafer Tunaya, *Turkiye'de Siyasi Partiler*, (Istanbul: Hurriyet, 1984-1989).

⁶ 1927 Republican People's Party Programme in Taha Parla, *Turkiye'de Siyasal Kulturun Resmi Kaynaklari: Kemalist Tek Parti Ideolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku*, (Istanbul: Iletisim, 1992) pg.27

⁷ 1931 Republican People's Party Programme in Parla, *Turkiye'de Siyasal Kulturun Resmi Kaynaklari: Kemalist Tek Parti Ideolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku*, pg.30.

⁸ Atatürk's Speeches and Writings that has not been published in Official Documents , (Ankara: Ankara Halkevi, 1980), pg.338

⁹ *Ibid*, pg.338

¹⁰ Sureyya points out this reaction by the Kemalist elite to the idea of autonomous nations in the Ottoman Empire and argues that " the new Turkish homeland, unlike the old Ottoman Turkey as country of separated peoples who were against each other, will serve the common needs of people who come together around certain principles" Sevet Sureyya quoted in Ergun Yildirim, "Modern Ulus Devlet", *Bilgi Ve Hikmet*, Summer 1993, No. 3. pg.47.

in Ataturk's thinking that challenge the Ottoman Empire's definition of nation. The first is the idea that the nation is a modern political community which is free of racial and religious ties and based on a shared language, culture and ideals. The second is the idea of a people and a central state that emerges out of this modern political community.

The boundary between nation, people and public is vital for easing the tension between the homogenizing tendency of nation and the pluralistic character of the public sphere. The boundary between the nation and people becomes blurred when the state claims to be one and the same with the people. Similarly, the boundary between nation and public is blurred when the public sphere operates as an extension of national discourse, providing the space for national identity to establish itself as the privileged representation of the society. In the Turkish case, the hegemony of nation and people over a differentiated public resulted in a homogenized public sphere that did not permit expression of any kind of difference within it.

The modernizing elite's emphasis on both the civic dimension of nationalism and on the autonomy of the individual as the agent of society were probably promising signs as to the possibility of realizing a differentiated and autonomous public sphere. Yet, the modernizing elite's ambiguous understanding of nationalism diminished the hope for the autonomy of the public sphere. Even though the RPP programme and Ataturk himself defined nationalism as a political community based on a shared culture, language and ideal, a second aspect of Turkish nationalism emerged within the process of the actual nation-building process, that of Turkishness as the basis of the nation. That is to say the RPP modernizers saw Turkishness as the comprehensive identity into which all other identities could be assimilated.

In addition to aspects of territory and citizenship, Turkish nationalism also had a tendency to emphasize its ethnic roots and cultural similarity. The perceived need to establish a core for the new nation forced the modernizing elite to focus on the Turkishness of the nation as a unified community. This prevented the emergence of the public sphere as a space where different identities and groups represented themselves in their own right. This second aspect of nationalism paved the way for the erasure of individuality by molding the individual into the national whole and by erasing any kind of difference either in the form of ethnic or cultural differences.¹¹ The ambiguous nature of the national discourse did not allow the autonomous individual to emerge as the sovereign agent of society. Instead, Turkish identity became the sovereign agent of Turkish society by marginalizing all other aspects of identity within the community.

Ataturk's speeches reflect this double sided nature of nationalism in the Turkish Republic. While some of his speeches promoted a civic nationalism based on citizenship, others focused on the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of the nation. For example, in one of his important speeches, he stated that "the Turkish people is a group who has racial or religious and cultural affinity", while adding that the religious minorities of the nation enjoy the same rights and duties as other citizens.¹² This speech illustrates the ambiguity of his understanding of the nation. On the one hand, Ataturk identifies religious and cultural affinity as components of nationalism, on the other, he includes racial affinity within the components of the nation. On another occasion, Ataturk stated that Turks and Bulgarians came from the same "blood" and belong to the same race.¹³

¹¹ Tanil Bora, "Turk Milli Kimligi, Turk Milliyetçiligi ve Balkan Sorunu", *Bilgi Hikmet*, Summer 1993, Vol.3, pg.86.

¹² *Ataturk's Speeches Vol.1 1919-1938*, (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1961). pp.221-222.

¹³ Ataturk's speech on relationship between Turkey and Bulgaria quoted in Parla, *Turkiye'de Siyasal Kulturun Resmi Kaynaklari: Kemalist Tek Parti Ideolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku*, pp.196-197.

Similarly, he argued that the Balkan nations; Albanians, Bulgarians, Romanians, Greeks, Yugoslavians and Turks have common ancestors who came from the same blood and race.¹⁴ That the nation is understood to be a racial and cultural whole is in direct contradiction with Atatürk's other statements defining the nation according to principles of territorialism and citizenship.

On the one hand, building the Turkish nation was based on territoriality and citizenship, while, on the other hand, official state policy was to create a homogeneous community based on Turkishness. As Mardin argues, what happened in the Turkish case was turning the Turkish nation from a fictitious entity into a reality. For Mardin "when [Atatürk] started his job, the Turkish Nation was neither of the general will nor the source of national identity".¹⁵ The institutionalization of Turkish nationalism in the Republic, therefore, oscillated between two contradictory concepts of nationalism. While they engaged in actively making a nation based on Turkishness, the Turkish modernizing elite established the legal base for a nationalism based on territory and citizenship.¹⁶

Practices designed to increase awareness of national identity reflect the way that Turkishness emerged from the primary efforts of constructing a national identity. In

¹⁴ His speech to the members of 1931 Balkan Conference, Ibid, pg.198.

¹⁵ Serif Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din ve Laiklik*, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), pg.65.

¹⁶ Even before the foundation of the Republic, in 1920, Atatürk informs the press by sending a telegram to the Governor of Sivas about national issues. In that telegram, Atatürk states that Turkey respects the rights and sovereignty of Syria and the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Caucasus, Azerbaijan and Georgia. He also adds that they have no intention of getting involved with other muslim groups in Asia. In the same document he cautions against irredentist Turanist and Panislamist movements. He states that Turkey's main concern is the unity of Anatolia and Thrace. He acknowledges Wilson Principles declaration of right to self-determination and supports struggle against imperialism. Atatürk's Telegram to the Governor of Sivas in 4.03.1920 quoted in Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku*, pp.176-177.

fact, historians, linguists and anthropologists were given the task of discovering the Turkish nation in ancient Central Asia.¹⁷ This active discovery of the nation was articulated in the "The Turkish Historical Thesis" and "Sun-Language Theory". In order to discover the ancient roots of the Turkish nation, in 1931 Ataturk founded the Society for the Study of Turkish History and, in 1932, the Society for the Study of the Turkish Language. These two institutions were responsible for tracing the historical and linguistic roots of the Turkish nation. The Society for the Study of the Turkish History was under the strict control of the state and historians did not see any problem working under the guidance of state directives.¹⁸

The Turkish Historical Thesis claimed that Turks originally ascended from Central Asia and then migrated to other parts of the world as a result of droughts and hunger. According to this thesis, within the process of this long migration Turks founded the most advanced civilizations in different parts of the world. The ancient civilization of Anatolia was seen to have Turkic roots. A continuum was then established between Anatolian and Asian Turks. The principal aim of the Turkish Historical Thesis was to prove the fact that Turks had a glorious history of their own, quite distinct from the Ottoman Past. In order to disseminate the history of the Turkish nation the state

¹⁷ Aydin, "Etnik Bir Ad Olarak Turk Kavraminin Sinirlari ve Genisletilmesi Uzerine", pg.60.

¹⁸ Busra Ersanli Behar, *Iktidar Ve Tarih: Turkiye'de "Resmi Tarih" Tezinin Olusumu*, (Istanbul: Afa Yayıncılık, 1992) pp.95-96. Berktaş puts forward an opposite view by arguing that Ataturk was careful not to incorporate the Society within the state. He argues that historical studies and historians were autonomous in their studies. Halil Berktaş, "Tarih Calismalari", *Cumhuriyet Donemi Turkiye Ansiklopedisi*, (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari) Vol.9 p.2463. Berktaş is factually right that, in principle, both historians and the Society had autonomy in their work. The Society itself was not founded as part of the state institutions. I agree, however, with Behar that, even though there was an institutional autonomy, historians associated with the institute readily accepted the established opinion about the Turkish History. They did not see any need to challenge the dominant thesis. This voluntary participation with the official view challenges Berktaş's argument that historical studies were indeed autonomous from the state.

established "People's Houses" across the country and wrote new textbooks explaining Turkish history from the perspective of the Turkish Historical Thesis.¹⁹

Similarly, the Society for the Study of the Turkish Language engaged in the purification of the Turkish language by examining its original roots. The members of the society started to collect words from different Turkic dialects, ancient literary sources and from the Turkic languages of Central Asia. The state, the RPP and the People's Houses were active participants in ensuring the widespread usage of new words and encouraging citizens to come up with Turkish words to replace Arabic and Persian words.²⁰ Even though the Society for the Study of the Turkish Language was an autonomous institution and its future revenues were guaranteed from Atatürk's will, it always worked in close connection with the state institutions and became part of the nationalist ideology in Turkey. Activities centered around the purification of the Turkish language and the establishment of it as "different" from Arabic and Persian, reached their peak with the 'Sun-Language Theory'. Zürcher asserts that the new language movement ran into difficulties because very few new words were accepted by the population. The new words existed with the old ones, and, a new artificial language was created which was only accessible to insiders.²¹ A Viennese orientalist by the name of Dr. H.F. Kvergic²² made

¹⁹ For the content of history textbooks and how the Turkish Historical Thesis was incorporated into those textbooks see Behar, *Iktidar Ve Tarih: Türkiye'de "Resmî Tarih" Tezinin Oluşumu*, Section 2, pp.98-118.

²⁰ Belge reports that while the members of the academy discovered pure Turkish words to replace Arabic and Persian ones, they also attempted to make Turkish similar to Western languages. For instance word for school "okul" was derived from the Turkish root of "okumak". But it was also attempted to make it similar to French "ecole". Murat Belge, "Türk Dilinde Gelismeler", *Cumhuriyet Donemi Turkiye Ansiklopedisi*, (Istanbul: İletisim), Vol.10, pg.2599.

²¹ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993) pg.198. Belge also gives examples from Atatürk's speeches where the new words were heavily used to set an example for the population. One of the most representatives of these speeches is his official speech delivered for the honor of the Crown Prince of Sweden. Many parts of the speech, were inaccessible to the population of 1934, and are probably

a contribution to the already troubled language reforms and saved them from a temporary deadlock. Kvergic sent an unpublished document to Atatürk, titled "La psychologie de quelques éléments des langues turques". In it, he argued that during the stone and iron ages, the Turkish language traveled to other parts of the world and became the source of all other languages. The Sun-Language theory claimed that all the words whose sources are unknown in French, English and German originally generated from the Turkish language. The theory grabbed Atatürk's attention and he asked the Society to study it. In its third congress in 1936 the Society adopted the theory. The Arts Faculty of Ankara set up obligatory courses to study the theory. The Sun-Language theory saved the troubled language reform since all languages generated from Turkish, there was no need to replace foreign words with Turkish ones.

Both the Turkish Historical Thesis and the Sun-Language theory were attempts to construct a glorious past for the new nation which was trying to put a distance between itself and its Ottoman past. The "politics of forgetting"²³ in the Turkish republic required a discovery of a past that had been forgotten a long time ago. It was the "true" history of the Turkish nation in the sense that it established the distinctiveness of the Turkish people from the Ottomans and restored their dignity. All nationalisms require symbols and myths upon which an "imagined" past can be built.²⁴ In the Turkish case, the ancient Asian origin of the Turkish people was the source of many Anatolian

still inaccessible to contemporary Turkish speakers. Belge also supports Zucker's observation that the attempt to free Turkish from its Ottoman past became highly problematic around 1935. The situation reached the point where everybody was making new words and using them in their own writings which were only intelligible to their own writers, Belge, *Türk Dilinde Gelismeler*, pp 2559-2600.

²² It is Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, who identified Kvergic as an orientalist. Belge does not provide any information regarding his background but only mentions that he was Dr. Phil.

²³ I borrowed this term from E. Fuat Keyman

²⁴ Perhaps the imaginary aspect of nationalism is best articulated by Benedict Anderson in his *Imagined Communities*. (London: Verso, 1991)

civilizations and its language which was the source of all languages. To create a new nation based on Turkishness, as opposed to a multiethnic and multicultural state, was a deliberate and conscious choice on the side of the Turkish modernizing elite whose visions were shaped by the last years of Ottoman Empire where the heterogeneous structure was believed to be its source of weakness. The inability of the Ottoman Empire to create a core to unite differences around a common ideal deeply affected the Turkish modernizing elite in their attempt to create a new community. For this reason, despite the fact that the new Turkish Republic had attempted to avoid ethnic and irridentist versions of nationalism, Turkishness, with its history and language, was introduced as the core identity of the new nation.

This double nature of Turkish nationalism carried consequences for the formulation and the functioning of the public sphere in Turkey. Earlier it was noted that Atatürk was very conscious of the importance of a rational individual who he believed had not been allowed to develop under the Ottoman system. Extensive educational and cultural reforms were aimed to create the rational subject whose autonomy would be the basis of the public sphere in Turkey. The modernizing elite's intention to prepare the ground for the development of an autonomous rational subject was, however, impeded by their attempt to create a nation based on Turkishness.

In addition to placing an emphasis on Turkishness as the national identity, Turkish nationalism was also integrated into the institutional framework of the state. That is, the state became the dominant player in defining the boundaries of the nation. This effectively destroyed the differentiation between nationalism and peoplehood. The boundary between people and nation is particularly important because, when the space between people and nation disappears, the distinction between the ruled and the ruler also disappears. The way that peoplehood manifested itself in the nation building process

will be discussed in the next section. The remainder part of this section will look at the role of the state in determining the unity of the nation and in its becoming identical to the nation.

In the Turkish case, the active creation of the nation from above by the modernizing elite placed the state in a special place where it became identical to the people within the process. It is not surprising that the state was an active participant of nation-building in Turkey. Since the idea of a Turkish nation had to be created from nothing and made a reality, the state became the main actor of this endeavor. This process of identifying the people with the state, however, had serious consequences for the public sphere in Turkey. Rather than being a space of negotiation, the public sphere became an arena in which the national imagination is manifested.

Ataturk stated that "within the political mechanism of a nation, the state, culture and economy are related to and dependent upon, each other to the degree that if these mechanisms do not work in harmony with each other, the progressive force of the government is wasted".²⁵ In the same speech he added that the principal programme of the state was the Programme of the Republican People's Party²⁶ He continued to declare the unity of the state and people in the following sentences: "[T]he spirit of the programme prevents us from serving a certain group of our citizens. We are here to serve all the Turkish citizens. Last year, by combining the party and the government"²⁷

²⁵ Ataturk' speech delivered during the opening ceremony third year of the fifth Grand National Assembly. Taha Parla, *Turkiye'de Siyasal Kulturun Resmi Kaynaklari: Ataturk'un Soylev Ve Demecleri*, (Istanbul: Iletisim, 1991), pp.183.

²⁶ Parla, *Turkiye'de Siyasal Kulturun Resmi Kaynaklari: Ataturk'un Soylev Ve Demecleri* , pg.183

²⁷ Here Ataturk is referring to the fourth congress of the Republican People's party. In this meeting the unity of the state and the party was declared and the Republic officially became a one-party state where there was no difference between the state and the party. In 1936 in order to coordinate the state and the party, the minister of interior became

we actively proved that we reject fragmentation among our citizens. This is in tune with our main principle in the governance of the state, there is one power and it is the nation'.²⁸

This speech nicely sums up the relationship between the state, the party and the nation. As Parla states, the political system described in this speech depends on the unity of the state, culture and economy as a whole and does not leave any autonomous space outside the state.²⁹ The unification of the state with the party was justified by the argument that since Turkish citizens are a unified whole, there was no need for different parties to represent differences among citizens. It was, therefore, a political system where government, the state and the nation was regarded as an undivided whole. Atatürk justified the unity of the political system with the principle that the nation is the force above all others, therefore there is a logical unity between the state and the nation. This formulation resembles a Rousseauian general will where the common good is represented by the state. As Keyman notes "the state was not the liberal but the organic state acting in the name of the people, insofar as its functions, while independent of the general will, were assumed to correspond to that will".³⁰

the general secretary of the party and governors of districts became district leaders of the RPP. Incorporation of six principles of the RPP; republicanism, nationalism, secularism, reformism, etatism and populism; into the constitution in February 13, 1937 finalized the unification of the party and the state. For more on the relationship between the RPP and the state see Mete Tuncay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923-1931)*, (Ankara : Yurt Yayınları, 1981).

²⁸ Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Atatürk'un Soylev Ve Demeçleri* , pg.184.

²⁹ *ibid.* pg. 186.

³⁰ E. Fuat Keyman, "On the Relation Between Global Modernity and Nationalism: The Crisis of Hegemony and the Rise of (Islamic) Identity in Turkey", *New Perspectives On Turkey*, Fall 1995, 13, pg. 104.

Ataturk's formulation of the unity of people and the state within the tradition of a Rousseauan general will contradicts the idea of the public sphere as a differentiated sphere of citizens. The logic of the public sphere requires a conciliation of differing interests through a rational critical debate. Together with rational critical debate the existence of the autonomous individual subject with the ability to exercise reason is the basic condition of the public sphere. The conditions of the differentiated subject positions and the formulation of the public good through rational debate within the public sphere are of the unresolved tensions between Hobbessian and Rousseauan formulations of the political community.

The organization of the public sphere in the modernization process attempts to resolve this tension by putting an emphasis on the creation of the modern nation as the general will. The state and the nation had a clearly defined "general will" and that was, as many times stated by Ataturk, to reach to level of "contemporary civilization". Because of this, rather than being the arena of differentiated citizenry, the public sphere became the site within which the general will manifested itself. Consequently, if this level of contemporary civilization was to be achieved any difference that was considered to be outside the general will had to be subsumed into. Difference, whether ethnic, religious or political, was thought to be a destructive element that might jeopardize obtaining the general will.

The following quotation from the general secretary of the RPP, Recep Peker, nicely illustrates how the state understood difference within the nation:

we accept our citizens who were inflicted with the ideas of Kurdish, Circassian and Laz and Pomak nationalisms as one of our own. These false ideas that are coming from the dark sides of the past need to be corrected. Our affiliation to these citizens is entirely different from the Ottoman

governments policy of community (*ummet siyaseti*)³¹ We have to make our position clear with respect to our Christian and Jewish citizens. Our party accepts these citizens as Turks based on the principles of unity of language and ideal which was explained earlier.³²

Recep Peker's speech is not only a perfect example of the paradoxical nature of the Turkish nationalism but also the manifestation of how difference came to be understood in the Turkish public sphere. Even though he outlines civic nationalism based on citizenship, he presents Turkishness as the core of this citizenship. Ethnic and religious differences are eliminated from the public as legitimate subject positions. Ethnic difference and its manifestation, according to Peker, is a false idea. He is at least more careful when referring to religious difference and does not declare them as false subject positions. However, he still makes it clear that they are considered Turks based on shared language and ideal.

If the definition of nationalism prevented the emergence of autonomous public sphere in Turkey, the way in which peoplehood was defined further complicated the possibility of the expression of different identities and groups in a pluralistic public sphere. The next section will focus on how the concept of people was defined in the Turkish Republic and its effect on the public sphere.

5.2. People and the Public Sphere in Turkey

If the definition of the nation as the unity of the state and the people prevented the Turkish public sphere from operating as a space where difference can be negotiated, the

³¹ Here he refers to the Ottoman Millet system

³² Recep Peker's speech delivered in the conference for the explanation of the RPP programme in 1931, Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kùltürün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku*, pg.110.

populist definition of people further complicated the functioning of the public sphere as the realm of critical debate.

In Habermas' definition of the ideal form of the public particularities do not belong to the public sphere but are located in the private realm. The impersonality of the public sphere assumes that, irrespective of their particular positions in the private realm, citizens are equally located in the public sphere. This equalizing effect of the public sphere is visible in the way the concept of people is defined in the Turkish case. In Turkey, the nation-building process not only did not see a difference between the state and the people, but also failed to accept that any difference existed among citizens. In addition to the fact that the Turkish identity was the dominant identity by which the nation was represented, the definition of the peoplehood further opposed the manifestation of difference by rejecting the fact that citizens in modern society may have different and, in some cases, conflicting interests.

The principle of populism, which was one of the six principles of Kemalism, presented the idea that the people was an undifferentiated whole. As Tekeli argues, the idea of populism made its way into Turkey before the foundation of the Turkish Republic and was largely influenced by the Narodnik movement in Russia and Solidarist movement in France.³³ Thereafter, Ziya Gokalp³⁴, in his formulation of the Turkish nationalism, introduced populism as part of Turkish nationalism. Gokalp believed that it was imperative to find a mechanism to reconcile differences in society. Durkheim's concept

³³ İlhan Tekeli, "Türkiye'de Halkçılık", *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, (İstanbul: İletisim) Vol.8 pg.1929. For more on the idea of populism during the late Ottoman Empire see Zafer Toprak, "İkinci Meşrutiyette Solidarist Düşünce: Halkçılık", *Toplum ve Bilim*, Spring 1977, No.1, pp.92-123.

³⁴ For Gokalp's formulation of the Turkish nationalism see Ziya Gokalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, (İstanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1923)

of solidarism provided Gokalp with the mechanism to turn differentiation into a harmonious whole. He proposed a corporatist solidarity as a way of social integration and as an alternative to a class-divided society. In this solidarist community even though individuals would pursue their own interests, their combined work would produce a common good.³⁵

Populism was later incorporated into the six principles of Kemalism and the RPP together with nationalism in the Turkish Republic. Both the 1931 and 1935 Programmes of the RPP stated that populism was one of the founding principles of the state. The 1935 Programme declared that all citizens were equal before the law and that no individual, family, class or community would receive preferential treatment. This formulation established a civic notion of citizenship where individuals were placed as equals before the law. By stating that preferential treatment among citizens was not acceptable, the RPP programme also placed the state in an impartial position vis-à-vis the people. According to the RPP programme, citizens were equals in the public sphere irrespective of their class, community, family or individual affiliations.

As in the case of nationalism, however, after laying the ground for a possible liberal interpretation of citizenship the RPP programme moved away from a pluralistic definition of the people and adopted a populist definition:

Our main principle is to see that the people of the Turkish Republic do not consist of different classes but, for the individual and social life, are seen to be a society which consists of different groups according to a division of

³⁵ Selahattin Hilav, "Dünya Tarihi (1908-1980)" in *Çağdaş Türkiye 1980-1980*, ed. by Sina Aksin (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992), pg.368.

labour... With this principle we aim, instead of class struggle , to achieve social order and solidarity and establish a harmony between interests.³⁶

The populist definition of the people leaves no room for competing interests. Rather it projects a society with differing interests channeled into a common good. This harmonization of interests suggests that direction towards which society is moving. The unity of the state and the people at the level of nation is also secured at the level of people by presenting it as an undifferentiated whole working for the same ideal.

The RPP programmes and Ataturk's speeches defined the people as a unified whole with a clear directive. Individual interests should not conflict with the common good of people and in order to achieve this, it was important to have a sense of a community working together for the same objective. This solidarist and corporatist depiction of the people ruled out the possibility of a pluralist public space within which different objectives and interests can be negotiated.³⁷ On April 24, 1920, the day after the first Grand

³⁶ 1935 Programme of the RPP, Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku*, pg.38. In both 1931 and 1935 Programmes the different groups in society are listed according to a division of labour. In the 1931 Programme the groups were the small landowners, small business, workers, private business and industrialists- big landowners-big business. Parla argues that, far from being divided according to a division of labour, this list is drawn according to class differences. The fact that small landowners and big landowners are classified in different categories proves the fact that the list reflects a class division rather than a division of labour. In the 1935, as Parla notes, this contradiction was to a certain degree corrected and the division between big and small landowners and business were eliminated. Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Atatürk'ün Soylev Ve Demeçleri*, pg.43.

³⁷ Koker, however, notes an important discrepancy in the evolution of the principle of populism in the Turkish Republic. He argues that from the 1920s to the 1930s the principle of populism had two stages. During the years of National Struggle and the first years of the Republic the principle of populism was defined as "the unconditional sovereignty of the nation" and as "the ability of the people to be in control of its own destiny". Koker argues that the principle of populism operated in the first stage within the platform that was defined by "representational democracy". Yet, during the 1930s the principle of populism operated as "for the people despite the people" which limited the participation of the people in the political process. Levent Koker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1995). pp.137-138.

National Assembly opened, Ataturk proposed that the Grand National Assembly should be responsible to the people. In the same motion he also stated that there is no legitimate power other than the Grand National Assembly.³⁸ Given the fact that in 1920 the Sultan was still the ruler in Istanbul, and the Empire was occupied by Western powers, Ataturk's swift action to define the role of the GNA as the representative of the people, rather than representative of the sultan was a clear indication of his intention to establish the people as the source of sovereignty. In the first GNA there were intense debates about the representation of the people. Many deputies proposed a representation based on professional specialization. They believed that such a representation would allow the people to take a direct part within their own affairs and eliminate the danger of professional politicians taking over the representation of the people.³⁹ The deputies of the First Grand National Assembly were radical enough to propose direct democracy as the only way to guarantee the sovereignty of the people.

Yet, even in the first Grand National Assembly the question of who constituted the people was still not clear. Many of the deputies, even though they touted the idea of direct democracy, still saw the sultan as the one and only sovereign. For this reason it can be argued that Ataturk was the only one in the first Grand National Assembly with a clear vision of the sovereign people. His rapid inclusion of the sovereignty of the people into the mandate of the assembly, whose majority would not even consider challenging the sovereignty of the sultan, was an early indication of Ataturk's decision to create a new people and a new society.

The definition of the people reflects this aspect of the Kemalist modernization project. Even though Ataturk in some of his writings acknowledged the importance of a multi-

³⁸ Ibid. pg.139.

³⁹ Ibid. pp.141-143.

party system as the sine-qua-non condition of democracy, in practice, he objected to the representation of the people by different parties. At least in its earlier stage, the Kemalist modernization project ruled out the possibility of the multi-party system simply because this would delay or even jeopardize revealing the general will of the people.

For Atatürk, opposition and different political organizations were acceptable only after the general will had been fully revealed to the people. Until that time, it was thought that differing interests in society could divert the efforts of achieving the ultimate goal, that of creating a modern society and reaching the level of 'contemporary civilization'. The decisive factor in representing the people as a unified whole with a single interest was Atatürk's belief in the idea that the people could represent themselves only when there no longer was a contradiction between the people and the general will. The two short-lived multi-party experiments proved the fact that the general will had not been fully revealed to the people.⁴⁰ In both cases opposition parties became a main source of resistance to the reforms and derived popular support from the segments of the society the Kemalist reforms were aiming to transform. The strong support that those parties

⁴⁰ The resistance against the hegemony of Atatürk and his friends in the Grand National Assembly resulted in the foundation of the Progressive Republican party in February 17, 1924. The Kurdish revolt in February 1925 provided the pretext for the closure of the party in June 1925. Atatürk and his friends considered the Progressive Republican party as a reactionary element that would derail the process of modernization. In 1930 Atatürk asked his friend Fethi Bey (Okyar) to form an opposition party. Fethi Bey and his friends formed the Free Republican Party on August 12, 1930. Compared to the RPP, the FRP was advocating economic and political liberalism. The new party rapidly gained support from the different segments of society and became a source for resistance to the RPP regime. When it became clear that the FRP was going to be a serious alternative for the RPP, Atatürk distanced himself from the party. The leaders of the FRP were unwilling to get into a confrontation with Atatürk and they dissolved the party on November 17, only after three and a half months. For more on the opposition and the parties during the early years of the Republic see *Mete Tuncay, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923-1931)*, (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1981) and *Tevfik Cavdar, Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi 1839-1950*, (İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları: 1995) Chapters V and VI.

derived from society proved that harmony between the people and the general will did not yet exist

That the idea of the people viewed as part of an organic whole may suggest that a fascist ideology was at the root of the nation-building process in Turkey. Yet, the emphasis on establishing the conditions for the emergence of the rational individual contradicted this. This paradoxical relationship between the desire to create a sovereign people and a sovereign individual is what makes the Kemalist paradigm different from simple fascist ideological and political systems.⁴¹ This paradox created a tension between rationalistic individualism and the idea of common good.

As noted earlier, the Turkish modernizing elite, on one level, adopted a civic notion of nation and citizenship. The RPP programme and Atatürk's own speeches indicate a notion of citizenship free from religious and ethnic ties that recognized all citizens as equals before the law. On another level, however, both the RPP programme and Atatürk defined the nation as a unity between the people and the state and they proposed a definition of the people united around a common good and represented by the state. The argument which followed from those definitions was that since the people were united around a common good, there was no need for different political parties representing different interests in society. This paradoxical definition of the people had an impact on the public sphere in such a way that while the public sphere provided the legal basis for a democratic

⁴¹ It should be noted that during the 1920s and 1930s the representational democracies were in crisis in Europe. Italy, Portugal, Germany and Spain were under fascist administrations. Feroz Ahmad notes that within this international environment the interpretation of the people and the nation put forward by Turkish Republic's political system resembled these fascist systems. But he also notes that the elite in Turkey consciously distanced themselves from embracing fascism as the political system of Turkey. Liberal tendencies within the government and already growing private sector "shunned fascism as ideology". Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (London: Routledge, 1993), pp.62-64.

reconciliation of difference, the representation of the people as an organic whole contradicted this possibility.

The concept of the people is a modern one designating a community whose sovereignty rests in itself rather than in the monarch or divine power. Popular sovereignty assumes that individuals are autonomous and capable of controlling their own destiny. In the nineteenth century, the sovereignty of the sultan was already at issue in the Ottoman Empire. Under the influence of the French Revolution, the Ottoman intelligentsia had come in contact with the ideas of sovereignty and the people. Efforts to establish a constitutional regime to limit the powers of the Sultan became a central part of politics in the late Ottoman Empire. The concept of the people as a source of sovereignty was, however, an ambiguous idea due to the fact that the people in its modern form did not exist in the Ottoman Empire.⁴² Ottoman intellectuals used the concept of the people, but it was not clear who these people were. The attempt to unite different groups around the idea of Ottomanism with Islam soon vanished as a possible identity of the people.

The ambiguity of who would constitute the people in the crumbling Ottoman Empire burdened the Kemalist project of creating a modern society. Two aspects to the category of 'the people' arose: the people as the source of sovereignty and the people as the agents of a modern society. For this reason, the Kemalist discourse on the definition of people operates on two different levels. At the individual level, the people is the only source of sovereignty and that sovereignty requires an rational autonomous individual. At the level of society, the people is an undifferentiated whole moving towards the common good of "reaching the level of contemporary civilization". The understanding of people in the

⁴² Serif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992),pg.234.

Kemalist project shifts back and forth between Hobbesian "rational individualism" and Rousseauian "general will". The paradoxical nature of the people in the Kemalist project produces a very peculiar public sphere which, on the one hand, mobilizes society around the creation of a modern rational individual whose sovereignty is the only source of legitimacy. On the other, however, efforts to constitute "the general will" become one of the biggest obstacles standing in the way of realizing the rational subject. The paradox inherent in the Kemalist paradigm has led scholars to interpret Kemalist ideology differently. Some focus on the democratic undertones of the Kemalist ideology while others argue that the very same ideology was authoritarian and corporatist and impeded the development of the democratic forces. For instance, looking at the Atatürk's writings, and especially his textbook on "civic knowledge", Kislali argues that, from the beginning, Atatürk aimed to create a democratic society where the people are powered with civic liberties. For Kislali Atatürk saw the competing political parties as an integral part of the democratic system.⁴³ Again, in his speeches and writings, Atatürk continuously emphasized the importance of the idea of liberty as the basis of the sovereign people. Kislali states that Atatürk's insistence of the democratic aspect of peoplehood coincides with the time period many regimes in Europe reversed the Enlightenment ideal of civic people with the fascist interpretation of the people.⁴⁴ Atatürk's understanding of the public also indicates that he visioned a pluralistic society in which the public sphere would play an important role in critical debate about the matters related to the people. Atatürk claimed that the public would play an important role in representative government and that it can not fulfill its duties without the freedom of the press and freedom of association and without a critical stance towards

⁴³ Ahmet Taner Kislali, *Kemalizm, Laiklik ve Demokrasi*, (Istanbul: Imge Kitabevi, 1994). pg.19.

⁴⁴ *ibid*, pg.19.

matters related to the public.⁴⁵ It may not be an exaggeration to argue that Ataturk's description of the public contains properties which Habermas considers to be the constitutive elements of the public sphere. In contrast to Kislali, however, Parla draws the opposite conclusion from Ataturk's speeches. Parla argues that Ataturk's understanding of the people is solidaristic, corporatist and harmonizing. He claims that Ataturk's frame of the people is anti-liberal and can be identified with corporatist populism.⁴⁶

In summary, what would be the role of the public sphere in the Turkish case where the nation has been formulated as the unity of the state and the people and where the concept of the people was thought to be as an undivided whole? The first argument that could be made is that the public space did not, and could not, fulfill its function as a critical space for rational debate. Ideally, the boundary between the public, the people and the nation guarantees the autonomy of the public space which can counteract the homogenizing role of the nation. In this ideal case, the autonomy of the public from the nation and from the people enables difference to be articulated. In the Turkish case, with its holistic formulation of nation and people, however, the public sphere is colonized and the possibility of a social space where different identities other than the Turkish identity can participate in their own right within the Turkish public sphere is eliminated.

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, pg.19.

⁴⁶ Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Atatürk'ün Soylev ve Demeçleri*, pg.217. For more on Parla's argument on corporatist populism in Turkey see Taha Parla, *Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1989). Whether Kemalism is a democratic or an authoritarian ideology is still one of the most important controversies occupying public debate in Turkey in the 1990s. Recently "the Second Republic" debate is the another attempt to come to grips with the authoritarian aspect of the Kemalism. The Second Republic debate is discussed in the chapter 7 in detail.

The insecurity of the Kemalist elite is manifested in the belief that there is a discrepancy between the desire to create a truly modern society and the aspirations of the people. There was a fear that the autonomy of the public sphere might have unleashed the reactionary elements in the society which had remained uncomfortable with the vision of the modernizing elite. Ataturk's speeches and his writings as well as the principal definition of the people within the RPP programme illustrate the contradictory nature of the category of the people. That contradiction was seen by the Kemalist elite as the necessary step towards creating a truly modern nation. The Kemalist elite concluded that the people could be in control of its destiny only when no discrepancy remained between the general will (reaching the level of contemporary civilization) and the desires of the people. They were aware of the fact that erasing a memory of six hundred years, replacing it with a new history, new language and new sense of identity and belonging is an act of social engineering that would not go hand in hand with pluralistic public sphere where the very process of creating a new community and identity could be questioned. Because of this, rather than being a space of negotiation and dialogue, the public sphere in Turkey became a tool in the institutionalization of the modern regime in Turkey. Ataturk had projected that once the new people created, the pluralistic public sphere might have emerged spontaneously. Yet, once the regime was consolidated after the 1930s, the hegemony of the nation and people over the public sphere became more intensive. Contrary to Ataturk's belief, the project of nation building became a major obstacle to the emergence of a pluralistic public sphere where different identities and groups find an opportunity to represent themselves.

5.3. Private lives and Public identity in the Turkish Republic

The normalizing and homogenizing effort of the bourgeois public sphere was certainly operative in the Turkish public sphere.⁴⁷ In Turkey, however, the dichotomy between modernity and tradition acted as the normalizing logic of the public sphere. The Turkish public sphere operated as a governing regime⁴⁸ with the opposition between modernity and tradition at its core. The Kemalist regime's understanding of modernity and tradition as an unresolvable tension led to a series of binary dichotomies. The practices of the public sphere largely reflected these distinctions.

The location of the Ottoman Empire vis-à-vis the West had already created a binary opposition between modernity and tradition. By being both inside and outside of what was going on in the West from the seventeenth century onwards, Ottoman intellectuals were living the tension between the established traditions of the communal life in the Empire

⁴⁷ For more on the normalizing function of the public sphere especially within the case of Western Europe see Geoff Eley, "Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century" in *Habermas and Public Sphere*, ed. by Craig Calhoun (Cambridge: The MIT Press: 1992) pp.289-339.

⁴⁸ Here I refer to Foucault's terminology to explain the mode of operation within the Turkish public sphere. By governmentality Foucault means "[t]he ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security" Michel Foucault, "Governmentality" in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, Peter Miller (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), pg.102. What this indicates is "totality of practices, by which one can constitute, define, organize, instrumentalize the strategies which individuals in their liberty can have in regard to each other. It is free individuals who try to control, to determine, to delimit the liberty of others, and, in order to do that, they dispose of certain instruments to govern others" Michel Foucault, "The Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom" in *The Final Foucault* ed. by James Bernauer and David Rasmussen, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1988) pg.

and the powerful and influential modern forms affecting every day life. Earlier in the chapter, the intellectual responses to this tension were briefly noted. These responses ranged from a rejection of modern forms, to finding a middle way between modernity and tradition, and ultimately to a rejection of tradition altogether.⁴⁹ The Kemalist project rested its promise of creating a new individual and society on the complete rejection of tradition. It developed the new self in relation, and often in opposition to, the other, that is the traditional Ottoman subject.

The public sphere was important for creating a new self and society because it was the site of all that which was deemed to be new, modern and progressive. The Kemalist project reserved the public sphere for the modern and rational self. To ensure that the public sphere remained exclusively for this modern identity, a strict distinction between the public and private had to be maintained. There were two elements which the Kemalist regime wanted to remove from the social relations of the society : religion and ethnicity. These two elements of Ottoman society were seen as the biggest obstacles preventing the move towards modernization. The division established between the public and the private in Turkey ensured that religion and ethnicity were relegated to the realm of the private sphere.

The properties ascribed to the public sphere were rationalism, progress, the modern nation, and secularism whereas those relegated to the private realm were ethnic

⁴⁹ The late Ottoman literature was very rich in reflecting the tension between tradition and modernity. Novels written, in particular, during the Tanzimat era, are full of characters oscillating between modernity and tradition. The newly emerging urban modern characters are usually made fun of and placed in contradiction with traditional characters. The tension between modernity and tradition shapes the relationship between different characters. For more on the relation between modernity and tradition in the Tanzimat novel see Serif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, (Istanbul: İletişim, 1991) pp.21-75.

identities, religion, and traditional social relations. The public space in Turkey had the specific mission of representing a modern and rational society while the habits of traditional society were left to the private sphere. The Kemalist elite was not only modern but also modernist in that they thought there was a clear path from tradition to modernity.⁵⁰ What is important to emphasize, however, that the Kemalists did not seek to eradicate tradition from the heads of the people. Rather, their carefully crafted public sphere simply worked to confine tradition to the private realm.⁵¹

As noted earlier, the Turkish Republic based its legal framework on positive law, where all citizens are equal before the law. It also established a modern bureaucracy to provide equal service to all citizens. The principle of populism proposed that no difference existed among citizens, refusing "preferential" treatment to any group, class, family or individual. The Kemalist reforms were detailed enough to ensure the impartial public life where the state treats citizens as equals. Toprak defines the neutrality of the public sphere in Turkey as follows:

⁵⁰ For more on the relationship between progress and Kemalism see Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, (Istanbul: Dogu-Bati Yayinlari, 1978) and Toktamis Ates, *Kemalizmin Özü*, (Istanbul: Der Yayinlari, 1981) and Macit Gokberk, "Aydınlanma Felsefesi, Devrimler ve Atatürk", in *Çağdaş Düşüncenin Işığında Atatürk*, (Istanbul: Dr. Nejat Eczacıbaşı Yayinlari:1983).

⁵¹ Given the fact that secularism was one of the principles of Kemalism that received special attention from Atatürk, because he firmly believed that society could not be modern if religion played a public role, religion was not banned on a personal level. Comparisons are usually made between the early days of the Turkish Republic's attitude towards religion and those of socialist countries. Unlike the socialist countries the Kemalist elite in Turkey did not ban religious practice altogether but paid special attention to eliminate religion's role in public life. The best example of this attitude is probably the role of the state in religious education. With the 1924 law of unification of all education, religious education came under strict control of the state. For more on the relationship between the state and religion see Ali Yasar Saribay, *Türkiye'de Modernleşme, Din ve Parti Politikası*, (Istanbul: İletisim, 1985) and İstar B. Tarhanlı, *Musulman Toplum, "Laik" Devlet: Türkiye'de Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı*, (Istanbul: Afa Yayinlari, 1993). For the evolution of the relationship between the state and religion see Metin Heper, "Türkiye'de İslam, Siyasal Sistem ve Toplum", in *Türk Siyasal Hayatının Gelismisi*, ed. Ersin Kalaycıoglu and Ali Yasar Saribay, (Istanbul :1986).

Turkey is among the few non-Western countries which was not colonized and which inherited a bureaucracy and an intellectual milieu already under the influence of universal legal forms. The reforms of the early republican period laid the foundations for a secular legal system which recognized gender equality, secular education, and a conception of public service, both within the bureaucracy and in the political arena, which did not rest on class differentiation, ethnic background or kinship ties. Thus, the political and the bureaucratic establishment never belonged to a specific ethnic group, family, clan or people of the same class. This is important for state-society relations. A conception of the public sphere which is value neutral in terms of ethnic or kinship ties and which rests on universal criteria does not exist in many parts of the developing world and perhaps explains the unique position of Turkey in the Middle Eastern context...⁵²

Toprak's account of the neutrality of public life in Turkey is accurate to a degree but does not recognize the exclusionary nature of the public sphere. Like Habermas, Toprak assumes that the neutrality of the public sphere is sufficient to ensure the existence of a democratic and inclusive political system. Like Habermas, Toprak also assumes that the differences and complexities of the private realm can be offset by the public sphere as long as its neutrality can be preserved. Behind this is the assumption that there is a clear separation between the public and the private: individuals enter the public sphere without their private identities. The neutrality of the public sphere assured inclusion and participation irrespective of background and identity. The Turkish public sphere was probably far more sensitive about the principle of neutrality due to the fact that at the center of the Kemalist reforms was the attempt to create an integrated and homogeneous nation state.

As Fraser argued, in stratified societies the institutional framework produces inequality among citizens and the idea of a single, neutral public does not address these existing inequalities. Furthermore, disadvantaged groups and identities do not have a real chance

⁵² Binnaz Toprak, "Civil Society in Turkey" in *Civil Society in the Middle East* Vol.2, ed. by Augustus Richard Norton (Leiden : E.J. Brill, 1996) pg.87.

to participate in the public sphere no matter how neutral the public sphere may be. Even in a multicultural society, the single, neutral public does not provide justice to all groups and identities within the society because the framework of the public is be defined by the culturally dominant group.⁵³ In sum, the institutional neutrality of the public sphere does not also automatically lead to economic and cultural neutrality. Cultural and economic differences, originally thought to be properties of the private sphere, may also operate within the public sphere. Power imbalances emerging from economic and cultural differences will exclude some groups from the public sphere and limit others from participating in it. The neutrality of the public sphere, therefore, does not guarantee equal participation nor that people can engage in peaceful negotiation of differences. Quite the contrary, power imbalances not only affect who gets to participate, but also shape the boundaries of the public sphere.

The cultural, not to mention economic, differences, that existed in Turkish society thus rendered meaningless any institutional neutrality in the public sphere. The principles of a state-controlled secularism, nationalism and rationalism framed the public sphere in such a way that its citizens could only be equal, and the operation of the public sphere could only be value neutral, within the boundaries of these principles. In the case of state-controlled secularism, where secularism was not only a principle of the regime but also part of the regulative aspect of everyday life, the issue of dress, such as women's dress or male hats, became an important source of exclusion. Similarly, where the public space was only identified with the nation, the existence of other particular groups in the public realm could turn into a crisis. Like any other nation state, Turkey contained, and still contains, different cultural and ethnic groups. By assuming that there was a single Turkish public sphere, the Kemalist project eliminated the

⁵³ Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere", in *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, ed. by Craig Calhoun (Cambridge : The MIT Press, 1992), pp.122-128.

possibility that other groups would participate in the public with their own identity. Citizens could be part of the public only if they left their particular identities in the private realm. This strictly crafted and controlled public sphere, which ensured the unity of the people and the state, operated on the basis of exclusion of the other(s) whose values and aspirations were not in harmony with the general will of the Kemalist project. If we look at the defining characteristics of the public sphere in Turkey, we may be able to trace the mechanisms of inclusion and the exclusion in the public sphere. Three important defining characteristics of the public sphere in Turkey are worth noting: it was a national, rational and secular space. These three properties of the public sphere defined its boundaries.

Ataturk believed that there was an unresolvable conflict between normative and institutional frameworks of modern society and the traditional values of the Ottoman system. The assumption of an unresolvable conflict between modern and traditional meant that nationality, rationality and secularism did more than define the boundaries of the public sphere.

From the beginning, the Kemalists feared that the traditional social values would challenge the structures of the new society whose roots were not yet very deep. Ever since the Tanzimat Reforms had altered the traditional structures of Ottoman society, there had been strong reactions against changes. In many cases the majority of the population viewed "Westernization" as a deterioration of traditional values. The groups against these changes framed their reaction in traditional terms.⁵⁴ Ataturk and his cadres were aware of the power that tradition had as a social force. Thus, the Kemalist reforms attempted to break the power of tradition by introducing a radical break with

⁵⁴ Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din Ve Laiklik*, pp.66-67

the past. Rather than injecting modern institutions into the traditional forms, the Kemalist elite engaged a radical restructuring. Apart from institutional and legal restructuring, this entailed a reorganization of the public sphere with modern symbols such as dress codes, modern music, art and literature. The removal of the Arabic alphabet, and the elimination of Arabic and Persian words from Turkish reflected the attempt to break with the past and prevent traditional relations being transmitted to the new generations. The Western hat and Western style of dress (along with the Gregorian calendar) were adopted in 1925. In 1928 the European numerals were adopted as was the metric system in 1931. In 1935, Western music became part of the school curriculum and in the same year the weekly holiday changed from Friday to Sunday.

The Kemalist elite was aware of the persistence of tradition within social relations and the role of symbols in transmitting these traditional forms. The sweeping reforms from the alphabet to language, the arts, system of measurement, as well as, dress codes was intended to cut networks and symbols from the public life and prevent their reproduction. Ataturk's insistence on dress codes, such as, the removal of the *hijab* from women's dress code, and the harsh penalties imposed on people who insisted on wearing the fez, were all directed to remove the visibility of religious and ethnic symbols from public life. Religion and ethnicity were only permitted to exist in the private realm, that is, within the family, through stories and other informal organizations that would transmit collective memory. The institutions of the public sphere such as schools, media, and cultural activities excluded the discourses of religion and ethnicity. For this reason, the public sphere had a double function : a social space where the Kemalist elite created the modern nation and a social space which limited traditional forms to the private realm and made sure that they remained there. To

counter the power of tradition, reforms focused on the urban areas with the hope that the modern urban society would eventually transform the rural areas.⁵⁵

In this context, rationality and secularism were as much attempts to provide a modern framework for the new society as to control the role of religion in the public life and to relegate it to the private sphere. The connection between rationality and secularism in modern Turkey is well known. Less attention has been devoted to the way rationalism and secularism worked to exclude religion from the public sphere. Mardin argues that Atatürk was aware of the importance and the role of the rational individual in the development of the Western civilization. The concept of the autonomous individual as a constitutive aspect of modern society did not receive much attention among Ottoman intellectuals contemplating possible forms of modernization in the Empire. The distinctiveness of the Kemalist movement was indeed its committed action to establish the individual as one of the progressive pulses of Turkish modernization. For the Kemalists the development of the autonomous individual was the only way to free the people from the control of religion and ethnic ties and to turn subjects into citizens. Rationalism was the engine of personal transformation in the public sphere while secularism provided the institutional framework for modern society.

Public education was seen by the Kemalists as the main tool for transforming people into rational and secular citizens. The public education system underwent radical restructuring after the foundation of the Republic, ending the dual education system the Republic had inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Traditionally, Islam had constituted

⁵⁵ The relationship between the center and periphery since the times of Ottoman Empire is best explained in Serif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" *Daedalus*, Winter 1973, pp.169-190.

the backbone of education in the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁶ In the nineteenth century, increasing contact with the transformations taking place in Europe introduced modern elements into the Ottoman education system. Reorganization of the administrative and military structures required that bureaucrats be educated in the modern system. New engineering, military and medical schools were also opened during the Tanzimat era to meet the growing needs of the state.⁵⁷ In addition to these schools there were many British, French, American, German, and Italian missionary schools in the Empire spreading Western influence throughout the Empire. By the time the Ottoman Empire had collapsed and the new Turkish Republic had been founded in 1923, the modern system of education had already been institutionalized along with religious education.⁵⁸

The modernizing elite gave priority to education by introducing the law called 'unification of education' in 1924 together with the abolition of the caliphate. This allowed the government to centralize education and to develop a single curriculum dictated by the principals of the new regime. In addition, the adaptation of the latin alphabet in 1928 strengthened the Republican education system since it became easier to educate the masses with an easier-to-learn latin alphabet.⁵⁹ The rate of literacy,

⁵⁶ For more on the traditional Ottoman education see Mehmet Dag-Hifzirrahman R. Oymen, *Islam Egitim Tarihi*, (Ankara: Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1974).

⁵⁷ It is not a coincidence that the modernizing elite in Turkey largely came from military and bureaucratic circles. The dominance of the military-bureaucratic elite continued in the Turkish Republic. The commonly made argument that the bureaucracy and military was the founding block of modern Turkey is an accurate one.

⁵⁸ For more on the education system during the final years of the Ottoman Empire see Bayram Kodaman, *Abdulhamid Devri Egitim Sistemi*, (Istanbul: Otuken Yayınevi, 1980).

⁵⁹ The replacement of Arabic script with the latin alphabet was also considered to be a move that would bring Turkey closer to Europe. Journalist, Yunus Nadi, stated that the real goal of adapting latin alphabet was "to unite Turkey with Europe in reality and mentality". Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (London: Routledge, 1993), pg82. The adaptation of the latin alphabet was extremely radical since, as Ahmad notes, it turned millions into illiterates in one stroke and cut all the ties with the past. Given the fact written materials transforms the collective memory of a society from one

indeed, rose very rapidly after the adaptation of the latin alphabet, from "8 per cent in 1928 to over 20 per cent in 1935, and 30 per cent at the end of the war".⁶⁰ The language reform also contributed to the new education system. With the unification of the education system religious education was abolished and the religious orders were banned from providing religious education. The state opened a limited number of religious schools strictly for the education of imams of mosques but in 1930 the state closed all those religious schools and opened one religious institute in Istanbul University in 1934. Until the end of the second world war, the religion was completely removed from the university curriculum.⁶¹

The state invited famous educators to Turkey to develop a new system in tune with modern scientific education. John Dewey from Columbia University and Professor Kuhne from Germany came to Turkey in 1924 and 1925 to work on the restructuring of the education system.⁶² Removing religion from the education system was the driving force behind developing a new education system. Scientific principles formed the core of the new educational system because the modernizing elite was convinced that a scientific education would counter religious dogma with the objective and material laws of universe.⁶³ In addition to the primary and secondary school system, the Kemalist

generation to another, the use of latin alphabet cut six hundred years from collective memory. To this day some still argue that such radical move created generations who is able to read and learn their own history from first-hand sources.

⁶⁰ Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, pg.82.

⁶¹ For more on the Kemalist education system see Ilhan Basgoz and Howard E. Wilson, *Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Eğitim ve Atatürk*, (Ankara: Dost Yayinlari, 1968).

⁶² Ilhan Tekeli, "Osmanli Imparatorlugu'dan Gunumuze Egitim Kurumlarinin Gelismisi", *Cumhuriyet Donemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* Vol.3, (Istanbul: Iletisim), pg.662.

⁶³ Timur notes that the popularity of positivism, especially Auguste Comte, predates the Kemalist elite and could be traced all the way back to the Young Turk Movement. She adds that Comte's principle of order and progress gave the opportunity to the Ottoman elite to adopt Western principles without getting too close to Christianity. Taner Timur, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası, 1919-1946*, (Ankara: Dogan Yayinlari, 1971). pg.132. Koker argues that the Ottoman intelligentsia and the Kemalist elite felt at ease with

cadres restructured the university system. In 1933 the Ottoman University, *Darulfunun*, was closed and replaced by Istanbul University. One of the reasons for replacing *Darulfunun* with Istanbul University was the distanced attitude of the *Darulfunun* towards the Kemalist reforms. The Kemalist cadres decided that the *Darulfunun* was unable to grasp the changes being brought by the reforms and would not take part in a movement which involved a complete modernization of the education system.⁶⁴ The state invited professors from Europe to completely restructure the university system. The growth of fascism in Europe drove many of very famous professors to Turkey and they established new faculties and departments both in engineering, and the arts and sciences.⁶⁵

Toprak argues that "educational institutions function as disseminators of new ideology" and "act as channels of social, economic and political change"⁶⁶, and this is certainly an accurate observation for the Turkish case. The Turkish educational system not only aimed to create a national identity but also attempted to shape a new individual who would see the world through the lenses of science and reason rather than from the dogmas of the religion. This insistence on Western style education was due to the Kemalist's determination to create autonomous individuals who could become the rational subject of the public sphere. In the West the sovereign subject emerged from the economic, political and social transformations of feudal Europe and created the public sphere.

positivism because positivism, with its emphasis on the objective truth available to human consciousness fitted with the idea of enlightened elite communicating the objective reality to the people. Koker, *Modernlesme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, pg.223.

64 Tekeli, "Osmanli Imparatorlugu'ndan Gunumuze Egitim Kurumlarinin Gelismisi", pg.663.

65 For more on the university reforms see Horst Widmann, *Ataturk Universite Reformu*, (Istanbul: Istanbul Universitesi Cerrahpasa Tıp Fakultesi, 1981).

66 Binnaz Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981)pg.51.

whereas in Turkey, the public sphere was constructed by the modernizing elite in its efforts to create its own sovereign subject.

While the Kemalist elite was aiming to transform the people on an individual level, through educational reforms, they were also radically remaking the institutional framework of the regime by completely removing the public influence of Islam from the public. Again, the Kemalist reforms of secularization of the public life was as much for creating a modern public as for controlling and containing Islam as a social force. The institutional reforms directed towards secularization of the public sphere also involved the state's control over religious affairs.⁶⁷ The regime abolished the Caliphate in 1924 and that same year the office of the *Seyhu-l Islam* and the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Pious Foundations (*Seriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti*) were also abolished. In 1928, the 1924 constitution was amended to terminate Islam's status as the state religion. The 1921 and 1924 constitutions already recognized national sovereignty as the legitimate basis of political authority.⁶⁸ Along with the abolition of the Caliphate and other Islamic public offices, the new constitutional framework completed the elimination of religion from all public offices.⁶⁹ In 1924, the state established the Presidency of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi*) and the Directorate-General of Pious Foundations (*Evkaf Umum Mudurlugu*). Under these institutions, religious institutions that were once autonomous were now put under state control. The Kemalist elite was also

⁶⁷ Koker, *Modernlesme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi*, pg.166. Koker also notes that Islam's detailed organization of daily and institutional life of community was the factor behind the Kemalist elite's strict control over the religion. The modernizing elite thought that if not strictly controlled and contained, Islam could have made its way into the public life. For the differences between Islam and Christianity on secularization and their impact on Turkish modernization see Niyazi Berkes, *Ataturk ve Devrimler*, (Istanbul: Adam Yayincilik, 1982), chs 10, 15 and 16.

⁶⁸ For more on the effects of these changes see Cetin Ozek, *Turkiye'de Laiklik*, (Istanbul: Baha Matbaasi, 1962).

⁶⁹ Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*, pg.46.

concerned about the Islamic brotherhoods. These organizations of popular Islam could easily emerge as centers of resistance.⁷⁰ In 1925 the regime dissolved all religious brotherhoods, banned their ceremonies and prohibited such activity altogether.

After removing Islam from the public life altogether the Kemalist elite introduced a series of judicial reforms. In 1924 the *Shari'ah* courts were abolished and the judicial system was reorganized under the Ministry of Justice. In 1926 the state adopted the Swiss Civil Code, the Italian Criminal Code and the German Commercial Code.⁷¹ With the legal reforms the regime completely removed Islam from the public life. Just as the educational reforms removed Islam from the personal development of individuals, legal and institutional secularization pushed Islam out of the legal and institutional framework of public life. On both the personal and institutional level, the Kemalist regime turned the public sphere into a site of nation-making and of political and ideological control of Islam. With the removal of Islam from the public sphere, the Kemalist elite hoped that Islam would find its place in the private sphere, within the spiritual lives of

⁷⁰ In 1925 two religious leaders who belonged to the Naksibendi order organized a revolt, Seyh Sait Revolt, in 1925 in the mainly Kurdish Southeast part of Turkey provoking people with the argument that Islam was being destroyed. The regime's reaction to that was very swift and ruthless. The fact that the revolt took place in Kurdish areas indicated that religion and ethnicity could easily blend as a resistance to the regime.

⁷¹ The adaptation of Swiss Legal Code removed the impact of *Shari'ah* law from the legal system. With the Swiss Civil Code the following changes were implemented: a) individual freedom to choose his/her religion b) secularization of the marriage ceremony c) the principle of monogamy d) the secularization of divorce proceedings. The new law gave the following equal rights to both men and women e) the elimination of the rule that muslim women cannot marry non-muslim man f) equal rights for men and women on parenthood g) equal inheritance rights for men and women. Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*, pp.52-53. However, the adaptation of the Italian Criminal Code undermined the liberating effect of the Swiss Civil Code. The Italian code was written during Mussolini's time and had serious restrictions on civil liberties. The Italian Criminal Code provided the pretext for the state's restriction of political freedoms.

individuals. The public sphere as the space of reason did not have any tolerance for religion.

The Kemalist reforms were equally restrictive when it came to allowing ethnic particularities in the public sphere. The previous section discussed how, through homogenization and solidarity, the Kemalist formulation of the nation and the people centered around the Turkish identity. The obsession with unity and the dislike of diversity can be attributed to the legacy of the Ottoman Empire.⁷² It is a common argument that as early as the eighteenth century, the imperialist powers decided to break up the Ottoman Empire and the minorities of the Empire contributed to this by pursuing their own nationalisms. The new Republic established itself upon this memory making the need to ensure the survival of the "state" a very strong pulse in the Kemalist ideology.⁷³ Obsession with survival, coupled with the desire to form a nation-state, were behind the idea of creating a public sphere free from ethnic identities with their divisive effects. The Turkish public sphere reflected what Mardin calls an 'obsession of division', not allowing the expression of ethnic particularities within the public sphere.

Most nation states, even those which adopt civic nationalism, base themselves on a dominant ethnicity and attempt to assimilate others into that dominant ethnicity. Within this process the division between public and private plays an important role since in many cases it is the public sphere that reflects the voice of the nation and the idea of citizenship provides the background against which claims to equality are made that render the question of ethnicity less important within the frame of public affairs. Following this logic, the Turkish public sphere rejected ethnicity as a legitimate public concern since the public sphere was supposed to belong to Turks, the citizens of Turkey.

⁷² Bora, "Turk Milli Kimligi, Turk Milliyetçiligi ve Balkan Sorunu", pg.86.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 86.

The elevation of Turkish national identity within the public sphere eliminated the possibility for the representation of other ethnicities in their own right in the public sphere. Official state ideology was such that there could be no languages nor ethnic communities in Turkey, other than the Christian minorities whose rights had been granted by the treaty of Lausanne.⁷⁴ Given the fact that Anatolia had so many cultural and ethnic groups, the single, national public sphere functioned as a mechanism for assimilating those particular identities into the Turkish national identity.⁷⁵ This meant not only the denial of ethnic and cultural identities within the public sphere but also the inability of the public sphere to resolve the differences and correct power imbalances generating from these differences. The state's attitude towards the Kurdish nationalism is an example of how public and private division disabled the state to understand the sources of Kurdish nationalism. The standard line is that there is no discrimination against the Kurds in Turkey. The argument is that there are many citizens with Kurdish origin in Turkey who are businessmen, politicians, ministers and MPs. Turgut Ozal, the Prime Minister and later President of Turkey after 1983, publicly stated that he was of Kurdish origin. While the argument is correct, it does not address the fact that there is no discrimination against Kurdish citizens as long as they do not claim Kurdishness publicly. In the case that the citizens with Kurdish origin operate in the society as Turk there is usually no problem, but the moment they want to express themselves as Kurdish in the public then the state reacts against such claims. The public expression of ethnicity, according to the state, is the beginning of divisive politics.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Senol Durgun, "Ulus-Devlet Surecinde Turkiye'de Demokratiklesme ve Kimlik Sorunu", *Bilgi Ve Hikmet*, Winter 1994, Vol.5, pg.123.

⁷⁵ For a very useful survey of different cultural and ethnic group that exist in Turkey and their relationship to the national identity see special issue of *Birikim*, "Etnik Kimlik Ve Azinliklar", March-April 1995, vol.71-72.

⁷⁶ There is a growing body of literature on the Kurds and mainly written by foreign scholars. This in itself indicates the sensitivity of the issue. This is, however, changing and there are now works by Turkish scholars addressing the Kurdish question. One of

Conclusion

Contrary to Habermas' argument, in the West the public sphere has also operated as a realm of exclusion. The distinction between public and private was instrumental in the mechanism of inclusion and exclusion since the boundaries of public and private also determined who could legitimately participate and what could be debated within the public sphere. As Habermas observed, in the Western form of the public sphere the family or the intimate relations of society and the economy were the properties of the public sphere. Recently, new historical work has also concluded that minorities and women have also been excluded from public debate. The bourgeois character of the public sphere was behind the process of exclusion in the West since values and relations of the male-bourgeois largely determined the boundaries and the content of public debate. Groups and identities who were outside the male-bourgeoisie realm had to struggle for inclusion in the public sphere. Contrary to Habermas' argument, from the beginning, the public sphere was a political space in which difference and power produced controversies and contradictions.

In Turkey, the relations of production were not as influential as nationalism and modernity in the formation of the public sphere. That is to say that the formation of the public sphere did not take place as a result of a transformation of production relations but rather as a project to create a new society with modernity at its center. Thus, the division between public and private took place along the lines of modernity and tradition and determined the process of inclusion and exclusion in the public sphere. The division

the most comprehensive of them is the recently published book by Kirisci and Winrow. Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow, *The Question of Kurdish Nationalism and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict*, (Frank Cass Publishers, 1997).

between the public and private was functional in creating a new society and controlling the traditional elements that would challenge the modern institutions and social relations. The Kemalist elite were committed modernizers in that they believed that the relation between modernity and tradition could only be antagonistic and that the force of modernity would eventually erase traditional social relations from the societies collective memory. The perceived antagonism between modernity and tradition sharply divided the public and private in such a way that the public sphere did not permit any configuration or interaction between modern and traditional forms.

Once the antagonism between tradition and modernity defined the boundary between the public and private, it became impossible for the public sphere to accommodate traditional elements of society, let alone differences emerging from religious forms and ethnic identities. In sum, national identity, reason, secular education, modern dress and music were among the many conditions which licensed entry to the public sphere. Elements which did not fit into this modern framework did not have any public outlet in which to negotiate the differences. Neither citizenship, based on equality before the law, nor the unity of the people, could alter the power imbalances that already existed within society

CHRONOLOGY OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC (1940-1997)¹

1946	<i>7 January</i> , foundation of Demokrat Party (Democrat Party) <i>21 July</i> , first multi-party elections, but results are disputed.
1950	<i>14 May</i> , Democrat Party sweeps general elections. Adnan Menderes becomes prime minister and Celal Bayar replaces Ismet Inonu as president. <i>16 May</i> , Democrat party government allows arabic prayers mosques.
1956	Democrat party government shows authoritarian tendencies. Government allows religious classes in high schools.
1957	<i>27 October</i> , Democrat party wins general elections second time.
1960	<i>18 April</i> , Democrat party government forms special commissions to investigate its opponents.
1960	<i>27 May</i> , A military coup overthrows prime minister Adnan Menderes and the Democrat party government.
1961	<i>17 September</i> , ex-prime minister Adnan Menderes is hanged, a day after his foreign minister Fatin Rustu Zorlu and his finance minister Adnan Polatkan. <i>11 February</i> , Adalet Partisi (the Justice Party) is founded. The Justice Party followed the political line of the Democrat Party. <i>1 March</i> , The Republican People's Party forms a new government under the premiership of Ismet Inonu.
1965	<i>27 October</i> , The Justice Party wins the elections and Suleyman Demirel, the leader of the Party, becomes a new prime minister.
1971	<i>12 March</i> , Forced by the left-wing officers, the chief of staff sends a warning letter to the government to find a solution for growing conflict between left and right-wing groups. As a result

¹ Sources: *Turkish History Vol.4: Contemporary Turkey 1908-1980*, ed. by Sina Aksin, (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992); *Turkish History Vol.5: Present Turkey 1980-1995*, (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1995); Nicole Pope and Hugh Pope, *Turkey Unveiled Atatürk and After*, (John Murray: London, 1997).

	Demirel resigns and Nihat Erim, an independent, forms a government of technocrats.
1972	<p><i>17 April</i>, Nihat Erim government resigns. Ismet Inonu resigns from the leadership of the Republican People's Party. Bulent Ecevit is elected as the new leader.</p> <p><i>11 October</i>, Islamist Milli Selamet Partisi (The National Salvation Party) is formed.</p>
1973	<i>14 October</i> , The Republican People's Party wins the general elections under the leadership of Bulent Ecevit.
1974	<i>25 January</i> , The Republican People's Party forms a coalition government with the Islamist the National Salvation Party.
1975	Suleyman Demirel forms a government of National Alliance with the islamist National Salvation Party and the ultra nationalist Nationalist Action Party.
1977	<p><i>1 May</i>, gunfire kills 39 people during a May Day demonstration by 200,000 workers in Istanbul.</p> <p><i>5 June</i>, the Republican People's Party comes first in elections but does not have enough MPs to form a government. Suleyman Demirel forms the second National Alliance government</p>
1978	<p><i>5 January</i>, Bulent Ecevit's Republican People's Party forms a government.</p> <p><i>25 December</i>, Martial law is declared in 13 provinces to control the growing fight between leftist and rightist groups.</p>
1979	<i>12 November</i> , Suleyman Demirel forms a third National Alliance government with islamist and ultra nationalist parties.
1980	<p><i>24 January</i>, Measures are launched to turn Turkey into a free market economy. The value of the Turkish lira was devalued.</p> <p><i>12 September</i>, General Kenan Evren and the top leader of the military launches a military coup to stop political violence which cost 5,000 lives in 1970s.</p>
1981	<i>16 October</i> , military abolishes all political parties.

- 23 *October*, Consultative Assembly which was put together by the military starts working in the National Assembly.
- 1982 7 *November*, National referendum approves the new constitution. The new constitution, unlike the 1961 Constitution, applies restrictions on civil rights and rules against leftist and Kurdish nationalists and installs a strong presidency. General Evren is elected president after the referendum.
- 1983 16 *May*, with the backing from the military, Turgut Sunalp, a retired general, forms a Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi, Nationalists Democracy Party.
- 6 *November*, Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party wins general elections with 45 per cent vote.
- 24 *November*, The National Assembly opens after three years and Turgut Ozal forms the new government.
- 1984 15 *August*, PKK, Kurdish Nationalist Party, launches its first armed offensive.
- 1985 3 *November*, Two social Democrat Parties, SODEP and HP, merge and Social Populist Party is formed.
- 1987 6 *September*, in a referendum the political ban on pre-1980 politicians is lifted and Suleyman Demirel and Islamist leader Necmettin Erbakan are back in political life.
- 29 *November*, Ozal's Motherland Party gets a 36 percent in general election and receives two-thirds of seats in parliament.
- 1989 Motherland deputies in parliament elect Ozal president.
- 1991 20 *October*, Suleyman Demirel's conservative True Path Party wins general elections and forms a coalition government with social democrats.
- 1993 17 *April*, Ozal dies of heart attack. Parliament elects Suleyman Demirel president.
- 13 *June*, The True Path Party chooses Tansu Ciller to become Turkey's first woman prime minister.

- 2 July, Islamist mob burns hotel during Alevi festival in Sivas; 37 die.
- 1994 *March*, islamists Welfare Party under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan wins municipal elections, taking municipalities in Istanbul and Ankara.
- 1995 *20 September*, Social Democrats pull out and coalition government collapses.
25 December, Islamists Welfare party comes first in general elections with 21.3 percent of the vote.
- 1996 *8 July*, Welfare Party coalition with True Path Party receives a parliamentary vote of confidence.

Chapter VI

THE END OF THE LEGISLATIVE PUBLIC IN TURKEY : IDENTITY/ DIFFERENCE IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN THE POST- 1980 ERA

Introduction

The last chapter concluded that the national public sphere has been shaped by Kemalist ideology as well as resistance to it. Yet, while traditional groups and identities have posed a challenge to the hegemony of the Kemalist modernization, for the most part, they have remained within the system and when they have become a serious threat to the regime, as was the case in 1960 and 1971, the military intervened to restore the hegemonic position of the Kemalist paradigm. The exclusionary character of the public sphere and its national character were largely the result of the hegemony of the Kemalist paradigm and its construction of the public sphere as a space where the modern national Turkish identity could be represented. In this context, the public sphere ensured the hegemonic representation of the Turkish identity by marginalizing other identities and groups and preventing them from participating in public debate.

This chapter will argue that the Kemalist ideology lost its ideological power after the 1980 military take over. One of the most important consequences was the growing autonomy of the public sphere from the national discourse. Although the generals' intervention in 1980 aimed to restore order in the country and to ensure the integrity of Kemalist principles, their policies had the unintended consequence of contributing to the declining hegemony of the Kemalist interpretation of modernity. As a result, space emerged for identities and groups that had long been marginalized by the Kemalist interpretation of modernity and national identity. From the second half of the eighties onward the public sphere witnessed a greater autonomy from the national discourse in

that religious and ethnic identities engaged in political struggle to redefine the boundaries of the public sphere and to participate in public debate. One of the most significant characteristics of the post-1983 era was the direct challenge to the institutional and everyday aspect of the public sphere by religious and ethnic particularities. The rise of political Islam and Kurdish nationalism shook the principles of secularism and nationalism as well as rationalism from the public sphere. Both of these forces not only challenged the institutional framework but also carried their struggle into everyday life. The space which these forces opened made it easier for other groups and identities to manifest themselves in the public space. For example, the Alewite community¹ began to raise their claims in the public space along with demands made by feminist women who tried to reclaim the women's agenda from the governing elite. This chapter argues that the struggle of various identity positions for representation in the public sphere resulted in the pluralization of the public sphere in Turkey. The pluralization of the public sphere was possible because national identity, as defined by the Kemalist paradigm, lost its hegemony as the dominant agent of the public sphere. In fact, the very definition of national identity has become a source of a public struggle² as Islamists and Kurdish nationalists scrutinize the content of national identity

The first section outlines the conditions that gave rise to an increasing autonomy and pluralization of the public sphere. The next section will discuss two important

¹ Sunni and Alewite are two main muslim sects in Turkey. Sunni constitutes the majority of the population and the Alewite comes from the Shi'a tradition. There is a general tendency among the Sunni majority to see Alewite as a subversive force. It is for this reason that Alewites have a historical grievance against Sunni oppression and always identify themselves with secularism and social democratic parties.

² Rather than public debate, I use the term public struggle to explain the condition of the public sphere in the post-1983 Turkey. The next chapter will concentrate on the difference between public struggle and public debate and focus on why the autonomy of the public sphere in Turkey gave way to public struggle rather than public debate.

developments that resulted in the decline of the Kemalist hegemony: Turkey's shifting place in the globalization process and the military regime's reordering of the Turkish political and cultural landscape. Following to that, the impact of the new governing elite on the public sphere will be assessed. The last section will look at the pluralization of the public sphere which resulted from the shifting relationship between the categories of the nation, the public and the people.

6.1. Decline of the Kemalist Hegemony in the Turkish Public Sphere

The military takeover of 1980 occurred in the wake of continuous fighting between left-wing and right-wing groups in the country. The lack of political will and the inability of civilian politicians to act swiftly to counter the potential civil war, in addition to a Parliament which was blocked by the rival political parties created a power vacuum that was finally filled by the military on September 12, 1980.³ This was not the first military take over in Republican Turkey. The military had already intervened in the political process twice; first in 1960 and second in 1971.⁴ On the surface, the

³ Discussion of the conditions that prepared the ground for a military takeover is beyond the scope of this chapter. But, memories of politicians active in that period provides an inside narrative of events leading to the military takeover. One of these political memoirs is Turan Gunes, *Araba Devrilmeden Önce*, (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari, 1983).

⁴ The first military takeover was directed against the government of the Democratic Party whose controversial policies convinced the military that the Party was derailing the Kemalist regime. The Democratic Party came into power in May 1950 after the second multi-party elections. Its victory marked the end of a single party regime and enabled the resistance to the Republican People's Party's regime to be channeled into the political process. Soon the Democratic Party gave signals that it was not going to follow the Kemalist principles as religiously as the RPP. From 1950 to 1960 the tension between the cadres of the Democratic Party and the bureaucratic-military elite grew consistently leading to the military take over in May 27, 1960. This was the first reaction of the regime during the multi-party era to the potential threat of diverting from the Kemalist Principles. For more on the May 27 military takeover see Kemal Karpaz, *Turkey's Politics, the Transition to a Multi-Party System*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959) and Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975*, (London: C.Hurst&Company, 1977). After the takeover the military reorganized political life; the most significant step was the 1961 constitution which have extensive civil liberties. Since the DP government took an authoritarian

September 12 military takeover looked like the previous ones which aimed to restore law and order and clear the ground for the transition to a democratic regime.

Nevertheless, the September 12 takeover carried far greater political, economic and ideological consequences than the two previous military takeovers.

The 1980 takeover marked the beginning of a crucial era of decline in the hegemonic position of the regime. Interestingly enough, it was not the leftists, Islamists or Kurdish nationalist groups who set the stage for the decline of the hegemonic position of the Kemalist regime but rather the military regime. The military regime, whose agenda was the restoration of the hegemonic position of the Kemalist ideology, prepared the ground for the most radical transformation of the very regime it was trying to protect. While this was hardly a conscious act on the part of the military regime, several internal and external forces conditioned the policies of the military regime such that it led to the decline of the Kemalist ideology.

Both global and national factors prepared the ground for the decline of the Kemalist regime. In response to the acute economic crisis of import-substitution industrialization, the military regime took drastic measures to adopt liberal economic policies which opened up and integrated the Turkish economy into the world capitalist system. Furthermore, after 1983, a newly elected government was more responsive to

turn towards the end of the fifties, the military wanted to strengthen civil liberties so that no government could even take an authoritarian turn again. On October 15, 1961, with a parliamentary election, the process of returning to a democratic regime was complete. By 1969 the violence between the left and the ultra nationalist right escalated especially in the university campuses and the Justice Party government became inactive in keeping law and order. On March 12, 1971 the military gave an ultimatum to the government. It requested the formation of a strong government which would restore law and order and end the violence. After a two year transition period, the regime returned to Parliamentary democracy. This time, however, the civil liberties in the 1960 constitution were severely curtailed since the military believed that the political violence was largely due to the extremely liberal civil liberties of the 1960 constitution. A very good journalistic account of the 1971 take over can be found at Ismail Cem Ipekci, *12 Mart*, (Istanbul: Cem Yayinlari, 1972).

interventions from organizations such as the European Union and the European Parliament as it aimed to reverse Turkey's isolation in Europe. On a national level, the military regime reordered the political landscape and defined a new role for religion. Even though they were committed to Kemalist principles, the leaders of the military thought that under strict control of the state Islam would act as a counter force against leftists, ultra-nationalists and ironically the religious movements. This was a clear departure from Kemalist principles. One could argue that the military leaders quietly accepted the fact that the Kemalist regime was not completely successful in providing the unitary principles needed to achieve social cohesion. As the Kemalist definition of national identity failed to counter the growing challenge of leftists, Islamists and Kurdish groups, generals attempted to give a new meaning to national identity with a controlled dose of religion. This had far reaching consequences that could not have been anticipated by the generals. In addition, the broken alliance between the intelligentsia and the military-bureaucratic elite eliminated the possibility of restoring the Kemalist regime in its original form. The Kemalist regime created its own intelligentsia which was loyal to the principles of the regime. The intelligentsia gave clear support to the military during the previous two military takeovers since they were also convinced that the Kemalists principles were under serious threat. Yet, the 1980 takeover put an end to that alliance in that there emerged a serious discrepancy between the generals' interpretation of Kemalism and that of the intelligentsia.

The following two sections will discuss the details of global and national factors which prepared the ground for the decline of the Kemalist ideology.

6.2. Turkey's Shifting Place in the Global World

When the military intervened in the political arena in September 1980 there had been an acute economic crisis. In line with protectionist policies of the late twenties and early thirties, the Kemalist regime had subscribed to the idea of a self-sustaining national economy as it had strong convictions that there could not be national sovereignty without economic sovereignty.⁵ In order to ensure rapid economic growth and capital accumulation, the regime had adopted an import-substitution growth model which aimed to protect domestic production and create a bourgeois.⁶ The new international environment after the Second World War found its resonance in Turkey in the form of more liberal economic policies. The post-war years were the first period when the Turkish economy moved from a self-sustaining national economy, with strong protectionism, to a more liberal orientation, open to the foreign trade regime and external aid.⁷ During the postwar years the Turkish economy became increasingly dependent on foreign capital and debt and infested with acute trade deficits.⁸ The first phase of incorporating the Turkish economy into the world capitalist system failed to produce the expected results of rapid economic growth and after the second half of the fifties the regime retreated back to more protectionist policies and adopted an import-substitution growth model.⁹

⁵ Yahya Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi (1923-1950)*, (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1986) pp128-129.

⁶ *ibid.*, pg.135.

⁷ Korkut Boratav, *İktisat Tarihi (1908-1980)*, in *Cagdas Turkiye 1908-1980*, ed. by Sina Aksin, (Istanbul: Cem Yayinlari, 1992)pg.311

⁸ *ibid.*, pg.311

⁹ This was not entirely surprising because the Turkish economy did not have the comparative advantage in the international economy. Its strength largely came from the agrarian sector and the lack of industrial production produced chronic trade deficits. It was also clear that opening up the economy to international capitalism with the absence of strong industrial base and bourgeoisie class would destroy whatever industrial base had been established since the foundation of the Republic. These factors led the regime to return to the import substitution policies of the sixties. For more on the first incorporation of the Turkish economy into the world capitalist system see Yakup Kepenek, *Turkiye Ekonomisi*, (Ankara: ODTU Yayinlari, 1983).

Even though the import-substitution model produced a qualified success during the 1960s in terms of industrialization and of creating a bourgeois, its crisis became visible by the first half of the 1970s. It is true that the import-substitution model led to the development of an industrial base¹⁰ and enabled capitalist production relations to become rooted. Yet, the policy did not decrease the dependence on imports since most of the technology transfer had to come from outside of the country. During the 1960s and early 1970s it was relatively easy for the government to finance this process through external debt. As with other experiences with ISI in the developing world, the Turkish economy suffered from serious setbacks due to an inability to finance itself, a lack of growth in the domestic market and a lack of competitiveness in the international markets.

The growth linked to ISI, however, transformed the social structure of Turkey in such a way that the Kemalist idea of the people as an undivided whole became more of a fiction. The growth of the industrial production created a bourgeoisie, and at the same time forced large segments of the population from rural areas to urban centers as workers. As a result, there emerged a strong labour movement whose interests often clashed with those of big business. In addition, the consolidation of capital within the large industrial firms of urban centers began to threaten the traditional "petty bourgeoisie" of provincial towns.¹¹ The regime was unable both to reproduce capital accumulation and to mediate between the different segments of society. It is during this period that the

¹⁰ The growth of the manufacturing sector is especially important in assessing the effects of the ISI model in the development of the industrial base. For more on the development of the manufacturing sector see Oktar Turel, "The Development of Turkish Manufacturing Industry During 1976-1987: An Overview" in *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, ed. by Atila Eralp, Muharrem Tunay and Birol Yesilada, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993) pp 69-96).

¹¹ Caglar Keyder, "Economic Development and Crisis: 1950-80" in *Turkey in Transition : New Perspectives*, ed. by Irvin C. Schick and Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) pg. 303

various Turkish governments engaged in populist policies which required a regime of redistribution among various groups in society despite the fact that the level of capital accumulation was not sufficient to support the distributive mechanism. Since in ISI the reproduction of capital accumulation depends on the domestic market, the state-subsidized distributive mechanisms benefited the bourgeois.¹² It was only after it became clear that the state could no longer sustain the redistributive mechanisms that the conflict between different segments of the society became more visible.

As the crisis of the ISI policies became acute, it became clear that in addition to the redistributive mechanism the regime was not able to sustain the accumulation of capital. In 1980 the economy came to a complete halt and the conservative government of the Justice Party introduced a radical economic program which became known as the January 24th programme. The infamous January 24th programme was nothing more than IMF directed austerity measures which aimed to remove trade barriers and which entailed a new form of capital accumulation that relied on export promotion. The model dictated by the IMF was based on a different role for the state than that of its traditional interventionist role. With IMF directed austerity measures the state was asked to take a passive role, providing a background for the market forces rather than being an active producer in the economy.¹³ The export orientation and liberal trade policies required a radical social reorganization that would be unpopular among workers and wage earners. The export orientation required a shift of focus from the domestic to the international market. This shift led to a squeeze on wages, a decline in state expenditures, especially

¹² Boratav, *İktisat Tarihi (1908-1980)*, pp.329-330.

¹³ Ziya Onis, "The State and Economic Development in Contemporary Turkey: Etatism to Neoliberalism and Beyond", in *Turkey Between East and West*, ed. by Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pg. 160. Onis describes the main properties of the IMF oriented liberalization as "progressive liberalization of the trade regime and the capital account, a liberal approach to foreign direct investment, an emphasis on export expansion, the focus of the state activity shifting away from manufacturing to infrastructure activities" pg.161

social transfers, and the introduction of a tight monetary policy in order to create a comparative advantage in the international market.

The generals were in a much easier position to implement the hard-to-swallow IMF policies than civilian politicians who were under pressure from different segments of society.¹⁴ This was manifest in the military's decision to continue with the January 24th programme under the economic leadership of Turgut Ozal.¹⁵ The military's endorsement of the IMF austerity measures marked the first radical break from Kemalist ideology which adopted statism as the central economic policy. In fact, during the previous two interventions, the military had been a supporter of etatism and state led economic growth since etatism was one of the six principles of Kemalist ideology. With the acceptance of the liberalization of economy, however, the military moved away from one of fundamental principles of the Kemalism. The military elite, for the first time, openly accepted the incorporation of the Turkish economy into the world capitalist system despite its implication of losing national sovereignty. The military's acceptance of the IMF programmes started the process of incorporating the Turkish economy into the global capitalist system which, in turn, facilitated the decline of the hegemony of Kemalist ideology.

¹⁴ For the detailed analysis of the liberalization of the Turkish economy see Tosun Aricanli and Dani Rodrik, *The Political Economy of Turkey: Debt, Adjustment and sustainability*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1990) and Ziya Onis and Steven B. Webb, "The Political Economy of Policy Reform in Turkey in the 1980s" in *Voting For Reform : The Politics of Structural Adjustment in New Democracies*, ed. by Stephan Haggard and Steven B. Webb, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp.128-186).

¹⁵ The Generals choice of Turgut Ozal was particularly interesting because Ozal was close to the Islamist Salvation party and was a candidate from the Salvation Party during the last election. Yet, he was also the high ranking bureaucrat who was in charge of negotiating austerity measures with the IMF and being an employee of the World Bank. At some point he was also closely connected with the international financing circles. For a journalistic account of the January 24 Programme see Emin Colasan, *24 Ocak: Bir Donemin Perde Arkasi*, (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1983).

The aim of this transformation was a liberal market economy, a reduced role for government, liberalized trade and financial regimes and export-oriented growth. The globalization of international economic affairs and the ascendancy of market liberalism around the world, together with the already exhausted protectionist economic policies, rendered the liberalization of the Turkish economy as the only alternative. The military government quickly liberated the trade regime, encouraged the export sectors, promoted exports, and liberated the monetary system in order to integrate the Turkish economy into the international exchange system. Exports became the magic formula of the Turkish economy. The companies who were geared towards export markets gained popularity and, in a short time period, the Japanese type of trading houses, through which smaller producers could export their goods¹⁶, emerged.

The adoption of the export-led growth model was as much a political decision as an economic one. It shifted the regime of capital accumulation from state-driven industrialization, with its heavy emphasis on the domestic market, to the production of manufactured goods directed towards international markets.¹⁷ One of the political consequence of this shift was that a new alliance, formed between the bureaucratic-military elite and a certain segment of the bourgeoisie which was export-oriented. In this equation, wage earners were losers since they were forced to give up part of their share in the GDP in order to ensure a competitive edge for the manufactured goods in international markets.¹⁸ Similarly, domestic market oriented producers were also badly effected by the new regime of accumulation since the loss of priority of the

¹⁶ Ayse Bugra, *State and Business in Modern Turkey*, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), pp.152-156.

¹⁷ For more on the capital accumulation and the role of the state on capital accumulation see Haldun Gulalp, "Patterns of Capital Accumulation and State-Society Relations in Turkey", *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol.15, No.5, pp.76-91.

¹⁸ Consistent effort of suppressing the wages and the political rights of the labor is documented in S. Guzel, "1980 Sonrasinda Isci Haklarinda Gerilemeler" *Onbirinci Tez*, No.5, pp.76-91.

domestic market in capital accumulation meant that they did not have any chance to compete in the international market.¹⁹ The tight monetary policy necessitated the removal of state subsidies to the agrarian sector whose income level was largely dependent on state subsidized pricing.

The shift to export-led growth and the incorporation of the Turkish economy into the world capitalist system alone cannot explain the decline of the hegemonic position of Kemalist ideology. Yet, it represented a crack in the hegemonic discourse of the Kemalist regime. The actors introduced by the new accumulation regime generated alliances which had an irreversible impact on the Kemalist regime's ability to drive and control the public agenda. In other words, the shift in capital accumulation and the traditional role of the state as the key player of capital accumulation created new possibilities for alternative hegemonic agendas concerning the control of the public sphere.²⁰

The new export-oriented business community was different from the traditional Republican business community which grew under the protection of the regime. The export-oriented business elite saw the state-driven growth policies as outdated and ineffective and was instrumental in importing the global surge of market ideology. The generals decided to open-up the Turkish economy to the world capitalist system as a response to the economic crisis. The new business elite was, however, ideologically committed to the idea of integrating Turkey into the World capitalist system.

Economic integration within the global economy was not the only external factor that triggered a shift in the structure of the Kemalist regime in Turkey. After 1983, the new

¹⁹ Sevket Pamuk, "24 Ocak Sonrasinda Siniflar ve Gelir Dagilimi", *Onbirinci Tez*, 1986, No.2, pp.87-101.

²⁰ Muharrem Tunay, "The Turkish New Right's Attempt at Hegemony" in *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, ed. by Atila Eralp, Muharrem Tunay and Birol Yesilada, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993), pp19-21.

government attempted to counter Turkey's isolation in Europe. During the military regime, European countries halted their relations with Turkey and threatened to expel Turkey from the European Council. Turkey signed its first agreement with what was then called the European Common Market in 1963 with the hope of becoming a full member. It failed, however, to show a serious initiative to develop a relationship with the ECC during the sixties and seventies. With the official application in 1987, membership to the EC became one of the central objectives of the Turkish government.²¹ The European Community was able to use the membership application as a leverage to force democratic opening in Turkey. While it would be difficult to argue that European leverage made a significant impact in changing the antidemocratic legal and political system, nevertheless, the EC was an important factor in the domestic politics of Turkey and forced the government to make concessions such as accepting Turkish citizens' right to take the government to the European Court.²² In addition, universities, labour unions, human rights groups and other civil society organizations were able to establish relationships with various European institutions which allowed them to operate outside of the heavy control of the state.

In the same time period there was also a major change in Turkish foreign policy. During the military regime, the generals put special emphasis on developing a relationship with Asian and Arab countries. Given the fact that since the foundation of the Republic, Turkish foreign policy was consistent in not developing strong ties with Arab countries, establishing close ties with Arab countries constituted a major change in the foreign policy.

²¹ Bulent Tanor, "Dis Politika" in *Bugunku Turkiye 1980-1995*, (Istanbul: Cem Yayinlari, 1995), pg.107.

²² *Ibid*, 108

The direction of the relationship between the E.U. and Islamic countries enabled different segments of society to establish alliances outside Turkey. Islamic groups were able to receive other Islamic organizations in Arab countries while the secular segment of the society developed stronger ties with European organizations. Given the fact that Turkey was highly closed to the outside world before 1980 and its citizens had a limited contact with the outside world, these new international alliances had a positive impact on increasing the ability of civil society organizations to move beyond the state's control. Both economic integration with the world economic system and the external political linkages increased the importance of the global dimension in the economic, political and cultural landscape of Turkey.

The long-lasting impact of the global dimension on the public sphere can be summarized as follows.

a) with its new role as a facilitator of entrepreneurial activity, the state largely retreated from its activities of production and social distribution. One outcome of this, at least on an economic level, was that the discourse of solidarity could no longer be sustained. The corporatist and interventionist state was able to define itself as the provider of solidarity, but now the state positioned itself with the segment of bourgeoisie which focused on export oriented economic activity.

b) the state's active involvement in promoting the export-oriented growth model created a new alliance between the military-bureaucratic elite and a certain segment of the bourgeoisie, particularly big business which was well-integrated into the international economic system. Previously, the business sector was under the tutelage of the state since, through subsidies and incentives, the state had controlled the growth and activities of the business sector.

c) the shift to liberal economic policies and growing relations with Arab countries broke the alliance between the Kemalist intelligentsia and the military-bureaucratic elite. The Kemalist intelligentsia was a staunch defender of Kemalist principles and it regarded the move from a state-controlled economic system to a liberalized economy and a departure from traditional foreign policy as a serious betrayal of Kemalist principles. The ruptured alliance between the intelligentsia and the military-bureaucratic elite had important consequences as the Kemalist intelligentsia had a privileged place in reproducing the Kemalist ideology and the state discourse. The Republican regime has its own 'state intelligentsia' who occupied center places in educational institutions, political parties and various key state institutions and the press.²³ During the two previous military interventions they gave support to the military regime to put the Kemalist reforms back on track.²⁴ After the 1980 takeover they parted with the military bureaucratic elite as they understood the 1980 takeover as a defeat.²⁵ The policies of the military government further reduced the influence of them in the public sphere. There, however, emerged a new intelligentsia who does not feel loyal to the Kemalist regime but ready to make alliances with international organizations. These intellectuals criticized the Kemalist ideology both from secular and Islamist perspectives and proposed alternatives to the Kemalist interpretation of modernity.

While the external factors opened the Turkey's closed society to the outside world and allowed alternative voices to emerge, political and cultural changes in the domestic realm further contributed to the decline of the Kemalist hegemony.

²³ Murat Belge, "Tarihi Gelisme Sureci Icinde Aydinlar", *Cumhuriyet Donemi Turkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol.1, (Istanbul: Iletisim, 1983), pg.127.

²⁴ For more on the development of the intelligentsia and the organic relationship between the Kemalist intelligentsia and the state see Yalcin Kucuk, *Aydin Uzerine Tezler*, Four volumes (Istanbul: Tekin Yayinlari, 1986).

²⁵ Yalcin Kucuk, "Cumhuriyet Doneminde Aydinlar ve Dergileri", *Cumhuriyet Donemi Turkiye Ansiklopedisi Vol.1*, (Istanbul: Iletisim, 1983), pg. 143.

6.3. Rationalism, Secularism and the Public Sphere in the Post- 1980 Turkey

The Kemalist reforms of various institutions and of everyday life in the Republic deliberately attempted to remove Islam from the public life, seeking to confine it to the personal life of individuals. While Kemalist ideology placed secularism and rationalism at the center of public life, it denied any public role for religion. The generals of the September 1980 takeover, however, had a different vision. They were by no means sympathetic to political Islam nor did they envision turning Turkey into an Islamic society. The military was, and still is, one of the institutions in Turkey that had always had a zero tolerance policy for religious politics in its ranks.²⁶ They did, however, depart from the traditional Kemalist approach towards Islam.

In the First Announcement of the National Security Council, the generals declared that they had no choice but to intervene since religious and other subversive ideologies were penetrating the education, administrative, and judicial systems and the security forces as well as labour unions and political parties.²⁷ General Kenan Evren, the Chief of Staff, (his first speech to the nation) had declared the military government's commitment to Kemalist principles, targeting Islamic and leftist groups as threats to national unity. His whole speech was a perfect example of Kemalist ideology in the sense that the national unity and indivisibility of the people were the main messages.²⁸ The

²⁶ Islamists see the army's distanced position towards Islam as an alienation from society. Since the military is one of the founders of the Republican party and also defines one of its roles as safeguarding the Kemalist principles, Islamists see the army as an institution cut off from and placed above the society. Davut Dursun, *Laiklik, Siyaset ve Degisim*, (Istanbul: İnsan Yayinlari, 1995), pp.131-132.

²⁷ The First declaration of the National Security Council published in the State Official Newspaper, No.17103, September 12, 1980.

²⁸ Kenan Evren, Declaration to the Turkish Nation, *Official State Newspaper*, No. 17103, September 12, 1980.

Generals had decided that the decisive moment for them to intervene was the political rally organized by the Islamist Salvation Party in Konya, a city where the Islamist Party was powerful, only a couple of days before the takeover. In this rally, slogans called for the abolition of the secular system and calls were made for the return of the *Shari'ah*. General Evren has long emphasized the effect of that rally on the ranks of the military.

Despite their commitment to Kemalist ideology, the generals sought a different role for Islam in the post-1980 era. The growing influence of political Islam on the one hand, and increasing power of leftist and ultranationalist groups on the other, convinced the military that society was missing a core value around which solidarity could be built. In the late 1970s, the initial idea of an organic community became extremely difficult to sustain as society diversified with different interests and as values did not always coincide with the official ideology. In other words, there emerged a spontaneous differentiation between the people and the nation. The maintenance of an organic society, with undivided interests under the guidance of the state, was no longer possible. The Kemalist regime lacked the mechanisms to incorporate different groups as legitimate actors into the public sphere. Kemalist ideology could not resolve the tension between the idea of the general will and the plurality of difference. It became clear that the early Republican project of the modern public with a privileged rational subject as its agent, was no longer sustainable. Nor was the regime able to develop the democratic mechanism to transform an exclusionary public sphere into an inclusionary one.

The generals' rediscovery of Islam as a cultural code which could provide the missing core of society marked the implicit acceptance of the failure to create a solidaristic society and of the radical secular orientation of Kemalist ideology.²⁹ Fragmentation and

²⁹ The idea that the shortcomings of the radical modernization project under the

the polarization of the public space along the lines of Islamists, leftists and ultranationalist ideologies suggested that the core of this modern Kemalist-based community was still absent.³⁰

Islam served two purposes within the logic of the military government of the 1980: the first was to counter the influence of the leftist groups and the second one was to use Islam as a social cohesive.³¹ The generals thought that one of the reasons why Islamic movements grew powerful during the 1970s was that the radical secularism of the Kemalist reforms, including the education system, had pushed people into underground religious organizations.³² They believed it was necessary for the state to develop a new relationship with Islam so that religious orders and other groups could not exploit the population. Islam, far from being pushed aside by modernization, was still an important social force in Turkish society.

Kemalist regime were responsible for the ascendancy of Islamic forces was also put forward by scholars as well. For more see Richard Tapper, *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), 1-27 and Ilkay Sunar and Binnaz Toprak, "Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey", *Government and Opposition*, No. 18, 1983, pp.412-41.

³⁰Saribay argues that one of the shortcomings of the Kemalist regime was its inability to support its ideological and cultural codes with socioeconomic transformations. In other words, the Kemalist regime projected modernization as a universal project but failed to provide a socio-economic base within which ideological and cultural codes of modernization could be internalized by the masses. Ali Yasar Saribay, *Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve Islam*, (Istanbul: Iletisim, 1994), pg.62. Mardin also notes the complex relationship between traditional forms and the socio-economic transformations of modernization. Like the reactions against the modernization efforts of Republican Turkey, resistance also occurred during the Tanzimat years to the new lifestyles and consumption patterns and the emergence of the urban bourgeoisie on the basis of the erosion of tradition. Serif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, (Istanbul: Iletisim, 1992), pp 68-69.

³¹ Feroz Ahmad, *Making of Modern Turkey*, (London: Routledge, 1993), pg.219.

³² The Generals argued that children did not receive any religious education at home since the secular educational system of the Kemalist regime produced a generation who had no contact whatsoever with religion. This ignorance about religion, according to the Generals, played into the hands of religious groups since they exploited the religious feelings of ordinary citizens who consider themselves muslims but did not have any knowledge of religion. Ahmad, *Making of Modern Turkey*, 220.

The military government aimed to find a middle ground between a conservative political tradition and the radical secular Kemalist tradition. In this way, they wanted to keep Islam under control while making a bridge between the modern and traditional segments of society.³³ To achieve that goal they adopted a new cultural policy, the Turkish-Islam synthesis (*Türk-Islam sentezi*). In the late seventies a conservative organization called the House of Intellectuals (*Aydınlar Ocakı*) had formulated the idea of a Turkish-Islam to counter the growing influence of leftist groups.³⁴ They argued that national culture in Turkey had two dimensions: the cultural values of Asiatic Turkic tribes and those of Islam. National culture in Turkey, they argued, was the natural synthesis of these vital dimensions of the "Turkish spirit".³⁵ This definition marked a radical departure from the Kemalist definition of national culture.

The generals adopted a softer version of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as the official cultural policy. The report, prepared by the Atatürk Higher Counsel of Culture, Nation and History, eliminated the ethnic tone of the argument, while incorporating Islam as one aspect of national culture, along with Turkish and Western cultures.³⁶ Contrary to the original argument put forward by the House of Intellectuals, the state's report made a strong declaration that the new policy was in line with Kemalist principles and

³³ Sencer Ayata, "The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and Its Institutional Framework" in *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, ed. by Atila Eralp, Muharrem Tunay and Birol Yesilada, (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993), pg.63.

³⁴ House of Intellectuals were a close-knit group with a very limited number of members. It was initially founded by a group of conservative university professors from Istanbul University in 1968 to create a forum for conservative minded intellectuals and to counter the influence of marxist ideology in the university. Soon they attracted members from other segments of society such as the bureaucracy, media, business and arts. It remained as principally an exclusive club with limited but highly influential members. While they did not directly challenge Kemalist ideology, the solutions which they proposed for Turkey's economic and political problems contained ideas that were directly the opposite of those of Kemalist modernization. For more see Bozkurt Guvenc, Gencay Saylan, İlhan Tekeli and Serafettin Turan, *Dosya: Türk-Islam Sentezi*, (Istanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1991), pp.187-196.

³⁵ Guvenc, Saylan, Tekeli and Turan, *Dosya: Türk-Islam Sentezi*, pg.223.

³⁶ *ibid*, pg.75

included Western culture as part of the national culture. At the same time it saw Islam as an integral part of national culture.

Reform of the education system was the first attempt to soften the radical secularism. Traditional groups had long complained that centralized state education completely excluded Islam from its curriculum and indoctrinated generations who lost their tradition and culture.³⁷ To counter this, and to tighten the state's control over religion, the military regime introduced compulsory lessons in religious culture and ethics into the primary and middle schools. These classes did not enforce a strict learning of Islam but rather more of a general knowledge of Islam and other religions. Nevertheless, this was still a radical departure from the positivistic educational system of the Kemalist tradition. Similarly, the generals increased the number of state schools that trained prayer leaders (*imams*) for mosques.³⁸ Since the number of graduates exceeded the number of state employees needed for mosques because there were no women prayer leaders in the mosques, the surplus men and all of the women graduates of these schools started to attend universities and obtained positions in other state institutions.³⁹

Beginning with the military regime and then gaining momentum after returning to civilian rule in 1983, the religious orders established themselves as important actors

³⁷ Davud Dursun, "Universite ve Egitim Sorunu Uzerine" in *Larikilik, Siyaset ve Degisim*, (Istanbul: Insan Yayinlari, 1995), pg. 179-187.

³⁸ In Turkey, prayer leaders of Mosques (*imams*) are state employees and are appointed by the state institution called the Directorate of Religious Affairs. After the 1980 Military takeover the number of schools training praying leaders increased from 258 to 350 in three years. Ahmad, *Making of Modern Turkey*, pg.219. The Directorate of Religious Affairs was one of the mechanisms by which the state kept a tight leash on Islam. The existence of a Directorate of Religious Affairs is often cited by islamist arguments as being proof of the fact that Turkey is not a real secular country since, in a secular country, the state does not intervene in the religious life of its citizens. Yet, the islamists argument is only true for the Anglo-Saxon countries whereas in France there is still a state control over religious activities in the public sphere.

³⁹ Ahmad, *Making of Modern Turkey*, pg.220 and Ayata, "The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and Its Institutional Framework", pg. 64

in the public sphere, then penetrated political parties, set up business operations, such as financial and trading institutions, and by targeted state institutions for their followers.⁴⁰ By 1996, religious orders such as *Suleymanci* and *Naksibendi* were operating Qur'an courses and youth hostels to educate impoverished youth from rural areas. The religious orders also began to publish numerous newspapers and journals that helped to broaden their influence in the public sphere.⁴¹

Both the liberalization of the Turkish economy and the relaxation of the ideological strongholds of the Kemalist regime had an irreversible impact on the national public sphere. The military-bureaucratic elite's departure from the traditional etatist policies and their careful introduction of Islam into the public sphere shook the foundations of the Turkish national public sphere. As Gole argues, liberalism and Islam, together with Kurdish nationalism and leftist ideology, were four phobias of Kemalist ideology.⁴² Kemalist ideology disliked liberalism because it carried the potential danger of undermining the general will. Liberalism would unleash subversive forces that might challenge the modern Turkish national identity at a time when modern society was in the process of creating its agent, the rational subject. The Kemalist elite therefore made a conscious decision to keep capital accumulation under state domination, due to the absence of a national bourgeoisie, but also due to a fear of enabling other actors to become powerful enough to challenge the boundaries of the public sphere. Islam was also believed to be a subversive force that could challenge the making of the new society.

The military government of 1980 undermined the foundations of the existing public sphere in Turkey by altering the balance that the Kemalists had established between the

⁴⁰ Umit Cizre Sakallioğlu, "Islam-State Interaction in Turkey", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.28, No.2, May 1996, pg.244.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, pg.244.

⁴² Nilüfer Gole, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics", in *Civil Society in the Middle East Vol.2*, ed. by Augustus Richard Norton, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), pg.20.

public, the nation and the people. By eliminating the space between the nation and the people, the Kemalist regime had been able to use the public sphere as an instrument of the general will. The people as a whole, and its unity with the state, were contingent upon an apolitical and controlled public space where the representation of difference in the public, at best, was regulated by the state, and at worst, was eliminated altogether from the public realm. This said, the Kemalist elite deserves credit for being consistent as they were aware of the fact that the realization of the general will could not tolerate the pluralism which would emerge from an autonomous and political public space. Unlike the Kemalists, however, the generals of September 1980 failed to understand the inherent contradiction between an autonomous public sphere and popular sovereignty under the umbrella of the nation. Their intention was to restore the hegemony of the Kemalist project of creating an organic society by reformulating and softening its original promises. They inadvertently created a process which undermined the very basis of the organic society they wanted to create.⁴³

6.4. New Actors in the Public Sphere: The Growing Influence of the Periphery

Through state-led industrialization, the Kemalist regime aimed to create its own bourgeoisie that would be dependent upon state subsidies and incentives. This newly created urban industrial class was for a long time happy to cooperate with the state and grew under the guidance of state policies.⁴⁴ The business class did not have any

⁴³ Toprak and Birtek argue that by incorporating Islamic discourse into the state discourse of national unity and by departing from the "radical secularism of the early republic" the military regime of 1980 undermined the foundations of Kemalist ideology. Binnaz Toprak and Faruk Birtek, "The Conflictual Agendas of Neo-Liberal Reconstruction and the Rise of Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Hazards of Rewriting Turkish Modernity", *Praxis International*, 13, pg. 197.

⁴⁴ Bugra describes the state-business relationship in the early Republic as follows: "It is a relationship in which the businessman, to be successful, has to convince the political authorities of his desire and ability to serve the state through entrepreneurial activity. Similarly, the social status of the business class is largely defined by the

economic autonomy from the state let alone any political autonomy.⁴⁵ While encouraging the development of the national bourgeois, the Republican elite kept its distance from the landowners and local notables who later constituted the petty bourgeois of Anatolia. Even though the Kemalist regime had to rely on the landowners and the local notables to establish its hegemony in the periphery, it never saw them as participants of the modernization process.⁴⁶ As the local bourgeoisie grew stronger, it resented the centralized administration of the single party regime of the RPP and advocated free enterprise and less state involvement in economic life.⁴⁷ After a transition to a multi-party system in 1945, the petty bourgeois of Anatolia consistently supported opposition parties arguing for a more limited role for the state in economic life.

The tension between the center and the periphery in the Turkish Republic was as much cultural as economic. Within the Kemalist project the national public sphere was also primarily an urban space where the modern society could free itself from the forces of religion and tradition. The periphery, where religion and ethnicity had deep roots in the social relations of communities, represented a contrast to the urban and modern national public sphere.⁴⁸ It had thus been important to the Kemalist regime to keep the

nature of the national development project undertaken by the political authority. Consequently, the latter becomes the main source of any legitimacy that the new class possesses. Ayse Bugra, *State and Business in Modern Turkey*, pg 50.

⁴⁵ Similar to Bugra, Keyder argues that "The Kemalist regime had promoted a special type of controlled capitalist development in which RPP governments never allowed the nascent bourgeoisie a free hand". Caglar Keyder, "The Political Economy of the Turkish Democracy", *New left Review*, 115, 1979, pg.19

⁴⁶ Ergun Ozbudun, *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1976), pp 43-45.

⁴⁷ The introduction of the land reform Bill in 1945 was the peak point of the cleavage between the RPP and the local landowners and notables. Groups representing the landowners in the RPP resisted the Bill strongly. Even though the Bill was passed in the parliament, it was never fully implemented. Yet, the RPP's attempt to curb the influence of the landowners created a distrust between the urban military-bureaucratic elite and the local landowners and notables. Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975*, (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1977), pp.10-11.

⁴⁸ Serif Mardin, "Turk Siyasetini Aciklayabilecek Bir Anahtar: Merkez-Cevre Iliskileri" in *Turkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, (Istanbul: Iletisim, 1992), pg.64.

influence of the periphery out of the public sphere in order to ensure development of modern society. The relationship between the center and the periphery was one in which the military-bureaucratic elite of the center allied with the peripheral forces whenever necessary while at the same time keeping them under control.

The public sphere played an important part here since its strict cultural and ideological boundaries did not allow access to the forces of periphery. The urban centers of the Republic were where the nation represented itself as a modern society, not only in institutional forms, but also in every day life as well. Modern public life, with liberated gender relations, western life style, new consumption patterns, and music and arts represented a new set of social relations alien to the traditional social patterns of the periphery. The every day social relations of the public sphere in many ways constituted a more limited access to the public sphere than the actual control of the State.⁴⁹ For this reason, the rural population identified the RPP administration with this particular urban life and did not see it as its representative. Instead, political parties starting with the Democratic Party and after the 1960 military takeover with the Justice Party voiced the grievances of the periphery and pushed the boundaries of the

⁴⁹ Popular Turkish cinema during the fifties and sixties nicely captured this tension between the center and the periphery. The usual story line was such that the rich landowner from Anatolia comes to Istanbul and he invests his capital into business and becomes an industrialist. He and his family aspire to live the modern life style of Istanbul, to buy a house in an expensive neighborhood, have their children go to private colleges and to travel to Europe. Yet, despite all these efforts the newly urbanized landowner from Anatolia can never fully become a modern individual. His efforts to become a bourgeois are always represented in the movies as tacky. Yet, his children always break free from the backward culture of the periphery and always look down at their father's roots. One category lower them is the rich rural landowner (Haciaga) who comes to the city to spend money. He has no idea whatsoever about the manners of modern public life. He annoys people since he assumes that he can buy anything with his money. He is completely oblivious to the liberated gender relations of the city. For him, all city women are loose. All of these rural characters in the popular movies appear to be foreigners to the modern public life. They do not belong and everyday social relations in the modern public remind them constantly that they do not really belong there.

public to include some of the concerns and values of the periphery into the public sphere.

The September 1980 takeover inadvertently reversed the control that the Kemalist regime had exercised over the public sphere. By eliminating religious and ethnic solidarities from every day life and by keeping a tight control over the economic activity of private enterprise, the Kemalist regime had managed to keep the periphery out of the public sphere. By defining a new role for the state, as the facilitator of economic activity, and by shifting the focus of capital accumulation to private enterprise, the military regime licensed new actors to participate in the public sphere. In addition, the new role defined for Islam as a social cohesive further gave new visibility to groups and identities denied access to the public sphere by the early Republican regime. From 1950 onwards, political parties and groups opposed to the Kemalist ideology had demanded less involvement from the state in the economic realm and a more liberal attitude towards Islam in the public space. Ironically, it was the military government in the 1980s that unleashed the demands of the opposition.

The first general election in 1983 witnessed new faces in the political landscape largely because the military government closed previous political parties, including the Republican People's Party, and imposed a ban on their cadres. Despite the National Security Council's attempt to eliminate the influence of the previous parties and cadres from the political scene, once political life returned to normal, the leaders of old parties formed new parties with the help of their supporters. The generals used veto mechanisms to keep the number of nominees from those parties under the required number necessary for entering the election. Nevertheless, in the 1983 general elections, the Motherland Party won the election with 45 percent of the general vote. The Populist Party (Social Democratic Party) won 30 percent and became the second

leading party. The National Democratic party, backed by the generals, only won 23 percent, coming in third.⁵⁰

The Motherland Party's victory came as a surprise to many since most commentators believed that with a clear backing from the military leaders the National Democratic Party was destined to win the elections. In fact, Turgut Ozal's party came very close to being disqualified from the elections as a large number of its candidates had been vetoed, due to their connection to Islamist groups. The generals were particularly sensitive about the Islamist orientation of Turgut Ozal and his cadres. Nevertheless they allowed the party to participate in the election. Turgut Ozal was the bureaucrat behind the infamous January 24th Programme. After the military takeover the generals asked Ozal to keep his position and to continue with the reforms. He was responsible for economic restructuring until the financial scandal in 1983 (called Bankers Scandal, Banker Skandalı) which wiped out the savings of many middle class families in Turkey. Even though his economic policies coincided with the general's economic restructuring, Ozal was also known for his close connections with the Islamists Salvation Party.

Although Ozal had been a candidate from the Salvation Party, he was never elected as an MP and did not have official ties with the Party. As the cadres of the Salvation Party were banned from politics, the Motherland Party cadres were mostly small business owners from Anatolia and engineers from the private sector and bureaucratic ranks. Though lacking any previous political history, they considered themselves to be representatives of the political tradition of the traditional bourgeois of Anatolia and groups close to Islamic politics associated with the Democratic Party, the Justice Party

⁵⁰ For a journalistic account for the first general elections after the military takeover and politics behind it see Yalcin Dogan, *Dar Sokakta Siyaset (1980-1983)*, (Istanbul:Tekin Yayinlari, 1985).

and the National Salvation Party.⁵¹ Despite the fact that the parties representing resistance to the radical secularism of the Kemalist reforms had been in office at various intervals since 1950, their impact on the general framework of the public sphere had been limited. This can be attributed to several factors. First, although the Democratic Party and its predecessors opposed a certain segment of Kemalist ideology, they nevertheless were drawn from the Kemalist establishment.⁵² In contrast, the most significant aspect of the new governing elite was the fact that they did not belong to the previous political establishment. This had been aided by the military regime which had been determined to eliminate the previous political figures from the political scene. Second and more importantly, previous conservative parties had been operating under a regime where the hegemony of the Kemalist ideology was still intact and unchallenged. This gave them limited room to maneuver. When a serious challenge to the hegemony of Kemalist ideology arose in the 1970s, the military-bureaucratic elite intervened in the political process to restore it. The new governing elite enjoyed the space that was opened up by the declining hegemony of the Kemalist ideology. What also makes the post-1983 governing elite different from their predecessors of the conservative liberal legacy is their ability to combine the conservative discourse with the language of individualism. Previous conservative parties, despite their commitment to private involvement in the economic life, did not present a coherent discourse that provided an alternative to the Kemalist modernization process. Rather, their efforts appeared to be a reaction to the excesses of the Kemalist regime. The Motherland Party combined a loyalty to Muslim

⁵¹ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey A Modern History*, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993), 297.

⁵² This is particularly true for the Democratic Party whose founders broke from the ranks of the Republican People's Party as a result of the broken alliance between the military-bureaucratic elite and the landowners of Anatolia. One of the founders of the Democratic Party, Celal Bayar, was a very close friend of Atatürk. Yet, they operated within the logic of the public sphere defined by the Kemalist ideology. Ali Yasar Sarıbay, "The Democratic Party, 1946-1960" in *Political Parties and Democracy In Turkey*, ed. by Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1991), pg.119. This is less true for the Justice Party, but the ranks of the Justice Party were still from the political establishment.

conservatism with a strong commitment to economic liberalism, which reoriented the Turkish economy to world markets".⁵³

The policies of the Motherland Party were not simply about economic restructuring but also contained elements that allowed new actors into public sphere and shifted the parameters of the public discourse. The Motherland Party introduced itself as a cohesive rather than a divisive force and declared its attempt to bring together four political orientations: liberal, ultra-nationalist, Islamist and social democrat.⁵⁴ Tunay argues that with this unlikely alliance the new right in Turkey after 1983

tried to shape a new ideological system by harmonizing all the contradictory elements of the traditional ideologies, and strove for the formation of an 'organic ideology', which would be at the heart of the constitution and provide an expansive hegemony that had never existed in Turkish society before. This ideology was called 'conservative nationalism' and it was a more refined and much more enriched version of the limited-appeal nationalism of the 1970s. Also, since conservative nationalism would discriminate against only the revolutionary left, it could articulate the interests of different groups into a compact whole. Obviously, this approach was expected to attract the disillusioned social democrats to a national-popular program⁵⁵

Bringing together four distant political movements, the Motherland Party was giving the message that it was not planning to return to the pre-1980 era with political violence and social divisions. Instead, they hinted a new societal project which would require togetherness and solidarity. In this respect, the Motherland Party nicely incorporated one of the main concerns of the military-bureaucratic elite into its programme even though it did not subscribe to the principal values of Kemalist solidarity.⁵⁶ Yet, Tunay's

⁵³ Gole, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics", pg.30.

⁵⁴ Anavatan Partisi Programı, 1983, (Ankara: ANAP Publication), pg.153.

⁵⁵ Tunay, "The Turkish New Right's Attempt at Hegemony", pp.21-22.

⁵⁶ Parla argues that the solidaristic tone of the Motherland Party contradicts with its liberal discourse in economy. In the party program it was stated that different interests of the society are part of the whole while the programme declared that competitive market economy is the choice of the party. Parla argues that the Motherland party's pragmatic politics of bringing four different political view together results in a contradictory programme which reflects the lack of consistent ideology in the Part

description of the new ruling class' attempt to form a new alliance with different segments of society does not fully explain the power and the support that the Motherland Party enjoyed. The basis of the hegemony did not come from the Motherland's naively formulated call for a unity of four distinct ideologies, but rather its ability to integrate conservative values with a dynamism and entrepreneurial spirit of material progress. . On the one hand, the Motherland Party appealed to the conservative segments of society with its national-conservative discourse (*milliyetçi muhafazakar*). The Motherland Party described its political orientation as nationalist-conservative, a position very close to the Turkish-Islam synthesis which was formulated by the House of Intellectuals.

On the other hand, it offered something to liberals and social democrats with its heavy focus on private enterprise, policy oriented governing, E.U. membership and opening up Turkey to the world. The Party emphasized the importance of nationalism as the core of society, but its nationalism was different from that defined by Kemalism. In redefining the national identity, the Motherland cadres gave Islam a privileged role as the unifying force of the nation. The Motherland, in a sense, followed the course of action that was started by the generals of the 1980 takeover. The Motherland Party was, however, more radical than the generals in moving away from the Kemalist interpretation of modernity. More specifically, it was able to form a hegemonic bloc which cut across class lines because it was able to put an end to the monopoly of the Kemalist ideology over change and progress. That is, with conservatism, the Motherland Party managed to identify itself with dynamism, progress and change. It created a new discourse of progress which was identified with the energy of entrepreneurial activity and openness to the world. In contrast to this new discourse, the Kemalist way of achieving progress through state driven modernization appeared old fashioned and archaic.

Programme. Taha Parla, *"Türkiyenin Siyasal Rejimi, 1980-1989"*, (Istanbul: İletişim, 1995), pg.150.

From a Kemalist perspective, the Motherland Party's orientation toward Islamic values and its commitment to progress and change were a contradiction in terms. The Kemalist regime constructed its discourse of progress and change by posing itself against a stagnant Islamic value system. Similarly, Kemalism represented the Turkish identity and the public sphere as modern and the condition of being modern was not to be Islamic. The Motherland Party challenged this interpretation and formulated a new view of modernity in which a traditional value system was no longer at odds with the idea of progress, constant change, being open to the world. This new interpretation found its manifestation in Turgut Ozal's own description of himself as "both a Muslim and modern"⁵⁷ It was indeed the consistent message of the Motherland Party that being Muslim and conservative was consistent with being modern and being open to the world.

Ozal and his cadres were mostly small business owners and engineers with Anatolian backgrounds and rather conservative values. They came from rural areas that were not the strongholds of the Kemalist regime. Even though they were educated in the secular system, religious solidarities still existed within the family and community life. They internalized the positivistic world of science and technology while also keeping Islam integral to their value system.⁵⁸

For Kemalists there was no distinction between Western science and technology and Western social and cultural values. Unlike the Kemalist's reading of modernity, however, the new governing elite did not see any contradiction between accepting the science and technology of the West and keeping the traditional values of Turkish society.

⁵⁷ Gole, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics", pg. 32.

⁵⁸ Nilufer Gole, "Engineers: 'Technocratic Democracy'", in *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities*, ed. by Metin Heper, Ayse Oncu and Heinz Kramer (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993) pg.210.

They frequently used the Japanese example as a way of modernizing without losing one's sense of culture and identity.⁵⁹ They distanced themselves from the Kemalist reading of modernity, arguing that complete Westernization would result in an inferiority complex. The Turkish people would be ashamed of going to mosque to pray, something which the Kemalists had always presented as backward.⁶⁰

Their admiration for traditional values was not seen as an obstacle to progress and development. In an interview, one Motherland Party engineer stated that "Turkey is shedding its shell. With an economic model which emphasis on exports... we are becoming an open society, members of which are traveling and thus learning".⁶¹ In another interview, a party member pointed out that

we have to be an open society. we have to leave behind the dogmas of the Left and the Right, and keep an atmosphere of debate. Turkey is, in fact, beginning to display vitality. There is a new generation, between 30 to 35 years old, in blossom. They are the ambitious young professionals who speak two foreign languages and who are impatient to expand towards the world market⁶²

The above quotation reflects the *modus operandi* of the new governing elite in Turkey who established itself as a new actor in the public sphere.

The governing style of the new ruling elite presented a sharp contrast to the traditional ways of operation of the Turkish bureaucracy. The MPs, including Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, introduced themselves not as career politicians but as technicians who were

⁵⁹ Gole, "Engineers: 'Technocratic Democracy'", 214.

⁶⁰ One of the engineers who was a member of the Motherland Party, in an interview with Gole, complained that the head of state in Turkey can not go to a mosque whereas a head of a state in the West can go to a church on Sunday. *ibid*, 215.

⁶¹ *ibid*, 215.

⁶² *ibid*, 216.

willing to form a government to "get things done".⁶³ The discourse of "getting things done" was particularly very effective because it indicated that the state was there to serve the people rather than the other way around. It also pointed to a managerial professionalism as opposed to the slow and sluggish style of Turkish bureaucracy. The new governing elite presented itself as a technocratic team identified with rational policies, free of ideological preoccupation.⁶⁴

The idea of entrepreneurial activity became the engine of growth and economic progress. Anything that stood in the way of profit making entrepreneurial activity was quickly discredited. The new political elite, especially Ozal and his cadres, actively promoted this culture of entrepreneurship, and they were always proud to bypass the traditional bureaucratic methods of doing things.⁶⁵ For instance, Ozal never hid his dislike of Turkish diplomats because they did not want to adopt his business-like diplomacy. He also constantly bypassed the traditional bureaucracy by bringing young and gifted engineers and economists, who were called "Ozal's princes", from the USA to run the high levels of the economic bureaucracy. In many cases, laws that would normally have disqualified them from work in the bureaucratic ranks were ignored and they were placed in full control of key economic positions. Ozal's business-like style of governing was unusual for the traditional mechanism of the Turkish state and its political culture, and he regularly shocked the establishment with his utter disregard for the traditional

⁶³ Ustun Erguder, "The Motherland Party, 1983-1989" in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. by Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau, (New York : I.B. Tauris, 1991), pg.164

⁶⁴ Parla, "*Turkiyenin Siyasal Rejimi, 1980-1989*", pg.152.

⁶⁵ Ozal himself regularly explained his policies in a TV program called "Inside the Executive Branch" with an emphasis on his managerial and policy-oriented governing style. These programs were intended to differentiate his governing style from the traditional bureaucratic style. In these programs, he strictly focused on policy issues such as tax reforms, the E.U. membership, export promotion, infrastructure investments, rather than on political issues. The programs usually started with colourful pictures of different infrastructure projects such as highways, bridges or the ambitious South Eastern Anatolian Project (The GAP) with Turkish people working in them. They aimed to create the image of Turkey as a dynamic country "skipping the age".

ways of doing things.⁶⁶ As awkward, and in some cases incompetent, as the new governing elite's ruling style was, it made a crack in the heavy, authoritarian state discourse.

Ozal and his cadres' famous slogan of "skipping an age" was almost counter to the Republican slogan of "reaching the level of contemporary civilization". The Republican ideal was directed towards reaching the level of Western civilization, towards creating a new nation no different from other Western nations. In contrast, the Motherland Party's slogan of "skipping an age" did not subscribe to the ideal of becoming a truly Western nation but a nation in tune with the technological and economical advancements of the global age while keeping its traditional character. "Skipping an age" was also skipping the Kemalist inward-looking nation that had closed itself off to the outside world.

The new discourse of a possible harmony between progress and entrepreneurialism, on the one hand, and traditional values, on the other, gave hope to Anatolian migrants, who had been migrating to the large urban centers since the early eighties. It suggested that it was possible to continue to observe traditional Islamic values in the big city and still contribute to change and progress. The Motherland Party was particularly successful in reading the situation of migrants correctly and thus integrating large segment of the working class in its ranks. Working class neighbors that had traditionally been social democrats soon became the supporters of the Motherland Party.

⁶⁶ For the first time in the history of the republic, a prime minister ignored the traditional relation between military and the civilian politicians. Ozal intervened in the promotion of the ranks in the military, an act which was previously performed by the military and approved by the civilian governments.

The new discourse of progress with conservative values challenged the boundaries of the public sphere which had been operating on the assumption that there was an unresolvable conflict between modernity and tradition. The post-1980 era brought important changes to the public sphere in Turkey as the Kemalist discourse lost its previous hegemonic position in defining the boundaries of the public sphere. As the hegemony of the Kemalist discourse declined after the 1980s, new identity positions entered into the political scene challenging the principal properties of it.

6.5. The Pluralization of the Public Sphere: An Altered Relationship Between The Nation, The People and the Public.

The pluralization of the public sphere was made possible by the broken link between the public, the nation and the people. Instead of being an integral part of national discourse, the public sphere was developing into a separate social sphere where identities other than the official Turkish identity could engage in a political struggle for representation. Three factors broke the link between the public, the nation and the people: (a) an increasing stratification of Turkish society put an end to the Kemalist formulation of the people as an undivided whole; (b) the changing role of the state ended its function in reproducing national identity and the hegemony of the Kemalist ideology; and (c) the discourse of liberalism gave priority to the category of the individual over the totalistic project of nation building. The combined effect of these three developments freed the public sphere from the dominance of the nation and the people and increased the autonomy of the public sphere vis-à-vis these other two levels.

The Kemalist project of nation building defined the concept of people as an undifferentiated whole, without significant class differences. The famous Republican

slogan of " we are an integrated community with no classes and privileges", however, was already on its way to becoming obsolete as early as the late fifties and became increasingly so during the seventies. The rapid industrialization of the 1970s, along with migration from rural areas to urban centers, created inequalities which started to jeopardize the Kemalist idea of a solidaristic society.⁶⁷ In the late seventies, the growing conflict between workers and the business community, particularly between TUSIAD (the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association") and labour organizations such as DISK (Revolutionary Workers Union), intensified the stratification of Turkish society.⁶⁸ In the urban centers, especially, class differences became visible. Despite the state's effort to act as a social mediator, Turkish society had clearly evolved into different classes.

The ISI development strategy's logic was in tune with the idea of solidaristic society to the extent that it required the participation of different segments of society as part of the domestic market.⁶⁹ The collapse of ISI in the late 1970s, and the sudden shift to an export-oriented growth model, however, stripped the state from its role as the stabilizer of the domestic market. An the export-oriented growth model did not require a stable domestic market as the source of capital accumulation. The new strategy not only required that the social policies of the state, which aimed to achieve a certain level of equal income distribution, be abandoned, thus deepening the cleavages among the different classes of society.

⁶⁷ Korkut Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi, 1980-1980" in *Çagdas Türkiye 1980-1980*, ed. by Sina Aksin, (Istanbul: Cem yayinevi, 1992), pp.325-331.

⁶⁸ Atilla Eralp, "The Politics of Turkish Development Strategies", in *Turkish State, Turkish Society*, ed. by Andrew Finkel and Nukhet Sirman, (London: Routledge, 1990), pg. 231.

⁶⁹ Keyder provides a detailed explanation of the incorporation of the different segments of the society into the domestic market as part of the logic of the ISI development strategy. Caglar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey, A Study in Capitalist Development*, (London: Verso, 1987)pp. 145-150.

Curbing the powers of the trade unions was also central to the export-oriented growth model since the international competition of Turkish goods depended upon cheap labour. In line with austerity measures, the state withdrew its subsidies from the agricultural sector and this increased the pace of migration from rural to urban areas.⁷⁰

Furthermore, export promotion strategy put industrialists, whose products were sold in the domestic market, at a disadvantage since workers and wage earners no longer enjoyed previous levels of income. It was the newly emerging group of industrialists, who were oriented towards export activity, that benefited from the incentives of the new trade regime.⁷¹ In a short time the new accumulation strategy created a considerable amount of wealth which was concentrated in the hands of limited number of large industrialists and Japanese style trading houses. The entrepreneurship and rapid urbanization transformed the social balances of Turkish society in such a way that income polarization became more visible than ever before. A lavish life style, with expensive consumption patterns, soon became part of the new urban style along with an extreme poverty.

While the idea of an undifferentiated people became obsolete during the post-1980 era, the state lost its original role in shaping the development of the nation. The state had a particularly important role under Kemalist ideology as it was an active agent of creating a modern nation and bringing the people to the level of "contemporary civilization".⁷² According to Kemalist ideology, the unity of the state and the people was crucial to the creation of a modern society. That unity required the constant reproduction of the

⁷⁰ Eralp, "The Politics of Turkish Development Strategies". pg.238.

⁷¹ Canan Balkir, "Trade Strategy in the 1980s", in *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, ed. by Atila Eralp, Muharrem Tunay and Birol Yesilada, (Wesport: Praeger, 1993), pg. 145.

⁷² Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, (North Humberstone: The Eothen Press, 1985), pg.50.

Kemalist hegemony on economic, political and ideological levels. While dismantling the idea of people as an undifferentiated whole, the liberalization discourse of the post-1980 era also marked a separation between the people and the state. The state gave up its role as the agent of national development and the creator of the modern subject. The state retreated from its role of leading national development and left this function to private enterprise.⁷³ It also abandoned its role of creating a "modern Western society". As opposed to "progress, secularism, and reason", the cornerstones of the Kemalist modern society, the state promoted notions of "traditionalism, religious accommodation, and a sense of moral community".⁷⁴ As Birtek and Toprak suggest "the new state ideology redefined the republican nation-state; and, in uprooting it from its liberal Enlightenment heritage resituated it in *volk-geist* conservatism".⁷⁵ This allowed new actors to offer alternative readings of national identity which incorporated Islam into its constitutive elements.

Finally, the discourse of liberalism along with private entrepreneurial activity decreased the importance of a solidaristic society in which citizens direct their efforts to a realization of the general will. Instead, the post-1980 era witnessed a great deal of debate about the individual and the importance of individual activity. The rediscovery of the category of individual and the autonomy of individual action became popular even among the Turkish left who rediscovered the merits of civil society after a long period of Jacobean and communitarian tradition.⁷⁶ The post-1980 era created an environment

⁷³ For a detailed analysis of the new role of the state in national development during the post-1980 era see Onis, "The State and Economic Development in Contemporary Turkey: Etatism to Neoliberalism and Beyond", pp.162-176.

⁷⁴ Faruk Birtek and Binnaz Toprak, "The Conflictual Agendas of Neo-Liberal Reconstruction and the Rise of Islamic Politics in Turkey", *Praxis International*, No.13, pg.196.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pg.196.

⁷⁶ For a good analysis of the left tradition in the Republican Turkey see Ahmet Samim, "The Left" in *Turkey in Transition*, ed. by Irvin C. Schick and Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp.147-176.

which "developed more in the direction of anarchic liberalism: it dismantled traditions, freed individuals, legitimized hedonistic dreams, undermined juristic constraints, heightened aspirations, opened up new markets, and destroyed all obstacles in its way".⁷⁷ It was indeed the power of the discourse of liberalism was stronger than the actual liberalization of the economy itself.

The solidaristic description of society presented by Kemalist ideology was believed to represent stagnation and underdevelopment whereas the "ascendant values" (*yükselen değerler*), such as entrepreneurial activity, a get-rich-quick attitude, an opening up to the world, and a new dynamism, were seen to be the future of Turkish society. Several times Ozal stated that his critics could not even catch his dreams. While the discourse of liberalism did not lead to the liberalization of the political system, it opened up the space for a "hedonistic individualism".⁷⁸ However erratic, the new era created an entrepreneurial class that was forward looking, and identified with technical and economic progress as well as with "getting things done" and the power of individual enterprise.

⁷⁷ Gole, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics", pg.33

⁷⁸ Ali Yasar Saribay, *Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve Islam*, (Istanbul: İletisim, 1994), pg.152. Saribay also argues that individualism emerged between 1980-1983 as a response to the authoritarianism of the Military regime. The strategy of the intelligentsia was to turn inwards and develop an esoteric mood. He argues that the mood with the rise of the Motherland Party turned into "individuation" which emphasized the material aspect of the individual without any commitment to moral values. *ibid*, pg.151-152. Saribay's observation indicates an important phenomenon among the Turkish intelligentsia. Large number of leftist intellectuals who were defenders of the collective ownership and etatism dropped their former convictions and became close to Ozal and his party. They later became the defenders of liberalization and private entrepreneurial activity as a symbol of progress and dynamism.

Conclusion

The increasing autonomy and pluralization of the public sphere indicates a return of the political to the public sphere. The Kemalist elite wanted to maintain a public sphere which was free from politics in order to realize their image of the modern society. As the public sphere started to gain its autonomy from the categories of the people and the nation, it became difficult to sustain the image of the Kemalist modern society. For more than six decades Kemalist ideology had been able to provide a moral and ideological framework for the public sphere. The loss of its hegemonic position in the post-1980 era resulted in the decline of this moral and ideological framework from the public sphere with no obvious replacement for it.

The liberalization and integration of the Turkish economy within the global system had an erratic style as it did not rest on a strong civil society and democratic polity.⁷⁹ The lack of a bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and the tradition of state intervention in every aspect of economy, on the other, made the process of economic liberalization an unruly practice. In other words, the discourse of liberalization freed the public sphere from its constraints and allowed a certain degree of autonomy, without giving way for the moral and institutional framework on which the conditions of plurality in the public sphere could be established. Gole argues that liberalism in Turkey, understood as a "free rein to all", "started to connote anarchical individualism, hedonistic consumerism and permissive modernism".⁸⁰ As a result, liberalism in Turkey lacked its political components such as a "solid definition of citizenship, urban codes of behavior, professional ethics, and entrepreneurial morality and institutions and regulations".⁸¹

⁷⁹ Ilkay Sunar, "State, Society, and Democracy in Turkey", in *Turkey Between East and West*, ed. by Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), pg. 148.

⁸⁰ Gole, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics", pg.33

⁸¹ *ibid*, pg.33.

Instead, this liberalism was identified with getting rich quickly- "*koseyi donmek*"- with no necessary rule or regulations. This "anything goes" mentality was both a contradiction to the early Republican values of modesty, moral decency and equality and to the traditional Islamic values of honesty and social justice. Thus, apart from being autonomous, the public sphere took on chaotic nature which polarized the different identity positions and demands, rather than channeling them into a deliberative political process. That is, the politics of the public sphere became a public struggle for recognition instead of a peaceful negotiation for representation.

Chapter VII

ALTERNATIVE PUBLICS AND THE PUBLIC STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION

Introduction

The key defining characteristic of post-1980 Turkish public sphere was the multiplication of identity positions and their struggle for inclusion in the public sphere. Kurdish nationalism and political Islam presented the most important challenges to the boundaries of the public sphere and the homogeneous representation of national identity within it. By drawing attention to the exclusionary nature of that national identity, Kurdish nationalism posed a serious challenge to the privileged position of Turkish identity. The representation of the Kurdish identity in the Kemalist public sphere was impossible since this was viewed as a direct threat to a homogeneous national identity.¹ Kurdish nationalism grew despite the forceful reaction from the regime and its denial of public access to the Kurdish identity. Its existence has forced public debate on what Turkish identity means, and whether the citizens of Turkey should be called Turks or the people of Turkey.²

¹ One of the biggest political controversies erupted when a member of parliament who was of Kurdish origin took an oath in the parliament in Kurdish. Similarly, publishing in Kurdish or demanding Kurdish education was strictly banned as Turkish was declared to be the only official language in the Public Sphere. For more see Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M. Winrow, *Kurt Sorunu, Kokeni Ve Gelismisi*, (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayinlari, 1997), pg.153.

² Even political leaders had publicly acknowledged the existence of Kurdish identity which was once a taboo and discussed the meaning of Turkish identity. Ozal, when he became president, paid special attention to the Kurdish question and irritated many of the defenders of the Kemalist establishment by going as far as pronouncing a taboo word: federation. Later Suleyman Demirel, when he became prime minister, declared that he recognized the 'Kurdish reality' which was unthinkable before. The leader of the New Democracy Movement Cem Boyner criticize Ataturk's saying " Happy who says I am a Turk" and proposed "Happy who says I am a Turkish Citizen". Similarly Tansu Ciller in one her speeches in 1995 changed Ataturk's words as " Happy who says I am a Turkish Citizen". *ibid*, pp.122-158.

Political Islam represents another challenge to a homogeneous Turkish identity whose constitutive properties were not supposed to have religious codes. Unlike the Kurdish identity, however, Islamists were able to establish themselves in the public sphere as political actors and to question the fundamental aspects of the public sphere and national identity. Islamists have consistently attacked the equation of modernity with secularism and Westernization. The growing urban Islamist population, who have considerable economic power and an intellectual background, demand that a religious life style be included in the organizations of the public sphere. Islamists have been particularly successful in organizing themselves in civil society.³ The Islamic bourgeoisie, with a very efficient and active business organizations, and the Islamist intellectuals,⁴ with their vibrant publishing community, have been extremely crucial in opening up the space in the public sphere. Within the last five years, the Islamist Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*) has gained strong momentum by successfully integrating the new migrants from Anatolia into the Islamic discourse. The slums (*gecekondu*) had been traditional territories of the left, but Islamists have been very successfully reversing this trend. The newly urbanized migrants find a hospitable discourse in the Welfare Party's "issue oriented" language

Apart from Kurdish nationalism and political Islam, there are also other identity positions that call into question the boundaries of the public sphere. For example, the women's movement challenges the way that women's identity has been incorporated into the national identity as a marker of modernity in the public sphere.⁵ Similarly,

³ Binnaz Toprak, "Civil Society in Turkey". *Civil Society in the Middle East, Volume II*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), pp. 106-122.

⁴ For the case of Islamists intellectuals see Binnaz Toprak, "Islamists Intellectuals: Revolt Against Industry and Technology" in *Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities*, ed. by Metin Heper, Ayse Oncu and Heinz Kramer, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), pp.237-257.

⁵ Sirin Tekeli, " Tek parti Doneminde Kadin Hareketi de Bastirildi" in *Sol Kemalizme Bakiyor*, ed. by Levent Cinemre and Rusen Cakir, (Istanbul: Metis Yayinlari, 1991).

Alewites, the second most numerous Muslim group in Turkey, demand public recognition and representation in the public sphere.

The third chapter argued that the public sphere can only accommodate different identity positions if it has a cosmopolitan orientation. A cosmopolitan public sphere requires an environment where different identities are not only represented but also they can actively engage in debate over the nature of the public sphere itself. The dialogical quality of such public sphere allows identities to engage a negotiation over their differences. It can also prevent a particularistic politics in which each and every identity position represent itself as a fixed category.

Unfortunately, the pluralization of the public sphere in Turkey has not produced a cosmopolitan environment. The lack of a liberal rights discourse in Turkey and the strength of the communitarian orientation within the national public sphere appear to be the main obstacles preventing the emergence of a dialogical political process. The public sphere in Turkey is not yet equipped to deal with difference and plurality. It has always historically functioned as a space of homogenization of the national identity. For this reason, the struggle of various identity positions for inclusion has taken the form of a communitarian politics. Issues are debated within the context of communal values and lifestyles.

This chapter will discuss how different identity positions not only attempt to gain recognition but also question the basic principles of the public sphere to establish themselves as legitimate actors. The first section will demonstrate this pluralization of the public sphere by focusing on the forms of public struggle. Following this, two alternative forms of constructing the public sphere will be discussed: the Second

Republic debate and the *Medina* Document. The former outlines a secular alternative to the Kemalist formulation of the public sphere whereas the *Medina* document provides an Islamic framework for the public sphere. Both challenge the Kemalist interpretation of modern society.

7.1. The Public Politics of Private Lives and the Shifting of the Boundaries of the Public Sphere

Competition and struggle over the meanings of symbols and representations in everyday life that shape "social values" are vital for understanding how the struggle over the control of institutions as well as resistance to certain political and economic structures take place.⁶ The division between public and private is particularly important in this context because what is public and what is private often determines the location of cultural codes and the usage of language. It can prevent certain identities from being represented as legitimate actors in the public sphere. The struggle to represent these excluded cultural forms, traditions and identities in the public sphere is carried out by mobilizing certain symbols and language and the boundaries of the public and private shift as a result of this struggle over cultural codes and symbols.

This usually takes place within the process of everyday life in different locations ranging from interpersonal relations to the meaning and definitions of institutions. In the sphere that Habermas calls "life- world", a space outside the systemic effects of society and the networks of everyday life, symbols and cultural codes are reproduced. Turkish modernization represents an interesting example how the power of symbols and cultural codes have played a role in licensing certain identities and life styles as modern and defining others as traditional. This process aimed not only to transform the state

⁶ Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), pg.9

and other institutions but also actively to create a modern subject by establishing cultural practices and modern symbols related to life style choices. The Turkish public sphere is particularly important in this respect because the boundaries of the public sphere reflect the cultural codes and symbols of Turkish modernization. The secular life style identified with education, mannerisms, dress, food, architectural style, music, cinema, opera, ballet and theater were some of the sites among others that defined the boundaries of the public sphere. For example, the propaganda movies of the 1950s usually pictured a modern Turkey where unveiled modern women with stylish short hair cuts worked together with men in modern public buildings, national theaters, symphony orchestras, and in the opera and ballet.⁷ Even "the body language" that indicated a modern individual educated by the secular establishment represented what was acceptable in the public sphere.⁸ Absent in the representations of modern Turkey were religious motifs such as mosques, religious dress and veiled women.

By carefully manipulating the symbols and cultural codes the modernizing elite strictly controlled what was represented in the public sphere. In 1928 the Kemalist elite went as far as to appoint a committee to examine "the problem of reform and modernization in Islamic religion" which concluded that "religious life, like moral and economic life, must be reformed on scientific lines".⁹ The modernizing elite was committed to eliminating the signs and symbols of Islam from the public sphere but the physical presence of mosques constituted reminders of past and tradition. The committee therefore sought to reform behavior in the mosques. It recommended that "mosques

⁷ Resat Kasaba and Sibel Bozdogan, "Introduction" in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity In Turkey*, ed. by Resat Kasaba and Sibel Bozdogan, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), pg.5

⁸ Nilufer Gole, "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter Elites", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 51, No.1, Winter 1997, pg. 52

⁹ Resat Kasaba, "Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities", in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity In Turkey*, ed. by Resat Kasaba and Sibel Bozdogan, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), pg.25

should be clean and orderly, with pews and cloakrooms, and that people should enter mosques with clean shoes".¹⁰ Given that one can not enter a mosque while wearing shoes, the committee was determined to modernize the rituals of Islam in order to make the mosque a part of modern public life.

The post-1980 era witnessed a movement where formerly marginalized groups and identities began to use symbols and cultural codes to redefine the meaning and the boundaries of the public sphere. The secular establishment had the first shock when Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party became the government in 1983. As mentioned previously, Turgut Ozal did not come from the Kemalist intelligentsia. He was the son of an Anatolian bureaucrat and did not have a strong commitment to the Kemalist project. Most of his government consisted of what Nilufer Gole calls 'Islamist engineers'. They changed the tone of the state discourse and put the secular establishment on the defensive. Another important moment in the struggle over the boundaries of the public sphere started with the ascendancy of the Islamist Welfare Party. The Welfare Party won the March 1994 municipal elections and the mayorship of such major cities as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. This was a great shock because it was the first time that the modern cities of Turkey had Islamist mayors. The second shock came with the December 1995 general election where the Welfare Party became the leading party with 22 percent of the vote. In June 1996 the Welfare Party entered into a coalition government.

Starting with the election of the Motherland Party in 1983, the struggle over symbols and cultural codes has been the main agenda of public debate. Islamists have attempted to gain legitimacy in the institutions which they had a claim to govern by successfully struggling over the inclusion of cultural codes and symbols in the public sphere. By changing the language of modernization and by struggling to introduce symbols

¹⁰ *ibid*, pg.25

previously excluded from the public sphere, they aim to redefine the public sphere. Like the modernizing elite, their struggle over inclusion in the public sphere has multiple dimensions ranging from dress codes, music, historical symbols to education and mannerisms. In Gole's terminology, they try to establish their own "symbolic capital" which would legitimize their existence in the public sphere.¹¹ Similar to the attitudes of the secular establishment, it is important for Islamists to struggle over what one listens, wears, eats, dresses and studies in the public sphere. Islamist claim for control over institutions goes hand in hand with their struggle for control over the symbols and cultural codes of everyday life.

The struggle by Islamists to control symbols and cultural codes mobilized the secular segments of society to protect the modern symbols of the public sphere as religiously as the early Republican elite. Aware that the secular modern identity, as defined by the Kemalist project, is no longer the privileged agent of the public sphere, and threatened by the Islamist aim to transform the public sphere, the secular establishment is also engaged in a fight over the protection of the symbols of the public sphere. In this respect, the Islamic presence in the public sphere is met by two types of secular responses. The first group consists of traditional Kemalists who defend the principles of Kemalism without any compromise.¹² For example, organizations like *Ataturkcu*

¹¹ Gole, "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter Elites", pg.52

¹² Sometimes protection of what is modern and acceptable in the public sphere by the secular population reaches the point of absurdity. In 1984 in a symposium about the Princess Islands (a cluster of four islands just off the shore of Istanbul) Doc. Dr. Reha Gunay argued that proper conduct should be the norm in the Islands (efendilestirmek). For him the proper conduct was that restaurants should serve fried mussels instead of "lahmacun". *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 05.05.1984. Of course one has to explain this seemingly meaningless anecdote. With their cosmopolitan population of Greeks, Turks, Armenians and Levantines the Princess Islands since the Ottoman times have been the symbol of aristocratic and modern life style in Turkey. One of the biggest complaints was that in recent years, that is after 1980s, the islands came under siege by the daily trips of Anatolian migrants whose taste in food and music was in seeming contradiction with the island life style. Their existence in the islands along with the traditional music and food - which is lahmacun, a kind of Turkish pizza, usually cooked in the Southeast

Dusunce Dernegi (The Association of the Kemalist Thought) and *Ataturkcu Kadinlar Dernegi* (The Association of Kemalist Women), as well as various groups of retired army officers and several columnists in the media reject any kind of debate over the principles of the Kemalist public sphere. Another secular segment, however, indicated its readiness to accept a pluralistic public space. They are more sympathetic to the existence of an Islamic life style in the public sphere, as long as their secular life style is not threatened.¹³

These two types of secular responses can be seen in the writings of two journalists. In his analysis of why the Welfare Party had to leave the government after less than a year, Hadi Uluengin, a journalist in *Hurriyet* daily, concluded that Islamists failed to understand the fact that secularism is a life style in Turkey which has deep roots in "the collective consciousness of the society".¹⁴ He argued that Islamists in Turkey read the crisis of modernity correctly but failed to understand that the modern and secular life style is a non-negotiable fact for large segments of society.¹⁵ By making symbols their main political strategy to achieve public recognition, Islamists failed to understand the importance of symbols for seculars. Similarly, an influential columnist Guneri Civaoglu wrote in his column that the Welfare Party is destined to be excluded from the public life. He describes the cultural landscape of Istanbul in which every year during

part of Turkey, and their Islamic life style, especially headscarfed women was seen as a threat to the modern outlook of Istanbul. In the symposium Dr. Gunay was complaining on behalf of that sentiment which sees *lahmacun* as a threat to the modern life style. In the expression of such sentiments Dr. Gunay was not an isolated figure. After the eighties it was very common to see articles and debates in the newspapers about how Anatolian life style was threatening the cosmopolitan and modern life style of cities.

¹³ Metin Heper, "Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a Reconciliation", *Middle East Journal*, Vol.51, No.1, Winter 1997, pp.42-44.

¹⁴ Hadi Uluengin, "Hayat Tarzi", *Hurriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 4. 04.1997

¹⁵ *ibid.* Uluengin displays the typical secular reaction in Turkey by arguing that by not allowing alcohol service in his receptions the Prime Minister created a serious doubt in the minds of Turkish people whose drinking culture is part of the folk literature. Yet, Uluengin takes a conciliatory tone and notes that if the Prime Ministers decided to serve juice and lemonade together with alcohol he would not threaten the people and give a liberal message.

the summer the Istanbul Film Festival, Theater Festival, and Istanbul Classical and Jazz Music Festivals drive hundreds of thousands of young and old people into concert halls and open air theaters and cinemas.¹⁶ For Civaoglu "with their confrontational style, with their poor taste in dress and with their mustaches", the Welfare MPs in the parliament are the antithesis of modern Turkey represented in the cultural landscape of Istanbul.¹⁷ In other words the Welfare party is destined to be excluded because it fails to adopt the modern face of Turkey.

7.2. The Rediscovery of the Ottoman Legacy

One of the first clashes between Islamist and secular groups over the foundations of the public sphere started with Islamists' increasing use of the Ottoman Empire and its cultural symbols as an alternative to the secular Kemalist identity. Due to Kemalism's complete rejection of the Ottoman legacy the secular establishment in Turkey had long refused to engage with the Ottoman history and culture as part of the Turkish identity. The Kemalist elite was particularly sensitive about language and had identified the elimination of Arabic and Persian words from Turkish as one of the principal aspect of modernization. The modern Turkish language should not be the mixed language of Ottoman but that of pure Turkish. To modernize the language Ataturk created the Turkish Language Association, and the Association replaced thousands of Ottoman words with newly created Turkish words until 1980 when it was closed down by the military government.

When the Motherland Party formed the government and appointed a new director for the state television, TRT (Turkish Radio Television Corporation), a ban was issued on the

¹⁶ Guneri Civaoglu, "Cenaze Ve Dugun", *Milliyet* (Istanbul Daily), 13.07.1997

¹⁷ *ibid.*

use of 205 words in TRT programming and programmers were asked to replace them with their Ottoman counterparts.¹⁸ The banned words had been created by the Turkish Language Association to replace their Ottoman counterparts. There was a similar attempt to replace the new Turkish words with the Ottoman ones in school textbooks. The Minister of Education, Vehbi Dincerler, a member of Ozal's Motherland Party, started a campaign to rewrite the books with words that would be in harmony with the general structure of Turkish.¹⁹ Since there is a centralized education system in Turkey and all the schools in the country use the same textbooks, replacing the new words with the Ottoman words quickly became a source of controversy. The ban on words was condemned quickly not only by political parties but also by writers and artists. Writer Aksit Gokturk pointed out that the TRT was trying to reverse the development of the Turkish language.²⁰

In addition, in September 1985, the TRT aired a panel discussion in which participants argued that the Ottoman Empire was secular and that, in this respect, Ataturk's reforms represented a continuum with the Ottoman legacy.²¹ The chair of the panel discussion, Prof. Dr. Ayhan Songar, told the journalists that Ataturk's reforms adapted Islam to the requirements of the modern age.²² Even though the panel discussion on the public television was far from criticizing the Kemalist ideology, the attempt to establish a continuum between the Ottoman legacy and Kemalist modernization created an angry uproar from the Kemalist establishment. The leaders of political parties condemned the panel declaring it an attack on Kemalist principles. Cezmi Kartay, the leader of the Social Democratic SODEP party, argued that by establishing a relation between the

¹⁸*Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 14.01.1985

¹⁹*Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 16.07.1985. One of the arguments that was put forward by the conservative groups was that new words did not fit into the general grammatical structure of Turkish.

²⁰*Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 14.01.1985

²¹*Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 04.09.1985

²²*ibid.*

Kemalist principles and the Ottoman legacy, the panel participants were praising the Ottoman administration and the caliphate and displaying a desire to return to pre-Republican times.²³ The member of the center right MDP party, Memduh Yasa, noted that under the pretext of discussing secularism, participants had actually engaged in religious propaganda.²⁴ The same angry response was also directed towards the Minister of Education who gave a seminar after the panel arguing that the Ottoman Empire was not a theocratic state but a secular one. The Social Democrat Populist Party issued a declaration stating that the national education was in the hands of an ignorant individual who had a medieval mind and that he was an embarrassment to the Turkish people.²⁵ The leader of the center right True Path Party, Husamettin Cindoruk, argued that the Minister's claim that the Ottoman Empire was secular had no scientific validity.²⁶

Even before the controversy over words became a public issue, there were other controversies which focused on the use of Republican symbols. In 1984, the city council of Ankara, which was controlled by the Motherland Party, decided to replace a Hittite Statue with another, which symbolized 17 different Turkish states in history. This was a deliberate attempt to challenge the historical thesis of the new Republic. In order to remove the Ottoman past from the collective memory, the Kemalist elite decided to establish a continuum with the civilizations of Anatolia. The new symbol of the capital, Ankara, was selected. It was to be the Hittiteite Sun and state enterprises were named after different Anatolian civilizations such as the Assyrians (Sumer) and the Hittite (Eti). By removing the Hittite statue from the public location, the Ankara

²³ *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 05.09.1985

²⁴ *ibid.*

²⁵ *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 10.09.1985

²⁶ *ibid.*

Municipality was attempting to challenge one of the important symbols of the modern Republic.

Immediately thereafter, the municipality decided to rename Lausanne Square as the Malazgirt Square.²⁷ Similarly, the Lausanne Treaty was also one of the most important symbols of Republican Turkey because it signified, not only the foundation of the Turkish Republic, but also recognition of the Republic's borders by the international community. The Malazgirt war was a symbol marking the Turkish entry into the Anatolia. To replace the name of the Square with Malazgirt was an attempt to replace an important Republican historical symbol with a pre-Republican one.

The member who proposed the motion explained the rationale of replacing the statue and the name of the square as follows: 'Hittite Civilization is an Anatolian civilization; it has nothing to do with the Turkish civilization. If we decide to erect statues of other civilizations we will have to erect a statue for the Byzantine Empire. Tourists come to this city and see the Hittite statue in the center of the city and think that it is a representative of Turkish culture. We do not want to change the name of the Lausanne square but we want to replace the Hittite statue with another one which represents the Turkish culture'.²⁸ He was careful enough to realize that the Lausanne issue was an overly sensitive one and immediately withdrew this part of the motion.

The removal of the Hittite statue created a major controversy and one journalist, Cüneyt Arcayurek, wrote that 'for the sake of the health of the regime the municipal and central governments should stop playing with the symbols of established norms in Turkey'.²⁹

²⁷ *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 01.06.1984

²⁸ *ibid.*, The same member, Melih Gökçek, became a mayor of Metropolitan Ankara after 1994 Municipal election from the Welfare Party List and already earned a reputation of being the most controversial Mayor of Ankara

²⁹ *ibid.*

The former minister of culture, Cihat Baban, urged that everybody should pay attention to what was happening because "these people" would start with the statue and the next step would be closing down the Museum of Anatolian Civilizations.³⁰ The former Mayor of Ankara, Ali Dincer argued that the fight was not about the statue but that the Kemalist conception of history was being attacked by a reactionary Islamic interpretation of Turkish history.³¹ Soon enough, sculptors joined the debate and declared the municipality the enemy of art.³² In the face of such reactions, the municipality had to withdraw its motion. The controversy over the statue is indicative of how much each side was able to shift the public conception of history. Rather than a direct debate about history, the fight over the Statue became a fight over which interpretation of the past would inform modern national identity. For this reason, the secular segment of society read the attempts to bring the symbols of the Ottoman past into the public sphere as a setback to modern Turkish life. The Kemalist establishment perceived these attempts as turning the Turkish Republic into either an "Ottoman Republic" or a "Turkish Islamic Republic".³³

When the Minister of Education stated that "rejecting the past is illness and it is necessary to combine the beauty of the Ottoman system with the Kemalist project", this proved to Kemalists that subversive forces were trying to bring the past back by using Ataturk's name.³⁴ In reaction to the Minister of Education, writer Oktay Akbal noted that education could not be left to someone like Dincerler and that "everybody should realize that this is Ataturk's Turkey and we do not have any involvement with the

³⁰ *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 06.06.1984

³¹ *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 04.06.1984

³² *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 02.06.1984

³³ Suna Kili, "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti mi, Türkiye İslam Cumhuriyeti mi?", *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 13.03.1984.

³⁴ Oktay Akbal, "Ataturk'un Yolu Osmanlıcilik Degildir", *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 19.08.1985

Ottoman Empire... We are not a mixed Ottoman community but a Turkish nation".³⁵ His article was followed by numerous others arguing that the suggestion that the Ottoman system was a secular one was nothing but a sinister attempt to reduce the importance of the Kemalist reforms.³⁶

The debate on the Ottoman legacy represents a good example of how secular and Islamist groups have long engage in a struggle over the foundations of the public sphere. It also demonstrates the power of symbols in shifting the boundaries of the public sphere. The initial attempts by Islamists to make a connection between the Ottoman legacy and the Kemalist project have been able to shift significantly the parameters of the public debate over the last decade. Thus, in 1984, the Minister of Education's suggestion of establishing a harmonious relationship between the Ottoman legacy and Kemalist ideology received an angry response from the secular establishment. Since the progressive nature of Kemalism had always been explained in relation to the old and backward Ottoman system, any link between the two was an unforgivable sin for the Kemalist establishment. In the second half of the nineties, however, some secular groups have rediscovered the Ottoman legacy. It became common practice, for example, for secular writers to praise Ottoman multiculturalism in order to criticize the intolerance of Islamists. Just as the Islamists used the Ottoman legacy to shift the boundaries of the public sphere, the secular segment of society was also forced to rethink its relationship with the Ottoman past. This rethinking led the secular establishment to reclaim the tolerance and multiculturalism of the Ottoman legacy to counter the Islamists' claims. The debate over the Ottoman legacy was also an education process for seculars. Once they realize that the state was not the protector of the Kemalist legacy, secular groups

³⁵ *ibid.*

³⁶ Vehbi Belgil, "Osmanlı Devleti Laik miydi?", *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 10.09.1985

rediscovered political action becoming once again political in the public sphere in order to defend the symbols of modern Turkey.

7.3. Education as a source of Identity.

The Kemalist elite had promoted an education system informed by a positivistic world view. They believed that education based on scientific principles would eliminate the remnants of Islam from the minds of the people. The centralized education system which had a tightly controlled curriculum was indeed very effective in producing individuals committed to the secular world view. Although the education system has lost its radical tone over the years, it is still very instrumental to maintain the secular life style as one of the no-compromise foundations of the public sphere . The radical secular orientation of the education system has always been a source of controversy between the Kemalist establishment and the conservative groups. It was thus no surprise that during the post-1980 period, education became an area of intense struggle to challenge the boundaries of the public sphere.

The biggest blow to the Turkish education system came not from Islamists but from the military regime of 1980. Schools did not have religion classes in Turkey until 1982. There were some limited elective religion classes which required the permission of parents and usually they were not very significant due to poor attendance. The new 1982 Constitution commissioned by the military government, however, made religion classes mandatory for secondary schools. The rationale behind this decision was that since the state schools did not provide a religious education, children learned religion from unauthorized individuals who would exploit religion and put all sorts of nonsense into children's heads. The generals thought that if the state teaches religion in a proper

way, the exploitation of religion by ignorant groups would stop. They were careful not to offer Islamic religion classes: the course was titled "The Knowledge of Religious Culture and Ethics" which was supposed to be a general course on religious cultures including Judaism and Christianity. The mandatory religious culture classes convinced the Kemalist intelligentsia that this was an unacceptable concession to Islamic groups.

While the Kemalist establishment was still trying to recover from the shock of mandatory religion classes, the Minister of Education, Vehbi Dincerler of the Motherland Party declared a war on Darwin's theory of evolution. He issued a report which was sent out to schools in which he asked that Darwin's theory not be thought of as the absolute law. In the same report, he noted that there were serious doubts about the validity of Darwin's theory and teaching it to children as an absolute truth would create a unidimensional educational policy which would do nothing but condition students' minds.³⁷ Like the debate over language, the debate over Darwin's theory quickly turned into a political struggle between Kemalists and Islamists. This statement outraged different groups and they immediately condemned the Minister of Education as a representative of reactionary religious thought at war not only with scientific thought but also with modernization in Turkey since the eighteenth century.³⁸ The Minister rejected the idea that he was waging a religious war on Darwin; as he had simply suggested that Darwin should be studied together with other theories.³⁹ If necessary the ministry would organize a scientific council with educators and scientists to discuss the matter. He gave examples from Western countries where they teach Darwin but where they also teach the creation theories of Christianity and Judaism.⁴⁰ Scientists from

³⁷ *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 26.04.1985

³⁸ Dr. Resit Canbeyli, "Dincerler, Darwin'e Neden Karsi?", *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 30.03.1985, Ilhan Selcuk, "Milli Egitimde Gerici Ideoloji", *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 30.03.1985

³⁹ *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 29.03.1985

⁴⁰ *ibid.*

various universities ridiculed the Minister's idea of forming a scientific council, arguing that the Minister was trying to incorporate religious knowledge into the curriculum by creating a controversy over Darwin's theory.⁴¹ Both the Minister and the Kemalist groups knew that the debate over what should be taught in schools was really about who should control the minds of citizens. For this reason, the Kemalist establishment perceived the Minister's attempts as part of a sinister strategy to revise the education system that had been based on universal, humanist, secular and positivist principles. Newspaper articles already mentioned his pilgrimage (*Hac*) to Mecca and argued that it was unacceptable to have a pilgrim (*haci*) as a Minister of Education.⁴² In other words, the implication was that someone who was religious enough to go pilgrimage should not lead the modern Turkish education system.

The Minister of Education also attempted to change music education in schools. The new curriculum was to put more emphasis on classical Turkish music as opposed to Western classical music. The ministry was careful to inform the public that the Western classical music would not be eliminated from the courses, stating only that Turkish music would be given more emphasis than it had in the past.⁴³ It was no coincidence that the Minister selected music education as the course to revise as an emphasis on Western classical music had been the main principle of music education in Turkey. The Kemalist education system had declared classical Turkish music monotone and backward, accepting Western tunes as the principal source of the music education.

In addition to the controversy over the curriculum, there was also a controversy over the nature of schools. The Kemalist education system remained in its initial form until the end of the Second World War. After a transition to a multi-party system, demands

⁴¹ *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 27.03.1985

⁴² *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 11.07.1984

⁴³ *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 19.04.1985

for religious education grew rapidly. In order not be left behind by the Democratic Party the Republican People's Party reintroduced religion classes as electives in primary schools in 1946 and reopened a limited number of *Imam-Hatips* schools (Secondary Schools directed towards educating imams for mosques) which later became the main source of controversy between secular and conservative groups.

After the RPP lost the election in 1950, the government of the Democratic Party opened 7 Imam-Hatip schools and higher Islamic institutes to educate teachers for Imam-Hatip schools. In 1958 there were 26, by 1971 there were 71, and by 1997 there were 600 Imam-Hatip schools which exceeded the number of graduates needed for mosques.⁴⁴

Secular groups were opposed to these schools as they argued that they had diverted from their initial mission of graduating *imams* and had become instead general educational institutions whose graduates attended universities and become doctors, engineers, lawyers and, more importantly, state bureaucrats. Moreover, since it is impossible, as a woman, to become an *imam*, secular groups argued that the fact that these schools were admitting female students proved the fact that the real purpose of these schools was not to produce imams but rather to take over the education system slowly and to destroy the secular and positivist orientation of it.

The media closely followed what was being taught in these schools as well as where the graduates of these schools found employment. The education of girls and boys in different classrooms reinforced the belief that these schools were not simple educational facilities but were on their way to becoming religious institutions. President Kenan Evren urged city governors to make sure that education in the Imam-Hatip schools would take place in mixed classrooms. Controversy erupted when the Motherland Party government removed the Director of School System in Izmir because he followed the President's

⁴⁴*Milliyet* (Istanbul Daily), 01.04.1997

instructions and issued a memorandum to the Imam-Hatip schools to end segregated classrooms.⁴⁵ When the media campaign intensified, the President had to intervene to ensure that schools had mixed classrooms.

In an interview with one of the students from an Imam-Hatip school, one journalist received a response that "science he learns in his schools tell them science means to be against infidels walking around in provocative dresses".⁴⁶ This response, together with the segregated classrooms, proved the suspicions of the secular establishment that these schools were filling young minds with reactionary religious knowledge and graduating students who were against the fundamental principles of the Republic. The media started a campaign claiming that, rather than teaching scientific knowledge, these schools were educating children with the principles of the *Sharia* which rejects reason as human's biggest asset in controlling their own destiny.⁴⁷

In December 1985, 20 female headscarved Imam-Hatip students came to a panel discussion attended by students from other schools and listened to the national anthem while wearing their headscarves. While they were warned by the chair to remove their headscarves they disobeyed the chair and left the meeting in protest.⁴⁸ The media was filled with angry letters and the Minister of Education was forced to launch an investigation to find out who these students were and to take disciplinary action against them.⁴⁹

With the ascendancy of the Islamist Welfare Party after the first half of the nineties, the controversy around the Imam-Hatip schools intensified. Furthermore, the interest of

⁴⁵ *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 28.11.1985

⁴⁶ *ibid.*

⁴⁷ İlhan Selçuk, "Kim Gerici", *Cumhuriyet*(Istanbul Daily), 06.12.1985

⁴⁸ *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 12.12.1985

⁴⁹ *ibid.*

Imam-Hatip graduates in the law schools and the departments of political science and public administration was, for the secular establishment, an indication that Imam-hatip graduates were targeting the strategic bureaucratic ranks in order to quietly change the secular system. The number of Imam-Hatip graduates taking the judicial and public service exams increased and, in 1997, 100 out of 1756 successful candidates who past the test to become a judge and prosecutor, were from Imam-Hatip schools.⁵⁰

On February 28, 1997 the National Security Council⁵¹ advised the government to increase the number of mandatory years of education from five to eight years. The Council advised the government that eight years mandatory education should be conducted as a principal education after which students would go into schools related to their choice of profession.⁵² The debate over increasing the number of years of mandatory education to eight years was not new. In fact, in 1973 the council of education had advised the government to increase mandatory education to eight years, but no government had been brave enough to implement this since to do so would require closing down the first five grades of the Imam-Hatip schools. Since students were choosing their professional direction after the fifth grade, the Imam-hatip schools recruited students after the fifth grade. The new arrangement would require the Imam-hatip, and any other technical schools, to recruit their students after the eighth grade. The conservative circles were opposed to this arrangement since ninth grade would be too late to begin one's technical

⁵⁰*Sabah* (Istanbul Daily), 01.05.1997

⁵¹ The National Security Council is an advisory body composed of the President, the Prime Minister, Ministers and high ranking soldiers. The council coordinates issues related to national security and advises the government about national security issues. As a civilian-military body the existence of the National Security Council has been controversial especially after the military take over 1980. The 1982 constitution increased the significance of the Council and the role of soldiers in the Council. Even though the Council can not dictate to the government, the careful wording in the constitution suggest that the advises of the council should be taken into consideration by the government with priority. Taha Parla, *Turkiye'nin Siyasal Rejimi, 1980-1989*, (Istanbul: Iletisim, 1986), pg. 80.

⁵²*Milliyet* (istanbul Daily), 02.03.1997 and *Sabah* (istanbul Daily), 02.03.1997

education. The secular groups, however, claimed that the Imam-hatip schools recruited students in the sixth grade when their identity was not yet completely formed and when they could mold them into Islamic individuals.

Primarily as a result of the pressure from the military, the National Security Council took their advice and concluded the controversy over the education system. This indicated that the issue was not really about education per se but rather about security which threatened the foundations of the Republic. Ironically enough, Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Islamist party and the first Islamist prime minister of Turkey, signed the council memorandum which approved the eight year mandatory education and declared that the religious groups were a threat to the foundations of the Republic.

Islamist groups were aware that the eight year mandatory education meant the end of the Imam-hatip schools and they fiercely opposed the advice of the Council in order not to lose their hard-won territory against the Kemalist education system. That Necmettin Erbakan had signed the memorandum as a result of the pressure from the military created an earthquake in the party and Erbakan was criticized by party members for destroying the party's foundations.⁵³ A rift emerged between the Welfare Party and its coalition partner, the center-right True Path Party. The Minister of Education, a member of the True Path Party, announced that his ministry had started to prepare for a shift to the eight year mandatory education and, like any other technical schools, the sixth, seventh and eighth grades of the Imam-Hatip schools would be closed down.⁵⁴ The Welfare Party MPs declared that they would never vote for the eight year education

⁵³*Hurriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 30.04.1997

⁵⁴*Milliyet* (Istanbul Daily), 01.04.1997

reform in the parliament and that they would mobilize their base to protest the new system.

Soon the controversy over the eight year education reform turned into a struggle between secularism and Islamism. Islamists declared that they would never kill the Imam-Hatip schools while secular groups stated that they were determined to close down the Imam-Hatip schools. That no attention was paid to the technical aspect of the issue in a subject like education indicates that the struggle was not really over education but over what type of individuals the Republic produces in its schools. Islamists protest the education system by arguing that the Republican education system produces unidimensional individuals who lacks the critical ability to question and the Imam-Hatip schools would be a sacrifice for this centralist conception of education.⁵⁵

In various cities there were demonstrations by Islamists and secular groups. Islamists used the slogan "do not touch my Imam-Hatip" while secular groups chanted slogans such as "we want a secular Turkey not a *Medrese* (a religious mosque schools of the Ottoman Empire)".⁵⁶ On the anniversary of the Unification of the Education Law there were marches across the country in which university teachers and women's organizations took the leading role and issued declarations stating that secular education was the guarantee of democracy.⁵⁷ During the celebrations of the Day of Youth and Sport - which is the day Atatürk started the National Liberation War and later dedicated to the Turkish Youth - in the football stadium Imam-Hatip students chanted slogans " do not touch the Imam-Hatip" and students of other schools immediately started to chant "Turkey is secular and will remain secular".⁵⁸

⁵⁵Fehmi Kuru, "Imam-Hatipler Ideolojiler Catismasinda", *Zaman* (Istanbul Daily), 26.03.1997

⁵⁶*Milliyet* (Istanbul Daily), 25.05.1997

⁵⁷*Sabah* (Istanbul Daily), 04.03.1997

⁵⁸*Hurriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 20.05.1997

Universities, business associations, labour unions and other civil society organizations such as women's groups and environmentalists put pressure on the coalition government. Probably for the first time in the history of the Republic, the military issued a declaration inviting civil society organizations to be alert about religious fundamentalism and organized seminars to explain the political methods that such religious groups used. The National Security Council issued an advisory to the government requesting that strict measures be taken against religious fundamentalism. Under heavy pressure from both military and civil society organizations, the government collapsed in June 1997. The new government formed by center right Motherland Party and the Democratic Left Party took the issue of the eight year mandatory education reform as a priority and passed the legislation in the Parliament in August 1997 with heavy protests from the Welfare Party MPs. This has been presented as a victory of secularism in Turkey

At the center of the controversy over the education system was the control of the minds of the younger generations. Islamists, like Kemalists, understood the importance of education. Segregated classrooms with headscarved female students has always touched a sensitive nerve in the Kemalist regime which saw dress and outlook as part of being modern and secular. Furthermore, the school curriculum which incorporated Islamic teachings posed a threat to the regime's most important project of creating modern individuals free from religious dogmas. The existence of Imam-hatip schools, however, provided religious groups with an outlet from which they could resist the rigid education system which they perceived as oppressive. For this reason, the struggle over the Imam-Hatip schools was not simply a struggle over education but a struggle over the representation of the modern and the traditional in the public sphere.

7.4. No Modernity With Headscarf

Another sensitive public issue during the eighties and nineties had been the wearing of headscarves in public places. For the Kemalist regime, if education was about creating a modern individual, modern dress was about the representation of that modern individual. In this context the Kemalist elite put a very heavy emphasis on the representation of women in the public sphere. Atatürk himself repeated numerous times that a modern nation could not exist where women were locked inside and covered when they ventured outside. The Kemalist elite paid as much attention to the representation of women in the public as to the incorporation of women into professional and political life since their representation as being modern would act as a window for modern Turkey to the outside world.⁵⁹

The Kemalist regime assumed that as women became more educated they would free themselves from the oppressive structure of traditional life which had denied women a public role. Contrary to this Kemalist assumption, a group of female university students started to wear headscarves in the eighties. This sent shockwaves across the country. The secular public reacted angrily to the appearance of headscarved female students in universities and argued that the only reason for this 'headscarf business' was to bring the Turkish women back to the middle ages.⁶⁰ Female students with

⁵⁹ For more on the Kemalist Project's incorporation of Women's issues into the modernization process see Nilufer Gole, *The Forbidden Modern, Islamists Veiling and Civilization in Turkey*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).

⁶⁰ Prof. Dr. Jale Baysal, "Mayo, Basortusu ve Lailaheillahlah", *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 14.12.1985

headscarves were banned from universities based on a ruling from the Organization of Higher Education. A female headscarfed university teacher was suspended as a result of this same ruling.⁶¹ A group of female students went to the appeals court to challenge the ruling. The appeals court rejected their application stating that "it may be tolerable for individuals with little education to wear headscarves but the wearing of headscarves by educated females, especially in universities, is intolerable and a reaction to secular society".⁶² The court further added that "women who are under the influence of their parents and traditions may cover their head, but female students who are studying in universities do not have to comply with these traditions, therefore their attempt to cover their head is a deliberative attempt on their side to express their belief in a system ruled by religion. Headscarves in universities are not innocent acts but symbols of a world view that is against women's liberation and the basic foundations of our Republic".⁶³

The court's ruling reflects the foundational principles of the public sphere in Turkey. First of all, the headscarf is not a problem if it is used by traditional women with little education. The headscarf only becomes problematic when it appears in the public sphere. Everybody in Turkey, in fact, has a relative or grandmother who covers her head and this is not usually an issue. Yet, if a representative of modern women, a university student, for example, decides to cover her head, as the court ruled, she offends the foundations of the Republic. A headscarfed woman is a reminder of the past that the Turkish Republic tried very hard to erase and its reappearance in the public sphere still constitutes a serious offense. When, for instance, the Higher Education Organization issued a new ruling stating that female students may be allowed to have a "modern" turban, women's organizations reacted angrily and accused the Organization

⁶¹*Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 01.06.1985

⁶²*Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 08.11.1985

⁶³*ibid.*

for giving in to reactionary movements.⁶⁴ The ban on the headscarf on university campuses went on and off according to reactions from society. Wearing a headscarf while in public office however, was still a taboo that even the Islamists did not dare to play with.

With the ascendancy of the Welfare Party, the headscarf became the subject of an intense public controversy. The Turkish Bar Association took a decision not to allow headscarfed female lawyers into the courtrooms. The minister of Justice, a member of the Welfare Party, refused to recognize the ruling of the Bar Association.⁶⁵ The Bar Association then took the ministry to court to get a ruling stating who was responsible for the dress code within the courts. In the meantime, Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Welfare Party, allowed public servants to wear headscarves but, faced with strong reaction from the public and from the Party's coalition partner, he had to then recall this decision.⁶⁶ The Welfare Party offered a compromise that would permit headscarves only in the universities, but this was also rejected by other parties and civil society organizations. By the end of January, 1997, the headscarf issue had turned into a crisis between coalition partners since the True Path Party members, under heavy pressure from different segments of society, declared that if the Welfare Party insisted on the headscarf issue they would break the coalition protocol.⁶⁷ On February 15, 1997, women's organizations organized a march to protest against the Welfare Party and decided to continue their marches periodically.⁶⁸ Newspapers gave large coverage to women's protests as an indication of Turkish women's determination not to return to medieval times. Until the coalition government threatened to break the coalition over the headscarf issue, it remained in the public agenda and probably was one

⁶⁴*Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 08.06.1985

⁶⁵*Milliyet* (Istanbul Daily), 09.12.1996

⁶⁶*Hurriyet* (Istanbul Daily), 29.01.1997

⁶⁷*Sabah* (Istanbul Daily), 04.02.1997

⁶⁸*Milliyet* (Istanbul Daily), 26.02.1996

of the most important factors leading to the end of the first islamist-secular coalition government in Turkey. The resistance to the headscarf was so strong from the secular establishment when Necmettin Erbakan became prime minister that one of the public's biggest concerns was the fact that his wife, who wears a headscarf, would represent Turkey in the international area.

The public struggle over the wearing of the headscarf in schools and public offices is fundamentally about the struggle over inclusion in the public sphere. Female university students who wear headscarves usually come from families who have recently migrated from Anatolia. Given their traditional backgrounds, the wearing of a headscarf allows them to participate in the public sphere. While wearing a headscarf eases the pressure from family and community and allows them to attend university, the foundational principles of the public sphere excludes them as legitimate actors participating in public life. Moreover, the existence of headscarved female university students and public employees destabilizes the meaning of modern national identity. The headscarf issue, therefore, cast doubts on the national identity and becomes a struggle over the boundaries of the public sphere. For this reason, the demand to wear headscarves in public institutions receives a strong reaction as it is perceived to be a direct threat to the foundations of the modern public sphere. Moreover, it is the reason why both Islamists and secular groups chose public institutions and symbols to be their political ground since both are aware that institutions and symbols determine inclusion and exclusion in the public sphere.

7.5. Alternative Publics in Secular and Islamists Politics

The examples discussed above show how, despite its increasing pluralization, the public

sphere is far from being a democratic social space where different identity positions represent themselves and enter into negotiation to reconcile differences. Instead, the public sphere lacks the normative framework to turn everyday political struggle for recognition into a deliberative political process. Because of this, identity politics in the public sphere takes a communitarian form in which secular and Islamic groups struggle to impose their life style over the other. The lack of a normative framework to facilitate debate among different identity positions leads to a belief that in order to secure one's lifestyle and value system, one has to have control over the symbols and the institutions of the public sphere.

The public struggle between secular and Islamist groups reinforces the declining hegemony of the Kemalist ideology as the principal defining logic of the public sphere. As a result, the public sphere has become fragmented along the lines of different identity positions, particularly secular and Islamic identity positions. They both redefine the foundational principles of the public sphere in order to gain recognition. In the following pages the chapter will concentrate on two alternative forms of publics: the "Second Republic Debate" as a secular response to the crisis of the Kemalist paradigm and the "Medina Document" as an Islamist conception of the public sphere.

The Second Republic Debate

The Second Republic Debate of the early 1990s grew out of an effort to find a secular alternative to Kemalist ideology.⁶⁹ The writers, politicians and civil society organizations who had initiated the Second Republic Argument distanced themselves from the Kemalist reading of modernity. They drew attention to the fact that, while the first

⁶⁹ Mehmet Altan, "2. Cumhuriyet, Demirel ve İki Soru", *Sabah* (Istanbul Daily), 12.8.1992.

Turkish Republic was successful in establishing the modern nation in Turkey, it failed to open up the democratic process and thus wound up promoting an authoritarian structure. Proponents of the Second Republic argued that although the regime declared popular sovereignty as the basis of the Republic, it was the military-bureaucratic elite who actually exercised sovereignty on behalf of the people or in some cases despite the people.⁷⁰ Second Republic supporters called for a new institutional and legal framework for the modern regime based on contractual relationship between citizens and the state.

The following points were seen as central to the restructuring of the modern regime in Turkey:

- a) the exercise of popular sovereignty by the people and not by the military-bureaucratic elite;
- b) a definition of citizenship based on legality rather than any kind of ethnic category such as Turkishness and an acceptance of the multiplicity of identities in Turkey;
- c) the elimination of the role of the state in the economy and the implementation of the principles of a market economy;
- d) modernization not as social engineering but as an outcome of the development of social and economic forces;
- e) participation in cultural, political and economic globalization.

As the above points suggest, the Second Republic Argument proposed its solutions within the framework of political and economic liberalism. The Second Republic Argument had two aims: to provide an alternative to the ideological and normative framework of the Kemalist Republic and to propose a liberal political system that would work in harmony

⁷⁰ Mehmet Altan, "Türkiye'nin Butun Sorunu Politik Devletten Liberal Devlete Gecememesidir" in *2. Cumhuriyet Tartismalari*, ed. by Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar (Ankara: Basak Yayinlari, 1993), pg.35

with a market economy.⁷¹ Political liberalism was particularly important for the Second Republic Argument since the Kemalist Republic's distaste for a liberal public sphere had limited the development of civil society in Turkey. For this reason, the proponents of the Second Republic Argument heavily criticized the Kemalist definition of the people for denying the expression of differences among groups and individuals.⁷² They argued that the definition of the people as an integrated whole did not permit individual initiative and creativity. It was, they believed, particularly restrictive in allowing the type of private initiative that would be the most efficient way not only of wealth creation but also social development.

The New Democracy Movement (*Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi*) was a political movement which was influenced by the arguments of the Second Republic Debate. The manifesto of the New Democracy Movement⁷³ stated that there was a need to create a new Turkey in which the old state structure would not prevent society's move towards the information age and where the fundamental freedoms of thought, belief and private enterprise would be respected.⁷⁴ The manifesto stated that the New Democracy Movement saw a plurality of identity positions not as Turkey's weakness but rather its strength.⁷⁵ The movement endorsed a competitive market economy and the primacy of private enterprise as the basis of wealth creation. When the New Democracy Movement became a political party its programme rejected the Kemalist version of secularism, redefining secularism as a

⁷¹ Asaf Savas Akat, "Turkiye'de Sivil Toplum Inanilmaz Bir Hizla Guclenmektedir" in *Ikinci Cumhuriyet Tartismalari*, in note 95, pg.122

⁷² Altan, "Turkiye'nin Butun Sorunu Politik Devletten Liberal Devlete Gecememesidir", pg.36

⁷³ The New Democracy Movement was founded by industrialist Cem Boyner who owns a textile conglomerate in Turkey. A democratic movement initiated by an industrialists created doubts especially within the leftist camp. Some read that initiative as the bourgeoisie's attempt to restructure the regime to complete the integration of Turkey into the global capitalism.

⁷⁴ The Manifesto of the New Democracy Movement, pp.1-2

⁷⁵ *ibid*, pg.4

neutral position towards different beliefs and life styles emerging from such beliefs.⁷⁶ The party commissioned a map of identities in Turkey in order to reveal the multiplicity and the heterogeneity of the Turkish population.⁷⁷ It stressed that the global age requires a multi-centered societies governed by multi-faceted political structures. The manifestation of socio-economic, cultural, ethnic and religious differences in the public sphere were endorsed as part of the political process.⁷⁸

The Second Republic argument was also picked up by another group who attempted to integrate liberal discourse with an alternative reading of national identity. They argued that national identity, as defined by the Kemalist project, did not have any historical and traditional roots but was an identity copied from Western cultural values. Instead, they advocated a neo-Ottomanism which shared the liberal discourse of the Second Republic Argument but also stated that Turkey was the natural inheritor of the Ottoman legacy. This legacy provides Turkey with an opportunity to have an influence over a large geographical area from the Balkans to Central Asia. The neo-Ottoman position criticized the Kemalist project for being unimaginative and unable to use the endless cultural and political opportunities that the Ottoman legacy would provide. For the advocates of neo-Ottomanism, it was important to recognize the cosmopolitan quality of Turkish-Ottoman identity which enabled it to bring different religious and ethnic identities under the same umbrella.⁷⁹ The neo-Ottomanism's solution was to re-introduce the cosmopolitanism of the Ottoman millet system.

⁷⁶ The YDH party programme, pg.1.

⁷⁷ *Demokrasi Haberleri*, No.1, 1-15 July 1994

⁷⁸ Zulfu Dicleli, "Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi ve Siyasetin Yeni Islevi", *Demokrasi Haberleri*, No.2, 15-31 July 1994, pg.3.

⁷⁹ Cengiz Candar, "Ozal'in Cenaze Töreni Kemalizmin Cenaze Törenine Benziyordu", in *2. Cumhuriyet Tartismalari*, in note 95, pp. 101 and 104

Even though some of the key figures of both the Second Republic Argument and the Neo-Ottomanism came from leftist circles, both positions attracted supporters from a large spectrum of political positions. A number of leftist intellectuals who were disillusioned by the sectarian attitude of the Marxist left and the authoritarian tone of the Kemalist regime were attracted to the Second Republic Argument while other groups in the left condemned the Second Republic Position as another project to subject Turkey to the exploitative mechanism of international capitalism.⁸⁰ Ultimately, Turgut Ozal's close affinity with both the proponents of the Second Republic Argument and of neo-Ottomanism as well as his strong emphasis on the market economy and private enterprise were sufficient for the left to distance itself from it. In his speech to the Third Izmir Economic Conference on June 4, 1992, Ozal revealed his close connection with the Second Republic Argument, stating that he and his cadres had "read the necessities of the age correctly". The correct reading of the age required a new relationship between the state and society in which the driving force of the society comes from individual initiative and not from the directives of the state.⁸¹ The engine of change should be an individual capable of using his/her creative energy in a productive way. Ozal further pointed out that the need to reform the legal structure to accommodate three fundamental freedoms "freedom of thought", "freedom of belief" and "freedom of private enterprise".⁸² The market economy and the democratic regime could flourish only if these three fundamental freedoms were guaranteed by the legal framework.

⁸⁰ Fikret Baskaya, "2. Cumhuriyet Dünya Kapitalizminin Yeni Evresine Uyum Sağlama Cabasıdır", in 2. *Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları*, in note 95, pp.355-366, Sungur Savran, "2. Cumhuriyet Demokratik Bir Acilim Degildir", in 2. *Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları*, in note 95, pp.257-282 and Ertugrul Kurkcu, "Sosyalistler ne 1. Cumhuriyetçilerin ne de 2. Cumhuriyetçilerin Yanında Yer Almalıdır", in 2. *Cumhuriyet Tartışmaları*, in note 95, pp.301.

⁸¹ Turgut Ozal, His Speech in the Third Izmir Economic Conference, June 4 1992.

⁸² *ibid.*

While the Left was critical of Second Republic, the Kemalist response was much stronger. The Kemalist establishment, especially the Kemalist argued that the proposed reconstruction of the regime was nothing but the fragmentation of a unitary state and a departure from the principles of those of Kemalism.⁸³ They argued that the Kemalist modernizers did what they had to do within the social, economic and cultural limitations of 1930s.⁸⁴ Furthermore, the Second Republic supporters' acceptance of Islamic groups as credible actors in civil society was unacceptable for the Kemalist camp. They considered it as a concession to Islamists with the pretext of democracy.⁸⁵

Until the Second Republic debate proposed an alternative reading of modernization, only the Kemalist secular camp and the traditional segments of the society had been represented in various political parties and religious organizations. The secular Kemalist camp was the progressive force committed to modernization while the representative of the traditional forces were considered to be reactionary and hindrance to modernization. The Second Republic debate put the Kemalist establishment on the defensive. It posed an internal critique to the Kemalist project by indicating its inherent authoritarianism and by questioning the Kemalist reading of modernity. For the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic there was an alternative reading of modernity emerging from the secular segment of society. Furthermore, by calling for the democratization and pluralization of the public sphere and by representing Kemalist ideology as an obstacle to such an endeavor, the Second Republic Argument depicted the Kemalist modernization project a conservative force, resistant to change.

⁸³ Coskun Kirca, "Uydur Uydur Sacmala", *Milliyet* (istanbul daily), 03.08.1992.

⁸⁴ Toktamis Ates, "2. Cumhuriyet Tartismalari Abesle Isgalden Baska Birsey Degildir", in *2. Cumhuriyet Tartismalari*, in note 95, pg. 151.

⁸⁵ *ibid.*, pg.156.

The debate between the supporters of the Second Republic and the Kemalist establishment was in fact a debate as to how the boundaries between the public and the people and the nation should be redrawn. The proponents of the Second Republic Argument questioned the boundaries between these three categories and proposed a new arrangement in which the unity of the state and the people would be an obsolete idea and where the idea of people as an undivided whole would be abandoned. Their project was to save the public sphere from the dominance of the nation and the people by calling a political and economic liberal framework. This constituted a threat to the fundamental principles of the public sphere because it proposed to change the course of modernization in Turkey in which the public sphere was the tool of realization of the "general will" of reaching "the contemporary level of civilization". The Second Republic's proposal of pluralization and the autonomy of the public sphere, touched the fundamental contradiction of the Kemalist project which identified pluralization of the public sphere with the derailing of modernization efforts in Turkey.

The Second Republic Argument started a public debate about the nature of modernization in Turkey. Although it was largely initiated by secular intellectuals and picked up by secular politicians, the Second Republic position accepted Islamists and ethnic groups as credible actors in the public sphere.

Medina Document: An Islamist Alternative to Modern Public Sphere

While the secular segments of society were searching for ways to rethink identity and modernity in Turkey in order to be able to reconstruct the Kemalist regime, Islamists proposed their ideas for an alternative societal project by drawing on the Medina document as a social contract between various groups of different beliefs. The Medina document was a legal document or a contract acknowledging the autonomy of other

religious communities and defining the boundaries between Muslim and non-Muslim communities.⁸⁶ After migrating from Mecca to Medina in 622 in order to flee from prosecution, the Prophet Mohammed established a political community in Medina with his followers. In the process of establishing an Islamic community the Prophet signed an agreement with non-Muslims in Medina which was later called the Medina Document. In the Medina document, non-Muslim communities were given the right to organize a legal system emerging from their own beliefs.⁸⁷ While different groups had their autonomy in deciding their legal framework according to their belief, in the case of intercommunity conflict, they were supposed to seek the arbitration of the Prophet. The historical significance of the Medina document comes from the fact that it stands as a contractual agreement between Muslim and non-Muslim communities of Medina which recognized the autonomy of each community. According to Islamists, the fact that the Prophet decided to make a social contract with other communities signifies that it is possible to have a pluralist society in Islam. In other words Islamists read the Medina document as a societal project which allows plurality and tolerance within a society that is governed by Islamic rules.

Islamist intellectuals, particularly Ali Bulac, introduced the Medina Document in the early 1990s as a Muslim project of 'living together'. Bulac criticizes the unitary nation-state model for assimilating differences into a single value system and subjugating them to the power of the majority.⁸⁸ He argues that the nation state with a single executive, the judiciary and legislative system, has a homogenizing function which does not permit the manifestation of difference in public and puts minority

⁸⁶ Eyup Koktas, "Medine Vesikasi: Islam'in Cogulculuk Referansi", *Bilgi Ve Hikmet*, Winter 1994/5, pg.59.

⁸⁷ Huseyin Algul, "Asr-i Saadette Idari Hayat", *Bilgi Ve Hikmet*, Winter 1994/5, pg. 64.

⁸⁸ Ali Bulac, "Bir Arada Yasamanin Mumkun Projesi Medine Vesikasi", *Bilgi Ve Hikmet*, Winter 1994/5, pg.5.

positions at a disadvantage. After pointing out the fragmentation of nation states within the globalization process, Bulac indicates the need to propose new forms of "living together" which would enable greater plurality than exists in the arrangements of nation state.⁸⁹ Unless there are alternatives to the homogenizing forms of nation states that are crumbling as a result of the globalization process, it would be impossible to stop conflicts emerging from the coexistence of different religious and ethnic groups. For Bulac the only way to enable different belief systems to manifest themselves freely would be to abandon the single judicial system and adopt a judicial system consisting of multiple judicial systems permitting each community to live according to its belief system.⁹⁰

It is argued that a political system based on the Medina document would not pose any obstacles for organizing different religious, philosophical and ideological positions as Islam rejects any imposition of having to accept a certain religious belief.⁹¹ Pointing to the *Bakara* verse in the Quran, which rejects the imposition of religious belief, Bulac suggest that different groups, which may include secular and atheist elements as well as other ideologies, can form their life spaces. As long as they do not wage a "war" on Muslims, members of other beliefs and convictions should pursue their life style according to their value system.

For Islamist intellectuals the Medina document is not simply a utopian ideal but an actual historical experience that created a contractual relationship between different religious communities of Medina between the years of 622 and 632.⁹² The Ottoman Millet system, which was organized around the autonomy of religious communities, shows

⁸⁹*ibid.*, pg.8

⁹⁰*ibid.*, pg.13

⁹¹*ibid.*, pg.13

⁹² Bulac, "Bir Arada Yasamanin Mumkun Projesi Medine Vesikasi",., pg.12

similarities with the contractual relationship based on the Medina Document. Yet, the Islamists stress a fundamental difference between the Medina document and the Ottoman Millet system. In the Ottoman Millet system there was a hierarchy between religious communities where the Muslim community was the "sovereign nation" (*millet-i hakime*) and non-Muslim communities were "subjected nations" (*millet-i mahkume*) while in the Medina document there was no such hierarchical division and each community had equal status. Islamists point out that, unlike the Ottoman Millet system based on the sovereignty of the Muslim community, the Medina document proposes a project of living together based on equal participation.⁹³ The normative framework of the Medina document provides Islamists with a "realistic" alternative which would enable a pluralistic civil-society-based societal project to be realized. The idea of multiple judicial systems in the Media Contract was in fact picked up the Islamist Welfare Party. Its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, made multiple-judicial systems part of Welfare Party's election campaign to argue that unlike the stereotypical image of Islamic parties, the Welfare party is seeking a pluralistic society in which different communities can live according the their value systems.

There are two important aspects of the Medina Document which make it an alternative to the way the public sphere is organized: the first is to "transcend modernity and its

⁹³ Kadir Canatan, "Toplum Tasarimlari ve 'Birlikte Yasama Felsefesi", *Bilgi ve Hikmet*, Winter 1994, Vol.5, pg.106. In order to explain this obvious difference between the Ottoman Millet system and the Medina document Canatan offers a rather bizarre explanation. According to him there were two patterns in Muslim's conquering policies. Whenever there was a peaceful incorporation of a territory into the Muslim umma, muslims entered into a contractual relationship with the other communities of the territory based on an equal relationship. The Medina document was a product of such peaceful incorporation. In contrast, when muslims conquered lands after a war, there was usually a relationship of subjugation. Most of the Ottoman incorporations of territories took place after wars, and therefore, the autonomy of other communities were based on hierarchical relationship. Following this, Canatan argues that, in the present, when muslims gain power in peaceful ways, there will be a peaceful coexistence between different groups. *Ibid*, 107.

political forms"⁹⁴ to form a new societal contract that would not conflict with Islam; the second is the emphasis on plurality and civil society. Islamist intellectuals present the Medina document as an example that Islam is actually capable of accommodating a pluralist society since it is clearly stated in the document that the relationship between different beliefs is not hierarchical but based on equality.⁹⁵ Moreover, the Medina Document give a priority to civil society over the state, because the communities themselves decide what is good and bad for themselves.⁹⁶ The cultural, judicial and religious autonomy of the different communities require that activities such as legislative, culture, science, art economy, health and education should be left to civil society and the state should not have any say over these areas of societal life.⁹⁷ In the contractual Medina model that Islamists propose that the function of the state is to serve citizens and to protect different values and life styles of communities forming society.⁹⁸

Most of the Islamists are aware of the fact that a document written in the 7th century cannot possibly provide a contractual model for a modern society.⁹⁹ Yet, they also argue that the normative framework of the Medina document provides a blueprint for Muslim to form a contractual relationship with other beliefs and lifestyles. A societal project based on the Medina document requires a vision of the public sphere significantly different from that of modern thinking. In the Medina-based project, agents in the public sphere are autonomous communities, not individual citizens. This is reflected in the advocacy of multiple judicial systems based on the value systems of those

⁹⁴ Bulac, "Bir Arada Yasamanın Mumkun Projesi Medine Vesikası", pg.14

⁹⁵ Taner Akcam, "Türkiye İçin Yeni Bir Toplumsal Projeye Doğru", *Birikim*, No.42, October 1992, pg.14.

⁹⁶ Ömer Çelik, "Beraber Yasama Sorunu, İnsanın Anlam Arayışı ve Siyasal Otorite", *Bilgi Ve Hikmet*, Winter 1994/5, pg.27.

⁹⁷ Kadir Abdülmamoglu, "Modern Anayasa Hukuku Açısından Medine Vesikası", *Bilgi Ve Hikmet*, Winter 1994/5, pg.43 and Ali Bulac, "Medine Vesikası Hakkında Genel Bilgiler", *Birikim*, No.42, October 1992, pg.110.

⁹⁸ Abdurrahman Dilipak, "Farklılıklar İçinde Birarada Yasama İlkesi ya da Medine Belgesi", *Panel*, No.41-42, August-September 1992, pg.20.

⁹⁹ Abdülmamoglu, "Modern Anayasa Hukuku Açısından Medine Vesikası", pg.44.

communities. The societal project which is based on the Medina document, therefore, does not envision a single public sphere but multiple publics organized around autonomous communities with their own legal framework. The public sphere in this case resembles the communitarian interpretation of the public sphere which privileges value systems of independent communities. As one of the most distinguishing characteristics of the modern regime is the single public sphere with universal citizenship and legal framework, the Islamists' alternative to the modern public proposes to address the question of plurality outside the framework of the modern regime.

There is, however, a significant difference between multiple publics which compete within the context of a universal public sphere and the Islamist proposal of multiple publics which are independent of each other. A single public space may indeed contain different and alternative publics, each struggling to gain recognition and to negotiate with one another. The public sphere provides a normative and legal framework within which this political struggle and negotiation takes place. The promise of dialogical interaction presupposes the fact that the boundaries of the public sphere may be open to negotiation but that there has, nevertheless, to be a common reference point to facilitate the debate among various different groups and identities. The contractual Medina model of the public sphere abandons the idea of a single public sphere as a political space where state and society can interact within a process of deliberative politics. In a society with multiple judicial systems there will be as many public spheres as communities which are separate from each other in a single territory. The lack of a common framework within which negotiation can take place would unavoidably lead to ghettoized communities within the framework of a nation-state. The dilemma of the societal project based on the Medina document lies on its reliance on the territorially based nation state. Islamists proposition of a new societal arrangement, capable of transcending the modern society,

would unavoidably be constructed upon the nation state. As the core of society in the Medina document is based on communities (*umma*), the separation of these communities according to their belief systems begs the question of what the state's role would be in this arrangement. For instance, how intercommunity conflicts in society would be resolved and the role of the state in those conflicts remains ambiguous. During the time of the original Medina Document, the Prophet was the arbiter between different communities. It is not clear if the state would take the same kind of role in a society based on the principles of the Medina document.

Furthermore, the separated publics of the Medina document do not acknowledge the mobility of identities. Since society is based on communities and their value systems, an individual's identity can only be defined in relation to the community of which he/she is a member. The rigid separation of communities rules out the possibility of the shifting of identities, locking identities instead within their respective communities. The priority of the community ignores individual identity and the separation of communities according to their value systems prevents the possibility of identities being remade through interaction with others in a single public sphere.

In sum, the Islamists' alternative public sphere based on the Medina Document poses a serious challenge to the Kemalist project of single public sphere. In the case of Turkey, where the idea of modernity is highly contested and the project of modernization based on the creation of a singular modern identity, the Islamists' emphasis on civil society and the recognition of differences based on communities provides a challenging alternative to the Kemalist paradigm. Islamists are particularly successful in reading the effect of globalization on the logic of nation state and the inability of the nation state to respond to demands of differences within its borders.

Conclusion

The public sphere in Turkey today is radically different from that of the early Republican years. Unlike the well-ordered and regulated modern Republican public sphere, the public sphere in Turkey is now populated by various identity positions that locate themselves outside the national identity as described by the Kemalist project. Islamist groups are the most active and effective on this account. Their existence in the public sphere poses questions to the Kemalist project long considered taboo. Aware of the sensitive nerves of the secular system, Islamists constantly struggle to shift the boundaries of the public sphere in Turkey. Their claims such as the building of a mosque in Taksim - historically one of the most modern quarters of the city where there are churches and synagogues but no mosques or the request for a break during the parliamentary session for prayers or to have a Quran when they have a parliamentary oath, are attempts to increase the visibility of Islamic parameters in the public sphere. The secular segment of society, which still constitutes the majority of the population, reacts angrily against such claims by arguing that these claims are directed toward destroying modern public life in Turkey.

Yet, the experiment in municipal governments and the eleven month coalition government with the Welfare Party suggest that the struggle is more about the visibility in the public sphere than changing its foundations. One example of this is the Welfare Party controlled Municipalities in big cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. When the Welfare Party won the municipal election in 1994, there was an overwhelming sense of panic within the secular public, concerned that the Algerian case would be repeated in Turkey. Yet over the last three years the Welfare Municipalities have, to a

large degree, kept their promise and not interfered in the daily life of citizens. The Islamist mayors of the big cities have been instrumental in furthering the presence of Islamic discourse in the public space by promoting cultural activities such as concerts, debates and stage plays which provide Islamic groups with the opportunity to represent themselves in the public sphere. At the same time, they are very careful not to impose any Islamic life style choice on other groups. Modern public life, indeed, is livelier than ever before in the big cities. The best example of this is the Beyoglu municipality in Istanbul- a mecca of not only modern but also alternative life styles with gay bars, rock bars and all sorts of night life. Under a Welfare Mayor, Beyoglu is still the center of these alternative life styles. Islamists in Turkey are keen on increasing their presence in the public sphere, but not necessarily destroying this public life. They constantly adopt modern forms into their own life styles. Islamic fashion shows with dresses adopted to the Islamic dress codes, Islamic discos and pop music and radio stations and private television channels are some of the examples of the ways Islamic life style makes itself visible in the public sphere.

In big cities where Islamist Mayors run municipalities, there is a constant and daily political struggle between secular and Islamists groups. The fact that the big Turkish cities have a relatively developed civil society indicates that no single group, including the Islamists, would be powerful enough to impose its value system over others. For this reason, different groups engage in a political struggle over life style choices. Welfare Mayors in small Anatolian cities, in fact, are less conciliatory and more open in imposing on Islamist life style.

What is presently missing in Turkey thus is the normative and legal framework which would allow a deliberative process of negotiation of differences in the public sphere. The

lack of such framework results in a public sphere in which politics is limited to the struggle for recognition by imposing one's value system on others.

Conclusion

This thesis has sought to illuminate the ways in which identities are defined in an increasingly global world through critical review of the recent theoretical debates. It focused on the relationship between the universality and the particularity in the modern regime. In modern times the antagonistic relationship between the universality and the particularity has resulted in marginalization of particular identities. For instance, nation states acted as mechanisms which reproduced the tension-filled relation between universality and particularity. The hegemonic representation of national identity worked to keep particular groups and identities from represent themselves in their own right. It secured its stability by denying the legitimate representation of others. Although, on the surface, this was believed to have been a stable environment where identity was thought to be unproblematic¹, such stability was secured at the price of marginalizing and silencing identities and groups that were outside the domain of national identity.

The thesis argued that the globalization process is altering the relationship between universality and particularity, creating a space for particular identities to challenge universal categories and identities. This proliferation of identities can be liberating for particular identities long silenced by national identities. The globalization process, however, does not contain any guarantees that the proliferation of identities will result in a pluralistic environment. In fact, the proliferation of identities can be a destructive force. Identity is only meaningful in the presence of difference. In other words, the meaning of a particular identity lies in its difference from others. Exclusion is,

¹ In 1988 Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association meeting, in a panel on the present state of Turkish Social Sciences, one political science professor from Turkey complained about extensive emphasis on issues related to identity. He was somewhat puzzled that new generation social scientist seems to be concerned with identity so much whereas fifteen years ago students did not have problems with their identity.

therefore, a part of the process of identity formation. The exclusionary dimension of identity reminds us that there is nothing to guarantee that the process through which meaning is assigned to identity will be a liberating or peaceful one. For this reason, the possibility always exists that the identity formation process can become one of negation resulting in violent outbursts that produce closed and xenophobic identities.

When identities are formed on the basis of solely exclusive categories, violence becomes an integral part of this proliferation process. As mentioned above, times of crises and transformation are particularly susceptible to reactionary strategies as well as liberating possibilities. Moreover, there is a high level of contingency during such times. The globalization period is one such time in which there is high level of contingency in terms of the redefinition of identities.

The condition of particularity within the globalization process was explored in order to illuminate the ways within which proliferation of identities can lead to a peaceful co-existence. The thesis argued for the interpretation of globalization with multiple subjectivities. This interpretation, developed on the basis of work done by postcolonial writers such as Said and Bhabha and political theorists such as Benhabib, defines identities as open entities with multiple centers. This interpretation of identity has the potential of providing a framework which refuses to accept identities as isolated and fixed entities. Instead, it sees identities as constantly changing entities through interaction with each other. For, this understanding of identity to become a norm, however, a framework is needed to ensure that the identity formation process occurs through peaceful negotiation. This framework began with an assumption that the meaning of identities is as much relational as it is derived through difference from others. The relational aspect of identity is a reminder that identities do not, and cannot exist, in a vacuum but are always formed in relation to others. Recognizing the

relational quality of identity also means rejecting the argument that identities have essential cores that can not be changed. In addition, acknowledging that identities exist in relation to one other requires equal recognition of the responsibility for others that this implies. Of importance is not how one's identity is defined and secured but how one's identity exists with others. For this reason I have emphasized the centrality of the public sphere as the background of such a framework. The dialogical aspect of the public sphere has the potential of providing a social space in which identity formation is a process of negotiation rather than one of exclusion. The tragic examples of Bosnia and Rwanda prove the fact that once the public sphere collapses there is very little opportunity for identities to negotiate their life choices. The public sphere in modern times, however, has failed to realize its dialogical and emancipatory potential as it usually becomes an integral part of national discourse. The lack of autonomy from national discourse has produced a public sphere that is hostile to the manifestation and negotiation of difference. There is now much effort to revive the concept of the public sphere to reveal the emancipatory dimension of the modern regime. For instance, together with other theorists, Habermas has emphasized on the public sphere to reveal the dialogical aspect of reason. My thesis, however, has argued that Habermas in particular, and the debate on the public sphere in general, fails to address the role that national discourse plays on the way public sphere facilitates and accommodates difference within nation states. The procedural framework that is put forward by Habermas to unleash the dialogical potential of the public sphere can only be realized if it is acknowledged that the public sphere need to be autonomous from the national discourse and has a cosmopolitan orientation which accepts the identity formation as an integral part of public debate.

The Turkish case provides a good example of a country where the national identity established itself as a universal and homogeneous entity. Such universality was realized

by eliminating the presence of particular groups and identities from the public sphere. The proliferation of identities in Turkey after 1980 did not, however, produce a public sphere in which identity formation could take place as a result of peaceful negotiation. Instead, different groups and identities have been engaging in a public struggle to establish their hegemony. The lack of an institutional and normative framework in the public sphere has led to a lack of public debate directed towards the negotiation of identities. The Turkish example is a reminder that a pluralistic public sphere needs have two dimensions: a public debate that addresses issues arising from claims of identity formation and an institutional and normative framework which provides the procedural dimension of the public sphere.

Turkey is a treasure mine for the social scientist as it contains many contradictory moments in itself and changes rapidly. However, this also presents the potential danger of having one's work on Turkey become obsolete in a matter of months. Since I have completed the chapters on Turkey, for example, the first and only Islamist prime minister of Turkey was forced to resign and his party was closed down by the constitutional court. The leaders of the Welfare Party were banned from politics for three years but other members of the party formed a new party and now have a group in the parliament. The army was behind the process that led to ousting the Welfare Party from power. It is interesting, however, to note the reaction of civil society. For the first time in Turkish history, the business community collaborated with labour unions to mobilize public opinion against political Islam. Similarly, women's groups, small manufacturers, university teachers, as well as other professional organizations such as bar and engineering associations, launched an extensive campaign against the conservative-Islamist government coalition. More interesting and probably ironic is that most of the organizations of civil society supported the army's pressure behind the scenes to force the Islamists out of power. Army intelligence officers gave seminars to

civil society organizations about the potential danger of political Islam, and the chief of staff urged citizens to exercise their rights and civic duties to challenge the growing power of political Islam.

Most commentators have focused on the undemocratic nature of the background intervention of the army. While not incorrect, these analyses have usually missed the growing influence of civil society in Turkey. Both secular and Islamist segments of civil society provide interesting clues to the future of democracy in Turkey. The secular segments of society have raised a strong voice that a political regime, which is based on Islamist principles, is not acceptable. Reaction from wide range of groups and organizations are demonstration of the fact that the secular life style is an indispensable part of life in Turkey. Secular groups and organizations, however, still fail to understand the nature of the Islamist movement in Turkey. There is a tendency to put all Islamist groups in the same basket and to label them as extremists wanting to eliminate the secular system altogether. Islamists groups in Turkey, however, are heterogeneous and have different claims. Even a quick look inside Islamists discourse demonstrates that there are serious differences between Islamists and that they are far from being a monolithic group. More importantly, despite recent events, Islamists in Turkey prefer to operate within the political system and do not initiate armed conflict. Their willingness to participate in the political process is an indication that they can also become part of the political system.

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