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**Institutional Development and Adaptability:
Canada, Taiwan and the Social Construction
of "One China"**

by

Der-yuan Wu, B.A., M.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

**Department of Political Science
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
Nov.27, 2000**

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acceptance of the thesis,

**INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND ADAPTABILITY: CANADA, TAIWAN, AND
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 'ONE CHINA'**

submitted by

Der-Yuan Wu, B.A., M.A., M.A.

in partial fulfilment of the requirements
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Chair, Department of Political Science

Thesis Supervisor

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Carleton University
January 19, 2001

Abstract

This thesis explores how the concept of "one China" has come to be accepted in the world and how Canada has been vitally complicated, consciously or unwittingly, in the institutional development of "one China". Moreover, the thesis links them with the adaptability issue. It outlines international and particularly Canadian adaption to the development of "one China" as well as to continuing existence of the Republic of China on Taiwan, on the one hand. On the other, it examines how Taiwan has adapted itself to the growing rigidity of the "one China" structure.

The thesis argues that the global "one China" construction and its current prevalence, through state agencies' recognition of Beijing as the sole legal government of China and their realization of the importance the PRC attaches to the Taiwan issue, began with Sino-Canadian practice. This involved intersubjective understandings on the issues in the midst of the Stockholm negotiations and culminated in their codification of respective positions in the Joint Communiqué of October 13, 1970. Subsequently, this practice diffused globally, in slightly variant formulae that tended to add new elements over time but commonly acknowledged the "one China fact". Moreover, the "one China" principle was elaborated in its application to various "non-political" policy areas. This internal elucidation process

also involved parallel institutional learning across nations.

The thesis further argues that the repercussions of the social construction of "one China" are far-reaching. Countries concerned are then forced to conduct and institutionalize their transactions with Taiwan and mutual representation on a society-to-society basis. This also entails institutional diffusion and leads to the emergence of virtual representation on global scene. On the part of Taiwan, in particular, adaptation to the "one China" structuration is manifested in the shifts of internal and external legitimacy, state-building, conception of sovereignty, as well as the transformation of foreign policy argumentation and discourse. The ROC on Taiwan, however, encounters the issue of goal complexity and dilemma of rationality in the adaptation process.

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As argued in the thesis, achievement of entities is always tied to contextual support. The completion of this project cannot be exceptional.

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List of Abbreviations

ACIO: Australian Commerce and Industry Office
ACSF: All China Sports Federation
ADM: Assistant Deputy Minister
Agn: Agentina
Amb: Ambassador
ASPECT: Association pour la promotion des échanges
 commerciaux et touristique avec Taiwan
AUSSEA: Assistant Under Secretary of State for External
 Affairs
BAPA: Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs
BCITF: British Columbia International Trade Fair
BFO: British Foreign Office
BPA: Bureau of Public Affairs
Bru: Brussels
Bul: Bulletin
CABA: Canadian Amateur Boxing Association
CBC: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CCNAA: Coordination Council for North American Affairs
CCOC: Canadian Chamber of Commerce
CdnDelNY: Canadian Delegation (to the UN) New York
CETDC: China External Trade Development Council (Taiwan)
CNA: Central News Agency
CNBRA: Canberra
COC: Chamber of Commerce
COJO: Organizing Committee of the Montreal Olympics
ConGen: Consul General
Cons: Consular
Conv: Conversation
CPD: Commercial Policy Division
CPHGN: Copenhagen
CS: Canadian Society
CTOC: Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee
CTOT: Canadian Trade Office in Taipei
CTPFC: Canada-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Committee
Dcs: Discussion
DEA: Department of External Affairs (Canada)
Def: Defence
DFAIT: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Div: Division
DMI: Department of Manpower and Immigration
DPH: Despatch
DTC: Department of Trade and Commerce
EAD: East Asian Division
EAO: External Aid Office
EARA: East Asian Relations Association
Eco: Economic
Euro: European
FED: Far Eastern Division
FETC: Far Eastern Trade Company

Gdl: Guideline
 GDR: Germany, Democratic Republic of
 GIO: Government Information Office
 HK: Hong Kong
 HSNKI: Helsinki
 IAPH: International Association of Ports and Harbours
 IGOs: Inter-Governmental Organizations
 Inf: Information
 IOC: International Olympic Committee
 IQ: Important Question (Resolution)
 ISLD: Intelligence & Security Liaison Division
 ITC: Industry, Trade and Commerce (Department of)
 KLUMPUR: Kuala Lumpur
 KMT: Kuomintang
 KTN: Kingston
 LAD: Legal Advisory Division
 Ldn: London
 Leg: Legal
 Let: Letter
 LG: Lieutenant General
 Memo: Memorandum
 MFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (PRC)
 Min: Minister
 MNL: Manila
 MOE: Ministry of Education (ROC)
 MOEA: Ministry of Economic Affairs (ROC)
 MOFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ROC)
 MP: Member of Parliament
 MPP: Member of Provincial Parliament
 MRSTI: Mutual Respect for Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity
 Mtg: Meeting
 NAAD: North American Affairs Department (MOFA, ROC)
 NAC: National Archives of Canada
 NCL: National Central Library (Taiwan)
 NCNA: New China News Agency
 NCNE: Neither Challenge Nor Endorse
 NEAD: Northeast Asian Division
 NHB: National Harbour Board
 NIDA: Non-Interference in Domestic Affairs
 NOC: National Olympic Committee
 NGOs: Non-Governmental Organizations
 NY: New York
 Ott: Ottawa
 OttT&C: Ottawa Trade and Commerce (Department of Trade and Commerce)
 PCO: Privy Council Office
 Pek: Peking (Beijing)
 PM: Prime Minister
 PMO: Prime Minister's Office
 PO: Press Office

PPG: Parliamentary Press Gallery
PR: Public Relations
PRC: People's Republic of China
PRET: Pretoria
PS: Parliamentary Secretary
PTC: Protocol
Rcd: Record
ROC: Republic of China
ROCO: Republic of China Olympic Committee
SAD: South Asia Division
SSEA: Secretary of State for External Affairs
STKHM: Stockholm
TDNO: Take Due Note Of
TECO: Taipei Economic and Cultural Office
TECRO: Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office
Tel: Telegram
TKP: Talking Points
TNO: Take Note Of
TPE: Taipei
TRO: Taipei Representative Office
TWKB: Taipei Wirtschafts-und Kulturburo Bonn
UND: United Nations Division
UNGA: United Nations General Assembly
USAD: United States of America Division
USOC: United States Olympic Committee
USSEA: Under Secretary of State for External Affairs
WAS: Warsaw
WLGTN: Wellington
WSHDC: Washington DC

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The dissertation examines the institutionalization of a "one China" structure, the role Canada played in the process and its impact on Ottawa-Taipei relations. The analysis will utilize a synthesized conceptual framework bringing together theoretical insights from agency-structure relations, new institutionalist and social constructivist perspectives. The elaboration of this framework together with the rationale for its relevance will be made in next chapter. In this introductory chapter, a brief sketch of the case, its significance, key research questions, a literature review on foreign-policy-related subject, and an outline of this thesis will be dealt with.

**** **** **** **** **** ****

I. The Case and Its Significance:

The world we live in has often been characterized with its increasing complexity and ambiguity. In view of the tendency in which phenomena in social world were becoming featured with "negative dialectics" (Adorno 1973), that is, things may turn around thereby defying simple modelling, some social scientists argued that the world has entered into a "post-modern" era, as opposed to the "modern" epoch during which the world was often assumed to be a priori manageable and predictable on the basis of a firm belief in "linear progress, absolute truths, and rational planning of ideal world". (Harvey 1989: 27) This characterization of

"post-modernity", in a genetic sense, was meant to refer to societies where the stage of capitalist modernization has been considerably achieved. For the "less developed" world where industrialization has never reached the existing level of those "post-modern" societies, development problems often entail intermingling of various aspects of issues in a much more complicated way. In the wake of globalization, the sense of uncertainty about prospects for development has been particularly augmented in societies with deep communal cleavages. For these societies, the issue of national identity and state-building, which was supposed to be resolved fundamentally, if not completely, no later than the accomplishment of industrialization as in the trajectory of typical Anglo-American and Western European development¹, remained of primary concern. The case of Taiwan is a case in point.

While Taiwan has been admired for its "miraculous" economic development and its recent achievement of democratization, issues relating to its identity and role in the world remain perplexing. The fundamental identity issue continues to haunt Taiwanese society, although its development with democratic governance and economic

¹ Nevertheless, some scholars such as Arend Lijphart questioned the appropriateness of assuming the growing irrelevance of ethnic factor in the process of political, economic or social development in orthodox Anglo-American modernization literature. See Lijphart (1977a).

prosperity is achieved. The Taiwan phenomenon might appear to be even much "paradoxical" if the uneven contrast between its steady economic growth with extensive world trade networks and its virtual non-existence in international diplomatic arena was taken into account. (Kim 1994: 145-6) As of January 1999, only 28 countries maintained diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) government on Taiwan.² (see Appendix I) The ambiguous separation between "Taiwan" and "China" is even more evident when international "realities" in economic and political worlds are juxtaposed: while products with labels of "made in Taiwan" could be easily distinguished from those of "made in China" and both units have been independent members of some economic-oriented international governmental organizations such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), in the world political arena only one unit, that is "China", is presumed to exist.

Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War brought the emergence of the "new world order" in which dialogue and "soft power" were heralded to substitute for the coercive approach of resolving differences. Also, the conception of "security" has been under transformation from being basically defined in military terms during the Cold War to

² In this thesis, the term "Republic of China" or "ROC" will be used interchangeably with "Taiwan" to refer to the state that has exercised jurisdiction over Taiwan and its adjacent territories since 1949.

highlighting the dimension of "human security". Nevertheless, the crisis that erupted in March 1996 when Beijing decided to hold a series of missile tests around Taiwan while people there were electing directly their president has exposed the "time bomb" (Gu 1996) of the unresolved issue. Consequently, Taiwan is listed by the Canadian Department of National Defense (DND) as one of three main areas where military conflict is likely to take place in the world.³ More recently, there has been a diplomatic row between the PRC and the United States (US) over the possibility that Taiwan might be included in American anti-missile shield system project. (G&M Feb.15/99:A8)⁴

At the same time, as globalization was gaining momentum, many parts of the world continued to witness the resurgence of nationalism. Nationalists, striving for full-fledged "self-determination" that was often met with relentless suppression in the past, swept the former Soviet Union and the Eastern European region. Like the case of Taiwan, those societies lost opportunities to solve their national identity problems during the Cold War. However, as being counterfactual, the blatant nationalist approach

³ This is revealed by a DND policy planner.

⁴ Although I highlighted the military aspect of security here, this should not be read as overlooking of the significance of soft power and human security concepts.

popular in the region appeared to be less appealing to many Taiwanese as well as the ROC government there. And most countries not recognizing the government on Taiwan seemed to be satisfied with the ambiguity and complexity involved in their intercourses with the island. In this connection, the Canadian experience is pertinent to demonstrate the puzzling nature of the problem.

The Asia-Pacific region has been targeted as a new Canadian "frontier" since Pierre Trudeau formed his first government in 1968.⁵ 1997 was proclaimed as an Asia-Pacific Year for Canada. Nevertheless, within the region, Taiwan continues to be a difficult factor for Ottawa. The avoidance of contact with the ROC government on Taiwan and its semi-official representative office in Ottawa has become an integral part of Canadian "one China" policy. The policy, similar to those adopted by many other countries, was formulated and elaborated in a way in which the persistent confusion resulting from the historical separation of Taiwan from mainland China could be managed. The complexity of the problem and its accompanied perplexity have grown in unprecedented degree after the restructuring of Taiwan's foreign policy since the late-1980s.

With the defeat of the Nationalists on the Chinese mainland by the Communists, Chiang Kai-shek re-established

⁵ Canadian non-governmental activities in the region could be traced to the early 20th century. (Woods 1998)

his base on Taiwan in 1949, all the while proclaiming as his official objective the imminent reunification of China. During the Cold War, Taipei withdrew from the United Nations (UN) in 1971 and severed official ties almost simultaneously with any countries establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing. Since the late 1980s, however, it has had no objection to other governments opting for "dual recognition" of both Beijing and Taipei authorities. A new "one Divided China" principle was promulgated by Taipei to renovate its version of "one China" policy. In mid-1999, Taipei depicted its relations with Beijing as "special state to state relations". Moreover, two decades after its withdrawal, Taipei launched its first campaign to seek to re-participate in the UN. In light of its official "one China" goal, the ROC's pursuit of expanding international space appeals to institutional arrangements reminiscent of ones abortively initiated by some western powers which were rejected by Taipei in the 1960s then entails complexity. All of the ROC's recent foreign policy measures, its so called "pragmatic diplomacy", fundamentally aim to reshape an existing world-wide "one China" structure. The "bring-back-the-1960s" movement in contemporary Taiwan's foreign policy stimulates another intellectual puzzle: if "one China one Taiwan" or "two China" arrangements were turned down by the Nationalist government in Taipei in the 1960s and 1970s, how can leaders from the same ruling party that officially

championed Chinese re-unification contemplate the reversal of historic trends through "pragmatic diplomacy"? Nevertheless, in the development of the existing "one China" structure, at least at its outset, Canadian policy formulation has played a vital role, as will be fully substantiated in the thesis.

In sum, the genesis of the "one China" complex can be traced to the "Canadian formula". The Canadian formula recognizing the PRC was the first instance where the status of Taiwan was explicitly referred to in the communique announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC. The formula, adopted in the Sino-Canadian Joint Communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations on October 13, 1970, stipulated that Canada recognizes the PRC as the sole legal government of China, while taking note of the Chinese position that Taiwan is a part of China. It was later elaborated in subsequent policy applications, notably in 1976 Montreal Olympics, which ended with Taipei's withdrawal from the competition. Moreover, the "Canadian formula" also set up a feasible model for several countries such as Australia, Belgium, Italy, Japan and the US to follow. They all shifted their diplomatic ties away from Taipei to Beijing during the 1970s. Canada-Taiwan relations, constrained by the "one China" structure, were thus forced to be readjusted. The institutionalization of the bilateral relations in non-political areas has been underway

significantly after mid-1980s. Nevertheless, it has continuously, though not completely, been subject to the "one China" complex.

With respect to the significance of Canada-Taiwan relations, the case can be conceptualized as the bilateral relations between two less-than-major-powers, with their "big brothers", that is, the US and the PRC, respectively sitting close alongside. These relations are then often overshadowed by either partner's relations with its hegemonic neighbour. This also reflects in the state of mainstream International Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) literature: traditional Realist-oriented IR/FPA scholars were often preoccupied with foreign policy behaviour of "great powers" or their relations with one another or the less-than-major-power. This can be further illustrated in relevant literature review on Canadian and Taiwanese foreign policy.

**** **** **** **** **** ****

II. Review of Relevant Literature/Case Studies:

As Canada-Taiwan relations were one major concern in the thesis, a review of relevant literature should start with studies on their foreign policies. Some distinction should be made between the primary emphasis of Canadian Foreign Policy (CFP) and that of the ROC on Taiwan's Foreign Policy (ROCTFP) studies.

In the CFP literature, one major theme points to the

role and position Canada identifies itself in the world. Ongoing debates have focused on whether Canada is a middle power, dependent or principal power. (Nossal 1997: 52-66; Cooper 1997:6-21) The three visions of position are correspondingly espoused by liberal-internationalists, periphery dependencia and complex neo-realists. (Dewitt and Kirton 1983; Hawes 1984; Molot 1990)

The other major theme, linked with the above issue, in the literature addresses the independence of CFP vis-a-vis the US. (Heeney 1972) This begs the issue of bilateralism vs multilateralism. In the former context in particular, Canadian-American relations (CAR) are the major preoccupation of the CFP literature.⁶ In view of Ottawa's sensitivity to the American factor, Kim Richard Nossal argued that "virtually all foreign policy issues become linked to Canadian-American relations." (Nossal 1997: 33) Multilateralism to a large extent was regarded as a major mechanism in CFP to offset the predominant influence of the American factor, especially after the decline of the British Empire in the post World War II era. The predominance of CAR studies in the CFP literature, echoes the aforementioned tendency in the mainstream IR/FPA literature to focus on the

⁶ There are numerous works related to the area. Examples of major texts on the subject notably include (Bothwell 1992), (Granatstein 1989), (Granatstein and Hillmer 1991), (Hillmer 1989) and (Thompson and Randall 1994). On multilateralism, see (Keating 1991).

foreign policies of major powers, or a given country's relations with them.

The China/Taiwan phenomenon can cast new light on the relevance of both major themes in the CFP. However, the existing CFP literature and the CAR studies generally inadequately address the problematique in two senses.⁷ First, in the CAR studies, the Western Hemisphere is often taken as a primary source of empirical pools, albeit with some attention paid to conflicts in Korea or Vietnam (Stairs 1974; Donaghy 1997a). The China/Taiwan phenomenon, in the CAR spheres, rarely attracted special attention or was solely dealt with in terms of individual episodes or crises. (Frolic 1996; Macintosh and Hawes 1994: 37-58; Reford 1968; St Amour 1991) Certain aspects of the phenomenon might have been addressed when discussion is related to Canadian China policy in the CFP literature. There were however traces of disparity.

Indeed, most Canadian studies which deal with the elaboration of Canadian foreign policy toward Taiwan do so almost wholly in the context of Canada-PRC relations. Taiwan is almost never problematized as an independent object of CFP study. (eg. Evans and Frolic 1991; Frolic 1990; Holmes

⁷ As an outstanding exception, among the CFP general texts, Kim Nossal (1997) linked the China/Taiwan phenomenon to the CAR. For example, while highlighting the importance of the American factor in Canadian policy-makers' minds, he attributed the late recognition of the PRC to incessant deliberations on likely American reactions. (1997:34)

1965; Quo and Ichikawa 1972; Molot 1977) Paul Evans also acknowledged that "we have focused too much on Taiwan as a reflection of our abiding interest in China. An interesting pattern emerges when Taiwan is advanced to centre stage." (1990:79) Despite the prevalence of primary emphasis on the PRC, Evans & Frolic (1991), essentially centring on the 1970 recognition/derecognition and Chinese representation in the UN issues and the role of some key policymakers in the process, remains the most authoritative study of pre-1970 Sino-Canadian relations from a Canadian point of view. Another notable exception which more directly probed into Canada-Taiwan relations is B. Michael Frolic's paper (1996) that dealt with Canada's China policy and the exclusion of Taiwan from the 1976 Montreal Olympics.

Moreover, the existing CFP literature on Canada-China or Canada-Taiwan relations tends to deal with the subjects within relatively limited time frame, with few exceptions of Evans (1990) and Frolic (1990). Meanwhile, some work appeared to neglect consciously or unconsciously the contextual environment of the policy process when the issue of independence of CFP is invoked. For example, although Frolic's (1991) remarkable contribution employing restricted Department of External Affairs (DEA) files to discuss Trudeau's initiatives, notably the Stockholm negotiations between Canadian and Chinese delegations in 1969-70, no doubt should be acknowledged, relatively inadequate

attention was given to the Canadian international engagement in the process. Edmonds' recent article (1998) revealed a no less evident trace of voluntarism.

Having reviewed selective CFP/CAR literature, I should now shift to the ROCTFP one. While Canadian scholars were preoccupied with the Canadian position in the world and independence of its foreign policy, these themes have seldom been problematized by the ROCTFP analysts. Nevertheless, "survival" perhaps is the most prevalent underlying theme taken up there. This is testified by an English-written study on the ROC on Taiwan diplomacy by Chiao-chiao Hsieh, entitled Strategy for Survival (1985). A comprehensive Chinese-written two-volume work by Lang Kao (1993; 1994) on the same subject dealt with the development of diplomacy by analyzing the vicissitudes of recognizing countries, the ROC overseas missions and its participation in the international organizations. The underlying theme of the two volumes boils down to the issue of "survival" as well. "Pragmatic diplomacy" was a popular subject in the literature to testify to the ROC's survival. (eg. Bellows 1976; Mengin 1997; Tsai 1995; Wang 1990) However, discussion on the related issues in the ROCTFP literature often suffers from lack of cohesive conceptual frameworks for empirical guidance to address what social or institutional basis, international and domestic alike, on which the ROC on Taiwan's survival or adaptability has been secured, the

extent to which survival is institutionalized, and more importantly, how the transformation of that basis has been underway over half a century⁸, although some have explicitly linked recent Taiwanese democratization with the "pragmatic diplomacy" campaign. (eg Shiau 1996) To be sure, from the political scientist's perspective, the weak theorization problems are common for both the CFP and the ROCTFP analysts.⁹ This points to the relevance of this thesis and will be further addressed in the next chapter.

In terms of case studies, the ROCTFP literature manifests no less a tendency in its emphasis on the ROC on Taiwan's relations with major powers than the CFP does. The primary concerns of the ROCTFP often lay in Taipei's relations with Tokyo or Washington. To a lesser extent, Taiwan's relations with other countries might be discussed under the frameworks of broader regions, such as Europe, Africa, Latin America and Southeast/South Asia. More importantly, most discussion of Taiwan's external relations with reference to the "one China" issue by Taiwanese and other authors alike barely explores the role Canada has played.¹⁰

⁸ Exceptions to the generalization might include Kim (1994) and Mengin (1994) which empirical evidences were organized within discernible conceptual frameworks.

⁹ Maureen Molot explicitly argued that the CFP "has remained highly descriptive".(1990: 78)

¹⁰ This tendency of neglecting Canada is not only demonstrated in related analyses by American, Japanese or

For the ROCTFP literature on the subject, with the exception of a recent thesis that strictly addressed pre-1970 relations (Chang 1997), most discussion tends to focus on post-1980 development, especially booming economic, cultural or scientific exchanges. (eg. Bedeski 1990; Keng, Lin, Wilson and Wolff 1996) Political aspects of the subject traceable to pre-1980 period have been consciously or unconsciously downplayed in many extant literature. Although the contributions of those prescriptive- and non-political-oriented studies on the subject should be acknowledged, this thesis hopes to redress the imbalance by "bringing the political/historical back in".

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III. Research Question, Key Arguments and Outlines:

Against the above backdrop, my primary research question is: How was a "one China" structure constructed and institutionalized in world politics despite the evident existence of two governments controlling two distinct territorial units across the Taiwan Strait? What role did the opening of diplomatic relations between Canada and the PRC play in the process, which in turns set the overall parameter of bilateral institutional development?

My underlying arguments throughout this thesis would be

Taiwanese scholars, but is also prevalent in relevant European and Australian studies. See for example (Mengin 1994; Hughes 1997; Nath 1998; Roy 1998; Klintworth 1994)

as follows: Political relations among states are not simply reflections of power and interest, as espoused explicitly or implicitly by the (Neo-)Realists and Neoliberalists in the mainstream IR literature. Instead of being exogenously given, power and interest are embedded in institutionalized systems of meaning relations which agency help construct and reproduce, and which then become encoded in structure that constrains further action and constitutes agency.

Institution/structure and agency are not totally self-sustaining and self-contained, as they may appear to be. Rather, just as organizational survival and adaptation are ensured through environmental support, so institutional development or adaptability, while aiming to operate in an autonomous way, virtually hinges upon the degree of acceptance it accrues from its social basis. The source or extent of that foundation of legitimacy is often subject to change over time. On the part of institutions, their development depends very much on continuing practice by agency. The adaptability of agency is contingent upon its capability for continuous re-adjustments of legitimate basis in broader context.

As terms such as "agency", "structure", "institution" and "construction" have suggested, to examine the case, this thesis will adopt a framework bringing together theoretical insights from "agency-structure relations", "new institutionalism" and "social constructivism" in Comparative

Politics, Public Administration/Policy, International Relations and Sociology literature. The streams of the three perspectives, their relevance to the case and the synthesized framework will be dealt with in Chapter 2.

As a case of "negative dialectics" in point, the "one China" issue, ironically, was initially shaped by the ROC in its efforts to challenge the Communist legitimacy in mainland China, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. It will be argued that the issue is strictly contemporary. By and large, insofar as the China/Taiwan phenomenon is concerned, the historical condition throughout the period was relatively fluid to the extent that there were wider range of possibilities for institutionalization. The demarcation between the mainland and Taiwan was never institutionalized into de jure separation, although some contingent events prolonged the de facto state of division. In the wake of the change in the Cold War system, various actors' reactions were evident but varied in their efforts to move beyond existent "one China" representation by Taipei. The pursuit of the Canadian China policy objective at different stages was subject, in varying degrees, to some contingent events in the 1950s, the American factor, the domestic quest for an independent foreign policy, concern over Taiwanese self-determination and the state of official relations with Taipei. These will be explored in Chapter 3.

The structure of the dissertation follows the following

scheme. We start by making a theoretical and empirical distinction between the competitive search for recognition between the PRC and the ROC and the establishment of a "one China" structure in international relations. We then describe how the negotiations over Canadian recognition of the PRC helped to initiate the construction of a "one China" complex. We then proceed to demonstrate how that structure is diffused, elaborated and institutionalized, bilaterally and internationally. We finally point out how the constraints of the "one China" structure shape Taiwan's efforts at diplomatic survival. This is instantiated in bilateral relations between Canada and Taiwan and so-called pragmatic diplomacy through the "globalization of Taipei."

The social construction of "one China" began with the Sino-Canadian Stockholm negotiations in 1969-70 which led to the establishment of diplomatic relations in October 1970 with the embodiment of the "Canadian formula". Besides, Canadian diplomacy in the Stockholm negotiations presents a feature of "engaged independence" where the pursuit of an independent foreign policy was achieved through consistent engagements with Canadian allies. The Canadian initiative, and its eventual transition to a "one China" policy in the midst of interactions with the Chinese and its international engagement, will be elaborated in Chapter 4.

The subsequent global construction of "one China" and new waves of institutionalization since 1970 involve a dual

process of the international diffusion of the "Canadian formula" and other formulations in line with the Sino-Canadian practice on Taiwan issue, on the one hand, and its internal elaboration in some policy areas, on the other. For the former, respective bilateral intersubjective understandings on Taiwan issue, albeit in relatively equivocal phrases, were reached and likewise incorporated in various joint communiques between the PRC and many countries in the 1970s. The cases of selected western countries, namely, Italy, the US, the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Japan, and their varying connections with the Sino-Canadian practices, will be highlighted. It will also be argued that there was an increasing tendency for countries concerned to recognize explicitly Beijing's sovereignty over Taiwan and to add new elements of agreement in the 1990s. These will be examined in Chapter 5.

As for the internal elaboration of the "one China" structure, Canadian policies toward Taiwanese entry, nomenclature and official contacts in sport and other non-political areas, testified to the state of the institutional development. Post-1970 Canada-Taiwan relations were plagued with a series of incidents erupting over the display of the "ROC" designation and symbols at the time the Taiwanese participated in Canada-hosted international activities. The 1976 Montreal Olympics nevertheless is a notable case exemplifying the issues at dispute. The repercussions of the

dispute were far-reaching and Taiwan's membership in the international Olympic movement was then re-configured. This will be explored in Chapter 6.

As the institutional development of "one China" entered a new stage, the issue of adaptability came to the fore. Canada, as well as other countries, were faced with how to represent their interests in an increasingly prosperous Taiwan within the "one China" context. For Taiwan, how to forge links with outside world was a primary diplomatic task. The mutual establishment of non-official resident representations provided a vital means to meet that adaptative need. It will be argued in Chapter 7 that there was an incremental search for a comprehensive institutional representation especially on the part of Taiwan. This will be demonstrated in the transition from discrete offices under ambiguous titles in the early years to the emergence of encompassing organizations with nomenclature of "Taipei" in the late 1980s. Canada and other western countries also set up functional representation in Taiwan in the 1980s.

The issue of the ROC on Taiwan's adaptability in broader context would be addressed in Chapter 8 in terms of the shift of social and institutional basis, domestic and international. The early Nationalist minority rule over majority Taiwanese meant that a domestic "one-China"-based institution was the primary source of legitimacy of the Nationalist regime. The loss of a "one China" mandate in the

world turned the Nationalists to inward-looking and power-sharing programmings. "Pragmatic diplomacy" was intended to bridge the gap between domestic and international legitimacy after democratization was underway. This was accompanied as well by the re-adjustment of the ROC's foreign policy argumentation and discourse, seeking to regain international legitimacy and recognition for its actual exercise of jurisdiction over Taiwan and adjacent territories.

Finally, Chapter 9 will sum up the case of "one China" through the synthesized framework formulated in the second chapter and stress the significance of Canadian foreign policy. It will recast the case in terms of the politics of representation, social construction of reality and agency-structure relations. It will highlight the distinct historical conditions between the pre-transition and the post-1970 period in terms of the configurative elements of institutions. In doing so, it will also bring in new developments in the issues concerned. The Canadian contribution to the social construction of "one China" and the trajectory of China/Taiwan policy will be stressed. It will conclude in terms of the significance of this study and on future theoretical construction.

Having highlighting the research question and sketched main arguments and outlines of chapters as above, I should now define the scope of research and introduce the sources of data and the general methodology adopted in this thesis.

First of all, insofar as the time frame of the research is concerned, this thesis will cover the period from 1950 to 2000. Within this relatively long frame of time, discussion of the case in historical and political context will no doubt be selective: highlighting events relevant to the "one China" historical process. In so doing, I exclude from research the normative/prospective question of whether the "one China" institutionalization should be conducive to unification of mainland China and Taiwan or leading to the perpetuation of Taiwan's separation. Prescriptive measures will not be directly addressed in this thesis. In this sense, this thesis basically adopts a "critical", rather than "problem-solving", approach. (Cox 1986:207-210) Second, my empirical pools in terms of the "one China" development will be essentially drawn from the practices of bilateral diplomatic recognition, rather than the Chinese representation in the UN. A basic rationale for this emphasis is that the degree of exchanges and commitment of parties concerned in areas concerned can be directly demonstrated in bilateral face-to-face interactions. This does not mean that their state of participation in international organizations will be neglected completely in the thesis. Rather, the issue of the Chinese representation in the UN and the international Olympic movement will be outlined in relation to the development. Third, since the "one China" issue will be examined primarily in post World

War II international context, the genealogical aspect of the "one China" issue within China/Taiwan's settings, that is the historical genesis of "China" as a major discourse or the extent to which it underwent transformation, will be bracketed.

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IV. Sources and Research Methods:

As this thesis is a historical-oriented research, reliance upon first-hand documentation should naturally be expected. Indeed, ever since this research was undertaken in 1997, the author has made strenuous endeavours both to gain exhaustive access to government files in Canada as well as Taiwan and to arrange prospective interviews with key players. However, perhaps because of extraordinary sensitivity of political issues involved and thus conceivably "unwelcome" nature of the research, final access to sources of first-hand information was obtained on a selective basis. Thus, the research relied heavily upon numerous declassified but mainly restricted Department of External Affairs (DEA) files deposited in the National Archives of Canada (NAC). These are supplemented by selective interviews conducted in both Canada and Taiwan (name lists of interviewees as attached in Appendix III), and by some files drawn from the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in Taiwan, and some series of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). In addition, the

research refers to a variety of sources, first-hand or secondary, which includes public statements, web site sources, existing scholars studies, memoirs or biographies of key decision-makers, newspapers and periodical articles.

As this thesis is fundamentally guided by "an amalgam of perspectives" (Nossal 1997:xiv) drawn from western constructs, it is interdisciplinary-oriented. This will be elaborated further in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, it should be noted that my approach taken here does not mean that all of the issues related to the subject for me can be completely explained and understood through western theories.

Furthermore, since the subject of the thesis is political and historical, this begs a couple of questions: Are historical and political science approaches reconcilable? If so, how could we proceed? The answer to the first question has been largely suggested by E.H. Carr, a well-known historian as well as IR/FPA scholar: "the historian is not really interested in the unique, but in what is general in the unique..(and) constantly uses generalisation to test his evidence.."(1987:63) The second question is largely methodological.

In terms of epistemology, I generally see the scientific enterprise as a part of the human rationalistic-oriented approach in the sense of attempting to make sense of complicated phenomena, natural or social, by seeking order and regularities in an appropriately simple way,

although in the studying process social scientists may simultaneously reproduce the "reality", consciously or unconsciously, to the extent that it may support or challenge status quo "reality".¹¹ For this author, both aspects of issues should be frankly faced and clarified in research. The major research question that how the "one China" structure came into "objective being" with regularity effects "observable" considerably points to the "scientific" orientation of the thesis. Meanwhile, a researcher should also make all possible attempts to seek to understand the subjective part of the world, or the meanings of human action. After all, as John Ruggie argues, interaction and relations involve interpretation of behaviour, justification and rationales and pleas for understanding.(1998:98) This points to the importance of interpretive methods with respect to intersubjective understanding. With respect to ontology, aside from constant awareness of the social construction of knowledge in the process of research, a researcher should be able to distinguish "analytical tools" from "their concrete physical existence in the world". For this author, "structure" in social world may not be on an equal footing with "agency" in the latter sense. After all, the perception of "structure" often hinges upon the degree

¹¹ Robert Cox argued that theories are always for some purpose and for someone (Cox 1986: 207), whereas positivists envisaged separation of "fact" and "values".

of consciousness the "observers" possess at a given time period. "Structure" and "agency", nevertheless, can be treated as approximately equal analytical tools to help make sense of the world.

Finally, the methodological approach adopted in this thesis will essentially be qualitative in its orientation. However, this does not mean that the use of quantitative data and the search for some dimensions or indicators would be absolutely precluded from this research. At minimum, concepts used in this thesis would be defined as clearly as possible in next chapter.

CHAPTER TWO: LAYING THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS: STRUCTURATION, SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION AND INSTITUTIONALISM

As suggested in the previous chapter, both the CFP and ROCTFP literatures tend to be relatively descriptive and just as Taiwan is almost never problematized as an independent object of CFP study so Canada barely exists in the ROCTFP literature on "one China" issue. Both aspects could be partly attributed to the nature of the China/Taiwan phenomenon. The lack of theoretical relevance of study on the subject may be understandable given that many observers tend to treat the China/Taiwan phenomenon or Taiwan's external relations as "a unique situation which everyone thought was only temporary". (Mengin 1994:148) Indeed, Taiwan often defies the handy categories of "states" vs "non-state actors" in IR, analogous to Georg Simmel's "stranger" which falls out of an "insiders-vs-outsiders" framework. (Wolff 1950: 402-8)

Moreover, since this thesis aims to examine the institutional development of "one China" in the world arena through the lens of Canadian foreign policy and the CFP literature per se provides no ready-made conceptual framework, a workable scheme should be established for such purpose. This case, for this author, could be explored through a framework incorporating insights from "agency-structure relations", "social constructivist" and "new institutionalist" perspectives. Why they are relevant, the

major themes and development of the three perspectives, and a synthesized conceptual framework drawing from them would be illustrated in this chapter.

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I. Relevance of Perspectives:

The China/Taiwan phenomenon constitutes a classic case of the politics of representation, albeit its spatial reference is confined to traditional territorial states on international scene.¹ The politics of representation generally entails two levels of struggles: one on the meaning aspect of representation, the other on political and socioeconomic institutional arrangements. Although the two levels of representation in effect intertwine with each other, the former tends to focus on the extent to which language/categories represent reality, whereas the latter is mainly concerned about the extent to which various agents' interests and identities deserve respective representation in established but presumably reformable institutions. While the "new" politics paradigm tends to focus on the struggle of the former sense of representation, the "old" politics mostly limits itself to the latter level of representation.

The China/Taiwan problematique historically was

¹ "New" politics literature tends to focus on non-governmental actors in domestic-transnational space. For example, "new social movement" is seen as new form of representation based on the logic of "difference". For its contrast with "old" politics see (Offe 1987; Wu 1997a).

addressed within the "old" politics parameter, that is, which government, Beijing or Taipei, represents Chinese people in international society ("China problem") and whether Taiwanese deserves a separate representation in the world ("Taiwan issue"). This representation was pursued not only in international organizations, but also through the practices of diplomatic recognition. Nevertheless, the politics of representation, old or new, always boils down to the issues of inclusion and exclusion, domination and resistance, and power and legitimacy, which no doubt are the primary concerns of Political Science and IR.

It is against this backdrop that the emerging Social Constructivism in IR is pertinent for this case study. (Price and Reus-Smit 1998:275) In a sense the "one China" institutionalization entails social as well as political construction of international reality. Moreover, the process of construction involves reverse trends of inclusion and exclusion, domination and resistance, power and legitimacy, insofar as the PRC and the ROC on Taiwan are concerned. As will be elaborated in following chapters, an old "one China" arrangement that pertained to uphold Taipei's international legitimacy was first meant to exclude Beijing's interests in the world. Subsequently, however, the existent arrangement was re-constructed inversely to the effect that it placed the ROC on Taiwan in the position of hostage of diplomatic isolation.

The Social Constructivist perspective, furthermore, provides useful insights for the formation/transformation of interest and identity in interactional context. As will be elaborated later in Chapter 4, Canadian interests were re-formulated in the midst of Stockholm negotiations with the PRC. In addition, in Chapter 7, the ROC on Taiwan's gradual drift of identity in the increasing use of "Taipei" testifies to the relevance of Constructivism.

Since the issue of legitimacy is one of the major concerns in the thesis and it could be analyzed in terms of the relations between organization and its environment, new institutionalism provides a very useful, if not exclusive, conceptual tool to understand it. Moreover, new institutionalism, with its emphasis on the "embeddedness" of organization, can cast new light on Taiwan's adaptability, "one china" institutional development and on how the "deep-seatedness" of "one China" affects the possibility of Taiwan's future action.

One of the merits of agency-vs-structure debates and structuration theory lies in their inquiries into the authorship of social/political world, or where structure comes from, and how these interact with each other. These are all relevant to the exploration of the case of "one China" and how Canada play a vital part in the institutionalization process. Nevertheless, the outlined relevance will become more evident in the discussion of the

three perspectives and following chapters.

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II. Agency-Structure Relations: Development and Themes

Within the social sciences generally, several longstanding debates, usually revolving around issues of epistemology, ontology and methodology, have been ongoing for decades.² The agency-structure debate, mainly centring on the extent to which human agency possesses free will in historical process and whether/how the gap between agency-centric and structure-centric approaches can be bridged in the form of new theories, constitutes one of the central problems in social and political theory. The debate nevertheless provides at least three insights.

First of all, the debate emphasizes the importance of identifying individual or collective agents and of conceptualizing the structural context within which the agents take action. Second, it highlights both the extent to which the context constrains and enables agents in making history as they intended, and the degree to which they are autonomous, knowledgeable or reflexive in perceiving the existence of opportunities or constraints and in monitoring

² For brief introduction of relevant issues, see (Burrell and Morgan 1979: 1-9). For their relevance to empirical research design, or philosophy of empirical science, see (Bennett 1996: 53-54; Osabu-Kle 1997:3-10). For more comprehensive discussion on these issues related to philosophy of social science, see (Hollis 1994), (Little 1991) and (Rosenberg 1995).

the consequences of their actions. Finally, with regard to power relations, an added emphasis on structure complements or supersedes traditional agency-centred approaches and echoes Steven Lukes' "the third dimension of power" (1974) that underscores the construction and reproduction of oft-invisible structures by powerful agents to their advantage.

These three themes were often highlighted in the "synthetic" approaches which aimed to transcend endemic debates between agency-centric and structure-centric approaches and were often formulated in reaction against existing mainstream ones. Philip Abrams' approach in Historical Sociology, as a case in point, maintains that the fundamental concern of Historical Sociology is to explain the relationship of social action and structure, as opposed to dominant "evolutionary" approach. (Abrams 1982:6-7) With these in mind, Abrams re-assessed the contribution of Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx and Max Weber to the subject. In brief, his criticism of Durkheim centred on the latter's ambiguity on the origins of structure (mainly the "division of labour") and who is the agent for the creation of the structure, despite Durkheim's pioneering studies on social facts and institutions. Durkheim's theoretical weakness was in fact Marx's significant contribution to Historical Sociology: disclosing the agency and structure interrelationship. However, what Marx tended to downplay in his discussion of the historical process are the role of

ideas and inter-subjective understandings which was taken up by Weber. (Abrams 1982: 32-6;73-6)

The dual-goal orientation is particularly evident in Anthony Giddens' social theory. His structuration theory was built to resolve seemingly irreconcilable conflicts between agency-centred and structuralist approaches, on the one hand, and intended to provide a viable alternative to functionalist-evolutionary approach, on the other. (Giddens 1979; 1984) Some major aspects of his structuration theory should be elaborated on.

Underlying in the core of Giddens's structuration theory is the theme that agency and structure are mutually constitutive, or "each presupposes the other." (Giddens 1979:53;69) Social life is composed of ongoing active flow of interaction between them. (Giddens and Pierson 1998: 76) Structure, containing generative "rules" and "resources", defines, constitutes or legitimates agency. Meanwhile, structure itself is both the medium and outcome of agency. Unlike the existence and effect of physical structure, social structure does not have an independent ontological existence external to agency and its persistence and effects presume continuous production and reproduction through agency's action. In a sense, then, structure is a "virtual" existence to the extent that it is "instantiated" through various practices. (Giddens 1979: 64;69; Giddens and Pierson

1998: 77; 82-3)³ All structuration process in social interaction involve three elements: "the communication of meaning", "the exercise of power" and "the evaluation or sanction of conduct". Correspondingly, there are three central structures in social interaction: "signification", "domination" and "legitimation".(Giddens 1979: 81-85; 1977: 132-33)

It should be noted that the agency-structure debate and synthetic attempts are present also in the IR literature. Arguably, Harold and Margaret Sprout's concept of "ecological triad"--that is, entity, its environment ("milieu") and entity-environment relationships (1965; 1968:11-21)--was the first attempt to address the agency-structure problematique in the discipline.(Friedman and Starr 1997:4-5)⁴ Nevertheless, the epistemological and ontological aspects of the contemporary agency-structure problem, as reflected in social theory, were virtually not given much attention in the literature until the late 1980s.

In effect, as in the case of structuration-vs-utilitarianism/functionalist in social theory and Historical Sociology, this new trend in the IR was emerged in a context

³ It is by this sense of "structure" that Giddens differentiates his structuration theory from structuralism which is criticized for reifying social structure as if it were physical object.

⁴ The "ecological triad" framework was further reformulated into "opportunity and willingness" framework. See (Friedman and Starr 1997: 5-9) for brief account.

of vehement reaction against the Neo-Realist approach established mainly by Kenneth Waltz (1979). Alexander Wendt (1987) exemplifies the surge of the problematique in IR theory. In the synthesis-minded work, heavily drawing from Giddens' structuration theory, he criticized both Waltz's agency-centred Neo-Realism and Wallerstein's structure-centric world system theory for their limitations in theoretical and empirical relevance. (Wendt 1987: 340-49) His approach was further developed, albeit in slightly different direction, by Dessler (1989) and Carlsnaes (1992). However, these attempts to reconcile the incompatibility of "agency" and "structure" incurred criticism from Hollis and Smith (1992) who stress the intractability of the problem and suggest that there be always two stories to tell: one is agency-oriented and the other structure-oriented. The new round of agency-structure debates, in effect, much like those in social theory, was pursued as series of exchanges essentially between Wendt and them. (Hollis and Smith 1991; 1992; 1994; Wendt 1991; 1992b)⁵

Overall, as the contemporary agency-structure debates and attempts at synthesis in the IR literature more or less aspire to "know the reality", these exercises inevitably beg some epistemological and ontological issues. This coincides

⁵ Wendt's approach to the agency-structure problematique was criticized by Doty (1997) and Friedmann and Starr (1997) for failing to resolve it, scenario of which is similar to the reaction to Giddens' approach.

with the approximately simultaneous emergence of Social Constructivism in IR. Insofar as ontological problem is concerned, a dividing line could roughly be drawn between "objectivists" and "constructivists".

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III. Social Constructivism and Ideational Turn:

In fact, the (re)surgence of social constructivism, as a part of common (re)turns to ideational factor, has been similarly witnessed in other disciplines of social sciences, albeit with their arrival perhaps earlier than in IR. Indeed, since the late 1970s/early 1980s, many disciplines in social sciences almost simultaneously have been experiencing several common "ideational turns": "postmodern turn", "cultural turn", "interpretative turn", "identity turn", "constructivist turn" in general as well as "argumentative turn" in Policy Analysis. The resurgence of "idea-oriented" approach, often contrasted to the "interest-oriented" one, is thus not accidental.⁶

In the IR theory literature, this new turn was equally evident. At the ontological and methodological levels, the issue at stake is often related to the unity of science. While "positivists" tend to envisage a unity of natural and

⁶ Although "interest" and "idea" are in effect mutually constitutive and not completely opposite of each other, as Ernest B. Haas (1990) maintained, for analytical purpose approaches of either orientation could still be distinguished. This division has its philosophical lineage of the debate between "materialism" and "idealism".

social world, "interpretivists" or "constructivists" are more sceptical about the unity. (Neufeld 1993) The former often takes an "explanation" approach, whereas the latter adopts an "understanding" one. (Hollis and Smith 1990)

The name "constructivism" was first introduced in the IR by Nicholas G. Onuf in his World of Our Making (1989: 35-65). Its growing popularity "coincided" with a fundamental transformation in international system since the end of the Cold War. To the effect that the whole world is continuously "under construction", the title of the emerging perspective appears apposite. (Kubalkova, Onuf and Kowert 1998:x)

Indeed, the constructivist turn might not have gained considerable momentum if Waltz's Neo-Realism had not exposed its major weaknesses in failing to addressing the anomalies of international change and identity resurgence during the decade. (Kratochwil 1993; Wendt 1995) The discussion of Constructivism therefore should be traced back to its backdrop in series of debates in IR theories as well as its classical intellectual roots.

The IR theories have thrived in at least three waves of debates. The first debate mainly took place between "Realists" and "Idealists" in the 1920s and 1930s.⁷ The end

⁷ Following Hollis and Smith (1990: 10-12), this thesis uses capitals "R", "I", "N" or "C" to refer to (Neo)Realism, Idealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, or Constructivism within the IR theories to differentiate them from relevant theoretical debates in other fields that begin with small "r", "i" or "n" for "(scientific) realism", "idealism" or "new institutionalism".

of the World War II signalled the triumph of Realism but soon was ensued by the second debate between the Behaviouralists and Traditionalists in the late 1950s and 1960s. This was followed by the third debate in the 1980s during which many theorists engaged in triangular interparadigmatic competition [that is, (Neo)Realists vs (Neo)Liberalists vs (Neo)Marxists] (Waever 1997:12-15) or almost simultaneously in bipolar opposite contestations [that is, Rationalists [mainly (Neo)Realists and (Neo)Liberalists] vs Critical theorists]⁸ Constructivism grew in particular in the wake of the latter dualistic debate and had its intellectual roots in Giddens's structuration theory, Jurgen Habermas' communicative theory or Foucault's poststructuralism. (Price and Reus-Smit 1998:260) If traced further along this lineage, its classical precursors could include Durkheim and Weber. (Ruggie 1998; Onuf 1989) The Constructivist turn in IR theories is in fact very much Sociological oriented, as opposed to the Economics-

⁸ The third debate in triangular form was discussed in many IR texts, such as (Holsti 1985; Viotti and Kauppi 1987) The dualist debate was labelled in slight different pairs of terms. For example, Neufeld (1993) used "positivist" vs "interpretive", Yosef Lapid (1989) "positivist" vs "post-positivist", Keohane (1988) and his co-edited work with Goldstein (1993) preferred "rationalists" vs "reflectivists", which was also taken by Steve Smith (1997). E.Adler (1997) chose "rationalists" vs "interpretivists/relativists". This author here followed Price and Reus-Smit's (1998) labelling of "rationalists" vs "critical theorists". The latter group include postmodernists, poststructuralists, critical theorists in the Frankfurt School and feminists.

inspiration of Waltz's Neo-Realism and broadly mainstream IR Rationalism. (Wendt 1992a; Ruggie 1998) Interestingly this echoes the development of Political Science in adopting either Sociological or Economics approach as epitomized by Brian Barry (1970 esp.1-11).

Constructivism as a whole, then, is assuming a place as a viable alternative to the existing mainstream Rationalist perspective and seizing "the middle ground" in a spectrum with extreme Rationalists and Critical theorists as end poles. Both tendencies are as prevalent as in Giddens' structuration theory highlighted above. Insofar as the dualist axis is concerned, Onuf and John Ruggie both argue that Constructivism provides a workable alternative to Neo-utilitarianism or "Liberal Paradigm". (Onuf 1989: 17-9; Ruggie 1998) The middle ground claim was notably pursued by Emanuel Adler. (1997) Steve Smith (1997) similarly regarded Constructivism as bridging the gap between Rationalist and Reflectivist perspectives. Both roles the Constructivism has played in IR theories are exemplified in Waeber's analysis which maintained that the increasing polarization on the Rationalist vs Reflectivist axis in the late 1980s gradually "opened up" room for Neoliberal Institutionalism as well as Constructivism in the 1990s. (Waeber 1997) Along this line, therefore, Constructivism represents not only a "third way" but also an alternative to the existing mainstream approaches. All of these categorizations of Constructivism

in IR literature, nevertheless, would become more and more evident as its main propositions are epitomized as follows.

First of all, Constructivists in IR generally problematize identity and interests of agency (mainly "state"), as well as the "anarchical nature" of international society. As opposed to bracketing them in Rationalist/Neo-utilitarian perspective, Wendt, for example, argued that identity and interests, instead of being a priori given, fixed and exogenous, are acquired or transformed in the midst of international social construction, and in particular the process of interaction among states. (Wendt 1994) Meanwhile, rejecting Neo-Realist Hobbesian assumption of anarchical state of nature in international system and echoing Hedley Bull's view of international society or J.J. Rousseau's state of nature, Wendt (1992a) and Onuf (1989; 1998: 63) alike maintained that anarchy and the world of power politics, as one possibility among several others, were only realized through social construction process.

Secondly, Constructivists highlight the importance of normative or ideational factors and broaden/deepen its related causation, although they try to avoid downplaying material forces. For them, Rationalists assume material interests as given and ideas are at best treated as intervening variable between interests and political outcome. (Adler 1997:332; Ruggie 1998) Ruggie (1998) held

that Constructivists define "ideas" as "intersubjective understandings" that work at several levels, not merely as "beliefs held by individuals" as seen in Goldstein and Keohane (1993), and that Constructivist ideational causation is concerned about reasons for actions, rather than causes of action as in Neo-utilitarian perspectives. In terms of "causality sequence", for Constructivists then, it is often the "institutionalized meaning systems define (states') identities which (in turn) constitute their interests and shape their actions." (Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 266)

Thirdly, as closely linked with the second proposition, Constructivists underline the constitutive aspect of rules, in addition to regulative one that is already overemphasized by the Rationalists. By extension, existing instrumental conceptions of institutions and regimes in IR that give nearly all attention to regulative rules are argued to be insufficient.⁹ (Ruggie 1998:95-6) Ruggie explicitly pointed out that Neo-utilitarians while importing from Economic modelling, consciously or unwittingly left behind broader social, political and legal contexts. (Ruggie 1998: 23-4)

⁹ Ruggie's assertion in an article was first made in the 1980s when predominant international regimes literature surged. In his 1998 collection, revision of the article as a chapter did not take into account a most recent exceptional work by Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, entitled Theories of International Regimes (1997), in which the authors classify three theories as "interest-based", "power-based" and "knowledge-based", respectively. The third perspective no doubt refers to constitutive aspect of rules, thereby taking a similar line with Constructivism.

Drawing from John Searle's insights, he defines constitutive rules as the type "X count as Y in context C".

Fourthly, inheriting more directly from Giddens' structuration theory, Constructivists with barely an exception assert that agency and structure are mutually constitutive¹⁰ (Price and Reus-Smit 1998: 267) or "co-constituted" (Onuf 1989:29; 1998; Kubalkova et al 1998) Agents' action is taken through the medium of structure in which they are embedded, and the reproduction/persistence of structure fundamentally depends on ongoing instantiation or practice by agents.

Finally, as contrasted with Waltz's Neo-Realism, Constructivists envisage transformation of international structure and rules through the process of co-constitution, unintended consequences or historical contingency. (Ruggie 1998: 26-17) Routinized practice and following rules do not necessarily result in institutional stasis.(Onuf 1994)

Notably, in addition, some Constructivists develop the emerging perspective, along some lines of Karl Popper's "evolutionary epistemology", by highlighting "cognitive evolution" as its dynamics. A major objective of this

¹⁰ Wendt appeared to downplay this theme somehow in his works in the 1990s. Ringmar in his assessment distinguished early Wendt from late Wendt: "structuration on a realist basis" vs "social interactionism on a constructivist basis".(1997: 271-74; 277-81) Nevertheless, at least his early work on "agent-structure problem", he did underscore this theme.

approach is to explain how institutional facts ("World 3" in Popper's terminology, as opposed to "World 1" of brute facts and "World 2" of intentionality and meanings) become taken for granted or "naturalized" (Adler 1997: 327-28; 340; 1991: 47-48; Kratochwil 1989: 22-28; Ruggie 1998: 90-91) This exemplifies the close linkage between Constructivism in IR and neo-institutionalism in Organizational Analysis.

At the juncture, it should be noted that the usage of the term "neo-institutionalism" must not be confused with the "Neoliberal Institutionalism" used commonly in aforementioned IR literature and "New Institutionalism" labelled by both Wendt and Duvall (1989) and Ruggie (1998). As this author would argue, "neo-institutionalism" in Sociology and Organizational Analysis (SOA) is much more congenial with "Social Constructivism" in IR. Strikingly, as will be demonstrated later, like Giddens' structuration theory, both grew in reaction to and thus regarded themselves as viable alternatives to rationalist/utilitarian perspectives. In order to make this case of linkage, I shall now elaborate "new institutionalism" across disciplines and its differentiation from "old institutionalism".

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IV. New Institutionalism: Themes and Development:

The growing independence of Organizational Analysis as a major area in Sociology in the 1940s and 1950s no doubt provided a major catalyst for the development of

contemporary institutional theory, although its legacy could be traced back to earlier studies in Economics, Political Science and Sociology (Scott 1995a: 1-24) In brief, early institutionalist economists such as Thorstein Veblen criticized the classical utilitarian model of economic behaviour for neglecting broader social context and historical change. Meanwhile, institutionalist political scientists before World War II generally were preoccupied with formal political or legal structure and configurative studies. Durkheim and Weber, with their respective focus on "objective facticity" and "subjective meaning", were the early canons in sociological institutional studies. While Durkheim discussed the embodiment of institutions as "social facts" that are external and constraining individuals, Weber probed further into actual construction process in which individual interpretation of meanings transforms into a legitimate authoritative collective account. The inquiry of how it is possible that subjective meanings become objective facticities is the very task of the sociology of knowledge, from which both contemporary social constructivism and new institutionalism have been drawn. (Berger and Luckmann 1966:18; Ruggie 1998: 27-33)

As reflected in the streams of "old institutionalism", the new institutionalism to date therefore could be roughly classified along the three discipline boundaries, although there are increasingly "invasions" of the economics version

into the other two subjects in the form of rational choice theory. (Koelble 1995; Powell and DiMaggio 1991) This stage of renaissance in institutional studies overall is a reaction against the Behavioural Revolution. In general, contemporary economist institutionalists are concerned with rule system to regulate economic exchanges. Williamson's transaction costs approach exemplified this new development. In Political Science, new institutionalists have overall taken historical or rational choice perspectives. Notable members of the former camp include March and Olsen (1984; 1989), Hall (1986), Skocpol (1985), and Thelen and Steinmo (1992) who argued that preference and interests of actors are shaped by institutional framework and many structures/outcomes are not rationally planned but result from historical contingency or unintended consequences of action. (Scott 1995a:26-7; Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Koelble 1995: 236-9) New institutionalists in Sociology further broaden definition of "institution" to include not only rules, procedures but also conventions and culture. Particularly, they emphasized the features of "taken-for-grantedness" and "embeddedness" inherent in institutional development. Along the lines of W.Richard Scott's three pillars of "institution"--"cognitive", "normative" and "regulative"--which will be elaborated later, together with "level of analysis", new institutionalists in Economics and Political Science tend to emphasize the regulative aspects

of institutions at organizational level, whereas their colleagues in Sociology are inclined to focus on their cognitive features in wider societal level. (Scott 1995b:69; 1995c:xix) It is precisely the new institutionalism in Sociology and Organizational Analysis (SOA) that this thesis would be drawn from, which and its distinction from "old institutionalism" in SOA deserves further illustration.

The new institutionalism in SOA has its roots in the "old institutionalism" of Philip Selznick. (1949) Both "old" and "new" approaches challenge the assumption of instrumental rationality and of self-contained nature of organizations entertained by traditional interest-oriented organizational studies, and instead emphasize bounded rationality, the relationship between organizations and their environments, and the role of ideas/culture. Nevertheless, the new perspective departs from the "old" one in at least major aspects as follows. (Powell and DiMaggio 1991:12-5)

First of all, while the old approach tends to be much concerned with political interest conflicts among group players and their mobilization/alliance strategies (eg cooptation), inside or outside organizational boundaries, the new perspective generally focuses on how key players seeks to maintain legitimacy through institutional symbolic manipulation aiming to prevent actors concerned from recognizing or acting upon their interests.

Secondly, in terms of organizational embeddedness within environment, the old institutionalism emphasizes cooptation from the part of organization, whereas the new one tends to be preoccupied with how environment (or institution/structure) constitutes identities/interests of organizations. In addition, concerning institutionalization, while the old one is inclined to address differentiation within organization, the new one generally give more heeds to the diffusion of institutional practices across organizations.

Furthermore, insofar as organizational change-vs-persistence is concerned, for old institutionalism change is more oft-seen since organizations need to adapt continuously to dynamic environmental setting. By contrast, the new approach overall stresses both the aspect of homogeneity across organizations through institutional diffusion and institutional persistence and stability. Moreover, in their challenges to conventional instrumental rationality views based on means-ends hierarchy, the old institutionalists tend to emphasize displacement of goals in decision/policy process, whereas most new espousers focus on the ambiguity of goals. Finally, in regard to rationality of human action, while the old underscores the aspect of "unintended consequences" that often go beyond agency's control, new institutionalists highlight the unreflective aspect of routinized rule-following behaviours.

Likewise, W. Richard Scott made pithy dual distinctions between the two generations: (1) the new institutionalism shifts its attention from a primarily normative dimension that stresses social obligation as the basis for compliance to a cognitive and "taken-for-granted" orientation. (2) ontologically speaking, the new institutionalists tend to adopt a social constructivist rather than a objectivist or social realist stance that was typically taken by their predecessors. (Scott 1995a:xv)

Since the new institutionalism in SOA grew mainly as a reaction against Economics-inspired utilitarian perspective and sought to provide a viable alternative, a parallel dualistic debate could be witnessed as in Constructivist-vs-Neo-utilitarian in the IR literature mentioned above. While this exercise for differentiation has been widely practised among SOA theorists (eg. Scott 1995c: xiii; Scott 1995b: 72-3; Meyer, Boli and Thomas 1995:11-16; Powell and DiMaggio 1991), Krasner (1988) has pertinently epitomized the contrasts between "new institutionalism" and "utilitarian or functionalist" perspective in the following ways.

The utilitarian/functionalist perspective, first of all, tends to be more agency-centred in the sense that the given agency, individual or collective, is often assumed to be relatively self-contained, unitary or rational self-interest maximizer endowed with some "natural" capacities, rights, interest and identity. Secondly, in terms of

organization-environment relationship, its conception of environmental effect is often limited to technology, (scarcity of) material resources or opportunity niches. (eg Meyer et al 1995:11-16; Meyer 1995: 32) Moreover, utilitarians tend to assume that adaptability of organizations is relatively fluid and that institutions, predominantly instrumental in nature, are more ready to be responsive to incentive changes in environment in order to achieve the most optimal equilibrium. Fourthly, their views of history are also more teleological, static or unilinear to the extent that social change is often treated as gradual, progress-directed and low in costs. As a result, failure, often downplayed compared to success stories, is often deemed as a random event, tantamount to flawed adaptation in a competitive setting, or simply attributed to the given agents' "incompetence" in achieving some necessary structural differentiation within the system. (Krasner 1988: 66-71)

By contrast, new institutionalism tends to be relatively structure-oriented or to argue for mutual constitution of agency and structure. Agency's action then is often maintained to be "deeply embedded" in institutional context. The conception of environment is much expanded to incorporate symbolic and meaning systems. (eg. Meyer et al 1995: 17-19; Meyer 1995:32) In addition, the historical process is often viewed as more multiple-path-oriented and

thus its trajectories as more path dependent and dynamic to the extent that both institutional inertia and dramatic change are more probable than steady evolution, and that the cost involved in revolutionary change is often tremendously heavy. Institutions that were initially out of rational design may become relatively self-perpetuating over certain period of time, albeit in suboptimal condition.¹¹

Institutionalists assert that previous institutional choices actually limit the range of options opened for later decision-making. (Krasner 1988: 71-74)

From the above contrasts, several major propositions of new institutionalism were evidently presented. Nevertheless, the gist of new institutionalism could be summed up in W. Richard Scott's succinct analysis. He identified three pillars of institution: "regulative", "normative" and "cognitive" elements.¹² The "regulative" element generally includes enforceable rules and laws that usually are backed

¹¹ cf. "Cognitive evolutionary" approach maintains that "it may not be the best-fitted ideas, nor the most efficient institutions, that become 'naturalized' or reified, but those that prove most successful at imposing collective meanings and function on physical reality" (Adler 1997: 340)

¹² In fact, Scott has revised his classification schemes. In his earlier conception, he proposed a "layered model" that is made up of "(1) meaning systems and related behaviour patterns, which contain (2) symbolic elements, including representational, constitutive and normative components, that are (3) enforced by regulatory processes." (1995b: 54-64) In his seemingly later published works, he simplified them into "regulative", "normative" and "cognitive" elements. (1995a: 34-45; 1995c: xiv-xix)

by sanctioning power, coercion and monitoring mechanisms. The "normative" element entails norms, values and roles that often involve creation of moral beliefs, evaluative prescriptive and obligatory systems in order to meet "social" expectations. The "cognitive" element serves to define, constitute and legitimate actors' capacities, rights, interest, identity and their relevant activities. (Scott 1995a: 35-45)

Finally, the new institutionalism in SOA features a crucial and distinct concept that further differentiates it from its predecessor and other perspectives. This is the notion of "isomorphism", which was first raised by Meyer and Rowan (1977) and was later developed further by DiMaggio and Powell (1983)¹³ Essentially referring to the process in which organizations or institutions, by incorporating rules in their broader environments, become more and more homogeneous over time, it constitutes one major strategy of organizations to link up with the outside environment. (Scott 1992:209)

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V. Reformulation: A Conceptual Framework:

Having traced and outlined the agency-structure relations, Social Constructivism and new institutionalism as above, I shall now conclude this chapter by highlighting

¹³ Both pieces of work are collected in Powell and DiMaggio eds. (1991:41-62; 63-82)

their commonalities. These perspectives and themes will be recast in terms of their mutual linkages, be mapped in figures and synthesized as a conceptual framework ending with definitions of several concepts.

1. Mutual Linkages:

The interrelationships between the three broad perspectives are primarily manifested as three linkages: agency/structure (or structuration)--Constructivism; Constructivism--neoinstitutionalism; agency/structure--neoinstitutionalism. While their respective convergence has been suggested in the previous section, some points should be underscored as follows.

(1) Agency/Structure(Structuration)--Constructivism:

This linkage appears to be self-evident. Nevertheless, several evidences could be highlighted here. As a major indication, for instance, almost all leading Constructivists in IR literature cite Anthony Giddens' structuration theory in their works. (eg. Onuf 1989; 1998; Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1987) Equally evident, one of the key propositions of Constructivism is that agency and structure are mutually constitutive, which is exactly the gist of Giddens' theory. Thus, John Ruggie explicitly put it: "the agent-structure problem..is a subset of issues concerning the social construction of social reality."(1998:256)

(2) Constructivism--Neoinstitutionalism:

As highlighted by Scott and mentioned above, new

institutionalism, in comparison to old one, tends to take a "constructivist" position. Much of new institutionalism (eg. Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott 1995) was built upon the work of Berger and Luckmann (1966) in which social reality is argued to be constructed through social interaction process that is often embodied as "institutionalization".

Moreover, as elaborated above, both Constructivism and neoinstitutionalism are sociological-oriented perspectives and have commonly challenged the mainstream status of Economics-inspired (neo-)utilitarianism, while presenting themselves as serious alternatives to them. (eg. Onuf 1989; Ruggie 1998; Krasner 1988; Powell and DiMaggio 1991) Meanwhile, constructivists (eg Adler 1997) and new institutionalists (eg. Scott) identify their approach as the third/middle way primarily aiming to bridge the gap between agency and structure.

(3) Neoinstitutionalism--Agency/Structure:

This can be demonstrated in the similarities of Giddens and Scott's "eclectic" approaches. Just as Giddens formed structuration theory to transcend agency-structure debates, so Scott argued that reconciliation is possible and desirable.¹⁴ (Scott 1995b: 60) Scott also explicitly

¹⁴ Thus, Scott made it clear that "although the focus of institutional theory is on symbols and meanings and rules, ...it is essential that we not lose sight of the human agents that are creating and applying these symbols, interpreting these meanings, and formulating, conforming to, disobeying and modifying these rules." (1995b:60)

acknowledged that "all of these (neo-institutionalist) arguments are broadly consistent with Giddens' (1984) model of the duality of structure and action." (Scott 1995b:77)

Most notably, Scott's three pillars of "institution" considerably converges with Giddens' three "interactions" and corresponding "structures" as follows:

Table 1: Institutionalism and Structuration: 3 Elements			
Interactions (Giddens)	Power	Sanction	Communication
Structures (Giddens)	Domination	Legitimation	Signification
Pillars (Scott)	Regulative	Normative	Cognitive
Sources: Giddens (1979:82); Scott (1995a;1995c)			

2. Mapping and Synthesis:

A synthesized map that locates the three perspectives and some of their competing ones can be built in terms of their positions in ontological dimension of "constructivist-oriented" vs "objectivist-oriented" and "agency-oriented" and "structure-oriented" dimension:

Figure 1: Perspective Map in Structuration, Constructivism and New Institutionalism Literature	
Ontology/OE Dimension	Agency-Structure Dimension
	Agency-Oriented ————— Structure-Oriented
Constructivist/ Embedded Objectivist/ Self-Contained	<div> <div>Phenomenology</div> <div>Constructivism</div> <div>Structuration</div> </div> <div> <div>Poststructuralism</div> <div>Neoinstitutionalism (SOA)</div> <div>Critical Theory</div> <div>Gramscian Marxism</div> <div>Critical realism</div> <div>Classical Realism(IR)</div> <div>Neoinstitutionalism(PS/IR)</div> <div>Neoinstitutionalism(Ecn)</div> <div>Neo-Realism(IR)</div> <div>Utilitarianism</div> </div> <div> <div>Oldinstitutionalism (SOA)</div> <div>Structural-functionalism</div> </div>
Sources: Adapted from (Hay 1995:193), (Jepperson1991:154) and (Adler 1997: 331)	

Noteworthy is the relative positioning of the three perspectives, streams of neoinstitutionalism and old-institutionalism in the SOA. It presents much closer convergence of structuration theory and the Constructivism in IR with new institutionalism in SOA than with its cousins in Political Science/IR and Economics. Notwithstanding the similarities between the three perspectives, it should be noted that this author does not intend to argue that there are no major differences among them.¹⁵

¹⁵ For example, in terms of their orientations in Robert Cox's (1986) "problem-solving-vs-critical-approach" spectrum and of the frequency of empirical application, while new institutionalism in SOA tends to be more "problem-solving-oriented" and more widely applied to empirical

Some conceptions of the three perspectives that are relevant for the case of "one China" institutional development can be listed respectively. These include: (1) "mutual constitution of agency and structure", "virtual existence and duality of structure", "reproduction of structure by agents through practice and instantiation" and "constraining and constitutive effects" in structuration theory; (2) "(re)-formulation of states' interests and identities through interactions and learning", "constitutive and regulative aspects of rules" and "reinforcement or transformation of structure through practices" in Social Constructivism; (3) "three pillars of institutions" , "the taken-for-granted aspect of institution", "future possibility of actions being set within parameters of prior institutional choices", "organizational embeddedness in broader environmental context", and "institutional isomorphism" in the SOA new institutionalism.

In particular, three overarching themes can be further identified for the purpose of this thesis: (1) social construction of reality through politics of representation; (2) the exercise of power through structuration; (3) the pursuit of legitimacy through engagement in broader environmental context.

cases, structuration theory appears to be closer to critical tradition and less applied to empirical studies, with Constructivism generally sitting in between.

First of all, social construction of reality embodied through institutionalization involves a selecting process that is essentially political. (Adler 1997:340) The emphasis here is what sort of ideas or knowledge prevails over others. This process entails systemization and simplification that often results in marginalizing, delegitimizing, isolating or excluding some potentially competing elements in a broad and complex pool of ideas, possible interpretations or practices which might not fit into constructed categories, to the effect that these dislodged elements are often labelled as "Other" or "less important". (Doty 1996: 7-12; Shapiro 1988: 13-54) By implication, just as organization can be seen as "the mobilization of bias" (Schattschneider 1960: 71), so a given institution always favours some agency while against others. As an illustration in point, Robert H. Jackson argued that the institution of sovereignty favours the quasi-states' ruling sovereigns but against their citizens since it grants the former needed (international) legitimacy although there is less proportionate legitimacy gained from domestic society. (1990:5) As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, politics of representation involves dual yet interrelating levels of struggles: one on the meaning level, the other on concrete institutional arrangements. This is perhaps best epitomized by Michael Atkinson who maintained that in overall policy process "many political struggles can

be understood as efforts to embed systems of meaning and political discourse within institution."(Atkinson 1993:26)

Another common thread seaming through the three broad perspectives is power relationship. The operation of power, as manifested in Steven Lukes' "third dimension of power" (1974), is not completely visible as envisaged by Robert Dahl (1957). Rather, through institutionalization, it often involves repeated discipline-oriented efforts and practices to stabilize interactions and relations to the extent that the constructed relations are "naturalized" or taken for granted as reified reality. While coercive power and sanction may be exercised in an observable way, broader power relations involves oft-invisible legitimation process in which the power agents are able to secure from their social constituencies.

The third common theme among the three perspectives, which is particularly highlighted in the SOA new institutionalism, refers to the social basis of organizations and institutions. These entities must gain legitimacy by being "grounded in nature and reason".(Adler 1997:340) Members of organizations are provided with "a set of analogues with which to explore the world and justify the naturalness and reasonableness of the institutionalized rule".(Douglas 1986:112) A primary attention is directed to how legitimacy is acquired, maintained and strengthened through reproduction of structure (structuration),

embeddedness in environment (new institutionalism) or construction of reality for target population (social constructivism). It is precisely based upon this common denominator that the "constructivist-vs-objectivist" dimension is argued to be coincided with the "embedded-vs-self-contained" one as shown in Figure 1.¹⁶

This theme on embeddedness of entity deserves further elaboration. In social sciences, debates related to this theme appear to be omnipresent. For example, a major issue on the autonomy of the state in Comparative Politics and Sociology fundamentally boils down to the extent to which the state is insulated/separated from civil society. The Miliband-vs-Poulantzas debate (eg Miliband 1969; Poulantzas 1973; Miliband and Poulantzas 1972: 238-262) in neo-Marxist literature is a case in point.

Similarly, in development studies there were ongoing debates related to the theme. Taking Cal Clark and K.C.Roy's handy classification for illustration, there were at least three waves of debates engaged between: (1) modernization and dependency/world system theory; (2) neo-classical Economics and the Developmental State model, and (3)

¹⁶ Indeed, if the figure is re-viewed, the conglomerations of "structuration", "constructivism" and "SOA new institutionalism", occupying the upper part on the map, are visually contrasted with those of "utilitarianism", "Neo-Realism" and "structural-functionalism" that spreads on the lower part of the figure. This significantly corresponds to what Giddens (1979), Ruggie (1998) and Krasner (1988) have projected in their works written in three decades.

Developmental State and the State-in-Society. (Clark and Roy 1997: 1-7) By and large, these theories, with varying degrees of reference across time and space, point to the extent to which economy of a given country has been promoted through the guidance of the state and whether the economy and state alike could be appropriately depicted as "self-sustaining". In this regard, in particular, Peter Evans coins a term "embedded autonomy" to make the case that the developmental state is "embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies..(thereby it) could..transcend individual societal interest.."(Evans 1995:12)

Not only does a relatively concrete organization, such as the state as a whole, require environmental support for its persistence, but some less tangible entities could not be completely secluded from its broader contextual influence. For example, Karl Polanyi (1944) dismissed the unreflective myth entertained by predominantly utilitarian functionalists that market can be self-regulating without the interference of political, social and legal institutions. In the thesis, nevertheless, I will argue that the issue of independence of Canadian foreign policy could be recast along this line as well. In chapter four, the Stockholm negotiations between Canada and the PRC will be

shown to present the feature of "engaged independence".

In effect, Giddens' notion of the mutual constitution of agency and structure, in a sense, could be reconceptualized in light of organization-environment relationship. To the extent that agency could not sustain itself without re-producing environmental structures to its advantage and that structure would cease to exist if there is no longer continuous instantiation through practices by agency, both could be argued to be co-constituted.

Having elaborated the common themes as a conceptual framework of this thesis, before proceeding to the case of "one China", I should nevertheless clarify several key terms that have recurred thus far and would be referred frequently in this thesis.

In the first place, "institutions" and "structures", unless otherwise defined, are to be mostly used in an interchangeable way. They generally refer to "agency-constructed arrangements, formally or informally organized, which consists of 'cognitive' (or 'constitutive'), 'normative' (or 'evaluative') and 'regulative' (or 'dominative') elements that aim to define entities, to stabilize interaction-oriented activities or to provide meanings of human action."¹⁷ It should be added that

¹⁷ This definition is basically drawn from Scott's discussion and Giddens's structuration theory. For the former, see (Scott 1995a:33).

"structure" employed in this thesis is analogous to what sociologists such as Giddens and Lukes have in mind, rather than Waltz's usage that refers to "distribution of power capacities".

Similarly, "structuration" and "institutionalization" are to be treated approximately as synonyms and broadly defined as "a process by which agency produces and reproduces (creates, elaborates, interprets or incorporates) structure and the latter constrains and constitutes (limits, defines, shapes or (de)legitimate) the agency's capacity, rights, interests, identities and its actions."

Finally, this thesis will refer to "one China structure" or "institutional structure" more often than "one China policy" for two reasons. Firstly, it is assumed that there are some broad intersubjective understandings among many countries on their treatments of the issues involved. "Structure", in terms of its "overarching" connotation or its state within agents' minds, analogous to memory traces as seen by Giddens, appears to be pertinent. Furthermore, compared to "policy" that may connote voluntarism and "separateness" of individual states, "structure" seems to capture better the features of how the constitutive and constraining effects of some longstanding arrangements have commonly had on subsequent actions of various policy-makers across nations. Now, let me begin to pursue how the case of "one China" structure has been constructed and reproduced.

CHAPTER THREE: YEARS OF CONTESTED REALITY

The political demarcation between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan is strictly contemporary. It was not a concern of world politics until the 1940s. The advent of the Cold War further froze it into a state of de facto separation. It then went through a decisive transition leading to the prevalence of the existing arrangement favouring Beijing's representation for "one China", which will be explored later in the thesis.

This chapter will explore the years prior to that transformation. They were characterized with contested claims of "reality" which entailed a series of struggles among ideas and forces to define the mainland-vs-Taiwan division. Overall, the condition during the period was relatively fluid with possible direction of the course of history largely open. This competitive situation was later reinforced by the transition of the Cold War system. The nuance change of the broader international context had been detected by some agencies wishing to augment their influence on world stage. These included Beijing, Ottawa, Paris and Washington.

The period also largely coincided with the golden age of Canadian internationalism and Pearsonian diplomacy. It manifested a growing aspiration for a middlepower statesmanship and independence in foreign policy, which meant that Ottawa must engage in policy deliberations and readjustment with respect to the China-vs-Taiwan phenomenon

to carve a diplomatic niche. The part Canada played during the period thus must be highlighted to make sense of its later initiatives.

This chapter will thus focus on the development of Canadian China policy within the context of broader change. Meanwhile it will selectively explore some major reactions of the PRC, France, the USA and the ROC to the fundamental transformation of the Cold War system. Nevertheless, the issue at dispute, the demarcation between the mainland and Taiwan, was not formed from nowhere nor self-perpetuating. Before dealing with agency's (re-)actions, I shall first trace the origin of the China/Taiwan phenomenon and its development in the context of the 1940s and 1950s.

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I. The Genesis and Early Development of the Demarcation:

The geographical separation between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan generally did not attract much global interest until the World War II. When Chiang Kai-shek met with his American and British counterparts in Cairo in 1943 that ended with a common declaration that "Formosa¹ and the Pescadores... shall be restored to the Republic of China.." (Chiu 1979) Taiwan's linkage with the discourse of Chinese nationalism was thus (re-)established.

It was argued in a recent study on the subject that

¹ "Formosa" refers to "Taiwan".

although the Taiwan issue had become of symbolic importance for the development of Chinese nationalism in the late 19th century, prior to the World War II both the Communist and Nationalist Chinese did not take it for granted that Taiwan is an integral part of China. (Hughes 1997: 5-6; 12-13) This was demonstrated by none other than Mao Zedong who, while responding to Edgar Snow's interview in 1936, reportedly defined the issue as identical to that former Chinese colony of Korea and thus proposed "independence" as a common solution of both issues in the event of Japanese defeat. (Hughes 1997: 12) In this sense, then, the Taiwan issue was constructed ex post facto as an integral discourse of Chinese nationalism. Nevertheless, the linkage between Taiwan and "one China" issue could be understood in some historical backdrop.

Historically, China had sometimes been divided on the mainland settings long before the Peace of Westphalia established in 1648 the time when modern inter-state system evolved. The term "China" was first used to refer to a unified entity of Chin dynasty under the First Emperor in 221 BC. In view of cycling trends of Chinese history by which "unified" kingdoms were often preceded or followed by competing co-existing kingdoms on given territorial settings on the Chinese mainland, Lo Kuanchung, an author of a popular Chinese classic 14th century historical novel entitled Romance of the Three Kingdoms, concluded that "long united,

the Kingdom must divide; long divided, it must unite. It has always been thus." (Roy 1998: 54) Nevertheless, Taiwan was first embroiled in the "unification-vs-dividedness" discourse of Chinese history between AD 1662 and 1683 when Taiwan was a bastion of a Ming loyalist Koxinga aiming to recover the mainland from the "barbarian" Manchu rulers who had just captured the Chinese state.² Nevertheless, Taiwan's part in the discourse of Chinese unification was also related to the island's international relations at the time.

Before Koxinga took Taiwan from the Dutch in 1662, the latter had just conquered the Spanish-controlled northern part of the island in 1642. (Beckmann 1973; Goddard 1966: 49-62) Koxinga's recovery base eventually collapsed under the Manchus' successful operation in 1683 thereby ending the political separation between Chinese mainland and Taiwan. Nevertheless, after that the Manchus paid relatively little attention to the island for almost two centuries. Despite the fact that the Ching court had endeavoured to effectuate its control over the island in light of the Japanese expansion in the mid-19th century, Taiwan was ultimately ceded to the Japanese under the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 following the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. As such, arguably, by

² There was then some striking parallel between Koxinga and contemporary Nationalist Chinese in terms of their re-establishing themselves in Taiwan as a bastion to fulfil their causes of the legitimate government of China vis-a-vis the "unChinese" rebel regime on the mainland.

the time, the Taiwan issue had become regional concern.

The issue resurged in the 1940s albeit in a world, rather than regional, forum and with new historical condition: this time it was interwoven with the China representation problem. After a half-century Japanese colonization, in light of the Cairo Declaration, the island was reversed to the Nationalist Chinese jurisdiction in 1945. However, a rampant Chinese civil war erupted accordingly on the mainland. With the Communists' victory being imminent in mid-1949, Taiwan provided sanctuary for defeated Nationalists and became an unprecedented international cynosure. As both the Communists and the Nationalists competed to claim as the sole legitimate government of China, the contemporary "one China" problem emerged on the world stage. If the Chinese civil war had produced China/Taiwan phenomenon on an ad hoc basis, it was the Korean War that prolonged the demarcation.

As Mao's forces swept across northern and central mainland in summer 1949, "liberation" of Taiwan had been envisaged. Visits to Moscow by Liu Shaoqi and Mao himself were partly intended to secure Soviet military assistance for a large-scale attack on Taiwan which was accordingly planned in the early spring of 1950. (Li 1998:51) Meanwhile, the Truman Administration had publicly declared a "hands-off" policy toward Taiwan and excluded it from American defence perimeter.

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950

fundamentally changed the course of history. The War effectively integrated the Asia-Pacific into a global Cold War system that had first emerged in Europe. (Yahuda 1996:21) The Americans viewed it as another instance of Communist aggression, following Soviet blockade of West Berlin in 1949. The Seventh Fleet was ordered to interpose in the Taiwan Straits to prevent both Beijing and Taipei from attacking with each other.

After the "Chinese People's Volunteers" formally crossed the Yalu River in October 1950, the Americans took measures to sanction the Beijing regime by imposing an economic embargo and initiating a resolution in the UN condemning it as an "aggressor". In the meantime, the War prompted many western countries, including Canada, to hold off plans to recognize the "new China". Thus, the Korean War not only helped integrate the Asia-Pacific into the parameter of global Cold War, albeit presenting it in a form distinguishable from the North Atlantic setting (Yahuda 1996: 29,44,46), but provided a catalyst to perpetuate the China/Taiwan phenomenon.³

Shortly after, the legal termination of the state of

3. In view of this, some analysts attributed Taiwan's survival and development to the Korean War. It should be noted however that the War is not a unique historical contingency. As some Nationalists would argue, the Japanese's full-fledged attacks on the mainland in the World War II propitiously served to save Mao's "Chinese Soviet" from being exterminated.

war with Japan became a contentious issue, given that it was interwoven with the "one China" representation. Although both Chinese parties were unable to participate in the San Francisco Peace Conference of September 1951, under explicit US pressure Tokyo concluded a separate peace treaty with Taipei in April 1952, formally relinquishing its sovereignty over Taiwan while making no reference to who would succeed the island. The implication of a de jure "frozen" status for Taiwan pointed to a possible direction of future institutionalization, which complicated the "one China" issue.

Besides the Korean War and the Peace Treaty with Japan, the demarcation between Beijing and Taipei was further fortified through a series of incidents. The Offshore Islands Crisis was first initiated by Beijing in September 1954 and intensified in early 1955, attempting to detach the Chinese civil war from the Cold War system. (Li 1998:54-8) Washington responded by signing the Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) with Taipei in December 1954. Nevertheless, the MDT carefully limited the American obligation to Taiwan and Penghu, excluding its application to Kinmen and Matsu, the main offshore islands at stake. In light of the limitation, the Congress passed the "Formosa Resolution" to authorize the President to defend the islands against any Communist attack at his discretion. The political demarcation between the PRC and the ROC was thus fortified with military deployment.

The confrontation later escalated into the Second Offshore Islands Crisis when the Communist forces began a massive artillery bombardment of Kinmen on August 23, 1958. While President Eisenhower thought the offshore islands unimportant, the Secretary of State Dulles attached vital importance to the maintenance of the Nationalists' morale. Escorts of Nationalist resupply ships to 3-mile limit of the islands were approved, albeit reluctantly, to show American symbolic but careful support of the Nationalists. To deter the PRC from further pressing the islands, President Eisenhower further made known his intention to use nuclear weapons if necessary. (FRUS 1958-60 XIX: 73-5, 83-6, 96-102)

In sum, from the Korean War to the Offshore Islands Crises, the political demarcation between Beijing and Taipei further escalated into military confrontation. Meanwhile, the Peace Treaty with Japan implied Taiwan's international status was undetermined. This left room to maneuver in the historical process. The de facto division between the two sides fell short of de jure arrangements. In essence the contested legal claims of each side, together with the ambiguous posture of the US and Japan kept the structure of Chinese sovereignty from becoming institutionalized.

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II. Representing Reality in the Contextual Change:

The political demarcation in the 1950s was very much translated into diplomatic deadlock. Beijing and Taipei were

engaged in ongoing struggles for "one China" representation throughout the period. The state of contested representation will be outlined first. This became complicated when the Cold War system underwent transformation. The perception of reality and ensuing reactions to the systemic change varied from player to player. The section will sketch the change and diverging representation of reality and responses in the West and Beijing. Then comes the French recognition of the PRC, as a way to put into practice their conception of new reality, marked as a crucial move to circumvent the previous arrangement. Finally, the reactions of Washington and Taipei will be examined in the end.

1. Contested "One China" Diplomacy:

The "one China" issue as the subject of Beijing-Taipei diplomatic struggles during the pre-transition period centred upon the representation of China, rather than of Taiwan's status. In many ways, both the Communists and the Nationalists shared the consensus that Taiwan is a part of China thereby regarding it as "non-decision" one, although many countries in the world remained to be convinced of the position. Thus, the period witnessed a co-existence of conflict and tacit "cooperation" between Beijing and Taipei. This not only was the case in the 1950s, but continued throughout the 1960s and beyond. The complexity of conflict and consensus on the issues was betrayed in the pursuit of the ROC foreign policy objectives, elaborated by Foreign

Minister Shen Chang-huan.

Shen identified a two-pronged policy of "safeguarding Taiwan and recovering the mainland" as the ultimate objective of the ROC diplomacy. To achieve it, he further specified ten operative goals. Noteworthy are the followings:

(1) solidifying the UN membership and preventing the Communists from being seated there; (2) Improving ROC-USA relations and seeking American economic and military assistance; (3) Urging democratic and free countries that recognized the ROC to establish missions in Taiwan and preventing them from switching diplomatic ties to Beijing; ..(7) Seeking diplomatic ties with those countries that recognized neither Beijing nor Taipei or at least prevent them from establishing ties with Beijing;..(9) Breaking diplomatic relations with countries that had already had formal ties with the ROC but did recognize the PRC so as to dash any international 'two Chinas' plot;.. (my own emphasis; Shen 1962: 75-76)

The implementation of the objectives did bring about some diplomatic success for Taipei in the 1950s. A major project of the ROC diplomacy during the period was to shape the "one China" issue to its advantage so as to challenge the Communist legitimacy in the mainland. On numerous occasions, Taipei sought to depict Beijing as unstable, irresponsible and aggressive. The Korean War as well as the Offshore Islands Crises provided great opportunities to demonstrate the "warmonger" nature of the Communist regime. The UN's condemnation of the PRC as an aggressor thus was a diplomatic triumph for the Nationalists. Later on, despite the Japanese ambivalence with respect to Taiwan's status, the symbolic meaning of the Peace Treaty was important for Taipei. By

emphasizing the fact that it was the Republic of China government that first declared war against Japan and that it was regarded as one of the Allies during the World War II, together with its maintaining the China seat in the UN, the Nationalist claim to legitimacy was bolstered at home and abroad. (CH 1952-1953: 160-161)

Nevertheless, the PRC also gained some ground. The Korean War highlighted the important role the PRC could play in peace and security in the Asia-Pacific. Some western countries now regarded the PRC as a vital player. Thus, Beijing was invited to participate in the Geneva conference of May 1954 which was convened to address the Korean and Indochina issues. In July an agreement was concluded by the parties of the conference to the effect that the Cold War demarcation in Asia was complete through the affirmation of a Korean armistice and of a partition of Vietnam. Earlier in April, as a part of its new wave of omnidirectional foreign policy, Beijing signed a Joint Communiqué with New Delhi in which India agreed that Tibet was an integral part of Chinese territory and both announced that their relations would be based on "the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence". Meanwhile, along the spirit of these principles, the PRC joined Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan, in Colombo to urge for a united Third World voice. This laid a framework for the first Asian-African conference held one year later in Bandung which further provided a platform for

Beijing to promote its international profile. (Yahuda 1996: 36;45; 53)

Later on, the outbreak of the Offshore Islands Crises also led to, through Zhou Enlai's conciliatory offer in Bandung, an ultimate establishment of the PRC-US ambassadorial talks starting at Geneva in August 1955. (FRUS 1955-57, III; 1958-60 XIX: 142-43) Hence, Beijing gained ground through the initiation of crises by demonstrating its coercive capacity. With the size of territory and population under its control, the implications of Beijing's importance to regional and world peace were clear. The effect of this implication was reinforced through a simmering Sino-Soviet rift beginning in the late 1950s and became more and more evident to the extent that the PRC's existence could no longer be ignored. Nevertheless, the Beijing-Taipei diplomatic rows on China representation continued throughout the 1960s, albeit in a more contentious fashion.

The strained competition could be demonstrated through Taipei's strenuous efforts to seek the (re)-establishment of diplomatic missions in Taiwan by other countries and a series of intensive trips by the ROC Foreign Minister especially in the mid-1960s. Insofar as the former aspect is concerned, one major achievement involved the Australians' final decision to open an embassy in Taipei, in June 1966 to "fill the vacancy" of the embassy, left over 17 years as a result of the Chinese civil war. For that purpose, the Australian Foreign Minister

Malcolm Hasluck visited Taiwan and signed a Joint Communiqué with the Nationalist counterpart in which he "expressed deep appreciation for President Chiang Kai-shek's penetrating views and wise assessment of the current crisis in Asia.." and pledged that "Australia would continue to oppose the admission of the Chinese Communist regime to the UN". (DEA file E,1,8882: CNBRA Tels to OTT Jun.1;3;17/66) This action diverged from Ottawa's approach.

The ROC foreign policy was predicated on alignment with the West in the Cold War. During his visit in Washington in February 1965 while the Americans were engaged in bombing North Vietnam, the ROC Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan explicitly pledged Taipei's support for Washington's action. (DEA file E,1,8882: WSHDC Tel to OTT Feb.23/65) Immediately following, Shen travelled to Montreal and Toronto, and made the first official visit by a ROC Foreign Minister to Ottawa. (CDN Feb.22/65; MOFA files 412.21: CDA Tel to ROC Feb.25/65) The message he conveyed was self-evident from the title of his speech, "The Chinese Communist Threat to The Free World". (MOFA file 412.21) During his stay in Ottawa, Shen reaffirmed the longstanding ROC policy that Taipei would not accept any "two Chinas" offer and would sever relations with any country which recognized Beijing. (CDN Feb.25/65)

Later in 1965, Shen was dispatched to New Zealand and Australia to present Chiang's views on the Southeast Asian situation before the upcoming Commonwealth Foreign Ministers

meeting. In New Zealand, Shen stressed that the Chinese Communists were the fundamental source of problems related to the region, and that the Chinese were already in Vietnam often discounted by westerners for lack of credible evidence. (DEA files E,1,8882: Note of Dcs June.11/65; WLTON Let to USSEA June 17/65) Shen raised similar issues with Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies. (DEA file E,1,8882: FED Memo to SSEA Aug.3/65)

Overall, in the increasingly strained competition, the ROC's diplomatic accomplishments prior to 1969 was reflected in a relatively stable but slightly increasing proportion of countries recognizing Taipei in the 1960s compared to previous decade. Taipei's diplomatic missions abroad also increased. Taipei's profile in the diplomatic tug of war is presented in table 2.

Table 2 The PRC-vs-ROC Diplomatic Profile (1950-68)*													
Year (19__)	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62
Recognizing ROC%	43	42	44	43	43	45	43	46	45	46	46	46	47
Recognizing PRC%	21	21	21	21	22	25	27	28	31	33	32	32	32
*Sources: (Kao 1993: 52-3; 142-3)													

Table 2 (continued)						
Year	63	64	65	66	67	68
ROC%	50	46	43	46	47	48
PRC%	34	37	36	33	32	31

The record indicates that the proportion of countries extending recognition to Taipei reached a peak of 50 percent in 1963, whereas Beijing received the highest rate of recognition in 1964-65.

As can be seen from the table, prior to 1970 Beijing's diplomacy demonstrates a remarkably uneven record with certain periods showing stagnant-growth especially during 1950-53, 1960-63 and 1966-68. In the 1950s, the eruption of the Korean War brought in a period of militant and parochial-oriented foreign policy that underwent readjustment in the mid-1950s with a relatively conciliatory omni-directional approach. This flexible tendency was succeeded by a reversion back to ideological and regionally-oriented external behaviour. Caught in a vortex of domestic campaigns, relations with Moscow deteriorated and ambassadorial talks with Washington reached a stalemate. Just prior to French recognition, Beijing was diplomatically isolated.

French recognition in early 1964 was accomplished as part of a new foreign policy readjustment. Premier Zhou Enlai and Foreign Minister Chen Yi made successive trips in Asia and Africa. Noteworthy is Zhou's visit to Ceylon that culminated in a Joint Communiqué in which Ceylon "reaffirmed its view that Taiwan is an integral part of China" in late February.⁴ (DEA file B,2,8874: Colombo Tel to OTT Mar.3/64)

⁴ Although this statement was not issued on the occasion of establishing diplomatic relations, it was the first Joint

Beijing also detonated its first nuclear device in October. On non-political fronts, in addition to agreements reached with Canadian and Japanese news agencies, the PRC also concluded an exchange of trade offices with Austria in December 1964, and with Italy in following spring. (DEA files F,1,8902: Euro. Memo for file Dec.17/64; B,4,8875:Rome Tels to OTT Apr.9;12/65)

Subsequently, however, the PRC suffered several setbacks. In the wake of American increasing involvement, Beijing's support for North Vietnamese seemed to be less real than Moscow's. Its call for revolution fell on deaf ears in Africa and Asia. A tendency to revert to militant ideological rhetoric, indicated by Lin Piao's reaffirmation of "People's War" and Chen Yi's conditions on its UN membership, further alienated several Beijing's friends in the Third World. An abortive coup attempt in Indonesia in October 1965, resulting in a loss of a longstanding ally in that regime, further disclosed Beijing's connection and substantiated the threat of Communist infiltration in many Asian countries. On the other hand, Beijing's feud with Moscow showed no sign of abatement with Mao Zedong's vehement condemnation of the Soviet leaders as revisionists. This development had far-

Communiqué that was immediately concluded after the French recognition and explicitly referred to Taiwan's status. However, whether the specific reference to Taiwan resulted from Chinese learning a lesson from the precarious French experiment remained to be confirmed.

reaching consequences in domestic politics. Mao began to identify alleged revisionists within China, a process which was to culminate in the so-called "Cultural Revolution". (Yahuda 1996: 59) The Cultural Revolution brought Beijing's global diplomacy to a virtual halt. Nevertheless, Canadians noted the PRC foreign relations emerging from the shadow of anarchy by the end of 1967.

Beijing and Taipei were engaged in a continuous contest for China's representation throughout the two decades. This was coupled with a tacit consensus on "one China", which later to be illustrated in the Nationalist actions to reject any international offer smack of "one China one Taiwan" or "two Chinas". Before dealing with this aspect, I shall first sketch the change of broader context and western reactions through seeking to establish direct contact or normalizing relations with the PRC while leaving rooms for Taiwanese representation.

2. Contextual Change and Reactions:

With the growing influence exerted by Beijing over issues of peace and security and increasing evidence of the Sino-Soviet disunity, the Cold War entered into a new and volatile era in the 1960s. Against this backdrop, the longstanding problem of how to deal with Communist China became much more urgent and contentious than ever before in the West. Within this new context, reactions ranged from relaxing containment and expanding contacts with Beijing to

moving boldly to establish diplomatic ties. Any policy change was premised on a clearer distinction between "China" and "Taiwan". Arrangements along the lines of "one China one Taiwan" or "two Chinas" then began to surface.

(1). Western Divergence and The Sino-Soviet Split:

Although the gap between western views on the Communist China became less and less bridgeable in the 1960s, signs of divergence emerged soon after the process of the integration of the Asia-Pacific into global Cold War system began in the early 1950s. The true nature of the Communist Chinese already puzzled the West even before their victory on the mainland. Whether or not they represented an integral force in International Communist Movement was a core issue in dispute. While the answer of the Americans tended to be positive, Canada along with Britain, India and several other Commonwealth countries were inclined to separate Chinese nationalism from Soviet communism. (Pearson 1951: 24; Pearson 1993: 25;124) Western approaches to the recognition of Beijing government further diverged after the Korean War and offshore islands crises erupted. The British and Canadians, while sharing the Commonwealth tradition of recognizing governments exercising effective authority over certain territory, consistently championed a "constructive engagement" approach. By contrast, in the 1950s the Americans tended to be closer to the Nationalist cause that "Red China" should not be "rewarded" with recognition and instead be

contained and isolated in view of its aggressive policy.

With the collapse of Sino-Soviet alliance and the rift which opened in the early 1960s, the above sources of divergence among the West--two entities vs. monolithic, recognition as acknowledge of fact vs. moral approval, engagement vs. containment--were further brought to the fore. For those countries that attached much importance to bringing Beijing into international community, in particular, the split of the Communist giants testified to the validity of their arguments and the recognition of and engagement with Beijing were reasonable and effective prescriptions. More importantly, the new change in the East strengthened their belief that time was ripe for taking due actions to foster engagement.

As early as the mid-1950s, while the Soviet Union under Khrushchev increasingly promoted "peaceful coexistence" with the West, Mao's China continued to preach world revolution against the capitalists. Their divergent approaches toward the West soon were put into severe test in the Offshore Islands Crises. The PRC's request for a Soviet-made sample atomic bomb in view of American nuclear threat was rejected. In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow's willingness to restrain Beijing from developing its own nuclear weapons culminated in the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty caused the simmering dispute to burst into open split.

Under the new circumstances, there were indications

Of a reorientation of the PRC's foreign policy and new initiatives were taken to make the most of this trend. For the Canadian observers, as early as 1963, there was already evident sign of deliberate change in the behaviour of Beijing's diplomats. For example, the Canadian Ambassador to Poland reported in April 1964 that his PRC colleague, Wang Ping-Nan, significantly became cordial and amiable, attending social functions more frequently at the end of summer 1963, in contrast to his austere standoffishness before. (DEA file B,2,8874: WAS Let to USSEA Apr.23/64)

The most important sign of an overall foreign policy readjustment no doubt was Mao Zedong's timely elaboration of the "intermediate zone" theory in an interview with Japanese journalists in January 1964. According to this theory, Mao identified the PRC itself as sitting at one end of a spectrum of countries and put the US and the USSR together, with their parallel objectives, at the opposite end of the spectrum. In-between were the "intermediate zone" that included Asian, African and Latin American countries on the one hand, and Canada, Australia, Japan and Western European countries on the other. The purpose was to form the broadest global united front to oppose the "imperialists". (DEA file A,1,10056: HK Tel to OTT Jan 24/64) The French move to recognize the PRC, from Mao's viewpoint, thus testified to the validity of this theory. More importantly, it represented a new western initiative to build a diplomatic bridge to Beijing in light

of transforming international environment. As well, it marked the first western experiment to put the possibility of simultaneous existence of the "two Chinas" into a test.

(2). French Recognition of the PRC:

After General de Gaulle came to office in 1958, the pursuit of a more independent French foreign policy outside of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) framework gradually took a firm hold. With respect to China, experience of participating with Communist China in the Geneva conference of 1954 set the tone of reconciliation. The end of the Algerian War in 1962 came at a time when the Communist Chinese were detaching from the Soviet bloc, opening the window for an eventual Franco-Chinese normalization. (Fejto 1965:42-46;52-58) In November 1963, Georges-Picot, a retired senior diplomat, led an exploratory French commercial mission to Beijing. He suggested to Foreign Minister Chen Yi that the PRC need not publicly put forward a firm precondition that France must first sever diplomatic relations with the ROC in order for normalization to be realized since Taipei would almost inevitably take the initiative thereby meeting its need, which would be more palatable to the West. However, Chen did not find this acceptable. (DEA file B,1,8874: Paris Tel to OTT Nov 28/63)⁵ Subsequently, former French Prime

5. This was reported by Canadian Embassy in Paris after its officials had a lunch with Georges-Picot who recalled his trip to Beijing. On that trip, he reportedly marketed his above proposal to Zhou Enlai who was said to turn it down but added that "let us not decide now that it cannot be

Minister, Edgar Faure, visited the PRC at the latter's invitation. According to British Charge d'Affaires in Beijing, Faure was authorized to offer French recognition to the Chinese, which however did not include French withdrawal of recognition from the ROC nor an acknowledgement of Beijing's sovereignty over Taiwan. The offer was rejected. (Ibid: Briefing Note Dec.23/63)

On January 7, 1964, Couve de Murville, French Foreign Minister, informally told American Ambassador Bohlen that Paris decided to recognize Beijing. This was later confirmed by French Ambassador in Washington to the State Department. Paris claimed that it did not accept Beijing's condition of breaking relations with Taipei first and that relations with Taiwan will remain unchanged unless Taiwan chooses to break relations. (FRUS 1964-68 XXX: 1) This was similarly conveyed to Canadian officials during Lester B. Pearson's visit to France on January 15. In addition, Couve de Murville expressed his opinion to his Canadian guests that the "two China" solution accords with reality and makes the best sense. (DEA file A,1,10056: Paris Let to USSEA Jan 23/64) The rationale of French decision was that the Sino-Soviet bloc was no longer monolithic and that Beijing exerted increasing influence in Indochina. (Ibid; FRUS 1964-68 XXX:5-7)

Washington then did all it could to urge Taipei to

done." (DEA file B,1, 8874: Delhi Tel to OTT Jan.10/64)

refrain from taking immediate retaliatory action. President Johnson wrote a personal letter to Chiang Kai-shek on January 16. Two days later, Dean Rusk called in Ambassador Tsiang and urged the ROC to stand fast in order to put both the French and Communists to maximum test and to avoid giving the French any normal pretext for severing relations with it. (FRUS 1964-68 XXX:8) Within one week, Dean Rusk, after having heard news about the ROC's hard-line rhetoric, called in Tsiang again to express his disappointment and asked Taipei not to "give French any indication of intention to withdraw in any circumstances". (FRUS 1964-68 XXX: 12) Meanwhile, Ray Cline, an senior official in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Chiang Kai-shek's close friend, was sent to "bring the Gimo around..(with) implied threat.." (FRUS 1964-68 XXX: 12)

In the early morning of January 27, the exact day French announced its recognition, Cline and American Ambassador held talks with Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, and received assurance from the latter that "if French statement (is) equivocal, the ROC would consider possible responses aiming at the US objectives". Meanwhile, Chiang complained that if Washington had supported his plan to recover mainland and implemented it, there would have been no such problem occurring at the moment, and seized the chance to sell his proposals for the solution of the Indochina problem through American support of Taipei's operations on the mainland and related alliance building.

(FRUS 1964-68 XXX: 13-15; 19-21).

On the other hand, a short Joint Communiqué was issued in both Paris and Beijing to the effect that both governments agreed to establish diplomatic relations and to appoint respective ambassadors within three months. But there was no reference to the status of Taiwan. (Erasmus 1964; SCMP 3150 Jan.30/64: 16) Before and after the decision was announced, while Taipei showed no sign of withdrawing its mission in Paris, there was speculation that France was pursuing a "two Chinas" policy and that the PRC had dropped its steadfast objection to that option. Beijing's Ministry of Foreign Affairs nevertheless set out its stance the next day:

According to international practice, recognition of the new government of a country naturally implies ceasing to recognize the old ruling group overthrown by the people of that country. Consequently, the representatives of the old ruling group can no longer be regarded as..(those) of that country to be present side by side with..(those) of the new government in one and the same country or international organization. It was with this understanding that..(the PRC government) reached agreement with (French) government..on the establishment of diplomatic relations and the exchange of ambassadors..The Chinese government deems it necessary to reaffirm that Taiwan is part of China's territory and that any attempt to detach Taiwan from China or otherwise to create "two Chinas" is absolutely unacceptable to the Chinese government and people. (SCMP 3151 Jan.31/64: 23)

On January 31, de Gaulle presided over a news conference defending his decision. While admiring Chiang's character, he emphasized that "France only recognizes the world as it is" and that the decision implied no approval of Beijing regime. (TT Feb.1/64:1) Despite the press conference,

the ROC continued to maintain its mission in Paris. Ten days after, nevertheless, Taipei ultimately announced its decision to sever relations with the French on February 10, in view of the humiliation which would be caused by the French action to throw out its representative in Paris.

More accurately, however, the ROC's action in fact was taken in reaction to a French demarche. On February 10, French Charge d'Affaires (in Taipei) Pierre Salade requested a meeting with Shen Chang-huan. Salade mentioned the arrival of Communist Chinese Charge was expected soon in Paris and ambassadors would be exchanged thereafter as scheduled, and explicitly added that "when..arrived in Paris, he would be recognized as representative of China. From that time onward there would be no longer any raison d'être for mission..(of the ROC) in Paris." Shen then had him reiterate and asked if this meant France intended to break relations with the ROC. Salade shrugged and replied "Yes".(DEA file E,1,8882: WSHDC Tel to OTT Feb 13/64) The American Ambassador (to Taipei) Jerauld Wright later was told by President Chiang Kai-shek that the ROC had co-operated with the US in his handling of French actions on January 27 and 31 but considered the French demarche had ended the period of maneuver. Wright reported that afterwards, after having demurred, he again urged the ROC Premier and Foreign Minister to get the French message in writing.(FRUS 1964-68 XXX: 22) Presumably later, Shen contacted Salade and asked if he would confirm French

intention in writing but Salade saw no need for it. (DEA file E,1,8882: WSHDC Tel to OTT Feb 13/64)⁶

The State Department was disappointed with the ROC's action given that "maximum advantage of tactical maneuver was lost through..(the ROC's) failure (to) put onus for break clearly on French", (FRUS 1964-68 XXX: 23), although Taipei's decision was also regarded as "understandable" since a continuing maneuver would lead to an eventual collapse of the Nationalists' legitimacy over Taiwan. (DEA file E,1,8882: WSHDC Tel to OTT Feb 13/64) Later in an overall assessment for his mission to postpone Taipei's rupture with Paris, Cline reported that the US accomplished a condition in which the failure of the "two Chinas" experiment discouraged other countries from following suit, although it dealt a shattering blow to the morale of the Nationalists who had just experienced a coup attempt and would continue to live under the shadow of military coups. (FRUS 1964-68 XXX: 25-26) Nevertheless, the French case was far-reaching in the development of the "one China" complex in terms of its impact on the new Canadian initiative in the late 1960s. Additionally, the process of the French and American maneuverings might be seen as seeking to replace the old

6. The DEA file revealed that Salade's first interview with Shen ended at the point where the former's reiteration of his point, under the latter's request, was done. But later Shen contacted Salade to ask for a written demarche. This second meeting presumably came after Wright-Chiang Kai-shek talk that was reported in the FRUS.

representational arrangement with a new one in a bilateral setting. The case also pointed to the important parts Washington and Taipei played in reaction to the transformation of the Cold War system.

(3) Washington and Taipei's Reactions:

The French action was not isolated. In the wake of the overt split between Beijing and Moscow, several other countries attempted to transcend the diplomatic deadlock on "one China" representation.⁷ Canada was one country that proposed alternative arrangement. Nevertheless, as the French case highlighted, the attitudes of the USA and the ROC were crucial for eventual success or failure of conceived arrangements.

Since the Sino-American ambassadorial talks began in the mid-1950s, there had been numerous stories of Washington-orchestrated maneuverings towards some sort of "two Chinas" arrangement. American policy moves in the direction became more and more evident in the 1960s. For example, the Kennedy Administration had some initial deliberations with the

⁷ These actions included the Italian, Belgian, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia proposals in the UN to make both Beijing and Taipei's representations possible. In bilateral settings, there were also efforts to foster change. For example, Beijing and Taipei were both invited to Malawi Independence celebrations in July 1964. However, in the end, only Taipei sent a Vice Foreign Minister to the event whereas Beijing was absent. Beijing media's vehement criticism of Malawi and the ROC, after a few days' silence, revealed their concern over a possibility that Taipei might eventually yield to accepting some sort of "one China one Taiwan" solution. (DEA file E,1,8882: HK Let to USSEA Jul.13/64)

Canadians and Japanese seeking a "two Chinas" arrangement in the UN in the early 1960s but the exploration ended fruitlessly owing to a premature leak. (Page 1991: 86-7)

In fact, by the time Paris moved to recognize the PRC, Washington had shown willingness and readiness to accept Beijing if the latter changed its "bellicose" approach. For instance, in a speech in December 1963, Roger Hilsman, then Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, stressed that there could be no improvement of relations with Beijing unless the latter accepted the fact of American commitment to Taiwan's existence. (NYT Dec.14/63) Shortly later in March 1964, Senator Fulbright delivered a speech suggesting that it be "possible to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with the PRC if it abandons its intention to acquire Taiwan". Although the PRC's response was not encouraging, the American "flexible" gesture continued. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the degree of American "flexibility" was limited with a firm conviction, back with coercive power, that it was Beijing rather than Washington which needed to re-examine its world view and to learn to live peacefully with its neighbour. The Americans were also concerned that Beijing might draw the misleading conclusion from gaining French recognition that its militant approach had paid off. (DEA file C,1,8924: WSHDC Tels to OTT Apr.22; Jul.22/64)

The American approach towards "two Chinas" then moved

further in 1965-1966. A ban on travel to the mainland by doctors and medical scientists was lifted in late 1965. Further liberalization on travel restrictions was expanded in 1966. (Hsieh 1985:134) Most importantly, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a series of hearings on China Policy in March 1966 where many American sinologists spoke out in favour of a policy of "containment without isolation". This was taken seriously in Johnson Administration.

For example, the American UN Ambassador Goldberg wrote to President Johnson in April 1966 proposing a new policy of keeping the ROC in the UN while shifting the onus of non-participation to Beijing, in line with newly developing concept of "containment but not isolation". (FRUS 1964-68 XXX:293) He also recommended a "successor state" resolution, the initiation of which was to be taken by the Canadians without attribution to the US. (Ibid: 293-4) Dean Rusk shortly later in May asked Johnson to authorize his discussion with Chiang Kai-shek hoping that Taipei stand steady, rather than withdraw, if other parties develop a "two Chinas" tactic in the coming UN session. (Ibid: 301-2)

The creeping of American policy towards "two Chinas" was closely watched. The policy was cogently observed by Ottawa as follows:

The public position of the USA is that the government in Taipei is the only legally constituted Chinese government and that Taiwan is not necessarily a part of China. The

private position of the Admin is that there are in fact two Chinas...The Administration has begun, very quietly, to make its private position public. Bill Bundy's Feb. speech pointed to a 'two China' concept.⁸ Even if the USA gives greater publicity to its private two-China thinking, it will not in present circumstances act in a way consistent with that thinking since to do so would undermine the legitimacy of the mainlander-dominated Nationalist regime in Taiwan and threaten its political stability and economic progress... (DEA file C,5,8925: WSHDC Tel to OTT May 14/68)

The longstanding position of the Nationalists was that there was no "Taiwan issue" but "China problem". As such, they unwittingly converged with the Communists. The flip side of "one China" diplomacy was tacit cooperation to foil any international effort to institutionalize the demarcation as a de jure separation. As mentioned above, this was listed as one of the operative goals of the ROC diplomacy by Shen Chang-huan. Taipei's final decision in the case of French recognition of Beijing exemplified such a policy orientation.

The increasingly evident posture-changing of Washington with respect to China representation in the UN was certainly not unknown to Chiang Kai-shek. In a long talk with the American Ambassador on July 1, 1966, Chiang repeatedly expressed the view that if the US held firm in support of the ROC's "one China" stance there should be no danger in the UN, and that failure to make explicit objection to PRC membership

⁸ Bundy stated that "the territory controlled and administered by Peking is well known to our government and when matters arise which pertain to that area..our approach obviously is to the Chinese Communist authorities..the USA recognized the government of Republic of China and deals with that government on all matters of common interest.."

"encouraged countries such as Canada already wavering to become even more unpredictable." Believing that the UN membership was not beneficial to the ROC since it had suffered many insults there, Chiang alluded any "two Chinas" arrangement to forming a sort of international coalition government with the Communists, which was unacceptable to his government in light of historical experience. Moreover, he stressed that it was the ROC's national honour and dignity at stake and that "the legitimate government cannot agree to coexist with a usurper". (FRUS 1964-68 XXX: 344-7)

In many ways, "one China" and "recovering the mainland" as the core objective of Taipei's diplomacy constituted a fundamental basis of legitimacy for the mainlander-dominated Nationalists. In documents, this might well be presented in an euphemism. For example, in speaking to a visiting Japanese Foreign Minister, Shen specified the recovery mission as "the whole spirit and purpose of the existence of the Nationalist government." (DEA file E,1,8882: Tokyo Tel to OTT Jul.13/64) Failing to pursue that objective through whatever symbolic gestures would jeopardize the Nationalist rule in Taiwan. As mentioned above in the Canadian observation on public-vs-private American China policy, the constraint that prevented the Americans from explicitly articulating a "two Chinas" policy lay in the consideration for the survival of the Nationalist regime.

The primary objective of "recovering the mainland" thus

did not change in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split and American deliberations, although it might be toned down, as in Chiang Kai-shek's 1959 New Year message. On that occasion, Chiang promulgated that the recovery of the mainland was to be achieved primarily through political means with military approach as supplementary.⁹ Even so, he did not completely rule out using a variety of military options to achieve his "one China" goal in the wake of mainland's economic troubles caused by Mao's disastrous policy of the Great Leap Forward and the escalation of Vietnam War. This could be testified in the routine ROC-USA consultations well before the French recognition of Beijing. (FRUS 1961-63 XXII: 181-4;186-7;189-96;198-207;218-9;227-9;233-6;383-92)

On the surface, the ROC diplomacy in the 1960s, by adhering to the "one China" principle and continuing to lobby American support for its military operations might appear to be fruitless. However, on closer examination, it at least succeeded in playing up the American and Japanese fears that in desperate situation Chiang might decide to turn over Taiwan to China rather than accept "two Chinas" solution or launch suicidal attack against the mainland. (DEA files E,1,8882: WSHDC Tel to OTT Mar.13; Tokyo Tel to OTT

⁹ The key statement of the Message was: "Now the task of mainland recovery is to be accomplished by efforts which are '70 percent political and only 30 percent military.'" (The China Yearbook 1959-1960: 974)

Mar.27/64; FRUS 1961-63 XXII: 58-62;89-93;95-97;102-10)
Nevertheless, the cost of that approach in retrospect is tremendous and has now had to be swallowed by Taipei's contemporary diplomats.

Questions might have been posed: Why did Chiang and his Nationalists not change course and accept arrangements other than "one China"? No archival evidence is available to provide an answer with certainty. The Table 2 portrays the strength of the ROC's diplomatic condition of the 1960s in comparison to the 1950s. The degradation of the mainland's condition in the Cultural Revolution might well prompt Chiang to entertain further hopes of "naturally" dramatic change there. In a private gathering in 1997, a senior MOFA official commented that in his observation Chiang was rather realistic and might have decided to take such offers as the "dual representation" in the UN, had a timely institutional readjustment been ready to rationalize that policy change with warranted continuing supports from domestic mainlanders and overseas Chinese alike.

Overall, as of the 1960s when the Cold War system was transforming and Beijing was readjusting tactics, there were varying signs of policy change in Paris and Washington on "one China" representation while Taipei remained adamant on its proclaimed policy. In this regard, the evolution of Canadian China policy before 1968 captures the crux of interplay between agency and structure on world stage. It

also illustrated a typical western reaction to the change of broader international environment and growing gulf between Taipei and the western world in representing reality. The pre-transition Canadian policy should now be explored.

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III. The Evolution of Canadian China Policy:

The Canadian road to recognition of Beijing, as one analysis put it, "was a rocky one". (Quo & Ichikawa 1972: 387) The historical contingency of the Korean War, the Taiwan issue, Ottawa's will and policy priority and the Canadian-American relations were all related to that long march. As some of the factors for procrastination especially in the 1950s have been addressed in other research (eg Beecroft 1991; St Armour 1991) and an outline would be sufficient here, other aspects of China policy drawn from the DEA files do need elaboration. This section will first sketch the state of play in the 1950s. Then comes an outline of the Canadian expansion of contact with the mainland through the exchange of correspondents, followed by the UN initiative and the American factor. Finally, the pre-transition Canada-Taiwan political relations will be explored.

1. The Brink of Policy Change:

As archival and memoirs evidence revealed, Ottawa was on the brink of recognizing the "New China" in 1949-50. (Beecroft 1991: 49-52; Ronning 1974:171-5) As early as the establishment of the PRC in Oct 1949, Chester Ronning,

Canadian Charge d'Affairs, and the DEA all gave recognition a favourable consideration, in view of Beijing's exercising effective control over the mainland. (Ronning 1974: 171-2) Nevertheless, timing was a major factor for deliberation.

It was considered that recognition should be held after a forthcoming UN meeting and consultation with other Commonwealth countries. Although Pearson recommended early recognition after attending the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers meeting in January 1950, he and his DEA officials failed to convince cabinet of the desirability of an early recognition. In light of the hardening American attitude toward Beijing, cabinet preferred not to risk antagonizing the Americans for the sake of limited Canadian interests in China. (Beecroft 1991: 49-50)

It should be noted that at the time the DEA and cabinet already favoured seeking negotiation to establish diplomatic relations and extend recognition simultaneously in order to circumvent the difficulties faced by countries such as Britain and India adopting a unilateral recognition approach. (Beecroft 1991: 51) This thus set the tone for later Canadian implementation of recognition. The advent of the Korean War forced the plan to be shelved. As the PRC's involvement in the War led to its denunciation by the UN, a possible Canadian move to negotiate a diplomatic tie inevitably begged the need for justification. (Beecroft 1991:53-55)

Besides, domestic concerns slowed down the pace of the

intended move. St Laurent's controversial statement on the eventual recognition of the Beijing regime in his Far Eastern tour incited vehement criticism of the Conservatives and public outcries orchestrated by the Roman Catholic church in Quebec. (Beecroft 1991: 56)

For the DEA, the aftermath of Geneva conference of 1954 provided an opportune time to recognize Beijing, in light of the latter's new conciliatory posture and Anglo-Chinese exchanges of Charge d'Affaires. However, this window of opportunity soon was slammed shut by the first Offshore Islands Crisis in September, which made it inappropriate for Ottawa to take immediate action to pursue that desired goal. (Beecroft 1991: 56-57)

During the crisis, Canada adopted a low profile overall, aside from urging caution on the Americans and attempting via India to persuade the PRC to renounce the use of force. Beyond that, Pearson was reluctant to press the Americans further to ensure the Nationalist evacuation of all offshore islands and was equally unwilling to endorse an Australian proposal for an international guarantee of Taiwan security in return for that evacuation. (Pearson 1993:133)

The dissipation of the crisis and the first sign of Sino-American rapprochement through ambassadorial talks did not bring about desirable space for Ottawa to resume its moves in favour of recognition. As Sino-American talks soon floundered on the Taiwan issue, Ottawa had second thoughts on

the timing. The need for caution obviously outweighed some DEA officials' desire to do something to prove to be diplomatically independent of the Americans. This resulted in a continued search for propitious timing and a wait-and-see approach. Meanwhile, the Suez crisis and the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 further forced the China question onto the back burner. (Beecroft 1991: 58-59) With the formation of Diefenbaker government in 1957, the "cycles of procrastination" persisted. Nevertheless, after having weighed advantages against liabilities in a policy review of 1958, it decided to adopt an incremental approach, as some European countries did, by expanding trade contacts with the mainland while maintaining diplomatic recognition of Taipei. (Beecroft 1991:65-67) Among the contacts, the wheat sales to Beijing were most noted. It was initiated first in 1958 and a larger-scale deal was further struck in 1960-61. (Kyba 1991: 168-72) The beginning of the wheat sales made the concern for Canadian trade relations with the mainland become of growing importance in the policy process. Equally significant, this set the stage for expanding non-political exchanges with Beijing under the new atmosphere.

2. Years of Incrementalism and Tests:

As the Liberals returned to power, the Canadian policy toward China was now embodied in a two-pillar approach. A major decision was taken to expand non-governmental contacts with Communist China, which was notably manifested in a

program of exchanging correspondents. Besides, policy proposals were made to resolve an institutional impasse within the UN framework. (DEA file B,1,8874: Briefing Notes Dec.23/63) The dual approaches were put forward by Paul Martin, the new SSEA. In December 1964, he articulated a rationale for considering a new initiative in the UN forum.

Concerned about a possible diplomatic fiasco as a result of rigid American policy in light of irreversible change in the international system, Martin considered the multilateral venue was where Washington could afford to display flexibility. He saw the American assumption that the Communist Chinese deliberately pursued a confrontation policy as misleading. Instead, in his observation Beijing was cautious in military matters and not provocative. Moreover, he thought diplomatic contacts among antagonistic countries, if used properly, would be beneficial as in the case of Soviet-American communication at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Martin also emphasized that "...the net effect of isolation and non-recognition has been to leave Communist Chinese owing nothing to anyone not even to the USSR..(to the extent that they could) hot up and cool down military and political situation in the Far East as they wished.." (DEA file C,1,8924: Ott Tel to WSHDC Dec.3/64)

In addition to the multilateral venue, Paul Martin believed that bilateral expansion of contacts in the commercial and cultural fields would help to encourage the

PRC's emergence from isolation, and that the exchanges of correspondents, if implemented successfully, constituted a forward step to remove the barriers and misunderstandings between the PRC and the West. (DEA file A,2.1,10056:OTT Tel to WSHDC Apr.22/64)

(1) The Exchanges of Correspondents:

The Canadian pursuit of journalistic exchanges with the Communist Chinese was first made in fall 1958 when the Toronto-based Globe and Mail (G&M) requested governmental approval to issue entry visa to the New China News Agency (NCNA) applicants. The government approved but the NCNA did not really apply. Nevertheless, the G&M sent Frederick Nossal to Beijing for nine months. A genuine exchange did not actually take place until 1964. In this new initiative, the G&M sought government support for a renewed arrangement of exchange program. Cabinet approved it in January 1964.

The NCNA's reaction to the Canadian move was positive. Its manager in Hong Kong expressed his delight at Ottawa's decision in view of the propitious timing of an imminent French recognition. (DEA file A,1,10056: HK Tel to OTT Jan.22/64) Canadian officials in Hong Kong similarly supported the idea in light of Mao's newly-released "intermediate zone" theory in which Canada was favourably singled out as a prime potential partner. (Ibid: HK Tel to OTT Jan.24/64)

To cope with both domestic and American concerns over

security, nevertheless, the DEA further defined the function of correspondent and "strict reciprocity" principle. In the end, visas, together with an explanatory letter defining the principle, were issued to the two NCNA applicants in the presence of Canadian diplomats in Hong Kong in mid-July. (Ibid: HK Tel to OTT Jul.14/64)

The arrival of the NCNA correspondent and his interpreter did not end the part DEA played in such an exchange. Overall, there was no evidence showing their contacts with Canadian officials were restricted because of the non-recognition policy. Moreover, the NCNA's presence in Canada, insofar as the available official documents are concerned, seemed to bring little difficulty for the Canadian government. Nor was there any evidence indicating that the ROC embassy in Ottawa had lodged persistent and vehement protests in the event of any perceived official involvement or a conceivable implication of "two Chinas", thereby making it a thorny issue for the Canadian government, as might be much often encountered later yet in a reverse situation.¹⁰ In this sense, in comparison to the situation of post-1970 "one China" institutionalization that often involved a turbulence

¹⁰ In addition to a letter to Arnold Smith in mid-January, Hsu Shuhsi had brought to the attention of R.L.Rogers, head of the Far Eastern Division of the DEA, a press release issued by the ROC MOFA on the general nature of the Communist newsmen. (DEA file B,2,8874: Hsu let to Rogers Jun.1/64)

of domination and resistance among Beijing, Ottawa and Taipei, the Canada-PRC interaction process, official and unofficial alike, at this stage as shown in the correspondent exchange, appeared to be relatively smooth.

(2) The Canadian Initiative in the UN:

The Canadian approach toward China representation in the UN had been generally consistent in the 1950s. With a slight exception in 1950 when a proposal was made to have the issue explored by a special committee of the Security Council, over the 1950s, the Canadian delegation had sided with a "moratorium" resolution initiated by the Americans to exclude the issue from the principal decision agenda in the UN forum.

Then the DEA underwent a major policy review on the issue to search for a feasible strategy to replace the ground-losing moratorium resolution in late 1960. This included the Far Eastern Division's proposal to declare both Beijing and Taipei governments as successors of former unitary Republic of China. However, objection within the DEA led to no action and Ottawa began to back the American "Important Question" resolution.

When Paul Martin took over the DEA, French recognition of Beijing in early 1964 and the PRC's first detonation of a nuclear device in October reinforced his belief that the time was ripe for the West to take appropriate steps to end the isolation of the PRC and that resolving the deadlock of China

issue in the UN would be a feasible pathbreaking step. After having learned that the Americans would not take any initiative in the UN because of their involvement in the Vietnam conflict, Martin considered it necessary to formulate Canada's own proposal and to persuade the Americans to accept a UN seat for Beijing. A proposal, submitted by the FED of the DEA to initiate a declaratory resolution to the effect that a Beijing-Taipei coexistence in the General Assembly would be coupled with a substitution of the PRC for the ROC in the Security Council, with the issue of competing territorial claims of both parties left to the President of General Assembly for further investigation, was approved by Martin. He himself also met with Dean Rusk several times emphasizing the necessity of putting forward a proposal and attempting to persuade the Americans into at least acquiescing to the Canadian initiative. (FRUS 1964-68 XXX:124-5;137-40) The Martin exercise in 1964 in the end however was not successful for lack of adequate support from both the Americans and other allies. (Page 1991: 89-93)

Despite increasing escalation of the Vietnam War in early and mid-1965, the undaunted Martin continued to press for a two-pronged approach to resolve both the Indochina conflict and the China issue at the UN. However Prime Minister Pearson became more and more cautious and reserved in this regard in the aftermath of his April speech at Temple University. (Donaghy 1997a:13-19) Although his hope for an

immediate seating of Communist China was dampened by a September statement of Chen Yi, the PRC Foreign Minister, on Beijing's view/conditions on entry into the UN, to the extent that he urged Beijing itself to make an accommodation, Martin continued to search for feasible proposals and consult with his American colleagues. (FRUS 1964-68 XXX:304-6;358-60;396-9) A proposal calling for an interim solution without prejudice to the eventual settlement of territorial disputes of the both parties was ultimately approved by the Canadian cabinet in 1966. Martin subsequently presented the renewed proposal and discussed it with Dean Rusk seeking American understanding. The Americans, objecting to the Canadian initiative, instead advised that a resolution to form a study committee be sponsored by the latter. (Donaghy 1997a: 47-49; FRUS 1964-68 XXX:420-5;455-7; Page 1991: 93-97) The 1966 Canadian initiative in a direction of sort of a "one China one Taiwan" arrangement then ended in vain. Pearson and Martin decided not to "tread heavily on Americans' toes" nor to press the issue further. (Martin 1985: 527) Nevertheless, a far-reaching decision signalling the beginning of a switch in Canadian policy was made on that occasion. For the first time, Paul Martin abstained in the vote on an Albanian resolution that sought to replace Taipei by Beijing in the UN. Nevertheless, The failure of Ottawa's UN initiatives points to the importance of the American factor.

3. Testing the Water: The American Factor

In view of geographical proximity, strategic, economic and historical relations, Washington's interests are uppermost on Ottawa's mind. The making of Canadian China policy thus could not be completely immune. Its direction was largely contingent upon the state of Canada-USA relations.

World War II and the perceived threat of the Soviet Union afterwards brought closer economic and military links between the two countries. Despite some disagreement over how the Korean War should be managed and exceptional episodes such as the issue of new members' admission to the UN in the mid-1950s, the first postwar decade witnessed relatively harmonious bilateral relations. (Granatstein and Hillmer 1991: 175-86) Nevertheless, increasing American domination over Canadian cultural, economic and military activities aroused some concerns. Moreover, the alleged Liberal government's American connection, the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the suicide of Herbert Norman, a well-respected Canadian diplomat, who was victimized by McCarthyism, provided a catalyst for growing anti-Americanism that led to eventual election victory by John Diefenbaker's Progressive Conservatives in 1957. (Granatstein and Hillmer 1991: 187-90; 194-6) Bilateral relations then entered into a period of crisis. (Bothwell 1992: 70-97)

In the wake of the heated Cold War exemplified by the Cuban Missile Crisis, Diefenbaker's indecision over deployment of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil and

continental defense issue exacerbated bilateral strains. Later, a blunt American intervention in 1963 election further flamed the seed of anti-Americanism. (Bothwell 1992: 70-87; Granatstein and Hillmer 1991: 196-213) While the bilateral rift was largely repaired during Lester Pearson's tenure as Prime Minister, the resurgence of Canadian economic nationalism and the Vietnam War continued to feed anti-American fervour. Over Vietnam, Lester Pearson's Temple University address that called for a suspension of bombing North Vietnam resulted in President Johnson's verbal and physical attack during their meeting at Camp David, which further soured the two leaders' personal relations.¹¹ (Donaghy 1997a: 13-19; Granatstein and Hillmer 1991: 215-7) Besides, anti-war "teach-ins" took place across almost all Canadian universities and were coupled with campaigns calling for more independence of Canadian foreign policy. Among the agenda of these campaigns was the issue of recognition of the PRC. (Granatstein and Hillmer 1991: 232; 237)

Meanwhile, a thrust to forge a distinct Canadian national identity was gaining momentum in the 1960s. It grew in reaction to the American societal decay, engagement in a unpopular foreign war and endemic poverty and violence across

¹¹ The speech agitated Johnson for going beyond his rule that "you don't piss on neighbour's rug". (Granatstein and Hillmer 1991: 231) For the text of the speech see (English 1992: 138).

cities and against the background of surging Quebec nationalism that was further fanned by General de Gaulle's controversial trip to Montreal.¹² The adoption of a new maple leaf flag in 1965 and the centennial of confederation in 1967 provided further rallying points for the new Canadian nationalism which include a strong element of populist anti-Americanism. (Granatstein and Hillmer 1991: 235-6)

Notwithstanding the strained mood, it should be born in mind that the surging anti-Americanism and Canadian nationalism did not destroy official transactions at the state level. On the contrary, consultation based on "quiet diplomacy" principle was reaffirmed in the publication of the Heeney-Merchant Report in June 1965 to the effect that both sides acknowledged "it is in the abiding interest of both countries that, wherever possible, divergent views between the two governments should be expressed and if possible resolved in private, through diplomatic channels." (Granatstein and Hillmer 1991: 234)¹³ However, it is exactly the principle of "quiet diplomacy" that Canadian nationalists

¹² De Gaulle's address which ended with "Vive Montreal! Vive le Quebec! Vive le Quebec libre!" outraged many English Canadians, including Lester Pearson. The trip then was cut short without de Gaulle's coming to Ottawa for a state visit. (Hillmer and Granatstein 1994: 282-3)

¹³ The Report, entitled "Canada and the United States: Principles for Partnership", was written by Arnold Heeney, Canadian ex-Ambassador to Washington, and Livingston Merchant, American ex-Ambassador to Ottawa. A more complete but excerpt version can be seen in (Granatstein 1993: 38-53).

were criticizing. For them, a "speak-out-disagreement" approach would demonstrate the "independence" of Canadian foreign policy.

With the delicate atmosphere in bilateral relations, Washington's China policy had been continuously monitored in Ottawa for years. The need to strike a balance between the domestic quest for an independent policy and the tradition of due consultation meant that Ottawa's China policy was delicately managed. Any sign of Washington's "relaxing" posture, such as the "containment without isolation" policy proposed in the Senate hearings in 1966, was thus reported in a positive tone back to the DEA headquarters. (DEA file C,3,8925: WSHDC DPH to USSEA May 4/66) Meanwhile, the Canadian embassy in Washington was routinely briefed on the American talks with the Communist Chinese in Warsaw. (DEA files C,2,8924: WSHDC Tels to OTT Jul.13/65; Sep.22/65; Dec.16/65; Dec.21/65; C,4-5,8925: WSHDC Tels to OTT Jan.25/67; Jan.4/68)

Although the Americans occasionally might caution against Canadian moves, as in the aftermath of the French recognition and the Cultural Revolution (DEA files A,1,10056: WSHDC Tel to OTT Feb.4/64; B,8,8875: WSHDC Tel to OTT Jan.12/67), by and large, Ottawa was encouraged by the increasing flexibility of the American China policy. For example, in mid-May 1968, the Canadian embassy observed that:

Privately, the USA would like to see other countries, such as Canada, Italy or Belgium, adopt an open two-China position since it would be a reasonable approach... (The Americans) seek also to develop their relations with Peking but not at Taiwan's expense. They would see Canadian recognition of Peking, on Peking's terms, as seriously contrary to their interests. (DEA file C, 5, 8925: WSHDC Tel to OTT May 14/68)

Similar public statements by American officials along the line of "two Chinas" concept were accordingly reported to Ottawa.¹⁴ Highlighted was the "private" American expectation that third countries would make some moves in that direction. Overall, Washington's "deregulation" towards Beijing and the perceived American "expectation" for Canada, coupled with inadequate bondage between the Canadian and the Nationalist governments, obviously provided a favourable occasion for Ottawa to launch a new initiative. This coincided with Pierre Trudeau's rise to power. Before exploring the historic Canadian move in next chapter, I shall now turn to the state of Canada-ROC relations.

4. Friendly but not Close: Canada and the ROC on Taiwan:

The official ties between the two governments, in general, were never close and warm, although diplomatic relations were maintained right up till October 1970. For many Canadian officials in the DEA, there had never been any

¹⁴ These included, for example, the addresses by American under-Secretaries of State, Katzenbach and Rostow, in May and June 1968. See (DEA file C, 5, 8925: Dept of State for the Press, No.112, May 21/68; WSHDC Let to USSEA Jun.7/68.)

real affection for Chiang Kai-shek regime. This lack of enthusiasm for the Nationalists was not caused by one or two incidents. Rather, the deep-seated mentality grew from some appalling reports of corruption, brutality and incompetence of the regime in its last few years on the mainland. (Beecroft 1991: 45-7) The Canadian attitude towards the Nationalists did not seem to significantly change after the government relocated its base to Taiwan. Moreover, recognition of Beijing was seen as a matter of timing. Nevertheless, the condition of bilateral relations in the 1960s should be further elaborated on.

As of late 1963, the state of bilateral official relations could be illustrated in three ways. In the first place, the ROC government did not succeed in persuading its Canadian counterpart into accrediting a diplomatic mission in Taipei. Secondly, the Nationalist proposal of seeking Canadian technical assistance on a bilateral basis was turned down.¹⁵ Thirdly, the Secretary of Overseas Missions of the Canadian Presbyterian Church recommended that the Taiwanese be permitted the benefits of self-determination, which was

¹⁵ According to A.E. Ritchie's letter to the External Aid Office (EAO), the underlying reasons for Ottawa not to set up an office in Taiwan or extending technical assistance to the Nationalists were that "the Canadian government has supported the principle of self-determination for the people of Formosa... (and) knowing that there would eventually have to be some arrangement with Peking, we have avoided becoming too involved with the Nationalist regime.." (DEA file D,1.1,10057: Let to EAO Dec.3/63)

drawn to the SSEA's attention. (DEA files D,1.1,10057: Memos for Min Sep.25; Nov.20/63; EAO Let to MNA: Dec.12/63) Three themes that shaped the remaining course of Ottawa-Taipei relations can thus be identified: (1) Canadian concern over the self-determination of Formosans; (2) Nationalist pressure for a Canadian office in Taipei and the expansion of its missions in Canada; (3) continuing divergent views and conflictual interests of the two governments on China representation.

(1) Concern over Taiwanese Self-Determination:

Although official ties between Ottawa and Taipei were not intimate, there was a stronger and longer linkage in societal level. The legacy of George Leslie MacKay, a well-respected Canadian doctor, missionary and educator, and Canadian Presbyterian influence in Taiwanese society, was far-reaching since the late 19th century. (Evans 1990: 78-80) Coupled with the longstanding linkage was the Canadian concern over the fate of the Taiwanese vis-a-vis the oft-repressive states surrounding them. This was explicitly expressed in Lester Pearson's 1955 statement on "Formosa" that envisaged the final disposition of the problem in international negotiation and acknowledged "...the wishes of the people there...should be a primary consideration". (EA Feb/55: 65) This concern was even more evident in the 1960s Canadian statement in the UN and the persistent attention Ottawa paid to the case of Peng Ming-min.

The explicit sympathy with Formosan self-determination was presented in an official statement delivered by Senator Brooks of Canadian delegation to the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1961. In it, he declared that:

There must be preserved for the people of Formosa the right to self-determination, that is the right to decide their own future.. My delegation cannot accept (Mao Zedong's) claim (that Taiwan is China's affair)..Canadians have always been led to believe that the UN's function is to prevent the imposition by force on any people of a political regime unacceptable to them.

Almost three years later, in the meeting with Arnold Smith, the ROC Ambassador Hsu Shuhsi conveyed his government's concern over continuing references to "self-determination for the people of Formosa" in Canadian public statements and urged Canadians not to aid to the cause of pro-independence Formosans. Smith stated that "the expression in its UN context was to express the idea that regardless of what might happen concerning mainland China, developments in that area should not deprive the people of Formosa, i.e. Formosans and Nationalists, of the right to determine their fate and to maintain some international status and recognition." (DEA file A,3,10056: Memo for Min Sep.28/64)

Shortly after the episode, Peng Ming-min's case was brought to the DEA officials' attention. Peng was the Chair of the Department of Political Science at National Taiwan University. He and two students drew up "1964 Declaration of Taiwanese Self Salvation", advocating an alternative

political community determined by the residents on Taiwan, but were immediately arrested and imprisoned by the Nationalists. (Hughes 1997: 35-37) The Chairman of Formosan Association first wrote a letter to Martin for his assistance on the case. Meanwhile, Maxwell Cohen, Director and Dean of Faculty of Law at McGill University, discussed the case with Max Wershof, Assistant Under-SSEA, and wrote to Taipei's Ambassador for further information. Wershof, in responses to Cohen's letters, mentioned that he telephoned Ambassador Hsu to let the latter know that, while not making the call officially on behalf of the DEA, he suggested "humanitarian worries of eminent people at (McGill) might reasonably be taken into account by the Chinese authorities". He nevertheless acknowledged that he "doubted there is much more that can properly or usefully be done from (Canadian) end". (DEA file D,1.1,10057: Wershof Lets to Cohen Nov.3; Dec.8/64) A number of leading Canadians also wrote letters to plead for the DEA's proper intervention to the extent that the FED decided to prepare a brief-giving facts of the case for the SSEA. While expressing their sympathetic interest in the case, the DEA officials, nevertheless, made it explicit that "as Dr.Peng is not a Canadian citizen, it would be inappropriate for the Canadian government to make any representation on his behalf." (Ibid: USSEA Let to ConGen Manila Jan.25/65) A suggestion by the FED to raise the case with the ROC Foreign Minister in his forthcoming visit to

Ottawa was also vetoed. (Ibid: FED Memo to AUSSEA Feb.17/65)
Despite the official stance, the DEA was constantly exposed to subsequent debates between Hsu and Cohen over the case.

In one episode, for example, after Peng was tried and sentenced in late March, a television program of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) in April invited Cohen and two Formosans to discuss the case. Hsu then protested to the CBC and enclosed his protest letter to the DEA officials. The letter criticized Cohen's comments in the program as neglecting both the human rights of vast Chinese on the mainland and Taipei's endeavours to introduce and implement democracy and accused him of colluding with two partners to "defame the ROC government." (Ibid: Hsu Let to CBC Apr.20/65)
Hsu also bluntly claimed, in a response to a letter sent from a former Peng classmate, that Peng did not deserve sympathy since he is "not as ideal a person..did not behave well and was politically irresponsible" and added that Peng should have appreciated his luck--if the case happened in a reunified China he would deserve harsher punishment. (Ibid: Let to Fenston Jun.9/65)
The DEA regarded Cohen's remarks as moderate and cautious, whereas Hsu's letter contained a certain amount of "unpleasant insinuation and innuendo about Dean Cohen's motives and purposes". (Ibid: FED Memo to AUSSEA Aug.23/65; AUSSEA Memo to FED Aug.24/65)
As continuing exchanges between Cohen and Hsu ended in unpleasant tones, Peng's case was finally suspended in early November with a

pardon ordered by Chiang Kai-shek.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the high level of attention given to the case and the numerous documents collected in the early DEA files on Canada-Taiwan political relations¹⁷ indicated Ottawa's concern over the development of Taiwanese self-determination.

(2) The Issue of Bilateral Representation:

Insofar as institutional representation is concerned, the Chinese government had first established a Consulate General in Ottawa in 1909 with a Consulate set up in Vancouver later. It was not until 1942 that the Canadian and Nationalist governments reached an agreement to establish diplomatic relations and exchange representatives. After the Nationalists withdrew to Taiwan, Canada maintained its mission in Nanjing until spring 1951, without accrediting a representative in Taipei, whereas the ROC government continued to keep its embassy in Ottawa and the Consulate General in Vancouver but closed its Toronto Consulate General and Winnipeg Consulate in March 1950. (NAAD/MOFA 1996:40) Urging the Canadian government to establish a mission in

¹⁶ The case resurfaced in early 1970 when Peng mysteriously slipped into Sweden where Canada-PRC was negotiating the establishment of diplomatic relations. Nevertheless, according to the State Department, Peng's release was attributed to Chiang Ching-kuo's personal intervention. (DEA file D,1.2,10057: WSHDC Tel to OTT Nov.10/65)

17. Majority of lengthy Parts 1.1 and 1.2 of the file covered this case.

Taipei then constituted a major diplomatic task for the Nationalists.

Not surprisingly, Taipei seized available opportunities to press the case. For example, when it was made known that the Canadian Ambassador to Argentina Richard Bower was to be posted to Japan, the Nationalists sought his assistance to reopen the Canadian mission in Taipei. (MOFA file 412.1: AGN Tel to TPE Nov.29/62; TPE Tel to OTT Dec.18/62) This subject was also raised when J.L. Mutter, the Canadian Trade Commissioner in Manila, made a trip to Taiwan in late Oct.1963. (DEA file C,1.1,10057: Trip Report Oct.18-Nov.1/63) Overall, the trade officials in Manila urged Ottawa to give a favourable consideration. (DEA file C,1.1,10057: Memo to ConGen MNA Apr.16/64; MNA Let to OttT&C Apr.28/64) The suggestion was of course not taken seriously in view of the concern over complicating an eventual recognition of Beijing. Indeed, as of July 1964, the DEA had envisaged the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing by the end of 1965. (DEA file A,2.2,10056: FED Draft to Smith Jul.23/64)

The issue, however, had not really become dormant since then. In light of Canberra's consideration of opening a mission in Taipei, the Canadian Consul General in Manila, while drawing the similarities of Australian and Canadian experiences with respect to China/Taiwan, recommended the assignment of a trade representative to Taiwan. (DEA file

E,1,8882: ConGen MNA Let to ITC Nov.8/65) When the Australians announced their decision to open an embassy in Taiwan, the Consul General reported the move and urged for a follow-suit. (DEA file E,1,8882: ConGen MNA Let to USSEA Jun.22/66) Nevertheless, this proposal was of course never realized before 1970.

Besides pressing for a Canadian representation in Taiwan, the Nationalists sought to expand their representation in Canada by probing the possibility of reopening the Consulate in Toronto that had been closed for economic reasons in 1950 on their own initiative. It was first informally raised by Ambassador Hsu Shuhsi in January 1965. When Hsu had an interview with Arnold Smith, the Assistant Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, in March, he pointed out that work load in Ottawa was excessive and stressed the advantages in retaining contact should Canada recognize Beijing, as the British precedent showed. He further suggested that, if that was not possible, Canada might agree to have additional Nationalist consular officers posted in Ottawa but with "consular agents" in Toronto. Smith, in response, discouraged the issue from being formally raised further. But he did not completely foreclose Hsu's suggestion of using the consulate option to maintain contact in the event of derecognition of Taipei. The interview was reported to Paul Martin, suggesting a further survey on the option and available precedents. (DEA file D,1.1,10057: Memo for Min Mar.4/65) The DEA then

instructed its missions in London, Paris and New Delhi to enquire into the ROC consulate status there. (DEA file D,1.1,10057: FED Memo to USSEA Mar.11/65) Hsu then was formally informed that Ottawa did not support Taipei's plan to reopen a Consulate in Toronto, but had no objection to its posting one or two consular officers to the embassy. (DEA file D,1.2,10057:Let to Hsu Jul.16/65)

Notwithstanding Ottawa's decision, Taipei continued to press a favourable consideration for the case. For example, Hsu later proposed as additional idea the appointment in Toronto of a Canadian citizen of Chinese origin as Honourary Consul, and then again in April, suggested that his newly-arrived Economic Counsellor might establish himself either in Montreal or Toronto as a member of the embassy in Ottawa. (DEA file D,1.2,10057: FED Memos to Protocol Feb.23; Apr.26/66) All these ideas were considered and in summer a final decision was made to the effect that, except the idea of appointing a Honourary Consul, all other options were closed and that the decision would be announced only if Taipei pressed further. (DEA file D,2,8788: FED Memos to USSEA Jun.24; Jul.27/66)

Later, when Hsueh Yu-chi, Taipei's new Ambassador, raised the case in May 1967, he was told that it was not likely Ottawa would approve a reopening of Consulate in Toronto and that the issue might "best be left in abeyance for some time". (DEA file D,2,8788: FED Memo for file May 10/67)

Nevertheless, during the state visit by the ROC Vice-Premier in October, the issue was brought forward again. Taipei's embassy continued to press the issue in April 1968 by stressing its difficulties in dealing with passport applications from Toronto and suggested the establishment of a passport office posted by the Ottawa Embassy officers residing there. The FED then proposed the appointment of an Honourary Consul in Toronto since it involved individual rather than an institutional organization and no issue of diplomatic privileges and immunities. (Ibid: Memo from FED to Collins Apr.30/68; Memo for USSEA May 15/68) The negative decision was made on political grounds as Marcel Cadieux admitting: "we wish to be helpful to the Nationalist Chinese in that their request on practical grounds is a legitimate one which in other circumstances we would readily grant.." (Ibid: Memo for Min May 15/68)

(3) Divergent Representation on Reality and Interests:

The worldviews of the Canadian and the Nationalist governments were much divided with respect to the nature of and approach toward the Beijing regime, the internal condition of the mainland, the function of recognition and the Canadian initiative in the UN. These were also demonstrated in the ROC ambassadors' encounters with the DEA officials.

In many ways, Ottawa and Taipei held divergent stances on world reality. The Nationalists' views towards the nature of

Beijing regime and prescriptive approach to it were epitomized in Hsu Shuhsi's 8-section, 33-page "The Chinese Problem" which was written in his capacity "as a citizen of free world" in Easter 1964. In it, he maintained that politics could not be detached from ethics, that Chinese Communism is fundamentally evil and the most effective approach to it was to thoroughly defeat it. He held that in tackling the Chinese problem, one must face two parts of "reality": the evil nature of Beijing and the deprivation of human rights of vast Chinese by that regime. Moreover, "recognition" was deemed as a privilege of modern nation-states which "naturally" contains an implication of moral discrimination. (DEA file E,1,8882) These worldviews, however, were not taken seriously by the DEA officials.¹⁸

On their part, the Canadians regarded recognition as acknowledging the fact without any implication of moral approval. Besides, they maintained even in the wake of the Cultural Revolution that the Chinese Communists should be engaged with in view of the historical lessons of the Korean War and western initial experiences with a newly-established Soviet Union. (DEA file A,4.2,10056: SSEA Let to Mah Mar.2/66; Memo for Min Mar.30/66) As for the nature of

¹⁸ Among the eight sections, apparently only the last two sections that dealt with "How the West Could Do" was read and underlined, the first six sections that focused on the nature of the Chinese Communist were left in brand new condition.

Beijing regime, the argument that Beijing was aggressive by nature was significantly discounted in light of a delicate historical comparison of the Communist development experiences between the Chinese and the Soviets. (DEA file B,6,8875:MOSCOW Tel to OTT Feb.7/66) As well, the Communist antagonism tended to be justified in light of their "violent release from isolation" and a century of humiliation in Chinese encounters with the West. (DEA file A,4.2,10056: SSEA Let to Mah Mar.2/66) The condition in the mainland was continually monitored and assessed. Although the chaotic situation in 1966-67, mob attacks against the British mission and their implications for a psychology of Chinese foreign relations were analyzed with a substantial caution against a move of hasty recognition, by the end of 1967 Chinese foreign relations was observed to be seemingly "returning to more conventional forms..(and showing) some faint signs of positive interest in improving their relations with some other countries." (DEA file B,11,8875: HK Tels to OTT Jul.7; Dec.4/67) Nevertheless, the fact that Ottawa did not share Taipei's views could be manifested in several encounters between the ROC ambassadors and the DEA officials.

First of all, shortly after Paul Martin made an address in the Hague on the possibility of "two Chinas" in the UN on May 12, 1964, Hsu Shuhsi requested an interview with the SSEA. While expressing Taipei's unhappiness at that statement, Hsu revealed the hope that the ROC's friends would

not discuss the issue publicly because to do so would promote Beijing's cause, and that Ottawa would consult with Taipei in advance of any formulation of new policy. Besides, he pointed out that there was a chance of changing the regime on the mainland and that the proper course of action was to try to facilitate a change. Martin, while clarifying that his statement did not represent new policy but an attempt to anticipate a situation that might arise and reassuring Ottawa only meant to help Taipei, explicitly urged the Nationalists to be realistic and suggested that it might be wise for Taiwan's friends to prepare some contingency plan in order not to be caught by surprise at a time of change in situation. (DEA file D,1.1,10057: Memo for Min Jun.1/64)

After Paul Martin took the initiative in the UN General Assembly to put on record the interim solution proposal in 1966, Hsu expressed his surprise at the extent to which Ottawa had been prepared to shift its policy. Hsu presented a plea that Canadian government went slowly in carrying forward its policy on China. Martin reassured him that Ottawa would consider its policy and proceed very carefully. (DEA file D,2,8788: OTT Tel to CdnDelNY Dec.6/66) Shortly later in January 1967, Hsu informed the DEA that he would be replaced by a new ambassador because he "had been such a failure in seeking to dissuade the Canadian government from adopting a 'two China' policy." (Ibid: FED Memo to Protocol Jan.24/67)

In the wake of the Cultural Revolution, Hsueh Yu-chi, the

new Ambassador, called R.E.Collins to bring the internal situation of the mainland to the latter's attention. While emphasizing the volatility of the situation, he urged Ottawa not to act too quickly in considering extending recognition to Beijing. (Ibid: Memo for file May 10/67) Later, in his meeting with the SSEA, Hsueh urged Ottawa to vote against the Albanian resolution. Martin nevertheless declined the idea. (DEA file D,2,8788: Memo from Anderson to Seaborn Sep.6/67) On September 27, Martin made a statement upholding universality principle in the UN General Assembly to the effect that:

If this organization is to realize its potential capacities all nations, and especially those which, like continental China,..must be represented here..(which) represent a reasonable and just solution of the problem of China's representation..If one supports that membership one likewise must be as a supporter of the principle of universality recogniz(ing) the right of Formosa to a place in this organization.. (Ibid: Cdn Statement in 22nd UNGA Sep.27/67)

The DEA did not receive any official representation from the Nationalist embassy on this statement. However, then came the Globe and Mail coverage citing Taipei's Central Daily News editorial that expressed anger over Martin's statement and suggested reconsidering the imminent Canadian trip by Vice-President Yen Chia-kan, which was intended as a goodwill visit to promote friendly relations. (Ibid: G&M Oct.2/67) On the following day, it was confirmed that Yen would not undertake the visit.(Ibid: LG Let to Hsueh Oct.3/67)

The visit by the ROC delegation led by Vice-Premier Huang Shao-koo in October 1967 to celebrate the centennial event constituted Taipei's last major effort at large-scale personal and official representation. In a conversation between Paul Martin on the one side and Huang and accompanying Foreign Minister Wei Tao-ming on October 9, Martin began by reassuring his guests that the people he considered as "friends" were from Taiwan. Huang described the situation of the mainland as chaotic and stressed that his government's confidence was based on numerous yet consistent reports of its agents and mainland defectors. Moreover, Huang held that Taipei disliked the phrases of "two Chinas" or "one China one Taiwan" because they could not capture the "genuine condition" in which Chinese people under Communist control secretly supported Taipei government. Foreign Minister Wei stressed that when time was ripe, the forces of the ROC would be able to restore order on the mainland and it was thus necessary for Canada to give moral support to his government. Martin then explained his statement in the UN reflected the firm Canadian belief in the principle of universality in the UN. When he had realized that the speech did not have a sufficiently strong reference to the need to safeguard the position of Taiwan in the UN, he personally added a few sentences and reiterated that it was not his intention that Taiwan be "thrown to the wolves". Before they left, Huang re-stressed the chaotic situation on the mainland. (Ibid:

Anderson Memo to Seaborn Oct.16/67)

Finally, it should be noted that throughout the pre-transition period Ottawa had sent no top-ranking officials, such as Prime Minister or Foreign Minister, to visit Taiwan, indicating the restricted political links between Ottawa and Taipei. This state of official ties was also manifested in Ottawa's level of participation in Chiang Kai-shek's fourth term Presidential inauguration in May 1966. The decision to send J.L.Mutter, the Trade Commissioner and Consul General in Manila, was essentially based on considerations of courtesy. While consulting other countries such as Italy that were to send their representatives in the Far East as special envoys, the DEA pondered that if a forthcoming policy review with respect to the Chinese representation in the UN would result in a deterioration of relations with the Nationalists, the Canadian participation on that event "might be one of the last friendly gestures" made to them. However, in view of possible domestic public reactions, the representation should be kept at a fairly low level. The appointment of Mr.Mutter as a Canadian envoy then was regarded as being consistent with the nature of bilateral relations, in the DEA officials' own words, "friendly but not intimate relations". (DEA file D,1.2,10057: Memo for Min May 12/66)

IV. Summary:

This chapter covered four major themes: First of all, it

argued that the mainland/Taiwan demarcation persisted through contingent factors in the 1950s. Secondly, the historical condition during the period was relatively fluid and the de facto division was barely translated into de jure institutionalization. Third, in the wake of the change of the Cold War system, agencies' reactions varied in their efforts to move beyond existing "one China" representation by Taipei. Finally, the pursuit of the Canadian China policy objectives at different stages was subject, in varying degrees, to some contingent events in the 1950s, the American factor, domestic quest for an independent foreign policy, concern over Taiwanese self-determination, and the state of official relations with Taipei. The deliberation of these various factors was at one moment embodied in a two-pronged approach of expanding contacts with the mainland and taking the UN initiative in a direction of "one China one Taiwan". These themes deserve some comment.

To begin with, the China/Taiwan phenomenon was shown to be relatively recent. The Korean War and the Offshore Islands Crises in the 1950s prolonged the demarcation. Beijing and Taipei gained respective ground on "one China" representation in the 1950s. The PRC in particular, through its involvement in various conflicts, demonstrated its importance to peace and security in the region. Against that backdrop and the Sino-Soviet split, the divergent perception of reality and China by agencies concerned became evident in the 1960s.

It was then demonstrated that in reaction to the new circumstances, Beijing had readjusted its diplomatic gestures and re-mapped its world (through the introduction of "intermediate zone" theory). Paris seized the timely opportunity to foster a bilateral change in existent "one China" representation while maneuvering towards the possibility of "two Chinas", and that Washington increasingly made its private "two Chinas" policy visible while Taipei continued to adhere to its stated policy mainly for the sake of regime legitimacy. Highlighted was that while engaging in heated struggles over "one China" representation, Taipei shared Beijing's efforts in preventing the division from being institutionalized as "two Chinas" or "one China one Taiwan."

Nevertheless, it should be stressed that there was a wider range of options possible throughout the period. Many international agencies other than Beijing and Taipei remained to be persuaded that Taiwan and mainland are common parts of Chinese nation deserving single representation. This makes the case of Canada's China policy at the time instructive.

To be sure, Ottawa's intended recognition of Beijing was delayed by contingent and American factors in the 1950s. Nevertheless, the Canadian desired objective, translated into incrementalism and a short-lived, "one China one Taiwan"-oriented UN initiative in the early-middle 1960s, became gradually feasible under new conditions, including new

nation-building campaigns, American "deregulation", concern over Taiwanese self-determination and the state of less intimate relations with the Nationalists. It was against this backdrop that the new wave of Canadian initiatives developed in 1968-70 with other major countries following later, thereby fostering a fundamental transition away from the existing "one China" representation by Taipei. Prior to exploring this in the following chapters, it should be highlighted that there was at least one major distinction between the American and Canadian approaches.

Although by 1968 both were evidently moving in parallel towards the acceptance of the PRC in international community, they were not exactly in the same position. While Washington, in creeping towards "two Chinas" direction, was primarily preoccupied with the survival of the Nationalist regime (or "the state"), Ottawa, with its "one-China-one-Taiwan"-oriented policy, felt no particular obligation to or fondness for the KMT state but was more concerned about the fate of local Taiwanese (or "society"). Their divergence can be further demonstrated in their courses of normalizing relations with the PRC.

CHAPTER FOUR: STRUCTURATION I: SINO-CANADIAN TALKS

As has been argued, the "one China" structure was under serious challenges in the 1960s and in the end underwent far-reaching transformation starting from a new round of Canadian initiative on the bilateral front. Therefore the part Canada has played in the beginning of structuration process deserves special examination. The new Canadian initiative was not achieved overnight. It required pre-encounter preparations, networking and a long series of negotiations with Communist Chinese delegates in Stockholm between February 1969 and October 1970. The first section of this chapter will deal with the preparation for new initiative prior to February 1969. It will then proceed to examine the first encounter and the interaction leading up to the final agreement. Canadian engagement with outside parties in the course of the Stockholm negotiations will be followed by a conclusion of this chapter.

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I. The Eve of New Canadian Initiative:

As elaborated in last chapter, the international context up till 1968 had provided conditions amenable to a Canadian move towards implementation of recognition of Beijing. Meanwhile, as opposed to the general pattern of dividedness in the 1950s, Canadian public opinion polls in the 1960s indicated a consistent tendency of majority support for recognizing the PRC. (DEA file, 1.1, 10088: Gallop

Polls Survey; Beecroft 1991: 63; Page 1991: 86) It was against this backdrop that Pierre Elliot Trudeau rose to leadership in the first half of 1968. Canadian foreign policy had undergone a fundamental change under Trudeau's governance. For the new leadership, since previous diplomacy "had been too closely identified with American interests", the new Canadian China policy offered a major "focal point for a symbolic, if not real, emancipation from American influence." (Frolic 1991:190) The recognition of the PRC was then highlighted as one of the few areas to receive urgent examination. (Granatstein and Bothwell 1990: 13)

Prior to the cabinet's making a final decision and initiating contact with Beijing representatives, reviews of Canadian China policy had long been underway. In early April, the DEA had probed feasible future policy options. A draft memorandum first acknowledged the inevitability of recognition and highlighted some favourable developments. This included observations that the internal conflicts caused by the Cultural Revolution on the mainland had abated, that there were hopeful signs of a peaceful resolution of the Vietnam War and that Canadian public opinion favoured recognition while the Americans with a upcoming Presidential election had become more realistic about future policy on China. (DEA file I,1.1,10088: Memo to USSEA Apr.4/68) Shortly afterwards two policy options was identified: unilateral recognition and exploratory talks

with Beijing.(Ibid: Memo to USSEA Apr.18/68)

In the meantime, in early May Trudeau himself had made it clear that although "the PRC would probably say no unless we agreed to break relations with Taiwan. We wouldn't do that."(quoted in Frolic 1991:191) Similarly, in a CBC interview later, he observed that "I feel our hands are free. I feel that there are two facts of life in international politics...the fact there is a government in Peking which represents 700 or 800 million people, and the government of Taipei represents..10,12 or 14 million people."(quoted in Frolic 1991:191) Most importantly, on May 29, Trudeau explicitly declared that "our aim will be to recognize the People's Republic of China government as soon as possible and to ensure that government to occupy the seat of China in the United Nations, taking into account that there is a separate government in Taiwan." (my emphasis) (DEA file I,1.2,10088: PMO Press Release May 29/68; Frolic 1991:192) This statement was then taken as a formal official guideline shaping Canadian policy actions.

On the same day, moreover, Mitchell Sharp, the new SSEA, elaborated the new Canadian policy on a press conference in much greater detail. This expression smacked of a more overt "one China one Taiwan" formulation:

We intend to have negotiations with the PRC designed to bring about recognition of that government. We also have to recognize that there is a government on Formosa. I would not call it a two China policy. I would think that

there would be one China and the government of Formosa..We wouldn't be recognizing the government of Formosa as government of China..I hope that we can bring about a situation in which the existence of a separate government in Taiwan is recognized and that we can at the same time recognize that the People's Republic government in Peking is effectively in control of the mainland area. (DEA file I,1.2,10088:OTT Tel to WSHDC May 30/68)

As the Canadian policy objective on the China/Taiwan phenomenon was promulgated, the China Policy Review had been gaining increasing momentum in the DEA. Before a major part of the Review was completed in early July, a dynamic consultation process had been launched since May. Included were certain Canadian missions abroad and some foreign governments who had recognized and had missions in Beijing.

1. Consultation with Missions Abroad:

The Review papers, as it stood in early July, dealt with political and practical aspects of recognition and other alternatives. (DEA file I,2,10088: Memo for Min Jul.3/68) On the political aspect of recognition, separate papers examined issues such as, "forms of recognition", "effects on Canadian relations with Taiwan", and "international repercussions". Several Canadian diplomatic missions abroad were requested to comment on some of the draft papers. Among the posts, views from the Canadian Embassy in Washington on the implication of the policy change on Canadian-American relations evidently exerted great influence over Ottawa's thinking.

In the first place, the Embassy, while recalling

vigorous American reaction to previous Canadian initiatives at the UN in 1966, was of the view that the first draft on "International Repercussions" understated likely American reaction. (Ibid: WSHDC Tel to Ott Jun.18/68) In this connection, Ambassador Ritchie strongly recommended that the timing of the Canadian announcement of its intention to negotiate with Beijing be deliberately delayed until after the incoming American presidential election was over or a new Administration took office lest that a premature announcement should prejudice Canadian relations with the new Administration. (Ibid: WSHDC Tel to Ott Jan.20/68) This suggestion was taken seriously by Ottawa and eventually incorporated in a Memorandum. (Ibid: Memo for Min Jul.3/68)

2. International Reactions:

Since Trudeau and Sharp made official statements on the Canadian intention to recognize the Beijing government, many countries continuously expressed their interest in the Canadian move. Some countries, predominantly those that had recognized the PRC, welcomed it whereas other governments that had not done so urged caution. These latter categories of countries, predominantly those having tremendous strategic interests at stake with respect to Taiwan's position within the context of Asia-Pacific Cold War, tended to express serious concerns over the effects of Canadian action on weakening Taipei's international position. These included some major Western democratic states bordering the

Pacific, namely, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the US.

First of all, as the China Policy Review was completed and the 1968 UNGA imminent, Canberra instructed its High Commissioner in Ottawa to make formal representations. While welcoming new Canadian involvement in the Asia-Pacific region, Australia regretted that the new step Canada was contemplating would have an unfortunate impact on the equilibrium of the region and hoped that Canada would continue to support the Important Question (IQ) resolution, since the UN membership was important to the ROC's international position and the PRC had not shown any respect for the international community and its neighbours. (Ibid: CANBRA Tel to Ott Aug.14/68; Ott Tel to CANBRA Aug.19/68) Similarly, New Zealand raised its concern for the ROC position in the UN and urged Canada to maintain its support for IQ resolution, but revealed a certain sympathetic understanding toward Canadian approach. (Ibid: Ott Tel to WLTN Aug.13/68; WLTN Tel to Ott Aug.16/68) Notwithstanding these voices, concerns from Japan and the US were presented much more continuously and forcefully.

Upon learning of Trudeau's earlier statements, the Japanese embassy in Ottawa had shown its concern over the "bad timing" of the Canadian decision. (DEA file I,1.1,10088: FED Memo for file May 17/68) Later, the Japanese Gaimusho directly cautioned that Beijing might demand Canadian recognition of its government as that of the whole Chinese

territory including Taiwan. (DEA file I,2,10089: Tokyo Tel to Ott Jun.17/68) Subsequently, the Japanese further delivered their "formal" comments on Trudeau and Sharp's statements. For Tokyo, the new Canadian policy was an attempt to recognize a "plain fact" as it stood by continuing recognition of the ROC while adding that of the PRC. Moreover, they saw little possibility of success of the Canadian objective in light of the French experiment and the hardening of Beijing's position on the Taiwan issue. Since Ottawa's proposal was not acceptable to Beijing, it would result in severance of diplomatic relations with Taipei, thereby damaging Taiwan's international position. Therefore, from the Japanese view, the most sensible arrangement would be continued diplomatic recognition of the ROC while promoting economic relations, cultural and personal exchanges with the PRC. (Ibid: Tokyo Tel to Ott Jul.9/68; Talking Points Jul.10/68)

No doubt, the frequency and intensity of American representations over the issue was no less evident than those of the Japanese. As soon as Trudeau referred to the subject in Vancouver on May 10, the American embassy in Ottawa brought to the DEA's attention some of the "inside story" of the French experience of recognition. (DEA file I,1.1,10088: OTT Tel to WSHDC May 10/68) After both Trudeau and SSEA's May 29 statement, William Bundy, the Assistant State Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, made a

"low-key" representation to Ambassador Ritchie. In it, he also referred to the French case, underlining the French ultimatum to the ROC on Feb 10, 1964 and pointing out that the French did not gain real improvement of their relations with Beijing, and emphasized the likely serious repercussions on Vietnam peace talks and on the ROC as well as East Asian security. Meanwhile, the Americans provided a detailed chronology of the French recognition of Beijing to Canadian officials in Washington DC for Ottawa's reference. (DEA files I,1.2,10088: WSHDC Tels to OTT Jun.7; Jun 10/68; Frolic 1991:195) When the Review was almost complete, the State Department stressed its concern for Taiwan by noting that any political development which came as "traumatic shock" to the ROC government would require response from the USA, forcing it to come to rescue Taipei or to retreat from its own cautious advance. (Ibid: WSHDC Tel to Ott Jul.2/68)

3. International Consultations:

Notwithstanding the cautions from the above governments, other countries that had recognized Beijing welcomed, in varying degree, the Canadian decision. The British, French and Swedes while encouraging the Canadian move provided certain information deriving from their own experiences with Beijing. Although this consultation process was initiated mostly from the Canadian side, it also involved some voluntary action on the part of the respective

governments.

First of all, Ottawa sought to obtain information regarding the conditions the British diplomatic mission had faced in Beijing in terms of diplomatic access, travel restrictions and other housekeeping matters. (DEA file I,1.2,10088: Ott Tel to Ldn May 14/68; Ldn Tels to Ott May 17/68; May 23/68) The British, besides providing relevant information, advised Ottawa of the advantages of having a mission in Beijing, despite their own unpleasant experience with the Chinese in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. (Ibid: Ldn Tel to Ott May 20/68) In reply to a voluntary offer of information by Sir Donald Hopson, the British Charge d'Affaires who was subjected to Chinese mob's physical abuse when the Red Guards sacked the British mission in August 1967, Ottawa further inquired into Hopson's views on whether or not and why Beijing would be interested in the Canadian initiative and whether the Communists would put forward explicit Canadian acceptance of their sovereignty over Taiwan as a precondition. (Ibid: Ott Tel to Ldn May 22/68; Graham Let to Denson May 23/68) Sir Hopson, in reply, advised that "the Canadians would be wise to remain silent (on the Taiwan issue) and should certainly try to avoid a statement if at all possible." (Ibid: Ldn Tel to Ott Jun.6/68) When he personally visited Canada in late October, Sir Donald Hopson was further pursued on various subjects. (Ibid: Memo for PM Oct.24/68)

Additionally, the DEA also sought French and Swedish views on similar issues ranging from the diplomatic administration to the Taiwan issue. (Ibid: Ott Tel to Paris; USSEA Let to STKHM May 23/68) Noteworthy is the French reply. The French indicated that in the 1963-64 negotiations they made it clear to the Chinese that they did not seek to attach diplomatic recognition by other countries a precondition of recognizing their claim to sovereignty over Alsas-Lorraine. While the Chinese had not accepted this argument they had not let this issue stand in the way of exchanging diplomatic relations at that time. (Ibid: Paris Tels to Ott Jun.4; Jun.11/68)

To sum up, Canadian international consultations prior to the Stockholm negotiations was dynamic. Their significance became more and more evident as the negotiations progressed. Nevertheless, while preparing for pending negotiations with Cabinet mandate, since July 1968, the DEA had come to a critical stage of developing possible courses of action on what form of future relations with Taiwan. (Ibid:Memo for Min Sep.13/68)

One of possible interpretations of Trudeau's policy statement, at one extreme side of spectrum, to be sure, was for Canada to have official relations with both "one China" and "one Taiwan". This line, if taken, would seem to accord with what Mitchell Sharp initially had in mind. When asked at the May 29 press conference, he had explicitly

anticipated the situation of dual diplomatic relations with both Beijing and Taipei might emerge since "the world is changing". (Ibid: Ott Tel to WSHDC May 30/68) This position was further confirmed by the SSEA office in a memorandum to the FED dated June 10, 1968. Meanwhile, it was also realized that whether it might be possible to enter into diplomatic relations with Beijing while retaining official ties with Taipei could only be tested by "getting into actual discussions with Peking." (Ibid: Memo for Min Jun. 6/68)

This possible interpretation of the Trudeau's policy statement as an embodiment of a "one China one Taiwan" stance, however, was obviously not a mainstream one among the DEA officials. When the DEA's China Policy Review was completed in early July, it was acknowledged that it was extremely unlikely that Canada could obtain the maximum objective of having diplomatic relations with both the PRC and the ROC. One of the major reasons for the DEA's reluctance to embrace a "two China" policy boldly lay with Canada's own sensitivities and vulnerabilities with regard to Quebec. The DEA explicitly cautioned that "anything which suggests our acceptance of a two-China policy could be regarded as interference in the internal affairs of China and thereby perhaps render less credible our own insistence of having Canada treated as an indivisible entity in all international dealings.. (Hence) the less we are able to say

of our view of the status of Taiwan, the better."¹ (Ibid: Memo for Min Jul.3/68) On the eve of cabinet discussions in December, this rationale was reasserted. (DEA file I,4,10089: Memo for Min Dec.10/68)

The authoritative interpretation of the Trudeau's statement within mainstream DEA officials, as it turned out, was operationalized as an approach that sought to establish formal official relations with Beijing while maintaining less than full diplomatic ties with Taipei. In fact, this formulation grew out of a scenario where Canada would encounter a situation analogous to the French experience in negotiations with the PRC. According to this scenario, Beijing, while trying to avoid making an issue of Taiwan until an agreement had been reached and made public, would issue an ex post facto statement by presenting with the alternatives of breaking off relations with Taiwan or having the agreement collapse with a maximum of embarrassment and vituperation. (Ibid: Memo for Min Sep.30/68) Faced with this scenario, Canada would have three conceivable options to take. The recommended "third option"² would be for Canada to

¹ Interestingly, this DEA view "converged" with that of Paul Lin, a noted pro-Beijing sinologist. Lin criticized Trudeau and Sharp's statements for the same reasons. (G&M Jun. 21/68)

² The first option was "to engineer the breaking off of relations with the Nationalists, as French did" and the second one was to insist on retaining full diplomatic relations with Taipei.

withdraw recognition of Taipei representatives as that of China, while declaring its "readiness to deal with the Nationalists on matters concerning Taiwan and to permit them to have non-diplomatic representatives in Canada on that basis if they so wished." (Ibid: Memo for Min Oct.31/68)

In its genetic form, the FED also proposed to make a counter-statement publicly, in the event of China following the French experience, not only expressing the Canadian wish to deal with a Taiwan administration but clarifying that:

This does not and is not intended to constitute recognition of Taiwan as an independent state, nor to imply any other Canadian position as to the status of that territory..(We are) prepared to allow representatives of that administration to have a mission in Canada with such immunities and privileges, as may be necessary for the performance of their functions. (Ibid: FED Memo to Legal Oct.21/68)

While it was later realized that "Canadian law does not provide for the according of full diplomatic privileges and immunities to persons who are neither representatives of sovereign states nor officials of international organizations" (Ibid: Legal Memo to FED Nov.21/68), an option to offer Taiwan representatives certain customs and other privileges normally accorded to diplomats was still left open at this stage. (Ibid: Memo for Min Oct.31/68) This formulation was regarded as not only meeting Trudeau's stated objective on May 29, but also a move to acknowledge another part of reality of the situation that "Peking does not control Taiwan and that government and people there have

not indicated any wish to come under Peking's control".

(Ibid: Memo for Min Dec.10/68)

As a part of preparation for cabinet discussion and impending negotiations, a detailed study was conducted on the case of French recognition of Beijing in 1964 and brought to the SSEA's attention. (Ibid: Memos for Min Sep.30; Dec.10/68) Other documents enclosed for consideration by the SSEA or the cabinet committee included analyses of the Cultural Revolution and on Chinese foreign policy and relations. (Ibid: Memos for Min Sep.25; Dec.6/68) In the final analysis, Beijing's "pragmatists" were thought to be apparently in control and thus the Cultural Revolution was seen as being virtually terminated. With the completion of the American presidential election, moreover, the stage was further set for a full cabinet discussion.

At this juncture, however, it should be reminded of the importance of the American factor and timing considerations in relation to the cabinet discussion on the China/Taiwan subject and the action to contact Beijing's representatives. As mentioned above, Ambassador Ritchie suggested that the factor of the American presidential elections be taken seriously into account, which was formally adopted when the Review was completed in July. On the eve of cabinet meeting, more importantly, the American factor was further highlighted to the extent that the DEA recommended that:

(It be) desirable to wait for the inauguration of a new

American Administration before taking any concrete step..and to plan on making contact before mid-February..(since) the Americans have agreed to hold talks on February 20. Should the Warsaw talks pronounce more acrimony in Sino-American relations our own initiative might find a more hostile reception in Washington than it would beforehand. If the talks are a spectacular success we may find ourselves overshadowed by events. (Ibid: Memo for Min Dec.10/68)

It should also be briefly noted that in the long interim before cabinet decision, several issues were raised and examined. Among them were the possibility of setting up a resident trade office in Beijing as an alternative to the exchange of diplomatic mission, the repercussion of recognition on Canadian-American economic relations, and the effect of a clearer "one China one Taiwan" stance on future wheat sales to the mainland. On the final issue, in particular, the Wheat Board strongly objected to the pursuit of policy in that direction, which was also endorsed by the Industry, Trade and Commerce. (DEA file I,5,8814: FED Memo to USSEA Jan.23/69; Frolic 1991: 196-7)

As preparations reached a decisive stage, the DEA began to draft a memorandum to cabinet in early January 1969. The memorandum listed 12 concrete proposals and elaborated the American factor and the effect on Taiwan in relation to the Canadian move. Among the proposals, the DEA suggested that the Canadian Ambassador in Stockholm be instructed to approach his Communist Chinese counterpart there to propose talks at a mutually convenient time and place, and that the Ambassador in Washington be instructed to inform the

American government of Canadian intentions, with simultaneous notification of the ROC Ambassador in Ottawa, immediately after cabinet decision is reached. Additionally, during negotiations, the DEA proposed not to accept any Chinese demand for a prior commitment to vote for their admission to the UN, although the Canadian representatives should be ready to indicate to their counterparts that the Canadian UN policy will be consistent with the state of bilateral relations. As for future Canadian relations with Taiwan, it was suggested that Canadian negotiators be instructed not to raise the Taiwan issue and to make clear to Beijing delegates that Canada would not cease de facto intercourse with Taiwan after derecognition and not make a statement accepting Beijing's claim to Taiwan, at the cost of suspending negotiations. As for the extent of that future relations, it specified that "we might envisage permitting the Taiwan authorities to have non-diplomatic representative in Canada if they so wished and establishing an unofficial Canadian trade mission in Taiwan if this were to seem useful for either political or economic reasons." (Ibid: Memo to Cabinet Jan.7/69)

Insofar as the American factor is concerned, the draft document, in identifying as unprecedented the 1958 Eisenhower-Diefenbaker encounter where the former blatantly threatened the latter not to move to recognize Beijing and adding that since then Canadian-American relations had never

been expressed in such fashion, pointed out that Washington had so far reacted calmly and revealed the Canadian confidence that the American concern over the repercussions of Canadian move on Vietnam war/peace, the ROC's international position and the UN situation could be delicately managed. In a special section dealing with the effects on Taiwan, the draft document summarized main reasons for Ottawa's desire to maintain any relations with Taipei: Taiwan's being an existing market for Canadian exports, the sale of nuclear reactor, the American concern, Trudeau's policy statement and the correspondence with another part of the reality which may serve as a precedent for other countries and as a logic policy. (Ibid)

The DEA's proposals for negotiations with the PRC as well as future relations with Taiwan were finally approved in a full cabinet meeting on January 30, 1969. The proposals with respect to Taiwan were largely identical with those of previous suggestions, with the option of reciprocal exchange of non-official trade office remaining open. (Ibid: Memo for Min Jan. 29/69; PCO record Feb. 6/69; Granatstein and Bothwell 1990: 182) Subsequently, on the same day, the DEA instructed its embassy in Washington to inform the State Department of the decision. (Ibid: Ott Tel to WSHDC Jan. 30/69) A shorter version of the message was also conveyed to the ROC Ambassador in Ottawa, with the emphasis that while it was not possible for Canadian government to continue diplomatic

relations with the ROC government, there would be no need for Ottawa to announce a break. (Ibid: Memo for Min Jan.31/69; Ott Tel to WSHDC Feb.3/69) Although Taipei was assured that Canadian future relations with Taiwan would be as warm as possible, no available evidence indicates that the possibility of exchanging trade offices was conveyed.³ Moreover, the cabinet decision was made known to other close and friendly countries. The Canadian embassy in Stockholm was then instructed to seek an appointment with the Chinese there. (Ibid: Ott Tel to STKHM Feb.4/69)

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II. The Stockholm Negotiations:

With the cabinet mandate, Canadian diplomats in Stockholm took initiatives on February 6 and 7 to phone the PRC mission. Although the initially scheduled meeting on February 8 was not actualized, the SSEA announced the decision as planned in the House of Commons. The first meeting was eventually set on February 21, 1969. The 20-month, 18-session negotiations in Stockholm between Canada and the PRC then ensued.

Overall, the 18 sessions could be roughly divided into three main phases: (1) preliminary talks, (2) substantive discussion on principles, and (3) substantive give-and-take in the contents of the text of an agreement. In time frame

³ In this author's interview with Mr. Mitchell Sharp on Nov. 5, 1998, he could not verify this part either.

approximately, the first stage took place from February to April 1969, the second from May to September 1969, and the third from September 1969 to October 1970. As the details of the discussions covered a wide range of issues, for the purpose of the thesis, the following account will deal essentially with Taiwan-related part of the negotiations.

1. The First Phase:

The first three rounds basically addressed procedural matters, notably time and place in which ensuing substantive talks would be held.

(1) The First Meeting on February 21, 1969:

At the first encounter, the Canadian Ambassador, Arthur Andrew, informed the Chinese Charge d'Affaires, Liu Chi-tsai, that the Canadian government wished to have its representatives meet with those of the PRC at a mutually convenient time and place to discuss mutual recognition and the exchange of ambassadors. The Chinese Charge, while saying he would refer the Canadian proposal to Beijing, put forward three "constant principles", and asserted that any country wishing to have relations with the PRC must:

- 1) recognize the Central People's Government as the sole and lawful government of the Chinese people;
- 2) recognize that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and in accordance with this principle sever all kinds of relationships with the "Chiang Kai-shek gang";
- 3) give support to the restoration of the rightful place and legitimate rights in the UN of the PRC and no longer give any backing to so-called representative of Chiang Kai-shek in any organization of this

international body. (DEA file I,7,8814: STKHM Tel to Ott Feb.21/69)

(2). The Second Meeting on April 3, 1969:

The Chinese declared that their government was willing to begin negotiations immediately, and proposed Stockholm as the site and English as the language for the talks. No mention was made of the "constant principles" of the Chinese government. The Canadian side agreed to refer the Chinese proposal to Ottawa.

(3). The Third Meeting on April 10, 1969:

Canada announced its acceptance of the Chinese proposal that negotiations be held in Stockholm. The Chinese agreed to refer to Beijing practical questions raised by the Canadian side. As well, the Chinese side noted that it had received no response to the statement of "constant principles" made at the first meeting, but did not suggest that acceptance of them would be a precondition to opening negotiations. (DEA file I,10,8814: Rome Tel to Ott May 15/69)

2. The Second Phase:

In the three meetings (the fourth, fifth and sixth), the Chinese side was preoccupied with the clarification of Ottawa's position in light of previous public statements made by Canadian leaders. Most importantly, it was during these series of talks that the principal themes of Canadian foreign policy toward China/Taiwan were reformulated.

(1). The Fourth Meeting on May 20, 1969:

In this session, the Canadian side while briefly

responding to the Chinese principles outlined three Canadian "concrete proposals" on reaching an agreement with respect to diplomatic exchange and necessary administrative assistance. At the same time, copies of an aide-memoire were given to the Chinese as an indication of the type of agreement on diplomatic privileges and immunities Canada would desire.

The Chinese asserted that before realistic discussions on the administrative questions raised at the third meeting could begin there would first have to be agreement on the principles for the establishment of diplomatic relations and suggested that if Ottawa was sincere when stating that it did not intend to adopt a two-China policy it would easily accept the three "constant principles". In this connection, the Chinese posed seven questions which indicated their overall desire to know if the Canadians agree to break off all relations with Taiwan, what sort of de facto relations with Taiwan Canada had in mind and how Canadian negotiators explained some statements made by their leaders. As well, the Chinese gave their counterpart a brief history lesson on Taiwan and claimed that Taiwan had "at all times" been a part of China and thus the Taiwan issue should not be treated as that of "territory under dispute". (DEA file I,10,8814: STKHM Tels to Ott May 20/69)

After having reported to the DEA the development of the meeting, the Canadian embassy proposed to indicate to the

Chinese clearly at next meeting that "official Canadian policy will be emerging from the present discussions and has not been predetermined by public statements made at various times and in various context." (Ibid: STKHM Tels to Ott May 21; May 23/69) Ottawa, in response, basically approved the line, but drew to its attention that there was a disparity of statements on Canadian position on Taiwan's status: while the SSEA's standard expression was "neither accept nor challenge" the Chinese assertion on Taiwan, the actual Canadian presentation in the negotiations was "would not challenge". (Ibid: Ott Tel to STKHM May 30/69)

(2). The Fifth Meeting on June 7, 1969:

At the session, the Chinese briefly referred to the "other questions" raised at the third meeting (ie Canadian longstanding concerns about diplomatic conditions in Beijing), but reiterated their view that these issues were less important than the principles in the negotiations. The Taiwan issue continued to be the Chinese preoccupation.

Overall, Charge Liu, by referring to alleged Canadian statements, repeatedly posed questions about the possibilities of Canadian continuously supporting a UN seat for or recognizing the "Chiang Kai-shek regime" under whatever name, of the Canadian participation in activities promoting "one China one Taiwan" idea, and of the Canadian readiness to take initiatives to break off all relations with Taiwan. In reply, the Canadian side stressed that

Canada was not pursuing a two China policy in stating that recognition of a government was unrelated to the specific territorial claims of the government. Similarly, Canadian support for Beijing's representation at the UN was to be separate from the questions of recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations, although Canadian policy at the UN would be consistent with Canadian recognition of a new government of one China.

Additionally, the Canadian negotiators pointed out that they could not bind future Canadian governments by taking a position on hypothetical questions, and that the binding policy commitments by Canada would involve a government treaty-making process which requires public parliamentary debates and approval. As for the rupture of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the Canadian side held that no specific act was required to sever relations since it was impossible to recognize two governments as ruling over the same country, and that the credentials of an ambassador from a previously recognized government would be automatically invalidated. (DEA file I,11,8815: STKHM Tels to Ott Jun.7/69)

The DEA consequently made some comments on the Fifth Meeting. It raised concerns again over the form of expressions by its representatives on Canadian position on Taiwan's status. Noting they had said that "Canada would not challenge the Chinese position" at the May 20 meeting and that "Canada does not express views on territorial limits of

sovereignty" at the June 7 meeting, Ottawa suggested that at next meeting the Canadian side should rectify by reiterating the SSEA's "neither accept nor challenge" formula. (Ibid: Ott Tel to STKHM Jun.12/69) This formula was further modified by substituting "endorse" for "accept" to enhance the possibility of Chinese acquiescence. (Ibid: FED Memo to Leg Jun.23/69) The standard phraseology of "neither challenge nor endorse" (NCNE) then came into being.

(3). The Sixth Meeting on July 10, 1969:

During this reportedly "by far toughest" session, the Chinese side, led by the new Ambassador Wang Tung, recited again the "three constant principles" then focused on the "one China one Taiwan" idea with frequent quotations of things "said and done" by Canadian leaders that had harmed Chinese vital interests and interfere in their domestic affairs. For example, both Sharp and Trudeau's policy statements of May 29/68 that had been spared from any Chinese criticism for more than one year, together with their new talks in 1969, were now cited as evidence that Canada considered Taiwan's status undetermined, that Ottawa was actually challenging Chinese position despite its reiteration of "not challenging" such a stand, and that the Canadians continued to subscribe to "one China one Taiwan" idea embraced by "US imperialism". They then demanded that Canada recognize Taiwan as an integral part of Chinese territory so as to demonstrate the sincerity of Canadian

government in upholding the "one China" policy, and thought this request as "completely reasonable" in view of Canadian continuous "infringement on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity".

Overall, despite previous Canadian assurances that Canadian policy was that which was expressed in the negotiating session, the Chinese appeared particularly worried about public statements made by prominent Canadian figures before and during the negotiations. The Canadian side, saddened by the Chinese continuously harking back to past, tried repeatedly to impress the Chinese that the Canadian government was acting in good faith and on its own behalf, but found the exercise seemed to be getting nowhere.

Surprisingly, after a restatement of the "neither challenge nor endorse" (NCNE) formula and a cool closing statement by the Canadian side, the Chinese pressed eagerly for another meeting, invited the Canadian side for a farewell lunch for Ambassador Andrew, and insisted that Canada now understood "their position".⁴ (Ibid: STKHM Tels to Ott Jul.10/69)

After the session, the Canadian embassy proposed to Ottawa that a public statement be made to put on record as proof to the Chinese that what Canadian negotiators were

⁴ Wang Tung's parting words were: "I hope you understand our position better now" to which Arthur Andrew replied that "I would have had to be deaf not to". (Ibid: STKHM Tel to Ott Jul.10/69; Sharp 1994: 204)

telling them was indeed the position held now and publicly by the Canadian government. (Ibid: STKHM Tel to Ott Jul.14/69) This suggestion was taken to the effect that a question was then inspired in the House of Common on July 21 so as to allow the SSEA to make a formal statement which was subsequently sent to Stockholm embassy to draw the attention of the Chinese. (Ibid: Ott Tel to STKHM Jul.22/69) It clarified Canadian position on Taiwan as follows:

We are not promoting either a 'two-China' or a 'one-China one-Taiwan' policy. Our policy is to recognize one government of China. We have not asked and do not ask the government of the PRC to endorse the position of the Government of Canada on our territorial limits as a condition to agreement to establish diplomatic relations. To do so might cause doubts on the extent of our sovereignty. We do not think it would be appropriate, nor would it be in accordance with international usage, that Canada should be asked to endorse the position of the Government of the PRC on the extent of its territorial sovereignty. To challenge that position would, of course, also be inappropriate.

Subsequently, the DEA further considered the Canadian vote at the coming UNGA session on Chinese representation. It recommended that the vote should not change unless agreement was reached in Stockholm, that Canada vote for the Albanian resolution if agreement concluded by then, but continue to vote for IQ resolution in any case, and that the embassy be instructed to tell the Chinese of the general Canadian intention as a concession. It also sought a new cabinet mandate to override its previous ruling. (Ibid: Memo for Min Aug.18/69)

Shortly thereafter, in consulting legal advisors for a draft presentation text for next meeting, the FED for the first time in the official record phrased Ottawa's "non-position" on Taiwan's status to the effect that "Canadian government has taken note of (TNO) the Chinese position (on Taiwan) which we neither endorse nor challenge", thereby establishing a direct linkage between the often cited "TNO" and "NCNE" formulae. (Ibid: FED Memo to Leg Aug.27/69)

3. The Third Phase:

This phase of discussions, starting in September 1969, spanned more than one year but concluded successfully with the Joint Communiqué in October 1970. The major give-and-take areas nevertheless fell upon the form of expression directly related to the Taiwan issue.

(1). The Seventh Meeting on September 20, 1969:

Miss Margaret Meagher, the new Canadian Ambassador to Sweden first delivered an opening statement. In his turn, Ambassador Wang rephrased part of her statement to the effect "that is to say that Canadian side assures us that Canada follows one China policy and recognizes the PRC government is the sole legal government representing all Chinese people". To this, Miss Meagher repeated form of words from her introductory statement--"it recognize the PRC as sole government of one China", but both agreed that these amount to the same thing. Wang also expressed Chinese appreciation at the Canadian statement that Canada does not

intend to engage in activities to create "one China one Taiwan", and his satisfaction with the clarification of Canadian policy by the SSEA's statement on July 21, 1969.

Nevertheless, the significant topic of discussion was the form and content of a possible announcement of agreement. The Canadian side was asked to make a "concrete proposal" that would indicate that it was willing to affirm its acceptance of the Chinese principles. To this, the Canadian side, while handing over its first draft communique, declared its preference for a simple communique, like the Sino-French model of 1964, announcing the establishment of diplomatic relations, but conceded it would be willing to discuss an alternative text or the exchange of letters. In the meantime, the Canadian side repeatedly tried to elicit a reply to whether or not the PRC had required any other governments to subscribe to its principles or Taiwan's position in negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relations, but the Chinese side gave only evasive answers.

In the end, Meagher briefly mentioned that Canada would give Chinese advance notice of Canadian decision on the UN vote, prior to the UNGA debate, at future meeting and volunteered that she would call for next meeting for such purpose. To this, Wang did not seem much interested and remarked that "special meeting for that purpose did not seem necessary", which surprised the Canadian team. (DEA file I,12,8814: STKHM Tels to Ott Sep.20/69)

Accordingly, in its report to Ottawa, the embassy, while indicating that Ottawa might need to draft another communique adopting the Chinese favourite phrases of "mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity (MRSTI)" and "non-interference in domestic affairs (NIDA)" in view of the dim prospect of the French-style draft being accepted by Beijing's representatives, recommended to call for another meeting as soon as the cabinet made decision on the issue of the UN vote. Shortly later, the cabinet did approve what was proposed on the subject and the embassy was instructed to call the Chinese to arrange for the new meeting. However, the DEA made it clear that its legal advisers were reluctant to accept phrase referring to MRSTI and NIDA in future communique draft. (Ibid: Ott Tel to STKHM Sep.25/69) The embassy nevertheless continued to argue for the incorporation of the phrase as relatively harmless given that the Taiwan issue was not strictly a Chinese domestic affair, and it subsequently proposed for Ottawa's approval a draft agreed minute text that was intended to accompany with the communique. (Ibid: STKHM Tels to Ott Sep.26; Sep 30/69) Notwithstanding the suggestion, for the moment, Ottawa continued to hold that the reference to MRSTI and NIDA should be avoided in any case. (DEA file I,13, 8814: Ott Tel to STKHM Oct.1/69)

(2). The Eighth Meeting on October 18, 1969:

In an opening statement, the Canadian side again

expressed preference for a simple communique in one paragraph. The Chinese side, however, produced a three-paragraph communique. In it, the first paragraph referred to the principles of MRSTI and NIDA. The second paragraph further laid down both sides' positions on Taiwan:

The Government of the PRC reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the PRC. The Government of Canada expresses respect for the above stand of the PRC Government and will not pursue the policy of so-called "two Chinas" or "one China one Taiwan" and, therefore, decides to sever all relations with the Chiang Kai-shek clique.

The Canadians agreed to accept the more elaborate Chinese draft as a basis for discussion, reserving the right to suggest amendments. The Chinese side judged the Canadian one-paragraph draft inadequate and insisted that any communique would necessarily include a statement on Taiwan but suggested that this could be supplemented by a document explaining more fully the positions each side. (Ibid: STKHM Tels to Ott Oct.18/69)

After the session, the Stockholm embassy repeatedly indicated to Ottawa that the reference to MRSTI and NIDA principles in the first paragraph to which the Legal Division objected before should cause little problem for Canada, although the second paragraph was much more contentious. (Ibid: STKHM Tels to Ott Oct.20/69) The DEA, in response, remarked that:

The overriding Chinese interest seems to be to use negotiations with Canada as means of obtaining as

forthright statement as possible on Taiwan's status..(which) seems to be more important to Peking than actual establishment of diplomatic relations. (Ibid: Ott Tel to STKHM Oct.20/69)

(3). The Ninth Meeting on October 24, 1969:

At this session, the Chinese side was informed that their draft was unacceptable because the sentences concerning the Taiwan status were not in accord with the Canadian position described at earlier meetings. The Canadian side proposed that a draft modeled on the Sino-French communique be prepared, and that it be accompanied by an agreed minute setting forth the position of both sides on questions of principle. The Chinese again affirmed that important questions of principle would have to be dealt with in a communique but indicated their willingness to discuss the wording in their draft. (Ibid:STKHM Tel to Ott Oct.24/69)

(4). The Tenth Meeting on October 31, 1969:

At this brief meeting, while the Canadian side presented the text of a proposed agreed minute as a supplement to a simple communique, the Chinese side summarized the three "constant principles" as boiling down to one basic "principle" at issue in the negotiations --the status of Taiwan but declined to comment on the draft minute. (Ibid: STKHM Tels to Ott Oct.31/69)

During a long interval after the conclusion of the 10th meeting, the FED started drafting an alternative text of communique that rephrased the second paragraph of the

Chinese draft, and finally accepted, in consultation with the Legal Division, that it should be safe to keep intact the Chinese first paragraph that referred to the MRSTI and NIDA principles. (Ibid: FED Memo to Leg. Nov.5/69; Leg. Memo to FED Nov.7/69) It was during this internal consultation process that a preference list on alternative draftings came into being. (Ibid: Leg. Memo to FED Nov.7; FED Memo to Leg. Nov.19/69)

(5). The 11th Meeting on January 22, 1970:

At this session the Chinese delegation stressed that the Canadian statement on Taiwan, marked by the phrase of NCNE in the Canadian draft minute presented at the 10th meeting, was "vague and self-contradictory" and implied something less than "respect". To this, Meagher replied that the word "respect" did not actually reflect Canadian position. The Chinese nevertheless concluded that the Canadian draft of a proposed minute to accompany a communique was unsuitable.

Moreover, while the Chinese side expressed regret that Canada had abstained in the voting on the admission of the PRC to the UN, the Canadian side reminded them that the vote should come as no surprise since Ottawa had informed them in advance, which constituted a major Canadian concession by departing from Ottawa's usual diplomatic practice. (DEA file I,14,8814: STKHM Tels to Ott Jan.22;23/69)

The end of the session was followed by a series of

crucial elaborations of the Canadian position on Taiwan's status. The Canadian embassy first suggested to Ottawa that an argumentation be put forward at future meeting to explain why Canada preferred the NCNE formula. That is, "the Taiwan problem was not one we have had any share in making. We have neither right nor ability to solve it." As for the Chinese demand that Canada endorse their position on Taiwan's status, it proposed to respond by saying that the request was contrary to general principles of international law and that the PRC itself had not insisted that other countries must do so in order to have diplomatic ties with them. Moreover, the embassy pointed out the major task for the Canadian side to do at future meeting was to ascertain "whether the Chinese are rejecting our position or objecting to the terms (that were used to describe Canadian position)." (Ibid: STKHM Tels to Ott Jan.26; Jan.28/70)

The embassy then raised another proposal based on the assumption that the Chinese were actually objecting to Canadian form of words rather than the substantive position, and suggested that since the NCNE formula was explicitly turned down by the Chinese, using paraphrase or dropping the NCNE phrase from the new Canadian alternative draft communique that the SSEA had approved in late November 1969 might be much advisable. In this connection, with respect to the Canadian view, a new sentence was put forward to read that "Canadian government, while taking due note of (TDNO)

this position of the PRC government, nevertheless considers it inappropriate...." In the embassy's views, the phrase TDNO described Canadian stand accurately that:

We have understood it (ie, the PRC claim on Taiwan) without necessarily agreeing with it and would certainly take Chinese government's strong views into account (if not necessarily decisively) in Canadian decisions relating to Taiwan once we had relations with the PRC. (Ibid: STKHM Tel to Ott Jan.26/70)

This proposal was significant as a genetic attempt to adopt formally in the communique text a phrase that is closely analogous to the final version.⁵ It also contained the first systematic exercise to define what T(D)NO means.

Nevertheless, this proposal incurred a series of debates within the DEA, which further elaborated the Canadian "non-position".

The debates revealed that there were competitive interpretations of the meanings of the NCNE phrase in its presence/absence in the context of the communique. It further exemplifies the politics of representation in the meaning level as related to the issue of language and power. The issue at stake was whether Canada could afford to drop the NCNE phrase from the alternative draft text with respect to Canadian view on Taiwan's status. At the outset, the Canadian embassy in Washington assumed that the Chinese had

⁵ The final version of the Joint Communique employed the well-known phrase of "take-note-of" (TNO) to describe the Canadian position. Please see Appendix II.

appeared to learn a lesson from their encounter with the French in 1964 and thus seemed determined to forestall Canada from proclaiming that Taiwan's status is undetermined, and thought the NCNA phrase was only taken to mean for Canadian future freedom of action. It thus took the view that Canada should not drop the phrase from the approved alternative text of communique. (Ibid: WSHDC Tel to Ott Jan.28/70)

The interpretation of the NCNE phrase by the Washington embassy was challenged by the Stockholm mission. The Canadian post in Sweden thought it fruitless for Canada to insist on the form of words that the Chinese had explicitly rejected. Moreover, the post argued that the NCNE phrase does not necessarily connote a predisposition or even commitment by Canada to Taiwanese self-determination as the only effective solution to the Taiwan problem, since "the essence of Canadian position is that..Taiwan problem should be resolved without use of force by those directly concerned including the PRC". (Ibid: STKEM Tel to Ott Jan.30/70)

Subsequently, the embassy in Washington conceded that its previous interpretation of the NCNE as to implying a undetermined status for Taiwan and self-determination as a feasible solution and thereby objecting to deleting the NCNE for the sake of future freedom of action was one-sided and limited. The debates on the authoritative meaning of the phrase thus ended. (Ibid: Blouin Let to Seaborn Jan.30/70)

On the other front, the Legal Division took a position that it had no objection to dropping NCNE in the communique but suggested that the Canadian side continue to state the phrase publicly. In the meantime, it thought the TDNO phrase was objectionable for its implication that "Canadian government does in fact agree with the Chinese contention but is afraid to say so." (Ibid: Leg.Memo to FED Jan.29/70) The issue of whether the TDNO phrase should be incorporated and put forward to the Chinese then surfaced.

The FED in the beginning cautioned against the suggestion by the Stockholm embassy that the TDNO phrase be soon taken in an alternative draft communique.(Ibid: Ott Tel to STKHM Jan.27/70) The Stockholm embassy however pressed for earlier adoption since it merely expressed Canadian awareness of the Chinese position, and "if (it) is acceptable compromise between Chinese term 'respect' and Canadian NCNE formula..we should use it in our draft in the first place."(DEA file I,15,8814: STKHM Tel to Ott Feb.2/70) In response, the DEA remained opposed to the TDNO phrase since its "frequent use..in the UN resolutions has come to imply degree of tacit acceptance or at least carry such connotation in public mind." Instead, the DEA was prepared to consider replacing the phrase by "take-note-of" (TNO) in the future. (Ibid: Ott Tels to STKHM Feb.3;4/70)

(6). The 12th Meeting on February 14, 1970:

At this round of encounter, the Canadian side presented

their suggested amendments to the text that of the Chinese draft communique in the form of a three paragraph communique. While the first paragraph of the proposed Canadian redraft was very similar to the Chinese draft, Canada declined to commit itself to any position on the status of Taiwan in the second paragraph and added to the third paragraph provisions for the application of international usage and reciprocity to the operations of diplomatic missions in each country. No comment on the amendments was made by the Chinese side. In the meantime, the PRC negotiators repeatedly emphasized "if our two sides in the spirit of mutual accommodation and understanding can make joint efforts, it will not be difficult to reach agreement on establishment of diplomatic relations." This statement and reference to common interests of the two peoples to have diplomatic relations were taken by the Canadian side as meaning that the Chinese are genuinely interested in reaching agreement.

Later, the embassy gauged that the Chinese might possibly propose revision of Canadian amendment to read simply "the Canadian government takes note of this position.." at next meeting, and suggested that it be authorized to respond to such Chinese idea immediately in order to "save time", if Ottawa found such revision was acceptable with the companion of agreed minute or unilateral explanatory statement. (Ibid: STKHM Tel to Ott Mar.9/70)

(7). The 13th Meeting on March 12, 1970:

Now, the Chinese side produced two distinct provisions to the Canadian draft communique which had been presented at last meeting as an amendment to the first Chinese draft. The Chinese deleted from paragraph three, the Canadian sentence providing for mutual assistance in the establishment and performance of the functions of diplomatic missions in accord with international usage, arguing that this was unnecessary. More importantly, the reference to the Canadian position was revised to read "the Canadian government recognizes the government of the PRC as the sole legal government representing the entire Chinese people". Additionally, the Chinese side took the opportunity to expound on the Japanese role in the "two China plot" by conspiring with the Americans to get Peng Ming-min out of Taiwan and by building up him as focus for Taiwan independence movement. At that juncture, they then denounced Peng as a "traitor". Nevertheless, the atmosphere at the session was reported to be "extremely easy and friendly". For the Stockholm embassy, the Canadian position on Taiwan was understood and the remaining aim of the negotiation was to "find mutually acceptable form of words for communique." (Ibid: STKHM Tels to Ott Mar.12/70)

Ottawa then proposed to blend both Canadian and Chinese second paragraphs with respect to Canadian view on Taiwan's status to the effect that:

Canada, while taking note of the Chinese position and recognizing the PRC government as sole government of China, nevertheless considers it inappropriate to express any view on Chinese territorial limits. (Ibid: Ott Tel to STKHM Mar.16/70)

Thus, the phrase of TNO was formally adopted in a Canadian-proposed communique text. To this suggestion, however, the Stockholm embassy doubted the Chinese would agree to include the reference to Chinese territorial limits, and suggested to drop the explicit disclaimer on territorial limits, if necessary, to expedite the conclusion of negotiations. Furthermore, the embassy was of the view that Canada might have to give unilateral amplification of its position and to abandon completely the idea of "agreed minute". (Ibid: STKHM Tel to Ott Mar.17/70) In response, Ottawa, while starting to consider the embassy's suggestion of omitting the disclaimer for territorial limits or the agreed summary record as a future Canadian fall-back option, directed the embassy to press the Chinese to accept the existing Canadian proposal once more at next meeting. (Ibid: Memo for Min Mar.18; Ott Tel to STKHM Mar.19/70)

(8). The 14th Meeting on March 24, 1970:

At the 14th session, the Chinese side strongly argued in favour of the Chinese sentence that Canada recognizes Beijing as the "sole legal government representing the entire Chinese people" but clarified that the phrase "Chinese people" was not meant to refer to those Chinese

living abroad, and asked if Canada would agree to delete the disclaimer on Chinese territorial limits. The Canadian side responded that Ottawa considered it normal for each side to use their own chosen phrase to refer to their respective position on Taiwan but hinted that Canada might consider dropping the reference to territorial limits. Interestingly, in the process of exchanges of views, when Meagher suggested to rephrase Canadian recognition of Beijing as "the sole legal government of one China", her Chinese counterpart took the expression as "confusing" since "it implied that there was another China".

Notwithstanding the disagreement on form of words to refer to Canadian position on China and Taiwan, the Chinese side now agreed to reinstate the bulk of the second part of paragraph three of the Canadian draft concerning mutual assistance in the establishment and performance of diplomatic missions. (DEA file I,16,8814: STKHM Tels to Ott Mar.24;25/70)

During the longest pause following the 14th session, the DEA began another search for alternative phraseology for the second paragraph of the communique. The FED first listed seven options in preference order in a consultation with the Legal Division. Among them, the sixth option was for Canada to express its taking note of the Chinese position which was followed by the phrase of recognition of Beijing as the sole

legal government of China.⁶(Ibid: FED Memo to Leg. Apr.6/70)
The Legal Division, instead, suggested a reformulation of paragraph two in a new order of sentences as follows:

The Canadian government recognizes the Central People's Government as the sole and lawful government of the Chinese people. The Chinese government reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. The Canadian government takes note of this position of the Chinese government.

The Division now proposed to drop the disclaimer on territorial limits since it is "too loose and open to the interpretation that we recognize no limit to the Chinese writ." (Ibid: Leg.Memo to FED Apr.10/70) The suggestion to delete the reference to the Chinese territorial limits was adopted and proposed for cabinet discussion. (Ibid: Memo for Min Apr.9; Memo to Cabinet May 7/70) The cabinet on May 19, 1970 finally authorized the Canadian negotiators to omit the reference only if this is necessary to reach agreement, but added that it remained the Canadian strong preference to keep the disclaimer in. (Ibid: Andrew Memo to Fraser May 20; Ott Tel to STKHM May 28/70)

(9). The 15th Meeting on August 1, 1970:

At this session, although the agreement by both sides on the first and last paragraphs was now officially confirmed, there continued to be disagreement on paragraph

⁶ As it turned out later, this suggestion became one of the Canadian last two proposals in September 1970.

two of the communique.

The Chinese side said that it "decidedly cannot accept" the disclaimer on territorial limits since the Taiwan issue was "something completely different in character from unsettled boundary questions which could be negotiated through diplomatic channels". Canada put forward a new proposed text for paragraph two which had Canadian recognition precede Chinese affirmation on Taiwan's status followed by Canadian TNO phrase and the disclaimer (ie, similar to what the Legal Division's proposal on April 10 but adding the territorial disclaimer). This new Canadian proposal was greeted with dismay by Wang. He remarked that the proposal would complicate discussions and represented a "retreat" from the Canadian side, and insisted that the Chinese affirmation sentence should come first. Although Meagher hinted that her government might consider an omission of the disclaimer in exchange for the new Canadian proposed order of sentences, the Chinese side, while expressing their regret that agreement could not be reached on this round as they expected, did not offer to refer the new proposal to Beijing for consideration.

Moreover, the Chinese side maintained that if necessary either government on its own could issue a supplementary document simultaneously with the publication of an agreed joint communique, but added that such a document should not run counter to the spirit of the agreed communique.

The embassy, after the session ended, reported its view that the Chinese disappointment was not hard to understand and their give-and-take expectation was not unreasonable, given that they thought that Canadian agreement to drop the disclaimer could be accompanied with Chinese acceptance to substitute Canadian recognition phrase of "as sole legal government of China" for Chinese original sentence of "government representing the entire Chinese people". It then recommended that as a fall-back position, Canada accept the Chinese sequence of sentence and drop the disclaimer to the effect that the second paragraph starts with Chinese reaffirmation, followed by Canadian TNO phrase and recognition. (ie the FED's 6th option in April 6 memo) Furthermore, on the meaning of the TNO phrase in the new context, the embassy regarded it as serving no harm since "we are only saying that we realize this is the PRC position and will bear it in mind." (Ibid: STKHM Tel to Ott Aug.4/70)

Later, certain concerns were uttered from Gordon Robertson of the Privy Council Office (PCO) that the deletion of the disclaimer could be interpreted as not disputing the Chinese view and did not care what happen to Taiwanese, thereby creating hurdles for Canadian government. His suggested remedy was to have cabinet discuss the matter and to deliver a piece of paper to the Chinese making it clear that Canada does not "accept" the PRC position. (Ibid: Robertson Memo to Tremblay Aug.10/70) The DEA disagreed with

the latter suggestion. (Ibid: Memo for Min Aug.13/70)

Nevertheless, it recommended that a cabinet meeting be convened to decide:

- 1) if Canada continue to insist on its preferred sentence order (ie.Canadian recognition-> Chinese reaffirmation -> Canadian TNO) in exchange for its agreement to drop the disclaimer, even at the expense of suspension of talks;
- 2) if Canada could drop the disclaimer but add "does not comment" in Chinese preferred sequence (ie.Chinese reaffirmation-> Canadian TNO but does not comment->Canadian recognition);
- 3) if Canadian negotiators be authorized to accept 2) without "does not comment" if both of above options are rejected. (ie. Chinese reaffirmation ->Canadian TNO-> Canadian recognition) (Ibid: Memo for Min Aug.18; Memo to Cabinet Aug.19/70)

Meanwhile, the DEA staff quietly stressed to the SSEA that the difference between the three options were "really marginal" and tried to press for a preference for the third option by formulating some counterarguments against Robertson's views. (Ibid: Fraser Let to Meagher Aug.21; FED Memo to USSEA Sep.1; Memo for Min Sep.2/70) Mitchell Sharp approved the DEA preferred approach in the end.(Ibid: Fraser Let to Meagher Sep.3/70) Shortly later, the DEA began drafting an intended SSEA statement to be released simultaneously with the final joint communique. (Ibid: Memo for Min Sep.9/70)

The cabinet then ruled that the Canadian side should present the Chinese with choice of Canadian sentence order (ie option 1) or the Canadian new proposal of Aug.1) or Chinese text (or option 3)) but with the Canadian

recognition sentence being made into the third paragraph⁷, that the embassy be authorized to convey to the Chinese the exact text of the SSEA's intended statement. (DEA file I,18,8816: Ott Tel to STKHM Sep.11/70)

(10). The 16th Meeting September 18, 1970:

At the session, the Canadian side presented the two cabinet approved proposals. The Chinese agreed to refer both of them to Beijing. The Canadian side also read and gave the text of the proposed statement to them. The text was then returned to the Canadian side later without comment.

Furthermore, it was reaffirmed that agreement had been reached on the first and last paragraphs of the communique.

(Ibid: STKHM Tel to Ott Sep.18/70)

(11). The 17th Meeting on October 3, 1970:

The Chinese delegation, at the meeting, announced that it was authorized to reach agreement on a communique incorporating the second proposed amendments suggested by the Canadian side in last session. Both parties agreed on the text of a four-paragraph communique, subject to approval and agreement by their respective governments on the timing and form for the joint communique to be released. (DEA file

⁷ The third option with a separate paragraph dealing with Canadian recognition was reportedly proposed by Bob Stanbury during the course of a cabinet consideration. (Edmonds 1998: 212) In fact, the cabinet at that moment only reached tentative decision that Canada could accept option 3). It would be finally decided by cabinet in light of Chinese reaction to Canadian proposed public statement.

I,19,8816: STKHM Tel to Ott Oct.3/70) Then, the Canadian cabinet committee formally approved the final communique text and the embassy was authorized to authenticate copies of the texts.(Ibid: Ott Tel to STKHM Oct.6/70)

(12). The 18th Meeting on October 10, 1970:

The representatives of the government of Canada, Margaret Meagher, Canadian Ambassador to Sweden, and of the PRC government, Wang Tung, the PRC Ambassador to Sweden signified their approval of the text of the joint communique which was to be released in both Ottawa and Beijing on October 13, 1970, announcing the achievement of mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. The 20-month long Canada-PRC negotiations in Stockholm therefore came to a successful conclusion. The text of the communique, incorporated within a public statement, was released in the Canadian House of Commons by the SSEA at 11:00 am, October 13, 1970. (see appendix II)

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III. The ROC and the Change:

As mentioned in last chapter, prior to the emergence of Pierre Trudeau, the Canada-ROC governmental relations were already in low ebb. The appointment of a diplomatic rising star, Ambassador Yu-chi Hsueh, by Taipei in early 1967 was intended to improve the official ties. (DEA file B,9,8875:HK Let to USSEA Apr.25/67; Lai 1994:212-14)⁸ Nevertheless, the

⁸ David Anderson, the then Canadian Assistant Trade

timing of that posting was considered too late and the prospect for changing Canadian course of action were regarded as dim by several observers, including Lester B. Pearson. (Lai 1994:213-14)⁹ In this section, the process of the Canadian transition toward "one China" will be further demonstrated through the last representation made by Hsueh and his searches for some form of future institutional representation for Taipei, albeit ended in vain.

First of all, a representation was made for the establishment of a ROC Passport office in Toronto, which was in effect an outstanding leftover issue of the reopening a General Consulate there as explored in last chapter. In April-May 1968, the DEA recommended a compromise solution

Commissioner, visited Taiwan and learned from the American and British missions there that Hsueh was highly regarded among those youngly recruited vigorous diplomats in a rejuvenated ROC diplomatic service in the 1960s. In his own biography, Hsueh's posting from the Deputy Representative of the UN to the Ambassador to Canada was depicted as "incredibly good news" for the supporters of the Albanian Resolution, mainly from Eastern European and the Soviets.

⁹ In a talk with Hsueh, Pearson reportedly expressed the absurdity of the ROC's claim to represent the whole China since Taipei could not provide visa for Canadians who intended to travel to the mainland. In reply, Hsueh said, "Canada was a democratic country and in your election campaigns you vowed to promote democracy and pledged anti-communism. Isn't it contradictory and a sign of lacking integrity for Canada to engage with a communist country?" Pearson did not pursue the subject but added that "you have been noted for being an outstanding diplomat and I could testify it today. However the transformation of the Canada-ROC relations is inevitable. Notwithstanding your talent, I am afraid you could not change the historic course." (Lai 1994:214 quotation was translated by this author)

that the ROC embassy in Ottawa be allowed to appoint an Honourary Consul in Toronto. (DEA file D,2,8788: FED Memo to Collins Apr.30; Memo for Min May 15/68)

After Trudeau and Sharp's statement had been publicized in May 1968, Hsueh sent the DEA a written statement of the ROC's views in the form of a long letter addressed to Mitchell Sharp, the gist of which was as follows:

The Chinese people on the mainland have not by any means accepted the communist regime, as is illustrated by the continuing flow of refugees and the chaos there;...(By contrast) The Chinese people on Taiwan have a government which offers an effective alternative to communism by its preservation of the traditional Chinese values and way of life..(and) has also achieved political stability and economic prosperity for its people. It is to be hoped that the Chinese people on the mainland may have the same opportunity and that Canada will refrain from doing anything which would lessen the chance of their throwing off the burden of communism. (Ibid: Memo for Min Jul.5/68)

When the Canadian cabinet was about to authorize contact with the PRC representative, Hsueh sought an interview with Sharp. While referring to the SSEA's talks in CBC television interview earlier, the Ambassador reviewed the historical and constitutional background of the ROC government and stressed that his government was based on the constitution of the ROC adopted by all Chinese on the mainland. Later, Sharp made it clear that Canada did not follow a "two Chinas" policy. At this juncture, Hsueh said that he realized this, and that he knew Canadian policy has been "one China one Taiwan". He asked if the "one Taiwan" was still part of Canadian policy. To this, Sharp replied

that he could give no such assurance but in any case Canada would hope to maintain de facto relations with Taiwan.

(Ibid: FED Memo to USSEA Jan.27/69)

As soon as the cabinet authorized contact with the Communist Chinese, the ROC embassy in Ottawa was immediately informed of it. (DEA file,I,5,8814: Memo for Min Jan.31/69) Shortly later, Hsueh presented the ROC government's protest note to R.E.Collins and requested that at least until the SSEA's announcement on February 10 no publicity would be given to that protest in accordance with his undertaking to the SSEA to keep the matter on a confidential basis. Then, Hsueh proceeded to speak "off the record" raising concerns about his embassy's status and requesting that he be informed on a personal and confidential basis in advance of Canadian recognition so that he would have time to plan his embassy's departure.

Moreover, taking up the SSEA's suggestion that Canada would hope to continue as good de facto relations as possible, he went on to say that the ROC government would like, after withdrawal of its embassy, to have unofficial representatives in Canada to act in a liaison role in trade and other areas. Pressed by Collins as to whether he knew this to be his government's wish, he said that he did and that he himself had recommended it. He emphasized that Taiwan's representatives would have no government status and would be analogous to Taipei's office in London. He went

further to say that he was really thinking of two kinds of unofficial representative: trade representatives (possibly set up as an import-export Company in Montreal or Toronto) and representatives with more general functions (possibly operating as a "publishing" or public relations company). (DEA file,D,3,8788: Memo for Min Feb.5/69)

On the issues of un-official representatives, Ottawa immediately consulted London. Canada House gathered relevant information on the nature of the Nationalist presence, primarily in the form of the "Free China Information Centre", in Great Britain, its activities and the British visa policy and discouragement of any semi-official relations with Taiwan. The Canadian mission then concluded with a comment that "the British experience and policies would seem to suggest that we may encounter serious difficulty in maintaining our objective to keep up and develop closest possible relations with Taiwan." (DEA file,I,6,8814: Ldn Tel to Ott Feb.8/69)

Aside from the possibility of unofficial Taiwanese representation in Canada, the future of the Chinese Consulate-General in Vancouver was explored. In response to Trudeau's request for information on this subject, the FED offered the views that while recognition of Beijing and withdrawal of recognition from Taipei does not necessarily involve the closing of a ROC Consulate in Canada theoretically, the renunciation of a "two Chinas" or "one

China one Taiwan" policy must entail the closing of the ROC Consulate General in Vancouver. (DEA file, D, 4, 8788: FED Memo to O/SSEA Aug. 6/69)

By the end of 1969, the "one Taiwan" element was virtually completely excluded from Canadian China policy to the extent that the DEA began exploring the existing scope of official transactions with any ROC government agencies and assessing possible measures to limit the transactions through coordination with other departments, agencies and Crown corporations. (Ibid: DEA Lets to ITC etc Dec. 4/69) The implications of this official position was further embodied and elaborated when the negotiations with the PRC were on the verge of success. For example, in September 1970 the DEA wrote a letter to the Department of Manpower and Immigration (DMI) consulting on the issues on recognition of Taiwanese passports and their entry. In it, the DEA specifically reminded the DMI that "when and if we recognize the Peking government we will at the same time cease to recognize or have official relations with the government of the ROC either as government of China or as government of Taiwan." (Ibid: Collins Let to Couillard Sep. 9/70)

Notwithstanding the dim prospect for bilateral official relations, during the Stockholm negotiations, after the end of each meeting, Hsueh had received regular briefings, often simultaneously with the American State Department, albeit less comprehensive insofar as the extent of information was

concerned, by the DEA.¹⁰

As the Stockholm negotiations marched towards a successful conclusion, the ROC embassy pursued further institutional and administrative arrangements for the post-derecognition transition. Ambassador Hsueh in a talk with Mr. Collins presented his idea of having a Taiwanese press representative stationed continuously in Canada. Moreover, he explicitly proposed that following the withdrawal of the ROC embassy one staff member be left "in a personal capacity" to advise Chinese residents on consular matters. At the juncture, he mentioned that similar arrangement had been made in Britain, France and the Netherlands. The DEA, while seeing that no serious difficulty should be involved in having continuous presence of the Taiwanese press representative as a reverse parallel to the NCNA presence in Ottawa since the mid-1960s, acknowledged it "a trifle uneasy at the prospect of unofficial 'consular' representation". Nevertheless, it subsequently sent telegrams to its posts in the three countries to obtain detailed information about their practices. (DEA file I,18,8816: Ott Tels to Ldn/Paris/Hague Sep.14/70) The British Foreign Office in reply confirmed that it did not allow Taiwan government to

¹⁰ The discrepancy was so evident that the State Department asked the Canadian embassy to be as specific as possible on the extent of briefings given to the ROC embassy Ottawa, so as for the Americans to be consistent with the Canadians in the event of inquiries by the ROC embassy. (DEA file I,10,8814: WSHDC Tel to Ott May 29/69)

retain any officer resident in Britain to deal with the Nationalist consular questions. (Ibid: Ldn Tel to Ott Sep.17/70) The Dutch practice also discouraged Taipei from posting someone to serve its interests. (Ibid: Hague Tel to Ott Sep.18/70)

On the subject, the Stockholm embassy volunteered some comments that presumably further dampened the hope of a favourable decision taken by Ottawa on Taipei's proposal of a unofficial institutional presence in the event of derecognition. The embassy was of the view that Hsueh's idea of leaving behind one staff member after the cessation of diplomatic relations seemed to be "particularly objectionable" since the consular service could be provided by the ROC offices in the US. Moreover, the embassy thought that the ROC officials could probably make visits to Canada in their personal capacity without being prevented by Canadian officials¹¹. (Ibid: STKHM Tel to Ott Sep.18/70)

The results of the consultation were incorporated into a memorandum for the USSEA that recommended a course of action to discourage Hsueh from entertaining any idea of a permanent Taiwanese representative remaining in Canada after the cessation of relations and to notify him that no

¹¹ This "easier" entry issue turned out to be contentious one to the extent that Ottawa's amended rules to make it difficult for the ROC people to enter Canada via the USA prior to the 1976 Montreal Olympics. This will be discussed in Chapter 6.

immediate action will be taken in respect of the press representative. (Ibid: FED Memo to USSEA Sep.21/70) Although the Dutch and French provided additional information on their practices later, the fundamental position of the DEA did not change. (Ibid: Hague Tel to Ott Sep.23; Paris Tel to Ott Sep.30/70)

As the negotiations nearly drew to a successful end, the FED in view of a undertaking to give Hsueh advance warning of at least 48 hours recommended that he be informed on October 11 that at 11:00 am, October 13 Canada would cease to recognize and to have diplomatic relations with his government and that the advance notification be kept confidential until public announcement. (DEA file D,5,8788: FED Memo to USSEA Oct.6/70) Administrative issues and detailed formalities or procedure concerning the departure of the ROC embassy staff, their families and files within one month were set up in an Aide-Memoire which was to be forwarded to the Ambassador on October 11. In the meantime, the FED found no indication that the embassy and the ROC government intended to make an issue of their departure, as they did with the French. To this, the FED added that "we would be indebted to the Ambassador and his government if they would keep our intentions to themselves until the Minister has made his statement to the House." (Ibid: FED Memo to USSEA; Aide-Memoire Oct.11/70) This confidentiality appeared to be kept to the extent that the process of

breaking off relation was rather smooth. Sharp invited Hsueh for a farewell lunch to show his high regard personally.¹² As a formality, on October 13, the Canadian First Person Note to the ROC embassy requesting closure of embassy and Consulate-General in Vancouver was delivered. Meanwhile, other Canadian government departments and agencies were notified the policy and sought their further cooperation.

In Taipei, the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after having confirmed that Beijing and Ottawa had just made public the establishment of diplomatic relations, announced the break-off at 11:15 pm local time (11:15 am Ottawa time). (UDN Oct.14/70) Thus the bilateral governmental ties were formally severed.

To sum up, evidences indicate that in the midst of negotiations, the "one Taiwan" element gradually faded off in the new Canadian policy. It might be fair to conclude that contrary to a common proposition that the ROC diplomacy was often conducted in a much rigid fashion under Chiang

¹² In Sharp's memoir, he made it specific that he liked the Ambassador. (Sharp 1994:205) However, this did not seem to be shared by the core members of the negotiation team. For example, Bob Edmonds in his recent article claimed that "indeed, they (the Nationalist embassy officials) did everything they could to prevent the negotiations from succeeding." This accusation was only supported with an actually irrelevant citation that Hsueh alleged made to Arthur Andrew: "I trust you don't think that Taiwan bought that NRX nuclear research reactor from Canada just because of your pretty blue eyes?" (Edmonds 1998: 214) The context of that comment was missing and the quotation per se was enlarged in the article.

Kai-shek leadership, the official Canadian record revealed certain degree of pragmatism at least in terms of its seeking "unofficial" representative/office, albeit unsuccessful, and of announcing the rupture of diplomatic relations after the publication of the Canada-PRC Joint Communiqué. The "a-typical" relatively calm reaction in Taipei, compared to its experiences with the French or later the Americans, might be attributed to the Canadian diplomatic practice of consistent consultations with countries concerned. In this regard, the ROC was not a unique case.

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IV. Canadian International Engagement:

At the outset, the Canadian intention to change its China policy had attracted extensive attention from the outside world, as mentioned in the first section. Increasing international interests and concerns became even more evident when actual encounters took place, which made the institutionalization of international consultations a distinct characteristics of Canadian diplomacy during the Stockholm negotiations.

Canadian policy of consultation with respect to China/Taiwan was firstly laid down in the China Policy Review in summer 1968. It was recommended that as soon as a date to contact the Chinese was set, Ottawa should begin consultations with those friends and allies most directly

concerned. Those targeted countries that were explicitly listed for recommendation were: France, Great Britain and the US, Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, Italy, Japan, West Germany, Sweden and the ROC. It was further suggested that Canada keep its close allies as closely informed as possible as to the progress of negotiation. A underlying rationale for this consultation practice was that "if we are able to take our allies into our confidence, it will help mitigate whatever apprehensions there may be regarding Canadian action." (DEA file I,2,10088: Memo for Min Jul.3/68)

As the negotiations progressed, this consultation policy was being implemented in a consistent way. Overall, Canadian missions in those specific countries, if any, had been listed as information addressees of virtually all telegram reports emanated from the Stockholm embassy on almost all sessions of negotiations with the PRC agents. More importantly, those Canadian missions had been authorized to contact local foreign affairs departments to brief them on the progress. In this section, some of those targeted countries involved in the Canadian consultation process will be highlighted. These included Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the US.

1. The USA:

As mentioned in last chapter, while the Canadians had experienced a complex delicate state of relations with the Americans since the early 1960s, the importance of "timely

and sufficient consultation in candor and good faith" was reaffirmed as a cornerstone for intergovernmental transactions, as embodied in the Heeney-Merchant Report published in June 1965. But it continued to champion traditional "quiet diplomacy" approach. (Granatstein 1993:44; 52) In the wake of surging Canadian nationalism and ensuing concern for an independent foreign policy vis-a-vis the USA, the tone of the Report no doubt irked many Canadian nationalists. In a retrospective defence seven years later, Heeney asserted in an insightful passage:

But total national independence in foreign policy is as impossible as is total independence for an individual in organized society. The trick is to achieve and maintain that sufficiency of freedom of action which will enable the nation (and the individual) to contribute best to its own and to world society. In the Canadian situation there is no alternative to partnership with the United States..The first Canadian objective surely should be to influence American decision making.. (Heeney 1972: 171; Granatstein 1992:115)

Although Heeney did not exemplify in the article Canada-USA consultations during Trudeau's China Policy Review and ensuing Stockholm negotiations, interestingly, there is abundant evidence collected from the DEA files demonstrating an elaborative practice of "engaged independence" in Canadian foreign policy.

As Heeney's critics heralded an ability to confront and defy American given foreign policy, or "daring to say No" as the title of a recent PRC bestseller suggested, as an indication of "genuine" independence of Canadian foreign

policy, what was overlooked was the part "engagement" might play in the fulfilment of "independence". This involves a process of institutionalizing interactions or networking through diplomatic briefings, exchange of views/information or consultations, in order to protect and assert national position, or to retain or promote freedom of action in broader social environment, or to influence another country's foreign policy making. Canadian interactions with the Americans on the issue of China recognition pertinently elaborates the meaning of "engaged independence".

Prior to the conclusion of the China Policy Review, first of all, Ambassador Ritchie had recommended that Canada consult closely and precisely with the Americans when a move became imminent and as far as possible in advance of any public announcement of a Canadian decision. He also advised that a new American Administration is given a chance at least to offer their views and arguments, thereby minimizing American objection or reaction. (DEA file I,2,10088: WSHDC Tel to Ott Jun.20/68)

As soon as the cabinet decision was taken, Ottawa immediately sent a telegram instructing the Washington embassy to inform the State Department. In view of American preoccupation with Canadian policy toward Taiwan, the telegram devoted majority of pages to trying to tell the Americans that while Ottawa did not envisage being able to maintain diplomatic relations with Taipei after the

establishment of official ties with Beijing nor would it let negotiations with the Chinese break down over refusal to say so, it intended to continue dealing with Taipei in matters of mutual concern. (Ibid: Ott Tel to WSHDC Jan.30/69) The Washington embassy subsequently reported the American response. The immediate reaction from a senior State Department official was "disappointment and surprise" that Ottawa did not intend to make an effort to achieve a "dual relationship" before "chopping off" relations with Taipei. Finding it necessary to clarify to the Americans a new Canadian policy on Taiwan, Ottawa argued that it did not really propose to "chop off" relations with Taipei without giving it real try, since the American reaction to Canadian earlier UN initiative had made Ottawa doubt the acceptability of this step in Washington. It went further to hold that should Taipei government propose another basis for diplomatic relations after it recognized Beijing, it would be prepared to consider the offer. (DEA file I,6,8814: Ott Tel to WSHDC Feb.3/69)

The exchange of views on Taiwan continued. William Rogers, the then Secretary of State, in the wake of the SSEA's imminent announcement of Canadian intention to contact the PRC, made a formal representation. He was reported to have advised that Ottawa not make the public announcement and that "in talking to Peking, Canada should not give up too soon, and should be seen not to be giving up

too soon, possibility of dual relationship". He also stressed that any explicit or implicit acknowledgement that Beijing has a rightful claim to Taiwan would pose very difficult problem for the USA, and suggested that Canada make statement to deny that recognition of Beijing implied acknowledgement of its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. Notwithstanding this expression of serious deep concern, the Washington embassy reported that Rogers concluded cheerfully that "we are still friendly as hell".(Ibid: WSHDC Tel to Ott Feb.6/69) This state of representation may indicate that the advance consultation might have forestalled a possible American negative reaction at this stage.

The American concern over Taiwan was obviously taken seriously in Ottawa. The Washington embassy reported further that the reason for Rogers' advice to Ottawa not to make a public statement was that Taipei had indicated its disquiet about Canadian public statements already made and told the Americans they would break relations if damaging statements were made following Canada-PRC contact in Stockholm. The embassy thus proposed to rephrase anticipated answers to the House carefully lest explicit answers should lead to premature rupture with the ROC government.(Ibid: WSHDC Tel to Ott Feb.7/69) The suggestion and the American advice was immediately taken seriously.(Ibid: Memo for Min Feb.7/69) After the SSEA made the public announcement, the embassy reported that the State Department Canadian Affairs official

commented that the SSEA statement had apparently caused no difficulty for the Department. (Ibid: WSHDC Tel to Ott Feb.11/69) As the negotiations began, the Canadian embassy in Washington reported its briefings to the State Department as instructed regarding the first encounter with the Chinese. (DEA file I,7,8814: WSHDC Tel to Ott Feb.26/69)

Notwithstanding the set-up of consultation as a major principle to deal with Canadian allies, the extent to which information on each session's discussion with the Chinese should be made available to foreign governments concerned, including the USA, remained subject to further clarification especially after the substantive talks began at the Fourth Meeting of May 20,1969. To control the extent of information flow, the SSEA proposed to prepare after each meeting in Stockholm a guidance telegram indicating what part of information can be passed over to which governments. (DEA file I,10,8814: Ott Tel to WSHDC May 22/69) Ambassador Ritchie then took the opportunity to press for fuller briefings to the Americans, and in so doing, also elaborated the policy of "engaged independence". In a telegram to the SSEA and USSEA only, he argued that:

The USA acquiescence in the course which we are following seems to me most probable if they are satisfied that we are being frank with them. In my view, the risk of USA interference or pressure will be greater if we attempt to keep them in the dark. The USA authorities might then suspect that something was happening which was worse than the reality. If we are reasonably forthcoming and give them a credible account they should feel under some

obligation to respect our confidence and to be not too unhelpful.. (Ibid: WSHDC Tel to Ott May 23/69)

To this suggestion, the USSEA and SSEA agreed to have greater disclosure to the Americans at least for short-term experimental purpose. While Ottawa was about to implement this policy, Washington at one moment became impatient about being withheld from detailed information on the first substantive meeting of May 20. For example, a senior State Department official was instructed to convey to the Canadian embassy that there were "some disappointment" that one week after the talk, the State Department has no substantial or detailed information on what took place. He reminded the Canadians that they had been briefed in detail after each USA-PRC meeting in Warsaw. (Ibid: WSHDC Tel to Ott May 27/69)

After this episode, briefings to the Americans following each session of Stockholm negotiations were gradually institutionalized to the extent that the Americans tended to receive fuller extent of information than other governments. And the Washington embassy routinely reported its briefings to the State Department after each instruction telegram.¹³ Noteworthy is that as the negotiations entered into the stage of discussions over the form of words in

¹³ See DEA files I, parts 11-19, Volumes 8815 and 8816 that covering instructions to brief the State Department after each meeting and the reports of briefings. To be specific, they included Ott Tels to WSHDC Jun.11; 18; Jul.17; Sep.24; 25; Oct.21;23;31; Nov.5/69 and WSHDC Tels to Ott Jun.20; Jul.18; Sep.25; Oct.23; Nov.7/69.

agreement, the Americans started revealing their uneasiness over the possibility that the give-and-take process might lead to departure from stated Canadian policy on Taiwan. For example, after Canadian briefings on the October 24 meeting, the Americans said they would be distressed to learn as a fait accompli that Canada had condensed the NCNE formula to read "does not challenge (Beijing's position)". (DEA file I,13,8815: WSHDC Tel to Ott Oct.31/69)

On the other hand, as will be explored further later, the Italians had at the same time requested Canadian provision of written draft text of agreed minute for their reference. Ottawa then faced a difficult situation. As the Americans' concern over the possibility of Canadian change of policy on Taiwan in the midst of give-and-take on the form of words became evident, the Canadian embassy expressed its hope that Ottawa would not need to provide actual texts to Rome. (Ibid: Blouin Let to Seaborn Nov.3/69) However, as it proceeded, Ottawa decided to provide a written text of agreed minute to the Italians.

An exchange of views between Ottawa and its embassy in Washington then ensued. Among them, a passage of reply letter to Blouin, the Minister of the Washington embassy, from Blair Seaborn, Director-General of the FED, testified to the delicate relationship between due consultation and freedom of action and the merit of "engaged independence":

It seems to me, from the American point of view is that if

they have in fact not been given prior access to exact texts, they are ultimately in a much better position to criticize the wording of such texts should they fall short of American desires. If they have seen the texts and have implied that the texts are not objectionable to them, the State Department would be hard pressed later on to defend itself publicly in the US against charges of having aided and abetted the Canadian move toward recognition...(Ibid: Seaborn Let to Blouin Nov.14/69)

Ottawa then decided to authorize its embassy to give text of agreed minute orally to the State Department but also to stress to the Americans that the briefing does not imply any Canadian obligation to give them full text of each and every piece of paper that is put forward for discussion with the Chinese. (DEA file I,14,8815: Ott Tel to WSHDC Nov.24/69) The senior State Department official who received the oral information of the text offered no comment and assured the Canadians that neither Ottawa nor Washington should have difficulty refuting accusations of collaboration since the briefings Canada gave were for information rather than consultation and absence of comment on their part did not imply approval of text.(Ibid: WSHDC Tel to Ott Dec.2/69)

After this encounter, the Canadians continued to brief the Americans after each session of discussions with the Chinese in Stockholm.¹⁴ Overall, this stage of briefings included Canadian passing over information on relevant paragraphs of various versions of Canadian as well as Chinese draft communique and the text of the SSEA's intended

¹⁴ See Ottawa's telegrams to WSHDC of Jan.27; Feb.19; Mar.18;26; Aug.4; Sep.21/70 in DEA file I,14-8, 8815-6.

public statement for announcing completion of negotiations. (DEA file I,15,8815: Ott Tel to WSHDC Feb.19/70; Ott Tel to STKHM Mar.16/70; I,16,8816: Ott Tel to WSHDC Mar.26/70; I,18,8816: Ott Tel to WSHDC Sep.21/70) The American reactions to this phase of Canadian-initiated consultations were typically "no comment" on major substantial parts of the meetings and the content wordings of the various texts involved.¹⁵ Nevertheless, as the negotiations were on the brink of success, Ottawa continued to ponder if its final two proposals on communique texts, that were offered to the Chinese at the 16th Meeting and varied on the part of Taiwan paragraphs, should be made available to the Americans. The new Canadian Ambassador Marcel Cadieux recommended for an explicit disclosure of the TNO phraseology to Washington: "Canada is apparently given credit both at the State Department and at the White House for liaison maintained during course of negotiations; greater candour now, it seems to me, would protect that credit at little foreseeable cost." (DEA file I,18,8816: WSHDC Tel to Ott Sep.23/70) The suggestion was taken by the SSEA then. (Ibid: Ott Tel to WSHDC Sep.29; WSHDC Tel to Ott Sep.30/70)

As soon as the Canadian cabinet approved the text of the Sino-Canadian Joint Communique, Ottawa notified

¹⁵ See WSHDC Tels to Ott, Feb.5; Mar.18;19;30; Aug.7; Sep.22/70 in DEA files I,14-18, 8815-16.

Washington the approval and transmitted the text of communique. (Ibid: Ott Tel to WSHDC Oct.7/70) Subsequently, a State Department official gave the Canadian embassy, on "personal and informal basis", text of anticipated questions and replies for State Department spokesman to be used in press briefing. (Ibid: WSHDC Tels to Ott Oct.8/70) In return, Ottawa authorized its embassy to give the State Department text of anticipated questions and answers prepared for the SSEA's use on the House of Commons. (Ibid: Ott Tel to WSHDC Oct.9/70) This information, together with newest development of final signature of the communique on October 10, were conveyed to a senior State Department official who reacted with warm appreciation. (Ibid: WSHDC Tel to Ott Oct.12/70) In the end, the Canadian embassy gathered a general impression that the State Department and the Nixon Administration seemed to be privately pleased with the Canadian action. (Ibid: WSHDC Tel to Ott Oct.15/70)

2. Networking with Other Powers:

Aside from routine, close and detailed exchanges of views with Washington, Ottawa also engaged in a networking process, which essentially involved an information sharing and exchanges on how negotiations with the PRC had been or should be conducted especially with respect to the Taiwan question. This networking was basically sustained through Canadian missions in those respective, directly targeted countries and their respective posts in Ottawa. Aside from

the USA, at least six countries could be identified as active participation in the Canadian networking process. Among them, Britain, Japan, Pakistan and particularly Italy should be elaborated as follows.

(1) Britain:

There are abundant evidences showing Ottawa's close linkages with London during the negotiations. For example, after the first meeting with the Chinese who put forward the three "constant principles", Ottawa sought London's views on the principles. (DEA file I,6,8814: Ott Tel to Ldn Feb.25/69) The British then advised that the "constant principles" be regarded as "seemingly pro forma statement for the record, not necessarily represent unalterable preconditions to further discussions". London also reminded Ottawa that the Chinese do not always insist on full compliance of their views and that they may selectively choose occasion to remind the principles but not mention them all the time. (Ibid: Ldn Tel to Ott Feb.28/69) Meanwhile, the British obtained for the Canadians a copy of a paper on Chinese negotiating tactics prepared by the incumbent British Charge in Beijing in May 1968. (Ibid: Ldn Tel to Ott Feb.28/69)

Moreover, the British Foreign Office (BFO) voluntarily passed to the DEA the three conditions the Chinese presented to the Italians. (DEA file I,9,8814: Ldn Tel to Ott May 8/69) As substantive talks started with Chinese preoccupation in the Taiwan issue, the British High

Commissioner in Ottawa, upon request, provided a passage recording Edgar Snow's interview with Mao Zedong in July 1936 on the subject of Taiwan's status.¹⁶ (DEA file I,11,8815: Crowe Let to Collins Jun.5/69) Furthermore, after the Canadian negotiators had experienced a tough exchanges on Taiwan with the Chinese on July 10, the British High Commissioner coached the FED that the Communist favourite negotiating tactic was to challenge the "sincerity" of the other side and added that whether or not the Chinese would shift from a tough line would all depend on whether or not the Canadians were prepared to hold out. (DEA file I,12,8815: FED Memo to USSEA Jul.31/69)

(2) Italy:

Rome was one of the few closest partners of Ottawa in information exchange, partly because Rome was almost simultaneously engaged in a similar series of negotiations with Beijing's representatives in Paris. However, this was not so intended at least in the beginning. Indeed, when the Canadian Ambassador to Italy proposed to brief Rome in detail Canadian first meeting with the Chinese, Ottawa was hesitant about the suggestion in light of the Italian lack of credibility in handling the 1966 Canadian UN initiative and of the possibility that Rome might take advantage of its knowledge to enhance its chance of success. (DEA file

¹⁶ The passage was excerpted from Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China. It was also cited in Hughes (1997: 12).

I,7,8814: Rome Tel to Ott Mar.3;5/69)

Later, the Italians in Paris embassy first gave to the Canadians a detailed account of their meeting with the Chinese there, which revealed the reason why Beijing pressed Rome to take a position on Taiwan. The Canadians were told that while trying to put aside Beijing's request for explicit recognition of its sovereignty over Taiwan, they were reminded by the Chinese that there was a world-wide American plot to obtain a "two Chinas" solution and since they were American ally and had in the past sponsored a study committee resolution in the UN, it was now up to them to declare their position. (DEA file I,9,8814: Paris Tel to Ott Apr.28/69)

Subsequently, in one meeting with the Italian Foreign Minister Nenni, the Canadian Ambassador, with Ottawa's authorization, read to him the precise wording of the Chinese three "constant principles" and stressed that both governments should not accept the PRC principles that went against international law. (Ibid: Rome Tel to Ott May 10/69) Despite the acknowledgement of a necessity to exchange relevant information, Ottawa was yet to define the extent of information sharing. The DEA then set the rule that unless the Italians further offered a resume on paper, the Canadian side should not give them its written account on meeting-by-meeting basis. (Ibid: Ott Tel to Rome May 12/69)

Further consultations continued and institutionalized,

albeit with a sort of competitive complex.¹⁷ The regular exchange of views and information, however, was interrupted later in summer in the wake of a unstable Italian coalition government. After the dust appeared to settle and Aldo Moro took over Foreign Ministry, Ottawa instructed its ambassador to get in touch with the new Italian government and to express the Canadian wish to renew the exchange of experiences regarding respective discussions with the Chinese. (DEA file I,12,8815: Ott Tels to Rome Aug.12;15/69)

Later, in his talks with Mitchell Sharp in Ottawa in mid-October, Foreign Minister Moro, while confirming that Rome would not introduce the "Study Committee" resolution in UN in 1969, mentioned that Rome would vote for both the Albanian and IQ resolutions after it recognized Beijing, but stressed that Italy decided not to complete negotiations with the Chinese before the 1969 UNGA vote to give the US time to adjust its policy. Moro also explicitly stated that the Italian policy would take account of both USA and USSR's concerns so that they would not be upset by a hasty recognition by Rome. (DEA file I,13,8815: Ott Tel to Rome Oct.15/69)

When the Canadian Ambassador briefed Italian Foreign Ministry on the 9th and 10th Sino-Canadian meeting, the

¹⁷ The DEA acknowledged that "we were not 'merely anxious to beat (the) Italians to tape'..are genuinely interested in having them stick to matter of principle." (DEA file I,11,8815: Ott Tel to Rome Jun.6/69)

Italians formally requested a copy of Canadian text of agreed minute put forward to the Chinese. (Ibid: Rome Tel to Ott Nov.7/69) This request was renewed to the SSEA but the Italian officials additionally offered a copy of Italian statement to be made in the UN to explain their vote on Chinese representation question. (Ibid: Nov.10/69) Shortly later, Ottawa decided to authorize its Rome embassy to hand over the text of agreed minute to the Italians partly in view of the "surprising discreetness" of the Italians in handling Canadian information. (Ibid: Ott Tels to Rome Nov.12; Seaborn Let to Blouin Nov.14/69)

The Italian officials appeared to be taken aback by the Canadian openness and appreciated the confidence Ottawa placed in Rome and undertook to respect the condition of confidentiality. In return, the Italian official showed to the Canadian Ambassador his policy recommendation in a memorandum to Foreign Minister Moro. (DEA file I,14,8815: Rome Tel to Ott Nov.17/69)

The Italian negotiations with the Chinese in Paris, nevertheless, was at a stand-still for the next four months, owing to the shaky Italian coalition government. (DEA file I,15-16,8815-16: Rome Tels to Ott Feb.2; Mar.9; Apr.17/70) Nevertheless, consultations with some exchange of written information between Ottawa and Rome persisted. (Ibid: Rome Tels to Ott Mar.20; Apr.7;8; Ott Tel to Rome Apr.3/70)

When the Italians were to resume their talks with the

Chinese, they further provided the Canadian Embassy with an intended unilateral statement to be accompanied with joint communique with the Chinese in time of mutual recognition, and inquired if Ottawa would be willing to coordinate with Rome the timing of announcement of agreement with the Chinese. (DEA file I,16,8816: Rome Tel to Ott Apr.17/70) The Italian proposal, however, was declined later. But Ottawa undertook to inform the Italians at the earliest possible moment in the event of a Sino-Canadian agreement. (Ibid: Memo for Min Apr.23; Ott Tel to Rome Apr.27/70)

Notwithstanding this episode, the Canadian-Italian consultation continued up until the very end of Canadian negotiations. (DEA files I,16-8,8816 Rome Tels to Ott May 27; Aug.6;27;Sep.15;18) As soon as the Canadian cabinet took a decision, in the end, Ottawa instructed its embassy in Rome to inform such decision and to pass over the whole text of communique. (DEA file I,19,8816: Ott Tel to Rome Oct.7/70)

(3) Japan:

The Japanese participation in Ottawa's networking process during the negotiations was no less evident. First of all, in the aftermath of the tough July 10 meeting, Japanese diplomats in Stockholm advised their Canadian colleagues to check Ottawa's own position with respect to the request made by Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia for international guarantees of territorial integrity one year ago. (DEA file I,12,8815: STKHM Tel to Ott Jul.24/69)

Moreover, the Japanese embassy in Stockholm passed on to the Canadians a copy of the Japan-ROC Peace Treaty of 1952 for reference. (Ibid: Aug.12/69)¹⁸ The Japanese Ambassador further offered pieces of information regarding diplomatic recognition and endorsement of territorial claims.(Ibid: Aug.13/69)

Furthermore, as the British did, the Japanese diplomats in Ottawa gave their views on why Beijing took a tough line on Taiwan. The Japanese thought the Chinese gesture was to ascertain Canadian seriousness in reaching agreement with Beijing, and coached that if the Canadians hold firm the chance for success would be higher given that Beijing tended to demand a great deal more than they expect to get.(Ibid: FED Memo to USSEA Jul.31/69)

(4) Pakistan:

The extent to which Pakistan was involved in Ottawa's networking process was worthy of noting, since it was one of the few friends the PRC had at that time and also a member of the Commonwealth. Presumably this also put Pakistan in an advantageous position to front for the PRC.

Mostly, Pakistan acted on its own initiative to show its concerns with the progress or even expressed its

¹⁸ The Japanese obviously thought a key passage of the Treaty (to be specified later) would help defend Canadian "non-position" on Taiwan. (Ibid: Aug.12/69) The passage was that "(the Treaty will be) applicable to all the territories which are now, or which may hereafter be, under the control of (Taipei) government".

interests in serving as an intermediary between the Canadians and Chinese. The Canadian embassy in Stockholm reported numerous approaches, inquiries as well as opportunities provided by their colleagues from Pakistan. Among them, one episode deserves elaboration since it led to a wide consultation process and disclosed international positions on Taiwan's status in the late 1950s.

The Pakistani Ambassador to Sweden on one occasion revealed an account of the PRC's demand in the late 1950s to obtain definite assurances from all governments then represented in Beijing that Taiwan is an integral part of China. The Canadian embassy took this disclosure seriously and verified first with their Swedish colleagues there. It also reported back to Ottawa suggesting to inquire further about the responses countries, such as Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Norway, had made to Beijing's alleged requests. (DEA file I,12,8815: STKHM Tels to Ott Sep.26/69) This proposal was adopted and instruction telegrams were sent to Canadian posts in countries concerned. (Ibid: Ott Tels to Oslo, CPHGN, HSNKI, Hague, Ldn, Berne Sep.29/69) Those missions later reported with a common conclusion that there was basically no record showing the alleged requests were presented in the manner described by the Pakistani Ambassador. (DEA file I,13,8815: Ldn/Hague Tels to Ott Oct.2; Bern/CPHGN Tels to Ott Oct.3; HSNKI Tel to Ott Oct.7/70) Nevertheless, the Norwegian response was reported

in detail to the effect that their mission as well as others were given in 1957 copies of Zhou Enlai's statement about Taiwan being a part of China, then requested to transmit the statement to respective governments but were not asked to reply or give any assurances. Norway, obviously like other western countries, did not make any reply.¹⁹ (Ibid: Oslo Tel to Ott Oct.6/69)

In sum, there was a continuing networking process while Canada was negotiating with the PRC representatives in Stockholm. It should be noted however that the actual list of consulted countries went beyond those highlighted above. These included France, Sweden, Belgium, India, West Germany and the NATO as a whole which were involved in varying degree at several temporal contexts, and of course the US. This networking practice, nevertheless, begs a question: To what the extent did the overall Canadian international consultations had been effective in bringing about its smooth transition to "one China". This should be addressed by reference to Australia and the Soviet Union.

3. Effects of Engaged Diplomacy: Canberra and Moscow

Actually, Canadian multilateral engagement during the negotiations was evident not only in its networking with the

¹⁹ The only exception then was Pakistan itself. Under the pressure from the US, it initially replied to Beijing that it was not prepared to take a position on Taiwan, which outraged the PRC, but eventually reverted its position to assure Beijing that it regarded Taiwan as a part of China. (DEA file I,12,8815: STKHM Tel to Ott Sep.26/69)

countries mentioned above, but also in its consultation with Australia, New Zealand and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the case of Australia and the Soviet Union is insightful in their testaments to the effect of Ottawa consultations on its ultimate recognition of Beijing.

(1) Australia:

Prior to the Canadian briefing to the Australians regarding its intention to contact Beijing's representative in Stockholm, the Canadian High Commissioner in Canberra had obtained a copy of Australian representation text handed to the Italian Ambassador there. This representation was obviously invited Italian displeasure. The Italian Ambassador made no secret of his unhappiness to his Canadian colleagues with Canberra's blatant reference to an "unjustified" Italian decision. The Italian interlocutor also warned the Canadians that the Australians indicated that Ottawa would receive a similar serious representation on the subject. (DEA file I,6,8814: CNBRA Tel to Ott Feb.4/69) However, in the DEA file on China Policy Review, there is no evidence showing that Canberra had made any representation in such a high-profile manner as it had to the Italians.

Three days later, Ambassador Menzies, after notifying the Australian Department of External Affairs on the Canadian decision to initiate contacts with the Communists, reported that he observed even Australian right-wingers

seemed to receive the statement of Canadian intentions as "better than they feared", and concluded that "we do well to keep our Australian friends fully informed and to show ourselves interested in their comments." (Ibid: Feb.7/69) Meanwhile, he gathered an interesting Australian observation albeit revealing Canberra's dislike to the effect that:

The real difference between Canadian and Australian positions lay in fact that Australia attached priority to the separation of Taiwan from mainland...Canada on the other hand attached priority to recognizing and establishing diplomatic relations with government of mainland China and only as a secondary objective were prepared to promote but not push hard for a separate identity for Taiwan. (Ibid)²⁰

Canadian briefings to Canberra continued throughout the Stockholm negotiations. Nevertheless, no evidence available points to that Canberra had ever made any trace of strong objection publicly to the Canadians despite its dislike. In the end, to the contrary, the Canadian High Commissioner heralded a triumph of Canadian consultation at his briefings to the Australians on the conclusion of the Stockholm negotiations. He reported that the delivery of the SSEA's text of announcement came as no surprise to them and there were no known Australian apprehensions and criticisms. To this he concluded that "clearly frank confidential briefings

²⁰ To this, Mitchell Sharp in an interview on Nov.5, 1998, however held that the recognition of a separate government in Taiwan did not happen at that time because Taipei still claimed to represent all of China and that it would be arbitrary for Canada to determine Taiwan's status.

of (the Australian) DEA here and Australian High Commissioner Ottawa since Stockholm negotiations began have been successful." (DEA file I,19,8816: CNBRA Tel to Ott Oct.14/70)

(2) The Soviet Union:

It should be noted first that the Trudeau initiative coincided with deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations. Moscow began a large-scale buildup of troops across Beijing's borders at the time. In 1969 when the negotiations were underway, border clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops took place in the west and the northeast. Against this backdrop, Moscow was highly attentive to the Sino-Canadian contacts.

Indeed, before the Canadian cabinet decision to proceed to contact the Chinese, the Soviets had expressed high interest in Canadian move and implicitly indicated their desire to have a Canadian arrangement with Beijing that would provide some accommodation for Taiwan. (DEA file I,5,8814: Ldn Tel to Ott Jan.16/69) The Canadian Ambassador in Moscow then proposed to contact the Soviet Foreign Ministry by providing some necessary information on Canadian China policy in order to gauge real Soviet interests, and accordingly recommended to add Moscow as one of information addressees on Stockholm negotiation reports. (Ibid: Moscow Tel to Ott Jan.27/69) Ottawa agreed to this suggestion and further authorized Ambassador Ford to give brief outline of

Canadian intentions including general approach to the Taiwan issue. (Ibid: Ott Tel to Moscow Jan.29/69)

Subsequently, the Soviets received formal notification regarding Canadian decision to contact and inquired about Ottawa's approach to Taiwan. (DEA file I,6,8814: Moscow Tel to Ott Feb.8/69) Since then, the Canadian embassy in Moscow had reported its briefings to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on a regular basis.²¹ More importantly, there were at least two instances that could indicate that Canadian consultation helped contribute to lessening the Soviets' reaction and concerns, at least compared to those received by the Italians, although their suspicion over Canadian motive appeared to persist.

For example, in a telegram reporting his briefings to and the comments made by the Soviets, Ambassador Ford concluded that "our gesture in keeping Russians informed of the progress of our negotiations is very wise and is already paying dividends (in terms of) giving me extra information." (DEA file I,11,8815: Moscow Tel to Ott Jun.21/69) The other instance was directly drawn from an Italian testimony. At the end of a consultation meeting with Canadian diplomats in Rome, an Italian official mentioned to his guest that the Soviet embassy had made a demarche regarding the Italian

²¹ These included Moscow's telegrams to Ottawa dated May 29; Jun.21; Sep.18; Oct.29; Nov.26/69; Feb.16; Apr.8; Aug.12 and Oct.7/70 in the DEA files I,10-18,8814-16.

move toward recognition of the PRC negatively and remarked in a similar vein about the Canadian negotiations. (Ibid: Rome Tel to Ott Jun.20/69) Throughout the DEA's China Policy Review file, however, there was no record that the Soviets had ever made a demarche publicly and directly against the Canadians on the subject.

From the cases of Australia and the USSR, it could be reasonably concluded that Canadian consultations mattered, albeit not exclusively, in the negotiation process and the completion of the "one China" transition. This should be evident in the juxtaposition of the divergent approaches Ottawa and Rome had adopted in their negotiations with Beijing's representatives: while Canada did not make hasty move in recognizing Beijing but went on steadily by semi-openly giving briefings to the public and other countries, Italy tended to take a secretive approach.²² The available evidence has confirmed that both the Australians and the Soviets had shown their concerns or displeasure to the Italians in a formal and outright manner, whereas they at least restrained themselves in making a public demarche against the Canadians despite their dislike.²³ The effect of

²² This contrast was drawn from a Japanese analysis that was presumably written by a senior Gaimusho official in a journal, Kokusai Jiho, issued by Kajima Institute of International Peace. The article was so authoritative that the Canadian embassy translated it into English and drew it to Ottawa's attention. (DEA file I,11,8815: Tokyo Let to USSEA Jul.11/69)

²³ In the eyes of the Americans, the contrast was

Canadian international consultations on its smooth transition to "one China" thus is evident.

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V. Summary:

This Chapter had explored the part Canada had played in the first round of social construction of "one China", namely the Stockholm negotiations, from February 1969 to October 1970. It began with a section on the pre-negotiation state of Canadian policy deliberations on the Taiwan issue and international consultation. From the beginning, in brief, Pierre Trudeau's policy statement and subsequent elaboration by Mitchell Sharp on May 29, 1968 set an overall objective for ensuing Canadian China policy. A major part of the DEA's China Policy Review was then completed in summer 1968, the process of which involved consultation with the Canadian overseas posts and foreign governments. The American factor, possible international repercussions and the timing in relation to an incoming American Presidential election were taken into serious account. In preparation for negotiations prior to a final decision being taken by the cabinet, other relevant issues including the French case of recognition and Canadian future relations with Taiwan were

equally evident. At least in one occasion, State Department officials had complained to the Canadian diplomats in Washington about the lack of close and detailed consultation by the Italians regarding their policy and progress of negotiations with the Chinese. (DEA file I,18,8816: WSHDC Tel to Ott Sep.15/70)

also studied carefully.

Insofar as the Taiwan issue was concerned, it was then commonly accepted in the DEA that a practical Canadian goal was to establish formal official relations with Beijing while maintaining non-full diplomatic relations with Taipei. One of the DEA's policy recommendations then was to leave open an option of reciprocal exchange of non-official trade offices with Taiwan. More importantly, the DEA suggested that Canadian negotiators reject any Chinese demand for supporting their claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. These proposals were ultimately approved by the cabinet in late January 1969. Up to this stage, although the cabinet decision did not go as far as to propose simultaneous recognitions of both "one China" and "one Taiwan" as it might be implied in Sharp and Trudeau's May 1968 statement, the realization of the "one Taiwan" component in foreseeable future remained considerably open.

Equally important, it was proposed that the Canadian decision be made known to friendly countries, including the US, the ROC and NATO allies. This was approved by the cabinet as well.

The second part of the Chapter explored the Stockholm negotiations process. There were 18 formal sessions of discussion that could be broken into three main phases: (1) preliminary talks; (2) substantive talks on principles and (3) substantive discussions on form/content of agreement.

Overall, the Taiwan issue dominated the discussion. First of all, the Chinese put forward three "constant principles" on exclusive recognition, Taiwan and the UN membership. After some preliminary talks on administrative matters, the second stage encounters entailed series of debates that revolved around the Taiwan issue, and as the negotiations entered into the next stage, the issue continued to dominate discussions on appropriate form of words to phrase Canadian position on the subject.

More importantly, it was during the substantial talks of the second phase, especially the 6th meeting of July 10 1969 that Canadian previous policy statements made by prominent Canadian policymakers, during or before the negotiations, and spared from immediate criticisms, were eventually cited as proofs of Canadian insincerity. It was against this backdrop that the official Canadian "one China" policy, as it is, in its embodiment in the SSEA's statement of July 21, 1969, was decisively taken.

In other words, the existing Canadian China/Taiwan policy in the last instance was formed in the midst of the interaction process primarily taking place in Stockholm, rather than pre-determined in the China Policy Review process. The possibility of according "one Taiwan" with some form of acknowledgement was then virtually receded into a remote future. It might then be reasonable to argue that the 6th meeting and ensuing SSEA statement signalled the formal

beginning of Canadian "one China" policy with the "one Taiwan" element bracketed.

As the discussions proceeded to negotiate the wording of an agreement text, while the Canadian side indicated a preference for a short communique along the line of the Sino-French model of 1964, the Chinese side insisted that their "constant principles" boiled down to their position of Taiwan being part of their territory be adopted in the text. The next issue at dispute then revolved around how and where to phrase appropriately the Canadian "non-position" on Taiwan's status, and whether a supplementary document putting forward both sides' positions should be agreed. For almost one year of deliberations and negotiations on the subject, the final joint communique was concluded with a unilateral Canadian statement.

The noted "Canadian formula" was thus formally established with a mutual understanding reached on the importance of Taiwan to Beijing's interest. Although Ottawa only took note of Beijing's position that Taiwan is an integral part of China, by not challenging that claim and acknowledging that the Taiwan issue should be solved in a peaceful way by parties concerned including the PRC, the Canadian government evidently made concessions in foregoing its "natural" right, regardless of Beijing's reaction, to initiate the issue on international setting and to publicize its previous concern over Taiwanese self-determination.

The Chapter accordingly examined the interactions between the DEA and the ROC embassy in Ottawa during the Stockholm negotiations. These involved not only DEA's routine briefings to the embassy on the progress of negotiations but also the ROC Ambassador's pursuit of some form of unofficial representation in the event of de-recognition by the Canadian government. Although this option was left open by the Canadian cabinet, in actual practice the ROC's proposal was declined in the end. The attitudes of the Stockholm embassy orienting towards an earlier and successful conclusion of talks were evidently instrumental and its power to influence policy-making was crucial, if not decisive, on the related issues.

The Canadian practice of "engaged independence" during the Stockholm negotiations was then explored. Ottawa's diplomacy was overall illustrated through its close consultations with the US and networking with at least Britain, Italy, Japan, and Pakistan. The practice was particularly elaborated in relation to the US. Additionally, Ottawa-Rome consultation was highlighted to explore the particular aspect of complex engagement that was imbued with competition. Finally, the effects of Canadian international consultations on the negotiation process were demonstrated in reference to the contrasting reactions of the Australian and the Soviets with respect to the Canadian and Italian approaches.

CHAPTER FIVE: STRUCTURATION II: ISOMORPHISM OF "ONE CHINA"

As argued in the last chapter, the social construction of "one China" in terms of reaching sort of mutual understanding of the status of Taiwan and codifying it ultimately in a joint communique actually started in the Sino-Canadian Stockholm negotiations. No doubt the negotiations and the final agreement alone would not have been sufficient to sustain the structuration process if it had not incited chain reactions from other countries in the world. Indeed, since then, the practice of defining publicly both issues of the China representation and Taiwan's external relations in an intersubjective way has been diffusing in large scale on world stage. In the meantime, the twin issues that often boil down to the status of Taiwan have been continuously elaborated and reproduced by various agencies in several policy areas, which will be explored in next chapter. In this chapter, I will concentrate on the perspective of "institutional isomorphism" of "one China". This aspect of structuration overall takes at least three major forms: one is for countries concerned to directly incorporate the exact Canadian terminology of "taking note of" (TNO) into the content of their joint communiques with the PRC. The second category include countries that reproduced the structure in a similar spirit of the "Canadian formula", albeit in slightly different terms. The

third form, essentially coming into existence in the 1990s, adds new element to further define Taiwan's external relations.¹ The first section will deal with countries that directly adopted the Canadian TNO formula. Subsequently, countries taking similarly relatively equivocal phraseology will be explored in section two ("acknowledge" as the focus) and the first part of section three (other forms of words), respectively. And the new practice of recognizing or adding new elements in the 1990s will be examined in the latter part of the third section. The chapter as usual will end with a summary.

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I. Isomorphism of the Canadian Formula:

As explored in last chapter, on October 13, 1970, Canada established diplomatic relations with the PRC through a publication of the Joint Communiqué in which the TNO phraseology was formally adopted to refer to the Canadian "non-position" on Taiwan. This was often referred as the "Canadian formula". It is unprecedented in that Canada was the first western country that was formally requested by the PRC to both take a stand on the status of Taiwan and to enshrine it in the Joint Communiqué. As mentioned above, when France normalized its relations with PRC, their Joint Communiqué did not refer to the issue, even though de Gaulle

¹ The first two categories with more sub-types had been discussed, albeit briefly, in (Shen 1986: 8-14).

made no secret of his intention to maintain official relations with the "two Chinas". More importantly, the official and ex post facto statement on it came in the form of unilateral action of Beijing's Foreign Ministry.²

After the Canadian practice, countries intending to normalize their relations with the PRC were often demanded to codify their stand on Taiwan in agreements. One solution was for the countries concerned to adopt the exact Canadian TNO formula.

So far, there have been 15 countries, in addition to Canada, in the world that directly borrowed the TNO formula with regard to Taiwan's status in their joint communiques with the PRC on the establishment of diplomatic relations. In chronological sequence, these countries are: Italy (Nov.6,1970), Chile (Dec.15,1970), Belgium (Oct.25,1971), Peru (Nov.2,1971), Lebanon (Nov.9, 1971), Iceland (Dec.8,1971), Malta (Jan.31,1972), Argentina (Feb.16,1972), Greece (Jun.5,1972), Venezuela (Jun.28,1974), Brazil (Aug.15,1974), Ecuador (Dec.24,1979), Colombia (Feb.7,1980), Cote d'Ivoire (Mar.1, 1983), and Uruguay (Feb.3,1988). Overall, the extent and strength of direct Canadian

² So far, there has been no available official record to explain the reason why Canada but not France was asked to enshrine its position on Taiwan in Joint Communiqué. However, it might be fair to conclude tentatively that the French might be rewarded for its "intransigence" against the "US imperialism" at the time when the PRC badly needed a credit to break its diplomatic isolation in the context of acute Sino-Soviet split.

influence could be indicated in both spatial and temporal dimensions. In terms of spatial dimension of the isomorphism, besides South America, it also spread to Africa, Europe and Middle East regions. Moreover, the span of diffusion lasted for nearly 18 years. Nevertheless, the effect of the Canadian formula on some cases could be elaborated on.

1. Italy:

As examined in last chapter, Rome had been exchanging information with Ottawa throughout the negotiations. The Italians, from the beginning, had told the SSEA that they were to follow the Canadian lead on the recognition matter and were pleased to do so.³ Ottawa's influence on Rome's thinking was so evident that the expression of Italian recognition of Beijing and position on Taiwan enshrined in text at final stage bore striking resemblance to the Canadian language. For example, in the Italian unilateral statement intended for a publication at the conclusion of negotiations, Rome declared its recognition that the PRC government is the only legitimate government of all China and, with respect to the Taiwan issue, recalled that it would not be appropriate to take a position on the territorial question of the recognized state.(DEA file I,16,8815: Rome Tel to Ott Apr.17/70) Moreover, the

³ Mr. Sharp's remark to this author on Nov.5, 1998.

phraseology of the final text of joint communique testified to the extent of Canadian legacy. Aside from a direct adoption of the Canadian TNO expression to refer to its position on Taiwan's status, Rome had even taken Ottawa's line to recognize the PRC government as the sole legal government of China. (PR 13,46:6)⁴ Indeed, when receiving the final text of the Sino-Canadian Joint Communique, the Italians inquired why the Canadian DEA had preferred the word "legal" to "legitimate" before "government of China" since they had been negotiating with the Chinese text using "legitimate". (DEA file I,19,8816: Rome Tel to Ott Oct.8/70)

2. Belgium:

Brussels had from the outset made it clear that it would let the Canadians and Italians take the lead on negotiating with Beijing representatives. When learning that the Canadians were to move to contact the Chinese, the Belgians remarked that their recognition policy would not need to be reviewed until Canada and Italy established relations with the PRC under "satisfactory" conditions. (DEA file I,6,8814: Bru Tel to Ott Feb.8/69) One of the "satisfactory" conditions obviously referred to the "non-position" on Taiwan's status, since the Belgian Foreign

⁴ In this thesis, the texts of joint communiques are drawn essentially from Peking Review (PR), which was renamed as Beijing Review (BR) after January 1979 when the romanization of Chinese names were launched. The reference to this source in this thesis will be followed by volume and number of the issue, and page number in the end.

Minister considered it "morally unacceptable for small country like Belgium to abandon another small power like Taiwan which is also under the threat of a great power". (DEA file I,11,8815: Bru Tel to Ott Jun.18/69) The Belgians nevertheless settled on the TNO formula on the very day Beijing was admitted into the UN. (PR 14,44:4)

3. Other Canadian Formula Followers:

Two months after the Italian recognition, Chile representatives also signed an agreement with their Chinese counterparts in Paris in which the Canadian and Italian influence could be evidently detected. As in the Belgian version, the four-paragraph communiques commonly started with reference to Beijing's favourite principles, followed by its reaffirmation on Taiwan and subsequently the respective governments' TNO statements, then a separate paragraph on their recognition of the PRC as the sole legal government of China, and ended with a statement on mutual assistance on establishing diplomatic missions. (PR 14,2:3) A similar line was taken later by Lebanon and Iceland not long after the Belgian announcement. (PR 14,47:3; 51:4)

On the other hand, there was a slight variation of practices by other follower countries. Nonetheless, the phraseology they used in reference to Taiwan's status was virtually the same as the genetic Canadian invention. Interestingly, the variation per se turned out to be one of the Canadian proposals put forward to Beijing negotiators in

Stockholm but was rejected by the latter. In this variation, the respective governments' expression of recognition of Beijing, being in the form of an independent paragraph or not, actually precedes the portion of the Chinese reaffirmation and the TNO statements. Countries following this pattern included at least Peru, Malta, Argentina, Greece, Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and Colombia.⁵ (PR 14,45:5; 15,7-8:26-7; 15,9:3; 15,23:3-4; 17,27:5; 17,34:4; BR 23,1:4-5; 23,7:8) Similarly, Ivory Coast' Joint Communique with the PRC followed similar sequence of paragraphs and phraseology on Taiwan but with additional variation which nevertheless was witnessed as well in the Canadian experience: It "recognizes that the government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the entire Chinese people." (BR 26,11:12)

In sum, all of these countries' practices in the final analysis could be traced to the Canadian experience, although arguably some of the communique texts may bear more resemblance to the Italian format than to the Canadian one and there might be regional isomorphism among eight South American countries. After all, it was Canada that had come up with the TNO phraseology to refer to its "non-position"

⁵ Moreover, in another variation, some South American countries managed to get Beijing, in return, to recognize their sovereignty over the maritime zone adjacent to their coasts within the limit of 200 nautical miles before this rule was formally enshrined in contemporary Law of the Sea.

on Taiwan's status and was confronted with relevant varied forms of words in its negotiations with the PRC in the first instance. Moreover, the Canadian experience in terms of being required to take a stand on the Taiwan issue in order for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing and of its eventual codification of its such position in joint communique had varying degree of impact on subsequent practices of other major countries on the subject.

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II. Social Construction of "Acknowledgement":

Aside from the direct diffusion of the Canadian formula, the Sino-Canadian construction of "one China" was followed, across time and space, by many other countries in the world. This wave of institutional isomorphism was often undergoing not so much through direct export of the Canadian TNO formula as by the reproduction of the formulation by these countries when they faced similar Chinese demands on the Taiwan issue. Some of them chose to adopt various phrases with relatively flexible connotations to tackle the issue. Among these countries, 10 opted for "acknowledging" Beijing's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. This section will examine the 10 countries' experiences. Given the influential position of Washington in world politics and the overall social construction of "one China", this section will first explore the case of the USA, leaving remaining cases to be outlined later.

1. Sino-American Normalization:

As mentioned in Chapter 3, as of the mid-1960s, the major foreign policy-making establishment in Washington was shifting toward favouring the inclusion of Beijing into international community through diplomatic recognition and admission into the UN. This view was gaining acceptance in the State Department and held by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. Long before Nixon was sworn in office in early 1969, the State Department had publicly conceded American recognition, redefining the ROC as the government only of territory which it actually governed and recognized the existence of Beijing regime. (DEA file C,5,8925: WSHDC Tel to Ott Feb.20/68) Nixon's thinking about China also underwent a fundamental but quiet shift well before his Presidency and could be traced to as early as the mid-1960s.⁶ Nevertheless, the Taiwan question, as Kissinger put it, was a catch-22 issue for Sino-American normalization, as shown in previous 134 rounds of fruitless ambassadorial talks in Warsaw. (Kissinger 1979:684)

As soon as Nixon had assumed the Presidency, his newly-appointed National Security Advisor, Kissinger, ordered the agency to do papers on China policy. (Kissinger 1979:178) Nixon lifted restrictions on trade and travel to mainland

⁶ In his travels in Asia at the time he observed that a good relationship with the PRC was more important than good relations with the Soviet Union. (Mann 1998:16-7)

China in July. Then, he approved a termination of regular patrols by the 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Strait in October. Additionally, in Warsaw meeting of early 1970, the Americans also offered the Chinese an olive branch by making plain that Washington intended to reduce US military deployments on Taiwan "as peace and stability in Asia grow" and proposing that it send a emissary to Beijing for "more thorough" talks. The American proposal was embraced by the Chinese later. (Mann 1998:23-4; Tucker 1994:102-3) Nevertheless, Washington did not inform Taipei of the decisive meeting of February 1970 that affected Taiwan's interest, despite its reiterated assurance of treaty commitments.⁷ (Garver 1999:269-70)

Soon after the Sino-Canadian normalization was completed, the role of Pakistan as intermediary between Washington and Beijing was set and Kissinger ordered a series of studies from the State, Defense Departments and the CIA on China policy. (Mann 1998: 26-7) Series of exchanges of views on arrangements for Nixon's special envoy and Nixon himself trips to mainland were made in spring 1970. Meanwhile, "Ping-pong diplomacy" by which Beijing invited American table tennis teams to visit the mainland

⁷ Less than two month after the Warsaw meeting, the ROC vice-premier, Chiang Ching-kuo, visited Washington where Nixon gave his personal assurance that "I can assure you that the United States will always honor its treaty obligations and..I will never sell you down the river." (Shen 1983:51)

was engaged in April 1971. (Burr 1999:28) Nevertheless, while this rapprochement was on progress, the issue of China representation in the UN came to a crucial stage.

According to Kissinger, as early as June 1970 in view of increasing international support for the Albanian resolution, Secretary of State William Rogers had already thought of the idea of "dual representation" by which the Americans would propose to have both Taipei and Beijing coexist in the UN General Assembly. But at that time, Rogers did not recommend an immediate change of American voting strategies in 1970. Later, Nixon gave the State Department a green light to go ahead with the approach in spring 1971. Thus the State Department made a statement on April 28, 1971 to the effect that Washington regarded the Taiwan's status as "undecided", which was intended to lay down the legal basis for the "dual representation" approach. However, for Nixon, a whole-hearted implementation of this policy was only intended to be contingent upon the result of Kissinger's endeavour to improve American ties with the Communist Chinese. Interestingly, the secondary importance attached by Nixon to the Chinese representation in the UN, as compared to Sino-American rapprochement, converged with Zhou Enlai's own deliberation as discovered by Kissinger.⁸

⁸ Kissinger gathered from Zhou that Nixon would still be welcome to fly to Beijing, regardless of American vote in the 26th UNGA.

(Kissinger 1979: 773-4) Based upon this consideration Nixon first inhibited Rogers from making a "dual representation" speech in January, April and June, holding off until Kissinger's trip to China and Nixon's subsequent announcement in July. Accordingly, Rogers was authorized to give the long-due speech on August 2, 1971. (Kissinger 1979: 720; 773-4) The effects of Kissinger's secret trips to mainland China in July and October, Nixon's announcement and the American decision to shift voting tactic in the 26th UN session were devastating for Taipei, ending with its withdrawal from the UN on October 25, 1971, the very day when Kissinger's second trip concluded.⁹ The failure of the "dual representation" terminated the last abortive American effort to construct "two Chinas". It is noteworthy that the objective of the State Department's statement on "undecided status of Taiwan" and the "dual representation" proposal in the vein of "two Chinas" solution was not meant to envisage a self-determination of Taiwanese people under democratic procedure in the future so much as intended to preserve a seat for Taipei government in the UN.

⁹ Kissinger, considering the "dual representation" approach as "awkward and self-defeating" in the beginning, denied his October trip had decisively impact on the UNGA voting. However, he later admitted that Nixon's ordering him to stop over in Alaska en route back to Washington "virtually acknowledged his trip was responsible for the outcome". (Kissinger 1979: 773; 776) On the result of Taipei's withdrawal, some scholars attributed it to Taipei's own vacillation in the process. See (Garver 1999: 248-63)

In effect, Kissinger's trips to mainland China dramatically facilitated a social construction process with respect to Taiwan's status. In July trip, Kissinger made decisive concessions, privately assuring his Chinese hosts that the US would not support "two Chinas", "one China one Taiwan" and Taiwan independence, and promised normalization in Nixon's second term. (Holdridge 1997:57-8; Mann 1998:33-4) During the second trip in October, Kissinger, while engaging in an "intimate dialogue on world major issues", began collaborating with the Chinese side on drafting a text of a would-be joint communique to be made when Nixon flew to Beijing later. Both sides now agreed to a formula by which they both would state their respective positions on various issues, including Taiwan.¹⁰ The new US views on Taiwan's status in the draft was ironically drawn from the source of Kissinger's rival State Department and read:

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China. The United States Government does not challenge that position.¹¹ (Kissinger 1979: 783)

¹⁰ Cf. The Chinese rejected the Canadian proposed "agreed minute" in Stockholm negotiations along these lines.

¹¹ While Kissinger claimed that the passage was adapted from "a State Department planning document for negotiations which aborted in the 50s" (1979:783), one analyst found evidence that it was essentially what State Department officials had drawn up two years earlier in preparation for Warsaw talks. (Mann 1998: 47-8) Noteworthy is the statement of "not challenge the Chinese position". It is the very phraseology that the State Department warned the Canadians against such a possible "retreat" from the NCNE. (DEA file I,13,8815: WSHDC Tel to Ott Oct.31/69)

At the moment, the phrase "and that Taiwan is a part of China" as presented in the final version was not yet added in the draft. According to Garver, the phrase was insisted by the Chinese side later. (Garver 1999: 271)¹²

As time came for Nixon's trip in February 1972, with respect to Taiwan and normalization, he reassured what Kissinger had pledged to the Chinese. (Kissinger 1979:1073) Meanwhile, the negotiations over the text of Shanghai Communique continued. A draft on the American view of Taiwan's status, as it stood now, was the aforementioned expression of the October formulation but with addition of the sentence "and that Taiwan is a province of China" to the end of "...but one China". (Kissinger 1979:1075) Overall, Kissinger failed to solicit an explicit commitment by Beijing for a peaceful resolution on the Taiwan issue, although he managed to link, albeit in a less tangible form as he originally hoped to achieve, the settlement with American withdrawal from Taiwan. On its part, the PRC continued to insist that the issue at stake be a Chinese internal affair. The American side sought to reaffirm the peaceful solution of Taiwan issue as a vital American interest. (Kissinger 1979:1075) As for the issue of American

¹² Garver cited Kissinger's White House Years (1979: 783) as in endnote #26. (Garver 1999:281) However, in re-checking Kissinger's work, I could not find any direct reference to the Chinese insistence on the addition.

presence on Taiwan, Kissinger proposed to tie the final withdrawal to the premise of peaceful settlement, and to link the progressive reduction of forces to the gradual diminution of "tension in the area". The Chinese negotiator, Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua, preferred to speak of the "prospect" of a peaceful settlement, instead of "premise". Kissinger ultimately conceded it since he "did not believe that the fate of Taiwan would be determined by such supersubtle shades of meaning." (Kissinger 1979: 1077-8) Additionally, Kissinger claimed that the American side secured Qiao's acceptance of the statement that the US acknowledged Taiwan as a "part" rather than a "province" of China, "thus eliminating a suggestion of subordination". (Kissinger 1979:1079) In the end, the Taiwan passage in the text of the Shanghai Communique of February 28, 1972 stands as follows:

The Chinese side reaffirmed its position:..the Government of the (PRC) is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all US forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of 'one China one Taiwan', 'one China, two governments', 'two Chinas', and 'independent Taiwan' or advocate that 'the status of Taiwan remains to be determined'. The U.S. side declared: The (US) acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The (US) Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all US

forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. (adopted from Holdridge 1997: 266)

What the formula had accomplished was subject to various interpretations. One mainstream view, focusing on positive side, regards this formula as a "diplomatic masterpiece" that accommodated both the American insistence that it would not remain disinterested if Beijing used force against Taiwan and the Chinese position that the Taiwan issue was an internal affair of China. (Garver 1999:271) The line of argument could be pursued further to read that:

The use of the word "acknowledge" (renshidao in Chinese) rather than "recognize" (chengren in Chinese) in the Shanghai Communique¹³, together with attribution of the view that "Taiwan is a part of China" to "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait", provided a legal basis for continuing US relations with Taiwan not subject to Beijing's veto. In diplomatic usage, "recognition" implies acceptance of a state or government's claim to sovereignty. The term "acknowledge" does not carry this implication.. (Garver 1999: 271-2)

Alternatively, one could also maintain that the Nixon Administration had actually sold Taiwan down the river by pointing out that it had secretly "made many, though not all, of the concessions China had sought" on Taiwan, which was intended as an exchange for the Chinese restraining North Vietnam. Although at the end of the trip "the US did

¹³ In fact, "acknowledge" could also be translated as chengren in Chinese, as in the case of Australia. In such a case, there is little distinction that could be made between "acknowledge" and "recognize" in Chinese.

not hand over Taiwan to China, nor did China abandon North Vietnam to the US" as envisaged in Nixon's trade-off, as an observer put it, Nixon had privately assured Beijing that Taiwan's status is determined, that is a part of China, that Washington will not support Taiwan independence, nor allow Tokyo to take over the then-American role there. (Burr 1999:46; Mann 1998:33-4; Tucker 1994:106) Nevertheless, the completion of the Shanghai Communique represented a formal termination of American "two Chinas" exercise and a beginning of American public endorsement of "one China" policy, although at that time Washington still officially recognized and had diplomatic relations with Taipei. Not surprisingly, as will be shown later, the American diplomatic coup incited a series of moves by many other countries further strengthening and broadening the process of social construction of "one China".

Notwithstanding the release of the Shanghai Communique, a finalization of the Sino-American normalization did not actualize until late 1978. Overall, the Americans were prevented from proceeding with their plan because of Vietnam and Watergate. In Beijing, the euphoria diminished as Washington kept delaying the fulfilment of its promise, coupled with concern about Soviet-American relations, the death of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in 1976, and the assumption of power by the hard-line Gang of Four. (Tucker 1994:125) In fact, there were series of follow-ups by

Kissinger to facilitate the process of normalization.

In early 1973, Kissinger made another trip to Beijing to brief the Chinese over partial withdrawal of American forces in Taiwan and to reaffirm Nixon's promise to establish diplomatic relations by mid-1976. In his subsequent report to Nixon in March, he admitted that the final break with the Nationalist China would be a painful process since "there are few friends as decent as our allies on Taiwan." (Burr 1999: 114-5) In a meeting with Mao and Zhou of November 1973, while Kissinger confessed that the Americans were not ready to break diplomatic relations as the Japanese did one year ago, Mao cynically urged no rush for the move and claimed that Beijing could "wait one hundred years". (Burr 1999:186-7; Kissinger 1982:691-2) One year later, in the wake of the abandonment of the doomed South Vietnam, Kissinger appealed for Qiao's consideration that "it is important that we not seen as throwing our friends (on Taiwan) away". Later, when Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping received Kissinger, the latter proposed a timetable to remove remaining American troops in Taiwan and a plan to reverse existing American institutional representations across the Taiwan Strait: maintaining a liaison office in Taiwan while upgrading its office in Beijing to embassy. As for the American security treaty with the ROC, Kissinger observed that "defense commitment is primarily a question of the way it can be presented politically, not a question of

maintaining it for an indefinite period of time", but requested a grace period to smooth American domestic concerns. Deng, while reminding him that America owed the PRC a debt, flatly rejected the proposal to reverse American presence in Beijing and Taipei, considering it as a variation of "one China one Taiwan", and specified three conditions of normalization. On that occasion, Kissinger in return reminded Deng that the Chinese also owed the American a debt for "starting the process" in 1971 that led to Beijing's admission into the UN. (Burr 1999: 285; 295-8)

The fall of Saigon in April 1975 limited Washington's freedom of action to implement the plan. As an American official explicitly confessed, it "created a context where any major change in our relations with Taiwan which implied abandonment of yet another ally would be unacceptable for foreign policy and domestic reasons". (Burr 1999:372) The 1976 election campaigns and events including the Montreal Olympics incident over the admission of a Taiwanese team made any move to normalization in that year inappropriate. (Burr 1999:407)

After Jimmy Carter won the Presidency, he instructed his staff to pursue final normalization with Beijing. The new Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, then made an exploratory trip to Beijing in August 1977, offering to establish diplomatic relation provided the PRC agreed to let the Americans keep a Consulate in Taipei which bore

resemblance to what Kissinger suggested in 1974. As Vance later acknowledged, this proposed measure deliberately gave Beijing Washington's "maximum position" in the negotiations over normalization, expecting correctly that the PRC would reject this first offer. (Mann 1998:82; Tucker 1994:131) Subsequently, the National Security Advisor Brzezinski flew to Beijing in May 1978 and announced American readiness to meet Beijing's requirements including severing official ties with Taipei while reiterating his predecessor's secret promises up until the mid-1970s. This was followed by series of secret negotiations between the American and Chinese delegates, while Vance was mainly kept in the dark, a scenario reminiscent of Kissinger and Rogers' relationships. (Mann 1998:88-9) Finally, on December 15, 1978, Carter announced the conclusion of normalization negotiations and both parties' establishment of diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979. The gist of the Sino-American Joint Communiqué, while reaffirming the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué, read as follows:

The (USA) recognizes..the (PRC) as the sole legal Government of China. Within the context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan..The Government of the (USA) acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. (Holdridge 1997:269)

The reaction from the Taipei government was furious not so much for the result of the Sino-American normalization as

for the surprise that it was caught unprepared in the process. President Chiang Ching-kuo had to be awakened at 2:30 am to be given the notification of rupture of diplomatic ties. (Mann 1998:94-5; Tucker 1994:132-4) Indeed, in this respect, there was a sharp contrast between American and Canadian diplomatic practices during their negotiations with the PRC delegates that led to normalization of bilateral relations.¹⁴ As explored in last Chapter, the Canadians had kept the Nationalist Chinese informed of the progress as well as the final conclusion of negotiations during their talks in Stockholm. By contrast, the essentially clandestine diplomacy conducted by Nixon, Kissinger, Ford, and Carter that could be traceable as early as 1970-71, had taken not only Taipei but at one moment also Tokyo by surprise. (DEA file G,7,8919: Tokyo Tel to Ott Jul.16/71) The disillusionment with Washington's diplomacy ultimately led to the collapse of Japanese reservations on the pace of normalization with Beijing. The ROC's last Ambassador to the US, James Shen, in view of this lack of due consultation, put his memoirs' subtitle as "How the US

¹⁴ Interestingly, while both Trudeau and Nixon similarly started their governance with certain degree of dissatisfaction with the established diplomatic headquarters, ie the DEA and the State Department, their according approaches for negotiations diverged: while Trudeau was confiding and relying on the DEA to complete Stockholm negotiations, Nixon opted for and depended upon Kissinger's "backchannels" to pursue the opening to Beijing. For Kissinger's own account on Nixon's decision to open "backchannels", see (Kissinger 1999:80-1).

Sold Out Its Ally". (Shen 1983) In that work, with respect to the practice of normalization, he specifically contrasted the Carter Administration with other Western countries that had either kept the ROC informed all the time (Canada) or sent special envoy bringing forward advance notices (France and Japan). (Shen 1983:18) As for the issue of American sacrifice of Taiwan, while John Garver, the American historian on Asian Cold War, evidently attempted to rescue Nixon from the charge by juxtaposing him with Harry Truman, albeit offering little evidence to support his personal judgement, (Garver 1999:265) James Mann, a noted journalist, obviously would dispute the above observation. Mann argued instead that accusing Carter of "selling Taiwan down the river" was not entirely correct, since Taiwan had already been sold well before Carter had arrived in the White House. (Mann 1998:93)

In sum, the American contribution to the social construction of "one China" could be highlighted through the relationship between the Canadian recognition and the American approach. So far, there has been no available evidence showing that the Canadian formula influenced the American thinking and approach in the Shanghai Communique and normalization afterwards. This is partly indicated by the fact there is a nearly absence of reference to the Canadian formula in major works dealing with the triangular relationships between Beijing, Taipei and Washington.

Moreover, virtually all studies on the "one China" issue assumed the Shanghai Communiqué as the genesis of existing "one China" structure. In an interview by this author, both Nat Bellocchi and David Dean, former Chairmen of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), considered it difficult to link the Canadian TNO formula to the American practice. In their views, the US formula of normalization was essentially driven by domestic concerns and interests.¹⁵

Another interpretation of the relationship between Canadian and American approaches of normalization was provided by Ambassador Yu-chi Hsueh. He argued that in the first instance the Americans' wavering in their China policy facilitated the Canadian move. To depict the delicate relationship, he used a metaphor that while walking in a street with his/her parents (the US) and knowing in advance where they were heading, a child (Canada) tried to lead the way ahead of them and was able to turn into the very direction at intersection well before they did so. This created an impression for the outsiders that it is the child who is independent as to lead his/her parents.¹⁶

Notwithstanding the divergent views on the relationship between Canadian and American formulae, there is evident

¹⁵ Interview conducted in New York on October 31, 1998.

¹⁶ During his interview by this author in Taipei on September 4, 1997, he vividly elaborated this metaphor. For brief illustration see (Lai 1994:221).

linkage between the Sino-Canadian practice and the Sino-American one, at least from the perspective of Beijing's "grand design", in their crucial contribution to the global "one China" structuration process. As a French diplomat had remarked in the NATO meeting, the Chinese were demanding Canadian declaration of Taiwan as an integral part of China "because they were looking beyond negotiations with Canada towards eventual negotiations with the USA". (DEA file I,15,8815: CanDelNATO Tel to Ott: Mar.10/70) Once the Sino-American rapprochement was underway as a result of Nixon and Kissinger's laying down "one China" policy, in addition to Beijing's admission into the UN, the floodgates eventually opened for further international social construction of "one China". This could first be demonstrated at least through some countries' similar adoption of the American "acknowledge" formula.

2. Other "Acknowledge" Practices:

In this part, I will first outline the British experience, then sketch other relevant cases with an emphasis on Australia and New Zealand. The three countries betrayed certain traces of Canadian influence.

(1) Great Britain:

As soon as the Shanghai Communique was concluded, Great Britain readily followed suit. In fact, the United Kingdom had unilaterally recognized the PRC in early 1950 with its Charge d'Affaires stationed in Beijing. However, the

recognition did not bring about tangible benefits, and that discouraged other countries, including Canada, from pursuing immediate normalization. Although the British later managed to seize an opportunity offered by Zhou Enlai's conciliatory gesture in the wake of Geneva conference of 1954 as to reach a reciprocity of missions then, an exchange of ambassadors did not finally take place until 1972. Sino-British normalization emerged in the aftermath of Cultural Revolution. (Boardman 1976:136)

It should be noted that the British had established a foothold in Taiwan long before the contemporary Chinese republics came into existence in the 20th Century. In 1861, London had opened its first Consulate on Formosa. After Taiwan had passed to Japanese rule in 1895, the British continued to maintain the presence of that mission there till 1941 when the Pacific War broke out. A consular post was re-established there in 1946 but was accredited to local Taiwan government, instead of the Nationalist central authorities on Nanjing. This practice persisted even after the Nationalists moved their bases to Taiwan and the British recognized the PRC government in 1950. The *raison d'être* for the continuing function of the British consulate in Tamsui, Taiwan, was that the international legal status of Taiwan remained undetermined, despite the Nationalist Chinese presence there. (Boardman 1976:117)

After the Sino-Canadian normalization had been

achieved, there were hopes in Britain that a semantic compromise on Taiwan issue might be worked out along the lines of the "Canadian formula". But the optimism did not last long, since the phraseology was not acceptable in the British case. The issue was not finally solved until 1972 when British new Charge d'Affaires arrived in Beijing and negotiated with the Chinese in early and mid-February and early March 1972. In the wake of the Nixon's diplomatic coup and ensuing domestic opposition's critics on the government's "quibble" on Taiwan's legal status, the Sino-British Joint Communique was reached and issued on March 13, 1972. (Boardman 1976:149-50) Based on the often-cited principles, both governments "decided to raise the level of their respective diplomatic representatives..from Charge d'Affaires to Ambassador." Moreover, the British government, "acknowledging the position of the Chinese government that Taiwan is a province of the People's Republic of China, have decided to remove their official representation in Taiwan." (PR 15,11:3) Since then, London has considered "the Taiwan question is China's internal affair to be settled by the Chinese people themselves." (Boardman 1976:150)

Subsequently but strictly in the 1970s, eight countries followed this "acknowledge" formula when they established diplomatic relations with the PRC. In chronological sequence, they are predominantly Asia-Pacific countries: Australia (Dec.21/72), New Zealand (Dec.21/72), Spain

(Mar.9/73), Malaysia (May 31/74), Thailand (Jul.1/75), Fiji (Nov.5/75), Western Samoa (Nov.6/75) and the U.S. (Jan.1/79)¹⁷ Overall, the extent of the diffusion of the formula was less broad across time and space than that of the Canadian TNO one. Although the phraseology was not directly borrowed from the Canadian formula, there were some signs of Ottawa's influence, at least insofar as Australia and New Zealand were concerned, which will be shown later. Moreover, as the cases of the UK and US demonstrated, to the extent that all of them were requested by Beijing to enshrine their positions on Taiwan in the joint communiques, they were directly involved in the social construction of "one China". Arguably, the fact that "acknowledge" was used in some sense meant that these countries did "not go so far as to accept or recognize the PRC's claim" (TT Mar.14/72), given that the meaning of the former term was broader but less crystal clear than the latter.¹⁸ I shall now outline the cases of Australia and New Zealand with a special emphasis on the Canadian influence on their recognition of Beijing.

(2) Australia:

¹⁷ For the joint communiques that referred to the cases of Spain, Malaysia, Thailand, Fiji and Western Samoa, see (PR 16,11:3; 17,23:8; 18,27:8-9; 18,46:3; 18,47:5).

¹⁸ According to Oxford English Dictionary, for example, "acknowledge" can mean (1) to admit (the statement) as true; (2) to recognize (the statement) to be what one claims; (3) to show recognition of (act etc.) (1989: 108)

As in the case of Vietnam war, the China/Taiwan problem had kept Australia apart from Canada. Canberra's decision to "reopen" its embassy in Taipei in June 1966, as mentioned in Chapter 3, further departed from the Canadian trajectory. Despite Trudeau's new look to the Asia-Pacific region and his personal visit to Australia in June 1970, both countries continued to be divided on the China policy during the Stockholm negotiations. However with the election of Gough Whitlam, in December 1972, as Prime Minister of Australia's first Labour government after World War II, the distance between the two capitals suddenly became shortened. The new government sent a stream of officials to Ottawa to learn about Canadian policy initiatives including the recognition of the PRC. (Donaghy 1997b:30-2)

In fact, the Australian institutional learning from the Canadian experience on the matter was strikingly evident even before the new government was formed. According to the DEA files, at least in May 1971, the Australians had explicitly requested Canadian provision of information on the Stockholm talks. In response, Ottawa managed to produce a 10-page-long summary account of its negotiations with the Communist Chinese and made it available to Canberra in June. (DEA file A,14,8773: Ott Tel to CNBRA Jun.1; Sum Jun.4/71) Although the structure and phraseology of the Australia-PRC Joint Communique of December 21, 1972 bears resemblance to the British format, the existence of Ottawa's influence on

Canberra could not be denied.

(3) New Zealand:

In many ways, the New Zealanders (NZers) betrayed even more evident linkage with the Canadians insofar as the China policy was concerned. As the Stockholm negotiations proceeded to substantive phase of discussions, Wellington's External Affairs officials revealed that they "had received explicit instructions from the Prime Minister's office to adopt more flexible line on the question of recognizing Peking" and explicitly attributed this change to the Canadian and Italian moves. (DEA file I,11,8815: WLGTN Tel to Ott Jun.16/69) As soon as the Sino-Canadian normalization was achieved, the New Zealand Prime Minister issued a statement, describing it as "an interesting development", and expressing his plan "to seek direct ties with Communist China", albeit claiming that "we do not acknowledge Peking's claim to Taiwan nor its right to assert that claim by force." (DEA file I,19,8816: WLGTN Tel to Ott Oct.14/70)

Finally, the text of the NZ-PRC Joint Communique strikingly followed the same Canada-PRC four-paragraph structure with virtually identical contents, except the effective time and substitution of "acknowledge" for "take-note-of". That is, the first paragraph highlighted the principles based on which the agreement was reached and the last paragraph stated mutual assistance for the establishment of diplomatic missions. The in-between

paragraphs two and three stated that:

The Chinese Government reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the (PRC) and that Taiwan is a province of the (PRC). The New Zealand Government **acknowledges** this position of the Chinese.. The New Zealand Government recognizes..the (PRC) as the sole legal government of China. (PR 15,52:3)

In sum, following the Shanghai Communique, there were nine countries, including the US itself, opting for the "acknowledge" formula to refer to their views on Taiwan's status in their joint communiques on the establishment of diplomatic relations. The cases, as in the TNO categories, constitute a vital part of the social construction of "one China" in post-1970 era. As well, some countries such as Australia and New Zealand actually inherited varying degree of Canadian legacy. Nevertheless, the social construction of "one China" undoubtedly was not limited to the total of 25 states. In next section I will examine some other countries' practices along similar lines of Canadian and American formulations and more recent trend of explicit recognition of Beijing's sovereignty claim on Taiwan.

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III. Continuing Construction and Growing Rigidity:

The social construction of "one China" in existing form is an ongoing process and not limited to the two categories mentioned above. It should be noted however that not all countries which normalized their relations with the PRC after Canada and the US emulated the two models or adopted

other formula to address the Taiwan issue. For example, Equatorial Guinea established diplomatic relations with the PRC two days after Canada, but in its joint communique with the Chinese, it did not refer to the Taiwan issue at all. (PR 13,43:10) Other instances of no reference to Taiwan included, but were not limited to, Austria (May 26,1971), Turkey (Aug.4,1971) and Mexico (Dec.14, 1971). (PR 14,23:11; 14,33:11; 14,7-8:26) However, the cases of both an ambiguous and no reference to the Taiwan issue became increasingly rare in the 1990s. This section will start with other equivocal formulae and then switch to the growing tendency of rigidity of the social construction.

1. Continuing Equivocal Construction:

There were some cases where countries adopted other formulations with flexible connotations to refer to their position on Taiwan in the joint communique, when they were requested by Beijing to do so. Among these, the Japanese formula deserves some note in view of Tokyo's historical ties with Taipei.

(1) Japan:

Arguably, an underlying rationale for Tokyo's policy towards Beijing and Taipei has been built on the principle of "separating politics and economics". Prior to September 1972, as one observer put it, while the Japanese maintained a "front-door" diplomatic ties with the Nationalists on Taiwan, they were basically engaged in close "backdoor" non-

political exchanges with the Communists on the mainland. (Clough 1978:178-84) The act of normalization with Beijing essentially brought about a reverse pattern of relations.

In retrospect, although the transformation was foreseeable and there was increasing domestic pressure for earliest recognition, there was no doubt that several major events, namely the Canadian success in negotiations through an acceptable formula on Taiwan, the PRC's admission into the UN, the Nixon's surprise announcement of mid-July 1971 and ensuing visit to mainland China, had acted as decisive catalysts for eventual normalization. (Clough 1978:186)

In the preliminary discussions with the Japanese, Beijing had put forward three principles: recognition of the PRC government as the sole legitimate government of China; recognition of Taiwan being an integral part of China; and the abrogation of the Japan-ROC peace treaty of 1952. Tokyo was most reluctant to terminate the peace treaty and diplomatic relations with Taipei in view of its strong and close historical ties. Nevertheless, after five days of negotiations, a compromise formula was finally agreed upon, and embodied in the Joint Communiqué of September 29, 1972. (Clough 1978:186-7) The vital Chinese conditions were considerably met and addressed in the following paragraphs:

The Government of Japan recognizes the Government of the (PRC) as the sole legal government of China;
The Government of the (PRC) reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the (PRC). The

Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of China and adheres to its stand of complying with Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation. (PR 15,40:12-3)

Noteworthy is that the Japanese phraseology with respect to Taiwan's status, like the aforementioned formula, was considerably flexible to the extent that it fell short of reaffirming that the PRC's stand is right and just. (Chou 1985:93) Additionally, the uniqueness of the Japanese formula entails both a provisional arrangement to ensure continuation of trade relations and carry-on of some routine operations of their existing diplomatic missions and eventually, three months later, an agreement on the establishment of unofficial representations in both Japan and Taiwan. The Japanese institutions based on Tokyo with the title of "Inter-Change Association" (ICA) set up offices in Taipei and Kaohsiung, whereas the Taipei-based "East Asia Relations Association" (EARA) established its branches in Tokyo, Osaka and Fukuoka.¹⁹ (Chou 1985: 94-6;109-11; Clough 1978: 189-94) Nevertheless, the Japanese model of retaining some form of institutional representation obviously had inspired Kissinger to put forward a modified formulation in his encounter with Deng in 1974. Notwithstanding the Kissinger's abortive venture, the US-Taiwan relations in the aftermath of de-recognition were handled through similarly

¹⁹ In Aug.1979, the EARA was approved to add another branch in Yokohama.

un-official institutional representations, namely the AIT and the Coordination Council of North American Affairs (CCNAA), although the American practice went further to govern the bilateral relations on the basis of a Congress-initiated legislation of the Taiwan Relations Act. (TRA)

(2) Other Constructions

Nearly three years later after the Japanese invention of "fully understand and respect" formula, the Philippines adopted the identical phraseology to express its view of Taiwan status in its joint communique with the PRC on June 9, 1975. (PR 18,24: 7-8) Other than this direct isomorphism, there were alternative phrases taken by some other countries that were also ambiguous with respect to their positions on Taiwan. For example, in the Netherlands' Joint Communique with the PRC on ambassador exchange on May 16, 1972, the term "respect" was employed to express the Dutch view on Taiwan. (PR 15,21:20) Similarly, when South Korea established diplomatic relations with PRC on August 24, 1992, Seoul also incorporated "respect" in this regard. (FBIS Aug.24/92:16) Others, such as San Marino, Sierra Leone and South Africa had decided to state their stances by means of respective phraseology of "pay attention to", "hold" and "view". (FBIS May 8/91:9; PR 14,32: 22-4; BR 41,3:4)

In sum, up till this part of the social construction of "one China", the Taiwan issue was addressed in various formula put forward in a relatively equivocal way. However,

as the diplomatic rows between Beijing and Taipei has turned to be more and more contentious in the wake of Taiwanese surging democratization since the late-1980s, the social construction process has entered into a new phase of formulation with additional elements.

2. Explicit Recognition/New Formula:

As many countries opted for "flexible" formula to enshrine their positions on Taiwan in the joint communiques with Peking, as explored above, in the meantime there were also countries that either made no statements on the Taiwan issue or explicitly recognized that Taiwan was a part of China. For the latter category, prior to 1990, there were about ten countries taking the clear position.²⁰ However, essentially in the post-Cold War era, while less and less countries were free to keep silent on the issue, there was a growing tendency for many countries that otherwise might not have been required to take positions on Taiwan being demanded to take sides. In addition, more and more countries formally recognized that Taiwan is a part of the PRC and pledged that they will not set up official offices nor have official contacts with Taiwan, while establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing or during state visits or other interaction occasions.

²⁰ In chronological sequence, these 10 countries were: Maldives, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Botswana, Jordan, Antigua & Barbuda, Angola, Lesotho, Bolivia and Nicaragua. For a quick reference, see The Cambridge Handbook of Contemporary China (1991: 151-5)

After the breakdown of former Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, and while Taiwan's "pragmatic diplomacy" was gaining momentum, the new pattern of institutionalization in joint communiques between newly independent states and the PRC came into shape. These predominantly included virtually all former Republics in the Soviet Union, the three Baltic states, Bosnia & Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia.²¹ Included is also Cook Islands, a "mini-state" that would be otherwise left alone in accordance with previous practice. (BR 40,32:5)

Meanwhile, some countries, usually not taking positions on Taiwan's status/external relations while establishing their diplomatic ties with the PRC before, were now requested to co-produce joint communiques along this line during state visits. For example, When visiting Beijing in April 1996, President Yeltsin "reiterated that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese territory" and pledged that "Russia will not establish official relations nor enter into official contacts with Taiwan". (BR 39,20:6) Likewise, joint communiques were phrased in a similar vein during state visits of both Polish and Yugoslav Presidents in late 1997. (BR 40,39:6-7) Equally importantly, France, while not referring to the issue in the Sino-French Joint Communique of 1964, 30 years later formally recognized that Taiwan is a

²¹ See various issues of BR or FBIS in September 1991, January, April, May and June 1992, and April 1995.

part of China in January 1994 after its controversial sales of Mirage 2000 fighters to Taiwan threatened its diplomatic ties with the PRC. (BR 37,4:4) Moreover, the US president, Bill Clinton, during his stay in Shanghai in summer 1998, publicly declared the American "three nos" policy: non-support of "one China one Taiwan" or "two Chinas", Taiwan independence and a separate Taiwanese membership in international organizations that require sovereign statehood. (BR 41,27:3; Wu 1998b)

Overall, the embodiment of "one China" structure has broadly come into shape in the post-1970 era. It addressed both issues of China representation and Taiwan's status. In earlier stage of the structuration process, many countries did so with equivocal formulations. However, this relatively loosely constructed frame tended to grow increasingly in both breadth and density in the 1990s. Nevertheless, coupled with this horizontally broadening development of "one China" in the form of codification of the Taiwan status in joint communiques is a vertical dimension of deepening structuration process undergoing in various policy areas. This latter aspect of the structuration of "one China" will be examined in the following chapter.

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IV. Summary:

In this chapter, it was first argued that the impact of the Sino-Canadian normalization through the adoption of "one

China" and the TNO formula was far-reaching. There were 15 countries in Europe, Middle East, Latin America and Africa directly incorporating the TNO formula. The institutional isomorphism of the formula also lasted for nearly two decades. This was the subject of the first section.

Subsequently, I further explored in sections two and three the institutional diffusion of "one China" statement through the reproduction by countries concerned of some equivocal formulations on Taiwan's status, such as "acknowledge", "fully understand and respect" or "respect". Notwithstanding the various formulations, the cases commonly involved Beijing's attaching declarations by respective governments on Taiwan's status to the establishment of diplomatic relations and ensuing bilateral intersubjective understandings that Beijing has vital, if not final, say in the resolution of Taiwan issue. As such, they contributed to the social construction of "one China" in post-1970 era. Additionally, there is some evidence showing that some countries had engaged in varying degree of institutional learning from the Canadian experience, although the formula they employed to declare their positions on Taiwan might differ in forms.

Moreover, the chapter also explored the case of the Sino-American normalization, in view of its tremendous influence on subsequent social construction of "one China" and of its distinction with the Sino-Canadian case. Among

the distinctions, the Nixon and Kissinger's clandestine approach could be juxtaposed with the Canadian "engaged independence". It was also maintained that the American "two Chinas" endeavours came to an end in the wake of a debacle of "dual representation" proposal in the UN. After all, the Sino-American rapprochement was a policy priority for Nixon in view of deliberate postponement, under his order, of the State Secretary Rogers' long-due speech on "dual representation". It was further argued that Kissinger's secretive trips to mainland China as well as Nixon's subsequent visit involved private assurances made to their Chinese hosts that the Americans would not support "two Chinas", "one China one Taiwan" and Taiwan independence, albeit not embodied in the Shanghai Communique.

Furthermore, the chapter examined some similarly "flexible" formulations on the Taiwan issue by several countries concluding joint communiques with the PRC. Among them, the Japanese practice was underlined not only for its phraseology on Taiwan's status but also for its success in reaching an agreement with Taiwan rendering for the setup and exchanges of unofficial institutional representation. This was also adopted by the Americans later with further institutionalization through domestic legislation.

Finally, it was held that besides the aforementioned formulations, up till the late 1980s, some countries intending to forge official ties with the PRC might still

choose not to state their views on Taiwan, and thus relatively few countries explicitly recognize Beijing's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. However, in the aftermath of the breakdown of the former Communist bloc in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Unions, there was a growing tendency for the countries concerned to overtly recognize Beijing's sovereignty claim while adding new elements, such as pledges not to establish official linkage with Taiwan, in their joint communiques with the PRC. Meanwhile, countries that were or could be spared from such pledge in the past now were demanded to do so. As a result, the social construction of "one China" in most recent decade tended to become rigid.

CHAPTER SIX: STRUCTURATION III: INTERNAL ELABORATION

The social construction of "one China" in international arena discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 has established some overarching principles with respect to both the issues of China representation and Taiwan's status. Nevertheless, these principles did not address the extent to which Taiwan's external relations should and could be conducted by countries concerned. This issue was often left for those countries to solve domestically, as in the American practice of the Taiwan Relations Act. Policy governing this aspect of relations with Taiwan in effect constitutes internal aspect of structuration, as opposed to external dimension elaborated in previous chapters. Nonetheless, both internal and external dimensions of the structuration process went hand in hand, although they could be addressed separately for analytical convenience, to the extent that external process were actually accompanied, almost simultaneously, with concrete elucidation in various policy areas. Besides, the internal process of structuration not only entailed parallel institutional isomorphism across nations but often grew out of series of interactions with Beijing. As such, the internal structuration constitutes a vital part of the social construction of "one China".

The underlying issues involved in the internal process

of structuration consisted in how countries concerned should receive Taipei's representation in individual (or collective and yet non-resident mode) and institutional (collective and permanent form) levels. This chapter will focus on the former aspect of internal structuration, whereas the latter will be left for Chapter 7. In this chapter, the political implication of de-recognition and ensuing policy elaboration governing Taiwanese admission and designation prior to the 1976 Montreal Olympics will first be explored. Then, the chapter will proceed to examine the case of Montreal Olympics as an instance of the "one China" policy elaboration. The impact of the incident on Taiwan's membership in the International Olympic Committee (IOC) will be pursued in the third section. The other aspect of the individual mode of representation outside Canadian border will be explored with a summary in the end.

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I. The Beginning of Turbulence:

From a "smooth ending" of Ottawa-Taipei bilateral official relations in October 1970 to an overt eruption of conflict over Taiwan's participation in the 1976 Montreal Olympics, at first glance it might make observers wonder why the relations turned sour so dramatically. In fact, as will be demonstrated below, several ongoing feudings could be detected in the interim. From Ottawa's perspective, these

were all related to how Taipei's officials and teams should be admitted into Canada and what appropriate designations should be used by Taiwanese visitors and goods. This section will first address these two aspects of issues arising from exchanges with Taiwan in non-political realms. Then, several episodes will be outlined to exemplify these issues.

1. Admission Policy:

The repercussion of the Sino-Canadian Joint Communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations was undoubtedly far-reaching. The direct effect of the de-recognition of Taipei was evident. As an official Canadian document put it, "...in Canadian eyes, ...Taiwan is no longer a political entity, only a geographical one...just...local authorities and not a government." (DEA file D,8788,5: Gdl Nov.3/70) Its policy implications, nevertheless, were well contemplated before de-recognition. The DEA had put forward concrete policy proposal to govern Taiwanese entry into Canada in early September 1970. It suggested that the ROC passports be recognized as valid proof of identity. Moreover, it proposed that Taipei's party or state officials, except visits in private capacity with undertaking to engage in no political activity or strictly on economic or trade matters, should be denied entry. So were members of Taiwanese delegation to trade fairs, sports teams purporting to represent the "ROC". (DEA file D,8788,4: Collins Let to Couillard Sep.9/70) Two

days after de-recognition, the DEA instructed all posts to process Taiwanese visa application by distinguishing ordinary from official/diplomatic passport holders: while the former was to be dealt with in accordance with normal criteria, the latter was to be referred to Ottawa for decision. (DEA file D,8788,5: Ott Tels Oct.15/70) Two weeks after de-recognition, these related policies were reaffirmed in a "Guidance for Canadian Officials Regarding Contacts with Taiwan". (Ibid: Gdl Nov.3/70)

Notwithstanding the policy guideline, the problem of relatively free Taiwanese entry into Canada via its southern border became more and more evident later. It first involved the entry of a ROC senior diplomat in Washington to attend a Toronto conference. Although the East Asian Division (EAD)¹ initially attempted to keep him out of Canada, it found there was no such regulation to be enforced. (Ibid: EAD Memo to USSEA Nov.26/70) The existing admission policy on Taiwanese officials was subsequently to undergo serious tests in the case of the 5th British Columbia International Trade Fair (BCITF) held in the following year. In view of

¹ The DEA undertook a major reorganization in 1971. The Far Eastern Division (FED) was incorporated into Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs (BAPA). Within it a new East Asia Division (EAD) was created. Later several reorganizations were completed with new set of abbreviations assigned to each unit. In this thesis, however, I will use my own ones for the sake of consistency. For organization chart and the official abbreviations, see 1971 Annual Report (AR).

some difficulties experienced in the incident and similar cases, the Consular Division proposed to revise the policy to govern the admission of Taiwanese officials to Canada. (DEA file D,8789,7: Con Memo to EAD Jun.21/71) As for the ordinary Taiwanese group entry, in the aftermaths of vigorous protests by the PRC embassy over tours of performance by a Taiwanese acrobatic troupe in summer 1973, the Canadian Embassy in Beijing vocally proposed a review of admission policy to Taiwanese visitors. (DEA file D,8789,8: Pek Tel to Ott Jul.6/73)

Similar incidents that were triggered by the Taiwanese entry via the USA further prompted the Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs (BAPA) to table changes of the regulations. (Ibid: draft Memo to Min Sep.27/73) By the end of 1975, a new set of visa regulations eventually came into effect. According to them, all Taiwanese must possess Canadian visas for entry and, in the case of group visiting under invitation from Canadian hosts, the DEA should receive assurances from the Canadian host organizations that no politically objectionable activities would be carried out by the group. (Ibid: Note Dec.30/75) Nevertheless, the change of admission policy did not prevent episodes of "politically objectionable" nature from taking place. Nor did it serve to defuse a sense of distrust.

For example, in one case, the PRC embassy registered a

complaint on the visit of a Taiwanese education official. The DEA's own investigation found that the official made a false declaration in visa application concerning his professional status but later disclosed his real official capacity while attending an international conference in Vancouver. Over the episode, the head of the EAD grudgingly concluded that "it is clear that Taiwanese cannot be trusted entirely to desist from provocative political activities." (DEA file A,8775,27: EAD Memo to file Dec.5/75) The legacy of increasing suspicion over Taiwanese political motives continued to linger during the Montreal Olympics.

The Canadian admission policy toward the Taiwanese, moreover, was not developed indigenously. Nor was its effect limited to Canada. In fact, it entailed an institutional diffusion and learning process. For example, the Australian opposition party had requested information on Canadian practice on Taiwanese admission. (DEA file,D,8789,8:CNBRA Tel to Ott May 17/73) Even after the new set of regulations had come into being and when the Montreal Olympics was looming, there were ongoing consultations from the Canadian side to find out the consular and immigration practices of its major western allies, including Australia, towards the Taiwanese. (eg. Ibid: Ott Tels to Bonn et al Apr.12; CNBRA Tel to Ott Apr.22/76)

Nevertheless, internal elaboration of "one China"

structuration was not restricted to the admission issue. The policy was closely interwoven with that of nomenclature for Taiwanese groups and individuals. Indeed, the subject of identification for the Taiwanese was perhaps the most contentious problem between Ottawa and Taipei and was a vital part of the Canadian "one China" policy.

2. Designation Policy:

The issues, such as how people from Taiwan should call themselves while in Canada, the extent to which their identification should be accepted and how Canadian government name people, goods and items coming from the region, arose from the change of Canadian "one China" policy. The Guidance first stipulated that all government departments should use "Taiwan" or "Taiwan (Formosa)", rather than "China" or "Republic of China" in documents and publications. It also suggested that wherever possible Taiwan should not be explicitly identified as a country. (DEA file D,8788,5: Gdl Nov.3/70) By the end of 1975, this policy was reconfirmed and new elements had apparently been added in place: "letters addressed to the 'ROC' are returned to senders. Imports from Taiwan must be labelled 'made in Taiwan', not 'made in the ROC'". (DEA file D,8789,8: Note Dec.30/75)

The issue of designation nevertheless primarily centred on how the Taiwanese groups and individuals should represent

themselves with proper name and symbols on Canadian soil. In fact, related disputes also arose from the activities of some Chinese Canadian communities. Incidents of this sort often involved flag-flying by some pro-Taipei groups which incited numerous protests from Beijing. For example, in August 1972, the PRC made representations over public display of the Nationalist flag outside a building that housed the Shing Wah News, a branch of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Community Centre in Toronto's Chinatown. The embassy demanded the Canadian government to have the flag removed and to take "effective measures" to prevent a recurrence of such incidents. In response, the DEA regarded it essentially as legitimate exercise of freedom of speech or demonstration by private Canadian citizens and there was no legal basis on which the Canadian government could intervene. (DEA file A,8774,20: Memo for Min Aug.6/72)²

To date, the issue of symbolic representation by pro-Taiwan Chinese Canadians continued occasionally to haunt Ottawa-Taipei relations afterwards. There appears to exist some Canadian suspicions over the role Taipei and its

² A former official of the ROC MOFA explained in an interview with this author that holding various events has become a crucial tradition in the overseas Chinese communities long since the establishment of the Republic by the KMT in 1912. Although their resident countries might have no diplomatic relations with the ROC, they routinely organize various events to express their view and to his knowledge these actions did not cause much concern by the USA administrations.

diplomats might have played in deliberately orchestrating public display of the official ROC symbols on the Canadian soils by local Canadians of Chinese descent.³ Nevertheless, as Canada-hosted international conferences or activities were the major sites for the contested Taiwanese designation issue, the core of the analysis should now be shifted to some events that preceded but bore some resemblance to the incident of the 1976 Montreal Olympics.

3. Cases:

Many of these events, like the Olympics itself, involved invitations extended to the ROC before the de-recognition, but ensuing decisions by hosting organizations to continue to honour those invitations afterwards put them often in conflict with the official Canadian "one China" policy monitored closely by the DEA. Some were solved smoothly while others precipitated into overt conflict reinforcing Ottawa's lingering sense of "deliberate sabotage" plotted by Taipei. Among the events, two should be highlighted as follows:

(1) The Fifth BCITF, Vancouver, May-June 1971:

The event was sponsored by the BC government and held in May-June 1971. Invitation was extended in the name of

³ The former official of the ROC MOFA in the interview attributed this allusion to some historical "predisposed misunderstanding" that from his viewpoints is misplaced in the context of contemporary democratizing Taiwan.

W.A.C. Bennett, the then BC premier, in 1969. Prior to the de-recognition, a contract for exhibit space was signed between Taipei and Vancouver. In February 1971, the Taipei-based China External Trade and Development Council (CETDC) notified that it would send three members to staff the "China Pavilion". Upon learning the case, the DEA, ITC and DMI all agreed to deny the visa application of the three "officials". Additionally, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and the ITC Minister Pepin conveyed messages to Premier Bennett urging him to withdraw an invitation already extended to the ROC, but all were declined by the latter. The three Taipei officials nevertheless managed to "slip in" via the USA.

The DEA and other federal agencies then made efforts to reach an arrangement to permit the display of Taiwanese goods under the name of the "Far Eastern Trade Service", a newly established office representing Taipei's economic interests, instead of being designated as from the "Republic of China", or "Taiwan", and other matters such as removing the Nationalist flags and stopping distribution of political pamphlets and so on. But unfortunately, the details of the arrangements for some reasons were not carried out and the PRC continued to protest over the presence of two bronze plaques bearing the Chinese characters meaning "Republic of China" and of a continued use of a fair logo in newspaper advertisement that included the Nationalist flag. The

federal government officials continued to press Bennett to do something and even contacted the ROC embassy in Washington with a view to solving it. While the latter undertook to contact their Vancouver people to remove the plaque and so forth, those offending objects were still in place when the Fair closed on June 12. (DEA file D,8789,7: Memos for Min Jun.14;17/71)

The repercussion of the BCITF incident was significant. It directly affected the official Canadian attitudes and handling on subsequent Canada-hosted international events and it actually facilitated a review process of revising regulations governing the Taiwanese officials' entry, as mentioned above.

(2) The 7th International Association of Ports and Harbours (IAPH) Conference, Montreal, June 1971:

The conference was sponsored by Montreal-based National Harbours Board (NHB), a Crown corporation. Taiwan's Kaohsiung and Keelung port administrations had first registered to participate in the event, the invitation of which was also made prior to the Canadian de-recognition of the ROC. The DEA, after having learned of the case on its own, requested the NHB to write to the Taiwanese for their voluntary withdrawal in view of Ottawa's new "one China" policy. The NHB declined. Nor was the IAPH Secretary-General prepared to rescind the registration. (DEA file D,8789,6:EAD

Memo to UND Mar.30; UND Memo to USSEA Apr.14/71) Then, the Taiwanese visa application was turned down. The dispute was followed by an intervention by the US State Department. It made an official representation expressing serious concerns about the likelihood that Ottawa's action might set negative precedents for international community and the contradiction of that decision with the previous Canadian pledge to continue normal commercial and non-political relations with Taiwan. This incurred reactions from the Canadian embassy in Washington which proposed to tell the State Department that the Taiwanese were "not helping their own case..(in the BCITF and that their) conduct has not been such as to encourage (Canadians) to have Taiwan delegates in Canada." (DEA file D,8789,7:WSHDC Tel to Ott Jun.16/71)

Similar cases occurred in other international events held in Canada. Overall, the title of "Taiwan" as a geographical label was an acceptable designation for the Canadians, as in the case of the 1976 Montreal Olympics to be illustrated later. However, for the PRC, even after a modification of policy to allow for delegates from Beijing and Taipei to participate simultaneously in any international conferences hosted by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) came into effect in summer 1979, "Taiwan" alone as designation was unacceptable lest that it should convey the independence of that entity. (DEA file

A,8775,30: NEAD Memo to BAPA Aug.30/79)

Moreover, similar issues arose when the PRC raised concern over admission and designations for various Taiwanese cultural groups or artifacts to perform or be displayed in Canada. For example, the PRC embassy vigorously protested, based on newspaper identification, against a proposed tour by the Hai Chia Acrobatic Troupe in spring and summer 1973. The DEA initially pointed out the nature of private arrangement which would be inappropriate for the Canadian government to intervene. As the two-month performance tour began in Toronto, the PRC made further representations against Ottawa's "tolerating the presence of 'two China' activities", in April and later in June. (DEA file D,8789,8:SAD Memo to BAPA Apr.10; Pek Tels to Ott Apr.13;Jun.12; Ott Tels to Pek Apr.17;Jun.14/73; DEA file A,8774,22: Note to DEA Apr.25/73) Eventually, the series of protests led to a review of visa policy toward Taiwanese visitors proposed by the Canadian embassy in Beijing. (DEA file D,8789,8:Pek Tel to Ott Jul.5/73)

Likewise, local exhibitions and book fairs where Taiwanese groups participated before or after the Olympics also were objects of the PRC concerns, when controversial designation for Taiwan and Canadian provincial officials were involved. For example, the PRC Ambassador complained to the DEA officials about the Taiwanese participation in

Quebec Book Exhibition of May 1974. What was offensive to the Ambassador was the display of the Nationalist flag and official title in the Taiwanese stand and the event was opened by the Quebec Minister of Culture. (DEA file A,8774,25: EAD Memo to file Jun.13/74) Similarly, in fall 1980, under Beijing's pressure, the DEA successfully maneuvered to cancel a scheduled exhibition of Chinese painting and calligraphy at the National Archives in Ottawa since that event was under the "honourary sponsorship" of the Ontario Ministry of Culture and Recreation and was financed by the ROC Ministry of Education. Equally offensive to Beijing was that the works to be displayed in the exhibition were authored from "young Chinese artists in 'Free China'". (DEA file A, 8775,30: BAPA Memo to BOC Sep.8/80)⁴

In short, up until the eve of the 1976 Montreal Olympics, series of incidents involving the Taiwanese admission and proper designations recurred to the extent that Ottawa's suspicion over Taipei's political motives was

⁴ In the DEA files, there were numerous instances in which the PRC embassy staff frequently raised concerns about Taiwanese designations and activities. In some instances it got some outright rebuffs. For example, at the end of an encounter with the Chinese Counsellor who had presented a list of "offensive events", the Director General of the BAPA offered personal advice to his guest that he should "attach less importance to the kind of thing...(and that) he should consider seriously not wasting so much of his time and the time of others on it." (DEA file A, 8775,29: BAPA Memo to NEAD Sep.22/78)

considerably reinforced. Meanwhile, the Canadian immigration policy had been modified to require visa approval in all cases of the Taiwanese applications. Nevertheless, it was the 1976 Montreal Olympics that had put both admission and designation policies into serious tests.

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II. The Case of the 1976 Montreal Olympics:

The incident of the 1976 Montreal Olympics certainly did not occur out of the blue. Aside from the state of Canada-Taiwan relations, the context of Canada-PRC relations is worth a brief note. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, the bilateral relations had gone through a "honeymoon" period for at least two years. By the middle of 1973, however, in light of some evidences where the Chinese had been more "realist" in dealing with the Canadians over administrative matters and of their newly won friendships with other western countries, the Canadian embassy in Beijing had warned that the Canadians no longer enjoyed preferential treatment they had been receiving since recognition. (DEA file A, 8774,24: Pek Tel to Ott Jul.27/73) One year before the Olympics, the DEA also concluded that the Sino-Canadian relationship was deteriorating on several fronts that including the issue of Taiwanese entry and activities into Canada and recommended some gestures should be taken to reassure the Chinese. (DEA file A,8775:27: Memo

for Min Jul.8; USSEA Let to Pek Emb Aug.27/75)

Apart from the broader backdrop of Ottawa's relations with Beijing and Taipei in post-1970 era, nevertheless, Canadian policy action in sport-related areas as well as the state of China/Taiwan representation in the Olympic movement constituted an immediate context prior to the eruption, escalation and termination of the summer 1976 crisis.

1. Immediate Context:

(1) Canadian related practice in sport:

Teams Taiwan encountered series of visa problem before the Olympic Games.⁵ This first involved cyclists and judo competitors in 1974 and early 1975 in which both Taiwanese teams were denied entry after they refused to use titles other than "the Republic of China" on Canadian soil.

In another instance, a Taiwanese amateur boxing team accepted the invitation of the Canadian Amateur Boxing Association (CABA) to participate in an international tournament which was organized according to Olympic categories and held in Montreal at the end of 1975. After having received a protest from the PRC embassy, the DEA attempted to dissuade the CABA from inviting the Nationalist

⁵ As a matter of fact, Team Taiwan was not alone in having problems with respect to the Canadian entry and sport policies. For example, prior to the Olympics, several visa incidents involved sport teams from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) with whom Canada did not have diplomatic relations until 1977. (Morse 1987:10-1)

team but failed. The DEA then recommended that the team be denied entry if it insisted on proclaiming itself as a representative of the "ROC" and if convincing assurances could not be obtained from the CABA on absence of undesirable political behaviour. (DEA file N,10926,1: Memo for Min Nov.13/75) Ten days later, the Taiwanese team decided not to come to Canada.

The Canadian policy nevertheless was not unique. There is some evidence indicating that Wellington's sport policy might reinforce Ottawa's thinking in the policy area. In the DEA files on the subject, the New Zealand's documents were placed in relevant dossier. For example, the New Zealand Prime Minister, in March 1975, wrote letters to the New Zealand Swimming Association and Badminton Federation explaining the government policy with respect to the entry and designation of Taiwanese groups. As the two hosting organizations invited Taiwanese teams to participate, Wellington decided to allow them in only if they agreed to compete in entirely personal capacity. These letters, together with a copy of question and answer in New Zealand's House of Representatives on Taiwanese Boy Scouts attending a jamboree event there, were sent by the Canadian High Commissioner to Ottawa for reference. (DEA file M, 3060: Let to USSEA Apr.23/75)

Having shown the related practices, I should further

note that the issue of the China/Taiwan representation in the Olympic movement has been ongoing for decades. The eruption of the Montreal Olympics crisis no doubt could be attributed to the unresolved problem.

(2) The PRC/ROC Puzzle in the Olympics:

China had participated in the Olympic movement before 1949.⁶ In 1949, the majority of Chinese Olympic committee members followed the Nationalist government to Taiwan, retaining the IOC's recognition. But some members chose to stay and reorganized on the mainland. In 1952, the IOC invited both teams to participate in the Helsinki Olympics, although it had not recognized the new PRC's sport association. Beijing sent a team whereas Taipei did not. In 1954, the PRC-based organization, under the name of the "Olympic Committee of the Chinese Republic", was formally recognized as a National Olympic Committee (NOC). Meanwhile, the existing NOC in Taiwan continued to be accepted as the "Chinese Olympic Committee". A "two-Chinas" situation was then created in the Olympiad. Nevertheless, both NOCs requested the IOC to de-recognize the other, which was rejected by Avery Brundage, the then President of the IOC. Both NOCs were invited to take part in the 1956 Melbourne

⁶ The China National Amateur Athletic Federation was recognized by the IOC as the National Olympic Committee (NOC) in 1924. The ROC sent teams to participate in 1932, 1936 and 1948, respectively. (Chan 1985:473; Liu 1994:89-90)

Olympics. The PRC while refusing to send a team continued to protest against the "two Chinas" situation and finally decided to withdraw its membership in 1958. (Chan 1985: 473-5; Liu 1994:91; DEA file J,3056,2: Inf Note May/75)

In May 1959, the IOC passed a motion, made by Lord Killanin who later succeeded as the IOC President in 1972, asking the NOC in Taiwan to change its name and reapply for recognition in order to avoid confusion in the sport field since the COC in Taiwan could no longer control the sport activity on the mainland. (Killanin 1983:103) In July 1959 the COC in Taiwan complied and re-applied under the name of the "Republic of China Olympic Committee" (ROCOC). This re-application was later approved by the IOC in 1960, but with qualification that the contingent of athletes from the ROCOC, for reasons of expediency, must compete under the name of "Taiwan". (ROCOC 1977: 28) Nevertheless, the ROCOC delegation would be allowed to fly the ROC flag and play its national anthem. Initially resisting the qualifier, Taipei grudgingly agreed to participate under the title but paraded with a placard of "under protest". Taiwan's achievements in the Rome competition were a mixed blessings. On the one hand, C.K. Yang, who served as acting director in 1976 delegation, won a silver medal in the decathlon competition. On the other, the ROCOC's entering into competition under an IOC-imposed title of "Taiwan", for the Canadian government

as it turned out later, constituted a precedent applicable to the 1976 Games. (Frolic 1996: 8)

Nevertheless, the arrangement of expediency was later rectified and subsequently the athletes from the ROCOC participated in the Olympic Games at Sapporo, Munich and Innsbruck under its formal national title. However, it should be noted that the use of the label "ROC" by the ROCOC did not mean to sustain a claim of controlling amateur sports of all of China, as it often implied in Taipei government's official "one China" policy at the time. Indeed, in the ROCOC official record, by drawing instances of participation by divided countries, ie both Koreas and Germans, it explicitly recognized that it did not represent the sports activities on the mainland. (ROCO 1977: 28)

Meanwhile, at the end of the Cultural Revolution, the PRC became more active in sport field. The "Ping-pong diplomacy" in the early 1970s signalled a beginning of new wave of engagement in world sports. Indeed, before it moved towards more open international diplomacy--initially through international table tennis contacts---it had attempted to set up rival international sports organizations. Then, as a major victory in sport recognition, without formal application, Beijing was admitted to the 1974 Teheran Asian Games. By contrast, Taiwan, as a formal member of the Asian Sport Federation, was excluded from that event. Initially,

the IOC which sanctioned the Games threatened to withdraw its patronage but finally acquiesced. (Frolic 1996:3)

The role Canada played in the PRC's increasingly active involvement in international sports was certainly significant. After the establishment of diplomatic relations Ottawa and Beijing set up a variety of sport exchange programs. (DEA file L,3059) As time elapsed, the Canadian side discovered that the Chinese had a larger agenda than the exchange programs, that is to lobby on their behalf to gain admission to international sport organizations. As testified by Frolic, the then First Secretary in charge of the exchange program in the embassy in Beijing, "Canada was subjected to a steady diet of rhetoric" expecting Canada to arrange for their participation in the 1976 Olympic Games. (Frolic 1996:4) In November 1974, the All China Sports Federation (ACSF) formally raised to the Canadian officials the issues of its participation in the 1976 Olympics. (DEA file J,3056,2: Inf Memo to EAD Feb.19/75) Eventually, on April 17, 1975, the PRC formally submitted its admission requests to the IOC.

On Taiwan's part, under the Premiership of Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek, Taipei had adopted some new measures to promote multilateral diplomacy in September 1972. This made it possible for Taiwanese to attend alongside Beijing representatives in some NGO activities

provided that the ROC's title and sovereignty were not compromised in their presence. (Liu & Tsai 1993: 101)

Subsequently, in April 1973, Taipei's basic position on participation in international sport activities, including the 1976 Olympics, had been taken in a meeting of Membership Task Force of the ROCOC. It was decided that:

Under no circumstance should the designation of the (ROC) be changed. In order to retain and protect memberships thereby continuing to struggle with the 'bandits' (sic) to the end, in the last resort, we would have no objection to the proposal raised by some friendly countries or their delegates to add '(Taiwan)' after the 'Republic of China'. However, in such case, after this proposal was accepted, we should express our regret emphasizing that we regard 'Taiwan' as reference to where our sport organizations at present were in control of related activities in Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. (quoted from Liu and Tsai 1993:103; translated by this author)

The bottom line designation acceptable to the ROCOC thus was "Republic of China (Taiwan)". This position was certainly not unknown to the Canadians which should now be turned to.

(3) Montreal and Canadian Policy Deliberation:

The bid for being a host city for 1976 Olympics started as early as the late 1960s. Montreal was competing with Los Angeles and Moscow. To support for Montreal's bid, Trudeau signed a letter extending "hearty welcome and cordial invitation" to those who are associated with the Olympic Games. (DEA file J,3056,2: Trudeau Let to Brundage May 21/69) Later in November 1969, Mitchell Sharp formally undertook to the IOC that:

All parties representing the (NOCs) and International Sports Federations recognized by the IOC will be free to enter Canada pursuant to the normal regulations. I should be pleased to provide any further information respecting these regulations should you desire it.. (Ibid: Sharp Let to IOC Nov.28/69)

The Sharp's letter and especially the qualifier, made at the time when Ottawa-Taipei diplomatic relations were not broken off, turned out to be a controversial object in the 1976 Olympics. The insertion of that qualifier at the time, as acknowledged by the DEA officials, was "largely to affect the form of admission, ie national passports and visas as distinct from group or individual 'Olympic passports'. It was not conceived as a device to frustrate participation by a duly accredited (NOC).." (DEA file N,10926,1: BPA Memo to EAD Dec.16/74) In an interview by this author, Mitchell Sharp retrospectively also denied the comments in some media that the qualifier was designed to forestall possible trouble caused by the GDR.⁷ Eventually, Montreal won the bid in May 1970, when the Sino-Canadian normalization had yet to be actualized.

⁷ However, he was not able to confirm or disconfirm that what Ottawa had in mind was actually Taiwan. The interview was conducted on Nov.5, 1998. On the other hand, there was analysis based on media commentary argued that the qualifier "was appended because Canada foresaw the possibility of embarrassment with its NATO partners and wanted to prevent the kind of imbroglio that eventually transpired over Taiwan. At the time, however, the potential problem was seen as East Germany.." (Macintosh and Hawes 1994: 45)

Ottawa began its policy deliberation on the Montreal Olympics in 1974. The EAD's study on the Chinese/Taiwanese participation in the Games was first drafted in late 1974, which was sent to other units and Beijing embassy for comment. Several issues such as the 1969 commitment, governmental involvement in hosting the event, nomenclature and politicization were major focuses. Insofar as Sharp's 1969 letter was concerned, Beijing embassy was of the view that the "1969 undertaking will not be considered binding by most countries in light of the 1972 UN decision (on the China representation there)". (DEA file J,3056,2: Pek Tels to Ott Nov.15; Dec.27/74) Meanwhile, the DEA conducted a comprehensive survey of politicization in the Olympic movement by highlighting the cases of East Germany, Rhodesia and South Africa in their manipulation of or exclusion from the movement. It also discovered that:

In many countries the NOC appears to be an extension of the national government and of its prestige into the Olympic sphere, implementing the foreign policies as well as sports policies of its national government..this..is the attitudes of both of the government in Taiwan and that of the PRC government...(and concluded that) in theory the Olympics are apolitical, in practice they are not.. (Ibid: EAD Memo to Inf Div Jan.7/75)

Overall, the implications of these studies appear to be such that since the movement has been highly politicized and the question of nomenclature regarding China has been solved by the UN, possible Canadian government policy action by

sticking to "normal regulations" in the Montreal Olympics should not cause much hurdle. This interpretation presumably had considerable impact on the final decision with respect to Taiwanese participation in the 1976 Olympics. Meanwhile, there were also constraints that pulled Canada from being too strong a public advocate of the PRC since the issue of Beijing's eligibility was within the jurisdiction of the IOC. (Frolic 1996:5) In Ottawa's calculation, the best scenario would be for the IOC to solve the China/Taiwan puzzle by admitting Beijing while "reconfiguring" Taiwan's status well before the Olympics.

About one week after Beijing's formal application for "restoring" its IOC membership, the DEA delegates eventually met Lord Killanin in Toronto. One version of record showed that Arthur Andrew, Assistant USSEA, reminded Killanin of the terms of Canadian recognition of the PRC as the sole legal government of China and expressed the hope that the PRC would become a member of the IOC in time for the 1976 Games. (Frolic 1996:5)⁸ According to this version, Andrew

⁸ The record of that meeting, together with some crucial documents, were removed from the files in accordance with the Access to Information Act. One study noted that there exist conflicting reports on what actually went on at the meeting and the "grave misunderstandings between Killanin and the SSEA". (Macintosh and Hawes 1994:47) Frolic (1996), however, seemed to gain unique access to the minutes of the meeting. This thesis in dealing with the meeting and the DEA's justification cited sources from Frolic's, and presumably official, account of the story.

did not explicitly say that a Taiwan team could not participate, but when pressed by Killanin for an assurance on Taiwanese entry, he responded that this was a Ministerial decision and declined to make it specific. (Frolic 1996: 5-6) The Canadian reluctance to specify possible policy actions was largely out of strategic consideration. It was deliberated that the PRC application was on the agenda of the IOC and Killanin was invited to visit Beijing, and that stating the possible Canadian policy action a year before the Games would have strengthened Killanin's hands, diminishing his motive to solve the China/Taiwan puzzle and have given him the latitude of moving the Games elsewhere if Canada did not modify its position. (Frolic 1996:6)

At the same time, the organizing committee of the Montreal Olympics (COJO) and the DMI had taken steps to prepare for the Games participation. The ROCOC received the official invitation letter dated January 31, 1975. (ROCO 1977:1) Later in April, the Minister of the DMI amended related immigration regulations to allow persons holding the Olympic Identity Cards to enter into Canada from mid-June until August. (DEA file J,3056,1:FIC Let to COJO Apr.11/75)

Subsequently, although the IOC did formally convene to consider the PRC's application in May, with the opposition of the US and the Soviet bloc to the PRC membership, it was unable to reach a decision on the issue. (Macintosh and Hawes

1994: 47-8) Moreover, Killanin's plan to visit Beijing to investigate the Chinese representation issue was later postponed. As time elapsed, Ottawa was under increasing pressure to deliberate policy options and to seek another meeting with Killanin. These preliminary policy actions were not made until February 1976 during the Winter Olympics in Innsbruck, Austria. On the eve of the meeting with Killanin, the DEA listed four policy options, including a possibility of having participation by both Beijing and Taipei through negotiations. (Frolic 1996: 9-10) The DEA, however, gathered from the meeting a "confirmation by Killanin of the unlikelihood of any resolution of the China problem by the IOC during the Innsbruck Winter Games or indeed prior to Montreal". (Frolic 1996:10) The *raison d'être* for the "dual participations" thus was no longer sustainable.

2. Decisions and Counterdecisions At Crises:

As the longstanding Beijing-Taipei representation deadlock in the IOC continued for the moment, Ottawa was forced to narrow down its policy options over the issues of the Taiwanese entry and participation in the imminent summer Olympics. A final decision that was taken in spring 1976 incurred first series of interactions between the IOC and the Canadian government. The IOC's counterdecision in early July and ensuing negotiations over the Taiwanese entry and participation further escalated into an open crisis

involving not only Lausanne and Ottawa, but also Beijing, Taipei and Washington. In this sub-section, the first stage of the Canada-IOC confrontation will first be dealt with, followed by the second phase of crisis.

(1) The Lausanne-Ottawa confrontation:

Approximately two months after the Winter Olympics, in a memorandum, the DEA eventually boiled down Canadian policy options to three:

(1) to take no action..and to allow the entry of a team designated 'Republic of China'; (2) to refuse entry to (such) team; (3) to allow entry to a team on condition that it is designated as something other than 'Republic of China' and adopts a designation that does not include the word 'China'.

It then recommended for the option (3) and added further elaboration of condition of entry "that they will not use any flags, anthems, emblems or other description of the ROC." (DEA file J,3056,2: Memo for Min Apr.20/76)

The memorandum concluded by noting the urgency of informing Killanin of the Canadian formal decision. However, this envisioned notification was actually delayed, as Frolic speculated, in order to "make last-minute cancellation, relocation or postponement of the Olympics more difficult (by the IOC)..". (Frolic 1996:11) On May 21, a memorandum to Pierre Trudeau was approved to the effect that the Canadian government formally decided to adopt the third option. To the extent that the option sought to meet, albeit partially,

the IOC's entry requirement and to address Beijing's demand for inadmission to the Taiwanese team, it constituted a compromise solution that put two otherwise irreconcilable positions into a conditional statement of policy. Indeed, it was regarded as "the most defensible position whatever happens this summer." (Frolic 1996:11-12)

Subsequently, Mitchell Sharp proceeded to meet James Worrall, representative of the IOC in Canada, to inform him of the decision. In a letter dated May 28, 1976, Sharp made it clear the "intention to apply Canada's normal regulations governing Taiwanese entry to Canada to those persons from Taiwan who will participate in the Olympics." The letter also explicitly cited the precedent in which Taipei competed under the title of "Formosa" in the 1960 Rome Olympics. (DEA file J,3056,1: Sharp Let to Killanin May 28/76)

The letter triggered the first confrontation between Lausanne and Ottawa. Ten days after, Killanin responded that the Canadian suggestions "are in complete conflict with Olympic rules and contrary to the conditions under which Montreal was allotted the Olympic Games." The IOC further confirmed that during the period of the Games it was the supreme authority, which was acknowledged even by Hitler four decades ago, that nomenclatures of Olympic committees, flags, anthems were the prerogatives of the IOC and the NOCs, and that the ROCOC no longer claimed sovereignty over

any sports in the area governed by the PRC. It also referred to the non-interference policy by the Austrian and Soviet governments in the Winter Olympics and the Moscow Universiad. At the end of the letter, Killanin claimed that he had explained the IOC position to the Canadian officials in previous meetings and no objection was raised. (Ibid: Killanin Let to Sharp Jun.8/76)

Before the letter reached Ottawa, however, the DEA had taken a series of actions to implement the policy. It drafted a letter to the DMI seeking cooperation to invalidate the Olympic Identity Cards issued to the ROC the previous year. (Ibid: Memo for Min Jun.10/76) Meanwhile, the DEA notified the PRC the Canadian decision and secretly conveyed the policy and its rationale to the ROC embassy in Washington to ensure crystal understanding of Ottawa's position by Taipei. (DEA file J,3056,3: Ott Tel to WSHDC Jun.9; WSHDC Tel to Ott; Pek Tel to Ott Jun.11/76)

Two weeks later, Killanin telexed to the DEA requesting for Canadian response to his letter. Ottawa subsequently replied that it was unable to confirm Canadian acceptance of his view. (DEA file J,3056,1: Killanin Tel to Sharp Jun.24; MacEachen Tel to Killanin Jun.27/76) In the wake of these fruitless exchanges, the DEA started drafting a statement on Canadian position to prepare for publicizing the issue should situation warrant. (Ibid: Memos for Min Jun.24;30/76)

Meanwhile, it also arranged a face-to-face meeting with Killanin on June 30 to try to solve the confrontation. (DEA file, J, 3056, 2: Ott Tel to Pek Jun. 28/76)

The result of the Frankfurt meeting on June 30 obviously was not positive. The IOC's Lausanne headquarters subsequently issued a strong statement suggesting that the IOC might withdraw its sanction from the Montreal Games, whereas Ottawa also made the issue public in a press conference. (Ibid: Memo for Min Jul. 4/76) Thus, the conflict surged to the fore and was ensued by a crisis involving actors other than the Canadian government and the IOC.

(2) Crisis and Parties Involved:

To be sure, over the issue of the Taiwanese participation, the PRC had a primary interest at stake. Beijing's interference, as the crisis escalated in early July, hence came without much surprise. As well, Taipei and Washington were naturally engulfed in the midst of the crisis. Nevertheless, an earlier intervention by Beijing well before the publication of the Lausanne-Ottawa row should be outlined first for its relevance to the social construction of "one China".

The PRC ambassador formally called on the DEA and presented a Note on May 17 requesting that Ottawa "take all necessary measures to stop the Chiang clique personnel from entering Canada". More importantly, the passage it referred

to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries read that:

The Canadian government recognizes that the government of the (PRC) is the sole legitimate government of China and that Taiwan is a province of China. The Chinese government appreciates this just stand taken by the Canadian.. (bold as my emphasis) (Ibid: PRC Emb Note May 17/76)

The broadening interpretation of the Canadian "formal recognition" of Beijing's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan was significant. However, there was no available evidence showing that the DEA had objected to the interpretation in its return Note which was delivered on June 10.

Moreover, in response to that Canadian statement, the PRC embassy presented another Note categorizing the Canadian policy of a conditional entry for Taiwanese team as "self-contradictory approach". The second PRC Note went further to point out that should Taiwanese be permitted to enter Canada, under whatever names, it would constitute tolerance by the Canadian government of the presence of "two Chinas" or "one China one Taiwan" on Canadian territory. It finally urged again Ottawa to "promptly take resolute and effective measures to stop the Chiang clique personnel from entering Canada.." (Ibid: PRC Note Jul.2/76)

Subsequently, the Canadian Ambassador in Beijing, while claiming his "real sympathies with the indigenous Taiwanese", explicitly suggested that:

(Since) Taiwan is inevitably destined, sooner or later, to be a province of China..(and) this reflects present and apparent future realities, it would be wise for Canada to move with the times and choose the best moment (eg the current Olympic controversy)..to recognize the island of Taiwan as Chinese territory..

Other rationale for the Ambassador to urge such a move at the time included the Canadian interest in peace, order and stability in the area, removal of a remaining irritant in Canadian relations with Beijing, defusing the PRC's criticism of the Canadian Olympic policy and further assistance offered to the Americans in the road to normalization with the PRC. (Ibid: Pek Tel to Ott Jul.6/76)

The Ambassador's proposal on the timing of the move, however, for the Canadian mission in Washington, was objectionable, since it might do more harm to the US-Canada relations in the wake of the American Presidential election and of the widespread negative views by the Americans on the Canadian Olympic policy.(Ibid: WSHDC Tel to Ott Jul.8/76) On the eve of the Taiwanese decision to withdraw, the DEA finally decided that time was not ripe to take the action as proposed by the Ambassador in Beijing, since it "would mark major revision of our China policy." (Ibid: Ott Tel to Pek Jul.15/76)

This episode in which Ottawa was at one moment near to slipping into Beijing's "one China" position nevertheless indicated the seriousness of the crisis. In order to fend off domestic and international criticism, the DEA had

developed series of policy argumentations redefining the issue and ensuing crisis as resulting from the inability of the IOC to solve the Chinese representation in the Olympic movement, rather than from the policy decision of the Canadian government. (Ibid: Note for Tactics Jun.21; Memo for Min Jul.4/76) Meanwhile, the Department had begun to deliberate some compromise options in preference order on the designation, flag and anthem of Taipei team so as to defuse the crisis in collaboration with the IOC. In a manuscript produced after the fruitless exchanges with Killanin, the DEA indicated its preference to have the team designation read as "Taiwan Olympic Committee" with no flag and anthem or ones unrelated to the ROC. The less preferred but acceptable option for the DEA was to have "Taiwan" or "Formosa" designated for the team with a flag resembling the existing ROC one but with Olympic rings superimposed and with anthem none or unrelated to the ROC. (Ibid: Memo for Min Jul.4/76)

On the eve of another meeting with Killanin, the DEA further drafted compromise proposal with a chart of conceivable formulae on name, flag, anthem that included not only the above two options but with expanded deliberation on other possibilities. The gist of the Canadian offer was to find a way in which Taiwanese were regarded as private athletes from an Olympic area, not representatives of a

state or nation. (DEA file J,3056,3: Drafts Jul.9/76)

Nevertheless, international furor had ensued as soon as the fray between Lausanne and Ottawa was publicized.

Immediately after the IOC statement that accused Canada of reneging on its undertaking to all IOC-credited athletes and threatened to remove its sanction on the Montreal Games, Philip Krumm, president of the US Olympic Committee (USOC) also stated that it might withdraw from the Games should the IOC decide to dissociate from the event. (Macintosh and Hawes 1994: 51)

As the opening of the Games was approaching, Killanin and some DEA officials, as also the last attempt from the Department, met to find a way out of the impasse on July 10. While both sides did not officially back down from their respective positions, Killanin later announced a proposal endorsed by the IOC Executive Committee that the Taiwanese participate under the IOC's flag and name. At the same time, however, he made it clear that the IOC would not impose this formula on Taiwan and rebuffed the qualifier in Sharp's 1969 letter as meaningless and its interpretation as being introduced by the DEA after the fact. (DEA file J,3056,3: Sum Jul.13/76) Nevertheless, the IOC proposal was turned down by Taipei.

Meanwhile, Krumm suggested to Henry Hsu, the IOC representative in Taiwan, that the USOC raise a proposal to

the IOC to allow the ROCOC's use of flag and anthem but with a change of designation as "Chinese Taipei" and that it boycott the Games should the IOC reject the American proposal. Krumm reportedly won support from President Ford who himself even called Taipei's Presidential Office to disclose the American plan. Shortly later, Henry Hsu conveyed a message to the Chair of the ROCOC asking him to seek Taipei's approval for the American suggestion as well as to mention that the proposal was endorsed by the Americans. However, the Chair fortuitously failed to convey the latter part of the message. As a result, it was flatly rejected by Premier Chiang Ching-kuo. (Hsu 1998:65-6)

In the last resort, on July 15, Killanin directly approached Trudeau and the latter convened an ad hoc cabinet meeting to discuss the crisis. (Martin 1988:158) Ultimately, in his final intervention, Trudeau agreed to allow the Taiwanese team to fly whatever flag and play whatever anthem, but remained adamant that the team not be designated as the "Republic of China". (Frolic 1996:18) This compromise was accepted by the IOC and the US, but was declined by Taipei. Meanwhile, the IOC's suggestion that the Taiwanese marched under placard "IOC/ROC" was rejected by the Canadian government. (DEA file N,10926,2.1: USAD to US posts Jul.16/76) Taipei's own proposal that it used the designation "Taiwan, ROCOC" was also refused by Ottawa.

(Yang 1976:11) Nevertheless, the reason why Taipei vetoed Trudeau's offer deserves some note.

The basic position of the ROCOC at the early stage of the crisis was twofold: "to support the IOC's efforts to safeguard the Olympic principle to render for Canadian change of attitudes, and not to accept any decision of altering national title into 'Taiwan'". To implement it, while preparing for a contingency plan of withdrawal and expressing its objection to the intrusion of politics into sport, the ROCOC decided to send a team as scheduled. (Liu 1995:84) At the crucial moment when Trudeau's last offer was announced, Taipei's delegation in Montreal was of the view that the ROCOC could accept the compromise since the title "Taiwan" had been used and participation in the Games could ensure its membership in the IOC. Then Henry Hsu's immediate consultation with Taipei was followed by the Nationalist senior officials' pursuing Chiang Ching-kuo in Eastern Taiwan for a final decision. But the Premier ruled that the preservation of the ROC's title, anthem and flag were all required. (Liu 1995:85) This final disapproval could be attributed to the absence of sound and profound argumentation which responsible officials should have made and presented to the Premier at least at the last moment.⁹

⁹ Interview with Mr. Te-chi Chan, a senior manager in the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee (CTOC), in Sep 1997.

The end of the story was for Taipei team to announce its withdrawal from the Games on July 16.

In sum, the whole crisis was largely defused when the Taiwanese team pulled out. Nevertheless, the aftermath of the crisis was far-reaching especially in its implication for the "one China" complex and Taipei's membership crisis in the IOC. These will now be explored further.

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III. The Montreal Aftermath and Olympic Formula:

The final stage of negotiation over the Taiwanese participation and the final withdrawal of the ROCOC were significant. In an immediate term, it disclosed the divergence between Ottawa and Beijing over how Taipei's participation should be tackled. In the medium-longer term, it facilitated the IOC under Killanin's leadership to find ways to resolve the longstanding China representation problem, which culminated in an "Olympic formula" in the early 1980s. Finally, the confidential official contact between Ottawa and Taipei's delegates in the process revealed the ceilings of bilateral relations under the "one China" framework. This section will explore these three aspects of repercussions.

1. Ottawa-Beijing Contradiction:

Well before the DEA formally conveyed its decision on the conditional admission of the Taiwanese, the PRC had

pressed for an unconditional denial of the Taiwanese entry, as mentioned above. Furthermore, as the Lausanne-Ottawa row was publicized, the PRC Ambassador sought an interview with R.L.Rogers, the acting Assistant Secretary, to express concern over the Canadian approach. He was reminded that:

In view of Canada's firm stand, it is hoped..Taiwan athletes in fact will not appear..(, that) there was no 'two China' connotation involved in Canadian policy on the Olympic issue..(and that) Canada did attempt to advance the PRC position at Innsbruck (Winter Olympics).. (DEA file A,8775,28: Mtg Rcd Jul.6/76)

As soon as Trudeau announced the last compromise offer allowing the Taiwanese to wave the ROC flag, singing its anthem but insisting on the designation of Taiwan, the PRC Ambassador called on Rogers to express his surprise and disappointment at the Canadian retreat and finally reiterated his hope that Canada "would resist pressures from the superpowers." (DEA file,N,10926,2.1: Jul.19/76¹⁰)

Interestingly, Beijing's most harsh criticism on the Canadian approach came to the latter's ears through the Australians. The embassy in Beijing grudgingly reported that their Australian colleagues had been harangued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry officials in an Australian-hosted social function. The Chinese Director in charge of Canadian affairs had relentlessly lashed his angry tirade on Canada to his Australian hosts. (Ibid: Pek Tel to Ott Jul.20/76)

¹⁰ No addressee was mentioned in the document.

Though senior officials from both sides tried to downplay the displeasure as being "official rather than real" (Ibid: BAPA Memo to EAD Jul.28/76), Rogers was eventually instructed to make a representation to the Ambassador expressing disappointment at the Chinese lack of gratitude for the unique Canadian efforts "in a direction favourable to China". (DEA file,N,10926, 2.2: Memo for Min Aug.3/76)

2. Taiwan and the Olympic Formula:

Taipei's final decision to withdraw from the Games "bitterly disappointed" Killanin. (Frolic 1996:19) Meanwhile, the IOC meeting in Montreal ratified a rule stipulating that the name of the NOC must reflect the territory controlled by the country and must be approved by the IOC. This provided the rationale for the IOC's later requests for a change of the ROCOC's title. (Liu 1995:86) After the end of the Games, Killanin took initiatives to consult all IOC members and affiliated international sport federations on the China/Taiwan representation problem.

On its part, in the aftermath of the withdrawal, the ROCOC mobilized its resources and set tone for policy defence aiming to preserve its membership. One of the basic argumentations for the targeted international sport audience was to decouple the issue of Taipei's membership with the Chinese representation and to emphasize the fact that the PRC has never ruled Taiwan. (Liu 1995:88-90) Moreover, one

year after the Olympics, three proposed new designations were put forward for future cabinet discussion: "Chung Hwa Olympic Committee", "Chinese Olympic Committee in Taiwan" and "National Committee in Taipei City". (Liu 1995: 91)

Later, the proposal was revised as three measures:

- 1) trying every means to procrastinate discussion on the 'China representation' question;
- 2) if 1) fails and the ROCOC title must be altered, try to seek friendly members' initiating and endorsing... 'Chinese National Olympic Committee (Taipei)';
- 3) if 2) fails and the IOC imposes "Taiwan" on us, lodge protest but not withdraw from the organization to keep Beijing out. (Liu 1995: 92-3)

In late November 1977 Premier Chiang remarked "the case should be tackled on the principle of not withdrawing thereby continuously excluding Beijing", but disapproved the proposed change of designation. His adamant position on the designation was reaffirmed in the wake of Killanin and the IOC's new initiatives to propose a new name for the ROCOC in early 1978. (Liu 1995:93-4)

Once the PRC established diplomatic relations with the US and proposed a "one country two systems" formula to unify Taiwan peacefully in January 1979, it altered its previous stance of excluding Taiwan as prerequisite for its membership in international organization. This new gesture and the proposal of resolving the Taiwan problem through direct cross-straits talks obviously won Killanin's support, but was declined by Taipei. Subsequently, a proposal to have

the ROCOC changed to "Chinese Olympic Committee (Taipei)" and to admit the PRC as "Chinese Olympic Committee (Peking)" that was put forward in the IOC Executive Committee meeting was accepted by Taipei but was turned down by Killanin and Beijing. (Liu 1995: 97-8) Nevertheless, the general meeting at Montevideo, Uruguay held in April passed a resolution to recognize the Chinese Olympic Committee located in Beijing, to maintain recognition of the Chinese Olympic Committee located in Taipei, and to continue to work out all matters relating to names, anthems, flags and constitutions of the two committees as soon as possible. (Chan 1985:480; Liu 1995: 99) Killanin however objected to this resolution. As well, Beijing denounced the resolution as "creating two Chinas".

Subsequently, as if to respond to Beijing's cause, the IOC Executive Committee meeting in San Juan, Puerto Rico in June confirmed the PRC's title as the "Chinese Olympic Committee" and recommended the ROCOC be renamed as the "Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee" with a different anthem and flag. (Chan 1985: 481; Liu 1995: 101) The formula of equity reference to both committees adopted in Montevideo general meeting was thus removed. Upon learning the new resolution, the Chair of the ROCOC immediately inquired if the new reference would imply central-local jurisdiction. While not responding to the inquiry, the IOC ironically took

the ROCOC's argument that "Taipei" was preferred to "Taiwan" since "the jurisdiction area of Taipei is broader than Taiwan" and held the ROCOC responsible for withdrawing from the Montreal Olympics. (Liu 1995: 101-2)

At the IOC Executive Committee meeting in Nagoya, Japan in October 1979, Killanin submitted a resolution to the 89 IOC members for a postal vote on the China/Taiwan issue. However, in the postal vote package, obviously with an intention to affect voting, the IOC secretariat attached a letter from the US State Department indicating American non-recognition of the ROC flag, anthem as symbol of sovereignty and added that "if the ROC athletes are allowed to use the ROC title, flag and anthem to participate in the 1980 Lake Placid Winter Olympics, another incident like the Montreal Olympics would recur.." It is also reported that all the postal ballots were photocopied. (Hsu 1998: 68-9)

Nevertheless, the results of the vote supported the resolution by a margin of 62 to 17 with 2 spoiled. Thus, Beijing was admitted as "Chinese Olympic Committee" whereas the ROCOC was required to rename itself as "Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee" (CTOC). Taipei had also to submit its new flag, anthem and emblem to the IOC Executive Committee for approval by January 1980. (Chan 1985:481; Liu 1995:104) The "Olympic formula" then came into being.

It should be added that when Killanin put the Nagoya

resolution for postal vote, the ROCOC and Henry Hsu filed two separate lawsuits at the Lausanne Civil District Court claiming that the resolution and postal vote violate the IOC rules. While the ROCOC lost its battle, Hsu's case went forward and dragged on for more than one year. Through the diplomacy of Juan Antonio Samaranch, who succeeded Killanin in 1980, Hsu's case was eventually dropped. In a formal agreement in March 1981, Taipei accepted the resolution of renaming the ROCOC as the CTOC adopting a new flag, anthem and emblem in exchange for the IOC's assurance that the CTOC would be equally treated as every NOC with equal status and rights and that the IOC would help the CTOC regain memberships in international sports federations. (Chan 1985:482; Hsu 1998:78-85; Liu 1995:112-117) Therefore, with the "Olympic formula" being reaffirmed, the China representation issue in the Olympic movement was finally settled. The 1984 Los Angeles Olympics was the first event where the Olympic formula was applied to allow both teams from Beijing and Taipei to participate.¹¹

In sum, the Montreal Olympics of 1976 had cast a far-reaching shadow over the eventual resolution of the

¹¹ After being admitted to the IOC, Beijing sent a team to the Lake Placid Winter Olympics in Feb 1980. Meanwhile, the ROCOC while initiating lawsuits in Lausanne and New York was barred from participating. When the PRC later joined the boycott led by the US in the 1980 Moscow Olympics, Taipei's membership was temporarily suspended since its new flag and anthem had not been decided. (Chan 1985: 483-4)

China/Taiwan representation in the Olympic movement in 1981. Additionally, the crisis of the Montreal Olympics also highlighted the need for some sort of official communication between Ottawa and Taipei's delegates. This testifies to the prevalence of the "one China" framework in setting parameters for the conduction and form of bilateral contacts, as will be outlined in next section.

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IV. Limitation of Official Contacts:

Over the Montreal Olympics issue, as mentioned above, soon after Ottawa had finalized its decision on Taiwanese entry, the information was relayed to the officials in the ROC's embassy in Washington in early June. As well, as the problem precipitated in early July, the confidential channel was again employed to communicate directly with Taipei's diplomats there. These actions from the Canadian part begged the issue of the limitation of official contact between Ottawa and Taipei and tested the boundaries of the Canadian "one China" framework in the aftermath of de-recognition of 1970. This section will explore the nature and scope of the contact in three aspects: Canadian interaction with the Taiwanese diplomats; Canadian officials' travel to Taiwan and visits to Taiwan by the Members of Parliament.

1. Contact with Taiwanese Diplomats:

As in the cases of designation and admission policy

toward Taiwan, another major effect of de-recognizing the ROC was for Ottawa to regulate the contacts with Taipei officials. Upon severing diplomatic ties, several Canadian posts had sought guidance from the Headquarters on the form of contacts with Taiwanese diplomats. (DEA file D,8788,5: WLGTN Tel to Ott Oct.14; MNL Tel to Ott Oct.15; Saigon Tel to Ott Oct.28/70) Ottawa then decided that:

There should be no contacts on the part of Canadian representatives with Taiwanese..at what might be termed 'political' level. Technical and commercial relationships (that serve Canadian interests) will be maintained but (through special arrangements)..At social level Canadian representatives should not accept or extend official invitations from or to Taiwanese.. Personal contacts, particularly when they serve a Canadian interest, are permissible and..normal rules of good manners continue to apply although undue affability should also be avoided.. Official notes or other communications from Taiwan representatives need not be returned but should not be acknowledged except when specific points of contact have been arranged... (Ibid: Ott Tels to all posts Oct.29/70)

Meanwhile, the DEA also instructed its Consulate General in New York to contact Taipei agents to seek for an agreement that New York should serve as normal point of contact for all consular matters, which was eventually reached. (Ibid: Ott Tel to NY Oct.29; NY Tels to Ott Nov.2; 3/70) Furthermore, it directed that correspondence with Taiwanese authorities will not be conducted on official stationery. (Ibid: Gdl Nov.3/70)

This policy was then further elaborated in the process of applying rules to various situations. For example, when

the issue of how to deal with the Taiwanese representative serving as the Dean of Diplomatic Corps arose in early 1971, consultations within the DEA and with other countries for their practices ensued. (DEA file, 8789,6: KTN Tel to Ott Jan.26; Ott Tel to KTN Jan.27; EAD Memo to PTC Jan.28; KTN Tels to Ott Apr.19;20/71) It was then decided that the Canadian representatives should "avoid terms conferring of state representatives and instead use terms such as 'mister'" when situation required conversation with their Taiwanese counterparts. (DEA file, 8789,8: Ott Tel to PRET Dec.21/72; Ott Tel to MNL May 24/73) Similarly, a Canadian mission was instructed to draw distinction between the "ROC Ambassador" as "representative of his country" and "Dean of Diplomatic Corps" to decide on which occasion invitations should be accepted or extended to. (Ibid: PRET Tel to Ott Jul.3; Ott Tel to PRET Jul.11/73)

Moreover, a designated channel for official contacts had been arranged in Washington for both Ottawa and Taipei's delegates to sort out their differences in textile import restraint in annual meetings. This channel was also employed for other technical communication. For example, Revenue Canada officials were advised to investigate alleged undervaluation or dumping by Taiwanese exporters through the Washington channel first. (Ibid: EAD Memos to LAD/CPD Mar.8; Ott Tel to WSHDC May 30/74)

It should be added that this designated channel was employed for contacts not only over issues of non-political nature but also for political ones should situation warrant. As mentioned above, in the midst of the Fifth BCITF, the DEA had contacted the ROC embassy there to help correct the undue public display of the ROC nomenclature by Taipei delegation in Vancouver. The Washington channel was heavily utilized for necessary communications during the Montreal Olympics. The issue of using "commercial channel for non-commercial purpose" then was raised by a senior Canadian official in Washington embassy. Major concerns were about a misleading signal the Taiwanese officials might have received from the Canadian action as well as about the risk of having Ottawa depend on Taipei's cooperation. (DEA file D,8789,8: Turner Let to Small May 19/77)

The headquarters, in response, explained the major reason for initiating the contact during the Montreal Olympics was because "Killanin did not pass key information to the Taiwanese". While acknowledging some contradictions implied in the approach, it reasserted the necessity to leave the channel open at some moment and reassured that the propriety of official contacts was judged on case-by-case basis in relation to the obligation assumed under diplomatic relations with the PRC and they would be minimized "to a discrete level". (Ibid: Small Let to Turner May 30/77)

The Washington channel did not cease to exist in the immediate aftermath of the Sino-American normalization in January 1979. Nor did the form of confidential contact change. On the contrary, the DEA instructed its embassy in Washington to continue to minimize official contacts with the "privatized" the CCNAA, the unofficial Taiwanese representative office, until further authorization. Thus, it advised the embassy not to respond to query from the Taiwanese on apple purchase, partly because "there have been several efforts in recent weeks by Taiwan to imbue slightest contacts with Canadians with official tinge and to probe or push for possible changes in government attitudes, now that new government is in office." (DEA file A,8775,30: Ott Tel to WSHDC Sep.28/79) The Washington channel of official contacts in need presumably was only replaced later by the exchanges of bilateral unofficial representative offices which will be explored in next chapter.

2. Canadian officials' travel to Taiwan:

The de-recognition of the ROC also necessitated new sets of regulations on Canadian officials' travel to Taiwan. Immediately after the rupture of official ties, the DEA instructed its staff members of all posts abroad holding diplomatic passports not to apply to the ROC missions for visas, although this rule was later amended to allow those holding ordinary passports to obtain Taiwanese visa in New

York. (DEA file,D,8788,5: Ott Tels to all posts Oct.15/70)
Later this was embodied in a guidance which further specified that "Canadian officials while in Taiwan should maintain a low profile, endeavoured to avoid publicity and keep official contacts at as low a level as possible."(Ibid: Gdl Nov.3/70)

Notwithstanding the new rule, Canadian trade officials in Manila were not given a green light to travel to the island until early March 1971. (DEA file D,8789,6: Ott Tel to MNL Mar.2/71) As for the DEA-affiliated officials there, the first private visit was not approved until early 1973. Rationale for previous discouragement lay in the suspicion that Taipei "might use the occasion to create politically embarrassing situation in beginning Sino-Canadian relations." (DEA file D,8789,8: Ott Tel to MNL Jan.2/73) The trial case was then institutionalized in spring but diplomats concerned were asked to seek Ottawa's approval first, to use the greatest circumspection and to file ex posto travel reports. (Ibid: Ott Tel to MNL/HK Apr.18/73)

The institutionalization of low-profile visits were not severely affected by the Montreal Olympics incident. For example, a Chinese language student residing in Hong Kong, later on ascending as a senior official, after having spent a week in Taipei, reported his impressions of Taiwan. (Ibid: Stephens Memo to USSEA Oct.20/76) The practice also

continued well beyond the 1970s. Indeed, the archival files revealed that as late as the mid-1980s, the Canadian officials posted in Hong Kong had made several carefully managed, low-key, functional visits to Taiwan. (DEA file, A,8775,32: HK Tel to Ott Apr.17/84) Nevertheless, compared to the bureaucrats or officials' visits, the tours by the Canadian MPs were much more controversial in the aftermath of publicity and ensuing protests from Beijing.

3. MPs' Visits to Taiwan:

The first case of the MP's planned visit to Taiwan involved a MP's scheduled tour in early October 1973, which coincided with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's upcoming official visit to the PRC. The MP's secretary was then reminded of the political motive of the Nationalist invitation. (DEA file D,8789,8: BAPA Memo to Min Aug.8/73)

The DEA officials later made similar but more active intervention when a planned visit in early 1976 by two Parliamentary Secretaries (PS) of federal ministers was disclosed. The EAD, believing that the visits would be paid for by Taipei and were organized by its public relations representatives in Canada, suggested that the USSEA speak to his colleagues to cancel the trip lest that their visit should be misinterpreted by Taipei as a form of de facto recognition. (Ibid: EAD Memo to USSEA Dec.29/75)

Subsequently, the USSEA proposed that the Minister send a

letter to all of his cabinet colleagues and the PSs explaining Canadian policy of discouraging official contacts with Taiwan. (Ibid: Memo for Min Feb.18/76)

The sensitivity of the MPs' visits and Beijing's concerns over the issue persisted. The priority to ensure smooth relations with the PRC prompted the DEA to institutionalize the policy when Joe Clark's Progressive Conservative government was sworn into office. The USSEA then sought Flora MacDonald's approval for a reaffirmation of the policy of discouraging even private visits by the MPs to Taiwan and recommended that the SSEA sign a drafted memo to the new Prime Minister for his approval.¹² (DEA file A,8775,30: Memo for Min Oct.2; Memo for PM Oct.9/79) Meanwhile, the converging concerns of the DEA and Beijing over the issue became more and more evident as those pro-Taiwan MPs turned more active in pressing for mutual establishment of some form of institutional representation.

As the problem lingered, it also became one of the subjects of international consultation. For example, in November 1982, Ottawa sought Tokyo's provision of information on its experience. (DEA file A,8775,32: Ott Tel to Tokyo Nov.1/82) In fact, the practice of international

¹² In June 4, 1979, Joe Clark formed a Progressive Conservative Government. His party and several key figures were often categorized as more receptive to the Nationalist views. However, his Prime Ministership lasted merely for nine months. See (Bothwell, Drummond & English 1989: 330-334).

consultation was not confined solely to the subject. Prior to the escalation of the Montreal Olympics crisis, the DEA sent telegrams to its missions in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Italy, New Zealand, Sweden and West Germany, inquiring about their respective practices with respect to various aspects of their unofficial relations with Taiwan, including their handling officials' visits to Taiwan and government contact with Taiwanese representatives. (DEA file D,8789,8: Ott Tels to Bonn et al Apr.12/76) Related information was collected from those posts. (Ibid: WLGTN/Bonn Tels to Ott Apr.15; Bru/Vienna Tels to Ott Apr.21; CNBRA/Rome Tels to Ott Apr.22; STKHM Tel to Ott Apr.26/76) This institutional learning and diffusion is also evident in the establishment of unofficial representation, which can be partly attributed to the MP's visits and will be examined in next chapter.

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V. Summary:

This chapter explored the internal elaboration of the "one China" structure as demonstrated first in the case of post-1970 Canadian policy towards Taiwan with respect to the entry and nomenclature of Taiwanese visitors to participate in international activities held in Canada. Several incidents occurred mainly because of Beijing's protests. As a result, the broken ties were imbued with shaky trust and

increasing suspicion, which had precipitated the bilateral relations between Ottawa and Taipei prior to the eruption of the Montreal Olympic crisis. These were the subject of the first section.

The chapter then examined the 1976 Montreal Olympics incident as the most noted instance of the implementation of post-1970 Canadian policy toward Taiwan under "one China" framework. It was argued that while the eruption of the crisis was related to the implementation of existent "one China" policy and policy deliberation taking for granted politicization of Olympics and resolution of Taiwan's nomenclature, it was attributable to a longstanding deadlock of the China/Taiwan representation in the Olympic movement. As the IOC failed to resolve the issue in the multilateral setting, Canada was forced to tackle the problem of the Taiwanese participation in a mainly bilateral setting. In keeping balance between its relations with Lausanne and Beijing, Ottawa offered a middle course compromise. That was to allow in the Taiwanese team provided they respected the integrity of the Canadian "one China" policy. This provision was initially embodied in a decision of a "three no" conditional admission: no display of the ROC flag, no play of its anthem, and no self-naming as the representative of China. On the eve of the opening ceremony of the Games, Trudeau, while dropping the first two conditions, remained

adamant on the designation of "Taiwan". At the time, this proved to be unacceptable to Chiang Ching-kuo and ended in Taipei's pull-out of the Games. It should be stressed that Trudeau's intervention was instrumental in the Canadian decision on the 1976 Montreal Olympics.

Subsequently, the chapter explored the aftermath of the Montreal Olympics especially in its far-reaching impact on the ultimate resolution of the China/Taiwan stalemate in the Olympic movement. The solution was the "Olympic formula" by which Beijing was admitted as the "Chinese Olympic Committee" whereas Taipei retained its membership in the IOC under the new title of "Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee". Trudeau's Olympic policy at some moment betrayed underlying contradiction between Ottawa and Beijing over the issue of Taiwanese participation.

The chapter then proceeded to outline the ramifications of the "one China" recognition on Ottawa's official contacts with diplomats from Taipei, Canadian officials as well as the MPs' visits to Taiwan. It was demonstrated that the range, site and frequency of official contact was significantly restricted with a view to maintaining a consistent "one China" policy while preserving some room for flexibility in dealing with Taipei should situations such as the Olympics crisis warrant. Moreover, bureaucrats' trips to Taiwan were kept in "unofficial" and low-key manners lest

publicity damage Canadian interests in its relations with the PRC. Similarly, the DEA wished to tone down the MPs' visits to Taiwan. However, since they were largely beyond government whips, an embarrassing situation might take place to the extent that the problem constituted a major irritant from the DEA's perspective.

It should be stressed finally that the internal elaboration of "one China" structure in various policy areas, like in the process of negotiation and normalization with Beijing discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, proceeded through the mechanism of institutional learning and diffusion. The study on Ottawa's handling its relations with Taipei on related issues in this chapter shows that "one China" knows no international boundaries.

CHAPTER SEVEN: ADAPTABILITY I: INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF RESIDENT REPRESENTATION

As the world-wide social construction of "one China" through diplomatic recognition and ensuing policy elaboration came into shape, Taiwan became marginalized in real politik world. Nevertheless, it continued to thrive at least in global economic community. The very survival process through continuous adaptation to the broader institutional development deserves elaboration.

In general, Taiwan's adaptation can be manifested in its readjustment of social bases, internal and external, of legitimacy, as well as in the shift of its diplomatic approach and policy argumentation. Both aspects of adaptation are interrelated and will be explored in next chapter. It was also made through the institutionalization of unofficial representative offices in countries that derecognized the ROC. Since this is often linked to a reciprocal private representation in Taiwan by those countries concerned thereby being part of aforementioned "one China" policy elaboration, this chapter will primarily deal with this subject.

As mentioned in Chapter 5, almost immediately after derecognition by Tokyo and Washington, Taipei set up the EARA in Japan and the CCNAA in the USA as substitutes for official missions. In return, the Americans and the Japanese had parallel presence of resident representation (ie the AIT

and the ICA). Despite their "unofficial" nature, these offices generally were organized with functional differentiation comparable to formal diplomatic missions and sanctioned through the state's arms of foreign service to the extent that they were often heralded as the prime examples of virtual representation.

Canada's road to the exchange of this form of institutional representation with Taiwan was significant, though it did not lead the way as it did in the recognition of Beijing. (Indeed, the Canadian process of "bringing back Taipei" came relatively late, compared to many other western nations and its Latin American neighbours. (Kao 1994: 360-2; 367-71)) The long march process and the adoption of incrementalism however testified to the strength and tenacity of the "one China" structure in the Canadian minds. This makes the Canadian instance distinct and thus is worth exploring as a micro subject.

This chapter will begin with the search for an appropriate institutional representation by Ottawa and Taipei in the turbulent 1970s. Then, it will be followed by the process of institutionalization in the 1980s and 1990s. The eventual accomplishment of exchanges of unofficial representation between both sides will then be linked to the global diffusion process of functional and virtual representation related to Taipei.

I. Road to Resident Representation:

The issue of unofficial Taiwanese representation in Canada was interwoven with that of similar Canadian institutional presence on the island. Indeed, as will be explored later, this involves a parallel long process in which both sides sought to establish some sort of representation in each other's territory in the 1970s, yet the eventual realization of a reciprocal exchange of the authoritative offices, albeit not simultaneously, did not take place until the early 1990s. From the Canadian perspective, the issue of unofficial representation constituted an integral part of the Canadian "one China" policy ramifications, the majority of which were related to policies of designation, admission, sport, official contact, officials and MPs' visits to Taiwan, as examined in last chapter. This section will trace the development of the issue of resident representation in the Canadian setting in the 1970s, with its fruition in the 1980s and 1990s left for next section.

As mentioned in Chapter 4, prior to the Sino-Canadian negotiations in Stockholm, the Canadian China Policy Review actually left open the option of Ottawa-Taipei mutual exchange of trade offices. At the early and late stages of the negotiations, the last Nationalist Ambassador Yu-chi Hsueh also confidentially probed the possibility of retaining some form of representation in Ottawa in the event

of Canadian de-recognition. Nevertheless, for various reasons, all of these ideas were not put into practice at the time of derecognition.

Notwithstanding the eventual severance of official relations, attempts from the part of Taipei to maintain and establish resident liaison representing its particular interests in Canada were continuously made in the 1970s. This could be manifested in the persistent presence of a resident correspondent of the Taipei-based Central News Agency (CNA), the establishment of the FETCs, and the MPs' urge for the cause as well as the lobbying of Taipei-hired public relations company.

1. The CNA Case:

The case of CNA correspondents could be seen as the primary instance for the ROC to venture for a resident representation in Canada. It thus also became a major subject of dispute between Ottawa and Beijing.

When both sides were about to reach agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations, the DEA decided not to take immediate action to ask the CNA agent, Li Yueh, to leave if he confined himself to news gathering and filled no quasi-consular function. (DEA file D,8788,5: Memo to USSEA Oct.6/70) The CNA correspondent thus was able to stay in Canada while retaining his membership in the Parliamentary Press Gallery (PPG). Nevertheless, the issue of CNA agent's continuing presence was repeatedly brought to the DEA's

attention by Beijing.

In summer 1971, the PRC embassy's Counsellor sought the DEA's explanation for continuing presence of "the official representative of the Chiang gang". While being told that steps were taken to find a suitable solution but the issue did not totally fall within the DEA's control, he emphasized that until this matter was settled, the NCNA correspondent would not join the PPG. (DEA file A,8773,15: EAD Memo to PO Aug.16/71) The unsolved problem dragged on and exploded nearly three years later.

As time elapsed, Li and his CNA colleague both applied for permanent residence and the DMI, despite the objection of the DEA on political grounds, eventually granted them landed immigrant status. (DEA file A,8774,25: Gotlieb Let to Ritchie May 14/74) The PRC Ambassador almost routinely raised the subject with senior DEA officials, objecting strongly to the continuing presence in Canada of the CNA agents. In one account, the Ambassador, being visibly agitated, lodged a formal protest to the USSEA over the issue, requesting his expulsion from the PPG, and accused the DEA of failing to keep its promise three years ago. At the juncture, he was told that the newsmen had been permitted to stay in Canada but as individuals, not as representatives of the CNA, and that the DEA had done everything it could but regrettably the matter was not solved in favour of Beijing. (Ibid: EAD Memo to AUSSEA

Sep.18/74) Almost one year after, the PRC Ambassador registered another protest over the same problem. While being advised again to approach the PPG directly, he stressed the nature of the issue being a serious irritant and vowed to pursue the case again and again till its final solution.¹ (DEA file A,8775,27: EAD Memo for file Jun.13/75) Notwithstanding Beijing's protests, the CNA correspondents, in a way being symbolic representatives of Taiwan's press institutions, continued to stay in Canada.

2. The FETCs in Canada:

As Taiwan's economy was taking off in the 1970s, Taipei took certain initiatives to establish overseas commercial offices to serve as the arms of its trade network. This was often assumed by the semi-official China External Trade Development Council (CETDC)², which was jointly sponsored by the government, industrial and commercial associations and formally established in July 1970 with a mandate to promote Taiwan's international trade as well as "to help foreign businesses establish a wider presence in Taiwan". (CETDC 1999) The overseas arms of the CETDC was the "Far Eastern Trade Company" (FETC).³ In the early post-derecognition era,

¹ However, interestingly, there was no evidence from the available DEA files indicating that similar scale of protests over the same issue had recurred.

² In the early stage, it was abbreviated as CETDC. But nowadays, it is more often referred as "CETRA".

³ "Far East Trade Service Inc." was a similarly-named organization. Nevertheless, while some FETCs strictly

it acted as a prime agent promoting the Taiwanese trade interest in Canada.

In early 1971, the Canadian Consulate-General in Manila reported that the Taiwanese may have solved the problem of an "official" representation in Canada by forming a FETC office in Montreal. (DEA file D,8789,6: MNL ConGen Memo to ITC Jan.26/71) This information was later checked and it was concluded that the FETC appeared to have no political connection with the Nationalist government in Taipei. (Ibid: EAD Memo to ISLD Mar.8/71) Nevertheless, from the Canadian perspective, the FETC in Montreal, and later another FETC in Toronto, as well as the CNA correspondents constituted major Taiwanese operations representing discrete interests in Canada. (DEA file D,8789,8: Briefing Note Dec.30/75) Indeed, as mentioned in last chapter, in the midst of the BCITF incident, Ottawa sought Taipei's cooperation to arrange the products in display to be designated from the FETC. (DEA file D,8789,7: Memos for Min Jun.14;17/71)

Notwithstanding the existence of the FETCs, in many ways, these agencies often confined themselves to strictly trade matters and presented little state-sanctioned authority over issues in other spheres. Indeed, unlike some

confined themselves to trade promotion matters, other same name "companies" were also utilized by the MOFA to fulfil certain functions of diplomatic representation. In the latter case, the FETCs would be listed as overseas missions in the MOFA record.

same name "companies" with obvious official tinge that would be listed by the MOFA as overseas missions and normally mentioned in the official China Yearbooks, the FETCs in Montreal and Toronto were never singled out in the official publications as achievement of bilateral relations.⁴ Their "private" nature accords with the result of Ottawa's investigation as mentioned above. This presumably led to Taipei's continuous search for alternative venues to represent broader Taiwanese interests in Canada.

3. Promoting Representation Cause in the 1970s:

In its search for resident representation, Taipei had sought support from local Canadian MPs and hired public relations company to advance its cause. As early as April 1974, several MPs had voiced their dissatisfaction with the government's cautious approach with respect to bilateral relations with Taiwan and asked it to facilitate the establishment of a Taiwanese trade office in Canada. (DEA file D,8789,8: Lambert Let to Gillespie Apr.18/74)

Meanwhile, Robert Smylie, a Public Relations (PR) agent acting on behalf of Taiwan, wrote letters to some MPs,

⁴ The FETC in Greece, for example, was credited as to "continue trade relations on a people-to-people level" upon Athens' establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing. This was also the case for the FETCs in Belgium. See (CY 1972-3: 394-5) The FETC in Milan, Italy was similarly heralded as an achievement in unofficial representation. However, in the accounts of the yearly development of the Canada-Taiwan relations in post-derecognition era, the CYs merely recorded the amounts of bilateral trade as what were accomplished in the past years.

presenting a summary of the state of unofficial relations between the ROC and a few countries, with a name-list of 17 Taiwanese agencies opened in the countries concerned, and urging the federal government to accept the Taipei's resident representation in Canada. (Ibid: Smylie Let to MP Haidasz Jun.4/75) The lobbying appeared to be successful. As a result, the EAD initiated a thorough review and thus came up with a briefing note on the state of Canada-Taiwan relations by the end of 1975. (Ibid: Briefing Notes Nov.25; Dec.30/75)

The DEA reacted, through submitting clarification to the MPs' questions, in cautious tones. It argued that the Nationalists had maintained two trade offices in Canada (ie, the FETCs in Montreal and Toronto) as they did in some European countries, claimed that these nations "have more or less the same attitude towards Taiwanese commercial and cultural offices as does Canada", and stressed that "Canada's essential current and long-term trading (and political) interests lie in the PRC, not Taiwan". The DEA officials added that they did not object to the continued operation of the Taiwanese offices if Taipei stuck to non-political purpose and did not attempt to promote the "ROC" identity and claims. They concluded that "as long as the 'ROC' claims to be the government of all China and Canada enjoys normal and highly profitable commercial relations with the PRC, there seems little incentive to adjust

significantly our policy towards Taiwan." (Ibid: Memo for Min Dec.30/75)

Notwithstanding the DEA's clarification, series of questions were continuously posed in early April 1976. Shortly later, the DEA instructed its posts in several western European countries to inquire about their practices in various issues, including the nature of Taiwanese representation offices there and whether it performed consular function. (Ibid: Ott Tels to Bonn, CNBRA, Ldn, Paris, Bru, Vienna, Athens, Rome, STKHM, WLGTN Apr.12/76)

Subsequently, with the exception of the Swedes, Wellington, Bonn, Brussels, Vienna, Canberra and Rome all confirmed that Taiwan had established commercial offices or various information and cultural centres there. (Ibid: WLGTN, Bonn Tels to Ott Apr.15; Bru, Vienna Tels to Ott Apr.21; CNBRA, Rome Tels to Ott Apr.22/76) Among these governments, both Australia and New Zealand respectively approved the establishment of "unofficial" but actually the state-sanctioned Taiwanese representations (ie, the FETC and the East Asia Trade Centre) immediately after the de-recognition in December 1972. The Australians further indicated to their Canadian counterparts that they envisaged no change of policy towards Taiwan in short term, "but if other countries such as Canada softened present policy towards Taiwan, Australian policy would be reconsidered". (Ibid: CNBRA Tel to Ott Apr.22/76) This acknowledged the

practice of institutional learning. In fact, the Canadian-Australian consultation over the issue was as evident as before. For example, besides the consultation telegrams, the DEA agreed to pass the briefing note on the state of Canada-Taiwan relations to the Australian Department of External Affairs. (Ibid: Ott Tel to CNBRA May 7/76)

On the other side of coin, the issue of the Canadian resident institutional presence in Taiwan, even of private nature, had become contentious subject between Ottawa and Beijing. Indeed, the sensitivity of the PRC was manifested when the Toronto-Dominion Bank decided to set up a branch office in Taipei in spring 1974. Upon learning the TD Bank's decision, the PRC embassy while interpreting it as "a step towards the creation of 'two Chinas'" and "an unfriendly act towards the Chinese people", repeatedly and "strongly demanded" the TD not to implement the decision. (DEA file D,8789,8: Notes Mar.18;21/74) Although the Chief Executive Officer in the Bank's Toronto headquarters wrote an explanation letter to the Chinese Ambassador, the First Secretary was instructed to respond that:

The 'explanation'..is totally untenable and unacceptable.. Should the TD Bank insist on its decision to establish a branch in Taiwan, a province of China..., your Bank must bear all consequences arise therefrom. (Ibid: Chang Let to Lambert May 5/74)

As the plan went ahead, Beijing ultimately ordered the Bank to close its branch in the mainland.

Meanwhile, some MPs posed questions on the possibility of establishing a Canadian commercial and trade office in Taiwan in order to redress trade imbalance. The PRC embassy certainly was closely monitoring the development of the issue. For example, upon learning the SSEA's answer to some MPs' questions in the House of Commons on April 2, 1976, the PRC embassy voiced its concern about the possibility of opening a Canadian trade mission in Taiwan. The DEA of course denied such a plan. (Ibid: Memo for Min Apr.28/76)

Both the issues of Taiwanese unofficial representation in Canada and Canadian parallel presence in Taiwan certainly did not become dormant. Indeed, as will be explored in next section, the issues were gaining momentum and eventually bearing fruit later in the 1980s and 1990s. A major factor that contributed to the resurgence of the problem was obviously related to the growing importance of Taiwan in global economic community. Indeed, on the basis of the newly acquired economic muscle, Taiwan launched another run of campaign seeking to forge non-political links with major western countries. In Canadian case, this was generally facilitated through two tiers of tactics: one was to organize ad hoc private trade and commerce delegations to Canada, the other was to search for setting up comprehensive permanent resident representations through venues other than the existing CETDC or CNA channels. In both fronts, the role of the General Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of China

(GCOCROC) was particularly important.

The GCOCROC, under the leadership of Chih-chin Chen, was reorganized and renamed in 1973. In the wake of booming Taiwanese economy with disproportionate diplomatic isolation in the 1970s, the GCOCROC expanded its existent liaison unit into a new "International Affairs Section" to strengthen its networking arms abroad. (Chu 1992:112)

Shortly after the Montreal Olympic incident in November 1976, the GCOCROC organized the first Taiwanese trade delegation to Canada, which was led by Chen himself and composed of several well-known local tycoons as well as delegates from the CETDC and MOEA, visiting several cities en route to Montreal and Quebec city.(Chu 1992:112)⁵ The trip was arranged through Pierre Loisel, a senior Canadian businessman residing in Taiwan, and Norman Bernier, the Director of le maison du Quebec in Tokyo, with an invitation extended by Quebec government in its effort to attract Taiwanese investment.⁶ This approach of sending special commercial missions was also pursued later. For example, during 1980-81, another trade delegation was led by Jimmy Chi-chien Chu, the then-senior officer of the GCOCROC and a member of the first "Team Taiwan", which achieved a protocol

⁵ The account of trade delegation was made by Mr. Pierre H. Loisel and Mr. Jimmy Chi-chien Chu in interviews on Sep. 9 and 9 1997, respectively. See also (CY 1977: 349-50)

⁶ Interview with Mr. Jimmy Chu, Sep. 11, 1997.

between the Taiwan Provincial Chamber of Commerce and its Quebec counterpart.⁷ Besides, official publication indicated that the first ROC special procurement mission visited Canada in May 1979, purchasing large quantities of wheat, corn and soybeans, which was later followed by a Canadian trade mission to Taiwan. (CY 1980: 350) Moreover, behind the venues of the Chamber of Commerce and Quebec government was some unknown story in which there were parallel confidential ventures by key pragmatic-minded MOFA officials at the time.

In an interview, Loisel depicted John Chang and Jen-ren Chen, medium-senior officials in the NAAD of the MOFA at the time, as espousers of modern Taiwanese practical diplomacy. John Chang had played particular role in rendering for not only the trips of trade delegation but also for the eventual establishment of the TECO later on. He reportedly had searched for the possibility of having a Canadian unofficial office in Taiwan. It was said that he had confidentially met Roland Michener, the then Governor General of Canada, who advised him to approach the Chamber of Commerce or the Quebec government to set up a resident liaison office in Taiwan.⁸ As it later turned out, while the Quebec venue was eventually abandoned, the COC channel was heavily relied upon. This not only led to the eventual establishment of the

⁷ Interview with Mr. Chu on Sep.11, 1997.

⁸ Interview with Mr. Loisel on Sep.9, 1997.

Canadian Trade Office in Taipei (CTOT) in the mid-1980s, but also to the formation of the GCOCROC office in Toronto, the forerunner of the TECO. This should be the subject of next section.

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II. Emergence of Unofficial Comprehensive Representation:

The new venue of the COC provided a necessary catalyst for the eventual establishment of authoritative resident representations by both sides. Nevertheless, this was not achieved spontaneously. Nor did its process proceed in a linear way. After all, the institutionalization of "one China", ensuing expansion of Beijing's diplomatic network with growing capacity of surveillance and an increasingly growing market in the mainland in the wake of the PRC's openness to global capitalist system, made it possible for Beijing to discipline the outside world in the event of the transgression of the "one China" boundary.

This section will first deal with the DEA's deliberation and some setbacks in the transition process, then proceed to examine an early fruition on the side of Ottawa. Finally, the establishment of Taipei's unofficial comprehensive representation in Canada will be explored.

1. Episodes and Whistle-Blowings:

The active involvement of the GCOCROC in international people-to-people contact, which constituted a part of Taipei's "total diplomacy" campaign, during the low ebb of

Taiwan's foreign relations in the 1970s, was manifested in its organizing several trade delegations not only to Canada but also to the USA. Additionally, in the aftermath of the Sino-American normalization, it began to establish its overseas branches in the North America. Toronto was one of the targeted cities where it intended to form offices. Later on, the venue also opened a window for the ROC government to staff within the organization seconded officials as authorized representatives in Canada. From the perspective of the GCOCROC staff, the passion of patriotism prompted them to voluntarily "front" for the government to help break new diplomatic ground, and to take initiatives in the first instance to coordinate their efforts with the state without being instructed to do so.⁹

From the perspective of mainstream DEA officials, however, this "linkage" with Taipei government by the GCOCROC, or other private organs or individual and their ensuing identification with Taipei's cause might often be interpreted as a part of "rational" design orchestrated by the Nationalist authorities aiming to sabotage Ottawa-Beijing relations, as also shown in the series of incidents

⁹ This view was solicited from a former senior officer in the GCOCROC's Taipei headquarters. Similar views were also expressed by former MOFA officials, some pro-Taipei Chinese Canadians and several CTOC staff, when they were confronted with his author's questions, based upon some alleged "trouble-making" account of flying flags and using the "ROC" as designation in Canada.

in the 1970s discussed before. Like the numerous cases related to Canada-held international activities, the problem of designation for the unofficial office provided the ammunition for clashes of interests and positions. The rise of Joe Clark's Progressive Conservatives, traditionally more sympathetic to the Nationalists, in June 1979 obviously also increased the DEA's concerns about Taipei's capitalizing on the situation.

The GCOCROC office in Canada was registered in June 1979 and formally set up in Toronto on July 11, 1980. (ROCYB 1979:358; 1980:324) Its formal establishment, however, triggered series of tension between Ottawa and Beijing. The case was drawn to the DEA's attention in late June when two representatives from the GCOCROC office in San Francisco applied visas to attend opening ceremony of the Toronto office. Their applications were turned down. Then, the DEA learned that already visaed Taiwanese COC delegates invited to Quebec would be present for opening ceremony, but it was too late to take effective action to forestall such attendance. To this, the DEA considered as "flagrant" breach of terms of visa of not participating in promotion of the "ROC". After all, although the office was opened by Canadian citizens of Chinese descent, it bore a nameplate of the "GCOCROC", with display of the ROC flag, distribution of printed materials showing the official emblem and designation and participation by a delegation from its

Taiwan headquarters. Moreover, Canadian officials from Ontario government, several MPPs and a Senator attended the ceremony. Not surprisingly, the PRC embassy lodged a formal protest and demanded firm and effective measures to remove the nameplate and prevent such occurrences in the future. (DEA file A,8775,30: Ott Tel to Pek Aug.11; BAPA Memo to AUSSEA Aug.13/80)

The incident resulted in certain punitive actions from Ottawa. This included probationary denial of visa application by the GCOCROC. Additionally, the DEA sought advice on the legalities of the establishment of that office and of its use of the "ROC" as title, and drafted letters to Ontario Premier and to the Senator outlining the impropriety of provincial or federal involvement in events of this kind. (Ibid: BAPA Memos to AUSSEA Aug.13; Aug.21/80)

Nevertheless, protests from the PRC did not cease. Indeed, Beijing incessantly raised this subject wherever there were high level contacts in the subsequent years. For example, in early September, Han Xu, the Director of Americas and Oceania Department in the PRC MFA, delivered a statement accusing the Canadian government of approving the establishment of the "ROC"-bearing office and urging Ottawa to take resolute measures to stop creating "two Chinas". (Ibid: Pek Tel to Ott Sep.2; Ott Tel to Pek Sep.4/80)

Moreover, when Vice Premier Bo Yibo visited Canada, his accompanied MFA official raised the same issue. (Ibid: NEAD

Memo to BAPA Sep.3/80) When Han Xu himself later travelled to Ottawa, the issue was again put on agenda for discussion. While being told that the Canadian government has no legal power to prevent Canadian citizens from using whatever name they wish, he was assured that Ottawa was looking into various means to end use of the name "ROC", although no success would be guaranteed. (DEA file A,8775,31: Ott Tel to Pek Nov.27; NEAD Memo for file Dec.3/80)

Subsequently, on one occasion, Ambassador Wang Tung unwittingly pointed out that the use of the "ROC" indicated the existence of semi-official relations which Beijing regarded as a transgression. (Ibid: Ott Tel to Pek Jan.16/81) Six months later, it was confirmed that the DEA has sought the assistance of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce (CCOC), which in turn persuaded the Taiwanese office to change its name. (Ibid: Memo to Min Jul.22/81) In October 1982, the DEA recorded that the issue was almost resolved to the effect that the new English nameplate would be "Chamber of Commerce of Taiwan (Canada)". (DEA file A,8775,32: TKP Oct.4/82) In the meantime, Ottawa requested information on the Japanese experience with respect to the extent of political activities engaged by Taiwanese offices there. (Ibid: Ott Tel to Tokyo Nov.1/82) However, when the PRC's Deputy Prime Minister, Wu Xueqiang, visited Canada, the Chinese side made it clear to the Canadians that they considered the name "Taiwan" prefaced to "Chamber of

Commerce" at the office in Toronto as unacceptable. (Ibid: USSEA Memo to Pek Oct.19/83)

Later on in the Taiwanese official record, the Toronto office was recorded as "The General Chamber of Commerce of Chung-hwa (Canada) Inc"¹⁰ (GCOCCH) which was sponsored by both the GCOCROC and the Government Information Office (GIO) (FAA 1989: 169) While the designation of the office was on the way to an eventual resolution, another episode erupted in the mid-1980s. The episode ended with the deportation of the Director of the office, Patrick Chang. He came to Canada in January 1983, but he was ordered to leave by the Minister of Immigration in February 1986. It was reported that the main reason for his being declared as non persona grata consisted in his displaying a sign of the "ROC" for the office, unfurling the flag at a social event in Toronto's Chinatown, and his active involvement in arranging all-expense-paid-trip for several MPs and MMPs to Taiwan, which he was admonished not to act. (G&M Feb.15/86)

In sum, the issue of an appropriate designation for the newly established office appeared to be a major barrier for its being immediately accepted as a legitimate Taiwanese

¹⁰ From Taipei's perspective, "Chung-hwa" differs from "Chung-kuo", although both terms could be translated as "Chinese" in English. It should also be noted that "Chung-kuo" is often translated as "China" in English. Thus, in the "Olympic formula", "Chinese Taipei" was translated as "Chung-hwa Taipei" (in Chinese) in Taiwan, whereas the same term was referred as "Chung-kuo Taipei" in the PRC.

unofficial representation. Beijing's series of protests naturally had certain impact on the progress of the establishment of a Canadian unofficial office in Taiwan.

2. The Canadian Trade Office in Taipei (CTOT)

As the Sino-American normalization was accomplished and Beijing proposed a "peaceful unification with Taiwan under 'one country two systems'", Ottawa at some moments appeared to contemplate the possibility of having closer ties with Taipei by establishing some form of unofficial office there.¹¹ Available evidence indicates that the Canadian High Commission in Hong Kong had hinted such a move. However, the embassy in Beijing objected to that idea in that:

The market potential of Taiwan should not be minimized, but key question remains whether we should jeopardize our long nurtured and potentially substantial commercial interests in China for sake of a market in which we are **not faring too badly in any case**. (DEA file A,8775,30: Pek Tel to Ott Oct.17/79; bold as this author's emphasis)

Almost one year later, while the designation issue of the GCOCROC Toronto office was at dispute, the DEA in a document acknowledged that the departments in Canada were at the stage of carefully considering a move to establish an unofficial representation on Taiwan in view of the fact that "chambers of commerce in some countries, notably Germany and Australia, are now proceeding to establish private sector

¹¹ Because of no access to some core files on Canada-Taiwan relations since 1977, the account herefrom is strictly drawn from those on Canada-PRC relations.

trade offices (there)". (Ibid: Note¹²)

Shortly later, in preparing for an incoming visit by Han Xu, the NEAD proposed to raise to the Chinese guests the matter of the Canadian commercial activity in Taiwan and the possibility of having a unofficial representation in Taipei. It anticipated a possibility that the Chinese might link the opening of a private Canadian office in Taiwan with the resolution of the nomenclature problem of the GCOCROC Toronto office. In such case, it suggested to respond to the Chinese that the Canadian side "would advise any private Canadian group that resolution of the Toronto problem should precede any action by them to establish an office in Taiwan." Then, it also proposed to remind the Chinese of the presence of other countries' trade promotion offices in Taiwan. (DEA file A,8775,31: TKP Nov.21/80)

In the real encounter, the gist of the Canadian scenario was considerably met. In answer to the Canadian probing the possible establishment of a private office in Taiwan, Han stated that both sides should adhere to the Sino-Canadian Joint Communique and then turned to the USA-Taiwan relations, noting that they were "purely unofficial" and on a people-to-people basis. (Ibid: NEAD Memo to file Dec.3/80) The case of the Canadian private office in Taiwan was thus made with the Chinese "no-objection". Timing was

¹² No date was shown on the Note, but presumably around Sep.2 or 3, 1980, judging from dossier's sequence.

the major remaining issue. Presumably, the eventual move was largely hinged upon the solution of the designation issue of the GCOCROC Toronto office. Additionally, in the context of Beijing's vehement reaction to the Dutch sale of submarines to Taiwan and the PRC diplomatic note, the implementation of the move naturally would be incremental and cautious.

Obviously in reaction to many western countries' expanding their unofficial presence in Taiwan, the PRC Foreign Ministry delivered a formal diplomatic note to all foreign missions in Beijing. It reiterated its "one China" principle and went further to state that:

The Chinese government is firmly opposed not only to any country permitting Taiwan to establish, or exchanging with it, representative offices of an official nature for official contacts, but also to any country permitting any organizations of the Taiwan authorities to perform 'consular functions' or establishing any organization in Taiwan to perform such functions.. (DEA file A,8775,32: Note#93 Jun.29/83)

Although this note did not result from any Canadian policy action¹³, it might have preempted Ottawa from making an immediate move in that direction. Nevertheless, like many other western powers, Ottawa's move was initiated by private Canadians with minimal degree of government's involvement.

At this juncture, it should be stressed that just as the seemingly "laissez faire" state often involves in the

¹³ As the Canadian embassy in Beijing interpreted, the "warning was addressed specifically to Japan, USA, Venezuela and possibly some other South American countries." (Ibid: Pek Tel to Ott Jul.6/83)

creation of favourable condition for market operation in political economy, so provision of institutional support through subtle coordination, counselling or other "infrastructure" investment by the Canadian government in Canada-Taiwan relations on society-to-society basis was evident. Indeed, at the end of a letter to the USSEA, the ITC Deputy Minister explicitly acknowledged that "officials of both Departments have provided counsel to the Canadian Chamber of Commerce in its efforts to formalize cooperative arrangements with the Taiwanese Chamber." (DEA file A,8775,31: Johnstone Let to Gotlieb Jan.22/81) Besides, evidence shows that in spring 1984, the Canadian High Commission in Hong Kong reported its plan to improve its servicing of the Canadian community in Taiwan on such matters as passports, registration of births etc through the office of the Canadian Society (CS) in Taipei. (DEA file A,8775,32: HK Tel to Ott Apr.17/84)

In many ways, the progress towards the establishment of a private Canadian office in Taiwan was relatively steady. During 1982-83, while more frequent trade delegations organized by the CCOC visited Taiwan, the CS was formed in Taipei by local Canadian community with a view to solving various problems resident Canadians there commonly faced, such as communication, visas and passports. It was the first "foreigner"-based association that registered in the ROC's

Interior Ministry without a "ROC"-prefaced title.¹⁴

Meanwhile, in the House of Commons, the "Canada-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Committee" (CTPFC) was established In December 1982. Parallel MP tours to Taiwan primarily organized by the CTPFC became as frequent as those the CCOC-sponsored trade delegations. (eg ROCYB 1981:350; 1982:348; 1983: 367-8; 1984; 1985:411) More importantly, MPs with the CTPFC background turned more vocal and active, which was also reinforced by the CCOC's local lobbying activities, in pressing the federal government to approve the establishment of a trade office in Taiwan. Taipei's MOFA of course welcomed the development. (S&C 1984-85:24) Eventually, on July 9, 1986, the CCOC announced the formation of the Canadian Trade Office in Taipei (CTOT). It was then approved by the federal government and formally opened on November 28. (FAA 1988: 169) Robert Kelly became the first Director of the CTOT and was succeeded by John Clayden in 1988 (CTBR Mar/87; Spr./88) Shortly later, the BC provincial Chamber of Commerce followed suit to establish BC's office in Taipei, which was then followed by the Alberta and Quebec Chambers

¹⁴ It took around two years for the CS to complete registration, partly because of designation issue. Initially, the Canadian community wished to have "Canadian Society in Taipei" as the title of the organization. This did not meet the existent regulations of the Ministry. After series of negotiations, it was registered as "CS" in English and "Overseas Canadian Association" in Chinese without reference to the "ROC". Interview with Mr. Pierre Loisel, one of founding members of the CS, on Sep.9, 1997.

of Commerce. (FAA 1990:223) The CTOT itself, in fall 1990, while moving to a new office building in Taipei, expanded its functions to cover not only commerce and trade investment but also tourist and cultural exchanges affairs, with fuller authority to issue visas directly. At the same time, the working staff in the CTOT increased from 9 to 22. (FAA 1991:218)

In the early stage of operation, however, disagreement between the CCOC and the Canadian government over various issues surged. Later in 1989, this disagreement and some CTOT internal operation problem forced the Canadian government to step in. The third Director of the CTOT, Ronald Berlet, was then directly recruited from the DEA, which was based on the British model of "seconding" rather than the American "retiring" formula.¹⁵ Meanwhile, immigration and trade officers were brought in. As of February 1994, then, the main functions of the CTOT were incrementally established: to issue various categories of visas; to promote mutual trade and investment and to communicate on behalf of the Canadian government with relevant government agencies in Taiwan on certain interested subjects. (NAAD 1996: 41)

In brief, the institutionalization of Canadian unofficial resident representation came into shape upon the

¹⁵ Interview with a former DFAIT official.

establishment of the CTOT. A former DFAIT official highlighted several factors that contributed to the eventual Ottawa approval for the institutionalization of Canada-Taiwan representation: Taiwan's continuing existence, innegligible economic strength and growing trade surplus vis-a-vis Canada; the CCOC's initiative; John Chang's active involvement; the precedents of the American Institute in Taiwan (1979) as well as the Australian Commerce and Industry Office (ACIO) (1981); increasing Taiwanese immigration to Canada.¹⁶ Noteworthy are the American and Australian factors, which is related to the global context and institutional isomorphism. Before this subject is pursued in the next section, the other side of the institutionalization of resident representation in the Canada-Taiwan axis should now be examined.

3. Taipei Economic and Culture Office (TECO), Canada:

As mentioned earlier, the "GCOCROC" office in Toronto was established in 1980 and later renamed as "GCOCCH". Nevertheless, its functions remained relatively limited, although in a way it had for the first time in Canada assumed both functions of information-collecting and commercial-servicing which used to be separately represented by the CNA correspondent and the FETCs. Moreover, it was essentially sponsored and run by the GCOCROC and the GIO.

¹⁶ Interview with the former DFAIT official.

The MOFA's role in the GCOCROC Toronto office was minimized to dilute political sensitivity. Despite the episode of Patrick Chang incident, Ottawa and Taipei started, in 1988, to discuss on the possibility of establishing a more comprehensive yet unofficial Taiwanese representative office in Canada and direct civil aviation linkage, but without reaching concrete agreement. (NAAD 1996:42) This round of contact culminated a trip to Ottawa by John Chang, the then Vice Minister of the MOFA, at the end of the year. Upon returning to Taipei, he disclosed the promising prospect for the establishment of such an office. (FAA 1988: 578-9)

The Tiananmen Square incident of June 4, 1989 was a turning point for the development. Canada was one of the western countries that vigorously criticized the repressive measures taken by the Beijing government. Meanwhile, Ottawa took initiatives to contact Taipei, expressing hope to resume talks on the issues concerned.¹⁷ (NAAD 1996:43) Both sides then resumed negotiations in Tokyo, Vancouver and Ottawa for five rounds, and eventually reached an agreement on the establishment of Taipei's representative offices and direct civil aviation linkage. (NAAD 1996:42) Two decades after de-recognition, on October 22 1990, the agreement was signed between Henry Wang, the then Director General of the NAAD, and John Clayden, the then Director of the CTOT on the

¹⁷ Interview with a former MOFA official on May 14, 1999.

two major issues. (FAA 1991: 217-8) Nevertheless, an incremental approach was taken to implement the formation of the TECO offices in Canada.

Initially, Taiwan hoped to establish an office in Ottawa in the first instance. Canada, on the other hand, suggested that the Taiwanese offices be established first in cities, such as Toronto or Vancouver, and that the formation of an Ottawa office be left for a propitious time.¹⁸ Taipei eventually agreed and the first Representative of the newly established TECO, Henry Wang, arrived in Toronto on March 30, 1991, and the Director of its Vancouver office, James Wang, reached the post in late April. (FAA 1991: 217-8) Both offices formally began to operate in fall. (FAA 1992:218)

After its formation, the authority of the TECO as Taipei's leading unofficial representation, differentiation of its functions and relations with other pre-existing unofficial institutions were gradually affirmed. The overall representative function in Canada was assumed by the Toronto office which was composed of four divisions: Secretariat, Information, Trade and Services. It then incorporated the pre-existing the "GCOCCH" and later proposed to put the FETC Toronto office under its framework. (CTBR June/91: 3-4; FAA 1990:218)

The setup of the Ottawa office and its enhancement as

¹⁸Interview with the former MOFA official.

the Taipei's general representative institution in Canada was not realized until May 1992. A trip to Taiwan by the Deputy Minister Campbell, in charge of International Trade, brought about a major breakthrough over the issue. Taiwan was then given a green light to establish the Ottawa office, partly thanks to the smooth operation of the Toronto and Vancouver offices.¹⁹ Taipei announced the formation of the Ottawa office subsequently and began to implement the relocation of its representative office from Toronto, which was achieved in August 1993. (FAA 1993:239) The decision to set up the Ottawa office, as cited in the Ottawa Citizen on an interview with Leonard Chao who was charged with opening it, was not intended to press for Canadian diplomatic recognition but to promote non-political exchanges in a low profile. (OC Sep.26/92) Meanwhile, Taipei sent its special delegates to Ottawa directly negotiating with Canadian counterparts over detailed issues such as functional immunities, vehicle plates, contacts and correspondence. The related treatment package was concluded and institutionalized with signature of the Governor General in April 1994.²⁰ Among these arrangements, functional contact, correspondence and visits of senior officials deserve some notes for their relevance to previous discussion in the

¹⁹ Interview with a former MOFA official on May 14, 1999.

²⁰ Interview with the former MOFA official.

state of contact in the 1970s.

Overall, the contact and correspondence between the TECO staff and the DFAIT officials were gradually set up on the basis of needs. Should the situation warrant, for example, it would be legitimate for the TECO staff to make necessary visits to the DFAIT headquarters over issues concerned. Likewise, normal functional correspondence from the DFAIT officers could be conducted with official letter heads and their titles, except matters of politically sensitive nature. As for officials' mutual visits, they were essentially engaged on functional or private purpose. Generally, Ottawa may approve the visits by Taipei's middle-senior level officials or cabinet members in charge of specialized and non-political affairs.²¹ Empirically, Taipei's record showed that there were 13 Minister-/Deputy-Minister-level visits to Canada, whereas four Canadian Ministers travelled to Taiwan on functional purpose between 1993 and April 1996. (NAAD 1996: 108)

In sum, the eventual presence of the TECO offices in Canada in the early 1990s, representing an embodiment of commitment by both sides, signified a new phase in Canada-Taiwan relations. Since then, trade and economic cooperation and flows have grown steadily and significantly, if not dramatically.²² (Liou 1996: 35-9) Both sides, usually

²¹ Interview with the former MOFA official.

²² There is no statistical evidence showing an abrupt

between either CTOT or TECO and respective government agencies, have also reached numerous Memoranda of Understanding in various policy issue areas, such as "maritime systems and technologies", "communications and information technologies" and "aboriginal affairs" in 1998.(MOFA 2000) Moreover, the institutionalization of Canada-Taiwan relations could also be indicated by the growth of numbers of officers in charge of the Canadian affairs in the NAAD of the MOFA. While there was only one officer responsible for the Canadian affairs prior to 1985, the Third Section of the Department was assigned to take charge of the affairs since the agreement to set up TECO offices was reached in 1990. As of 1997, the Canadian affairs unit consisted of one Chief and five officers.²³

It should nevertheless be noted that the new state of bilateral relations did not mean that the "one China" structure was completely circumvented and thus became outdated, which will be pursued in Chapter 9. In parallel to the "one China" structuration, the institutionalization of Ottawa-Taipei relations was not a local experience existing only between the two countries. In fact, as will be examined below, it constituted a part of the globalization of "unofficial" network emanating from Taipei.

increase of trade flows after the setup of the TECO offices.

²³ Interview with a former MOFA official.

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III. Globalization of Virtual Representation:

Although the derecognition of the ROC by countries concerned often resulted in the closure of embassies and consulates in each other's territories, locally varied institutional representation appeared in different times. On the one hand, western countries respectively established or reconfigured their representation on functional basis. On the other, various forms of Taiwanese unofficial institutions later, if not immediately, came to succeed certain functions of previous diplomatic representation.

This section will first outline the development of the Taiwanese virtual representation in major western countries. Then it will proceed to sketch the forms of parallel representation presented by countries concerned in Taiwan. Overall, it will be argued that, as in the Canadian-Taiwanese case, over time, the once discrete and various forms of representation tended to be "re-assembled" within some umbrella unofficial organizations with varying degree of public authority or "blessings" from home governments. Additionally, the initially locally-varied experiences were then diffused into global common practices.

1. Taiwanese Re-presentation of Representation:

In the aftermath of waves of derecognition in the 1970s, Taipei's various agencies preserved or established their overseas offices under different names. These agencies

ranged from semi-official CETDC to government departments such as the Tourism Bureau, the GIO and the MOFA. Basically, the extent of "officialness" of the overseas offices were related to their domestic linkage with the Taipei government. Thus the CETDC-affiliated FETCs normally tended to be less official than the GIO-directed "Information Centres". However, in some cases, the "FETC" might in fact be operated in close affiliation with the MOFA.²⁴

In the early 1970s, the designation, function and status of Taipei's MOFA/GIO-affiliated unofficial representation often varied from case to case. While some focused upon the sphere of "trade and commerce" and others aimed to promote "tourism and information", their status could range from "Company", to "Centre" or "Representative Office". Nevertheless, there were some general correlations between the designation and region.

Overall, Taipei's representations in several Central and Southern American countries were established almost immediately after the derecognition and tended to assume more state-sanctioned functions with the title of "Taiwan" or to a lesser extent "Far Eastern". For example, Taipei set up the "Oficina Comercial de Taiwan" in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela to replace their official embassies at the time of derecognition in 1973-1974. In Asia-Pacific and the

²⁴ See footnote #3 of this chapter.

Middle East regions, earlier Taiwanese representation tended to be named with the preface of "Far Eastern". These included Australia, Brunei, Malaysia, Jordan, Lebanon. However, there were some deviations. For example, the mission in New Zealand was named as "East Asia Trade Centre", whereas that in the Philippines called "Pacific Economic and Cultural Centre". Furthermore, the first unofficial representation established in Thailand at the juncture of derecognition was "Office of Representative, China Airlines Ltd", whereas Taiwan's presence in Hong Kong was "Chung Hwa Travel Service". Noteworthy in particular is the representation in Europe. The early titles ranged from "Sun Yat-sen Centres" (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain and Switzerland), to "Free Chinese Centres" (Ireland and Great Britain), to "Institute of Chinese Culture" (Austria) to "Far East" (West Germany and Greece). (Kao 1994: 125-7; 360-371)

Moreover, like in the case of Canada, these offices were complemented in functions with other forms of institutional representation. For example, in Great Britain, in addition to the "Free Chinese Centre", "Majestic Trading Co." and "British-Taiwan Cultural Institute" were set up in the 1970s. Additionally, in France, besides "Association pour la promotion des echanges commerciaux et touristique avec Taiwan" (ASPECT), there was "Asian Trade Promotion Centre". In West Germany, "Fernost informationen" was

coupled with "Freichina Informationsdienst", "Far East Trade Service Centre" and "Frankfurt Office, Tourism Bureau". (Kao 1994: 373-4)

The various designations and offices, however, were under significant transformation later. In 1972, 45 percent of Taiwanese unofficial representation was designated as "Taiwan", 33 percent as "Republic of China", and 11 percent as "East Asia" or "Far East". In 1982, the last category rose to 50 percent, with "Taiwan", "Chung-Hwa" or "Republic of China" dwindling to 11 percent, and "Taipei" emerged to 3 percent. Ten years later, "Taipei", accounting for 67 percent, prevailed as predominant designation of these offices. (Kao 1994:123-5) It is this surge of "Taipei" and an ensuing tendency for the Taiwanese unofficial representation abroad to adopt convergingly a relatively standardized title of the "Taipei Economic and Cultural Office" (TECO) that deserved special elaboration.

The first instance of "Taipei"-prefaced overseas Taiwanese offices appeared as "Taipei Trade Tourism & Information Office" and "Taipei Trade Centre" in Sweden and Norway, respectively, in 1981. The formula, however, did not diffuse immediately. The closest nomenclature second to the Northern European instances was "Taipei Economic and Cultural Centre" adopted in Malaysia in 1988. (Four years later it was further renamed as the TECO in August 1992.) Then, the first full "TECO" designation was adopted in

Turkey in August 1989. Subsequently, in the early 1990s, the title "TECO" was widely diffused. During the period and afterwards, not only most pre-existing Taiwanese unofficial representation were renamed as "TECO", but newly established agencies also bore the exact title. The latter included those in Czech, Denmark, Finland, Poland, Israel, and Vietnam.

Meanwhile, Taiwan's representation in major western countries underwent similarly standardized (re-)naming process. For example, while Taiwan's "underground embassies" in Australia and New Zealand were just renamed into "TECO", in Japan, the "EARA" became the "Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO)" with local branches being renamed as "TECOs" in March 1992. One month later, the "Free Chinese Centre" in the U.K. was transformed into the "Taipei Representative Office" (TRO). Likewise, the "ASPECT" was renamed as "Bureau de representation de Taipei en France". And the office in the FRG was retitled as the "Taipei Wirtschafts-und Kulturburo Bonn" (TWKB). (FAA 1990: 912; Mengin 1998:34) The US also approved the CCNAA to be renamed as the "TECRO" and "TECOs" in September 1994.

Moreover, it should be noted that approximately a decade later after the surge of the "TECO", there was a tendency in particular in Europe for some existing "TECO" designation to be renamed as "TRO" which was first used in Singapore in late 1990. This could be exemplified by

transformation of the office name in the FRG from the above TWKB to "Taipeh Vertretung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" (MOFA 2000). Statistically, in 1992-3, among its agencies in 20 European countries, only the one in the UK, was named as "TRO" with majority of the rest being designated as "TECO" or its resemblance. (Kao 1994: 367-71) As of February 2000, nevertheless, among the Taiwanese offices in 21 European countries, nine agencies, including those in France, Germany, Italy and the UK, were (re)-designated as "TRO". Meanwhile, 10 retained the "TECO" title and 2 used "Taipei Mission". In any case, all Taiwanese unofficial offices in 21 European countries were prefaced with "Taipei". (MOFA 2000) Additionally, in the same process, "Mission" appeared to be more desirable than "Office". Thus the TECO in Turkey was renamed as "Taipei Economic and Cultural Mission". And the established institutions in the former Soviet Union, namely those in Latvia and Belarus, were titled directly with "Mission". (MOFA 2000)

Overall, the trend of transformation is evident and the convergence into a relatively standardized "TECO" or "TRO" testifies to the prevalence of institutional isomorphism in the process. Nevertheless, on the other side, many countries' unofficial representation in Taiwan also underwent similar process of institutional "chain reaction" (Mengin 1997: 231), albeit the designations concerned were

not so obscure as in the case of Taiwanese agencies abroad.

2. Western Functional Representation in Taiwan:

Like their Taiwanese counterpart, major countries having no or severing diplomatic ties with Taipei have set up their unofficial institutions there mostly since the 1970s. While many of these institutions were commercial-oriented, some carried with exclusive cultural functions. For example, the "German Cultural Centre", established in 1963, was the first European unofficial agency setting foot on the island. As of April 2000, in total there were 47 countries establishing "private" representations in Taiwan. Approximately half of them are organized by the western or European countries. (MOFA 2000) It is this western presence that will be explored in detail below.

By contrast to the various obscure titles of the Taiwanese unofficial representation in western capitals or cities, the designations of bureaus from the West tended to be relatively straightforward with clear national identities. However, in the 1970s certain ambiguity remained evident. For example, the French bureau, formed in September 1978, was titled "France-Asia Trade Promotion Association". (Chiu 1991:32) Nevertheless, while the Canadian CTOT set foot on the island in 1986, most European unofficial institutions were established in either the early or late 1980s. Like the CTOT, many of the western representation offices were formed through private Chambers of Commerce,

although not all of the offices had that connection. For example, the "Spanish Chamber of Commerce", set up in May 1974 as the first European informal presence in Taiwan in the aftermath of derecognition, specified that connection and the designation remained intact at present. (Chiu 1991:32; MOFA 2000)

Aside from the connection, the European establishment of commercial offices in Taiwan primarily resulted from the growing trade flows between the two regions and ensuing need for an institutional framework. In this regard, one major distinction should be made between the American and Japanese institutional presence in Taiwan on the one hand and the overall European instances on the other: while the former sought to safeguard their pre-existing substantial dealings with Taiwan in the process of relegating official relations to the unofficial one, the latter were to create non-official institutions from the outset. (Mengin 1997:229-31) Thus, the feature of institutional isomorphism in setting unofficial representations in Taiwan for functional purposes could be demonstrated through the European practices, apart from the Canadian case.

There were at least two major waves of institutional diffusion that could be discerned. The first major wave of European institutional isomorphism to have commercial offices in Taipei came in the early 1980s. (Mengin 1997: 231) This included the Austrian, Dutch, German, Swiss,

Swedish and Danish organizations. (Chiu 1991:32) Meanwhile, in October 1981, the Australian Chamber of Commerce established the ACIO in Taiwan. (Klintworth 1994:271) This could be attributed to the Sino-American normalization and Beijing' conciliatory policy toward Taiwan. It presumably led to the delivery of a diplomatic note by the PRC Foreign Ministry to all posts in Beijing. The second major wave of institutional isomorphism took place mostly after the eruption of the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989. This entailed the formation of trade offices in Taipei by Italy, Ireland, Norway, Luxembourg, and Finland. (Chiu 1991: 32)

Overall, the western unofficial representation in Taiwan was often presented with relatively clear national titles. Despite their unofficial nature, they received varying degree of authorization from their respective governments. In this regard, it should be noted that there were some "asymmetrical" differences of representation between Taiwan and its western counterparts at least in terms of staffing, the degree of direct linkage with the state and officers' treatment.

First of all, while majority of officers in the Taiwanese unofficial representations were posted directly from respective government departments, including the MOFA, MOEA, MOE, and GIO, in Taipei, those working for European countries in Taiwan were often drawn from societal associations. Although those senior managers might have

certain public service background, they were "recruited" virtually through various indirect procedures to dilute their government bandage. In this sense, while Taiwan was disposed to a state-to-state level of representation, the European partners seemed to prefer to maintain a civil-society-to-civil-society level. (Mengin 1994: 162)

Furthermore, insofar the personnel treatment is concerned, there was certain degree of disparity. On the one hand, while the Taiwanese staff in Europe did not enjoy the privileges and immunity of diplomats in the early stage, they were increasingly receiving certain facilities which were normally accorded to diplomats from recognized nations. Nevertheless, the privileges and immunity granted to the Taiwanese officers in Europe were based on national law or administrative regulations rather than international agreement, nor reciprocal but on functional purpose. (Mengin 1997: 231-34; 1994: 160-1) By contrast, from the outset, the western staff in Taiwan have continuously received normal diplomatic facilities. From the MOFA's perspective, "the main purpose...is to obtain reciprocal benefits for Taipei's representatives in Europe". (Chiu 1991:31)

Notwithstanding the differences, most of the Taiwanese and western offices were performing some quasi-consular functions. As time elapsed, the Taiwanese offices generally were given green lights to issue visas or "letter of recommendation" which could be exchanged for visas upon

arrival in Taiwan. (Chiu 1991:29) The western institutions from the very beginning were granted the right to issue visas, albeit many of them chose to do so on the names of their missions in places such as Hong Kong or Tokyo.

At this juncture, it should be noted that the disparity of diplomatic facilities and the "quasi" nature of representations short of proportionate formal status could be attributed to the tenacity of the "one China" structure. The fact that the nomenclature of the Taiwanese unofficial representations have undergone transitions from variety of discrete and obscure names to the relatively standardized "TECO" or other "Taipei"-prefaced titles not only suggests the prevalence of the "one China" constraints but also reflects an evolutionary process of the Taiwanese identity. These will be pursued in concluding chapter. Before this is done, it should be stressed that the historical development of Taipei's unofficial institutional representations, as demonstrated in Taiwan's striving for suitable and clearer nomenclature, a state-to-state level representation, and reciprocal diplomatic treatment for its personnel, revealed a vital process of adaptation on the part of Taiwan. This should be examined first.

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IV. Summary:

The chapter presented the forms of resident representation as embodiment of adaptation by countries

concerned to the institutional development of "one China". For Canada, the incremental search for a unofficial representation and its institutionalization with respect to relations with Taiwan could be seen not only as a part of "one China" policy elaboration, but also as an adaptation to the continuing existence of Taiwan. For Taiwan, it constituted as genetic measures taken to transcend the diplomatic isolation brought by the global "one China" structuration. The Canada-Taiwan linkage in this respect was argued as an integral part of global process which involved the institutionalization of societal-based functional representation by western countries in Taiwan and of parallel but more state-sanctioned representation by Taiwan in countries concerned. While the former institutionalized Taiwan as "non-state" entity, the latter was characterized by an emerging trend of global representation in the name of Taipei.

The process of the institutionalization of Ottawa-Taipei unofficial relations was presented as a proto-type local practice and a part of global "virtual representation" with respect to Taiwan. It was demonstrated that there were several preliminary attempts made by both sides' societal actors to establish resident presence in each other's territory in the early 1970s. On the part of Taiwan, this included the maintenance of the CNA correspondents and establishment of the FETCs in Montreal and later in Toronto.

On the part of Canada, the TD Bank set up a branch in Taipei, and some agents pressed for government facilitation of a trade office there. These were proceeded under incessant pressure from Beijing. Nevertheless, later on, the chamber of commerce, the CCOC or GCOCROC, increasingly became instrumental for bridge-building.

Then, the institutionalization of relatively comprehensive yet unofficial representations gained momentum in the early 1980s, albeit with some episodes. The GCOCROC Toronto office was first established in 1980, which incurred series of high-profile Beijing's protests over the use of the title "ROC" or "Taiwan", thereby leading to its name-changing. Meanwhile, on the Canadian side, the federal government started deliberating and facilitating, albeit cautiously, an encompassing institutional presence in Taiwan. It eventually, under the initiatives of the CCOC, bore fruit in the formation of the CTOT in 1986. With some intervals, then, Ottawa-Taipei negotiations led to the establishment of the TECO as the Taiwanese authoritative yet unofficial representation in Canada in the early 1990s, followed by further institutionalization of bilateral transactions in non-political issue areas.

Overall, Taiwan's modes of unofficial representation in Canada underwent transitions from institutions with discrete functions to the emergence of comprehensive and authoritative organizations performing various functions

parallel to formal diplomatic missions. In the aftermath of de-recognition by Ottawa, the CNA correspondents continued to serve as Taipei's information gathering agent. The form of representation was then coupled with the establishment of the FETCs to promote Taipei's commercial interests.

Beginning in 1980, these existing institutions were further complemented by relatively encompassing authoritative representation of the GCOCROC Toronto office. Then, in the late 1980s, negotiations were conducted on the terms of representation and operation of existing and additional functions within an overall framework of the TECO.

The chapter then turned to the global institutional isomorphism of the "virtual representation" with respect to Taiwan. This was manifested in the transformation of forms of the representation, on the part of Taiwan, from previously discrete institutional presence with predominantly FETC-related and other obscure titles to increasingly converging, Taipei-prefaced, umbrella organizations. Indeed, this globalization of "Taipei" as another form of "global city"²⁵ was particularly evident in Europe with a considerably simultaneous shift from the "TECO" to the "TRO". On the part of the western countries, a

²⁵ This sense of "global city" should be distinguished from mainstream Sociological sense which regards cities such as New York, Los Angeles as micro-representation of globalization displaying main features of compression of time and space and variety of cultural representation.

similar process of institutional isomorphism was witnessed in the early 1980s and late 1980s. Like their Canadian counterpart, the other western chambers of commerce were actively involved and assumed the primary operation of the non-official institutions in Taiwan.

CHAPTER EIGHT: ADAPTABILITY II: MISSION IMPOSSIBLE?

As Beijing's "one China" stance increasingly gained global acceptance with increasing diplomatic marginalization of Taipei, the Nationalists had successfully maintained their rule on Taiwan for more than half a century up till being defeated in the recent 2000 Presidential election. Meanwhile, Taiwan continued to function at least as an indispensable economic entity in the global community. The issue of how and why Taiwan was able to survive and thrive, or the entity's "adaptability" in environmental change, had been mostly addressed in terms of the structural transformation of the KMT and the role the state played in "governing the economy". (Aberbach et al 1994; Dickson 1996; Huang 1996; Jiang & Wu 1992; Meaney 1992; Moody 1992)

Here my focus on Taiwan's adaptability will be different and linked to previous discussion. Chapter 7 dealt with western, Canadian as well as Taiwanese adaptation to the "one China" institutional development, in the form of the emergence and convergence of "virtual representation" in each other's capitals, in the aftermath of the de-recognition of the ROC. Nevertheless, Taipei's diplomatic adaptation even in this regard was not conducted in a vacuum. Rather, the phenomenon was closely related to the configuration of social bases in broader domestic as well as international settings. In this sense, diplomacy is indeed

an extension of domestic affairs.

As foreign policy argumentation was a primary tool for Taipei to secure external support especially in the wake of increasing isolation, it had to reflect the readjustment of the KMT social base. Moreover, Taipei's pursuit of overall national objective faced an oft-irreconcilable dilemma of rationality: to continue to pursue its longstanding policy thereby unwittingly accepting the hegemony of the global "one China" structure in Beijing's favour, or to move further towards complete self-determination based upon the recently bestowed mandate of popular sovereignty. Or, how much room is left for Taipei to take the middle course by aiming to institutionalize the status quo, at least on a tentative basis? The case of Taipei diplomacy thus betrayed the phenomenon of goal complexity.

This chapter will examine how that adaptation has proceeded. The exploration will start with the nature of the Nationalist mandate in terms of the configuration of bicomunal forces within Taiwan and the vicissitudes of domestic and international legitimacy of the party state. Then, it will proceed to examine the meaning of democratization for pragmatic diplomacy, which can be demonstrated in the shift of foreign policy argumentation and discourse. Finally, the chapter will address the issue of goal complexity in the Nationalist foreign policy in the

wake of the global acceptance of Beijing's "one China", with a short summary in the end.

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I. The Legitimation of the KMT in Taiwan:

As the Nationalists took over Taiwan from the Japanese at the end of the World War II, the first encounters between the mainland Chinese (or "mainlanders") and local Taiwanese (or "Taiwanese")¹ began, albeit with mixed illusion and disenchantment. Simmering tensions culminated in the February 28 Incident of 1947 in which numerous Taiwanese elites were wiped out by the mainlander-dominated KMT government. The delicate bicomunal relations became more and more evident after the discredited Nationalists relocated themselves to the island two years later.

Although not all of political phenomena should be reduced to one single factor, the domestic social basis of the Nationalist regime cannot be explained without looking at the ethnic relations in shaping, if not determining, the course of the post-war politics and legitimation process in

¹ The two groups certainly are not homogeneous and can be subdivided further in terms of ethnic, linguistic or regional cleavages. Four major communities were then often identified: Fukienese group, 72%, Hakka group, 12%, the Aborigines, 2% (Together, they are often referred as "Taiwanese") and the "mainlanders", 14%. (Clough 1978: 38; Tien 1989: 35-6) Nevertheless, insofar as political mobilization was concerned, the "Taiwanese" vs "mainlander" categorization remained meaningful in capturing many aspects of ethnic politics there at least prior to recent decade.

Taiwan. More importantly, the bicommunal politics was often imbued with the "unification vs independence" discourse in contemporary Taiwan, and hence directly linked to the "one China" complex. Thus, the issue of the Nationalist legitimation in this section will be examined from the aspect of bicommunal relations.

The early stage of the KMT governance over Taiwan can be equated with minority rule, since the party members were essentially controlled by the mainlanders who accounted for merely 14 percent of the population in Taiwan. Approximately three decades after the relocation, nevertheless, this form of political rule was gradually transformed in a direction of power-sharing with the local Taiwanese. Overall, this process can be analyzed through two models: ie. control model and consociationalism which have been formulated to make sense of political stability in societies with fragmented political culture. (Lijphart 1977b: 16-24; McRae 1989: 94-5) Before dealing with the Taiwan case, I shall outline some defining features of both models.

1. Consociationalism:

Elaborated by Arend Lijphart, the consociational model is normally presented in four characteristics. The first and most important element is "a grand coalition" in which elites of all significant segments participate. It may take various institutional forms, such as a grand coalition

cabinet in a parliamentary system, an advisory council, committee or a well-distributed presidency and other high-ranking posts among segments. Yet the essential attribute of it is not so much any particular institutional arrangement as an overarching cooperation among leaders of all significant segments. The other three basic elements are: mutual veto, proportionality and segmental autonomy.

(Lijphart 1977: 25; 31-52)

2. The Control Model:

By contrast, the control model, essentially developed by Ian Lustick, could be defined in the following features. First, game rules in allocating resources are set by and in favour of superordinate groups. Second, linkages between the segments are penetrative or exploitative. Third, absence of hard bargaining in interactions between the segments is obvious. Fourth, the state apparatus is an instrument of the superordinate group. Fifth, the sources of political legitimacy are presented in the predominant adoption of a superordinate-group-oriented ideology. Sixth, central strategic problem, manifested in the resources and power relationships between segments, is fundamentally asymmetrical, i.e., in favour of the monopoly of superordinate segments. (Lustick 1979: 330-32)

The transformation of ethnic politics in Taiwan and the adaptability of the KMT party-state could be demonstrated

through the juxtaposition of the two theoretical constructs, as they were applied to Canada (Cannon 1982) and Malaysia (Wu 1990). This constitutes a critical shift of internal legitimacy for the regime. The linking mechanism for the transformation was liberalization and democratization traceable to the series of diplomatic setbacks in the early 1970s. In temporal setting, generally speaking, the early development presented evident characteristics of the control model. Once the KMT put in motion policies of indigenation and liberalization, some features of consociationalism became salient especially since the mid-1980s. (Wu 1990: 50-91)

3. The Control System in Early Post-War Taiwan:

From the outset, the political development of the ROC on Taiwan demonstrated major attributes of the control system. These could be listed in at least six aspects. First of all, the rules of the game in allocation of political resources evidently favoured the mainlanders. In this sense, a fundamental rule was that the Chinese mainland is the main locus for Chinese people as a whole and Taiwan is a frontier of the Chinese nation. The ROC Constitution, setting the essential parameters for resource allocation, was enacted when the Nationalists were in control of the mainland. It continued to serve as primary source of legitimation for the mainlander-dominated regime in subsequent period. Meanwhile

the practice of a fuller scale representative democracy was considerably circumvented by some extra-legal regulations for dealing with the constant struggles with the Communists. Among them, the Temporary Provisions legitimated the maintenance of some gigantic institutions by which the Nationalists claimed to represent all of China. For example, the National Assembly, the Control Yuan and the Legislative Yuan, the three parliaments in Taiwan, largely maintained over 3,000 national delegates whose tenure had been extended indefinitely since they were first elected in 1946.

Secondly, bicommunal relations especially in the first decade were characterized by a penetrative linkage. In the early post-war years, political participation by local Taiwanese was suspended and superseded by the Nationalist tutelage, since they were presumed to have been "tainted" by the Japanese colonialism. The occurrence of the February 28 Incident was met with relentless suppression. Since then, the Taiwanese community became leaderless, atomized, quiescent and apolitical. (Kerr 1965: 200-310; Mendel 1970: 30-41; Gold 1986: 50-2) Prior to 1986, collective participation in central politics by local Taiwanese was primarily channelled through mainlander-designed institutions, including the KMT itself. Other than that, independent participation was allowed on individual basis.

Thirdly, the presumption of the Nationalist regime as

the sole legitimate government of China was beyond questioning. For decades, there had been no hard bargaining on this "non-decision" issue. Any attempt to make the central government more representative of the majority Taiwanese would be viewed as subversive. For example, Peng Ming-min and his student followers were persecuted for treason for their questioning the imperative of Chinese nationalism and the representativeness of the Nationalists in 1963. (Hughes 1997: 35-6)

Fourthly, the mainlanders evidently monopolized the state apparatus at least in two ways: their disproportionate presence in the civil service, cabinet and the security sectors, and the prevalence of the executive predominantly staffed by mainlanders. Immediately after the World War II, the mainlanders filled out most of the vacancies left by the Japanese. Although this trend has been redressed with the passage of time, the disproportionality remained conspicuous in the civil service. (Clough 1978:38; Cole 1967; Gates 1981) In cabinet, likely, ministerships with responsibilities for critical policy-making were overwhelmingly held by the mainlanders before 1980. By comparison, Taiwanese, at the time, mostly held relatively insignificant positions. Similar configuration was also presented in the security sector, the three parliaments and the Judiciary Yuan. (Tien 1989: 37-9; 140-2; 152-5; 210)

Fifth, the ideological sources of the KMT's legitimacy were mainlander-specific. The national anthem, flag and "the Three Principles of the People" all originated in the pre-1949 mainland. Moreover, the Nationalist relocation to the island was followed with additional constructed mythology based on Chinese nationalism. The core of the construct was some familiar "one China" presumptions: there is only one China and the ROC is the sole legitimate government of all of China; Taiwan is an inseparable part of China and the Chinese mainland is the homeland of all Chinese people; and that the Chinese civil war has not yet terminated. The implications of the themes were evident: since the ROC government only temporarily "moved" to Taiwan, mainlanders who are best eligible for representing the spacious Chinese mainland, should be overrepresented in the "national" government institutions, the scale of which then should not be curtailed, or run the risk of downgrading them into a regional authority. Furthermore, based on the second proposition, there is no difference between Taiwanese and mainlanders, nor does conflict of interest exist. The Taiwanese provincialism is not a genuine version of nationalism. The only valid nationalism is all-Chinese nationalism. By the same token, since Chinese civil war has not yet ended, in order to defend Taiwan only senior mainlanders who have unique and abundant experience in

struggling with the cunning Communists, are qualified for leadership and the military establishment must not be demobilized.

Finally, the bicomunal power relations in Taiwan have displayed two aspects of asymmetry for at least three decades: availability of resources (source of power) and strategic leverage in practice (exercise of power). The mainlanders generally possessed overwhelming edge over Taiwanese in terms of leadership, degree of mobilization, cohesiveness of ideology, access to the party/state apparatus and disposition of financial resources in the earlier stage of development. As for strategic leverage in practice, many mainlander elites were able to perpetuate the asymmetry through manipulating tactics such as cooptation, fragmentation and insulation. The holding of elections for county magistrates, city mayors, and Taiwan provincial assembly from 1951 and 1954 onwards provided devices for recruiting local Taiwanese to serve as a safety valve. Land reform dismantled alternative bases for potential Taiwanese leadership and community solidarity and cultivated new sources of support for the regime by many Taiwanese tenants. Regional and linguistic subdivision were further reinforced. Moreover, insulation was practised to cut off any conceivable links between local Taiwanese and their exiled or imprisoned elites.

4. Taiwanization, Transformation and Consociationalism:

The control elements nevertheless faded in varying degree as the Nationalists were searching for a new form of legitimacy. The existing base of legitimacy built on minority control became more and more untenable as the KMT continued to take refuge in Taiwan. The international erosion of Taipei's "one China" mythology and ensuing diplomatic setbacks in the early 1970s reinforced legitimization crisis. While the group-specific ideology element remained largely intact, the Taiwanization campaign, launched by Chiang Ching-kuo in 1972, gradually transformed the facade of the KMT edifice. The "creeping democratization" period began as more and more Taiwanese technocrats were recruited into national government institutions and the KMT headquarters. Meanwhile, special devices to sustain the Nationalist constitutional claim to legitimacy were adopted. From 1969 onwards, supplementary elections were held to solve the problem of Chinese national representation caused by natural attrition of old representatives elected on the mainland. Moreover, since 1972, regular "supplementary" elections were further introduced for a small number of seats to represent Taiwan as "free area of China". (Hughes 1997: 33)

Notwithstanding the initiation of the reform, the KMT's concern over "one China" imperative set limits on the extent

of popular representation. Increasingly vocal and nationalized "Tang-wai" ("outside the KMT party") forces also proved to be a major threat for the Nationalist renewing legitimation process. The creeping democratization period thus witnessed several retrogressive development in which coercive repression was exercised by the Nationalists on the budding opposition movements in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The process was not really facilitated until a vital step of liberalization was achieved in 1986 when a genuine Taiwanese national opposition force, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was acquiesced to organize. Meanwhile, a lift of Martial Law one year later certainly contributed to liberalization and democratization. Up to the moment, certain consociational attributes became evident when more KMT-affiliated Taiwanese technocrats were promoted to share power with the mainlander elites. These could be sketched as follows:

First of all, a grand coalition between the two segments was formed to sustain the Nationalist mandate of rule. It occurred among the top office-holders in the central government and the Standing Central Committee (SCC) of the KMT. While the presidency and vice-presidency of the five branches of government and the Presidential Office were often assumed by mainlanders and Taiwanese respectively in the 1980s, more and more Taiwanese were promoted to cabinet

positions as well as the SCC of the KMT. (Tien 1989: 75-81; 116-121; Winckler 1984: 488-90)

Secondly, accommodation through bargaining began to surface in the Legislative Yuan and social movements in the 1980s. Mainlander lawmakers who were normally KMT whigs often negotiated with opposition Taiwanese legislators over issues varying from legislative proceedings to street confrontations between the Nationalist security forces and Taiwanese supporters. Frequently, the scene in legislative accommodation could be witnessed to the extent that mainlanders promised to allow full discussions and to seek for consensus without resorting to majority rule for breaking legislative impasse. In return, the opposition Taiwanese vouched for a conciliatory approach. The DPP's formation also involved mutual accommodation. In return for mainlanders' refraining from relentless suppression, the Taiwanese-dominated DPP took a rather cautious and conciliatory approach by avoiding putting "self-determination" theme in the party charter. (Chou and Nathan 1987: 287-90)

Thirdly, the proportionality of "mainlander-vs-Taiwanese" representation in core political institutions, with the exception of the three parliaments, was considerably presented in the mid-1980s.² This can be

² From some mainlanders' perspective, however, that development shifted from proportionality in accordance with

demonstrated in the ethnic composition of the cabinet and the SCC of the KMT: the ratios of Taiwanese/mainlander representation in there were 37:63 and 14:17, respectively, in 1986. (Tien 1989: 146)

Fourthly, after the lift of the Martial Law in 1987, Taiwanese veto in terms of cutting budgets of some mammoth, mainlander stronghold government organizations became more often seen. (Tien 1989: 151) Meanwhile, political aspiring Taiwanese began to enjoy genuine autonomy by forming political parties and groups and choosing their own leaders.

Overall, the power-sharing and accommodation with Taiwanese, engineered through Chiang Ching-kuo's hands, have succeeded in renewing the ruling Nationalist's legitimacy. Under his leadership, the KMT's longstanding "one China" principle was also stretched to allow travels to the mainland by residents on Taiwan, parallel participation with Beijing in international sports through the "Olympic formula", and continuing membership in the ADB. Nevertheless, Chiang's reform fell short of reversing bicomunal power configuration, altering "one China" priority as well as edging towards a fuller scale of representative democracy based on popular sovereignty. It was not until Lee Teng-hui succeeded Chiang in January 1988

population and size of "imagined" territory, ie the pan-Chinese context, to overrepresentation of Taiwanese.

that a much comprehensive reform was set in motion.

With the native Taiwanese ascendancy to the Presidency, traditional bicomunal balance of power gradually altered. Within the KMT itself, a tendency of reverse power sharing configuration became prevalent: while more and more Taiwanese elites, led by Lee himself, were capturing traditional mainlanders' strongholds, they were now often assisted by their former patrons. Meanwhile, the division between the "mainstream" Taiwanese members and "non-mainstream" mainlanders within the Nationalists and ensuing bargaining and accommodation became more and more evident.

Subsequently, with the end of the Temporary Provisions that legitimated unrestrained executive power and a new formula set for "national" and "overseas" constituencies so as to maintain the facade of Chinese representation, the second National Assembly and Legislative Yuan elections were held in late 1991 and 1992, respectively. (Hughes 1997: 58; 70-82) Although the aging legislators elected on the mainland setting in 1946 were now retired to make rooms for the newly elected representatives, the ruling KMT maintained firm majority in the new parliaments. Nevertheless, consociationalism that was witnessed primarily within the KMT setting in the 1980s was gradually transformed into inter-party accommodation among the KMT, the mainlander-dominated New Party which was split from the KMT in 1993,

and the DPP. Equally importantly, a new form of legitimacy for the Nationalist government based upon the principle of popular sovereignty was hereafter established.

5. Pragmatic Diplomacy: Bridging the Gap of Legitimacy:

Under Lee Teng-hui's leadership, the comprehensive democratization process was soon matched with further expansion of non-political exchanges with the mainland and "pragmatic diplomacy" campaign. (Lin 1992) The new foreign policy initiatives were taken to balance off the increasing links with the mainland. They were first reflected in the acceptance of "dual recognition", under which Taipei no longer objected to the establishment of diplomatic relations with countries maintaining official ties with Beijing, despite its short-lived experiment by Grenada in July 1989. (Lin 1992; Hughes 1997: 55)

In the aftermath of the comprehensive parliamentary elections with a fresh mandate bestowed upon the Nationalists, "pragmatic diplomacy" campaign turned more and more self-assertive, which could be manifested in the frequency of the "vacation diplomacy" engaged by several Taiwanese top office-holders, including Lee himself, and the bid to participate in the UN in 1993-94. As such, Taipei's increasingly active diplomatic campaign arguably aimed to bridge the wide gap between fuller domestic mandate and shrinking international legitimacy. In retrospect, it is the

overall sequential way of addressing internal and external legitimacy that characterizes the uniqueness of the adaptability of the ROC on Taiwan in the wake of increasingly rigid "one China" institutional development.

The sustainable development of any organization hinges upon the degree of support it could accrue from the outside environment. At the very bottom, the adaptability of an entity is obviously similar. The state-building process, often interwoven with nation-building, is no exception and broadly involves securing both domestic and international legitimacy. Manufacturing consent, forging distinct identity vis-a-vis "Others" and winning international recognition as an equal sovereign entity are among primary projects for such purpose.

Historically, the formation of European nation-states witnessed approximately simultaneous accomplishment of both internal and external legitimacy in the state-building process. This was cogently elucidated by Charles Tilly (1990). As he demonstrated, the European state-building was achieved through a dynamic process of struggles for setting up agreeable rules of games and a mandate to rule. Typically, the process entailed a set of given state elites' continuous competitions and bargaining with both domestic societal actors (ie urban bourgeoisie) over resource-extracting for war-making and with their international

counterparts. The Taiwan's case is unique in that it actually involves a de-coupling process between internal and external dimensions of legitimacy.

From the outset of the Nationalist relocation, arguably, the internal aspect of state-building was already completed. Since then the ROC government has exercised effective control over the Taiwan area. Nevertheless, its original mandate that was primarily based upon the 1947 Constitution was bestowed on the mainland. One decade after, as the ROC government continued to locate in Taiwan, its claim to mainland sovereignty, existent legitimacy built upon a broader Chinese context, and practice of representative democracy on Taiwan were all subject to questioning. The loss of mandate for representing "one China" in the world reinforced its legitimation crisis. Domestically, the issue of inadequate legitimacy was largely resolved through the completion of comprehensive elections in the early 1990s. However, the external aspect of state-building and legitimacy remained incomplete in that the ROC on Taiwan continued to be de-recognized by many nations in the world. From this perspective, then, the "pragmatic diplomacy" can be seen as an effort to redress the imbalance between internal and external dimensions of state-building and legitimacy.

Moreover, there is a striking parallel to the

decoupling of internal and external dimensions of state-building/legitimacy in Taiwan's experience. From the perspective of outside world, the ROC fell short of a full-fledged independent sovereign status. The view was premised on the distinction between "internal" and "external" aspects of sovereignty. While the former refers to the elements, such as population, territory and authority-exercising, the latter the recognition of the claim of sovereignty by other international actors. (Biersteker and Weber 1996:2-3) In the case of the ROC on Taiwan, just as legitimacy and state-building have been accomplished domestically, so internal aspect arguably is existent. It is the lack of external recognition and the power of the social construction of sovereignty that leads to the ROC's "non-state" status. This begs the question of how Taipei reformulated its foreign policy argumentation in order to regain international mandate. As to be elucidated below, there was indeed a transformation in this respect, which reflects the shift of state legitimation bases.

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II. Transition of Foreign Policy Argumentation/Discourse:

In the course of its struggle for survival and in reaction to the increasingly rigid "one China" complex, the ROC's foreign policy argumentation and discourse has undergone a major change.

Under the Cold War system, as mentioned in chapter 3, Taipei's foreign policy arguments often focused on the instability and aggressiveness of the Communist regime on the mainland, and projected Taiwan as a bastion of anti-communism, or "unsinking aircraft carrier" that was to recover the Mainland in the due time. In making the case, it also justified its claim of sovereignty over the Chinese Mainland not so much by basing it on the actual exercise of authority there as by highlighting the ineffectiveness of the regime in maintaining law and order and its threat to world peace. To achieve this, instances such as the eruption of the Korean War, the offshore island crises and the Great Leap Forward campaigns in the 1950s were used as hard proof that the communist regime was of unstable nature and was indeed a warmonger. Meanwhile, the ROC occasionally demonstrated its ability to exercise some power on the Mainland by launching commando attacks with a view to facilitating the collapse of the Beijing regime. This sort of argument was to a varying degree plausible for both domestic and external audience at the height of the Cold War. The emphasis on the Nationalists as the genuine inheritor of Chinese tradition culminated in a "Reviving Chinese Culture" campaign in 1967, which aimed to counter the Cultural Revolution in the mainland and to raise Taipei's moral legitimacy. (Hughes 1997: 34-5)

However, as international environment changed and detente became the main historic trend, the arguments began to lose appeal. A series of shifting diplomatic recognitions from Taipei to Beijing by many countries in the 1970s could also be attributed to the fading power of the old arguments. Especially, as time elapsed, the fact that the ROC government remained seated on Taiwan made the old arguments appear more and more problematic.

As the international aspect of ROC legitimacy was called into doubt in the 1970s, Taipei sought to strengthen its internal legitimacy. The initiation of the Taiwanization campaign arguably aimed for such purpose. Meanwhile, in many ways the party state began to take an essentially inward-looking and voluntarist approach that emphasized on building the "objective" capability and forging a tenacious will. It thus concentrated on economic development. To the domestic audience, the Nationalists also preached the importance of "being self-reliant and composed while in adversity" and, by referring to Chinese historical experiences, admonished that "a country tends to corrupt and perish if no enemy exists".³ As such, at this stage, domestic audience was the primary target. Nevertheless, the key tone of arguments for both internal and external audience did not vary substantially.

³ In retrospect, when this author was in grade 6-9, this sort of "objectivist" indoctrination were often experienced not only in schools but also in media.

Familiar themes such as "anti-communism", "Taiwan as reservoir of authentic Chinese culture", and "the ROC represents all of China" continued to guide foreign policy argumentation at the time.

As the "pragmatic diplomacy" campaign was gaining momentum and democratization underway, diplomatic rhetorics were re-oriented in a new fashion. These often boiled down to several key propositions. The first one essentially focused on the "objective" part of reality that for decades the ROC government has incessantly exercised effective jurisdiction over Taiwan area while acknowledging that it does not exercise authority over Chinese Mainland. (Chien 1995:31; Lin 1991; Shiau 1996; Tsai 1995) The gist of this statement has been reiterated in virtually all Taipei's official policy statements, as will be shown later.

Besides, deriving from the above proposition is an "equal partnership" theme, that is, the ROC on Taiwan and the PRC on the Mainland are separate but equal political entities with respective jurisdiction areas. To take part in international activities, the ROC government is willing to accept the designation of "Taipei China" vis-a-vis "Beijing China". Moreover, especially after the first direct Presidential Election held in March 1996, when domestic legitimacy was assumed to be secured, the ROC highlighted its new "democratization" accomplishment in statements in

order to win international support. Also, Taiwan's economic achievement has long been argued in a way of showing that it has already proved itself therefore it deserves world wide recognition, de facto or de jure. Fifthly, the traditional means-ends based argument that the modernization of Taiwan, serving as a model for Chinese development as a whole, was to achieve an eventual reunification of a democratic and wealthy China did not completely disappear. Instead, it was revised for new campaign uses. One interesting instance based upon the old argument is that the ROC was adopting a sort of "one-China-oriented-transitional-two-China" policy as suggested in P.K. Chiang's controversial statement in the APEC forum in Seattle in 1993. More recently, a more delicate argument was raised repeatedly that Taiwan's bid for UN participation should not lead to permanent division of China, as demonstrated by the cases of former East and West Germanies and North and South Korea.⁴(MOFA 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998) Rather, it was argued that the parallel participation of both ROC and PRC in international organizations would create favourable condition for unification by promoting mutual trust.

Furthermore, when further diplomatic setbacks were

⁴ Some scholars also conduct research comparing ROC-PRC with West-East Germany or South-North Korea and analyze the applicability of the latter to the former. (Bau 1994) and (Clark & Chan 1991) are two of the systemic attempts of the kind.

experienced and its desirability and feasibility was questioned, "pragmatic diplomacy" was often depicted as the only course of action that the ROC and its people have to take in order to survive. Meanwhile, the alternatives of both keeping a diplomatic low-key while strengthening various ties with the Mainland and of pursuing an outright independence were shown to be impractical and short-sighted.

The transformation of foreign policy argumentation interestingly is echoed with parallel shifts in Taipei's views of "sovereignty" and diplomatic discourse. Insofar as the ROC's claim of sovereignty was concerned, the early stage no doubt presented a constructionist, if not social, view of "one China": the ROC is the sole legal government of China with its sovereignty extensive to mainland China. This continued to be so in the wake of growing diplomatic marginalization. Nevertheless, there was a sign of a shift to emphasize the "objective reality". For example, shortly after the US decided to recognize the PRC in December 1978, Chiang Ching-kuo affirmed that:

The Republic of China is an independent sovereign state with a legitimately established government on the ROC constitution. It is an effective government which has the wholehearted support of her people. The international status and personality of the ROC cannot be changed merely because of the recognition of the Chinese Communist regime by any country of the world. The legal status and international personality of the ROC is a simple reality which the US must recognize and respect. (Chiu 1979:262)

The tendency to emphasize "objective reality" became

more and more evident after the "pragmatic diplomacy" campaign was initiated in 1988. The promulgation of "One Divided China" principle by the Nationalist government in February 1997, as an attempt to renovate its version of "one China", addressed the China/Taiwan issue along the line of "objective reality". In the document, it was argued that:

The term 'one China' implies that China is not yet reunified. If it were, then there wouldn't be any 'one China' issue. No one nowadays speaks of 'one Germany' or 'one Vietnam' let alone 'one America' or 'one Japan', because they are now unified countries... (GIO 1997).

The appeal to such theme and emphasis on the statement as "describing existing reality" culminated in Lee Teng-hui's controversial statement in which the cross-Strait linkage was depicted as "special state to state relations" in July 1999. (GIO 1999)

Overall, the Nationalist views of sovereignty have been characterized with a shift from focusing more on winning support for its claim of sovereignty over not only Taiwan but also Chinese mainland (external dimension) to emphasizing the recognition of its de facto exercise of authority over Taiwan's 21.5 million population and territory. (internal dimension) (Wu 1997b) Nevertheless, the shift in sovereignty aspect and foreign policy argumentation could also be recast in terms of discourse analysis.

As John S. Dryzek (1988; 1996) put it, a discourse "embodies a shared set of capabilities which enable the

assemblage of words, phrases and sentences into meaningful 'text' intelligible to readers or listeners." (1988: 710)

The political aspect of a discourse includes the following elements: (1) ontology--that is a set of entities whose existence is recognized or constructed; (2) assignment of degree of agency to those entities--Some may be granted subject status, others categorized as objects; (3) among those with agency, a recognition of some motives and a denial of others; (4) conceptions of what is natural and unnatural in political relationships. Through this framework, we may reinterpret the change of discourses in the ROC foreign policy as follows:

First of all, during the Cold War period, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, the ontological entities of Taipei's diplomatic discourse included the Chinese nation that was represented by the ROC government, major western powers and a few developing countries. Secondly, the varying degree of "agency" was assigned to the above entities, ranging from those with full "subject" status, namely, the ROC elites and their western allies upholding the "free world", to those of merely "object", essentially the "Communist bandits".

Thirdly, the motives of strong moral rectitude particularly on the part of the ROC could be detected in the old discourse to the extent that the world-wide campaigns against the Communists were regarded as a just war vis-a-vis

evils. For Taipei, the recovery of the Mainland and the anti-communist campaign was not launched with self-interested motives. Finally, international political relations between the "democratic" and "communist" camps were assumed to be primarily asymmetric in favour of the former. The instability and vulnerability of the communist regime was assumed to be fundamentally self-evident. As such, the western Allies, particularly the U.S, would soon realize the strengths they possessed. Thus, it would be "unnatural" for the West to be willing to appease the Chinese communists.

As Taipei's foreign policy was re-structured through "pragmatic diplomacy", the previous worldview was undergoing transformation toward a new discourse with distinct elements. Firstly, in terms of ontology, entities previously subsumed under the broad "democratic" and "developing" categories are now perceived as relatively autonomous ones that by and large are no longer subject to powerful entities' leadership. More importantly, the PRC is treated as an independent entity that has been exercising its effective control over the Mainland area. In domestic setting, thanks to democratization, ordinary residents on Taiwan are deemed as equal as the Nationalist elites. Therefore, secondly, the hierarchy of agency characterized the old discourse now has broken down into roughly equal

"subjects". These certainly include the PRC, and in domestic setting, the ordinary people, or the "Tou-cha" (literally meaning "the boss"). The appeal of "sovereignty lies with the people" by President Lee Teng-hui manifests the re-orientation of the discourse. Thirdly, concerning motives, the ROC's participation and representation in the world based on the claim of de facto jurisdiction over 21.5 million of people were highlighted as the "win-win" solutions for the broader China, the Asia-Pacific and global community. Taipei thus denies that the measures taken under the "pragmatic diplomacy" project aim to create "two Chinas" or "one China one Taiwan". Instead, it is depicted as being beneficial to both the ROC and the PRC for the sake of a united Chinese nation in the future. Finally, it is assumed that democratization naturally will lead to international recognition and support for Taiwan's cause. And it will be unnatural if the ROC government with its effective exercise of authority over the population on Taiwan area is not recognized as a sovereign state that is as equal as others in the world.

Notwithstanding the transition of Taipei's foreign policy argumentation, views on sovereignty and discourse, the question of Taiwan's adaptability cannot be addressed without tackling the broader issue of rationality. This is also closely tied to what Taiwan has experienced with the

existing gap between internal and external dimensions of legitimacy, state-building and sovereignty. After all, the decoupling process in the wake of the dominant "one China" structuration and transition of argumentation meant that Taipei's pursuit of survival must entail goal complexity. It also suggests some limitations which Taiwan's adaptability has encountered in institutional development. I shall now turn to the issue of rationality and goal complexity.

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III. Rationality, Goal Complexity and Adaptability:

In recent decade, within both Public Administration and Public Policy fields, there was a general trend of shift, in dealing with the issue of rationality, away from traditional instrumental-oriented rationality to the one taking into account the role of context, ideas, arguments in organizational or policy process. The issue of adaptability is interwoven with that of rationality: a rational decision/policy process improves the adaptability of the organization concerned and a better adaptation helps promote the rationality in the process. In Organizational Analysis (OA), the phenomenon of "goal complexity" provided a catalyst for the shift of rationality.

Organizations are genetically purposive in the sense that they are formed to pursue ultimate goals. Nevertheless, the fundamental objectives tend to be vague, general and

non-operational. Thus, specific sets of subgoals are always formulated within the organizations to guide course of action in operational ways. (Scott 1992:30-1; Simon 1976: xxxiv-xxxv, 112-5) For Herbert Simon, a rational organization then often formulates "means-ends chains". The overall process of means-ends derivation often starts with decision-makers facing some requirements or constraints. They need to search for a course of action, in a given situation, to satisfy the requirements or constraints. A possible solution is selected as an alternative and further tested to establish if it satisfies the constraints and examined to see if it results in expected consequences. Although Simon later revised his model and acknowledged "bounded rationality", his genetic contribution to the rise of the "instrumental rationality" perspective remained significant. According to this model, it is possible to address the question of rationality by examining whether the course of action taken by the organization is oriented to the given ends. This model was challenged by Charles Lindblom who instead proposed various versions of "incrementalism". He maintained that politics and power matter in the decision-making process.

Moreover, some scholars pointed out the issue of "goal displacement" in organizational settings. (Selznick 1949; Sills 1957) As a primary manifestation of "goal complexity",

it refers to "a process in which instrumental values or goals are either substituted for the ultimate objectives of the organization, or become valued because they have desirable consequences that were not originally anticipated." (Fry 1989:207; March and Simon 1958:38-9) To the extent that it assumes that once established an organization may become self-perpetuated and self-serving, the "goal displacement" theme considerably converges with the "bureaucratic process" decision-making model articulated by Graham Allison (1971). This challenge to "instrumental rationality" was not coincident.

The recent "argumentative turn" in policy analysis also criticized traditional vision of instrumental rationality and highlighted the importance of use of rhetoric, argument or discourse in constructing/re-constructing policy advocacy coalition to pursue policy goals. (Cahill & Overman 1990; Dryzek 1993; Dunn 1993; Fischer & Forester 1993; Majone 1989) Rationality and adaptability then must take into account institutional constraints and broader context. As such, the rationality of policy process is assessed in terms of the degree to which organizations concerned are able to provide ex post facto justifactory reasons for their policy action and the arguments are acceptable to a reasonable audience. (Majone 1989: 23)

In the case of the ROC on Taiwan, goal complexity has

gradually become an issue of concern since the Nationalists relocated in Taiwan in 1949. Broadly speaking, the primary goals of Taipei's foreign policy varied from period to period. Before 1971, the major sub-goals were to forge an international anti-communist alliance, to solidify its membership in the United Nations and to strengthen its diplomatic ties with major powers in order to achieve eventual mainland recovery. The three subgoals were to a large extent achieved. Following the withdrawal from the UN, however, Taipei's struggles for diplomatic recognition and memberships in international organizations began losing ground. Nevertheless, the official stated goal of the ROC on Taiwan continued to be anti-communism prior to 1988. In practice, with few exceptions the general course of action during the period was for Taipei to suspend diplomatic relations with any countries announcing their shifts to Beijing. Meanwhile forging "substantive relations" and engaging in "people-to-people diplomacy" became immediate operative goals that were not to subvert the official objective of an eventual unification of China. In other words, the longstanding "one China" principle remained the imperative of Taipei's foreign policy. (Hughes 1997)

After Lee Teng-hui succeeded to the Presidency in 1988, "dual recognition" became an acceptable arrangement in order to achieve an immediate goal of participating in

international society. Even if "reunification of China" was proclaimed to be a firm ultimate objective, it was regarded as compatible with "pragmatic diplomacy". For example, a growing confidence was revealed in Lee's inauguration speech of May 1990 in which he put forward three conditions for unification with the mainland to be realized: 1) Beijing implements democracy, a free market economic system; 2) Beijing renounces the use of force against Taiwan and 3) the PRC will not interfere with the ROC's development of foreign relations. (Hughes 1997: 59) Nevertheless, it is particularly at this stage of foreign policy actions that the controversial issue of goal complexity surfaced to the fore. For some domestic and international critics alike, and especially the PRC policy-makers, the ROC on Taiwan's foreign policy has disclosed traits of goal displacement, ie pursuing "one China one Taiwan" or "two Chinas" as new goals. Nevertheless, the issue can be re-examined from another angle.

In general, the official ultimate goals of the ROC on Taiwan are twofold: one is to "promote international cooperation, advance international justice and ensure world peace" which are specified in the ROC constitution. The other sets of ultimate goals, formed in Taiwan setting, aim to protect the integrity of ROC's sovereignty and to promote the reunification of China. In the context of "pragmatic

diplomacy", this is usually referred to as to facilitation of peaceful reunification of China under freedom, democracy and prosperity. (FBIS Feb.8/93: 71-7)

To attain the ultimate goals, the ROC on Taiwan needs to meet two requirements: (1) it is treated as an equally independent and sovereign state as other countries in the world and is able to use its formal title, "the Republic of China" or "ROC" to deal with its counterparts; (2) when participating in international organizations or activities, people or groups from Taiwan are capable of employing this formal title for designation. These two requirements could be deemed as derived goals. Two possible alternatives could further be generated as potential operative goals: (A) maintaining and establishing diplomatic relations with the majority of countries and enabling societal actors, individuals or groups, to take part in majority of international activities under the designation of the ROC; (B) maintaining and moderately increasing the number of countries recognizing ROC while focusing on promoting substantive relations with countries that have no official ties with it, and increasing both participation and memberships in international organizations by using any other names connoting its equal status with PRC counterparts. Obviously, the ROC government on Taiwan would prefer Alternative (A) to (B). However, there are a couple

of structural constraints which make Alternative (A), though desirable, less feasible: on the one hand, majority of countries in the world have recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China while adopting "one-China" policies. On the other, the ROC's reiterating its commitment to the one-China goal would prevent itself from publicly seeking "two Chinas" or "one China one Taiwan".⁵ Indeed, when confronting with PRC's accusation of goal displacement, the ROC on Taiwan took pains in denying the case. (FBIS Oct.30/92: 47-8) Against this background, Alternative (B) which contains essence of "pragmatic diplomacy" appears to be more feasible. To see if it really satisfies the constraints, it has been incrementally tested in various occasions and examined for its consequences. These occasions include finding appropriate names for Taiwan delegates to participate in international activities, and for its representative offices abroad, and seeking for an acceptable way for Taiwan's high-ranking officials to visit countries with no formal diplomatic ties. In fact, Taiwan was confronted with the first sort of situation long before the "pragmatic diplomacy" was underway. The "Olympic formula" was finally accepted as one alternative, though with considerable reservation. Aside from this, accepting

⁵ See for example Free China Journal, Sept.16, 1994; FBIS Feb 8, 1993, pp.71-7; July 22, 1993, pp.54-5; Nov.12, 1992, p.45; Feb.22, 1991, p.53.

the "TECO" as the title for its representative offices abroad and arranging for top-ranking officials including the Foreign Minister to travel abroad in "private capacities" have been considerably institutionalized through numerous tests on a variety of occasions. However, in the meantime, a few episodes demonstrate the controversial facet of goal complexity. One incident occurred when Taipei's Economic Minister P.K.Chiang represented President Lee to attend the informal leadership meeting of the APEC in November 1993. He publicly proclaimed that "Taiwan's current policy is a step-by-step approach to 'two China' policy." His statement aroused questions by Taipei's legislators that were put forward to the Foreign Minister. The common concern was to see if the ROC's ultimate goal is no longer "one-China". Foreign Minister Chien Fu responded that Chiang's statement was a response to the PRC's Jiang Zemin's announcement in the occasion that "Taiwan is a province of the PRC". He continued, "he personally have never used the term 'two-China'. One must not use a few words to describe a complex situation." (FBIS Nov. 26/93: 50-1) The other episode involved Chen Fu himself. On one occasion, he stated that "we should no longer talk about one China". He was then called into question by legislators and responded that if the ROC continued to talk about one-China while expressing its wish to join in the UN, the international community

would generally believe "one-China" refers to the PRC, and that pragmatic diplomacy means that a diplomat should not use such high-flown words as "one China". (FBIS Oct.13/93: 61) The promulgation of "One Divided China" theme in February 1997 and Lee Teng-hui's "special state to state relations" statement two years later exemplifies and highlights the increasing complexity of goal pursued by Taipei.

Overall, prior to the initiation of "pragmatic diplomacy", the imperative of "one China" as ultimate objective to be pursued by the Nationalist government on Taiwan was evident. Although there were attempts to stretch the "one China" objective, the priority eventually prevailed. By contrast, as a newly representative democracy was established through popular sovereignty, the mandate to defend the independence of the renewed sovereignty of the ROC on Taiwan means that Taipei's pursuit of the objective at least should be weighed as equally as that of the longstanding stated goal of the reunification of one China. The process of pursuing the two-pronged ultimate objective then inevitably presents features of goal complexity. At some moments, the tensions between the two components may arise and become irreconcilable, the possibility of goal displacement can turn out to be real. The phenomenon of goal complexity in Taipei's foreign policy indicates the

limitations of adaptability imposed by the "one China" structuration process. The synthesis of the overall institutional development should be the subject of next chapter.

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IV. Summary:

This chapter began with a sketch of the nature of the Nationalist rule in Taiwan in terms of bicomunal relations between mainlanders and local Taiwanese. The majority support from Taiwanese constituted a vital source of legitimacy for the KMT regime. In many ways, the early stage of minority rule corresponds with core features of the control system. The increasingly untenable support from Taiwanese on the basis of Chinese constitutional mandate and series of diplomatic setbacks in the early 1970s prompted the regime to strengthen its domestic social basis through Taiwanization campaign. Nevertheless, the imperative of "one China" representation meant that the reform underway was at best a "creeping democratization". Consociationalist elements became more and more evident in the mid-1980s and provided new venues for the Nationalist governance on the island. The pace of democratization was facilitated in the 1990s, which in many ways further strengthened domestic legitimacy basis of the Nationalists. Meanwhile, "pragmatic diplomacy" campaign was launched and later speeded up to

"bring back the international legitimacy".

Then, the chapter proceeded to examine the shift of Taipei's foreign policy argumentation and conception of sovereignty. In brief, while the previous approach was imbued in a constructivist orientation, the new initiatives were packaged with an objectivist plate. The transition was also recast in terms of discourse analysis where the ontology, degree of agency, representation of motives, and conception of "natural" relations distinguish the former discourse from the new one. Overall, the transformation in these aspects echoes the shift of legitimacy basis of the Nationalists. However, what was coupled with the relatively encompassing transition and adaptation is a fundamental dilemma of rationality. In the final section, the issue of goal complexity was highlighted to show the uneasy tensions in Taipei's pursuit of a two-pronged national objective in the wake of increasingly rigid "one China" complex and domestic democratization. It has become a challenging task for Taipei to strike a delicate balance between the two components of foreign policy objective: the longstanding stated goal of the reunification of one China and the incessant call for defending the renewed ROC sovereignty on Taiwan.

CHAPTER NINE: CONSTRUCTING "ONE CHINA" WORLD: THE END OF HISTORY?

As demonstrated in previous chapters, this thesis has explored the institutional development of "one China", the role Canada has played in the structuration process and ensuing adaptability issue particularly on the part of Taiwan. This chapter will conclude the study and sum up its significance.

Although it is not possible to recast all propositions and issues addressed in the empirical chapters (3-8) which were outlined in the end section respectively, some major themes will be highlighted here primarily through the lense of the synthesized framework discussed in Chapter 2. This chapter will be organized along three major themes that seam through the case: (1) social construction of reality through politics of representation and institutional diffusion; (2) exercise of power through structuration; (3) mutual constitution of agency and structure. Among them, the exercise of power will be explored as the impact of the "one China" structuration in terms of constraining, enabling and constitutive effects. Some comment on the importance of Canadian diplomacy in the "one China" structuration as well as the significance of the study on future theoretical construction will also be made in this chapter.

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I. Constructing "one China" through the Politics of
Representation and Institutional Diffusion:

The existing "one China" arrangement arguably can be regarded as an embodiment of Gramscian hegemonic ideology organized and reinforced along the line of traditional state-centric conception of sovereignty. It has achieved with prevalent acknowledgement in the world that the PRC government is the sole legitimate government of China and that Beijing has a vital, if not final, say in the eventual resolution of the Taiwan issue. This arrangement with the facade of "natural order" certainly did not come to the fore of world stage immediately after World War II. Rather, it first developed through stages of competing history-making processes, then came into existing shape by a major global transformation in post-1970 era. The transition began with the Sino-Canadian negotiations in Stockholm and ensuing successful establishment of diplomatic relations. These were the core subjects of Chapters Three, Four and Five.

An overriding theme linking and connecting throughout the above chapters is the politics of representation. This involves ongoing struggles by parties concerned for dominant mode of organizing representation of interests and reality, in both levels of concrete institutional arrangements and of authoritative interpretation of symbolic meaning systems. As in other social and political phenomena, the struggles over the representation of China led to the selection and entrenchment of one set of institutions and interpretation

of "one China" over alternative ones which were then marginalized or excluded as illegitimate.

Moreover, in many aspects, the post-transformation "one China" order is constructed unprecedentedly. The uniqueness of the order can be distinguished from previous period in terms of the degree of cohesiveness and convergence of the three institutional elements--cognitive, normative and regulative ones.

The first stage of PRC-ROC international competition for "one China" legitimation between 1949 and 1970 was the period of relative fluidity and the struggles themselves lay in the representation of China--which government, Beijing or Taipei, is the sole legitimate authorities for China. On concrete institutional level, existent arrangements during the period were at best transitory with virtually no institutionalized predisposition toward a final resolution for the disputes in global setting. At the time most of observers tended to see the demarcation between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan as a tentative phenomenon, although the separation was reinforced through the Korean War of 1950, the ROC-USA Mutual Defence Treaty of 1954, and the Offshore Island crises of 1954-55 and 1958. Nevertheless, compared to later development, neither the demarcation nor the Nationalist unilateral claim that Taipei was the capital of all of China were institutionalized with cohesive

organization of regulative, normative and cognitive elements. Nor were they concentrated in the hand of the ROC whose national survival was at stake.

Many ideas from the West aiming to revise the existent arrangement were often limited to "what in one's minds" level. There were indeed some bolder attempts, including Paul Martin's proposals in the UN forum, to move further to create some relatively fixed institutional arrangements along the line of "two Chinas" or "one China one Taiwan" but, with the flat rejections by both Beijing and Taipei, all ended in vain.

Some observers may argue that Taipei's "one China" was institutionalized in the UN to the effect that Beijing was excluded from the organization.¹ Indeed, while Taipei continued to hold the seat of China in the UN and to function as the Chinese permanent member in the Security Council till 1971, many challenges to the existent UN arrangement were effectively fended off through the US-orchestrated "Important Question" resolution there. Nevertheless, the struggles over the representation of China in the UN were often fierce, demonstrated through typically close margin of voting and large number of abstentions,

¹ For example, Shiping Zheng of University of Vermont posed a question along the line to this author during the panel discussion of the International Political Science Association World Congress in Quebec city, on August 1, 2000.

especially in the 1960s. And the very existence of numerous vocal and incessant challenges disclosed the fundamental vulnerability of that arrangement. Moreover, the mere attendance by most members with the ROC in the multilateral forum did not mean Taipei's membership had been institutionalized to the extent that those members accepted its claim of "one China" sovereignty. Even for the ROC's "longstanding" allies, the expedient arrangement for Taipei to represent China at the time was not so much a symbol of support for the Nationalist moralistic cause of "one China" as an instrument for strategic maneuvering in the heyday of the Cold War. Most importantly, the Nationalist subjective claim of "one China" sovereignty had never gone through a process of bilateral re-negotiation of terms of mandate in the wake of rebus sic stantibus and intersubjective approval, with which the post-transformation development could be characterized.

In many ways, the cognitive, normative and especially the regulative power of the arrangement that Taipei represented China was not much controlled by the ROC. Rather, Taipei's representation was essentially bolstered with the American sanctioning power. Meanwhile, the western countries to a varying degree were prepared to accept Beijing as a major representative of China cognitively and normatively. However, as long as they continued to maintain

diplomatic ties with Taipei, their cognitive beliefs that the Communists effectively controlled the mainland and normative expectation that diplomatic recognition should thus extend to Beijing were not actualized, not to mention institutionalizing them with the aid of regulative elements. Thus, the "one China" arrangement prior to 1971 not only tended to be loosely organized and less cohesive, but also often split in divergent direction. Hence, it would be untenable to maintain that before 1971 Taipei's "one China" was institutionalized internationally as prevalent as in post 1971 era. Instead, it should be fair to argue that the historical condition during the period was relatively fluid to the extent that the direction of course of history was largely open.

On symbolic institutional level, the politics of "one China" representation in the 1950s and 1960s were characterized by fierce competition among various interpretations of whether the "one China" represented reality and what was meant for "one China". Although individual countries might have adopted a given set of interpretation on the situation to guide their policies, there was virtually no single dominant mode of representing reality prevailing over others on the global setting. Despite the fact that the ROC continued to hold the UN seat, vocal challenges to that arrangement could be seen in most

of the annual gatherings in the forum. Meanwhile, the western support for the existing arrangement was obviously not wholehearted to the effect that certain diplomatic deliberations of substitute institutions or even "low-profiled" negotiations with the PRC were often visible. The heated discussions on the China/Taiwan representation in the UNGA testified the fierce competitions among various interpretations as well as prescriptions for the situation.

The high degree of historical fluidity has profoundly changed since the Sino-Canadian normalization in October 1970. It began with a tedious Stockholm negotiation process. The significance of the evidence that Ottawa switched from "one China one Taiwan" to "one China" policy in the midst of the talks, rather than prior to them, confirms a core social constructivist proposition in the IR: interests and identity develop from interaction process, rather than be pre-determined exogenously. After all, it was after series of encounters and heated exchange of views that the Canadian policy-makers eventually realized the top importance Beijing has attached to the Taiwan issue and linked it to the prospective exchange of diplomatic recognition. Meanwhile, Ottawa formally abandoned pursuing alternative courses of institutionalization with respect to the Taiwan issue. For a middle power aspiring to expand its international influence, the priority of Canadian foreign policy objective lay in the

normalization with Beijing rather than an immediate recognition of the other fact of the separate existence of Taiwan. This meant that Canadian national interests and identity had to be constructed on the new basis of "one China" in order to achieve the ultimate success of the negotiations and establishment of diplomatic relations. As such, the Stockholm negotiations could be read as a micro process of social construction of "one China".

The "one China spirit" of the Sino-Canadian agreement was then carried through by many countries that commonly accomplished the results through negotiations and codification. This principle has been followed and upheld by many countries in the world through institutional isomorphism. The institutional learning and diffusion of the "one China" statement in joint communiques, albeit in relatively equivocal phrases in reference to Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s, was evident. Thus, the Canadian practice arguably could be regarded as the constitution of the global "one China" structure.² As such, the windows of previously conceivable institutional options to represent reality were then virtually closed. The politics of "one China" representation thus entered a new era.

In sharp contrast to the previous decades, Beijing's

² This cogent depiction was inspired by Dr. Jeremy Paltiel.

new power and national interests emanating from the emerging "one China" institution were acquired and entrenched through numerous bilateral-oriented intersubjective understandings, the core mechanism of social construction. The PRC's negotiations and ensuing agreements with many countries on a bilateral, one-by-one basis thus have forged even more direct and stronger "one China" network than multilateral venues alone would have achieved. The effect was no doubt reinforced as Beijing captured the China seats in major international organizations. Power and interests in Realist world politics thus can only be effectivated through the process of intersubjective understandings. The power of this new practice is obviously far-reaching. This is similarly manifested in the degree of cohesive organization of relevant components in the surging "one China" institution.

Undoubtedly, the recognition of Beijing by countries concerned as the sole government of China has strengthened consciously or unwittingly both normative and regulative elements of the new "one China" arrangement in the PRC's favour. As the possibility of "one China one Taiwan" or "two Chinas" was now foreclosed, the legal and moral implications were that previous public sympathy with the cause of self-determination of the residents on Taiwan was replaced by at best a formal urge of peaceful resolution of dispute between Beijing and Taipei, which was also taken for granted as the

sole conceivable option. With more and more acknowledgement bestowed upon Beijing's vital interest in solving the Taiwan issue, the PRC now has legitimate grounds to interfere in the nature and scope of countries' transactions with Taiwan. Moreover, as the PRC was recognized by more and more countries in the world, its missions abroad were expanding rapidly. This undoubtedly strengthened its surveillance mechanism and increased its monitoring capacity with regard to other countries' practice on Taiwan issue. Overall, this meant that the power to define and defend the "one China" institution in all of cognitive, normative and regulative aspects can now be decisively wielded by Beijing. As the mainland market grew in a very real sense under Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms and Beijing's capacity to deliver rewards and penalties increased, many countries in the world could not afford to neglect the power of "one China" structuration when Taiwan issue was invoked. Thus, in sharp contrast to the pre-1970 situation, the three institutional elements thus were organized in a much more cohesive way and consolidated in the hands of the PRC.

On the level of symbolic representation of reality, as the gap of diplomatic recognition Beijing and Taipei have won as the government of China became wider and wider, the PRC's version of "one China" was also accepted as the dominant and legitimate mode of representing reality. As

such, in international setting, it is often taken for granted that Beijing is the spokesman of China and that Taiwan falls within its vital sphere of interests. This cognitive acknowledgement, firmly reached and entrenched through numerous joint communiques between the PRC and countries concerned, is also backed up with the concentration of sanctioning power. As a result, all the other modes of possible interpretation, primarily including Taipei's own version of "one China", "one China two political entities", "one-divided China" or "special state to state relations", were marginalized and excluded in world political discourse.

From another perspective, the overall process of the social construction of "one China" arguably entailed series of implicit competition, apart from institutional learning, among some major countries in their varying extent of representing the continuing existence of Taiwan. As compared to those of unilateral recognition of Beijing without mentioning the Taiwan issue that were adopted by countries such as the UK and India almost immediately after the establishment of the "new China", these new emerging practices, starting with the French, involved the negotiations of mutual recognition in a time when the Beijing-Taipei log-jam has persisted for more than one decade. The French practice simply announced a bilateral

exchange of ambassadors in the joint communique of 1964 without addressing Taiwan's existence. Up to 1970, the formula was attractive at least in terms of succinctness. The absence of the Taiwan statement was thus deliberately modelled after by the Canadians and Italians during their negotiations with the Chinese. But the follow-suit moves were unacceptable for Beijing. The Canadian formula to break the new ground of normalization through embodying the "one China" statement in the joint communique therefore represented a genetic and unique practice that ignited the flame of "one China" structuration. The Italians immediately adopted it. Similar practice was made during Nixon's trip to the PRC that culminated in the release of the Shanghai Communique. The Japanese catch-up practice, while retaining the equivocal element on Taiwan status, additionally arranged for the establishment and exchange of non-official offices in Taiwan and Japan. The American practice, while continuing the tone of the Shanghai Communique and incorporating the gist of both Canadian and Japanese practices, went further to enact the Taiwan Relations Act to govern their bilateral relations with the Taiwanese people. In a way, then, these various local practices and modes of representing the existence of Taiwan were competing with one another for historical recognition.

In this sense, at first glance, the historical merit of

the Canadian formula might have been depreciated, compared to the Japanese and American arrangements that have moved further to maximize the continuing existence of Taiwan. Nevertheless, since all of the practices, starting with the Canadian one, entailed the upholding of the "one China" principle and its codification in the joint communiques and eventually converged as the dominant approach across nations, the primary importance of the Canadian instance as the constitution of the global "one China" framework should be acknowledged.³ The importance of Canadian foreign policy toward China/Taiwan should be highlighted later.

It may be added that as time elapsed the "one China" complex became increasingly rigid. As explored in Chapter 5, the change of phraseology from an equivocal approach to direct recognition with new elements suggests the trend. Moreover, the tendency can be manifested in the varying degree of importance Beijing has attached the "one China" principle to the initiation/resumption of negotiations for normalizing relations. As explored in Chapter 4, the PRC did

³ Like most literature on the related subjects, "the One China Principle and the Taiwan issue" document newly published by the PRC in Feb.2000 attributed the global acceptance of "one China" to the UNGA resolution in Oct 1971, the Sino-Japanese and Sino-American joint communiques for the establishment of diplomatic relations, without acknowledging the historic importance of the Canadian practice. (BR 43,10: 18) This considerably departed from Zhou Enlai's open recognition comparing the significance of the French and Canadian practices when he received Mitchell Sharp. (DEA file A,8774,20: Notes Aug.19/72)

not put the Canadian acceptance of its "three constant principles", which boiled down to the "one China" principle, as the pre-condition for the Stockholm negotiations. At the present time, by contrast, Beijing raised the explicit acceptance of the "one China" principle by the new Taiwan government as the precondition to resume cross-Straits talks.

This contrast begs further questions: In what ways does the "one China" become increasingly rigid? What impact does the social construction of "one China" cast? Before addressing the problems later, I should conclude this section with a short note on why the crucial transformation took place.

It should be obvious that from the outset the Beijing-Taipei coexistence and confrontation was often presumed to be a transitory phenomenon by most countries including both the PRC and the ROC. Hence, there was little incentive for parties concerned to make strenuous efforts to institutionalize the demarcation.⁴ As time went by and the de facto separation continued, Beijing arguably realized that the Taiwan issue would not be solved in the immediate future. From this perspective, then, the international

⁴ The Nationalists might well refrain from pressing their western allies to codify intersubjective understanding of Taipei's "one China" sovereignty as they probably were aware of the complication of the issue and the likely reluctance of the West to do so might make them lose faces.

institutionalization of "one China" since 1970 could be viewed as attempts by Beijing to transcend the restriction of time and space so that it can more patiently wait for fortuitous time to solve the problem once and for all. This seemed to be confirmed in the recent contentions within Beijing's policymakers circle with respect to its future policy toward Taiwan in the wake of Chen Shui-bian's winning Presidential election. Qian Qichen, the PRC Vice Premier, reportedly rebuffed the hardliners' advocacy of immediate military operation against the island and was confident in the effectiveness of containing Taiwan within the "one China" framework through diplomatic means. (ttnn Mar.27/00)⁵ Almost two months later, in reaction to Chen's inauguration speech, he reiterated Beijing's intention to "wait to see how the Taiwan authorities could manage to change (the 'one China' fact)." (ttnn May 23/00)

Before dealing with the issue of growing rigidity and impact of "one China" structuration, I should sum up the discussion of the "one China" transformation by highlighting the role Canadian foreign policy played in the process.

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II. Canadian China/Taiwan Policy: Continuity and Change

As argued in Chapter 3, despite a common move towards

⁵ The Taiwan News Network (TTNN) virtually covers news drawn from the China Times (CT).

the acceptance of the PRC by 1968, while the Americans tended to be more concerned about the fate of the KMT state, the Canadians considered it important to give Taiwanese society a say in determining its own future. In implementing the policy of accepting Beijing, as also shown in Chapters 4 and 5, Ottawa consistently adopted a multilateral approach, from the UN initiative to the international engagement in the Stockholm negotiations, whereas Washington, with efforts continuously made through bilateral channels, opted for a secretive course of action. Insofar as representing the China/Taiwan reality is concerned, while the American trajectory was switched from "two Chinas" to "one China" in the Shanghai Communique to "one China" with "one Taiwan society" approach exemplified in the Sino-American Communique of 1979 and the Taiwan Relations Act, the Canadian course moved from "one China one Taiwan" to "one China" with "one Taiwan" bracketed. This Canadian position should be elaborated.

Multilateralism was the primary venue for Ottawa to pursue an independent foreign policy. Arguably, Canadian policy towards China/Taiwan from the outset was developed in the process of achieving its self-assertiveness and nation-building. As the UN forum was often plagued with the issue of China's representation, Paul Martin's initiative in a way aimed to fulfil Ottawa's desire to make the institution work

better. Trudeau's initiative in bringing about recognition of the PRC was intended to yield greater leverage in world affairs and accomplished through a consistent multilateral engagement in the Stockholm negotiation process. It brought about the Canadian formula that allowed for interpretive space between Beijing's position and Ottawa's on Taiwan. In a way Ottawa was silent on Taiwan's existence hereafter, and arguably, unlike the Shanghai Communiqué, the formula did not commit the Canadians to the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan. However, it entailed an evident cost: Ottawa cannot take any action to contradict Beijing's position on the issue, as "non-challenge" implied. Moreover, the intended interpretive space especially on the "non-endorse" part of the formula, like the option of exchanges of trade offices with Taiwan decided by the Cabinet, was not actively pursued by Ottawa. To the extent that the possibility of allowing Taiwan to develop some diplomatic space initially contemplated became more and more remote in the post-1970 development, as explored in Chapter 6, the formula ended up as a one-sided formula which served Beijing's purposes. Arguably, as late as 1976, in light of Ottawa's reluctance to take its Beijing embassy's advice of formally recognizing Beijing's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, his final offer for Taiwanese participation and insistence upon "Taiwan" as the nomenclature of Taipei team, Trudeau seemed to have

thought that Taiwan's status as separate from China was still an open possibility. The cause for the missed opportunities was a complicated issue. From the DEA's perspective, the ambivalence of the Nationalists in 1976 Montreal Olympics as well as their lack of credibility in post-1970 transactions evidently led to the dissipation of some opportunities. The absence of unofficial institutional representation in Canada by which Taipei might have been able to more acutely observe Beijing-Ottawa-Washington interactions at the time, in the first instance, might also contribute to the closing of the opportunity. This begs the question of why the option envisaged in the Cabinet decision prior to the Stockholm negotiations was left unaddressed on the Canadian side. Here the role of the Canadian embassy in Stockholm was instrumental.

As explored in Chapter 4, the embassy was obviously anxious to conclude the negotiations as soon as possible. There is no archival evidence showing that the self-determination of Taiwanese and the option of exchanging unofficial trade offices were seriously on the Canadian negotiators' mind. On the contrary, the desire to facilitate the conclusion of negotiations evidently outweighed the consideration of Taiwan's interest, which was exemplified in their foiling the PCO's Gordon Robertson's intervention.

Nevertheless, the recognition of Beijing was a remarkable triumph of Canadian diplomacy. This, together with the provision of "rational" interpretation of "one China" formula in the recognition issue per se and the 1976 Montreal Olympics, undoubtedly should be attributed to Trudeau's leadership. Equally important, the practice of "engaged independence" in the course of the Stockholm negotiations certainly contributed to that success by ironing out potential opposition from at least Canberra, Moscow, Taipei and Washington. Although they did not like the Canadian initiative, their hostility appeared to be defused effectively. This could be juxtaposed with the overt protests Canberra and Moscow presented against Rome in the Sino-Italian negotiations, on the one hand, and with Taipei's grievances towards Washington's secretive betrayal in the 1970s, on the other. The account of the Stockholm negotiations, however, will not be complete without the release of the Chinese sources.

Finally, it should be added that there is another unwitting contribution of the Canadian foreign policy to "one China" structuration. Initially, Ottawa had hoped to have the UN and the IOC resolve first the China/Taiwan impasse on representation issue to clear ways for it to achieve its bilateral-oriented policy objective. However, both wishes were dampened as the membership deadlock in both

arena dragged on. Ultimately, Ottawa was forced to take its own measures to settle bilateral relations which unwittingly paid ways for eventual solution of the China/Taiwan puzzle in both multilateral settings. However, the Canadian diplomacy in both cases received variant reactions: praises and blessings in the Sino-Canadian normalization in 1970 but black eyes in the 1976 Montreal Olympics. Whether or not the lack of international consultation in the decision-making process of the latter case led to the unsatisfactory result deserves further investigation.

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III. Structuration Impact I: Enabling and Constraining Effects:

As highlighted above and elaborated in Chapters 4 and 5, the prevalence of the existing "one China" structure could be traced to the Sino-Canadian collaboration and its institutional diffusion later. The institutional development however underwent in an increasingly rigid fashion in recent decade. It should be noted that at the same time there was a parallel policy elaboration process to implement the "one China" principle in various non-political issue areas.

As explored in Chapter 6, the Canadian policy ramifications, insofar as its economic and sociocultural interaction with Taiwan was concerned, were present in situations where the issues of Taiwanese visitors bearing

formal symbols to enter and participate in Canada-hosted international activities and Ottawa's contacts with Taiwanese officials were invoked. These were exemplified in the 1976 Montreal Olympics and ensuing change of Taiwanese nomenclature in international Olympic movement. The impact of the "one China" structuration on concrete transactions related to the island was thus evident. It was also demonstrated through the emergence of "virtual representation" for Taiwan to substitute for normal diplomatic institution, as explored in Chapter 7. This new form of institutional representation can also be seen as Taiwanese as well as international adaptation to the "one China" institutional development.

Nevertheless, the repercussion can be further updated in view of recent development and presented through the lense of Anthony Giddens' structuration theory. On the one hand, it enables Beijing to engage in global governance when the "one China" issue was invoked. On the other, it limits the freedom of action of Taiwan and countries concerned.

1. Enabling a Global Governance from Beijing:

Since the sustaining of the "one China" institution depends upon continuing practices of relevant agencies, the maintenance of an extensive monitoring system and the wielding of sanction power (ie "regulative" element of institution) are crucial. The PRC no doubt has a primary

interest at stake in the globalizing process and thus wants to ensure an effective surveillance mechanism firm in place. This condition had been achieved long before.

As explored in Chapters 6 and 7, Beijing often blew whistles on alleged "transgressions" to the Canadian government when relevant cases had been learned. As mentioned above, its capacity to deliver rewards and penalties was further magnified with the presence of a real market since economic reforms was launched. Many countries, including Canada, had found it not affordable to neglect Beijing's concerns when the Taiwan issue was invoked.

Since more and more nations began to expand their non-governmental ties with Taiwan and its democratization and growing self-assertive foreign policy were set in motion, the PRC increasingly found it necessary to articulate their concerns in a systematic way. This could be exemplified by the release of two comprehensive documents recently. The first document, entitled "The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China", was published by the Taiwan Affairs Office and Information Office of the State Council of the PRC in August 1993. (BR 36,36: 1-8)

Within a special section on Taiwan's international relations, the PRC reiterated its position in four spheres. First of all, Beijing explicitly warned those countries which have established diplomatic relations with it not to

establish official ties with Taiwan. Secondly, it reaffirms its opposition to Taiwan's lobbying for "one country two seats" formula in international organizations that requires sovereign statehood on the grounds that "the sovereignty of each state is an integral whole which is indivisible and unsharable"⁶ and that Taiwan is a part of China. The question of Taiwan's participation, Beijing maintained, can be considered only on the basis of "one China" principle, taking into account the nature and statutes of international organizations concerned and specific circumstances. Specifically, it held that Taipei's memberships in the ADB and the APEC is "only an ad hoc arrangement and cannot constitute a 'model' applicable to other (IGOs)."

The document further defined the scope of aviation services to be allowed between Taiwan and countries recognizing Beijing. It claimed that those state-run airlines of countries having diplomatic ties with PRC "must not operate air services to Taiwan and (that) privately-operated airlines must seek China's consent through consultations between their government and the Chinese

⁶ The contemporary Chinese conviction that sovereignty is unsharable has its roots in the historical fact that China has always been organized in a unitary system with no federal or confederal experience. The perception that a strong central government is required for national unification to withstand foreign challenge has been reinforced by a presumed association of historical "chaotic" social condition with decentralized governments or weak states.

government before they can start reciprocal air services with those of Taiwan." Finally, it reiterated its firm opposition to arms sales and technology transfers "in any form or under any pretext" to Taiwan.

More than six years later, in the wake of an imminent Presidential election in Taiwan when the pro-independence candidate had a good chance to win, Beijing deemed "it necessary to further explain to the international community the Chinese government's position and policy on the one-China principle". It was embodied as "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue" in February 2000. (BR 43,10:16-24)

The new document frequently referred to the previous one and repeatedly expounded Beijing's existing positions which boil down to the syllogism that "there is only one China in the world, (that) Taiwan is a part of China, and (that) the government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of China." (BR: 43,10:17)⁷ It now attributed Taipei's memberships in the ADB, APEC and

⁷ This discourse is intended for foreign audience and different from the argumentation put for the Taiwanese "compatriots". Most recently, the latter was watered down to the effect that "there is only one China in the world, (that) both mainland and Taiwan belong to the one China, and (that) China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is not divisible", as explicitly stated Qian Qichen when he received a Taiwanese media delegation in late August. (UDN Aug.25/00) See: <http://dailynews.sina.com/taiwan/udn/2000/0825/1632411.html>

GATT under various names to that "the Chinese government has made arrangements for (on the basis of the principle of one China)" (BR 43,10:23) Moreover, Beijing reasserted its firm objection to any country's plan to sell arms to and forge military alliance with the island.(BR 43,10:24)

Furthermore, the Taiwanese "pragmatic diplomacy" was depicted as a plot to create "two Chinas" or "one China one Taiwan". The document then put it, "it is only natural that the Chinese government should firmly oppose these." As for Taiwan's non-governmental economic and cultural exchanges with other nations, the PRC also sought to take credits by claiming that "it has adopted many flexible measures to make Taiwan's economic, trade and cultural contacts with foreign countries more convenient." (BR 43,10:24)

As such, Beijing's involvement in global "one China" structuration process become more and more evident. (Wu 2000) Overall, by comparison to the earlier stage where the institutionalization was mostly conducted through bilateral collaborations with most initiatives originating from countries concerned, the recent development of the "one China" complex betrayed traits of global governance directly centred upon Beijing. Coupled with the enabling effect of the "one China" structuration on Beijing's global governance nevertheless is the dwindling of Taiwan's international diplomatic space.

2. Constraining Effect: Global Exclusion of Taiwan:

While facing ongoing diplomatic adversity, the Nationalist government continued to survive. This could be partly attributed to some adaptive measures taken to strengthen its domestic legitimacy base in the aftermaths of loss of international mandate. As explored in Chapter 8, this readjustment of social bases in a way corresponds with the transformation of Taipei's foreign policy argumentation and is coupled with the phenomenon of goal complexity. Nevertheless, Taipei's incessant pursuit for international survival unwittingly revealed the power of the "one China" structuration.

Ironically, the "one China" institution was initially shaped by the Nationalist government in its efforts to challenge the Communist legitimacy in mainland China, as argued in Chapter 3. However, as the power to define the "one China" principle shifted internationally, the ramifications of the ROC's "one China" policy became more and more evident: so long as the goal of the Taipei government remained to be the ultimate representation of an legitimate statehood for China as a whole, this constrained the state-building of Taiwan, and Taipei thus has limited freedom to assert its international status with respect to other countries that have accepted the parameters of the "one China" institution.

From the late 1980s onwards when democratization was gaining momentum in Taiwan, the Nationalists began attempting to escape from the increasingly rigid global "one China" straitjacket and stretching its own "one China" principle. (Hughes 1997: 46-69) However, the power of Beijing-orchestrated structuration meant that Taiwan's counterparts were often reluctant to break earlier rules and practices when the "one China" issue was invoked. The consequence of this global process is a continuing marginalization of Taiwan in the global diplomatic community, despite its relatively extensive ties in global trade networks.

The phenomenon of Taiwan's diplomatic isolation has been demonstrated in various academic studies for decades. By 1990, Taiwan was labelled as a "pariah" or "outcast" state, comparable to the historical experiences of Israel and South Africa in view of its being virtually excluded from the world club of sovereign states and vital policy process. (Geldenhuis 1990; Inbar 1985) In the late 1990s, the subject continued to attract academic attention. For instance, one scholar argued that as the international practices in recent decade could be flexible enough to create some functional substitutes for diplomatic consular institutions to handle increasingly extensive non-official relations between Taiwan and its counterparts, the status of

Taiwan as a "non-state" entity ironically has also been institutionalized in this process. (Mengin 1997: 244-6) Similarly, in view of the fact that Taiwan has not achieved an independent statehood nor an integration with the existing mainland statehood, a recent study categorized it as an "intermediate state". (Hughes 1997: 129-152)

Empirically, there are numerous evidences pointing to the global marginalization of Taiwan. This could be briefly illustrated through a roughly continuing drop of countries recognizing the Republic of China. In 1949, there were 46 countries recognizing the ROC, compared to 16 for the PRC. The number once rose to 60 for Taipei and 50 for Beijing in 1966. Seven years later, the number of states recognizing Taipei as the legitimate Chinese government fell to 39, whereas the Beijing earned 85 recognitions. In 1988, only 22 countries recognized the ROC. (Wang 1990) As of January 1999, there were 28 countries maintaining diplomatic ties with Taipei, whereas 163 countries established diplomatic relations with Beijing. (ICD 1999; MOFA 1999)

Moreover, the practice of treating the ROC in different categories became universal through institutional diffusion across nations. This manifests itself not only in the codification of "one China" statement but also in various policy issue-areas. As shown in Chapter 6, the Canadian practice, with evident trace of international learning, was

elucidated to the extent that it virtually prohibited Taiwan from calling itself as "Republic of China" or "ROC", flying its national flag and playing its anthem in international arena such as the 1976 Montreal Olympics. It should be added that the tenacity of the "one China" constraining effect on Taiwanese freedom of action meant that displaying the ROC flag and using the formal nomenclature remained a thorny issue recently. For instance, when the 35th World Skills Competitions were held in the same Montreal Olympic Stadium in November 1999, these very problems arose. Nevertheless, in contrast to its policy action in the 1976 Montreal Olympics, Taipei eventually decided to accept the arrangement of parading under the flag of the International Vocational Training Organization (IVTO) in the opening ceremony.⁸

Furthermore, the constraining effect of the "one China" structuration not only affects Taiwan but also other countries concerned that have no diplomatic ties with the ROC. Restrictions have been imposed upon formal visits/stays in those countries by Taipei's top-ranking figures, namely President, Vice-President, Premier, Vice-Premier, Foreign Minister. The fact that the Missile Test Crisis of March 1996 was often attributed to Lee Teng-hui's trip to Cornell University for an alumni reunion is a case in point.

⁸ Interview with a former official of the ROC MOFA.

Approval of individual visits by Taiwanese prominent figures who no longer bear official titles could also trigger furious responses from Beijing. For example, recently in late June 2000, Lee's visit to the UK in his capacity as an ordinary individual after the end of his term of the Presidency also incurred vigorous protests from the PRC. Beijing then cancelled ministerial-level contacts, froze official meetings and even hinted at action against British trade interests. (TT Jul.6/00: 20) This new episode illustrates the tenacious constraining effect of the "one China" structuration on Taiwan's conduction of international relations.

The power of the "one China" complex and the globalization of the exclusion of Taiwan could also be manifested through the instance of Bill Clinton's personal utterance of the "three nos" policy in his state visit to the mainland in summer 1998. Even as the leader of the most powerful country in the post-Cold-War world, he himself still found it necessary to reproduce "previous" policy elements, as Washington claimed to be, and to proclaim that new synthesis on the Chinese soil, albeit in an oral, "low-profile" way. (Wu 1998b)

Moreover, the occurrence of numerous events in the past year revolving around the longstanding sovereignty dispute further testified the strength of the "one China"

institution and the state of Taipei's marginalization. As an attempt to break the increasingly-tightening "one China" straitjacket, for example, Lee Teng-hui's explicit but controversial statement that depicted the cross-strait ties as "special state to state relations" on July 9, 1999 (GIO 1999: 27) not only incited further conflict between Taipei and Beijing, but also "affected mutual trust (between Taipei and Washington), from the American perspective", as testified in the Legislative Yuan by Stephen Chen, the former TECRO representative in the US. (CNA Dec.31/99)⁹ In reaction to Chen Shui-bian's new ascendancy to the Presidency, Beijing has attached to the resumption of the cross-strait talks some "pre-conditions", including "an explicit acceptance of its favourite 'one China' principle by Chen, his public acknowledgement of being a 'Chinese', and his unequivocal commitment to pursue the eventual reunification objective." (CT Jun.29/00) Nevertheless, the fact that a series of low-profile gestures and strenuous efforts made by Chen since his inauguration so far have failed to convince Beijing into lowering the price of resumption of talks demonstrates the power play of the "one China" discourse.

⁹ Stephen Chen in that testimony confirmed that Taipei's unilateral declaration without prior consultation with Washington fundamentally led to the American mistrust. The CNA report could be accessed from:
<http://dailynews.sina.com/taiwan/ckp/1999/1231/10.html>

As such, the Nationalist choice of "one China" policy in the beginning of the 1950s has limited, for the rulers in Taiwan, the range of institutional options open for the future of the island, and reduced the potential of its own adaptability. After all, the adaptative capacity of any entity is conditioned by the degree of support it could accrue from social constituency. Taiwan's case suggests that within the "one China" parameters, the choice of domestic support on the basis of the selected institution may alienate external audience. The Nationalist interests in showing to its domestic audience through citing foreign dignitaries' visits as the instances of explicit support for the ROC from other countries having no diplomatic ties with it often clashed with those embarrassed governments who wished to keep the visits in low profile in order not to touch the "one China" nerve. In this regard, archival evidences revealed Ottawa's thoughts that Taipei's publicity of some contacts or use of nomenclature were deliberately designed for propaganda purpose. The Canadian lingering sense of distrust of the Nationalists, reinforced by previously-acquired stereotype of the regime being corrupt and repressive on the mainland, arguably reduced the effectiveness of Taipei's adaptative diplomacy.

Moreover, the ROC's adaptability was restricted by given domestic institutional framework that provided handy

basis for existent legitimacy. So long as the fundamental principle of the ROC constitution based upon Chinese nationalism remained firm in place, it would not be possible for the KMT to engage in a rapid and comprehensive transformation searching for alternative but uncertain source of domestic as well as international social support. This in turn limited the Nationalist room of adaptative maneuvering in reaction to the increasingly unfavourable global "one China" institution.

Overall, the institutional development of "one China" structure has not only endowed Beijing with legitimate reasons for action to intervene in the practices of other countries but also limited Taipei's freedom of diplomatic actions to raise its international standing vis-a-vis Beijing. The power of the "one China" institution has grown to the extent that despite its invisibility, the structure virtually exists and has been effectively ingrained in agents' minds. When speech acts of these agents instantiate the structure, or when issues related to "one China" are invoked in international transactions, the enabling and constraining effects of the structure immediately manifest themselves.

Nevertheless, the repercussions of the "one China" structuration through enabling Beijing and constraining Taiwan do not mean that Taiwan is only a passive observer in

a determined structure. The "one China" structuration, through the interactions between Taiwan and countries concerned, also involves the transformation of the international identity of Taiwan. The constitutive effect of the structuration should now be elucidated.

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IV. Structuration Impact II: Constituting Taipei:

The act to accord recognition and to establish diplomatic relations in public ceremonies in a way could be likened to "the rites of passage", coined by a noted French anthropologist, Arnold van Gennep (Gennep 1960), in global diplomatic community. Without going through the open symbolic rituals to change international status with the presence of witness, a country would not be regarded as a full-fledged sovereign state in the world and its national title would not be listed and cited in international documents. In this sense, the protocol of signing agreements to exchange diplomatic missions could be seen as a vital international social engineering for the qualification and status of independent sovereign statehood. Insofar as Taiwan is concerned, this license-acquiring requirement was coupled with the "one China" structuration process, which reinforced an irresistible constitutive effect on the island. The institutionalization and diffusion of western functional representation in Taiwan, as explored in Chapter 7, in a way

constituted Taiwan as "non-state" entity. In the wake of post-1970 derecognition, the constitutive effect of the "one China" structure perhaps is best epitomized as: "Taiwan could still exist, but not as 'China'", as an observer put it. (Frolic 1996:1)

Numerous instances revolving around the issue of Taiwan's appropriate designation, as explored in Chapter 6, exemplified the constitutive effect. Overall, in the beginning, the Nationalist government had been recalcitrant in resisting the imposition of names other than its formal title by other governments. Taipei's decision to pull its team out of the 1976 Montreal Olympics prior to the opening ceremony was a case in point. Trudeau's last offer at the end of crisis was made in a constitutive tone by insisting "that Taiwan not hold itself out to be China, something it clearly was not. Taiwan..could call itself anything it wanted, so long as the name was not in flagrant violation of international comity." (Head and Trudeau 1995: 194) The turbulence in the 1970s meant that international efforts to "internalize" the Nationalists as "coming from Taiwan" was not very successful and were often met with firm resistance. Nevertheless, a later "expedient compromise" by Taipei made in the context of international interactions, which could be indicated in the transformation of name plates in the virtual representation of Taiwanese non-official offices

abroad and that of diplomatic discourse, demonstrates the eventual constitutive effect of the global "one China" structuration.

The increasing prevalence of "Taipei" as the standard title of Taiwan's overseas representative offices since the late 1980s did not come out of the blue. In the aftermath of de-recognition of the ROC, as explored in Chapter 7, Taipei arguably conducted various experiments by using various less-political titles such as the "Far Eastern Trade Company" or "Sun Yat-sen Centre" as the name of its quasi diplomatic representation abroad. In the meantime, the settlement of Taiwanese membership in the Olympic movement through the formula of "Chinese Taipei" provided an alternative basis for Taiwan's international identity. However, perhaps for fear of an ultimate loss of distinctiveness vis-a-vis the mainland which captured the position as the legitimate representative of "one China", the Nationalists found the expedient arrangements less and less satisfactory. The surge and convergence of "Taipei" as new form of international identity for Taiwan, or as in the case of the GATT, the emergence of "Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu independent customs territory", very much came, for the ROC, as reactions to the "one China" structuration.

As the Taiwanese virtual representation in the world

increasingly bears the title of "Taipei Economic and Cultural Office" (TECO) or other similar titles prefaced with "Taipei", in a way Taipei has appeared as a new form of "global city". Besides the title of Taiwanese unofficial representation abroad, the essentially voluntary adoption of "Taipei" as new symbol of identity can be seen in other fields as well. For example, as the major public radio station in charge of propagating the progress, democracy and prosperity of Taiwan for overseas audience, the "Voice of Free China" was reorganized and renamed as "Radio Taipei International" (RTI) in January 1998. (PN May 10/00)¹⁰ Recently, similar new names bearing "Taipei" were adopted in other major internationally-oriented media organs such as the "Free China Review" and "Free China Journal". Both were renamed as "Taipei Review" in April 2000 and "Taipei Journal" in January 2000, reportedly on the grounds that "the old titles, as adopted in the Cold War, became inappropriate under existing international atmosphere." (UDN May 4/00)¹¹

¹⁰ The RTI is a branch of the Central Broadcasting System (CBS), the new Taiwanese national broadcasting, which was established through incorporating both previous CBS and the Overseas Section of the Broadcasting Corporation of China (BCC) that used to take charge of the "Voice of Free China". see:
<http://dailynews.sina.com/taiwan/pnn/2000/0510/1064217.html>

¹¹ The United Daily News can be accessed from:
<http://dailynews.sina.com/taiwan/udn/2000/0504/1042620.html>

Additionally, in the context of a growing maturity of the "one China" institution in the 1990s, Taipei often adopted a new form of Hegelian synthesis as a substitute formal title in its diplomatic discourse. Since the thesis of "the Republic of China" was unacceptable internationally, nor was the antithesis of "Taiwan" satisfactory to the Nationalists, the use of the "Republic of China on Taiwan" (ROCOT) provided an alternative formula for identity. It also served to highlight Taipei's international distinctiveness through specifying the territoriality of the state. Meanwhile, it has the advantage of avoiding an implication of independence as direct use of "Taiwan" might connote. The transformation of the international identity certainly is not accidental. The fact that it emerges in the ROC foreign policy argumentation only after years of international interactions, rather than be adopted right in the beginning of 1970s, testifies the validity of the social constructivist proposition that identity and interest develop in the midst of social interactions.

It should be noted however that the increasing use of "Taipei" does not mean that "Chinese Taipei" is no longer used. Despite its diminished desirability for Taipei's policy-makers, it remained a major formula for Taiwan to participate in international organizations and activities. Since 1990, for example, the Taiwanese membership in the

APEC, the IVTO and continuing negotiations on participation of the WTO have been bearing the name of "Chinese Taipei". Nevertheless, the general trend from the initial insistence on the "Republic of China", "ROC", or "Free China" to the reluctant acceptance of the "Chinese Taipei" and recently, to the voluntary choice of "Taipei"¹² suggests an interesting transformation of Taiwan's international identity vis-a-vis the mainland and outside world. This ultimately could be attributed to the "one China" structuration.

The constitutive effect of the "one China" not only is presented through international interactions, but is also increasingly reinforced by Beijing. The PRC has often tried to remind its audience that it is the sole representative of "one China" within which Taiwan is a local part, even though it itself has not exercised effective jurisdiction over the region at any historical moment. For such purpose, news briefings and conferences held by the PRC Foreign Ministry serves as one of major forums to constitute Taiwan within the locality of China. Chinese Premier Li Peng's comment in

¹² Although there is growing use of the TECO nomenclature, so far there has been no available evidence showing that the simple use of "Taipei" was intended to replace increasingly unpopular "Chinese Taipei". Distinction should also be made between the usage of "Taipei" in many bilateral settings and that of "Chinese Taipei" in primarily multilateral forum. This was inspired through an interview with a former official of the ROC MOFA.

reaction to the upcoming first Taiwanese direct presidential election epitomized Beijing's constitutive view of "one China". In a speech in January 1996, Li Peng emphasized that "regardless of how Taiwan's leaders are selected, the fact that Taiwan is a part of China's territory and its leaders are only leaders of one region of China cannot change." (BR 39, 8-9:15)

At the juncture, it should be noted that there is a distinction between Taipei's responses to the constitutive efforts by foreign countries and the PRC. Insofar as the cross-Strait relations are concerned, in a way Taipei was adopting an "objectivist" strategy vis-a-vis Beijing's "constructivist" approach. Indeed, for the Nationalists "one China" refers to the future condition¹³ and the "existing fact" is both sides of the straits maintain respectively effective jurisdiction whereas for Beijing the "one China" principle must be committed to in the present. While the PRC has offered "peaceful unification under 'one country two systems'" since the early 1980s attempting to constitute Taiwan as a "region of China", the ROC on Taiwan defies such intended construction and instead urges Beijing to "face

¹³ For the new DPP government, the "one China", as "a valid option" for Taiwan, constitutes one of future possibilities, rather than condition. See the statement of the Director of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) which can be accessed in:
<http://w3.ttnn.com/cna/000530/p02.html>

reality" by treating Taipei as a parity partner with effective jurisdiction authority in order for meaningful negotiations to proceed. Lee Teng-hui's declaration of the "special state to state relations" statement was to circumvent Beijing's constitutive efforts that might be brought about in an incoming talk scheduled in fall 1999. (GIO 1999: 34-42) Taipei's resistance of "one country two systems" constitutive effort is manifested in Lee Teng-hui's statement almost two weeks after the "special state to state relations" declaration:

China must be reunified..under a system of democracy, freedom and equitable prosperity..(rather than) under the proven failure of communism or the so-called 'one country, two systems' formula..(which) has a number of fundamental flaws... (Lee 1999: 120-121)

The distinction between Taipei's reaction to international and Beijing's constitutive efforts may well be at least partly attributed to the variant length and frequency of "quasi-official" interactions conducted in whatever private capacity, the micro source of social construction, between Taipei's and foreign government officials on the one hand and the very exchanges across the Taiwan Strait between both governments' officials on the other. After all, the limited contact and mutual distrust between officials from both sides have made intersubjective understanding through interactions less likely to reach.

In a way, the relationship between "one China"

institutional development and Taiwan's adaptability is embodied as ongoing struggles between the PRC's diplomatic discourse that "Taipei is merely a local Chinese city" and the ROC's counter-discourse that attempts to make Taipei emerge as a "global city". Nevertheless, as "one China" appears to be the dominant historical trend, does this suggest the end of history for Taiwan? Agency-structure relations may provide some clues for the answer.

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V. Mutual Constitution of Agency and Structure:

The development of "one China" institution itself presents an interesting illustration of the relationship between agency and structure. The recent condition in some ways may suggest the prevalence of the "one China" structure over any given sets of agents. For example, Bill Clinton, as the leader of the most powerful nation in the world, eventually yielded to the Beijing-centred "one China" structure by personally uttering the "three nos" statement in June 1998. Likewise, the abortive attempts by Lee Teng-hui, with his defiantly Taiwanese identity, to circumvent the "one China" structure through specifying the cross-strait ties as "special state to state" relations in July 1999 ultimately backfired. This may lead to some analysts to come to a deterministic or even fatalist views toward the future of Taiwan. Nevertheless, as Anthony Giddens'

structuration theory inspires, the dualism may well be qualified with caution.

It should be reemphasized that the "one China" structure/institution, like many social/political counterparts, is not the kind of objective, "external" reality as it appears and tends to be perceived by hard-line structuralists. It is not existent external to agency's influence and is the result of social creation. (Granovetter and Swedberg 1992:17) Nor should it be reified as an objectified fact as tangible as physical thing. Rather, as the core proposition of the structuration theory holds that the sustaining of structure very much depends on continuing practice or reproduction by agents, the power of "one China" structure is primarily manifested through constant instantiation and reproduction of agents concerned. Likewise, the survival of agency hinges upon its ability to build certain legitimation structure to bridge into broader social environment. In the latter, the support for agency is drawn not only from domestic but also international audience, though the degree of "immediate need" for survival varies from one to the other. Policy argument thus is crucial for maintaining and promoting support and thus legitimacy, as the case of Taiwan's adaptability has highlighted in Chapter 8.

Nevertheless, insofar as agency's reproduction of

structure is concerned, the instantiation of structure through speech act of agency deserves more explanation. The conventional wisdom of not referring to any sensitive subject on one's initiative or the diplomatic polemic of "no comment" when a given issue was raised can be seen as attempts to avoid instantiating a memory-trace-like structure. The difficulty the Canadian side had experienced in the Stockholm negotiations when the Chinese side was constantly testing Canadian "sincerity" in accepting the "one China" principle, for example, might be attributed to the "outspokenness" of Canadian policymakers on the China-Taiwan issue, as implicitly argued by Fred Nossal, a well-known Canadian journalist and the first Globe and Mail correspondent sent to Beijing in the late 1950s. Nossal wrote in early 1970:

What seems to have annoyed the Chinese Communists are repeated statements in the past by Trudeau and Sharp that Canada today faces two facts--the fact of the Peking government which controls the mainland, and the fact of Taiwan where Chiang Kai-shek is the undoubted ruler... Peking always prefers to have such things left unsaid... Perhaps Canada has been somewhat too honest for its own good in outlining policy toward China. Had Mr. Trudeau and Mr. Sharp been less open in their statements, the exchange of ambassadors may have been considerably closer than it is today. (DEA file I,8815,14: Hatherway Let to Seaborn Jan.15/70)

Structure or institution is never fixed with identical impact across time and space. The net effect of mere reiteration of a given statement certainly would be greater

than the absence of that act, even if the contents of the statement on various occasions are virtually identical. Moreover, structure can be re-produced in either synthesizing or rephrasing forms. In the process, new elements may be added in. Bill Clinton's "three nos" statement is a case in point not only for "instantiation of structure" but also for agency-structure debate.

When Jiang Zeming visited Washington in October 1997, it was reported that Clinton orally reassured Jiang of the American "three nos" policy toward Taiwan--not supporting Taiwan independence, "one China one Taiwan" or "two Chinas" and Taiwan's membership in international organizations that require statehood. Subsequently, within less than one year, the Secretary of State, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, National Security Adviser, and Clinton himself all reiterated the gist of the "three nos" policy. Although part of the policy components have appeared or been implied in other form of statements made by previous American administrations, it was now first articulated as a whole and reformulated in a concise way to the effect that it constituted new emerging elements of the "one China" structure. (Wu 1998b: 6-9) The simple repetition of the same expression not only instantiated the memory-trace-like "one China" structure but also in effect reinforced its power. Clinton's personal utterance of the "three nos" on Chinese

soil made the policy more credible and authoritative. It however alienated Lee Teng-hui government and led to Lee's statement on the "special state to state relations" one year later. From the perspective of the Clinton Administration, the "three nos" statement is nothing new and has been followed in previous administrations. In other words, the "one China" structure already existed and Clinton only followed the trajectory it directs. But for Taipei, the agency, or the author responsible for adding new elements into the "one China" structure, is concrete and identifiable: Bill Clinton and his administration. The dispute between the Clinton Administration and the Nationalist government in this sense parallels the academic debate between structure-centred and agency-centred approaches.

The debate on "continuity vs change" of foreign policy thus can be examined from the perspective of the reproduction of structure. Whether Clinton's "three nos" statement constitutes new American China policy or not certainly is not the only controversial instance. Lee Teng-hui's "special state to state" statement was also defended by Taipei as being "nothing new" on the grounds that it could be traced to Lee's unilateral announcement of terminating the state of civil war with the Communists in 1991 and ensuing Constitutional amendments which means "the

effective jurisdiction of the ROC under the Constitution now covers only Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu". (GIO 1999:34)¹⁴ Likewise, in response to harsh criticism by foreign media and governments, Qian Qichen rebuffed the accusation that Beijing has changed its policy towards Taiwan by specifying "the Taiwanese indefinite procrastination for unification talks" as additional condition for the Chinese military invasion. In doing so, he referred to Deng Xiaoping's talk in 1984 to demonstrate the listing condition was consistent with previous policy. (ttnn Mar.1/00) From the perspective of structuration theory, nevertheless, these instances all constitute effective synthesis and reproduction of previous policy frameworks with a view to reinforcing or debilitating the "one China" structure.

From another perspective, as the "one China" structure could not exist without continuous external support from agency, Beijing's domination and the institutionalization of "one China" is not completely successful. Until other agents have been internalized to discipline themselves to act habitually in accordance with the PRC's wish when the Taiwan

¹⁴ The quotation was cited from a statement by Dr. Bih-jaw Lin, the former Deputy Secretary-General in the Office of the President, on July 12, 1999. The ROC Mainland Affairs Council on the very day also issued a press release stressing that "the declaration represents a continuity of policy." (GIO 1999:36)

issue is invoked and Beijing finds no necessity to act on the front stage by reinforcing the international memory of "one China", the structure will never be thoroughly self-perpetuated. So long as the stage of self-sustaining and self-containing development has not been achieved, the power of "one China" structure would at best be relative, rather than deterministic. The prospect of Canada-Taiwan relations thus should not be viewed in determined ways. Political and historical relations are indeed crucial and often provide a meaningful framework for the development of non-political and contemporary relations. It nevertheless will not penetrate into every aspect of bilateral relations in a fatalistic way. So long as the "one China" structure is not instantiated, or more explicitly, the issues of nomenclature and other official symbols are not invoked, the normal transactions in non-political spheres between Ottawa and Taipei can still be made relatively "autonomously" without outside interference.

It should be added that the non-deterministic tone of the "one China" structuration here also converges with that of new institutionalist perspective. As the sustaining of the "one China" institution in the end depends upon continuing practices of relevant agencies, given its primary interests at stake, Beijing certainly will incessantly monitor the process and wield its regulative power if

necessary. Meanwhile, a "disciplining" process might be invoked to indoctrinate the whole world that the existing "one China" arrangement is the only conceivable option for the course of human history. Beijing's unprecedented release of two critical documents with respect to the Taiwan issue not only pointed out but arguably intended to instill into the parties concerned the direction of institutional development it desires. However, this new effort unwittingly discloses the incompleteness of the "one China" institutionalization, in light of western post-modernist, institutionalist as well as pre-modernist Chinese thoughts.

As a well-known institutionalist put it, "the high triumph of institutional thinking is to make the institutions completely invisible." (Douglas 1986:98) Likewise, Michel Foucault (1995) highlighted the new form of power: in contrast to previous mode of power control, in modern/post-modern era it is those who are subject to discipline/punishment are visible whereas those who wield the power of discipline cease to be visible. Interestingly, this line of argument can also be found in pre-modern Chinese literature. For example, the Taoist notion of "governing by not acting" and Confucian conception that "weed bends while wind blows" similarly testify the "spontaneous" and "taken-for-granted" aspect (or "cognitive" element) of institutions. As long as Beijing finds it

necessary to wield its sanctioning power and act directly on the front stage over the Taiwan issue, this means the highest stage of the institutionalization of "one China" is yet achieved. After all, "additional control mechanisms are required only insofar as the process of institutionalization are less than completely successful". (Berger and Luckmann 1966:55)

In spite of the fact that the "one China" structure does not and will not determine the destiny of the island, it should nevertheless be noted that the very structure has conditioned and will continue to shape the future of Taiwan. Meanwhile, the will and practice of agents concerned as crucial variables often matter in the historical process, although history is not necessarily made in accordance with the wish of human agency, as Karl Marx cogently epitomized the dialectics of agency-structure relations. (Marx 1969: 398)¹⁵ As such, it remains to be seen whether or not Taipei will eventually cross the "dire strait" by requesting Beijing's primary establishment of a valid and credible constitutional framework guaranteeing Taiwan's autonomy and veto power, as newly proposed by Dr Jeremy Paltiel. (2000)¹⁶

¹⁵ The famous quotation in "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" is: "men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past."

¹⁶ The price Taipei has to pay though is some sort of

From this perspective, then, it may be too early to come to the conclusion that the "one China" is the end of history in the Chinese as well as global settings.

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VI. Conclusion: Theoretical Significance and Future Space

This thesis took a genealogical view of the formation of the "one China" institutional structure on global setting. The relevance of the perspectives of agency-structure relations, social constructivism and new institutionalism and the insights they provide for the case of the "one China" are evident. The exploration of the case also points to the importance and meaningfulness of those oft-abstract theoretical constructs. After all, theories are not developed in a vacuum. The power of theoretical perspectives exactly lies in their relevance to empirical phenomena. A major contribution of this research to Political Science lies in efforts to bridge the gap between configurative approach based on practioners' accounts and theoretical construction, and making sense of diplomatic history through the lens of western theoretical constructs.

However, this thesis should not be read as assuming that non-western policy action could be completely explained through western perspective.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the process of acknowledging "one China" in semantically acceptable way.

¹⁷ Fuller access to the Chinese sources may help further clarify some issues, such as whether there was an

the prevalence of "one China" in the world, the core subject of the research, could be captured through the adopted perspectives. In this regard, this thesis also unveils the unique role of Canadian diplomacy in the "one China" structuration process and links the China/Taiwan phenomenon to the Canadian-American relations, thereby casting new light on the Canadian Foreign Policy studies.

The case of "one China" structuration also discloses some merits of social constructivist approach in international relations. One major value of this approach vis-a-vis Realism is that power and interest are embedded in the symbolic meaning systems. It is only through the process of intersubjective understandings that the power of "one China" and the PRC can be projected. Beijing as well as Taipei's claims to "one China" and their consensus that the future of Taiwan lay in an integration with mainland China in the 1950s and 1960s did not become effective and powerful until bilateral and eventually international intersubjective understandings were achieved through the hands of Beijing later. It is demonstrated in the thesis that power, a longstanding concern in Political Science and IR, is embedded in and manifested through the operation of symbolic indigenous "deep-seated" belief in Chinese identity which was distinct from western view. This may explain why the Nationalists repeatedly rejected early western offers smack of "one China one Taiwan" despite the temptation of "objective interests inherent" in Taiwan setting.

meaning system. Language, interpretation and structure are linked to the exercise of power by agencies.

The merits of social constructivist approach and its convergence with new institutionalist and structuration theory in providing necessary tools for understanding social and political phenomena including the "one China" are indeed evident. As Berger and Luckmann put it, "it is impossible to understand an institution adequately without an understanding of the historical process in which it was produced." (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 54-55) This thesis contributes to our understanding of the "one China" institution and its international genealogy.

In practical and strategic maneuvering, in a way like the relationship between "attack" and "defence", the "constructivist" and "objectivist" approaches can be used complementarily. While the "objectivist" perspective aims to confirm some present state of affairs as "reality", the "constructivist" approach is adopted to fix certain aspect of present situation and to make it applicable to the future, as illustrated in the state of the Taipei-Beijing political discourse. There is no gainsaying the value of the "objective" elements of reality in rendering for more effective prevalence of the institution. After all, the social construction of reality is often made on the basis of some "objectivist" elements albeit in varying degree. In

retrospect, the extent the claims to representation of China as a whole by Taipei and Beijing corresponds to "objective" reality of effective control considerably affects the third parties' willingness to accept the intended construction of "one China" reality by both parties. The result of varying effectiveness of that construction arguably can be related to the "objective" elements involved in the process.

Moreover, in practice, the relevance for an agency to build materialist and objectivist strength to withstand the force of social construction should not be neglected. The Nationalist self-reliant policy to concentrate on economic development in the wake of diplomatic adversity in the 1970s no doubt helped Taiwan re-emerge and thrive in international economy and provided a fundamental basis for Taiwanese survival in the "one China" constructivist world, aiming to win eventual international recognition of its existence.

Methodologically, the social constructivism may well not be detached completely from "objectivist"-oriented perspectives. It may be more fruitful to envision an objectivist-constructivist spectrum, in which most phenomena are located in between the two ends of pure ideal types.

The primary issue at dispute between "objectivist" and "constructivist" approaches, practical and theoretical levels alike, lies in how valid a given approach with a particular sampling method has appropriately "re-presented"

the reality of universe and whether a "fair" representation of reality can be achieved. Inevitably involved in the process of representation is the procedure of selection and ensuing exclusion of other elements of the universe, which may then provide the ammunition for future mobilization of forces "on behalf of" the excluded to engage in political struggles on the cause of deserving due representation.

Along the line of representing reality, the oft-heard argument of "consistency" of foreign policy may well be briefly commented here. The appearance of "consistency" may often be constructed as required for legitimation purpose. The discrepancy between what were sampled and the universe may well reveal the inevitable gap in representing reality. In the case study of the thesis, if Beijing had been omnipresently consistent in insisting on the "one China" principle and denouncing "one China one Taiwan" complication in the normalization talks, it might have achieved nothing with the French and the Canadians in the end. As implicitly acknowledged by the top Chinese negotiator in his memoir, in the negotiations with the French, Beijing deliberately "adopted an approach distinct from its dealing with other capitalist countries" and sided away the oft-claimed precondition for countries concerned to sever ties with Taipei prior to announcement of exchange of ambassadors, thereby creating a tentative "two Chinas" phenomenon, as

explored in Chapter 3. (ttnn Jun.15/00)¹⁸ Likewise, the Chinese dissatisfaction with Trudeau and Sharp's "one China one Taiwan" statements in May 1968, as mentioned in Chapter 4, was intendedly "reserved" and brought about one year after in the midst of the Stockholm negotiations. Thus, in a way, "consistency" of foreign policy is constructed to serve "national interests". Social Constructivism and Realism in the IR then should not be viewed as mutually exclusive theoretical enterprises.

Moreover, the application of new institutionalism to the case study also adds new insights for future direction of theoretical refinement. The transformation of the power of "one China" in terms of the configuration of the three institutional elements and their coherence, as another contribution of this thesis, also points to the direction in which Scott's new institutionalism can be developed further to explain the transition of institution. The degree of convergence of the three elements where the cognitive constitutes the inner core of the whole institution surrounded with normative and further by regulative "boxes" may be further developed to associate with the condition of the transformation of institution or institutional inertia.

Finally, the "eclectic" approach of this thesis

¹⁸ The part of story can be accessed from:
<http://w3.ttnn.com/cna/000615/b10.html>

deserves some closing notes with the hope that it could incite further reflections on relevant issues, thereby contributing to the refinement of theorization of the social sciences as a whole. It is acknowledged in the thesis that there are dual approaches in social sciences theorization: "scientific" and "interpretistic". While the former seeks to discover and pattern relevant phenomena in the form of regular relationships, the latter rejects the desirability of such categorization enterprise of hard sciences that is based on the presumption of one-to-one correspondence between signifier and the signified in language use and instead emphasizes the aspect of the creation of new reality through reproducing and interpreting existing meanings. In this author's view, debates on the desirability of one approach over the other in a way bears striking semblance to the structure-agency debates: the former aims to put phenomena under certain analytical framework ("structure"), whereas the latter highlights the author's ability ("agency") to innovate and reproduce that framework. The thesis should be read as an attempt to recognize and reconcile the duality of the two approaches.

Appendix I

List of Countries Recognizing the Republic of China on Taiwan (As of January 1999)*

Total: 28 countries

Asia-Pacific region: 4 countries

Republic of Nauru
Solomon Islands
Tuvalu
Republic of the Marshall Islands

African region: 8 countries

Burkina Faso
Republic of Chad
Republic of The Gambia
Republic of Liberia
Republic of Malawi
Democratic Republic of Sao Tomincipe
Republic of Senegal
Kingdom of Swaziland

European region: 2 countries

Holy See
Macedonia

Central and South American regions: 14 countries

Belize
Republic of Costa Rica
Commonwealth of Dominica
Dominican Republic
Republic of El Salvador
Grenada
Republic of Guatemala
Republic of Haiti
Republic of Honduras
Republic of Nicaragua
Republic of Panama
Republic of Paraguay
Saint Christopher and Nevis
Saint Vincent and The Grenadines

* Source: The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<http://www.mofa.gov.tw/frame14cb.htm>

Appendix II

**Statement Made to the House of Commons on October 13, 1970
by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, The
Honourable Mitchell Sharp***

I am pleased to announce the successful conclusion of our discussions in Stockholm with representatives of the People's Republic of China, reflected in today's joint communique, which records our agreement on mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. The joint communique of the Government of Canada and the Government of the People's Republic of China concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and China is as follows:

1. The Government of Canada and the Government of the People's Republic of China, in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and equality and mutual benefit, have decided upon mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations, effective October 13, 1970.

2. The Chinese Government reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Canadian Government takes note of this position of the Chinese Government.

3. The Canadian Government recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China.

4. The Canadian and Chinese Governments have agreed to exchange ambassadors within six months, and to provide all necessary assistance for the establishment and the performance of the functions of diplomatic missions in their respective capitals, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit and in accordance with international practice.

Officials from my Department and from Industry, Trade and Commerce will be leaving for Peking very shortly to begin administrative preparations for the opening of a Canadian embassy in Peking. We hope to have the embassy in operation within two or three months.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and China is an important step in the development of relations between our two countries, but it is not the first step, nor is it an end in itself. We have opened a new and important channel of communication, through which I hope we will be able to expand and develop our relations in every sphere. We have already indicated to the Chinese, in our Stockholm discussions, our interest in settling a small

number of problems left over from an earlier period. The Chinese have expressed the view that our relations in other fields such as these can only benefit from the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two countries. They have also agreed in principle to discuss through normal diplomatic channels, as soon as our respective embassies are operating, some of the specific issues we have raised with them.

Position on Taiwan

As everyone knows, the agreement published today has been under discussion for a long time. I don't think it is any secret that a great deal of this discussion has revolved around the question of Taiwan. From the very beginning of our discussions the Chinese side made clear to us their position that Taiwan was an inalienable part of Chinese territory and that this was a principle to which the Chinese Government attached the utmost importance. Our position, which I have stated publicly and which we made clear to the Chinese from the start of our negotiations, is that the Canadian Government does not consider it appropriate either to endorse or to challenge the Chinese Government's position on the status of Taiwan. This has been our position and it continues to be our positions. As the communique says, we have taken note of the Chinese Government's statement about Taiwan. We are aware that this is the Chinese view and we realize the importance they attach to it, but we have no comment to make one way or the other.
(bold as emphasis by this author.)

* Source: External Affairs November 1970, Vol.22 No.11, pp.378-9.

Appendix III

Partial Interview List*

The following is an alphabetical list of interviewees who agreed to be identified by name.

Bellocchi, Nat H., Former Chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan

Chan, Te-chi, Deputy Secretary-General, The Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee, Taiwan

Chou, David S., Professor of Diplomacy, National Chengchi University, Taiwan

Chu, Jimmy Chi-chien, Former Senior Officer, The Republic of China General Chamber of Commerce

Dean, David, Former Chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan

Hsueh, Yu-chi, Former ROC Ambassador to Canada

Lin, Bih-jaw, Former Deputy Secretary-General, Office of the President

Loisel, Pierre H., Senior Canadian Businessman in Taiwan

Sharp, The Right Honourable Mitchell, Personal Advisor to Prime Minister Jean Chretien

Yen, Chen-shen J., Associate Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taiwan

* There are a number of interviewees, including former officials from the Canadian Department of International Trade and Foreign Affairs and the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs are not listed here for confidentiality and consistency. These also include some individuals who declined to be identified.

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* GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS *

I. Canadian Sources: The major sources of government documents in this thesis are drawn from the Department of External Affairs (DEA) files deposited in the National Archives of Canada. The reference to Canadian government documents in the thesis, unless otherwise noted, is ordered as follows: (DEA file, abbreviate identification, part #, Volume #: type/destination of the document, date of documentation) The series of file identification are listed in the following:

A: 20-1-2-PRC
 B: 20-PRC-1-3
 C: 20-PRC-1-3-USA
 D: 20-1-2-TAIWAN
 E: 20-TAIWAN-1-3
 F: 20-AUSR-1-3-CHINA
 G: 20-JPN-1-3-PRC
 H: 20-NZ-1-3
 I: 20-1-2-CHINA-1
 J: 36
 K: 40
 L: 65
 M: 68
 N: 55-26-OLYMP-1976-3-TAIWAN

II. American Sources:

American government documents cited in this thesis mainly lie in the series of The Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), published by the United States Government Printing Office in Washington DC. The reference to these sources is generally followed by years, volume and page number. The cited series include:

FRUS 1955-57 III CHINA (Washington: 1986)
FRUS 1958-60 XIX CHINA (Washington: 1996)
FRUS 1961-63 XXII NORTHEAST ASIA (Washington: 1996)
FRUS 1964-68 XXX CHINA (Washington: 1998)

III. Taiwanese Sources:

The ROC government documents cited in the thesis, mainly Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) files, are relatively limited in volumes and series because of some regulations concerned. They were cited in the following way: (identification number: type/destination of document, date of documentation) This includes two volumes:

MOFA 412.21: Minister Shen's Visiting Canada
MOFA 412.1 : Canadian Reopening Mission in Taipei

*** OTHER OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS AND NEWSPAPERS ***

I. Official Publications: (Agency Abbreviations, Years of Publication)

CETDC 1999: <http://www.cetra.org.tw/>
GIO 1997: "Looking Beneath the Surface of the 'One China' Question"
GIO 1999: Getting Real
ICD (Information and Cultural Department, MOFA) 1999, Collection of Joint Communiques Between the PRC and Countries Concerned
MOFA 1999; 2000: <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/frame14cb.htm>
/frame15_2htm
/frame32.htm
/frame33.htm
MOFA 1993-1998: UN Position Papers
NAAD 1996: North American Affairs Department, Information About Relations with Canada
ROCOC 1977 Official Report of the Republic of China Delegation to the XXI Olympiad Games, Montreal 1976

II. Newspapers and Official Publications: (Abbreviations)

AR: Annual Report (DEA Ottawa)
BR: Beijing Review (Beijing)
CDN: Central Daily News (Taipei)
CNA: Central News Agency (Taipei),
http://dailynews.sina.com/taiwan
CH: China Handbook (Taipei)
CT: China Times (Taipei), http://dailynews.sina.com/taiwan

CTBR: Canada-Taiwan Business Review (CCOC Ottawa)
 CY: China Yearbook (Taipei)
 EA: External Affairs (DEA Ottawa)
 FAA: Foreign Affairs Annals (MOFA Taipei)
 FBIS: Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Washington)
 FCJ: The Free China Journal (Taipei)
 G&M: The Globe and Mail (Toronto)
 NYT: The New York Times (New York)
 OC: Ottawa Citizen (Ottawa)
 PN: Power News (Taipei), <http://dailynews.sina.com/taiwan>
 PR: Peking Review (Beijing)
 ROCYB: Republic of China Yearbooks (Chinese version) (Taipei)
 SCMP: Survey of China Mainland Press (Washington)
 S&C: Statements and Communiques (MOFA Taipei)
 TT: The Times (London)
 ttnn: The Taiwan News Network, <http://w3.ttnn.com>
 UDN: The United Daily News (Taipei)
 <http://dailynews.sina.com/taiwan>

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