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BRITISH POLICY AND THE OHIO VALLEY, 1754-1774.
AN EXERCISE IN MERCANTILISM.

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AN EXERCISE IN MERCANTILISM.

a thesis submitted in
conformity with the requirements
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KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

1. A.H.R. American Historical Review
2. C.H.R. Canadian Historical Review
3. D.R.C.H.C. A. Shortt & A. Doughty, eds., Documents Relative to the Constitutional History of Canada 1759-1791 (Ottawa, 1918). Vol.I.
4. E.H.R. English Historical Review
5. Gage Corr. C. E. Carter ed., The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage. (New Haven, 1933).
6. M.V.H.R. Mississippi Valley Historical Review
7. N.Y.C.D. E. B. O'Callahan ed., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York. (Albany, 1855).
8. P.A.C. Public Archives of Canada.

PREFACE

That section of the Quebec Act which annexed a large part of the Ohio Valley to the Province of Quebec has been a topic for discussion many times in the past. While it is generally conceded that the western extension of the boundary was not closely related to the rest of the Act, there has been some debate regarding the critical forces which effected the 1774 decision. This study was begun with the view of analysing those forces. The actual reason for annexing the area to Quebec lies in the frustration of earlier attempts on the part of the British government to provide some order in the interior. The Quebec Act was, in that respect, the culmination of twenty years of imperial activity on the frontier.

The geographic limitations of the topic are flexible over time. They conform with that territory south of the Great Lakes described at various times as "the Indian Country". By 1774, it was bounded on the southeast by the Ohio River and on the southwest by the Mississippi River. The temporal limitations conform to the period during

which Britain exercised active control over the frontier.

Following the War of the Austrian Succession, the French made a futile attempt to confine the Anglo-American colonies to a narrow strip of coastline along the Atlantic seaboard. In the north, they tried to prevent the expansion of British settlement over the mountains. In 1754, spurred to action by the success of the French in defending their claim to the trans-Appalachian wilderness, the British Government assumed active control of the frontier. In the course of the ensuing war, the British government determined on a policy of reducing French power in North America. The successful conclusion of the war gave Britain possession of half the continent.

The policy followed with respect to the new acquisitions was conditioned by the experience which the British had gained in the conduct of the war and the determination of British officials to make the new acquisitions a productive addition to the empire. In pursuing that end, the interior was classified as an area open for trade only and isolated from settlement. The expense of administering the system of close regulation led, in 1768, to a modification in the method of administering the trade in the interior. The inability of the northern colonies to cooperate in the management of the trade, which had been left to them in 1768, disillusioned imperial officials and led them to favour the reassertion of central control over the interior. The Quebec Act became the vehicle for the reassertion of imperial control, and the government of Quebec was made the instrument for effecting it.

It has proved necessary in the course of this essay to assume a basic understanding of the precepts of mercantilism. The "interest of the mother country", however uncertainly defined by 1774 was still the determining factor governing Britain's relations with her colonies. Over time the Navigation Acts had become mutilated by the successful activity of various pressure groups. A well established trade, if it had some claims to importance, could expect protection even if its direct contribution to the "interest of the mother country" was hard to demonstrate. Thus the Carolinas were allowed, in apparent contradiction of mercantilist principles, to export their rice directly to the Mediterranean; colonial tobacco planters were protected not only against foreign but against British competition; and New England shipping was allowed to compete with that of the mother country on terms which the latter complained were better than equal. The theoretical primacy of British interest was commonly taken to mean the defence of vested interests. In spite of all these exceptions, the substance of the Navigation Acts was never lost sight of.

Ultimately, colonies were judged by Whitehall by the value of their commerce to Great Britain. On the North Atlantic seaboard, this judgment was compromised by one hundred and fifty years of trade and settlement. Before the Seven Years War however, there were no strong vested interests to complicate a policy for the interior. By mercantilist standards, inland, settled colonies were rated as undesirable and the trade of the interior, no matter how small, was the acknowledged object to be pursued. To control that trade, to

prevent the interior from being a source of danger to the established colonies or of great expense to the imperial government -- these comprised the "interest of the mother country" beyond the Appalachian barrier. Once the interior became an integral part of the empire, the policy of isolation was a natural consequence of Britain's commercial interest. That policy can never be properly understood unless these mercantilist principles are kept in mind.

CHAPTER I.

BRITISH POLICY PRIOR TO 1754.

The British policy, or lack of one, for the northern interior can be closely correlated with the policy for the northern colonies in general. Before 1754, a triangular economy was in operation within the Empire. The real jewels among Britain's North American possessions were the West Indies and the southern plantation colonies. Newfoundland was considered valuable for the support it gave to the fishing industry but the other northern colonies were only of secondary worth. The mercantilist theories of the day dictated that the most desirable colonies were those which produced a non-European staple. The northern colonies, while not producing any such non-European staple, contributed to the welfare of the empire by providing foodstuffs, livestock, timber, and shipping and credit services to enable the southern colonies to play out their role in the imperial scheme.¹

1. See R. Pares, "Economic Factors in the History of the Empire" in The Historian's Business and other Essays edited by R. A. Humphries, (London, 1961).

The Board of Trade was founded in 1696, "at the behest of the merchants",² to oversee Britain's interests in her colonies. The Board undertook the task of implementing the Navigation Acts which subordinated the colonies' welfare to the interests of the mother country. The early period of the Board's existence was a very busy one. Once the regulations had been promulgated, the Board ceased to have any real importance and functioned only as an avenue of communication between colonial officials and the cabinet. It must be noted that, from its inception, the Board was a body of reference whose duties were "to advise and inform the council and the secretary of the state on colonial administration".³ The executive action lay in the hands of the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, who was responsible for the colonies as well as southern and central European affairs.

The "Whig Supremacy", based as it was on the judicious manipulation of all available patronage, saw the colonies viewed by the Ministry primarily as an area for "placemen". This was never more true than during the period when the Duke of Newcastle held the southern secretaryship. Newcastle, a prominent member of the Pelham family, held this position from 1724 to 1748. His primary interest lay in the patronage available from the colonial possessions. Up to 1748, the British Government's policy towards the northern interior remained

2. A. H. Basye, The Board of Trade (New Haven, 1925), p.82.

3. Ibid., p.62.

basically one of indifference. Insofar as there was any control, "the Imperial government was mainly guided by the desire not to suffer any colony disregarding the interests of the others or hampering freedom of trade".⁴ What policy there was remained negative and particular, and consisted of directives passed through the Board of Trade cautioning the colonial governors to promote peaceful relations with the Indians. Since there was no real commercial advantage to be derived from that area, there was little reason for British concern.

In spite of the lack of interest of the British government the colonists proceeded to advance on the frontier. By the middle of the eighteenth century, swelled by heavy immigration from Europe, and an exceptionally high rate of natural increase, settlement had moved into the mountain valleys and was creeping down the western side of the Appalachian Mountains. As they advanced, the settlers came into constant conflict with the natives. The original cordial relationship between the Indians and white men was replaced by a bitter hostility when the tribes opposed encroachments on their lands. The Indians were viewed by the colonists as savages barring the advance of civilization. The result was an almost continuous conflict as the settlers pushed further westward. The continuing demand for cheap land led to land speculation which only compounded the Indian problem by laying claim to vast tracts of territory west of the mountains.

4. A. B. Keith, The First British Empire (Oxford, 1930), p.320.

The three colonies most interested in the northern interior were New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia. Virginia, by its sea to sea charter, laid claim to a vast area but made little effort to assert its claims beyond the bounds of its settled frontier. The Ohio Company, founded in 1748 by a group of upper-class Virginians, which included Governor Robert Dinwiddie, attempted to take possession of part of the interior. Pennsylvania was naturally interested because so much of its territory bordered on the frontier and it was faced with the normal conflict with the natives. Unlike the others, New York had inherited a central interest in the fur trade from the Dutch in 1664. Albany had been the centre of the trade during the Dutch period of rule and it retained that position when the British took over the province. The dominance of Albany was confirmed in 1674 when the Albany Commission was set up to oversee relations with ^{The} powerful Iroquois confederacy.

The Albany Commission was the only effective body consistently concerned with the interior. It was made up of fur traders, many of them Dutch, and their prime concern was making a profit from the trade. In this case, the British interest in the interior was subordinated to the profit motive of the Albany traders. They preferred to sit back and let the Indians come to trade with them at Albany. Oswego, which was established in 1722, was never more than a trading post and certainly not an extension of British power in the interior.⁵ In

5. See A. H. Buffington, "The Policy of Albany and English Western Expansion", M.V.H.R. (March, 1922), pp.227-266.

this situation, the Iroquois assumed a position of real importance both politically and commercially for the British traders.⁶

The Ohio Valley was not a central theatre of conflict between the French and English before the War of the Austrian Succession. In the preceding years, the conflict took place east of the Hudson River on the New England frontier. The struggle in Acadia was an adjunct to the struggle on the New England frontier and a result of the frustration of English attempts to advance on Quebec. The seeds of the final struggle were sown in 1713 due to the peculiar relationship between the English and the Iroquois. By the Treaty of Utrecht, the French promised "not to molest in the future the Five Nations or tribes of Indians subject to Great Britain".⁷ The quasi-suzerainty which this agreement implied, as well as the vagueness of the wording were to be the centre of the final conflict between the British and the French in North America.

Events arising from the War of the Austrian Succession brought the Ohio Valley to the forefront as an area for Anglo-French conflict. Pennsylvania traders had been entering the area prior to the war but there was no effort to assert British control over the area. In view of the lack of any effort on the part of the French to keep them out, the Pennsylvania traders expanded their operations. The war had the

6. See A. W. Trelace, "The Iroquois and the Western Fur Trade", M.V.H.R. (June, 1962), pp.32-52.

7. Quoted in, M. Savelle, The Diplomatic History of the Canadian Boundary. 1748-1763 (Toronto, 1940), p.8.

effect of cutting off a large part of the trade goods available to the French. In 1745, the English traders established a permanent base at Pickawillany on the Greater Miami River. At the conclusion of the war, the French became aware of the extent to which the English traders were encroaching on their control of the interior. While they had been willing to tolerate the presence of a few itinerant traders, they could not disregard this affront to French claims of ownership.

The Treaty of Aix la Chapelle returned the situation in the interior to the status quo ante bellum. Both the British and the French recognized the importance of the interior when they re-appointed the commission which had been set up by the Treaty of Utrecht, to settle the ownership of the Ohio Valley as well as other disputed areas. The boundary commission was deadlocked from the beginning. The French claimed control over the whole interior by right of prior discovery. The British, on their part, harkened back to the old promise of 1713 and claimed the whole Ohio Valley by right of their alliance with the Iroquois, who in turn claimed dominance over a great number of lesser tribes. The negotiations got under way shortly after the treaty was signed and continued until after the outbreak of hostilities in 1754.⁸ The fact that both the British and the French were seeking a peaceful solution did not prevent either side from taking steps to assert their claims by force of arms.

8. See M. Savelle, op.cit., Ch.II & III.

The French reacted quickly to the threat posed by the English advance on the frontier. The Marquis de la Galissoniere, Governor of New France, brought home the seriousness of the threat in a long report which pointed out the consequences to French power in North America of a British advance on the line of communication with Louisiana. He readily recognized the advantages of the natural barrier of the mountains and advocated a strong line of defence to contain the British. If this was not done, he feared the British would break the French hold on the interior.⁹

The French government realized the importance of the report and issued orders for the immediate securing of the frontier. Celeron de Bainville was ordered, in 1749, to make an expedition into the disputed territory to reassert French ownership of the area. He was urged to drive out the British interlopers and cement the Indian tribes to the French interest.¹⁰ The expedition failed because it simply lacked the force necessary to back up its intention. The French had to be prepared to erect forts and shower gifts on the natives, not bury a few lead plates alongside a few rivers, to regain control of the trans-Appalachian wilderness. The Marquis de la Jonquiere, who succeeded La Galissoniere as Governor of New France in 1751, took the real initiative one year after his arrival. In the summer of 1752, a strong expedition cut a wide swath through the Ohio Valley and was climaxed

9. "La Galissoniere's Report", December 1749, N.Y.C.D., X, pp.220-232.

10. See A.G.Wood, "Celeron de Bainville and French Expansion in the Ohio Valley", M.V.H.R. (March, 1923), pp.302-319.

by the capture of Pickawillany. The first blows in the struggle for the continent were struck deep in the interior on that day in June of 1752.

The War of the Austrian Succession had done much to awaken the British to the importance of the colonies. While it did not solve any of the problems of Anglo-French rivalry in North America, it certainly brought them to the fore. The balance of power in Europe was inextricably bound up with the balance of colonial possessions.¹¹ The British, after the long period of lethargy during Newcastle's term of office, were shifting from a period of unconscious expansion to one of conscious imperialism and a vigorous approach to problems in North America. The Duke of Bedford succeeded Newcastle into the southern secretaryship in 1748, but the more important shift in personnel was the appointment of George Montagu Dunk, second Earl of Halifax, to the presidency of the Board of Trade. Lord Halifax was a dynamic and influential person and he brought a keen and positive mind to the administration of colonial policy. His views on the relationship between mother country and colonies were strictly orthodox, but he had ambitions to increase the importance of his office and was active in promoting the defence of the colonies.

In spite of his ambition, Halifax had a difficult time in asserting British control in the interior. The founding of Halifax in 1749

11. See M. Savelle, "The American Balance of Power and European Diplomacy: 1713-1778", in R. B. Morris (ed.), The Era of the American Revolution (New York, 1939), p.159.

pays tribute to the influence of its namesake. It was a conscious effort to check French expansion in an area being contested and certainly represents a step towards protecting the more northerly colonies.¹²

Unlike Nova Scotia, the Ohio Valley had no powerful vested interest in London to demand an assertion of British power. As a result the British were not nearly as forceful as the French in that area before 1754.

The threat to the British on the Ohio was less evident immediately before the war than the ominous establishment at Louisburg. An additional factor which had to be considered was the lack of any machinery for central control over policy. It was their greater control of policy which had given the French the early advantage in the Ohio.

It cannot however be denied that the British took a renewed interest in the interior after 1748. The deadlocked boundary commission did much to keep the area in the limelight. The ratification of the Ohio Company's Charter in 1749 was a tentative step in the direction of promoting the British interest but it was less direct and certainly less forceful than the French move under La Jonquiere. Halifax was aware of the need for room for expansion if the British were to have any hope of maintaining a balance of power in America. More positive action had to await the firm assertion of French claims to the interior.

The French, as noted above, used the early inactivity of the

12. W. S. MacNutt, "Why Halifax was Founded", Dalhousie Review (January, 1933), pp.524-532.

British to good effect by a brilliant manipulating of the natives. They had always been more adept at managing the Indians than the British and after 1748, they used all their resources. Men of zeal, who knew the Indian mentality and were willing to pamper it, were active in promoting the French interest among the tribes. The successful reduction of Pickawillany had been a momentous psychological victory for the French. They followed up that victory with the establishment of Fort Duquesne in 1753 and the result was the effective destruction of British influence in the interior. When Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia tried to mount a counter-offensive in 1754, the natives were firmly in support of the French and, as a result, the force dispatched under George Washington received a crushing defeat. It was only at that point that the British administration took definite action in the interior.

CHAPTER II

THE GERMS OF A POLICY: 1754-5

The winds of change with regard to a policy for the interior of North America had been blowing both in England and in the colonies since 1748. The year 1754 is a convenient starting point because that year witnessed the great turning point in Britain's policy towards the interior. A memorandum by Lord Halifax presented a reliable summary of the change in attitude:

In order to check those hostile encroachments, it is proposed to erect forts at proper places upon the frontier at ye back of our settlements ... on those rivers and passes where such of the French forts as most prejudice our rights are built.

Although the details of policy were not yet completely formulated, the British government was beginning to respond to the French claims in the Ohio Valley. Halifax went on to point out that such forts would serve not only for defense but:

1. "Heads of a Paper Relating to the Defence of North America". April, 1754. P.A.C. Add. MSS. 135913. Canada Papers. ff.65-6.

as warehouses for goods used in Indian trade which might be regulated and directed by a commissary stationed at each fort. The proceedings and accounts of these resident commissaries should be inspected by two general commissaries who should likewise be empowered to make the usual presents to ye Indians.²

Halifax certainly showed a keen awareness of the principal problems facing the British on the frontier. He repeated the instruction of the previous summer,³ that the colonial governors co-operate in the defense of the frontier. Vague reference was made to a colonial fund to defray the cost of a frontier establishment.

British statesmen were, by 1754, coming to realize the importance of the French claims to the interior and were moving towards a more positive opposition. Prior to the War of the Austrian Succession, the governor of New York had negotiated an alliance - the "Covenant Chain" - with the Iroquois confederacy. During the war, the natives fought bravely on the side of the English in a number of limited engagements against the French. During the war, their affairs were supervised by William Johnson who had come to New York in 1737 and personally supervised their military affairs. Johnson was overseer of his uncle's estate which was situated in the heart of Iroquois country on the Mohawk River. He proved particularly adept at managing the Indians and he soon gained an ascendancy over them not matched by any other white man. He was appointed Colonel over the Five Nations in recognition of his special position. During the war, he established himself as their leader by successfully defending the frontiers of northern

2. "Heads of a Paper". op.cit., ff.66-7.

3. "Earl of Holderness to American Governors". 28 August 1753. N.Y.C.D. VI. p.890.

New York.

Johnson resigned his position as military leader of the Iroquois in 1751 because of the delay in reimbursing him for personal expenditures made in the course of the war for the defence of the colony. His resignation left the Iroquois leaderless and the Albany Commissioners proceeded to threaten the alliance by their short-sighted policies towards the Indians. The Tuscaroras moved northward from the Virginia frontier to join the Mohawk, Oneida, Seneca, Onondaga and Cayuga tribes in 1752. The confederacy, now composed of six nations, had its disgruntled and anti-British element reinforced. French success in the Ohio after 1752 forced them to make a decision regarding their alliance with the British. The French challenge to British control of the interior was also a challenge to the Iroquois and the latter were much quicker in realizing the importance of the French claims.

The result of New York's apathy towards the Iroquois interest was the formal breaking of the Covenant Chain in 1753.⁴ The response of the British was immediate. The alliance with the Iroquois was the foundation stone of their claim to the interior, and it had to be maintained if there was to be any hope of breaking the French hold. The day after the information arrived, the Board of Trade recommended that a congress to "renew our ties with these most important allies," be held immediately.⁵ The following day a circular letter informed the governors from Virginia

4. "Governor Clinton to the Board of Trade". 18 August, 1753 N.Y.C.D. . VI. pp.781-788.

5. "Board of Trade to Earl of Holderness". 18 September, 1753. Ibid., p.799.

northwards of the intention to call such a congress.⁶ The Congress was to be held under the direction of the governor of New York and supplementary instructions were sent to Sir Danvers Osburn, the newly appointed governor. Osborne died on his arrival and the instructions were carried out by Lieutenant-Governor James Delancy. The British government authorized the necessary gifts to win back the Indians. The result of this action was the calling of the Albany Congress to meet on June 17, 1754.

The primary purpose of the Congress was, of course, the renewal of friendship with the Six Nations tribes. Delegates to the Congress were received from all the colonies invited except Virginia which was fully occupied with problems on its own frontier. By this time, the basic format of Indian Congresses was well established and there was little deviation at Albany. The meetings, which lasted for a full two weeks, were accompanied by a great deal of pomp and ceremony. William Johnson, who had retained his seat in the council of the colony of New York, was the leading speaker for the colonists. The Indians were given ample opportunity to raise their complaints, none of which were really original. The twin evils of trade frauds and land speculation were high on the list and the Indians tried to make the most of their activity in the previous war to procure a redress of grievances.⁷

An additional complaint levelled by the natives was in connection with the political and more immediate problem of French pressure.

6. "Earl of Holderness to American Governors". 19 September, 1753.
N.Y.C.D. VI. p.800.

7. See "Minutes of the Albany Congress". June and July 1754. N.Y.C.D. VI. pp.850-885.

It paralleled the complaint leading to the breaking of the Covenant Chain and went to the root of the Indian problem. The Indians requested supplies and military support to protect themselves from French threats otherwise they would be forced to desert the British cause. The French were forcing them to a decision and they wanted to hear the British view. In addition to military aid, they asked that:

Colonel Johnson be reinstated and have the management of Indian affairs, for we all lived happily whilst they were under his management, for we love him and he has always been our good and trusty friend.⁸

The reaction of the delegates to the Indian's requests was a unanimous vote of approval in support of the natives and a firm promise to rectify all just grievances. In a general summary at the end of the meetings, the delegates agreed that for the future:

the Indians in alliance or friendship with the English be constantly regarded under some wise direction or superintendency ... that some discreet person or persons be appointed to reside constantly with each nation of Indians, such persons to have no concern with trade, and duly to communicate all advices to the superintendent. That the trade with the said Indians will be well regarded and made subservient to the public interest more than private gain. That there be forts built for the security of each nation for the better carrying on of trade with them ... That all future purchases of land from the Indians be void unless made by the governor where such lands lie and from the Indians in a body, in their public councils.⁹

This plan of action was more comprehensive than anything previous to it and answered the complaints of the Indians. If carried into effect, it could have meant the effective regulation of the frontier.

The delegates realized that a major cause of problems in the

8. "Minutes of Congress". loc.cit., pp.870-871.

9. Ibid., p.888.

past was the lack of any unified control over the frontier. There had never been "any joint exertion of force or council to repel or defeat the French interest" and the delegates were determined to correct this fault. It was only natural that the delegates to the congress should look to a plan of union as a means of implementing their comprehensive plan for Indian and frontier management. The idea of a union for defence was not a new one. Over the last half-century, a number of such schemes had been put forward. Benjamin Franklin, at that time a leading Philadelphia publisher and a delegate to the Congress from Pennsylvania, was noted for his advocacy of a co-operative effort to oppose the French and increase English influence in the interior. His famous plea of "Join or Die" was already well known in the colonies and had received a certain amount of support. He had even gone so far as to draft a tentative plan of union in 1752.¹⁰

The Albany Plan of Union was, in effect, a variation on the earlier scheme drawn up by Franklin and can, generally speaking, be described as a loose federation of the northern colonies for the purpose of defence against the French and the management of Indian affairs. It called for a governor assisted by a grand council representing the provincial assemblies. The powers of this federal government were in regard to defence and general power to:

hold or direct all Indian treaties in which the general welfare or interest of the colonies may be concerned ... make such laws as they judge necessary for the regulating of all Indian trade. That they make all purchases from the Indians of lands not now within the bounds of particular colonies.¹¹

10. See J. Bigelow (ed.), The Works of Benjamin Franklin (New York, 1904). Vol. II, pp. 433-440.

11. "The Albany Plan of Union". N.Y.C.D. VI. p. 890.

The delegates were certainly ambitious in their plans and aware of the basic problems which had to be overcome and the need for a united front. The great defect in the plan was the authority it gave to the federal government to:

raise and pay troops and build forts for the defence of any colony ... that for these purposes they have powers to levy such general duties, imposts or taxes as to them shall appear equal and just.¹²

In spite of the fact that the delegates were in unanimous accord on the plan of union, it failed to get any more than passing reference in the various assemblies. The governors of the colonies concerned tried in vain to gain acceptance for the plan but local assemblies would have no part of it.¹³ Governor Shirley of Massachusetts was amazingly accurate when he predicted that "their different situations, constitutions, circumstances and tempers" would prevent any successful action on the plan.¹⁴ The old-time evils of individualism and provincialism were still much too powerful to allow for any curtailment of the colonies' jealously guarded powers. The colonies were more than willing to contribute to the defence of their own frontier, if there was any chance of invasion by the French.

While the delegates were talking out their plan at Albany, events in the Ohio were presenting the British Government with cause for action. Governor Duquesne, who had succeeded Jonquiere as Governor of New

12. "The Albany Plan of Union" *loc.cit.*p. 890

✓ 13. See R. Neuhold, The Albany Congress and Plan of Union of 1754 (New York, 1955). Ch.V., for a thorough and very scholarly study of the fate of the plan in the various colonies.

14. "Governor Shirley to Secretary Robinson". 24 December, 1754. N.Y.C.D., VI. p.930.

France in 1753, followed up the action of his predecessor by securing French control of the Ohio Valley. Governor Dinwiddie's determination to oppose the French led inevitably to a conflict of arms. The French had, by 1753, realized that a firm policy of exclusion was their only hope of success. Fort Duquesne was in direct conflict with the claims of the Ohio company to the area at the junction of the Monongahela and the Ohio Rivers. When news of Washington's rebuff at Fort Duquesne arrived in London, the British government was ready to act.

A cabinet meeting was held shortly after the news reached London. Even the peace-seeking Duke of Newcastle, who by this time was the effective leader of the ministry, awakened to the threat which the French advance posed. Lord Halifax was present at the meeting and he strongly advised that military action would prove the only solution.¹⁵ The upshot of the meeting was a directive from the new Secretary for the Southern Department, Sir Thomas Robinson, ordering:

that a plan of general concert should be entered into by His Majesty's several colonies for their mutual and common defence and to prevent or remove any encroachment on His Majesty's dominions. I am to signify to your lordships that you should forthwith prepare such a plan of concert.¹⁶

This line of action was a logical follow-up to Halifax' earlier expressed belief in the need for a co-operative defence effort. The plan which the Board of Trade developed closely paralleled the Albany plan of Union. The key to the similarity of the two plans is

15. See M. Savelle Diplomatic History. p.54.

16. "Secretary Robinson to the Board of Trade". 14 June, 1754. N.Y.C.D. VI. p.844.

the fact that they were both aimed at solving the same problem.

The Board's plan was delivered to the Cabinet on August 9.¹⁷ It envisaged a "Captain General" assisted by a representative council. The essentially military purpose is evident in the plan. A scheme for common response and the establishment and maintenance of forts on the frontier was the main feature of the plan. The provision of a unified direction for Indian affairs was also seen as a key benefit to be derived from such a government.

The Board realistically observed that the implementation of such a plan would take some time and would have to overcome problems of regionalism in the colonies. In order, therefore, "to answer the purpose of the present exigency", the Board recommended the appointment of a "Commander-in-Chief and Commissary General of Indian Affairs".¹⁸ As a direct result of this recommendation, and the information which had, in the meantime, arrived from Albany, the British Government appointed General James Braddock to the newly created post.¹⁹ The decision to send Braddock was taken in October of 1754 and his instructions dated 24 November, made him Commander in Chief and gave him direct control over the interior. His instructions were to remove the French from British territory and to erect

... a good and sufficient fort on the most convenient pass on the said river (the Ohio) ... to protect the Indians in those parts as well as our settlements which have lately been broken up.²⁰

17. "The Board of Trade Plan of Union". N.Y.C.D. VI. pp.901-6.

18. Ibid, p.906.

19. See T. Riker, "The Politics behind Braddock's Expedition". A.H.R. (July, 1908). pp.742-753.

20. "Secret Instructions to General Braddock". 24 November, 1754. N.Y.C.D. VI. pp.920-922.

The fact that neither the Board of Trade's plan nor the Albany Plan was ever put into operation does not detract from their importance. The intention of the plans was carried out by the appointment of Braddock. Political reasons played a large part in postponing any final action on the plan. There was still a faint hope of a peaceful settlement of the boundary problems. At home, the Newcastle ministry was none too firmly established and colonial opposition to any general plan seemed certain. Rather than raise a problem, the cabinet hoped to solve the problem quickly by a show of force on the frontier.²¹ The decision to send Braddock was fraught with long-term implications which were not immediately apparent to the people responsible.

There has been a certain amount of controversy in the past concerning the driving force behind the British decision to assume control of the frontier in 1754. To some extent, the debate has been marked by extreme claims. Charles McIlwain gave much of the credit to Peter Wraxall.

I am inclined to believe that this abridgement of Wraxall's had more influence in shaping the policy of the British Government towards the North American Indians (and the Interior), in leading them to withdraw Indian relations from the provincial governments and concentrating them in the hands of one crown official, and in inducing them to make Colonel Johnson that official.²²

Peter Wraxall had come to Albany in 1750 as Secretary agent for the Governor of New York to the Indians and clerk of the peace for the town of Albany. It was a political appointment. He wrote his abridgment

21. See A. G. Oleson "The British Government and Colonial Union: 1754". William and Mary Quarterly (January, 1960). pp.22-34.

22. C. H. McIlwain (ed.), Wraxall's Abridgement of the New York Indian Records: 1678-1751 (Cambridge, 1915). pp.XCVII-XCVIII.

in 1753-4 in the hope that "it might aid his Majesty's administration in preparing and pursuing methods for the security and prosperity of the North American Colonies".²³ What followed was an extensive indictment of the policy of an uncontrolled frontier as it operated in New York. He did this by writing a history of the Albany Commissioners and their relations with the natives. The incompetence and selfishness of the commissioners was contrasted with the more pure William Johnson;

No man in this colony is so much respected by the Indians, has so much influence, over them or better deserves it. They look upon him as their patron and their brother.²⁴

McIlwain placed the weight of his argument on the time factor. He pointed out that Wraxall's Abridgement reached London before the Board of Trade released its Plan of Union on August 9, while the Albany Congress proceedings did not arrive in London until September. Even if the report was read by Halifax, there is little evidence that it was really influential. In spite of the temporal coincidence, the report was provincial in scope and aimed basically at the Albany Commissioners. If it did have any influence, it was only to confirm the already present opinion which Halifax had expressed the previous spring. To make such exorbitant claims for its influence would be to ignore a number of more potent factors.

A similar judgment may be passed on Thomas Pownall's claim to a leading role in the foundation of policy.²⁵ Pownall, a younger brother

23. C. H. McIlwain (ed.) op.cit., p.3.

24. Ibid., p.248.

25. Thomas Pownall. The Administration of the Colonies (London, 1764). pp.104-9.

of John Pownall, the perennial secretary of the Board of Trade, had come to New York as secretary to Sir Danvers Osborne and stayed on as Delancy's assistant. His appointment was purely political but he had pretensions of importance and claimed influence in high places. He attended the Albany Congress more as a witness than anything else and appended a short report to the proceedings.²⁶ He gave a brief resume of the Congress and placed special emphasis on the need for a strong political leader or "state-holder" to look after Britain's interest among the natives. He made no mention of Johnson in his rather vague report. The fact that something akin to his recommendations was finally carried out certainly does not imply that he had any special influence. Pownall's call for a more positive approach was merely a reflection of the times and certainly no original stroke of genius.

William Johnson appended a short report to the proceedings of the Congress.²⁷ Like Pownall, he gave a brief review of the Congress and advocated a system of management which closely paralleled the one which he later had such an important part in implementing. He placed a great deal of emphasis on the need for unity and the exertion of a strong political influence:

I cannot but help observing that for want of a strict correspondence between the several governments ... in regard to Indian affairs, that the Indians must think there can be no union in our councils when it has been known more than once that the Six Nations have been invited to a conference by different colonies

26. "Thomas Pownall to Board of Trade". 17 July, 1754. N.Y.C.D. VI. pp.894-896.

27. "Johnson to Board of Trade". 18 July, 1754. N.Y.C.D. VI. pp.897-899.

at the same time. This looks among the Indians as though our measures are not mutual and occasions them to be divided in their councils also being doubtful of our acting with vigour and unanimity against the French.²⁸

This brief comment by Johnson may not have had any more effect than the others, but the British government certainly was aware of his talents and, coupled with the plea of the Indians for his reinstatement as Indian agent, it must have carried some weight. Johnson's comments were simple and to the point. His solution to the Indian problem was in close line with Halifax's thought on the subject. If any of the three writers had any effect, it is most likely to have been Johnson.²⁹

With the appointment of General Braddock in 1754, the British government assumed effective control of the American frontier. This assertion of imperial authority on the frontier was the result of a number of factors. In the last analysis, it was basically a response to French attempts to contain the northern colonies east of the mountain divide. In the general competition between empires, it was imperative that Britain's colonies be given freedom to expand, otherwise France would outstrip them on the continent and thus possess a favourable balance of power. In essence, then, the British action was a move to counter French attempts to contain the natural expansion of the northern colonies westward. The British government was not so much concerned with the expansion itself as it was with the possibility

28. "Johnson to Board of Trade". 18 July, 1754. loc.cit., p.898.

29. See J. R. Alden. "The Albany Congress and the Creation of the Indian Superintendencies". M.V.H.R. (Sept. 1940). pp.193-210.

that the French would be able to check all future expansion. It was, with these factors in mind, that the British government took the action which would eventually lead to a formal state of war.

CHAPTER III

THE SEARCH FOR PRINCIPLES: 1755-61

On his arrival in America in 1755, General Braddock assumed direct control over all military activity on the frontier and assumed responsibility for Indian relations. One of his first measures was to appoint William Johnson as his assistant for the conduct of Indian Affairs.¹ At this point, Johnson's responsibilities were still rather uncertain. There was, as yet, no real permanency in the British plan of action. The main purpose of Braddock's appointment was the assertion of British rights in areas under dispute. The Ohio Valley was the most critical area and Braddock took personal control of the campaign there. His instructions also called for a show of strength on the Great Lakes and in the Hudson Valley on Lake Champlain. A fourth area of dispute was in Nova Scotia, where the French were crowding the

1. "Braddock to Johnson". 15 April, 1755. P.A.C. R.G.10, Series II. Minutes of Indian Affairs. Vol. 4, pp.1-2.

British. It must be made clear, at this point, that there was no plan for all-out war on the French. The British government saw itself as exerting control over its territory, which was being encroached upon by the French.

The fate of Braddock's expedition into the Ohio against Fort Duquesne is too well known to bear repetition here. Governor Shirley of Massachusetts had been named second in command. His task was to reinforce Oswego and challenge the French fort at Niagara. His advance ground to a halt because of poor organization and a lack of co-operation from local officials. Although he was able to reinforce Oswego, there was no attempt to advance along the lakes. William Johnson, because of his influence over the Iroquois, was ordered to lead an attack up the Hudson Valley against the French establishment at Crown Point. Johnson's mixed force of Indians and militia-men was repulsed on Lake George but they did manage to establish Fort William Henry at the southern tip of Lake George. For this limited success, Johnson was made a baronet. The success on Lake George was one of two bright spots in an otherwise dismal year. The other was in Nova Scotia, where Governor Lawrence succeeded in reducing Fort Beauséjour on the Isthmus of Chignecto.

The first year of hostilities had indeed been a discouraging one for the British cause in North America. The mettle of the French had been tested and found hard in most areas. Braddock's defeat had a cataclysmic effect on Britain's position west of the mountains.

It completely eliminated British influence in the region. The Indians went over to the French side in toto and proceeded to terrorize all British settlements west of the Appalachian Mountains. Within a few short months, the mountains had become the barrier which the French had been seeking. The British certainly had to be more forceful if they ever hoped to succeed.

Upon Braddock's death, General Shirley, who had been made second in command in recognition of his efforts against Louisburg in the previous war, assumed command of British forces in America. He immediately came into conflict with Sir William Johnson over the question of Indian management. While Johnson insisted on consolidating gains and protecting the tribes, Shirley favoured a continuing pressure on the French outposts. When Shirley tried to interfere in Indian affairs, an open rift developed between them. His appointment of Lydius as Colonel of the Six Nations was an affront to Johnson's position and he immediately asked for an explanation of his position:

I must beg leave to declare to your lordships that if his Majesty should think proper to honour me with the management of Indian Affairs, I do not think I can fulfill his royal expectations and do that service to my country which will be thereby attended; if my proceedings are to be subject to the control of any governor ... Permit me to observe to your lordships that unless the monies apppointed to carry on Indian Affairs are confided to my disposal and a certain fixed fund fixed on, I shall be ever liable to be perplexed and opposed.²

2. "William Johnson to Board of Trade". 3 September, 1755. N.Y.C.D., VI. p.996.

General Shirley's dual role made his command of the British forces subject to the normal interprovincial rivalries and was doomed to failure. Johnson's emphasis on the need for a steady and consistent policy towards the Indians found a receptive audience in London. By the autumn of 1755, the diplomatic manoeuvres between Britain and France were in their last stages and both sides were becoming resigned to the inevitability of a broad conflict.³ Only the official declaration of war remained to be made and it came soon after the new year. The British government was finally becoming convinced that a limited war could not be successful.

In October of 1755, John Pownall, the secretary of the Board of Trade, had informed Johnson of the Board's opinion that;

the affairs of the Indians ought to be regulated, established and conducted under some one general plan and system adopted to their particular situations and comprehensive of everything that can promote their security, convenience and satisfaction ..⁴

In face of Johnson's complaints and the general confusion which resulted from Shirley's command of British forces in North America, the Imperial government decided to replace Shirley with a British officer. In addition, the British government had recognized the importance of Indian relations by deciding to confirm Johnson's appointment. In March of 1756, Pownall informed Johnson of the intention to grant

3. See M. Savelle Diplomatic History. pp.90-104, for an analysis of the final stages before war.

4. "Pownall to Johnson", 9 October, 1755, N.Y.C.D., VI. p.1018.

his demands and the intention to replace Shirley with the Earl of Loudon, a career officer in the British Army.⁵ Two weeks later, Fox, the new Secretary of State for the Southern Department, confirmed Johnson's position with a commission from the Crown.⁶

Sir William Johnson's commission of 1756 gave him full powers over Indian relations in the northern district. One week later, a similar commission was issued to Edward Atkin for the southern district. The dividing line between the two jurisdictions was the northern boundary of Virginia. Johnson's commission provided for an annual salary of £600 payable by the Crown and authority to draw directly on the treasury to defray the cost of managing the natives.⁷ The Imperial government promised its full co-operation redressing all the just complaints of the Indians. Johnson was also given the control of trade with the natives as an integral part of his commission. Generally speaking, Johnson was under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief, at least for matters pertaining to military strategy. In practice, he exercised absolute control over relations with the Indians. In the early years, this activity was confined to the Six Nations since most other tribes were dominated by the French.

5. "Pownall to Johnson". 5 March, 1756. N.Y.C.D., VII, p.40.

6. "Secretary Fox to Johnson". 13 March, 1756. Ibid, p.56.

7. Atkin's commission was less definite on the question of financial support. While his Commission gave him supreme control over Indian affairs, he had to depend on local officials for support. See J. R. Alden. John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier. 1754-1774. (Ann Arbor, 1944). Ch. IV.

The official appointment of Johnson and Atkin in 1756 represents the culmination of the line of action begun in 1754. The complaints of the Indians at Albany had pointed out the need for unity of command. Sir William Johnson had consolidated his position as the leading expert on Indian affairs by pointing out the difficulties of divided jurisdiction. His commission of 1756 clarified his position and guaranteed his independence of action. Confirmed in his appointment, he went on to implement a policy of close control over relations with the Indian tribes, insofar as that was possible in wartime.

The appointment of Lord Loudon to command the British forces did not turn the tide of battle in favour of the British. Indeed, the campaign of 1756 was even worse than the disaster which 1755 had been. The plan of action for 1756 was identical to the one for the previous year. Loudon took Shirley's advice and made the main strike to the north, but the advance fizzled out because he was unable to get the required co-operation from local officials. It is difficult to place all the blame on Loudon's shoulders. He lacked the necessary reinforcements to carry out the task while the French had gotten a new commander in General Montcalm, who was properly reinforced and supported. On the frontiers of Virginia and Pennsylvania, there was no attempt at an advance. The settlers had all they could do to protect themselves. On the Great Lakes, General Montcalm reduced Oswego to eliminate British influence in that area.

The following year, a proposed attack on Louisburg failed to

materialize when bad weather and poor management locked Loudon in Halifax. General Montcalm reduced Fort William Henry during the summer to eliminate the British in another area. The campaign of 1757 placed the French in control of all the territory which they had been claiming prior to the war. Back in England, William Pitt had succeeded Newcastle as the effective leader of the government and he became convinced that nothing short of a complete victory in America would be acceptable. Talented and honest, Pitt believed that England's prestige and power rested on her colonies and he was determined to expand. His discontent with the previous efforts was reflected in his new Secretary of State for the Southern Department, Lord Hardwicke.

As all attempts to remove the French encroachments in North America have failed of success and they have not only retained their former possessions but have taken from us some very important places; deprived us of trade and influence among the natives, whom they have successfully employed in destroying our back inhabitants by laying waste our settlements ... the cause of our past misfortunes are in general owing to want of union and activity in our colonies and the mistaken and divided manner in which our troops there have been employed." To remedy the problem "a united and rigorous execution of our strength against Canada". was called for.⁸

The determination of Pitt's ministry was reflected in the success enjoyed by the British in 1758. The reforms inaugurated by Pitt provided for a more dynamic leader in the person of General Jeffery Amherst. The naval strategy of "close watch" kept the French fleet locked in its harbours, giving the British freedom of the North Atlantic.

8. "Hardwicke to Lyttleton", 4 October, 1757. P.A.C. transcripts.
Add. MSS.35913. Canada Papers. ff.68-72.

Isolated in North America, the French became an easy prey. The main attack in 1758 was on Louisburg with Amherst in command. Louisburg was strong enough to prevent an advance on Quebec until 1759. Lord Loudon managed to fumble an attack on Lake Champlain. Fort William Henry was recaptured but Montcalm's defence at Ticonderoga was brilliant.

The routes to the interior were reopened in two separate ventures. Colonel John Bradstreet recaptured Oswego and reduced Fort Frontenac to break the French hold on the Lakes. The fourth line of advance was into the Ohio Valley. Brigadier General John Forbes led a united force on Fort Duquesne. His success may have been hardly more than a corollary to the reduction of Fort Frontenac, but when he took possession of the French fort late in 1758, he won the interior for Britain.

The activities of the Superintendent for Indian Affairs had been severely restricted by the lack of success of British arms before 1758. The Indians liked nothing better than a winner. As long as the French retained control over the interior, Sir William Johnson confined his activities to retain the loyalty of the Six Nations and participating in the military activities of the day. He managed to retain their support by a long series of conferences in which he promised aid to the Indians. He used his power to effect a rigid system of control over trade with the natives and personally looked after land problems to make sure the Indians were not mistreated. His correspondence with the Board of Trade was permeated with references to the large number of agreements he had to make to retain the active support of the

Iroquois. The Board, of course, had little choice but to agree to them since all matters were submerged in the pursuit of victory. Sir William Johnson had little trouble in enforcing his rules, since the frontier was not in such a state as to promote either settlement or trade.

The victories of 1758 gave a new scope to the activities of Johnson's department. Prior to that year, all negotiations with the more westerly tribes were carried on through the Iroquois. The influence of the British was very limited, as the French dominated most of these tribes. Forbes' victory in the west had opened the door to new areas of activity. The Congress held at Easton, with George Croghan present as Johnson's personal representative, was typical. Forbes reflected Johnson's policy when he told the Indians:

We are not come to take possession of your hunting country in a hostile manner like the French did when they came, but to open a large and extensive trade with you and all other nations ... who choose to live in friendship with us.⁹

He went on to make an explicit promise to recognize their right to their land and promised fair treatment.

The following two years saw the British bring about the successful reduction of Canada. Wolfe's success at Quebec was the crucial victory. Amherst's slow advance on Lake Champlain was the only thing that prevented the complete victory in 1759. The advance of General John Prideaux

9. "Congress with the Delawares at Easton". 4 December, 1758. P.A.C. Transcripts. Boquet Papers, V.25, p.19.

past Niagara to Michilimackinac in 1759 placed the area west of Fort Frontenac firmly in British hands. The French in the Illinois country, thus isolated, were rendered impotent by lack of supplies. While the British were gaining the ascendancy Johnson repeated many times over the promise made by Forbes. The Treaty of Lancaster in 1760 and the large congress held at Detroit in 1762 were only the most important of a long series of meetings at which Johnson committed the British government to the defence of Indian rights. In his correspondence, he continued to emphasize the need for a constant and steady policy of control if the gains of the frontier were to be retained without disturbance.

The influence which Johnson had can be seen in the policy followed after the cessation of hostilities in 1760. While the frontier was ablaze, there had been no need for any statement of policy. With the cessation of hostilities in 1760, the westward movement of settlers resumed. The war had done little to quench the thirst for land. The British government, in an attempt to avoid conflict, was determined to prevent encroachments on lands reserved for Indians. An Order-in-Council of 1761 prohibited "the granting of lands hitherto unsettled and the establishing of colonies upon the frontier before the claims of the Indians are ascertained."¹⁰ Two weeks later, the American governors were ordered to proclaim His Majesty's intention to prevent encroachments among the Indians ... and protect the said Indians

10. 23 November, 1761. N.Y.C.D., VII, p.473.

in their just rights and possessions and to keep inviolable the treaties and compacts which have been entered into with them.¹¹

The British Government had no choice but to recognize the compacts made by Johnson and his staff. There was no peculiarity in this. They were simply trying to avoid trouble.

In the ensuing year, the flood of colonists over the mountains did not stop. In answer to a request for directions from Governor Boone of North Carolina, the Board of Trade previewed the policy to be enacted the following year.

We are inclined to think that our interest with respect to the Indians can never be settled with any stability but by the interposition of the Parliament of Great Britain; in making some regulation for the management of Indian affairs, upon some general plan, under the sole direction of the Crown and its officers.¹²

From that date until the signing of the Peace Treaty, the following year, the British government tried to follow a policy of isolating the interior from further encroachments. By 1761, the Board of Trade had become convinced that the colonies would not co-operate in carrying out imperial plans.

During the course of the Seven Years War, Sir William Johnson had risen to a position of supremacy in the conduct of Indian Affairs. His rise to power had begun in 1754 when he had been recommended for the position of leadership by the Indians themselves. Successive

11. "Board of Trade to Governors in America" 11 December, 1761.

N.Y.C.D., VII, p. 478.

12. "Board of Trade to Governor Boone". 3 June, 1762, in L. W. Labaree (ed.), Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors: 1620-1776 (New York, 1935), II, p.320.

commanders-in-chief had depended on him for all direction of Indian affairs and, as a matter of course, all affairs in the interior. In carrying out his duties, Johnson simply applied his dictum of 1754 concerning a unified command and a fair deal for the natives. This, in turn, was a reaction to the complaints voiced by the Indians at the Albany Congress.

The remedy of isolation accompanied by strict control had proven successful in the course of the war. The frontier was calm as long as the Indians' rights were respected. Johnson had proved himself consistently right in his evaluation of Indian reaction to British policy. It was only logical that, when a statement of policy was in the offing, his many recommendations would be considered.

CHAPTER IV

THE STATEMENT OF POLICY: 1763 - 64

With the end of the war in sight and Britain victorious in North America as well as in Europe and in India, the problem of the division of spoils begged solution. In the course of events, it became necessary for the British Government to make a choice as to which of the conquered French colonies would be retained and which given back. In North America, the choice devolved to one between Canada and the rich sugar island of Guadeloupe. The British cabinet was aware of the choice but there was never any real doubt as to their decision.

Canada, including the Island of Cape Breton and those in the gulf and river Saint Lawrence are now completely in our possession. The value of that acquisition as a security to our other colonies in America and as a means of wealth and power to Great Britain is so universally admitted that nothing need be added thereto and there can be no doubt that the whole will be clearly and fully ceded to us if any part of our conquests are to remain with Great Britain ... Guadeloupe is well worthy to be retained if possible but not in any equal degree to North America and if some must be given up this island seems fittest.¹

1. "Considerations for the Peace of Paris". 19 April, 1761. P.A.C.
Add. MSS. 35913. Canada Papers. pp.73-5.

In spite of this apparent fixity of purpose among the British cabinet a great public controversy soon arose over the relative merits of Canada and Guadeloupe as colonial possessions. The volume of pamphlet literature is much too immense to bear a close examination here.²

Richard Pares has summed up the historical judgment on the issue:

Although the weight of the argument was probably on the side of keeping the West Indian Island, yet it was Canada, not Guadeloupe that was kept. As long as the choice was between these two conquests, there was hardly any doubt. Although it might not be the strongest, the most popular point in the whole controversy was the necessity of driving the French out of Canada in order to cut off the root of all future wars. The statesmen and the mob alike believed this to be the real object of the struggle and the most necessary end.³

The great mass of writing, even if it had little effect on the final decision, is of some importance as an indicator of British thought on the value of colonies. It is necessary to note that none of the important pamphlets denied the basic precept of mercantilism. All acknowledged the fact that colonies were for the benefit of the mother country. The debate was centred on the relative value of each of the two alternatives. If anything, the greater number were in favour of retaining Guadeloupe. Professor Alvord's polarization of the debate into the two extremes of expansionists and anti-expansionists was a gross oversimplification of a more complex phenomena.⁴ The economic factors and financial interests represented in the pamphlets did not

2. W. L. Grant. "Pamphlet War - Canada vs. Guadeloupe". A.H.R. (July, 1912), pp.735-743.

✓ 3. R. Pares. War and Trade in the West Indies (London, 1963), p.219.

✓ 4. C. W. Alvord. The Mississippi Valley in British Politics (Cleveland, 1917). I. p.46.

signify any close correlation between the pamphlets and the action taken at the Treaty of Paris. His attempt to correlate the pamphlets with political factions was also an over extension.

Two interests decidedly in favour of the retention of Canada did exert a certain amount of influence. The sugar planters of the newer West Indian colonies and the fishing interests were both in favour of retaining Canada; the former because they feared competition and the latter because they saw the chance to drive a rival away from the Grand Banks. It was not, however, these economic considerations but the broader concept of the balance of power and military strategy which dictated the retention of Canada. The British Government saw the retention of Canada as a means of reducing French power in America and thus, according to current mercantilist views, at home.⁵ Canada was held in order that Great Britain might suppress the great hinterland into the Anglo-American Empire; thereby making that Empire safe from border warfare and the fear of continental encirclement, while at the same time opening a vast new area for economic exploitation by British subjects.

The peace-seeking George III with his mentor, the Earl of Bute, could not disregard the necessity for taking Canada from the French. With the still powerful William Pitt demanding Canada as a sine qua non for peace, there was never any doubt of its retention. A certain

5. M. Saville. "The American Balance of Power and European Diplomacy: 1713-1778". loc.cit. p.163.

amount of controversy at the peace table over the extent of Canada was rendered pedantic by the crushing British victories on the continent. France was completely humbled and had to accept the terms offered. Britain demanded Canada and all its dependencies and France had no choice but to agree to the terms.

By the Treaty of Paris, which was finally concluded on February 10, 1763, the King of France renounced all claim to Canada. In order to prevent any future conflicts the boundaries were firmly spelled out:

a line drawn along the middle of the river Mississippi from its source to the river Iberville and from thence by a line drawn along the middle of this river and the Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the sea.⁶

France had previously transferred New Orleans and the territory west of the Mississippi River to Spain by the secret Treaty of San Ildefonso, so that France's power on the North American mainland was completely reduced.

The first problem to face the British was the disposition of the territory gained in North America. The British interest in the interior was closely bound up with the then current theories of mercantilist value. The disposition of the area which had been gained from the French was to be decided in the light of these principles along with the commitment made by British officials to the natives in the interior. As Lord Shelburne, that supposed paragon of free trade virtue, stated:

" ... the possession of territory is but a secondary point and

6. Article VII. D.R.C.H.C. , p.114.

it is considered more or less valuable as it is subservient to the interests of commerce, which is now the great object of ambition.⁷

The eight months between the Treaty of Paris and the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763, provide a clear insight not only into the mechanism for forming policy but also into the underlying principles which were ultimately responsible for that policy. The instruments of policy formation were set in motion three months after the signing of the Treaty of Paris. The Earl of Egremont, a former Pittite but even closer to Grenville, had taken over as Secretary for the Southern Department and he ordered the Board of Trade to "take into consideration these articles [of the Peace Treaty] which relate to the new cessions". He wanted the Board's opinion on what new governments were necessary and what "regulations, [by which] the most extensive commercial advantage may be derived from those cessions and how these advantages may be rendered most permanent, and secure to His Majesty's trading subjects". For North America, he desired particular information on the means of preserving "the internal peace of the country against Indian disturbances". He proposed that the best means for providing this was by

... protecting their property and persons and securing to them all possessions, rights and privileges they have hitherto enjoyed and are entitled to, most carefully guarding against any invasion of their hunting lands.⁸

Lord Egremont also raised the crucial question of a revenue

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7. "Notes on the Peace Treaty". Dec. 9. 1762. Shelburne Papers, Vol.165., quoted in J. Norris. Shelburne and Reform (London, 1963), p.32.
 8. "Egremont to Board of Trade." May 5, 1763. D.R.C.H.C. pp.127-8.

for support of the new acquisitions.

By what means the least burdensome and most palatable to the colonies can they contribute towards the support of the additional expence which must attend their civil and military establishment, upon the arrangement your lordships shall propose?⁹

The failure of the Board of Trade to answer that question led to the difficulties of later years. The problem of revenue was a key one in managing the interior.

In company with the general directive from Lord Egremont was a long and detailed memorandum the author of which is generally conceded to have been Henry Ellis, a former governor of Georgia and powerful influence behind Egremont, whom he served as under-secretary.¹⁰ This memorandum elaborated on some of Egremont's suggestions and pointed out the necessity of fixing, "some line for a Western boundary to our ancient provinces beyond which our people should not at present be permitted to settle".¹¹ Two reasons for such action were that inland settlements were not considered as valuable by mercantalistic principles and in any event would infringe upon the rights of the Indians. Ellis further recommended that the territory be placed "under the immediate protection and care of the officers commanding the distant posts".¹² This problem of a government for the new area was to cause trouble later on.

What Egremont was calling for was a comprehensive and detailed plan for the assimilation of the new acquisitions into the Empire and

✓ 9. "Egremont to Board of Trade." loc.cit., p.128.

✓ 10. V. W. Crane (ed.), "Hints Relative to the Government and Division of the Conquered and newly acquired countries in America".
M.V.H.R. (March, 1922), pp.367-373.

11. Ibid , p.371.

12. Ibid , p.372.

he assumed that mercantilist considerations would be given a high priority. It took about a month for the Board of Trade to formulate a reply. The young Earl of Shelburne had recently been appointed to the presidency of the Board. The Board's report was quite extensive and began by outlining the essential benefits to be accrued from the new acquisitions. In addition to strengthening Britain's hold on the fisheries, Canada would provide "a monopoly of all the fur and skin trade of all the Indians in North America" and "the supplying of all the Indian tribes with ... European commodities immediately through the hands of British traders."¹³

This emphasis on the fur trade brings out the essentially mercantilist outlook of the real powers in British colonial administration. Even if the fur trade was a miniscule portion of the total British trade pattern, it was worth protecting because of its strong mercantilist appeal. It was a non-European commodity which could be processed in England for re-export. This enhanced its value far beyond its actual worth to the economy.¹⁴ It was this consideration, in conjunction with the need to pacify the Indians, that underlay British policy towards the interior in the ensuing years.

In addition to the purely commercial advantages to be derived from the new territories, it was hoped they would provide room for expansion. The "monopoly of lands in the hands of land jobbers"

13. "Board of Trade to Egremont". 8 June, 1763, D.R.C.H.C., p.137.

✓ 14. See M. G. Lawson. Fur: A Study in British Mercantilism: 1700-1775 (Toronto, 1943).

gave the appearance of over-population in the more settled Northern colonies. It was hoped that the new territories to the north and south would provide a suitable outlet for excess population while, at the same time, taking pressure off the western frontier. This phase of the plan was closely linked to the question of new governments.

The criteria for establishing a government was set up as

all places where settlement as well as trade and commerce are the immediate objects ... But as no such regular civil government is either necessary or indeed can be established where no perpetual residence or planning is intended; it will there [the interior] be sufficient to provide for free trade for all your Majesty's subjects under such regulation and such administration of justice as is best suited to that end.¹⁵

In the former category, as areas ripe for more colonization, were placed Quebec, Nova Scotia in its enlarged form, and East and West Florida. The area south and west of the Great Lakes was classed as Indian territory and placed in the latter category.

Insofar as the Board of Trade's report of July 8th dealt with the problem of the interior, it was not a unique document. In the main, it was an expansion on the hints offered by Ellis. The report repeated the need for an immediate statement of policy to reassure the Indians. The Board deferred action on a plan of Indian management until full information was available from "the Commander-in-Chief in America and ... the agents for Indian Affairs".¹⁶ The document does offer a unique interpretation of the desire for controlled expansion. The differ-

15. "Board of Trade to Egremont". 8 June, 1763. loc.cit., pp.138-9.

16. Ibid , pp.139-140.

entiation of territory into areas for expansion of trade only and areas for trade and settlement was an important step in the development of the idea of an integrated empire. This was a crucial factor in determining later policy.

Lord Egremont met the recommendations with a general word of approval.¹⁷ His one point of difference was on the matter of providing a government for the interior. He was justly afraid of the consequences which might flow from the lack of any civil establishment. Although he was in complete agreement with "not permitting, for the present, any grants of land or new settlements beyond the bounds proposed in your report", he felt that some form of civil government was a necessity. If no other alternative presented itself, he suggested that the lands be included in the commission of the new Governor of Quebec.

Lord Shelburne listed three basic objections to the proposition of restoring the territory to Canada.¹⁸ In the first place, it was felt that the British title to the land would be compromised in view of the fact that the recent war had been fought because Britain felt the territory did not belong to Quebec. Secondly, by giving that territory to Quebec, they would give an unfair advantage to one province in the conduct of the fur trade and consequently impede the freeflow

17. "Egremont to Board of Trade". 4 July, 1763, D.R.C.H.C., p.149.

18. "Board of Trade to Egremont". 5 August, 1763, Ibid., pp.151-2.

of trade. Finally, the area, for the foreseeable future, was to have no permanent settlement and would, of necessity, have to be administered by the Army. This could only lead to a conflict between the Governor of Quebec and the Commander-in-Chief in North America. The result was a recommendation to place the area under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief.

In this letter, we get the true reason for the limitation of Quebec. Deceived by the great expanse and the relatively small population of Quebec, the British officials estimated that even a limited area could serve as a receptacle for the excess population of the older colonies. The interior, which was rapidly being termed "the Indian Country" was not an area where settlement was to be promoted; therefore, there was no need for any civil establishment above what was necessary for the management of trade.

It is necessary, at this point, to consider events in America and, more especially, events on the frontier. The taking over of the interior had proceeded rather smoothly until 1763. The French gave up control of the interior posts in accord with the articles of capitulation with little trouble. In the course of time, the Indians had become truly disenchanted with the British administration. The chaotic state of the Indian tribes in the Ohio Valley made it a fertile ground for discontent. The tribes had been forced northward by British expansion and there was a general state of confusion with regard to their respective territorial holdings. This general confusion was accentuated by the change of ownership and the interruption in the

general flow of trade goods which had been a result of the war. General Amherst's action in cutting off all presents to the tribes certainly did little to calm their fears.¹⁹

The causes for the Indian revolt which is known as "Pontiac's Conspiracy" were as many and varied as there were tribes participating. The general state of confusion which resulted from the change of masters played on submerged fears and jealousies to spark an uprising. Pontiac was less a leader of the uprising than a rallying point for the general discontent. The actual events on the frontier have been repeated too many times to bear repetition here. The causes being basically transitional and the natives unable to maintain any lasting pressure, the revolt soon collapsed.

The timing of the revolt, coming as it did just prior to the issuance of the proclamation of October 7, 1763, has led to some speculation regarding the effect it may have had on British officials. The evidence does not seem to point to any cataclysmic cause-effect relationship between the Indian uprisings and the proclamation. Shelburne had advised the issuance of a proclamation in his letter of August 5th, while news of the uprising was still on the high seas. It was not until late in September that the full extent of the uprising was known in London and even then there was no sign of panic in official circles.²⁰ It would be folly to say that the uprising had no effect

19. W. R. Jacob. "Presents to Indians as a Factor in the Conspiracy of Pontiac". Michigan History (Dec. 1949), pp.314-322.

20. See C. S. Grant. "Pontiac's Rebellion and the British Troop Moves of 1763". M.V.H.R. (June, 1953), pp.75-88.

on the British but, to say that it was the key factor, would be equally dangerous. What the uprising did do was accentuate the need for a clear statement of policy and perhaps hurry the policy statement which had been in the process of formation since May of 1763.

The two men most responsible for the evolution of the policy were not in office when the final statement was made. Lord Egremont had died in August and Shelburne fell from office as a result of his political activity in support of Pitt. Egremont was succeeded by the same Lord Halifax who had presided over the Board of Trade from 1748 to 1763. He was the most knowledgeable man then in England on the problems of colonial management. Wills Hill, the Viscount Hillsborough, took over Shelburne's position as president of the Board of Trade. His appointment was a strictly political move and he had no special talent for the job assigned to him. If anything, he was, at that time, strictly orthodox in his views on colonial affairs.

The affairs of North America were taken up in the Cabinet as a matter of course. On September 17, Halifax ordered the Board of Trade to prepare a proclamation in accord with the earlier plans. He decided to

lay aside the idea of including within the government of Quebec, or any established colony, the lands which are to be reserved for the present for the use of the Indians.²¹

By October 5, the proclamation was ready for consideration and it

21. "Halifax to the Board of Trade". 17 September, 1763, D.R.C.H.C., p.153-4.

received royal approbation two days later. The provisions of the proclamation were entirely compatible with the policy which Egremont and Ellis had outlined in May, and which Shelburne had agreed to and elaborated upon in the following months. There is no evidence that the policy would have been any different if they had remained in office. The basic aim of the Proclamation was in close accord with the Board of Trade's report of June 8. It had envisaged a comprehensive plan of imperial integration in North America. The new governments in the Floridas and Quebec were aimed at the settlers seeking new lands. The standard form of government offered was aimed at promoting the flow of settlement. At the same time, the Proclamation was aimed at the interior with the hope that the firm statement of policy would tranquilize the natives.²²

On the suggestion of John Pownall, the Appalachian divide and "all lands whatever which have not been ceded or purchased by us" was set down as the limit beyond which no settlement was to be permitted.²³ The line was explicitly temporary, awaiting the negotiation of a more definite line by the Indian Commissioners. All persons who were found 'squatting' to the west of the line were to be removed immediately. The selection of the mountains as a line had obvious inconsistencies, but it was convenient because of its clearness and the fact that the Indians could readily understand it.

22. D.R.C.H.C., pp.153-4.

23. J. Pownall, "Sketch of a Report Concerning the Cessions in Africa and America", printed in R. A. Humphries, "Shelburne and the Proclamation of 1763", E.H.R. (June, 1934), p.258.

The Proclamation placed the interior under the direct control of the Commander-in-Chief assisted by the superintendents for Indian Affairs. Trade regulations for the interior were left in abeyance in view of the fact that full information was not yet available. Traders were to be permitted to enter the area after they obtained licences from the governor of the colony from which they were to proceed. For the time being, traders were to be under such regulations as the Commander-in-Chief and his Indian agents felt necessary.

The Proclamation then was a calculated attempt to integrate the new possessions into the North American empire, an effort to determine the true interest and policy of this kingdom in reference to its new colonies either as that interest arises from their situation in general or relatively to our commercial and political connections with the various nations of Indian tribes now under your Majesty's dominion and protection.²⁴

In essence, the policy combined isolation of the interior with a close supervision of trade relations with the natives, to ensure a maximum benefit to the empire at large.

The second stage of the policy statement was the formulation of a specific plan for the regulation of trade with the natives. The Board took up the problem immediately but the solution was forecast by Halifax in October, which appears to indicate that he played a large part in setting up the plan. He informed Amherst that the intention was

24. J. Pownall, "Sketch " loc.cit., p.259.

to suffer no trade to be carried on but at the several posts, where it will be under the inspection of Commanders respectively commanding at each; and to allow every subject to trade there on taking out a licence from the governors of the several colonies, and giving security to observe such regulations ... as shall be thought necessary for the effectual prevention of those fraudulent practices which have produced so many bad consequences and which it appears impossible to prevent by any other means. A plan for the regulation of the trade is now under consideration and I hope to transport it to you soon.²⁵

The Board proceeded to examine the great mass of information which had accumulated as a result of Shelburne's inquiries of the preceding summer.²⁶ The resulting plan was presented to the cabinet on July 10, 1764.²⁷ Generally speaking, it incorporated the recommendations of General Gage, Sir William Johnson and John Stuart. Gage had succeeded Amherst as Commander-in-Chief late in 1763, and John Stuart had succeeded Atkin as Southern Superintendent for Indian Affairs.

The plan contained forty-one clauses, many of which were strictly administrative. In general, it called for a close regulation of political and commercial relations with the natives, under the supervision of the Indian superintendents. The key benefit seen was the unity which such a plan would give, free as it was from the interference of the various colonies. The plan also called for the revocation of all colonial laws respecting interior trade. As it turned out, the plan was never put into effect because it was never adopted by Parliament. This does not, however, detract from its importance because it was

25. "Halifax to Amherst". 19 October, 1763, Gage Corr. II, p.5.

26. See "Shelburne to Johnson". 5 August, 1763, N.Y.C.D., VII pp.535-536, for a typical Shelburne letter demanding information.

27. "The Plan for the Management of Indian Affairs". 10 July, 1764. Ibid., pp.637-641.

implemented unofficially by Johnson and Gage in the ensuing years.

The official correspondence of 1763-4 on the policy adopted for the interior presents a clear reflection of the then current opinion on the value of colonies. The experience which the British officials had encountered on the frontier, both during and after the war, had affected the method of administrating the interior. It was this factor which led British officials to assert control over the area after the war. The method of control which they adopted can only be properly understood if it is remembered that the interior was looked upon as an area to be exploited for its commercial value. As a supplier of non-European commodities and as a probable market for British goods, the interior was an almost perfect mercantilist possession. The fur trade of the interior was not, in fact, nearly as important as the provision trade of the older colonies but it did have a certain aura about it which made its protection necessary. It was this mercantilist reasoning which made the isolation of the interior not only feasible but desirable from the point of view of the British.

CHAPTER V

THE POLICY OF 1763-4 IN OPERATION

Once Great Britain assumed active control over the whole interior, her task was to restore order. Lord Halifax had hoped that the proclamation would "insure the internal peace of that continent".¹ General Gage, who had succeeded Amherst as Commander-in-Chief, was given the task of putting down the Indian revolt. He encountered the problem of lack of colonial cooperation. The same principles were involved as had prevented full cooperation during the war. The absence of any promise of reimbursement made the colonies still more reluctant to participate. The uprising did not affect the great mass of the American population. It set the interior ablaze, but Americans were excluded from the area so that there was little inclination to assist the British in putting down the revolt. As long as they were in no immediate danger, the colonies were not likely to authorize the spending of money for frontier defence. This early experience was eye-opening

1. "Halifax to Amherst". 11 October, 1763. Gage Corr. II, p.3.

for General Gage, who, in later years, hesitated to place any faith in the ability of the colonists to administer the interior.

In spite of these many difficulties, the British army had little trouble in putting down the revolt in 1764. One British column, led by Colonel Henry Boquet, operated in the Ohio valley where British power had been threatened. A second advance was led by John Bradstreet along the Lakes as far as Detroit. The Indians were simply exhausted by their year of fighting. They had never been able to operate over long periods and they lacked the supplies necessary for an extended military venture. The occupation of the Illinois territory was not quite so easy, but it was physical barriers and not Indian rebellions that hampered the British advance in that area.²

In the meantime, the plan for Indian management ran aground on the shoals of British politics. The Grenville ministry was not willing to bring it into Parliament because of the cost of implementation, which was estimated at £20,000 per year. The conduct of the war had raised the national debt to a record high and this expense depleted a large part of the revenue. In these conditions, the cry for "economy" and retrenchment became more and more prevalent. The American expenditures were already quite high and any increase was bound to be met with a great deal of opposition. As a result, the plan for Indian management was shelved indefinitely.

✓2. See C. W. Alvord & C. E. Carter (eds.). The Critical Period: 1763-1765 (Springfield, 1910), Ch.I.

The search for an American revenue and/or the reduction of the American expenditure was the leading topic of discussion in the ensuing years. The political disturbances which resulted, while not having any direct effect on interior policy, prevented any concrete action being taken. Grenville's attempt to raise a colonial revenue by the Stamp Act was responsible for his fall from office. The Rockingham ministry proved just as incapable of solving the dilemma and, after a year of delaying, that ministry also fell from office.

The result was that when Pitt, now Lord Chatham, took up the reins of office again in 1766, the problem of retrenchment was still a live one. Lord Shelburne returned to office, this time as Secretary of State for the Southern Department. His immediate problem was the same one he had been unable to deal with in 1763. His attempts to solve the puzzle of American expense led to a shift in policy, but before that can be examined, it is necessary to observe the situation in North America where British officials had to wrestle with the problem of managing the interior.

Once the Indian revolt had been put down, General Gage had to determine on action for the preservation of the peace. Lord Halifax had advised that he leave the peace-making duties to Sir William Johnson, who was continued in his office as Superintendent of the Northern Department. Halifax had hoped that the Proclamation would

"quiet their jealousies with respect to encroachments on their land",³ and Johnson used it for all it was worth. At a series of congresses, he renewed the British pledges to the natives with regard to the preservation of their hunting grounds and the redress of their grievances.⁴ What had been won by force of arms had to be maintained by trade, otherwise the western Indians would fall under the influence of the French traders who were operating from the Western bank of the Mississippi River.⁵ Early in 1765, General Gage proclaimed the interior open to trade and issued orders for the regulation of that trade which closely paralleled the plan which the Board of Trade had drawn up the previous summer.⁶

Gage felt justified in his implementation of the plan because of the general approval which it had received from colonial officials. Johnson, Stuart and most of the governors had approved of it. The notable exception was Governor James Murray, the recently appointed Governor of Quebec. He had objected to the extensive power which the plan had given to the Superintendent of Indian Affairs. He referred to it as establishing "a power within a power, the policy of which I do not comprehend".⁷ Since that part of the plan was never fully enacted his objections went unanswered. Of more lasting importance was his criticism of the system of confining trade to the posts. The policy of imperial regulation, he said, was too expensive and

3. "Halifax to Gage." 14 January, 1764. Gage Corr., II, p.11.

4. "Johnson to Board of Trade". 8 October, 1764. N.Y.C.D., VIII, pp.657-665.

5. See "Gage to Governor Penn". 16 June 1765, in Alvord and Carter (eds.), The Critical Period, p.519.

6. "Orders for the Regulation of the Trade". 16 January, 1765. Ibid., p.400.

7. R. A. Humphries(ed.), "General Murray's Views on the Plan of 1764". C.H.R. (June, 1935), pp.162-169.

would lead to a reduction in trade. He even suggested that a general plan of co-operation could be evolved among the colonies which would adapt to the varied circumstances of the long frontier and save Britain expense at the same time. His comments were lost in the great bulk of praise which the plan received, but they appear prophetic in the light of later decisions.

The restrictions in the trade were founded on the belief that;

The people sent out with our trade, if not confined to forts, ramble everywhere; they are generally of no character and of desperate fortune, and for the sake of present profits, have never thought of the consequences of what mischief they entailed upon the country.⁸

In applying the policy of restriction, Gage worked in close co-operation with Sir William Johnson. Johnson had, of course, been the leading exponent of a policy of close regulation of the trade. His letters to the Board in 1763 continually emphasized the need for such a policy.⁹ General Gage naturally respected Johnson's opinion and acted largely on his recommendations.

In spite of the many regulations to the contrary, colonial speculators and land seekers continued to look beyond the mountains. All attempts at directing new settlement to the north and south failed. During the war there had been a great buildup, as settlers were prevented from expanding by Indian pressure. By 1760, settlers were pouring through the Cumberland gap into the fertile valleys leading

8. "Gage (of) Conway". 24 June, 1766. Gage Corr., II, p.97.

9. See "Johnson to Shelburne". Nov. 13, 1763. N.Y.C.D. VII p.572-581.

to the Ohio River. They paid little attention to Indian claims as they advanced. Sir William Johnson pointed out rather acidly that "the English colonists are ill suited to cultivate a good understanding with the Indians."¹⁰ He tried as best he could to meet the demands of the Indians for a fair treatment but he was hampered by the lack of support from London. The Southern Department, during the short-lived Rockingham ministry was under General Henry Conway. While extolling the value of the fur trade and the necessity for peaceful relations with the Indians, he did nothing to aid Gage and Johnson in enforcing control on the frontier.¹¹

In their attempts to maintain some form of order in the interior, Johnson and Gage relied heavily on the Army. When their pleas for the full enforcement of the plan of 1764 for Indian management went unanswered, they had little choice. The result was that the cost of maintaining the army rose, since the bulk of it was stationed in the interior where provisions were expensive. While using the army to implement the substance of the 1764 plan, Johnson continued to voice the complaints of the natives at every opportunity. He pointed out that the protection of the Indians' rights was the surest way of maintaining peace and consequently gaining the most benefit from the interior for the Empire.¹²

10. "Johnson to Board of Trade". November 16, 1765. Alvord and Carter (eds.), The New Regime, p.117.

11. "Conway to Gage". 27 March, 1766. Gage Corr., II, p.34.

✓ 12. "Johnson to Shelburne". 3 Dec., 1767. N.Y.C.D., VII pp.997-1003.

The aggressiveness of settlers in moving across the mountains barrier necessitated the establishment of a more realistic boundary. Sir William Johnson was persistent in his plea for authorization to carry out at least that part of the plan of 1764. Article 42 of that plan had ordered

That proper measures be taken, with the consent and concurrence of the Indians, to ascertain and define the precise and exact Boundary and limits of the lands, which it may be proper to reserve to them, and where no settlement whatever shall be allowed.¹³

He rightly pointed out that the Indians were losing faith in the British administration because of the number of settlers squatting on the lands supposedly set aside for them. The British ministry refused to take action, as they feared any expenditure which it might entail, and the Board of Trade refused to press the matter. A series of incidents on the frontier tended to make the situation even more critical.¹⁴

When Shelburne took office in 1766, he considered the matter and finally in 1768 authorized the negotiation of a permanent line of division.¹⁵

Colonial opposition to the policy statement of 1763-64 was quickly emerging in a number of other areas. If not the most influential, certainly the most vocal group were the Canadian merchants. This group was made up of a number of American merchants who had followed the Army north to Montreal and were augmented by a number of Scottish merchants who came to Canada shortly after the conquest. Most of the

13. "The Plan for Indian Management". *loc.cit.*, p.641.

14. "Johnson to Shelburne" 16 Dec., 1766. *N.Y.C.D.* VII p.880-883.

15. "Shelburne to Johnson". 5 January, 1768. *N.Y.C.D.*, VIII, p.2.

✓ See also Max Farrand, "The Indian Boundary Line". *A.H.R.* (July, 1905), pp.782-791, for a brief yet very penetrating examination of the problem.

leading French merchants had withdrawn and those who remained were cut off from their previous connections. The newcomers had more than geographic advantages over the other colonies in the conduct of the fur trade; the famous couriers des bois and voyageurs were still present and looking for work. It did not take the traders long to set the French trading machine back in motion with themselves at the controls.

Alexander Henry was one of the first of the early traders to venture into the area west of Niagara and his experience was typical of the others.¹⁶ The merchants were quick to adapt to the ways of their French predecessors and journeyed to the interior to trade directly with the Indians. The strict regulation which the plan of 1764 envisaged posed a real threat to the advantage which the Quebec merchants enjoyed over their southern counterparts and they opposed it from the very beginning. One short month after Gage opened the trade, they complained of

such restrictions and conditions as does for the present (and we apprehend must for ever) discourage the traders from engaging therein to the total ruin of that reliable branch of commerce, the lessening of both his Majesty's revenue and the consumption of British manufactures.¹⁷

The intricate system of credit and partnership among the merchants, which resulted from wintering with the Indians, led to a high degree of inter-dependence. This, in turn, led to a more effective system

✓ 16. Alexander Henry, Travels and Adventures (Toronto, 1901).

17. "Petition of Merchants to Murray". 20 February, 1765. P.A.C., C.O.42, V, p.362.

of representation for the interests of Montreal merchants in London.¹⁸

The merchants realized that their only hope for a change in policy lay in exerting pressure in London. Their line to London was made much smoother by the appointment of Fowler Walker as their agent.¹⁹

Walker, a London barrister and close friend of Francis Maseres, Attorney-General of Quebec, was to look after the merchants' interests in London for the next ten years. He acted as the effective liaison between the Quebec merchants and their London suppliers and worked to effect a change in policy regarding trade regulations.

The merchants' petition to Murray was only the first of a long line of similar petitions, memorials and presentations which they showered on colonial officials until 1768. The proclamation which isolated the interior from settlement was in complete accord with their sentiments. What irked them was the limitation of trade to the posts and the countless minor restrictions which required them to be continually under the supervision of the military men who controlled the interior. Over time, the complaints of the merchants became more sophisticated. They dredged up a long series of secondary arguments to support their claim for a change in policy.

Generally speaking, the merchants emphasized the fact that the restrictive laws were to the detriment of the Empire at large. By restricting trade to the forts, they said, the British traders could

18. See M. J. Jackson, "The Beginnings of the British Fur Trade at Michilimackinac", Minnesota History (1930) pp.231-270; and W. E. Stephens, "The Organization of the British Fur Trade: 1766-1800" M.V.H.R. (Sept, 1916), pp.172-202.

19. "Montreal Merchants to Fowler Walker". 19 April, 1765. P.A.C. Transcripts. Add.MSS. 35914. Canada Papers. f.1.

only carry on a limited trade. This not only acted as a detriment to British trade but augmented the trade and influence of the French and Spanish traders who were active among the natives, not being controlled by law. They pointed out that the Indians were not pleased with the restrictive laws since they were used to having traders come among them. The system of posting bonds for their behaviour and diverse other limitations on their freedom of movement were also complained about frequently.^{20.}

The grand summary of the merchants' complaints came in 1767 in a long memorial to Governor Carleton. It is unique only because it contained all of the diverse arguments which had been used by individual petitioners. Carleton had previously supported the merchants when Sir William Johnson complained that "they (the traders) together with the encouragement and misrepresentation of the French" were the cause of all difficulties with the natives.^{21.} Carleton defended both the traders and the French and echoed their complaint that

Unless the present restraints are removed, that trade must greatly suffer; this province nearly ruined, and Great Britain be a considerable loser, and France the sole gainer.²²

20. Some of the more important memorials were:

"Benjamin Frobisher's Observations on the Indian Trade". 10 November, 1766. P.A.C. Shelburne Manuscripts. V.500., pp.160-165.

"Petition of London Merchants to the Board of Trade". 20 April, 1765. Quebec Gazette, 4 July, 1765.

"Memorial of Fowler Walker to Board of Trade". 26 June, 1766. P.A.C. C.O. 42, V. pp.158-160.

"John Gray's reflections on the Fur Trade". 1768. P.A.C. Transcripts, Add. MSS. 35914. Canada Papers. ff.322-331.

21. "Johnson to Carleton". 27 January, 1767, P.A.C. Q.SERIES, IV, pp.115-120.

22. "Carleton to Johnson". 27 March, 1767, P.A.C. Q.SERIES, VI, pp. 123-124.

The day after he wrote to Johnson, Governor Carleton forwarded the merchants' petition to the Board of Trade and added his support to their plea for a "free and open trade" and "permission for all traders to winter with the Indians". Carleton pointed out that

through his province is the most easy access to that country (the interior) the Canadians are well acquainted with the genius of its savage inhabitants; and ... I am confident that if not prevented by the jealousy of their rivals in that trade, they may be made useful instruments to wrest it out of the hands of our antagonists.²³

The same day, Carleton wrote a long letter to Lord Shelburne in defence of the merchants.²⁴ He pointed out, rather naively, that the fur traders were aware of the necessity for peaceful relations with the natives and would not jeopardize their trade by cheating the Indians. While it is undeniable that the merchants' demands had some influence in London, - especially after Governor Carleton added his support - to say, as M. S. Reid has,²⁵ that their opposition was directly responsible for a change in policy, would be to ignore a number of more important factors.

In the older colonies, opposition to the Proclamation was quick to form. The prohibition of settlement beyond the mountains was an affront to too many local land speculators and settlers to go unnoticed. Virginians continued to settle west of the mountains in defiance of the orders. In Pennsylvania, a more concentrated form of opposition took shape. The Philadelphia-based firm of Baynton, Wharton and

23. "Carleton to Board of Trade". 28 March, 1767, P.A.C. Q Series IV, pp.198-205.

24. "Carleton to Shelburne", 28 March, 1767. Ibid., pp.111-114.

25. M. S. Reid, "Quebec Fur Traders and Western Policy: 1763-1774". C.H.R. (March, 1925), pp.15-32.

Morgan opened up a very lucrative trade with the far west shortly after Gage re-opened the trade. Unlike the Montreal merchants, the firm was not primarily concerned with the peltry trade. The supplying of the army was a much more profitable enterprise for them.

The Philadelphia firm's operation was typical of the middle colonies' interest in the west. Like true entrepreneurs, they were interested in any development west of the mountains which might return a profit. By 1766, they became the centre of a movement in support of the founding of a colony in the Illinois territory. The Illinois Company sought support from colonial officials for its scheme.²⁶ Benjamin Franklin, who by this time was agent for Pennsylvania in London, became the leading supporter for the interior colony in the capital of the Empire. The company showered the British officials with a great number of petitions in favour of the scheme. Phineas Lyman's petition in favour of the scheme is one of the most typical.²⁷

The success of the venture depended on the extent to which the lobbyists could convince British officials that such a colony would be a benefit to the empire. They concentrated on pointing out that, such a colony would be a barrier to French in the interior. In that case, they would secure a dubious area for the empire. At the same time, they emphasized the fact that a colony in the far west would eliminate the need for such a large military establishment and lower

26. "Wharton et. al to Johnson". 6 June, 1766. Alvord and Carter, (eds.), The New Regime, pp.248-256.

27. "Phinias Lyman's Reasons for a Settlement on the Illinois". Alvord and Carter (eds.), The New Regime, pp.261-288.

the cost of maintaining the troops that were retained. Even Sir William Johnson gave guarded support to the project if it was "duly conducted with the approbation of the Indians and due regard to their rights".²⁸

The lobbyists were effective enough to prompt Secretary Conway to ask the opinion of the Board of Trade on the feasibility of interior colonies.²⁹ The Board of Trade's reply did not come until four months later, after Conway had left office. It flatly rejected the idea of a colony in the interior until

some one uniform plan, as may remedy the disorders which have prevailed therein, preserve the goodwill of the Indians and put the trade under such regulations that this nation may reap all the advantages which that trade is capable of affording.³⁰

The Board, which by this time was under the leadership of Lord Clare, a political appointee of mediocre ability, expressed its faith in the Proclamation. It was not convinced of the "just benefits" which the lobbyists predicted would flow from interior settlements.

When Shelburne returned to office late in 1766, the most pressing problem facing the ministry was the reduction of expense at all levels. The country and the opposition were clamouring for a decrease in taxes. The American expenditure was a particularly obnoxious burden. In these circumstances, Lord Shelburne began an extensive re-examination of the policy inaugurated in 1763-4. In answer to their requests

28. "Johnson to Conway". 10 July, 1766. Alvord & Carter (eds.), The New Regime, pp.334-335.

29. "Secretary Conway to Board of Trade". 23 May, 1766. Ibid., p.245.

30. "Board of Trade to Lord Shelburne". 3 September, 1766. Ibid., pp.370-1.

for a change in policy, he informed the Canada Committee of London merchants that the whole policy towards the interior was being reconsidered.³¹

Lord Barrington, the Secretary-at-War, had drawn up a plan for the reduction of the expense in the interior in the spring of 1766.³² He formed the plan with a military mind and a treasury eye. He advocated the complete removal of British troops from the distant posts. The plan did not receive any serious consideration until January of 1767, when Barrington tabled the American expense at £700,000 for the army alone. This amount was inflated by the cost of Indian management; but it was still a tremendous expense. Lord Shelburne considered Barrington's earlier proposals and found them wanting because they underestimated the necessity for keeping troops on the frontier.³³ In this respect, he followed the recommendation of General Gage.³⁴ Charles Townsend, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, was demanding a reduction of the American expense and Lord Shelburne was forced to look for an alternate solution.

The previous winter, Lord Shelburne had inaugurated a great search for information on the best means of achieving a reduction of the American expense. He had informed Gage of the necessity of a reduction of the army expenditure and concluded:

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- 31. "Lord Shelburne to the Canada Committee of Trade". 30 November, 1766. P.A.C. Transcripts. Add. MSS. 35914. Canada Papers, ff.132-134.
 - 32. "Lord Barrington's Plan Relative to Outposts and Indian Trade". 10 May, 1766. P.A.C. Shelburne Manuscripts, Vol.50, pp.23-42.
 - 33. "Lord Shelburne's Comments on Barrington's Plan". P.A.C. Shelburne Manuscripts. Vol. 50, pp.43-51.
 - 34. "Gage to Shelburne". 4 April, 1767. Gage Corr., I., pp.129-130.

it is to me a matter of doubt whether any method of managing Indians can be found preferable to that of leaving the trade of each province to the particular care of that province under some general rules and regulations to which all the provinces must be subject in general.³⁵

General Gage, while cautiously agreeing to the relinquishment of imperial control of trade, favoured the retention of control over political relations with the natives.

With respect to the carrying on of commerce with the Indians, the present method pursued, particularly in the Northern Department, ... approved by most people at first from its good appearance is found upon trial not to answer ... the posts cannot be multiplied to the degree necessary to complete it.

He went on to point out that the English were losing trade because of their restrictions while the French and Spanish were gaining. He concluded by agreeing that the colonies be permitted to manage the trade "subject to some general rules and restrictions" with which "by due care and attention in his Majesty's governors and Indian agents and Commissaries, I think much good may be done."³⁶

Shelburne's later observations on the plan of 1764 for Indian management reflect the influence of Gage:

On the whole, if management of the Indian Trade of each province was left to themselves subject always to a control at home, it would seem preferable to this or any other plan which can be formed at this distance.³⁷

He also criticized much of the detailed regulations of trade which the plan contained, pointing out that: "It is the nature of trade

35. "Shelburne to Gage". 11 December, 1766. Gage Corr., II, pp.123-124

36. "Gage to Shelburne". February 22, 1769. Ibid., p.124.

37. "Lord Shelburne's Observations on the 1764 Plan for the Management of Indian Affairs". P.A.C. Shelburne Manuscripts, Vol.60, pp.6-12.

to regulate itself and it may be hoped that in time it will do so in America without those heavy expenses which at present attend it."³⁸

It would seem apparent, then, that by the spring of 1767 Lord Shelburne was determined to revise the plan of Indian management.

Lord Shelburne also became convinced, in the course of time, that the colonies proposed by the Pennsylvania lobbyists would help reduce expense and secure the territory for the empire. He reflected almost perfectly the idealistic hopes of the lobbyists:

The enormous expense attending the present method of supplying the troops contained in the back settlement ... To remedy this evil no measure seems to bid fairer than one which by establishing government where provisions and necessaries may be furnished on the spot, will render half the posts now kept up unnecessary, while the remainder may be partly transferred to the care of the several provinces and partly maintained at a much lesser expense. The illicit trade with the French and Spanish would be in a great measure cut off as the goods must be intercepted by our traders in their passage.³⁹

Shelburne's conversion on this matter was largely effected by the intercession of Benjamin Franklin and Richard Jackson. Jackson had been colonial agent for Pennsylvania and occupied a position of special importance as a friend and advisor of Shelburne. Both he and Franklin, in separate reports, urged the establishment of colonies in the far west for the same reasons outlined above by Shelburne.⁴⁰ They were both against the old plan which Jackson described as well-intentioned "yet in a great measure impracticable". The only good point was the

38. "Lord Shelburne's Observations on the 1764 Plan for the Management of Indian Affairs". loc.cit., p.10.

39. "Shelburne to Gage". 14 November, 1767. Gage Corr., II, p.54.

40. "Remarks on a Plan for the future Management of Indian Affairs". 1767, in Bigelow (ed.), "Franklin's Works". IV, pp.243-247. and; "Remarks on a plan for the Future Management of Indian Affairs by Mr. Jackson". P.A.C. Shelburne Manuscripts Vol. 57. pp.347-374.

power the Crown retained over land purchases and they wanted that power used to make land available for settlement.

While Shelburne was busy considering ways and means of decreasing the American expenditure, Charles Townsend took the initiative in American Affairs. He promised the House of Commons that he would "find a source of revenue if not adequate, yet nearly sufficient to answer the expense of America when properly reduced."⁴¹ With this commitment made, he pressed Shelburne for a plan to properly reduce the expense. Finally, in the summer of 1767, Shelburne brought forward his solution. In essence, he offered a two-pronged attack on American expense based on his findings. He called for the transfer of control of Indian relations to the colonies and the establishment of two new settlements in the Illinois Country and a third one at Detroit to defray the cost of managing the interior.⁴² He attacked the plan of 1764 as "improper and at the same time productive of a very heavy expense".⁴³

The Cabinet accepted Shelburne's plan and directed him to forward it to the Board of Trade for further consideration.⁴⁴ One month later, Shelburne submitted the considerations with a long memorandum to the Board of Trade, commanding them to examine the numerous representations he had received with a view towards reducing expenses.⁴⁵ He made it

41. Quoted in J. M. Sosin. Whitehall and the Wilderness (Lincoln, 1961). p.131.

42. "Minutes to the Cabinet on the System of Indian Management". 1767. P.A.C. Shelburne Manuscripts. V.50, pp.118-126.

43. Ibid. p.118.

44. "Cabinet Minute". 11 September, 1757. Alvord & Carter (eds.), Trade and Politics, p.21.

45. "Shelburne to Board of Trade". 5 October, 1767. Ibid., pp.77-81.

quite plain in his memorandum that he expected an affirmative recommendation for the plans he had proposed.

Shelburne's action in 1767 has been the subject of some debate among historians. Professor Alvord's rather sweeping claim that the new policy represented a real free-trade bias on Shelburne's part cannot be accepted.⁴⁶ Lord Shelburne was not far removed from the mainstream of current mercantilist thought. His dicta on the nature of trade must not be taken to mean that he was a confirmed free-trader. His attempt to revise the policy of 1763-64 was based on the need for revenue and for the reduction of the American expense. In seeking a solution to that problem, he was governed by a rather vague belief in the need for a decentralized empire. These beliefs were the product of his relationship with Lord Chatham.⁴⁷ The receptiveness he showed to the pressure of the Pennsylvania lobbyists and the Quebec merchants was based on his desire to meet the need for economy. The two most persistent and influential groups in favour of a revised policy had been wise enough to stress the economy of their plans and Lord Shelburne yielded to their demands.

While the Board of Trade examined his proposals for a revision of western policy, the exigencies of politics once again forced control of colonial affairs out of Shelburne's hands. His influence in the Cabinet had been a result of his close association with Chatham. When Chatham fell from active control of policy, Shelburne lost his influence.

⁴⁶ Alvord, Mississippi Valley in British Politics (Cleveland, 1917). Vol.II. p.11.

⁴⁷ See R. A. Humphries, "Lord Shelburne and British Colonial Policy: 1766-1768". E.H.R. (June, 1936), pp.257-277.

There was little he could do when, in January of 1768, it was decided to split the southern secretaryship and erect a third Secretary of State for the colonies. The decision had little to do with Shelburne's conduct of American affairs. The ministry needed more support and a third secretaryship provided for a broader base.⁴⁸

If Lord Shelburne's recommendations had been fully implemented, they would have represented a basic revision of British policy towards the interior. There is no evidence to support the claim that Shelburne really envisaged such a change in policy. He had a rather naive faith in the reasonableness of American colonists in their conduct towards the Indians. He assumed that they would show restraint in their trade and political relations with the natives. Indeed, even the mercantilist Board of Trade was partially duped, although not quite so conspicuously, into a partial acceptance of the revision which the colonists were demanding.

✓ 48. See A. H. Basye, "The Secretary of State for the Colonies". A.H.R. (January, 1922), pp.13-22.

CHAPTER VI

TOWARDS A FINAL SOLUTION 1768-1773

Lord Hillsborough was the first incumbent of the new office of Secretary of State for the Colonies. He had earlier served as president of the Board of Trade and he drafted the Proclamation of 1763. He lost the presidency of the Board in 1765 when the Rockingham ministry replaced Grenville's. He served as president of the Board for a second term in 1767 and retained this position when he took over the new secretaryship. Known for his rather orthodox mercantilist views, Hillsborough was certainly well acquainted with the problems of colonial management and the true interest of Britain in the interior. In his new position, he was largely responsible for the response of the Board of Trade to Shelburne's request for a policy change.

The final report of the Board was made public in March of 1768.¹ It was a detailed exposition of basic mercantilistic principles.

1. "Lords of Trade on Indian Affairs". March 2, 1768. N.Y.C.D., VIII pp.19-34.

The Board reluctantly consented to the "laying aside" of imperial control of the fur trade "as a means of avoiding much difficulty and expense both at present and in the future".² The Board hoped that the colonies had learned their lesson with respect to Indian management. A cooperative plan of fair and honest administration of trade relations with the Indians was envisaged. The Indian superintendents, who were to be retained as overseers of political relations with the tribes, were recommended as advisors for the implementation of the new policy.

The problem of the disposition of British troops in America was also considered. The Board recommended a great reduction of the force in the interior. Since the colonies were to have control over the administration of trade, all those forts, which had been maintained for that purpose, were to be abandoned. Detroit, Michilimackinac and Niagara were to be maintained and all other forts abandoned at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief.³ The Board advised the building of armed vessels on the Lakes to ensure British control over that area and to act as a deterrent to any attacks from the west. The decision on the disposition of troops was based on a strategy which dictated control of the Lakes and the three key forts were aimed at preserving that control.

The Board, with a statement of mercantilist theory, completely rejected Shelburne's advice on the question of interior colonies.

2. "Lords of Trade on Indian Affairs". 8 March, 1768, loc.cit., p.24.

3. Ibid., p.23.

The northern colonies were in the empire to serve the specific purposes of provisioning the plantation colonies and protecting the fisheries. Neither of these functions could be carried out by colonies in the interior. Interior colonies simply did not fit into the mercantilist scheme of the empire. The Board realized the necessity for providing an outlet for excess population but saw no reason why it could not be channeled along a north-south route to fill up the Floridas and Nova Scotia. Each of the benefits which Shelburne had listed would accrue from interior colonies were individually discredited and the interior was left as a preserve for fur trade.

the extension of the fur trade depends entirely upon the Indians being left undisturbed in the possession of their hunting grounds; that all colonization does in its nature, and must in its consequences operate to the prejudice of that branch of Commerce.⁴

The principles outlined in the Board's report were to govern Britain's attitude in regard to the interior for the next five years. The cabinet quickly took action in approving the Board's recommendations.⁵ One month later Hillsborough informed General Gage of the action and authorized the withdrawal of troops.⁶ The same day, he informed the colonial governors of the new system of Indian management. They were advised to initiate action immediately since it was in the interest of the colonies to promote the growth of trade. They were further advised to consult with the superintendants to settle on the most judicious form of appeasing the Indians.⁷

4. "Lords of Trade on Indian Affairs". 8 March, 1768. loc. cit., p.33.

5. "Cabinet Minutes". 18 March, 1768 Trade and Politics p.217.

6. "Hillsborough to Gage". 15 April, 1768 Gage Corr. II p.61.

7. "Hillsborough to Several Governors". 15 April, 1768. Trade and Politics p.245.

The Board's report also approved Shelburne's decision to negotiate a permanent boundary line with the natives. Lord Hillsborough, in a letter to Johnson, re-affirmed this decision with the hope that the boundary would "remove the first great foundation of jealousy and discontent from the minds of the Indians".⁸ Sir William had already called the Indian Congress which was necessary for the settlement of the line. He was of course convinced that the British government would cement its hold over the Indians by establishing a definite boundary and maintaining it.⁹

John Stuart, who had replaced Edward Atken as southern superintendent, was authorized to negotiate a line with the southern tribes. He carried out his orders immediately to the satisfaction of the British government. It was expected that Johnson would establish a line to meet the northern tip of Stuart's to make a single consistent boundary along the frontier. Johnson's congress met at Fort Stanwix in October of 1768 and went on for one month.¹⁰ He was successful in negotiating for a large piece of territory stretching from the mountains to the banks of the Ohio. It was not without difficulties that Johnson was able to establish the line. He worked under a disadvantage because he negotiated exclusively with the Six Nations Indians and this led to a complete disregard for the claims of other tribes to territory south of the Ohio. In order to consolidate the gains in the north, Johnson was

8. "Hillsborough to Johnson". March 12, 1768. N.Y.C.D. VIII pp.35-36.

9. "Johnson to Hillsborough". 23 October, 1768. N.Y.C.D. VIII. pp.104-106.

10. See M. Farrand "The Indian Boundary Line". A.H.R. (June, 1905). pp.387-388.

forced to recognize the Iroquois claims to disputed areas in the south. This led to a divergence from his instructions and was to have important consequences in the future. Hillsborough hesitated in ratifying the treaty because of the disputed area but finally acceded to it in July of 1770.¹¹ The Treaty of Lochabar of 1771, negotiated by Stuart, incorporated the most westerly English settlements to complete the line. This final modification, temporarily at least, settled the most outstanding Indian problem.

When the Board of Trade's report dashed the hopes of the members of the Illinois Company, their interest in western lands did not diminish. When Johnson began to negotiate for that stretch of territory between the mountains and the Ohio, the same people began to share an interest in the newly acquired territory. It has been said that Johnson was interested in these schemes and conspired to gain a large portion of territory from the natives to enable the speculator to have room for the establishment of a new colony.¹² The speculation, which began at Fort Stanwix, soon took the shape of a concerted effort to form a new colony. The formation of the Walpole Company and its efforts to establish a new colony - Vandalia - between the mountains and the Ohio presents a good example of the forces behind the land speculators, and their methods of exerting pressure in London. By this time however, the imperial problem in the interior lay beyond the new boundary line; the area which had

11. "Hillsborough to Johnson". July 20, 1770. N.Y.C.D. VIII. pp.224-244. Also see C. W. Alvord. The British Ministry and the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (New York, 1909).

12. See J. M. ~~S~~ Osin Whitehall and the Wilderness (Lincon, 1961) Chs. VII and VIII.

been left to the Indians.

While Johnson was settling the boundary with the Indians, the colonies were not correspondingly active in applying a system of Indian Management for the interior. Lord Hillsborough had suggested that the interior, the area beyond the Ohio, be divided into spheres of influence with Quebec, New York and Pennsylvania being responsible for specific areas.¹³ In spite of the urging of the respective governors no action was taken to effect any change. In 1769, General Gage reported:

I have not observed that either New York or Pennsylvania have yet paid much attention to this business. The trade had for some time been supported at the expense of Great Britain ... Without considering how many people gain their livelihood by the Indian trade, it is said that the profits thereof centre in Great Britain. People argue about the trade as they do about other colonies.¹⁴

General Gage was very perceptive in his analysis. The northern colonies, except for Quebec, were not vitally concerned with the conduct of the fur trade. The interest in western lands was a much more dynamic force. Colonial assemblies were not interested in the fur trade and were certainly not willing to spend any money for its protection. Regionalism and provincial jealousies, the same factors which had prevented the Albany Plan of Union from taking effect, had not diminished. The Board made a bad judgment when they estimated that the colonies would cooperate in the management of Indian affairs.

13. "Hillsborough to American Governors". 15 April, 1768, loc.cit., p.245.

14. "Gage to Hillsborough". 3 Feb., 1769. Gage Corr., I. p.216.

There was an abortive attempt at cooperation in 1770 when Governor Dunmore of New York called for a conference of colonial officials concerned in the trade. It was postponed until the following January because all the provinces could not attend. By that time it was obvious that there could be no firm agreement on a plan and the various colonies failed to attend. The Quebec merchants would not consider any policy of strict restriction while the other colonies were in favor of something akin to the 1764 plan of Indian management.

Lord Hillsborough was also becoming convinced of the futility of the attempt to have colonies cooperate in managing the trade. He was thoroughly disenchanted by their lack of effort. General Gage once again reflected colonial feeling when he pessimistically predicted that, "if they ever meet it will be for no good purpose, for they could never agree on any plan".¹⁵ Two months later Hillsborough informed Thomas Cramahe, Lieutenant Governor of Quebec in Carleton's absence, of his opposition to the holding of such a congress.¹⁶ The same day he wrote to General Gage and elaborated on his change of heart:

I cannot but think that any meeting of the commissioners for the purpose of settling arrangements for the Indian trade would be altogether as fruitless as the measure itself is improper and impolitic; and although it appears highly unreasonable to me that the Crown should bear the expense of smiths, interpreters and commissioners yet I see no effective remedy to this inconvenience ... until mens minds shall be better reconciled to that which I think as the only sensible proposition upon this head; the regulation of Indian Affairs upon some general plan by an Act

15. "Gage to Hillsborough". Feb 5, 1772. Gage Corr., I. p.316.

16. "Hillsborough to Cramahe". 18 April, 1772. P.A.C. Q Series, Vol. 8, p.42.

of Parliament that shall at the same time erect a fund by duties upon the trade for the defraying of expense.¹⁷

While the colonies temporized on the problems of interior management General Gage and William Johnson were forced to continue imperial control in the area. They could not evacuate the interior until the provinces provided an alternative form of management. The situation in the Indian country was becoming critical as a result of disputes arising from the Treaty of Fort Stanwix. The powerful Delaware and Shawnee tribes, as well as the Cherokee, were all indignant over the manner in which their territory had been ceded to the British. Their restlessness was intensified by the continued encroachments on their lands and the increasing activity of dishonest traders. Johnson and Gage were not able to effect a strict control over traders after 1768 and the result was a sharp increase in fraudulent trading practices.¹⁸

By 1770 the complaints of the Indians were becoming more acute and a general outbreak seemed imminent. There were almost continuous rumors of a powerful alliance of tribes in the mid-west to oppose the British interest. Johnson was particularly persistent in his warnings about the possibility of a general outbreak in the interior. He lacked confidence in the ability of the colonies to provide for the fair conduct of trade. He referred frequently to the tendency of the colonists "in the ordinary pursuit of their landed or commercial interests in America" to alienate the Indians.¹⁹

17. "Hillsborough to Gage". 18 April, 1772. Gage Corr., II, p.144.

18. "Johnson to Hillsborough". 26 August, 1769. N.Y.C.D. VIII. 183-186.

19. "Johnson to Hillsborough". 20 July, 1768. N.Y.C.D. VIII. pp.82-87.

Control of trade had been given to the colonies to "relieve this kingdom of every expense that can safely be avoided".²⁰ British officials did not foresee the laxness of the colonies Hillsborough pointed out:

I am persuaded that if it could have been foreseen that the colonies would have been so backward and negligent in meeting those intentions of the King, which induced his Majesty to leave the regulation of commerce to them ... such a deviation from the plan at first proposed as has almost entirely defeated every useful object it had in view.²¹

After 1768 an additional factor clouded the issue of interior control. In 1764 General Gage had confirmed the right of those French Canadians in the interior to "enjoy the same rights and privileges, the same security for their persons and effects and the liberty of trade as the old subjects of the King."²² This action, taken simply in accord with the Treaty of Paris, was fraught with unseen consequences. Until 1768 there had been a marked ignorance among colonial officials regarding the nature of French settlements in the interior. They were dismissed as a group of "straggling vagabonds" and were usually blamed for all Indian problems in the far west. British officials hoped that they would eventually disappear but, on the contrary, they increased. The settlements had been set up to support the fur trade during the French period and had remained basically agricultural. When Gage confirmed their rights he was not aware of the nature or permanency of the settlements.

20. "Hillsborough to Johnson". 12 Oct. 1768. N.Y.C.D., VIII p.102.

21. "Hillsborough to Johnson". 4 Dec. 1771. Ibid., pp.286-7.

22. "Gage's Proclamation to the Illinois Inhabitants". Dec. 30, 1764. Alvord and Carter(eds.) The Critical Period p.396.

The settlements in the interior began to attract attention in London after 1768 when the French began to demand some form of civil government. The Illinois company had tried earlier to use the French settlements to gain its end of a separate colony in the interior. When the land speculators lost interest in the Illinois country they left a budding desire for government. Lord Hillsborough's reaction to the settlers demands was hostile. He expressed the hope that the Indian disturbances would force them to remove to the more settled areas.²³ When this did not take place he tried to have them evacuated by the army and even issued limited orders to that effect.²⁴ Hillsborough's opposition to any form of settlement in the interior was never more apparent than in this case.

The cause of the Illinois French brightened in 1772, when Lord Hillsborough was replaced by William Legge, second Earl of Dartmouth. Hillsborough had made himself obnoxious by his persistent opposition to the demands of the Walpole Company. In their search for an interior colony, the Pennsylvania lobbyists had received support from high-placed officials. Their power was such that Hillsborough was forced to resign rather than to see their plea put in effect over his head. Dartmouth, who had served a short term in 1765-66, as president of the Board of Trade, was familiar with colonial issue. It was not for his ability that he was selected for the vacant position. It

23. "Hillsborough to Gage". July 3, 1771. Gage Corr. I. p.133.

24. "Hillsborough to Gage". Dec. 4, 1771. Ibid., pp.137-8.

was his indifference to the question of a colony in the interior that qualified him for the post of Secretary of State for the Colonies.²⁵

When he took office, Dartmouth was deluged with a series of documents from the Illinois French proving their claims to their land in accord with Gage's earlier proclamation. Dartmouth turned a sympathetic ear to their claims for recognition as peaceful settlers.²⁶ Convinced that they had a legal claim to their lands, he began to search for a solution to the problem of governing them. It was one thing to recognize their right to their lands but quite another to agree to their demands for separate local government. Such a concession would be too contrary to the very fabric of Britain's policy towards the interior to gain any real support.

When Dartmouth accepted office he was faced with the same problem that had perplexed his predecessors. He, too, saw the necessity for the re-imposition of imperial control in the interior and the need for a revenue to defray the establishment required.

.... as the colonies do not seem disposed to concur in any general regulations for that purpose, I am at a loss to suggest any mode by which this important service can be otherwise provided for than by the interposition of the authority of the supreme legislature, the exertion of which would be in such a case inadvisable until truth and conviction have removed the unhappy prejudices which have for so long prevailed in the colonies on the subject.²⁷

Almost since its inception the plan to have the colonies administer

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25. See D. B. Bargar. The Administration of Lord Dartmouth 1772-75. (Unpublished Ph d. Thesis, Toronto, 1952) Ch. 3.
 26. "Dartmouth to Gage". March 3, 1773. P.A.C. Add. MSS. 21697. Dartmouth Papers ff.60-61.
 27. "Dartmouth to Johnson" 3 Feb., 1773. N.Y.C.D., VIII. pp.348-9.

the interior had proved a failure and the British government still had to find a method of exerting control without submitting to a drain on the imperial treasury. By 1773 the British government was convinced of the inevitability of another major uprising among the tribes, "unless the general ground of their jealousy and discontent could be effectually removed".²⁸

When the situation in the interior was most critical, the Illinois French began to expand their campaign for some form of government. The first hint that the solution of both problems might be linked came in December of 1773. Dartmouth informed Lieutenant Governor Cramahe:

There is no longer any hope of perfecting the plan of policy in respect to the interior country which was in contemplation when the Proclamation of 1763 was issued; many circumstances with regard to the inhabitancy of parts of that country were then unknown, and there are a variety of other considerations that do, at least in my judgment, induce a doubt both of the justice and propriety of restraining the colony to the narrow limits prescribed in the proclamation.²⁹

28. "Dartmouth to Johnson" 10 April, 1773. N.Y.C.D., VIII. p.360.

29. "Dartmouth to Cramahe". 1 Dec., 1773. D.R.C.H.C. p.485.

CHAPTER VII

THE QUEBEC ACT - 1774

The Proclamation of 1763 had called for a distinctively British constitution for the new province of Quebec. This action was not considered unusual when it was taken because, in the view of the British government, Quebec was to be an area set aside for English settlement. It was assumed when the Proclamation was drawn up that, in a short time, the English population of the province would be dominant and the French assimilated. As it turned out there was no great flow of population northward from the older colonies. After a time it became obvious that the population of Quebec would remain French for the foreseeable future. In these circumstances the British officials began to realize the mistake they had made in providing an English system of government and law for a group of people to whom that system was completely alien.

In 1767 Lord Shelburne set in motion that process which resulted

in a new government for Quebec.¹ Before that date there had been much discussion but no action. Shelburne began the process of calling for reports and investigations into the state of the province. His initiative bore fruit in 1773 when the first draft of the Quebec Act was drawn up. The general intent of the Act was to restore the French Canadian system of government and laws to the province of Quebec. This meant a government unencumbered by an assembly.

Until the early months of 1774 there was no official mention of extending the boundaries of Quebec. There was no overt connection seen between the two separate problems of governing Quebec and maintaining order in the interior. The British government was still thinking in terms of some form of direct exertion of imperial control over the interior to overcome those problems which the colonies proved unable to solve. British officials were convinced of the necessity for asserting this control by an act of parliament which would give added weight to the decision and provide a revenue to defray the expense. Conditions being what they were in 1773, imperial officials did not dare assert themselves for fear of the reaction such an act would provoke from the older colonies.

The British government was looking for an excuse to re-assert its control over the interior when the problem of French settlements in the Illinois country began to seriously beg solution. Of itself,

1. "Shelburne to Carleton". 17 Dec., 1767. D.R.C.H.C., p.201.

the question of providing some form of government for these settlements was not as pressing as the overall condition of the interior and was not considered important enough to call for any detailed action. As an excuse for extending imperial control into the interior, the settlements proved ideal. While the Quebec Act was being drafted during the winter of 1773-1774, both General Gage and Governor Carleton were in London. From the long series of meetings and consultations among leading imperial officials came a decision to use the Quebec Act as a vehicle for the re-assertion of imperial control over the interior. Early drafts of the Quebec Act, which had been drawn up before that time, did not make any mention of extending the boundary of the province. It was not until the final draft that the boundary extension was included.²

The Quebec Act was basically a legal or judicial document. It was aimed at the provision of a new constitution for a colony. Given the nature of the Act, it was only natural that the boundary extension should be framed in judicial terms as well.

whereas by the arrangements made by the said Royal Proclamation, a very large extent of country, within which there were several Colonies and Settlements of the subjects of France, who claimed to remain therein under the faith of the said Treaty, was left without any provision being made for the Administration of Civil Government therein all the territories ... in North America bounded by ... Lake Ontario and the River commonly called Niagara; and thence along by the Eastern and South-Eastern bank of Lake Erie, following the said bank until it be intersected by the Northern Boundary granted by the Charter of the Province of Pennsylvania ... and from thence along the Northern and Western

2. See D.R.C.H.C., p.374-400.

boundaries of the said province until the said Western Boundary strike the Ohio ... and along the Bank of the said river, Westward to the Banks of the Mississippi and Northwards to the Southern boundary of territory granted to the Merchants and Adventurers of England trading to Hudson's Bay be ... annexed to ... the province of Quebec.³

These boundaries included all that territory north of the Ohio. left to the Indians by the Treaty of Fort Stanwix.

The debate which followed the introduction of the bill into parliament were centred on its constitutional and judicial aspects. The criticism of the boundary extension was submerged into the general debate. Lord North, as leader of the ministry, defended the extension on the grounds that;

as we ought to discourage colonies in the inward part of the country; (and yet) as there are already some settlements there, there must be some government by magistrates. The only way to settle these two points is to annex it to some government. That is, the ground for taking this settlement and adding it to Canada.⁴

Like the rest of the ministry, he was not opposed to the system of representative government but, where there was a need to restrict the flow of settlement, such a system was, "unwise as it was unnecessary". His sentiments were echoed by other members of the ministry in the course of the debate.⁵

The general flow of opposition to the Act was instigated by the Quebec merchant group who opposed the form of government. Long and detailed

3. 14 Geo.III, cap.83. D.R.C.H.C., pp.401-402.

4. Sir Henry Cavendish. Debates of the House of Commons on the Quebec Act., (London, 1784.) p.454.

5. Ibid., p.18 and p.309.

attacks on the lack of representation and the French laws referred only incidentally to the boundary extension. Edmund Burke expressed a fear that the boundary would affect "the rights of Americans" and he cautioned the government to "make such a boundary with certainty".⁶ His sentiments were echoed by Dunning who opposed the ambiguity of the Act in respect to the western boundaries of the other colonies.⁷ As a result of this criticism a proviso was added to the Act in third reading that "nothing herein contained relative to the Boundary of the Province of Quebec, shall in anywise affect the Boundaries of any other colony".⁸

The overbearing emphasis on the need for some form of government for settlers in the interior in the debates made the extension more palatable in the eyes of the opposition. The fact that the settlers were all French made it only logical that the government extend to them the same benefits that were given to the French in the more settled parts of North America. Lord Hillsborough, who by that time was out of office, was consulted on the Quebec Act by William Knox, Undersecretary of State for the Colonies. He objected to the extension of the boundary pointing out that:

If an extension of the boundary for the sake of jurisdiction only over the inhabitants was intended, there is no occasion for doing it by act of parliament as it is in the power of the Crown to give such jurisdiction if thought fit. And it is better to do it by authority of the crown only, because the jurisdiction so given may be limited and restrained in such manner as to answer purposes of government and to avoid the inconveniences with which a general extension or annexation will be attended.

6. Cavendish. op.cit. p.443.

7. Ibid., p.30.

8. 14 Geo.III, cap.83. loc.cit., p.402.

9. "Lord Hillsborough's Objections to the Quebec Bill". April, 1744.

D.R.C.H.C. , pp.551-552.

Hillsborough was of course correct in his statement that no act of parliament was necessary to provide magisterial powers in the interior. He did not, however, see the logic behind the extension. In his reply to Hillsborough, Lord Dartmouth pointed out that while the Boundary extension provided for civil government over wilderness settlers;

it does by no means imply a further intention of settling the lands included in this extension and, if it is not wished that British subjects should settle that country, nothing can more effectually tend to discourage such attempts; which in the present state of the country, your lordship knows very well it is impossible to prevent.¹⁰

The "inconvenience" which Hillsborough had pointed out was the real strength behind the extension of Quebec's boundary. The benefit thus gained far outweighed the trouble of providing some simple form of government for the settlers. By assigning the interior to Quebec, Dartmouth was isolating it from other colonies. Nothing was more likely to dissuade further encroachment on Indian lands than a system of laws alien to the English colonists.

The extension of the Quebec boundary was preferable to other forms of administering the interior because it neatly side-stepped the issue of raising a fund for Indian management. The problem which Lord Shelburne and all other colonial officials had been unable to solve was finally overcome. The Quebec Revenue Act, passed shortly after the Quebec Act, authorized Governor Carleton to levy a tax on the trade for the support of this government on the interior.¹¹

10. "Dartmouth to Hillsborough". 1 May, 1774. D.R.C.H.C. p.554.

11. 14 Geo.III, cap.88. D.R.C.H.C. pp.406-408.

For the British government the Quebec Act was a means of relief from the burden of supporting the interior, while avoiding the need for a tax on the older colonies. The fur trade would finally be made to support itself if only the governor of Quebec could exert control.

William Knox made the final apology for the Quebec Act and revealed the true principles which motivated the boundary extension. Knox had been provost-marshal in Georgia during the Seven Years War and was noted for his knowledge in colonial affairs. As undersecretary he was one of those permanent officials who often had a great influence over policy formation. He drew up a long memorandum for Dartmouth in which he gave a brief survey of the previous administration of the interior and pointed out the futility of allowing the colonies to have control. The boundary extension was seen as a solution to

the dangers and disorders arising from the present defective state of the interior; to give force and effect to the power and authority of the Crown within it; to give scope to the many commercial advantages which may be derived from it (and finally) to extend civil government to the settlements of Canadian subjects that have been formed in different parts of it.¹²

In June of 1774 Knox published his famous pamphlet which expanded on the reasons, given by Dartmouth, for extending the boundary of Quebec.¹³ Once again a long analysis of the frustration of the previous ten years prefaced an expression of the need for firm control over the interior. The determination of the British government to use

12. "The Extension of Quebec". P.A.C. Dartmouth Manuscripts VII p.2358.

13. William Knox. The Justice and Policy of the late Act of Parliament
(London, 1774)

that area for the benefit of the empire necessitated a reassertion of imperial power. Quebec was preferable to other colonies for that task because of the easy access by water to the interior, and the determination of the newly formed government to enforce "such regulations as might be necessary for giving security and satisfaction to the savages in their dealings with our traders". The new administration was "pledged to recommend that the acts for those purposes be the first objects upon which the legislative powers will be exercised".¹⁴

It seems apparent that the extension of the boundary was primarily an effort on the part of the British government to re-assert its control over the interior. Professor Alvord has pointed out that the extension was the last in a series of attempts on Britain's part to assert imperial authority in the Mississippi Valley. He also believed that the instability of the British ministries for the preceding ten years had led to a continuous vacillation in British policy towards the interior. In actual fact the Quebec Act was entirely compatible with Proclamation of 1763 and in spite of the many changes in the British ministry in the intervening years, there was a marked consistency in the objects of the policy towards the interior.

In 1763 the British government had determined to isolate the backwoods and use it as a reserve for the Indians and a source of furs. The method of fulfilling this end was to draw a boundary between the interior, or Indian country, and those areas which were to be

¹⁴. William Knox, op.cit., pp.44-46.

open for settlement. The full application of that policy was hampered by the cost of the establishment necessary for the interior and the inability of the British government to raise a revenue in America for the support of it. As a result the British were forced to relinquish their control of trade but they did not intend any change in the policy towards the interior. The modification of 1768 merely changed the instruments of policy administration and not the policy itself. When the colonies proved incapable collectively of administering to the needs of the interior, the British government was forced to seek an alternative instrument for the application of its policy.

The essential reason for the limitation of the province of Quebec in 1763 had been to differentiate it from the interior as an area open for settlement. The proclamation was a comprehensive attempt to distinguish between areas within the empire which were available for settlement and areas to be used for trade only. In the intervening years it had been realized that there would be no major flow of settlement northward and Quebec lost its status as an area where English migration would be promoted. By 1768 it was determined that Quebec would remain a predominantly French province for the foreseeable future. This in turn necessitated a change in policy towards Quebec which culminated in the Quebec Act.

The change in policy towards Quebec removed the reason for its limitation. It was no longer an area for colonization. In fact, the new constitution would dissuade English settlers from entering the

province. In this situation it was the best available instrument for the reassertion of British control over the interior. The similarity between the Quebec Act and the Proclamation in this respect can be best discerned in Carleton's instructions of the following year. The peltry trade was to be made free and open to subjects of all colonies in accord with the proclamation but the responsibility for regulation was to lie with "Our legislature of Quebec". Carleton was further instructed to use the "Plan proposed by Our Commissioners of Trade and Plantations in 1764" as a guide for setting up a system for the regulation of the trade.¹⁵ Free from the interference of other colonies and with an income independent of the restrictions of any assembly, it was expected that Quebec would finally produce that stability and security which the trade demanded.

15. "Instructions to Governor Carleton". 3 Jan., 1775. D.R.C.H.C.
pp.576-580.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

If the Quebec Act was the final attempt to implement a policy of isolation and regulation in the interior, it remains to be considered whether or not that policy was a realistic one. Unfortunately, the American Revolution intervened to prevent the full implementation of the plan which the Quebec Act had envisaged. While the continued military superiority of the British in the far west after 1774 gave the Montreal-based merchants an extended advantage in the conduct of the trade, there was never any concerted attempt to implement the Quebec Act. There is little reason for attributing the persistence of Britain's attempt to control the interior after 1774 to the influence of those merchants.

After their promise to withdraw from the area south of the lakes in 1783, the British government insisted on retaining control of the forts in the interior. While the new republic was groping towards a constitution, the British army continued to supervise relations

with the natives. At the discussions leading to Jay's Treaty in 1794 the British proposed an Indian buffer-state as a means of solving the problem of Indian management. The Americans, of course, rejected the idea. It was not until the War of 1812 that British officials completely abandoned the idea of extending British influence to the interior. The attempt to revive the Indian buffer state plan at the Treaty of Ghent in 1815 was only half-hearted and was never taken seriously by either side.

The persistence of the British officials in their attempt to manage the interior after 1774 cannot be attributed to economic reason. By 1780 the area south of the Great Lakes was no longer a prime commercial area for furs. Even the Montreal merchants were withdrawing their investment from the area. Britain's interest in the interior was, by that date, strictly political, arising from the series of treaties made with the natives in the course of the war. Since taking control of the interior in 1754 the British government had turned full circle. The original motivation had been strictly political, arising from the struggle with France for the continent. Once their ownership of the interior was confirmed the British interest became commercial. When the area was ceded to the new republic in 1783, the British feared the political implications and continued to interfere in the interior to promote stability.

Professor Alvord's attempt to explain British policy between 1763 and 1774 as a compromise between the principles of mercantilism and an emerging free trade opinion leaves unexplained the consistency of the British attempt to isolate the interior. When he placed Lord Shelburne at the head of a free-trade movement he overestimated and pre-dated its power. Shelburne, as R. A. Humphries has shown, was not opposed to the substance of mercantilism at that early date in his career. J. M. Sosin has gone to the opposite extreme in his interpretation of British policy. He emphasizes the temporary nature of British decision while ignoring the consistency of the end pursued. Behind the decisions of British officials lay a strong belief in mercantilist principles.

Vincent Harlow comes closest to the truth in his treatment of interior policy. He placed the attempt to isolate the interior into a comprehensive movement to revitalize the empire to promote the interest of Britain. His overemphasis of the centralizing tendency led to a misinterpretation of the Proclamation. The promotion of population movement on a north-south axis was a by-product of the attempt to isolate the interior and not the result of any positive program for ^{the}populating of those areas. Quebec, Nova Scotia and the Floridas were alternatives to the west.

While Britain was in possession of the interior the policy of isolation was motivated by a desire to gain the greatest benefit from an area which was looked upon as an economic unit. Thus defined, the policy of isolation was logical and consistent with current thought

and colonial possessions. The attempt to exploit the area was doomed to failure by the inevitability of American expansion westward.

That the British officials failed to comprehend the force of the westward movement is not unusual. The forces behind it were many and varied.

Ever since early explorers first brought news of the fertile valleys west of the mountains to the settled colonies, the search for western lands was uncontrollable. The government of Quebec would have proved, like all earlier devices, too feeble to stem the tide.

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Manuscript Sources:

A number of collections of documents in the Public Archives of Canada proved valuable as sources for this essay. Of primary importance were the transcripts of the Colonial Office Papers - Series 42 and the Q Series. These two complementary collections contain all the official correspondence, with enclosures, between the governors of Quebec and imperial officials. They throw valuable light on the evolution of the Quebec Act from the Canadian point of view. Governor Carleton's position as the champion of the Quebec merchants' interests was made especially clear. Series 5 of the Colonial Office Papers, while not used so extensively, did prove of some value for the earlier period.

Two collections of British statesmen's papers were particularly useful. The selections from the Shelburne Papers gave an entirely adequate picture of one of the most important officials involved in policy formation. As president of the Board of Trade in 1763, and later as Secretary of State for the Southern Department, he participated in a number of major decisions affecting the interior. 1. A full bibliography follows on page 116.

His habit of calling for full reports on all matters of concern led to a great accumulation of material on colonial problems. His special interest in the problem of interior management makes his papers one of the most valuable collections available for the topic.

The Dartmouth Manuscripts, while not nearly as extensive as Shelburne's, were no less valuable. The papers available are all from his period as Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1772 to 1775. As the official ultimately responsible for the drawing up of the Quebec Act, his papers were of key importance. Like Lord Shelburne, he was the recipient of vast quantities of correspondence on the problem of interior management. This selection available gives an adequate picture of British aims in extending the boundary of Quebec.

Among the papers of military figures active in North America during the period, those of Sir Fredrick Haldimand and Brigadier-General Henry Boquet proved to be of some value. Haldimand was second in command to General Gage from 1763 to 1774. In 1773, while serving as acting Commander-in-Chief when Gage was in London, he reaffirmed the necessity for greater control over the interior if Britain hoped to gain any benefit from the area. The Boquet Papers were less important. As an active commander in the interior until 1765, Boquet provided a great deal of necessary first-hand information. Any effect his writings may have had on policy formation were necessarily indirect and difficult to trace.

The Canada Papers proved the most valuable of two miscellaneous collections consulted. The papers are comprised of selections from three volumes of the Hardwicke Papers. Of primary interest were the papers of Fowler Walker, who served as London agent for the Montreal merchants. Many letters and memorials among those papers throw valuable light on the manner in which the Montreal merchants attempted to change the British policy towards the interior. A single item, in the form of a long memorandum from Henry McCulloch to Lord Halifax in 1751, serves to indicate the direction in which British colonial officials were moving before the war. Concerned with the system of colonial administration, the memorandum concluded, after a laborious comparison between the British and French systems, by recommending a more positive form of control over imperial possessions. While the effect of the memorandum may have been slight, it serves as a reflection of current thought on imperial problems.

✓ The records of the Indian Department proved to be of some limited value. The correspondence of Sir William Johnson and his journal supplemented the printed sources available.

II. Printed Collections of Documents and Contemporary Works:

The formation of colonial policy for the period concerned in this essay has been exceptionally well illustrated in printed collections of documents. As the references no doubt point out, the collection of Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York,

under the general editorship of E. B. Callahan, proved indispensable. The London series contains most of the correspondence necessary for a basic understanding of the nature of British policy. All the important statements of policy are found in it and so is a large part of the important correspondence of Sir William Johnson. The Johnson Papers in thirteen volumes, proved to be very cumbersome. The absence of any index or table of contents detracts from the value of this most important collection. As a result, in most cases, reference was made to other collections which also contain quite complete selections of Johnson's important writings.

The edition of The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage by C. E. Carter proved indispensable. As Commander-in-Chief in North America from 1763 to 1775, he ranked with Johnson as the most influential of all colonial officials. Professor Carter's judicious selection of documents and the valuable commentary enhance the value of the collection.

The old but still very useful collection of Documents Relative to the Constitutional History of Canada, edited by A. Shortt and A. Doughty proved once again to be a handy source for a number of the key documents. The constructive notes added by the editors increase the value of the collection. Where possible, reference has been made to this work, which is readily available.

C. W. Alvord and C. E. Carter edited three volumes for the Illinois State Historical Library; the "British Series" of documents relative to the

Illinois country deal with the period from 1763 to 1769. While the collection was aimed at promoting local history, a judicious selection of the more important policy statements were also included. For the present essay, the special value of this collection lay in its full illustration of the activities of the firm of Baynton, Warton and Morgan.

The Debates of the House of Commons on the Quebec Act, derived from the notes of Sir Henry Cavendish, gives the only account of the parliamentary discussion of the Quebec Act. Needless to say, the many speeches both for and against the Act throw a great deal of light on its purpose. The Quebec Gazette, published weekly from June 21, 1764, was the only newspaper published in Quebec for the period. The lack of any editorial comments detracted from its value. Local incidents, rather than major issues, were reported in its pages. Aside from a number of ordinances and proclamations, it proved of little use for the topic at hand.

Two chronicles of merchants active in the interior proved to be of some value. Alexander Henry's Travels and Adventures: 1760-1776 and The John Askin Papers give a great deal of background material on the actual conditions of trade. The basic organization of the Montreal fur trade, as well as the needs and troubles of the traders, are placed in clear relief. Neither work makes any striking analysis of Imperial policy.

Two collections of official correspondence proved to be of limited

value. G. S. Kimball's selection of Pitt's correspondence with his colonial governors throws a great deal of light on the British war aims and Pitt's method of attacking the problem of colonial apathy. L. W. Labaree's edition of Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors: 1670-1776 was of some value as an indicator of the direction in which colonial policy was moving, especially towards the end of the Seven Year's War.

C. H. McIlwain's edition of Wraxall, mentioned in Chapter II, proved to be of primary value. As a history of attitudes towards the Indians and the interior prior to 1754 it is exceptionally important. The essay was written as a chronicle of the activities of the Albany Commissioners while they held sway over relations with the Indians. The fact that the volume also presents a strong argument in favor of dismissing the commissioners does not detract from its value as a historical work. The Bigelow edition of The Works of Benjamin Franklin proved entirely adequate for the purposes of this essay. Franklin, who was variously a newspaperman, inventor, statesman, colonial agent and land speculator, was one of the most active, if not the most influential, persons to cross our stage. He had a deep and early interest in the west. He best typifies that entrepreneurial spirit which made the colonists look to the west as a land of opportunity without regard for the tenets of mercantilism.

Two major policy statements, the Proclamation of 1763 and the Quebec Act were very productive of pamphlet literature. As mentioned

in Chapter IV, the Canada vs. Guadalupe controversy of 1760-1763 produced a veritable flood of pamphlets. Of more importance as an indicator of official opinion on colonial development was the long work on colonial administration by Thomas Pownall, which was first published in 1764 and went through several editions. Holder of a number of colonial appointments and brother of John Pownall, the perennial Secretary of the Board of Trade, Thomas was in a position to gauge the drift of official thought. He was certainly aware of the main stream of British thinking on colonial possessions. When Pownall advocated a more dynamic direction of colonial policy and some degree of standardization among colonial governments, we can be safe in assuming that it was a fair reflection of official thought, especially that of Halifax.

The second major pamphlet of interest is William Knox's apology for the Quebec Act, which was published in 1774. It was one of several pamphlets published in that year on the topic and the only one of any real importance. As one of the chief secretaries of the newly established colonial department, Knox was one of the officials responsible for drafting the Quebec Act. His short treatment of the boundary question proved to be a brilliant summary of official opinion. The extension of Quebec's boundary emerges clearly as an alternative to the 1764 plan of Indian management and a continuation of the basic policy of isolation stated in the Proclamation of 1763.

III. Secondary Works:

The great bulk and variety of secondary material available on the period under discussion precludes comment on all sources. A large number of works on topics within the scope of this essay have been referred to and no further comment is necessary. This section is concerned with the major works on the topic, their main lines of interpretation and some of the disparities among them.

The basic and perhaps the most important work in the field is C. W. Alvord's Mississippi Valley in British Politics, first published in 1917. The primary concentration by Alvord is on the crucial problem of policy formation. His thesis hinges on his concept of a polarization of opinion on the matter of interior policy, a polarization occurring in the course of the Canada vs. Guadalupe controversy. Drawing a sharp and distinct line between anti-expansionists and expansionists he relates each of the factions in British politics to a particular opinion, and even in some cases to a particular pamphlet. The resulting conclusion is that the intrigues of party faction in Britain were ultimately the determining factor in the formation of policy. This rigid system of classification tends to detract from the overall value of Alvord's work.

*This is
badly expounded
in his book.*

On the basis of the above theory Professor Alvord pointed out a great vacillation of policy in line with the "kaleidoscopic changes in the British ministry". The basic consistency of British policy seems to throw some doubt on his conclusion. Two corrective articles

by Robin A. Humphries in the E.H.R. do much to contribute to a better understanding of the period. Although both of the articles concentrate on Alvord's interpretation of Lord Shelburne as a free-wheeling expansionist, they also do much to undermine Alvord's over-all thesis. They tend to soften the emphasis on theory and politics in Alvord and do much to bring out the basic consistency of British mercantilist objections.

A second early work which closely paralleled Alvord's and in most ways complements it is C. E. Carter's Great Britain and the Illinois Country. It is an excellent companion work to Alvord. Published in 1910, this volume set the stage for the more searching volume by Alvord. Carter's concentrates on the local history of the British occupation and provides an excellent summary of events. His later work on the role of the Commander-in-Chief and with the Gage papers qualifies him as a leading authority on this subject.

The most recent major work in the field is Professor J. M. Sosin's Whitehall and the Wilderness, a revision of Alvord's work based on later research. The basic assumption of Sosin's work is that:

British politicians were primarily administrators who arrived at particular solutions to specific problems as the issues arose The ministers did not necessarily have any doctrinaire frame of reference, although they may have couched their decisions in the language of mercantilism. (p.52-3).

This general statement is in need of some qualification. Professor Sosin has incorporated the most up-to-date research in his compact volume and presents a balanced picture. His constant reference, without

any elucidation, to rather vague "ad hoc measures" adopted during the war, appears however to be a weakness in his interpretation. He does not distinguish between the method of carrying out British policy and the end or purpose behind that policy. His rejection of the very existence of any firm commitment to mercantilism colours his approach and detracts from the final value of his work. Although an excellent and detailed piece of analytical work on particular problems involved in the period, Sosin's work fails to catch the full scope of Whitehall's policy towards the wilderness.

The most balanced, though somewhat scanty, treatment of the topic is found in V. T. Harlow's major work, The Founding of the Second British Empire. A rather short section on the Western problem balances Alvord's theories with a closer examination of the total imperial development, and the result is a more balanced picture of imperial objectives. A drawback in Harlow's work is the lack of any real depth in colonial affairs which, while leading at times to factual errors, does not detract from the general usefulness of his interpretation. However, there is one point on which his view appears difficult to accept. He believed that the whole question of the interior was regarded, by the imperial government in 1763, as chiefly a problem of controlling population movements. In consequence, he exaggerated the importance of the rather sketchy plans to promote northward and southward migration from thirteen colonies after the Seven Years War, and underestimated the attention paid to the older frontier questions of trade and Indian relations.

Most of the general works on the First British Empire have sections dealing with the west: G. L. Beer's early work, British Colonial Policy: 1754-1765, proved to be quite useful. The fact that interior policy was more or less submerged in the more general consideration of finance places it in the background. Professor Beer gives a particularly good account of the early period and the general drift towards a tighter policy. Professor L. H. Gipson's emerging series, under the general title The British Empire before the American Revolution is the most up-to-date and certainly the most erudite work on the first British Empire. It has in most aspects superseded earlier works on the topic. Basically concerned with interpreting the American Revolution in the light of colonial developments, Professor Gipson deals only incidentally with our topic. His general hypothesis, that the Revolution was the result of maturity and security gained as a result of the Seven Years War, is too vague either to be questioned or to be of special usefulness. It is the great mass of particular data that makes his work indispensable.

The major work on Canada's development during the period in question is A. L. Burt's masterpiece, The Old Province of Quebec. A classic of historical research, this volume also provides a basis for interpreting imperial policy towards the interior. Although the work is primarily aimed at interpreting the constitutional and social aspects of the movement towards the Quebec Act, there is a section on the final disposition of the interior in 1774. There is, perhaps, a tendency to over-emphasize the factor of economic competition between

Quebec and the other colonies. This is a consequence of his belief in the influence of Governor Carleton and the Montreal fur traders.

Professor D. G. Creighton's Empire of the Saint Lawrence reflects his well-known bias towards the unity of the Saint Lawrence. Like Burt, he emphasizes the idea that the Saint Lawrence was actually the best route to the interior and the "natural" outlet for the trade. The effect of the Quebec Act as a factor in confirming the belief of the Montreal traders in this theory was of great consequence for Canadian history. The belief of the Montrealers in their destiny was, as Professor Creighton points out, a key factor in determining the course of Canada's economic development.

It is hardly convenient to comment on the great mass of learned articles which have proved valuable in the course of this essay. Most of them are concerned with individual problems within the topic. A few articles offer basic interpretations of the course of British policy. They have the common fault of over-emphasizing their particular areas of research. M. S. Reid's early article on "The Quebec Fur Traders and Western Policy" suffers from a provincial outlook. Certainly the merchants did have an effect on the boundary extension of 1774, but to say that they were the deciding factor is surely an over-statement, the more so as no close specific causal link is demonstrated.

L. P. Kellogg's "Footnote to the Quebec Act" and J. M. Sosin's "The French Settlements in British Policy for the Interior" provide

an illuminating argument in favor of this aspect of the subject.

Professor Sosin's article certainly has more balance than Miss Kellogg's but one must remember that the interior settlements did not have any real effect until about 1770 and, even then, they comprised only one factor. The problems that faced Hillsborough, and later Dartmouth, were varied and the interior settlements were a minor factor until the last minute. They did provide a useful excuse for the new policy, but little else.

An earlier article by Duncan McArthur on "The British Board of Trade and Canada", in conjunction with his later writings on the period, gives a balanced view of the essential problems faced in managing the interior. He points to the consistency of the policy and is refreshingly undogmatic in his approach.

I like it
BCB

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